George Santayana's Marginalia: A Critical Selection: Abell-Lucretius

The Works of George Santayana Volume VI, Book Two Marianne S. Wokeck, Editor William G. Holzberger, Textual Editor Kristine W. Frost, Associate Editor Johanna E. Resler, Assistant Editor David E. Spiech, Assistant Textual Editor Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., Founding and Consulting Editor

This volume is dedicated, with thanks, to Mairi

Santayana’s drawing of the Virgin of the Macarena, Seville, from Thomas Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man Courtesy of Rare Books Collections, Georgetown University Library, Special Collections Research Center, Washington, D.C.

George Santayana’s Marginalia A Critical Selection Book Two: McCord — Zeller

Edited and with an Introduction by John McCormick Kristine Walters Frost, Associate Editor

The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England

© 2011 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “Introduction,” John McCormick. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopy, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American University Presses’ Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition. Manufactured in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Santayana, George, 1863–1952. George Santayana’s marginalia : a critical selection / edited and with an introduction by John McCormick. 2 v. — (The works of George Santayana ; v. 6) Includes bibliographical references. Contents: Bk. 1. Abell–Lucretius — bk. 2. McCord–Zeller. ISBN 978-0-262-01629-2 (v. 1 : hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-262-01630-8 (v. 2 : hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Philosophy. I. McCormick, John, 1918– II. Title. B945.S2 2011 191—dc22 2010052839 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials. ANSI Z39.48 1984.  ∞ ™

The Santayana Edition Marianne S. Wokeck Kristine W. Frost Martin A. Coleman Johanna E. Resler David E. Spiech Elizabeth Garmen John Joachim

Director and Editor Assistant Director and Associate Editor Associate Editor Assistant Editor Assistant Textual Editor Graduate Intern Graduate Intern

Editorial Board Hugh J. Dawson Matthew C. Flamm Morris Grossman Angus Kerr-Lawson John Lachs Richard C. Lyon

Douglas M. MacDonald John M. Michelsen Andrew J. Reck Beth J. Singer Glen Tiller Henny Wenkart

Consultants Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. William G. Holzberger

The Works of George Santayana I II III IV V

Persons and Places: Fragments of Autobiography, 1986 The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outlines of Æsthetic Theory, 1988 Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, 1989 The Last Puritan: A Memoir in the Form of a Novel, 1994 The Letters of George Santayana Book One: 1868–1909, 2001 Book Two: 1910–1920, 2002 Book Three: 1921–1927, 2002 Book Four: 1928–1932, 2003 Book Five: 1933–1936, 2003 Book Six: 1937–1940, 2004 Book Seven: 1941–1947, 2006 Book Eight: 1948–1952, 2008 VI George Santayana’s Marginalia: A Critical Selection Book One: Abell — Lucretius, 2011 Book Two: McCord — Zeller, 2011

Contents Book Two: McCord — Zeller Introduction Editorial Practice List of Authors

xi xv xix

MARGINALIA

3

Appendix: George Santayana’s Library Listed by Author Listed by Title

427 A : 1–40 T : 1–22

Introduction John McCormick In his essay “Imagination,” George Santayana wrote, “There are books in which the footnotes, or the comments scrawled by some reader’s hand in the margin, are more interesting than the text.”1 That remark might serve to define the quality of a great many of the thousands of marginalia that Santayana never scrawled, but neatly and legibly entered, in the hundreds of books he acquired over the course of a long lifetime. It is not that he was given to buying dull books, but that his comments serve to illuminate, to defy, to negate, or interestingly to expand his authors’ thought in routine or surprising or frequently delightful ways. At the same time, the marginalia offer a unique way into the processes of Santayana’s mind, a measure of his undoubted originality as philosopher, imaginative writer, critic, essayist, and as human being. We look to marginalia for indications of a writer’s development or changes of mind, for a relaxed statement in place of public formality, for unsuspected moods, passions, or enthusiasms, and for otherwise imperceptible traces of influence, prejudice, or omission. Santayana’s comments offer all that and more, even though he often insisted in letters that his thought did not develop; his claim is borne out for the most part when one pursues the marginalia over a period of years. The process at work is accretion resulting in changes of emphasis or definition of terms (see “essence,” early and late) rather than fundamental change. During his years at Harvard as student and lecturer, another kind of marginalia from the ruminative or critical occurs in passages clearly representing study or lecture notes. Such notes might be compared to a concert pianist’s interpretation of a familiar score, so that we hear it anew and vividly: thus the notes on Kant’s work. In another sense, the marginalia can be seen as Santayana’s stylebook; they show us his daily linguistic discipline, his practice in diction that salts his cogent prose. Santayana’s marginal notes are frequently surprising as his reactions change in the course of a long text. By turns he approves (although rarely), he is quirky, always critical, sometimes slangy, literary, frivolous,

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and sometimes bitchy: only that word will do. He shows full control of the American language despite his preference for British spellings. Often a generalized comment, thought, or meditation occurs on the page, set in motion by the subject at large: e.g., Bultmann, Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition (The History of the Synoptic Tradition) 11 p 110 (1:121). The effort here, then, has been to list alphabetically by author all the books extant that belonged to Santayana; to indicate where each book is located and how extensively annotated; and to reproduce a sufficient number of annotations to be of use to the reader or student of Santayana’s thought, his art, and his life. The professional writer on Santayana will of course want to go directly to the sources listed: no simple task. The bibliographical listings, as complete as can be ascertained, can answer with reasonable certitude when Santayana read a given text, from date of publication, from changes in his penmanship as he aged, and from secondary sources. In maturity, his habit was to order books from Blackwell’s, Oxford, or from the United States through his nephew and business agent, George Sturgis, or through his publisher in the United States, Charles Scribner’s Sons. He read books so ordered at once. The many books sent by aspiring writers he acknowledged courteously upon reception, so that he would not necessarily have to read them. Santayana led a wandering life from 1911, when he determined to retire from Harvard, to 1940, when he settled in Rome and where he died in 1952. As he acquired books in those peripatetic years, he would deposit them with his lifelong friend Charles Augustus Strong, first in Strong’s quarters in Paris, then in his villa, Le Balze, in Fiesole, Italy. After Santayana’s death, his literary executor, Daniel Cory, who had inherited the library, sold off many of the books in lots to various libraries in the United States, and one lot of some 300 to Blackwell’s, Oxford, which firm in turn sold them to the University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario. Because of the war and its aftermath, however, Cory had no access to Santayana’s books in Strong’s villa. Strong died in 1939; the Germans were believed to have occupied the villa and to have destroyed the contents. In 1979 Augustus Strong’s daughter, Margaret de Cuevas de Larrain, presented the villa, its contents quite undestroyed, to Georgetown University, and Santayana’s part of the library, insofar as it can be identified, has now been deposited in the Special Collections 2 section of the Lauinger Library at Georgetown University. Santayana’s wit is apparent in all his many kinds of writing, but his humor, his occasional outcry at a writer’s folly, his concern as great for

Introduction

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the niceties of English prose as for the placing of Greek accent marks, these the marginalia indicate in abundance. Reputed to be isolated, antisocial, even a recluse, although he had no such attributes, Santayana nevertheless, living by choice in celibate solitude, spent a great deal of time talking to, and talking back to, a wonderful miscellany of writers, from Spinoza to Kant to J. S. Mill to Bertrand Russell and Ezra Pound. After retiring from his Harvard professorship in 1912 and moving back to Europe, Santayana persisted in his habit of marking up the books he was reviewing or texts on subjects he was writing about. Accordingly, the present compilation might well be entitled Santayana’s Critical Marginalia. If only the flavor of those remarks registers as they deserve it should, the edition in hand will have succeeded in fulfilling the editor’s ambitions for it, and the volume will not appear as a mere compromise with the many volumes which would be necessary to publish Santayana’s marginalia in their entirety. Marginalia are customarily published in one of two ways: either in multivolume sets, faithful to every utterance and punctuation mark of the given writer; or in single volumes embracing all the marginalia of a given 3 writer on a single work. The volume in hand, obviously, does neither. It is rather an attempt to accommodate the financial realities of the day, which rule out multivolume sets, without sacrificing a reasonably extensive and usable compilation. In the same vein, marginalia already published includes Paul Grimley Kuntz’s edition of Santayana’s Harvard dissertation, Lotze’s System of Philosophy, Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1971, Appendix, 95105, and Kuntz, “Santayana and Lotze,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, Summer 1972, 115–21. In a long work occupying five years’ attention, the editor has committed many an undetected error, for which he alone is responsible. He is more indebted than brief mention can adequately express to Santayana’s former literary executrix, Mrs. Margaret Cory, for permission to print the marginalia; to Mrs. Donna Hanna-Calvert, former Associate Editor of the Santayana Edition; Brenda Bridges, former Editorial Assistant; and Johanna E. Resler, Assistant Editor. Very particular thanks go to Nicholas Scheetz and his associates in the Special Collections Division, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, and to Mrs. Susan Saunders Bellingham, Special Collections Librarian, University of Waterloo; to Susan Halpert, Reference Librarian, Houghton Library, Harvard University; to Mr. Bernard Crystal and his colleagues in the Rare Book

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and Manuscript Collection, Butler Library, Columbia University; to the Humanities Research Center, University of Texas, Austin; to the librarians of the University of York, Yorkshire; to the founding General Editor of the Santayana Edition, Professor Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., and not least to the tireless and precise work of Kristine W. Frost, Associate Editor of this volume. York, U.K. September 2007.

1

Soliloquies in England (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1922), 124. Early lists of books in the villa presumably belonging to Santayana were in fact Strong’s; such is the opinion of the librarians at the Lauinger Library, and the editor’s. 3 E.g., George Remington Havens, Voltaire’s Marginalia on the Pages of Rousseau (Columbus: The Ohio State University, 1933). 2

Editorial Practice The following enumeration of pages does not reflect the relative importance of a given work sub specie aeternitatis; the numeration of marginalia in each volume indicates only the degree of attention that Santayana paid to that specific work. The selected texts from Santayana’s personal library are listed in alphabetical order by author (or by title if the work is “edited by” rather than authored) and then, most often, by date of publication. Editions of standard writers are listed by that writer, not by the editor; e.g., Lucretius, but not Munro, editor of the edition in question. Pseudonymous works are listed by pseudonym, followed by the author’s authentic name. A work in two or more volumes is most often treated as one book; there are a few exceptions. A headnote for each text includes the author’s name in bold face type, the title of the work in italics, brief publication information (place and date), library location of the text, and the number of marginalia contained within the text (or by an indication of lack of importance in the editor’s view). Publisher or printer is not included in the headnote. Anonymous works are listed alphabetically by title. Not all marginalia within a given text have been selected for inclusion in this edition. Text is chosen for content and style. Paraphrase occurs to save space. Crucial phrases or entire passages are given in the original language other than English, followed by translation in a footnote. Translations, which are literal, not literary, are the editor’s, unless otherwise indicated. Each marginalia from a particular text is numbered consecutively, followed by the page number(s) and any other information regarding Santayana’s markings (‘marked’, ‘marked Z’, ‘underlined’, etc.) or placement (top, bottom). Santayana’s spelling and usage is maintained throughout; e.g., “every thing” (two words) for “everything.” He favored British spelling after his visit to Frank Russell’s establishment in 1887. Slips of the pencil are reproduced. His punctuation, which he knew to be uncertain in English, caused him to use colons where correctness would indicate semicolons. Single or double quotation marks are reproduced as Santayana wrote them; he was inconsistent.

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Flyleaf matter is indicated as such, but presentation messages are not considered to be marginalia. Marginalia within Santayana’s own works are not included here, since they are incorporated in the complete critical edition. Key to location of texts: Columbia Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York City Georgetown Special Collections, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Harvard Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts Le Balze Georgetown University, Villa Le Balze, Fiesole, Italy Texas Humanities Research Center, University of Texas, Austin Waterloo Rare Book and Manuscript Room, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario Key to symbols and typefaces within the edition: The reproduced text taken from a particular book is in regular tenpoint typeface from margin to margin. It is not within quotation marks, but material quoted within the selected text is so marked. Literal translations (in place of reproduced text) from another language into English are in italic typeface from margin to margin. When the text is reproduced in its original language, a translation is given in a footnote, in italic. Text which has been paraphrased by the editor is placed within double vertical bars || … || and aligned from margin to margin. Editorial comments are a smaller, nine-point size text within square brackets [ … ] and block indented. Comments or clarifying words within the text or marginalia also are placed in square brackets and in the smaller font size. Santayana’s marginalia, which normally follow a block of text, are in bold ten-point typeface and block indented. In the marginalia the bracketed question mark [?] indicates a questionable reading of Santayana’s hand.

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Footnotes immediately follow the text to which they refer within each numbered entry. Any underlined text reflects underlining done by Santayana. A single slash through a character, as well as strikethroughs and insertions (marked by inferior carets) within the reproduced text or within the marginalia itself, reflect Santayana’s markings. The term ‘marked’ indicates that Santayana drew a vertical line in the margin next to the lines of text reproduced (‘doubly marked’ indicates two vertical lines). ‘Marked X’ indicates that Santayana wrote an ‘X’ in the margin next to the text. ‘Marked Z’ indicates that he drew a wavy vertical line (probably for emphasis) next to the lines of text. ‘Underlined Z’ indicates a wavy horizontal line drawn under a word or words. The “List of Authors” on the following pages informs the reader of authors of books in Santayana’s personal library which the editor has included in this volume, whether or not they contained marginalia. Authors of books in Santayana’s library which are not included in this volume are noted at the end of the list. Book Two of George Santayana’s Marginalia contains an appendix with a complete listing of all of the works known to have been in “George Santayana’s Library.”

List of Authors Abell, Walter Acton, Harold Adam, Antoine Adam, James Aiken, Conrad Ainger, Arthur Campbell Alain [Emile Auguste Chartier] Albert, Thomas Alonso, Dámaso Amery, L[eopold] S[tennett] Ames, Van Meter Archer-Hind, R. D. [Editor] Aristotle Asín Palacios, Miguel Atkinson, Brooks Babbitt, Irving Bacon, Francis Bailey, Cyril Bailly, Auguste Bainville, Jacques Balfour, Arthur James Barbusse, Henri Baring, Maurice Barnes, William Bartlett, Alice Hunt Bates, Ernest Sutherland Bede, Cuthbert Belgion, Montgomery Benda, Julien Benn, Gottfried Berenson, Bernard Bergson, Henri Berkeley, George Beruete, Aureliano de Bevan, Edwyn Robert Bewick, Thomas Birnbaum, Martin Bishop, Elizabeth

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List of Authors

Blanshard, Brand [Editor] Bolaffio, Carlo Bolton, Isabel Bradley, F[rancis] H[erbert] Breasted, James Henry Buchheim, Karl A. [Editor] Buchler, Justus Bullett, Gerald William Bülow, Prince Bernhard von Bultmann, Rudolf Karl Burgard, Raymond Burnett, Whit and Charles E. Slatkin [Editors] Butcher, Samuel Henry Butler, Bishop Joseph Butler, Richard Caird, Edward Callimachus Calverton, V[ictor] F[rancis] Campbell, Lewis Campion, George C. Camus, Albert Carco, Francis Cardozo, Benjamin N. Carus, Paul Castelli, Enrico Castelnau, Jacques Thomas de Cavalcanti, Guido Céline, Louis-Ferdinand Chapman, John Jay Chaucer, Geoffrey Chénier, André Marie Churchill, Winston Clemens, Cyril Clifford, William Kingdon Coates, Adrian Cole, G[eorge] D[ouglas] H[oward] Coleridge, Samuel Taylor Collingwood, R[obin] G[eorge] Collis, John Stewart Colony, Horatio Confucius Corneille, Pierre Corwin, Norman Lewis Cramb, J[ohn] A[dam] Crisógono de Jesús Sacramentado

List of Authors Croce, Benedetto Crosfield, Thomas Cuneo, Niccolò Dante Alighieri Dasgupta, Surendranath Datta, Dhirendra Mohan Davenport, Russell W. Delphic Club Denifle, Henri Dewey, John Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes Dillaway, Newton Douglas, Norman Ducasse, C[urt] J[ohn] Dudley, Owen Francis du Maurier, Daphne Dunn, Robert Dunning, Ralph Cheever Durant, Will[iam] [ James] Duron, Jacques Dyer, Louis Eastman, Max [Forrester] Eaton, Charles Edward Eddington, Arthur Stanley Edman, Irwin Edwards, Jonathan Einstein, Albert [Editor] Eliot, T[homas] S[tearns] English Institute Ewing, A[lfred] C[yril] Falconi, Carlo Fargue, Léon-Paul Fichte, Johann Gottlieb Ficke, Arthur Davison Fielding, Henry Fisch, Max H. [Editor] Fletcher, Phineas Foote, Henry Wilder Frank, Philipp Frazer, James George Freud, Sigmund Frost, Robert Fuller, Benjamin Apthorp Gould Fülöp-Miller, René Furon, Raymond

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List of Authors

Garbe, Richard von García Marruz, Fina Gavin, Frank Gibson, James Gide, André Gioberti, Vincenzo Giraudoux, Jean Gobineau, Joseph Arthur (Comte de) Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von Gollancz, Victor Goodman, J[ack] R[awlin] Gordon, Hirsch Loeb Gorer, Geoffrey Gray, Thomas Green, Thomas Hill Gregory, Alyse Groethuysen, Bernhard Guénon, René Gumpert, Martin Guzzo, Augusto Hadfield, James Arthur Hamilton, William Harcourt, Robert d’ Harnack, Adolf von Heard, Gerald Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Heidegger, Martin Hemingway, Ernest Henrich, Edith Herodotus Hersch, Jeanne Hertzberg, Gustav Friedrich Hilliard, A. L. Hirn, Yrjö Hispanic Society of America Hogg, James Holmes, Pauline Holt, Edwin Bissell Homer Hone, William [Editor] Hook, Sidney Housman, A. E. Hovelaque, Emile Husserl, Edmund Inge, William Ralph

List of Authors Irazusta, Julio Jackson, Henry James, Alice James, William Jeans, James Hopwood Jeffers, Robinson Jerrold, Douglas Jiménez, Juan Ramón Johnson, Lionel Juan de la Cruz Kallen, Horace Meyer Kant, Immanuel Keith, Arthur Berriedale Kettner, Frederick Keynes, John Maynard Keyserling, Graf Hermann A. Kinney, Mary Cyril Edwin Knowles, David Knox, H. V. Korean American Cultural Association La Batut, Guy de [Editor] La Fontaine, Jean de Lamont, Corliss Langstaff, John Brett Lecky, William E. H. Le Dantec, Félix Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm Le Roy, Edouard Levy, Hermann Lietzmann, Hans Lindsay, A[lexander] D[unlop] Lippmann, Walter Locke, John Loisy, Alfred Firmin Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth Lotze, Hermann Lowell, Robert Lucian [Lucianus Samosatensis] Lucretius [Titus Lucretius Carus] McCord, David McCulloch, Hugh Machiavelli, Niccolo Macran, Frederick Walter Mallon, James J. and E. C. T. Lascelles Manacorda, Guido

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List of Authors

Mann, Thomas Manning, Hugo Maraini, Fosco Marchant, James [Editor] Maritain, Jacques Marsh, Gerald Masson, John Maxwell, William Mayberry, George [Editor] Maycock, A. L. Medici, Lorenzo de’ Meissner, Erich Meyer, Kuno Michelangelo Buonarroti Mill, John Stuart Millevoye, Charles Hubert Mins, Henry F. Moncrieff, Malcolm M. Montague, William P. Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat More, Paul Elmer Morison, Samuel Eliot Morley, Christopher Motwani, Kewal Müller, Gustav Emil Mumford, Lewis Munitz, Milton Karl Munro, Thomas Murchie, Guy Murry, John Middleton Neilson, W. A. and A. H. Thorndike Nevill, Ralph Nicolas, Marius Paul Nock, Albert Jay Ortega y Gasset, José Otto, Emil Peers, E. Allison Péguy, Charles Pierre Perry, Ralph Barton Pestalozzi Foundation of America Petrie, William Matthew Flinders Phelps, William Lyon Pilar, Princess of Bavaria and Desmond Chapman-Hutton Pizá, Pedro Antonio Plato

List of Authors Pound, Ezra Loomis Powys, Llewelyn Prezzolini, Giuseppe Privitera, Joseph Frederic Prokosch, Frederic Proust, Marcel Quinn, David B. Read, Carveth Reid, Thomas Reves, Emery Richards, I[vor] A[rmstrong] Rickert, Heinrich Rideau, Emile Rimbaud, Arthur Roback, Abraham A. Rolland, Romain Rossetti, Dante Gabriel Rousseau, Jean-Jacques Royal Asiatic Society Royal Society of Literature of the United Kingdom Royce, Josiah Runes, Dagobert D. Rush, Benjamin Russell, Bertrand Russell, David Russell, John Francis Stanley Salter, William MacKintire Sankaracarya Santayana, George Sarolea, Charles Scheler, Max Schilpp, Paul Arthur [Editor] Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. Schneider, Herbert W. Schneider, Robert E. Schofield, William H. Schopenhauer, Arthur Sebastian, Fannie B. Seidenberg, Roderick Sellars, Wilfrid and John Hospers [Editors] Semon, Richard Shaw, George Bernard Sitwell, Osbert Slochower, Harry Smart, Charles Allen

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List of Authors

Smith, Logan Pearsall Smith, Robinson Smith, Thomas V. Sophocles Soutar, William Spaulding, Edward G. Spencer, Herbert Spender, Stephen Spengler, Oswald Spinoza, Benedict Spinoza Society Spring, Henry Powell Stalin, Joseph Stanley, Carleton W. Stearns, Harold Sterne, Laurence Stevenson, Robert Louis Stickney, Trumbull Stone, Christopher Strachey, Giles Lytton Strong, Charles Augustus Sturt, Henry Cecil Sturzo, Luigi Surmelian, Leon Z. Swift, Jonathan Thalheimer, August Thomas, Lowell Jackson Thomas Aquinas Thompson, Anna Boynton Thompson, Francis Thompson, Samuel Martin Thoreau, Henry David Toy, Crawford Howell Toynbee, Arnold Joseph Twain, Mark Umfazi [Clara Urquhart] Urquhart, Clara [Editor] Vaihinger, Hans Valéry, Paul Valois, Georges Vercel, Roger Vergil [Publius Vergilius Maro] Vidal, Gore Viereck, Peter Vivante, Leone

List of Authors von Hagen, Victor Wolfgang Walden, Selma Warren, Edward Perry [pseud. ALR] Waterman, Charles Watson, John Broadus Weber, Alfred Weyl, Hermann Wheelock, John Hall Whitehead, Alfred North Whitman, Walt Williams, Oscar [Editor] Williams, William Carlos Winchester College Archaeological Society Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. Woods, James Haughton Worth, Claud Alley Wycherley, William Young, George Malcolm Zeller, Eduard Authors not included in the volume: Alexander, Samuel Bonitz, Hermann Brooks, Van Wyck Drake, Durant Fadiman, Clifton Fairbanks, Arthur Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bovier de Huysman, J.-K. Lutoslawski, Wincenty Manrique, Jorge Noli, Fan Stylian Owen, John

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Santayana’s idea of the Baron de Charlus, a major character from Marcel Proust’s A L’Ombre des Jeunes Filles en Fleurs Courtesy of Rare Books Collections, Georgetown University Library, Special Collections Research Center, Washington, D.C.

David McCord

Poet always Next But One Williamsburg, Virginia: 1951. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Hugh McCulloch Written in Florence: The Last Verses of Hugh McCulloch London: 1902. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Niccolo Machiavelli

Erotica Milano: 1924. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Frederick Walter Macran

English Apologetic Theology

London: 1905. Georgetown. Sixty-two marginalia. [Signed and dated 1905. Several passages are illegible.] 1 pp 98–99, marked

Just as a watch from the skill of its contrivance, and the elaborate construction of its mechanism, inferred an intelligent maker, so, only in a higher manner, did that vast machine the universe […] imply that it was the product of a vast and wise intelligence. I wonder if the ingenious mechanism of the artist’s mind, too, must prove another artist, and so ad infinitum. 2 p 150, marked

More dangerous [to faith than materialism], because more subtle, is that pantheistic idealism which, starting from apparently the opposite pole of thought to materialism, issues in results scarcely less hostile to religion and morals. 3 p 150, marked

||The problem of reconciling the truth of the divine immanence with that of the personality of both God and man|| can be answered […] by the assertion of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity which, while maintaining firmly the im personality of God, asserts that the nature of the Divine existence is^not^fully expressed by that term, […] He is supra-personal. If there are three persons in God God is not one person: disunity is impersonal, like humanity, though it resides, of

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course, in individuals. Individuals alone are facts. The question then becomes: Find the divine persons. 4 p 153

||The moral difficulties posed by the Old Testament anthropomorphic notions of the deity.|| But in the case of a progressive revelation, as in all other developments, we can only judge of it as a whole and with reference especially to its final goal in Tennyson and Browning . ^ ^ 5 p 165, marked

||Tennyson’s “Nature, red in tooth and claw” quoted as evidence of the evolutionists’ disparagement of the theory of Divine origin.|| Their ethics were decidedly utilitarian, and the theory of Herbert Spencer, that truths which seem to us intuitive are really an inheritance transmitted from the slowly formed habits of our forefathers, was eagerly taken up by the school of sense philosophers. A man who grasps at every sophism supporting his prejudices naturally thinks his opponents will do likewise. 6 p 169, underlined

||Paradoxically, evolution has affirmed man’s dignity and made his position as the crown of creation more certain than previously.|| It further proves […] that on this earth, as it now exists, there can never be a higher creature than man, and thus goes a long way towards restoring to him that place as the head and crown of creation, of which science since the days of the Copernican theory, to say nothing of the various forms of materialism, had tended to deprive him. ! 7 p 169, marked

Finally, the development of personality and character is seen to go hand in hand with that of the religious consciousness, and man can read in his own constitution and possibilities the assurance of his own immortality. Can twiddle twaddle do and escape whipping? 8 p 173

||Macran finds a relationship between Christianity and the cosmic.|| What has Christianity ever had to do with “the cosmic”? 9 p 187, underlined

||Tennyson described as|| the great poet and thinker […]. Hurrah!

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10 p 193, underlined

Champions, however, were not wanting for the defence of the doctrine of the incarnation, and the creed of Nice, at this critical juncture. Does he think it was at the Riviera? How English!1 1

The creed of Nicaea was proclaimed in A.D. 325 at that city in Asia Minor, not at Nice on the Riviera. 11 p 204, marked

It may thus be quite true that, while Cerinthus and the Ebionites held humanitarian notions concerning the Person of Jesus, Theodotus and Artemon were the first heretics who denied the Divinity of Christ. If this view of the belief of the primitive Church be accepted, Priestley’s theory, that Christian dogma originated in the influence of the Platonic philosophy upon the faith of the early Church, falls at once to the ground. [From “If this view”:]

Suavity and the desire to deceive are real gifts in the clergy. Of course, Greek philosophy admitted the divinity of the intellect and of the god, but why say these were in Jesus in particular? That was the christian and new element in Gnosticism. They were christians by accident. 12 p 211, underlined

[Fairbairn, Christ in Modern Theology, p. 17, quoted:]

“[…] a strange and significant thing: so much speculation about Christ, so little earnest inquiry into His actual mind; […].” As if Christ had an “actual mind”! Conceive a psychology of the Holy Ghost and his hot feelings when his lineage from both Father and Son is called into question! 13 pp 218–19

||Macran lists at length the achievements of modern theology, saying that one can look to it|| […] for the presence with us of a Divine Spirit and Person; for that sacrifice was not merely the assurance of Divine forgiveness, but contained in its bosom the seed which was to blossom forth in a regenerated and purified humanity :of the time of King ^ Edward VII . ^ 14 p 237

[On the moral excellence of Christ:]

If, as we mark the ascent of the soul in piety and holiness, we invariably notice that the sense of sin is deepened and the experience of contrition is more marked, […].

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Didn’t Jesus see through “sin” altogether? In a clear mind repentance is only sadness, and one is nothing but the “son of man”. 15 p 241, marked Z

[Charles Gore, Bampton Lectures, p. 169, quoted approvingly:]

In past ages, “the versatility and intellect of the Greeks, the majestic discipline of the Romans, the strong individuality of the Teutons—each in turn has been able to find its true ideal in Jesus of Nazareth, […].” Bosh! 16 pp 251–52, marked

For in our age men are more logical in their deductions, and more determined to draw inferences and extend the circle of results contained in any primary truth or idea. Listen to this. 17 p 262, marked

[A quotation from Edward Caird, Evolution of Religion, Vol. II, p. 222:]

“While the individual influence is very limited in its operation, and the bare universal is like a disembodied soul that has lost the power of action in the finite world, the individual who is regarded as the organ of a universal principle […] which has incarnated itself for perception or imagination in an individual life, takes hold upon man by both sides of his nature, and works with irresistible force upon all his thought and life.” This is good. When a man has a certain talent, as the Master of Balliol has, it comes out even through the mists of a perverse phraseology. 18 p 267, underlined and marked

The great texts which assert the Deity of our Lord or His oneness with the Father may be forced into statements of the Divine immanence which found in Him its highest manifestation, and thus be deprived of all their significance. It would seem then advisable […] to direct attention rather to statements concerning the office, than those with regard to the Person, of Christ. Thus, He claims to stand in a peculiar ! relation to ^^ the human race as the Son of Man. It seems to me plain, when I read the gospel, that Jesus was a person who saw through myths, even when he had to use them, and that his intuitions we[re] more, not less, “rationalistic” than those of the philosophers. He knew

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what he was talking about when he said “The Father” etc. The prophets had meant something, too. 19 p 271

||Macran ventures that half a century after his death was necessary for the transformation of Jesus into Christ, the Messiah.|| Three weeks would suffice. These good people have evidently no experience of a “religious” atmosphere. They should read the Lives of the Saints, or hear the pious gossip about a convent. 20 pp 272–73

||The Jews had no reason to think that Jesus would be born of a virgin.|| At least this would seem to be the case, judging from the dialogue of Justin Martyr with the Jew Trypo, when he endeavours to prove to the latter that the “prophecy had been spoken not with reference to Hezekiah as ye were taught, but to this my Christ”. What a world these Jews and Christians lived in! What assumptions! What standards! 21 p 274, marked

||Pagan links to the accounts of Christ|| have been adduced, such as the Buddhist legend, are not by any means so close as is sometimes supposed, and really bear a stronger resemblance to the stories contained in the apocryphal gospels than to the narrative of our Lord’s birth as contained in St. Matthew and St. Luke. There are connecting links. 22 p 299, underlined and marked

Paley, the one great theologian of that epoch [the 18th century], was a disciple of the school of sense philosophy, a Utilitarian, if not a Hedonist, in his ethics, […]. “Cindy, don’t be vulgar.” [End-papers:]

Things learned from this book. 1. The incorruptible nature of parsons. 2. That Newman was, and remained, a disciple of Butler, and that both made the “conscience”, which they didn’t venture to disentangle, an avenue to the supernatural. A comparison with Kant’s “Practical Reason” here suggests itself.

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3. That the High Church party, in building up its defences again, has not thought of their foundation, but that its apparent return to catholic doctrine is a merely literary and pietistic pose. The whole pantheistic and evolutionist doctrine has been let in underneath, only an exception, honoris causa,1 being made for the person of Christ. 4. That the contradiction between creation and redemption is not yet perceived, but is horribly troublesome none the less, the incarnation (both philosophical and traditional) being made, as far as possible, a substitute for both doctrines. But in orthodox doctrine it is not a substitute but a link. (over) 5. That religion is always several thousand years behind conscience. Personal immortality, that flatulent exaggeration of selfishness, is called the “chief hope of mankind”, in an age when unselfishness is the virtue best felt and best practised. 1

For reason of honor.

James J. Mallon and E. C. T. Lascelles

Poverty Yesterday & Today

London: 1930. Waterloo. Three marginalia. 1 p 85, marked

||The measure used to define poverty is a very low standard.|| 2 p 94, marked

Family Endowment cannot fail to interest anyone whose object is the reduction of poverty. Guido Manacorda

Benedetto Croce, ovvero: Dell’improntitudine Firenze: 1933. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Thomas Mann

Der Zauberberg Erster Band. Berlin: 1930. Georgetown. Six marginalia.

[Marginalia are principally translations of words or phrases.]

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1 p 58, marked

Dem einzelnen Menschen mögen mancherlei persönliche Ziele, Zwecke, Hoffnungen, Aussichten vor Augen schweben, aus denen er den Impuls zu hoher Anstrengung und Tätigkeit schöpft; wenn das Unpersönliche um ihn her, die Zeit selbst der Hoffnungen und Aussichten bei aller äusseren Regsamkeit im Grunde entbehrt, wenn sie sich ihm als hoffnungslos, aussichtlos und ratlos heimlich zu erkennen gibt und der bewusst oder unbewusst gestellten, aber doch irgendwie gestellten Frage nach einem letzten, mehr als persönlichen, unbedingten Sinn aller Anstrengung und Tätigkeit ein hohles Schweigen entgegensetzt, so wird gerade in Fällen redlicheren Menschentums eine gewisse lähmende Wirkung solches Sachverhalts fast unausbleiblich sein, […].1 Style & philosophy slump together. [Santayana’s comment may be unfair. Mann gives us Hans Castorp’s meandering reflections, meandering in part because he suffers the constant fever of a man slowly dying of tuberculosis; hence “slump.” But if the comment describes Mann’s own style, it is mistaken, surely.] 1

To the solitary man, various personal aims, purposes, hopes and prospects might dangle before the eye, prospects in which to find the impulse to greater striving and achievement. But with impersonality all about him, and according to all signs the time itself of hopes and prospects were lacking, when those signs made it clear to him that they were hopeless, unpromising and hidden, and some manner of known or unknown question posed, after a final, more than personal, unconditional sense of all striving and activity were opposed by a hollow silence, so directly in the instance of honest humanity a certain paralyzing consequence of such circumstances virtually constant ….

Hugo Manning

The Crown and the Fable: A Poetic Sequence London: 1950. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Fosco Maraini

Segreto Tibet Bari: 1951. Waterloo. Eight marginalia.

1 p 116, marked

||The relationship between westerners and the Tibetans is compared to high officials at the circus; they the circus, we the onlookers.|| Dante, Bach, the Roman Empire, the renaissance, Shakespeare, Leonardo, the Gothic cathedrals, St. Francis? Only the slightest impression; but a Kodak, how portentous! 2 p 176, marked

[An extract from sacred Tibetan scripture:]

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Ho pietà di colui che non sa liberarsi dal proprio egoismo, nella città incendiata dei desideri […].1 I pity him who is not free from / His own ego, / In the burning city of desires ….

1

3 Table 50

So once the starlight drank the fire of love And spirit knew the flesh that it was of. Jacques Maritain

Art et scolastique Paris: 1927. Waterloo. Thirty-four marginalia.

1 p 14

[Summary and critique:]

Is the separation of entelechies from their organs countenanced by Aristotle? All this is a view of the forest from the air, and [illegible] the roots. All habits are habits in matter, though they may be sciences & arts of the spirit. 2 p 19

||Manual dexterity has no part in art; it is only a material, extrinsic quality.|| Art being a good, the agility is not more than a means to the pre-ordained degree of excellence. You may trill too much. 3 p 31, underlined

||The scholastics saw the virtue of the artificer not as muscle work or suppleness of fingers. It was no more than pure empirical agility|| which is formed in the memory and in the animal reason, which imitates art and dont l’art a absolument besoin.1 This ought to be looked up, to see how near the Aristotelians come to recognising the genetic order of things. 1

Which art absolutely needs.

4 p 36, underlined

La beauté est essentiellement objet d’intelligence, car ce qui connaît—au sense plein du mot, c’est l’intelligence, qui seule est ouverte a l’infinité de l’être.1 Intuition not understanding, because there is no reference to the not-given, no animal faith concerned in this

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“intellection”. The point is the beauty is an essence & can lodge only in essences. 1

Beauty is essentially an object of intelligence, for whoever understands—in the full sense of the word, it is the intelligence which alone is open to the infinity of being. 5 pp 36–37, marked

[…] our intelligence is not so intuitive as that of the angels; […] only the sensitive understanding perfectly possessed in man is required for the perception of beauty. Thus man may doubtless enjoy purely intelligible beauty, but the beautiful co-natural to man is that which comes from the delectation of the intelligence by sense and intuition. Such, also, is the distinctive beauty of our art, which operates through tangible matter to cause joy to the mind. He would also thus believe that paradise is not lost. He has the taste for an earthly paradise, the peace and delight simultaneously of the intelligence and the senses. Excellent. 6 p 39

[Santayana’s gloss:]

What a pity that an actual correspondence with spirit should be attributed to an origin in spirit! As if spirit were matter, power, or potentiality, and not the actuality & fruition of everything else. 7 p 45fn1, underlined

Ajoutons, s’il s’agit de la “lisibilité” de l’oeuvre, que si l’éclat de la forme peut paraître dans une oeuvre “obscure” comme dans une oevure “claire”, l’éclat du mystére peut paraître dans une oeuvre “claire” aussi bien que dans une oeuvre “obscure”.1 “Phèdre!” 2 1

Let us add that if it is a question of the “readability” of a work, if the brilliance of the form may appear in an “obscure” work just as in a “clear” work, the brillance of the mystery may appear in a “clear” work just as well as in an “obscure” one. 2 Santayana’s favorite play, which he tells us he recited to himself when, in old age, he slept little. 8 p 46, marked

||On the attributes of beauty in a work of art|| […] it is the reflection on those attributes of a man’s thought or of a divine thought; it is above all the splendor of the soul which shows through, of the soul, principle of life and of animal energy, or the principle of spiritual life, of pain and of passion. The Psyche well understood.

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9 p 49, underlined

Dieu est beau. Il est beau par lui-même et en lui-même, beau absolument.1 Pure Being is absolutely fitted for intuition, each essence being so, & all their external relatives. 1

God is beautiful. He is beautiful by himself and in himself, beautiful absolutely.

10 p 52, underlined

As soon as one touches upon the transcendental, one touches upon l’être1 itself, upon a likeness of God, upon an absolute […]. Pure being, i.e. essence. 1

Being .

11 p 99

[Santayana’s gloss:]

In the senses usually employed in action essence is unsatisfying; the psyche requires truth. This is a practical man’s prejudice. Beauty, in nature and in pure art, is non-significance. 12 p 119, marked

||Christianity does not make art easy, but while it raises difficulties, it solves others, and makes known hidden beauties.|| 13 p 181, underlined

||God prefers the charity of one soul to the greatest works of art.|| […] les âmes, sa nourriture à lui, la pâture de son amour.1 How sentimental the axiom of the democracy of spirit becomes in modern Catholicism! 1

… souls, his best and only nourishment, the pasture of his love.

Jacques Maritain

Réflexions sur l’intelligence et sur sa vie propre Paris: 1930 (3rd edition). Waterloo. 126 marginalia.

1 p 20, underlined

Je peux savoir par la raison que Dieu existe, mais à condition de partir de l’être que je touche et je vois.1 i.e. in animal perception, not in intuition. 1

I may know by reason that God exists, but on condition that such knowledge is apart from the being that I touch and see. 2 p 21, marked

[On the conception of Being:]

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Pure Being = the Realm of Essence: as for Existence, it is many, essentially because in flux. 3 p 25, underlined

J’ai parlé de la vérité de à l’intelligence. L’intelligence est vraie, selon qu’elle juge la chose comme elle est. Mais les choses aussi sont vraies, selon qu’elles sont conformes à l’intelligence dont elles dépendent:1 […]. Translate: Things are true (there is a truth of things) as they possess essence. 1 I have spoken about the the truth of the intelligence. Intelligence is true according to how it judges the thing as it is. But things are also true, according to how they conform with the intelligence on which they depend.

4 pp 37–38, marked

Nietzsche’s madness is the consummation in a human body of everything awry in the spirit since Luther and Descartes. He was a lamentable victim! A great and generous writer who foundered in dementia because he wanted, in order to live, to improve on the truth. After believing that he could regenerate the world by the suppression of the ascetic ideal, and possessing a lively hatred for christianity, he wrote a madman’s letters, signed THE CRUCIFIED, believing himself to be at the same time the Antichrist and the successor to Christ […]. 5 p 41, marked Z

[Maritain quotes I. J. Marechal, Le Point de depart de la Métaphysique, cahier II, 1923, p. 78.] [L]e “contenu objectif de la conscience considéré en lui-même, abstrac-

tion faite de son inhérence à un sujet psychologique et de sa valeur représentative d’un objet ontologique, le contenu de conscience considéré comme objet phénoménal.” 1 Almost essence but not quite, since “content of consciousness” is an adventitious circumstance. 1

The “objective content of the consciousness considered in itself, an abstraction made of its inherence in a psychological subject and of its representative value as an ontological object; the content of consciousness considered as a phenomenal object.” 6 p 45

[Santayana’s gloss:]

Given essences are terms, not objects, in perception or opinion. They become objects only in pure intuition, if this fills the mind. 7 p 48–49, marked

Descartes et Kant se sont trompés de même, parce qu’ils ont conçu la connaissance, et en particular la connaissance intellectuelle, qui est ce

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qu’il y a de plus élevé dans la nature, secundum modum infimarum creaturarum, quæ sunt corpora, parce qu’ils ont confondu les choses du connaître avec les choses de l’action transitive.1 Which transitive action is only the physical basis of knowledge. 1

Descartes and Kant were both wrong, because they conceived of intellectual knowledge, which is the highest order in nature, to be the second mode in low beings, which are bodies, because they confounded things [objects] of knowledge with those of transitive action. 8 p 58

[Summary:]

Essence defined in intuition. Intuition is not knowledge. 9 p 62, marked

||God, according to Cajetan on Aquinas’s Summa, has endowed us with certain kinds of perfection.|| Life is the deity that has worked this miracle. 10 p 67, marked

||Post-Kantian commentators on Aquinas believed consciousness derived from an automatic process.|| [Santayana summarizes:]

Imagery without intelligence. 11 p 68

[Santayana’s free translation of St. Thomas, de Veritate, I, 3:] Description is on a different plane—the spiritual plane— from existence. But it is true description—partakes of truth—when it borrows the essence of the thing and asserts

it of that thing. 12 pp 73–74, marked

||Kant was correct to wish, contrary to Hume and Leibniz, to restore the progressive and “synthetic” movement of reason. Of synthetic judgments a priori,|| he searched in them for the full law and complete regulation in the subject and its alleged forms a priori, rather than believing them to reside completely in the object […]. 13 p 74, marked

[Of Maritain’s phrase, “spontanéité vitale”:]

Very good: the only true spontaneity of mind is curiosity—desire to discover the object.

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14 p 148, marked

Nous rendons grâces à Pascal d’avoir rappelé à tant de baptisés en partance pour les paradis de la science humaine, et à certains théologiens qui plaquent les vertus chrétiennes sur l’homme de la nature comme un peu d’or sur du cuivre, que ce n’est pas une chose plus ou moins difficile, comme d’être un Archimède ou un César, mais bien une chose entièrement impossible à la seule nature que d’être chrétien: ex Deo natus. Nous lui rendons grâces d’avoir affirmé magnifiquement la surnaturalité de la foi. C’est à la lumière de cette doctrine qu’il faut considérer les Pensées.1 What Cory means by “supernatural”.2 But being Christian is horribly human. The irrational force in conversion or faith is an animal force, common to all religions and all madmen. 1

We give thanks to Pascal for having recalled to so many of the baptized leaving for the paradise of human science, and to certain theologians who plate Christian virtues on natural man rather like gold on copper, that it is not so difficult to be an Archimedes or a Caesar, but something entirely impossible to the solely natural as to be a Christian, born of God. We thank him for having magnificently affirmed the supernaturalism of the faith. It is in the light of this doctrine that we must consider the Pensées. 2 Daniel Cory, Santayana’s literary executor, read proofs and did occasional jobs for Santayana while regarding himself as a philosopher and viveur. 15 p 199, underlined

||Physical reality, which is the subject matter of natural science|| is observed, weighed, measured, and noted; then it is translated into algebraic symbols: but it is not sue,1 in respect to its physical reality. i.e. it’s intrinsic essence is not specified. Can the essence of matter in existence be specified? 1

Known.

16 p 200, marked

||Moderns investigating matter|| continuent pourtant de l’appeler «science,» parce que ce qui leur importe ce n’est pas ce qui importait aux Anciens: la conquête intellectuelle et spéculative de la vérité procurée à des hommes libres par des qualités perfectionnant leur intelligence et surélevant intrinsèquement leur humanité; mais c’est avant tout, depuis Bacon et Descartes, la conquête pratique du monde sensible, pour la béatitude temporelle du genre humain, qui usant de méthodes automatiquement infaillibles, s’emploiera à dompter la matière et les forces physiques,—(et qui par là même augmentera indéfiniment sa

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dépendance à l’égard de celles-ci, et entrera sous la loi de fer du factibile matériel).1 [At top:]

Quote in Americanism This is all true, but expressed unamiably. The quality expressed in modern reflexion is not cognitive dogmatically, but aesthetic and emotional. We are satisfied with practice and poetry. 1 … moreover continue to name their activity “science,” because what concerns them is not that which concerned the ancients: the speculative and intellectual conquest of truth, procured for free men through qualities which made perfect their intelligence and intrinsically elevating their humanity. But since Bacon and Descartes above all, the moderns would conquer the sensible world for the temporal beatitude of the human race, using methods automatically infallible, and would control matter and physical forces,—(and in consequence would indefinitely increase their dependence on those forces, and would subscribe to the factitious iron law of materiality).

17 p 200, underlined

Or la «Physique» des modernes, si elle ne nous apprend rien sur l’être de son objet, sur la nature de la réalité physique comme telle, nous met en état d’utiliser merveilleusement cette réalité; aussi pour ceux qui jugent des choses au point de vue utilitaire et pratique, mérite-t-elle par excellence le nom de «science».1 1 Now modern “Physics,” if it teaches us nothing about the being [or essence] of its object concerning the nature as such of physical reality, permits us wonderfully well to use that reality; for those who judge things from the point of view of utility and practicality, it superbly merits the name of “science.”

18 p 205, marked

[…] when we set out in quest of verifying experimentally if two masses are or are not equal, we do not know at the outset, or by another method, what it is that constitutes equality. The verification itself must be intuitive. The essence is given both to thought and to sense. N.B. as if that didn’t touch the substance of things. 19 p 218

[Santayana summarizes and comments on a long footnote relating to P. Langevin, La Physique depuis vingt ans: ]

Intuition of time in eternity fixes the order of time: does it create that order? No: then that order lies in the events themselves.

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20 p 222, marked

||Maritain considers Einsteinian relativity in space-time with reference to simultaneity of thought between two minds.|| […] I am in the presence of a major event, unknown until now, the relativity of identity. Each system of reference has its own truth; and it is not even possible to conceive of a thought that is what it is independently of a system of reference. What I think varies with the relative speed of the apparatus that registers thought […]. Capital. But while the essences of thought are determinate, the essences of instants are identical. All, therefore, in pure time, are the same instant! 21 p 252, marked

||On Einstein’s concept of time; it is not mathematical:|| separated from things and independent of all real movement, from rational mechanics, but it is none the less real time, the time of the philosophy of nature or of physics in the Aristotelian sense of the word, the continuity of impermanence in movement […]. 22 p 252, marked

All that reminds one that Einsteinian physics is a mathematics of phenomena based on an integral empiricism. 23 p 253, marked

||It would be ridiculous not to admire Einstein’s scientific work. It is the end-product of the research of Maxwell, Lorentz, and Poincaré, and of the entire secular effort in modern quantum physics.|| 24 p 298, marked

||Of the Thomist idea of man; Kant and Rousseau were anomalies.|| Man an omnipotent spirit in chains! 25 p 307, marked

||Rousseau confounded pessimism with Christian dogma, and rationalism with art and civilization. But as for Aquinas, the love of God which infuses and creates the good in all things|| inclines toward all existence because all that exists is good exactly in its place; an optimistic metaphysical formula to which, this time, it is Rousseau who would counter [with] the motto of romantic pessimism: […]. Everything would be good if it were perfect after its kind: but nothing is. Thus the two maxims can be reconciled. Is this, I wonder, what you are going to say?

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26 p 310, underlined

||Maritain represents as Manichean|| certains grands artistes modernes, comme Baudelaire ou Oscar Wilde. ! 27 p 325, marked

||Thomist and modern idealism contrasted in terms of mental activity and spontaneity.|| While Kant affirms mental activity only in the course of destroying objectivity, because he has in view only fabricated activity, Thomism, because it sees mental activity truly immanent and truly vital, makes the objectivity of the understanding reason itself and the purpose [fin] of its activity. Aristotle is a moralist in metaphysics. 28 p 326

||Thomism “drains” modern idealism insofar as the interiority of consciousness is concerned. The Thomists say|| que l’intelligence est une faculté attirant les choses à soi d’une façon parfaite, «perfecte trahens res ad se ».1 That is, things are conceived as their essences: the matter is accidental to their “being”. Yet makes possible their existence. This existence, however, ought to be included in the “thing”. 1

… that intelligence is a faculty that draws things to itself in a perfect manner.

Jacques Maritain

Sept leçons sur l’être, et les premiers principes de la raison spéculative Paris: n.d. (c. 1933–34). Waterloo. 151 marginalia.

1 p 14, marked Z

Progress by substitution is appropriate to the natural sciences; it is their law. The more purely they realize their type, the greater their progress. But that progress is not the law of wisdom. Its progress is a progress of deepening, of progress by adhesion and of the most profound union, of increasing intimacy. Good science does this too. 2 p 26, marked

||The idea that existence does not exist is not a contradiction,|| because the word existencia, the concept that the name of existence designates existence itself from the point of view of essence, insofar as it has a certain intelligible density, a certain source [foyer] of intelligible determination, is existentia ut significata [existence as signified], as apprehended in a concept […].

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The essence of existence is a definition: essence caught in non-essential relations. This does not exist except when exemplified. 3 p 33

||Maritain quotes St. Thomas on necessity and on knowledge or cognition.|| Poor stuff. 4 p 34

||It is an error of many contemporaries who confound being [être]||, le sens commun et les sciences de la nature,1 ||with metaphysics.|| Etre = substance rather than essence. 1

… common sense and natural science, ….

5 p 37

[Santayana tersely paraphrases:]

Animal faith excited by sense-data. 6 p 41

Terms. “Being” or “reality” as a mere term. Logic, according to this, treats of terms only, not of essences. It is properly only a grammar. 7 p 42, underlined

||Pure Being is not a substance.|| Voilà la différence entre l’être du logicien et celui du métaphysicien, il est considéré là dans l’esprit […].1 There is an equivocation here. The terms, in their essence, are not “in the mind”: they exist only as objects of thought—as non-existent objects. 1 There lies the difference between the logician’s Being and the metaphysician’s; it is considered in the mind ….

8 p 46 note 1, underlined

[Aquinas on what Maritain calls the old meaning of the term, dialectic, in which Aquinas distinguishes between dialectic and philosophy.]

Dialecticus auter circa omnia prædicta procedit ex probabilibus; unde non facit scientiam, sed quamdam opinionem. Et hoc ideo est, quia ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturæ. Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quæ quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur.1 [At consequuntur:]

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i.e. are attained. If you see “yellow” it would mean that intent creates essence when it selects it: which would defeat all dialectic since it would have no constant terms. 1

Dialectic, however, in all predictions proceeds from the probable, thus it does not produce knowledge, but mere opinion. This idea derives from the two-fold nature of being: obviously, rational being and natural being. Being, however, is properly said to be rational by intention, as if reason found things by reflection, and the purpose of genera, species and the like were not found in the nature of things, but resulted from human thought. 9 p 54, underlined

||Concerning intuition:|| […] dans un moment d’émotion décisive et comme de feu spirituel l’âme est en contact vivant, transverbérant, illuminateur, avec une réalité qu’elle touche […].1 Is there any such rot as this in St. Thomas? 1 … in a moment of decisive emotion and like a spiritual fire, the soul is in living contact, reverberating, alight with a tangible reality ….

10 p 55, underlined

||More concerning intuition: Intelligence and the concept of being [être] respond to such rat-like intuition [as above, 9 p 54].|| […] il faut toute la métaphysique non seulement faite mais à faire et dans toute sa croissance future pour savoir ce que contient de richesses virtuelles le concept d’être.1 Are you talking of the universe? 1 … all metaphysics already known but also to be known, as well as complete future faith are necessary in order to realize the potential richness of the concept of being.

11 pp 56–57

||On the relationship between spirituality, intellect, and readiness to recognize metaphysical and natural reality.|| This is a notion of a divine plan or will behind the natural world; something truly “metaphysical and oracular”. It is not the object of philosophy but only of the metaphysics of the Socratic school. 12 p 61

||Of the perception of the ineffable:|| Here we come to the first root of the whole of intellectual life, discovered finally in itself. Do you mean animal faith, the assertiveness of living mind?

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13 p 74, underlined and marked Z

[Santayana criticizes Maritain:]

[…] (dès que je réfléchis sur l’être, je le vois clivé en types d’être qui diffèrent selon tout leur être: être créé et être incréé, être substantiel et être accidentel); mais encore, en vertu de sa structure essentielle elle-même, le concept de l’être enveloppe en lui d’une manière indissociable, à tous les degrés de sa polyvalence […] les deux termes liés et associés de la dualité essence-existence, […].1 [To “elle-même”:]

No criticism of grammar or myth. [At “termes liés”:]

Only if by being we mean existent being. 1 … (as soon as I reflect on being, I see it cleaved into types of being which differ according to their accidental make-up: created being and uncreated being, substantial being and accidental being; but again , by virtue of its essential structure, the concept of being contains in itself an inseparable manner, in all the degrees of its versatility, the two terms implicit in and associated with the duality essence-existence.

14 p 75

[Reconciliation:]

[…] l’essence et l’existence, qui hors de notre esprit sont réellement distinctes.1 You come out all right, but after some confusion. 1

… essence and existence, apart from our minds, are really distinct.

15 p 76, underlined

[…] toute chose est bonne (métaphysiquement bonne, nous ne parlons pas ici du bien moral), toute chose est bonne ou propre à être aimée, à être l’objet d’un amour, dans la mesure même où elle est.1 [At “bonne”:]

say perfect. 1 … everything is good (metapysically good; here we are not discussing moral good), everything is good or proper to be loved, to be an object of love, in the exact measure that it is [exists].

16 pp 76–77

[Santayana’s generalized comment:]

norm. But all being hasn’t such a norm; and the propulsion of existence is not growth. Here the discussion has ceased to be generative: we do not approach the doctrine with reasons; it is explained to us by authority: we are told what we ought to think. Another doctor would tender us something different.

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17 p 77

||The Thomists follow the words of St. Thomas Aquinas:|| “Every form follows an inclination”; they say that is a truth evident in itself to which the metaphysical intuition of being applies. This is the consequence of the Socratic origin of “metaphysics”. The good explains the real.1 1

See Santayana’s comment to 11 pp 56–57, above.

18 p 78

[Santayana paraphrases a turgid paragraph of Maritain’s:]

Sympathy with existence (& motion) is natural to life, because it excites: cf. children. But it very easily turns to hate when it over-excites or hurts. 19 p 84

||The idea of being implies movement toward desired perfection.|| […] wherever there will be an inclination in the entire universe of things which are not God, and which need to perfect themselves in some fashion,—and above all in the material world, a place metaphysically indigent,—there will be movement, change. Myth with a vengeance. 20 p 84, underlined

||Two theories of movement were classically opposed: that of Heraclitus and that of Parmenides.|| C’est cette distribution de l’être sur […] ces deux plans, acte et puissance, sont eux-mêmes essentiellement analogues, c’est d’une manière analogue que les notions d’acte et de puissance se réalisent en ceci et en cela.1 Cf. Heidegger, “Je”. 1 It is this distribution of being … according to two plans, action and power, which are in themselves essentially analogous, it is in an analogous manner that the notions of action and power are realized in this and that.

21 p 85

[Sub-chapter: Extensive and Intensive Visualisation.]

We have here simply the accession to the order of the intelligible and the universal in general; […]. “cows” 22 p 85

After that a second step must come: the accession to the order of universal type and of essential intelligibility, in which the typical form is expressly unmasked and clear. “the cow”

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23 p 93, top

Scholasticism is myth denuded of poetry and reduced to grammar. 24 p 94

Excellent: metaphysics is pure intellectual fiction. 25 p 109

Rationalistic axiom: All being must be open to thought. 26 p 110, top

That all Being is “true” is known by definition, truth being the description of existence. But it does not follow that all Being is intelligible, or all truth rational: the surds are true too and intellect must bow to them. Power is before truth. 27 p 111, underlined

[…] l’essence de Dieu est raison de son existence, on dit qu’il est a se, il est à lui-même la propre raison de son esse, la raison de son existence, parce que son essence est précisément d’exister.1 ou plutôt de connaître, être esprit.2 1

… the essence of God is the reason of His existence; one says that He is unto Himself, He in Himself the pure reason of His Being, the reason of His existence, because His essence is precisely to exist. 2 Or rather to know, to be spirit. 28 p 111, marked

||Descartes was wrong to oppose divine existence with the doctrine of efficient cause.|| Quelle philosophie rampante! L’existence divine est infiniment plus que cela, elle est acte d’intellection, c’est une existence de connaissance ou d’intellection, c’est pourquoi dire que Dieu existe n’est pas énoncer un simple fait empirique ni une simple position, même nécessaire, mais une éternelle justification intelligible, une éternelle et infinie satisfaction d’une infinie exigence intelligible, une plénitude infinie de repos pour l’intelligence.1 Yes: a hypostasis of the satisfaction of seeing necessity in things. But this is sophistical, because existence is necessarily contingent and unintelligible. 1

What a crawling philosophy! Divine existence is infinitely more than that. It is the act of intellection, it is existence in knowledge or intellection, it is why to say that God exists is not to enunciate a simple empirical fact nor a simple position, however necessary, but an eternal, intelligible justification, an infinite plenitude of repose for the mind.

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29 p 112, underlined

||God’s knowledge of Himself: in knowing Himself,|| il se veut, il s’anime,1 […]. The universal Narcissus. 1

He wills Himself, He animates Himself.

30 p 112, marked Z

It is possible to reduce the principle of the reason of Being to the principle of identity: by reduction to the absurd. There is a reason for everything, because philosophers look for some reason for some things! 31 p 113

If the truth be the standard of rationality, everything is reasonable. But the truth is contingent. 32 p 114

[…] le principe de raison ne joue nulle part plus magnifiquement que dans le cas du libre arbitre.1 “Free will” is a moral not a physical indetermination. It is a physical determination on grounds morally insufficient. 1

The principle of reason plays no part more magnificently than in the case of free will. 33 p 116

[Santayana’s comment on Maritain’s scholastic logic:]

A caused being must have a cause! 34 p 128

||On the distinction between action and agent:|| It is clear that if an agent brings about a certain action, produces a certain effect, there exists a reason of being; that is to say, it is determined before the action has produced one effect and not another. We come to see—it is the principle of finality—that the agent has an order, which is an appetite or a love, it has a relation to such a good or it perfects itself or otherwise, which is its action. Le feu parfait le bois en le brûlant?1 1

The fire perfects the wood by burning it?

35 p 128, underlined

||Hydrogen and oxygen are related in producing water,|| qui est leur essence même,1 […].

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Not their essence: because if there were no O, water would not be produced (or desired) by H. It is part of the truth about H & O in this world. 1

Which is their very essence.

36 p 128–29, marked Z

Poursuivons cette suite de réflexions. Peut-il y avoir une relation ou un ordre entre deux choses qui ne sont en aucune manière, entre deux néants, ou bien entre une chose qui est et une chose qui n’est pas? Pour qu’existe la relation ou l’ordre entre deux termes il faut que ces termes en rapport soient là tous les deux; il faut donc que l’effet ou l’action soit là de quelque manière pour que l’agent s’y trouve déterminé, ordonné, ou enclin. Qu’est-ce que cela veut dire? Il faut que l’action ou l’effet soit là avant d’être produite ou réalisée.1 Scholasticism at its worst. 1

Let us pursue these reflections. Is it possible to have a relation or an order between two things that do not exist in any manner, between two zeros, or even between one thing that exists and one that does not? In order for a relation to exist between two terms, it is necessary that both terms be in rapport; the effect or action must in some way be such that an agent may find it determined, ordered, or so inclined. What does that mean? It is necessary that the action or effect be present before being achieved or realized. 37 p 130, top

We name fire; the name connotes what fire does. Therefore fire could not have acquired its properties unless it had been first conceived to connote them, and so named FIRE. 38 p 130, marked Z

Mais poser cette chose que je nomme feu c’est précisément poser un ordre, une préordination ou une détermination radicale à l’action de brûler, action conçue par une pensée comme à produire, à accomplir par cette chose-là.1 N.B. Cf. note above. 1

To set forth this thing which I call fire is exactly to set forth an order, a preordination or a radical determination in the action of burning, an action conceived by a thought to bring about, to accomplich that particular thing. 39 pp 130–31, underlined

You see that we may well say that if the bird flies it is because it has wings, because it is a bird. Mais qu’est-ce qu’être oiseau? C’est précisément être ordonné à voler, et violà le fond du principe de finalité.1

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To be fit to do that which you are fit to do is true teleology. 1 But what is it to be a bird? It is exactly to be organized to fly, and there lies the basis of the principle of finality.

40 p 132

||Maritain’s involved, mystical statement of the nature of God’s love.|| He loves & creates to satisfy his artistic essence.1 1

Surely irony?

41 p 133, marked

[…] Dieu veut que le monde physique soit pour l’homme et que l’animal soit pour l’acte de voir et d’entendre […] il veut que les choses soient pour sa bonté et pour la communication de sa bonté.1 Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc; sed non propter hoc vult hoc.2 Yes: he wishes things to find satisfaction: he doesn’t wish the satisfaction first. I.e. the goods are good only for those natures. (God, here, is a name for the truth.) 1

God wills that the physical world be for man, and He wills that animals exist to see and to hear … He wills that things exist out of His goodness and for the communication of His goodness. 2 He wills this, therefore it is by reason of His willing; but not by reason of this does He will it. (Summa Theologica, I, 19, 5.) 42 p 135

Things must be preordained: else there would be no reason why they are as they are? And why were they preordained in that way rather than in another? Because that is what, in fact, comes. So that your principle of finality is merely a façon de parler.1 1

Manner of speaking.

43 p 137

||Concerning finality (purpose) and the difficulty of accounting for fortuitous elements involved, for|| tout agent agit en vue d’une fin, pour une fin, […].1 Each wind has a purpose, but the resultant currents of air have none? Or is it only air and heat that have a purpose, & are all winds (and vapours) fortuitous? 1

… each agent acts with a purpose in view, for a purpose.

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44 p 137, underlined

The only unity that [fortuitous events] can have is in a thought. Then the whole material world threatens to be fortuitous: it would be a medley of accidents produced by moral agents at cross purposes. 45 p 139, underlined

Le Dieu de Spinoza, ce Dieu très imparfaitement immanent et pensée et étendue, comme serait une Géométrie subsistante; […].1 Excellent 1

Spinoza’s God, this God very imperfectly immanent and intellectual and extended, as the shreds of a geometry might be; …. 46 p 144, underlined

[On the contingency of being:]

L’être contingent, l’être qui n’est pas par soi, […].1 Note the notion of contingency, as derivative being. 1

Contingent being, being that cannot exist by itself.

47 p 149

[…] si nous comparons ces deux notions d’être contingent et d’être causé, ou ayant en un autre la raison de son existence, nous voyons que le sujet propre de ce qui a en un autre la raison de son existence, c’est précisément l’être contingent.1 Hardly, since its cause is self-evident in itself and in its operation to produce this effect. The contingent could be necessary! 1 … if we compare the two notions of contingency and cause, or finding in another the reason for his existence, we see that the real subject of the reason for another’s existence is precisely contingency.

48 p 153

[On chance:]

||Among the ancients, chance results from several factors coming together in an unforeseeable moment. But a chance event might be foreseen if the factors involved are sufficiently simple.|| Chance is a moral category, like all categories of this philosophy. Turning it into a physical category is superstitious.

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49 p 155

||A man killed by thieves:|| il n’y pas une nature, un agent naturel qui soit de par sa structure préordonné à cette chose-là, préordonné à ce fait de la rencontre de ces trois événements, […].1     2 1

… it is not nature, a natural agent which by its preordained structure, preordained by the fact of the coming together of three circumstances. 2 First falsehood (or premise). 50 p 155, underlined

||The meeting with thieves had no être because it is not a thought; it exists but is not|| une essence. Not a Socratic nature. 51 p 162, top

Note the radical incapacity to conceive that the thought is a hint only because the organism is unified in its functions. This unity is indeed requisite to a unity in the action or product: the thought is only a dramatic transcript, and often mythical. Marriage Ceremonies and Priapic Rites in India and the East By a member of the Royal Asiatic Society n.p.: 1909. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Gerald Marsh

Prairie Grass Poems Dallas: 1947. Waterloo. Three marginalia.

1 pp 26–27

I am a follower after the demagogues, Those who pass in kaledioscopic caravans, spotlighted one after another, I crowd around bandwagons, shouting madly for them ---------------------------------------When you look for me, you’ll find me standing By the rostrum of a windy politician, Enclosed in the triumphant mob, the flurry and confusion, A part of the shuffling, noisey [sic] pulsating blood of Democracy.

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Good: but some features are not characteristic of the “people”, except in rural America. The people are essentially the Poor. They are unhappy They are, at bottom, the beggars, those that society has found no place for.1 1

Santayana’s comment on this parody or pastiche of Walt Whitman is his only remark, to my knowledge, on “rural America,” of which he seemed to know little or nothing.

John Masson

Lucretius: Epicurean and Poet London: 1907. Georgetown. Three marginalia.

1 p xxxi

[Introduction.]

Inspiring all his merciless war with ‘Religion’ (by which he [Lucretius] means superstition), there is a deep and true love of man. Yes, and an essential reverence also, for he would have men ashamed to believe that the Gods can be propitiated by casting to them one of their fellows as a victim. So the author not a christian after all? William Maxwell

The Folded Leaf New York and London: 1945. Waterloo. No marginalia.

A. L. Maycock

An Oxford Note-book Edinburgh and London: 1931. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Lorenzo de’ Medici

Poemetti Edited by Emilio Cecchi Milan: 1943. Columbia. Fourteen marginalia.

[Stanzas 78, 81, 108, 112, 113, 116, and 117 are marked. At 117:]

anti climax 1 p 25

[Santayana looking for rhymes:]

love, wave, cave

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Erich Meissner

Confusion of Faces: The Struggle between Religion and Secularism in Europe London: 1946. Waterloo. Seventy-five marginalia.

1 p 8, marked

||The main fact in European history for the past 400 years is the secularization of life.|| 2 p 11, marked

[Meissner quotes Goethe:]

‘There is only one interesting thing about the Reformation and that is Luther’s character. That is what people admire. All the rest is but a muddle that is still worrying us daily.’ This is true intellectually, but not biologically. 3 p 12, underlined

The forces working for disunity, notably modern nationalism, proved infinitely stronger than any kind of secular humanism. 4 p 15, marked

||The many undercurrents of heresy in Europe were very strong in Germany.|| An ‘age of faith’ has never existed: […]. Nor a land of faith. Look at Ireland, & Spain. 5 p 15

||But there was|| an almost mystic fervour and desire to introduce Christianity into everyday life, into all secular spheres so that Christian men would behave and act differently from non-Christians. Latent insanity in inspiration. 6 p 16

The anticlericalism of the illiterate was different in character from the eloquent and sarcastic criticisms of the Humanists. Erasmus and his followers mocked at the monks and clerics, attacking their ignorance and corruption, […]. The hard headed man sees that he is being deceived; yet his heart may be religious. 7 p 20

[…] the Western reader of Dostoevsky is not unfamiliar with that peculiar and potent humility—the inarticulate philosophy of sinners—which seems capable of shaking the foundations of human life. There is one

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immediate consequence. The brotherhood of men, sought in vain by idealists, is established by sinners. Faith the escape from guilt: or one superstition healed by another. 8 p 22

The modern view, recommending Christianity as an appropriate political tool, is an ineffective and slightly dishonest approach to the religious problem. The Christian religion cannot be called in as a Cinderella to clear up some worldly mess. […] Why should a scheme of social reform be called Christian if no principle peculiar to Christianity is involved? […] we must realize that the vigour of the Christian faith will not be at our disposal just because we feel it would be a good thing if it were. Listen to this, Boston 1880! 9 p 23

The state can be defended and the common cause conscientiously and competently served and guarded by men who do not believe in Christ. Cf. Stalin & the enthusiasm for industrial reform.1 1 Santayana was reading Stalin in Togliatti’s Italian translation at this time: Questioni del Leninismo. See the entry below.

10 p 29

||The doctrine of obedience to the teachings of the Church.|| this is true of good Catholic converts: e.g. Max Jacob. 11 cp 42

||No secular philosophy has arisen in Europe to rival true religion.|| Marx, Lenin, Stalin? don’t count? 12 p 46, marked

||Prussians thought that civilians should be kept out of war.|| The idea of a nation’s war, demanding the whole-hearted participation of every civilian, is quite un-Prussian; the French Revolution proclaimed it, Robespierre’s friend, Saint Just, was its apostle. True militance is free; selected and special. Even the Christian flock has to be shepherded. 13 p 49, top

Reason is aristocratic like militancy, but peaceful. It uses one natural force to neutralise another where they conflict. It so generates its order.

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14 p 53, marked

The peculiar thing about the Reich was that its nationalism got interfused with the military traditions of Prussia. ||A few, Wilhelm I perhaps too, distrusted the Reich.|| 15 p 53, underlined and marked

The Reich, up to a certain point, was Prussia, […] but it was a deflected and vulgarized Prussia, supported by mass-acclamation and allied with commerce and the acquisitive spirit of the industrial age. […] The golden calf had never been worshipped in Prussia […]. Now the cult of Mammon was spreading rapidly. I remember my surprise in 1886 at the luxury in a private house in Göttingen. I had expected Spartan simplicity. 16 p 54, marked

||Heine was not a true representative of the bourgeois time and its misplaced self-confidence.|| He dwelt in a different zone. Goethe’s wider influence was based on the misconceptions of his admirers. 17 p 55

The German ‘Bildungsphilister’ the educated bourgeois, welcomed the Reich frantically; they were beside themselves with joy and self-satisfaction. There had been victory after victory and further gains were still to come; […]. As in Russia now, 1946. 18 p 57

Since the fourteenth century Austria had borne the burden and responsibilities of the Holy Roman Empire; she is therefore built on imperial and not on national foundations. This should have been the international power. 19 p 58

The seat of the Roman Empire when it became Christian became migratory. It was ideal. 20 p 58

[Meissner quotes Frederick the Great as of 1752:]

‘Prussia cannot tolerate it that France should lose Alsace or Lorraine.’ N.B.!

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21 p 59

Protestantism derived its sense of unity from the strong feeling (anxiously preserved) that whatever the common Protestant heritage may be, it was certainly and emphatically anti-Catholic. They felt until recently that they must help to defend themselves against the religion & culture which they had betrayed. 22 p 63, underlined

[From the chapter on the effect of the French Revolution on German history.]

||The French Revolution introduced a sequence never since broken up of|| the alliance between irreligion, utopian hope and compulsion […]. La carrière ouverte1 for all vices and crimes, if committed in private. 1

The open career.

23 p 64, marked

[At top:]

N.B. Political agitators working on their own or paid by others are familiar figures in history. Their effect has always been pretty well the same: they are the link between the genuine grievances and the revolutionary outburst. ||In the French Revolution, the agitator became a central figure, who|| tried to establish himself in society as a permanency—a professional man, doing a useful job. Birth of the politician. 24 p 66

[…] complete disregard of personal liberty, backed up by the pernicious doctrine that the individual as such does not matter, gets quickly rid of […] encumbrances and turns the state into a smoothly running machine, capable of any ‘total’ effort […]. Cf. the Russian revolution & reconstruction. 25 p 67, top

Militant society: the bond of crime is the most compulsive and internal, but also the most brittle externally, when the criminals turn against one another. 26 p 69, marked

When in 1793 the Committee of Public Safety began to revolutionize the war, the country was weary and apathetic. It had to be driven into this

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enterprise at the sword’s point. The formidable weapon which in times to come made Europe tremble, was forged against the will of the French nation under the pressure of a Terrorist government. Such is the historical origin of total war. Unanimity in war & religion is a product of tyranny, working in part by contagion and in part by terror. It is a false and fragile unanimity. 27 p 70, top

Last meaning of “Democracy” = herd psychology or linch [sic] law. 28 p 72, marked

[Fichte’s ideological nationalism.]

Note the insidious though perfectly logical combination of mystical nationalism and compulsion! The ‘consuming flames of higher patriotism’ which Fichte was trying to kindle have devoured since then the happiness of millions and devastated the ancient commonwealth of nations. To call these ideas Prussian is misleading, nor were they German (they were indeed opposed to all German traditions); they were revolutionary. What is German in Fichte is the Egotism and the racial claim to supremacy. 29 p 85, marked

||In 1815 the chance for a prudent constitutional government in Germany was missed.|| Liberalism became a demagogic revolutionary force—and allied itself with the mass emotion of modern nationalism, […]. 30 p 91, marked

[At top:]

Vacant liberty in Art ||In Bismarck’s Reich, Art went down hill. Experimentation, and the artist’s reluctance to engage the bourgeoisie led to his isolation.|| The human mind, thrown back on to itself, must go to pieces through lack of communication and support. Modern art, in its genuine representatives, entered the purgatory of this experience. […] The sensitive observer will be deeply moved by the sounds of sorrow that come from the waste land. The best German example is, I think, the Austrian poet Georg Trakl (died 1914). Rilke’s Duineser Elegien should also be mentioned here. The deadly isolation of the autonomous individual has been poignantly formulated by Alexei Khomiakov, the great Slavophil: ‘Modern society

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in its decay releases every individual to the freedom of his own impotence.’ [At Khomiakov’s quotation:]

Solipsistic art “Success” or fame are not needed. Contradiction? 31 p 94, marked

Education cannot lead. It requires a fund to be transmitted: but it may rationalise the traditional elements. 32 p 112

||Meissner quotes Arnold Toynbee that political, social and economic developments of the nineteenth century have deprived many people of true citizenship; they have become an internal proletariat.|| ‘The true hall-mark of the proletarian […] is neither poverty nor humble birth but a consciousness—and the resentment which this consciousness inspires—of being disinherited from his ancestral place in society and being un-wanted known in a community which is his rightful home, ^ ^ […]. I am a proletarian. 33 p 113, marked

The Hitler movement can be called a stampede of suburbia […]. 34 p 118, marked

[Meissner quotes a conversation of Hitler with Rauschning:]

‘Providence has ordained that I should be the greatest liberator of humanity. I am freeing men from the restraints of an intelligence that has taken charge; from the dirty and degrading self-mortifications of a chimera called conscience and morality and from the demands of a freedom and personal independence which only a very few can bear.’ Thus spake Nietzsche’s clown! Hitler’s creed Militancy in excelsis Spontaneity in a gang. 35 p 121, marked

[At top:]

Atlantic Charter attacked ||The hungry want bread, but the wants of the bored are less articulate.|| Boredom may well be called a disease of the mind, and a serious one. It weakens and eventually kills the power of appreciation. Life becomes a misery, although the two demands of the Atlantic Charter, freedom from want and freedom from fear may be completely secured.

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36 p 124 and 124fn

If mysticism tries to explore and to conquer the dangerous realm beyond good and evil,1 it often becomes the supporter and ally of immoral violence. 1

In actual fact, the realm does not exist. It is an illusion of the proud. On closer examination it turns out to be a dependency of evil. or sensibility to all

^ the little, for intugood. The result for morals is contentment in ition ideal possession of everything. ^ [Thus Santayana tames Nietzsche.]

37 p 125, underlined

[Concerning “Conservative Revolution” and Nihilism:]

At the end of the nineteenth century the educated bourgeois responded keenly to Schopenhauer’s sombre visions; their sons followed Nietzsche; their grandsons took to dynamite which they considered the real thing. They were no longer interested in shattering ideas. Scepticism had destroyed itself and produced, as its last exhalation, the fata morgana of a new authoritative world. It had released the natural man in an artificial world. You don’t see that in the natural world he would be normal. It is your superstitious nominalism that makes him seem (and feel) devilish. 38 p 125 and 125fn, underlined

Belief in Hell and disbelief in Heaven […] is, indeed, the core of the widespread and obnoxious affair which has been called, for want of a better name, Nihilism.1 1

A better name would certainly be desirable. For Nihilism is not just nothing; it is full of dynamic life, it is a forceful enterprise of deliberate transgression— impiety sure of itself.

Anarchism? But compare my Lucifer, Satanism? who is a sort of saint. 39 p 127, marked

The fighters of 1848 were mostly lofty idealists, not counting the professional instigators. In post-war Germany the revolutionary spirit became decidedly cynical and acid. To make a revolution, to kill opponents, to direct persecutions, to establish a most ruthless system of state control, to do all that without real beliefs was indeed a new departure. Compare Hitler with Robespierre.

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Isn’t it all a form of romanticism? But there is also an antique element of political force or formativeness. Cf. Stalin. 40 p 127, marked

The disillusioned interpretation of human nature has become the basic common conviction of modern political activism though the actual programmes differ. Hence the determination to control and, if necessary, to compel man in all his activities also in his thoughts and feelings. Hence the peculiar love of violence and compulsion. Hence the complete disregard of individuals who are sacrificed without uneasiness. 41 p 127, marked

Love of mankind (upheld as a principle) or devotion to the proletariat or some master race are perfectly compatible with hatred and contempt of the neighbour. Hitler was not the bold, solitary, Nietzschean philosopher that he would have liked to be. Nothing commoner than the philanthropist who hates all the best works of man, and loves only babies. Kuno Meyer

A German Grammar for Schools London: 1896. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Michelangelo Buonarroti

Rime e lettere Firenze: 1892. Georgetown.

[No marginalia as such, but Santayana collates other versions and corrects typographical errors to sonetto ii, iii, iv, vi, viii, ix, x; to madrigale vii; to sonetto xvii; and to madrigale xix, xx, and xxxiv.]

John Stuart Mill

Dissertations and Discussions New York: 1882. Georgetown. Seventy-three marginalia.

[Volume III, “Utilitarianism.” Santayana used “Utilitarianism” when he taught Philosophy 15 at Harvard. His address, written on the title page, “19 Hollis. Cambridge.” suggests that he read the text as an undergraduate. Many of the marginalia are a student’s or lecturer’s paraphrase]. 1 p 301

But, though in science the knowledge of particular truths precede the ^ ^ general theory, […].

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2 p 303, underlined

||The intuitive school’s affirmation of a science of morals.|| They either assume the ordinary precepts of morals as of à-priori authority, or they lay down as the common groundwork of those maxims some generality much less obviously authoritative than the maxims themselves, and which has never succeeded in gaining popular acceptance. [At authoritative:]

so is utility 3 p 303

||Mill asserts that a law of morality ought to exist.|| Such a law has tacitly existed. 4 p 305

The Utilitarian principle proposed: the ultimate good can not be proved to be such except rhetorically. 5 p 306

Utility not opposed to ornament and pleasure. 6 p 308

But consists in seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. 7 p 309

Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. […] a doctrine worthy only of swine […]. Supposed bestiality of the doctrine explained. 8 p 311

People always prefer the pleasures of the higher faculties. (This merely says that people do not choose happiness) 9 p 316

Is happiness possible? 10 p 317

Tranquility and excitement sufficient for happiness. 11 pp 318–19

||On the pleasures of the cultivated mind.|| Now, there is absolutely no reason in the nature of things why an amount of mental culture sufficient to give an intelligent interest in these objects of contemplation should not be the inheritance of every one born in a civilized country. Which can be removed by education. (False)

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12 p 321

Unquestionably, it is possible to do without happiness: it is done involuntarily by nineteen-twentieths of mankind, even in those parts of our present world which are least deep in barbarism; and it often has to be done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, for the sake of something which he prizes more than his individual happiness. Those who renounce happiness should do so to increase the happiness of others. (False, as here stated.) 13 p 324

The greatest happiness principle, though the ground of right, need not be the conscious motive of every act. 14 p 333

||Traditional beliefs|| are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher, until he has succeeded in finding better. Cf. Browning’s new morality, the ethics of Mrs Way. [Mrs. Why?]1 1 See Santayana, “The Poetry of Barbarism,” Chapter VII, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion.

15 p 340

There is, I am aware, a disposition to believe that a person who sees in moral obligation a transcendental fact, an objective reality belonging to the province of “things in themselves,” is likely to be more obedient to it than one who believes it to be entirely subjective, having its seat in human consciousness only. The transcendental idea of duty does not make us respect it more. 16 p 341

If there is innate duty it is to regard others. 17 p 343

Merely acquired conscience can be analysed away. (This is to say that not reason but sentiment is the basis of right.) 18 p 347

||Social feeling as a sanction for Utilitarianism. Despite differences in sensibility and culture, one need feel no conflict, for|| he is not opposing himself to what they really wish for,—namely, their own good,—but is, on the contrary, promoting it. This feeling in most individuals is

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much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting altogether. this is a self-contradiction. 19 p 347, underlined

||For those who have social feeling,|| it possesses all the characters of a natural feeling. It does not present itself to their minds as a superstition of education, or a law despotically imposed by the power of society, but as an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without. The social creature would not be without his interest in others, although this may make him unhappy. He wishes happiness, but only on the basis of his own nature. 20 p 349, underlined

||How Utilitarianism is proved.|| No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. Instinctively he does, but deliberately he does not. If we are wise, we know happiness is not worth having. 21 p 349

But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue, or maintain that virtue is not a thing to be desired? Happiness is, and yet must not consciously be, the sole aim. 22 pp 349–50, underlined and marked !

||Mill’s doctrine maintains not only that|| virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly, for itself. Whatever may be the opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue is made virtue; however they may believe (as they do) that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue,—yet this being granted, and it having been decided […] what is virtuous, they not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as a means to the ultimate end, but they also recognize, as a psychological fact, the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself, […]. (this is delightfully absurd. As when Christians say that we must do everything for the love of God, but must not think about him at all.) 23 pp 350–51

Virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so, and, in those who

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love it disinterestedly, it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness. (then to the vicious, vice must be also a part of happiness & of virtue.) 24 p 352, underlined

Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there were not this provision of nature, by which things originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures, […]. (Sensual pleasures are then the only real basis of happiness). 25 p 353, underlined

||Virtue may be considered a good in itself and highly desired,|| and with this difference between it and the love of money, of power, or of fame,—that all of these may, and often do, render the individual noxious to the other members of the society to which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him so much a blessing to them as the cultivation of the disinterested love of virtue. (This is not evident at all. Consider the hermits.) 26 p 353, underlined

Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united: […]. (That is, most people who desire virtue do not desire it for its own sake. True, but it ought not to be so.) 27 p 356

(Of course, Mill is far from the doctrine that virtue consists in not desiring at all.) 28 p 365

||On how Utilitarianism is connected to justice; the question of the existence of rank and privilege.|| (Would it not come nearer the truth to say that inequality is considered just when it is considered natural, unjust when it is considered artificial?)

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29 p 365, underlined

||Communists think that rewards should be shared equally by all;|| others hold that those who work harder or who produce more, […] may justly claim a larger quota in the division of produce. And the sense of natural justice may be plausibly appealed to in behalf of every one of these opinions. (Evidently if we have decided here what is natural, we have decided what is just.) 30 p 373, underlined

It is common enough, certainly, though the reverse of commendable, to feel resentment merely because we have suffered pain; but a person whose resentment is really a moral feeling,—that is, who considers whether an act is blamable before he allows himself to resent it,— […] certainly does feel that he is asserting a rule which is for the benefit of others as well as for his own. (Curious. What else on utilitarian principles can resentment be felt for? Acts are blamable only because they give pain.) John Stuart Mill

Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism London: 1885 (3rd edition). Georgetown. No marginalia.

John Stuart Mill

An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy London: 1889 (6th edition). Georgetown. 162 marginalia.

[Fly-leaf:]

G. Santayana in re Hyde 19051 1 Early in 1905 William James urged Santayana to accept the Hyde lectureship at Harvard. James would follow Santayana: “You the Baptist! I the Messiah! (That’s the way it looks to my wife.)” Cf. McCormick, George Santayana: A Biography, 181–82. (Santayana told Cory that one should never refer to one’s own work, but here he forces my hand.)

1 p 22

||Concerning the “reality” of matter.|| The “reality” is a logical empty term that which has “the essential attributes of matter or mind.” As if in knowing the attributes of a thing I did not know it.

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2 p 24

[Hamilton] says, that not only all the knowledge we have of anything, but

all which we could have if we were a thousandfold better endowed than we are, would still be only knowledge of the mode in which the thing would affect us. The above artificial unknowable is logical; that is why Mill can’t see it: it is of course not incompatible with material reality being known. The unknowable is no cause; it is only a grammatical term, like “I.” 1 1

This has obvious reference to Santayana’s lecture “The Unknowable,” the Herbert Spencer Lecture, delivered at Oxford, 1923, and frequently reprinted. 3 p 27, marked

||Mill’s summary of Hamilton’s account of relative knowledge as distinct from absolute knowledge.|| This is quite right—as an interpretation of Sir W. 4 p 68, underlined

||Hamilton’s argument against Victor Cousin:|| he speaks of the effect as a condition of its cause. i.e. of the cause being called a cause. 5 p 84

The inconceivable is no category of physics. 6 p 85, marked Z

[…] the universe of thought and that of reality […] must have been framed in complete correspondence […]. This is of course not the language or thought of an Identitätsphilosophie.1 1

Philosophy of identity.

7 p 94, top st

1 meaning—unimaginable nd 2 '' —incredible rd 3 '' —unintelligible

}

meanings of “inconceivable”

8 p 128, marked

||Mill says he does not mean goodness by ascribing goodness to God; but Mr. Mansel asks what Mill means by venerating Goodness?|| Mill is a Socratic moralist, Mansel an ordinary blooming idolater.

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9 p 129, marked

[…] I believe that [Mansel] and I have at bottom the same standard of truth and rule of right, and that he probably understands better than I the facts of the particular case. Socratic ethics 10 p 178

||Mill comments on Hamilton’s and others’ interpretations of consciousness.|| Could we try the experiment of the first consciousness in any infant—its first reception of the impressions which we call external; whatever was present in that first consciousness would be the genuine testimony of Consciousness, and would be as much entitled to credit […] as our sensations themselves. It is extraordinary that Mill should regard an infant’s first feeling as an ultimate authority in metaphysics. 11 p 179, marked

||On supposedly original intuitions, their origins, and our memory of them.|| As if it mattered which were original! Mill is a poor victim of the malicious psychology, and of the intuitive dogmatism behind it. 12 p 181, marked Z

||Hamilton demands|| “that no fact be assumed as a fact of consciousness but what is ultimate and simple.” But to pronounce it ultimate, the only condition he requires is that we be not able to “reduce it to a generalisation from experience.” m Sir W , too, is a victim of this strange illusion. If we are obliged to imagine a thing, this incapacity to be put right is a proof that we are right! 13 p 181, underlined

This condition is realised by its possessing the “character of necessity.” […] In this Sir W. Hamilton is at one with the whole of his own section of the philosophical world; with Reid, with Stewart, with Cousin, with Whewell, and we may add, with Kant. No! Kant thought the necessary was necessarily wrong. 14 p 185fn, marked

||Is the unimaginable subject to proof as true?|| […] is a creation a nihilo, or Matter capable of thinking, unimaginable, or only incredible? Both the one and the other are habitually ranked among the most

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unimaginable of all things. Yet the one is firmly believed by all Materialists, and the other by all Christians. Both are perfectly and easily imaginable; and the only difficulty is a confusion with dialectic. Ex nihilo1 is a contradictory phrase, if ex involves nihil’s having an inside or a removable substance. 1

Out of nothing.

15 pp 202–3

Sir W. Hamilton thinks us entitled to infer a substance from attributes, though he allows that we know nothing of the substance except its attributes. A substance is not inferred; it is included in any datum. 16 p 207

The notion that perceptions need a cause is the root of all evil. 17 p 208, underlined and marked Z

All this artillery is directed against the simple supposition that by a law of our nature, a modification of our own minds may assure us of the existence of an unknown cause. I should think a puff of wind would suffice to overturn this axiom. 18 pp 214–15, marked Z

||Reid, citing Locke, on the appearance of colour equalling an idea:|| “By the constitution of our nature, we are led to conceive this idea as a sign of something external, and are impatient till we learn its meaning.” 1 Observe this artificiality in a “natural realist”. As if “the meaning” of colour could be clearer than the colour itself. 1

From Locke’s Inquiry into the Human Mind, edited by Hamilton, p. 111.

19 p 216, marked

“When I move my hand along the table, the feeling is so simple that I find it difficult to distinguish it into things of different natures, yet it immediately suggests hardness, smoothness, extension, and motion— things of very different natures, and all of them as distinctly understood as the feeling which suggests them.” 1 Monstrous! A “perfectly simple” feeling suggests a multiplicity of perfectly clear qualities in unknown things. 1

Locke cited again, p. 123.

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20 p 228, top

Here Mill gives his case away: If I had only sensations I should believe them to be sensations: if I had only a dream, I should recognise that I was dreaming. This is the psychologist’s fallacy in a nut-shell. 21 pp 229–30, underlined and marked X

Let us now take into consideration another of the general characters of our experience, namely, that in addition to fixed groups, we also recognise a fixed Order in our sensations; […]. This page gives away the contention it begins with. 22 p 236, underlined

It is an admitted fact, that we are capable of all conceptions which can be formed by generalising from the observed laws of our sensations. But it is admitted that there are none or few. Cf. p. 230. 23 p 238, underlined

Our sensations we carry with us wherever we go, and they never exist where we are not; but when we change our place we do not carry away with us the Permanent Possibilities of Sensation: they remain until we return, or arise and cease under conditions what? with which our ^ ^ presence has in general nothing to do. [At “they remain”:]

N.B. in space and time. 24 p 239, top

It must be confessed that such worthies as Mill have little speculative capacity and missed their vocation in becoming philosophers. It is a mere scratching of the surface in a deep soil of prejudices and verbal conventions. There is not the least freedom or sweep of mind. 25 p 245, underlined and marked Z

Supposing me to believe that the Divine Mind is simply the series of the Divine thoughts and feelings prolonged through eternity, that would be, at any rate, believing God’s existence to be as real as my own. Poor old weary God! 26 p 276, underlined

||Hamilton on the primary qualities of matter. Mill quotes:|| “The difference between six inches and eighteen inches is expressed to us by the different degrees of contraction of some one group of muscles; those, for

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example, that flex the arm, or, in walking, those that flex or extend the lower limb.” [ Blush here.] 27 p 328

Confusion of physics with dialectic, the implications of fact with those of intent. 28 p 334

||Our experience does not let us conceive of two straight lines enclosing space.|| This is really too ridiculous. 29 p 339, underlined

[…] one necessity is always proved by the other. The evidence always given, and the only evidence which I believe can be given, that we must think anything as necessary, is that we necessarily think it.    madmen (and philosophers) often think something necessary which is not so, and vice versa: for they forget their intent. 30 p 344, underlined

It is not the mental impressions that are latent, but the power of reproducing them. Everyone admits […] that we may have powers and susceptibilities of which we are not conscious. Potentiality needs to be better defined when so very much is made to hang upon it. 31 p 366

||Mill says that Brown|| professes to explain the phenomenon of causality. Hurrah! 32 p 443

As if a concept were not a thing meant but a thing had. 33 p 462, underlined

Logic collects rules for thought grounded on a scientific investigation of the requisites of valid thought. How is this? 34 p 477, underlined and marked

If thought be anything more than a sportive exercise of the mind, its purpose is to enable us to know what can be known respecting the facts of

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the universe: its judgments and conclusions express, or are intended to express, some of those facts: […]. N.B. John Stuart Mill

A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive

London: 1904. Georgetown. 311 marginalia, and ten pencil-sketches. [More than half the marginalia here consist of Santayana’s suggesting his terms in place of Mill’s.] [Title page:]

G Santayana 1905 in re Hyde1 1

See note l, p. 2:42 above.

1 p 3, marked

||Mill’s examples of truths.|| Memory is intuition? This is the “common sense” philosophy. 2 p 4, top

A feeling without an object would be one without a character—since all its characters belong to its object—it would be an abstract intensity. An object without any intensity would be a mere idea—not felt and not existent. 3 p 4, underlined

Whatever is known to us by consciousness, is known beyond possibility of question. What one sees or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels. No science is required for the purpose of establishing such truths; no rules of art can render our knowledge of them more certain than it is in itself. There is no logic for this portion of our knowledge. This confusion of knowledge with condition or state is the root of all “idealism”. If seeing or feeling have no object: but I may have what I call the toothache and it may be no toothache but a temptation of the devil. All that the feeling assures me of is that some thing is wrong—and the optimists would deny that!

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4 p 5, marked

The province of logic must be restricted to that portion of our knowledge which consists of inferences from truths previously known; […]. With the claims which any proposition has to belief on the evidence of consciousness, that is, without evidence in the proper sense of the word, logic has nothing to do. Isn’t this fearful! As if feeling without an object—could evince anything! 5 p 13, marked

||Mill’s advice that to look to the self for truth is to discard the philosophical tradition.|| Transcendentalism 6 p 14, marked

What does any one’s personal knowledge of Things amount to, after subtracting all which he has acquired by means of the words of other people? Quotable maxim. 7 p 17, marked

“A class is the indefinite multitude of individuals denoted by a general name.” All divisions in the flux are made by discourse—except those in discourse itself and in its basis. 8 p 31, underlined

||Mill discusses the ambiguity among early logicians when concrete names are given to abstractions.|| Being is, by custom, exactly synonymous with substance; except that it is free from a slight taint of a second ambiguity; being applied impartially to matter and to mind, while substance, though originally and in strictness applicable to both, is apt to suggest in preference the idea of matter. To neither, as you understand them. 9 p 34, marked

||Acts of perception|| take their place among the varieties of feelings or states of mind. Intent is a state of mind: thus is “logic”. 10 p 34, marked

||Perception of objects such as stones are outside logic; the nature of intuitive belief.||

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Wretched. The artifice of this is enough to throw one into the arms even of a Scotchman. 11 p 42, marked

||On the effort of logicians to avoid the charge of resort to occult causes:|| the very absurdity which Molière so happily ridiculed when he made one of his pedantic physicians account for the fact that opium produces sleep by the maxim, Because it has a soporific virtue. The true answer being: because it has a certain mechanical structure affecting, in the end, the eyelids and the brain. 12 p 42, underlined

||On the whiteness of snow:|| If it be said that the sensation must have some cause, I answer, its cause is the presence of the assemblage of phenomena which is termed the object. [At “presence”:]

O sancta stupiditas!1 1

O holy stupidity!

13 p 43, marked

||Things denoted by names.|| Origins for meaning. 14 p 44, marked

Dawn and sunrise announce themselves to our consciousness by two successive sensations. Our consciousness of the succession of these sensations is not a third sensation or feeling added to them; […]. Good psychology. No sense for transcendental functions. 15 p 45, marked

[…] it is evident that two different persons cannot be experiencing the same feeling, in the sense in which we say that they are both sitting at the same table. Want of Platonism is want of common sense. As if natures were not “realities”? 16 p 46

Identity of indiscernibles denied—for want of dialectic and superfluity of psychology. 17 p 47, underlined and marked

Every attribute of a mind consists either in being itself affected in a certain way, or affecting other minds in a certain way. […] A mind

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does not, indeed, like a body, excite sensations, but it may excite thoughts or emotions. Psychologism in a nut-shell. [At “minds”:]

not bodies [At “like a body”:]

here bodies Horrible muddle! Another mind excites what the idea of another mind excites—or rather (for this is the fact) what is predicted of it! 18 p 50

[Santayana quarrels with Mill’s Greek.]

Why not see that   means character? The existent is  . 19 p 56, marked

[Concerning “Import of Propositions”:]

To determine what it is that happens in the case of assent or dissent besides putting two ideas together, is one of the most intricate of metaphysical problems. Intent 20 p 56, marked

In order to believe that gold is yellow, I must, indeed, have the idea of gold, and the idea of yellow, and something having reference to those ideas must take place in my mind; but my belief has not reference to the ideas, it has reference to the things. Hurrah! Is this you? 21 p 61, underlined

[…] the proposition is not true because the object is placed in the class. Origin and essence are constantly confused. What does Mill mean by “because”? Diamonds are combustible on account of their mechanical structure: the consequent transformation is called combustion because it satisfies a practical definition of that process. 22 p 72

The essence of man, simply means the whole of the attributes connoted by the word; […]. Essences are nominal. Yes, and names are practical.

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23 p 73, underlined

[On “Names and Propositions”:]

Individuals have no essences. No, but they ought to have if they have ideals. 24 p 74

[Locke] distinguished two sorts of essences, Real and Nominal. His nom-

inal essences were the essences of classes […]. Nor is anything wanting to render the third book of Locke’s Essay a nearly unexceptionable treatise on the connotation of names, except to free its language from the assumption of what are called Abstract Ideas, […]. But besides nominal essences, he admitted real essences, or essences of individual objects, which he supposed to be the causes of the sensible properties of those objects. Locke says the real essence of a thing is its molecular structure. 25 p 77, marked Z

Animal, […] is a genus with respect to man, or John; […]. Very anti-Aristotelean. 26 p 94

The nature of dialectic is wholly missed here. It is supposed that it is either analytic and barren, or a part of physics. Intent is taken out of it, and the art of comparing a development with a premiss is left out of sight. 27 p 100fn, marked

“Few people […] have reflected how great a knowledge of Things is required to enable a man to affirm that any given argument turns wholly upon words.”1 1

The source of Santayana’s memorable phrase in Persons and Places ? He remarks that the Spaniard may be outwardly vain and punctilious, “but inwardly he knows that he is dust. This is the insight that I express by saying to myself that the only authority in existence is the authority of things.” Critical edition (Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1986), p. 284. 28 p 117

N.B. “expectation” and “possibility” are not the same thing. 29 p 118

Things are possibilities and attributes are resemblances. This is a tolerably Platonic or notional metaphysics.

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30 p 120, marked

||On possibility; the unreliability of the syllogism, Socrates is a man, etc.|| Unless the general truth be known on authority, say on the authority of past experience. [See the next entry.] 31 p 121

This is a confusion of dialectic (some things ideal) with physics. That the Duke [of Wellington] will die is a physical presumption: that if he is a man and all men are mortal, he must die, is a dialectical truth. 32 p 123

||Experience is superior to maxims from books.|| The error here lies in supposing reason to be instrumental at all. Of course our action is governed by particular habits in particular circumstances. Our thought supervenes to justify or record them: and the justification is a general idea. 33 p 125, underlined

||Concerning the idea of circles as opposed to|| the particular circle […]. There is some such. Mill seems to think that we are discoursing about an image. 34 p 144, doubly marked

[…] all sciences tend to become more and more Deductive, they are not, therefore, the less Inductive; every step in the Deduction is still an Induction. 35 p 147

||The truth of mathematics|| is an illusion; in order to sustain which, it is necessary to suppose that those truths relate to, and express the properties of, purely imaginary objects. N.B. Very important: of course the necessity is ideal; the application being based on induction. 36 p 149, marked

When, therefore, it is affirmed that the conclusions of geometry are necessary truths, the necessity consists in reality only in this, that they correctly follow from the suppositions from which they are deduced. Good.

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37 p 151, marked

That things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, is as true of the lines and figures in nature, as it would be of the imaginary ones assumed in the definitions. ? No two “things” are equal. 38 p 153, marked

||Where conviction comes from. Infancy?|| Cf. Descartes & Locke 39 p 190

There are several processes used in mathematics which require to be distinguished from Induction, being not unfrequently called by that name, and being so far similar to Induction properly so called, that the propositions they lead to are really general propositions. For example, when we have proved with respect to the circle that a straight line cannot meet it in more than two points, and when the same thing has been successively proved of the ellipse, the parabola, and the hyperbola, it may be laid down as an universal property of the sections of the cone. The distinction drawn in the two previous examples can have no place here, there being no difference between all known sections of the cone and all sections, since a cone demonstrably cannot be intersected by a plane except in one of these four lines. It would be difficult, therefore, to refuse to the proposition arrived at the name of a generalisation, since there is no room for any generalisation beyond it. But there is no induction, because there is no inference: the conclusion is a mere summing up of what was asserted in the various propositions from which it is drawn. A case somewhat, though not altogether, similar, is the proof of a geometrical theorem by means of a diagram. Whether the diagram be on paper or only in the imagination, the demonstration […] does not prove directly the general theorem; […]. [Santayana drew a cone marked with the parabola and the hyperbola and wrote:]

Where is the ellipse? Why have I forgotten my geometry? 40 p 199, underlined and marked

||Definitions once accepted cannot prevail against new knowledge. Whewell, in his Philosophy of Discovery allows|| of no logical process in any case of induction other than what there was in Kepler’s case, namely, guessing until a guess is found which tallies with the facts; […]. But in my apprehension there is such a thing as proof, and inductions differ altogether from descriptions in their relation to that element.

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Induction is proof; […]. When, on the contrary, we merely collate known observations, and, in Dr. Whewell’s phraseology, connect them by means of a new conception; if the conception does serve to connect the observations, we have all we want. As the proposition in which it is embodied pretends to no other truth than what it may share with many other modes of representing the same facts, to be consistent with the facts is all it requires: […]. This doctrine here opposed is that of Mill’s own metaphysics. A “permanent possibility” is a mere trustworthy “view”. 41 p 221

This sort of idealism is materialism in suspense. 42 p 238, marked Z

No dialectic. What will justifies is what it desires and pictures its ideal. This is internal to it, though it may need elaboration. 43 p 245, marked

||Mill refers to|| The Laws of Life […] simple laws of life; […]. Pre-Darwinian. 44 p 251, marked

[…] as in mental philosophy, […]. Strange notion. To apply dialectic to psychology would be to make it a moral science. 45 p 300, marked

That social phenomena depend on the acts and mental impressions of human beings never could have been a matter of any doubt, […]. Neither, again, after physical science had attained a certain development, could there be any real doubt where to look for the laws on which the phenomena of life depend, since they must be the mechanical and chemical laws of the solid and fluid substances composing the organised body and the medium in which it subsists, together with the peculiar vital laws of the different tissues constituting the organic structure. In other cases really far more simple than these, it was much less obvious in what quarter the causes were to be looked for, as in the case of the celestial phenomena. It is much clearer that life is mechanical than that the sky is: only the right astronomy hasn’t got so far because the case, though more obvious, is more complicated.

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46 p 325, marked Z

[Concerning hypotheses:]

In all these cases, verification is proof; if the supposition accords with the phenomena, there needs no other evidence of it. Sometimes M. speaks as if a hypothesis were true in itself, as if verification proved not its validity as a method, but its truth as a representation of objects potentially sensible. 47 p 436

||On the needs of philosophical language.|| clearness abundance 48 pp 482–83, marked

[On fallacies:]

Persons of timid character are the more predisposed to believe any statement, the more it is calculated to alarm them. Cf. [Cardinal] Newman. 49 p 496, marked

||Mysticism is a word often used but rarely understood.|| Whether in the Vedas, in the Platonists, or in the Hegelians, mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence to the subjective creations of our own faculties, to ideas or feelings of the mind; and believing that by watching and contemplating these ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes place in the world without. A list of definitions of mysticism would be a curious thing. Here it is taking concretions in discourse for concretions in existence and dialectic for physics. 50 p 503

There is no reason why anything should not “cause” anything e.g. mind body & vice versa. 51 p 521, doubly marked

We always find that those are the greatest slaves to metaphorical language, who have but one set of metaphors. 52 p 523, marked

Since what was thought to be perfection appeared to obtain in some phenomena, it was inferred (in opposition to the plainest evidence) to obtain in all. “We always suppose that which is better to take place in nature, if it be possible,” says Aristotle; […].

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53 p 523, marked Z

As late as the Copernican controversy it was urged as an argument in favour of the true theory of the solar system, that it placed the fire, the noblest element, in the centre of the universe. This was a remnant of the notion that the order of nature must be perfect, and that perfection consisted in conformity to rules of precedency in dignity, either real or conventional. Again, reverting to numbers: certain numbers were perfect, therefore those numbers must obtain in the great phenomena of nature. Six was a perfect number, that is, equal to the sum of all its factors; an additional reason why there must be exactly six planets [Kepler]. The Pythagoreans, on the other hand, attributed perfection to the number ten; […]. Hegel is not above this 54 p 550, underlined

[On “Liberty and Necessity”:]

||Mill refutes the fatalists’ idea that character is determined and unchangeable. A man’s|| character is formed by his circumstances, (including among these his particular organisation,) but his own desire to mould it in a particular way is one of those circumstances, and by no means one of the least influential. [At “desire”:]

Not an original circumstance; not one of the mechanical factors, but only a literary name for a process involving several of them. 55 p 551, underlined and marked Z

I shall not here inquire whether it be true that, in the commencement, all our voluntary actions are mere means consciously employed to obtain some pleasure or avoid some pain. It is at least certain that we gradually, through the influence of association, come to desire the means without thinking of the end: the action itself becomes an object of desire, and is performed without reference to any motive beyond itself. Strange! False appeal to association, as if the overt part of the mind were baseless. 56 p 555, marked

[On the “Laws of Mind”:]

All states of mind are immediately caused either by other states of mind or by states of body. […] When a state of mind is produced directly by a state [of] body, the law is a law of Body, and belongs to physical science.

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Why? According to your classification they should be psycho-physical. 57 p 557, marked

The subject, then, of Psychology is the uniformities of succession, the laws, whether ultimate or derivative, according to which one mental state succeeds another— […]. The third law is, that greater intensity in either or both of the impressions is equivalent, in rendering them excitable by one another, to a greater frequency of conjunction. Contrary to fact. A vivid accompaniment of the sea— sea-sickness—does not tend to be recalled when I see the water from the land. I cannot recall it.1 1 On his numerous voyages, Santayana was always acutely sea-sick, for which condition he ate arrowroot pudding.

58 p 560, underlined and marked

[…] the idea of some particular pleasure may excite in different persons, even independently of habit or education, very different strengths of desire, and this may be the effect of their different degrees or kinds of nervous susceptibility; […]. What is that? The act called a pleasure by you, or the past experience called a pleasure by me? 59 p 561, marked

||Mill quotes with approval an essay on Priestley by Martineau:|| “when nature has endowed an individual with great original susceptibility, he will probably be distinguished by fondness for natural history, a relish for the beautiful and great, and moral enthusiasm; where there is but a mediocrity of sensibility, a love of science, of abstract truth, with a deficiency of taste and of fervour, is likely to be the result.” Bosh! John Stuart Mill

Bibliography of the Published Writings of John Stuart Mill

Edited from his manuscript by Ney MacMinn, J. R. Hainds, J. M. McCrimmon Evanston, Illinois: 1945. Waterloo. No marginalia.

George Santayana’s Marginalia

Charles Hubert Millevoye

2:59

Oeuvres de Millevoye Paris: n.d. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Henry F. Mins

Materialism: The Scientific Bias New York: 1934. Waterloo. No marginalia.

[Various underlinings, but not by Santayana.]

Malcolm M. Moncrieff

The Clairvoyant Theory of Perception: A New Theory of Vision London: 1951. Waterloo. No marginalia.

William P. Montague Great Visions of Philosophy: Varieties of Speculative Thought in the West from the Greeks to Bergson La Salle, Illinois: 1950. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Charles Louis de Secondat Montesquieu

Lettres persanes

Paris: 1928. Waterloo. Nine marginalia. 1 p 31, marked

[Letter xii:]

The troglodytes worked for the benefit of the community. They displayed no qualities other than those that a sweet and tender order of friendship gave rise to. In a remote countryside, separated from their compatriates, unworthy of their presence, they led a happy, tranquil life. The very earth seemed to flourish by itself when cultivated by those virtuous hands. The ideal of America & the Revolution. 2 pp 164–65, underlined

||The emperor Theodosius caused all the inhabitants of a town, even women and children, to be put to the sword. When the emperor wanted to enter a church, the Bishop, named Ambrose, shut the doors to him as a murderer and sacrilegious man:|| et en cela il fit une action héroïque. Cet empereur, ayant ensuite fait la pénitence qu’un tel crime exigeoit, ayant été admis dans l’église, s’alla placer parmi les prêtres; le même

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évêque l’en fit sortir; et en cela il commit l’action d’un fanatique et d’un fou: tant il est vrai que l’on doit se défier de son zèle.1 Note the assurance of M. in judging about right & wrong. A phase of Protestantism in the Deists. 1

… and in that he performed a heroic action. This emperor, having later performed the penance that such a crime deserved, and having been admitted into the church, made as though to station himself among the priests. The bishop forced him to leave, and in that he committed the action of a fanatic and madman, so much so must one be on guard against his zeal.

Paul Elmer More

Platonism Princeton: 1917. Georgetown. Eighty-two marginalia.

1 p 4, underlined

But if the existence, even the predominance, of the doubting mood in Socrates cannot be overlooked, ||he is not to be considered a sceptic.|| 2p4

Thus, when a man calls himself a sceptic, it commonly means that he subscribes to some form of materialistic dogma, […]. Dunce! 3p7

Socrates was not contradicting himself, but was basing his conduct on a profounder form of scepticism than Pyrrho’s, when, in one and the same discourse, he avowed that his only wisdom was to know his own ignorance, yet declared himself ready to face death with this downright affirmation: “To do wrong and to disobey our superior, whether human or divine, this I do know to be an evil and shameful thing.” This is a very shallow interpretation. It is not a dogma that Socrates falls back on but an institution of morals on freedom of spirit. 4 p 9, underlined

It was one of Socrates’ favorite maxims that no man errs, or sins, willingly, but only through ignorance—a saying hard to reconcile with the actual conduct of the world, hard to reconcile with the other aspects of the Socratic doctrine. Because you don’t understand it. Since morals are freely instituted, you break your own purpose only if you are inconsiderate and inconsistent.

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5 p 9, underlined

||How can a teacher as a sceptic|| reject the authority of the senses, and as a mystic avow that his morality depends on a superrational intuition? oh! 6 p 18

It was just this principle of the innate divine that Protagoras denied—certainly at least Plato so understood him—when he made man the measure of truth and avowed that of the gods there was no way of knowing whether they were or were not. If he meant reason, it would be formally right. Prudence wisdom or self-knowledge is the principle of integrity: humanism & theism are the guarantees of harmony, and beneficence in integrity. 7 p 25, marked Z

The condemnation of the sophists, as a body, is not that they turned the current of thought in a new direction, but that they were themselves so deeply immersed in the popular tide, and lent their weight to its onward sweep. N.B. the tide sets towards perdition. 8 pp 30–31, underlined

Here, then, is an issue between philosophy and apparent fact; and if you solve this difficulty by explaining the equation of virtue and knowledge after the manner of the utilitarians, as Socrates and Plato did, you forthwith lay yourself open to the charge of throwing away your spiritual affirmation. Not really: this is an other case of unintelligence. 9 p 32, underlined

None of these Dialogues is conclusive, and at the end of each the reader is left in a mood like that of the ancient Persian, who complained that he had heard great argument “About it and about, but evermore Came out by the same door where in he went.” What rot! 10 p 33, marked Z

Each [dialogue] sets out to define a particular virtue […] and ends by rejecting as inadequate or inconsistent the various proposed definitions. But through all their inconclusiveness, these two thoughts are continually before the mind: that in some way which the debaters cannot understand the diffferent virtues are distinct from one another, yet at the same time

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merely aspects of one all-embracing virtue; and, secondly, that in some way, equally obscure to the debaters, this one inclusive virtue is dependent on knowledge. N.B. What a strange modern blindness to the good ! 11 p 45

Callicles is decent enough to admit that some pleasures are in themselves better than others, and having thus granted the existence of the good, or the honourable, as a standard outside of pleasures by which we may grade them, he has virtually given up his case. He has expressed his character (which has a certain conventional cast) not given up his case. 12 p 53, underlined

So far Plato has come in the Quest: he has shown that the popular view of morality has the sanction of religion, and that, if only the myth of future retribution be true, then certainly it is better, measured by the ordinary standard of happiness, to be just than to be unjust. True literally, though a myth? O stupidity! 13 p 89, top

This book renders neither the atmosphere of ambiguity, nor the accent of Socrates and Plato, nor the nerve of the their philosophy. 14 p 90

No statement of a categorical imperative, no trust in an innate sense of duty, no exhortation to the love of God or of man, will avail against the temptations of the world unless the admonition bears with it the promise of satifying what all men instinctively crave. The heart of man naturally demands pleasure or happiness, and will not forgo its demand. But, old fool, how could it be otherwise when the good is concerned? Have you once mentioned the good? 15 p 99, top

A probable surplus of pleasures is a sign of living according to one’s nature—(if the environment and fortune were very unfavourable, we could not have done so)—but the end is this congenial career, including a happy death, which is a part of happiness or the good. 16 p 109, top

“Moral superstitions or inverted taboos.”

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17 p 115, underlined

||More compares Socrates and J. S. Mill.|| To Mill there was nothing beyond the decision, nothing (in his philosophy taken literally, that is, for in his character he was inconsistent) to give validity to the decision of virtue when it might be weakened by doubts. Stupid not to see that the question is whether this is virtue. 18 p 122, marked

It is to be remembered, also, that even in the Phaedo the “body” is really not so much the material flesh as a symbol for all that part of the soul which is swayed by the baser desires. So it is with the Christian ascetics. 19 p 141, underlined

||Plato’s dualism showed the courage of his convictions.|| He was, mainly, I think, kept in the strait and narrow path by fidelity to his master; and to understand the nature of that element of the soul in which he placed human freedom and morality, […]. N.B. This writer is a poor thing. 20 p 145, underlined

||In the Apology, Plato causes Socrates to say that something in his mind warned him against an act, but never urged him to an act.|| It was this inhibitive aspect of the Socratic religion which Plato never forgot, and which justifies us in connecting the daemonic admonition symbollically [sic] with the principle of liberty and morality in the Platonic psychology. Monstrous, to identify the love of the good with this feeble arrest! 21 p 149

||Socrates was fearless on the field of battle and unterrified of his imminent death.|| He was a philosopher. 22 p 149, underlined

Hence the vigour of his morality, and the preservation of his chastity against such attacks of lust as are described with appalling freedom in the last scenes of the Symposium. More than that—love.

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23 p 163, underlined

What is the bond between the inner check, or spirit, and the concupiscent element of the soul? Monstrous! 24 p 164, top

The “scepticism” of Socrates was no doctrine concerning the non-existence of God, matter, or moral truth: it was perplexity and suspension of judgment, amounting to agnosticism in matters of cosmology: but never in ethics. 25 p 165, marked

But to hold, as it has become rather the fashion nowadays, that at a certain moment in his [Plato’s] career he repudiated one theory of Ideas and adopted a contrary theory, or even that the change in his views was anything more than the natural shifting of interest from one aspect of the question to another, is, I say flatly, to misconceive totally his philosophic history. Yes. 26 p 177

||More attempts to analyze the Platonic doctrine of Ideas.|| The Good is the idea by participation in which all other things have ideas, or are related to ideals. Ergo, etc. Generalities (without function & finality) are not ideas. 27 p 180, marked

You will scarcely retain any deep love for what is only a name; you may conform to the popular rules of justice from habit or for prudential reasons, but, really, one may well be slow in trusting you very far out of sight, or in placing much reliance on your character—indeed, one may ask whether, properly speaking, you have such a thing as a character. [From “one may ask”:]

There is the crux: the reason of the fixity of the good is the existence of a nature in you. 28 p 195, underlined and marked

Those who dwelt with [Socrates] and understood his manner of speech knew well enough that all his babble about the pursuit of beautiful bodies was a veil of irony thrown before the hunger of his soul for fulfilment of its unearthly love.

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Yes: and it is so even if you indulge the passion “Unearthly” in its object, or rather immaterial: but quite animal in its basis. 29 pp 196–97, underlined and marked

This power of suspension [of acting on desire], which to Locke was the substitute for the free will, and which I have termed the inner check or, more precisely in the language of Plato, the daemonic opposition, intervenes between desire and the reaching out for fulfilment. The man has time to calculate from experience or precept, half unwittingly it may be, whether it will be better to grant himself this pleasure or to forgo it. The result of this act of suspension, whether it end in permission or negation, and whether the judgment of ultimate pleasure and pain be right or wrong, is the virtue of temperance, and with it comes the feeling of happiness. That is the dialectical certainty, what we know by immediate and incontrovertible evidence. But with this certainty there rises before the man’s imagination, if he reflects on his state, the Idea of temperance as a visible power or presence, so alluring in itself that beside it the object of his physical desire appears mean and ephemeral. If his judgment was led to veto that desire, it will seem to him that his act of restraint was merely the choice in its place of this more desirable image; the love of the Idea has driven out the baser love of the flesh. If his judgment granted the desire as good, then it will seem to him as if this desired object were indeed beautiful, but beautiful only as a shadow or receptacle of the overflowing loveliness of the Idea. Good in itself but bad exegesis. 30 p 205, top

N.B. Compare this to the school-master’s ferule: is it the dynamic centre of education? 31 p 209, underlined

||In his discussion of Science and Cosmogony, More decides that Plato|| would be in accord with the most recent trend of scientific theory. Pfew! Plato is not interested in the trend of 1910–20 or in the perhaps opposite trend of 2000. 32 p 213, marked

There is nothing of the “ivory tower” in [Plato’s dialectic], no place for the dreamer in wisdom or for the antinomian hypocrite; and Plato is as thoroughly convinced as St. James that faith and works cannot be disjoined. How otherwise could it be in a doctrine wherein the assurance

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of truth takes the form of happiness attending an active and unremitting self-government? This is you at your best: but not Plato. 33 p 213, marked Z

[…] mathematical studies were the only ones sufficiently advanced in Greece to offer the sort of discipline obtained in our graduate schools today in many fields of history and linguistic beyond the preparatory and general education of the college. Poor dear prof. ! 34 p 222, marked Z

The modern conception of natural law, though expressed in the most strictly scientific terms, will in the end be found to depend on an implicit trust in the submission of nature to reason and rightness. The chief difference is that the modern man of science, in formulating his general hypotheses, is likely to be less aware of his mental processes and more subject to naïve illusions than was Plato. What quibbles! 35 p 231, marked

||Physical necessity as a substitute for spiritual law gives no stable foundation for conduct. Finally men will want release from such servitude;|| if they cannot discover the way of freedom in the law of the spirit, they will throw open the gate of the soul to the throng of invading desires, and the stoical necessity of science, save for the few exceptional minds, will remain as a theory, while in practice the mass of mankind will follow a rebellious and epicurean individualism. [From “will remain as”:]

Hurrah for Lenin! 36 p 235, marked

||In Neo-Platonism:|| Evil is merely a contingent of subordinate existence—all of which, to the mind hungering after the truth, is nothing but “words, words, words.” How sharp the gentleman is: the religious idealists are word-eaters, are they? Not altogether. 37 pp 272–73, marked Z

To the true Platonist the divine spirit, though it may be called, and is, the hidden source of beauty and order and joy, yet always, when it speaks directly in the human breast, makes itself heard as an inhibition; like the guide of Socrates, it never in its own proper voice commands to do, but

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only to refrain. Whereas to the pseudo-Platonist it appears as a positive inspiration, saying yes to his desires and emotions. Goethe unwittingly was giving expression to the everlasting formula of pseudo-Platonism when he put into the mouth of Mephistopheles the fateful words: “I am the spirit that ever denies.” It is God that denies, not Satan. The moment these terms are reversed, what is reverenced as the spirit becomes a snare instead of a monitor: liberty is turned into license, a glamour of sanctity is thrown over the desires of the heart, the humility of doubt goes out of the mind, the will to follow this or that impulsion is invested with divine authority, there is an utter confusion of the higher and the lower elements of our nature. Samuel Eliot Morison The Development of Harvard University Since the Inauguration of President Eliot, 1869–1929 Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1930. Waterloo. One marginale.

Samuel Eliot Morison

Three Centuries of Harvard: 1636–1936

Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1936. Waterloo. Three marginalia. 1 p 308

It is said to have been a combination of clerical , alcoholic, and classi^ cal influence that prevented John Fiske, the brilliant young^ convert to Darwinism who graduated in 1863, from obtaining a Harvard tutorship. 2 p 323, marked Z

||Morison paraphrases a speech of Charles W. Eliot, just appointed president of the university, in 1869:|| Harvard must expand with the country, must save something for the advancement of learning out of this scramble for wealth, or the age would pass her by, and the ghosts of Dunster, Leverett, and Kirkland would rise to reproach her. There were plenty of rival universities ready to carry the caduceus, if Harvard slowed up or stumbled. Style Style Style Christopher Morley

The Powder of Sympathy New York: 1927. Waterloo. No marginalia.

[Pages 87ff, a chapter entitled “Santayana in the Subway,” concerns Character and Opinion in the United States.]

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Kewal Motwani

India: A Synthesis of Cultures Bombay: 1947. Waterloo. Two marginalia.

1 pp 276–77, underlined

A vapid religiosity, a meaningless sacerdotalism, an inane emphasis on secularization of state, all these arise from ignorance and inadequate appreciation of all that is involved in religion. I.e. such ecclesiastics and such statesmen who have roots in the genes [illegible] orders of that society England was an example of this in the 19th century. Gustav Emil Müller

Amerikanische Philosophie Stuttgart: 1936. Waterloo. Twenty-five marginalia.

1 p 16, marked

||The mentality of the Bible-belt still obtains. The Ape-trial in Tennessee was no exception, but a sign of the continuity of that mentality. The witch-trials in Pennsylvania are not far in the past. Nevertheless America remains, in terms of technical progress and in oases, a modern country. Puritanism lives on; the ideals of Voltairean enlightenment are regarded as the last word.|| intellectual backwardness 2 p 16, underlined

[On the American Revolution:]

Hier in der Revolution verschmilzt die puritanische Richtung zusammen mit dem liberal-bourgeoisen Aufklärungsdenken und dem ursprünglichen demokratischen Individuismus des Grenzertums.1 [Santayana enumerates his three underlinings:]

123 1

In the Revolution, the puritanical leaning coalesced with the liberal-bourgeois thought of the Enlightenment and with the native democratic individuality of the frontier. 3 p 95, underlined

||Müller describes Henry James’s [senior] attraction to Swedenborg.|| Gott offenbart sich nur im Menschen, als Mensch.1 This is an indirect confession of the vital if not “moral” nature of the whole experience. 1

God becomes known only in mankind, as man.

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4 p 95

But man has only a “provisional” reality. In truth, his life is God’s life, when he himself lives or believes he can be master of his life: thus illusion and sin. You think you are a man, but are really God dreaming that he has become human. 5 p 99, underlined

[About Ralph Waldo Emerson:]

Er ist der Prophet eines absoluten Moralgesetzes, das sich aber jeder wirklichen Verpflichtung in der Endlichkeit entzieht, er verkündet ein Sollen, das nicht Sollen bleiben, sondern zugleich endlich-wirklich sein soll.1 Aspiration not subjection. The Ought is the potentiality of the Is. 1 He is the prophet of an absolute moral law, which extricates him, however, from every real subjection to limitation; he proclaims an obligation which does not remain an obligation, but at the same time must be so in the end.

6 p 99

Concord the middle point between Rome and Chicago. 7 p 105, underlined

||No one since the Renaissance dreamt of universal man as did Ralph Waldo Emerson.|| Und keiner hat ihn auf eine solche paradoxe Spitze getrieben, indem er ihn ganz in das einzelne, empirische Individuum gesetzt und gezogen hat.1 Only in representation. The play’s the thing. 1 No one has urged him to the top of such a paradox, one in which he has placed the solitary, empirical human being.

8 p 111, marked X

||Müller describes Royce as “angelsächsischen.”1|| 1

Anglo-Saxon. (Royce was Jewish.)

Lewis Mumford

Herman Melville New York: 1929.

[Professor Richard Lyon’s listing of Santayana’s books at Villa Le Balze includes this volume, dedicated to Santayana by Mumford, and containing “some” marginalia, on a page or two. The volume does not appear to have been sent to Georgetown; I have not seen it.]

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Milton Karl Munitz

The Moral Philosophy of Santayana New York: 1939. Columbia. Sixty-eight marginalia.

[Three marginalia on pages 11 and 18, are in Cory’s hand.] 1 p 3, underlined

||Santayana’s|| contributions to ontology and the theory of knowledge are best viewed as outgrowths of an interest in exploring the environment in which the activities of life take place […]. ? Religion was my original interest, and to substitute truth for fiction in placing human life. 2 p 4, marked

||Santayana’s|| historical affinities […] are with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, not with the Romans, Hebrews, or Germans, for [he] seeks to define the conditions of happiness rather than of righteousness. Good! 3p5

||Munitz analyses Santayana’s theory of morals.|| All this is slightly out of focus, and too “activistic”. 4 p 6, underlined

Happiness, the general name for all positive human values, as Aristotle long ago pointed out, itself needs neither justification nor praise. 5 p 9, underlined

||In The Life of Reason, Munitz finds an attitude|| to be recognized as post-rational […] and therefore one to be smilingly overcome by the energetic hopefulness of the proponent of a rational ethics. ? Interest in a good society with friendship and beauty in it. M. is studious and just, but not sympathetic. He doesn’t know how I felt. 6 pp 10–11, underlined

He has been able, as perhaps few other contemporary philosophers have been, to present a successful restatement of certain orthodox positions that together combine to fill out a thoroughgoing naturalistic theory in metaphysics, methodolgy, and ethics. This is all I should desire to have done.

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7 p 13

||Concerning Santayana’s belief in common sense, Munitz writes that|| the complex total of activities, institutions, beliefs, and ideals of human life are accessible and do not need proof. N.B. the stars are left out, and even the cities. M. slides into literary psychology. 8 p 15

A rationally practical life begins when, by joining impulse and imagination, enlightenment is given to the former and practical efficacy to the latter. Not my words. 9 p 17, underlined

||Transcendentalism assumes that|| “a spontaneous constructive intellect cannot be a trustworthy instrument, that appearances cannot be the properties of reality, and that things cannot be what science finds that they are.”1 Here is a genuine difference between S the 1st and '' '' 2nd. I still say that some may be properties of “reality”, and all may be signs of it. But it is only physical reality that is so remote from intuitive sympathy. The other realms are more open to inspection. 1

Munitz here refers to Reason in Science (Scribner’s, 1906), 310.

10 p 22, underlined

Instead of considering essences, as Santayana generally does, to be ontologically antecedent objects that subsist prior to existence, […] they are regarded as natural creations or poetic themes […], for they are products of the imagination, structures embodied in the limitless languages that the mind can construct, forms that a fertile imagination can freely contrive. This is an inexcusable mis-statement. A theme is neither a creation nor a prior “subsistent”. It is a theme found. Is the number 2 a creation or a prior subsistent? 11 p 23

||Munitz calls spirit a trope.|| Spirit is not a trope.

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12 p 26–27

Nature is dynamic, a matter of beginnings and endings, of potentialities and actualities, of growth and decay. Nature is as much the seat of values and ideals (since man who is a part of nature may experience values and strive for ideals) as of mechanism and blind causation. It is as thoroughly qualitative as it is quantitative, as much logical as it is physical. The sphere of nature is the unified totality of whatever it produces and contains. All distinctions found within this universe are discoveries of its diversely qualified and related contents. This passage is excellent. 13 p 27

||In Scepticism and Animal Faith Santayana sets forth a theory of knowledge that casts doubt on his naturalism.|| The procedure is that of transcendentalism, the conclusion—agnosticism. ||He takes over problems|| bequeathed to modern philosophy by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and seeks an answer to those problems in terms of the assumptions common to the characteristic epistemologic inquiries of these philosophers. The result is no more satisfactory than the conclusions arrived at by Hume or Kant or Spencer. Descartes’ method ignored! Of course it is Descartes that I follow in my scepticism. 14 p 33

||Munitz quotes Santayana early and late concerning science. From Reason in Science, 319, science|| “contains the sum total of our rational convictions and gives us the only picture of reality on which we should care to dwell.” ||And from Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy, p. 79:|| From the point of view of an agnosticism such as his later writings develop, […] “science, when it is more than the gossip of adventure or of experiment, yields practical assurances couched in symbolic terms, but no ultimate insight.” This is an excellent confrontation of texts. It shows the two sides of knowledge or mind, sufficient as an entertainment but inadequate as a report. In the L of R I1 was studying the entertainment. I was younger. 1

Reason in Common Sense (Scribner’s, 1905).

15 p 35

||Santayana follows the Cartesian tradition in modern philosophy.|| Yes.

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16 p 35

Active reflection is a psychic process. For spirit, reflection is only a change of perspective. 17 p 37, underlined

||Santayana is an ontologic dualist, leaning on both Locke and Plato for his ontology.|| Santayana transforms the ideas that intervene as a screen between the spirit and the external world into a realm of timeless universals, […]. Yes, in the sense that they become pure words and no longer, as in Locke, intervening objects, or as in Plato, supernatural powers. Words are vehicles and not obstacles to knowledge. 18 p 39, underlined

For the philosopher, intent upon viewing things in the light of the eternal and the infinite, the realm of essence provides the ultimate standard and goal of insight. Not a standard, since it is infinite, but a sufficient theme when the natural goal of some psychic movement. Cf. music. 19 p 88, underlined

||Munitz criticizes Santayana’s detachment, remarking that he construes the spiritual life in two incompatible ways: as a life of understanding, and as a life of escape from existence,|| as a disintoxication from all ideals, as a reversion to the immediately given that in itself possesses no meaning nor significance. Loving all children equally is radically incompatible with natural fatherhood, but it is not incompatible with the existence of some monks in a rational society, nor with an element of charity to all in the American family. [At bottom:]

Spiritual life is not “engaged in inquiry”. It is a culmination concomitant with all life; but in anxious inquiry there is an element of slavery and distraction. 20 p 92, underlined

In general, then, the spiritual life is not a release from preoccupation with existence, if by this anything more is meant than a provisional detachment from the pursuit of those activities which characterize the practical life.

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Munitz is not as lucid as usual. Pre-occupation is impediment, occupation may be expression & mastery. 21 p 98, underlined and marked Z

The proper function of spirit, in passing beyond good and evil, is “to see such things as come in its way under the form of eternity, in their intrinsic character and relative value, in a word, in their truth.”1 This is not a fair account. Why not quote the text as in the L. of R.? Because the text here w’d destroy his misrepresentations. 1

Platonism and the Spiritual Life, 33.

22 p 99, underlined

||Concerning Santayana’s phrase, the “disintoxication from values”:|| For it would seem that if we are to take this as a serious claim to having overcome completely the necessity for distinguishing good from evil, on all levels of vital endeavor, then we are left with an evident condition. Does M imagine that beauty and love are excluded by me from the spiritual life? Is this accurate? Cf. the text. It is the illusion of exclusiveness, not the fact of excellence, that is to be banished from things. 23 p 100, underlined

For if we grant, as Santayana asks us to do, that the proper function of spirit “is to see such things as come in its way under the form of eternity, in their transitiveness and necessity, in a word, in their truth,”1 […] then evidently the good of the intellect, which consists precisely in this ability to see things in their necessity and their truth, remains as one value from which there can be no disintoxication, […] from values, it still remains true that the disintoxication itself is but with respect to certain values, while leaving others intact. It is impossible to negate all ideals and to elude all interests except by death. [At “disintoxication”:]

There is a trick of some sort here. Of course, “intellect” is that which disintoxicates life, and makes it truly good. Cf. St. Thomas on the Beatific Visions or Dante’s Saints. [At “leaving others intact”:]

Certainly: has salvation no “value”? 1

Platonism and the Spiritual Life, 33.

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24 p 102

To lead the spiritual life is to understand and to act in accordance with that which is morally relevant to life as a whole. Ideals acquire validity in their applicability to material conduct and affairs. The spiritual man is not apart from the world; rather by his elevated and penetrating vision he is brought into closer contact with its essential and ultimate values. All the saints have been Deweyites. 25 p 103

Yet this all-inclusive charity toward every possible good, besides tending to obliterate the distinction between physics and morals, tends in the end to serve as a justification for whatever pre-rational, barbarous ideals may happen to exist. And when we find Santayana telling us that “understanding relieves a truly intelligent man from fussiness about social institutions and conventions [because] they are absurd,”1 we seem to be confronted with an apologetic for reigning conventions and a willingness to submit to the powers that be, that cannot but appear as the very abdication of intelligence in the face of irrationality. It leaves the field open for all sorts of fanaticisms to arise and contest for domination in the world. This lets the cat out of the bag.2 1

Genteel Tradition at Bay, 71. Munitz’s criticism and Santayana’s weak response indicate the naked confrontation between the standard, liberal position of the 1930s, and Santayana’s attempt to rise above thrusting, social issues after a decade of economic depression. 2

26 p 105

[At top:]

It is the moral collapse of America rather than of Europe that disenchants me. It was nicer in the 1890’s. In Europe there is fresh inspiration.1 [Marked Z:]

||Munitz finds disparity between Santayana’s spiritual values and his naturalism, and his enunciation of them early and late.|| But whereas in the earlier writings the stimulus for adopting a contemplative attitude was the confrontation of the world-view of science with that of religion, in the latest writings, it is the increased confusion of the social world, reflecting a maladjustment of political and economic forces, that gives ground for the attempt to rise to an otherworldly contemplation of essences and a complete disintoxication from moral values.

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Here a false ground is alleged. Never my feeling, but I was interested in “culture”. moral rather than spiritual, although of course morality is a spiritual experience and presupposed in salvation. 1

This in 1939–40.

27 p 106

Like the otherworldly emphasis of Christianity, Santayana’s conception of the spiriutal life recalls the spirit from its concern with the intelligible structure of nature and the natural ideals of human life, to a world beyond. It is essentially a variant of the advice to render unto Caesar those things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s, and of the belief that the Kingdom of God is within us. Not bad company. Better than New York!1 1

To the seasoned reader, this translates into one more expression of anit-semitism. 28 p 106, underlined

The realm of essence […] is a world of Platonic Ideas that has been romantically extended in infinite directions. Happiness is now sought in the free play of fancy […], the varied imaginative excursions into which are to be enjoyed in their immediacy as subjective impressions, significant as indications neither of natural conditions nor of possible moral ideals. Not fair. Thomas Munro

Scientific Method in Æsthetics New York: 1928. Georgetown. Six marginalia.

29 p 96

||Formal and psychic factors relating to judgments of value in works of art need verification and clarity.|| The result will be no single definition of “beauty” or standard of æsthetic value. Æsthetics inherits from Platonism an exaggerated respect for the importance of this and similar very broad and “fundamental” words. It is dissatisfied with any standard which is not couched as a brief absolute definition of beauty or goodness, for all persons at all times. Constant confusion of truth with true opinion or final dogma.

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Thomas Munro

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Great Pictures of Europe New York: 1930. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Guy Murchie

Saint Croix: The Sentinel River New York: 1947. Waterloo. One marginale.

John Middleton Murry

God: Being an Introduction to the Science of Metabiology London: 1929. Waterloo. 221 marginalia.

[Santayana’s careful reading of this work by a literary charlatan may perhaps be explained by the dedication to him, “to whom this book owes much more than the author could plainly indicate, from John Middleton Murry November 21 1929.”] 1 p 36, marked

||Murry writes a chapter of autobiography. After the sensation of complete isolation, he describes being bathed in warm light, feeling no menace in the universe, and being part of it.|| […] I belonged, and because I belonged I was no longer I, but something different, which could never be afraid in the old ways […]. The ego transferred to the non-ego: not such a mysterious operation, since it is all putative. 2 p 41, marked

||A description of mystical experience after reading Meister Eckhart:|| I concluded […] that Christianity was an accidental accompaniment of such experience. Hindus, Buddhists, Mohammedans have it too. 3 p 45

I discerned, or thought I discerned, an intimate relation between Jesus and Shakespeare. Take the primary conviction of the existence of God away from Jesus, I thought, and you have a Shakespeare. What fudge!

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4 p 52, marked

||To do what one likes is not easy, but for Murry, it is hard.|| For to know what you really like means to know what you really are; and that is a matter of painful experience and slow exploration. Nothing is more classical than self-knowledge. 5 p 61, marked Z

||Murry decided to write a life of Jesus:|| if this is presumption, criticism that is serious is in duty bound to presume, for there is nothing between presumption and incomprehension. There is discipleship. 6 pp 64–65, underlined

||Christ was not the Messiah; he was rejected.|| Yet what could he have done, being rejected? He could not deny his experience, or recant his teaching. The experience was real, the teaching was true. Had he refused to go onward, his very name might have been lost for ever. Really, the motives & “experience” ascribed to Christ are blasphemous. 7 p 67, underlined

||On the death of Keats and the death of Jesus: Christ would not have required him to sacrifice Keats to Jesus.|| To the Jesus who was real to me, Keats would have been a brother, […]. N.B. 8 p 78, underlined

||Good Friday, 1929: If Christ was alive, he would be with the people in the pubs.|| ‘The Sabbath is made for man, not man for the Sabbath,’ was probably the occasion of the traditionalists’ resolve to destroy him, would have been found at Southend rather than St. Paul’s. How hopelessly wrong a Protestant view of Jesus is! 9 p 79

He [Murry] thinks of a Christ looking for his own sentiments, instead of pitying and forgiving. 10 p 80, underlined

||Of the physical resurrection of Christ:|| It would distress me greatly to be condemned to live in a universe in which an event so stupid might happen; […]. The intelligentsia speaks.

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11 p 87, top

The Bloomsbury perspective of the universe 12 p 87, underlined

By that resurrection in which [ Jesus] affirmed his belief he obviously meant some new mode of existence wherein human relations of the kind we know are transcended. Protestants confuse the body with the world: but there might be bodies in heaven, just as there are stones in a church. 13 pp 87–88

To imagine that he, a Jew, at any time in his life claimed to be God, or the son of God in any sense other than that in which, as he believed, all men were sons of God, is fantastic. Wasn’t St. Paul a Jew too? 14 p 95, underlined

What Jesus preached and taught was not anarchy; […]. No: because he had no hostility to any order. It was not preaching in that sense: it was monition & insight. 15 p 102, underlined

||In 1929 it may be foolish to have a concept of God and to believe in it.|| It was assuredly not foolish nineteen hundred years ago in Galilee to believe in God. What stupidity! As if imagination were literal! 16 p 106, top

||Concerning Christ’s mystical certainty.|| Wasn’t the “mystical certainty” simply commonplace oriental insight? And wasn’t the coming of the kingdom something else, earthy, Jewish, humanitarian, revolutionary? 17 p 109

No man […] in such extremity [as Christ’s], can go forward with open eyes to his own annihilation. Why not? 18 p 112, marked Z

[…] to be prepared to introduce the category of the supernatural into my thinking, would be mental and spiritual suicide. A world which at a certain point, no matter how far distant in time, ceased for a period to belong to the natural order, is no world for me, a man of the twentieth

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century, to contemplate or live in: it would be a cheap and vulgar world, from which it would be my duty as a man to escape immediately. But then that would be the truly natural order. The 20th century be damned. 19 pp 134–35

||There are two kinds of knowledge: mystical and intellectual;|| they cannot meet in combat or contradiction. Intuition is not knowledge at all. It is feeling with a diversified image. 20 p 159, marked

An age which can take Behaviourism seriously as a psychology might be said to be ignorant of the Soul for the simple reason that it had lost it. 21 p 169, marked Z

There is organic unity attainable by man, and there is an organic unity in the Universe, […]. Why should “organic” be a magical word? 22 p 173

||Many of the works of man are ugly.|| Many animals are hideous 23 p 178, underlined and marked

[…] the suffering God was a tremendous creation; it came nearer to the truth of things than any religious imagination had done before: nearer than any of the sublime speculations of the Greeks. […] Essentially, this amazing evolution of religion was the effort of man to find order in the world of his experience. Osiris? Mithra? [At “amazing”:]

Not at all: you are not at home in ancient religion. 24 pp 182–83, marked Z

‘Value’ is creative newness in the organic process of the universe; […]. The creative newness of Jesus was inevitably death to the biological individual, but it was Life to the process as a whole. It became the focus of centuries of conscious and unconscious effort in successive generations of men: a new type had arisen, to which according to their metabiological potentialities a succession of individuals responded.

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“Response to value” is a movement in a direction toward which the organism is predisposed. Otherwise it woud not be a “value”. “Meta” is therefore de trop. 25 p 185, underlined

||In the post-Christian world, life is to be obeyed willingly even to death; it is not the life-force giving us the excuse to do as we wish, but life|| as it came to self-awareness and act in the unity of himself, a strange new creature with a new delicacy of sensibility and a new passionate instinct to live and to understand. Chelsea & Bloomsbury.1 1

And the writings of D. H. Lawrence.

26 p 189

An organic response, relatively to human nature, is one in which intellect and emotion and will are equally participant and equally satisfied. This complete Naturalism, therefore, should have the effect of precluding that extreme conflict between intellect and emotion, and the consequent paralysis of the will, upon which the mystical experience has been shown to supervene. [At top:]

There was no conflict of intellect with emotion except in th the XIX century. The conflict was between prosperity & disaster, passion and passion. 27 p 202, marked

Anyone who wishes to understand human history must understand religion; […] the effort to understand religion is incumbent upon all who seek self-knowledge. Socrates? 28 p 206, marked

||Rascals are as prevalent as in the middle ages.|| By making “value” “objective” you have made it non-moral: i.e. worthless. Brothels have maintained themselves, therefore, etc. 29 p 208

The facts with regard to ‘highness’ and ‘lowness’ are simply that such descriptions of variations are themselves variations. Are you a Behaviourist! Fie!

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30 p 224, marked Z

||Christ was slain for his perfection.|| That is the central meditation of the Christian faith. And everyone who dares to meditate it, be he Christian or unbeliever, knows that in that evil there was good, in that pain joy, and in that death a victory. Misunderstanding. Good could come out of it, or could overcome it. It was never itself good. 31 p 229, underlined

||On joining the Catholic Church:|| It asks no greater sacrifice than Little Bethel or the Church of England; and it does not insult your intelligence by inviting you to become a member of a contradiction in terms—the church of England? O dear, but it is so un-English! 32 p 249, underlined

Reality is the pure phenomenon, and there is no other. Brute fact, he means. 33 p 252, marked Z

The function of the human being is to maintain all possible organic responses. Organic responses are infinitely various. They may be emotional, or intellectual, or animal. What has to be done is to recognize them clearly for what they are. They are not all compatible with one another; many of them will certainly be in open or sullen warfare with each other. Some of them will probably appear to the individual damnable and horrible, and he will be doing his utmost to hide them. His duty is to get them into consciousness. Why talk like this? 34 p 256

[One] must learn that the most blessed gift of all the gods to men (as Goethe said) is Patience. You mean Impatience. 35 pp 263–64, marked

[…] I believe that [D. H. Lawrence] has been instinctively aware that the attempt to decide about Jesus would be truly perturbing to himself. Whereas I am in no danger of discovering that I am like the founder of Christianity; D. H. Lawrence veritably is. He happens to be more like him than any man who has lived for the past fifty years, unless perchance it were that other anti-Christian, Friedrich Nietzsche.

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Think of a man who says this attempting to write a “Life of Jesus”!1 1

Murry had discussed such a project earlier in his text.

36 p 289, marked Z

||On pure contemplation, the wonder in seeing that a simple object exists.|| This is that ‘awe before the pure phenomenon,’ which Goethe tried to describe, and which (if we are not mistaken) gives ontological ultimacy in Mr. Santayana’s metaphysic. It is, in our description, pure and total organic contact with the real. Goethe meant facts, or fact as observed. 37 p 297, marked

The metabiological is just as biological as the biological itself. Why use such jargon? 38 p 301

There is a pathetically eager welcome for the physicist or the logician who dallies with the notion that there may be something (even very much) in mysticism. Eddington & Whitehead. 39 p 316, underlined

I am not a genius; but neither am I a fool. If the truth stared me in the face for so long, and I could not see it, perhaps it must be a difficult truth. And yet, there it is, obvious, before me; and so far as I am able to judge, I am absolutely sane. I have indeed a feeling of sanity such as I have never experienced in my life before. [At “am I a fool”:] ? [At “sanity”:]

To feel sane is to be sane: I was never sane before; when shall I be sane again? John Middleton Murry

Studies in Keats

London: 1930. Georgetown. Thirty-three marginalia. 1 p 36

[“The Meaning of ‘Endymion’.”]

‘What the Imagination seizes as Beauty must be Truth’ appears to mean that what the Imagination conceives as Beauty must be actually existent, ‘whether it existed before or not’.1

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“I am sure of the right which the Heart has to assert the excellence of that which it loves. All the passions create true excellence, whether their objects ever exist or not.” It is evidently the poet’s mission to feel and to praise such perceived excellence, such a truly beautiful Beauty. Is this what K. meant? 1

Quotation from Keats’s letter to Benjamin Bailey as he was writing the poem. 2 pp 47–48, marked

This sensuality of the imagination consists in seeking in the creatures of imagination a substitute for that specific physical satisfaction of which the biological man is in need. […] The sensuousness of the creative imagination is biologically disinterested. But sensuality of the imagination is the sign of a temporary failure in the process of transmutation. The biological desire which was being wholly transformed into metabiological creation now asserts itself as biological desire; the imagination becomes biologically interested. This distinction, which though generally disregarded is of the utmost importance in any real examination of the vexed question of pornography, […]. Did [D. H.] Lawrence transmute? 3 p 54

[Murry quotes from the prelude to Keats’s Endymion: ]

Wherein lies happiness? In that which becks Our ready minds to fellowship divine, A fellowship with essence; till we shine Full alchemiz’d and free of space. N.B. 4 p 61

No ultimate truth is true, except we love it. Unless it awakens love, it is merely a fact and alien to us. Love alone will change fact into Truth. And this, however strange it sound, is no foolish fancy. For Love is a faculty of understanding, and unless it enters into and transmutes our knowledge of fact, we cannot really know. […] That is what Keats meant when he declared that ‘Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty’; and that is what he had glimpsed when he wrote Endymion. Unless I love the facts—or at least the essence I see in them—I do not see their beauty: and they truly have this beauty in relation to such a loving apprehension. But what

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is the sense of saying that they have it absolutely or intrinsically? Their “Truth”, according to you, is only another name for their Beauty; it arises when they are loved 5 p 69, marked Z

[Murry quotes Keats’s well-known letter to his brothers of 19 March 1819:]

“May there not be superior beings, amused with any graceful, though instinctive, attitude my mind may fall into as I am entertained with the alertness of the Stoat and the anxiety of a Deer? Though a quarrel in the street is a thing to be hated, the energies displayed in it are fine. The commonest Man shows a grace in his quarrel. [Seen] by a superior Being our reasonings may take the same tone—though erroneous they may be fine. This is the very thing in which consists Poetry … ” With that perfect and inevitable conclusion we have a complete manifestation of the mood of ‘diligent indolence’. One might describe it as the organic advance to an organic self-awareness. Poetry is the reintegration into organic unity of the would-be autonomous Mind. When the Mind, as it were, behaves as the pure instinct that it veritably is, when it becomes the willing instrument of the total organism, instead of its separated lord,—then Poetry appears. [At “One might describe”:]

Isn’t there a confusion here between love and assimilation? To love or to write poetry you must assert yourself as master of the other. 6 p 78

||The words “beauty” and “truth” recur frequently in Keats’s letters.|| They are at the core of his famous definition: ‘The excellence of every art is its intensity, capable of making all disagreeables evaporate from their being in close relationship to Beauty and Truth.’ Intuition mastering the will. Cf. Schopenhauer. 7 p 81, underlined and marked Z

The relation between [beauty and truth] is simple and inextricable. When we love a Fact, it becomes Truth; when we attain that detachment from our passions whereby it becomes possible for us X to love all Facts, ^ ^be loved, it is not then we have reached our Peace. If a Truth cannot Truth, but only Fact. But the Fact does not change, in order that it may become Truth; it is we who change. X All Fact is beautiful; it is we who have to regain our innocence to see^its^Beauty.

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Not as fact. That would be wickedness. Only the essence which may (or may not) appear in the facts. For Beauty is fiction even before it is “Truth”. 8 p 116

||Murry quotes I. A. Richards:|| “A pseudo-statement is ‘true’ if it suits and serves some attitude or links together attitudes which on other grounds are desirable.” “Vital lies” W. A. Neilson and A. H. Thorndike

The Facts about Shakespeare

New York: 1913. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Ralph Nevill

Floreat Etona: Anecdotes and Memories of Eton College London: 1911. One marginale.

[On Richard Lyon’s list at Villa Le Balze; not at Georgetown.]

Marius Paul Nicolas

De Nietzsche à Hitler Paris: 1936. Waterloo. Eighty-four marginalia.

1 p 10, marked

||Nietzsche’s mission: to hold nothing sacred.|| This suggests respect for truth. 2 p 17

||Benda said that all Nietzsche’s work was the work of a fanatic.|| Unbridled spontaneity = madness. 3 p 19

||Nietzsche held Christ responsible for the St. Bartholemy massacres and the other autos da fé committed in his name.|| A protestant who has his own historical Jesus 4 p 20

||Nietzsche knew that his thought was difficult and would not be understood.|| Isn’t it odd that his companions answered: “It’s of little import to us what you said! Let us just see what the crowd has understood.” The point is to understand what the crowd had in it. The misunderstood great man is content to understand himself.

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5 p 24, underlined

||Nietzsche quoted:|| “Nulle souffrance, disait-il, n’a pu ni ne pourra me tenter de donner un faux témoignage sur la vie.”1 This is not at all the truth. It is rather gaia scienza.2 1

“No amount of suffering,” he said, “can nor could tempt me to bear false witness to life.” 2 The gay science. 6 pp 26–27, marked

||Nietzsche on the social lies of our civilization:|| “To speak idiocies to children but not to tell them truths, to say polite nothings to women but not truth, to speak to young people about their future, their pleasures, and not at all of realities,” that is what seemed to him wrong, the eternal abdication from effort, the eternal submission to prejudice. “Truth” = spontaneity, poetic freedom? Subjectivity is too deep in N. for him to be consistent. 7 p 28

Partout où l’on dit: “La vérité est là”, il répond: “On ment.”1 So that the love of truth is expressed by living merrily without it. 1

Wherever they say to him, “The truth lies there,” he answers: “They lie.”

8 p 29, top

Truth descriptive: before all description must be existence, reality, actuality. This must also lie beyond. 9 p 43, doubly marked

A clerc1 who would stop “thinking against” [i.e. critically] would cease to be a clerc. N.B. Definition of “clerc” = fault-finder. 1

Scholar, intellectual.

10 p 43

||Belief in law, or right, unites Hitler and Hindenburg.||One has seen that “belief ” does not unite Hitler and Nietzsche. It is true that Nietzsche thought of vital force, not of armies & police. He thought of health and the dance. 11 p 49, doubly marked

||A quotation from Nietzsche’s posthumous work:|| “Je connais la volupté que renferme le malheur de la connaissance.”1 1

I am familiar with the pleasure attending the sickness of the understanding.

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12 p 53, underlined and marked X

||From Thus Spake Zarathustra: || “L’art est le plus fulgurant symbole de l’oppression du peuple par les élites.”1 [At bottom:]

There is some confusion here between intellectual pride and material domination. The super-man is bitterly realistic (intelligent) but for that very reason despises the impotent intelligentsia. This is what Benda feels, & he tries to revenge himself by degrading Nietzsche into a brutal Nazi. But the Nazis, too, have intellectual superiority to prejudice. That is what these gents don’t see. 1

Art is the most blazing symbol of the oppression of the people by the elite.

13 p 56

Presque tous les génies de la pensée romantique cultivent cet étrange ^ ^ sentiment dont parle Nietzsche lui-même, ce “sentiment de haine, de vengeance et de révolte contre tout ce qui est déjà, contre tout ce qui ne devient plus”.1 1

Almost all the geniuses of romantic thought cultivate the odd idea of which Nietzsche himself speaks, this “feeling of hatred, of revenge and revolt against what already is, against whatever cannot again be.” 14 p 62, underlined

“Quatre couples d’hommes ne se sont pas refusés à moi,” écrit Nietzsche: “ce sont Epicure et Montaigne, Gœthe et Spinoza, Platon et Rousseau, Pascal et Schopenhauer.”1 ! 1

“Four pairings of men have not rejected me,” Nietzsche wrote: “they are ….”

15 p 69, underlined

For the Chancellor, Hitler, what makes the greatness of a man, “ce n’est pas la richesse de ses facultés intellectuelles, mais sa propension à mettre toutes ses capacités au service de la communauté”.1 This is not to be guided by the masses, but to guide them, of course for the good of themselves. 1 It is not the abundance of his intellectual qualities, but his proclivity to place all his abilities to the service of the community. [Mein Kampf ]

16 p 71

||In Zarathustra, Nietzsche was original in inventing the idea of the true masters to legislate for the world.|| There is Plato’s Republic.

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17 p 75

||Concerning Nietzsche’s superman:|| If the superman governs, is his superiority that of a governor or of a pure intelligence? 18 p 78, top

Did Nietzsche want a theocracy? 19 p 82, underlined

||Benda said that Nietzsche doesn’t admit a doctrine because it is just or good,|| “mais parce qu’elle incarne bien la morale de son temps1 ….” This is true of Hegel. 1

Because it embodies the morality of his time.

20 p 86, top

Things are the measure of thought when thought is about them: thought is its own measure when it is about nothing: when it merely define [sic] its own ideas. 21 p 91

||Nietzsche recognized his ideas as Utopian. Benda defined the ideals of the clerc as Utopian.|| Utopia, sport, earnestness without seriousness. 22 p 105

||Nietzsche on Christian dogma.|| Nietzsche is often ignorant. 23 p 109

||Nietzsche’s call to love life not only for the good and the beautiful,|| mais de 1’aimer encore dans ce qu’elle a de mal, de tragique ou d’affreux.1 Why? This is a new reversal of values. 1

… but to love it also in what it offers of evil, of tragedy or frightfulness.

24 p 142

||German anti-semitism, abundantly described, from Hitler’s Mein Kampf to the diatribes of Rosenberg.|| [At top:]

You can’t get one Chosen People to love another.1 1

Here Santayana is not only anti-semitic but also cynical.

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25 p 154

||Nietzsche’s criticism of socialist culture, of Spencer’s industrial state, of Barrès’ nationalism, the primacy in France of the intelligentsia:|| la France représente à ses yeux “le refuge de la culture la plus intellectuelle” […].1 1880’s “Culture” is an intellectual brothel. 1

France represents in his eyes “the refuge of the most intellectual culture.”

26 p 155

||The League of Nations: everyone sees his neighbor as neither black nor white, but grey, which is not the color of flags.|| N.B. 27 p 155, underlined

“Hélas! s’écrie Renan, depuis le commencement du monde, on n’a pas encore vu une aimable nation.” L’avis de Stendhal est plus net: “Rien n’est bête, dit-il, “comme une nation.”1 Beauties in the house opposite? 2 1

“Alas,” cries Renan, “since the beginning of the world, one has never seen a lovable nation.” Stendhal’s opinion is more precise: “Nothing is so stupid,” he says, “as a nation.” 2 Santayana unaccountably detested Stendhal, whom he may have regarded as a romantic, thus ignoring his neo-Classical side. 28 p 159

||Nietzsche wanted to create a new Europe and a new caste of chosen men, superior to their culture and will,|| to put an end to the endless comedy of petty politics. Nietzsche a patron of Geneva, with Calvin and Wilson? 29 p 160

||Further to Nietzsche’s vision of the new Europe as a world center for the exchange of ideas:|| he dreamed of the “fusion of nations.” He wanted to be a Maenad of the mind. This dates Nietzsche. He was a genius: but in politics he was an aesthete 30 p 161, bottom

The mistake is to transfer to a nation what Nietzsche desired for the Spontaneous Me. Yet it is true, against this criticism, that the defiance of reality is equal in both forms of self-agrandisment [sic ]

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31 p 165

||Nietzsche wrote:|| True heroism consists in not fighting at all. The Martyr 32 p 169

La guerre aussi est une source d’énergie.1 Much more of virtue. How admirable the English were during the [Great] war, and how contemptible they are now! [1936] 1

War is also a source of energy.

33 p 176, marked Z

||Nietzsche saw wars of religion as forms of progress, for they were conflicts for what he saw as the idea of progress, as opposed to territorial wars.|| Absolute reversal of the truth. Territorial wars are inevitable, because bodies are competitors for space & food: but wars for ideas are fanatical, mad, & needless; and end by enslaving the spirit of the material victor. Nine

[Literary periodical.] Nos. 1–11, Autumn 1949–April 1956 Waterloo. One marginale.

Albert Jay Nock

Memoirs of a Superfluous Man

New York and London: 1943. Waterloo. Thirty-three marginalia. [Marginalia includes several corrections of grammar and spelling.] 1 p 20, marked

[…] Ruskin’s observation that “travel becomes uninteresting in exact proportion to its rapidity” applies as well to commuters’ travel […]. 2 p 28, underlined

||The first music to stay in Nock’s memory was|| a few measures from the final chorus in the second act of la Traviata. third? 3 p 120, underlined

||Against the state control proposed by reformers:|| The control would again be taken over by the most sagacious among the poor mass-men, they would become rich, […].

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Not if they were employed on a just salary as officials and inheritance were abolished. 4 p 146, marked

As a general principle, I should put it that a man’s country is where the things he loves are most respected. 5 p 275, marked

||The idea of an educable minority is quite wrong, for it is only appropriate to a certain kind of society, which the United States had not.|| 6 pp 279–80, marked

||Nock had no fits of depression.|| “Things and actions are what they are,” said Bishop Butler, “and the consequences of them will be what they will be.” There the State was, fixed, immovable, standing as the great instrument of economic exploitation; there also was the philosophy of economism; there also was a system of compulsory popular instruction, answering to the requirements of both. In its great work of training and conditioning the ineducable masses, I thought our system was doing, on the whole, a first-rate job, and I said so publicly. As for the educable minority, they were merely casualties of the time and circumstances […]. ? If this is sincere it redeems the faults of this ill-tempered book. José Ortega y Gasset

La rebelión de las masas

Buenos Aires and Mexico City: 1938 (2nd edition). Waterloo. 157 marginalia. 1 p 9, underlined

||A man|| Dice, poco más o menos, una parte de lo que pensamos […].1 Confusión de lo que pensamos con lo que debeiramos pensar.2 1

Says, more or less, a part of what we think …. Confusion over what we think with what we ought to think.

2

2 p 34, underlined and marked

||Such is the power of the masses that one cannot envisage an individual act in the near future.|| La cosa es horrible […].1 ? 1

The prospect is horrible.

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3 p 35, underlined

Es […] muy difícil salvar una civilización cuando le ha llegado la hora de caer bajo el poder de los demagogos.1 ¿Porqué intentar salvar una cosa que se muere? ¡Que nascia otra!2 1

It is very difficult to save a civilization when it has arrived at the point of falling into the hands of demagogues. 2 Why try to save a dying thing? Let another be born! 4 p 35, underlined

The essential demagoguery of the demagogue lies within his mind and is rooted en su irresponsabilidad […].1 Lloyd George 1

In his irresponsibility.

5 p 39, underlined

||Ortega asserts the necessity of continuity in history, which is supported by the ability to|| recordar 1 ||transmitted from one generation to another.|| [At “recordar”:]

de tradición. La memoria sin documentos e instrumentos no vale nada.2 1

Remember. Of tradition. Memory without documents and records is worthless.

2

6 p 40, marked

||The extreme formality of the coronation of George VI in England was necessary because of the uproar on the continent and the necessity to affirm the permanent customs of national life.|| y para protestar contra el insulto de la abdicación de Eduardo VIII.1 1

And to protest against the insult of the abdication of Edward VIII. [In order to marry the American divorcée, Mrs. Simpson.] 7 p 66, underlined and marked

||In the past thirty years, humanity in Europe arrived at the point to which it had to reach, a point for which it had begun to travel many generations ago.|| filisteo yo no1 1

Philistine not I.

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8 p 67

||At times in the nineteenth century, there were those who were|| archisatisfechos.1 No eran las personas las que estaban satisfechas: estas eran pesimistas: la satisfacción era ideologica.2 1

Completely satisfied. It wasn’t individuals who were satisfied: they were the pessimists: the satisfaction was ideological. 2

9 p 77

||The possibilities of enjoyment for the man of moderate means have increased fantastically.|| y nunca se aburrió tan soberanamente!1 1

And never has he been so supremely bored!

10 p 77, top

El periódico y el cine no valen una guitarra Tu, pintada y pati nuda Ya no me llega al alma.1 1 The newspaper and the films / cannot equal the guitar / You, all painted and bare-legged / I cannot possibly love you.

11 p 78, top

||Ortega on the advances of modern physics.|| Hoy sin cielo y sin infierno el mundo se ha hecho chico1 1

Today without heaven or hell the world has become diminished.

12 p 80fn

It is not that we are decadent, but that since we are ready to admit any possibility, we do not exclude decadence. Fichte le dijo hace 100 años.1 1

Fichte said that 100 years ago.

13 p 105, underlined

||Ortega asks why, to his knowledge, there has never been|| un ensayo sobre la tontería?1 Erasmus 1

An essay about foolishness.

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14 p 111, marked

||The political complexion of the present lacks definition from the habit of making peace with the enemy, governance through compromise, creating a homogeneous, crushing mass which eliminates all opposition.|| Liberalism would be pure intelligence if it were limited to granting minorities the right to live, provided that the chosen life of the majority were not thereby disturbed: the right to live separated. But liberalism is dissolving if it means the right of minorities to derange the life of the majority & render its perfect operation impossible. 15 p 113

La rebelión de las masas puede, en efecto, tránsito de una nueva y sin par organización de la humanidad, pero también puede ser una catástrofe en el destino humano.1 Y puede ser la cosa mas ordinaria y corriente del mundo2 1

The revolt of the masses may in fact amount to a new and unparalleled organization of humanity; but it might also be a catastrophe in human destiny. 2 And it may be the most ordinary and common thing in the world. 16 p 118

||What liberalism and technology need.|| Trade! 17 p 125, marked Z

Historical knowledge is a technique of the first order for conserving and continuing an old civilization. Los romanos conocían su larga historia. Porque no progresaron siempre?1 1

The Romans knew their long history. Why did they not continue always to progress? 18 p 126

The politics of the nineteenth century was devised—by the eighteenth century—precisely in order to avoid the error of all the earlier politicians. Montesquieu? 19 p 131, marked

[Chapter: “La época del ‘señorito satisfecho’.” 1 ]

Summary he was Ignorant Self-satisfied aggressive 1

The epoch of the smug young gentleman (or playboy).

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20 p 132, underlined

Es una de tantas deformaciones como el lujo produce en la materia humana.1 N.B. Here you touch the live wire. 1

He is one of the many deformations that luxury produces in the raw material of humanity. 21 p 133

||Ortega writes that the hereditary aristocrat is divorced from his ancient authenticity; he cannot be any more, he can only represent what he is presumed to be.|| No; this is pure sophistry. The heir has a lovely place of his own in his world. 22 p 133

El resultado es esa específica bobería de las viejas noblezas, que no se parece a nada y que, en rigor, nadie ha descrito todavía en su interno y trágico mecanismo— […] su irremediable degeneración.1 No conoce V. Inglaterra2 1 The result is that specific stupidity of the old nobles who amount to nothing, and whom no one has as yet truthfully described in their internal and tragic mechanism—their irremediable degeneration. 2 I do not recognize this. Vide England.

23 p 140, marked

Casi nadie presenta resistencia a los superficiales torbellinos que se forman en arte o en ideas, o en política, o en los usos sociales.1 Este libro es uno de esos torbellinos.2 1 Practically no one resists the superficial whirlwinds that form in the arts or in ideas, or in politics, or in social habits. 2 This book is one of those whirlwinds.

24 p 162, marked

||One can only govern through janissaries with their cooperation and the consent of the governed.|| Physical presence leaves traces & creates reflexes: otherwise it would not govern but only push. (Talleyrand to Napoleon: “Con las bayonetas, Sire, se puede hacer todo, menos una cosa: sentarse sobre ellos.”)1 1

“With bayonets, Sire, you can do anything save one: sit on them.”

George Santayana’s Marginalia

2:97

25 p 175, underlined and marked

||On the Spanish middle class:|| But one would have to see the enormous dose of personal demoralization, de encanallamiento que en el hombre medio de nuestro país produce el hecho de ser España una nación que vive desde hace siglos con una conciencia sucia en la cuestión de mando y obediencia.1 1

… the degradation in the middle class in our country produces the fact that Spain is a nation that has lived for centuries with a dirty conscience in the question of command and obedience. 26 p 182, underlined

Se habla mal del Parlamento en todas partes; pero no se ve que en ninguna de las que cuentan se intente su sustitución, […].1 Este protesta no acierta.2 1 Everywhere they speak badly of the Parliament; but no one sees that none of them talk about trying an alternative. 2 This protest is off the mark.

27 p 198

||The state must grow or die.|| He reached his twentieth birthday with a sigh. When he stopped growing, he began to die. 28 p 206

||Ortega contemplates the rise and decline of Rome.|| It is true that aggression unites a band that self-defence might disperse. 29 p 211

||The contrast between the static state, as Spain has been, with the state in constant process of change and growth.|| Este estado es esencialmente fascista.1 1

This [dynamic] state is essentially fascist.

30 p 214

Ahora llega para los europeos la sazón en que Europa puede convertirse en idea nacional. […] El Estado nacional de Occidente, cuanto más fiel permanezca a su auténtica sustancia, más derecho va a depurarse en un gigantesco Estado continental.1 [Santayana omits accent marks here.]

¿Sin Inglaterra or con ella? ¿Sin los Estados Unidos? ¿Con Rusia?

2:98

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Es que le gustan las naciones extranjeras y quiere ser ingles, frances, y aleman sin dejar de ser español. Pero lo internacional—las matematicas, la religion—no es otra nacionalidad, sino una cosa espiritual or [sic] material comun a todos.2 1

Now the time arrives for Europeans in which Europe might be converted to the national idea … . The national State in the West, insofar as it remains loyal to its authentic substance, the more directly it will purify itself into an enormous continental State. 2 Without England or with her? Without the United States? With Russia? It is that foreign nations want to remain English, French, and German without ceasing to be Spanish. But the international idea—in mathematics, religion—does not constitute another nationality, but a spiritual or material quality common to all. 31 p 216, underlined

Por fortuna, la idea del Estado nacional que el europeo, dándose de ello cuenta o no, trajo al mundo, no es la idea erudita, filológica que se le ha predicado.1 [At top:]

Mussolini & Hitler, eruditos filólogos.2 1

As luck would have it, the idea of the national State offered to the world, taking account of it or not, is not the learned, philological idea that had been preached. 2 Mussolini and Hitler, learned philologists. 32 p 217

||The fast pace of contemporary existence.|| 1926? 33 p 217, underlined

Todo, desde la manía del deporte físico (la manía, no el deporte mismo) hasta la violencia en política; desde el «arte nuevo» hasta los baños de sol en las ridículas playas a la moda.1 1938 Expulsion de los judios Todo va en aumento2 1

Everything, from the mania for physical sport (the mania, not sport itself) to violence in politics; from art nouveau to sunbathing in the ridiculous, fashionable beaches. 2 Expulsion of the Jews. Everything increasing. 34 p 217

La libertad falsificación de la vida1 1

Liberty falsification of life.

George Santayana’s Marginalia

2:99

35 pp 217–18, underlined

||Nations as individual units become slack, lose moral impetus.|| Ya no puede hacerse nada con ellos si no es trascenderlos.1 [At top:]

¡Que quieres, niño?—Mamá, “dame un nuevo principio de vida”! Quelle erreur!2 1

Now one can expect nothing from them unless they transcend their condition. What do you want, child? “Mama, give me a new principle of life.” What a mistake! 2

36 p 221, underlined

Con tal de servir a algo que dé un sentido a la vida y huir del propio vacío existencial, no es difícil que el europeo se trague sus objeciones al comunismo, y ya que no por su sustancia, se sienta arrastrado por su gesto moral.1 Romanticismo Hay que fingir heroicamente.2 1

With such as that to make sense of life and to fill their existential vacuum, it is not difficult for the European to swallow his objections to communism, although not for its actual meaning, and to be carried away by its moral aspect. 2 Romanticism One must imagine heroically. 37 p 223

En cuanto a las otras Dictaduras, bien hemos visto cómo halagan al hombre-masa, pateando cuanto parecía eminencia.1 Ferrero, Croce, Einstein, eminencias.2 Marconi, Gentile, Spengler vulgaridades.3 1

As for the other dictatorships, we have seen how they make up to mass-man, trampling them under foot when they looked to be eminent. 2 Eminences. 3 Ordinary types. 38 p 252

||The spirit and ideals of the League of Nations were out of date and mistaken from the beginning.|| Old Calvin-and-water Wilson. 39 p 272, underlined

||Recent events in the world,|| cosas de grave importancia para Inglaterra y que le han sorprendido.1 Abyssinia, Palestine, Germany, Spain, Geneva! Wrong every time! 1

… events of grave importance for England which have surprised that country.

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40 pp 274–75, doubly marked

A few days ago Albert Einstein took it upon himself as a “right” to pronounce his opinion about the Spanish civil war and to take a position on it. Well, Albert Einstein displays radical ignorance about what has occurred in Spain, now, a century ago, and always. The impulse that brings him to this insolent intervention is the same impulse which for a long time has caused the universal loss of prestige of the intellectuals, and which, in their turn, it seems that now they send the world adrift for lack of spiritual power. 41 p 278, underlined

Por lo pronto, vendrá una articulación de Europa en dos formas distintas de vida pública: la forma de un nuevo liberalismo y la forma que, con un nombre improprio, se suele llamar «totalitaria».1 [At “liberalismo”:] ? 1 Meanwhile, an articulation of Europe in two distinct forms of life will arrive: the form of a new liberalism, and the form with an inappropriate name which they are accustomed to call “totalitarian.”

Emil Otto

Elementary German Grammar Heidelberg: 1914. Waterloo. Two marginalia.

E. Allison Peers

Spanish Mysticism: A Preliminary Survey

London: 1924. [An anthology.] Waterloo. Forty-four marginalia. 1 p 6, marked

||The founders of Seville said of the Cathedral,|| “Let us build so magnificent a temple that in ages to come men shall think us to have been mad.”1 1

The founders of Seville were Moors, and their “temple” a mosque.

2 p 183, underlined

[From Francisco de Osuna:]

Llámase también unión, porque llegándose el hombre de esta manera a Dios se hace un espíritu con él por un trocamiento de voluntades, que ni el hombre quiere otra cosa de lo que Dios quiere, […].1 This happens in every realised good. 1

That is also mystical union, because when a person arrives to God in such a manner, he joins with Him in an exchange of desires; he desires only that which God desires.

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2:101

3 p 203

[From Juan de Avila:]

||Love of God begins crudely and imperfectly.|| Entremos en la cárcel de su amor, pues Él entró en la del nuestro, […].1 This is artificial emotion. Stories and heroisms cannot be the source of spiritual love. It may be their source, but must spring from our own nature. 1

Let us enter into the prison of his love, for He entered into our prison.

4 p 222

[Santayana paraphrases St. John of the Cross. God is:]

Beyond reason & beyond self. 5 p 224, marked

[San Juan de la Cruz, “¡Oh Lámparas de Fuego!”]

[…] al alma el mismo Dios muchas lámparas, pues de cada una tiene noticia, y le dan calor de amor […] una lámpara; la cual lámpara es todas estas lámparas, porque luce y arde de todas maneras.1 The good is all goods, in their common attribute of goodness: and it requires their diversity in order to be all goods. 1 God imbues the soul with many lights, all of which bring knowledge; one alone gives the soul the warmth of love, which lamp is all the lamps, because it enlightens and burns as do all.

6 p 225, marked

||San Juan elaborates his metaphor of the fiery lamps.|| This is exactly the dialectic of Diotima reversed: & this movement is the least often understood From the one to the many. 7 p 226

The Absolute is there to be an object to the relative: and also vice versa, in so far as the Spirit in each is absolute spirit: but it must be the spirit of a relative psyche. 8 p 236

|| Juan de los Ángeles’ sermons, he believes, perform a grand service to God|| and it will be of no small benefit to the Christian republic, if he shall write his book, Triunfos y Diálogos. ¡Que pillo!1 1

What a scoundrel!

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9 p 241

St. Augustine said animatedly that the love of God was a weight on his soul. momentum not weight 10 p 245, underlined

||Diego de Estella on the function of the will in wanting to do God’s will:|| Porque en la voluntad no hay necesidad como la hay en la naturaleza, y pluguiese a tí, mi Dios, que la hubiere y un atamiento necesario, de manera que aunque no quisiésemos no pudiésemos hacer otra cosa, […].1 [At “que aunque”:]

The will, then, would still be free and vacuous. This is the illusion in most minds: Diego de Estella at least sees that it is a dreadful pity that it should be so. 1 Because in the will there is no necessity, as there is in nature, and if it pleased you, my God, that we undergo a necessary restraint of the will in a manner that we disliked and still were unable to act otherwise … .

11 p 245, marked

We are pilgrims in this world, and as such we pronounce the divine letters and make our way to you, Lord, as to our own land and the nature of our souls, en quien nos movemos, come dice el Apóstol, y vivimos y somos:1 X […]. ^ X Note that this is understood morally, not physically^ or pantheistically. We live move and have our being in the thought of what we love. It is our secret, not our locus. 1

… in whom we move, as the Apostle says, and in whom we live and have our being. 12 p 254, marked

[Diego de Estella:]

[…] sutil y claro, asi el amor, aunque en su comienzo empiece al principio imperfecto, impuro y terreno, va subiendo a su propia esfera, que es Dios, y perfeccionándose hasta llegar a él y mejorándose hasta llegar al punto de su perfección.1 This is good sense, and like the Symposium 1 … subtle and clear, thus is love, although in its origins it starts from an imperfect, impure and earthly principle, rising to its own sphere, which is God, and perfecting itself until it arrives at Him and improving itself to the point of perfection.

George Santayana’s Marginalia

Charles Pierre Péguy

2:103

Notre jeunesse Paris: 1933. Waterloo. Thirteen marginalia.

1 p 168, marked

||About the Dreyfus affair. In retrospect, it may look as though the intellectuals were responsible for the Dreyfus affair. They were not.|| Reflection shows that intellectuals are ineffectual in bringing plans into reality, and plans that come about in history owe little to intellectual efforts. Cf. the war of l914–18. 2 p 180, underlined

[Of the moderns:]

Ceux qui font les heureux sont aussi malheureux, plus malheureux que les autres, plus malheureux que nous.1 America 1 Those who make the moderns happy are themselves unhappy, more unhappy than the rest, more unhappy than we are.

3 pp 199–200

When a great war breaks out, or a great revolution—that sort of war—it is because a great people, a great race must break out. It has had enough, particularly enough of peace. True of the Germans in 1914. Ralph Barton Perry

The Moral Economy New York: 1909. Georgetown.

[Marginalia few, inconsequential, and probably not in Santayana’s hand.]

Pestalozzi Foundation of America

Pestalozzi Foundation

New York:[?] 1947. Waterloo. No marginalia.

William Matthew Flinders Petrie

The Revolutions of Civilisation

New York and London: 1941. Waterloo. Six marginalia. [Fly-leaf:]

From Paul Burke 89–21 161st St. Jamaica, N.Y. 1 p 112, doubly marked

[Concerning the Arabs in Spain, and in Europe:]

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George Santayana’s Marginalia

The political power was […] at its greatest extent when Abd er Rahman reached the middle of France in 732. When we look further, we see that by 1030 they deplore the rapid deterioration of the people; and by 1144 a democratic system began, setting up and overthrowing rulers with great frequency by the power of the vox populi. This regular feature of a decaying civilisation shows that it had certainly passed all its stages of growth and glory. Democracy is a weedy growth over among the corn. But it is itself the harvest when there is no grain grown. This informs to the indoctrinated genteel democracy in America. Hence British & Protestant. William Lyon Phelps

Robert Browning: How to Know Him Indianapolis: n.d. Georgetown. No marginalia.

Philosophy in American Education

Edited by Brand Blanshard et al. New York and London: 1945. Waterloo. Two marginalia.

1 p 16, marked

[On World War II:]

The question has arisen recurrently whether most men, even those who have fought and won it, are sure what it has all been about. They are, in the sense that they know in a general way what they are against; they are against aggression, against settling things by violence, X against racial ^ ^ precisely for? oppression and political dictation. But what are they Democracy? Yes, certainly. But what is that? Again they know in a way. It is what has made possible the sort of life they have been living, with its thousand points that affection clings to, and its thousand little grounds for gratitude. [At top:] X

Can any victory settle anything except by violence?

Princess Pilar of Bavaria and Desmond Chapman-Hutton Don AIfonso XIII: A Study of Monarchy London: 1931. Waterloo. No marginalia.

George Santayana’s Marginalia

Pedro Antonio Pizá

2:105

Fermagoric Triangles Santurce, Puerto Rico: 1945. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Plato [Santayana of course had read the Platonic dialogues as a student at Harvard, and he lectured on Plato and Aristotle as an instructor there. His fullest study of the Greek texts took place during his residence in King’s College, Cambridge, in 1896–97. His Greek texts, as well as his edition of Jowett’s translation, are inscribed “King’s College,” and dated 1896 or 1897. From Santayana’s cross-references in Jowett, as well as from his autobiography, we know that he worked directly from the Greek with his tutor, Henry Jackson. He appears to have used Jowett occasionally to correct Jowett or to crib from him. It is obvious from certain of the marginalia in Jowett that he used it in his lectures on Greek philosophy. He complained frequently about his “bad Greek,” and remarked in a letter that he abandoned the idea of true scholarship on Plato after the year at Cambridge because of his failure to master the language. His self-deprecation must be read with scepticism. The marginalia-count, in both the Greek and the English translation, gives some indication to the qualities of precision and philosophical interpretation that Santayana brought to his Platonic year with Jackson:]1 Greek text Jowett’s translation Cratylus 9 12 Phaedo 37 11 Theaetetus 4 29 Sophist 100 + 4 pages of 40 notes tipped in Politics (Statesman) 8 Timaeus 103 8 Republic 82 (Intro. 28) text, 59 In Jowett only: General introduction, 24; Phaedrus, 6; Ion, 9; Gorgias, 37; Laws, 86; Parmenides, 4; Philebus, 46. All of Santayana’s Plato are in the Georgetown library. 1 See Persons and Places, critical edition (MIT Press, 1986), p. 439. A great many of the marginalia are purely linguistic and of interest mainly, or only, to students of Greek as a language. Translations are Jowett’s, unless otherwise indicated.

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George Santayana’s Marginalia

[The following are Santayana’s notes tipped into the Sophist.]

References to the nature of the Ideas Euthy phro. Phaedrus

Symposium Republic

Phaedo

Parmenides

Sophist

Philebus Timaeus

5 C–D ? [ 237 B –248 C. ] 247 C – 250 C especially 247 – 248. 209 E – 212 C especially 210 A – 211, B.C. 475 E, 476 A. 508 E. 509 B. [ 523 A ] ? 522E–594C 596 A — E. 65 D. 100 C — 103 especially 100 C D 102 B C 129 D–E 130 B—E 131 E – 132 B. [ 228 D ] ? 245 A 246 B 12 C, D – 13 A 14 C – 15 C 51 B – 51 D. 52 A — D.

1) Society - temperate, brave, [?] wise “just” ? Throughout. 2) 1st wave Women like men — division of labour must be natural. 3) 2nd wave — Community of wives. 4) 3rd wave – Kings philosophers. Dialectic.

George Santayana’s Marginalia

Plato

2:107

Cratylus In Platonis dialogi secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi Edited by K. F. Hermann Six volumes. Volume I. Leipzig: 1896. Georgetown.

[Thrasyllus (under Tiberius, 42 Democritus and Plato.]

B.C.–37 A.D.)

was editor of works of

1 p 185, para. 389, underlined and marked

||Socrates says that as the shuttle-maker has in mind an ideal shuttle as he works, so the legislator strives for perfect form in syllables and words.||  ’A              !"     !       ! !                !!       !"#   "         !" !"        $         %  "  &  !"           $      "  "         %  "  ! &    !      ' " #1 Most important passage 1 Socrates: Then, as to the names: ought not our legislator also know how to put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but the materials may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country;—there is no difference.

2 p 200, para. 399, marked

||Socrates on how words are formed and written.||  ( [B] $     "  " " %     !  )   ) " "  "   !)!           )  !!1 What could Greek have sounded like? 1

Take the word Diî Philos; in order to convert this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one of the iotas and sound the middle syllable grave instead of acute; as, on the otherhand, letters are sometimes inserted in words instead of being omitted, and the acute takes the place of the grave.

2:108

George Santayana’s Marginalia

Plato

Thaeatetus Edited by K. F. Hermann, after Thrasyllus Volume III. Georgetown.

1 p 339, paras. 188–89, underlined and marked

||Socrates to Thaeatetus on the difficulty of distinguishing between true and false opinion:||  *   "     +    + "         "   # ,-*. /    /        + ,-*. 0  % 1               ,-*. 2  1   "          # ,-*. 1    /  " )3  &   )3# ,-*. *"  /    )3  &  # ,-*.  &  /  "  )3    )3 ,-*. /    * "   "  )3      )31 Here is the Platonic definition of reality, by implication. To be is to have a quality: to partake in logical being or determination—to have an “essence”. 1

Socrates: But if [a man] sees any one thing, he sees something that exists. Do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non-existing things? Thaeatetus: I do not. Socrates: And he who hears anything, hears some one thing,—a thing which is? Thaeatetus: Yes. Socrates: And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and therefore is? [… … … …] Socrates: So, then, does not he who holds an opinion holds an opinion of some one thing?

George Santayana’s Marginalia

Plato

2:109

Sophist Edited by K. F. Hermann, after Thrasyllus Volume IV. Georgeown.

[Translation of Harold North Fowler throughout the dialogue.] 1 p 396, para. 228, marked

[Socrates to Thaeatetus:]

Is deformity anything else than the presence of the quality of disproportion, which is always ugly? Good 2 p 399, para. 229, marked

[The Elean Stranger defines ignorance:]

Thinking that one knows a thing when one does not know it. Through this, I believe, all the mistakes of the mind are caused in all of us. [Charles Eliot] Norton 3 p 402, para. 231, top

[A general comment:]

All this shows (intentionally?) that the class “sophist” is a variable; therefore there can be no idea of sophist. 4 p 407, para. 234, marked Z

||The Stranger tells young Thaeatetus that the young may be deluded by oratory, but experienced men find that facts do not conform to unreal propositions.|| ,-*. 4  %    " "   " &"# [D] 5- 4       ,"       $ & " &  !      6 " "       !   !" 3    !       )    !   &   +    [E] '  !  %         )  #7 Quote in Life of Reason 1

Therefore all of us elders here will try, and are now trying, to bring you as near as possible without the sad experience. So answer this question about the sophist: Is this now clear, that he is a kind of a juggler, an imitator of realities, or are we still uncertain whether he may not truly possess the knowledge of all the things about which he seems to be able to argue?

2:110

George Santayana’s Marginalia

5 p 418, para. 241

[Drawing of a young man. No reference to the text here, although “images” were discussed earlier in the dialogue.] 6 p 430, para. 248, marked

||The Stranger discourses on the distinction between generation, acting, and being; with reference to the myth of Cadmus’s sowing dragon’s teeth and reaping men.|| Stranger: It is in reply to this that they say generation participates in the power of acting and of being acted upon, but that neither power is connected with being. Cf. Royce’s first view. 7 p 438, para. 253

5- / "   !       &     % !’  "         "   )  ,-*. 8   # 5- 4   "      

  &"               ,-*. 1   5- 8         " &"

      # ,-*. 4&" 5- 8# ,-*. 4" " 5- 4 #     )   % [B] !  ’  &  #           " &" &      " )   # ,-*. /   5- 1    " &  &    "  ,-*. 8 ’  # [Drawing of a man in left margin; no reference to Plato’s text.] 8 p 450, para. 259, marked

||Following upon a long discourse on being and non-being, the stranger remarks to Thaeatetus:|| And if any man has doubts about these oppositions, he must make investigations and advance better doctrines than these of ours; or if he finds pleasure in dragging words about and applying them to different things at different times, with the notion that he has invented something difficult to explain, our present argument asserts that he has taken up seriously matters which are not worth serious attention; for this process is neither clever nor difficult, […].

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2:111

This is a great conclusion of Plato’s philosophy. Cf. Parmenides ad finem. 9 p 463, para. 267, marked

||On image-making and falsehood:|| Stranger: When anyone, by employing his own person as his instrument, makes his own figure or voice seem similar to yours, that kind of fantastic art is called mimetic. Cf Plato on art. 10 p 463, para. 267, marked

Stranger: But what of the figure of justice and, in a word, of virtue in general? Are there not many who have no knowledge of it, but only a sort of opinion, and who try with the greatest eagerness to make this which they themselves think is virtue seem to exist within them, by imitating it in acts and words to the best of their ability? Plato

Statesman Edited by K. F. Hermann, after Thrasyllus Volume IV. Georgetown.

[Only five pages of Santayana’s notes in this edition survive.] [Beginning of dialogue, para. 257, underlined.]

||Socrates thanks Theodorus for having introduced him to Thaeatetus and the Eleatic Stranger. Theodorus answers that Socrates is three times in his debt for the definitions of the statesman, the philosopher, and the sophist. The two discuss the meaning of “three times as much,” Socrates maintaining that the expression is merely mathematical, not one of genuine value.|| ,-/ -   "  " !    *         " ")        "         ! $ [   ]  [ " ] [  ] ) [ "  '] &3 [   )"]  []    [C] [  ] %  [ ]    [ ]

)!1 Greek is very redundant & prolix. Latin would omit the words in brackets. 1

Theodorus: By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair hit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will retaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger, who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with the Statesman or with the Philosopher, whichever he prefers.

2:112

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Plato

Republic (Politeia) Edited by K. F. Hermann, after Thrasyllus Volume IV. Georgetown.

1 p 1, para. 327

||Socrates, as narrator of the dialogue, begins Book I with the well-known speech I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon […].|| 8/9.4-.* ["    ] 4* 4/: (.*9/;/: 8**?/ *(-.>*24/ 1-0*9/ * I. 1" &!  8  ; &   *    )  ' !   " "   !!   "       "      "  & "  )     "   […]. The fact that the dialogue is told on the following day excuses the wording of all the picturesque elements in the first book. It is more natural, in reciting a past scene, to describe the setting at the beginning, and to refer to it only incidentally after the discourse is well under weigh. Yet what a pity it is that the dramatic movement could not have been carried through with sentimental or superstitious arguments against the laws about women, or the doctrine of a future life. Socrates is not without his interesting and not too virtuous young friend. The character of Glaucon is drawn as one might draw that of a well known person, by a few occasional references to his familiar traits, not as one draws a character to be introduced for the first time and for the sake of its dramatic value, as the characters of Cephalus and Thrasymachus are introduced. Glaucon and Adeimantus, being Plato’s brothers, are taken for granted, as it were, and characterised only by sous-entendus.1 1

Inference.

2 p 2, para. 328

||Socrates’ regard for Cephalus.||

George Santayana’s Marginalia

2:113

Jowett suggests that this figure symbolises the old-fashioned virtue which it is the task of the Republic to defend. It is given here in an example before the analysis of its essence begins. 3 p 5, para. 530, underlined

||The nouveaux riches were impossible at Athens.|| Note the open-mindedness of Cephalus, who will not be the dupe of cynicism any more than of credulity. 4 p 6, para. 331

||Cephalus praises a passage of Pindar.|| [B]            "    )" "  ! "      " ! !   " ! &"           "  &" "   &    &     !     &  !"         &     &" [C]  8 "     1      "  "  " "!   "               ' "              #                         &"           "              &  @ "@" .1 Is this idiom or loquacity or merely conversational looseness of construction? This is a very inferior syntax to the Latin, for all its fluency. 1 The great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this in my opinion the greatest.

5 p 49, para. 369

[Santayana translates literally and indicates a source for his passage in The Life of Reason.]

.          "  *   "  

2:114

George Santayana’s Marginalia

XI. ;   " ’      "  & "     "    " " ’  &" "  3# /   "  [C] / 

"     ’    ’  &+       "      "!   ' ' ) + !!   " # 8    >   "        "       8  .! " " ’    ) &"   "   "   " " & ;   "  & "     "    " We are not self-sufficing, but need many things: when we discover this, the state arises. The state is a product of reason on the basis of need. Cf. Life of Reason. C ad finem "   "   " " & Our need, as is seems, shall guide the construction. And the primary need is food, etc. The correctness of this beginning cannot be too much praised. 6 p 50, para. 371

[On the division of labor in the city:]

The division of labour is here made to rest on its natural basis, diversity of gifts and opportunities. The question for the individual as for the state depends on the right balance between diversity of culture and quantity of wealth. The ideal is perhaps to divide labour and to synthesize arts; that is, to do one servile thing each, and all liberal things together. A community loses nothing by the absence of mines, if it can get its metals more cheaply by exchange: but it loses by the absence of music, or of learning, or of religion, because these are not the means to its life, but the expressions of it. 7 p 163, para. 474

[C]    "

 !    "  A    A  " !  !   "      "  " 3! .! "    !"  '     '  '  )""! *   " *"      " A 

" " "        "

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   ! "           "   # [Santayana translates:]

Dialectic 474C. The lover of anything loves it universally, not in one example only. So the lover of youth, finds every form of youth cleansing, and gives each it peculiarity a favourable ^ ^manifested, being always the name, the grace, variously same grace of youth. So love is hypocritical, and attributes to the accidents of the object an attraction due to its own universal and impartial hunger. (next page) 8 p 164, para. 475

-    " A             &    & 4 # " A $              +    "   3 # 1  1 "       !+   " ""  B  &   "  3 [B]   !         " ! "  1 '    4  " ! " "$ $    ! "          " !  "        # 8  " /         " ! ""    "  " A    "# *"!" 4    !"

&   [C]     "  &   &"  "   " !"            &"   '   A !          1 !  " 4  "  & !  !"  !     !   " &   A  ' "   " # [D]   ;   "C 8       $    !      ! &      "     A    !        " "    

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! !   !      & !   (                         [E] !"      &     "# /    A      Ideas cover whole classes 475. A. So the lover of wine finds all wines pleasing. Likewise the lover of honour. B. ! ". It is in the region of desire that Plato finds his first example of the universal ( ). The fastidious eater is not a lover of food [ but of his own whims. ] C. The philosopher the omnivorous learner. Then, says Glaucon, we shall have a motley “School of Athens.” Sightseers will be philosophers—the vulgar lovers of experience for its own sake. E. No. They are counterfeit philosophers ( ) 9 p 165, paras. 475–76, marked Z

?? 4   "!   "  # 4  " "! " A  ! 1    A  " !$     # /   " A  +        "     4 # ’- "    &     [476 A] 8 A  # /    "    # 1   1 

     !                     '   )    " + &  B 3  !  ’/!  "  4 '   " A   &      "  B !   &     [B]  &             !     8  " # /    " A  "  B !     3  &  &"        "     

         "  "      ! -&    "  "   /  " A   

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     + !A        # Ideas are single 475 E. Who, then, are true philosophers? Those who love to look upon truth. What is Truth i.e. True being? 476 A Opposites are two. Each is therefore one. Each idea ( justice & goodness) is one, although it appears to our fancy in many acts and many bodies. So we separate sightseers from truth-lovers. [The latter pursue the Idea] The understanding of the former is unable to seize "        . Ability to do is so is rare. ^ the ^ others awake? Yet consider: are For to dream is to false the similar [ copy] for that which it resembles. To know both the original and the copies is to be awake. 10 p 166, para 476–77, underlined

[E] )   !!    ! "     & # (   "  " .! "        "      !! A               ! A        A "   $     "   #          ’*   "    8  "   # [477 A] /      "    !"# .     &   &'         "   " ' ' # . -   "    &     "    )             " ' # >)  /         "  A ) "  "    )    )    3"" [B]    ""    &   # 8    *A      ) # 8   # 8 "  "" " "  "# *" 

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’-A D   )  A  ""  " "   "  " /  /   ""           #     

    ! 8# Ideas are “real” 476 E. He who knows knows something. 8  "   #      "    !"# 477A / The object of knowledge must be something, must have some quality (Cf. Theaetetus [sic] the one must be, since it is one) ∴ some essence, ∴ must be something ∴ must be. [ Being is here identified with essence. To be in key—i.e. to be remote from the indeterminate—is regarded as more truly existence than to be perceived—i.e. to be for another.] That which has perfect essence ( ) is perfectly knowable—the wholly indeterminate or unsubstantial ("  " ') is wholly unknowable. The "  " ' is what has no predicates. This kind of “being”(= determination) has degrees. Therefore to the intermediate realm between being and not-being corresponds an intermediate perception—opinion. [At “   #”:]

the determining actions of being. 11 p 167, para. 477D—478B, underlined

* !  " *  

"      

      &    &"              

3 A         $

 [D] A      A      3   ' "      "      "     3" "  "  "      3" "    #  # /   " (  "  " A    ""    '    " " 

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  !"# -    "    B " [E] 4 # )   "     # /    "   )3 !     " )  *  "     "     ""   ) 8    "   "B   " "       & !"# 1 " A   "   "" ) [478 A]  "   - A     "      *" -""           &# 2 ()   )3# 2 =    ""      

)   # "  # *     "   "  A  "    

    )  [B]  "" "        "   &   )    /          ) "   "# *  *A     "  )3# "   

)  " #    &  )3    "

)# "     )3  )3  " # *  Knowledge or science deals with ideas.  "  unknowable even by opinion [At “  "    ”:]   here is a class. Science is addressed to the real, to learn its nature or its determinations. The function of knowledge is to deal with the real, to learn its determinates. It is impossible to have opinions about the absolutely indeterminate—" —an attack on Parmenides. In thinking you must think something. 12 p 168, para. 478C—479A

*A      )3  )3# 2 * " "    &    "  !A  [C]   8  >"  "  ) "      /!  " /       "  )3 /   /       )  " /   *A          "   "+ "   +# /   *A  " A      )     # 1     " [D] - A   # 2 >)    "   )

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1 '    /       !   "      "     )  !          "     ""    A   !   )       ""# /! 2      )     "   ) 8  [E] XXII. - " A  "        &      "       !      ' )     '          )   )    $ "  &  # /  4  "    "  ! [479 A]  &"               "  "        & B      3   !    ' &      '           "   "          & "#        #       # [B] /  A "  "       & " The "  cannot be any one thing, cannot have any one quality, not even this quality of being one. The "  has no predicates. Therefore neither the  nor the "  can be the object of opinion. Opinion has more light than ignorance, less than science. It remains to find the object of opinion. Particular things have their qualities temporarily relatively and accidentally. They have and have not the attributes which are assigned to them at each moment. They are the objects of opinion, and of the lovers of sights and of miscellaneous experience. See 505 A. (p-194) 13 p 195, para. 505E—506A, marked

        " '       "!   !          !    3"  "  )  ! " "  3# 1   " / "   

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 &"      [E]  B  "         &           &"!  +         &        "  "       [506 A]     !         '    & # = A  " /          '  !       )  "!         B    "     !  1   "   /   " "   "   [B]    " ' )    "# The idea of the good is absolutely fundamental since it determines even why or when pleasure and insight are good [ why insight is good and when pleasure is so] and is the most practical of the things that a statesman should know. Kings should be philosophers because philosophy is the science of practical good which is the formative principle even of truth and reality. Go on at 508 A E. Everyone has a premonition of what would help him, but errs, and abandons conventional goods perhaps, in the hope of that uncertain perfect satisfaction. 14 p 197, para. 508

The simile of the sun The eye, unlike other senses, needs a medium of vision— light. This, of all the gods, the sun dispenses. 15 p 198, para. 508

[“The Sun”: most important for Plato and for Santayana.]

4     " "! &      "     "   !    !   A ""    "!  B "              "!       "    ! "" ""

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The “Sun.” 508 E. 4     " "! &—the Sun of ultimate utility—has, according to this passage, the following functions. 1)  " "! &—it gives truth [ to objects.-] 2)      "    —it furnishes the organ of perception and the objects with their [illegible] power of inter-communication ^ ^ mind and the world. —it is the medium between the Hence 3)  ""   4)  "!  "   —The principle of truth, as truth is discoverable by thinking, and the cause of the resulting science. 5)    —more beautiful and nobler than truth or knowledge. Cf. L. of R.1 [Because fact, apart from human uses, is without dignity, and knowledge, apart from the same, without excuse.] 1

Life of Reason.

16 p 199, para. 509

[B] 8# 4 "       "   !  & "   "    )"   "       8 # 1     "   !     !         "   A            !  A   "   +   & [C] XX. 1  ;    *   " B  "!    " A   3  

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  A          >"   " [D] 2"   " A             "         A      "    )   3!   $ A   &     "  "# -&

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     " & ""   "    "                        "B +   +  "     [E]    "       509. B. 6)      "   A  (  ! )   —not only the knowability quoad nos but the being and essence of things comes to them from the Idea of the Good. [ i.e. a teleological principle—utility—has presided over their formation.] Discussion on the supremacy of the good. The inner nature or instinct, that gives direction to idealization

The life of reason has two conditions

The outer facts or accidents, on which the realisation of the ideal depends.

These two conditions are not conceivably subordinated to the good in the same sense as the works of reason are: they can be said to be so only 1) in the sense that, being conditions to the life of reason, they subserve the reason when they are favourable to its operation—when they do not disappoint they / hopes they originate. 2) in the sense that they (and the l. of r. they make actual) are products of reason on a deeper plane. In this case, however, does not the problem seem farther back? 17 p 200, para. 510

[A]            

         ) "        *  4    !        " 3            4!"  " =  !     " A  ""! "!+   "   )       !    !"# [B] -A

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 "    "    "   "  " ' " 8'# =        "!   &" &" 3" 3 ) !   A &"  " A   "  A    EF A &"  ! ) !            A   " !   " 4 A  "    &  ! [C] *A    ! " A $ +    " !"                   B   !         &"     "        !A " !        " !               )       [D]       A &   " " )              " 8     "      /         &                  A                       " A   [E]  " "                                     & 3"  The question of the metaphysical supremacy of reason seems to be reduced to a question of eventual experience of the realisation of the ends of our own rational action. Views on this point are 1) Plato’s & Aristotles (distinguish the two)X (consistent ^ ^ of human with experience and with the supreme authority ends) to the effect that there are two metaphysical forces one like reason, one opposed to it. 2) that there is one force indifferent to reason. Spinoza & the materialists. 3) that there is one force harmonious with reason. X

Plato’s is simple and possible—God vs. matter. Aristotle’s is less simple & less possible. Postpone this. ] 18 p 290, para. 597B and C, underlined

[B] >"  G     " A     3""  ""    A # -    " /   

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    $   "  '    "      ! ! " A # /    >   "   2  " >  "  3  " # - H  "  !         2  [C] /  " !        " " "  "   '  !   "   "    " "   "$     "       !"    !    "  8 "#  " /  " A     "     " "          &  "    " " A  &   /!  " 597 B. The bed that has its being in the nature of things or may say was made by a god; i.e. nothing is more original and divine than the functional needs of life by which the idea and use of a bed comes into existence. This idea of the bed is one; else the two or more would be examples of a deeper nature, corollaries of a deeper function. Cf. for interpretation the corselet and the bridle 601. B C . ^ ^ 19 p 295, para. 601C and D, underlined

[C]  # 2 >"   "    "!

A    9  " H   "     &# 2 8"      & # 8  *A         "    &    # "   A  "   &       A      &"!   # *"!   *A          " &# 8# [D] 8      &  &"" "  ""# 2 /   "    !"      3  )      " " &   "   ' " "  # /  8"  "  &       !  "'  ! "    ' &+  &"$   ""   

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The bit and the bridle The painter paints reins and bit. The artisan makes them. The horseman possesses their Idea, for he knows their use. [Marked.] The virtue beauty and rightness of every work of art or animal or action is relative to the function of that being, and to nothing else. [ Hence it necessarily follows that the Highest Good is the highest function, since it is surely the source of virtue beauty and rightness in things. ] The man of practice must become an ‘angel’ to the ‘poet’—he must tell him what is the excellence he should celebrate.

The Phaedo of Plato

Edited by R. D. Archer-Hind London: 1883 (2nd edition, 1894). Georgetown.

[Introduction:] 1 p xvi

  How translate “antapodosis”? “Give & take” “Polarity” “Generation from opposites” “Alternation”. 2 p xvii, marked

  knows that  !" is a mode of existence, " that it is a state of intelligence. 3 p xviii

The principle of reciprocity itself is most loose and arbitrary and the whole argument weak in the extreme. It is no argument, but rather a rhetorical plausibility, which Socrates, as a preacher, may well have used. 4 p xxiii, marked

This demonstration, which is worked out with a completeness, clearness, and subtlety peculiarly Plato’s own, is on Platonic principles perfectly incontrovertible: given the eternal ideas as causes of existence, the eternity of soul is an inevitable inference. But though complete in itself it utilises some of the materials of former arguments: the principle that the eternity of soul is inseparably bound up with the existence of the eternal ideas has been the chief feature of " and the psycho-

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logical argument: in this last proof it is precisely formulated, handled in a new manner, and pushed to its logical conclusion. Secondly, the whole argument has for its ultimate premiss the constancy of the sum total of existence: &'     ! " &    !    ! ) And this we say to be the fundamental proposition laid down in the argument of  . Moreover " is still valid to prove the existence of the ideas and the soul’s intelligent activity apart from the body. N.B. 5 p xxv

||Archer-Hind refers to the “quantity of spirit in the universe,” and to the “sum of force” as “constant.”|| What does that mean? What is spiritual “force”? 6 p xxvii

[…] a permanent mode of existence for the soul is not excluded by the Platonic theory. Why do you say that? Simply because you like it better so. 7 p xxviii, underlined

[…] the particular soul retains the knowledge of truths which are the possession of soul at large, not necessarily of this soul in a former personal existence. A similar examination of the remaining arguments of the Phaedo will show that individual immortality is not fairly deducible from any of them. The same applies to the brief but pregnant demonstration in Phaedrus 245 C foll. There the case for the eternity of soul is stated with unequalled force and clearness; but it applies to the universal soul alone, and nothing can be deduced from it regarding the permanence of particular souls. The strikingly subtle argument beginning Republic 608 E contains a remarkable expression (611 A),         sc.  &. This seems at first sight like an assertion of the continued existence of the same personalities. A closer examination however shows that this is not the case. Plato simply means that if the whole vital force of the universe is distributed into a certain number of souls, no addition to this number is possible, else the sum total of vitality would be increased, which is inadmissible. The whole force of the argument lies in the assumption that without individual experience no preformation of mind is possible; that the categories are memories, ∴ the individual soul existed.

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[At “sum total of vitality”:]

What? 8 p xxxi

||Even if personal immortality is ruled out of the Timaeus, it does not follow that it is true for the Phaedo.|| Consistency by any other name stinks as sweet. 9 p xxxv

The essential nature of soul is simple, as much in the Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus as in the Phaedo. Hence it is beside the point to ask which of the three parts is immortal: Plato is seeking to prove that soul herself is eternal, not that certain relations and functions of soul are perpetual. Does then the soul live at all? The “principle” of life is not a life; “ &"” is not &" . 1 1

Soul.

10 p xli, marked

The standard of   1 then lies in the nature of  :2 and   in operating    3 is working out its own being. This is perhaps true and herein lies the explanation of the originally so pure perception of the good in Plato. 1

The absolute best. Mind or purpose. 3 Toward the absolute best. 2

11 p 2, para. 58

||Phaedo and Echecrates discuss Socrates’ trial and preparations for death.|| Note how the interest & pathos of the subject is relieved by these familiar, legal and beautiful images. 12 p 8, para. 61, underlined and marked

||Phaedo has asked Socrates, in their final conversation, why Socrates is turning Aesop’s fables into poetry and composing a hymn to Apollo, for Socrates has never before composed poetry. Socrates replies that he is satisfying the bidding of a dream, in which he was urged to continue what he was already doing; that he wished to honor the god, and being without invention, he resorted to Aesop for material for his verse.||        "       " "  "      $   ’  " "  "   "   !  "    !'  ) &"   

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      " " " "  "  " !"         "    ! " "  !    [B]   "     ! "   " "   ! $    ! "   ""    ""    !            "   !     "    &  &    !   ""   *     "     & Quote. Plato’s Th.[eory] of art. 13 p 9, note 1, marked

||Plato did not in all cases disapprove of suicide.|| 14 p 10, para. 64, underlined

[Archer-Hind’s notes 9 and 16 do full justice to the text.]

    "     +     !  !!       ! !    "'$     "  !’   &     1"    IX. 1       &  !    "!            "    " !'   !      "! […] 9.   ] At this point the main business of the dialogue begins: all that precedes has been merely preparatory to this thesis, and all that follows is logically evolved in its defence. 65 A—67 B, cc. ix-xi. The philosopher’s whole life is nothing else than the study and practice of death; how then shall he be dismayed when that comes for which he has always been striving? This paradox is explained as follows. First we define death as the state of separation of soul and body. Now the philosopher’s aim is the attainment of knowledge and wisdom. But the body is for ever thwarting his endeavours: (1) by its pleasures and appetites, (2) by the intrusion of sensual perceptions, (3) by its weaknesses and maladies. All these hinder the free action of the soul and prevent her from gazing calmly on the truth. Accordingly so long as the soul is in union with the body, she can never attain to perfect wisdom; only death, by setting her free, enables her, if ever, to reach the truth. But the true philosopher will do all he can during life to anticipate this condition: he will withdraw his soul, so far as may be, from all

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communion with the body; its pleasures and pains he will scorn, its perceptions he will ignore; and so when the hour of release arrives the soul will be pure and unsullied by material taint; she will be fit to enjoy the free life of intelligence that is now before her. 16. !'   !] ‘dying and being dead.’ !' represents the philosophic training, the gradual emancipation of the soul from bodily passions; […]. Would Plato think of this separation as absolute— nirvana—or as passage into direct perceptions of another kind? Are the Ideas visible? 15 pp 58–59, paras. 83–84, marked

||Socrates tells Cebes that the soul of a philosopher after death will be free of pain and pleasure; the soul will calm passion and be loyal to reason.|| 3"        "!' " "!' " ! "'       !        "!"  " " "     !  [C]         &    &    3   4    #  "  1" / 

&"  ! 3   "!" "  "!"       "!       &'       "!  &   &$     IJ $ "  # 8  /       !   

&"  # 8 "# [D] /  " " "   "  " &  "  "     B +    " )3    "!"       '      )       & 3       !   "   *   !  !       )  &         "  !       "   !   !      [E]    *"!  "   1"   Quote in “Poetry of Barbarism” 16 p 120, para. 106, marked

LVI. /    !   "  "     " 3"       !     B "!" "   ! 8   " (   " !         ! /

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"       !    &" "  ! [E]  &    !  "# (1) particulars partake successively, or even simultaneously, of contrary ideas, but the idea itself can never admit its opposite, but at the approach thereof either withdraws or perishes; and this applies both to ideas as existing in nature and as immanent in particulars: (2) there is a second set of ideas, not being themselves opposites, but containing opposite ideas; no such idea can admit the opposite of the idea it contains, but either withdraws or perishes; e.g. the triad contains the idea of odd and cannot admit that of even: (3) particulars which one of this second class of ideas informs can never admit the opposite of the contained idea; e.g. three things can never be even: (4) if in any such instance refusal to admit the opposite necessarily involved indestructibility, we could predicate immortality of that which refused to admit it; e.g. if refusal to admit evenness involved indestructibility, three would be imperishable; but since this is not so, three may perish at the approach of evenness: (5) but in the case of soul refusal to admit the opposite of its contained idea does involve indestructibility, since the contained idea is life, whose opposite is death; and that which will not admit death is imperishable: soul therefore on the approach of death has not the option of perishing, but must adopt the other alternative, & Else, if the principle of life perished, nothing could be found to resist destruction. 106 D—107 B, c. lvi. Thus from the general principle that all things which refuse to admit death are indestructible we infer that soul can never perish: when death comes upon a man, his mortal part perishes, but his soul withdraws, making way for death, while she herself is saved alive. It must be then that our souls live in Hades. Kebes is now fully convinced: Simmias cannot controvert the reasoning of Sokrates but still feels misgivings; whereupon Sokrates encourages him to sift the matter until he is thoroughly satisfied. [At “(4) if in any such … since this is not so,”:]

This is like the ontological argument. [At “and that which will not admit death is imperishable”:]

X

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The Timaeus of Plato Edited and with an Introduction by R. D. Archer-Hind. London: 1888. Georgetown. [Greek-English parallel text, translated by Archer-Hind and so quoted unless otherwise attributed.] 1 p 33

[Introduction.]

||Unity is eternal and present to the senses.|| Each idea is the idea of the good specialised in some particular mode or form—blueness is the mode in which the good reveals itself to the faculty which perceives blue. This unity is perhaps one of relation: the faculty of perceiving blueness its possible perfection, analogous to the perfection of every other function. This relation constitutes the good, which is thus similar sorry bliss [?] without being one in any obscure sense. 2 p 84

The question for Plato is what ideas the universe suggests, not what origin it has. 3 p 87, para. 28

[Santayana lucidly paraphrases:]

Why should the object of reason be changeless? Because it is an expression for the logical need of identity and permanence in objects of thought. A flux, however, could as easily be asserted here as in the natural world, when permanence is also assumed in common thinking. 4 p 89, para. 29

If now this universe is fair and its Artificer good, it is plain that he looked to the eternal; but if—nay it may not even be uttered without impiety,—then it was to that which has come into being. Now it is manifest to every one that he looked to the eternal: for the universe is fairest of all things that have come to be, and he is the most excellent of causes. If the cosmos did not suggest any idea, we might say it was made by chance—by a drifting of accidents. As it is we must attribute what it suggests to a cause. 5 p 92, para. 30

||In creation, the creator saw that reason is essential to perception of the fair and good|| and that without soul reason cannot dwell in anything. Because

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then he argued thus, in forming the universe he created reason in soul and soul in body, that he might be the maker of a work that was by nature most fair and perfect. There is here the mixture of intelligibility & intelligence which is formed in all Platonism. 6 p 92, para. 30

||In note 1, Archer-Hind asserts the impossibility of perfection in the universe, because of the inherent nature of evil.|| To make Plato in this way the first absolute idealist is like making St. Peter the first pope. You say he was so because in your opinion he ought to have been so. But in fact he spoke in figures because he thought in them and didn’t believe in dogmas. 7 p 96, para. 32

[Santayana translates and comments:]

(N.B. the senses exist (in thought?) before the universe.) [line] 10 The world is sensible therefore material. (We may

note here the obscurity of taking a non-psychological view of these things. God must have made the world of matter, because that is what we make of it.) (i.e. of the sensations we construct it of.) 8 pp 97–98, para. 32

If the body of the universe were to have been made a plane surface having no thickness, one mean would have sufficed to unify itself and the extremes; but now since it behoved it to be solid, and since solids can never be united by one mean, but require two—God accordingly set air and water betwixt fire and earth, […]. This absurd passage is praised by Hegel as still valid for philosophy. 9 p 113, para. 36

[Note 6.]

||Plato’s numerology as determining the positions of the planets.|| There is a possibility of distinguishing the principle here from its actual application. The principle is that nature is to be understood upon as a sort of aesthetic co-religious ^ ^ is to the universe of spheres symbolism. The application of Plato’s time.

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10 p 138, para. 41, marked Z

||Timaeus’s long speech to Socrates on creation: Oceanus and Tethys, who engendered Phorcys and Cronus and Rhea, who gave birth to Zeus and Hera.|| "  "              " !.     " !      "  !  &     !  .      "! !                "  !"!      )! !  " "  " 3      B  &   ’ ! )  !             !1 Cf. Act V Scene I. of Temptation of Lucifer. (original draught.) 1

When all of them, both those who visibly appear in their revolutions as well as those other gods who are of a more retiring nature, had come into being, the creator of the universe addressed them: Gods, children of gods, who are my works and of whom I am the artificer and father, my creations are indissoluble, if so I will. All that is bound may be undone, but only an evil being would wish to undo that which is harmonious and happy. Wherefore, since ye are but creatures, ye are not altogether immortal and indissoluble, but ye shall certainly now be dissolved, nor be liable to the fate of death, having in my will a greater and mightier bond than those with which ye were bound at the time of your birth. [ Jowett] 11 p 145, para. 42

||Men, descendants of gods, possess souls assigned to a star; if they live well, their souls at death ascend to their star. If not, they will live again as a woman; if still evil, return as a beast.|| It is necessary to insist on the human basis of this and revive in men the sense of the possibility and value of their purification. The beast is not depraved, but the man who is bestial. 12 p 162, para. 46

This asserts that rational causes are first—ultimate—to the seeker of reason. Plato does not tell us why, but we may infer a reason—the rational interests of that man, which are ultimate in him. 13 p 164, para. 47, marked

||The blessings of vision.|| The vision of day and night and of months and circling years has created the art of number and has given us not only the notion of Time but also means of research into the nature of the Universe. From these we have procured Philosophy in all its range, than which no greater boon ever has come or will come, by divine bestowal, unto the race of mortals. [R. G. Bury]

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Say in order that our reason should meet in this life with something of a kindred nature—something intelligible and not confused. Else reason would have lived in the isolation of a Lucifer. Cf. “The children of Pythagoras” etc. 14 p 243, para. 64, marked

Now a process which takes place with perfect facility is perceptible in a high degree, but it is accompanied neither by pleasure nor by pain. Cf. Schopenhauer. Pain = strain. Pleasure = [illegible] 15 p 252, paras. 68E–69A, underlined and marked

   " &"     " 3!      !    !   3" "       !  " "   &    [69 A]  & 3               3          ’   &1 N.B. Could anything be wiser and clearer than this? Quote in R L. of R. 1 Wherefore we must distinguish two kinds of causes, one of necessity and one of God: and the divine we must seek in all things for the sake of winning a happy life, so far as our nature admits of it; and the necessary for the sake of the divine, reflecting that without these we cannot apprehend by themselves the other truths, which are the object of our serious study, nor grasp them nor in any other way attain to them.

16 p 266, para. 71, underlined

"   ' ! !'  $1 1

God gave unto man’s foolishness the gift of divination ….

Good motto. 17 p 324, para. 86, underlined

||Distortions in the body create a diseased soul, sexual incontinence and other forms of strange behaviour.||  &  "   "             !  3$          " )    1 This is a bad blunder for Plato. Why should we not reprove the pernicious and ignorant man? Why should we not reproach the man who “unwittingly” wills to be bad? Free will is quite irrelevant to responsibility. 1 And indeed almost all those affections which are called by way of reproach intemperate pleasure, as though the wicked acted voluntarily, are wrongly reproached; for no one is voluntarily wicked ….

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The Dialogues of Plato

Translated by Benjamin Jowett Five volumes. Oxford: 1892. Volume I. Georgetown.

[Euthydemus, Introduction.] 1 p 193, underlined

||The study of dead sciences|| is apt to blind the judgment and to render men incapable of seeing the value of evidence, and even of appreciating the nature of truth. What is this nature? [Cratylus, Introduction.] 2 p 285, underlined

||It is writing and speaking that changes the meanings of words,|| and particularly great writers, or works which pass into the hearts of nations, Homer, Shakespear, [sic] Dante, the German or English Bible, Kant and Hegel, are the makers of them in later ages. Fancy, and not Aristotle. 3 p 287, marked

||Socrates holds that|| words have an independent existence; thus anticipating the solution of the mediaeval controversy of Nominalism and Realism. O sapience! 4 p 304, underlined and marked

Metaphysics are even more troublesome than the figments of grammar, because they wear the appearance of philosophy and there is no test to which they can be subjected. They are useful in so far as they give us an insight into the history of the human mind and the modes of thought which have existed in former ages; or in so far as they furnish wider conceptions of the different branches of knowledge and of their relation to one another. But they are worse than useless when they outrun experience and abstract the mind from the observation of facts, only to envelope it in a mist of words. This is very good, if we understand “history” as natural history. 5 p 316, underlined

|| Jowett compares ancient and modern languages; the modern in many ways are superior to the ancient:|| the thought is generally clearer, the connection closer, the sentence and paragraph are better distributed. ?

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6 p 316

||There is no reason why English and French should die out, like ancient languages.|| […] whenever a great writer appears in the future he will find the English language as perfect and as ready for use as in the days of Shakspere [sic ] and Milton. ? Of course no language will disappear until circumstances lead people not to speak it or to speak it differently. English is suffering a sad transformation in America already. 7 p 316

[On English:]

A language of bricks. Greek is marble. Latin is granite, English brick. 8 p 318, underlined

[On tautology:]

||Only Plato and perhaps Bacon, while indulging in tautology,|| has attained to any high degree of literary excellence. Not the highest, of course, but a high degree might be claimed for many: including the only man who has ever written good German. There is Cicero (perhaps hardly philosopher enough), and Seneca and St. Augustine (a great writer in his own style) there is Descartes, Berkeley, Hobbes, Pascal. But none except Plato and, as Jowett says, perhaps Bacon (if he is regarded as a philosopher) has a such a style that it is of poetic value, of value apart from the importance of the thought. 9 p 320, marked

[…] there is also a higher ideal of language in which all is relative— sounds to sounds, words to words, the parts to the whole—in which besides the lesser context of the book or speech, there is also the larger context of history and circumstances. Oh, yes. Every word is bathed in the light of all nature, and has the pathetic accent of Man. [Cratylus.] 10 p 330

[Socrates to Hermogenes:]

[…] when a man has discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must express this natural form, and not others

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which he fancies, […] he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several uses? Practical or moral determination of ideas here. Cf. Sense of Beauty. 11 p 364, marked

||Socrates sophistically shows how returning to ancient roots of words alters meaning.|| All this satire might be imitated against Hegel. 12 p 388, underlined and marked

[Socrates to Cratylus:]

Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the truth is what Heracleitus [sic] and his followers and many others say, is a question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue; […]. Perfect model of the way to criticise the extravagances of metaphysics. [Phaedrus.] 13 pp 449–51, marked

||Socrates on the forms of divine madness: love, prophecy, poetry.|| 14 p 451, doubly marked

But he who, having no touch of the Muses’ madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art —he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters into rivalry with the madman. [Ion.] 15 pp 501–3, underlined and marked

||Socrates’ long explanation to Ion of the nature of poetry as possession, inspiration, rather than art. Lyric poets are|| like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under the influence of Dionysus but not when they are in their right mind. […] For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: […] for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine.

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Had he learned by rules of art, he would have known how to speak not of one theme only, but of all; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers […] in order that we who hear them may know them to be speaking not of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God himself is the speaker, […]. Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs? [Symposium.] 16 p 557

Merits of the Symposium. 1) A real dialogue 2) Picture of scene & manners 3) Genial, varied, naturalistic sense for existence—no censoriousness 4) Wit & humour 5) Wealth of colour, movement, incident. 6) Physical philosophy as well as moral. 7) The highest flights of wisdom. 17 p 573, marked

For God mingles not with man; but through Love all the intercourse and converse of God with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. Cf. Aristotle’s God. The Dialogues of Plato

Translated by Benjamin Jowett Volume II.

[Phaedo.] 1 p 227, marked

||Socrates explains to Cebes how pleasures and pains falsify the interpretation of objects.|| And the soul of the true philosopher […] abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able; reflecting that when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, not merely the sort of evil which might be anticipated—as for example, the loss of his health or property which he has sacrificed to his lusts—but an evil greater far, which is the greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks. […] The evil is that when the feeling of pleasure or pain is most intense, every soul of man imagines the objects of this intense feeling to be then plainest and truest: but this is not so, they are really the things of sight. Quote in the “poetry of barbarism” The translation here is weak. Cf. Text.1 1 Santayana does not actually quote the passage, but its meaning informs much of Interpretations of Poetry and Religion.

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2 p 244, marked Z

||Socrates recounts his disappointment in the mechanical explanations of Anaxagoras for events. The accusations against Socrates and his remaining to undergo his sentence were not subject to Anaxagoras’s reasoning.|| Here the argument trips; because the ideal justification is made the efficient cause. 3 pp 311–12, marked

[ Introduction, Gorgias. ]

We may further observe that the art of government, while in some respects tending to improve, has in others a tendency to degenerate, as institutions become more popular. Governing for the people cannot easily be combined with governing by the people: the interests of classes are too strong for the ideas of the statesman who takes a comprehensive view of the whole. Cf the U.S. 4 p 314, underlined

||The office of the poet is to choose a higher pleasure over a lower one.|| Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of poetic and artistic influences. This is a false note. Plato had another beauty to portray, which estranged him from the vulgar one. 5 p 314, underlined

||The modern poet|| is not the master of his words, but his words—perhaps borrowed from another—the faded reflection of some French or German or Italian writer, have the better of him. Swinburne, Matthew Arnold, Rosetti [sic]. 6 p 341

||Socrates finds that Gorgias’s words about rhetoric are awry, for the rhetoric of justice must be just, but|| when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency […]. i.e. the art that treats of what ought to be done is morals. 7 p 350, marked

||Socrates on good as the end of action.|| When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the good? Cf St Paul.

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8 p 365

||Socrates elicits from Polus the argument that the unjust man, uncorrected by punishment, lives the worst and commits the greatest crimes. Socrates:|| May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:—Is not that a parallel case? This argument for all its beauty and truth, is marred by a too great reliance on analogy. Medicine and punishment have not the same function precisely: for medicine regards only the individual, whereas punishment may sacrifice him to save others. This could be called a benefit only if the sufferer were not unjust, which is contrary to the hypothesis. 9 p 366, underlined and marked

||The case of Archelaus. Socrates:|| […] You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who suffers. Why not “corrected” and “correction”? 10 p 378

||Callicles:|| How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates! ||Socrates:|| Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things. ||Callicles:|| Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument. The better individual may be the under man by force of a hostile majority; he is better because, man for man, he could enslave the others. 11 p 379

||Socrates on the subject of self-rule before one can rule others.|| Will he be free himself, or able to command others, unless he is chastened inwardly first? [Thus Santayana re-phrases the question.] 12 p 382, marked

||Callicles maintains that pleasure consists in abandonment of control and the resulting superabundance of energy. Socrates:|| Capital, excellent; go

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on as you have begun, and have no shame; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of them to pass your life in scratching, in your notion of happiness? A life without a centre, or an order, or a defined aim. [ Callicles does not know that all achievement is in reflection only & therefore in the eternal.] 13 p 387

||Callicles objects to Socrates’ dialectic concerning equivalence between pleasure and pain, and good and evil, but loses the argument.|| Here Callicles is caught napping by the dialectic of Socrates, whose victory is cheap. Callicles should have said that folly and cowardice were only definable in reference to eventual pleasure. Cf. Plato’s own doctrine in Rep Protagoras. 14 p 390

[Santayana paraphrases:]

Pleasure and the good differ as perception and reality: each the momentary realisation of the other, which is its permanent possibility. 15 p 399, underlined

||Socrates on the nature of the good.|| […] I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: […]. The “good” present in the good man is the true direction towards happiness of his acts pleasures and desires. 16 p 411, marked

||Socrates:|| I use the same images as before intentionally, in order that you may understand me the better. In several places there are in this dialogue signs of the senile manner. Cf. Laws. 17 p 421, doubly marked

||Socrates tells Callicles of belief in stories handed down about judgment after death in another world.|| Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife’s tale, which you will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or truer: […]. Quote in L of R.

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Translated by Benjamin Jowett Volume III.

[Introduction, Republic.] 1 p xi, underlined

The pompous and empty Sophist is utterly helpless in the hands of the great master of dialectic, […]. [At “empty”:] ? 2 pp xiii–xiv, marked

Thus in a succession of characters Plato represents the successive stages of morality, beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden time, who is followed by the practical man of that day regulating his life by proverbs and saws; to him succeeds the wild generalization of the Sophists, and lastly come the young disciples of the great teacher, who know the sophistical arguments but will not be convinced by them, and desire to go deeper into the nature of things. These too, like Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, are clearly distinguished from one another. Neither in the Republic, nor in any other Dialogue of Plato, is a single character repeated. 3 p xxiii, underlined

Thus the sophistical fabric has been demolished, chiefly by appealing to the analogy of the arts. ‘Justice is like the arts (1) in having no external interest, and (2) in not aiming at excess, in having a finite stan^ dard. […].’ ^ 4 p xxvii

In speaking of education Plato rather startles us by affirming that a child must be trained in falsehood first and in truth afterwards. ? He says no such thing. 5 p xlix, underlined

The connection in the Tragic Choruses and in the Greek lyric poets is not unfrequently a tangled thread which in an age before logic the poet was unable to draw out. What nonsense! 6 p lxxxix, marked

The [modern] philosopher is no longer living in the unseen, nor is he sent by an oracle to convince mankind of ignorance; nor does he regard

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knowledge as a system of ideas leading upwards by regular stages to the idea of good. No? 7 p lxxxix

The eagerness of the pursuit has abated; there is more division of labour and less of comprehensive reflection upon nature and human life as a whole; […]. i.e. less philosophy. 8 p lxxxix

The philosopher in modern times is one who fixes his mind on the laws of nature in their sequence and connexion, and also on their origin ^ and justification. not on fragments or pictures of nature i.e. not on ^ particular sciences or fragments of history. ; on history,^not on con^ troversy; […]. 9 p xcviii

||It is remarkable that good as the first principle of truth and being is mentioned no other place, but briefly in Book VI.|| Perhaps not by that name: but in the Phaedrus and the Timaeus, as well as Laws and elsewhere it is the subject of discourse. 10 p clix

||On Plato as the enemy of poets:|| Had Plato been asked whether the Zeus or Athene of Pheidias was the imitation of an imitation only, would he not have been compelled to admit that something more was to be found in them than in the form of any mortal; […]. Does Plato for a moment deny this? Is the Athene a goddess, or an imitation of a goddess? Art does deal with images, and not to admit it frankly is to demurr to the wrong point—if there is a wrong point. 11 p clix, marked

Again, Plato objects to the imitative arts that they express the emotional rather than the rational part of human nature. He does not admit Aristotle’s theory, that tragedy or other serious imitations are a purgation of the passions by pity and fear; to him they appear only to afford the opportunity of indulging them. Cf. Bernanys. [? scarcely legible] If he is right, Aristotle’s theory is the same as Plato’s as to the psychology, differing only in the ethics of it.

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12 p clix, underlined

Every one would acknowledge that there have been times when they were consoled and elevated by beautiful music or by the sublimity of architecture or by the peacefulness of nature. for how long? [“To be bewitched is not to be saved, ….” Reason in Art, p. 328, Volume IV, Triton Edition.] 13 p clxi, marked Z

But Plato, who is deeply impressed with the real importance of universals as instruments of thought, attributes to them an essential truth which is imaginary and unreal; for universals may be often false and particulars true. Had he attained to any clear conception of the individual, which is the synthesis of the universal and the particular; or had he been able to distinguish between opinion and sensation, which the ambiguity of the words ) ! 1 and the like, tended to confuse, he would not have denied truth to the particulars of sense. Oh, Jowett Jowett, how easy it is to be wise. 1

Opinion, notion; explanation, clarification; reasonable, probable.

14 p clxiii

The modern English novel which is the most popular of all forms of reading is not more than a century or two old: will the tale of love a hundred years hence, after so many thousand variations of the same theme, be still received with unabated interest? Let us hope not. 15 p clxv, underlined

[ Jowett pursues his question, “Why was Plato the enemy of poets?”]

||There might be a form of poetry given over to divine perfection, goodness, truth.|| Then the tale of love might begin again in poetry or prose, two in one, united in the pursuit of knowledge, or the service of God and man; and feelings of love might still be the incentive to great thoughts and heroic deeds as in the days of Dante or Petrarch; What heroic deeds did Dante & Petrarch indulge in? and many types of manly and womanly beauty might appear among us, rising above the ordinary level of humanity, and many lives which were like poems (Laws vii. 817 B), be not only written, but lived by us. A few such strains have been heard among men in the tragedies of Æschylus and Sophocles, whom Plato quotes, not, as Homer is quoted by him, in irony, but with deep and serious approval,—in the poetry of Milton and Wordsworth, and in passages of other English poets,—first and above all

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in the Hebrew prophets and psalmists. Shakespeare has taught us how great men should ? speak and act; […]. ^ ^ have detested the Protestant unseizableHow Plato would ness of these ungeometrical persons, people whose brains are full of clouds—thunderclouds with Milton, lake-mists and pietistic fogs with the other. [And how Santayana detests the romantics.] 16 p clxv

Possibly, like Mephistopheles in Faust, [the poet] may retaliate on his adversaries. But the philosopher will still be justified in asking, ‘How may the heavenly gift of poesy be devoted to the good of mankind?’ Ba! You have said nothing. 17 p ccxx

[Dante] speaks in a very interesting manner of the beauty and utility of nature and of the human frame, which he conceives to afford a foretaste of the heavenly state and of the resurrection of the body. The book is not really what to most persons the title of it [The Divine Comedy ] would imply, and belongs to an age which has passed away. But it contains many fine passages and thoughts which are for all time. This is a strange monument to the critic’s limitations. Compare Jowett’s comments on the Philebus. [Republic, Book I.] 18 p 18

||Thrasymachus explains to Socrates his idea of justice in government.|| Justice then is the advantage of the art—what makes for perfection. Thrasymachus has the same doctrine as Socrates, but a different tone and reading. That is right conduct which tends to make conduct infallible. Otherwise, Thrasymachus would hold that infallible art is useful to satisfy desires which are not elements in any art—but are there any such? 19 p 25

||Socrates sums up: both art and government serve their own interests; they provide for the weak, not the strong; no one wishes to govern, which is to reform evils without payment.|| This is not consistent with Socrates’ position: what need of a selfish motive, if art is unselfish? But it is quite true in itself because all arts must be based upon some impulse or motive, so that a man may be prompted to exercise them.

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20 p 25

||The good take office from necessity, and because they do not want others less qualified to rule.|| This is really the reason of one’s eagerness to undertake any thing—the conscious ability to perform it better than others: an artistic impulse mixed with vanity. 21 p 25, underlined

For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, X then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention ^ ^ office is at present; […]. as to obtain X In what, O Socrates, would goodness consist if not in finding pleasure and profit in the performance of liberal arts, among them that of governing? 22 p 29

||Thrasymachus loses the argument.|| The finiteness and objectivity of the standard makes this wisdom and goodness. Thrasymachus is caught by being forced to rationalise his principle, which is avowedly irrational. He might have said above that the unjust man did not wish to go beyond his own model, the “perfectly unjust” man. 23 p 30

The fact is that perfect injustice is justice in a given field: it has the rationality of justice on the basis of inhuman or imperfectly human impulses and arts. [Republic, Book II.] 24 pp 58–59.

[Concerning education: at Socrates’ discourse with Adeimantus on the ideal education, Santayana marks the exchange on the second half of 58 and most of 59, 60 and all of 61, with the remark at mid 58, presumably for a lecture or for Reason in Art.]

Quote with omissions from here on. [Republic, Book III.] 25 p 89, marked

||The lover will not tolerate lack of harmony in the soul of the beloved, but he will be patient with bodily defects and continue his affection.|| This shows the error of Pastor Schleiermacher in saying all Platonic love is sensuous.

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26 p 90

||The discourse on gymnastics.|| This the true beginning of the next book or division, on the physical and practical discipline of citizens. [Republic, Book V.] 27 pp 173–74, marked

475 C. Quote in “Function of Art.” 28 p 175, underlined

||Discourse on being and not being.|| […] for how can that which is not ever be known? Why is this not as cogent as Descartes’ axiom? [Republic, Book VI.] 29 p 208

||Socrates and Glaucon discuss sensuous perception.|| If the good is a medium for perceiving (& even determining) the intelligible, the ideas are conceived not as they lie in the life of reason, not as they lie in the realm of essence. 30 p 209, underlined

[The discourse continues:]

And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun? Exactly. Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by sight? [In left margin:]

If the sun were sight we should have phenomenalism, if the author of sight, rationalism. [In right margin:]

Exoteric and esoteric meanings. The sun is the great creator of seeing (since eyes are developed because the sun is there to give us light) and the reality is the great creator of the appearance, whose function is to reproduce that reality to us. 31 p 210, top

This philosophy of the good is a metaphysical rendering of the utilitarianism of Socrates, as the philosophy of ideas is a metaphysical rendering of his general terms.

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32 p 210

||The idea of the good is more honorable, higher, than mere perception for demonstrable truth.|| The principle of the formation both of things and of senses and categories, is utility. 33 p 210, marked

[…] the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power. Cf. Life of Reason: the “good” is the principle of individuation and fixation in things and ideas. Yet utility far exceeds determinations, and transmutes them as it itself varies its directions. 34 p 212

||Through hypothesis, dialectic rises above hypothesis.|| i.e. a world of hypostasis. [Republic, Book IX.] 35 p 294

||Socrates and Glaucon conclude that the philosopher, having judgment and experience, approves of the love of wisdom, of honor, but least, the love of gain.|| A hint in all this of my principle of the subjective judgment criterion of all values. Cf. Life of Reason Chapter ^ ^ X. The Dialogues of Plato

Translated by Benjamin Jowett Volume IV.

1 p 49

||Parmenides: Would Socrates make ideals of all things? Not of mud, dirt, and the like, Socrates replies.|| Their ideal is their reality: rubbish is the only thing that fulfils its idea. 2 p 52, underlined

And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing? Impossible, he said. The thought must be of something? Yes.

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Of something which is or which is not? i.e. has or has not an essence? [Theaetetus.] 3 p 199

[Santayana paraphrases:]

To know that clay is the substance used by all these artisans is to know it by its function, i.e. ideally & morally. It is of course not to know it physically or in itself. 4 p 213

||On dreams, waking, and sleep.|| Waking consists in finding the given unreal; i.e. in controlling it. Perhaps the difference in these levels of experience and thought consists not in that one contains the real, and so is true, but that one contained the sense of the unreal, and so is free. Waking has more perspective. That is all. 5 p 224, doubly marked

||Socrates:|| And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the evils which appear and are to a man, into goods which are and appear to him. […] Remember what has been already said,—that to the sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, and to the man in health the opposite of bitter. Now I cannot conceive that one of these men can be or ought to be made wiser than the other: nor can you assert that the sick man because he has one impression is foolish, and the healthy man because he has another is wise; but the one state requires to be changed into the other, the worse into the better. [From “Remember”:]

“Pragmatism” 6 p 224, doubly marked

[…] so I conceive that a good mind causes men to have good thoughts; and these which the inexperienced call true, I maintain to be only better, and not truer than others. 7 p 236, doubly marked

||On confusion between what the state defines as good and the ideal of the good.|| […] he who said so [that they were identical] would be playing with the name ‘good,’ and would not touch the real question—it would be a mockery, would it not? Cf. pragmatism

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8 p 252

Error = Institution. 9 p 257

Error = false apperception. [Sophist, Introduction.] 10 p 314, underlined

The Platonic unity of differences or opposites is the beginning of the modern view that all knowledge is of relations; it also anticipates the doctrine of Spinoza that all determination is negation. Plato takes or gives so much of either of these theories as was necessary or possible in the age in which he lived. Jowett is not a very learned man, and this defence of Hegelianism is less to be trusted than if it came from a less glib and superficial pen. 11 p 315

In several of the later dialogues Plato is occupied with the connexion of the sciences, which in the Philebus he divides into two classes of pure and applied, adding to them there as elsewhere (Phaedr., Crat., Rep., States.) a superintending science of dialectic. This is the origin of Aristotle’s Architectonic, which seems, however, to have passed into an imaginary science of essence, and no longer to retain any relation to other branches of knowledge. […] But even now the time has not arrived when the anticipation of Plato can be realized. Though many a thinker has framed a ‘hierarchy of the sciences,’ no one has as yet found the higher science which arrays them in harmonious order, […]. Does this man know anything? This sounds like a newspaper. 12 p 321, marked Z

We may ponder over the thought of number, reminding ourselves that every unit both implies and denies the existence of every other, and that the one is the many—a sum of fractions, and the many one—a sum of units. We may be reminded that in nature there is a centripetal as well as a centrifugal force, a regulator as well as a spring, a law of attraction as well as of repulsion. The way to the West is the way also to the East; the north pole of the magnet cannot be divided from the south pole; […]. Female philosophy.

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13 p 325, marked Z

Formerly when philosophers arrived at the infinite and absolute, they seemed to be lost in a region beyond human comprehension. Fancy that! But now we have changed all that. 14 p 326, marked Z

The system of Hegel frees the mind from the dominion of abstract ideas. […] For Hegel has found admirers in England and Scotland when his popularity in Germany has departed, and he, like the philosophers whom he criticizes, is of the past. No other thinker has ever dissected the human mind with equal patience and minuteness. And the Scholastics? It would have been dangerous to know about them when Balliol must be kept liberal and broad. [ Jowett, of course, was Master of Balliol.] 15 p 330, marked Z

The true meaning of Aristotle has been disguised from us by his own appeal to fact and the opinions of mankind in his more popular works, and by the use made of his writings in the Middle Ages. No book, except the Scriptures, has been so much read, and so little understood. What an ignoramus good fat Jowett really is. Does he think he understands Aristotle better than did Saint Thomas? [Sophist.] 16 p 360, top

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. To know the grounds of things is mastership. [Santayana’s eloquent translation.] 17 p 372, marked

||The stranger maintains to Theaetetus that Parmenides and the Eleatics held to a philosophy of being and non-being that was a mythology.|| Then there are Ionian, and in more recent times Sicilian muses, who have arrived at the conclusion that to unite the two principles is safer, and to say that being is one and many, and that these are held together by enmity and friendship, […] peace and unity sometimes prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again plurality and war, by reason of a principle of strife. [From “peace and unity”:]

Cf. Lucretius who evidently imitated Empedocles here.

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18 p 375, marked

||Stranger:|| […] if being be not a whole, through having the attribute of unity, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, being lacks something of its own nature? ||Theaetetus:|| Certainly. ||Stranger:|| Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will become not-being? Hegel’s joy! 19 p 377, top

Nature The Moral = actual =   or the physical or existent Matter Life or Mood moral logical or the causal or the truth or potent Immediate or the standard, the typical or actual the ideal. The ideal = potential = possible 20 p 379

||Stranger:|| […] and I hold that the definition of being is simply power. Cf. Schopenhauer. 21 p 380, underlined

[… the idealists] will allow that if to know is active, then, of course, to be known is passive. And on this view being, in so far as it is known, is acted upon by knowledge, and is therefore in motion; for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon, as we affirm. Sophism. Cf. Aristotle. 22 p 391

[Santayana paraphrases:]

“Being is not the things that are. not-being is only not merely being. It is, but is not— “Being”. 23 p 393, top

A little System of Philosophy I {Evolution. Genesis II {Discourse. Types Logic III {Art. Valuation Estimation IV. {Criticism. Skepsis.

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24 pp 403–4, underlined

||Theaetetus and the Stranger discuss the nature of images. Stranger:|| And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one house by the art of building, and another by the art of drawing, which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake? [At top of 404:]

Definition of fine art [Philebus, Introduction.] 25 pp 531–32, underlined

In the language of ancient philosophy, the relative character of pleasure is described as becoming or generation. This is relative to Being or Essence, and from one point of view may be regarded as the Heraclitean flux in contrast with the Eleatic Being; from another, as the transient enjoyment of eating and drinking compared with the supposed permanence of intellectual pleasures. This is bad. The point missed by Jowett, is rather that pleasure cannot be the object of ultimate desire, because, being a process, it is not an object at all. But the good is the object of desire. Ergo pleasure is not the good. But pleasure & pain are the sanctions of reason and life, the signs of right activity and of wrong, and the source of values as distinguished from their objective seat or embodiment. Cf. Aristotle, also Green. 26 p 534

The most sensual pleasure […] is inseparable from the consciousness of pleasure; no man can be happy who, to borrow Plato’s illustration, is leading the life of an oyster. Wretched criticism. [Philebus.] 27 p 577

||Socrates and Protarchus debate whether pleasure or wisdom is the good.|| [Santayana comments:]

Pleasure is what Hegel would call an abstraction—it has all sorts of contexts, and involves none of them in particular. Query: Is the presence of a common element the same logically and physically? E.g. old age common to the pyramids & Teiresias: gold, common to coins & crowns. Which

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is pleasure like? In other words, is it a separable element? Hedonists say yes: Plato, no. 28 p 578

[Santayana interprets and comments:]

If knowledge were the good, any kind of knowledge would do: but much of knowledge is useless or (by its ^ ^as much of pleasure is: ergo, predominance) hurtful, ^ neither knowledge nor pleasure, of^ every sort and in general, can be the good. Human life is assumed. Plato’s ethics is politics. 29 p 586

||The life of pleasure vs. the life of wisdom.|| Nature perhaps contains both these species—mechanisms accompanied by images within feelings, and mechanisms unaccompanied by feelings without images. Who shall say that they ought or ought not to exist? We may say two other things, however: that the first could assign no value to itself (since it has no appreciative consciousness) and that both are repulsive to man, whose necessities and ideals involve both sorts of experience. 30 p 596, doubly marked

||Socrates asks to which class mind and knowledge belong, and answers his own question,|| […] since all philosophers assert with one voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth—in reality they are magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. N.B. 31 p 598, marked

||Our souls and minds must come from the soul or mind of the universe. Is there another source? Socrates asks and Protarchus agrees that it is the only source. Socrates:|| Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom;—we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things?

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Soul, i.e. a principle of life order and reason is drawn by us from the world. Cf. L of R. Chapt 1. Book I. 32 p 599

Pleasure is the material principle and intelligence the formal principle of the life of reason. 33 p 600, underlined

||Socrates:|| […] would not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own nature is pleasure? This involves the highest good as the principle of pleasure itself. 34 pp 604–5

||Socrates develops the idea that desire is the wish to replenish pleasure, that one cannot want a pleasure of which one has no experience, and that it is through memory that desire occurs, through the mind and not the body.|| This artificial rationalistic psychology is one of the worst things in Plato and Aristotle. As if desire were of what we remembered, not of what we have never experienced, but throw together at the instigation of blind instinct and dwell on with near delight as upon a great and delicious discovery! 35 p 614

False opinion about pleasure confused with false pleasure. 36 p 638

||Concerning the possibility of mixing pleasure and wisdom. Socrates:|| One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and one art to be more exact than another. […] There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some of them regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the permanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when judged by the standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer than the former. This appeal to “truth” (the value of which has not been investigated) would be a gross ineptitude if by “truth” were not meant “genuineness”, true goodness.

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37 p 641, underlined

||Socrates and Protarchus agree that knowledge and wisdom are constituents of the good. Socrates:|| Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be created or subsist. = a definite nature. This mixture must be a single essence. 38 p 641, underlined

||Socrates:|| And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule of the habitation of the good? Distinctly the common political good, since both the applied or empiric arts and the necessary pure pleasures are admitted on human grounds—on which also vague ^ ^ & infinite pleasures are also excluded. 39 p 642, doubly marked

||Measure and symmetry are also essential to the good. Socrates:|| And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world over. 40 p 643

[Santayana summarizes his own language:]

God. The principle of order. (principle of selection) Heaven. Essences (intrinsic goods) religion, Dialectic (system of goods) morality. Physics. (opinions about goods.) feeling. experience (sense of good) 41 p 644, underlined

||Socrates:|| […] convinced of what I have just been saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained, not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than pleasure. N.B. The Dialogues of Plato

Translated by Benjamin Jowett Volume V.

[Laws, Book II.] 1 p 45, marked

||The Athenian stranger suggests that boys shall not have wine until age eighteen. Then,|| they may taste wine in moderation up to the age of thirty, but while a man is young he should abstain altogether from

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intoxication and from excess of wine; when, at length, he has reached forty years, after dinner at a public mess, he may invite not only the other Gods, but Dionysus above all, to the mystery and festivity of the elder men, making use of the wine which he has given men to lighten the sourness of old age; that in age we may renew our youth, and forget our sorrows; and also in order that the nature of the soul, like iron melted in the fire, may become softer and so more impressible. Charming passage on the value of Combination Rooms.1 1

“Combination Rooms” at Cambridge are common rooms in other British universities. 2 p 46, marked

||From a discussion of music and dancing, which produce pleasure and charm, the argument moves to eating and drinking, and on to learning.|| [Santayana paraphrases:]

It could not be said that learning was good only for the accompanying charm: yet it is good for its utility 3 p 47, marked Z

||Music is imitative, the Athenian says. If it gives only pleasure it cannot really be excellent,|| but only that other kind of music which is an imitation of the good. The polemic here is against the immediate or irrational pleasure. True utility is not touched. 4 p 47, marked

||Athenian:|| And those who seek for the best kind of song and music ought not to seek for that which is pleasant, but for that which is true; and the truth of imitation consists, as we were saying, in rendering the thing imitated according to quantity and quality. This is quite true: art must be squared with the purpose of life in general, not allowed to go about loose. Music to be judged by its appropriateness alone. Plato little thought such a maxim would lead to what he would most abhor—a Wagner. [Laws, Book III.] 5 p 69

||The discussion now concerns the origin of government. The Athenian speaks of the dissolution of the Dorian confederacy.|| […] not cowardice was the cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole design, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of the rulers or of

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their subjects; but their misfortunes were due to their general degeneracy, and especially to their ignorance of the most important human affairs.  , Cf. Other countries in this respect. The American  for instance, and what it may come to. 6 p 70, underlined and marked

||Athenian:|| […] the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil. This disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the worst ignorance; and also the greatest, because affecting the great mass of the human soul; […]. [From “This disagreement”:] N.B. 7 pp 82–83, marked

||Of ancient music, and of the disorder introduced by poets:|| They were men of genius, but they had no perception of what is just and lawful in music; raging like Bacchanals and possessed with inordinate delights— mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with dithyrambs; imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and making one general confusion; ignorantly affirming that music has no truth, and, whether good or bad, can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure of the hearer. N.B. Quote in Function of Art. [Laws, Book IV.] 8 p 87, marked Z

||What will the ideal city be? Description of its site; it would be eighty stadia distant from the sea. Athenian:|| But there is comfort in the eighty stadia; although the sea is too near, especially if, as you say, the harbours are so good. Still we may be content. The sea is pleasant enough as a daily companion, but has indeed also a bitter and brackish quality; filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and begetting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways—making the state unfriendly and unfaithful both to her own citizens, and also to other nations. Plato would not, in this age, have regretted being a Spaniard. Castile is a naturally noble country and would be great if it had a noble training. 9 p 89, marked

||Athenian:|| And in estimating the goodness of a state, we regard both the situation of the country and the order of the laws, considering that the mere preservation and continuance of life is not the most honourable

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thing for men, as the vulgar think, but the continuance of the best life, while we live; […]. 10 p 91, marked

||Athenian:|| I was going to say that man never legislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways. The violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly overturning governments and changing laws. Canovas on the inner constitution of Spain. 11 p 104

||The Athenian outlines and applies the double method of persuasion and command. If a man did not marry between ages thirty and thirty-five, he would be fined.|| This would be the simple law about marriage. The double law would run thus:—A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, considering that in a manner the human race naturally partakes of immortality, which every man is by nature inclined to desire to the utmost; for the desire of every man that he may become famous, and not lie in the grave without a name, is only the love of continuance. Cf. Life of Reason. 12 p 105. marked Z

||The Athenian pursues his idea.|| And for a man voluntarily to deprive himself of this gift [of immortality through his posterity], as he deliberately does who will not have a wife or children, is impiety. What is the postulate here? That the natural desire for life is the basis of virtue. Cf. a man who, believing in personal immortality, should neglect to save his soul. [Laws, Book V.] 13 p 125, marked Z

||From the Athenian’s long discourse about the state and its governance:|| The intention, as we affirm, of a reasonable statesman, is not what the many declare to be the object of a good legislator, namely, that the state for the true interests of which he is advising should be as great and as rich as possible, and should possess gold and silver, and have the greatest empire by sea and land;—this they imagine to be the real object of legislation, at the same time adding, inconsistently, that the true legislator desires to have the city the best and happiest possible. Alas! When will this be understood! Cf. note in my text.

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[Laws, Book VI.] 14 p 137, marked

||The Athenian to Cleinias:|| The old saying, that ‘equality makes friendship,’ is happy and also true; but there is obscurity and confusion as to what sort of equality is meant. For there are two equalities which are called by Equality. 15 p 138, marked

[The Athenian’s speech continues:]

the same name, but are in reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another; one of them may be introduced without difficulty, by any state or any legislator in the distribution of honours: this is the rule of measure, weight, and number, which regulates and apportions them. But there is another equality, of a better and higher kind, which is not so easily recognized. This is the judgment of Zeus; among men it avails but little; that little, however, is the source of the greatest good to individuals and states. For it gives to the greater more, and to the inferior less and in proportion to the nature of each; and, above all, greater honour always to the greater virtue, and to the less less; and to either in proportion to their respective measure of virtue and education. And this is justice, and is ever the true principle of states, at which we ought to aim, and according to this rule order the new city which is now being founded, and any other city which may be hereafter founded. To this the legislator should look,—not to the interests of tyrants one or more, or to the power of the people, but to justice always; which, as I was saying, is the distribution of natural equality among unequals in each case. But there are times at which every state is compelled to use the words, ‘just,’ ‘equal,’ in a secondary sense, in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions. For equity and indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of justice. And this is the reason why we are obliged to use the equality of the lot, in order to avoid the discontent of the people; and so we invoke God and fortune in our prayers, and beg that they themselves will direct the lot with a view to supreme justice. And therefore, although we are compelled to use both equalities, we should use that into which the element of chance enters as seldom as possible. Good on “equality.” 16 p 155, marked

||The Athenian on marriage:|| Let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, and let us remember what was said before—that a man

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should cling to immortality, and leave behind him children’s children to be the servants of God in his place for ever. This is Biblical yet literal enough. Cf. Text. But the sort of piety is different from the Hebrew. [Laws, Book VII.] 17 p 179, marked

||Children who change the rules of traditional games will as adults want to change institutions and laws.|| Important idea. If we could bring up people under the same influences we should not have this instability in affairs. 18 p 199, marked

||The Athenian on rules for comedy:|| For serious things cannot be understood without laughable things, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either; but he cannot carry out both in action, if he is to have any degree of virtue. Cf. Text & note. This is doubtful, although not so bad as if action too had been made experimental. Perhaps only he who has not laughed can know what it is to be serious: the other can always laugh at his own zeal, as above. 19 p 199, underlined

And for this very reason he should learn them both, in order that he may not in ignorance do or say anything which is ridiculous and out of place— […]. The only thing one should be forewarned against is what one is probably predisposed to: then the [illegible] is not really suggested, but the natural suggestion met by a foretaste of the consequences and perhaps inhibited. But when there is no predisposition the suggestion is gratuitous and dangerous. 20 p 200, marked

||Objections to imitation in the arts are again posed: “Serious” poets, tragedians, from other cities are not to be permitted to make their arguments in the Athenian’s model city until their scripts have been approved by the magistrates.|| Here begins the great explanation.

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[Laws, Book VIII.] 21 p 212, marked

||Military drill and athletic exercises are to occur regularly and to be as realistic as possible. Should a man be killed in the process,|| the homicide is involuntary, and we will make the slayer, when he has been purified according to law, to be pure of blood, considering that if a few men should die, others as good as they will be born; but that if fear is dead, then the citizens will never find a test of superior and inferior natures, which is a far greater evil to the state than the loss of a few. Cf. our athletics 22 p 220

||On the forbidding of sexual intercourse between brother and sister.|| ||The Athenian:|| Nor does the thought of such a thing ever enter at all into the minds of most of them. ||Megillus:|| Very true. ||The Athenian:|| Does not a little word extinguish all pleasures of that sort? ||Megillus:|| What word? ||The Athenian:|| The declaration that they are unholy, hated of God, and most infamous; and is not the reason of this that no one has ever said the opposite, but every one from his earliest childhood has heard men speaking in the same manner about them always and everywhere, whether in comedy or in the graver language of tragedy? The reason is familiarity and the presence of other opportunities. We do not warn boys against falling in love with their sisters. Is it possible to fall in love with a person one knows well? Hardly. Lust is possible, the love of fancy is not. [Laws, Book IX.] 23 p 236

||The Athenian on sacrilege. To the guilty he would say:|| When any such thought comes into your mind, go and perform expiations, go as a suppliant to the temples of the Gods who avert evils, go to the society of those who are called good men among you; hear them tell and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man should honour the noble and the just. How Greek is this tragic sense of crime and of destiny.

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24 p 260, underlined and marked

||Human selfishness creates the necessity for laws.|| For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and free, and in harmony with nature. Strange persistence of this Socratic hobby. In what relation could Plato & Aristotle & St Thomas think the instincts passive and character lay to the intellect? There must be some explanation of so unreal a doctrine held by such men. [Laws, Book X.] 25 p 282, marked

||The Athenian insists that there are two souls, one of good and one of evil.|| This proves the moral rectitude of Plato, in spite of the tendency to monism in the Timaeus. 26 p 283, marked

||The world moves regularly, thus it is guided by the good soul. But if it moves wildly, the evil soul is guide.|| But, alas, here is the confusion of moral with logical and aesthetic order once more. [Laws, Book XI.] 27 p 299, marked

||The Athenian quotes an old saw:|| ‘Move not the immovables.’ How superstitious Plato becomes. After being in the last book, sophistical and fanatical. [Laws, Book XII.] 28 p 359, marked

||On the regularity of motion of bodies.|| Strange, many would rather say the regularity was proof of mechanism and an irregularity would be proof of life. This is really the thought underlying the definition of life as spontaneous motion: for regular motion has no origination, no spontaneity in it.

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[Timaeus, Introduction.] 29 p 429

But the Timaeus still remains the greatest effort of the human mind to conceive the world as a whole which the genius of antiquity has bequeathed to us. And Lucretius? [Timaeus.] 30 p 449, marked

||Timaeus to Socrates:|| Now it is all-important that the beginning of everything should be according to nature. i.e. that our foundations correspond to the real structure of things. 31 p 450, top

The myth of creation. God (being the good) is not jealous but self-diffusing. He finds a chaos: he shapes it into an image of himself.—But good = intelligence. Therefore the form of the world is to be as intelligent and intelligible as possible. As the total of ideas is one, the total of phenomena is one also. 32 p 450

[Santayana’s paraphrase:]

The ideal realm is limited to the types of nature. The whole realm of essence is manifested in the realm of nature. 33 p 451, top

Deduction of the four elements: Since the “created” is sensible & visible, it must be earth & fire. But to combine these, their numbers must be brought into a proportional series with two other terms (two, because cubes have two powers) hence water and air. 34 p 451, marked Z

For whenever in any three numbers, whether cube or square, there is a mean, which is to the last term what the first term as the last term is to the mean,—then the mean becoming the first and last, and the first and last both becoming means, they will all of them of necessity come to be the same, and having become the same with one another will be all one.

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[From “then the mean becoming”:]

The same law will unite them. Nuts to Hegel.1 1

Who said that Santayana did not command the American vernacular?

35 p 509, marked

||Timaeus says that mental disease originates in the body.|| And in general, all that which is termed incontinence of pleasure and is deemed a reproach under the idea that the wicked voluntarily do wrong is not justly a matter for reproach. For no man is voluntarily bad; but the bad become bad by reason of an ill disposition of the body and bad education, things which are hateful to every man and happen to him against his will. Why has mankind such a superstitious zeal in hating itself for its misfortunes? Ezra Loomis Pound

Quia pauper amavi London: n.d. [1919?]. Waterloo. Twelve marginalia.

[Early versions of Pound’s first three Cantos.] 1 p 19

I Hang it all, there can be but the one “Sordello,” […] Fert animus to imitate Browning.1 […] I dump my catch, shiny and silvery As fresh sardines flapping and slipping […] Good image of catch what comes. I stand before the booth (the speech), but the truth Is inside this discourse: this booth is full of the marrow of wisdom. Give up the intaglio method? Vomit, don’t write. 1

“Fert animus” should probably be “Fort animus”: brave spirit.

2 p 7, underlined

Langue d’Oc When the nightingale to his mate Sings day-long and night late My love and I keep state In bower, In flower, ’Till the watchman on the tower Cry: “Up! Thou rascal, Rise, […]”

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This is intentional? Otherwise guitar-like. 3 p 21, underlined and marked X

True, it was Venice, And at Florian’s, under the North arcade 4 p 27

Back once again in middle Indiana, Acting as usher in the theatre, Painting the local drug-shop and soda bars, The local doctor’s fancy for a mantle-piece: Sheep! jabbing the wool upon their flea-bit backs, 1890: Americans gone to seed. Llewelyn Powys

Rats in the Sacristy London: 1937. Waterloo. Sixteen marginalia.

1 pp 59–60, marked

“The multitude,” Heraclitus once said, “are like people heavy with wine led by children knowing not whither they go.” 2 p 101, underlined

||Lucian, on a place|| of monotony where there is neither strength nor beauty, where one is no better than another, “all under the same gloom.” Democracy. 3 p 140

||On Machiavelli: Each person has a modicum of freedom, within bounds. It is folly for an individual to struggle against the mass.|| This is not free-will but harmony with nature and necessity. Giuseppe Prezzolini

Il cattolicismo rosso Napoli: 1908. Georgetown. Forty-three marginalia.

1 p xiii, marked

[Prezzolini’s Introduction.]

||Hundreds among the aristocracy of the Roman Church have preferred to see it go down rather than to go along with the machine-like version of religion, automatism of faith, that had dominated the clergy and the Vatican.||

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2 p xvii, doubly marked

[Introduction.]

||Luther believed that he was being a good Catholic by attempting to reform the Church. Now certain people who call themselves Catholic are not such; others, supposed rebels, are more Catholic than the Pope; still others who think they are treating of religious matters|| sono fuori non solo del Cattolicismo ma della stessa religione.1 1

… are not only outside Catholicism but beyond religion itself.

3 p 11

||Theologians have diminished piety, condemned mysticism to the convent alone, suppressed aesthetic, linguistic, and artistic expressions of religious sentiment, and virtually denied individual will.|| The early Church—say in the 4th century—had most of these characteristics. Cf. Gibbon. 4 p 23

[Santayana’s paraphrase:]

Practical madness is not now so often founded on theoretical madness. 5 p 25

[Santayana concludes from the analysis:]

i.e. true Christianity is impossible for a society. 6 p 27

||Concerning automatic responses to religion, without doctrine or formal instruction.|| This unconsciousness of religion is a proof, of course, that this is the really proper and representative religion of the age. A sentimental desire to be very religious, like other ages, is a sign, not of religion, but of coxcombry. 7 p 44

Strange inconsistency in the revolutionists and democrats not to welcome the popular and modern religious fiction. 8 p 58, marked

||The Socialists rely on economic determinism, reject the idea of Christian charity, and are anti-clerical: all the result of exterior philosophies.|| How socialism has become anti religious. [sic]

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9 p 95

||Cardinal Newman’s reliance not on the Council of Trent but on divine grace and personal illumination.|| In this we forget that he was bred an Anglican—a hot house even more artificial. 10 p 146, marked

Per i protestanti la vita religiosa è in uno sguardo al passato, in un ravvicinamento al Cristo che è stato, in un ritorno ai suoi tempi. Il Protestantismo, che si dà per una religione di progresso, è una religione di regresso; è stato una rivoluzione reazionaria.1 1

For Protestants the religious life is a glance at the past, in a state of reconciliation with Christ, in a return to His times. Set forth as a religion of progress, Protestantism is a religion of regress; it is a reactionary revolution. 11 p 190, marked

||Prezzolini quotes and criticizes Le Roy for recommending anti-intellectual states of consciousness, suitable, Prezzolini says, for Buddhists, but hardly appropriate to the effort to renew study of Catholicism.|| Nostalgie de la boue . . psychique! The worship of psychic slime. Protoplasm worship. 12 p 240, marked

||Prezzolini approvingly cites Loisy: it might have been better had Christian revelation occurred in the nineteenth-century rather than when it did; Catholicism would then be rid of a great deal of historical freight and open to genuine faith and piety.|| Quite excellent! 13 p 318

||A disquisition on the nature of charity.|| Might not the higher spiritual life consist in charity: then every expression of charity would be christian. Joseph Frederic Privitera

The Latin American Front

Milwaukee: 1945. Waterloo. Seventeen marginalia, and a draft of a poem in the end-pages. 1 p 40

If the Indians were converted by Protestant propaganda it would be to Protestant thrift and conceit, not to Protestant

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religion. If they have religious instincts of their own, not appealed to by the Catholic system, those instincts would surely be appealed to much less by Protestantism. But by that time Protestant missions may have ceased to be religious even in name. 2 p 54, underlined

Do we desire only the trade of Latin America? This desire, made reciprocal, is enough for organising trade relations all the world over. Desire for cultural union should remain “uncovenanted”. 3 p 58

||Privitera foresees the day when the United States will send south Latin American engineers, geologists, and the like to starve to death.|| Isn’t the better way this: that S. Americans should learn engineering in the U.S. and then teach it at home? Didn’t the Japs do this? 4 p 135, underlined

Surrounded as we are in the United States by the most modern comforts, the best food, […]. ? 5 pp 148–49, marked

“If heroes exist in this country, they are not to be found among writers”; these words of Gálvez have a familiar ring. It is a striking fact that spiritually Argentina resembles the United States more than it does the rest of Latin America. While Argentinians themselves have never been willing to put it quite that way, those who have given any thought to the matter have at least seen evidence of those traits which one generally associates with the cultural pattern of the United States. […] The profession of writer, [Gálvez] says, is scorned. A poet is considered a useless creature, a muerto de hambre,1 a pariah, if not a beggarly alcoholic. When he was a boy, he tells us … “parents took care not to encourage literary study in their children. In fact, they did everything in their power to place obstacles in the path of a boy as soon as they suspected in him an affection for poetry.” 1

One dead of hunger.

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6 p 151, marked

The Latin finds in conversation a communion of the spirit with his fellow man that is both delightful and satisfying to the soul. This is an art which we in the United States no longer possess. [End-paper:]

While on earth [illegible] thrift and earthly ^ ^ Though loving circumstance must needs on earth control Our rights freedom lives wakes within the soul, ^ ^ Smooth Wise custom ^ ^ The soul, the seed of all things Smiling she signs the temporary bond knows no bond the matrimonial bond And Smiling submits to every civic bond, Fashions Builds as she it may, but yet ever looks beyond control ^ ^thrift & circumstance ^ ^ While on earth Wise custom, freedom wakes within the soul Smiling submits to every civic bond Builds as it may, but ever looks beyond Frederic Prokosch

Chosen Poems New York: 1948. Waterloo. Five trivial marginalia.

Marcel Proust

A la recherche du temps perdu Paris: 1919. Georgetown. Fifteen marginalia.

[The pagination of Santayana’s copies of the Gallimard 1919 edition do not correspond to the pagination in the other 1919 printings I have been able to locate.] [A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs, tome I.] 1 p 18, underlined

||Marcel the narrator reflects on his vacillating, childhood love for Gilberte, as opposed to love for another person, love in the abstract, detached from individuals.|| […] quand on aime, on sent que cet amour ne porte pas leur nom, pourra dans l’avenir renaître, aurait pu, même dans le passé, naître pour une autre et non pour celle-là. Et dans le temps

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où l’on n’aime pas, si l’on prend philosophiquement son parti de ce qu’il y a de contradictoire dans l’amour, c’est que cet amour dont on parle à son aise on ne l’éprouve pas alors, donc on ne le connaît pas, la connaissance en ces matières étant intermittente […].1 [At “dont on parle”:] knowledge [At “la connaissance”:] intuition 1 … when one is in love, one feels that this love is not attached to a name, that in the future it may be re-born, or that it might, in the past, have come into being for another than the beloved. And during the time in which one is not in love, if one philosophically faces up to the contradictory side of love, one finds that such love of which one speaks at one’s ease had not in the past been tested, thus one does not really recognize it, recognition in these matters being intermittent ….

2 p 45

[…] chez ceux qui aiment et sont abandonnés, le sentiment d’attente—même d’attente inavouée—dans lequel ils vivent se transforme de lui-même, et bien qu’en apparence identique, fait succéder à un premier état, un second extrêmement identique, fait succéder à un premier état, un second exactement contraire.1 1

Santayana corrects either a typographical error or an extremely obscure sentence. … among those who are in love and are abandoned, the sensation of waiting—even of unavowed waiting—in which they live becomes transformed, and while identical in appearance, causes a second state to succeed the first, a second absolutely identical, causes a second exactly the contrary of the first to come about. 3 pp 59–60, marked

||More concerning Marcel’s love for Gilberte.|| Souvent (notre vie étant si peu chronologique, interférant tant d’anachronismes dans la suite des jours), je vivais dans ceux, plus anciens que la veille ou l’avant-veille, où j’aimais Gilberte.1 1

Often (our lives being so slightly chronological, so many anachronisms breaking into the sequence of our days), I re-lived those days, before the times of wakefulness or semi-sleep, when I loved Gilberte.

[A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs, tome II.] 4 pp 84–85, marked

||At the new year, walking with Françoise, the young Marcel sees a poster on a column advertising a performance that Berma had given on New Year’s day.|| A gentle and moist wind was blowing. Having lost Gilberte, Marcel thinks of a new world in parallel to the former in which a new friendship may occur, as in the first days of the creation of the world. J’avais beau dédier celle-ci à Gilberte, et comme on superpose une religion aux lois aveugles de la nature, essayer d’imprimer au jour de l’an l’idée particulière que je

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m’étais faite de lui, c’était en vain; je sentais qu’il ne savait pas qu’on l’appelât le jour de l’an, qu’il finissait dans le crépuscule d’une façon qui ne m’était pas nouvelle: dans le vent doux qui soufflait autour de la colonne d’affiches, j’avais reconnu, j’avais senti reparaître la matière éternelle et commune, l’humidité familière, l’ignorante fluidité des anciens jours.1 1

However much I would consecrate this to Gilberte, and as one superimposes religion on the blind laws of nature, to try to imprint on a day of the year the particular idea that I had of it was in vain. I felt that it did not know what we called the New Year, that it ended in the twilight in a way that was not new to me: in the gentle wind blowing about the column of posters, I had again known, I had sensed to re-appear that eternal and common substance, the familiar dampness, the unknowing flow of former times. 5 p 114, underlined

||Marcel has written a letter to Swann to which Swann had not bothered to reply.|| J’admirais l’impuissance de l’esprit, du raisonnement et du cœur à opérer la moindre conversion, à résoudre une seule de ces difficultés, qu’ensuite la vie, […].1 Bergson revised & materialised. 1 I wondered at the impotence of the mind, of rationality and of the heart to bring about the slightest change, to resolve any one of the difficulties that life entails, ….

6 p 145, marked

Ce qu’on appelle la posterité, c’est la postérite de l’œuvre.1 [Vinteuil’s music.]

Your only posterity is the offspring of your work. 1

That which we call posterity is the posterity of the work.

7 p 146

||Marcel meditates upon our illusion of the orderliness of past tradition in the arts, and of the changes, necessarily surprising and disorderly, which must come about in the art of the future.|| Songeons seulement aux choquants disparates que nous présenterait, si nous ne tenions pas compte du temps à venir et des changements qu’il amène, tel horoscope de notre propre âge mûr tiré devant nous durant notre adolescence. Seulement tous les horoscopes ne sont pas vrais et être obligé par une œuvre d’art de faire entrer dans le total de sa beauté le facteur du temps, mêle, à notre jugement, quelque chose d’aussi hasardeux et par là aussi dénué d’intérêt véritable que toute prophétie dont la non réalisation n’impliquera nullement la médiocrité d’esprit du prophète, car Depth of mind deepens the view of essence, not of events. ce qui^appelle ^

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à l’existence les possibles ou les en exclut n’est pas forcément de la compétence de génie; […].1 1

Just imagine the shocking disparities we should confront if we did not take into account the future and the changes it would lead to, in a horoscope of our maturity taken in adolescence. But horoscopes are not necessarily true, and the necessity in judging works of art to include time in the totality of its beauty introduces into our judgment something as hazardous and as barren of interest, as any prophecy, the lack of fulfillment of which does not imply mediocrity on the prophet’s part, for it is not within the compass of genius to call possibilities into existence or to exclude them …. 8 p 166–67

||Mention of the writer Bergotte startles Marcel and brings to mind Bergotte’s beard, his general appearance. His earlier mental portrait of Bergotte had now to include|| the snail-shell nose and to incorporate the black goatee: just as one discards as worthless the solution to a problem, the terms of which one has not read fully and so failed to note that a specified figure was to be reached. [At the description, Santayana translates Proust’s words into a drawing.] 9 p 172, marked

||On the excellence of Bergotte’s diction, his subtlety, and the deceptive flow of his thought, all of which came over into his conversation, which gave it an air of falsity,|| de faire du paradoxe, et qu’ainsi ses idées semblaient le plus souvent confuses, chacun appelant idées claires celles qui sont au même degré de confusion que les siennes propres.1 1 … an air of paradox, so that his ideas seemed, more often than not, to be confused; each of us calls those ideas clear which display the same degree of confusion as his own.

[A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs, tome III.] 10 p 73, marked

||Marcel thinks that exterior impressions of Balbec, of the young girls, his relatives, pleasures, or his work were only|| un flocon d’écume dans un grand vent qui ne la laisse pas se poser, n’existait plus que relativement à cette puissance intérieure: l’ivresse réalisé pour quelques heures l’idéalisme subjectif, le phénoménisme pur: tout n’est plus qu’apparences et n’existe plus qu’en fonction de notre sublime nous-même.1 1

… a fleck of foam in a high wind which will not let it settle; they existed only relatively to this interior power: the ecstasy realized in a few hours of subjective idealism, pure phenomenality: then everything is no more than appearance and has no existence other than its function of pertaining to our sublime selves.

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11 p 171

[Santayana makes a paragraph symbol in the midst of one of Proust’s very long paragraphs: like trying to fence in a portion of the sea.] 12 p 198, marked

Les traits de notre visage ne sont guère que des gestes devenus, par l’habitutde, définitifs.1 1

Our facial characteristics become hardly more than gestures, by habit, definitive.

Marcel Proust

A la recherche du temps perdu: Le Temps retrouvé Paris: 1927. Waterloo. Two marginalia.

1 p 60

||Gossiping indiscretions of Mme Verdurin’s circle during the Great War.|| Mais beaucoup de grands hôtels étaient à cette époque peuplés d’espions qui notaient les nouvelles téléphonés par Bontemps avec une indiscrétion que corrigeait seulement par bonheur le manque de sûreté de ses informations toujours démenties par l’événement.1 Reeves [sic]2 1 But at that time many of the grand hotels were inhabited by spies who marked the news that Bontemps telephoned with a degree of indiscretion that corrected only by good luck the lack of security of his information, always refuted by the event. 2 A reference to Emery Reves, The Anatomy of Peace (1945). This would date Santayana’s reading of Le Temps retrouvé. See Reves marginalia below.

2 pp 198–99, marked

||Marcel in his age reflects on his amours: Gilberte, Mme de Guermantes.|| Du reste déjà, à cause justement de cet individuel auquel on s’acharne, les amours pour les personnes sont déjà un peu des aberrations. Et les maladies du corps elles-mêmes, du moins celles qui tiennent d’un peu près au système nerveux ne sont-elles pas des espèces de goûts particuliers ou d’effrois particuliers contractés par nos organes, nos articulations, […]?1 1

And for the rest, precisely owing to that individual whose victim one is, the love of persons is really on the order of aberration. And even the illnesses of the body, or at least those that we associate with the nervous system, are they not an order of particular tastes or of particular terrors contracted by our organs, our joints, …?

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David B. Quinn

Raleigh and the British Empire London: 1947. Waterloo. One marginale.

1 p 24, marked

It was in Ireland in the decade after 1565 that Englishmen became accustomed to the conception of a real colony settlement, involving the transplantation of a section of English society overseas, where it must find a livelihood with the aid of cheap land and native labour. A[rthur] L[yon] R[aile] [pseud., Edward Perry Warren] A Tale of Pausanian Love London: 1927. Waterloo. Eight marginalia. 1 p 122

Besides, I could not help but thinking that, by forwarding this engage^ misery beyond my power to help, and ment, I might be sealing ^Fred’s / that my desire to help was, after all, more or less, if not by any means altogether selfish. yielding to a selfish desire of my own. ^ ^ Carveth Read

The Metaphysics of Nature London: 1905. Georgetown. Twenty-seven marginalia.

Readings in Ethical Theory

Thomas Reid

Edited by Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers New York: 1952. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man

Abridged, with notes and illustrations from Sir William Hamilton and others Philadelphia: [1861], 1864 (10th edition). Georgetown. Thirty-three marginalia, two drawings. Several marginalia illegible. 1 p 103

Hence it is that philosophers speak of the perceptions of memory and the perceptions of imagination. A vital criticism of the un-technicality of the English writers,—one of their great merits.

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2 p 103, marked

However improbable it may appear that philosophers, who have taken pains to study the operations of their own minds, should express them less properly and less distinctly than the vulgar, it seems really to be the case; […] the vulgar seek no theory to account for the operations of their minds; they know that they see, and hear, and remember, and imagine; and those who think distinctly will express these operations distinctly, […]. Admirable passage. Yet the theory of the origin of distinctions is worth studying.1 1

A comment suggesting that Santayana may have read this as a student. He perhaps read the book with William James. 3 p 119, underlined

||Perhaps Bishop Berkeley saw that|| if we perceive only the ideas of spirits, we shall find the same difficulty in inferring their real existence from the existence of their ideas, as we find in inferring the existence of matter from the idea of it; […]. Not fair to B., who denies the idea. 4 p 120–21, underlined

[…] two philosophers of the eighteenth century, of very distinguished rank, were led by a philosophical hypothesis, the one to disbelieve the existence of matter, and the other to disbelieve the existence both of matter and of mind. Is this quite ingenuous? Mind is not consciousness, matter is not the world of sense. 5 p 128, marked

||Philosophers say that immediate objects of perception exist in the mind itself;|| that, for instance, we do not see the sun immediately, but an idea, or, as Mr. Hume calls it, an impression, in our own minds. Hume doesn’t mean that the act is one thing the impression another. Is it proper to say a perception is perceived? What cannot be doubted is the belief, its object may not exist. 6 p 244, marked

[…] it is not my remembering any action of mine that makes me to be the person who did it. This remembrance makes me to know assuredly that I did it; but I might have done it, though I did not remember it. That relation

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to me, which is expressed by saying that I did it, would be the same, though I had not the least remembrance of it. Alas! Common sense has its pitfalls. What is this self, that memory testifies to, but does not constitute? 7 p 245, underlined

[Concerning personal identity:]

We probably at first derive our notion of identity from that natural conviction which every man has from the dawn of reason of his own identity and continued existence. The operations of our minds are all successive, and have no continued existence. But the thinking being has a continued existence, and we have an invincible belief, that it remains the same when all its thoughts and operations change. ? ^ ^ [At “we have”:] Have we? Emery Reves

The Anatomy of Peace New York and London: 1945. Waterloo. Fifty marginalia.

1 p 2, underlined

[…] in 1917, the United States was forced to go to war in defense of American rights. 2 p 3, underlined

[…] no one could fail to see that the European and Asiatic military powers, known as the Axis, were planning the conquest of North and South America. 3 p 82, marked

It is of utmost importance for the future of mankind to realize the apostasy and failure of all three of the monotheistic world religions and their domination by disruptive and destructive nationalism, as without the deep influence of the monotheistic outlook of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, human freedom in society—democracy—could never have been instituted and cannot survive. “Democracy”, then is contrary to moral freedom since one spirit dominates the universe. 4 p 83, underlined

For Aristotle a democratic state was not conceivable with more than ten thousand inhabitants. citizens

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5 p 83

||Fifteen centuries of Judaeo-Christian-Islamic teaching was needed|| to forge the ideology of modern political democracy. The promise of Judaism was always one of domination not of “democracy”. 6 p 87, marked X

||Only universalism can save human society. Christian churches must make it central or vanish.|| 7 p 116, underlined

[Reves’s axioms:]

1. Individual freedom and individual security in modern society are the product of democratically created and democratically executed law. 2. All individuals must be directly related ? to the institutions express^^ ing the sovereignty of the community. 3. Any intermediary organizations with attributes of sovereignty standing between individuals and the institutions of the sovereignty of the community (cities, provinces, churches, nations or any other units) destroy the rights of the individual, the sovereignty of the community and, consequently, destroy democracy itself. All psychologically impossible. 8 p 121, top

The love of man based on the fear of God. 9 p 177, top

Dull abstract poor monotonous jargon. 10 p 177

The moment organized socialist workers in the various countries had to choose between loyalty to their comrades in the internationally organized class warfare within class in all classes nations, and loyalty to ^ all of their compatriots ^in the nationally organized warfare between ^ ^ nations, they invariably chose the latter. 11 p 177

[Marked from “Through” to “international war.”]

Through a fundamental contradiction in its program, modern socialism is particularly to blame for strengthening nationalism and for the inevitable consequence: international war. The contradiction lies in the discrepancy between the socialist political ideal of internationalism and

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the socialist economic ideal of nationalization . of the means of pro^^ duction. 12 p 178, top

Interests, in so far as they are physical, ought to be comiliatory & brotherly; in so far as they they are ideal, they ought to be uncompromising and diverse. 13 p 178, marked

The greater the extent of nationalization, the more power is vested in the nation-state, the more impregnable becomes nationalism. 14 p 178, marked

The socialist and Communist parties must realize that through their program of “nationalization” they have done more to strengthen and buttress the modern totalitarian nation-states than have the aristocracy or any feudal or capitalist ruling class. 15 p 178

This tragedy is the result of acting emotionally on first impulses, without thinking the problem through. The workers of the world must realize that through their misconception and through their self-deluding ideal of internationalism, they are preventing the realization of their ideals of peace and betterment of economic and social conditions. well-being. ^

^

16 p 179, top

National interests are private interests, selfish and pugnacious. 17 p 179, underlined

By advocating nationalization, the socialists originally had in mind, of course, collectivization, the transfer of certain property rights from individuals to the community. 18 p 179, marked

But at the present stage of industrial development, in the middle of the twentieth century, nothing is more remote from the ideal of the community than the nations. They have shrunk into tightly sealed compartments obstructing any community expression. 19 p 179, underlined

“Nationalization” today no longer means collectivism but its opposite.

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20 p 179, marked

Confusing the nation-state with the community people is a most dan^ ^ gerous error, as today nation-states are the mortal enemies of the ideal of human community, far more than any landowner, industrialist or private corporation. 21 p 195, top

It takes two to make peace, but one to make war. 22 p 199

||The Winston Churchill who in 1930 said that national sovereignty could not last, in 1940 declared that nationalism and self-determination must be the foundation of society.|| W. C. is a histrionic opportunist. 23 p 203, marked

||The central idea of the Atlantic Charter is that all peoples have the right to choose their own forms of government, and that sovereign right and self-government must be restored to those who have been deprived of them.|| This is the liberal ideal, falsely applied to physical & biological life. But intervention is intolerable in spiritual things. 24 p 206, marked X

We fail to recognize that what made the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of the Rights of Man possible were the Ten Commandments of trade . ^ ^ 25 p 214, underlined

Just as a council of delegates and representatives of fifty sovereign cities, defending the interests of their respective municipalities, could never create a united nation ||so fifty nations cannot.|| ? The American colonies were independent in theory before the Union. But they possessed one army. Hence … . 26 p 230, underlined

Within the span of a single generation, two world wars into which the United States has been dragged against the will of its people […]. Japan would not have acted against the U.S. if the latter had been home-keeping.

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27 p 251, marked

Or must we become resigned and admit that Plato was right in saying that “human beings never make laws; it is the accidents and catastrophes of all kinds, happening in every conceivable way, that make the laws for us”? A ray of truth. I[vor] A[rmstrong] Richards

Mencius on the Mind London: 1932. Columbia. Five marginalia.

1 p 78

||Interpreting Mencius, Richards writes of|| the social origin of human consciousness. Society among human animals must be an implication of their nature & cannot produce that nature. It may be a condition of consciousness, or of specific kinds of feelings: but to confuse consciousness with nature in man is so appalling a blunder that one feels like closing this book. The author has good points but is essentially a journalist. 2 p 80

We have seen reason to suppose that Mencius’ pronouncements ought probably to be read more as injunctions than as statements. this is the style of an American professor. Is Richards an American?1 1 On the title page of Santayana’s copy of the book, Richards is identified as Fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge.

I. A. Richards

The Philosophy of Rhetoric

New York and London: 1936. Columbia. Marginalia not counted. 1 p 35, underlined

[…] what a word means is the missing parts of the contexts from which it draws its delegated efficacy. A word “means” what it does not indicate? 2 p 40

||Ambiguity discussed.|| Water “means” (among other things not water) the Desert of Sahara, because there is no water there. Cf. McTaggart.

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3 p 95

||Richards quotes Kant, “practical” and refers to its “practical” use.|| Kant used “practical” in the sense of relating to conduct i.e. morals, or preceptive. Not the American “practical”. 4 p 103

||Richards quotes Lord Kames:|| I have taken this instance of vain pedantry chiefly to fill up my lecture-hour and to accustom you to ^ ^ my use of technical terms, […]. 5 p 131, underlined

[Although Santayana still believes Richards to be an American, he agrees with him about metaphor.]

[…] to present language as working only through the sensations it reinstates, is to turn the whole process upside down. It overlooks what is important in Mallarmé’s dictum that the poet does not write with thoughts (or with ideas or sensations or beliefs or desires or feelings, we may add) but with words. “Are not words,” so Coleridge asked, “parts and germinations of the plant? And what is the law of their growth? In something of this sort,” he wrote, “I would endeavour to destroy the old antithesis of Words and Things: elevating, as it were, Words into Things and living things too.” We must do so if we are to study metaphor profitably. Hulme and the school teachers are forgetting everything that matters most about language in treating it as just a stimulus to visualization. They think the image fills in the meaning of the word; it is rather the other way about and it is the word which brings in the meaning which the image and its original perception lack. Because the word is more easily transferred to a different context and marks the dispersed instances of the identical. 6 p 134, underlined

||Richards writes of the difficulty of belief in poetry, particularly that in which metaphor is the mode. If The Divine Comedy is a metaphor in its entirety,|| what is it that we might believe in it? Is it […] ‘that tenor and vehicle are thus and thus related there’? Or is the belief required no more than […] in accordance with the resultant meaning in so far as we apprehend that meaning—or rather in so far as that meaning apprehends, grasps, takes control of, us?1 Rather the moral? Is moralising perhaps behind this whole mess.? 1

Quotation from T. S. Eliot.

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Heinrich Rickert

Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Einführung in die Transzendentalphilosophie Tübingen and Leipzig: 1904. Georgetown. Two marginalia.

Emile Rideau

Le Dieu de Bergson Paris: 1932. Waterloo. Sixty-five marginalia.

1 p 24, marked X, top

It is perhaps true that by his mythical expressions B. is only expressing subjectively a sense of the unknown depths of matter. As he confuses “matter” with the idea of matter, so he confuses it with the idea (= consciousness) of force of will. But it is not an idea at all. 2 p 24, underlined, marked X

Or, il y a infiniment plus dans la réalité matérielle, dans la vie surtout, que dans leur expression, si exacte, si approchée, si progressive soit-elle, en termes de pensée: […].1 Yes, in the realism of matter; but in B’s intuition or élan there is infinitely less. 1 Now, there is infinitely more in material reality, in life above all, than in their expression, however exact, however approximate, however progressive it may be in terms of thought: ….

3 p 32, marked

The sentiment of Spirit has been for Bergson a progressive conquest from the Essay as far as Deux sources: […]. Yes he has become more spiritual and more Catholic. 4 p 33, marked X and underlined

[…] the dominating law of life lies in its uneasiness and suffering, for if it is always created anew in the world, life is toujours1 discontented with the results. “Spirit”, for B. is a self-creation out of nothing. German Will. But in reality the German Will is a transmutation of sausages and beer. 1

Always.

5 p 39, underlined

||Rideau discusses God’s works of creation.|| Dieu, immanent à ses œuvres par une présence éminemment active et amoureuse, ne les abandonne pas à leur sort, mais s’intéresse à leur développement et le poursuit.1

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What is this force or fate with which God has to fight? 1 God, immanent in his works by a presence eminently active and loving, does not abandon them to their fate, but is interested in and pursues the course of their development.

6 pp 67–68, marked Z

||Because certain Catholics lead a life of prayer and adoration, the Catholic Church insists that proof and demonstration of God’s works are possible.|| [At top:]

How little the critics brought up in the Church understand the religion of others! 7 p 71, marked Z

||Mysticism must somehow explain the existence and nature of God. Bergson says,|| […] «l’accord profond (des mystiques chrétiens) est signe d’une identité d’intuition qui s’expliquerait le plus simplement par l’existence réelle de l’Être avec lequel ils se croient en communication».1 N.B. B’s feeble notions of the order of nature. His genesis is specious. 1 … “the profound agreement (about the Christian mysteries) is a mark of an identity of intuition, which is explained in the most simple manner by the actual existence of the Being with which they believe themselves to be in communication.”

8 pp 82–83, underlined

||According to Bergson, human labor has a sacred quality under Christianity, which thus leads to the conclusion that it is|| […] l’élan créateur de la civilisation occidentale et «l’industrialisme lui-même». Alors que des mysticismes incomplets, comme le bouddhisme, ignorent «le don total et mystérieux de soi-même», le christianisme croit «à l’efficacité de l’action humaine»: «seule cette confiance peut devenir puissance et soulever les montagnes».1 avec de la dynamite. ^ ^ [At top:] Quote N.B. 1 … the creating force of Western civilization and the industrialization of the same. Whereas the incomplete mysticisms, like Buddhism, ignore the total and mysterious gift of itself, Christianity believes in the efficacy of human action: only such confidence can become power and raise mountains.

9 pp 98–99, marked

La durée résorbe dans son progrès l’extension apparente du passé: tout l’univers est la croissance organique d’une mémoire unique et simple, qui

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se développe sans à-coups, ni hiatus, par explicitation immanente de sa confusion.1 N.B. The past is not past: it is a confused part of the present. This, being true of the idea of the past, is transferred idealistically to the past itself 1

In its progress, duration reabsorbs the apparent extension of the past: the whole universe is the organic development of a unique and simple memory, which is developed without jolts or hiatus, by the immanent explicitness of its confusion. 10 pp 104–5, top

B. becomes at the end a more intelligible, a more appealing, and a nobler figure than he seemed at first. We feel his earnestness, his sincerity; a sort of Pauline enthusiasm & missionary sense: yet there is no real inspiration, a great narrowness, a great monotony. The passions (apart from hatred of certain philosophies) are absent; so is birth, death, and love—erotic love—everything in fact that the sense of [illegible] life w’d reveal to a complete man. We have here the zeal of a scribe, not the free flight of a genius. 11 p 105fn, underlined

||With reference to Bergson’s phrase, “création de soi par soi,”1 Rideau cites|| E. S., 25.2 Énergie spirituelle. What energy would a man have if he didn’t eat? 1

“Creation of the self by the self.” Bergson, L’Énergie spirituelle; essais et conferences (Paris, 1919).

2

12 p 109, top

Disinterestedness super-rational & pessimistic [Marked:]

In order to “prolong social solidarity and human brotherhood,” it is not necessary to count on “an expansion of the self”: “we do not reach humanity by steps, in passing from the family to the nation.” Confusion of objects with principles. We might like all babies, even black ones; but we might hate all frogs. Buddha would not. So absolute love of the good is love of all goods.

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13 p 118fn, underlined

||Rideau vaguely paraphrases Bergson on the mystery of life and its connection to death. He then quotes Bergson in a footnote:|| «Cet amour, où quelques-uns ont vu le grand mystère de la vie, nous en livrerait peut-être le secret. […] Il nous laisse entrevoir que l’être vivant est surtout un lieu de passage, et que l’essentiel de la vie tient dans le mouvement qui la transmet».1 [Santayana here manages a black pun:]

F_____ g [sic] is the essence of life. Quel bel effort! 2 1

This love, in which some have located the great mystery of life, perhaps delivers the secret to us. … It allows us to glimpse that life is above all a passage-way, and that the essential thing about life lies in the movement that transmits it. 2 What a lovely effort! 14 p 126, top

This reading of the depths of life, as felt, is arbitrary & narrow. Hunger, love, death, repletion. 15 p 127, top

[Rideau’s conclusion:]

Does The dawn arises/ by an effort? Is propagation is ^ ^ ^ an effort? etc. Literary composition—^except in inspired passages, which are poetry—is indeed an effort, very hard work, because so many things have to be collected & combined which are not [illegible] spontaneously in intuition. But etc. above? Arthur Rimbaud

Oeuvres de Arthur Rimbaud: vers et proses

Préface de Paul Claudel Paris: 1937. Waterloo. Eight marginalia and a translation of the poem “Bonheur.” 1 p 85

[In “Bateau ivre,” one of Rimbaud’s lines contains a difficult reading: “Plus douce qu’aux enfants la chair des pommes sures,” usually translated, Sweeter than the flesh of sour apples to children. Sur does not mean “sour” in standard French.]

“mûres”?1 1

Ripe.

2 p 144

“Chanson de la plus haute tour.” Oisive jeunesse

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Cf. Oliver ^ ^

A tout asservie, Par délicatesse J’ai perdu ma vie. Ah! que le temps vienne Où les coeurs s’éprennent!1

1 Lazy youth / Enslaved by everything / Out of delicacy / I have lost my life. / Ah, may the time come / When hearts are lost in love!

3 p 151–52

[Santayana’s translation of “Bonheur”:]

BONHEUR O saisons, ô châteaux, Quelle âme est sans défauts? O saisons, ô châteaux, J’ai fait la magique étude Du bonheur, que nul n’élude. O vive lui, chaque fois Que chante le coq gaulois. Mais je n’aurai plus d’envie, Il s’est chargé de ma vie. Ce charme! il prit âme et corps, Et dispersa tous efforts. Que comprendre à ma parole? Il fait qu’elle fuit et vole! O saisons, ô châteaux! Joy. O springtide, O castles wide What soul is without shame or pride? O springtide, O castles wide ^ ^ I have learned the lore of Magic Book joy for a every boy. ^ ^ ^ ^ Let joy [illegible ] live, and ever fl[illegible ] ^ Gallic^ cock doth crow. While the Not one [illegible ] need I avow I am in joy’s keeping now. All my troubles [illegible ] at this spell ^ ^ Vanished. All ceased to trouble. All is well

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And But what mean these airy things? Nothing! Joy has lent them wings. O Springtide, O castles wide. 4 p 180, marked

[From Les Illuminations, “Á une Raison.” Final line:]

Arrivée de toujours, tu t’en iras partout.1 1

You, arrival from forever, you will leave for everywhere.

5 p 227

[The first lines of “Les Ponts,” no. xiv of Les Illuminations.]

Des ciels gris de cristal. Un bizarre dessin de ponts, ceux-ci droits, ceux-là bouclés, d’autres descendant en obliquant angles sur les premiers; […].1 Paysage Cubiste2 1873! 1

Skies grey crystal. An odd design of bridges, some straight, others curved, still others coming down in angles oblique to the first, …. 2 Cubist landscape. 6 p 229, underlined

[First lines of Les Illuminations, xv, “Ville.”]

Je suis un éphémère et point trop mécontent citoyen d’une métropole crue moderne, parce que tout goût connu a été éludé dans les ameublements et l’extérieur des maisons aussi bien que dans le plan de la ville.1 Cf. the judgment of Descartes. All forms should be demolished and rebuilt on a single plan. 1

I am an ephemeral and not at all very discontented a citizen of a metropolis believed to be modern, because all good taste has been omitted in the furnishings and facades of the houses, as well as in the city-plan. 7 p 236

[Les Illuminations, vii, “Vies.”] Un envol de pigeons écarlates tonne autour de ma pensée.1 Chinese 1

A flight of scarlet pigeons thunders about my thought.

8 p 295, marked

||From Une saison en enfer, just before “O saisons, ô châteaux!” the lines in prose:|| Le Bonheur était ma fatalité, mon remords, mon ver: ma vie serait toujours trop immense pour être dévouée à la force et à la beauté.1 1 Joy was my fatality, my remorse, my worm: my life would always be too vast to be given over to strength and beauty.

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9 p 295, marked

O saisons, ô châteaux! Quelle âme est sans défauts! J’ai fait la magique étude Du bonheur, qu’aucun n’élude.1 1

O seasons, o castles! / What soul is without fault! / I have studied the magic / of happiness, which no one escapes.

Abraham A. Roback

Psychorama: A Mental Outlook and Analysis

Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1942. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Abraham A. Roback

Personality in Theory and Practice

Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1951. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Romain Rolland

Jean-Christophe: L’Adolescent Paris: 1904 (1908). Location unknown. Eight marginalia.

[See McCormick, George Santayana, Appendix B, for an account of these marginalia.]

Romain Rolland

L’Aube

Paris: 1903 (16th edition, n.d.). Location unknown. No marginalia.

Dante Gabriel Rossetti

The Complete Poetical Works Boston: 1891. Georgetown. No marginalia.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau Du contrat social [and] Les Rêveries d’un promeneur solitaire London: 1912. Georgetown. Twelve marginalia; none in Les Rêveries. 1 p 10, underlined and marked X

L’homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers.1 1

Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains.

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2 p 10, underlined and marked

Si je ne considerais que la force, et l’effet qui en dérive, je dirais: Tant qu’un peuple est contraint d’obéir et qu’il obéit, il fait bien; sitôt qu’il peut secouer le joug et qu’il le secoue, il fait encore mieux: car, recouvrant sa liberté par le même droit qui la lui a ravie, ou il est fondé à la reprendre, ou l’on ne l’était point à la lui ôter. Mais l’ordre social est un droit sacré qui sert de base à tous les autres.1 The weak can prove collectively[?] stronger. satirical 1

If I considered only strength and the effect that derives from it, I should say: insofar as a people are constrained to obey and they do obey, well enough; insofar as they can shake off the yoke and they do so, so much the better, for it is a case of recovering liberty under the same right that took it away, of taking back the right on which it was based, a right that no one whatsoever should have removed. But the social order is a sacred right which serves as a base for all other rights. 3 pp 10–11, underlined and marked X

||The social order is not based in nature but in certain conventions, such as that of the family. Members of a family voluntarily give up individual, total liberty for the common good.|| Cette liberté commune est une conséquence de la nature de l’homme. Sa première loi est de veiller à sa propre conservation, ses premiers soins sont ceux qu’il se doit à lui-même; et, sitôt qu’il est en âge de raison, lui seul étant juge des moyens propres à le conserver, devient par là son propre maître.1 [At “conservation”:]

Not if you mean enlightened judge: fine if you mean seat of the judgment. 1 That common liberty results from man’s nature. His first law is to see to his own survival; his first cares are those that he owes to himself. As soon as he attains the age of reason, being the only judge of the methods of self-preservation, he thus becomes his own master.

4 p 13, underlined and marked X

Or, qu’est-ce qu’un droit qui périt quand la force cesse?1 False notions altogether. 1

Now, what is a right that perishes when power fails?

5 p 13, underlined and marked X

Convenons donc que force ne fait pas droit, et qu’on n’est obligé d’obéir qu’aux puissances légitimes.1 1 Let us then agree that power does not make right, and that one is not obliged to obey excepting to legitimate powers.

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6 p 14, underlined and marked X

Quand chacun pourrait s’aliéner lui-même, il ne peut aliéner ses enfants; […] leur liberté leur appartient, nul n’a droit d’en disposer qu’eux.1 1

While each person may give up his own rights, he may not enslave his children; … their liberty is theirs alone, and no one has the right to dispose of it but they themselves. 7 p 14, underlined and marked X

||Before children come of age, a father may set conditions to their liberty for their own good, but not irrevocable ones,|| car un tel don est contraire aux fins de la nature, et passe les droits de la paternité.1 False Protestant or moralistic notion of right, freedom, or duty; and an unnatural notion of nature. 1 For such a condition is contrary to the ends of nature and exceeds the rights of paternity.

8 p 19, top

[On the “Social Contract”:]

You can’t get up if you are sitting down, or sit down if you are standing up. You can’t open your mouth or shut it, without some sacrifice: but you must make the one or the other. Royal Society of Literature of the United Kingdom Essays by Divers Hands 3rd series, volume 1, London: 1921. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Josiah Royce

The World and the Individual Two volumes. New York and London: 1899. Harvard.

[See Peter Fuss, “Santayana’s Marginalia on Royce’s The World and the Individual.” Journal of the History of Philosophy, viii, no. 3, July 1970, 318–74.]

Dagobert D. Runes

Letters to My Son New York: c. 1949. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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Dagobert D. Runes

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Of God, the Devil and the Jews New York: c. 1952. Waterloo.

[Some inconsequential marks, probably not Santayana’s.]

Benjamin Rush

The Selected Writings of Benjamin Rush Edited by Dagobert D. Runes New York: 1947. Waterloo. Four marginalia.

1 p 99, marked

[On education:]

The same systems of grammar, oratory and philosophy, will be taught in every part of the state, and the literary features of Pennsylvania will thus designate one great, and equally enlightened family. Pre-industrial America. Bertrand Russell “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” Reprinted from Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1911. Texas. Eighteen marginalia. 1 p 111, marked

Awareness of universals is called conceiving and a universal of which we are aware is called a concept. Not only are we aware of particular yellows, but if we have seen a sufficient number of yellows and have sufficient intelligence, we are aware of the universal yellow […]. The “universal” here is not the essence of any yellow but a name for a range of yellows, having “yellowness” in common. “Yellowness” is also an essence but not one given in sense. Sense, therefore, never presents Russell’s universals. But it presents my essences; it presents something; the universal is not all of that something: the present character therefore has more character than its universal. Aesthetical essences are richer than logical. 2 p 111, marked

And the universal yellow is the predicate in such judgments as “this is yellow”, where “this” is a particular sense-datum. always?

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3 p 113, underlined and marked

We know that the man with the iron mask existed, and many propositions are known about him, but we do not know who he was. In literature, or in rerum natura? 4 p 116, underlined and marked

I suspect that even the Universe, as considered in metaphysics, involves such a connection with particulars. In logic, on the contrary, where we are concerned not merely with what does exist, but with whatever might or could exist, or be, no reference to actual particulars is involved. Are there non-actual particulars? Then R. would admit essences that were concrete. 5 p 118

[Concerning judgments:]

I judge that A loves B […] the constituents are myself and A and love and B and judging. Judgment = assertion; supposition = conception. 6 p 122, marked

[On denotation:]

[…] propositions concerning “the so-and-so” are possible even when the “so-and-so” has no denotation. Take, e.g., “the golden mountain does not exist” or “the round square is self-contradictory.” If we are to preserve the duality of meaning and denotation, we have to say, with Meinong, that there are such objects as the golden mountain and the round square, although these objects do not have being. We even have to admit that the existent round square is existent, but does not exist. Lovely! 7 p l22, underlined

Meinong does not regard this as a contradiction, but I fail to see that it is not one. Indeed, it seems to me evident that the judgment “there is no such object as a round square” does not presuppose that there is such an object.1 There are two essences, and a vain attempt to identify them. 1 Russell’s footnote: [Alexis] Meinong, Über Annahmen, 2nd edition, Leipzig, 1910, p. 141.

8 pp 123–24, underlined

A Miss Jones argues “that Scott is the author of Waverley” asserts the identity of denotation between Scott and the author of Waverley. […] it

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would be nearer the truth to say that the meaning of “Scott” is the denotation of “the author of Waverley.” The relation of “Scott” to Scott is that “Scott” means Scott, […]. Heigh, diddle diddle. Bertrand Russell

“On the Relations of Universals and Particulars.”

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, volume xii (1911–1912), 1–24 Texas. Twenty-four marginalia. 1 p 4, marked Z

[…] universals are generally conceived as common properties of particulars, in fact, as predicates. For our purpose it is barely worth while to invent a technical term ad hoc; I shall therefore speak of entities which are not relations simply as non-relations. essences cover both. 2 p 7, underlined

[On tactile perception:]

Hence if the thing is to be impartial as between sight and touch, it must cease to have the actual qualities of which we are sensible, and become their common cause or origin or whatever vaguer word can be found. Thus the road is opened to the metaphysical theories of science and to the metaphysical theories of philosophy: the thing may be a number of electric charges in rapid motion, or an idea in the mind of God, but it is certainly not as essence, tho’ it is as substance what the senses per^ ^ ceive. 3 p 7, marked Z

Realists who reject particulars are apt to regard a thing as reducible to a number of qualities co-existing in one place. But apart from other objections to this view, it is doubtful whether the different qualities in question ever do co-exist in one place. If the qualities are sensible, the place must be in a sensible space; but this makes it necessary that the qualities should belong to only one sense, and it is not clear that genuinely different qualities belonging to one sense ever co-exist in a single place in a perceptual space. Why make the senses a criterion of possible existences? Your apprehension may be made to fit any essence. 4 p 9, underlined and marked

Likeness at least, therefore, must be admitted as a universal, and, having admitted one universal, we have no longer any reason to reject others.

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Thus the whole complicated theory, which had no motive except to avoid universals, falls to the ground. Whether or not there are particulars, there must be relations which are universals in the sense that (a ) they are the objects of concepts, not percepts; (b ) they do not exist in time; (c^) they are the^objects of verbs, not substantives. ^ an essence which is explicIs this the same^ as a variable— itly a range of essences? Cf. blue or Plato’s “infinite”. 5 p 11, top

[Apropos nothing in Russell’s paper:]

[ Note on Bergson: The Hebrew preference for time is partly, superficially, traceable to immediation of the critical sort; it is arbitrary when immediation becomes metaphysical or analytic, for their exterior is as characteristic of reality as duration. ] 6 p 12

[…] we must suppose that an indivisible object of visual perception may occupy a finite extent of visual space. Splendid instance of the fallacy of treating mental views as if they were things. 7 p 17, marked

||It is self-evident that two patches of white are numerically diverse.|| It follows from this that the terms of spatial relations cannot be universals or collections of universals, but must be particulars capable of being exactly alike and yet numerically diverse. Places are not essences, but elements of matter. 8 p 19, top

Characteristics of consciousness: 1. Immaterial, without base, extension of place. 2. Undiscoverable from outside—imperceptible 3. Synthetic, & in one sense instantaneous— aesthetic essence perceived 4. Cognitive 5. Actual 6. Moral 7. Appreciative or impassioned 9 p 19, underlined

||On the differing forms of belief: Men of quite differing characteristics will agree that two plus two equal four.|| A particlar belief is a complex

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of which something which we may call a subject is a constituent: in our case, it is the diversity of the subjects that produces the diversity of the beliefs. objects But these subjects cannot be mere bundles of general ^ Suppose ^ one of our men is characterised by benevolence, qualities. stupidity, and love of puns. It would not be correct to say: “Benevolence, stupidity, and love of puns believe that two and two are four.” 10 p 20

Persons, like places are material elements.1 1

The origin of Santayana’s title, Persons and Places?

11 pp 22–23, underlined

It will be seen that, according to the theory which assumes particulars, there is a specific relation of subject to predicate, unless we adopt the view—considered above in connection with Berkeley and Hume—that common sensible qualities are really derivative from specific kinds of likeness. Assuming this view to be false, ordinary sensible qualities will be predicates of the particulars which are instances of them. The sensible qualities themselves do not exist in time in the same sense in which the instances do. Predication is a relation involving a fundamental logical difference between its two terms. Predicates may themselves have predicates, but the predicates of predicates will be radically different from the predicates of substances. The predicate, on this view, is never part of the subject, and thus no true subject-predicate proposition is analytic. Propositions of the form “All A is B” are not really subject-predicate propositions, but express relations of predicates; such propositions may be analytic, but the traditional confusion of them with true subject-predicate propositions has been a disgrace to formal logic. Aesthetic essences will be predicates of matter. [Doubly marked from “Predication is a relation” to “Propositions of the form”:]

N.B. Bertrand Russell

The Problems of Philosophy

London: n.d. [1912]. Texas. Eleven marginalia, plus notes on an end-paper. 1 p 135, marked

||On Kant and knowledge a priori: arithmetical knowledge is always constant, but, Russell says, such knowledge according to Kant is a result

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of our nature.|| It might happen, if Kant is right, that tomorrow our nature would so change as to make two and two become five. This possibility seems never to have occurred to him, yet it is one which utterly destroys the certainty and universality which he is anxious to vindicate for arithmetical propositions. 2 p 196, marked

[On truth and falsehood:]

When Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, he must not have before his mind a single object, “Desdemona’s love for Cassio,” or “that Desdemona loves Cassio,” for that would require that there should be objective falsehoods, which subsist independently of any minds; and this, though not logically refutable, is a theory to be avoided if possible. In a sense all disembodied essences are “objective falsehoods”—they are such to the idolater of existence. 3 p 235, underlined

||Descartes’ kind of scepticism is the criticism|| which constitutes philosophy. Some knowledge, such as knowledge of the existence of our sensedata, appears quite indubitable, however calmly and thoroughly we reflect upon it. It is certain that the essence occurs or appears: it is not certain that it “exists” or persists substantially. What appears need not work until we distinguish, in that “what”, the substance that works from the essence that appears.1 1

Of obvious pertinence to Scepticism and Animal Faith.

[End-paper:]

5 Babe’s 4 “from which it follows—” 6 “How understand, etc 6 “That is what happens beautiful!! 6 “over and above what we are aware of.” ambiguous” [No such pagination in Russell. “The Babe” was the familiar name of Willie Haines Smith, consort of Howard Overing Sturgis. For details, cf. McCormick, George Santayana, p. 130.]

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Bertrand Russell

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The Analysis of Matter London and New York: 1927. Texas. 258 marginalia.

1 p 16

[On “Pre-Relativity Physics”:]

It is impossible to lay down a hard-and-fast rule that we can never validly infer something radically different from what we observe—unless, indeed, we take up the position that nothing unobserved can ever be validly inferred. This view, which is advocated by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, has much in its favour, from the standpoint of a strict logic; but it puts an end to physics, and therefore to the problem with which this work is concerned. I shall accordingly assume that scientific inference, conducted with due care, may be valid, provided it is recognized as giving only probability, not certainty. Given this assumption, I see no possible ground for rejecting an inference to absolute space and time, if the facts seem to call for it. [From “I shall accordingly”:]

Poor stuff. 2 p 17, marked

Everything that we perceive directly is subject to certain conditions, more especially physiological conditions; it would seem a priori probable that where these conditions are absent things would be different from anything that we can experience. Yes. 3 p 17, marked

If we suppose—as we well may—that what we experience has certain characteristics connected with our experiencing, there can be no a priori objection to the hypothesis that some of the things we do not experience are lacking in some characteristics which are universal in our experience. 4 p 18

||On objections to Newtonian physics: force and cause derived from notions of pushing and pulling.|| […] secondly, that people falsely supposed themselves in contact with things when they pushed and pulled them, or were pushed and pulled by them. I do not mean that such crude notions would have been explicitly defended, but that they dominated the imaginative picture of the physical world, and made Newtonian dynamics seem what is absurdly called “intelligible.” Berty in his innocent intellectualism: Why not define “things” so that “we” may be in “contact”?

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5 p 24, underlined and marked

Any statement runs a risk of being out of date before it is printed. 6 p 27, marked

[…] no empirical evidence can decide between two theories of the atom which yield the same result as regards the interchanges of energy between the atom and the surrounding medium. 7 p 27, marked

It may be that the whole Rutherford-Bohr theory is too concrete and pictorial; the analogy with the solar system may be much less close than it is represented as being. A theory which accounts for all the known facts is not thereby shown to be true: this would require a proof that no other theory would do the same. Doors always open. 8 p 27, marked

It is proper and right to use a pictorial theory as a help in investigation; but what can count as definite knowledge is something much more abstract. And it is quite possible that the truth does not lend itself to pictorial statement, but only to expression in mathematical formulæ. Good little Berty, sometimes I love you. 9 p 81, underlined

||Electrons or protons are assumed to be unchangeable throughout time, but our continuum is one of events.|| Any two such events can be connected by a geodesic in which any two points have a time-like separation; therefore, so far as the laws of dynamics are concerned, they might both belong to the same material unit. Yet sometimes we think they do, and sometimes we think they do not. […] The decision must depend […] upon the existence of some series of intermediate events (or sets of events) following each other according to some law. If there exists any law which is in fact obeyed by strings of events, such a law can be used to define what we mean by one material unit. How are events strung together? Isn’t there here a psychological prejudice? 10 p 102

||On “The Principle of Differential Laws”: What creates change in a particular case may not be known.|| But we are not likely to find science returning to the crude form of causality believed in by Fijians and philosophers, of which the type is “lightning causes thunder.” Empiricism is superstition? This from Berty!

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11 p 126

||The suggestion that light is carried by photons:|| when light radiates, what happens is that a photon travels; […]. [At top:]

Light The electric spark may only mark The friendship of two atoms in the dark. 12 p 128, underlined

[…] light […]. Ambiguity here: it would not be light but it would be power, i.e. the sun would be as ready to light & warm objects in one direction (where there was nothing) as in another. The fact of possible directions would be implied in its substance. 13 p 132, marked

The view of Locke, that the secondary qualities are subjective but not the primary qualities, was more or less compatible with physics until very recent times. There are spaces and times in our immediate experience, and there seemed no insuperable obstacle to identifying them with the spaces and times of the physical world. But it was a foolish presumption, even to ignorant philosophers like the Indians. 14 p 133, underlined

We may therefore concentrate upon light as a source of our knowledge concerning the external world. Not our bodies? But it is bodily sense that give [sic] us the type of all material existence. 15 p 135, marked Z

[On “The Abstractness of Physics”:]

||A drop in water loses its identity, and fire presents difficulties to common sense.|| The elaboration immediately suggested leads on naturally to elementary physics and chemistry, where it is still assumed, at least tacitly, that the objects concerned are of the same sort as sensible objects, but rather smaller. Yes & no: Berty is here beginning to suffer from not admitting substance and forgetting that it is always assumed.

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16 pp 137–38, marked Z

||Physics as an empirical study leads to trouble when, if it invalidates perception it yet depends on perception.|| I do not say that physics in fact has this defect, but I do say that a considerable labour of interpretation is necessary in order to show that it can be absolved in this respect. And it is because of the abstractness of physics, as developed by mathematicians, that this labour is required. No: it is because of the pictorial physics from which it starts and which Berty wants to restore. 17 p 138, marked

||Russell expresses admiration for Whitehead; however,|| I think there are points—and not unimportant points—where his methods break down for want of due attention to psychology and physiology. Moreover, there seem to be premisses in his construction which are derived rather from a metaphysic [sic] than from the actual needs of the problem. 18 p 143, underlined

||An infant has only enough primitive instincts to keep it alive with the aid of its mother.|| In this primitive condition, the infant obviously has no conception of an “object.” Not of his own body? Cf. “Narcissus.”1 1

How old was Narcissus?

19 p 144, underlined and marked Z

The space containing my visual objects has no point in common with the space containing yours, since no visual object in my world is precisely identical with one in yours. Not object but essence is here meant. The objects, not the essences, are discovered to be one, but each essence, from the beginning meant an object, since it aroused a reaction. 20 p 149, marked Z

||Experience accounts for reactions to familiar stimuli.|| If an adult were to hear a donkey’s bray for the first time, without having previously known that there was an animal which made that noise, his experience would be amazingly unlike that of a normal adult in the same circumstances. but would carry just as great an assurance ^ the strange noise—say, a devil. of something causing ^ 21 p 151

[At top:]

Psychologism with a vengeance.

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At a primitive stage, X there is no distinction between “substance” and ^ first ^ in language and then in thought, the emotion “thing”; both express, of recognition. X at which my mind is arrested 22 p 156, marked Z

||In the seventeenth century, the scientific outlook superseded the approach of common sense in physics.|| The historical aspects of this change have been set forth by Dr [sic] Whitehead in his Science and the Modern World, particularly in the chapter on “The Century of Genius,” so admirably that it would be foolish to attempt to cover the ground again. What rot 23 p 176, underlined and marked X

In a science, there are two kinds of empirical propositions. There are those concerned with particular matters of fact, and those concerned with laws induced from matters of fact. The appearances presented by the sun and moon and planets exist on certain occasions when they have been seen are particular matters of fact. The inference that the sun and moon and planets exist even when no one is observing them—in particular, that the sun exists at night and the planets by day—is an empirical induction. The occurrence of the appearance is confused with the existence of what appears—an object of literary psychology with an object of physics. 24 p 179, underlined and marked X

When I say, “I know that I have just heard a clap of thunder,” I am saying something not so indubitable as when I say, “There has just been a clap of thunder.” ? It is earlier: but it is more dubitable. Physics is all dubitable: autobiography is less so in parts. 25 p 181

||The recollection of experience and expectation of an experience to come.|| Everyone knows the story of the Orangeman who fell off a scaffolding and murmured as he fell: “To Hell with the Pope, and now for the—bump.” Empirical fallacy: why expect a bump? Because he had always bumped before when falling, or because he was then deprived of support?

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26 p 184, marked Z

The feeling of surprise marks error, and the absence of this feeling marks correctness. Strange that Berty, so late, should sink so low in Millism. 27 p 192

[On inference:]

||The light goes out at a dinner party. When it is turned on again,|| if there are fewer spoons than before, we do not infer that they have ceased to exist, [ but that someone present is a thief. ] ^ ^ lecture-habit here spoils the nicety ^ ^ of wit. If he had The lived in the XVIII th century he would have left the last clause unexpressed. 28 p 195, marked

And a result deduced from a hitherto successful theory is more likely to be right than the theory is: the theory is only right if all its consequences are true (at least, so far as they can be tested), but a verifiable consequence of the theory is likely to be true if most of the verifiable consequences are true. That is why the practical value of scientific theories is so much greater than their philosophic value as contributions to ultimate truth. [From “That is why”:]

Quote 29 p 201, underlined and marked

||The causal theory of perception. We cannot see our own faces, but can imagine what an invisible part of our bodies ought to look like.|| When we see another person frowning, we can imitate him; and I do not think the habit of seeing ourselves in the glass is indispensable for this. Silly: how new Berty is to psychological observation. 30 p 253, underlined

||Knowledge in physics is mathematical since no|| non-mathematical properties of the physical world can be inferred from perception. ||The exception is time.|| I shall assume […] that, when we are speaking of physical space, all our percepts are in our head. Consequently psychological time is the same as time measured by our watches, […]. i.e. physical time in so far as intuitions are dated in it. 31 p 258, marked

I hold that the world is very full of events, that often a group of these events, or some characteristic which the members of the group possess in

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varying degrees, is such as to suggest arrangement in an order, generally a symmetrical order about a centre— […] e.g. if we move so as to make the big drum look larger, we also move so as to make it sound louder. In this way we construct a space containing both percipients and physical objects; but percepts have a twofold location in this space, namely that of the percipient and that of the physical object. N.B. 32 pp 265–66, underlined

[On “Non-Mental Analogues to Perception”:]

||Russell proposes the example of a dictaphone and a camera recording the process of dictation;|| […] now we will assume the four-dimensional manifold of physics and the justification (in principle) of the inference from perceived to unperceived events. Assuming this, what can we infer as to the relation between (a) the sounds heard by the listener, (b) the events just outside his ear when he hears, (c) the events at the dictaphone at the same time, (d ) the dictaphone record, (e ) the sounds heard by the man when he listens to the dictaphone? The similarity between (a) and (e ) is fundamental, and is known by a comparison of a percept with a memory. Simplistic & verbal psychology is at the bottom of this whole construction. 33 p 269, marked

||On the perception of color: it does not appear to be analogous to perception of a light-wave, which is a periodic process.|| […] we do not really know that our percept of a colour does not have the rhythmic character of the stimulus. We know something about percepts, but not all about them. N.B. they are not, then, given in sources, but posited tests suggested to the mind or will by the given essence—or rather, objects posited by the impulse to act and described in terms of the given essences. 34 p 269, underlined and marked

We all know that if an object is made to rotate rapidly, for instance on a top, we can see it rotating if it does not go too fast, but when it passes a certain speed we see only a continuous band. This is to be expected in view of the existence of akoluthic sensations. But it by no means follows that there is not a flicker in the percept, although we cannot perceive a flicker. N.B.

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35 p 269, underlined

Exactly the same thing applies to light and sound generally, and to the apparent continuity of motion in the cinema. We cannot know, unless in virtue of some elaborate argument, whether our percepts are static or rhythmical, nor yet whether their physical stimuli are continuous or discrete. Such knowledge is rendered impossible by the fact that we can only assume semi-similarity, not full similarity, between percept and stimulus. Oh Berty, where is your logic? ^ ^ because something We cannot perceive what we perceive else may be anything. 36 p 270, marked

But we have found it necessary to emphasize the extremely abstract character of physical knowledge, and the fact that physics leaves open all kinds of possibilities as to the intrinsic character of the world to which its equations apply. Cf. Strong1 1

See the entry below under “Strong.”

37 p 275, underlined

[“Particulars and Events.”]

We do not want the percept to appear mysteriously at the end of a causal chain composed of events of a totally different nature; if we can construct a theory of the physical world which makes its events continuous with percpetion, we have improved the metaphysical status of physics, even if we cannot prove more than that our theory is possible. which is only mathematical. Cf. p. 291. 38 p 277, underlined

I shall give the name “particulars” to the ultimate terms of the physical structure—ultimate, I mean, in relation to the whole of our present knowledge. intrinsic essences of substances. 39 p 281, underlined

||On distinguishing among colors: when are percepts not percepts?|| Now, instead of different static shades of colour, let us suppose what we are watching a chameleon gradually changing. We may be quite unable to “see” a process of change, and yet able to know that, after a time, a change has taken place.

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Very good: but that does not make the identical percepts different. Berty gives a false permanence & substantiality to data. 40 p 284

It is a mere linguistic convenience to regard a group of events as states of a “thing,” or “substance,” or “piece of matter.” This inference was originally made on the ground of the logic which philosophers inherited from common sense. But the logic was faulty, and the inference is unnecessary. By defining a “thing” as the group of what would formerly have been its “states,” we alter nothing in the detail of physics, and avoid an inference as precarious as it is useless. Is honesty as useless as it is precarious? The matter is not an inference but an assumption of action. 41 pp 286–87, marked

||The traditional assumption of one cosmic time and one cosmic space made possible the notions of things in various states. Four-dimensional space-time dismisses all that.|| I shall therefore assume henceforth that the physical world is to be constructed out of “events,” by which I mean practically, […] entities or structures occupying a region of space-time which is small in all four dimensions. “Events” may have a structure, but it is convenient to use the word “event,” in the strict sense, to mean something which, if it has a structure, has no space-time structure, i.e. it does not have parts which are external to each other in space-time. I do not assume that an event can ever occupy only a point of space-time; […]. N.B. 42 p 286–87

[…] the construction of “points” out of finitely extended events will form the subject of the next chapter. Nor do I assign a maximum to the duration of an event, though I hold that any event, in the broad sense, which lasts for more than about a second can, if it is a percept, be analyzed into a structure of events. But this is a merely empirical fact. Quote on the restoration of Scholastic quibble & trifling. 43 p 328, marked

It is clear that whenever we perceive light we absorb it, that is to say, the energy in the waves of light (or light quanta?) that hit the eye is transformed into a different kind of energy, though I should not venture to say what kind. Ah! Percepts here are parts of the body, like the undiscoverable insides of electrons.

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44 p 328

Therefore all visual percepts involve this process of absorbing light. And if perception can ever be a source of knowledge as to things outside the percipient’s body, there must be causal laws connecting what happens to the percipient with what goes on outside. It is, of course, obvious that there are such laws; we “ cannot ” = “don’t like to”; all science ^ Leibniz’s ^ ^ windowless ^^ here is partisan. revive monads. ^ 45 p 331, underlined

If we had sufficiently powerful microscopes, we could see a glowing gas dissolving into a comparatively small number of spots of light, while the atoms in steady motion would be invisible. Thus we seem to reach the conclusion that the causal laws which genuinely connect one piece of matter with another are quantum laws, in which there are various stages: first, a periodic process having no outside effect; secondly, a sudden disruption of the energy of this process into two parts, one being a new periodic process in the original body, the other a periodic process travelling in empty space; […]. What is this beast? 46 p 331, marked

[…] thirdly, the arrival of the travelling process at another body; fourthly, a quantum change in this other body, involving absorption of the radiant energy in the production of a new steady state in the absorbing body. All genuine causal relations between different bodies, we may suppose, involve this process of sudden loss of energy by one body and its sudden acquisition, later, by another body. This is intelligible. 47 p 340, doubly marked

There is […] no inconsistency in the view that the physical event differs from the percept in the way suggested by physics, since the difference consists in attributing more structure to the physical event, not in denying to it those elements of structure which are possessed by the percept. Good and important 48 p 340, underlined

[…] although percepts may have an unperceived structure, this does not diminish the significance of the fact that the structure we perceive in percepts has only a one-many relation to that of their stimuli. [At “structure”:] = ground

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49 p 345, underlined

[Definition of the quality of an event.]

Physics traditionally ignores quality, and reduces the physical world to matter in motion. This view is no longer adequate. Energy turns out to be more important than matter, and light possesses many properties—e.g. gravitation—which were formerly regarded as characteristic of matter. The substitution of space-time for space and time has made it natural to regard events, rather than persistent substances, as the raw material of physics. N.B. Berty seems to be clearly aware that his events are substances and his gravitating light & energy are matter. 50 p 350

[“Periodicity and Qualitative Series.”]

This is just what I had understood from Weyl1 about the junction of 2 times which in each of them instants are not comparable in date with the instants of the other time. 1

Hermann Weyl, the noted mathematician.

51 p 352, top

Quote 52 p 352, marked

If we could imagine a homunculus floating on the crest of a light-wave, he would have no means of discovering that anything periodic was occurring, since he could not “see” the other parts of the wave. The different parts of a light-wave cannot, in a word, interact causally in any way, because no causal action can travel faster than light. Fatal consequence of relativity. 53 p 356, marked Z

A “steady event,” as I use the term, is anything which is devoid of physical structure and is compresent with events which are not compresent with each other, but are one earlier and the other later; in other words, the steady event is a member of at least two points which have a time-like interval. What determines the sense of earlier & later? Intuition? 54 pp 359–60, marked

[…] a rhythm can never consist merely in periodic changes of spatial relation between two or more bodies, but must consist of qualitative cycles of events. We have experience of such cycles when we watch a large-scale periodic event, such as the swing of a pendulum. All that

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happens to us during the cycle happens in us, not in a number of different places; and any effect upon us depends upon what happens to us. I am suggesting that this is a proper analogy when we wish to understand how a periodic motion affects an electron. [At “I am suggesting”:]

Leibnitz always knocking at the door. 55 p 362, underlined

From our point of view, it is a difficulty in the quantum principle that it is stated in a form involving energy, which, from a relativity standpoint, requires reinterpretation. N.B. This is a euphemism: it disappears, and every datum is an absolute universe. 56 p 363, marked Z

The relation of a steady event to a rhythm I conceive according to a musical analogy: that of a long note on the violin while a series of chords occurs repeatedly on the piano. All our life is lived to the accompaniment of a rhythm of breathing and heart-beating, which provides us with a physiological clock by which we can roughly estimate times. Yes: but the synthetic unity of apperception! 57 p 373

[On “Causality and Interval”:]

An interval is the number of absolute steps between two crisis [sic]. [ Really only the units are extended: and they have no intervals ] . 58 p 377

[“The Genesis of Space-Time.”]

A group of more than five events is called “co-punctual” when every quintet chosen out of it is co-punctual. A “point” is defined as a co-punctual group of events which cannot be added to without ceasing to be co-punctual. “Events” are defined as the field of the relation of compresence. “Events” are “concretions in existence” i.e. things. 59 p 389

[…] physics might, ideally, be able to predict that at such a time my eye would receive a stimulus of a certain sort; it might be able to trace the physical properties of the resulting events in the eye and the brain, one of which is, in fact, a visual percept; but it could not itself give us the knowledge that one of them is a visual percept.

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Intuition needs to be distinguished from “knowledge”. 60 p 393, underlined

||The likelihood that physical determinism is limited.|| This, of course, is merely a speculative possibility; but it interposes a veto upon materialistic dogmatism. How inveterate is the desire of the British mind to end with a hushed Amen. 61 p 398, underlined

In Part II., we approached a different type of question: the question of the evidence for the truth of physics, i.e. of the relation of physics to perception. This is a partisan identification. Intuition, faith, and reason have different kinds of evidence or force: perception is a confused notion.1 1 A central aspect of Santayana’s objection to empiricism and pragmatism is lodged in this marginale.

62 p 402, underlined

[Final sentence of the final page:]

But from the standpoint of philosophy the distinction between physical and mental is superficial accidental and unreal. transitory ^ ^ Russell has always^ been indifferent to existence. It ^is his secret: it makes his keeness [sic] & thinness. Bertrand Russell

New Hopes for a Changing World London: 1951. Waterloo. Twenty marginalia and a quatrain.

1 p 98, marked

[On the notion of a world government:]

For my part I believe that, if it is constituted, it will be on a basis of consent in some regions and conquest in others. 2 p 165, underlined

||That the mistakes of exterminating Jews by Nazis, or Russians killing the rich would not have been made|| by men who understood that when different groups have different interests it is because of unwise passions and not because of any physical fact. Is it unwise to exist?

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3 p 165, marked X

If we are to live happily with a modern technique—and it is possible for modern technique to bring a far higher level of happiness than was formerly possible— […]. [At bottom:]

It has been their false modern idea of human interests that has rendered both Russell brothers tragically unhappy. 4 p 182

||Unfortunate loves, and the possibility of new loves.|| Divorce is the comfort of cuckolds. 5 p 183

Love, if it is to be satisfactory, must not be obsessed by the fear of loss. It should rejoice in what the gods give, not destroy the gift by the corroding fear of jealousy. Secret Happiness I’ll love you when you love me I’ll kiss you when you smile And when you kiss another I’ll take a walk the while. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell

Edited by Paul A. Schilpp Evanston, Illinois: 1946. Waterloo. Seven marginalia.

David Russell

Sing with Me Now Dallas: 1945. Waterloo. Five marginalia.

1 p 49

[Verse about V-E Day, May 8, 1945. “Rejoice, O Men.”]

The pulsing drum Of war is muffled, and the air At last devoid of death is fair. Cf. Phèdre, her last words. John Francis Stanley Russell

My Life and Adventures

London and New York: 1923. Georgetown. 149 marginalia. [More than half of these marginalia are extensive, sharp in tone, and even bitter, indicating the strength and perhaps the confusion of

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Santayana’s sentiments for and against Frank Russell, his women, his habits, and his character.] 1 p 14, marked

||Russell’s fondness for dogs as a child.|| I had, however, from time to time cats & women! of my own, […]. ^ ^ 2 p 14, marked

||Even now, his dogs and cats (belled, to prevent cruelty to birds) love him and come running at the sound of his motor-horn.|| Vera1 too was oddly unfortunate and made you cruelly suffer. No wonder we all love you—Every thing loves you. Strange, there are some exceptions. 1

Vera was the writer “Elizabeth,” best known for Elizabeth and Her German Garden (1898). She was born Mary Annette Beauchamp, and married Count Henning August von Arnim. She later married Frank Russell and published a memoir-novel of that unfortunate marriage entitled Vera. 3 p 23, marked

||Russell does not recall having indulged in small-boy wickedness.|| R. has a very bad memory about moral facts. 4 p 26, underlined and marked

||As a youth in the grounds of the Palazzo Barberini, Rome,|| a terrible adventure befell me […]. This was an indecent assault by a strange man. 5 p 35, marked

||His schoolroom books showed|| slushy innocence. This is conscious hypocrisy. He means: “You see, I was provoked to be a rebel”. 6 p 39

||At Cheam school, Russell met Burke, who was to marry three times.|| Poor dear Burke! 7 p 40, marked

||The cricket ball that passed before Russell saw it.|| Symbol 8 p 41, marked

||For failing to write to his grandmother, young Russell was punished at school by having to eat standing up, and deprived of pudding, still his favorite food.||

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N.B. It is the surviving small-boy sensuality that runs through R. 9 p 42

||At the death of his grandfather,|| I was no longer Viscount Amberley, I was Earl Russell—wretched child of twelve! This is a mixture of liberal cant and psychic inversion: he wants to excuse himself, and remembers that it is a calamity to be an Earl. 10 p 54, marked

||At age forty, Russell had been to a music-hall only three times; twice with his aunt, and once as an official of the London County Council.|| This suggestion of strictness in morals is a strange illusion. R. was never chaste, but he was secretive in his pleasures. 11 p 58, marked Z

||The failings of his aunt Rosalind.|| It was a sad development, for she was a fine character, full of energy directed to noble objects, but it shows how the best qualities may suffer from unchecked domination, and from the arrogance that claims the judgment of God without His infinite mercy or pity. This recurring cant is almost unintelligible to me. R. is not quite sane, or he would feel the falsity of this pose. He does not assume it for an ulterior purpose, but for his own satisfaction in feeling virtuous. 12 p 59, underlined

||After Winchester school,|| my grandmother even went so far as to offer me a permanent room in Dover Street, and the use of the address for my visiting cards. Fool not to accept. But he vacillated, loving the low world better than the great world. In part this was high unworldliness and democratic pique: in part it was love of bossing low companions. He once introduced me to Lady S.1 at Dover Street. It was all very grand and imposing, and left an impression of true distinction and kindness in that circle, with no cant. Why does R. wallow in cant, when he knew and liked true wit? 1

Lady S. = Lady Stanley, wife of the first Lord Russell.

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13 p 71, underlined and doubly marked

||At Winchester, as a Prefect, Russell officially spanked one of his cousins.|| I remember the incident because next morning in spite of his protests we examined the locus in quo, and to my horror the marks of five fingers were still clearly discernible. From that day to this I have never raised my hand to a fellow creature in anger for fear of hurting him. Not true. But R has a terribly bad memory for his own acts and feelings. He is often perfectly furious and merciless. Once—when I dragged him into the water (it being entirely his fault)—he was so to me.1 1

See Persons and Places, critical edition (Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1986), p. 297, for a description of the incident. 14 p 81

||Russell deplores that the Queen’s yacht costs £1,000 per annum to maintain.|| R. can’t resist radical tags of this sort. In some respects he is an idiot. 15 p 90, underlined and marked X

||Acquaintance with Lionel Johnson at Winchester; his appearance:|| an oval face and rather dark hair. It was an arresting picture; he looked like some young saint in a stained glass window. Lionel Johnson’s hair was of the exact colour of khaki, sleek and parted very much on one side, so that it looked like a silk cap. The shadows in it might have looked dark; but it was pale hair. 16 p 90, underlined and marked Z

||Friendship with Johnson was not easy;|| he was always aloof and detached and apt to suggest an Epicurean god rather than a human being. False note. He was rapt in ideas, but he was a perfectly tractable child. R. has no notion of a spiritual life & takes it for the lack of something. He was Ariel to R’s Achilles. 17 pp 90–91, marked Z

Above all [ Johnson] taught me to read and to love Browning, but he taught me more than that, a lesson I have never forgotten, and that is that all the supposedly real things of life, that is to say the external things, the physical things, the humours, the happenings, disgraces, successes, failures are in themselves the merest phantoms and illusions, and that the only realities are within one’s own mind and spirit.

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[From “successes”:]

Bosh: these are Lionel’s words, but R. has no notion of what they mean. By his own mind & spirit he means his barbaric ego, his “will”, not a sacrificial intelligence or love. 18 p 91, underlined

||The spirit of Winchester as Johnson felt it compared to Dante’s ideal of service to Beatrice, to Galahad’s feeling for the Holy Grail,|| as of an Englishman for his fair England, […]. R. thinks he is making a speech. He loves England only as his launch or his motor car or his big chair. 19 p 94, marked Z

||Russell has been expelled from Winchester for an unspecified offence. To prepare for Oxford, he attends a private tutor.|| A worse exchange for the healthy communal life at Winchester could not well be imagined. The man himself was vulgar and mean in spirit, and his wife, though kind, shared the same detestable middle-class gentility. Something essential is left out here. What had given P. L. [the headmaster?] the notion of corruption? 20 p 94, marked Z

||Russell’s distaste for his fellow crammers.|| Then there was one at least of the type of boy who had been requested to leave his public school. This touch is impayable.1 1

Priceless.

21 p 103

||At Balliol, Oxford, Russell’s diary over the Christmas holiday:|| We all went in the morning to hear Boyd Carpenter preach which he did splendidly. Boyd Carpenter was a Broad Churchman who thought, on the whole, Christianity had done more good than harm, and so we ought to be Christians in name. Pragmatism before Wm James. The good Christianity had done was of course not to introduce Christianity, but to make people wash and read the newspapers. It seemed to me, as I heard him preach to this effect at Saint Mary’s, that it was a long way round, by Calvary, to the London Times and to Pear’s Soap. I don’t think Boyd Carpenter pleased Oxonians in general.

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22 p 107, marked X

Jowett, who was, it will be remembered, both the Master of Balliol and the Vice-Chancellor, sent for me and told me he had been informed that I had been guilty of disgusting conduct in writing some scandalous letter, but that he thought that it was probably only a piece of thoughtlessness, and he suggested that I should go down for a month as a punishment, and come back in June to take my examination in Honour Mods which was approaching. I was startled beyond belief by such an accusation, and I was also infuriated by his calm way of talking to me as if it could possibly be true. So remote was it from the truth that I was entirely possessed by that white virginal flame of innocence which I think is even stronger in adolescent boys than in girls, and I was horrified that it should be possible for anyone in close relation with me to think otherwise. ||Russell then demanded to see the letter; Jowett refused; Russell demanded an inquiry before the Vice-Chancellor’s court, which Jowett refused.|| I then completely lost my temper, told him that he was no gentleman, that he was behaving in an autocratic way, indefensible even in the head of an Oxford college, and that I refused to have anything more to do with him. Jowett’s reply was to tell me that I should be sent down for a year, and that at the end of that time he would graciously consider the question of re-admitting me. I told him that nothing of the sort would happen and that I should not be sent down for a year because I should then and there take my name off the college books, and shake the dust of Oxford from my feet. [At “virginal flame of innocence”:]

This is true as regards Lionel Johnson & Russell, but it is a lie if applied to R. in his general habits—a cheeky lie, when so many of his readers know the facts. [Concerning the entire episode:]

This is a complete falsification of the events as told me by R. himself. The chief point was that Lionel Johnson had spent a night in R’s rooms. 23 pp 107–8, underlined

And I did. Thus the autocratic injustice of an old man and the passionate indignation of a young one combined to wreck my life at Oxford, and to place my whole life under a cloud which any number of public vindications have never entirely dissipated. I left Oxford in May, 1885, accompanied to the railway station and seen off by scores of enthusiastic friends and defiantly wearing in my buttonhole the white flower of a blameless life.

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Good God! No doubt he wore a white buttonhole. It was aestheticism à la Bunthorne, then prevalent in Oxford, where Oscar Wilde’s influence was recent. 24 p 115, underlined

||Life at Teddington; the Williams, [Billings?] his old nurse, lives there, and|| her daughters act as my servants. Not merely. Of course silence is justified here, the Williams’s or their children may still be living. But why assume a puritan tone? When he took Mary Williams out in the launch he compelled her to wear her hair hanging loose. On one occasion, when her sister & I were also of the party, she seemed most unhappy. He did not seem to notice it. 25 p 119, marked

||In November, 1885, Russell paid a visit to Walt Whitman, in Camden, New Jersey.|| He was most pleasant to talk to, though I didn’t venture to say much. N.B. 26 p 127

||Polygamy in Utah and the Christian conscience. If an elder had five wives, a new law decreed that he select one, but he might keep the other four as mistresses, provided that he treated them with respect.|| R. is curiously “moral”. If you legalize a thing it becomes beautifully right. 27 p 153, underlined and marked

||Russell successfully navigates his yacht through a stormy night in the Mediterranean.|| It was with devout thankfulness and a great peace in my heart that I handed over the command to Bowles at 4 a.m., […]. N.B. This is a key passage to R’s religion. It is old phraseology covering an intensive animal will to live. 28 p 157

||Intrigue having to do with Russell’s marriage to Mabel Edith Scott and his subsequent suit against the Scotts for criminal libel, i.e. for buggery.|| It is hopeless to straighten out a tale so radically misleading. R. is putting up a smoke-screen of lies, composed of atoms of truth.

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29 p 160, underlined and marked

[Of Lady Scott:]

Her mother again was a weak, kind-hearted woman, but she was by instinct a blackmailer and a preyer upon men, and I doubt if she ever fully realized what she was doing. I cannot, however, acquit my wife of perhaps the most serious blame of all, for she did know the truth, and therefore knew that her allegations were false, […]. True. Yes, I am inclined to think she did: but not what the reader here is expected to conceive as the truth. He was then proud of his free morals and ready to boast of his actions. 30 p 161

||Of Mabel Edith Scott and her mother, Russell quotes a friend:|| “They have the morality of the Choctaw Indian.” R. I suspect is thinking of himself. This was his case exactly. 31 p 163, marked

[Mabel’s charges:]

Another was that I tried to revive her by sprinkling water over her when she had fainted. ||Also swearing and flourishing a revolver, which was in storage.|| This covers a terrible unmentionable accusation, involving all R’s past. 32 p 166, underlined

I forgot to mention that with the same malignity as in the X case they had thrown to the public the name of a young woman who belonged to the period before the marriage, and who was in no way connected with the case. On that incident the Judge remarked in his summing-up: “I cannot help thinking that those who instructed the learned Counsel to put those facts were actuated by nothing but malice.” ? ^^ Kate Williams. There was the same unmentionable background to this as to the fainting of Mabel Edith. The Scotts regarded such things as normal, but their lawyers (and the nurse) refused to mention them, and so left the whole case vague & incoherent.1 1

Santayana was a witness on Russell’s behalf in the trial.

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33 p 169

||Russell accused of visiting one Roberts in his bedroom on four occasions.|| I think Mabel Edith was really jealous: and she invented the cause. Roberts was a perfectly nice simple man; but it is true that R. was fond of him and preferred his company to other people’s in a way which might wound anyone inclined to jealousy or other wise offended already. 34 p 170

||Would such a man as Jowett, counsel asks, attend the wedding of the blackguard Russell has been accused of being?|| Jowett was a man of the world. He was thinking of the future, not of the past; he was kind; the Russells were a distinguished family; and R. had not done anything, as a matter of fact, that an open-minded person would make a fuss about, if appearances could be preserved or restored. 35 p 176

||Russell succeeds in negating the charge against a young girl of having murdered her bastard child.|| I was at this hearing. R. had an obvious feeling of sympathy with the poor Gretchen, victim of social tyranny, but he put it on the business ground that “no jury would convict”. 36 p 180, underlined

||Leaving a possibly unfortunate liaison in 1894,|| I decided to run away before my feelings were too deeply involved. And naturally I ran to America, which I had not seen for ten years, and where I had always wanted to return. If this is Agnes Tobin, he went to America to see her people! He had her photo & that of Mary Morris always in his pocket. Laying them one day before me, he asked which I should incline to: and I very truthfully said: Neither! 37 p 185, top

[Chapter XXII, “Restitution Suit.”]

R. had begun by defying public opinion, and feeling himself a hero. Then, under direct accusation, he quailed, and fought desperately, not for his opinions, but for public success. He half-succeeded; forgot or over-laid his old opin-

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ions with cant; and ran into the arms of disgrace in another direction—the arms of Vera. 38 p 207

||Lady (Lena) Scott had libelled Russell, he believes, by suborning members of the crew of his yacht to swear to unpleasant sexual activity aboard; he determines to sue her.|| I was at Amberley Cottage when the libel arrived. R. came to me with the papers in his hand, flush, saying: “This time it’s a prosecution for criminal libel, and Lena goes to prison!” 39 p 208, underlined and marked

Some of the witnesses on my side were also examined. Including myself. 40 p 210

Lady Scott when sentenced, cried: It is all true! 41 p 212, marked

||Russell quotes from a contemporary newspaper account of the trial:|| “But the case was one of those in which—so far as regards the principal person concerned—prudence and self-regard seem to have been entirely sacrificed at the shrine of vengeance.” No: because the Scotts or their lawyers knew that the “raking up” had been done by bribes. Cockerton may have had some grudges: but William Aylott was attached to R. and would have said nothing (even if true) unless prodded. I never saw Kast, but heard about him from R. I doubt that he could have stood cross-examination.1 1

Santayana had been a guest in Russell’s yacht on a trip from the South of France up the Rhone to Paris. 42 p 220

[On the “Vestry” of the National Liberal Club, London:]

It was a queer mixture of all sorts of people with all sorts of interests […]. Odious people, odious place. 43 p 236

||Russell visits the Grand Canyon.|| Hell

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44 p 257, underlined

[…] I have always maintained that the real inhabitants of the West are delightful. If you don’t mind their being common. It is a peasant temperament with middle-class resources. R himself is a common man enlarged. 45 p 262, underlined

||Russell adds 200 acres to his residence at Beacon Hill.|| Here was a new joy, and I fell upon it tooth and nail. I surrounded it with a wire fence to show that it was really mine, […]. A piece of folly, except for this passion of domination made evident in symbols & ceremonies, which it assuaged. The same passion governed him with people: “Kiss the rod!” he would say, lifting a finger to Mary Morris, and she would literally do it. 46 p 345

||Russell remains free, like Cyrano, to|| “rever, chanter, pleurer.”1 How can you say anything so very much out of character? 1

To dream, to sing, and to weep.

William MacKintire Salter

Nietzsche the Thinker: A Study

London: [c. 1917]. Georgetown. Forty-one marginalia. 1 p 69, underlined

||Salter defines Nietzsche’s idea of the saint in terms of a quotation from Schopenhauer:|| “A happy life is impossible; the highest thing which man can reach, is an heroic course of life. Such he leads who, in any manner and situation, fights against enormous odds for what is in some way of universal benefit and in the end conquers, though he is ill or not at all rewarded.” How? Salvation? 2 p 160, underlined

||A quotation from Nietzsche’s Will to Power.|| Let us be on our guard against making death the antithesis of life—the living is only a species of the dead, and a rare species. [Outlined by a pencilled rectangle:]

Motto for Essence

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3 p 172, underlined and doubly marked

[…] Zarathustra stretches out his hands, so to speak, in blessing on all existence. “Pain is also a joy, curse is also a blessing, night is also a sun. … Say also to woe: go, but come again … joy wills […].” a wicked & selfish joy. 4 p 327, underlined

Utilitarians, æstheticians, friends of knowledge, and idealists may make the same demands which morality makes, so that its self-destruction need not practically change matters. Utilitarians not moralists! 5 p 332, doubly marked

In passing to Nietzsche’s construction in morality I may say at the outset that it is a mistake to suppose that he was by temperament and instinct a radical—traces of a certain natural conservatism are plainly visible in his writings. He mentions with pride that he came of a line of Protestant pastors, and it is evident that it was intellectual necessity more than anything else that led to his departure from the ancient ways, and that even in his mental revolutions he kept something of the old spirit. What this book tries to prove 6 p 361, marked X

But Nietzsche is not bête,1 and so far as he speaks of power as a desirable end for man he means just a power that does not necessarily effectuate itself, that has to be striven for and may or may not be attained—it is emphatically a power that requires a will to power. This would have to be intelligence. 1

Foolish.

7 p 362

||Whether in packs, herds, or communities, Nietzsche favors the strong over the weak.|| Of course, no independence is absolute and Nietzsche is well aware of it; still beings are graded in his eyes according as they are more or less capable of it. Then the secret of dominance is adaptation! 8 p 388, underlined

||A description of Nietzsche’s view of great men:|| […] we must give particular attention, encouraging them, giving them room, not measuring them by ordinary standards, and willing rather to be hurt by them than to prevent their arising, knowing that, whatever immediate harm they

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do, humanity’s possibilities of “ further development ” are bound up ^ ^ ^ ^ with them. Snob. Snob. Snob. 9 p 389, underlined

||According to Nietzsche, not the individual but the mass is now dominant.|| The most human aim is not to provide for the comfort and happiness of the mass, but to raise the type— […]. Snob! 10 p 435, underlined and doubly marked

[Will to Power quoted:] “There is absolutely nothing better than the good! and that means having some kind of proficiency and creating from it virtù in the Italian Renaissance sense.” Then it is not for the sake of the Uebermensch that others exist. Yet he seems to mean that they [shoemakers or schoolmasters] are good only to supply a soil for the Uebermensch to glow in. 11 p 439

Zarathustra’s instinct is to love “all that lives” (whatever danger may lie in doing so), and tears come to his eyes as he watches the setting sun pouring its golden light on the sea, so that even the poorest fisherman rows with golden oars. Bosh! 12 p 441

At present [Nietzsche] finds men in civilized lands much the same in one respect: they work for the sake of the reward. Cf. Fichte Sankaracarya

Self-Knowledge New York: 1946. Waterloo. No marginalia.

George Santayana [Many of the volumes contain no marginalia. The notes that Santayana did write, e.g. in his revisions of The Life of Reason in his copies of the Triton Edition (now in the Beinecke Library, Yale University), will be

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or are being incorporated in the critical edition. What follows, therefore, is a list of those volumes together with the usual indication of their location.]

Sonnets and Other Verses, Georgetown. A second copy is in the Butler Library, Columbia. The Sense of Beauty, Georgetown The Life of Reason, Georgetown Reason in Common Sense Reason in Art Reason in Religion Reason in Science Winds of Doctrine, Georgetown Egotism in German Philosophy, Columbia Character and Opinion in the United States, Georgetown Poems, Georgetown Scepticism and Animal Faith, Georgetown The Unknowable, Waterloo Lucifer, or the Heavenly Truce, Waterloo A Brief History of My Opinions, Waterloo The Genteel Tradition at Bay, Waterloo The Last Puritan, Waterloo Der letzte Puritaner, Waterloo. A second copy is in the Butler Library, Columbia. Le Dernier puritain, Waterloo Persons and Places, Waterloo The Middle Span, Waterloo Die Spanne meines Lebens, Waterloo The Idea of Christ in the Gospels, Waterloo [two copies] La idea de Cristo en los evangelios, Waterloo L’Idea di Christo nei vangeli, Waterloo Die Christusidee inden Evangelien, Waterloo Atoms of Thought (edited by Ira D. Cardiff), Waterloo Dominations and Powers, Waterloo George Santayana

Lotze’s System of Philosophy Edited by Paul Grimley Kuntz Bloomington, Indiana: 1971.

[Santayana’s doctoral dissertation, unpublished until 1971. This volume contains Santayana’s marginalia to his volumes of Lotze’s work, now in the Loewenberg Library, Wells College, Aurora, New York.]

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Charles Sarolea

The Anglo-German Problem London and New York: 1912 Personal library of Adelaida Sastre, Avila. Five marginalia.

1 p 159

But Bernhardi’s chief authorities are the historian of the super-race, the Anglophile obe Treitschke, and the philosopher of the super-man, ^ ^ Nietzsche. Max Scheler

Die transzendentele und die psychologische Methode Leipzig: 1900. Georgetown. No marginalia.

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.

Orestes A. Brownson: A Pilgrim’s Progress Boston: 1939. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Herbert W. Schneider

The Puritan Mind New York: 1930. Waterloo. Thirty-two marginalia.

1 p 98, marked

Beliefs seldom become doubts; they become ritual. 2 p 101, underlined

||About the response to the Puritans’ preaching.|| You turn, […] for your own best good and enjoyment to the glory of God and in him you dwell at home. This part seems to have been vague. What was it to enjoy God?—the reversion to the world was satisfying because religion had been made a blank. 3 p 136, marked

To a Puritan the most natural science was the science of mind. […] What may surprise us, however, is the overwhelming power which Locke’s Essay had on this college sophomore [ Jonathan Edwards], fourteen years of age. It doesn’t surprise me. 4 p 154, underlined

Such is the general purport of the story, robbed of its metaphors. It is Puritanism purged of its local and mythological aspects and become an

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example of that catholic idealism which portrays in poetic language the nature of moral ideas, and which in all ages has found expression in one form or another. i.e. nakedness or self-abnegation in intrepid allegiance to the facts. 5 p 160

||Reference to an Encyclopaedia, dated|| Anno a Christo pro nobis incarnato 1714 et a mundo per numen creato 5663.1 5663 1714 3949 BC. 1 In the year of Christ made flesh for us, 1714, and sent into the created world by the divine will, 5663.

6 p 214, marked

[A paraphrase and quotation from Samuel Hopkins, The Knowledge of God’s Law Necessary in Order to the Knowledge of Sin.]

The most hardened sinner is he who imagines that he can oblige God to save him on account of his natural virtue. God will not be obliged! Man must surrender unconditionally; and no man is further from surrender than he who is still confident of the value of his own strivings. “The plain reason for this is, his sin and guilt are infinite and his virtue finite. Therefore the latter … is of not more avail … than nothing at all.” It follows that “the secure, unawakened sinner does not sin so directly and immediately against God as the awakened, convinced sinner.” 7 p 235, marked

[…] Unitarians were not required to build their own churches, they inherited the meeting houses of the Puritans, together with their social traditions and intellectual habits. In some sense the [sic] were still puritans. What is this sense? 8 pp 246–47, underlined

[On the simplicity of Benjamin Franklin’s prose:]

Though more recent instrumentalists have succeeded in putting this doctrine in language which appeals more to “university men, […]”. not to me! 9 p 254, underlined

If the Franklin morality substitutes for anything, it is for the traditional Christian virtues, for they, too, constitute a philosophy of the discipline of life. The Christian life is traditionally portrayed as one of humility,

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charity, penitence, poverty, self-denial, a forgiving spirit. These are obviously instrumental virtues and not ideal perfections, for they disappear in heaven. Not at all. Even poverty and self-denial, in one sense, remain in Piccarda. 10 p 254, doubly marked

Franklin’s diagnosis of his own case corresponds fairly well to the historians’ diagnosis of Puritans in general. They pretended to live saintly lives, but their actual ideals were pagan. They pursued “health, wealth and wisdom” while they professed election into the Covenant of Grace. 11 p 261, doubly marked

[Schneider quotes Lloyd Morris, The Rebellious Puritan, who quotes Nathaniel Hawthorne:]

“We go all wrong by too strenuous a resolution to go all right.” Oliver1 1

In his inscription, Schneider wrote, “To George Santayana (and for ‘Oliver’, if he wants it) with a sense of deep obligation.” 12 p 262–63, marked

Needless to say, Hawthorne used the theological terminology metaphorically. He did not need to believe in Puritanism, for he understood it. He saw the empirical truth behind the Calvinist symbols. He recovered what Puritans professed but seldom practiced—the spirit of piety, humility and tragedy in the face of the inscrutable ways of God. There is also self-dedication in Oliver. 13 p 264, marked

And now that Emerson is dead or dying, [in terms of readership, c. 1930] the solitary Puritan who “said so little,” has an opportunity of “showing his purer power.” Whenever self-reliance fails, as it sooner or later must, and sinners see themselves as God sees them, piety becomes reincarnate, though the language in which it finds expression may bear little resemblance to that of the Puritans. But whenever sinners become convinced that they are instruments in the hand of God, elected to carry out his holy will, they lose their piety and begin doing good to others. Mere self-surrender or conformity is not puritan: there is the uncompromising hatred of mummeries & vanities as well.

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Robert E. Schneider

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Positivism in the United States: The Apostleship of Henry Edger Rosario, Argentina: 1946. Waterloo. No marginalia.

William H. Schofield

English Literature, from the Norman Conquest to Chaucer

London and New York: 1906. Georgetown. No marginalia.

Arthur Schopenhauer

Parerga und Paralipomena

Two volumes. Leipzig: 1891. Le Balze. One marginale.

Fannie B. Sebastian

Poetry for Today Washington, D.C.: 1951. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Roderick Seidenberg

Posthistoric Man: An Inquiry Chapel Hill, NC: 1950. Waterloo. Twelve marginalia.

1 p 174, marked

In the shifting panorama of history, the doubts, problems, and antinomies of one age are not so much resolved as supplanted by those of another age. 2 p 186

[Santayana’s paraphrase:]

Spirit not abolished but generated by perfection of life. 3 p 189

[…] the person as the source and citadel of spiritual realities, as the ultimate center of being and the nucleus of creative thought and activity, will ultimately come to seem to whom? to God? a remote myth, a vague ^ ^ historic concept […]. But spirit has to be incarnate.

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Richard Semon

Die Mneme als erhaltendes Prinzip in Wechsel des organischen Geschehens Leipzig: 1911 (3rd edition). Georgetown. No marginalia.

George Bernard Shaw

The Adventures of a Black Girl in Her Search for God London: 1932. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Osbert Sitwell

The Scarlet Tree Boston: 1946. Waterloo. Two marginalia.

1 p 349

[Sitwell on himself at Eton:]

I possessed a liking for things of the intellect, a passion for the arts, which already I placed above everything. I don’t as yet see great signs of “intellect” in you: a taste for gossip, for novels, & the Russian ballet is not intellectual. It shows sprightliness. Strange silence about the classics and about history & politics. Harry Slochower

Three Ways of Modern Man New York: 1937. Waterloo. One marginale.

1 p 72, underlined

[A quotation from Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain:]

[…] “une aventure dans la mal” […].1 ! 1

An adventure in evil.

Harry Slochower

Richard Dehmel Dresden: 1928. Georgetown. No marginalia.

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Charles Allen Smart

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Wild Geese and How to Chase Them New York: 1941. Waterloo. Six marginalia.

1 p 54

||The United States keeps out of the war from second-hand prudence. Are we|| afraid to say that we want to go into this war to the hilt […] simply because we hate all bullies’ guts, and are willing to take any consequences? Isn’t this a call of “insanity”? A bully seems to be speaking. 2 p 57, underlined

[…] people who have been places, […]. New idiom? Logan Pearsall Smith

Afterthoughts London: 1931. Georgetown. No marginalia.

Robinson Smith

The Solution of the Synoptic Problem: Sources, Sequences and Dates of the Gospels and Epistles, and the Consequent Life of Christ

London: 1922. Waterloo. No marginalia; three-quarters un-cut.

Thomas V. Smith

The Philosophic Way of Life in America New York: 1943. Waterloo. Twenty-nine marginalia.

1 p 121, underlined

[Chapter V: “The Aesthetic Way: Santayana.”]

Ideas, while not the very things of nature, are held to be the essence of the things for which they stand. not by me 2 p 210

[Chapter VIII: “The Legislative Way: Congress.”]

People are not able to represent one another (This is an objection to autocracy, and also to representative government).

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3 p 216

[Smith urges variety and tolerance in taste.]

Ideal to like everything. 4 p 217

[An appeal for everyone to learn touch-typing.]

Democratic joy in touch typing. 5 p 217

A man of the world learns how to meet men halfway; […]. Insidious cordiality 6 p 218

Accomodation liberates (what remains of) the self. 7 p 219, marked

||The roots of amiability and animosity are in all of us.|| But under proper conditions they do grow and flower into the friendliness of a self-respect so staunch that it respects others as part of the very same with itself. Do parliaments foster kindness in all nations? In the U.S. are Congressmen kinder than commercial travellers? Fairness & patience are really characteristic of government by agreement and compromise. 8 p 223, underlined

Congress would break up again if all other representatives were to turn on those who speak for one cause with the united conviction that they were rogues not worthy to be heard. As you do upon fascists. 9 p 227

The beginning of collective wisdom is for each man to discover that he is not God. 2 points: 1. Moralism is here taken as typical selfishness. 2. The “legislative life” = the life of reason. 10 p 233

||Better a majority have its way than a minority.|| Quantity only considered rather than faculty. 11 p 234

||One is not a good man if he compromises his very self.|| The good man and the good citizen meet and merge in a society so peaceful that

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freedom of conviction is habitually allowed. This is the end-goal of the legislative way of life: […]. But the private loyalties may be to another society or church. Your democracy therefore should be multiple and in material things, federated. Sophocles

Antigone Translated by Lauro de Bosis Rome: 1927. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Sophocles

Oedipus Rex Translated by Dudley Fitts and Robert Fitzgerald New York: 1949. Waterloo. No marginalia.

William Soutar

Conflict London: 1931. Waterloo. One marginale.

Edward G. Spaulding A World of Chance, or, Whence, Whither, and Why? New York: 1936. Waterloo. 101 marginalia. 1 p xvii, marked

No property, e.g., perfection, “generates” or necessitates its own instances. No essence generates its instances. 2 p xviii

||Concerning properties which are|| instances of Impossibility. The essence of contradiction cannot be exemplified (except in thought or language). 3 p xxv, footnote

A proposition is not the words of a sentence, nor an “awareness” of any kind; rather it is an objective “state of affairs,” a meaning, that is “made” true or false by something external to itself. A proposition is an essence.

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4 p xxvi, marked

[…] the proposition is a specific objective state of affairs through or by means of which we judge. It is a possibility, but a specific one, namely, that of being open to realization by something external to itself. If the proposition is realized, it is true, if it is not, it is false. Definition of truth. 5 p xxvii, marked

[…] in asserting any position to be true, we are presupposing, (1), that a certain set of propositions is disclosed, and, (2), that through the propositions which constitute this set, we are getting at facts which are independent of both the propositions and the judgments. This is Realism. Definition of realism. But what is a “fact”? 6 p xxxi

[Santayana’s gloss:]

Realism is open to conviction about reality, whereas idealism has its reality at home. 7 p xxxii, underlined

||Spaulding’s list of words that he regards|| to be neither mere words, nor “constructs,” nor “fictions,” nor “ideas,” but facts, realities: Functionality (“Propertiness”) Possibility, Necessity, Contingency, […]. He won’t say “essence” and sweats! 8p5

[Santayana interprets:]

Odd to call essences “facts”. 9 p 6, marked Z

[On propositions about propositions that might be true or false:]

Essences are not “true” about themselves. Judgments may be true or false about them when they are specified. But this involves selection & intent. 10 p 9, underlined

||The relation between the non-physical and fact contradicts|| the explicit tenet of Behaviorism, that everything is physical; […]. including relations. Does Watson deny relations? 11 p 21

[Chapter II, “Propositions about Propositions.”]

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Even if one said, after investigation, as does, e.g., the nominalist, “There are no propositions,” one would be aware of, or would be discovering, at least one proposition. 1st meaning of “is”.1 1

See Santayana’s “Some Meanings of the Word ‘Is’” in Obiter Scripta (Scribner’s, 1936), pp. 189–212. 12 p 22, underlined

It will be found that these realities [nature, existence] are of different kinds, and that these kinds have definite relations to one another. All kinds & all relations. If you limit the realm of essence you contradict yourself, since you refer to what you exclude, indicating it in denying it. 13 p 34, marked Z

[…] if “round-squareness” is an impossibility, then, on the one hand, it itself is an instance of this property, but, on the other hand, it is an instance which is of such a character (impossibility) not only that it is not, but also that it cannot be, exemplified,—i.e., there are no possible instances of it. There are, then, some properties (if, by courtesy, they may be called this), some pseudo-properties, that, as themselves instances of Impossibility, cannot be possibilities-of-instances, of classes. No: there are no such essences in that genus (no round square in space or geometry) but there are many instances (like round squares) of contradiction in speech and attempted thought. 14 p 36, footnote

||Can logical consistency be established, as by mathematicians, through an appeal|| to an external factor, to a “concrete representation.” This is, of course, an appeal to truth, […]. Isn’t intuition meant? To see contradiction you must distinguish the compared terms definitely. i.e. in intuition, in actual vision. 15 p 37, footnote, underlined

Whether […] maintaining that propositions as propositions, meanings as meanings, are such as to reveal their consistency or inconsistency, there is a concealed reference to an external factor, and therefore to a “concrete representation” and so to an external test, is an open question. No, no, no. Intuition does not rest on an external object but on an essence, which has no locus and no existence.

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16 p 38

Silly ass. All essences are “one” no matter how many parts (not to speak of instances) they may synthesize. 17 p 52

In brief, and to summarize: There is either an infinite series (regress) of properties or there is not. If there is, then, ipso facto, there is no ultimate property. If there is not, then either there is one ultimate property or there are many ultimate properties. “Number” e.g. cannot be an instance of number, i.e. a particular number. Does it follow that there is a higher essence than Being, of which all essences are “instances”? 18 p 77, marked Z

[…] we discover what may be called the Antinomy or Paradox or Dilemma of Functionality (or Propertiness) and Ultimacy. Each presupposes the other. Functionality, if, or as, an Ultimate, presupposes, or is an instance of, Ultimacy, and Ultimacy, as a function, presupposes, or is an instance of, Functionality. Scholastic trifling & monkish quibbles. 19 p 96, underlined

What, then are some of the more important classes or types of relations? Note the fishing of this professor, so as to be able to go on with his lecture. 20 p 104

i.e. you are rambling among the ideas that happen to occur to you. 21 p 114

Truth may be found in mere ideas if these ideas are made objects, and referred to in other terms at other moments. By “idea” I mean not psychological moments—intuitions— but specific essences. Science may therefore be mathematical or logical: & within limits propriety & consistency in developing them may be called “truth” i.e. formal or grammatical truth. The limits are set by the prevalence & clearness of the ideas discussed. 22 p 117, marked

The propositions, identical with meanings, are symbolized; they are “understood,” or not, by other minds than that of the investigator; and

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they are made true or false by facts. But the facts themselves care not whether or not there is truth or falsity, understanding, symbolization, rational examination, science, or philosophy; only, if there are these, then the realm of fact is by so much the richer. Good sense. 23 p 130

||Truth is always contingent.|| There are no necessary truths. Herbert Spencer

The Study of Sociology

London: 1897 (19th edition). Georgetown. Thirty-four marginalia. 1 p 34, marked Z

True, if you please to ignore all that common observation, verified by physiology, teaches—if you assume that two European parents may produce a Negro child, or that from woolly-haired prognathous Papuans may come a fair, straight-haired infant of Caucasian type—you may assume that the advent of the great man can occur anywhere and under any conditions. What is the standard of greatness? 2 p 52, marked

It needs but to ask what would happen if men avoided one another, as various inferior creatures do, to see that the very possibility of a society depends on a certain emotional property in the individual. If men were not social they would not live in society. Do you know the social structure in the individual, or only the social action of individuals in the mass? 3 p 195, top

[Santayana summarizes two pages.]

1. 2. 2. 3.

ideals of society or life. Well-fed ideal. [sic] Reproduction ideal Hunting ideal

4. ideals of War. ^ ^ 5. Industry. [Spencer] 6. State. 7. Fame.

Business is the background of labour. Love is the background of art. 4 p 199, underlined and marked Z

Those educated in the religion of enmity—those who during boyhood, when the instincts of the savage are dominant, have revelled in the

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congenial ideas and sentiments which classic poems and histories yield so abundantly, […]. N.B. 5 p 200

||It is a perverted idea of society presented by Gibbon when he writes that Rome declined because of public happiness creating corruption, as opposed to the vitality and health of the empire at war.|| The author doesn’t see that in fighting a scarcely conceived and repellent enemy we bind closely to us all the friends and allies of our own soul. 6 p 209, underlined

[On “The Bias of Patriotism”:]

We can see nothing save crime in the endeavour of the Hindus to throw off our yoke; and we recognize no excuse for the efforts of the Irish to establish their independent nationality. We entirely ignore the fact that the motives are in all such cases [of patriotic rebellion] the same, and are to be judged apart from results. This from you? 7 p 371, marked

||The selfish, thoughtless young men and women become responsible and unselfish when they become parents.|| Good passage on the representative value of the family. Rationality within is so firmly established that it over balances irrationality without. 8 p 377, underlined and marked

That the emotion of awe aroused by contemplating whatever suggests transcendent force or capacity, which constitutes religious feeling, is strongest in women, is proved in many ways. We read that among the Greeks the women were more religiously excitable than the men. N.B. 9 p 380, top

Some little organs nature moulds in vain Like a man’s nipple or a woman’s brain. 10 p 413, top

If population doubled every 25 years, in 300 years the whole land-surface of the world would be covered with a population as thick as that of London.

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[End-paper:]

Plato’s Republic Aristotle’s Politics. St Augustine’s City of God. Dante’s De monarchia. Montesquieu. L’esprit des lois. Rousseau. Contrat Social. Hobbes. Leviathan. Machiavelli: De principe. Spinoza: Politico-Theological tractate. Hegel: Philosophy of history— history of philosophy. Phil ^ ^ of religion Sidgwick: Politics. Maine’s Ancient Law. Spencer’s Sociology. Kidd: Social evolution. Comte: Philosophie positive, vol. I. Bossuet. Discours de l’histoire universelle. Hume: Natural history of religion. [ Caird: Evolution of religion.] [ Mill’s Liberty. ] Arnold. Culture and Anarchy. Stephen Spender

The Destructive Element: A Study of Modern Writers and Beliefs London: 1935. Texas. Fourteen marginalia.

1 p 50, underlined

What distinguishes James from the æsthetes is his extraordinary sense of life, as distinct from reported experience. Writers like Wilde and Lionel Johnson, and even Whistler, were so deeply embroiled in various sensations and memorable experiences, that it was natural for them to think of Art as something cut off from life. I.e. in buggery and drunkenness. 2 p 133, marked

[On T. S. Eliot and his poetry:]

One notices further that there is a tendency in the work of all these artists [ Joyce, Proust, Baudelaire, Rilke] to regard life as an illness, and themselves (although they, too, are very seriously ill) as doctors or nurses or spiritual fathers, or mere affectionate holders of fading hands.

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3 p 161, underlined

[On T. S. Eliot’s criticism:]

In Eliot’s essay [“Tradition and the Individual Talent”] there seems to be little feeling that a sense of tradition can be derived from the conditions of life round the poet; that his audience, or his potential audience, is, as it were, the carrier of tradition, and that he is the one infected. Nor is there, as yet, any feeling that tradition may be found in the Church, or, as we find it in Henry James, amongst an aristocracy. It is to be found in books. This fallacy infects American minds. It stinks at Harvard. 4 pp 166–67

||With regard to After Strange Gods, although Eliot is not a fascist, his statement concerning Jews, and “excessive tolerance is to be deprecated” would be approved by such fascists as Mussolini, Mosley, and Hitler.|| The doctrine is not Catholic or Protestant. It has no echo in Renaissance Italy or in the teachings of the Church which claimed to stand above all cultures and local characteristics, and to unite all peoples. Nor does it apply to our own history since the Reformation. It is in fact an Old Testament doctrine suited to the intense nationalism and racial self-sufficiency of the Chosen People. There is nothing in the New Testament to correspond to it. You forgot Plato and the Greek legislators, e.g. Lycurgus. 5 pp 172–73, marked

To call Joyce a traditionalist means a lot, but to call Lawrence a heretic means nothing. For if the tradition is all that matters, it finally disposes of Lawrence as a serious writer. On the other hand, if Lawrence does matter, then we have got to revise our use of the word tradition, and the machine that Eliot has constructed falls to pieces. We remember his curious remark that Blake was only traditional ‘up to the age of twenty.’ After that he became not a classic—like Dante—but ‘only a poet of genius.’ Perhaps a part of the English tradition is to produce artists who are only poets of genius. [From “Perhaps a part”:]

Perhaps poets of genius who are not artists. Robert Bridges says Shakespeare was not an artist. 6 pp 177–78, underlined

[On D. H. Lawrence:]

Lawrence was only an individualist in the sense that he wished the individual to be free in order that he might transcend his own separation

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from his fellow-beings, and fulfil his deep and unconscious being through sex, and through non-individual, primary sensations. Animality doesn’t fulfill: it subtends. If this were all in Lawrence and Spender they would be beasts. 7 p 186

[From a letter of D. H. Lawrence:]

‘[…] You mustn’t look in my novel for the old stable ego of the character. There is another ego, according to whose action the individual is unrecognizable, and passes through, as it were, allotropic states which it needs a deeper sense than any we’ve been used to exercise, to discover are states of the same single radically unchanged element.’ The psyche is not the spirit. Excellent if you are interested in the conduct and ineraction of people for its physical drama. Oswald Spengler

Reden und Aufsätze Munich: 1938. Waterloo. Eighty-four marginalia.

1 p 4, marked

||Democritus and the ancient materialists differed from the moderns.|| And the ancients were more profound. 2 p 19, underlined

(Nietzsche macht auf das Treffende des Ausdrucks “Wirklichkeit” aufmerksam.)1 Schopenhauer said it first: Die Wirklichkeit ist das Wirken.2 1

Nietzsche notes the pertinence of the expression “Reality.” Reality is activity.

2

3 p 29

[On Heraclitus, Santayana’s gloss and translation:]

Contrariety exists only by comparison: but the contrary essences lie uncompared in the movement of things. A terrible fallacy is skirted here, viz., that the turn of thought creates the alternation of forms. This is another point. Things identical with themselves have contrary relations to other things, large and small etc.

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4 p 65, underlined

||A powerful current in modern German thought derives from Leibniz by way of Goethe and Hegel.|| Leibniz became Goethe’s influential teacher, although Goethe himself was not aware of this connection and instead pronounced the name of the quite alien wesensfremden Spinoza […]. Jew!!! 5 p 65, underlined

||If one deletes Leibniz’s writings on politics, efforts at reunification of the country; his observations on mining, on mathematics and the organization of knowledge,|| so bleibt wenig übrig.1 Only the monadology. 1

Very little else remains.

6 p 65, underlined

Der gewaltige Hegel war der letzte, dessen Denken, von politischen Wirklichkeiten ausgehend, noch nicht ganz durch Abstraktionen erstickt wurde.1 Very true. He was a politician like you. 1

The overpowering Hegel was the last one whose thought, diverging from political realities, was not completely suffocated in abstractions. 7 p 66

[Santayana paraphrases:]

History a collection of parables to enforce a policy. 8 p 66, marked

The blaze of emotional and experienced deeds once extinguished, one reflects analytically. Fate is a word the contents of which one feels. Time, longing, life are closely related words. No one may believe that he has understood the kernel of my manner of thought if the ultimate meaning of such words, as I intend them, remains closed to him. Bergson in more virile form, and more honest because not pretending to be true, only inspiring. 9 p 67

[…] den Gang der Welt instinktiv zu durchschauen, […]. [Santayana glosses:]

“Intuition” in the sense of divination. Certainly there is divination in the Napoleons: but there is also study; and when the insight is not based on study it leads to ruin.

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10 p 78, marked

In the land of Till Eulenspiegel, I miss great comic style of world-historical heights and depths, exalted, tragic, light and fine; it is almost the only form in which, without becoming unauthentic, both the philosopher and the poet can use. 11 p 116, marked

||In “Nietzsche and his Century,” Spengler compares Goethe’s times and education with Nietzsche’s.|| N. was more literary than G. more drunk with words. Aristocracy & Democracy are ideas. The real people in both cases are beastly and helpless. 12 p 117, marked

||Nietzsche was incapable of living a communal life, but lived a lonely and isolated existence, unlike Goethe.|| It is the beauty of friendship not to be “society” but a conjunction of solitudes: like religion. 13 p 118, underlined and marked X

||The Birth of Tragedy displayed classical knowledge quite different from conventional teachings; he saw Greek culture|| ins Innere1 […]. 1

In essence.

14 p 122, underlined

Niemand […] No one wrote more histories [than in the neo-classical period] without a conception of a single culture and a unified set of mores. Except Croce & Co. 15 p 131, underlined

Der Charakter eines Volkes ist das Ergebnis seiner Schicksale. Nicht das Land, das Klima, Himmel und Meer, auch nicht die Rasse, das Blut bringen ihn letzten Endes hervor. Das ist nur der Stoff, aus dem die Schläge der geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit eine Form schmieden.1 There is a curious shift from realities at work in history, to history at work on men. The realities all material. 1 The character of a people is the result of its fate. Neither the land, climate, the skies and sea, neither race nor blood ultimately determines it. Those elements are only the material out of which the blows of historical reality forge a form.

16 p 150, underlined

Vor 50 Jahren kannte man den Streitwagen nur aus Homer.1 And the Bible. 1

Fifty years ago we knew about war chariots only from Homer.

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17 p 182, marked

||Man preyed upon nature like an animal|| before he linked himself to a culture of his own, in which each expression of life became a new shackle. Liberty, death, & dirt go together for the proud savage. 18 p 236fn, underlined

Spanish bullfighting, concerning the origins of which little has been known, was still in the Baroque period the special privilege of noblemen. The individual man approached the animal with sword in hand in order to display his skill. At the beginning of the nineteenth century bullfighting turned into a show for the rabble, in which professional troops practised nur noch scheinbar gefährliches Gewerbe ausüben.1 Each animal was “disposed of ” in about twenty minutes.2 ! 1

Only an apparently dangerous occupation . Santayana went often to corridas in Madrid, understood them, and was properly astonished at Spengler’s ridiculous account. 2

19 p 256, marked

[Santayana satirically paraphrases Spengler’s history of civilization.]

True culture stopped short in the semi nigger court of the Empress Josephine. 20 p 269

[On the military heroes of the Old Testament:]

The Jews were the Foreign Legion. So things came round. Oswald Spengler

Der Untergang des Abendlandes

Two volumes. Munich: 1922–23. Georgetown. 195 marginalia. [Volume I.] 1 p 20, marked

[Introduction.]

||The conception “world history” may prove in the end to be not a culture or a particular human type, but|| eine Form, ein Inhalt des kosmischen Bewußtseins ist.1 naturalism is therefore the author’s real conviction: this book is merely the expression of an arbitrary orthodoxy confessed to be an illusion. 1

A form, a content of the cosmic consciousness.

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2 p 21

||The conventional divisions of history into a classical period, middle ages, and modern are senseless and unjust to the actual cultural past.|| Here begins the controversy of orthodoxy against heresy—all within the sphere of illusion. 3 p 55, underlined

Hat man diese Höhe der Betrachtung erreicht, so fallen einem alle Früchte von selbst zu. An den einen Gedanken schließen sich, mit ihm lösen sich zwanglos alle Einzelprobleme, welche auf den Gebieten der Religionsforschung, der Kunstgeschichte, der Erkenntniskritik, der Ethik, der Politik, der Nationalökonomie den modernen Geist seit Jahrzehnten und leidenschaftlich, aber ohne den letzten Erfolg beschäftigt haben. Dieser Gedanke gehört zu den Wahrheiten, die nicht mehr bestritten werden, sobald sie einmal in voller Deutlichkeit ausgesprochen sind.1 The Key to the Mystery! 1

If one had attained these heights of contemplation, all the fruits would have fallen by themselves to him as one. Within that one way of thought, all individual problems are easily solved, those problems approached by way of research into religion, art-history, theory of knowledge, of ethics, politics, or national economies, which have absorbed the modern mind for decades without the slightest success. These ideas pertained to the truth that is no longer engaged, whereas once they were fully discussed. 4 p 56

||The models for Germany are not to be found in Periclean Athens, but in Rome.|| This is all an apology for Prussian monstruosity [sic], likened to Roman grandeur. What rot! As if in all ages something beautiful could not be made. 5 p 57, marked

Wenn unter dem Eindruck dieses Buches sich Menschen der neuen Generation der Technik statt der Lyrik, der Marine statt der Malerei, der Politik statt der Erkenntniskritik zuwenden, so tun sie, was ich wünsche, und man kann ihnen nichts Besseres wünschen.1 Why must people do the fashionable thing? Worldliness is absolutely ineradicable in the Jew-German mind. 1

When, under the influence of this book, men of the new generation turn to technology rather than to lyric poetry, to the sea rather than to painting, to politics not to theory of knowledge, they will act as I should wish them to, and one cannot wish them anything better.

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6 p 61

||Praise again for Roman architecture, and denegration for other forms of ornament.|| Oh rot! as if the ornaments were less expressive than the structure. 7 p 81, marked

[Chapter: “Vom Sinn der Zahlen” (On the meaning of numbers).]

Geschichte verstehen heißt Menschenkenner im höchsten Sinne sein.1 Literary psychology. 1

To understand history means to understand mankind in the highest sense.

8 p 82, underlined and marked Z

Jede Philosophie ist bisher in der Verbundenheit mit einer zugehörigen Mathematik erwachsen. Die Zahl ist die bildgewordene Idee der kausalen Notwendigkeit, wie die Vorstellung von Gott, die jede Kultur aus ihrer tiefsten Tiefe neu gestaltet, die bildgewordene Idee der Notwendigkeit des Schicksals ist.1 Note that every Kultur creates the world: yet the Kulturen seem to arise in an order dependent on astronomy. Where are we? 1

Previously each philosophy developed in connection with a parallel mathematics. Number is the shaping idea of causal necessity, like the introduction of God, which each culture set forth anew out of its profoundest depths, and which is the shaping idea of the necessity of fate. 9 p 87, top

Turbid and profuse repetitions, jumble of assumptions, and cocksure interpretations of remote lore in China Greece and Egypt. 10 p 87, doubly marked

||Kant assumes identity of mental activity in all mankind.|| Quite so. But this is not the reason. The reason is that Kant thinks transcendentally. The natural occasions for thinking exist only for thought. 11 p 92, underlined

||The creations of higher mathematics compared to the interior of a Cathedral,|| ( wie die Verse der Engel im Faustprolog ) 1 ^^ ^^ Not this: this is sentimental convention. You mean the contemplation of essence. 1

Like the angel’s verse in the prologue to Faust.

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12 p 93

Substance is not essence. 13 p 101

||Spengler cites the deeply religious intuition of mathematical artists.|| What does he mean by religious? Mystical? pious? 14 p 110

[On mathematical functions:]

Relations and types rather than shapes & sizes. But Platonic Ideas were types. 15 p 112, marked

In the totality of the history of mankind, one finds nothing innately strange. And even so, because opposites disturb, because in their depths they refer to a possible commonality, we discover in the western Faust-like soul every longing search for the Apollonian ideal, which they alone among all others grasp and are envied for the strength of their devotion to the pure-intellectual future. This is like Goethe, not like you. You pretend to like being a German. 16 p 113

[“On the meaning of numbers,” i.e., mathematical thought:]

All this comes to the simple conclusion that there is some analogy between the way mathematicians of a particular nation think, and the other arts of that nation. It is not mathematics or the arts that change their total constitution. 17 pp 113–14

||In early civilations, Egypt or Greece, architecture, sculpture, and mensuration were in accord. Modern men experience an intense longing for what is irrecoverable. Spengler writes of|| das Urgefühl der Sehnsucht1 ||of the modern.|| False history. 1

The primitive feeling of longing.

18 p 114, underlined

Wie alles Werden sich auf ein Gewordensein richtet, mit dem es endet, so rührt das Urgefühl des Werdens, die Sehnsucht, schon an das andre des Gewordenseins, die Angst.1 Hardly that: sorrow, a Sehnsucht that is hopeless. 1 Just as all becoming is directed to fulfillment, its proper end, so the primitive feeling of becoming, longing, arises, [with] that other aspect of fulfillment, anxiety.

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19 p 114, underlined

Es ist etwas Fremdes, das Zukunft in Vergangenheit verwandelt,1 […]. Yes, to spirit, but not to the childish psyche, that loves change. 1

It is rather strange that the future changes into the past ….

20 p 115, top

“Sentimental Time” 21 p 115, marked

Only the inwardly dying men of the great late cities, of Ptolemaic Alexandria or of contemporary Paris and Berlin, only the purely intellectual sophist, sensualist and Darwinist loses sight of or denies an unmysterious “scholarly Weltanschauung” between himself and the strangeness of being. This animus is against the radicals who omit spirit from their philosophy. But Empedocles felt the strangeness of existence. 22 p 116

[A random observation:]

Essences are a harness thrown over substance—the intended object of knowledge. 23 p 125

The infinite is a provocation to motion, not an actual thing. 24 p 127

[On the mathematical absolute:]

Absolute space must be a notion, because if it existed there would be no difference in individuality in its parts: how then could it exist? Existence also implies change: how could absolute space move or endure inward motion? 25 p 129

||Only a few understand the sphere of mathematical thought that Spengler sets forth.|| Aren’t you in danger of being a coxcomb with your profundity? 26 p 130

||For us, the days of the great mathematicians are over.|| No Einstein yet?

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27 p 136

Egotism unconscious of itself: But you—fussy, vain prejudiced person—how are you going to do that? 28 p 137, marked

[Chapter: “Das Problem der Weltgeschichte” (The problem of worldhistory).]

“The World” is for each individual his own, singular, necessary and completely willess experience. Schopenhauer called it the world as representation and its identity for all mankind as obvious. And you assume a lot of barbarians artists & children besides yourself. Why? 29 p 390, marked

[Chapter: “Musik und Plastik.”]

||The elevated greens of Grünewald, Lorrain, and Giorgione are Catholic colors; Rembrandt’s browns represent the Protestant world-feelings.|| N.B. Can nonsense further go? 30 p 427

This is another notion—picturesqueness, idiosyncrasy: but the same in that it treats a man as a stimulus for me. 31 p 428, underlined

Man bemerkt […] daß jede einzelne Kultur als eineheitliches Wesen höherer Ordnung im historischen Gesamtbilde ihre eigne moralische Fassung besitzt. Es gibt so viele Moralen, als es Kulturen gibt.1 N.B. Kultur = tradition. 1 One observes … that each single culture uniformly possesses, in historical perspective, a higher order of moral perception. There are as many orders of morality as there are individual cultures.

32 p 429

He confuses harmony with passivity. I am not passive if I live according to nature, nature living in me. But I am quiet and settled. 33 p 434, marked

||Spengler contrasts the fable of the ancients with the short story, or novellas, the masters of which are Cervantes, Kleist, Hoffmann, and Storm.|| !

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34 p 465, marked

||The analysis of an order of morality cannot itself be a form of morality.|| N.B. Yet he has an evident preference for the Faustish. 35 p 466, marked

Himself the passionate opposer of all “Herd-morality,” Nietzsche is hardly able, in the ancient sense, to confine his zeal to himself. Of course not. Nietzsche is a raving barbarian. 36 p 471, marked

Each culture has its own ethical standards, the validity of which begins and ends with it. There is no ethics common to all. Not complete: but there are some human goods recognized every where. E.g. health. If St. Francis prefers illness, it is as a means to “true” health. 37 p 472

||The many varieties of morality.|| Why such unanimity? Are there not always all sorts of people at bottom? Perhaps it is only the snobs & their fashions that change. 38 p 479, marked

Nietzsche’s Master-morality is a reality as a type of energetic, imperial, highly intellectual civilization. Here we find the politics of reality, the moneyed magnate, the great engineer and organizer. Nietzsche was a poet, not a Prussian or an American. 39 p 484

This is a confession that Kant (unintentionally) meant to express a chaotic freedom. 40 p 486, marked Z

The inner certainty of a free will is intrinsic in the whole of portrait painting since Leonardo. Typical twaddle. 41 p 486, underlined

Der freie Wille als „Form der inneren Anschauung“, mit Kant zu reden, steht in einer tiefen Beziehung zur Einsamkeit des faustischen Ich, zum Monologischen seines Daseins und seiner gesamten künstlerischen Äußerungen, wovon die apollinische Seele nichts besitzt.1 Freedom is wanted only as an illusion.

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1

Free will as a “form of inner reflection,” to speak in Kant’s terms, is profoundly connected to the islolation of the Faustian I, to the monologue of its existence and all its artistic utterances, of which the Apollonian mind possesses no part. 42 p 487, underlined and doubly marked

||The ethical socialism of the ancient and contemporary Bhuddists.|| Rousseau ist der Ahnherr dieses Sozialismus. Rousseau steht neben Sokrates und Buddha, den anderen ethischen Wortführern großer Zivilisationen. Seine Ablehnung aller großen Kulturformen, aller bedeutungsvollen Konventionen, seine berühmte „Rückkehr zur Natur“, sein praktischer Rationalismus gestatten keinen Zweifel. Jeder von ihnen hat eine tausendjährige Innerlichkeit zu Grabe getragen.1 Rousseau and the liberals are really enemies of tradition and “undertakers” of Kultur. 1 Rousseau is the ancestor of that socialism. Rousseau stands alongside Socrates and Buddha, the other ethical spokesmen of great civilizations. His denial of all great forms of culture, all meaningful conventions, his famous return to nature, his practical rationalism permit no doubts. Each of these qualities has buried a thousand years of inwardness.

43 p 489, marked

The scholarly worlds are superficial worlds, practical, spiritless, clean, extensive worlds. They eliminate the outlook of Buddhism, stoicism, and socialism. I.e. to see things as they are kills the Faust-like nature. But it is admitted that they are so. 44 p 490, marked

||In Faust II, Goethe symbolized the centuries to come as practical, far-seeing, and directed outwardly, in opposition to the tragic aspect of Faust I. In part II,|| Goethe predicted psychologically the entire future of Western Europe. Yes. 45 p 499, marked

||The many ways in which modern man has gone astray.|| There is no greater opposition than that between civilized and a Kulturmenschen.1 Primitive man himself is not so foreign to doric and gothic times. Thank you. 1

Humanity at one, in ancient fashion, with its conditions.

46 p 532, marked

||Spengler contrasts “Nature” and “a physical world-picture.”|| What then is the historical cosmos in which Kulturen arise?

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47 p 554, marked Z

Since the late Renaissance, the representation of God in the minds of all serious people as pure space is more and more common. What rot! 48 p 556, marked Z

||On the tragic, doomed aspect of Apollonian apprehension of nature.|| So that this is your mighty Wille? 49 p 612

N.B. Romantic “life” is the source of science, but in what sort of a world is Romantic Life extant? In a novel? Oswald Spengler

Der Untergang des Abendlandes

[Volume II.] 1 p 9, marked Z

[Chapter: “Ursprung und Landschaft” (Primal cause and landscape).]

||A lyrical description of the development of a plant.|| The appearance of the first green tips in the ground of winter, the swelling of the buds, the great power of the blooms, the scent, shining, ripening: it is all a desire to fulfill its fate and a continuous longing question to the harvesting. myth 2 p 10, marked Z

Anxiety before the invisible indicates the individuality of human religiosity. […] The “invisible God” is the highest expression of human transcendence. But this may be because he is a substance. 3 p 14, doubly marked

||Why do we think as we do? Spengler asks, and answers:|| Das Blut aber herrscht wirklich, indem es schweigend die Tätigkeit des Denkens beginnen oder enden läßt. Auch ist ein Unterschied zwischen Sprechen und Leben. Das Dasein kann des Wachseins, das Leben des Verstehens entbehren, nicht umgekehrt. Das Denken herrscht, trotz allem, nur im „Reich der Gedanken“.1 If you stick to this you are all right. 1 Blood [race] really dominates, while it quietly allows the activity of thought to begin or to end. Further, there is a distinction between speaking and living. Existence can do without the growth and life of the understanding, not the reverse. Thought dominates, in spite of all, in the “country of thought.”

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4 p 16, underlined

||Reason and understanding compared to ancestor and fulfillment in the plant world.|| Vernunft1 calls ideas into life; the understanding discovers truth; truths are lifeless and allow themselves to be uttered, but ideas belong to the living self of their discoverer and may be shared. [For Vernunft, Santayana wants:]

Imagination. “Reason” is a principle of harmony, not of invention. Criticism has no first principle. 1

Reason.

5 p 18, marked Z

[Santayana criticizes as he summarizes:]

The time it takes for a cause to work is a part of the discovery. It is not a formula, but an event. 6 p 21

||The life of contemplation and the life of action contrasted.|| I think the contemplative man is also natural; but he is less involved in means to ends. 7 p 23, marked Z

||Bird-song and warfare: all part of one great cosmic tactic, irrespective of mankind’s desires.|| A great respect for bang, bang. Stonehenge is impressive because one wonders what the builders felt and imagined, not because they moved stones about. 8 p 29, underlined

Es gibt keine Geschichte an sich.1 N.B. He is talking only of views. 1

There is no history as such.

9 p 30, marked

It is obvious that each man belonging to the Faust-like culture has his own idea of history, and not only one, but numberless notions from adolescence on, views which the experiences of days and years continuously weaken and change. N.B. 10 p 37

Of course there is no reason why types should be adapted more than is barely requisite for survival: and any accident may set them up or kill them off. Only you must not suppose a “destiny” that presides miraculously over events. It is only a perspective a posteriori.

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11 p 55, marked

||With reference to Ranke’s idea of what constitutes history:|| Ohne Zweifel ist hier das, was geschehen ist, mit dem verwechselt, was innerhalb des Blickfeldes der jeweiligen Geschichtsforschung geschehen ist. Daß Mardonios bei Platää geschlagen wurde—hat das aufgehört Geschichte zu sein, wenn 2000 Jahre später ein Gelehrter davon nichts mehr weiß? Ist das Leben nur dann eine Tatsache, wenn in Büchern davon geredet wird?1 N.B. Quote. 1

No doubt that here we have what happened, confusing what happened within the field of vision of momentary historical research. That Mardonius was conquered at Plataea—has that history ceased to be if 2000 years later a scholar no longer knows about it? Is life only then an event if it is spoken about in books? 12 p 56, underlined

||The historian’s certainty about the past occurs|| in einem Augenblick der Erleuchtung […].1 Bad, bad, bad. 1

In a moment of enlightenment ….

13 p 58, underlined

||People are without history when their destiny is fulfilled, the development of their civilization comes to an end,|| die letzten Möglichkeiten eines sinnvollen Daseins erschöpft hat.1 Romantic drama: if not, you are a worm. I think the sweetness of life remains to the worms—say, to the Spaniard. The U.S. are an anthill. 1

The final possibilities of a meaningful existence have been exhausted.

14 p 60

The natural is not romantic 15 p 61

Try Romantic — Conventional for Kultur — Civilization Query: Does he admit that the historical is a part of the biological, apperceived romantically? Or is there a romantic force occasionally at work? Why & when? 16 p 133, marked Z

[Chapter: “Städte und Völker” (Cities and peoples).]

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Race is cosmic and spiritual. Somehow it is periodic and in its essence conditioned by the great astronomical conditions. Languages are causal images; they function through the polarity of their means. N.B. 17 p 243

[Chapter: “Probleme de Arabischen Kultur” (Problems of Arabian culture).]

||Emphasis on the element of magic in the cult of Mithra. The catacombs, the early cult of Jesus.|| Sacraments & doctrines of redemption take the place of propitiatory rites. 18 p 265, marked

||Spengler’s interpretation of “Give unto Caesar what is Caesar’s” is that one suffers, obeys, and does not ask if it is just.|| Very good 19 p 289, underlined

||If one had a vague suspicion of how strange the inner life of Jesus|| uns allen ist1 […]. you all: because you are egotists & worldlings. 1

Is to us all ….

20 p 292, marked

||The distinction in piety between Islam, and the piety of such as Santa Teresa, Luther, or Pascal.|| The Faustian Ur-sacrament of repentance implies a strong and free will that overcomes itself. But “Islam” means exactly the impossibility of an individual as a free power opposed to God’s will. There is really not much difference, since the surrender of the will is only the surrender of folly and illusion. 21 p 293, marked

In reality, Augustine is the last great thinker of early Arabian scholasticism, with no less than a Western outlook. He is a Catholic not a Lutheran nor a Calvinist. 22 p 295fn

||Spengler takes pains to write that he uses the word “good” only as a declared value, [Wertschätzung] not a substance.|| Good is not an arbitrary taste: it is a harmony in the realm of truth.

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23 p 326, underlined and marked

Einen kausalen Zusammenhang innerhalb der Welt als Natur, von dem wir überzeugt sind, daß er durch weiteres Nachdenken unmöglich verändert werden könne, nennen wir Wahrheit. Wahrheiten „stehen fest“ and zwar zeitlos— […].1 N.B. Confusion of objects. The idea is not the connection nor the truth: and it is only the idea that reflexion could modify. 1

To a causal connection within the world of Nature of which we are convinced that further rejection cannot possibly change, we give the name truth. Truths “stand fast” and are in fact timeless— …. 24 p 334, marked

||Praise for Francis of Assisi and Bernard of Clairvaux.|| You are very good for a barbarian. 25 p 337, marked Z

One can only love something of lasting purpose in which one believes. Love assumes belief in an established world-order. Why this fancy? What does he mean by “love”? Possession? Love in a cottage? 26 p 355, underlined

Marienmythus und Teufelsmythus haben sich zusammen ausgebildet und keiner ist ohne den andern möglich.1 Not true. Cf. Spain at present. 1

The myth of the virgin birth and the myth of the devil have been imagined simultaneously, and neither is possible without the other. 27 p 356, marked

Together with the hymns glowing with love to Mary, the dense smoke of innumerable funeral fires arises. Close to the Cathedrals stand the wheel and the gallows. In those times everyone lived in the awareness of terrible danger, not from the hangman, but of hell itself. Thousands of witches were convinced of its reality. They themselves attested through their confessions, out of purest love of truth, to their nightly travels and pacts with the devil. In tears, the Inquisitors out of sympathy hanged them in order to save their souls. Overdrawn but well-grounded. 28 p 378, marked Z

||Buddha, Confucius, and Rousseau were philistines; impossible to ignore the pedantry of the Socratic way of life.||

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Not Philister [philistines] but tame animals. Only you don’t see the humour and the poetry of it. 29 p 385, underlined

The Buddhist teachings about experience, in theory and practise aus Weltmüdigkeit und intellektuellem Ekel hervorgegangen […].1 No greater than any honest man feels in any age—say Homer or Shakespeare. 1

Resulted from world-weariness and intellectual disgust ….

30 p 396

||On the persistence of ancient “wisdom” and dubious beliefs.|| Why shouldn’t human nature remain faithful to the truths it has once discovered. 31 p 408, marked

||On the importance of breeding.|| Women out of the depths delude themselves that a few years in the respectable world are possible, but they sink back down all the faster. Mankind changes itself with difficulty, because men are weak. The proletariat wants to become aristocratic; the aristocrat completely proletarian. How German! 32 p 409

[Santayana’s summary:]

Kultur is intentional breeding. 33 p 448, marked Z

Plant life exists only in relation to animal life; the two elements condition each other in opposition. Similarly, a people exists only in relation to another people, and this reality occurs naturally and inevitably, in attack and defence, enmity and warfare. This is a good example of twaddle inspired by wickedness. 34 p 451

Right & law not distinguished. Right would be what was for the natural advantage of all concerned, if this harmony could be established. The circumstances will determine the best type of harmony to establish: i.e. that which involves the least mutilation all ’round. 35 p 455

||The nobility will operate the State for its own benefit.|| Quite different is the disparity between the theory of the State and the idea of the residual positions,

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which collectively stand apart from the State as such, ||and consider that the efforts of the state should be directed to social benefit.|| This is why liberals are essentially traitors. 36 p 456, marked

N.B. ideals are sometimes prophetic of what facts are pregnant with. 37 p 525, marked

||The failure of the innumerable current revolutions.|| Yes: everything is destruction except the mechanical complication of life. 38 p 526

||Since the time of the Napoleonic wars, entire populations, through conscription, are subject to active warfare.|| This will be a suicidal policy, because no one will know if his army will fight or go home. 39 p 540

||On the historical necessity for the traditions of the monarchy and the aristocracy to lead society.|| But it seems to be the Fascisti, not the Junkers! 40 p 550, underlined

||Means, not measures are essential, men who represent the inmost possibility of their race, and who possess the ambition to lead|| an die Spitze der Ereignisse1 […]. This comparative and invidious ambition is unworthy of a free being. 1

To the heights of events.

41 p 552

In the U.S. there is only self-trust, no consecutive loyalty. There is team-work, but no policy. 42 p 552, underlined

||The man of action is in no danger of setting in motion the politics of feelings and programs.|| Er glaubt nicht an die großen Worte. Er hat die Frage des Pilatus beständig auf den Lippen. Wahrheiten—der geborne Staatsmann steht jenseits von wahr und falsch.1

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? “Theories”. [for “Wahrheiten”] They are not needed for action, but the implicit assumptions of action, if it is to be successful, must be true. 1

He does not believe in big words. He has Pilate’s question continually on his lips. Truth—the born statesman stands beyond true and false. 43 p 553

Gladstone was “conscientious” in the bad sense—guided by emotional formulas. 44 p 556, underlined and marked

||Without a Caesar, or in Germany a leader on the order of Moltke, events are subject to the idiosyncrasies of|| eine Sammlung von Köpfen,1 […]. And heads full of hobbies & notions. Consider the rot that German ambassadors and ministers talked during the war—and since. 1

A collection of heads.

45 p 557, marked

||The outbreak of revolution indicates the lack of political insight on the part of the ruling party and the opposition.|| Consider Lloyd George and Ireland. 46 p 561, top

Important passage on parties. [Marked.]

||On the power of factions, on changes in politcal forms:|| A party is not a natural growth, but a collection of heads opposed to a tradition contrary to their instinct. The parties are the deadly enemies of those who oppose their opportunistic positions. The conception of the party is always joined to an absolute denying, unravelling, social levelling, bound up with the idea of equality. It is not worthy ideals that are recognized, but professional interests. N.B. It is a pity that the better sort in England are divided into parties. They ought to be one force. 47 p 565

||The end of democracies and their usurpation by Caesarism.|| Political parties yield to leaders with a personal following. 48 p 570

||In a democracy lacking as champion a true “Herrennatur,”1 demagogy must result.||

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Yes: but you forget natural democracies, like that of America, where there are certainly no Herrennaturen. 1

One fitted by nature and breeding to lead.

49 p 571, underlined

||Measures for governance that are merely rationalized and|| nicht auf Grund einer tiefen Kenntnis der Menschen und Dinge, sondern abstrakter Vorstellungen von Recht und Gerechtigkeit1 ||depart from realities and from the necessities of the particular people.2|| Cf. such a silly and nugatory measures as votes for women. 1

Not established on the basis of a profound understanding of mankind and its conditions, but on abstract legalistic ideas of justice. 2 Volk. 50 p 580

In preparation for the World War, the press of entire countries was placed under the financial command of London and Paris; thus the subject peoples entered into a form of intellectual slavery. Not in Spain. 51 p 589

||Madness tends to rule in history.|| The story of anything (say of an illness) can’t be reduced to mechanisms unless we know the elements and in large human affairs the elements can’t be counted. 52 p 591

[Santayana’s paraphrase:]

There is art and jollity in healthy labour.1 1

Consult the Nazis’ “Arbeit macht frei.”

53 p 615

||Early German capital was responsible for the discovery of the two Americas.|| Columbus is a German. 54 p 633fn, underlined

||The dictatorship of money in modern industrialism, owing to|| Dies gewaltige Ringen einer sehr kleinen Zahl stahlharter Rassemenschen von ungeheurem Verstand, […].1 Bosh: I know Jack Morgan & old Rockefeller: they are ridiculous. 1 These powerful circles of a very small number of iron-hard [Rassemenschen] men of quality [or racially pure leaders ] of powerful intelligence ….

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Benedict Spinoza

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Benedicti de Spinoza opera, quotquot reperta sunt Ethica: Ordine geometrico demonstrato

Edited by J. van Vloten and J. P. N. Land Volume I. The Hague: 1882. Waterloo. Twenty-six marginalia. [Translation based on that of R. H. M. Elwes, The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza. London: 1919.] 1 p 42

[Part I, “Of God,” Proposition VII.]

That thing is called free, which exists by the nature of its own nature alone. Axiom: If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence. This is a physical, not a logical proof. The radical facts must be the ground of the universe. 2 p 77

[Ethics, Part II, “On the Origin of the Mind,” Axiom III.]

Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, and the like. But the idea can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking. Idea here is a particular sort of pensée having an external object. 3 p 78

[Proposition I, Note.]

This proposition is also evident from the fact that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection. Therefore a being which can think an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As from the consideration of thought alone we conceive an infinite being, is necessarily one of the infinite attributes of God, as we wished to demonstrate. The “hideous hypothesis”. 4 p 81, marked Z

[Proposition VII, Note.]

A circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes. This seems to place the identical substance in diverse places & times, since God does not think the circle where the material circle is. If the circle thinks it surely does not

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think of a circle. [ No: but it feels what it is to be a circle, which is the true knowledge of the circle, in S.’s sense.] [In Santayana’s early, minute hand, as are most of these marginalia.] 5 p 99

[Proposition XXIV, Proof.]

The parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation. The psyche or organism (not the parts of the latter) is the organ of mind: i.e. the essence of the body is functional. 6 p 101, underlined and marked

[Proposition XXVI, Proof.]

Cum Mens humana per ideas affectionum sui Corporis corpora externa contemplatur, eandem tum imaginari dicimus; […].1 This requires development. 1 If the human body in no way is affected by a given external body, then neither is the idea of the human body ….

7 p 101

But in so far as the human body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far it perceives that external body. Our The knowledge (i.e. imagination & belief) of things is utterly other than the mental phase of those things. 8 p 105

[Proposition XXXV, Note.]

This seems to assume that when ideas are adequate (or normal) they present the essences of their objects as well as of their ideates. Ideates and objects then become identical. Benedict Spinoza

Benedicti de Spinoza opera, quotquot reperta sunt Tractatus Politici Fifty-two marginalia.

1 p 282, top

Politics science, not preaching and the more useful for that reason.

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2 p 282

[Chapter I, para. III.]

Et sane mihi plane persuadeo, experientiam omnia Civitatum genera, quæ concipi possunt, ut homines concorditer vivant, […]. [Santayana translates and summarizes:]

Everything has been tried. [ N.B. Concord & control the objects] 3 p 282, underlined and marked

[Chapter I, para. IV.]

Cum igitur animum ad Politicam applicuerim, nihil quod novum vel inauditum est, sed tantum ea, quæ cum praxi optime conveniunt, certa et indubitata ratione demonstrare, […].1 1

When therefore I apply my mind to politics, I have resolved to indicate by a certain and indubitable process, or to deduce from human nature, not what is new and unheard of, but only such as concord with human nature. 4 p 283, top

Somewhat petty view of human nature. Dutch-Jewish. Reason utopian. (rather logic) [Santayana’s paraphrase:]

It is human to pity suffering & to envy[? almost illegible] prosperity. More inclined to vengeance than to mercy. Intolerant of differences and satisfaction in victory rather than in profit. Golden rule futile. [ S. himself moralizes here. Would it work if people pleaded other people’s suits.] Contracts vain. [ Does S. mean that governments aim only to remain in office?] 5 p 284, underlined

||Because in all communities men form some manner of civic government,|| ideo imperii causas, et fundamenta naturalia, non ex Rationis documentis petenda, sed ex hominum communi natura seu conditione deducenda sunt, quod in sequenti capite facere constitui.1 Human nature & circumstances determine everything. 1

… we must not look to proofs of reason for the causes and natural bases of government, but derive them from the general nature or position of mankind, as will be seen in the sequel. 6 p 284, marked

[Chapter II, para. II.]

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Res quæcunque naturalis potest adæquate concipi, sive existat sive non existat; ut igitur rerum naturalium existendi principium, sic earum in existendo perseverantia ex earum definitione non potest concludi.1 Essence 1

Any natural thing can be just as well conceived, whether it exists or does not exist. As the beginning of existence of natural things cannot be inferred from their definition, so neither can their continuing to exist. 7 p 284

[Santayana’s summary of the remainder of para. II and para. III.]

All things are natural. Might [ ie. capacity to exist] is right. [ Note equivocal use of “right”.] 8 p 285, top

Carrière ouverte aux

{

possibilités, pouvoirs, puissances.1

1

Career open to (possibilities, powers, might).

9 p 286, marked

[Chapter II, para. VI.]

||On the power of man to sin or not to sin, to stand or to fall.|| At dicunt, eum a Diabolo deceptum fuisse. Verum quis ille fuit, qui ipsum Diabolum decepit? quis, inquam, ipsum omnium creaturarum intelligentium præstantissimum adeo amentem reddidit, ut Deo major esse voluerit?1 Egotism, madness or S. Pre-romantic. 1 But they say that he was deceived by the devil. Who then was it that deceived the devil himself? Who was so maddened a being that excelled all other created intelligences that he wanted to be greater than God?

10 p 287

[Santayana’s glosses from here to p. 291:]

Nature forbids nothing but the impossible. 11 p 288

Harmony of interest establishes a common light. 12 p 289

The best man is the worst enemy. Natural rights verbal only. Convention establishes private rights, and has the right against rebels that go beyond the rights allowed them.

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13 p 290

Natural right = anarchy. 14 p 291

Justice conventional If society is rational, irrationality becomes wrong. It is not “wrong” in the jungle. 15 p 291, marked

[Chapter II, para XXIII.]

Ut itaque peccatum et obsequium stricte sumptum, sic etiam justitia et injustitia non nisi in Imperio possunt concipi.1 1

As, then, wrong-doing and obedience, in their strict sense, so also justice and injustice cannot be conceived of except under government. 16 p 293

[Santayana’s gloss:]

Liberty is the abdication of the state in favour of the individual. This cannot happen except as the state disappears. 17 p 294

[Chapter III, para. VI.]

||Reason teaches nothing contrary to nature.|| Adde, quod Ratio omnino docet pacem quærere, quæ quidem obtineri nequit, nisi communia Civitatis jura inviolata serventur; […].1 The “free” man perfectly obedient. Cf. Hobbes. 1

In addition, reason altogether teaches us to seek peace, and peace cannot be maintained, unless the general laws remain unbroken …. 18 p 294–95

[Chapter III, Para. VII.]

Nam Civitatis Jus potentia multitudinis, quæ una veluti mente ducitur, determinatur. At hæc animorum unio concipi nulla ratione posset, nisi Civitas id ipsum maxime intendat, quod sana Ratio omnibus hominibus utile esse docet.1 Does this mean that irrational government is not authoritative? 1 The right of the state is determined by the power of the multitude, which is led as though by one mind. But this unity of mind cannot be conceived unless the state pursues the end that sound reason teaches is in all men’s interest.

19 p 295, underlined

||The state cannot force one to repugnant, unnatural acts.|| Atque huc etiam illa referenda sunt, a quibus humana natura ita abhorret, ut ipsa

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omni malo pejora habeat; ut quod homo testem contra se agat, ut se cruciet, ut parentes interficiat suos, ut mortem vitare non conetur, […].1 filios: because a man may often wish to kill his parents, but there are few Medeas. Solution: There is war, both sides being right, between a rebel & a government. 1 And to this category must also be referred such things as are so abhorrent to human nature that it sees them as actually worse than any evil, such as that a man should be witness against himself, or torture himself, or kill his parents, or not try to avoid death, ….

20 p 296

[Gloss and comment:]

Peace and concord the chief end of (commercial) government. Cultus is indifferent (also art, speech, sport, manners) 21 p 302, marked Z

[Chapter V, para. II.]

||That state is best in which laws are kept unbroken.|| Dutch-Jewish shopkeeper! But see §V.1 1 V: That dominion is best where men live in unity. I understand a life to be defined not by the circulation of the blood and other animal qualities, but by reason above all, the true excellence of the life of the mind.

22 p 303, top

Double error: all men are alike all diversity in Sittlichkeit1 is due to government. 1

Morals.

23 p 304, top

The notion that a “libera multitudo” has obvious interests, which it will pursue in unison, implies a special public (like an army) demanding plain objects (such as loot or pay). It does not apply to a democracy divided into classes, sects, & parties. 24 p 304

[Chapter V, para. VII.]

||Approval of Machiavelli’s The Prince, for Spinoza believes that Machiavelli believed in liberty and advised how best to attain it.|| Machiavelli exonerated.

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25 p 304

[Chapter VI, para. I.]

||Since men are led more commonly by passion than reason, the multitude is unified in wishing to be led by a common hope or fear.|| Cf. Hobbes 26 p 305, marked

Reason should be imposed or contrived when not spontaneous. So government should be controlled, not loose or absolute. 27 p 306

[Chapter VI, para. VII.]

||Kings educate their sons so that they may have no reason to fear them.|| Jewish republican calumny. Benedict Spinoza

Benedicti de Spinoza opera, quotquot reperta sunt Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione Thirty-six marginalia.

[There is considerable repetition of the marginalia to the Ethics.] 1p5

||On the folly of worldly possessions.|| The wisdom of Buddha. 2 p 13

[Santayana glosses:]

The mind is a natural product, and the first requirement of right reason is a fund of noble ideas and normal habits. You should start from the R. of E. [Realm of Essence] in understanding existence. 3 p 19

Curious confidence in the existential force of essence. 4 p 22, marked

Nam quoad primam, de qua prius locuti sumus, ubi scilicet res clare concipitur, vidimus, quod si ea res, quae clare concipitur, et etiam ipsius existentia, sit per se aeterna veritas, nihil circa talem rem poterimus fingere; sed si existentia rei conceptae non sit aeterna veritas, tantum est curandum, ut existentia rei cum ejus essentia conferatur, et simul ad ordinem Naturae attendatur.1

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All essence is true! 1 As for the first manner of fiction already discussed, when a thing is clearly conceived, one saw that if the existence of that thing is in itself an eternal truth, fiction can have no bearing upon it. But if it is not an eternal truth, we need only compare that thing to its essence, and to attend to the order of nature.

5 p 23, top

Truth = justified assertion. The Hegelian notion of truth = coherence is implicit here, in spite of Spinoza’s naturalism: because nature for him is too intelligible. 6 p 23

Truth is internal to evidence. It is the definition of essences. 7 p 24, bottom

Truth of essence is the infinite nature of essence. 8 p 27

Porro si quis recte procedat investigando, quae prius sunt investiganda, nulla interrupta concatenatione rerum, […].1 The perfect prig Was never wrong. Twig, twig Twig, twig Was all his song. 1

Thus if one proceeds with investigation in proper order, inquiring first into those things which should first be inquired into, never passing over a link in the chain of association, …. 9 p 28

S. sees in the character of ideas the reason for their occurence [sic]. Benedict Spinoza

Benedicti de Spinoza opera, quotquot reperta sunt Edited by J. van Vloten and J. P. N. Land Volume II. The Hague: 1883. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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Benedict Spinoza

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Benedict von Spinoza’s Ethik

Translated by J. H. von Kirchmann Heidelberg: 1886. Harvard. Twenty-seven marginalia and one drawing. [There is much repetition of the notes to Santayana’s Latin edition.] 1 p 16, marked

||The idea of a triangle must be based in the fact, as well as in its essence.|| N.B. What need there was of a Hume! 2 p 43

||The gods and men together are bound by the same principles.|| This is the essence of religion, as far as it is a creed and not an emotion. 3 p 51

Das Denken ist ein Attribut Gottes, oder Gott ist ein denkendes Wesen.1 The fallacy that the conceivable is actual is with S. raised to an axiom. 1

Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking substance [or essence].

4 p 59, underlined

Das Wesen des Menschen wird durch gewisse Zustände der Attribute Gottes gebildet, nämlich durch die Zustände des Denkens, von denen die Vorstellung, der Natur nach, der erste von allen Zuständen des Denkens ist.1 What sort of philosophising is this? Not unlike that spoken of in the note on final causation. 1 The essence of mankind will in certain circumstances be conceived as an attribute of God, namely through the circumstances of thoughts of which the representation, following nature, is the first of all the circumstances of thought.

5 p 69, underlined

[…] um die gewohnten Ausdrücke beizubehalten, die Erregungen des menschlichen Körpers, deren Vorstellungen uns die äusseren Körper als gegenwärtig darstellen, die Bilder der Dinge nennen, obgleich sie die Gastalten der Dinge nicht wiedergeben; […].1 N.B. Cf. James. 1 … to keep to the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, although they do not recall the figure of things ….

6 p 83, marked

Often the crude expression of a theory is the best.

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7 p 93

In the mind there is no willing; i.e. affirming or denial, except that which an idea, inasmuch as it is a representation of an idea, contains. This is a profound truth not yet comprehended by psychologists. 8 p 102, marked

Unter Affekte verstehe ich die Erregungen des Körpers, durch welche des Körpers Vermögen zu handeln vermehrt oder vermindert, gesteigert oder gehemmt wird, und zugleich die Vorstellungen dieser Erregungen.1 James 1

By emotion I understand the modifications of the body in which the active power of the body is increased or diminished, aided or prevented, and at the same time the ideas of such modifications. 9 p 110

Individual things are modes in which the attributes of God are expressed in a given manner […] no thing contains in itself anything by which it can be destroyed or which can take away its existence. To the contrary, it is opposed to anything that could take away its existence. […] It persists in its own being. There is something of Schopenhaur’s [sic] poetry in this. 10 p 127, marked

[…] Jeder von Natur verlangt, die Andern sollen nach seinem Sinne leben. Wenn dies Alle in gleicher Weise verlangen, so sind sie Alle sich gleich hinderlich; und wenn Alle von Allen gelobt oder geliebt sein wollen, so werden sie einander hassen.1 That is why there is more hatred among the poor than among the rich and independent. 1

… by his nature, each wants others to live according to his particular understanding. If all desire the same order of things, all are then communally let down when disappointed, and if all are praised or loved, they will hate one another. 11 p 127, bottom

In bleeding earth and infinite calm, heaven Alike in beauties to my charmed eyes. 12 p 138

A thing which we conceive as free must be perceived through itself without anything else. If we therefore conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we shall love or hate it, with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from either emotion. But if that which causes the emotion can be thought of as acting from necessity, we then

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conceive it not as the only cause, but as one of the causes of the emotion, and our love or hatred will be less intense. This is the sole foundation of the contention that determinism removes responsibility. Benedict Spinoza

Epistolario Translated by Oscar Cohan Buenos Aires: 1950. Waterloo. Three marginalia.

1 p 164, marked

I believe that the idea of spectres is completely in accord with the ideas that I find in my imagination concerning harpies, griffins, hydras, etc.; I cannot consider them other than as dreams, which differ as much from God as Being from non-Being. N.B. God, matter, existence. Yet if all essence exists, why not centaurs? Septimana Spinozana: Acta conventus oecumenici in memoriam Benedicti de Spinoza diei natalis trecentesimi Hagae comitis habiti Edited by the Spinoza Society The Hague: 1933. Waterloo. 103 marginalia. 1 p 25, marked

[Gebhardt, “Spinoza in unserer Zeit.”]

||The enemy of new, open thought was|| the middle ages and its monarchic-feudal order. More frankly: the enemy was Christendom, Christian society. 2 p 30

[Ravà, “Il pensiero di Spinoza e i problemi dell’ora.”]

||Spinoza is studied and respected by churchmen in Catholic institutions.|| ? 3 p 47, underlined

[Brunschvicg, “Physique et Métaphysique.”]

||On the return to an old metaphysics,|| that which was practised before science et avant la civilisation. Aristotle was a savage. 4 p 56, marked

[Clay, “Physik und Metaphysik.”]

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In those times one still made his [Spinoza’s] well-known difference between thought and ideas about reality and reality itself. Yet this is what idealists repeat. 5 p 63, marked

||Clay quotes Max Planck to the effect that positivism is too confined and confining to be able to elicit the purpose of physical research, which approximates metaphysics ultimately.|| 6 p 77, marked

[G. Bachelard, “Physique et Métaphysique.”]

The euphony of mathematical expression uncovers a singular euphoria in the mathematician’s soul, a euphoria which takes effective part in the genuinely real rationalism of human thought. Yes: but this confirms the playfulness of mathematics. 7 p 81, marked

An electron is only a functionary dependent on the technique of thought. It has no individuality. N.B. 8 p 81, marked

Organic chemistry is really form in quest of matter, it is the renewed formal cause, supplanting the efficient cause, it is the conquering geometric form. N.B. 9 p 112

[In Santayana’s own contribution, “Ultimate Religion,” he corrects “chose” to “choose”.] 10 p 127–28

[S. Alexander, “Spinoza and the Philosophy of Religion.”]

It is clear that pantheism is the only philosophy whose God can be the object of such a passion. Only a pantheistic God can replace for the philosopher the prescribed beings which theistic religions adore. You forget Platonism. 11 p 216, underlined

[Rivaud, “Quelques remarques sur la notion d’essence.”]

Or, déjà pour Descartes, un mode n’a son essence que dans la substance dont il est le mode […].1 [At “essence”:] cause 1 Now for Descartes, a mode possesses essence only in the substance of which it is the mode ….

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12 p 217, marked

[…] les possibles eux-mêmes, ou les essences, n’ont leur être que par l’entremise de la puissance divine qui crée, à la fois, ex nihilo, les possibles et les existences […].1 God couldn’t have existed without thinking: he wouldn’t think without thinking something, without essences. He no more created these than he created himself. 1

… possibilities themselves, or essences, have their being only through the mediation of the divine power which creates, at the same time out of nothing, the possibilities of existences …. 13 p 221, underlined

L’essence d’un esprit est susceptible de comporter un conscience, […].1 ! 1

The essence of a spirit is susceptible to comprising a consciousness, ….

14 pp 221–22

It is of slight importance that consciousness, to Descartes, is no more than an essential determination of the thinking being. Really! How can thinking not be essential to thinking? 15 p 235, marked

[Töennies, “Hobbes und Spinoza.”]

||On the perception of bodies when the bodily object is no longer there:|| such bodies are only perceived as though in no particular moment they seem to have been perceived. Certainly: this shows the intervention of tropes and the non-instantaneous nature of physical time and of psychic existence. The transcendental unity of spirit is not in time: it is dateless: though you might date its initiation, the point in physical change where the existence of a perceiving spirit is first involved. But the spirit need not occupy that point. 16 p 248, marked

[Ebbinghaus, “Spinozas Attributenlehre.”]

||On the difficulties involved in God’s conception of specific objects and of extension as well. It is necessary to confront the problem, because|| according to Spinoza a final intelligence is no other than an Idea (in divine understanding); but such an Idea as cognition in its unity may be determined absolutely through anything other than through the unity of its objects, insofar as it thus has reference.

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I. e. God thinks everything once, and each thought can be the thought of only one object—yet why shouldn’t this object be more complex? It is also complex: but we happen to be the thought of what we happen to think. Some one must have been just me. 17 pp 288–89, marked

[Polak, “Spinoza und Kant.”]

Der höchste, letzte Massstab von Wahr und Falsch kann nicht trügen, ist grundsätzlich und notwendig (nicht etwas bloss tatsächlich für bezweifelbaren Glauben) unfehlbar, weil Fehlen nur vor einem höheren Massstab bestände, somit der letzte nicht der letzte wäre.1 This is Spinoza but not Kant: it is the very essence of non-relativity. Turn it, and it becomes pragmatism or the denial of the very idea of truth. 1 The highest and final measure of truth and falsehood cannot deceive, if fundamental and necessary (not something only real for undoubted beliefs), unfailing, because failures exist only according to a higher standard, hence the ultimate would not be the ultimate.

18 p 293, marked

||On Spinoza’s distinctions between lust and joy, between the common and the noble, the slavish lustling and the wise.|| Yes: but this is the Jewish-Dutch prejudice of Spinoza, not his philosophic insight. The prejudice not only makes him safely good, but also spiritually blind—say to Platonism. Henry Powell Spring

Challenge to Think Winter Park, Florida: 1943. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Henry Powell Spring

Essays on Human Science Winter Park, Florida: 1943. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Joseph Stalin

Questioni del Leninismo Translated by Palmiro Togliatti Two volumes. Rome: 1945. Waterloo. 174 marginalia.

[These volumes had obvious influence on several of Santayana’s ideas as he prepared Dominations and Powers for publication.]

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[Volume I.] 1 p 22, marked

||Lenin’s idea that instead of waiting for the proletariat to be educated to the necessity for taking power, better to take power, then carry on through cadres the necessary education.|| Compare the feebleness of Labour leaders & “cultured” American officials with the efficacy of the rough Americans and of the Russians. 2 p 47, marked

Soviet power resides in the unification and integration of the various states in a single organization, in a proletarian state organization as the avant-guard of the exploited and oppressed masses and as the dominant classes, and their unification in the Soviet Republic. A soviet republic is ruled by the leaders of the militant poor. It is an anti-biological order. The Catholic Church is a Soviet Republic! Only it is not concerned with the material interests of the poor, but with their “opium”: parasitical & idealistic. 3 p 63

This shows how only the material interests of mankind, food, health and small comforts, are valued by communists: as if nationality did not determine a special “culture”. 4 p 64, underlined

Così si presenta la questione dei movimenti nazionali singoli e dell’eventuale carattere reazionario di questi movimenti se, naturalmente, non si considerano questi movimenti da un punto di vista formale, dal punto di vista dei diritti astratti, ma concretamente, dal punto di vista degl’interessi del movimento rivoluzionario.1 “Reactionary” in this system means ideal. In practice, however communism may be itself an ideal of the Franciscan sort. 1 Thus the question of national movements, individual and reactionary in character if, naturally, these movements are not considered from the point of view of abstract rights, but concretely, from the point of view of the interests of the revolutionary movement.

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5 p 67

Does not foresee the murderous rivalry of races for the earth. It was primitive and will come if other structures do not enlist the masses. 6 p 68

Are these “republics” [of the Soviet Union] really free nations? 7 p 68

||Stalin quotes Nicholas II’s idea of the fusion of small states into the greater entity of the empire.|| Fusion, moral fusion, is precisely what is to be avoided. 8 p 81

You change your tactics never your aim. Not the liberal (aimless) practice of compromising in respect to the aim. 9 p 85, marked

The revolutionary party can be the dominant power after the proletarian revolution. The ruling class, without a revolutionary party, is an army without a leader. The party is the leader of the state delegated by the proletariat. This may be the root of a real ruling class for the whole world, like the Roman army. (or Curia) 10 p 86

The army must have a people to feed it, the curia a flock. The universal government shall be backed by the whole commercial class of the world, i.e. by all material interests coordinated. It must not rely on any non-material interest not recognisable by everybody. 11 p 92

||With the disappearance of social classes, the dictatorship of the proletariat would also disappear.|| Then there would be no government? 12 p 93, marked

||The end of divisions in the party is indispensable; the necessity of discipline.|| This allegiance to a decision once arrived at legally makes the force of Anglo-American governments. But the aim here is only temporary and the authority relative.

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13 p 95

La via dello sviluppo e del consolidamento dei partiti proletari passa attraverso la loro epurazione dagli opportunisti e dai riformisti, dai social-imperialisti e dai social-sciovinisti, dai social-patrioti e dai social-pacifisti. Il partito si rafforza epurandosi dagli elementi opportunisti.1 Distinction from Fascists Nazis and pacifist socialists. 1

The route to development and consolidation of proletarian parties necessitates their purifying themselves of opportunists and reformers, of social imperialists and social chauvinists, of social patriots and social pacifists. The party strengthens itself by purification of opportunistic elements. 14 p 97, bottom

||On the practical American spirit, and revolutionary maneuverings.|| It would be easy to unify these two virtues if the Russians became true materialists and the Americans true “pragmatists”, giving up their apostolic conceit. 15 p 109, marked

||Lenin on the future of revolutions elsewhere than in Russia.|| Universal conquest anticipated. 16 p 121, top

[ Elimination of peasants ] & its consequences. All working people become militant. Soviets are militant bodies representing the industrial & professional order of production. 17 p 124

||Stalin lists all the reasons why a constituent assembly must fail.|| Query: Will not the UNO have this fate? An empire of Soviet (industrial) republics to be substituted? 18 p 137

Reform is generative

revolution militant.

19 p 145, marked

||The party and the working class in the dictatorship of the proletariat. The avant-guard of the party form the leadership of the party.|| The leaders are not an Executive but a determining force, choosing the direction to be taken. [ How are the leaders selected?]

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These are now dictated by politicians but need they be so in a settled community? 20 p 151

||Further details about the dictatorship of the proletariat.|| This is nothing more than to say that government requires a substance, a people to work upon. It does not share the government with them, but shares the political life. 21 p 153, marked

Governs by consent of the proletariat. Violence belongs to the latter in respect to the upper classes. [ N.B. the exact analogy to the government of the church.] 22 p 156

[Santayana summarizes his reflections on Stalin’s chapter concerning the workings of “proletarian” government.] st

All government requires 1 acquiescence of the people, nd rd 2 possibility of success in its policy [ 3 vitality in its own personel [sic] and spirit] [These are insecure essentially, so that all government is more or less unsuccessful.] Add fidelity in its agents. 23 p 160, top

Criterion for distinguishing free from organized areas: The physical possibility of compulsion succeeding You may impose methods, language, customs. '' '' not '' impulses, tastes, beliefs, affections. 24 p 161

Propaganda first, persecution afterwards. 25 p 165

||Lenin’s ideals for government:|| alle masse senza partito: non osate contraddire, non osate discutere, perchè il partito può tutto, perchè nel nostro paese esiste la dittatura del partito; […].1 Something like this existed in the young Fascists. 1 … to the masses without [not belonging] to the party: do not dare to contradict, do not dare to discuss, because the party is capable of all that, because in our country the dictatorship of the party exists.

26 p 181

N.B. the advantage of forming real common interests instead of common opinions.

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27 p 212, marked

[Chapter on “The International Character of the October Revolution”:]

According to the first stage in the history of humanity, the salaried classes, the persecuted classes, the classes of the oppressed and of the exploited might rise into the dominant classes, earning by its example the loyalty of the proletariat in all countries. The Roman legions used to appoint Emperors. It is true that they didn’t alter the administration or the army. Did the Soviets do so? 28 p 215

||Oppressed peoples were never benefited by bourgeois revolutions. Only the October revolution put an end to that, liberating the oppressed and offering fraternal union to all.|| Why then do you persecute the vast majority of Poles, etc.? 29 p 249

Remarkable passage. Communism depends on impersonal anonymous powers controlling the individual workmen. It is a form of slavery. 30 p 251, top

Contrast the small scale militancy of the trader with the large scale militancy of the law-giver. 31 p 284, top

The “Four Freedoms” literary privileges or material support. The real liberties are of trade, of property, of education, of movement, (person & residence); to which the Left is opposed. 32 p 288

[Santayana paraphrases and reflects:]

Agriculture must be rendered serviceable to industry by the destruction of peasant life. Instead of being its own reward, labour must be the means of carrying on all other labours. For what? For numbers of drudges. 33 p 319, doubly marked

||Problems posed by the necessity for investment in heavy industry cannot be solved by cadres.|| The Soviets aim to breed their own elite. They seem to have done so. 1946.

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34 p 320

This eludes the question of the benefits to the peasants by referring only to the advantage to the harvests to be gathered for the state. The Kulaks perish, the poor peasants become machinists, and the crops go to the engineers, soldiers, and politicians in the cities. It is a town domination. 35 p 335

[At top:]

N.B. Militancy is “reason armed”: it is dangerous & unstable. [Text marked:]

N.B. Property is evil. Ascetic sentiment in materialism. 36 p 345, marked

||On the lot of the peasants unattached to the collective farms.|| Defence of the poor against the rich farmers has become ^ the government. ^ attack—by 37 p 346, underlined and marked

||A quotation from Lenin on the transformation of small holdings and the mentality associated with them.|| Risolvere questo problema rispetto al piccolo agricoltore, risanare, per così dire, tutta la sua mentalità, è cosa che può esser fatta solo da una base materiale, da una tecnica, dall’impiego su vasta scala di trattrici e di macchine nell’agricoltura, dall’elettrificazione su vasta scala.1 Propaganda by material progress. Cf. U.S.A. 1

To resolve the problem posed by small farmers, to cure, so to speak, their entire mentality, can only be accomplished on a material basis, by means of a technique employing on a vast scale the treatment in agriculture by machinery and electrification on that vast extent of country. 38 p 347, top

Militancy sometimes enforces a system without legislating, and sometimes legislates without enforcing. To do both, it needs to enforce first, and legislate afterwards—as nature does in morals, e.g. in regard to marriage. Militancy works best when it initiates growth by creating habits and prejudices.

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Stalin

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Questioni del Leninismo Volume II.

1 p 7, marked

[…] il colcos offre al contadino, al contadino povero e medio, la via per liberarsi dall’indigenze e dalla miseria.1 The point touched at last. 1

… the collective offers to the average poor peasant a way to liberate himself from poverty and misery. 2 p 18, marked

||More on the importance of the collectives.|| N.B. Fixity & purity of the cause, and indifference to the existence of other systems. True militancy. 3 p 29, underlined

Esiste da noi questo partito? Sì, esiste. È giusta la sua politica? Sì, è giusta, perchè riscuote seri successi.1 It is “just”, i.e. fit, because it works. 1 Does our party exist? Yes, it exists. Is its politics just? Yes, it is just, because it achieves success.

4 p 33, marked

We are behind advanced countries by 150 years. We have to cover that distance in ten years. Either we shall do it, or we shall be crushed. Tragic cry that inspires sympathy. 5 p 33, marked

||Lenin’s impassioned expression of why the Soviets deserve the support of the working class world-wide: because the Soviets were the first to liberate the working class in actual battle against oppression. They will gain that wide support, not dishonor.|| Great passage. 6 p 39

Communism admits diverse salaries for skilled and unskilled labour. 7 p 40

||High salaries should not motivate workers, but knowledge of participation in the common good.|| Love of the subject & desire to do good not sufficient motives: there must be money in it. This is the failure of

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communism in the world. It can subsist only in the cloister or in the fine arts. 8 p 224, top

Does life impose inevitable crimes? 9 p 224, marked

||On the necessity of the Stakhanovite system in Soviet industry.|| “Ruthless” ambition, dangerous, cruel, but efficacious and rational in principle, tho’ hardly to be justified in practice since it may miss the victory that might cover its crimes. 10 p 230, top

N.B. Motto for vacant liberty 11 p 230, marked

Se il pane non basta, se la carne e i grassi non bastano, se non bastano i manufatti, se le abitazioni sono cattive, con la sola libertà non si fa molta strada. È molto difficile, compagni, vivere di sola libertà.1 1

If there’s not enough bread or meat or oil, not enough manufactured goods, if your houses are wretched, liberty alone is not worth much. It is very hard, brothers, to live only on empty liberty. 12 p 271, marked

||The dialectic of Marx and Engels is not identical with Hegel’s.|| Marx and Engels took from Hegel only his nucleus of rationality, ridding themselves of Hegelian courtesy and developing a dialectic consistent with modern scientific thought. Not dialectic 13 p 272, marked Z

||The dialectical method follows the method of nature in which phenomena are constantly in motion and transformation; the development in nature and the development in method are natural, and display contradictions as does nature.|| Variation in things is not dialectical: it may be sometimes expressed dialectically, by playing with opposite terms applied to real mutations. 14 pp 272–73

Contrary to metaphysics, dialectic does not consider nature as a casual mass of objects, static phenomena, isolated and independent from one another, but as a completely concrete unit, in which objects, phenomena, are organically related, each dependent upon the conditions of the others.

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? By material deviation or by dialectical play of qualities? Historical connections unite these two bonds: events [one or two words illegible] one another materially; they are reviewed and dramatised by their moral relevance to some chosen interest. Hence the Hegelian sophistry or myth. 15 p 274

||Engels quoted to the repeated fact that nature is dialectical, not metaphysical.|| [At “dialettico”:]

verbal, not natural [ Engels is refuting Aristotle: but confusing Hegel with Darwin.] 16 p 277

||Current methods in historiography are an accumulation of absurd errors.|| Moral errors: misreadings of moral progress. The choice of a goal is presupposed in this sort of partisan history. Join the winners. This is the soul of “dialectic”. 17 p 278, underlined

Così si presenta il metodo dialettico marxista, nella sua applicazione alla vita sociale, alla storia della società.1 Pure sophistry. 1 Thus is the Marxist dialectical method in its application to social life, and to social history.

18 p 282, top

Le fer aurait déjà tranché ma destinée, Mais je laissais gémir la vertu soupçonnée. J’ai voulu, devant vous exposant mes remords Par un chemin plus lent descendre chez les morts …1 1 The sword will already have severed the thread of my destiny / But I allowed my suspected virtue to groan. / Exposing before you my remorse, I wanted / To descend to the grave by a slower route. [Phèdre’s death speech from Racine’s Phèdre.]

19 p 282

||Socialism, become a science, will offer a finer future to humanity at large.|| Science the guide,—If you know where you want to go. It might guide you to kill yourself.

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But the decisive physical growths for society are in the psyche not in the outer world. e.g. sex, involving social cohesion of the generative order. 20 p 320

||Stalin boasts the superiority of the Soviet industrial system.|| The Russian people are still poor. And it is not intended to keep them simple. They are to be flooded with bourgeois trash. 21 p 335

||The threat posed by capitalist espionage.|| What can spies discover that would pain you? 22 p 354

[Santayana’s gloss:]

Intensify the sectarian spirit of the party. Carleton W. Stanley

Roots of the Tree London: 1936. Waterloo. Two marginalia.

1 p 42

It is not […] an accident nor even an original thing, in Aristotle to conceive of Nature as having an ascending scale, and of creatures adapting themselves to their environment […]. In biology he seems to have come pretty close to Lamarck’s Theory of Use and Disuse. Do you mean that Aristotle accepted the evolution of species? Harold Stearns

Liberalism in America New York: 1919. Georgetown. No marginalia.

Laurence Sterne

The Novels of Laurence Sterne London: 1926[?]. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Robert Louis Stevenson

The Ebb-Tide: A Trio and Quartette London: 1894. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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Trumbull Stickney

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Les Sentences dans la poésie grecque: d’Homère à Euripide Paris: 1903. Georgetown. No marginalia.

Christopher Stone

Eton London: 1909. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Giles Lytton Strachey

Portraits in Miniature, and Other Essays London: 1931. Waterloo. Four marginalia.

1 pp 174–75

||Macaulay’s optimism; his description of Torquay:|| “The inhabitants are about ten thousand in number. The newly-built churches and chapels, the baths and libraries, the hotels and public gardens, the infirmary and the museum, the white streets, rising terrace above terrace, […] present a spectacle widely different from any that in the seventeenth century England could show.” Ah, why wasn’t Mac an American? 2 p 189, marked

Frederick was in reality a knave of genius, a sceptical, eighteenth-century gambler with a strong will and a turn for organization; and this was the creature whom Carlyle converted into an Ideal Man, a God-like Hero, […]. Charles Augustus Strong

“L’Être et le devenir: Thèse de philosophie naturelle.” in Recherches philosophiques Paris: 1934[?]. Waterloo. Seventeen marginalia.

1 p 37

All duration contains more than one present; it must consist of at least two presents which are not real at the same time. Here the dogmatism becomes subjective: all presents are real always.

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2 p 37

The whole universe is contained in, or exists at, each instant. The instant is not empty, far from there, and it may very well contain the universe, for it must do so since the universe exists in time, which consists in presents. Potentiality introduced. Is it a name for fertility or for pregnancy? 3 p 42, marked Z

[Santayana’s criticism:]

Distance between occupied points belongs to their history & relations: it is not an absolute distance in a prior void. 4 p 49, marked

||Strong quotes Bergson in defining sensation as a contraction of an inconceivably large number of small beings.|| Let us say then that what occupies a point in an instant is a miniscule sensation-force. Or rather this is the nature of ultimate beings, or their nature is unknowable. Or the word being [être] in this sense, to which I do not know how to attach a positive meaning. For, as we have seen, I can conceive of force only through its effects. This is well put: but it regards physical knowledge as still gained by intuition, and not by action positing the object and describing it in dynamic terms. Charles Augustus Strong

Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind

London: n.d. Texas. 358 marginalia, one drawing. [The drawing is reproduced on p. 300 of McCormick, George Santayana.] 1 p 4, underlined

[Introduction.]

A being who had no faculty but sense-perception could never suspect the existence of such things as feelings. Except that feeling which sense perception is. ^ ^ 2p5

The structure of the nervous system must supply the ground-plan of the mind, its functions must furnish the key to the mind’s activities. It is impossible to understand the mind aright by contemplating it from within. Platonism again barred: but not explicitly. S. never thinks of that possibility.

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3 p 7, marked Z

Knowledge of the external or of the past will depend on the assumption that things appear to some extent as they really are. Knowledge not defined. 4 p 13

||Awareness is not a possible datum of observation.|| This is not exactly the case in regard to spirit. This, too, can’t be the dynamic object of my perception but may be its intended ontological object or “eject”. 5 p 14, underlined

If feelings, in themselves considered, are “blind, windowless, ignorant”, that is to say, non-cognitive, then a feeling is not known to us, or an object before the self, at the moment of its existence; it is a mere component in the self. non sequitur. A thing is not unknown simply because it does not know. 6 p 15, underlined

Though James denied consciousness or awareness to be a datum of experience, he did not of course deny that we have experience of anything psychical, for feelings are obvious data. [Santayana draws a line between his underlining on the previous page and on this one, writing:]

contradiction 7 p 15, underlined

[ James] fails to recognise that in perception we are aware only of physi-

cal things, yet that sensations then exist without our being aware of them […]. Intolerable paradox. The sensory excitement is that of which, in feeling, we are aware though not by intuiting its essence, but by intuiting an emotional essence which is the sign of it^for us. The ^ sensory excitement is the object causing the feeling revealed by it, though the feeling does not resemble it. 8 p 17, underlined

The apparent thing is the real thing as the senses assert it to be. Good Aristotelean phrase.

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9 p 26

“‘A motion became a feeling,’” says William James: “no phrase that our lips can frame is so devoid of apprehensible meaning.” But if a motion, in itself considered, is a feeling? Do you mean this, or rather that that which moves is a feeling, or a multitude of feelings? A motion may produce a feeling: and as the motion is a trope, with no unity save in the realm of truth, the feeling which hypostatises it in the realm of spirit might be said to be the integrated reality of that motion. Some sense might then be given to the phrase “a motion is a feeling”. But it is nonsense as you mean it. 10 p 31

[“The Genesis of Sense-Data.”]

Holt has argued that the simplicity of sensible qualities is in a certain sense illusory, and due to the suppression of a multitude of minute parts—to “condensation” or “fusion”. Contraction and fusion are clearly the same process; perhaps the most generally applicable and readily intelligible name for it will be simplification. This presupposes a sort of new realism or objective idealism which regards the material many and the specious one as on the same plane of phenomena. But only the result is phenomenal. Projection & simplification are therefore both impossible & uncalled for. 11 p 38

In aesthetic enjoyment what enthralls us is the character of our states of sentience—quite literally, we enjoy ourselves. Does excitement excite, or does not rather the music excite until the enthusiasm overwhelms it in consciousness? 12 pp 46–47, underlined

[On distance and magnitude:]

[…] an object near at hand, such as a house, may appear many times the size of the body, and therefore many times the size of the sensations by means of which it is seen. Monstrous this use of words. The only thing that can have size is a body, i.e. an existing figure.

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13 pp 48–49, underlined

When I notice that the landscape is framed in by the window, and the window in turn by the rim of my glasses, I am observing that the window-sensation given essence regarded as existing is larger than ^ ^ than either. the landscape-sensation and that the rim-sensation is larger [At top:]

Two English axioms unconsciously accepted by S. 1. The given exists, and nothing else can exist. 2. The mind is the given inside the body. 14 p 53, underlined and marked

Only by assuming states of sentience, with characters which may account for the nervous processes as well as for the introspective data, can psychology become explanatory. Isn’t this the method of myth-making? 15 p 61, underlined

If it costs us an effort to believe that characters so unquestionably experienced and to the senses so real as distance and magnitude can be fictitious, we should remember that vision is a function that has existed since before there were vertebrates, and that an illusion so necessary to its success in conveying knowledge and guiding action must needs be very deeply ingrained. What a wicked thought! This from you, Oh S.? 16 pp 66–67, underlined and marked X

[“The Genesis of Sense-Data: Sensible Qualities.”]

Assuming it to be undeniable, then, that intuition of wholes without parts is a fact, let us inquire as to the whereabouts of the missing parts, and as to the means by which they have been suppressed or excluded from our awareness. For, though excluded or suppressed, they are evidently in some sense present, ready to be perceived whenever we turn our attention to them. A little Aristotle would have saved S. from many blunders. The parts are potential; they have never been actual. 17 p 67

Our thoughts will be more definite if we consider a concrete example. And, since most objects—a printed word, for instance, or a face—have meanings, which it is desirable to exclude because they would complicate the problem, let the object be an aesthetic one, which, holds our attention by its mere sensible quality and form: say, a rose. [Santayana encircles the text, then writes:]

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This is an author’s note which should have been “suppressed”. 18 p 76

If we were as quick in our movements as swallows or humming-birds, we might be correspondingly quick in our acts of apprehension, […]. I would you were a humming bird And darted like the swallow, And I should find your winged word Much easier to follow. 19 pp 88–89, underlined

[…] when I hear a melody, my self must have passed be passing ^ ^ through a sequence of different states. Intuition cannot be based on passed intuitions, but on their persistent and co-existent causes. 20 p 90, underlined

[“On the Relation of the Apparent to the Real.”]

The essential principle of neo-realism is the identity of the real thing with the apparent thing. This identity is necessary to the possibility of knowledge: for, unless in perception the real thing appears, no inference from what appears can justify our belief in a real thing; from what other source indeed than perception could our knowledge of it be derived? The real thing must be the object, and the given essence must symbolise it: i.e. must express at least, by its practical signification, some of the facts about the object: though not at all its internal essence. 21 p 92

2. The Three Ingredients of Perception.—Perception, even in the chick, involves three things: intuition, intent, and animal faith. [Footnote 1:]

I make use of the excellent terms chosen by Mr. Santayana, with whose doctrine of perception mine agrees in most respects. I think it important, however, to insist more strongly than he does that intuition is not a separate act, but only an ingredient of the one act of perception; and that the sense-datum, accordingly, while in its nature an “essence”, is in perception always predicated of a real thing, and therefore, in use, a particular. Only thus, it seems to me, is it possible to avoid representationism and vindicate the claim of perception to be direct acquaintance (false or true) with the external thing itself.

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I agree: but perhaps an essence is not “in use” even in perception: and the particular is not the datum but the perception itself with all its material implications. 22 p 96, underlined and marked

The apparent thing as distinct from the real thing is an object which exists only for the critic of knowledge, and which has been brought into existence as a separate entity by his doubt. or hypothetical false ^ belief. It has been brought into existence by cancellation or suspension ^ of the animal faith normally characterising perception. No: because ^ that would reveal the pure datum. ^ It is therefore neither the datum nor the object, but a psychological fiction. 23 p 104, underlined

Nor, again, is the sense-datum that with which we are acquainted, but the object of acquaintance is the real thing given to intent, and with which we become acquainted by predicating the sense-datum of it. I think this is what “acquaintance” is understood to mean: although James may have meant “coming up against a fact”. Experience. 24 p 106, marked

The sense-datum presented, for instance, when I look at a flower is confused with the impression on the self by means of which I see the flower, and the real existence belonging only to the sensation or the object ^ an existent at ^ is attributed to the sense-datum; which thus hardens into once physical and mental. Very good 25 p 116, marked

[…] introspection, instead of appearing to reveal an existent that cannot be in space, will confirm the testimony of perception that the real is spatial. For that the self is in time we are not likely to doubt. Yes. 26 p 118, top

This is a particularly bad page: Strong here is the old-fashioned professor drooling second-hand philosophy in a country college.

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27 p 125, marked Z

||Since we are natural, composed of natural materials,|| we have reason to regard our confidence in knowing as justified. Sobald er reflectiert, ist er ein Kind.1 1

The moment he reflects, he is a child.

28 p 145, underlined

[“The Continuity of Space and Time.”]

||If progress is continual in time why|| has it not strictly no limit? Because—in the case of time—there could then be no single present. Time would consist exclusively of durations, that is, of parts every one of which contains a before and an after, without ever a part which is not thus composite, a part which is real at once. Nothing existent is “real at once”, it is unreal, transitional; and only in the realms of truth & essence can you find that which it is. 29 p 146, top

My nose, my toes, my finger-tips and t’ other ends of me, Must really be just where they end and end just where they be. 30 p 161, underlined

[“The Soul and Its Bodily Presentment.”]

||Strong refers to|| an idea rightly condemned— […] Professor Strong knows right from wrong. 31 p 181

The objects, then, that appear to us in the form of introspective data such as fear, pain, desire, are groups of sensations—not “modes of awareness”. A hint of the view James may have meant to deny: consciousness a substance waiting to be qualified by its objects. 32 p 183, underlined

Introspection, no less than perception, exists primarily for practical purposes. We need to become aware of our states only when they are specially intense, painful, or pleasant, for the purpose of taking the requisite action. Action then happens or ought to happen, in order to avoid pain (not injury to the body), etc. Strong is deep in mythological psychologism.

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33 pp 190–91, underlined

||Strong concludes his chapter with the identity between body and soul.|| The principle of the conservation of energy, so often appealed to as contradicting interaction, is found to ensure it. The assertion, apparently required by the facts, that mind depends on matter gives place to the harmless statement that matter is such only for awareness, and that awareness is a function of the active soul. The animus of the Rochester Seminary. But this conclusion is excellent in itself, not because it turns the tables “pleasantly” on materialism but because it assumes the materiality of the psyche. 34 p 196, marked Z

[“On Images and Thinking.”]

That we should see light when external light acts on the retina and brain is intelligible enough; that, after we have once seen it, the brain should have acquired the power of recreating within itself this special process, is by no means so easy to understand, and ought not to be admitted except upon cogent proofs. ? Strong the innocent. 35 p 212, underlined and marked X

Suppose we hear a musical phrase consisting of four or five successive tones. How can we, when the phrase is completed, have that sense of surveying it as a whole, […] the earlier tones are past and no longer heard, and all that we actually hear is the present tone. S. says he hears what he believes to be the object, which in music is absolutely irrelevant. Only the essences matter, and these are exactly as intuition conveys them. 36 p 213

Hopeless attempt to discover psychological mechanisms. 37 p 216

||On vision as anticipatory:|| The tiger (I confess that I have no tech^ an antelope in the distance cannical knowledge of tigers) who sees ^ not yet seize and crunch it, but must hold these reactions in readiness until the moment of fruition arrives. 38 p 229, marked

Plato was led to his doctrine of ideas largely by Pythagorean considerations; among the entities most prominently in his mind were the geometrical and arithmetical essences, […].

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These were intermediate: it was Socrates who invented Ideas: and these were moral perfections. 39 p 234

[“The One and the Many in Psychology.”]

||On the nature of awareness.|| Awareness, if it is only a relation, cannot change the character of actual feeling: it can only bestow on this feeling (for the third person) a certain value as a sign. Intent within feeling remains undescribed. “Awareness” is cognitive validity: intent is cognitive claim. The first is a question of truth, the second a fact. 40 p 236

[…] James’s recognition that consciousness is not observable and that only the kinaesthetic sensations are so is a most important advance, entailing consequences in psychology and in philosophy the full extent of which will only appear with time. James is innocent of this. Strong is the Messiah. 41 p 237, marked Z

||A newly-hatched chick’s behavior with a grain of corn.|| Strong knows the chick’s consciousness perfectly, as he does James’s. 42 p 244, marked

We could not think of many things at once if our souls were not many— if they did not consist of many simultaneous sensations, or, in other words, consist of as many parts as do the wholes of which we think. What is necessary to our being aware of many things at once is not the absence of parts in us, but co-operation of the parts. Excellent 43 p 257, marked Z

When we hear a bell, its sound is an external quality, and it is not from this that the conception of sentience can be obtained; in simply listening to a bell we are not aware of anything that can be called sentience. ? Not only pure sentience: certainly also some essence: but the impression of that essence, & the void or echo it leaves, are a sort of self-consciousness forming a background for special intuitions. Pure essence is reached by contemplation: it is not given in pure animal sensitivity.

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The latter is self-conscious, tho’ the self is not clearly distinguished from the world. 44 p 264

If […] the peripheral processes should chance to be the sole basis of sensations, the “messages” sent inward to the centres would, from the very outset, be motor messages (in a broad sense)—that is, messages tending to secure the right response; […]. But of course you & Bergson are proposing as a great revolution the simplest ontological axiom: motion is motion, light is light, etc. Consciousness has no seat at all; it has merely a local cause. 45 p 267, marked Z

Whatever be the basis of the sensible qualities—of red, sweet, warm—they are in any case produced by a simplification of elements which do not possess the quality in question. In any case these qualities have no existence in the real world. They exist only as data of awareness, and in the ultimate units there is no awareness. To ask whether these units have a quality seems, therefore, a little like asking what is the colour of an atom or an electron. Strong here slips towards denying his psychologism: but never quite does so. He has asserted that all sentience has the quality common to all sensations. 46 p 268

All the differences of things are due to number; what is not number is all alike. Our philosophy is thus a Pythagoreanism, justifying what is sound in the ideas of Plato. Good God! 47 p 271

“Cats do not lie awake at night and whine over their sins”, as Whitman irreverently says. O yes: if love be a sin. 48 p 285, underlined

||Strong cites William James on the material base of all life, including mental life.|| James winds up with the proposition, “If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present at the very origin of things.” Strong! [Because of Strong’s use of the phrase “winds up with.”]

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49 p 295, underlined

[“A Defence of Mind-Stuff.”]

For, if feelings are distinct from the acts of awareness which, when combined with a suitable reaction, they make possible—if they are existents (and their nature the nature of the existent), whereas the acts in question are only functions—there is no longer any reason why feelings may not exist outside a consciousness or mind. This is nonsense: an act is an event, the temporal and particular exercise of the function. 50 pp 302–3, marked Z

No feeling, at the moment when it exists, is ever aware of itself. Its unawareness of itself does not prevent it from being a feeling—that is, from being what introspection finds, and from having the nature which introspection finds, in the rare cases in which introspective attention is turned upon it. This is realism applied to introspection. That is the essence given in feeling is never the essence of feeling (i.e. of spirit) but the essence of this sort of pain, colour, etc. Where such a given essence is inarticulate it is called “feeling”—so that feeling in this sense is a datum of feeling. But when not a datum it cannot exist: and when it is a datum what really exists is the act of feeling that bears the same name as the datum. Charles Augustus Strong

The Origin of Consciousness London: 1918. Georgetown. No marginalia.

Henry Cecil Sturt

The Idea of a Free Church

London and New York: 1909. Georgetown. Sixty marginalia. 1 p 12, marked

There is not a word in the New Testament to recognize the value of art or literature or philosophy or the sympathetic study of the past or science or education or political enterprise or soldierly valour and honour. To what a mean, spiritless monotony, destitute of every enthusiasm that distinguishes civilised society from a herd of inoffensive human cattle, to what a level of sainted noodledom would Christian exhortation drag us down.

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2 p 13, marked

Worst of all is the Christian attitude to family life. In its original authentic form Christianity was an anti-domestic institution. The Christian family, of which so much is said in edifying books, is, to speak strictly, a contradiction in terms. The Christian community from the first was against the family. Jesus and his apostles were religious mendicants, calling urgently upon men to renounce domestic ties in view of the speedy coming of the Messianic Kingdom. We know how consistently St. Paul held by the anti-domestic tradition. The great saints of Christian history have not been family men and women, but ascetics to whom love and the breeding of children were abomination. 3 p 14, marked Z

||We need charity, but not Christian charity.|| The right sort of charity for ordinary use is that whose nursery is the family and whose main field of exercise is the modern commonwealth. No: the good Samaritan & the Sister of Charity are pitiful for the love of God, which is something good & remedial. 4 p 21, marked Z

||Sturt will argue that|| the welfare of civilized man lies in the principle of freedom, that is, in the proper development of every essential part of human nature under the guidance of the individual judgment. The right ideal of manhood is an ideal that is governed by this principle; right religion is a religion that harmonizes with this principle; a good church is a church that is animated by a free religion and has for its subsidiary aims the promotion of all that appertains to the life of freedom. Individualism, not as a source of sincerity, but as an ideal of diversity. This is not my idea. I would breed men whose ideal would be social, whose spontaneity would be art. 5 p 27, marked

There is no better moral tonic than working shoulder to shoulder with men who insist on your obedience if they are better than you, but are willing to obey if you are better than they. Principle of snobbery & servility! 6 p 27

A nation penetrated by this spirit (however imperfect its form of government) is capable of such enthusiasm as makes it unconquerable. U.S. idealised?

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7 p 43

||The good father is attentive to his wife, industrious, and proud of a fine family of children.|| The author, I hear, is a bachelor. 8 p 48, marked

No one who knows the British workman well and has listened to his familiar talk and swearing can doubt that his ideal is one of strength and efficiency. He does not aspire to be gallant and an object of feminine admiration, or to be thought well-off with a house and land of his own, or to have savoir-faire and use a pocket-handkerchief: he likes to be thought a man who can do and be depended on. 9 p 50, marked Z

||Sturt attacks the unnaturalness of academia, and the notion that the isolated scholar is anything other than an antiquarian. The futility of the third-rate norm.|| Philistia potens1 1

All-powerful philistines.

10 p 57, marked Z

A scheme of life like Goethe’s, all intellectual curiosity and adventure with no enduring affections, always breaks down in the end. How? 11 p 57

What is it that Nietzsche’s Superman is striving for? What will he do with the beautiful blonde strength that he is so proud of? If it is only to behave like a wild beast, the first rational man whom he meets will shoot him. If he cares for nothing, true: but is there nothing but home, sweet home? 12 p 60

||On the moral danger of monarchy and aristocracy.|| The other side of all this is that without a great advantage no one can be truly great: Helen had to suffer for her beauty: but, for that very reason, she was the more beautiful. So with hereditary advantage. 13 p 75, underlined and marked Z

Without religion there is so little meaning in our life in relation to the universe.

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This is a silly cry. Why should we be much “in relation to the universe”? How would that help us?—This feeling is a survival of the time when the universe was an egg-shell for the human chick. 14 p 76, underlined and marked X

We must frame our scheme of life not for the thoughtless but the thoughtful. […] We cannot seriously believe that the resources of science will ever keep us from dying, or from growing old, or make us cease to feel that we are creatures of trifling size compared with the vast spaces around us. What of that, you idiot? 15 pp 82–83, underlined

Oh! the horrible mendicant whine of certain forms of Christianity! Seigneur, ayez pitié de nous: 1 any one who has been importuned by the miserable wasters who haunt the streets of Paris knows what are the moral affinites of that. In London they do not beg so humbly: they grab you. That is what Sturt’s beggars would do. 1

Lord, have mercy on us.

16 p 83

It is the business of human authority to frame and enforce the necessary rules of abstention: religion has a much more important and noble function, to stimulate us to enterprise and aspiration. and make Roosevelts ^ of us. ^ 17 p 90, marked

The politician must believe in his party, or he cannot be an efficient and self-respecting politician. Sophism. It is one thing to join the party in which you believe: another to believe in a party to which at birth you have been joined. 18 p 93, underlined and marked

In periods of decay and despondency, as in the decline of the Roman Empire, we always find right religion declining—the pure radiance of right faith sinking into the smoky flare of superstition. “Right” religion is no religion.

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19 p 109, underlined

We cannot imagine a God who has purpose, but no power to execute the purpose. Why not? 20 p 113, underlined

[…] it is most desirable that we should think of God as having the faculties of intelligent purpose, moral preference and appreciation of beauty. Once he walked in his garden in the cool of the evening. Now, he walks through the National Gallery, with the trans-Atlantic tourist. 21 p 115, underlined

Above all, man must be a source of satisfaction to God. Why? 22 p 121, marked Z

Why did God let the Brahmin think he was singing the hymn, when he was really singing it himself? God is a word, my dear sir: have you not discovered this yet? 23 p 183, marked Z

||The scribes of Jerusalem went to Nazareth to urge the holy family to restrain Jesus.|| The family party, then, came with this object from Nazareth to the lake shore. An eldest son so gifted and sweet-natured as Jesus must have been greatly beloved, almost worshipped, in his home: […]. Is this a cheap novel? 24 p 184, marked Z

As Mary moved away weary and broken-hearted, she must have felt that all hopes of saving her noble and beloved first-born were at an end. Bosh 25 p 285, marked

The Church of England is saturated through and through with the virus of gentility. That a clergyman should be a gentleman is to the average Anglican a fortieth article of religion; and to many minds it is an article that quite outweighs the other thirty-nine. Jesus was the least genteel of prophets, and the Church of England is the most ladylike of churches.

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Luigi Sturzo

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I discorsi politici Rome: 1951. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Leon Z. Surmelian

I Ask You, Ladies and Gentlemen New York: 1945. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Jonathan Swift

Gulliver’s Travels, A Tale of a Tub, Battle of the Books London: 1933. Waterloo. Twenty marginalia.

[All marginalia are to “A Tale of a Tub.”] 1 p 482

[…] all [the Æolists’] belches were received for sacred, the sourer the better, and swallowed with infinite consolation by their meagre devotees. And, to render these yet more complete, because the breath of man’s life is in his nostrils, therefore the choicest, most edifying, and most enlivening belches, were very wisely conveyed through that vehicle, to give them a tincture as they passed. Origin of the American accent. 2 p 484, marked Z

||The oracles of the Æolists are inspired by|| certain subterraneous effluviums of wind, […] these were frequently managed and directed by female officers, whose organs were understood to be better disposed for the admission of those oracular gusts, as entering and passing up through a receptacle of greater capacity, and causing also a pruriency by the way, such as, with due management, hath been refined from carnal into a spiritual ecstasy. Oh, oh! 3 p 495, marked

[“A Digression concerning Madness.”]

For cant and vision are to the ear and the eye, the same that tickling is to the touch. Those entertainments and pleasures we most value in life, are such as dupe and play the wag with the senses. For, if we take an examination of what is generally understood by happiness, as it has respect either to the understanding or the senses, we shall find all its properties and adjuncts will herd under this short definition, that it is a perpetual possession of being well deceived. And, first, with relation to the mind or

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understanding, ’tis manifest what mighty advantages fiction has over truth; and the reason is just at our elbow, because imagination can build nobler scenes, and produce more wonderful revolutions than fortune or nature will be at expense to furnish. This is capital; and why didn’t S. apply it to what he retained of religion, say, the Bible? 4 p 496, marked

Last week I saw a woman flayed, and you will hardly believe how much it altered her person for the worse. 5 p 532

[“A Digression on the Nature, Usefulness, and Necessity of Wars and Quarrels.”]

This is the best bit in the book. Does the author feel that in spite of his biting irony, he is showing up the true nature of life? It would be lovely if this double irony could be exhibited plainly. 6 pp 532–33

[…] those that cannot or dare not make war in person employ others to do it for them. This maintains bullies, bravoes, cut-throats, lawyers, soldiers, &c. Most professions would be useless, if all were peaceable. Hence brutes want neither smiths nor lawyers, magistrates nor joiners, soldiers nor surgeons. Hint of Rousseau & Walt Whitman. 7 p 535

||The project of a description of Australia the Unknown, of great use for all families,|| because it contains exact accounts of all the provinces, colonies, and mansions of that spacious country, where, by a general doom, all transgressors of the law are to be transported; […]. In hell there are many mansions. August Thalheimer

Introduction to Dialectical Materialism New York: 1936. Waterloo. 155 marginalia.

1 p 42, marked Z

The Jewish national god expanded into a world god. This Jewish national god was highly suited to be the starting point for an international world god of ancient times since he was the god of an oppressed

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national people, and the oppressed classes and peoples of the Roman empire naturally became the first bearers of this new world religion. 2 p 55

[Santayana summarizes the argument to this point and comments:]

Historical economic forces, not arguments, create & destroy religion. [ and everything else, including Marxism. ] 3 p 55, marked

||Dialectical materialism opposes religion and will destroy it because it hinders social development.|| N.B. Is the socialist motive desire to destroy religion? [ Protestantism wished to destroy the church for the sake of lay freedom and wealth. ] 4 p 57

||If one is religious, one cannot be a member of the communist party.|| Communism a religious sect. 5 p 58, marked

Only complete material freedom, not merely legal freedom such as already exists in many bourgeois states, can give the full intellectual freedom which renders them competent to free themselves from religious ideas. Vital liberty of thought does not exist under liberalism. Social pressure forbids. So that society has to be liberated before it can become free. Circumstances have to do it. Is this “dialectical” or “historical” materialism? 6 p 59

||Historical dialectics defined as|| a phenomenon which is necessary under certain conditions and signifies progress, under changed historical conditions straightway changes to its opposite and becomes a hindrance to further development. Circumstances produce views which change those circumstances and thereby undermine themselves. What views, contrary to socialism, will socialism produce? [Santayana repeats this comment several times.] 7 p 60

||Dialectical materialism is the final and highest step resulting from struggles that took place since the beginning of history.|| [Generalized comment at top:]

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Circular movements, or tropes, overlooked in Hegelian dialectic. It is based on Protestant theology, not on logic. Protestant theology was essentially self-contradictory. 8 p 66, marked

||The ancient Tyrants|| were supported by the people against the city nobility. With the help of the people they raised themselves above the city nobility ||who were merchants||. Like the Fascist leaders in our time vs. the liberal politicians & bankers. 9 p 83, underlined

||In Platonism, material phenomena are subordinate to spiritual prototypes.|| Thus the true locus of things is posited in the mind. The highest idea is the idea of the Good. Leaving out Socrates spoils this summary. The Good comes in to moralise the universe & make a new mythology. 10 p 92

[On “Ancient Logic and Dialectics”:]

[…] if I generalize and propound without qualifications I fall into grave errors. Then this law of formal logic does not hold good. I must turn to a higher system, to dialectics; that is, I say that difference is bound up with all identity. Thus in no object can I absolutely separate identity and difference. The object remains the same, and at the same time it changes. The logic of essence does not control existence: so that your “dialectic” is not logic at all, but physics & history. 11 p 92, marked

A modern bourgeois philosopher, the Frenchman, Bergson, fell into the error of overlooking identity in universal change, […]. If I extend the change between two states of a thing so far that no identity at all remains between them, then I cannot establish any change. I am utterly unable to say that they represent two states of one thing. [From “If I extend”:]

Excellent. 12 p 93, underlined

We have already said that a thing which changes is identical with itself and is different from itself. It is identical and different; identical and not identical. Within the same thing there exists a contradiction. “Contradiction” is here a sophistical name given to instability. Logic confused with physics.

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13 p 98, top

Dialectic admitted to be superficial. 14 pp 97–98, doubly marked

||On the idealistic character of dialectics in Plato and Aristotle:|| both assume that contradictions have their origin in the mind and that the contradictions in actual things derive from the mind. We materialistic dialecticians say that the contradictions in concepts are only a reflection of the motion of things. [At “from the mind”:]

From appearance? Plato = actual things: i.e. treacherous exemplifications of ideas. 15 p 119

[Chapter on Hegel and Feurbach.]

||Bacon and Descartes as|| fathers of modern bourgeois philosophy […]. “Bourgeois philosophy” (a good term, if not abused). 16 p 121, underlined

[Voltaire and Rousseau:]

What they wanted was a bourgeois Christianity. i.e., without religion. 17 pp 122–23, marked Z

Dialectics halts for nothing. Nothing is sacred to it, nothing is inviolable. This destructive power of dialectics is, in the Hegelian view, the strongest force of historical progress, or as Goethe, who lived in the time of Hegel, said, “All that exists has this much value, that it perishes.” ! Mephisto says, “Alles was entsteht ist wert, dass es zu Grunde geht.” i.e. Everything crumbles because it’s rotten; or everything that arises deserves to perish. 18 p 125, underlined and marked

With Hegel there is as yet no sharp contradiction between religion and philosophy. Hegelian philosophy undermines religion from within. 19 p 133, underlined

||The Chartist movement|| was the most obvious place to study the materialistic explanation of historical events. i.e. the material incentives to party movements. But incentives work through psycho-physical processes. History is not dialectical in itself, after Hegel’s fashion.

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20 p 134, marked

||Feuerbach discovered the materialistic explanation of nature. Marx and Engels based their materialistic explanation of history on modes of production: basic agriculture.|| [In his note, Santayana appears to instruct himself on how to proceed in writing Dominations and Powers.]

Trace the method of supporting life to agriculture, fishing, & cattle-breeding. All else is parasitic trade, parasitic work. 21 p 136, marked Z

Marx conceived of dialectics as the sum of the universal laws of motion of the real, material world and the laws of thought in the minds of men corresponding to these universal laws. In other words, the real, material world is dialectical; it follows the laws of dialectics; and dialectics also operates in the human mind since the human mind is also a part of the material world. Absurdity useful in defining the term “dialectical” as here mis-used. 22 p 140

||An A,B,C of sense impressions and their difficulties.|| Knowledge is a mode of faith: faith is a presupposition of intelligence. And by trusting faith you may understand the source of both faith and knowledge, that they are normally true, since animals live surrounded by other things to which it would be fatal to them not to pay attention. This attention has a spiritual side called faith, perception, or knowledge. 23 p 142, marked

Hegel […] says that things exist outside of human consciousness, but also that things are not of a material, corporeal nature, but spiritual. This is objective idealism. Materialism maintains that the external world is of a corporeal nature. This has been adequately proved by natural science. [From “Materialism maintains”:]

What rot: curious that a person so well informed in one place should be so foolish in another. 24 p 159

||Bergson reverts to Heraclitean theory of flux.|| Bergson denies this. He preserves the past.

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25 p 161, underlined and marked Z

||Dialectics are not incomprehensible;|| anyone can grasp them because everyone has the proof of dialectics in his daily experience as well as in his own mind. In this respect human thought is exactly the same in all minds. The most general and the most inclusive fundamental law of dialectics from which all others are deduced is the law of the permeation of opposites. N.B. The levelling intolerance of the moderns. Cf. Watson: “there is no fatigue”. 1. Permeation of opposites. i.e. existence changes. You can make opposites of the terms of any variation. Cf. the dichotomies of the Politicus & Sophist. 26 p 164

“Dialectics” = facility in admitting changes in society, in politics & morals. 27 p 169, underlined and marked X

[…] this law of the permeation of opposites may be deduced from the examination of thought itself. It is the law of thought as well as of nature. Not a “law”, but a result of the incidence of essences in the flux of existence. Flux = variation in essence with continuity of substance. 28 p 170, underlined

[…] the law of the negation of the negation, or the law of development through opposites. Law is a superstitious term Do you materialise it? Is there no “dialectic” amongst “laws”? 29 p 174

With Bergson development becomes an incomprehensible, mystical process in which the relations between the old and the new are conceived of only as oppositions and not […] as identities. Quite false since the past, according to B. is that which acts in the present and is retained entire. 30 pp 174–75

Dialectics concerns itself with definite, concrete negation. The first distortion of dialectics, the distortion which disregards negation, may be called the opportunistic distortion. The second in which the retention of the old in the new is disregarded may be called the anarchistic distortion.

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These two opposed distortions […] are alike in that both put an end to development—the first because it puts an end to negation as the moving force in development, and the second because it puts an end to the connection between opposites. i.e, you must destroy society and inherit its possessions. 31 p 176, underlined

The mystical or falsified dialectics of the Bergsonian type rejects historical regularity and replaces it by miracle […]. i.e. evolution, which in fact is natural & materially controlled. 32 p 183, marked

The most general characteristic of dialectical thought is the study of things in their inter-relations, in both one-beside-the-other relations and one-after-the-other relations,—that is, in their changes. It is physical instead of nominal knowledge. 33 p 184, marked

Like dialectics, the theory of historical materialism is not a means of mere contemplation, but it is an instrument for action. It is not true but partisan. 34 p 185, marked

Divorced from revolutionary practice the materialistic theory of history would be lifeless. might be true? 35 p 195, underlined

A division of society into classes appeared only after a relatively long development in consequence of the division of labor which was introduced into the primitive classless society. There were always old & young, leaders and followers, men and women. 36 p 196

We also distinguish a class which is still pre-capitalist, but which exists under capitalistic conditions; the class which owns its means of production and itself works, the small farmers, the handicraftsmen, or simple commodity producers. e.g. poets.

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37 p 197, underlined

||Classes emerge when|| a surplus product ||is regularly produced and one social group takes|| the surplus product of another group. Commerce, production for sale, is the beginning of trouble. 38 p 204

Envy of some other class. [ Can the interests of a “class” be to abolish that class, e.g. slavery? Evidently the “class” is always harmonious with the world in which it exists. Only the individuals have or may think they have contrary interests.] 39 pp 204–5, underlined

This consciousness that all workers have common interests, or all small farmers have common interests, this consciousness of the oppressed and exploited classes, is not present from the outset. It emerges only through the struggle. This is a strange notion. Only when they don’t eat one another’s oats. “Class-consciousness” is a political phenomenon. 40 p 207, marked

All ruling classes have used and use certain means to set false ideologies in motion, to deceive oppressed classes in regard to their interests. 41 p 209

If “class” = material means of living, it is true that “class” underlies all other social forms. 42 p 234–35

Another very profound conception of Lao-tse which reminds one of Hegel is that the impulse in things comes from non-being. In Hegel’s view the moving force of things is ascribed to negation. Rather call or need for something else: the self-transcendence of essence taken to be the ground rather than the condition of the flux. 43 p 238, marked Z

[…] the revolution now in process in China demands not individual but collective behavior from the masses of the people, not passivity and contemplation, but the greatest activity. Hell.

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44 p 240, marked

||Thalheimer will discuss pragmatism|| because it is the best known of the foreign world-views or philosophies and because it has a particularly progressive, democratic, and unprejudiced quality. ||It is not easy for the uninitiated to see that pragmatism|| is reactionary and idealistic. 45 p 245, marked

[On pragmatism:]

This school or trend originated in America. It then spread to England and Italy and, in lesser degree, to France and Germany. It reflects the characteristic spirit of the American bourgeoisie. Hence the democratic and pseudo-radical touch, as well as the distortion of cause and effect, and the tendency towards commerce. 46 p 247, marked

Naturally, if the existence of a material world independent of human consciousness is reasoned away, there can no longer be a problem of the relationship of such a world to human thought. This utterly simple and staggering “solution” is merely a sleight-of-hand by which the problem itself is made to disappear. In its fundamental conception pragmatism is therefore idealism. 47 p 248, marked

[Concerning a pluralistic universe:]

To be sure, it is not self-contradictory to postulate a world which is at the same time a unity and a plurality, but to affirm a world, a universe, which is a plurality without unity is plainly a meaningless contradiction. If one asks oneself how a school of philosophy can achieve such palpable nonsense, one does not have to seek far for the answer: the prototype of the world which consists of parts having nothing to do with each other is the world of the high priests of all schools, a world composed of the earthly vale of tears and the heavenly hereafter which are utterly and absolutely separate and different from each other. The “pluralistic universe” is merely a new “higher” label for this ancient and insipid clerical nonsense. Knock out for old Wm. [ James, of course.] 48 p 249, marked

||In pragmatism, truth is what works, is useful.|| The measure is thus subjective. The undefined subject who is the measure of truth is not man in general but the bourgeois in particular and his particular ends. The bourgeois mind governed by bourgeois interests is made the

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supreme judge of truth. That this is very convenient for the bourgeoisie certainly cannot be disputed. Truer of Dewey than of James, who was romantic. 49 p 253, marked

[Final sentences of the book:]

Karl Marx once said: “The task of philosophy [and by philosophy he meant materialism] is not to explain the world anew, but to change it.” No one who lives in a great revolutionary period can remain merely a theorist. Pure Pragmatism! Lowell Jackson Thomas

Out of This World: Across the Himalayas to Forbidden Tibet New York: c. 1950. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Thomas Aquinas

Summa Theologica

Three volumes, n.p.: 1894 (Marietti edition). Georgetown. No marginalia.

Anna Boynton Thompson

The Unity of Fichte’s Doctrine of Knowledge Introduction by Josiah Royce. Radcliffe College Monographs, no. 7. Boston: 1895. Georgetown. 134 marginalia.

[A special bite in many of Santayana’s comments indicates his intolerance of those whom he called “lady philosophers.”] 1 p 6, marked

||One defect of determinism is that it has no place for reflective ideas.|| Even if by means of the assumption of the existence of the mind and of matter, and of the validity of the laws of cause and effect, they can account for our successive states, yet they can give no reason why at any point in the succession the mind should abstract itself from the immediate sensation, mount above itself to reflect upon itself receiving the sensation […]. Ignorance of Spinoza.

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2 p 9, marked Z

||Of determinations via will:|| We name it Freedom, signifying […] complete absence of all the determinations of actual existence, but complete liberty at any moment to assume them, just as it is freedom not to assume them. Pure myth, since the undetermined is nothing. 3 p 10, marked

That […] there is a real, potential Free Will apart from the consciousness that conceives it, and a real free-will act that precedes consciousness and creates it, Fichte never for a moment asserts. Fichte admits that he is mythologising. 4 p 11, underlined

The conclusion reached in the “Grundlage” that the ego appears as an Absolute, and therefore as unrelated to an extra-mentem creator, awaked, as is well known, great philosophic scandal. People misunderstood Fichte’s form of expression, paused here, and asserted that Fichte taught that the ego creates itself. This is a false category: but it would be fair to say that Fichte teaches that the ego is not created at all. And the scandal would be no less at that. 5 p 15, top

Vitality, inwardness} the chief characteristics of the life Ignorance, tentativeness} described by the idealists. 6 p 17, underlined

||On the ego and free will:|| This world is Freedom appearing as the world of consciousness with its laws. This freedom on the part of nothing to become anything is an empty myth. True freedom is ability on the part of an [illegible] and definite nature to realise itself in the midst of the world. 7 p 17, underlined

[…] in the world of consciousness is no freedom except in so far as this world is that which has freely willed not to be free: […]. Cf. Schopenhauer. This is simply a mythical way of saying that the world is arbitrary.

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8 p 21, marked

The proposition “existence is identical with God” is self-contradictory, for existence means “standing forth from God as the image of his reality: eternally separate from God as image must be from reality.” When the image is absolutely identical with the imaged there is no image; if existence were absolutely identical with God, there would be no existence, no standing forth as separate. Reality is an intellectual idea not to be realised in any mind that still conceives reality as different from perception. 9 p 22, marked Z

||The author paraphrases the Wissenschaftslehre: || Freedom, as Freedom, is undetermined; if now Freedom choose to renounce itself and become Law, Law must, for us, be its end, as we can conceive no other end: Freedom obeys law for the sake of law. But that will which chooses law for the sake of law we call Holy Will, and describe it as “doing what it ought because it ought.” The motive power of will is desire: a free will that chooses must choose from preference, otherwise there is no will and no choice, but blind chance. Hence Holy Will chooses law because it loves law, and we have a God of whose nature the ultimate fact is Love. What an abuse of significant language! This logic is worthy of a Sunday-School. 10 p 25, underlined

[…] from the empirical facts of freedom and necessity, Holy Will is deduced […]. ! 11 p 30

[Santayana’s general reflection:]

The mythical choice of law qua law becomes a real virtue in the will where it is a loyalty to the nature already latent (or chosen) in oneself. It is then loyalty to the ideal, and to this an ideal grounded in real organization and real ^ ^ of growth. possibilities 12 p 30, marked

But we must always hold in mind that there are two stages of being, one the actual, the other the logical, that is, the sphere of conditions and pre-suppositions which the rationalizing of facts demands. Cf. Münsterberg.

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13 p 35

||The objective world is real to man only because of the perfect faith of the ego that it is so.|| Is verification nothing This is the first sphere[?] of the “categorical imperative”. 14 p 36

[…] the withered arm is stretched forth […]. This has the sound of “Christian Science”. 15 p 36

Faith is action, and action is Faith. Philosophy is rhapsody, and rhapsody is philosophy. 16 p 45

||Of God, truth, and thought.|| i.e. the stable object. (But God is the most unstable of all objects of thought.) 17 p 51, underlined

Of himself man is nothing: personal merit and blame are the short-sighted judgments of ignorance: persons as independent integers have no power and no existence, for power and existence are attributes of the One and Only Reality which we conceive beyond the appearance. Candid but commonplace and superficial determinism. 18 p 57

||Concerning Will willing that Law conquer, right prevail.|| the absolute bluff. The self-abuse of the absolute Fakir. 19 p 60, underlined and doubly marked

Fichte’s doctrine is an Egoism which faith turns into a Pantheism. 20 p 64, underlined

But consciousness exists only in finite individuals, and finiteness cannot receive the command [of the moral law] in its wholeness: hence the law cannot appear as the revelation of a definite ideal which is to be realized by men upon earth, for no human mind can contain it; […]. Here is obscurantism and moral superstition with a vengeance.

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21 p 64, underlined

A problem that presents difficulties in other ethical systems is the ground of moral obligation. Why should I do right? If I do right for the result thereby gained, I am not doing right, I am making a commercial venture. Topsy-turvy down. The ethics of a wistful child or thunder struck savage. 22 p 72, underlined

To discover his own view [of truth] in its purity is pre-eminently the task of [man’s] life, since he exists for no other purpose than to set forth this view. This pose is intolerable to me. 23 p 102

||At birth we are not directed to the Truth, but we exist in a shadowy, foggy world.|| And thus the recognition of the natural fictions emboldens us to substitute unnatural fictions for them. 24 p 119, top

[Appendix. Quotations from Fichte’s writings, many of which Santayana translates or paraphrases without comment or criticism, but here:]

A net-work of pedantry over a core of barbarism. 25 p 120

||On the reflective freedom of the will.|| The world of thought changes, and the German thinks he has changed his mind and regenerated the world. 26 p 126, underlined and marked Z

||Fichte uses the term “God” loosely.|| Gott stellt sich dar, wie Gott sich darstellen kann.1 Cf. Schopenhauer’s Unhappy deity! 1

God exhibits himself as he is able to.

27 p 131

God as Immediacy. Here the divine is the rational form which reflection meets in experience. 28 p 135, underlined

Gott ist zu denken als eine Ordnung von Begebenheiten, keineswegs aber als eine Forme der Ausdehnung.1 Does the shoe pinch? 1

God is to be thought of as an event, but by no means as a form of extension.

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29 p 152, underlined

[On the “Unity of Fichte’s Doctrine of Knowledge”:]

But is it impossible to get beyond the products of thinking which are only images? Can we reach no reality? Yes, we can find and we possess reality. This reality is the immediate activity of thinking, which, indeed, cannot be grasped, and is inconceivable, yet in its inconceivable activity is reality. mysticism 30 p 153, marked Z

On the other hand, we cannot maintain that being, or an Ansich, is the cause of image, or the realistic theory, for not only does realism fail to explain the connection between being and image, but it accepts as ultimate the results of the laws of thought, knowing no ground for these laws: the realist thinks out his Ansich, using the methods of thought without questioning them, accepting the validity of results obtained by obedience to the laws of thought without seeking the ground of such validity; hence consciousness, in its activity and laws, is really his ultimate, and he is an idealist: in effect he says, “Consciousness is the only reality, and whatever it asserts must be so.” The realist’s weak point is his confidence in reason: his strong point is his expression of reason. We should express reason without too much confidence in the result. 31 p 157, marked

If the question is asked, “Why is Wissen an absolute Von instead of something else?” we reply that Wissen in its qualitative and material determinations is, of necessity, incomprehensible (this incomprehensibility is the necessary condition of comprehension as its inseparable opposite). If we understand something we cannot understand understanding. 32 p 178, underlined and marked

The term Leben is sometimes used interchangeably with God, hence it sometimes denotes:—(1) the Inconceivable which appears as the world of consciousness; (2) the notion which we form of the Inconceivable. !! 33 p 180, bottom

“Life” is a term, merely an improper word applied to an empty idea in order to conceal its emptiness.

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34 p 183, underlined

The important results of this analysis by consciousness of itself are that: (1) In obedience to the laws of consciousness the First Cause takes the form in consciousness of a Power, a Life, a Free-Will; […]. Is it the first cause or are the laws of consciousness such? 35 p 191

[Santayana summarizes:]

Intelligence is a mythical antecedent to the world, like all its antecedents. 36 p 195, top

L. of R. “Nature or experience” a good phrase to use, like Spinoza’s “Deus sive natura”,1 to show that experience is the presence of nature and nature the content of experience. Nature has its locus in experience, and experience its object and meaning in nature. 1

God or nature.

37 p 203, marked Z

The conclusions of the Wissenschaftslehre are not actualities: Kein einziger ihrer Gedanken, Sätze, Aussprüche, ist einer des wirklichen Lebens, noch passend in das wirkliche Leben. Es sind eigentlich nur Gedanken von Gedanken, die man hat, oder haben sollte, Sätze von Sätzen, die man sich zu eigen machen, Aussprüche von Aussprüchen, die man selbst aussprechen soll.1 The essence of transcendentalism. 1 Not one of your thoughts, sentences, expressions, is one of actual life, nor suited to actual life. One really has and should have and utter only thoughts about thought, sentences about sentences, expressions about expressions.

38 p 210, top

Contrast romantic ignorant childish revolutionary

with

transcendental philosophy. reflective, profound, sterile but productive

Francis Thompson

Shelley New York: 1909. Georgetown. Twenty-eight marginalia.

1 p 27, marked

Indeed, nothing is so artificial as our simplicity.

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2 p 27, marked

An age that is ceasing to produce child-like children cannot produce a Shelley. For both as poet and man he was essentially a child. 3 p 30, underlined and marked

To the last [Shelley] was the enchanted child. This was, as is well known, patent in his life. It is really, though perhaps less obviously, manifest in his poetry, the sincere effluence of his life. 4 pp 45–46, marked

The universe is his box of toys. He dabbles his fingers in the day-fall. He is gold-dusty with tumbling amidst the stars. He makes bright mischief with the moon. The meteors nuzzle their noses in his hand. He teases into growling the kennelled thunder, and laughs at the shaking of its fiery chain. He dances in and out of the gates of heaven: its floor is littered with his broken fancies. He runs wild over the fields of ether. He chases the rolling world. He gets between the feet of the horses of the sun. He stands in the lap of patient Nature, and twines her loosened tresses after a hundred wilful fashions, to see how she will look nicest in his song. Right idea—over-expressed.1 1 In Santayana’s astonishing approval of this sort of thing may lie the cause for the failure, from one point of view (mine), for much of his own verse.

5 pp 47–48, marked

||Shelley a poet of nature, but not in the sense that Wordsworth was.|| To such following of Nature, Shelley felt no call. He saw in her not a picture set for his copying, but a palette set for his brush; not a habitation prepared for his inhabiting, but a Coliseum whence he might quarry stones for his own palaces. Even in his descriptive passages the dream-character of his scenery is notorious; it is not the clear, recognizable scenery of Wordsworth, but a landscape that hovers athwart the heat and haze arising from his crackling fantasies. The materials for such visionary Edens have evidently been accumulated from direct experience, but they are recomposed by him into such scenes as never mortal eye beheld. 6 p 48, underlined and marked X

The one justification for classing Shelley with the Lake poet is that he loved Nature with a love even more passionate, though perhaps less profound.

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Physically, intellectually, perhaps, but not morally, humanly. The good is the first category of mind. Wordsworth was a “slave”—a nature-worshipper. 7 p 52, marked

[Concerning metaphysical poetry:]

So you may toy with imagery in mere intellectual ingenuity, and then you might as well go write acrostics: or you may toy with it in raptures, and then you may write a Sensitive Plant. 8 p 63, marked Z

[Of Shelley’s “Adonais”:]

What utter desolation can it be that discerns comfort in this hope, whose wan countenance is as the countenance of a despair? Nay, was not indeed wanhope the Saxon for despair? What deepest depth of agony is it that finds consolation in this immortality: an immortality which thrusts you into death, the maw of Nature, that your dissolved elements may circulate through her veins? Bosh 9 p 65, marked Z

After all, to finish where we began, perhaps the poems on which the lover of Shelley leans most lovingly, which he has oftenest in his mind, which best represent Shelley to him, and which he instinctively reverts to when Shelley’s name is mentioned, are some of the shorter poems and detached lyrics. Here Shelley forgets for a while all that ever makes his verse turbid; forgets that he is anything but a poet, forgets sometimes that he is anything but a child; lies back in his skiff, and looks at the clouds. He plays truant from earth, slips through the wicket of fancy into heaven’s meadow, and goes gathering stars. Bad, bad, bad. [Final page, unnumbered. Santayana sums up his own reactions:]

Pessimism & idealism complementary. A person like Browning is incapable of being a pessimist because he is incapable of loving the good. A pig is truly in no need of a bath-tub, soap, and disinfectants; but a human child is who has fallen into the stie. Shelley is The Catholic has not a word for the sublime self-less-ness [sic] of the poet.

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Francis Thompson

The Hound of Heaven London: c. 1912. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Samuel Martin Thompson

“A Study of Locke’s Theory of Ideas” A dissertation.

N.p., n.d. Texas. Nineteen marginalia, and various remarks by Daniel Cory. 1 p 8, underlined

Instead of taking some limited aspect of experience as a clue to the nature of his system and attempting to fit the whole into this scheme, he makes the examination of experience and its objects primary […]. What is experience? 2 p 21

Intuition of terms a prerequisite to perception or belief. [ This is true only of explicit propositions: it is not true of animal faith, which is an acquiescence in action and in the assumptions of action, before the terms of perception are clearly given. We must turn & attend first.] 3 p 31, doubly marked

[Note 39:]

For Hume an “impression” is nothing but “a particular instance of the mind’s awareness of a universal,” while for Locke ideas of sensation possess characteristics which “determine them to this or that particular existent” (Whitehead: Process and Reality, p. 221). Essence in Hume according to Whitehead. 4 p 39, underlined

In fact, if we attempt to determine precisely what it means to be a representation of something we find such a relation possible only on the basis of a nature in some respect common to the representation and that which is represented. If representation is graphic: but it may be symbolic. And it is not “ideas” that are true of nature but propositions. 5 p 46

[…] where Locke speaks of ideas as in things he cannot intend his statement to be taken literally. The only way to make such a statement intelligible, when his general position is taken into account, is to interpret it in terms of the distinction between the existence and content of

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ideas, and to assume that where Locke speaks of “ideas” in this way he is referring to the content of ideas. So far as their existence is concerned ideas are in the mind, not in things. But this is the classic meaning of “idea”, the Platonic meaning. 6 p 91, underlined

If […] the real world is one which exists in some fashion within our experience, if experience can be regarded as the medium through which certain important qualities of the objective order come into existence, then our knowledge will have reference to the real world. Bosh. Does your great grandfather exist within your experience? Henry David Thoreau

Paragraphs N.p., n.d. Texas. Eighteen marginalia.

1 p 4, underlined

Let us spend one day as deliberately as Nature, and not be thrown off the track by every nutshell and mosquito’s wing that falls on the rails. Let us rise early and fast, or break fast, gently and without perturbation; let company come and let company go, let the bells ring and the children cry,—determined to make a day of it. Why should we knock under and go with the stream? Let us not be upset and overwhelmed in that terrible rapid and whirlpool called a dinner, situated in the meridian shallows. Weather this danger and you are safe, for the rest of the way is down hill. With unrelaxed nerves, with morning vigor, sail by it, looking another way, tied to the mast like Ulysses. Grim resolve to ignore facts while not denying them. Dine looking another way. 2p4

If you stand right fronting and face to face to a fact, you will see the sun glimmer on both its surfaces, as if it were a cimeter, and feel its sweet edge dividing you through the heart and marrow, and so you will happily conclude your mortal career. Be it life or death, we crave only reality. If we are really dying, let us hear the rattle in our throats and feel cold in the extremities; if we are alive, let us go about our business. Here the opposite—true. Face “reality”

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3 p 5, underlined

Talk of Fate! How little one can know what is fated to another! What he can do and what he cannot do. I doubt whether one can give or receive any very pertinent advice. In all important crises, one can only consult his genius. Though he were the most shiftless and craziest of mortals, if he still recognizes that he has any genius to consult, none may presume to go between him and her. Shiftlessness curiously characteristic of early Americans. Thoreau, Poe, Hawthorne, & even Emerson. It goes with individualism. 4 p 5, marked

We live too fast and coarsely, just as we eat too fast, and do not know the true savor of our food. We consult our will and our understanding and the expectation of men, not our genius. I can impose upon myself tasks which will crush me for life and prevent all expansion, and this I am but too inclined to do. Oliver. 5p6

||A description of weather after a storm.|| Late in the year, at the eleventh hour, we have visions of the life we might have lived. In each case, every recess was filled and lit up by the pure white light. The maples were Potter’s, far down stream, but I dreamed I walked like a liberated spirit in the maze; the withered meadow grass was as soft and glorious as paradise. And then it was remarkable that the light-giver should have revealed to me for all life the heaving white breasts of those two ducks within this glade of light. It was extinguished and relit as it traveled. Tell me precisely the value and significance of these transient gleams which come sometimes at the end of the day before the final dispersion of the clouds at the close of a storm; […]. Desperate need of finding a meaning in trifles. A sort of high-brow superstition. 6 p 7, underlined and marked

||A fine day in spring.|| I lean over a rail to hear what is in the air liquid with the bluebirds’ warble. My life partakes of infinity. The air is as deep as our nature. Is the drawing in of this vital air attended with no more glorious results than I witness? The air is a velvet cushion against which I press my ear. I go forth to make new demands on life. I wish to begin this summer well, to do something in it worthy of it and of me, to transcend my daily routine and that of my townsmen, to have

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my immortality now, in the quality of my daily life, to pay the greatest price, the greatest tax, of any man in Concord, and enjoy the most!! I will give all I am for my nobility. I will pay all my days for my success. Desperate egotism. 7 p 7, marked

May I gird myself to be a hunter of the beautiful, that naught escape me. May I attain to a youth never attained. I am eager to report the glory of the universe. May I be worthy to do it, to have got through with regarding human values so as not to be distracted from regarding divine values. Transcendental bluff 8 p 8, marked

Do not seek so anxiously to be developed, to subject yourself to many influences to be played on; it is all dissipation. Humility like darkness reveals the heavenly lights. The shadows of poverty and meanness gather around us, “and lo! creation widens to our view.” We are often reminded that if there were bestowed on us the wealth of Crœsus, our aims must still be the same, and our means essentially the same. Moreover, if you are restricted in your range by poverty, if you cannot buy books and newspapers, for instance, you are but confined to the most significant and vital experiences; you are compelled to deal with the material which yields the most sugar and the most starch. Minor key Satisfaction with simplicity & poverty—most un-American but balanced by complacency—most American. 9 p 10, underlined

I love Nature partly because she is not man, but a retreat from him. None of his institutions control or pervade her. Here a different kind of right prevails. In her midst I can be glad with an entire gladness. If this world were all man, I could not stretch myself. I should lose all hope. He is constraint; she is freedom to me. He makes me wish for another world; she makes me content with this. None of the joys she supplies is subject to his rules and definitions. What he touches he taints. In thought he moralizes. Cf. Whitman. But W. thinks it is only civilised man that is bad—Rousseau in both. 10 p 10

There is no law so strong which a little gladness may not transgress. I have a room all to myself. It is nature. It is a place beyond the jurisdiction of human governments. Pile up your books, the records of sadness,

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your saws and your laws. Nature is glad outside, and her many worms within will erelong topple them down. Pantheism passing into Schadenfreude.1 1

Gloating, or malicious pleasure.

11 p 10

Our appetite should always be so related to our taste, and our board be an epitome of the primeval table which Nature sets by hill and wood and stream for her dumb pensioners. Rot. There are harmonies at each moment anywhere. 12 p 17

Nothing is so attractive and unceasingly curious as character. […] I am not concerned to know what eighth planet is wandering in space up there, or when Venus or Orion rises, but if in any cot east or west, and set behind the woods, there is any planetary character illuminating the earth. Moralism gone to seed. 13 p 18, underlined

To be calm, to be serene! There is the calmness of the lake when there is not a breath of wind; there is the calmness of a stagnant ditch. […] I awoke into a music which no one about me heard. Whom shall I thank for it? The luxury of wisdom! the luxury of virtue! Are there any intemperate in these things? I feel my Maker blessing me. Old Protestant madness. 14 p 21

Men may talk about political? measures till all is blue and smells of ^ home and ^ sit down and expect their measures to brimstone, and then go do their duty for them. The only measure is integrity and manhood. 15 p 26, marked Z

In proportion as I have celestial thoughts is the necessity for me to be out and behold the western sky before sunset these winter days. That is the symbol of the unclouded mind that knows neither winter nor summer. What is your thought like? That is the hue, that the purity and transparency and distance from earthly taint of my inmost mind; for whatever we see without is a symbol of something within, and that which is farthest off is the symbol of what is deepest within. “Within” = the realm of truth?

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Crawford Howell Toy Judaism and Christianity: A Sketch of the Progress of Thought from Old Testament to New Testament Boston: 1892. Georgetown. No marginalia.

Arnold Joseph Toynbee

A Study of History

Six Volumes. London, New York, and Toronto: 1934–45. Volume I. Waterloo. Forty-six marginalia. 1 p 4, underlined and marked

[Introduction: “The Relativity of Historical Thought.”]

||Mommsen’s work fragmentary, in which he was|| representative of the Western historians of his generation—a generation in which the prestige of the Industrial System imposed itself upon the ‘intellectual workers’ of the Western World. Dispersed information was the boast of natural science rather than of industry which was unified by the aim of comfort & wealth. 2 p 15

||Historians do not abstract their study from their national environment.|| It seems to consist, in Russia & the U.S.A. in assigning a larger field to the home practice. Be like me or die! 3 p 49

||On the processes of synthesis and interpretation in history.|| Very well: but do you suggest that each synthesis covers all that was synthesized before. That is folly. The arts are lost: also the histories. 4 p 55, underlined

||Lucretius was a poet in time of difficulties who|| knew at first hand the distracted Roman masters of a devastated Hellenic world: […]. Like those that at this moment control Europe. 1945. 5 p 92, marked

||On extinct societies: the Minoan.|| If we now examine, in their turn, the backgrounds of these extinct societies, and if, in these older backgrounds, we discern the same tokens again, we may hope in this way to identify other extinct societies of an older generation […]. Ha this staging should be pulled down.

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6 p 158, marked

||The sense of triumph expressed in now-extinct societies.|| Fatuity universal. 7 p 159

||Is there hope that any of the seven civilizations still about may continue?|| While there is life there is hope; […]. If this is T’s conclusion he misses the moral nature of success. 8 p 162

||If Germany had begun World War II with Russia as an ally, she would have won it.|| Moreover had Germany & Russia no part in civilization? 9 p 177, bottom

T. has an absolute standard in petto at least for mankind. Angels & gods would then be required to restore reason. 10 p 192

||Primitive men imitate the older generation. Custom rules, society is static.|| On the other hand, in societies in process of civilization, mimesis is directed towards creative personalities which command a following because they are pioneers on the road towards the common goal of human endeavours. N.B. Questionable theory that progress depends on militancy or enterprise. Genesis too is original. 11 p 195, underlined and marked Z

[…] dominant minorities are static by definition; […]. Against this static condition, the secession of a proletariat is a dynamic reaction; […]. Pericles, Augustus, Louis XIV, Queen Victoria were primitive on this view. All life is dynamic & somewhat varying in mood But it need not be militant or proletarian 12 p 246

In the classic account of the Covenant in the Book of Genesis, Yaweh is made to declare: ‘I will establish my Covenant between me and thee and thy seed after thee in their generations for an everlasting Covenant.’ Not exclusive or original with the Jews.

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13 p 250fn, underlined

[Note 2:]

In the first age of Hellenic history Hellenic minds had passed through the stage of being under the dominion of the concept of Race, as is shown by the two facts that the earliest Hellenic institutions were based on kinship and that the earliest Hellenic efforts at historiography took a genealogical form. Here is a fallacy that runs thru’ this book. It is not the concept of race but the fact of descent, it might be quite fresh, as from Zeus in the case of Alexander or from Apollo in that of Plato. Not a question of colours. 14 p 253, underlined

The Race-theory finds its differentiating natural cause in the diversity of the human physique […]. The skin is not the psyche: the psyche is not “consciousness”. This is the shallow in which the otherwise excellent Toynbee floundered. A. J. Toynbee

A Study of History Volume II. Waterloo. Twenty-one marginalia.

1 p 11, underlined

Such were the achievements of the Syriac Civilization under the stimulus of the desert. The incentive was love of money. The desert simply was a field that could be exploited, not a divine challenge as this book makes it. 2 p 13, underlined

||The statues show that the art of sculpture|| must have been kept alive on Easter Island by continual transmarine intercourse. ? Why not a development & decline in the island? 3 p 16

||The abandonment of a village in early Connecticut|| explained the miracle of those great cities in Ohio and Illinois and Colorado and California which had sprung into existence overnight. In this hard environment of New England, an apprenticeship had been served for the hard task of building the United States. The village no longer paid! Marvellous moral lesson.

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4 p 31

We have now perhaps established decisively the truth that ease is inimical to civilization. & civilisation is barbarous without ease. ^ ^ 5 p 96

||The hardships of migration are responsible for the great epics. The non-migrating peoples produce drama.|| Where are the American epics? There was drama in Castile but epics in Italy & Portugal. 6 p 97, top

Origin of “town meetings” [Text marked:]

Discussion & forensics go with trade: authority with licence. 7 p 97, marked

In the city-state thus founded, the ‘cells’ of the new political organization would be, not kindreds held together by the tie of common descent, but ‘tribes’ representing ship’s companies; […]. Having co-operated at sea as men do co-operate when they are ‘all in the same boat’ in the midst of the perils of the deep, they would continue to feel and act in the same way ashore when they had to hold a strip of hardly-won coast against the menace of a hostile hinterland. Important. 8 p 213

||On slavery and “The Stimulus of Penalizations.”|| Does it not occur to you that all this “stimulus” weeds out the weak and leaves only the strong? 9 p 359, marked

||Stimulated by Charlemagne, the Scandinavians broke out and by way of the Vikings,|| they had made a supreme effort to overwhelm the civilizations of the South which they encountered on their warpath, and to establish in their stead a new Scandinavian Civilization erected on barbarian foundations and unencumbered by reminiscences of a traditional style or by traces of a traditional ground-plan. Cf. America

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A. J. Toynbee

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A Study of History Volume III. Waterloo. Fifty-three marginalia.

1 p 14

Nomadism, according to this, is militant. 2 p 23

||The interdependence of the Nomad and his flocks. Without human herding, neither the flocks nor the people could not have been so numerous.|| What advantage is it to a free band to be enslaved in order to become more numerous? This profits only the foreign masters now lording it over them. 3 p 94, marked

Aristotle rejects Plato’s prescriptions of an intellectual governing caste, which is to be segregated from the military caste ab initio and to exercise authority over it at all times (an idea which Plato rightly believed to be the most important contribution in the Republic to Hellenic social philosophy). Aristotle is content to recruit his senate from time-expired soldiers. Toynbee believes in Christus Rex. 4 p 95, underlined

[Concerning Plato’s Republic: ]

The ‘human watch-dog’ cannot and will not be happy; but his personal happiness is of no account; for the individual human being exists, not for his own sake, but in order to promote the welfare of the commonwealth of which he is a member. Theocracy in Plato a mask for “nationalism”. 5 p 97, underlined

The Utopian programme of the fourth-century Athenian philosophers was a forlorn hope, for the ‘Lycurgean’ system, in which they put their trust, was visibly crumbling at the very time when they were seeking to arrest the incipient decline of the Hellenic Civilization by ‘pegging’ it to the Spartan rock. Only Plato was deceived. Aristotle only reviewed constitutions. He did not imagine that Alexander might cane[?] the world.

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6 p 134, underlined

||The rule seems to be that geographical expansion may|| effect ‘actual regression’, arrest. English belles lettres in America. 7 pp 136–37, marked

And Don Quixote might also have noted that the wave of the Italian Renaissance, which had swept over Spain in the generation of Cervantes and over Germany in the generation of Goethe, only irrigated New England in the generation in which Texas was conquered from its Spanish-descended occupants by Sam Houston and his fellow-filibusters. Moreover, the intellectual renaissance of Houston’s respectable fellow-citizens and contemporaries in New England—an Emerson and a Longfellow and a Thoreau and a Hawthorne—passed over as swiftly and as abruptly as an Indian Summer. The “Indian Summer” of New England 8 p 154, marked

On this interpretation, a declining society is apt to hasten the day of its dissolution by squandering its diminishing store of vital energy in material performances on an excessive scale, not so much out of wanton megalomania as in a vain effort to give the lie to its own unacknowledged but agonizing consciousness of incompetence and failure and doom. How about a study of history in 13 volumes? 9 p 167, marked

Perhaps we may infer from the foregoing survey that an improvement in military technique is usually, if not invariably, the symptom of a decline in civilization. Anyhow now. 10 p 202

And in this tug-of-war which we are witnessing in Russia between the ideals of Lenin and the methods of Ford we may look forward to seeing the modern ascendancy of the Western over the Russian Civilization paradoxically confirmed. This needs revision. 1947, Totalitarian discipline has intervened.

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11 p 203

And thus we see Ghandi to-day promoting a political movement with a Western programme—the transformation of India into a sovereign independent parliamentary state—and with a Western procedure […]. ? This will not last. 12 p 203

In this spiritual travail of a Gandhi and a Lenin in our generation, we can watch the impact of the Western Civilization upon Hinduism and upon Russian Orthodox Christendom in the act of transformation from an external encounter between the Western Society and its neighbours into an inner experience of a Westernized World. This adoption of “Western” spirit is not really spiritual but instrumental and external. “Spirit” for Toynbee = steam, it is a source of motion, not of form. 13 p 212, doubly marked

Or are we going to turn our new power to our own destruction by putting its unprecedently powerful ‘drive’ into a number of ancient anti-social institutions—into War and Tribalism and Slavery and Property— […]. Perhaps it will be War issuing in industrial & commercial imperialism. 14 p 217

We know it because already, on the peaks of the mountains, the grim chthonic glow is turning miraculously into the ethereal flush of dawn; and because, down here in the shadow, unhurried but unhindered, there floats or dances through Space and Time a living chain of Goddesses, hand linked in hand: the endless procession of the Hours. Drop it! 15 p 230, marked

A field of action—and, a fortiori, an intersection of a number of fields of action—cannot be a source of action. The source of action is other than the field of action ex hypothesi. A ray in the fog! 16 p 231, marked

It is human individuals and not human societies that ‘make’ human history.

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17 p 237

||Concerning an award for the invention of the tank|| by His Brittanic Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. Why this waste of words? Toynbee is sometimes cheap. 18 p 242, underlined and marked

||The stagnation of the Indian masses|| while the few were making their tremendous moral and intellectual advance. What rot 19 p 242

The very fact that the growths of civilizations are the work of creative individuals or creative minorities carries the implication that the uncreative majority will be left behind unless the pioneers can contrive some means of carrying this sluggish rear-guard along with them in their eager advance. You don’t realise that militant revolutions are erratic. The great flux remains generative and automatic. 20 p 246fn, underlined

[Note 3:]

||Toynbee quotes Bergson:|| ‘This is the principal mode in which the greatest minds of an age produce their effect. They set the tone which others take, and the fashion which others use.’ A thousand Toynbees quote the unique Bergson. 21 p 263, underlined and marked

||The persistence of the myth of the eternal return; the return of the Messiah in Judaism.|| In the concept of the Second Coming, the motif of Withdrawal-and-Return attains its deepest spiritual meaning. It is its unspiritual Jewish side that appears here. All is to be mundane in nature though supernatural instead of being natural but spiritual in its “return” or consummation 22 p 263, marked

In the last chapter of his career, Paul employed his gifts of propaganda in responding to the challenge of Hellenism in a totally different way. He sought to solve the problem of Helleno-Syriac relations by peace instead of war. Very good. It was Hellenism not Jesus, that he turned to.

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23 p 264, underlined

After his vision on the road to Damascus, in which he was suddenly enlightened, Paul withdrew into the wilderness, as Jesus himself had withdrawn after his sudden enlightenment at the moment of his baptism by John. Not a good Anglican then, but a wild Protestant or fancy Christian (like St. Paul!) 24 p 264, marked

Benedict of Nursia […] was born just after the first barbarian ‘successor-state’ of the Roman Empire was set up by Odovacer in Italy, and he died in the throes of the long-drawn-out and devastating war between the Ostrogothic ‘successor-state’ and the Imperial Government of Constantinople—a war which was the worst that Italy had undergone since the War of Hannibal, and which completed the destruction of the ancient order of society in the peninsula. Like that of 1940–5 Cf. German & Anglo-Saxon 25 p 372, marked

||Toynbee quotes H. W. C. Davis, Mediaeval Europe: Civilizations flourish|| when institutions are stable and adapted to the needs of those who live under them; when the minds of men are filled with ideas which they find completely satisfying; when the statesman, the artist, and the poet feel that they are best fulfilling their several missions if they express in deed and work and language the aspirations common to the whole society. Then for a while Man appears to be the master of his fate; and then the prevailing temper is one of reasoned optimism, of noble exaltation, of content allied with hope. […] Now by a period of history we mean the tract of years in which this balance of harmonious activities, this reconciliation of the real with the ideal, is in course of preparing, is actually subsisting, and is vanishing away. Moral definition of a period or a progress. 26 p 372, underlined and marked Z

The particular moment of equilibrium that was in the historian’s mind when he wrote this eloquent and imaginative passage was the moment in the second period of our Western history at which the two institutions of the Papal Church and Feudalism were found satisfying by men and women in Western Christendom. We may perhaps equate this moment with those five years in the thirteenth century of the Christian Era when

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Saint Dominic and Saint Francis of Assisi and the Emperor Frederick II and Saint Louis King of France were all in the World together. Not every body liked it then, and Catholics like it now. [At “five years”:]

cats & dogs 27 p 373, underlined

This social expedient of mimesis is a ‘short cut’; and the resort to it is proof in itself that the goal of human endeavours has not yet been attained. The climber has not yet reached the ledge above him where he may hope to find rest. So that stasis is the good after all. This is feeble in a progressist. 28 p 383

||On Spengler, Decline of the West.|| This notion of Kultur is itself local & temporal. Toynbee & Spengler both confuse ideal eternity with cosmic universality: the latter is a false generalisation or hyperbole. The former is an intrinsic determinative. A. J. Toynbee

A Study of History Volume IV. Waterloo. 122 marginalia.

1 p 17, marked

||The Risorgimento was|| at least as notable a feat of rejuvenation as the Italian Renaissance; […]. Nonsense It was mere envy of the northern wealth & “progress”. 2 p 34

||Toynbee writes at length about yin and yang.|| The springs of life are everywhere diffused: each tends to repeat its trope, but they collide & even inter-marry, so that the trope in each generation is of a different individual character. The total is a result not a purpose. 3 p 41

||Roads built by the British in Greek Macedonia, 1916–18 were abandoned.|| Cf. Italian roads in Abyssinia.

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4 p 44, underlined

[…] the social disease of Assyrian militarism […]. A scourge to Babylon but perhaps a sign of health in Ninevah. 5 p 45

Politics the curse of industry. 6 p 81, underlined

This Syriac assimilation of the Egyptian society— […]. Jewish? 7 p 94

||The Japanese wiped out Ainu society.|| Tragic effects of militancy in a naturally generated society. 8 p 128

||Creative souls break the seal of custom, or mimesis.|| This baring of a blade means the removal of a safeguard; and the necessity of using the tool of mimesis without the protection of a customary régime— […] condemns a growing civilization to live dangerously. Timid natures (like B. [Bergson, whom Toynbee has just quoted] & this woolly Toynbee) love the idea of adventure. They have no notion of rational courage or heroism. 9 p 135, marked Z

The element of retardation is likewise of the essence of revolutions; and it is this that accounts for the violence prominent to them. Revolution may be desired before it occurs, because it is a [sic ] 10 p 141, marked

||That the North won the American Civil War.|| Industrialism & democracy become militant with a vengeance. 11 p 156

||Toynbee again quotes Bergson:|| For Democracy ‘breathes the spirit of the Gospels … and its motive-force is Love’./ , Hate & Envy. ^ ^ 12 p 162, underlined

In origin and essence, Democracy is not parochial but universal, not militant but humanitarian.

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It is the herd instinct, & animal. It fights any other herd or individual moving within sight. It is militant and tyrannical. 13 p 172

In Germany a customs union—the German Zollverein—actually anticipated, and prepared the ground for, the establishment of a political union, the German Reich. The economic union was rational, the political artificial & demagogic. 14 p 173, underlined

It will be seen that the British Free Trade movement of the ‘eighteen-forties’ was in accordance with the general spirit of the times. It was in the generative order, but unintentionally, because the motive bias local and militant. 15 p 174, underlined

[…] the disruption of the eighteenth-century British Empire to which the establishment of the United States was the sequel. prologue? 16 p 175, marked

For Economic Nationalism did not make its first appearance in our Western World after the War of 1914–18 in post-war Poland or Czechoslovakia; it was born in the United States during the Civil War of 1861–5 and in Germany after the foundation of the Reich in 1871. 17 p 176

||The United States set itself up as|| ‘Workshop of the World’. “Arsenal of Democracy!” 18 p 181, marked

||The nineteenth-century economic world order, British in origin,|| has grown up without any corresponding political framework and indeed without any design at all. That was its virtue. It was lovely for everybody. 19 p 181

||Bankers and industrialists who built up industry in formerly agricultural nations did not reflect that their new order could not live on unless it was matched by a political framework.|| If the old moralities, or Napoleon, had still been in power, they would have managed it. Intelligence with a fundamental disinterestedness are needed.

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20 p 182

The British are empirical. They think their ideas create the world. 21 p 185, underlined

In less than fourteen centuries the narrow-verged Western Christendom of Gregory’s generation has grown into the ubiquitous Great Society of our day. If a religious basis was required for Gregory’s unpretentious economic building, and if it is this basis that has enabled our civilization to grow on the material plane […], it seems unlikely […] that the vaster structure of a world order, which it is our task to build in our day, can ever be securely based upon the rubble foundation of sordid economic interests. It had been changed at the Reformation into a Jewish millenium. Hence these tears. But a Catholic world would not have been militant in industry. 22 p 188

||The eighteenth-century Spanish-American republic of Panama|| seceded from Colombia in 1903. bribed by the U.S. & mutilated 23 p 200

Alone among the leading peoples of the Western World, the Germans retained an element of Autocracy in their government after A.D. 1871; and, although there was a large infusion of Parliamentarism in the constitution of the Bismarckian Reich, the survival into the twentieth century of even a remnant of a sixteenth-century autocratic régime in the government of one of the Great Powers of the Western World was sufficient to involve not only Germany herself, but all the other countries that were members of the Great Society of the day, in the catastrophe of A.D. 1914. Did commercial & colonial rivalry have no lodgement in England? Or the defence of the Mediterranean to this day? 24 p 206, marked

||It is possible that|| the militarism and imperialism of the Romans were the expression of their native abilities, while their domestic political institutions were an imitation—and a belated imitation—of Hellenic models which were hardly calculated to work smoothly except in the hands that had originally fashioned them.

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N.B. “Politics” in the Greek sense, is a disease. It signifies a perpetual conflict of parties where there ought to be as in a family or an army a perpetual cooperation of ^ ^ functions. 25 p 208

[…] in the international field the Solonian economic revolution confronted the Hellenic Society with death through the necessity for ^ establishing a political world-order. ^ 26 p 211, top

A government must have a local seat and personal rulers, but it need not represent or defend or express any single city, nation, or man. 27 p 211, underlined

||The Hellenic city-states preserved their autonomy, but they were unequal, subject to the power of|| a forcible and selfish domination of some single city-state over all the rest. If Rome had remained a political city with everything determined by shouts in the forum, this evil unity w’d have abolished itself. But Rome became a government and an army, two rational instruments. Polity yielded to law and authority. 28 p 218

||The breakdown of the Papacy in the late middle ages.|| The radical loyalty of the Papacy to its religious office is ignored. When most “corrupt” officially the Church was full of saints vitally. There were its true interests rather than political successes. The parallel with British compromises is a proof of blindness. 29 p 225

||Fanaticism in Judaism; it was anti-Hellenic, and satirized by Junius Iuvenalis,|| in an apparently genuine ignorance of the moral and intellectual sublimity of the religion which had betrayed its Jewish champions into their notorious militancy. In the history of Christianity likewise—both in its internal schisms and in its encounters with alien faiths—we observe the same evil spirit of fanaticism breaking out again and again. Because this is a monarchical theism, & not pantheistic as you are.

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30 p 254, marked X

||Toynbee quotes verses from the Tao-te King as translated by Arthur Waley.|| A fatuous poet pleased with vulgar rhymes. 31 p 259fn

[Note 5:]

||The paradoxical but right and natural victory of the “dark horse” motif in the Beatitudes, in folklore, in some fiction.|| This is only because the era was coming to an end. You assume that all things are radically changing all the time. Conditions are constant in essentials, else we could not exist 32 p 262, underlined

||On the history of the Jews. They raised themselves above the Syriac peoples in|| a mighty feat of spiritual intuition to perceive in the lineaments of a primitive volcano-demon of the Arabian Wilderness the epiphany of a God who was omnipresent and omnipotent. […] And then, after having divined a truth which was absolute and eternal, they allowed themselves to be captivated by a temporary and relative half-truth. They persuaded themselves that Israel’s discovery of the One True God had revealed Israel itself to be God’s Chosen People; and this half-truth inveigled them into the fatal error of looking upon a momentary spiritual eminence, which they had attained by labour and travail, as a privilege conferred upon them by God in a covenant which was everlasting. This is the first Blunder that I have detected in this interpretation. 33 p 271

He doesn’t like Oxford and quotes Cambridge books only. 34 p 275

||After the eighteenth century, the contributions of Italy|| to the general life of the age were inferior. except in opera 35 p 295

[…] Jugoslav nationalism in South-Eastern Europe has only been satisfied at the cost of a world war […]. Not settled yet: 1947.

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36 p 295

The inferiority of the Old World to the New World in psychological plasticity can also be illustrated from the histories of certain modern international frontiers. The New World has less structure, but is even more stubborn in sticking to what it has, as the only right thing. 37 p 298, underlined

The gift of creativity, which is in origin the reward of a successful response to a challenge, becomes in its turn, in the act of being conferred, a new and uniquely formidable challenge for its devoted recipient. N.B. the verbal derivation of events in this writer. If you succeed in doing something your reward is the gift of doing it. Your punishment is the temptation to do it again. Moralists have no physics. Their philosophy is all words. 38 p 307, underlined

||Dual citizenship in the Greek city-states.|| This creative compromise was psychologically possible only in those communities in which the idolatrous worship of City-State Sovereignty had not acquired a stranglehold over the citizens’ hearts and minds; and the importance of this psychological condition becomes apparent as soon as we remind ourselves of the actual circumstances in which this political invention was gradually evolved in a long historical process which the Roman political genius eventually carried to completion. The demonology of T. appears here in its nakedness. By admitting other cities to Roman citizenship, Rome had eluded the “stranglehold” of a demon that was lying in ambush for it, to punish it for being a city-state! 39 p 307

||Toynbee cites a book published at the Clarendon Press, Oxford.|| First Oxford book quoted, as far as I remember. 40 p 315

||The departed glories of a former age in the view of the eighteenthcentury traveller.|| You may now see Dresden or Monte Cassino destroyed by the sin of not being saved by the League of Nations. 41 p 317

Where a survival of the town government exists, all is more living & beautiful than when the tyrant great power

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(even in England) has flattened the towns into provincial centres. 42 p 318

||In modern times we|| replace the medieval Sovereign City-State, on the pattern of Florence or Nürnberg, by the modern Sovereign National State, on the pattern of France or Great Britain, as the standard sovereign unit in our political system; […]. You telescope the centuries there and lengthen them here. Wait a bit! 43 p 393, marked

This contrast between the respective experiences of the East Roman Empire and Bulgaria, in and after their Hundred Years’ War, […]. In such a conflict the less civilized combatant is apt to suffer egregious defeats and to show an extraordinary capacity for surviving them, while his more civilized opponent is apt to have the inverse experience of winning brilliant victories and then emerging exhausted from a struggle […]. Cf. England & Germany, the U.S. and Russia in 1947. 44 p 394

||On losers and winners in World War I.|| Repeated with modifications in 1939–45. Germany recovered and was wholly destroyed: Russia recovered & undertook to become a universal power. England withdrew exhausted: the U.S. advanced with a prophetic mission. In a duel with Russia, who w’d prevail? 45 p 407, marked

But can we count upon Time to prolong our reprieve to Eternity? And is it really a reprieve that Time has been granting us? Has not Time perhaps been fattening our Western body social, like a sacrificial victim, for a mighter holocaust than Orthodox Christendom was ever able to afford? Two or three years after you wrote this the atomic bomb was split.1 1

A rare example of Santayana’s idiom failing him.

46 p 551, marked Z

In Hildebrand’s generation the Western Christendom was passing out of the first into the second chapter of its history—out of a defensive state of mind in which the height of ambition was to keep alive, as the Abbé Siéyès boasted in a later age that he had lived through the French

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Revolution, into an adventurous state of mind in which this vegetative life for life’s sake began to seem hardly worth living unless it could now be transcended, on the Aristotelian scheme of social growth, in an effort to make life a stepping-stone towards attaining the true end of Man. Complete travesty of the text below. [Quotation from the Politics, I, chap. 2, para. 8.] Aristotle says: We build cities for defence: we dwell in them for virtue. 47 p 553, underlined

||The purpose of the church:|| the regeneration of Mankind? Salvation of souls, not political reform, is the object of Christian preaching. You are a corrupt Christian yourself. 48 p 572

||Reiteration of a point already made repeatedly concerning the top-heaviness of the Papacy.|| Redundant repetitous. T. is a cheap preacher when he is not a diligent “student” of history. 49 p 577

||The failures of the territorial politics of numerous popes.|| These defeats touch the man not the Pope. A Protestant always misses where the Catholic heart lies. 50 p 646, marked

If we have really lost the power or the will to practise the virtues of Gethsemane, then it is certainly better to practise those of Sparta or Valhalla than to practise none at all. Moralism at a loss to justify itself, turns to superstition rather than to reason & nature. 51 p 647

What is true of the dross in which the diamond has lain buried is likewise true of the ephemeral institution of War in which an eternal principle of goodness has glimmered darkly for a season, in the guise of ‘the military virtues’, in order that it may shine out brightly hereafter in the perfect physical peace of the City of God. This is utter rot. The beauty of sacrifice comes from the liberation of the will from every obsession. Not at all from the baby’s pap to be. 52 p 648

||Ways of waging war, and attitudes toward war vary in history.||

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The methods of war vary: the physical interference of one life with another remains. 53 p 649

Granting that this gruesome institution has provided a field for the exercise of ‘the military virtues’ yesterday, we may be sure that to-morrow the ‘chivalrous’ kind of War will either rankle into a ‘Militarism’ without a vestige of virtue or beauty or else will be transfigured into a militia Christi in which the physical warfare of one man against another will have been translated into a spirtual warfare of all men united in the service of God against the powers of evil. I.e. they are to have a common aim apart from the existence of any one of them. Very well. But one or another will survive to inherit that aim: and “war” of some kind must decide which. Perhaps the good children will chloroform the bad boys, as at Nürnberg. A. J. Toynbee

A Study of History Volume V. Waterloo. Sixty-eight marginalia.

1 p 13, top

Ridiculous fallacy. [Text underlined:]

[…] in the disintegrations of civilizations, the perpetual variety which gives light and life to their growth is replaced by a merciless uniformity; and intensification, instead of diversification, is the form of change which now relieves the monotony of the series of performances. The absence of interest for the historian is here projected into the world, as if each generation, in falling in love like its predecessors felt bored by the monotony of the feeling! 2 p 17

Not control over things but moral unanimity is the test of political health. 3 p 19, underlined

||On decline in Hellenic society:|| A ‘creative minority’ which had once evoked a voluntary allegiance from the uncreative mass, in virtue of the gift of charm which is the privilege of creativity, had now given place to a ‘dominant minority’ which found itself unable to exert the charm because it was destitute of the creative power.

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fashion is “creative”. It depends on novelty & is probably worthless. The test of true progress in the growth of viable faculties that support the radical order of the psyche 4 pp 28–29, underlined

[…] the ‘union sacrée’ between internal proletariat and dominant minority took the form of an amalgamation of the living worship of Osiris with the dead worship of the official Egyptiac Pantheon; and this artificial act of syncretism killed the religion of the internal proletariat without availing to bring the religion of the dominant minority back to life. for more than 2000 years. ^ “living worship of Osiris”:] ^ [At Might be said of Judaism in Christianity in Protestant times, & reversed in Catholic times. 5 p 31, marked

[…] creativity is subject to its own peculiar nemesis; and that a minority which has demonstrated its creative power by responding to one challenge victoriously is likely to inhibit itself from repeating its exploit—that is to say, from responding, later on, to a different challenge with equal success— […]. This is a British generalization of the occasional awakening of a dull comfortable society to different unnecessary projects of special circles. In most nations the “problems” are always the same, and the “response” a religious or philosophical resignation, always the same too.[?] This if the people are intelligent and have good traditions. 6 p 54

||The hatred of the Chinese for the Manchus.|| Can they [the Chinese] love the Americans? 7 p 61

||Toynbee quotes lines 365–75 of Gilbert Murray’s translation of Antigone: || High-citied he: citiless the other Who striveth, grasping at things of naught, […]. Shocking translation: why don’ t you give the original? 8 p 79

||Toynbee quotes Bergson, Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion:|| The first form of religion had been infra-intellectual […], the second was

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supra-intellectual. We may best understand religion in the incomplete opposition between the two. Had B. read vol. 5 of the L. of R.? 9 p 93

The plebs has no memory. Remove the old demagogues, introduce new ones and you can convert it to anything. 10 p 155, marked

We can also observe another fact in the life of an intelligentsia which is written large upon its countenance for all to read: an intelligentsia is born to be unhappy. 11 p 178, marked

The distinctively Jewish (or perhaps originally Zoroastrian) element in the traditional religious inspiration of Marxism is the apocalyptic vision of a violent revolution which is inevitable because it is the decree, and irresistible because it is the work, of God himself, and which is to invert the present roles of Proletariat and Dominant Minority in a tremendous peripeteia—a reversal of roles which is to carry the Chosen People, at one bound, from the lowest to the highest place in the Kingdom of This World. Apocalyptic Marx. 12 p 179, marked

[…] it is of the essence of the Marxian apocalyptic doctrine that the Messianic Kingdom is not only to be a material kingdom in This World but is also to be won by a victorious stroke of violence. If this archaic Futurism is the distinctive Jewish element in the Marxian faith, the distinctively Christian element is an Oecumenicalism which is positively antipathetic, and not merely foreign, to the Jewish tradition. Militant prophet & Jewish, but œcumenical like Christianity. 13 p 320, doubly marked

It will be seen that, in the record of our Western Christendom’s relations, [664–1171 A.D.] with the primitive societies round about, there are more entries on the debit and fewer on the credit side than in the corresponding chapter of the Hellenic Society’s account. This black & white list of events is the curse of this whole book. Is history a confessional? And by whose catechism guided?

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14 p 338, top

Quote in possible Review. [Text marked:]

Our present muster of other examples will perhaps have confirmed us in the belief that these are, in fact, the three camps into which any disintegrating civilization tends to divide against itself; [ and in the light of our survey we shall perhaps also have come ^to^ the conclusion that ] the characteristic works of dominant minorities are schools of ^^ philosophy and universal states, and that internal proletariats display their creative power in [ the creation of ] ‘higher religions’ and ^ ^ while external ^proletariats ^ [ of ] universal churches, express them^ ^ ^ ^ selves in barbarian or dissenting religions and in ‘heroic’ poetry. Scheme of this whole “Study”. 15 p 338, bottom

A trope suggesting a teleological miracle = a civilisation. 16 p 339

False Platonism. Potentiality is determined to a particular development by circumstances: the a priori element is only the inheritness of the psyche concerned. [ Cf. last page of this vol.] [End-page, opposite p. 712:]

Suppose that at some exceptional crisis the organisation of matter were ground so fine that no particular heritage remained, but only abstract or indeterminate potentiality for any growth whatever. It would be the distribution of these disinherited atoms,—this rising proletariat—that could alone induce a particular form of reorganisation; and then, as the heritage of each organised centre was enriched, it would at once narrow and predetermine the character of the future development possible for it, without destroying afresh its acquired heritage. 17 p 341

The Russians may do for us what Napoleon ought to have done, if they become Europeans. 18 p 359, marked Z

Alone among barbarian heresies, the Arab prophet Muhammad’s amalgam of Christianity and Judaism escaped the scrap-heap which is the usual destination of such crude barbarian black-smith’s work.

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Exceptional prejudice for A. J. T. 19 p 370

Judaism native to Babylon and not to Judaea? And does Egypt not count in this matter? 20 p 371

The philosophic & spiritual side of Hinduism not noticed? 21 p 389

Between them, the two archaizing Heracleidae and the two archaizing Gracchi let loose a spate of Violence which did not subside until it had swept away the whole fabric of the commonwealth which the would-be reformers had sought to save. Everything lapses in time. You are preaching. 22 p 390, underlined

[…] the men who worked their will upon a distracted world during the last two centuries B.C. begot […] a breed of public servants with the conscience and the ability to organize and maintain a universal state; […]. It was a confused violence that accomplished nothing. Alexander and Caesar were violent too but wise. 23 p 390, underlined

In the souls of the Roman fraction of the Hellenic dominant minority the ideal of Archaism had been supplanted by that of Detachment; in the souls of the Jewish fraction of the Hellenic internal proletariat the ideal of Futurism had been replaced by that of Transfiguration. ? ^ ^ vertiOnly futurism postponed? The Jews never took the cal direction except sadly, like Ecclesiastes. 24 p 393

||Peter, a “futurist,” drawing his sword in the garden of Gethsemane.|| Even at the climax of his Master’s earthly career—when all that the Master himself had foretold was patently coming true— […]. Is this way of taking the Gospels as if historical a mere façon de parler or is it an idée fixe that no learning can cure? 25 p 393, underlined

||Paul’s evangelism compared with Peter’s confession to Cornelius’s messengers.|| What are these two ways of life which produced these

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vast spiritual effects when they were respectively adopted in place of Archaism by Cato and in place of Futurism by Peter? The suicide of the republican die-hards was not a spiritual nor a vast effect. It expressed the pride of a sect, a sort of political fashion & irrational. 26 p 396fn, marked

||On the varying linguistic roots of “behold, the Kingdom of God is within you.”|| It is a moral allegiance or “spiritual home” that persons may develop or dwell in either singly or in company. You might be more intensely conscious of this state of grace in heaven than on earth but the time, place, or duration of the thing is accidental. 27 p 399, underlined

||In primitive society, one can distinguish alternation between the orgiastic and the ascetic,|| according to the season, in the tribe’s ceremonial corporate expression of its members’ emotions. The emotions that accompany orgies are supplied here to cause them. First you love music (although never heard) and then you play it to satisfy your musical emotions. Inverted psychology. 28 p 411, underlined and marked

||On “la trahison des clercs”:1|| Their treason did not begin with the pair of treasonable acts—a cynical loss of faith in the recently established principles, and a nerveless surrender of the recently won gains, of Liberalism—that have been perpetrated by our ‘intellectuals’ within living memory. The truancy that has given this latest exhibition of itself was set on foot, centuries earlier, when the ‘clerks’ repudiated their clerical origin—and in the same act cut our Western culture off from the possibility of drawing nourishment any longer from the sap of the Tree of Spiritual Life—by trying to shift the rising edifice of our Western Christian Civilization from a religious to a secular basis. [At “rising edifice”:] ! Liberalism = Protestantism = a bastard X’ity; so that to be a Fascist is to desert the Church. Yes, Hegel was a “Fascist”. He liquidated X’ity into Pantheism. 1

Betrayal of the Intellectuals, the title of Julien Benda’s well-known book of 1927.

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29 p 456, marked

[…] when the Christian Church eventually succeeded—whether in spite of persecution or because of it—in overcoming the proletarian opposition and establishing its own ascendancy over the internal proletariat’s life, the dominant minority signified its unenthusiastic acceptance of the proletariat’s revised verdict by a wry-faced announcement of its own conversion to a religion which had now decisively proved its title by its sensational victory in the proletarian arena. Plausible fiction. This was not the motive of Julian the Apostate or of Constantine. Philosophy and superstition also counted in both directions. 30 p 458, marked

The proletarianization of a dominant minority could be watched in the London metropolitan area in the year 1938 by any one who entered the doors of either a cinema or a club; for in the cinema he would see people of all classes taking an equal pleasure in films that had been artfully designed to cater for the taste of the proletarian majority of the audience, while in the club he would find that the black ball did not exclude the yellow press. Farewell to England. 31 p 617

||On the doctrine of predestination; we may conclude|| that his belief in the coincidence of his own will with the inevitable course of Destiny is hollow in the exact measure of the believer’s display of ‘dynamism’. As if the joy of doing what God has made us to do were not both spontaneous and pious. These insular prejudices & blind spots spoil T.’s book. 32 p 670

||Religious scepticism in seventeenth-century France.|| Was there no cynicism about religion before there were any Protestants? E.g. Machiavelli. A. J. Toynbee

A Study of History Volume VI. Waterloo. Sixty-three marginalia.

1 p l0, top

Last word

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[Text marked:]

The only society that is capable of embracing the whole of Mankind is a superhuman Civitas Dei; and the conception of a society that embraces all Mankind and yet nothing but Mankind is an academic chimaera. Yes. All mankind does not or need not have a unanimous vocation. The dogma that they ought to be unanimous under one law is a Hebraic instance of egotism. Cf. The Marriage of Venus, Jupiter’s last speech. 2 p 13

The whole of Mankind can never dwell together in a brotherly unity until men have learnt to exchange their intrinsically conflicting as well as parochial tribal loyalties for one common allegiance to a heavenly king. This is the Jewish claim to Domination, contrary to reason & liberty. 3 p 174

That is ‘palingenesia’ in which the work of creation is resumed, but not as a ‘vain repetition’. Neuen Lebenslauf Beginne Mit hellem Sinne, innd neue Lieder Tönen darauf.1 What blasphemy to quote Goethe on eternal life when he means only to keep the ball rolling. 1 New life / Begins / With a clear mind / And new songs / Resound to it. (Goethe, Faust, II,11.1622–26.)

4 p 217

||The idea of a superior Nordic race was first the work of de Gobineau before the French Revolution; it passed out of his hands|| into those of a Nietzsche and a Houston Stewart Chamberlain whose caricatures of de Gobineau’s theme helped to inspire the masters of the Second German Reich […]. Don’t you know that this was in Fichte far more serious than in Nietzsche? 5 p 241, marked

The outlook and ideals and standards and examples with which the saviour-outcasts’ advent irradiates the Internal Proletariat’s murky native ‘ideology’ are the only elements of the futurist Weltanschauung that survive the inevitable failure of the futurists’ forlorn hope.

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Aristocratic virtue survives in revolutionary leaders of the nobility: Alcibiades, Byron, etc. 6 p 256, underlined

||Machiavelli quoted on the necessity to force belief in people if they will not believe willingly.|| In these wholesomely brutal words Machiavelli brings out a sinister feature in the strategy of the philosopher-king which Plato almost disingenuously slurs over. N.B. Plato is always and essentially a dissembler, an idealist who forces his cards into the politician’s hand. Cf. Catholic teaching. 7 p 274, marked Z

||The difficult question of the adoption of Jesus as the son of God, versus his conception by the Holy Ghost. The two words “adoption” and “conception”|| have in our Christian version acquired a new connotation which is neither legal in the one case nor physical in the other, but is in both cases metaphorical. The essence of the Christian mystery lies in a belief that God has made himself, by means that have been spiritual and not corporeal, the father of a son who has lived and died on Earth as a man in the flesh. A. J. T. in deep water. 8 p 314

||Toynbee self-approvingly suggests that western disintegration has been explained by his review of disintegration in other civilizations.|| “I should leave this out, too.” B. Jowett’s words to his pupils. 9 p 315

||World War I was not the climax of a movement to ever more wars.|| If the series continues, the progression will indubitably be carried to ever higher terms, until this process of intensifying the horrors of war is one day brought to an end by the self-annihilation of the war-making society. faute de combattants! 1 ^ Quite so In 2 years ^ it was on us harder than ever and now 1948 threatens to come a third time 1

For lack of combatants.

10 p 362

It was an utter violation of the Jewish mind to conceive of God in the shape of a living creature. Cf. the golden calf.

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11 p 439

||Concerning the authorship and reliability of early documents.|| People normally half invent what they say they have heard or read, prouder of seeming to report than of actually “creating” i.e. lying. 12 p 448, marked

[…] the Gospels can be properly described as the epic cycle of the Hellenic internal proletariat; and epic poetry is a kind of Zwischenreich 1 between the two mental realms of ‘folk-lore’ and history. Cf. my “Idea of Christ in the Gospels” 1

Middle-ground.

13 p 457, marked Z

From the foregoing survey it would appear that the Gospels contain, embedded in them, a considerable number and variety of elements which have been conveyed to them by the stream of ‘folk-memory’, and which have originated partly in these waters but partly also on stretches of once dry ground which the shifting subterranean currents of a perennially flowing primitive psychic life have subsequently undermined and swept away. [ Damnable rhetoric] Bits of old philosophy or poetry were current, without any conception of their original sense. 14 pp 502–3

||On the source of the saying, “He that is not with me is against me,” attributed to Caesar by Cicero.|| The militant feel that neutrals are against them: traditionalists that neutrals are for them. And both parties are right. But was not Caesar the revolutionary who conspired against the Republic? Not at bottom, but only in forms: because he represented the force of evolution, and Brutus the conceit and peripheral dogma of private sentiment. ^ ^ 15 p 507

Style too verbose & would-be edifying. 16 p 508

||The slave-intelligentsia as heroic leaders.|| Aristocratic ethos does not fit a plebian hero, even in myth. Christ has the prophetic Jewish sublimity which is not aristocratic but mystical.

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17 p 527, marked

||The pagan roots of certain scenes in the Gospels. Why are they there?|| These scenes which [an author] has failed to knit up into the main fabric of his work may have been virtually impossible for him to leave out for the reason that his public may have expected to find them in any Volksbuch in which the hero was presented in the role of a saviour. The evangelists are not professional men of letters: they are docile to tradition and report; they look only for explanation in the fulfilment of old prophecies. If the faithful adopted a pagan picture, they copied it. 18 p 529

||A Jewish caption supplied to a Hellenic tableau? This with reference to scenes from Christ’s passion.|| Then not even S. John never felt that anything was Hellenic: they thought it was original in Jesus: & their one assurance was that Jesus had been the Messiah. 19 p 538, marked

[…] if, […] the Parables have been recognized by the Church as being revelation without being history, are we debarred from accepting other elements in the Gospels on the same footing because, unlike the Parables, they do not proclaim themselves to be fiction, but are cast, like epic poetry or ‘folk-tales’, in the form of statements of fact? Inspiration understood critically, but attributed mythically to a divine intention. Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature of the United Kingdom Volumes XIV, XVI, XVII, XXV. 1935–50 London: 1921. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Mark Twain

The Prince and the Pauper New York: 1909. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Mark Twain

The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn New York: 1912. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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Mark Twain

Mark Twain’s Autobiography New York: 1924. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Mark Twain

Tom Sawyer Abroad and Other Stories New York: 1924. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Umfazi [Clara Urquhart]

Amadodana Ami (My Sons) N.p. 1950. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Hans Vaihinger

Die Philosophie des als ob Leipzig: 1922. Georgetown. 352 marginalia.

[Usually I have followed C. K. Ogden’s translation, The Philosophy of ‘As If,’ London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner (1924), 1952.] [General Introduction.] 1 p 4, marked Z

It is the purpose of the organic function of thought to change and elaborate the perceptual material into those ideas, associations of ideas, and conceptual constructs which, while consistent and coherent among themselves are, as the phrase goes and as we can also say provisionally, “clothed in objectivity.” What rot! All this is a matter of words. 2p5

||We cannot know, but can only infer, objective reality. Therefore,|| thought has fulfilled its purpose when it has elaborated the given sensationcomplexes into valid concepts, general judgments, and cogent conclusions, and has produced such a world that objective happenings can be calculated and our behaviour successfully carried out in relation to phenomena. Is the man mad? Does he suppose animals & children, or even professors, don’t jump until they have formed universal ideas and passed universal judgements? 3 p 6, underlined

||According to Schopenhauer, the will|| is the only metaphysical principle, and a will that is blind and illogical, so the brain with all its ideas is in his

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opinion essentially nichts als ein Werkzeuge des willens, das ihm zu dienen und das Leben des Individuums zu erhalten hat.1 How can an instrument serve a will that has not yet the idea of what it wants? Has the Will an articulation of its own to begin with? Are its phases prearranged in the order of space, time, species, and individual, before the idea has arisen, to express that order in consciousness? If so Will is but a romantic name for the realm of matter. 1

… nothing but a tool, whose function it is to serve the will and preserve the life of the individual. 4p7

Durch diese Reduktion der Begriffe: Denken, Handeln, Beobachten u. s. w. auf schliesslich physiologische Elemente, auf Empfindungen, gewinnen wir allein den richtigen Massstab für die Abschätzung der logischen Arbeit, […].1 Utter confusion of terms. 1 Only through the reduction of the concepts thought, action, observation, etc. to elements ultimately psychological, to sensations, may we obtain a correct standard for the evaluation of work in logic ….

5 p 8, underlined

||One might define the purpose of thought as|| the elaboration and adjustment of the material of sensation for the attainment eines reicheren und volleren Empfindungslebens.1 Who wants this, and what is the use of it? Doesn’t the fool see that it is the complicated vegetation of material organs, like flowers, that introduces & perpetuates all this sensitivity? Cf. sex. 1

… of a richer and fuller life of sensation.

6 p 9, underlined

||The fact that|| die organische Funktion des Denkens meistenteils unbewusst verläuft.1 Indeed! 1

… for the most part, the organic function of thought takes place unconsciously.

7 pp 9–10, marked

Should the product of thought finally enter consciousness, or should consciousness momentarily accompany the processes of logical thought, this light only penetrates to the shallows, and the actual fundamental processes are carried on in the darkness of the unconscious. This is honest, but fatal.

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8 p 10

Es handelt sich für die Logik nun gerade darum, die dunkel und unbewusst arbeitende Tätigkeit des Denkens zu beleuchten und die kunstvollen Methoden, die sinnreichen Wege kennen zu lernen, welche jene unbewusst wirkende Tätigkeit einschlägt, um ihr Ziel zu erreichen.1 Freudian logic, i.e. myth. 1

Logic is specifically concerned to light up the dark and unconsciously working activity of thought, and to study the ingenious methods and devices which that unconscious activity employs in order to attain its object. 9 p 22, underlined

[Part I: “Basic Principles.”]

Logical processes are a part of the cosmic process and have as their immediate purpose [Zweck] the preservation and enrichment of the life of organisms; […]. Which? What is a Zweck? 10 p 23

Utility [of fictional constructs] is then a myth, and whatever conception you arrive at you call the reality, adaptation to which was useful to produce this very conception. Oh sapience! 11 p 25

[“Artificial Classification.”]

Confusion. One question is: Is nature articulate? Another question is: can or does the human mind discover that articulation, and express it in its existential terms? To the first question I answer Yes, to the second, No. The articulations of sense & thought are aesthetic, not material. They are literary descriptions of [word cropped] 12 p 27, marked Z

||Fiction treated as hypotheses unrealized are false hypotheses.|| They derive real value only if one realizes that they have been deliberately set up as provisional representations, which in the future are to make space for better and more natural systems. In another sphere, perhaps: i.e. in psychology or knowledge of discourse. 13 p 42

[Of “indispensable fictions”:]

Substance, above all, is such a fiction, as Fichte indicates its nature naïvely when he says, “The ceaseless change in the stream of time must be given something of a

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permanent and unchangeable nature to support it.” (Wesen d. Gelehrten 6. Vorlesung.) Permanence is important to substance because active (which posits a substantial medium) is prospective and preservative: it posits the continued efficacy of the changes it initiates. No absolutely changeless material state need be contained in this lasting substance. 14 p 42

[Apropos nothing in paticular:]

Thought is talk. 15 pp 42–43, doubly marked

||By a different method, Vaihinger reaches the conclusion of Kant: categories do not assist in grasping reality, and as analogical fiction, they cannot produce true knowledge.|| Yes. Not for literal knowledge, which is impossible of anything but essence. 16 p 51, marked

||Discussion of “élan vital,” vital force. Du Bois-Reymond quoted:|| “Force is simply a disguised outlet for the irresistible tendency to personification; a rhetorical device, as it were, of our brain which seizes upon a figurative expression because the idea is not clear enough to be directly formulated.” A hard blow and a soft blow are identical approaches and contacts of visible objects? There are inner reactions of the body that supply the notion of strain or force. Of course, used as a symbol in physics it is allegorical—like all perception and discourse. 17 p 67, underlined

||Ideals are fictions, but useful in history.|| The ideal is a Begriffsbildung1 ? contradictory in itself and with reality, but it has irresistible power. The ideal ^ is a^ practical fiction. The pretty image is one thing: the state of the world which would be best if and when it arose is another thing. The latter is “The ideal”. 1

Conceptual image.

18 p 68, underlined Z

The logical optimist will be depressed by this formula [of practical fictions] compressed into a few sentences. Die Wissenschaft geht unbarmherzig vorwärts.1

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Heaven won’t fall on your account, my boy. 1

Science moves forward mercilessly.

19 p 69

||In Kantian ethics, morality always rests on a fictional basis, yet we must act as if God imposed duties on us and as if we will be judged and punished for immorality.|| As soon as this as if is transformed into a because, its ethical character vanishes and it becomes a matter of our lower interests, mere egoism. This violent pose is a remnant of superstition, as in Kant. 20 p 98

It is not possible without the help of discursive thought to make ourselves intelligible to others or even to think or to calculate. Other people? What fiction is that? 21 p 98

The importance of the logical function does not prevent it from recognizing its own nothingness. Man’s most fallacious conclusion has always been that because a thing is important it is also right. What a fiction! 22 p 101, underlined and marked

Das diskursive Denken schafft sich selbst immer feinere Mittel, um mit diesen die Wirklichkeit zu bearbeiten, zu umspannen, zu umfassen: es ist ein logischer Fehler, das Mittel, das Instrument mit dem Gegenstande selbst zu werwechseln, zu dessen Bearbeitung allein es berufen ist.1 Yes Why is contradiction impossible in “reality” but harmless in thought? 1

Discursive thought creates more and more delicate means of encompassing and dealing with reality, and it is a logical error to confuse the means, the instrument, with what the instrument was created to deal with. 23 p 112, marked

||Kant’s Ding an sich, the thing in itself: only sensations are real.|| Confusion of origin and meaning of sensations. To ask for their origin is to have accepted their meaning: it is to have posited the natural world. Otherwise no origin could be found or demanded. But this acceptance of the meaning of sensation is necessary if you are to think or believe anything, or to write any stupid book like this.

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24 p 113, top

It is one last instance of hypostatizing given essences, to hypostatize our sense of ignorance into the Unknowable. The object meant is the one common intended object of all these descriptions—The world found about us in action. There is an unknowable residue in the best known things, and in the most charming people. 25 p 113

||For Kant, the Ding an sich was an absolutely necessary fiction, without which we cannot think or speak; the presented world is ungraspable.|| i.e. The Unknowable is required to keep up the false sense of subjectivity in regard to natural things, which it is the ghost of. 26 p 135, marked

[Separation of scientific from aesthetic fictions.]

Just as the aesthetician firmly decides between good and bad pictures, so the logician decides between good and bad fictions. Very good: now let us see how you manage it. 27 p 136, underlined Z and doubly marked

Die logische Wahrheit X eines Begriffes folgt demselben psychologis^ ^ die ästhetische Schönheit—nämlich dem chen Grundgesetze, wie Grundgesetz, das in der Seele das Zweckmässigste beharrt.1 Science is human, but truth is not. 1

The logical truth of a concept follows the same psychological ground rule as that of aesthetic beauty—the rule that in the mind the most purposeful perseveres. 28 p 144

[The difference between fiction and reality.]

A hypothesis is directed toward reality, i.e. the ideational construct contained in its claims, or hopes, to coincide with some perception in the future. If this means “reduced to intuition” it is impossible. But a fiction may be reduced to its initial instance, as matter to perception of a stone. The stone is not a hypothesis, but it is a “fiction” in so far as it is an existence described by a given essence. 29 p 159

The impulse to unify, and to substitute some single essence for any manifold is doubtless a physiological necessity: the

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equilibrium or organization of movements is a new system of movement, expressed in a fresh intuition. 30 p 166

[“Linguistic Forms of the Fiction.”]

The form of the atomic fiction is that matter must be treated as it would be, if there were atoms of which it was imagined to be composed. The form of the hypothesis connected with this assumption is: only of the presupposition that atoms exist and only if they do exist, can the empirical appearance of material phenomena be explained. This is still a hypothesis in the air: a positive hypothesis would say: “Such and such facts will be observed” and the intervening machinery would be fictitious. A hypothesis is a prophecy modified by a fiction. 31 p 178, doubly marked

[Outline of a “General Theory of Fictional Constructs.”]

[…] the psyche is a machine which is continually improving itself, and whose purpose is to perform as safely, expeditiously, and with the minimum expenditure of energy, the movements necessary for the preservation of the organism; […]. Not bad 32 p 179

To regard ideas as ends in themsleves is an error; and finally the theoretical is only a means to the practical. As soon as we treat the problem seriously from this standpoint, as first adopted by Kant and Fichte, several difficulties and obscurities become clear. The complication in the psyche which renders it intelligent is confused with the intuition involved. 33 p 184

||The formation of a Gleichheitszentrum, or similarity-center, in the psyche.|| What rot is this? 34 p 190, marked

Aenesidem correctly reduced Kant’s philosophy to the following: the necessity of being thought is by no means the same as existence [Sein]. This is true even if Sein is sensation elsewhere. 35 p 191, marked

||Thought needs mental aids in order to attain its purpose.|| It is true that Locke, Berkeley and Hume had partially recognized this better and more clearly

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than Kant. In Kant one looks in vain for the modern point of view which regards thought as a means to an end. This is the point to attack. 36 p 193

[End of page and chapter:]

Specious necessity & specious inconceivability are not authoritive over things. The obvious & the inconceivable are proper to animal faculty—they are subjective. But how does “utility” help them to become true? It does not: but a prosperous mode of imagination expresses a habit at least not fatal to the animal, and so has some slight value as a symptom for the order of nature. 37 p 217, underlined

[“Antithetic Error.”]

Gehen ist ein reguliertes Fallen: […].1 Cribbed from Schopenhauer, if it is not older. 1

Walking is a regulated falling.

38 p 220

[“The Law of Ideational Shifts.”]

The psychical elements can be divided into fixed and well-established ideas or groups of ideas. […] On the one side are groups of ideas which are without hesitation regarded as the expression of reality; on the other side ideas whose objective reality may be doubted. The former are dogmas, the latter hypotheses. the elaborate history of the mind is postulated in silence. 39 p 220, underlined

Die Seele hat die Tendenz,1 to bring all ideational contents into equilibrium and to establish an unbroken connection between them. N.B. 1

The mind has a tendency ….

40 p 228, doubly marked

To maintain a fiction as a fiction implies a highly developed logical mind, one that does not surrender too quick to the impulse to equilibrium, but distinguishes with care means from end. To maintain a purely critical standpoint as represented by Hume and Kant, great mental energy is needed. All attempts after Kant are nothing but attempts, and premature, to resolve the condition of tension, which is uncomfortable and prevents mental laziness. N.B. Quote

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41 p 279, underlined and marked Z

||The origin of the idea of sensation itself as a fiction is a metaphysical joke.|| Durch die „zufällige Ansicht“ der Philosophen kann nicht die Entstehung der Empfindungen aus einer Abweisung einer fingierten Störung erklärt werden.1 Not if you believe nothing: but V. is a credulous man. It is true that to hypostatize the Life of Reason would yield an absurd metaphysics. What you must hypostatize is physical substance. 1

One cannot explain through the “accidental opinion” of philosophers the origin of sensations from a refusal of an imaginary disturbance. 42 p 290, marked Z

How can it be that although in thinking we make use of a falsified reality, the practical result proves it to be correct? The solution must lie in the thought-process. The course of nature is unchangeable and proceeds according to hard and unalterable laws. Nature’s will is iron, but thought is an adaptable, pliant and adjustable organic function. What is “nature” here? 43 p 291, underlined

||Vaihinger writes of|| Denkinstruments1 […]. language! 1

Thought-instruments.

44 p 297, top

The art of remaining an idiot when you are a learned man. 45 p 301

[“Categories as Fictions.”]

Who authorized the use of “white” as a thing, or of “sweet” as an attribute? Who indeed? 46 p 307

A contradiction exists between the thing and its attributes thought of in isolation. For what can “thing” be without “attribute,” or vice-versa? The tension is here released in the judgment, “Sugar is sweet”, and we believe that this constitutes understanding, knowledge. […] Thought has now corrected its error. Strange that these mistaken people get on so well! The egotistical blunder is yours, my man.

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47 p 313, underlined

[“Categories as Analogical Fictions.”]

Die Kategorien sind also keineswegs ein angeborener Besitz der Seele, sondern sie sind im Lauf der Zeit angewandte und ausgewählte Analogien, nach denen die Geschehnisse erfasst werden.1 What on earth is the good on this system? 1

The categories are in no sense innate possessions of the mind, but analogies selected and applied in the course of time, according to which events have been explained. 48 p 317, marked Z

Criticism allows us to prove that analogies themselves cannot be understood, and further that they have been taken from fields of knowledge of too intricate a nature. ? Even the most useful of analogies, that of causality, the only one that in mod^ ^science has survived the general ruin, had its origin in a field of knowledge far ern too complicated to allow it to serve for explanation. It arose in inner experience and action, which is the product of a highly complicated form of being. These expressions are used today only symbolically, to designate an unalterable relation of sequence. True of metaphorical moral “causes”—not of the order of genesis in nature; not in sensation. What a muddle to regard the reckoning of material events as a means of bringing order into sensations where there is no order. 49 p 318

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas?1 1

Happy the man who can know the cause of things?

50 p 320, underlined and marked Z

[“The Practical Utility of the Fiction of Categories.”]

Nach rein „psychomechanischen“ Grundgesetzen categories? der ^ ^ is Verbindung1 fusion, interpenetration, association, etc. a knot, so to speak, formed in the conceptual stream; […]. Very doubtful literary psychology. 1

According to the purely “psycho-mechanical” principles of combination, ….

51 p 323

“Action” is a desire for sensations to come? Where is the sugar when I have sucked the sweet? Vain hypothesis! Sweet fiction! 52 p 324, top

“Why should thy avid dreaming logic speak of honey? ^ ^ Sweetness is all!”

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Plato might say this, as well as Aristippus. 53 p 324, bottom

The lying thought itself the only truth. That you’re a liar is all the truth of you. 54 pp 326–27, marked

Allein dieser Schluss von der Ergiebigkeit einer Vorstellung in der Praxis auf ihre theoretische Wahrheit ist sehr unlogisch und beruht auf falschen Beobachtungen.1 Very true: & this is the fallacy of pragmatism. 1

This conclusion as the result of a conception on its theoretical truth in practice is very illogical and depends on false observations. 55 p 366

If a fiction is “useful” it must exhibit some analogy in the order of the facts. This element in it will be literally true and dogmatic. So the element of prophecy in a hypothesis. In both cases there is simply a truth conveyed in a medium which has also a figurative linguistic or fictitious side. Vaihinger is therefore either announcing with trumpets that 1 + 1 = 2, that expression and knowledge are not identical with their themes; or else a perfect falsehood, that these have no analogy or relevance whatever to those themes. 56 p 367, underlined and marked

[“Lotze’s ‘Hypothetical Animal.’”]

||That fictional animal is useful for the theory of knowledge, according to Laas, because by|| developing the consequences of an impossible assumption, a false Kantian doctrine can be disproved: that an intelligence automatically provided with categories was necessary in order to arrive at objective knowledge; „das Lotzesche Tier, mit unserem Verstande ausgerüstet, wird an der Hand des unmittelbar Gegebenen sich wohl über objektive Ruhe und Bewegung ein Urteil verschaffen können“, ohne jene von Kant als notwendig erachteten kategorialen Funktionen.1 [In left margin between “Verstande …” and “kategorialen …”:] ? Did Kant conceive the categories as existing before they are employed? Aren’t they mere names for the actual intellect? 1

“Lotze’s animal, endowed with our understanding, would be in a position by means of the actual data to arrive at some idea of objective rest and motion” without those categorical functions which Kant regarded as necessary.

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57 p 381

Between fictions & hypothesis, & before either of them, comes description. As an indication of an object & its locus, description is a hypothesis; as a search for aspects and epithets, it is a fiction: but in itself, in its logical & cognitive force, it is a poetic use of the fictions to paint the hypothetical fact. This “painting” is genial caricature in human terms; but its subject-matter is not human: hence the charm and audacity of the picture. 58 p 387, marked Z

[“Abstractions as Fictions.”]

Die Realisation blosser Möglichkeitsabstraktionen hat zu den törichsten Fragen geführt, wie immer dies bei der Hypostase solcher Fiktionen der Fall ist; […].1 Poor dear essences! But these old ladies move in good society: Aristotle & Co frequent them, although Vaihinger refuses to know them. 1 The realization of bare abstract possibilities leads to the most insane questions, as is always the case in the hypostasis of such fictions; ….

59 p 472

[“The Fiction of Pure, Absolute Space.”]

Since the primary characteristic of a useful hypothesis is its freedom from contradiction, such a contradictory concept as an absolute, unoccupied, mathematical space cannot be a hypothesis. Why not? Every thing imaginable, thinkable, or mentionable is, in its essence, an immediate datum. 60 p 606

The “utility” of the Als Ob is perhaps reducible to a verbal utility or convenience: there are terms in which reckoning can go on, (like x’s & y’s) which are avowedly not the forms of things. So that no illusion or concrete fiction is demanded at all. 61 p 630

||Kant’s use of fictions in his Critiques: || Reason easily perceives the idealistic and purely imaginary elements in an idea of God. It cannot be persuaded by imaginary elements alone to accept at once as a real entity a product of its own creation. Reason thinks it has dogmatic proofs of such an entity and of its right to assert the reality of a mere idea. While the procedure is false, it is also useful.

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e.g. The interior of the earth is a hypothetical object: the parallels & meridians on its surface are ideas. God, the good, etc. are like the parallels & meridians. 62 p 652

Every thing may be only ideal, but in that case the glory of pursuing an ideal is a question of disposition. You may, if you think the game worth playing. There is nothing sublime in this. 63 p 664

The element of compulsion (inconsistent with autonomy) which lies in the categorical imperative is a survival in Kant of what his own philosophy makes out to be superstition—obligation imposed by authority and threats. 64 p 668

||A useful fiction is the idea of Zweckmässigkeit,1 the central idea of the Critique of Judgment. Kant quoted:|| The particular, empirical laws of Nature must be in accord with such unity as the understanding provides. Instance of existence in an irrelevant medium. If laws were facts they would lie in the medium of their terms, whereas they lie (if they are facts at all) only in the mind that thinks them, and which they do not reveal. 1

Fitness, suitability.

65 p 683, marked Z

||Kant quoted, from “Verkündigung des nahen Abschlusses eines Traktats zum ewigen Frieden in der Philosophie.”|| A postulate is an a priori given without the possibility of explaining itself as a more ready, more practical imperative. [The German defies translation, and Ogden makes no attempt.] We do not postulate things, nor above all the design of any manner of object, but only a rule for the action [Handlung] of a subject. N.B. This is the radical back-handedness of Kant. You know when there is nothing to know knowledge and ^ believe^ in belief without believing in anything. The age is full of people who believe in the Church without believing her doctrines, and are shocked at atheism, although God is entirely absent from their own belief.

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66 p 684

||The Als Ob functions in Kant like the notion that one believes in God as though there really were a God, and in the good as though the good were decisive in the world.|| This is not implied in pursuing the good at hand. On the contrary, if there was a Providence in everything, all pursuit of goods would be illusory if not impious. The contrary assumption is a mere local prejudice, not “critical philosophy”. 67 p 685, top

Kant is a dear old burrowing buzz-brain, but no guide. 68 p 707, marked

Finally the fiction of the idea of God reaches its climax in the idea of God as a judge who punishes the world. As Kant says in his “final note,” the idea of a divine penal justice is here personified: “it is not a special being who administers it, for in that case conflicts would arise between it and legal principles. It is justice regarded as substance […] which passes judgment.” Excellent, far better than I had supposed was forthcoming in Kant. Why, then, all that other stuff? Only the atheist, if he is a moral fanatic, believes in God. Ordinary believers, qui pretendent se sauver,1 are atheists. Moses the prince of atheists. 1

Who pretend to save themselves.

69 pp 722–23, underlined and doubly marked

||Reflections on the ‘Ding an sich’ in Kant’s posthumous papers.|| „Der Gegenstand an sich = x ist das Sinnenobjekt an sich selbst, aber nicht als ein anderes Objekt, sondern eine andere Vorstellungsart.“ In diesem Sinne nennt Kant das Wahrnehmungsding „ein Ganzes der Anschauung, welches objektiv bloss Erscheinung ist, dem der Gegenstand als Ding an sich lediglich in der Idee korrespondierend gedacht wird.“ „Das Ding an sich ist nicht ein anderes Objekt, sondern eine andere Art, sich selbst zum Objekt zu machen, nicht objectum noumenon, sondern der Akt des Verstandes, der das Objekt der Sinnenanschauung zum blossen Phänomen macht, ist das intelligible Objekt.“1 This is very important, if Kant’s constant doctrine. Isn’t it rather one more inconsistency? 1

“The object-in-itself = x is the sense-object in itself, not however as another object but rather as another mode of conception.” In this sense Kant calls the entity of perception “a unit of perception, which objectively is a mere appearance, to which the

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object as Thing-in-itself is thought of as corresponding purely in idea.” “The Thing-in-itself is not another object but another manner of becoming the object. It is not an objectum noumenon. The act of reason which makes of the object of senseperception “a mere phenomenon, is the intelligible object.” 70 p 743, underlined and marked

||Forberg’s Kant: Whether the striving for heavenly virtue is in itself virtue, or whether virtue exists in itself. If so, is the aspiration pointless?|| Der Gegner, der Vertreter der gemeinen Menschennatur, wird daraufhin, wie Forberg ausführt, sagen: „Das nicht. Aber es ist seitdem unvernünftig geworden.“1 Yes: unless the pursuit is a new object of desire for its own sake, as in a paper-chase. This is what Kant (a frivolous old fraud) really meant. 1 The opposer, the representative of common human nature will respond to that, as Forberg says, “Not like that. It has long since become absurd.”

71 p 745, marked

||In the religion of Als Ob, the aspiration to God creates the rules or laws, the success of which no one can judge, but the aspiration is its own end.|| ? This is Als Ob pure. Here again he relapses into the idea that it is in the hope and belief that it can come that you try to bring it. 72 p 751

||Vaihinger writes that Forbergian religion is at once positive and pessimistic.|| Heroic pessimism or romantic virtue. “All is madness, but what a fine madman am I ! ” 73 p 752

||On the interpretation in Forberg of Kant’s|| true sceptical atheism. All Catholic readers of Kant have always understood this. But few Catholics have read him. 74 p 761

||On the mythical aspect of Christ’s life, his suffering and death, according to F. A. Lange.|| Just what I have always thought and said. 75 p 761, marked

The weakness of American pragmatism is that it does not look into the double aspect of belief, but resolves scientific concepts of truth completely into the relativity of religious concepts of truth […].

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Very good. James couldn’t understand how, in the Life of Reason, I treated science otherwise than religion. 76 p 766, top

The whole polemic against materialism rests in the wilful confusion of the idea of matter with the object meant, of the term with the fact. Every idea projected upon the energetic object or dynamic thing is an idea of matter. These ideas must change with every sense and with every theory: but they all have the same object. 77 p 773, underlined

||On Nietzsche and the will to appearance.|| Zur Kunst wie zum Leben ist der Schein, die Illusion die notwendigste Voraussetzung: […].1 No: this is characteristic of German wrong-headedness, to call a concomitant effect a presupposition because it may be a ground for giving a certain name (“art”) to the operation. 1

In art as in life, appearance, illusion is the most necessary presupposition.

78 p 781

This notion of refuting a thing is grotesque: you may find ideal difficulties in the idea. 79 p 783, marked Z

||The persistence, the use, and honoring of fictions.|| “What a hero I am to live on lies, which I know to be lies!” This is the spirit of the arrogant villain of melodrama, so prevalent in contemporary Germany. If they only knew how ugly it is! 80 p 790

[Final page, still on Nietzsche.]

If he had lived to see The truth, he would have been like ME.1 1

The best summary of Santayana’s reading of Vaihinger is contained in an as yet (2010) unpublished essay, “Vaihinger,” a thirteen-page autograph manuscript on deposit in Special Collections, Columbia University Library. In the essay he calls the philosophy of Als Ob the “philosophy of bluff.”

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Paul Valéry

Charmes Paris: 1926. Waterloo. Two marginalia.

1 p 118

[Santayana translates the final verse of eight of the poem, “Le Rameur.”]

Leur nuit passe longtemps. L’âme baisse sous eux Ses sensibles soleils et ses promptes paupières, Quand, par le mouvement qui me revêt de pierres, Je m’enfonce au mépris de tant d’azur oiseux. Threading their length of night, and passing through, Th’eyelids laid low their suns and fain were furl’d. The deep cool garment of that stony world Wrapped me in scorn of so much flaunting blue. Threading their length of night, my soul pass’d through, Her eyelids sudden furl’d: her two suns set: And, as a garment down’d, that stony net Wrapp’d her in scorn of so much flaunting blue. Paul Valéry

Monsieur Teste Paris: 1927. Waterloo. Four marginalia.

1 p 41, underlined

L’incohérence d’un discours dépend de celui qui l’écoute. L’esprit me paraît ainsi fait qu’il ne peut être incohérent pour soi-même.1 i.e. for the complete psychic process, which is not a spirit. “For me” = for my reflective self. In my autobiography, however complete, there would be much incoherence, which an omniscient psychist w’d find coherent enough. 1 The incoherence of a speech depends on who is listening to it. In spirit, it seemed to me that his discourse could not be incoherent to him.

2 p 60, marked

What would be more tiresome than to conceive of a multitude of minds? Paul Valéry

Variété II Paris: 1930. Waterloo. Twelve marginalia.

1 p 85, marked

[On “Stendhal”:]

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Se connaître n’est que se prévoir; se prévoir aboutit à jouer un rôle.1 1

To know oneself is only to predict; to predict future action ends in playing a role.

2 p 104

The cult of specific place and of ancestors has not been restored, for railways and the disorderly effects of modern economies have still not caused many to feel the need, more or less profound, for roots more or less real, or the nostalgia for a practically vegetable state which those who have undergone it have not always much cared for. Cf. my fondness and dislike for Avila. 3 p 117, marked

Comédie et convention consistent dans une certaine substitution de ce que l’on sait à ce que l’on est,—et l’on ne sait pas ce que l’on est.1 1

Comedy and convention consist in a certain substitution of what one knows for what one is,—and one does not know what one is. 4 p 120

||Stendhal witnessed the establishment of political parties and of parliamentary government on the ruins of régimes.|| Last phase of the Reformation. 5 p 134, marked Z

||Stendhal’s characters look for the evils in human nature.|| Un «psychologue» à la Stendhal, tout sensualiste qu’il est, a besoin de la mauvaiseté de notre nature.1 Why evils? Why not simply facts? To think facts evil is a remnant of dogma. 1 One of Stendhal’s “psychologues,” complete sensualist though he is, requires the nastiness in our nature.

Paul Valéry

L’Idée fixe Paris: 1934. Waterloo. Eight marginalia.

Paul Valéry

Variété IV Paris: 1938. Waterloo. Three marginalia.

1 p 29, marked

||On the uniqueness of French atmosphere for the cultivation of letters.|| The world generously admits that we represent, in a time that is lacking in grace,

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a particular cult of exquisite things, and that we make favorites both artists and amateurs happy in their fate, their skies clear, their countryside filled with beauty, […]. La France bordel del’esprit.1 1

Brothel of the spirit.

Paul Valéry

Introduction à la poétique Paris: 1938. Waterloo. Three marginalia.

1 p 37, marked

Perhaps if great men knew they were great, they would not find themselves great. Paul Valéry

Lèttres à quelques-uns Paris: 1952. Columbia. Twenty-five marginalia.

1 p 10, underlined

[Final three lines of Valéry’s sonnet, “Élévation de la lune.”]

Alors, Elle apparut! Hostie immense et blonde Puis elle étincela, se détachant du monde Car d’invisibles doigts l’élevaient vers les cieux!1 Cf. my first verses. 1 “Moon-rise.” Then she appeared! Huge and blonde sacrificial victim / Then she sparkled, detaching herself from the world / For invisible fingers raised her toward the skies!

2 p 61, marked

[Valéry to F. Vielé-Griffin, 1898:]

In these journalistic times people do not know how to think. They call republican a little tyrant who speaks of liberty. They call the most obvious weakness power. They often call it Nature to want easy work, or the desire to sell themselves and to be considered men of genius of the day. The curse of France, etc. etc. 3 p 99, marked

[Valéry to Albert Thibaudet, 1912:]

Mais une certaine heure sonna. Il y en eut qui parurent se réveiller en sursaut. Quoi! j’ai 35, j’ai 40 ans! je ne suis ni riche ni célèbre. Je péris, si je reste. Et toujours dominé, toujours conscient d’être moindre! Quelque chose d’instinctif les précipita—au journal, au théâtre, aux centres académiques, aux ministres, aux éditeurs, au public: à toutes les latrines du troupeau….1

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The fear of not being of one’s own time. 1 A certain time arrives. They seem to awaken with a start. What! I am 35, I am 40 years old. I am neither rich nor famous. I’ll die if I do nothing. And always oppressed, always aware of being nobody. Some instinct hurries them on—to journalism, to the theater, to the universities, to the ministries, to the publishing houses, to the public: to all the latrines of the troop.

4 p 168

[To André Fontainas, c. 1927:]

||Valéry dislikes memories, either good or bad. The bad are painful, the better memories are the worst. Reading pages that he wrote as a young man produces his mood.|| There is something perverse in this perpetual unrest. An initial error intolerance of human nature? 5 p 201

[To Jean Guéhenno, 5 March 1932:]

||On the idea that war and human progress tend to go together in the minds of such as Maistre and Nietzsche.|| War is born from politics; politics, such as it is, needs for its purposes credibility, excitability, emotion; it has to have indignation, hatred, confidence, mirages. A lion, an Ajax or a singer may be perfect without reaching nirvana. 6 p 202, marked

Je ne veux point être cru, pas plus que je ne veux croire.1 1

I do not at all want to be believed, any more than I want to believe.

7 p 208, underlined and doubly marked

[To Jean de la Tour, 28 July 1933:]

||Valéry writes that he has never published philosophical matter that did not move his spirit.|| Le philosophe ne veut pas avouer qu’il fait et ne peut faire qu’œuvre d’art et se refuse à centrer cette œuvre sur soi-même, tel qu’il est. Je crois que prétendre à quelque chose de plus est une absurdité: Je préfère l’art avoué.1 1

The philosopher does not wish to aver that he makes, and can make only a work of art, and refuses to center that work in himself, such as he is. I believe that to pretend to anything more is an absurdity. I prefer avowed art. 8 p 243, marked

[To R. P. Rideau, 1943:]

||The index of Rideau’s book on Valéry causes him surprise, self-opposition, and sets forth contradictions.|| Je me permets de penser qu’il y a de la pauvreté d’esprit à être toujours d’accord avec soi-même.1

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Cf. the opening of my “Change of Heart”. Absolute spirit rejects all truth because it admits no objective reality. 1

I permit myself to think that it is one poor in spirit who is always consistent in himself. 9 p 244, marked

La logique n’est pas un des moindres pièges que nous trouvions sur les voies du verbe.1 1

Logic is not one of the lesser traps on the paths of the word.

Georges Valois

Le Père Paris: 1913. Georgetown. Eight marginalia.

1 p 39

une seule religion? une seule science? All this is weak: you merely say what it had to be. Roger Vercel

Bertrand of Brittany: A Biography of Messire du Guesclin London: 1934. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Vergil [Publius Vergilius Maro]

Carmina omnia Paris: 1858. Waterloo. One marginale.

[End-paper:]

From Joe Stickney Paris September 1902 Vergil

The Georgics of Vergil Translated by R. D. Blackmore. London: 1931. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Gore Vidal

The Season of Comfort New York: 1949. Waterloo. One marginale.

1 p 211, marked

||In Vidal’s novel, the owner of a “modern though not, chronologically speaking, contemporary” art gallery remarks:|| “I don’t see any great sense of decay or birth in the Americans; one must be aware of one or

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the other or both. Since our period is one of decay the European artists paint the disintegration of Western civilization but here, where in many ways the decay is more rapid, the artists, for the most part, pretend to ignore it. In America there is such a youth and beauty fetish. It’s like an old man, now impotent, who surrounds himself with beautiful young girls whose faces are only clumsy facsimiles of his desire. Your country is in love with beautiful boys who wear unstarched collars. I see so much exciting decay here, the accelerated rot of the New World and I think it a pity that so few of your painters seem aware of it. Your writer Faulkner is the only one aware of this destruction and he isn’t particularly liked in this country. Your country should be producing Joyces and Picassos but it hasn’t. Well, perhaps in time. You are still infatuated with youth; you still think you’re young and new: as though you could escape your degenerate ancestry; you brought decay with you from Europe: you’re not new at all and certainly not young. This is still the fin de siècle, the transition, and there’s no sign of a new messiah yet (God help us if it’s the Russians). Christianity is almost dead; it has one final fight in it and then dissolution. No, I show the pictures of the French and the Spanish because they are decaying with considerable ingenuity and faultless taste.” Peter Viereck

Terror and Decorum: Poems 1940–1948 New York: 1948. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Peter Viereck

Strike through the Mask! New York: 1950. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Peter Viereck

The First Morning: New Poems New York: 1952. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Leone Vivante

Note sopra la originalità del pensiero Rome: 1925. Georgetown. Thirty-three marginalia.

[Perhaps one-half the marginalia are translations of Italian words.]

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1 p 25

||Vivante discusses the idea of “scelta” (selection) in consciousness, and asks whether it is possible for there to be|| «selezione incosciente» (espressione inintelligibile!).1 Is conscious selection intelligible? The attention that wanders over given elements may be an incandescence playing over a field not given. 1

Unconscious selection (an unintelligible expression).

2 p 43

||On the relationship between perception, logic, thought, and the character of the thinker; the “spiritual reality” at work.|| Yes: This instance of thought can’t borrow its logic from the logic of other instances or from an absolute logic other than its own. 3 p 47, marked

||The spiritual principle,|| infinitamente originale, essenziale, che ha una intrinseca necessità o carattere […] e non strumentale.1 Its essence, by which it is known & distinguished in eternity. 1

Infinitely original, essential, having an intrinsic necessity or character … is not instrumental. 4 p 48

[Santayana paraphrases, sympathetically, into his own philosophical language, words he has used and will use repeatedly in others’ studies of thought-processes.]

Every given essence is an original & eternally itself. 5 p 64, marked X

Soltanto una necessità-finalità di valori, intrinseca, infinitamente originaria, soltanto questa profonda necessità, questa eternità nell’atto, questa soltanto fa l’uomo integro, non monco, non goffo, nei suoi movimenti non arbitrario e inconsulto….1 These two sections are mystical in the bad sense—intuition becomes Schwärmerei.2 1

Only an ultimate necessity of values, intrinsic, infinitely original, only this the integral man, not incomplete, not clumsy, undertakes in movements un-arbitrary and well-considered. 2 Gush. 6 p 83, marked Z

[On muddy thinking. Santayana sums up:]

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An Italian is a kind of man, a man a kind of animal, an animal a kind of creature endowed with sensibility: Q.E.D. 7 p 84, marked Z

||Eyes are not only to see with, but we have them|| as instruments of life, instruments to accomplish an end. Confusion: You see because an animal so endowed has a Spiritual life, which his eyes are instruments of: but the demand for eyes is nonsense. 8 pp 173–74

A truth reveals itself immediately, but not without some sense of victory. But its name assuredly is liberty, liberation coming to oneself power is asserted, ^ ^ a value, implied force or vocation; grace or merit. 9 p 250

[Santayana’s paraphrase of a long paragraph:]

That is: choice is not between given alternatives, but is instinctive—expressive of a physical affinity. 10 p 251, underlined

[…] valore come causa; […].1 Affinity: I think as my physical nature prompts, in its service. 1

Values as cause.

11 p 275, marked

[Santayana’s concise reduction of 200 words of Vivante:]

Faith is imposed by a vital requirement or instinct, because I am acting out my faith before I express it dogmatically. Leone Vivante

Studi sulle precognizioni Florence: 1937. Waterloo. Twenty-five marginalia.

1 p 45, underlined

The ineluctable fact does not prove determinism. […] Fact implies some thing as an obscure will which opposes our own, indicating an obscure willed reality final, spirituale; […]. Rather, superstitious because the separate absolute predicted event has impressed the speaker or is hugged by one of his passions.

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2 p 110, marked

Ammesso che la figura del sogno non abbia voluto imbastire una commedia, le sue parole sembrano supporre: 1) voluntà minori (quella del defunto) che interferiscono, in modo sopranormale, modificando parzialmente l’avvenimentto; 2) uni più forte precisa volontà, o altrimenti un’anticipazione totale, o di più largo giro, e di più oscura natura;1 Vivante is mad. 1

Suppose that the figure in a dream had not wanted to sketch a comedy, his words might seem thus: 1) the lesser will (that of the dead) which would interfere, in a super-normal manner, partially modifying the introduction; 2) a rather more exact will, or otherwise a total anticipation, or given another twist and a darker nature; [All in the service of how to interpret psychic material.] 3 p 179

||Thought is not art, but artifice.|| Aesthete not craftsman—true of Vivante. 4 p 184

[Santayana translates concisely:]

Matter is the “will” to take a form. 5 p 187

||How a work of art comes into being.|| Imagination is first hand, not second hand experience or creation. 6 p 188, marked Z

Half-right. Images are confused with essences. Nature pursues chosen essences: images are only glimpses of those (or other) essences, & caricatures of them. 7 p 194, underlined

||It is the function of the mind to be open to receiving images as though they were orders, to retain them in memory, and|| a custodirli in istrati di coscienza meno facilmente accessibili, […].1 An order, my friend, is not an image but a threatened compulsion. It scares the psyche, and canalises it—deprives it of fabulating with a good conscience. 1

To care for them in the strata of the mind least easy of access ….

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8 p 196, marked Z

Tropes are not adaptations: they are experiments. 9 p 200

||Memory and forgetfulness.|| Why does old age make me forget at once what I set about doing? Leone Vivante

Indétermination et création Translated by Lorenzo Ercole Lanza Paris: 1939. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Leone Vivante

La poesia inglese ed il suo contributo alla conoscenza dello spirito Florence: 1947. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Leone Vivante Notes on the Originality of Thought: The Concept of Internal Necessity, Poetic Thought and Constructive Thought Translated by Arthur Brodrick Bullock London: 1927. Georgetown. No marginalia.

Victor Wolfgang von Hagen

The Aztec and Maya Papermakers New York: 1944. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Victor Wolfgang von Hagen

Sudamérica los llamaba Mexico City: 1946. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Victor Wolfgang von Hagen

Frederick Catherwood, Archt. New York: 1950. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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W. Bayard Cutting, Jr. 1878–1910 New York: 1947. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Selma Walden

Do You Ask for My Death? Chicago: 1945. Self-published. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Edward Perry Warren [See Raile, Arthur Lyon]

Charles Waterman

The Three Spheres of Society London: 1946. Waterloo. No marginalia.

John Broadus Watson

Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist

Philadelphia and London: 1919. Texas. Forty-six marginalia. 1 p 8, marked

Because an occasional business leader has known how to pick out and keep good men, we are offered no reason why we should not seek to understand and control the processes involved in picking and keeping good men. The same may be said of the factors in keeping men out of crime, keeping them honest and sane, and their ethical and social life upon a high and well-regulated plane. Tyranny. Isn’t this rather a Jesuitical art of controlling men’s souls? Trapping them into little habits, and small enticements, until they can only run in that harvest. 2 p 11, underlined

Life presents stimuli in confusing combinations. As you write you are stimulated by a complex system—perspiration pours from your brow, the pen has a tendency to slip from your grasp; the words you write are focussed upon your retinæ; the chair offers stimulation, […]. twirls! Oh, wretched American professor!

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3 p 11

The world of stimulation is thus seen to be exceedingly ugly and ^ ^ complex. 4 p 12, underlined

||Watson’s theory of “reaction possibilities”:|| It lies well within the bounds of probability that if we were able to obtain a new-born baby belonging to the dynasty of the Pharaohs, and were to bring him up along with other lads in Boston, he would develop into the same kind of college youth that we find among the other Harvard students. His chances for success in life would probably not be at all different from those of his classmates. Without being a Pharaoh I think I know some differences. 5 p 44, underlined and marked

Owing to the remarkable but widespread notion that language behavior has some peculiarly great significance, the development of performance tests has been seriously handicapped. People are supposed to think when they talk; it is a prejudice; it might lead to the conclusion that women think more than men. 6 p 79, underlined

The various reactions to noise stimuli have not received any great amount of study. Any tonal stimulus interrupted before two complete vibrations have been transmitted to the fluids of the ear is reacted to as a noise. Popular language contains many words characterizing noise stimuli such as hiss, murmur, sigh, boom, bang, rumble, crash, etc. grumble, crish-crash 7 p 89, underlined and marked

||On reaction to light:|| The subject reacts to it as to a non-homogeneous or white light. N.B. the way of avoiding saying seen. 8 p 202

||A child in a rage goes into a “death feint.”|| [At top:]

Je demeure immobile, et mon âme abbatue cède au coup que me tue.1 1

I remain motionless, and my battered soul / surrenders to the blow that kills me.

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9 p 226

||Certain people can type only so many words a minute, trapped, apparently, in stereotyped responses.|| What is the test of health? To work longer hours and to be able to type-write more words a minute? 10 p 227, top

[Apropos of nothing in Watson:]

Thinking is muttering. 11 p 229

||Watson concludes from his study of emotional reactions that emotionally unstable people need medical attention.|| Tyranny. Nothing unusual is to be allowed. 12 p 231, marked

Probably every stimulus which leads to a definite instinctive act leads at the same time to some change in emotional tension. It seems easier to believe that emotion can occur without overt instinctive response than that instinctive action can occur without at the same time arousing emotional activity. This disproof of mere behaviourism—because it is contrary to fact. 13 p 267, marked

||Modern education frustrates a boy’s natural mechanical talents, putting in their place chance, vague aspiration to business or the like.|| In socialism the boy would be put to the trade (sailor, carpenter, hunter, etc.) which he affected, and not taught the higher snobbery. The family must be abolished. 14 p 269, underlined and marked

Not until the child begins to handle and generally manipulate objects, to build with blocks or clay, to crawl or walk from spot to spot and to put on language habits is it a going human concern. Style 15 p 274, underlined

The implicit-habit systems which we cannot observe except with the aid of instruments are probably equally as numerous if not more so and oftentimes more complex than the explicit. Style

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16 p 319, underlined and marked

||Concerning a child’s early habits of language:|| Abbreviated and short-circuited actions become a necessity if it is to hold its own in that environment and make progress. What is the teleology here? 17 p 332

||Of the man who would like to go to the races, but decides he must write letters.|| DUTY! Alfred Weber

Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte Berne: 1946. Waterloo. Seventy marginalia.

[The book was written, Weber says, toward the end of World War II.] 1 p 8, marked

Das Schicksal der Welt liegt heute in sehr wenigen Händen, so wenigen wie noch nie in der Geschichte.1 1

Today the fate of the world lies in very few hands, fewer than ever before in history.

2 p 33, marked

There is a spiritual history of Europe in terms of dogmatism. But what her great men saw in absolute values that were not dogmatic, which values they honored, and how they understood or modified them, that is the genuine spiritual history of Europe. Borrowed and native elements in the life of spirit. 3 p 33

||Despite its material wealth, nineteenth-century Europe sank into nihilism.|| Embarras de richesses1 bring on despair. 1

Overwhelming riches.

4 p 41, marked

||Michaelangelo’s slave-figures. A transcendental animation marks them.|| Self-transcendence of matter. 5 p 43, marked

One must be blind not to feel in Michaelangelo’s figures his obsession with transcendence, undogmatic, the basis of which is present in all his symbolic figures, whether Christian, Judaic, or derived from ancient mythology. They appear to

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detach themselves from their origins, from their mythological burden to become purely and directly human. Of course, since the myth is itself a rendering of nature. 6 p 45, marked

||When Shakespeare’s major figures use the pronoun I, they are not merely individuals, but as Gundolf says,|| their destinies, in all their unmistakable characterization, “powers become Man, the incarnation of various elemental forces, tensions, colours, masses.” The spectrum of chaos. 7 p 51

||A discussion of Othello.|| [Santayana’s generalized speculation:]

Othello is jealous of his young wife: but the Christian world is jealous of Othello, as the gods were jealous of good fortune in Greece. 8 p 65

||Approving quotation of Hobbes concerning the “beast-world” of lust for money and power; efforts to elevate such motives through transcendental visions.|| Hobbes & Darwin Sophistry & hypocrisy right fundamentally about the modern world. 9 p 75, marked

||The eighteenth century; its differences from the preceding period.|| The regulation of the wolf-hunger of the state under William of Orange, and in which people could see a new and perhaps eternal principle of life for the West, superseding the former supra-biological sanctions, eased into life as a whole harmonious conceptions and a sense of balance. Respectability and dignity replaced religion. This lasted in th the 19 century. 10 p 88, marked

||Praise of Goethe.|| The type of man that the upper classes produced at this time was of a breadth, depth, and delicacy of feeling and fellow-feeling unexampled in any age. His sensibility went out broadly, without allowing it to disintegrate chaotically into himself. Goethe at his best. 11 p 89, top

Egotism in German Philosophy.

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[Text marked:]

||The weakness of the latter half of the nineteenth century lay in its discounting scientific and philosophic ideas of reality of the foregoing periods and substituting groundless structures quite separated from existence.|| th The real forces of nature subjectified in the 19 century. 12 p 95, underlined and marked

||Weber sums up his reading of Kant and later nineteenth-century philosophies.|| Denn hier zum erstenmal wird, veranlaßt durch die Atmosphäre des nach Napoleon heraufziehenden Jahrhunderts, eine spontan ergreifbare Macht, der Schopenhauer die Chiffre Willen aufdrückt, gesehen und als das Wesen der Objektwelt, als das «An sich» des Daseins gefaßt. Damit wird deutlich in Fluß gebracht, in anderer und tieferer Weise als in dem scholastischen Denken Hegels, ein Sichbewegen und Sichentfalten alles dessen, was hinter den denkerischen Fixierungen des achtzehnten und des vorangegangenen siebzehnten Jahrhunderts […].1 1 Here, stimulated by the atmosphere of the century dawning behind Napoleon, Schopenhauer sees a power which he names Will, that we can apprehend spontaneously and know as the essence of the objective world, as the “in itself” [Kant] of Being. Thus in a different and more profound manner compared to the scholastic thought of Hegel, he brings about reanimation and unfolding of what was an immediate datum of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

13 p 120, marked

||After broad economic prosperity in England, c. 1875, and apparent progress for the working-class as well, the prosperous middle class forget the misery of the 1840s and acquisition became again paramount.|| Still so in the U.S. 14 p 121

||In Germany the intellectuals withdraw into a corner after 1875.|| The Intellectuals sit admiring in a corner? Don’t they really love the man of action? 15 p 122

||The appearance of an intelligentsia standing apart from the bourgeois world, repudiating it.|| Rise of the detached cosmopolitan intellectual. Aesthetic Jews and I! Nietzsche here? 16 p 144, underlined and marked

[“Nietzsche and the Catastrophe.”]

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||The superman and the Dionysian view. Nietzsche:|| «böse heiß ich’s und menschenfeindlich: all das Lehren vom Einen und Vollen und Unbewegten und Satten und Unvergänglichen. Alles Unvergängliche—das ist nur ein Gleichnis. Und die Dichter lügen zu viel. […]»1 Very clever and a back view of the truth. The likeness is the eternal element in the transitory. 1

“I call it evil and misanthropic: all the teachings about the One and the Perfect and the Unmoved—that is only a figure, a metaphor. And poets lie too often.” 17 p 165

[On the Will to Power: ]

It is not true that all interpretation is a matter of perspective. No Absolute view of that state [? illegible] but only normal madness. 18 p 166, marked

What else is the self-enlarging quantum but a mechanistic concept of measure taken over from contemporary natural science, which Nietzsche so hated? He should have left the physics to the physicists. 19 p 169, underlined

||From the Will to Power: a serious weakening of spontaneity results in heaviness and weariness rather than in external alertness.|| Dazu sozial eine «überreichliche Entwicklung der Zwischengebilde und Zwischenpersonen», die «dem Staat einen unsinnig dicken Bauch machen»; […].1 1

Socially, “a vast crop of the half-educated and half-persons,” who “give the state a ludicrous fat belly.” [Santayana draws a “fat belly” in the right margin.] 20 p 171, marked

||Nietzsche’s “Herdentier,” herd-animal, responds to commands and obeys.|| Even in America people elect a Roosevelt 4 times—a sort of Hitler! 21 p 172

||Nietzsche’s hope for a “great cure.”|| Can the Russians do it? Or the Americans?

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22 p 179, underlined

||Nietzsche’s ultimate vision of the highest, greatest man, who will demand of the world a vast task.|| «Denn unsere Kraft ist es, welche über uns verfügt.»1 Kraft = artificial strength, militancy. It play [sic] in the psyche, as well as in society. 1

For it is our power that rules us.

23 p 204, marked

|| Just before 1914,|| the forces of imperialism, nationalism, and militarism were coming together in feverish cooperation behind the scenes. Auch capitalismus. 24 p 204

||With the outbreak of the Great War, the entire spiritual and intellectual world|| collapsed. It fell apart not only in Germany but the entire earth was smashed as if with a powerful hammer-blow. Not in my case! 25 p 206

[At the end of the long chapter on Nietzsche:]

Why nothing about Weimar and Hindenburg? Or the Russian revolution, friendly to Hitler? 26 p 215

||Weber asks whether it is not possible for the world to be linked to the transcendental and metaphysical level of earlier times, before the onset of nihilism?|| Superstition to the front again. This is a worse result than the others. 27 p 239, marked

||The necessity for Germany to educate herself once more in order to achieve spiritual renewal and transformation.|| And foreign powers must again be clear: the spirit cannot be compelled, it bends as and where it will. They must leave to the Germans their renewal of mind and character. Anything else would be nothing but waiting for revenge and a wish to push into some crack or other of the new world syndicate or something equally disastrous, which could only be worse. American conceit & British stupidity take note! 28 p 241, marked

[“Fragments to Direct Transcendence.”]

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Whereas our difference arises from immediate naked experience of how active, spontaneous forces operate in nature and matter, while mind is only a special expression of the spontaneity which pervades all existence. Spirit is a mode of natural exuberance [ so that what W. means would be that each centre of life has an environment to count with and every environment centre of life active within it ] . 29 p 244

Quite true that mechanism is itself a spontaneous miracle. The question is only how regular and pervasive any trope is. 30 p 251, underlined and marked

When we experience the power striving for beauty of expression and active in an extraordinary way in the world of plants, experience it as a disparate yet unifying phenomenon, as in the symphonically orchestrated carpet of flowers in an Alpine valley, wo sie individuell und artmäßig Getrenntes in eins zusammenfaßt,1 then it seems as though it [that power] embraced the inanimate too, and raised the whole to a melody of vibrant color and line. ? Myth gone mad. 1

Where it unites things that are separate into one category, … .

Hermann Weyl

Raum, Zeit, Materie Berlin: 1923. Georgetown. Fourteen marginalia.

[None from p. 23 to the end on p. 332. Weyl’s mathematical treatise no doubt strained Santayana’s admittedly weak mathematics.] 1 p 7, marked

[On measurement of time:]

Note that it is the filling that determines the extent of a duration. You assume that you can transfer the same fact to a different portion of time, which will then be equal to that time filled by that event in the first instance. In itself the smallest length of time equals the greatest. 2p8

The chosen point of vantage remains essential to any vista in time. But not to the order of the events surveyed. ^ ^ 3p9

[At the end of the introduction:]

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X Why assume that an object can be the same when posited in two acts and measured on two scales? Animal faith! According to this, relativity is only a matter of scales & measures, and the universe is assumed to be single and unambiguous.

John Hall Wheelock

Poems: 1911–1936 New York: 1936. Waterloo. No marginalia.

Alfred North Whitehead

Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect

Cambridge, England: 1928. Georgetown. Twenty-eight marginalia. [In his Preface, Whitehead writes that this work is best understood by reference to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding and to Scepticism and Animal Faith by George Santayana.] 1p4

||An artist, a colored shape, a chair, and a puppy dog are posited. The dog is commanded to sit; the artist’s perception of a shape.|| This seems to imply a ridiculous psychologism, as if the dog or man had to infer the existence of the chair (and what would “chair” mean?) before he sat in it. Of course the colour etc. are effects of his reaction, not causes of it. 2p5

[…] both men and puppies often disregard chairs when they see them. Against behaviourism? 3 p 10

||On the “self-production” of a symbol:|| The potter, and not the pot, is responsible for the shape of the pot. An actual occasion arises as the bringing together into one real context diverse perceptions, […] feelings, […] purposes […]. Does this ever happen? Not to me. 4 p 11

||No symbols are without meaning; there are no symbols alone or in compartments of experience.|| This statement is the foundation of a thorough-going realism. phenomenalism? ^ ^

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5 p 13, underlined

[…] why do we say that the word ‘tree’—spoken or written—is a symbol to us for trees? Both the word itself and trees themselves enter into our experience on equal terms; […]. visual images? A tree never entered into my experience: I am not a park. 6 p 14, marked

The poet’s readers are people for whom his words refer symbolically to the visual sights and sounds and emotions he wants to evoke. This is not very good. What would Valéry say? 7 p 41, underlined and marked

||We know time as succession.|| But this succession is not pure succession: it is the derivation of state from state, with the later state exhibiting conformity to the antecedent. Time in the concrete is the conformation of state to state, the later to the earlier; and the pure succession is an abstraction from the irreversible relationship of settled past to derivative present. N.B. 8 p 42, marked

The past consists of the community of settled acts which, through their objectifications in the present act, establish the conditions to which that act must conform. This is very good. “Acts” are moments in the flux of substance. Each is occasioned by the combined influence of its predecessors, in spatial as well as temporal recession. 9 p 43, marked

Thus the immediate present has to conform to what the past is for it, and the mere lapse of time is an abstraction from the more concrete relatedness of ‘conformation.’ Quite so. 10 p 43, marked

The ‘substantial’ character of actual things is not primarily concerned with the predication of qualities. It expresses the stubborn fact that whatever is settled and actual must in due measure be conformed to by the self-creative activity. This is good, except for the “self-creative activity” which is simply a sham name for flux. The need of going on is

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just as fatal as the necessity of going on from here with this. 11 p 93, marked Z

The world is a community of organisms; these organisms in the mass determine the environmental influence on any one of them; there can only be a persistent community of persistent organisms when the environmental influence in the shape of instinct is favourable to the survival of the individuals. What is the instrument of instinct and on what does it work to prove its aptitude? 12 p 99

||The vagueness of symbolic words in literature.|| Eloquence would then always be deception: but there is the art of showing the eloquence of things. 13 p 100

Our only interest in the hoot [of a motor car] is to determine ( a definite locality as the seat of causal efficacy determining the future.^)^ ^ ^ “to Is this meant to be humorous? If so, he might have said determine the whereabouts of the enemy.” 14 p 104, underlined

The art of free society consists first in the maintenance of the symbolic code; and secondly in fearlessness of revision, to secure that the code serves those purposes which satisfy an enlightened reason. What is your test? Alfred North Whitehead

Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology

New York and Cambridge, England: 1929. Texas. 371 marginalia. [A great many of the marginalia are verbal or incidental markings, and several are Daniel Cory’s.] 1 p vi

Science and opinion, not nature, is to be the theme. 2 p 9, underlined

In monistic philosophies, Spinoza’s or absolute idealism, this ultimate is God, who is also equivalently termed ‘The Absolute’. In such monistic schemes, the ultimate is illegitimately allowed a final, ‘eminent’ reality, beyond that ascribed to any of its accidents. In this general position the philosophy of organism seems to approximate more to some strains of

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? Indian, or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European, ^ ^ thought. I agree that the ultimate has no pre-eminent reality. But Brahma surely is said to have it. 3 p 14, marked Z

The depositions of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel, merely mean that ideas which these men introduced into the philosophic tradition must be construed with limitations, adaptations, and inversions, either unknown to them, or even explicitly repudiated by them. A new idea introduces a new alternative; and we are not less indebted to a thinker when we adopt the alternative which he discarded. Philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher. Too evolutionary and “historical”. The impossibility of reversion is accidental. 4 p 14, underlined and marked

||The appeal to facts is difficult, because it must be phrased in the instrument of language.|| This appeal is not solely to the expression of the facts in current verbal statements. The adequacy of such sentences is the main question at issue. It is true that the general agreement of mankind as to experienced facts is best expressed in language. He feels a qualm but reverts to his sin. Experience is expression. If science seeks to express generalities of experience, it is merely thin literature. 5 p 17, underlined

[…] actual entity […]. Truth must think itself? 6 p 23, underlined

[…] the social expression ||of experience.|| This is the Hegelian side of Whitehead: all is the history of theory. 7 p 26

The electrons long for the nucleus. And what does the nucleus long for? 8 p 27, marked

It is a complete mistake to ask how concrete particular fact can be built up out of universals. The answer is, ‘In no way’. The true philosophic

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question is, How can concrete fact exhibit entities abstract from itself and yet participated in by its own nature? Very good: Essences cannot produce matter: how does matter acquire essence? 9 p 32, underlined

[…] whatever is a datum for a feeling has a unity as felt. Remember that this [datum] means cause. 10 p 33, underlined

[…] every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance, has its reason either in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, or in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence. This category of explanation is termed the ‘ontological principle’. It could also be termed the ‘principle of efficient, and final, causation’. Facts are primitive. They may be regarded as their own origin and as their own purpose. 11 p 34, underlined and marked Z

The ‘subjective aim’, which controls the becoming of a subject, is that subject feeling a proposition with the subjective form of purpose to realize it in that process of self-creation. Horrible way of saying: “turning up”. 12 p 36, underlined and marked

The Category of Conceptual Valuation. From each physical feeling move^ ment of the psyche there is the derivation of a purely conceptual ^ feeling whose datum is the eternal object determinant of the definiteness of the actual entity, or of the nexus, physically felt. Yes, if I understand. 13 p 39, underlined

It is fundamental to the metaphysical doctrine of the philosophy of organism, that the notion of an actual entity as the unchanging subject of change is completely abandoned. N.B. Substance is not unchanging, or it would be non-existent. He is thinking of the Ego! 14 p 40, marked

In the philosophy of organism it is not ‘substance’ which is permanent, but ‘form’.

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In mine also: yet substance may be constant in some respects. 15 p 42

The primordial created fact is the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. This is the ‘primordial nature’ of God. God primordially contemplates the Realm of Essence. Does “valuation” imply choice, in view of order? Then God would be contingent. 16 p 42, marked

‘Creativity’ is another rendering of the Aristotelian ‘matter’, and of the modern ‘neutral stuff’. 17 p 42, marked

But it is divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of ‘form’ or of external relations; it is the pure notion of the activity conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world—a world which is never the same twice, though always with the stable element of divine ordering. Very good 18 p 53, underlined

||Whitehead claims authority for his main positions|| of one, or the other, of some supreme master of thought—Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant. !!! 19 p 54

Apart from such orderings, there would be a complete disjunction of eternal objects unrealized in the temporal world. at any time? ^ Novelty would be meaningless, and inconceivable. We^are here extending and rigidly applying Hume’s principle, that ideas of reflection are derived from actual facts. Which is not true. ^ ^ 20 p 57

||Whitehead’s theory of “concrescence.”|| Tea-table mythology.1 1 So wrote Santayana, in the right margin. On the left, Cory wrote: “idealistic bull-shit.”

21 p 57, underlined

||Despite imperfections, metaphysics enables belief in the rationality of things. We may|| lose hope at the exact point where we find ourselves.

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The preservation of such faith must depend on an ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action—that it should embody the adventure of hope. Jewish notion that religion is hope—especially unreasonable hope. Might it not be the surrender of hope? 22 p 59

||Whitehead uses the figure of a|| Wolf-eating-Lamb. There is wolfness eating lambness In the perfectness of damness Of the whole 23 p 61, top

Whitehead’s “Satisfaction”: “I love the people I don’t know, And feel supremely happy so.” 24 p 62

Your animus is against the deniers of infinite essence. Good boy! 25 p 63

[…] the general potentiality of the universe must be somewhere; since it retains its proximate relevance to actual entities for which it is unrealized. This ‘proximate relevance’ reappears in subsequent concrescence as final causation regulative of the emergence of novelty. This ‘somewhere’ is the non-temporal actual entity. Thus ‘proximate relevance’ means ‘relevance as in the primordial mind of God’. But at once you wander into the opposite, making essence self-conscious and so all actual. How does your God decide which order to adopt for the world? 26 p 64, marked

The Leibnizian theory of the ‘best of possible worlds’ is an audacious fudge produced in order to save the face of a Creator constructed by contemporary, and antecedent, theologians. Naughty, naughty! 27 p 65, underlined

The doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that, however far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of components of a concrescence—its data, its emotions, its appreciations, its purposes, its phases of subjective aim—beyond the determination of

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these components there always remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity of the universe. This final reaction completes the self-creative act by putting the decisive stamp of creative emphasis upon the determinations of efficient cause. Cf. James & Bergson on free will. 28 p 68

We find ourselves in a buzzing world,1 amid a democracy of fellow creatures; whereas, under some disguise or other, orthodox philosophy can only introduce us to solitary substances, […]. This is the world of faith, from which “enlightenment” came to deliver us. Are you a reactionary? 1

Whitehead credits William James for the phrase.

29 p 69, marked Z

The principle of universal relativity directly traverses Aristotle’s dictum, ‘(A substance) is not present in a subject’. On the contrary, according to this principle an actual entity is present in other actual entities. In fact if we allow for degrees of relevance, and for negligible relevance, we must say that every actual entity is present in every other actual entity. [At “we must say”:]

This is a buzzing universe indeed. Yet its author, Bergson, is a poor shy thing, afraid of draughts. 30 p 70

[Concerning Locke:]

He was English, like you. 31 p 71, underlined and marked

||In pre-Kantian terminology, an entity’s experience|| is being described in respect to those forms of its constitution whereby it is that individual entity with its own measure of absolute self-realization. Its ‘ideas of things’ are what other things are for it. In the phraseology of these lectures, they are its ‘feelings’. The actual entity is composite and analysable; and its ‘ideas’ express how, and in what sense, other things are components in its own constitution. Oh: that can’t be all you mean: that its being is partly conception of other things. 32 p 75, underlined and marked

[Concerning Locke’s “Of our Complex Ideas of Substances,” II, XXIII, 1:]

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In this section, Locke’s first statement […] is exactly the primary assumption of the philosophy of organism: “The mind, being furnished with a great number of the simple ideas conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, …”. Here the last phrase, ‘as they are found in exterior things’, asserted what later I shall call the vector character of the primary feelings. The universals involved obtain that status by reason of the fact that ‘they are found in exterior things’. The identity in the “concrescence” is then one of essence only. You absorb the forms of things. 33 p 85, marked

||The contemporary world is perceived by the senses as entities divided one from another.|| This limitation of the way in which the contemporary actual entities are relevant to the ‘formal’ existence of the subject in question is the first example of the general principle, that objectification relegates into irrelevance, or into a subordinate relevance, the full constitution of the objectified entity. Strong’s summation. Perception is symbolic, its terms are not the qualities native to the object. 34 p 96

The spontaneity of existence is here attributed to its satisfaction in being what it is. Quousque, Domine!1 1

How long, O Lord!

35 p 108, marked Z

The notion of the undifferentiated endurance of substances with essential attributes and with accidental adventure was still applied [in molecular theory]. This is the root doctrine of materialism: the substance, thus conceived, is the ultimate actual entity. Not of mine. It is perhaps Epicurean, being sensualistic. But materialism is practical & intellectual. 36 p 111, underlined

According to the philosophy of organism, the extensive space-time continuum is the fundamental aspect of the limitation laid upon abstract potentiality by the actual world. Substantial heredity. To call it an “aspect” is Hegelian, & ruins your realism. Cave Hegel, Cave Bergson!

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37 p 114

[End of Chapter II:]

This seems an exact reversal of things. Bergson calls “reality” that which Plato says “never really is”. 38 p 115 CHAPTER III.

THE MORAL ORDER OF NATURE. ^ ^

39 p 117, marked

This satisfaction is the attainment of something individual to the entity in question. It cannot be construed as a component contributing to its own concrescence; it is the ultimate fact, individual to the entity. The good is fruition, not force. 40 p 117, underlined and marked

The ‘formal’ reality of the actuality in question belongs to its process of concrescence and not to its ‘satisfaction’. This is the sense in which the philosophy of organism interprets Plato’s phrase ‘and never really is’; for the superject can only be interpreted in terms of its ‘objective immortality.’ truth. ^ ^ N.B. 41 p 121, marked Z

The ‘objectifications’ of the actual entities in the actual world, relative to a definite actual entity, constitute the efficient causes out of which that actual entity arises; the ‘subjective aim’ at ‘satisfaction’ constitutes the final cause, or lure, whereby there is determinate concrescence; […]. There is, in this way, transcendence of the creativity; and this transcendence effects determinate objectifications for the renewal of the process in the conscrescence of actualities beyond that satisfied superject. [From “There is, in this way”:]

Gott im Himmel! 42 p 145, marked Z

What has to be explained is originality of response to stimulus. This amounts to the doctrine that an organism is ‘alive’ when in some measure its reactions are inexplicable by any tradition of pure physical inheritance. It is a prejudice to suppose that novelty has anything to do with vitality. The last lover is as vital as the first.

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43 p 155, marked Z

This betrays the spirit in which this book is written. It is not scientific but romantic. 44 p 160

[…] each sensum is complex; for it cannot be dissociated from its potentiality for ingression into any actual entity, and from its potentiality of contrasts and of patterned relationships with other eternal objects. “Internal” relations do not render simple essences complex: they merely show them to be elements in other more complex essences. 45 p 163, marked

||To substitute the word “energy” for “emotional intensity,” and “form of energy” for “specific form of feeling” shows us that|| this metaphysical description of the simplest elements in the constitution of actual entities agrees absolutely with the general principles according to which the notions of modern physics are framed. Yes: it is a translation of physics into deceptive psychological terms. 46 p 163, underlined

It has been a defect in the modern philosophies that they throw no light whatever on any scientific principles. Would it be better to throw darkness? 47 p 167, marked Z

The crude aboriginal character of direct perception is inheritance. What is inherited is feeling-tone with evidence of its origin: in other words, vector feeling-tone. In the higher grades of perception vague feeling-tone differentiates itself into various types of sensa—those of touch, sight, smell, etc.— […]. N.B. Myth at bottom, as in psychoanalysis. This is earlyStrong rather than late-Strong, since the “feeling” is mental. A mental substance in a physical frame. 48 p 180

The term ‘duration’ will be used for a locus of ‘unison of becoming’, and the terms ‘presented locus’ and ‘strain locus’ for the systematic locus involved in presentational immediacy. Not intelligible to me

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49 p 189, underlined

||Hume on simple impressions and repetition. The argument in the beginning of the Treatise is circular.|| We cannot even be wrong in thinking that we think of ‘necessary connection’, unless we are thinking of ‘necessary connection’. Of course, we may be very wrong in believing that the notion is important. Why not say “true”? You can hardly mean by “important” anything but applicable to dynamic facts. 50 p 195, marked

||Whitehead quotes and criticizes Locke.|| “Our abstract ideas are to us the measures of species”. And again: “Nor let any one say, that the power of propagation in animals by the mixture of male and female, and in plants by seeds, keeps the supposed real species distinct and entire”. In technical language, Locke had no use for genetic evolution. This is an attack on Aristotle. It does not deny evolution, but real species. A good deal of your criticism is captious & egotistical. 51 p 198, marked Z

The approximation of the philosophy of organism to Santayana’s doctrine of ‘animal faith’ is effected by this doctrine of objectification by the mediation of ‘feeling’. Santayana would deny that ‘animal faith’ has in it any element of givenness. This denial is presumably made in deference to the sensationalist doctrine, that all knowledge of the external world arises by the mediation of private sensations. No: no part of the object is given: but intent is given; it is a feeling carrying the whole panorama. 52 pp 198–99, underlined

The divergence from, and the analogy to, Santayana’s doctrine can be understood by quoting two sentences [from Scepticism and Animal Faith]: “I propose therefore to use the word existence … to designate not data of intuition but facts or events believed to occur in nature. These facts or events will include, first, intuitions themselves, or instances of consciousness, like pains and pleasures and all remembered experiences and mental discourse; and second, physical things and events, having a transcendent relation to the data of intuition which, in belief, may be used as signs for them; …” It may be remarked in passing that this quotation illustrates Santayana’s admirable clarity of thought, a characteristic which he

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shares with the men of genius of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Now the exact point where Santayana differs from the organic philosophy is his implicit assumption that ‘intuitions themselves’ cannot be among the ‘data of intuition’, that is to say, the data of other intuitions. This possibility is what Santayana denies and the organic philosophy asserts. Quite so. In this respect Santayana is voicing the ^ ^ position which, implicitly or explicitly, pervades modern philosophy. He is only distinguished by his clarity of thought. If Santayana’s position be granted, there is a phenomenal veil, a primitive credulity associated with action and valuation, and a mysterious symbolism from the veil to the realities behind the veil. The only difference between such philosophers lies in their reading of the symbolism, some read more and some less. There can be no decision between them, since there are no rational principles which penetrate from the veil to the dark background of reality. [At “phenomenal veil”:]

Rather, an internal sensibility. Language is not a veil, but a tentacle: so is sensation. Yet the tentacle is no part of the thing touched. 53 p 199, underlined and marked X and Z

The organic philosophy denies this doctrine because, first, it is contrary to naïve experience; secondly, ‘memory’ is a very special instance of an antecedent act of experience becoming a datum of intuition for another act of experience; thirdly, the rejected doctrine is derived from the misconception of Locke, […] that logical simplicity can be identified with priority in the concrescent process. 54 p 199

Locke, in his first two Books, attempts to build up experience from the basic elements of simple ‘ideas’ of sensation. These simple ideas are practically Santayana’s ‘intuitions of essences’. Santayana explicitly repudiates the misconception, but in so doing he knocks away one of the supports of his doctrine. A fourth reason for the rejection of the doctrine is that the way is thereby opened for a rational scheme of cosmology in which a final reality is identified with acts of experience. 55 p 200

Whitehead interprets philosophy like a foreigner to it.

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56 p 215

[Santayana’s general observation:]

“Objectification” seems to `mean “efficacious element” in the stimulus-side of things on which the organism reacts. 57 p 217, underlined

We have now come to Kant, the great philosopher who first, fully and explicitly, introduced into philosophy the conception of an act of experience as a constructive functioning, transforming subjectivity into objectivity, or objectivity into subjectivity; […]. i.e. made the error of imagining mental machinery. 58 p 219, underlined

[…] datum […] can be […] universals. Certainly it cannot, if the datum means the stimulus. But where did you get your knowledge of the stimulus? If you mean by the intent in alarmed feeling, this certainly gives a ‘datum’ which lies outside—i.e. is not given but posited. 59 p 225, marked Z

Each phase in the genetic process presupposes the entire quantum, and so does each feeling in each phase. Bergson: this “physical time” seems to be specious. 60 p 233, underlined and marked

||More on relativity in the philosophy of organism.|| The subjectivist principle is that the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experiences of subjects. Process is the becoming of experience. It follows that the philosophy of organism entirely accepts the subjectivist bias of modern philosophy. It also accepts Hume’s doctrine that nothing is to be received into the philosophical scheme which is not discoverable as an element in subjective experience. N.B. If subjects are unconscious, there is relativity, not subjectivity. 61 p 233, underlined and marked Z

Thus Hume’s demand that causation be describable as an element in experience is, on these principles, entirely justifiable. The point of the criticisms of Hume’s procedure is that we have direct intuition of inheritance and memory: thus the only problem is, so to describe the general character of experience that these intuitions may be included. There is an equivocation here. We can’t have intuition that our intuition is true.

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62 p 234

||Modern philosophies are in trouble for accepting the subjectivist principle while continuing to use categories derived from other points of view. Language has been formed to express the concept of “vacuous actuality” and the concept “of quality inherent in substance.”|| […] language, in its ordinary usages, penetrates but a short distance into the principles of metaphysics. Finally, the reformed subjectivist principle must be repeated: that apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness. Apart from tea and toast there can be nothing nothing nothing for breakfast. Apart from Christianity, there is no religion. Apart from myself, there is bare nothingness. 63 p 299

An instance of concrescence is termed an ‘actual entity’—or, equivalently, an ‘actual occasion’. There is not one completed set of things which are actual occasions. For the […] fact is the creativity in virtue of which there can be no ‘many things’ which are not subordinated in a concrete unity. Thus a set of all actual occasions is by the nature of things a standpoint for another concrescence which elicits a concrete unity from those many actual occasions. Thus we can never survey the actual world except from the standpoint of an immediate concrescence which is falsifying the presupposed completion. Synthesis adds a new item: but before the synthesis, were there not the facts there were? 64 pp 299–300

The creativity in virtue of which any relative complete actual world is, by the nature of things, the datum for a new concrescence, is termed ‘transition’. Thus, by reason of transition, ‘the actual world’ is always a relative term, and refers to that basis of presupposed actual occasions which is a datum for the novel concrescence. There seems to be a fallacy here. Because a universe becomes a relative term to me, when I arise in it, it was not essentially relative to me before. 65 p 301, marked Z

||The process of attainment of the private ideal|| which is the final cause of the concrescence. But the process itself lies in the two former phases. The first phase is the phase of pure reception of the actual world in its guise of objective datum for aesthetic synthesis. ||Such synthesis involves the private centers of feeling.|| The feelings are felt as

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belonging to the external centres, and are not absorbed into the private immediacy. Not intelligible. The feelings may belong to the scattered centres: they cannot be felt as belonging there, for that would be a new single feeling, and not those feelings themselves. “Feelings” must here mean objects or even essences. Then the assertion would be clear. 66 p 315, underlined

Each task of creation is a social effort, employing the whole universe. Each novel actuality is a new partner adding a new condition. Every new condition can be absorbed into additional fullness of attainment. […] A new actuality may appear in the wrong society, amid which its claims to efficacy act mainly as inhibitions. Then a weary task is set for creative function, by an epoch of new creations to remove the inhibition. Your brother is a bishop. And here you’re talking his shop. 67 p 320, underlined and doubly marked Z

The process through which a feeling passes in constituting itself, also records itself in the subjective form of the integral feeling. The negative prehensions have their own subjective forms which they contribute to the process. A feeling bears on itself the scars of its birth; it recollects as a subjective emotion its struggle for existence; it retains the impress of what it might have been, but is not. The mythological character of the system is evident here. This is true of the psyche. It is not true either of matter or feeling. 68 p 320, underlined

In the first phase of this conceptual prehension, there is this eternal object to be felt as a mere abstract capacity for giving definiteness to a physical feeling. as if the feeling could have been other than it was—other than definite before. The essence acquired is simply another essence, another definiteness. 69 p 323, underlined

Bradley’s discussions of relations are confused by his failure to distinguish between relations and contrasts. A relation is a genus of contrasts. He is then distressed—or would have been distressed if he had not been consoled by the notion of ‘mereness’ as in ‘mere appearance’—to find that a relation will not do the work of a contrast. It fails to contrast.

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i.e. will not indicate two separate essences. But of course it does. 70 pp 324–25, underlined and marked Z

Our perceptual feelings feel particular existents; that is to say, a physical feeling, belonging to the percipient, feels the nexus between two other actualities, A and B. It feels feelings of A which feel B, and feels feelings of B which feel A. It integrates these feelings, so as to unify their identity of elements. This is true if “feeling” includes intent: the objects of intent are substances. But “physical feeling” may mean also “physical reaction”—the ground of intent. 71 p 328, underlined

The way in which the feeling feels expresses how the feeling came into being. It expresses the purpose which urged it forward […]. Is this mythical language meant to deceive? 72 p 335, underlined and marked

Thus a simple physical feeling is one unconscious feeling which feels ^ from the subject another feeling. But the feeling felt has^ a subject diverse of the feeling which feels it. Fancy that ! The cause or object is a different fact from the effect or passion. 73 p 343, marked Z

||Whitehead discusses|| the deep-seated alliance of consciousness with recollection both for Plato and for Hume. Surprising assertion. Hume’s “impressions” were of course conscious. 74 p 344, underlined

[…] the fourth category of explanation, that no entity can be abstracted from its capacity to function as an object in the process of the actual world. ‘To function as an object’ is ‘to be a determinant of the definiteness of an actual occurrence’. According to the philosophy of organism, a pure concept does not involve consciousness, at least in our human experience. i.e. to be material. Hume did forget this. 75 p 344, marked

Also affirmation involves its contrast with negation, and negation involves its contrast with affirmation. Further, affirmation and negation

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are alike meaningless apart from reference to the definiteness of particular actualities. Truth is about existence, faith is about nature. 76 p 344

Consciousness requires that the objective datum should involve (as one side of a contrast) a qualified negative determined to some definite situation. Originally consciousness is cognitive: that is, it is intuition carried by intent. But the intent (as you say above) may be suspended. Then we have imagination without illusion. 77 p 363, underlined

This difference between propositions and eternal objects arises from the fact that truth and falsehood are always grounded upon a reason. But according to the ontological principle […], a reason is always a reference to determinate actual entities. Now an eternal object, in itself, abstracts from all determinate actual entities, including even God. It is merely referent to any such entities, in the absolutely general sense of any. This is a point of difference between your eternal objects and my essences. Mine are prior to all existences. 78 p 395, underlined

Thus in the successive occasions of an enduring object in which the inheritance is governed by this complex physical purpose, the reverted conceptual feeling is transmitted into the next occasion as physical feeling, and the pattern of the original physical feeling now reappears as the datum in the reverted conceptual feeling. Matter borrows its form from the previous form of matter: i.e. it keeps vibrating in the same way. 79 p 407, underlined

An actual entity, in its character of being a physical occasion, is an act of blind perceptivity of the other physical occasions of the actual world. “a response to” the “actual world” is limited (by definition) to the substances active in that production. The rest of nature is not relevant. 80 p 446, underlined

In their most primitive form of functioning, a sensum is felt physically with emotional enjoyment of its sheer individual essence. For example, red is felt with emotional enjoyment of its sheer redness. In this primitive prehension we have aboriginal physical feeling in which the subject feels itself as enjoying redness. This is Hume’s ‘impression of sensation’ […].

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Unconsciously, remember! For Hume they were given essences in intuition. 81 p 447, marked

[…] the perception of a red cloak may often be associated with a feeling of red irritation. Cf. Strong. “red irritation” is what is going on in the retina. In other words, your eyes may ache when you see red. Is the ache the true red? 82 p 448, underlined

The philosophy of organism provides for this relevance by means of two doctrines, (i) the doctrine of God embodying a basic completeness of appetition, […]. Destiny would be a better word. 83 p 461, marked Z

The Cartesian doctrine of the ‘realitas objectiva’ 1 attaching to presentational immediacy is entirely denied by the modern doctrine of private psychological fields. Not at all. The “objective” for Descartes means the imagined or intuited—the given essence. 1

Objective reality.

84 p 462, underlined and marked Z

The whole doctrine of mentality—from the case of God downwards—is that it is a modifying agency. But Descartes and Locke abandon the ‘realitas objectiva’ so far as sensa are concerned (but for Descartes, cf. Meditation I, “It is certain all the same that the colours of which this is composed are necessarily real”), and hope to save it so far as extensive relations are concerned. Of course: they are obvious. Whitehead is ignorant of the Scholastic language still familiar to Descartes. 85 p 489

The perfection of God’s subjective aim, derived from the completeness of his primordial nature, issues into the character of his consequent nature. In it there is no loss, no obstruction. The world is felt in a unison of immediacy. The property of combining creative advance with the retention of mutual immediacy is what in the previous section is meant by the term ‘everlasting’. The stored up memory of Bergson.

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86 p 490

The consequent nature of God is his judgment on the world. He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. Truth sentimentalised. 87 p 490, underlined

[…] we conceive of the patience of God, tenderly saving the turmoil of the intermediate world by the completion of his own nature. He doesn’t seem to have a tender stomach if he digests all that mess. [ This God is like Lord Parmoor, bleating in the House of Lords. ] Walt Whitman

Leaves of Grass Philadelphia: 1891–92. Georgetown. Twelve marginalia.

[Inscribed by an anonymous donor, “To G. Santayana Cambridge, Mass. in memory of a pleasant week of heat & philosophy San Francisco. 14 Aug. 1894.” The prose of A Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads is included.] 1 p 48, underlined

[“Song of Myself,” section 24:]

I speak the pass-word primeval, I give the sign of democracy, […]. Two different things 2 p 54, marked

[“Song of Myself,” section 32.]

I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contain’d, I stand and look at them long and long. They do not sweat and whine about their condition, They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins, They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God, Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things, Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago, Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth. [At top:]

That each is perfect is here compared with the perfection of all things for each.

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3 p 108, underlined

[“A Promise to California.”]

Sojourning east a while longer, soon I travel toward you, to remain, to teach robust American love. ! 4 p 429, marked

[A Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads .]

Think of the absence and ignorance, in all cases hitherto, of the multitudinousness, vitality, and the unprecedented stimulants of to-day and here. It almost seems as if poetry with cosmic and dynamic features of magnitude and limitlessness suitable to the human soul, were never possible before. It is certain that a poetry of absolute faith and equality for the use of the democratic masses never was. Curious illusion that America was more stimulating [than Europe]. 5 p 430, underlined

||The themes of aestheticism, the mind, the soul, and|| just as inherent and important, of their point of view, the time had come to reflect all themes and things, old and new, in the lights thrown on them by the advent of America and democracy— […]. Anarchy & equality: did he think these had triumphed? 6 pp 434–35, marked

The educated world seems to have been growing more and more ennuyed for ages, leaving to our time the inheritance of it all. Fortunately there is the original inexhaustible fund of buoyancy, normally resident in the race, forever eligible to be appeal’d to and relied on. 7 p 435, underlined

Democracy has been so retarded and jeopardized by powerful personalities, that its first instincts are fain to clip, conform, bring in stragglers, and reduce everything to a dead level.While the ambitious thought of my song is to help the forming of a great aggregate Nation, it is, perhaps, altogether through the forming of myriads of fully develop’d and enclosing individuals. Inconsistent with the contrast with the past which is so strong in your self-consciousness. The really new man is drearily empty.

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8 p 435, underlined

Welcome as are equality’s and fraternity’s doctrines and popular education, a certain liability accompanies them all, as we see. That primal and interior something in man, in his soul’s abysms, coloring all, […] The inner man lost. 9 p 435–36

The ranges of heroism and loftiness with which Greek and feudal poets endow’d their god-like or lordly born characters—indeed prouder and better based and with fuller ranges than those—I was to endow the democratic averages of America. You didn’t ^ ^ 10 p 436

||Of sex and “amativeness” in Leaves of Grass: || I am not going to argue the question by itself; it does not stand by itself. The vitality of it is altogether in its relations, bearings, significance—like the clef of a symphony. At last analogy the line I allude to, and the spirit in which they are spoken, permeate all “Leaves of Grass,” and the work must stand or fall with them, as the human body and soul must remain as an entirety. Yes: except perhaps this form which is neither simple nor delicate. 11 p 437, underlined and marked

||The purpose of Whitman’s work is to emphasize that the United States’ growth is to be spiritual, heroic.|| To help start and favor that growth—or even to call attention to it, or the need of it—is the beginning, middle and final purpose of the poems. (In fact, when really cipher’d out and summ’d to the last, plowing up in earnest the interminable average fallows of humanity—not “good government” merely, in the common sense—is the justification and main purpose of these United States. i.e. giving average men more to live for. William Carlos Williams

Paterson (Book One) New York: 1946. Waterloo. No marginalia.

William Carlos Williams

Paterson (Book Two) New York: 1948. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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Winchester College: Its History, Buildings and Customs Winchester: 1926. Georgetown. Six marginalia. 1 p 77, underlined

The oldest piece of plate possessed by the College is Election Cup, a large silver-gilt covered cup jewelled and elaborately worked: […]. chalice? 2 pp 86–87

Secondly, as Matthew says, ‘our head is not covered by hat or heavy cap’. Uncovering in Chamber Court, by the analogy of All Souls and Christ Church is an act of respect rather to the Warden and Fellows than, as is commonly supposed, to our Lady, whose statues are above Middle Gate. The custom lapsed for a while, some time after 1778, till the Warden had it revived in 1848. Let our account close with this word of comfort to the foes of superstition. Is this ironical or serious? Everything is possible with an Englishman. Frederick J. E. Woodbridge

The Realm of Mind: An Essay in Metaphysics New York: 1926. Texas. Thirty-six marginalia.

1 p vi, underlined Z and marked X

[Preface:]

||Woodbridge would not put thinking outside nature or make thinking a product of nature. Thinking is rather a natural event.|| And the major consequences seem to me to be, first, that mind as a logical structure of existence is antecedent to thinking, and secondly, that our thinking as individuals is a bodily activity congruent with that structure. The essence of the cosmos, in so far as persisting[?] in the laws of nature? 2 p vi, underlined

Or again, as our digesting involves a chemical world, so our thinking involves a logical world. Habits of readjustment in animals are relevant to habits ^ ^ of existence at large? 3 p viii, underlined and marked X

[…] language is ever matter […].

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4 p viii, marked

We describe matter in figures of speech because the figure of speech is what matter indestructibly is. Does this mean anything? Or is it just matter arranged in a certain way? 5 p 26

At best the greater duration of the world […] proves only that we are not thinking from everlasting to everlasting. Is the future “cut off” from the man who bets? Or is it contemporary with his betting? 6 p 38, marked

||Thinking discovers logical connection.|| That fact defines as a logical world the world in which thinking is an event. If such a world is properly the mind’s world, then the mind is not properly a being, but a realm of being. N.B. Mind or   is an order in nature. How about dreams? 7 p 39, underlined and marked

It is the world as experienced with which we have to do, and the world as experienced is the concrete, vivid world of every day. How timid American philosophy is. This dear world of cars and mothers is the real one. 8 pp 40–41, marked

[…] we use the term mind to denote the fact that while experience is a matter of space and time, of objects, qualities and relations, it is also a matter of implications and inferences. N.B. i.e. what is the idea of mind. 9 p 42

[Chapter II:]

OBJECTIVE M IND [Santayana alters this to:]

The Applicability of Language to Facts or Objective Mind 10 p 44, underlined

||Confusion could be avoided if writers|| who insist that mind is no more than a name for a being that thinks, would abide by this restriction of the term.

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Is this the act of thinking or man thinking? (the absence of the category of substance is fatal to clearness). 11 p 45, top

A “being” if this means an essence cannot think; the agent is a substance, the operation is an event. 12 p 45, underlined

[…] our bodily selves. at last! 13 p 46, underlined

If […] our thinking is to be wise and sane and correct, it is not the body which makes it so, […]. ? 14 p 46, underlined and marked

It is a coherence between us, our bodies, and those things. These may be a chaos when we think of chaos, by engaging disparate impulses in one sweep. all of it? 15 p 51, underlined

||Although most of us profess intellectual emancipation from foibles, hidden away is|| the solid conviction that in the nature of things ||is something whether found out or not,|| which, if found, would render intelligible to us this sorry scheme of things entire. It has to be ordered as it is ordered, and so as to make our language and thought possible. 16 p 87

Knowledge finds in [mind] its objective ground and the possibility of its verification. The realm of truth. 17 p 89

Objective mind may be august, but it is not a human mind. Logic it hath, but it reasoneth not, mind it hath, but it mindeth not. 18 p 116, marked

||The author would deal with the relation of mind to body|| not as a problem to be solved, but as a fact to be stated. Good

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19 p 139

||The metaphysicians’s work is a moral event. He may be a Prometheus, working with stolen fire and doomed, but|| like him boasting that the great gift he gave himself and others was “to make them that die cease to look forward to their doom.”—!"     "  !  and mortals | in this light | forget their doom. | at my word | James Haughton Woods

The Value of Religious Facts

New York: 1899. Georgetown. Thirty-nine marginalia. [Santayana’s four-page “Analysis” in the end-pages fully summarizes his marginalia:]

Analysis p. 1–18. The historical materials, interpreted sympathetically, leave us in doubt whether religion has a universal essence, and whether it is something specific [ the effect of a special cause, God’s grace ] or a natural complication of other more primitive activities of the human mind. p. 19–85. The characteristic which all religions however diverse have in common is the idea of “superhuman realities to which reverence is due” p. 23. This idea is not the product of hope. “Religion is what it is, not because it satisfies logical postulates, but because of its own peculiar value (and its close connection with all the ideal significance of reality, with the higher emotions, and with the sense of an infinite reality higher ? than what is human.) p. 27. All the geniuses of religious history have troubled themselves precious little about unity. and sufficient reason” etc Religion, then, is not science or philosophy. No more is it poetic inspiration or personification. Quote p. 31. [Page 31 reads: Heaven, Creation, Light, Lord are poetical terms, but to a developed religious nature symbols of inner facts independent of any æsthetic insight.]

Religion although ideal as contrasted with material reality, is personal and immediate, as contrasted with logical or aesthetical ideals. It has “entered into men by some kind of sorcery” (Religion is superstitious i.e. it is a belief in the actuality and efficacy of what is at the same time,

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and in its essence, ideal. It is like the resolution of congress that people “are and of right ought to be” free and independent. That which ought to be, although it is not, must be asserted to be, and to be about to appear.) p. 42. If the ideal be actual, we have a religious object,— ^ ^ God. We have a sense of dependence upon a Power which is the source of every benefit. Religion God cannot be ^ ^ identified with the ideal “except in the highest levels of the great religions”. p. 44. Lower religions are not ideal. [ ? ] If the ideal exists in name only religion is an illusion. p. 50. “Something more” comes into play at all times. “A will which is not the result of judgments i.e. of aspira^ tions but the cause of them.” ^ p. 53. Quote p. 53. [Page 53 reads: If, however, these needs are necessary demands of human nature, then they are rather the way to truth than the way to illusion, unless we conclude that, on the whole, the world seems to us hopelessly rudimentary and without real meaning.]

[ This assumes that an ideal is false if it is not realised.] And that another actual world, a paradise of some sort would give the actual world a meaning. Is it not obvious that another fact can never be the meaning of a fact given? [ Quote the absurdity on p. 53 to show the hopeless entanglement of the author in dogma.] [Page 53 reads: This theory of postulates from the sense of need is not without weaknesses. Thereby we should be forced out of the deepest impulses of our nature to form the idea of a normal Being bearing all in himself, who has all the attributes which can be revealed directly or indirectly to the finite being, and yet who deems it better to allow himself to be postulated, […]. Santayana underlines “who deems … postulated,” and writes:]

Oh! p. 55. God is an object because of the need of him. p 67. The experience of God is the occasional intuition of the Absolute in a kind of ecstasy. As this disintegration of the categories is necessarily unstable there is need of “repetition of the religious experience.” This ecstasy must start from something: hence the need of positive religion as a background.

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p. 70. “The contemplation of God never occurs by itself.” Its forms are the symbols of it. “Religious life without imagination is unknown.” Religion is thereby made relevant to life. It contains and feeds all the emotions aroused by our positive interests. This realisation being conceived as dependent upon God. [On page 70 Santayana’s marginalia reads:] The author does not see that this “religious experience” is negative: that it arises by the disintegration of the mind. [Page 98 reads: A half-conscious state arouses the will and keeps before it obscure but deeply felt aims. Impulses play their part in the unconscious depths of the soul. Here the connection of the inner life with the surrounding world produces impulses and directions of aim which drive men to conscious questions about the objects they seek and compel them to a clear knowledge of their own purposes.]

Could confusion be worse confounded? p. 86–113. The historical cases must be viewed as approaches to the realisation of this ideal. We must presuppose the reality of religion in studying its forms [ as we used to presuppose the inspiration of the Bible ] . Phenomenalism and monistic substantialism are both inadequate ideas of this revelation. History is the adjustment of man to the divine will, which is gradually revealed by intuitions. Unless religious history is guided by Providence it is a history of illusions. Religion is not science nor theology: theology is the effort to combine or adjust the two: it is essentially a compromise. p. 114–65. A norm for religion cannot be found by abstraction or comparison. Nor can we begin with the most primitive form as the measure, for the higher forms present incom-measurable [sic ] values. We must therefore take on our highest ideal. Those who have a different ideal can nevertheless transpose one literally into their own key: the classification will not be useless even to them. Claud Alley Worth

Yacht Navigation and Voyaging London: 1928. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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William Wycherley

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The Country Wife: A Comedy London: 1934. Waterloo. No marginalia.

George Malcolm Young

Victorian England: Portrait of an Age London: 1949. Waterloo. Three marginalia.

1 p 96, marked

[…] the Universities broke the fall of the aristocracy by civilizing the plutocracy. Eduard Zeller

Die Philosophie der Griechen

Six volumes. Leipzig: 1892. Georgetown. Eighty-nine marginalia. [One marginale in Volume I; none in Volume II; nine in Volume III; twenty-three in Volume IV; none in Volume V; fifty-six in Volume VI.] [Volume III.] 1 p 467, underlined

||Aristotle wrote about Plato’s work not as a historian of literature,|| der ein vollständiges Verzeichniss derselben aufzustellen und alles, was er über sie weiss, mitzutheilen verpflichtet ist; […]1 What an ideal. 1

… who records his subject in detail and is duty-bound to report all that he knows of that subject …. 2 p 469

||Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s dualism with respect to object and idea.|| Aristotle’s reason is perfectly clear to me. See below. This criticism is perfectly good. The minor gods of the Timaeus notwithstanding. For if you begin with the aspiring nature, and get the goal out of that, you have a relation between them: but if you begin with the goal, you never can get away from it to the thing that is to approach it, or see why it chooses that end. 3 p 703

||On the basis of the idea in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: || The basis of this difficulty would appear as well as the solution, if the human genesis of the doctrine were considered. An idea is a concretion in time: only the

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relatively permanent, of which a general idea can be formed by assimilation of particulars that recur, can therefore have an idea. Yet everything of which there is knowledge is incipiently such a general permanent object. Hence incipiently there is an idea of everything thinkable.1 1

Obviously of great import as an early, possibly the first, full statement of Santayana’s philosophy of essence, although the term is not yet used. 4 p 704, underlined

||Ideas, based in nature, display an orderly succession from one to another, in which there are various crossings from one to another, or independence,|| oder an einander theilhaben.1 Nothing real could be participated in without being divided: the ideas should therefore never be hypostatised. 1

… or take part in one another.

[Volume IV.] 1 p 176, marked Z

||Aristotle’s method forbade the dualism which he found in Plato.|| This is an important criticism. The solution of the difficulty would seem to lie in abandoning the attempt to regard form as more than an ideal; an ideal which the living reality engenders and which exists merely as the direction of its effort, eventually defined in reflection. Definition of Idea: a goal which reflection eventually assigns to the movement of reality. Or better: a standard to by which reflection eventually measures reality exis^ ^ ^, either as the goal of its movement or as the notion tence ^ of its being. 2 p 293, underlined and marked Z

||The meaning of the real|| Wirkliches ||to Plato, as opposed to Aristotle’s interpretation in his philosophy.|| The meaning of “reality” is at the bottom of this quarrel. X For Plato it is a eulogistic, for Aristotle a scientific term. The eulogistically real is only an aspect or function of the scientific reality, while the latter is a mixture of reality X and unreality, in the eulogistic sense of these words. Experience is a mixture of the intelligible and the surd; the expressible is only an element in the actual. But the

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expressible alone is known; the actual must be enacted. The expressible, the thinkable is, however, the only good for the rational part of our nature. 3 p 310, marked

||Knowledge as possibility:|| Wissenschaft als Vermögen […]. Knowledge in potentia is theory: knowledge in act is ideal realisation in detail, and knowledge of the absolutely individual. Actual knowledge is therefore impossible to an imperfect and transitive being: it could be possessed only by a static and comprehensive intelligence, the mirror of all particulars in all their relations. 4 p 311

||The fundament of Aristotle’s system is that in specifics forming general principles lies reality, truth, and the notion of the Godhead.|| Because there theory becomes representation of the whole detail of truth, and is knowledge of all individuals. The true, so conceived, is however entirely opposed to the good and the beautiful, which have affinity only to the entelechies of things, not to their embodiments. 5 pp 312–13, underlined

Aristotle put aside the Platonic hypostatizing of general concepts, but two contradictory principles remain: dass nur das Allgemeine Gegenstand that there be only the universal object of knowledge, and the truth of knowledge of the reality of its objects prevents any progress toward universals. How then is it possible to unite both despite their opposition? This sentence has the same equivocal meaning as that of knowledge being only of psychological ideas: it is through ideas, but not of them. So knowledge is of the individual through the theory that reconstructs it, and if successful vanishes into the vision of the concrete individuality. The universals are in the things: in knowing them we know aspects of the thing (or our thought would not be true or representative of reality) and if our knowledge were complete we should have all the aspects of the thing: the totality of applicable universals would make one nature—one individual. 6 p 330, marked Z

||Aristotle failed always to make distinct and to unify the formal, the efficient, and the final cause.||

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This is an exaggeration of a certain affinity and occasional coincidence of these principles. The willingness to identify them in such haste is a reason for Zeller’s difficulties in interpreting Aristotle. 7 p 349, marked Z

||Zeller introduces the idea of possibility of the realization of Form not as entirely subject to formal logic; the notion of the Verlangen, longing, for Form.|| Ah! here the matter begins to appear in its proper light. 8 p 350, marked Z

||Zeller’s note insists on a psychological reading of various passages in Metaphysics, V.|| Bosh. The whole point is that the psychological desire is a phenomenal phase of the metaphysical tendency and universal direction towards the possible & predeterminate good. 9 p 362

||The idea of Bewegung, attraction, in Aristotle.|| Cf the “attraction” of Aristotle with that of Newton, as an eternal unmoved first mover of the world. 10 p 427, underlined

1) Phys. II, 8. 199, b, 26:    " !   !  "           " &"     $    "   )  "  ""    $    ' &'        7 Quote in L of R chapter on the utility of thought. 1

It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not observe the agent deliberating. Art does not deliberate. If the ship-building art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature. If, therefore, purpose is present in art, it is present also in nature. (The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995 [Volume I, page 341].) 11 p 577

||On the separation of reason, as abstracted from the body, from bodily thought.|| May we not regard the two as aspects of one faculty? The passive reason is Reason made phenomenal, conditioned

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reason: active reason is reason as an eternal power, manifesting itself in the other. Without conditions the power does not manifest itself, and nobody thinks. Without the power no conditions could produce thinking. The active reason is the active reason abstracted from its temporal embodiments and regarded as completely realised in act. [Volume VI.] 1 p 487, marked

||Of Plotinus.|| The good is not the concept “good” but the unthinkable exciting good—so called for no reason. 2 p 489

||The negative connotations of the Godhead.|| Auch das Sein = ^ Essence nicht, denn alles Sein ist Totalität, […]1 ^ 1 Nor is it being, for being is totality ….

3 p 493, marked

||The idea of the good in Plotinus.|| We pursue it: its essence would be to be the good if it had an essence and were merely ideal: being real it cannot be good. 4 p 496

[…] die Ursächlichkeit Gottes […].1 Oh, how excellent! If you had only worked that out! God is not the ground of things, since he exludes their articulation; he is only the aim of things in which that articulation would be perfect. And then he is not One, but infinitely various, and not real, but only ideal. The unity is only harmony of each ideal with itself. 1

God as a fundamental cause.

5 p 497, marked

||Plotinus on number.|| Cf. the relation of number to the numerality of things. Number overflows into things, without changing its essence or being an efficient power. It is rather a condition which existence finds if it is to have being.

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6 p 502, top

Thus all things souls gather whence they went ^ ^ And their one content is content. 7 p 502, marked

||Zeller interprets Plotinus as saying that all strive toward participation in the first cause, and that constitutes the Good.|| Eigentlich ist das Verhältniss freilich das umgekehrte: der Drang des Menschen nach dem unendlichen ist das Erste, und erst aus diesem subjektiven Bedürfniss ist die Weltanschauung hervorgegangen, welche alles endliche Sein nur als Wirkung eines überweltlichen Urwesens erscheinen lässt.1 Zeller is not in it! The Drang nach dem Unendlichen ! It is the effort toward proper perfection  !   7 In fact the situation is quite the reverse: the striving of men toward eternity is foremost, and from this first subjective necessity arises a world-view in which all eternal Being permits an over-worldly primordial being to appear.

8 p 502

[Santayana translates the pertinent passage quoted in Zeller’s footnote 1.]

Each thing, in striving to be perfect, strives to be harmonious, self-equilibrated, a pure  and entelechy: it thus has its own unity as its goal. But now its own unity is like the proper unity of anything else—in character and value, and so in all relevant content: possibly even in material content, which would be mere pleasure or “content.” 9 p 514, underlined

         "        "   " Isn’t there a confusion here between essence and existence? Or is it to be taken instransitively, so that the phrase is a tautology? 10 p 527

||Zeller suggests that inhuman things, animals, plants, stones cannot have the same origins, hence not the same order of idea, as human beings.|| Why? Z. is stupid at times. 11 p 529, underlined

       "    "     #    "     &      "     "            "      

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  " " ""   !" IV, 8, 3.471, A. i.e. potentiality if we do not distinguish the thoughts from the thinkings. Or vice versa, the whole is potential, the particular ideas actual, (of which the “idea of the whole” would of course be one; for it is a special idea). 12 p 549, marked Z

||According to Zeller, Plotinus offered “positive conditions” in his system for metaphysical evil.|| How perverse. Metaphysical evil can be deduced from the surplus good of imitating the highest—i.e. from the good of the creature: but physical or moral evil (the latter is part of the former) cannot be deduced at all. 13 p 553

||Dualism with respect to the world of appearance as illustration of the intelligible world.|| Not so much of a dualism, my dear Hegelian. “The ghost of good that haunts the earth is sadder than all evil”.1 1

Lucifer to Hermes in Lucifer: A Theological Tragedy, Act IV, page 111 (Chicago and New York: Herbert S. Stone, 1899). 14 p 558, marked

This is the error of essentialism in physics: as if ideal relations could be dynamic bonds. 15 p 563

||Zeller questions what happens to the pursuit of the good in time of war, before the prospect of death?|| Sycophancy & Fanaticism—these are the usual ingredients of Theodicies and optimisms. 16 p 575

This is a very unsatisfactory commentary.—The soul, being impassable, ought not herself to descend or suffer. But the body, soliciting and deserving such a soul, might breed a likeness of her in itself—a consciousness. This might, at best, identify itself with its own eternal idea—and be saved.—The notion of a “fallen soul” needs

2:424

George Santayana’s Marginalia

to be analysed into two: 1st the heavenly {idea soul = 2nd the aspiring consciousness or life. 17 p 582

[Santayana translates Plotinus:]

Is an idea of suffering possible to one who has never suffered? [Then he comments:]

Only in material terms of pursuit, struggle, etc. 18 p 584, underlined

||Zeller explains the|| Sorge ||of the soul for the fate of the body.|| [Santayana translates “Sorge” as:]

concern—fellow-feeling—dramatic imitation. Of course, this is not the soul, but the consciousness that has that soul for its eventual heaven. 19 p 587

No one seems to consider that freedom (the worst of things) belongs to ungoverned matter. Sin, chance, etc. and rises from below to disturb order and reason. 20 p 593, underlined

||The persistence of Persönlichkeit1 in the eternal.|| What is this to Plotinus? 1

Personality.

21 p 594, marked

||The distinction in Plato between recurring memory and thinking,|| etwas anderes sei, als das Gedächtniss, und weil es dieses nur mit dem zeitlichen und veränderlichen zu thun habe, in Beziehung auf das ewige dagegen wohl eine Erneuerung der Denkthätigkeit, aber keine Erinnerung statthabe.1 Use this in interpreting the Phaedo. 1 … might be rather different from reflection, and because it is confined only to the temporal and changeable. On the other hand, with reference to the eternal, a renewal of mental activity, but no memory occurs.

22 p 597, marked

||To the happy man, misfortune is an irrelevance.|| […] wird seine Vaterstadt zerstört, so wird er Holz und Steine für nichts grosses achten; kommen seine Mitbürger um, so bedenkt er, dass Sterben besser ist, als

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Leben; stirbt er eines grausenhaften Todes, so wird seine Ansicht über den Tod dadurch nicht geändert werden; […].1 Couldn’t this be used in the Philosopher at Court? Try. 1

… should his native city be destroyed, he will not consider wood and stone of great account; if a fellow-citizen falls in battle, he reflects that dying is better than living; should he himself die a frightful death, his attitude to death still would not change; ….

George Santayana’s Library Books and journals owned by George Santayana were deposited at or collected by various institutions or individuals. The editors of The Works of George Santayana are aware of approximately 525 titles at nine different locations. The major repositories include: Columbia Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York City Georgetown Special Collections, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Washington, DC Harvard Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA Le Balze Villa Le Balze, Fiesole, Italy (Charles Augustus Strong’s Villa, now owned by Georgetown University) Texas Humanities Research Center, University of Texas, Austin Waterloo Rare Book and Manuscript Room, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario

Two appendixes have been included on the following pages. The first (appendix A) is a listing (alphabetically by author) of all of the books known to have been in Santayana’s possession at one time. The list includes a record number, which corresponds to the “George Santayana’s Library” database number, the author’s name, the title of the work, publication information, and repository. Any particular comments about the book are also included. Most of the books contain Santayana’s marginal notes, comments, or markings, and the majority of the titles are included in this volume, George Santayana’s Marginalia. An asterisk following the record number indicates those titles.

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The second is a listing, alphabetically by title (appendix T), of the books known to have been in Santayana’s possession at one time. Initial record numbers in this list refer to the more complete alpha by author list in appendix A. The Santayana Edition obtained photocopies of bibliographic records from the major repositories. From these records and John McCormick’s notes, a library database has been compiled that contains the following fields: Record number Inclusion or not in McCormick’s volume Type of publication Author’s name Title Publisher and place of publication Year of publication Number of pages Name of repository Library catalog number Reference comments

Not all fields are included in the following appendixes. However, it is the intention of the Santayana Edition to post and maintain the complete database of “George Santayana’s Library” on the Santayana Edition Web site. The database will be updated as more information is received.

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1 * Abell, Walter. Representation and Form: A Study of Aesthetic Values in Representational Art. New York: Scribner’s, 1936, 172p. Waterloo. Introduction by Arthur Pope. No marginalia. 2 * Acton, Harold. Memoirs of an Aesthete. London: Methuen, 1948, 415p. Waterloo. 3 * Adam, Antoine. Le Vrai Verlaine: essai psychanalytique. Paris: E. Droz, 1936, 139p. Waterloo. 4 * Adam, James. The Religious Teachers of Greece. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908. Georgetown. Being Gifford Lectures on natural religion delivered at Aberdeen. Edited by Adela Marion Adam. No marginalia. 5 * Aiken, Conrad. The Divine Pilgrim. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1949, 288p. Waterloo. 6 * Aiken, Conrad. The Kid. London: John Lehmann, 1947, 46p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 7 * Ainger, Arthur Campbell. Memories of Eton Sixty Years Ago. London: J. Murray, 1917, 353p. Waterloo. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 8 * Alain [Emile Auguste Chartier]. Histoire de mes pensées. Paris: Gallimard, 1936, 310p. Waterloo. Eighth edition. 9 * Alain [E. A. Chartier]. Le Citoyen contre les pouvoirs. Paris: Editions du Sagittaire, S. Kra, 1926, 235p. Waterloo. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 10 * Alain [E. A. Chartier]. Les Dieux. Paris: Gallimard, 1934, 400p. Waterloo. 11 * Alain [E. A. Chartier]. Les Idées et les âges. Paris: Gallimard, 1927. Waterloo. Volume II. 12 * Alain [E. A. Chartier]. Propos de littérature. Paris: P. Hartmann, 1934, 324p. Waterloo. 13 * Alain [E. A. Chartier]. Propos de politique. Paris: Rieder, 1934, 346p. Waterloo. Seventh edition. 14 * Alain [E. A. Chartier]. Propos sur le Christianisme. Paris: Rieder, 1924, 174p. Waterloo. 15 * Albert, Thomas. Manufacture of Christianity. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1946, 177p. Waterloo. Holograph address written by Santayana on inside front cover. No marginalia.

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16 - Alexander, Samuel. Space, Time, and Deity. London: Macmillan and Co., 1920. Le Balze. The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916–1918. Volume One of two. Inscription identifies book as having belonged to Daniel Cory “Rome, 1929.” 17 * Alonso, Dámaso. Poesía Española: ensayo de metodos y limites estilisticos. Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1950, 671p. Waterloo. 18 * Amery, L[eopold] S[tennett]. Thoughts on the Constitution. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, 166p. Waterloo. Four Chichele Lectures delivered at All Souls College, Oxford. 19 * Ames, Van Meter. Proust and Santayana: The Aesthetic Way of Life. Chicago and New York: Willet, Clark, and Co., 1937, 176p. Waterloo. 20 * Aristotle. Aristoteles Metaphysik. Berlin: Reimer, 1890. Georgetown. Translated into German by Hermann Bonitz and edited by Eduard Wellmann. 21 - Aristotle. Aristotelis Metaphysica recognovit et enarravit Hermannus Bonitz. Bonnae: A. Marcus, 1848–1849. Georgetown. Two volumes in one. 22 * Aristotle. Aristotle’s Psychology: A Treatise on the Principle of Life (De Anima and Parva Naturalia). London: S. Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1902. Georgetown. Translated and edited by William Alexander Hammond. Inscribed by Santayana, “G. Santayana 1903.” 23 - Aristotle. Metaphysica. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908. Georgetown. The Works of Aristotle, Volume VIII. Translated into English under the editorship of J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross. 24 * Aristotle. The Nichomachaean Ethics of Aristotle. London and New York: Macmillan, 1892. Le Balze. Translated by J. E. C. Welldon. Inscribed by Santayana, “G. Santayana Avila 1895.” McCormick notes few and unimportant markings. 25 * Aristotle. Psychologie d’Aristote: Traité de l’âme. Paris: Librairie Philosophique de Ladrange, 1846. Le Balze. Translated into French by J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire. McCormick notes few and unimportant markings. 26 * Asín Palacios, Miguel. El Islam cristianizado. Madrid: Editorial Plutarco, 1931, 543p. Waterloo.

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27 * Atkinson, Brooks. Once Around the Sun. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951, 376p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 28 * Babbitt, Irving. Democracy and Leadership. London: Constable & Co., 1924. Georgetown. No marginalia. 29 * Bacon, Francis. The Essays or Counsels: Civil and Moral. London: David Scott, 1891. Columbia. Inscription indicates this volume belonged to Daniel Cory. 30 * Bailey, Cyril. The Greek Atomists and Epicurus. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928. Georgetown. 31 * Bailly, Auguste. Byzance. Paris: A. Fayard, 1948, 442p. Waterloo. Holograph note on back flyleaf reads: “From Mattie Dana” and lists address. 32 * Bainville, Jacques. L’Allemagne. Paris: Plon, 1939. Waterloo. Two volumes of articles previously published in L’Action française. Volume One has no marginalia. 33 * Bainville, Jacques. L’Angleterre et l’empire Britannique. Paris: Plon, 1938, 243p. Waterloo. Collection of articles, most of them previously published in L’Action française and La Liberté. 34 * Bainville, Jacques. La Fortune de la France. Paris: Plon, 1937, 364p. Waterloo. Consists of articles reprinted from various periodicals. 35 * Bainville, Jacques. La Russie et la barriere de l’est. Paris: Plon, 1937, 294p. Waterloo. Consists of articles reprinted from L’Action française and La Liberté. 36 * Balfour, Arthur James. The Foundations of Belief. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1901. Georgetown. Eighth edition, revised. 37 * Barbusse, Henri. Jésus. Paris: E. Flammarion, 1927, 249p. Waterloo. 38 * Baring, Maurice. Have You Anything to Declare? London: W. Heinemann, 1936, 323p. Waterloo. Holograph inscription on flyleaf. No marginalia. 39 * Barnes, William. Poems of Rural Life in the Dorset Dialect. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1883, 467p. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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40 * Bartlett, Alice Hunt. Six Historic and Romantic Leaders Who Visioned World Peace: Poetic Dramas. New York: Distributed by Brentano’s, 1946, 275p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 41 * Bates, Ernest Sutherland. Biography of the Bible. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1937, 183p. Waterloo. 42 * Bede, Cuthbert. The Adventures of Mr. Verdant Green. London: J. Blackwood, n.d. Le Balze. No marginalia. 43 * Belgion, Montgomery. Our Present Philosophy of Life. London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1929. Georgetown. 44 * Benda, Julien. Essai d’un discours cohérent sur les rapports de Dieu et du monde. Paris: Gallimard, 1931, 221p. Waterloo. Extensive notes on back flyleaf. 45 * Benda, Julien. La Fin de l’éternel. Paris: Gallimard, 1929, 260p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 46 * Benda, Julien. Mon premier testament. Paris: Gallimard, 1928, 141p. Waterloo. 47 * Benn, Gottfried. Der Ptolemäer. Wiesbaden: Limes, 1949, 139p. Waterloo. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 48 * Berenson, Bernard. Sketch for a Self-Portrait. London: Constable, 1949, 144p. Waterloo. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 49 * Bergson, Henri. La Pensée et le mouvant. Paris: F. Alcan, 1934. Columbia. Third edition. 50 * Bergson, Henri. Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion. Paris: F. Alcan, 1932. Columbia. 51 * Bergson, Henri. L’Intuition philosophique. Paris: Helleu et Sergent, 1927. Georgetown. 52 * Berkeley, George. Selections from Berkeley. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884. Georgetown. Third edition, revised. 53 * Beruete, Aureliano de. Velazquez. London: Methuen and Co., 1906. Waterloo. Translated by Hugh E. Poynter. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 54 * Bevan, Edwyn Robert. Jerusalem under the High-Priests. London: E. Arnold, 1918. Georgetown.

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55 * Bewick, Thomas. A Selection of Engravings on Wood by Thomas Bewick. London: Penguin Books, 1947, 56p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 56 * Birnbaum, Martin. Jacovleff and Other Artists. New York: P. A. Struck, 1946, 235p. Waterloo. Author’s signed presentation copy to Santayana (200 copies of this edition are signed by the author). No marginalia. 57 * Birnbaum, Martin. John Singer Sargent. New York: W. E. Rudge’s, 1941, 80p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana signed by the author. No marginalia. 58 * Bishop, Elizabeth. North & South. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946, 54p. Waterloo. Winner of the tenth anniversary HoughtonMifflin fellowship award for a volume of poetry. 59 * Blanshard, Brand [Editor]. Philosophy in American Education. New York and London: Harper, 1945, 306p. Waterloo. 60 * Bolaffio, Carlo. Colui che si chiama “lo sono.” Modena: Guanda, 1936, 721p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author (number 252/500). 61 * Bolton, Isabel. Do I Wake or Sleep? New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1946. Waterloo. Pseudonym of Mary Britton Miller. No marginalia. 62 - Bonitz, Hermann. Platonische Studien. Berlin: F. Vahlen, 1886. Georgetown. 63 * Bradley, Francis Herbert. Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay. London: S. Sonnenschein; New York: Macmillan, 1893. Texas. “1894” inscribed by Santayana, and signed by Santayana on half-title page. 64 * Bradley, Francis Herbert. Ethical Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927. Georgetown. Second edition, revised. 65 * Breasted, James Henry. The Dawn of Conscience. New York and London: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1933, 431p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 66 - Brooks, Van Wyck. Emerson and Others. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1927. Le Balze. 67 * Buchheim, Karl Adolf [Editor]. Deutsche Lyric. London: Macmillan & Co., 1883. Georgetown. Fourth edition.

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68 * Buchler, Justus. Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, 176p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 69 * Bullett, Gerald William. Dreaming. London: Jarrolds, 1928, 85p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 70 * Bullett, Gerald William. Poems in Pencil. London: J. M. Dent, 1937. Waterloo. No marginalia. 71 * Bülow, Bernhard von. Imperial Germany. London, New York, and Toronto: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1914. Adelaida Sastre, Avila. 72 * Bultmann, Rudolf Karl. Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1931, 408p. Waterloo. 73 * Burgard, Raymond. L’Expédition d’Alexandre et la conquête de l’Asie. Paris: Gallimard, 1937, 187p. Waterloo. University of Waterloo’s copy imperfect, lacks pages 189–252. 74 * Burnett, Whit and Charles E. Slatkin [Editors]. American Authors Today. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1947, 559p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 75 * Butcher, Samuel Henry. Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts: With a Critical Text and Translation of the Poetics. London and New York: Macmillan, 1898. Georgetown. Second edition. No marginalia. 76 * Butler, Joseph. The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. London: George Bell & Sons, 1902. Georgetown. 77 * Butler, Richard. “The Notion of Essence in the Philosophy of George Santayana.” Rome, 1952. Columbia. Published as The Mind of Santayana. Chicago: Regnery, 1955. 78 * Caird, Edward. The Evolution of Religion. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Georgetown. The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of St. Andrews in sessions 1890–91 and 1891–92. Two volumes. 79 * Callimachus. Poems of Callimachus: Four Hymns and the Epigrams. London: J. Cape, 1931, 123p. Waterloo. Number 107/500. No marginalia. 80 * Calverton, Victor Francis. The Liberation of American Literature. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1932. Georgetown.

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81 - Calverton, Victor Francis. The Passing of the Gods. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1934. Georgetown. 82 * Campbell, Lewis. Religion in Greek Literature. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898. Georgetown. Inscribed by Santayana, “G. Santayana Harvard College 1899.” No marginalia. 83 * Campion, George C. Elements in Thought and Emotion: An Essay on Education, Epistomology, & the Psycho-neural Problem. London: University of London Press, 1923. Georgetown. No marginalia. 84 * Camus, Albert. Le Mythe de Sisyphe. Paris: Gallimard, 1942, 189p. Waterloo. New edition with appendix on Kafka. 85 * Camus, Albert. La Peste. Paris: Gallimard, 1947, 337p. Waterloo. Margins heavily marked by Santayana, but no comments. 86 * Carco, Francis. Images cachées. Paris: A. Michel, 1929, 253p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 87 * Carco, Francis. La Lumière noire: Roman. Paris: A. Michel, 1934, 254p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 88 * Cardozo, Benjamin Nathan. Law and Literature, and Other Essays and Addresses. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1934, 190p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 89 * Carus, Paul. The Canon of Reason and Virtue: Being Lao-tze’s Tao Teh King. London and Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1927. 209p. Waterloo. 90 * Castelli, Enrico. Idealismo e solipsismo: e saggi critici. Rome: A. Signorelli, 1933, 108p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 91 * Castelnau, Jacques Thomas de. Le Paris de Charles V, 1364–1380. Paris: Hachette, 1930, 158p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 92 * Cavalcanti, Guido. Rime. Genova: Edizioni Marsano, 1931. Waterloo. One volume. No marginalia. 93 * Céline, Louis-Ferdinand. L’École des cadavres. Paris: Denoël, 1938, 305p. Waterloo. 94 * Céline, Louis-Ferdinand. Mea culpa: suivi de la vie et l’oeuvre de Semmelweis. Paris: Denoël et Steele, 1937, 124p. Waterloo.

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95 * Chapman, John Jay. Notes on Religion. New York: Laurence J. Gromme, 1915. Georgetown. 96 * Chaucer, Geoffrey. The Canterbury Tales of Geoffrey Chaucer. London: The Medici Society, 1929, 637p. Waterloo. Passages marked by Santayana, but no comments. 97 * Chénier, André Marie. Bucoliques. Paris: La Sirene, 1923, 155p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 98 * Churchill, Winston. The Dawn of Liberation: War Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1945, 417p. Waterloo. Compiled by Charles Eade. No marginalia. 99 * Clemens, Cyril. The Man from Limehouse: Clement Richard Attlee. Webster Groves, MO: International Mark Twain Society, 1946, 159p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 100 * Clemens, Cyril. The Man from Missouri: A Biography of Harry S. Truman. Webster Groves, MO: International Mark Twain Society, 1945, 184p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 101 * Clemens, Cyril. My Chat with Thomas Hardy. Webster Groves, MO: International Mark Twain Society, 1944, 31p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 102 * Clifford, William Kingdon. Lectures and Essays by the late William Kingdon Clifford. London and New York: Macmillan, 1901. Georgetown. Edited by Leslie Stephen and Sir Frederick Pollock. Inscribed by Santayana, “G.S. in re Hyde 1905.” 103 * Coates, Adrian. A Sceptical Examination of Contemporary British Philosophy. London and New York: Brentano’s Ltd., 1929. Georgetown. No marginalia. 104 * Cole, George Douglas Howard. The World of Labour: A Discussion of the Present and the Future of Trade Unionism. London: George Bell & Sons, 1920, 443p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 105 * Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. The Friend. London: George Bell & Sons, 1899. Georgetown.

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106 * Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. The Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. London: George Bell & Sons, 1890. Georgetown. Edited by T. Ashe. Volume Two only (of two). No marginalia. 107 * Collingwood, Robin George. The Idea of Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945. Texas. 108 * Collingwood, Robin George. The New Leviathan, or Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944, 387p. Waterloo. 109 * Collis, John Stewart. While Following the Plough. London: J. Cape, 1946, 232p. Waterloo. Notes on endpaper listing Santayana’s places of residence 1939–1941. 110 * Colony, Horatio. Bacchus and Krishna. Privately printed, 1952, 43p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 111 * Confucius. The Unwobbling Pivot & the Great Digest. Norfolk, CT: Pharos, 1947, 52p. Waterloo. Translated by Ezra Pound. No marginalia. 112 * Corneille, Pierre. Oeuvres de Pierre Corneille: Théatre complet. Paris: A. Laplace, 1869, 777p. Waterloo. 113 * Corwin, Norman Lewis. On a Note of Triumph. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, 71p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 114 * Cramb, J[ohn] A[dam]. Germany and England. London: J. Murray, 1914. Adelaida Sastre, Avila. 115 * Crisógono de Jesús Sacramentado. San Juan de la Cruz, su obra científica y su obra literaria. Madrid: Mensajero de Santa Teresa y de San Juan de la Cruz, 1929. Waterloo. Two volumes. 116 * Croce, Benedetto. Ce qui est vivant et ce qui est mort de la philosophie de Hegel. Paris: V. Giard and E. Brière, 1910, 249p. Waterloo. Translated by Henri Buriot. 117 * Crosfield, Thomas. The Diary of Thomas Crosfield. London: Oxford University Press, 1935, 169p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 118 * Cuneo, Niccolò. Spagna cattolica e rivoluzionaria. Milano: Gilardi e Noto, 1934, 352p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 119 * Cutting, W. Bayard. W. Bayard Cutting, Jr. 1878–1910. New York: Marchbanks Press, 1947, 56p. Waterloo. Privately printed. No marginalia.

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120 * Dante Alighieri. The Comedy of Dante Alighieri, Florentine by birth but not in conduct. New York: Harbor Press, 1934. Waterloo. Translated by Louis How. Two volumes. Presentation copy to Santayana from How. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 121 * Dante Alighieri. The Divine Comedy: The Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso. New York: Pantheon Books, 1948, 187p. Waterloo. Translated by Lawrence G. White. Presentation copy from George Rauh to Santayana. No marginalia. 122 * Dante Alighieri. La Divina commedia. Firenze: Casa Editrice Nemi, 1931, 527p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 123 * Dante Alighieri. La Divina commedia di Dante Alighieri. Parigi: Torchi de Dondey-Dupré, 1818–1819. Georgetown. Comment by G. Biagioli. No marginalia. 124 * Dasgupta, Surendranath. A History of Indian Philosophy. Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1922. Georgetown. 125 * Datta, Dhirendra Mohan. The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1950, 541p. Waterloo. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 126 * Davenport, Russell Wheeler. My Country. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944, 62p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 127 * Delphic Club. Quinquennial Catalogue of the Delphic Club of Harvard University. Cambridge, MA.: Graduates’ Association, 1936, 1946, 1950. Waterloo. Three volumes [1936, 1946, 1950]. No marginalia. 128 * Denifle, Henri. Luther et le Luthéranisme. Paris: Picard, 1911. Georgetown. Translated by J. Paquier. Volume Two only (of three). No marginalia. 129 * Dewey, John. Experience and Nature. Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925. Georgetown. 130 * Dewey, John. The Quest for Certainty. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1930. Columbia. Gifford Lectures, 1929. 131 * Dewey, John. Reconstruction and Philosophy. London: University of London Press, 1921. Georgetown.

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132 * Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. Appearances: Being Notes of Travel. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1914. Sastre Family, Madrid. 133 * Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. Is Immortality Desirable? Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. Georgetown. 134 - Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. The Meaning of Good: A Dialogue. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons, 1901. Georgetown. 135 * Dillaway, Newton. Prophet of America: Emerson and the Problems of Today. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1936, 423p. Waterloo. 136 * Douglas, Norman. South Wind. New York: Macmillan, 1929, 421p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to James W. Oliver from Lawrence James Wathen. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 137 - Drake, Durant. Problems of Religion: An Introductory Survey. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916. Georgetown. 138 * Ducasse, Curt John. Nature, Mind, and Death. La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1951, 514p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. Holographic note on flyleaf by Santayana. No marginalia. 139 * Ducasse, Curt John. “On the Attributes of Material Things.” The Journal of Philosophy [reprint], 31 (1 Feb 1934): 57–72. Texas. 140 * Dudley, Owen Francis. Will Men Be Like Gods?: Humanitarianism or Human Happiness? London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924. Georgetown. Introduction by G. K. Chesterton. 141 * Du Maurier, Daphne. Hungry Hill. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1943, 402p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 142 - Dunn, Robert. And Least Love. Katonah, NY: SouthworthAnthoensen Press, 1945, 92p. Waterloo. Page references to text on back flyleaf. 143 * Dunn, Robert. Horizon Fever. New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1932. Georgetown. 144 * Dunning, Ralph Cheever. Rococo: a poem. Paris: E. W. Titus, 1926, 22p. Waterloo. Signed by the author and the illustrator. Presentation copy number 35/500 to Santayana from the author. No marginalia.

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145 * Durant, William James. The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1926, 586p. Waterloo. 146 * Durant, William James. The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1926, 586p. Waterloo. Second copy. 147 * Duron, Jacques. La Pensée de George Santayana: Santayana en Amérique. Paris: Nizet, 1950, 556p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 148 * Dyer, Louis. Studies of the Gods in Greece at Certain Sanctuaries Recently Excavated. London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1891. Georgetown. Eight lectures given in 1890 at the Lowell Institute. Inscribed, “George Santayana Cambridge 1891.” No marginalia. 149 * Eastman, Max [Forrester]. The Enjoyment of Poetry: with Anthology for Enjoyment of Poetry. New York: C. Scribner’s, 1951, 317p. Waterloo. Author’s autograph presentation copy to Santayana. No marginalia. 150 * Eaton, Charles Edward. The Shadow of the Swimmer. New York: Fine Editions Press, 1951, 33p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 151 * Eddington, Arthur Stanley. The Nature of the Physical World. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1928. Georgetown. 152 * Edman, Irwin. Philosopher’s Quest. New York: Viking Press, 1947, 255p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Daniel Cory from the author. No marginalia. 153 * Edwards, Jonathan. Representative Selections. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, Boston, Atlanta: American Book Co., 1935, 434p. Waterloo. American Writers Series. 154 * Einstein, Albert [Editor]. Living Philosophies. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1937, 334p. Waterloo. 155 * Eliot, T[homas] S[tearns]. After Strange Gods. London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1935. Texas. 156 * Eliot, T. S. The Cocktail Party: A Comedy. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950, 190p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from T. W. 157 * Eliot, T. S. Four Quartets. London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1948, 44p. Waterloo.

George Santayana’s Library

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158 * English Institute. Essays, 1948. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. Waterloo. Edited by D. A. Robertson Jr. No marginalia. 159 * Ewing, Alfred Cyril. Idealism: A Critical Survey. London: Methuen, 1934. Texas. Marginal annotations in Santayana’s hand in pencil, Daniel Cory’s hand in ink. 160 - Fadiman, Clifton. Reading I’ve Liked. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941, 908p. Waterloo. 161 - Fairbanks, Arthur. The First Philosophers of Greece. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1898. Le Balze. Inscribed by Santayana, “G. Santayana 52 Brattle Street Cambridge 1898.” 162 * Falconi, Carlo. Jean Paul Sartre. Modena: Guanda, 1949, 293p. Waterloo. 163 * Fargue, Léon-Paul. Portraits de famille: souvenirs. Paris: J. B. Janin, 1947, 29p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 164 * Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. Science of Knowledge. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1868. Georgetown. Translated by A. E. Kroeger. 165 * Ficke, Arthur Davison. Tumultuous Shore, and Other Poems. New York: A. A. Knopf (Norwood, MA: Plimpton Press), 1942, 110p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 166 * Fielding, Henry. The History of Tom Jones: A Foundling. London: Hutchinson, 1934. Waterloo. Two volumes. 167 * Fisch, Max H. [Editor]. Classic American Philosophers: Peirce, James, Royce, Santayana, Dewey, Whitehead. New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1951, 493p. Waterloo. Presentation copy from the editor to Santayana. 168 * Fletcher, Phineas. Venus & Anchises (Brittain’s Ida) and Other Poems. London: H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1926, 125p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 169 - Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bovier de. L’Esprit de Fontenelle. La Haye: Chez Pierre Gosse, 1753. Waterloo. Eight volumes. 170 * Foote, Henry Wilder. Thomas Jefferson: Champion of Religious Freedom: Advocate of Christian Morals. Boston: Beacon Press, 1947, 70p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from Cyril Clemens. No marginalia.

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171 * Frank, Philipp. Einstein: His Life and Times. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1947. Waterloo. Translated from a German manuscript by George Rosen. 172 * Frazer, James George. Studies in Greek Scenery, Legend and History: Selected from his Commentary on Pausanias’ Description of Greece. London: Macmillan, 1919, 419p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 173 * Freud, Sigmund. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. London and Vienna: The International Psycho-analytic Press, 1922. Georgetown. Translated by C. J. M. Hubback. 174 * Freud, Sigmund. Die Traumdeutung (The Interpretation of Dreams). Leipzig and Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1914. Georgetown. Fourth edition. 175 * Freud, Sigmund. L’Avenir d’une illusion. Paris: Denoël et Steele, 1932, 196p. Waterloo. Translated by Marie Bonaparte. No marginalia. 176 * Frost, Robert. A Masque of Reason. New York: H. Holt, 1945, 23p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from Omar E. Mueller. No marginalia. 177 * Fuller, Benjamin Apthorp Gould. A History of Philosophy. New York: H. Holt, 1938, 417p. Waterloo. Originally published in two volumes. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 178 * Fülöp-Miller, René. The Mind and Face of Bolshevism: An Examination of Cultural Life in Soviet Russia. London and New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1927. Georgetown. Translated by F. S. Flint and D. F. Tait. McCormick notes no significant marginalia. 179 * Furon, Raymond. La Perse. Paris: Payot, 1938, 238p. Waterloo. 180 * Garbe, Richard von. Die Sâmkhya-Philosophie: eine Darstellung des indischen Rationalismus. Leipzig: H. Haessel, 1894. Georgetown. Inscribed by Santayana, “G. Santayana 5 Grove St.” No marginalia. 181 * García Marruz, Fina. Las miradas perdidas, 1944–1950. Havana, Cuba: [Ucar García], 1951, 205p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 182 * Gavin, Frank Stanton Burns. Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge; Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1936, 430p. Waterloo.

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183 * Gibson, James. Locke’s Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1917. Columbia. 184 * Gide, André Paul Guillaume. Amyntas. Paris: Gallimard, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, 1927, 220p. Waterloo. 185 * Gide, André Paul Guillaume. Journal des faux-monnayeurs. Paris: Gallimard, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, 1929, 144p. Waterloo. 186 * Gide, André Paul Guillaume. Le Voyage d’Urien. Paris: Gallimard, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, 1929, 165p. Waterloo. Sixth edition. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 187 * Gide, André Paul Guillaume. Si le grain ne meurt. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1924. Waterloo. Two volumes. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 188 * Gioberti, Vincenzo. Cours de philosophie, 1841–1842. Milano: Fratelli Bocca, 1947, 278p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 189 * Giraudoux, Jean. Les Cinq tentations de La Fontaine. Paris: B. Grasset, 1938, 292p. Waterloo. 190 * Gobineau, Joseph Arthur, comte de. La Renaissance: scénes historiques. Paris: Plon, 1929. Waterloo. Two volumes. No marginalia. 191 * Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. Goethe’s Gedichte. Berlin: S. Fischer, 1905. Waterloo. Edited by Otto Pniower. 192 * Gollancz, Victor. Our Threatened Values. London: V. Gollancz, 1946, 157p. Waterloo. 193 * Goodman, Jack Rawlin. A Self Portrait. New York: Exposition Press, 1949, 110p. Waterloo. Presentation copy signed by the author. 194 * Gordon, Hirsch Loeb. The Maggid of Caro: The Mystic Life of the Eminent Codifier Joseph Caro as Revealed in His Secret Diary. New York: Pardes Publishing House, Shoulson Press, 1949, 396p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 195 * Gorer, Geoffrey. The Americans: A Study in National Character. London: Cresset Press, 1948, 211p. Waterloo. 196 * Gray, Thomas. Poems. London: Printed for J. Murray, 1786. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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197 * Green, Thomas Hill. Prolegomena to Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890. Georgetown. Third edition. Edited by A. C. Bradley. 198 * Gregory, Alyse. Wheels on Gravel. London: J. Lane, The Bodley Head, 1938, 208p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 199 * Groethuysen, Bernhard. Origines de l’esprit bourgeois en France. Paris: Gallimard, 1927. Waterloo. Second edition. 200 * Guénon, René. Les États multiples de l’être. Paris: Les Editions Véga, 1932, 140p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 201 * Guénon, René. L’Homme et son devenir selon le Vêdânta. Paris: Bossard, 1925, 271p. Waterloo. Second edition. 202 * Guénon, René. Introduction générale á l’étude des doctrines Hindoues. Paris: M. Riviére, 1921, 346p. Waterloo. 203 * Gumpert, Martin. The Anatomy of Happiness. New York, London, and Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1951, 310p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 204 * Guzzo, Augusto et alii. Concetto e programma della filosofia d’oggi. Milano: Fratelli Bocca, 1941, 286p. Waterloo. Istituto de Studi Filosofici. 205 * Guzzo, Augusto. Il pensiero di B. Spinoza. Firenze: Vallecchi Editore, 1924, 536p. Waterloo. Presentation copy from the author. 206 * Guzzo, Augusto. La filosofia domani. Milano: Fratelli Bocca, 1943, 128p. Waterloo. Presentation copy signed by the author. No marginalia. 207 * Guzzo, Augusto. La filosofia e l’esperienza. Roma: Editrice Perrella, 1942, 218p. Waterloo. Presentation copy from the author. 208 * Guzzo, Augusto. L’io et la ragione. Brescia: Morcelliana, 1947, 381p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 209 * Hadfield, James Arthur. Psychology and Morals: An Analysis of Character. London: Methuen, 1923. Georgetown. 210 * Hamilton, William. Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1858. Georgetown. Fifth edition. Edited by O. W. Wight.

George Santayana’s Library

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211 * Harcourt, Robert d’. Goethe et l’art de vivre. Paris: Payot, 1935, 200p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 212 * Harnack, Adolf von. Dogmengeschichte. Freiburg: Mohr, 1898. Georgetown. 213 * Heard, Gerald. Is God in History?: An Inquiry into Human and Prehuman History. London: Faber and Faber, 1951, 256p. Waterloo. 214 - Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie. Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1914[?]. Le Balze. Edited by Georg Lasson. 215 * Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. The Logic of Hegel. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874. Georgetown. Translated from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences; with Prolegomena by William Wallace. 216 - Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Phänomenologie des Geistes. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1841. Le Balze. Edited by Johannes Schulze. Inscribed by Santayana, “G. Santayana Oct. 1889 29 Thayer Cambridge.” 217 * Heidegger, Martin. Sein und Zeit. Halle: Niemeyer, 1931. Columbia. 218 * Hemingway, Ernest. Hemingway. New York: Viking Press, 1944, 642p. Waterloo. The Viking Portable Library. Edited by Malcolm Cowley. No marginalia. 219 * Henrich, Edith. The Quiet Center. New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1946, 73p. Waterloo. Typescript letter to Santayana from Byron Dickson tipped in. 220 * Herodotus. Le Move muse. Milano: Sonzogno, 19–[?], 375p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 221 * Hersch, Jeanne. L’Illusion philosophique. Paris: F. Alcan, 1936, 204p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 222 * Hertzberg, Gustav Friedrich. Alkibiades: der Staatsmann und Feldherr. Halle: C. E. M. Pfeffer, 1853, 360p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 223 * Hilliard, Albert Leroy. The Forms of Value: The Extension of a Hedonistic Axiology. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, 343p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 224 * Hirn, Yrjö. The Origins of Art: A Psychological & Sociological Inquiry. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1900. Georgetown.

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225 * Hispanic Society of America. Handbook: Museum and Library Collections. New York: Printed by order of the trustees, 1938, 442p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 226 * Hogg, James. The Suicide’s Grave: Being the Private Memoirs & Confessions of a Justified Sinner. London: J. Shiells, 1895, 226p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 227 * Holmes, Pauline. A Tercentenary History of the Boston Public Latin School, 1635–1935. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935, 541p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 228 * Holt, Edwin Bissell. The Concept of Consciousness. London: George Allen & Co., 1914. Texas. 229 * Homer. Aphrodite: The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite and the Pervigilium Veneris. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1948, 53p. Waterloo. Translated by F. L. Lucas. No marginalia. 230 * Homer. The Original Iliad. n.p., 1937, 108p. Waterloo. Translated by Robinson Smith. No marginalia. 231 * Hone, William, Jeremiah Jones, and William Wake. The Apocryphal New Testament. Philadelphia: Gebbie & Co., 1880[?]. Georgetown. No marginalia. 232 * Hook, Sidney. The Metaphysics of Pragmatism: With an Introductory Word by John Dewey. Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1927. Georgetown. 233 * Hook, Sidney. “What is Materialism?” The Journal of Philosophy, 1934. Waterloo. Volume XXXI, number 9. No marginalia. 234 * Housman, A[lfred] E[dward]. More Poems. London: J. Cape, 1936, 71p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 235 * Hovelaque, Emile. Les États-unis et la guerre. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1919. Georgetown. No marginalia. 236 * Husserl, Edmund. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1922. Waterloo. 237 - Huysmans, J.-K. A vau l’eau. Bruxelles: Kistemaekers, 1882. Columbia. Contains a sonnet at the back in Santayana’s hand. 238 * Inge, William Ralph. The Philosophy of Plotinus. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918. Georgetown. The Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews, 1917–1918. Two volumes.

George Santayana’s Library

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239 * Irazusta, Julio. Actores y espectadores. Buenos Aires: Sur, 1937, 183p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 240 * Irazusta, Julio. Tito Livio, O, Del imperialismo en relación con las formas de gobierno y la evolución historica. Mendoza: Ediciones del Instituto de Estudios Politicos, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1951, 296p. Waterloo. 241 * Irazusta, Julio. Tito Livio, O, Del imperialismo en relación con las formas de gobierno y la evolución historica. Mendoza: Ediciones del Instituto de Estudios Politicos, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1951, 296p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. This second copy contains no marginalia. 242 * Jackson, Henry. Plato’s Later Theory of Ideas. London[?]: s.n., 1881–1896. Georgetown. Articles excerpted from The Journal of Philology. No marginalia. 243 * James, Alice. Alice James: Her Brothers—Her Journal. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934, 252p. Waterloo. Edited by Anna Robeson Burr. Contains note on flyleaf: “Nancy Toy, May 1934 From K. L.” Overwritten with “Please do not return.” 244 * James, William. Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. Georgetown. 245 * James, William. Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. Georgetown. 246 * Jeans, James Hopwood. The Universe around Us. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1929. Georgetown. No marginalia. 247 * Jeffers, Robinson. The Double Axe, and Other Poems. New York: Random House, 1948, 149p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from Carleton Smith. 248 * Jeffers, Robinson. The Selected Poetry of Robinson Jeffers. New York: Random House, 1938, 622p. Waterloo. No marginlia. 249 * Jerrold, Douglas. An Introduction to the History of England, from the Earliest Times to 1204. London: Collins, 1949, 614p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 250 * Jiménez, Juan Ramón. Fifty Spanish Poems. Oxford: Dolphin Book Co., 1950, 97p. Waterloo. English translations by J. B. Trend. No marginalia except a quip by Santayana opposite the title page.

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251 * Johnson, Lionel Pigot. Some Winchester Letters of Lionel Johnson. London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1919. Georgetown. Edited by Frank Russell. 252 * Juan de la Cruz. Aphorismes de Saint Jean de la Croix. Bordeaux: Feret, 1924, 78p. Waterloo. Edited by Jean Baruzi. 253 * Kallen, Horace Meyer. Art and Freedom. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942–1943. Waterloo. Two volumes. No marginalia in Volume One. 254 * Kallen, Horace Meyer. The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy. New York: Moffat, Yard and Co., 1918. Georgetown. No marginalia. 255 * Kallen, Horace Meyer. Culture and Democracy in the United States. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1924. Georgetown. No marginalia. 256 * Kallen, Horace Meyer. The Education of Free Men. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1949, 332p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 257 * Kallen, Horace Meyer. Patterns of Progress. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, 87p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 258 * Kallen, Horace Meyer. William James and Henri Bergson: A Study in Contrasting Theories of Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1914]. Georgetown. 259 * Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1884. Harvard. Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. 260 * Kant, Immanuel. Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. New York: Macmillan, 1900. Georgetown. Second edition, revised. Translated by F. Max Müller. Inscription by Santayana, “G. Santayana 1901.” 261 * Kant, Immanuel. Immanuel Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Leipzig: Reclam Verlag, 1878. Harvard. Edited by Karl Kehrbach. 262 - Kant, Immanuel. Immanuel Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hamburg and Leipzig: L. Voss, 1889. Georgetown. Edited by Benno Erdmann. Inscription by Santayana, “G. Santayana 5 Grove St.” 263 * Kant, Immanuel. Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1883. Georgetown. Third edition. Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott.

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264 * Keith, Arthur Berriedale. The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1925. Georgetown. McCormick notes two volumes, with no marginalia in Volume One. 265 * Kettner, Frederick. Life and Spirit: Biosophical Poems. New York and Chicago: Biosophy Press, 1948, 139p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 266 * Keynes, John Maynard. A Revision of the Treaty. London: Macmillan, 1922, 223p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 267 * Keyserling, Hermann Alexander. Menschen als Sinnbilder. Darmstadt: O. Reichl, 1926. Georgetown. 268 * Kinney, Mary Cyril Edwin. A Critique of the Philosophy of George Santayana in the Light of Thomistic Principles. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1942, 131p. Waterloo. 269 * Knowles, David. The Benedictines. London: Sheed and Ward, 1929, 112p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 270 * Knox, Howard Vicenté. The Evolution of Truth, and Other Essays. London: Constable, 1930, 180p. Waterloo. Author’s autograph presentation copy to L. P. Jacks. No marginalia. 271 * Korean American Cultural Association. The Culture of Korea. Honolulu: s. n., 1946, 334p. Waterloo. Edited by Changsoon Kim and signed by editor. No marginalia. 272 * La Batut, Guy de. Henri III: Les Amours des rois de France. Paris: Éditions Montaigne, 1931, 222p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 273 * La Fontaine, Jean de. Fables, contes et nouvelles. Paris: Gallimard, 1948, 751p. Waterloo. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 274 * Lamont, Corliss. Humanism as a Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949, 368p. Waterloo. Second edition. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 275 * Lamont, Corliss. The Illusion of Immortality. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, 316p. Waterloo. Second edition. Presentation copy to Santayana, signed by the author. No marginalia.

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276 * Langstaff, John Brett. Man and Christmas Verse. New York: H. Emmerson, 1947, 160p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 277 * Le Dantec, Félix Alexandre. L’Athéisme. Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1906. Georgetown. 278 * Le Roy, Edouard Louis. Dogme et critique. Paris: Librairie Bloud, 1907. Georgetown. 279 * Lecky, William Edward Hartpole. A Victorian Historian: Private Letters of W. E. H. Lecky, 1859–1878. London: Home and Van Thal, 1947, 90p. Waterloo. Edited with an introduction by H. Montgomery Hyde. No marginalia. 280 * Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. The Philosophical Works of Leibniz. New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, 1890. Georgetown. Inscription by Santayana, “G. Santayana 7 Stoughton Cambridge.” 281 * Levy, Hermann. England and Germany: Affinity and Contrast. Leigh-on-Sea, Essex: Thames Bank Publishing Co., 1949, 167p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 282 * Lietzmann, Hans. Geschichte der alten Kirche. Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter, 1932. Waterloo. 283 * Lindsay, A[lexander] D[unlop]. The Philosophy of Bergson. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1911. Georgetown. 284 * Lippmann, Walter. A Preface to Morals. London: Allen & Unwin, 1929. Georgetown. 285 * Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Samuel Marks, 1825. Georgetown. Two volumes. 286 * Loisy, Alfred Firmin. George Tyrrell et Henri Brémond. Paris: E. Nourry, 1936, 205p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 287 * Loisy, Alfred Firmin. La Naissance du christianisme. Paris: E. Nourry, 1933, 452p. Waterloo. 288 * Loisy, Alfred Firmin. Les Origines du nouveau testament. Paris: E. Nourry, 1936, 375p. Waterloo. Copy imperfect, lacks all before page 17. 289 * Loisy, Alfred Firmin. Simples réflexions sur le décret du Saint-office. Haute-Marne: Chez l’Auteur, 1908. Georgetown. Second edition.

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290 * Loisy, Alfred Firmin. Y a-t-il deux sources de la religion et de la morale? Paris: E. Nourry, 1933, 204p. Waterloo. 291 * Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth. The Prose Works of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. London: G. Routledge, 1852, 267p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 292 * Lotze, Hermann. System der Philosophie: Erster Theil, Drei Bücher der Logik. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1887–1888. Wells College. 293 * Lotze, Hermann. System der Philosophie: Metaphysik Drei Bücher der Ontologie, Kosmologie, Psychologie. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1884. Wells College. 294 * Lowell, Robert. The Mills of the Kavanaughs. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951, 55p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 295 * Lucian [Lucianus Samosatensis]. Lucian’s True History. London: A. H. Bullen, 1902, 117p. Waterloo. Translated by Frances Hickes. Copy number 44/500. No marginalia. 296 * Lucretius [Titus Lucretius Carus]. De rerum natura libri sex. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1886. Georgetown. Fourth edition. Translated and with notes by H. A. J. Munro. 297 - Lutoslawski, Wincenty. The Origin and Growth of Plato’s Logic. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1897. Le Balze. Inscribed by Santayana, “G. Santayana 60 Brattle St. Cambridge.” Also has inscription in what may be Daniel Cory’s hand giving Cory’s name and a Foubourg St. Honore address. 298 * Machiavelli, Niccolo. Erotica. Milano: Studio Editoriale Corbaccio, 1924, 222p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 299 * Macran, Frederick Walter. English Apologetic Theology. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1905. Georgetown. 300 * Mallon, James Joseph and E. C. T. Lascelles. Poverty: Yesterday and Today. London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1930, 100p. Waterloo. 301 * Manacorda, Guido. Benedetto Croce, ovvero, Dell’improntitudine. Firenze: R. Bemporad, 1933, 125p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 302 * Mann, Thomas. Der Zauberberg. Berlin: Fischer, 1930. Georgetown. Volume One of two.

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303 * Manning, Hugo. The Crown and the Fable: A Poetic Sequence. London: Gaberbocchus Press, 1950, 31p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 304 - Manrique, Jorge. Coplas de Don Jorge Manrique. Boston: Allen and Ticknor, 1833. Columbia. Translated by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. Contains Santayana’s corrections of Longfellow’s translations. 305 * Maraini, Fosco. Segreto Tibet. Bari: Edisioni “Leonardo da Vinci,” 1951. Waterloo. 306 * Marchant, James [Editor]. If I Had My Time Again: An Anthology Contributed by Twenty Distinguished Men and Women. London: Odhams Press, 1950, 256p. Waterloo. 307 * Maritain, Jacques. Art et scolastique. Paris: L. Rouart, 1927, 352p. Waterloo. 308 * Maritain, Jacques. Réflexions sur l’intelligence et sur sa vie propre. Paris: Desclée, de Brouwer, 1930, 380p. Waterloo. Third edition. 309 * Maritain, Jacques. Sept leçons sur l’être, et les premiers principes de la raison spéculative. Paris: P. Téqui, 1934[?], 163p. Waterloo. 310 * Marsh, Gerald. Prairie Grass Poems. Dallas: Story Book Press, 1947, 76p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from H. James. 311 * Masson, John. Lucretius: Epicurean and Poet. London: John Murray, 1907. Georgetown. 312 * Maxwell, William. The Folded Leaf. New York and London: Harper, 1945, 310p. Waterloo. Eighth edition. No marginalia. 313 * Mayberry, George [Editor]. A Little Treasury of American Prose: The Major Writers from Colonial Times to the Present Day. New York: C. Scribner’s, 1949, 954p. Waterloo. 314 * Maycock, Alan Lawson. An Oxford Note-book. Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood, 1931, 304p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 315 - McCord, David Thompson Watson. Notes on the Harvard Tercentenary. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936, 99p. Waterloo. 316 * McCord, David Thompson Watson. Poet always Next But One. Williamsburg, VA: College of William and Mary in Virginia, 1951, 25p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia.

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317 * McCulloch, Hugh. Written in Florence: The Last Verses of Hugh McCulloch. London: J. M. Dent, 1902, 107p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 318 * Medici, Lorenzo de’. Poemetti. Torino: G. Einaudi, 1943. Columbia. Edited by Emilio Cecchi. 319 * Meissner, Erich. Confusion of Faces: The Struggle between Religion and Secularism in Europe. London: Faber and Faber, 1946, 136p. Waterloo. 320 * Meyer, Kuno. A German Grammar for Schools. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1896. Waterloo. No marginalia. 321 * Michelangelo Buonarroti. Rime e lettere: precedute dalla vita dell’ autore scritta da Ascanio Condivi. Firenze: G. Barbèra, 1892. Georgetown. 322 * Mill, John Stuart. Bibliography of the Published Writings of John Stuart Mill. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 1945, 101p. Waterloo. Edited from his manuscript by Ney MacMinn, J. R. Hainds, and J. M. McCrimmon. Presentation copy to Santayana from MacMinn. 323 * Mill, John Stuart. Dissertations and Discussions. New York: Holt, 1882. Georgetown. Volume Three of five. 324 * Mill, John Stuart. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1889. Georgetown. Sixth edition. Inscription by Santayana, “G. Santayana in re Hyde 1905.” 325 * Mill, John Stuart. Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1885. Georgetown. Third edition. No marginalia. 326 * Mill, John Stuart. A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904. Georgetown. Eighth edition. Inscription by Santayana, “G. Santayana 1905 in re Hyde.” 327 * Millevoye, Charles Hubert. Oeuvres de Millevoye. Paris: Garnier, 19–[?], 443p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 328 * Mins, Henry Felix. Materialism: The Scientific Bias. New York: s.n., 1934, 120p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia.

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329 * Moncrieff, Malcolm Matthew. The Clairvoyant Theory of Perception: A New Theory of Vision. London: Faber and Faber, 1951, 315p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 330 * Montague, William Pepperell. Great Visions of Philosophy: Varieties of Speculative Thought in the West from the Greeks to Bergson. La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Co., 1950, 484p. Waterloo. Paul Carus Foundation Lectures, fourth series. No marginalia. 331 * Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brede et de. Lettres persanes. Paris: A. L’Enseigne du Pot Cassé, 1928. Waterloo. 332 * More, Paul Elmer. Platonism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1917. Georgetown. 333 * Morison, Samuel Eliot [Editor]. The Development of Harvard University Since the Inauguration of President Eliot. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930. Waterloo. 334 * Morison, Samuel Eliot. Three Centuries of Harvard: 1636–1936. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936, 512p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 335 * Morley, Christopher Darlington. The Powder of Sympathy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Press, 1927, 304p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 336 * Motwani, Kewal. India: A Synthesis of Cultures. Bombay: Thacker, 1947, 319p. Waterloo. 337 * Müller, Gustav Emil. Amerikanische Philosophie. Stuttgart: F. Frommann, 1936, 303p. Waterloo. 338 * Mumford, Lewis [Editor]. The Arts in Renewal. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1951, 156p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 339 * Mumford, Lewis. Herman Melville. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929. Le Balze[?]. 340 * Munitz, Milton Karl. The Moral Philosophy of Santayana. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. Columbia. Inscribed, “July 6, 1939. To Prof. Santayana. Respectfully, Milton K. Munitz.” 341 * Munro, Thomas. Great Pictures of Europe. New York: Brentano’s, 1930, 289p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana inscribed by author. No marginalia. 342 * Munro, Thomas. Scientific Method in Æsthetics. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1928. Georgetown.

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343 * Murchie, Guy. Saint Croix: The Sentinel River. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1947, 281p. Waterloo. 344 * Murry, John Middleton. God: Being an Introduction to the Science of Metabiology. London: J. Cape, 1929, 316p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 345 * Murry, John Middleton. Studies in Keats. London: H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1930. Georgetown. 346 * Neilson, William Allan and A. H. Thorndike. The Facts about Shakespeare. New York: Macmillan, 1913, 273p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 347 * Nevill, Ralph. Floreat Etona: Anecdotes and Memories of Eton College. London: Macmillan, 1911. Le Balze[?]. 348 * Nicolas, Marius Paul. De Nietzsche à Hitler. Paris: Fasquelle, 1936, 190p. Waterloo. 349 * Nock, Albert Jay. Memoirs of a Superfluous Man. New York and London: Harper, 1943, 326p. Waterloo. 350 - Noli, Fan Stylian. George Castrioti Scanderbeg (1405–1468). New York: International Universities Press, 1947, 240p. Waterloo. 351 * Ortega y Gasset, José. La rebelión de las masas. Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe Argentina, 1938, 279p. Waterloo. 352 * Otto, Emil. Elementary German Grammar. London: David Nutt, 1914, 216p. Waterloo. 353 - Owen, John. The Skeptics of the Italian Renaissance. London: S. Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Le Balze. Inscription by Santayana, “G. Santayana Cambridge.” 354 * Peers, Edgar Allison. Spanish Mysticism: A Preliminary Survey. London: Methuen, 1924, 277p. Waterloo. 355 * Péguy, Charles Pierre. Notre jeunesse. Paris: Gallimard, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, 1933, 217p. Waterloo. 356 * Perry, Ralph Barton. The Moral Economy. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1909. Georgetown. McCormick notes, marginalia few, inconsequential, and probably not in Santayana’s hand.

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357 * Pestalozzi Foundation of America. Pestalozzi Foundation. New York: s.n., 1947, 171p. Waterloo. Copy imperfect, pages between flyleaf and page 5 are lacking. No marginalia. 358 * Petrie, William Matthew Flinders. The Revolutions of Civilisation. New York: P. Smith, 1941, 135p. Waterloo. 359 * Phelps, William Lyon. Robert Browning: How to Know Him. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, [1915?]. Georgetown. No marginalia. 360 * Pilar, Princess of Bavaria. Don Alfonso XIII: A Study of Monarchy. London: J. Murray, 1931, 436p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 361 * Pizá, Pedro Antonio. Fermagoric Triangles. Santurce, Puerto Rico: Imprenta Soltero, 1945, 153p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 362 - Plato. Dialogi. Leipzig: Teubner, 1887. Georgetown. Volume One only. 363 * Plato. The Dialogues of Plato. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892. Georgetown. Five volumes. Third edition, translated by Benjamin Jowett. 364 * Plato. The Phaedo of Plato. London and New York: Macmillan, 1894. Georgetown. Edited by R. D. Archer-Hind. Inscribed by Santayana, “G. Santayana King’s College 1897.” 365 - Plato. Platonis dialogi secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Lipsiae: In aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1851–1853. Georgetown. Six volumes. Edited by Karl Friedrich Hermann. 366 * Plato. Platonis dialogi secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Lipsiae: In aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1892–1898. Georgetown. Edited by Martin Wohlrab after Karl Friedrich Hermann. Inscribed by Santayana, “G. Santayana 1897.” 367 - Plato. Platons Parmenides: Griechisch und Deutsch. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1854. Georgetown. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Wagner. 368 - Plato. Platons Phädon: Griechisch und Deutsch. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1852. Georgetown. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Wagner. 369 - Plato. Platons Philebos: Griechisch und Deutsch. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1857. Georgetown. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Wagner.

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370 * Plato. The Timaeus of Plato. London and New York: Macmillan, 1888. Georgetown. Edited by R. D. Archer-Hind. Inscribed by Santayana, “G. Santayana King’s College 1896.” 371 * Pound, Ezra Loomis. Quia pauper amavi. London: The Egoist, 19–[?], 51p. Waterloo. 372 * Powys, Llewelyn. Rats in the Sacristy. London: Watts, 1937, 218p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 373 * Prezzolini, Giuseppe. Il cattolicismo rosso. Napoli: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1908. Georgetown. 374 * Privitera, Joseph Frederic. The Latin American Front. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1945, 212p. Waterloo. Manuscript poem on back flyleaf. 375 * Prokosch, Frederic. Chosen Poems. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948, 81p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 376 * Proust, Marcel. A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs. Paris: Librairie Gallimard, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, 1919. Georgetown. 377 * Proust, Marcel. Le Temps retrouvé. Paris: Librairie Gallimard, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, 1927. Waterloo. 378 * Quinn, David Beers. Raleigh and the British Empire. London: Hodder and Stoughton for the English Universities Press, 1947, 284p. Waterloo. 379 * Read, Carveth. The Metaphysics of Nature. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1905. Georgetown. 380 - Read, Carveth. The Origin of Man. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1925. Georgetown. Second edition. 381 * Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Philadelphia: E. H. Butler & Co, 1861. Georgetown. 382 * Reves, Emery. The Anatomy of Peace. New York and London: Harper, 1945, 275p. Waterloo. 383 * Richards, I[vor] A[rmstrong]. Mencius on the Mind. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1932. Columbia. 384 * Richards, I[vor] A[rmstrong]. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1936. Columbia.

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385 * Rickert, Heinrich. Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Einführung in die Transzendentalphilosophie. Tübingen and Leipzig: J. C. B. Mohr, 1904. Georgetown. 386 * Rideau, Emile. Le Dieu de Bergson: essai de critique religieuse. Paris: F. Alcan, 1932, 138p. Waterloo. 387 * Rimbaud, Jean Nicholas Arthur. Oeuvres de Arthur Rimbaud: vers et proses. Paris: Mercure de France, 1937, 398p. Waterloo. 388 * Roback, Abraham Aaron. Personality in Theory and Practice. Cambridge, MA: Sci-Art, 1951, 437p. Waterloo. Author’s presentation copy to Santayana. No marginalia. 389 * Roback, Abraham Aaron. Psychorama: A Mental Outlook and Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Sci-Art, 1942, 365p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 390 * Rolland, Romain. Jean-Christophe: L’Adolescent. Paris: Cahiers de la Quinzaine [?], 1904 (1908). Unlocated. 391 * Rolland, Romain. L’Aube. Paris: Cahiers de la Quinzaine [?], 1903. Unlocated. Sixteenth edition (n.d.). No marginalia. 392 * Rossetti, Dante Gabriel. The Complete Poetical Works of Dante Gabriel Rossetti. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1891. Georgetown. Edited by William M. Rossetti. Inscription by Santayana, “G. Santayana Cambridge 1893.” No marginalia. 393 * Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Du contrat social and Les Rêveries d’un promeneur solitaire. Londres: J. M. Dent & Sons; Paris: Ed. Mignot, 1912. Georgetown. No marginalia in Les Rêveries. 394 * Royal Asiatic Society. Marriage Ceremonies and Priapic Rites in India and the East. Printed for private circulation only, 1909, 107p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 395 * Royal Society of Literature of the United Kingdom. Essays by Divers Hands. London: Oxford University Press, 1921. Waterloo. Volumes 14, 16, 17, and 25 from the Santayana Collection. No marginalia. 396 * Royce, Josiah. The World and the Individual. New York and London: Macmillan, 1899. Harvard. Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen.

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397 * Runes, Dagobert David. Letters to my Son. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949, 92p. Waterloo. Autographed by the author. No marginalia. 398 * Runes, Dagobert David. Of God, the Devil and the Jews. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 186p. Waterloo. McCormick notes some inconsequential marks, probably not by Santayana. 399 * Rush, Benjamin. The Selected Writings of Benjamin Rush. New York: Philosophical Library, 1947, 433p. Waterloo. 400 * Russell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Matter. London: Kegan Paul, 1927. Texas. Marginal annotations in Santayana’s hand in pencil, Daniel Cory’s hand in ink. Signed on front end page “Daniel MacGhie Cory.” 401 - Russell, Bertrand. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1900. Le Balze. Inscription by Santayana, “G. Santayana May 9, 1901 King’s College (on a visit to Dickinson).” 402 - Russell, Bertrand. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: Allen & Unwin, 1948. Texas. 403 * Russell, Bertrand. “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society [reprint], 1911. Texas. 404 * Russell, Bertrand. New Hopes for a Changing World. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1951, 218p. Waterloo. 405 * Russell, Bertrand. “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society [reprint], 1911–1912. Texas. Volume xii, pages 1–24. 406 * Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. London: Oxford University Press, 1912. Texas. Written on front end page, “G. Santayana from the author; Trinity College February 1912.” 407 * Russell, David Riley. Sing with Me Now. Dallas: Kaleidograph Press, 1945, 95p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 408 * Russell, John Francis Stanley. My Life and Adventures. London and New York: Cassell, 1923. Georgetown.

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409 * Salter, William MacKintire. Nietzsche the Thinker: A Study. London: C. Palmer & Hatward, 1917. Georgetown. 410 * Sankaracarya. Self-Knowledge (Atmabodha). New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1946, 228p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 411 * Sarolea, Charles. The Anglo-German Problem. London and New York: Thomas Nelson, 1912. Adelaida Sastre, Avila. 412 * Scheler, Max. Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode. Leipzig: Dürr, 1900. Georgetown. No marginalia. 413 * Schilpp, Paul Arthur [Editor]. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. Evanston, IL: Library of Living Philosophers, 1946, 816p. Waterloo. The Library of Living Philosophers Series, Volume Five. 414 - Schilpp, Paul Arthur [Editor]. The Philosophy of George Santayana. New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1951, 710p. Waterloo. The Library of Living Philosophers Series, Volume Two. 415 * Schilpp, Paul Arthur [Editor]. The Philosophy of John Dewey. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University, 1939. Texas. The Library of Living Philosophers Series, Volume One. 416 * Schlesinger, Arthur Meier. Orestes A. Brownson: A Pilgrim’s Progress. Boston: Little, Brown, 1939, 320p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 417 * Schneider, Herbert Wallace. Meditations in Season: On the Elements of Christian Philosophy. New York, London, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1938, 82p. Waterloo. Presentation copy signed by the author. 418 * Schneider, Herbert Wallace. The Puritan Mind. New York: H. Holt, 1930, 301p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 419 * Schneider, Robert Edward. Positivism in the United States: The Apostleship of Henry Edger. Rosario, República Argentina: s.n., 1946, 308p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 420 * Schofield, William Henry. English Literature, from the Norman Conquest to Chaucer. New York and London: Macmillan, 1906. Georgetown. No marginalia.

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421 * Schopenhauer, Arthur. Parerga und Paralipomena. Leipzig: Brockhaus[?], 1891. Le Balze. Two volumes. Inscription by Santayana, “G. Santayana Cambridge.” 422 * Sebastian, Fannie B. Poetry for Today: Subjective in Form. Washington, DC: American Publishing Co., 1951, 160p. Waterloo. Autographed by the author. No marginalia. 423 * Seidenberg, Roderick. Posthistoric Man: An Inquiry. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1950, 246p. Waterloo. 424 * Sellars, Wilfrid and John Hospers [Editors]. Readings in Ethical Theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952, 707p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 425 * Semon, Richard Wolfgang. Die Mneme als erhaltendes Prinzip im Wechsel des organischen Geschehens. Leipzig: Verlag von Engelmann, 1911. Georgetown. Library notes marginal annotations in Santayana’s hand. McCormick notes no marginalia. 426 * Shaw, George Bernard. The Adventures of a Black Girl in Her Search for God. London: Constable, 1932. Waterloo. No marginalia. 427 * Sitwell, Osbert. The Scarlet Tree. Boston: Little, Brown, 1946, 381p. Waterloo. 428 * Slochower, Harry. Richard Dehmel. Dresden: C. Reissner, 1928. Georgetown. No marginalia. 429 * Slochower, Harry. Three Ways of Modern Man. New York: International Publishers, 1937, 240p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 430 * Smart, Charles Allen. Wild Geese and How to Chase Them. New York: Random House, 1941, 245p. Waterloo. Author’s letter of presentation tipped in by Santayana. 431 * Smith, Logan Pearsall. Afterthoughts. London: Constable & Co., 1931. Georgetown. No marginalia. 432 * Smith, Robinson. The Solution of the Synoptic Problem. London: Watts & Co., 1922, 298p. Waterloo. Second edition. No marginalia. 433 * Smith, Thomas Vernor. The Philosophic Way of Life in America. New York: F. S. Crofts, 1943, 258p. Waterloo. Second edition.

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434 * Sophocles. Antigone: tragedia de Sofocle. Roma: Il Convivio, 1927, 89p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from Lauro de Bosis. No marginalia. 435 * Sophocles. Oedipus Rex. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949, 109p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from Robert Fitzgerald. Holograph note by Santayana on flyleaf. No marginalia. 436 * Soutar, William. Conflict. London: Chapman and Hall, 1931, 41p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 437 * Spaulding, Edward Gleason. A World of Chance, or, Whence, Whither and Why. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 293p. Waterloo. 438 * Spencer, Herbert. The Study of Sociology. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1897. Georgetown. 439 * Spender, Stephen. The Destructive Element. London: Jonathan Cape, 1935. Texas. 440 * Spengler, Oswald. Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte. München: C. H. Beck, 1922–1923. Georgetown. Two volumes. 441 * Spengler, Oswald. Reden und Aufsätze. München: C. H. Beck, 1938, 295p. Waterloo. 442 * Spinoza, Benedict. Benedict von Spinoza’s Ethik. Heidelberg: Weiss, 1886. 255p. Harvard. Translated by J. H. von Kirchmann. Signed, “G. Santayana, Avila, June, 1891–.” 443 * Spinoza, Benedict. Benedicti de Spinoza opera, quotquot reperta sunt. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1882–1883. Waterloo. Two volumes. Edited by J. van Vloten and J. P. N. Land. McCormick notes no marginalia in Volume Two. 444 * Spinoza, Benedict. Epistolario. Buenos Aires: Sociedad Hebraica Argentina, 1950, 224p. Waterloo. Translated by Oscar Cohan. Presentation copy from the translator to Santayana. 445 * Spinoza Society. Septimana Spinozana: acta conventus oecumenici in memoriam Benedicti de Spinoza diei natalis trecentesimi Hagae comitis habiti. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1933, 321p. Waterloo. 446 * Spring, Henry Powell. Challenge to Think. Winter Park, FL: Rollins Press, 1942, 331p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. Holograph note by Santayana. No marginalia.

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447 * Spring, Henry Powell. Essays on Human Science. Winter Park, FL: Orange Press, 1943, 360p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 448 * Stalin, Joseph. Questioni del Leninismo. Roma: Società editrice l’Unita, 1945. Waterloo. Two volumes. 449 * Stanley, Carleton Wellesley. Roots of the Tree. London: Oxford University Press, H. Milford, 1936, 107p. Waterloo. 450 * Stearns, Harold Edmund. Liberalism in America: Its Origin, Its Temporary Collapse, Its Future. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1919. Georgetown. Library notes marginal annotations in Santayana’s hand. McCormick notes no marginalia. 451 * Sterne, Laurence. The Novels of Laurence Sterne. London: Navarre Society, 1926[?]. Waterloo. Four volumes. No marginalia. 452 * Stevenson, Robert Louis. The Ebb-Tide: A Trio and Quartette. London: W. Heinemann, 1894, 237p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 453 * Stickney, Trumbull. Les Sentences dans la poésie grecque: d’Homère à Euripide. Paris: Société nouvelle de librairie et d’édition, 1903. Georgetown. No marginalia. 454 * Stone, Christopher Reynolds. Eton. London: A. and C. Black, 1909, 174p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 455 * Strachey, Giles Lytton. Portraits in Miniature, and Other Essays. London: Chatto and Windus, 1931, 217p. Waterloo. 456 * Strong, Charles Augustus. Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind. London: Macmillan, [1930]. Texas. 457 * Strong, Charles Augustus. “L’Être et le devenir: thèse de philosophie naturelle.” Paris: Boivin, [1934?], 35–57p. Waterloo. Published in Recherches philosophiques. Presentation copy from the author. 458 * Strong, Charles Augustus. The Origin of Consciousness. New York and London: Macmillan, 1918. Georgetown. No marginalia. 459 * Sturt, Henry Cecil. The Idea of a Free Church. London and New York: The Walter Scott Publishing Co., 1909. Georgetown. 460 * Sturzo, Luigi. I discorsi politici. Roma: Istituti Luigi Sturzo, 1951, 445p. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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461 * Surmelian, Leon Z. I Ask You, Ladies and Gentlemen. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1945, 316p. Waterloo. Holograph note by Santayana inside front cover. No marginalia. 462 * Swift, Jonathan. Gulliver’s Travels, A Tale of a Tub, Battle of the Books. London: Oxford University Press, 1933, 599p. Waterloo. 463 * Thalheimer, August. Introduction to Dialectical Materialism: The Marxist World View. New York: Covici-Friede, 1936, 253p. Waterloo. 464 * Thomas, Lowell Jackson. Out of This World: Across the Himalayas to Forbidden Tibet. New York: Greystone Press, 1950, 320p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from Shih-hsiang Chen. No marginalia. 465 * Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica. Augustae Taurinorum: Typographica Pontificia, 1894. Georgetown. Volumes One, Four, and Five of six. No marginalia. 466 * Thompson, Anna Boynton. The Unity of Fichte’s Doctrine of Knowledge. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1895. Georgetown. Radcliffe College Monographs No. 7. Introduction by Josiah Royce. 467 * Thompson, Francis. The Hound of Heaven. London: Burns and Oates, c. 1912, 17p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 468 * Thompson, Francis. Shelley. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1909. Georgetown. 469 * Thompson, Samuel Martin. “A Study of Locke’s Theory of Ideas.” n.p., n.d. Texas. 470 * Thoreau, Henry David. Paragraphs. n.p., n.d. Texas. 471 * Toy, Crawford Howell. Judaism and Christianity: A Sketch of the Process of Thought from Old Testament to New Testament. Boston: Little, Brown, 1892. Georgetown. No marginalia. 472 * Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. A Study of History. London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1934–1945. Waterloo. Six volumes. 473 * Twain, Mark. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. New York and London: Harper, 1912, 404p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from Cyril Clemens. Holograph note on flyleaf by Santayana. No marginalia.

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474 * Twain, Mark. Mark Twain’s Autobiography. New York: Harper & Bros., 1924. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from Cyril Clemens. No marginalia. 475 * Twain, Mark. The Prince and the Pauper. New York and London: Harper, 1909, 280p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from Cyril Clemens. No marginalia. 476 * Twain, Mark. Tom Sawyer Abroad and Other Stories. New York and London: Harper, 1924, 452p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from Cyril Clemens. Library says marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 477 * Umfazi [Clara Urquhart]. Amadodana Ami (My Sons): A Story of Racial Conflict in South Africa. [S.l.]: Editions Franco-Suisses, 1950, 164p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 478 * Urquhart, Clara [Editor]. Last Chance: Eleven Questions on Issues Determining our Destiny. Boston: Beacon Press, 1948, 182p. Waterloo. 479 * Vaihinger, Hans. Die Philosophie des als ob. Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1922. Georgetown. 480 * Valéry, Paul. Charmes. Paris: Gallimard, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, 1926, 125p. Waterloo. 481 * Valéry, Paul. L’Idée fixe. Paris: Gallimard, 1934, 206p. Waterloo. 482 * Valéry, Paul. Introduction à la poétique. Paris: Gallimard, 1938, 59p. Waterloo. 483 * Valéry, Paul. Lèttres à quelques-uns. Paris: Gallimard, 1952. Columbia. 484 * Valéry, Paul. Monsieur Teste. Paris: Gallimard, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, 1927, 129p. Waterloo. 485 * Valéry, Paul. Variété II. Paris: Gallimard, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, 1930. Waterloo. 486 * Valéry, Paul. Variété IV. Paris: Gallimard, 1938. Waterloo. 487 * Valois, Georges. Le Père. Paris: Nouvelle librairie nationale, 1913. Georgetown. 488 * Vercel, Roger. Bertrand of Brittany: A Biography of Messire du Guesclin. London: G. Routledge, 1934, 256p. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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George Santayana’s Library

489 * Vergil [Publius Vergilius Maro]. Carmina omnia. Paris: Didot, 1858, 470p. Waterloo. Holograph note by Santayana on endpaper reads, “From Joe Stickney, Paris, September 1902.” 490 * Vergil [Publius Vergilius Maro]. The Georgics of Vergil. London: G. W. Jones at the Sign of the Dolphin, 1931, 128p. Waterloo. Translated by R. D. Blackmore. Edition limited to 500 copies on specially made paper. This copy is not numbered. No marginalia. 491 * Vidal, Gore. The Season of Comfort. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1949, 253p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. 492 * Viereck, Peter Robert Edwin. The First Morning: New Poems. New York: C. Scribner’s, 1952, 120p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 493 * Viereck, Peter Robert Edwin. Strike through the Mask: New Lyrical Poems. New York: C. Scribner’s, 1950, 70p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 494 * Viereck, Peter Robert Edwin. Terror and Decorum: Poems 1940–1948. New York and London: C. Scribner’s, 1948, 110p. Waterloo. Marked by Santayana. McCormick notes no marginalia. 495 * Vivante, Leone. Indétermination et création. Paris: F. Sorlot, 1939, 270p. Waterloo. Translated by Lorenzo Ercole Lanza. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 496 * Vivante, Leone. La poesia inglese ed il suo contributo alla conoscenza dello spirito. Firenze: Vallecchi Editore, 1947, 542p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 497 * Vivante, Leone. Note sopra la originalità del pensiero. Roma: P. Magione & C. Strini, 1925. Georgetown. 498 * Vivante, Leone. Notes on the Originality of Thought. London: J. Lane, 1927. Georgetown. Translated by Arthur Brodrick Bullock. No marginalia. 499 * Vivante, Leone. Studi sulle precognizioni. Firenze: Vallecchi Editore, 1937, 218p. Waterloo. 500 * Von Hagen, Victor Wolfgang. The Aztec and Maya Papermakers. New York: J. J. Augustin, 1944, 120p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 501 * Von Hagen, Victor Wolfgang. Frederick Catherwood, Archt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 177p. Waterloo. No marginalia.

George Santayana’s Library

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502 * Von Hagen, Victor Wolfgang. Sudamérica los llamaba: exploraciones de los grandes naturalistas. Mexico: Editorial Nuevo Mundo, 1945, 478p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 503 * Walden, Selma. Do You Ask for My Death?: A Book of Poetry. Chicago: s.n., 1945, 31p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Santayana from the author. No marginalia. 504 * Warren, Edward Perry [pseud. ALR]. A Tale of Pausanian Love. London: Cayme Press, 1927, 136p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 505 * Waterman, Charles. The Three Spheres of Society. London: Faber and Faber, 1946, 294p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 506 * Watson, John Broadus. Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott, 1919. Texas. 507 * Weber, Alfred. Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte: Uberwindung des Nihilismus? Bern: A. Francke, 1946, 262p. Waterloo. 508 * Weyl, Hermann. Raum, Zeit, Materie. Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1923. Georgetown. 509 * Wheelock, John Hall. Poems, 1911–1936. New York and London: C. Scribner’s, 1936, 245p. Waterloo. Presentation copy to Mrs. Crawford H. Toy from the author. No marginalia. 510 * Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. New York: The Macmillan Co.; Cambridge, England: University Press, 1929. Texas. Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh during the session 1927–28. Marginal annotations in Santayana’s hand in pencil, Daniel Cory’s hand in ink. Signed on front endpaper, “Daniel Cory, 1930 July (Paris).” 511 * Whitehead, Alfred North. Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1928. Georgetown. 512 * Whitman, Walt. Leaves of Grass. Philadelphia: D. McKay, 1891–1892. Georgetown. 513 * Williams, Oscar [Editor]. A Little Treasury of Modern Poetry, English and American. New York: C. Scribner’s, 1946, 672p. Waterloo. 514 * Williams, William Carlos. Paterson (Book One). New York: New Directions, 1946. Waterloo. No marginalia.

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George Santayana’s Library

515 * Williams, William Carlos. Paterson (Book Two). New York: New Directions, 1948. Waterloo. No marginalia. 516 * Winchester College Archaeological Society. Winchester College: Its History, Buildings and Customs. Winchester, England: P. & G. Wells, 1926. Georgetown. 517 * Woodbridge, Frederick James Eugene. The Realm of Mind: An Essay in Metaphysics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1926. Texas. 518 * Woods, James Haughton. The Value of Religious Facts. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co, 1899. Georgetown. 519 * Worth, Claud Alley. Yacht Navigation and Voyaging. London: J. D. Potter, 1928, 260p. Waterloo. No marginalia. 520 * Wycherley, William. The Country Wife: A Comedy. London: Hutchinson, 1934, 125p. Waterloo. Edition limited to 1000 copies. This is number 535, signed by the illustrator. No marginalia. 521 * Young, George Malcolm. Victorian England: Portrait of an Age. London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1949, 219p. Waterloo. First published in 1936. 522 * Zeller, Eduard. Die Philosophie der Griechen. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1879–1892. Georgetown. 523 * Estria [Literary Periodical]. Rome: Roma Colegio Español, 1951. Waterloo. Cuadernos de poesia que edita el colegio Español de Roma. No. 1, April 1951. No marginalia. 524 * Fifty Best Poems of America. New York: Little Leather Library Corporation, n.d. Columbia. No marginalia. 525 * The Golden Goose [Literary Journal]. Columbus, OH: Cronos Editions, 1948. Waterloo. Number 2, Autumn 1948. No marginalia. 526 * Harvard College: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Class of ’86. Boston: Anchor Linotype Printing Co., 1936. Waterloo. Prepared by John McKinstry Merriam, class secretary. No marginalia. 527 * Nine [Literary Periodical]. Tunbridge Wells, P. Russell, 1949–1956. Waterloo. Numbers 1–11.

George Santayana’s Library

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376 * A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs. Proust, Marcel. 237 - A vau l’eau. Huysmans, J.-K. 507 * Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte: Uberwindung des Nihilismus? Weber, Alfred. 239 * Actores y espectadores. Irazusta, Julio. 426 * The Adventures of a Black Girl in Her Search for God. Shaw, George Bernard. 473 * The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Twain, Mark. 42 * The Adventures of Mr. Verdant Green. Bede, Cuthbert. 155 * After Strange Gods. Eliot, T[homas] S[tearns]. 431 * Afterthoughts. Smith, Logan Pearsall. 243 * Alice James: Her Brothers—Her Journal. James, Alice. 222 * Alkibiades: der Staatsmann und Feldherr. Hertzberg, Gustav Friedrich. 477 * Amadodana Ami (My Sons): A Story of Racial Conflict in South Africa. Umfazi [Clara Urquhart]. 74 * American Authors Today. Burnett, Whit and Charles E. Slatkin [Editors]. 195 * The Americans: A Study in National Character. Gorer, Geoffrey. 337 * Amerikanische Philosophie. Müller, Gustav Emil. 184 * Amyntas. Gide, André Paul Guillaume. 76 * The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Butler, Joseph. 400 * The Analysis of Matter. Russell, Bertrand. 203 * The Anatomy of Happiness. Gumpert, Martin. 382 * The Anatomy of Peace. Reves, Emery. 142 - And Least Love. Dunn, Robert. 411 * The Anglo-German Problem. Sarolea, Charles. 434 * Antigone: tragedia de Sofocle. Sophocles. 252 * Aphorismes de Saint Jean de la Croix. Juan de la Cruz.

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George Santayana’s Library

229 * Aphrodite: The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite and the Pervigilium Veneris. Homer. 231 * The Apocryphal New Testament. Hone, William, Jeremiah Jones, and William Wake. 63 * Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay. Bradley, Francis Herbert. 132 * Appearances: Being Notes of Travel. Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. 20 * Aristoteles Metaphysik. Aristotle. 21 - Aristotelis Metaphysica recognovit et enarravit Hermannus Bonitz. Aristotle. 22 * Aristotle’s Psychology: A Treatise on the Principle of Life (De Anima and Parva Naturalia). Aristotle. 75 * Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts: With a Critical Text and Translation of the Poetics. Butcher, Samuel Henry. 253 * Art and Freedom. Kallen, Horace Meyer. 307 * Art et scolastique. Maritain, Jacques. 338 * The Arts in Renewal. Mumford, Lewis [Editor]. 500 * The Aztec and Maya Papermakers. Von Hagen, Victor Wolfgang. 110 * Bacchus and Krishna. Colony, Horatio. 301 * Benedetto Croce, ovvero, Dell’improntitudine. Manacorda, Guido. 442 * Benedict von Spinoza’s Ethik. Spinoza, Benedict. 443 * Benedicti de Spinoza opera, quotquot reperta sunt. Spinoza, Benedict. 269 * The Benedictines. Knowles, David. 488 * Bertrand of Brittany: A Biography of Messire du Guesclin. Vercel, Roger. 173 * Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Freud, Sigmund. 322 * Bibliography of the Published Writings of John Stuart Mill. Mill, John Stuart. 41 * Biography of the Bible. Bates, Ernest Sutherland. 254 * The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy. Kallen, Horace Meyer. 97 * Bucoliques. Chénier, André Marie.

George Santayana’s Marginalia

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31 * Byzance. Bailly, Auguste. 89 * The Canon of Reason and Virtue: Being Lao-tze’s Tao Teh King. Carus, Paul. 96 * The Canterbury Tales of Geoffrey Chaucer. Chaucer, Geoffrey. 489 * Carmina omnia. Vergil [Publius Vergilius Maro]. 116 * Ce qui est vivant et ce qui est mort de la philosophie de Hegel. Croce, Benedetto. 446 * Challenge to Think. Spring, Henry Powell. 480 * Charmes. Valéry, Paul. 125 * The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy. Datta, Dhirendra Mohan. 375 * Chosen Poems. Prokosch, Frederic. 329 * The Clairvoyant Theory of Perception: A New Theory of Vision. Moncrieff, Malcolm Matthew. 167 * Classic American Philosophers: Peirce, James, Royce, Santayana, Dewey, Whitehead. Fisch, Max H. [Editor]. 156 * The Cocktail Party: A Comedy. Eliot, T. S. 60 * Colui che si chiama “lo sono.” Bolaffio, Carlo. 120 * The Comedy of Dante Alighieri, Florentine by birth but not in conduct. Dante Alighieri. 392 * The Complete Poetical Works of Dante Gabriel Rossetti. Rossetti, Dante Gabriel. 228 * The Concept of Consciousness. Holt, Edwin Bissell. 204 * Concetto e programma della filosofia d’oggi. Guzzo, Augusto et alii. 436 * Conflict. Soutar, William. 319 * Confusion of Faces: The Struggle between Religion and Secularism in Europe. Meissner, Erich. 304 - Coplas de Don Jorge Manrique. Manrique, Jorge. 520 * The Country Wife: A Comedy. Wycherley, William. 188 * Cours de philosophie, 1841–1842. Gioberti, Vincenzo. 401 - A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. Russell, Bertrand.

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George Santayana’s Library

259 * Critique of Pure Reason. Kant, Immanuel. 268 * A Critique of the Philosophy of George Santayana in the Light of Thomistic Principles. Kinney, Mary Cyril Edwin. 303 * The Crown and the Fable: A Poetic Sequence. Manning, Hugo. 255 * Culture and Democracy in the United States. Kallen, Horace Meyer. 271 * The Culture of Korea. Korean American Cultural Association. 65 * The Dawn of Conscience. Breasted, James Henry. 98 * The Dawn of Liberation: War Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill. Churchill, Winston. 348 * De Nietzsche à Hitler. Nicolas, Marius Paul. 296 * De rerum natura libri sex. Lucretius [Titus Lucretius Carus]. 28 * Democracy and Leadership. Babbitt, Irving. 385 * Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Einführung in die Transzendentalphilosophie. Rickert, Heinrich. 47 * Der Ptolemäer. Benn, Gottfried. 440 * Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte. Spengler, Oswald. 302 * Der Zauberberg. Mann, Thomas. 439 * The Destructive Element. Spender, Stephen. 67 * Deutsche Lyric. Buchheim, Karl Adolf [Editor]. 333 * The Development of Harvard University Since the Inauguration of President Eliot. Morison, Samuel Eliot [Editor]. 362 - Dialogi. Plato. 363 * The Dialogues of Plato. Plato. 117 * The Diary of Thomas Crosfield. Crosfield, Thomas. 72 * Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition. Bultmann, Rudolf Karl. 425 * Die Mneme als erhaltendes Prinzip im Wechsel des organischen Geschehens. Semon, Richard Wolfgang. 522 * Die Philosophie der Griechen. Zeller, Eduard. 479 * Die Philosophie des als ob. Vaihinger, Hans.

George Santayana’s Library

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180 * Die Sâmkhya-Philosophie: eine Darstellung des indischen Rationalismus. Garbe, Richard von. 412 * Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode. Scheler, Max. 174 * Die Traumdeutung (The Interpretation of Dreams). Freud, Sigmund. 323 * Dissertations and Discussions. Mill, John Stuart. 121 * The Divine Comedy: Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso. Dante Alighieri. 5 * The Divine Pilgrim. Aiken, Conrad. 61 * Do I Wake or Sleep? Bolton, Isabel. 503 * Do You Ask for My Death?: A Book of Poetry. Walden, Selma. 278 * Dogme et critique. Le Roy, Edouard Louis. 212 * Dogmengeschichte. Harnack, Adolf von. 360 * Don Alfonso XIII: A Study of Monarchy. Pilar, Princess of Bavaria. 247 * The Double Axe, and Other Poems. Jeffers, Robinson. 69 * Dreaming. Bullett, Gerald William. 393 * Du contrat social and Les Rêveries d’un promeneur solitaire. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 452 * The Ebb-Tide: A Trio and Quartette. Stevenson, Robert Louis. 256 * The Education of Free Men. Kallen, Horace Meyer. 171 * Einstein: His Life and Times. Frank, Philipp. 26 * El Islam cristianizado. Asín Palacios, Miguel. 352 * Elementary German Grammar. Otto, Emil. 83 * Elements in Thought and Emotion: An Essay on Education, Epistomology, & the Psycho-neural Problem. Campion, George C. 66 - Emerson and Others. Brooks, Van Wyck. 281 * England and Germany: Affinity and Contrast. Levy, Hermann. 299 * English Apologetic Theology. Macran, Frederick Walter. 420 * English Literature, from the Norman Conquest to Chaucer. Schofield, William Henry.

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George Santayana’s Library

149 * The Enjoyment of Poetry: with Anthology for Enjoyment of Poetry. Eastman, Max [Forrester]. 444 * Epistolario. Spinoza, Benedict. 298 * Erotica. Machiavelli, Niccolo. 44 * Essai d’un discours cohérent sur les rapports de Dieu et du monde. Benda, Julien. 285 * An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke, John. 395 * Essays by Divers Hands. Royal Society of Literature of the United Kingdom. 244 * Essays in Radical Empiricism. James, William. 447 * Essays on Human Science. Spring, Henry Powell. 381 * Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Reid, Thomas. 456 * Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind. Strong, Charles Augustus. 29 * The Essays or Counsels: Civil and Moral. Bacon, Francis. 158 * Essays, 1948. English Institute. 523 * Estria [Literary Periodical]. 64 * Ethical Studies. Bradley, Francis Herbert. 454 * Eton. Stone, Christopher Reynolds. 78 * The Evolution of Religion. Caird, Edward. 270 * The Evolution of Truth, and Other Essays. Knox, Howard Vicenté. 324 * An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. Mill, John Stuart. 129 * Experience and Nature. Dewey, John. 273 * Fables, contes et nouvelles. La Fontaine, Jean de. 346 * The Facts about Shakespeare. Neilson, William Allan and A. H. Thorndike. 361 * Fermagoric Triangles. Pizá, Pedro Antonio. 524 * Fifty Best Poems of America. 250 * Fifty Spanish Poems. Jiménez, Juan Ramón. 492 * The First Morning: New Poems. Viereck, Peter Robert Edwin.

George Santayana’s Library

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161 - The First Philosophers of Greece. Fairbanks, Arthur. 347 * Floreat Etona: Anecdotes and Memories of Eton College. Nevill, Ralph. 312 * The Folded Leaf. Maxwell, William. 223 * The Forms of Value: The Extension of a Hedonistic Axiology. Hilliard, Albert Leroy. 36 * The Foundations of Belief. Balfour, Arthur James. 157 * Four Quartets. Eliot, T. S. 501 * Frederick Catherwood, Archt. Von Hagen, Victor Wolfgang. 105 * The Friend. Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. 350 - George Castrioti Scanderbeg (1405–1468). Noli, Fan Stylian. 286 * George Tyrrell et Henri Brémond. Loisy, Alfred Firmin. 490 * The Georgics of Vergil. Vergil [Publius Vergilius Maro]. 320 * A German Grammar for Schools. Meyer, Kuno. 114 * Germany and England. Cramb, J[ohn] A[dam]. 282 * Geschichte der alten Kirche. Lietzmann, Hans. 344 * God: Being an Introduction to the Science of Metabiology. Murry, John Middleton. 211 * Goethe et l’art de vivre. Harcourt, Robert d’. 191 * Goethe’s Gedichte. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. 525 * The Golden Goose [Literary Journal]. 341 * Great Pictures of Europe. Munro, Thomas. 330 * Great Visions of Philosophy: Varieties of Speculative Thought in the West from the Greeks to Bergson. Montague, William Pepperell. 30 * The Greek Atomists and Epicurus. Bailey, Cyril. 462 * Gulliver’s Travels, A Tale of a Tub, Battle of the Books. Swift, Jonathan. 225 * Handbook: Museum and Library Collections. Hispanic Society of America. 526 * Harvard College: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Class of ’86. 38 * Have You Anything to Declare? Baring, Maurice.

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George Santayana’s Library

214 - Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 218 * Hemingway. Hemingway, Ernest. 272 * Henri III: Les Amours des rois de France. La Batut, Guy de. 339 * Herman Melville. Mumford, Lewis. 8 * Histoire de mes pensées. Alain [Emile Auguste Chartier]. 124 * A History of Indian Philosophy. Dasgupta, Surendranath. 177 * A History of Philosophy. Fuller, Benjamin Apthorp Gould. 166 * The History of Tom Jones: A Foundling. Fielding, Henry. 143 * Horizon Fever. Dunn, Robert. 467 * The Hound of Heaven. Thompson, Francis. 402 - Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. Russell, Bertrand. 274 * Humanism as a Philosophy. Lamont, Corliss. 141 * Hungry Hill. Du Maurier, Daphne. 461 * I Ask You, Ladies and Gentlemen. Surmelian, Leon Z. 460 * I discorsi politici. Sturzo, Luigi. 459 * The Idea of a Free Church. Sturt, Henry Cecil. 107 * The Idea of Nature. Collingwood, Robin George. 159 * Idealism: A Critical Survey. Ewing, Alfred Cyril. 90 * Idealismo e solipsismo: e saggi critici. Castelli, Enrico. 236 * Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Husserl, Edmund. 306 * If I Had My Time Again: An Anthology Contributed by Twenty Distinguished Men and Women. Marchant, James [Editor]. 373 * Il cattolicismo rosso. Prezzolini, Giuseppe. 205 * Il pensiero di B. Spinoza. Guzzo, Augusto. 275 * The Illusion of Immortality. Lamont, Corliss. 86 * Images cachées. Carco, Francis. 260 * Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Kant, Immanuel. 261 * Immanuel Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Kant, Immanuel.

George Santayana’s Library

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262 - Immanuel Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Kant, Immanuel. 71 * Imperial Germany. Bülow, Bernhard von. 495 * Indétermination et création. Vivante, Leone. 336 * India: A Synthesis of Cultures. Motwani, Kewal. 482 * Introduction à la poétique. Valéry, Paul. 202 * Introduction générale á l’étude des doctrines Hindoues. Guénon, René. 463 * Introduction to Dialectical Materialism: The Marxist World View. Thalheimer, August. 249 * An Introduction to the History of England, from the Earliest Times to 1204. Jerrold, Douglas. 213 * Is God in History?: An Inquiry into Human and Prehuman History. Heard, Gerald. 133 * Is Immortality Desirable? Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. 56 * Jacovleff and Other Artists. Birnbaum, Martin. 162 * Jean Paul Sartre. Falconi, Carlo. 390 * Jean-Christophe: L’Adolescent. Rolland, Romain. 54 * Jerusalem under the High-Priests. Bevan, Edwyn Robert. 37 * Jésus. Barbusse, Henri. 57 * John Singer Sargent. Birnbaum, Martin. 185 * Journal des faux-monnayeurs. Gide, André Paul Guillaume. 471 * Judaism and Christianity: A Sketch of the Process of Thought from Old Testament to New Testament. Toy, Crawford Howell. 263 * Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics. Kant, Immanuel. 6 * The Kid. Aiken, Conrad. 403 * “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.” Russell, Bertrand. 32 * L’Allemagne. Bainville, Jacques. 33 * L’Angleterre et l’empire Britannique. Bainville, Jacques. 277 * L’Athéisme. Le Dantec, Félix Alexandre.

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George Santayana’s Library

391 * L’Aube. Rolland, Romain. 175 * L’Avenir d’une illusion. Freud, Sigmund. 93 * L’École des cadavres. Céline, Louis-Ferdinand. 169 - L’Esprit de Fontenelle. Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bovier de. 457 * “L’Être et le devenir: thèse de philosophie naturelle.” Strong, Charles Augustus. 73 * L’Expédition d’Alexandre et la conquête de l’Asie. Burgard, Raymond. 201 * L’Homme et son devenir selon le Vêdânta. Guénon, René. 481 * L’Idée fixe. Valéry, Paul. 221 * L’Illusion philosophique. Hersch, Jeanne. 51 * L’Intuition philosophique. Bergson, Henri. 208 * L’io et la ragione. Guzzo, Augusto. 122 * La Divina commedia. Dante Alighieri. 123 * La Divina commedia di Dante Alighieri. Dante Alighieri. 206 * La filosofia domani. Guzzo, Augusto. 207 * La filosofia e l’esperienza. Guzzo, Augusto. 45 * La Fin de l’éternel. Benda, Julien. 34 * La Fortune de la France. Bainville, Jacques. 87 * La Lumière noire: Roman. Carco, Francis. 287 * La Naissance du christianisme. Loisy, Alfred Firmin. 147 * La Pensée de George Santayana: Santayana en Amérique. Duron, Jacques. 49 * La Pensée et le mouvant. Bergson, Henri. 179 * La Perse. Furon, Raymond. 85 * La Peste. Camus, Albert. 496 * La poesia inglese ed il suo contributo alla conoscenza dello spirito. Vivante, Leone. 351 * La rebelión de las masas. Ortega y Gasset, José. 190 * La Renaissance: scénes historiques. Gobineau, Joseph Arthur, comte de.

George Santayana’s Library

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35 * La Russie et la barriere de l’est. Bainville, Jacques. 181 * Las miradas perdidas, 1944–1950. García Marruz, Fina. 478 * Last Chance: Eleven Questions on Issues Determining our Destiny. Urquhart, Clara [Editor]. 374 * The Latin American Front. Privitera, Joseph Frederic. 88 * Law and Literature, and Other Essays and Addresses. Cardozo, Benjamin Nathan. 9 * Le Citoyen contre les pouvoirs. Alain [E. A. Chartier]. 386 * Le Dieu de Bergson: essai de critique religieuse. Rideau, Emile. 220 * Le Move muse. Herodotus. 84 * Le Mythe de Sisyphe. Camus, Albert. 91 * Le Paris de Charles V, 1364–1380. Castelnau, Jacques Thomas de. 487 * Le Père. Valois, Georges. 377 * Le Temps retrouvé. Proust, Marcel. 186 * Le Voyage d’Urien. Gide, André Paul Guillaume. 3 * Le Vrai Verlaine: essai psychanalytique. Adam, Antoine. 512 * Leaves of Grass. Whitman, Walt. 102 * Lectures and Essays by the late William Kingdon Clifford. Clifford, William Kingdon. 189 * Les Cinq tentations de La Fontaine. Giraudoux, Jean. 50 * Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion. Bergson, Henri. 10 * Les Dieux. Alain [E. A. Chartier]. 200 * Les États multiples de l’être. Guénon, René. 235 * Les États-unis et la guerre. Hovelaque, Emile. 11 * Les Idées et les âges. Alain [E. A. Chartier]. 288 * Les Origines du nouveau testament. Loisy, Alfred Firmin. 453 * Les Sentences dans la poésie grecque: d’Homère à Euripide. Stickney, Trumbull. 397 * Letters to my Son. Runes, Dagobert David. 483 * Lèttres à quelques-uns. Valéry, Paul.

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George Santayana’s Library

331 * Lettres persanes. Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brede et de. 450 * Liberalism in America: Its Origin, Its Temporary Collapse, Its Future. Stearns, Harold Edmund. 80 * The Liberation of American Literature. Calverton, Victor Francis. 265 * Life and Spirit: Biosophical Poems. Kettner, Frederick. 313 * A Little Treasury of American Prose: The Major Writers from Colonial Times to the Present Day. Mayberry, George [Editor]. 513 * A Little Treasury of Modern Poetry, English and American. Williams, Oscar [Editor]. 154 * Living Philosophies. Einstein, Albert [Editor]. 183 * Locke’s Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations. Gibson, James. 215 * The Logic of Hegel. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 295 * Lucian’s True History. Lucian [Lucianus Samosatensis]. 311 * Lucretius: Epicurean and Poet. Masson, John. 128 * Luther et le Luthéranisme. Denifle, Henri. 194 * The Maggid of Caro: The Mystic Life of the Eminent Codifier Joseph Caro as Revealed in His Secret Diary. Gordon, Hirsch Loeb. 276 * Man and Christmas Verse. Langstaff, John Brett. 99 * The Man from Limehouse: Clement Richard Attlee. Clemens, Cyril. 100 * The Man from Missouri: A Biography of Harry S. Truman. Clemens, Cyril. 15 * Manufacture of Christianity. Albert, Thomas. 474 * Mark Twain’s Autobiography. Twain, Mark. 394 * Marriage Ceremonies and Priapic Rites in India and the East. Royal Asiatic Society. 176 * A Masque of Reason. Frost, Robert. 328 * Materialism: The Scientific Bias. Mins, Henry Felix. 94 * Mea culpa: suivi de la vie et l’oeuvre de Semmelweis. Céline, LouisFerdinand.

George Santayana’s Library

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134 - The Meaning of Good: A Dialogue. Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. 417 * Meditations in Season: On the Elements of Christian Philosophy. Schneider, Herbert Wallace. 349 * Memoirs of a Superfluous Man. Nock, Albert Jay. 2 * Memoirs of an Aesthete. Acton, Harold. 7 * Memories of Eton Sixty Years Ago. Ainger, Arthur Campbell. 383 * Mencius on the Mind. Richards, I[vor] A[rmstrong]. 267 * Menschen als Sinnbilder. Keyserling, Hermann Alexander. 23 - Metaphysica. Aristotle. 379 * The Metaphysics of Nature. Read, Carveth. 232 * The Metaphysics of Pragmatism: With an Introductory Word by John Dewey. Hook, Sidney. 294 * The Mills of the Kavanaughs. Lowell, Robert. 178 * The Mind and Face of Bolshevism: An Examination of Cultural Life in Soviet Russia. Fülöp-Miller, René. 46 * Mon premier testament. Benda, Julien. 484 * Monsieur Teste. Valéry, Paul. 356 * The Moral Economy. Perry, Ralph Barton. 340 * The Moral Philosophy of Santayana. Munitz, Milton Karl. 234 * More Poems. Housman, A[lfred] E[dward]. 101 * My Chat with Thomas Hardy. Clemens, Cyril. 126 * My Country. Davenport, Russell Wheeler. 408 * My Life and Adventures. Russell, John Francis Stanley. 151 * The Nature of the Physical World. Eddington, Arthur Stanley. 138 * Nature, Mind, and Death. Ducasse, Curt John. 325 * Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism. Mill, John Stuart. 404 * New Hopes for a Changing World. Russell, Bertrand. 108 * The New Leviathan, or Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism. Collingwood, Robin George. 24 * The Nichomachaean Ethics of Aristotle. Aristotle.

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George Santayana’s Library

409 * Nietzsche the Thinker: A Study. Salter, Will iam MacKintire. 527 * Nine [Literary Periodical]. 58 * North & South. Bishop, Elizabeth. 497 * Note sopra la originalità del pensiero. Vivante, Leone. 95 * Notes on Religion. Chapman, John Jay. 315 - Notes on the Harvard Tercentenary. McCord, David Thompson Watson. 498 * Notes on the Originality of Thought. Vivante, Leone. 77 * “The Notion of Essence in the Philosophy of George Santayana.” Butler, Richard. 355 * Notre jeunesse. Péguy, Charles Pierre. 451 * The Novels of Laurence Sterne. Sterne, Laurence. 435 * Oedipus Rex. Sophocles. 387 * Oeuvres de Arthur Rimbaud: vers et proses. Rimbaud, Jean Nicholas Arthur. 327 * Oeuvres de Millevoye. Millevoye, Charles Hubert. 112 * Oeuvres de Pierre Corneille: Théatre complet. Corneille, Pierre. 398 * Of God, the Devil and the Jews. Runes, Dagobert David. 113 * On a Note of Triumph. Corwin, Norman Lewis. 139 * “On the Attributes of Material Things.” Ducasse, Curt John. 405 * “On the Relations of Universals and Particulars.” Russell, Bertrand. 27 * Once Around the Sun. Atkinson, Brooks. 416 * Orestes A. Brownson: A Pilgrim’s Progress. Schlesinger, Arthur Meier. 297 - The Origin and Growth of Plato’s Logic. Lutoslawski, Wincenty. 458 * The Origin of Consciousness. Strong, Charles Augustus. 380 - The Origin of Man. Read, Carveth. 230 * The Original Iliad. Homer. 199 * Origines de l’esprit bourgeois en France. Groethuysen, Bernhard.

George Santayana’s Library

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224 * The Origins of Art: A Psychological & Sociological Inquiry. Hirn, Yrjö. 43 * Our Present Philosophy of Life. Belgion, Montgomery. 192 * Our Threatened Values. Gollancz, Victor. 464 * Out of This World: Across the Himalayas to Forbidden Tibet. Thomas, Lowell Jackson. 314 * An Oxford Note-book. Maycock, Alan Lawson. 470 * Paragraphs. Thoreau, Henry David. 421 * Parerga und Paralipomena. Schopenhauer, Arthur. 81 - The Passing of the Gods. Calverton, Victor Francis. 514 * Paterson (Book One). Williams, William Carlos. 515 * Paterson (Book Two). Williams, William Carlos. 257 * Patterns of Progress. Kallen, Horace Meyer. 388 * Personality in Theory and Practice. Roback, Abraham Aaron. 357 * Pestalozzi Foundation. Pestalozzi Foundation of America. 364 * The Phaedo of Plato. Plato. 216 - Phänomenologie des Geistes. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 152 * Philosopher’s Quest. Edman, Irwin. 433 * The Philosophic Way of Life in America. Smith, Thomas Vernor. 280 * The Philosophical Works of Leibniz. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 59 * Philosophy in American Education. Blanshard, Brand [Editor]. 283 * The Philosophy of Bergson. Lindsay, A[lexander] D[unlop]. 413 * The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. Schilpp, Paul Arthur [Editor]. 414 - The Philosophy of George Santayana. Schilpp, Paul Arthur [Editor]. 415 * The Philosophy of John Dewey. Schilpp, Paul Arthur [Editor]. 238 * The Philosophy of Plotinus. Inge, William Ralph. 384 * The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Richards, I[vor] A[rmstrong]. 210 * Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton. Hamilton, William. 242 * Plato’s Later Theory of Ideas. Jackson, Henry. 365 - Platonis dialogi secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Plato.

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George Santayana’s Library

366 * Platonis dialogi secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Plato. 62 - Platonische Studien. Bonitz, Hermann. 332 * Platonism. More, Paul Elmer. 367 - Platons Parmenides: Griechisch und Deutsch. Plato. 368 - Platons Phädon: Griechisch und Deutsch. Plato. 369 - Platons Philebos: Griechisch und Deutsch. Plato. 318 * Poemetti. Medici, Lorenzo de’. 196 * Poems. Gray, Thomas. 70 * Poems in Pencil. Bullett, Gerald William. 79 * Poems of Callimachus: Four Hymns and the Epigrams. Callimachus. 39 * Poems of Rural Life in the Dorset Dialect. Barnes, William. 509 * Poems, 1911–1936. Wheelock, John Hall. 17 * Poesía Española: ensayo de metodos y limites estilisticos. Alonso, Dámaso. 316 * Poet always Next But One. McCord, David Thompson Watson. 106 * The Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. 422 * Poetry for Today: Subjective in Form. Sebastian, Fannie B. 163 * Portraits de famille: souvenirs. Fargue, Léon-Paul. 455 * Portraits in Miniature, and Other Essays. Strachey, Giles Lytton. 419 * Positivism in the United States: The Apostleship of Henry Edger. Schneider, Robert Edward. 423 * Posthistoric Man: An Inquiry. Seidenberg, Roderick. 300 * Poverty: Yesterday and Today. Mallon, James Joseph and E. C. T. Lascelles. 335 * The Powder of Sympathy. Morley, Christopher Darlington. 245 * Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. James, William. 310 * Prairie Grass Poems. Marsh, Gerald. 284 * A Preface to Morals. Lippmann, Walter.

George Santayana’s Library

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475 * The Prince and the Pauper. Twain, Mark. 406 * The Problems of Philosophy. Russell, Bertrand. 510 * Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. Whitehead, Alfred North. 197 * Prolegomena to Ethics. Green, Thomas Hill. 135 * Prophet of America: Emerson and the Problems of To-day. Dillaway, Newton. 12 * Propos de littérature. Alain [E. A. Chartier]. 13 * Propos de politique. Alain [E. A. Chartier]. 14 * Propos sur le Christianisme. Alain [E. A. Chartier]. 291 * The Prose Works of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth. 19 * Proust and Santayana: The Aesthetic Way of Life. Ames, Van Meter. 25 * Psychologie d’Aristote: Traité de l’âme. Aristotle. 209 * Psychology and Morals: An Analysis of Character. Hadfield, James Arthur. 506 * Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. Watson, John Broadus. 389 * Psychorama: A Mental Outlook and Analysis. Roback, Abraham Aaron. 418 * The Puritan Mind. Schneider, Herbert Wallace. 130 * The Quest for Certainty. Dewey, John. 448 * Questioni del Leninismo. Stalin, Joseph. 371 * Quia pauper amavi. Pound, Ezra Loomis. 219 * The Quiet Center. Henrich, Edith. 127 * Quinquennial Catalogue of the Delphic Club of Harvard University. Delphic Club. 378 * Raleigh and the British Empire. Quinn, David Beers. 372 * Rats in the Sacristy. Powys, Llewelyn. 508 * Raum, Zeit, Materie. Weyl, Hermann. 160 - Reading I’ve Liked. Fadiman, Clifton.

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George Santayana’s Library

424 * Readings in Ethical Theory. Sellars, Wilfrid and John Hospers [Editors]. 517 * The Realm of Mind: An Essay in Metaphysics. Woodbridge, Frederick James Eugene. 131 * Reconstruction and Philosophy. Dewey, John. 441 * Reden und Aufsätze. Spengler, Oswald. 308 * Réflexions sur l’intelligence et sur sa vie propre. Maritain, Jacques. 264 * The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads. Keith, Arthur Berriedale. 82 * Religion in Greek Literature. Campbell, Lewis. 4 * The Religious Teachers of Greece. Adam, James. 1 * Representation and Form: A Study of Aesthetic Values in Representational Art. Abell, Walter. 153 * Representative Selections. Edwards, Jonathan. 266 * A Revision of the Treaty. Keynes, John Maynard. 358 * The Revolutions of Civilisation. Petrie, William Matthew Flinders. 428 * Richard Dehmel. Slochower, Harry. 92 * Rime. Cavalcanti, Guido. 321 * Rime e lettere: precedute dalla vita dell’ autore scritta da Ascanio Condivi. Michelangelo Buonarroti. 359 * Robert Browning: How to Know Him. Phelps, William Lyon. 144 * Rococo: a poem. Dunning, Ralph Cheever. 449 * Roots of the Tree. Stanley, Carleton Wellesley. 343 * Saint Croix: The Sentinel River. Murchie, Guy. 115 * San Juan de la Cruz, su obra cientifica y su obra literaria. Crisógono de Jesús Sacramentado. 427 * The Scarlet Tree. Sitwell, Osbert. 103 * A Sceptical Examination of Contemporary British Philosophy. Coates, Adrian. 164 * Science of Knowledge. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. 342 * Scientific Method in Æsthetics. Munro, Thomas.

George Santayana’s Library

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491 * The Season of Comfort. Vidal, Gore. 305 * Segreto Tibet. Maraini, Fosco. 217 * Sein und Zeit. Heidegger, Martin. 248 * The Selected Poetry of Robinson Jeffers. Jeffers, Robinson. 399 * The Selected Writings of Benjamin Rush. Rush, Benjamin. 55 * A Selection of Engravings on Wood by Thomas Bewick. Bewick, Thomas. 52 * Selections from Berkeley. Berkeley, George. 193 * A Self Portrait. Goodman, Jack Rawlin. 410 * Self-Knowledge (Atmabodha). Sankaracarya. 309 * Sept leçons sur l’être, et les premiers principes de la raison spéculative. Maritain, Jacques. 445 * Septimana Spinozana: acta conventus oecumenici in memoriam Benedicti de Spinoza diei natalis trecentesimi Hagae comitis habiti. Spinoza Society. 150 * The Shadow of the Swimmer. Eaton, Charles Edward. 468 * Shelley. Thompson, Francis. 187 * Si le grain ne meurt. Gide, André Paul Guillaume. 289 * Simples réflexions sur le décret du Saint-office. Loisy, Alfred Firmin. 407 * Sing with Me Now. Russell, David Riley. 40 * Six Historic and Romantic Leaders Who Visioned World Peace: Poetic Dramas. Bartlett, Alice Hunt. 353 - The Skeptics of the Italian Renaissance. Owen, John. 48 * Sketch for a Self-Portrait. Berenson, Bernard. 432 * The Solution of the Synoptic Problem. Smith, Robinson. 182 * Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought. Gavin, Frank Stanton Burns. 251 * Some Winchester Letters of Lionel Johnson. Johnson, Lionel Pigot. 136 * South Wind. Douglas, Norman. 16 - Space, Time, and Deity. Alexander, Samuel.

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George Santayana’s Library

118 * Spagna cattolica e rivoluzionaria. Cuneo, Niccolò. 354 * Spanish Mysticism: A Preliminary Survey. Peers, Edgar Allison. 145 * The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers. Durant, William James. 146 * The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Greater Philosophers. Durant, William James. 493 * Strike through the Mask: New Lyrical Poems. Viereck, Peter Robert Edwin. 499 * Studi sulle precognizioni. Vivante, Leone. 172 * Studies in Greek Scenery, Legend and History: Selected from his Commentary on Pausanias’ Description of Greece. Frazer, James George. 345 * Studies in Keats. Murry, John Middleton. 148 * Studies of the Gods in Greece at Certain Sanctuaries Recently Excavated. Dyer, Louis. 472 * A Study of History. Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. 469 * “A Study of Locke’s Theory of Ideas.” Thompson, Samuel Martin. 438 * The Study of Sociology. Spencer, Herbert. 502 * Sudamérica los llamaba: exploraciones de los grandes naturalistas. Von Hagen, Victor Wolfgang. 226 * The Suicide’s Grave: Being the Private Memoirs & Confessions of a Justified Sinner. Hogg, James. 465 * Summa Theologica. Thomas Aquinas. 511 * Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect. Whitehead, Alfred North. 292 * System der Philosophie: Erster Theil, Drei Bücher der Logik. Lotze, Hermann. 293 * System der Philosophie: Metaphysik Drei Bücher der Ontologie, Kosmologie, Psychologie. Lotze, Hermann. 326 * A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. Mill, John Stuart. 504 * A Tale of Pausanian Love. Warren, Edward Perry [pseud. ALR]. 227 * A Tercentenary History of the Boston Public Latin School, 1635–1935. Holmes, Pauline.

George Santayana’s Library

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494 * Terror and Decorum: Poems 1940–1948. Viereck, Peter Robert Edwin. 170 * Thomas Jefferson: Champion of Religious Freedom: Advocate of Christian Morals. Foote, Henry Wilder. 18 * Thoughts on the Constitution. Amery, L[eopold] S[tennett]. 334 * Three Centuries of Harvard: 1636–1936. Morison, Samuel Eliot. 505 * The Three Spheres of Society. Waterman, Charles. 429 * Three Ways of Modern Man. Slochower, Harry. 370 * The Timaeus of Plato. Plato. 240 * Tito Livio, O, Del imperialismo en relación con las formas de gobierno y la evolución historica. Irazusta, Julio. 241 * Tito Livio, O, Del imperialismo en relación con las formas de gobierno y la evolución historica. Irazusta, Julio. 476 * Tom Sawyer Abroad and Other Stories. Twain, Mark. 68 * Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment. Buchler, Justus. 165 * Tumultuous Shore, and Other Poems. Ficke, Arthur Davison. 466 * The Unity of Fichte’s Doctrine of Knowledge. Thompson, Anna Boynton. 246 * The Universe around Us. Jeans, James Hopwood. 111 * The Unwobbling Pivot & the Great Digest. Confucius. 518 * The Value of Religious Facts. Woods, James Haughton. 485 * Variété II. Valéry, Paul. 486 * Variété IV. Valéry, Paul. 53 * Velazquez. Beruete, Aureliano de. 168 * Venus & Anchises (Brittain’s Ida) and Other Poems. Fletcher, Phineas. 521 * Victorian England: Portrait of an Age. Young, George Malcolm. 279 * A Victorian Historian: Private Letters of W. E. H. Lecky, 1859–1878. Lecky, William Edward Hartpole. 119 * W. Bayard Cutting, Jr. 1878–1910. Cutting, W. Bayard. 233 * “What is Materialism?” Hook, Sidney.

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George Santayana’s Library

198 * Wheels on Gravel. Gregory, Alyse. 109 * While Following the Plough. Collis, John Stewart. 430 * Wild Geese and How to Chase Them. Smart, Charles Allen. 140 * Will Men Be Like Gods?: Humanitarianism or Human Happiness? Dudley, Owen Francis. 258 * William James and Henri Bergson: A Study in Contrasting Theories of Life. Kallen, Horace Meyer. 516 * Winchester College: Its History, Buildings and Customs. Winchester College Archaeological Society. 396 * The World and the Individual. Royce, Josiah. 437 * A World of Chance, or, Whence, Whither and Why. Spaulding, Edward Gleason. 104 * The World of Labour: A Discussion of the Present and the Future of Trade Unionism. Cole, George Douglas Howard. 317 * Written in Florence: The Last Verses of Hugh McCulloch. McCulloch, Hugh. 290 * Y a-t-il deux sources de la religion et de la morale? Loisy, Alfred Firmin. 519 * Yacht Navigation and Voyaging. Worth, Claud Alley.