Europeanization: New Research Agendas

Europeanization New Research Agendas

Edited by

Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink

Europeanization

Also by Paolo Graziano L’EUROPEIZZAZIONE E POLITICHE PUBBLICHE ITALIANE. Coesione e lavoro a confronto Also by Maarten P. Vink LIMITS OF EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: European Integration and Domestic Immigration Policies

Europeanization New Research Agendas Edited by

Paolo Graziano Assistant Professor, Department of Institutional Analysis and Public Management Bocconi University, Milan

and

Maarten P. Vink Research Fellow, Institute of Social Sciences University of Lisbon, Portugal

Editorial matter, selection and introduction © Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink 2007, 2008 All remaining chapters © respective authors 2007, 2008 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in hardcover 2007 First published in paperback 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–9535–3 hardback ISBN-10: 1–4039–9535–4 hardback ISBN-13: 978–0–230–20431–7 paperback ISBN-10: 0–230–20431–7 paperback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Europeanization : new research agendas / edited by Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–9535–4 (cloth) 0–230–20431–7 (pbk.) 1. Public administration – Europe – Research. 2. Europe – Politics and government – 1989 – Research. 3. Europe – Social conditions – Research. I. Graziano, Paolo. II. Vink, Maarten Peter, 1975– JN12.E876 2007 320.94072—dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

2006049470

Contents List of Tables and Figures

vii

Acknowledgements

viii

List of Contributors

xi

Part I: Introduction 1 Challenges of a New Research Agenda Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano

3

Part II: Theory and Methods 2 The Three Worlds of Regional Integration Theory James Caporaso

23

3 Conceptual Issues Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier

35

4 Theorizing Europeanization Simon Bulmer

46

5 Methodology Markus Haverland

59

Part III: Politics and Polity 6 Territory Klaus H. Goetz

73

7 Candidate Countries and Conditionality Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier

88

8 Regulatory Governance David Levi-Faur

102

9 State Structures Peter Bursens

115

10 Core Executives Brigid Laffan

128

11 Parliamentary Scrutiny Ronald Holzhacker

141

v

vi

Contents

12 Political Parties and Party Systems Peter Mair

154

13 Interest Groups and Social Movements Rainer Eising

167

14 Courts Stacy A. Nyikos

182

Part IV: Policies 15 Implementation Ulf Sverdrup

197

16 Agricultural Policy Christilla Roederer-Rynning

212

17 Environmental Policy Tanja A. Börzel

226

18 Cohesion Policy Ian Bache

239

19 Social Policy Gerda Falkner

253

20 Telecommunications Policy Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle

266

21 Economic Policy Kenneth Dyson

281

22 Anti-Discrimination Policy Virginie Guiraudon

295

23 Asylum Policy Sandra Lavenex

309

24 Foreign Policy Reuben Wong

321

Part V: Conclusion 25 Some Promises and Pitfalls of Europeanization Research Dirk Lehmkuhl

337

Bibliography

354

Name Index

403

Subject Index

411

List of Tables and Figures

Tables 6.1 Core research questions on Europeanization and territory 12.1 Europeanization and party politics: four outcomes 24.1 Three dimensions of foreign policy Europeanization

75 157 326

Figures 2.1 Europeanization and domestic change 15.1 Transposition deficit 1997–2005 15.2 Conflict level in the EU, 1995–2003

vii

28 200 202

Acknowledgements Although the cooperation between the editors of this handbook, as well as some of the contributors, goes back to a five-panel section on “Europeanization: Challenges of a New Research Agenda” organized at the ECPR General Conference in Marburg in September 2003, our broader scholarly interest in what we see as a distinct but still developing research agenda has its roots in two separate doctoral research projects started in the late 1990s in the respective fields of social policy and immigration policy. Our projects vividly taught us what Europeanization research is about and, in fact, what precisely makes it a very interesting but at the same time daring object of study: trying to disentangle national and European politics in a situation where both “European” and “national” parts of the equation are constantly under discussion. The European Union, with its “ever-closer” cooperation between an everincreasing number of states, faces an almost permanent identity question (yet seems to do remarkably well despite that); and in the domestic part of the story there is also “never a dull moment”, to quote the title of a paper by two former colleagues from Leiden, which pointed at recent Dutch politics, yet would be almost stating the obvious as far as Italian politics are concerned. Moreover, these national and European debates may often seem obsolete in the face of a changing global environment, which adds a third level to the equation. This handbook presents a critical review of the state of the art in Europeanization research. After our initial idea to bring together the most renowned Europeanization scholars and, rather than collecting previously written papers, ask them to write a fresh paper that reflected critically on one specific aspect of this new research agenda, we soon realized that – apart from the quality of contributions – this project would for a large part find its added value in its comprehensive nature. Hence we found ourselves quickly faced with a list of 25 chapter topics and realized that not only would we need to come up with a good story to find a publisher to satisfy our (and we dare think also the scholarly community’s) encyclopedic desires, but we also saw that the whole project seemed to assume ever-increasing proportions. Our worries about finding a publisher were happily and quickly resolved by the enthusiasm and persistence of Palgrave Macmillan’s politics and international relations division. We thank in particular Steven Kennedy for his initial encouragement and Alison Howson and Gemma d’Arcy Hughes for their editorial guidance and positive commitment. Our more substantial concerns, however, had to do with, first, convincing this large group of “big names” that our idea was worthy of investing their viii

Acknowledgements ix

already scarce time and, second and most important, with making all these scholars truly commit to the project, stick to our strict deadlines (which inevitably turned out to be not that strict) as well as to our tight norms on word limits and chapter structure, and in the end to deliver a serious piece of work on the state of the art of Europeanization research. Here we can simply say that, from the beginning, the enthusiastic responses and the excellent work by all our contributors has been a truly wonderful experience. This book is thus, in the first place, needless to say (but worthy of stressing nevertheless), a collection of their efforts and thinking. Moreover, and we are sure that we can say this as well on behalf of all contributors, we are greatly indebted to the equally long and impressive list of external reviewers whose critical, constructive and often extensive review reports have contributed to the quality of the chapters in this volume to a more than significant degree. Their generous efforts, sometimes within a very limited time frame, are highly appreciated. This book, in short, but also very much ‘the making of’, represents to us as editors all the best an intellectually stimulating and socially appreciative scientific community has to offer. In particular, we would like to thank the following reviewers: Rudy Andeweg (University of Leiden), Gordon Anthony (Queen’s University Belfast), Svein Andersen (ARENA/University of Oslo), Michael Burgess (University of Kent), Daniele Caramani (University of Mannheim), Maria Green Cowles (American University, Washington), Sergio Fabbrini (University of Trento), David LeviFaur (University of Haifa), Maurizio Ferrera (University of Milan), Neil Fligstein (University of California, Berkeley), Marco Giuliani (University of Milan), Jürgen Grote (University of Konstanz), Liesbeth Hooghe (University of North Carolina/Free University of Amsterdam), Kerry Howell (University of Essex), Andrea Lenschow (University of Osnabrück), Renata Lizzi (University of Bologna), Liborio Mattina (University of Trieste), Bruno Palier (CNRS, Paris), Guido Schwellnus (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich), Philippe Schmitter (European University Institute), Eiko Thielemann (London School of Economics and Political Science), Sophie Vanhoonacker (University of Maastricht), Esther Versluis (University of Maastricht), Luca Verzichelli (University of Siena), Helen Wallace (European University Institute), Antje Wiener (Queen’s University Belfast), and two anonymous Palgrave reviewers. We would also like to thank Leonardo Morlino and Dave Allen for participating in an earlier stage of this project. Finally, our editorial work would obviously not have been possible without a supporting institutional framework. Paolo Graziano would like to thank the POLEIS Center for Research on Comparative Politics of Bocconi University in Milano for providing an ideal academic infrastructure for the formulation and implementation of this project; and the Centre d’Études Européennes at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris for warm hospitality in a very friendly and stimulating scientific environment. Maarten Vink

x

Acknowledgements

would like to thank the Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies of the European University Institute for providing a wonderful year of post-doctoral freedom to conceive and work out the idea for this project; the Center for European Studies at New York University and the Department of Philosophy and Culture at the University of Minho in Braga, Portugal for hosting two visiting scholarships which provided much-needed time and space for editorial work; and finally the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Maastricht for generously granting a leave for both scholarships during parts of the past two years. PAOLO GRAZIANO MAARTEN VINK

List of Contributors Ian Bache, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield Tanja A. Börzel, Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Free University Berlin Simon Bulmer, Department of Political Science, University of Scheffield Peter Bursens, Department of Political Science, University of Antwerp James Caporaso, Department of Political Science, University of Washington Kenneth Dyson, School of European Studies, Cardiff University Rainer Eising, Institute of Political Science, Institute of Political Science, Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena Gerda Falkner, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna Klaus H. Goetz, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam Virginie Guiraudon, Department of Social and Political Sciences, European University Institute, Florence Paolo Graziano, Center for Comparative Political Studies, Bocconi University, Milan Markus Haverland, Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University, Rotterdam Ronald Holzhacker, Department of Political Science, University of Twente; and Department of Political Science and International Relations, University College Utrecht Brigid Laffan, Department of Politics, University College Dublin Sandra Lavenex, Institute of Political Science, University of Lucerne Dirk Lehmkuhl, Center for Comparative and International Studies, University of Zurich David Levi-Faur, Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Peter Mair, Department of Social and Political Sciences, European University Institute, Florence Stacy A. Nyikos, Tulsa Graduate College, University of Oklahoma Romain Pasquier, National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Research Center for Political Action in Europe (CRAPE), Institute of Political Science, University of Rennes Claudio M. Radaelli, Department of Politics, University of Exeter Christilla Roederer-Rynning, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Southern Denmark xi

xii

List of Contributors

Frank Schimmelfennig, Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zürich Volker Schneider, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz Ulrich Sedelmeier, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science Ulf Sverdrup, ARENA, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo Maarten P. Vink, Department of Political Science, University of Maastricht, and Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon Raymund Werle, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne Reuben Wong, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore

Part I Introduction

This page intentionally left blank

1 Challenges of a New Research Agenda Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano

1.1 Connecting domestic and European politics The concept of Europeanization may have been, and perhaps still is, essentially contested as to its usefulness for the study of European politics. Yet few will dispute the claim that it has enjoyed increasing popularity in academic circles since the late 1990s. Scholars use the concept to assess the effectiveness of European-level policies at the domestic level, as well as to understand how new European opportunities and constraints affect national politics. This new research agenda thus focuses on changes in national political systems that can be attributed to the development of European regional integration, and brings together scholars from the fields of international relations, EU studies, and comparative politics. Where did this research agenda come from? First, mirroring the liberal intergovernmentalist stress on the domestic sources of European politics (Moravcsik 1993, 1998), and somewhat reminiscent of earlier debates in international relations, the new research agenda of Europeanization has provided the study of European integration with a “Second Image Reversed” (Gourevitch 1978). It is true, of course, that the intergovernmental paradigm and its overwhelming attention for “grand bargains” has always taken a “domestic route” to the study of European politics. In a famous unpublished paper, Moravcsik (1994) even explicitly dwells on the strategic use governments make of two-level strategies; yet this “feedback” perspective has never been systematically developed and was instrumental to understanding European-level politics. To an even greater degree, classic neo-functionalism (Haas 1958), its contemporary counterpart supranational governance (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; Stone Sweet et al. 2001) and to some extent also the multi-level governance approach (Hooghe and Marks 2001) tend to concentrate on European institutions and their output in terms of European policies. In these traditional integration theories the focus is rather on the creation of a European political arena and on the addition of 3

4

Introduction

new governance structures more generally, than on the diffusion of EU policies and institutional practices at the national and subnational level (see Wiener and Diez 2003 for a more elaborate overview of European integration theory). The Europeanization approach goes beyond this European-level orientation of classic integration theories by shifting the attention principally to the domestic level. An early manifestation of this “domestic” shift was the increasing attention for the administrative adaptation of member states to EU membership (Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Mény et al. 1996; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Kassim et al. 2000; Zeff and Pirro 2001). These works, as well as more explicit Europeanization studies (cf. Harmsen 1999), are principally centered on the executive branch of government, although others have focused in a broader sense on changes in the “organizational logic of national politics and poliy making” induced by EU membership (Ladrech 1994: 70; see also Falkner 2001). The classic strand of Europeanization literature focuses particularly on the domestic implementation of EU policies. As Sverdrup argues in his overview chapter on Implementation, these studies begin primarily from the idea that European integration remains an incomplete project as long as European rules are not implemented according to their intentions (see Chapter 15). “Classic” European policy domains such as environmental policy (Knill 1998), transport policy (Héritier et al. 2001), or cohesion policy (Gualini 2003) have been extensively studied, but work has also been done in policy areas for which competence is traditionally located rather at the national level, such as social policy (Graziano 2005), refugee policy (Lavenex 2001a, b) or even citizenship policy (Checkel 2001a; Vink 2001). These studies are often qualitative case studies or focused comparisons of a limited number of countries, although recent work with a wider empirical scope can also be found (e.g. Falkner 2005 on social policy). Typical quantitative work related to Europeanization in this “policy strand” has been concerned mainly with the differences in transposition rates of European directives in EU member states (e.g. Börzel 2002; Mastenbroek 2003). Secondly, Europeanization research also provides a “European” route to the study of national politics. Comparative political scientists and sociologists increasingly realize that the European Union, as an advanced instance of regional integration, becomes a natural part of “national” politics. Whether this implies a “hollowing out” of the nation-state, or new opportunities for national social and political actors, new analytical tools and simply a broader empirical knowledge that goes beyond the traditional units of analysis for comparativists, are needed to understand national political dynamics in an integrating Europe. This has been more obvious for the study of executives, as already referred to above, in terms of the need for governments to coordinate national positions in EU negotiations and to oversee the implementation of EU policies (see, for example, an early study by Helen Wallace (1973)). This scholarly

Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano 5

interest is, however, of a much more recent vintage for aspects of national politics that have traditionally been assumed less subject to European influence, such as political parties (Ladrech 2002), party systems (Mair 2000) or local government (De Rooij 2002). Sometimes, as in the case of national parliaments and particularly the issue of government scrutiny (Holzhacker 2002), this timing has to do very much with political actors only discovering or acknowledging the need to adjust to a new political game; or simply with the EU becoming increasingly more competent in an increasing number of policy areas, as with immigration policy (Vink 2002). In other cases, the importance of European integration for domestic affairs may be a long-established yet relatively “silent” phenomenon, as with domestic courts who have since long applied and interpreted European law (Stone Sweet 2004). The judicial construction of Europe may even be a commonplace by now, but, as Nyikos argues, so far very little is known about how national judges in fact make use of EU law (see Chapter 14 on Courts). The strong calls for further research, in particular for much more systematic comparative work, put forward in many of the chapters of this handbook, underline the fact that despite a hitherto abundant literature the study of Europeanization has only just begun. It is precisely because these gaps in the literature, and thus these shortcomings in our understanding of domestic politics in an integrating Europe, are now becoming increasingly clear that we think a more comprehensive approach to Europeanization research is well-timed. This handbook thus presents a critical overview of the state of the art in Europeanization research, evaluates what more than a decade of scholarly contributions has brought us, taking Ladrech’s (1994) seminal paper on France as a starting point, and provides directions for further research. The approach of this handbook is “critical” to the extent that it explicitly does not assume a domain reservé for Europeanization research among the traditional disciplines of international relations, comparative politics and EU studies, but rather tries to present a comprehensive stocktaking that enables a balanced judgment of the added value of Europeanization research. Hence this book is very much about assessing the potentials and pitfalls of an evolving research agenda, to cite the title of Lehmkuhl’s concluding chapter of this volume. The reader would be mistaken, however, to deduce a pessimistic view on the contribution of Europeanization research to understanding the workings of contemporary European politics from our “critical” approach. On the contrary, we think there is a good “minimal” case to make for the argument that Europeanization research has at least enriched the study of European politics by providing new empirical data on previously underresearched questions related to domestic politics in an integrating Europe. In fact, the mere pointing out of new questions for further exploration, even critics argue, makes Europeanization valuable as an “attention-directing device” (Olsen 2002).

6

Introduction

Why a new book on Europeanization? There are at least three reasons why we want to add to the still-growing literature. By including a large number of relatively concise chapters on whether and how national politics, polities and policies change under pressure from “Europe”, this handbook first of all aims to satisfy a growing “encyclopedic” desire that has naturally evolved alongside the “academic growth industry” of Europeanization research (Olsen 2002: 921). Though recognizing the important volumes from recent years that bring together theoretical reflections as well as empirical contributions (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a; Kohler-Koch 2003; Dyson and Goetz 2004; Bulmer and Lequesne 2005a), this book presents the core conceptual, theoretical and methodological questions and – uniquely – a comprehensive overview of the main empirical fields of Europeanization research. Secondly, by pointing out exactly what the gaps of the literature are in its current stage of development, this book also intends to serve the scholarly community by pointing out explicit directions for further research. This book thus aims to present the different research agendas related to the various aspects of the phenomenon of Europeanization. The final ambition of this book, making up the balance of more than a decade of Europeanization research, is even more challenging. The jury is still out on the question of whether Europeanization research is a “passing fad” or rather a more permanent part of the study of European politics (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003b). At this stage of development of the “new” research agenda, therefore, a comprehensive and clear-cut presentation of the key achievements and shortcomings of Europeanization research may well be very timely. With this timing we mean that, as probably with many new research agendas, early Europeanization research has focused very much on conceptual delimitation, construction of analytical frameworks and mostly illustrative and informative case studies. The online journal European Integration online Papers has greatly advanced the conceptualization and study of Europeanization (Radaelli 2003 (2000); Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002 (2000); and Börzel and Risse 2003 (2002) were all first published as EIoP papers). Notwithstanding the invaluable contribution to a developing research agenda, however, much of that early research – certainly as far as some conceptual (e.g. on top-down vs bottom-up definitions, or on convergence) or theoretical (e.g. on the fit–misfit model) discussions are concerned – has been relatively inward-looking. Given the need to delimit a certain reserved space amongst the traditional disciplines of international relations, comparative politics and EU studies and to clarify the conceptual perimeter for Europeanization research, there is probably little surprise regarding the somewhat abstract and self-contained scholarly discourse in those years. As Radaelli and Pasquier argue, debates on definitions

Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano 7

are particularly important in the genetic stage of a new field of inquiry (Chapter 3). By contrast, more recent Europeanization work is rather straightforward in tackling empirical puzzles in a more down-to-earth inductive manner and also more willing to connect to, particularly, comparative politics and comparative (institutional) sociology. Two preliminary comments can be made about what might be called this “empirical turn”. First, having moved beyond conceptual issues, there is now – much more than before – attention for methodological aspects of Europeanization research. Haverland’s (2005) paper on methodology is not only path-breaking because simply no such work existed before, but substantially also presents a first attempt to bring rigor to the typical tool of counterfactual reasoning in Europeanization research (see also Chapter 5). In fact, apart from obvious research gaps due to overconcentration on the “usual suspects” of comparative Europeanization studies (foremost France, Germany and the United Kingdom), or a lack of large-N studies more generally, the most common methodological problem noticed by many contributors to this volume is surely the overdetermination of research designs (see e.g. Eising on interest representation, or Lavenex on asylum policy). Secondly, the empirical turn in Europeanization studies does not mean that theoretical debates are closed. On the contrary, a major challenge exists as to how to theorize Europeanization. The research challenge is after all not one of inventing definitions or doing straightforward descriptions, but rather one of modeling of the dynamics of change coupled with empirical tests (Olsen 2002: 944; but see Caporaso’s argument in Chapter 2). In the remainder of this chapter we briefly introduce the kind of discussions that readers may expect as to conceptualizing, theorizing and measuring Europeanization. We end with an outline of the book and a brief explanation of the uniform chapter format.

1.2 Conceptualizing Europeanization So what is Europeanization? Without prejudging Radaelli and Pasquier’s discussion of conceptual issues (Chapter 3), we wish to provide the reader here with at least a brief delimitation of the conceptual scope of Europeanization research. Although some scholars have underlined the relevance of both construction and diffusion of EU institutions and policies (see, for example, Börzel 2003b; Radaelli 2003), most of the contributions have mainly considered Europeanization as an adaptive process triggered by European regional integration. For the purpose of this handbook we thus understand Europeanization very broadly as the domestic adaptation to European regional integration. Let us clarify this briefly. With “regional integration” we mean the formation of closer

8

Introduction

economic and/or political linkages among countries that are geographically near each other. Note that our explicit use of the term “Europeanization” means we specifically do not restrict Europeanization to adaptation to the EU only. “Domestic adaptation” should be understood here in a broad sense, and can include, for example, the administrative adaptation of executive government to a “continuous system of negotiations” within the EU (Chapter 10), the adaptation of interest groups and social movements to new institutional opportunity structures (Chapter 13), and also the normative consequences in terms of substantial political issues (see e.g. Chapter 8 on Regulatory Governance, Chapter 19 on Social Policy, or Chapter 21 on Economic Policy). In all cases the contributions to this book deal with research agendas concerned with how European regional integration “feeds back” in national political systems, and thus have a principal (though not exclusive) focus on the domestic level. The chapter on Courts, for example, deals with domestic courts rather than with European courts, though needless to say the rulings of the European Court of Justice may be an important source for explaining enhanced judicial activism at the national level (Chapter 14). And all policy chapters (Part III) deal not so much with the development of policies at the European level, though a quick overview will be presented in most cases, but rather with how these policies are implemented nationally (or how domestic policies change indirectly even in cases where explicit European models are absent). It is important to note that this definition, in Radaelli and Pasquier’s terminology, serves more as a “background concept” to clarify in a very general sense the scope of research presented here, than as a “systematized concept” that encompasses all intricacies of the phenomenon of Europeanization. We would see five points that need to be taken into account were one to go beyond our very basic definition and see more explicitly what the scope of the Europeanization research agenda is. These points, which we elaborate below, also summarize the main contested areas related to the conceptual scope of Europeanization research: ●

●

●

●

There is nothing necessarily “top-down” about focusing on domestic adaptation to European regional integration; The research scope should include both direct effects (implementation of European legislation) as well as indirect effects (horizontal effects of European integration); The research scope should not be restricted to a uniform impact (harmonization or convergence) but should also allow for a differential impact of European integration; The research scope should not be restricted to changing policy domains only but should allow for a wide potential domain of impact and thus include the wider polity and politics dimensions (e.g. political structures, domestic discourses, identities, etc.).

Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano 9

●

The research scope goes beyond the mere impact on EU member states, and also beyond the impact of the European Union, and therefore the dynamics of change should be generalizable to the effects of regional integration processes as such.

On the first point, many scholars distinguish the new research agenda of Europeanization from traditional approaches to European integration by pointing out its exclusively top-down approach. This perspective is perhaps best expressed by Hix and Goetz (2000: 3–4) who argue that [t]o understand the impact of European integration on domestic systems it is not decisive whether delegation is determined by domestic government preferences, driven by transnational economic actors, or “cultivated” by supranational entrepreneurs. What matters for domestic actors and institutions is how the delegation to the European level affects policy outcomes in the domestic arena. Put another way, who are the winners and losers from the EU? At face value, such an approach would imply that we need to look at domestic policy A, domestic institution B, or domestic actor C, and analyze change in terms of policy substance, institutional set-up, or political behaviour between the time before (t0) and after (t1) a specific European dimension is introduced in a given policy area or a new European agency or coordination mechanism is created. In this way one can, as it were, analyze Europeanization by observing the “net change” at the domestic level between t0 and t1. Apart from the problem that in reality increasingly intertwined political systems make it difficult to detect what causes what (as Mair notes in Chapter 12 on political parties acting at both the national and the European level), it is crucial to see that even in this simplistic modelling there is nothing inherently “top-down” about Europeanization research. Implementation research related to the transposition of European directives may admittedly have such a distinct Europe-to-national characteristic, but this is research much more interested in questions of effectiveness and performance within a European system of governance rather than in explaining domestic change as such (see also Sverdrup on implementation performance in Chapter 15). By contrast, to assess the “net result” of European regional integration without making that European factor “a cause in search of an effect” (Goetz 2000), domestic change can only be accounted for by starting from a – hypothesized – domestic situation ex ante (the t0 situation). This means that in order to study Europeanization we need to start at the domestic level, analyze how policies or institutions are formed at the EU level, and subsequently determine the effects of political challenges and pressures exerted by the diffusion of European integration at the domestic level (cf. Börzel 2002b: 193). Such

10

Introduction

a “bottom-up-down” design is probably the only guarantee, if any (cf. Haverland 2005), for a due consideration of the European factor as one of several alternative explanations. On the second point, of direct versus indirect effects, our background definition of Europeanization is basically agnostic on the question whether pressure from either specific European models or more indirectly from new opportunities and constraints results in political change. “Horizontal effects” may be understood as the result of both increased competition and cooperation between countries and also of increased exchange of information and mutual learning simply by being part of an integrated Europe. Although empirically the difference might not be very easy to capture, in principle these effects can be categorized alongside the mechanisms of adaptation, the magnitude of the effects, and the actors involved. The mechanisms of adaptation are clearly more predictable in the case of direct EU pressure and effects since specific objectives and policy instruments have to be put in place in order to comply to EU regulation. By contrast, where there is no EU regulation or only a “soft” framework such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), indirect effects could introduce new mechanisms such as diffusion or learning that are more difficult to detect. The magnitude of these effects could also be different due to a greater discretion for member state governments when policy objectives and instruments are not formally imposed by Brussels. Finally, in the case of indirect effects, we might expect a greater role for non-state actors, such as political parties, pressure groups and think tanks, as vital catalysts of Europeanization. On the third point, of focusing not purely on convergence in terms of the substantial outcome of Europeanization, we need to specify not only what Europeanization is, but also what it is not. To avoid the danger of conceptual stretching, as Radaelli (2003) rightly notes, Europeanization should not be confused with convergence, harmonization or political integration. Convergence can be a consequence of European integration, but it must not be used synonymously with Europeanization because there is a difference between a process and its consequences (Radaelli 2003: 33). There may have been convergence in monetary policies towards monetarist policy and away from Keynesianism in the member states that joined the EMU (Sbragia 2001; see also Dyson’s chapter on Economic Policy). Yet, as Eising argues, the responses to European integration may very well be differential, as the effects on interest representation show, which are very much embedded in a specific domestic context (Chapter 13). Laffan also sees a continuing diversity in administrative adaptation of executive government rather than convergence upon a certain model (Chapter 10). Harmonization of national policies is often seen as an important goal of European integration, but empirical research suggests that Europeanization is often manifest in a “differential” impact of European requirements on domestic policies (Héritier et al. 2001). For example, European directives aimed at

Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano 11

harmonizing gender equality policy, in effect often leave much room for continued national diversity (Caporaso and Jupille 2001). Understanding, finally, why countries pool and delegate sovereignty (Milward 1994; Moravcsik 1998) is not the same as understanding the specific dynamics, or even the unexpected consequences, this process of political integration brings about at the domestic level. On the fourth point, about the need for Europeanization research not being restricted solely to policy domains, this is not so much a point many will contest, as a point that needs to be stressed in terms of opening new avenues for further research. Since EU institutions or policies provide not only specific goals and targets, but also simultaneously new resources to national actors, the national political domain needs to be investigated in a broad sense to properly understand the dynamics of change caused by Europeanization. Broadly speaking, effects can display for all the traditional levels of a political regime: politics, policy and policies (Börzel and Risse 2003). Although the literature has initially been very much policy oriented, more recently also political processes and actors such as parties and interest groups on the one hand, and national polities on the other, have widened the analytical spectrum. In fact, both the search for political power and the functioning of national political institutions have been challenged by the deepening of European regional integration. To begin with, parties now have to deal with a multi-level political system where there is not only a national parliament but also a supranational political arena – the European Parliament – where party competition takes place. As Mair shows in his contribution to this volume, over the years parties have been influenced not only as potential decision makers but also as political actors primarily aimed at representing electorates in specific political arenas (cf. Mair 2000, 2004). Similarly, interest groups have been challenged by the development of increasing competences at the EU level: not only have they tried to influence supranational political actors such the European Commission and the European Parliament, but they also have witnessed domestic organizational changes due to Europeanization (Grote and Lang 2003). Furthermore, national polities have been at the centre of pressures for adaptation originated by the EU, as clearly manifested in the enlargement process, but also for example by a new politics of regulatory governance that at least partially originates in increased regional integration in Europe (see Levi-Faur on Regulatory Governance). On the fifth point, of clarifying the “European” aspect of Europeanization, it seems that the concept of Europeanization is monopolized by scholars of the unification process between the member states of the European Union, and concentrates on adaptation to “Brussels”. As the following contributions will show, this handbook is no exception to this rule and probably strongly reflects the EU domination of Europeanization research. Europeanization research has, of course, not been restricted to EU member states only, but has also included

12

Introduction

non-members Switzerland and Norway (Mach et al. 2002) and candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). In both cases, however, domestic adaptation is still seen as a response to the EU, either as quasi-member or as candidate member. Yet it must be recognized that “European integration” in itself covers a wider range of processes and institutions than just the EU. Europeanization is more than and different from EU-ization (Wallace 2000; Schmidt and Wiener 2005). Recent Europeanization research may have been boosted by the specific case of the European Union, but there is much to say to include other instances of regional integration within that same research agenda. Within Europe, one may think of such regional institutions as the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in the economic sphere, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the field of international relations, and the Council of Europe (COE) in the area of human rights. These institutions are often highly intertwined with the European Union in terms of organization and even identity, as in the case of the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) between the EU and the EFTA. Furthermore, the EU and the COE share both flag (twelve golden stars on field of blue) and anthem (Beethoven”s “Ode to Joy”). These overlaps do not preclude, however, the distinct origins and institutions of the different European organizations. Perhaps more importantly, by not restricting the concept of Europeanization solely to the impact of the EU, we can apply the same methodological tools to larger processes within Europe, and for other cases of regional integration. By opening up to more generalizable dynamics we can embrace the theoretical argument that views the European Union not as a unique phenomenon requiring a sui generis explanation, but as an advanced instance of regional co-operation (Moravcsik 1998: 4–5; cf. Caporaso 1999: 161). Since other regional organizations as ASEAN, MERCOSUR or WAU are evolving rapidly tools developed theoretically in the Europeanization literature could be applied in other cases, and vice versa. We see such a wider scope as an important catalyst of this developing research agenda (but see Lehmkuhl’s skepticism on this point in Chapter 25).

1.3 Theorizing Europeanization Our last point about broadening the conceptual scope very much relates to the issue of how to theorize the domestic adaptation to European regional integration. As Bulmer notes in his contribution (Chapter 4), Europeanization as such is not a theory, but rather a phenomenon that needs to be explained. Radaelli (2004; cf. Featherstone and Radaelli 2003b: 340) also stresses that Europeanization should be seen as a problem, rather than a solution. Theory thus comes in where we need to answer how European policies, rules and norms are affecting domestic political systems. Here Europeanization scholars have

Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano 13

reverted almost without exception to the broad spectrum of theories that fall under the umbrella of the so-called “new institutionalism”. In fact, one might even go so far as to say that the Europeanization research agenda as such exemplifies the institutionalist turn in the political science of the 1980s (Hix and Goetz 2000: 18; Börzel and Risse 2003; Olsen 2002). And as far as institutions are seen as norms or collective understandings that constitute the self-images and preferences of actors, in other words as far as the sociological institutionalist strand is concerned, one may also see a clear link between the Europeanization agenda and the constructivist turn in international relations theory (Checkel 1998: 326, 341). Institutional approaches are characterized most concisely by the notion that “institutions matter” (Pierson 1996). Institutions are classically understood as the formal rules, standard operating procedures and organizations of government. In its “new” understanding, however, institutions may also encompass informal rules, routines and conventions. Following March and Olsen’s (1989) two institutional logics, those of consequentiality and of appropriateness, two main logics of change are usually distinguished when applying institutional theory to Europeanization research. A most common, rationalist, story accounts for change by pointing at evolving political opportunity structures. We referred earlier to Moravcsik’s paper about executives enhancing their bargaining leverage by playing simultaneously a domestic and a European game. Yet other well-known “rationalist” examples may be interest groups or business associations profiting from a reshuffling of the domestic power structure (Chapter 13). And not only may judges be empowered by a new European referral process, but litigants and lawyers may also profit from “a second line of defense against unfavorable national legislation”, as Nyikos argues (Chapter 14). A sociological perspective, on the other hand, accounts for change by pointing at norm entrepreneurs and cooperative informal institutions mobilizing in favor of adaptation. Socialization and learning, although under-researched according to Laffan (Chapter 10), may thus be very relevant for the “EU cadre” in domestic administrative systems. The securitization literature in the field of asylum policy is another example that draws on such socialization mechanisms (Chapter 23). Finally, one may also distinguish a third historical strand of institutionalism that points more directly at the temporal dynamics of change (Hall and Taylor 1996; see also Bulmer in Chapter 4). These two, or three, logics need not be mutually exclusive but may be seen as part of a synthetic theoretical framework for Europeanization research (Börzel 2002b; Börzel and Risse 2003). Apart from these insights from institutional theory, one perhaps less noticed shortcoming of current theorizing of Europeanization is its failure to feed back to the traditional integration theories. The case of the European Union is one of the most advanced instances of nation-states working towards an “ever-closer

14

Introduction

union” and seemingly becoming ever more porous. European integration studies have by consequence always been occupied with the viability of the sovereign state as such since the early days of post-war European economic cooperation, but have approached this question very much via the study of how a regional institution as the EU with a supranational legal order has evolved. In questioning the state of the state, therefore, the Europeanization research agenda responds much better to the general concern of “unit variation” in contemporary political science (Kahler 2002; Rhodes 1994). Yet, precisely because it is more specifically directed at the study of state porosity, there is also a very good opportunity to reflect on how these insights feed back to the process of institution building at the European level. This connection between institutional logics of change and theories of integration may be briefly explained as follows. First, as to neofunctional theories of integration, although the endpoint of the integration process has never been a univocal “United States of Europe”, even a quasi-federal trajectory would indeed signify the beginning of the end of the nation-state as the dominant unit for political organization. Jean Monnet, for example, the first President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), advocated supranational competencies only in certain economic sectors, but not without seeing the potential for further integration. Such “spillover” from limited to wider economic cooperation forms the core of the neo-functionalist theories of European integration (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963). These theories are functionalist to the extent that they acknowledge that specific goals, such as exchange rate stability, can sometimes only be achieved by taking further actions, such as wider monetary cooperation. The “hollowing out” of the state in this model is then preordained by the fact that member states are “resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe” (EC Treaty, Preamble). With regard to the logic of institutionalization, neo-functionalism and its contemporary counterpart of supranational governance underline the importance of transnational activities (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997: 311). Although supranational theories do not necessarily exclude actor-centered strains of institutionalism (see e.g. Pierson 1996), they do tend to emphasize the broader cultural environment in which decisions are being made and their historical background and determinants. European organizations and rules are increasingly taken for granted and structure the behavior of national actors. Hence we might connect those “thicker” and “historically driven” forms of Europeanization, as hypothesized by sociological and historical institutionalism, to supranational theories of European integration (cf. Stone Sweet et al. 2001: 6). Second, a contrasting model of European integration is provided by intergovernmentalist theory. Here the development of a supranational political

Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano 15

organization is viewed as contributing not so much to the demise, but rather to the rescue of the nation-state. “The surrenders of national sovereignty after 1950 were one aspect of the successful reassertion of the nation-state as the basic organizational entity of Europe” (Milward 1994: 438). According to Moravcsik (1993: 474), a proponent of so-called liberal intergovernmentalism, “the EC can be analyzed as a successful international regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination.” What matters for understanding the European Union are the preferences and power of its member states because these explain the choices of sovereign governments to shift decision-making powers to European institutions. By implication, because member state governments remain in the driver’s seat, European integration is by no means preordained to an “ever-closer” federal union. The persistence of national power, on the contrary, shows the unlikelihood of the disappearance of the nation-state (see Moravcsik 1998 for a fuller account). Looking more closely at the domestic impact of European integration, intergovernmentalists depart from two-level theories where national executives are simultaneously involved in international negotiations and bargaining with domestic interest groups. Governments, or powerful groups within the executive, can achieve more optimal outcomes at the international level if they convincingly show that their hands are tied by domestic commitments. More importantly, it allows them to avoid blame at home for unpopular policies by pointing at international package deals and the need to honor their international obligations (Putnam 1988). One could argue that European integration redistributes domestic political influence in favor of the executive because it shifts control over agenda-setting, alters decision-making procedures, and creates informational asymmetries and new justifications for domestic policies. National executives are increasingly able to “cut slack” and loosen the constraints imposed by legislatures, interest groups and other domestic actors (Moravcsik 1994). By pointing to the manifestation of Europeanization in changing opportunity structures, where calculating actors strategically adapt to new circumstances, the intergovernmentalist theory of integration clearly connects to the rational strain of new institutionalism.

1.4 Measuring Europeanization As Haverland argues in his chapter on methodology there has so far been little, yet some, attention for the issue of how to measure the decisiveness of the European factor. We highlight four points here, one about taking a broad approach to how Europe impacts on domestic political systems, one about counterfactual reasoning, one more generally about doing more comparative and possibly quantitative work, and a final note about the remaining importance of thick description and process tracing.

16

Introduction

First, direct effects of European integration should be distinguished from indirect effects. As Mair points out in his chapter with reference to parties and party systems, the introduction of elections to the European Parliament has led to the formation and mobilization of new political alternatives in those elections as well as in national contests. Other examples could be the organizational restructuring of a ministry in order to cope with EU obligations, or the legal transposition of a European directive into national legislation. In other cases, however, effects might be rather indirect, as in the case of political parties that might be weakened through the encouragement of alternative forms of interest representation (Chapter 12). Another example of indirect Europeanization are the cost containment pressures experienced by European welfare states before the European Employment Strategy and the Open Method of Coordination were launched. Or so-called horizontal effects may be seen as indirect Europeanization where domestic changes are the result not so much of “top down” imposition from Brussels, but rather of increased policy competition between countries as a result of growing exchange of information, as for example in the case of asylum policy (Chapter 23). From a methodological point of view, this means that we cannot always (or probably not even in most cases) see a “European effect” by looking for a label that says “European”. Laws that are introduced to transpose a directive may say so in the legal motivation, and also parliamentary debates may in such cases refer to the straightforward need to implement European law, but in most other cases researchers may observe a European effect only by the hypothesized direct or indirect effects of European integration. Secondly, counterfactual reasoning is a natural and indispensable methodological tool for Europeanization research. One key problem of much of the Europeanization literature is an over-determination of the European factor, when explaining domestic change. Especially when looking at policy changes at the national level, we should carefully try to distinguish Europeanization from, for instance, globalization (Graziano 2003). At the same time, plausible alternative explanations for domestic change may not only be derived by looking beyond European pressures, but also by taking into account endogenous processes within national political systems. To use a simple example, change of government, could well be a better explanation for, say, a restriction of immigration policy than a still vague notion of “fortress Europe” (Vink 2005). Bursens’ example of the Belgian federalization process being the result rather of an internal domestic political dynamic rather than of a so-called “Europe of the regions” strategy by the Commission is another classic example of where counterfactual reasoning comes in (Chapter 9). The reader will find other examples in the contributions to this handbook, together with an equally common call in most critical sections to take counterfactual reasoning seriously. Thirdly, a more general point about using different research designs. It is true that much Europeanization research to date has been of a qualitative nature

Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano 17

and restricted mostly to either case studies or focused comparisons of a limited number of countries. The reader will find in the following contributions many calls for more research that goes beyond this small-N, often thick descriptive work. Eising points at the research gap that currently exists as to the simple lack of comprehensive information about the scope of interest group Europeanization across the EU (Chapter 13). Even in a much-researched field as environmental policy, Börzel argues, we are still missing the bigger picture (Chapter 17). The same can be said, according to Falkner, about the field of social policy (Chapter 19). This problem of generalizability of findings is probably exacerbated even further by the fact that where comparative work is undertaken, this is often restricted to such “usual suspects” as Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Or comparative work is done within a certain group of states, such as the new member states, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue, but not within a theoretically more interesting group of earlier candidates and new member states (Chapter 7). Case selection and the focus of the study should be explicitly linked, Guiraudon also concludes, as different designs may be needed for attempting to explain different degrees of Europeanization between countries, weighing the explanatory value of the European sources of domestic change against alternative explanations, and trying to understand the meaning of “EU pressure” (Chapter 22). At the same time, finally, such calls for broader comparisons in no way imply a uniform consensus on the need for more quantitative work at the expense of older qualitative traditions of Europeanization research. Yet what is generally accepted is that, at minimum, methodological reflection should be more visible in forthcoming research. A more explicit and transparent use of interviews, and qualitative work more generally, could be of great use to Europeanization research. Although there has been criticism on the use of interviews within the European integration literature (Moravcsik 1998; but see Scharpf 1999), interviews constitute a major source of information and may be plausibly used to trace motivations for certain actions. As Haverland argues, process tracing may be indispensable not only in finding out about the historical context of a policy domain or domestic actor, but also in elucidating the causal mechanisms through which regional integration actually matters for European domestic political systems. Bulmer’s call for more explicit historical institutionalist theorizing also implies that we need thick description to point out the critical junctures in European and national policy or institutional changes.

1.5 Outline We stated three main ambitions for this book at the outset of this introduction: to satisfy emerging requests for a well-informed and comprehensive overview of Europeanization research, to set out directions for further research, and to make up the balance of the evolving Europeanization research agenda. As to

18

Introduction

whether this book lives up to its ambitions it is worthwhile stressing that this volume is not merely a collection of previously written work on Europeanization by internationally renowned scholars. Every contribution has been written with the explicit purpose of providing a state-of-the-art review of a specific aspect of the new research agenda of Europeanization, and this has been done within a uniform chapter structure. We should also stress that there was no expectation from our side to apply a common framework to a particular field and, apart from our broad background definition, we in fact resisted several requests from contributors to provide even as much as a more systematic understanding of Europeanization. The considerable diversity in understandings of Europeanization by the different contributors reflects an ongoing discussion within the literature and our aim is to reflect, rather than suppress that diversity. Contributors were also asked not to expose their own theories and empirical findings on a specific topic beyond what was reasonable given their own contributions to the literature. By contrast, each contributor was encouraged by us to provide more than just a summary of their own writings, or the literature at large, and expected to critically reflect on the achievements and pitfalls of the research agenda of Europeanization, to focus on general problems in research design and methodology, on conceptual and theoretical issues. We also asked contributors to do all this in a concise manner and to stick to a restrictive word limit of 5,500 words, excluding references. In order to secure a comprehensive and critical survey of the evolving literature we furthermore sent out draft versions of all chapters to anonymous expert reviewers with the request to assess which parts of the research domain were not well covered by the author, which major trends should be included, and which other shortcomings of the literature should at least be discussed. The stocktaking approach of this handbook is reflected by the uniform four-section outline according to which Chapters 3 to 24 are structured: Introduction, Core Research Questions, Key Problems, and Conclusion. In the introduction each chapter gives a short historical overview of Europeanization research in the specific field. The second section presents the main focus of inquiry by going into the core research questions regarding a specific topic. Here one can find which research questions scholars have been occupied with, what the main names are in the field, and how they have gone about in their research. Subsequently, the third section highlights the key problems of past and current research with regard to addressing these core questions, and points at the main theoretical, methodological and empirical shortcomings of the literature. The fourth section of each chapter concludes with a brief evaluation of what has been achieved so far and with some suggestions for further research.

Maarten P. Vink and Paolo Graziano 19

The Handbook is structured into five parts. The two central parts are dedicated to the most common empirical fields of study covered by existing research on Europeanization, focusing on politics and polity, and on policies. The third part is fully devoted to the polity and politics dimensions of national political systems. Contributions deal with the three classic institutions of government (legislatures, executives, judiciary), but also with power relations (for instance, among various state structures), territorial differentiation in Europeanization patterns (north–south, or between old and new member states), regulation and deregulation, and with national political actors (parties, interest groups, social movements). The fourth part, on policies, comprises a number of policy chapters which illustrate the main results in the most studied public policy fields. It starts with a more general chapter on the central issue of implementation, and then includes chapters on both policy domains which have been longer established at the European level (such as agricultural policy and cohesion policy), as well as on fields which are fairly new in terms of EU competence but already a firm part of the Europeanization literature (such as social policy, asylum policy and foreign policy). The second part of the book deals with the three issues of how to conceptualize, how to theorize, and how to measure Europeanization. Caporaso’s chapter on the “three worlds of regional integration theory” provides readers with a further introduction from the point of view of regional integration theories. That contribution is meant to remind readers of the tradition in which this new research agenda is embedded, and also to picture the three-step approach that has become one (if not the) classic model of Europeanization so far, and thus very much represents the state of the art against which this handbook is set. We have highlighted some main issues for an assessment in this introduction in order to provide the reader with some basic terminology of Europeanization research. Three further chapters in Part II very much set out the theoretical and methodological lines much more specifically along which readers can evaluate the empirical chapters and judge what Europeanization research is about, what its potentials are, and what hurdles are yet to be taken to further progress this developing research agenda. The final part of the book comes back to the background and overall evaluation of this new research agenda. In the closing chapter of the book Lehmkuhl approaches the promises and pitfalls of Europeanization research from a more generalist perspective of the theory and methodology of political science and public policy research. That conclusion comes back to the issues discussed in this introductory chapter and aims at a vital “closing” of the book by reflecting on what has been achieved so far by this new research agenda. With its explicitly critical perspective, however, the book ends with a chapter aiming to stimulate, rather than closing, an ongoing discussion on the proper status of Europeanization research.

20

Introduction

Key readings Bulmer, S. and C. Lequesne (eds) (2005) The Member States of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cowles, M.G., J. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds) (2001) Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Dyson, K. and K.H. Goetz (eds) (2003) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Featherstone, K. and C.M. Radaelli (eds) (2003) The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hanf, K. and B. Soetendorp (eds) (1998) Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union. London and New York: Longman. Héritier, A., D. Kerwer, C. Knill, D. Lehmkuhl, M. Teutsch, A.-C. Douillet (2001) Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking. Boulder, CU: Rowman and Littlefield. Goetz, K. and S. Hix (eds) (2000) Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems. London: Frank Cass (also published as a special issue of West European Politics, 23(4), 2000). Kassim, H., B.G. Peters and V. Wright (eds) (2000) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kohler-Koch, B. (ed.) (2003) Linking EU and National Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Meny, Y., P. Muller, J.-L. Quermonne (eds) (1996) Adjusting to Europe: Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies. London: Routledge. Rometsch, D. and W. Wessels (eds) (1996) The European Union and Member States: Towards Institutional Fusion? Manchester: Manchester University Press. Zeff, E.E. and E.B. Pirro (eds) (2001) The European Union and the Member States: Co-operation, Co-ordination and Compromise. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. A note on bibliography: given the inevitable overlap between references in the 25 chapters of this volume, and because of limited space, we have opted to include all references in one main reference list at the end of the book. That fifty-page reference list may also usefully serve as a comprehensive bibliography of Europeanization literature. In addition, all chapters end with a short list of “Key readings.”

Part II Theory and Methods

This page intentionally left blank

2 The Three Worlds of Regional Integration Theory James Caporaso

2.1 Introduction The rise of the concept of Europeanization, and subsequent attempts to launch a research program with this concept at its center, raises a number of important questions. The most important question addressed in this chapter has to do with the origins of this concept. Why do we need it? To what particular developments does the concept respond? The answer advanced is that Europeanization emerged and developed as a result of changes internal to the theory of integration itself – that is, the idea of Europeanization is endogenous to the evolution of integration theory. A second question has to do with the logical status of Europeanization theory. What claims does it make? How are we to understand the basic model of Europeanization? A third question has to do with the challenges posed by Europeanization research. In the remainder of this chapter I attempt to show how Europeanization is a logical outgrowth of the evolution of integration theory (the central claim), that is, how the seeds of this idea were planted inside integration theory itself. In demonstrating this endogenous ideational change, it is necessary to provide a schematic outline of one Europeanization model to show the “state of the art” regarding our knowledge of Europeanization. Finally, I address some of the key problems of Europeanization research.

2.2 Opening up an analytical space What is meant by “Europeanization”? It may seem odd to use a term before its precise meaning is clear. My guess is that the natural history of definitions follows a pattern in which terms are first loosely used to grapple with a vaguely defined reality, followed by a period of tightening up, increasing precision, and clarification. With the recent explosion of writing about Europeanization, it should be no surprise that so much energy is directed to what the term means 23

24

Theory and Methods

(Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a). On this point only, I part company with Johan Olsen (2002: 921) who argues that “the research challenge is one of model building, not one of inventing definitions”. The research challenge involves both inventing definitions and model building. Indeed, the two are related. Among the criteria for assessing definitions, there is the standard that says we ought to use words in such a way as to strengthen the connections between our terms and other interesting phenomena. Words may mean what people say they mean, but language would not be helpful if the categories we invent were not connected. So the process of assigning meaning to terms is, from the start, a theoretical exercise. Why do we need the term Europeanization today and not in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s? What developments led to increasing use of this term, probably in uncoordinated fashion, by many different people during the 1990s and beyond (Ladrech 1994; Graziano 2003; and Börzel and Risse 2003)? While usage of Europeanization does not necessarily imply need (Europeanization “talk” could just be a cultish fad), I argue that there were perfectly good reasons for dissatisfaction with current vocabulary to describe the process of integration, in full. In short, with progress in European integration, in particular with the bumpy transition from a decentralized balance of power system to a protoEuropean polity, it became clear that traditional theories of integration were not adequate to describe, let alone explain, developments at the European level. Intensification of the use of the term Europeanization is best understood in the context of stages in integration theory. However we define integration – the formation of a whole out of parts, increasing interaction of member states with one another, removal of obstacles to flows of goods and factors, emergence of an independent political entity at the supranational level – we can say that the first wave of European integration was dominated by bottom-up thinking, i.e. the causal flow was predominately from state and society of the member states to the regional organization. The research exemplar of this stage of integration was Ernst Haas’ The Uniting of Europe (1958). In this book Haas outlined in detail the organization and activity of interest group life at the national and transnational levels and how demands generated in this context led to the transfer of authority to the international level. This orientation (from the member states to the center) was natural. The European system was still very much a decentralized balance of power system which had not made the strong institutional move to a supranational polity. The differences between functionalists and intergovernmentalists (or realists, in an earlier imperfect reincarnation) were important, but both operated for theoretical purposes within the international relations paradigm. Functionalists stressed domestic and transnational society and economy and downplayed anarchy and state power, the intellectual cornerstones of the realist tradition. Intergovernmentalism focused on the most powerful states, their interests, and the strategic interaction and inter-state

James Caporaso 25

bargains that led to integrative agreements. Functionalists generally believed that integration produced autonomous regional configurations of power and competence while intergovernmentalists insisted that the new institutions of Europe rested on delegated authority which could be controled and even retracted. It is important to bear in mind that the predominant if not exclusive focus was on the parts (the states, national society, and transnational society) and how these parts came to form a whole. Amitai Etzioni (1963: 407) used the term “epigenesis”, to refer to “the formation of units that acquire functions not previously serviced by the unit”. In short, most of the first wave of European integration theory was dominated by international relations thinking and research. It could hardly be otherwise. Before the European Union (or European Economic Community) could become a distinctive focus of research, it had to have some flesh and bones, i.e. it had to develop out of the aspirations and resources of the member states. The key works of this first stage were Haas (1958), Deutsch et al. (1957), and Lindberg and Scheingold’s special issue of International Organization (1970a), which included important articles by Haas, Lindberg, Schmitter, Nye, Puchala, and Alker – all international relations and comparative politics scholars. Scholars such as Lindberg, Schmitter, and Nye were, of course, well versed in theories of comparative politics and drew on seminal comparative works such as Andrew Shonfield’s Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (1966). Yet without wanting to downplay the importance of comparative politics in the first wave of regional integration theory, the major research aim was to use knowledge of domestic societies to explain the move to international institutions. By the 1980s, a regional integration threshold had been passed and we entered the second stage. More and more laws originated in Brussels, most were presumptively implemented and obeyed, decisions were increasingly taken by qualified majority vote and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rendered judgments that often collided with the interests of member states. The daily operation of the EC was propeled more and more by institutional structures and economic configurations situated at the European level and did not require a daily dose of energy and initiative from the member states, except, most strikingly, for new initiatives to restructure the EU. The Gerschenkronian “big push” which Europe needed and received from the member states had given way to self-sustained growth. Much of Europe had become institutionalized in the sociological sense that its existence and functioning across broad issue areas became unproblematic, taken for granted. The EC was now a polity, a political system that could be analyzed with the tools of most domestic systems (Hix 1994). The success of integration, its ability to tame a variety of issues heretofore thought to be intractable, including commercial policy, free movement of

26

Theory and Methods

goods and productive factors (not completely dealt with until the Single European Act), and agriculture, was bound to have an influence on its doppelgänger, regional integration theory. Functionalism would treat the changes mentioned as confirmation of the theory that cooperative incentives, even ones in areas of low politics, would lead to a transformed supranational structure. Intergovernmentalists would interpret the new Europe in terms of higher levels of delegation and discretion, with much of the ultimate control in the hands of the powerful member states. Yet both had to deal with the new facts of regional integration, however theorized. The arrival of policy analysis and the tools of comparative politics signified that the EU had arrived as a quasi-autonomous level of analysis. New scholars, from odd places such as American politics (Kingdon 1995; Baumgartner and Jones 1993), arrived on the scene exhibiting novel conceptual wares such as issue framing, median voter theorems, policy sequences, and equilibrium analysis. These changes reflected the success of the first stage of the process of integration. For decades scholars had looked at integration as the transfer of authority and decision-making capacity from the member states to the European Union. “Europe’s Would-Be Polity”, the title of a book by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970b), had become Europe’s de facto polity. The analytical tool kit of policy analysis and comparative politics became available to scholars of regional integration (Hix 1994). To summarize, the process of integration, as well as integration theory, had gone through two stages: The first stage involved the shift from a decentralized balance of power system, coordinated by the bilateral and multilateral efforts of executives and ministers, to a partial supranational polity with a contestable capacity for self-regulation. The second stage involved the growth and institutionalization of the European institutional order through extensive policy making in many sectors. European practitioners and theorists faced a crossroads. The new political situation could be treated as an equilibrium and Europe could be analyzed as any other political system. For those who felt that the EU had been thoroughly domesticated, the logical analytic response was to treat the EU as any other polity. Another approach was to ask novel questions about crosslevel relationships – not only from the member states to the EU, but also from the centers of the EU back to the member states. This latter set of questions is associated with the Europeanization focus. Within integration theory, a consensus appeared on the following points. First, Europe was seen as a multi-level polity. Those with a legal orientation tended to see this multi-level polity as federal or confederal (Weiler 1991), but at least as tending toward a legally-based split of powers between the center and the member states. Others (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2001) conceptualized Europe as a multi-level polity, with subnational, national, and supranational actors interacting in complex ways. This convergence on the conceptualization

James Caporaso 27

of Europe as a system with many levels encouraged the asking of numerous questions. It left the conceptual door ajar with regard to bottom-up analysis (traditional integration theory), intra-EU analysis (comparative politics, and analysis of the EU as a political system), and top-down analysis (the still-to-beformulated Europeanization program). Given the variation in implementation of EU laws and Directives, and the diversity of the member states despite belonging to the same organization, the question became unavoidable. How do European integration and European policy making affect the very states responsible for integration in the first place? The term “Europeanization” was invented to answer this question and to fill this gap. It responded to the conceptual difficulty of talking about the effects of integration on domestic structures. “Europeanization” closed the loop as it were. Europeanization is defined, in Transforming Europe, as the process by which distinct structures of governance at the European level affect domestic structures and domestic politics broadly defined. The full definition poses some problems, since the authors (myself included) define Europeanization as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance” (Risse et al. 2001: 3) and at the same time they want to look at Europeanization in terms of its impact on domestic structures. For this chapter, I prefer to use Europeanization to refer to the impact of European integration (either the dynamics of stage one or the normal politics of stage two) on domestic politics. Europeanization serves a dual (definitional) function. First it highlights the role of European politics and institutions as an independent variable in domestic politics. It turns the causal arrows around and asks how European integration and everyday policy making affect domestic structures. Second, Europeanization refers to the processes by which domestic structures adapt to European integration. In the section below, I outline the basic model within which Europeanization plays a role. The model is quite general and can be elaborated in a number of more specific ways. Nevertheless, it provides a general sense of one way in which the idea of Europeanization can be put to work.

2.3 The three-step model The basic model states that European integration leads to pressures to adjust (goodness of fit) which are then mediated by domestic-level factors, and finally to outcomes (Risse et al. 2001: 6–12). Technically, the model is close-looped, since the domestic outcomes feed back into the process of Europeanization, but for research purposes the analysis is basically terminated with domestic adjustments. For methodological purposes, it is important to note that there are no exogenous variables (everything is endogenous) in this model, since every variable is a function of some or all other variables in the model, a point to which

28

Theory and Methods

European Integration

Goodness of Fit

Mediating institutions

Domestic Structural Change

Figure 2.1 Europeanization and domestic change Source: Adapted from Risse et al. (2001: 6).

I return. The first generation of European integration studies concentrated on the shift of problem-solving capability from the domestic to the regional level, from the individual member states to Brussels. The second stage focused on policy making within the new European institutions. The third stage – Europeanization – asks what difference stages one and two make for the same domestic societies and polities that initiated the process of integration. The focus is reflexive. Having set in motion the process of integration, we now ask what effect does integration have on the member states who created it? Let us look at each phase of the process in more detail (where I draw heavily on Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001). First Step: European integration. European integration involves a great deal of political activity – law making by the Council of Ministers, Commission, and European Parliament, implementation by the Commission, judgments by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and so on. The scope of integration has increased (Pollack 1994) and its depth as well, as reflected in the ways the Commission and Court have tightened up the implementation of the Treaties. For example, in the area of gender equality the ECJ has broadened the meaning of pay to include wages, vacation allowances, maternity leave, access to company privileges such as company cars, unemployment insurance and pensions. It has also included indirect discrimination (de facto pay inequality generated by market segregation) under the meaning of discrimination. Further, the Court has restricted the range of exceptions that member states have tried to create. While it is taken for granted that the EU has become the legislative focus in many sectors for the member states, the study of law making in Brussels does not by itself ask (let alone answer) the question of what difference this shift in levels of authority makes for domestic politics. Indeed, it was this gap which inspired many to develop the Europeanization framework in the first place. Second Step: Fit/Misfit. Of course, European integration has an effect on the member states. Indeed, member states enter into supranational law making in

James Caporaso 29

order to change circumstances in their own countries. That “Europe matters” has never really been at issue. But how, under what conditions, what amplifies or dampens responses? Are the changes that occur primarily intended, as intergovernmentalists would expect, or rather unintended, as many functionalists would claim? We know that the range of national responses is huge. Member states may ignore what happens in Brussels, they may automatically “download” what takes place there, they may show creativity in the way they implement directives, and they may transform their domestic structures so as to accomplish the goals set up in Brussels. How do we think about these processes? We begin to theorize the response by thinking of the degree of pressure created by Europeanization. This pressure is a function of the degree of fit (misfit) or congruence (incongruence) between “Europe” and the domestic level. If there is a good fit, there is little pressure for change at the domestic level. For example, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) made provisions for a European Central Bank (ECB). These provisions were very close to those that already existed in Germany with the Bundesbank. Here we expect little structural change since the German domestic structure is isomorphic to the European structure. German domestic policies would presumably have to conform to the stability and growth criteria set forth in the EU. Of course, we now know that Germany has violated some of the criteria (budget deficits) of the Stability and Growth Pact. But if the fit is poor, say between the ECB and the organization of the banking sector in other countries – for example, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France – greater adaptational pressure will be felt, resulting in (perhaps) a more significant response or a bigger deviation from the European norm. A poor fit would occur if the banks were located within a political ministry, such as the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Economics, and hence subject to direct political control of the Prime Minister. If this were the case, there would be a substantial discrepancy between the “independent” organizational standing of the ECB and the national bank in question. Intense adaptational pressure would be exerted on the national political system to come up with an organizational structure in the financial sector which more closely corresponded to the European level. Adaptational pressure need not result in a strong Europe-conforming response. Such pressure is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for domestic change (Börzel and Risse 2003: 58). Other possibilities are no change, symbolic change without substantive content, and active attempts to subvert the European policy. In theoretical terms, the variations in outcomes are due to mediating factors which intervene between adaptational pressures and outcomes. The fit/misfit can be over policies, economic conditions (gender inequality), ideational systems (conceptions of citizenship), institutions and even constitutional orders (basic rights granted under national constitutions and

30

Theory and Methods

rights granted or denied at the European level). Policy misfit is the least interesting case. If a country has a policy out of line with the EU, we have only to examine if there is compliance or not. What is more interesting (and more typical) is when a misfit implies some incongruity with basic domestic institutions. In sum, while there is one policy that comes out of Brussels, this policy will intersect with many different domestic institutions and styles. A change in citizenship laws will mean one thing for France ( jus soli) and another for Germany ( jus sanguinis). Liberalization of telecommunications will affect the United Kingdom (already very liberal) differently from Italy and Portugal (where a strong state presence in the telecommunications sector has to be taken into account). While regional integration theory was always sensitive to crosscountry differences affecting integration, the Europeanization perspective refocuses our attention on the importance of national variation for domestic outcomes of the integration process. Third Step: Mediating Factors. The route from Brussels to member states is not a straight line. In the case of high adaptational pressure, the existence of domestic mediating factors is crucial. There are numerous mediating factors. Indeed, nearly every domestic structural condition that affects the impact of European integration could be conceptualized as a mediating factor. Domestic cultural factors that are cooperative vs those that are oppositional would, almost by definition, have a facilitating (obstructive) effect. The federal-unitary distinction could also have an effect, though in precisely what way would have to await further contextual specification. Federalism implies multiple veto points and this can obstruct change. On the other hand, the territorial structure of the EU, with its emphasis on strong rights for the member states, mirrors the federal structure of some of the member states, such as Germany. This makes it likely that Germany will feel more comfortable with the overall political architecture of the EU than, say, the United Kingdom, with a unitary structure. Below I give a flavor of how two sets of mediating factors can work. I emphasize that these two are illustrative of a much broader range of mediating factors (for a fuller treatment, see Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001; Radaelli 2003; and Börzel and Risse 2003). The first set of mediating factors are formal and informal institutions. In the area of gender equality, the United Kingdom had high levels of inequality (Caporaso and Jupille 2001: 27, Table 2.1; Mazey 1988). The legislation from Brussels, coming out of the work of the Council of Ministers and Commission, was minimal, consistent with the “saga of high aspirations and modest results” characteristic of social policy in general (Leibfried and Pierson 1995: 46). Yet the ECJ provided an opening through its judgments starting with Defrenne vs Sabena. While the United Kingdom’s flexible labor market approach was

James Caporaso 31

characterized by high inequality, there were characteristics of both the public and private spheres that fostered a response. The British Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC) was critical in providing British women a forum and vehicle to further gender equality. The EOC became the focus for feminist groups, lawyers, and labor unions interested in advancing the cause of gender equality within the labor market. France, which had a much lower level of inequality, also seemed to lack the interest group activity as well as public bodies autonomous from the state, to serve as a motor of labor market equality. The French case can be described as one of low adaptational pressure (since labor market inequalities were much lower than in the United Kingdom) along with domestic institutions that were not facilitative of change. Thus even the smaller changes that one might have expected in line with gender inequality in France did not occur since French institutions, political culture, and interest group structure were not poised to take advantage of the changes in Brussels. Still, some change did take place. The French were out of line with implementation of the Equal Treatment Directive and the ECJ, in three separate rulings, found French legislation in this area to be unsatisfactory. While the interplay between the ECJ and French domestic institutions is complicated, in general French law was rather closely aligned with European standards (Caporaso and Jupille 2001: 34–45). The case of gender equality provides just one concrete example of the differential impact of European integration and European policy making (stages one and two) on outcomes in the member states. Outcomes are not expected to be identical, except in the improbable case where adaptive pressures and mediating institutions are identical. Convergence is neither theoretically predicted nor empirically likely. The process of Europeanization involves a continual arbitrage between national differences, different adaptational pressures, different mediating institutions, and outcomes. A second set of mediating factors are veto points or veto groups. The greater the number of veto groups, ceteris paribus, the more difficult it will be to move away from the status quo. A veto, in the strongest sense, is the ability to turn something down, e.g. to refuse a piece of legislation or to implement an executive order. A veto player is someone who has such a right or power of refusal. In a federal system, regional actors may have the right to say no to, for example, constitutional changes and social partners such as unions, employers, or consumer groups may have similar rights, formal or not, in forging social pacts. Veto power is not limited to the formal right of rejection. It can be extended to include the capacity to obstruct, slow down, or amend legislation or implementation. Presidential systems may have a more difficult time passing legislation than parliamentary ones because of the split between legislative and executive power in presidential systems. Coalition governments have more potential veto players than governments with a single dominant party. Viewed

32

Theory and Methods

in this fashion, veto power refers to a spectrum of possibilities rather than an either–or property. While the idea of veto players had been around a long time before the term was used, the recent discussion was stimulated by Fritz Scharp’s “Joint Decision Trap” (1988). It has since broadened to include macro-institutional features such as consensus vs majoritarian democracies (Giuliani 2003), federal vs nonfederal systems, and the structure of party systems (fragmented vs cohesive or encompassing party systems). Tsebelis (1995) has formalized some intuitions about veto players and extended the concept to institutional and partisan veto players (parties). Note that in some sense the idea of veto player is implicit in constitutional theorizing about separation of powers, or in any type of political system where the desire is to prevent concentrated political power. Separation of powers and judicial review are two of the most important structural arrangements for preventing concentrated power. In terms of applications relevant to Europeanization, we can take the work of Héritier and Sbragia as exemplary. Addressing herself to the problem of road haulage in Italy, Héritier (2001: 45) argues that if there are a large number of veto points, not compensated by consensual decision making, and if there is further a poor fit between European institutions and national ones (making for high adaptive pressure), there will likely be little change, despite strong pressure for change. The pressures from the European level can be ignored or subverted by the rules of the game, which give to many players the opportunity to veto. This is essentially what happened in the transport sector with regard to deregulation of road haulage. Here the small haulers, or padroncini, lobbied hard against deregulation and were successful in preventing change from taking place. On the other hand, in the same country with the same macro-institutional structure and party system (though with a different set of interest groups), the considerable opposition to European monetary integration was overcome by a broad coalition supportive of a more disciplined monetary and fiscal policy, as well as by vaguer but no less important feelings about not being left “out of Europe”. It is hard to imagine a poorer fit between the institutions and policies of EMU and Italian monetary institutions and fiscal practices (Sbragia 2001: 80). For Italy, EMU had implications for domestic budget cuts, fiscal austerity, and the interests of powerful groups and political parties. How then did Italy overcome the resistance to EMU? The short answer, the only one possible here, is that Italy was helped by three sets of mediating factors: empowerment of domestic elites in key ministries who were favorable to reform; a tendency on the part of elites to be receptive to arguments couched in terms of “Europe”; and the broad permissive consensus on Europe that existed in the Italian electorate (Sbragia 2001: 80–1). The first factor shows just how elusive the idea of mediating factor can be, since here two institutions (Treasury and the office of Premier) were

James Caporaso 33

empowered to act by the very challenge that they were supposed to meet., i.e. by the proposed monetary union itself. To a certain extent then, mediating institutions are endogenous with respect to Europeanization (Sbragia 2001: 87).

2.4 Conclusion In this section I reiterate the main thesis of this chapter and attempt to draw out some of the implications and challenges for future research. The main goal of this chapter is to carve out an analytic space within which Europeanization can be used to illuminate aspects of the overall regional integration process. The term Europeanization is identified with a set of top-down processes having to do with the effects of European integration on member states – particularly their domestic institutions, beliefs, and policies. Defined as such, Europeanization does not get in the way of other concepts (is not redundant) and describes and explains in a general (rather than ad hoc) way the circular flow of the integration process. In a sense, a focus on Europeanization is required for a comprehensive understanding of the integration process. The three worlds of integration theory – classical integration (the making of a whole out of the parts), Europe as polity, and Europeanization – form a unified whole not just for descriptive but also for explanatory purposes. Since each of the parts is an input for the others, analysis of each world, one at a time, constitutes only partial rather than general equilibrium analysis. Thus, the term “Europeanization” is not so much created as discovered, that is, the attempt to understand European integration leads us directly to these top-down influences. In short, if we were to theorize about the rise of Europeanization as a body of research, Europeanization would be endogenous with respect to stages one and two of regional integration. Ideational causes for ideational effects. The second point relates to a challenge posed by Europeanization research. Figure 2.1 clearly shows that the basic model of Europeanization is based on a system of mutual feedback relationships among European integration, goodness of fit (adaptive pressure), mediating institutions, and domestic structural change. The model has a non-recursive structure, with each variable either directly or indirectly affecting all other variables. For example, European integration directly affects “goodness of fit” but indirectly affects domestic structural change as well as Europeanization itself. The model is thus reflexive in the sense that the output of one component at one time period comes back to affect the same component at a subsequent time period. This has an important methodological implication, namely that everything is endogenous – nothing exogenous. One requirement for causal modeling, at least in the dominant Simon–Blalock tradition, is that there be at least one exogenous variable in our model, at least one variable which cannot be written as a function of some other variable or combination of variables in the theory. Causal thinking always requires an asymmetry and the demonstration of one-way influence

34

Theory and Methods

with no feedback simply to square with our intuitive notions of what causality is and how it is distinguished from correlation. It seems to me that there are two specific ways in which this observation might affect how we carry out our research. First, we could cut into the diagram at any particular place, say examining the relations between European integration and adaptational pressure, or between mediating factors (facilitating factors) and domestic change. However, when we do so, it is important to keep in mind that the intervention is purely for analytic purposes and does not entail responsibility to demonstrate that no feedback occurs, nor should the analyst be led into quietly assuming that the links being observed are cut off from the rest of the circular flow in the model. Second, were we to conduct an econometric analysis of the full model, it would have to be specified in full as a set of simultaneous equations, with each variable specified as a function of the others in the model. Recursive models designed to facilitate causal inferences are not compatible with the overall structure of the Europeanization model. A final point concerns the nature of EU studies. It can be inferred from what has been said above that what is loosely referred to as “EU studies” is a collection of different intellectual undertakings. My attempt to break the field up into its component parts is done in the spirit of reculer pour mieux sauter, i.e. to understand the parts in the hope of better understanding the whole. If this analysis is correct, it follows that we ought to be more tolerant of the diversity in our field, more understanding of the differences, yet more optimistic about fitting these different islands of theory together. It does not make sense to argue that “the EU is really a polity” or “the EU is really a decentralized balance of power system” as if the complexities of the EU could be dealt with in a deft ontological move. The three worlds of integration theory signify different operating realities (theorized realities, to be sure) that provide us with grist to be analyzed and synthesized for as long as this analyst can see.

Key readings Haas, E.B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Lindberg, L.N. and S.A. Scheingold (eds) (1970) Regional Integration: Theory and Research. International Organization, 24(4), special issue. Olsen, J.P. (2003) The Many Faces of Europeanization. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5) 921–52. Risse, T., M.G. Cowles, and J.A. Caporaso (2001) Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction. In M.G. Cowles, J.A. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 1–20. Schmitter, P.C. (1970) A Revised Theory of Regional Integration. International Organization, 24(4) 836–68.

3 Conceptual Issues Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier

3.1 Introduction Definitions, conceptual analysis, theorization, and methodology occupy a prominent position in political science research on Europeanization. Conceptual analysis cannot be reduced to the definition(s) of Europeanization, although the two are obviously inter-related. Good concepts need solid definitions to operate. But conceptual analysis, in addition, covers issues such as the relationship between concepts and measurement, the role of the “ladder of abstraction” in classification, the function played by typologies in research designs and explanations, and the treatment of category mistakes and pitfalls (Brady and Collier 2004; Daly 2003; Majone 2005: 24–5; Majone and Quade 1980; Sartori 1984). In turn, conceptual analysis is a component of the wider attempt to explain and understand politics via theories. Finally, concepts have to be made amenable to empirical analysis via appropriate methods and research designs. Concepts, research methods and methodology are therefore closely connected. In this vein, some scholars argue that the discussion of concepts is only an “attention-directing” device in that it directs academic attention towards a new set of questions and research puzzles (Olsen 2002). Others think that the literature has already shown too many cases of conceptual pitfalls. Consequently, they see more rigorous conceptual analysis as a priority (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a). Accordingly, they argue for more systematic links between Europeanization and the classic concepts of political science, especially power, conflict, and, ultimately, politics (Mair 2004). Finally, one may well take a completely different perspective and argue that Europeanization is not an objective entity to be pigeonholed into one aseptic definition. Quite the opposite, it is a set of contested discourses and narratives about the impact of European integration on domestic political change. In this perspective, Europeanization is “what political actors make of it” and researchers may well wish to engage in 35

36

Theory and Methods

the debate with their own accounts, but they must acknowledge that their definitions are only a component of a wider political discourse.

3.2 Core research questions With these clarifications in mind, we can move on to analyze some definitions and their scope. There are several ways in which one can approach Europeanization. Patterns of Europeanization predate the EU. Even in the postWorld War II period, the European Communities first and the EU later represent only one of the integration paths – as shown by the examples of the Council of Europe and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Majone 2005: 2–3). In a broad, encyclopedic sense, to reduce Europeanization to the “Europe of Brussels” is misleading. Yet it is useful to make a distinction between background concepts and systematized concepts (Adcock and Collier 2001). As a background concept, Europeanization refers to all the possible meanings we may want to include in an encyclopedia. But communities of specialists work with systematized concepts where definitions are explicitly formulated to address the core questions of a research field. It is in this systematized sense that Europeanization – in political science scholarly work – has started to denote the range of studies dedicated to the effects of European integration on domestic polity, politics and policy. Risse et al. (2001: 3) define Europeanization “as the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance”. Although the whole volume from which this definition is drawn (Cowles et al. 2001) is clearly dedicated to domestic policy adjustment and not to European integration per se, this approach seems to point to the origins of European governance (as shown by the term “emergence”) rather than towards the domestic consequences of integration. This slight gap between the conceptual definition and the research design maintains an ambiguity between Europeanization and European integration. Drawing on early conceptual analysis by Robert Ladrech (1994), another definition considers Europeanization as processes of (i) construction, (ii) diffusion and (iii) institutionalization of norms, beliefs, formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” that are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy processes and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures, and public policies (Radaelli 2003). There are two possible misunderstandings of this definition. One is to reduce it to the analysis of how EU decisions (policies, common positions of the Council, legislation, etc.) impact on domestic political systems. Another is to extend it to the point that everything that goes on in Brussels can be seen as a manifestation of Europeanization when analyzed from the point of view of domestic politics.

Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier 37

The “EU policy processes” mentioned in the definition should not be equated with the adoption of policies or law. They may lead to policies and legislation, but in some circumstances they may be highly conflictual and may not end with the adoption of any EU policy. However, they can still produce effects on member states’ politics. Repeated negotiations are often necessary to finalize complex policy packages. For many years there may be just a flurry of working groups, white papers, and bargaining without final decisions, but nevertheless interaction in Brussels can change policy paradigms at the domestic level (for the example of corporate taxation see Radaelli 1997). Thus, the EU policy process designates a political space with a distinct EU dimension wherein social interaction among elites (and in some cases public opinion) takes place. Of course, this does not mean that any political space where there is some interaction produces effects – the second misunderstanding mentioned above. Indeed, one classic problem of conceptual analysis is how to avoid prejudging the role of the EU in domestic politics. In order to produce effects, these interactions at the EU level must become a reference point in domestic political action, either via socialization effects or through the production of policies that modify the logic of political interaction at home. Scholars working on the notion of référentiel (Muller 1995, 2000) would say that there is Europeanization when the EU becomes the référentiel of domestic political action. Both definitions mentioned above are grounded in an understanding of Europeanization as institutionalization (Stone Sweet et al. 2001) and interactive process, rather than a mechanism of uni-directional reaction to “Europe” (Salgado and Woll 2004: 4). As such, they go beyond a narrow notion of “impact” (of the EU on domestic systems). The link with the concept of time and its role in politics is evident. To chart the interactions between the domestic and the EU levels, one needs research designs that use time to control for sophisticated processes of causation and, in some cases, it may be necessary to dig out the “slow and big movements” that cannot be captured by one-shot interactions between Brussels and the member states (as shown by Pierson 2003, 2004). The point is important, because the concept of impact is crucial. Indeed, one common way to introduce students to this field is to say that Europeanization is all about the domestic impact of the EU. In a sense, this is true. Yet one has to be clear about the meaning of impact. There are impacts that can be described as “responses to pressures coming down from Brussels”. But there are other types of impact. To begin with, the decline of the Community method (Majone 2005: ch. 3) shows that some areas of EU policy are moving away from vertical policy making in the sense of laws created in Brussels and then “imposed” onto member states via transposition and implementation. There are also horizontal processes based on cooperation among the member states’ governments in the

38

Theory and Methods

context of the EU but outside the Community method, as shown by the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the components of Justice and Home Affairs that so far have not been taken into the Community framework. In the context of the policies for a more competitive knowledge society in Europe, the open method of coordination produces “pressure” in a radically different way from the Community method. Of course, it can work and produce impact or it may not work at all – this is a question that recent empirical research is looking at (Borras and Jacobsson 2004). But when it works, the open method of coordination draws on the logic of benchmarking, networking, and, ultimately, learning facilitated by the EU institutions. Open coordination refers to a mode of governance based on cooperation among member states facilitated by EU institutions (especially the Council and the Commission). It does not lead to the formulation of EU legislation but to EU-level guidelines (and in some cases indicators) that are implemented by the national parliaments. Under these circumstances, the notion of “impact” does not denote adaptation to vertical pressures, but more subtle impacts of socialization processes, ideational convergence, learning, and interpretations of policy paradigms and ideas. To analyze these types of impacts, one needs to go back to the classic literature in political sociology and political science about socialization processes and the politics of learning and knowledge diffusion. Secondly, we must account for creative usages of Europe and thus for the political construction of impacts. Domestic actors are at the same time filters and users of European norms and rules. They often have discretion to use the EU in many different ways. They can reappropriate European norms and policy paradigms to implement their own policies (Pasquier 2005). They can draw on the EU as a resource without specific pressure from Brussels (Thatcher 2004). Europeanization looks at how domestic change is processed, and patterns of adaptation can be more complex and creative than reactions to “Brussels” (Jacquot and Woll 2003). Indeed, complex adaptation patterns and interactive logics are common (Megie and Ravinet 2004), especially if one adds the subnational dimension and explores impacts at the local level (Pasquier and Weisbein 2004). Finally, impacts can be discursively created – and consequently we must refer to the notion of Europeanization as discourse (Hay and Rosamond 2002; Kallestrup 2002). In turn, discourse on EU politics and policies is cast in different forms, from rhetoric (Schimmelfennig 2001) to policy narratives (Radaelli 1999a). Yet discourse is not just language. It is also an interactive process (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). Indeed, it is a set of ideas and an interactive process. The ideational dimension itself divides into two activities: a cognitive activity which enables actors to make sense of reality (drawing on knowledge, policy analysis, information about problems, actors, and resources) and a more normative activity wherein reality is judged. The interactive dimension of

Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier 39

discourse shows that impacts should be examined in the context of the interaction among policy makers – at the stage of policy formulation – and in the mediatic arenas of political communication to the public.

3.3 Key problems The first problem is that it is not clear how far the territory covered by the concept extends. Having established that we consider only the systematized concept of Europeanization, does it cover exclusively EU effects, or intergovernmental relations in Europe (but not necessarily in the institutional context of the EU)? Does it stretch as far as enlargement, candidate countries, and even countries that cannot possibly be interested in EU membership (think of the possible impact of the EU on democratic regimes in Latin America)? It is impossible to pin down precisely the territory covered by the concept. Different researchers interested in different problems will continue to draw on different notions – the issue becoming one of being clear each time about the properties of the concept (Sartori 1984). To continue with our discussion of the territory occupied by the concept, some authors correlate Europeanization with the homogenizing impact of the EU on “specific institutions and practices across a wide range of state activities” (Page 2003: 163). However, it is useful to make a distinction between Europeanization and its possible impacts in terms of convergence or divergence. There is now substantial evidence that EU politics provide different opportunities to different actors in terms of creative usages of Europe – the implications being that there is more differential impact than convergence. This does not mean that we should rule out convergence (see Knill and Holzinger 2005 on policy convergence). In some policies, Europeanization, engineered by different institutions and multiple tools, from directives to the use of competition policy and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, has resulted in convergence (Harcourt 2002). But Europeanization should not be used as yet another way to refer to convergence and homogeneity in Europe. Institutional theory (both rational choice and sociological institutionalism) would predict that domestic institutions refract the EU in different ways (Risse et al. 2001; Héritier et al. 2001). Hence the prediction to test is about lack of convergence, not its presence. The second problem is whether Europeanization is a black-and-white concept that can be measured. Can we look at a member state and measure whether it is Europeanized or not, possibly using objective indicators? The answer is yes, but it is very difficult, since Europeanization is more a process than an end-state (Goetz 2002). Consequently, it cannot be measured until the criteria used to track down the process and its outcomes are spelled out explicitly (see Giuliani 2003 for a valuable attempt). As one anonymous reviewer noted,

40

Theory and Methods

getting old is also a process but can be measured. The question is: where does one find the unit of measurement? Europeanization is sometimes measured according to a scale comprising transformation, adaptation, inertia, retrenchment (Héritier et al. 2001), and, perhaps, hostile reactions to Europe. Prima facie, these categories seem to make sense. However, it is difficult to specify objective indicators of what makes adaptation different from transformation. More often than not, we have to rely on the intuition and the interpretative skills of the researcher – not the most solid tracks to produce scientific information. What one researcher may classify as “adaptation” may look like “transformation” to another – it depends on the standards and time horizon they are using (implicitly or, hopefully, explicitly). So much so that some authors prefer to avoid this set of outcomes and re-define the dependent variable as implementation, and then discuss types of implementation that have already been classified by policy theory (see, for example, Zahariadis 2005). In any case, it is indispensable to control for change over relatively long periods of time. Some changes apparently linked to the implementation of EU policies may have been cultivated and prepared for years by domestic coalitions (Bull and Baudner 2004). Over a fairly long period of time, the domestication of Europe can appear more important than Europeanization. Given this complexity, research designs are crucial. The classic problems of Europeanization research are: (i) prejudging the impact of the EU on domestic politics and policy; and (ii) assuming that if some domestic changes look similar to those proposed by Brussels, this must be an instance of Europeanization. One way to avoid prejudging the role of Europeanization is to specify rival alternative hypotheses (such as globalization, or domestic politics). So far, however, there has been more debate on how to specify mechanisms of Europeanization than on the mechanisms at work in rival alternative hypotheses. The risk of assuming that “if they do something similar to what Brussels want, they must be doing it because of Brussels” must be handled – we submit – by using research designs sensitive to time (so that one can check where there was something moving on before Brussels entered the scene) and to the system of interaction at the domestic level. Here we see the difference between the standard model of Europeanization, presented by Caporaso in his chapter for this volume (see Figure 2.1), and an approach based on bottom-up research designs. The standard model is based on a chain where EU “pressure”, mediated by intervening variables, leads to reactions and change at the domestic level, including resistance and inertial responses. Pressure is clarified in terms of “goodness of fit”, which is not just the fit or lack of between EU and domestic policies, but covers structuralinstitutional fits as well. In addition, the intervening variables are made explicit and, instead of being generated by ad hoc explanations based on the peculiarity of the political systems of the member states, are grounded in either social

Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier 41

constructivism or rational choice institutionalist frameworks (Börzel and Risse 2003). The bottom-up approach follows different tracks. Instead of starting from EU policy/politics as independent variable and tracking down the consequences for domestic institutions, policies, and politics, it starts and finishes at the level of domestic actors. The idea is to start from actors, problems, resources, policy style, and discourses at the domestic level (that is, the system of interaction at the domestic level). By using time and temporal causal sequences, a bottom-up approach checks if, when, and how the EU provides a change in any of the main components of the system of interaction. Finally, “bottom-uppers” try to measure the consequences of all this in terms of change at the domestic level. One property of this bottom-up approach (to use a term that is well known in the literature on policy implementation) is that it can control for rival alternative hypotheses via process-tracing and time-sensitive political analysis. To illustrate with an example, a bottom-up analysis of the impact of Economic and Monetary Union on Italian politics has shown that EMU produced clear causal effects on domestic politics in some critical circumstances, but not in others, and that bold claims about Italy being rescued by the EU are not supported by the empirical evidence (Radaelli 2002). Note that this is a choice in terms of design. It does not reflect any assumption in terms of the nature of Europeanization – that is, whether the latter is more a process driven by society and local actors or a top-down steering mechanism. To conclude with the comparison between the standard model and the bottomup approach, let us look at the conditions for Europeanization. To begin with, a distinctive EU-level system of interaction (the “space” mentioned above) is a necessary condition for Europeanization to occur in all models. Further, both the standard model and bottom-uppers agree that socialization is not a sufficient condition. However, adaptational pressure is a necessary condition in the standard model but not in the bottom-up approach. The bottom-up approach is also clear on the fact that the establishment of EU policies is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for Europeanization. The standard model is less interested in this question, as the key variable is the presence or absence of adaptational pressure – whether it comes from agreement on policies in Brussels or other types of reaction is less important. Another problem that has beleaguered European integration theories is the reliance on too many ad hoc conceptualizations and sui generis explanations. On this dimension, the work done on Europeanization shows improvement. True, there are some ad hoc concepts such as the “goodness of fit” – this being the correspondence between EU templates and domestic ones. However, even the goodness of fit concept is nested into a neo-institutional explanation of politics. More generally, research on Europeanization has provided the opportunity to “normalize” European Studies (Hassenteufel and Surel 2000).

42

Theory and Methods

Put differently, work on Europeanization makes extensive use of concepts which “travel well” across the whole spectrum of political science research – as evidenced by the use of concepts such as “governance”, “regulatory competition”, “agency and structure”, and “policy framing” (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Bulmer and Radaelli 2005; Radaelli 2004). At the same time, Europeanization as problematique attracted the attention of “mainstream” comparative political scientists that have seen this field compatible with their research agenda focused on domestic political change and the reshaping of nation-states in Europe. Broadly speaking, Europeanization fits in rather well with the major theoretical interests and “turns” in contemporary political science. It is a way to respond to Sbragia’s invitation to look at the EU with comparative politics lenses (Sbragia 1991).

3.4 Conclusion In order to make progress, concepts need the flesh and bone of models and theories. This is the important issue raised by Olsen (2002) when he observed that the challenge posed by Europeanization is all about model-building, not definitional. But, specifically, what are the most promising models to be considered? Up until now, apart from the valuable suggestions coming from general frameworks such as neo-institutionalism and constructivism, there has been considerable uncertainty on this issue. Yet if one wants to build on the normalization effect mentioned above, and make Europeanization even more integrated with cumulative research in political science, there are some obvious directions. Given that Europeanization is concerned with how domestic political systems are “penetrated” by the logic of EU politics and policy, it makes sense to draw on classic categories used for the explanation of the formation of political systems. Current research is aware of this, as shown by the growing interest in politicization and socialization – two concepts that appear in Risse and Börzel (2003) but deserve to be explored further. Politicization is a long-term process leading to the formation, consolidation, and equilibrium of a political system. Europeanization provides “the view from domestic politics” on these processes. Following Stein Rokkan’s seminal work (1999), we can start from five macro trends that have structured domestic systems in Europe, namely state-building, development of capitalism, democratization, nation formation, and the development of welfare-systems. These trends have structured deep mechanisms of political regulation, collective identity and solidarity based on the nation-state (Baisnée and Pasquier 2005). Europeanization affects these domestic structures (directly or indirectly) because collective and individual actors (sub-state institutions, firms, corporations, trade unions and so on) have from now access to political resources external to the nation-state. As such, Europeanization modifies center–periphery

Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier 43

relations by altering the capacity of local-regional governments (Börzel 2002a; Pasquier 2004). Europeanization may also affect the sphere of social norms and welfare policy institutions through the diffusion of paradigms (“neo-liberalism” or “social market economy”) and the structuring of new patterns of contestation and collective action (Balme and Chabanet 2002; Hassenteufel and Hennion-Moreau 2003). Europeanization finally impacts on the sphere of political participation and representation through the low political accountability of most European Union institutions, and by constraining national political options in various policy fields (Bartolini 2001). Thus, to explore Europeanization as politicization requires more attention to long-term dynamics, conflict, cleavages, and the distribution of political resources arising out of European integration. In terms of dependent variables, a focus on politicization may help us to map out the winners and losers of Europeanization and the restructuring of politics in the EU. But Europeanization cannot be captured exclusively by maps of winners and losers. There is something deeper than a zero-sum game. For this reason, the second direction currently being considered is socialization (Checkel 2005). This has to be conceived in a broad sense. It covers the interaction among elites operating at different levels on EU political issues, but also the production of political identities. Finally, it has a cognitive and normative dimension, being the process through which beliefs, norms, and values are diffused and institutionalized. Europeanization produces socialization through the growing interdependence between various actors at European and domestic levels (European Commissioners and domestic political leaders, high civil servants, members of parliaments, policy experts, lobbyists, journalists and so on). The EU may provide the normative frame and the platforms for socialization of domestic actors who then produce exchanges (of ideas, policy paradigms, power, legitimacy) between each other. These socialization processes may notably concern policy paradigms, knowhow and governance instruments. For instance, Pasquier (2005) shows how French and Spanish regional actors have been socialized to a European model of local development and use it to implement their own policies. However, these socialization processes may affect deeper mechanisms of regulation and legitimization. Although domestic systems are still the main arena where conventional political legitimacy is produced via elections, the European Commission develops an alternative conception of political legitimacy, notably based on the expertise and the technicization of political issues (Radaelli 1999b; Smith 2004). This triggers “frictions effects” in political systems with their particular rules, norms and values. A set of actors may become the new elite with its specific beliefs, interests and discursive repertoires. In the case of Economic and Monetary Union, it has been argued that Europeanization has transformed

44

Theory and Methods

the political elite and the institutions of economic policy by empowering technocrats in some member states (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). New technocrats with political power and legitimacy provided by EU policies can operate as the promoters of a new political order where new repertoires of action, discourses and legitimacy emerge. Pierre Muller (1995) would say that these new political entrepreneurs of Europeanization are the médiateurs of a new dominant référentiel. The implications for politics can be discussed. Socialization and identity change can be linked to the “winners and losers” perspective. One argument may well be that Europeanization strengthens a technocratic attitude to political choice. But an alternative argument has also been made, one pointing to the diffusion of a culture of responsibility, transparent political choices based on evidence and reasoned argumentation, and ultimately better models of governance (Di Palma 2000: 42–3). These considerations invite the following conclusions. To begin with, if Europeanization is all about orchestrating existing concepts rather than re-inventing the wheel, the theoretical challenge is about integrating the insights of comparative politics, comprehensive sociology, and theoretical policy analysis. Secondly, bottom-up research designs have potential in this direction. By analyzing Europeanization from the point of view of domestic political systems, “bottom-uppers” have less temptation to presuppose and prejudge EU effects. They are in a better position to specify causal sequences. Indeed, Europeanization is only one of the factors of change. Change may also draw on domestic channels or be led by other supranational dynamics (globalization, for instance). In the future, these designs could be usefully extended from policy analysis to long-term investigations of comparative politics, by addressing the crucial issue of the reshaping of the nation-state in Europe. In turn, this has potential for a thicker approach to the concept of time and the relationship between time and change. Change operates in the time-sequence of implementation of public policy, but more importantly it can be examined in relation to the formation and stabilization of long term political equilibria in nation-states. This is how we get to the next point, based on the notions of politicization and socialization, as concepts with considerable potential for the understanding of domestic political change. Politicization focuses on the long-term re-allocation of political resources in domestic systems. It accounts for conflict in mechanisms of change. It explains “winners and losers” of Europeanization. As for socialization, it questions how the interactions between multi-level elites may transform repertoires of action, discourses, and legitimacy. In terms of dependent variables, socialization adds to the conflict-based, “winners-and-losers” dimension the explanation of the degree to which the EU logic of political behavior is embedded in domestic political systems.

Claudio M. Radaelli and Romain Pasquier 45

Key readings Ladrech, R (1994) Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France. Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(1) 69–88. Olsen, J.P. (2002) The Many Faces of Europeanization. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5) 921–52. Radaelli, C. M. (2003) The Europeanization of Public Policy. In K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds) (2003) The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 27–56. Risse, T., M.G. Cowles, and J.A. Caporaso (2001) Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction. In M.G. Cowles, J.A. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 1–20. Sartori, G., ed. (1984). Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis. London: Sage.

4 Theorizing Europeanization Simon Bulmer

4.1 Introduction Over the last decade or so, Europeanization has been a growth area in European Union studies. Driven by the dynamism in the integration process from the Single European Market, through the development of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU ) and other policy areas, students of the EU have been confronted with explaining the EU’s subsequent impact upon the member states, accession states and near-neighbors, such as those in the European Economic Area (EEA). Indeed, this much can be seen from the structure of this volume. Studies of the impact tend to focus on individual policy areas, on the structures and actors engaged in governance, or to be organized geographically, typically by focusing on a single member state. Where, then, does theory come into the frame? The role of theory in political science is to develop causal explanations of phenomena. However, not all causal explanations of phenomena are explicitly theoretical. Thus, empirically driven research may seek to explain phenomena through a descriptive account where theory is, at best, implicit. By contrast, theoretically driven explanations of phenomena require the explicit use of concepts and of explanations of causal inference (see King et al. 1994). Theory is understood in subtly different ways by different political analysts. What should be common to all theory, however, is that it “helps us see the wood for the trees”. Thus “good theories select out certain factors as the most important or relevant in providing an explanation …” (Stoker 1995: 16–17). But political scientists are also concerned that good theory should show certain intrinsic characteristics, and some academics go as far as to prioritize theory building such that it seems more important than explaining empirical phenomena. In any event there is widespread agreement that theory should be internally coherent, that hypotheses can be derived from it; and that it should be falsifiable (for other criteria, see Rosamond 2000: 9). 46

Simon Bulmer

47

The above observations are abstract, but they are relevant in more specific terms to understanding theorizing about Europeanization. As Goetz (2001: 211) has cautioned, Europeanization can very easily become “a cause [i.e. the EU] in search of an effect [at the domestic level]”. It is for this reason that it needs theoretical underpinning (as well as suitable methodological safeguards). The risks of this situation are compounded because Europeanization is not itself a theory (see also Featherstone and Radaelli 2003b: 340). Rather, Europeanization is the phenomenon which a range of theoretical approaches have sought to explain. In order to understand the relationship between theory and Europeanization, therefore, we need to take two steps. First, what processes are understood as Europeanization? Secondly, what are the causal relationships which theory seeks to explain? Olsen has sought to map the different processes understood as Europeanization and identified five variants (2002: 923–4). First, Europeanization is used in connection with “changes in external boundaries”. The most obvious example is the extension of the policies, rules, institutional requirements and values in the new member states which acceded in 2004. Secondly, he identifies Europeanization as “developing institutions at the European level”. This usage relates to the development of a central governance capacity in the EU, with its implications of constraints and opportunities for political actors at the domestic level. Thirdly, Europeanization is used as a term covering the “central penetration of national systems of governance”. This is arguably the core usage of Europeanization and covers adjustment processes in respect of institutional structure, policy, patterns of political behavior and so on at lower levels of the multi-leveled European political system. A fourth usage is to identify Europeanization as “exporting forms of political organization”. Here the term is deployed where the EU seeks to export its values, such as through the Lomé/Cotonou Conventions or through its foreign policy to states or regions that can quite well be beyond Europe itself. However, export may take place from one EU member state to another, mediated by the EU. Although not specifically identified by Olsen, horizontal, intra-EU Europeanization needs to be incorporated under this heading. The EU’s development of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has emerged from the late 1990s to provide multiple arenas where domestic actors can exchange “good practice” on policy areas such as employment generation, social exclusion and innovation policy. A final usage is Europeanization as “a political unification project”. Like the earlier second definition, this one is about the development of capacity at the EU level. Simplifying Olsen’s typology, the principal distinction is between two understandings of Europeanization: the transfer from “Europe” to other jurisdictions of policy, institutional arrangements, rules, beliefs, or norms, on the one hand; and building European capacity, on the other. When understood as capacity

48

Theory and Methods

building, Europeanization can be best explained by picking from a well-established menu of theoretical approaches on integration (see, for instance, Rosamond 2000; Wiener and Diez 2003; see also Chapter 2 by Caporaso), and is not considered further here. One explicit link between the two understandings has been made by Börzel (2002b: 193), and is worth mentioning. She has portrayed Europeanization “as a two-way process. It entails a ‘bottom-up’ and a ‘top-down’ dimension”. The bottom-up dimension, which she also terms uploading, is about constructing the EU system of governance, whereas the top-down dimension (downloading) is about its domestic impact. Her argument is that – subject to their policy preferences and action capacity – individual member states may seek to upload their policy model to the EU level in order to minimize subsequent adjustment costs (Börzel 2002b, 2005). In her usage the two understandings of Europeanization form an integrated understanding. Theory is deployed in Europeanization studies in order to explain causal relationships. The core theoretical questions are concerned with explaining the change brought about by “Europe”. Goetz and Hix (2001b: 20), in surveying the literature, argue that “a common theme to emerge … is that national institutions and actors matter in the sense that they have a profound, if not determining, effect on how European integration as a force of polity and politics change plays out in the domestic context”. In many cases domestic politics and the domestic polity serve as forces of inertia and explain the resilient or “sticky” responses to Europeanization. In order to grasp the potential scope of theoretical enquiry associated with Europeanization, it is worth considering Featherstone’s (2003) review of publications utilizing the term in the period up to 2001. He drew up a fourfold classification of the areas covered: historical processes, cultural diffusion, institutional adaptation and policy (or policy process) adaptation. This classification already suggests competing (temporal, sociological and institutional) research agendas. Hence, as with any phenomenon for which there are contesting theories, there are divergences in relation to how the dependent variable is understood, what the mechanisms of change are and, more broadly, in regard to the individual analyst’s understanding of the nature of politics.

4.2 Core research questions The core questions relating to mapping the theoretical underpinning of studies of Europeanization are: its intellectual evolution; its relationship to new institutionalist theory; competing models of explanation; and the classification of its outcomes. How can the intellectual evolution of theorizing on Europeanization be characterized? It has not been tidy. A particular problem has been that some of the writing has not explicitly used the terminology of Europeanization at all.

Simon Bulmer

49

Nevertheless, there have arguably been two phases of Europeanization studies (Jordan and Liefferink 2004b: 4). The first considered the broad consequences of European integration at domestic level, treating integration as the independent variable. The second has adopted a finer-grained analysis, with the explanatory variables more usually located at the domestic level. The first phase of Europeanization studies is quite important, even if the term was not explicitly used. The reason for this is that there were clear links with other theoretical debates on European integration. Three strands may be identified (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005b: 11). The first strand is associated with an influential working paper by Moravcsik (1994), which argued that European integration strengthens the state and specifically national governments. This argument was a clear top-down counterpart to his liberal intergovernmentalist account of European integration (Moravcsik 1993, 1998). It led, in a second strand, to ripostes from other analysts critical of the “world view” of liberal intergovernmentalism. Sandholtz (1996: 403) argued that integration could create new “options for domestic actors in their choice of allies and arenas” (multi-level politics), and induce changes in domestic institutions and policies. Marks et al. (1996) made a similar counter-argument to the state-centrism of Moravcsik, setting out a range of ways in which member states (or governments) were losing control over authority in the EU. Thirdly, and less as a response to Moravcsik’s agenda, Kohler-Koch and her collaborators articulated a “transformation of governance” argument. Her argument was that integration had not only shifted the distribution of power between multiple levels of authority but also the boundary between the public and private spheres (Kohler-Koch 1996: 360). The character of the state – its institutional structures and political processes – is transformed as part of this process (also see Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996: 22–3; Kohler-Koch and Eising 2000). These early arguments about the impact of the European Union were chiefly a spin-off from long-standing theoretical arguments concerning state power in the EU. The chief concerns of the authors were to defend propositions about European integration and governance rather than about Europeanization. However, they demonstrated that Europeanization was connected to other theoretical disputes over integration. These works were not centrally concerned with identifying how European integration had its impact at the domestic level, not least because none of them was explicitly expressed in terms of Europeanization. Nevertheless, they opened up this area of study beyond its previously rather haphazard coverage. In this first phase of research, European integration was the independent variable explaining domestic outcomes or change. The next phase of research, which in reality was not as discrete from the first as this ordering suggests, has been rather more fine-grained. It has been characterized by a new institutionalist agenda, including the various sub-branches of that theoretical literature.

50

Theory and Methods

It is now necessary to explore the relationship between Europeanization and new institutionalism in order to understand how the latter informs theorizing Europeanization. The new institutionalist literature is generally seen as characterized by three variants: rational choice (or rationalist) institutionalism (RCI); historical institutionalism (HI) and sociological institutionalism (SI) (Hall and Taylor 1996; Aspinwall and Schneider 2001b; for a different classification see Peters 1999). Rational choice institutionalism is typically concerned with two particular issues. First, it explores the ways in which actors’ preferences are oriented towards institutional settings or rules. Institutions are regarded as opportunity structures or veto points; actors seize the available opportunities or are blocked by the veto points. Thus, in the context of Europeanization such RCI analysis might look at the responses of domestic political actors – whether these be governments, parties, interest groups, firms or similar – to new opportunities opened up by European integration. Such an approach might help explore the changing pattern of power relationships between domestic actors in response to developments at EU level. A further concern of RCI analysis is with the design of institutions in connection with desired policy objectives. In the context of Europeanization, therefore, the design of institutions or rules with a view to achieving specific behavior at the domestic level might be an illustrative research question. Analysis using RCI tends to be quite formally modeled and concerned with snapshot pictures. Historical institutionalists have a rather different research agenda. They are concerned with the role of time in the integration process. Time itself can be disaggregated into three different facets: time, timing and tempo. In the context of Europeanization, therefore, their research agenda is concerned with the temporal dimension of domestic adjustment processes to the EU. To give an empirical illustration: a researcher might explore the way in which different ministries in a member state were obliged at different times to adjust to the impact of the EU upon their turf, and thereby seek to identify how the timing and tempo of developments triggered adjustment processes. These adjustment processes could be in terms of setting up administrative machinery to handle EU business or they might relate to the policy impact. Historical institutionalists highlight the “stickiness” of both institutional and policy arrangements, observing broad patterns of incremental change that may be interrupted very occasionally by seismic events that trigger a critical juncture or “punctuate” the pre-existing equilibrium. Sociological institutionalists are concerned with the realm of norms, ideas, discourse, organizational culture and the psychology of politics. Their understanding of institutions is much broader than is the case for rational choice institutionalists, who tend to zero in on rules. The “transmission mechanisms” in this variant of institutionalism are consequently more sociological than rulebased. Thus culture, ideas and attitudes play a greater role in the work of SI

Simon Bulmer

51

analysts who theorize Europeanization. SI suggests research agendas exploring the transmission of ideas from the EU to the domestic level, or considers how domestic elites use language to shape domestic perceptions of the European issue. Another variation on the sociological theme might be how to consider domestic actors behave within EU institutions: does their participation lead them to change behavior through a process of socialization? The different variants of new institutionalism suggest that there are competing models of explanation. In reality that would be an oversimplification, for the three variants have not been utilized to the same degree. In addition, there have been efforts to synthesize from the different institutionalisms. First, there has not been much application of pure RCI to Europeanization. Second, not all authors place themselves neatly into one of the three institutionalisms as identified above. Börzel and Risse, two significant contributors to the literature, reveal (to this observer at least) many affinities with historical institutionalism while identifying themselves with attempting to synthesize from the other two variants (Börzel and Risse 2003). Thirdly, and above all, the theoretical frameworks utilized for explaining Europeanization are necessarily influenced by the definition that is used (see Chapter 3). Despite these caveats the argument here is that an awareness of the new institutionalisms is indispensable for understanding how Europeanization is theorized. Arguably the greatest debate in the theoretical literature has related to whether Europeanization is exclusively a top-down phenomenon or whether it is in part horizontal. This debate is a function of the analyst’s understanding of the dynamics of Europeanization. Thus an understanding of the EU in hierarchical terms points the researcher towards judging domestic conformity with “the supranational”. By contrast, an understanding of the EU in terms of domestic actors sharing good practice suggests other, more horizontal, mechanisms of Europeanization. Top-down or hierarchical approaches emphasize as a first stage the identification of “goodness of it” or “misfit” at domestic level with EU requirements (see in particular Risse et al. 2001). Where there is misfit between EU requirements and domestic circumstances, adjustment pressure builds up at domestic level. However, the adjustment pressure is not the same between the member states; the typical finding of cross-national Europeanization studies is encapsulated by the title of one such study: “Differential Europe” (Héritier et al. 2001). The question that is posed, therefore, is how can the differential pressure be explained? Two typical rationalist explanations are the existence of institutional veto points and/or supporting facilitating formal institutions at domestic level (Börzel 2005: 53). Depending on their particular admixture domestic actors may be able to secure adaptation, for example, if the veto points are few and there are facilitating factors such as EU funding enabling domestic actors to gain support for pursuing change. Because the admixture of these two factors

52

Theory and Methods

differs cross-nationally, so runs Börzel’s argument, the differential impact of Europeanization upon individual states is the consequence. Although this interpretation is rationalist in nature, anticipating that domestic actors will respond to institutional cues at domestic and EU level, Risse et al. (2001) and Börzel (2005) eschew a purely RCI interpretation, opting instead to incorporate some of the variables associated with sociological institutionalism. Thus they include the normative dimension and socialization, “Norm entrepreneurs may seek to persuade actors to change their preferences”. In consequence, domestic actors may undergo social learning even to the extent of developing new identities (Börzel and Risse 2003: 69; Börzel 2005: 54–5). This is the framework employed in one of the key studies of Europeanization (Cowles et al. 2001; See also section 2.3 for an overview by Caporaso). The volume brings together empirical cases of Europeanization ranging from policy areas, institutions, to citizenship and identity. It is an important study, and the synthetic framework provides a useful theoretical discipline to a diverse set of empirical material. Two observations are worth making about this volume. The first is that the synthetic framework will not suit all tastes; others will – depending on their theoretical “world view” – prefer to work within just one of the institutionalist approaches. The second is that the framework’s starting point of fit/misfit is regarded by some observers as problematic. This aspect deserves further elaboration. The first stage of the Risse/Cowles/Caporaso and Börzel/Risse framework posits misfit and adaptational pressure as the source of the twin-track (rationalist and sociological) set of factors leading to domestic adaptation. However, some authors have questioned how valid misfit is an explanatory factor (see Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Héritier and Knill 2001; Haverland 2000; Thatcher 2004). Héritier and Knill (2001: 288) found that Europeanization could occur without there being misfit. Part of this difficulty seems to come about because the goodness of fit precondition itself better fits policy areas where the EU sets a policy template that has to be put into effect in the member states (or wouldbe states). However, there are important areas of EU policy where there is considerable scope for national discretion. With the burgeoning of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) member states have come together in a rather different mode, with the EU serving as a “bourse” for policy transfer (see Radaelli 2000: 29). For instance, they share information on national employment programs where quite limited EU goals are in place, such as a headline objective in terms of job creation. The whole point of the OMC is to avoid imposing policy templates from the supranational level. Under both these circumstances the initial step of presuming misfit as the causality leading to domestic change is open to question. Börzel has addressed some of these concerns (2005: 51–2). However, there seems scope for alternative explanations to be offered on the OMC, regulatory competition and negative integration: areas where the Europeanization literature has been relatively quiet hitherto (see Radaelli 2003;

Simon Bulmer

53

Bulmer and Radaelli 2005). These views join the critique made by Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999; see also Knill 2001: 213–27) and are predicated upon EU governance being more multi-faceted than the goodness of fit/misfit approach assumes. Thus, these authors all see different mechanisms at work where negative integration applies, such as in the single market, where liberalization alters the strategic position of domestic actors (Knill 2001: 14). Policy framing and learning are regarded as a mechanism of Europeanization, that affects perceptions of domestic actors. The weakness of these critiques rest upon the absence of systematic exploration beyond the domains of environmental and transport policy. Despite the prominence of the fit/misfit framework, it goes without saying that other theoretical reference points have emerged for understanding policy adaptation. Vivien Schmidt (2002) has suggested a range of variables to explain the differential impact of Europeanization upon national economic policy. She identifies economic vulnerability, political institutional capacity, policy legacies, policy preferences and discourse as the key mediating factors. The distinctive feature in her work, which also seeks to be pluralistic in orientation, is the introduction of discourse. She argues that, where significant policy change is needed, it is most likely to occur where a convincing supportive domestic discourse is deployed (Schmidt 2002: 900). In later work with Radaelli, the role of discourse in institutional learning is disaggregated and developed in greater detail, although it remains one of the five factors identified above (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). The fit/misfit model also has prominence in the analysis of domestic institutional adaptation. This situation arises because the literature is rather less well structured. There are a number of studies of domestic institutional adaptation: for instance, Wessels, Maurer and Mittag (2003), Kassim, Peters and Wright (2000) and Hanf and Soetendorp (2000). However, these studies concentrate on the member states’ machinery for EU policy making without resort to the language of Europeanization. Alternative frameworks are utilized and there are also some reservations about applying Europeanization to the examination of domestic EU policy-making machinery on the grounds that it is tautological. The tautology arises because domestic EU policy making is self-evidently a response to Europeanization. An earlier study (Rometsch and Wessels 1996) included Europeanization within its remit in a limited way. This study’s broad findings, like those of the others, identified little evidence of convergence of member states’ policy-making practice around an EU model. Apart from a relatively few instances, such as where national governments – or, for that matter, subnational government or local authorities – are required to meet EU stipulations as part of funding arrangements, the EU does not generate systemic “misfit” in the sense that the EU does not determine the domestic institutional arrangements of its member states.

54

Theory and Methods

One prominent study of institutional impact is that by Knill (2001). His study is based on close comparison of several EU environmental policy issues and their impact on administrative arrangements in Germany and the UK. Knill explores the dynamics of adaptation pressure, but broadens out his findings into three mechanisms of Europeanization that are familiar from other policy work: namely institutional compliance (positive integration); changing domestic opportunity structures (negative integration); and Europeanization by “framing” domestic beliefs and expectations (where the EU exerts least pressure). Jordan (2002) has made a detailed study of the Europeanization of British environmental policy. Although not explicitly driven by a theoretical model of Europeanization, this study informs a separate theoretical article, which deploys “double-loop learning” from the organizational learning literature to explain the cultural change within the UK Department of the Environment during the early 1990s (Jordan 2003). The organizational learning literature itself is based around the “ability to detect and correct errors and thereby improve the functioning of an organization” (Olsen and Peters 1996: 4), thus taking a position that is comparable with the misfit starting-point common in the Europeanization literature. This approach with its focus on cultural change over time emphasizes SI variables, whilst using the temporal perspective of HI. It complements the HI approach that has been followed by Bulmer and Burch to explain the adaptation of UK central government to EU membership (1998) and pursued elsewhere within a Europeanization framework (Bulmer and Burch 2001, 2005). Here the interest is in the dynamics of change: identifying the twin dynamics of incremental change and critical junctures. This HI approach has also been followed in a cross-national context by a project on “organizing for EU enlargement” (see papers at www.oeue.net). “Stickiness”, that is to say the tendency of domestic institutional (and policy) arrangements to stay on well-established domestic pathways in response to Europeanization, is often the default response. However, double-loop learning and critical junctures offer concepts that can liberate historical institutionalism from otherwise overly deterministic applications. The literature on enlargement has brought some limited additional theoretical approaches to Europeanization into the spotlight. In broad terms the existing literature has simply been adapted (see, for instance, Lippert et al. 2001). The circumstances are different, not least because the Central and Eastern European states have less established democratic systems, but the dynamics are essentially similar. It is, rather, a specific set of stages that may characterize the Europeanization of these states (Lippert et al. 2001: 985–1001), but with the familiar pattern of differential, cross-national impact that has been witnessed more generally. One slight departure from this general picture is to be found in the work of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004), although it is not couched

Simon Bulmer

55

in the language of Europeanization. They explore three mechanisms by which EU rules are adopted in accession states: a rationalist “external incentives model”; and two more sociological (or constructivist) approaches, namely social learning and lesson-drawing. This contribution is useful for taking the phenomenon of Europeanization out into wider literatures that are dealing with comparable phenomena (see also Bulmer and Padgett 2005 for a similar exercise deploying the policy transfer literature). One final area of theoretical insight that can be attributed to Europeanization relates to individual national civil servants. Again it is not usually labeled as Europeanization but the subject matter would fall within most definitions of the term. This work concerns the roles taken on by national officials when participating in EU committees, such as Council working groups or Commission advisory groups. In short, it considered the question: do national officials act rationally as delegates of their government or are they socialized into appropriate behavior for a multinational committee? Two examples of this kind of analysis are Lewis (1998) and Trondal and Veggeland (2003). In the realm of political forces the Europeanization literature is arguably at an earlier stage of development. Some preliminary articles covering the terrain were presented in Hix and Goetz (2001a), but detailed, theoretically-informed exploration of the Europeanization of political parties, public opinion, interest groups and such like remains some way behind other domains of the polity. A final area of theoretical discussion relates to classifying the outcomes of Europeanization. Many authors who use Europeanization are more interested in the empirical outcomes than in trying to theorize categories of outcome. Radaelli offers a fourfold typology: inertia, absorption, transformation and retrenchment (2003: 37). Börzel and Risse, by contrast, have a slightly different threefold classification: absorption, accommodation and transformation (2003: 69–73). Radaelli’s typology has the ability to capture a wider range of circumstances. A further related debate concerns whether outcomes reveal convergence or divergence. However, as implied by Radaelli’s typology, there is no inevitability of convergence arising from Europeanization. Beyond noting these points this aspect of theorizing is essentially one about classification schemes. However, the key observation is that it is important to have a theoretical understanding of the outcomes of Europeanization in mind rather than merely writing an empirical story.

4.3 Key problems Four key problems can be identified in the theorizing of Europeanization. These are: the privileging of hierarchy over coordination in the conceptualization of Europeanization; the under-representation of the classic HI themes of time, timing and tempo; the continuing gaps of theoretically informed studies of

56

Theory and Methods

Europeanization; and the ubiquitous methodological problem of ensuring that findings are attributable to Europeanization. First, Europeanization seems to have been conceptualized in its early stages in an overly hierarchical, vertical manner. In cases of negative integration, regulatory competition and, above all, the OMC, this verticality may screen out some of the Europeanization process. A similar situation has emerged in respect of the Europeanization of institutions, for adaptation pressures are relatively weak. But horizontal relationships – between national governments, regions and political parties and interest groups – are well-developed empirically but under-developed in the theoretical literature. The notions of framing and regulatory competition do not help, especially outside the policy domain of Europeanization. Instead, more generic work on incentive structures, learning and lesson-drawing may be more useful. Thankfully, Europeanization has not been developed entirely around one set of circumstances in the way that neofunctionalism was, but it has a certain bias towards explaining one particular version of EU governance. It can be useful as a corrective to this bias to think of the processes of policy adjustment in other international arenas and epistemic communities; these are much more horizontal and not without suitable, more generic, conceptual apparatus. Another useful “reality check” is to refer to the insights offered by the so-called “second image reversed” literature, which sees the international system as a determinant of domestic change (Gourevitch 1978). A second issue relates to the relative under-use of HI in the context of Europeanization. HI has been regarded as offering a useful synthesis between the two poles of RCI and SI. And yet, whilst much of the work discussed here considers a synthesis of RCI and SI, it does not attempt to theorize over time. This is rather strange. HI analysts have offered insight into the dynamics of integration: the contrasts between incrementalism and “constitutional moments”, when major change occurs (for example, Pierson 1996). It is therefore surprising that there has been so little work that has sought to attend to the impact of time, timing and tempo at EU level upon the domestic level. Have national governments or parliaments, for example, made a perfect adjustment to the non-linear pattern of constitutional development in the EU? And if not, why not? In light of Pierson’s recent prospectus for greater analysis of the “politics of time”, this would appear to be a gap in need of being filled (Pierson 2004). A third problem relates to the continuing empirical gaps, notably in the Europeanization of parties and interest groups (for one discussion, see Ladrech 2002b). In one sense this gap is simply empirical. However, one suspects that the qualitatively different nature of the subject matter would be likely to generate new theoretical insights into the phenomenon generally. More theoretically-informed research is needed in this area.

Simon Bulmer

57

Finally, Europeanization still has to contend with the competing, non-EU, explanations for domestic change. In the policy domain, there has to be control for the effects of globalization. In studies on the impact upon domestic governance, it is necessary to control for changes relatively unrelated to the EU: the pervasive impact of New Public Management in systems open to Anglo-Saxon ideas, for example. However much authors take note of these problems, it is rare to see the same theoretical argument being used to test a rival hypothesis alongside that of Europeanization (Goetz 2001; Radaelli 2003: 50).

4.4 Conclusion The Europeanization literature has become a firmly established component of EU studies. Theoretical development has ensued, drawing on the new institutionalist approach. The theoretical dimension is arguably much less contested than the conceptual one. The dynamics and mechanics of change have been explored and core questions have emerged for debate. Some of the pitfalls of earlier integration theorizing have been avoided; Europeanization has tended – leaving aside the specific notion of fit/misfit – to have engaged with existing analytical and theoretical toolkits, notably from comparative politics. Theoretically informed work on Europeanization has been undertaken predominantly by northern Europeans, with academics based in Britain, Germany and Norway to the fore. The sectoral balance of theoretically informed work is also somewhat skewed; environmental policy is prominent, whereas longerestablished supranational policies such as agriculture or competition policy have received less attention, as have strikingly intergovernmental ones, such as foreign and security policy or justice and home affairs. One explanation for this imbalance lies in contemporary publication patterns in the social sciences. The emphasis on journal articles produces a wealth of specific case studies of Europeanization. However, conceptual development often necessitates a larger project: either a monograph or a well-focused collaborative anthology. Such projects have been few in number and the geographical and policy biases evident in the discussion within this chapter are a direct result. There thus remains plenty of mileage in theorizing Europeanization, assuming the term “mileage” has not yet been Europeanized!

Key readings Börzel, T. and T. Risse (2003) Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe. In K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 57–80.

58

Theory and Methods

Bulmer, S. and C. Lequesne (2005) The European Union and its Member States: An Overview. In S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds), The Member States of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–20. Olsen, J.P. (2002) The Many Faces of Europeanization. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5) 921–52. Pierson, P. (1996) The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist Analysis. Comparative Political Studies, 29(2) 123–63. Risse, T., M.G. Cowles, and J.A. Caporaso (2001) Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction. In M.G. Cowles, J.A. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 1–20.

5 Methodology Markus Haverland

5.1 Introduction This chapter discusses methodological issues in Europeanization research. Europeanization research draws its theories mainly from international relations, comparative politics and public administration. Methodology as such, however, is invariant to specific social science disciplines. The general methodological question of any social science research endeavor can be posed as: how should we design our research and shape our strategies of data collection and analysis in order to achieve a maximum of reliability and validity given a specific research question and theoretical framework? More specifically, this chapter deals with two questions. The first question juxtaposes qualitative/case study research and quantitative/statistical research: Which strategies are utilized in Europeanization research and has this stream of research been able to exploit fully the strengths of the respective strategy while minimizing its weaknesses? The second question concentrates on the particular focus of Europeanization research – the effects of European regional integration on member state polities, politics, and policies: To what extent and how have the methods that have been utilized been able to demonstrate that domestic continuities and changes are indeed causally related to European-level factors rather than global or domestic forces? To be sure, there are other methodological issues that could also be addressed. Current Europeanization research utilizes a range of strategies for data collection, including archive research, interviews, participatory observation, and surveys. It also, employs many different data analysis techniques, such as grounded theory, discourse analysis, quantitative content analysis, and regressionbased statistical techniques. It would be an insurmountable task to provide a meaningful tour d’horizon through all methodological items of potential relevance. Readers interested in the basic treatments of these issues are referred to 59

60

Theory and Methods

textbooks such as like Babbie (2001), Neumann (2004) and Schnell et al. (2005). More advanced discussions can be found in specialized monographs, as well as in major general political science journals such as the American Political Science Review and the European Journal of Political Research, and specialized methodological journals like Political Analysis and Sociological Research and Methods. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 elaborates on the two core questions and sketches methodological templates against which past and current Europeanization research can be assessed. Section 5.3 reviews Europeanization research and points to the achievements and pitfalls in dealing with the core questions. Finally, section 5.4 provides for a brief evaluation and some suggestions for further research.

5.2 Core research questions There has been a long debate about the strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative research. This debate has gained new vigor with the publication of King, Keohane and Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry, which introduced a unified methodological framework for both strategies, solely framed, however, by the principles of mainstream quantitative research (1994; see also Lijphart 1971; Lieberson 1991, 1994; Goldthorpe 1997). The strongly proclaimed superiority of the principles of quantitative research, which is reflected, for instance, in their repeated advice to increase the number of cases, has met resistance from other scholars and has triggered a number of publications. These publications emphasized the merits of qualitative research, including the focus on one or a few cases (American Political Science Review 1995; Brady and Collier 2004; McKeown 1999; Mjoset et al. 1997; see also George and Bennet 2005; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Ragin 1987, 2000; Pierson 2004). Although not all issues have been settled so far, the discussion has contributed to a clearer view of the logic behind and the relative advantages and disadvantages of qualitative and quantitative research strategies. Therefore, the debate provides for a useful template for the review and assessment of their application in Europeanization research. Note that the debate between quantitative-oriented and qualitative-oriented scholars cannot be easily squared with the debate between rationalists and constructivists in international relations and EU studies (see, for example, Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Caporaso et al. 2003; Christiansen et al. 1999; Fearon and Wendt 2002). That debate is concerned with epistemological and ontological questions rather than methodology. In fact, constructivists themselves have noted that methodology has attracted scant attention in their camp (Adler 2002; Checkel 2004). The properties of the rationalist and constructivist positions imply however, that most rationalists will probably subscribe to the statistical worldview of King et al. which does not preclude case studies but

Markus Haverland 61

favors quantitative designs. In contrast, as most constructivists are interested in identifying causal social mechanisms, constitutive social relations and the discourses that construct social reality (Adler 2002: 98), they are typically convinced of the intrinsic advantages of intensive qualitative case studies. In fact, most empirical studies by constructivists are single or comparative case studies (Adler 2002; see also the reviews by Checkel 1998, 2004). Yet the affinity to the qualitative position as defined in this chapter applies only to “modernist” and “critical” constructivism (Adler 2002: 97–8). “Radical” constructivism adheres to a subjective hermeneutic position and a deconstructivist attitude towards knowledge and does accordingly claim that “no statements can be more valid than others” (Adler 2002: 98). This position falls outside the common epistemological base on which the qualitative–quantitative debate, and this chapter, builds. What are the relative strengths and – by implication – weaknesses of the quantitative and the qualitative research strategy? With regard to the different stages of theory development, case-oriented research is better equipped for concept formation and the generation of new hypotheses, while quantitative studies provide for better opportunities for comprehensive testing of competing theories (see below). Note, however, that case study designs can also accomplish at least some preliminary theory testing (see below, Eckstein 1975; George and Bennet 2005). Concerning reliability, that is the degree to which measurement is not distorted by random error, quantitative studies have the advantage that those errors will be canceled out given the large number of observations (King et al. 1994). A study’s reliability can be checked through replication. Given the quantification of indicators, statistical research is generally easier to replicate than qualitative research and it is therefore more amenable to peer control. But measurement errors are probably less likely in case-oriented studies, as the researchers are usually familiar with their cases. With regard to validity, a distinction can be made between concept validity, internal validity and external validity. Concept validity refers to the requirement that the empirical indicators should capture the meaning of the theoretical concept they represent. In general, case study research scores better here, as the low number of cases and the intensive knowledge thereof allow for a meaningful operationalization by contextualizing the theoretical constructs (George and Bennet 2005: 19; see also Sartori 1970, 1984). Concerning internal validity – that is, the demonstration that the variable of interest, rather than any other variable, has caused the outcome – both strategies have their own distinctive strengths. The large number of cases typically analyzed in a quantitative study allows for the discrimination between alternative explanations and the establishment of their relative importance (King et al. 1994). Many comparative case studies, however, seek to control for at least

62

Theory and Methods

some alternative explanations through a theoretically guided selection of cases – for instance, by choosing a most similar system design (Frendreis 1983; Landman 2003) Moreover case study research allows for “within-case” analysis and is therefore equipped to uncover whether the causal processes or mechanisms do operate as hypothesized (Collier et al. 2004; George and Bennet 2005; Mahoney 2003). Results based on a large sample provide confidence that the patterns found can be generalized to the population at large. By contrast, if only a few cases are studied, results in qualitative research might be driven by the undetected idiosyncrasy of the specific case(s). Hence quantitative research scores better on external validity. Note, however, that in case study research generalization is typically not sought in regard to a population, but to cases that share specific theoretical properties. Yin refers to this distinction as statistical generalization versus analytic generalization (1994; see also Eckstein 1975; George and Bennet 2005: ch. 6). The second question addressed by this chapter concentrates on one of the methodological issues discussed above, the issue of internal validity or causality. Europeanization research includes explanatory variables like the goodness of fit, the number and type of veto points, or the existence of epistemic communities. I want to address a distinctive type of explanatory factors, the potential (isolated) European-level source of domestic changes and continuities, be it a legal obligation, an incentive or a model. Does Europeanization research utilize strategies to demonstrate the causal importance of the European-level factor? Given the central place of the European level in any theoretical model of Europeanization, it is surprising that this methodological issue has attracted almost no attention to date. There are a few scholars who mention that issue in passing. These scholars have emphasized that Europeanization research needs to demonstrate whether observed domestic developments would have occurred even in the absence of the European regional integration and needs to account for alternative explanation in order to establish the relative importance of the EU, or its “net impact” (Levi-Faur 2004; see also Anderson 2003: 47; Eising 2003a; Goetz 2000: 227–8; Haverland 2003). These scholars have proposed a number of strategies to demonstrate the causal importance of the EU. The first strategy is process tracing, in which the researcher starts by deriving observable implications from the EU-level theory and alternative theories. These implications or predictions can denote what should happen, how it should happen and when it should happen if the theories are valid. These “patterns” of implications will then be compared with the empirical pattern identified by the case study (Yin 1994). As Goetz and others have argued, temporal patterns are particularly important in Europeanization research. Drawing on insights of Schmitter and Santiso generated with regard to

Markus Haverland 63

democratic consolidation, they make a distinction between time, that is the point in time when an event occurs; timing, or the sequence of events; and tempo, or the speed by which an event occurs (Goetz 2000: 223; see also Anderson 2003; Eising 2003a; Schmitter and Santiso 1998). Counterfactual reasoning is another strategy proposed (Anderson 2003; Checkel 2001; Haverland 2003; Schmitter 1999). The statement that European integration has resulted in a particular outcome implies that if European integration had been absent, the particular outcome would not have occurred. Making such a statement explicit allows the researcher to develop the counterfactual scenario to substantiate his or her view that the EU was indeed causally important. Note that counterfactual reasoning should not result in unlimited speculations. There are some rules that must be adhered to if counterfactuals are to be compelling (see Fearon 1991; Ned Lebow 2000; Tetlock and Belkin 1996). These include the rule that researchers should make explicit which variables are changed in his or her thought experiment and which remain unchanged. Also, counterfactuals should rewrite history as little as possible, to assure some amount of historical consistency. Also theoretically substantiated counterfactuals are generally more compelling than a-theoretical accounts. They will at a minimum provide the reader with a more explicit perspective from which to evaluate the plausibility of the counterfactual. The third strategy proposed is the inclusion of non-EU cases in the research design as control group (Anderson 2003; Eising 2003a). Hence, in contrast to the counterfactual scenario, this strategy proposes to include real cases where the cause, the European-level factor, is absent. In a quasi-experimental fashion, one compares countries where the “stimulus”, the EU, is present, with a control group where the stimulus is lacking (Lijphart 1971). If both groups show similar developments, the EU “stimulus” has not been effective. Note that this control group can consist of either non-EU countries or “sections” within member states that are not subject to EU pressures, incentives or models. Examples for the latter are policy sectors where no EU competencies exist, administrative sub-units not dealing with EU affairs, or interest groups that have no incentive to lobby the EU. In short, there are a number of strategies that potentially allows for demonstrating the EU effect. In the next section, I analyze, among other things, whether and how these strategies have been applied.

5.3 Key problems Which methodological strategies to achieve valid and reliable results are actually chosen in Europeanization research? To what extent and how has Europeanization research exploited their strengths and minimized their relative weaknesses? And, more specifically, does Europeanization research apply strategies to demonstrate the causal importance of European regional integration?

64

Theory and Methods

Studies about the effects of European integration gained prominence in a period in which the competencies of the EU had significantly increased (the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty). This broadening and deepening of EU competencies had made an impact on member states more and more likely. Initially, most studies focused on policies, more in particular on the implementation of EU law, and changes in the political structure, foremost in the central government machinery dealing with EU issues. Research on domestic politics took up rather late. Surveying three major EU journals – European Union Politics, Journal of Common Market Studies, and Journal of European Public Policy – Franchino (2005) has found that 81 per cent of all empirical studies published between 1994 and 2004 followed the case study method. Europeanization research is no exemption to the dominance of case studies in EU research at large. Given that the Europeanization perspective is still relatively new, an emphasis on case studies is not a weakness as such, as it potentially allows for concept formation, the generation of hypotheses, and preliminary theory testing. However, almost all early studies on Europeanization have been descriptive and have focused on a single case. Moreover, case selection has been motivated by policy relevance rather than theoretical concerns. Accordingly, these studies were not able to exploit the strengths of the case study strategy; they did not contribute much to theory development. A notable exception to the single case designs of this period is the collaborative project by Siedentopf and Ziller (1988). They studied the implementation of 17 directives in ten of the then 12 EU member states. Their theoretical framework, however, still consisted of a checklist of potential factors functioning as an organizing device rather than being informed by a strong theory that would allow for a limitation of variables and theoretically guided case selection. Theoretically informed comparative case studies gained prominence in the late 1990s, when the institutional turn in political science reached Europeanization research. Duina (1999), Harmsen (1999), Knill and Lenschow (1998) and many contributors to Cowles et al. (2001), for instance, explicitly grounded their research in institutional theorizing. These studies contributed significantly to theory development. For one, they succeeded in specifying and refining a number of concepts, in particular the concept of “goodness of fit”, which is now a key construct in Europeanization research. Moreover, due to a careful selection of cases, allowing for variation in the explanatory variable of interest and control for alternative explanations, they provided for (preliminary) theory testing. It is an achievement of Europeanization research that by now probably most case studies published in major journals are theoretically informed, and most of them have a comparative design – either cross-sectional (across countries, policy sector, etc.) or longitudinal. With regard to the latter, it is worth noting that there are now studies that cover several decades, a perspective that is especially

Markus Haverland 65

appropriate for developing and testing historical-institutionalist claims (see, for instance, Bulmer and Burch 1998; Jordan 2003; Wessels 2000; and, for historical institutionalism generally, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Pierson 2004). Quantitative studies have gained ground only recently. This might be due to the original focus on units on the macro level (member state administrations, policy sectors), which logically implied a limited number of potential cases. Another reason has been that relevant data had not been available and there had been no (collaborative) efforts to collect them. With a greater focus on the politics dimension – political participation, parties, interest groups, media – studies increasingly concentrated on units of analysis on the meso- and microlevel, (organizations, individuals, media items), where naturally more cases are available. The focus on politics also brought political sociologists into Europeanization research. They typically have more affinity with quantitative methods than the public policy and public administration scholars that studied the implementation of European policies or the adaptation of government administrations. As a result of these developments, there are now systematically collected quantitative data available, dealing, for instance, with national compliance with EU law, including data on transposition records and infringement procedures (reasoned opinions, court referrals and court decision). These data have been analyzed with descriptive and explanatory statistical techniques (e.g., Giuliani 2003; Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; Mbaye 2001; Mastenbroek 2003; Tallberg 2002). There have also been projects that collected and analyzed survey data on the Europeanization of interest group strategies (e.g., Eising 2003b), or the socialization of national civil servants in European committees (e.g., Beyers and Trondal 2004; Egeberg 1999). Other research has made use of quantitative content analysis, for instance research into the Europeanization of media coverage (e.g., Voltmer and Eilders 2003), EU-related political protest (e.g., Imig and Tarrow 2001) or the salience of European issues in party programs (e.g., Saalfeld 2003). From a perspective that emphasizes the complementarities of qualitative and quantitative research, the multitude of current research strategies is a real achievement. Methodologically, the Europeanization research program is catching up with similar endeavors such a research on the democratic peace, democratic transition and consolidation, or welfare state development. A potential pitfall is, however, that theory development follows along the line of particular research strategies and are is not informed by the achievements of scholars following the other line. Qualitative and quantitative researchers need to speak to each other (see below). The general review of research strategies employed in Europeanization research does not tell us more specifically to what extent and how strategies are

66

Theory and Methods

employed that help to establish the (relative) causal effect of European integration. In fact, only a small portion of Europeanization studies has utilized adequate strategies such as systematic process tracing, counterfactual reasoning, or the inclusion of non-EU cases. To be sure, most Europeanization studies are case studies and accordingly use some form of process tracing. But by doing this process tracing, many studies are not very explicit about their expected observable implications. More importantly, however, they do not systematically and rigorously account for alternative explanations for domestic changes and continuities. An example of a study that explicitly deals with alternative explanations and utilizes intensive process tracing is Eising’s (2000, 2002) research into changes in electricity regulations in Germany, the UK, and the European Union. His theoretical framework pits European integration against economic globalization and neoliberal ideas. He derives contrasting observable implications from these explanatory factors with regard to member state preferences and changes in national policies. Through intensive process tracing he was able to identify the relative importance of these factors. Another example is Maor and Stevens’s study on the impact of European integration on the recruitment and training in the UK civil service (1997). They deduced observable implications from the hypothesis that the EU matters and contrast this expectation with implications derived from new public management. By taking this alternative explanation for changes in the civil service system into account, they were able to delineate the EU impact. I am not aware of any study that uses a fully fledged counterfactual analysis as a main strategy for establishing the causality of the EU. There are, however, some studies that have used counterfactual reasoning as complementary strategy. I discuss, with apologies, a study conducted by myself. In my study on packaging waste policies in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK, I argued that the European Union was causally important for a strong legal codification of the Dutch packaging waste policy: a shift from a voluntary covenant focused on a selective group of companies to a generally binding ministerial regulation. I argued, that in the absence of the European packaging directive, the government would not have had sufficient incentives to formalize the packaging waste policy. The benefits were low due to the low public support for environmental measures while the political costs were high because the Dutch policy would be binding for tens of thousand companies, rather than only for those 300 companies that participated voluntarily in the covenant (Haverland 1999). Checkel also used a counterfactual argument in his study on the impact of European norms of citizenship and membership on the German conception of citizenship. He argues that the German conception would probably have changed regardless of these European norms as “immigration and nationality policy in liberal states have an in-built bias towards becoming more expansionist and exclusive over time” (Checkel 2001: 194).

Markus Haverland 67

Almost all studies on Europeanization focus on member states only. Therefore, these studies do not provide for quasi-experimental control of the EU impact. There are, however, a few studies that have included non-EU cases. In a quantitative study of OECD countries, Verdier and Breen investigated the impact of economic globalization and/or European integration on broad patterns of interest representation in the capital market and other areas while controlling for a number of other variables. The EU impact was conceptualized in both possible ways, either as strengthening economic globalization or as weakening it. With regard to the capital market, an area quite likely to be affected by the EU, given EMU and Commission and Council activity in this area, no effect of European integration could be found (Verdier and Breen 2001). Levi-Faur also provides evidence that in areas where most scholars would probably expect an EU effect, developments are actually driven by other factors. In his extremely comprehensive qualitative study of telecommunication and energy reforms in 28 countries, he generally found that “it is highly plausible that the major features of the liberalization would have been diffused to most member states even if the Commission and other agents of Europeanization had not existed” (Levi-Faur 2004: 25). There are also a number of studies that follow a cross-section strategy. LeviFaur does not only compares member states with non-members, but also facets of electricity and telecommunication regimes that are subject to EU pressures with facets that are not. Similarly, in an effort to investigate the effects of the EU on domestic politics Sciarini et al. (2004) compare the free movement of persons, a policy field facing direct EU pressures; telecommunication reform, a policy field exposed to indirect pressures; and pension reform, a policy field experiencing only negligible pressures. The discussion of these examples should not distract from the general impression that there are actually only a few studies that systematically and consciously utilize methods that allow for demonstrating the (relative) causal importance of European regional integration for domestic developments. Most studies focus on the question of how the EU matters, rather than to what extent it matters. These studies carry the danger that they bias towards EU-level explanation, where in fact global or domestic forces caused changes and continuities in the political systems of the member states.

5.4 Conclusion The review of research strategies employed in Europeanization research has sought to demonstrate that descriptive single case designs increasingly make way for theoretically informed comparative case studies and statistical research. From a perspective emphasizing the complementarities of different research designs, the use of multiple strategies is a promising development. To be sure,

68

Theory and Methods

the conduct of case studies should remain important in Europeanization research. There is still a need to better elucidate the causal mechanisms through which the EU matters, including framing, socialization and changing opportunity structures (e.g., Börzel and Risse 2003; Checkel 1999; Haverland and Holzhacker 2006; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2000; Liebert 2003; Radaelli 1997). Intensive case studies are indispensable for this. But there is also a need for more quantitative research, because this type of research allows for the establishment of the relative importance of the different causal factors impacting on domestic developments, and enables statistical generalization beyond the cases studied. A crucial precondition for quantitative research is the further collection of – publicly available – quantitative data on the various facets of Europeanization. It is a potential pitfall of the existence of a multitude of research strategies that scholars following a particular strategy do not take into account the results of studies following another route. Other research programs in political science have suffered from this, but some contributions may also serve as inspiration for how qualitative and quantitative research can fruitfully interact with each other. For instance, George and Bennet (2005: ch. 2) have described incisively how quantitative and qualitative research (and formal modeling) has contributed to the accumulation of knowledge in the interdemocratic peace research program. And the studies of Huber, Stephens and collaborators are good examples for the triangulation of research designs in the area of democratic transition (Rueschemeyer et al. 2003) and the area of welfare state research (Huber et al. 1993; Huber and Stephens 2001, see also, more generally, Landman 2002; Tarrow 2004a). Based on the assumption that full explanation requires both co-variation and the identification of the connection between cause and effect, the experience of these research programs suggests the following sequences for Europeanization research. The concepts and hypotheses generated in many case studies with regard to the EU impact on domestic policies and polities should be tested systematically for a large number of cases now. These statistical studies will probably identify cases that remain unexplained. These deviant cases can be studied more intensively and will probably result into new or more refined concepts and causal mechanisms from which new hypotheses can be derived that can be tested in turn by quantitative studies, and so on. With regard to areas of Europeanization research where the first studies took a quantitative form, the next step would be to utilize case studies to test more directly the causal mechanisms suggested by the correlations found. These studies will probably result into refined concepts and mechanisms and new hypotheses that can be tested again in a quantitative fashion. It is worth mentioning that there are attempts to combine the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative research in a single method called qualitative

Markus Haverland 69

comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987, 2003; Ragin and Pennings 2005). QCA and its related Fuzzy Set Method can be reasonably applied to some 15 to 50 cases; for instance, specific aspects of the current 25 EU member states – and some appropriate control cases. This method is particularly appropriate for situations where causal heterogeneity can be assumed. Causal heterogeneity refers here to the existence of multiple causation, also called equifinality. That means that different (combinations) of causes can lead to the same outcome. For instance, there might be different path of adaptation to EU requirements. It could be that high adaptation pressure combined with the existence of normentrepreneurs may lead to adaptation, as does low adaptation pressure in combination with a low number of veto points. This kind of causal complexity can arguably be neither addressed by case studies, nor by conventional statistical techniques. QCA and Fuzzy Set Analysis have now been applied in comparative politics (e.g., Katz et al. 2005; Pennings 2003), welfare state research (e.g., Hicks et al. 1995), and political sociology (e.g., Cress and Snow 2005). But as far as I know, applications in Europeanization research are lacking. The review of the strategies utilized to demonstrate the causal effect of the European level variables has shown that the question of whether and to what extent the EU matters has drawn relatively little attention compared to the question of how the EU matters. There are relatively few studies that systematically use any of the potential strategies that help to demonstrate the causal effect of the EU. Among those process tracing is most common, while there are almost no studies that entertain counterfactual reasoning or include non-EU cases for quasi-experimental control. It is apparent that each of these strategies has its own problems. In regard to process tracing, scholars need to be aware that alternative explanations may generate similar patterns similar to those found with European-level factors. Examples of this are economic globalization and new public management that trigger similar changes as EU-level factors, and their implications may also follow a similar temporal pattern (Anderson 2003; Goetz 2000). And, although there are some rules for making counterfactuals more compelling, they still remain speculative – in particular, when studies seek to demonstrate the effects of rather large hypothetical changes, for instance, the absence of EU integration as such, rather than the absence of a particular directive. In such cases, history needs to be radically rewritten. But the more changes we make, the greater the number of consequences and the lower their predictability – in particular, when there are also interaction effects between different variables. With regard to including non-EU cases for control, scholars need to assure that the EU effect is really absent in those cases. Switzerland and Norway, for instance, might be very well affected by the EU as well, either by legal obligations due to EEA membership (Norway) or bilateral treaties (Switzerland), or by horizontal EU effects, such as framing and socialization (Graver 2000; Sciarini et al. 2004; Sverdrup

70

Theory and Methods

1998). If control cases are also affected by the EU, then the fact that they exhibit similar developments to those seen in EU countries cannot be taken as evidence that the EU does not matter. Still, if scholars are aware of these potential pitfalls, the application of these strategies, also in combination with each other, will increase the causal leverage of the research. Generally speaking, a greater awareness of political science methodology and a systematic application of its implications will help us to arrive at more compelling answers to the questions of whether, to what extent and how European regional integration makes a difference.

Key readings Anderson, J.J. (2003). Globalization and Europeanization: A conceptual and theoretical overview. In K. Dyson and K. Goetz, eds. (2003).Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint. Oxford: Oxford University Press and British Academy, pp. 37–53. Brady, H. E., and D. Collier, eds (2004). Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. George, A., W. and A. Bennet (2005). Case Study and Theory Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Haverland, M. (2005). Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? The Problem of Case Selection in Europeanization Research. European Integration online Papers, 9(2). King, G., R. Keohane and S. Verba (1994). Designing Social Enquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Part III Politics and Polity

This page intentionally left blank

6 Territory Klaus H. Goetz

6.1 Introduction Enquiring into the status of territory in the study of Europeanization opens up an exceptionally broad range of empirical questions; as will be argued below, it should also lead us to reflect critically on both the potential and the limitations of Europeanization as an analytical framework for understanding the changing European political landscape. The impact of European integration on the territorial structuring of politics and territoriality as a fundamental ordering principle of political life embodied in the modern nation-state, in which territorial borders and borders of public authority coincide, is at the heart of a vigorous debate in International Relations and Comparative Politics. In this context, European integration is often understood to involve the “debordering” of the member states, while, at the same time, it entails the creation of a new political space. Amongst the key questions discussed is whether, as part of this process, we should expect a reorganization of the territorial bases of political life and, if so, what direction such a reorganization may take. Some, such as Bartolini (2004: 41), argue that territory is not becoming less important, but rather that the “processes of boundary removal, boundary redefinition, and new boundary creation that are linked to the European integration process will redistribute resources directly and indirectly, and this redistribution will result in ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, both in terms of social groups and territories”. Integration does not necessarily strengthen functional-sectoral organizing principles at the expense of territory; it may well accentuate territorial logics, as can be seen in the rise of new forms of substate territorial politics. This argument resonates with the debate on the “new regionalism” in Europe (Keating 1998). By contrast, Tarrow (2004b: 61), in his discussion of political contention, notes with respect to EU structural policy, a process of “sectoralization”: the “shift of regional mobilization and potentially territorial claims to sectoral objects and claims through the brokerage of EU officials and national governments buffers the regional 73

74

Politics and Polity

cleavages … What might have developed as a transgressive process formenting territorial exit develops instead as a process of bargaining, alignment, and contained contention”. In this instance, European integration would appear to de-emphasize the territorial principle. At first sight, the debate about the “restructuring of territoriality” (Ansell and di Palma 2004) is only loosely connected to the Europeanization literature. Of course, students of Europeanization have inquired into the links between integration and multi-level governance (see Bursens in this volume). But issues about the broader territorial restructuring of the European political space have largely been left to those who work on integration and transnationalization, whereas the empirical focus of the Europeanization literature is the individual member state. Against this background, this chapter suggests that more systematic attention to territory may advance the agenda of Europeanization research. I argue that issues of territory – and associated questions of temporality – are central to mapping and explaining patterns of Europeanization. My starting point is the question whether, beyond noting cross-country differences and commonalities in national trajectories of Europeanization, it is possible to identify broader multi-country groupings with a common territorial base, marked by substantial similarities in a shared Europeanization experience, whilst showing clear signs of distinctness if compared to other groups of states. Although the question of such a “regional clustering” has been little debated, there is a body of work by students of Europeanization on which we can draw. In considering the case for regional clustering, and possible explanations for such clusters, one needs to address wider arguments about “families of nations” and center–periphery relations and their relevance to the study of Europeanization. This chapter, thus, combines elements of a “state-of-the-art” review with the more exploratory character of a modest agenda-setting exercise. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows (see Table 6.1). I first consider the case for a regional clustering of Europeanization, in terms of both substantive effects and modes and processes of Europeanization (Question I). Whether the evidence is interpreted as “worlds”, “stages” or “flexible groupings” (Question II) will partly depend on what are seen as the chief explanations that could account for such territorially-based clusters. Extending arguments about the importance of domestic and integration-related variables explaining crossnational commonalities and differences, I argue that “families of nations”, on the one hand, and center–periphery structures, on the other, promise to provide key insights into cross-regional differentiation (Question III). Both are, however, in themselves partly remolded by the process of European integration (Question IV), and, as such, are likely to make for dynamism and change in flexible regional groupings.

Klaus H. Goetz

75

Table 6.1 Core research questions on Europeanization and territory Explanandum

Explanans

Territory

I. Are there regional clusters of Europeanization?

III. Are families of nations and center–periphery structures key to understanding crossEuropean patterns of Europeanization?

Associated Temporality Concern

II. Do the clusters constitute worlds, stages, or flexible groupings of Europeanization?

IV. How changeable are family ties and center–periphery relations?

6.2 Core research questions Answering the question of whether there are distinct regional clusters of Europeanization, encompassing several countries, is less straightforward than the by-now sizeable collection of Europeanization studies might suggest. As with the bulk of work in comparative European politics, single-country studies (much of this work is reviewed and summarized in Bulmer and Lequesne 2005a) or edited collections based on country-by-country chapters predominate. Systematically comparative work is rare and is typically restricted to no more than three or four countries; comparative work featuring a larger number of cases is very scarce (but see Anderson 2002). Much of what we know in empirical terms about national trajectories of Europeanization along the dimensions of polity, politics and public policy focuses on the north-western core of the founder members of the Communities – France, Germany and the Benelux countries, along with the United Kingdom, and the Nordic countries. This concentration is not difficult to explain. As founder members the north-western states do, of course, have the longest experience of an active engagement with the integration process; as such, they are also likely to have been most deeply and enduringly Europeanized. Likewise, Europeanization in both the UK and the Nordic states – including Norway as a non-member state – has long been subject to sustained scholarly attention, not least because the integration process and its effects on domestic political systems have been fiercely contested. The politics of integration and Europeanization are, therefore, unusually well researched for the UK and the Nordic states. By contrast, in the cases of the states that joined the EU during the Southern enlargements of the 1980s and, in particular, the ten new member states that acceded to the EU in 2004, the systematic opening of their political systems to the EU has begun much more recently. For the latter group of countries, including eight Central and Eastern European countries, Malta and Cyprus, our knowledge is, by necessity, still largely limited to the “anticipatory and adaptive” Europeanization (Ágh 2003) prior to accession. However, both Southern Europe

76

Politics and Polity

and, perhaps even more so, Central and Eastern Europe are increasingly moving from the margins to the center of Europeanization research, as a crop of recent studies shows. In the case of the Southern countries, this takes the form of a reassessment of the role of the Southern member states in the European project and of the extent to which EU membership has remolded the political systems of the European south (see, e.g., Featherstone and Kazamias 2001a; Pinto and Teixera 2002; Royo and Manuel 2003a,b). As regards the new Central and Eastern European states, there is a wave of recent research that charts the influence of integration on institutional and policy development in the region (e.g., Ágh 2005; Andonova 2004; Dimitrova 2004; Jacoby 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudová 2005); further research work is under way. All of this means that the stock of studies on which cross-country comparative work can draw – including long-standing members, recent members, would-be members, and the few remaining outsiders – is growing rapidly. There are, then, many pieces that may help to form a European-wide mosaic; but if we take a step back, does a pattern of regional differentiation in Europeanization emerge that amounts to more than a random patchwork of cross-country differences? Inquiring into such clustered commonalities seems to run counter to influential work on European integration and its domestic effects. A central strand of literature has stressed the “differential impact” of Europe (Héritier et al. 2001). Diversity of domestic responses – across countries, institutions, and policy domains – has become a key theme in Europeanization research. In fact, it has become something of an article of faith that Europeanization is not associated with convergence (Wessels et al. 2003); by implication, this also makes clustering unlikely. Others criticize the search for broader regional patterns as a way of perpetuating outmoded historical notions. This point has, for example, been put forcefully by Closa and Heywood (2004: 240) in their study of Spain’s membership of the EU, which adopts a Europeanization perspective. Thus the argument presented in this study calls into question the continued analytical utility of notions such as “Mediterranean Europe”, or the idea that Southern Europe should be seen as distinctive (apart from the obvious fact of geographical location) (…) comparative studies of the EU and its member states should be built around robust classificatory principles, rather than rely on potentially flawed categories derived from historical developments and trajectories. Of course, not everybody takes such a skeptical view. Work that is focused on intra-regional comparisons appears to be attractive to scholars, be it, as already mentioned, on Southern and Central and Eastern Europe, or on the Nordic region (e.g., Dosenrode and Halkier 2004; Egeberg 2005a; Ingebritsen 1998;

Klaus H. Goetz

77

Jacobssen et al. 2003; Miles 1996). It is true that in these studies, a degree of regional commonality is typically taken as given (and provides a reference point for the discussion of individual country experiences), but in some the aim is primarily to establish how much commonality really exists (e.g., Featherstone and Kazamias 2001). It is not possible to do justice to the richness of the empirical findings of these studies in the present context; but, for our purposes, it is relevant to note that regionally focused comparative analysis tends to suggest a greater degree of commonality in Europeanization experiences than the advocates of cross-country diversity and non-convergence would lead us to expect. Considering, first, the substantive Europeanization profile, a few examples may suffice. As regards the Nordic states, with the exception of Finland, there is intense political contestation over Europe and evidence of a major European effect on electoral behavior and party system dynamics ( Jenssen et al. 1998; Sitter 2001). At the same, time, in policy terms, the Nordic states are set apart from the rest of Europe as model implementers (Sverdrup 2004). The “world of law observance”, identified by Falkner et al. (2005) in their research on “complying with Europe”, is exclusively populated by Nordic member states. But with both Denmark and Sweden outside the Eurozone they exhibit a pattern of differential membership. On the institutional side, observers have noted how integration has further promoted cooperation within the region (Egeberg 2005a) and the transnationalization of national governments (Jacobssen et al. 2003). The Southern region offers almost a mirror-image of the Nordic scenario: it now stands out in Europe for the virtual absence of popular-based or partybased Euroskeptisicm. Its implementation record is contested (Börzel 2003a; Falkner et al. 2005: 317ff), but, against considerable odds, the Southern member states of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece all succeeded in securing full EMU membership. Institutionally, Featherstone and Kazamias’s (2001: 13) comparative exploration has highlighted “dynamism, asymmetry and fragmentation” as key substantive attributes of the Southern Europeanization experience. In the new Central and Eastern member states of Europe, Euroscepticism is also widespread (it is by no means restricted to Poland) (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004) and, unsurprisingly, there are many question marks over their implementation capacity. Full EMU membership, at first eagerly desired by the new members, has, by now, become at best a long-term aspiration for most. In terms of institutional effects, Europeanization has been associated with centralization and the creation of “islands of excellence” in public administration (Goetz 2001b; Lippert and Umbach 2005), a development aided by the preference of both the Commission and the member states for dealing with a small number of privileged interlocutors during the accession negotiations. The impression of regional clustering is reinforced if we look at the second central dimension of differentiation – that is, modes and procedures of

78

Politics and Polity

Europeanization. In fact, it is in this respect that evidence of inter-regional differentiation may appear more compelling. In this regard, two issues, in particular, have been broadly debated in recent years: the extent to which Europeanization involves societal mobilization, i.e. “usage of Europe” (Jacquot and Woll 2003, 2004) beyond the confines of state institutions; and the importance of conditionalities in shaping domestic responses to EU accession in Central and Eastern Europe. Recent research suggests that usage associated with domestic mobilization beyond a political-technocratic elite is weakly developed in both Southern and Central and Eastern Europe, in contrast to the Western founder states and Scandinavia. An investigation into the “mobilizing” effects of the EU Convention in Southern Europe has noted that “Southern Europe … provides a fascinating geographical area for this type of analysis … the traditional debate on the weakness of civil society and social capital in these societies makes them an ideal test to measure the ‘power’ of the Convention as an agent of mobilization” (Lucarelli and Radaelli 2005: 6). “The potential in terms of discourse and more generally mobilization around issues raised by the Convention was higher than in other areas of the EU” (ibid.), mainly because “Europe has always been a fundamental actor in domestic processes of democratization, modernization, and policy change in Southern Europe”. Yet, the projects found that “social mobilization was limited and often ‘absorbed’ by party politics … there was far less social participation than expected” (ibid.: 21). Similarly, the process of accession of the new Central and Eastern European member states was largely dominated by executive actors, with only very limited opportunities for broader societal participation (Goetz 2005). The Central and Eastern European experience stands out when it comes to the role played by conditionalities. The impact of the latter on shaping postCommunist institutional and policy development and pre-accession Europeanization has been extensively debated (see, e.g., Grabbe 2001, 2003; Hughes et al. 2004a, b; Smith 2003; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005), although, predictably, the outcome of this debate has been inconclusive. Some contributions stress the importance of conditionalities as a key component of the “external governance” to which the countries of CEE have been subjected (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005); others note the obstacles to the external direction of domestic change, be it in territorial organization and regional policy (Brusis 2002; Hughes et al. 2004a, 2004b) or budgetary policy (Dimitrov, Goetz and Wollmann 2006). The key to resolving these differences lies in the interaction between external requirements and domestic mobilization. The importance of the latter has, for example, been highlighted by Malová and Rybár (2003) in their insightful analysis of the effects of the EU’s role in Slovak regime change. Modes and processes do not just matter in their own right, but because they influence the substantive institutional, policy and political effects of accession.

Klaus H. Goetz

79

In Central and Eastern Europe, Europeanization could have been expected to have been more immediate than in other parts of the EU (Grabbe 2001; Goetz 2005). Oft-cited reasons include, inter alia, the weakness of institutional “cores” in the post-Communist states – notably those that only came into being after the fall of Communism – which are less likely to offer resistance to “adaptive pressures” than the deeply embedded state institutions of Western Europe; evident crises of performance and legitimacy of domestic institutions, which encourage policy transfer and learning from foreign experiences; and the existence of institutional and policy “voids”, so that Europeanization involves not so much adaptation, but rather the ab ovo creation of new actors, institutions and policies. On the other hand, there are equally good arguments to suggest that Europeanization effects, whilst more immediate, may also be less profound and that patterns of “institutionalization for reversibility” prevail (Goetz 2005). Thus, the new members had little incentive to invest in “deep” Europeanization that would “lock in” specific institutional and policy arrangements prior to full membership precisely because of their weak uploading capacity as demandeurs. They could hope that, as full members, they would be able to challenge, or escape altogether, some of the constrictions that a negotiation process that was structured to favor the existing members had imposed on them. Moreover, processes of socialization and learning that would lend depth and durability to Europeanization and could support and complement consequentialist institutional and policy adaptation will take time. The last remark already points to a temporal issue that any argument about broader patterns in the substance and modes and processes of Europeanization needs to address: how stable are intra-regional commonalities and interregional differences? Do the main units of regional divisions commonly analyzed in the comparative literature – the Nordic countries, Southern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and, albeit rarely explictly treated in terms of a regional grouping, the founder member states – form fairly stable “worlds of Europeanization” (Goetz 2002)? Should they be understood as representing different stages in a dynamic Europeanization process, with the territorially contiguous founder members as the most advanced group and the recent accession countries still the early stages of Europeanization, but likely to travel along a similar path? Or are they flexible regional groupings, not as stable and as mutually exclusive as the notion of worlds suggest, but neither on the way to a common destination, as a stages model of Europeanization implies? To be able to answer these questions would require a historical perspective in Europeanization research that has, so far, been largely absent. Research into Europeanization from the 1950s to the late 1980s, which would allow for both cross-regional and the necessary cross-temporal analysis, is still lacking. How that comparative evidence will be weighed and interpreted is, however, likely to depend crucially on the explanatory lenses to regional clustering that are employed. Addressing this question,

80

Politics and Polity

we are moving from a survey of the “state of the art” to exploring the future research agenda.

6.3 Key problems As is discussed at length elsewhere in this volume, mainstream contributions to the Europeanization debate have, to date, relied on two main types of explanations in seeking to account for national patterns of Europeanization: first, domestic variables, covering a wide array of country-specific political, institutional and policy factors and ranging from macro-analyses, such as Schmidt’s (2004) distinction between “simple” and “compound” polities, to very fine-grained reconstructions of case-specific institutional, actor and policy constellations; and, secondly, integration-related variables that probe the causal links between a country’s experience of integration and specific patterns of Europeanization. An example of the latter are references to how a member state’s record of “uploading” its policy preferences shapes patterns of “downloading”. When it comes to differences across territorially-based groups of countries – the regional clustering of Europeanization experiences – there are, I would suggest, at least two related types of potential explanations from which Europeanization research may draw inspiration: the notion of “families of nations” (Castles 1993) and associated debates, which is, in essence, about shared domestic characteristics across borders, how they might have come about and might be maintained; and arguments about center–periphery dynamics in the process of European integration, which take their principal clues from the work of Rokkan (1999). The “families of nations” notion draws attention to the fact that domestic variables that may affect patterns of Europeanization – be they institutional, ideational, ideological, actor- or policy-related – are not distributed randomly amongst countries, but may show cross-regional variation. As initially set out by Castles (1993), the notion has three components: first, “that it may be possible to identify distinct families of nations, defined in terms of shared geo-graphical, linguistic, cultural and/or historical attributes” (xiii); second, that processes of cross-national “transmission and diffusion” are critical to establishing and perpetuating these commonalities; and, third, that families of nations matter for public policy profiles to the extent that “the commonalities of policy outcomes that characterize groupings of nations could be explained, in whole or in part, by common ideas, common customs and common institutions transmitted from the past” (xvi). What can be gained from these ideas for the analysis of Europeanization? The first proposition is probably the least contentious and although “family membership” need not necessarily imply spatial proximity, there is often an element of a shared geographical space that underlies comparative institutional

Klaus H. Goetz

81

and policy analysis. Successive enlargements of the EU have, of course, followed a path that coincides quite closely, though by no means perfectly, with the most commonly, if perhaps sometimes uncritically, employed distinction between a continental Western Europe, Southern Europe, the Nordic region, and Central and Eastern Europe. If one accepts that these are more than purely geographical labels, then more or less distinct families of nations – to which the Anglo-Irish might be added – have joined the integration process at particular stages of the integration project. At least the initial patterns of Europeanization would, accordingly, also likely to be distinct, reflecting, on the one hand, a family-typical set of domestic circumstances and, on the other, cross-temporal variation in what integration implied at the time of joining. The second proposition concerning the establishment and perpetuation of families ties in with a number of common themes in the study of Europeanization, notably what is now variously discussed under the labels of policy transfer, diffusion, cross-border policy learning and “horizontal” Europeanization. Such cross-border linkages and exchanges are likely to be most intense in cases where common lineage, affinity, partnerships, i.e. “unions of deliberate coordination” (Therborn 1993: 329), and shared space coincide. The key point here is not merely that European integration is associated with stimulating such cross-border exchanges, but rather that, in doing so, it may act to maintain, enhance or even help to (re-)create family ties (as has been argued with respect to the Iberian peninsula, see Royo and Manuel 2003a) and, thus, reinforce a degree of regional distinctness. The third proposition, too, is readily compatible with the dominant approach to the definition of domestic explanatory variables in Europeanization research, with its orientation towards interests, institutions, ideas and identities. It does, however, underline that the chief explanatory variables commonly employed may themselves be the result of historical experiences of “integration” of a different kind, and, as such, have an important conditioning effect on the degree of the cross-regional “differential impact” one is likely to find. Whereas the notion of “families of nations” and related concepts give a regional dimension to what otherwise appear as country-specific, strictly domestic explanations, attention to EU-wide center–periphery structures points to a decisive territorial dimension of integration and, potentially, Europeanization. Most recent discussions of “center” (or core) and “periphery” take their clues from the work of Rokkan (1999), who considered center–periphery relations within the context of his analysis of political system building, with a focus on state-formation and nation-building. For Rokkan, territorial centers come in three different types – military-administrative, economic and cultural – making them into “privileged locations” within the territory (Rokkan 1999: 110ff.). Where these different types coincide in a small area, Rokkan speaks of a monocephalic structure; a polycephalic structure exists where “there is a marked

82

Politics and Polity

dispersion of the different types of arenas across several regions of the territory” (p. 111). The “key characteristics of peripheries are … distance, difference, and dependence” (115). A periphery “is located at some distance from the dominant centre or centres”, it possesses “some minimum level and sense of separate identify”; and it depends on the centre in one or more of the following: “in political decision-making, in cultural standardization, and in economic life” (ibid.: 115). Rokkan was interested both in the role of centers and peripheries within states; and center–periphery structures across Europe (Rokkan 1999: 191ff.; Bartolini 2005). With a focus on the latter, the issue of prime concern in the present context is the extent to which territorial differentiation within the European Union can be understood in terms of center–periphery relations. Discussions of Southern Europe and, more recently, Central and Eastern Europe are often couched in terms of dependency and distinctness (with advances in transport and communication, physical distance may lose much of its former marker status). For example, Featherstone and Kazamias’s (2001: 2) comparative analysis of Europeanization in Southern and Mediterranean Europe argues that it can be identified as an EU “ ‘periphery’ in terms of a number of predominant traits”, which include, inter alia, “economic inequality”, “the historically distinctive mode of the region’s economic development”, “financial dependence on EU aid”, and ‘the lesser bargaining strength of the “south” in EU treaty negotiations’ (ibid.: 2). Similarly, power asymmetries between the dominant EU member states and the new members of CEE have often been noted, as has their cultural distinctness and relative economic backwardness. Fractious “family ties” may reinforce these aspects of peripherality. Helen Wallace (2001), highlighting the relative neglect of the territorial – compared to the functional and affiliational – dimension in accounts of integration, contrasts Western and Eastern European experiences. Whilst in Western Europe the mutual reinforcement of functional, affiliational and territorial linkages have resulted in a “distinctive pattern of integration: multi-framework, multi-layer, multi-lateral and multi-purpose” (p. 12), in Central and Eastern Europe we find a segmented history, followed by recent attempts to define European engagement by achieving incorporation within the west European-defined transnational system. This move “towards” western Europe is now beginning, but only beginning, to be flanked by more local patterns of linkage. There are also tragic instances of de-linkage where (joint functions) task, territory and (affiliation) trust are all contested. (ibid.: 11) Much also tends to be made of the fact that, with the exception of Poland, the new EU members are either small or very small states. This fact may accentuate their peripherality in terms of dependence and further encourage a distinct

Klaus H. Goetz

83

pattern of Europeanization (Soetendorp and Hanf 1998). All of this suggests that peripherality combined with small country status may make for differentiation in patterns of Europeanization that is not just country-specific, but region-specific. The same applies to territorially-based groups of countries that share center characteristics. The notion of “families of nations” and attention to center–periphery structures provide analytical lenses that may help to account for EU-wide regional clustering of substantive and modal-procedural patterns of Europeanization. In employing them, we need, however, to be especially sensitive to two interlinked issues: the malleability of family ties and center–periphery structures; and the restrictions of understanding Europe-wide differentiation by focusing on the member state as the main unit of comparative analysis. As Therborn (1993: 329) has pointed out, “families of nations” come in different forms, based on common descent or lineage; consisting of “separated siblings” or “kindred nations”; affinity groups; or partnerships, as “unions of deliberate coordination”. Some of these are constituted by historical developments that cannot be undone (but may be reinterpreted); others, notably affinity groups and partnerships, may be constituted, reconstituted and dissolved by design or by default. Put differently, while “families of nations” may have explanatory power, they are not a static, but, in fact, a dynamic explanans, which is itself highly susceptible to the process of European integration. Thus, it is important to pay attention to how forms of inter-state cooperation and coordination change over time and how integration itself impacts on the family patterns; it is also important to recognize that individual countries may belong to several groupings simultaneously. EU integration itself is, of course, unthinkable without intensive bilateral and multilateral territorially-based cooperation and coordination. It may be of longstanding, such as the Franco-German partnership, or of more recent origin, such as the Visegrad Group – consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – focused on “regional activities and initiatives aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region” (Visegrad Declaration of 2004). The sectoral-functional specificity of such ties also has to be recognized. While in some cases, bilateral and multilateral linkages serve to facilitate cooperation and coordination across a range of arenas and policy issues, others are more narrowly defined in purpose. In short, the impact of families of nations on patterns of Europeanization can be expected to vary significantly over time, across space, and across policy domains. Similarly, center–periphery structures have to be understood as a dynamic variable and, again, European integration is an important, though by no means the sole, driver of change (Bartolini 2005). It is, of course, an open question whether Europe-wide structures of territorial difference and dependence – two of the three key characteristics of peripheries suggested by Rokkan – are reinforced

84

Politics and Polity

or ameliorated by integration, as has, for example, been discussed with reference to the rationale and effects of European regional and cohesion policy, which is often interpreted as a compensation mechanism for EU policies that tend to privilege the center (Allen 2005). Similarly, distance, the third criterion, is affected, not so much in a strictly geographical sense although the emergence of new centers in a polycephalic structure may affect this aspect, too, but rather as a result of the growing porosity of political, economic and cultural borders and improved transport and communication. What seems broadly accepted is that EU economic disparities had decreased prior to the accession of the ten new member states (Commission of the European Communities 2005) and that some countries, perhaps most notably Ireland, have, in the process, shed central defining traits of their former peripheral status. When we look at differentiation in the Europeanization experience of multi-country grouping we are, then, shooting at a moving target and key explanations for variation are, themselves, dynamic rather than static. This would suggest that the patterns found will be “flexible groupings” rather than “worlds” or “stages” of Europeanization.

6.4 Conclusion But are country groupings the appropriate unit of analysis? Considering this question leads us to broader issues about the study of Europeanization and its limitations. As was noted at the start of this chapter, challenges to territoriality as an ordering principle of the modern polity, in which the four key dimensions of control over resources, the rule of law and sovereignty, legitimation, and welfare provision coincided and reinforced each other within the framework of the modern nation-state (Zürn and Leibfried 2005), are now widely regarded as undermining the classical nation-state model. Di Palma (2004: 259) argues with reference to Ruggie’s argument (1993) about the “unbundling of territoriality” in the context of the European project, to unbundle territoriality means to recompose and rebundle it. It means to recognize the presence, in the political space below and beyond the state, of a variety of territorially relevant collective actors: some private, some public and legal (or indeed illegal), some constitutionalized … in some ways, the multiplicity of actors subtracts from the centrality of the national state. In other ways, it involves a repositioning of the state and the emergence of new state tasks. Amongst these processes of recomposition and rebundling, the effects of European integration, on the one hand, and what has become known as the “new regionalism” (Keating 1998) on the other, have been most widely debated. Based on central tenets of Rokkan’s work, Bartolini (2005) has recently

Klaus H. Goetz

85

analyzed the former as “the formation of an enlarged territorial system”, revolving around centre formation, system building and political structuring. By contrast, the debate on the new regionalism focuses on themes such as changes in territorial management; spatial economic policy, “new forms of spatially-based production systems and forms of social regulation”; “the resurgence of cultural regionalism”, and the growing importance of intermediate, regional biers of government (Keating et al. 2003: 6). Of course, the Europeanization debate does not altogether ignore such themes. After all its principal motivation is to examine the effect of integration on the political systems of current and prospective member states, and there is no shortage of studies of the Europeanization of subnational governance. However, with its focus on changes within the “container” (Taylor 1994) of the nation-state, the analytical lens of Europeanization is, arguably, rather less well placed to capture and explain the transformation of governance between and amongst member states. We find references to “horizontal” Europeanization, but that tends to be associated with non-hierarchical mechanisms of domestic Europeanization such as cross-border policy transfer, learning and diffusion (Radaelli 2003: 4), and not the constitution of a transnational policy space. There is, then, a gap between the study of integration, and the role that states and groups of states play within it, and the study of Europeanization, with its focus on substantive responses within member states. One important attempt to bridge this gap is provided by the notion of “interdependent European governance” and the associated idea of a “transnational polity space”. Kohler-Koch, whose work is most closely associated with these notions, has recently argued that whilst there is ample evidence to suggest “institutionalized interdependence in governance” (Kohler-Koch 2003b), this does not produce the disintegrative effects at the level of the nation-state, which, is emphasized, for example, by Zürn and Leibfried (2005): “European governance has made the boundaries of the member states more permeable, but is not yet a stumbling stone for national system coherence. It has not transformed or disintegrated the national systems of political structuring and does not impede the national territorial construction of solidarity, political participation and identify” (Kohler-Koch 2005: 13). Several consequences for Europeanization research flow from these remarks. First, individual states remain meaningful units of comparative analysis in the study of Europeanization, but they cannot be understood as “lonely states” in terms of domestic and integration-related factors that shape their Europeanization experience. Secondly, integration intensifies cross-border political exchanges, not just at the level of the central state executives, but across a wide range of political actors and at different levels of the political system, although the intensity of exchanges varies considerably across the European space, with a higher density in Western and Northern Europe, and a low-level intensity in Southern and Central and Eastern Europe. Exchanges can be expected to be

86

Politics and Polity

most intensive amongst neighboring countries. They are, thus, likely to reinforce the distinctness of regional groupings of countries within the EU and, by implication, of their Europeanization patterns. Thirdly, although key variables that may help to account for regional groupings, such as historical patterns of descent, affinity and cooperation or conflict, are relatively stable, they are far from immutable. The regional groupings that have thus far dominated in comparative analyses – the Nordic countries, Southern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and the founder member core – provide obvious starting points, but they must not be taken for granted, especially if European integration itself involves a restructuring of European-wide center–periphery relations (Bartolini 2005). Finally, when we search for broader regional patterns, we must take into account both the Europeanization effects within the member states and those effects that are primarily visible within the transnational space constituted by groups of countries. Distinct regional groupings would, thus, be characterized by similarities in domestic responses and a distinct pattern of transnational linkage, be it intense and cooperative (as in the case of the Nordic countries or the Western core) or relatively weak and conflict-ridden (as in the case of Central and Eastern Europe). To be able to map such patterns, Europeanization research will need to widen its analytical focus and engage even more intensively than has been the case so far with the study of integration and the debate over transnationalization and the emergence of a European political space. As the European Union continues to extend its borders, the question of how much diversity it can sustain is becoming ever more pressing. Arguments about both the extent and stability of cross-regional differences in Europeanization, therefore, go the heart of the debate about the future of the EU.

Acknowledgment A first draft of this chapter was presented at a workshop in Oslo in May 2005, which was organized by Ulf Sverdrup in the context of the CONNEX network. I wish to thank the workshop participants, especially Johan Olsen and Ulf Sverdrup, for their most helpful comments. I also wish to acknowledge the very constructive comments offered by the anonymous referee and the editors of the present volume. The draft was revised during my stay as a Visiting Professor at the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. I would like to thank Professor Kenji Hirashima, whose kind interest in my work made it possible for me to work in this most congenial of environments.

Key readings Ansell, C.K. and G. di Palma (eds) (2004) Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bulmer, S. and C. Lequesne (eds) (2005) The Member States of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Klaus H. Goetz

87

Dyson, K. and K.H. Goetz (eds) (2003) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Featherstone, K. and G. Kazamias (eds) (2001) Europeanization and the Southern Periphery. London: Frank Cass. Héritier, A., D. Kerwer, C. Knill, D. Lehmkuhl, M. Teutsch and A.-C. Douillet (2001) Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

7 Candidate Countries and Conditionality Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier

7.1 Introduction Originally, research on “Europeanization” was concerned almost exclusively with domestic change in EU member states. In light of the developments of European integration in the past decade, however, this exclusive research focus no longer appears appropriate. In the aftermath of the crisis and downfall of communism, most Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have declared the “return to Europe” to be their key foreign policy goal. This “return to Europe” included the pursuit of closer institutional ties with the EU, such as trade and association agreements, and cumulated in the accession of eight CEECs in 2004 (as well as Cyprus and Malta). Bulgaria and Romania are on schedule to follow in 2007, and Croatia and Turkey started accession negotiations in 2005. The remaining countries of the (Western) Balkans that are covered by the Stabilization and Association process launched in 1999 also possess a general membership perspective. These institutional ties are generally accompanied by the promotion and diffusion of EU institutions and policies in the partner countries, and thus by processes of Europeanization. In the context of enlargement, in particular, the desire of most CEECs to join the EU, combined with the high volume and intrusiveness of the rules attached to its membership, have allowed the EU an unprecedented influence on the restructuring of domestic institutions and the entire range of public policies in the CEECs. Predictably, the growing involvement and influence of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe has sparked increasing interest among researchers. This literature has made “conditionality” the central focus of studying the impact of the EU on domestic change in the CEECs. In essence, a policy of conditionality is one in which international organizations promise rewards (such as financial assistance or membership) to target states on the condition 88

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier 89

that the states fulfill one or more conditions (such as policy adjustments or institutional change) set by the international organizations. Conditionality is widely seen to constitute the core of the EU’s policy toward the non-member states in its neighborhood. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU (then EC) has made financial and technical assistance as well as the development of institutional ties – first informally and later formally – conditional on the fulfillment of democratic and human rights standards (and the establishment of a market economy). Political conditionality is now a standard feature of all agreements with external countries. Generally, these conditions become more stringent as external countries seek to upgrade their institutional ties with and assistance by the Union. The Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 established the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” as the sine qua non political condition of accession to the EU. In its 1997 Opinions on the applications and in its subsequent annual progress reports, the Commission has regularly evaluated the political conditions in all candidate countries. A positive assessment of the political situation in the candidate countries has generally been a basic condition for the opening of accession negotiations. Once accession negotiations have started, the focus of conditionality shifts from general democratic and human rights norms toward the specific EU rules of the acquis communautaire – or from democratic conditionality to acquis conditionality. In the course of the negotiations, the candidate countries were expected to accept these specific rules and transpose them into domestic law. The EU considered as the only legitimate subject of accession negotiations (short) transition periods during which a limited number of EU rules would not be (fully) applied to the new member states. In contrast, EU rules could not be renegotiated or rejected altogether. We can subdivide the literature according to its substantive focus. One large group of studies focuses on the political or democratic conditionality of the EU and analyzes how and under which conditions the EU has been able to produce democratic change and consolidation in its neighboring countries. Authors from both International Relations and Comparative Politics have contributed to this literature (see, inter alia, Kelley 2004a; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; Pridham 2005; Vachudova 2005; Whitehead 2001; Zielonka and Pravda 2001). A second group of studies deals with the effects and the adoption of specific EU policy rules such as in social policy, environmental policy, or agricultural policy (see, e.g., the case studies in Dimitrova 2004; Linden 2002; Jacoby 2004; or Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Finally, a third group of studies considers the Europeanization of Central and Eastern European state structures, executives and administrations more generally (see, for instance, Dimitrova 2002; Goetz 2001b).

90

7.2

Politics and Polity

Core research questions

Which mechanism of Europeanization has been dominant in the nonmember and candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe? And under which conditions has the Europeanization of nonmember and candidate countries been effective? These have been the two core questions of Europeanization research in this particular region. Studies of Europeanization in the accession countries typically analyze the effects of EU conditionality as compared to those of other strategies and mechanisms (such as socialization or social learning) and the conditions under which EU conditionality has or has not been effective in the CEECs (see, for example, Jacoby 2004; Kelley 2004a; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Whereas these studies generally point to the overall strength and effectiveness of EU conditionality, a few others emphasize ambiguities, inconsistencies and lack of effectiveness or even detrimental effects of EU conditionality (see, for example, Grabbe 2001; Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003; Hughes et al. 2004b). Theoretically, most of the recent work is embedded in institutionalist theory. The earliest theory-based and comparative study of the impact of western institutions on Eastern Europe was informed by (neoliberal or functional) institutionalism (Haggard et al. 1993). The major theoretical debate of the 1990s in International Relations, the debate between rationalist institutionalism, on the one hand and constructivist or sociological institutionalism, on the other, provided the theoretical starting point for most of the more recent monographs or edited volumes (Kubicek 2003; Jacoby 2004; Kelley 2004a). In our own collaborative research project (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005), we compare the explanatory power of a rationalist institutionalist “external incentives model” with that of a sociological institutionalist “social learning model” and a “lesson-drawing model”, emphasizing domestically-driven rule adoption. We suggest that the external incentives underpinning conditionality are indeed the dominant mechanism of Europeanization in nonmember and accession countries and that the variation in Europeanization outcomes can largely be attributed to conditions of effective conditionality bargaining. Generally, the conditions of effective conditionality have been favorable in EU-CEEC relations. Interdependence is highly asymmetrical in favor of the EU. Whereas the CEECs are only of marginal importance to the EU economy, the CEECs are heavily dependent on the EU market and will benefit much more strongly from accession than the EU member states. What is more, the number of veto players in the CEECs is considered to be small. Whereas asymmetrical interdependence gives the EU the leverage to achieve rule adoption and compliance in the CEECs in exchange for assistance and integration, the absence or weakness of veto players removes the main potential domestic obstacle to effective conditionality.

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier 91

Our discussion of core findings follows the distinction of the two main contexts of conditionality introduced above: democratic conditionality and acquis conditionality. In the context of democratic conditionality, Europeanization effects are measured by the adoption of democratic and human rights norms as a result of EU conditionality in countries outside the EU. Generally, EU democratic conditionality has depended on two main factors for its effectiveness: the presence or absence of credible EU membership incentives, on the one hand, and the domestic political costs of adoption for incumbent governments in the target countries. Accordingly, we can differentiate between the three groups of target countries (Schimmelfennig 2005). First, in the democratic frontrunner countries, where liberal democracy was a domestic equilibrium or adoption costs were small, EU democratic conditionality was mostly unnecessary or redundant for democratization or democratic consolidation. Countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, or Slovenia had already been well on the way towards democratic consolidation before the EU’s democratic conditionality was fully developed and would most probably have continued on this path even in the absence of EU conditionality. In these countries, all major parties were oriented towards liberal democratic reform and western integration. Whenever a government voted out of office, its successors followed the same basic parameters of political change. Second, in non-democratic countries governed by strongly nationalist and authoritarian governments, the domestic political costs of compliance proved so prohibitive that EU democratic conditionality was ineffective even when it was highly credible. Democratic rules would have required these governments to give up the very instruments on which their political power rested. Thus, in cases such as Serbia under Milosevic or most successor states of the Soviet Union, democratic conditionality was not sufficient for domestic change. Under these conditions, Europeanization required prior political change bringing democratic, reform-oriented political forces into power. Finally, EU democratic conditionality has been most consequential in those countries that are situated somewhere between the democratic frontrunners and entrenched authoritarianism, that is, fragile democracies in which individual democratic and human rights norms are contested and democratic and authoritarian political forces compete for power. In the Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia, for instance, minority rights for the Russian-speaking population remained contested despite a generally smooth transition to liberal democracy. In these countries, international efforts to promote minority rights in these countries mostly failed unless they were clearly linked to membership by the EU and NATO (Kelley 2004a; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; Schimmelfennig 2005). In other countries, in which strong liberal-democratic and nationalist-populist political parties have competed for power for a long time and governments

92

Politics and Polity

have alternated between the two (such as in Croatia, Romania, or Slovakia), EU membership conditionality has been capable of exercising decisive influence in favor of democratic reform. According to Milada Vachudova (2005), the prospect of EU membership provided a focal point and a common goal for cooperation among opposition political forces and the vocal criticism of the EU weakened the credibility of the illiberal governments with electorates aspiring to EU membership. Both influences helped the liberal opposition to come to power and to join the liberal states in the accession process. As a result, illiberal governments in Romania (1997), Slovakia (1998), and Croatia (2000) were defeated and new, reform-oriented governments put their countries (back) on the track to membership. In addition, conditionality worked through lock-in effects in this group of countries. When liberal-democratic parties were temporarily in government, the domestic reforms they institutionalized, and the progress they made in western integration, raised the stakes in democratic consolidation and increased the costs of any potential future reversal. Their illiberal rivals therefore adapted their political goals in order to preserve the achieved benefits of integration. After the major nationalist-populist parties of Croatia (HDZ), Romania (PDSR) and Slovakia (HZDS) had been voted out of government, Romania and Slovakia started accession negotiations with the EU, and Croatia became an EU associate and applied for membership. Over the same period, these parties modified their programs and presented themselves as unequivocally pro-integration. When the PDSR and the HDZ were elected back to power in 2000 and 2003, they remained on the course of reform and integration. In the context of acquis conditionality, the EU’s influence has been particularly pervasive. Studies in this area show that the key condition for the success of Europeanization is whether the EU sets its rules as conditions for countries with a credible membership perspective. We do observe some rule adoption even before the EU’s conditionality was spelled out, but it was patchy and selective. The same holds for soft or weak EU rules during the accession process. CEEC governments often adapted EU rules in line with domestic requirements, some broad perception of a European model or mixed EU rules with other models. However, once a given issue area became subject to the EU’s conditionality, rule adoption increased dramatically and became a consistent feature across countries and issue areas (see case studies in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Jacoby 2004; Guillén and Palier 2004). Just as in the context of democratic conditionality, the most important factor influencing the cost/benefit calculations of CEEC governments is the credibility that the EU will reward rule adoption with membership. This credibility increased significantly once accession negotiations started so that rule adoption increased dramatically after 1998. In contrast, the importance of adoption costs contrasts sharply with the context of democratic conditionality. As acquis

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier 93

conditionality does not concern the political system and the bases of political power as such, governments generally do not have to fear that the costs of rule adoption in individual policy areas will lead to a loss of office. Costs are thus unlikely to be prohibitive. Moreover, once a credible membership perspective has been established, adoption costs in individual policy areas are discounted against the (aggregate) benefits of membership, rather than just the benefits in this particular policy area. Thus, adoption costs and domestic veto players do not play as decisive a role as in the case of democratic conditionality. For example, in the area of social policy, the CEECs even adopted the more costly rules relating to secondary legislation (such as health and safety at the workplace) more fully than the less costly rules relating to the Social Dialogue. Similarly, concerning the free movement of persons, rule adoption was more pronounced for the more costly Schengen rules than for the internal market rules. In some cases, however, variations in the speed of rule adoption across issue areas and countries are explained by adoption costs and domestic veto players. Adoption costs and veto players therefore often influence the timing of rule adoption, but they do not lead to systematic variation in the likelihood of rule adoption as such. For instance, in the Czech Republic, regionalization only increased after the Klaus government had lost office, and in the area of environmental policy, opposition from the energy sector in Poland prevented the adoption of control-and-command instruments that the EU prescribed to combat air pollution. In contrast to the Czech Republic, EU rules were thus only adopted in the late 1990s, once the EU applied its conditionality. The stage of accession negotiations might have had a negative effect on the credibility of conditionality. For example, civil service reforms in the Czech Republic – a frontrunner that might thus not have feared exclusion in the late stages of accession negotiations – were much less in line with the EU’s requirements than was the case in most countries further down the line of accession. However, such a negative effect is not consistent. For instance, we observe that towards the final stages of accession negotiations, rule adoption increases particularly in the more costly areas, in which the CEECs had delayed rule adoption. This is the case, for example, with regard to Schengen rules in Hungary and Poland. The broader picture that emerges is thus that it is not necessarily the stage of accession negotiations as such, but rather the salience the EU attaches to a particular area, that is a key factor in rendering the EU’s conditionality credible, and hence leading to an increase in rule adoption. CEEC governments know that the Commission and member states monitor adoption of these rules particularly closely and give them a higher weight in their enlargement decision. EU actors clearly communicated to the CEECs that the Schengen rules were a key condition for membership. By contrast, parts of the Commission and some member states indicated that in other policy areas rather superficial rule adoption

94

Politics and Polity

would not present an obstacle to concluding negotiations. This was the case in social policy and, maybe paradoxically in view of the repeated emphasis on the need for institutional capacity, in the area of civil service reform. In contrast, conditions usually associated with constructivist or sociologicalinstitutionalist models of “social learning” – the legitimacy of EU rules and conditions – did not prove to be systematically related to effective EU impact on rule adoption in the nonmember and candidate countries. Various practices in the EU’s use of conditionality that damaged the legitimacy of EU conditions were causally irrelevant. First, in the context of democratic conditionality, legitimate EU rules (democratic rules shared and implemented by the member states) did not produce more compliance than the minority protection rules, which have remained outside the acquis and are not generally accepted by the member states. Second, areas in which the EU has no competencies vis-à-vis the member states – such as administrative capacity and civil service reform – did not have a smaller impact than acquis rules, as long as they were explicitly defined as a condition of membership. Third, this finding also holds for issue areas in which the EU did not play by its own rules by delaying the benefits of rules adoption for the new members. This concerned, for example, the phasingin of the receipts from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the transitional period that will delay the free movement of workers from the new members, or membership in the Schengen area, which will require a separate decision by the member states. Finally, in areas in which the implementation and compliance record in the member states itself is patchy, such as social policy, the thus damaged legitimacy was not detrimental to rule adoption.

7.3 Key problems Whereas the core findings on the conditions and outcomes of democratic and acquis conditionality are sufficiently robust and widely shared in the literature, they are limited in scope. In the following, we discuss three possible extensions: first, an extension of the study of accession Europeanization to post-accession Europeanization; second, a systematic comparison between Europeanization East and West; and third, a distinction between Europeanization and other factors and sources of change in the accession countries. The main findings of the research on the Europeanization of accession countries point to the paramount causal relevance of asymmetrical interdependence and credible accession conditionality for the quick and pervasive adoption of EU rules in the accession countries. These findings immediately trigger a question for the future: what will happen after accession, when these instruments of Europeanization are no longer available? Once the candidates have joined the EU, they already reap the benefits of membership and cannot be induced to comply with EU rules by conditional incentives. Will this new context slow down, stall or even reverse the Europeanization process in the CEECs?

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier 95

There are, indeed, many good reasons for concern. First, many EU rules have been only formally transposed into national legislation, but are not fully or reliably implemented. Even at the level of basic state institutions and the rule of law, analysts come to the conclusion that the independence of the judiciary and the civil service is precarious. Since rule adoption has been driven mainly by external incentives, the absence of these incentives should significantly slow down or even halt the implementation process. Wade Jacoby, for instance, has repeatedly pointed at “Potemkin harmonization” (Jacoby 1999), “talking the talk” ( Jacoby 2002) and “CEE dissembling” ( Jacoby 2004) as a consequence of EU external pressure. In addition to strategic decoupling of external legitimation and domestic practices designed to reduced the costs of adaptation and placate entrenched societal and bureaucratic interests, however, implementation is often hampered by a true lack of administrative capacity. Second, in the absence of high conditional external benefits, domestic structures such as adoption costs, veto players, and resonance, which were superseded in the conditionality context, will again have a causal impact. This will be particularly relevant because rule adoption via external incentives is generally more likely to be contested than if it has resulted from social learning or lesson-drawing. Third, many of the policy makers or “core executives” responsible for the quick transposition of EU rules and knowledgeable in EU affairs – who are also those most likely to have been influenced by social learning – will move to Brussels to assume the posts in the EU organizations allotted to the new member states. Fourth, the new member states might not be willing to accept further the rules of the “enlargement acquis”, which were specifically designed for accession candidates, but are not binding on the old members. Moreover, as we know from the British and Spanish experiences, accession deals that are considered unfair impositions lead to disgruntled newcomers that spend much of their early accession years trying to renegotiate perceived wrongs. Under all these circumstances, the short-term effectiveness of rule transposition in the context of conditionality might well be compromised by medium-term ineffectiveness of implementation. Finally, many observers point to potential negative effects of acquis conditionality on the democratic process in the accession countries. Generally, the accession process has strengthened a technocratic and top-down process of policy making in the accession countries. On the part of the EU, the process was shaped by the Commission, which negotiated mainly with the negotiating teams of the accession countries, the ministerial bureaucracies or even inter-ministerial coordination units designed specifically to introduce and implement the acquis. The accession process thereby contributed to further centralization in the accession countries (Grabbe 2001). Electoral choice and

96

Politics and Polity

party competition on socioeconomic issues were undercut by the fact that whoever was in government had to work towards adopting EU rules (Innes 2002). Interest groups and societal networks were marginalized (Bruszt and Stark 2003; Sissenich 2002). Parliamentary activity was, to a large extent, determined by the schedule of the accession process and the need to formally transpose EU rules as soon as possible. To achieve this, many parliaments introduced accelerated legislative procedures during accession, resulting in a tendency to rubber-stamp EU-related legislation. In addition, acquis conditionality resulted in a mushrooming of regulatory agencies in the candidate countries, installing a technocratic regulatory state on top of the democratic institutions in place (Maniokas 2002). As a result, some observers suggest that EU accession has contributed to the volatility and abstinence of voters and to increasing Euro-skepticism in Central and Eastern Europe (Innes 2002; Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003), which may in turn contribute to inhibiting the post-accession Europeanization of these countries even further. Yet the absence of conditionality need not necessarily result in the stagnation or breakdown of Europeanization – if other mechanisms replace external incentives efficiently. First, in areas of the regular acquis, the new member states will be subject to the same non-compliance procedures as current members, such as the infringement procedure, which allows the Commission to bring member states before the Court (who might impose fines), or private litigation in national courts (see e.g. Börzel 2001a; Tallberg 2002). In the area of former democratic conditionality, the new Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union gives the EU the power to sanction and eventually to exclude countries that violate its fundamental democratic rules. Moreover, the Commission has already introduced instruments developed initially to monitor compliance in the candidate countries inside the EU, such as the publication of annual “scoreboards” on implementation records with internal market legislation. However, these old and new EU instruments rely more on shaming and social influence than on effective material sanctioning mechanisms. Large-scale breaches and infringement procedures in themselves would be detrimental to the mutual trust in the ability and willingness of all members to play by the rules on which the internal market is based. In addition, the EU does not possess instruments to sanction breaches of the rules of the “enlargement acquis” that were adopted during the accession process. Secondly, the mechanisms of lesson-drawing and social learning that were crowded out by the massive impact of external incentives in the context of conditionality, might again come to the fore and gain in relevance after accession. Among other factors, the active participation in EU policy making may be conducive to such processes. Thirdly, as suggested by historical institutionalist analyses, the formal rules and institutions transposed to the new member states may prove “sticky” even

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier 97

in the absence of external enforcement. They may nurture domestic interest in preservation, e.g. the interest of bureaucratic actors whose turf and income are based on them, or they may simply be difficult to abolish for institutional reasons. Finally, the enlargement acquis might feed back into rule creation in the EU. In part, actors in the EU might promote the transfer of competences to EU institutions in areas of democracy conditionality, in order to have a continued leverage over new members that might slip back into authoritarian rule. The Article 7 provisions mentioned above are one example of this. At the same time, norm entrepreneurs may seize on the EU’s apparent double standards as well as on the discursive validation of democratic and human right norms as constitutive principles of the EU in the enlargement discourse in order to promote a legalization of these norms at the EU level. Research on the accession countries and their Europeanization has mainly used a “within-region” design – that is, the scope of the studies is usually confined to Central and Eastern Europe and comparisons are made between accession countries or accession policies but not beyond. The often implicit assumption here is that Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe is special in two ways. First, accession Europeanization appears to differ substantially from member state Europeanization and, second, the CEECs seem to differ qualitatively from earlier candidates and new members. These assumptions are common but remain generally untested. Even if they are correct, they provide no compelling reason for avoiding comparative studies of Europeanization, including old and new members or previous and current candidates and new members. Such comparative studies promise to expand our knowledge about the great variety of Europeanization processes and mechanisms and about the conditions under which they are observable and effective. They would not only make the empirical picture more complete but, above all, permit us to test the established findings of member state Europeanization in a new context and check some new variables. The available findings suggest that accession conditionality, as an instrument that the EU obviously does not possess in its relations with the member states, does indeed make a big difference for the process and the conditions of Europeanization (see also Héritier 2005). First, the dominant logic of conditionality or external incentives corroborates the “actor-based rational-choice approach” (Héritier 2001b: 3) to the study of Europeanization, which highlights the change of opportunities and constraints and the redistribution of resources as the main mechanisms of domestic change. The fact that the adoption of EU rules in the context of accession conditionality – with its concomitant high adaptive pressure – was quick and general also confirms rationalist expectations where sociological or historical institutionalism would have predicted more inertia (Börzel and Risse 2003: 70; Jacoby 2004: 197–202). Second, however, the main mediating factor emphasized in the rationalist analysis of Europeanization – domestic structures defined as veto points or

98

Politics and Polity

players – only played a minor role in the accession process. In the context of democratic conditionality, the adoption costs of governments were paramount; in the context of acquis conditionality, the veto-player structure only mattered for the speed but not the likelihood of rule adoption. Apparently, the high benefits and the time pressures of accession significantly reduce the causal impact of veto players and other intervening domestic structures. Similarly, institutional legacies or specific national traditions and situations only played out to the extent that EU rules were flexible enough to leave room for them. Moreover, except for the difference between democratic and acquis conditionality, we did not detect any systematic variation between policy types and the mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanization (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). Thus, for the peculiar context of accession conditionality, our findings go against the thrust of the Europeanization literature, which highlights the relevance of domestic mediating factors and institutional inertia. Can we attribute the weak causal relevance of domestic structures to the overpowering impact of accession conditionality alone or is it (also) an effect of the simultaneity of systemic transformation in the CEECs that reduced institutional inertia (Héritier 2005)? An answer to this question would require a careful comparative analysis of the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe with, say, the EFTA candidates with their stable political institutions. Our analysis of democratic conditionality, at least, suggests that inertia was of minor relevance compared with the credibility and adaptation costs of accession conditionality. On the one hand, Turkey’s entrenched political institutions began to change rather quickly once the membership perspective became credible; on the other hand, the Slovak government under Meeiar stuck to its authoritarian practices (for reasons of domestic power preservation) although they had been introduced only very recently. Finally, it appears as if Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe not only proceeded at a much quicker pace than in the member states, but also produced more homogeneous and convergent outcomes. To substantiate this assumption, however, we would not only need comparative East–West research but also a longer time-frame for the analysis. A last issue that looms particularly large in the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe is that of multiple sources and motors of institutional change. Potentially, domestic change in these countries can be thought to have been influenced by endogenous domestic factors such as national political actors and cultures, legal and political traditions, and historical legacies; by sub-regional demonstration, learning, or competition effects among the postcommunist countries; by other regional organizations, such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, or NATO; by extra-regional actors such as the United States; or by “global” forces such as the integration of the CEECs into the global financial market and global trade or global international organizations. Naturally, studies

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier 99

of Europeanization tend to focus on the EU and its rules as a source of change in the CEECs and are therefore likely to overstate the EU’s influence. Disentangling the effects of Europeanization from those of other processes is easiest when EU institutions and policies differ clearly from domestic legacies and preferences as well as from other international rules. Often, however, there is a correspondence of rules. In democratic conditionality, for instance, EU demands were very similar to those of NATO and even copied older demands by the OSCE and the Council of Europe. In such cases, the disentanglement of influences requires a careful process tracing of the adaptation process to see whether and to what extent target state responses and changes can be linked plausibly to EU interventions. That being said, there is considerable evidence that Europeanization has become the most relevant source of domestic change in the CEECs in the second half of the 1990s. Whereas in the early 1990s, the adoption of EU rules in the CEECs has been patchy and selective and domestic change has been inspired more strongly by other regional and global international organizations (including the International Financing Institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), the US, and domestic and sub-regional influences, the establishment of a credible accession conditionality and the beginning of accession negotiations clearly changed the picture. In the second half of the 1990s, the EU not only crowded out other sources of institutions and policies, but it also achieved rule adoption where other organizations had failed (such as in minority protection). In other words, in many areas of EU competency, Europeanization superseded the transition, Westernization, or globalization of the CEECs as the dominant motor of institutional change.

7.4 Conclusion The literature on the conditionality as a key instrument of the Europeanization of candidate countries can be evaluated with regard to its substantive, theoretical and methodological dimensions. The substantive dimension concerns the extent of the EU’s influence on candidate countries. The literature broadly agrees that the EU’s influence has been pervasive with regard to the acquis communautaire. While the CEECs emulated certain EU rules before the EU set its conditionality, such more voluntary rule adoption was selective and adaptive. Once the EU explicitly spelled out the rules of the acquis that new members would have to adopt, rule adoption increased dramatically across candidate countries and policy areas. By contrast, the EU’s ability to promote democracy in candidate countries was more limited. Whereas the EU was powerless to induce authoritarian governments to adopt democratic rules and practices that would have endangered their powerbase, it worked effectively as a “lock-in” of democratic change once authoritarian parties and elites had lost office.

100

Politics and Polity

A theoretical evaluation of the mechanisms under which EU conditionality was most effective supports the explanatory factors emphasized by rational choice institutionalism, rather than those advanced by sociological institutionalism. A key factor is the domestic cost of adopting EU rules. In the context of democratic conditionality, the domestic power costs of governments explain well their inclinations to comply with the EU’s conditionality. In the context of acquis conditionality, the adoption costs in individual policy areas were not prohibitive; these costs only influence the timing, but not the likelihood of rule adoption as such. Rule adoption then depended crucially on the credibility of conditionality, which in particular hinged on the start of accession negotiations. While the factors emphasized by constructivist and sociological institutionalism appear to be unable to explain the broader patterns of candidate country Europeanization, we note one area in which the insights of these approaches appear particularly important. Rule transfer through conditional incentives is more likely to result in a continued contestation of EU rules in domestic politics than rules transferred through mechanisms of socialization and persuasion. These differences in the dominant mechanism of pre-accession rule adoption might then become causally relevant for the likelihood of compliance problems after accession. With regard to methodology, we note that comparative design is paramount in studying the relevance of conditionality and accession for Europeanization. Such comparative design can be organized in different ways. First, we may compare candidates from different enlargement rounds. From such a comparison we can learn more about how domestic, or region-specific, conditions account for variation in accession Europeanization. Second, we may compare different contexts and stages in the process of accession Europeanization. In this case, variation is according to the intensity of the institutionalized relationship with the EU. These stages range from no institutionalized relationship via association and accession negotiations to early membership. These variations allow us to analyze the systemic context variables of Europeanization and the dynamics of the Europeanization process. It also includes the analysis of differences between pre-accession Europeanization and post-accession behavioral compliance with given rules. A third comparison may be by issues. It distinguishes member and non-member Europeanization with regard to specific rules and policies. This conclusion suggests one main area for future research in this area: how does the dominant mode of pre-accession Europeanization affect post-accession compliance once the candidates have obtained membership? Much of the compliance and implementation literature focuses on country-level factors, such as capacity limitations that might lead to involuntary defection and high adoption costs that facilitate strategic non-compliance. Our analysis suggests that important insights into post-accession compliance can be gained by focusing on

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier 101

the micro-level, i.e. specific policy areas or particular rules. Depending on the mechanism of pre-accession rule transfer – conditional incentives or social learning – we would expect different pathways of post-accession compliance.

Acknowledgement Ulrich Sedelmeier gratefully acknowledges funding from a Marie Curie Fellowship at the European University Institute (contract MEIF-CT-2005–514104).

Key readings Grabbe, H. (2001). How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(6) 1013–31. Hughes, J, G. Sasse, and C. Gordon (2004). Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Jacoby, W. (2004). The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Schimmelfennig, F. and U. Sedelmeier (eds) (2005). The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Vachudova, M. (2005). Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration Since 1989. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

8 Regulatory Governance David Levi-Faur

8.1 Introduction The European Union is now conventionally described as a regulatory state par excellence (Knill and Lenshow 2004: 218; Majone 1994a; McGowan and Wallace 1996; Loughlin and Scott 1997; Lodge 2001; Laegreid et al. 2005). While there are some doubts as to the appropriateness and usefulness of characterizing the European Union as a “state”, there is no doubt that the intersection of regulation and Europeanization creates one of the most intriguing political spaces of our era. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that scholars of European politics and policy are increasingly interested in regulatory change across such diverse areas as telecommunications, competition, finance, health, environment, food, equal opportunities, minority rights and labor standards. Accordingly, there is also strong and increasing interest in issues of regulatory design and in the growth in the number of regulatory agencies and probably also in the scope of their authority. Regulation, despite some expectations to the contrary, is still high on the agenda of scholars and is expanding in Europe and also well beyond it. Indeed, regulation – as both policy instrument and subject of study – is here to stay despite the assertion that it is deregulation that is the defining characteristic of our era. Surprisingly enough, and seemingly by stealth, Europe is experiencing a dramatic growth of regulation across diverse levels and arenas of political action (Vogel 1995; Majone 1997; Levi-Faur 2005; Gilardi 2005). Alasdair Young suggested that “the single market programme is probably the most far-reaching and ambitious regulatory project in the world” (Young, 2007). Majone (1997) asserted that Europeanization amounts to very little without regulation because the EU’s power to tax and spend is greatly constrained. Yet the close relations between Europeanization and regulation are served by more than these budgetary constraints. As asserted by Scot Jacobs, once head of the OECD’s program on regulatory reforms, far from living in an age of deregulation, we live in the 102

David Levi-Faur 103

golden age of regulation (cited in Levi-Faur 2005). Growing expectations of a “riskless society” on the one hand and a shrinking willingness to trust political authorities on the other contribute to increasing reliance on regulation that reduces risks and replace some trust relations by others (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). Even if the constraints on the EU’s powers to tax and spend are somehow relaxed, we have good reason to expect the intimate relations between Europeanization and regulation to develop further. Indeed, to study Europeanization without reflecting on the nature of regulation as system of controls, or to study regulation without close attention to European Union developments, is to miss important elements of our political, economic and social order. It might be useful to start with a brief clarification of the notions of Europeanization and regulation as they are to be applied here. Regulation is the promulgation of an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by some mechanism for monitoring and promoting compliance with those rules. This set of rules can be shaped by a public or a private authority, and at the international or national levels; and it can target sector-specific as well as economy-wide action (cf. Baldwin et al. 1998: 3; Parker and Braithwaite 2003; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004: 2–4; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). I understand Europeanization to be the development of institutions and actors at the European level. Accordingly, I suggest that we can talk of a process of Europeanization to the extent that there is institutional development at that level and that this development is characterized also by new types of actors that derive their power from the EU-level institutions, policy and politics. This definition captures some of the more important dimensions of Europeanization as explicated by Olsen (2005) and by Cowles et al. (2001). Yet, unlike these definitions, it emphasizes the co-evolution of actors and not only institutions as criteria for the evaluation of the process of political change. In this respect, our definition of Europeanization reflects the balance between actors and institutions as put forward by Scharpf (1997) better than notions which pay attention solely to institutional aspects. The definition leaves for empirical investigation the question of the domestic effects of Europeanization which this essay suggest might be less direct, less tangible and less critical than many assume. Regulation and Europeanization are intimately connected. Take, for example, the following definition of Europeanization by Radaelli (2003: 30): Europeanization consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies.

104

Politics and Polity

Rules and procedures, therefore, stand at the core of what is constructed, diffused and institutionalized as the essence of Europeanization. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that regulation and Europeanization advance hand in hand to create an innovative and, in some respects, unprecedented multi-level system of regulatory governance. This innovative system may well fashion model governance for the coming century well beyond Europe; and at its core stand elaborate, complex and challenging systems of regulation. Changes in our understanding of regulation, regulatory instruments and regulatory compliance are expressed in the way the European system of governance is constructed. To study the European model of multi-level regulatory governance is to study some of the most important features of international politics and policy for the twenty-first century.

8.2 Core questions Europeanization and regulation were brought together in the most forceful way in the work of Giandomenico Majone, whose work has dominated the field over the last decade. It is Majone who single-handedly “virtually invented the notion of a ‘European regulatory state’ ” (Moran 2003: 17) and it is therefore only natural to start the discussion with his work. Majone suggested that changes in the governance of capitalist economy and society are best expressed as a transformation from a “positive state” to a “regulatory state”. This transformation is evident in the amalgamation of five shifts: (i) from taxing and spending to rule making; (ii) from centralized bureaucracy to autonomous agencies; (iii) from party and parliamentary politics to legalistic and professional politics; (iv) from corporatist to pluralist political culture; and (v) from direct to indirect political accountability (Majone 1997). Majone’s interest in the process of regulatory change is derived from his interest in EU integration and EU public policy processes. His research agenda therefore prioritizes problematization of Europeanization over that of regulation and regulatory change generally. Most important, in his interpretation the driving force of regulatory change is Europeanization as a causal force. The Europeanization of policy making (by which he meant the increasing interdependence of domestic and supranational policies within Europe) involves two major aspects. The first is the central position of regulation at the EU level and the second involves the impact of EU policies on regulatory developments in the member states (Majone 1997: 144). The progress of Europeanization is the progress of re-regulation at the EU level, accompanied by an increasing transfer of authority to the EU level. Re-regulation at the European level and the ensuing supra-nationalist interpretation of the process seems to reflect the decline of “taxing and spending” policies and of the “positive state” more generally. The assumption that Europeanization is “force majeure” in the domestic political process of the member state is either explicitly or implicitly embedded in his work.

David Levi-Faur 105

Majone not only characterized the change and defined its ultimate outcomes, but he also set out (somewhat less successfully to my mind) the explanatory framework to deal with it. Regulatory change is portrayed by Majone (1997: 140) as the outcome of the concentration of several basic strategies: “privatization, liberalization and deregulation … fiscal retrenchment, economic and monetary integration and various policy innovations associated with the New Public Management paradigm”. The most important causal forces are threefold. First is the perceived failure of public ownership modes of control and the ensuing turn to privatization policies. This led him to suggest that regulation serves as an alternative mode of control for public ownership. A second source of the rise of regulation in Europe is the process of Europeanization itself. Fiscal constraints make regulation the preferred instrument of government at the EU level, leading, in a second stage, to the proliferation of regulatory agencies and regulation at the national level. In order to take an active part in the formulation of new rules at the EU level, and then to implement them at the national level: [M]ember states have been forced to develop regulatory capacities on an unprecedented scale. (Majone 1997: 146) It is the reluctance on the part of member states to increase the taxing and spending options of the EU that led them to give up on the regulation “front”: Paradoxically, the attempt of the member states to limit the scope of supranational polices by imposing a tight and rigid budget constraint on the Commission has favored the development of a mode of policy making that is largely immune from budgetary discipline. (Majone 1998: 26–7) The third cause of the growth in regulation is a shift from direct to indirect or proxy government. The various aspects of this development include “administrative decentralization and regionalization; the breakdown of formerly monolithic entities into single-purpose units with autonomous budgets; delegation of responsibility for service delivery to private and non-private agencies, competitive tendering and other contractual or quasi-contractual arrangements” (Majone 1997: 146). Here Majone makes an implicit link to theories of regulatory governance, as he suggests that new forms of control and accountability and responsibility are emerging as a force that propels the regulatory explosion at the European level. Citing Seidman and Gilmour’s Politics, Position and Power he suggests: If policy makers wish to control or influence agencies and other organizations operating at arm’s length, they must do so by contractual arrangements, and by means of rules and regulations: “government by regulation is the inevitable concomitant of government by proxy”. (Majone 1997: 147)

106

Politics and Polity

One may note the circularity of the analysis as the third cause of growth of regulation is also one of the five characteristics of the regulatory state as described above. Yet, for our purposes it might be useful to discuss the turn in Majone’s attention after 1997 to the rise of the regulatory agencies as the administrative nerve centers of the regulatory state. Majone examines the rise of agencies in general and regulatory agencies in particular through an exploration of the logic of delegation. How can one explain, he asks, the willingness of legislators and political executives to delegate powers to institutions independent of the political process? The answer he offers is basically and most prominently framed as a solution for the low credibility of intergovernmental regulatory agreements on the one hand and democratic politics on the other. While there is more than one reason (or logic) for the act of delegation, he suggests that the central reason is policy credibility rather than the alternative explanations that were proposed by scholars, including the demand for expertise, blame shifting by politicians and decision costs. Policy credibility explanations suggest that governments delegate authority in order to enhance the credibility of their policies in the eyes of their citizens, potential investors, and other governments (Franchino 2002). The demand for “credible commitment” is increasing in an age of international interdependence and should therefore be especially strong in the EU policy context. Here policy credibility becomes an essential condition of policy effectiveness and is achieved to a large extent through the delegation of powers to autonomous institutions (Majone 1996: 616). Majone discusses some of the implications of the growing delegation to regulatory agencies and regulators (and, more generally, to non-majoritarian institutions), including the problems of democratic deficit and challenges to legitimacy and accountability, but he is essentially concerned with the strengthening of the policy credibility of the regulatory institutions of the European Union. Normatively he clearly prioritizes the efficacy and efficiency of policies over the goals of democratic legitimacy and political accountability of the technocrats. Member states’ objections to further increases in the scope of the EU’s authority are portrayed as the major obstacle to strengthening the regulatory powers of the EU. The particular form of Europeanization that Majone envisions goes beyond increasing delegation to the Commission. He suggests that the growing complexity of the Community policy-making system should be matched by greater functional differentiation, in particular by the explicit assignment of an autonomous role to EU-level agencies. These agencies are expected to take over responsibilities both from the EU Commission, which is increasingly portrayed as a politicized form of supranational institution, and from the member states. Such a development represents a new stage in the strategic use of regulation and regulatory theory in the service of Europeanization. Unlike Majone, Thatcher and Gilardi focused on regulatory developments at the domestic level, thus offering a new dimension for the study of the regulatory

David Levi-Faur 107

state. Thatcher embarked on a study of the regulatory agencies in the larger countries of Europe and focused on their autonomy from ministerial supervision and from the regulatee, and on their decision-making processes (Thatcher 2002a, 2002b). His findings emphasized the continuity of national variations or the persistence of divergence, as well as the interaction of contextual and functional factors in determining the shape and direction of change. Adopting a principal-agent perspective, he later revisited the issue of agencies’ autonomy and examined their legitimacy problems and operation in a broader framework (Coen and Thatcher 2005; Thatcher 2005). Gilardi (2002, 2005) dealt with similar issues but developed an index of agency autonomy (probably the first such index outside central banking) and applied quantitative analysis to the topic. The design of regulatory agencies is best understood, he concluded, by the credibility aspirations of government. Again, unlike Majone, Gilardi seems to believe that member states’ politics merit scholarly attention even in the era of Europeanization. Yet the link between EU-level regulatory change and member states’ politics remains largely unexplored and still open to debate even in the work of these authors. Consequently, as I will elaborate soon, the link between regulatory developments at the EU level and those at the member state level remains largely unexplored. When it is explored, the research design of the scholarship often suffers from serious problems of case selection and validity (Haverland, this volume).

8.3 Key problems The domestic effects of EU-level changes constitute probably the most important issue to be raised in the context of this volume. The dominant account of the domestic effects is, unsurprisingly, that of Majone, who detects a territorial shift from “the national” to the “European” (Majone 1997). The domestic effects of Europeanization, not unlike much of the 1980s literature on the effects on globalization of the nation-state, are expressed in something like the “hollowing out” of the member state. Indeed, this view gets some support from the growth in the number and power of regulatory agencies at the EU level. More than 25 agencies have so far been established at the European level. These agencies were established in diverse policy fields such as vocational training, safety and health at work, food safety, aviation safety, maritime safety, railway safety and interoperability, and police cooperation. They employ more than 2,700 statutory staff and receive a total EU subsidy of almost €300 million a year (Szapiro 2005: 1; see also Kelemen 2002; Majone 2002b). Note, however, that these agencies, with the notable exception of the European Central Bank, are social regulatory agencies, and that a critical number of them were established after 2000. If one examines developments at the member state level, however, it becomes clear that regulatory agencies were established earlier

108

Politics and Polity

(mostly in the mid-1990s) and that most of them were established in the economic rather than social sphere (Gilardi et al. 2006). The standard account, as formulated by Majone (1997: 9), of the establishment of regulatory agencies at the member state level suggests that member states have been forced to develop regulatory capacities in order to take an active part in the formulation of all these new rules in Brussels, and then to implement them at national level. Elsewhere I have expressed some serious doubts about the alleged effects of Europeanization on the member states in two important industries (telecoms and electricity). I have also claimed that Europe does not vary that much from Latin America on a number of indicators and that this may suggest that the European Union has a less pervasive presence in the member states than is usually suggested (Levi-Faur 2002). It might well be the case that the sources of regulatory change are to be found and best explored from a diffusion perspective and are dominated by a global rather than a European change in the thinking about the relation between states and the economy (Levi-Faur 2002; Levi-Faur and Jordana, 2005; Gilardi et al. 2006). Indeed, by Majone’s (2002b) own account, legal prohibitions (the Meroni Doctrine and Article 7 of the EC Treaty) constrain the ability of the EU to create fully independent regulatory institutions at the European level; but he portrays this situation as anachronistic, and forecasts that functional pressures will lead to the creation of an elaborate structure of regulatory institutions at the European level in the not too distant future (Majone 2002c: 303). The top-down view of the domestic effects of Europeanization leaves many questions unanswered. If the sources of change are indeed at the EU level, why the imbalance in the establishment of agencies between social and economic arenas? And if the member states are forced to develop regulatory capacities, why are they capable of blocking the establishment of regulatory agencies in important economic sectors? Indeed, efforts to create European regulatory agencies either ended in failure (for telecoms, see Levi-Faur 1999; Michalis 2003) or did not eventuate at all (for electricity, see Jakobsen 2004). The only case of a powerful regulatory agency at the European level, though hardly a marginal exception, is the European Central Bank (Jabko 2004; McNamara 2001). As an alternative to influential regulatory agencies at the regional level, which have proved so difficult to establish, the European Commission is promoting networks of national regulators and a coherent European identity in each sector through the exchange of information (Dehousse 1997). A group of European telecommunications regulators was established in Paris in 1997 to coordinate on issues of market liberalization, as well as acting as an advisory body to the European Commission. For electricity, the Florence Forum of European regulators was established in 1998 and its existence formalized in 2003 (Decision 2003/796/EC of 11 November 2003). In the regulation of securities and exchange, a Federation of European Securities Commissions (FESCO)

David Levi-Faur 109

was set up in 1997 (Muegge 2004). The common denominator of all these arrangements is their low level of institutionalization. All this represents some important challenges for Majone’s “top-down” view of the role of EU institutions as a major source of regulatory change at the member state level. Another difficulty with Majone’s interpretation (which is probably widely accepted) is manifested in the claim that the EU is becoming the major source of legislation in the member states. “Even in Britain”, wrote Majone (1997: 9), “the chairman of the Health and Safety Commission has recently noted that the EC must now be regarded as the principal engine of health and safety regulations affecting the UK, not just in worker safety but in major hazards and most environmental matters”. A recent paper by Christensen (2005) examines this widespread belief, critically arguing that it is empirically unsupported and inherently imprecise. For one thing, it is an analytically complex task but the challenge, as Christensen approaches it, reveals that the EU effect is more elusive than is usually portrayed in the literature. In his words, despite the extension of EU power and scope: [t]he EU of the millennium was still far from being the prime political and legal source of at least economic regulation … (p. 26) It might be useful, therefore, to open the question of the relations between Europeanization and regulatory change. A second important problem touches on the nature of regulatory change in the European system of governance. For Majone (1997: 140), the regulatory state is about “limiting the role of the interventionist or positive state”. The regulatory “state” is portrayed as a neoliberal state and, it is only reasonable to infer, the “Europeanization” of regulation is for Majone a process that structures neoliberal actors and institutions at the heart of Europe. This is probably why he suggests that he viewed the growth of regulation as mainly driven by the EU. It is not that Majone did not recognize that much of what is usually understood as “deregulation” is really about “re-regulation”. He certainly did, yet the real scale and scope of regulatory expansion hardly featured in his work as something that was puzzling in its own right, and the “neoliberal” features of the change are emphasized in the face of contradictory evidence. Indeed, even critical accounts of Majone, such as that offered by Jabko (2004), agree with him on this interpretation. Yet to suggest that Europeanization is about the promotion of a neoliberal agenda through regulation is to ignore some of its key characteristics. First, regulation is by its very nature a form of intervention. Some regulations represent more intrusive forms of intervention than taxing and spending; their application can be inflexible, rigid and alienating (Bardach and Kagan 1982). Moreover, consider the regulatory explosion that characterized fields like competition, telecommunications, finance, the

110

Politics and Polity

environment and food safety over the past two decades (Vogel 1996; Levi-Faur 2005). On the one hand governments and other actors used their power to open a space for market and commercial activity. On the other hand they used multiple regulatory controls to create an ever-more intrusive system of governance. Regulation-for-competition created a “new state” that is more neomercantilist than neoliberal (Levi-Faur 1998; Jordana et al. 2006; but see Cerny 2004). A similar critique came recently from the pen of Moran, who assessed Majone’s characterization of the European regulatory state in light of the British developments: These images, then, identify the regulatory state with withdrawal from utopian interventionism, with the construction of regulatory institutions to fit the new task of steering, and with renunciation of command. … They are images of great analytical and rhetorical power. Unfortunately, they are also inaccurate, or at best only half accurate. (Moran 2003: 6) This observation by a British scholar on the basis of the British experience is especially important since Britain is the European prototype of a regulatory state. The observation led Moran to raise the possibility that “[i]t may be that the European regulatory state is not at all as Majone imagines; that it has its own interventionist ambitions and utopian projects quite as marked as older interventionist systems” (Moran 2003: 21). After the great crisis of the 1970s, the state in Britain did indeed scale down many of its central ambitions, argues Moran, but it also acquired some startling new ones. It did indeed renounce many responsibilities that lay at the heart of the positive state, but the turn to regulatory modes of control also greatly widened the range of social and economic life that was subject to public power. A portrayal of regulation and regulatory reforms in general as the manifestation of the “retreat” and “hollowing out” of the state may be therefore misleading and represent an oversimplification of the nature of the change and the forces that shape it. A third problem is that in some accounts, including Majone’s, the regulatory state is portrayed as a functionalist or adaptive response to changing economic and technological conditions. Politics comes into the picture in the form of member states’ objections to the requirements of adaptation and in the more general form of ideational change, which is the public’s “rediscovery of efficiency” (Majone 1996). The adaptive nature of regulatory developments at the EU level and therefore of Europeanization more generally is expressed in the dominance of delegation theories in the study of regulatory change in general and the establishment of regulatory agencies in particular. Most important in this respect are delegation explanations that emphasize transaction costs, the pressures for credible commitment, and time inconsistency as an explanation for the delegation of regulatory powers (Majone 1999; Gilardi 2002). Yet, as

David Levi-Faur 111

Thatcher (2002a,b 2005) and Elgie and McMenamin (2005) showed, these functionalist explanations only very partially explain the widespread forms of delegation upward to the EU and downward to domestic institution. Coen (2005) demonstrates the persistence of strong national and sectoral variations in business-agencies interactions that cannot be accounted for by functional or market explanations. Eberlein and Grande (2005: 90) recently concluded that these “functional pressures rarely translate seamlessly into corresponding allocations of regulatory authority”. In rather similar vein, Jabko (2004: 215) argues that “it is important to see the regulatory state for what it is, that is, a form of coercive state power instead of a non-political and arguably utopian form of state power”. In his interpretation the emergence of Europe as a regulatory state is the result of “political maneuvering by the commission, rather than evolving functional requirements” ( Jabko 2004: 200). Jabko seems to point to the prominence of political processes at the intersection between Europeanization and regulation. Finally, proponents of the new regulatory order advocate depoliticization and technocratization of the new order (Harcourt and Radaelli 1999). This is an old theme of mainstream liberalism and it may therefore be claimed that there is nothing new in this process and that it doesn’t represent a severe challenge. Indeed, the advantages of delegation from politicians to experts were recognized very early in the American context of regulatory governance. Thus, Bernstein wrote in the mid-1950s: In general, the commission form has been championed by those who believe that administrative regulation requires a high degree of expertness, a mastery of technical detail, and continuity and stability of policy. These requirements, it is alleged, can only be met by a board of commissioners functioning in a neutral environment, free from partisan political considerations. (Bernstein 1955: 4) Similarly, in the current European context, Majone (1994a: 81) emphasizes that regulation requires detailed knowledge of, and intimate involvement with, the regulated activity. Yet while the “technocratization” of politics and policy is not new, and while there are grounds for believing that the new European agencies are less autonomous than the American ones (Eisner 2000; Scott 2003), the process of change in the making of the current regulatory order goes further than that. Indeed, the rise of the “regulatory state” at the European level is accompanied by a growth in the scope of authority and autonomy of a new type of public servant, best called “regulocrats”. Unlike their elders, the bureaucrats, the regulocrats are free from the direct and formal controls by elected members of the executive branch of government. Not only are they free from the direct control of the executive branch, but they seem increasingly to be

112

Politics and Polity

members of transnational networks of regulators, well beyond the state (Slaughter 2004; Eberlein and Grande 2005: 90–1). These empirical observations are often followed by strong normative advocacy. For Majone, the rise of regulocracy is a necessary condition for depoliticization and the institutionalization of regimes for “credible commitment”. Bartle (2006) suggests that this reflects a rationalist-procedural model of policy making and contrasts it with a “republican-participatory” model. While the first model draws on the American administrative experience and on clearly defined administrative procedures to ensure good administration and accountability, the second rests on skepticism about an easy separation of economics and politics and on a republican theory of participative citizenship as laid out by Ayres and Braithwaite’s (1992) theory of “responsive regulation”. Rather than advocating either of these models, Bartle suggests that each has its own limitations and that probably the best way forward in terms of institutional design is to rely on careful selection of accountability-maximizing elements of both models.

8.4 Evaluation Probably the greatest challenge to scholars of Europeanization is to overcome the tendency to study it in the framework of conventional “statist” forms of political order and power and at the same time to overcome the tendency to develop a Euro-centered analysis. When a comparative analysis is applied it is often confined to the history of regulation in the United States and its particular form of federalism (e.g. Kelemen 2003; Doren and Wilks 1998). While this is useful, other comparative strategies may be of value as well. The European Union is an exceptional political order but it does not stand outside the more general frames, interests and institutions that shape our world. Moreover, it may well project the way forward for many countries and regions in other parts of the world, an expectation that is only forcing the need to study it in a more global context. The challenges are not easy to tackle as scholars are required to deal with three shifts: from government to governance (Rhodes 1997), from the national to the regional and the global (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992) and from unitary state to disaggregated states (Slaughter 2004: 12). All these three shifts are hardly new to scholars of Europeanization and, more generally, to scholars of the European Union; and all of them require us to move beyond the notion of “regulatory state” (Kohler-Koch 1999; Jachtenfuchs 2001). To do so might prove useful not only in a purely theoretical sense but also in more “mundane” and practical ways, notably through a more profound critique of the malaises of Europeanization and a more powerful exposition of its promises.

David Levi-Faur 113

If Europe is at the same time more and less than a “regulatory state”, how can one best capture its nature? And, if regulation is not necessarily primarily about neoliberal goals and interest, what is it about? Elsewhere I argued against a Euro-centered bias and have suggested that the changes in Europe, including the rise of the “regulatory state”, are best understood in the framework of the rise of new order of “regulatory capitalism”. I suggested characterizing this order as an order that is at the same time more open than is usually portrayed by pessimists and more socially and politically oriented than is usually portrayed by proponents of neoliberalism (Levi-Faur 2004, 2005; Henisz et al. 2005; Jabko 2004). This new order rests on regulation to an unprecedented degree, and it is not surprising that it is characterized by both the advantages and the pathologies of governance by rule making (Sunstein 1990). More generally, and with an eye well beyond Europe, the notion of “regulatory capitalism” requires us to reconsider and possibly modify our understanding of the working of power and politics; to identify and explain new instruments of governance and to point to the problems and challenges that are either intended or unintended consequences of the new order. Most important, it might be useful to better explore the working of multi-level systems of governance, especially those systems where states matter but not necessarily in a hierarchical or coercive manner. At the same time, in order to best capture the changing pattern of governance we may also need to work beyond the zero-sum assumptions that characterize the current literature on Europeanization and regulation. It may well be that more authority at the EU level is accompanied by more authority at the national and organizational levels. If new instruments of regulation are expanding the tools and the scope of power that are available to political and social actors, the zero-sum assumption is less valid than it might have been in the past. In short, we may want to move away from the zero-sum assumption that dominates our scholarship, or at least place ourselves at some critical distance from it. If scholars of regulation and Europeanization succeed in this goal, their contribution may be felt well beyond Europe and well beyond the sub-discipline of European Union studies.

Acknowledgements Many fine contributions to the literature on European regulatory reforms lie beyond the scope of this 5,500-word chapter. I apologize to any of my colleagues who are not covered in my brief literature survey. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the comments and advice from the editors of this volume, from an excellent anonymous referee and from my colleagues Fabrizio Gilardi and Per Laegreid. As I was only partly responsive to their comments, responsibility for the final product remains exclusively mine.

114

Politics and Polity

Key readings Eberlein, B. and E. Grande (2005) Beyond Delegation: Transnational Regulatory Regimes and the EU Regulatory State. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(1) 89–112. Gilardi, F. (2005) The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe. Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Sciences, 598(1) 84–101. Jordana, J. and D. Levi-Faur (eds) (2004) The Politics of Regulation in the Age of Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Levi-Faur, D. (2005) The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 598(1) 12–32. Majone, G. (1994a) The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe. West European Politics, 17(3) 77–101.

9 State Structures Peter Bursens

9.1 Introduction In a paper on methodological aspects of Europeanization, Falkner (2003a) suggests that much more work should go into the operationalization of the variables used. This observation is also a relevant point of departure for an overview of the impact of the EU on the state structures of its member states. How can state structures be operationalized as a relevant focus within the Europeanization research agenda? Taking the threefold distinction between policies, politics and polity, this contribution focuses primarily on the Europeanization of the domestic institutional set-up (as part of the polity dimension) while also touching on the Europeanization of the process of domestic European policy making (as part of the politics dimension). More concretely, two issues will be addressed. First of all, the main focus is on the impact of European integration on domestic inter-institutional relations, in particular on the central–regional relationships (the polity dimension); secondly, attention will be paid to the role of central–regional relations in the creation of coordination mechanisms for the uploading and downloading of European policies as a response to EU membership (the politics dimension). Such an analysis of the relations between domestic institutions and layers clearly offers added value to overviews of the European impact on individual institutions. The inter-institutional perspective in this overview discusses the impact of European integration on the relations, not inside isolated components of states, but between governmental institutions and layers of the member states. A review of the relevant literature on Europeanization of the politics and polity features as defined above immediately uncovers the fact that there are many articles and books on the Europeanization of policies but that Europeanization of the polity has received much less attention. In this respect, Olsen (2002: 937) writes that “… there have been a limited number of studies of the adaptation of the polity at large …”. In addition, Anderson (2002) observes 115

116

Politics and Polity

that the Europeanization of the polity is far less studied and that it even often serves as a background for studying the Europeanization of policies. Featherstone (2003: 6) has also conducted an analysis of academic articles on Europeanization and equally found an overrepresentation on the policy focus. Authoritative books and (collections of) articles indeed have a dominant focus on policies and (less) on politics: see, for example, Featherstone and Radaelli’s The Politics of Europeanization (2003a) or the Journal of European Public Policy (2004/6) special issue on the Europeanization of Italy. A similar observation can be made for work on methodological aspects, such as Knill and Lehmkuhl’s article (2002b) on the different mechanisms of Europeanization. They focus almost entirely on the domestic adaptation of policies and politics. The question then becomes whether these mechanisms can be extended to polity aspects and more in particular to the relations between domestic governance layers. Despite the observation that policy studies are overrepresented, there is still a substantial literature dealing with politics and polity features that were singled out as the focus of this chapter. Two kinds of literature in particular are found to be relevant: volumes on domestic mechanisms for the coordination and implementation of national European policies and more explicit studies on how European integration affects domestic inter-institutional relationships.

9.2 Core research questions The topic of the Europeanization of state structures can cover many specific features. This contribution focuses on one specific aspect of domestic state structures: the relations between the central/national/federal level of government on the one hand and the decentralized/regional level of government on the other hand. Does European integration alter these relations, if so in what direction and under which circumstances? To answer these questions, we firstly turn to the literature on national coordination mechanisms. These studies focus on the question of how member states organize themselves to comply with the requirements of EU membership. The issue of center–periphery relations is only one object of study in these works, but it is one that has received increasing levels of attention over the years. The literature on coordination mechanisms can be divided into three distinct generations. The first generation can be considered Europeanization literature avant la lettre: although it is written without or with only very limited explicit framing in the Europeanization literature, it already addresses how member states set up coordination mechanisms in response to European requirements. That most of these “early” works hardly mention center–periphery relations, should not be surprising because they either discuss member states where the central– regional divide was (not yet) an issue, especially not in EU policy making (e.g. Wallace and Wallace 1973 on the UK; Lequesne 1993 on France) or they

Peter Bursens 117

approach the issue from a organizational or management perspective (cf. Metcalfe 1994). From this first generation, Helen Wallace’s 1973 book deserves more substantial consideration. It can be considered to be the first volume to offer a comparative discussion of how national governments organize themselves to determine national positions and to defend their interests at the European level. Wallace uses a Europeanization vocabulary in pre-Europeanization times. More importantly, as early as 1973 Wallace touches upon core concepts of the later Europeanization literature, including domestic inter-institutional relations. One example is the question of divergence versus convergence. She suggests that the impact of European integration does not lead to convergence among member state approaches. “There are deep rooted differences in administrative traditions and political style which account for significant variations in the adaptation of individual governments to Community membership” (1973: 86). Referring to the effects of – then – EC membership on inter-institutional relations she states that “… Community membership exerts some pressures for greater centralization … In the long term, this may contribute to the strengthening of the powers and the administrative resources of heads of government” (1973: 85). In short, Wallace starts the discussion on the impact of the EU on domestic inter-institutional relations, but does not go as far as to focus explicitly on the relations between different layers of government. The second generation consists of a rather extensive list of edited volumes, covering most, if not all member states. Many of these are still written without explicit reference to Europeanization. In fact, some of them make hardly any reference at all to a theory. However, even these studies can be regarded as early Europeanization studies, because they describe how member states have installed domestic procedures to deal with the coordination of preference formation and with the transposition and application of European regulations. The more recent these works are, the more the descriptive case studies become framed by theoretical chapters and the more central–regional–local relations become an object of scrutiny. Pappas (1995) presents a series of well-documented and informative case studies. The chapters on the (quasi-)federal states describe how regional authorities are involved in national EU policy making. The authors of this reader concur in their observations that federal state structures shape the way in which EU policy making is organized. However, lacking any theoretical perspective, they are unable to draw any significant conclusions with respect to the broader consequences for central–regional relations. Similar evaluations can be given of Siedentopf and Ziller’s (1988) study on the implementation mechanisms of the member states and Petiteville’s (1999) volume on the elaboration of national positions. The latter succeeds in distinguishing between centralized, decentralized and complex coordination mechanisms corresponding with unitary,

118

Politics and Polity

decentralized and federal member states, but it fails to analyze this observation any further than the statement that national political systems determine their European policies. Furthermore, the volume edited by Zeff and Pirro (2001) offers almost no theoretical framework, hence delivering a heterogeneous series of chapters which hardly begin to address the issue of central–regional relations. Hanf and Soetendorp (1998) adopt an exclusive focus on governmental adaptation in small member states. Using the process of adaptation as a central concept they move away from purely descriptive work towards a more theoryframed overview of member states, although still not explicitly within the Europeanization framework. Kassim et al. (2000b) provide a nice – comparative politics – theory-framed example of how analyses of domestic coordination structures de facto come down to studies of Europeanization. Although they explicitly regard the concept of Europeanization “undesirable” for their purposes (Kassim 2000: 235), they refer to mechanisms that Europeanization studies would also consider. In their introductory chapter, for instance, the editors write that “[the] need to co-ordinate policy in response to EU membership may be a common stimulus, but … the member countries responded differently” (Kassim et al. 2000b: 2). In line with previous studies, they find that despite a number of pressures for convergence (common European pressures, learning processes, coercion, socialization and optimization), member states’ patterns of coordination remain quite distinctive, because of differing national policy styles, national notions of coordination and political and administrative opportunity structures. In the concluding chapter, Kassim (2000: 257) touches upon what he calls “the systemic implications” of the installation of coordination mechanisms. Concluding that “[A]t the domestic level, the development of coordinating structures has altered the pre-existing institutional balance” (2000: 257), Kassim claims that adaptation to EU requirements has changed the relation of the executive vis-à-vis the legislative and has altered the position of the regional entities vis-à-vis the federal level. In later work Kassim (2003a: 105) makes a useful exercise to categorize types of national coordination systems. Distinguishing between comprehensive centralizers (France and UK), selective centralizers (Ireland and Spain) and comprehensive decentralizers (Germany and Belgium), he confirms that the particular types of state structures reshape themselves through the installation of EU coordination mechanisms. Rometsch and Wessels (1996) and Wessels et al. (2003) both expect that EU policy making triggers institutional adaptation in member states and alters the domestic rules and inter-institutional distribution of means for effective participation in European governance (Wessels et al. 2003: 14). Considering the empirics from the so-called “fusion approach”, their main findings are very similar to earlier ones: national institutions mobilize additional resources and adapt their national machinery, but with only limited constitutional revisions

Peter Bursens 119

and minor institutional rearrangements. They find no evidence of convergence into one model of adapting to European integration. Instead, traditional national patterns are found to be both resistant and flexible at the same time (Wessels et al. 2003: xv). With respect to inter-institutional relations, they find uneven adaptation: parliaments and regions are weak adaptors, while governmental institutions are strong adaptors, leading to “a shift in the internal national balance of power towards governments and administrations” (Wessels et al. 2003: xvi). The third generation of national coordination studies starts from a much more explicit Europeanization perspective. Harmsen (1999) is a clear example of a small-scale comparative study of France and the Netherlands. Closa and Heywood on Spain (2004) and Giddings and Drewry on the UK (2004) are excellent illustrations of extensive work on individual member states. With respect to the German case, Dyson and Goetz (2003b: 355) write that European integration has at least “introduced increased sensitivities into federal–Länder relations”. They argue that Europeanization is a two-way process. It has not only triggered the Länder to try to improve their position vis-à-vis the federal level, but also made the Länder try to reshape the European level to their benefit. With respect to the internal relations, Dyson and Goetz state that the pre-existing strong institutional position of the Länder was crucial for their success to strengthen their position in EU affairs. Finally, the volume edited by Bulmer and Lequesne (2005a) achieves what many others before them have largely failed to do: it incorporates a series of theoretical chapters, most notably some that link the traditional rather descriptive analysis of member states’ behavior in the EU with the notion of Europeanization. Kassim’s chapter in particular is relevant for the Europeanization of state structures. Discussing the impact on subnational authorities, he claims that regional entities are strengthened by European integration (Kassim 2005). One of his most relevant conclusions is that the impact of European integration on domestic intra- and inter-institutional features is mediated by existing domestic institutional features. More concretely, European integration has strengthened strong regions – the so-called constitutional regions – more than their weaker colleagues in their position vis-à-vis the national government. In short, the following conclusions can be drawn from the coordination literature. Although it pays little attention to the impact of the EU on state structures, the coordination literature delivers some first interesting insights with respect to domestic core–periphery relations. Authors agree that the EU is not causing any convergence between the member states. The impact of the EU is strongly mediated by pre-existing domestic power balances. Overall, the coordination literature observes a trend towards a strengthening of the regional level, which is more outspoken for strong regions such as the German Länder and the Belgian Regions and Communities. The exact scope of the impact and

120

Politics and Polity

the concrete mechanisms at play, however, is not addressed. The following paragraphs will show that, to unravel the details of adaptation, we need to turn to the more explicit literature on the impact of the EU on state structures. The main research questions evolving from the literature with respect to European impact on central–regional relationships are the following. Are domestic inter-institutional relations affected by European integration? If so, what is the outcome and is there variation in the effect of European integration on these relations? If there is variation, why are some states affected more than others? And how exactly do the mechanisms of impact work? Studies discussing these questions can be divided in three categories: works on European regionalism, studies within the multi-level governance perspective and, thirdly, Europeanization literature pur sang. The work by Keating, Jones, Jeffery and others on regions and regionalism in Europe is not inspired by the Europeanization research agenda, but nevertheless relevant to mention. The central focus of Jones and Keating (1995) is the impact of EU regional policies on the relations between regions and EU institutions. Also from this point of view, it is concluded that power relationships within member states can change under European impact. Jones and Keating argue that the combination of European opportunities and regional activism results in a differentiated pattern of shifts in central–local relations (Jones and Keating 1995: 291). Jeffery (1996, 1997) and Keating (1998) add to this that in particular strong regions succeed in using EU developments to strengthen their position vis-à-vis their the central/federal level of government. Other articles on regionalism in Europe come to similar findings (see Keating 2004 for an overview). Drawing from a series of empirical studies on member states’ responses to EU policies, Hooghe equally finds that “EU cohesion policy has not left relations between central and subnational actors undisturbed” (1996b: 13). She furthermore confirms that subnational authorities in federal states are more successful than their counterparts in less decentralized states. In the same volume, Marks concludes that, at least with respect to EU cohesion policy, the EU has enabled in particular strong regions to play along with the federal level (1996: 418). In other publications, Marks and Hooghe elaborate on these ideas through the introduction of the multi-level governance approach (cf. Marks et al. 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001). Their basic argument is that European integration has weakened the national or federal governmental level (in contrast to the liberal intergovernmental perspective which claims exactly the opposite). According to Marks and Hooghe, central governments remain important players within the overall European polity, but their monopoly is effectively challenged by other public and private actors, in particular by regional authorities in decentralized and federal states. From the relevant non-Europeanization literature we conclude that empirical evidence points towards a substantive but differential impact of European

Peter Bursens 121

integration on domestic central–regional relations (cf. also Goldsmith 2003; Bache and Flinders 2004). We need to turn, however, to the Europeanization studies pur sang for further details on the what question and, above all, for answers to the how and why questions. Early Europeanization studies hypothesized that participation in European integration would lead to similar reactions on the part of member states, i.e. to a convergence in the domestic institutional set-up. By contrast, later empirical studies confirmed the findings of other literature that member states react differently, leading to the conclusion that the result of national adaptation is divergence rather than convergence. The question then remains how and under which conditions member states adapt to European integration. Most scholars agree that domestic adaptation is triggered by a misfit between member state and EU level. While several kinds of misfit can occur, especially relevant in this instance is institutional misfit, which refers to a conflict between European requirements and domestic institutional set-up. Changes in domestic inter-institutional relations are expected to happen when the existing domestic set-up endangers effective national participation in the European political game. Another broadly accepted understanding is that form and scope of the changes depend on the pre-existing domestic institutional set-up. Börzel (2005) identifies three different views on these mechanisms of Europeanization. Two of these correspond with the opposing strands of institutionalist theory. Both expect divergent outcomes. First, rational choice institutionalism supposes that the number of veto points and the presence or absence of facilitating formal institutions can predict whether or not institutional misfit leads to a resource redistribution which can enable some actors to alter domestic interinstitutional relations (Börzel 2005: 52–3). For example, Article 203 of the EC Treaty makes it possible for regional entities to represent their member states within the Council of Ministers. From a rationalist point of view, the answer to the question whether regional entities will exploit this opportunity and will hence be able to change the domestic power balance with respect to preference formation on European issues, depends upon the existing domestic rules, for instance in terms of regional foreign policy competencies. If these domestic provisions are favorable, then the combination of the European opportunity structure and the national facilitating rules will result in significant domestic change, altering the relations between the federal and the regional level. Secondly, sociological institutionalism supposes that the presence or absence of domestic norm entrepreneurs and the presence or absence of cooperative informal institutions determines whether or not respectively a conflict between European and national norms and understandings leads to the incorporation of the European norms on the domestic level, hence causing domestic change. While this perspective has been successfully applied in studies on the Europeanization of policies, it has not been used very often to explain changes in

122

Politics and Polity

domestic polities (Börzel 2005: 54–6). A third perspective draws on organizational theory. Contrary to other two perspectives, it hypothesizes that European rules, norms and practices are diffused to member states and lead, in the long run and through the mechanisms of coercion, imitation, normative pressure, competitive selection and framing, to institutional adaptation in the form of institutional isomorphism (Börzel 2005: 56–8). In the same contribution Börzel (2005: 59–60) lists five possible results of the Europeanization process. With respect to central–regional relations, domestic institutions can first of all resist to pressures for change and remain the status quo (inertia); secondly, domestic institutions of member states are changed, but in a direction other than that expected, causing more instead of less misfit (retrenchment); thirdly, member states absorb European requirements, i.e. adapt without major modifications; fourthly, member states accommodate, meaning that they change peripheral aspects of institutions; finally, member states transform, i.e. replace or alter the core aspects of existing state structures. What do empirical studies have to say about these hypotheses? In the following paragraphs a series of examples of single and comparative studies is reviewed. With respect to the Spanish state structure, Börzel (2000) finds that Spain has evolved from a system of competitive regionalism to a system of cooperative federalism. She claims that this shift, which might even be termed a transformation, is the result not of a consolidation of the Spanish state but of the Europeanization of the Spanish system in terms of an encouragement of consultation and cooperation between the different government levels. The argument is that European requirements have increased the interdependence between the federal and the regional level, stimulating both levels to cooperate on European issues. The precise form cooperative federalism ultimately takes depends on the specific domestic institutional set-up, implying that the adaptation of center–periphery relations in federal states is differential and mediated by domestic institutional features. Bursens (2004, 2006) produces similar findings in an analysis of Belgian regional participation in national preference formation towards the EU. He finds that the regional–central relations with respect to European policy-making evolve into differential sector-specific systems of joint decision-making, suggesting that the European-level impact on intra-state institutional relationships exists but is mediated by formal and informal domestic institutions (see also Kerremans and Beyers 1996). Elsewhere, Bursens (2002a) claims that the federalization process in Belgium took place with hardly any reference to the European dimension, suggesting that Belgium has indeed adapted its European policy making, but that major state reforms (i.e. changes in core institutional features) follow an almost exclusively national logic. The various chapters on individual institutions and polity features in the volume on Germany edited by Dyson and Goetz (2003a) reveal that internal

Peter Bursens 123

restructuring has taken place, also with respect to horizontal and vertical inter-institutional relationships. The impact of European integration is again found to be differential and depending on domestic institutional “incentives to Europeanize” (Dyson and Goetz 2003b: 352). One of the most relevant conclusions is that cooperative federalism, one of the core features of the German polity, is under increasing European pressure (Jeffery 2003: 102; see also Goetz 1995). Equally stressing the domestic logic of reform, Falkner (2001) argues that in the years before Austrian membership the Länder demanded a revision of the federal system, but that these reforms were not adopted. In other words, the comparatively weaker starting position within the Austrian federation makes Austrian Länder less powerful than, say, the German Länder in terms of using the European context to alter the internal power balance. In a more comparative overview, Schmidt (1999a) finds that the EU has had an impact on member states’ institutional structures, but in a differential way. Linking this observation to polity features, she claims that the EU has greater impact, in terms of altering the balance of power among branches and levels of government, on unitary and statist states such as France and Britain than on federal and corporatist states such as Germany: … the European Union’s quasi-federal institutional structure has been more disruptive to unitary member states, where the EU has served to undermine traditional executive autonomy and to diminish legislative power while promoting national court independence and subnational autonomy, than to federal member states, which have largely maintained the balance between executive, legislature, and judiciary as well as between center and periphery. (Schmidt 1999a: 6) In another comparative study of Germany and Spain Börzel (1999, 2002a) argues that regions of both Germany and Spain have been granted participation and co-decision with respect to the formulation of the national position in European decision making. However, despite the overall similar reaction to European integration, many differences were also detected. The most important difference is that the involvement of German Länder merely reflected the existing institutions of cooperative federalism, while the participation of the Communidades Autonomas was regulated through a new system of intergovernmental relations. In terms of impact of European integration this means that the existing German territorial institutions were simply reinforced, while the new Spanish procedure caused pressure for more domestic institutional change. In her explanation, Börzel takes a new-institutionalist perspective, claming that institutionalist theory is necessary to understand “when and how Europe affects the institutions of its member states” (Börzel 2002a: 3). She adds

124

Politics and Polity

that “[T]he extent to which Europeanization changes the institutions of the member states depends on these very institutions” (Börzel 2002a: 2). Two logics apply: firstly, the goodness of fit: “The less the [European and national] institutions fit, the higher is the pressure for adaptation and the more likely is change” (Börzel 2002a: 6): federal states feel more adaptational pressure than centralized states, opposing the views of Schmidt (cf. supra). Secondly, “the informal collective understandings of what is considered appropriate behavior within a given rule structure influences how actors respond to pressure for adaptation in their attempt to reduce adaptational costs” (Börzel 2002a: 6): this refers to cooperative versus confrontational culture, leading respectively to the reinforcement of existing domestic institutions or substantial pressure on existing domestic institutions. To summarize, most studies use a new-institutional approach to determine the effects of European integration on domestic inter-institutional relations (cf. Vink 2003). Their major common findings are that domestic state structures in terms of central–regional relations are affected by European integration, but in a differential way, due to the different pre-existing characteristics of the national polities. Olsen (2003: 356) summarizes this nicely as follows: In sum, European level developments do not dictate specific forms of institutional adaptation but leave considerable discretion to domestic actors and institutions. There are significant impacts, yet the actual ability of the European level to penetrate domestic institutions is not perfect, universal or constant. Adaptations reflect variations in European pressure as well as domestic motivations and abilities to adapt. In addition, country case studies seem to agree that so-called constitutional regions are more successful than less powerful regions in exploiting the European integration process to regain some ground from the central level. Finally, on the issue of convergence or divergence effects, the literature seems to deliver broad support for Börzel’s (2002a: 25) conclusion, that: “institutional divergence among member states is likely to prevail”.

9.3 Key problems Following from the literature overview, this section addresses four somewhat problematic areas in the literature on the Europeanization of state structures. Much common ground has been found on issues such as divergence and differential empowerment. However, with respect to the more concrete form and scope of changing core–periphery relations less common understanding has been reached. While it is broadly recognized that “Europeanization affects federal or regionalized member states in a different way than more centralized

Peter Bursens 125

member states” (Börzel 2002a: 2), authors seem to disagree on the exact difference between federal and unitary states. For instance, Börzel argues that federal states feel more adaptational pressure than centralized states, but Schmidt finds that unitary states are more likely to undergo substantial internal changes. This disagreement leads to two important observations. Firstly, since there is no univocal relation between adaptation pressure and eventual impact on polity features, future work needs to place an increased focus on the intervening role of domestic institutions. Secondly, Europeanization scholars need more comparative empirical evidence to sort out the exact mechanisms of Europeanization. Critical cases should become the object of examination: what happens in highly centralized states and are domestic structures also changed with respect to traditional national/federal areas of competence such as treaty revisions? In a similar conclusion Featherstone and Kazamias (2001a) argue in their edited volume on the Europeanization of the Southern periphery that it is difficult to generalize, exactly because domestic institutions can have different mediating effects. Secondly, this chapter often draws attention to the division between policies, politics and polity. While it is broadly acknowledged that the three are interconnected, they are not often studied in a comprehensive way. A useful way to proceed in Europeanization studies would therefore be to leave the compartmentalized agenda and to embark on a more integrative agenda of studying the Europeanization of policies, politics and polity simultaneously (cf. Radaelli 2004). This strategy would also shed new light on the effects on domestic central–regional relationships. One way to do this is to link the Europeanization literature with the Governance literature, and, more specifically, with authors such as Kohler-Koch. Her research agenda stems from a different perspective but holds very similar hypotheses and asks very similar questions. “European governance serves national actors to accumulate political capital. It endows them with rights, empowers them by providing exit opportunities and access to resources, and stimulates imaginations of a wider identity. These openings will have varying effects in different member states. How hard they will shake the coherence of national polities depends in part on their attractiveness and on the ease of access and in part on what holds national polities together” (KohlerKoch 2005: 7). It is not difficult to see the parallels with the Europeanization literature. Both examine the impact of the European level (be it European governance or other EU features) on member states’ politics and polities; both seek to identify the mechanisms at work (be it exit and voice or Europeanization processes); and both hypothesize that there will be a differential impact, partly caused by intervening domestic variables (be it system characteristics or other domestic variables). Especially the Governance focus on polity features of member states leads to the observation that both research agendas could benefit from one another.

126

Politics and Polity

Thirdly, although institutionalism is the mainstream approach, different strands of institutionalism are used, sometimes leading to different conclusions. “European signals are interpreted [cf. sociological institutionalism] and modified [cf. rational choice institutionalism] through domestic traditions, institutions, identities [cf. sociological institutionalism], and resources [cf. rational choice institutionalism] in ways that limit the degree of convergence and homogenization” (Olsen 2003: 346). While only a few authors manage to use the different strands at the same time (cf. Börzel 2002a), it would be a fruitful avenue to combine approaches in order to achieve deeper understanding of the mechanisms at work. The attempts to bridge sociological and rational choice institutionalism in other areas, such as preference formation (cf. Chong 2000; Hooghe 2004), might serve as an example for studies on the Europeanization of state structures. Finally, and not limited to state structures, Europeanization scholars should take the methodological issues, raised inter alia by Falkner (2003) and Haverland (2005), seriously. Especially with respect to the study of state structures some rigorous comparative research has already started (cf. Anderson 2002; Kassim 2003). One way to respect the acknowledged need for comparative research (see also Kohler-Koch 2005) and to overcome the small-N problem is to try out new methodological ways such as qualitative comparative analyses (Ragin et al. 1996; De Meur and Rihoux 2002).

9.4 Conclusion In this final section, two extra research agendas with respect to the Europeanization of state structures are presented. The first draws upon Radaelli’s (2004) division in generations of Europeanization research. While the First Generation considered Europeanization as a synonym for European integration (Europeanization as a bottom-up process), the Second interpreted Europeanization (changes in domestic policy, politics, and polity) in a top-down manner. The Third Generation mixes both previous generations: how do member states responses to/usages of European integration (the original effect of the top-down process) affect domestic change through European integration (bottom-up process)? Until now this third approach has been mainly applied to policies and politics. Radaelli’s (2004) mechanisms, for instance, relate to modes of governance and deal with the eventual impact on domestic policies, to a lesser extent on politics and not on polities. It is up to future research to figure out whether this third generation can also be usefully applied to polity issues and more in particular to the Europeanization of state structures and central–regional relations. Finally, there remains the issue of legitimacy: a growing focus in EU studies, but something that is rarely, if ever, addressed by Europeanization scholars. Some authors have pointed out that legitimacy must be studied (cf. Kassim 2000: 258), but little has been done to date. Some articles mention the issue, but only

Peter Bursens 127

as asides of another or broader research focus (e.g. Featherstone 1998), i.e. when discussing Europeanization of member states’ parliaments, executives and the relation between both. Legitimacy becomes above all relevant when studying Europeanization of state structures and domestic central–regional relations. Given the empirical evidence that European integration alters domestic interinstitutional relationships, what implications does this changing balance have from a legitimacy point of view? One of the few examples explicitly discussing the impact of the EU on domestic legitimacy is Schmitter (1999), but even he does not succeed in going much further than discussing whether European integration strengthens or weakens the executives of the member states. Another example is Schmidt (1997, 1999) who argues that federal states have been less vulnerable to European impact on their institutional set-up and democratic formulae than unitary states, and therefore suffer fewer problems with regard to democratic accountability and legitimacy. Anderson (2002) has found that the core features of national democratic polities are quite immune from the pressures of European integration, but adds at the same time that these conclusions are still preliminary because the Europeanization of the democratic policy is still an under-researched area. The conclusion is that legitimacy must become the subject of research that tries to answer the question of whether the changed domestic structures increase or decrease the input and output legitimacy of the national and the European system. It will have to ask the core questions of Europeanization: Why and when does European integration affect domestic democracy? What mechanisms are in play? Should we expect a differential impact on domestic democracy? What is the role of existing democratic patterns in the member states? Perhaps it will eventually lead to a chapter on Europeanization of domestic democracy, whether or not with a focus on central–regional relationships, in a second edition of this handbook.

Key readings Börzel, T. (2002) States and Regions in the European Union: Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bursens, P. (2004) Enduring Federal Consensus. An Institutionalist Account of Belgian Preferences regarding the Future of Europe. Comparative European Politics, 2(3) 320–38. Hanf, K. and B. Soetendorp (eds) (1998) Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union. London: Longman. Kassim, H., B.G. Peters, V. Wright (eds) (2000a) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rometsch, D. and W. Wessels (eds) (1996) The European Union and Member States: Towards Institutional Fusion? Manchester: Manchester University Press.

10 Core Executives Brigid Laffan

10.1 Introduction This chapter explores the Europeanization of executive government. The Europeanization of executive government is not limited to EU member states but extends to all states that experience sustained interaction with the governance structures of the European Union, largely through bids for membership, involvement in the European Economic Area (EEA) or Europe Agreements. Early studies of the influence of the EU on its member states tended to focus on the impact on executive government because of the interdependence of EU and national policy making and the importance of national executives in EU decision making (Wallace 1973; Sasse et al. 1977). National governments could not ignore the European Union. Europeanization of domestic core executives is but one dimension of a wider phenomenon, which extends to many facets of the domestic polities, policies and politics (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a). It is also one of the five faces of Europeanization identified by Olsen (2002). The character of the Union and its style of governance places particular demands on central governments. To start with, the EU is characterized by dense institutionalization, far denser than found in any other organizations above the level of the state. Once there is agreement to engage in collective problem solving in any particular area, there is a process of institutionalization in the Commission, the EP, and the Council. Responsibility is assigned to particular units and committees are established. The member states must service the relevant Council and Commission committees, ministerial councils and the European Council. The structural features of the EU’s system of policy making ensure that domestic executives are drawn into its web. The EU’s system of public policy making rests on a continuous system of negotiations. The different phases of the policy process impose different demands on national governments. The pre-negotiation phase is particularly important for agenda setting and the drafting of the initial proposal in the Commission has a 128

Brigid Laffan 129

major impact on the subsequent outcome. In the pre-negotiating phase, national officials and experts have the opportunity to participate in Commission advisory or expert groups. The decision-making phase involves negotiations within the Council and between the Council and the EP depending on the decision rule. National governments service the Council working parties where the preparatory work for Councils is accomplished. The implementation phase of the policy process imposes further demands on the member states as they have a legal responsibility to transpose and implement EC laws and policies at domestic level. EU policy making is characterized by a high degree of functional differentiation. The EU deploys a number of different modes of governance, notably, regulation, common policies, complementary policies, benchmarking and coordination in different policy areas. The development of EU policy regimes has led to new principles of governance such as mutual recognition, partnership, home country control and additionality that may impact on domestic policy paradigms, domestic institutions and ways of doing business. The EU’s system of public policy making is characterized by a rhythm of activity that is beyond the control of any one member state. The calendar technique and pre-determined timeframes are deployed extensively in the EU. These timeframes interact with and are affected by national calendars, but they have a dynamic of their own beyond the control of any member state. Adjustment to engagement with the Union’s collective governance and EU membership does not require a one-off adaptation and adjustment. The demands of collective governance are continuous and sometimes unpredictable, given the fluid and open character of the Union’s agenda and the evolving nature of the EU as a polity. National governments do their homework for individual negotiations, position their state in the Union and develop policies on the future development of the EU. All of these requirements imply an ability to scan the environment and to develop and maintain critical relationships with EU institutions and other member states in the Union. Nor are national governments passive recipients of EU laws, policies and programs. They are key actors in shaping the governance of the Union and high-level political actors may alter a member state’s approach to integration. Engagement in collective governance does not mean a downgrading of national governments. Rather “representing national interests and contributing to shaping the development of the EC requires more, rather than less of national governments” (Metcalfe 1993: 2). The importance of administrative capacity was highlighted in the accession negotiations at the Madrid European Council (1995) and since then has been frequently reiterated as a condition of membership. Domestic executives form a key nodal point in the Union’s networked system of governance, projecting domestic preferences in the EU arena and acting as translators and editors of EU policies, norms and practices in the domestic arena (Bulmer and Burch 2001: 78;

130

Politics and Polity

Mörth 2003: 169). In exercising their role of projection and reception, domestic executives act as “translator devices” between the European and the national (Genschel 2001: 98). National governments are more embedded in the Union’s policy and political networks than other national actors. They are a key nodal point in the interface between the national and the European because of their political and administrative resources, their underlying constitutional position, and their legitimacy. They can call on formidable structural power in managing Europe from home. Central governments remain “key political actors in society and the predominant expression of collective interests” (Pierre and Peters 2000: 25). Domestic core executives are a dominant carrier of Europeanization (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003b: 335).

10.2 Core questions As noted above, analysing the evolution of domestic structures and processes for managing European business formed part of the early work on member state adaptation to EU membership. There is an extensive literature on executive adaptation, which may be grouped into seven clusters. First, there is a large body of work that analyses executive adaptation in one state (Bulmer 1986; Bulmer and Burch 1998, 2000, 2001; Closa and Heywood 2004; Falkner et al. 1999; Jeffrey 1996; Laffan 2001; Lequesne 1993; Van Meerhaeghe 1992; Wolters and Coffey 1990). These studies range from highly analytical treatments of core executive adaptation to descriptive narratives of the topic. Second, there are a number of volumes that adopt a comparative perspective seeking to explore the impact of the EU on all member states or a particular sub-set of states (Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Wessels et al. 2003; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Kassim et al. 2001; Harmsen 1999; Metcalfe 1993; Lippert et al. 2001; Goetz 1999, 2001). Third, there is a cluster of research that deploys the lens of comparative public policy analysis to explore the Europeanization of national administrations and structures (Börzel 2002; Knill 2001; Héritier et al. 2001). Fourth, there is a cluster of work that addresses the impact of the EU on executive adaptation in non-member states (Sverdrup 2000; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998). Fifth, there are a small number of studies that analyze the impact of the EU on individual ministries (Schout 1999; Jordan 2002, 2003). Sixth, there is a limited body of work that adopts individual officials as the unit of analysis. The emphasis is on the impact of EU engagement on attitudes and identity (Beyers et al. 1998; Egeberg 1999; Trondal 2000, 2001). Seventh, there is a literature that addresses issues relating to the transposition of European law in the member states or the dynamics of EU negotiations that draws attention to some aspects of core executive adaptation, although the Europeanization of core executives is not a primary concern. The literature on transposition and EU negotiations, which is beyond the scope of this chapter, tends to draw its analytical frameworks from

Brigid Laffan 131

rational choice institutionalism or actor-centered institutionalism. Eight, there is a literature that focuses on the impact of Europeanization on executive– parliamentary relations. This literature, which is not treated in this chapter, concludes that the dynamic of Europeanization altered the relationship between executives and legislatures to the detriment of the latter. Holding executives to account for what they do in Brussels is a major challenge to Europe’s parliaments. The literature on core executive adaptation is characterized by a multiplicity of theoretical, analytical and methodological approaches and a variety of levels of analysis. A number of key dimensions of core executive adaptation are treated in the literature. The impact of the EU on domestic structures at core executive level and the emergence of new structures for handling the demands of the EU system is a central focus. National coordination ambitions, mechanisms and processes is a recurring theme, as are the links between the domestic and the EU. How individual ministries modify their organizational structures, ways of doing business and begin to “think European” forms the core of a number of studies. The impact of the EU on national officials is a more recent focus. The adaptational pressures generated by the EU and the degree of change associated with the Europeanization of this facet of domestic government and governance is a recurring theme. The literature includes “thick” descriptions of structures and processes in a large number of states, theories concerning the evolution of the EU, sophisticated coordination scales and analytical grids that classify the different member states on the basis of set dimensions. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage in an exhaustive exploration of the literature. Rather it is intended to draw attention to a number of theoretical and analytical approaches and to identify the key empirical findings. The theory and analytic approaches are drawn from integration theory, historical institutionalism, comparative politics and organizational theory. A distinctive sub-set of research relates research on domestic core executives to core questions about the macropolitical development of the EU and the impact of the EU on statehood in Europe. In a number of works, Wessels argued that there is a “fusion” of “public instruments from several sate levels linked with the respective ‘Europeanisation’ of national actors and institutions” (Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Wessels et al. 2003). This work identifies the growing density, institutionalization and complexity of the EU system and the manner in which an increasing number of domestic actors and institutions are drawn into the EU system. From this perspective “EU policy making … triggers institutional adaptation in the Member States and alters domestic rules” (Wessels et al. 2003: 14). Given the importance of domestic governments in the EU system, considerable attention is paid to core executive–EU linkages and the development of new structures and processes for managing European affairs in this approach.

132

Politics and Polity

Historical institutionalism is the preferred framework in a number of studies, notably Bulmer and Burch (1998, 2000, 2001), Harmsen (1999), and Laffan (2004). Historical institutionalism, it is argued, offers considerable theoretical purchase for core executive analyses because its focus is on “organizational and institutional configurations” rather than particular institutions in isolation (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 693). National executives are highly institutionalized sites of public policy making that lie at the interface between the political and administrative systems. Policy is fashioned by the reciprocal relationships between key actors embedded in institutions (Smith 2000a: 25–7). The significance of critical junctures and endogenous and exogenous sources of change are treated in this approach (Bulmer and Burch 2000: 50; Laffan 2004). Bulmer and Burch developed an analytical framework based on four institutional levels or gradations – namely, the systemic or constitutional, the organizational, the regulative and the procedural levels. They augment these four levels of analysis with a fifth component, the cultural, which they argue is present at all levels (Bulmer and Burch 2001: 77). Laffan (2004), in analyzing core executive adaptation in six states, adopted an analytical framework that distinguished between structures, processes and agents. A comparative politics approach was used by Kassim et al. (2000a) to analyze national coordination of EU policy at both domestic and EU levels. Building on country case studies, Kassim (2001) explored the pattern of domestic coordination and the Europeanization of national administrative systems. He identified two fundamental dimensions along which domestic coordination systems varied. The first dimension was the coordination ambition. Put simply, this referred to the extent to which a state pursued a high level of coordination in relation to EU business. The second dimension was the extent to which the coordination was centralized or decentralized. There are few studies that explore the Europeanization of a single ministry. Schout (1999, 2001) constructed a framework for analyzing the management of European affairs in the Dutch Economic Affairs Ministry using organizational analysis. The focus of the study was on structural change in the ministry as a result of a decision to decentralize European responsibilities within the organization. Schout (1999: 104–5) constructed an analytical framework based on different kinds of organizational structures and coordination mechanisms. The aim of the study was to track changes in the internal management of European business on the basis of four organizational configurations (Schout 1999: 105). In his analysis of the Europeanization of the UK Environment Ministry Jordan (2003: 282) explored changes to both the institutional “hardware” of the ministry and also the “software” of national structures. The key empirical findings in relation to executive adaptation may be grouped into four main themes. First, all empirical studies point to the differential impact of the EU on domestic core executives. Second, we have extensive

Brigid Laffan 133

knowledge about the structures and processes that have been established for managing Europe from home and the coordination styles in different states. Third, there is more limited knowledge about the roles and cadre that have evolved for managing European issues and, fourth, the sources of change in domestic core executives have received some attention. The first key finding is that managing Europe places varying demands on different parts of the domestic executives. A distinction may be drawn between the central coordinators, the inner core and outer circle of ministries (Laffan 2004). Individual ministries may move from the outer circle to the inner core when the EU begins to play an increasingly important role in policy fields for which they have responsibility; environmental ministries and interior/justice ministries, for example, have shifted from the outer circle to the inner core from the mid-1980s onwards. The central coordinators form the lynchpin of the domestic systems. The central coordinators constitute the core executive for EU purposes and are custodians of the structures and processes of managing European issues. The central coordinators are responsible for projecting their states in the EU system, for establishing the integration trajectory of the state, for managing the key bilateral and multilateral relationships, for mediating conflicts at domestic level, for ensuring that the domestic systems of interministerial and intra-ministerial coordination operate and for managing the inevitable “flash points” in managing European issues. Beyond the key coordinators in the domestic systems, the distinction between the inner core and the outer circle relates to the degree of Europeanization in a particular policy domain. The second key finding relates to the structures and processes that have evolved for managing European business. The literature provides “thick descriptions” of the institutional configurations that have evolved in the member states. In some states dedicated institutions – so-called EU Offices – were established whereas in others EU business was grafted onto existing institutions. A distinction may be drawn between prime ministerial- or foreign ministry-led systems. In the original member states, rivalries between foreign ministries and economics ministries were not uncommon. However, economics ministries gradually lost out to foreign ministries. An exception among the “inner six” was France with the SGCI a very large institution that was established in 1948 to manage the inter-ministerial dimension of Marshall Aid. Subsequently, it evolved into a highly institutionalized center of coordination characterized by a high level of control over the projection of French preferences in the EU system. Great Britain adopted a version of this model by creating the EU Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, a small cohesive office at the heart of the British core executive. Finland transferred competence for EU coordination from its Foreign Ministry to a newly created office under the auspices of the PM in 2000. The new member states tended to locate EU coordination responsibility

134

Politics and Polity

in the PM’s office, which underlines the priority accorded to EU membership and the growing role of the heads of state and government in the EU. In 2005, the Swedish Government decided to shift EU co-ordination capacity to the PM’s office. In the other member states, responsibilities are located in EU divisions in the foreign ministries. Apart from the location of day-to-day responsibility, the management of European affairs requires horizontal structures to manage the cross-cutting nature of much EU business. The member states have resorted to the traditional devices of cabinet committees and inter-ministerial committees as the institutional devices designed to ensure coordination. Although the labels differ from one state to the next, all have resorted to the same kinds of structures. These structures tend to mirror the different levels – political, senior official, expert level – found in the Council hierarchy. At the apex of the domestic systems is the cabinet or government. In most member states, a practice has evolved of establishing a cabinet subcommittee to deal with the important EU dossiers. Meetings of the Government and the cabinet subcommittee provide political direction, mediation, arbitration and “rapid responses” to the EU agenda. In almost all states, the work of the political actors is complemented by high-level inter-ministerial committees consisting of senior civil servants. The committees meet with more or less frequency and it is not uncommon for them to meet on a weekly basis. In all member states, the senior official level is further complemented by inter-ministerial working groups that are expertbased with a focus on a sector. These groups do the homework for the Council working parties and identify those issues that must go up the official and political hierarchy for resolution. The level at which issues are dealt with depends on domestic administrative and political culture, the priority accorded to an issue and the degree of conflict if any about the issue at domestic level. In many member states, the desk official, the expert on the issue is accorded a high degree of autonomy to determine the domestic preference whereas in other more centralized systems, issues are driven up the hierarchy for consideration and resolution. The creation of new structures was accompanied by new processes for handling European issues. Domestic processes are designed to cope with the different phases of the EU’s negotiating process. In the member states, we find a mixture of formal rules and guidelines and informal conventions that have evolved over time. The formal rules cover the allocation of competence for EU affairs, the responsibilities of different actors, the issuing of instructions for working parties, COREPER and Council meetings, the drafting of reports, relationship with national parliaments, consultation with non-governmental actors and the circulation of information in the domestic system. The codes and rules are the product of formal governmental decrees in most cases and are complemented by guidelines that flesh out the agreed processes. New technology has greatly

Brigid Laffan 135

facilitated the creation of sophisticated EU document management systems in the member states that allow for wide circulation of EU relevant material. The new member states have invested heavily in establishing central communication systems for EU business. EU-related structures and processes combine to produce distinctive coordination styles at domestic level. Kassim (2003a: 93), as discussed above, identified two key dimensions concerning coordination – namely centralization/decentralization and a comprehensive coordination ambition versus a selective coordination ambition. Plotting these two dimensions on a grid gives a fourfold categorization of coordination types: comprehensive centralizers (e.g. France, UK); comprehensive de-centralizers (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands); selective centralizers (e.g. Ireland, Portugal); and, selective de-centralizers (no member state in this category). The degree of centralization and the coordination ambition is molded by attitudes toward integration, on the one hand, and the political and administrative culture, on the other. The third key finding relates to the agents or individuals who act as the “boundary managers” between the domestic and the European. In all states, there are a number of key political roles held by individuals who have primary responsibility for managing European affairs. These are the heads of government, key ministers (Foreign Affairs and Finance) and Ministers for European Affairs. The political cadre is complemented by a civil service cadre that includes a number of senior officials, notably, the permanent representative, senior ministry officials and the experts in the sectoral areas. The EU cadre differs in terms of its size and training from one state to another but is important in all. The cadre consists of those officials who are Brussels insiders, deeply knowledgeable about the EU system, experienced EU negotiators and comfortable in the world of EU politics. In some states, there is highly formalized training fast track systems designed produce this cadre whereas in others it is left to the established processes of recruitment and promotion. The fourth key finding relates to the evolution of the domestic systems and sources of change. States began to interact with the EU system at different times and for different purposes. Pressures for the development of enhanced capacity for the management of EU affairs emanates from four sources, two exogenous and two endogenous. The two exogenous sources were the demands of engagement with the EU and policy and regime change in the Union. The two endogenous sources of change were systemic change at national level and political events at domestic level (Laffan 2004).

10.3 Key problems This section addresses key problems in the literature on the Europeanization of domestic core executives. Key problems are identified as issues that are

136

Politics and Polity

unresolved in scholarly debate or that have not been addressed adequately, if at all. The first problem identified here is the question of convergence or continuing divergence of national responses. The second problem relates to the utility of a core concept in the Europeanization literature, misfit, in addressing the Europeanization of core executives and the third and perhaps the most important problem relates to the impact of the Europeanization of core executives on domestic politics and not just public policy making. Underlying comparative studies on executive adaptation is what emerged as the core question of convergence or continuing divergence of national responses (Kassim 2001: 27–9; Harmsen 1999: 83–5; Wessels et al. 2003: 444–5). The dominant conclusion found in the existing literature on executive adaptation points to the continuing diversity of domestic responses to EU engagement. This conclusion is aptly captured by the quote form Harmsen (1999: 81–2) who concluded his comparative analysis of France and the Netherlands as follows: There is little evidence of the Europeanization of national administrations in the sense of convergence towards a common institutional model. National administrations are not coming to resemble one another, nor are they coming to resemble a sort of synthetic EU prototype. The administrations of the member states have, for the most part, retained their distinctive structures and operating procedures. Similar quotes expressing similar conclusions are littered through the literature on domestic executive adaptation (Page and Wouters 1995; Bulmer and Burch 2001: 80). Although continuing diversity is the dominant finding in the literature, there are studies that point to “a mixed pattern of similarity and difference” in the organization of member state representations in Brussels (Kassim 2000b: 235). There is a convergence of structural mechanisms for dealing with Europe, notably EU units, high-level inter-ministerial committees, and sectoral policy groups but continuing diversity in terms of the underlying national styles of managing internationalization. In managing Europe from home, states appear to choose from a menu of models. The two dominant models identified above are prime ministerial- or foreign ministry-led systems. Convergence of structures has not led to a convergence of national styles and processes for managing European affairs. There are significant differences concerning the politico-administrative interface, the number of officials assigned to managing the EU/national interface, the role of individual civil servants, the range and membership of crosssectoral policy committees, the regularity of meetings and the engagement of national parliaments and societal groups in molding domestic policy. It is thus apposite to draw a distinction between the instrumentalities for managing the

Brigid Laffan 137

EU–domestic interface where we see convergence and the underlying political and administrative core of the national systems that is characterized by continuing divergence (Knill 2001: 35–57). Even if we accept the continuing divergence hypothesis with a caveat concerning the modalities of managing EU business, it is important to identify the variables that explain variation across the member states. Kassim’s schema discussed above was an important effort to assist us in classifying national coordination styles on the basis of two dimensions. This classificatory schema provides an insight into coordination but not the underlying domestic structures. Laffan identified two variables – the degree of institutionalization and the relationship between formal and informal processes – that too stood out in explaining variation across six states. Institutionalization is a multifaceted concept that implies structuration, routinization, the development of standard operating procedures and shared codes of meaning (Olsen 2000: 4–5). The degree of structuration and routinization of EU business differs markedly across the member states. Some states have highly institutionalized and regularized systems for managing EU business whereas other systems are weakly institutionalized and less stable. A high degree of institutionalization was characterized by a pyramid of structures and related processes through which EU business was channeled. The structures and processes mattered for the way in which EU affairs were dealt with. The degree of institutionalization can be plotted on a continuum from highly institutionalized to weakly institutionalized. The second variable is the relationship between formal structures and processes and informal ones within the national policy style. In states where there was a high degree of institutionalization, the informal was subordinate to the formal processes, whereas in systems that were weakly institutionalized, the informal was more important for policy outcomes than the formal structures. In Greece, for example, informal links and political channels are the key to understanding the “living system”. In response to administrative problems or blockages, the solution in Greece is to appoint a person to tackle the problem rather than address administrative blockages and deficits. Agents are more important than structure and informal channels more important than the formal. Hence more attention needs to be paid in the literature to the “boundary managers” who manage the interface between the domestic and the EU. They create the living system of core executive adaptation. The Europeanization of domestic executives raises important questions about one of the key concepts in the Europeanization literature, namely “misfit”. The central argument in relation to misfit is that the degree of misfit, either institutional or policy-related, determines the adaptational pressure experienced by the member states (Börzel and Risse 2003: 61). The literature on core executive adaptation suggests that the EU imposes varied demands on

138

Politics and Polity

the member states at different times. Institutional and policy developments at EU level triggers demands for structural or procedural change at the domestic level but change also occurs as a result of systemic or political change at the domestic level. Misfit may not be a useful concept in exploring macro-level core executive adaptation as domestic executives must develop structures and processes for managing Europe from home. The loosely coupled nature of the EU allows for a variety of responses and goes with the grain of domestic diversity. The third and most important problem with the literature on core executives is its overemphasis on the modalities of adaptation to the neglect of important normative issues that are raised by the process of Europeanization. Core executives were the first domestic institutions to become intimately embedded in the EU system. This had significant consequences for executive–parliamentary relations, and relations between official and political power. The predominant form that Europeanization has taken since the establishment of the EU has weakened the ability of domestic parliaments to hold their executives to account and has enhanced the role of officials who populated the myriad committees in the EU system. The technocratic and bureaucratic nature of the Union’s policy process had important consequences for domestic politics. Executives could use the EU system to engage in two-level games that reinforced their autonomy from national parliaments.

10.4 Conclusion Although the literature on core executive adaptation is richer and more sophisticated than it was during its formative period, there are limits to our knowledge of the impact of the EU on the domestic and the available literature does not represent cumulative knowledge about the dynamics of core executive adaptation. We do not know just how pervasive the Europeanization of domestic core executives is. The focus on the machinery for managing Europe tends to neglects the impact on ministries in the inner circle and outer circle. We do not know the extent and nature of the human resources that governments devote to EU affairs. The available figures suggest that the numbers are very limited relative to the size of domestic administrations. Rather than there being a fusion of the EU and the domestic, the EU and the domestic may be more loosely coupled than acknowledged in the literature. In order to explore this question, more attention needs to be paid in research to the EU cadre that has evolved in all domestic administrations. The cadre is a significant inter-ministerial cohort of officials who manage the interface between the EU and the domestic. We need to know more about their attitudes, practices, career trajectories and identities if we are to develop a deeper understanding of the EU–domestic dynamics. Studies should draw on sociological

Brigid Laffan 139

institutionalism to complement historical institutionalism. We need to know more about the adaptation of individuals, not just structures. The literature on officials may be limited, but research on domestic political actors and Europeanization is non-existent. There has been very little work on the impact of the EU on the interface between the political and the official levels of government. It is generally accepted that the EU has led to a delegation of power from the political to the official level and that the EU privileges administrative over political power. However, there is no comparative research that explores in-depth the political-administrative interface in relation to EU affairs. Deepening our understanding of the dynamics of core executive Europeanization will depend on further cross-national comparative studies adopting analytical frameworks that enable them to go beyond thick descriptions. Using different institutionalist approaches in a complementary manner has the potential to lead to cumulative knowledge about this subject. Historical institutionalism provides an appropriate analytical framework to explore macro-level structures and processes over time. It assists in identifying key characteristics of the domestic administrative and political culture and institutional choice. Studies of this kind provide the basis for generating hypotheses that may be tested in rational-choice-driven case studies of particular sets of negotiation and implementation. Rational choice approaches, used more frequently in implementation research, could be deployed to good effect in studies of how the domestic core executives actually perform in EU negotiations. Sociological institutionalism provides an additional lens to explore the role of individual actors. This approach allows for an exploration of socialization and learning in the EU system, one of the key mechanisms identified in the literature of Europeanization. Moreover, it is important that further research on Europeanization addresses key issues in political science – namely, the nature of the contemporary state and the dynamic of contemporary government and governance. Research on Europeanization should form part of a wider interrogation of the evolution and transformation of the European nation-state system.

Key readings Bulmer, S. and M. Burch (2001). The Europeanisation of Central Government: the UK and Germany in Historical Institutionalist Perspective. In G. Schneider and M. Aspinwall (eds), The Rules of Integration. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 73–96. Harmsen, R. (1999). The Europeanization of National Administrations: A Comparative Study of France and the Netherlands. Governance, 12(1) 81–113.

140

Politics and Polity

Kassim, H. (2003). Meeting the Demands of EU Membership: The Europeanization of National Administrative Systems. In K. Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 83–111. Laffan, B. (2004). Impact of EU on Executive Government: A Comparative Analysis, http://www.oeue.net/papers/acomparativeanalysis-theimpact.pdf. Rhodes, R.A.W., ed. (2000). Transforming British Government, vols 1 and 2. London: Macmillan.

11 Parliamentary Scrutiny Ronald Holzhacker

11.1 Introduction In recent years, the national parliaments of the member states of the European Union (EU) have seen a diminution of their powers. Issues that parliaments traditionally had the right and power to decide over are increasingly being decided either within the institutions of the EU or by the national executives of the member states. Increasingly, the law-making powers of national parliaments in important areas of policy are being tightly circumscribed by the EU – consider agricultural policy, trade policy, competition policy, indeed many aspects of economic policy, but also environmental policy and, more recently, justice and home affairs. But as the competency of the EU is extended into more and more policy areas, national parliaments and the political parties within them have begun to realize their loss and have adapted their institutional structures to claw back some of that lost power. Traditional concepts of executive–legislative relations emphasize two formal powers of parliament: (i) installing a government at the beginning of a term and powers of dissolution, and (ii) law-making powers. But parliamentary oversight and scrutiny over government decision making is becoming an increasingly important power of parliaments. Thus, while the policy outputs of parliaments have traditionally been national laws, resolutions, the approval of treaties with foreign countries, as well as the scrutiny of ministerial performance in domestic matters, in many cases these outputs may now include scrutiny of the governments’ position taken within the EU, principally actions and votes taken in the Council of Ministers. Many of the parliaments of the member states began to adopt new rules and procedures to better influence and control their own national decision-making processes in the late 1980s and early 1990s in response to a series of treaties deepening the impact of the EU on the member states. The Single European Act, signed in 1986, brought the EU into policy areas not included in the original 141

142

Politics and Polity

Treaty of Rome (including the environment, health and safety, and economic and social cohesion) and set an ambitious goal of 1 January 1993 for the completion of the internal market. The treaty also extended qualified majority voting to the decision-making processes of the Council of Ministers, which meant that increasingly member states could be bound by decisions they had not explicitly agreed. This shift of power from national institutions to the Community was further strengthened in the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), signed in 1992, with the decision to create a common currency. The Maastricht Treaty, however, also reflected a greater awareness and sensitivity to the interests of the member states through the introduction of the concept of subsidiarity and a call for a greater role for the national parliaments in the decision-making processes of the EU. This reflected in part treaty language calling for an ever-closer union that had set in motion a sense of uneasiness and uncertainty in the minds of nationally elected elites and their electorates. The continued growth of multi-level governance since the Maastricht Treaty has led to a number of changes over time which have had a great impact on the national parliaments within the EU: increasing policy making at the community level; widening of the functional scope of the EU, involving more and more national actors; creation of new institutions and procedures which increase the variety of interaction styles and modes of governance; activation of policy networks of interest groups which demand consultation; and an increase in the scope and density of legal obligations onto the member states (Maurer and Wessels 2001). Today, all of the national parliaments in the member states, including the ten states which have recently joined the EU, have established some kind of European affairs committee within their parliament to improve parliamentary scrutiny over the decision making of their government concerning EU matters. These committees typically focus on the negotiating position taken by their government in Council of Ministers meetings, but may also be involved in the transposition of directives or monitoring long-term developments in the EU. National parliaments are central to the system of democratic representation and legitimacy in the member states. The emergence of multi-level governance in the EU has impacted the national parliaments of the member states in two fundamental ways. First, increasing proportions of sovereign decision making in important policy areas are being transferred to the EU level, decreasing the independent decision-making capability of the nation-state. Secondly, to the extent that the authority which has been transferred to the EU resides in the European Council or the Council of Ministers, there has been a transfer of decision-making authority from the parliamentary level to the member states’ executive. The power to reach decisions in policy areas which have traditionally been vested in national parliaments now rests in part either in the supranational decision-making institutions of the EU (the European Parliament, the

Ronald Holzhacker 143

European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Central Bank) or in national governments when they vote in the inter-governmental decision-making institutions of the EU (the European Council and the Council of Ministers). Parliaments throughout the EU have responded to the challenge of multi-level governance by creating new institutional structures in an attempt to better control and monitor the decision making of national governments over EU issues. These new structures, consisting of formal rules and procedures of parliament, but also of informal processes and procedures of parliamentary party groups, hold the promise of better linking governmental decisions to the electorate and improving democratic representation and legitimacy. Thus, there has been a Europeanization of national parliaments through a process of institutional adaptation and a change in the behavior of the principal actors in parliament in response to multi-level governance. This chapter will first introduce the topic of the Europeanization of national parliaments, focusing on the development of parliamentary scrutiny over EU decision making in the member states. This introduction firmly grounds parliamentary scrutiny within the traditions of democratic government and parliamentary–executive relations, and focuses on the key actors in parliament and the scrutiny process, the governing and opposition parties. The chapter will then review the current research in this area, point out strengths and weaknesses of the research, and then lays out fruitful areas for future research.

11.2 Core questions Let us begin with a definition of parliamentary scrutiny. Parliamentary scrutiny is the exercise of power by the legislative branch to control, influence, or monitor government decision making. These three terms refer to various degrees of influence that parliament may have on the government. Dahl (1999: 32) defines the term “influence” as “a relation among actors such that the wants, desires, preferences or intentions of one or more actors affect the actions, or predispositions to act, of one or more other actors”. Dahl furthermore states that this influence may either be “manifest”, in which parliament explicitly acts to achieve a given outcome, or “implicit”, in which parliament is successful in achieving a given outcome without taking any overt actions because a government may act in anticipation of reactions from parliament. Parliamentary scrutiny may occur publicly in the formal institutions of parliament, such as committees, public hearings, the submission of written or oral questions, and plenum debate. These activities may also occur privately within the various institutions of parliamentary groups, such as parliamentary party group meetings, committees or working groups of the party groups, and informal consultations between specialists in the party group and government ministers.

144

Politics and Polity

The actual degree of influence which a parliament has over a given issue will depend on the constitutional and legal relationship between parliament and government, the traditions of parliamentary–government relationships in a given country, and the incentives of the parliamentary party groups to act on the issue. Research into national parliamentary scrutiny is important to better understand the functioning of the new institutional mechanisms that are being created as institutions adjust and react to the multi-tiered governance pattern emerging in the EU. Involvement by parliament in the decision-making processes of national governments, considered the institution in a democracy closest to the people, assists in democratizing the entire multi-level governance system of the EU. It means that a part of the decision-making process moves from the civil servants in the ministries and closed cabinet meetings to a wider circle of representatives of both governing and opposition parliamentary party groups. Opening the decision-making process may at a minimum bring involvement of MPs with a specialized interest in a particular topic, a smattering of interest groups, and members of the public with a heightened interest in the topic. But at other times such an opening of the process may bring entire parliamentary party groups, a wide range of competing interest groups, and media attention to carry the debate to the wider public for debate and consideration. These processes reduce the democratic deficit in the EU and the member states, improve representation, and may increase a sense of democratic legitimacy among the European electorates in the evolving system of multilevel governance. One of the reasons that national parliamentary scrutiny is so important for increasing the legitimacy and participation in the process of European decision making is that it is the primary institutional source for receiving input from opposition parties (see Holzhacker 2005b). In the Council of Ministers, only governments – elected from governing parties – are represented and participate in setting European policy. Yet traditional democratic structures normally allow some opportunity for opposition parties to discuss and debate laws and policies set by the government. They are normally given powers to ask written and oral questions, to raise matters in committee, and to place matters on the agenda for general debate. It is important that the voice of opposition parties is heard at the national level, because the voice of opposition parties is non-existent or weak within the EU institutions themselves. The voice of these non-governing parties is not heard in the Council or the Commission, and only rather weakly in the European Parliament (EP). Because the EP does not formally vote a government into office in the way a national parliament does, there is not the traditional division of parliament into governing and opposition party roles. To understand how national parliamentary scrutiny over EU matters functions in the member states, one must analyze the

Ronald Holzhacker 145

interaction between governing parties and opposition parties in the process of scrutinizing their national executive. Modern representative democracy is based on an institutional structure in which parliaments elected by the people enact laws and hold executives responsible for government decision making and the policy outputs of the political system. It is hoped that representation and democratic legitimacy emerges from the process of political parties competing for the people’s vote, forming a government from parliament thereafter, and then ensuring that both governing and opposition parties play an active and ongoing role in passing laws and scrutinizing government decision-making and policy outputs. The interactions between members of parliament and government ministers have been commonly analyzed under the rubric of “executive–legislative” relations, a term developed in the American context. Here it is referred to as parliamentary–government relations, a term more appropriate for the parliamentary democracies in Europe. Traditionally, the governing parliamentary party groups and the government have been seen as essentially one entity belonging to two different constitutional bodies, a perspective referred to as “monism”. But increasingly scholars have begun to develop a deeper look at the variations in interactions between parliament and government (e.g. Polsby 1975; Steffani 1981). Indeed, a whole range of possible interactions between individual MPs, governing and opposition parliamentary party groups, and between parliament and government ministers are possible. King (1976) has created a typology of executive–legislative relations, which has also been applied by others to specific countries (see Saalfeld 1990 on Germany; Andeweg 1992 on the Netherlands; and Mueller 1993 on Austria). Here a modification of King’s typology proposed by Andeweg and Nijzink (1995) is presented, setting out three basic types of parliament–government relations: a non-party mode, an inter-party mode and a cross-party mode. The goals of parliamentary party groups when engaged in parliamentary scrutiny over EU matters varies by the mode of parliamentary–government relations. There are times when parliamentary–government relations involving parliamentary scrutiny over EU matters may function in a non-party mode. Parliaments may act as a whole at times, usually through their European affairs committee, to press their right for timely information concerning decision making over EU matters. For example, after German reunification the German parliament amended the Basic Law to give parliament and the Länder enumerated powers in the country’s decision-making process over EU matters. Because the issues involved were mainly seen as procedural ones, and constitutional revision required a two-thirds vote in the Bundestag, the parliamentary party groups were forced to work together to increase the power of parliament vis-à-vis the government. In these cases, parliament may be seen as acting as an institution, in a non-party mode, to define and defend what it perceives are its

146

Politics and Polity

rightful constitutional powers within the democratic system of government in the country. There may also be examples when parliamentary scrutiny over EU matters takes on the character of the cross-party mode. In such circumstances, MPs from various parliamentary party groups unite to press a government minister to consider the sectoral or geographic interests of the MPs. However, while such cross-party activity may be successful in influencing government, it usually occurs through channels other than the exercise of the formal powers of parliament. The formal exercise of parliamentary power across party lines poses a severe threat to the cohesiveness of party parliamentary party groups and the stability of governments in parliamentary systems. Most of the interactions between parliament and government occur in the inter-party mode. Here parliament is seen as an arena in which the competition between the various parliamentary party groups is played out. Inter-party issues are those in which the goals of governing and opposition parliamentary party groups vis-à-vis the government diverge along party lines. Here, distinctions may be drawn between the various parliamentary party groups’ goals in engaging in parliamentary scrutiny on a given issue, whether to protect and defend the government (intra-coalition mode), oppose the government (opposition mode), or persuade and bargain with other parliamentary party groups to modify a government proposal (“floating coalition” mode) (Holzhacker 2005b; cf. Martin and Vanberg 2005). Research into national parliamentary scrutiny has come from various disciplines. Legal and constitutional scholars have focused on the formal relationships between parliament and the government. Political scientists have researched national parliamentary scrutiny either as single nation studies or in a broadly comparative way. The comparativists may not only focus on institutional change, but also on behavioral change of the members of parliament and parliamentary party groups in the scrutiny process. Early research in this area began a decade ago to document the differing responses of national parliaments to the evolving system of European governance (Norton 1996; Rometsch and Wessels 1996). Norton states that by 1994, national parliaments were faced with three challenges: (i) an increasing amount of law making occurring at the EU level; (ii) an explicit invitation to be more involved in the decision-making processes of the EU found in the declarations appended to the Maastricht Treaty; and (iii) the creation of two new pillars of the Community – foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs – in which decision making was to occur at the inter-governmental level (Norton 1996: 8). Norton was concerned with how national parliaments adapted to these challenges posed by the move toward greater integration and hypothesized that they responded by undertaking institutional change to better control the decision-making processes of their own national government.

Ronald Holzhacker 147

Because parliamentary scrutiny has undergone rapid change over time, this chapter will focus on recent “state of the art” research in this field. In terms of broadly comparative work, the influential work of Maurer and Wessels (2001: 449) identifies three important variables in their consideration of national parliaments. First is the parliament’s working style, whether the main focus of scrutiny is in the European affairs committee or in the specialized standing committees, or instead in the plenary sessions. Second is the nature of the scrutiny processes, whether it is orientated toward supportive scrutiny (assisting the government) or toward formulating voting instructions (attempting to control the government). Third is the phase in the EU policy cycle when scrutiny typically occurs, whether anticipative, ex-ante to EU draft legislation or reactive, ex-post to EU legislation. The individual country chapters prepared by country specialists in the volume find a wide range of variation in national parliamentary scrutiny across these three variables, often as a result of the continuing force of parliamentary–government relations in the domestic arena that is also applicable to scrutiny over EU affairs. Other research has tried to explain possible reasons for the cross-national variation in the level of parliamentary scrutiny. Here research has identified variables such as the degree of public support for the EU in the country, the type of government – whether majority, coalitional, or minority, the internal cohesion of political parties, as well as the traditions of parliamentary–executive relations in a country (Bergman 1997, 2000; Raunio and Wiberg 2000; Mauer and Wessels 2001; Rozenberg 2002; Raunio 2005). Auel and Benz (2006) have developed a line of reasoning which emphasizes that parliaments often do not attempt to tie the hands of the governments too closely when conducting EU negotiations. They argue that the effectiveness of policy making might be jeopardized and national interest may be thwarted if parliaments are not careful. Realizing this dilemma, parliaments develop strategies to deal with the sometimes conflicting requirements of national party politics and European policy making (Auel 2005). They list a number of such strategies, such as keeping work in closed committee sessions instead of the plenary. They also discuss strategies in which the members of parliament may informally cooperate with a minister to influence him or her, without binding the government to a specific mandate. Finally, members of parliament may seek contact with actors at the European level or in other member states, which gives them access to independent information about the position of others toward issues, allowing them to better judge the mandate they should provide their government (Benz 2004). One country where the parliament has the most power and where the government must seek a mandate before it takes a negotiating position is Denmark. There has been considerable interest both on the part of academics (Jensen 2005; Damgaard and Nørgaard 2000; Dosenrode 1998; Laursen 1995, 2001) and

148

Politics and Polity

by parliamentarians in other countries about the Danish model of scrutiny. Perhaps because of the reasons set forth by Auel and Benz, no other parliament has assumed so much power vis-à-vis its government as Denmark. In any case, the tradition of minority government in Denmark combined with a Euroskeptic public place the country in a special position that has been emulated in a number of aspects, for example by Sweden, Finland and Austria, but never with the same degree of power for parliament which the Danish systems assures (see Bluemel and Neuhold 2001; Hegeland and Neuhold 2002). In general, there has been a considerable academic focus on parliamentary scrutiny in the Nordic countries and concern for the democratic implications of EU decision making (Wiberg 1997; Bergman and Damgaard 2000; Raunio 2001). Other research has tried to tie the study of national parliamentary scrutiny to the debate on the democratic deficit within the EU. A recent volume on democracy and the EU by Eriksen and Fossum (2000), which focuses on applying concepts from deliberative democracy to the EU level, also touches on subjects related to the role of national parliaments. The chapter by Bellamy and Castiglione (2000) on the democratic deficit and that by Follesdal (2000) on subsidiarity and democratic deliberation are relevant to this discussion, but the key one is the chapter by Blichner (2000), who builds on the argument by Habermas (2000) in the volume that European democracy is in need of public spheres which cut across national borders. He argues that interparliamentary discussions, though such bodies as COSAC, may serve as such an intermediary public sphere (Blichner 2000: 152). Early theoretical work, for example that of Beetham and Lord (1998), also attempted to place national parliamentary scrutiny in a larger democratic frame. In their work on legitimacy and the EU, they set forth the role which various national and EU institutions should play to democratically legitimize EU decision making. They present the legitimacy claims of both the intergovernmental and supranational approaches to the democratization of the EU in terms of three concepts – authorization, representation, and accountability. For the intergovernmental mode, these include authorization of political leadership through domestic election of members of the European Council and Council of Ministers, representation of national governments through these bodies, and accountability of these bodies to national parliaments and electorates. They argue that within intergovernmental decision making, the best means for making EU governance accountable is for the members of the European Council and the Council of Ministers to account to national parliaments and electorates. Some volumes have attempted to place parliamentary scrutiny in a larger context and to combine theoretical research with a democratic normative component. For example, the volume by Holzhacker and Albaek (2006a) discusses the opinion formation process of EU issues through the media, interest

Ronald Holzhacker 149

intermediation by political parties and interest groups, national decision making by the executive, and, finally, parliamentary scrutiny over the entire process. This places national parliamentary scrutiny within a longer sequence of processes and discusses the interaction between societal and state democratic processes. The authors were not only interested in empirically studying this process, but also normatively evaluating the democracy emerging in the multilevel political system. For example, a chapter by Holzhacker and Roemmele (2006) argues that if national parliamentary scrutiny over EU issues is to be seen as part of a broader democratic representative process linking the electorate and public policy coming from Brussels, political parties should be communicating their issue positions toward Europe during national election campaigns. Their empirical evidence finds that very few articles appear in newspapers during election campaigns which present voters with the opportunity to distinguish the competing political parties based on their positions toward the EU. Research has also begun into national parliamentary scrutiny in new member states. Àgh (2005), for example, has conducted research on the Hungarian, Polish, and Czech parliaments. He argues that the scrutiny function of these parliaments over EU issues is still underdeveloped, since there has been such an overload of EU issues as part of the accession procedure and the EU policy universe has been rather unknown to most of the MPs. He argues instead that these parliaments have played a stronger role in their communicative function. These parliaments have been a window to the EU for these publics. He also argues that they serve an aggregative function of national interests, allowing other voices beyond elite business interests to be heard in policy making toward the EU. Other work has focused on the impact which the EU is having on domestic political competition in East Central Europe (Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003). Work focusing on a single parliament among the new member states includes Brokl (2001) on the Czech Republic; Gyori (2004) on Hungary; KolarskaBobinska (2003) on Poland; and Vehar (2004) and Fink-Hafner (2005) on Slovenia. Others have asked after enlargement, what would the consequences be for the legitimacy of EU decision making in a scenario where weak or moderate national parliaments outnumber the strong ones in the scrutiny of EU affairs. Kiiver (2005: 1) argues that a mix of weak and strong scrutinizers among the 25 national parliaments is irrelevant to the public of any given member state and to their perception of the democratic legitimacy of EU decision-making. Some very recent research investigates the possible role of national parliaments in new modes of governance within the EU, specifically the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (Raunio 2006). OMC may be a way for member states to achieve important policy objectives, like increased economic competitiveness and reducing unemployment, while preserving national sovereignty and national leeway in implementation (Héritier 2002; Borras and Jacobsson 2004;

150

Politics and Polity

Haverland and Holzhacker 2006). There has also been interest in speculating about the role of national parliaments in the EU’s constitutional order if a new Constitution comes into force (Cygen 2004). Moving from empirical and theoretical concerns, there is also a prescriptive literature attempting to set forth best practices for national parliamentary scrutiny. For example, Raunio (2006) advocates delegating authority to specialized committees, conducting hearings with ministers before Council meetings, improving access to information, and finally investing resources in producing and sifting information inside the parliament. Finally, there are also reports from official bodies that are extremely helpful in providing comparative documentation of the operation of scrutiny by national parliaments. For example, a recent COSAC report asked the national parliaments whether their government provides explanatory memoranda to EU draft legislation, what specific information is to be provided in these memoranda, and the deadline for its delivery to parliament. Most governments are required to provide their parliament with such memoranda, and often provide their parliaments with a summary of the draft legislation, its legal basis, the position of the government, and its impact on the countries current legislation and national economy. Some of the Nordic governments are to provide even information beyond the government’s official viewpoint, and are asked to include various viewpoints from civil society. For example the Danish government is to include the responses received from interest groups and the Swedish government is required to provide the positions of Swedish authorities and organizations to proposed legislation. When a deadline is specified for the receipt of the documents and the government’s explanatory memoranda, the time ranges from 10 days to 6 weeks after the Commission has provided documents to the government (COSAC Secretariat 2004: 27–9; cf. COSAC Secretariat 2005). All in all, national parliaments are portrayed as reactive institutions in the literature, casting rather modest influence on policy initiatives coming from the executive (Raunio 2006). In addition, while European integration has had an impact on national parliaments, any weakening of parliamentarism is only partly attributable to the EU (Hix and Raunio 2000). But it should also be pointed out that at times the EU can act as a catalyst for parliamentary activity in areas traditionally not subject to domestic legislation in certain countries (Duina and Oliver 2005). For example the EU laws on gender equality caused a “shock” to some national policy systems and created a new policy area at the national level (Mazey 1998). Duina and Oliver state that this process of precedent setting occurred by policy transfer between parliaments and the exchange of best practices for parliamentary scrutiny. Those involved in the legislative process may learn from others in how to set objectives, devise strategies, work in a multi-level setting, and cooperate with elements of civil society (Duina and Oliver 2005; Dolowitz and March 1996).

Ronald Holzhacker 151

11.3 Key problems Now we will turn our attention to the key problems of the existing literature and research in this area. First, there is a distinct divide between the scholars that are employing broadly comparative approaches to the study of parliamentary scrutiny and the parliamentary specialists which focus on understanding a single country in great depth. When comparativists conclude that features of parliamentary scrutiny often depend on the existing executive–legislative relations in each country, they may begin to systematically identify the features of executive–legislative relations which most impact on scrutiny over EU matters. Part of the difficulty here is that when the comparativists are researching parliamentary scrutiny over EU matters, they often fail to systematically research how scrutiny is conducted over domestic matters at the same time, using the same method and variables. Thus there is the traditional gap between the in-depth knowledge of the single country parliamentary specialists and those attempting broad comparative research. Secondly, it is difficult to accurately measure longitudinal change in parliamentary scrutiny. Research on parliaments is qualitatively oriented, and each study uses its own approach to identifying and operationalizing the key variables involved. This makes it difficult to replicate or compare studies conducted at different times. In Europeanization studies, one is attempting to trace change overtime in national parliaments in response to developments at the EU level. To properly isolate the causal factors, one needs to accurately measure institutional change over time, requiring the proper definition and measuring of variables. Thirdly, while there has been a focus on legal and institutional changes, there needs to be more focus on how the key actors involved in the process of scrutiny, the parliamentary party groups, individual MPs, and the ministers and their ministries, actually use these legal instruments and institutions in practice. Fourthly, the emphasis of research on national parliamentary scrutiny has focused on scrutiny under the first pillar, that is decision making arising under the European Community Treaty. But scrutiny may also occur on intergovernmental decision making under the second and third pillars, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. In some countries the scope of information which governments must provide to their parliaments European affairs committee under these two pillars is analogous to the first pillar, but in others such information is communicated via the Committee for Foreign Affairs for the second pillar, and in other countries such information for decision making under the second and third pillars is provided at the government’s discretion (ECPRD 2002: 22–5). Finally, there is a need for parliamentary research to connect with two broader sets of ideas. One, the role of national parliaments within the overall pattern of government and governance emerging within the EU and the member

152

Politics and Polity

states, and secondly, with ideas concerning democracy and representation within this newly emerging political system.

11.4 Conclusion The research on national parliaments has focused attention on the impact which the EU is having on the functioning of democratic institutions at the member state level. As such, it is part of the broader Europeanization literature focusing on the member states. In addition to the five problems identified in the previous section in which future research should be mindful, we shall mention here some fruitful areas for future research. First, there is a need now to research the constitutional bases, institutional arrangements, and especially the actual functioning of the European affairs committees in the ten newly admitted EU countries. The existing comparative work does not include a systematic consideration of these countries yet. Secondly, there will be a need to study the response of national parliaments to changes to the EU structure if and when the new Constitution takes effect. The COSAC secretariat has prepared a report discussing the implications of the Constitutional Treaty on national parliaments, including the national parliaments’ new role in monitoring the principle of subsidiarity (the “early warning system”). The report also discusses improved transmission of EU documents to national parliaments, extended waiting times before the Council may adopt a piece of legislation in order to give parliaments more time to act, new opportunities for inter-parliamentary cooperation within COSAC, and a number of other constitutional articles with direct implications for national parliaments including those in the area of freedom, security, and justice, as well as treaty revision procedures (COSAC Secretariat 2005). Even if the Constitutional Treaty does not come into force, there have already been informal discussions among parliamentary scholars, the professional staff of parliaments, and COSAC representatives to attempt to implement some of the provisions which expand the rights of national parliaments to intervene in the process of European decisionmaking (see Discussion at the conference “Ireland, Europe, and the Challenge of Democracy” at University College Dublin, Ireland, May 20, 2005). Interest in this area should continue, and research into national parliamentary scrutiny in the member states is important to better understand the democratic functioning of the multi-level political system emerging in the EU.

Key readings Auel, K. (2006). Europeanization of Parliamentary Democracy: Institutional Reforms and Strategic Adaptation. In R.L. Holzhacker and E. Albaek, eds, Democratic Governance and

Ronald Holzhacker 153

European Integration: Linking Societal and State Processes of Democracy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming. Duina, F. and M. Oliver (2005). National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Integration? European Law Journal, 11(2) 173–95. Raunio, T. and S. Hix (2000). The Impact of European Integration on Parliamentary Government. West European Politics, 23(4) 142–68. Holzhacker, R.L. (2005). National Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Decision-Making: The Role of Opposition Parties. Journal of Legislative Studies, 11(3/4) 428–45. Maurer, A. and W. Wessels, eds. (2001). National Parliaments on their Ways to Europe: Losers or Latecomers? Baden-Baden: Nomos. Norton, P., ed.(1996). National Parliaments and the European Union. London: Frank Cass.

12 Political Parties and Party Systems Peter Mair

12.1 Introduction Within the varied literature that has addressed the relationship between European integration, on the one hand, and the character and development of parties and party systems, on the other, three related concerns have been prominent. In the first place, and often reflecting the earliest tradition of research in this area, scholars have sought to trace the origins and development of transnational – and specifically trans-European – party federations, seeing in these nascent organizations the potential for the emergence of genuine political parties at the European level. The pioneering work in this regard was carried out by Pridham (1975) and Pridham and Pridham (1981) in the period surrounding the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament, and was subsequently further developed by scholars such as Bardi (e.g., 1994) and Hix (e.g., 1995). Second, reflecting a more recent phase of research, scholars have been concerned to analyze the shape and dynamic of the parties and the party systems as they function within the European Parliament. This remains a key and quite dominant strand of contemporary research, with the focus being constantly expanded and reconstituted on the basis of new data derived from roll-call analysis, patterns of alignment, and the shifting memberships of federations and parliamentary fractions. The literature here is also enormous, with pioneering work being carried out by Bardi (1989) and Attinà (1990), and with the more sophisticated recent work being well represented in the collection of papers edited by Marks and Steenbergen (2004). The third strand of research is more varied, but is primarily concerned with the extent to which “Europe”, however defined, plays a role in party programs, party ideology and party competition at the national level. This third strand of research, which is now tending to receive more attention, also incorporates studies of national party and party-system adaptation to the development of European integration, as well as analyses of the extent to which the process of integration poses difficulties 154

Peter Mair 155

for, or offers opportunities to national political actors. This is also where most of the growing work on the politics of Euroskepticism can be located (see, for example, Kopecky´ and Mudde 2002). Although a lot of the work here is inevitably nationally-oriented, there have been occasional landmark articles (e.g., Ladrech 1994; Andeweg 1995; Pedersen 1996) and comparative studies (Featherstone 1988; Gaffney 1996) which have tended to set the terms of reference for later work. It is only recently, however, that the notion of Europeanization in its relation to national political parties and party systems has begun to be systematically unpacked and specified (see Ladrech 2002a, b). Before coming to the four core sets of questions that have been addressed by the various scholars in the field (section 12.2) and to the key problems that can be identified (section 12.3), there are two immediate observations that can be made about this literature. In the first place, there is an interesting correspondence between the different concerns that have come to the fore in the literature and the three main elements, or faces, that are seen to constitute political parties as organizations: the party on the ground, the party in central office, and the party in public office (see Katz and Mair 1993). Thus, for example, it is possible to draw a link between interest in the development of transnational parties and in the emergence of Euro-party organizations in this particular literature and the interest in the wider party literature in the development and functioning of the party in central office. Similarly, the focus on the party fractions and groups in the European Parliament can be related to the wider interest in the party in public office, while the concern with the role played by “Europe” in party programs and party competition at the national level can be seen to correspond to the more general interest in the politics of the party on the ground. This is not just a casual correspondence, moreover, but serves to emphasize how closely these three themes are bound up with one another and how they reflect a marked degree of mutual dependence. In other words, and drawing lessons from work on party organizations more generally, it may be argued that it is often not possible to understand the limits and possibilities of the transnational federations and party-building exercises – the development of the party in central office – without also understanding the role acquired by the party fractions in the Parliament – the party in public office. Nor is it possible to understand how these party fractions work without at least some understanding of the processes of national party adaptation and competition – the processes involved in the party on the ground. As the wider literature testifies, to study any one of these elements in isolation from the others is therefore to set immediate limits to the capacity for interpretation and understanding. The second observation is that within the literature on all three research themes, Europeanization has tended to be understood in two different ways. On the one hand, it is often conventionally understood in the same sense as is offered by the editors of this present volume – that is, as a factor that is external

156

Politics and Polity

to the national experience, or as occurring when “something in national political systems is affected by something European.” Evidence of Europeanization in this sense is usually sought in work that falls within the third theme noted above – that is, when scholars look for evidence of the impact of Europe – European elections, European policies, European alliances – on the organization, programs, or strategies of political parties in the domestic arena. On the other hand, Europeanization is also understood as a process that involves “the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance” (Cowles et al. 2001: 1), and in this sense it is usually sought in work that comes under the second theme that was identified above – work that looks at the emergence and consolidation of party alignments in the European Parliament, as well as at the nascent leadership alliances that appear to be building up between like-minded parties in the preparations for various European Council meetings (Hix and Lord 1997: 183–97). Both senses of Europeanization play a role in work that deals with the first theme, with Europeanization as a distinct level of governance being one of the more useful parameters with which to assess transnational party-building exercises, and with Europeanization as an external factor being cited in assessments of how national party organizations adapt to these new challenges. That said, it is also worth noting that transnational party building and the concomitant national party organizational adaptation has sometimes little to do with Europeanization as such, but is instead prompted by the desire to build alliances on a global – or, at least, global democratic – stage.

12.2 Core research questions As suggested elsewhere (Mair 2004: 340–3), these two senses of Europeanization can be considered as the limits of a single “Europeanization dimension”, bounded at one end by conflicts regarding the institutionalization of a distinct European political system, and at the other by conflicts regarding the impact or penetration of European rules, directives and norms into the domestic sphere. In other words, at one end of the Europeanization dimension we see political struggles developing over the creation and consolidation of political institutions at the supranational European level, including parties and party systems, whereas at the other end of the dimension the struggles involve the extent to which local policies and practices, and hence also local parties, are subject to the impact of standardized European influences and constraints. The impact of Europeanization can also be understood in two ways. On the one hand, it can have a direct effect on political parties and party systems. For example, it can be shown how the adoption of particular rules and procedures in the European Parliament have led directly to the creation of particular party alliances and coalitions, or how the introduction of elections to the Parliament

Peter Mair 157

has led to the formation and mobilization of new political alternatives in those elections as well as in national contests. On the other hand, the impact of Europeanization might also be indirect. In this case, for example, it may be argued that by removing certain policy areas from the exclusive authority of the national political arena, Europeanization exerts an important, but nevertheless indirect influence on the way in which parties compete with one another. Europeanization may also weaken parties through the encouragement of alternative forms of interest representation, and by opening up new channels for ostensibly non-partisan modes of participatory governance and the like. Putting both of these parameters together results in Table 12.1, with most of the existing literature on the Europeanization of parties and party systems being classifiable in one or other of the four categories shown there. The table combines the distinction between Europeanization as penetration and as institutionalization with the distinction between direct and indirect, yielding four possible outcomes. These four categories also serve to indicate the different sets of questions that tend to be addressed in this field of research. The first set of questions that is relevant here concerns the extent to which Europeanization as penetration has directly led to the formation of new political parties, whether in the national or in the European arenas (Outcome 1). These may be parties that mobilize in opposition to the influence of European decision-making in national politics, but they may equally be parties that are formed to expressly promote an expansion or deepening of that influence. In practice, these questions have also been broadened to include inquiries into the shifting responses to Europe that can be discerned within existing political parties, as well as questions regarding the extent to which alignments on the issue of Europe overlap with, or run counter to, traditional alignments along leftright, religious-secular, center–periphery, or even materialist-postmaterialist dimensions (Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; Van der Eijk et al. 1995; Marks and Wilson 2000). Table 12.1 Europeanization and party politics: four outcomes Mechanism Penetration

Institutionalization

Direct

1. Emergence of new anti-European parties, or anti-European sentiments within existing political parties

2. Creation and consolidation of pan-European party coalitions

Indirect

3. Hollowing out of national party competition, constraints on domestic decision making, devaluation of national electoral competition

4. Emergence of alternative and non-partisan channels of representation, diffusion of “Europe” in domestic discourse

Impact

158

Politics and Polity

In other words, among the key questions that are posed here is whether a European dimension – however defined – constitutes a wholly separate and new dimension in party competition, or whether it reinforces, is absorbed within, or is even exploited by, pre-existing dimensions of competition. As Valen (1976) demonstrated many years ago, for example, there may be considerable overlap between divides over Europe, on the one hand, and more traditional center–periphery divides, on the other. In yet other work, an emphasis has been laid on the link between the European dimension and the religious–secular dimension, whether defined in general Christian terms or more denominationally (Nelsen et al. 2001; Vollaard 2005). Elsewhere, Hooghe and Marks (2001) have suggested that the opposition between proponents and opponents of European integration overlaps with the more conventional opposition between left and right, with more left-wing parties being increasingly inclined to endorse European ambitions in building a regulatory system, and more right-wing parties proving increasingly suspicious or skeptical in this regard. In an earlier phase of European integration, by contrast, it was the traditional left that proved more suspicious and the right more supportive. Despite the increasing volume of work in this area, however, it can also be argued that the European dimension remains too inchoate and incoherent for us to form a definitive view on its positioning, while its relation to other divides will also inevitably vary across national political systems, and in the context of different national complexes of cleavage structures. It is also perhaps too soon to say whether this dimension can even survive as an independent base for party competition. Nonetheless, it is here that some of the more important questions can be and are being addressed, for it is in this context that the issue of Europe can be linked to our longer-term understanding of the established structures of political competition. A second set of questions relates to the direct effects of Europeanization as institutionalization, and is concerned to probe the extent to which a coherent pattern is emerging with respect to the behavior and political alignments of party groups in the European Parliament (Outcome 2). How cohesive are these groups, for example, and to whose cues do they respond? Might they be regarded as genuinely European parties – and hence as a core element within the institutionalization of European governance – or do they still remain tied to the terms of reference established by the organizations in national politics from which they originally derive? If, as Hix (2002) contends, the members of these party groups are agents with two principals – national and European – then it becomes important to see how this balance has developed over time, and to explore the conditions in which the European party identity has been able to assert itself over and above the control exerted by the national organization. In a related vein, there is also an increasingly sophisticated and insightful body of work that deals with the attitudes, preferences and behavior of voters in

Peter Mair 159

European elections (e.g., Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; van der Eijk et al. 1995; Blondel et al. 1998), and which is concerned to explore the extent to which European elections are different from those for national parliaments, as well as the extent to which we can identify a distinctly “European” electorate. In this case, the questions include whether there are pan-European cues to which voters in national systems respond in comparable ways, or whether, for example, similar groups of interests in different countries act more or less in concert with one another (see also Gabel 2000). Other key questions that arise here concern the degree to which these elections remain “second-order” (see the original analysis by Reif and Schmitt 1980, and the later evaluation by Marsh 1998), and hence whether the outcomes may be described as meaningful – in the sense of being representative and legitimate (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Van der Eijk et al. 1995; Katz and Wessels 1999). Because most of the now very extensive literature on Europe and party politics has been dominated by these two sets of questions, the result has been that attention has been focused primarily on the analysis of the direct effects of Europeanization rather than the indirect effects (see also below). Once we consider the impact of Europe on parties and party systems in particular, however, it is the indirect effects that may well prove the more decisive (Mair 2000: 48–9; Ladrech 2005: 332–3). To begin with, the development of a European level of decision making has clearly played a major role in the “hollowing out” of policy competition between political parties at the national level (Outcome 3). This has happened in three ways. First, and most obviously, one major effect of Europe has been to limit the policy space that is available to the competing parties. This happens when policies are harmonized across the Union, and when there is more or less forced convergence, with one size fitting all (e.g., Grabbe 2003). National governments and the parties in those governments may still differ in how they interpret these demands for convergence, of course, and in this sense there may still remain a degree of variation from one system to the next. But even when such interpretations differ across countries, they rarely appear to differ – at least across the mainstream – within countries. Thus when one of the member states does seek to opt out of a particular policy, this usually happens by agreement between government and opposition, and hence the policy space remains foreshortened and the issue in question rarely becomes politicized. Second, Europe limits the capacities of national governments, and hence also the capacities of the parties in those governments, by reducing the range of policy instruments at their disposal. This occurs through the delegation of decision making from the national level to the European level – whether to the European Central Bank, or to Europol, or to any of the many new regulatory agencies that now proliferate at all levels within the European polity (Kelemen 2002). These are the so-called non-majoritarian institutions, from which parties and politics are deliberately excluded (see also below). In this instance, policy is

160

Politics and Polity

decided according to a variety of different expert or legal merits, and in principle, at least, is not subject to partisanship. Third, Europe reduces the ability of parties in national governments to compete by limiting their policy repertoire. This comes through the now-familiar process of negative integration, whereby once-standard policy practices are disallowed on the grounds that they interfere with the free market. Particular goods can no longer be excluded from import or sale, particular qualifications can no longer be deemed inadequate, and particular domestic services can no longer be privileged. In other words, practices that involve public bodies in selection, privileging, or discrimination become more and more restricted, and hence the stock of policies available to governments, and to the parties which control those governments, is steadily curtailed. All three sets of limits serve to substantially reduce the stakes of competition between political parties, and to dampen down the potential differences wrought by successive governments. Through Europe, albeit indirectly, political competition becomes increasingly depoliticized. At the same time, however, and most crucially, there is no compensating process of politicization developing at the European level, and hence no newly emerging structures of political representation through which national inadequacies can be redeemed (for a lengthy analysis of this problem, see Bartolini 2005). There are also two other senses in which the deepening of European integration can be seen to promote depoliticization and disengagement indirectly. First, there is the simple socializing effect, in that the existence and weight of the European institutions, and of the Commission in particular, is clearly going to accustom citizens into a more generalized acceptance of being governed by institutions which are neither conventionally representative nor electorally accountable. The corollary of this is obviously that less attention need then be given to those institutions that are representative and/or accountable. In other words, if important decisions are made by so-called non-majoritarian institutions, and if these are accepted and acceptable, then this inevitably raises the question about the centrality, relevance, and sheer necessity of those institutions at the national level that still do depend on the electoral process. In short: politics is devalued to the extent that key decisions are taken by non-political bodies. Second, because the European Parliament – the one European body which does depend on the electoral process – fails to generate much commitment and enthusiasm on the part of citizens, it may well be indirectly responsible for a negative spill-over effect on national politics. This can happen in two ways. On the one hand, through contagion, whereby a disregard for the European Parliament as a legislative institution, and in particular a disregard for the MEPs who work in that institution, can feed into, or be encouraged to feed into, a disregard for national parliaments and national representatives. On the other hand, through learning, in that by not voting in EP elections, citizens may learn that it is also possible and acceptable to fail to take part in national

Peter Mair 161

elections. In sum, the Europeanization of decision-making, and the creation of a host of national democratic deficits alongside the more familiar European democratic deficit, risks an indirect effect whereby all elections, and not just European elections, are turned into second-order – or at least second-rate (Irwin 1995) – contests. The final set of questions that is relevant here concerns the relationship between the institutionalization of the European Union, on the one hand, and the emergence of alternative channels of representation, on the other (Outcome 4). Here too the effects on parties and party systems are primarily indirect, in that it is through the encouragement or promotion of participation and representation through civil society, interest organizations, advocacy groups, and the lobby system that the European polity fosters a version of democratic engagement that may indirectly undermine the conventional partisan channel. With the exception of the role they play within the rather poorly regarded system of European elections and European parliamentary representation, parties as such have little opportunity to act authoritatively within the developing system of European governance; and as their role becomes diminished with respect to the other actors and institutional voices that are encouraged by the new emphasis on civil society and participatory governance, so also does it risk being diminished in the national arena. Disregard is contagious, and the non-party alternatives that are fostered in European governance at the expense of parties (Beyers and Kerremans 2004) can also eventually come to be seen to carry greater weight and legitimacy in systems of national governance. In this sense, there remain major questions that can be asked about the indirect impact of Europe on the declining legitimacy of traditional actors in national politics. As yet, however, these questions have only sporadically been addressed (Greven and Pauly 2000; Bartolini 2005).

12.3 Key problems There are five main problems in the contemporary literature and hence five main areas where the issues relating to Europeanization and parties and party systems remain relatively unclear. In the first place, as indicated above, far too little systematic attention has been paid to analyzing the indirect impact of Europeanization on parties and party systems, especially at the domestic level, where it is likely to be more important. Although this effect can be easily assumed, it is rarely specified, and, for example, little attempt has been made to control for its effects by distinguishing between those issue areas in which Europe has become the principal authoritative voice and those in which national politics – and hence national political competition – continues to play a decisive role. Yet it is only by exploring this distinction that a real assessment of the impact of Europeanization can be effected. That said, even if parties do

162

Politics and Polity

manage to sustain their authority within a narrower range of non-Europeanized policy areas, the sum total of their authority is still likely to be diminished, and hence competition as such will continue to be constrained. Second, in looking for the impact of Europe on parties and party systems at the national level in particular, the literature has relied perhaps too heavily on standardized quantitative variables that can be used directly in highly abstract cross-national research. One example of this is the research effort that has been made to identify party positions on Europe, while another is the effort to assess the weight which divisions on Europe play in party competition. In some cases, this research has relied on the sort of crude, but easily accessible data provided by expert judgments (Ray 1999; Hooghe et al. 2004), while in others it has been based on analyses of the contents of party programs, particularly in the context of elections to the European Parliament (e.g., Gabel and Hix 2004), where issues relating to the institutionalization of Europe may prove formally irrelevant. What is really needed here, however, particularly given that this is a new and often exploratory avenue of research, is a much more systematic, inductive, and largely bottom-up comparison of political discussions at the national level – whether as revealed in parliamentary debates, or in contests surrounding European referendums, or in the ebb and flow of the arguments used in national election campaigns. In other words, in addition to the imputed location of a party’s core identity, and in addition to the evidence provided by the formal policies which it adopts or is obliged to adopt, we need to know more about how Europe actually plays in national political discourse, as well as about the way in which it is conceived: is Europe usually cited as a constraint by parties at the national level, for example, or is it seen as an opportunity, or do these parties scarcely cite it at all? Such a strategy calls for quite a slow and sustained series of case-study analyses, however, and for the accumulation of thick descriptive accounts which can then be compared from the bottom up, and this is hardly seen as cost effective. To be sure, individual cases are sometimes examined, both thoroughly and usefully (e.g., Aylott 2002; Garry 1995; Johansson and Raunio 2001), and various cross-national projects have been developed by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2004, 2006), for example, which seek to pull together work about what is really happening on the ground. As yet, however, there has been not enough of this sort of work, and not enough systematic integration of its various findings, and hence we have far too little robust comparative evidence concerning the impact of Europe on parties at the national level, and the role of Europe in party competition. Third, the impact of Europeanization on parties and party systems, whether direct or indirect, needs to be integrated more closely into the more general theories of party change and development. Without such a framing, Europe risks being seen as a sort of deus ex machina that can be called in to account for a myriad of different effects; with such a framing, on the other hand, the potential

Peter Mair 163

impact of Europe can be assessed against other factors which are also known to impact upon parties, whether in Europe or elsewhere. In this regard, Europe has been too often seen as a challenge to party and political leaders, obliging them to adapt to circumstances which appear to put their preferred strategies at a disadvantage. There is another way of looking at this development, however, in which the construction of Europe and the depoliticization of decision making more generally can be seen to be part of a consciously chosen strategy whereby vulnerable political leaders externalize their political costs and seek to evade both accountability and responsibility. In this sense, “the Commission made me do it” offers an attractive get-out (Smith 2000b), and can be linked to wider patterns evident in party development in post-industrial political systems whereby party leaders also build other barriers to help secure the position of their party in the polity as well as their own positions in public office (Katz and Mair 1995; Blyth and Katz 2005). Fourth, in considering both the role of parties within the European polity and the impact of Europe on parties in the national polity, the literature has perhaps been too readily inclined to go along with the assumption that EU is exceptional, and hence that it need not be subject to the forms of analysis that are conventionally applied to national political systems. This is hardly plausible, however, particularly if we return to the earlier literature on the political system (Almond 1960; Easton 1965) which consciously attempted to develop a set of comparative political science tools that could accommodate primitive, developing, and other so-called “exceptional” polities. Taking this now-classic language and set of terms of reference on board allows us to treat the European Union as a political system, and, in this sense, as something that is directly comparable to other political systems (Hix 2005: 1–9; Kassim 2003b: 140–2; Mair 2005: 14–17). But though comparable, it is also distinctive, and one of the ways in which this distinctiveness comes through most sharply is in the way demands are processed. That is, while in other political systems demands are primarily voiced through elections and, within the electoral process, through parties, this is scarcely the case in the EU political system. This is not to suggest that the EU political system is unresponsive: on the contrary, it may even be said to be highly responsive to the formally non-partisan demands that are voiced by civil society, and that are encouraged by different modes of participatory governance. But what is obviously most striking about the EU when compared to other ostensibly democratic political systems is that it is not responsive in terms of elections and parties. In other words, what we have here is a political system that cannot be reached or accessed adequately by means of elections and parties, and that is open to all sorts of actors and organizations while being relatively impenetrable to voters. This obviously has major implications for how parties continue to function in both the European and the member state polities, as well as for the standing of parties in the eyes of the

164

Politics and Polity

citizenry, and must therefore be addressed as part of the research agenda associated with the question of Europeanization. The fifth problem, which builds on the previous two concerns, is more difficult to specify and is also of more general application. As European integration progresses and becomes more institutionalized, it becomes increasingly difficult to separate out distinctive European and national levels. To be sure, the institutions at both levels are separate and unmistakable, but even then there is often substantial overlap and to-ing and fro-ing among the persons who inhabit these institutions and among the actors who make them work. Ministers, parliamentarians and civil servants may well be conscious of the differences between European institutions and national institutions, but they will often work in both, and sometimes more or less simultaneously. In other words, Europe is now less easily compartmentalized, and has become part of the everyday work of many national actors, while national considerations have become part and parcel of the parameters adopted by European actors. As Europe hits home (Börzel and Risse 2000) from the one side, and as the national systems hit Europe (Beyers and Trondal 2004) from the other, governance as such comes to reflect a symbiosis between what was previously European and what was previously domestic. In other words, while we still speak of separate layers of decision-making, in practice they have become so intertwined as to become indistinguishable (see also Flinders 2004a, b). Although this is perhaps less true for parties than for many other actors and institutions, in that parties have done much to insulate themselves from European encroachment into the domestic arena (Andeweg 1995; Pedersen 1996; Mair 2000), it is nevertheless still the case that it is usually the same actors, in the form of the same party organizations, that compete in both European and domestic elections, while it is also the same national political – and hence party – leaders who occupy and are nominated to offices in both national and European institutions. Here, then, as in so many other areas, it becomes ever more difficult to conceive of Europeanization as occurring when “something in national political systems is affected by something European.” That is, it becomes increasingly difficult to work out what precisely it is in the national political system that can be affected, and what it is in Europe that does the affecting. The two levels become increasingly hard to separate, and hence national parties become, in large part, European parties, or at least they also act on the European stage. The same pattern of intertwining is also evident when viewed from the perspective of the citizen who seeks to resolve the problems that arise from her encounters with the state. Here too the new and increasingly complex network of governance serves to cloud almost all the traditionally visible distinctions. As life in both the public and private sphere becomes subject to an increasing body of more or less complex regulations (see also Hirst 1998), decisions tend to be processed by both national and European institutions. Governance in the

Peter Mair 165

regulatory state becomes in this sense indivisible, and hence the representation of interests by political parties, as well as the voicing of demands more generally, requires a less pronounced division of labor between what is European and what is not.

12.4 Conclusion In the broadly defined research area that relates to Europeanization and party politics, there has been a discernible shift from an almost exclusive concern with parties at the European level – whether in the form of transnational organizations or Europarliamentary fractions – to a growing concern with the impact of European integration on party politics and political representation at the national level. At the same time, there has been a greater emphasis on questions that derive from theories of comparative politics and political behavior rather than international relations (for an early assessment, see Hix 1994), and hence a growing and welcome tendency to relate specific European-focused research to more wide-ranging patterns of mass political and institutional development. This helps to redress some of the problems identified in the previous section of this chapter. In part, this shift reflects a general maturing and expansion of research in this field. In part also, however, it reflects, or is responding to, real political debates and real world issues. As this literature testifies, Europe is now becoming a more tangible issue in national political discussions, and Euroskepticism, whether focused on European complex in particular or on systems of governance more generally, is becoming both more widespread and more potent. As van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) have emphasized, Europe has previously proved to be remarkably under-politicized, in that many of the mainstream parties that contest elections at the national level were keen to push it to the margins. Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004: 47) refer to Europe in this sense as “the sleeping giant”, arguing that the issue is now “ripe for politicization” and suggesting that “it is only a matter of time before policy entrepreneurs … seize the opportunity … to differentiate themselves from other parties in EU terms”. It now appears that we are seeing signs of such a development, in that the Europeanization dimension is finally beginning to force itself with greater weight into the various national electoral arenas. At the same time, however, it is often uneven in its impact, since what we have also learned is that it is those who stand away from the mainstream, or those who are outside the cartel, who tend to be the more Euroskeptic (see also Taggart 1998; Anderson 1998), and this alone may undermine its potential stability and sustainability as a dimension of competition. Euroskepticism feeds on discontent, and discontent, in turn, feeds on exclusion. Whether it can survive being integrated into “normal” politics, and becoming part of an opposition within the mainstream, remains something for real-world politics to answer.

166

Politics and Polity

Acknowledgement I am grateful to Hans Vollaard, the editors and an anonymous referee for useful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

Key readings Bartolini, S. (2005) Re-Structuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hix, S. and C. Lord (1997) Political Parties in the European Union. London: Macmillan. Ladrech, R. (2002) Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis. Party Politics, 8(4) 389–403. Mair, P. (2000) The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems. West European Politics, 23(4), 27–51. Marks, G. and M.R. Steenbergen (eds) (2004) European Integration and Political Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

13 Interest Groups and Social Movements Rainer Eising

13.1 Introduction This chapter analyzes the Europeanization of interest organizations and social movements. Emphasis will be placed on the strategies these collective actors have adopted to represent their interests in the European Union (EU), on their influence in EU policy making, and on the EU effects on domestic interest intermediation. Even though organized interests have been steady companions of European integration, the bulk of attention has always been devoted to EUlevel interest groups and interest intermediation (see Greenwood 2003a). Singling out the EU’s impact on domestic interests has only recently began to receive attention so that the analysis of this topic is characterized by notable research gaps and important areas of controversy and ambiguity. Europeanization studies seek to explain the ways in which the EU affects national actors, processes and structures (see Cowles et al. 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a). They have identified several causal mechanisms that leave the EU imprint on the member states. Among these are the promotion of new policy ideas and concepts, the political socialization in EU politics, the processes of policy learning and diffusion, and the change of the institutional framework that defines the target structure of interest organizations as well as the formulation of European rules that constitute part of the legal framework within which interest organizations and their members act. Of these mechanisms, the transformation of the institutional setting figures most prominently in accounts of interest group adaptation to the EU. Several studies look into the political activities of organized interests in the EU multi-level system (Hooghe and Marks 2001), assess its consequences on the influence of private and public actors (Grande 1996; Baltz et al. 2005), or analyze the adaptation of the actors’ organizations, decision-making practices, and strategies of interest representation (Platzer 1984; Adshead 1996; Grote and Lang 2003). Consensus has emerged that both pull and push factors shape the adaptation of domestic interest 167

168

Politics and Polity

organizations to the EU. On the one hand, the state institutions are not merely an arena in which to pursue interests – they also pursue their own policy preferences and structure the representation of private interests. On the other hand, the characteristics of the interest organizations and their embeddedness in domestic contexts are said to matter greatly. Furthermore, a recent strand of the literature (Marks and McAdam 1996; Imig and Tarrow 2001; Balme et al. 2002) has investigated how social movements have adapted to European integration. So far these analyses found little evidence of a strong Europeanization of social movements and political protests. Again, properties of social movements and characteristics of the institutional opportunity structure are held to be responsible. Finally, several studies focus on the EU impact upon domestic modes of interest intermediation and associational self-regulation (see Schmidt 1999b; Cowles 2001; van Waarden 1994). They discuss whether EU regulation and the EU mode of interest intermediation cause profound changes in the domestic arena. The findings are inconclusive so that it is as yet unclear whether and how the EU affects pluralistic, corporatist, or statist regimes. I examine these core questions by considering how both social movements and national interest organizations have sought to cope with the European Union. After this, I discuss some key problems by drawing attention to some research gaps as well as areas of controversy and ambiguity. In the evaluation, I recall the main results of this review and identify some desiderata for future research.

13.2 Core research questions In this section, I explore the core questions that have been addressed. First, I look into the consequences of the changing institutional opportunity structure for the political activities of interest groups and social movements. Next, I analyze the impact of multi-level governance on the influence of interest groups and state institutions. Finally, I scrutinize the EU influence on domestic modes of interest intermediation and associational self-regulation. Several studies emphasize that the political opportunity structure of interest organizations and social movements has changed as a result of European integration (Marks and McAdam 1996; Imig and Tarrow 2001). Even though this concept is often held to be quite vague and includes many factors that affect the chances of groups to realize their interests in the EU, it highlights the transfer of political authority to the EU institutions. This transfer is important for domestic groups because political institutions do not only “organize some conflicts into politics and some conflicts out of it” (Egeberg 2005b: 105), but also channel how these conflicts are being resolved. Two main analytical approaches are applied to capture how interest organizations responded to these institutional changes: multi-level governance and Europeanization studies.

Rainer Eising

169

While the former tends to assume a systemic perspective and conceptualizes the European Union as an integrated political setting that encompasses the European level as well as the national level, and in several studies also the regional and local levels of the member states, the latter maintains an analytical distinction among the European and the national layer in particular. The concept of multi-level governance is supposed to capture the point that political authority is dispersed across and shared among European and national institutions (Jachentenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001). This concept implies that the transfer of autonomous powers to the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice does not render national institutions obsolete for national interest groups. In fact, national executives continue to enjoy substantial EU policy-making powers as members of the EU Council or the European Council. And as most EU policies are implemented by national institutions there is general agreement that these will remain important addressees of domestic interest groups. In EU studies, it is widely acknowledged that state institutions are not merely an arena in which to pursue private interests. Rather, public actors pursue their own policy preferences and they also structure the representation of interests in the multi-level setting by setting up consultation fora, delegating policy-making powers to interest groups, granting financial support to their activities, and setting standards for appropriate political behavior (Coen 1998; Commission of the European Communities 2001a, 2002; Falkner et al. 2005b; Pollack 1997). Together with the delegation of political authority to the EU institutions, a layer of European interest groups has evolved. In its CONNECS data set on EUlevel interest groups, the Commission counted more than 900 of these organizations in the year 2002. To different degrees, they serve to create links among their members and to the EU institutions, to provide and distribute information on EU activities, to promote the interests of their members, and to formulate and implement EU policies. While most EU associations are considered to be arenas that condition their members’ political options and strategies, some of them have acquired organizational autonomy and are regarded as actors in their own right. Yet a few others are considered to be instruments in the hands of their dominant members. The membership of domestic organizations in these Eurogroups is quasi-automatic and does not depend on the specific incentives these groups have to offer (see Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998). Many analysts infer from the changes in the institutional setting that domestic groups need to pursue a “dual strategy” and promote their interests now indeed vis-à-vis domestic and EU institutions (e.g. Kohler-Koch 1997: 3). This differs considerably from the intergovernmental conception of European politics in which domestic interest groups rely entirely on their national governments for the pursuit of their EU-related interests (Moravcsik 1998). These act as gatekeepers to European politics and aggregate domestic interests. In recent years,

170

Politics and Polity

some studies have moved beyond the general argument and illustrative evidence presenting quantitative evidence on the empirical regularities of interest representation within the European multi-level system (Bennett 1997; Beyers 2002; Bouwen 2002; Coen 1998; Eising 2003, 2004a; Baltz et al. 2005). These studies establish that only a limited number of business interest organizations – and even fewer social movements – act at both the European and the national level on a regular basis. Based on a cluster analysis, a study of 800 European and national business associations and 34 large firms (Eising 2003, 2004a) found that 29 per cent of the German associations (N
321), 22 per cent of the British groups (N
204), 14 per cent of the French organizations (N
113), and 74 per cent of the large firms (N
34) represented their interests frequently to both European and national institutions and enjoyed good access to them. About a quarter (French associations) to a third (Germany, Great Britain) of the associations continue to represent their interests regularly to national institutions, but are only occasionally active at EU level. A very small minority of interest organizations in each member state has decided to be active only at the EU level thus exiting from the domestic arena. It is interesting to note that, owing to the division of labor in the domestic interest group systems, between 37 per cent (Germany) and 55 per cent (France) of the national business associations display only infrequent political activities because they concentrate on the provision of services or the coordination of markets. When considering only those organizations that represent their members’ interests frequently, 47 per cent of the German groups, 39 per cent of the British associations, and 36 per cent of the French organizations have evolved into multi-level players, suggesting a substantial Europeanization of business interest groups in that a significant share of these organizations now routinely represent their interests at both the EU and the domestic level. Social movements appear to be far less Europeanized. In their study of 9,872 protest events that were reported on the Reuters news wire between 1984 and 1997, Imig and Tarrow (2001) found that only some 5 per cent of these protests were responses to European Union institutions or policies. 95 per cent of all protests were related to regional or national affairs. Moreover, 83 per cent of the few protests against the EU took place within a member state, only 17 per cent of them were the outcome of transnational collaboration. Finally, 82 per cent of the EU protests were staged by occupational groups such as farmers, fishers and coal miners. These are heavily affected by EU market regulation and have also a tradition of political protests on domestic grounds. Only some 18 per cent of the contentious action against the EU are organized by non-occupational groups. This is a striking difference to the pattern in the member states and regions where these groups account for a large proportion of all protests. What reasons are given for the differential responses of firms, business interest groups and social movements to European integration? To some extent, the

Rainer Eising

171

embeddedness of these actors in the institutional opportunity structure is supposed to explain their political behavior. However, the hypotheses and the illustrative evidence that have been provided are inconclusive (Eising 2004b; Beyers 2002: 35). On the one hand, it is plausible to assume a negative relation among domestic embeddedness and European activities: the closer their relations with domestic institutions are, the less interest groups would need or aspire to become involved in EU politics. According to this logic, it will usually be those interest organizations that are policy outsiders in the member states that will act at EU level in order to seek political compensation. On the other hand, a positive relation between domestic embeddedness and European activities may be found. Close relations with domestic institutions increase the information of domestic groups about EU politics which can thereby improve their capacity to represent their interests at EU level. Similarly, tried and tested negotiation practices on domestic grounds may facilitate their lobbying efforts at EU level. In turn, these European activities can strengthen the position of the interest organizations in the domestic policy networks. Finally, the neo-functionalists expected that interest groups would gradually turn to the EU institutions to realize their interests more effectively. Their integration in the European policymaking process was supposed to let “their erstwhile ties with national friends undergo deterioration” (Haas 1958: 313) and lead to national disintegration. The data presented above on the business interests indicate that none of these general propositions finds full empirical support: very few national interest organizations that are weakly embedded in domestic policy networks seek compensation at they EU level. Only a handful of interest organizations in each member state shifted their activities entirely to the EU level. In conclusion, weak domestic embeddedness does not make for strong embeddedness at EU level. However, the bulk of the social movements and more than half of the business associations that represent their members’ interests routinely vis-à-vis domestic institutions have not really incorporated the EU institutions in their strategies of interest representation so that the hypothesis about the inertia of well-embedded domestic actors finds some empirical support. Finally, threequarters of the large firms and more than 40 per cent of the national business associations that are routine governance partners of domestic parliaments and governments have extended their political activities to the EU level indicating that strong domestic embeddedness may actually strengthen EU-level activities. To sum up, the impact of strong domestic embeddedness is not fully conclusive so that additional factors must be taken into account to explain the Europeanization of lobbying strategies. What are the conditions that lead domestic actors to incorporate the EU institutions into their strategy of interest representation? In general, three sets of factors are said to affect their motivation and capacity to represent their interests in the multi-level system. First, there is a wide-ranging consensus that

172

Politics and Polity

a higher degree of EU regulation propels them to represent their interests at EU level. Second, interest domains seem important: according to this proposition, business interests have a greater say in EU policy making than non-commercial interests, and diffuse interests within each category find it more difficult than specific interests to influence EU policy making because the latter tend to formulate more extreme policy positions that may lead EU and national policy makers to rephrase their initial proposals (see Baltz et al. 2005). However, studies looking at the access of interest organizations to EU policy-makers have indicated that, when controlling for further organizational and sectoral characteristics, the size of the interest domain does not have a significant impact on the access patterns (Eising 2004b: 510). Hence, while the size of the interest domain may not affect the access to EU policy-makers, the propensity of more specific interests to formulate more specific (and extreme) policy demands may allow them a larger say in EU policy-making. Thirdly, many studies stress that resources have a positive effect on the capacity to act within the multi-level setting – most notably the expertise (Bouwen 2002), the financial means (Eising 2004a, b), the socio-economic clout (Cowles 2001; Coen 1998; Coen and Dannreuther 2003), and the ability of interest organizations to steer the compliance of their members with EU legislation (Wolf 2005). This is an important reason why resourceful large firms are more likely to evolve into multi-level players than national associations or small firms. A corollary is that social movements have difficulties in mobilizing a large number of participants in parallel protests in Brussels and in the member states because they lack the resources to carry the high transaction costs (Rucht 2002). Finally, the capacity to put forward political concepts that resonate among other actors and to align with other interest organizations and political institutions is said to be of great importance because EU policy networks usually consist of many actors, meaning that isolated strategies stand only a small chance of success. In addition, the complexity of the EU’s multi-level setting is said to cause further troubles for social movements (Rucht 2002). They are linked to EU-level interest organizations which lobby the EU institutions quite regularly, but organize only few protests because political protest is usually targeted at the media and the public whose support is supposed to bring about the desired political change. However, political communication about the EU takes usually place within national borders because there is still no transnational European public even though the media have intensified their coverage of EU affairs over the years. Moreover, only in the member states public opinion has an immediate effect on public policy-makers because these are accountable to their voters (Della Porta 2003: 11). In the EU, this mechanism is underdeveloped because the elections to the European Parliament are “second-order” elections and because the EU executive is not at the disposal of the voters. Hence, there are

Rainer Eising

173

relatively few protests against the EU and most of them are staged in national arenas and targeted at national audiences and policy makers. Last but not least, the EU decision-making style is not at all conducive to political protests. The prevailing consensus orientation and political deliberation in EU negotiations support strategies of insider lobbying rather than outsider lobbying so that social movements have recourse to protests only as a means of last resort after all other attempts to influence the EU institutions and policies failed. How then does the EU affect the influence of interest organizations, social movements, and state institutions? It is contested whether European integration strengthens the influence of state institutions or that of interest organizations on public policy. On the one hand, three factors are enlisted to support the hypothesis that multi-level policy making strengthens state actors. Moravcsik (1998) has emphasized that European integration strengthens national executives because these act as gate keepers between the national and the European arenas and obtain more resources from European integration than other actors. It appears that European integration strengthens their capacity to set the domestic political agenda, control policy information, legitimize their political actions, and contain the ability of opposing actors to veto their political initiatives. Second, according to Edgar Grande, domestic interest organizations may also lose ground due to what he calls the “paradox of weakness”: the very loss of autonomy incurred by public actors in the horizontal and vertical negotiations that are characteristic of EU decision making may, at the same time, allow them to gain autonomy vis-à-vis private actors (Grande 1996). The strategy of “selfbinding” to certain policy stances and the reference to negotiation pressures in the EU are supposed to be suitable means for public actors to turn down unwarranted interest group demands. Finally, the complexity of the EU multi-level system and the allocation of competencies to a multitude of public actors is said to make it impossible for interest organizations to identify “the” decisive locus of political authority in the EU (Grande 1996). On the other hand, several authors doubt that European integration generally strengthens state actors vis-à-vis interest organizations. They highlight various aspects of the EU institutional setting or emphasize the cooperation of public and private actors in EU policy networks. Some authors argue that the EU multi-level system increases the influence of interest organizations because it grants them many points of access to voice their political demands (Pollack 1997). Such studies pay greater attention to the total number of access points in the multi-level setting than to the negotiation logic that may arise from its interlocking structure of political authority. In this view, easy access to and the resource dependencies of the EU institutions may tip the balance in favor of private players.

174

Politics and Polity

Other institutionalist arguments emphasize the legal opportunities of the EU system. The supranational character of EU law, the practice of the European Court of Justice to view many EU legal provisions as creating rights for individuals, and the increasing use of the preliminary rulings procedure allows interest organizations and their constituencies to proceed against domestic rules and practices. Therefore, not only Jill Lovecy (1999: 148) reaches the conclusion that EU law may sometimes allow “ ‘policy outsiders’, at the national level to come centre-stage at the EC level” and overturn “entrenched national and sub-national … practices which have been the product of those who are ‘policy insiders’, within the member states”. However, bringing a case to the court is costly, time consuming and usually requires an established body of favorable EU law. As its outcome is uncertain and may not apply to other cases, this route is not open to each and every actor. In line with the findings about the importance of interest group resources, the strategic use of litigation seems to be confined to actors “which dispose of sufficient resources to engage in uncertain and costly legal battles” (Dehousse 1998a: 111). A third group of institutional arguments stresses the horizontal differentiation of the EU, pointing out that national executives may not gain autonomy across the entire range of EU policy areas. The strengthening of public vis-à-vis private actors has been found in studies that analyzed either treaty reforms or policy areas in which the executives enjoy decision-making rights. In the Social Dialogue, such rights have been accorded to the EU social partners. According to Falkner and her collaborators (2005b), as a result, information asymmetries may arise in favor of the national social partners rather than the national governments because the former are closely involved in European social policy making. However, as this quasi-corporatist arrangement applies only to a limited area of social policy, the social dialogue can hardly invalidate the assessment that public actors gain vis-à-vis private actors. But, more generally, EU politics need not always lead to information asymmetries in favor of state institutions. Finally, studies drawing on the literature about policy networks or advocacy coalitions pose a conceptual challenge to the claim that private interests lose out to public institutions. They emphasize that European policies are predominantly made in constellations that consist of both private and public actors and that may stretch from the EU level into the member states. In this perspective, it is necessary to disaggregate the public and the private sectors, rather than referring to the “public sphere” or the “private sphere” alone in order to identify in detail the winners and the losers. These spheres are blurred and even the internal negotiations among the state institutions are embedded in the constitutive policy networks of private and public actors. In sum, good reasons are given for both the perspective that the EU strengthens the state and the point of view that private actors are empowered, so that the evidence on this question is yet inconclusive.

Rainer Eising

175

Some studies rooted in the Europeanization discourse considered the EU’s impact on domestic modes of interest intermediation. The literature on state–society relations distinguishes among four such modes: pluralism, corporatism, statism, and networks. While many scholars still look at national interest group systems in Europe as independent units (Siaroff 1999), the Europeanization studies draw attention to the embeddedness of these systems in the European Union. A core hypothesis often linked to the Europeanization concept is that the degree of fit among the European and the domestic situation is decisive in determining the level of national adaptation to the EU (Cowles et al. 2001). Frequently, a high (low) degree of fit is associated with low (high) adaptation pressures in the member states. In studies about the Europeanization of interest intermediation, this proposition is tested in two steps. First, these studies identify the degree of fit among the EU and the national patterns of interest intermediation. Second, they analyze domestic change taking into account several contextual and intermediating factors. In line with this proceeding, Schmidt (1999b; see also Falkner 2000) analyzes the repercussions of the EU on the domestic modes of interest intermediation in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. She finds that quasipluralistic patterns are prevalent at the EU level and argues that German corporatism fits this mode better than the statism that she identifies in the UK, Italy and France. Consequently, adaptation pressures – and difficulties – would be greater in this group of countries than in Germany. However, Maria Green Cowles arrives at fundamentally different results than Schmidt in her study of the impact which EU foreign trade policy making in the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) has on national industry federations. She also rests her case on the degree of fit argument and characterizes the EU mode as a form of “elite pluralism” because, in the context of the TABD, large firms have a direct say in the formulation of EU foreign economic policy. She argues that this elite pluralism poses a greater challenge to associations socialized in German corporatism and French statism than to those that are used to British pluralism. Cowles finds empirical support for her argument in the German and British cases and contends that the French industry association has actually been empowered on the domestic level due to its involvement in the TABD negotiations. Hence, the findings of these studies on the Europeanization of interest intermediation are quite contradictory (see the discussion on key problems in the next section). It seems more promising to analyze the impact of Europe on associational self-regulation because these practices are more specific than the rather abstract “types” of interest intermediation and because there is binding EU law on such practices. In several member states that are usually held to be corporatist, interest organizations have been accorded a public status. Legitimized by the subsidiarity principle, arguments in favor of a free economy and society, or functional

176

Politics and Polity

reasoning, they have been credited with rights to formulate and/or implement public policies or regulate problems falling into their domains. For example, in Denmark, the social partners enjoy wide-ranging powers to regulate and implement industrial relations. In Germany and the Netherlands, welfare associations are involved in the governance of social policy. How do EU legislation and adjudication affect such arrangements? The EU institutions have proven to be more skeptical of self-regulation than member states such as Denmark, Germany, Austria, Sweden or the Netherlands because the large majority of EU associations can neither alleviate them from their internal negotiation pressures nor guarantee a uniform implementation of EU law throughout the union whereas in national corporatism, the associations assume such vital functions for policy makers. Many EU interest groups do not cover all member states, the governance capacities of their national members vary, and, quite frequently, their national members do not agree on a common position. In these circumstances, the Commission has formulated a number of restrictive conditions for the use of associational “co-regulation” (Commission 2001a: 21). Co-regulation needs to be compatible with EU competition law and must be set in a legal framework with enforcement and appeal mechanisms as well as conditions for monitoring compliance. It “should only be used where it clearly adds value and serves the general interest”, and “the organisations participating must be representative, accountable and capable of following open procedures”. It should never be used in situations “where rules need to be implemented in a uniform way in every Member State.” Furthermore, public authorities should always be able to step in if co-regulation fails. These conditions are highly restrictive. Even in the realm of the social dialogue in which the EU social partners have been accorded the rights to formulate EU social policy and to implement the ensuing measures, the national social partners have not become co-regulators because they cannot guarantee a uniform and legally binding implementation of EU law (Falkner et al. 2005b). In general, their agreements need to be backed by erga omnes provisions or even replaced by national legislation. This leads to the question of whether the EU influence will gradually undermine self-regulatory practices in the member states. In a comprehensive study of this problem, Van Waarden (1994: 255–6) came to the conclusion that the EU would not undermine these practices because they are rooted in national traditions and therefore partly resistant to pressures for change. The adaptational pressures emanating from EU competition law would also seem to be limited because most member states have implemented these legal provisions for quite a while. Nonetheless, there are several Commission and ECJ decisions that prohibited or circumscribed associational activities on the grounds that these had as “their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of

Rainer Eising

177

competition within the common market” (Reid 2003: 76). Hence, all in all, the EU institutions tend to circumscribe the use of co- or self-regulation and place them also in a tighter legal framework than the member states which strengthens the role of third parties and courts in the monitoring of these arrangements.

13.3 Key problems The Europeanization of domestic interest organizations and interest intermediation is a fairly recent research topic in EU studies so there are several research gaps as well as areas of controversy and ambiguity, as the above discussion has illustrated (see also Baumgartner and Leech 1998 on interest groups in the US). In this section, I highlight some research gaps before moving on to discuss the reasons for the controversies and ambiguity. So far, the systematic and comparative study of the EU impact on domestic interests is confined to a limited number of member states. Most analyses concentrate also on certain categories of interests such as business interests or interest groups in specific issue areas, thus aiming at modest generalizations. The few comparative studies concentrate on three large Western European member states – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Schmidt 1999b; Cowles 2001; Eising 2004a) or tend to include smaller Western and Northern European member states (Lehmkuhl 1999; Baltz et al. 2005). Further Europeanization studies are country studies. For example, there are empirical contributions on Belgium (Beyers 2002), Denmark (Sidenius 1999), Italy (Constantelos 2004), the Netherlands (Wilts 2002), Sweden (Pestoff 2005), and Switzerland (Kriesi 2005). An earlier collection of essays on the EU consequences for domestic interest intermediation (Van Schendelen 1993) provided useful, but general overviews of the country-specific patterns. Interestingly, so far the contribution of the EU to the consolidation of democracy and civil society in the Southern and Eastern European member states is little explored (see Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2001). Moreover, several findings about the Europeanization of domestic interests are “side-effects” of detailed policy studies. Hence, whereas we have obtained rather detailed knowledge about a few member states and issue areas, we lack comprehensive evidence about the scope of interest group Europeanization across the union. Furthermore, to date EU scholars do not pay great attention to the structure and internal politics of domestic interest groups or to the inter-organizational dynamics of co-operation and competition that emerge in multi-level networks (but see some contributions in Balme et al. 2002; Imig and Tarrow 2001; Eising 1999; Grote and Lang 2003; Lehmkuhl 1999; Platzer 1984). The work on multi-level policy networks is often descriptive or concentrates on mapping the structure of influence, information, and access relations based on a sociometric network analysis (Beyers 2002). Scant attention is paid to the dynamics of

178

Politics and Polity

intra-organizational and inter-organizational relations. Similarly, we do not know much about the linkages between European and international policy networks. The lack of studies on these topics is partly due to the fact that it is difficult to gain access to information about the internal turf of interest organizations. Finally, the study of the relations among EU interest group politics and the underlying cleavages in the member states is a relatively recent phenomenon (see Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Our knowledge about how these cleavages are transformed into interest group politics and social movement activities in the EU and how these, in turn, feed back into the cleavage structure is quite limited, to put it kindly. There are also other reasons for the areas of controversy and ambiguity that have been outlined. I illustrate some of the most important sources of concern by discussing the different findings on the impact of the EU mode of interest intermediation on domestic modes. First, ambiguity results from conceptual problems. For example, the contradictory findings of Schmidt and Maria Green Cowles owe much to the fact that both have different conceptions of pluralism and stress different elements of this concept. In her definition, Schmidt (1999b: 157–62) paints a broad picture of the EU policy-making process, dividing it into the twin phases of policy formulation and implementation. She notes that the EU institutions are open to interest group influence in policy formulation and used to cooperative decision making with business interests having a greater say in EU policies than non-business interests. However, she also finds that the EU institutions are comparatively insulated from undue influence because the politics of party and money are not as important in the EU as they are in the United States and because they can gain autonomy vis-à-vis interest organizations by strategically using their internal negotiation pressures (see the discussion of the “paradox of weakness” above). By contrast, in her discussion of “elite pluralism” in the EU, Maria Green Cowles focuses on a narrower observation and finds that large firms are more involved in EU foreign trade policy-making than are industry federations. Stressing the aspect of consensus formation in the making of policies, Vivien Schmidt identifies a high degree of fit among European quasi-pluralism and German corporatism. In contrast, Maria Green Cowles highlights the different roles that firms and associations supposedly play in each system thus arriving at a poor degree of fit. These conceptual differences lead the authors to classify one of their cases differently. While both authors characterize the EU mode as pluralistic, the German mode as corporatist and the French mode as statist, they disagree on the United Kingdom. Schmidt groups the UK among the statist countries because the British government has excluded interest organizations on important occasions from policy formation, whereas, for Maria Green Cowles, the UK falls in the pluralistic camp because both firms and the British industry federation are usually routinely involved in British policy formation. Accordingly,

Rainer Eising

179

both have contradictory expectations about the EU impact on the UK and find them confirmed in their empirical analysis. Partly as a consequence of their different definitions of pluralism, these two authors also study different empirical objects. Schmidt analyzes cross-sectoral patterns of policy formulation and implementation in the EU and in the member states whereas Maria Green Cowles looks at specific patterns of decision making in a sub-sectoral forum of EU trade policy making and their fit with domestic foreign economic policy formation. As a result of looking at different objects of study, the findings of these authors may well apply to their units of observation but may not necessarily be extended to other issue areas, levels of analysis, or time periods. More generally, these difficulties stem from problems that are built into typological analysis not only because different elements are being used to construct these typologies but also because, empirically, these typological elements do not always co-vary in the way envisaged. Even those cases that have been allotted to one and the same type may vary greatly. This makes it not only difficult to determine the prevalent modes of interest intermediation in the EU and in the member states but also to establish the exact “degree of fit” among them. Further controversies point to research design and measurement problems. Thus, albeit not only in EU studies, the influence of interest organizations is difficult to establish. Case studies and comparative analyses need to apply careful process-tracing methods and put competing propositions to the test in order to provide a persuasive account of the say of private actors in EU politics. Nonetheless, even well-designed qualitative studies face difficulties in attributing policy outcomes to specific causes and isolate the role of interest groups. This may allow for alternative interpretations of the events. For example, Edgar Grande (1996) has established his “paradox of weakness” (see above) on the basis of a case study about the involvement of German actors in EU research and technology policy in the area of information and communications technologies. However, the strengthening of public actors vis-à-vis private actors is not the only lesson one may draw from this case. It is well established that the initial EU IT program ESPRIT was drawn up by a coalition of large firms and the Commission against the resistance of the administrations in the large member states (Sandholtz 1992) so that, in fact, the very case that gave rise to the “paradox of weakness” theorem in EU studies entails important evidence against it. Quantitative studies apply spatial models or survey methods to establish the influence of actors on EU decision making or on the formation of national positions regarding EU policy (e.g. Baltz et al. 2005). These studies have the advantage that they do not suffer from the “small N–large X” problem and can generalize on the basis of a large number of cases. In one way or the other, the spatial models measure how close the policy outcome is to the actors’ preferences. However, they may be criticized on several different accounts: an outcome close

180

Politics and Polity

to the actors’ preferences does not automatically imply that these had a say in the decision. To solve this problem, greater attention would need to be devoted to the mechanisms by which actors seek to exert influence. Moreover, measuring only the shift from the initial formal policy proposal to the final legislative act overlooks the dynamics of agenda setting that are hard to grasp in a formal analysis. In surveys, scholars may also directly ask interest groups to assess their own influence on EU policy. Obviously, this method has the drawback that interest organizations may overstate their own influence in order to legitimize the resource flows from their members (see Dür 2005: 12–14). Controlling for the assessments of state actors would seem useful to improve the validity of the results.

13.4 Conclusion The Europeanization of interest organizations and social movements is an emergent research field which means that there are still substantial research gaps and areas of controversy or ambiguity. Nonetheless, systematic comparative and quantitative studies were able to establish and explain some empirical regularities. They found that the changes in the political opportunity structure have not led to a major reshuffling of the domestic power structure, the division of labor among associations, or the embeddedness of social movements in domestic politics. Rather, European integration has promoted extensions and modifications of established practices and, for the most part, reaffirmed the power of those organizations that had already built up capacities to articulate, aggregate, and represent the interests of their constituencies. Those organizations that are well embedded in domestic policy networks, possess substantial resources, can develop persuasive policy concepts, are subject to substantial EU regulation, and represent specific rather than diffuse interests adapt more readily to EU policy making than domestic interests that lack these properties. While the effects of these variables have been singled out in quantitative analyses, systematic case studies seeking to address the areas of controversy and ambiguity can help to fine-tune the analysis, assess competing propositions, and identify interaction effects and more complex conjunctural patterns of causation. Hence, an important element in future research strategies would be to build more connections between formal theory, quantitative analyses and systematic casestudy methods because they share important epistemological precepts and have each distinct strengths and weaknesses (Pahre 2005). Moreover, a more consistent use of established concepts and theories across different studies would be essential in building cumulative knowledge. While it is clearly necessary to tease out the implications of concepts such as pluralism and theories for the research problem at hand, rephrasing them in terms of the research problem makes for conceptual ambiguity and renders generalizations across cases difficult.

Rainer Eising

181

Finally, to date, the studies on the Europeanization of interest organizations and social movements have some clear emphases. Broadening this literature would allow us to incorporate important new research problems. Some empirical research gaps – such as the EU effects on the development of civil society in Eastern Europe – may be addressed by designing comparative studies with a broader focus that include countries, issues and organizations that have so far been neglected. Currently, efforts are under way to fill in a major theoretical research gap – the EU impact on the contribution of interest organizations to European democracy and social capital – both by designing empirical work on this topic and by reinterpreting the empirical findings of previous work. In that respect, analyses of the Europeanization of interest groups and social movements are well placed in that they can draw on the insights derived in studies of both European integration and comparative politics.

Key publications Balme, R., D. Chabanet, and V. Wright (eds) (2002) L’action collective en Europe/Collective Action in Europe. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Eising, R. and B. Kohler-Koch (eds) (2005) Interessenpolitik in Europa. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Imig, D. and S. Tarrow (eds) (2001) Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Streeck, W., J. Grote, V. Schneider and J. Visser (eds) (2005) Governing Interests: Business Associations Facing Internationalism. London: Routledge.

14 Courts Stacy A. Nyikos

14.1 Introduction The legal boundaries of national court jurisprudence no longer end with the cartographer’s chunky black, broken lines. Rather, they have become dynamic peripheries constantly shifting as the result of transnational influences. As a result of Europeanization, i.e. the changes caused by EC law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the European judicial process – more specifically, the preliminary reference process – upon domestic legal systems, national law is no longer a “national” phenomenon. It is now a Euro-national one. Italian pasta, German beer, Sunday trading laws in Great Britain, female police officers carrying firearms in Northern Ireland, even abortion in Ireland – all of these contentious nationalistic issues have come under the interpretation of the ECJ. What is more, they have been placed upon the European interpretive palette due not to external forces but to internal ones. National courts, the gatekeepers of the entrance to and flow of national law, have voluntarily referred the cases, at the very least thereby tacitly entertaining the prospect that European law supersedes national law. Further, participation within the European legal process has changed not only the way national law reads across member states but also the decision-making process, the internal make-up and the very role national courts play. They too have become Euro-national. One should not, of course, overlook the effects of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence on the protection of fundamental rights within Europe and the evolution of national legal systems and doctrine (Defeis 2001). In fact, it has even come to pass, such as in The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. Stephan Grogan and Others, Case 159/90 [1991] 11–12 HRLJ 455, that both the ECJ and ECHR may be deliberating similar issues from the same country legal system, albeit in different cases. While in the Grogan case the ECJ deliberated the issues of EU treaty law in regards to the definition of services and state’s rights in regulating the distribution 182

Stacy A. Nyikos 183

of information, at the same time, the ECHR was deliberating on fundamental rights issues in a similar Irish abortion case, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland [1992] 12 HRLJ 378. Dynamic interaction among concepts and legal arguments abounded, not only involving national courts, the European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights, but also moving into political debate and resulting in a Protocol being added to the Maastricht Treaty to enable Ireland to keep an autonomous hold – legal and otherwise – over abortion within its borders (Smyth 1996). Clearly, Europeanization includes interactions on other legal plains that spill over, interweave and create new concepts and positions within European and national law. Nevertheless, such an analysis of the effects of Europeanization as a result of both the ECJ, the ECHR, and their joint influence upon domestic courts and legal evolution goes well beyond the parameters of this discussion, and also beyond the scope of much of the research that has been carried out on the topic of Europeanization. Indeed, it is a field in need of much further study. However, I focus here specifically on the effects Europeanization on domestic courts as a result of national court interaction with the European Court of Justice through the preliminary reference process. Despite, as can be seen from the above example, the potentially radical changes that Europeanization has exacted, exacts, and will continue to exact upon the boundaries of national law and the courts that interpret it, very little is known about the effects of Europeanization upon the internal composition of national courts, their legal procedure and application of EC law: “How and to what effect national judges use EU law in their work remains a vast, largely unexplored area of research” (Stone Sweet 2004: 23). Nevertheless, we do not confront a tabula rasa. Pioneers within this area, still overwhelmingly at the frontiers of what we have yet to explore, have already uncovered a great deal of material that indicate a wealth of knowledge waiting to be unearthed through further research.

14.2 Core research questions To determine how courts could and have been affected by Europeanization, we begin by isolating that which has had the greatest impact on these institutions – the law. European legislation directly influences national law. As a result, national parliaments may respond to legal changes agreed upon at the European level through their own legislation. National governments may respond through policy change. And, in other instances, nothing happens and inconsistencies arise between national and European law. Yet legal change does not directly affect a national court until a related case is brought before it. Even then, it can ignore European law. It is only when a national court chooses to interpret the effects of EC law upon national law, or to engage in judicial

184

Politics and Polity

dialogue with the European Court of Justice, that it is directly affected by Europeanization. And it is thus that the national court steps one timid foot upon the slippery slope from national to European court. National courts engage European law most directly through the preliminary reference process. According to Art. 234 (ex. Art. 177) EC Treaty, if a national court has a question of European law, which it is necessary to resolve in order to advance the case before it, courts may (courts of last instance must) refer the questions to the European Court of Justice for interpretation. The interaction among litigants, national courts and the ECJ within the referral process enables EC law to permeate the boundaries of national law, and it turns national courts into Euro-national ones. Simultaneously such changes alter the potential course of future legal interactions among litigants and, ultimately, future court interpretation. Two such instances of wide-ranging changes that forever altered national law, national court functions, and the very course of adjudication are the ECJ’s creation of direct effect and supremacy. Very succinctly, the direct effect of EC law has meant that individuals may be able to rely upon provisions of EC law, i.e. treaty provisions, directives and regulations, in national courts (Van Gend en Loos (NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming) v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, Case 26/62 ECR [1963] 1). Equally important is the concept of supremacy (Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64 ECR [1964] 585 or CMLR [1964] 454). It holds that “in any conflict between an EC legal norm and a norm of national law, the EC norm must be given primacy. Indeed according to the Court, every EC norm, from the moment it enters into force, ‘renders automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of … national law’ ” (Stone Sweet 1998: 306–7). Hence, Community law supersedes national law. The effects of these two doctrines upon legal norms, reasoning, and judicial functions border on revolutionary. Community law suddenly became accessible to the every day citizen. Furthermore, it trumps national law. Courts themselves were suddenly were imbued with the power to interpret the compatibility of national law with a higher level of law, European. Thus, in systems were there was no judicial review of the constitutionality of primary legislation, such as Great Britain, courts were suddenly given enormous power, forever altering the relationship between the judiciary and parliament, as well as the judicial hierarchy itself (Chalmers 2000b). Not all courts, though, have embraced with equal acceptance or ease the supremacy of EC law. Some courts have had little trouble, such as those in the Netherlands (Claes and DeWitte 1998). They have “gone gentle into that good night”, perhaps as a result of their monist legal traditions. Other legal systems, and high courts especially, however, have raged “against the dying of the light” of national legal autonomy.

Stacy A. Nyikos 185

Jens Plötner (1998) describes the French conversion as one of the most difficult. It was not until 1989, well over two decades after the Costa decision, that the Conseil d’Etat finally accepted the superiority of EC law to national law (Tomlinson 1995). Yet, and as if to demonstrate the truly dynamic nature of law and legal procedure, of late French national courts have been bound by the governmental processes in their use of the preliminary reference procedure: “The Minister of Justice’s department (SAEI) in co-operation with the SGCI [Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel] organizes control of the ‘appropriateness’ when courts bring Article 234 EC Treaty matters before the ECJ” (Szukala 2003: 238). The Italian and German constitutional courts have yet to bow their heads to the complete superiority of EC law. Initially, they expressed grave concern about the lack of protection at the EU level for fundamental rights (Kokott 1998; Cartabia 1998), leading the German FCC to issue three Solange decisions, each time restating that until the European Union creates a codified body of fundamental rights, the German FCC reserves the right of final interpretation to ensure that fundamental rights protected by the German Basic Law are not unconstitutionally infringed upon by EC law. While not yet having seceded such review powers to the ECJ, since then, however, the German FCC seems to have shifted its focus from concerns about fundamental rights to one about the Kompetenz-Kompetenz (Weiler and Haltern 1998). Yet, despite the reservations of all of these higher courts, lower courts within the same systems have referred numerous cases to the ECJ (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998b). Thus, the fundamental issue each scholar who studies national courts and the ECJ confronts, because of the very wide-ranging changes that Europeanization has meant to national law, judicial autonomy, and the very role of national courts is: Why engage? There are various theoretical answers to this question. The first is judicial empowerment (Weiler 1991; Mattli and Slaughter 1998; Alter 2001). Referring outside of the national legal system offers domestic courts the opportunity to increase their power nationally. Courts choose to participate in the EU judicial process because the EU legal system gives “judges at the lowest level power that had been reserved to the highest court in the land … And the ingenious nature of [ex. Article 234] Article 177 ensured that national courts did not feel that the empowerment of the European Court of Justice was at their expense” (Weiler 1991: 2426). According to these scholars, judicial hierarchies and power allotment across courts have been restructured across all member states’ legal systems through the referral process. Indeed, Alter finds empirical support for judicial empowerment. In her study of courts in France, Great Britain and Germany, she finds that low courts were more likely to refer cases than high courts, thus taking advantage of their new ability “to circumvent the restrictive jurisprudence of

186

Politics and Polity

higher courts, and to re-open legal debates which had been closed, and thus to try for legal outcomes of their preference for policy or legal reasons” (Alter 1996: 466). Lower courts could be so bold because “having an ECJ decision behind a lower-court decision also made its reversal by a higher court less likely. Thus, it actually bolstered the legal power and influence of the lower courts” (ibid.). Other scholars, however, have proposed that courts were brought into the referral process and have subsequently accepted the direct effect and supremacy of EC law due to forces other than empowerment (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a; Stone Sweet 2004; Ramos 2002). Ramos (2002: 11) hypothesizes that national courts refer to the ECJ for organizational reasons: “referral practices outsource the production of knowledge necessary to resolve EC law cases. Outsourcing is desirable when actors within an organization face problems that only appear infrequently and thus from which it makes no sense that someone within the organization develop the knowledge necessary to confront them”. He found that, while there were exceptions, predominantly, across member states higher courts referred proportionally more of their cases than lower courts. Stone Sweet and Brunell investigate the influence of transnational trade and EC legislation. They argue that increases in these areas have created inconsistencies at the national level and the need for dispute resolution. Domestic courts therefore become involved in disputes concerning the compatibility of national law and EC law. The more often a national court is exposed to the need for such resolution, the more likely it is to refer: “As the percentage of cases involving EC law rises, so do judicial incentives to master the tools that are most appropriate for the job, and those tools have been supplied by the European Court. Judges that need these tools less will be slower or more reticent to master them, and they will have less reasons to be concerned with helping to guarantee the effectiveness of EC law” (Stone Sweet 2004: 22). National courts refer because they are compelled to do so. The referral process is the most appropriate tool to resolve the legal dispute. Furthermore, if the ECJ performs its task efficiently, it lowers the transaction costs for the litigants that originally brought the case to the judiciary. This, in turn, encourages further transnational exchange, and, in turn, further cases. Litigants request more referrals. Thus, the process is largely endogenously driven. Conant (2001), however, argues that national patterns of adaptation to the European legal system have been far less uniform than any of the above theories predict. The previous studies reveal “substantial cross-national and subnational divergence in the extent to which national courts participate in the European legal system” (Conant 2001: 97), yet which these studies fail to explain. She broadens the investigative scope by focusing on domestic level structural adaptation that influences referral rates. Such adaptation, she asserts,

Stacy A. Nyikos 187

is a function of three factors: institutionalized access to legal arenas, substantive domestic law, and aggregate political structures. Her case studies of German, French and British courts reveal that that while the German legal system – designated most likely to refer cases to the ECJ – has indeed sent more referral cases than either the French or British, judges in the British legal system invoke ECJ case law in their decisions far more often than their referral rates would predict that they would. In other words, Conant’s research shows that the British common law practice of citing existing case law has colored the effects that Europeanization has had on British courts. While practicing judicial review of primary legislation – often inextricably tied to referring a case to the ECJ – is not native to traditional British legal practice, citing existing case law is. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that British referral rates are proportionally lower than might be predicted. Such a practice is not indigenous to British legal procedure. British courts, however, invoke ECJ case law at a higher rate than their referral rates would predict. This is a wonderful example of the intermingling of legal cultures and new practices. European law takes the path of least resistance, altering member state legal systems where the legal culture is most compatible or likely to accommodate legal change. In the British case, because its courts are less familiar with judicial review, they refer fewer cases. However, more true to British legal practice, they cite ECJ decisions at a far higher rate than their referral rates would predict. They have Europeanized where adaptation was most in keeping with original procedure and practice. Similar, however, across all three systems is that courts that deal with commerce cases referred the most cases. German tax courts, French civil and commercial courts, and the high Court of Justice of England and Wales have been responsible for over 50 per cent of referrals in each of the their respective legal systems. These findings offer support for Stone Sweet and Brunell’s claims that levels of transnational trade influence the types of cases referred. While these investigations offer varying explanations as to why courts have engaged, thus offering insight into how the European judicial process has changed the form of national adjudication, it has been case studies of individual countries that have shed light on individual changes to the member state courts and legal systems. In an empirical study of British courts Chambers (2000b) reveals that the hierarchy between the British judiciary and other arms of government has been reversed, and that within the judiciary has been undermined. British courts, as a result of the Europeanization of British legal practice, now mediate fundamentally new and different relationships between the individual and the state. Further, administrative intervention within the legal institutions of civil society is more invasive than ever before. Nevertheless, the scope of British judges’ access to EC law in their decision making is very narrowly focused. Such behavior covers few areas of EC law, few

188

Politics and Polity

private litigants, and has produced a narrow range of ideological adjustment. Chalmers argues that this narrow focus is one reason behind the compliant attitude of British judges toward applying and complying with EC law. They resist only “where EC law restricts domestic institutions’ capacity to secure conformity in British society” (Chalmers 2000b: 173). In addition, Chalmers finds evidence contrary to the judicial empowerment model. His data show that the House of Lords referred proportionally more of its cases than other, lower courts, such as the High Court and the Court of Appeal (Chalmers 2000a). Courts have not been the only domestic participants involved in the effects of Europeanization upon domestic legal practices, procedure, and, ultimately, themselves. The act of referring also creates new opportunities for litigants and lawyers, thus altering the way they approach litigation, and ultimately, domestic court functions and legal procedure. First, EC law and referral give litigants a second line of defense against unfavorable national legislation. Positive results at the EU level encourage them to request that more cases be sent to the ECJ or decided under European law. Secondly, the EC law option changes litigant strategy by encouraging forum shopping for judges most likely to refer to the ECJ or employ EC law (Alter and Vargas 2000). Thirdly, the more litigants push for the employment of EC law or the referral process and the more courts comply, the more “individuals in real cases and controversies (usually against state public authorities) [become] the principal ‘guardians’ of the legal integrity of the Community law within Europe similar to the way that individuals in the United States have been the principal actors in ensuring the vindication of the Bill of Rights and other federal law” (Weiler 1991: 2414). For countries in which individuals had not had the ability to protest the constitutionality of national law, such as in France and Great Britain, such a change in institutional parameters alters the very core of the legal system. Litigant influence on legal procedure is equally influential at the end of the referral process. Nyikos has also found that litigants play a very significant role in the last stage of referral by desisting. Desistment means that litigants in a case that has been referred to the ECJ voluntarily accept the interpretation of the ECJ as binding at the national level, foregoing the necessity of a final national court ruling at the domestic level (Nyikos 2003). In so doing, litigants in some systems, such as the German, enjoy significant financial gains by avoiding the costs of further litigation. Yet to act in such a pre-emptive manner, litigants must believe that the national court will, verbatim, apply the decision of the ECJ; otherwise, why forego its final decision if there is a viable chance the domestic court could find differently than the ECJ? Indeed, research does indicate that national courts overwhelmingly implement the interpretations of the ECJ within a referral case. Schwarze (1988) and Korte (1991), and also Nyikos (2003), find that national court implementation in cases in which litigants did not pre-emptively end the judicial process, is

Stacy A. Nyikos 189

extremely high (92 per cent for German courts, Schwarze 1988: 39; 90 per cent for the Dutch courts, Korte 1991: 89). Such predictable behavior has led to a new type of behavior by litigants, desistment, which was at 44 per cent for the cases Nyikos investigated (2003: 410). This, in turn, suggests that a transformation is under way at the national level regarding the legitimizers of ECJ rulings. Pre-emptively adjourning legal proceedings strips national courts of their role as domestic legitimizer and national ambassador between EC and national proceedings. European law arguably becomes more embedded within national law and procedure because its acceptance no longer requires that domestic courts translate it via final decisions into the national legal system. Rather, litigants take on this role. In addition, about 80 per cent of the time one of the litigants in a referral case is the member state, be it as an agency, region, ministry, or directly as the government. Thus, when litigants agree to desist, often times it is the government itself that is expressing direct acceptance of an ECJ interpretation. Compliance, however, is an entirely different manner. While implementation – in other words, application of the ECJ decision to the case at hand – may be high, compliance – other courts and national agencies abiding by the altering judicial ruling (Usher 1996) – with ECJ case law is far from uniform. Nor can it be equated with policy change at the national level (Conant 2002). Administrations contain the expansion of ECJ case law by complying only in the case at hand, not introducing broader policy changes. The lack of formally binding ECJ case law precedent also leaves a gaping back door open to national courts to legitimate restrictive interpretations of ECJ rulings. Consequently, “ ‘Europeanization of national law’ is a complex, messy, conflict-laden process, occurring, if at all, through painful negotiation and adjustment” (Stone Sweet and Cichowski 2004: 180). Despite its messy evolution, however, Europeanization of the domestic legal system is difficult to halt because of its endogenous nature: “the willingness of national courts, especially of lower courts, to play their role in the partnership will widen the circle of actors, individuals, corporations, pressure groups and others who may build a stake and gain an interest in the effectiveness of Community norms” (Weiler 1993: 423). Therefore, the more often individuals bring EU issues before national courts, and the more often national courts address these issues in preliminary references to the ECJ, the wider the circle of potentially affected national players and thus the larger the number of “guardians” of EC law and procedure. This characteristic of the process ensures an ever-increasing category of players, driven by the most provocative force of all, self-interest. Even if national courts wanted to pull back, they will have difficulty doing so since the process itself endogenously expands and embeds an increasing number of players. Thus, when investigating domestic courts, it is important to include related players in the analysis in order to understand

190

Politics and Polity

the full, dynamic effects of Europeanization upon these courts and their legal systems.

14.3 Key problems Among the major shortcomings with the study of the effects of Europeanization on domestic courts are: (1) there is so little of it; (2) it has been focused on why courts engage in referral or accept EC legal supremacy; (3) we know very little about actual changes to courts at the domestic level, in terms of their composition, procedures, and internal employment of EC law. While what we do know helps to understand the motives behind court engagement within the EU judicial process, we still know little about the very basic changes Europeanization has brought about at the institutional court level. In other words, we need more research along the same lines as that of Chalmers, which discusses the effects of Europeanization upon judicial hierarchy, interaction between parliament and the judicial system, how often courts employ EC law in their decision making, and whether they use it appropriately, as well as much more. Taking these research topics one step further would mean also adding a comparative component. What are the effects across legal systems and courts? There are various, significant hurdles to taking on a comparative analysis of the effects of Europeanization upon domestic courts. Each member state has hundreds of courts that could potentially refer, cite, ignore, or decide in direct disagreement with European law. Multiply that by the number of member states and the unit of analysis becomes quite large. Language also becomes a potential hurdle since opinions from courts are recorded in their original language. Clearly the multitude of languages within the EU is an issue for any comparative analysis; yet it becomes even more of a hindrance when one confronts the multitude of cases that must be examined to run empirical analyses on the effects of Europeanization upon a single national legal system, let alone 15 or more. Even in those rare but blessed instances when joint projects have been constructed to investigate the effects of Europeanization on the member states (Wessels, Maurer and Mittag 2003), while courts are receiving increasing attention, it remains cursory at best. Nevertheless, the points of entry into analyses on the effects of Europeanization on domestic courts are richly alluring. We know little about the changes that Europeanization has had upon the training of judicial elites across member states. How have university law departments adopted their curriculum to accommodate the growing need for new lawyers and judges to have a strong, working knowledge of European law? Such changes in curriculum could have a huge impact on how judges and lawyers have approached European law over time. We have anecdotal evidence that Europeanization at

Stacy A. Nyikos 191

the individual level and in its most extreme form, i.e. becoming an ECJ judge, can have a radical impact on a national legal system. Mr Galmont, who served on the French Conseil d’Etat, was nominated to serve as an ECJ judge. After his tenure in Luxembourg, he returned to the Conseil d’Etat. One short year later, the “renegade” supreme court ended its 15-year isolationism and publicly accepted the supremacy of EC law in the Nicolo case (Plötner 1998). If Europeanization at the individual level can have such a profound effect, what influence do more subtle changes, such as alterations in core curriculum, have upon the legal community at large? The example of Mr Galmont brings a second point of departure for court research into focus. Individual judges, like individual politicians and architects of the European Union, have been points of light in the process of bringing their own domestic legal systems into the European fold. How many more such individuals have aided their country’s legal system through the awkward transition from national courts to Euro-national ones? Perhaps the work of judges, such as Judge Reimer Voß, a highly active supporter and referee to the ECJ, should be more closely studied (Interestingly, in keeping with Conant’s findings, Judge Voß sat on a tax court in Hamburg). Further case studies of member state legal systems will surely unearth other individuals who have been active in bringing their countries into the European legal arena. Through studying their influence, we may begin to understand more clearly why certain legal areas made the transition to European law – or referred more cases than others – as well as when and how they did. Related to the study of individual judges is further investigation of law firms and litigant behavior. We know very little about the litigants, lawyers, or law firms that bring cases to the ECJ. What has been their influence on legal proceedings and domestic courts? While Nyikos has found that litigant and court interaction at the end of the referral process has clearly changed judicial procedure and limited national court control over the referral process, the issue looms: what effect do litigants and lawyers have on the early stages of referral? Gender equality cases and resulting policy change at the national level have received recent attention (Cichowski 2002; Alter and Vargas 2000). However, we know very little about when, where, and how forum shopping occurs across legal areas and member states, or, if and when law firms coordinate across national borders on certain European legal issues. Further, what effect has Europeanization had upon law firms and their strategies in the legal process? Since it is the parties in a case who often request that national courts consider EC legal issues and the effects of EC law on the issues at hand, understanding patterns of lawyer and litigant behavior could help in understanding how legal systems more generally have been influenced by Europeanization.

192

Politics and Polity

While scholars have begun to go beyond the surface of domestic courts to investigate the effects of Europeanization on judicial decision making, research has yet to reach the genetic level. Studies on the effects of Europeanization on court composition, appointment processes, or alterations to judicial proceedings have yet to be undertaken. Anecdotal evidence obtained through interviews with judges indicates that at least some courts in Great Britain and the Netherlands have responded to the growing number of cases they receive involving EC law by appointing one judge with EC expertise to the court, or delegating one or two judges as EC experts (Nyikos 2004). Effects of this kind upon court composition or, more generally, the appointment process, could reveal much about how courts and the judicial system have reacted to the new needs placed upon them by the additional task of performing as Euro-national institutions. Reversed, preliminary research also reveals that domestic courts have already begun to leave their mark on the process of referral itself in the form of pre-emptive opinions (Nyikos 2006), reminding us that judicial interaction is dynamic and two-way. Each side influences the other, causes change, and, in turn, sets up a new round of interactions that result in new changes. Yet how have alterations to the referral system brought about by one set of courts affected other courts’ treatment of the EU judicial process? Do domestic courts in one member state “teach” or “pass over” to domestic courts in another member state new techniques that make referral more effective? Comparative, large-N research studies can help to answer such questions. There have been a number of case studies and individual country projects, but fewer large, empirically based research designs, although in recent times we have begun to see the emergence of such projects. Primus Inter Pares was begun in the 1980s under the directorship of Joseph Weiler to investigate implementation of ECJ decisions by national courts within referral cases; however, it only produced two reports, one for the Netherlands (Korte 1991) and one for Germany (Schwarze 1988). Nyikos’ work (2003) looks at implementation across three issue areas for the period 1961–94, but only for three areas of law. Stone Sweet and Brunell created a large-N database containing all referral cases from 1961–98 and used it to test variation in references across time, countries, and legal area due to an increase in transnational trade, individuals’ desire to exit the national legal system and gain access to the European one, the ability of the EC legal system to contend with the change in case load, and the Community’s abilities to create laws to govern the new situations that develop due to the increase or change in transnational exchange. While they have found a strong causal relationship among an increase in transnational trade, an increase in EC legislation, and an increase in preliminary references (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998a, b), most recently, Carrubba and Murrah revisited these same data and have found “that national legal institutions,

Stacy A. Nyikos 193

judicial behavior, and litigant behavior all matter.” Thus, it is not only transnational trade and its triadic counterparts, but also monism vs dualism, political awareness and other variables that influence referral rates (Carrubba and Murrah 2005). There is no single causal argument that is sufficient for explaining the evolution in national court and litigant behavior. The Europeanization of judicial procedure is, as stated before, messy. It is high time for scholars to delve into the mess and begin to sort it out.

14.4 Conclusion As more and more scholars investigate court behavior, the prejudicial concept of fairy-tale courts (Stein 1981) enters the rather messy reality of modern-day jurisprudence. Empirical evidence suggests that courts have engaged in the European judicial process for a variety of reasons: judicial empowerment, outsourcing, efficiency, push on the part of litigants, increasing levels of transnational trade, and general political awareness. Courts have accepted supremacy and direct effect, but at varying levels, in narrow areas, or with reservations. Finally, scholars have shown that the European judicial system has been embraced by legal systems, but engagement takes place at varying rates. There is no one answer. That is good. Confusion breeds curiosity and the need for answers. The transition is taking place none too soon. Large-N research has shown how dramatically referrals rates have risen in the 1990s (Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998b). The ECJ now faces a potential crisis. Resolving a referral case used to take approximately six months. Now it takes up to three years. Ten new member states have just joined the EU, so referrals are unlikely to decrease over the next five years. What we most desperately need to know is how capable domestic courts are of shouldering the burden of resolving an increasing number of European legal issues within their own chambers. New data are needed to complement Volcansek’s earlier empirical work (1986), which showed that the main reasons that national courts did not refer cases to the ECJ were because they felt the resolution to the issue was already clear or relevant ECJ precedent enabled the domestic court to resolve the issue at hand. If ever there were a time when practical knowledge about the effects of Europeanization upon domestic courts were relevant, it is now. Has adequate EU legal education been implemented at the university level? Has it prepared lawyers and judges to handle the very practical need to decrease referral rates and, ultimately, has it enabled domestic courts to resolve certain types of conflict between European and national law? Will litigants and domestic courts accept and use new European courts with lesser pull than the ECJ? Knowing the answers to these issues will enable legal scholars to make valuable recommendations to EU institutional architects regarding the state of adjudication and whether a more hierarchical, federal court system should or even can be implemented.

194

Politics and Polity

The future of the European judiciary very much depends on what we know about the effects of Europeanization on domestic courts, and, correspondingly, how courts will or can react to future changes in the EU judicial system. Empirical investigation of these issues is integral to the future of the European legal system. The time is ripe for in-depth, comparative investigation on Europe’s most dynamic hybrid, Euro-domestic courts. Scholars wanted.

Cases Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64 ECR [1964] 585 or CMLR [1964] 454. Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland [1992] 12 HRLJ 378. The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. Stephan Grogan and Others, Case 159/90 [1991] 11–12 HRLJ 455. Van Gend en Loos (NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming) v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, Case 26/62 ECR [1963] 1.

Key readings Carrubba, C. and L. Murrah (2005) Legal Integration and Use of the Preliminary Ruling Process in the European Union. International Organization, 59(2) 399–418. Conant, L. (2001) Europeanization and the Courts: Variable Patterns of Adaptation among National Judiciaries. In Cowles et al., pp. 97–115. Nyikos, S.A. (2003) The Preliminary Reference Process: Changing Opportunity Structures and Litigant Desistment. European Union Politics, 4(4) 397–420. Slaughter, A.-M., A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler (eds) (1998) The European Court and the National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence: A Legal Change in its Social Context. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Stone Sweet, A. and T. Brunell (1998) The European Court and the National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References, 1961–1995. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1) 66–97.

Part IV Policies

This page intentionally left blank

15 Implementation Ulf Sverdrup

15.1 Introduction Implementation is a key issue when studying Europeanization. The term implementation means to give practical effect to, and to ensure actual fulfilment by concrete measures. In this chapter, implementation refers to the processes through which European norms are transposed, adhered to and enforced at the domestic level. This chapter presents some key research questions and discusses some advances and controversies in the field of implementation studies. In addition to calling for the further development of reliable quantitative indicators, the chapter suggests three issues worth considering. First, research could benefit from paying increased attention to the processes shaping the goals and aspirations in European implementation. Secondly, we should increase attention to the interplay between different explanatory mechanisms and, in particular, to the crucial roles of ambiguities and domestic capabilities. Finally, we should increase our interest into the study of outcomes and goal achievements, and thereby also offer critical and refreshing views on the dynamics of the actual European integration, as well as linking this branch of research to the general research on legitimacy and democracy in Europe. Students of implementation in the European Union have been engaged with three distinct, but interrelated, sets of questions. The first set of questions concerns the implementation performance across space and time. Is there an implementation deficit in the European Union (EU)? Who are the leaders and who are the laggards? How can we explain variation in performance across space, policy sectors and time? A second set of questions relates to the processes and dynamics of implementation. Is implementation a result of imposition and inducement by the EU institutions, is it dependent upon processes of learning and development of domestic capabilities, or some kind of combination of different mechanisms? Finally, the third set of research questions relates to the 197

198

Policies

study of actual outcomes. What is the degree of goal achievements in European integration? Implementation studies in the European Union are fortunate to build upon the general literature on implementation. Numerous studies have led to refined theories and perspectives on implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Palumbo and Calista 1990). However, this literature has also run into difficulties, some of which stem from the complexities of implementation. For instance, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981) listed 17 key variables critical for implementation, while O’Toole (1986) found that researchers were using more than 300 variables when studying implementation. After a decline in interest in implementation studies during the 1980s, there has recently been a call for the “rediscovery” of implementation studies in the general political science (Lester and Goggin 1998). The increased interest in implementation studies has been motivated by the ubiquity of multi-level governance, the greater significance of intergovernmental relations, the transformations of domestic capabilities, and also advances in theories of actions and institutions. Since the classical implementation literature has often dealt with implementation in entities with a clear centre of authority, the multi-centered system in the EU makes it a particularly interesting test-bed. It follows from such general developments that studies of implementation in the EU should not only play an important role in our understanding of Europeanization, but we should consider the EU as a laboratory for testing and advancing theories and models of implementation in general. The chapter focuses primarily on the implementation of legal rules related to the internal market and, in particular, the implementation of European directives, which are not directly applicable at the national level (as regulations are). It centers primarily on implementation by the national central governments, which play a key role in ensuring implementation. The chapter focuses on the period from 1995 to 2005, a critical period for the EU with the launching of the Single Market and the accession of new member states. Finally, the article is not concerned with individual low-level decision making regarding implementation. We should, of course, keep in mind that “street-level bureaucrats” are critical for implementation, since they make discretionary decisions and modify policy goals (Lipsky 1980).

15.2 Core research questions The study of implementation is important for students of Europeanization. It is therefore unsurprising that there have been numerous qualitative and quantitative studies of implementation in the European Union (e.g. Peters 1997; Siedentopf and Ziller 1988; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Goetz and Hix 2001; Cowles et al. 2001; Tallberg 1999; Azzi 2000, 2001; Dimitrova and Steunenberg

Ulf Sverdrup

199

2000; Dimatrakopoulos 2001; Mbaye 2001; Bursens 2002b; Börzel 2001, 2002; Falkner et al. 2004; Sverdrup 2004). We can identify four different sets of core questions. Let me discuss each of them. Why study implementation? First, implementation studies are critical in determining how and to what extent European integration affects and transforms member states. The development of shared rules, interpretations and applications constitutes the core of European integration. Compared with other forms of regional integration, formal institutions and the rule of law play a particularly important role in the EU. In most instances, the member states are responsible for implementing and enforcing EU legislation. Adapting and implementing the legal rules is one of the most important mechanisms through which European integration influences the member states. At a higher level, implementing European legal initiatives not only involves the implementation of the specific policy proposal, but is also an act of recognizing and establishing a new European political and legal order. Another important reason for studying implementation is its role when assessing the functioning of the EU. The future of EU decisions is largely dependent upon the willingness and ability of the governments of the member state to implement EU decisions. It is therefore not surprising that significant conflicts in the EU have been related to implementation, or the lack thereof. If European rules are not implemented according to their intentions, the potential benefits of developing shared rules will remain unrealized. In the longer run, it is likely that low levels of implementation or considerable variations in performance between member states can undermine the support for European integration. Prevailing variation in the degree of implementation between member states is also likely to have distributional consequences and can potentially increase the level of conflict in the EU. For instance, since compliance is often conditional, that is, implementation by one actor is dependent on compliance by others, the failure to implement by some is likely to increase non-implementation by others. Finally, the politics of implementation is an important indicator for measuring the shifting balance of power between different levels of governance in Europe. A commonly held assumption is that implementation is more easily ensured within a system of clear rules, considerable capabilities at the central level for imposition and inducement, as well as efficient monitoring and sanctioning system. However, at least so far such a hierarchical single-authoritycenter model runs into conflict with core principles and practices of the more multi-authority-centered Europe. Member states have been cautious of delegating strong enforcement capacities to the European level in order to protect national sovereignty. Although the EU rests on the ideal of liberal democracy and respect for law – including the duty to obey laws that the member states have freely given themselves – implementation also involves a balancing act

200

Policies

between, on the one hand, securing homogeneous implementation and, on the other hand, allowing for some domestic discretion. Shifts in this balance, for instance with the introduction of new implementation tools and instruments, are therefore important for understanding shifts in European governance. Implementation performance in the EU. To what extent are domestic institutions implementing European rules and legislation? The basic principle in the EU is that Community law should be “applied with the same effectiveness and rigor as the application of national law” (Commission of the European Communities 1993). This follows from Art 10 EC, which states that “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks.” Transposition means that EU legislation is put into national legislation. Figure 15.1 shows the pattern of average EU transposition in the period between 1997 and 2005. As we see, the share of non-transposed acts has dropped. In average about 2.5 per cent of the EU directives are not transposed. There is variation between the different member states. Over time, France has had among the highest deficits, while Denmark has had the lowest. With the exception of the last two years, the country variation has decreased and all states have moved in the same direction. Data on the ten new member states from East and Central Europe is limited (not included here). Some observations indicate a huge variation, ranging from a deficit of 40.4 per cent in Malta to 3.9 per cent in Poland and 0.8 per cent in Lithuania (Internal Market scoreboard no. 13, 2004). 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

Denmark

Figure 15.1

France

Avg. EU

Transposition deficit 1997–2005

Source: Internal Market Scoreboards nos 1–13 (European Commission).

Jul-05

Jul-04

May 03

Nov-02

May-02

Nov-01

May-01

Nov-00

May-00

Nov-99

May-99

Nov-98

May-98

0

Nov-97

1

Ulf Sverdrup

201

The data on transposition show that different states transpose different directives, creating an over-all fragmentation. However, this fragmentation has gradually decreased over time. Member states fail more frequently to transpose recent, rather than old legislation. A study of the timeliness of transposition found that 60 per cent of the directives were transposed after the deadline specified by the directive (Mastenbroek 2003). Data also show sector variations, transpositions of transport policies have been slower than consumer policy, social policy and telecommunications. We should also note that the total number of directives created by the EU varies across time, putting differentiated pressure on transposition in various periods. In general, we have seen a trend of decreasing number of legal initiatives from the European Commission in the period. Data on transposition give little information on the actual application of these rules, but data on the infringement proceedings can shed further light on the puzzle. In order to secure uniform actual implementation, the Treaty delegates competences to the European Commission and the European Court of Justice to monitor and sanction non-compliance. The European institutions initiate investigation related to non-implementation based on complaint cases and own-initiatives. There are five types of breaches that can occur: (i) violations of treaty provisions, regulations and decisions; (ii) non-transposition of directives; (iii) incorrect legal implementation of directives; (iv) improper application of directives; and (v) non-compliance with Court of Justice rulings. When the European Commission detects mismanagement or failures in implementation, or receives complaints, they can initiate a set of informal and formal procedures. Whereas the opening of cases for inspection is mandatory, the Commission enjoy discretion in terms of when and, indeed, whether to close the proceedings. Many cases are settled through informal exchanges between the Commission and the member states before formal infringement proceedings are opened. The infringement procedures cover three formal steps: letter of formal notice (LFN), reasoned opinion (ROP) and refer to court (RTC). At any of these steps, the disputes can be settled and proceedings terminated. When an infringement case is opened, an LFN is sent to the member state. The state gets the opportunity to present its view within a specified period. If the Commission still considers the state to be in breach of the obligation it sends an ROP. If the state fails to comply with the ROP within a specified time, the Commission may refer the matter to the Court of Justice. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the Court has the power to impose fines on a member state failing to take the necessary measures to comply with its rulings (Article 228 EC Treaty). So far, there have been few instances where member states actually have to pay fines. The number of infringement proceedings opened against each member state per year has remained relatively stable. The average number of LFN per member

202

Policies

50 45

Number per state

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999 Year

Avg. Ref. to Court

Figure 15.2

2000

2001

2002

2003

Avg.Reasoned Opinion

Conflict level in the EU, 1995–2003

Source: Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 1994–2004 (European Commission).

states varied between 60 and 85 in the period from 1995 to 2002. There is small variation between the member states in the numbers of LFN they receive. Figure 15.2 shows the steady increase at both stages of conflict resolution. The total annual number of ROPs has more than doubled in the period – from 192 in 1995 to 533 in 2003. The average ROPs per state increased to about 35 in 2003, up from 13 in 1995. There is an even stronger and steadier growth in the number of cases referred to the Court. The total number of Court referrals has tripled, from 72 in 1995 to 215 in 2003. The Commission referred the average EU member state 13 times to the Court in 2003, compared with five times in 1995. These data show that disputes regarding implementation are settled at an increasingly later stage. Infringement data reveals considerable variation among the member states. In general, the larger states receive more ROPs and they are more frequently referred to the Court, than the smaller states. In addition, states from the northwestern corner of Europe in general, and the Nordic states in particular, seem to settle disputes more frequently before they reach the final stage of the infringement proceedings. For instance, the two countries France and Italy together have one-third of the total referrals to the Court in the period (372 of 1,325), while Denmark had just nine. Spain is the only exception to this pattern. Infringement cases are costly. They take considerable time and resources for the EU administration and for the member states; however, the costs and benefits are not necessarily equally distributed. The majority of the infringement proceedings take more than two years, and more than ten per cent of the cases take more than five years.

Ulf Sverdrup

203

The Commission has had as one of its objectives to reduce the number of infringement proceedings (Commission of the European Communities 2003). In the absence of specific EU bodies, the Commission often has to rely upon the capacities of domestic institutions. There have therefore been attempts at strengthening the cooperation between administrative units at different levels of governance, by, for instance, training bureaucrats and promoting exchange programs as well as using seconded personnel. Another way of strengthening administrative cooperation has been the development of regulatory networks, where different national agencies cooperate and interact. These initiatives have gradually changed the domestic administrative entities into double-hatted units, serving partly domestic preferences as well as acting as an instrument for the European level in a larger European administrative space (Egeberg 2006). In addition to these structural initiatives, alternative ways of settling disputes have been introduced, such as the more extensive use of “package meetings” (where member states and the Commission meet to discuss and find solutions to numerous issues) and the introduction of non-legal dispute settlement mechanisms, such as for instance, SOLVIT (a system for administrative cooperation between member states). However, the number of infringement cases has continued to increase, and the number of instances being settled through alternative mechanisms are still limited (167 in 2003–04). The dynamics of implementation. Another set of key questions relates to the dynamics, actors and factors that facilitate and hinder implementation. Is failure to implement primarily a result of voluntary calculation or is it a result of involuntary actions? When answering such questions students of Europeanization have employed a variety of theories and perspectives. Regardless of theoretical approaches, at least, two key factors are important for explaining implementation: the European enforcement capacity and the domestic management capacity. The enforcement perspective takes as a starting point that implementation is dependent upon the capacity of the European-level institutions (the Commission and the Court of Justice) to impose changes at the domestic level (Weiler 1994; Tallberg 2002). It is assumed that implementation is more likely to take place when the capacity of the EU to monitor and sanction non-implementation is greatest. Such capacities could be negative or positive. The negative instruments are the rights and administrative capacities of the EU to monitor implementation and to sanction non-implementation. Such sanctions can be the right to impose fines, or the “softer” instruments of “shaming and blaming”, through various kinds of scoreboards. These instruments are created for providing information and developing trust in a system where conditional compliance is important. Positive instruments are the capacities of the EU to create incentives stimulating implementation. Such incentives can be financial, or they can involve

204

Policies

the ability to link issues, or set conditions on implementation in one policy field, for participation in other policy fields. For instance, the instrument of conditionality has been used in relation to membership in the Economic and Monetary Union, as well as in relation to the accession of new member states (Dimitritova 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Historically, the enforcement capacities of the EU have been limited. However, there has been an increased focus on securing better implementation and there has been a gradual development of capacities at the European level to impose sanctions against non-implementation (Mendrinou 1996; Sverdrup 2004). Recent treaty revisions and legal developments have allowed for more use of financial sanctions, and there has been a proliferation of the use of scoreboards as a way of collecting information and increasing the pressure on states. However, allocating increased capabilities to the EU, for instance, the principle of state liability, has also caused protests among the member states (Tallberg 2000). The second factor is primarily concerned with the role of domestic preferences and institutions. Since the sanctioning capacity is often limited, the proper question is: Why are states implementing, even in the absence of external monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms? There are two responses to this question. One position, rooted in a rationalistic approach, assumes that implementation is likely to take place because the member states benefit from the new rules and regulations. EU rules often solve coordination problems or they reduce transaction costs. Member states are likely to implement if there is expected utility of implementing. However, different member states have different utility functions. Hence, they are likely to pursue different strategies dependent upon the configuration of domestic preferences. From such a position, it is expected that member states are pursuing different strategies, for instance the strategies of “foot-dragging” or “fence-sitting” (Börzel 2002). In addition, there have been studies showing the important role played by structures of interest representation and domestic veto players in implementation (Haverland 2000). Member states not only adapt to their environment, but also seek to model their environment. Such strategies could, for instance, be setting the EU agenda, as well as delaying and altering decision-making processes in the EU. Some of these attempts are not necessarily slowing implementation. Member states can sometimes seek European legislation in order to secure distinct domestic developments they would otherwise have been unable to achieve via domestic channels. Another set of ideas, an institutional account, often starts with a competing assumption. Here the idea is that states, when entering the EU, tend to alter their behaviur, their relationships and their expectations of one another over time (Chayes and Chayes 1993). The basic assumption is that most states

Ulf Sverdrup

205

comply with the norm of pacta sunt servanda, that is, treaties and obligations should be obeyed. Although states have an intention to comply, they often lack the ability or capability. Such capabilities can be different financial, administrative, organizational or individual skills and resources. Since legal cooperation is at the core of the EU, the competences and capabilities of domestic legal systems are particularly important for implementation. Since there are different legal cultures and traditions in Europe (Gibson and Caldeira 1996), it is likely that this also affects implementation. From this perspective, it is assumed that actors act under the limitation of bounded rationality. They have limited time and attention, they follow rules and standard operating procedures, they conduct limited search for solutions, and they often solve new problems with existing solutions. Resources and capacities are often linked to rules and practices, making them more robust and resistant to change (Cyert and March 1963; March and Olsen 1989). It follows that in situations with misfit between European legislation and established practices and institutional norms it is more likely that there will be difficulties of implementation than in instances of good fit (Olsen 1992; Knill 2001). Related to this set of ideas is that domestic capabilities can be built and changed through processes of learning and socialization. For instance, participation in decision making can, under some conditions, increase knowledge, breed “ownership”, and increase the trust in others complying and implementing (Checkel 2001b; Knill and Lenschow 2000). These various dynamics of enforcement, calculation and domestic capabilities are related. Often different mechanisms are involved. One important challenge is to determine the domain, scope and the sequence of the interaction between the mechanisms. It is, for instance, reasonable to assume that voluntary nonimplementation is primarily a result of limited enforcement capacities or domestic preferences, while involuntary non-implementation is often due to limited domestic capabilities. In addition, different mechanisms are likely to have different relevance dependent upon the degree of conflict and the costs of implementing (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975). If the level of conflict is high and the costs of implementation is high, the issue at stake is probably more likely to be subjected to calculations, than instances where the level of conflict is low and the costs of implementation low. The neglected outcome studies. The fourth set of research questions relates to the outcome. Has the initial goals of the EU decisions been realized? This is a critical question, but students of implementation have so far paid only limited attention to the issue. Increased focus on outcome studies can serve as an effective link between the implementation literature and the literature on public attitudes and legitimacy of European governance. Analyzing the outcome is important for evaluating the effects of European integration and the effectiveness of European governance, but it is difficult.

206

Policies

Some studies have been conducted on behalf of the Commission – for instance, in assessing the effects of the single market after ten years (Commission of the European Communities 2004) – but they lack critical distance. Some of the difficulties results from the fact that the goals and standards of desirability are often ambiguous and contested in the EU. In addition, the causal effect relations are often incomplete or difficult to describe. In such situations, with ambiguous goals and unclear causal relations, the efficiency tests, that is, analyzing the degree of goal realization with a minimum of resources, or the instrumental tests, that is, analyzing the degree of goal realization not taking into account the use of resources, are difficult and even inappropriate. In such situations, Thompson (1967) suggests that we conduct so-called social tests, where policies are validated by consensus or authority and by how many or who endorses the outcomes.

15.3 Key problems In this section, I point to some challenges ahead for the literature on implementation as well as offering some observations regarding methods. Attention to evaluating implementation performance. When studying implementation it is easy to slip into normative arguments, claiming that the performance is “poor” or “some are better than others”. In order to make normative statements we need standards of evaluation. Moreover, evaluating can prevent us from seeing the benefits of non-implementation. For instance, the implementation “deficit” in the EU can be seen as a flexibility clause increasing support, as well as functioning as an internal conflict-reducing device. In fact, the EU can function fairly well even if not all rules are implemented in a strict manner. If the benefits of the collective good created by the rules outweigh the costs to them of providing the good, some states are likely to carry on covering the costs, even if other states refrain from implementing. The critical question is then: what is the acceptable performance level? Implementation is a partly a legal process, but it also involves political processes and actors. In the absence of objective standards for evaluating implementation, we need to understand how the appropriate level is shaped and created by actors in political processes. In the EU, there have been several attempts in the EU to alter the level of acceptability. For instance, the Commission has fought for a cumulative process in which the member states should commit themselves to setting and respecting more ambitious transposition targets (Commission of the European Communities 2003). Another illustration is the so-called “grace periods”, where it is accepted that some states at certain periods of time have a poorer implementation performance. In general, goals and aspirations serve cognitive and emotional functions, since they provide motivations, directions and constraints on decision making

Ulf Sverdrup

207

and actions. Goals are used for symbolizing to the environment, in order to gain legitimacy and resources. Sometimes goals are also used for justifying actions. Rather than treating goals and appropriate levels as externally given, insights could be gained by examining how and to what extent the level of acceptability is determined and adjusted across time through processes of political and institutional learning, cooperation and conflicts. One hypothesis is that the performance level is likely to be increased in periods were the participants fear the risk of crisis – for instance, if the member states fear that the shared legal framework is close to collapsing (Chayes and Chayes 1993). Another hypothesis is that the level of acceptability is likely to change as a result of pressure from actors having an implementation record that is higher than the average. A third hypothesis is that it is sometimes easier to change the levels of acceptability than the actual performance; hence the aspiration level is adjusted so that it fits with the actual performance (March 1988). Attention to the interlinking of dynamics and the role of ambiguity. It is important to develop a better understanding of the domain and scope of the different factors and processes, as well as understanding how they interact. Here are two suggestions related to various policy fields and time periods: First, studies have found that the general support for European integration has no significant impact on the overall degree of implementation (Mbaye 2001), but it has been observed that the specific support for a policy initiative affects implementation. In most situations, implementation is dependent upon a balance between the member state’s overall commitment to the issue at stake, and the member state’s overall institutional capacity to fulfil its obligations. Based upon these two simple dimensions it is possible to classify most implementation situations into four broad categories: (i) Low commitment and low capacity, (ii) Low commitment and high capacity, (iii) High commitment and low capacity, and finally, (iv) High commitment and high capacity. Such a matrix could be helpful in guiding case selection as well as increasing our understanding of the interplay between different mechanisms. For instance, we can assume that implementation is more likely to occur in situations with high score on both dimensions, while it is more unlikely to occur in situations with low score on both. A further challenge is to examine why some states are developing strong or weak commitments, and why some are developing and maintaining high or low capacities. Although will and ability can be treated separately, they are also interrelated, since the development of capabilities is a product of will, and institutional capabilities influence will-formation. Secondly, the interplay between different mechanisms of implementation can vary across time. Enlargement did increase the focus on administrative quality and capacity. The dominant mechanism of change in the new member states was initially the external pressure and conditions posted by the EU. For instance, recognizing the achievement and the strong motivation by the

208

Policies

applicants Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) still question whether this short-term effectiveness in transposition was achieved at the expense of longterm inefficiency in actual compliance. Since the key driving mechanism was the EU conditionality, the authors ask what will happen when the “engine” of the prospect of future membership is gone. This problem links to the discussion on the effectiveness of conditionality we can find in the development literature. For instance, some claim that conditionality is an ineffective tool, since there is often lack of “ownership” by governments (Killick 1997), while others see it as effective (Hopkins et al. 1997). Another feature of implementation in Europe is the ubiquity of ambiguities. Studies find that if the European rules are clear and easily interpretable, it is more likely that they are implemented correctly (Weiler 2000; Falkner et al. 2004). Ambiguity allows different groups to support the same policies for different reasons and with different expectations about consequences, and in particular the administrative consequences of the policies (Baier, March and Saetren 1986). In the EU, the linguistic, as well as considerable social cultural and geographical differences, combined with a relatively long time horizon from policy making to actual implementation often increase ambiguities. Operationalizing ambiguity is difficult, and it is important to be aware of the fact that sometimes ambiguities relates to the goals, other times, ambiguities stem from uncertainties regarding the preferred instruments and means, the causal relations can be poorly understood, the technologies uncertain, or the environments so complex that it is difficult to develop precise instruments. In addition, some of the ambiguities can be deliberate, while others are the result of unintended effects or events. One hypothesis is that implementation will vary according to the degree of ambiguity and the level of conflict related to the decision that is supposed to be implemented. Building on Matland (1995), we can separate between four situations: (1) In situations with low ambiguity and low conflict, implementation is likely to depend upon administrative resources and capabilities; (2) In situations with low ambiguity and high conflict, implementation is likely to depend upon the coercive and enforcing power of the EU; (3) In situations with high ambiguity and low conflict, implementation is likely to depend upon which of the actors that is attentive, active and most involved, and therefore largely dependent upon contextual conditions; and (4) Finally, in situations with high ambiguity and high conflict, implementation is likely to be symbolic, rather than actual, and depend to a large degree upon the strength of specific domestic coalitions. Improving research design. Implementation studies vary in design and methods. Many have used careful case studies, but we have recently seen a trend towards more quantitative studies. In order to conduct good studies it is important to develop good and unbiased data sets for measuring implementation, or lack

Ulf Sverdrup

209

thereof. So far, we have often relied upon data generated by European institutions. These data are not collected and presented primarily for the purpose and criteria of relevance for researchers, and they have some important limitations. For instance, infringement data measure the cases that are actually detected and acted upon, while instances of undetected or ignored non-implementations are unaccounted. There is a danger in developing more and more advanced methods and models when at the same time lacking good data (for a discussion on the quality of data see Börzel 2001). In order to conduct rigorous quantitative research it is therefore important that students of implementation develop reliable and unbiased indicators, which should not only cover directives, but also relate to regulations and standards and other kinds of instruments that are increasingly frequently used in European governance. However, there is an increasing awareness of the importance of improving quantitative, qualitative and comparative research design. For instance, two large projects on implementation, led by Börzel and Steunenberg, have tried to develop and refine quantitative measures of transposition and implementation. A large qualitative case study, by Falkner and others (2005), has examined implementation in 15 member states of six labor laws. In addition, Zürn and Joerges (2005) have compared implementation of EU rules, with implementation of domestic norms, as well as with other international norms and treaties. They find that EU regulations are complied with at a rate, better or at least as good as the national and the WTO regulations. Implementation studies are likely to improve further if one could compare implementation in EU member states with activities in comparable non-member states (Haverland 2004).

15.4 Conclusion Implementation studies are important for our understanding of how and to what extent European integration affects and transforms the member states, how the EU functions, as well as for our understanding of shifts in the multilevel character of European governance. There has been considerable progress in this research field. We know more now than before regarding the performance levels and the dynamics of implementation in the EU. In general, member states have increased their level of transposition of EU legislation, but at the same time, the number of conflicts regarding non-implementation has increased. Some of the well-known dynamics of implementation from the general literature are also found in the EU. We have developed knowledge on how European legal initiatives impacts on the national legal institutions and governmental bodies, however, we have less systematic knowledge of the actual outcomes of European integration and the degree of goal realization. Increased focus on the ability of the EU and the member states to “deliver” the results that are desired could give important insights into implementation processes, as

210

Policies

well as offer critical views on the dynamics and legitimacy of European integration. In this chapter, some themes and topics for further research have been suggested. First, research can benefit from increased attention to the goal-setting processes related to implementation performance. If we improve our understanding of how aspiration levels and norms of “acceptable levels” are created, maintained and changed, we are likely to improve our understanding of the dynamics of implementation. Second, research should move beyond the either/or relationship regarding the mechanisms of implementation (March and Olsen 1998; Zürn and Checkel 2005). Most situations are combinations of imposition, individual calculation, as well as an element of domestic factors that contribute to smoothen or prevent implementation. The interesting research questions are to understand the domain and scope of the different mechanisms, their sequence and their interaction. Finally, the further development of good qualitative, comparative and quantitative research designs is important, including the development of valid and unbiased quantitative indicators. The positive developments discussed here takes place concurrently with the increasing interest in the general political science to “rediscover” implementation studies. The increasingly trans-national character of political regulations, and the increasing number and significance of international agreements and organizations have reopened the agenda for reconsidering theories of implementation. There are therefore reasons to be slightly optimistic in believing that implementation studies in the more multi-centered governance system in the EU can, not only contribute to our understanding of the EU, but also provide insights feeding back to the general literature.

Key readings Azzi, G.C. (2000) The Slow March of European Legislation: The Implementation of Directives. In A. Wiener and K. Neunreither (eds), European Integration after Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 52–66. Börzel, T.A. (2002) Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting. Member State Responses to Europeanization. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2) 193–214. Peters, B.G. (1997) The Commission and Implementation in the European Union: Is There an Implementation Deficit and Why? In N. Nugent (ed.), At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission. London: Macmillan, pp. 187–202. Siedentopf, H. and J. Ziller (eds) (1988) Making European Policies Work: The Implementation of Community Legislation in the Member States. London: Sage. Tallberg, J. (2002) Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union. International Organization, 56(3) 609–43.

Ulf Sverdrup

211

Websites Börzel project: http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~europe/forschung.htm Steunenberg project: http://www.transposition.leidenuniv.nl Internal Market Scoreboards (European Commission): http://europa.eu.int/comm/ internal_market/score/index_en.htm

16 Agricultural Policy Christilla Roederer-Rynning

16.1 Introduction Agriculture is perhaps the policy domain where claims of Europeanization have been so routinely made and yet so little documented. Rare are the analyses of agricultural policy that do not begin with a statement of the central place of this policy domain in European integration, usually backed by obligatory references to the integrated character of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), its weight in the EU budget, and its hold on the administrative machinery of EU institutions. And yet there is surprisingly little research on the domestic ramifications of this massive shift of resources and competences to the European level. The scholarship on agriculture in Western Europe has been very much dominated by “the puzzle of CAP reform agenda” and its three main questions: (i) Why did the CAP take the form it did in the 1960s? (ii) Why did any attempt at reforming the CAP fail to materialize until the mid-1980s, while no less than five reforms have taken place in the last two decades? (iii) To what extent have these reforms challenged the fundamental principles of the CAP? While this agenda has produced rich insights into issues of institutional design and policy optimality, it is of little interest for present purposes since it considers the CAP from the perspective of the EU and tends to equate Europeanization with the degree to which the CAP is supranational. Clues about the domestic impact of European integration must be found elsewhere, in a handful of studies dealing with an eclectic range of topics such as: agricultural lobbying, farm protest, national agricultural legislation, and the role of subnational authorities. Taken individually, these studies suggest various ways in which “the domestic” and “the European” intersect. Taken collectively, they cluster around three main debates: (i) the debate on state–farmer relations; (ii) the debate on state structure; and (iii) the debate on a European model of agricultural policy. 212

Christilla Roederer-Rynning 213

16.2 Core research questions Interest in state–farmer relations lies at the core of research on farm politics. At the European level, a rich literature has traced the development of cohesive farm policy networks at the European level and their gradual reinvention in the last decade under the combined pressure of commodity groups and nonfarming interests (see, for example, Daugbjerg 1999 and Delorme 2001). Some of this work, by contrasting farm policy networks in the EU and in non-member countries (Sweden before accession), suggests interesting areas for research on Europeanization (Daugbjerg 1997). Yet these works have not paid systematic attention to the European sources of domestic state–farmer relations. Likewise, studies of state–farmers relations at the national level, ironically, often stress the role of idiosyncratic domestic factors even as they point to a fairly constant pattern of interest intermediation across Western Europe. The hallmarks of this pattern are: strong, quasi-institutionalized, and exclusive partnerships between the state and farmers; powerful national peak farm organizations, often generously subsidized by the state; and the exclusion of nonfarm interests from agricultural policy making. In virtue of these partnerships, farmers benefited from an extended discretionary power over decision making, and overtook key areas of implementation. The state, in return, could count on the support of farmers to undertake the necessary restructuring of this sector while delegating to farm leaders the responsibility of administering painful reforms. In theoretical works, accounts of state–farmer partnerships were captured in terms of neocorporatism (Keeler 1987; Muller 1984), policy community (Smith 1990), or simply vested interests (Self and Storing 1962). In the last decades, a growing number of studies has challenged the usefulness of these accounts by pinpointing a growing fracture in state–farmer partnerships (e.g. Berger 1985; Culpepper 1993; and Wilson 1987 on France; Jordan, Maloney, and McLaughlin 1994 on the United Kingdom). Interestingly, these critics have also concentrated on the state, at most mentioning in passing “the European dimension” of this fracture ( Jordan et al. 1994: 518). In fact, until recently, one of the rare studies to consider the issue of Europe in the making of national agrarianism, Milward’s (1992) The European Rescue of the Nation-State, emerged not from rural studies but from European studies. Milward’s (1992: 44) thesis is that European integration represented a “further stage in the reassertion of the role of the nation-state” in postwar Europe. Thus, in agriculture, “it took Europeanization of the regime of protection and subsidization […] to prevent the income gap [with other sectors of the economy] from widening before 1979. Without Europeanization the political power of the agricultural interests would have been too weak even to achieve this result” (Milward 1992: 316). Milward thus suggests that one of the major effects of Europe in the agricultural sector, paradoxically, was to sustain national agrarianism well after the economic bases of farmers’ power had disappeared.

214

Policies

While Milward’s analysis stopped with the inception of the CAP, new CAP research casts contradicts some of his argument. Three types of arguments can be identified. Some refute the thesis of Europeanization altogether. This is the case with Saurugger (2003: 331), who argues on the basis of a comparative study of France’s FNSEA and Germany’s DBV in the negotiations on the Eastern enlargement that “the practices and strategies deployed by interest groups at the national level are enduring,” and that “the national level continues to a significant degree to influence the repertoires of action of interest groups.” Some allow for a mild, indirect effect of Europe, though not in the direction predicted by Milward’s argument. Daugbjerg and Just (2003: 148) argue in their study of the evolution of the organization of the agricultural policy domain in Denmark in the last century that the main effect of Denmark’s entry in the European common market was to “weaken … undeniably the information monopoly of farm organizations.” Yet the “administrative changes, which occurred in 1973, were not as significant as they appear to be. In practice, the model of organization of agricultural policy domain changed from delegated administration [where the implementation of policy is carried out by farm organizations] to corporative management [where civil servants share policy competences with farm organizations].” The diluted effect of EC membership reflects, according to the authors, the fact that “national power relations are the decisive factor in shaping the administrative regime” (Daugbjerg and Just 2003: 154). Finally in tune with Milward, some have claimed that the establishment of the CAP contributed to the sustaining power of national agrarian blocks. The novelty of their argument is that European integration, at least during the classic age of the CAP, solidified – rather than weakened – domestic structures. Grant (2005: 31) recently remarked how the transformation of the British state, taking place in the 1970s and leading to “the functional and geographical dispersion of authority so that the state became ‘hollowed out’ … was long delayed in agriculture. In part, this was because the subsidy regime was entrenched in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a politically embedded policy that was difficult for the UK government to change – however much they might want to.” Lowe and his colleagues (2002: 14) have observed that “the paradox of the CAP is that, in creating a European agricultural block, it has strengthened the place of agiculture in national politics out of all proportion with the sector’s economic importance.” Roederer-Rynning’s (2002, 2005) study of agricultural conflict in France provided detailed evidence that the establishment of the CAP went hand in hand with the consolidation of domestic corporatism, and CAP reforms with its attenuation. While market cycles and local solidarities in the 1960s represented a constant hurdle for the edification of a national agrarian block, the implementation of the CAP in the 1970s was the main vehicle of organizational cohesion by federating farmers around a policy of high-price support.

Christilla Roederer-Rynning 215

Changing patterns of farm protest pinpointed this development: first volatile and regionally-sponsored in the 1960s; then routinely modeled upon European price-setting negotiations and domesticated by national organizations in the 1970s; and, again, increasingly unpredictable and marked by interorganizational feuds in the 1980s and 1990s. These findings “shed light on the neglected ‘European’ sources of farm corporatism and farm protest in France, which have often hastily been portrayed as idiosyncratic features of French politics” (Roederer-Rynning 2002: 120). The point is that “European institutions have played a significant role in the production and transformation of farm representation and agricultural conflict in France” (Roederer-Rynning 2002: 105), albeit, as Milward had foreseen, not necessarily in the form of an increased salience of transnational collective action. State structure has also come under scrutiny in the literature on European agriculture. Traditionally, the main issue of focus concerned whether and how different state structures, defined with reference to the strong/weak states or centralized/decentralized states dichotomies, affect policy efficiency and the possibility for agency capture at the national level (Sheingate 2001) or at the European level (Scharpf 1988). These works were anchored in well-established theoretical agendas in the field of public policy and comparative politics. Recently, another group of studies has reversed the problematique to explore the impact that agricultural policy, policy making, or politics have had on the structure of member states. These works are empirically disparate, and theoretically eclectic. They have not thus far coalesced into a distinct research agenda, even though all address the extent to which European integration in agriculture has promoted regionalization, understood broadly as the growing political emancipation of peripheries vis-à-vis old centers. Single case studies highlight the geographically variegated effects of Europeanization on state–region relations in agriculture. Beyers and his colleagues (2004), for example, have shown how EU developments, in interaction with state modernization in Belgium, have brought about a significant shift of agricultural policy competences to the regions away from the center. Although domestic reform had led to the transfer of some agriculture competences to the regions in 1988, the process sped up in the 1990s to bring about the “almost complete de-federalization of [Belgium’s] agriculture policy” – de-federalization being defined somewhat confusingly as “the gradual transfer of policy competences from a federal or central government to the federalised” (Beyers et al. 2004: 129). The authors trace the “hollowing out” of the state to three factors taking place in 1992. At the domestic level, the fourth Belgian state reforms transferred to the region most competences in the national agricultural policy and a few competences within the purview of the CAP. At the European level, the McSharry reforms further consolidated the regional level with the introduction of new policy areas (typically falling under the competences of the

216

Policies

Belgian regions) into the CAP’s legislative and financial purview. Finally, innovations in the Maastricht treaty (notably TEU-article 146 on the empowerment of subnational authorities in the Council of Ministers) enabled the regions to claim more power in the formulation of the CAP itself. The 2002 domestic reform sanctioned a new bargaining system in agriculture, where Belgium’s policy towards the CAP is now really the result of the positions of the federated states (Flanders and Wallonia), aggregated in the new Coordination Office for Agriculture (Beyers et al. 2004: 126). By contrast, Ieraci (1998) tells the less successful story of decentralization in Italy. Two forces at the European level promoted a redefinition of territorial relationships in Italy. At a macro level, the principle of subsidiarity “redefine[d] the position of the regions with regard to European Union (EU) institutions” (Ieraci 1998: 21). At the policy level, the CAP played a key role in the politics of regionalism owing to the sheer amount of the financial transfers involved and to the growing role opened up for the regions in the area of structural policy. The emergence of quasi-federalism in the 1990s was thus “deeply affected by the development of the European integration and by the CAP” (Ieraci 1998: 28). Yet the bottom line is mixed. Europe played a distinct role in the political assertion of Italian regions, although one dwarfed by national counter-moves. In particular, the CAP has become a lever in the political assertion of Italian regions, which led “to the 1993 referendum and the temporary abolition of the Italian Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry” and to a reform that “took into account the regions’ requests for more decentralization of the NAP [National Agricultural Policy] and the potential transformation of the state–regions relationships due to the Maastricht Treaty” (Ieraci 1998: 22). On the other hand, complete regionalization did not take place because the regions still lack decisional power in the EU Council and financial autonomy. This finding is all the more interesting as Ieraci writes six years after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, which, as Beyers and his colleagues have argued, opened up new venues for Belgian regions to claim decision-making prerogatives in Brussels. Both case studies present embedded explanations of regionalization, where various domestic and European-level factors interact. The contrast between Belgian’s “almost complete de-federalization of agriculture policy” (Beyers et al. 2004) and Italy’s problematic “quasi-federalism” (Ieraci 1998: 24) creates an intriguing puzzle for Europeanization research. Attempts to compare findings across the EU suggest that the “concomitant processes of European integration and of the growing role of the regions are not just a chronological coincidence but reflect an entanglement of interactions” (Perraud 1999: 10). “Europe of the regions” is materializing in agricultural policy, even though the recomposition of policy-making competences falls short of a “territorial homogenization of the European space” (Perraud 1999: 8). Single case studies traced patterns of regionalization to broad European features

Christilla Roederer-Rynning 217

relating either to general features of EU institutions or the CAP. By contrast, this group of studies (see also Perraud 2000) traces regionalization specifically to rural development policies – the second pillar of the CAP. They argue that regions are now active both as the key target of European programs (due to the new substantive aims introduced by the second pillar) and a close planning partner of the EU Commission (as a result of the import of structural funds procedures). The pace and form of regionalization then reflect the varying importance of national administrative traditions (Ward and Lowe 2004), the “ritualization of state–regions relations” (Perraud 1999), and patterns of organization of interest groups at the regional level (Genieys et al. 2000). All in all, there is some consensus in recent studies of agricultural policies to attribute regionalization to Europe, and its deflection to domestic factors. The decade since the mid-1990s has witnessed a growing debate about the so-called European model of agricultural policy, the third debate. It has become customary, following Coleman et al. (1997), to distinguish different paradigms of agricultural policy reflecting different sets of policy goals and beliefs, instruments, and instrument settings. The distinction between the state-assisted agriculture paradigm, also variously referred to as developmental paradigm or dependent agriculture paradigm, and the market-liberal or competitive paradigm, formed a basic dichotomy, to which other models have later on been added such as the multifunctional paradigm (Moyer and Josling 2002). The state-assisted and the market-liberal agriculture paradigms both view the production of food as the essential function of agriculture, but while in the former the state plays a key role in the organization and regulation of agriculture (agriculture is considered a special sector of the economy), the market performs these functions in the latter. The multifunctional paradigm distinguishes itself from both paradigms in that it views the function of agriculture as the production of both private goods (food) and public goods (public health, clean environment, living countryside, well-kept landscapes, etc.), but justifies public intervention in various shades. Although a consensus has emerged to characterize CAP reforms as a mutation away from the state-assisted paradigm, there is no agreement on where the CAP is headed, or whether the multifunctional model that European policy makers claim to promote in the reformed CAP significantly departs from the old state-assistance agriculture paradigm. This debate has, by and large, been fuelled by the development of international trade negotiations (the Uruguay round and the Doha round), and a growing body of research has investigated the connections between international trade negotiations and CAP reform. By contrast, intra-EU dynamics and the domestic context of implementation of CAP legislation have received little attention, which is regrettable given that the idea of a European model of agriculture presumes a certain degree of coherence of domestic agricultural policies. This last debate thus addresses a central aspect of the Europeanization

218

Policies

agenda in agriculture: to what extent has Europe transformed national agricultural policies? The findings are mixed. Montpetit (2000) is one of the few to claim evidence of a Europeanization of domestic agricultural policy. His study examines how “Europe” shaped 1990s’ agricultural policy reform in France, when for the first time policy makers adopted a series of “stringent environmental regulations for the agricultural sector” (Montpetit 2000: 576). According to the author, these regulations amounted to a miniature earthquake in domestic farm politics given, on the one hand, their intrusiveness, and on the other hand farm organizations’ relentless efforts to block their adoption. That the latter were unable to obstruct environmental legislation, unlike in the 1980s, owed to Europe, Montpetit claims (2000: 577) – more specifically to the nitrate directive (1991) and the agri-environmental measures (1992), of which the new French agricultural legislation in fact was the implementation. “Without Europe such a policy outcome would not have been possible”. [Europe] enabled the ministry of the environment to play what resembles a two-level game. While satisfying its own preference for a command and control environmental approach to agriculture by agreeing to the Nitrate Directive, the environment minister was able to justify the loss for farmers on the grounds that the development of an environmental policy was an important step for Europe. (Montpetit 2000: 587) By contrast, a handful of studies have documented a complex relationship between national and European agricultural policies, pointing to the resilience of distinctive national policies and the renationalization of the CAP. Studies of renationalization date back to Kjeldahl and Tracy’s (1994) Renationalisation of the Common Agricultural Policy? This work showed how trends towards the development of distinct national measures materialized within the common framework of the CAP. Tracy (1994) pointed out that national diversity has always existed within the CAP: in market policy, through an opaque system of state aids and the application of agrimonetary compensation; in socio-structural policy (and by extension what is now termed the rural development pillar), through the devolution of “a considerable degree of responsibility to national authorities to determine the content of the action and to implement it” and through the creation of agri-environmental measures (Tracy 1994: 2). But while the desire to discriminate in favor of own producers once drove “(unilateral) national policy measures,” it is now rather the need for flexibility and targeting that seems to be driving policy differentiation at the national level (Wilkinson 1994: 22). The implementation of Agenda 2000 and of the 2003 midterm review are cases in point of how legal flexibility at the European level has led to the development of distinct national strategies. Lowe et al.’s (2002) study of the

Christilla Roederer-Rynning 219

implementation of Agenda 2000 modulation in Britain and France thus shows how two states which singled themselves out by their “very active implementation of the RDR [rural development regulation]” gave birth to very different national policies: the French aiming above all to reinforce social justice at home, the British government seeking to flesh out its long-standing commitment to a countryside policy, both governments eager to position themselves vis-à-vis forthcoming CAP reform negotiations. Coleman and Chiasson (2002) saw in the French policy a testimony to the ability of EU member states, under certain conditions, to exercise “transformative capacity” and forge an individual response to the challenge of globalization. With the 2003 midterm review, policy differentiation and flexibility now encompass core areas of the CAP as member states were given considerable leeway to implement the transition to a single, decoupled farm payment and thus “introduce.., at least in the medium term, … a variable speed approach” (Greer 2005: 209). While we lack a systematic analysis of implementation, Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2005: 10) note that the CAP is now “undergo[ing] an element of re-nationalization,” which is reflected in the fact that “no two of the ‘old’ (EU15) Member States are applying the reform in exactly the same way.” Together, these studies trace important and overlooked changes both in national agricultural policies and in the nature and degree of coupling between national agricultural policies and the CAP. However, they fail to indicate how these changes fit in with the broader articulation of a European model of agriculture.

16.3 Key problems Few in agriculture have studied the domestic impact of Europe, and among them only a tiny fraction has done so with reference to the Europeanization agenda that has developed in European Studies. In many respects, the works discussed above have contributed pioneering research in a field that is very much dominated by the study of agricultural policy from the perspective of the European Union. Even so, the deficiencies of individual research designs draw our attention to three general problems for the Europeanization agenda in its current state of affairs. The first concerns the definition of Europeanization; the second, the specification of theoretical relationships; and the third, the interpretation of empirical relationships. What is Europeanization (and how is it different from regionalization and renationalization)? Although the studies discussed above share a concern for investigating “the domestic impact of Europe,” they fail to provide a coherent or systematic definition of Europeanization. Some ostentatiously place Europeanization at the center of the analysis while abstaining from defining it. Others adopt changing understandings of Europeanization in the course of their

220

Policies

analysis. Yet others just about stumble on Europeanization and discuss it almost by inadvertence or in digressions. Disorder may be inevitable at this early stage of research, though it raises real challenges for cumulative research. Indeed, lack of clarity about the defining criteria makes it difficult to recognize instances of Europeanization and draw meaningful conclusions from current debates. The debate on domestic neocorporatism is a case in point in this regard. As we have seen, while a converging set of findings pinpoints the resilience of domestic agricultural corporatism (at least until the 1990s), there is little agreement about what it means for Europeanization. Does the resilience of national neocorporatist structures demonstrate that Europe has had no effects on domestic structures, as Saurugger concludes? Or does it rather demonstrate that a main, albeit paradoxical, result of Europe was (at least for some time) to keep domestic agricultural neocorporatism alive, as Roederer-Rynning argues? Divergences, it seems, are above all rooted in definitional differences – whether Europeanization is understood as the emergence of transnational structures (Saurugger) or more broadly the domestic impact of Europe (Roederer-Rynning) – rather than in discordant observations. In that case, this would leave us with the main paradox that Europeanization has been the bedfellow of national agrarianism. Likewise, the debates on state structures and on the European model of agriculture suggest that a great deal of misunderstanding arises from ambiguities in the literature on the concurrent use of the terms “regionalization” and “renationalization.” What is the conceptual relationship between renationalization and regionalization on the one hand, and Europeanization on the other hand? Are they the opposites of Europeanization (as in Kjeldahl and Tracy’s analysis of renationalization of agricultural policy), or a manifestation of Europeanization (as Perraud clearly argues about the regionalization of agricultural policy)? Do they describe competing forms of governance (characterized by varying degrees of supranationality) or various ways in which Europe affects its member states? Wallace has proposed to introduce the term of domestication, side-by-side with that of Europeanization. She defined it as “the ways in which domestic actors frame and influence the incoming impacts of Europeanization” (Wallace 2000: 369–70). Could some of the phenomena described by Tracy, Kjeldahl, and others be captured in terms of domestication? If Europeanization is to provide a coherent framework of research in agricultural studies, then it must be clearly distinguished from other terms. Provided one accepts the very loose understanding of Europeanization as the domestic impact of Europe, as this volume does, the literature remains elusive on the theoretical relationships underpinning this process. It is clear from the literature that Europe seldom operates alone in producing domestic change. In fact, it could be argued that the whole point of the Europeanization research is to investigate to what extent domestic factors support, cancel out, or deflect European impetuses of change. What remains unclear, however, are the logics

Christilla Roederer-Rynning 221

according to which domestic and European factors interact and the role of Europe relative to other sources of change. Some, like Montpetit (2000), develop a relatively straightforward line of argument where Europe is a permissive factor, which triggers change first and foremost by shaping the setting for action. Their argument is rationalistic in that European institutions, policies, and norms are seen as a stock of resources that domestic actors, chiefly the state, can use to make their preferences prevail. A problem raised by this interpretation is that it remains ambiguous on the extent to which Europeanization, understood in these terms, is a transformative process. Montpetit makes a strong claim about the significance of Europeanization by arguing that change would not have been possible without Europe. Yet, exactly how Europe mattered remains unclear. He claims that “the environment minister was able to justify the loss for farmers on the grounds that the development of an environmental policy was an important step for Europe” (Montpetit 2000: 587). But how plausible is it that farmers, who for some time had been fiercely fighting similar legislation because of the costs that it would impose upon them, should all of a sudden have surrendered their own interests in the name of Europe? Montpetit’s analysis suggests that changing state preferences, a process with which Europe apparently did not have anything to do, were the decisive factor behind the new legislation. Changing preferences explain why the French state adopted, contra the historical record, European legislation that would have significant material repercussions for farmers. By the same token, changing state preferences also explain why the state, contra other European states, adopted a stringent interpretation of this legislation at home. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see why change would not have been possible without Europe unless changing state preferences themselves can be traced to Europe. Other studies (e.g. Lowe et al. 2002) suggest another possibility: that the adoption of European legislation in the 1990s only corroborated a trend that had already taken place at the domestic level. In the case of water pollution, which is Montpetit’s case, one can thus propose that change might have occurred without Europe, though it would have taken another form. That, it appears, is the real issue to investigate. Beyers et al. (2004: 103) make an intriguing argument about the “embeddedness” of domestic change. “The case of agricultural policy,” according to them, “demonstrates how … domestic reform and … Europeanisation evolve through a concatenated set of small incremental, at first seemingly unrelated, steps which may lock in actors into a specific set of institutional choices.” Likewise, Perraud underscores the entanglement of domestic and European logics of change. These interpretations allow for an open-ended interplay between domestic and European factors that grant more significance to Europeanization, but they remain fairly a-theoretical. A particular problem finally arises from studies attributing domestic continuity (such as the resilience of farm corporatism) to

222

Policies

changes at the European level (such as the consolidation of the CAP) (RoedererRynning 2002). This argument rests on a discrepancy between an independent variable that varies (to put it broadly, European integration) and a dependent variable that does not vary (domestic continuity). Clearly, more work must be done to specify the intervening mechanisms linking European causes and domestic effects. Last but not least, the claims that are made in the literature are sometimes weakened by a questionable interpretation of empirical relationships. Here, one of the main important problems is the frequent lack of specification of how “European” the alleged European cause is. One mistake, given the multi-level form of European governance, is to attribute to Europe what upon close scrutiny should be attributed to the state. Analyses of domestic agricultural change in the EU are thus often flawed by a presumption of Europeanness of the CAP, which is notably based on the fact that the CAP appears in the Rome Treaty as one of the founding policies of the EU. Lowe et al. (2002: 14) qualify the CAP as “the supranational policy par excellence within the EU,” while Saurugger (2003: 113) brands it “one of the most integrated policies with regard to its political foundations and its institutional apparatus” – in so doing only endorsing widely held perceptions of the agricultural policy domain in Europe. The problem is not just that the CAP, now as the only policy under the purview of EU institutions, is placed under the consultation procedure, which is the least supranational procedure in the first pillar of the EU. More importantly perhaps, agricultural policy in Europe is more than the CAP and the CAP itself is not a homogenous policy regime. Not all of agricultural policy in the EU is conducted within the framework of the CAP. Important areas, such as social security provisions, the regulation of the working conditions and wages of agricultural workers, and land tenure remain altogether outside the purview of the CAP. Furthermore, policy areas covered by the structural policy/rural development pillar of the CAP are placed under the shared competences of EU and member states. Finally, market policy, the only policy area placed under the exclusive competence of EU institutions, does not cover all commodities; nor is it any longer subjected to a strict logic of uniform application of EU law, as illustrated by the implementation of Agenda 2000 and the 2003 midterm review. The heterogeneity of the agricultural policy domain has several consequences. First, the CAP budget is far from being the only public expenditure on agriculture in today’s EU. Although at present we lack a comprehensive and systematic study of all public transfers to agriculture in the EU, there have been indications that national agriculture expenditure (excluding CAP transfers) remains a very significant component of total farm expenditures in the EU. Second, the principle of exclusivity of EU competences only applies to a very specific sub-field of agricultural policy – the market pillar of the CAP – and even there, with some reservations because of the fact that member states can

Christilla Roederer-Rynning 223

intervene either in favor of the commodities not encompassed by EU legislation (though in respect of the EU regime on the freedom of goods), or to influence the formation of commodity prices by intervening at the retail and distribution stages, or to fill in the gaps created sometimes deliberately by European regulations (for example, the calculation of direct payments). Third, a corollary is that the principle of subsidiarity applies, contrary to what is sometimes stated, to a growing segment of CAP legislation (placed in the second pillar of the CAP). And, finally, a significant and growing body of CAP (second pillar) legislation takes the form of directives, to the effect that “there can be different ways of national implementation of agreed policies” (Britton 1976: 410). What is important, in light of the Europeanization agenda, is not just that agricultural policy in Europe is in fact represented by the CAP and 25 national agricultural policies (NAP) but the fact that the CAP itself, as some have put it, might be more aptly described as a “co-ordination of national policies” (Pearce quoted in Snyder 1985: 62). In light of these observations, monolithic representations of agricultural policy in Europe are obviously problematic.

16.4 Conclusion It has been noted that Europeanization need not mean the replacement of established domestic structures, the convergence of domestic policies, or the emergence of clear division of labor between the different administrative echelons constituting the European Union. Thus, in agriculture, one of the tentative hypotheses emerging from the literature suggests that European integration, for most of its history, froze domestic politics along pre-EEC lines by consolidating the weakened compacts between states and farmers and the superior authority of the state vis-à-vis subnational regions. In this sense, European integration was the bedfellow of national agrarianism. Europeanization manifested itself primarily as the perpetuation of the status quo in the form of the political resilience of a declining sector of the economy. There is evidence that this pattern is being questioned by new logics of interaction between European and domestic factors. Domestic studies of agriculture have pointed to changing relations between states’ cores and their peripheries and between farm interests and non-farm interests. Change, however, is not irreversible, uniform across space, or even synchronized. Analyzing and explaining contrasting patterns of change, in both time and space, are important tasks for any future research. To this end, research must focus more systematically on the following questions. Precisely what aspect of the CAP contributed to the consolidation of domestic farm corporatism? Was it the path that policy follows in the institutional machinery, which reinforced the role of established domestic power constellations? Was it the amount of money that Brussels transferred to European farmers, which enabled them to crowd out the critics of the CAP? Was the federation

224

Policies

of farm interests dependent upon, and facilitated by, particular policy instruments of the CAP? Or was it a combination of all these three factors? What would have happened without the CAP? Can it be established that corporatism would have withered away in the absence of the CAP? To what extent did the domestic changes recorded in the 1990s reveal a broader departure from corporatism? And how, specifically, can these changes be traced to CAP reforms? In addressing these questions, scholars must bear in mind the potential role of other factors at the EU level (either broad institutional principles or developments in cognate policy domains) and of concomitant domestic processes (such as state modernization or changing state preferences). Responses to these questions must rest on a more accurate description of the agricultural policy domain in the EU. What is domestic agricultural policy? What is common in the Common Agricultural Policy? The widely held perception of agricultural policy as a uniform body of legislation placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of EU institutions flaws the terms of Europeanization research (for an exception, see Kjeldahl and Tracy 1994). The CAP is a segmented policy regime, which spans different institutional logics and policy-making procedures, and its complexity has only grown with Agenda 2000 and the Midterm Review. Likewise, domestic agricultural policy is a bundle of decisions featuring national policy makers as original decision makers and as implementing agent of EU legislation. What role do national policy makers perform for a given policy outcome – that of original decision makers or implementing agents? What EU constraints and opportunities in the form of financial transfers, institutional procedures, and policy instruments are attached these roles? How dependent are the national agricultural policies on CAP financial transfers? How do national agricultural budgets, and the policies that they support, fit in with the emerging European farm policy architecture? Collecting data on national farm expenditures is a huge and complex task for it presumes that information is publicly available and comparable across member states. In the 1970s, the European Commission suggested, on the basis of confidential inventories of state aids, that national farm budgets were larger than the Community budgets (Snyder 1985: 37). Yearly compilations of agricultural statistics in the EU (the EU’s The Situation of Agriculture in the European Union) do not permit the evaluation of these budgets, partly because they omit regional expenditures for agriculture and remain unspecific about the type of expenditures that are included at the national level. Research is sparse and mostly based on agricultural structural policy (Delorme et al. 1994; Bonnet et al. 1996). Finally, how does Europe filter broader international developments? Is Europe bringing globalization home in the form of greater pressure to adopt a marketliberal model of agriculture or has it given national policy makers more room for maneuver? How is growing regional differentiation within the European model of agriculture compatible with international trade negotiations? To what extent

Christilla Roederer-Rynning 225

does it challenge the ability of member states to articulate coherent farm policy responses to globalization? These questions have become particularly pressing with the EU’s eastward expansion, which increases the heterogeneity of agricultural policy by introducing still more different types of farming systems, national conceptions of the role of agriculture in society, and administrative traditions. Enlargement brings into sharp relief the unstable dynamic that characterizes European agricultural policy today, pulled in different directions by the integrative imperative emerging from enlarged EU membership, a growing sensitivity to national traditions and identities, and the liberalizing impulse impressed by international trade negotiations. Though young and exploratory, research on the domestic impact of Europe in agriculture has already offered stimulating insights and puzzles. The challenge now is to produce cumulative knowledge. The questions raised in this contribution sketch out the bases on which a more structured “Europeanization agenda” might develop – side by side and in dialog with the “puzzle of CAP reform agenda.”

Key readings Daugbjerg, C. (1999) Reforming the CAP: Policy Networks and Broader Institutional Structures. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(3) 407–28. Greer, A. (2005) Agricultural Policy in Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Milward, A. (1992) The European Rescue of the Nation-State. Berkeley: University of California Press. Roederer-Rynning, C. (2002) Farm Conflict in France and the Europeanisation of Agricultural Policy. West European Politics, 25(3) 107–26. Ward, N. and P. Lowe (2004) Europeanizing Rural Development? Implementing the CAP’s Second Pillar in England. International Planning Studies, 9(2/3) 121–37.

17 Environmental Policy Tanja A. Börzel

17.1 Introduction In 1986, the EU received the power to legislate on the environment. But even before this time, it had already developed a rather comprehensive body of environmental legislation driven by the demand for both market-making and market-correcting policies. While the evolution and the making and implementation of EU environmental policies are well researched, we know much less about their impact on the institutions, policies and political processes of the member states. The literature provides a number of theoretically wellinformed comparative case studies that clearly demonstrate the differential impact of Europe in the field of environmental policy. But there is still no big picture. Since EU environmental policy resembles a regulatory patchwork rather than a coherent framework, we should not necessarily expect to find a general convergence across the member states. Nevertheless, we might see a diffusion of certain instruments and problem-solving approaches that emerge from the “uploading” of national policies to the EU level and the “downloading” of EU policies at the national level. Moreover, to what extent have EU environmental policies impacted administrative structures and regulatory styles of the member states? Has Europeanization led to a centralization of environmental policy making in the member states? Have EU environmental policies empowered societal interests in pushing for progressive environmental regulation? How will Europeanization affect the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe? Will they be drawn into the camp of the Southern European laggards or will they join the group of Northern European leaders? Finally, how does the Europeanization of member state environmental policy feed back into EU environmental policy making? The chapter will review the state of the art on the Europeanization of environmental policy and evaluate to what extent it provides satisfying answers to the questions raised above. My main assertion will be that the domestic impact of Europe on environmental 226

Tanja A. Börzel

227

policy has been more subtle and indirect than the Europeanization literature would lead us to expect. The degree of domestic change is limited and there is little evidence for convergence toward an EU policy model. Having identified the main gaps in the literature, I will conclude with some considerations for further research.

17.2 Core research questions Environmental policy is one of the most developed areas of EU policy making. As stated earlier, the EU received the competence to legislate on environmental protection as late as 1986. But the first European environmental measure had been adopted 20 years earlier (cf. McCormick 1999: 41–68). By now, the environmental acquis comprises more than 300 environmental issues regulating virtually every aspect of the environment (ibid.: 63–5). It is fair to say that the vast majority of environmental policies are made in Brussels rather than in the capitals of the member states. Given its high degree of institutionalization and regulatory density, environmental policy is a most likely case for Europeanization. But to what extent has European integration resulted in policy and institutional change in the member states? And if national environmental policies are Europeanized, do they converge towards a “European model”? The impact of Europeanization can be traced along three dimensions: policy, polity, and politics (Börzel 2005; Börzel and Risse 2003). It would go beyond the scope of this chapter to explore all possible aspects of Europeanization. Therefore, the analysis will follow the approach adopted by most studies on EU environmental policy and focus on policy content, administrative structures, and regulatory style (Knill 2001; Knill and Lenschow 2000a, 2001a). Policy content refers to the problem-solving approach (precautionary vs reactive), the policy instruments (substantive vs procedural), and the policy standards (cf. Börzel 2003a: 36–8). Administrative structures are defined by the degree of (de)centralization of policy-making competencies horizontally between different ministries and vertically between different levels of government (cf. Knill 2001). Finally, regulatory styles describe the patterns of interest intermediation between public authorities and societal and economic actors in the making and implementation of environmental policy (hierarchical, adversarial vs discretionary, consensual) (Knill 2001; Jordan and Liefferink 2004c). Environmental policy is probably the most intensively researched field regarding the impact of European policies on national frameworks. The literature provides a growing number of theoretically well-informed studies. Yet these works are necessarily limited by the number of cases and the dimension of change they can analyze at a time. As a result, we are still missing the big

228

Policies

picture. Only one recent published volume, by Jordan and Liefferink (2004a), offers a systematic exploration of the Europeanization of policy content, policy structures, and policy style across ten different states. The study covers Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, including “only” one Southern European country and none of the new Central and Eastern European member states. Nevertheless, it is the most comprehensive academic study to date. I will summarize the main findings and then see in the last part of this chapter to what extent they challenge theoretical arguments of the Europeanization literature. In a nutshell, the comparative study of Jordan and Liefferink finds that environmental policy has been Europeanized to some extent in all member states, but in some member states the impact has been deeper than in others. Moreover, Europeanization has mostly affected policy content. The EU has promoted a more precautionary problem-solving approach (source-based rather than effect-based), particularly in the area of air and water pollution control. It also introduced procedural policy instruments (participatory, incentive-based), such as the Access to Environmental Information and the Environmental Impact Directives. Finally, EU policies have led to tighter standards in virtually all areas of environmental policy. While the EU has affected the policy content of all ten countries, the environmental late-comers (Spain, Ireland, the UK) have been much more Europeanized than the environmentally progressive “leader” states. The Europeanization of administrative structures paints a similar picture. In all ten countries, the domestic impact of Europe has fostered the centralization of environmental policy-making competencies in the hands of central government departments and agencies at the expense of subordinate levels of government. While regional governments in highly decentralized states have to some extent been compensated by co-decision rights in the formulation and implementation of EU environmental policies, the main losers of Europeanization are the national and regional parliaments. Regulatory styles, by contrast, have been much less affected by European integration. While the Europeanization of environmental policy making has created new political opportunities, particularly for citizens and environmental groups, it has reinforced existing consensual and adversarial styles rather than changed them. The only exceptions are the three Northern European countries, which joined the EU in 1995. In Austria, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Finland, the need to implement EU environmental policies in a timely manner has reduced the scope for extensive consultation with affected interests undermining the traditionally consensual patterns of interest intermediation. Moreover, the legalistic approach of the Commission in the monitoring of compliance with EU Law has constrained the discretion public authorities used to

Tanja A. Börzel

229

exercise in the implementation of environmental regulations in the UK, Ireland and France. In sum, Europeanization has affected the policy, polity, and politics of the environment. But the degree of change differs significantly from country to country. While the member states have largely absorbed any impact of Europeanization on their regulatory styles, EU environmental policy has had some bearing on their administrative structures resulting in moderate domestic change. Europeanization is most apparent in relation to policy content where we also find the greatest variation between the member states. Finally, the environmental late-comers of Southern Europe and Ireland have been more affected or Europeanized than the environmental first-comers in the North. Since the impact of Europeanization on national environmental policy is both limited and differential, we should not be too surprised that we find almost no evidence for convergence towards an EU policy model. This is all the more true since the member states had already had many similarities, especially with regard to policy content and regulatory style, before they have become subject to increasing Europeanization since the 1970s (Jordan and Liefferink 2004d). Convergence is not synonymous with Europeanization. Member states can undergo significant domestic change without necessarily becoming more similar. The degree and the direction of domestic change are two separate issues. While most Europeanization approaches would lead us to expect little convergence in terms of direction, the limited degree of domestic change raises an interesting puzzle. The same is true for the differential impact of Europeanization. Why has Europeanization left a greater mark on policy than on polity and politics? And why have the Southern European environmental late-comers been more affected by Europeanization than the Northern European environmental first-comers? The latter question touches upon an ongoing debate in the field of EU environmental policy making on whether the EU is having a “Southern problem” (Pridham and Cini 1994) and whether its four southern member states are suffering from a disease called “Mediterranean Syndrome” (La Spina and Sciortino 1993). The debate has been more related to issues of compliance with EU environmental law (for a critical review see Börzel 2003a). Yet, it also raises some important questions for Europeanization literature. Does uneven Europeanization give rise to a “North–South conflict”, in which Southern late-comers increasingly resist what they see as the attempt of the Northern first-comers to use Europeanization as a means to impose their environmental policies upon the economically less-developed South whose environmental problems are often quite different from those faced in the highly industrialized countries of the North? The question has become even more relevant after 10 new member states joined the EU in 2004, which have significantly reinforced the group of environmental late-comers.

230

Policies

17.3 Key problems The limited degree of change in national environmental policy after more than 30 years of increasing Europeanization should temper our assumptions about the transformative capacity of Europe. Not only have the member states absorbed or accommodated most of the adaptational pressures, but the EU has not even been the main driver of much of the domestic change observed. The country studies in the Jordan and Liefferink volume highlight other causes, such as domestic economic pressures, long-term industrial transformations, or the emergence of new public management, and find these, in many instances, to be more important. This does not render Europeanization irrelevant. Rather, the editors conclude that “national environmental policies would undoubtedly have been modernized without the EU, but not nearly as quickly, as uniformly or as comprehensively as they have been with it” (Jordan and Liefferink 2004d). In other words, the domestic impact of Europe is often more subtle and indirect than the Europeanization literature would lead us to expect. This is due to methodological problems rather than flaws in our theoretical thinking about Europeanization. The findings of most empirical studies are driven by the characteristics of the cases (Haverland 2003: 215). It is much more appealing to study cases where Europe left a marked impact than where it had no effect. Moreover, the vast part of the Europeanization literature employs qualitative methods (for an exception see Giuliani 2003; Holzinger et al. 2003) doing comparisons of two or three member states, which often include the “usual suspects” – France, Germany and the UK. Many fewer studies have been carried out on Italy, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark or Luxembourg. Ever tried to find something on Greece or Portugal? The number of policies analyzed tends to be equally limited. Much has been written on Directives such as Packaging Waste, Access to Information or Environmental Impact Assessment. Far less is known about noise, electronical waste or surface water. This is not to say that Europeanization research suffers from a general selection bias on the dependent variable, with an undue focus on “success cases”. Students have become increasingly concerned with explaining the differential impact of Europe selecting their cases accordingly (Cowles et al. 2001; Héritier et al. 2001; Börzel 1999). Intervening variables, such as the goodness of fit and mediating factors (veto players, facilitating formal institutions, norm entrepreneurs), should not only be able to account for the absence of convergence toward an EU policy model and the limited degree of domestic change in national environmental policy (a). They should also explain why the impact on policy has been deeper than on polity and politics (b) and why some member states have been more affected by Europeanization than others (c). (a) Most studies on Europeanization have found that there must be some “misfit” (Börzel 1999; Duina 1999) or “mismatch” (Héritier 1996) between

Tanja A. Börzel

231

European and domestic policies, processes, and institutions in order for domestic change to occur. The “goodness of fit” (Risse et al. 2001) or congruence between the European and the domestic level determines the degree of pressure for adaptation generated by Europeanization on the member states. Since EU environmental policy is one of the most densely regulated and institutionally wellentrenched policy sectors, it should exert considerable pressure for adaptation on the member states. Yet EU environmental policy resembles a regulatory patchwork rather than a coherent framework (Héritier 1996). It combines different problem-solving approaches and policy instruments, sometimes even within one policy. In the absence of a uniform EU policy model, we should expect national environmental policy neither to converge nor to profoundly transform, particularly if most of the member states have always been quite similar with regard to their policy content and regulatory styles (see also below). Even at the level of individual policies, where procedural regulations, such as the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, may require substantial changes of existing national policies, the effect remains limited. First, EU Directives are only framework legislation that, by design, grants the member states leeway to fit EU policies into their national arrangements (Rehbinder and Stewart 1985). Second, member states often seek to avoid costly adaptations by not fully or correctly implementing a Directive. The extent to which they succeed in watering down misfitting EU requirements or in circumventing them altogether, depends on mediating factors, such as the existence of domestic actors mobilizing in favor of full compliance with the EU policy (cf. Börzel 2003a). (b) If Europeanization causes domestic change, it is with regard to policy content rather than administrative structures and regulatory styles. Again, the goodness of fit provides a plausible explanation for this differential impact. The literature distinguishes between two types of misfits by which Europe exerts adaptational pressure on the member states. First, Europeanization might cause a “policy misfit” between European policies, on the one hand, and national policy goals, regulatory standards, the instruments used to achieve policy goals, and/or the underlying problem-solving approach, on the other (cf. Héritier 1996; Börzel 2003a). Second, Europe can cause “institutional misfit” challenging domestic rules and procedures and the collective understandings attached to them (e.g. Lehmkuhl 1999; Risse 2001; Börzel 2002a). EU environmental policies primarily regulate policy content. They hardly prescribe specific administrative structures and regulatory styles (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999). Hence, Europeanization is much more likely to exert pressure for adaptation on the content of national policies rather than the administrative structures and regulatory styles of the member states. To be sure, policy misfit can also challenge underlying institutions and political processes. For instance, the Access to Environmental Information and the

232

Policies

Environmental Impact Directives provide citizens and environmental groups with additional voice in environmental decision making. Yet the member states have been very reluctant to effectively implement these policies as a result of which societal actors have hardly been empowered. Citizens and environmental groups in Southern Europe countries, where hierarchical and adversarial regulatory styles still dominate, could have benefited most from the new opportunities provided by EU environmental policies. But they have been the least likely to exploit them since they lack the necessary resources to pressure their governments into compliance. If EU environmental policies, such as Access to Information, are not effectively implemented because they do not fit the regulatory style of a member state, domestic actors are hardly empowered by the legal and political opportunities offered (cf. Börzel 2000b, 2006). And even if these policies were effectively implemented, they would be unlikely to change the overall regulatory styles of Spain, Portugal or Greece since their effect is confined to specific issues, such as the licensing of environmentally damaging projects. Procedural regulations, such as the Environmental Impact Assessment and the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directives, not only challenge regulatory styles but also require changes in administrative structures. Since they prescribe the assessment of certain public and private projects with regard to their environmental impact across the different media (air, water, soil, noise), EU procedural regulations demand extensive coordination among the authorities in charge of the different media, which are often located at different levels of government. Unlike in the case of regulatory style, we can indeed observe a concentration of environmental competencies in the hands of the central executive. But these changes are generally not driven by individual EU (environmental) policies. Rather, they reflect a general trend towards executive federalism in the EU caused by the functional needs for effective national coordination in the formulation and implementation of EU policies (Goetz 2000; Kassim 2003a; Börzel 2002a). While this trend may frustrate the hopes for a “Europe of the Regions” and a “Europe of the Citizens”, its impact on the domestic institutions of the member states remains altogether moderate since it reinforces rather than counteracts domestic developments. For instance, EU membership has been accompanied by the creation of the Ministry of the Environment in Spain and the enhancement of technical agencies in some other countries, yet the EU was not necessarily the main driver of these changes (Jordan and Liefferink 2004d). The same is true for the centralization of environmental competencies that has much to do with the transboundary nature of environmental pollution, on the one hand, and economic globalization, on the other. In order to preserve both their high levels of environmental regulation and the international competitiveness of their industry, environmentally progressive countries seek to negotiate

Tanja A. Börzel

233

international environmental agreements. The making of environmental policies beyond the nation-state necessarily weakens the power of national parliaments, subnational governments, and societal actors not commanding the necessary resources to make their voices heard at the international level. (c) While the overall Europeanization of national environmental policy is limited, Ireland, the UK, and Spain have been more affected than Austria, France, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden. It is in explaining such country variation that Europeanization research has been at its best. Once again, the goodness of fit provides the starting point. As policy misfits produce adaptational costs at the domestic level, member states seek to “upload” their policies to the European level in order to minimize the misfit. But since they have distinct social, political, and economic institutions, national governments often compete for policies that conform to the preferences of their constituencies (Héritier 1996). High-regulating countries seek to harmonize their strict social or environmental standards at the European level where they may meet the vigorous opposition of industrial late-comers, which want to avoid competitive disadvantages for their industry. But not only do member state governments pursue diverging and often competing policy preferences. They also differ in their capacity to successfully engage in the European policy contest. The environmental “first-comers” (Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Austria) not only have a strong incentive to harmonize their strict environmental standards and regulatory policy instruments at the European level to avoid competitive disadvantages for their industries and avoid adaptations in their policies. They also have the action capacity (resources) to actively shape European policies according to their environmental concerns and economic interests. The environmental “late-comers” (Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Ireland) lack both the policies and the action capacity (money, staffpower, expertise, administrative coordination) to upload them to the European level (cf. Börzel 2002b, 2003a). Since they are policy takers rather than policy shapers, these member states are far more likely to run into serious policy misfit than the pace-setters. At the same time, their environmental policies have been less robust and, hence, more open to EU-induced changes. First, as environmental late-comers, they have to build up regulatory structures to implement EU policies rather than fit EU policies into historically grown, comprehensive domestic arrangements. Second, with the exception of Italy, EU membership coincided with processes of endogenous transition where domestic institutions were in flux and not sufficiently robust in order to withstand challenges by EU policies (Morlino 1999; Knill and Lenschow 2001a). The only member state which does not seem to fit the pattern at first sight is the UK. It is certainly not an environmental late-comer. When the UK joined the EU in 1973, it had in place a comprehensive regulatory system for environmental protection. Yet, its reactive, effect-based problem-solving approach and

234

Policies

the emphasis on procedural, incentive-based regulation are difficult to reconcile with the more precautionary, source-based approach and the use of substantive regulation in the environmentally leading countries of continental Europe, which shaped most EU environmental policies in the 1970s and 1980s. While the UK had the necessary resources to upload its policies to the EU level, Euroskepticism turned the British government into an environmental footdragger and policy taker instead of a pace-setter and policy shaper (Jordan 2002). As a result, the British administration was forced to adapt its policy content as well as its discretionary regulatory style, which has traditionally been based on voluntary regulation and ad hoc and pragmatic negotiation with industry (Knill 2001). The initial response of the British government to the growing policy misfit was to subvert key directives, which earned the UK the reputation of a “laggard” and the “dirty man of Europe”. At the beginning of the 1990s, however, the British position started to change. Having become aware of the considerable costs which European environmental policy could impose, the Department of the Environment adopted a more proactive role at both the national and the European level (Jordan 2002). The Environmental Protection Act of 1990 not only brought the UK into compliance with EU environmental legislation of the 1980s; it also put it into the position of setting the pace in several areas of European environmental policy. British policy initiatives were facilitated because the Commission had turned away from its “command-and-control” approach of imposing strict substantial standards and moved towards horizontal measures of general cross-sectoral application. Procedural regulations which adopt an integrated approach, such as the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, the Access to Information Directive, and the Eco-Auditing Regulation, are prominent examples of Britain’s successful pace-setting strategy (cf. Héritier et al. 1996: 207–65; Lowe and Ward 1998). Since the UK only turned from a policy taker into a policy shaper in the 1990s, early EU environmental policies that were modeled after the continental European approach significantly changed the British policy content and regulatory style. If the capacity to shape EU policies is a major determinant of the degree of domestic change Europeanization is likely to cause, this has major repercussions for the new ten member states that recently joined the EU. First, the fit between their national environmental policies with the environmental acquis is low. Like in the southern member states, the problem is not so much one of integrating “misfitting” EU policies into a dense network of domestic regulations but to build up new regulatory structures. Moreover, the domestic policies, polities and politics of the accession countries are malleable since they are still in the process of consolidating their transition to democracy and market economy. While it is too early to take stock of the Europeanization impacts, the EU is likely to leave a significant imprint on the policy content as well as on

Tanja A. Börzel

235

the administrative structures and regulatory styles of the new member states (the latter two of which, however, are shaped by broader processes of Europeanization; cf. Goetz 2001b; Grabbe 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Currently, the new member states face a huge policy overload. While they have most of the EU environmental policies on the books, practical application and enforcement is still wanting. If the Central and Eastern Europeans follow the southern example, they will seek to postpone effective implementation. This is particularly likely to happen if the EU does not help strengthening their “taking” capacity. So far, EU assistance programs, such as PHARE or the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), only cover a small fraction of the total compliance costs (Schreuers 2004: 43–5). If EU environmental policies are not sensitive to the adaptational problems of the new member states, Eastern enlargement may indeed split the EU into a “leaders” and a “laggards” camp, with the latter clearly outweighing the former. So far, the “leader–laggard” dynamics of EU environmental policy making have not resulted in stable coalitions among the first-comers and the late-comers, respectively. The northern pace-setters have rarely been able to forge stable alliances with each other. Rather, “green” coalitions are formed on an issue-byissue basis and remain prone to defections (Liefferink and Andersen 1998). The pace-setters may share similar “norms of environmental behaviour” (Skjaerseth 1994: 38). But their policy contents still significantly differ a result of which environmental leaders often pursue diverging policy preferences, which give rise to competition rather than cooperation among them. Their regulatory contest has provided openings for tactical coalitions that cut across the “leader–laggard” divide. While northern first-comers have repeatedly teamed up with southern late-comers to oppose EU policy initiatives, southern footdraggers might also support northern pace-setters, although such coalitions have remained exceptional. Finally, the southern late-comers have not been able to form stable alliances either. Like their northern counterparts, they view each other as temporary allies in fighting against costly regulations and in pressing for more European funds, respectively. At the same time, however, they compete among each other – not so much for uploading domestic policy preferences to the EU level but for EU financial support in downloading EU policies at the domestic level. Such competition has also precluded them from jointly pushing for EU policies that would address some of their commonly shared problems, such as deforestation. The diversity of the member states and the dynamics of EU policy making have so far prevented the emergence of a “North–South conflict” in European environmental politics. Yet eastern enlargement may have significantly reinforced existing tensions, changing the balance of power between leaders and laggards. The economies of the Central and Eastern European member states are still weak. Like the Southern European member states, they seek to catch up

236

Policies

with their wealthy Northern European counterparts. Moreover, the environmental situation in Central and Eastern Europe differs from Western Europe due to the different paths to socioeconomic development after the Second World War. Central planning resulted in a marked contrast between heavily polluted “hot spots” and relatively unspoiled areas with exceptionally high levels of biodiversity (Homeyer et al. 2000: 353–5). The industrially and environmentally advanced countries of the North will continue to push for the rapid adoption and progressive development of European environmental standards that address their most pressing environmental problems and also both prevent competitive disadvantages for their industries and create new export markets for their environmental industries. The economically weaker member states in the South and East, by contrast, may become increasingly reluctant to bear the costs of environmental policies, which they perceive as mostly directed to the economic interests and environmental problems of the North. In an enlarged Union, the first-comers are no longer able to set the pace against the united opposition of the late-comers. Nor will the pace-setters be able to form a blocking minority against attempts of foot-draggers to lower existing environmental standards (Dehousse 1998b: 147). Against this background, European policies are more likely to be shaped by the interests of the environmental late-comers rather than the first-comers (cf. Schreuers 2004). Some have argued (for example, Jehlicka 2001) that the new member states are less inclined to join the group of environmental laggards than is usually expected. Unlike the Southern Europeans, the Central and Eastern European countries used to pursue a more proactive approach to environmental policy, adopting regulations that went beyond existing EU legislation. Only since they entered the accession process have they developed into passive policy takers focusing on the adoption of the environmental acquis. Moreover, their common history and shared problems have not prompted these countries to engage in any systematic coordination of their interests in the run-up process to accession. Nor have they sought to approach the Southern European latecomers for political support or the exchange of accession experience. Nevertheless, high adaptational costs, limited implementation capacities, and low environmental mobilization suggest that the new member states will be more likely to side with the laggards than with the leaders.

17.4 Conclusion Existing approaches in the Europeanization literature seem to be well equipped to account for the differential Europeanization of environmental policy in the member states. The combination of the (top-down) goodness of fit argument with a (bottom-up) focus on the capacity of the member states to shape EU policy seems to be particularly fruitful. The relationship between the EU and its

Tanja A. Börzel

237

member states is not a one-way street. Member states are not merely passive receivers of European demands for domestic change. They may proactively shape European policies, institutions, and processes to which they have to adapt later (Andersen and Liefferink 1997; Bomberg and Peterson 2000; see already Wallace 1971). Moreover, the need to adapt domestically to European pressures may have significant return effects at the European level, where member states seek to reduce the misfit between European and domestic arrangements (Dyson 2003; Jeffery 2003). An effective strategy of maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of European policies is to “upload” or export national policies to the European level. “Uploading” reduces the need for legal and administrative adaptation in “downloading”, that is, incorporating European policies into national policy structures. Shaping and taking provide an important link between the bottom-up and top-down dimensions of Europeanization. But what defines the capacity of national governments to shape and take European policies and decisions? Bulmer and Katzenstein argue that the congruence in “constitutional order”, “norms and conventions”, and “patterns of meso-level governance” between Germany and the EU has allowed Germany to play a leading role in shaping supranational institution building and the making of European policies (Bulmer 1997; Katzenstein 1997), which in turn has reduced adaptational pressures on its domestic institutions, processes and policies (cf. Bulmer et al. 2000). Others point to the “political clout” (Wright 1999: 163) or “institutional weight” (Hosli and Soetendorp 2000) of the member states in EU decision-making bodies. A third group of scholars emphasize the political and administrative mechanisms through which member states coordinate and articulate national interests in the EU policy-making process (Kassim et al. 2000a; Zeff and Pirro 2001). The implementation literature discusses similar factors in accounting for the failure of member states to effectively take EU policies at the domestic level. Some studies refer to the degree to which policy-making competencies are dispersed between different policy sectors and between different levels of government, on the one hand, and to the absence or presence of mechanisms of horizontal and vertical coordination, on the other hand (Siedentopf and Hauschild 1988; Haigh 1986). Others focus on the number of domestic veto players that can block the implementation of EU policies (Haverland 2000), or the level of socioeconomic development, which affects the costs of applying EU legislation as well as the capacity and willingness of actors to cope with them (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Jänicke and Weidner 1997; Börzel 2003b). Finally, some look to cultural variables, such as public awareness and the readiness of domestic actors to engage in collective action (Putnam 1993; La Spina and Sciortino 1993). While research on the shaping and taking of EU policies shows significant overlap, few attempts have been made to draw the two strands of literature

238

Policies

together (but see Van Keulen 2002). The logic of the argument made above implies that the more successful member states are in shaping EU policies, the fewer problems they are likely to face in taking these policies. But does the shaping and taking capacity depend on the same factors or do the two stages of the policy process require different capabilities? Alternatively, some factors might be more important to shaping than taking, or vice versa (cf. Börzel 2003b). They could also have contradicting effects on shaping and taking. We still lack research that systematically combines and compares the causal influence of the different factors in the two stages of the EU policy process. The use of quantitative methods could help to get a grip on the problem of too many variables and too few cases that has plagued so many case studies in the Europeanization literature. Finally, looking at both the shaping and taking EU policies would provide a fruitful way to theoretically link the implementation research in EU policy making with the Europeanization literature (see Börzel and Risse 2006).

Key readings Börzel, T.A. (2003) Environmental Leaders and Laggards in the European Union: Why There is (Not) a Southern Problem. London: Ashgate. Haverland, M. (2003) The Impact of the European Union on Environmental Policies. In K. Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 203–21. Jordan, A. and D. Liefferink (eds) (2004) Environmental Policy in Europe: The Europeanization of National Environmental Policy. London: Routledge. Knill, C. and A. Lenschow (eds) (2000) Implementing EU Environmental Policy: New Approaches to an Old Problem. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Schreuers, M. (2004) EU Enlargement and the Environment: Institutional Change and Environmental Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Environmental Politics, 13(1) 27–51.

18 Cohesion Policy Ian Bache

18.1 Introduction In simple terms, EU cohesion policy aims to bridge social and economic disparities within Europe. Its main financial instruments, the structural funds, are aimed primarily at promoting the development of disadvantaged regions and localities in the context of market integration. EU cohesion policy now accounts for approximately one-third of the total EU budget. In terms of Europeanization, it is a much-studied policy sector in which the themes of “fit” and “misfit” have been prominent, particularly in relation to the governance requirements of cohesion policy and extant practices within member states. This chapter provides an overview of developments across member states and, in a more detailed study of Britain, explores subtle and long-term Europeanization effects in an unlikely member state. Cohesion policy was elevated in importance in the late 1980s in the context of the acceleration of the single market program and the assimilation of Greece, Portugal and Spain into the European Community (EC). In 1989, financial allocations to the structural funds were doubled and new governing principles for governing structural policy were introduced. Additionality required that funds be spent in addition to planned domestic spending: concentration focused funds on areas of greatest need; programming required regions to develop strategic multi-annual plans to ensure coherence between projects funded; and partnership required that funds be administered through regional partnerships within each state, consisting of representatives of national government, regional (or local) government and the European Commission. The partnership principle was of particular significance for academic debate. This principle gave subnational governments a formal role in the EC policy process for the first time. Up to this point, national governments had dominated both EC-level negotiations and the domestic process of implementation. In subsequent structural fund reforms (1993 and 1999) the Commission pushed 239

240

Policies

for and secured agreement to greater involvement of non-state actors (non-governmental organizations, trade unions, environmental groups etc.) within the regional partnerships, thus providing a stronger horizontal dimension to the established vertical interactions. The 1989 reform and its domestic effects have been the subject of much scholarly attention. Some of this attention has focused on the policy effects (for example, see Conzelmann’s 1998 and 2003 work on Britain and Germany), but the main debate has been on polity effects. More specifically, the 1989 reform prompted widespread academic and practitioner debate on the prospects for territorial and governance change in Europe and was central to the development of the multi-level governance concept (Marks 1992, 1993). In an early explication, Gary Marks (1993: 392) referred to multi-level governance as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers” and described how “supranational, national, regional, and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks” (Marks 1993: 402–3). Multi-level governance challenged state-centric accounts of the EU and focused more on the nature of the beast than on the process of integration. This debate focused on the empowerment of regional level and the challenges to national governments, often through the partnership principle (Anderson 1990; Bache 1999; Hooghe 1996a; Pollack 1997; Smith 1997; Smyrl 1997; Thielemann 1999; Tommel 1998). Such was the popularity of the notion of a “Europe of the Regions” that it was adopted as a slogan by some regions and even by the Commission for a short period under the presidency of Jacques Delors (John 2001: 73). The effects of the 1989 reform of the structural funds, and the partnership principle in particular, have remained central to debate on cohesion policy. This debate continues to focus on governance effects, but often more explicitly in relation to the concept of Europeanization (for example, Bache 2000; Bache and Marshall 2004; Benz and Eberlein 1999; Börzel 1999, 2001b; Burch and Gomez 2003 and 2006; Chapman 2006; Gualini 2003b; Marshall 2005 and 2006; Thielemann 2000). Moreover this research generally fits with the notion of Europeanization applied in this volume, defined broadly as the construction and diffusion of European institutions and policies at the national level, or, more narrowly, as domestic change caused by European integration (Chapter 1). The focus of Europeanization research on cohesion policy has been primarily on the “downloading” dimension, although there is a related literature on subnational mobilization that often links to the “uploading” phase of cohesion policy (John 1994, 2001; Hooghe 1995; McAleavey and Mitchell 1995; Benington and Harvey 1998; Bomberg and Peterson 1998; John and McAteer 1998; Jeffery 2000). Moreover, those scholars who place their empirical focus on the “downloading” impact of EU cohesion policy on the domestic arena

Ian Bache 241

generally view uploading as a related process that needs to be understood to explain the domestic effects. In the literature on Europeanization and cohesion policy, the concept of multi-level governance remains prominent. However, this concept has been clarified and refined in recent times, not least in response to findings on the study of cohesion policy. Hooghe and Marks (2003, 2004b) have distinguished between two types of multi-level governance. Type I multi-level governance resembles federalism. It sees the dispersion of authority as being restricted to a limited number of (non-overlapping) jurisdictional boundaries at a limited number of territorial levels. Here, jurisdictions are general-purpose, with those jurisdictions at the lower territorial levels “nested” into higher ones. In this typology, the distribution of authority is seen as relatively stable and the focus of analysis is on individual governments or institutions rather than on specific issues or policies. Type II multi-level governance presents a picture of governance that is more complex, more fluid and consisting of innumerable jurisdictions. These jurisdictions often overlap one another and tend to be flexible as governance demands change. They are focused around specific policy sectors and issues and devised to secure optimal policy-making efficiency. In this typology, the distribution of authority is less stable and the focus of analysis is more on specific issues and policy areas than on individual governments or institutions. This distinction provides the potential for a clearer understanding of the Europeanization effects, in particular by distinguishing between system-wide and sub-systemic specific effects, and it is used in the case study of Britain below to highlight the nature and significance of Europeanization effects.

18.2 Core research questions The core questions about the domestic effects of EU cohesion policy have related to territorial restructuring and changing patterns and modes of governance. That earlier studies focused on the former is quite understandable: in the first phase of structural policy post-1989, multi-level partnerships consisted almost exclusively of state actors – representatives of the Commission, national governments, regional and local governments. Only from 1993 (and again in 1999) did the horizontal dimension become more significant as a broader range of non-state actors were brought into the policy process on a formal basis. It is not surprising, therefore, that an early criticism of the multi-level governance concept was that it focused on relations between state actors and was thus more accurately described as multi-level government. Later studies tended to be more concerned with both the vertical and horizontal effects of cohesion policy. This section has three parts: the first looks at a number of studies of the domestic effects of cohesion policy in a number of member states; the second

242

Policies

looks in more detail at research on the case study of Britain; finally, the third considers recent research on the states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Territorial and governance change in the EU. Hooghe’s (1996a) study on the effects of cohesion policy on territorial restructuring considered two related questions: whether partnership had led to the convergence of diverse domestic territorial relations across member states; or whether existing territorial relations had been upheld. The study revealed significant differences in the effects of partnership in different member states. A key part of the explanation in the degree of “Europeanization” was the pre-existing balance of territorial relations within a member state. In other words, and in line with many studies on Europeanization, the mediating role of domestic institutions was crucial. In centralized member states where central governments actively sought to limit the territorial impact of the new arrangements, such as in Britain and Greece, they met with considerable success. There was sufficient scope within the EU requirements for strong central governments to dominate partnerships, where there was a will to do so. In these cases, subnational actors were mobilized, but not necessarily empowered. In more decentralized member states, subnational authorities – normally regional governments – were often better placed to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the partnership requirement, which also fed into pressures for regionalization in states such as Belgium and Spain (Marks 1996: 413). Ireland also experienced a symbiosis, but with a domestic shift to participatory modes of governance coinciding with the EU’s increasing emphasis on partnership and “bottom-up” regional development (see also the section on Britain below). In this changing context, subnational actors grasped the new participatory opportunities offered by EU programs. This interaction of domestic and EU-led developments promoted shifts towards a consensus over the importance of the role of local actors in development policy, leading Adshead (2002: 165–6) to argue that “in Ireland the European Union has had a significant impact upon the institutions and organization of development policy at both national and sub-national levels of government”. That Ireland was a centralized state influenced in the direction of greater local influence by the EU demonstrated that no easy assumptions could be made about the “fit” between the multi-level partnership principle and established territorial relations within member states. Germany provided another case counter to this assumption. Here, the misfit hypothesis would suggest that the existence of powerful regional governments (Länder) would lead to easy assimilation of the partnership principle and a further strengthening of the role of subnational actors. However, this was not the case, as “neither the federal nor the regional governments sought to reformulate the relationships they cultivated with one another” (Anderson 1996: 163). For some time, the Länder had

Ian Bache 243

played a key role in administering domestic regional policy and there was little evidence that the partnership principle had shifted patterns of interaction with the federal government. Thielemann (1999, 2000) later highlighted the absence of social and economic partners from Germany’s structural fund partnerships, which contravened EU guidelines. This was explained by the particular tradition of decentralization in Germany: Germany’s co-operative federalism (which views European regional policymaking predominantly as a matter for public authorities of Bund and Länder) sits somewhat uneasily with the Commission driven conceptualization of “partnership” which seeks to promote bottom-up dynamics and a substantial (and formal) role of subregional and semi-public actors in the regional policy process. (Thielemann 2000: 21) Smyrl’s (1997) assessment of regional empowerment through cohesion policy in Italy and France found variation within as well as across these states. In both states, some regions made gains in discretionary authority, while others did not. His explanation for this outcome again focused on domestic factors, but this time the argument was about regional rather than national dimensions. In particular, explanations for the degree of regional empowerment within states centered on the nature and extent of regional entrepreneurialism and the pre-existence of a territorial policy community for economic development. In “successful” regions, “political leaders gave public priority and invested administrative and political resources to European programs in the hope of reaping future political gain” (Smyrl 1997: 289). Where there were established economic development networks, these “took on a European dimension and made it possible for regional elites, to extract full benefit from the resources transferred from Brussels” (Smyrl 1997: 289). An EU-wide study funded by the European Commission highlighted continuing differences in the implementation of the partnership principle and its territorial effects, emphasizing the continued importance of the intervening role of many national governments: “Member States continue to dominate and delimit partnership functioning – through their roles in negotiating program content and selecting horizontal partners, and through their provision of secretariats and managing authorities” (Kelleher et al. 1999: vi). Yet the report also suggested that governments were increasingly realizing the benefits of partnership working in order to further their own agendas and were often encouraging the practice and broadening participation. The Commission was identified as an “important force” in promoting greater inclusion. Despite this, considerable variations in the inclusivity and effectiveness of partnerships across member states remained. The role of social partners was generally limited and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were often absent from partnerships.

244

Policies

In this study also, domestic factors were key to understanding the nature of partnerships within member states. Echoing the Hooghe study, the report restated the importance of domestic factors, suggesting that “the degree of decentralization and the type of de-concentration occurring in the different member states inevitably shapes the relations between key actors within partnerships and determines the competencies and composition of partnerships” (Kelleher et al. 1999: viii). Of particular importance were historically specific national institutional cultures, such as “de-centralism” in Austria, and specific historically contingent factors, such as the need to quickly formulate programs in Sweden on accession to the Union or the previous experience of the Integrated Mediterranean Programme in Italy (Kelleher et al. 1999: 18). Yet while the degree of Europeanization was limited by domestic variables, there were notable effects. The report found that where member states had little experience of partnership, the EC regulation had often “kick-started” partnership working; and, where member states had more experience of the principle, the EC regulation was seen to often reinvigorate their activities and promote innovation (Kelleher et al. 1999: viii). Later studies became more explicit in their focus on the governance effects of EU cohesion policy. In their study of France and Germany, Benz and Eberlein (1999: 15) spoke of how: Europeanization and regionalization favored the rise of new, innovative forms of level linkages and, more generally, a new mixture of modes of governance, which lies at the heart of the successful management of the EU territorial multi-level fabric. These modes of governance would vary according to national traditions and practices. This study highlighted Europeanization as a two-way process, which helps to explain more effectively the nature and degree of adaptation pressures for particular member states. Benz and Eberlein (1999: 17) noted how key principles of EU cohesion policy – partnership and programming – were “modeled” on regional development practices in France. As such, French actors found adaptation to the “EU model” much easier than domestic actors elsewhere. Generally, the Europeanization effects of cohesion policy remained uneven across member states. In relation to Spain, there was evidence of a strong central presence in the implementation process and varying degrees of subnational empowerment according to internal patterns of devolution, with “those regions on the fast track to devolution … generally more able to participate effectively in the policy-making process” (Bache and Jones 2000: 18). In her study of the Basque region, Bourne (2003) went further by suggesting not only that partnership had no significant empowering effect, but also that the process of European integration as a whole undermined Basque political power.

Ian Bache 245

Gualini’s (2003b: 633) study of implementation of the structural funds in Italy placed more emphasis on the constraints facing central government actors, in their relationships with both the Commission and subnational governments, which hindered its ability to play the gatekeeping role over the domestic effects. Territorial and governance change in Britain. Britain provides a good example of a relative “misfit” between EU requirements and the domestic arena, but one in which a subtle process of Europeanization has taken place over time. There is a broadly defined “misfit” between the nature of EU governance and that in Britain; in institutional terms, between the multi-layered and multi-actor EU system and the traditionally strong centralized British state; and, in political terms, between EU norms of cooperation and consensus-seeking politics and the adversarial style of politics in Britain. Yet, in recent years, the British system of governance has experienced significant change, which has accelerated its transformation towards a multi-level polity. Most obviously this is marked by political devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. There are, however, also less obvious changes at other territorial levels such as the English regions, municipal and even sub-local levels, and also in the horizontal dimension to governance, for example in the proliferation of partnership governance involving various mixes of public, private and voluntary sectors. That much of this transformation has occurred since the change of government in 1997 suggests strong domestic explanations for these developments. However, over a longer period, Europeanization has also been significant; particularly in relation to the emergence of English regional governance, the strategies and approaches of local authorities, and the spread of community-led decision making (Bache 2005). In relation to English regional governance, the 1989 requirements of reform of the structural funds, particularly in relation to regional programming and regional partnerships, provided the major push for activity at the English regional level during this period. Despite the steering role of central government, EU cohesion policy reinforced the standard regions as the “official” boundaries and created embryonic regional networks in England that provided something for the Labour government to build on from 1997. At the local level, the partnership principle had a particular impact on activities. Partnership was not a new concept in the UK when the 1989 reform of the structural funds came into effect. However, it was a different beast in UK regeneration policies, used primarily by the Conservative government to undermine local government and increase the role of the private sector. “Partnership” was often characterized by tension and conflict between center and locality and between local state and non-state actors, as local authorities reacted with hostility to this perceived threat to their role and autonomy. A major contribution

246

Policies

of the EU partnership requirement, which sought to empower local and regional authorities, was that over time it broke down barriers to inter-agency working for many in British local government, who came to see it as more of an opportunity than a threat. This encouraged new ways of working and the development of new networking skills. In this sense the EU has promoted a more consensual and cross-sectoral approach to politics and policy-making in these areas than was generally the case in the adversarial circumstances of the 1980s. Below the local level, EU programs have brought new actors into the policy process. Of particular importance has been the Community Economic Development (CED) approach, which funds “capacity-building” measures to facilitate “resident-led” approaches to development in the most deprived communities. CED’s “bottom-up” approach has been influential over domestic policies for community-based regeneration, such as the New Deal for Communities and the Single Regeneration Budget. Particularly influential was the “Pathways to Employment” experiment within the Merseyside 1994–99 Objective 1 structural fund program, which was identified by national government as a model of best practice and informed domestic programs aimed at addressing social exclusion (ECOTEC 2003: 19). However, while there is a distinct EU effect on governance developments in Britain, its overall effect on the British polity should not be exaggerated. The English regions remain weak within the British system and, in terms of Type 1 multi-level governance, the domestic devolution agenda is far more significant. This weakness was confirmed in November 2004 by the decisive vote (4–1) against elected regional government in the North East region – the region considered most likely to vote “yes”. The lack of popular support for regional government expressed in the North East led to the cancellation of other planned referendums in the North West and Yorkshire and Humberside. Beyond the regions, there is clear evidence that the EU has promoted Type II multi-level governance, leading to the proliferation of task-specific cross-sectoral bodies at regional, local and sub-local levels. This has intrinsic importance in signaling a shift in the nature of governance and a shifting style of politics towards consensualism. However, just as the English regional tier remains weak within the British system of governance, so does the role of localities and there is no suggestion that this situation has been significantly effected by the EU. Moreover, no significant political claims are made – at this stage at least – for the growing number of bottom-up programs in Britain (Bache 2005). Central and Eastern Europe. The 1999 reform of the structural funds signaled a general acceptance that the bulk of funding would have to be redirected towards the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe. From around this time, an increasing focus of the literature has been on these states. The Commission reaffirmed its commitment to the core principles of structural

Ian Bache 247

funding post-enlargement. This would present a number of challenges to states that had little or no experience with the EU’s model of regional development and, in particular, the concept of multi-level and cross-sectoral partnerships. In the period before the transition from communism, regional imbalances in the CEE states were dealt with by the central direction of investment. In the period immediately following transition, limited central resources and a reduced role of the state in the economy reduced the scope for regional measures. Moreover, emphasis on market economics implied that regional imbalances would be corrected through that mechanism. As these states began to look more seriously at the prospect of EU membership, regional policy measures began to develop alongside the institutional capacity necessary for effective regional policy making: a Europeanization effect in anticipation of membership. Bailey and De Propris (2002: 409) argued that over the period 1989–97, one explanation for the continuing lack of convergence across European regions was that some regions lacked the institutional capability to participate effectively in the policy-making and implementation process. Moreover, this failing would be replicated in the CEE states without sufficient capacity building. However, the development of institutional capability was generally slow and uneven across the accession states. To assist this process, a number of structural funding instruments were developed to provide financial aid over the period 2000–06. ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies Pre-Accession) provided funding for transport and environmental projects, SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agricultural and Rural Development) provided assistance for agriculture and rural development, while the PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Aid for Economic Restructuring) program aimed to strengthen economic and social cohesion and administrative and institutional capacity in the accession states. Bailey and De Propris (2002) considered the extent to which these instruments had brought about institutional change and, specifically, accelerated a shift to multi-level governance in the accession states. They noted that the Commission had been the “dominant player” in the use of these funds, “dictating the terms of institutional changes required, the size of territorial units (NUTS II), the institutional capabilities needed and so on to candidates countries’ national governments which are eager to comply with the new rules of the game” (Bailey and De Propris 2002: 319–20). As such, this raised the prospects for multi-level governance. However, their empirical study of five accession states suggested that national government “gatekeepers” remained “firmly in control” of domestic subnational actors, who were able to participate in, but not significantly influence, the policy process. Here, it was important to distinguish between the development of institutional capacity, such as offices, staff and buildings, and institutional capability, such as the ability of institutions

248

Policies

to carry out the functions assigned to them. The latter was slow to develop during the accession process, but would be crucial to the effective participation of these regions in the EU in the longer term. Research on compliance with the conditions for membership or “conditionality” in the process of eastward enlargement suggested that, in practice, the EU’s requirements of accession states in relation to cohesion policy were both ambiguous and limited in their effects, leading to diverse territorial and governance effects. Their findings reflect the importance of national actors and circumstances and the relative weakness of EU actors to enforce change identified in studies of existing member states (above): Given that regional policy is a competence under EU law where the national governments have a great deal of power to decide the institutional framework and means of implementation, the Commission lacked a repertoire of legal instruments to force a particular institutional model on the candidates. (Hughes et al. 2004a: 547) Significantly, this research does not suggest that the Commission sought to impose a uniform institutional model on the CEECs. Rather, there was tension within the Commission over the degree to which management of the funds within the accession states should be centralized or regionalized. As such, “the asymmetrical form of regionalization in the CEECs is, in fact, a convergence with the diversity of regional government in the Member States, and reflects the different preferences inside the Commission” (Hughes et al. 2004: 547).

18.3 Key problems As stated at the outset, EU cohesion policy has been the subject of much scholarly attention. It has also been at the leading edge of conceptual development in European Studies, not least through contributions on multi-level governance and Europeanization. Moreover, in line with research in other areas of European Studies, there has been an increasing refinement of concepts and sophistication in analysis. Most obviously, in a relatively stable policy framework, the importance of learning has become more prominent and there has been a move away from focusing on zero-sum power struggles towards new governance dynamics. As with other areas of Europeanization research, domestic variables are important in mediating EU effects. Yet there is no easy reading of the effect of intervening domestic institutional arrangements on the Europeanization effects of EU cohesion policy. The domestic complexities include: the nature of formal governing arrangements and administrative traditions; the dominant political style (e.g. adversarial vs consensual); the political complexion of governing elites (e.g. their EU orientation); and the domestic sensitivities of particular EU policies and issues.

Ian Bache 249

Moreover, there is no easy separation between the EU effects and domestic effects in many areas of cohesion policy. In some states, principles of partnership and programming were relatively new, and the Europeanization effects clearer to trace. In others, these practices were established and convergent with EU policies, which complicates the issue of whether any effects could therefore be understood as Europeanization. Yet in other cases, there were established practices of partnership, but of a different nature and purpose from those advanced by the EU. Here, the difficulty of sorting the Europeanization effects from the domestic effects becomes more complicated. In relation to the argument that Europeanization promotes multi-level governance specifically, or new modes of governance less specifically, there is a challenge not only in separating out the domestic effects, but also the effects of globalization. The relationship between globalization and new forms of governance is often assumed rather than explained. While research on Europeanization has sought to trace its relationship with new forms of governance closely, we are still unclear about how and to what extent globalization has a direct effect on governance change; and, equally important, how globalization indirectly influences domestic and EU-induced governance changes. These observations are not particularly specific to research on EU cohesion policy alone, but also relate to Europeanization research more generally. Setting these to one side for now, there are specific issues that arise out of research on cohesion policy that await further investigation. The first of these is that in the debates on cohesion policy and multi-level governance, the focus on regions and regional empowerment has obscured the importance of effects at levels of governance below the region. Below the regional level, new structures have emerged, new actors have been engaged and new patterns of activity have developed. In Britain at least, there is evidence of marked effects on the development strategies of local government and in their approach to cross-sectoral collaboration more generally. Further down the territorial scale, EU cohesion policy has been particularly innovative in developing community-led approaches to decision-making. The effects and significance of this are relatively under-researched (although see Tofarides 2003 on the effects of EU urban policy). The second issue relating to Europeanization and cohesion policy is that much of what has been studied in terms of governance effects has related to the direct effect of EU requirements. There has been less research on the indirect consequences of EU cohesion policy on governance arrangements for domestic programs. Yet there is sufficient convergence in governance arrangements for domestic and EU policies to suggest the need for further investigation into the processes of lesson-drawing and policy transfer. The third issue applies to new forms of governance generally, but has particular relevance to cohesion policy because of its centrality to the development of

250

Policies

partnership arrangements and multi-level governance in the EU context. This is the question of accountability. Multi-level governance has increasingly been used in normative terms to promote particular arrangements to secure efficient and effective decision making. Yet there is a danger that such arrangements reduce transparency and obscure accountability. There is a perceived trade-off, in which gains in efficient decision making are traded for democratic accountability: something that Peters and Pierre (2004) have described as a “Faustian bargain”.

18.4 Conclusion Studies of EU cohesion policy on territorial restructuring and governance change have revealed different effects both across and within member states. There has been a consensus, as in the case of Europeanization studies more generally, around the importance of domestic variables – in this instance, on the importance of pre-existing vertical and horizontal governance arrangements. There has been a broadly perceived misfit between the multi-level requirements of EU cohesion policy and centralized states, and also between the cross-sectoral and consensual aspects and states that lack this tradition. In cases such as Britain, there is a misfit on both counts. Despite this, there is also broad acknowledgement that EU cohesion has had effects on territorial restructuring and governance change in a wide range of circumstances, although the pattern is highly uneven. Börzel (1999: 593) has suggested that “Europeanization appears to promote more co-operative forms of intergovernmental relations” and there is some evidence here that this pattern is emerging. However, as she also suggested, we are unlikely to see a general pattern of convergence across Europe in the pattern of intergovernmental relations. Moreover, the effects of Europeanization and explanations for these effects have changed over time. For example, recent studies of CEECs suggested no clear signal from the Commission about the organization of structural funds delivery in the domestic arena, which is part of the explanation for uneven regionalization in these states. This contrasts with the post-1989 situation, in which member states were given clear signals that regional administrative partnership structures were to be developed as a precondition of funding. Even in centralized states with no tradition of regional government, regional structures were established. These may have been of different size and population coverage, but there was a clear attempt by the Commission to ensure structural fund administration was not monopolized by central governments. Of course, some of the responses to EU requirements post-1989 were superficial: regional administrative partnership structures would be established by national governments, which would then often dominate them. As suggested by studies of the

Ian Bache 251

CEEC, the Commission had a relatively weak legal position in seeking to enforce more effective compliance. Structural fund regulations are often deliberately vague in order to ensure agreement between governments with very different needs and objectives. Hence, it took a number of reforms before the partnership principle began to stipulate with any detail the types of actors who should be involved in the process. Yet what is interesting over this period is the extent to which there appears to have been a diminution of resistance to the multi-level governance dimension to EU cohesion policy. Again, this effect is not even across states and it would appear to be a distant prospect in many of the 2004 entrants. Yet even in centralized states such as Britain there has been a change over time. Part of this can be attributed to the election of a Labour government in 1997, less opposed to the EU, regional intervention, and partnership than its predecessor. However, there is also evidence of a process of learning taking place in this context, signaled by the incorporation of EU practices into those for domestic policies (ECOTEC 2003; Marshall 2006). EU cohesion policy has not promoted a particularly prescriptive form of governance, but in general terms it has promoted moves towards multi-actor cooperation and consensualism. The EU’s approach has chimed with the emergent needs for pragmatism and flexibility in response to new policy challenges more generally and has accelerated change in this direction in a number of member states. In this reading, state actors redefine their strategies in a changing context and seek to become mediators or partners in policy making, seeking to steer rather than control processes. Börzel (2001b: 139) suggested that “Europeanization does not strengthen or weaken but transforms the state by fostering the emergence of cooperation between the actors at different levels of government”. Gualini’s (2003b: 619) research on Italy suggested that it may be appropriate to “talk of a domestication of multi-level governance as part of strategies of state restructuring” in which “state actors address a strategic alternative to zero-sum power struggles, directed towards building new frames for intergovernmental consensus”. There would appear to be much value in this argument. Over time, Europeanization studies on cohesion policy have shifted away from concerns with power shifts between subnational, national and supranational actors towards a focus on new governance, new dynamics and new behavior in a less predictable governing context. However, in this changing context, there remains a particular focus on what Vink (2003: 72) identified as “the larger question that has been at the basis of classic integration theories”: that is, transformation of the nation-state. In sum, EU cohesion policy continues to enjoy a central place in the debate about the territorial and governance effects of the EU on its member (and accession) states. It has generally focused on regional empowerment, but there is evidence that the emerging forms of multi-level governance that are evident are

252

Policies

often less orderly than the “triadic dynamic” (between, regions, governments and the EU) typically portrayed (see John 2001) and at least in some cases (e.g. Britain) are closer to the Type 2 multi-level governance identified by Hooghe and Marks (2004b). How widespread this pattern is requires further research. Moreover, there has been a shift in research emphasis on the process of learning in the context of EU cohesion policy and on the transformation of the role of the state and other actors in the context of governance, rather than on zero-sum power struggles. There is clearly scope for more research on the governance effects of EU cohesion policy below the region and on domestic policy-making arrangements. Research on cohesion policy processes and democracy has begun (Olsson 2003), and along with research on new forms of governance and democracy more generally, is set to remain a major part of the research agenda for years to come. Finally, there has been much consideration of effects of cohesion policy on governance in the domestic arena, but there is a need to understand how these effects then feed back into the EU processes and European integration more broadly: the relationship of “mutual structuration” as Kohler-Koch (2005: 3) has described it.

Key readings Bache, I. and R. Jones (2000) Empowering the Regions? The Political Impact of EC Regional Policy in Britain and Spain. Regional and Federal Studies, 10(2) 1–20. Benz, A. and T. Eberlein (1999) The Europeanization of Regional Policies: Patterns of Multi-level Governance. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(2) 329–48. Conzelmann, T. (1998) “Europeanization” of Regional Development Policies? Linking the Multi-level Governance Approach with Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change. European Integration online Papers, 2(4). Gualini, E. (2003) Challenges to Multi-level Governance: Contradictions and Conflicts in the Europeanization of Italian Regional Policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(4) 616–36. Hooghe, L. (1996) Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

19 Social Policy Gerda Falkner

19.1 Introduction Since EU social policy was of “second order importance” during the early decades of European integration, the academic debate revolved more around the shift of policy making to the European level, rather than being focused at the domestic adaptation to European integration. For a long time, the predominant issue of scholarly concern was how scarce EC competence initially was in the social field and, in addition, what should – or should not – be tackled at a level above that of the nation-state. More, or often rather less, analytical descriptions of what the EU actually did in the social realm hence dominate the relevant academic writing, at least on a quantitative level. Europeanization in the more narrow sense of top-down impact on the member states has been studied much less intensely, the practical reason without any doubt being that there are methodological and practical hurdles to be overcome. Section 19.2 of this chapter will outline the incremental development of EU social policy over time, for some basic historical and legal knowledge is indispensable for understanding why the Europeanization debate (in the more narrow sense) is a relative latecomer here. It will also discuss the hitherto central research questions in the field of the Europeanization of social policy, which involve the distribution and use of social policy competences across the multi-level system. As section 19.3 will outline in detail, other potential core issues have been quite neglected in the literature so far. This concerns, in particular, the quality of the EU’s social policy output in terms of the degree of improvement compared to pre-existing domestic or international standards, and also the practical effects on national social policies. Section 19.4 will evaluate the hurdles that need to be overcome to accomplish such research. 253

254

Policies

19.2 Core research questions The core questions of the scholarly debate on Europeanization in the social realm are closely connected to the very specific character of EU social policy itself. Therefore, this section combines both the main lines of history and the main topics and insights of scholarly analysis in our field. Social policy is a market-correcting activity outside of the EU’s original core aims, which entail economic market-making activity. The dominant philosophy of the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) was that welfare would be provided by the economic growth stemming from the economics of a liberalized market. Welfare was not foreseen to arise from the regulatory and (re-)distributive capacity of a public policy at the European level and therefore, social policy was at best of “second order importance”. However, the Treaty contained a small number of concessions for the more “interventionist” delegations, the two main ones being the provisions on equal pay and the establishment of a “European Social Fund” (ESF). The other provisions of the EEC Treaty’s title on “social policy” are evidence of the will to include some social policy provisions, but without empowering the EEC to act. This conflict has never been fully resolved. There are still different schools of thought on EU-level social policy, as most clearly expressed by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), on the one hand, and the employer’s EU-level representation (UNICE), on the other. This legal situation accounts for a number of specificities of social policy among all EU policies. For a long time the EEC (and later the EC) possessed no explicit competence provision empowering the Commission to draft legislative proposals for later adoption by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. It was due to the existence of so-called “subsidiary competence provisions” that intervention in the social policy field was – implicitly – made possible. But it was only permissible if it was considered functional for market integration (most importantly, Article 100 EEC Treaty and Article 235 EEC Treaty). It is crucial to note that from the 1970s onwards these provisions provided a loophole for social policy harmonization at the EU level. The necessary unanimity, however, constituted high thresholds for joint action: action by the Council of Ministers needed unanimous approval. During the early years of European integration, social policy consisted almost exclusively of efforts to facilitate the free movement of workers. In a number of EEC regulations, national social security systems were coordinated with a view to improving the status of internationally mobile workers and their families. During the late 1960s, however, the political climate gradually became more favorable to a wider range of European social policy measures. At their 1972 Paris summit, the Community Heads of State and Government declared that

Gerda Falkner

255

economic expansion should not be an end in itself but should lead to improvements in more general living and working conditions. They agreed a catalogue of social policy measures – the social action program (OJ 1974 C13/1) – that were to be elaborated on by the Commission. This was confirmation that governments now perceived social policy intervention as an integral part of European integration. Several of the legislative measures proposed in the 1974 Social Action Program were adopted by the Council in the years that ensued, and further Social Action Programs followed the first one. From 1974 on, the development of EU social policy was rather impressive – at least, from a purely quantitative perspective (for references on general history and details of EU social law see, for example, Rhodes 1991; Barnard 1999; Shaw 2000; Geyer 2000; Falkner 2003b). Despite the meager Treaty basis, a large number of Directives and other, less binding measures have been adopted (by 31 December 2003, 85 Council decisions on social policy Directives had been taken). Furthermore, the Treaty provisions have been adapted with the Single European Act (1986) that introduced qualified majority voting for issues related to worker health and safety; the Maastricht Treaty (1992) where the then 12 member states agreed far-reaching additional competences and procedural reforms, with a passing exception for the UK; the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) that ended the UK opt-out and inserted an employment coordination chapter into the EC Treaty; and finally the Nice Treaty (2001), although this document only contained very minor reforms in the social realm, such as unanimous decisions that qualified majority suffices thereafter. After this brief sketch of empirical developments, let us now consider the scholarly analyses of the distribution of social policy competences in the European multi-level system. As outlined in the introduction, this aspect has triggered by far the largest amount of research in the field of Europeanization. Ever since the birth of European integration, lawyers have studied the few relevant provisions of the EEC founding treaty and the further developments in Treaty reforms. Political scientists have also discussed the initial lack of an active EU social policy project and the unanimity requirements (see exemplary references above). Much of this writing was rather descriptive, but finally Scharpf’s “joint-decision trap”, though developed in reference to the EU’s agricultural policy, became a seminal concept for a more analytical literature (Scharpf 1985, 1988). The focus of this was on the institutional dynamics of EU social policy and on its main dynamics that, according to different authors, were dominated either by the governments or by supranational actors such as the Commission. Scharpf (1988: 242) ascribed to systems of cooperative federalism, such as the German and the EC’s political systems, what he called “the paradox of European integration – frustration without disintegration and resilience without progress”. Where the constituent governments’ consent is needed for federal legislation, and decisions have to be unanimous or nearly

256

Policies

unanimous, a “pathology of interlocking politics” (ibid.: 254) results. There is a system of interlocking of competences, instead of a division of competences, and the institutional self-interests of the lower level governments to preserve their sovereignty are not filtered by a representation principle. Scharpf (ibid.: 267) expected the political priority of substantive compromises over institutional reform and the institutional self-interest of the member governments in the preservation of their veto position as a result from such systems. When looking at the field of EU social policy, Scharpf’s analysis was accurate at the time of the famous article’s publication and remainded so beyond this. With good reasons, then, nearly all scholars were concerned that more social policy capacity might be lost on the national level than would be re-established at the European level, and that a kind of “social dumping” process with competitive devaluation of national standards might result. First arguments revealing a somewhat more lively character of EU social policy were presented in an edited book by Leibfried and Pierson (1995a). For the first time, this volume provided a broad overview on the topic of EU social policy, its development and even to some extent its relationship with national policy (for a more recent overview volume, see Shaw 2000). It investigated the dynamics of social policy integration by examining, and comparing, the evolution of EU social policy in several areas. In overall terms, what Leibfried and Pierson (1995b: 4) saw emerging was a “system of shared political authority over social policy”. In this system, the power of the member states was not only pooled, but also, to an increasing extent, constrained (ibid.: 7). Multi-tiered systems, they argued along the lines of Scharpf, exhibit distinctive features, including a prominent role for their constituent units, dilemmas resulting from shared policy-making authority, and transformations in the strategies and influence of social actors (ibid.: 5). “What is emerging is a multileveled, highly fragmented system in which policy ‘develops’ but is beyond the firm control of any single political autonomy” (Pierson and Leibfried 1995a: 433). They highlighted that the EU institutions were not simply tools of the member states, but that member state power was actually restrained by the autonomous activity of EU organizations and, in addition, by three further limitations: the impact of previous policy commitments at the EU level; the growth of issue density; and the activity of non-state actors. Their book also showed that, at least in some fields, EU social policy initiatives had surpassed the lowest common denominator of member state preferences (Pierson and Leibfried 1995a: 458). Their analysis highlighted aspects in support of this as much as later work by other authors. In fact, the prime empirical example of a lock-in situation due to previous policy commitments at the EU level occurred after the 1986 Single European Act introduced, in the social provisions chapter, a provision selectively allowing for qualified majority voting, Article118a on minimum harmonization concerning the health and safety of workers. This case in point for the

Gerda Falkner

257

arguments forwarded by Pierson and Leibfried provided an escape route out of the unanimity requirement since reluctant member states could for the first time be forced to align their social legislation with the majority of member states, even against their will. An extensive use of this provision was possible mainly because the wording and the definition of key terms in Article 118a were somewhat vague, which made it easy to play what has since been called the “treaty base game” (Rhodes 1995). It allowed the governments to adopt not only measures improving the working environment (for example, a directive on the maximum concentration of air-borne pollutants), but also measures which ensured the health and safety of workers by improving working conditions in a more general sense (for example, on limiting working time). It was clear that the reason why this Treaty basis, once in force, was frequently chosen as a legal basis for Directives was the fact that this was the only Article allowed for majority voting at the time. In short, a large part of the social policy Directives adopted by the EC during the 1990s and beyond were only possible because the unanimity requirement could be circumvented in this “escape from deadlock” (Héritier 1999). If there was more EU social policy than had during the 1980s been expected by most observers, this is a crucial explanatory factor. (That the quantitative development needs further qualitative evaluation will be discussed in section 19.3.) The activity of non-state actors is a second crucial dimension where the social policy development of the EU transcends intergovernmental dynamics, as predicted by Leibfried and Pierson. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that writings on the involvement of interest groups in EU social policy-making are another main strand in the relevant academic literature. Academic debates focused on the question if a kind of corporatism on the EU-level was feasible or not. The most famous treatise on the issue of “EU and corporatism” was co-authored by Schmitter and Streeck (1992). Under the telling title “From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism” they analyzed why the EU falls short of centralized labor–industry–state relations that would, as in some historical national systems, govern economic policy decisions in the wider sense in a cross-policy manner. However, Schmitter himself explicitly recognized later the “possible development of ‘islands’ of Euro-corporatism in specific sectors or around distinctive territorial arrangements such as the Euro-regios” (Traxler and Schmitter 1995: 201). Indeed, it has been suggested that research should conceptualize the EU as a plurality of sector-specific constellations rather than as a single unitary and “pluralist” macro-system of Euro-politics (Cawson 1992; Greenwood et al. 1992: 239, 248). A consideration of the developments during the 1990s underlines the importance of this argument. The Commission has successfully promoted what may be called corporatist patterns on the policy-specific level (Gorges 1996; Keller and Platzer 2003), or a “4th generation corporatism” in the form of a

258

Policies

corporatist policy community in EU social policy (on generations of corporatism, see Falkner 1998). EC social policy making is nowadays characterized by the coexistence and entanglement of governmental negotiations and collective bargaining. In fact, the EC Treaty provisions on social affairs drafted under the leadership of Commission President Jacques Delors and his team, and adopted at Maastricht in December 1991 (which are still in place, and would be even under the 2004 Draft Constitution), give primacy to agreements between management and labor over traditional Council Directives. Whereas agreement was not possible on all topics, a number of cross-sectoral collective agreements have resulted from this tripartite pattern, such as on parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term work. To sum up the scholarly debate on presumptive “Euro-corporatism”, there has for a long time been unanimous agreement that there is no macrocorporatism on the EU level. Evidence has been presented meanwhile that the meso-level of policy-making in specific policy areas, most importantly, EU social policy, may look different. This indicates that the EU is not a totally different political “animal”, but that crucial dynamics are similar to those operating at the national level. At the same time, it needs to be underlined that the political significance of corporatist cooperation between public and private actors has crucially less political leverage if it happens on a meso-level only. While this debate once again focuses on the EU-level developments (the bottom-up side of Europeanization in a broad sense), it needs to be mentioned at this point that explicit studies of Europeanization in the member states are yet again rare (among the exceptions are Schmidt 2005; Falkner and Leiber 2004; Falkner 2000). This means that we still know too little about the effects of EU-level public–private interaction on the domestic patterns of interest intermediation. A recent study has at least made clear two aspects (Falkner et al. 2005a). First, cooperative patterns of public–private interaction in the European multi-level system offer no easy way of improving compliance with EU law. Contrary to the expectations of classic implementation theory, it can be argued that the participation of representatives from societal target groups in law-making does not systematically lead to rules that are easier to implement. Rather, the EU-level social partners may fail to agree upon clear standards, leaving member states with ambiguous provisions that are therefore prone to interpretation problems. Likewise, when it comes to national implementation of social policy Directives, the co-actorship of domestic social partners in the transposition is no guarantee for good compliance. Rather, it may at times foster deficient interpretations of EU law as well as delays in implementation. Second, national corporatism is not left untouched by the direct or indirect consequences of EU social policy. In fact, the EU not only offers some “soft” incentives towards increasing social partner involvement, but at times also interferes with the tradition of

Gerda Falkner

259

autonomous social partnership in some member states. In the long run, this may lead to more moderate diversity in national public–private interaction patterns. In any case, more analyses of top-down Europeanization are needed (see also the discussion in section 19.3). To sum up, academic analyses have pointed out that not only has EU social policy developed beyond what was expected two decades ago, but also that there is no doubt that it has transcended the purely intergovernmental realm both in terms of decision-making procedures in the Council of Ministers, and of social partner participation. While these are interesting findings, Section 19.3 will outline that their practical significance still seems unclear and under-researched.

19.3 Key problems While we do have sufficiently detailed knowledge about the legal competence distribution and rather well-developed knowledge about the political dynamics in EU-level social policy making, the same cannot be said about the top-down direction of Europeanization. We need more insights concerning the practical significance of the EU’s social policy output if compared to earlier standards in the various member states, and on its practical effects on national social policies. The Europeanization of national social policy includes two crucial aspects: direct effects ensuing from the implementation of EU social policies, and indirect effects ensuing from non-extant EU measures and effects of various marketmaking policies on social issues. Neither of them has been studied to a sufficient extent. For sure, there are a number of in-depth analyses on the first aspect, which are mostly “small-N” in character (see citations below). However, the lack of comparable studies on further cases or in other countries impinges on the potentials for generalizing their results. An exception is an early cross-sectoral implementation study with a qualitative approach that included a few of the EU’s social provisions, i.e. on improving driver safety by using a tachograph (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988) and revealed major implementation problems in ten countries. Gender equality has been dealt with in some detail, but the covereage is still, quite eclectic in terms of Directives and countries actually studied. The Equal Pay Directive’s implementation has been studied in France, Italy and Germany by Duina (1999), who also included the Air Pollution Prevention Directive in his comparative study. In none of these three cases has implementation functioned properly both at the transposition and the application level. Comparing two countries with a view to the Europeanization of gender equality policy, Caporaso and Jupille found that “Europeanization has resulted in greater change – in legislation, in individual rights, and in the domestic institutional

260

Policies

balance – in the United Kingdom than in France” (Caporaso and Jupille 2001: 42). Hoskyns (1996), Mazey (1998) and Warner (1984) also gave rather critical accounts of the success of implementation in the field of gender equality on the basis of small-scale, but insightful studies. Few in-depth studies exist yet of the domestic Europeanization process in the field of the much-debated open method of coordination (OMC). The work that has been conducted focuses predominantly on its genesis and on the procedures of adaptation on the national level (e.g. De la Porte and Pochet 2002) rather than on the definitive outcomes on the level of domestic policies. Even after recent path-breaking international cooperative studies such as by the GOVECOR project on the related sphere of economic coordination (Maurer et al. 2003) and the Zeitlin/Pochet study (2005) of the European employment and social inclusion strategies, there is the fundamental challenge of determining what is indeed an effect of EU-level policy and what is independent domestic reform without causal connection to the OMC. In other words, it is still difficult to estimate the definitive “net effect” of the recently so much debated new strategy that does without binding imposition on the member states (Pochet and De la Porte 2004: 75; Ferrera and Sacchi 2005: 167; Jacobsson 2005: 119; Zeitlin 2005: 449). In particular, more impact assessments are desirable with quantifiable findings that can be directly compared across cases and countries. In any case, the most up-to-date and elaborate findings on policy outcomes at the national level indicate that the impact of the OMC may actually have been overestimated (Zeitlin and Pochet 2005; Ferrera and Sacchi 2005; Visser 2005). A relatively comprehensive study on domestic adaptation exists in the area of labor law (Falkner et al. 2005a), which is indeed the main field of active EU social policy regulation. This volumes analyzed the national transposition, enforcement, and application of six EU labor law Directives (on written information on contractual employment conditions; parental leave; working time; and the protection of pregnant, young and part-time workers) in all 15 “old” member states. More than 180 expert interviews with experts from the ministries, interest groups and labor inspectorates in the 15 member states indicated, in overall terms, that EU social policy has a clearly visible effect. The degree of misfit between earlier national rules and the EU minimum standards was considered high in 10 cases, medium-scale in 33 cases, and low in 46 cases. In all 90 cases, only one instance occurred in which a country had to enact no changes whatsoever. But the need for adaptation alone does not account for top-down Europeanization, in practical terms. Which causal factors, then, do trigger (non-) implementation in the member states? The results of the above-mentioned study highlight that neither the amount of “misfit” or mis-match to be overcome (see e.g. Knill and Lenschow 2000a; Héritier et al. 1994, 2001;

Gerda Falkner

261

Cowles et al. 2001) nor any minimalist or maximalist logic across all cases determines the outcome. In the majority of countries (eight out of 15), domestic politics typically plays an important role at the transposition stage. At the same time, some EU member states displayed quite a regular pattern of compliance or non-compliance, regardless of how the specific provisions actually fitted with the relevant national policy legacy and governmental ideology. Therefore, the best point of reference available for predicting the fate of any forthcoming case of social policy implementation seems, in fact, the specific national culture of digesting adaptation requirements. One can discern three ideal-typical patterns of how member states handle the duty of complying with EU law in three different “worlds of compliance” within the EU15: a world of law observance, a world of domestic politics, and a world of neglect (for details, see Falkner et al. 2005a). In overall terms, this study reveals manifold hurdles for social policy Europeanization in the member states. Implementing EU social law is neither mechanical nor automatic, nor efficient. It is slow, as only approximately 11 per cent of the cases were transposed correctly and on time; painstaking, with a large number of infringement proceedings needed to reach reasonable levels of compliance; and incremental, with frequently many steps that are needed before a Directive is fully implemented. While the diversity of domestic labor law regulations is now less than it would have been without the Directives, there is doubtlessly an implementation deficit to be tackled if the even further enlarged Union should have joint minimum standards that are more than “dead letter”. The second aspect of Europeanization in the social realm, that is indirect effects ensuing from non-extant EU measures and from effects of various market-making policies on social issues, has been another step-child of the Europeanization agenda. At the same time, it is undisputed that these effects are no less crucial than direct ones, for the completion of the internal market created competitive pressures that constrain member states in social policy as much as in taxation and in other “market-correcting” policy choices. These constraints may not only reduce the problem-solving effectiveness of national polities in the absence of supranational substitution, but they can also affect their institutional legitimacy by preventing the adoption of policies responding to the manifest demands of national electorates (Scharpf 2000a). There may hence be significant costs from non-social Europe, as some authors have highlighted (e.g. Begg et al. 2004). Additionally, it has been highlighted that the indirect pressures created by European economic and monetary union in the social sphere are anything but insignificant (Pochet and Vanhercke 1998). In their outstanding empirical study of work and welfare in the open economy with a focus on internationalization effects in a broad sense, Scharpf and Schmidt (2000b) conclude that states can actually do more to protect their

262

Policies

social systems than had often been feared. The country studies indicate that it is indeed possible to maintain very different levels of welfare state in an open economy. The undeniably tight economic constraints, however, demand under the condition of open markets that competitiveness is upheld. For the authors this implies that redistribution must be achieved through public expenditures rather than through the regulation of employment relations, and that the costs of the welfare state have to be collected from the non-capital incomes and the consumption expenditures of the non-mobile population. (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000b: 335–6; see also Scharpf 2000b) If the extent of redistribution and the overall size of the welfare state remain a matter of political choice, then, it is only within these considerable constraints. Nonetheless, the previously entrenched political debates over lacking competences and scarce activities in EU social policy have meanwhile cooled down. Some authors indeed follow the reasoning of the OECD and conclude that “there is little evidence of a race to the bottom actually occurring in the EU” (Barnard 2000: 63), hence that the notion of social dumping is more a part of debate than of practice. It is true that if we connect the finding of persisting action capacity at least to some extent, or more than sometimes expected, to the other finding of the Europeanization literature that the EU itself has become somewhat more active than expected in re-regulated labor law standards, the glass of EU social policy may be seen to be at least “half full” (Ross 1994). And, whatever the real effect of European integration and the true extent of social Europeanization in the member states may be in overall terms, it must be mentioned that worldwide economic liberalization has meanwhile made the EU, with its limited but visible success in social policy, look more like a potential solution to the problems of wider globalization than like the trigger of social dumping in Europe as was discussed in the late 1980s. After all, the EU is to date the relatively best example among contemporary political systems of combining liberalization and social standards. Nevertheless, more in-depth research is still needed to assess if this is indeed enough to safeguard a “social” market economy, in the longer run.

19.4 Conclusion Over several decades, incremental social regulation has led to the development of an EU social policy, mainly based on minimum standards regulating employment conditions, the European social fund, and more recently “open coordination”, that touches on nearly every aspect of the domestic social and labor law systems. As outlined above, this came as a surprise to the large majority of social

Gerda Falkner

263

scientists and led to a re-evaluation of pro-integrative pressures that may (at times and gradually) allow for an exit from the joint-decision trap. These institutional dynamics have been unveiled in the academic literature on social policy Europeanization (in the wider sense) and the output of EU social policy making has been described in great detail and often enough. At the same time, we still know too little about the empirical top-down dimension of Europeanization in the social sphere – that is, about the direct and indirect effects EU action or inaction really has on domestic social policy. This has at least three reasons: lack of funding for large empirical projects, the danger of coordination deficits in transnational research cooperation, and methodological difficulties. Unluckily, the social sciences often lack the kind of resources to conduct the intensive and comprehensive studies that would be needed for comparison and for overall conclusions about social policy Europeanization. If those needs, most importantly in terms of personnel, but also in terms of travel budgets, were accepted by politicians, the frequent portrait of “hard” sciences needing (and deserving) a lot of money and social sciences being comparatively cheap might crumble at least to some extent. Good social science also has a price … However, projects need more than funding alone. Particularly in circumstances where researchers do not form a coherent team but are loosely spread across the continent and beyond, realizing the tight coordination needed for coherent results in empirical research is a huge challenge. Project coordinators often cannot overcome the centrifugal forces originating from the individual interests of the large number of nominal associate researchers that are, however, densely integrated in their home institutions and are typically simultaneously involved in other projects and tasks. Hence, many interesting hypotheses stemming from one country study can never be tested against truly comparable cases, for partner teams in other countries often research their specific questions in only loosely related fields. However, findings from one particular country or case simply cannot easily be generalized across the EU. This problem makes much of our Europeanization research somewhat less valuable both in academic and in political terms than it could be in a less individualistic and/or less loosely coordinated research environment. Lastly, it must be mentioned that in the social field there are great methodological difficulties in differentiating EU-induced adaptations from autonomous national reforms. This concerns at least two issues – establishing the adaptation that actually occurs in practice at the domestic level, and attributing causal factors that may have triggered that development. Consider the field of implementation research. Describing an EU Directive, for example, is a relatively easy task in academic research. Establishing the size of the adaptation requirements triggered in the member states, however, requires empirical data on the previous domestic social

264

Policies

standards in the field. Only with such data can we see the “misfit”, or the departure that the EU standards actually represent with regard to the previous domestic situation. Finding out if a member state has indeed taken on board all of the adaptation requirements entailed by a specific social Directive in a correct manner makes even more tedious and expensive research on the spot indispensable. Such questions are already difficult to answer for any individual country, but then we need cross-national comparison for a valid judgment of the overall Europeanization process (which brings us back to financial and coordination problems). This problem of all top-down-oriented Europeanization research trying to establish if the observed effect would also be present if the EU did not exist is particularly salient in this policy domain. After all, we witness a time where national politicians mostly rely on neoliberal concepts that recommend more of the same policy activities than EU-induced competitive pressures may suggest. In addition, changed demographic and economic circumstances make it difficult to distinguish where appropriate adaptations take place, and where member states in truth try to undercut social costs for enterprises elsewhere. However, abstract discussions of what the practical impact of EU social policy at the domestic level could possibly be, as well as descriptions of existing national social policy outcomes as presumed effects of EU (in-)action, fall short of being viable Europeanization research, if they do not meet the challenge of evaluating counterfactuals. They both need contrasting with the situation of what would have happened without EU intervention. Concrete empirical studies of the practical impact of EU social policy in the member states, which must isolate the impact of European activity from other causal factors as part of their research design, in turn, need extensive time and financial resources. This is one reason why that kind of on-the-spot empirical research has only been ventured by a few scholars. Maybe a further reason is in the field of the academic publication economy, for abstract discussions of average quality or sheer descriptions of EU policy can be produced with much less effort than fresh research following an elaborate design. A further outstanding difficulty, finally, lies in the field of projection. Here we come back to the crucial issue of future sustainability of the social systems in EU member states. The literature has highlighted the pressures on social standards in the member states exerted by the EU’s selective non-activity in social policy as well as its activities in other fields such as the by now open markets for capital, goods and services, as well as the European Economic and Monetary Union. Also revealed were the remaining action capacities for politicians who want to protect welfare in the open economies of Europe. This leeway for politics is exactly where political science has to admit uncertainty of final outcomes. As far as we can shape the future at least within the realms of our own

Gerda Falkner

265

discipline, in any case, I hold that we should strive to see on our future research agenda in the field of Europeanization of social policy more in-depth and encompassing studies but less wordy discussions.

Key readings Falkner, G. (1998) EU Social Policy in the 1990s: Towards a Corporatist Policy Community. London: Routledge. Falkner, G., O. Treib, M. Hartlapp and S. Leiber (2005) Complying with Europe: EU Minimum Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leibfried, S. and P. Pierson (eds) (1995). European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Scharpf, F.W. and V.A. Schmidt (eds) (2000). Welfare and Work in the Open Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zeitlin, J. and P. Pochet (eds) (2005) The Open Method of Coordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, with Lars Magnusson. Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang.

20 Telecommunications Policy Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle

20.1 Introduction Since the mid-1980s telecommunications policy has attracted growing interest from political science. Hundreds of books and articles deal with governmental decisions, programs and actions related to the broadening spectrum of technologies and technical systems that facilitate communication over large distances. Telecommunications policy is studied at national, cross-national and supranational level, and it is widely acknowledged that this specific domain of public policy has changed significantly and taken on a European character. However, the answers diverge regarding the question of which forces have driven this process. Likewise, telecommunications policy is only rarely defined or delineated in a systematic way. Depending upon what is considered when telecommunications policy is analyzed, we arrive at different conclusions concerning the extent and the characteristics of the Europeanization of national telecommunications policies in Europe. Telecommunications policy’s traditional core area comprises the fixed telephone network, the plain telephone (voice) service and other services based on the telephone network, such as facsimile or some simple data transmission services. Mobile telephony has also recently been added to this domain. More encompassing concepts of telecommunications include electronic (mass-) media on the one hand and (value-added) information networks and services, particularly the Internet, on the other. Usually public telecommunications policy is regulatory policy. In Europe and most other parts of the industrialized world, governments no longer operate networks, nor do they provide services through public companies or administrations. Rather, they develop, stipulate and enforce rules that guide and control the provision and use of telecommunications technologies by private companies and users. As in the era of public telecommunications monopolies, policies protecting and promoting the telecommunications industry continue 266

Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle 267

to be important elements of government strategies. However, they are now caged in a liberal pro-competitive economic governance regime composed of international, European and specific national elements. In this setting also non-governmental actors play a crucial role as policy makers. Their activities either influence governmental actions indirectly or contribute directly to collective decision making and/or to the production of collective goods through mobilizing complementary resources in private–public policy networks. But private actors also generate rules, standards and enforcement capacities without direct involvement of governments, thus enabling them to (self-)regulate the provision and distribution of communication goods and services. Private and public actors are involved in and affected by the Europeanization of telecommunications without necessarily giving it a specific shape or direction. The literature on Europeanization uses various concepts with multiple meanings to describe this phenomenon (Olsen 2002; Radaelli 2000b). In this context we suggest an analytical distinction between four basic types of Europeanization. Type 1. A significant engagement of supranational EU actors/institutions in the telecommunications policy domain, the establishment of genuine European institutions, and the adoption and execution of European rules in this area (Sandholtz 1998; Schneider and Werle 1990). Type 2. Adjustment and adaptation of domestic actors and institutions in EU member states to policy processes and goals at EU level (Börzel and Risse 2000; Cowles et al. 2001). Type 3. Institutional convergence of telecommunications among EU countries and adjacent non-member countries such as Switzerland or Norway mainly, but not exclusively, through horizontal bargaining and other interaction processes that go beyond mere information sharing (Mach et al. 2003; Sciarini et al. 2004). Type 4. Institutional convergence through passive, unilateral policy diffusion, where member states and non-member states simply copy or emulate policy programs of other (not necessarily EU member) states without any active concertation and coordination (Levi-Faur 2004, 2005; Simmons and Elkins 2004). Types 1 and 2 embrace the “vertical” dimension of Europeanization and, respectively, the “top-down” (download) and “bottom-up” (upload) efforts of European institution building and integration in telecommunications. Type 1 sometimes also is labeled “European integration”, if Europeanization is not used – as we do – as an umbrella concept which covers all forms of institutional convergence triggered by the emergence or existence of the EU as a new

268

Policies

political entity. On the other hand, types 3 and 4 focus on “horizontal” relationships between EU member states and also certain nonmembers. Each type of Europeanization operates through specific mechanisms. For instance, the supranational type is driven by the policy-entrepreneurship of the Commission (corporate actor model), by judicial decision making through the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or by collective decision making (based on different voting rules) through the Council and the European Parliament (EP). A good example of a Type 1 indicator is the establishment of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in 1988. Conversely, structural adaptation and assimilation at the level of the member states refers to the process of transposition and implementation of EU rules which are imposed by supranational actors but usually leave room for modifications through intermediation by domestic institutions and actors. Additional mechanisms may be competitive selection of regulatory systems, ideological framing and horizontal diffusion by learning, as well as imitation and emulation among member states (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002a; Scharpf 2001; Schneider 2002). They may reshape EU institutions or establish them (decentralized) at the level of the member states. An instance of this Type 2 Europeanization is provided by the emergence of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) in the member states. The core of Type 3 Europeanization relates to horizontal feedback processes and mutual influence among the EU, the member states and the European non-members of the Union. But apart from these more or less EU-centered phenomena also other instances of European convergence in telecommunications can be classified as Type 3 if specific European spaces of interaction and bargaining emerge. A historical example is provided by the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) which was established outside the EU in 1959. Type 4 may be accounted for by globalization processes and related processes of information diffusion or by the spread of political ideologies (e.g. neo-liberalism). In this case global developments take on a European character based on dense networks of information exchange in this area. The four types of Europeanization are the theoretical background for the core issues addressed in various theoretical and empirical studies of telecommunications policy in Europe. Most of these studies – often implicitly – focus on fixed and mobile voice telephony. But the scope of telecommunications policy is much broader and also includes other areas of technical communication such as broadcasting and television or data communication, particularly the Internet.

20.2 Core research questions Based on the four types of Europeanization and the various ways in which public policy makers can be involved in telecommunications, we encounter a broad

Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle 269

spectrum of policy-making activities. However, not all areas that are theoretically thinkable have been Europeanized during recent decades. This is especially true of the provision of telecommunications infrastructures, which was never a realistic option for European institutions, although it was an important function of the modern state in many countries (in particular in continental Europe). It might well have been possible during the 1980s, for the European Community to channel a part of its R&D resources into the establishment of a pan-European telematic network (Videotex), a kind of European Minitel, in order to promote the emerging information society. However, at that time intra-European rivalries, in particular those between Britain, France and Germany, prevented such a big jump. The conflicts between these big European players even prevented the adoption of common technical standards (Schmidt and Werle 1998). Huge trade barriers in the telecommunications and computer industry protected the national markets (Genschel and Werle 1993) and reinforced techno-economic divergence (Bouwman and Christoffersen 1992; Schneider et al. 1991). Thus, up to the middle of the 1980s the telecommunications industry was extremely resistant to all European dimensions and it appears paradoxical that some twenty years later large parts of this same industry are Europeanized. Therefore, the core research questions are: (i) why and how did the EC/EU expand into the domain of telecommunications policy?; (ii) what are the direct effects of European telecommunications policy on domestic actors and institutions in member states, candidate states and associate countries?; (iii) what are the indirect or horizontal effects of European integration on domestic telecommunications policies in member states, candidate states and non-member countries?; and (iv) which methods, concepts, approaches, and empirical research domains enhance the further study of European telecommunications policy? The literature which tackles these questions often focuses on one of the four basic mechanisms that are distinguished above. We introduce and discuss the studies in the above-mentioned order. Although interesting and partly competing explanations are offered, many studies restrict themselves to describing the transformation processes or just illustrating and further specifying the core questions. Supranational expansion into telecommunications policy. The first crucial question is why in the middle of the 1980s the European community started to successfully expand into the telecommunications policy domain, and why this expansion was so pervasive during the 1990s. In the 1950s, when the European Coal and Steel Communities were formed, a European postal and telegraph union was also proposed. But the European governments opted for a much loser, if more inclusive, integration in this area and, in 1959, created the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) with 19 West European member countries.

270

Policies

Several studies show (see, inter alia, Natalicchi 2001; Schneider et al. 1994; Thatcher 1999) that despite the establishment of the CEPT the EC managed to expand into this policy domain in various interrelated steps. The Commission launched R&D programs and initiated measures to liberalize the market for telecommunications equipment. It proceeded with actions aiming at regulatory harmonization complemented by large programs intended to facilitate Europe’s transition to an information society. Current EU policy making covers almost all aspects of communications policy – from simple telephony to the Internet, multimedia and broadcasting, and from rule setting for markets and technologies to the pursuit of social and security goals (Curwen 1995; Gibbs 2001; Goodwin and Spittle 2002; Halpin and Simpson 2002; Hills and Michalis 2000; Jordana 2002b; Kofler 1998; Michalis 1999; Mina 2003; Niebel 1997; Simpson 2000; Waesche 2003). During the 1980s telecommunications was increasingly regarded not only as an important object of trade integration, but also as a promising instrument of a common industrial policy. In explaining these initial steps towards Europeanization two approaches stand out: supranational integration and variants of the multi-level governance approach. We rarely find intergovernmental explanations of the type which Moravcsik (1991) used to explain the adoption of the Single European Act. Grande’s perspective comes close to Moravcsik’s (Grande 1989, 1994). In his view, the changes in telecommunications are an expression of a more encompassing transformation of the state. In the state’s positive form governments were involved in the provision of infrastructures whereas in the regulatory state governments leave the provision of formerly public services to the market and merely concentrate on regulatory oversight. Accordingly, policy making at the European level does not appear as a factor in its own right, but as a kind of derivative. Supranational and multi-level governance approaches, in contrast, see European policy making as an important independent factor explaining institutional and policy change in the telecommunications sector. The approaches diverge with respect to the weight of the different levels, as well as regarding the number of actors that have to be integrated in an explanation model. Early accounts of the European Community’s “assault” on telecommunications policy highlight the importance of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Schneider and Werle 1990). Referring to structural changes of the economy they emphasize that the decisions of core actors were a response to these challenges. According to Sandholtz and Zysman, at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s European policy makers realized that the old strategies of promoting national champions had failed. They responded by transposing dispersed national strategies to a coordinated European industrial policy. The liberalization of certain European high-tech markets, they believed, would help prepare the European multinationals for the

Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle 271

competition in the world market. In this perspective the new collective European response that first materialized in research and development programs (ESPRIT, RACE) was achieved through elite bargains between the Commission, certain political leaders, specific national government agencies, and senior business leaders. The Commission which the authors conceive as an “entrenched, self-interested advocate of further integration” plays the central role of a policy leader who mobilizes business coalitions exercising crucial influence on their respective governments (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989: 108). In contrast, Schneider and Werle (1990: 93) consider the triggering event to be not so much the failure of old strategies but the perceived requirement of responding to the immediate American threat that was indicated by an expected global expansion of AT&T (after the divestiture) and the diversification of IBM into telecommunications. In this situation of increasing competitive pressure, they argue, the Commission managed to convince the member states that close European cooperation in telecommunications under the leadership of the EC was advantageous, if not necessary. To specify the preferences of EC institutions the authors introduce the corporate actor concept which emphasizes the emergent interest of formal organizations to expand their established domains and competences (Coleman 1974). A similar explanation inspired by supranational integration theory and focusing on supranational policy leadership is provided by Sandholtz (1993, 1998). He stresses the role of a proactive Commission and a supportive European Court of Justice in creating a supranational telecommunications policy domain. Business users in particular needed advanced international services and a growing number of equipment and service providers eagerly sought to meet this demand. Thus, business actors with high stakes in the liberalization of telecommunications markets became the coalition partners of the Commission and the ECJ which was able to intervene because private actors took telecommunications-related cases to the court. The decisions by the ECJ provided the Commission with institutional resources on which its expansive actions could be based. While these supranationalist approaches do not ignore the actions and interests of national actors, they do place a strong emphasis on the role played by the supranational institutions in this transformation process. In addition, European institutions appear as relative autonomous actors, equipped with their own resources and oriented towards their own interests. However, a number of studies try to qualify these capacities and orientations by pointing to conflicts among member countries on the one hand and by indicating interest divergences between European institutions and member states on the other. These studies show that in crucial cases supranational integration in telecommunications did not materialize, despite the efforts of supranational actors. An important example here is the establishment of national regulatory agencies instead of a single European regulator (Thatcher 2002c).

272

Policies

In order to specify the autonomous action capacities, the particular legal powers of the Commission are studied in detail (Schmidt 1997, 1998). Particularly in telecommunications, where they were to some extent based on the former Article 90 III, they certainly go beyond mere agenda setting. The Commission, however, rarely made use of the Article 90 III competence to issue directives without the participation of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. It preferred an informal procedure of consultation in which the relevant actors at the European and national level were involved. On the other hand, acting in the “shadow” of its further reaching formal competence, the Commission could build up pressure if arguing and bargaining alone turned out to be less successful (Schmidt 2000). Similarly, Thatcher (2001) argues that a number of institutional control arrangements make the Commission very sensitive to the preferences of national governments in substantive EC telecommunications regulation. Such structures limit the discretion of the Commission but also the degree of freedom of member states in the implementation of European regulations and directives. As a result the Commission and the national governments acted in partnership. In contrast to these models, which treat telecommunications policy as a twolevel game between national governments and the Commission, there are approaches that integrate private actors in a multi-level framework. In Grande’s view, for instance, ESPRIT was the result of a multi-level process in which the Commission, member countries, and private actors interacted in complex ways (Fuchs 1994; Grande 1996). Accordingly, the Round Table of Industrialists, an important actor in this context, appears as an initiative by the Commission and not by the companies themselves, thus demonstrating that the prime target of the companies’ pressure was not the Commission, which would have supported IT programs anyway, but the Council and the national governments. The Commission thereby created a kind of lobbying group which helped overcome the Council’s resistance to the new technology programs (Grande 1996: 323). This essentially is a network perspective integrating various actors operating at the national and supranational level (Esser and Noppe 1996; Schneider, Dang Nguyen and Werle 1994). The network approach distinguishes not only between the private and public status of political actors, but also between organizational forms such as business associations on the one hand and directly lobbying European firms on the other (Schneider 1992). The interactions in this multilevel system do not necessarily follow hierarchical pathways. For example, national firms and associations exercise pressure, simultaneously, on national governments and on supranational institutions; and the latter, in turn, interact with national firms and associations (Natalicchi 2001). Domestic impacts of European policy making. The supranational expansion in telecommunications policy has led to a large number of EU regulations and

Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle 273

directives which liberalized markets, harmonized regulatory arrangements, and supported the communications sector by various research and development programs. An important research question is how these policies and related institutional changes become effective at the member states level – the main aspect of what we call Europeanization Type 2. The question is, as Börzel and Risse (2000) phrase it, when and how “Europe hits home”. Since much of this research is based on variants of neo-institutionalist theory, a major hypothesis is that the domestic impact of EU policy making is mediated by particular national institutions enabling or prohibiting domestic change. National institutional arrangements include formal institutions which concentrate or diffuse political power (e.g. few or multiple veto points) but also encompass national political culture, distinct identities and policy styles (Börzel and Risse 2000; Cowles et al. 2001). Such an approach suggests that the domestic enforcement of European rules differs in relation to national institutional structure and that member states with similar institutional structures produce similar results. A number of cross-national studies support this institutional hypothesis highlighting the differences in the structural reform of telecommunications systems (Grande 1989; Grande and Schneider 1991; Vogel 1996). Countries such as the UK, in which political power is more centralized, transformed their systems more rapidly and more deeply than countries like Germany and Italy, where political power is more dispersed. This is confirmed by Thatcher’s comparison of French and British telecommunications policy. Distinct and stable national traditions shape distinct path-dependent developmental pathways – despite technological changes, the international regulatory reform, and even the creation of the Single Market. Similarly, Hulsink (1999) shows that differential policy evolution in the Netherlands, France and Britain largely corresponds to different national policy styles, e.g, market-oriented vs state-controled. However, as Coen (2002) has emphasized, the reality deviates from these expectations in some respect. All countries liberalize, privatize, and introduce independent regulatory agencies. Moreover, all converge to a similar structure and such variation as exists relates mainly to the speed of adaptation. This argument has been pushed much further by Levi-Faur (2004) who shows, in a comparison of regulatory reform in EU countries with Latin American states, that similar transformation processes have taken place. All countries adapted to international pressure and converged to similar institutional configurations. The author claims that major features of liberalization would have diffused to most if not all member states, even in the absence of European-level policy-making. Liberalization in Levi-Faur’s perspective largely reflects national policy preferences, and Europeanization is only an additional factor reinforcing transnational policy diffusion which originated in the US.

274

Policies

Bartle (1999), even if he does make some similar observations, draws at different conclusions. In his perspective globalization and technical change are the major transformative forces which are mediated by institutional factors concerning the pace and timing but not the direction of policy change (Bartle 2002). That institutional effects on policy development are contingent on time and space is also acknowledged in a recent article by Thatcher (2004b) in the context of the “varieties of capitalism” debate. Comparing Britain, France, and Germany he shows that three factors (transnational technological and economic developments, overseas reforms, and European regulation) affected institutional reform. Accordingly, institutional inertia and path dependency can be overcome and different types of capitalism only endure when international pressures are low. Similar observations have been made by Genschel (1997) and Schneider (2001a, b). But this line of argument cannot be generalized to all subsectors of telecommunications. It loses explanatory power if a broader concept of technical communications is used, including not only telephony and other forms of interactive communication but also electronic mass communication. The national regulatory regimes of radio broadcasting and television which emerged in the era of analogue technology have remained widely unaffected by both globalization and EU-level regulation which started in the early 1980s with the advent of commercial television. The EU “Television without Frontiers” directive, adopted in the late 1980s, has remained as little more than a symbolic move to weaken the tight regulations in this area. The goal of ensuring the free movement of broadcasting services within the internal market (freedom of reception) never gained precedence over the nationally specified rights to preserve certain public interest objectives, such as cultural diversity, the right of reply, consumer protection and the protection of minors. The digitization of broadcasting has challenged the regulatory legacy because it has led to a general realignment of the industry (Clements 1998). On the other hand, the regulatory reactions to this development, which dealt with issues such as competition, media ownership, merger control, content control and the funding of public service broadcasting, all continued to be national in character. The EU Commission’s desire to become a central actor in broadcasting regulation was supported by the media giants but blocked by the member states (Hills and Michalis 2000). Levy (2001), who analyzed this development, argues, in an analysis of Germany and the UK, that neither a shift of regulatory competences to the EU level nor horizontal regulatory convergence can be observed in this politically and culturally sensitive area. These institutional obstacles notwithstanding, technical convergence of all types of communication in one encompassing system has become a real option on a digital basis. The global Internet provides the platform for convergence. Therefore it comes as a surprise that, having foreseen convergence, the

Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle 275

Commission (and the Council of Ministers) still hesitated to promote the Internet, thereby unintentionally slowing down our Type 1 process. One explanation is that the Commission which early on tried to combine supranational expansion with an industrial and technology policy supporting the European industry (Schneider and Werle 1990) saddled the wrong horse. In line with the dominant national telecommunications network operators and equipment manufacturers the Commission promoted multimedia and ISDN technology based on “European” standards (Kogut 2003; Werle 2002). Only deregulation, liberalization and privatization of telecommunications and the promotion of competition in this area paved the way for a rapid diffusion of the Internet. Partly because of the European public policy failure in the early 1990s the Internet’s expansion and regulation was guided and driven by private actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002b) in a manner that was completely unprecedented in European telecommunications. It took some time until – following the American model – a European Internet policy domain was established besides the traditional telecommunications policy domain (Werle 2000). The Europeanization of the Internet policy domain has been a bottom-up process pushed forwards by the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and to some degree also by the United Kingdom. These countries either had no significant stakes in “European” telecommunications technologies such as ISDN or they had liberalized their telecommunications markets earlier than the other European countries. Coordination and administration of the Internet in Europe covers all European countries. The European top-level registry RIPE (Réseaux IP Européens) provides a prominent example of this type of Europeanization. RIPE is an independent, not-for-profit membership organization which collaborates with national registries in the management and distribution of the Internet address resources. In this context the EU Commission plays a minor role, as it does at the global level in relation to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (Leib 2002). The Europeanization of Internet coordination and regulation has two crucial dimensions: an infrastructure dimension that involves the technical network and a contents and services dimension that involves the use of this infrastructure. In both dimensions private initiative and bottom-up institutionalization prevails and often has a global rather than a European character. This also holds for the only significant effort of the Commission related to the Internet infrastructure. Here the Commission has promoted a concerted undertaking of the industry to provide an infrastructure for mobile services. The Commission initiated and supported the adoption of a European system via the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) which was set up and accredited by the Commission in the process of telecom liberalization. The European system, however, was significantly influenced by private firms with a global rather than a European orientation (Lembke 2002). Concerning Internet services and

276

Policies

contents, their growing commercial viability increased the pressure to set up a global regulatory regime that governs commercial transactions. This globalization pressure opened the window of opportunity for the EU Commission to take the lead in the Europeanization of a regulatory framework regarding the commercial use of the network. With the eEurope agenda and a series of directives the commission has started to promote a harmonized European e-commerce regime which also includes security provisions such as electronic signatures, cryptography, and privacy protection (Holznagel and Werle 2004). A significant part of the Commission’s activities appears to be protecting the emerging European regime against globalization processes which are mainly pushed forward by the United States. The Commission represents European interests and values at the international level and negotiates binding international agreements (Farrell 2003) which, intentionally or not, serve to defend all types of Europeanization. Spin-offs and side-effects of European policy making. The adoption of European rules is not restricted to member states of the Union. Adjacent countries and/or countries maintaining intensive political or economic relations with the EU also may converge to these European standards. The transmission mechanisms in this process – which we call Europeanization type 3 – include bilateral or multilateral negotiations with the EU. This “direct” Europeanization is distinguished from “indirect” Europeanization where a nonmember state adapts unilaterally to existing EU rules (Sciarini et al. 2004). The transformation of the telecommunications sector in Switzerland provides an interesting example of such indirect Europeanization. During the 1990s, Swiss telecommunications were thoroughly restructured in a manner similar to the EU member states. The new Swisscom was separated from the PTT, the former national monopolist, and partially privatized. The new institutional framework included liberalized markets and the establishment of an independent regulatory agency, the Commission of Communication. This reform process emulated the development at the European level: (i) the reform proposal was highly similar to the EU directives; (ii) the decisions followed a parallel rhythm to the EU decision-making process (Mach et al. 2003). The indispensable alignment of the national law with the EU system was an argument that was often deployed to justify the reform. Thus, reference to the EU transformation process helps legitimize change in neighboring countries. But this does not imply that nonmember states simply transpose the EU rules into national law. In particular, “direct” Europeanization, which involves political bargaining between the EU and adjacent countries such as Norway, only rarely results in perfect adaptation to the EU (Claes 2002). Processes of institutional transformation of the Central and Eastern European countries have been even more differentiated and complex. Some of them are

Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle 277

now new members of the EU while others still struggle to achieve candidate status. After the fall of the Iron Curtain these countries adapted to western liberal capitalism and – in anticipation of a future EU membership – to the EU policy regime. In this process the EU has been one but not the only “tutor” (Jacoby 2001). Others have been the NATO or the International Monetary Fund. Thus, it is clear that not every aspect of what is going on in these countries can be called Europeanization (Type 3).

20.3 Key problems Determining the mechanisms and effects of Europeanization in telecommunications creates conceptual and methodological problems. We have argued that four types of Europeanization can be distinguished. In telecommunications, these processes have co-evolved. But most studies refer to Type 1. They focus on the activities of supranational EU actors, the evolution of genuine European institutions and the adoption of European rules. In this view the EU appears in telecommunications policy as a federal “supranational state” (Schmitter 1996) which – after an initial period of polity building – performs the usual tasks and deals with the familiar problems of policy formation and implementation. But acknowledging that telecommunications is more Europeanized than other domains of infrastructural policy (Eliassen and Marino 2001) does not necessarily imply that the Type 1 process generally prevails. If Type 1 were predominant then Type 2 would mean little more than the execution and implementation of European Directives in the member states. But several studies indicate that regulatory change was autonomously initiated by member states, emulated by other members of the EU and finally taken up and, in some cases, reinforced by the European institutions (Thatcher 2001). The establishment of regulatory authorities at the level of the member states rather than at the European level provides an example of such Type 2 Europeanization. The member states successfully prevented the creation of a centralized authority even though centralization was regarded a necessary step in the process of liberalization and promotion of an integrated European infrastructure (Lehr and Kiessling 1999). Thus, a European regulatory regime has evolved which is framed and instructed by European guidelines but varies from member state to member state in several respects (Tenbücken and Schneider 2004) without a short-term or medium-term perspective to converge on a single regulatory model (Coen 2005b). One instructive difference has been revealed in the process of allocating licenses to the operators of the next generation mobile communication network (UMTS). In line with EU competition rules all member states awarded more than one license, however, some states opted for auctions while others preferred the “beauty contest”, an administrative procedure of licensing (Boergers et al. 2003; Cartelier 2003).

278

Policies

The evolution and development of the EU has attracted so much attention that the majority of studies have overlooked our Types 3 and 4 processes. Type 3 concerns the institutional convergence of EU countries and adjacent non-member countries such as Switzerland or Norway based on bargaining and intensive interaction. In addition, adaptation and adjustment to the institutional regime of the EU often appears as the result of a one-way diffusion. It is not contentious to say that the EU (as the dominant supranational political institution) and its Single Market regime exert pressure on the neighboring countries towards adaptation. But the differences between the member states of the EU concerning Type 2 Europeanization suggest that also in the EU neighboring countries domestic forces and other factors play a role in shaping the process and the outcome of adaptation to the EU. As for those countries which were adjacent to and are now new members of the EU, we are confronted with the additional methodological problem that they – after the fall of the iron curtain – at the same time transformed their general political, economic and social order and prepared for the integration with the EU (Stawarska 1999). One factor often used to explain the degree of adaptation of member and non-member states to the EU regime is the pre-existing fit or misfit between EU institutions and national institutions. But even within the EU this variable explains less than has been suggested for a long time (Falkner et al. 2005). Given that the EU has no direct sanctioning power over non-member states adaptation is more selfdirected and unilateral in action than imposed by the EU. Interestingly, what appears as autonomous in some respects may well be influenced by encompassing globalization processes and the liberal international telecommunications regime which has been promoted by the OECD and established by the WTO (Cowhey and Richards 2000). This shows that the studies of Europeanization of telecommunications face substantial methodological challenges. Global, national and supranational European factors are involved in the process of transformation, and the specific characteristics of the telecommunications industry, in particular its innovative technology, also account for significant changes (Just and Latzer 2004). As these factors are compounded, it becomes extremely difficult to estimate their relative weight. Most studies either focus on a single country or restrict comparison to few cases. Some compare countries, others sectors or industries, and only very few include different countries and different sectors. This allows “thick description” of how Europeanization materializes in telecommunications but it rules out establishing how much variance it explains (Fligstein and Merand 2002). A research design which includes non-European control cases (such as Levi-Faur 2004) may provide a solution to some of the methodological problems (Haverland 2005) but it still does not solve the problem that the cases are only partially independent because of aforementioned horizontal processes.

Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle 279

In order to estimate the “net effect” of Europeanization, more complex explanatory models have to be built, in which the transformation of the old telecommunications policy regime and the convergence to a new institutional model is shaped by multiple factors. Here EU policy making is not an independent but an intervening variable and the same forces that bring about supranational Europeanization impinge directly on domestic developments. EU membership has an additional transformative effect in such a model because the supranational European level provides a central decision-making mechanism through which a qualitative majority of member states can impose their policies on other EU members who may be either unwilling or institutionally unable (e.g. because of too many national veto players) to adapt to the new policy trend (Schneider 2001a, b). The picture gets even more complex if a broader definition of technical communication is applied including not only telephony (one-to-one communication) but also radio broadcasting and television (one-to-many) and the Internet (enabling different types of communication). Before the Internet took off it was comparatively easy to draw a distinction between the different types of electronic communication. Even at the beginning of digitization they were clearly separated and strongly shaped by national institutions. The EU Commission’s strategy to Europeanize mass communication by introducing a competitive market order without national frontiers had to struggle with many obstacles and failed. Only with the advent of the Internet was a new window of opportunity opened, allowing for the supranational European actors to initiate and shape a process of regulatory convergence. But influenced by the USA and in line with the specific governance tradition of the Internet (Werle and Leib 2000) a more private global regime of self-regulation has emerged which restricts EU activities to defensively attuning European regulatory principles to the global regime. The blurring of boundaries between different types of technical communication and the convergence of media on the basis of digital technology raises doubts concerning the appropriateness of the traditional institutionally fragmented regulatory regime with its national peculiarities. There will be change, but it is an open question as to whether it will result in some kind of harmonized regulatory regime and what the relative weight of global, European, national, as well as private and public components of such a regime will be.

20.4 Conclusion Research on the Europeanization of telecommunications policy has resulted in a broad array of publications which often examine the process of transformation in great detail. Case studies focusing on selected European countries, specific policy areas or particular technological innovations continue to prevail.

280

Policies

Both the relatively far-reaching institutional change and the extremely swift technological development provide a rich ground for empirical study. On the other hand, they at the same time require some caution concerning generalizations. Thus, most studies provide thick descriptions of how Europeanization takes shape. Some regard it as a process driven by supranational EU actors, others stress the significance of national processes of differential adaptation to and co-development of European rules. A third, smaller, group of studies analyzes the spin-offs of telecommunications policy within the EU as they affect the adjacent countries, including the former accession countries. But with few exceptions they all tend to analyze these phenomena in isolation from trans-European international processes of shaping the institutional and regulatory regime of telecommunications. Most studies narrowly fix their attention on the different facets of the European telecommunications policy process which is guided by the principles of the Single European Market. As a consequence, the studies easily miss the discontents and negative externalities of a pro-competitive policy in telecommunications which have mobilized opposition by civil rights organizations, trade unions and other NGOs.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Maarten Vink, Paolo Graziano and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to Catherine Brandt Gaudry and Daniel Krupka for valuable research assistance.

Key readings Hulsink, W. (1999) Privatisation and Liberalisation in European Telecommunications: Comparing Britain, the Netherlands and France. London: Routledge. Jordana, J., ed. (2002) Governing Telecommunications and the New Information Society in Europe. Cheltenham: Elgar. Levi-Faur, D. (2004) On the “Net Impact” of Europeanization: The EU’s Telecoms and Electricity Regimes between the Global and the National. Comparative Political Studies, 37(1) 3–29. Schneider, V. (2001) Institutional Reform in Telecommunications: The European Union in Transnational Policy Diffusion. In M.G. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 60–78. Thatcher, M. (2001) The Commission and national governments as partners: EC regulatory expansion in telecommunications 1979–2000. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(4) 558–84.

21 Economic Policy Kenneth Dyson

21.1 Introduction There are prima facie good grounds for assuming that the economic policies of EU member states, and of states seeking EU accession, are highly Europeanized, certainly compared to the pre-single market and pre-Economic and Monetary Union period of European integration. Indeed, into the 1980s texts on comparative European economic policies had little to say about Europeanization (see, for example, Dyson and Wilks 1983; Katzenstein 1978; Shonfield 1965). By the turn of the millennium scholarly interest of economists and political scientists had shifted to how EMU in particular was affecting domestic policies (e.g. Dyson 2002 and 2006; Beetsma et al. 2003; Martin and Ross 2004). This interest was, first and foremost, in monetary, exchange-rate and fiscal policies that affected the broad parameters of interest rates and price stability, competitiveness and trade, taxation, fiscal deficits and debt, and employment. However, “regime” changes through creation of the Euro Area had implications for other policy sectors, notably labor markets and social policies. Loss of domestic monetary policy and of exchange-rate adjustment and the constraints of fiscal rules forced the attention of macroeconomic policy makers to the importance of social policy for unit labor costs and of labor-market flexibility for efficient adjustment. In short, Europeanization worked in two ways: a loss of traditional policy instruments for economic adjustment (or constraint on their use) displaced attention to social policy and labor-market reforms as the main instruments for improving and sustaining competitiveness and employment. The result was paradox: member states embraced full policy union in exchange-rate and monetary policies, whilst seeking to retain responsibility in fiscal, labor market and social policies; and, in these increasingly sensitive areas of their remaining responsibilities, were torn between arguments for greater policy coordination (tax harmonization, for instance), focused in particular on avoiding a ruinous “race to the bottom” in employment and social policy 281

282

Policies

standards, and greater policy competition to attract and retain inward investment in a Europe in which factors of production were more mobile. The key catalysts for change were the European Monetary System (EMS) after 1978, the Single European Act of 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, along with the creation of the Euro Area in 1999. In economic policy the member states were subjected to a widening range of intensifying EU-level pressures for convergence in institutional arrangements, policies and outcomes: from tightening exchange-rate coordination within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in a framework of complete liberalization of capital movement, intensifying market competition, and the shift towards a monetary union and a single currency. These pressures mimicked globalization, but in a more intense, sustained way around emerging norms of price stability, exchange-rate coordination and market liberalization. Domestic economic policy structures, processes, instruments and their use were affected by the increasing freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and labor; by a toughening of competition policy; by the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty for euro entry (covering inflation, fiscal deficits, public debt, exchange-rate stability and longterm interest rates); by the excessive deficit procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact, with their fiscal rules; and, especially for Euro Area members and members of the new Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), by the monetary policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) (for details see Dyson 2000). The cumulative effects seemed all the greater because Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the single market formed a coherent policy paradigm of market liberalization and stability culture that gave a consistent direction to change. Member states faced stronger external incentives to embrace “stability culture” in domestic economic policy, initially through ERM membership, and then through the new constraints of the monetary policy of the independent ECB and of the excessive deficit procedure and the fiscal rules in the Stability and Growth Pact. Stability culture, essentially a German export, involved priority to a monetary policy exclusively focused on price stability and to fiscal policy discipline understood as a “sustainable” public debt. In addition, the Single European Market program, especially when combined with EU enlargement to much-lower-cost economies, exposed domestic economic policies to the harsh disciplines of more open competitive markets. From the outset economists and central bankers argued that monetary union with a single currency required an integrated economic space in which there had been a substantial convergence of economic structures through a single European market in capital, goods, services and labour (Dyson 1994). Otherwise, economies would be more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. Hence EMU was not separable from the agenda of the single European market. Moreover, the issue of how both the single market and EMU relate to globalization became central to debates about Europeanization of economic policies – was Europeanization a Trojan horse for globalization or, to

Kenneth Dyson 283

vary the metaphor, a lightning conductor? Did Europeanization mean the triumph of an Anglo-Saxon model of neoliberalism, the end of the varieties of national capitalisms, especially dirigiste and “Rhineland”, and the closure of prospects for a distinctively European model of capitalism (Dyson and Padgett 2006a,b)? The view of Europeanization as the triumph of neoliberalism has been contested. First, EMU restored lost autonomy to member states whose economic policies has been constrained by small currencies in global financial markets. The creation of a single currency in 1999 relieved the pressures on domestic exchange-rate policies by insulating member states from currency speculation. Domestic economic policies of Euro Area members were relieved of the exchangerate crises that had beset the old ERM, notably in 1983, 1992 and 1993 and caused domestic policy dramas, notably in France in 1983 (Dyson 1994). The benefits were experienced after 1998 in the growth-stimulating effects of lower long-term interest rates for Euro Area members other than Germany. Second, Europeanization was a story about learning to live with new constraints, especially the implications of the loss (at least in theory) of both domestic exchange-rate and interest-rate policies as classic instruments of domestic economic adjustment. This loss was experienced in the context of the lack of EU policy structures that were likely to pursue an actively managed euro exchangerate policy, of a “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy, and of tough EU-level fiscal rules that narrowed discretion. The experience was a challenge to domestic creativity in developing and activating new policy instruments – like national social pacts and employment-centred social policies – to address issues of competitiveness and to put large domestic welfare states on a sustainable basis (Crouch 2002; Rhodes 2002). However, the coincidence of the creation of the Euro Area with an upswing in the economic cycle and a depreciating euro as a stimulus to export-led growth created a lack of incentive for domestic structural reforms. As these twin conditions changed, the scope and pace of domestic reforms to social policies, labor markets and collective bargaining gathered pace (though cf. the view in Martin and Ross 2004). Finally, Europeanization can be seen as embedded in a multi-level process, in which individual sectors are differently exposed to external global and European pressures and policy makers, banks and firms make strategic use of the new opportunities that are offered by these pressures. In consequence, Europeanization (and globalization) is associated with the development of “hybrid” forms of capitalism across Europe. In some instances, this hybridity takes the form of an evolving sectoral convergence, especially where EU regulation, as in utilities, requires new common institutional structures. In others, hybridity mixes global and European market liberalization with domestic varieties of capitalism in new and complex forms, as in banking and finance. Domestic institutional continuities in forms of capitalism mask the extent to which institutions, for

284

Policies

instance in industrial relations and labour markets, are malleable as domestic actors take advantage of new market incentives (Dyson and Padgett 2006a,b). The notion of “hybrid” capitalism captures the evolutionary processes of crossbreeding between global and EU-level market liberalization and domestic institutional forms of capitalism and different sectoral and national outcomes.

21.2 Core research questions The debate about the Europeanization of economic policies has focused on five main questions: how to contextualize Europeanization, whether it has independent effects, by which mechanisms (direct and indirect, top-down and bottom-up), what the scope of its effects are across domestic polities, politics and policies, and whether it is producing convergence. Consensus has been most marked with respect to the question of how to contextualize Europeanization. There is broad agreement that how Europeanization of economic policies expresses itself is inseparable from the contrasting types of European economic integration and from the distinctive nature of European economic governance in which it is embedded. The scope and conditions of Europeanization are bound up with the European single market and EMU as processes of European integration (e.g. Moravcsik 1998; Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Verdun 2000) and with the EU-level structures, rules and practices of economic governance (e.g. Dyson 2000; Wessels and Linsenman 2002). They shape what domestic actors have to “download” into economic policies and what opportunities they have to influence what is “downloaded”. By participation in European economic governance through the Euro Group (for Euro Area members), the Economic and Financial Committee, and the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN), domestic finance ministries can seek to “upload” their policy preferences. In this way the Europeanization experiences of member states shape how economic integration develops and economic governance is transformed. As the French, German and Italian proposals for reform of the Stability and Growth Pact and their opposition to the European Commission proposals for freedom of service provision in 2005 exemplified, member state governments seek to solve difficult problems of domestic adjustment by changing the rules, their interpretation and application. In short, domestic problems of “misfit” between EU requirements and domestic policies are not givens: they can be addressed by influencing and revising EU requirements. What constitutes appropriate “fit” can be redefined through negotiation, thereby evading or ameliorating adaptational pressures from EU policies. There is a broad consensus that the different processes of Europeanization of economic policies reflect the asymmetrical design of EMU (Dyson 2000, 2002). Its design ranges from supranational integration in monetary policy, through

Kenneth Dyson 285

“hard” (though “softening”) coordination in fiscal policy, to “soft” coordination and the “open” method of coordination in policies to promote competitiveness and macroeconomic coordination. “Hard” coordination involves targets, rules, “naming and shaming”, and sanctions. “Soft” coordination is about guidelines, peer review, and policy learning through benchmarking best practice (Hodson and Maher 2001). These complex differentiated forms of European integration and governance reflected a broadly shared preference of states to limit the loss of economic policy sovereignty consequent on EMU, a political recognition that fiscal policy was a deeply sensitive aspect of domestic sovereignty and raised very difficult questions about democratic choice and accountability, and, more particularly, German power in pressing the principle of “subsidiarity” in economic (as opposed to monetary) policy. Germany provided the basic templates for design of EMU (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). In monetary union, the ECB was essentially the Bundesbank “writ large”; in fiscal policy, the Stability and Growth Pact derived from a German initiative; whilst the German idea of subsidiarity in the rest of economic policy, including employment, prevailed. These features of EMU are to be explained by the central political requirement of German consent and participation if it was to be a viable project and by the greater credibility of Bundesbank ideas about how to establish an effective ECB. This political requirement and policy credibility stemmed from the prestige of the Bundesbank in delivering both price stability and a pattern of sustained economic growth that had avoided the boom and bust cycles of other economies, the consequent strength of the D-Mark, and the fact that Germans were being asked to renounce more than others – a treasured national asset of enormous symbolic importance. Hence EMU’s institutional arrangements had to ensure the fundamental principle that the euro would be “at least as stable as the DMark” (Dyson 2003). An independent ECB, pledged exclusively to deliver price stability, and with safeguards even stronger than for the Bundesbank, would bind the hands of other Euro Area states. Its monetary policy needed to be flanked and supported by tough fiscal policy rules with sanctions, outlined in the Stability and Growth Pact. Conversely, German policy makers wished to put in place barriers against EU interference in wider economic policy issues, fearing an erosion of competition principles if countries like France and Italy gained influence on policies through some sort of EU “economic government”. Hence the Euro Group, which brought together the Euro Area finance ministers, had no more than an informal character: it lacked authority over policy. This design of EMU has important implications for Europeanization of economic policies. In monetary policy, it was “top-down”: because of its independence in defining price stability and operating monetary policy instruments, the ECB could credibly threaten higher interest rates to penalize errant behavior by member state governments, for instance in fiscal policy, or by

286

Policies

domestic collective bargainers in wages policy. In growth and employment policies, by contrast, Europeanization was “bottom-up”. Domestic reforms remained voluntary and influenced by the political interest and will in make domestic reforms credible by basing them on the policy lessons drawn from best-performing states in growth and employment. Fiscal policy hovered between “top-down” and “bottom-up” Europeanization: an initial focus on tough sanction-backed rules gave way to a stress on flexible application (Dyson 2000). In particular, Europeanization was restricted by the prevailing EU-level paradigm of macroeconomic policy coordination. The absolute priority to central bank independence in monetary policy ruled out explicit, a priori EUlevel macroeconomic coordination in which EU actors and member states would assume detailed obligations. The ECB would not bind its hands to policy objectives other than price stability. Consequently, the ruling idea of macroeconomic policy coordination was that it was essentially post-hoc: it occurred when each main actor discharged her/his own responsibility effectively (Dyson 2000; Wessels and Linsenmann 2002). Even so, pressures for EU-level coordination stemmed from the way in which integrated economies (especially through increased trade and financial flows consequent on the Euro Area) faced problems of “externalities” from the behavior of other member state governments and from collective bargaining by domestic employers and trade unions. Governments might be tempted to fiscal “free riding” by relaxing their budgetary positions and exporting the costs (in terms of higher collective interest rates) to others. Employers and trade unions might resort to inflationary wage settlements to increase demand or to competitive disinflation to gain competitive advantage, imposing adverse economic costs on others. The key question was how monetary policy was to be coordinated with fiscal, wage and supply-side policies so that the overall policy mix supported price stability, growth and employment. A plethora of parallel and overlapping processes emerged: the Luxembourg process in employment policy, the Cardiff process in structural reforms, the Cologne process for the macroeconomic dialogue, and the overarching Lisbon process that focused on creating a world-class European knowledge-based economy. These crowded initiatives took shape in the short period 1997–2000 in parallel with the creation of the monetary union. They were complemented by the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, which covered issues of macroeconomic coordination, and by the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997, which gave greater precision to the excessive deficit procedure for fiscal coordination in the Maastricht Treaty. The impression was activism on a broadening front, a lack of focus, and a confusion of coordination mechanisms, each lacking credible mechanisms to enforce EU-wide policy requirements. This combination of asymmetrical institutional design with lack of strong coordinating mechanisms in either fiscal policy or policies to promote

Kenneth Dyson 287

competitiveness limits the scope and depth of Europeanization of economic policies and underlines the potential for friction between monetary politics at the Euro Area level and social labor-market policies at the domestic level (Martin and Ross 2004). In addition, the question of who shaped European economic integration and governance suggested that Europeanization would be associated with different domestic processes and predictable if variable results. Germany – and states, like Austria and the Netherlands, that had successfully modeled themselves on Germany – could be expected to accommodate EMU relatively easy. Others states – such as Greece, Italy and Portugal – would have major adaptation problems because of “misfit” between domestic institutional patterns and practices and what had been created in the German image at the EU level. However, whilst this expectation was broadly met, the surprise was that Germany itself had considerable problems of fit between Euro Area and domestic policies and consequent strong adaptational pressures in fiscal and supply-side policies (Dyson 2003). Under the earlier ERM German monetary policy provided the benchmark for economic stability. The link of the domestic currency to the D-Mark through the ERM had been a device for other EU states to “import” credibility through a tough external discipline. This asymmetry – expressed in higher long-term interest rates outside Germany – was undone with EMU. Germany did not capture the macroeconomic and fiscal policy advantages that other Euro Area members reaped from lower long-term interest rates under EMU. The paradox was that EMU represented both German economic policy hegemony and an erosion of this hegemony as the old asymmetry that stemmed from German-centered domestic economic policies across Europe disappeared and Germany simultaneously sought to grapple with the long-term competitiveness problems consequent on German unification in 1990. “Fit” proved a complex multidimensional concept. The question of whether Europeanization represents an independent effect of significance is much more problematic. The literature is not always clear about what role it plays as a variable. In the domestic politics model of Europeanization it is either the dependent variable, to be explained by domestic institutional and political variables, like the nature of domestic veto players and party competition, or an intervening variable, in which European integration conditions the strategic context of domestic actors, who bring their own preferences to policy choices. In the “top-down” model Europeanization is the independent variable, in the form of a “misfit” between European requirements and domestic arrangements as the trigger for change. Despite this imprecision and confusion there is a broad consensus, even in the “misfit” literature, that domestic institutional and political variables matter in understanding the Europeanization of economic policies. This consensus extends to the view that these domestic variables vary not just at the macro-political level – distinguishing, for instance, Europeanization in France from that in Britain and

288

Policies

both from Poland – but also at the sector level – for instance, between finance, energy and telecommunications. Dyson (2006) suggests that the dynamics of Europeanization of economic policies are better captured by an approach that focuses on the definition and negotiation of fit. In this perspective fit matters in a way not properly captured in domestic politics models of Europeanization, but is bound up in the interplay between global, EU and domestic levels in which domestic actors have strategic options. However, as we saw earlier, more problematic are the questions surrounding how Europeanization relates to globalization, which matters most in shaping economic policy, and their relationship to different national varieties of capitalism. Both domestic economic policy and Europeanization are framed within the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization negotiations, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development reports, G7/8, and Basle negotiations and agreements in central banking and financial markets. Disentangling the respective influences of globalization and Europeanization in these various contexts is an arduous task of empirical process tracing. In financial markets, for instance, Europeanization is tightly embedded in globalization (Luetz 2005). Conversely, Europeanization can be seen as an especially advanced form of regional globalization around a single market and currency: as not just anchoring but also leading globalization (Rollo 2006). Either way, globalization and Europeanization serve to give a strong direction of market liberalization to economic policies, whether they are seen as top-down processes or constructions used by domestic actors to justify reforms. A third question is how Europeanization works as a mechanism. Here it is useful to distinguish between direct and indirect effects through changes to the structures of incentives and constraints within which economic policy makers operate. Direct effects involve changes in policy objectives (by domestically embedding “stability culture”) and in policy instruments (by eliminating national exchange-rate and interest-rate policies). They were linked to a revival of “new” corporatism during the 1990s in EU states that prioritized euro entry – for instance Ireland, Italy and Spain. Governments sought to develop new forms of national social pacts in which employers and trade unions pursued more moderate and flexible wage policies and accepted labor-market reforms in return for supportive social policies (Crouch 2002; Rhodes 2002). In short, EMU had direct effects on domestic institutional innovation to compensate for loss of traditional policy instruments. This revival of “new” corporatism lost momentum once Euro Area entry had been achieved, reflecting the tougher character of entry conditionality (meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria) than of membership conditionality. However, the European single market and EMU, especially when combined with EU enlargement to lower-cost economies, also produced powerful indirect

Kenneth Dyson 289

effects. These effects were mediated through the changed behavior of firms, which sought to anticipate and capture lower transaction costs (resulting from regulatory harmonization and competition, from the elimination of exchangerate risk, and from transparency of costs and prices), to relocate production to lower-cost locations, and to seize the opportunities to develop integrated production structures and supply and distribution chains (Dyson 2002). Exit threats by firms were much more credible and potent in a framework of freedom of goods, services and capital, of a single currency, and of EU enlargement that brought much lower-cost locations into the single market. In consequence, domestic actors were forced to rethink their strategies on collective bargaining about wages and working time and on employment and labor-market policies and business taxation policies. The result was major changes to these strategies and policies in Germany (Dyson and Padgett 2006a,b). Similarly, integrated production, supply and distribution systems meant that, though competitiveness remained largely a national responsibility, firms and employer and industrial associations pressed more forcefully the case for a “harder” coordination of economic reform under the Lisbon process (Monti 2005). These indirect effects – articulated by firms responding to changed market incentives – were a powerful mechanism of Europeanization (Dyson and Padgett 2006a,b). Again, they require careful empirical tracing. A second way of differentiating how Europeanization works is by distinguishing “top-down” and “bottom-up” processes. “Top-down” processes assume a clear institutional template for economic policy at the EU level that member states or accession states are obliged to “download”. Where this template represents a “misfit” with domestic arrangements, processes of economic reform are triggered. An example is the Maastricht convergence criteria for entry into the Euro Area, and the template of central bank independence for member states with a derogation from Euro Area membership. As we saw earlier, the conditions for “top-down” Europeanization are not firmly established in fiscal policy; indeed, the reforms to the Stability and Growth Pact in 2005 can be seen to weaken them. “Bottom-up” Europeanization is more prevalent where – as in employment and competitiveness policies – there is no clear EU template but where, through “soft” coordination, the EU seeks to be active as a forum for encouraging policy learning and transfer. Domestic reformers instrumentalize European arguments to justify economic policy changes and strengthen their positions, for instance the need for social, labor-market and industrial relations policies that boost competitiveness and employment. “Bottom-up” Europeanization has been used by finance ministries to extend their influence, and contain that of veto players, over these domestic policies areas because of their relevance to competitiveness, employment and fiscal sustainability (Dyson 2002).

290

Policies

This range of mechanisms of Europeanization raises a further question about the scope of its effects. Europeanization is most apparent in economic and related policies, sometimes direct and “top-down” but often, as in social and labor-market policies, indirect and “bottom-up”. There are also effects on polities and politics. Europeanization of domestic economic governance in Euro Area states is most apparent in the privileging of central bank governors as part of the independent European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of finance ministries as the gatekeepers to the Euro Group. In states with a derogation, like the new accession states, central bank governors are privileged because of the requirement of their domestic independence, and finance ministries because they are responsible for ensuring that the convergence criteria for euro entry are met. Europeanization of domestic economic governance is also manifested in domestic attempts to restructure relations with subnational governments to ensure that fiscal criteria and rules can be met. In Germany, for instance, the Federal Finance Ministry has sought to negotiate a national stability pact with the Länder, raising sensitive issues about sovereignty (Dyson and Goetz 2003a). More fundamentally, Europeanization has played a role in opening a debate about the design of the German federal system so that the responsibilities for economic and related policy reforms are more clearly assigned and transparent and the opportunities for veto players reduced (Dyson and Padgett 2006a,b). The political effects of Europeanization of economic policies are apparent in tightening constraints on domestic party and electoral competition from diminished opportunities to pursue a political business cycle, in which discretion over tax, spending and interest rates gives a large amount of space for tailoring economic policies to vote-winning strategies. The results include efforts by national governments to relax fiscal constraints in the Stability and Growth Pact, not least by appealing to the risk that overtly “top-down” Europeanization could generate Euroskeptic political reactions. Similar considerations about domestic political effects of Europeanization informed French, German and Italian attempts to water down the European Commission proposals on freedom of movement of services. The question about whether Europeanization is generating convergence requires a differentiated and nuanced answer. Along with globalization, it is associated with the powerful pressures for convergence that are outlined above. However, these pressures do not convert neatly into convergence of economic governance, policies or performance (Dyson 2002). Central bank independence and a more privileged role for finance ministries, with a greater delegation of budgetary authority to them, represent convergence in economic governance compared to the 1970s and 1980s. Otherwise, domestic forms of economic governance continue to reflect the varieties of capitalism, especially the extent to which they prioritize non-market forms of coordination in corporate governance, finance, skill training and technology transfer (Dyson and Padgett

Kenneth Dyson 291

2006a,b; Hall and Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2002b). Convergence of policies is more pronounced, especially towards industrial relations, labor-market and social policies that focus on employment and competitiveness. However, the launch of the Euro Area was not followed by a convergence of economic performance. There was evidence of convergence before its launch, suggesting that the convergence criteria proved more powerful than the macroeconomic framework within the Euro Area. After 1999 there was divergence in inflation rates, fiscal performance, and growth and employment, with traditional “core” states like France, Germany and Italy performing less well than the classic “periphery” of Finland, Ireland and Spain (although Greece and Portugal also posed problems). One factor was the differential effects of the euro, especially on longterm interest rates. Another factor seemed to be size. EMU appeared to be a more effective trigger for domestic structural reforms in small than in large states; as large states were more significant in determining the overall growth and employment performance of the Euro Area, especially through trade, it could be claimed that EMU had negative effects on growth and employment for all member states (Duval and Elmeskov 2005).

21.3 Key problems The literature addressing these key questions about the Europeanization of economic policies raises a number of problems that have not as yet been solved: isolating Europeanization from the effects of other variables; dealing with “fit” as a variable; distinguishing Europeanization in existing member states from new accession states; and an institutional bias that fails to address both the malleability of institutions of economic governance and the vital roles of corporate behavior and changing market incentives. In explaining particular changes to domestic economic governance or policies it is difficult to disentangle Europeanization from other processes – not just global but also domestic. This is in part a level of analysis problem. In taking the EU level as the given, analysis can fail to address whether, for instance in financial markets, the EU is merely ratifying globalization processes. Seen in this perspective, Europeanization expresses itself in the timing and tempo of domestic economic policy changes (Dyson 2002). Hence Europeanization research has to check continuously for the presence and effects of global economic processes. Similarly, it needs to examine critically whether economic policy change can be explained by reference to domestic variables, with Europeanization playing perhaps a symbolic role. This checking is made easier when one extends comparison by asking whether similar economic policy changes are taking place outside the European region, for instance Australia or Canada. Second, as Dyson and Goetz (2003) stress, the differences between “misfit” and domestic explanations of Europeanization can be overstated. Moreover,

292

Policies

“fit/misfit” is a difficult variable to use. In the first place, much depends on whether there is a clear set of domestic institutional arrangements in place, in terms of which “fit/misfit” can be established. For this reason the variable has little relevance in, for instance, financial market and prudential regulation in the new member states of east central Europe (Cyprus and Malta are different). Second, “fit/misfit” has less applicability in the broad area of “soft” economic coordination, where the EU stressed flexibility and diversity in institutional and policy prescriptions (Hoder and Maher 2001). Third, as renegotiation of the Stability and Growth Pact showed, member states can use their power and influence to eliminate or at least contain “misfit”. Conversely, domestic economic policy makers can create “misfit”, for instance by prioritizing early entry into the Euro Area, in order to accelerate reforms. “Misfits” are not just givens. They are a matter of definition; conflicts can remain dormant or be exploited. The skills of European economic integration reside in whether and when to open up conflicts by stressing “misfits”, a process that was apparent in the problems of freedom of movement for service providers. A third problem relates to the paucity of knowledge about Europeanization of economic policies in the new member states of east central Europe and how this experience compares with earlier members. There are good grounds for expecting this experience to differ, not least because of the scope of EU policies that they had to “download” during the pre-accession stage and the particular legacy of transition after communism. However, it remains unclear whether this distinctiveness will erode, especially vis-à-vis the southern European states, and how much unity and variation of Europeanization experience these east central European states will display. Four conclusions emerge (Dyson 2006). First, the main room for maneuver of these new member states rests in revising euro entry strategies to extend or shorten the time horizon for entry, thereby either slowing or accelerating the tempo of domestic reforms. Secondly, though they have been “policy takers” in the pre-accession stage, membership equates with a more self-confident activism in setting the agenda on issues like business taxation and welfare-state reforms. The impacts from tax reforms in Estonia and Slovakia on economic policies in older member states may prove more substantial than from the Lisbon process. Thirdly, with certain exceptions like financial market policies, the new member states of east central Europe possess their own, individually distinctive domestic institutional structures. They are, in short, not institutional voids into which EU economic policy ideas can be neatly fitted. Finally, in terms of ERM II and Euro Area entry they divide into pace-setters (like the Baltic States, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia) and laggards (notably the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). Relative size seems to be an important explanatory variable. In terms of domestic fiscal policy institutions Hungary and Poland are closer to the core Euro Area states than other east central European states.

Kenneth Dyson 293

Finally, the predominantly institution-based accounts of the Europeanization of economic policy risk a narrowing of focus to the interaction of EU and domestic economic policy makers. In the process, key variables that shape Europeanization are excluded or marginalized. This risk is mitigated if analysis takes account of indirect Europeanization through changing market incentives and the strategic behavior of banks, firms and employer and industrial associations as they seek to seize new opportunities for profitable investment (see Dyson 2003). The Europeanization of economic policies needs to be seen, in short, in the wider institutional setting of the political economy (see Hall and Soskice 2001). This observation situates Europeanization of economic policies in the debate about global capitalism and varieties of capitalism, about the emergence of “hybrid” capitalisms, and about the malleability of institutions (Dyson and Padgett 2006a,b).

21.4 Conclusion A key challenge is to relate research on Europeanization of economic policy to the larger debate about global capitalism, European varieties of capitalism, and emerging, exotic species of “hybrid” capitalisms (Dyson and Padgett 2006a,b). A broad political economy approach pays closer attention to the role of firms and market structures and incentives, capturing “indirect” mechanisms of Europeanization that may be neglected in traditional political science and policy analysis literature. The loyalty, voice and exit strategies of banks and firms and the changing incentive structures that they face need to be placed more centrally in analytical and explanatory frameworks. In particular, research on convergence needs to be sensitive to its complex, multidimensional nature. Across its various dimensions, convergence is variable, and in some cases there is divergence. EU and Euro Area enlargement open up further ongoing challenges to research as first-wave is followed by second, third and possibly more waves (Dyson 2006). Does each wave represent a distinctive Europeanization experience? Does this distinctiveness erode once the transition is made from accession negotiations to membership? No less importantly, in what ways does enlargement alter the Europeanization experience of the traditional member states, especially as lower-cost locations seek to maximize their gains from the single market and potentially from speeding euro entry? EMU appears as an extreme case of Europeanization for the new member states; not just because the scope and intrusiveness of its potential effects but because of the longer duration of accession conditionality after EU entry and the tightening of this conditionality with ERM II entry. Finally, there is a pressing need for comparative research on the Europeanization of economic policies that focuses on technical elites, political

294

Policies

elites and public opinion and how European integration has affected their attitudes and relationships. It is important to know to what extent, and in what ways, European economic integration, notably EMU and the single market, especially in combination with EU enlargement, is changing identities on these three levels and how they are communicated, notions of appropriate forms of representation and accountability, and ideas of “good” economic governance. To the extent that there is a differential impact and rate of change, the prospect emerges of heightened contest between technical elites, on the one hand, and political elites and public opinion, on the other, or – perhaps – greater fragmentation within political elites and public opinion (Dyson forthcoming).

Key readings Dyson, K. (ed.) (2002) European States and the Euro: Europeanization, Variation and Convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dyson, K. and S. Padgett (eds) (2006) The Politics of Economic Reform in Germany. London: Routledge. Martin, A. and G. Ross (eds) (2004) Euros and Europeans: Monetary Integration and the European Model of Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Savage, J. (2005) Making the EMU: The Politics of Budgetary Surveillance and the Enforcement of Maastricht. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Verdun, A. (2000) European Responses to Globalization and Financial Market Integration: Perceptions of Economic and Monetary Union in Britain, France and Germany. Houndmills: Macmillan.

22 Anti-Discrimination Policy Virginie Guiraudon

22.1 Introduction The 1997 Amsterdam treaty added new provisions to combat discrimination, including on grounds of race and ethnicity, religion, handicap, age and sexual orientation (Article 13 EC Treaty). Two directives were adopted in June 2000, namely a “race directive” that focuses on combating discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnicity in areas such as housing, employment, education and training, and the provision of goods and services (directive 2000/43/EC of 28 June 2000); and a directive combating all forms of discrimination in employment (directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000). The directives covered both direct and indirect discrimination and allowed scope for “positive action”, including in areas such as housing where there was no prior Treaty competence. A Community action program for the period 2001–2006 is under way with a budget of €100 millions (Council decision of 27 November 2000). This program aims at developing non-legal instruments, such as comparative measures of discrimination, that would allow for the monitoring of the various groups targeted in Article 13. Community law prohibiting discrimination existed before Amsterdam: direct and indirect discrimination against Community nationals using their right of free movement to work in another member state has been explicitly prohibited with some exceptions (Articles 12 and 39 of the Treaty and Council Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on the free movement of workers within the Community). Discriminating against women in ways that contravened Article 119 (now Article 141) of the Treaty of Rome on equal pay for equal work was also prohibited. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice with respect to free movement of workers and gender equality has been abundant. Legal scholars agree, however, that Article 13 in several ways is an innovation compared to past legislation and jurisprudence. In particular, it goes beyond ensuring formal equality among groups in favor of substantive equality (i.e. equality 295

296

Policies

in outcomes) and expands the notion of indirect discrimination to cover apparently neutral laws and practices that disadvantage persons from specific groups. It also introduces notions such as harassment which constitute absolute rather than relative rights for individuals. Another novelty of Article 13 and the 2000 directives is that it addresses new groups as potential victims of discrimination. Before Amsterdam, policies directed at ethnic minorities had remained a national or local prerogative. Scholars have underlined strong national variations in policy paradigms directed towards immigrant-origin and subnational minorities. Not only has EU policy emerged amidst contrasting national models, it also requires extensive change of deeply rooted national institutions. Article 13 covers other grounds for discrimination where there are different national approaches or little experience with the issue at all. This policy domain is therefore an interesting area of EU competence to observe the dynamics behind the “Europeanization” of policy making. Concomitantly, identifying precisely the added value of EU developments in changing norms and practices in the field of anti-discrimination is challenging because (i) there were already a number of international and European legal texts addressing similar issues (United Nations conventions, European Convention of Human Rights provisions, Council of Europe conventions); and (ii) the possibility of horizontal transfer of policy ideas cannot be overlooked, with antidiscrimination as a policy frame being largely a US import in Europe when it comes to race/ethnicity and handicap. Another interesting aspect of EU anti-discrimination policy is that only a month after the adoption of Article 13, which offers ethnic minorities protection against discrimination within the EU, the European Commission declared that “respect for minorities” would be a condition for states wishing to join the EU. The eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) needed to comply with Article 13 and show that certain groups, especially the Roma, would be protected from discrimination. We can thus observe the effect of “conditionality Europeanization” (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, and also in this volume). Moreover, post-accession dynamics in this policy domain show that an originally external concern for national minorities converged with an internal recognition of the discrimination by migrant-origin ethnic minorities (see De Witte 2000 on EU and minority rights; cf. Wiener and Schwellnus 2004). There is no single definition of Europeanization and, in the next section, we will see that the various definitions in existing studies have implications on the research question, the theory and the methods used. “Europeanization”, Radaelli (2004) has suggested, is a problem rather than a solution. In fact, this is true only for those who are not satisfied with the study of the implementation of EU norms based on readily available data. I will argue that Europeanization is not only a problem to be studied but a methodological predicament, in

Virginie Guiraudon 297

particular when it comes to case selection (see Haverland 2005 also on this point). This issue is examined in section 22.3. I have defined Europeanization in a broad sense to cast a wide net over existing studies without excessive concept-stretching: Europeanization refers to (domestic) changes that can be traced to EU-level developments. These can be legal changes such as the transposition of directives following EU legislation, but also and foremost changing policy conceptions and changing opportunity structures for domestic actors. These changes, in part by changing the balance of power among domestic actors and (de)legitimizing certain policy options in turn, can recast policy debates, alter frames, introduce new instruments, and ultimately change policy outcomes.

22.2 Core research questions So far, the existing literature on Article 13 has focused mainly on analyzing the reasons behind the emergence of a EU anti-discrimination policy. An older and more developed literature has focused on the fight against gender discrimination in the EU (on the comparative impact of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, see Guiraudon 2001a). There have been several comparative studies on the dynamics of mobilization and policy change induced by compliance to Article 119 (now 141) EC Treaty and subsequent secondary law such as the Equal Pay and Equal Treatment directive. A characteristic of this body of work is an emphasis on litigation strategies using EC legislation to foster change at the national level (see Wobbe 2003 for a more sociological approach to EU law in this area). I briefly review this literature and sum up its contributions and shortcomings in the next two paragraphs. Alter and Vargas (2000) have argued that the EU legal system enabled domestic groups in the United Kingdom and provided a means of altering the balance of power to force the Thatcher government to implement reforms to enhance gender equality. In their contribution to one of the early volumes using the concept of Europeanization, Caporaso and Jupille (2001) compare national responses to the Equal Pay and Equal Treatment directive in the UK and France using the notion of “goodness of fit” between European legislation and domestic structures. For Europeanization (understood as domestic structural change) to occur, there must be adaptive pressures (a “misfit” between EU and national law) and a mediating institution in a strong position in relation to decision makers and supported by active interest groups. This was the case in the UK, not in France. Tesoka (1999) also focuses on EU equality discrimination and its impact on national opportunity structures in the fight against gender discrimination, adding the German case to the study of France and the UK. Her meticulous analysis of the conditions under which EU legislation can lead to successful domestic mobilization for change alerts us to the many possible variables that

298

Policies

could affect “Europeanization” although, in the end, one factor stands out: the existence of a strong women’s movement that had a positive attitude towards litigation strategy in general and something to gain from using EU as opposed to domestic law. It is interesting to contrast the studies on gender compared to those on race/ethnicity or other grounds such as age and disability. Article 119 (now 141) has been in force since the treaty of Rome as opposed to Article 13 which came into existence following the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the relevant directives on gender date back to the 1970s. This means that scholars have a lot more hindsight and can also analyze the development of case law. This is a mixed blessing. The literature is limited to EU legal norms as the European source of change and litigation as a measure of “Europeanization”. The use of referrals to the ECJ as a variable permits quantitative analysis and is a reassuring tangible measure. Yet, soft norms and non-binding mechanisms such as the Open Method of Coordination could also have an effect on domestic structures and they are not taken into account. In fact, in the very case of gender equality, legal routes were exhausted by the 1980s and EU policy has been reframed and non-binding instruments are in force: “Mainstreaming” and the inclusion of gender equality in the European Employment Strategy national action plans. Conversely, there may be less possibilities for the domestic use of “hard” EU norms: this has been due to treaty reform including the explicit reference to subsidiarity in the Amsterdam treaty and European Court of Justice case law developments (see for example Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, C-450/93, ECR [1995] I-3051, against a positive action scheme for the employment of women in a German Land). One of the contributions of the aforementioned literature on gender is its capacity to explain change. The studies on gender view EU norms strategically as an opportunity for domestic interest groups that face challenges at home in a way reminiscent of the “boomerang” metaphor in Keck and Sikkink’s book on transnational contention (1998): resource-poor groups using international organizations against their own government. Notwithstanding, these conclusions are based on one emblematic case where change occurred: the United Kingdom. The main puzzle seems to explain resistance to change or lack of change in the other member states rather than “Europeanization in one country.” In this respect, approaches that can loosely be labeled “historical institutionalist” (Hall and Taylor 1996) may be more appropriate since they highlight the staying power of institutions that include norms or shared understandings and their filtering role in the face of exogenous change. EU legislation goes through cognitive filters at national level. Notably, Ostner and Lewis (1995) have argued that gender equality does not have the same meaning in different national settings, ranging from equality as sameness to equality of difference. Similarly, the idea of the family and the organization of work differ. This may result in

Virginie Guiraudon 299

different interpretations of EU norms. In any case, national regimes may be slower to change than the political opportunity structure approach to Europeanization suggests. While the literature on gender equality has focused almost exclusively on the implementation of EU legal norms, this is not the case of the research on Article 13. In the latter case, scholars envisaged the possibility of an effect of the emergence of EU competence in this area before there were any EU legal norms. And they address the relationship between the ways in which the EU level gained policy competence in the area and the consequences in return in national and local political settings. There has also been some limited attention for the issue of Europeanization qua effects in the form of changes in domestic policies, structures, norms and practices, particularly in studies focusing on France and the United Kingdom and on accession countries. These studies assess the situation both before and after the adoption of binding EU rules, and focus on vertical and horizontal sources of “Europe.” I discuss them below. I should mention, however, that anti-discrimination has also been dealt with in studies on related issues including immigration and citizenship (Vink 2005; see also Lavenex’s chapter in this volume). First, let us clarify the theoretical debates in the field of immigration, citizenship and anti-discrimination that prompted the studies on EU-level politics and national developments. Sociologist Soysal argued in Limits of Citizenship (1994) that international organizations and transnational actors diffused “postnational norms”: new understandings of belonging, participation in the polity and rights that de-linked citizenship and nationality. While thoughtprovoking and elegant, her argument was undermined by later studies that failed to find any evidence of post-national frames in national claims-making (see, for instance, Koopmans and Statham 2003). In any case, throughout the 1990s, as new policy-making powers were conferred to the EU, a polemic raged between “globalists”, such as Soysal, and scholars that insisted on the nationstate-centered character of policies towards ethnic minorities (Joppke 1999). It spurred interest in the capacity of a supranational set of institutions such as the EU to drive change at the domestic level, as had in a limited way the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (Checkel 2001; Guiraudon 2001a). In one of the first articles on the Europeanization of immigration policy that analyzed the anti-discrimination agenda, Favell (2001) used sociologist Bourdieu’s notion of “field” and argued that to mobilize in the EU context required the knowledge of local norms and practices known as habitus in Bourdieu’s theory, which only certain actors had: NGO activists who could mobilize expert networks and make alliances with Commission insiders. This in a way meant that policy could not be elaborated by the beneficiaries of the policy, such as migrant communities, as the latter did not have the resources of these euroactors

300

Policies

and remained state-centered. Concomitant research also emphasized the success of initiatives by lobby-like structures whose EU savvy included interpersonal relations with the members of relevant Directorate Generals such as Employment and Social Affairs, the knowledge of emerging agendas that they could exploit to carve out a space for new policy issues, and more generally a knowledge of EU law and institutional dynamics (Geddes 2001a; Guiraudon 2001b). This was the case of the Migration Policy Group that mobilized a group of Anglo-Dutch lawyer-activists who combined a strong commitment to antidiscrimination legislation with a high level of EU-related technical know-how. They coordinated the Starting Line Group, founded in 1992, that asked for the inclusion of an anti-discrimination article in the Treaty, and with 300 signatories proved a successful campaign since Article 13 greatly resembles their original proposal. Their success is not only explained by their organizational structure, but also because their call for new provisions located in the EU’s first pillar drew on the “market integration” principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment. They argued that the absence of anti-discrimination provisions impeded the operation of the single market by, for instance, acting as a barrier to movement by people of immigrant and ethnic minority origin who feared racist discrimination when exercising EU rights. They also linked their proposal to the “social exclusion” policy frame that was developing in the early 1990s (Geddes 2001). This frame was more successful than the “citizenship” frame that migrant organizations of the EU Migrants’ Forum used. Still, the fact that the group that spearheaded the initiative for Article 13 did not build upon nation-centered movements and used a frame that only resonated in the UK and the Netherlands meant that, at the national level, there would be an uphill battle to render Article 13 effective in practice and to “socialize” national actors to this “antidiscrimination” policy paradigm. The same could be said of the other EU lobbies that lobbied for antidiscrimination. Around a dozen of mostly British activists and academics lobbied in the early 1990s for a civil rights model for disability. This model was imported from the US and especially from California via conferences, trips by European activists and most prominently the UN. The Commission financed their network-building project Helios II with one of the action programs in the fight against social exclusion, which provided a useful idea-sharing space for advocacy. They then joined the groups speaking for ethnic and racial minorities and gay and lesbian rights. Only three of the EU 25 had civil rights disability rights laws before the directive based on Article 13 was adopted and several member states have requested extra time for compliance (see Burke 2004). During the first months of 2000, there was an acceleration of negotiations at EU level based on Article 13 (this section is based on Geddes and Guiraudon

Virginie Guiraudon 301

2004). On February 3rd, a coalition government was formed in Austria with the extreme-right party of Jörg Haider receiving six of ten full ministerial posts. At an informal meeting of the Ministers for Employment and Social Affairs in Lisbon the following week, the Belgian and French ministers were the most vocal in calling for a quarantining of the new Austrian government. To match word with deed, EU negotiations on the race directive accelerated. This was so because for some key member states (France and Germany) anti-discrimination is synonymous with anti-racism and resonates with post-war attempts to fight the ideas of the extreme-right – not, as in the UK, with the management of migrant minorities. The linkage between the anti-discrimination package and the Austrian far right ensured not only that the dossier would be given priority, but also that the Austrian delegation would be extremely cooperative during the negotiations, as well as the German one for fear of being associated with Austria. Having affirmed their political will in the summit conclusions, the ministers left the Social Affairs Council working group to negotiate behind closed doors. Most participants mentioned the fact that Community legislation and jurisprudence on gender equality derived from Article 119 EC provided a frame of reference for the directive on racial discrimination. This was particularly so for France that had a good track record with respect to gender but little experience with anti-discrimination. The reference to gender equality was, however, partly misleading with respect to at least one crucial point: indirect discrimination. With the exception of the UK, member states gather statistics on the basis of gender, not on the basis of race. The French in fact refused to accept statistics as the legal basis to prove indirect racial discrimination in the courts. Linkages to the fight against xenophobia and an equal opportunity framework inherited from the EU gender and equal treatment legislation accelerated negotiations. In fact, the race directive was adopted with unprecedented speed. This prevented input from potential opposition by employers and national bureaucratic actors, while giving weight to the European Parliament whose opinion was needed for the race directive to come into force. The EP had shown a willingness to pursue the kinds of ideas advanced by pro-migrant lobby groups whose framing of the issue was recognizable in the context of British and Dutch responses to anti-discrimination. In some respect, the policy lobbies who knew Brussels had no social or organizational base that they could activate at the national level when seeking to socialize actors into a new (imported) policy model. So that their success at the Euro-level does not imply an easy implementation in practice of the EU law based on Article 13. Indeed, anti-discrimination law requires judicial activism on the part of NGOs, yet national NGOs did not partake “bottom up” in the Brussels-based initiatives. The two processes of shifting competence to the EU and seizing upon EU legal opportunities may well involve different actors that

302

Policies

had not previously been in contact with one another. For example, in France, SOS Racisme, an NGO that has launched testing strategies in the area of race/ethnicity and is involved in anti-discrimination case law, never attended Brussels meetings of the Starting Line Group, which they considered irrelevant given their media-friendly repertoire of action. The groups that lobbied for anti-discrimination provisions to protect ethnic minorities or the disabled wished to induce reform through a reframing of existing policies. Yet a change of frame at EU level may not necessarily result in “thick learning” by national actors if the frame has multiple possible meanings or is a catch-all concept as is often the case in EU policies (“social exclusion”, “sustainable development”, …). If the adoption of policies was necessary to join the EU, as was the case for candidate countries, strategic behavior does not exclude social learning in theory, yet may seem unlikely. The jury is still out on the actual extent, degree, and type of change one should expect at the domestic level. What is interesting, however, is that among states that have complied with the two EU directives from 2000 there is still a lot of variation in the ways in which they have done so and the effect that will have in the implementation of the laws. One example regards the setting up of independent bodies: there can be one body for all grounds of discrimination or there can be several bodies specialized in issues such as race or handicap. Activists favor the latter option to avoid the dilution of issues rather than the “cost-saving” one size fits all antidiscrimination agency. There is also variation in the ways in which member states have gone further than was required. One illustration concerns the grounds for discrimination. Several member states chose to leave the list of potential victims open; others specified grounds not found in EU texts. In November 2001, the French parliament examined the transposition of the directive on race discrimination (law no. 2001–1066 of 16 November 2001). On the one hand, parliamentarians added grounds for discrimination not mentioned in the directive including the person’s name and residential address (denoting a foreign origin or residence in a “bad” neighborhood), thereby displaying a will to appropriate EU legislation in a way relevant to the French situation on the ground. On the other hand, they skillfully managed to seem to comply with provisions on indirect discrimination without giving courts the means to apply them. They introduced the concept in French labor law, yet without authorizing the collection of statistics on the socioeconomic characteristics of ethnic and racial groups that could help prove in court that they were victims of indirect discrimination. Just focusing on compliance does not help us seeing variation in actual outcomes and answering the question on policy convergence or divergence.

Virginie Guiraudon 303

22.3 Key problems Four theoretical and methodological problems that can be found in the Europeanization literature are illustrated in this section by research on EU antidiscrimination policy. First, the Europeanization literature that relies on the notion of “goodness of fit” overlooks cases where the fit is a priori “good”. This problem leads to a selection bias on the “dependent variable” with a focus on change in domestic laws and practices. Having one’s policy paradigm become a European “model”, however, can re-legitimate policy actors or instruments under fire in member states. This is clearly the case for the UK and the Netherlands, the only two member states that had developed an anti-discrimination policy that resembled and in fact inspired the NGOs that lobbied for Article 13 and the “race” directive. In these countries we saw an emphasis on (direct and indirect) discrimination in employment and provision of goods and services beyond just racist behavior, civil suits, and also an independent body to examine complaints, as well as ethnic monitoring. When the EU directives were discussed and thereafter, past policies in both the UK and the Netherlands had suffered major criticism. In the UK, there was a debate on the inability of the measures designed to eradicate racist discrimination to have any tangible socioeconomic impact in some parts of the country and for some ethnic minority groups. This agonizing debate came in the wake of the 1998 inquiry into the police investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence that revealed a culture of institutional racism and continued after the adoption of the directive with the “race riots” in Oldham in 2001. In the Netherlands, anti-discrimination had been a central element in ethnic minority policy after a turn away from multiculturalism after 1989. Yet, as in the UK, politicians underlined the “failure of integration” of ethnic minorities and called for the end of diversity and anti-discrimination policies. The tone of the discourse has become harsher after the 2002 electoral success of Pim Fortuyn’s party and reforms are now under way. In fact, the “positive action” dispositif, the 1998 SAMEN Wet (Act for Stimulation of Labor Market Participation) which explicitly called for the monitoring of minorities with the aim of achieving a multicultural workplace in the Netherlands by publishing the numbers of members of minorities in companies of more than 35 employees was terminated at the end of 2003. Thus local anti-discrimination bureaus and national NGOs and other bodies, including the Equal Treatment Commission itself, are referring to EU legislation and UN commitments to legitimize their positions. NGOs are also active in responding to call for tenders to compensate for the disengagement of Dutch public authorities. In sum, the potential for an “effect” of EU policy can also be expected in countries that face little adaptational pressure in juridical terms and seem “frontrunners” in the field, if only because of political backlash. After all, it has been convincingly argued in the case of

304

Policies

postwar human rights regimes, international legal instruments are meant to “lock in” domestic acquis, in other words prevent new governments from getting rid of protective laws (Moravscik 2000). Second, the Europeanization literature generally takes EU rules as a stable independent variable and assumes that EU institutions such as the Commission diffuse the same message and put the same emphasis on all member states. Yet, the member states least likely to implement EU guidelines may be targeted during the implementation period, and there may also be different aspects of policies that are stressed, or different messages transmitted to domestic actors. In the case of anti-discrimination policy, this can be illustrated by comparing demands towards new and old member states. It should be noted that when ten new states joined the EU in 2004, they had been previously asked to comply with Article 13 as part of the acquis communautaire (Hughes and Sasse 2003). This is an example of “conditionality Europeanization”, whereby candidate countries are under considerable pressure to adapt as a condition to join the EU (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Some of the Central and Eastern European states actually complained that they were held up to a higher standard with respect to minorities than the old member states – the “double standard issue” (see Grabbe 2001). The CEE countries are still targeted by Commission actions in particular with respect to their treatment of Roma populations, the only ethnic group that is explicitly targeted as victims of discrimination. The Commission in implementing the Action Plan has emphasized that “The total number of Roma in Europe today is estimated to be at least eight million, with the majority living in central and eastern Europe. Following enlargement, the Roma will become one of the largest ethnic minority groups in the EU” (Commission of the European Communities 2001b). In other words, although there are Roma populations in the old member states, the pressure and attention is directed at new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. In brief, there is no uniform pressure that member states must adapt to, no equality among candidate states and, after accession, between new and old member states. This is visible in other areas such as the establishment of ethnic and racial discrimination monitoring systems and seems commonsensical. Why would the Commission try to preach to the converted? The energy is concentrated on converting the unbelievers such as the French demographers and statisticians. A French-led team was in charge of the Commission-financed project on the measurement of discrimination (MEDIS) so that their compatriots could not dismiss the idea as totally foreign. This means that, in selecting cases for study, there is a need to take into account the varying attention of EU institutions in charge of supervising implementation and “keeping the pressure on.” In brief, the Commission addresses perceived laggards much more strongly than member states considered to be policy leaders (here the UK and the Netherlands).

Virginie Guiraudon 305

Third, more attention should be paid to the various mechanisms of Europeanization. There is already a distinction between direct and indirect pressure from the EU, between different types of laws (hard and soft norms), and between negative and positive integration requirements, but these typologies require further modeling and testing. Regarding the latter, I mean that studies rarely adopt a comprehensive approach, because of theoretical or methodological bias, while it may be fruitful to trace different mechanisms of change. This in turn requires a better specification of the mechanisms themselves and a need to link them to the type of change expected. In the case of anti-discrimination, EU soft norms, or instruments such as “monitoring” and “benchmarking”, have had more impact in certain countries than the required transposition of the directives. Typically, in all EU member states, no data were gathered on discrimination, except for the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands. Monitoring ethnic, racial and religious discrimination requires that groups are categorized according to race/ ethnicity/ religion and that studies are conducted. This was not the case even in countries as France that already had anti-discrimination laws leading to (a few) criminal cases each year. The very idea of monitoring groups and then tracking discrimination in employment and the provision of goods and services, especially in politically explosive areas such as (social) housing, has created debates among expert publics such as demographers and intellectual and political elites. There have also been divisions among business interests – with some firms wanting to seem proactive in this area and others resenting the intrusion – and among civil society actors. While the transposition of the directives may take years to produce tangible effects because of the slow and costly dynamics of judicial activism, the managerial EU norms of “benchmarking” and “monitoring” have already fed debates in member states that preferred “color-blind” policies. Monitoring is also the reason behind the building of institutions such as independent national anti-discrimination bodies and commission reports by consultancy groups such as the Migration Policy Group that will keep the issue alive after the issue of compliance with EU legislation is dealt with. Fourth and finally, it is crucial to distinguish EU sources of change from cross-border influence, or from global or other European supranational actors. The development of EU policies takes place alongside other processes of internationalization and regional integration. Furthermore, horizontal influences, whereby policy ideas and instruments in one state are imitated in another, should not be neglected. In brief, Europeanization is a sub-field within the larger study of the impact of international norms on the domestic level which includes cross-national policy transfers and norms diffusion via international organizations. In the case of anti-discrimination, many of the policy frames and instruments come from the US and Canada. The countries that adopted anti-discrimination policy before EU law in this area had looked across the Atlantic: the UK had

306

Policies

modeled their race relations system on the US model (Bleich 2003), the Dutch had borrowed from the Canadian equal opportunities policy when adopting positive action schemes in employment (Guiraudon et al. 2005), British, Irish and Swedish disability activists have been inspired by the US civil “rights revolution”. EU lobbies mobilized these frames to the extent that they echoed existing EU existing agendas. When national-based actors are now invoking EU norms, they may do this as a new resource to justify reforms that they have observed in non-EU countries or simply to overturn the existing balance of power without caring too much about the origin of the new legal norms. In some areas, such as racial discrimination and disability, one could argue that international institutions such as the UN and the Council of Europe had already familiarized activists with the policy models and all the activists needed from the EU was its legal and financial clout. In any case, the EU does not produce ideas, it produces compromises and activates mechanisms for change such as benchmarking or legal recourse. In the case of compliance by the new member states of the EU, pressure from the EU in the form of conditionality took place alongside the efforts of other organizations such as the Council of Europe or the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (Checkel 2000; Kelley 2004b). So if the research agenda is about EU-induced cognitive or normative change, research designs must take into account other international and transnational sources of change. In some sense, this may also be helpful for counterfactual reasoning if it is found that other countries or international organizations had already diffused within member states without leading to policy reform in the manner of the EU. Still, for the EU as for the others, the question of penetration within the national policy communities is important: is the EU a mere new instrument or can it question existing world views and practices? This is only part of the future agenda for research.

22.4 Conclusion At present, the literature on anti-discrimination needs to focus on current developments: domestic changes that followed the required transposition of EU directives and the effect of the Community action program. By the deadline for implementation in 2003, some member states (the United Kingdom, Belgium, Sweden and Italy) had come close to compliance while others (including Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and Spain) were real laggards. The report issued in September 2005 on implementation (Cormack and Bell 2005) noted that, with the exception of Germany and Luxembourg, which had made no

Virginie Guiraudon 307

progress towards legal implementation, most member states (17 out of 25) had complied more or less fully with the directives and many had gone beyond the requirements, for example, by adding new grounds for discrimination. Cormack and Bell noted, however, that the real issue was the application of the national laws in practice as the number of cases brought forward remained low. I would further argue that “compliance” masks great differences in the institutions set up to monitor discrimination, in particular the equal treatment bodies that should be set up according to the directives. Whether the body covers all grounds for discrimination or one is set up for each, the budget and staff that is allocated to it, the stature of the members chosen, all these features will lead to a very different leverage and visibility and ultimately impacts on policy outcomes. To take into account the remarks made earlier in the chapter, avoiding a narrow focus on EU legislation and case selection are essential. Comparative approaches focusing on paired case studies would seem an interesting research strategy. If the focus is on trying to understand the meaning of EU “pressure,” this type of methodology implies that two member states that were precursors in the policy area (trend setters) should be compared to one another as well as to two member states with no prior legislation in this area and with a demonstrable reluctance for complying with the new EU policy (laggards). Old and new member states with similar policy “baselines” (ex ante situation with respect to minorities such as Roma or similar lack of legislation) could also be compared. If the focus of the study is instead on the role played by EU legislation in relation to other sources of change, in-depth studies of the domestic struggles among actors in areas affected by anti-discrimination legislation and the role played by the new EU vocabulary should also be promising (and could complement counterfactual analysis, see Haverland 2005). A variety of contentanalysis techniques can be used to understand the role of EU frames. Interviewing actors involved in domestic power struggles is also useful as long as they are not induced to appear “politically correct” by invoking EU legislation that they would otherwise ignore – with questions such as “do you think the EU plays an important role in … ?”

Key readings Alter, K. and J. Vargas (2000) Explaining Variation in the Use of European Litigation Strategies. European Community Law and British Gender Equality Policy. Comparative Political Studies, 33(4) 452–82. Caporaso, J. and J. Jupille (2001) The Europeanization of Gender Equality Policy and Domestic Structural Change. In Green Cowles et al., 21–44.

308

Policies

Cormack, J. and M. Bell (2005) Developing Anti-discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 EU Member States compared. Brussels: European network of independent experts in the antidiscrimination field (European Human Consultancy Migration Policy Group). Geddes, A. and V. Guiraudon (2004) Britain, France, and EU Antidiscrimination Policy: The Emergence of an EU Policy Paradigm. West European Politics, 27(2) 334–53. Sasse, G. and E. Thielemann (eds) (2005) Special issue: Migrants and Minorities in Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies, 43(4).

23 Asylum Policy Sandra Lavenex

23.1 Introduction In few other fields of Europeanization is the interplay between international institutions and norms, cooperation at the EU level and domestic policy making as intricate as in the case of asylum policy. Originally a domestic humanitarian commitment, enshrined in national constitutions and laws and safeguarded by an international regime, its place on the EU agenda was the result of different dynamics. On the one hand, the decision to abolish controls at the internal borders created a functional spill-over for cooperation on the entry of what became the “third country nationals”, including asylum seekers. On the other hand, the completion of the single market coincided with the increasing politicization of asylum policy in influential member states, which successfully “uploaded” their domestic problems onto the EU agenda. Nearly twenty years after the start of European cooperation, asylum policy has developed rapidly from a peripheral question linked to the realization of the single market to a prominent issue in the European integration process. As shown in the Amsterdam and the Constitutional Treaty, cooperation in this area has expanded from the more limited aspect of responsibility allocation for the examination of asylum claims as agreed in the 1990 Dublin Convention to the ambitious aim of a common European asylum system. Whereas the Dublin Convention merely stipulated the mutual recognition of asylum determination procedures and outcomes, asylum cooperation today covers a broad range of positive integration measures. These range from a harmonized approach towards subsidiary forms of protection to the adoption of minimum standards in the areas of admission, asylum procedures, a harmonized definition of the term refugee, and common policies towards they countries of origin and transit of asylum seekers and refugees. This substantive expansion is not without consequences for the political profile of the EU and its identity in the world. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights reflects the normative implications of 309

310

Policies

creating a common European asylum policy and enshrines, in Article 18, commitment to the international refugee regime and the right to seek asylum. In this chapter, I will argue that this “career” of asylum policy in the EU system is intricately linked to the normative foundations of the asylum right and the interplay between cooperation at the European level and legal and constitutional constraints at the level of the member states. It is the outflow of the internal institutional dynamics in the European multi-level system where cooperation first started by “negative integration”, resulting in a differential pattern of adaptation in the member states, which then created the need for more “positive integration” through common EU policies, including the constitutionalization of the normative foundations of refugee law. In terms of our understanding of Europeanization, the existing literature on asylum policy highlights three arguments, which may or may not be specific to this policy field: the limits of a unidirectional understanding of causation in the effects of Europeanization and the need for a more circular perspective on the relationship between processes at the level of the EU and of the member states; the difficulty to separate the impact in terms of politics, polity and policies; and, last, but not least, the need to look at the interplay between politics and norms in the Europeanization of this policy field. The chapter concludes with some suggestions of areas for further research.

23.2 Core research questions Notwithstanding current debates on the heuristic value of the term Europeanization and the absence of a common definition, there is a growing consensus around studies that understand by it the institutional and legislative impact of European integration at the national level of the member states, or, put differently, “a process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to European integration” (Hix and Goetz 2000: 26; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002a). This section begins with a short critique of the general usage of the concept of Europeanization from a policy perspective and then presents the four main strands of research dealing with the transformative impact of the developing European cooperation in the area of asylum policy. Starting from the definition of Europeanization cited above, in the application to policy change, most studies follow an implementation perspective. This perspective takes the output of European policy-making processes as its point of departure and focuses on the conditions for its implementation at the domestic level. A national policy – in this case asylum policy – becomes Europeanized if and when the relevant European provisions have been translated in domestic laws and administrative procedures. In our field, but probably also in others, such an approach has a number of shortcomings.

Sandra Lavenex 311

The first question that arises is: what is being Europeanized? What is the object of Europeanization? The problem with the above definition of Europeanization would imply that a country’s asylum policy is Europeanized when this country has made all legislative and administrative changes necessary to implement the relevant EU acquis. But what happens when the EU acquis consists only of a small number of binding policy instruments, as it stands today, when it has focused on “negative integration” through the promotion of the mutual recognition of national asylum systems, and when the few examples of “positive” common rules are fraught with exception clauses, such the 2004 asylum procedures and refugee status directives? A related point is what such an approach implies for our understanding or asylum policy. A narrow juridical conceptualization of Europeanization may bias our view on what constitutes a policy field as it necessarily focuses our attention on those measures already adopted at the European level and obscures all measures which have been discussed but where no political agreement was attained as well as all those aspects of a policy which have not even reached the European agenda. Furthermore, it discloses our attention from the more structural impact of European integration on the way social problems are perceived and the frames of reference that guide political action. The second question emerging from the predominant usage of the term Europeanization concerns which people – or, more often, which countries or governments – are affected by these processes – and whether these effects are limited to states alone or whether it would also make sense to extend the circle of actors concerned to international organizations and NGOs active in the field. The transnational nature of asylum flows and the international codification of refugee law suggest a widening of the scope of Europeanization to include also non-member states and international organizations or institutions. The existing literature on the impact of EU asylum policies reflects these broader effects of what one may term Europeanization, although not all of this work has done so under that label. In fact, most work on this topic has been conducted by migration scholars who are more concerned with the policy field itself than with the intricacies of EU politics and policy making. Roughly, four perspectives can be distinguished in the literature, which each approach the topic from with a slightly different set of core questions. Firstly, more constructivist or interpretative approaches which analyze the changing normative and ideational foundations of asylum policies in Europe; secondly, institutionalist studies that take the relationship between intergovernmental and supranational elements in the EU polity as the central dependent variable; and, thirdly, studies that deal more explicitly with the interplay between the domestic level of the member states and EU developments. More recent research looks at the external effects of Europeanization beyond the circle of the member states, that is third countries and international organizations and regimes. Although

312

Policies

strictly speaking only the third group of studies establishes an explicit link with what has been conceptualized as Europeanization research, it will be argued in the next section that all four perspectives need to be taken into account in order to grasp the transformative impact of European integration on asylum policy in Europe and beyond. The core question for constructivist or interpretative scholars with regard to EU asylum policy cooperation concerns the changes in the substance of this policy with a focus on the discourses, practices, norms and values that shape the rights and perils of asylum seekers and refugees. The main thrust of this sociological and political science literature is the investigation of the processes of securitization in this policy field – that is, the dynamics by which refugee policy and immigration more generally have been reframed from a humanitarian or, in the latter case, economic issue into a potential threat to receiving societies and states. Whereas Bigo (2001) stresses the role of transgovernmental networks of law and order officials in strengthening the security practice and discourse linking migration and security, Huysmans (2000) and Waever (1995; cf. Waever et al. 1993) highlight a broader, more structural impact of European integration. According to Huysmans (2000: 753), “the explicit privileging of nationals of Member States in contrast to third-country nationals and the generally restrictive regulation of migration sustains a wider process of de-legitimating the presence of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. EU policies support, often indirectly, expressions of welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural homogeneity as a stabilizing factor”. Although in more abstract terms, Waever (1995: 404) too detects a tension between European integration, national identities and migration: “A nation will only allow integration when it is secure that its national identity will be not be threatened, that it may even be strengthened by its exposure to different identities”. Without abiding to a constructivist theoretical perspective, the emphasis on security aspects to the detriment of the human rights dimension of asylum and immigration policies has also been at the center of more policy-oriented analyses by sociologists (e.g. Brochmann and Hammar 1999) or political scientists (e.g. Van Selm-Thorburn 1998). Finally, the normative substance of European asylum and immigration policies is also the main concern of a rich body of literature by migration scholars from a legal background who usually discuss the trend towards securitization in the context of international refugee law (Guild 2003, 2005; Noll 2000). From this perspective, the weakness of institutionalized human rights norms and of legal scrutiny in the early framework of cooperation in the EU has provided a platform to circumvent international obligations. In the EU institutional framework, in the words of Noll (2003: 295), “control continues to enjoy a first mover’s advantage over protection”, thus slowly transforming the driving principles of refugee law in Europe.

Sandra Lavenex 313

Focusing on the intricacies of policy making in the EU, a second body of research approaches the topic from a more institutionalist point of view and focuses on the relationship between intergovernmental and supranational elements in the development of this policy field. Recalling the traditional debates in European integration studies, Geddes (2000, 2001b) reviews contending explanations for the shift of asylum and immigration policies from the national to the European level. These are a neofunctionalist logic with “policy harmonization arising from single market integration and broader global economic and political change” against an intergovernmentalist “escape to Europe” thesis which states “a conscious shift to cooperation and integration at EU level because this actually facilitates the attainment of restrictive policy objectives” (Geddes 2001b: 108). This latter interpretation has been put forward eloquently by Guiraudon (2000) with the notion of “vertical venue-shopping”. Other authors, such as Kostakopoulou (2000) or Uçarer (2001), have focused on the powers of supranational actors in this field and the conditions for Communitarization, understood as the transfer of competences and rules from the national to the European level. A common assumption in this literature is that a greater empowerment of the Commission and the European Parliament would be preconditions for a comprehensive and balanced European approach to asylum. The analyses concur that cooperation has hitherto been driven by a transgovernmental framework which has limited common action to the aspect of immigration control and measures to reduce the flow of asylum seekers to the main receiving countries. Harmonization of national policies in contrast has been much more difficult to achieve, it has taken more than ten years to agree on common directives on minimum standards for asylum procedures or the interpretation of refugee states, and these directives contain so many exceptions and room for national discretion that they hardly challenge the status quo in asylum countries. The third group of studies focuses more explicitly on the interplay between developments at the EU level and policy reforms in the member states. Combining a social-constructivist focus on the role of policy frames with institutionalist approaches, Lavenex (2001b, 2006) has argued that in order to achieve a de-securitization of European asylum cooperation, institutional reforms alone will not suffice. Rather, this would require the emulation of traditionally national normative foundations of the asylum right in the EU framework, such as now envisaged with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Constitutional Treaty. The absence of institutionalized human rights norms in the EU framework, the lack of jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice and the exclusive Council arena, where interior ministers dominate, have favored a securitarian framing of cooperation that allowed to circumvent normative (constitutional) and political constraints on restrictive asylum

314

Policies

reforms traditional asylum countries, in particular Germany and France. This impact of Europeanization was particularly salient in the parliamentary debates surrounding the restriction of the constitutional asylum rights in the two countries and in the verdict of the German Constitutional Court of 1996, which legitimized the restrictive asylum law as a basis for a comprehensive European refugee policy aiming at the establishment of a common system of burdensharing (Rulings of the German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerGE 2 BvR 1938/93 and 2 BvR 2315/93 of 14 May 1996, §1). Considering that after these incisive changes, refugee policies in both countries showed little signs of a European impact, it can be concluded that for these main destination countries of asylum seekers, Europeanization has mainly consisted in the weakening of normative and juridical constraints on the reform of originally very liberal asylum laws. Considering at the case of a “small” European country, the Netherlands, Vink (2002) finds that important asylum reforms in the 1990s which implemented European decisions were not justified in terms of adoption of the EU acquis but with reference to the need to adapt to restrictive changes in a neighboring country, Germany. Therefore, Vink concludes that the impact of Europeanization has been small. Yet, Lavenex would counter that the need to adapt to Germany wouldn’t have been there without the transformative impact of the Schengen and Dublin Conventions on the German reforms, therefore pointing at the interdependence of and multiple feed-back loops of Europeanization processes in the different member states. As will be argued further below, the transformative impact of European cooperation consists not only of the vertical effects of European rules on an individual member state, but also the horizontal repercussions of domestic changes on other interdependent member states, even when the latter no longer refer explicitly to the European sources of a particular provision. The same is true for a third category of countries – the former transit countries of Southern and Central-Eastern Europe. It is in these countries that the strongest independent impact of Europeanization has been observed. Given the weakness or, in some cases, absence of asylum laws and institutions prior to “Europeanization”, EU requirements were the main drivers of contemporary asylum policies in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (see Baldwin-Edwards 1997; Nascimbene 2000; Schuster 2000) and also in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs). Here, asylum reforms have been shaped by accession conditionality, and have reflected the ambiguous priorities of the European approach. The trajectory of reforms proceeded in three phases, starting in the early 1990s with the adoption of fairly general asylum legislation in the Visegrad countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland); moving to a second wave of restrictive reforms in all candidate countries adopting the main elements of the Schengen and Third Pillar acquis in the second half of the 1990s; and in recent years a third wave of more balanced policy changes

Sandra Lavenex 315

which are basically a reaction to the deficits identified by the European Commission in its annual reports on progress towards accession. Given the hitherto limited and fragmented nature of the EU acquis in asylum matters, however, these changes are less the result of the domestic implementation of supranational legislation than the product of intergovernmental processes of policy transfer by individual EU member states towards their neighboring countries (Lavenex 1999, 2002; Byrne et al. 2002; Wallace and Stola 2001). Finally, with the growing external dimension of EU asylum policies, scholars have started to examine their impact on non-EU countries and international organizations (Boswell 2003; Lavenex and Uçarer 2002, 2004). Here, it could be shown that the external effects of European policies on third countries is not limited to the immediate neighbors of the Union, but extend through trade and association agreements further afield. They are the result of both unintentional externalities of common policies and – increasingly – also purposeful external action on part of the Union and the member states. On the part of the third countries, effects take place along a continuum that runs from fully voluntary to more constrained forms of adaptation including the use of conditionality. This external dimension has been referred to as strategy of “remote control” beyond the territory of the own jurisdiction (Zolberg 2003; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000), but is increasingly also becoming one of “remote protection” (Lavenex 2006). The main elements in this strategy are the safe third country notion; the conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries; the promotion of immigration control facilities in third countries through transfer of know-how, technology and legislation in the framework of association agreements; and, finally, the more recent plans uttered by member governments but also the EU Commission to process requests for protection in the region of origin or in “transit procession centers” outside the EU border, and to admit only successful applicants on the common territory (Noll 2003). These external effects are also promoted through overlapping but not mutually inclusive membership in pertinent international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the International Organization for Migration, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The fact that the latter has itself proposed a model for “remote protection” as a reaction to the calls of member states’ governments shows how much the organization is itself affected by the developments in the EU (Van der Klaauw 2002). The EU’s weight in the world, its presence in international organizations but also its important role as carrier of ideas and normative power (Manners 2002) highlights the more ideational impact of Europeanization beyond the question of legal adaptation on the principles and norms that shape international cooperation in a given policy area. In this perspective, the EU’s impact consists in the projection of normative templates, of models how to deal with particular social problems. The legitimacy or superiority of these European solutions derives from the liberal

316

Policies

democratic tradition of Western European states, and the fact that in addition to being in the EU, these are mostly also important promoters of multilateral frameworks and international regimes.

23.3 Key problems Whereas the core questions identified above continue to be relevant, the way they have been put in the existing literature raise a number of issues for clarification for the analytical concept of Europeanization: firstly, the relationship between formal “obligations” and more ideational dynamics in the process of Europeanization; secondly, the interdependence between Communitarization and Europeanization in the differential impact on the member states; and, thirdly, the interplay between Europeanization within the Union and the evolving external dimension of cooperation in this field. The first point refers to the relationship between a formally rather limited EU acquis and the way we conceive of the impact of Europeanization. Is a domestic asylum system Europeanized because it observes the acquis, or does Europeanization rather consist in a broader normative reorientation in the approach towards refugee protection? And which consequences do these questions raise for the theories and methods with which we study Europeanization? As the interpretative studies quoted above argue, European integration can exert a more structural impact on overarching discourses and representations of social problems – quite independently from the production of actual legislation. In our case, Europeanization has associated more general concerns about losses of sovereignty in the process of integration symbolized in the abolition of internal border controls with those about the entry of foreigners, thus contributing to the already ongoing securitization of immigration and asylum issues in the member states. The adoption of a more ideational notion of Europeanization makes it very difficult to separate the impact of the EU from other dynamics impacting on national asylum discourses. Whereas the relationship between the EU and domestic processes is pretty clear-cut in the case of the transposition of an EU directive which can be directly retraced in the legislative process, the effects of framing processes are much more diffuse; they involve a broader range of actors and do not necessarily function in a linear causal manner. This also makes it difficult to separate counterfactually the impact of the EU from other factors impacting on the policy field. It may therefore be more accurate to speak of Europeanization as context or discourse, rather than causal factor. The strong substantive and normative focus of Europeanization research in the area of asylum policy thus has methodological implications. A narrow, legalistic view of Europeanization may be easier to reconstruct causality, when limited to the question of legal transposition. It is, however, ill-suited to grasp its qualitative, substantive impact in terms of changes in the way social problems are

Sandra Lavenex 317

defined and the overall norms and values that guide political action. Indeed, this reproach of “value-blindness” could be made for European integration studies more broadly. Probably it results from the main theoretical approaches to integration, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, in which common policies are interpreted either as a functional consequence of “real” problems or as the outflow of the domestic interests of the most powerful member states. A focus on ideas and norms may in contrast require more interpretative methodologies, and a focus on language as main indicator of processes of ideational change, such as followed by discourse or frame analysis The second problem for the Europeanization approach is related to this and concerns the analytical assumption of linearity or unidirectionality inherent in a “top-down” approach limited to the reverberation of EU policies on the member states. In order to contrast the Europeanization approach from more traditional analyses of European integration, scholars have placed a considerable emphasis on limiting it to the reverberations of European developments on the domestic level, while excluding the more bottom-up perspective by which these European developments were first promoted. As empirical studies show, however, the domestic effect of Europeanization is inherently linked to the question how far domestic problem perceptions and preferred solutions were effectively uploaded to the European level beforehand. Thus, in Germany and France, the politics behind the reforms of the constitutional asylum right in 1993 which were justified with the need to implement the Schengen and Dublin Conventions can only be fully understood if one retraces the efforts of the respective ministers of the interior to craft these European Agreements since the mid-1980s. Conversely, Europeanization had a more direct impact in the case of the southern and new central-eastern member states, which had little or no influence on the definition of the common European rules. Furthermore, Vink’s (2002) analysis on the Netherlands and Thielemann’s (2003) work on burden-sharing show that Europeanization may also work horizontally, through a “contagion” between the member states. Interdependence between the member states implies that Europeanization in one country will necessarily have implications on other member states, even if the vertical link between the latter’s domestic change and European level phenomena cannot be directly reconstructed from political discourse. The conceptual problem that arises then is how to link the more “bottom-up” perspective of the member states impacting on the EU level with the latter’s repercussions onto the domestic level. Some authors have proposed to establish this link with the notion of “goodness of fit” (Cowles et al. 2001). This notion looks at the legislative status quo of domestic laws and regulations and assumes that Europeanization is only effective when there is a certain degree of misfit between the European template and the domestic policy. Apart from again narrowing down the optic to a legalistic one, thus missing the potential structural

318

Policies

or contextual impact of Europeanization, another problem with this approach is that it misses the possibility of strategic games in which particular sections of national administrations make use of the EU arena in order to change the policy debate at the national level. A related issue concerns the long-term impact of Europeanization. To date, studies have mainly focused on its impact in terms of convergence or divergence of policy solutions. In cases where not only the policy approaches, but also the problem structures differ, an interesting point to study would be whether Europeanization, by changing the policy, also leads in the long term to stronger approximation of problem structures. For instance, in the case of asylum policy, it could be shown that policy changes under the influence of Europeanization had redistributive effects on the flows of asylum seekers between the member states and candidate countries (Vink and Meijerink 2003). An interesting question to follow concerns the consequences of changes in domestic problem structures for domestic policies – and the possible feed-back effects at the European level. This interplay between domestic pressure, Communitarization, Europeanization, domestic change, and new Communitarization is very salient in the case of asylum policy, and refers more broadly to the nature and intensity of the changes associated with the term Europeanization, and how far or under which conditions these trends are reversible. Indeed, the evolution of the harmonization agenda in asylum policy may be interpreted as a reaction to the imbalances created by Europeanization based on negative integration. Of particular importance in this context would be the asylum right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Constitutional Treaty, once the European Court of Justice has jurisdiction over this matter. This shows the necessity of adopting a more circular understanding of the processes of Europeanization, and the interplay between bottom-up and top-down processes of integration. Finally, the third key problem results from the international nature of the refugee issue and the repercussions European integration has beyond the circle of the member states. Although Olsen (2002: 937) has included the “export” of European policies in his notion of Europeanization, the external dimension of Europeanization has remained neglected. One attempt to address this challenge proposes applying concepts taken from analyses of policy transfer (Lavenex and Uçarer 2002, 2004). These concepts allow to differentiate between the intentionality and non-intentionality of external effects, the scope to which policies are being transferred (studies on policy transfer distinguish between the transfer of general principles guiding the exercise of a policy, norms, specific policy instruments, policy programs, procedures, and institutional transfer involving, for example, the creation of specialized administrative agencies dealing with asylum), and the degree to which the receiving country adapts voluntarily to the policy (by “policy learning” or “lesson drawing”) or under pressure (e.g. by conditionality). With the explicit salience of an “external dimension” in EU

Sandra Lavenex 319

asylum and immigration policies, their impact on third countries is starting to be studied more widely. Again, however, the normative impact of these changes, their effects on the principles and norms of the international refugee regime or the international organization in charge of safeguarding this regime, has mainly remain outside the scope of existing Europeanization approaches.

23.4 Conclusion The previous sections have identified three “key problems” emerging from the literature on asylum for the concept of “Europeanization”: the “normative” dimension of policy transformation, the question of how best to approach the differential impact on the member states; and how to study the effect of Europeanization on international refugee protection. In part, these “problems” may be idiosyncratic in the sense that they result from the fact that asylum policy is a very recent area of European integration and that in some respects the polity and policy may not yet have reached the “maturity” which is necessary in order to study Europeanization in its narrow sense as the implementation of “positive” EC law. As was mentioned above, cooperation has hitherto focused on “negative integration”. The cornerstone of the EU asylum system, the Dublin Convention and new regulations determining which country is responsible for examining an asylum claim does not harmonize national asylum systems, but is based upon the principle of the mutual recognition of asylum determination outcomes – as well as procedures. It has been much more difficult to agree upon common minimum standards, but the 2004 directives on asylum procedures and on the refugee definition may allow to take such a narrower view on legal transposition and implementation. Nevertheless, such a perspective may be interesting for lawyers, but it would miss the complex interplay between domestic problem structures and European outputs, thereby losing much of its explanatory potential. Therefore, rather than suggesting the future application of the “legalistic” approach to top-down Europeanization, I appeal for a broader understanding that treats Europeanization as a circular process and more as a phenomenon that need to be understood than a theoretical framework itself. A more circular understanding of Europeanization takes its point of departure in the member states, retraces their bottom-up influence on the output of European cooperation, and then evaluates the impact back onto the member states in the light of the role they played in the design of these European policies (see also Radaelli 2004: 4). The need for such a circular understanding is highlighted in both the securitization literature and the analyses of the differential impact on the member states quoted above. It is only by adopting such a broader perspective that we can understand why European provisions culminated in constitutional reforms in Germany and France, where they became part of a two-level game, and why

320

Policies

they had such a strong impact on the Southern and new member states, which had no chance to influence the process of European decision-making in the first place. Furthermore, this circular perspective also allows taking into account the feed-back effects of these processes on the European level, and the pressure for a strengthening of the normative basis of asylum law in the Charter and Constitution resulting from the “securitarian” dynamics of transgovernmental cooperation. To conclude, it could be argued that we need to look at Europeanization as a problem which we want to understand, rather than a “solution” or an explanation to the phenomenon (Radaelli 2004: 4). In this light, the different approaches addressed in this chapter would not be a sign of scholarly confusion, but rather a series of “new insights, original explanations, and interesting question”, (ibid.: 2) contributing to our understanding of the changing face of asylum policy under the influence of European integration. Yet, at the end, if Europeanization is not an “explanans” in the sense of a set of independent variables explaining an outcome, then we may well ask whether it deserves to be treated as an analytical approach at all – and how it is related to perhaps more “conventional” notions such as the constructivist and institutionalist approaches addressed in this chapter.

Key readings Huysmans, J. (2000) The European Union and the Securitization of Migration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5) 751–77. Lavenex, S. (2001) The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Normative Challenges and Institutional Legacies. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(5) 851–74. Schuster, L. (2000) A Comparative Analysis of the Asylum Policy of Seven European Governments. Journal of Refugee Studies, 13(1) 118–32. Thielemann, E.R. (2004) Why European Policy Harmonisation undermines refugee burden-sharing. European Journal of Migration and Law, 6(1) 43–61. Vink, M. (2002) Negative and Positive Integration in European Immigration Policies. European Integration online Papers, 6(13).

24 Foreign Policy Reuben Wong

24.1 Introduction The concept of “Europeanization” is of very recent vintage in the study of the domestic impact of European regional integration, in particular the impact of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), on national foreign policies. Other concepts that have been applied to the study of national foreign policies within the context of Europe – such as “Brusselsization” and “Europeification” (Allen 1998; Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002; Andersen and Eliasen 1995) describe and study the top-down impact of the EU/CFSP as a strictly Pillar II (i.e. intergovernmental) phenomenon in national foreign policy making. They focus on CFSP decisions as compromises between national foreign policies of member states rather than binding decisions from a supranational authority. They are less concerned with the interactive, bottom-up phenomenon of national inputs in CFSP; and the informal socialization of norms – both core research questions in foreign policy Europeanization. The novelty of “Europeanization” in foreign policy studies is a function of the debate on the existence of a common European foreign policy. Although the international system is populated by important non-state actors, the dominant paradigm in international relations still conceives of foreign policy as essentially the domaine réservé of sovereign governments and therefore exclusive to states. Foreign policy can be defined as “ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states, in nonstate actors, in the international economy, or in the physical environment of the world” (Holsti 1992: 82). Or as “an attempt to design, manage and control the external activities of a state so as to protect and advance agreed and reconciled objectives” (Allen 1998: 43–4). The problem with the EU of course, is that it is not a unified state actor, nor does it have clear and consistent external objectives. 321

322

Policies

Instead of a coherent and authoritative decision-making center, we observe persistent national foreign policies that operate under or alongside – and sometimes at variance with – “EU” foreign policies defined by the Commission, the European Parliament and/or the Council. As the EU is not a single unified actor, “EU foreign policy” (EFP) is usually understood and analyzed as the sum and interaction of the “three strands” of Europe’s “external relations system”, comprising: (a) the national foreign policies of the member states; (b) EC external trade relations and development policy; and (c) the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (Hill 1993; Ginsberg 1999; Zielonka 1998b; White 2001; H. Smith 2002; Tonra and Christiansen 2004). The explicit application of “Europeanization” to foreign policy studies really took off with Ben Tonra’s seminal study of the foreign policies of the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland (Tonra 2000, 2001; Vaquer i Fanés 2001). Other works have looked at Greece, Spain, Germany, Britain, Austria, France, and even new and aspiring member states such as Poland and Turkey (Stravridis et al. 1999; Torreblanca 2001; Miskimmon and Paterson 2003; White 2001; Alecu de Fler 2005; Wong 2006; Terzi 2005). Tonra (2000: 229) defines Europeanization in foreign policy as “a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making”. Manners and Whitman’s (2000: 245) volume on EU member states’ foreign policies uses the term “Europeanization” to focus on the limits on member states’ pursuit of independent national foreign policies arising from EU/CFSP membership, and concludes that “Member States conduct all but the most limited foreign policy objectives inside an EU context”. Under the CFSP, “Europeanization” can be understood as a process of foreign policy convergence. It is a dependent variable contingent on the ideas and directives emanating from actors (such as EU institutions and statesmen) in Brussels, as well as policy ideas and actions from member state capitals (national statesmen). Europeanization is thus identifiable as a process of change manifested as policy convergence (both top-down and sideways) as well as national policies amplified as EU policy (bottom-up projection).

24.2 Core research questions Within EFP studies, one school sees member states as the principal actors while another emphasizes the role of supranational institutions (especially the Commission) and the emergence of a pan-European identity and “national interest”. Neither school developed good causal theories of EU foreign policy because they tended to be highly normative and to advocate positions on what the EU should be rather than what the EU is actually doing in world politics.

Reuben Wong 323

The Europeanization approach attempts to strike a middle path: it accepts that member states adapt to CFSP decision-making structures and norms, while at the same time recognizing that these same member states are themselves actively involved in creating these structures and norms. The debates about the Europeanization of foreign policies have focused on the following five questions: how can the process be conceptualized (e.g. is it specific to EU member states?)?; what is changing and what are the mechanisms and direction of change (top-down from the EU to the member states, bottom-up, or socialization?); what are the scope of its effects?; is it producing convergence or harmonization?; and what is the significance of informal socialization as a vector of change? First, conceptualizing foreign policy Europeanization. This goes back to the wider debate between the paradigmatic European integration theories – intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. Is foreign policy immune to Europeanization (if we understand the process as “policy convergence”)? Intergovernmentalists privilege the role of national governments in defining their national interests independently of the EU, and then bringing these interests to the table for negotiation. Hoffmann (1966, 2000), observing the reassertion of nationalist sentiment in the EC/EU by France under Presidents Charles de Gaulle (in the 1960s) and Jacques Chirac (from 1995), claimed that states remained the basic units in world politics and that France today remains fiercely jealous and protective of its foreign policy independence. Moravcsik (1991: 75), the chief scholar arguing for liberal intergovernmentalists, argues that “the primary source of (European) integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels”. The key actors are governmental elites and the motivation for integration is the preservation of executive capacity at the national level, not its erosion (Moravcsik 1993: 515). Neofunctional expectations of convergence have been given a new lease of life in the study of European foreign policy by social constructivist accounts of the interaction of foreign policy elites under the regimes of EPC (1970), CFSP (1991) and ESDP in the 2000s. Enmeshed in such a context of policy making where national elites interact with Commission, Council and other EU member states’ national diplomacies, a reflexe communautaire becomes the norm rather than the exception (Øhrgaard 1997; M.E. Smith 2000; Tonra 2001; Carlsnaes and White 2004). The Europeanization approach attempts to bridge two rival approaches to the study of EU member states’ foreign policies. In the traditional approach, the focus is on the foreign policy of individual member states as utility-maximizing, selfish and purposive actors – let us call this the “state-centric” school. The “hard” position in this tradition claims that states are the only essential and salient actors, and that EFP decisions are lowest-common denominator

324

Policies

products of intergovernmental bargaining. Any study of EU foreign policy is thus unproductive as the “real” Europe is the one of state governments. “ ‘Europe’ is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one” (Bull 1983). Of course, Bull’s assessment was colored by the escalating Cold War tensions of the 1980s between the USSR and Reagan’s USA, but his prognosis for a European military capability independent of the USA/NATO finds renewed favor today in the aftermath of Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq (Gordon 1997; Howorth 2005). In the other camp – which I will call “European-idealist” – is the perspective which treats European Foreign Policy as a given, i.e. as a foreign policy that already exists, has a consistent personality that makes an impact on world politics, and is taken seriously by other actors (H. Smith 2002; White 2001; Nuttall 2000; Zielonka 1998b; Carlsnaes and Smith 1994). This approach often presumes that EFP’s scope will expand eventually to subsume national policies in almost all other functional areas (M.E. Smith 2000). The European-idealist perspective privileges the role of supranational European institutions in building a common “European” identity, and a distinctive moral presence in world politics. Duchêne (1973), the first major spokesman in this school, envisaged the EU as a “civilian power”, a kind of “soft power” which wields civilian instruments on behalf of a collectivity which has renounced the use of force among its members and encourages others to do likewise. Taking as their starting point Duchêne’s premise that the EU should and can become a “civilian power” and a model of reconciliation and peace for other regions in the world, Europeanidealists posit that EU foreign policy should focus on the promotion of democracy, human rights, and security cooperation (K. Smith 1998; Zielonka 1998a). A second debate revolves around what is changing and in which direction. Questions relating to the domestic impact of the CFSP/ESDP have focused mainly on the “socialization” effect arising from increasingly close links between the foreign ministries of the EU member states (Hocking and Spence 2002). Whilst the CFSP assumes the continued existence of national foreign policies, the fundamental research question revolves around the extent to which the CFSP socialization process has led to change in either the procedures or the actual substance of national foreign policies. The recent enlargement provides an opportunity to examine the Europeanization effect on new members with radically different national foreign policy traditions. On the mechanisms and scope of foreign policy Europeanization, some scholars have found that foreign policy convergence is to be expected over the long term (Wong 2006, looking at France). Others have argued that only the most superficial convergence – usually in procedure rather than substance – is taking place, and that national foreign policies remain decidedly national (Tsardanidis and Stravridis 2005, looking at Greece). There is general agreement, however, that three distinct dimensions of the Europeanization process are

Reuben Wong 325

evident in the relationship between a member state’s foreign policy and the EU (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005; Wong 2005, 2006; Major and Pomorska 2005): (i) a top-down process of national adaptation and policy convergence (downloading or “EU-ization”); (ii) a bottom-up and sideways process involving the export of national preferences and models (uploading or “national projection”); and (iii) the socialization of interests and identities, or “identity reconstruction” (“crossloading”). The first dimension of Europeanization is used predominantly in the literature to explain the top-down adaptation of national structures and processes in response to the demands of the EU. This concept predicts cross-national policy convergence between EU states after a sustained period of structural and procedural adaptation. The second Europeanization dimension refers to the bottomup projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level. Third, Europeanization in its broadest sense means a process of identity and interest convergence so that “European” interests and a European identity begin to take root alongside national identities and interests, indeed to inform and shape them. The three aspects of Europeanization and their expected indicators are summarized in Table 24.1. Fourthly, a key (and probably the most contested) question for research on foreign policy Europeanization, is whether the process would lead to a real convergence of the EU member states’ foreign policy trajectories and an emergence of shared norms and notions of European interests. Scholars who expect convergence to be the dominant tendency over the long term list geopolitical, institutional and socialization factors. They argue that European states have become relatively less powerful in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries with the rise of competing centers of power such as the United States, Japan and China. Smaller member states such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal and Denmark have been forced to adapt to the changing world environment by aligning themselves with EU positions so as to amplify their voices in international trade and politics. The “post-neutral” member states Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Finland have had to redefine their defense policies in response to the CFSP in 1991 and the CESDP in 1999. This does not mean that the EU always smothers the smaller states’ foreign policies – it sometimes gives small states the necessary institutional resources to profile themselves in “new” regions, or to project their own interests as European interests. Thus Portugal found that the Mediterranean, especially North Africa, became part of its foreign policy agenda, and that it was able to draw effective attention to East Timor through the EU (Tonra 2000, 2001; Phinnemore 2000; Miles 2000; De Vasconcelas 1996).

326

Policies

Table 24.1 Three dimensions of foreign policy Europeanization Aspects of Europeanization

National foreign policy (FP) indicators

I

a) Increasing salience of European political agenda b) Adherence to common objectives c) Common Policy outputs taking priority national domaines réservés d) Internalization of EU membership and its integration process (“EU-ization”)

Adaptation and Policy Convergence – Harmonization and transformation of a member state to the needs and requirements over of EU membership (“downloading”)

II National Projection – National foreign policy of a member state affects and contributes to the development of a common European FP (“uploading”) III Identity reconstruction – Result of above two dimensions. Harmonization process tending towards middle position; common EU interests are promoted (“crossloading”)

a) State attempts to increase national influence in the world b State attempts to influence foreign policies of other member states c) State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella d) Externalization of national FP positions onto the EU level a) Emergence of norms among policy-making elites b) Shared definitions of European and national interests c) Coordination reflex and “pendulum effect” where “extreme” national and EU positions are reconciled over time

Sources: Adapted from Wong 2005: 142; Tsardanidis and Stravridis 2005: 220–4; and Major and Pomorska 2005.

Scholars arguing for foreign policy convergence point out that the EU provides even the larger states (especially those with colonial histories), a means to re-engage in areas of former colonial influence in Africa and Asia. Britain could re-engage with its former Southeast Asian colonies through the ASEAN-EU dialogue in 1980. France was able to re-engage with all the countries in the East Asia region through the vehicle of the Asia-Europe Meeting, launched in 1996 and effectively a summit meeting of EU and East Asian leaders. The EU offers a means or cover in affording a “politics of scale” to support member states’ interests (Ginsberg 1989). By acting as an agent of European foreign policy, Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands could claim more credit for their dual national/European roles in troubled areas in the African Great Lakes regions, Southeast Asia and even discussions on North Korea. Many large operations in the Balkans, Asia and Africa are not confined to CFSP, but require Pillar I resources and member states’ contributions, e.g. peace-keeping forces. In seeking to Europeanize their national approaches, these key states needed support from allies in the EU, as seen in French and German efforts to upgrade political dialogue with China and to end the arms embargo imposed since

Reuben Wong 327

1989, or British efforts to enlist EC help in the Falklands war in 1982. On the side of those who argue for convergence are foreign policy studies in the enlargements of 1986, 1995 and 2004, where new member states “modernized” their foreign policies upon accession by jettisoning outmoded national policies to align themselves with established European norms. Thus Spain changed its position on the Western Sahara and recognized Israel, and Austria revised its neutrality policy (Barbé 1996; Luif 1998; Grabbe 2001). Of course, such convergence processes are not irreversible or pre-determined. Member states continue to resist being locked into a fixed path of identity and policy convergence. French and British policies are often contrasted to that of Germany, supposedly the model of a “Europeanized” state with a European identity. Yet even Germany showed a clear preference for national interest over agreed EU policy in its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991 (Marcussen et al. 1999; Rummel 1996). National interests, as defined by incumbent national elites, still play a decisive role in national foreign policy making. But while national elites may resist the institutionalization of EU practices and a reflex of working for the collective interest, changes in the international context and venues of decision making which are increasingly oriented towards Brussels have incrementally altered even the definition of what constitutes the “European” or the “national” interest. Commercial policy is a prime example of this shift. The Commission’s 1991 “Car deal” with Japan undertook to dismantle, over a period of ten years, quotas for Japanese car imports in the protected markets of France, Italy and Spain. Member states share the same interests of improving access to world markets and habitually entrust the Commission to take the lead in multilateral negotiations with strong economic powers such as the United States, Japan and China, especially at the WTO (Devuyst 1995; M. Smith 1998b). Economic convergence is not limited to top-down processes proceeding from the Commission. The successful national policies of other member states are often copied. British and Dutch successes in attracting Japanese FDI in the 1980s, and Germany’s export success in China in the 1990s, are two examples of policies emulated by other (more protectionist) EU governments (Lehmann 1992; Nuttall 1996). The Union’s Human Rights policy throws up an even more complex picture of convergence and divergence. The EU has suffered from conflicting interests and coordination problems between the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), the member states, the Commission and the European Parliament (EP) on dealing with human rights situations from Chad to China. While the formal locus of effective decision making on human rights issues is the Council – empowered by the Maastricht Treaty to ensure the “unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union” – deliberations on human rights action in practice impinge on other policies across the three-Pillar structure (affecting inter alia development assistance, Trade and Cooperation

328

Policies

Agreements, enlargement, justice and immigration), and thus involve a multiplicity of intra-EU actors, not to mention interactions with the US, UN, Council of Europe, human rights lobbies, etc (Clapham 1999; K. Smith 2001). A fifth debate has been over the relative importance of formal CFSP institutionalization versus informal socialization. Theories of rational-choice institutionalism admit that “institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities” (Keohane and Martin 1995: 42). States may, however, withdraw from multilateral cooperation if the benefits accruing from cooperation do not compensate the costs incurred. Such a conception will lead us to think that CFSP actions have continually to contend with intergovernmental bargaining, coordination and the constant threat of collapse as the costs to each member state are variable. But the nature of even CFSP, one of the most inter-governmental of EU institutions, has over the last 30 years moved a long way from its original anti-communautaire approach towards a reflexe communautaire. It is not just another rational-choice institution, but has become a critical sociological force and venue that shapes perceptions, structures policy choices, and privileges certain courses of national and collective action while constraining others (Øhrgaard 1997; Bátora 2005). Many scholars argue that EU foreign policy is not an independent variable, but a variable dependent on the roles played by member states themselves – especially the larger and more powerful ones, in fashioning EU structures and policies. These states, in “projecting” their national policies and policy styles onto the larger European structure, “Europeanize” their previously national priorities and strategies and create a dialectical relationship (cf. Table 24.1). By exporting their preferences and models onto EU institutions, they in effect generalize previously national policies onto a larger European stage. This has several benefits. First, the state increases its international influence. Second, the state potentially reduces the risks and costs of pursuing a controversial or negative policy (e.g. sanctions) against an extra-European power. At any rate, a strong European presence in the world is potentially beneficial to all in increasing individual member states’ international influence. In the same vein, scholars have argued that the UK Europeanized its sanctions on Argentina during the Falklands conflict in 1982 (Regelsberger et al. 1997; White 2001). However one may conceptualize Europeanization – whether as a cause, effect or process in national foreign policies – I would argue that these examples suggest that foreign policy is not a special case immune to Europeanization pressures on member states. Elite socialization is a phenomenon frequently associated with national officials attached to the Commission and other EU institutions in Brussels. Research undertaken in recent years by Øhrgaard, M.E. Smith and Glarbo suggest that officials are increasingly thinking in “European” rather than “national” terms. Anthropological studies of European Commission officials

Reuben Wong 329

suggests that these officials were exhibiting traits of cultural “hybridization” whereby their “national being” was becoming a “European being” (Harmsen and Wilson 2000: 149–50). Most scholars agree that intense and repeated contacts have socialized not only EU officials, but also national officials working in EU institutions. Even national diplomacies are becoming more “European” and displaying a “coordination reflex” in foreign policy making (Øhrgaard 1997; Glarbo 1999, 2001). Hill and Wallace point out the potential transformational effects of elite socialization within this complex network (Hill and Wallace 1996: 6): From the perspective of a diplomat in the foreign ministry of a member state, styles of operating and communication have been transformed. The COREU telex network, EPC working groups, joint declarations, joint reporting, even the beginning of staff exchanges among foreign ministries and shared embassies: all these have moved the conduct of foreign policy away from the old nation-state sovereignty model towards a collective endeavour, a form of high-level networking with transformationalist effects and even more potential. Whether or not national officials have indeed been “localized” or “captured” by EU interests to think “European” rather than “national”, most studies indicate that officials in Brussels work with both the national and the European interest in mind. In their study of the impact of the EU on Irish officials, Laffan and Tannam note that “public officials are no longer just agents of the Irish state; they are participants in an evolving polity which provides opportunities for political action but also imposes constraints on their freedom of action” (Laffan and Tannam 1998: 69; Tonra 2001). Research in this school suggests convergence as “prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines” (M.E. Smith 2000: 164). The main agents for convergence include elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, and an institutionalized “imperative of concertation” (Glarbo 1999: 650). Control by the Council and/or the Commission represent “two cultures” competing in the European foreign policy-making process. The EPC had been devised essentially along the lines of the Gaullist Fouchet Plan, to prevent Brussels from becoming a foreign policy centre and to keep foreign policy as a national competence within the Council. Even so, the “Brusselsization” (steady enhancement of Brussels-based decision-making bodies) of foreign policy shows no sign of abating, and even member states jealous of their foreign policy sovereignty have not been immune to this process (Allen 1998; Peterson and Sjursen 1998; White 2001).

330

Policies

24.3 Key problems If foreign policy Europeanization is conceptualized as a three-dimensional (top-down, bottom-up, and cross-loading) and mutually constitutive process of change linking the national and European levels (Table 24.1; Major 2005: 177), the key problems in researching this policy area relate to defining exactly what are the causes, effects and results of Europeanization: identifying and measuring the change; the (current) small number of case studies; and isolating the effect of European regional integration from other possible causes of change such as globalization. As discussed in section 24.1 above, in European foreign policy there exists “no clear, vertical chain of command, in which EU policy descends from Brussels into the member states” (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004: 9). Not yet communitarized, CFSP follows an intergovernmental decision-making process. Unlike commercial, competition or monetary policy, there is no supranational entity above the national governments that can authoritatively state what CFSP should be. While the Europeanization approach was originally applied to the domestic impact of the EU on national polities, policies and politics in first pillar issues where the direction of change was primarily top-down, applying the concept to CFSP where decision making is dominated by a bottom-up process, was certain to cause confusion about actors, structures, cause and effect. Defining Europeanization as multi-dimensional and as “a matter of reciprocity between moving features” is also epistemologically problematic as it blurs the boundaries between cause and effect, dependent and independent variables. Considering Europeanization as a process suggests that the result is a “Europeanized” foreign policy. But how can an EU foreign policy – viewed as being the cause of change at the national level – also be seen as being conceived at the national level (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004)? The notion of Europeanization lacks paradigmatic consistency. Unlike major schools of integration theory such as neo-functionalism or intergovernmentalism, Europeanization does not put forward a series of interrelated premises concerning the dynamic or the endstate of the European integration process. Europeanization is a concept which can be criticized as lacking “core tenets, common to all or most usages of the term, which might serve as the basis for constructing a common paradigmatically defined research agenda” (Harmsen and Wilson 2000; Olsen 2002, 2003). Identifying and measuring change has proven to be a second major research problem. It is much easier to examine the impact of the CFSP on national foreign policy procedures than substance. Whilst it is possible to record significant changes in foreign policy working practices that directly relate to the CFSP/ESDP, it is much harder to relate substantive policy change to the EU as opposed to a response to globalization and other developments in the wider international system. The process of Brusselsization whereby CFSP activities are

Reuben Wong 331

increasingly situated in Brussels rather than national capitals confounds some intergovernmental assumptions about the integrative consequences of avoiding the community method. But compared with the level of institutionalized integration in the first pillar, domestic change resulting from foreign policy Europeanization is weaker, less clearly defined and more difficult to detect (Major and Pomorska 2005: 2). Studies on foreign policy Europeanization have also tended to rely heavily on interviews with national officials and Commission in Brussels (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005; Tonra 2001) for evidence. But can these officials seriously be expected to tell the researcher that they do not subscribe to the ideals of a coordinated, coherent CFSP? A related third problem is the paucity of studies applying Europeanization to national foreign policies. Few full-length studies over many years (rather than, for example, over the short duration of a member state’s EU presidency) have been conducted to test the longitudinal impact of the EU on national foreign policies (Tonra 2001 and Wong 2006 are exceptions rather than the norm). This problem may, however, be in the process of being resolved as there has in recent years been an explosion of research, with many PhD theses currently being written which examine in detail the interaction between EU and national foreign policies. Research on the foreign policies of new member states offers a potentially promising control factor in measuring the impact of EU foreign policy making on non-Western European foreign policies with very different diplomatic traditions (Alecu de Fler 2005; Pomorska 2005) Even with a larger “N” of case studies, however, the theoretical and definitional problem of what exactly “Europeanization” is in foreign policy needs to be resolved (Haverland 2005). Is it a movement towards some “ideal” European foreign policy position where member states instinctively coordinate their positions and cooperate on all foreign policy issues? If this is the yardstick, then the intra-EU disagreements over Iraq in 2003 certainly do not bode well. If however, foreign policy Europeanization is taken as a negotiated convergence between “extreme” positions within the EU involving both Community and national actors, then what some call a “pendulum” effect is observable and even measurable (Tsardanidis and Stravridis 2005). Unlike intergovernmentalism, the Europeanization approach acknowledges the important roles played by non-state actors and Europeanized elites in formulating national foreign policy. But contrary to Haasian integration theory, Europeanization does not foresee a supranational center eclipsing the national capitals. The Europeanization process is just one – albeit a significant one – among many effects in the domestic politics, processes and foreign policies of EU member states. This leads us to the fourth cluster of research problems – if most of the case studies are on EU member states, how do we control for other causal variables? The methodological problem here is what Peters characterizes as “a collection

332

Policies

of cases without variance in the dependent variable” (Peters 1998: 72). Most studies on foreign policy Europeanization assume a priori that European integration has an important effect on national foreign policies. But variables at the global, European, national and subnational levels interact in intricate ways, so that to claim pressures from European integration as the deterministic or dominant causal variable, would be overstating the case (Wong 2005: 151; see also Haverland, and Vink and Graziano in this volume). Perhaps that has been why each study which claims that a member state’s foreign policy has been Europeanized is challenged by another which claims that the same has not. Interestingly, a lively debate has focused on a particular member state – Greece – with some studies claming that a previously obstructionist, uncooperative national foreign policy has come to conform with EU norms (Keridis 2003; Economides 2005; Terzi 2005), and others claiming that this has only been in form but not in substance (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005). There is thus a need to account more systematically for alternative explanations of foreign policy changes, rather than simply ascribing causation to the EU. The use of counterfactual analysis, in other words of consciously posing the hypothetical question “What if the EU did not exist?”, which is almost inherent in any Europeanization study, would thus also be very relevant in this policy field. Few studies in the domain of foreign policy rigorously employ this thought experiment. Counterfactuals are not substitutes for field research, but they are useful to help one arrive at more accurate conclusions after the range of real available cases has been exhausted. When even non-EU member states (notably Norway, Switzerland and Turkey) formulate foreign policies that seem to respond to Europeanization pressures (Major 2005: 178–9; Terzi 2005), researchers should be careful to control for the impact of other variables that might cause the same kinds of effects otherwise ascribed to the impact of the European Union.

24.4 Conclusion The growing currency of Europeanization in foreign policy studies in recent years could be attributed to the concept’s utility in capturing, more accurately than the paradigmatic European integration or International Relations theories, the significant changes that are taking place at the national level, fostering at the same time convergence and diversification at various levels of European polities (Hill and Smith 2005b: 393–4). As a top-down process, Europeanization is the process of policy convergence caused by participation over time in foreign policy making at the European level. This produces shared norms and rules that are gradually accumulated (Sjursen 2001: 199–200; Øhrgaard 1997). As a bottom-up process, it is the projection of national preferences, ideas and policy models into Europe.

Reuben Wong 333

Europeanization is thus a bi-directional process that leads to a negotiated convergence in terms of policy goals, preferences and even identity between the national and the supranational levels (M.E. Smith 2000; Aggestam 2004). The supranational–intergovernmental divide has narrowed considerably today as member states adjust to the increasing pressures of foreign policy Europeanization. Even Britain and France, the two member states traditionally most opposed to European supranational integration and in favor of intergovernmental decision making in the EU, show evidence of creeping towards foreign policy decision making at the European level (White 2001; Wong 2006). Studies on foreign policy Europeanization share many overlapping assumptions about causes, effects and processes. For example, proponents of the topdown “national adaptation” dimension would accept the bottom-up claim that member states play critical roles in forging “European” policies in the first place. And the third dimension of Europeanization – that of identity and interest convergence – stops short of the neofunctionalist claim that the European would supplant the national over time. However, these studies share the common expectation that European identity shapes and is increasingly incorporated into national identities and, in turn, national foreign policies. If Europeanization is a dependent variable or effect, what is/are the independent variable(s) driving the process? I would argue that we would have to cast the net for explanatory variables farther than the current Europeanization literature in Comparative Politics/Public Policy, and deeper into time for an answer. Europeanization is ultimately driven by European integration, which itself can be traced to the underlying political and economic imperatives for highly coordinated cooperation between member states that early integration theorists identified (Haas 1958). The significance of Europeanization in the foreign policy arena is that foreign and security policy is one of the last remaining bastions of national sovereignty. Treaties, not legislation, govern CFSP. Foreign policy Europeanization is much more a process of socialization than forced, formal adaptation. Yet socialization and learning processes have taken place and actually brought integration forward in this policy area originally designed to avoid supranational integration. Perhaps the primary contribution of the Europeanization concept to foreign policy analysis has been its utility in making sense of this unexpected socialization of foreign policy elites (Tonra 2001; Glarbo 2001; Aggestam 2004).

Key readings Aggestam, L. (2004). Role Identity and Europeanisation of Foreign Policy: A Politicalcultural Approach. In B. Tonra and T. Christiansen (eds), Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 81–98.

334

Policies

Major, C. (2005). Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy: Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State? Politics, 25(3) 175–90. Manners, I. and R. Whitman (eds) (2000). The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Tonra, B. (2001). The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate. Wong, R. (2006). The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Part V Conclusion

This page intentionally left blank

25 Some Promises and Pitfalls of Europeanization Research Dirk Lehmkuhl

Wer zählt die Völker, nennt die Namen,

Who knows the nation, who the name,

Die gastlich hier zusammenkamen? Of all who there together came? Die Kraniche des Ibykus (Friedrich Schiller)

The Cranes of Ibycus (Friedrich Schiller)

25.1 Introduction Admittedly, Europeanization research is not comparable to Schiller’s songs and chariot fighting as, fortunately, constructive discourse now dominates the everburgeoning literature and has replaced early days taunting.1 Hence, the objective of this conclusion does not compare to the task of the chorus in Schiller’s poem that with divine intervention seeks to tie fetters around villains. Rather, the idea is to highlight some of the strengths the present contributions make to the ever-broader stream of Europeanization research and, at the same time, to indicate some remaining open questions for the future research agenda. Given the extreme empirical richness of the research, to identify blind spots or shortcomings is difficult enough as any mentioning of potentially weak points may be countered by reference to an existing study that more or less explicitly addresses this exact aspect. For instance, Mair’s (2004) critique concerning the lack of awareness of traditional foci of political science, i.e. power and politics, may be countered by pointing to the studies that focus on the differential empowerment of actors at the national level and on the changes in domestic politics, actually, not only in member states of the European Union (Mach et al. 2003; Sciarini et al. 2002; see also Goetz – if not indicated differently, authors refer to contributions in this volume). Another example are the opposing claims made by Bulmer according to which Europeanization has engaged with 337

338

Conclusion

existing toolkits, “notably from comparative politics” and Mair (2004), who calls for an explicit usage of the insights from comparative politics. As a consequence, operating in the almost unavoidable shadow of ignorance is a general caveat not only for the present concluding remarks, but also for the overall assessment of the present volume. Even the best possible larger project, i.e. a monograph or collaborative anthology as called for by Bulmer, will face substantial problems in grasping the variety and richness characterizing Europeanization research up to date. This caveat notwithstanding, the present collaborative effort to provide a focused overview on conceptual, theoretical, methodological and empirical aspects is already a substantial reflection of the strength and the potential of the research agenda of Europeanization research. Also, despite the focal constraints suggested by the editors, the individual chapters do not only provide a very intriguing analysis of core concepts and key problems related to the study of Europeanization in their respective field. Rather, they managed very well to indicate issues and problems that go beyond the limited core focus. Thus, almost all authors address problems related to a specific understanding of Europeanization as well as open questions and desiderata in their respective field and, more generally, in the broader research agenda. To provide an overview of both major achievements and open questions is the objective of the remainder of the conclusion. The debate will touch upon conceptual, theoretical, methodological and empirical issues by adapting some of the criteria established for an analysis of the goodness in concept formation (Gerring 1999). The relative importance of conceptual questions in Europeanization may be related to the degree of maturation of this strand of research. The move from a debate about definitions to broader conceptual issues may be interpreted as a maturing of Europeanization research. Expression of maturing of a field is the extension into ever-more empirical fields and, perhaps more importantly, the move into neighboring disciplines such as sociology, law and public administration. At the same time, it has not yet accomplished the move from concept to theory. It remains an open question whether the current degree of maturation is again just a snapshot on the way up the ladder of abstraction and generalization or whether we are facing the limits of this strand of research.

25.2 Generations of foci and conceptual coherence Throughout the volume, time and its derivatives – timing and tempo – figure more or less prominently in the contributions. With a view on the patterns of scientific debates, the existence of attention cycles or sequences of research foci seems to be inherently linked to the dynamics of research and its ideal of cumulating empirical and analytical knowledge. In this regard, it seemed self-evident

Dirk Lehmkuhl

339

for the mainstream of European studies to first of all address policy making and institutional dynamics at the European level as the new phenomena in the process of European integration and to discover other themes and foci only later in the history of European studies. The sequencing of research foci in European studies and the identification of different generations have become a frequent way of distinguishing changes in the research agenda over time – with Europeanization attracting increasing attention and becoming a growth industry from the late 1990s onwards. As apparent in this volume, waves of changing foci over time are also prominent in the narrower realm of Europeanization research. For instance, Bursens identifies three generations of research dealing with national institutional setups to coordinate European activities at the national level. According to his distinction, the relationships between “central/national/federal government level and the decentralized regional level of government” was first ignored or addressed from a management perspective, then addressed issues such as coordination of preference formation or the transposition of European regulations and, finally, provided small-scale comparative studies that explicitly had the Europeanization focus on changes at the national level on their agenda. The case is but one example for shifts in analytic foci in Europeanization research. In its early days, controversies over definitions were quite frequent. Indeed, definitional issues are very important as they decide whether we perceive the field as coherent – in case of a relative narrow definition – or whether we are confronted with the wildly yielding and partly confusing richness of research. Actually, it did take some time before the term Europeanization prevailed other labels such as Unionization, EU-ization or domestication. But the relative dominance of a certain definition has not proved to end the contestation about the approach. Either the term is too familiar with other labels or it resonates with too many research foci so that scholars with a variety of interests jumped on the bandwagon of a growing crowd of Europeanization research. Moving beyond questions of definitions, but remaining below the demanding requirements of a theory, conceptual issues have become prominent as the ground for the contest of what Europeanization is or is not about. In this respect, definitional issues are inherently linked to the dimensions internal coherence and external differentiation. For Gerring (1999: 373), internal coherence is the most important criterion for a good concept. It refers to the extent to which the properties of a concept and the phenomena it covers “belong to one another”, i.e. are logically related (ibid.). The coherence criterion makes it necessary that the researcher consolidates attributes around a single core principle (1999: 374). Reviewing the contributions in this volume, we are able to identify some properties delineating such a single core concept, but we will also come across less common attributes that challenge the internal coherence. We will address this issue later.

340

Conclusion

Turning first to the common ground, this handbook’s broad definition of Europeanization as the domestic adaptation to European regional integration (see Vink and Graziano in the Introduction) encompasses a couple of attributes to which certainly not only most contributors of the current volume could subscribe: Europeanization is about the vertical and horizontal dimensions of influence rather than merely by attention to top-down pressure; it is characterized by a sensitivity to institutional and ideational factors rather than merely to matters of institutional misfit; and it pays attention to voluntary adaptation through processes of learning or policy transfer rather than merely looking at reactive processes of adaptation. Many of the contributions in this volume explicitly address, on the one side, shifts from the bottom-up perspective on policy making and, on the other side, institution-building at the European level to a top-down perspective on the impact of European impulses on national policies, politics and polities, including more sophisticated approaches to analyze the transformations at the national level. Following from this observation – and from the previous considerations on shifting foci of research – is the statement that the concept of Europeanization is better understood as a living concept that evolves over time and allows for alterations (Buller and Gamble 2002: 10) rather than being a more rigid rule-defined concept à la Sartori (see Radaelli and Pasquier). Such an evolutionary understanding of the concept of Europeanization, however, is not free of risks. Advantages are the adaptability to changes in its object in question or the incorporation rather than an exclusion of competing claims into or from the debate about its core attributes. Disadvantages relate to a potential disagreement about what the concept is not about. As the flip side of internal coherence, external differentiation or boundedness establishes the boundaries of a concept (Gerring 1999: 375). Although an evolutionary understanding of a concept is inherently more tolerant to the problem of concept stretching, it does not go without (self-) constraints. The delineation of boundaries may result from learning processes. For instance, throughout the volume it is a shared understanding that Europeanization is not to be equated with convergence and across-the-board harmonization. On the contrary, an emphasis on the differential impact and the need to come to terms with the factors explaining the differential effects is a common theme. Another strategy of delineating the boundaries of a concept is to relate it to most-similar concepts. In our case, one might come to the conclusion that an overly inclusive definition of core principles may render the concept of Europeanization amorphous. This would, for instance, be the case when we accept the coexistence of characterizing criteria of Olsen’s five faces of Europeanization. If understood in such an encompassing way, Europeanization loses its differentium specificum. Along these lines, we may end this section on conceptual issues with a more skeptical observation about the achievements of external differentiation. A good

Dirk Lehmkuhl

341

case in point is the debate on which part of the national – to Europe – to national circle Europeanization should include. In many contributions we find the call for addressing the whole loop in order to grasp “the big picture” (Börzel). According to Börzel, shaping and taking provide an important link between the top-down and bottom-up dimension of Europeanization. In the realm of economic policy, Dyson identified a variety of patterns of Europeanization: top-down in monetary policy, bottom-up in growth and employment policies and hovering between top-down and bottom-up in fiscal policy. According to him, bottom-up Europeanization is prevalent in case in which there is no European template but in which “soft” coordination inspires learning processes and policy transfer. Nyikos provided us with a particular story on the uploading and downloading issue. According to her, Europeanization through law is not only a matter of the European Court of Justice or the Commission’s top-down impetus, but also a case of national courts, lawyers and litigants bringing domestic cases to the European level. In a recent contribution on the Europeanization of competition law, McGowan (2005) illustrates the chain of Europeanization neatly when identifying a constant bottom-up and top-down influence between European and domestic competition authorities. He also illustrates quite nicely the horizontal pattern of Europeanization as domestic cases in one country may turn into important European precedents of how to deal with a specific case. (More generally, the horizontal pattern of influence between member states seems to have the advantage that it has not to deal with the problem of a successful uploading. i.e. the strategy of uploading of by now twenty-five different national policy-preferences to minimize adaptation costs.) Lavenex, to end the enumeration at this point, is also very explicit in emphasizing the necessity to account for the “multiple feed-back loops of Europeanization processes in the different member states”. Her observations lead her to reiterate statements in earlier work of Radaelli according to which Europeanization should be conceived as a circular process. Or, as already Gourevitch (1978: 911) put it, the “international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structure but a cause of them … International relations and domestic politics are therefore so interrelated that they should be analyzed simultaneously, as wholes”. The broadly supported call to address the entire loop of policy making and implementation in the multi-level system of European governance would first of all require that we take the dimension time more serious in the analysis of Europeanization. In this particular institutional set-up, policy cycles hardly have clearly separated phases, actually they may be in different phases at different levels at the same time. This may imply that even without material outputs, the engagement of different actors in multiple interactions may contribute to changes in the preferences of actors. As a consequence, transformation of policies, politics and polities at the national level may occur over time. With

342

Conclusion

such an understanding of Europeanization that in its interest in the “domestic adaptation to European regional integration” is sensitive to time, to different channels and to different directions of influence, we are confronted with the question what distinguishes Europeanization from other concepts that in their raison d’être have a broader explanatory and theoretical ambitious agenda. Again, the broader the conceptual core principles are defined, the more the concept of Europeanization becomes similar to the over-arching notion of European integration or European governance with its focus on the simultaneous transformation of the state and the multilevel setting of European polity and politics (Kohler-Koch 2005). As a consequence, we may want to reflect again on the limits of the concept of Europeanization.

25.3 Crucial questions: causality and domestic variables The latter point on the question of which part of the national – to Europe – to national circle to address raises not only conceptual questions. We also enter into the realm of methodological issues as, obviously, the answer to the question must also entail some thoughts on what is explanans and what is explanandum. Indeed, the issue of identifying and separating variables and of causality and inference is at the heart of debate on methodology and there is good reason to assume that finding answers to the problems at hand will be decisive for the future of the concept of Europeanization. But the situation is quite complex and requires a differentiation of the problems at hand. Basically, we may distinguish between the necessity to separate factors for change assigned to Europeanization from globalization and national factors, the problems to determine the role Europeanization plays as a variable and, last but not least, the role of variables explaining the differential domestic digestion of external impulses. To start with, it did not take long until Europeanization research faced the crucial question of whether its basic explanatory assumption (European integration influencing the national level) really is the decisive factor or whether there are other influences. And if so, the next question was how to distinguish between the relevance of Europeanization and the two most important other strands of inference – that is globalization and independent domestic factors. Since the clearest form of external influence on domestic politics, policies and polities, that is “outright invasion and occupation” (Gourevitch 1978: 883) is – fortunately – absent, there is the threefold problem that “alternative explanations generate similar observable implications, playing out at roughly the same time with similar speed, and being caused in interaction – rather than independently from – each other” (Haverland). Both the disentanglement of a “European” effect from other factors and the re-entanglement of mutually supporting or opposing influences is still on the top of the agenda of

Dirk Lehmkuhl

343

Europeanization research (see, for instance, Hennis 2001 on the missing link between Europeanization and globalization). Despite some successful examples of identifying the “net impact” of Europe (e.g. Levi-Faur 2004), many contributions in this volume underline the need for analytical precision and clarification of explanatory factors. For instance, Roederer-Rynning states that what remains unclear “is the logics according to which domestic and European factors interact and the role of Europe relative to other sources of change”. In her contribution on agriculture policy she identifies the need to find an answer to these questions with respect to the relationship between the issues of renationalization and regionalization on the one hand and of Europeanization on the other. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier also identify the existence of multiple source and motors of institutional change in the transformation of Central and Eastern European countries. In their case, it is not only globalization, for instance in terms of an integration into international financial markets, that might compete or complement inference with endogenous domestic factors. Rather, there is a strong influence of other regional organizations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE or NATO and of extra-regional actors such as the United States. Interestingly, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier offer two possible explanations of how to disentangle Europeanization from other effects. According to them, cases of significant differences between European institutional and policy requirements on the one hand and both domestic legacies and cultures and international rules on the other hand might facilitate the isolation of European influences. For more problematic cases they suggest a careful process tracing. Accounting for time and timing, they were able to identify different phases with different sources dominating in their explanatory significance for changes: “Europeanization superseded the transition, Westernization, or globalization of the CEECs as the dominant motor of institutional change.” Actually, process tracing is one of the strategies suggested by Haverland to deal with the problem of multi-collinearity, i.e. in our case to separate causal inferences related to European-level factors from global or domestic forces. In addition, he suggests alternative research strategies such as counterfactual reasoning and the inclusion of non-EU cases to increase the causal leverage of the research. In their introduction, Vink and Graziano refer to the aforementioned “bottom-up-down” strategy as an auspicious way to identify the “European factor as one of several alternatives”. This said, however, we are confronted with a second substantial methodological problem – that is, the question how to precisely determine our set of dependent and independent variables. The “bottom-up-down” strategy is but one example for the changes in the role variables may play. As aptly put by Dyson, there is some imprecision and confusion in the role Europeanization

344

Conclusion

play as a variable: the dependent variable to be explained by domestic institutional and political variables … ; an intervening variable, in which European integration conditions the strategic behavior of domestic actors who bring their own preferences to policy choices; or the independent variable, in the form of a “misfit” between European requirements and domestic arrangements as the trigger for change. Addressing this problem is more difficult than it may seem. Especially when we take previously made claims serious and replace the static or snapshot interpretation of the policy cycle by an understanding that seeks to incorporate the multiple feed-back loops in Europe’s multi-level policy making. This then confronts us constantly with the need to spell out what exactly explains what and when. What is more, we have to be aware that both the material and ideational properties assigned to institutional factors might change over time. Finally, it seems necessary to spend some time to reflect about these institutional factors. Reference to their importance is a common feature in the contributions of this volume as in the general literature on Europeanization. Most of the times, institutional factors at the national level are seen as the variables explaining the absence of a far-reaching convergence in the way in which domestic adaptations to European regional integration takes place (e.g. Falkner, Börzel in this volume). The usual suspects are presented with more or less sophistication in the broader literature: the existence and number of veto players, the centralization or decentralization of a political system, facilitating formal institutions, norm entrepreneurs, policy legacies, political institutional capacity and policy preferences. In addition to the absence of convergence, this variety of variables should account for the differential impact of Europeanization across countries, sectors and time. As a consequence, we face a problem superbly described by Wallace (2000: 372) in her analogy of the Heineken test (according to advertisements in the UK, a beer that reaches parts of the body other beers do not reach), “every beer drinker knows that the result of beer drinking is not the same for every beer drinker”. The difference between the Heineken test and Europeanization is not only that there are different “intervening” or “mediating” variables. More seriously, a couple of problems are related to generalizations about how national variables process external influences. To start with, one of the problems is that of everincreasing numbers of phenomenon-specific explanations. The more we go into the deep when seeking explanations for a specific way in which a national institutional setting reacts differently than others, the larger the number of case-specific explanations is going to be. The reason is that it seems just not enough to list variables, we also need to account for the specific role they

Dirk Lehmkuhl

345

actually play. For instance, the mere existence of veto positions is just not enough to explain a specific domestic process. Rather, we have to understand what potential veto players are actually doing and why they behave in one way or in another, i.e. exercise their veto power or not (cf. Jacquot and Woll 2003; Mach et al. 2003). While it may be necessary to dig deeper into institutional features and domestic politics in order to obtain a proper explanation for a respective domestic change, this effort is not without risk. Actually, Sverdrup implicitly indicates that Europeanization might face a similar fate as the scholarly interest in implementation. He points out that the attraction of the issue that once boomed between the late 1960s and the early 1980s faded not at least because of on overdose of explanatory variables: the range identified was between 17 key variables and more than three hundred variables used by researchers when studying implementation. Neither Haverland’s triad of research strategies nor King, Keohane and Verba’s strategy to extend the number of cases for comparison could help to cope with such large number of variables. But there is a deeper problem related to the role institutional factors at the national level play in the mediation of European (and other external) impulses. Being aware of this problem related to the endogenous nature of institutions, may actually not only improve our understanding of the differential impact of Europeanization. It will also allow for addressing Mair’s call for a politicization of Europeanization, in this case a politicization of domestic institutions. But what is meant by the endogeneity of institutions? In the literature on democratization and conflict resolution, a debate on institutions has emerged from the frustration about the results of external interventions in conflicts. The debate addresses the role of institutions and has started to bother with the basic propositions of the new institutionalism according to which, first, institutions matter as influence beliefs and actions and second, institutions are endogenous as their form and function depends on the conditions under which their emerge and endure. In his heretical contribution “Institutions Matter?”, Przeworski (2004: 527) points to the observation that in case of strong endogeneity the causal effect of institutions is necessarily very much limited and our present methodology is unable to provide a satisfying answer to the question of how to distinguish the “effects from institutions from those of the conditions that give rise to them”. He ends in a skeptical note on “our belief in the power of institutions” (ibd.: 540). Hug (2005) elaborates along these lines when arguing that we have to pay attention for both the historic sociopolitical conditions in which institutions have emerged and the actual conditions in which institutional reform or an “institutional engineering” is scheduled. Adapting the idea of an endogenous nature of institutions to our context, we may argue for a couple of aspects. For one thing, the differential impact of

346

Conclusion

Europeanization may be related to differences in the specific purposes that institutions play in a society. The question then would be how Europeanization impacts upon these specific purposes that led to the establishing of an institution in the first place. For instance, federal arrangements, decentralization and regional autonomy may have their origins in efforts to pacify societal conflicts. The question then would be how Europeanization impacts upon these societal conflicts: does it contribute to a transformation of these conflicts or of the respective institution? From an empirical example we may refer to changes in state–society relations – according to Eising, a neglected area in Europeanization research to date. With respect to the transformation of transport regulation in the Netherlands, one could argue that the liberalization of the Dutch transport policy from the end of the 1980s onwards was inspired and went alongside European liberalization policies. Hence we would have a case of policy adaptation. One could, however, also argue that in the Netherlands Europeanization added economic thrust to a societal process of depillarization – that is to an erosion of the deeply rooted pattern societal segmentation along confessional and ideational cleavages. The consequence was a transformation of the structure of interest representation that even allowed for a strengthening rather than a weakening of corporatist patterns of interaction. In Germany, by contrast, the influence of Europeanization “purified” the patterns of state–society interactions as client-based elements in government intervention disappeared. The differences in the origin and development of the two corporatist structures accounted for style, timing and tempo of national changes (Lehmkuhl 1999). Another example is the politicization of Swiss consociationalism. The high degree of voluntary adaptation to European regulation has contributed to shifts in the relative importance of different stages in the process of policy making. In particular, the stage of pre-parliamentary consultation has partly lost its importance for an accommodation of interest. The consequence is a polarization of other stages in the political process and, more general, of the party system (Sciarini et al. 2002) – of course, the example also illustrates the need to account for endogenous domestic factors for change. All of these aspects point into the direction of comparative designs – a point frequently made throughout the volume. These should not only look at the differential impact caused by domestic factors. Comparative studies should be aware of the respective purpose or objective of institutions in different societies. Also, awareness of the endogeneity of institutions may account for the differences in timing and tempo in national adaptations. The way to address the aspects may differ, but two points seem to be important. Qualitative and quantitative studies should be seen as complementary and should seek to address common analytical questions much more than they have done so far (a point made by Haverland). At the same time, we should refrain from over-burdening research with overly ambitious goals. As will be stated in the next section, a

Dirk Lehmkuhl

347

strength of Europeanization research so far has been its step by step development, based on careful, and more and more often, comparative empirical analysis.

25.4 Field utility: rich empirical insights and blind spots From its very beginning, Europeanization research has basically been a collective empirical undertaking, cumulatively contributing to a substantial increase of our knowledge of a specific aspect of European integration. The contributions in this volume mirror this richness as they address a large number of nominal policy areas such as agriculture, cohesion, economic, environment, social and telecommunication policy; some sub-sectors such as anti-discrimination and asylum policy and also a number of areas with a cross-cutting character such as accession, courts, executives, interest groups, parliaments, party systems, regulation, state structures and territory. Similarly rich is the scope of what is examined: the polity dimension, including legal aspects, the policy dimension, including content and performance and the politics dimension, including processes and mechanisms of linkage and usage. Due to constraints in space (and certainly also interest), in what follows I would like to highlight some achievements and aspects that deserve further consideration rather than to recapitulate empirical findings in an encompassing manner. My top three issues are the topic of convergence, gaps of research and the question on the external dimension. There is hardly any dimension that has attracted more attention in the Europeanization agenda than the issue of convergence or divergence. Actually, there was something excessive in the search for convergence that with different degrees addresses all p-dimensions: policies, polities and politics. Speculatively, one might relate this excessive interest in convergence or divergence to the basic means of integration – that is, integration through law (Weiler 1991). The approach of legal integration, with its doctrines of pre-emption, supremacy and direct effect, nourished the expectation that sooner or later European integration member states would converge with the European model. Indeed, compared to other states or federal systems (e.g. India, Switzerland or the United States of America), the degree of legal harmonization in Europe is certainly very high. Nevertheless, already implementation studies at the national level have shown that the process of transposition allows for substantial local or regional variance. Hence, it hardly came as a surprise that Europe has a differential impact (Héritier et al. 2001) and continuing divergence rather than convergence characterizes domestic adaptation to European regional integration. The contributions in this volume very nicely account for criticism of the convergence expectation (e.g. Radaelli and Pasquier; Falkner; Goetz) and the variety of domestic adaptation (e.g. Bursens; Laffan; Lavenex; Roeder-Rynning;

348

Conclusion

Schneider and Werle; Sverdrup). And yet, as Knill and Lenschow (2001b: 195) informed us earlier, the scope of institutional change and national convergence differs if viewed either on the spot or from a bird’s-eye perspective. There may be islands of convergence, such as the establishment of competition authorities in almost all member states where there were not more than a few a couple of years ago, but convergence across the board will probably not occur in the near future. As identified by Goetz, clustered convergence seems the maximum we might expect to observe. Referring to the empirical richness in the areas of polity, politics and policies, or, with a different raster, of input, throughput, output and outcomes, it is somewhat astonishing that there are still blind spots or empirical desiderata. For instance, Roederer-Rynning states that the routinely made claims about the Europeanization of agriculture lack substantial documentation. Her review of the literature identified that there are very few studies that addressed the domestic impact of Europe and an even smaller percentage that has done so with reference to the Europeanization agenda. Other contributions in this volume underline the lack of empirical knowledge for instance with respect to the polity dimension (Bursens), parties and party systems, groups and movements (Eising; Mair) or core executive adaptation (Laffan). Frequently, the claims for future research link up to methodological issues (such as the call for more quantitative comparative work). In other cases, the authors call for new perspectives: for instance, attention to variations in broader territorial patterns (Goetz) or a politicization of domestic adaptation (Mair). The structure of the contributions allows quite nicely for gaining a quick overview of these claims. A final aspect that we repeatedly find in the contributions relates to the geographical or territorial limits of Europeanization. Frequently we can find the claim that domestic adaptation should not only be studied in member states of the European Union. For instance, Haverland points to non-EU member states as control cases allowing for the identification of a European cause for a domestic change – while excluding Norway and Switzerland from the set of possible control cases because they are too close to the EU; Laffan identifies a group of studies – including Norway and Switzerland – examining the impact of the EU on executive adaptation in nonmember states; in accordance with Olsen’s first face of Europeanization, that is the changes in the external territorial boundaries, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier are aware of the expansive character of the EU and, as a consequence, allow for adapting their model for both historical and future cases of widening; and, finally, Lavenex is most explicit in her call for attention to the extra-territorial impact of European integration. Her account of the Europeanization of asylum policy informs us that the circle of actors affected by European policies goes well the member states of the European Union. It involves international organizations, international conventions and international non-governmental organizations.

Dirk Lehmkuhl

349

Generally, I share both the demand of incorporating the external dimension in the studies of Europeanization and the need for more explicit studies in this area. Actually, apart from a few exceptions (e.g. Lavenex and Uçerer 2002) we are largely lacking systematic efforts accounting for the way in which European regional integration impacts upon non-member states and other actors and organizations. In their introductory remarks, the editors join the calls for extending the focus when stating that the research scope of the concept of Europeanization goes well beyond “the mere impact on EU member states, and also beyond the impact of the European Union” (Vink and Graziano). Despite my personal sympathy to the idea of a broader perspective, there seem to be two substantial related problems. On the methodological level, a broadening of the perspective would again aggravate the problem of attributing unambiguous causality to a European impact. As in the case of enlargement, the number of potential alternative variables for a domestic reaction would rise as other external factors such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, NATO or individual states such as Russia or the United States of America. This diversity of interests would require a carefully reflected research design that may combine some of Haverland’s strategies. On conceptual grounds, an extension of the concept of Europeanization beyond the member states of the European Union poses again the problem of external differentiation. Firstly, one may object that such an extension may conflict with the definition of Europeanization applied in this volume. At least to my understanding, the “regional” in the definition of Europeanization as “domestic adaptation to European regional integration” has a geographical implication. It may include Norway and Switzerland, but certainly not South Africa. This is why I would hesitate to extend prima facie the concept of Europeanization to include the impact of regional integration in Europe on third countries, on other regions or projects of regional integration or, most generally, on international affairs or world politics. Rather, I would argue that we need to come up with a delineation of what European and what regional means in order to limit the extension. A second objection to an all too broad interpretation of Europeanization refers to the risk that doing so implies a move into the realm of other concepts such as European external governance or European foreign policy. It seems to me that these concepts are not only broader in their aspiration. Unless we do not reduce the external dimension to the magnetic dimension of the economic attraction of the European market, European external governance or European foreign policy imply an active understanding of an actor or a unit seeking to influence its environment. Such an active understanding is somewhat different from the more passive understanding of Europeanization as an adaptation to regional integration in Europe. Given that Europeanization has not – yet? – accomplished the move from conceptual issues to theory, these

350

Conclusion

theoretically more saturated neighboring concepts have some analytical advantages. This said, we are automatically confronted with the question on the theoretical contribution of Europeanization research.

25.5 Theoretical utility: is there an original theoretical contribution? By and large, the analytical reflection on what Europeanization research is about, crystallizes around conceptual rather than theoretical issues. According to Gerring (1999: 364, 381), the objective of social science concepts is to support the formulation of theories. As building blocks of all inferences, concepts are “the hand-maidens of theories”. Apart from one contribution in this volume (Caporaso), skepticism dominates assessments on the theoretical achievements of Europeanization research. Rather, there are some critical points made by different authors. These points as well as the bits and bytes of theoretical considerations found in the volume and, finally, Caporaso’s idea of Europeanization research as a logic outgrowth of the evolution of European integration research will be addressed in the following. More than once in the volume we can find the complaint that Europeanization research misses the link to broader theoretical debates or concepts. For instance, Holzacker identifies the need to link Europeanization with two broader sets of ideas, that is the role of national parliaments within the “overall pattern of government and governance” on the one hand and, on the other hand, with “ideas concerning democracy and representation” within the emerging political system of the EU and the member states. Related to this is Mair’s call to integrate the impact of Europeanization on parties and party systems more closely into the more general theories of party change and development. His suggestion is to operate with a distinction between direct and indirect effects on one hand and the dichotomy of penetration (with Europe as an external factor to domestic politics) and institutionalization (with Europe as an internal factor to domestic politics) on the other to capture the changes in the increasingly indivisible multi-level political structure in the EU. More than that, following Hix and others, he argues that and Europeanization and may benefit from incorporating the well-established “set of comparative political science tools”. One may, however, wonder whether this strategy is more appropriate to analyze normalities or specificities of the EU as a political system rather than Europeanization in terms of domestic adaptation. For instance, as Mair (2005: 17) elaborates elsewhere, this approach allows him to identify the most striking difference between the EU and other political systems in the post-industrialized world, that is the non-responsiveness in terms of “elections, parties and the conventional procedures of popular democracy”. In addition, the benefits of this strategy may be limited to some areas (such as party systems); and, as mentioned earlier, we might expect an increase of domestic

Dirk Lehmkuhl

351

variables explaining domestic adaptation rather than substantial theoretical charging of Europeanization research. It may only be of little comfort that international relations research in the second image reversed tradition has little more to offer (see, for example, Milner and Keohane 1996). One theoretical area that might, however, benefit from a stronger inspiration of Europeanization research by comparative politics is the institutionalist agenda. Although, as aptly put by Bulmer in his contribution, “an awareness of the new institutionalism is indispensable for understanding how Europeanization is theorized”, the historical institutionalist account is more prominent in comparative domestic politics than it has been in Europeanization research so far (Bulmer; but see, for example, Bache in this volume). By contrast, especially the rationalist and the sociological versions of the new institutionalism are by now inherently linked to Europeanization studies. As a consequence, the political science trinity of interest, institutions and ideas, which so far has been more explicitly entered in theorizing international relations, is well-established in Europeanization and comparative politics research. Nevertheless, the impression remains that there is little “new” or original that we can derive from institutional accounts to Europeanization, compared to new institutionalism as theoretical approach as such. There are perhaps two exceptions to this skeptical note on institutional accounts. A first relates to the findings of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier. With respect to Central and Eastern European countries they find differences in the actual transformation and adaptation with respect to different forms of conditionality (democratic, acquis) which can be related to rationalist or sociological institutionalist explanations. According to their account the domestic adaptation in the new EU member states was not only related to institutional capacity (offices, staff, buildings) and institutional capability (the ability of institutions to carry out a specific function) (see Bache), but also to the credibility of the EU. Actually, acquis conditionally was a force majeure changing the domestic incentive structure. However, they also find regional differences between the new European member states. Regional patterns actually are the theme of Goetz in his theoretically inspiring considerations on the implication of Europeanization for the territorial dimension of politics. Linking up to the renewed interest in macro-sociological analysis (expressed, for example, by Rokkan for the classic and Bartolini for the more recent account), Goetz finds fault with the largely neglected issue of territory. While affirming, for instance, those studies that underline the continued relevance of the national realm (Eising in this volume; Kohler-Koch 2003b, 2005), his approach to regionally clustered patterns of Europeanization goes beyond the mere observation of domestic adaptation to European regional integration of or within single states. So far, all too quick generalizations on other regional patterns, e.g. with respect to implementation deficits, have not materialized in the way it was predicted (e.g. Börzel 2003a). Yet it would be interesting

352

Conclusion

to follow this track and, as a reviewer suggested, look for different (regionally patterned?) policy models. Perhaps along these lines some may be more willing to join Caporaso’s positive account for the theoretical yield of Europeanization research. For him, Europeanization completes existing theories of European integration theories, including classical integration (“the making of a whole out of the parts”), Europe as a polity (characterized by the “growth and institutionalization of the European institutional order”) and Europeanization (“not so much created as discovered” to analyze the effect of European integration and European policy making on states as agents of European integration in the first place). In this regard, Caporaso and Goetz touch upon one of the crucial tenets of international relations theorizing – that is, the transformation and change in the system of territorially defined states. Actually, one might refer to Krasner’s considerations on the historical continuity of Westphalian sovereignty. Speculating about the future of the EU, he delineated three options involving becoming a larger state, a reversion to a conventional treaty or, breaking the spell of the historical continuity, a political arrangement in which different authority structures govern[ed] different functional areas. Foreign trade and monetary policy might be determined at the Union level. Environmental issues might be decided by regional entities that cross existing territorial boundaries. Social policy might be set by the national state. Such a structure would be different from the Westphalian state in which authority is coterminous with territory. (Krasner 1995: 134) Such a far-reaching theoretical interpretation, however, would probably overstretch both the analytical insights that can be drawn from Europeanization research and the empirical reality. Yet while the actual momentum of disintegrative effects of Europeanization may be limited (Kohler-Koch 2005), Europeanization may more than it has done so far open its analytical focus and engage in studying “transnationalization and the emergence of a European political space” (Goetz).

25.6 Is there something that we can learn about Europe? This then takes us to the final question of what Europeanization tells us about Europe. Given that space is a scarce resource, only a few aspects may be touched upon. For one thing, although Europeanization research clearly has an empirically- rather than a theoretically-driven agenda (Bulmer), the largest portion of studies has contributed to a by now substantial knowledge on all three of Caporaso’s worlds of integration. For instance, as Sverdrup indicates,

Dirk Lehmkuhl

353

levels of “acceptability” reflected the actual state of the European integration process rather than being fixed. He ventilates the idea that member states were more indulgent with non-norm conform domestic adaptation when facing the threat that the shared legal framework might collapse. The idea of a shared legal framework itself might also be worth a moment of reflection. Its very existence in conjuncture with certain legal doctrines such as supremacy and direct effect has contributed to the prevailing interpretation of European integration as an integration through law. This, in turn, might have fueled the expectation of a far-reaching convergence. And yet, Sverdrup’s thesis according to which the “EU is first and foremost a legal co-operation” faces Lavenex’s vivid opposition to a basically legalist top-down interpretation of Europeanization. Criticizing major theories of integration for their “valueblindness” – as they either view common policies as a response to functional needs or as the outflow of domestic interests of major states – she argues for an account that pays more attention to the ideational dimension of European integration. There is good reason to argue that both the construction of Europe and the making of European policies are also about the norms and principles rather than merely about technicalities. At the heart of the politics of European rule making is also the controversy about the norms and principles enshrined in legal provisions. For instance, for the actual design of a legal framework it makes a difference if asylum policy is framed as a policing issue and security threat or from a human rights perspective. Along these lines we can argue that domestic adaptation to concepts such as sound money or liberalized utility markets is neither only about institutional capability and capacity nor does it only indicate the transversal influences of an economic (vs political) process (as an anonymous reviewer of this chapter suggested). Rather, Europeanization also means adaptation to potentially new normative frameworks and underpinnings. It might be argued that if Europeanization research pays more attention to the ideational dimension of European integration and how it “hits home”, its contribution to our understanding of European integration will be even more substantial.

Note 1 Remember the only-ever comment – re-comment dispute in the European Integration online Papers was between the proponents of the three mechanisms vs the three steps approach? At the same time, the proponents of this controversy were obviously unaware of already existing important contributions to the debate (see the comment page of European Integration online Papers, 3(7), 1999 at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/ 1999-007a.htm; and see Kohler-Koch et al. 1998b).

Bibliography Adcock, R. and D. Collier (2001) Connecting Ideas With Facts: The Validity Of Measurement. American Political Science Review, 95(3) 529–46. Adler, E. (2002) Constructivism and International Relations. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B.A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, pp. 95–118. Adshead, M. (1996) Beyond Clientelism: Agricultural Networks in Ireland and the EU. West European Politics, 19(3) 583–608. Aggestam, L. (2004) Role Identity and Europeanisation of Foreign Policy: a Politicalcultural approach. In Tonra and Christiansen, pp. 81–98. Aggestam, L. (2000). A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in the EU. In L. Aggestam and A. Hyde-Price (eds), Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda. New York: St Martin’s Press, pp. 86–115. Ágh, A. (2006) The Role of Central European Parliaments in EU Integration. In Holzhacker and Albaek, forthcoming. Ágh, A. (ed.) (2005) Institutional Design and Regional Capacity-Building in the Post-Accession Period. Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies. Ágh, A. (2003) Anticipatory and Adaptive Europeanization in Hungary. Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies. Alecu de Fler, N. (2005) Convergence of National Foreign Policies? The Effects of CFSP on the National Foreign Policies of the EU Member States. Paper presented at LSE–Kings College London European Foreign Policy conference, London, July 1–2. Alker, H.R. Jr. (1970) Integration Logics: A Review, Extension, and Critique. International Organization, 24(4) 869–916. Allen, D. (2005) Cohesion and Structural Funds: Competing Pressures for Reform? In H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. Pollack (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 5th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 213–41. Allen, D. (1998) Who speaks for Europe? In Petersen and Sjursen, pp. 41–58. Almond, G.A. (1960) Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics. In G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman (eds), The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 3–64. Alter, K.J. (1996) The European Court’s Political Power. West European Politics, 19(3) 458–87. Alter, K.J. (2001) Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Alter, K.J. and J. Vargas (2000) Explaining Variation in the Use of European Litigation Strategies: European Community Law and British Gender Equality Policy. Comparative Political Studies, 33(4) 452–82. American Political Science Review (1995). Review Symposium: The Qualitative–Quantitative Disputation: G. King, R. O. Keohane, and S. Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. American Political Science Review, 89(2) 454–81. Andersen, M.S. and D. Liefferink (eds) (1997) European Environmental Policy: The Pioneers. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. Andersen, S. and K. Eliasen (eds) (1995) Policy Making in Europe: The Europeification of National Policy Making. London: Sage. 354

Bibliography 355

Anderson, C.J. (1998) When in Doubt, use Proxies: Attitudes Toward Domestic Politics and Support For European Integration. Comparative Political Studies, 31(5) 569–601. Anderson, J.J. (2003) Globalization and Europeanization: A conceptual and theoretical overview. In Dyson and Goetz, pp. 37–53. Anderson, J.J. (2002) Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic Polity. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5) 793–822. Anderson, J.J. (ed.) (1999) Regional Integration and Democracy: Expanding on the European Experience. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield. Anderson, J.J. (1990) Skeptical Reflections on a Europe of Regions: Britain, Germany, and the ERDF. Journal of Public Policy, 10(4) 417–47. Andeweg, R.B. (1995) The Reshaping of National Party Systems. West European Politics, 18(3) 58–78. Andeweg, R.B. (1992) Executive-Legislative Relations in the Netherlands: Consecutive and Coexisting Patterns. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17(2) 161–82. Andeweg, R.B. and L. Nijzink (1995) Beyond the Two-Body Image: Relations between Ministers and MPs. In H. Doering (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt am Main: St Martin’s Press, pp. 152–78. Andonova, L. (2004) Transnational Politics of the Environment: The European Union and Environmenal Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ansell, C. K. and G. di Palma (eds) (2004) Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aspinwall, M. and G. Schneider (2001b) Institutional research on the European Union: mapping the field. In Schneider and Aspinwall 2001a, pp. 1–18. Attinà, F. (1990) The Voting Behaviour of European Parliament Members and the Problem of the Europarties. European Journal of Political Research, 18(5) 557–79. Auel, K. (2006) Europeanization of Parliamentary Democracy: Institutional Reforms and Strategic Adaptation. In Holzhacker and Albaek, forthcoming. Auel, K. and A. Benz (2005) Expanding National Parliamentary Control: Does it Further European Democracy. In B. Kohler-Koch and B. Rittberger (eds), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming. Aylott, N. (2002) Let’s Discuss This Later: Party Responses to Euro-division in Scandinavia. Party Politics, 8(4) 463–81. Ayres, I. and J. Braithwaite (1992) Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Azzi, G.C. (2000) The Slow March of European Legislation: The Implementation of Directives. In A. Wiener and K. Neunreither (eds), European Integration after Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 52–66. Babbie, E. R. (2001) The Practice of Social Research, 9th edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Bache, I. (2005) Europeanization and Britain: Towards Multi-level Governance? Paper prepared for the EUSA 9th Biennial Conference. Austin, Texas, March 31–April 2. Bache, I. (2000) Europeanisation and Partnership: Exploring and Explaining Variations in Policy Transfer. Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, 8. Bache, I. (1999) The Extended Gatekeeper: Central Government and the Implementation of EC Regional Policy in the UK. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(1) 28–49. Bache, I. and M. Flinders (eds) (2004) Multi-level Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bache, I. and R. Jones (2000) Empowering the Regions? The Political Impact of EC Regional Policy in Britain and Spain. Regional and Federal Studies, 10(2) 1–20. Bache, I. and A. Jordan (eds) (2006) The Europeanization of British Politics? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

356

Bibliography

Bache, I. and A. Marshall (2004) Europeanisation and Domestic Change: A Governance Approach to Institutional Adaptation in Britain. Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, 5. Baier, V.E., J.G. March and H. Saetren (1986) Implementation and Ambiguity. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 2(3/4) 79–212. Bailey, D. and L. De Propris (2002) EU Structural Funds, Regional Capabilities and Enlargement: Towards Multi-Level Governance? Journal of European Integration, 24(4) 303–24. Baisnee, O. and R. Pasquier (2005) Européanisation et sociétés politiques nationales. In O. Baisnee and R. Pasquier (eds), Les sociétés politiques nationales face à l’européanisation. Paris: Editions du CNRS. Baldwin, R., C. Scott and C. Hood (1998) Introduction. In R. Baldwin, C. Scott and C. Hood (eds), A Reader on Regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–55. Baldwin-Edwards, M. (1997) The Emerging European Immigration Regime: Some Reflections on the Implications for Southern Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies, 35(4) 497–519. Balme, R., D. Chabanet and V. Wright (eds) (2002) L’action collective en Europe. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Baltz, K., T. König and G. Schneider (2005) Immer noch ein etatistischer Kontinent: Die Bildung nationaler Positionen zu EU-Verhandlungen. In Eising and Kohler-Koch, pp. 283–309. Barbé, E. (1996) Spain: The Uses of Foreign Policy Cooperation. In Hill, pp. 108–29. Bardach E. and A.R. Kagan (1982) Going By the Book. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Bardi, L. (1989) Il Parlamento della Comunità Europea. Bologna: Il Mulino. Bardi, L. (1994) Transnational Party Federations, European Parliamentary Party Groups, and the Building of Europarties. In R.S. Katz and P. Mair (eds), How Parties Organize. London: Sage, pp. 357–72. Barnard, C. (1999) EC “Social” Policy. In P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 479–516. Barnard, C. (2000) Regulating Competitive Federalism in the European Union? The Case of EC Social Policy. In J. Shaw (ed.), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union. Oxford: Hart, pp. 49–69. Bartle, I. (2006) Legitimising EU Regulation: Procedural Accountability, Participation, or Better Consultation? In R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione and J. Shaw (eds), Making European Citizens: Strategies for Civic Inclusion. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bartle, I. (2002) When Institutions no Longer Matter: Reform of Telecommunications and Electricity in Germany, France and Britain. Journal of Public Policy, 22(1) 1–28. Bartle, I. (1999) Transnational Interests in the European Union: Globalization and Changing Organization in Telecommunications and Electricity. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(3) 363–83. Bartlett, C.A. and S. Ghoshal (1989) Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution. London: Hutchinson Business Books. Bartolini, S. (2005) Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bartolini, S. (2004) Old and New Peripheries in the Processes of European Territorial Integration. In C. K. Ansell and G. di Palma (eds), Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19–44. Bartolini, S. (2001) La structure des clivages nationaux et la question de l’intégration dans l’Union européenne. Politique Européenne, 4, 5–45.

Bibliography 357

Bátora, J. (2005) Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy? Journal of European Public Policy, 12(1) 44–66. Baumgartner, F.R. and B.D. Jones (1993) Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Baumgartner, F.R. and B.L. Leech (1998) Basic interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and Political Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Legitimacy and the European Union. London and New York: Longman. Beetsma, R., C. Favero, A. Missale, A. Muscatelli, P. Natale and P. Tirelli (eds) (2003) European Macroeconomic Policies after Monetary Unification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Begg, I., M. Ferrera, D. Hodson, M. Kongshoj, M. Matsaganis, S. Sacchi, W. Schelkle (2004) The Costs of Non-Social Policy. Final Report to the European Commission. DG V, Brussels. Bellamy, R. and D. Castiglione (2000) The Uses of Democracy: Reflections in the European Democratic Deficit. In Eriksoen and Fossum, pp. 65–84. Benington, J. and J. Harvey (1998) Transnational Local Authority Networking Within the European Union: Passing Fashion or New Paradigm? In D. Marsh (ed.), Comparing Policy Networks. Buckingham: Open University Press, pp. 149–66. Bennett, R.J. (1997) The Impact of European Economic Integration on Business Associations: The UK Case. West European Politics, 20(3) 61–90. Benz, A. (2004). Path-dependent Institutions and Strategic Veto-Players – National Parliaments in the European Union. West European Politics, 27(5) 875–900. Benz, A. and T. Eberlein (1999) The Europeanization of Regional Policies: Patterns of Multi-level Governance. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(2) 329–48. Berger, S. (1985) The Socialists and the Patronat: The Dilemmas of Co-Existence in a Mixed Economy. In H. Machin and V. Wright (eds), Economic Policy and Policy-Making Under the Mitterrand Presidency, 1981–1984. London: Frances Pinter, pp. 225–43. Bergman, T. (1997) National Parliaments and EU Affairs Committees: Notes on Empirical Variation and Competing Explanations. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(3) 373–87. Bergman, T. (2000) The European Union as the Next Step of Delegation and Accountability. European Journal of Political Research, 37(3) 415–29. Bergman, T. and E. Damgaard (eds) (2000) Delegation and Accountability in European Integration: The Nordic Parliamentary Democracies and the European Union. London: Frank Cass. Bergman, T., W.C. Müller, K. Strøm and M. Blomgren (2003) Democratic Delegation and Accountability: Cross-national Patterns. In K. Strøm, W.C. Müller and T. Bergman (eds), Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109–221. Bernstein, M.H. (1955) Regulating Business by Independent Commission. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Beyers, J. (2002) Gaining and Seeking Access: The European Adaptation of Domestic Interest Associations. European Journal of Political Research, 41(5) 585–612. Beyers, J., T. Delreux and C. Steensels (2004) The Europeanisation of Intergovernmental Cooperation and Conflict Resolution in Belgium: The Case of Agriculture. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 5(1) 103–34. Beyers, J. and G. Dierickx (1998) The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations? Journal of Common Market Studies, 36(3) 289–318. Beyers, J. and B. Kerremans (2004) Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Societal Interests: How is European Policy Making Politicized? Comparative Political Studies, 37(10) 1119–51.

358

Bibliography

Beyers, J. and J. Trondal (2004) How Nation States “Hit” Europe: Ambiguity and Representation in the European Union. West European Politics, 25(5) 919–42. Bigo, D. (2001) Migration and Security. In V. Guiraudon and C. Joppke (eds), Controlling a New Migration World. London: Routledge, pp. 121–49. Bleich, E. (2003) Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blichner, L. (2000) The Anonymous Hand of Public Reason: Interparliamentary Discourse and the Quest for Legitimacy. In Eriksen and Fossum, pp. 141–63. Blondel, J., R. Sinnott and P. Svensson (1998) People and Parliament in the European Union: Participation, Democracy, and Legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blyth, M. and R.S. Katz (2005) From Catch-all Politics to Cartelization: The Political Economy of the Cartel Party. West European Politics, 28(1) 33–60. Boergers, T. and C. Dustmann (2003) Awarding Telecom Licences: The Recent European Experience. Economic Policy, 18(April) 215–68. Bomberg, E. and J. Peterson (2000) Policy Transfer and Europeanization: Passing the Heineken Test? Queen’s Paper on Europeanization, 2. Bomberg, E. and J. Peterson (1998) European Union Decision Making: The Role of Sub-national Authorities. Political Studies, 46(2) 219–35. Bonnet, A., H. Delorme and D. Perraud (1996) La politique agricole commune et les transferts entre agricultures de la CEE. Analyse empirique d’une phase de transition. Notes et Études Économiques, 2, 7–62. Borras, S. and K. Jacobsson (2004) The Open Method of Coordination and New Governance Patterns in the EU. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(2) 185–208. Börzel, T.A. (2006) Participation through Law Enforcement: The Case of the European Union. Comparative Political Studies, 39(1) 128–52. Börzel, T. (2005) Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States. In Bulmer and Lequesne (2005a), pp. 45–69. Börzel, T.A. (2003a) Environmental Leaders and Laggards in Europe: Why there is (Not) a Southern Problem. Aldershot: Ashgate. Börzel, T. (2003b) Shaping and Taking EU Policies: Member State Responses to Europeanisation. Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, 2. Börzel, T.A. (2002a) States and Regions in the European Union: Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Börzel, T. (2002b) Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2) 193–214. Börzel, T. (2001a) Non-compliance in the European Union: Pathology or Statistical Artefact. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(5) 803–24. Börzel, T. (2001b) Europeanization and Territorial Institutional Change: Toward Cooperative Regionalism. In Cowles et al., pp. 137–58. Börzel, T. (2000a) From Competitive Regionalism to Cooperative Federalism: The Europeanization of the Spanish State of the Autonomies. Publius, 30(2) 17–42. Börzel, T.A. (2000b) Improving Compliance through Domestic Mobilisation? New Instruments and the Effectiveness of Implementation in Spain. In Knill and Lenschow, pp. 222–50. Börzel, T. (1999) Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanization in German and Spain. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(4) 573–96. Börzel, T.A. and T. Risse (2006) The EU and Domestic Politics: From Implementation to Europeanization. In K.E. Joergensen, M.A. Pollack and B. Rosamond (eds), Handbook of European Union Politics. London: Sage, forthcoming.

Bibliography 359

Börzel, T. and T. Risse (2003) Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe. In Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a, pp. 57–79. Börzel, T.A. and T. Risse (2000) When Europe hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change. European Integration online Papers, 4(15). Boswell, C. (2003) The “External Dimension” of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy. International Affairs, 79(3) 619–38. Bourne, A. (2003) The Impact of European Integration on Regional Power. Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(4) 597–620. Bouwen, P. (2002) A Comparative Study of Business Lobbying in the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of Ministers. Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Paper, 02/7. Bouwman, H and M. Christoffersen (eds) (1992) Relaunching Videotex. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Brady, H.E. and D. Collier (eds) (2004) Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Braithwaite, J. (2000) The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology. British Journal of Criminology, 40(2) 222–38. Braithwaite, J. and P. Drahos (2000) Global Business Regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Britton, D.K. (1976) National Policies within the CAP. Food Policy, 1(4) 405–12. Brochmann, G. and T. Hammar (1999) Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies. London: Berg Publishers. Brokl, L. (ed.) (2001) Deputies, Senators and Integration of the Czech Republic into the European Union. Prague: Institute of Sociology. Brusis, M. (2002) Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics, and National Traditions: Re-creating Regions in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Governance, 15(4) 531–59. Bruszt, L. and D. Stark (2003) Who Counts? Supranational Norms and Societal Needs. East European Politics and Societies, 17(1) 74–82. Bull, H. (1983) Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 21(2) 149–70. Bull, M. and J. Baudner (2004) Europeanisation and Italian policy for the Mezzogiorno. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(6) 1058–76. Buller, J. and A. Gamble (2002) Conceptualising Europeanisation. Public Policy and Administration, 17(2) 4–24. Bulmer, S. (1998) New Institutionalism and the Governance of the Single European Market. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(3) 365–86. Bulmer, S. (1997) Shaping the Rules? The Constitutive Politics of the European Union and German Power. In P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), Tamed Power: Germany in Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 49–79. Bulmer, S. and M. Burch (2005) The Europeanization of UK Central Government: From Quiet Revolution to Explicit Step-change? Public Administration, 83(4) 861–90. Bulmer, S. and M. Burch (2001) The “Europeanisation” of Central Government: the UK and Germany in Historical Institutionalist Perspective. In Schneider and Aspinwall, pp. 73–96. Bulmer, S. and M. Burch (2000) The Europeanisation of British Central Government. In Rhodes, vol. 1, pp. 46–62. Bulmer, S. and M. Burch (1998) Organising for Europe: Whitehall, the British State and the European Union. Public Administration, 76(4) 601–28. Bulmer, S., C. Jeffery and W. Paterson (2000) Germany’s European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

360

Bibliography

Bulmer, S. and C. Lequesne (eds) (2005a) The Member States of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bulmer, S. and C. Lequesne (2005b) The European Union and its Member States: An Overview. In Bulmer and Lequesne 2005a, pp. 1–20. Bulmer, S. and S. Padgett (2005) Policy Transfer In The European Union: An Institutionalist Perspective. British Journal of Political Science, 35(1) 103–26. Bulmer, S. and C.M. Radaelli (2005) The Europeanization of National Policy. In Bulmer and Lequesne 2005a, pp. 338–59. Bulmer, S.J. and C.M. Radaelli (2004) The Europeanization of National Policy. Queen’s Papers on Europeanization, No.1/2004. Burch, M. and R. Gomez (2003) Europeanization and the English Regions. Paper for UACES/ESRC seminar series, 2 May, Sheffield, www.shef.ac.uk/ebpp. Burch, M. and Gomez, R. (2006) The English Regions. In Bache and Jordan, forthcoming. Burke, T.F. (2004) The European Union and the Diffusion of Disability Rights. In M.A. Levin and M. Shapiro (eds), Transatlantic Policymaking in the Age of Austerity: Diversity and Drift. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 158–76. Bursens, P. (2006) EU Environmental Policy-Making in Belgium: Who Keeps the Gate? Journal of European Integration, 28(2) 159–79. Bursens, P. (2004) Enduring Federal Consensus. An Institutionalist Account of Belgian Preferences regarding the Future of Europe. Comparative European Politics, 2(3) 320–38. Bursens, P. (2002a) Belgium’s Adaptation to the EU. Does Federalism Constrain Europeanisation? Res Publica, 54(4) 549–98. Bursens, P. (2002b) Why Denmark and Belgium Have Different Implementation Records: On Transposition Laggards and Leaders in the EU. Scandinavian Political Studies, 25(2) 173–95. Byrne, R., G. Noll and J. Vested-Hansen (eds) (2002) New Asylum Countries? Migration Control and Refugee Protection in an Enlarged European Union. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. Caporaso, J.A. (1999) Towards a Normal Science of Regional Integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(1) 160–64. Caporaso, J., J.T. Checkel and J. Jupille (2003) Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism and the Study of the European Union. Comparative Political Studies, special issue, 36(1/2). Caporaso, J. and J. Jupille (2001) The Europeanization of Gender Equality Policy and Domestic Structural Change. In Cowles et al., pp. 21–43. Carlsnaes, W., H. Sjursen and B. White (eds) (2004) Contemporary European Foreign Policy. London: Sage. Carrubba, C. and L. Murrah (2005) Legal Integration and Use of the Preliminary Ruling Process in the European Union. International Organization, 59(2) 399–418. Cartabia, M. (1998) The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship between the Italian Legal System and the European Union. In Slaughter et al., pp. 133–46. Cartelier, L. (2003) Auctions versus Beauty Contests: The Allocation of UMTS Licences in Europe. Annales de l’economie publique sociale et cooperative, 74(1) 63–85. Castles, F.G. (1993) Introduction. In F.G. Castles (ed.), Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies. Aldershot: Dartmouth, pp. xiii–xxiii. Cawson, A. (1992) Interests, Groups and Public Policy-Making: the Case of the European Consumer Electronics Industry. In J. Greenwood, J.R. Grote and K. Ronit (eds), Organized Interests and the European Community. London: Sage, pp. 99–118. Cerny, G.P. (2004) Mapping varieties of Neoliberalism. IPEG Papers in Global Political Economy, 12.

Bibliography 361

Chalmers, D. (2000a) The Much Ado About Judicial Politics in the United Kingdom: A Statistical Analysis of Reported Decisions of United Kingdom Courts Invoking EC Law 1973–1998. Harvard Jean Monnet Working paper, No. 1/2000. Chalmers, D. (2000b) The Positioning of EU Judicial Politics within the United Kingdom. West European Politics, 23(4) 169–210. Chapman, R. (2006) The Third Sector. In Bache and Jordan, forthcoming. Chayes, A. and A.H. Chayes (1993) On Compliance. International Organizations, 47(2) 175–205. Checkel, J. (2005) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework. International Organization, 59(4) 801–26. Checkel, J.T. (2004) Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics: A Review Essay. Review of International Studies, 30(2) 229–44. Checkel, J.T. (2001a) The Europeanization of Citizenship? In Cowles et al., pp. 180–97. Checkel, J. (2001b) Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. International Organization, 55(3) 553–88. Checkel, J. (2000) Compliance and Conditionality. ARENA Working Paper, WP 00/18. Oslo: ARENA. Checkel, J.T. (1999) Social Construction and Integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4) 545–60. Checkel, J.T. (1998) The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics, 50(2) 324–48. Chong, D. (2000) Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Christensen, J. (2006) Elusive Europe: The Impact of EU-regulation on Danish Public Policy. Paper presented at the conference on Progress and Problems in Building a European Legal Order. Luxembourg: Chamber of Deputies, June 24–5. Christiansen, T., K.E. Jorgensen and A. Wiener (1999) The Social Construction of Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, special issue, 6(4). Cichowski, R. (2002) Litigation, Mobilization, and Governance: The European Court and Transnational Activists. Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California-Irvine. Claes, D.H. (2002) The Process of Europeanization: Norway and the Internal Energy Market. Journal of Public Policy, 22(3) 299–323. Claes, M. and B. de Witte (1998) Report on the Netherlands. In Slaughter et al., pp. 171–94. Clapham, A. (1999) Where is the EU’s Human Rights Common Foreign Policy, and How is it Manifested in Multilateral Fora? In P. Alston (ed.), The European Union and Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 627–86. Clements, B. (1998) The Impact of Convergence on Regulatory Policy in Europe. Telecommunications Policy, 22(3) 197–205. Closa, C. and P.M. Heywood (2004) Spain and the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Coen, D. (2005a) Business–Regulatory Relations: Learning to Play Regulatory Games in European Utility Markets. Governance, 18(3) 375–99. Coen, D. (2005b) Managing the Political Life Cycle of Regulation in the UK and German Telecommunication Sectors. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 76(1) 59–84. Coen, D. (2002) The Politics of Regulation in Europe (review article). Journal of European Public Policy, 9(1) 141–5. Coen, D. (1998) The European Business Interest and the Nation State: Large-Firm Lobbying in the European Union and Member States. Journal of Public Policy, 18(1) 75–100.

362

Bibliography

Coen, D. and C. Dannreuther (2003) Differentiated Europeanization: Large and small firms in the EU policy process. In Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a, pp. 255–75. Coleman, J.S. (1974) Power and the Structure of Society. New York: Norton. Coleman, W.D., G. Skogstad and M. Atkinson (1997) Paradigm Shifts and Policy Networks: Cumulative Change in Agriculture. Journal of Public Policy, 16(3) 273–301. Coleman, W.D. and C. Chiasson (2002) State Power, Transformative Capacity and Adapting to Globalization: An Analysis of French Agricultural Policy, 1960–2000. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(2) 168–85. Collier, D., H.E. Brady and J. Seawright (2004) Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Towards and Alternative View of Methodology. In H. E. Brady and D. Collier (eds), Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham, etc.: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 229–66. Commission of the European Communities (2005) Third Progress Report on Cohesion. COM (2005) 192 final. Commission of the European Communities (2004) The Internal Market: Ten Years without Frontiers. http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/10years/docs/workingdoc/ workingdoc_en.pdf. Commission of the European Communities (2003) Internal Market Strategy Priorities 2003–2006. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0238en01.pdf. Commission of the European Communities (2002) Communication from the Commission. Consultation document: Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – Proposal for general principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission. COM(2002) 277 final. Commission of the European Communities (2001a) European Governance: A White Paper. COM(2001) 428 final. Commission of the European Communities (2001b) Making a Success of Enlargement. Strategy Paper and Report by the European Commission on the Progress towards Accession of Each Candidate Country. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities (1993) Making Most of the Internal Market. Strategic Programme. Brussels. Conant, L. (2002) Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Conant, L. (2001) Europeanization and the Courts: Variable Patterns of Adaptation among National Judiciaries. In Cowles et al., pp. 97–115. Constantelos, J. (2004) The Europeanization of Interest Group Politics in Italy: Business Associations in Rome and the Regions. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(6) 1020–40. Conzelmann, T. (1998) “Europeanization” of Regional Development Policies? Linking the Multi-level Governance Approach with Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change. European Integration online Papers, 2(4). Conzelmann, T. (2003) Contested Spaces: Europeanised Regional Policy in Great Britain and Germany. Draft paper prepared for the EUSA 8th Biennial International Conference, March 29, Nashville, Tennessee. Cormack, J. and M. Bell (2005) Developing Anti-discrimination Law in Europe. The 25 EU Member States Compared. Brussels: European network of independent experts in the anti-discrimination field (European Human Consultancy Migration Policy Group). COSAC Secretariat (2004) Second Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny. Paper presented at XXXII Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union, The Hague, 22–3 November.

Bibliography 363

Cowhey, P. and J. Richards (2000) Dialing for Dollars: Institutional Designs for the Globalization of the Market for Basic Telecommunications Services. In A. Prakash and J.A. Hart (eds), Coping with Globalization. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 148–69. Cowles, M.G. (2001) The Transatlantic Business Dialogue and Domestic BusinessGovernment Relations. In Cowles et al., pp. 159–79. Cowles, M.G., J. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds) (2001) Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Cowles, M.G. and T. Risse (2001) Transforming Europe: Conclusions. In Cowles et al., pp. 217–37. Cress, D.M. and D.A. Snow (2005) The Outcome of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing. American Journal of Sociology, 105(4) 1063–104. Crouch, C. (2002) The Euro and Labour Market and Wage Policies. In Dyson 2002, pp. 278–304. Crouch, C. (ed.) (2000) After the Euro: Shaping Institutions for Governance in the Wake of the European Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Culpepper, P.D. (1993) Organisational Competition and the Neo-Corporatist Fallacy in French Agriculture. West European Politics, 16(3) 295–315. Curwen, P. (1995) Telecommunications Policy in the European Union: Developing the Information Superhighway. Journal of Common Market Studies, 33(3) 331–60. Cyert, R.M. and J.G. March (1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Cygan, A. (2004) The Role of National Parliaments in the EU’s New Constitutional Order. In T. Tridimas (ed.), European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order. Oxford: Hart, vol. 1, pp. 152–69. Dahl, R.A. (1999) On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Daly, S. (2003) The Ladder of Abstraction: A Framework for the Systematic Classification of Democratic Regime Types. Politics, 23(2) 96–108. Damgaard, E. and A.S. Nørgaard (2000) The European Union and Danish Parliamentary Democracy. Journal of Legislative Studies, 6(1) 33–58. Daugbjerg, C. (1999) Reforming the CAP: Policy Networks and Broader Institutional Structures. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(3) 407–28. Daugbjerg, C. (1997) Policy Networks in Agricultural Policy Reforms: Explaining Deregulation in Sweden and Re-regulation in the European Community. Governance, 10(2) 123–42. Daugbjerg, C. and F. Just (2003) Internationaliseringen af landbrugsforvaltningen og nationale magkonstellationer. In M. Marcussen and K. Ronit (eds), Internationaliseringen af den offentlige forvaltning i Danmark. Magtudredningen. Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, pp. 128–55. Daugbjerg, C. and A. Swinbank (2005) The 2003 CAP Reform: Accomodating WTO Pressures. Unpublished manuscript. Defeis, E.F. (2001) Human Rights and the European Union: Who Decides? Possible Conflicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. Dickinson Journal of International Law, 19(2) 301–31. Dehousse, R. (1998a) The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration. London: St Martin’s Press. Dehousse, R. (1998b) Institutional Models for an Enlarged Union: Some Reflexions on a Non-Debate. In R. Dehousse (ed.), An Even Larger Union? The Eastern Enlargement in Perspective. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 143–55.

364

Bibliography

De la Porte, C., P. Pochet (eds) (2002) Building Social Europe through the Open Method of Co-ordination. Work & Society, vol. 34. Brussels: Peter Lang. Della Porta, D. (2003) The Europeanisation of Protest: A Typology and Some Empirical Evidence. EUI Working Paper, SPS 2003/18. Delorme, H. (2001) Les relations des agriculteurs et des institutions communautaires: du corporatisme agricole au lobbyisme agro-alimentaire. In R. Balme, D. Chabanet, and V. Wright (eds), L’Action Collective en Europe. Paris: Presses de Science Po, pp. 313–46. Delorme, H., D. Perraud with the assistance of A. Bonnet (1994). De la convergence communautaire à la cohesion des politiques nationals: le financement des politiques socio-structurelles dans la CEE. Économie rurale, 220–1, 197–202. De Meur, G. and B. Rihoux (2002) L’Analyse Quali-Quantitative Comparée. Brussels: Bruylant. De Rooij, R. (2002) The Impact of the European Union on Local Government in the Netherlands. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(3) 447–67. Devuyst, Youri (1995) The European Community and the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round. In C. Rhodes and S. Mazey (eds), The State of the European Union: Building a European Polity? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 449–68. De Witte, B. (2000) Politics versus Law in the EU’s Approach to Ethnic Minorities. Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies Working paper Series. RSC 2000/4. Florence: European University Institute. Published in J. Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound. New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 137–59. Deutsch, K.W. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dimatrakopoulos, D. (2001) The Transposition of EU Law: “Post-decisional Politics” and Institutional Economy. European Law Journal, 7(4) 442–58. Dimitrov, V., K.H. Goetz and H. Wollmann (2006) Governing after Communism: Institutions and Policy-Making. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Dimitrova, A.L. (ed.) (2004) Driven to Change: The European Union’s Enlargement Viewed from the East. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Dimitrova, A. (2002) Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU’s Administrative Capacity Requirement. West European Politics, 25(4) 171–90. Dimitrova, A., and B. Steunenberg (2000) The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union. An Impossible Quest? European Union Politics, 1(2) 201–26. Di Palma, G. (2004) Postscript: What Inefficient History and Malleable Practices Say about Nation-States and Supranational Democracy When Territoriality Is No Longer Exclusive. In C.K. Ansell and G. di Palma (eds), Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 246–69. Di Palma, G. (2000) Introduzione: Istituzioni e politiche nell’Italia che cambia. In G. Di Palma, S. Fabbrini and G. Freddi (eds), Condannata al successo? L’Italia nell’Europa integrata. Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 9–43. Djelic, M.L. and K. Sahlin-Andersson (eds) (2006) Transnational Regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Doering, H. (1995) Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt am Main: St Martin’s Press. Dolowitz, D. and D. March (1996) Who learn What From Whom? A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature. Political Studies, 44(2) 343–57. Doren, G.B. and S. Wilks (eds) (1998). Changing Regulatory Institutions in Britain and North America. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Dosenrode, S.Z. von (1998) Denmark: The Testing of a Hesitant Membership. In Hanf and Soetendorp, pp. 52–68.

Bibliography 365

Dosenrode, S. and H. Halkier (eds) (2004) The Nordic Regions and the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate. Duchêne, F. (1973) The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence. In M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager (eds), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community. London: Macmillan, pp. 1–21. Duina, F.G. (1999) Harmonizing Europe: Nation-States within the Community Market. Albany: State University of New York Press. Duina. F and M. Oliver (2005). National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Integration? European Law Journal, 11(2) 173–95. Dür, A. (2005) Interest Group Power in the EU: Access, Influence and Resources. Paper prepared for the CONNEX Workshop The State of the Art in EU Interest Representation, Leiden, April 14–16. Duval, R. and J. Elmeskov (2005) The Effects of EMU on Structural Reforms in Labour and Product Markets. Paper prepared for the conference on “What Effects is EMU Having on the Euro Area and its Member Countries?” organized by the European Central Bank and held in Frankfurt on June 16–17. Dyson, K. (forthcoming) Publications on EMU from European Union Framework 6 project “INTUNE”: Integrated and United? A Quest for Citizenship in an “Ever Closer Europe”(2005–8). Available at http://www.intune.it. Dyson, K. (ed.) (2006) Enlarging the Euro Area: The Euro and the Transformation of East Central Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dyson, K. (2003) Economic Policies: From Pace-Setter to Beleaguered Player. In Dyson and Goetz 2003a, pp. 201–30. Dyson, K. (ed.) (2002) European States and the Euro: Europeanization, Variation and Convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dyson, K. (2000) The Politics of the Euro-Zone: Stability or Breakdown? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dyson, K. (1994) Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. London: Longman. Dyson, K. and K.H. Goetz (eds) (2003a) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dyson, K. and K. Goetz (2003b) Living with Europe: Power, Constraint, and Contestation. In Dyson and Goetz 2003a, pp. 3–36. Dyson, K. and Goetz K.H. (2003c) Europeanization Compared: The Shrinking Core and the Decline of “Soft” Power. In Dyson and Goetz 2003a, pp. 349–76. Dyson, K. and K. Featherstone (1999) The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dyson, K. and S. Padgett (eds) (2006a) The Politics of Economic Reform in Germany. London: Routledge. Dyson, K. and S. Padgett (2006b) Introduction: Global, Rhineland or Hybrid Capitalism? In Dyson and Padgett. Dyson, K. and S. Wilks (eds) (1983) Industrial Crisis. Oxford: Blackwell. Easton, D. (1965) A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley. Eberlein, B. and E. Grande (2005) Beyond Delegation: Transnational Regulatory Regimes and the EU Regulatory State. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(1) 89–112. Eckstein, H. (1975) Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In F. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 79–137. Economides, S. (2005) The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy. West European Politics, 28(2) 471–91.

366

Bibliography

ECOTEC (2003) Evaluation of the Added Value and Costs of the European Structural Funds in the UK. Final Report to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). London: ECOTEC Research and Consulting Limited. Egeberg, M. (ed.) (2006) The Multi-Level Union Administration: Transformation of Executive Politics in Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming. Egeberg, M. (2005a) The EU and the Nordic Countries: Organizing Domestic Diversity. In Bulmer and Lequesne, pp. 185–208. Egeberg, M. (2005b) EU Institutions and the Transformation of European-Level Politics: How to Understand Profound Change (if it Occurs). Comparative European Politics, 3(1) 102–17. Egeberg, M. (1999) Transcending Intergovernmentalism? Identity and Role Perceptions of National Officials in EU Decision-Making. Journal of European Public Policy 6(3) 456–74. Eijk, C. van der, and M.N. Franklin (2004) Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe. In G. Marks and M.R. Steenbergen (eds), European Integration and Political Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 32–50. Eijk, C. van der and M.N. Franklin (1996) Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Eising, R. (2004a) Multilevel Governance and Business Interests in the European Union. Governance, 17(2) 211–46. Eising, R. (2004b) Der Zugang von Interessengruppen zu den Institutionen der Europäischen Union. Eine organisationstheoretische Analyse. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 45(4) 494–518. Eising, R. (2003a) Europäisierung und Integration. Konzepte in der EU-Forschung. In M. Jachtenfuchs and B. Kohler-Koch (eds), Europäische Integration. Opladen: Leske & Budrich UTB, pp. 387–416. Eising, R. (2003b) Interest Groups: Opportunity Structure and Governance Capacity. In Dyson and Goetz, pp. 147–72. Eising, R. (2002) Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization. International Organization, 56(1) 85–120. Eising, R. (2000) Liberalisierung und Europäisierung. Die regulative Reform der Elektrizitätsversorgung in Grossbritannien, der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Eising, R. (1999) Reshuffling Power: The Liberalisation of the EU Electricity Markets and its Impact on the German Governance Regime. In Kohler-Koch and Eising, pp. 208–28. Eising, R. and B. Kohler-Koch (eds) (2005) Interessenpolitik in Europa. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Eisner, M. (2000) Regulatory Politics in Transition, 2nd edn. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Elgie, R. and I. McMenamin (2005) Credible Commitment, Political Uncertainty or Policy Complexity? British Journal of Political Science, 35(3) 531–48. Eliassen, K.A and M.S. Marino (2001) Telecommunications Policy: Interest Convergence and Globalization. In S.S. Andersen and K.A. Eliassen (eds), Making Policy in Europe. London: Sage Publications, pp. 86–105. Eriksen, E.O. and J.E. Fossum (eds) (2000) Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation. London and New York: Routledge. Esaiasson, P. and K. Heidar (2000) Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic Experience. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Esser, J. and R. Noppe (1996) Private Muddling Through as a Political Programme? The Role of the European Commission in the Telecommunications Sector in the 1980s. West European Politics, 19(3) 547–62.

Bibliography 367

Etzioni, Amitai (1963) The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level. American Journal of Sociology, 68(4) 407–21. Falkner, G. (2003a) Comparing Europeanisation Effects: from Metaphor to Operationalisation. European Integration online Papers, 7(13). Falkner, G. (2003b) The EU’s Social Dimenision. In M. Cini (ed.), European Union Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 264–77 (new edition due in 2006). Falkner, G. (2001) The Europeanization of Austria: Misfit, Adaptation and Controversies. European Integration online Papers, 5(13). Falkner, G. (2000) Policy Networks in a Multi-level System: Converging Towards Moderate Diversity? West European Politics, 23(4) 94–120. Falkner, G. (1998) EU Social Policy in the 1990s: Towards a Corporatist policy Community. London: Routledge. Falkner, G. and S. Leiber (2004) Europeanisation of Social Partnership in Smaller European Democracies? European Journal of Industrial Relations, 10(3) 239–60. Falkner, G., and S. Leiber (1999) The Impact of EU Membership on Policy Networks in Austria: Creeping Change Beneath the Surface. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(3) 496–516. Falkner, G., O. Treib, M. Hartlapp and S. Leiber (2005a) Complying with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States of the EU. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Falkner, G., M. Hartlapp, S. Leiber and O. Treib (2005b) Die Kooperation der Sozialpartner im Arbeitsrecht: Ein europäischer Weg? In Eising and Kohler-Koch, pp. 341–62. Falkner, G., M. Hartlapp, S. Leber and O. Treib (2004) Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor? West European Politics, 27(3) 452–73. Farrell, H. (2003) Constructing the International Foundations of E-commerce. The EU–US Safe Harbor arrangement. International Organization, 57(2) 277–306. Favell, A. (2001) L’européanisation ou l’émergence d’un nouveau “champ politique”: le cas de la politique de l’immigration. Cultures et conflits 38/39. Paris: L’Harmattan. Fearon, J. and A. Wendt (2002) Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage, pp. 52–72. Fearon, J.D. (1991) Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. World Politics, 43(2) 169–95. Featherstone, K. (2003) Introduction: In the Name of “Europe”. In Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a, pp. 3–26. Featherstone, K. (1998) “Europeanization” and the Centre–Periphery: the Case of Greece in the 1990’s. South European Society and Politics, 3(1) 23–39. Featherstone, K. (1988) Socialist Parties and European Integration. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Featherstone and G. Kazamias (eds) (2001a) Europeanization and the Southern Periphery. London: Frank Cass. Featherstone, K. and G. Kazamias (2001b) Introduction: Southern Europe and the Process of “Europeanization”. In Featherstone and Kazamias, pp. 1–22. Featherstone, K. and C.M. Radaelli (eds) (2003a) The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Featherstone, K. and C.M. Radaelli (2003b) Conclusions: A Conversant Research Agenda. In Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a, pp. 331–41. Ferrera, M. and S. Sacchi (2005) The Open Method of Co-ordination and National Institutional Capabilities: The Italian Experience. In Zeitlin and Pochet, pp. 137–72.

368

Bibliography

Fitzmaurice, J. (1976) National Parliaments and European Policy-making: The Case of Denmark. Parliamentary Affairs, 29(3) 281–92. Fitzmaurice, J. (1996) National Parliamentary Control of EU Policy in the Three New Member States. West European Politics, 19(1) 88–96. Fligstein, N. and F. Merand (2002) Globalization or Europeanization? Evidence on the European Economy since 1980. Acta Sociologica, 45(1) 7–22. Flinders, M. (2004a) Distributed Public Governance in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(3) 520–44. Flinders, M. (2004b) Distributed Public Governance in Britain. Public Administration, 82(4) 883–909. Follesdal, A. (2000) Subsidiarity and Democratic Deliberation. In Eriksen and Fossum, pp. 85–110. Franchino, F. (2005) The Study of EU Public Policy: Results of a Survey. European Union Politics, 6(2) 243–52. Franchino, F. (2002) Efficiency or Credibility? Testing the Two Logics of Delegation to the European Commission. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(5) 677–94. Frendreis, J.P. (1983) Explanation of Variation and Detection of Covariation: The Purpose and Logic of Comparative Analysis. Comparative Political Studies, 16(2) 255–72. Fuchs, G. (1994) Policy-Making in a System of Multi-Level Governance: The Commission of the European Community and the Structuring of the Telecommunications Sector. Journal of European Public Policy, 1(2) 27–44. Gabel, M. (2000) European Integration, Voters and National Politics. West European Politics, 23(4) 752–82. Gabel, M. and S. Hix (2004) Defining the EU Political Space: An Empirical Study of the European Election Manifestos, 1979–99. In Marks and Steenbergen, pp. 93–119. Gaffney, J. (ed.) (1996) Political Parties and the European Union. London: Routledge. Garry, J. (1995) The British Conservative Party: Divisions over European Policy. West European Politics, 18(4) 170–89. Geddes, A. (2001a) Lobbying for Migrant Inclusion in the European Union: New Opportunities for Transnational Advocacy. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(4) 632–49. Geddes, A. (2001b) The Shift to Europe: Explanations for and Implications of the Development of EU Immigration Policies. Swiss Political Science Review, 7(3) 106–13. Geddes, A. (2000) Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe? Manchester: Manchester University Press. Geddes, A. and V. Guiraudon (2004) Britain, France, and EU antidiscrimination policy: The Emergence of an EU Policy Paradigm. West European Politics, 27(2) 334–53. Genieys, W., M. Guglielmi and Y. Le Pape (2000) Les traductions régionales du partenariat: la mise en œuvre des programmes 5 B. In D. Perraud (ed.), L’Europe Verte. Paris: INRA, pp. 17–32. Genschel, P. (2001) Comment: The Europeanisation of Central Government. In Schneider and Aspinwall, pp. 97–100. Genschel, P. (1997) The Dynamics of Inertia: Institutional Persistence and Change in Telecommunications and Health Care. Governance, 10(1) 43–66. Genschel, P. and R. Werle (1993) From National Hierarchies to International Standardization: Modal Changes in the Governance of Telecommunications. Journal of Public Policy, 13(3) 203–25. George, A. L. and A. Bennet (2005) Case Study and Theory Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gerring, J. (1999) What Makes a Good Concept? A Critical Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Science. Polity, 31(3) 357–93.

Bibliography 369

Geyer, R.R. (2000) Exploring European Social Policy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Gibbs, D.C. (2001) Harnessing the Information Society? European Union Policy and Information and Communication Technologies. European Urban and Regional Studies, 8(1) 73–84. Gibson, J. and G. Caldeira, (1996) The Legal Cultures of Europe. Law and Society Review, 30(1) 55–85. Giddings, P. and G. Drewry (eds) (2004) Britain in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Gilardi, F. (2005) The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe. Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Sciences, 598(1) 84–101. Gilardi, F. (2002) Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6) 873–93. Gilardi, F., J. Jordana and D. Levi-Faur (2006) Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies across Europe and Latin America. In A. Graeme Hodge (ed.), Privatization and Market Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Ginsberg, R.H. (1999) Conceptualising the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Capability–Expectations Gap. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(3) 429–54. Ginsberg, R.H. (1989) Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale. Boulder: Lynne Riennes. Giuliani, M. (2003) Europeanization in Comparative Perspective: Institutional Fit and National Adaptation. In Featherstone and Radaelli, pp. 133–55. Glarbo, K. (2001) Reconstructing a Common European Foreign Policy. In T. Christiansen, K.E. Jørgensen and A. Wiener (eds), The Social Construction of Europe. London: Sage, 140–57. Glarbo, K. (1999) Wide-Awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4) 634–51. Goetz, K.H. (2005) The New Member States and the EU: Responding to Europe. In Bulmer and Lequesne, pp. 254–80. Goetz, K. (2002) Four Worlds of Europeanisation. Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops. Turin, Italy, 22–7 March. Goetz, K. (ed.) (2001a) Executive Governance in Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(6), special issue. Goetz, K.H. (2001b) Making Sense of Post-Communist Central Administration: Modernization, Europeanization or Latinization? Journal of European Public Policy, 8(6) 1032–51. Goetz, K. (2000) European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search of an Effect. West European Politics, 23(4) 211–31. Goetz, K.H. (1995) National Governance and European Integration: Intergovernmental Relations in Germany. Journal of Common Market Studies, 33(1) 91–116. Goetz, K. and S. Hix (eds) (2000) Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems. London: Frank Cass. Goetz K.H. and H.Z. Margetts (1999) The Solitary Center: The Core Executive in and Eastern Europe. Governance, 12(4) 425–53. Goldsmith, M. (2003) Variable Geometry, Multilevel Governance: European Integration and Subnational Government in the New Millennium. In Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a, pp. 112–34. Goldthorpe, J.H. (1997) Current Issues in Comparative Macrosociology: A Debate on Methodological Issues. Comparative Social Research, 16(1) 1–26.

370

Bibliography

Goodwin, I. and S. Spittle (2002) The European Union and the Information Society: Discourse, Power and Policy. New Media Society, 4(2) 225–49. Gordon, P.H. (1997) Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy. International Security, 22(3) 74–100. Gorges, M.J. (1996) Euro-Corporatism? Interest Intermediation in the European Community. Lanham, New York and London: University Press of America. Gourevitch, P. (1978) The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics. International Organization, 32(4) 881–911. Grabbe, H. (2003) Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process. In Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a, pp. 303–27. Grabbe, H. (2001) How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(6) 1013–31. Grande, E. (1996) The State and Interest Groups in a Framework of Multi-level DecisionMaking: The Case of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 3(3) 318–38. Grande, E. (1994) The New Role of the State in Telecommunications: An International Comparison. West European Politics, 17(3) 138–57. Grande, E. (1989) Vom Monopol zum Wettbewerb. Die neokonservative Reform der Telekommunikation in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag. Grande, E. and V. Schneider (1991) Reformstrategien und staatliche Handlungskapazitäten. Eine vergleichende Analyse institutionellen Wandels in der Telekommunikation in Westeuropa. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 3(3) 452–78. Grant, W. (2005) An Insider Group under Pressure: The NFU in Britain. In D. Halpin (ed.), Surviving Global Change? Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 31–50. Graver, H.P. (2000) Supranationality and National Legal Autonomy in the EEAAgreement. ARENA Working Papers, 23. Graziano, P. (2002) Europeanization or Globalization? A Framework for Empirical Research (with some evidence from the Italian Case). Global Social Policy, 3(2) 173–94. Greenwood, J. (2003a) Interest Representation in the European Union. New York: Palgrave. Greenwood, J. (ed.) (2003b) The Challenge of Change in EU Business Associations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Greenwood, J. and M. Aspinwall (eds) (1998). Collective Action in the European Union. Interests and the New Politics of Associability. London: Routledge. Greenwood, J., J.R. Grote and K. Ronit (1992) Conclusions: Evolving Patterns of Organizing Interests in the European Community. In J. Greenwood, J.R. Grote and K. Ronit (eds), Organized Interests and the European Community. London: Sage, pp. 238–76. Greer, A. (2005) Agricultural Policy in Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Greven, M.T. and L.W. Pauly (eds) (2000) Democracy beyond the State?: The European Dilemma and the Emerging Global Order. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield. Grote, J. and J. Lang (2003) Europeanization and Organizational Change in National Trade Associations: An Organizational Ecology Perspective. In Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a, pp. 225–54. Grzymala-Busse, A. and A. Innes (2003) Great Expectations: The EU and Domestic Political Competition in East Central Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 17(1) 64–73. Gualini, E. (2003a) Multilevel Governance and Institutional Change: The Europeanization of Regional Policy in Italy. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Bibliography 371

Gualini, E. (2003b) Challenges to Multi-level Governance: Contradictions and Conflicts in the Europeanization of Italian Regional Policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(4) 616–36. Guild, E. (2005) Changing the Ground Rules: Reframing Immigration, Asylum and Security in the European Union. In A. Verdun and O. Croci (eds), Institutional and Policy-making Challenges to the European Union in the Wake of Eastern Enlargement. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 134–50. Guild, E. (2003) International Terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum and Border Policy: the Unexpected Victims of 11 September 2001. European Foreign Affairs Review, 8(3) 331–46. Guillén, A. M. and B. Palier (2004) Introduction: Does Europe Matter? Accession to EU and Social Policy Developments in Recent and New Member States. Journal of European Social Policy, 14(3) 203–9. Guiraudon, V. (2001a) European Courts and Foreigners’ Rights: A Comparative Study of Norms Diffusion. International Migration Review, 24(4) 1088–125. Guiraudon, V. (2001b) Weak Weapons of the Weak? Mobilizing around Migration at the EU-level. In S. Tarrow and D. Imig (eds), Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 163–83. Guiraudon, V. (2000) European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-Making as Venue Shopping. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2) 251–71. Guiraudon, V. and G. Lahav (2000) The State Sovereignty Debate Revisited: The Case of Migration Control. Comparative Political Studies, 33(2) 163–95. Guiraudon, V., K. Phalet and J. Ter Wal (2005) Monitoring Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands. International Social Science Journal, 157(183) 75–88. Gyori, E. (2004) How can the Hungarian National Assembly Preserve its Sovereignty after Accession to the EU. In A. Àgh (ed.), Post-Accession in East Central Europe: The Emergence of the EU25. Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies. Haas, E.B. (1970) The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing. International Organization, 24(4) 607–46. Haas, E. (1961) International Integration: The European and Universal Process. International Organization, 15(3) 366–92. Haas, E. (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Habermas, J. (2000) Beyond the Nation-State? On Some Consequences of Economic Globalization. In Eriksoen and Fossum, pp. 29–41. Haggard, S., M. Levy, A. Moravcsik, and K. Nicolaïdis (1993) Integrating the Two Halves of Europe: Theories of Interests, Bargaining, and Institutions. In R. Keohane, J. Nye and S. Hoffmann (eds), After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 173–95. Haigh, N. (1986) Devolved Responsibility and Centralization: Effects of EEC Environmental Policy. Public Administration, 64(2) 197–207. Hall, P. and D. Soskice (eds) (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hall, P. and R. Taylor (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Science, 44(5) 936–57. Halpin, E.F. and S. Simpson (2002) Between Self-regulation and Intervention in the Networked Economy: The European Union and Internet Policy. Journal of Information Science, 28(4) 285–96. Hanf, K. and B. Soetendorp (eds) (1998) Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union. London and New York: Longman.

372

Bibliography

Harcourt, A. (2002) Engineering Europeanization: The Role of the European Institutions in Shaping National Media Regulation. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(5) 736–50. Harcourt, A.J. and C.M. Radaelli (1999) Limits to EU Technocratic Regulation? European Journal of Political Research, 35(1) 107–22. Harmsen, R. (1999) The Europeanization of National Administrations: A Comparative Study of France and the Netherlands. Governance, 12(1) 81–113. Harmsen, R. and T. Wilson (eds) (2000) Europeanization: Institutions, Identities and Citizenship. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Hassenteufel, P. and S. Hennion-Moreau (eds) (2003) Concurrence et protection sociale en Europe. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes. Hassenteufel, P. and Y. Surel (2000) Des politiques publiques comme les autres? Construction de l’objet et outils d’analyse des politiques européennes. Politique Européenne, 1: 8–24. Haverland, M. (2005) Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? The Problem of Case Selection in Europeanization Research. European Integration online Papers, 9(2). Haverland, M. (2003) The Impact of the European Union on National Environmental Policies. In Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a, pp. 203–21. Haverland, M. (2000) National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance of Institutional Veto Points. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(10), 83–103. Haverland, M. (1999) National Autonomy, European Integration and the Politics of Packaging Waste. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis. Haverland, M. and R. Holzhacker (2006) Cooperation and Integration Among Europeanized States. In R. Holzhacker and M. Haverland (eds), European Research Reloaded: Cooperation and Integration among Europeanised States. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 1–17. Hay, C. and B. Rosamond (2002) Globalization, European integration and the discursive construction of economic imperatives. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(2) 147–67. Hegeland, H. and C. Neuhold (2002) Parliamentary Participation in EU Affairs in Austria, Finland, and Sweden: Newcomers with Different Approaches. European Integration online Papers, 6(10). Henisz, J.W., A.B. Zelner and F.M. Gullén (2005) The World-Wide Diffusion of MarketOriented Infrastructural Reform, 1977–1999. American Sociological Review 70 (December): 871–97. Hennis, M. (2001) Europeanization and Globalization: The Missing Link. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(5) 829–50. Héritier, A. (2005) Europeanization Research East and West: A Comparative Assessment. In Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, pp. 199–209. Héritier, A. (2002) New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy-Making Without Legislating. In A. Héritier (ed.), Common Goods: Reinventing European Integration Governance. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 185–206. Héritier, A. (2001a) Differential Europe: National Administrative Responses to Community Policy. In Cowles et al., pp. 44–59. Héritier, A. (2001b) Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking. In Héritier et al., pp. 1–21. Héritier, A. (1999) Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe: Escape From Deadlock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Héritier, A. (1996) The Accommodation of Diversity in European Policy-Making and its Outcomes: Regulatory Policy as a Patchwork. Journal of European Public Policy, 3(2) 149–67. Héritier, A., D. Kerwer, C. Knill, D. Lehmkuhl, M. Teutsch, A.-C. Douillet (2001) Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield.

Bibliography 373

Héritier, A. and C. Knill (2001) Differential Responses to European Policies: A Comparison. In Héritier et al., pp. 257–94. Héritier, A., S. Mingers, C. Knill and M. Becka (1994) Die Veränderung von Staatlichkeit in Europa. Ein regulativer Wettbewerb: Deutschland, Großbritannien, Frankreich. Opladen: Leske
Budrich. Hicks, A., J. Misra and Tang Nah Ng (1995) The Programmatic Emergence of the Social Security State. American Sociological Review, 60(June) 329–49. Hill, C. and M. Smith (eds) (2005a) International Relations and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hill, C. and M. Smith (2005b) Acting for Europe: Reassessing the European Union’s Place in International Relations. In Hill and Smith 2005a, pp. 388–406. Hill, C. and W. Wallace (1996) Introduction: Actors and Actions. In C. Hill (ed.), The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy. London: Routledge, pp. 1–16. Hill, C. (1998) Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics: National Foreign Policies and CFSP. In Zielonka, pp. 35–51. Hill, C. (ed.) (1996) The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy. London: Routledge. Hills, J. and M. Michalis (2000) Restructuring Regulation: Technological Convergence and European Telecommunications and Broadcasting Markets. Review of International Political Economy, 7(3) 434–64. Hirst, P. (1998) Ownership and Democracy. Political Quarterly, 69(3) 354–64. Hix, S. (2005) The Political System of the European Union, 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hix, S. (2002) Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European Parliament. American Journal of Political Science, 46(3) 688–98. Hix, S. (1995) Political Parties in the European Union System: A “Comparative Politics Approach” to the Development of Party Federations. EUI Florence: PhD thesis. Hix, S. (1994) The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics. West European Politics, 17(1) 1–30. Hix, S. and K. Goetz (2000) Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems. West European Politics, 23(4) 1–26. Hix, S. and C. Lord (1997) Political Parties in the European Union. London: Macmillan. Hocking, B. and D. Spence (eds) (2002) Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hodson, D. and I. Maher (2001) The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(4) 719–45. Hoffmann, S. (1966) Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. Daedalus, 95, 862–915. Hoffmann, S. (2000) Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy? Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2) 189–98. Holsti, K.J. (1992) International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 6th edn. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Holzhacker, R.L. (2005a) Parlementaire controle op EU-besluitvorming in Nederland. Beleid, Politiek en Maatschappij, 32(1) 34–44. Holzhacker, R.L. (2005b) National Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Decision-Making: The Role of Opposition Parties. Journal of Legislative Studies, 11(3/4) 428–45. Holzhacker, R.L. (2002) National Parliamentary Scrutiny over EU issues: Comparing the Goals and Methods of Governing and Opposition Parties. European Union Politics, 3(4) 459–79. Holzhacker, R.L. and E. Albaek (eds) (2006a) Democratic Governance and European Integration: Linking Societal and State Processes of Democracy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.

374

Bibliography

Holzhacker, R.L. and E. Albaek (2006b) Introduction: Democratic Governance and European Integration. In Holzhacker and Albaek, forthcoming. Holzhacker, R.L. and A. Roemmele (2006) National Election Campaigns and European Issues. In Holzhacker and Albaek, forthcoming. Holzinger, K., C. Knill and A. Schäfer (2003) Steuerungswandel in der Europäischen Umweltpolitik? In K. Holzinger, C. Knill and D. Lehmkuhl (eds), Politische Steuerung im Wandel: Der Einfluß von Ideen und Problemstrukturen. Opladen: Leske
Budrich, pp. 103–129. Holznagel, B. and R. Werle (2004) Sectors and Strategies of Global Communications Regulation. Knowledge, Technology and Policy, 17(2) 19–37. Hooghe, L. (ed.) (1996a) Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hooghe, L. (1996b) Introduction: Reconciling EU-Wide Policy and National Diversity. In Hooghe 1996a, pp. 1–26. Hooghe, L. (1995) Subnational Mobilisation in the European Union. West European Politics, 18(3) 175–98. Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2004a) Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration? PS Online, July 2004. Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2004b) Contrasting Visions of Multi-Level Governance. In I. Bache and M. Flinders (eds), Multi-Level Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15–30. Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2003) Unravelling the Central State, But How? American Political Science Review, 97(2) 233–43. Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2001) Multi-level Governance and European Integration. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. Hooghe, L., G. Marks and C.J. Wilson (2004) Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration? In Marks and Steenbergen, pp. 120–40. Homeyer, I. von, A. Carius and S. Bär (2000) Flexibility or Renationalization: Effects of Enlargement on EC Environmental Policy. In M.G. Cowles and M. Smith (eds), Risks, Reform, Resistance, and Revival. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 347–68. Hopkins, R., A. Powell, A. Roy and C.L. Gilbert (1997) The World Bank and Conditionality. Journal of International Development, 9(4) 507–16. Hoskyns, C. (1996) Integrating Gender. London: Verso. Hosli, M.O. and B. Soetendorp (2000) The Hidden Dynamics of EU Council DecisionMaking. Paper presented at the 41st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), Los Angeles. Howorth, J. (2005) From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP. In Hill and Smith 2005a, pp. 179–204. Huber, E., C. C. Ragin, and J.D. Stephens (1993) Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State. American Journal of Sociology, 99(3) 711–49. Huber, E. and J. D. Stephens (2001) Development and Crisis of Welfare States: Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Hug, S. (2005) Institutions and Conflict Resolution: Dealing with Endogeneity. Paper prepared for presentation at the TAICON Conference, September 16–17, 2005, Zurich; First rough draft September 5. Hughes, J. and G. Sasse (2003) Monitoring the Monitors. EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs. Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 1(1) 1–37. Hughes, J, G. Sasse and C. Gordon (2004a) Conditionality and Compliance in the EU’s Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(3) 523–51.

Bibliography 375

Hughes, J, G. Sasse, and C. Gordon (2004b) Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hulsink, W. (1999) Privatisation and Liberalisation in European Telecommunications: Comparing Britain, the Netherlands and France. London: Routledge. Huysmans, J. (2000) The European Union and the Securitization of Migration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5) 751–77. Ieraci, G. (1998) European Integration and the Relationship between State and Regions in Italy: The Interplay between National and Common Agricultural Policies. Regional and Federal Studies, 8(2) 21–33. Imig, D., and S. Tarrow (eds) (2001) Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity. Lanham, etc.: Rowman and Littlefield. Ingebritsen, C. (1998). The Nordic States and European Unity. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Innes, A. (2002) Party Competition in Postcommunist Europe: The Great Electoral Lottery. Comparative Politics, 35(1) 85–104. Irwin, G.A. (1995) Second-Order or Third Rate: Issues in the Campaign for the Elections for the European Parliament. Electoral Studies, 14(2) 183–98. Jabko, N. (2004) The Political Foundation of the European Regulatory State. In Jordana and Levi-Faur, pp. 200–17. Jachtenfuchs, M. (2001) The Governance Approach to European Integration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(2) 245–64. Jachtenfuchs, M. and B. Kohler-Koch (1996) Regieren im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem. In M. Jachtenfuchs and B. Kohler-Koch (eds), Europäische Integration. Opladen: Leske
Budrich, pp. 15–44. Jacobsson, B., P. Lagreid and O.V. Pedersen (2003) Europeanization and Transnational States: Comparing Nordic Central Government. London: Routledge. Jacobsson, K. (2005) Trying to Reform the “Best Pupils in the Class”? The Open Method of Co-ordination in Sweden and Denmark. In Zeitlin and Pochet, pp. 107–36. Jacoby, W. (2004) The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jacoby, W. (2002) Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk: The Cultural and Institutional Effects of Western Models. In F. Bönker, K. Müller and A. Pickel, eds, Postcommunist Transformation and the Social Sciences: Cross-Disciplinary Approaches. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 129–52. Jacoby, W. (2001) Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European Elites, and Western Models. Governance, 14(2) 169–200. Jacoby, W. (1999) Priest and Penitent: The European Union as a Force in the Domestic Politics of Eastern Europe. East European Constitutional Review, 8(1/2) 62–7. Jacquot, S. and C. Woll (2004) Les usages de l’Europe: Acteurs et transformations européenne. Paris: L’Harmattan. Jacquot, S. and C. Woll (2003) Usage of European Integration: Europeanisation from a Sociological Perspective. European Integration online Papers, 7(12). Jakobsen, M.L. (2004) European Electricity Liberalization: Ideational Globalization or Europeanization Paper presented at the Second Par-European Conference on EU Politics, Bologna, June 24–6. Jänicke, M. and H. Weidner (eds) (1997) National Environmental Policies: A Comparative Study of Capacity-Building. Berlin: Springer. Jeffery, C. (1996) Farewell to the Third level? The German Länder and the European Policy Process. Regional and Federal Studies, 6(2) 56–75.

376

Bibliography

Jeffery, C. (2003) The German Länder: From Milieu-Shaping to Territorial Politics. In Dyson and Goetz, pp. 97–108. Jeffery, C. (2000) Sub-national Mobilization and European Integration: Does it Make Any Difference? Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(1) 1–23. Jeffery, C. (ed.) (1997) The Regional Dimension of the EU: Towards a Third Level in Europe? London: Frank Cass. Jehlicka, P. (2001) Environmental Implications of Eastern Enlargement of the EU: The End of Progressive Environmental Policy? EUI Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre, 23. Jensen, H. (2006) A Model for the Strictest Scrutiny? In Holzhacker and Albaek, forthcoming. Jenssen, A.T, P. Pesonen and M. Gilljam (eds) (1998) To Join or Not to Join: Three Nordic Referendums on Membership in the European Union. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. Johansson, K.M. and T. Raunio (2001) Partisan Responses to Europe: Comparing Finnish and Swedish Political Parties. European Journnal of Political Research, 39(2) 225–49. John, P. (1994) UK Sub-national Offices in Britain: Regionalization or Diversification? Regional Studies, 28(1) 739–46. John, P. and M. McAteer (1998) Sub-national Institutions and the New European Governance: Local Authority Strategies for the IGC. Regional and Federal Studies, 8(3) 104–24. John, P. (2001). Local Governance in Western Europe. London: Sage. Jones, B. and M. Keating (eds) (1995) The European Union and the Regions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Joppke, C. (1999) Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jordan, A. (2003) The Europeanization of National Government and Policy: A Departmental Perspective. British Journal of Political Science, 33(2), 261–82. Jordan, A. (2002) The Europeanization of British Environmental Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Jordan, A. and D. Liefferink (eds) (2004a) Environmental Policy in Europe: The Europeanization of National Environmental Policy. London: Routledge. Jordan, A. and D. Liefferink (2004b) The Europeanization of national environmental policy. In Jordan and Liefferink 2004a, pp. 1–14. Jordan, A. and D. Liefferink (2004c) Measuring Europeanization and Policy Convergence: National Baseline Conditions. In Jordan and Liefferink 2004a, pp. 32–46. Jordan, A. and D. Liefferink (2004d) Europeanization and Convergence: Comparative Conclusions. In Jordan and Liefferink 2004a, pp. 224–45. Jordana, J. (ed.) (2002a) Governing Telecommunications and the New Information Society in Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Jordana, J. (2002b) Introduction: Regulating telecommunications and enforcing the Information Society in Europe. In Jordana 2002a, pp. 1–23. Jordana, J. and D. Levi-Faur (2005) The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America. Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science, 598(1) 102–24. Jordana, J. and D. Levi-Faur (eds) (2004) The Politics of Regulation in the Age of Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Jordan, G., W.A. Maloney and A.M. McLaughlin (1994) Characterizing Agricultural Policy-Making. Public Administration, 72(4) 505–26. Just, N. and M. Latzer (2004) Self- and Co-Regulation in the Mediamatics Sector: European Community (EC) Strategies and Contributions Towards a Transformed Statehood. Knowledge, Technology and Policy, 17(2) 38–62.

Bibliography 377

Kahler, M. (2002) The State of the State in World Politics. In I. Katznelson and H. Milner (eds), Political Science: State of the Discipline. New York and London: W.W. Norton, pp. 56–83. Kallestrup, M. (2002) Europeanisation as a Discourse: Domestic Policy Legitimization Through the Articulation of a Need for Adaptation. Public Policy and Administration, 17(2) 110–24. Kassim, H. (2005) The Europeanisation of Member States Institutions. In Bulmer and Lequesne 2005a, pp. 285–316. Kassim, H. (2003a) Meeting the Demands of EU Membership: The Europeanization of National Administrative Systems. In Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a, pp. 83–111. Kassim, H. (2003b) The European Administration: Between Europeanization and Administration. In J. Hayward and A. Menon (eds), Governing Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 139–61. Kassim, H. (2001) Introduction: Coordinating National Action in Brussels. In Kassim et al. 2001a, pp. 1–47. Kassim H., A. Menon, B.G. Peters and V. Wright (eds) (2001) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The European Level. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kassim, H. (2000b) Conclusion: The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: Confronting the Challenge. In Kassim et al. 2000a, pp. 235–64. Kassim, H., B.G. Peters and V. Wright (eds) (2000a) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kassim, H., B.G. Peters and V. Wright (2000b). Introduction. In Kassim et al., pp. 1–21. Katz, A., M. Vom Hau, and J. Mahoney (2005) Explaining the Great Reversal in Spanish America: Fuzzy-Set Analysis versus Regression Analysis. Sociological Methods and Research, 33(4) 539–73. Katz, R.S. and P. Mair (1995) Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party. Party Politics, 1(1) 5–28. Katz, R.S. and P. Mair (1993) The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: The Three Faces of Party Organization. American Review of Politics, 14 (Winter), 593–617. Katz, R.S. and B. Wessels (eds) (1999) The European Parliament, National Parliaments, and European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Katzenstein, P.J. (1997) United Germany in an Integrating Europe. In P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), Shaping the Rules? The Constitutive Politics of the European Union and German Power. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 1–48. Katzenstein, P. (ed.) (1978) Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Keating, M. (ed.) (2004) Regions and Regionalism in Western Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Keating, M. (1998) The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. Keating, M., J. Loughlin and K. Deschouwer (2003) Culture, Institutions and Economic Development: A Study of Eight European Regions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Keck, M. and K. Sikkink (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Keeler, J.T.S. (1987) The Politics of Neocorporatism in France. New York: Oxford University Press. Kelemen, D. (2002) The Politics of Eurocratic Structure and the New European Agencies. West European Politics, 25(4) 93–118. Kelemen, D. (2003) The Structure and Dynamic of EU Federalism. Comparative Political Studies, 36(1/2) 184–208.

378

Bibliography

Kelleher, J., S. Batterbury and E. Stern (1999) The Thematic Evaluation of the Partnership Principle: Final Synthesis Report. London: The Tavistock Institute Evaluation Development and Review Unit. Keller, B. and H.-W. Platzer (eds) (2003) Industrial Relations and European Integration: Developments and Prospects at EU-level. Aldershot: Ashgate. Kelley, J. (2004a) Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kelley, J. (2004b) International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions. International Organization 58(2) 425–57. Keohane, R. and L. Martin (1995) The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security, 20(1) 39–51. Keohane, R. O. and H.V. Milner (eds) (1996) Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keridis, D. (2003) The Foreign Policy of Modernisation: From Confrontation to Interdependence? In P. Tsakonas (ed.), Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy, vol. 1. Athens: Sideris, pp. 297–325. Kerremans, B. and J. Beyers (1996) The Belgian Sub-National Entities in the European Union: Second or Third Level Players. Journal of Regional and Federal Studies, 2(4) 41–54. Kiiver, P. (2006) The National Parliaments in the European Union: A Critical View on EU Constitution-building. The Hague, London and New York: Kluwer Law International. Killick, T. (1997) Principals, Agents and the Failings of Conditionality. Journal of International Development, 9(4) 483–95. King, A. (1976) Modes of Executive–Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1(1) 11–36. King, G., R. Keohane and S. Verba (1994) Designing Social Enquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kingdon, J.W. (1995) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman. Kjeldahl, R. and M. Tracy (eds) (1994) Renationalisation of the Common Agricultural Policy? Tonbridge: Combined Book Services. Knill, C. (2001) The Europeanisation of National Administrations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Knill, C. (1998) European Policies: The Impact of National Administrative Traditions. Journal of Public Policy, 18(1) 1–28. Knill, C. and D. Lehmkuhl (2002a) The National Impact of European Union Regulatory Policy: Three Europeanization Mechanisms. European Journal of Political Research, 41(2) 255–80. Knill, C. and D. Lehmkuhl (2002b) Private Actors and the State: Internationalization and Changing Patterns of Governance. Governance, 15(1) 41–63. Knill, C. and D. Lehmkuhl (1999) How European matters: different mechanisms of Europeanization, European Integration online Papers, 3(7). Knill C. and A. Lenschow (2004) Modes of Regulation in the Governance of the European Union: Towards a Comprehensive Evaluation. In Jordana and Levi-Faur, pp. 218–44. Knill, C. and A. Lenschow (2001a) Adjusting to EU Environmental Policy: Change and Persistence of Domestic Administrations. In Cowles et al., pp. 116–36. Knill, C. and A. Lenschow (2001b) “Seek and Ye Shall Find”. Linking Different Perspectives on Institutional Change. Comparative Political Studies, 34(2) 187–215. Knill, C. and A. Lenschow (eds) (2000a) Implementing EU Environmental Policy: New Approaches to an Old Problem. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Knill, C. and A. Lenschow (2000b) On Deficient Implementation and Deficient Theories: The Need for an Institutional Perspective in Implementation Research. In Knill and Lenschow 2000a, pp. 9–35.

Bibliography 379

Knill, C. and A. Lenschow (1998) Coping with Europe: the Impact of British and German Administrations on the Implementation of EU Environmental Policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(4) 595–614. Kofler, A. (1998) Digital Europe 1998: Policies, Technological Development and Implementation of the Emerging Information Society. Innovation, 11(1) 53–71. Kogut, B. (2003). Conclusion. In B. Kogut (ed.), The Global Internet Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 437–72. Kohler-Koch, B. (2005) European Governance and System Integration. European Governance Papers, EUROGOV C-05-01. Kohler-Koch, B. (ed.) (2003a) Linking EU and National Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kohler-Koch, B. (2003b) Interdependent European Governance. In Kohler-Koch 2003a, pp. 10–23. Kohler-Koch, B. (1999) The Evolution and Transformation of European Governance. In Kohler-Koch and Eising, pp. 14–35. Kohler-Koch, B. (ed.) (1998a) Interaktive Politik in Europa. Regionen im Netzwerk der Integration. Opladen: Leske
Budrich. Kohler-Koch, B. (ed.) (1998b) Regieren in entgrenzten Räumen. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Kohler-Koch, B. (1997) Organized interests in the EC and the European Parliament. European Integration online Papers, 1(9). Kohler-Koch, B. (1996) Catching up with Change: The Transformation of Governance in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 3(3) 359–80. Kohler-Koch, B. and R. Eising (eds) (1999) The Transformation of Governance. London: Routledge. Kokott, J. (1998) Report on Germany. In Slaughter et al. pp. 77–131. Kolarska-Bobinska, L. (2003) The EU Accession and Strengthening of Institutions in East Central Europe: The Case of Poland. East European Politics and Societies, 17(1) 91–8. Koopmans, R. and P. Statham (2003) How National Citizenship Shapes Transnationalism: A Comparative Analysis of Migrant and Minority Claims-making in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands. In C. Joppke and E. Morawska (eds), Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. London: Palgrave, pp. 195–238. Kopecky, P. and C. Mudde (2002) The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe. European Union Politics, 3(3) 297–326. Korte, J. (ed.) (1991) Primus Inter Pares: The European Court and National Courts. The Followup by National Courts of Preliminary References ex Art. 177 of the Treaty of Rome: A Report on the Situation in the Netherlands. Baden-Baden: Nomos Publications. Kostakopoulou, T. (2000) The “Protective Union”: Change and Continuity in Migration Law and Policy in Post-Amsterdam Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(3) 497–518. Krapohl, S. (2003) Risk Regulation in the EU Between Interests and Expertise: The Case of BSE. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(2) 189–207. Krapohl, S. (2004) Credible Commitment in Non-Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the European Agencies for Pharmaceuticals and Foodstuffs. European Law Journal, 10(5) 518–38. Krasner, S. D. (1995) Comprising Westphalia. International Security, 20(3) 115–51. Kriesi, H. (2005) Institutional Filters and Path Dependency: The Impact of Europeanization on Swiss Business Associations. In Streeck et al., forthcoming. Kubicek, P. (ed.) (2003) The European Union and Democratization. London: Routledge. Ladrech, R. (2005) The Europeanization of Interest Groups and Political Parties. In S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds), The Member States of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 317–37.

380

Bibliography

Ladrech, R. (ed.) (2002a) The Europeanization of Party Politics. Party Politics, 8(4), 387–503, special issue. Ladrech, R. (2002b) Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis. Party Politics, 8(4) 389–403. Ladrech, R. (1994) Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France. Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(1) 69–88. Laegreid, P., S. Steinthorsson and B. Thorhallsson (2005) Europeanization of Nordic Central Governments: Towards a Regulatory State? Paper presented at the Workshop on the National Control of EU Public Policies. Reykjavik, August 11–13. Laffan, B. (2001) Organising for a Changing Europe: Irish Central Government and the European Union. Dublin: Trinity Blue paper. Laffan, B. (2004) Impact of EU on Executive Government: A Comparative Analysis, http://www.oeue.net/papers/acomparativeanalysis-theimpact.pdf. Laffan, B. and J. O’Mahoney (2004) The Europeanisation of the Irish Core Executive, http://www.oeue.net/papers/ireland-theeuropeanisationofth.pdf. Laffan, B. and Tannam, E. (1998) Ireland: The Rewards of Pragmatism. In K. Hanf and B. Soetendorp (eds), Adapting to European Integration. London, Longman, pp. 69–83. Lampinen, R. and P. Uusikylä (1998) Implementation Deficit – Why Member States do not Comply with EU directives? Scandinavian Political Studies, 21(3) 231–51. Landman, T. (2003) Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics. London and New York: Routledge. La Spina, A. and G. Sciortino (1993) Common Agenda, Southern Rules: European Integration and Environmental Change in the Mediterranean States. In J.D. Liefferink, P.D. Lowe and A.P.J. Mol (eds), European Integration and Environmental Policy. London and New York: Belhaven, pp. 217–36. Laursen, F. and S.A. Pappas (1995) The Changing Role of Parliaments in the European Union. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration. Lavenex, S. (2006) Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of EU Immigration Control. West European Politics, forthcoming. Lavenex, S. (2002) EU Enlargement and the Challenge of Policy Transfer. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28(4) 701–21. Lavenex, S. (2001a) The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Between Human Rights and Internal Security. Aldershot: Ashgate. Lavenex, S. (2001b) The Europeanization of Refugee Policies: Normative Challenges and Institutional Legacies. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(5) 851–974. Lavenex, S. (1999) Safe Third Countries: Extending EU Asylum and Immigration Policies to Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press. Lavenex, S. and E. Uçarer (2004) The External Dimension of Europeanisation. Cooperation & Conflict, 39(4) 417–43. Lavenex, S. and E. Uçarer (2002) Migration and the Externalities of European Integration. Lanham: Lexington Books Lehmann, J.-P. (1992) France, Japan, Europe, and Industrial Competition: the Automotive Case. International Affairs, 68(1) 37–53. Lehmkuhl, D. (1999) The Importance of Small Differences: The Impact of European Integration on Road Haulage Associations in Germany and the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis. Lehr, W. and T. Kiessling (1999) Telecommunication Regulation in the United States and Europe: The Case for Centralized Authority. In S. Eisner Gillett and I. Vogelsang (eds), Competition, Regulation, and Convergence: Current Trends in Telecommunications Policy Research. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 105–20.

Bibliography 381

Leib, V. (2002). ICANN – EU can’t: Internet governance and Europe’s role in the formation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Telematics and Informatics, 19(2) 159–71. Leibfried, S. and P. Pierson (eds) (1995a) European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Leibfried, S. and P. Pierson (1995b) Semi-sovereign Welfare States: Social Policy in Europe’s Emerging Multi-tiered System. In Leibfried and Pierson 1995a, pp. 43–77. Lembke, J. (2002) EU Regulatory Strategy for Mobile Internet. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(2) 273–91. Lequesne, C. (1993) Paris–Bruxelles: Comment se fait la politique européenne de la France? Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Lester, J.P. and M.L. Goggin (1998) Back to the Future: The Rediscovery of Implementation Studies. Policy Currents, 8(3) 1–9. Levi-Faur, D. (2005) The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 598(1) 12–32 (also published in D. LeviFaur and J. Jordana (eds), The Rise of Regulatory Capitalism: The Global Diffusion of a New Order. London: Sage, pp. 12–32). Levi-Faur, D. (2004) On the “Net Impact” of Europeanization. The EU’s Telecoms and Electricity Regimes Between the Global and the National. Comparative Political Studies, 37(1) 3–29. Levi-Faur, D. (2002) Herding towards a New Convention: On Herds, Shepherds and Lost Sheep in the Liberalization of the Telecommunications Industries. Nuffield College Working Papers in Politics. Levi-Faur, D. (1999) Governing the Dutch Telecommunications Reform: Regulation, Deregulation and Re-regulation within the Context of a European Policy Regime. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(1) 102–22. Levi-Faur, D. and G. Sharon (2004) The Rise of the British Regulatory State: Transcending the Privatization Debate. Comparative Politics, 37(1) 105–24. Levy, D.A.L. (2001) Europe’s Digital Revolution – Broadcasting Regulation: The EU and the Nation State. London: Routledge. Lewis, J. (1998) Is the “Hard Bargaining” Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive. Journal of Common Market Studies, 36(4), 479–504. Lieberson, S. (1991) Small N’s and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning Based on a Small Number of Cases. Social Forces, 70(2) 307–20. Lieberson, S. (1994) More on the Uneasy Case for Using Mill-Type Methods in Small-N Comparative Studies. Social Forces, 72(4) 1225–37. Liebert, U. (2003) Explaining Europeanisation: A Mechanisms Based Approach. Forschungslogik und Methodik in den Internationalen Beziehungen, Evangelische Akademie Hofgeismar. Liefferink, D. and M.S. Andersen (1998) Strategies of the “Green” Member States in EU Environmental Policy-making. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(2) 254–70. Lijphart, A. (1971) Comparative Politics and Comparative Method. American Political Science Review, 65(3) 682–93. Lindberg, L. (1963) The Politics of European Economic Integration. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Lindberg, L.N. and S.A. Scheingold (eds) (1970a) Regional Integration: Theory and Research. International Organization, 24(4), special issue. Lindberg, L.N. and S.A. Scheingold (1970b) Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

382

Bibliography

Linden, R. (ed.) (2002) Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Lippert, B. and G. Umbach (2005) The Pressure of Europeanisation: From Post-Communist State Administrations to Normal Players in the EU System. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Lippert, B., G. Umbach and W. Wessels (2001) Europeanization of CEE executives: EU membership negotiations as a shaping power. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(6), 980–1012. Lipsky, M. (1980) Street-Level Bureaucracy: The Dilemmas of Individuals in Public Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Lodge, M. (2001) Regulatory Transparency: Towards a Single-Citizen Consumer Model? In K. Dowding, J. Hughes and H. Margetts (eds), Challenges to Democracy: Ideas, Involvement, and Institutions. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Loughlin, M. and C. Scott (1997) The Regulatory State. In P. Dunleavy, I. Holliday, A. Gamble and G. Peele (eds), Developments in British Politics 5. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 205–19. Lovecy, J. (1999) Governance Transformation in the Professional Services Sector: A Case of Market Integration “by the Back Door”? In Kohler-Koch and Eising, pp. 135–52. Lowe, P., H. Buller and N. Ward (2002) Setting the Next Agenda? British and French Approaches to the Second Pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy. Journal of Rural Studies, 18(1) 1–17. Lowe, P. and S. Ward (eds) (1998) British Environmental Policy and Europe. London: Routledge. Lucarelli, S. and C. Radaelli (2005) The European Convention: A Process of Mobilization? In S. Lucarelli and C. M. Radaelli (eds), Mobilizing Politics and Society? The EU Convention’s Impact on Southern Europe. London: Routledge, pp. 1–23. Luetz, S. (2006) The Finance Sector in Transition: A Motor for Economic Reform? In Dyson and Padgett, forthcoming. Luif, P. (1998) Australia: Adaptation through Anticipation. In Harf and Soetendorp. pp. 116–30. Mach, A., S. Häusermann and Y. Papadopoulos (2003) Economic Regulatory Reforms in Switzerland: Adjustment without European Integration Or How Rigidities Become Flexible. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(2) 301–18. Mahoney, J. (2003) Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative Historical Analysis. In J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 337–72. Mahoney, J. and D. Rueschemeyer (eds) (2003) Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mair, P. (2005) Popular Democracy and the European Union Polity. European Governance Papers, EUROGOV No. C-05-03. Mair, P. (2004). The Europeanization Dimension. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(2) 337–48. Mair, P. (2000) The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems. West European Politics, 23(4) 27–51. Majone, G.D. (2005) Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Majone, G. (2002a) Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity. European Law Journal, 8(3) 319–39.

Bibliography 383

Majone, G. (2002b) Functional Interests: European Agencies. In J. Peterson and M. Shackleton (eds), The Institutions of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 292–325. Majone, G. (2001) Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance. European Union Politics, 2(1) 103–22. Majone, G. (2000) The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2) 273–302. Majone, G. (1997) From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance. Journal of Public Policy, 17(2) 139–67. Majone, G. (1994a) The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe. West European Politics, 17(3) 77–101. Majone, G. (1994b) Paradoxes of Privatization and Deregulation. Journal of European Public Policy, 1(1) 53–69. Majone, G.D. and E.S. Quade (eds) (1980) Pitfalls of Analysis. Chichester, Wiley. Major, C. (2005) Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State? Politics, 25(3) 175–90. Major, C. and K. Pomorska (2005) Europeanization: Fashion or Framework? Fornet CFSP Forum, 3(5). Malová, D. and M. Rybár (2003) The European Union’s Policies towards Slovakia: Carrots and Sticks of Political Conditionality. In J. Rupnik and J. Zielonka (eds), The Road to the European Union. Volume 1: The Czech and Slovak Republic. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 98–112. Maniokas, K. (2002) EU Enlargement and Europeanization: When a Patchwork Becomes a Blueprint. Mimeo. Manners, I. (2002) Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2) 235–58. Manners, I. and R. Whitman (eds) (2000) The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Maor, M. and H. Stevens (1997) Measuring the Impact of New Public Management and European Integration on Recruitment and Training in the UK Civil Service. Public Administration, 75(Autumn) 531–51. March, J.G. (1988) Decisions and Organizations. Cambridge: Blackwell. March, J. and J. Olsen (1998) The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. International Organization, 52(4) 943–69. March, J. and J. Olsen (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The Organization Basis of Politics. New York: The Free Press. Marcussen, M. (2000) Ideas and Elites: The Social Construction of Economic and Monetary Union. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press. Marcussen, M., T. Risse, D. Engelmann-Martin, H.J. Knopf, and K. Roscher (1999) Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4), 614–33. Marks, G. (1996) Exploring and Explaining variation in EU Cohesion Policy. In Hooghe 1996a, pp. 367–87. Marks, G. (1993) Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC. In A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal (eds), The State of the European Community, Vol. 2: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond. Harlow: Longman, pp. 391–410. Marks, G. (1992) Structural Policy in the European Community. In A. Sbragia (ed.), EuroPolitics: Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 191–224.

384

Bibliography

Marks, G., L. Hooghe and K. Blank (1996) European Integration from the 1980s. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(3), 341–78. Marks, G. and D. McAdam (1996) Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union. West European Politics, 19(2) 249–78. Marks, G. and M.R. Steenbergen (eds) (2004). European Integration and Political Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marks, G. and C.J. Wilson (2000) The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Responses to European Integration. British Journal of Political Science, 30(4) 433–59. Marsh, M. (1998) Testing the Second-Order Model after Four European Elections. British Journal of Political Science, 28(4) 591–607. Marshall, A. (2005) Europeanization at the Urban Level: Local Actors, Institutions and the Dynamics of Multi-Level Interaction. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(4) 668–86. Marshall, A. (2006) Local Governance. In Bache and Jordan, forthcoming. Martin, A. and G. Ross (eds) (2004) Euros and Europeans: Monetary Integration and the European Model of Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Martin, L. and G. Vanberg (2005) Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review. American Political Science Review 99(1): 93–106. Mastenbroek, E. (2003) Surviving the Deadline: The Transposition of EU Directives in the Netherlands. European Union Politics, 4(4) 371–95. Matland, R.E. (1995) Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The AmbiguityConflict Model of Policy Implementation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 5(2) 145–74. Mattli, W. and A.-M. Slaughter (1998) Revisiting the European Court of Justice. International Organization, 52(1) 177–209. Maurer, A., C. Meyer and G. Umbach (2003) EU Governance by self co-ordination? Towards a collective “gouvernement économique” (GOVECOR). Cologne. Available at http://www. govecor.org/intro/GOVECOR_Final_report.pdf. Maurer, A. and W. Wessels (eds) (2001) National Parliaments on their Ways to Europe: Losers or Latecomers? Baden-Baden: Nomos. Mazey, S. (1998) The European Union and Women’s Rights: From the Europeanisation of National Agendas to the Nationalisation of a European Agenda? In D. Hine and H. Kassim (eds), Beyond the Market: The EU and national social policy, The State and the European Union, pp. 134–55. Mazey, S. (1988) European community in Action on Behalf of Women: The Limits of Legislation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 27(1) 63–84. Mazmanian, D. and P. Sabatier (1981). Effective Policy Implementation. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Mbaye, H.A.D. (2001) Why National States Comply with Supranational Law. Explaining Implementation Infringements in the European Union 1972–1993. European Union Politics, 2(3) 259–81. McAleavey, P. and J. Mitchell (1995). Industrial Regions and Lobbying in the Structural Funds Reform Process. Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(2), 237–48. McCormick, J. (1999) Environmental Policy. In L. Cram, D. Dinan and N. Nugent, eds, Developments in the European Union. London: Macmillan, pp. 193–210. McGowan, F. and H. Wallace (1996). Towards a European Regulatory State. Journal of European Public Policy, 3(4), pp. 560–76. McGowan, L. (2005) Europeanization Unleashed and Rebounded: Assessing Modernization of EU Cartel Policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(6) 986–1004. McKeown, T. (1999) Case Study and the Statistical World View: Review of King, Keohane and Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. World Politics, 53(Winter) 161–98.

Bibliography 385

McNamara, K. (2001) Where Do Rules Come From? The Creation of the European Central Bank. In Stone Sweet et al., pp. 155–70. Megie, A. and P. Ravinet (2004) Contrainte de coopération intergouvernementale et processus d’européanisation, La construction des espaces européens de l’enseignement supérieur et de la justice. Paper delivered to the conference on Europeanisation of Public Policies and European Integration, IEP, Paris, 13 February 2004. Mendrinou, M. (1996) Non-Compliance and the European Commission’s Role in Integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 3(1) 1–22. Mény, Y., P. Muller, J.-L- Quermonne (eds) (1996) Adjusting to Europe: Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies. London: Routledge. Metcalfe, L. (1994) International Policy Co-ordination and Public Management Reform. International review of Administrative Sciences, 60(2) 271–90. Metcalfe, L. (1993) Trends in European Public Administration. Statsforvaltningens internationalisering, Stockholm: Sweden, p. 44. Michalis, M. (2003) The Governance of European Telecommunications: Towards Soft-Policy Coordination. Paper for the EPCR general conference, Marbury, September 18–21. Michalis, M. (1999) European Union Broadcasting and Telecoms: Towards a Convergent Regulatory Regime? European Journal of Communication, 14(2) 147–71. Miles, L. (2000) Sweden and Finland. In Manners and Whitman, pp. 181–203. Miles, L. (ed.) (1996) The European Union and the Nordic Countries. London: Routledge. Milner, H.V. and R.O. Keohane (1996) Internationalization and Domestic Politics: A Conclusion. In Keohane and Milner, pp. 243–58. Mina, A. (2003) The Creation of the European Market for Mobile Telephony: Overview of an Instituted Process. International Review of Sociology/Revue Internationale de Sociologie, 13(2) 435–54. Milward, A.S. (1994) The European Rescue of the Nation-State. London: Routledge. Milward, A. (1992) The European Rescue of the Nation-State. Berkeley: University of California Press. Miskimmon, A. and W.E. Paterson (2003) Foreign and Security Policy: On the cusp between Transformation and Accommodation. In Dyson and Goetz, pp. 325–45. Mjøset, L. (1997) The Historical Meanings of Europeanization. ARENA Working Paper, 24. Mjøset, L, F. Engelstad, G. Borchmann, R. Kalleberg and A. Leira (eds), (1997) Methodological Issues in Comparative Social Science. Comparative Social Research, special issue, 16(1). Monti, M. (2005) Toughen Up the Reform Agenda and Make It Count. Financial Times, March 23. Montpetit, E. (2000) Europeanization and Domestic Politics: Europe and the Development of a French Environmental Policy for the Agricultural Sector. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(4) 576–92. Moran, M. (2003) The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moravscik, A. (2000) The Origins of Human Rights Regime: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization, 54(2) 217–52. Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Moravcsik, A. (1994) Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation. Center for European Studies Working Paper Series (Harvard University), 52. Moravcsik, A. (1993) Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4) 473–524. Moravcsik, A. (1991) Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community. International Organization, 45(1)

386

Bibliography

19–56 (also published in R. Keohane and S. Hoffmann (eds), The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change. Boulder: Westview, pp. 1–40). Moyer, W. and T. Josling (2002) Agricultural Policy Reform: Politics and Process in the EU and US in the 1990s. Aldershot: Ashgate. Morlino, L. (1999) Europeanization and Representation in Two Europes: Local Institutions and National Parties. Paper presented at the conference “Multi-Party Systems: Europeanization and the Reshaping of National Political Representation”, European University Institute, Florence, December 16–18. Mörth, U. (2002) Europeanization as Interpretation, Translation and Editing of Public Policies. In Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a, 159–78. Muegge, D. (2004) Financial Liberalization and the European Integration of Financial Market Governance. Unpublished Manuscript, ASSR, University of Amsterdam. Mueller, W.C. (1993) Changing Executive-Legislative Relations in Austria (1945–1992). Legislative Studies Quarterly, 18(4) 467–94. Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. (2002) Das neue Entscheidungsystem in der Hermeinsamen Aussenund Sicherheitspolitik der Europaeischen Union. In G. MuellerBrandeck-Bocquet (ed.), Europaeische Aussenpolitik. GASP- und ESVP- Konzeptionen ausgewaehlter EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 9–27. Muller, P. (2000) L’analyse cognitive des politiques publiques: vers une sociologie politique de l’action publique. Revue Française de Science Politique, 50(2) 189–207. Muller, P. (1995) Les politiques publiques comme construction d’un rapport au monde. In A. Faure, G. Pollet and P. Warin (eds), La construction du sens dans les politiques publiques, débats autour de la notion de référentiel. Paris: L’Harmattan, pp. 153–79. Muller, P. (1984) Le Technocrate et le Paysan. Paris: Ed. Ouvrières. Nascimbene, B. (2000) Immigration Legislation Reform in Italy: The International and European Community Frameworks. Revue des Affaires Européennes/Law & European Affairs, 94–106. Natalicchi, G. (2001) Wiring Europe: Reshaping the European Telecommunications Regime. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. Ned Lebow, R. (2000) What’s so Different About a Counterfactual? World Politics, 52(July) 550–85. Nelsen, B.F., J.L. Guth and C.R. Fraser (2001) Does Religion Matter? Christianity and Public Support for the European Union. European Union Politics, 2(2) 191–217. Nelsen, B. and A. Stubb (eds) (2004) The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, 3rd edn. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Neuman, L. W. (2004) Basics of Social Research, 5th edn. Boston, etc.: Pearson. Neyer, J. and M. Zürn (2001) Compliance in Comparative Perspective: The EU and Other International Institutions. InIIS-Arbeitspapier no. 23/01. Niebel, M. (1997) The Action Plan of the European Commission. In H. Kubicek, W.-H. Dutton and R. Williams (eds), The Social Shaping of Information Superhighways: European and American Roads to the Information Society. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, pp. 61–7. Noll, G. (2003) Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues raised by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones. European Journal of Migration and Law, 5(8) 303–342. Noll, G. (2000) Negotiating Asylum: The EU acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Norton, P., (ed.) (1996) National Parliaments and the European Union. London: Frank Cass. Nuttall, S. (1992) European Political Cooperation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Nuttall, S. (2000) European Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bibliography 387

Nye, J.S. (1970) Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model. International Organization, 24(4) 796–835. Nyikos, S.A. (2006) Strategic Interaction among Courts within the Preliminary Reference Process: Stage 1 – National Court Preemptive Opinions. European Journal of Political Research, forthcoming. Nyikos, S.A. (2004) The European Court of Justice and National Courts: Opportunities and Agenda-Setting within the Preliminary Reference Process. Unpublished manuscript. Nyikos, S.A. (2003) The Preliminary Reference Process: Changing Opportunity Structures and Litigant Desistment. European Union Politics, 4(4) 397–420. Øhrgaard, J.O. (1997) Less than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental: European Political Cooperation and the Dynamics of Intergovernmental Integration. Millennium, 26(1) 1–29. Olsen, J.P. (2003) Europeanization. In M. Cini (ed), European Union Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 333–48. Olsen, J. (2002) The Many Faces of Europeanization. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5) 921–52. Olsen, J. (2000) Organising European Institutions of Governance. Arena Working Papers, WP OO/2. Olsen, J.P. (1992) Analyzing Institutional Dynamics. Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, 3(2) 247–71. Olsen, J. and B.G. Peters (1996) Learning from Experience? In J. Olsen and B.G. Peters (eds), Lessons from Experience: Experiential Learning in Administrative Reforms in Eight Democracies. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, pp. 1–35. Olsson, J. (2003) Democracy Paradoxes in Multi-level Governance. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(2) 283–300. Ostner, I. and J. Lewis (1995) Gender and the Evolution of European Social Policies. In S. Leibfried and P. Pierson (eds), European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 159–94. O’Toole, L.J. (1986) Policy Recommendations for Multi-Actor Implementation: An Assessment of the Field. Journal of Public Policy, 6(2) 181–210. Page, E.C. (2003) Europeanization and the Persistence of Administrative Systems. In J. Hayward and A. Menon (eds), Governing Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 162–76. Page E. and L. Wouters (1995) The Europeanisation of National Bureaucracies. In J. Pierre, Bureaucracy in the Modern State: An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 185–204. Pahre, R. (2005) Formal Theory and Case-Study Methods in EU Studies. European Union Politics, 6(1) 113–46. Palumbo, D. and D. Calista (eds) (1990) Implementation and the Policy Process: Opening up the Black Box. New York: Greenwood Press. Pappas, S.A. (ed.) (1995) National Administrative Procedures for the Preparation and Implementation of Community Decisions. Maastricht: EIPA. Parker, C. and J. Braithwaite (2003) Regulation. In P. Cane and M. Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 119–45. Pasquier, R. (2005) Cognitive Europeanisation and the Territorial Effects of Multi-level Policy Transfer: The Case of Local Development in French and Spanish Regions. Regional and Federal Studies, 15(3) 295–310. Pasquier, R. (2004) La capacité politique des régions. Une comparaison France/Espagne. Rennes: PUR. Pasquier, R. and J. Weisbein (2004) L’Europe au microscope du local. Politique Européenne, 12, 5–21.

388

Bibliography

Pennings, P. (2003) Beyond Dichotomous Explanations: Explaining Constitutional Control of the Executive with Fuzzy-Set. European Journal of Political Research, 42 541–67. Pedersen, M.N. (1996) Euro-parties and European Parties: New Arenas, New Challenges and New Strategies. In S. Andersen and K. Eliassen (eds), The European Union: How Democratic Is It? London: Sage, pp. 15–39. Pérez-Solorzano Borragán, N. (2003) The Organisation of Business Interests in Central and East European Countries for EU Representation. In J. Greenwood 2003b, pp. 213–25. Perraud, D. (ed.) (2000) L’Europe Veste. Paris: INRA. Perraud, D. (1999) Europe, états, régions: La gouvernance multi-niveaux et le rôle des régions dans les politiques agricoles et rurales. Grenoble: INRA-ESR. Pestoff, V. (2005) Globalization and Swedish Business Interest Associations in the TwentyFirst Century. In Streeck et al., forthcoming. Peters, B.G. (1999) Institutional Theory in Political Science. London: Pinter. Peters, B. Guy (1998) Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Peters, B.G. (1997) The Commission and Implementation in the European Union: Is There an Implementation Deficit and Why? In Neill Nugent (ed.), At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission. London: Macmillan, pp. 187–202. Peters, G. and J. Pierre (2004) Multi-level Governance and Democracy: A Faustian Bargain? In I. Bache and M. Flinders (eds), Multi-Level Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 75–92. Peterson, J. and H. Sjursen (eds) (1999) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? London and New York: Routledge. Petiteville, F. (1999) La face nationale de la gouvernance communautaire. L’élaboration des ‘positions nationales’ des Etats membres sur les propositions d’actes communautaires. Maastricht: EIPA. Phinnemore, D. (2000). Austria. In Manners and Whitman, pp. 204–23. Pierre, J. and B.G. Peters (2000) Governance, Politics and the State. London: Macmillan. Pierson, P. (2003) Big, Slow Moving, and … Invisible: Macro-social Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics. In J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 177–207. Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pierson, P. (1996) The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis. Comparative Political Studies, 29(2) 123–63. Pierson, P. and S. Leibfried (1995a) The Dynamics of Social Policy Integration. In Leibfried and Pierson 1995a, pp. 432–66. Pierson, P. and S. Leibfried (1995b) Multitiered Institutions and the Making of Social Policy. In Leibfried and Pierson 1995a, pp. 1–40. Pierson, P. and T. Skocpol (2002) Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science. In I. Katznelson and H.V. Milner (eds), Political Science: State of the Discipline. New York: Norton, pp. 693–721. Pinto, A. and N.S. Teixeira (eds) (2002) Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union, 1945–1980s. Boulder: Social Science Monographs. Platzer, H.-W. (1984) Unternehmensverbände in der EG – ihre nationale und transnationale Organisation und Politik. Dargestellt am Beispiel des Bundesverbandes der Deutschen Industrie, der Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, der deutschen industriellen Branchenverbände und deren EG-Verbandszusammenschlüssen. Kehl: Engel.

Bibliography 389

Plötner, J. (1998) Report on France. In Slaughter et al., pp. 41–75. Pochet, P. and C. de la Porte (2004) The European Employment Strategy: Existing Research and Remaining questions. Journal of European Social Policy, 14(1) 71–9. Pochet, P. and B. Vanhercke (eds) (1998) Social Challenges of Economic and Monetary Union. Work & Society, Observatoire Social Européen, vol. 18. Brussels: European Interuniversity Press. Polsby, N. (1975) Legislatures. In F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 257–319. Pollack, M.A. (1997) Representing Diffuse Interests in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(4) 572–90. Pollack, M. (1995) Regional Actors in an Intergovernmental Play: The Making and Implementation of EC Structural Policy. In S. Mazey and C. Rhodes (eds), The State of the European Union, vol. 3. Boston: Lynne Rienner, pp. 361–90. Pollack, M.A. (1994) Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community. Journal of Public Policy, 14(2) 95–145. Pomorska, K. (2005) The Impact of Enlargement: Europeanisation of Polish Foreign Policy? Tracking Adaptation and Change in The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Paper prepared for the 30th Anniversary Conference of the British International Studies Association, St. Andrews, 19–21 December. Pressman, J. and A. Wildavsky (1973) Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland. Berkeley: California University Press. Pridham, G. (2005) Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in PostCommunist Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Pridham, G. (1975) Transnational Party Groups in the European Parliament. Journal of Common Market Studies, 13(2) 266–79. Pridham, G. and M. Cini (1994) Enforcing Environmental Standards in the European Union: Is There a Southern Problem? In M. Faure, J. Vervaele and A. Waele (eds), Environmental Standards in the EU in an Interdisciplinary Framework. Antwerp: Maklu, pp. 251–77. Pridham, G. and P. Pridham (1981) Transnational Party Cooperation and European Integration. London: Allen and Unwin. Przeworski, A. (2004) Institutions Matter? Government and Opposition, 39(4) 527–40. Puchala, D.J. (1970) International Transactions and Regional Integration. International Organization, 24(4) 732–63. Putnam, R.D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. (1988) Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-level Games. International Organization, 42(3) 427–60. Radaelli, C.M. (2004) Europeanisation: Solution or Problem? European Integration Online Papers, 8(4). Radaelli, C. (2003) The Europeanization of Public Policy. In Featherstone and Radaelli 2003a, pp. 27–56. Radaelli, C. (2002) The Italian State and the Euro: Institutions, Discourse and PolicyRegime. In K. Dyson (ed.), European States and the Euro: Europeanization, Variation, and Convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Radaelli, C. (2000a) Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy. Governance, 13(1), 25–43. Radaelli, C.M. (2000b) Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change. European Integration online Papers, 4(8). Radaelli, C.M. (1999a) Harmful Tax Competition in the European Union: Policy Narratives and Advocacy Coalitions. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(4) 661–82.

390

Bibliography

Radaelli C.M. (1999b) Technocracy in the European Union. London: Longman. Radaelli, C.M. (1997) How does Europeanization Produce Domestic Policy Change? Comparative Political Studies, 30(5) 553–75. Ragin, C.C. (2000) Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago, IL: Chicago UP. Ragin, C.C. (1987) The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: Berkeley University Press. Ragin, C., D. Berg-Schlosser, and G. De Meur (1996) Political Methodology: Qualitative Methods. In R.E. Goodin, and H.-D. Klingemann (eds), A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 749–68. Ragin, C.C. and P. Pennings (2005) Fuzzy Sets and Social Research. Sociological Methods & Research, special issue, 33(4). Ramos, F. (2002) Judicial Cooperation in the European Courts: Testing Three Models of Judicial Behavior. Global Judicial Frontiers, 2(1) 4. Raunio, T. (2006) Ensuring Democratic Control over National Governments in European Affairs. In G. Barett (ed.), Ireland, Europe and the Challenge of Democracy. Dublin: Institute for European Affairs, forthcoming. Raunio, T. (2005) Holding Governments Accountable in European Affairs: Explaining Cross-National Variation. Journal of Legislative Studies, forthcoming. Raunio, T. (1999) Always One Step Behind? National Legislatures and the European Union. Government and Opposition, 34(1) 1–23. Raunio, T. and S. Hix (2000) Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back: European Integration and Parliamentary Government. West European Politics, 23(4) 142–68. Raunio, T. and M. Wiberg (2000) Does Support Lead to Ignorance? National Parliaments and the Legitimacy of EU Governance. Acta Politica, 35(2) 146–68. Ray, L. (1999) Measuring Party Orientations Towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey. European Journal of Political Research, 36(2) 283–306. Regelsberger, E., P. de Schoutheete de Tervarent and W. Wessels (eds) (1997) Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Rehbinder, E. and R. Stewart (1985) Environmental Protection Policy. Berlin: de Gruyter. Reid, A. (2003) EU Competition Law and Trade Associations. In J. Greenwood 2003b, pp. 74–90. Reif, K. and H. Schmitt (1980) Nine Second-Order National Elections: a Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1) 3–44. Rhodes, M. (2002) Why EMU Is – or May Be – Good for European Welfare States. In Dyson 2002, pp. 305–33. Rhodes, M. (1995) A Regulatory Conundrum: Industrial Relations and the “Social Dimension”. In Leibfried and Pierson 1995a, pp. 78–122. Rhodes, M. (1991) The Social Dimension of the Single European Market: National versus Transnational Regulation. European Journal of Political Research, 19(2–3), 245–80. Rhodes, R.A.W. (ed.) (2000) Transforming British Government, vols 1 and 2. London: Macmillan. Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Understanding Governance. Buckingham: Open University Press. Rhodes, R.A.W. (1994) The Hollowing Out of the State. Political Quarterly, 65, 138–51. Risse, T. (2001) A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities. In Cowles et al., pp. 198–216. Risse, T., M.G. Cowles and J. Caporaso (2001) Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction. In Cowles et al., pp. 1–20.

Bibliography 391

Roederer-Rynning, C. (2005) France’s FNSEA: A Giant on Clay Feet? In D. Halpin (ed.), Surviving Global Change? Agricultural Interest Groups in Comparative Perspective. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 91–114. Roederer-Rynning, C. (2002) Farm Conflict in France and the Europeanisation of Agricultural Policy. West European Politics, 25(3) 107–26. Rokkan, S. (1999) State Formation, Nation Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan. Edited by P. Flora with S. Kuhnle and D. Urwin. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rollo, J. (2006) Global Economic Governance and EMU Enlargement. In Dyson 2006, forthcoming. Rometsch, D. and W. Wessels (eds) (1996) The European Union and Member States: Towards Institutional Fusion? Manchester: Manchester University Press. Rosamond, B. (2000) Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. Rosenau, J.N. and E.-O. Czempiel (eds) (1992) Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Ross, G. (1994) On Half-Full Glasses, Europe and the Left: Comments on Wolfgang Streeck’s “European Social Policy after Maastricht”. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 15, 486–96. Royo, S. and P.C. Manuel (2003a) Some Lessons from the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Union. In Royo and Manuel, pp. 1–30. Royo, S. and P.C. Manuel (eds) (2003b) Spain and Portugal in the European Union: The First Fifteen Years. London: Frank Cass. Rucht, D. (2002) The EU as a Target of Political Mobilization: Is There a Europeanization of Conflict? In Balme et al., pp. 163–94. Rueschemeyer, D., E.H. Stephens and J.D. Stephens (1992) Capitalist Development and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. Ruggie, J. (1993) Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations. International Organization, 47(1) 139–74. Rummel, R. (1996) Germany’s Role in the CFSP: ‘Normalität’ or ‘Sonderweg’? In C. Hill, pp. 40–67. Saalfeld, T. (2003) The Bundestag: Institutional Incrementalism and Behavioural Reticence. In Dyson and Goetz, pp. 73–96. Saalfeld, T. (1990) The West German Bundestag after 40 Years: The Role of Parliament in a “Party Democracy”. West European Politics, 13(3) 68–89. Salgado Sanchez, R. and C. Woll (2004) L’Européanisation et les acteurs non-Etatiques, Paper delivered to the conference on a “Europeanisation of Public Policies and European Integration”. IEP- Paris, February 13. Available online at http://www.sciencespo.fr. Sandholtz W. (1998) The Emergence of a Supranational Telecommunications Regime. In W. Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 134–63. Sandholtz, W. (1996) Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(3) 403–29. Sandholtz, W. (1993) Institutions and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in Western Europe. World Politics, 45(2) 242–70. Sandholtz, W. (1992) High-tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Sandholtz, W. and J. Zysman (1989) 1992: Recasting the European Bargain. World Politics, 42(1) 95–128.

392

Bibliography

Sartori, G. (ed.) (1984) Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis. London: Sage. Sartori, G. (1970) Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. American Political Science Review, 64(4) 1033–53. Sasse, C., E. Poullet, D. Coombes and G. Deprez (1977) Decision Making in the European Community. New York: Praeger. Saurugger, S. (2003) Européaniser les interests? Paris: L’Harmattan. Savage, J. (2005) Making the EMU: The Politics of Budgetary Surveillance and the Enforcement of Maastricht. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sbragia, A. (2001) Italy Pays for Europe: Political Leadership, Political Choice, and Institutional Adaptation. In Cowles et al., pp. 79–96. Sbragia, A.M. (ed.) (1991) Europolitics. Institutions and Policy-Making in the “New” European Community. Washington: Brookings Institution. Scharpf, F.W. (2001) Notes Toward a Theory of Multilevel Governing in Europe. Scandinavian Political Studies, 24(1) 1–26. Scharpf, F.W. (2000a) Economic Changes, Vulnerabilities, and Institutional Capabilities. In Scharpf and Schmidt 2000a, pp. 21–124. Scharpf, F.W. (2000b) The Viability of Advanced Welfare States in the International Economy: Vulnerabilities and Options. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(2) 190–228. Scharpf, F. (1999) Selecting Cases and Testing Hypotheses. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(1) 164–8. Scharpf, F. (1997) Games Real Actors Plays: Actor Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder: Westview Press. Scharpf, F.W. (1988) The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons From German Federalism and European Integration. Public Administration, 66(3) 239–78. Scharpf, F.W. (1985) Die Politikverflechtungsfalle, Europäische Integration und Deutscher Föderalismus im Vergleich. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 26(4) 323–57. Scharpf, F.W. and V.A. Schmidt (eds) (2000a) Welfare and Work in the Open Economy. Volume I. From Vulnerability to Competitiveness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scharpf, F.W. and V.A. Schmidt (2000b) Conclusions. In Scharpf and Schmidt 2000a, pp. 310–36. Schendelen, M.P.C.M. (ed.) (1993) National Public and Private EC Lobbying. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Schimmelfennig, F. (2005) Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe. International Organization, 59(4) 827–60. Schimmelfennig, F. (2001) The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. International Organization, 55(1) 47–80. Schimmelfennig, F., S. Engert and H. Knobel (2003) Costs, Commitment and Compliance. The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey. Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(3) 495–517. Schimmelfennig, F. and U. Sedelmeier (eds) (2005) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Schimmelfennig, F. and U. Sedelmeier (2004) Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4) 661–79. Schmidt, S.K. (2000) Only an Agenda Setter? The European Commission’s Power over the Council of Ministers. European Union Politics, 1(1) 37–61. Schmidt, S.K. (1998) Commission Activism: Subsuming Telecommunications and Electricity under European Competition Law. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1) 169–84.

Bibliography 393

Schmidt, S.K. (1997) Sterile Debates and Dubious Generalizations: European Integration Theory Tested by Telecommunications and Electricity. Journal of Public Policy, 16(3) 233–71. Schmidt, S.K. and R. Werle (1998) Coordinating Technology: Studies in the Standardization of Telecommunications. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Schmidt, V.A. (2005) Theorizing Democracy in Europe: The Impact of the EU on National and Sectoral Policymaking Processes. Paper prepared for the conference Ninth Biannual Meeting of the European Union Studies Association, March 31–April 2 Austin, Texas. Schmidt, V.A. (2004) Europeanization in Simple and Compound Polities: Institutions, Ideas, and Discourse. Paper prepared for presentation to the National Meetings of the American Political Science Association. Chicago, September 1–5. Schmidt, V. (2002a) Europeanization and the Mechanics of Economic Policy Adjustment. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6) 894–912. Schmidt, V. (2002b) The Futures of European Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schmidt, V.A. (1999a) The EU and Its Member States: Institutional Contrasts and their Consequences. MPIfG paper, 99/7. Schmidt, V. (1999b) National Patterns of Governance under Siege: The Impact of European Integration. In Kohler-Koch and Eising, pp. 155–72. Schmidt, V.A. (1997) European Integration and Democracy: the Differences among Member States. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1) 128–45. Schmidt, V.A. and C.M. Radaelli (2004) Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues. West European Politics, 27(2) 183–210. Schmidt, D. and A. Wiener (2005) Democracy for Export? Revisiting the Europeanisation Approach. Paper presented at the International Studies Association conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 2–5. Schmitt, H. and J. Thomassen (eds) (1999) Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schmitter, P.C. (1999) Reflections on the Impact of the European Union upon “Domestic” Democracy in its Member States. In M. Egberg and P. Laegreid (eds), Organizing Political Institutions: Essays for Johan P. Olsen. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, pp. 289–98. Schmitter, P.C. (1996) Examining the Present Euro-Polity with the Help of Past Theories. In G. Marks, F.W. Scharpf, P.C. Schmitter and W. Streeck (eds), Governance in the European Union. London: Sage, pp. 1–14. Schmitter, P.C. (1970) A Revised Theory of Regional Integration. International Organization, 24(4) 836–68. Schmitter, P.C. and J. Santiso (1998) Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy. International Political Science Review, 19(1) 69–92. Schneider, G. and M. Aspinwall (eds) (2001) The Rules of Integration. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Schneider, V. (2002) Europäisierung zwischen Markt und Bürokratie. Eine Einführung in die Problematik. In V. Schneider (ed), Entgrenzte Märkte grenzenlose Bürokratie? Europäisierung in Wirtschaft, Recht und Politik. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, pp. 15–31. Schneider, V. (2001a) Die Transformation der Telekommunikation. Vom Staatsmonopol zum globalen Markt (1800–2000). Frankfurt am Main: Campus. Schneider, V. (2001b) Institutional Reform in Telecommunications: The European Union in Transnational Policy Diffusion. In Cowles et al., pp. 60–78. Schneider, V. (1992) Organized Interests in the European Telecommunications Sector. In Greenwood et al., pp. 42–68. Schneider, V., J.M. Charon, G. Thomas and T. Vedel (1991) The Dynamics of Videotex Development in Britain, France and Germany: A Cross-national Comparison. European Journal of Communication, 6(2) 187–212.

394

Bibliography

Schneider, V., G. Dang Nguyen and R. Werle (1994) Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy-Making – Harmonizing Telecommunications Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(4) 473–98. Schneider, V. and R. Werle (1990) International Regime or Corporate Actor? The European Community in Telecommunications Policy. In K. Dyson and P. Humphreys (eds), The Political Economy of Communications: International and European Dimensions. London: Routledge, pp. 77–106. Schnell, R., P.P. Hill, and E. Esser (2005) Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung, 7th edn. München: Oldenbourg. Schout, A. (2001) Organisational Analysis of a Europeanisation Process: A Dutch Experience. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration. Schwarze, J. (1988) Die Befolgung von Vorabentscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs durch deutsche Gerichte. Baden-Baden: Nomos Publishing. Sciarini, P., A. Fischer, and S. Nicolet (2004) How Europe Hits Home: Evidence from the Swiss case. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(3) 353–78. Sciarini, P., A. Fischer and S. Nicolet (2002) L’impact de l’internatinalization sur les processus de décision en Suisse. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 8(3/4) 1–34. Schout, A. (1999) Internal Management of External Relations: The Europeanization and Economic Affairs Ministry. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration. Schreuers, M. (2004) EU Enlargement and the Environment: Institutional Change and Environmental Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Environmental Politics, 13(1) 27–51. Schuster, L. (2000) A Comparative Analysis of the Asylum Policy of Seven European Governments. Journal of Refugee Studies, 13(1) 118–32. Scott, C. (2003) Organizational Variety in Regulatory Governance. Public Organization Review, 3(3) 301–16. Self, P. and H. Storing (1962) The State and the Farmer. London: Allen and Unwin. Shaw, J. (ed.) (2000) Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing. Sheingate, A.D. (2001) The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Shonfield, A. (1966) Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power. London and New York: Oxford University Press. Shonfield, A. (1965) Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Siaroff, A. (1999) Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies. Meaning and Measurement. European Journal of Political Research, 36(2) 175–205. Sidenius, N.C. (1999) Business, Governance Structures, and the EU: The Case of Denmark. In Kohler-Koch and Eising, pp. 173–88. Siedentopf, H. and C. Hauschild (1988) The Implementation of Community Legislation by the Member States: A Comparative Analysis. In Siedentopf and Ziller, pp. 1–87. Siedentopf, H., and J. Ziller (eds) (1988) Making European Policies Work: The Implementation of Community Legislation in the Member States, two volumes. London: Sage. Simpson, S. (2000) Intra-institutional Rivalry and Policy Entrepreneurship in the European Union: The Politics of Information and Communications Technology Convergence. New Media and Society, 2(4) 445–66. Simmons, B.A. and Z. Elkins (2004) The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. American Political Science Review, 98(1) 171–89. Sissenich, B. (2002) The Diffusion of EU Social and Employment Legislation in Poland and Hungary. In Linden, pp. 287–315. Sitter, N. (2001) The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: Is Euroscepticism a Government–Opposition Dynamic? West European Politics, 24(4) 22–39.

Bibliography 395

Skjaerseth, J.B. (1994) The Climate Policy of the EC: Too Hot to Handle? Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(1) 25–45. Slaughter, A.-M. (2004) A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Slaughter, A.-M., A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler (eds) (1998) The European Court and the National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence: A Legal Change in its Social Context. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Smith, A. (2004) Politics and the European Commission: Actors, Interdependence, Legitimacy. London: Routledge/ECPR. Smith, A. (1997) Studying Multi-level Governance: Examples from French Translations of the Structural Funds. Public Administration, 75(4) 711–29. Smith, E. (1996) National Parliaments as Cornerstones of European Integration. London: Kluwer Law International. Smith, H. (2002) European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is and What It Does. London: Pluto Press. Smith, K. (2003) The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality. In M. Cremona (ed), The Enlargement of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 105–39. Smith, K.E. (2001) The EU, Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries: Foreign Policy with an Ethical Dimension? In K. Smith and M. Light (eds), Ethics and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 185–204. Smith, M.E. (2004) Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, M.E. (2000) Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Cooperation. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(4), October, 613–31. Smith, M.J. (2000a) Prime Ministers, Ministers and Civil Servants in the Core Executive. In Rhodes, volume 1, pp. 25–45. Smith, M.J. (2000b) The Commission Made Me Do It: The European Commission as a Strategic Asset in Domestic Politics. In N. Nugent (ed), At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission. London: Macmillan, 2nd edn, pp. 170–89. Smith, M.J. (1990) The Politics of Agricultural Support in Britain. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Smyrl, M. (1997) Does European Community Regional Policy Empower the Regions? Governance, 10(3) 287–309. Smyth, A. (1996) “And Nobody Was Any the Wiser”: Irish Abortion Rights and the European Union. In R.A. Elman (ed), Sexual Politics and the European Union: The New Feminist Challenge. Oxford; Berghahn Books, pp. 109–30. Snyder, F.G. (1985) Law of the Common Agricultural Policy. London: Sweet and Maxwell. Soetendorp, B. and K. Hanf (1998) Conclusion: The Nature of National Adaptation to European Integration. In Hanf and Soetendorp, pp. 186–94. Soysal, Y. (1994) Limits of Citizenship. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Spanou, C. (2004) The Europeanisation of the Greek Core Executive. http://www.oeue. net/papers/greece-theeuropeanisationofthe.pdf. Stavridis, S., T. Couloumbis and T. Veremis (eds) (1999) The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean Countries and Applicant Countries in the 1990s. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Stawarska, R. (1999) EU Enlargement from the Polish Perspective. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(5) 822–38. Steffani, W. (1981) The Bundestag at the Intersection of Four Systems. In N. Orstein (ed.), The Role of the Legislature in Western Democracies. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, pp. 50–66. Stein, E. (1981) Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution. The American Journal of International Law, 75(1) 1–27.

396

Bibliography

Stone Sweet, A. (2004) The Judicial Construction of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stone Sweet, A. (1998) Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community. In Slaughter et al., pp. 305–30. Stone Sweet, A. and T. Brunell (1998a) Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community. American Political Science Review, 92(1) 63–82. Stone Sweet, A. and T. Brunell (1998b) The European Court and the National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References, 1961–1995. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1) 66–97. Stoker, G. (1995). Introduction. In G. Stoker and D. Marsh (eds), Theory and Methods in Political Science. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Stone Sweet, A. and R. Cichowski (2004) Sex Equality. In Stone Sweet 2004, pp. 147–98. Stone Sweet, A. and W. Sandholtz (1997) European Integration and Supranational Governance. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(3) 297–317. Stone Sweet, A., W. Sandholtz and N. Fligstein (eds) (2001) The Institutionalization of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Streeck, W., J. Grote, V. Schneider and J. Visser (eds) (2005) Governing Interests: Business Associations Facing Internationalism. London: Routledge. Streeck, W. and P.C. Schmitter (1992) From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market. In W. Streeck (ed.), 1992, Social Institutions and Economic Performance. London: Sage, pp. 197–231. Sunstein, C. (1990) Paradoxes of the Regulatory State. The University of Chicago Law Review, 57(1) 407–41. Sverdrup, U. (2004) Compliance and Conflict Management in the European Union: Nordic Exceptionalism. Scandinavian Political Studies, 27(1) 23–43. Sverdrup, U. (2000) Ambiguity and Adaptation: Europeanization of Administrative Institutions of Loosely Coupled Processes. PhD Dissertation, University of Oslo. Sverdrup, U. (1998) Norway: an Adaptive Non-Member. In Hanf and Soetendorp, pp. 149–66. Surel, Y. (2000) The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policy-Making. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(4) 495–512. Szapiro, M. (2005) The Framework for European Regulatory Agencies. Paper presented at the 3rd Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research. Budapest, Hungary, September 8. Szczerbiak, A. and P. Taggart (eds) (2006) Opposing Europe: The Comparative Politics of Euroscepticism, 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Szczerbiak, A. and P. Taggart (eds) (2004) Choosing Europe: The 2003 EU Accession Referendums. West European Politics 27(4), special issue. Szukala, A. (2003) France: The European Transformation of the French Model. In Wessels et al., pp. 216–247. Taggart, P. (1998) A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems. European Journal of Political Research, 33(3) 363–88. Taggart, P. and A. Szczerbiak (2004) Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 43(1) 1–27. Tallberg, J. (2002) Path to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union. International Organization, 56(3) 609–43. Tallberg, J. (2000) Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(1) 104–21. Tarrow, S. (2004a) Bridging the Quantitative–Qualitative Divide. In H. E. Brady and D. Collier (eds.), Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham, etc.: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 169–79.

Bibliography 397

Tarrow, S. (2004b) Center–Periphery Alignments and Political Contention in LateModern Europe. In C.K. Ansell and G. di Palma (eds), Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 45–64. Taylor, P.J. (1994) The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World System. Progress in Human Geography, 19, 151–62. Tenbücken, M. and V. Schneider (2004) Divergent Convergence: Structures and Functions of National Regulatory Authorities in the Telecommunications Sector. In Jordana and Levi-Faur, pp. 245–72. Terzi, Ö. (2005) Europeanization of Foreign Policy and Candidate Countries: A Comparative Study of Greek and Turkish Cases. Politique européenne, 17, 113–36. Tesoka, S. (1999) Judicial Politics in the European Union: Its Impact on National Opportunity Structures for Gender Equality. MPIfG Discussion Paper, 99(2). Cologne: Max Planck Institute for Social Research. Tetlock, P. E., and A. Belkin (1996) Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics. Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives. In P. E. Tetlock and A. Belkin (eds), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 1–38. Thatcher, M. (2005) The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe. Governance, 18(3) 347–73. Thatcher, M. (2004a) Winners and Losers in Europeanisation: Reforming the National Regulation of Telecommunications. West European Politics, 27(2) 284–309. Thatcher, M. (2004b) Varieties of Capitalism in an Internationalized World: Domestic Institutional Change in European Telecommunications. Comparative Political Studies, 37(7) 751–80. Thatcher, M. (2002a) Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual Mediation. West European Politics, 25(1) 125–47. Thatcher, M. (2002b) Regulation after Delegation: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6) 954–72. Thatcher, M. (2002c) The Relationship Between National and European Regulation of Telecommunications. In Jordana 2002a, pp. 66–85. Thatcher, M. (2001). The Commission and National Governments as Partners: EC Regulatory Expansion in Telecommunications 1979–2000. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(4) 558–84. Thatcher, M. (1999) The Politics of Telecommunications: National Institutions, Convergence, and Change in Britain and France. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Therborn, G. (1993) Beyond the Lonely Nation-State. In Castles, pp. 329–40. Thielemann, E.R. (2004) Why European Policy Harmonisation Undermines Refugee Burden-sharing. European Journal of Migration and Law, 6(1) 43–61. Thielemann, E.R. (2003) Between Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden-Sharing in the European Union. Journal of Refugee Studies, 16(3) 253–73. Thielemann, E. (2000) Europeanisation and Institutional Compatibility: Implementing European Regional Policy in Germany. Queen’s Papers on Europeanization, 4. Thielemann, E. (1999) Institutional Change and European Governance: An Analysis of Partnership. Current Politics and Economics of Europe, 9(2) 181–97. Thomson, J.D. (1967) Organizations in Actions. New York: McGraw-Hill. Tofarides, M. (2003) Urban Policy in the European Union: A Multi-Level Gatekeeper System. Aldershot: Ashgate. Tomlinson, E. (1995) Reception of Community Law in France. Columbia Journal of European Law, 1, 183–231. Tommel, I. (1998) Transformation of Governance: The European Commission’s Strategy for Creating a “Europe of the Regions”. Regional and Federal Studies, 8(2) 52–80.

398

Bibliography

Tonra, B. (2001) The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate. Tonra, B. (2000) Denmark and Ireland. In Manners and Whitman, pp. 224–42. Tonra, B. and T. Christiansen (eds) (2004) Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Torreblanca, J. (2001) Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy. ARENA Working Paper 01/26. Tracy, M. (1994) Summary of Major Policy Issues. In R. Kjeldahl and M. Tracy (eds), Renationalisation of the Common Agricultural Policy? Tonbridge: Combined Book Services, pp. 1–4. Traxler, F. and P.C. Schmitter (1995) The Emerging Euro-Polity and Organized Interests. European Journal of International Relations, 1(2) 191–218. Trondal, J. (2001) Is There Any Social Constructivist–Institutionalist divide? Unpacking Social Mechanisms Affecting Representational Roles among EU Decision-makers. European Journal of Public Policy, 8(1) 1–23. Trondal, J. (2000) Multiple Institutional Embeddeness in Europe: The Case of Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Government Officials. Scandinavian Political Studies, 23(4) 311–41. Trondal, J. and F. Veggeland (2003) Access, Voice and Loyalty: The Representation of Domestic Civil Servants in EU Committees. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(1), 59–77. Tsardanidis, C. and S. Stavridis (2005) The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal. European Integration, 27(2) 217–39. Tsebelis, G. (1995) Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentalism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science, 25(3) 289–325. Uçarer, E. (2001) From Sidelines to Center Stage: Sidekick No More? The European Commission in Justice and Home Affairs. European Integration online Papers, 5(2). Usher, J.A. (1996) Compliance with Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. M.K. Bulterman and M. Kuijer (eds), Compliance with Judgments of International Courts. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, pp. 87–110. Vachudová, M. A. (2005) Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Valen, H. (1976) National Conflict Structures and Foreign Politics: The Impact of the EEC Issue on Perceived Cleavages in Norwegian Politics. European Journal of Political Research, 4(1) 47–82. Van der Klaauw, J. (2002) European Asylum Policy and the Global Protection Regime: Challenges for UNHCR. In S. Lavenex and E.M. Uçarer (eds), Migration and the Externalities of European Integration. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, pp. 33–53. Van Keulen, M. (2002). National Governments in the EU Policy Process – Conceptualising Input and Performance. PhD Manuscript: University of Twente. Van Meerhaeghe, M.A. (ed.) (1992) Belgium and EC Membership Evaluated. London: Pinter. Van Meter, D.S. and C.E. van Horn (1975) The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework. Administration and Society, 6(4) 445–88. Vaquer i Fanés, J. (2001) Europeanization and Foreign Policy. Observatorio de Politica Exterior Europea Working Paper, 21. Vasconcelas, Á. de (1996) Portugal: Pressing for an Open Europe. In Hill, pp. 268–87. Van Selm-Thorburn, J. (1998) Asylum in the Amsterdam Treaty: A Harmonious Future? Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 24(4) 627–38.

Bibliography 399

Van Waarden, F. (1994) Is European Law a Threat to Associational Governance? In V. Eichener and H. Voelzkow (eds), Europäische Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung. Marburg: Metropolis, pp. 217–62. Vehar, P. (2004) The National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia and EU Affairs after Accession. Forum Parliament, 2(1) 16–20. Verdier, D., and R. Breen (2001) Europeanization and Globalization: Politics Against Markets in the European Union. Comparative Political Studies, 34(3) 227–62. Verdun, A. (2000) European Responses to Globalization and Financial Market Integration: Perceptions of Economic and Monetary Union in Britain, France and Germany. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Vink, M. (2005) Limits of European Citizenship: European Integration and Domestic Immigration Policies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Vink, M. (2003) What is Europeanisation? And Other Questions on a New Research Agenda. European Political Science, 3(1) 63–74. Vink, M. (2002) Negative and Positive Integration in European Immigration Policies. European Integration online Papers, 6(13). Vink, M. (2001) The Limited Europeanization of Domestic Citizenship Policy: Evidence from the Netherlands. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(5) 875–96. Vink, M. and F. Meijerink (2003) Asylum Applications and Recognition Rates in EU Member States 1982–2001: A Quantitative Analysis. Journal of Refugee Studies, 16(3) 297–315. Visser, J. (2005) The OMC as Selective Amplifier for National Strategies of Reform: What the Netherlands Want to Learn from Europe. In Zeitlin and Pochet, pp. 173–215. Vogel, D. (1995) Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Vogel, S.K. (1996) Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Volcansek, M.L. (1986) Judicial Politics in Europe: An Impact Analysis. New York: Peter Lang. Vollaard, H. (2005) Euroscepsis en Protestantisme in Nederland. In B. Boer and H. Vollaard (eds), Euroscepsis in Nederland. Utrecht: Lemma, pp. 151–76. Voltmer, K., and C. Eilders (2003) The Media Agenda: The Marginalization and Domestication of Europe. In Dyson and Goetz, pp. 173–99. Waesche, N.M. (2003) Internet Entrepreneurship in Europe: Venture Failure and the Timing of Telecommunications Reform. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Waever, O. (1995) Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in E.U. Studies. Journal of International Affairs, 48(2) 389–431. Waever, O., B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P. Lemaitre (1993) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. London: Pinter. Wallace, C. and D. Stola (eds) (2001) Patterns of Migration in Central Europe. London: Palgrave. Wallace, H. (2001) Introduction: Rethinking European Integration. In H. Wallace (ed.), Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 1–22. Wallace, H. (2000) Europeanisation and Globalisation: complementary or contradictory trends? New Political Economy, 5(3) 369–83. Wallace, H. (1973) National Governments and the European Communities, PEP European Series, no. 221. London: Chatham House. Wallace, H. (1971) The Impact of the European Communities on National Policy-Making. Government and Opposition, 6(4) 520–38. Wallace, H. and W. Wallace (1973) The Impact of Community Membership on the British Machinery of Government. Journal of Common Market Studies, 11(3) 243–362.

400

Bibliography

Wallace, W. and W.E. Paterson (eds) (1978) Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe: A Comparative Approach. Farnborough: Saxon House. Ward, N. and P. Lowe (2004) Europeanizing Rural Development? Implementing the CAP’s Second Pillar in England. International Planning Studies, 9(2/3) 121–37. Warner, H. (1984) EC Social Policy in Practice: Community Action in behalf of Women and its Impact in the Member States. Journal of Common Market Studies, 22(2) 141–67. Weiler, J.H.H. (2000) The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement. Jean Monnet Working Paper, No. 9/00. Weiler, J.H.H. (1998) Constitutional or International? The Foundations of the Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. In Slaughter et al., pp. 331–64. Weiler, J.H.H. (1994) A quiet revolution. The European Court of Justice and its interlocutors. Comparative Political Studies, 26(4) 510–34. Weiler, J.H.H. (1993) Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4) 417–46. Weiler, J.H.H. (1991) The Transformation of Europe. Yale Law Journal, 100 2403–2483. Weiler, J.H.H. and U.R. Haltern (1998) Constitutional or International? The Foundations of the Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. In Slaughter et al., pp. 331–64. Werle, R. (2002) Internet Europe: overcoming institutional fragmentation and policy failure. In Jordana 2002a, pp. 137–58. Werle, R. (2000) The Impact of Information Networks on the Structure of Political Systems. In C. Engel and K.H. Keller (eds), Understanding the Impact of Global Networks on Local Social, Political and Cultural Values. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 167–92. Werle, R. and V. Leib (2000) The Internet Society and its Struggle for Recognition and Influence. In K. Ronit and V. Schneider (eds), Private Organisations in Global Politics. London: Routledge, pp. 102–23. Wessels, W. (2000) Die Öffnung des Staates. Modelle und Wirklichkeit grenzüberschreitender Verwaltungspraxis 1960–1995. Opladen: Leske
Budrich. Wessels, W. (1997) An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macro-political View on Integration Processes. Journal of Common Market Studies, 35(2) 267–99. Wessels, W. and I. Linsenmann (2002) EMU’s Impact on National Institutions: Fusion towards a “Gouvernance Economique” or Fragmentation? In Dyson 2002, pp. 53–77. Wessels, W., A. Maurer and J. Mittag (eds) (2003) Fifteen into One? The European Union and its Member States. Manchester: Manchester University Press. White, B. (2001) Understanding European Foreign Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Whitehead, L. (2001) The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wiberg, M. (ed.) (1997) Trying To Make Democracy Work: The Nordic Parliaments and the European Union. Stockholm: Gidlunds. Wiener, A. and T. Diez (eds) (2003) European Integration Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wiener, A. and G. Schwellnus (2004) Contested Norms in the Process of EU Enlargement: Non-Discrimination and Minority Rights. In G.A. Bermann and K. Pistor (eds), Law and Governance in an Enlarged European Union. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 451–83. Wilkinson, A. (1994) Renationalisation: An Evolving Debate In R. Kjeldahl and M. Tracy (eds), Renationalisation of the Common Agricultural Policy? Tonbridge: Combined Book Services, pp. 23–32.

Bibliography 401

Wilks, S. and I. Bartle (2002) The Unanticipated Consequences Creating Independent Competition Agencies. West European Politics, 25(1) 148–72. Wilts, A. (2002) Europeanization and Means of Interest Representation by National Business Associations. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 7(3) 269–86. Wilson, F.L. (1987) Interest-Group Politics in France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wobbe, T. (2003) From Protecting to Promoting: Evolving EU Sex Equality Norms in an Organisational Field. European Law Journal, 9(1) 88–108. Wolf, D. (2005) “Nicht Input, sondern Output, nicht Supply-side, sondern DemandSide”: Zur Veränderung der Einflusslogik in der Europäischen Union. In Eising and Kohler-Koch, pp. 79–94. Wolters, M. and P. Coffey (eds) (1990) The Netherlands and EC Membership Evaluated. London: Pinter. Wong, R. (2005) The Europeanization of Foreign Policy. In Hill and Smith, pp. 134–53. Wong, R. (2006) The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wright, V. (1999) The National Co-ordination of European Policy-Making: Negotiating the Quagmire. In J.J. Richardson (ed.), European Union: Power and Policy-Making. London: Routledge, pp. 148–69. Wright, V. and J. Hayward (2000) Governing from the Centre: Policy Co-ordination in Six European Core Executives. In Rhodes, vol. 2, 27–46. Yin, R.K. (1994) Case Study Research and Method, 2nd edn. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage. Young, A.R. (2007) The Politics of Regulation and the Internal Market. In K.E. Jørgensen, M. Pollack and B. Rosamond (eds), The Handbook of European Union Politics. Zahariadis, N. (2005) Europeanization as Program Implementation: Effective, Efficient, and Democratic? Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Washington, DC, Sept. 1–4. Zeff, E.E. and E.B. Pirro (eds) (2001) The European Union and the Member States: Co-operation, Co-ordination and Compromise. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Zeitlin, J. (2005) The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action: Theoretical Promise, Empirical Realities, Reform Strategy. In Zeitlin and Pochet, pp. 447–503. Zeitlin, J. and P. Pochet (eds) (2005) The Open Method of Coordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, with Lars Magnusson. Brussels: PIEPeter Lang. Zielonka, J. (1998a) Explaining Euro-Paralysis. London: Macmillan Press. Zielonka, J. (ed.) (1998b) Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. Zielonka, J. and A. Pravda (eds) (2001) Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 2: International and Transnational Factors. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zolberg, A. (2003) The Archeology of “Remote Control”. In A. Fahrmeir, O. Faron and P. Weil (eds), Migration Control in the North Atlantic World. New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 195–222. Zürn, M. and J. Checkel (2005) Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rational Choice, Europe and the Nation State. International Organization, 59(4) 1045–79. Zürn, M. and C. Joerges (eds) (2005) Laws and Governance in Post-national Europe: Compliance beyond the Nation State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zürn, M. and S. Leibfried (2005) Reconfiguring the National Constellation. In S. Leibfried and M. Zürn (eds), Transformations of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–36.

This page intentionally left blank

Name Index Adcock, R. 36 Adler, E. 60, 61 Adshead, M. 167, 242 Aggestam, L. 333 Agh, A. 75, 76, 149 Albaek, E. 148 Alecu de Fler, N. 322, 331 Alker, H.R. 25 Allen, D. 84, 321, 329 Almond, A. 163 Alter, K.J. 185, 186, 188, 191, 197 Andersen, S. 235, 237, 321 Anderson, C.J. 165 Anderson, J.J. 62, 63, 69, 75, 115, 126, 127, 240, 242 Andeweg, R.B. 145, 155, 164 Andonova, L. 76 Ansell, K. 74 Aspinwall, M. 50, 60, 169 Attina, F. 154 Auel, K. 147, 148 Aylott, N. 162 Ayres, I. 112 Azzi, G.C. 198 Babbie, E.R. 60 Bache, I. 121, 244, 245, 246 Baier, V.E. 208 Bailey, D. 247 Baisnée, O. 42 Baldwin-Edwards, M. 314 Baldwin, R. 103 Balme, D. 43, 168, 177 Baltz, K. 167, 170, 172, 177, 179 Barbe, E. 327 Bardach, E. 109 Bardi, L. 154 Barnard, C. 255, 262 Bartle, I. 112, 274 Bartolini, S. 43, 73, 82, 83, 84, 86, 160, 161, 351 Batora, J. 328 Baumgartner, F.R. 26, 177

Beetham, D. 148 Beetsma, 281 Begg, I. 261 Bellamy, R. 148 Bell, M. 306, 307 Benington, J. 240 Bennett, R.J. 170 Benz, A. 147, 148, 240, 244 Berger, S. 213 Bergman, T. 147, 148 Bernstein, M.H. 111 Beyers, J. 65, 122, 130, 161, 164, 170, 171, 177, 215, 216, 221 Bigo, D. 312 Bleich, E. 306 Blichner, L. 148 Blondel, J. 159 Blyth, M. 163 Boergers, T. 277 Bomberg, E. 237, 240 Bonnet, A. 224 Borras, S. 38, 149 Börzel, T.A. 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 24, 29, 30, 41, 42, 43, 48, 51, 52, 55, 68, 77, 96, 97, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 130, 137, 164, 199, 204, 209, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 237, 238, 240, 250, 251, 267, 273, 341, 344, 351 Boswell, C. 315 Bourne, A. 244 Bouwen, P. 170, 172 Bouwman, H. 269 Brady, E. 35, 60, 70 Braithwaite, J. 103, 112, 113 Britton, D.K. 223 Brochmann, G. 312 Brokl, L. 149 Brunell, T. 185, 186, 192, 193 Brusis, M. 78 Bruszt, L. 96 Bull, H. 324 Bull, M. 40 Buller, J. 340

403

404

Name Index

Bulmer, S. 6, 7, 12, 13, 42, 49, 53, 54, 55, 65, 75, 119, 129, 130, 132, 136, 237, 330, 337, 338, 351, 352 Burch, M. 54, 65, 129, 130, 132, 136, 240 Burke, T.F. 300 Bursens, P. 16, 122, 199, 339, 347, 348 Byrne, R. 315 Caldeira, G. 205 Caporaso, J. 6, 7, 11, 12, 19, 28, 30, 31, 40, 48, 52, 60, 259, 260, 297, 350, 352 Carlsnaes, W. 323, 324 Carrubba, C. 192, 193 Cartabia, M. 185 Cartelier, L. 277 Castles, G. 80 Cawson, A. 257 Cerny, G.P. 110 Chalmers, D. 184, 188, 190 Chapman, R. 240 Chayes, A. 204, 207, 237 Chayes, H. 204, 207, 237 Checkel, J. 4, 13, 43, 60, 61, 63, 66, 68, 205, 210, 299, 306 Chiasson, C. 219 Chong, D. 126 Christiansen, T. 60, 322 Cichowski, R. 189, 191 Cini, M. 229 Claes, M. 184, 276 Clapham, A. 328 Clements, B. 274 Closa, C. 76, 119, 130 Coen, D. 107, 111, 169, 170, 172, 273, 277 Coffrey, P. 130 Coleman, J.S. 271 Coleman, W.D. 217, 219 Collier, D. 35, 36, 60, 62, 70 Conant, L. 186, 187, 189, 191 Constantelos, J. 177 Conzelmann, T. 240 Cormack, J. 306, 307 Cowhey, P. 278 Cowles, M.G. 6, 28, 36, 52, 64, 103, 156, 167, 168, 172, 175, 177, 178, 179, 198, 230, 261, 267, 273, 317 Cress, D.M. 69 Crouch, C. 283, 288

Culpepper, P.D. 213 Curwen, P. 270 Cyert, R.M. 205 Dahl, R.A. 143 Daly, S. 35 Damgaard, E. 147, 148 Dannreuther, C. 172 Daugbjerg, C. 213, 214, 219 Defeis, E.F. 182 Dehousse, R. 108, 174, 236 De la Porte, C. 260 Della Porta, D. 172 Delorme, H. 213, 224 Delors, J. 258 De Meur, 126 De Rooij, R. 5 Deutsch, K.W. 25 De Vasconcelas, A. 325 Devuyst, Y. 327 De Witte, B. 296 Diez, T. 4 Dimatrakopoulos, D. 199 Dimitrova, A. 76, 89, 198 Dimitrov, V. 78 Di Palma, G. 44, 74, 84 Djelic, M.L. 103 Doering, H. 355 Dolowitz, D. 150 Doren, G.B. 112 Dosenrode, S. 76, 147 Drewry, G. 119 Duchêne, F. 324 Duina, F. 64, 150, 230, 259 Dür, A. 180 Duval, R. 291 Dyson, K. 6, 44, 119, 122, 123, 237, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 293, 341, 343 Easton, D. 163 Eberlein, B. 111, 112, 114, 240, 244 Eckstein, H. 61, 62 Economides, S. 365 Egeberg, M. 65, 76, 77, 130, 168, 203 Eising, R. 7, 10, 17, 49, 62, 63, 65, 170, 171 Elgie, R. 111 Eliasen, K. 321 Eliassen, K.A. 277

Name Index 405

Elmeskov, J. 291 Eriksen, E.O. 148 Esser, J. 272 Etzioni, A. 25 Falkner, G. 4, 17, 77, 115, 123, 126, 130, 169, 174, 175, 176, 199, 208, 209, 255, 258, 260, 261, 278, 344, 347 Farrell, H. 276 Favell, A. 299 Fearon, J. 60, 63 Featherstone, K. 6, 12, 24, 25, 44, 47, 76, 77, 82, 116, 125, 127, 128, 130, 155, 167, 284, 285 Ferrera, M. 260 Fligstein, N. 278 Flinders, M. 121, 164 Follesdal, A. 148 Fortuyn, P. 303 Franchino, F. 64, 106 Frendreis, J.P. 62 Fuchs, G. 272 Gabel, M. 159, 162 Gaffney, J. 155 Garry, J. 162 Geddes, A. 300, 313 Genieys, W. 217 Genschel, P. 130, 269, 274 George, A.W. 60, 61, 62, 68 Gerring, J. 338, 339, 340, 350 Geyer, R.R. 255 Gibbs, D.C. 270 Gibson, J. 205 Giddings, P. 119 Gilardi, F. 102, 106, 107, 108, 110, 113 Ginsberg, R.H. 322, 326 Giuliani, M. 32, 39, 65, 230 Glarbo, K. 328, 329, 333 Goetz, K.H. 6, 9, 13, 39, 47, 48, 55, 57, 62, 63, 69, 77, 78, 79, 119, 122, 123, 130, 198, 232, 235, 290, 291, 310, 337, 347, 348, 351, 352 Goggin, M.L. 198 Goldsmith, M. 121 Goldthorpe, H.J. 60 Goodwin, I. 270 Gordon, P.H. 324 Gorges, M.J. 257 Gourevitch, P. 3, 56, 341, 342

Grabbe, H. 78, 79, 90, 95, 159, 235, 304, 327 Grande, E. 111, 112, 167, 173, 179, 270, 272, 273 Grant, W. 214 Graver, H.P. 69 Graziano, P. 4, 16, 24, 332, 343 Greenwood, J. 167, 169, 257 Greer, A. 219 Greven, M.T. 161 Grote, J. 11, 167, 177 Grzymala-Busse, A. 90, 96, 149 Gualini, E. 4, 240 Guild, E. 312 Guillén, A.M. 371 Guiraudon, V. 17, 297, 299, 300, 306, 313, 315 Gyori, E. 149 Haas, E. 3, 14, 24, 25, 171, 333 Habermas, J. 148 Haggard, S. 90 Haider, J. 301 Haigh, N. 237 Halkier, H. 76 Hall, P. 13, 50, 291, 293, 298 Halpin, D. 270 Haltern, R. 185 Hanf, K. 4, 53, 83, 118, 130, 198 Harcourt, A. 39, 111 Harmsen, R. 4, 64, 119, 130, 132, 136, 329, 330 Hassenteufel, P. 41, 43 Haverland, M. 10, 15, 17, 52, 62, 63, 66, 68, 107, 126, 150, 204, 209, 230, 237, 278, 297, 307, 331, 332, 342, 343, 346, 348 Hay, C. 38 Hegeland, H. 148 Henisz, J.W. 113 Hennion-Moreau, S. 43 Hennis, M. 343 Héritier, A. 4, 10, 32, 39, 40, 51, 52, 76, 97, 98, 130, 149, 230, 231, 233, 234, 257, 260, 347 Heywood, M. 76, 119, 130 Hicks, A. 69 Hill, C. 322, 329, 332 Hills, J. 270, 274 Hix, S. 9, 13, 25, 26, 48, 55, 150, 154, 156, 158, 162, 163, 165, 198, 310, 350

406

Name Index

Hocking, B. 324 Hodson, D. 285 Hoffman, S. 323 Holsti, K.J. 321 Holzhacker, R. 5, 68, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150 Holzinger, K. 39, 230 Holznagel, B. 276 Homeyer, I. 236 Hooghe, L. 3, 26, 120, 126, 158, 162, 167, 169, 240, 241, 244, 252 Hopkins, R. 208 Hoskyns, C. 260 Hosli, M.O. 237 Howorth, J. 324 Huber, E. 68 Hughes, J. 78, 90, 248, 304 Hug, S. 345 Hulsink, W. 273 Huysmans, J. 312 Imig, D. 65, 168, 170, 177 Ingebritsen, C. 76 Innes, A. 90, 96, 149 Irwin, G.A. 161 Jabko, N. 108, 109, 111, 113 Jachtenfuchs, M. 49, 112 Jacobs, S. 102 Jacobsson, K. 38, 149, 260 Jacoby, W. 76, 89, 90, 92, 95, 97, 277 Jacquot, S. 38, 78, 345 Jakobsen, M.L. 108 Jänicke, M. 237 Jeffery, C. 120, 123, 237, 240 Jehlicka, P. 236 Jensen, H. 147 Jenssen, A.T. 77 Joerges, C. 209 Johansson, K.M. 162 John, P. 240, 252 Jones, B. 120 Jones, R. 244 Joppke, C. 299 Jordan, A. 49, 54, 65, 130, 132, 213, 227, 228, 229, 230, 232, 234 Jordana, J. 103, 108, 110, 270 Josling, T. 217 Jupille, J. 11, 30, 31, 259, 260, 297 Just, N. 214, 278

Kahler, M. 14 Kallestrup, M. 38 Kassim, H. 4, 53, 118, 119, 126, 130, 132, 135, 136, 163, 232, 237 Katzenstein, P. 237, 281 Katz, R.S. 69, 155, 159, 163 Kazamias, G. 76, 77, 125 Keating, M. 73, 84, 85, 120 Keck, M. 298 Keeler, J.T.S. 213 Kelemen, D. 107, 112, 159 Kelleher, J. 243, 244 Keller, B. 257 Kelley, J. 89, 90, 91, 306 Keohane, O. 60, 328, 345, 351 Keridis, D. 332 Kerremans, B. 122, 161 Keulen, M. 238 Kiessling, T. 277 Kiiver, P. 149 Killick, T. 208 King, A. 145 King, G. 46, 60, 61, 345 Kingdon, J.W. 26 Kjeldahl, R. 218, 220, 224 Knill, C. 4, 6, 39, 42, 52, 53, 54, 64, 68, 98, 102, 116, 130, 137, 205, 227, 231, 233, 234, 260, 268, 275, 310, 348 Kofler, A. 270 Kogut, B. 275 Kohler-Koch, B. 6, 49, 85, 112, 125, 126, 169, 252, 342, 351, 352, 353 Kokott, J. 185 Kolarska-Bobinska, L. 149 Koopmans, R. 299 Kopecky, P. 155 Korte, J. 188, 189, 192 Kostakopoulou, T. 313 Krasner, S.D. 352 Kriesi, H. 177 Kubicek, H. 89, 90 Ladrech, R. 4, 5, 24, 36, 56, 155, 159 Laegreid, P. 102, 113 Laffan, B. 10, 13, 130, 132, 133, 135, 137, 329, 347, 348 Lahav, G. 315 Lampinen, R. 65 Landman, T. 62, 68 La Spina, A. 229

Name Index 407

Laursen, F. 147 Lavenex, S. 4, 7, 313, 314, 315, 318, 341, 347, 348 Lehmann, J.-P. 327 Lehmkuhl, D. 6, 19, 42, 52, 53, 68, 98, 177, 231, 268, 275, 346 Lehr, W. 277 Leib, V. 275, 279 Leiber, S. 258 Leibfried, S. 30, 84, 85, 256, 257 Lembke, J. 275 Lequesne, C. 6, 49, 58, 75, 116, 119, 130 Lester, J.P. 198 Levi-Faur, D. 11, 62, 67, 102, 103, 108, 110, 113, 267, 273, 278, 343 Levy, D.A.L. 274 Lewis, J. 55, 298 Lieberson, S. 60 Liebert, U. 68 Liefferink, D. 49, 227, 228, 229, 230, 232, 235, 237 Lijphart, A. 60, 63 Lindberg, L. 14, 25, 26 Linden, R. 89 Linsenmann, I. 286 Lippert, B. 54, 77, 130 Lipsky, M. 198 Lodge, M. 102 Lord, C. 148, 156 Loughlin, M. 102 Lovecy, J. 174 Lowe, P. 214, 217, 218, 221, 222, 234 Lucarelli, S. 78 Luetz, S. 288 Luif, P. 327 McAdam, D. 168 McAleavey, P. 240 McAteer, M. 240 McGowan, F. 102 McGowan, L. 341 McKeown, T. 60 McMenamin, I. 111 McMormick, J. 227 McNamara, K. 108 Mach, A. 12, 267, 276, 337, 345 Maher, I. 285 Mahoney, J. 60, 62, 65 Mair, P. 5, 9, 11, 16, 35, 155, 156, 159, 163, 164, 338, 348, 350

Majone, G. 35, 36, 37, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112 Major, C. 325, 326, 330, 331, 332 Malova, D. 78 Maniokas, K. 96 Manners, I. 315, 322 Manuel, P.C. 7, 81 Maor, M. 66 March, J.G. 13, 150, 205, 207, 208, 210 Marcussen, M. 327 Marino, M.S. 277 Marks, G. 3, 26, 49, 120, 154, 157, 158, 167, 168, 169, 178, 240, 241, 242, 252 Marsh, M. 159 Marshall, A. 3, 240, 251 Martin, A. 281, 283, 287 Martin, L. 146, 328 Mastenbroek, E. 4, 65, 201 Matland, R.E. 208 Mattli, W. 185 Maurer, A. 53, 142, 147, 190, 260 Mazey, S. 30, 150, 260 Mazmanian, D. 198 Mbaye, H.A.D. 65, 199, 207 Megie, A. 38 Meijerink, F. 318 Mendrinou, M. 204 Meny, Y. 4 Metcalfe, L. 117, 129, 130 Michalis, M. 108, 270, 274 Miles, L. 77, 325 Milner, H.V. 351 Milward, A. 11, 15, 213, 214, 215 Mina, A. 270 Miskimmon, A. 322 Mitchell, J. 240 Monnet, J. 14 Monti, M. 289 Montpetit, E. 218, 221 Moran, M. 104, 110 Moravscik, A. 169, 304 Morlino, L. 233 Mörth, U. 130 Moyer, W. 217 Muegge, D. 109 Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. 321 Mueller, W.C. 145 Muller, P. 37, 44, 213 Murrah, L. 192, 193

408

Name Index

Nascimbene, B. 314 Natalicchi, G. 270, 272 Ned Lebow, R. 63 Nelsen, B. 158 Neuhold, C. 148 Niebel, M. 270 Nijzink, L. 155 Noll, G. 312, 315 Noppe, R. 272 Norton, P. 146 Nuttall, S. 324 Nye, J.S. 25 Nyikos, A. 5, 13, 188, 189, 191, 192, 341 Ohrgaard, J.O. 323, 328, 329, 332 Oliver, M. 150 Olsen, J.P. 5, 6, 7, 13, 24, 35, 42, 47, 54, 103, 115, 124, 126, 128, 137, 205, 210, 257, 318, 330 Olsson, J. 252 Ostner, I. 298 O’Toole, L.J. 198 Padgett, S. 55, 283, 284, 289, 290, 293 Page, E. 39, 136 Pahre, R. 180 Palier, B. 371 Palumbo, D. 198 Pappas, S.A. 117, 147 Parker, C. 103 Pasquier, R. 6, 38, 42, 43, 340, 347 Paterson, E. 322 Pauly, L.W. 161 Pedersen, V. 155, 164 Pennings, P. 69 Pérez-Solorzano-Borragan, N. 177 Perraud, D. 216, 217, 220, 221 Pestoff, V. 177 Peters, B.G. 50, 54, 130, 198, 250, 331, 332 Peterson, J. 237, 240, 329 Petiteville, F. 117 Phinnemore, D. 325 Pierre, J. 130, 250 Pierson, P. 13, 14, 30, 37, 56, 60, 65, 132, 256, 257 Pinto, A. 76 Pirro, E.B. 118, 237 Platzer, H.-W. 167, 177, 257 Plötner, J. 185, 191

Pochet, P. 260 Pollack, M. 28, 169, 173, 240 Polsby, N. 145 Pomorska, K. 325, 326, 331 Pressman, J. 198 Pridham, P. 89 Przeworski, A. 345 Puchala, D.J. 25 Putnam, R.D. 15, 237 Radaelli, C. 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 24, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 47, 52, 53, 55, 57, 68, 78, 85, 103, 111, 125, 128, 130, 167, 267, 296, 319, 320, 330, 340, 341, 347 Ragin, C. 60, 69, 126 Ramos, F. 186 Raunio, T. 147, 148, 149, 150, 162 Ravinet, P. 38 Ray, L. 162 Regelsberger, E. 328 Rehbinder, E. 231 Reid, A. 177 Reif, K. 159 Rhodes, C. 14, 112, 255, 257, 283, 288 Richards, J. 278 Risse, T. 6, 11, 13, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 36, 39, 41, 42, 51, 52, 55, 68, 97, 137, 164, 227, 231, 238, 267, 273 Roederer-Rynning, C. 215, 220, 222, 343, 348 Roemmele, A. 149 Rokkan, S. 80, 81, 82, 83, 351 Rollo, J. 288 Rometsch, D. 4, 53, 118, 130, 131, 146 Rosamond, B. 38, 46, 48 Rosenau, J.N. 112 Ross, G. 262, 281, 283, 287 Royo, S. 7, 81 Rucht, D. 172 Rueschemeyer, D. 60, 65, 68 Rummel, R. 327 Saalfeld, T. 65, 145 Sabatier, P. 198 Sacchi, S. 260 Salgado Sanchez, R. 37 Sandholtz, W. 3, 14, 49, 179, 267, 270, 271 Santiso, J. 62, 63

Name Index 409

Sartori, G. 35, 39, 61, 340 Sasse, G. 304 Saurugger, S. 214, 220, 222 Savage, J. 294 Sbragia, A. 10, 32, 33, 42 Scharpf, F.W. 17, 103, 215, 255, 256, 261, 262, 268 Scheingold, A. 26 Schmidt, D. 12 Schmidt, S.K. 269, 272 Schmidt, V.A. 38, 53, 123, 124, 125, 127, 168, 175, 177, 178, 179, 258, 261, 291 Schmitter, P.C. 25, 62, 63, 127, 257, 277 Schmitt, H. 159 Schneider, G. 50, 60 Schneider, V. 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 277, 279, 348 Schnell, R. 60 Schout, A. 130, 132 Schreuers, M. 235, 236 Schuster, L. 314 Schwarze, J. 188, 189, 192 Schwellnus, G. 296 Sciarini, P. 67, 69, 246, 267, 276, 337 Sciortino, G. 229 Scott, C. 102, 111 Self, P. 213 Shaw, J. 255, 256 Sheingate, A.D. 215 Shonfield, A. 281 Siaroff, A. 175 Sidenius, N.C. 177 Siedentopf, H. 64, 117, 198, 237, 259 Sikkink, K. 298 Simmons, A. 267 Simpson, S. 270 Sissenich, B. 96 Sitter, N. 77 Skjaerseth, J.B. 235 Skocpol, T. 132 Slaughter, A.-M. 112, 185 Smith, A. 240 Smith, H. 322, 324 Smith, K. 78, 324, 328 Smith, M. 327, 332 Smith, M.E. 43, 323, 324, 328, 329, 333 Smith, M.J. 132, 163, 213 Smyrl, M. 240, 243 Smyth, A. 183 Snow, A. 69

Snyder, F.G. 223, 224 Soetendorp, B. 4, 53, 83, 118, 130, 198 Soskice, D. 291, 293 Soysal, Y. 299 Spence, D. 324 Spittle, S. 270 Statham, P. 299 Stavridis, S. 225, 324, 325, 326, 331, 332 Stawarska, R. 278 Steenbergen, R. 154, 178 Steffani, W. 145 Stein, E. 193 Stephens, J.D. 68 Steunenberg, B. 198, 209, 211 Stevens, H. 66 Stewart, R. 231 Stoker, G. 46 Stola, D. 315 Stone Sweet, A. 3, 5, 14, 37, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 192, 193 Storing, H. 213 Streeck, W. 257 Sunstein, C. 113 Surel, Y. 41 Sverdrup, U. 4, 9, 69, 77, 86, 130, 199, 204, 345, 348, 352 Swinbank, A. 219 Szapiro, M. 107 Szczerbiak, A. 77, 162 Szukala, A. 185 Taggart, P. 77, 162 Tallberg, J. 65, 96, 198, 203, 204 Tannam, E. 329 Tarrow, S. 65, 168, 170, 177 Taylor, P.J. 85 Taylor, R. 13, 50, 298 Teixeira, N.S. 76 Tenbücken, M. 277 Terzi, O. 322, 332 Tesoka, S. 297 Tetlock, P.E. 63 Thatcher, M. 38, 52, 106, 107, 111, 270, 271, 272, 274, 277 Therborn, G. 81, 83 Thielemann, E. 240, 243 Thomassen, J. 159 Tofarides, M. 249 Tomlinson, E. 185 Tommel, I. 240

410

Name Index

Tonra, B. 322, 323, 325, 329, 331, 333 Torreblanca, J. 322 Tracy, M. 218, 220, 224 Traxler, F. 257 Trondal, J. 55, 65, 130, 164 Tsardanidis, C. 324, 325, 326, 331 Tsebelis, G. 32 Uçarer, E.M. 313, 315, 318 Umbach, G. 77 Usher, J.A. 189 Vachudova, M. 76, 89, 92 Valen, H. 158 Vanberg, G. 146 Van de Klaauw, J. 315 Van der Eijk, C. 157, 159, 165 Vanhercke, B. 261 Van Horn, C.E. 205 Van Keulen, M. 238 Van Meerhaeghe, M.A. 130 Van Meter, D.S. 205 Van Selm-Thorburn, J. 312 Van Waarden, F. 176 Vaquer i Fanés, J. 322 Vargas, J. 186, 188 Veggeland, F. 55 Vehar, P. 149 Verdier, D. 67 Verdun, A. 284 Vink, M. 4, 5, 16, 124, 251, 299, 314, 318, 332, 340, 343, 349 Visser, J. 260 Vogel, D. 102 Vogel, S.K. 110, 273 Vollaard, H. 158 Voltmer, K. 65 Waesche, N.M. 270 Waever, O. 312 Wallace, C. 315 Wallace, H. 4, 12, 82, 102, 116, 117, 128, 220, 237, 344

Wallace, W. 116, 329 Ward, N. 217, 234 Warner, H. 260 Weidner, H. 237 Weiler, J.H.H. 26, 185, 188, 189, 192, 203, 208, 347 Weisbein, J. 38 Wendt, A. 60 Werle, R. 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 275, 276, 279 Wessels, W. 4, 53, 118, 130, 131, 142, 146 White, A. 322, 323, 324, 328, 329, 333 Whitehead, L. 89 Wiberg, M. 147, 148 Wiener, A. 4, 12, 48, 296 Wildavsky, A. 198 Wilkinson, A. 218 Wilks, S. 112, 281 Wilson, C.J. 157, 329 Wilson, F.L. 213 Wilson, T. 329, 330 Wilts, A. 177 Wobbe, T. 401 Wolf, D. 172 Woll, C. 37, 38, 78, 345 Wolters, M. 130 Wong, R. 322, 324, 325, 326, 331, 332, 333 Wright, V. 53, 237 Yin, R.K. 62 Young, A. 102 Zahariadis, N. 40 Zeff, E.E. 4, 118, 237 Zeitlin, J. 260 Zielonka, J. 89, 322, 324 Ziller, J. 64, 198, 259 Zolberg, A. 315 Zürn, M. 84, 85, 209, 210 Zysman, J. 270, 271

Subject Index Access to Environmental Information Directive 228, 230, 231–2, 234 acquis communautaire 89, 99, 304, 311, 314 asylum 315, 316 conditionality 91, 92, 96, 98–100, 351 enlargement 95–7 environment 227, 234, 236 acquis conditionality 91, 92, 96, 98–100, 351 actor-centered institutionalism 14, 131 additionality 129, 239 Agenda 2000 218–19, 222, 224 agriculture policy 19, 26, 57, 89, 141, 212–25, 247, 255, 343, 347, 348 see also Common Agricultural Policy Air Pollution Prevention Directive 259 Amsterdam Treaty 255, 295, 296, 298, 309 associational self-regulation 168, 175 asylum policy 7, 13, 16, 19, 309–20, 347, 348, 353 Austria 123, 176 anti-discrimination 301 de-centralism 244 economic policy 287 environmental policy 228, 233 foreign policy 322, 325, 327 parliamentary scrutiny 145, 148 Belgium 118, 122, 177, 230, 301, 306 agriculture 215, 216 federalism 16, 119, 242 foreign policy 326 state structures 118, 122 benchmarking 38, 129, 285, 305, 306 Benelux states 75 boundary managers 135, 137 boundary removal 73 bounded rationality 205 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 286 Brusselsization 321, 329, 330 Bulgaria 88 Bundesbank 29, 285

cabinet committees 134 candidate countries 12, 39, 88–101, 235, 236, 302, 304, 314, 318 Cardiff process 286 causality 34, 52, 62, 66, 316, 342–7 causal factors 68, 151, 238, 260, 263, 264, 332 causal heterogeneity 69 causal mechanisms 17, 24, 27, 41, 44, 61, 63, 67, 69, 167, 168 causal explanations 33, 46, 47, 48, 70, 80, 94, 95, 98, 104, 105, 192, 193, 206, 208, 238, 260, 263, 264, 322, 331 center–periphery relations 42, 74, 75, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 116, 119, 122, 124, 126, 127, 157, 158 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 76, 77, 78, 82, 84, 88–101 anti-discrimination policy 296, 304 asylum policy 314 cohesion 242–51 see also individual countries centralization 77, 95, 117, 135, 226, 227, 228, 232, 277, 344 Charter of Fundamental Rights 309, 313, 318, 320 citizenship 4, 29, 30, 52, 66, 112, 299, 300 civil servants 43, 55, 65, 134, 136, 144, 164, 214 cohesion policy 4, 19, 84, 120, 142, 239–52, 347 Cold War 89, 324 Commission of Communication 276 Commission of the European Communities 84, 200, 203, 206, 304 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 94, 212, 214–19, 222–5 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 38, 151, 321–34 Communidades Autonomas 123 Communism 78, 79, 88, 98, 247, 292 Communitarization 313, 316, 318, 330 411

412

Subject Index

Community Economic Development (CED) 246 Community method 37–8, 331 comparative design 64, 100, 346 comparative politics 3, 5–7, 25–7, 42, 44, 57, 59, 69, 73, 89, 118, 131, 132, 165, 181, 215, 333, 338, 351 comprehensive centralizers 118, 135 comprehensive de-centralizers 135 conceptual issues 6–12, 26, 27, 30, 35–45, 55–7, 67, 174, 178, 180, 220, 248, 257, 277, 311, 317, 323, 328, 330, 338–42, 349, 350 conditionality 88–101, 204, 208, 248, 288, 293, 296, 304, 306, 314, 315, 318, 351 Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 36 Conseil d’Etat 185, 191 constitutional regions 119, 124 Constitutional Treaty 152, 309, 313, 318 convergence 6, 8, 10, 31, 39, 53, 55, 76, 117, 126, 159, 223, 229, 344, 347, 348, 353 anti-discrimination policy 302 asylum policy 318 clustered 348 economic 327 environmental policy 226–30 executive coordination 118, 119, 121, 124, 136, 137 foreign policy 322–40 ideational 38 regional policy 242, 247–50 telecommunications policy 267, 268, 274, 278, 279 Convergence Criteria 282, 288–91 Copenhagen European Council 89 core executives 95, 128–40 see governments co-regulation 176 corporatism 104, 123, 168, 174, 178, 214, 215, 220, 221, 223, 224, 257, 258, 288, 346 COSAC 148, 150, 152 Costa vs ENEL 184 Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) 284 Council of Europe (COE) 12, 36, 98, 99, 296, 299, 306, 315, 328, 343

Council of Ministers 28, 30, 121, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 216, 254, 259, 272, 275 Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) 284 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) 327 Social Affairs Council 301 counterfactual reasoning 7, 15, 16, 63, 66, 69, 264, 306, 307, 316, 332, 343 courts 5, 8, 65, 123, 177, 182–94, 302 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 182, 183, 299 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 8, 25, 28, 30, 31, 39, 143, 169, 174, 176, 182–93, 201, 268, 271, 295, 298, 313, 318, 341 credibility 92–3, 98, 100, 106, 107, 285, 287, 351 credible commitment 106, 110, 112 Croatia 92 crossloading 325, 326 cross-regional differentiation 74, 79, 80, 81, 86 Cyprus 75, 88 Czech Republic 91, 93, 149 asylum policy 314 decision-making 15, 26, 82, 107, 122, 129, 141, 142–6, 149, 157, 161, 164, 167, 173, 174, 182, 204, 216, 237, 249, 259, 276, 279, 320, 322, 323, 329, 330 de-federalization 215, 216 Defrenne vs Sabena 30 degree of fit 29, 175, 178, 179 demandeurs 79 democracy 89, 127, 144, 145, 148, 149, 152, 177, 181, 197, 199, 234, 252, 324, 350 democratic conditionality 91–100 democratic deficit 106, 144, 148, 161 Denmark 147–8, 150, 176, 177, 214 environmental policy 233 foreign policy 325 transposition deficit 200 depoliticization 111, 112, 160, 163 deregulation 19, 32, 102, 105, 109, 275 desistment 188, 189 differential empirical objects 179

Subject Index

Directives Access to Environmental Information 228, 230, 231–2, 234 Air Pollution Prevention 259 Anti-discrimination 295 Environmental Impact Assessment 228, 230, 231, 232, 234 Equal Pay 259 Equal Pay and Equal Treatment 31, 297 Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 232 Nitrate 218 Packaging Waste 230 Race 295, 301, 303 Television without Frontiers 274 discourse 8, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 44, 50, 53, 59, 61, 78, 97, 103, 157, 162, 175, 303, 312, 316, 317 disengagement 160, 303 divergence 39, 48, 55, 107, 117, 121, 124, 136, 137, 186, 220, 269, 271, 291, 293, 302, 318, 327, 347 domestic politics 5, 12, 15–17, 27, 28, 35–7, 40–4, 48, 50, 64, 67, 75, 91, 100, 104, 136, 138, 139, 149, 180, 223, 261, 287, 288, 290, 331, 337, 341, 342, 345, 350, 351 domestic agenda 173 domestic costs 91 domestic interests 15, 97, 167, 169, 170, 177, 180, 298, 317, 353 (see also interest groups) domestic reform 92, 215, 216, 221, 260, 283, 286, 289, 292 double standards 97, 304 downloading 16, 29, 48, 51, 80, 115, 126, 226, 235, 237, 240, 259, 264, 267, 284, 286, 289, 292, 325, 326, 341 Dublin Convention 309, 314, 317, 319 East Central Europe 149 Eco-Auditing Regulation 234 Economic and Financial Committee 284 economic inequality 82 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 10, 32, 41, 43, 46, 67, 77, 204, 261, 264, 281–5, 287–8, 291, 293, 294 economic policy 44, 53, 85, 141, 175, 179, 257, 281–94, 341

413

ECOTEC 246, 251 elite pluralism 175, 178 elite socialization 328–9 employment policy 47, 52, 246, 255, 260, 262, 282, 283, 285, 286, 289, 291, 295, 298, 303, 305, 306, 341 Employment and Social Affairs 300, 301 enforcement 97, 176, 199, 203–5, 235, 260, 267, 273 enlargement acquis 95–7 environment acquis 227, 234, 236 Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 228, 230, 231, 232, 234 environmental policy 4, 17, 53, 54, 57, 66, 89, 93, 102, 109, 132, 133, 141, 204, 217–18, 221, 226–38, 347, 352 Equal Opportunity Commission 31 Equal Pay Directive 259 Equal Pay and Equal Treatment Directive 31, 297 Equal Treatment Commission 303 ESPRIT 179, 271, 272 Estonia 91 EU see European Union Euro Area 282, 283, 286, 291 Euro-corporatism 257, 258 Euro Group 284, 290 European agencies 107, 111 European Central Bank (ECB) 29, 107, 108, 143, 159, 282, 285, 286 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 14, 269 European Commission 11, 43, 108, 143, 169, 201, 224, 239, 270, 284, 290, 296, 315, 328 European Community Treaty (EC Treaty) 151 Preamble 14 Article 7 108 Article 13 295 Article 100 254 Article 119 297 Article 235 184, 185, 254 European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations 268, 269 European Convention of Human Rights 296

414

Subject Index

European Council 128, 142, 143, 148, 156, 169 see Copenhagen European Council, Madrid European Council European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 182, 183, 299 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 8, 25, 28, 30, 31, 39, 143, 169, 174, 176, 182–93, 201, 268, 271, 295, 298, 313, 318, 341 European Economic Area (EEA) 12, 46, 69, 128 European Employment Strategy 16, 298 European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 12, 98 European integration 28, 49, 267 market 239, 254, 300, 313 negative 52–6, 160, 305, 310, 311, 318, 319 positive 54, 305, 309, 310 theories 3, 4, 13, 24, 26, 33, 41, 57, 131, 251, 271, 323, 330–3, 352 European Integration online Papers 6 Europeanization 3–7 “attention-directing device” 5 bottom-up approach 24, 27, 40, 41, 44, 48, 126, 258, 290 bottom-up vs top-down debate 6, 236, 237, 267, 284, 286, 289, 318–25, 330–3, 340, 341 bottom-up-down approach 10, 343 conceptualizing 7–12, 23–4, 36, 219–20 measurement of 15–17 studies of 120, 121 theory of 12–15 three-step model 27–33 top-down approach and EU-centrism 11–12, 348–9 European Monetary System (EMS) 282 European Parliament (EP) 11, 16, 28, 142, 144, 154–62, 169, 172, 254, 268, 272, 301, 313, 322, 327 European Social Fund (ESF) 254 European System of Central Banks 290 European Telecommunications Standards Institute 268, 275 European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 254 European Union (EU) 4, 9, 11–12, 13, 15, 25, 26, 86, 102, 106, 108, 112, 113, 123, 163, 169, 191, 348–9

Europe of the Regions 16, 216, 232, 240 Europol 159 Euroscepticism 77, 155 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 282, 283, 287, 292, 293 executive adaptation 130–2, 136, 137, 138, 348 executive–legislative relations 141, 145, 151 external differentiation 339, 340–1, 349 external relations 322 families of nations 74, 75, 80, 81, 83 federalism 16, 30–2, 112, 117–27, 215, 216, 232, 241–3, 255, 290, 339, 346 Federation of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) 108–9 field utility 347–50 Finland 133, 148 environmental policy 228, 233 foreign policy 325 fit–misfit model 6, 28–30, 52, 53, 292 floating coalition mode 146 Florence Forum 108 foreign policy 19, 47, 88, 121, 321–34, 349 fortress Europe 16 Fouchet Plan 329 France 5, 75, 118, 119, 135, 136 agricultural policy 213–19 anti-discrimination 297, 299, 301, 302, 305 asylum policy 314, 317, 319 cohesion policy 243–4 Conseil d’Etat 185, 191 coordination mechanisms 118, 133, 135, 136 courts 185 economic policy 283, 285, 287, 291 environment policy 228–30, 233 foreign policy 323, 324, 326, 327 gender equality 31, 259 interest intermediation 170, 175, 177 telecommunications policy 273, 274 transposition deficit 200 Franco-German partnership 83 functional differentiation 106, 129 fusion approach 118 fuzzy set analysis 69

Subject Index

gender equality 11, 28, 30, 31, 150, 191, 259, 260, 295, 297–9, 301 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) 327 Germany 30, 66, 75, 118, 122–3, 135, 176, 242 anti-discrimination policy 297, 298, 301 asylum policy 314, 317, 319 Bundesbank 29, 285 cohesion policy 243, 244 coordination mechanisms 118, 119, 135 courts 185, 187–9, 192, 314 decentralization 243, 123, 145, 242, 255 economic policy 282–91 environmental policy 54, 66, 228, 233, 237 foreign policy 326, 327 interest intermediation 170, 175, 176, 178, 179 Länder 119, 123, 145, 242, 290 telecommunication policy 274 globalization 66, 67, 69, 99, 107, 219, 224, 232, 249, 262, 268, 274, 276, 278, 283, 288, 336, 342, 343 goodness of fit 27, 28, 33, 40, 41, 52, 53, 62, 64, 124, 230, 231, 233, 236, 297, 303, 317 governance change 240, 242, 249, 250 UK 245–6 governments local 5, 43, 239–49 national 4, 10, 15, 31, 37, 49, 50, 73, 91–3, 100, 110, 117–20, 128–40, 143, 150, 159, 160, 169, 174, 219, 233, 240, 242, 248, 257, 270, 272, 285, 304, 315, 330 regional 43, 228, 242, 246, 248, 250 subnational 53, 233, 239, 245, 290 grace periods 206 Greece asylum policy 314 cohesion policy 242 economic policy 287, 291 environmental policy 230, 232, 233 foreign policy 322, 324, 332 Grogan (The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. Stephan Grogan and Others) 182

415

harmonization 8, 10, 95, 159, 254, 256, 270, 281, 289, 313, 318, 323, 326, 340, 347 Helios II 300 historical institutionalism 14, 17, 50, 51, 54, 56, 65, 96, 97, 131, 132, 139, 298, 351 horizontal effects 8, 10, 16, 241, 269 Hungary 91, 93, 149 asylum policy 314 hybrid capitalism 283, 284, 293 identity reconstruction 325, 326 immigration 5, 16, 66, 299, 312–13, 315, 316, 319, 328 implementation 197–211 anti-discrimination policy 299, 301, 302, 310, 311 asylum policy 319 cohesion policy 245, 247, 248 dynamics of 178, 179, 203–5 ECJ 28, 30, 31, 189 environmental policy 226–38 key variables 100, 198 research design 208–9 social policy 258–77 studies 4, 64, 65, 117, 139, 199 transposition deficit 77, 200, 351 inertia 40, 48, 55, 97, 98, 122, 171, 274 informal processes 137, 143 infringement procedure 65, 96, 201–3, 209, 261 institutional misfit 121, 231, 340 institutional racism 303 institutional theory, see institutionalism institutionalism 13, 14, 39, 50, 51, 65, 90, 126, 139, 204–5 actor-centered 14, 131 historical 14, 17, 50, 51, 54, 56, 65, 96, 97, 131, 132, 139, 298, 351 new 8, 13, 15, 48–51, 123, 124, 143, 144, 345, 351 rational choice 41, 50, 100, 121, 126, 131, 328 sociological 13, 39, 50, 52, 90, 100, 121, 126, 351 institutionalization 128, 137, 157, 158, 162 Instrument for Structural Policies Pre-Accession 235, 247

416

Subject Index

Integrated Mediterranean Programme 244 Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive 232 integration theory 24, 26, 33 intergovernmentalism 3, 5, 6, 12, 13, 15, 24–5, 49, 59, 60, 73, 165, 317, 321, 323, 330, 331, 332, 341, 351, 352 multi-level governance (MLG) neo-functionalism 3, 14, 56, 171, 313, 323, 330, 333 supranationalism 3, 9, 11, 14, 24, 148, 212, 220, 255, 268, 270, 271 interest groups 8, 11, 15, 32, 56, 63, 142, 144, 167–81, 214, 217, 257, 297, 298 interest intermediation 7, 10, 16, 67, 157, 167–81, 204, 346 intergovernmentalism 3, 5, 6, 12, 13, 15, 24–5, 49, 59, 60, 73, 165, 317, 321, 323, 330, 331, 332, 341, 351, 352 internal validity 61, 62 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 99, 277, 288, 349 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 315 international relations 3, 5, 6, 12, 13, 24, 25, 59, 60, 73, 89, 90, 165, 321, 332, 341, 351, 352 international trade negotiations 217 Internet 266, 274 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 275 inter-party mode 145, 146 intra-coalition model 146 Ireland 118, 135, 242 environmental policy 233 Italy 116, 177, 273 agricultural policy 216 asylum policy 314 cohesion policy 243–5 courts 185, 202 economic policy 32, 41, 284, 285, 287, 290 environmental policy 230, 233 interest intermediation 175, 177 telecommunications policy 30 transport policy 32 joint-decision trap 255, 263 judicial empowerment 185, 188, 193

judicial procedures see courts; European Court of Justice Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 151, 314 Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen

298

Länder 119, 123, 145, 242, 290 Latvia 91 legislation 30–1, 95, 96, 150, 151, 183–90, 186, 187, 188, 200–1, 218, 221, 223–4, 297, 301–2, 307, 314–16 letter of formal notice 201 see infringement procedure liberal intergovernmentalism, see intergovernmentalism Lithuania 200 litigation 184–93, 297, 298, 341 Lomé/Cotonou Conventions 47 Luxembourg process 286 Maastricht Treaty 64, 142, 146, 183, 201, 216, 255, 258, 282, 286, 288, 289, 327 see also Treaty on European Union Madrid European Council 129 Malta 75, 88, 200 market integration 239, 254, 300, 313 Marshall Aid 133 McSharry reforms 215 mediating factors 28–34, 53, 97, 98, 125, 133, 175, 230, 231, 242, 248, 297, 344 Mediterranean syndrome 229 methodology 33, 47, 56, 59–70, 100, 116, 120, 131, 230, 253, 263, 277, 278, 296, 305, 307, 316, 317, 331, 342–9 Migration Policy Group 300, 305 Minitel 269 misfit 29, 30, 51–4, 121, 122, 136–8, 205, 230–4, 242, 245, 260, 264, 284, 297, 289, 292, 317, 340 see fit–misfit model mismatch see misfit mobile telephony 266 monism 145, 193 monitoring 103, 142, 151, 176, 177, 179, 204, 228, 295, 303–5 multi-level governance 3, 11, 26, 44, 47, 74, 104, 113, 120, 142–4, 167–73, 177, 198, 222, 240–52, 270, 341 mutual structuration 252

Subject Index

national legislation 13, 16, 95, 176, 188, 200 national parliaments 5, 38, 134, 136, 138, 141, 142, 142–3, 146, 147, 148–52, 159, 160, 183, 233, 350 National Regulatory Authorities 268 negative integration 53, 160, 310, 319 neo-functionalism 3, 14, 56, 171, 313, 323, 330, 333 neoliberalism 43, 66, 90, 109, 110, 113, 264, 283 Netherlands 119, 135, 137, 176, 177 anti-discrimination policy 301, 303, 306 asylum policy 314 courts 189 Economic Affairs Ministry 132 economic policy 66, 287 environmental policy 233 telecommunications policy 273 transport policy 346 New Deal for Communities 246 new institutionalism 8, 13, 15, 48–51, 123, 124, 143, 144, 345, 351 see institutionalism New Public Management 57, 66, 69, 105, 230 new regionalism 73, 84, 85 Nice Treaty 255 nitrate directive 218 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 134, 240, 243, 267, 280, 299, 301, 302, 303, 311, 348 non-majoritarian institutions 106, 159, 160 Nordic states 75, 77, 84, 148 see also individual countries North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 91, 98, 99, 277, 324, 343, 349 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland 182 Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 10, 16, 38, 47, 52, 56, 149, 260, 262, 285, 298 opposition parties 144–6 organizational theory 122, 131 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 288 Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) 12, 98, 306

417

package meetings 203 Packaging Waste Directive 230 pacta sunt servanda 205 padroncini 32 paradox of weakness 173, 178, 179 parliament–government relations 141, 145, 147, 151, parliamentary scrutiny 5, 141–53 party systems 154–66, 346, 348, 350 Poland 82, 91, 93, 149, 247, 292 asylum policy 314 democratic consolidation 91 energy policy 93, 288 Euroskepticism 77 foreign policy 322 parliament 149 transposition deficit 200 Poland and Hungary: Aid for Economic Restructuring (PHARE) 235, 247 policy 227 analysis 26, 38, 44, 130, 293 instruments 10, 102, 159, 227, 231, 233, 283, 288, 318 misfit 231, 233, 234 repertoire 160 space 85, 159 political parties 5, 9, 10, 16, 32, 55, 56, 91, 141, 145, 147, 149, 154–66 political protests 65, 168, 170, 172, 173, 188, 212, 215 politicization 42–4, 60, 165, 309, 345, 346, 348 pollution control 228 Portugal 135 asylum policy 314 economic policy 287 environmental policy 233 foreign policy 325 positive action 295, 298, 303, 306 positive integration 54, 305, 309, 310 postnational norms 299 Potemkin harmonization 95 preliminary reference 184, 185 Primus Inter Pares 192 private sector 174, 245 process tracing 15, 17, 41, 62, 66, 69, 99, 179, 288, 343 public administration 59, 65, 77, 338 public–private interaction 258, 259 public sector 174

418

Subject Index

qualitative comparative analysis 68–9 quantitative studies 65, 68 RACE 271 race directive 295, 301, 303 ‘race to the bottom’ 262, 281 rational choice institutionalism 41, 50, 100, 121, 126, 131, 328 reasoned opinion 201, 202 see also infringement procedure refer to court 201 see also infringement procedure référentiel 37, 44 reflexe communautaire 323, 328 refugees 309–20 regional clustering 77, 80 regional governments 43, 228, 242, 246, 248, 250 regional integration 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 199, 305, 330, 342, 349, 351 theory 7–8, 23–34 regionalism 73, 84, 85, 120, 122, 216 regulatory agencies 107–8, 110, 159, 271, 273, 276 regulatory capitalism 113 regulatory governance 102–14 regulatory networks 203 regulatory states 112, 113 regulocrats 111 renationalization 219, 220 representative democracy 145 re-regulation 104, 109, 262 Réseaux IP Européens 275 retrenchment 40, 55, 105, 122 riskless society 103 Romania 88, 92 Round Table of Industrialists 272 SAMEN wet (Act for Stimulation of Labor Market Participation) 303 sample size 62 sanctions 96, 199, 201, 203, 204, 278, 285, 286, 328 Schengen Convention 314, 317 area 94 rules 93 “second image reversed” 3, 56, 351 sectoralization 73 selective centralizers 135 selective de-centralizers 118, 135

self-binding 173 self-regulation 175–6, 279 Serbia 91 single currency 282, 283, 289 Single European Act (SEA) 64, 141, 255, 256, 282 Single European Market 282 Single Regeneration Budget 246 Slovakia 92 Slovenia 91 social action programs 255 Social Affairs Council 301 Social Dialogue 174 social dumping 258, 262 social learning 52, 55, 90, 94–6, 101, 302 social market economy 43 social movements 4, 167–81 social policy 4, 19, 30, 89, 93, 94, 174, 176, 253–65, 281, 352 socialization 43, 44, 51, 52, 65, 68, 69, 79, 90, 100, 118, 139, 167, 205, 321, 323–5 sociological institutionalism 13, 39, 50, 52, 90, 100, 121, 126, 351 soft coordination 10, 92, 203, 258, 285, 289, 292, 298, 205, 341 SOLVIT 203 Southern Europe 75–85, 125, 226–36, 292, 317 see also individual countries sovereignty 11, 15, 84, 149, 199, 256, 285, 299, 316, 329, 333, 352 Spain 76, 118, 122, 244 asylum policy 314 Communidades Autonomas 123 environmental policy 233 Special Accession Programme for Agricultural and Rural Development (SAPARD) 247 Stability and Growth Pact 29, 282, 284, 285, 289, 290, 292 Starting Line Group 300, 302 state-centricism 49, 240, 299, 300, 323–4 state–farmer relations 213 state structure 115–27, 215 statism 175 statistical generalization 62 subsidiarity 142, 148, 152, 175, 216, 223, 285, 298 subsidiary competence provisions 254

Subject Index

supranationalism 3, 9, 11, 14, 24, 148, 212, 220, 255, 268, 270, 271 supremacy 184, 186, 190, 191, 347, 353 Sweden 148, 150, 176, 177 environmental policy 228, 233 foreign policy 325 Swisscom 276 Switzerland 69, 177, 267, 276, 332, 348 tax courts 187, 191 taxation 37, 102–4, 109, 261, 281, 289, 292 technocratization 111 telecommunications policy 30, 266–80 “Television without Frontiers” directive 274 territorial change 242, 245–6 territory 73–87, 315, 347, 351, 352 third-country nationals 309, 312 trade agreements 88, 219, 224, 315, 327–8 trade policy 141, 175, 178, 179, 322, 352 trade unions 42, 240, 254, 280 Transatlantic Business Dialogue 175 transit procession centers 315 transnational trade 98, 186, 192 transport policy 4, 32, 53, 201, 346 transposition deficit 200 Treaty on European Union (TEU) 29, 64, 96, 142, 216 see also Maastricht Treaty Treaty of Rome 142, 222, 295, 298, see also EC Treaty two-level games 3, 15, 138, 218, 319 UNICE 254 United Kingdom (UK) 75, 118, 135 agricultural policy 213, 219 anti-discrimination policy 31, 297, 298, 305 cohesion policy 239, 240, 245–6, 249, 251

419

courts 184, 187, 192 devolution 245 environmental policy 53, 233–4 Environmental Protection Act 1990 234 Europeanization of environmental policy 53 EU Secretariat 133 foreign policy 326, 33 interest intermediation 170, 175, 177, 178 social policy 260 telecommunications policy 273, 275 territorial and governance change 245–6 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 315 unit variation 14 uploading 41, 48, 79, 80, 126, 233, 235, 237, 240, 267, 284, 286, 289, 309, 317, 325, 326, 341, 343 validity 59, 107, 180 external 61, 62 internal 61, 62 value-blindness 317, 353 Van Gend en Loos (NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming) v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie 184 vertical venue-shopping 313 veto players 31–2, 95, 97–8, 230 Videotex 269 Visegrad Group 83 welfare state 16, 65, 68, 69, 254, 262, 283, 292 World Bank 99, 349 ‘worlds of Europeanization’ 79 World Trade Organization (WTO) 209, 278, 288, 327