European Union Peacebuilding and Policing: Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy

European Union Peacebuilding and Policing

This new book provides an in-depth analysis of the projects of improvement carried out by the civilian peacebuilding missions in Bosnia and Macedonia. This is the first book-length examination of the role and governance of international policing in the EU in relation to the European Security and Defence Policy. The authors explore the double-sided nature of peacebuilding missions, on the one hand, as a way to pacify, democratize, humanize and improve life in societies emerging from crisis or violence and, on the other hand, as a kind of political pastorate that limits the range of acceptable heterogeneity by refashioning, repositioning and reorganizing subjects in line with transcendentalized notions of good governance. The authors develop a limited reform agenda for how EU police missions can fold an agonistic generosity more deeply into their civilizing ethos in order to ensure they have a light expatriate footprint in their host countries. The prescriptive part of the book also discusses generic problems in the implementation of EU police reforms and suggests ways to overcome these challenges. This innovative book combines a detailed empirical investigation of EU police missions in the Western Balkans with Foucauldian themes of power and domination. It will be of great interest to students and researchers of European Union Politics, Governance and Peace Studies. Michael Merlingen is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Central European University, Hungary. Rasa Ostrauskait˙e is a member of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, at the Council of the European Union, Brussels. From 2004 to 2006, she was seconded to the Office of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Routledge advances in European politics 1 Russian Messianism Third Rome, revolution, communism and after Peter J.S. Duncan 2 European Integration and the Postmodern Condition Governance, democracy, identity Peter van Ham 3 Nationalism in Italian Politics The stories of the Northern League, 1980–2000 Damian Tambini 4 International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995 Edited by Peter Siani-Davies 5 Widening the European Union The politics of institutional change and reform Edited by Bernard Steunenberg 6 Institutional Challenges in the European Union Edited by Madeleine Hosli, Adrian van Deemen and Mika Widgrén 7 Europe Unbound Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union Edited by Jan Zielonka 8 Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans Nationalism and the destruction of tradition Cathie Carmichael 9 Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe The democratisation of the general public in fifteen Central and Eastern European countries, 1991–1998 Christian W. Haerpfer 10 Private Sector Involvement in the Euro The power of ideas Stefan Collignon and Daniela Schwarzer 11 Europe A Nietzschean perspective Stefan Elbe 12 European Union and E-Voting Addressing the European Parliament’s internet voting challenge Edited by Alexander H. Trechsel and Fernando Mendez 13 European Union Council Presidencies A comparative perspective Edited by Ole Elgström 14 European Governance and Supranational Institutions Making states comply Jonas Tallberg 15 European Union, NATO and Russia Martin Smith and Graham Timmins 16 Business, the State and Economic Policy The case of Italy G. Grant Amyot 17 Europeanization and Transnational States Comparing Nordic Central Governments Bengt Jacobsson, Per Lægreid and Ove K. Pedersen 18 European Union Enlargement A comparative history Edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert 19 Gibraltar British or Spanish? Peter Gold

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European Union Peacebuilding and Policing Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy Michael Merlingen with Rasa Ostrauskaite˙

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group an Informa Business © 2006 Michael Merlingen with Rasa Ostrauskait˙e This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Merlingen, Michael, 1964European Union peacebuilding and policing / Michael Merlingen with Rasa Ostrauskait˙e. p. cm.--(Routledge advances in European politics ; 40) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-415-39790-1 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Peacekeeping forces--Europe. 2. European Union countries--Foreign relations--Decision making. 3. Europe--Politics and government--1989- I. Ostrauskait˙e, Rasa, 1974II. Title. III. Series. JZ6374.M47 2006 341.5´84--dc22 2006003443 ISBN10: 0–415–39790–1 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–96974–X (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–39790–2 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–96974–8 (ebk)

To our parents

Contents

Preface List of abbreviations

viii ix

1

Introduction

2

Power and governmentality

10

3

The EU’s peace support agenda: The development of ESDP policy machinery, capabilities and styles of thought

33

4

The EUPM in Bosnia

52

5

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia

79

6

Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid

103

7

Towards peacebuilding lite: A limited reform agenda for ESDP police missions

123

Conclusion

142

Notes Bibliography Index

146 160 177

8

1

Preface

We wish to extend our thanks to our interviewees who generously gave their time, shared their insights and guided us during our research. Rasa Ostrauskait˙e has co-authored Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Rasa also read and provided comments on the entire manuscript. The views expressed in this book are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina or of the European Union.

Abbreviations

BiH CARDS Civcom CFSP CONOPS CSCE DPA DUI EAR EC ECAP ECJHAT ECMM EFP EP EPC ESDI ESDP EU EUMC EUMM EUMS EUPAT EUPM EUPOL Proxima EUSR FS IC ICITAP IFOR IPTF

Bosnia and Herzegovina Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management Common Foreign and Security Policy Concept of Operations Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe Dayton Peace Agreement Democratic Union for Integration European Agency for Reconstruction European Community European Capability Action Plan European Commission Justice and Home Affairs Team European Community Monitoring Mission European foreign policy European Parliament European Political Co-operation European Security and Defence Identity European Security and Defence Policy European Union European Union Military Committee European Union Monitoring Mission European Union Military Staff EU Police Advisory Team in Macedonia European Union Police Mission in Bosnia European Union Police Mission in Macedonia European Union Special Representative Feasibility Study International Community International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme Implementation Force International Police Task Force

x Abbreviations IPU ISS KLA MOC MSU NATO NLA OECD OHR OPLAN OSCE PIC PIP PRC PSB PSC SAA SAp SBS SFOR SIPA UBK UN UNHCR UNMIBH USAID WEU

Integrated Police Unit Institute for Security Studies Kosovo Liberation Army Major and Organized Crime Multinational Specialized Unit North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Liberation Army Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Office of the High Representative Operations Plan Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Peace Implementation Council Programme Implementation Plan Police Restructuring Commission Police Steering Board Political and Security Committee Stabilisation and Association Agreement Stabilisation and Association process State Border Service Stabilisation Force State Investigation and Protection Agency Macedonia’s intelligence agency United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina United States Agency for International Development Western European Union

1

Introduction

European foreign policy (EFP) contributes in manifold ways to peace support operations. To begin with, member states of the European Union (EU) are active in international peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding, either as members of international organizations, as participants of coalitions of the willing or through unilateral initiatives. As to the European Commission, it has a strong external relations acquis in projecting peace abroad, notably in the form of preventive diplomacy and longer-term civilian peacebuilding. Finally, Union foreign policy, through the deployment of military and civilian operations under the new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), has become a key contributor to international peace missions. This book examines, from the perspective of critical social theory, a principal component of peacebuilding carried out under the ESDP: police missions. International assistance for police reforms in countries emerging from instability or violence directly affects both the quality of people’s lives and the contours of political and social order. As such it is central to the construction of peace (Dziedzic 2002; Eide and Holm 2000; Jackson and Lyon 2002; Neild 2001). Its particular focus notwithstanding, both the manner in which the study engages its empirical site and the features it brings into relief can be generalized beyond the policing field and the EU to international peacebuilding as such. The term ‘peacebuilding’ is often used to denote international military and/or civilian interventions in states aimed at creating the conditions for stable and lasting peace in the wake of civil strife (Paris 2004). Conversely, international efforts to strengthen and solidify peace in the context of a crisis or unstable peace are dubbed as ‘preventive diplomacy’. For the purpose of this book, we depart from this usage. By the term ‘peacebuilding’ we mean international action within states either to prevent civil war or to rebuild peace in the aftermath of violence. The advantage of our conception is that it brings into focus the discontinuity between traditional (Westphalian) preventive diplomacy and non-traditional (post-Westphalian) peacebuilding as well as the fact that both preventive and post-conflict peacebuilding interventions rely on the same toolbox. Thus, ESDP missions may be deployed

2 Introduction to countries either suffering from instability or emerging from civil war to make them safe for liberal peace. The ESDP is significantly more than a vehicle to further narrow European security interests. It is an expression of the EU’s international mission for humanity. With the ESDP, the EU endowed itself with a valueoriented international security policy that privileges peace support operations over war-fighting. It balances limited but increasingly robust military capabilities to enforce and keep the peace in conflict-prone or war-torn countries with strong civilian capabilities to assist countries in building stable peace. The ethical aspirations at the heart of the ESDP may be described in terms of its contribution to a global civilizing process, which ‘is concerned with reducing cruelty in world affairs and with widening emotional identification to include the members of other societies’ (Linklater 2005: 381). Of course, the peace operations carried out under the ESDP do not only reflect the value-driven foreign policy profile of the EU; as Richard Youngs (2004), among others, reminds us, EFP is invested with strategic calculations and sometimes the instrumental rationality underpinning this calculus weakens or even undermines the normative agenda of the ESDP. While this is an important critique, we believe the engagement with the normative impulse of the EFP in general and the ESDP in particular has to be pushed further and be more constructive. In a spirit that is not alien to Norbert Elias (1996, 2000), who pioneered the sociological analysis of modernization as a civilising process, we argue in this book that ESDP peacebuilding is inscribed in the dialectic of modernity, i.e. the dialectical relationship between the growing emancipation of individuals from violence and external compulsion and the growth of new forms of power. A clear example of the risks inscribed in international efforts to liberate people from oppression and to advance the global civilizing process is the overthrow by an international coalition of the dictatorship in Iraq in 2003 and the ensuing turmoil bedevilling the international construction of liberal peace. From the perspective of realist international theory, this case serves as a reminder that those who want to better the world in most cases end up making it worse. There is no room for emancipation in the realm of the international short of its structural transformation from anarchy to hierarchy. Hence, realists suggest, in politics beyond the state it is kind to be cruel. Liberals reject this dichotomy between normatively based politics within the state and brutish international relations. A series of factors ranging from the increased cognitive capacities of individuals to the growing importance of international organizations transform the global into an institutionalized heterarchy in which cross-border morality flourishes. Liberals, thus, are more likely to argue that the manner in which the Iraq policy was decided and executed, say, without approval by the United Nations (UN), is to be blamed for the problems of bringing democratic peace to conflict-ridden Iraqi society.

Introduction 3 Both realist pessimism and liberal optimism fail to do justice to the dialectic of the international civilizing process. The former denies against all evidence the gradual and uneven domestication of the international, positing a law of anarchy, or human fallibility, that produces an inevitable conjunction of good intentions and bad outcomes in anarchical action contexts. The latter celebrates reason as a barrier against injustice both in domestic and in global settings and thus attributes setbacks in the betterment of world politics to political, technical or administrative shortcomings, say, badly thought-out plans and slippage in the implementation process. Against both international theories, we argue that there is a more fundamental issue at play in the international politics of harm reduction. Peacebuilding is made up of elements that are in tension or opposition with each other, and it entails positive and negative tendencies. Successful interventions in which everything goes according to plan, in which the liberal-democratic norms infusing policy are fully implemented on the ground and the target society is effectively pacified, may lead to new forms of unfreedom. This is what we mean when we say that the ESDP, understood as an ethical project to promote the international civilizing process, is inscribed in the dialectic of modernity. We develop this thesis by engaging the ESDP through a dialectical critique that looks at strengths and weaknesses with a view to amplifying the former and limiting the latter. To this end, we mobilize the work of Michel Foucault. What can an exotic Parisian theory possibly tell us about the mundane world of ESDP peacebuilding operations? It enables us to see them as a mechanism of power projection that is inevitably both enabling and constraining. Peacebuilders empower conflict-ridden societies to change themselves in an improving direction yet in doing so they necessarily impose political limits. We argue that the ethos of care at the heart of the ESDP, even while it promotes ethical security policies that downplay the moral and political significance of the difference between citizens and foreigners, licenses practices by virtue of which the European comes to reside within and discipline societies in crisis or emerging from violence. In its normalizing mode, peacebuilding brings into play microphysical and non-sovereign forms of power that circulate through opaque capillaries that link foreign peacebuilders and local populations. The risk is that these constraints congeal into patterns of paternalism and domination, which stifle what David Scott (1999) calls the local demand for a future constructed in its own vernacular image. To explore this argument, we examine a dimension of the ESDP that, its crucial relevance for peacebuilding notwithstanding, is largely overlooked by the media and rarely discussed in public policy debates. The case for an analysis of ESDP interventions into the policing field is compelling, both conceptually and empirically. In the second half of the 1990s, the international donor community, notably the United Nations, identified policing reforms in violence-prone societies as a principal element in the construction of an order of liberal peace

4 Introduction and began to act accordingly.1 In line with the new international consensus, the EU views its police missions as vehicles to advance security sector reforms in support of peace in target countries through the dissemination of best European policing practices. Moreover, police interventions have emerged as the principal component of the ESDP, in terms of both the number of deployed peace missions and the depth of their involvement in reorganizing divided societies. In 2005, the EU had 4 concurrent missions engaged in (re-)forming police forces in Bosnia (European Union Police Mission, EUPM), Macedonia (European Union Police Mission in Macedonia, EUPOL Proxima, which was replaced by the EU Police Advisory Team in Macedonia, EUPAT, in December), Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa) and Iraq (EUJUST Lex). In early 2006, EUPOL Copps was officially deployed in Palestine. Also, at the time of writing, preparatory work was ongoing for the launch of an EU police mission in Kosovo. EU policing, then, is in high demand and the demand is likely to increase further. It is, in short, the most pronounced embodiment of the ESDP’s international mission for humanity. In this book, we engage EU policing by analyzing in detail the two most important police missions deployed so far by Brussels: the EUPM in Bosnia and the EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia. The purpose of this particularizing research strategy is to identify certain generic features of EU peacebuilding in the policing field with a view to scrutinizing them from the point of view of power relations. Our inquiry into the power in police missions, which has implications for the understanding of peacebuilding more generally, has both an analytical and a prescriptive dimension. Analytically, we are interested in the governmentality of ESDP police missions, i.e. the ways in which they mobilize forms of administrative power to fashion, position, classify and organize indigenous police officers and citizens. Our argument is that even while they develop more humane, professional and effective policing, missions may intensify the relations of dominance installed in the dense network of political, cultural and economic links that bind the Union to its insecure peripheries. Enfolded in contingent forms of knowledge and working through opaque mechanisms of microphysical power far removed from the easily visible exercise of power associated with empire, these civilian peacebuilding interventions evade and undermine the material, juridical and diplomatic limitations of the ESDP. They produce their power effects not through repression, prohibition and censorship but through the discursive production of contingent standards of normality calibrated against eclectic European practices, and their implantation in local subjects and institutions by virtue of inconspicuous political technologies. Our second intervention into EU policing is prescriptive. Peacebuilding inevitably brings into existence a constellation of social control. To improve conflict-ridden societies, locals who resist the envisaged order of life have to be normalized. Spoilers who prefer a politics by violent means to peace or want to construct a polity unencumbered by liberal freedoms are only the most visible example of this challenge to the logic of liberal peacebuilding.

Introduction 5 While peacebuilding even under the most propitious circumstances can thus never limit itself to non-adversarial dialogue, it can cultivate what, with William Connolly (2002), we call a care for an enlarged diversity of forms of life. Such care encourages plural visions of politics and order to co-exist in more creative ways than sustained by a communitarian liberal idea of a shared destiny between peacebuilders and divided societies, an idea exemplified by the EU’s commitment to give the countries of the Western Balkans a European perspective. While the idea of a shared destiny is a welcome expression of EU solidarity with less fortunate societies, it also embodies the temptation to ‘world’ the world as Europe. And this temptation is not accidental, it is rooted in that dimension of modernity which pushes ‘toward an organization of being that posits the same as fundamental and the other as what must be made the same’ (Coles 1992: 94). It is this homogenizing temptation in peacebuilding, and the disciplines mobilized in its pursuit, that we engage normatively by drawing on another dimension of modernity, namely its drive towards the critique and transgression of established truth and foundations. We develop a limited reform agenda for how EU police missions can fold an agonistic generosity more deeply into their civilizing ethos. Our emancipatory agenda also foregrounds the need to address problems in the implementation phase of police missions. We thus identify a series of general operational challenges that endanger the Union’s peacebuilding vocation in the policing field, and we suggest ways to overcome them. How does Foucault fit into this reformatory project? He was an astute critic of modernity, highlighting how in the name of progress difference was produced, confined and disciplined. As James Bernauer (1990: 6) put it, ‘[n]o other contemporary philosophical thinker possessed Foucault’s acute ability to discover and describe the confinements that imprison human life and thought’. In the course of his engagement with the power/knowledge complex in diverse sites of modernity such as the hospital, the prison and the government of states, he developed a toolkit to examine the micro-physics of power operating in everyday social practices that remain invisible to the naked eye. This toolkit is well suited to bring to light the subterranean workings of power in ESDP peacebuilding. Moreover, contrary to what many critics of his work believe, Foucault did not reject the enlightenment project tout court. He was more than the relentless critic of the dark underside of progress. Running through his work is an affirmative political ethics. We draw on this positive political imaginaire in Foucault to suggest ways to enhance the emancipatory potential of the Union’s growing actorness in international security affairs.

Situating the book in the literature Our book sits at the intersection of and contributes to different lines of research. It is angled towards readers interested in international relations, the

6 Introduction EU and the Western Balkans. To begin with, it invites a novel engagement with liberal peacebuilding. It brings into focus its potential to produce relations of domination and subjects them to an immanent critique using what Kevin Stenson (1998) calls a normatively committed form of governmentality research. The international construction of liberal peace in violenceprone societies licenses forms of micro-power that, although they reach deep into domestic orders, remain largely unnoticed by the literature. They are masked either by the humanistic theme of the peacebuilding discourse or by the forceful interventions through which metropolitan actors impose their humanitarian empire on target countries. The mainline literature shares with practitioners a pronounced will to improve societies that violently differ from those of the West. This ambition and the inscription of locals in relations of domination it facilitates are not interrogated, though the manner in which international peacebuilders implement what Michael Pugh calls the New York consensus is extensively scrutinized. As to more critical readings of contemporary peacebuilding, they, too, pay insufficient attention to the mechanisms in peacebuilding through which the international comes to reside within transitional societies. While such works criticize the high-handed use of illiberal power by the international administrators of liberal peace – censorship, the manipulation of elections, the removal of democratically elected officials and so forth – they fail to theorize and analyse the humble and mundane practices through which unfreedom operates in such international projects of improvement. However, without a thorough analysis of the elements of domination in peacebuilding, it is difficult to see how this critical research can realize its dream of imagining new practical forms that minimize the power of internationals over locals. In contrast, we use Foucault to bring into focus the opaque workings of power/knowledge in peacebuilding. Moreover, we elaborate a critical strategy to rearticulate peacebuilding as a terrain of political possibilities rather than a political limit. On a more empirical level, our book provides new insights into the involvement of the EU in building peace in the Western Balkans. Yet another added value of our project is that it is the first book-length exploration of a key development in the field of European security and European integration: the deployment of ESDP capabilities. Research so far has widely scrutinized the political, legal, financial, procedural, doctrinal and capability-related accomplishments, challenges and shortfalls faced by the ESDP.2 Conversely, little attention has been paid to interrogate its actual functioning in the field (Grignon 2003; ICG 2005a: 47–53, 2005b; Keane 2005; Mace 2004). One important explanation for this disjuncture is that the ESDP was put into action only in 2003. Sufficient evidence to systematically explore its performativity is just now becoming available. EU police missions, however, have not escaped the attention of students of the ESDP altogether. There are a number of scholarly publications which mention them en passant, even a few which are devoted to certain aspects of the

Introduction 7 subject (Merlingen and Ostrauskait˙e 2004, 2005a,b; Novak 2003; Osland 2004; Rummel 2005). Yet none of these inquiries provides a comprehensive analysis of police interventions, ranging from their conception in Brussels to the deployment to the field and their manifold reform activities. More generally, our examination of ESDP peacebuilding contributes to the conceptual debate in EU studies about the normative power of the EU. Our intervention provides a new angle on this debate by making it possible to rethink the notion of normative power Europe in Foucauldian terms as normalizing power Europe. Such a shift in perspective has important consequences both in terms of how we study norm projection by the EU and the ethical judgements we make about this form of seemingly soft power. Finally, the book complements research on international police assistance. Much of this work focuses on bilateral aid and UN police missions and operates with a truncated concept of policing that conceals that the police inevitably produce the security of a historically situated, particularistic order of domination. Finally, a note on methodology. As it has become apparent by now, we are not engaging in what Foucault (1991a: 58) somewhat flippantly calls the ‘uniform, simple activity of allocating causality’. Rather, in a postmodern version of middle-range research (Simon 1992), we excavate/map the power/knowledge complex in ESDP police aid and reveal its contingent nature. To support our empirical argument, we use documentary evidence concerning the ESDP in general and the police missions in particular. In addition to this textual analysis, we conducted extensive interviews, on a not-for-attribution basis, with EU Council decision-makers and mission planners in Brussels and ESDP police managers and operatives on the ground in Bosnia and Macedonia.

Organization of the book In the next chapter, we briefly but critically engage the three literatures that are most closely related to our subject matter. We argue that the reading of power produced by much of the peacebuilding literature and the normative-power-Europe scholarship is seriously incomplete, and we show how research into police aid mobilizes an understanding of policing that foregrounds apolitical claims about functionality. The conceptual gaps in these literatures can be addressed, we wish to argue, by governmentality theory, whose added value is its capacity to bring to light non-sovereign forms of micro-power. However, in many governmentality writings little attention is paid to reformatory practices. Drawing on a number of political theorists, we inscribe an ethico-political horizon in the theory, and we argue that such a move enables researchers to propose measures that limit the risks engendered by the daemonic coupling of the political pastorate and liberalism that is contemporary peacebuilding.

8 Introduction Chapter 3 examines the contingent political, material and ideational dimensions of the development of the ESDP and the peacebuilding vocation it embodies. Much of the chapter is devoted to an inquiry into how the EU developed a particular conception of itself as a security actor against the backdrop of its conduct in the Western Balkans and into the dynamics at play in the build-up of operational capabilities and decision-making structures. Beyond this, we show how distinct rationalities were inscribed in this material and organizational infrastructure so as to render it usable in civilian peacebuilding missions. We briefly discuss these rationalities, sorting them into two types, one concerned with securing bare life, and the other with transforming life in an improving direction. The latter rationality, we argue, licenses a governmental deployment of ESDP peacebuilding capabilities. Working in and through complex political crises, it addresses itself to the strategic reordering of the molar bodies of local populations, the microbodies of human beings and the institutions of security enframing them. In Chapters 4 and 5, we explore in detail the first two ESDP police missions ever deployed: the EUPM in Bosnia and the EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia. We pay particular attention to the transformation of the local policing fields into problem spaces requiring ESDP interventions, and we chronicle the manifold, often seemingly banal reforms pursued by the missions. The focus in these chapters is thus squarely on the programmes, projects, strategies, devices, calculations, knowledge claims and arguments deployed by EU peacebuilders to conduct the conduct of local police officers, governmental officials and citizens. However, operational aspects related to the planning and build-up phase of the missions as well as to their coordination with other EU actors on the ground are also covered. In Chapter 6, we argue that appearances notwithstanding, there is significant power in ESDP police missions. We bring into focus the repertoire of inconspicuous political technologies they employ to reform wayward police forces in transition countries in an improving direction, and we show how precisely these technologies produce and circulate power through capillaries that link mission experts, local police officers and citizens. Moreover, we inquire into the universalizing knowledges that program these technologies, highlighting their contingency as well as their practical effects on the visualisation and transformation of policing. In Chapter 7, our normative intent is brought to the forefront as we emphasize the double-sided nature of power in international police reforms. Peacebuilding interventions into the policing field enhance human security by disciplining, regulating and reorganizing the police, but they also bring into play a structure of social control that may congeal into pastoral dominance and restrict the options available for the construction of a local order of law enforcement. We draw on the Foucauldian political ethics identified in Chapter 2 to develop concrete proposals on how to amplify the emancipatory impact of ESDP police missions (current and future) and to contain any potential downsides. Incidentally, our limited reform agenda, which also

Introduction 9 addresses operational challenges faced by missions on the ground, promises to render ESDP policing reforms more sustainable. Finally, in the concluding chapter, we highlight that an ethically reinforced governmentality theory is a powerful tool for analytically and prescriptively engaging not just ESDP police missions but peacebuilding in general. The theory brings into relief the dialectic of international efforts to bring peace to divided and violenceprone societies, i.e. the fact that such liberal projects of improvement are, to paraphrase Gayatri Spivak (1993), a violating enablement. Moreover, it helps scholars and practitioners to identify ways and means to enhance the enabling effects of peacebuilding and, hence, its contribution to the global civilizing process.

2

Power and governmentality

In this chapter, we review three literatures related to our topic: the international peacebuilding literature, the normative-power-Europe scholarship and research on international police aid. The purpose of this critical engagement is to bring into focus a series of gaps in the treatment of power in these inquiries. In particular, power is either written out of them, framed as merely oppressive or thematized mainly as a discursive phenomenon. A very different understanding of power is advanced by Foucault. Modern power, he argues, is not flowing from a sovereign centre in the form of prohibitions but circulating through capillaries traversing the social body. Capillary forms of power operating in everyday social sites work primarily through the production of the normal and the abnormal, the desirable and the undesirable, the visible and the invisible. To analyse modern power, Foucault developed the twin concepts of political rationalities and political technologies in his later work on governmentality. We argue that governmentality theory, which, unlike in other fields, plays only a marginal role in research on international relations and the EU, can bring added value to the study of peacebuilding and the ESDP. Yet it also has a number of shortcomings that limit its intellectual and political reach. We identify three such limitations in relation to our concern with peacebuilding. Of particular importance is governmentality theory’s bracketing of the normative and its allied inability to contribute to a reformatory politics. Drawing on a number of political theorists, we elucidate a politico-ethical horizon in Foucault’s work and a correlated preference for an agonistic politics. We end by sketching out the political rationality embodied in the liberal politics of peacebuilding. This hybrid rationality creates a dilemma at the very centre of peacebuilding practices. While the dilemma cannot be resolved, we argue that by drawing on Foucault’s political ethics, one can device a strategy to reduce its harmful effects.

The power in international peacebuilding Peacebuilding evolved out of the peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations during the Cold War. Traditional peacekeeping is concerned

Power and governmentality 11 with the impartial interposition of military personnel to contain conflicts, prevent the recurrence of violence and create conditions of stability. The limited ambition of this form of multilateral military intervention – securing negative peace defined in terms of the absence of direct violence – is inscribed in the state-centric logic of the Westphalian international system. Conversely, the post-Cold War functional expansion of traditional peacekeeping goes, as it were, beyond Westphalia. On its ambitious civilizational agenda is the installation in recipient countries of positive peace, i.e. of norms, institutions and practices conducive to human security.1 While the notion of positive peace or peace with justice was originally elaborated by critical peace researchers (cf. Galtung 1975, 1976), in the post-Cold War era it was gradually appropriated by Western powers, multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations as well as by researchers studying their new peacekeeping practices. The upshot was that by the second half of the 1990s the notion of positive peace acquired a particular and rather extensive meaning. What Michael Pugh refers to as the New York orthodoxy equates the promotion of human security with the implantation in violence-prone countries of Western-style neoliberal market societies and representative democracy, if necessary by the use of military force.2 Despite or better because of its contemporary salience, ‘peacebuilding’ is an essentially contested concept.3 The varied meanings of the term notwithstanding, there are at least two points on which scholars widely agree (David 2002). Peacebuilding addresses intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts and foreigners have a crucial role to play in the process. However, on important issues such as the timing and length of peacebuilding missions or their relationship with development aid, the views of scholars and practitioners diverge. In what follows, we foreground in a deliberately schematic manner how the different strands of the literature on peacebuilding write power in, or out of, their accounts of international efforts to entrench an order of liberal peace in countries emerging from crisis or conflict. The literature on peacebuilding is voluminous. For the purpose of our brief review, which is not intended to be comprehensive, we identify three strands: empirical-analytical, policy-oriented and critical-normative research. Beginning with the former, a large part is devoted to explore the correlates (domestic and international) of the successful construction of liberal peace. The investigations draw on a range of methods, including case studies and statistical analysis, and theoretical tools from, among other things, social psychology, international relations and sociology. Thus equipped, scholars analyse particular peacebuilding operations, explicate which practices work under which scope conditions and explore new ways to conceptualize and organize the transition to positive peace.4 Analyses of the shortcomings of existing peacebuilding practices are an important part of this strand of the literature (Barnett 1997; Bertram 1995; Ignatieff 2003; Ottaway 2002, 2003; Paris 2002, 2004). Scholars, for instance, unmask the organized hypocrisy informing the diplomatic

12 Power and governmentality politics of peacebuilding, interrogate the legality and legitimacy of particular interventions, explore the frail grounds on which the contemporary peacebuilding consensus rests and argue that an overly zealous application of neoliberal thinking to countries emerging from conflict has the potential to aggravate the problems it is supposed to address. Empirical-analytical research makes an important contribution to our knowledge, especially of the factors that promote or spoil international efforts to promote selfenforcing peace in violently divided societies and of what peacebuilders and diplomats can do to improve their success rate. However, it has little to say on the issue of power even though what peacebuilders do in host societies without doubt produces ‘effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 3). Not surprisingly, we find the same lacuna in policy analysis. This research centres more narrowly on operational, doctrinal and political shortcomings of peacebuilding operations and suggests ways to overcome them.5 Its primary target audience are policy-makers and practitioners. The investigations, although often conceptually sophisticated, do not engage in critical reflections on the New York orthodoxy. Moreover, they tend to couch their descriptions, explanations and advice in observation language rather than theory language. The empirical findings are presented to the readers as unproblematic representations, or settled knowledge, of the empirical domain in question. This, then, is a literature that is under the influence of what Roland Paris (2000: 44) calls the ‘cult of policy relevance’. Driven by its cognitive interest, policy-oriented research produces important insights into the challenges faced by peacebuilders in the field and a host of recommendations for fine-tuning, inter alia, the modalities for the deployment of peacebuilding missions; the training of military and civilian staff; the command and control of missions; the coherence of multi-agency interventions; and the implementation of issue-specific reforms, say, of the security sector. More important in this context, policy-oriented research, even more so than the empirical-analytical literature, shares with ‘real existing peacebuilding’ a pronounced will to improve violence-prone societies. This ambition and the inscription of natives in relations of domination it facilitates are not interrogated, though the manner in which the will to improve is put into practice is often criticized. Hence, for a reading of peacebuilding that is more sensitive to the issue of power, we have to turn to critical-normative research. Reflecting on the fact that the humanist values embodied in peacebuilding may lead to and justify practices of domination and violence, this strand of the peacebuilding literature has a twofold thrust. On the one hand, it inquires into the discursive and material conditions of possibility for the international management of societies that violently differ from those of the West and the variegated effects of these practices on target countries and world politics more generally. On the other hand, it opens up normative space for thinking about fundamentally new forms of international

Power and governmentality 13 assistance that seek to minimize relations of power between international donors and local recipients and aid in the development of more egalitarian societies. Researchers, for instance, seek to destabilize the liberal peacebuilding consensus by critically interrogating the forms of knowledge and the cognitive interests on which it rests or by showing how global capitalism, through the socio-economic exclusion of the many from the wealth of the few, is implicated in producing the violent spaces subsequently subjected to international ‘riot control’ missions (Chandler 2004; Duffield 2002, 2005; Pugh and Cooper 2004; Sörensen 2002).6 From a post-structuralist perspective, François Debrix re-describes UN activities in support of peace (international and domestic) as disciplinary governance (1999a) and shows how the correlated discourse and visual symbols shape the meanings we attach to peace missions and the places to which they are dispatched (1999b). A somewhat similar concern with the reproduction of a world politics of which peacebuilding is an integral part animates Oliver Richmond (2002). Focusing on peace operations per se rather than the attendant media strategies and ideologies that are foregrounded in Debrix’ analysis, he shows how approaches to peacemaking and peacebuilding that are inscribed in a state-centric worldview inadvertently consolidate macropolitical orders of conflict. Richmond also draws a parallel between peacebuilding and colonial projects of improvement. He thus suggests that the peace implanted by peace builders is ‘simulated to be as it is in liberal states, though in practice it may be more like the situation that existed in former colonial dependencies’ (Richmond 2004: 85). Such a continuity between these two sets of practices is supported by detailed empirical work. Studies of peacebuilding in Bosnia, for instance, bring into focus how internationals exercize power in an autocratic manner that is at odds with the self-proclaimed goal to guarantee the local ownership of the transition process (Carpenter 2002; Chandler 2000; Knaus and Martin 2003). Finally, some critical-normative writers explore the possibilities inherent in different critical theory projects, ranging from post-structuralism to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, to re-envisage the how and what of peacebuilding. They thus consider ways to avoid the homogenizing and disciplining effects of the neoliberal reforms codified in the peacebuilding consensus, and they envisage an alternative agenda for the transformation of conflict-prone societies (Bellamy 2004; Fetherston 2000; Pugh 2004; Richmond 2001). Peacebuilding, this research suggests, does not have to rely on totalizing interventions. Nor does it have to build a liberal peace that is founded upon exclusionary social structures (global and local) which are intolerant of visions of the world other than that which is embodied by them. Work along these lines, although still in its infancy, constitutes an important beginning in the attempt to move peacebuilding, both the theory and practice, beyond its pronounced will to improve target societies by inscribing in them the values, practices and institutions of Western-style liberal democracy. However, to advance this intellectual labour needs to be

14 Power and governmentality grounded in a better understanding of the actual functioning of domination in peacebuilding. The point we want to make is that even though the critical-normative literature is an important supplement to the mainline engagement with peacebuilding, it, too, pays insufficient attention to the mechanisms in peacebuilding through which the international comes to reside within transitional societies. While it criticizes the high-handed use of illiberal power by international actors engaged in the humanitarian empire of peacebuilding – censorship, the manipulation of elections, the removal of democratically elected officials and other forms of ‘repression of the democratic rights of people who are supposed to be learning about democracy’ (Hulsman 2002: 97–8) – it fails to theorize and analyse the humble and mundane practices through which unfreedom operates in such international projects of improvement (but Pupavac 2000, 2002). For instance, his impressive case study of the excesses of peacebuilding notwithstanding, Chandler (2000) has little to say about the capillary workings of quotidian power that underpin the great, quasi-colonial machinery erected in Bosnia by the international administrators of the liberal peace. Yet without a thorough analysis of the elements of excess unfreedom in contemporary peacebuilding practices, it is difficult to see how new forms that minimize unfreedom can be imagined, concretely and in detail. In short, a fine-grained analysis of the power in peacebuilding is the condition of possibility for imaginative and at the same time practicable thinking on how to render peacebuilding more egalitarian. Later in this chapter, we argue that governmentality theory provides the conceptual tools needed for such a project. First, however, we turn our attention to a literature that helps us to bring into sharper relief another gap in the dominant understanding of liberal peacebuilding, a gap that, incidentally, also afflicts the study of EFP.

Civilian peacebuilding and normative power Europe In an innovative article, Ian Manners (2002) describes the EU as a normative power. The concept builds on the older notion of the EU as a civilian actor. The term was introduced into the EU studies literature by François Duchêne (1973). He saw the then European Community (EC) as an exemplar of a ‘new stage in political civilisation’, a political co-operative that would have a chance to demonstrate the influence that can be exerted in international affairs through ‘essentially civilian forms of power’ (Duchêne 1973: 19). Drawing on role theory, Hanns Maull (1990) subsequently refined the concept by identifying three key elements of a civilian power. A state can be brought under this description if it accepts the necessity of co-operation, deploys primarily non-military, especially economic foreign policy instruments and works with multilateral institutions to manage international problems. Manners argues that both these conceptions suffer from a bias. They privilege ‘physical power in the form of actual empirical capabilities’,

Power and governmentality 15 especially economic ones (Manners 2002: 238). This, he underlines, disregards the power of ideas and norms and thus tends to underestimate the international power of the EU. According to Manners, the ideational force of the EU consists in its capacity to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international affairs in line with its unique normative basis. More precisely, it diffuses, by virtue of its international presence and value-rational conduct in foreign policy, its constituent norms such as peace, democracy, the rule of law and good governance beyond its boundaries. Unlike Duchêne’s intervention, which was notoriously savaged by Hedley Bull (1982), who maintained that effective international power comes from the barrel of guns, Manners’ refined argument has been widely hailed as an important contribution. For instance, Andrew Linklater (2005: 369) praises it for shedding light on the fact that the ‘EU can be regarded as a major experiment in developing a complex civilising process in international politics’ (see also Sjursen 2006). Even critics do not seem to want to invalidate the notion of normative power Europe but only to show up its limits (but Hyde-Price 2006). Thus, Karen Smith (2001), Richard Youngs (2004) and others highlight a certain inconsistency between discourse and practice, pointing out that the EU sometimes subordinates the pursuit of norms to narrow economic or political interests. Even Robert Kagan’s (2003) notorious take on EFP acknowledges its civilian orientation, claiming only that it is not the effect of any particular normative basis but of its military weakness. A more far-reaching and, from the perspective of this book, more interesting interrogation of the EU’s (self-)representation as a force for the good in international affairs is provided by Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002) and Diez (2005). These authors qualify the presupposition that the EU is in the vanguard of political civilization, an exemplar of how to organize the ‘good life’ in political communities and hence a model of good governance, or a collection of best practices, to be exported to the European Elsewhere.7 They turn our attention to the identity of the EU that underpins the narrative of norm projection and point out the discrepancy between it and the Union’s own, less than perfect record of norm compliance. Nicolaïdis and Howse thus argue that the normative power scholarship overlooks the what of narratives of norm projection. The image the EU projects to the international plane and that guides, however imperfectly, its external conduct mirrors not the EU as it is but utopian versions of what it could be. They urge practitioners and scholars to acknowledge the gap between these utopian visions and the real existing EU and to ponder what ‘EUtopia’ they want to realize within the EU and hold up to the world as a shining example. In a similar vein, Diez alerts his readers to the fact that by framing itself as a normative power, the EU necessarily sets itself apart from other international actors, which lack this positive valuation, say, because they rely primarily on military means to achieve their foreign policy objectives or because they lack a firm normative basis on which to construct an ethical

16 Power and governmentality foreign policy. This othering process affects the EU, Diez argues, because it incites it to improve others rather than to overcome its own persistent shortcomings and to live up to its norms. Furthermore, a focus on the other as an object of improvement rather than on self-improvement lends itself more easily to the militarization of ethical foreign policy as this is seen as allowing for a more effective engagement of norm violators. He holds up the USA as an example of how an idealistic foreign policy may evolve into one that displays features of an imperial power. The notion of normative power, though it is not normally used in discussions of peacebuilding, is clearly relevant to the topic. Linklater (2005: 384), for instance, refers to EU civilian peacebuilding in the Western Balkans as an instance of the Union’s civilizing influence on political communities beyond its borders. And, as hinted at above, much of the mainline research on peacebuilding subscribes to its own more or less explicit notion of normative power when it discusses UN civilian peacebuilding operations. While a focus on norm change enhances our understanding of peacebuilding, we argue that in its current conceptualization, which is informed by constructivist currents in international relations and EU studies scholarship, the notion of normative power leads one to overlook important facets of what is implied in the normalization of societies transiting from instability or violence. In the introductory chapter, we discussed EU peacebuilding under the rubric of the dialectic of modernity. Here we want to specify this idea. The international diffusion of liberal norms to conflict-ridden societies is a two-sided process, involving both emancipation from domination and unfreedom and new forms of subjection. Norms are a tool of power that can render those subjected to it free (of oppression, violence, etc.) even while they impose on them ‘the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved’ (Foucault 1991b: 183). It is this latter dimension that is neglected in the normative power scholarship, just as it is in much of the peacebuilding literature, both of which tend to adopt a celebratory approach to the normative difference of the EU, or the liberal West more generally. Limiting our discussion to the EU, Richard Rosecrance (1998: 16), for instance, credits it with a unique normative accomplishment that consists in its ‘extremely felicitous influence upon the external world’. This, of course, is also the tenor of Manners’s article, notably when he discusses the EU’s efforts to abolish the death penalty in other societies. Even a perceptive critic such as Diez (2005: 632) argues that the Union’s norms and hence its normalization of world politics are ‘to be welcomed’ as they are based on ideas that envisage ‘a world of more peaceful and just relations’. We think the reason for the lack of sensibility to the potential downside of the exercize of normative power by the EU (and other actors) is the effect of two conceptual choices. To begin with, informed by liberal political theory, most students of EFP understand norms in terms of some essential, universal quality in humans that must be defended, respected or expressed

Power and governmentality 17 in interpersonal and institutional contexts. This framing inclines them to neglect how norm projection is inextricably bound up with the problematization of the other as in need of normative improvement. Among other things, this lacuna hides from view the contingent forms of knowledge informing such othering processes. There are instances when the constructedness of otherness is of little moral and political significance, say, in clear-cut cases of ethnic cleansing or genocide. However, in more mundane cases related to the international promotion of good governance in other countries the lack of attention to how norm-based problematizations construct difference so as to make it governable and, in doing so, radically narrow down the range of acceptable heterogeneity, limits the critical reach of research.8 The point to be made here is that by looking at norm projection in terms of the diffusion of nice universals such as democracy and human rights, analysts overlook the concrete exclusions and elisions entailed by the contingent savoir faire a norm promoter such as the EU deploys in its international projects of improvement. A second conceptual limitation of the normative-power-Europe scholarship is its overly representationalist orientation, which is particularly pronounced in the discourse-centred approaches of Diez, Nicolaïdis and Howse. But it is also present in the work of other scholars. Manners distinguishes the power of norms from the power of material capabilities, Rosecrance speaks of the Union’s purely normative as opposed to empirical attainment and scholars more generally differentiate between the EU’s normative power of attraction, its magnetism, and its weak empirical power (Zielonka 1998). By emphasizing the ideational quality of normative power and interpreting it as a kind of soft power (cf. Nye 2004), analysts overlook that the ability to seduce, persuade and socialize depends on a multitude of often small-scale technical means by which norms are made to act upon people. Normative power, therefore, is far from being non-physical. Yet both students of the EU and peacebuilding lack the conceptual tools to examine the microphysics of this form of power. To conclude this section, the point we want to make is that to subject the international normalization of countries to a dialectical critique that is attuned to both the promises and the downsides of norm diffusion, one requires a different toolbox than the one available to constructivist and discourse-centred post-structuralist scholarship. Before we describe such an alternative, we turn to yet another literature related to our topic of EU peacebuilding with a view to pointing out its shortfalls with regard to its understanding of power.

Policing and the construction of liberal peace International assistance for rule-of-law reforms became a cottage industry after the end of the Cold War. Support for constitutional and legal reforms in countries transiting from internal conflicts was quickly included in the

18 Power and governmentality toolbox of international peacebuilders. Initially, however, they paid little attention to the issue of policing. One of the reasons why at first police aid remained ‘outside the mainstream of the international donor community’s pet projects’ was that it was associated by many not with the rule of law but with violent repression (de Soto and del Castillo, quoted in Stanley 1996: 63). It was therefore with some delay that the United Nations, which soon became the trailblazer in the police aid field, identified the promotion of democratic policing as a principal component of the consolidation of peace and democracy and began to assemble police aid capabilities.9 By the mid-1990s, the organization was able to field missions centred on police institution-building as illustrated by the UN Civilian Police (Civpol) Mission in Haiti and the UN Police Support Group in Eastern Slavonia. A further step in the development of UN Civpol capabilities came with the deployment of missions with executive policing powers in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999.10 Besides the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was the most active international institution in the police aid field in terms of dedicated manpower and resources until 2003 when it was replaced as the main regional player by the EU (Merlingen and Ostrauskait˙e 2005c; Stodiek 2002).11 In search of new security tasks that would ensure its continued relevance in post-Cold War Europe, the OSCE began to develop police aid capabilities at the turn of the century. It quickly established itself as the continent’s lead organization in this field, not least by setting up a Strategic Police Matters Unit within the Secretariat in Vienna. Finally, in addition to police aid channelled through international institutions, there are numerous national support programmes. The principal donor is the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) in the USA, which carries out institution-building and training programmes around the world, including in the Western Balkans (Call 2002). A correlate of the growing role played by police assistance is the emergence of a dedicated literature centred on bilateral aid and UN Civpol missions (Bayley 2001; Call and Stanley 2001; Dwan 2003; Gregory 1996; Hansen 2002, 2003; Holm and Eide 2000; Neild 2001; Oakley et al. 2002; Stanley 1996). It is characterized by a widespread agreement on the link between security sector reforms and the entrenchment of liberal peace in post-hostility countries. Although rarely if ever the determining force in the process of transition, an unreformed police force marked by its divisive and repressive role in a conflict-ridden society impedes the transition from violence. First, only a democratic, human-rights oriented police is capable of securing the lives and property of citizens, independent of their ethnic, economic or social profile, as well as the public spaces that are so important to the exercize of political and civil rights. If the justice system cannot or will not ensure citizens’ equal standing before the law in respect of individual and communal protection, then a peaceful society cannot flourish. Moreover, pervasive insecurity in the form of crime and social violence is detrimental to the strengthening of civil values and an obstacle to post-conflict rehabilitation.

Power and governmentality 19 Second, it is the police, together with the military that wields the state’s monopoly of violence. In a democracy, this formidable repressive potential is held in check by making the police accountable to the public in order to ensure it does not become a state within the state, abusing its coercive means and discretionary powers to harass, intimidate, extort, torture or kill. Systematic police brutality and other forms of everyday police harassment impede peacebuilding efforts by curtailing the civil liberties of citizens, corroding their trust in public institutions and contributing to an order of endemic insecurity. In short, the dominant perspective in the literature is that the provision of collective and individual security is a foundation on which progress in the political (and economic) transition of disrupted societies rests. By moulding ‘apolitical police forces that are composed of different political contingents and ethnic groups, and who will protect citizens, uphold the rule of law and help maintain order with a minimum of force’, foreign aid in support of police reforms makes a crucial contribution to peacebuilding (Call and Barnett 2000: 44). Having been identified as an important aspect of rule-oflaw reforms, police aid is analysed as nonideological political development assistance inscribed in a commitment to universal human rights and validating the causal link between the consolidation of democratic institutions and the entrenchment of peace. The imagery of the police officer informing this view is that of a kind of ‘domestic missionary’ charged with bringing civilization and decorum to disrupted societies (Emsley 1996: 74). We argue that such a framing of policing and police aid that centres on claims about functionality is too narrow to allow analysts to fully appreciate how peacebuilding in the policing field works and what its effects are.12 Hence, we conceive of policing as action concerned with the strategic (re)ordering of life (cf. Brogden 1996; Waddington 2003). The advantage of such a broad conception is that it brings into focus three important aspects of policing that have to be foregrounded in any critical interrogation of police aid. First, the term does not have a fixed meaning. Policing refers to a set of contingent practices that vary across time and place. Thus, ‘optimal policing’ may be organized to focus on public reassurance, crime prevention and detection, community relations or other ‘functions’. Second, our definition leaves open the precise nature of the governance of public security. Just like the content of optimal policing, its organizational form, notably, policesociety linkages and the respective role of state and non-state actors in the policing field are subject to political choices rooted in social interests and policing ideologies. The third advantage of our conception of policing is that it highlights that such work is a highly political enterprise rather than a neutral service. The Western police in the present sense was created as a body to defend the emerging social order of modern states and the capitalist relations of production over which they presided against the disenfranchized and economically marginalized ‘dangerous classes’ (Sheptycki 1999: 218).

20 Power and governmentality Contemporary policing in advanced democracies remains embedded in a social order characterized by conflict rather than fundamental integration. It is an inextricable part of relations of domination and subjection, producing the security of a historically situated, particularistic order (Waddington 2003: 42).13 This is a feature of policing that is rarely acknowledged in the debates on public security in Western countries, which are more likely to frame the fundamental purpose of democratic policing as the apolitical protection and vindication of universal human rights for all (cf. Patten 1999a). Our understanding of policing brings into focus the Janus-faced nature of police assistance. International support for police reforms is not simply about creating or strengthening a rights-based, general order in recipient countries through the provision of basic security to citizens. It is also about modifying or replacing one particular policing order with another. Like economic or political development aid in general, contemporary police assistance seeks to transform non-liberal, although not necessarily illegitimate practices, and incorporate local societies into global Western society.14 Police interventions are thus inscribed in the uneasy and conflictual relationship between the international and the local, the universalizing and the particularizing. Both the normativity and the effectiveness of police aid is crucially shaped by how donors and recipients negotiate these tensions and contradictions. The inadequacy of a functionalist rendering of policing and police aid is that it (partially) conceals such challenges. The point we want to make here is that police aid that ignores the necessarily particularizing nature of its projects runs the risk of deteriorating into efforts to establish and secure a policing order informed by supposedly universal standards against deviant local conduct and organizations. In such a scenario, recalcitrant natives are disciplined and normalized before being inserted into a ‘best Western’ policing order. Later in this chapter, we shall argue that a tendency towards non-consensual interventions is inscribed in the very rationality of peacebuilding.

Governmentality theory Arguably, Foucault’s principal contribution to the study of politics is his conception of how power operates (Bernauer 1990; Bevir 1999). For the purpose of this book, his later work on governmentalities is of particular relevance. The conceptual apparatus he developed through his genealogy of political power extends his previous work on regimes of practices in localized institutions such as prisons and hospitals to population-centred governance. The study of governmentalities is concerned with the relations between government interventions and political thought or styles of political thinking. In Foucault’s account, contemporary (Western) forms of governing can be traced to the period between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries when in Europe a new politics gradually emerged that for the first time was

Power and governmentality 21 oriented towards the wealth, health and happiness of populations. It was a rational politics insofar as it derived its principles from the nature of what was to be governed rather than the fleeting interests of the sovereign prince or the divine order of the world. The underlying rationale was to strengthen the power of the state by enhancing the productivity and docility of the population. In this modern political imaginaire, government is a vast and neverending project of improvement. Its implementation requires both shaping the personal conduct of individuals so that they become civil and productive members of society and regulating macro-structures such as the economy and the ‘social’ so that they enhance the life and capabilities of the population. In short, a governmental politics demands a politics of the body – the disciplines applied to man-as-body – and a biopolitics of the population – investments in the social processes and conditions of life (Foucault 2003). While the early experiments of police government or cameralism sought to monopolize the government of micro-institutional and macro-structural relations in the central state, liberal government from the eighteenth century onwards has relied on a multiplicity of non-state authorities and agencies to discipline and normalize the conduct of individuals and to govern the molar body of the population. Picking up and further elaborating on this theme, scholars from a variety of disciplines have cast light on the sites and everyday practices of contemporary forms of liberal government and the knowledge complexes allied with them. They have analysed how administrative forms of power dispersed across the entire social field mobilize the truth claims of experts to produce, classify, discipline and organize subjects and citizens with the aim of aligning their desires, dreams and conduct with the objectives of authorities. What emerges from these researches is an understanding of politics in which diffuse forms of power emerge in the interstices and ‘underneath’ the rule of law; traverse the limits separating the public from the private; fashion the lives of individuals by imprinting on their selves self-definitions programmed by hegemonic discourses; and improve, protect and above all regularize the conditions and forms of life of the population (Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996; Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; Cruikshank 1999; Dean 1999; Dean and Hindess 1998; O’Malley 1998; Rose 1999, 2000a; Valverde 1998). The field of power designated by the concept of governmentality has to be distinguished from the realm of sovereignty. Power in this latter realm is concentrated and unitary, it prohibits and represses and its modus operandi is the law or force. However, the two fields of power may intersect to create a zone of indistinction (cf. Agamben 1998). Thus, for instance, Judith Butler (2004: 61) shows how the war on terror fought by the USA and its allies in the wake of 11 September 2001 has, in the form of the practice of indefinite detention, ‘reanimate[d] a spectral sovereignty within the field of governmentality’. In a similar vein, we shall show in subsequent chapters that

22 Power and governmentality ESDP police missions promote punitive, sovereign technologies of policing in the context of their governmental project to cultivate post-conflict police forces that effectively and humanely control and protect citizens and public order. A general shortcoming of much of the governmentality literature, as of Foucault’s own work, is that it is limited to domestic orders (but Larner and Walters 2004; Ong and Collier 2005; Perry and Maurer 2003; Walters and Haahr 2005; also Bigo 2002; Dillon and Reid 2000; Lippert 1999; Merlingen 2003; Merlingen and Ostrauskait˙e 2005b). Here we argue that international peacebuilding, too, can be interrogated using the conceptual apparatus of governmentality theory, notably the idea that governance is a de-centred phenomenon best explored in terms of mentalities or rationalities of rule and the technologies of power in which they are inscribed. Such a move, we argue, enables a more complex reading of the power in peacebuilding than is found in the literature. Making governance thinkable: Rationalities of power A Foucauldian exploration of governmental thought is founded upon the constructivist notion that the concerns that occasion and animate policy and the meanings that attach to it are not self-evident. Governance is dependent on and embodies distinct styles of reasoning. Hence, to understand how international peacebuilders such as the United Nations and the EU bring violent spaces under the ordering influence of their long-distance governance, we have to bring into focus the rationalities they employ to represent, interpret and appropriate the peoples, structures and processes to be acted upon and improved. These rationalities are not ideologies that stand in opposition to truth. Neither are they carriers of neutral information. Rather, they are forms of thought embodied in discursive formations – in other contexts of inquiry Foucault preferred to call such formations ‘regimes of truth’ – which are intimately linked to structures of power and produce effects of truth with regard to specific fields of governance such as crime or development. The concept of political rationalities thus brings into relief a point that informs much of Foucault’s work: knowledge is not beyond power, on the contrary, it is saturated with power. In particular, the interrogation of political rationalities makes it possible to see that for reality to be brought under the ordering influence of governance, it first has to be divided and sorted, based on morally or intellectually validated schemes, into what is imagined to be normal and what is deviant, threatening, risky, underdeveloped, and so forth. A narration of abnormality, ‘othering’, which, however, can take different forms (Diez 2005) and hence produce different political effects, is constitutive of any project of improvement, however noble its intent. Moreover, the analysis of political rationalities exposes the contingency of the truths they produce, not least by documenting how certain agendas,

Power and governmentality 23 agents and objects of concerns are included in and others mobilized out of the representations of the realm of government (cf. Stenson and Watt 1999). Therefore, by examining rationalities researchers can strip governance of its self-evident, normal or natural character, which is essential for the operation of power. As Foucault (2000: 323) argues, to investigate ‘forms of rationality is sometimes more effective in unsettling our certitudes and dogmatism than is abstract criticism’. Rationalities, then, make a particular domain intelligible under certain descriptions and capable of being subjected to the exercize of power (Rose and Miller 1992: 178–81). They do not constitute unified categorical or logical systems of rules. Rather, they are made up of different, not always coherent concepts, assumptions, empirical observations and myths. Rationalities can be specified by zeroing in on, among other things, the particular assemblage of problems to be governed; the posited link between (the solution of) these problems and the life of the population; the strategies and tools considered appropriate for tackling the problems; the conceptions of the person to be subjected to governmental interventions; and the concretization of what constitutes good governance across different issue-areas. For instance, the already mentioned doctrines of both cameralism and liberalism are political rationalities that can be analysed using such a grid of specification. An analysis of this kind may draw on official documents (e.g. decisions, policy papers, programmes, proposals) and pronouncements by relevant policy makers and administrators. Notwithstanding the importance of representationalist analyses of the discursive orders which incite and enable the governance of populations in the name of liberal peace, by themselves such explorations do not go far enough in outing the power relations in peacebuilding. The question that remains to be asked is, how are such rationalities rendered operational? To answer this question it is necessary to go beyond discursive power and to explore the political technologies of peacebuilding that international actors employ in an attempt to affect the conduct of governments and peoples. Making governance practicable: Political technologies While political rationalities delimit a discursive field within which forms of governance such as peacebuilding are made thinkable, political technologies make discourse practicable. They translate the governmental ambitions embodied in political projects of improvement into the realm of action. By making these translations, and the technical means by which they are accomplished, the subject to be studied, governmentality theory enables researchers to zero in on the materiality of discourse. This concern with the discursive as it unfolds in practical interventions aimed at the right disposition of people and things is an important addition to the representationalist analysis of political rationalities. It brings into focus the heterogeneous and multiple technologies through which people are governed.

24 Power and governmentality Governmentality studies have identified numerous political technologies. Here we limit ourselves to discussing two broad types, which we will later use to organize our empirics. Technologies of agency attempt to make subjects into conscripts of particular forms of life by fostering certain skills, values and attitudes. For instance, a movement such as Alcoholics Anonymous uses self-help technologies, or technologies of the self, to empower its members to govern their sobriety (Valverde 1998). And the neoliberal state works, among other things, on the unemployed to enhance their ‘job readiness’, say, by instructing them on how to write resumes and applications or how to conduct themselves at job interviews (cf. Dean 1998). In our empirical chapters, we shall identify two technologies of agency employed by ESDP police missions to mould local police officers in line with Union standards of normality. As to technologies of performance, they work on organizational settings with a view to transforming them into controllable spaces within which people’s conduct can be optimized (Dean 1999). Thus, private firms may be rendered more governable by creating cost or profit centres, contracting out certain activities or subjecting them to external audits (Power 1997). And public administrations and service providers may be ‘responsibilized’ by changing their legal status and statutes to convert them into private contractors or, less radically, reorient them towards primarily pursuing economic and industrial concerns (cf. Meredyth 1998). In general, in today’s neoliberal climate, technologies of performance for private and public organizations converge as the latter are re-envisaged as enterprises. Later in the book, we shall show how ESDP police missions employ calculative techniques and legal norms to re-engineer police apparatuses in countries transiting from crisis in line with European standards of security and performativity. Cutting across the distinction between technologies of agency and performance is a more fundamental distinction between technologies designed to orchestrate the conduct of others and technologies of the self. Whereas in his earlier work, Foucault focused on how some govern others, in his later work he paid great attention to how individuals are implicated in their own un/freedom. In the concept of governmentality, he combined a concern with both aspects of government. Government, he argued, is not just about inciting, inducing, seducing, constraining or forcing people to do ‘what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself’ (Foucault 1993: 204). The governmentality framework is designed to pull the (re-)formation of subjectivity into the analysis of government, which thus becomes framed as the site where technologies of domination and selfformation intersect (Foucault 1988a: 19). ESDP police interventions, as we shall see, work both through external pressures and constraints on policing in target countries and through the enrolment of local police officers in the remaking of their own subjectivities.

Power and governmentality 25 Two final comments. First, political technologies of power share a common principle of operation: the norm. They deploy norms to order human multiplicities with a view to enhancing their productive and limiting their disruptive political capacity. They do so by specifying the correct functioning for specific individuals, say, professionals, pregnant mothers or the unemployed, and by setting the standards for the administration of populations, say, the manner in which they are educated, housed or policed. For Foucault, norms are thus a principal tool of power. They are both productive of normal subjectivities and modes of behaviour and restraining in their contingent delimitation of what is abnormal and thus needs to be controlled or repressed. Second, there is no fixed relationship between particular rationalities and technologies. Each of the latter can be programmed in different ways depending on the rationality to which it is articulated. It is only through a genealogical inquiry that it is possible to establish how certain technologies at certain times and in certain contexts come to be linked up to certain rationalities (Garland 1999: 39).

Limitations of governmentality theory Foucault’s sketch of governmentality and the full-blown research programme elaborated subsequently by others has been criticized for a variety of alleged limitations such as its dislocation of law from sites of governance, crypto-functionalism, linear rendering of the history of government, suppressed psychoanalysis or misspecification of the conceptual link between sovereignty, geopolitics and governmentality (Agamben 1998; Brenner 1994; Butler 1997; Dean 2004; Dupont and Pearce 2001; Smith 2000). Here we identify three other, interrelated features of current governmentality theory that constitute, from the perspective of this book, a weakness. It lacks a theory of power with emancipatory intent, is not concerned with the practical effects of political rationalities and has a limited understanding of critique. To begin with, governmentality scholarship suffers from a curious lack of critical engagement with issues of domination. The lack is curious because of Foucault’s life-long project of mapping the arbitrariness, privileges, excesses and dangers of power/knowledge. In its welcome attempt to go beyond a conception of power as merely repressive and to bring out its productivity, this innovate research provides somewhat sanitized accounts of the manifold ways (neo)liberalism governs bodies and ‘souls’ at a distance, even occasionally displaying a kind of admiration for its capacity to integrate the government of self with the government of others. Governmentality scholars, we submit, thus fall into the trap set by critics of Foucault such as Nancy Fraser. They voluntarily subscribe to an ethically vacuous and hence apolitical reading of liberal power, according to which it is productive, ineliminable and normatively neutral (Fraser 1989: 31). The problem we see in this stance is that ‘a theory of power with radical intent requires

26 Power and governmentality an account of that which power represses, since without such an account relations of power must cease to appear objectionable’ (Dews 1990: 145). Critics of Foucault argue that it is precisely such an account that is missing in Foucault. They attribute this absence to his nihilism or refusal to elaborate normative standards of critique. Without any principled baseline, his critical interrogation of relations of power is little more than ‘arbitrary partisanship’ (Habermas 1998: 276). While we dispute this claim, we do find it odd and unsatisfactory that written out of many governmentality accounts of contemporary forms of Western rule, or marginalized by them, is the fact that power ‘is always exerted in a particular direction, with some people on one side and some on the other’ (Foucault 1988b: 213). For Foucault, relations of power are productive as well as repressive (Bevir 1999: 350; Butler 1997; Connolly 1985: 371; Lemke, Krasmann and Bröckling 2000: 24; Simons 1996: 33). On this reading, governmentality designates a space of governance in which the negative and positive dimensions of power come together: structures of social control work through the production of individuals who act on themselves. By zeroing in on the productivity of power while neglecting its negative dimension, governmentality research renders this double-sided character of liberal governance largely invisible.15 Yet another limiting feature of most governmental readings of the political ordering of life is a disconnection of the study of mentalities of rule from the study of the social relations in which they are embedded and are translated into everyday practices (Stenson 1998: 334). Researchers deliberately eschew sociological realism, i.e. they concern themselves with the intellectual dimension of (neo-)liberalism rather than its practical implementation. The upshot is that they do not investigate how social control is really exercised. There is thus, as David Garland (1999: 31) points out, in governmentality studies a tendency to use empirical evidence philosophically to demonstrate that there are different ways of knowing, strategizing and organizing for action rather than to explore how rationalities and technologies work on reality so as to transform it. Although important, this work, therefore, has little to contribute to our understanding of how power works, concretely and in detail. Again this is a bit odd given that one of Foucault’s legacies is an impressive range of local conceptual devices that enable researchers to empirically engage micropolitical sites and practices with a view to excavating the capillaries of power that traverse them. Finally, governmentality scholars refuse to formulate reformatory discourses, i.e. there is an absence in these texts of policy advocacy aimed at reducing the element of asymmetry and inequality in government. This lack is theoretically justified by a narrow framing of critique. Critical research is limited to efforts to disturb those practices that are settled and to clear thinking space and open up possibilities that are foreclosed or suppressed by that which exists (cf. Burchell 1993; Dean 1999). Yet no alternative future is imagined. This stance shows a fidelity to a certain strand in Foucault. ‘Critique’, he argued at one occasion, ‘doesn’t have to be the premise of a

Power and governmentality 27 deduction which concludes: this then is what needs to be done.


It isn’t a stage in a programming. It is a challenge directed to what is’ (Foucault 1991c: 84). We believe that limiting governmentality theory to such a restricted form of critique, which seems to depreciate a politics of social improvement, unnecessarily and unproductively blunts the critical thrust that can be generated by this intellectual machine. Fortunately, there is also another strand in Foucault’s work, one that reveals a more far-reaching, constructive conception of critique that sketches out, however vaguely, an alternative to what exists. In what follows, we elucidate this normative Foucault.

A Foucauldian reformatory politics? We agree with Michael Walzer (1989), who, in engaging Foucault’s politics, argues that criticism requires a regulative principle and is oriented towards a better future. However, we disagree with him that such a principle has to take the form of a standardized or transcendentalized code. Is there any ‘post-modern’ principle in Foucault? As already mentioned, critics deny it. They accuse him of bracketing the ethical. One of them is Stephen White, who puts his discomfort with Foucault’s alleged nihilism in stark terms. Foucault, he complains, has no criteria for expressing a preference for the reformatory politics of the women’s movement over those of the Ku Klux Klan (White 1986: 430). While it is without doubt true that Foucault was distrustful of the theme of emancipation in so far as it refers ‘back to the idea that there does exist a nature or human foundation which


found itself concealed, alienated or imprisoned in and by some repressive mechanism’ (1994: 2), he was not without ethico-political horizon. It is of course correct that ‘Foucault does not propound a normative theory’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1989: 115). But what is missed by those who seize upon this absence is the positive political imagination running through (some of) Foucault’s work. Without entering the intricate debate about the precise nature of Foucault’s normativity, we align ourselves with those political theorists who find in Foucault a regulative, albeit post-humanist ideal, a ‘hypothetical universal’ as William Connolly (2002: 146) calls it. While this ethical stance can be formulated differently, the formulation best suited for the purpose of our book is that which focuses on power. As is well known, Foucault (1980: 142) claims that ‘power is co-extensive with the social body; there are no spaces of primal liberty’. Relations between subjects are always power relations. Hence, there is no interaction, not even a state of communication without constraints and coercive effects. Yet, at the same time Foucault is at pains to highlight that the play of power and freedom in human interaction can be calibrated in different ways. Power relations can be light, fluid and changeable, or they can be firmly set and congealed into a configuration in which the margin of liberty is limited. The former, Foucault tellingly refers to them as strategic games

28 Power and governmentality between liberties, are ‘not something bad in themselves, from which one must free one’s self’ (Foucault 1994: 18). Indeed, this is mission impossible. However, what is possible, and what Foucault valorizes, are institutional and interpersonal contexts in which people direct the conduct of others ‘with a minimum of domination’ (Foucault 1994: 18). What this calls for is a political ethics of resistance (Simons 1996), according to which a regime of power is to be judged in terms of whether or not it minimizes the possibilities for agonistic struggle between governors and governed. In Leslie Paul Thiele’s (1990: 918) commentary, for Foucault, ‘the ethicopolitical choice to be made every day consists in a judgement as to what form of power most threatens the possibility of its continued resistance’. The corollary is that there is a principled reformatory politics implied in Foucault’s work, one that ‘aims not for a world without power but to prevent the solidification of strategic relations into patterns of domination’ (Simons 1996: 4). Finally, both Foucault’s ethics and politics are inscribed in what Connolly (2002: 146–7) calls ontalogy – an anti-ontology that substitutes a disorderly, nomadic and dispersed multiplicity for the idea of intrinsic order seen to embody universal reason and truth. Thinking further along these lines, Foucault’s politics is aimed at fashioning political conditions that make critical engagements with relations of power possible. There is no polity without restrictions but limitations only become ethically objectionable for Foucault if those affected by them have no possibility of altering them (cf. Foucault, quoted in Thiele 1990: 918–19). Thus, the polity Foucault values is one that is made up of relations of power that enhance the possibility for the expression of difference (Coles 1992: 93). In this view, then, there is a certain, albeit limited affinity between Foucault’s political thinking and liberalism. While it nurtures the belief in its transcendental grounding, liberalism also protects and promotes the pursuit of criticism, including its own foundations (Schoolman 2002: xi–xii). Hence, liberal institutions and the ethos of democracy, if pushed towards their limit (and beyond?), can be used to advance, at least to an extent, the kind of agonistic politics Foucault advocates (Simons 1996; Connolly 2002).

Governmentality and peacebuilding In this book, we analyse peacebuilding as a field of governmentality. This allows us to bring together a series of insights, not all of them novel, which, if combined in one framework, provide some new interpretative purchase upon peacebuilding. To begin with, our conceptual move, which incorporates the critique and corrections of governmentality theory just outlined, brings into relief the double-sided nature of peacebuilding. It is an expression of the care for others, a concrete manifestation of a global civilizing process which limits the moral and political significance of the difference between citizens and foreigners. Yet, and this is the other side, it also exemplifies a technologized, control-oriented approach to the

Power and governmentality 29 (re-)construction of territorialized order and justice. A second, closely related advantage is that it makes available for analysis both the totalizing and the individualizing character of peacebuilding. It is totalizing in the sense that potentially every aspect of conflict-ridden societies, from school curricula to electoral systems, may be targeted for improvement as international peacebuilders seek to address the root causes of communal instability and violence. It is individualizing in the sense that it applies itself to everyday life by acting upon the very soul, i.e. individuality of subjects and citizens. In the name of the manifold correlates of liberal peace, they are placed under surveillance, categorized, ordered, disciplined, trained and enframed by Western-style institutions. Third, by bringing into focus the knowledges enfolded in peacebuilding and the polymorphous and often banal procedures implementing them, a governmentality approach allows researchers to analyse the quotidian functioning of the micro-physical power in such international projects of improvement and to unmask the effects of unfreedom produced and sustained by the norms they diffuse. The approach thus enables a more practice-oriented, fine-grained and de-centred analysis of the texture of power than is found in much of the literature. Fourth, a governmental framing of peacebuilding brings into focus how even apparently weak peacebuilding missions, which lack big sticks and juicy carrots, are able to mobilize non-sovereign forms of power that evade and undermine the material, juridical and diplomatic limitations placed on them. Finally, our reading of Foucault’s politico-ethical project adds an evaluative and prescriptive element to governmentality research. As we shall argue in the next section, this allows us to ask whether the power relations that peacebuilding operations institute are justifiable. Moreover, such an ethical dimension enables us to formulate a reform agenda that promises not the utopia of a peacebuilding beyond power but the reduction of the element of non-consensuality in it. A prerequisite for this policy advocacy is a focus on empirics that goes beyond the dominant concern in governmentality research with policy schemes and inscription devices – reports, statistics, diagrams, charts and so forth. To interrogate and reform the power in peacebuilding, a more comprehensive map is needed of its manifold, often subterranean conduits that traverse those sites where a domestic order of liberal peace is constructed under the guidance of internationals. Hence, in this book we combine an analysis of the styles of reasoning informing ESDP police aid with an exploration of how precisely the EU implements its projects of improvement.

The peacebuilding dilemma Political rationalities can be interrogated at different levels of generality. Here we argue that there is a particular type of rationality implemented in contemporary peacebuilding. In subsequent chapters, we shall explore more

30 Power and governmentality concrete forms of thought inscribed in the civilian ESDP and, still at a lower level of abstraction, ESDP police interventions. Our argument at this point is that the international projects of improvement that are peacebuilding are enfolded in a rationality that is characterized by a particular admixture in liberal thought of elements of the pastorate. This hybrid political rationality is not unique to peacebuilding. It is a manifestation of the ‘daemonic’ coupling of the political pastorate and liberalism that Foucault regarded as characteristic of modern governmentalities. Indeed, one can even go further and argue that despotism is an inextricable part of liberalism: there is a pastorate at the very core of liberal freedom (Dean 2002; Hindess 2001a; Valverde 1996). In any case, the point we want to make here is that because of the rationality inscribed in it, peacebuilding is caught in a fundamental dilemma. While there is no solution to it, its effects can be ameliorated. Before expanding on this argument, we briefly describe the two political rationalities inscribed in peacebuilding. Foucault employed the metaphor of the Christian institution of the pastorate to describe a secular rationality of power that is based on the detailed knowledge and comprehensive regulation of those subjected to it (Foucault 1982: 214–15; also Hindess 2001b: 118–23). At the core of the pastorate is a paternalistic order of difference. Its figures are, metaphorically speaking, the shepherd, a distinct and superior kind of being, and the flock to be cultivated and protected. The members of the flock are imagined to lack the habit of or aptitude for making responsible choices. Hence, they are in need of constant surveillance and hierarchically administered benevolence. The effect, albeit not necessarily the intention of the political pastorship, is to constitute subjects as inferior and dependent things (Hindess 1997: 267). This conception of the subjects of rule stands in stark contrast to that circulating in liberalism. Liberalism, in our Foucauldian rendering, is a rationality of power that imagines a form of governance that operates through the activation of the autonomy of citizens and the promotion of certain kinds of freedom from governmental interference. Hence, liberal subjects are expected to be active participants in their own government and to assume responsibility for their own welfare and security. The valorization of individual liberty notwithstanding, liberal political reasoning seeks to recruit freedom for governmental purposes (Hindess 2001a: 100). It dreams of making up free citizens capable of bearing a particular, regulated freedom. As we discussed earlier, modern governmentalities link the government of individual comportment to the government of macro-structures such as the economy in an effort to ensure that the liberty of the former does not undermine the security of the latter and vice versa. Yet even though liberal freedom understood in this Foucauldian sense implies a process of subjectification, the liberal subject is in a non-negligible sense freer than the pastoral subject. It is not only the object of government as in the pastorate, but also the partner and accomplice of government (cf. Burchell 1993: 271).

Power and governmentality 31 Contemporary peacebuilding is underpinned by a rationality that joins, albeit uneasily, elements of both the pastorate and liberalism. It assembles heterogeneous programmes and technologies with a view to promoting liberty through practices of unfreedom. The underlying assumption is that a period of pastoral discipline and administration is needed to inculcate habits of responsible choice into natives and install institutional capacities for liberal peace in violently divided societies. Normatively speaking, the risk is that the pastorate in peacebuilding becomes too strong and the liberal freedom that is the goal of the project of improvement is reduced to an artefact, a freedom that is choreographed under the pastoral guidance of foreigners and thus difficult to see as freedom at all. The odds that this happens are raised by the fact that peacebuilding tends to be committed to the universal in the form of notions such as good governance, best practice and so forth. The likely albeit by no means inevitable effect of the fact that the pastoral improvement of locals is wedded to universal aspirations is that peacebuilders are reluctant to reformulate their goals and projects in line with indigenous values, interests and dreams and to refrain from limiting the space available for any other modernity than that envisaged by them. It is at this point that the dilemma mentioned earlier comes clearly into view. How can peacebuilding be committed to liberty as a condition of the security of liberal peace, and shape individual conduct and its institutional conditions with a view to fostering ‘free’ choices that are in conformity with Western standards of civility, order(liness), good governance and other correlates of peace? There is no principled solution to this dilemma. The free persons posited by peacebuilding are always already situated in subject-moulding networks of power/knowledge. Yet while the dissolution of the dilemma is impossible, certain specific transformations are possible that lead to a minimum of domination. We suggest that such transformations can be effected by amplifying an important facet of the liberal rationality of contemporary peacebuilding. A principal element of any liberal rationality is its inclination to interrogate the goals and methods of government. It warns of too much government and councils limitation and restraint. Liberalism, in this framing, is ‘an instrument for the criticism of reality’ (Foucault, quoted in Gordon 1991: 18). Here we argue that by bringing the critical ethos of liberalism into temporary alignment with Foucault’s ethics, one can amplify the former and use it to interrogate universalizing peacebuilding practices that lead to the congealment of relations of power into patterns of domination. Hence, an ethically reinforced governmentality theory makes possible an immanent critique of peacebuilding. It allows researchers, first, to identify whether there is too much government in a particular regime of peacebuilding and, second, to develop a more laissez-faire approach that is responsive to the subaltern demand for a future constructed in its own vernacular image (Scott 1999). In short, our argument is that governmentality theory can give voice to the critique of the pastorate in peacebuilding

32 Power and governmentality provided it is ‘wedded to a firm normative commitment to enhance and provide vigilant defence of liberal institutions and values against attack from within and from outside’ (Stenson 1998: 338). While such an articulation may seem far-fetched, there is, as we discussed earlier, a certain correspondence between Foucault’s political ethics and a more general ethos of liberal democracy.

3

The EU’s peace support agenda The development of ESDP policy machinery, capabilities and styles of thought

In the context of international security governance, the development of the ESDP has arguably been ‘one of the great political revolutions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’ (Webber et al. 2004: 19). In this chapter, we examine the material, political and ideational dimensions of this process, which led, in 2005, to the deployment of 10 peace support operations on three continents.1 While we agree with the claim that from its inception European integration ‘was about security as much as it was about economic integration’ (Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith 2000: 38), it would be wrong, as the quote with which we opened the chapter suggests, to see the construction of the ESDP as the inevitable outcome of a developmental process that began in the 1950s. This would attribute a teleology to the Western European security narrative and practice that disregards the discontinuities and the element of chance that has been pervading their unfolding. The chapter falls into four parts. We begin by exploring what Jolyon Howorth (2004a) calls the transformative discourse of European security policy that led to the creation of the ESDP. What were the conditions and events that prompted the member states to problematize the EU’s existing foreign policy tools and to launch the ESDP? Given the concern of this book, we pay particular attention to how the policy came to embody a commitment to peace support operations. Next, we outline the development of ESDP military and civilian capabilities and the allied policy machinery. In the third part, we inquire into the ideational dimension of the EU’s role conception as peacebuilder, limiting ourselves to its civilian aspects. We explore the evolving peacebuilding concepts of the EU and bring into relief the governmental ambitions inscribed in them. We conclude the chapter by discussing the broader epistemic changes in world politics that made these ambitions possible.

European security integration: A slow and inconspicuous beginning For decades the EC did not extend the integration project into the field of its security relations with non-member states. Efforts to do so were made

34 The EU’s peace support agenda but they came to naught. In the early 1950s the development of a supranational European Defence Community was blocked by France, and the Fouchet plan of the 1960s, which envisaged the creation of a common European, albeit intergovernmental security policy failed to gather any political momentum. It was only in the 1970s that foreign policy was added to the existing integration agenda. European Political Co-operation (EPC), which was launched in 1969, proved one of the few modest success stories in the 1970s and early 1980s (Regelsberger, de Schoutheete de Tervarant and Wessels 1997). An apparatus and habit for the exchange of information, consultation and policy co-ordination was developed, which enabled the EC to present common positions on a number of international issues, notably in the United Nations and the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The resulting EFP was mainly declaratory in nature, issuing ‘communiques replete with enough rhetoric to rattle the windows of chancelleries around the world’ (Patten 2000). When it came to taking action, especially important action, decisions were mostly made separately rather than jointly. Moreover, security was firmly kept off the agenda. To counter the perceived military threat by the Soviet Union, the members of the EC coupled their defence policies with that of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its hegemon, the United States, or kept it under national control as in the case of France. This state of affairs allowed or constrained the EC, depending on one’s viewpoint, to develop into what many saw as the quintessential civilian power (Manners 2002; Smith 1998). The end of the bipolar confrontation opened the way for re-writing the EPC. With the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, signed in February 1992 and in force since November 1993, the member states upgraded their joint capacity for foreign policy co-operation by assembling new instruments and decision-making procedures under the label of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Duke 2000; Nuttall 2000; Peterson and Sjursen 1998). For the first time, security was written into the remit of the EU; the treaty even envisaged that in time the EU might develop a common defence. A series of factors combined to create an opening for a stronger European profile in the foreign and security field. Key among them was the end of the Cold War, which revolutionized the international structure within which the EC interacted with the wider world. The disappearance of the (perceived) Soviet threat in the East enlarged the space for independent EFP actions. Moreover, the new Euro-Atlantic outlook of Eastern European states and the uncertainties and instability associated with the monumental political changes in the region instilled a new sense of collective responsibility for pan-European affairs in EC members. A crucial factor internal to the club was the argument of leaders such as President Mitterrand of France and Chancellor Kohl of Germany that the move towards a single currency, itself animated by a number of economic and political motives, had to be balanced out by making progress towards political union, including closer co-operation in foreign and security affairs. A principal impetus behind this

The EU’s peace support agenda 35 démarche was to make Europe fit for a re-unified Germany by embedding its foreign policy in an EU foreign policy. Finally, the process of socialization among foreign policy-makers and diplomats that was set in motion by the EPC created a constituency for further integration in this issue-area. With the Maastricht Treaty the EU ended a decade-old political taboo and explicitly committed itself to integration in the security field. But would the CFSP replicate the slow, tortuous and ultimately stunted development of the EPC or mark the beginning of the EU as an actor in the security field? At first it seemed that the CFSP did little more than to signal the intent of the EU to move beyond a civilian power Europe (Treacher 2004: 55; Whitman 1998: 135–6). The Treaty was strong on commitments and short on elaborating the capabilities needed to achieve its goals. Yet an unexpected development intervened to advance the CFSP: the EU’s travails to secure peace in Croatia and Bosnia.

The development of the EU’s peace support agenda In the summer of 1991, Yugoslavia descended into war with ethnic fighting breaking out first in Croatia and then in Bosnia. The EC expected, and publicly stated, that it would take the lead role in re-establishing peace. The then Luxembourg foreign minister, Jacques Poos, holder of the rotating EC presidency, boldly declared that ‘the hour of Europe’ had come. He and his colleagues intended to rely on the magnetic pull of the EC, holding out the carrot of establishing special associations with countries committed to peace and democratic reforms. Moreover, Brussels possessed an array of civilian crisis management and conflict prevention instruments including coercive diplomacy, notably economic sanctions. Finally, the Maastricht Treaty further upgraded the Union’s diplomatic means and even provided for a military option to project stability abroad. If the parties to the conflict were recalcitrant, the EU could, at least in theory, request the Western European Union (WEU) to impose peace by force. In short, it did not seem unreasonable to assume that the EC/EU would be able to exert a powerful influence in the Western Balkans. And while Brussels initially did have some diplomatic success in limiting the conflict, its impact was short-lived (White 2001: 108). As Yugoslavia violently disintegrated, a deadly gap opened up between diplomacy and force (Ginsberg 2001: 58). In the absence of a consensus to employ the WEU, the EC/EU ceased to play an independent role in the peacemaking efforts. It was reduced to the role of bystander, looking on as powerful states bilaterally and through clubs such as NATO and the Contact Group – the USA, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and Germany – brought the fighting to an end. It would have been quite understandable if the conclusion the EU drew from its experience was to stick with what it was good at by devoting its energy and resources towards ends such as the deepening of the single market, the widening of its membership or the development of its

36 The EU’s peace support agenda international profile as a civilian power. But this was not the case. In a seemingly accidental fashion, without a guiding strategy and in spite of the divergent meanings attached by different EU players to specific events in the Western Balkans, there slowly emerged a communauté des vues, comprising foreign policy elites in chancelleries, foreign and defence ministries and think tanks, on how to read the Union’s performance in the conflict. It was a problem requiring political attention and corrective action, though at this time there was no consensus yet on the form such reforms should take. A series of dynamics were at play in the problematization by Europeans of their role in the former Yugoslavia. To begin with, frustration over their collective performance prompted many EU member states to reconsider their position on European security integration. While countries such as France had for some time been advocates of a stronger security role for the EU, others had until the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia seen little reason to seriously look at the option of developing Europe’s actorness in the field of military security.2 The experience of being powerless to stop war and disorder in their neighbourhood, the tensions between them and the United States over how best to deal with the conflict in Bosnia and the absence of any meaningful European input into the peace negotiations in Dayton, where American unilateralism prevailed, provided the impetus for a number of EU policy makers and shapers to rethink established security policies. Yet another factor animating the problematization by Europeans of their experience in Yugoslavia had to do with identity. In particular for Germany, Europe’s collective failure to stop the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and the ensuing ethnic cleansing resonated powerfully with its guilt-ridden antiNazi identity and its memories of German atrocities in the region during the Second World War. Europe, in this view, should never be powerless again in the face of evil beyond its borders. The EU’s corporate identity made a difference too. Over the years the EC/EU gradually developed and concretized a self-understanding according to which it had the cosmopolitan obligation to prevent massive human rights violations abroad and to assist third countries in building decent polities.3 The disjuncture between its professed identity and its inability to act on it, a disjuncture that had been made clearly visible by developments in the Balkans, was a potent source of policy frustration for the EU and a reason for policy entrepreneurs to look for innovative solutions. There was also a degree of functionalist reasoning involved in the interpretation of Europe’s record in Yugoslavia. This applies first and foremost to the European Commission. It had prided itself in being a new kind of global actor, one that conceived of security in broad terms and thus approached civil strife not as a military challenge but from the vantage point of conflict prevention and resolution, using means such as aid and trade. Events in the Western Balkans as well as in the Great Lake region in Africa prompted a re-evaluation of this stance. In particular the siege of Sarajevo was taken

The EU’s peace support agenda 37 by Commission officials to mean that in countries embroiled in violent conflict the ability of international actors to carry out humanitarian and other civilian tasks depended on having recourse to force as the ultimo ratio, for instance to keep supply routes open. Therefore, if the EU preserved its pristine status as a civilian power, founded on economic prowess and diplomacy, then it would confine itself to a marginal role in the new international politics of peacebuilding. As one joint paper of the Council of the EU and European Commission (2002) expressed this new view, the use of troops for civilian tasks in war zones was a key component of international action and instrumental to its success (cf. also Patten 1999b). In short, developments on the ground led to the perception on part of the Commission of a functional linkage among different conflict management instruments. Last but not least, the construction of EC/EU conduct in Yugoslavia as a problem worthy of political reflection has to be seen in the broader epistemic context of international politics in the 1990s, which was significantly shaped by the violence in the Balkans. The member states as well as the European Commission regarded the wars in the former Yugoslavia as a harbinger of things to come rather than exceptional cases. This was in line with the conclusions drawn about the future of war both by other international actors and by many in the scholarly community: conflicts fuelled by identity or ethnicity issues were features endemic to post-Cold War international politics (Kaldor 1999; for a critical view, see Duffield 2005). Hence, if the EU wanted to pursue an ethical foreign policy that promoted humanitarian objectives, then it required both civilian and military assets to act under fire in zones of war and instability (Pappas and Vanhoonacker 1996; Zielonka 1998: 11). By inscribing a Hobbesian subtext in its traditionally liberal reading of world politics with its emphasis on reason and progress, normative power Europe incited itself to develop the means to intervene in future eruptions of illiberal violence. The violent disintegration of Yugoslav, then, left a powerful imprint on the EU. First, governments realized that they had to co-operate more closely to become more effective players in the security field. Second, the nature of their experience in relation to which they problematized their security ambitions ensured that proposals to remedy the identified shortfalls would be framed primarily, albeit not exclusively, in terms of peace support operations. Thus the issue of territorial defence, which had been one of the principal stumbling blocs standing in the way of elaborating the ‘S’ in the CFSP, was largely written out of the new EU security agenda that, in the wake of the war in Bosnia, began to gain momentum. Yet this convergence of views notwithstanding, there remained important policy differences among member states. Two basic options for the Europeanization of security were on the table. One was to give the EU an autonomous military capability, the other was to build-up and strengthen a separate European military identity within NATO. In particular the United Kingdom argued for the latter option, calling for

38 The EU’s peace support agenda the development within the transatlantic alliance of what was known as the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The stalemate between these two conflicting perspectives resulted in a gap between rhetoric and capabilities in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (entry into force in May 1999), which created a new role conception for the EU without providing it with the means to act on it. On the one hand, the member states agreed to formalize the Union’s newly fashioned commitment to peace support operations by incorporating the Petersberg tasks, which had been agreed in 1992 by the Council of Ministers of the WEU, into the treaty.4 On the other hand, they did little to equip the EU to act on its new treaty responsibilities: ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis situations, including peacemaking’. Among the moderate measures taken was the creation of the position of High Representative for the CFSP, of EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) and of new decision-making procedures such as the principle of constructive abstention. Also, the Amsterdam Treaty defined a new policy instrument – common strategies – to enhance the coherence of EFP across EU pillars. Finally, while the treaty nudged the EU a bit closer to the WEU by including new language in article 17 (Wessel 2003: 272), this fell short of a merger between the two institutions, which would have provided the EU with a degree of actorness on the field of military security. The merger proposal, which was supported by a majority of member states, was vetoed by the United Kingdom. The new Labour government of Tony Blair, following the policy script of its conservative predecessors, argued that such a move would weaken NATO. Only a year later, London’s security policy followed a very different script.

St Malo: A breakthrough for military peace support operations At the end of 1998, the lingering doubts about the EU’s security ambition were dramatically pushed aside. At the Franco-British summit in St Malo, which took place in the context of Western preparations for military intervention in Kosovo, the two governments called for an autonomous European military capacity ‘in order that its voice be heard in the world’ (EU ISS 2001).5 With their declaration, the two militarily most powerful EU members put an end to their cultivated ambiguity as regards an operational European security policy. Both countries committed themselves to move beyond declaratory policy and develop the EU into a military actor in its own right.6 What were the arguments that figured in this policy shift? Realist intergovernmentalism with its focus on national interests defined in material terms identifies important factors that worked as reasons for change in this case. To begin with, key decision-makers in both London and Paris began to argue that, in view of insufficient national military assets, it was in their interest to render the EU capable of filling the geopolitical vacuum in places like the Balkans and Africa where the United States had few national

The EU’s peace support agenda 39 interests at stake. The ability jointly to project power was framed as an issue of international order and security on which the Europeans, out of self-interest (political, security, economic), had to take action. On a related note, the two governments warned against the post-Cold War creation of an international division of labour according to which the United States is responsible for war-fighting and the Europeans are allocated the task of humanitarian and development assistance. Yet this shared understanding as to why it was incumbent upon the EU to acquire the means for autonomous military action notwithstanding, London and Paris interpreted the ends towards which security integration was to be directed in very different terms. In the United Kingdom, the new Labour government, which was less Euro-sceptic than its conservative predecessor, became convinced that there was a real danger that the United States might be tempted to disengage militarily from the continent if no significantly greater European military input into the transatlantic alliance was forthcoming. Hence, London saw in the transformation of the EU into a ‘hard’ security actor a means to strengthen transatlantic relations and prop up NATO.7 According to this logic, if the EU continued to refuse to heed Washington’s call for greater European military burden-sharing, the alliance might have no future. ‘We Europeans’, Prime Minister Blair (1999) declared, ‘should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our own backyard. The EU should be able to take on some security tasks on our own.’ The government’s concern was further heightened by the realization, prompted by military contingency planning for possible intervention in the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, which in 1998 began to slowly spiral out of control, that the Europeans once again would be heavily dependent on American capabilities if a decision should be taken to mount a military campaign to stop the bloodshed in the Serbian province. On a more subterranean level, the intellectual ground for the St Malo paradigm shift in British security thinking was prepared by a small group of senior government officials who, in the wake of the war in Bosnia, had begun, just like their continental counterparts, to reconsider the need for a militarily more autonomous Europe (Howorth 2004a). However, it was only under the less Euro-sceptic Labour government that their political masters began to listen to their advice. In short, within a year of coming to power, the new government turned British policy on European security on its head. Having initially followed the lead of the preceding conservative governments, which rejected European security integration as a threat to NATO, Prime Minister Blair soon became one of its demandeurs.8 The new official view was that the development of military power Europe was good for NATO. As to the French, the St Malo initiative did not represent a paradigm shift even though it required a far-reaching internal military transformation including the creation of a professional army (Howorth 2004a). In the wake of the end of the Cold War, Paris had returned its attention to the

40 The EU’s peace support agenda traditional Gaullist objective of advancing France’s international influence by making Western Europe politically and strategically more autonomous. The Anglo-French agreement marked a discontinuity with this long-standing goal only to the extent that France decided to rely on the United Kingdom rather than Germany as the principal partner in this endeavour. Thus, in contrast to Whitehall, the Quai d’Orsay interpreted the St Malo démarche not as a mission to save NATO. Rather, it viewed it as a first step in the emancipation of the EU in security affairs from excessive dependence on the United States.9 Clearly, the St Malo agreement is a polyvalent text that was (and continues to be) read differently in Paris and London.

The Europeanization of the Anglo-French démarche and civilian peacebuilding If the St Malo initiative was to have an impact on the Union’s security policy, it needed the support of other EU players. In particular, Germany’s backing was indispensable. Without its political, financial and military contributions, European security integration could not succeed. Yet, as we shall see later, small countries such as Sweden and Finland, too, played an important role in the process of Europeanizing the St Malo accord. They supported its focus on the creation of what Anne Deighton (2000) calls a military security pool but insisted that the EU also develops civilian peacebuilding tools. The context in which the Europeanization of St Malo unfolded was the violence perpetrated by Serbian forces in Kosovo. The failure of diplomacy and economic sanctions to stop the bloodshed provided a powerful refresher of EU memories of impotence in the face of armed conflict. Germany fully supported the Anglo-French démarche. In the wake of the country’s re-unification, Berlin’s security narrative began to stress the need to adapt the country’s policy to enable it to contribute more effectively to multilateral efforts to tackle European and global security challenges. This development was reinforced rather than stopped when the conservative government of Helmut Kohl was succeeded by Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer, who, in 1998, formed the first-ever red-green coalition government at the federal level. The pragmatic Social Democrats headed by politicians born after the Second World War readily espoused the idea that in the new post-Cold War security environment the EU had to develop military capabilities and that Germany had to fully support such a project. For instance, at the first joint meeting of EU foreign and defence ministers, the then German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping expressed his hope that within three years the EU would have the military wherewithal to be an effective international crisis manager and peacebuilder (Cross and Nassauer 1999). As to the more idealistic Green party, its support of a military ESDP represented a major turnaround (Hockenos 2004). In their 1998 campaign platform, they still called for a demilitarized Europe. Joschka Fischer was

The EU’s peace support agenda 41 crucial in ensuring that the Greens aligned with the Social Democrats in supporting NATO’s military campaign in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 and in agreeing to send German combat troops abroad for the first time since 1945. For the former pacifist Fischer, the military intervention in Kosovo was a legitimate and necessary last resort to stop barbarism and defend human rights, a view that resonated widely in a Germany still haunted by memories of the atrocities committed by the Nazis. The reassessment of the morality of using force in the former Yugoslavia ushered in a broader ideological realignment of the Green party, which, in turn, allowed the coalition government to turn German participation in international peace operations and the construction of the ESDP into a defining characteristic of its foreign policy.10 With the three main players in the EU firmly behind St Malo, and against the backdrop of the NATO campaign in Kosovo, which vividly reminded the Europeans of their military dependency on the USA (Shepherd 2003), the Cologne European Council in June 1999 took the first step in the transposition of the Anglo-French initiative into the acquis politique of the EU.11 Drawing on the language of the St Malo declaration, the member states agreed on the need to upgrade the CFSP by developing a ‘capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies’. Yet while this move was more or less strongly supported by all governments, some expressed concern that at the moment when the EU took the first practical steps to equip itself with the means to carry out peace missions, there was the distinct possibility that it would only acquire the attributes of a military security actor. These countries, especially Sweden, were not militating against ‘hard power’. Rather, they wanted to ensure that in elaborating the ‘S’ in CFSP, the EU would not simply go military but adopt a holistic view of peace support operations that brought together military and civilian dimensions (cf. Cross and Nassauer 1999; Debiel and Fischer 2000). Reflecting this demand, the Cologne Summit tasked the incoming presidency to elaborate plans for the improvement of both joint military and non-military crisis response tools. Six months later at the Helsinki European Council, the presidency submitted two separate reports on ways to develop crisis management capabilities in the military and civilian field that would put the EU in a position to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks.12 At the same time, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy tabled a joint proposal on the acquisition by the EU of military capabilities in line with an earlier initiative by London to adopt a headline goal for the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Thus, when, at the summit, the member states deliberated about a European security policy, they did so on the basis of texts covering both the military and the civilian aspects of peace support operations. Moreover, each of these texts had its own advocates among member states. The upshot was that the history-making decisions taken in Helsinki constitute an ‘intertext’, which fuses military and civilian security thinking.

42 The EU’s peace support agenda In short, the Helsinki European Council, while taking advantage of the momentum generated by the St Malo initiative, moved the EU clearly and irrevocably beyond the Anglo-French accord with its emphasis on ‘hard’ security policy.13 Since the Helsinki summit, the ESDP has come a long way. It has developed an integrationist dynamism that stands out in the overall malaise that has come to characterize other dimensions of the European project.14 While not without reversals (such as the temporary renationalization of member states’ security policies in the wake of 9/11) and remaining gaps (such as the lack of sufficient numbers of rapidly deployable and qualified civilian crisis management personnel), the process of giving the EU political and military autonomy in the security field has without doubt advanced significantly. In the next section, we turn to what Chris Patten called the ‘test by which ESDP will stand or fail’, i.e. the willingness of member states to back their ambitions with the necessary means (Patten 2000).

The evolving institutional machinery and capabilities of the ESDP The linchpin of the ESDP is the High Representative for the CFSP, who also acts as the Secretary-General of the Council. The office holder is charged with contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of Council decisions in matters falling under the CFSP as codified in Title V of the Treaty on European Union. By appointing Javier Solana, who had previously gained considerable international status as NATO Secretary-General, to the new post, the member states demonstrated that they wanted a strong leader capable of providing the necessary political and strategic impetus for realizing the EU’s international security ambitions.15 The High Representative is supported by the Council Secretariat, which has itself significant agenda-setting power in EU policy-making through its role in preparing meetings of all Council bodies, and by a newly created Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, or Policy Unit for short. Tasked with providing a longer-term horizon to foreign policy making, the Policy Unit, which is primarily comprised of diplomatic representatives of member states, quickly established strong credentials under the dynamic leadership of its first director Christoph Heusgen, and it evolved into Solana’s extended cabinet. Following the enlargement of the EU and in anticipation of the European External Action Service,16 the Policy Unit, however, was stripped of its privileged role. Although its corporate identity is retained (for the moment), its individual task forces, save those dealing with the so-called ‘horizontal issues’ such as human rights and conflict prevention, were merged with the respective units of the General Secretariat of the Council. The main components of the intergovernmental machinery in charge of the military ESDP were agreed in principle at the Helsinki European Council. The principal decision-shaping body is the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which comprises senior-level diplomats. It is a ‘dual-use’ committee,

The EU’s peace support agenda 43 through which both military and civilian crisis management decisions, as well as all other aspects of the CFSP, are channelled. The PSC (or COPS as it is known by its French acronym) maintains a privileged link with the High Representative for the CFSP and the EUSRs, and it ensures full political control of and provides strategic direction to all ESDP operations. The security committee is supported by two military bodies. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC), which is made up of the chiefs of defence or their delegates, provides military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC. The European Union Military Staff (EUMS), working under the direction of the EUMC, is mandated to support the ESDP by providing military expertise, including in operational matters, to the Council. To this end, it carries out early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for the military aspects of Petersberg tasks. The EUMS consists of military personnel seconded to the General Secretariat. Both the structure of the EUMC and the EUMS closely mirror that of NATO.17 While the Helsinki Council created an organizational infrastructure in the Council in support of the military aspects of the ESDP, it did not take similar steps in the civilian field.18 This was not due to fundamental political disagreement among member states but to a lack of preparatory work. Hence, a few months later, at the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000, the decision to establish the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom) was taken. Civcom, which is made up of mid-level representatives of the permanent representations of member states in Brussels, reinforced if necessary by experts from the capitals, is mandated to advise the PSC on the civilian aspects of second-pillar and member states’ crisis management activities. It is an inter-pillar structure that operates within the single institutional framework of the Union, which means that part of its role is to ensure inter-pillar coherence in civilian peacebuilding.19 In the years following the Helsinki summit, this basic organizational infrastructure was reinforced by a number of additional, lower-level organs aimed at improving the operational capacity of the ESDP. The satellite centre and the institute of security studies were transferred from the WEU to the EU in order to support its actions, especially in the area of the ESDP.20 A joint situation centre, which monitors and assesses the situation around the world on a 24-hour basis, provides analysis to policy-makers in Brussels as well as EU actors in theatre, especially the EUSRs and ESDP operations. Reflecting the special status of EU policing in the civilian ESDP, a Police Unit was established within the Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management in the Council Secretariat to give the Union the capacity to plan and conduct police missions.21 In co-operation with Civcom, the Police Unit developed the principal planning documents for police interventions, especially the doctrinal guidelines for the command and control of missions and generic mission concepts. Although some observers initially argued that the Police Unit remained relatively isolated in the Council Secretariat (Woolbridge

44 The EU’s peace support agenda 2001: 5), this is no longer, if it ever was, the case. The body works closely with the Policy Unit and other Council Secretariat structures on issues of common concern.22 To facilitate EU-NATO co-operation, in particular when the former draws on assets of the latter under the Berlin-plus agreement, an EU cell was set up at NATO military headquarters in Mons.23 Further important institutional upgrades include a civilian/military cell within the EUMS, which enhances the Union’s capacity for the strategic planning and co-ordination of peace support and other crisis management operations involving both civilian and military tools, and a non-permanent operations centre which can be activated on an ad-hoc basis to run stand-alone or combined military and civilian missions. Unlike in the case of the Police Unit, which first elaborated generic concept papers and only then proceeded with planning actual operations, the newly established civilian/military cell had to adopt a different approach of ‘doctrine follows practice’ as its first task was to plan the EU monitoring mission in Aceh. Turning to the issue of capabilities, the Helsinki European Council agreed a military headline goal of 50,000–60,000 troops to be achieved by 2003. The corps-sized force, which, as the summit declaration stated, was not intended to be the nucleus of a future European army, was envisaged as the EU’s vehicle to conduct the full range of Petersberg tasks. The force was expected to be deployable within 60 days and sustainable for up to a year. To operationalize the headline goal, pledging conferences were organized at which member states committed, on a voluntary basis, military assets to the ESDP. The operational shortfalls identified at these occasions prompted the EU at the end of 2001 to put in place a complex capability development process, whose key component is the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP).24 Notwithstanding the measures taken in the context of the action plan, the ambitious Helsinki Headline Goal was not achieved by the deadline, even though the ESDP was declared partly operational at the European Council in Laeken in December 2001 – an announcement which Christopher Hill (2004: 157) called ‘risibly premature’.25 In the wake of the adoption of the EU security strategy at the end of 2003, which elaborates the role the EU wishes to play in international security, the Union decided finally to get serious about addressing its notorious ‘capability–expectations gap’ (Hill 1993). It set a new, more realistic military headline goal, focusing on improving the interoperability, deployability and sustainability of ESDP forces.26 The key hardware-related components of the Headline Goal 2010 are the development of self-sustainable national and multinational battalion-sized battle groups and improvements in global strategic lift. So far good progress has been made in developing the battle groups, which are ideally suited for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacebuilding and peace enforcement in low-intensity warfare.27 By 2007, the EU is set to have the capacity to run two battle-group-sized operations concurrently. Finally, just as in the case of the original, the new headline goal is to

The EU’s peace support agenda 45 be achieved primarily through the ECAP. However, to inject more political momentum into, and to ensure a more systematic approach to, the capability development process, the action plan’s implementation is supervised and guided by the European Defence Agency, which was itself set up in the context of the Headline Goal 2010.28 As to the development of civilian assets, at the Helsinki European Council the member states committed themselves to establish a common rapid reaction capability including, as a priority, the capacity to deploy civilian police missions. In addition to policing, three more priorities areas were shortly thereafter identified as worthy of political attention by the European Council in Feira: assistance in support of the rule of law, support for civilian administration and civil protection. The decision at the June 2000 summit to focus on developing capabilities in these areas was not founded upon an analytical assessment of likely peacebuilding scenarios and the tools they called for. Rather, it was based on a study, carried out under the Portuguese Presidency, which surveyed the areas of civilian crisis management in which the member states had substantial resources and accumulated experience through their participation in international peace missions. Singling out EU policing, the Feira Summit adopted a civilian headline goal that called on member states to develop the capacity to provide up to 5000 police officers for ESDP missions by 2003. Besides this overall goal, member states pledged a rapid reaction capability, consisting of up to 1000 officers deployable within 30 days. Finally, going beyond quantitative targets, the headline goal urged member states to ensure that ESDP missions set new quality standards for international police reforms, notably by elaborating management tools that assist member states in seconding only well-trained and experienced officers with the required expertise. The quantitative target was reached, at least on paper, at a ministerial-level police capabilities conference in the fall of 2001. A further milestone in the development of the civilian ESDP was the Göteborg European Summit in June 2001. Besides adopting a Police Action Plan that specified the steps that had to be taken to render EU policing operational,29 the summit set concrete targets for the three other priority areas identified in Feira. As foreseen, the targets were met by the end of 2003. Beginning with civil protection, member states committed themselves to be ready to dispatch, within 3–7 hours, 2–3 assessment teams comprising in total up to 10 experts and, within very short notice, self-supportive civil protection intervention teams consisting of up to 2000 persons. Also, they agreed to have the capacity to deliver, within two days to a week, more specialized resources to the crisis area. For rule-of-law missions, governments pledged to provide up to 200 judges, prosecutors, correctional officers and other assorted experts. Finally, they promised to contribute personnel to a diverse pool of specialists in the area of civilian administration interventions under the ESDP, without, however, quantifying the pledge. In November 2004, the pledges in all four priority areas were updated by

46 The EU’s peace support agenda a post-enlargement capabilities commitment conference at which the new member states offered additional peace support assets. The conference was a key component of the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, which was adopted by the European Council in June 2004 in an effort to strengthen the Union’s peacebuilding vocation (EU ISS 2005a). Other key capability-related measures envisaged by the action plan include improvements in training and recruitment of mission personnel, the provision of additional crisis management expertise in support of missions and EUSRs as well as the enlargement of civilian crisis management assets through the development of new monitoring capabilities.30 Yet arguably the central notion of the action plan is the call for a comprehensive civilian headline goal. Rapidly acting on the initiative, the Union adopted a Civilian Headline Goal 2008 at the end of 2004 in a clear effort to copy the mechanism used in the development of military capabilities (EU ISS 2005b). The document clarifies the EU’s ambition as peacebuilder and the mechanisms to realize it.31 As to the latter, a project team within the Council Secretariat, working under the political guidance of the PSC, is charged with advancing the headline goal process. As to the EU aspiration to become a principal player in the peacebuilding field, the Union singles out rapid reaction as a key area in need of improvement. It expects that the headline goal process will give it the capacity to deploy missions within 30 days of the launch decision. Moreover, the headline goal is founded upon the assumption that future missions will have to operate in non-benign environments, which necessitates upgrades in logistical and mission protection capabilities. By implication, civilian and military ESDP missions may be deployed concurrently in such circumstances, putting a premium on improved coordination procedures such as the already mentioned civilian/military cell within the EUMS. Finally, another important contribution to the civilian ESDP, albeit outside the headline goal process, was the decision in 2004 by France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain to make available to the Union a European Gendamerie Force made up of armed military police (EU ISS 2005c). This capability of approximately 800 persons deployable within 30 days enables the EU to cover the full range of policing tasks in benign as well as non-benign environments. Having discussed material capabilities and organizational infrastructures, we next turn our attention to how the Council programmes its new civilian ESDP assets, i.e. how it makes them thinkable as tools capable of being deployed for the purpose of peacebuilding.

The EU’s evolving concepts of civilian peacebuilding In line with the identification of distinct civilian peacebuilding capabilities at the Feira and Göteborg European Councils, the Council Secretariat and Civcom initially developed four different concepts to guide the planning

The EU’s peace support agenda 47 and operation of missions. To begin with civil protection missions, they were designed to deal with victims of natural, technical and environmental disasters in situations marked by political violence. Disaster relief services are primarily organized and equipped for protection and rescue tasks at the national level, but they are also used to respond to emergencies abroad. In foreign assignments, the Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance supports a co-ordinated EU approach to search and rescue operations, the construction of refugee camps and the provision of humanitarian aid. The ESDP capabilities were added to these existing instruments to upgrade the Union’s capacity to carry out disaster relief in what has come to be known as complex emergencies, i.e. in situations in which the work of international responders is complicated by domestic instability and conflict. Moving from the protection of civilians to peacebuilding proper, ESDP rule-of-law missions were envisaged to address shortfalls of legal systems in countries in which peace and security is endangered by, say, incompetent judges, widespread corruption, or local laws that do not meet international legal standards, notably human rights standards. As a last resort, such missions may replace local court personnel with international judges, magistrates, legal experts, court officers and support stuff. A more likely scenario is that the interventions are designed to improve the functioning of the local judicial system by focusing on monitoring, mentoring and training officials and on assisting the government in reforming laws and the organization of the legal field. For its capabilities in the area of civilian administration, the EU developed a peacebuilding concept aimed at ensuring or improving the delivery of general administration, infrastructure and social services in countries in crisis or emerging from conflict. General administration services refer, among other things, to the documentation of people and property. This facilitates the organization of post-hostility elections and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. Infrastructure services comprise, for instance, the provision of electricity and the rebuilding of bridges. Such measures may impact on peacebuilding through their contribution to economic recovery or the integration of formerly isolated minority communities into the national road and electricity networks. Finally social service functions to be addressed by EU peacebuilders tackle social problems allied to conflict such as post-conflict trauma or school curricula inciting intolerance towards minorities. Last but not least, the peacebuilding concept for ESDP police missions focuses on the enforcement gap in peace operations as well as capacitybuilding measures. The enforcement gap refers to the belief that neither a military intervention force nor an unarmed international police mission is well equipped to advance the peace process in transitional societies marked by widespread lawlessness (Dziedzic 2002). While the former is primarily trained to kill rather than to control riots and enforce the law, the latter

48 The EU’s peace support agenda lacks the forceful means to take on armed criminals and deal with violent domestic disorder. To deal with such situations, civilian peacebuilders have to be supported by armed police forces that have an executive mandate to restore and maintain law and order. Capacity-building measures tackle policing problems such as a highly politicized police corps, officers tarnished by their participation in human right violations or lack of training and know-how. Such missions can be carried out by unarmed police contingents which limit themselves to monitoring, advising and training the local police. From the very beginning, there was some unease among EU players about the state of the art of EU thinking about ESDP civilian peacebuilding. Thus, already in the first half of 2001, the Swedish Presidency, bemoaning the limited range of civilian interventions that could be carried out under the ESDP, argued for considering additional civilian crisis management capacity areas (EU ISS 2002). Over the years, similar calls for strengthening the EU’s peacebuilding vocation were repeatedly made, including by security policy supremo Solana (2002a). A breakthrough occurred in 2004/5 when new assets – monitoring missions and generic mission support (specialists in a variety of fields such as border policing or human trafficking) – were made available to the civilian ESDP. This was accompanied by work on new EU concepts on monitoring and security sector reforms as well as on comprehensive planning, within and across pillars, for peacebuilding combining military and civilian assets. While monitoring missions are designed to observe the implementation of peace accords, security sector reform missions focus on shorter-term capacity-building measures in armed services. Just like police missions, they work, among other things, to institutionalize a commitment to human rights in the military, ensure its democratic oversight and its financial transparency and sustainability. A major doctrinal shift in EU peacebuilding was heralded by the 2004 Action Plan for the Civilian Aspect of ESDP. It introduced two ideas that until then did not figure prominently in the Union’s doctrine of civilian peacebuilding. First, the situations in which peacebuilders are deployed become ever more complex and, second, each situation has it own particular features. In line with the holistic peacebuilding philosophy expressed in the Brahimi report (United Nations 2000), the action plan thus concluded that the EU had to develop the capacity to deploy integrated peacebuilding resources that combine a range of tools and expertise selected to match the unique challenges confronting each mission. In the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 this objective is laid out in more detail (EU ISS 2005b). It emphasizes the importance of moving beyond the existing compartmentalized approach to peacebuilding and to develop the capacity to deploy multifunctional or modular peacebuilding packages. Furthermore, the headline goal also envisages the creation of rapidly deployable civil response teams comprised of individuals with expertise in various fields. The EU plans to have the capacity to rapidly mobilize (within five days) teams charged either with carrying out an assessment prior to mission

The EU’s peace support agenda 49 launch or with establishing an initial presence in preparation of a full-scale mission.32 Allied to this new, modular thinking, the Union has been moving from a supply-driven approach to capability development, in which member states pledge available assets without giving much thought to what they may be used for, to a needs-driven approach that is based on strategic assessments of the demand for and nature of future interventions. As part of the new philosophy of capability development, the Council Secretariat, in 2005, carried out a thorough evaluation of ESDP civilian capabilities, which was for the first time based on assessments of required capabilities for future missions rather than assets already available in member states. While shortfalls were identified in such areas as border police and the rule of law, surpluses were established in the field of monitoring and civil protection. A Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference in November 2005 ended with a pledge of EU foreign ministers to address the identified shortfalls. Finally, EU peacebuilding missions can be deployed in different formats: as autonomous EU operations or under the aegis of the United Nations or the OSCE. As to the launch decision, which requires unanimity, it is taken by the Council in the form of a joint action, which serves as the legal basis for the mission. To conclude this section, the Headline Goal 2008 introduced a major shift in both the peacebuilding doctrine of the EU – the move from compartmentalized to integrated peacebuilding – and the philosophy underpinning the build-up of EU peacebuilding assets. In the final section, we further anatomize EU thinking on civilian peacebuilding to bring into relief its governmental nature.

The governmental ambitions of EU civilian peacebuilding and its epistemic context In Chapter 2, we argued that peacebuilding can profitably be investigated as a site of governmentality. Here we want to zero in on the governmental ambitions inscribed in the EU doctrine (old and new) of civilian peacebuilding. Civilian ESDP missions are either programmed to secure bare life (civil protection missions) or to project order (all other missions). While either mission type embodies the EU’s mission for humanity, only the latter embodies a governmental rationality. Civil protection missions concern themselves with ‘human beings in the generic sense’: victims of emergency stripped of any characterization but their basic human needs, their survival (Rieff 2002: 35). The narrow telos of these missions is to rescue lives in mortal danger. The telos of all other ESDP peacebuilding missions is significantly broader. They address themselves, in varying degrees, to the improvement of the conduct and subjectivity of judges, prosecutors, police officers, public administrators and so forth. Their interventions, which tend to reach deep into subjects and societies, aim at the organized adaptation of certain facets of indigenous life to the demands posed by the liberal governance of peace so that this life becomes something other than what

50 The EU’s peace support agenda it was (cf. Dillon and Reid 2000). As we argued in the previous chapter, the risk of such interventions is that they govern too much, building a new order of liberal peace while at the same time reducing the political capacity of locals to construct a future in their own vernacular image. The supposability and imposability of the Union’s intrusive will to improve subjects and reorder and reorganize the police, armed forces, courts and so forth in the name of liberal peace is founded upon changes in the epistemic structure of contemporary world politics. Of particular importance in this regard are two interrelated discourses that gained hegemonic status in the post-Cold War era. To begin with, there is the new aid consensus. It is founded upon the ‘discovery’ of the relationship between aid and security. There is no development in chronically insecure environments and hence the root causes of conflict and instability have to be eradicated (Anderson 1999; Council of the EU 1998; European Commission 1996, 2003a; OECD 1997; Uvin 1999). Allied to this rethinking of the correlates of development is the notion that the ‘new wars’ beyond the realm of the liberal peace are the result of ‘a regressive developmental malaise’ characterized by illiberal and often corrupt or criminalized economies and state structures (Duffield 2002: 1066; 2005). According to this imaginaire, aid has to be harnessed to bring about a comprehensive transformation of violence-prone societies to put them on a path towards peace. It is at this point that the aid consensus intersects with the liberal peacebuilding consensus according to which market societies and democratic governments are the foundation of sustainable peace. The ESDP is inscribed in and legitimated by this aid consensus insofar as it rests upon the presupposition that the effective stabilization of countries transiting from crisis or violence necessitates their strategic reordering in line with best European/Western practices. The second body of knowledge which made it possible for the EU to think about the civilian ESDP in governmental terms is the new humanitarian consensus. During the Cold War the dominant, albeit not uncontested, discourse governing non-governmental and, less though, multilateral relief aid posited a humanitarian space separated from politics. Aid was to be given to those in need without any political conditions. Since then a rightsbased humanitarian agenda has gained widespread support among donors (Chandler 2002). Its appeal largely rests on the fact that it brings together two claims. To begin with, human rights are universal, apolitical rights to which each person qua person is entitled. This naturalist framing of human rights is of course not new. It is reflected in the international human rights regime built after 1945. The second claim only recently gained ground in the context of the post-Cold War spread of identity- and ethnicity-based internal wars. It states that there is a causal link between human rights and peace: ‘Human rights and humanitarian violations lie at the heart of many conflicts’ (SG/HR and EC 2000: 8). Together these two claims legitimize and ennoble interventions (political, military, economic) by the ‘international

The EU’s peace support agenda 51 community’ (IC) in illiberal countries to transform cultures of impunity and violence. They also empower the EU to plan, organize and conduct civilian ESDP peacebuilding missions that aim at reordering violent societies in a ‘rights-compliant’ manner.

4

The EUPM in Bosnia

In this chapter, we explore the first-ever civilian ESDP mission, which was launched in January 2003 and terminated in December 2005. After a brief overview of the war in Bosnia and the subsequent establishment of an international governance structure in the country, the chapter maps in detail the preparations for and actions of the EUPM. It is striking that in Bosnia, just as later in Macedonia, the decision to launch an ESDP civilian crisis management operation came at a point when the peacebuilding process was already well advanced. This brings into sharp relief the importance of problematizations through which international peacebuilding interventions are made thinkable as well as their contingent nature. As we argued in Chapter 2, rationalities of governance, in which problematizations are embedded, do not register an already always structured world but actively act upon it so as to make it governable. Here we shall show how ambivalence was mobilized out of the representation of the state of policing in Bosnia by international peacebuilders, including the EU, and how their reading licensed and conditioned the reordering of the local policing field. Our analysis of the construction of problems worthy of the attention of an ESDP police mission is followed by an examination of the activities and challenges involved in the planning and deployment of the EUPM and the translation of its mandate into operationally useful benchmarks. This discussion leads up to what is arguably the main part of the chapter: the thick description of the manifold, mostly small-scale reforms carried out by the mission. Our chronicle of the work of mission staff, which is the first thorough engagement with what the EUPM did in its three years of operation, is intentionally kept atheoretical so as to give the reader a flavour of its humble and mundane nature. In Chapter 6, we anatomize the activities of the EUPM and those of Proxima with the critical intent to bring into focus the workings of the generic political technologies they employ. Returning to this chapter, in the penultimate section we relate the EUPM to the other peacebuilding activities of the EU in Bosnia to highlight their sometimes conflictual relationship as well as the continuum between post-conflict peacebuilding and pre-EU integration. We end by briefly sketching out the rationale for and mandate of the EUPM follow-on mission, which was launched in January 2006.

The EUPM in Bosnia 53

War and peace in Bosnia Yugoslavia, which during much of the Cold War had occupied a privileged position between the blocs, courted by both sides, entered a severe crisis when the Cold War divide ended and the former geopolitical constraints on the redrawing of territorial boundaries weakened. In most constituent republics nationalist parties gained power through democratic elections in 1990. While the new Slovene and Croat governments called for the transformation of Yugoslavia into a loose federation, or confederation, Serbia favoured the maintenance of a more centralized state. The political deadlock between reformers and conservatives at the federal level led to the radicalization of nationalist sentiments in the formerly socialist republics, culminating in the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. The government of Serbia headed by President Slobodan Miloševi´c responded militarily in an effort to reunite the country. While the conflict between Slovenia and Yugoslavia/Serbia was limited to a few skirmishes, not least because of the diplomacy of the EC, a full-scale war broke out between Croatia and the former Yugoslavia. A year later in Bosnia, war again won out over peace in the continuing disintegration of Yugoslavia. When in March 1992 the Bosnian parliament, in the absence of its Serb members, declared independence, the country was on the brink of civil war. The following month, the EC, which back in March 1991 had expressed its support for the existing internal and external borders of Yugoslavia, recognized Bosnia as an independent state. Instead of calming the situation as Brussels had hoped, its recognition of Bosnia’s sovereignty sparked an attack on Muslim cities and villages in Eastern Bosnia by Serb irregulars and army reservists. A few days later the Yugoslav People’s Army itself joined the fighting. A war had begun that pitted Bosnian Serbs supported by Belgrade against Bosnian Croats and Muslims and, sometimes, Bosnian Croats against Muslims. The bloody conflict involved massive human rights violations, including widespread campaigns of ethnic cleansing.1 Despite numerous efforts by the United Nations and the EC (the EU with the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union in November 1993) to bring the fighting to an end, the conflict lasted for more than three years (Burg and Shoup 1999: 189–316; Gow 1997; Kintis 1997). A series of often interrelated military and political factors, including a more interventionist role by the United States, a changing balance of forces on the battlefield and a readiness on the part of the Serb government to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to agree to a peace deal finally led to a ceasefire in October 1995 and, a month later, to the successful peace negotiations in Dayton. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), which was signed in Paris on 14 December, not only brought the war in Bosnia to a formal end, but also set out the country’s new political structure, including its constitution.2 Post-Dayton Bosnia is a highly decentralized state composed of two territorial entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika

54 The EUPM in Bosnia Srpska. Despite the gradual consolidation of competencies at the state level forced through by international peacebuilders, the entities continue to wield far-reaching governmental powers.3 The key common state institutions are the presidency and the council of ministers. In an effort to mitigate ethnic tensions, the constitution institutionalizes power-sharing arrangements at the state level. Accordingly, each of the three constituent peoples – the Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs – is equally represented in the tri-partite presidency and the house of peoples, which is one of the two chambers of the Bosnian parliamentary assembly. As to the post-Dayton policing structure, it is made up of four overarching police agencies: the State Border Service (SBS), the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), the judicial police and the financial police. They are all part of the Bosnian ministry of security, which, on the insistence of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), was created in 2003 with a view to consolidating state-level policing. Yet below the state level, policing structures remain fragmented. In the Federation, each cantonal ministry of interior has its police force, which is responsible for crime and public security within its respective territory. The total strength of cantonal police forces in the Federation was about 8500 in 2004. In addition, the Federation ministry of interior has its own police force which is responsible for intercantonal crime, organized crime and anti-terrorism measures. The Republika Srpska, for its part, has a centralized police structure centred on the ministry of interior. There are five public security centres and four public security sectors, which together comprised about 6300 police officers in 2004. As to the Brˇcko District, its separate police structure comprises about 270 officers. The overall strength of the Bosnian police in 2004 was about 16,800 officers plus 6000 civilians. They are distributed across 17 different police agencies allied to 14 different legal orders at 3 different levels. The different agencies do not operate across the inter-entity boundary line. In support of the political system it put in place, the Dayton peace accord allocated civilian peacebuilding tasks to various international agencies. Internationals were also appointed to key Bosnian institutions such as the central bank and the constitutional court. At the apex of the international administration of Bosnia is the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). While the PIC is composed of 55 countries and international agencies, its Steering Board, which provides guidance to the High Representative, is made up of only 11 members. The executive body of the PIC is the OHR, which under Annex 10 of the DPA is mandated to monitor the civilian implementation of the peace settlement.4

The international governance of Bosnia: The office of the high representative Whereas the Dayton powers of the OHR were initially interpreted by the PIC Steering Board as being strictly limited to the co-ordination of the

The EUPM in Bosnia 55 peacebuilding activities of the many international actors on the ground, soon a more extensive reading gained ground, creating what has been described as a ‘creeping protectorate’ (S. Woodward, quoted in Cousens and Cater 2001: 129). Frustrated over what they saw as resistance by native spoilers to their international project of improvement, the Steering Board members, at their meeting in Bonn in December 1997, called on the High Representative to take a more proactive and forceful stance. He was thus encouraged to ‘facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary’, including ‘actions against persons holding public office’ (PIC 1997). Equipped with the new mandate, which gave it ‘absolute powers over an open-ended spectrum of issues’ (Knaus and Martin 2003: 69), the OHR, in particular under the leadership of Lord Ashdown, became the single most powerful political actor in the country. The result of this development was that the country and its population were opened up to a level of foreign surveillance, interventions and regulations (sometimes punitive) unprecedented since the colonial period.5 For instance, ‘King Paddy’, as The Times (2005) referred to Ashdown, forced out two heads of state, sacked more than 60 officials, many of whom democratically elected, and imposed numerous laws, all in the name of good governance. Paddy Ashdown, who became High Representative in 2002, was also an EUSR in Bosnia. Although Ashdown’s second ‘hat’ was relatively unknown to Bosnians, his bon mot that Bosnia was moving ‘out of the era of Dayton and into the era of Brussels’ became a central theme in the local political debate. In fact, even before the Council revisited Ashdown’s mandate in mid2004 and agreed on embedding a small EU-dedicated team within the OHR, he actively promoted the implementation of the 16 reform priorities identified in the European Commission’s Feasibility Study (FS), which spelled out the conditions Bosnia had to meet before it could enter into negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. Focusing on policing reforms, the OHR, at its peak, had about 200 international rule-of-law experts who, equipped with an executive mandate, engaged the local justice system, thus shaping the state of policing in manifold ways, say, through their anti-crime and anti-corruption activities.6 A more far-reaching reform, however, concerned the centralization of Bosnia’s fragmented policing structures. Work on the issue, which was the last great institution-building objective of the OHR, began late, mostly because of its constitutional implications. The High Representative set up a Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) tasked with devising a blueprint for rendering local policing structures more coherent and effective. The commission, which was chaired by the former Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens and financed by the European Commission, submitted its final report on 31 December 2004. In line with the requirement set by the FS, it recommended that the politically and territorially decentralized police be brought under the state’s legislative and budgetary control and be reorganized in functionally defined policing regions.7 At the time when the EUPM was wrapped up

56 The EUPM in Bosnia at the end of 2005, these recommendations had not yet been implemented, although, as discussed later in the chapter, preparatory work had begun. While police restructuring was not part of its mandate, the EUPM did contribute to the work of the PRC.8 Prior to the launch of the commission, EUPM experts assisted the rule-of-law department of the OHR, which was the lead agency on this issue, in delimiting the conceptual space within which structural changes to the policing field were to be conceived. Subsequently, a mission working group supported the PRC logistically and contributed to its deliberations. Also, the head of the EUPM, who repeatedly argued that the existing policing ‘system and structure [were] completely dysfunctional’, was a full member of the PRC.9 Once the body had completed its work, the EUPM, despite reluctance by some staff who thought this would involve them in politics, played an advocacy role, promoting the proposal among local police officers.10

The security transition: From NATO troops to EUFOR Althea To provide the military flanking measures for the international system of rule put in place in Bosnia and the peace it enforced, the United Nations authorized NATO to implement the military provisions of the DPA. The alliance thus deployed a 60,000-strong Implementation Force (IFOR) to the country, including a number of non-NATO troops. Besides being mandated to enforce compliance with the ceasefire, IFOR was tasked with overseeing the separation of Federation and Serb forces and their partial demobilization. It also stabilized the inter-ethnic boundary line between the two entities through the creation of a zone of separation, which it guarded. In December 1996, the NATO troops were reduced to about 31,000 and renamed Stabilisation Force (SFOR). While initially acting like a traditional peacekeeping force focused on military issues, over time, IFOR/SFOR, in line with its mandate, began to take on a series of law enforcement tasks.11 It thus provided, amongst other things, security to returnees, detained persons indicted for war crimes and stopped radio and television stations from broadcasting what the international authorities regarded as inflammatory speech (Cousens and Cater 2001: 58–9). Moreover, SFOR became more proactive in its capacity as a 911 service to civilian international peacebuilders on the ground. This evolution of SFOR towards a more interventionist, second-generation peacebuilding force was further reinforced by the creation, in August 1998, of the 500-strong Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), made up primarily of the Italian military police – the carabinieri.12 This gave SFOR an armed Police Unit with executive policing powers, which could be called upon to provide back-up or support to local police authorities in mainstream law enforcement tasks such as crowd and riot control. SFOR, which was gradually reduced to 7000 troops, most of whom hailed from EU member states, remained in Bosnia until early December 2004 when it was replaced by EUFOR Althea, the largest-ever ESDP military

The EUPM in Bosnia 57 13

operation. Although the EU had announced its intention to take over from SFOR already at the Copenhagen European Council in 2002, concerns in Washington about its ally’s military readiness delayed the transfer of security functions from Europe’s most powerful security organization to the continent’s newest player. As part of its efforts to reassure Washington, the EU, despite some internal opposition, decided to adopt ‘a NATO model’ for its operation, which is based on the Berlin-plus agreement and thus draws on NATO, i.e. US assets.14 ‘Seamless’ became the buzzword of all involved in the transition from SFOR to EUFOR. Thus, not only does Althea have an equally robust, UN-authorized mandate as SFOR – to ensure compliance with the DPA and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in the country – but it is also deployed in the same three geographical sectors and has its own MSU-style military police capability called the Integrated Police Unit (IPU).15 Moreover, at the time of the launch of the operation, it had the same number of troops as its predecessor. Finally, in yet another attempt to smoothen the transition from NATO to EUFOR, the latter took over the headquarters of SFOR in Camp Butmir in the vicinity of the capital Sarajevo; unusually, it shared them with the residual NATO presence. However, there was one area in which Althea developed a distinct profile. Under its first commander, the British general David Leakey, it carved out a role for itself in the fight against organized crime in Bosnia. We shall come back to this issue at the end of the chapter. Next, though, we set the stage for the examination of the EUPM by briefly describing the police reforms carried out by the United Nations prior to the arrival of the EU mission.

Marked by deviance: The Bosnian police and the UN policing reforms The prominence given to reforms of the Bosnian policing field in the DPA, which devotes a separate annex to the issue, is a reflection mainly of two facts. On the one hand, international peacebuilders, as explained in Chapter 2, have attached increasing importance to police reforms in postconflict reconstruction since the mid-1990s. On the other hand, the local police forces, especially the special units of the ministry of interior, acted as particularly repressive instruments of ethnic warfare during the civil war (Cousens and Cater 2001: 59; R. Kumar 1997: 122).16 Annex 11 of the DPA requested the United Nations, which was at the time the only multinational actor with expertise in the police aid field, to establish an International Police Task Force (IPTF) with a view to assisting in the provision of a safe and secure environment in Bosnia by developing law enforcement agencies that operate in accordance with international standards, including human rights and fundamental freedoms. In response, the Security Council agreed in 1995 to set up the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). It was comprised of the unarmed IPTF, which was headed by a police Commissioner who reported to both the UN Secretary-General and

58 The EUPM in Bosnia the High Representative, and a UN civilian office that supported the policing reforms through its contributions to the strengthening of the rule of law. UNMIBH’s mandate was terminated at the end of 2002 (for details, see Cordone 2000; Dziedzic and Bair 2002).17 The unarmed IPTF was not designed to put a quick end to police abuse and public insecurity in Bosnia. Rather, as a largely non-executive mission, its strength lay in capacity- and institution-building. It succeeded in setting up a formidable apparatus of pastoral power designed to gradually eliminate ‘black sheep’ among indigenous police officers, cultivate the remaining and reconstruct local police organizations. At its peak, the mission consisted of about 2000 international police experts. Through six reform programmes, it restructured, streamlined and (re-)trained the police forces (Annan 2002). The two principal institution-building programmes centred on the certification of local police officers and the accreditation of law enforcement agencies. The certification process, which covered every police officer, was used to select out those with what the mission considered inappropriate wartime records or insufficient policing proficiency. The IPTF denied certification to 876 officers due to a variety of reasons, including criminal backgrounds, human rights violations, a lack of qualified educational diploma or the illegal occupation of houses belonging to refugees.18 Overall, the IPTF presided over a dramatic reduction in the number of active police officers from about 50,000–60,000 at the end of the civil war to about 16,000 when its mandate expired. As to the accreditation of law enforcement agencies, every local police administration was forced to undergo a vetting process based on a checklist of requirements, which included, among other things, internal and external mechanisms to redress police abuse and maladministration, insulation from political interference through the creation of independent police commissioners or directors of police as well as multi-ethnic composition. Thus, even while it streamlined the police forces, the IPTF used its significant powers to increase the recruitment of ethnic minority officers. Additional institutionbuilding reforms included the separation of the police from the intelligence service and the creation of two state-level policing institutions – the SBS and SIPA.

The state of Bosnian policing after seven years of UN-administered reforms In mid-2001 the UN Secretary-General notified concerned parties of the likely departure of the IPTF from Bosnia at the end of 2002. Yet while the UN Special Representative in Bosnia, Jacques Klein (2002), believed that UNMIBH’s core mandate would be achieved by that time, he was in agreement with other international peacebuilders on the ground that the indigenous law enforcement agencies had not yet reached a sufficient standard of civilized policing. The legacy of police socialization ‘by ethnic apartheid’

The EUPM in Bosnia 59 counselled against releasing them into the exclusive control of the Bosnian authorities (R. Kumar 1997: 122). Expressing this international consensus about the continuing deviance of local policing, and the correlated need for international supervision, the International Crisis Group (2002: i) argued that if left to their own devices ‘nationally partial, under-qualified, underpaid, and sometimes corrupt police officers [would] uphold the law selectively, within a dysfunctional system still controlled by politicized and nationalized interior ministries’. UNMIBH (2001) itself warned that the ‘core goals the international community ha(d) set for Bosnia and Herzegovina [would] remain in jeopardy’ without a post-IPTF police mission that was based on the ‘intrusive co-location of highly qualified and specialized international police in all police institutions’. The foreign imagery of the local police thus continued to reflect to a certain extent the immediate post-hostility problematization of law enforcement by international peacebuilders, according to whom, to quote one senior ITPF member, indigenous police officers were little more than ‘thugs’ (quoted in Cousens and Cater 2001: 61). Underpinning this description of the local police was a hierarchy of knowledges and practices – Western/European policing knowledge and local ignorance, best Western/European policing conduct and Bosnian deviance. While in 1995 this hierarchy appeared self-evident, in 2002 its contingency and ambivalence came to the fore. On the one hand, as one long-term international peacebuilder on the ground pointed out to us, ‘the Bosnian police in 2002 was still lagging behind its Western European counterparts by 15 to 20 years.’19 On the other, the IPTF, supported by many other international peacebuilders, had done a good job and as a result the quality of policing in the country was significantly higher than in 1995 (Palmer 2004). This heterogeneity of local policing with its ambivalence of redeeming and unredeeming features notwithstanding, international peacebuilders unequivocally affirmed the persistent uncivilized and securityendangering identity and role performance of the Bosnian police and, hence, the need to further subject it to international improvement. This consensus view rested on a representation of the local policing field that downplayed local public security perceptions. For instance, the 2001 International Crime Victimization Survey of Bosnia showed that 75 per cent of the population felt ‘very or rather safe walking alone in their living area after dark’, compared to 77 per cent in Switzerland, 71.8 per cent in Slovenia and 64 per cent in Poland.20 These numbers were borne out by the fact that Bosnian citizens were less likely to be the victims of car theft, burglary, robbery or property theft than, say, their Belgian counterparts. Thus it comes as no surprise that a survey of citizens’ feelings of insecurity in Banja Luka, which was carried out in the context of a Swiss project running from 2001 to 2002, found that ‘[v]andalism, violence and crime perpetrated by idle youth [were] accentuated as three main security problems’. Moreover, mundane issues such as ‘[d]isrespect of traffic rules and irregular vehicle parking [were] marked as the prime

60 The EUPM in Bosnia policing problems of the city’ (Danicic et al. 2003: 43). More astonishing still, given the problematization of local police officers by foreigners, over 64 per cent of Bosnians were very or rather satisfied with the work of the police, which, again, compares favourably with other countries. Furthermore, the law enforcement officials did not only enjoy a higher legitimacy in the eyes of the population than some of their European colleagues engaged in reforming them, they were also effective. To take one indicator, the crime investigation success rate of the Bosnian police was higher than that of its counterparts in certain German Länder such as Berlin (cf. Knaus 2004: 73–4).21 Having rendered the Bosnian policing field legible as a site in need of continued foreign supervision and improvement, the IC had to decide who would take on the assignment. With a continuation of the UN involvement ruled out, the UN Secretary-General argued that it would ‘be desirable for regional [that is European] actors to assume responsibility for such a mission’ (United Nations 2001). The first organization to volunteer for the assignment was the OSCE. It made clear its readiness to continue the work of the IPTF and began to prepare its concept of operations (CONOPS) by starting to work on the role and tasks of an OSCE police mission.22 Yet after some prodding by the French, the EU realized the advantages of taking on the task itself. Not only would the deployment of an EU police mission demonstrate that the Union was finally ready to assume greater responsibility as a security actor in the Western Balkans, it also would allow it to showcase its brand-new civilian ESDP capabilities.23 In November 2001, the EU Council Secretariat conducted a first exploratory mission in Bosnia. This démarche was followed up by two more fact-finding missions at the beginning of 2002. Based on their assessment, which flagged the persistent deviance of indigenous policing from the standards of best European practice,24 the Council, in line with the dominant international view, concluded that a post-IPTF police presence was needed. In addition to policing shortcomings, the Council also highlighted the continuing fragile political and security situation in the country. According to this evaluation, violent nationalist extremism remained a potent force and ethnic tensions still were powerful enough to derail the peace process, say, in the context of forthcoming elections. Moreover, embedded within a weak economy, organized crime was singled out as a major problem for the construction of a viable state (Solana 2002b). Consequently, an EU crisis management mission was described as crucial for the consolidation of sustainable peace in Bosnia.

The mandate and deployment of the EUPM Acting on its problematization, the EU, in February 2002, officially offered to ensure the continuing involvement of the IC in policing reforms in Bosnia by deploying an ESDP police mission to take over from the IPTF.25 The PIC Steering Board and subsequently the Bosnian authorities accepted the

The EUPM in Bosnia 61 offer. This led to a Council decision in March to establish the EU’s first-ever crisis management operation, which was launched on 1 January 2003 and mandated to last until the end of 2005 (Council of the EU 2002a, 2005a). According to the mission statement, the principal task of the EUPM was to monitor, mentor and inspect the Bosnian police to bring its performance in line with best European practice and thus to contribute to the peace implementation in the country. By opting for a stand-alone police mission, the EU chose to ignore the advice of the United Nations, which, in view of the fact that the ‘efficacy of the police depends on the integrity and ability of the prosecutor, investigative judge, judiciary, appellate judge, prison administration and guards’, had called for the ‘consolidation of responsibility for all the rule-of-law institutions in one [follow-up] mission’ (UNMIBH 2001). The EU’s decision not to follow the UN recommendation, which was based on the identification of ‘lessons learned’ from peacebuilding in the 1990s, had little to do with intellectual disagreement. There were other reasons at play. First, there was a substantial OHR engagement foreseen in the ruleof-law sector through its rule-of-law pillar established in mid-2002. Second, Brussels had just agreed on four discreet areas for civilian crisis management. To ignore this conceptual work and the political decisions underpinning it would have raised questions about the credibility of the ESDP. Third, as one Civcom delegate told us, the ‘ESDP could not have started with an “integrated” approach. Too complicated, too costly, and certainly not for beginners.’26 Concerned about the challenge of deploying the first-ever ESDP mission, the Council of the EU, upon a proposal by the High Representative for the CFSP, appointed Sven Frederiksen, who was in charge of the IPTF in its final phase, as the head of the EUPM. In this capacity, Frederiksen first led the team which planned the mission and from January 2003 onwards assumed its operational command and quotidian management.27 After his unexpected death in early 2004, Kevin B. Carty took over, who served as head of mission until the termination of the mandate at the end of 2005. To ensure a seamless transition between the two police missions, Commissioner Frederiksen retained 119 IPTF police experts for the EUPM. Moreover, going beyond the mandate requirement ‘to preserve, through continuity with the achievements of the IPTF mission, the existing levels of institutional and personal proficiency’, the EUPM leadership adopted the same strategic priorities that had guided the work of the preceding mission.28 While this policy and personnel continuity facilitated the launch of the EUPM, it also had an unexpected downside. It proved difficult for the European police experts to develop their own, independent profile and to make clear that the new mission was distinct in its mandate. Given the import the EU attached to the symbolism of its first-ever ESDP operation, this was no minor glitch. With hindsight, senior EUPM leaders confirmed this. One affirmed that ‘Sven was the face of both missions, for locals and internationals alike.’29 A top-ranking police officer serving in the mission

62 The EUPM in Bosnia told us that ‘it was a mistake to take over former IPTF staff. They had difficulties adapting to the changed mandate.’30 In accordance with the mandate, the head of the police mission reported to the top Council foreign policy official Solana via the EUSR in the country. The head of mission was also politically accountable to the Brusselsbased PSC, which received his periodical briefings. The Monthly Assessment Reports as well as special reports drawn up by the mission were examined by Civcom, which then advised the PSC.31 The EUPM was a non-executive police mission which lacked powers of law enforcement and arrest.32 Its unarmed personnel were co-located at medium and senior level in police units at the state and entity levels as well as in the police force of the separate Brˇcko District. Moreover, staff were placed as advisors to the state-level ministry of security, to other state-level police organizations, to the ministries of interior of both the Federation and the Republika Srpska and to the entity police academies.33 While initially EUPM experts were deployed in 48 locations throughout the country, the number of co-locations was reduced to 29 in 2005. The length of a tour of duty was, on average, one year. To minimize interruptions when old staff was replaced by new one, rotations were staggered. Although the EUPM, unlike the IPTF, did not have the power to decertify recalcitrant Bosnian police officers, it had the right to recommend to the High Representative to remove or otherwise discipline them. In accordance with the decision of the High Representative on police disciplinary proceedings of January 2003, the procedure could be applied to police officers who violated the DPA, obstructed the peace implementation process by failing to co-operate with the EUPM or did not adhere to democratic policing principles. However, contrary to the expectations of some EUPM members, this non-compliance procedure was never used. While the EU decided that a significant majority of the mission’s police officers should come from EU member states, third countries were also invited to contribute personnel. Those that did had the same rights and obligations as EU countries, even if the top positions in the EUPM’s decision-making hierarchy remained reserved for EU nationals only. Until its personnel strength was reduced towards the end of its mandate, the EUPM comprised about 500 police officers – 215 by the end of 2005 – and between 50 and 60 civilian international experts. The police officers were seconded by the participating states which bore the personnel costs, including salaries. As in all EU civilian crisis management operations, common costs were covered by the CFSP budget.34

Difficult translations: The operationalization of the mission mandate In an attempt to underline its claim to be a somewhat different peacebuilder, the EUPM created an innovative police reform model. At its heart was the

The EUPM in Bosnia 63 principle of local participation in the reform process. The mission set up a structure that linked the indigenous law enforcement agencies in the field to a Police Steering Board (PSB) and a number of working groups for each mission programme and selected projects. The PSB was composed of the most senior local police managers as well as the head of the EUPM and other EUPM officers.35 Under the PSB, working groups composed of high-ranking Bosnian police experts as well as EUPM staff examined the seven thematic issues identified by the EUPM as programmatic priorities.36 The PSB and its working groups constituted the fora in which the EUPM consulted with local police on reform priorities and projects and in which the progress of the reforms was jointly monitored, assessed and recommendations for further improvement were developed. The idea was that once the mandate of the mission was terminated, this structure, without further guidance of the EUPM, would continue to lead and oversee reforms of the Bosnian police to bring it closer to best European standards. Still in the context of local ownership, the EUPM together with the OHR re-launched, in July 2004, the Ministerial Consultative Meeting on Police Matters, which was initially created by the IPTF but later became inoperative. In 2005, the body, which had not met the expectations of the EUPM, was renamed Ministerial Council for Co-operation on Police Matters, and its membership was expanded beyond the entity ministers of interior and the mayor of Brˇcko to include all ten cantonal ministers of interior and the PSB chair as non-voting members. In contrast to the PSB, which concentrates on the operational aspects of police reform, the Ministerial Council concerns itself with its politics. Finally, in the summer of 2004, this local ownership structure was further strengthened by adding yet another layer. On the insistence of the EUPM, the so-called ‘project implementation boards’ were established. They brought together co-locators and local police officers at the precise point where projects were delivered, making them jointly responsible for their implementation. As already mentioned, the EUPM objective was to raise policing standards in line with best European practice. To translate this benchmark into a catalogue of criteria that were operationally useful as systemic instruments of countrywide police reforms, the mission developed the Strategic Implementation Plan. It made four distinct issues recognizable as strategic challenges to be tackled by the EUPM’s interventions: police independence and accountability; organized crime and corruption; financial viability and sustainability; and institutional capacity-building at management level. This framing of the principal shortcomings of the local police reflected a continuity with the concerns that animated the IPTF. The four strategic reform areas were subsequently concretized in the form of seven programmes.37 Selected field co-locators were given a questionnaire to assemble in more detail the needs of the local police in the identified areas of improvement. This assessment, which was summarized in the

64 The EUPM in Bosnia Questionnaire Assessment Guide, was presented to the PSB, which prioritized the identified shortfalls. At the same time the programme development department of the EUPM was already busy drafting, and consulting with the working groups of the PSB on, concrete programme implementation plans (PIPs). These PIPs subsequently formed the basis for the monitoring, mentoring and inspection of the indigenous police officers by the EUPM co-locators. Initially, 45 thematic and 28 specific projects were submitted to the Steering Board for approval. Overall, the mission elaborated around 500 PIPs in its three years of operation.38 The development of the initial PIPs was a lengthy process, taking up much of the first year of operation. This delay in rendering the mission fully operational would have been untenable in a real crisis situation calling for quick reforms to strengthen public order. In addition to a series of generic staffand equipment-related problems hampering the work of the mission in the first six months, problems we shall discuss in Chapter 7, three PIP-related challenges account for the long lead-time needed for drafting the EUPM reform agenda. First, local police officers had to be consulted on the PIPs through the PSB. Second, project funding from the EC and other donors had to be secured. Third and most fundamental, the language in the mandate notwithstanding, there are no codified best European practices. More than once we heard the complaint that ‘there are no European standards in civil policing. If there are common standards, they are only in the military police and it’s only because we have common training, the same type of chain of command, comparable organisational charts.’39 The EU countries have divergent policing traditions, including different governance structures, police–society relations and policing philosophies, ‘especially’, as one senior EUPM staffer dryly observed, ‘when one compares the Nordics to Italy and Spain’.40 In the absence of a common EU-wide view on policing institutions and conduct, the EUPM programme development department was confronted with the challenge of what precisely is it that locals ought to be taught. After a lengthy trial-and-error phase, EUPM programmers fell back on using selected national experiences as the principal ingredients in their efforts to device the PIPs.41 To ensure that rotation did not negatively affect their translation into practice, the mission upgraded its induction training, devising a phased training schedule that required co-locators to return to the mission headquarters 3–6 weeks after their deployment in the field.

The EUPM reforms The EUPM had a two-pillar structure, reflecting its involvement in police reforms at different political levels. Activities and programmes covering state-level policing institutions – the ministry of security, the SBS and SIPA – were run by the deputy head of mission ‘State’. Programmes at the entity level and below fell into the competence of the deputy head of mission ‘Entities’. To enable headquarters and the civilian crisis management

The EUPM in Bosnia 65 directorate of the EU Council Secretariat to keep track of the progress made in the implementation of the reform projects, and to take remedial action if necessary, co-locators were asked to fill out monthly programme assessment questionnaires, which were collated and analysed by headquarters.42 Another management tool used by the mission to ensure projects were fully implemented was the quality control office that was created in mid-2004. On the one hand, it inspected co-locations to check if EUPM staff carried out its work effectively and consistently. On the other hand, it developed a computerized benchmarking system for co-locators to use when they inspected the local police to verify if projects had an impact on established practices. After this brief introduction, we turn to a detailed exploration of the manifold peacebuilding interventions carried out by the EUPM in its effort to implant European standards in the Bosnian police forces. Beginning with the flagship programme, the crime police programme operationalized the conviction of the EUPM and other international peacebuilders that organized crime in its various forms is the principal law enforcement issue in Bosnia. For instance, commissioner Carty described this form of criminality in dramatic terms as ‘a tumour, a cancer of this society that is destroying everything slowly but surely’.43 To direct the local police to zero in on this threat to state and society and to upgrade its crime attack capabilities, the programme development department of the mission elaborated reform projects that improved the forensic assessment capabilities of the police; ensured local detectives received basic criminal investigation training in specific crime police areas; upgraded the case handling of major crimes through the implementation of new procedures; assisted in the establishment and operation of an IT system that connects all police departments and allows them to use and exchange crime-related intelligence; trained officers in the criminal procedure code in order to enable them to work more effectively with the prosecutor and so forth. A key part of the crime police programme was the special project on major and organized crime (MOC), which was further divided into a number of sub-projects. For instance, the mission developed a witness protection project and specialized training courses to enhance the capacity of the local police to combat organized crime. Another sub-project focused on the restructuring of the criminal investigation departments across the country. Co-locators worked with local authorities to put in place a new organizational structure that gives priority to MOC rather than regular or bulk crime. In line with their advice, the crime departments at the state and entity levels as well as the Brˇcko District were (re-)structured to reflect the new focus. The departments were divided into seven subdivisions, including units on organized crime, terrorism and human trafficking.44 At lower administrative levels, too, crime departments were remodelled under the watchful eye of co-locators who ensured that the process was both compatible with the new organizational model institutionalized at the state and entity levels and tailored to the local crime threat. For instance, in cantons where homicide is

66 The EUPM in Bosnia rare, co-locators discouraged authorities from setting up dedicated murder subdivisions. The mission also elaborated an MOC sub-project that tackled the crime fighting methodology of the local police. Problematizing the latter’s reactive crime fighting approach, it focused on improving the collection, analysis and dissemination of crime-related information and intelligence. Co-locators assigned to the sub-project set up a 24-hour crime hotline – Krimo Lovci (crime catchers) – which citizens across Bosnia can use to anonymously report crime-related information to the police.45 A more far-reaching subproject was about the implantation in the local police of intelligence-led policing, which is a technology-based crime fighting methodology relying on risk assessments.46 The mission insisted upon and secured the establishment of criminal intelligence support subdivisions in all crime departments. To ensure the effective management of data on (organized) criminal activities, the programme development department developed guidelines, procedures and routines for the work of the intelligence units. For instance, it created templates for recording and maintaining crime intelligence including criteria for assessing, coding and retrieving the information and procedures for ensuring data security. Also, it identified and codified the routine tasks of intelligence officers, say, through the definition of the format of daily intelligence briefings.47 The correct implementation of these procedures was verified by co-locators. The principal component of the Criminal Justice Programme, which was discontinued prior to the mission’s mid-term review in the summer of 2004, was the development of a court police for the state, the two entities and the Brˇcko District. The EUPM elaborated a series of projects to guide and supervise the creation of police forces that would, among other things, carry out court orders such as assuring the presence of summoned witnesses, maintain order in the courtroom and guarantee the safety of judges. Co-locators monitored the build-up of the new police structures, mentored the court police officers and advised the local authorities on issues related to the internal organization of the court police, the implementation of its ranking system, the recruitment and training of officers and logistical requirements. Another project in the programme covered the promotion of standardized crime reporting formats and skills to improve crime case management, an issue that our interviewees repeatedly singled out as central to greater police effectiveness. Co-locators mentored, and contributed to the training of, local officers in interviewing witnesses and suspects, documenting their statements, writing logically structured police reports that are usable in court and so forth. The Criminal Justice Programme also addressed what the EUPM considered to be an endemic lack of leadership skills in the Bosnian police, including a lack of initiative and strategic thinking. ‘Leaders’, we were told, ‘were not updated, they were compartmentalized, reactive in dealing with problems and emergencies and they lacked vision’.48 The mission

The EUPM in Bosnia 67 co-operated with other police aid donors in upgrading the training for police managers throughout the country. Besides designing a management training programme and ensuring that its objectives were incorporated into the training delivered by other donors, the mission, for instance, facilitated the attendance of senior Bosnian police leaders at a management seminar at the Danish Police Academy in Copenhagen, which was aimed at familiarizing them with Western police management practices, including human resources development, benchmarking, service management and motivation theories. When most of its objectives were achieved, the Criminal Justice Programme was closed and the few remaining projects at the time still in the implementation phase were either transferred to the crime police programme or the police education programme. The Police Education and Training Programme was a late addition to the reform activities of the EUPM. It was brought online in 2004 after an audit of the indigenous police education system carried out by the strategic analysis office of the mission’s programme development department. The purpose of the new programme was twofold. It systematized the mission’s involvement in the training field by bringing together under a single framework those training projects formerly incorporated into other programmes: basic and middle management education, training on the presentation of investigative reports and training on the criminal procedure code. Moreover, it expanded the mission’s training involvement by developing and implementing new projects which covered all aspects of training, including organizational reforms to enhance the sustainability of the police academies and measures aimed at streamlining, updating and harmonizing their curricula. Turning to the Internal Affairs Programme, it was designed to equip local police forces with a transparent supervisory mechanism to ensure the accountability of police officers to their superiors as well as the public. The accreditation by the IPTF of the indigenous law enforcement agencies already included the adoption of a package of provisions aimed at establishing a reliable internal control system coupled with a public oversight mechanism to bring policing into line with international human rights standards and democratic policing principles. However, at the time of the launch of the EUPM, this reform had in most cases not yet reached the implementation phase: often only the relevant framework laws had been adopted. The EUPM thus took charge of monitoring and directing the implementation of these supervisory mechanisms. Its projects zeroed in on the establishment of professional standards units and public complaints bureaux and the elaboration of guidelines for the functioning of these bodies. Beginning with public complaints bureaux, they were non-existent in many jurisdictions at the launch of the mission, or the responsible ministry of interior had not yet appointed all their members.49 Co-locators therefore pushed local authorities to render these bodies operative, which provide citizens with a mechanism to seek redress if they are subjected to police misconduct or maladministration. Once the bureaux were set up and staffed,

68 The EUPM in Bosnia EUPM personnel controlled that they met at least once a week, co-operated with the police and issued decisions concerning complaints brought before them. To lower the psychological barrier for citizens to complain against the police, another project pursued and monitored the establishment of a model record-keeping system for complaints registration, including the set-up of a standardized complaints registry and the installation of a complaints box in every ministry of interior. As to the project on professional standards units, it tasked co-locators with ensuring that the units put in place the proper regulations and organizational structure to carry out internal audits, inspections, policy reviews and internal investigations of complaints independent of the operational chain of command of the ministry of interior. After the machinery was up and running, co-locators monitored officers affiliated with the professional standards units and mentored them in impartially investigating reports of police misconduct and carrying out internal inspections of training standards, administrative procedures and so forth. A closely related project was designed to ensure the strict application of procedures in disciplinary and criminal cases involving police officers. Co-locators, among other things, saw to it that the new penalty point system for offences was correctly applied, deadlines for every phase of the disciplinary procedure were observed and so forth. Yet another thematic focus of the reform activities of the EUPM was the Police Administration Programme. It was concerned with both narrow technical reforms, say, the establishment of a common policy in Bosnia on the safe storage of firearms, and broader sectoral reforms. Limiting our discussion to the latter, the EUPM implanted the latest European management practices in the local police forces, covering, especially, public affairs, personnel policy and financial management. Identifying outreach activities of the police to the media and communities as an instrument to raise the trust of citizens in the police, the public affairs project organized training courses for police spokespersons and monitored and mentored them with regard to a range of activities, including the organization of public information campaigns, ‘open door days’ and the elaboration of a strategy for external communication. With regard to personnel management, the mission put together projects to limit political influence on personnel policy and to increase the motivation of officers. A principal reform centred on the establishment of a modern career development system. One of the features of local police organizations that was open to abuse was the so-called ‘position system’, which was based upon the tasks or functions assigned to officers rather than their performance. The position system meant that a police officer ‘could be a station commander one day, then three months later an inspector, and the next day the chief of uniform police at the ministry, with each position paying a different salary’.50 Although this system was formally abolished by the IPTF, the implementation of a merit-based rank system connected to salaries remained incomplete. The career development project

The EUPM in Bosnia 69 developed by the mission was designed to overcome the remaining problems. In particular, it tasked co-locators with controlling that law enforcement agencies fully implemented the rank structure, monitoring how supervisors carried out the new performance assessment of their subordinates and developing an internal examination system that links promotion to merit in a transparent way. A closely related human resource management project monitored the selection and recruitment of cadets with a view to ensuring ethnic and gender balance in the force.51 Following the departure of the UN mission, local authorities were responsible for the process, which was regulated by procedures earlier imposed by the IPTF. Yet the EUPM project was not just about monitoring compliance with existing procedures. Co-locators developed a harmonized selection and recruitment model for police forces across the country and a monitoring mechanism to ensure transparency and accountability in the selection process. Finally, the police administration programme introduced financial transparency, strict budgetary controls and in general a Western culture of financial management into the local police organizations. Its financial viability project, which was finalized at the end of 2004, drew heavily on the findings and recommendations of the audit of the local police funded by the European Commission (ICMPD and TC Consult 2004). The objective of this project was twofold.52 On the one hand, it aimed at enhancing the independence of the police by creating separate policing budgets within the ministries of interior and by disseminating budget management skills to the police administration departments that would enable them to present strategic, needs-based budget plans to their ministers. On the other hand, the project was about strengthening financial controls and introducing resource-based budgeting to render local policing more cost-efficient and ensure its long-term sustainability. To achieve these two goals, the project, which was implemented with support from the OHR, the European Commission, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and private consulting bodies, pursued a series of measures, which ranged from large-scale to small-scale reforms. For instance, financial co-locators co-ordinated and supervised the training of local staff in how to carry out strategic budgetary planning, and they advised local police managers on the creation of budgetary planning units in each police force. Also, they verified if the new computerized police treasury system, which had been installed under international supervision, was properly used to track revenue collection and control expenditures.53 In addition to monitoring, guiding and inspecting these and other financial management reforms, the responsibilities of co-locators included checking the rational use of resources. Thus, they verified for instance that strict new policies on the private use of police cars were implemented and longer intervals between the replacement of police uniforms were observed. The Public Order and Security Programme was tailored to develop police capabilities for coping with civil disorder and unrest at major public

70 The EUPM in Bosnia gatherings such as demonstrations or sporting events and to ensure the safety of internally displaced persons and refugees who returned to their pre-war homes. One of the key components of this programme was the public order and crowd control project.54 Its objective was to strengthen the operational capacity of support units by upgrading the basic technical skills they had acquired through training administered by the IPTF in co-operation with SFOR’s MSU prior to the launch of the EUPM. The programme development department elaborated a framework for a train-the-trainer course covering the techniques and tactics of public order policing such as formations and manoeuvres, setting up roadblocks, the dismantling of barricades and so forth. Co-locators supervised the training and made sure that crowd control units carried out regular, realistic exercises at full strength. More generally, they mentored unit commanders and commissioners on the various aspects of public order maintenance, including the planning of operations, deployment of units and the initiation of high-risk operations. In carrying out their work of improvement in this policing area, co-locators drew on another public order project, which formulated a detailed doctrine for the deployment of Bosnian support units with a view to depoliticizing public order maintenance. The doctrine covers inter alia the organization and chain of command of crowd control units as well as their rules of engagement, including the use of force. A further project in the Public Order Programme centred on directing the local police to secure the safety of returnees and to co-operate with international organizations active in this issue-area such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). One problem identified by the EUPM was that the police often inappropriately classified ethnically motivated violence. Co-locators thus insisted upon and controlled that police stations put in place a standardized record keeping system to document all security information related to return and returnees. To increase the confidence of returnees, co-locators also directed their local counterparts to provide a constant presence in concerned areas, including patrols around religious buildings. A closely related project zeroed in on the promotion of community policing to improve police–minority relations. If prevention failed and hate crimes were committed, it was the task of co-locators to overcome any reluctance on the part of the local police to investigate such incidents and to put pressure on them to make every effort to arrest the perpetrators. At the end of 2004, the EUPM, in the context of its communitypolicing activities, established special forums for citizen returnees. Judged by some in the mission to fall outside the mandate, the project brought together returnees, local police and governmental representatives and mentored them on how to work together to deal with security and other concerns of returnees. Next we turn to two EUPM programmes that aimed at centralizing Bosnian law enforcement by strengthening state-level institutions: the SBS and the SIPA.55 While both institutions were set up by the IPTF, at the time of

The EUPM in Bosnia 71 the termination of the UN mission’s mandate, they were either existing only on paper (SIPA) or suffering from serious capacity shortfalls (SBS). Beginning with the SBS, it is a border control and customs law enforcement agency, which was set up in June 2000. Although the SBS was put in charge of Bosnia’s external borders and international airports before 2003, the EUPM, once it took over from the IPTF, quickly identified serious deficiencies in the agency’s workings. Concerned with creating a well-protected common policing space in the new country, the EU mission made the development of the SBS one of its key objectives. It designed a capacity-building programme that centred on combating cross-border organized crime, including smuggling and the trafficking of arms.56 The projects elaborated by the EUPM covered the delivery of technical training, say, to border guards on how to detect forged documents, or to the visa officers of the foreign ministry on how to conduct interviews with applicants. Another area targeted for intervention was the management capacity of senior officers. Co-locators mentored them on how to delegate authority, increase transparency in decision-making and give a greater role to analysis in the planning and conduct of operations. To carry out its projects, the mission deployed a 70-strong, mostly German co-location team – SBS’s ‘godfathers’ as its members were referred to in mission jargon.57 They were supported by bilateral assistance, notably by Berlin, which provided funds and equipment. Also, the German border guard agency – the Bundesgrenzschutz – entered into a twinning arrangement with the SBS and provided, for instance, management training to the SBS leadership in Germany. As to SIPA, which was set up in 2002, it was mandated, notably, to protect persons and objects upon the request of the state prosecutor and to serve as an informational clearing house facilitating the exchange of crime-related intelligence between the decentralized local police organizations.58 When the EUPM took over from the IPTF, it determined that the fragmentation of Bosnian law enforcement was a serious obstacle standing in the way of an effective attack on organized crime. Consequently, in the new SIPA law, for which it lobbied and which it drafted together with the OHR, the remit of the agency was expanded, in particular by adding a stronger executive component with a view to enabling the agency to play a pivotal role in the state-level fight against MOC. The development of the new agency, which was spearheaded by British co-locators, was one component in the two-pronged strategy of international peacebuilders to act on Bosnia’s decentralized policing field. We already discussed the other track, which tackles the problem directly by putting in place a new single structure of policing. The EUPM’s SIPA programme tied into its crime police programme. In particular, both programmes advanced an intelligence-led policing model across the country. Yet, while the crime police programme took the de-centralization of the indigenous police as a given and thus focused on capacity building at the local and regional levels, the SIPA programme tackled the fragmentation of the fight against organized crime through the

72 The EUPM in Bosnia build-up of a strong state-level agency with investigative powers. Initially, EUPM co-locators were heavily involved in drafting the book of rules on the internal organization and the organizational chart of the institution. Later they began to focus on improving the systematic gathering, analysis, use and exchange of intelligence as well as the flow of intelligence between Bosnia and foreign law enforcement agencies. Through their mentoring, monitoring and inspecting activities they shaped, together with ICITAP, the agreements on intelligence exchange and the installation of appropriate computer hardware and software for intelligence handling, storage and exchange. On a more operational level, the EUPM put together precise criteria for the recruitment of the agency’s leadership, including a vetting procedure to prevent the hiring of individuals guilty of police misconduct or involvement in war crimes. Consequently, co-locators supervised the proper application of these criteria. Also, the mission set up and initially staffed a temporary Criminal Intelligence Interface Cell to facilitate the two-way conduit of intelligence between international and local law enforcement authorities. The cell was designed to overcome the reluctance of the former to share intelligence with the latter, which was rooted in the perception that local law enforcement agencies remained untrustworthy and had, possibly, organic links with organized crime. Two conclusions can be drawn from our examination of the numerous, albeit obscure micro-sites and micro-practices in and through which the EUPM carried out its policing reforms. To begin with, we note the difference between the heavy-handed interventions by the IPTF – decertification, accreditation and so forth – and the often minuscule interventions of the EUPM. Yet the latter, not unlike the former, reached deep into the most elementary dimensions of policing, bringing the tiny details of quotidian policing in Bosnia into the governance of the powerful machinery of the EU. Furthermore, EUPM peacebuilding centred on medium-term capacitybuilding projects. It was empowered to do so not only by its mandate, but also by the fact that there was, as Lord Ashdown (2004) underlined in a speech at the United Nations, little prospect for a return to ethnic conflict. Hence, its peacebuilding activities were shaped more by the prospect of Bosnia’s integration into the EU (and NATO) than by the risk of a descent back into civil war. In the section that follows, we briefly look at the other EU actors on the ground that were at the time involved in implanting an European perspective in Bosnia, and we review their relationship with the EUPM. We conclude the chapter with a sketch of the EUPM follow-on mission.

Familial and other relations: The EUPM in the context of European integration As an integral part of the assemblage of international actors which monitored and governed security-sector and rule-of-law reforms in Bosnia,

The EUPM in Bosnia 73 the EUPM co-operated, on various levels and through a team of liaison officers, with other peacebuilders in the field. To better align policies between itself and its international partners, the mission established an IC/EU co-ordination cell in summer 2004. This mechanism was further strengthened at the beginning of 2005 when another co-ordination unit – the Donor Funds and Project Coordination Cell – was added in response to the identified need for closer co-ordination of bilateral donor assistance in the field of policing. These efforts notwithstanding, different organizational cultures and institutional interests caused occasional frictions among the EUPM and other (EU) peacebuilders. Though not a member of the EU family, the OHR was one of the principal interlocutors of the EUPM, not least because many mission reform projects required changes to laws and formal rules governing indigenous policing. Such legal changes could only be brought about with the support and political clout of the OHR. It is therefore not surprising that the legal department of the EUPM with its 26 lawyers sought advice on a regular basis from the significantly leaner, albeit far more authoritative legal department of the OHR. Also, the EUPM participated together with the OHR in the rule-of-law project management working group, which, on a weekly basis, addressed a variety of law enforcement issues such as the development of the SBS and SIPA. As already mentioned, police restructuring was another endeavour, in which the EUPM, just like other international actors, including the European Commission, worked hand in hand with the OHR to put pressure on reluctant local players, notably the Republica Srpska, to push through far-reaching reforms. Finally, the police commissioner participated in the weekly meetings of the Board of Principals, which under the chairmanship of the High Representative, co-ordinated the activities of the IC. Turning to the EU actors on the ground, the EUPM closely interacted with the EUSR. Prior to the deployment of the EUPM, the EU decided, with the support of the PIC, to appoint the incoming High Representative Paddy Ashdown also as EUSR (Council of the EU 2002b).59 In this capacity, Ashdown provided political guidance to the EUPM. Besides numerous ad-hoc meetings, Lord Ashdown and commissioner Carty had their weekly meetings on Monday mornings. Also, in addition to attending regular meetings of the EU heads of missions, the commissioner participated in EU co-ordination meetings chaired by the EUSR, at which, in addition, the commander of EUFOR, the term presidency of the EU and the heads of the EC delegation and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) were present. In late 2005, in anticipation of the strengthened role of EUPM II in tackling organized crime, the Crime Strategy Group was established to coordinate, under the leadership of the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR, activities in support of the fight against this form of criminality. Last but not least, the close co-operation between the EUSR and the commissioner was supplemented by frequent interaction at staff level. Thus, Ashdown and Carty

74 The EUPM in Bosnia were represented by members of their teams at each other’s daily morning meetings. More importantly, joint EUSR/EUPM presentations to the PSC or joint contributions to Civcom’s deliberations necessitated regular, albeit not friction-free interaction between EUSR and EUPM staff. The European Commission is a key player in advancing Bosnia’s approximation to the EU, both at the political-strategic level and through the activities of its delegation on the ground. The Stabilization and Association process (SAp) constitutes the overall framework for this process. Launched in 1999, the SAp has been serving as the anchor for reforms, providing an overall framework for the delivery of assistance to and the imposition of conditionality on the five Western Balkan countries. Its general objectives include the entrenchment of democracy and capitalist relations of production, the promotion of regional co-operation and, since the Thessaloniki European Council in 2003, the preparation of the region for EU membership (EU–Western Balkans Summit 2003).60 Bosnia was the last Western Balkan country to move forward in the SAp and to start negotiations with the EU on an SAA – a crucial step towards EU membership. With the launch of this phase on 25 November 2005, the day when Bosnia marked its Statehood Day, the country finally graduated from ‘Dayton ward to Brussels aspirant’ (Wheeler 2005). The SAp supported many of the police reforms of the EUPM, both politically and financially. Of particular importance in this regard was the FS. Conducted in 2003, the study set out 16 priority areas in which significant progress had to be made before Bosnia could qualify for negotiations on an SAA. Some of these preconditions were of direct relevance to the EUPM policing reforms. For instance, the full operationalization of SIPA, adequate staffing and funding of the ministry of security, and progress in police restructuring in line with three principles – vesting competence for policing at the state level, defining local policing areas according to technical criteria and keeping politics out of operational policing – were amongst the preconditions for Bosnia’s advancement on the European road. Channelled through the main financial instrument of the SAp, the CARDS programme, the funds made available to the country are managed by the European Commission delegation in Bosnia.61 Limiting ourselves to justice and home affairs projects, CARDS projects target policing, in addition to customs services, border management, judiciary reform and asylum policies. To establish synergies between the instruments of different EU pillars, CARDS supported or supplemented many EUPM projects, notably those grouped under the Crime Police Programme, ‘on which’, as a senior expert of the Commission delegation told us, their ‘priorities converged’.62 In particular, the European Commission contributed to the modernization of the material resources available to the domestic police (information technology, vehicles, various surveillance equipment, DNA and weapons data bases and so forth) and to the improvement of police management, training and crime-fighting techniques. For instance, CARDS funds supported training in

The EUPM in Bosnia 75 strategic crime analysis and in the use of the new police treasury system; the procurement of IT hardware and software for SIPA; the acquisition of an automatic fingerprint identification system to upgrade crime case management; and twinning projects, say, that between the German Bundesgrenzschutz and the SBS to which we referred earlier. CARDS also funded the review of the Bosnian police forces, which provided crucial input into the work of the EUPM-supported PRC. Between 2002 and 2005, the European Commission thus allocated EUR 18 million to policing reforms in Bosnia. In 2005, EUR 5 million was earmarked for the support of police restructuring. Together with ICITAP, the European Commission was the main partner of the EUPM in the police aid field. Overall, co-operation between the EUPM and the European Commission ‘was good, especially at the working level’.63 As we shall see in the next chapter, such productive interaction between first- and second-pillar police reformers cannot be taken for granted. The latest addition to the EU family in Bosnia was EUFOR Althea. Notwithstanding regular meetings and exchange of information between the two ESDP missions, including through a number of liaison officers, their relationship got off to a strained start, though over time it became less conflictual, not least because of the efforts of both heads of missions. Initially, the relationship was marked by a certain mistrust and rivalry, which can, at least partly, be attributed to the different police-related mandates of the two peacebuilding operations. Thus, while the EUPM was a strengthening mission tasked to inscribe its reforms in a local ownership strategy, the military police of Althea, the IPU, had an executive mandate that empowered it to act as an independent law enforcement body. Moreover, while the police officers of the EUPM were co-located with their local counterparts, this was not the case with EUFOR’s military police. Not surprisingly, as a result their attitudes towards the local police differed. While the former saw themselves as teachers tutoring colleagues in best European policing practices, the latter at first operated on the assumption that the police was rotten and untrustworthy. The operational implications of these attitudinal differences between the two ESDP missions were further aggravated by institutional rivalry. In view of the stable security situation in the country, EUFOR’s duties as peacekeeper in charge of implementing the military provisions of the Dayton accord were rather limited. Therefore, Althea could focus on executing a key supporting task of its mandate – the fight against organized crime and obstructionists. While the military perceived this as an opportunity to adopt a high-profile role in the peacebuilding process and differentiate itself from its predecessor, SFOR, the EUPM saw this move as an ‘aggressive’ intrusion into its turf.64 This perception was reinforced by Althea’s initial lack of co-operation with the EUPM and the local police. For instance, disregarding the Krimo Lovci hotline established by the EUPM, EUFOR opened another crime hotline, de facto entering into competition with the EUPM. Also, it carried out a series of major organized crime attack operations,

76 The EUPM in Bosnia which included road blocks and extensive security checks in order to crack down on illegal activities such as smuggling and trafficking. The operations, which in the first months of implementation were carried out with minimal co-ordination with the EU police mission and without prior or very late notification of the local police, were strongly criticized by the EUPM, not least because they undermined its local ownership strategy. Over time, Althea began to co-operate more closely with the EUPM and local law enforcement authorities on these crime-fighting operations, a fact which, incidentally, made them more successful. Arguably, the EU family dyad with the least developed relationship was that between the EUPM and the EUMM. Set up in 2001, the EUMM is mandated to provide the EU with timely information and early warning with regard to the political and security developments in the Western Balkans, notably on inter-ethnic relations and refugees.65 In addition to its headquarters and office in Sarajevo, the EUMM in Bosnia has field offices in Tuzla, Banja Luka and Mostar, each staffed by two international experts. If required, these field offices can be transformed into mobile monitoring teams. The EUMM shared its insightful reports with the EUPM and other EU actors in theatre. However, as the EUPM had its own extended field presence, the added value of the EUMM input into the mission’s security assessments remained limited. A somewhat more important contribution was the induction training provided by the EUMM for newly arrived EUPM personnel. Finally, although the EUPM and EUMM were co-located in the same building, the relationship between the two missions got off to a bad start and had to be deconflicted.66 The initially strained relations between, on the one hand, the EUPM and, on the other, Althea and the EUMM highlight the fact that despite the long-standing efforts to enhance the coherence of Union peacebuilding efforts, practical co-ordination on the ground among members of the EU family is sometimes fraught with difficulties. We shall discuss similar problems in the next chapter when we analyse EUPOL Proxima.

Conclusion In this chapter, we provided an in-depth account of the pre-launch, build-up and implementation phase of the first-ever ESDP mission. We paid particular attention to the low-key peacebuilding activities through which the European experts governed the Bosnian micro-world of policing irregularities and disorders. To conclude, we briefly discuss the ESDP police mission that succeeded the EUPM, not least because this allows us to comment on the record of the EUPM and some of the lessons Brussels drew from it. The EUSR, the EUPM and police planners in Brussels began to consider a follow-on mission in April 2005. In the end, three reasons prompted the decision to remain engaged in Bosnia. To begin with, while the country made considerable progress in adopting legislation required by

The EUPM in Bosnia 77 the European Commission’s Feasibility Study, there was one requirement that, because of political opposition by the Republika Srpska, had not yet been addressed: ‘structural police reform with a view to rationalising police services’ (European Commission 2003b: 41). Although political agreement on police reform was finally reached in October 2005, thus clearing the way for Bosnia’s negotiations on an SAA, its implementation is scheduled to last five years. It will require, among other things, the introduction of a new centralized budget process, the consolidation and standardization of legal and administrative rules, the downsizing of police officers and the harmonization of procurement rules. It is clear that the implementation of such a major security sector reform, which, in addition, necessitates a change to the DPA, represents a major organizational, political and financial challenge for Bosnian authorities. ESDP support for this complex and contested undertaking, which is closely linked to the Union’s concern about organized crime in Bosnia, was deemed crucial for its success. Another reason for the deployment of EUPM II was Brussels’ persistent concern about organized crime originating in Bosnia or transiting through it en route to the EU. The Council concluded that although three years of EUPM reforms prioritizing the fight against this form of criminality had built up the capacity of the local police to take on the threat, the latter required further international oversight and guidance in this area. Indeed, the new mandate is an indirect critique of the record of EUPM I. It tasks the follow-on mission to play a more active role in assisting Bosnian law enforcement agencies in planning and conducting crime investigations. A final and closely related reason for the continued ESDP engagement in support of Bosnian policing was the fact that although EUPM I had gone some way in achieving its objectives, say, with regard to police accountability, financial sustainability, police management, professional skills and crime-fighting methods, not all mission projects were completed at the end of 2005. This was due to different reasons such as a lack of donor funding or delays in the introduction of necessary legislation. While not all unfinished projects were of the same importance, in particular those which targeted the SBS and SIPA were seen as important residual tasks that required further attention. After all, these two state-level policing institutions play a central role in efforts by the EU to render local policing more effective in combating organized crime. In 2005, these bodies remained seriously understaffed and without adequate budgets.67 Hence, further hands-on ESDP capacitybuilding through co-location was considered crucial in completing their build-up phase. In view of these enduring shortfalls of the Bosnian police identified by the EU, a new, albeit significantly leaner ESDP police mission was agreed. It was launched on 1 January 2006 under the leadership of a new commissioner, General Vincenzo Coppola, a former head of the Police Unit in Brussels, and is scheduled to last for two years. Its refocused mandate centres on police restructuring and organized crime. Personnel was downsized to

78 The EUPM in Bosnia about 170 international police experts initially deployed in 18 co-locations. Taking account of the co-ordination problems between EUFOR and EUPM I, Brussels gave the follow-on mission the lead role in ensuring the coherence of the police-related activities of the two ESDP actors. Finally, to improve the co-ordination between the EUSR and the EUPM II and to enhance the Union’s impact on the politically contentious issue of police restructuring, the decision was taken to more closely integrate the mission into the EUSR office in line with the EU’s Comprehensive Policy for Bosnia (European Council 2004). Also related to EU leverage on the issue of police restructuring, Coppola became a permanent member of the steering board of the directorate of police reform implementation, which is the local body in charge of this policy brief.

5

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia

The EUPOL Proxima was launched on 15 December 2003. While its initial mandate was limited to a year, the mission was extended for another 12 months. To properly contextualize Proxima, we begin by exploring why, after it weathered the violent break-up of Yugoslavia during the 1990s, Macedonia plunged from precarious peace into ethnic civil war. We move on to discuss the role of international peacebuilders in restoring security, notably, through policing reforms. Our focus here is on the manifold activities carried out by a host of international peacebuilders that turned the local police into an object of extensive knowledge and intensive management prior to the deployment of Proxima. This leads us naturally to inquire how, two years after the ethnic fighting had come to an end and peace was well entrenched, the EU made the Macedonian policing field thinkable as a problem-space in urgent need of a crisis management intervention. We thus bring into focus the knowledgeable and malleable practices involved in discursively enabling the deepening of the Union’s peacebuilding engagement in the country. After a brief analysis of the mandate, planning and deployment of the mission, we examine its initial travails, paying particular attention to the challenges it faced in developing a programmatic approach to mandate implementation. In Chapter 7, we identify the generic shortfalls accounting for these difficulties and suggest reforms to the civilian ESDP that promise to tackle them. Returning to this chapter, we next chronicle in some detail the work of co-locators. While the scope of their reforms was more circumscribed than in the case of their Bosnian colleagues, they, too, reached deep into the everyday routines and activities of Macedonian police officers in an effort to transform them in an European direction. In the penultimate section, we discuss the extension of Proxima’s mandate for one more year. We conclude by situating Proxima’s peacebuilding activities in the context of pre-EU integration, highlighting the not always easy relationships it developed with the other members of the EU family on the ground.

80 EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia

Ethnic tensions and insecurity in Macedonia The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared its independence in the fall of 1991. Yet unlike in the case of Slovenia and Croatia and, later Bosnia, the move triggered neither a civil war nor an intervention by the Yugoslav national army.1 As Yugoslavia violently disintegrated, Macedonia, despite its ethnically heterogeneous make-up, managed to avoid war. One of the principal reasons for the country’s relative stability throughout the 1990s was that successive, democratically elected governments steered a moderate course in the domestic and foreign policy arenas (Ackermann 2000). Domestically, the state, although invariably dominated by the Slav Macedonian majority, sought to accommodate the country’s largest minority: the ethnic Albanians.2 Except for the first government of the newly sovereign country – a government of ‘experts’ rather than politicians – all executives in the 1990s comprised both Slavic and ethnic Albanian parties. They supported modest minority rights, notably in the sphere of culture and language. The country’s popular first president, Kiro Gligorov, too, was a moderate. As to foreign affairs, governments took pains to present the country as a ‘wise and peaceful mediating regional influence’, basing their foreign policy on the notion of ‘equidistance’ with neighbours (Blazevska and Mehmeti 1998: 22–3). In particular, Macedonia tried to maintain civil relations with Serbia. The relative stability notwithstanding, peace in Macedonia was considered to be fragile. At first, international attention centred on the danger of a spillover of the war in Bosnia, with domestic sources of instability such as police violence directed at ethnic Albanians seen as a minor concern (but Abrahams 1998a). In response to worries about the cross-border spread of ethnic violence, the CSCE set up a monitoring mission in Macedonia in September 1992, even before the country was admitted to the institution.3 The task of the eight CSCE monitors, who were supported by two colleagues from the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) placed under the operational command of the CSCE head of mission, was to observe developments along Macedonia’s borders with Serbia and Albania in order to assess if ethnic conflict was spreading across them as well as to promote respect for the country’s territorial integrity. Three months later, the UN Security Council, responding to a request by the Macedonian government, authorized the preventive deployment of peacekeeping troops.4 The UN operation, which was made up of about 1000 soldiers, military observers and police monitors, was mandated to monitor the country’s borders with Albania and Serbia and to alert the IC to any developments in the area that could undermine stability. In the second half of the 1990s, the United Nations expanded its involvement in the country beyond the military operation, notably offering its good offices to mediate conflicts between Slav Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. However, external sources of instability remained its main concern.

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 81 Inter-ethnic relations deteriorated in the course of the 1990s (Abrahams 1998b). The accommodative stance of the government notwithstanding, little headway was made in overcoming the underrepresentation of ethnic Albanians in the public sector, including the police. Even in the sphere of culture, education and language, there was no great willingness on the part of the Slavic majority to embrace limited autonomy for Albanians as the example of the government’s refusal to tolerate an Albanian-language university in Tetovo demonstrated. The upshot was that ethnic Albanians became increasingly politicized, seeing themselves as victims of exclusion from state employment and educational opportunities (Brown 2000). This frustration translated into dissatisfaction with the moderate Albanian political parties in government. Also, periodic violent incidents pitting the Slavdominated police against ethnic Albanians contributed to the malaise as did the economic crisis that was at least partly the result of the international embargo against Serbia and the Greek embargo against Macedonia in the early 1990s. The war in Kosovo in 1999, which led to the inflow of some 400,000 refugees, further damaged the economy, weakened the government and radicalized the Albanians, both indirectly and directly through the inflow of fighters and organizers of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Balalovska, Silj and Zucconi 2002: 16; Tziampiris 2002: 216).5 The combination of these short-term developments and long-term grievances led, at the beginning of 2001, to a string of attacks by the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) against Macedonian targets, notably the police. The government, believing it could defeat the insurgency, refused to give in to rebel demands for constitutional changes that would give more rights to ethnic Albanians.6 Yet its expectations were too optimistic and in the following months the conflict spread along the border area and further towards Skopje. Government offences and crackdowns against insurgents were followed by further rebel attacks. Under intense pressure by NATO and the EU, whose secretary-generals engaged in shuttle diplomacy to prevent the conflict from spiralling out of control, the two sides finally agreed to negotiations at the end of June. Directed by special representatives of the United States and the EU, the talks led to the signing of a peace agreement in August 2001: the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The NLA leadership under Ali Ahmeti agreed to disarm and play by the rules of ‘normal’ politics, and the reluctant Slav Macedonians agreed to constitutional changes in favour of the ethnic Albanians.7 The Ohrid peace accord, which was ratified by parliament in November 2001, addressed the main grievances of the ethnic Albanians, especially equitable representation of minorities in the public sector, the decentralization of government, minority education and minority language use. The international actors masterminding the agreement tasked themselves, as it were, to oversee and support its implementation. Limiting our discussion to the security-related reforms mandated by the peace deal, the short section

82 EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia on the cessation of hostilities assigned to NATO an important role in militarily flanking the transition to peace. The alliance’s job was to assist in decommissioning the weapons of the NLA. As to policing reforms, they formed a central part of the agreement, a fact that largely reflects the prominent role of the police in the ethnic fighting, both as a target of insurgent attacks and as a perpetrator of abuse. The police was to be decentralized and made accountable to municipal councils. Moreover, by 2004 it had to reflect the composition and distribution of the general population. To this end, the authorities were tasked to hire 1000 new officers from minority communities as a first step. The OSCE, the EU and the United States were invited to assist the country in its efforts to build an ethnically balanced, human rights–oriented police service through the delivery of police aid, including technical assistance, training and the development of a code of police conduct.

Restoring peace: The role of internationals To carry out its task under the peace accord, NATO deployed 3500 troops to Macedonia. The aptly called operation Essential Harvest, which lasted for only 30 days, collected and destroyed the weapons handed over voluntarily by the NLA. The alliance’s follow-on operation was significantly smaller. The German-led Amber Fox was tasked with providing protection to international personnel monitoring the situation on the ground and contributing to stability in the former crisis areas around Tetovo, Kumanovo, Gostivar and Skopje. At this stage in the peacebuilding process, one of the principal public security challenges was the re-entry of the Macedonian police into the villages and cities from which it had withdrawn during the conflict. Pressured by the EU and the United States, the government, which was keen on rapidly re-establishing the monopoly of public policing in the former rebel-controlled territories, embedded its reassertion of state control in a comprehensive security package that also included, among other things, a commitment to dismantle police and army checkpoints in the former conflict areas and a pledge by President Trajkovski of political amnesty for those involved in the ethnic fighting.8 These confidence-building measures notwithstanding, the re-deployment of the police remained politically sensitive, even contested among the local Albanians. They were distrustful of the Macedonian authorities, questioning their commitment to reconciliation and fair policing. In short, the re-deployment of the state police, which began in October 2001, had the potential to rekindle the ethnic conflict in the country.9 To prevent such an outcome, international actors, notably the EUMM (the former ECMM) and the OSCE, carried out confidence-building activities. They mounted information campaigns and deployed monitors to observe the re-entry of the police into the areas they had earlier vacated. By supervising the police re-deployment as well as post-entry policing, OSCE and EUMM

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 83 monitors reassured the ethnic Albanian population that the security forces would not be able to harass them with impunity or, in violation of the amnesty pledge by President Trajkovski, arrest those Albanians who had been involved in the ethnic fighting. The role of NATO in this process was to guarantee the safety of the monitors. The importance of its security umbrella was brought into focus by a series of incidents related to the issue of re-entry. For instance, in many cases villagers put up road blocks to prevent the return of the police. In one incident in November 2001, three Slav Macedonian police officers were killed when they were deployed to an area north-east of Tetovo against the advice of international actors on the ground. However, such occasional disturbances notwithstanding, the phased police re-deployment proceeded well and was completed by the summer of 2002. In view of the steadily improving domestic security situation, NATO further downscaled its deployment at the end of 2002. The Alliance’s third operation in Macedonia – Allied Harmony – consisted of only 450 troops. While continuing to provide protection to internationals, one of the key tasks of the new operation was to advise the government on security sector reforms. Allied Harmony was replaced on 31 March 2003 by an equally small EU-led military operation. Concordia, whose mandate copied that of the NATO force, was the first-ever ESDP military operation. Initially, the EU had harboured hopes to replace NATO well before that date. However, first Turkish and then Greek objections to the EU–NATO agreement concerning EU access to NATO assets delayed the EU deployment. The obstacle was removed in December 2002 when NATO’s 1999 offer to the EU to use its resources for EU-led military operations was finally translated into politically acceptable language. Consequently, Concordia was carried out under the new Berlin-plus agreement (on Concordia, see Mace 2004). The transfer of security responsibilities from NATO to the EU did not only reflect the evolving actorness of the latter in the military field, it also signified the conviction of the IC that Macedonia was relatively stable and that the consolidation of democracy and security proceeded well. Originally scheduled to last for six months, the operation was extended until 15 December 2003, when the EU felt that the country had reached a level of stability that made any further deployment of peacekeepers redundant. Moving beyond post-conflict stabilization measures, we next discuss broader transformational reforms in the security sector. More precisely, we describe the wide-ranging involvement of a series of international peacebuilders in the refashioning of policing in Macedonia prior to the deployment of EUPOL Proxima. This sets the stage for our analysis of how the EU brought the Macedonian policing field under a description that, two years after the Ohrid peace accord had been signed, made the urgent deployment of an ESDP civilian crisis management mission seem necessary.

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Security sector reform: The international improvement of policing With the completion of the redeployment of the police to the former ethnic hot spots, the attention of international peacebuilders shifted towards the qualitative improvement of policing. Of particular concern were police– minority relations. The principal international player in the effort to improve policing in the country in general and to promote the transition from reentry to normal policing in particular was the OSCE (cf. Merlingen and Ostrauskait˙e 2005c). To assist the authorities in assuring equitable ethnic representation in the police and ethical policing with human rights at its core, the OSCE reinforced its Spillover Monitoring Mission to Skopje. Building on its philosophy of co-operative security and its vision of a publicly accountable and just police, the organization elaborated an aid programme that focused on developing the institutional and attitudinal foundations for community policing. This policing mode was seen as best suited for democratizing the Macedonian police and building confidence between them and ethnic Albanians. To advance its project, the OSCE co-operated with the ministry of interior in the development of what was referred to as the New Approach to Policing. In support of the new approach, the OSCE’s training and educational support divisions developed and delivered training to police cadets and officers at the police academy in Idrizovo.10 While the majority of the selected recruits were ethnic Albanians, all courses were ethnically mixed, including Macedonians and non-Albanian minorities. Besides technical skills training, such as drug identification and firearms instruction, the curriculum emphasized subjects such as human rights training, policing in a multiethnic society, community policing and domestic violence awareness. These subjects were designed to facilitate the integration of the police into local communities by bringing about a shift in ethos in the police organization from being a force to a service, from law enforcement to community orientation, from policing alone to policing in partnership (Fleming 2002: 25). As part of its commitment to long-term police reforms, the OSCE also monitored and advised on the recruitment and selection of new cadets, paying particular attention to increasing the number of women and ethnic minorities in the service. Finally, through its police reform and community development divisions, the OSCE played an important part in the implementation of the New Approach to Policing. Among other things, the organization was engaged in raising awareness among citizens and municipal leaders about the benefits of community policing; delivering technical assistance in support of the decentralization of police command structures and the formation of citizen advisory groups, which constitute the principal interface between the police and the local communities; training community relations co-ordinators who work with the citizen advisory groups; and providing advice on the operation of public complaints mechanisms to deal

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 85 with citizens’ complaints about police misconduct, including ethnic bias and human rights violation. The other major international actor in the policing field in Macedonia at the time was the European Commission, which concerned itself with the reorganization of the ministry of interior. Drawing on CARDS funds and making use of its new Rapid Reaction Mechanism, the Commission deployed a team of experts – the European Commission Justice and Home Affairs Team (ECJHAT) – to the country in March 2002 to develop a reform strategy for the ministry and the police, including the border police. Its recommendations, which centred on the decentralization of the police and various capacity-building measures targeting issues such as human resource management and the establishment of a police information system, provided the basis for the police reform strategy adopted by the government in August 2003.11 Turning from multilateral to bilateral police aid, the United States was one of the key actors in the country. Through ICITAP it ran, among other things, programmes concerning the recruitment and training of cadets. It was also involved in organizational reforms such as the establishment of a professional standards unit within the ministry of interior and the promotion of community policing. Other bilateral donors were the United Kingdom and France, with the former, for instance, assisting the ministry of interior to create a multi-ethnic rapid deployment unit for counter-insurgency tasks and public order maintenance and the latter running police training and advisory projects on, among other things, crime investigations. There are two points we want to make here. To begin with, the police aid sector in Macedonia prior to the launch of EUPOL Proxima was crowded. Indeed, there were so many international actors involved in the policing field that more than once the Macedonian government was confronted with overlapping and inconsistent foreign interventions. Attempts to co-ordinate all multilateral and bilateral activities through the Police Expert Group only partly succeeded in eliminating institutional rivalry and duplication among international actors. Our second point is that the intense international reformatory activity in the wake of the Ohrid agreement had a noticeable impact on the quality of policing. Two years after the Ohrid agreement had been signed, the Macedonian policing field, and public security more generally, were a heterogeneous assemblage of normality and deviance, when judged against an Eurometrics of good policing. On the one hand, the police was ‘good and professional when it came to law and order’,12 not least because the first training courses administered by ICITAP and the OSCE had been successfully completed, putting officers trained in European/Western policing conduct on the streets. Significant progress had been made in ensuring the proportional representation of ethnic minorities in the force. Thus, by the end of 2003 the police was the most advanced public institution in terms of an ethnically balanced workforce.13 Moreover, as a long-standing EU observer in Macedonia told

86 EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia us, the IC had ‘no significant security concerns in Macedonia at the time’.14 Under the direction of international peacebuilders, the police had learned to tackle challenges to its authority, say, threats to Slav Macedonian police officers in Albanian villages or calls on ethnic Albanian officers to take off their uniforms and desert, in a pragmatic, non-violent manner. The Macedonian government, too, believed that the ‘greatest problem’ at the end of 2003 was ‘a better climate for foreign and domestic investment’, not insecurity (Project on Ethnic Relations 2004: 9).15 On the other hand, there was still some way to go to fully integrate ethnic minorities into the police. Also, practices deviating from European standards of good policing remained entrenched in the country. For instance, crime case management continued to rely primarily on confessions from suspects, which occasionally were even extracted under (light) ‘physical or psychological torture’, rather than on the patient collection of evidence.16 In the section that follows, we inquire into how the EU dealt with the hybridity and correlated ambiguity of policing in Macedonia. Our goal is to underline the importance of visualizing or mapping fields of action for bringing them under the influence of governance and the inevitable contingency of this activity.

The EU’s problematization of Macedonian policing In Chapter 2, we argued that international government proceeds by bringing issues and social relations under a certain description which makes them worthy of political attention. The construction of such problem-spaces by would-be peacebuilders is a complex achievement. It involves talking to informants, consulting statistics, reading policy papers and other documents put together by the local government and non-governmental organizations and so forth. Next the gathered information has to be sorted and interpreted and, finally, a report has to be written up that re-presents the assembled problem-space as requiring international intervention and that outlines a blueprint for how to govern it. The production of such governmental maps is also the story of the production of the normal and the abnormal, the desirable and the undesirable, the visible and the invisible. It is, in short, a constructive process. Here we show how the EU mapped the Macedonian policing field with a view to rendering it amenable to the reforms of an ESDP crisis management mission. At the beginning of July 2003, the PSC tasked the Council Secretariat of the EU to begin, in close co-ordination with the European Commission, with the planning of a possible future ESDP police mission in Macedonia. Soon thereafter, a joint fact-finding mission composed of staff from the two institutions was deployed to the country to map the police field, ascertain whether there was a need for an expansion of the EU’s involvement in local policing reforms and, in case there was a need, develop recommendations for the structure and areas of intervention of the mission (EAR 2005). The

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 87 European experts tabled their report on 28 August 2003. Their key point was that without an EU crisis management mission to tackle a number of urgent policing needs, the country was in danger of sliding back into instability and civil war. Moreover, instead of flagging the existence of numerous international police aid donors on the ground as an object of concern, they described the congested police aid field as a technical challenge of how best to improve the co-ordination of the manifold police reform projects. The list of shortcomings marking local policing that was produced by the European experts was long and in general in line with scholarly representations (Yusufi 2004).17 Beginning with police officers, they were described as having poor skills, inadequate ethical standards and low motivation. For instance, they had no internalized commitment to humane policing, including policing by consent. This predisposed them to rely on militarized patrolling and checkpoints to secure stability in ethnic hot spots. Also, they lacked the expertise to crack down on organized crime. In particular, they failed to appreciate the importance of intelligence-led policing, which is a key tool of Western police forces in the fight against this form of criminality. These shortcomings were seen as being aggravated by an insufficient ethnic and gender representation in the police as well as by organizational, managerial and equipment-related problems. For instance, the police apparatus was said to be characterized by, among other things, an overly centralized decision-making structure, inadequate internal control and promotion systems and political interference in operational policing decisions. Insufficient information exchange and co-ordination among different branches of the police and among the police and the other components of the judicial triad hampered crime investigations. In addition, the police lacked sufficient equipment to effectively carry out its tasks. Underdeveloped forensic and IT capacities were viewed as negatively affecting policing work. In short, the map of the Macedonian police field drawn by the European experts marked out the local police as a force deviating from European standards of normality. Its persistent ‘difference’ contributed to the alienation of significant segments of the population. One of the effects of the mistrust of citizens in the police was that crime was often not reported and thus could not be investigated. This undermined law and order in the country. It was concluded that, when placed in the context of unstable peace, an underperforming police which, in addition, lacked legitimacy in the eyes of citizens constituted a constant threat to the stability and security of the country. On the basis of their interpretation of the state of policing in Macedonia, the European experts saw a clear need for an enhanced EU role in this field. By addressing the operational shortfalls in the ministry of interior and in the police stations in the former crisis areas, an ESDP mission would be able to enhance the commitment of the local police to rational-legal norms, improve its effectiveness and build up its moral authority among the population.

88 EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia Hence, it was recommended that the mission pay particular attention to the fight against organized crime, operational aspects of police management, police accountability and internal control as well as the operationalization of the new civilian border police. These and other suggestions provided the basis for the formulation of the mandate and operations plan (OPLAN) of EUPOL Proxima. While the EU experts did not consider the possibility that the numerous reforms of the Macedonian police carried out by the IC made an ESDP police mission redundant, they did acknowledge the need for close co-ordination among the various donors in order to ensure synergy. As far as the relationship between an ESDP police mission and European Commission police aid was concerned, it was framed as complementary. The ESDP mission would, based on its experience gained in the field, provide input into the reforms of the ministry of interior administered by the European Commission. With regard to other multilateral and bilateral donors, the coherence of foreign interventions was meant to be secured through the co-ordinating role of the EUSR on the ground, the Police Expert Group and, in the case of the OSCE, the exchange of liaison officers. In the view of the fact finders, the insertion of an ESDP mission into the crowded Macedonian policing field would be facilitated by a clear division of labour: the ESDP mission would zero in on short-term operational management reforms and other international police reformers would continue to carry out longer-term institution-building activities. As we shall see further below, this neat dividing line traced out by the EU could not, at least not in the time available to the mission, be imposed on the Macedonian police aid field. This was one of the factors contributing to the resistance from persons, things and events that, by refusing to act, fall in place and unfold in line with the logic of the mandate, hampered Proxima’s reforms. Our discussion so far brought into focus how European experts constructed public security and its agents in Macedonia in such a way as to highlight the urgent need for corrective interventions by the EU. This mapmaking exercise, which highlighted certain features while rendering others marginal or invisible, was a crucial moment in Proxima’s pre-launch phase. Next, we turn to the preparation for and the deployment of the mission.

The mandate, planning and deployment of EUPOL Proxima In September 2003 the Council of the EU agreed to remain engaged in the peacebuilding process in Macedonia by deploying a civilian followup mission to the EU military operation Concordia. Preparatory work for EUPOL Proxima began immediately thereafter. In Brussels, the Council Secretariat together with the mission planning team headed by Bart D’Hooge carried out the necessary conceptual groundwork, including the elaboration of the OPLAN. At the completion of this phase, the focus shifted to Macedonia, where the planning team initiated and supervised the

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 89 procurement of the equipment needed for rendering Proxima operational. The planning phase was formally concluded with the official launch of the mission on 15 December 2003. The ensuing set-up phase did not proceed smoothly. It was only at the beginning of March 2004 that all initially planned field stations were operational, though some still had not received computers and other essential office equipment. It took about two more months before the build-up phase was finally completed at the end of April. The significant delay in Proxima’s build-up phase was mainly due to problems with force generation and procurement. As one senior staffer explained to us, ‘logistically, the mission was not prepared at all’.18 Also the mission was plagued by internal management deficiencies, not least because the ‘personnel management skills of the leadership were not the best’.19 Finally, unforeseen external factors such as the death of President Trajkovski and two rounds of early presidential elections, which diverted the attention of the mission, contributed to the slow beginning. Proxima was a non-executive mission mandated to last for a year and comprising about 200 international police experts. They were co-located primarily, albeit not exclusively at mid- and senior-level management in over 20 locations in north-western Macedonia, where ethnic fighting had taken place in the first half of 2001. With the exception of a separate Protection Element of some 20 police officers, mission personnel was unarmed.20 The co-locators were mandated, through monitoring, mentoring and advising activities and in close co-ordination with other international police reformers, to contribute to the consolidation of law and order, including the fight against organized crime, the development of a civilian border police and the strengthening of the confidence of citizens in the police. They were also tasked to draw on their field experience to provide input into the reforms of the ministry of interior carried out under the guidance of the European Commission and to enhance police co-operation with neighbouring countries (Council of the EU 2003). The EUPOL Proxima, just like the EUPM, was composed of police officers who were seconded by their governments as well as of contracted international civilian and local staff. The police officers remained formally under the command of their national authorities, which meant, for instance, that disciplinary measures in case of misconduct were taken by the appropriate bodies back home. Conversely, operational control of the mission and its day-to-day management were assumed by its head. Just like his counterpart in Bosnia, the police commissioner reported to the High Representative for the CFSP via the EUSR in the country and directly to the PSC, which was in charge of exercising political control over the mission and of providing it with strategic direction. In line with the regulations for financing civilian ESDP deployments, Proxima’s operational running costs and staff per diems were paid for by the CFSP budget, whereas salaries and travel allowances were borne by the member states and the third countries that accepted the offer to join the mission.21

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Devising policing interventions The police reforms in Macedonia carried out under the ESDP evolved over time as a result of both an internal reorganization of the mission in mid-2004 and the extension of its mandate at the end of the year. In 2004, Proxima went through two phases. During the first phase, which lasted until June, the detailed knowledge without which no international project of improvement can function was gathered (Scholz 2005). Proxima staff conducted Initial Field Level Monitoring and wrote up Performance Evaluation Reports to clear the space for the development of their reform activities. At the same time, detailed assessments of the ministry of internal affairs, its branches and sectors, were conducted and the performance of the border police was evaluated. Informed by its evaluation and drawing on the mandate, the mission identified five thematic reform priorities and drew up broad guidelines outlining work routines and procedures for the co-locators.22 As Proxima abstained from concretizing these broad objectives through the elaboration of detailed projects, co-locators had to carry out their work without precise operational guidance. The result was that the mission experts, both in the police reform working groups of the ministry of interior to which they were invited and outside such formal venues, mentored and advised their colleagues on a wide variety of policing issues without a clear idea of how these recommendations fit into the overall reform strategy. The upshot was that Proxima’s reforms resembled an unfocused awareness raising exercise: indigenous police managers were made aware of what this or that co-locator found problematic in their way of doing things and how their ways could be improved. For instance, at the level of the ministry of interior, co-locators recommended a hodgepodge of measures such as the development of a transparent and unified filing system for criminal investigations; the creation of an analysis and intelligence unit; the use of needs-based shift plans; the setting up of a hotline for victims and witnesses of human trafficking; and the decentralization of internal supervisory and control mechanisms. At the field level, they provided advice on issues such as the re-deployment of officers to regions with high crime rates; the collection of material evidence at crime scenes in order to reduce reliance on testimony; the detection of forged travel documents; the reduction of police patrols armed with AK 47 machine guns in the centre of cities; the need for empathy towards victims of crime and their relatives; and the eradication of endemic traffic rule violations by police. Although each of these recommendations may have been important in itself, they did not amount to a coherent reform effort. In short, in the first half year of its operation, Proxima pursued what can be called a ‘laundry-list approach’ to policing reforms. Facing criticism by the Council and realizing the lack of strategic impact of the mission, Commissioner D’Hooge and his senior staff decided at

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 91 the beginning of June to fundamentally reorganize the mission in order to enhance the effectiveness of its activities.23 The re-engineering, which was completed by mid-July, involved a shift from what amounted to ad-hocism to a programme-driven reform agenda. Proxima refocused resources and attention on a few clearly identified priorities: law enforcement, border policing and confidence building between the police and the citizens. Following this reorganization, Proxima had a work schedule covering 5 programmes, and 28 projects centred on these three priorities. Each co-locator was associated with at least one of the five programmes. The development of a programmatic approach proved significantly more difficult for Proxima than for the EUPM, even though, as we saw in the previous chapter, the mission in Bosnia encountered its own challenges in developing a reform agenda. Proxima’s programming problems, which, in turn, negatively affected its ability to implement its mandate, had to do with four main facts. Arguably the most basic one was that ‘unlike the EUPM, Proxima could not continue already existing reforms instituted by a preceding mission’.24 Second, programme developers soon realized that many of the issues covered by their mandate were already tackled by other international donors. It was simply difficult to find a niche for the newcomer. This was an issue of overcrowding rather than information exchange and co-ordination. For instance, the mandate called on the mission to provide technical assistance to the demilitarization of border security and the transition to a civilian border police under the authority of the ministry of interior. Yet this issue-area was already covered by both the OSCE and the European Commission. Another example concerns the mission’s objective to build confidence between the local police and the citizens. The lead role in this field had been taken by the OSCE and ICITAP. Both ran their own confidence-building projects. While in both these cases, Proxima in the end managed to develop useful projects, this was a time-consuming process. It required an in-depth analysis of existing reform efforts with a view to identifying gaps and coming up with solutions that could complement ongoing reforms rather than duplicate or undermine them. Given the complexity of their task, programme developers often failed to create projects generating added value. For instance, the mission elaborated projects that seemed designed to monitor not the local police but other international peacebuilders. Not only did this undermine the raison d’être of the mission, it also led to tensions and, occasionally, a (temporary) breakdown of co-operation and communication between it and its international ‘partners’. This happened when the mission sought to involve itself in the firearms training of local officers, which was carried out at the police academy under the direction of the OSCE. Not surprisingly, the OSCE refused to have its pedagogical management double-checked and thus did not co-operate with Proxima, rejecting repeated requests by the mission to share the teaching aids used for the subject at the academy. Even though the

92 EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia OSCE finally agreed to provide the requested information to its ‘partner’, the latter had by that time decided to discontinue its activities in this area. A third major problem faced by Proxima programme planners was that they were expected to focus on quick-impact reforms, an expectation which, among other things, was reflected in the mission’s short, one-year mandate. The programme department thus struggled to put together projects that, while being significantly less elaborate and demanding than those developed by the EUPM with its three-year mandate, promised to improve local policing and do so in less than a year. Often they succeeded, say, when colocators put together a manual of ‘do’s and don’ts’ on basic crime police techniques such as evidence gathering and house searches. In other cases, however, the goal to design quick-impact measures proved elusive. For instance, the mission formulated a project that was intended to supplement efforts by the European Commission to re-engineer the management culture of the police. It centred on the operational aspect of the task, addressing itself to human resource management, inspections as a tool for performance enhancement and the establishment of a meritocratic career system. Yet in this case just as in others, the clear-cut dividing line traced out by the fact-finding mission between short-term operational management reforms and long-term institution-building ones proved unhelpful as a planning tool. The result was that more than once the mission ended up with reform projects that required years rather than months to complete. In the case at hand, Proxima’s engagement with the local police management culture was prematurely terminated when the mission was extended for another year. Finally, project design was rendered difficult by the fact that reforms had to reflect that Macedonia, unlike Bosnia, was not de facto under international administration. Proxima’s programme developers thus had to pay more attention to the issue of ‘translation’ (Callon 1986). They had to find ways to define their projects as ‘obligatory passage points’ through which the local police had to pass if they wanted to advance their own goals. This alignment of EU reform objectives and the interests of local law enforcement officials proved difficult, not least because the mission had a limited capacity to bring into play material ‘interessement devices’ such as equipment donations or grants. Often Proxima was able to mobilize political momentum for its reforms by casting them as technical measures advancing policing standards required for EU membership, which was, and continues to be, a priority of the Macedonian government. However, occasionally local police officers resisted being enrolled in Proxima’s reforms. For instance, some were reluctant to be mentored on how to improve the policing of human trafficking. Co-locators told us that a number of Macedonian police managers, most of whom had gone through repeated international trainings on the issue, argued that human trafficking had already been brought under control in the country and that, in any case, they knew how best to deal with the problem.25

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 93

Forms of intervention: Proxima’s projects of improvement In this section, we provide a thick description of the heterogeneous and often minute activities through which Proxima co-locators reformed the Macedonian policing field. Beginning with the Criminal Police Programme, mission experts problematized the absence of proactive investigations and the correlated lack of analysis and investigation capabilities of the local police. They argued that these shortfalls contributed to the fact that organized crime was routinely classified as normal crime. To address them, Proxima elaborated a two-track strategy. One set of reforms centred on mentoring and training the local police on how to deal with specific types of crime such as trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, armed robberies and kidnappings. For instance, in the anti-human trafficking project, co-locators organized awareness-raising workshops and prepared and distributed handbooks providing guidelines for the detection and investigation of trafficking.26 Also, they put together a standard OPLAN designed to be used as a template by the local police when they carry out anti-human trafficking raids. A second set of reforms addressed what co-locators considered to be generic weaknesses of the fight against crime: insufficient interaction among the various parts of the justice system and skills shortfalls of investigators. Of the three projects designed to tackle these problems, the project designed to address crime techniques and forensics was the most active. Co-locators targeted the crime scene handling of the local police and raised awareness about the importance of forensic sciences in identifying perpetrators of crimes. For instance, to improve co-operation among the different players involved in crime case management, they organized a working group on crime investigations composed of, inter alia, representatives of the ministry of interior, the public prosecutor’s office and the institute of forensic sciences. Co-locators in the reporting procedures project, for their part, put together templates and guidelines to upgrade the quality of interviews of witnesses and suspects as well as crime scene documentation. Last but not least, mission experts assigned to the surveillance and shadowing project, in co-operation with the French embassy, trained and mentored the reconnaissance unit of the special Police Unit ‘Tigers’ and another surveillance unit of the organized crime department of the public safety bureau. Turning to the Border Police Programme, it had a twofold purpose. One was to deal with the operational aspects of the demilitarization of border security and to facilitate the transfer of political authority over border management from the ministry of defence to the ministry of interior.27 While the main international actor in this issue-area was the OSCE, Proxima’s monitoring and mentoring activities complemented its management training. A key project aimed at advancing the decentralization of decision-making within the border police through the transfer of operational competences from the ministry of interior to the border police command posts, and the improvement of management skills at field level. For instance, co-locators,

94 EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia having identified the existing format of written orders governing the interaction among officials at different levels in the chain of command as too rigid, mentored their counterparts in the ministry of interior and border crossings on how to leave room for autonomous action by subordinates. The other purpose of the programme was to enhance border security and to make sure that the border guards prioritized the fight against organized crime and illegal migration. This aspect of the programme centred on projects aimed at the dissemination of certain threat perceptions and technical skills through mentoring and the organization of workshops. For instance, one project targeted the detection of forged travel documents with a view to combating cross-border criminality (Scholz 2005). Co-locators conducted a series of trainings on various security features, say, picture safety measures and control numbers in documents, forgery methods such as imitations of watermarks and the skills needed to recognize manipulations of this kind through the use of UV-light, magnifying glasses and so forth. They also trained selected local officers as document consultants who later on, with the logistical support of the mission, trained their colleagues in the detection of forgery. The improvement of airport security was the theme of another project. Co-locators evaluated the existing security standards and elaborated a list of recommendations on how to upgrade them, including 24-hour patrolling of the perimeter fence around airports and tighter controls of the issuing of airport identification cards. Mission staff also organized a seminar dedicated to topics such as the X-raying of luggage, security patrols and checks and aeroplane searches. Finally, to improve the fight against illegal migration and smuggling the border police programme included a project on the control of buses and trains, for which co-locators, among other things, compiled a catalogue of possible concealments to aid their local counterparts in carrying out checks. The largest programme in terms of the number of co-locators assigned to it was the Uniformed Police Programme. We already referred to its most ambitious project, which aimed at re-engineering the organizational culture of the local police. Here we want to point out that not only was the schedule for the completion of the project unrealistic, but its key goals, say, the overhaul of the promotion system, were already covered by the European Commission Police Reform Project and other international police aid donors. This duplication underlines our point about the difficulties encountered by Proxima when it tried to find a niche for itself in the densely populated Macedonian police aid field. A more focused project of the Uniformed Police Programme dealt with confidence building between the police and the citizens through the promotion of community policing. Although the issue was covered by the OSCE and ICITAP, Proxima programme developers succeeded in devising a project that added value to ongoing reform activities. Its confidence-building teams mentored the OSCE-trained community relations co-ordinators on how to interact with citizens, especially in the citizen advisory groups, which play

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 95 a central role in the New Approach to Policing. Co-locators also incited the local police to explore additional ways of engaging local communities. For instance, they supervised the formation of school–police partnerships and brought together citizens and the police on issues of common concern such as the enhancement of road safety through the identification of traffic hot spots that would benefit from the placing of road signs. An additional issue-area in which the mission was able to carve out a niche for itself concerned generic skills shortfalls. After an initial monitoring phase, co-locators concluded that many new police officers, extending to middle management, who were hired to fulfil the quota stipulations of the Ohrid agreement, did not have sufficient proficiency to carry out their jobs effectively despite the training carried out by the OSCE and, to a lesser degree, by ICITAP. Working with the ministry of interior, mission experts thus reactivated the on-the-job training, which had earlier been discontinued, to complement the academy-based police education. Another project in the Uniformed Police Programme tackled the widespread violation of traffic law in the country. Co-locators, among other things, put together the first comprehensive traffic rule book to assure consistent policing in this area. Proxima also developed a reform programme targeting Macedonia’s intelligence agency (UBK), especially its capacity to plan and manage operations to counter terrorism and fight organized crime. One project dealt with broad organizational reforms in the agency. For instance, based on their observations, co-locators problematized the management practices of middle-level officers. On their recommendation, the OSCE subsequently organized a training course to introduce UBK personnel to Western management methods. Another general shortcoming identified by co-locators had to do with inter-agency co-operation. Hence, Proxima incited the UBK leadership to organize regular meetings with representatives of other services of the ministry of interior, notably the crime police. To institutionalize these fora, co-locators elaborated a set of principles guiding intra-ministerial cooperation and ensured its adoption. A second UBK project targeted undercover capabilities and operations. Co-locators provided input into the drafting of guidelines and rulebooks on the techniques and tactics of undercover operations, including the procedures for initiating such operations. They also directed their attention to the political oversight of the undercover unit through its integration into the chain of command of the ministry and to the recruitment procedures governing the selection of handlers and agents. To strengthen their case for reform, the mission leadership, at the end of 2004, organized a study visit for senior Macedonian players in the field of undercover policing to Belgium, where they were briefed by the undercover unit of the federal police and the federal public prosecutor’s office. Finally, co-locators advanced computerbased intelligence-led policing in the UBK to ensure that greater and more effective use was made of intelligence in the fight against organized crime

96 EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia and terrorism. Together with other police aid donors such as the United Kingdom, experts of the mission’s IT project assisted the UBK in the establishment of an intelligence unit and the implementation of an intelligence model based on generic risk assessment templates with the help of which collected information is standardized and analysed and results are rendered compatible with that of EU intelligence agencies.28 Last but not least, Proxima developed an Internal Control/Law Enforcement Monitoring Programme. Beginning with the internal control component, it was primarily intended to weed out and deter malpractice and police misconduct. The technical skills and gear-related aspects of malpractice were covered by a project designed to bring Macedonian practices in line with EU standards on issues such as the storage of police firearms, firearms training and the standardization of firearms equipment. Among the politically more salient projects was one concerned with ensuring that internal controls and disciplinary procedures were applied forcefully and in a transparent manner. For instance, to ensure that public complaints against the police were processed quickly and in line with existing rules, co-locators put together a handbook for inspectors of the professional standards units, i.e. those officers responsible for investigating police abuse.29 The handbook included sections on interview techniques and evidence collection in police misconduct cases. In addition, mission staff organized and facilitated meetings between inspectors and citizens who had lodged complaints as well as other relevant players such as representatives of the ombudsman and non-governmental organizations. As to law enforcement monitoring, it was an innovative effort to overcome the limitations of the mission mandate and to address law enforcement reforms in a holistic fashion, notably with regard to organized crime. The core project was designed to strengthen the institutional integration and coherence of the justice system with a view to enhancing co-operation among its various players. To this end, specialized Proxima lawyers monitored the implementation of legal reforms and alerted the government to the loopholes in existing laws that allowed criminals to avoid being brought to justice. More importantly, co-locators organized and monitored local meetings with stakeholders in different jurisdictions with a view to making them aware of existing shortcomings, and they urged them to improve the exchange of information and co-ordination of actions in high profile cases (Scholz 2005). Towards the end of 2004, Proxima staff sponsored similar meetings at the central state level to facilitate co-operation between the organized crime department of the ministry of interior and its newly established counterpart in the public prosecutor’s office. A second project in this programme focused on the development of a law on witness protection and the creation of a witness protection unit in the ministry of interior. On these issues, co-locators worked closely with their counterparts of the European Commission Police Reform Project, not least to overcome the reluctance of the ministry which considered that with this

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 97 project the mission stretched its mandate too far. A final project tasked co-locators with carrying out a survey of the conditions and treatment of detainees in police stations with a view to bringing about changes to the system. While the first part of the objective was achieved, co-locators ran out of time to pursue the second part. This observation provides us with a nice transition to the next section. As already mentioned, in a number of cases mission reform projects remained incomplete when the mandate expired. This was one of the reasons for the extension of Proxima.

Proxima II The idea of prolonging Proxima was first seriously discussed in the context of an evaluation of the mission by members of the Council’s Police Unit and Policy Unit in mid-2004. Here we have to remember that it was only in midJuly that the mission began to engage the local police on the basis of a clearly defined agenda for action. Hence, at the time of the Council assessment, it was foreseeable that the mission would probably not be able to fully achieve its mandate objectives. Not long after this evaluation, the EUSR in Macedonia, Michael Sahlin, proposed to the PSC to extend Proxima, albeit at reduced strength, for another year. He based his case on two arguments. First, given Proxima’s limited impact so far, the local police continued to suffer from a number of general weaknesses. In particular, they were corrupt and the population had little confidence in them. Also, certain branches of the force were identified as requiring continued supervision and assistance, especially the crime police and the border police. Second, according to Sahlin, the country’s security, although significantly better than at the launch of the mission, remained fragile and dependent on developments in Kosovo. Accepting the assessment and recommendation of the Special Representative, the PSC, advised by Civcom, decided to prolong the mission for 12 more months (Council of the EU 2004b).30 In addition to police- and security-related factors, there was one further important consideration at play in this decision: Proxima’s legacy. Given the (symbolic) importance of the dynamic ESDP in the context of an otherwise often stuttering European integration process, the Council did not wish to withdraw a mission that was widely perceived as having failed to live up to expectations. The idea was that the extension of the mandate and a new head of mission would allow Proxima to get its act together, improve its performance and hence transform itself into a success story. Beginning in November 2004, the planning for Proxima II began. Commissioner D’Hooge was put in charge of the process, even though a decision had already been made to replace him as head of mission. This move backfired, and the resulting leadership gap severely hampered the planning process for the new mission.31 Proxima II, which was launched on 15 December 2004, was an organizationally leaner and substantively more focused mission with a wider

98 EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia territorial coverage than its predecessor. Based on a new mandate from Brussels and a revised OPLAN, it confined its reforms to middle- and senior-level management, thus discontinuing the presence in local police stations. This allowed for a significant downsizing of mission staff even while deployment was expanded beyond the former ethnic hot spots to the whole country.32 As to the reform activities, the programmatic transition between the two missions was characterized by a fundamental continuity. To maximize the time available for project implementation and to minimize the programming phase, Proxima II by and large adopted its predecessor’s reform agenda. The mission did develop some new activities, say, mentoring police leaders on how to incorporate quality of life issues into local policing and how to implement information-led policing at a local level through tools such as hot spot mapping. In general, however, most of its activities were rolled over from Proxima I. Changes were limited to a reduction in the number of items on the agenda, with most remaining ones being sorted into new streamlined programmes. During a preparatory phase of two months in which programme implementation was halted, the mission repackaged its reform activities into three programmes, each consisting of one management and one skills project.33 The only Proxima I programme which largely remained intact was the Border Police Programme. Both Proxima I and Proxima II monitored the handover of responsibility for border control from the ministry of defence to the ministry of interior, a process which started in May 2004 and was successfully completed in late 2005. And although further monitoring of the implementation of the integrated border management strategy in Macedonia was considered necessary at the time of the departure of Proxima II, the mission had succeeded in its efforts to upgrade the skills of the border police, say, with regard to the detection of forged documents. As to the Uniformed Police Programme, it was discontinued. The new mission leadership under German brigadier general Jürgen Scholz regarded the link between the mission’s peacebuilding mandate and reforms aimed at, say, the traffic police as too tenuous, and it acknowledged that other projects in this programme, say, the development of a meritocratic career system, fell under the competence of the EC Police Reform Project. This having been said, Proxima II staff did continue to improve the skills of traffic cops as part of their efforts to empower local policing and thus translate the administrative decentralization of the police stipulated by the Ohrid framework agreement into mundane policing changes that are relevant to the daily life of citizens. In other changes, a new Organized Crime Programme integrated selected projects from three different Proxima I programmes, which covered the crime police, the UBK and law enforcement monitoring. The new programme targeted primarily the improvement of the intelligence gathering and threat assessment capacity of local law enforcement agencies. Some of the projects were successful, for instance, advancing vertical co-operation between the central UBK level and its field structure; others, however, had

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 99 to be discontinued as they did not muster enough support from the ministry of interior. Under the programme, co-locators also organized workshops, say, on organized crime for detectives of criminal investigation departments and on leadership skills for senior police managers. Other activities included the formulation of a mission statement for the UBK and the promotion of co-operation between inspectors of professional standards units and public prosecutors. Finally, the Public Peace and Order programme continued, albeit in a scaled-down manner, the activities of Proxima I in the fields of internal control, confidence building, policing skills and police management.34 Thus, the mission, among other things, organized workshops on the use of aide memoirs for field inspectors of professional standard units; intervened to put in place proper duty rosters in police stations; and continued to promote community policing by supporting already existing citizen advisory groups and establishing new ones. Although limited in scope and time-consuming, this latter initiative proved rather successful. Overall, however, the agenda for action pursued by Proxima II reflected, even more so than in the case of Proxima I, the EU’s concern with organized crime. All three programmes included activities devoted to this issue. Just as in the case of the EUPM, our examination of the reforms carried out by Proxima gives rise to two conclusions. First, the mission engaged the micro-world of local policing in manifold little ways. No detail was too small or unimportant to be outside the purview of the EU peacebuilders. Second, given that there was no immediate threat to peace and stability in Macedonia, Proxima was able to focus on transformative capacity-building reforms rather than quick fixes designed to address urgent security shortfalls threatening to derail the country’s transition process. Having brought into focus the quotidian workings of Proxima, we next place the ESDP police mission in the context of other EU actors on the ground. Our purpose here, as it was in the previous chapter, is to highlight their sometimes conflictual relationship as well as the link between postconflict peacebuilding and pre-EU integration.

Conclusion: Proxima in the context of European integration In Macedonia, as in Bosnia, a number of EU actors contribute to the consolidation of an order of liberal peace and the country’s advancement towards European integration. Beginning with the office of the EUSR, it is primarily responsible for co-ordinating the actions of the different, partially independent EU players on the ground. As the principal link between EUPOL Proxima and Brussels, the Special Representative was tasked with ensuring that the mission operated effectively within the overall political framework of EU peacebuilding in the country. A lack of continuous leadership, though, hampered this effort. When Proxima was deployed on 15 December 2003, Alexis Brouhns was the incumbent. One month into the mission, Brouhns’ mandate expired and, on 26 January 2004, he was succeeded by

100 EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia Søren Jessen-Petersen. The new office holder, though, soon stepped down to become the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Kosovo. He was replaced by Michael Sahlin on 1 August 2004. After a little over a year into his job, Sahlin’s status changed from resident Special Representative to non-resident Special Representative. Soon thereafter, he was replaced by Erwan Fouéré, who became the first-ever office holder to be double-hatted as head of the European Commission delegation in the host country. Prior to the creation of this personal union, the Special Representative, with a view to managing the coherence of EU external action in the country, organized regular co-ordination meetings among the EU presidency, European Commission delegation, European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), EUMM and Proxima.35 In addition, he chaired weekly meetings of the ‘security principals’, including NATO and the OSCE, and, on a fortnightly basis, a meeting of the heads of international organizations present in Macedonia – the ‘Friday principals’. In carrying out his job, the Special Representative was supported by a team of five to six international experts, two of whom initially were ‘double-hatted’, namely the spokesperson and one of the political advisers, and thus worked for both him and the head of Proxima. Finally, the headquarters of Proxima were co-located with the office of the Special Representative. This common logistical arrangement proved a forced marriage, at least initially. The ‘strained’ relationship between the office of the Special Representative and Proxima did not make co-ordination between the two Council actors easier.36 These difficulties, in turn, affected the mission in the planning and the early implementation phase and limited the impact of the EU on policing reforms as local interlocutors did not fully understand who was representing Brussels on this issue. In Proxima’s second year of deployment, the situation improved significantly, with the EUSR and commissioner Scholz working together well. Next, we move from the short-term peacebuilding agenda represented by the EUSR to the main driver of long-term peacebuilding in Macedonia: the European Commission. Macedonia is more advanced on its road to EU membership than Bosnia. In April 2001, the country signed an SAA. Three years later the SAA entered into force, thereby establishing the framework for EU–Macedonian dialogue at both political and technical levels. A further step was taken by the Macedonian government when it submitted its application for EU membership on 22 March 2004. The European Commission issued a positive avis on 9 November 2005. Despite some rumblings from the French, who called for a broad debate on the future of EU enlargement, the European Council agreed one month later, following an agreement on the budget for 2007–13, to grant candidate status to Macedonia. As to Community assistance programmes, they are run by the EAR, unlike in Bosnia where CARDS funds are managed by the European Commission delegation in the country. Established in 2000, the EAR’s original brief was to administer EC aid in Serbia and Montenegro. To give this

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 101 politically motivated decision, which was meant to accommodate the politically contested status of Kosovo, the semblance of legal appropriateness, the mandate of the agency was, in 2001, extended to cover Macedonia. Managing a portfolio of some EUR 2 billion in toto and some 262 million for Macedonia, the EAR is a key player in the peacebuilding field in the country, at points even running into conflict with the European Commission delegation on the ground. As part of its long-term peacebuilding strategy, the European Commission allocated, from 2000 to 2006, over EUR 14 million to police reforms in Macedonia and another 27 million for related projects such as integrated border management, including the border police. Also, from June 2004 to September 2005, it had had six residence advisors in Skopje. Contracted from the German federal state of Brandenburg, they oversaw the reforms of the ministry of interior and the police, which were elaborated by the already mentioned European Commission experts – ECJHAT – and adopted by the government in August 2003. In 2005 the Commission’s support remained centred on the police academy, the new border police (training and equipment) and, more generally, the refashioning of the organization and culture of the local police through, among other things, twinning arrangements with police organizations and ministries of interior of EU member states. Despite being mandated to work closely with the European Commission delegation and to assist it in its police reforms, the Proxima leadership was initially not able, or willing, to establish close relations with it. This failure to closely co-ordinate their activities put in doubt the engrenage between the short-term operational reforms pursued by the mission and the longer-term institutional reforms pushed by the European Commission. The problem of insufficient co-ordination was aggravated by the late arrival of the ECJHAT follow-up team in charge of directing the implementation of the reforms in the ministry of interior. This made it impossible for Proxima during the first half year of its operation to act on its mandate, according to which the information gathered by the Proxima co-locators was to provide crucial input into the work of the European Commission police experts in the ministry of interior. The relationship between first-pillar and secondpillar EU police reformers improved significantly in the second half of 2004, a development that continued into Proxima’s second year of operation. Indeed, mission performance as a whole got better in 2005, with the implementation of the leaner and more targeted reform projects proceeding smoothly. The ensuing positive effect of Proxima on the local police was also acknowledged by the Macedonian government. The ceremony marking the end of Proxima was held on 9 December 2005 in Skopje. However, it did not signal the end of the Council’s involvement in police reforms in Macedonia. The prevailing view in Brussels was that the EU had to bridge the gap between the exit of Proxima II and the scheduled launch in June 2006 of a police reform project run by the Commission. Although the idea of yet another extension of Proxima was

102 EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia briefly entertained, it was discarded as not feasible for political reasons. The continuation of an ESDP peacebuilding mission in an EU candidate country did not muster much support, neither in Brussels nor in Skopje. However, an agreement was reached to deploy a small advisory team (EUPAT) to Macedonia from 15 December 2005 to 14 June 2006 (Council of the EU 2005b). About 20 EU police officers, supported by international civilian advisors, were mandated to monitor and mentor senior- and mid-level police officers. In addition to its small headquarters in the capital, EUPAT had five mobile teams located in Skopje, Tetovo, Ohrid, Bitola and Stip. The mission, or Proxima III as it was sometimes referred to, had the same command arrangements and chain of command as EUPOL Proxima. EUPAT was followed by a 12-month long CARDS-funded project comprising some 35 international advisers tasked with monitoring and assessing local police operations, supervising the ongoing police reform process and promoting an interface between the police and the prosecutors.

6

Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid

Michel Foucault once observed that ‘relations of power are perhaps among the best hidden things in the social body’ (Foucault 1988c: 118). In the case of ESDP police missions this is certainly the case. Hence, it is not surprising that the policy-oriented literature on European security often laments the lack of forceful means available to police missions (ICG 2005b). Even national EU policy-makers rarely seem to be aware of the power operating in and through this peacebuilding tool (Bascone 2004: 12). In this chapter, we challenge the commonsensical view that ESDP police missions are ‘weak’ because they are small-scale operations lacking the means to use big sticks and juicy carrots to reform the security sector in divided countries. To this end, we draw on governmentality theory to extend our detailed exploration of the seeming banality of the interventions carried out by the EUPM and EUPOL Proxima. Unlike more traditional approaches in international relations scholarship, a governmental framework is not fixated on the conspicuous exercise of power and its forceful effects. Its focus on capillary, non-sovereign forms of power makes it well suited for bringing into relief how ESDP police missions refashion, reposition and reorganize law enforcement officials in host societies. The chapter falls into three parts. We begin by asking, how did power take shape and come into play in the police aid delivered by the EUPM and Proxima. The question directs our attention to the political technologies by virtue of which the missions acted upon local police officers and police organizations. In the second part of the chapter, we inquire into the policing knowledge or rationality that structured the reforms of the missions. We show its contingent nature and the effects it had on the policing style in the target countries. This chapter, then, excavates relations of power/knowledge, strips them of their normal, natural and self-evident character and thus makes visible their contingency, which is essential for their functioning. And while the details of the analysis are case-specific, the identified rationality and mechanics of power are of a general nature and can therefore be found in other ESDP police missions. In Chapter 7, we exploit the clearing created by our excavation to normatively engage the power in ESDP police aid and to suggest practical ways to place limits on its pastoral practices.

104 Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid Finally, a word of caution. The purpose of this chapter is to show how police missions work as dispositifs, or machines, of power by tracking relations of power at the molecular level. The chapter thus shares the preoccupation of most governmentality researches, which are primarily concerned with the various incarnations of the ‘will to improve’ (cf. Rose 2000a: 5). While this research focus is a deliberate choice on our part, it is important to point out its limit. What is sidelined in the concern with how power operates is the fact that the affiliation into durable form of individuals, spaces and inscriptions is an accomplishment that is tentative, subject to resistance and interruption. Therefore, the will to improve that is embodied in ESDP police missions is likely to encounter manifold practices of resistance as it is brought to bear on police officers and their institutional contexts. We saw this in the Macedonia case study, in which we referenced instances of locals seeking to escape or evade the functioning of normative power Europe. Yet this is a story for another occasion.

Discipline and cherish: Power in ESDP police aid The foremost task of non-executive ESDP police missions is not to conserve a precarious peace, defeat spoilers of a peace settlement or maintain public order. Rather, they foster and mould capacities for action in the police field with a view to making the conduct of locals consistent with EU objectives. In what follows, we identify the basic repertoire of technologies, which, separately or jointly, are deployed by missions to achieve such alignments: co-location, professionalization and governmentalization. Co-location manipulates relations of vision to regulate the conduct and subjectivity of local police officers, while professionalization does so by mobilizing the power of ‘truth’.1 Both are disciplinary technologies of agency, i.e. they act on individuals. Governmentalization, on the other hand, is a technology of performance that shapes action contexts. Through it, missions (re-)engineer legal and calculable spaces and relations within targeted police organizations and between them and the political system to implant European notions of security and performativity in local policing structures and processes. Though analytically different, in practice these technologies partly map over one another. They represent a technical take-off of the productivity of the power that the EU can bring to bear on countries emerging from crisis or violence. The operation of these political technologies brings into existence a field of governmentality. As we argued in Chapter 2, governmentality denotes administrative forms of productive power that circulate in the interstices and underneath of law and that are aimed at protecting, promoting and above all normalizing the lives of populations. They mobilize seemingly objective knowledge as a warrant and means for forging alignments between the personal projects of citizens and the objectives of authorities. Hence, a governmental field is one in which power has become diffuse and difficult

Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid 105 to locate. On the pages that follow, we excavate such non-sovereign forms of power in the two sites covered in the previous chapters. We show how, in their quest to transform policing in an improving direction, the EUPM and Proxima employed these technologies to spin fine meshes of a web of power through which they gained access to individual police officers – their conduct, know-how and souls – as well as the administration and direction of local police organizations. Co-location: The power of vision One of Foucault’s main contributions to the study of power relations is his argument that visibility is a key element in the functioning of certain forms of power. Domains of power can be brought into existence through the construction of fields of visibility. This allows power to exercize its hold over those subjected to it without physical violence and material constraints (Foucault 1980: 155). A structure of social control based on visibility comprises three generic components: hierarchical observations, normalizing judgements and corrections (Foucault 1991b). Penetrating observations, which are organized around certain notions of normality typically defined by experts, constitute individuals as cases whose behaviour and characteristic features can be documented in detail. The encoding of particular, institutionally salient facets of observed subjects in written reports and files makes possible all kinds of comparisons between those exposed to surveillance and between them and the operative standards at the heart of the panoptic machine. At this point the disciplinary gaze gives way to a judgement: do those who have been brought under a certain description measure up to the established norms or deviate from them? Deviants are made the target of repetitive normative corrections. Yet regimes of power based on visibility do not simply restrain subjects. They also incite them to constitute themselves as objects of their own gaze, exercising surveillance over and against themselves and subjecting themselves to the strictures of normality as defined by those in power. How is this political technology instantiated by the ESDP? The EU missions approach transitional policing as dispersed ensembles of practices, thereby producing multiple localized sites that can be improved. Both the EUPM and Proxima thus co-located their experts along senior local staff with strategic and tactical responsibilities in ministries of security or interior as well as alongside officers in field headquarters and police stations with a view to monitoring, mentoring and advising them.2 To bring into focus how these regimes of co-location generated their constraining and normalizing effects, we isolate three analytically distinct, albeit in practice overlapping, recurrent operations carried out by the two missions. In the monitoring phase, the co-locators observed the microstructure of police work and reported their observations up the chain of command. This rendered the daily routines of local officers legible for mission headquarters,

106 Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid where all the reports were collected. In the second phase, the recorded information was evaluated and compared to the standards of normality operationalized in the reform projects and the benchmark of best European practice that informed them. Gaps in performance were identified and deviance was attributed to local officers or their organizational environment. In the third phase, the problematized issues were addressed. To tackle institutional shortcomings, the missions deployed the technology of governmentalization, which we discuss further below. As to individual-level shortfalls, they were corrected through mentoring. Co-locators and their charges met at regular intervals. At these occasions the former presented, to quote one of the EU police officers we interviewed, their ‘truthful assessment’ of the mentees.3 A principal element of this judgement, which mobilized the seemingly universalizable standards of policing embodied in the notion of best European practice, was to bring out the inferiority of this or that aspect of local policing. Going beyond the calculated administration of shame, mentors also insisted on assisting their mentees in making concrete plans for improving their skills and conduct in line with the policing ideology of the missions. To intensify this productive aspect of mentoring, missions sometimes codified their co-locators’ ‘truth’ in the form of handbooks or lists of do’s and don’ts, which were then distributed to local officers. Moreover, the productive power of mentoring was deployed by mentors to mould the ‘souls’ – the deep subjectivity – of their mentees (cf. Rose 1999). The European experts intervened to reshape the relations of the local officers to their own selves by providing them with norms and little techniques for managing stress and pressure; for developing clear career aspirations and learning how to work effectively towards them; for coping well in complex and uncertain environments; for increasing self-confidence and so forth. In short, an important aspect of the mentoring role of co-locators was to facilitate the production of a new subjectivity in their supervisees that was related to itself through an externally shaped and codified self-reflection. Through mentoring, co-locators thus effectively integrated techniques of the self into a panoptic regime, i.e. they mobilized power not just through an external gaze but through recourse to processes by which their indigenous counterparts acted upon themselves. The mentoring phase of co-location was followed by another round of monitoring and evaluation. The European experts judged the scope of remaining gaps between standards of normality and the state of policing in the host country, and the mission leadership reviewed policy. At this point mission resources may have been reallocated and projects of improvement may have been refined, dropped or added. Finally, it is worth pointing out that a characteristic feature of ESDP colocation is that mission experts immerse themselves in the details of the work of local police officers. This concern with the minutiae of everyday policing, which we documented in our case study chapters, is not incidental. In

Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid 107 vision-based disciplinary regimes, no detail, however trivial, is unimportant because it provides a hold for the power of the gaze. The intimate knowledge co-locators gain about their counterparts enhances their power to constrain them in the name of appropriate rules and codes of policing.4 Professionalization: The making of good coppers The figure of the professional police officer figures prominently in the objectives of EU peacebuilders. On the one hand, this has to do with the fact that front-line officers may operate in ‘regions of low visibility’ (Van Maanen 1983: 377), where their surveillance by supervisers (national and international) is haphazard. Hence, the political technology of professionalization is suited to govern street conduct that is difficult to bring into view through co-location. On the other hand, the attractiveness of professionalization resides in the fact that in Western culture professional decisions are seen, pace Max Weber, as being grounded in objective expertise. Hence the professionalization of police forces is understood by the EU, and peacebuilders in general, as a kind of pedagogical development aid that raises the educational level of law enforcement officials, increases their sense of responsibility for the communities they police and enhances their ability, qua experts, to resist inappropriate political meddling in operative policing decisions. Here we offer a different reading of professionalization, conceiving of it as a political technology. This enables us to bring into focus the power relations traversing the encounter between trainers and trainees. Professionalization brings into play a form of power that works by co-opting local officers in their own subjection by working through their minds and souls. How precisely does the technology transform subjects into conscripts of this or that profession? It mobilizes ‘truth’ to reassemble individual selves. To begin with, through skills training it places trainees under the obligation to learn the things that (foreign) experts know. Drawing on a certain practical knowledge, trainers tutor inductees in what they, as educators, consider the right way of carrying out the tasks defining a particular profession. Trainees are thus constrained to acquire externally prescribed competences and to cut up the world in a particular manner with a view to acting in a suitably rational fashion in their sphere of competence. Yet, while technical expertise is important to the constitution of competent professional selves, the process cannot be reduced to it. To become true professionals, subjects have to acquire two kinds of things: know-how and character. Hence, they are also morally cultivated (cf. Fournier 1999). Character building brings into play another set of externally prescribed attributes of the appropriate self, say, loyalty, responsibility or careerorientation. To the extent that a professional ethos is successfully installed in trainees, they have in place a self-steering mechanism that regulates their work conduct from within. They internalize a series of norms that define their profession, and they are prone to subject themselves to

108 Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid self-scrutiny and self-evaluation in an effort to improve themselves. Professionals, then, are expected, and expect themselves, to conduct themselves appropriately. The standards of appropriateness in question are not an internally generated conscience but an externally programmed code designed to align their desires and aspirations with the ideology of the profession into which they are conscripted. The point to be made here is that by forming subjects who are both technically and morally competent, professionalization articulates a pedagogical project of disseminating professional know-how to a moralizing project of self-improvement. It works by inciting individuals to inscribe themselves in power relations and become ‘the principle of [their] own subjection’ (Foucault 1991b: 203). Just like co-location, professionalization pulls the reformation of subjectivity into a structure in which some are governed by others. How is this political technology employed by ESDP police missions? Both the EUPM and Proxima carried out manifold activities aimed at upgrading the professionalism of local coppers. However, only the EUPM concerned itself with academy-based police training. Proxima, not least because of its initial mandate, which limited the mission to one year, tried to make do with the frequent use of workshops to improve Macedonian officers. Yet this difference between the missions was one of intensity, not substance. This having been said, in our analysis of professionalization we focus on the EUPM as in this case the principal features of the manner in which ESDP police missions calibrate this political technology are most visible. In the first years of the involvement of international peacebuilders in policing reforms in Bosnia, basic training for cadets, including human dignity training, as well as re-training and specialized courses for police officers, say, on organized crime was conducted by the IPTF. In preparing its lesson plans, the UN mission mobilized seemingly universal policing knowledges. Towards the end of the 1990s, when the police academies and colleges in Vraca and Banja Luka and the State Border Service Training Centre in Suhodol were opened, responsibility for running the training was gradually transferred to local staff, who were prepared for their tasks by specialized train-the-trainers courses organized by the IPTF and ICITAP. The IPTF continued to preside over this nominally repatriated professionalization regime, in particular designing and monitoring the teaching content and methodology. In 2003, EUPM experts took over the responsibility for the international oversight of the (re-)fashioning of Bosnian police officers. They monitored and carried out inspections of the training regime, including the selection of new cadets, and they mentored the local teaching and management staff at the police academies. In the summer of 2004, the EUPM significantly upgraded its capacity to promote the professionalization of Bosnian recruits and police officers by adding a new programme on police training and education to its reform catalogue. The initiative covered all aspects of professionalization, i.e. both

Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid 109 the dissemination of skills, say, through organizing and monitoring training on trafficking in human beings, and the activation of values by, for instance, mentoring Bosnian teaching staff on how to enhance the commitment of trainees to the rule of law. The new programme also included measures aimed at a more far-reaching (re-)construction of the subjectivity of Bosnian coppers. For instance, EUPM co-locators quickly realized that the majority of the rank and file were content with the low degree of delegation characterizing their police organizations because it was seen as a way to keep their workload low. Identifying this management style as failing to meet EU standards, the mission worked to ensure that police training dismantled the ‘authoritarian personality’ of recruits and police officers and instilled in them a sense of Western-style individualism and the attended desire for autonomy and responsibility. The EUPM, in short, mobilized European truths to foster local police officers who mastered themselves, cared for themselves and acted in line with European standards of normality. Also, the EUPM professionalization regime sought to re-enforce professional conduct through additional institutional reforms of the police apparatus, which brought into play a series of punishments and rewards. Its Internal Affairs Programme, for instance, set up and reinforced professional standards units to deal with internal investigations and to assist in implementing disciplinary and non-compliance guidelines and procedures. One of the effects of these reforms was to valorize professional behaviour as defined by the mission and to deter and punish what it framed as inappropriate conduct. Finally, there were also flanking reform measures that ensured that the truth on which the professionalization regime centred was made to work on individual Bosnian officers not through constraints but through incitement and gratification. Of particular importance in this regard was the Police Administration Programme. The EUPM designed it to overhaul the recruitment and selection procedures and to elaborate a competitive career development system aimed at increasing the motivation of police officers to work on their competencies. By now the similarity between professionalization and co-location has become obvious. They both focus on the conduct of the conduct of police officers, administering a discipline that aims at habituating their minds and bodies to particular patterns. Working on and through individuals, professionalization and co-location are hybrid technologies, combining technologies of the self and of domination. Moreover, both are programmed by an Eurometrics of good policing calibrated against a contingent mix of knowledges and norms, which comprise the eclectic experiences of mission programme developers and are supplemented by policing doctrines such as that elaborated by the Council of Europe.5 However, there is one important difference between the two technologies. Professionalization is less dependent on relations of vision than co-location, a fact which allows EU peacebuilders to regulate the conduct of front-line police officers at a distance, i.e. without having to submit them to continuous surveillance.

110 Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid Next we turn to a different technology, whose target is not the individual officer but the indigenous police organization. The governmentalization of police organizations Broadly speaking, Foucault elaborated the concept of governmentalization to denote the (re-)organization of the state apparatus in line with a population-centred governmentality from the sixteenth century onwards. With the emergence of liberal government in the eighteenth century, this process was supplemented by what Foucault called the ‘disciplinarization’ of government, i.e. the process by virtue of which the government subjects its own staff and agencies to an intensified direct and indirect control (Gordon 1991: 27). As Mitchell Dean (1999: 193) points out, this concern with the efficiency and visibility of governing sites and practices has been revitalized in the context of the recent ascendancy of neoliberal political projects. Dean refers to the intensified drive to subject public sector organizations to technologies of performance as the governmentalization of government. Such technologies create a distance between the decisions of the central government and public sector agencies, and they implant market disciplines in the latter. Organizational reforms along these lines, although often phrased in terms of staff empowerment, do not reduce, or do away with, power in organizational spaces. Rather, they reconfigure power relations by prioritizing the financial accountability of public sector actors and their responsiveness to competitive pressures, however artificially created by the central government, over their political accountability and responsiveness to the democratic demands of citizens. Employing Dean’s terminology but going beyond his discussion of the process in relation to territorialized politics, we argue that the governmentalization of public sector organizations has become a powerful post-Cold War instrument of the West to shape the institutional trajectory of state apparatuses transiting from instability or violence with a view to making them secure for Western-style liberal peace. These interventions are rationalized and legitimized in the ahistorical, acultural and acontextual idiom of rational-legal authority and economic rationality. Peacebuilders who use the technology hollow out local law- and rule-making powers to advance their good governance agenda. In doing so, they run the risk of institutionalizing a concern with economic rationality in public organizations at the expense of alternative organizational principles, notably the democratic participation of citizens. ESDP police missions employ the technology by mobilizing the power of, on the one hand, legal norms and bureaucratic procedures and, on the other, budgets to build what can be called neo-bureaucratic police organizations. Such peacebuilding reforms uneasily combine contradictory building blocs of social order in a hybrid organizational form: bureaucratized markets (Farrell and Morris 2003). In what follows, we unpack this argument.

Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid 111 A principal objective of the legal-administrative reforms pursued by ESDP police missions is to reshape how local police forces are inserted into the state apparatus and how police organizations are internally organized. In this way, the EU seeks to replace regime policing or the excessive politicization of policing by a form of policing that is independent of politics on operational issues and provides appropriately effective and humane flanking measures to secure the emerging politico-economic order advocated and supported by it and other international peacebuilders. The two Western Balkans police missions were closely involved in effecting the institutional differentiation between the police and the rest of the state apparatus. Both the EUPM and Proxima, the former in cooperation with the High Representative/EUSR and the latter in support of the European Commission Police Reform Team, regularly drafted, lobbied for and assisted in the implementation of police-related legal reforms and regulations that had the purpose of placing limits on the appropriation of the police by the government and hence on the latter’s prerogatives in the policing field. For instance, in Bosnia the EUPM legal department, together with its OHR counterpart and domestic players, formed the Expert Legal Group to draft the federal law on police officials with a view to ensuring greater independence of policing from the politicized ministries of interior (entity and cantons). Besides advancing legal reforms aimed at moving operational policing decisions beyond politics, the two Western Balkans police missions involved themselves in ensuring that the formal independence of the police was translated into actual practice. To this end, they adopted an official position on the interpretation of laws, thus further enhancing their ‘footprint’ in target countries. Moreover, they promoted administrative rules and regulations that structured police organizations, their routines and procedures in such a way as to enhance the capacity of police managers to govern their institutional spaces and police operations in accordance with professional rather than political considerations. Such reforms included the curtailment of the discretion of front-line officers, say, through the strengthening of professional standards units. As we have seen, both the EUPM and the Proxima were active in this field. Another measure used by the missions to enhance the de-politicization of policing was the formalization of decision-making processes within police organizations so that authority was experienced as deriving not from ‘politics’ and clientelist networks but from abstract rules. The EUPM, for instance, implemented reforms of this sort by, among other things, running a project to establish a transparent career advancement model in the context of its Internal Affairs Programme. This and other reforms, which strengthened the rational-legal administration of local police organizations, were supplemented by interventions designed to promote the accountability of the police to citizens as opposed to politicians. For instance, one of the strategies of the

112 Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid EUPM to responsibilize the police was the development of public complaints bureaux. Moving from the deployment of legal instruments to financial ones, both the EUPM and Proxima were involved in bringing the power of budgets to bear on the control of police managers. Through the institutionalization of an economic gaze in the police organization, they aimed at transforming local policing into an object of calculation. They thus incited and constrained police decision-makers to visualize their organizations as a series of calculable spaces with a view to evaluating and reforming these spaces according to a financial rationale. Policing activities were translated into financial terms, ‘policing products’ costed, policing processes restructured to make them more efficient and so forth. The use in ESDP police reforms of methods of accountancy initially developed for industry is designed to promote police organizations that are governed by cost-accounting systems with a view to achieving lower costs per police output (crowd control, traffic policing, crime fighting and so forth).6 Reforms that aim at crafting a business-like police organization focus on capacity-building measures and organizational re-engineering that cultivate and support budget-based control and management systems. For instance, in the context of the Financial Viability and Self Sustainability project, EUPM finance advisors, together with finance experts of the finance and interior ministries, developed a package of measures such as accountancy training and the implementation of, and training on, the Treasury Oracle system – a financial management tool – to improve strategic budget planning, procurement and accountancy controls.7 Going beyond this numericization of management activities, Proxima concerned itself with the extension of calculable spaces in the Macedonian police apparatus by practically supporting the European Commission in, among other things, creating less hierarchical management structures through the promotion of self-initiative and the devolution of responsibility to lower management ranks. In a similar vein, both Proxima and the EUPM worked to open up the enclosures of specialization in local police organizations and between them and the judiciary and to responsibilize the various departments and branches by better integrating them and improving inter-agency co-ordination. The EUPM also created calculable regimes through the introduction of promotion systems based on job-related assessment exercises and the use of IT support systems. In short, the EUPM and Proxima employed the technology of governmentalization to reorganize the institutional spaces of indigenous police apparatuses, their routines and procedures in line with a neoliberal ensemble of discursive, administrative and institutional practices that make up the contemporary good governance agenda. Having analysed a series of polymorphous technical means of control and reformation brought into play by ESDP police aid, we next turn our attention to how, by virtue of which knowledge, these EU interventions into policing were made thinkable.

Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid 113

The knowledge in ESDP police aid In Chapter 2, we introduced the concept of political rationality. We highlighted that the exercise of power is dependent on and embodies distinct styles of reasoning, which supply it, among other things, with the concerns that animate it, the problems to be acted upon and its objectives. In Chapters 4 and 5, we unearthed a series of case-specific statements by virtue of which the EUPM and Proxima problematized the police forces in Bosnia and Macedonia, thus rendering their projects of improvement thinkable. In the sections that follow, we first reconstruct the general form of the EU discourse in which these statements were located before deconstructing it to show its internal gaps and contradictions. Next, we move from the stage of problematization to the stage of improvement. Our purpose is to bring into relief and critically engage with the regulative ideal – the telos – which programmes the EU peacebuilding agenda for police reforms in countries in crisis or emerging from conflict. We ask, what kind of police does the EU wish to implant in host countries? Also, we highlight the contingent nature and unintended consequences of the policing knowledges informing the telos of EU peacebuilding in the policing field.

The ESDP police reform discourse: Framing policing deviance The operative question in this section is this: what are the general elements out of which the EU assembles policing in divided societies as a problem-field marked by dangerous deviance? To identify these elements, we systematize our empirical data from Chapters 4 and 5 – the arguments by virtue of which the EUPM, Proxima, the preceding fact-finding missions and various competent EU bodies rendered transitional policing in Bosnia and Macedonia worthy of political intervention. This allows us to delineate the generic form of what we call the ESDP police reform discourse. Unlike in the case study chapters, we are here not concerned with the specificity of individual arguments but with their space of dispersion. We contend that the discourse deploys five markers to delimit the space of possible forms of policing deviance in countries in crisis or emerging from conflict. One of the principal signifiers of the otherness of policing in conflictridden societies that is mobilized by the EU is the figure of the low-skilled and morally negligent police officer. In the case of Bosnia and Macedonia, the European police experts assembled a number of individual-level dysfunctions. As we saw, they described police officers in the two countries as having poor skills, being corrupt and partial and lacking the moral fibre or motivation to resist efforts by powerful criminals to intimidate them. The lack of expertise was said to result in the use of inappropriate policing measures, say, improper crime scene management, which impeded the detection and prosecution of perpetrators. As to police officers who were corrupt or displayed a political or ethnic bias in carrying out their duties,

114 Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid they endangered the construction of liberal peace, not least by delegitimizing the police in the eyes of the public and undermining the very idea of democracy. A second marker that is employed by the ESDP police reform discourse to produce local policing as problematic is policing policy, including policing priorities. For instance, in Macedonia the use of militarized policing methods in the former ethnic hot spots was denounced by Proxima as a threat to domestic security. While the government saw the use of checkpoints staffed by armed and sometimes camouflaged officers as a last resort to preserve the country’s territorial integrity and prevent and control ethnic violence, Proxima interpreted it as evidence that local authorities were not (yet) committed to democratic policing and ethnic peace. Also, both ESDP missions criticized the police for failing to elaborate appropriate policing priorities. In particular, the reluctance to privilege the fight against organized crime was seen as indicating the absence of a rational policy selection system, which, in turn, was linked to claims that the police was either fearful of or co-operated with organized crime groups. A third element that is identified by the EU as making up policing in violently divided societies has to do with the organizational structure and management culture of police forces. Thus the Macedonian police was criticized for being over-centralized and the Bosnian police for being too decentralized. Moreover, in both countries a series of alleged organizational and cultural pathologies was brought into focus, ranging from a lack of co-operative decision-making to poor information exchange between police authorities and the absence of a needs-based deployment of police officers. The EUPM and Proxima attached particular importance to what they flagged as two of the chief abnormalities in their host countries: the lack of proactive policing and the absence of a service mentality and orientation. A fourth feature that structures the ESDP police reform discourse is a particular reading of the challenges of the past confronting societies emerging from instability or violence. The legacies of authoritarian regimes that instrumentalized the police to repress threats to their power and/or of internal conflicts, in which public security forces played a divisive role, are seen to render law enforcement agencies ineffective and to deprive them of legitimacy. For instance, in both Bosnia and Macedonia the EU intervention into policing was justified in parts in terms of the recent history of the two police forces. They were regarded as requiring outside assistance to overcome their past which undermined their moral authority and caused citizens to reject their right to enforce the law and issue commands. In the absence of European peacebuilders, citizens would not be willing to co-operate with the tainted police, thus severely degrading the latter’s ability to clear up crime and to keep public order without the use of excessive force. The fifth and final marker of the difference that in the EU discourse separates law enforcement in conflict-ridden countries from that in wellordered societies is the policing environment. Bosnia and Macedonia were

Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid 115 thus narrated as severe criminogenic settings that rendered law enforcement more difficult than it is in ‘normal’ countries such as the member states of the EU. As we saw, the EUPM and Proxima highlighted the threat to liberal peace posed by organized crime. Moreover, the policing context in these countries was described as being characterized by certain dysfunctions such as politically motivated riots. Thus, in Macedonia, Proxima insistently claimed a need for the local police to be prepared to tackle riots that it, together with other EU actors on the ground, routinely expected in the wake of major political events such as elections or referenda. The construction by the EU of the otherness of policing in crisis areas through the grid of specification just described resonates with scholarly work on policing in transition. To begin with, the tenor of research on the police in developing countries is that they are ‘generally, insufficiently trained, equipped, organized, or motivated to provide much protection for people, except the powerful’ (Marenin 1996: 323). In this view, therefore, the exercise of police powers in such countries tends to be inefficient, particularistic and corrupt. Yet another line of inquiry focuses on countries transiting from state socialism (Caparini and Marenin 2004; Kádár 2001). In particular the new countries that emerged in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union are described as environments marked by pronounced crime-generating processes associated with, say, the dissolution of existing patterns of social integration. Moreover, the lack of resources as well as the communist legacy of, among other things, the improper use of physical force and corruption are identified as major drawbacks. This legacy impedes the build-up of trust between citizens and the police, which, in turn, degrades the capacity of the latter to effectively fight crime (Beck and Chistyakova 2002; Shelley 1996, 1999). Finally, research into policing in sectarian societies suggests that it suffers from a series of shortfalls such as lack of accountability, biased law enforcement and unrestrained use of force (cf. Brewer 1991; Weitzer 1995). Given the status of scholarship as authoritative purveyor of objective knowledge, the fit between its accounts and the EU’s problematization of policing in the unstable European Elsewhere strengthens the apparent validity of the latter. Having delimited the general form of the ESDP police reform discourse, we now turn first to identify and then deconstruct the principle of formation at work in it. An EU standard of civilized policing How does the ESDP police reform discourse transform the difference that without doubt separates policing in crisis areas from EU police services into potentially dangerous otherness? The process relies on an unacknowledged supplement, namely the figure of civilized European policing. Without this figure, there would be no warrant for the judgement of policing in countries transiting from conflict. It is through the contrast of local policing with

116 Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid the standards of normality attributed to European policing that the EU discourse produces the former’s seemingly unambiguous, abnormal identity. Yet at closer investigation, this contrast becomes blurred and with it the deviant, security-endangering identity of policing in countries in the process of building peace. The figure of civilized European policing does not figure in ESDP mission mandates. Instead, the trope best European (or international) practice is used to guide policing reforms. While, as already mentioned, this benchmark has so far not been codified by the EU, its general meaning-in-use can be fleshed out in the following manner. Some bad apples notwithstanding, police services in the EU are a disciplined, impartial body of women and men enforcing a general order and protecting the common good. As members of the thin blue line who, in an even-handed manner, protect society from violence and anarchy on the streets, European police officers take part in an apolitical and universalizable enterprise. Organized in efficient and publicly accountable organizations that enjoy widespread popular support, they keep the democratic peace, control crime and deliver security without concern for ethnicity, social status and so forth. What is dissimulated in this reading is that policing in the EU, and indeed in the West more generally, shares many of the characteristics that the EU ascribes to policing in countries transiting from instability or war. First, the genealogy of the modern police unmasks them as instruments of those in power to control the ‘dangerous classes’ (Sheptycki 1999: 218). Clearly, there is more than a remnant of this concern with the maintenance of a particularistic, class-based order against ‘incivility’ in contemporary policing in the EU (and the West more generally), not least when the police is called upon to control citizens contesting the existing order. The social control of groups and movements that resist being integrated into the consumerist logic of modern market societies and stubbornly dream of alternative social orders, say, politicized citizens who envisage a radically different form of globalization, is an enduring task of good European policing. Hence, rather than simply maintaining order per se, the police in the EU (and elsewhere) are engaged in ‘keeping subordinate groups “in their place” and excluding those who challenge that order’ (Waddington 2003: 42). This understanding of the police is far removed from the sanitized image underpinning the notion of the police as neutral and impartial enforcers of the law. Second, the figure of civilized policing fails to acknowledge the mounting challenges facing European coppers: rising crime rates in many EU jurisdictions, home-grown organized crime, the growing sense of insecurity felt by the public, police abuse, corruption, incompetence, institutionalized racism in some police forces, the routine discrimination of minority and female officers and so forth. This litany of complaints, which is well documented in public opinion polls, police inquiries and scholarly work, has an eerie similarity to the shortcomings singled out by the ESDP police reform discourse to rationalize and justify EU intervention in the European Elsewhere.8 Third,

Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid 117 the contrast between advanced European policing and ‘backward’ policing in conflict-prone societies is further undermined by the fact that the growing social and cultural fragmentation and hedonistic individualism as well as the rise of private security providers characterizing European democracies have been undermining the public acceptance of the police, which is predicated on a harmonious and integrated society (Reiner 1992). Hence, the legitimacy problems facing the police in divided societies such as Macedonia and Bosnia are not alien to police forces in the EU. The general point we want to make here is that there is an absence at the core of the ESDP police reform discourse. In place of the civilizational plenitude of the fundamental figure of normal/civilized policing, one finds a hybrid composed of normal and abnormal elements of policing. This unsettling hybridity notwithstanding, the discourse has far-reaching power effects. It marks out the suppression of the difference between a standard of normal European policing and policing on the ground as a condition of the realization of the order(liness) of liberal peace in countries emerging from crisis or violence. To conclude, we want to emphasize again that our deconstruction of the figure of civilized policing does not imply that we deny that there is any significant difference between policing in any given EU country and policing in societies in crisis or emerging from violent conflict. This would be absurd. Nor does our argument imply that we think efforts by the EU to reform policing in post-conflict and other transitional societies are wrong. All we suggest is that with regard to certain conditions and practices of policing singled out by ESDP missions for reform there is often no clear-cut dividing line between local policing and average EU policing, let alone, one is tempted to say, British policing in Northern Ireland.9 Simply put, policing in the EU is marked by its own deviance just as policing in countries emerging from instability or violence often has its own redeeming qualities. Our deconstruction of the boundary-drawing, geographical imagery of transitional policing that characterizes the ESDP police reform discourse suggests the need for a more complex reading of EU peacebuilding than the one which tends to prevail among practitioners and scholars of EFP. Moreover, the destabilization of the boundaries between the normal and the deviant, which here is limited to the policing field but which can in principle be extended to other political, economic and social issue-areas, underlines the need for modesty in peacebuilding, not least because it brings into focus the following question. What qualifies international police officers, who may at home face challenges such as racism among their colleagues or a population distrustful of the police, to improve their colleagues in countries in crisis or emerging from civil war? From the reconstruction/deconstruction of the ESDP police reform discourse carried out on the preceding pages, we now move on to inquire into the programmatic goal to be achieved through ESDP police interventions and the rationality on which this telos rests.

118 Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid From problematization to improvement: The telos of ESDP police interventions In this section, we investigate the policing mentality through which the deployment of ESDP police aid is programmed. Our purpose is to bring into focus the regime of power internal to this mentality, the ways of seeing, speaking and acting that it produces. One strategy to document the effects of power attached to the knowledge circulating in EU policing is to document how certain agendas and objects of concern are systematically mobilized out of, or marginalized by, the ESDP reform script (cf. Stenson and Watt 1999). In mapping these gaps and margins, our reference point is the telos or desired end that informs EU policing.10 We infer the conceptual space which delimits this telos from the missions’ reform projects discussed in the previous chapters and from our interviews with police planners and mission managers. International police reforms such as those carried out by the EU can be analysed in terms of the policing style they seek to promote in target countries. Policing styles, in turn, can be circumscribed by locating them in a matrix delimited by the notions of care and control. This matrix, which was developed for research into domestic policing practices in the United Kingdom (Stephens and Becker 1994), can productively be deployed to bring into focus the variability of police aid styles. Hence, the operative question guiding us in the remainder of the section is the following. Are ESDP police interventions primarily concerned with inducing caring or controlling practices? It is in relation to these two possible teloi that we trace the power effects traversing the policing mentality enfolding EU policing. The control dimension of policing work refers to practices having to do with the maintenance of public order and crime fighting. A controlling policing style emphasizes unremitting sovereign law enforcement and, in extremis, the legitimate use of force. A police focused on maintaining or regaining control entertains a distantiated relationship with those being protected and it regards criminals as enemies to be hunted down. Empirical research in different countries suggests that the dominant ‘street cop culture’ – the occupational culture of lower rank police officers – is impregnated with control fantasies. This culture sees the command over territory and people as the essence of policing. Officers ‘own’ the ground they patrol and the people stopped on it (Holdaway 1984: 36). Hence, a policing style that is preoccupied with ‘control’ produces a self-image of the police as tough cops engaged in fighting crime and securing public order against incivility and anarchy. The caring dimension of policing work emphasizes the non-crime–related service function of the police, their citizen-oriented understanding of appropriate action and the importance of establishing good community relations. Officers seek to build a relationship with those they police that is characterized by respect and trust. Moreover, a caring policing style targets its

Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid 119 services to the needs of people. As one scholar put it, to ‘offer a service is in the first instance to understand the context within which someone who asks for police intervention is acting’ (Holdaway 1994: 72). In liberal democracies such as the United Kingdom the element of care is often emphasized by ‘management cops’ – higher rank police officers. A policing style that is more attuned to the notion of ‘care’ lends itself to a conception of police officers as soft cops whose job requirements call on them to act not only as enforcers of law and order but also as a kind of social service.11 While we believe that the care-control matrix is a useful conceptual tool to empirically differentiate between police aid practices in terms of the relative importance they attach to different teloi, we do not believe that a caring policing style is devoid of power. Both care and control are forms of power relations (cf. Walker 1994), though, as we shall argue in Chapter 7, a more caring policing style is more conducive to efforts to limit the power operating in and through policing than a controlling policing style. In what follows, we trace a series of concepts that are at the heart of how ESDP police decision-makers, planners and mission managers think about proper policing in places such as Bosnia or Palestine. Taken together, these concepts constitute an approach to policing that privileges control over care and silences or marginalizes certain agendas, actors and facts. In the EU’s imaginaire, the desired end of an ESDP police mission is a local police that is first and foremost an effective, albeit humane controller of organized crime and other major threats to the construction of an order of liberal peace rather than a service provider that addresses itself to local community problems of which crime is only one. By anatomizing this telos, we can see that it is made up of four overlapping sets of ideas: the professional policing model, a state-centred conception of public security, law-and-order policing and a particular criminological knowledge. Beginning with the notion of professionalism, which is emphasized in virtually all mandates and concepts of operation of ESDP police missions, it brings police officers under description as figures of authority. Their authority is seen to be based not only on their legal status but, more importantly, on their status as disinterested professionals who possess superior competence in matters of crime and justice. Professionalism, therefore, constructs police officers as powerful authority figures who subject the public to their expertise on crime rather than as a tool that citizens can use to police their communities. The professional policing model thus implies not only a sharp division between ‘those in the know’ and the rest but also a hierarchical police–citizen relationship that subordinates the latter to the former. Policing, in short, is understood as authoritative intervention into social relations grounded in the legitimating appeal to specialized knowledge. A professional police is competent and limits the ability of politicians to instrumentalize it for their narrow partisan interests. In the highly conflictual and politicized settings of divided countries, this is an important advantage. Yet a professional police also has a serious downside, not least in the context

120 Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid of peacebuilding. It tends towards closure, cultivating its own expertness in the field of crime and public order maintenance. The upshot is that citizens are excluded from having a say in how they are policed. Given the fact that in conflict-ridden societies there tends to be a large gap between the police and (certain segments of the) population, this is a severe handicap. So far, the EU has not paid much attention to the double-sided nature of the professional policing model and its policy implication. Another, closely related feature of the way those responsible for ESDP missions conceive of the end state of their reforms is state-centrism. Policing, in this Weberian understanding of the relationship between the state, law and the use of force, is an expression of the powers of the state and thus mainly or exclusively the task of the public police. Accordingly, ESDP missions emphasize the sovereignty-related rather than the consultative and co-operative aspects of the relationship between the local police and the population. They frame citizens and non-governmental organizations primarily as recipients of public security rather than as participants in its production. Hence, the practice in the West to combine state and communal provision of policing is only partially reflected in official thinking about second-pillar police missions. Third, ESDP police aid rests on the presumption that crime is a major obstacle preventing countries to escape from internal conflict. Hence, the effective enforcement of law and order is framed as the core function of policing – the authorized and expected work of the police – in these societies. On the one hand, it is feared that high crime rates undercut political support for peacebuilding in general and police reforms in particular. On the other hand, crime is regarded as undermining economic development and democratization. Underpinning this reasoning is the belief, under severe attack in many Western democracies, that the public police by itself is capable of providing territorialized law and order. Arguably, however, crime control is beyond the capacity of law enforcement agencies in the absence of strong societal control mechanisms (cf. Waddington 2003: 11). And it is precisely such social mechanisms that are fragile or missing in countries in crisis or emerging from violence. Furthermore, the law-and-order model of policing emphasized by ESDP police missions assumes that crime, including ‘organized’ crime such as people smuggling, is a disease that can be eradicated irrespective of the social context. It thus overlooks that certain forms of deviant conduct, say, illegal logging may be a coping mechanism, i.e. a productive adaptation of citizens to the normality of underdevelopment and conflict. A final feature of the ESDP police aid mentality is the nature of the criminological knowledge on which it draws and the crime-fighting approach that it seeks to transmit to police forces in conflict-prone societies. Criminal conduct is rendered intelligible through volitional theories, which remove it from the social relations within which it emerges. Drawing on ‘the commodity-buyer-price formulae of neo-classical economics’ (Garland

Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid 121 1999: 20), crime is framed as an entrepreneurial activity like any other, a rational choice based on opportunities for deviant behaviour and the likelihood and expected costs of prosecution (cf. Wilson 1975).12 What is sidelined in this reading of crime in post-hostility and other transitional societies is the possibility that a significant amount of criminal behaviour is rooted in social problems, and thus has social solutions. Moreover, the criminological categories through which crime and crime control are apprehended by the EU and which it seeks to promote in target countries are not neutral with regard to socio-economic arrangements. They mirror the asocial assumptions on which the promotion of liberal capitalism in peacebuilding sites is founded: human beings are egoistic, cost-sensitive utility maximizers rather than, say, moral beings, and policies can only be effective if they are designed to reflect the nature of homo economicus. In short, the policing mentality enfolding ESDP interventions embodies a worldview that cuts through the complexity of crime by playing down evidence that ‘has been accumulated to show that criminal acts are typically embedded in, and produced by, definite social and psychological relations’ (Garland 2001: 130). In line with viewing crime as the consequence of the rational calculations of opportunistic individuals taking advantage of vulnerable targets, the crime-fighting approach favoured by ESDP police missions extols the virtues of tightening controls and enforcing discipline. Thus, as we showed in the chapters on the EUPM and Proxima, both missions emphasized a strategy of sovereign law-enforcement that foregrounded retributive and deterrent policies. They guided the indigenous police forces to rely on their surveillance capabilities and enforcement powers to combat the perceived threat, promoting, say, the improvement of border management, the proactive gathering of criminal intelligence on individuals and groups and their intimidation and incapacitation based on risk assessments. In short, they prioritized the development of prosecutorially minded police officers over the elaboration of a correctionalist rationale for crime control. Our analysis of the telos of ESDP police aid shows that the kind of policing the EU wishes to implant in target countries is programmed in line with a certain vision of enforcement policing. While there are elements of care in this programme – for instance, the EU emphasizes the need of transitional police forces to reflect the diversity of local society – overall the balance between control and care is clearly tipped in favour of the former. The police are imagined predominantly as controllers: controllers of crime and public disorder. In the next chapter, we argue that this police aid mentality entrenches, albeit unintentionally, the authoritarian nature of local police–citizen relations and may be of limited effectiveness in dealing with (organized) crime in crisis areas. In this chapter, we identified the principal means by which the EUPM and Proxima carried out their reforms, and we traced the knowledges that programmed their activities. There are two important general themes that

122 Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid emerge from our analysis. First, to render the improvement of local police thinkable, ESDP police interventions mobilize a grid of specification through which indigenous policing is located in a space of deviance whose boundaries are maintained by masking the hybridity marking good Western policing. Furthermore, against the transgressions of policing in crisis areas, ESDP aid mobilizes a telos of improvement that envisages a form of policing that may not always be best suited for societies marked not just by conflict but also by underdevelopment. Second, the power in EU policing operates through inconspicuous technologies. While, for instance, the often spectacular exercise of quasi-sovereign powers by international actors such the OHR in Bosnia is easily recognizable, say, when the High Representative sacks senior, democratically elected politicians, the humble and mundane practices of the EUPM and Proxima seem to be devoid of power. Yet, as we showed, there is power in what they do, a form of power, however, that is microphysical and diffuse in nature and thus difficult to detect. In the next chapter, we give voice to our moral imagination by recommending measures to give ESDP police missions, to paraphrase Lakhdar Brahimi (2002), a lighter expatriate footprint in host societies.

7

Towards peacebuilding lite A limited reform agenda for ESDP police missions

In the previous chapter, we cast a critical look at the power/knowledge complex in ESDP police missions. We documented the political technologies of power by virtue of which they classify, refashion, reposition and reorganize local police officers. And we brought into focus the contingent nature of the essentialized European knowledges on which this mastery of policing fields in societies in crisis or emerging from violence is based. If ESDP police missions were a vehicle through which the European comes to reside within the European Elsewhere and nothing else, they would have little to commend them. But they do significantly more. Through their reforms, they contribute to the democratic and more equitable and effective provision of public security in host countries. They do so by working towards limiting and regulating the conduct of the local police by means of legal restraints, democratic controls and internal organizational and managerialist reforms. These activities directly affect the safety and quality of people’s lives and thus constitute a crucial site of emancipation in societies in transition. The double-edged nature of ESDP police missions, and international peacebuilding in general, is not accidental. It is inscribed in the dialectic of modernity and modernization. The humanistic norms peacebuilders diffuse limit the degradation and humiliation of individuals and significantly restrict the range of acceptable heterogeneity out of which they can fashion their lives. The disciplines they apply to wayward governmental authorities bring redress to vulnerable citizens and subject local order(ings) to the universalizing hegemony of Western forms of rule. And the power peacebuilders mobilize to do their good works in countries in transition may congeal into patterns of pastoral dominance. In this chapter, we develop a limited reform agenda that promises to amplify the emancipatory dimension of ESDP police aid and to limit its downsides. Against the seeming universality and sufficiency of an Eurometrics of good policing, and the disciplines mobilized in its name, we affirm the importance of practices of contestation. Peacebuilding, we claim, is constitutively agonistic, i.e. it is opposed to the idea that it is possible, or even desirable, to find a final, rational solution to conflicts over how to organize the social. In Chapter 2, we argued that without doing violence to

124 Towards peacebuilding lite his thought, one can read into Foucault an ethico-political stance that valorizes relations of power that cultivate a political ethos of agonistic care for difference. Such an ethos encourages adversarial encounters with otherness, encounters that are characterized by respect for the other, even while the participants engage in a contest over the organization of social relations. Here we seek to inscribe in EU peacebuilding an ethico-political horizon of this kind. Hence, our reform agenda emphasizes the open-endedness of police aid and the importance of involving local stakeholders, including, notably, citizens and non-governmental organizations, in the refashioning of policing with a view to ensuring that demands for a future constructed in its own vernacular image are heeded. What we advocate, in brief, is for ESDP police missions to be attuned to the contingency of forms of policing and the knowledges enfolding them, and thus to privilege interrogation and negotiation in their interaction with local stakeholders while playing down reforms that aim at the harmonization of policing practices with those in the EU. Missions would seek to establish a relationship with the local police that is marked by respect for their otherness even while engaging them critically with a view to disturbing their identity, limiting their wilful conduct and opening them up to public scrutiny and accountability. Adversarial encounters of this sort would neither assume that a rational consensus is within reach of the interlocutors nor would they simply tolerate local practices whatever they are. Rather, they would function, to use Foucauldian terminology, as strategic games between liberties through which EU peacebuilders would try to influence indigenous policing without transcendentalising their own expertise and practices while locals would make a case for what they consider proper policing. To instantiate such encounters, police missions would draw local stakeholders into relations of power that limit asymmetry and thus create the possibility for the expression of difference. This would create a space in which a limited number of Europeanizing reforms could be articulated to locally valued ‘disorderly’ forms of policing without suppressing the latter in the name of universalizing aspirations. Our proposal for what we call ‘police aid lite’ is not as radical as it may sound. It resonates, for instance, with a report on world governance annexed to a European Commission White Paper on Governance (2001: 16). The report by Commission officials, who served in their personal capacity, calls for a ‘new modesty’ on the part of the EU and ‘more nuance’ concerning its actions. The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first part, we flesh out what ESDP police missions can do to recalibrate their reform technologies with a view to rendering the relations of power they produce less pastoral. Moreover, we suggest that missions mobilize another technology in their arsenal, one that has so far been used only to a limited extent but that holds great potential as a democratizing tool. In an attempt to interest those who are not persuaded by our normative case in our reform agenda, we show that its adoption promises to enhance the sustainability of policing changes in host societies

Towards peacebuilding lite 125 and the effectiveness of crime control. In the second part of the chapter, we broaden our reform agenda by addressing a series of operational challenges confronting the implementation of ESDP police aid. The importance of these operational reforms resides in the fact that without them the emancipatory potential of EU peacebuilding in the policing field remains stunted.

Lightening the panoptic gaze Co-location is a principal means by virtue of which non-executive ESDP police missions in the Western Balkans and elsewhere reform policing. Based on physical proximity, the technology subjects local police officers to nearly continuous surveillance by mission experts. The latter’s detailed observations of the everyday conduct of their local counterparts, in turn, provide the basis for their evaluations and corrections. The disciplines administered by co-locators restrain police conduct, thus limiting brutality, abuse and bias (ethnic, political, etc.), and they habituate officers to modern, potentially more effective routines, say, concerning crime case management. The European disciplines are thus an important tool for reordering policing fields in countries emerging from crisis or violence. Yet this is not their only effect. They also insert locals in a regime of power, which brings into play elements of panoptic compulsion as well as processes through which the self is fashioned in line with external codes.1 How, we want to ask, can the pastorship in monitoring, mentoring and advising be curtailed? One recommendation to limit the power in co-location is to make the surveillance of the local police less continuous. This can be achieved by limiting the physical proximity between mentors and mentees, say, by separating the offices of mission experts from those of their local counterparts. Indeed, an idea to this effect was floated by the head of the EUPM for the follow-on mission. While not framed in terms of making mission interventions less intrusive, this would clearly have been one result of the suggestion, which envisaged mission staff to be assigned to five regions with field advisors, SIPA and SBS advisors sharing one building in each regional location.2 Yet, although the spatial repositioning of mission experts along these lines promises to lighten their gaze, it leaves unchanged the universalizing assumptions of the Eurometrics of good policing that informs their mentoring and advising activities. A more far-reaching reform strategy is to develop a dialogical approach to co-location. Such a move would be facilitated by the fact that there is no unified European policing culture. EU countries have divergent policing traditions, including different governance structures, police–society relations and policing philosophies. Both the EUPM and the Proxima leadership and programme planners framed this heterogeneity as an obstacle to mission programming. For instance, senior EUPM staff argued for the functional specialization of national contingents so that certain co-locating functions would be allocated according to nationality.3 Instead of dissimulating the

126 Towards peacebuilding lite fragmentation of Western policing practices in this fashion, we suggest that ESDP missions see it as an opportunity to move towards a less hierarchical form of monitoring, mentoring and advising. In what follows, we develop recommendations to advance such a project. While we assume that in most future police missions staff will continue to be co-located with locals, our recommendations are in principle also applicable to alternative spatial arrangements. To begin with, we advocate that ESDP programme planners limit themselves to elaborating, together with local counterparts, a broad framework for reforms rather than a reform catalogue spelling out in detail a plethora of projects. As we argued in the previous chapter, the greater the number of features of everyday policing targeted for reform, the greater the power of the disciplinary gaze over local police officers. Second, co-locators in the field should put less emphasis on mentoring and more on open-ended, dialogical interaction. Mentoring is a mimetic process through which European policing norms and practices are disseminated to target countries, i.e. it is inscribed in a non-egalitarian relationship in which one party directs and the other takes advice. In a dialogical version of co-location, ESDP experts would play the role of partner rather than supervisor. They would try to affect behavioural and attitudinal changes through the give and take of argumentation while showing a willingness to be persuaded as to why their advice could not be accepted or had to be adapted to the cultural and political contexts of policing in the host society. At the moment, mission managers tend to discourage the development of too collegial a relationship between co-locators and local officers, fearing that it would lead the former to ‘lose their standards’ and ‘go native’ (Nachtwei 2004). We recommend that such relationships be seen in a positive light: co-locators and their local counterparts co-operate in finding common solutions within the broad guidelines developed, with local input, by mission programme planners. Although a more dialogical approach to co-location would not evacuate power from the interaction between internationals and locals, it would make their relationship less pastoral. Turning from normative to functional considerations, it is not only equality that suffers if the pastorship in co-location is pronounced. The sustainability of the reforms brought about by the use of the technology may be undermined. To begin with, the paternalistic order of difference between the benevolent but strict shepherd and the unruly flock that is characteristic of the pastorate may seduce mission staff to view their local counterparts as largely dependent on their expertise and guidance. The risk in this attitude is that co-location becomes a means for transplanting best practices rather than for the joint search for solutions to what local actors perceive as problems.4 If this happens, missions may promote improvements that are irrelevant to the situation on the ground or even counterproductive. Closely related, international reforms that are perceived as not addressing local problems may lead to public alienation and cynicism. Co-location based on

Towards peacebuilding lite 127 co-operation and dialogue is a powerful antidote against these downsides of the pastoral tendencies in peacebuilding. In particular, it promises to ground mission reforms in ways culturally intelligible and acceptable in the recipient country. The need for greater modesty on the part of mission experts is further underlined by their lack of familiarity with local conditions. As a police opinion survey commissioned by the EUPM (2003) documented, mission experts had little knowledge of local (police-related) legislation, culture and history.5 This lack of knowledge of the local policing field and its contexts brings into relief another closely related weakness associated with a strong commitment on the part of mission staff to the paternalistic care for locals. The former are drawn from EU police forces, ministries of interior and academia and thus possesses historically contingent expertise in how best to solve their own country-specific policing problems. Even if local problems seem to be a variation of their problems back home, say, the underrepresentation of female and ethnic minority officers in the force or police misconduct, Western lessons are not likely to work in underdeveloped countries in crisis or transiting from civil war if they are not adjusted in the light of the different problem context. Hence, unless co-locators work more closely with their local colleagues and are ready to accept that with regard to certain issues local expertise and solutions may be superior to their own, they run the risk of devising unsustainable and ineffective measures. Both this and the preceding caution are borne out by research: strategies for building liberal peace have to be adapted to the specific contexts of cultures and political traditions (Jeong 2002b: 8). A third challenge to the sustainability of police reforms brought about by ESDP co-location has to do with the fact that the relationship between local officers of all ranks and international co-locators monitoring and mentoring them is structurally similar to that of street cops and management cops in any European police organization. Research suggests that attempts by police managers to change policies and rules in accordance with new values and ideas about the nature and objectives of policing are resisted by the rank and file. They modify and change the content of the reforms so that they accord with their own preferences and common sense (Holdaway 1994: 69; McConville, Sanders and Leng 1991). Applying this insight to ESDP police aid, we can expect that a pastoral approach to co-location will not be overly effective. While ‘slippage’ may not occur as long as the locals are closely monitored, once the ESDP mission is terminated and the eye of power is removed, local police officers are likely to adjust policy innovations in line with what they consider proper and effective. Again, we submit that the sustainability of ESDP co-location is tied to the issue of equality between internationals and locals. Research into persuasion suggests that confidential exchanges among small groups characterized by dialogue rather than lecturing are most likely to lead people to yield to persuasive influence and to modify their standpoint (Checkel 1999: 549). In short, there are good

128 Towards peacebuilding lite reasons to believe that a dialogical approach to co-location is more likely to lead to lasting reforms of the local policing field than pastoral interventions.

From prescription to mutual learning: Towards a different form of police training Professionalization is a powerful instrument to reform the conduct of people in clearly delineated fields of action. It interpellates individuals into new subject positions by instilling novel skills and attitudes in them. ESDP police missions deploy it to enhance the effectiveness and equitable delivery of policing. Through their pedagogical projects – the organization of workshops, the mentoring of teaching staff at police academies, the production and delivery of police manuals and so forth – they assist in making up proficient, duty-bound and moral police officers. Yet, just like co-location, professionalization raises important questions with normative implications. Who delimits and controls the competencies and values local police officers are expected to acquire and how is this knowledge acquisition to be organized? In its current configuration in ESDP missions, the technology is programmed with a unilateral paradigm of knowledge transfer in which local police officers figure principally as recipients of European competencies. Professionalization thus becomes a difference machine that constitutes the extant knowledge pool not only as being different from but inferior to European expertise. As one EUPM co-locator put it, local law enforcement officials are expected to ‘shed the procedures and mentality of the past’.6 The fact that the truth in the name of which trainees are equipped with certain skills and character is fashioned in a highly contingent process of construction is concealed as competencies are framed by the missions as objective attributes inscribed in the nature of good police work. To bring into relief the variability of professionalization regimes, we briefly look at how another police training provider – the OSCE – uses the technology (cf. Merlingen and Ostrauskait˙e 2005c,d). One of the key features of the organization’s pedagogical work is its distinct teaching philosophy. It embodies a paradigm of knowledge creation and dissemination according to which expertise is not owned by trainers, and teaching best avoids being overly prescriptive. The OSCE thus values experiential learning, which incorporates local values and knowledge in lesson plans, and aims at nurturing the latent aptitudes of trainees. Trainers, therefore, are not so much educators with ready-made lessons to teach but learning facilitators. They do not define and disseminate universal truths. Rather, the teaching content reflects the interaction and mutual development of international and local knowledges. In short, the hallmark of such an education regime is mutual movement rather than unilateral skills transfer (cf. Lederach 1995). We believe that on this issue ESDP missions could learn from the OSCE and thus limit the pastoral tendencies in their police reforms.7 Yet this would not be the only payoff. By modifying their approach to professionalization,

Towards peacebuilding lite 129 missions could become more effective change leaders and render their improvements more sustainable. Two lines of research support this claim. First, according to insights generated by the socialization literature, one of the scope conditions under which learning can be expected to work best is the use of a co-operative teaching methodology (Adler 2000; Checkel 2000). Second, police research underlines the importance of the cultural and political contexts of policing. As one leading expert puts it, ‘good policing cannot be defined operationally, that is by specific practices, nor learned or taught by the transference of “proven” policies from one setting to another’ (Marenin 1998: 165). Principles of good policing derived from advanced European states may not be applicable to crisis areas or may have to be translated to fit the local contexts. This insight suggests the need for mission staff to resist the temptation to inscribe their relationship with local officers in a steep knowledge hierarchy. Such an ‘inflated sense of superiority’, to borrow a phrase from a high-ranking diplomat with significant experience as peacebuilder, is counterproductive (Everts 2004: 59). To illustrate, we were repeatedly told by EUPM co-locators that cadets ‘unlearn’ parts of what they are taught in the police academies when they come into contact with established local policing understandings and habits. And officers who undergo refresher training or attend workshops organized by the mission may resist new knowledge if it does not draw on their own experience.

Reconfiguring governmentalization Governmentalization is an important tool for upgrading the institutional quality of public institutions. ESDP police missions employ it to discipline wayward police apparatuses characterized by, for instance, endemic corruption, secrecy or a culture of impunity. In their place, missions seek to institutionalize a crime-fighting culture that emphasizes freedom from partisan political interference, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. Yet governmentalization, too, is Janus-faced. Its downside is the depoliticization of what constitutes a good police organization in the context of the society in question. General principles derived from European experience and analysis tend to take precedence over public deliberation in the host country in shaping the meaning of a well-governed police. In short, behind the civilizing idiom of rational-legal modernization and economic efficiency may hide a contemporary version of paternalism. In the name of good governance, mission experts influence indigenous legal and administrative decision-making processes through which the internal workings and institutional trajectory of the police are shaped. Thus, the EUPM and Proxima, the former more energetically than the latter, identified ‘pre-modern’ features in policing structures and processes, blamed them for the existing order of insecurity and put pressure on local authorities to align laws and regulations with European templates. This form of governmentalization, which tends to evade indigenous law- and rule-making

130 Towards peacebuilding lite powers and to constitute projects of improvement as a kind of antipolitics, is justified by the notion that the prescribed laws and regulations embody standards that are above the contingencies of party politics and citizen involvement. Local politics, in this view, ‘pollutes’ the modernization of the police apparatus carried out by disinterested ESDP missions and is thus best kept at bay. To reduce the element of travesty in governmentalization – the creation by international peacebuilders of a local police fit for liberal peace by means of seemingly apolitical tools – we suggest that ESDP advisors redefine their role in legal and administrative reforms. Instead of seeing themselves as professional police reformers who have all the ready-made solutions and transpose their vision of how best to regulate policing to countries in transition, they would become facilitators who convert the laws and regulations governing policing into a site of local contestation over the meaning of proper policing structures and processes. Such a role conception would respect the integrity of the local political process in police reforms. Furthermore, to further deepen its commitment to the idea of local ownership and hence open up its peacebuilding reforms to bottom–up visions of and appeals to good policing, the EU should consider encouraging local non-governmental involvement in the process. This would go some way towards promoting police organizations that are responsive to the concerns of citizens. Further below, we shall have more to say about the local ownership of peacebuilding reforms. By redefining their role in police-related legal reforms ESDP experts would not only render the process more democratic, they would also enhance the sustainability of the resulting changes. What has been said about institutional reforms in general can also be applied to police organizations. They can be set up or reformed from the outside with the help of experts and consultants, but legal reforms of this sort only endure and become significant if they are regarded by recipients as solutions to real problems (Ottaway 2002: 1005). Moreover, the legitimacy of institutional reforms, in the policing field just as anywhere else, ‘is the result of domestic political processes that take time and can only be marginally affected by donors’ (Ottaway 2002: 1016). In short, policing reforms are not likely to work well if they devise and impart solutions without, or with limited, participation of local stakeholders. Next, we turn from reforms aimed at shaking up the existing bureaucratic settlements in police apparatuses to measures that craft on to them a business ethos. Just as in the case of the promotion of rational-legal organizational forms, EU efforts to encourage ‘enterprise’ in transitional policing may result in depoliticizing effects. In their well-intentioned attempts to ensure the financial sustainability of law enforcement, missions promote reforms in line with an economistic vision of the police organization as a financial system composed of inputs, management and outputs – police products such as traffic policing or crime fighting. Such a visualization of policing, which

Towards peacebuilding lite 131 zeros in on the organizational optimization and internal efficiency of the ‘policing firm’, runs the risk of disempowering stakeholders whose concerns with policing cannot be expressed in the idiom of economics. Citizens may find that their ability to shape decisions on how they are policed is curtailed because the open-ended nature of participatory politics cannot guarantee that the economic rationality of the reform process willed by the EU prevails. The point to be made here is that to reduce the element of pastorship in the management reforms promoted by ESDP missions, economic rationality must be balanced and legitimated by democratic procedures. We argue that this calls for the deepening of the practice of local ownership. As we documented in the case study chapters, both ESDP police missions in the Western Balkans established consultative relations between, on the one hand, mission experts and, on the other, local policy-makers and police officers. However, Proxima undermined its local ownership strategy, as well as its effectiveness, by failing to formally institutionalize procedures through which locals had an input into the formulation of reform projects. Conversely, the EUPM set up an elaborate, albeit not very effective structure to promote local ownership of mission-supported police reforms. It comprised, notably, the PSB and, working under its direction, a number of working groups for each EUPM reform programme and selected projects. Through these fora the EUPM consulted with local police on reform priorities and projects, jointly monitored and assessed reform implementation and elaborated recommendations for further policing changes. In comparison with UN Civpol operations in general and the IPTF in particular, the EUPM set new standards for participatory peacebuilding (on the latter, see Chopra and Hohe 2004; Pugh 2000). Yet although the mission went further than many other police aid donors in associating local stakeholders with its reforms, its approach remained inscribed in the logic of the pastorate. For instance, both the fact-finding missions and the planning team preparing the launch of the EUPM primarily relied on the IPTF for information about the state of policing in Bosnia.8 Hence, local police officials and civil society actors had little, if any, input into the formulation of the initial EUPM reform agenda. As to the elaboration of reform projects, the local police had a limited voice but citizens and nongovernmental actors were conspicuously absent in the process. The EU could enhance its reputation as an innovative peacebuilder by building on the EUPM’s practice of local ownership to develop an approach that goes beyond the currently fashionable attempt by international donors to co-opt natives in carrying out their modernizing designs. The hallmark of such an approach would be close co-operation between missions, the local authorities and citizens in the design and implementation of police aid, and the readiness of EU experts to accept that both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of policing may depend on preserving or even strengthening non-European institutional forms in the local police apparatus. Neither a rational-legal nor a market-based rationality nor a combination of the two

132 Towards peacebuilding lite is an acontextual means for streamlining organizational work routines and the quality of their output. For instance, police organizations marked by low salaries and significant equipment shortfalls are not the most hospitable sites for the introduction of European notions of performativity. Hence, efforts to implant a business ethos in such underresourced police forces, which have developed and institutionalized their own specific mechanisms to cope with the lack of means, are likely to encounter major problems. The experience of the EUPM supports this conclusion. As one co-locator put it, ‘imposing sophisticated Western European models of policing in BiH [ran] into difficulties in terms of results in performance, cultural change and effectiveness’ (Longmore 2004: 21). The more general argument to be made here is that unless governmentalizing reforms involve all stakeholders, indigenous police managers are likely to ignore, violate or creatively interpret the various contradictory demands of order placed on them by international police aid donors such as ESDP missions, supervisors, colleagues and citizens. A closely related point is that a deepening of existing local ownership practices would contribute to developing a local constituency (political and societal) for legal and administrative changes. The importance of such a constituency for the sustainability of ESDP-assisted police reforms resides in the fact that internal political factors are in most cases more important determinants of institutional transformations than international factors (Stanley 1996). Police experts who served in ESDP missions confirm this view. They thus advocate that ‘local authorities must be involved from the outset at all levels’ of missions (Blyth 2004: 2), and they highlight that it is crucial to involve non-governmental organizations already in the planning stage of missions (J. Davies, in Partners in Prevention 2005: 21). So far we advocated changes to how ESDP police missions employ their arsenal of political technologies in their attempt to improve policing in conflict-ridden countries in an improving direction. Next, we turn our attention to a political technology that missions so far have been reluctant to use.

Towards a more democratic post-conflict policing style: The technology of community policing Community policing is an essentially contested concept in the policing literature. A minimalist definition includes the following elements: noncrime problem solving, police–public partnerships, accountability and power sharing (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990). Here we treat community policing as a political technology that is designed to control crime through the activation of citizens’ individual energies, commitments and choices (Rose 2000b; Stenson 1993; Stenson and Edwards 2003). Like any technology, community policing can be configured in different ways. Thus, it can be allied to punitive sovereign technologies of crime control, say, broken windows policing. Sovereign crime control is an effort on the part of the

Towards peacebuilding lite 133 police to redeem the Hobbesian bargain between the state and the citizens and to protect public spaces against ‘anti-citizens’. It emphasizes aggressive tactics of crime reduction, including intimidation and the arrest of undesirables. By joining this approach with community policing, the police mobilize the power of both the state and the citizens against crime. The latter are incited to complement zero-tolerance policing by being vigilant, securitizing their property and defending their neighbourhoods. Community-cumsovereign policing has a strong exclusionary logic, expelling ‘anti-citizens’ such as prostitutes, beggars, the homeless and so forth from zones of security and subjecting them to various strategies of control such as harsher penalties and preventive detention. Yet community policing can also be configured in a very different manner, one that emphasizes its inclusive nature and its potential to democratize both the police organization and its relationship with citizens. For instance, the technology can be employed to institutionalize the co-production of police strategies and objectives by professional police officers and citizens and to create innovative links between, on the one hand, crime control, and, on the other, housing, education and labour market policies (Bayley and Shearing 1996; Garland 2001; Herbert 2001). So far ESDP police missions have made limited use of this emancipatory form of community policing. For instance, the EUPM failed to take full advantage of the democratizing potential of community policing, carrying out a few low-profile and often uncoordinated activities. And in Macedonia the main impetus for citizen empowerment in the policing field came from the OSCE, although the involvement of Proxima in this issue-area increased in its second year of operation. Initially, the mission did little more than monitor and mentor the OSCE-trained community-relations co-ordinators. Proxima II went beyond this restricted focus and widened the geographical scope of community policing by establishing new citizen advisory groups. This promising development notwithstanding, on the subject of police reforms that limit power inequalities within police organizations and between them and citizens, the EU can learn from the experience of the OSCE and the police aid mentality it embodies. The Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) of the OSCE, which is responsible for the organization’s police aid, believes that the knowledge required for policing is not exclusively owned by a particular group of persons: professional police officers. The staff of the SPMU valorizes lay knowledge and capacity in the policing field and emphasizes the role of citizens in shaping policing priorities and methods. Hence, most of the police reforms carried out by the OSCE aim at the promotion of an active role for citizens and non-governmental organizations in the policing of their communities. This has two principal effects. It encourages a pluralistic and accountable governance of public security, and it undermines overly hierarchical relations within the police organization. Moreover, the community policing philosophy of the SPMU emphasizes the importance of integrating into policing a concern with issues of justice and the quality of life, in addition to

134 Towards peacebuilding lite the typical law-and-order functions carried out by the police. In this broad conception of law enforcement, street-level officers and first-line managers are empowered to act as agents of civic governance who, often in co-operation with other agencies, assist people who experience some kind of personal emergency such as sexual abuse and help communities address the deep-seated problems of which crime and disorder are merely the symptoms (Loader and Walker 2001). The SPMU stresses that such an understanding of the police as an agency of social improvement that seeks to promote individual-level security in all its aspects facilitates the transformation of transitional police forces into humane and democratic police services that enjoy the trust of the population. Without suggesting that the EU should copy the OSCE police aid practices, we do argue that ESDP mission should pay greater attention to the development of a strong interface between, on the one hand, the indigenous police and, on the other, civil society actors and citizens.9 From our normative standpoint that seeks to limit pastoral and unaccountable forms of power that operate in and through peacebuilding, such a move is recommendable for a number of reasons. To begin with, the emphasis on co-operation in community policing fosters an occupational culture in the local police that is characterized by what we referred to earlier as a caring policing style. Research suggests that such a style is more compatible with ethical policing than a ‘hard policing’ style. Police officers who are trained to be fighters in a war on crime are more likely to get embroiled in allegations of brutality, corruption and scandal (Neyroud and Beckley 2001: 9–10). Second, with its emphasis on care, community policing creates a more hospitable organizational environment for female officers, thus supporting efforts by the EU to mainstream gender into police forces in countries transiting from crisis or violence. Third, by giving an institutional voice to citizens in the formulation of policing priorities, it encourages the indigenization of law enforcement agendas. By rendering policing goals socially acceptable, it in turn enhances the legitimacy of the local police in the eyes of the population. This nexus between policing objectives and legitimacy tends to be overlooked by ESDP police missions, which, as we documented in previous chapters, may incite and direct the local police to adopt policing priorities that reflect EU security perceptions. Finally, community policing contributes to limiting the authoritarian nature of local police–subject relations, which is likely to be pronounced in crisis or post-violence settings. Yet, not only normative reasons support the argument that ESDP police reforms ought to give citizens a greater say in policing issues. Community policing also has the potential to enhance the sustainability of reforms and the effectiveness of crime control. As to the former, by fostering and empowering local non-governmental stakeholders who have an interest in the democratization and localization of policing, ESDP police missions would cement their reforms and make it less likely that they are hollowed out after they leave their host countries. On the issue of

Towards peacebuilding lite 135 effectiveness, the de-differentiation of the social response to crime fostered by community policing holds the potential for rendering crime control more effective by revitalizing communities and hence empowering them to control themselves. Also, community policing is a suitable tool to promote a social approach to crime control. By co-operating with other governmental agencies and nongovernmental actors in addressing localized reasons for deviant behaviour, say, through the regeneration of neighbourhoods in social decline, it takes into account that crime is typically embedded in and co-produced by social relations. This is of particular importance in crisis areas where poverty and unemployment rates are high, not least among the youth. The large number of marginalized and discontented young men constitute a pool of potential recruits for crime groups. ‘Reserve gang members’ thus stand ready to fill the places of those arrested by police. In such a context, a focus on tracking down and cracking down on criminals is arguably of limited effectiveness in dealing with (organized) crime. Yet another advantage of community policing is that by assisting the police to overcome the legacy of mistrust that separates them from (certain groups of) citizens, it contributes to greater police effectiveness by encouraging citizens to provide them with the crimerelated information that is so crucial to high clear-up rates. The technology of community policing, then, is a potentially powerful tool peacebuilders can use to improve transitional policing in an improving direction. An ideational prerequisite is a police aid mentality that acknowledges the importance of balancing a controlling policing style with a caring one in order to promote democratic and effective police services. In the previous chapter, we argued that ESDP police missions are enfolded in a rationality that privileges a prosecutorial mindset in local police officers. The belief in and insistence on implementing and strengthening a detectionand arrest-oriented approach to law enforcement in societies emerging from instability or civil war puts limits on the ability of missions to encourage community policing. Hence, we recommend that ESDP decision-makers in Brussels and ESDP training providers encourage mission planners to adjust their police reform philosophy, notably by reconsidering the state-policing nexus in a way that opens up space in which organizational forms of policing that balance the pursuit of sovereign law enforcement with the pursuit of a participatory policing style can flourish. So far in this chapter we discussed a series of reforms aimed at containing and reducing pastoral power in ESDP police interventions and local police– subject relations and at rendering reforms more sustainable. Next we change our analysis format and zero in on the principal operational shortcomings affecting EU peacebuilding in the policing field. We address generic, rather than case-specific, challenges confronting the implementation of EU policing. No recalibration of ESDP police assistance aimed at reducing the power operating in and through it can ignore these shortcomings. On the other hand, and this is a caution, if the EU acts on these issues, as it indeed

136 Towards peacebuilding lite has begun, without at the same time making progress towards peacebuilding lite, then the emancipatory impulse of ESDP police missions will be curbed.

Cross-cutting operational issues: Speed, personnel and coherence The principal added value that the EU can bring to international peacebuilding in the policing field is the capacity for rapid response, the quality of its police experts and the ability to combine ESDP missions with a large array of additional EU instruments in an effort to maximize the Union’s impact on the transition to peace. However, as our case study chapters showed, the EU has not yet fully realized its potential in these areas. In what follows, we identify the main remaining problems and, drawing on the ongoing debate on EU peacebuilding as well as our own ideas, we recommend measures to tackle them. Speed is a crucial issue in peacebuilding. The capacity to rapidly deploy personnel and to provide them with the means to carry out their peacebuilding tasks may determine whether a country slips from a crisis to civil war or succeeds in implementing a peace accord after ethnic warfare. As foreign policy supremo Solana put it, ‘a month is an eternity’ in the international politics of peace support operations (quoted in Fondation Robert Schuman 2005). So far the EU has not done enough to put in place sufficient mechanisms for the rapid delivery of its ESDP police aid. This fact was driven home by Proxima. Launched on 15 December 2003, it only concluded the build-up phase by the end of April 2004. This delay notwithstanding, by that time it was still not yet fully operational: it had reached about 84 per cent of its planned manpower and some of its field offices still had not received computers and other essential office equipment. Despite the commitment made by member states at the Feira European Council to provide more than 5000 police officers to ESDP police missions, Proxima had to be launched with an insufficient number of experts whose skills, in addition, often did not match the job descriptions elaborated by the planning team. As a member of Civcom observed, there ‘is a clear gap between what the member states are declaring and the actual availability of these means’ (T. Koller quoted in Partners in Prevention 2005: 11). Finally, without the material support provided by the EUPM, EUMM, NATO and especially the OSCE, which lent among other things computers and mobile phones to the mission, the situation would have been worse. The lack of speed was also a problem for the EUPM. Among other things, it, too, experienced difficulties in procuring computers, a fact which degraded communications between headquarters and field co-locators and thus the quality of their projects of improvement.10 Moreover, just as in the case of Proxima, these delays negatively affected the morale of mission staff. Overall, though, the EUPM encountered less difficulties in the build-up phase than its sister mission in Macedonia. For instance, its quantitative and qualitative personnel shortcomings were significantly lower than those

Towards peacebuilding lite 137 11

which affected Proxima. The reason for the relatively better performance of the EUPM in this regard had to do with the fact that it had nine months for planning the operation, including the procurement of equipment. Conversely, Proxima had only 2.5 months of planning time. The fact that the EUPM planning team needed nine months of preparation to ensure the relatively smooth launch of the mission can be largely attributed to two problems. To begin with, the EU ‘was never designed as a foreign policy organisation in a traditional sense’ (Cooper 2005: 189). Neither the bureaucratic structures nor the decision-making procedures of the highly complex, multi-layered EFP policy-making system lend themselves to rapid policy formation and implementation. Rather, they institutionalize consultation, deliberation and negotiations at multiple levels and across institutions at the expense of speed.12 A more specific problem is the European Commission’s cumbersome and inflexible procurement procedure, which is applicable to ESDP civilian peacebuilding missions. While the EU, under the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, is committed to speed up the procurement process, no breakthrough has been achieved so far. In particular, proposals to learn from the United Nations and the OSCE by creating start-up kits consisting of pre-stocked items needed for mission launch and start-up funds that can be rapidly released to pay for essential procurements on the ground have so far not been implemented. Yet it is not just Brussels which is responsible for the long lead-time required for ESDP police missions to become fully operational. Member states, too, have not done enough to put in place national legal and financial frameworks that facilitate the rapid deployment of police experts. A second reason for the delays encountered by the EUPM and Proxima in the build-up phase has to do with the lack of standardized programme development tools. To develop general management tools that embody the lessons learned from EU and non-EU police missions is crucial because without them each mission is condemned, as it were, to reinvent the wheel. True, missions ‘are very different’, as a sceptical Police Unit staffer told us,13 but there are enough commonalities to make ‘template programmes’ a useful planning tool. On a closely related note, the EU should speedily implement the lesson it drew from its two Western Balkans missions and include programme developers in its fact-finding missions and planning teams. The assembly of reform projects is a lengthy process, and by starting preparatory work early, the build-up phase of missions can be reduced significantly. Also, there is a need to strengthen the Police Unit in the Council so that it is in a position to advice and support each mission on all policy and operational issues, including programme development and implementation. As a number of senior members of the two Western Balkan missions acknowledged, the support they received from Brussels was not always sufficient. This is not surprising given that in comparison to the EUMS responsible for planning and supporting military ESDP operations, the Police Unit remains severely under-resourced. Finally, the planning (and

138 Towards peacebuilding lite implementation) process of police missions, and civilian ESDP missions more generally, would benefit from the expertise and assets of non-governmental organizations. In this regard, the action plan to enhance the co-operation between the two sides is an important initiative (Ahtisaari 2006). Taken together, the measures proposed here would go some way towards ensuring that ESDP police missions have the in-built capacity to respond to a crisis not by lengthy deliberation, negotiation and preparation but by quick action on the ground. Moving from the issue of speed to the issue of personnel, a number of problems have to be flagged. To begin with, there is the challenge of providing peacebuilders with the requisite competencies to carry out their tasks efficiently and effectively. Both general and mission-specific competencies are required. As to the former, in addition to the special courses offered by the European Police Academy and the European Commission project on the training of experts for civilian aspects of crisis management, the EU put in place a training programme in ESDP, which, just like the Community project, is conducted by training institutions of the member states. Also, the new European Security and Defence College contributes to the improvement of the quality of EU peacebuilders (civilian and military). As to mission-specific training, important shortfalls remain despite efforts to upgrade joint, pre-deployment training. Police officers sent on missions often have little knowledge of the state of play of policing in the host country and of the reform activities pursued by the mission. Earlier we referred to an opinion poll which highlighted that many EU police officers deployed to Bosnia lacked a basic knowledge of Bosnian policing and its political, organizational and cultural contexts. The EUPM later addressed this problem by adopting a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, it developed a more comprehensive pre-joining package and sent it to contributing states for their pre-mission training. On the other hand, it upgraded its in-house induction training, in particular paying more attention to collective training on individual programmes. We recommend that the EU generalize this approach beyond the EUPM, making it a standard feature in ESDP police missions. Incidentally, such a move would also provide an opportunity for missions to sensitize staff to the importance and validity of different policing ideologies and practices and to highlight the importance of a dialogical relationship between international police experts and locals police officers. Yet another personnel issue has to do with rotations. Missions lasting longer than six months are likely to be confronted by the issue of revolving doors: there are police experts leaving the mission and new ones joining it.14 Drawing on the experience of the EUPM and Proxima, the circulation of staff poses a twofold challenge. First, there is the problem of an appropriate handover time at rotations. To ensure a smooth handover of duties from outgoing to incoming police experts, a unified system of transition in which the outgoing mission staff imparts its experience to the incoming one is advisable. Hence, ESDP missions should whenever possible have one week

Towards peacebuilding lite 139 of joint co-location (cf. Nachtwei 2004). Such a system would also assist in establishing an institutional memory as outgoing staff can pass on the lessons they learned lessons they learned to incoming staff. On a related note, to minimize the disruption generated by rotations, they should be better planned and more staggered. This applies also to situations when the mandate of a mission is extended. For instance, the transition from Proxima I to Proxima II was significantly complicated by the fact that most international staff was rotated out of the mission when its initial mandate expired. Second, both the EUPM and Proxima experienced a quantitative and qualitative decline in personnel as rotations proceeded. For instance, important positions remained unfilled as contributing states did not act quickly enough on calls for contribution or the skills of seconded experts did not match the job description. A partial solution might be to circulate job profiles to contributing states earlier. Also, the establishment by each member state of a national personnel database for all international organizations active in the policing field, notably the United Nations and the OSCE, would help to address this problem. For the time being many member states do not have ready-made and up-to-date information on police officers deployable to international missions. Yet, while standardized data on the expertise, professional experience, training levels and availability of potential mission members are an important management tool, by themselves they do not solve the underlying problem: the lack of sufficient numbers of highly qualified, deployable police experts. Even though EU member states (old and new) have pledged more than 5700 police officers to the ESDP, many of them are junior officers who do not have the profile required for EU police missions which focus their reforms on middle- and senior-level management. Furthermore, unlike soldiers who are ‘idle’ until they are deployed to a war zone, police officers are ‘in use’ in their home countries. If they are sent on a mission abroad they have to be replaced from within the service. In the current ideological climate in many EU countries, where the public and many politicians clamour for more police officers to ensure public safety, governments and police managers are understandably reluctant to accept a significant reduction in the number of personnel available for ‘homeland security’. The EU has begun to tackle the issue of rapidly deployable personnel in the context of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, notably with the establishment of Civilian Response Teams. We suggest that in addition the EU should consider relying more on contracted or seconded civilian police experts. Finally, we turn to the issue of intra-EU co-ordination in crisis management and peacebuilding. This, of course, is a well-known theme in EU discourse. After all, one of the principal comparative advantages of EU peacebuilding is supposed to be its capacity to deploy a wide range of civilian and military tools to countries in crisis or emerging from conflict. Yet the often invoked commitment to a common purpose among EU actors and

140 Towards peacebuilding lite bodies remains haunted by incoherence in practice (Keane 2004; Missiroli 2001; Rummel 2004). As we saw in the chapter on Bosnia, even among ESDP operations – the EUPM and EUFOR Althea – coherence of action may be difficult to achieve. The establishment of the civil-military cell in the EUMS in Brussels is an important step in attaining better co-ordination among ESDP instruments, as is the conceptual work on the management of EU-led operations involving more than one EU actor, which was initiated at the beginning of 2006. A greater challenge to coherence is presented by inter-institutional co-ordination, a fact exemplified by the initial lack of co-operation between Proxima I and the European Commission delegation on the ground in Macedonia. While it is exaggerated to claim, as Catriona Gourlay (2004: 404) does, that ESDP police missions are ‘institutionally and practically divorced from activities supported by the Commission’, she is certainly right in pleading for closer across-pillar co-ordination in peacebuilding. Greater coherence among EU actors on the ground is important if there is a division of labour between short-term peacebuilding activities carried out by an ESDP mission and longer-term reconstruction efforts promoted by the European Commission in order to ensure that the former lays ‘the strategic groundwork’ for the latter (Gourlay 2004: 417). Tight co-ordination is crucial when the boundaries between short-term and longer-term peacebuilding become blurred as in Bosnia and Macedonia where the mandates of the ESDP police missions were based on traditional development concepts such as the promotion of the rule of law and public administration reforms.15 Without an integrated first- and second-pillar approach to peacebuilding in the policing field, the danger is that a logic is created by ESDP interventions for public security, say, the fight against organized crime, first, and then community policing that is accountable and responsive to citizens. Moreover, better co-ordination is needed to enhance the effectiveness of police reforms. For instance, as we argued earlier, crime control strategies that are informed by a correctionalist criminology and that ignore the socioeconomic context of criminal behaviour are not likely to be overly effective in countries transiting from instability or civil war. In the context of widespread deprivation and dislocation, crime may be a structurally rooted coping mechanism which can only be tackled by an integrated approach that combines police-centred reforms with measures that address the socioeconomic causes of crime. Again, this puts a premium on close co-ordination between the Commission and the Council in any joint involvement in the construction of an order of liberal peace in a country in crisis or emerging from violence. Intra- and across-pillar co-ordination, then, significantly impacts on the ability of the EU to effectively employ its impressive array of policy tools in peacebuilding operations and thus on its success as a peacebuilder. While idiosyncratic factors such as the personality traits of the main EU representatives on the ground do matter, as the relations between both the EUPM,

Towards peacebuilding lite 141 and the EUMM, and Proxima and the European Commission delegation illustrate, we argue that there are a number of procedural and institutional measures that the EU can take to enhance the coherence of peacebuilding in the policing field. These measures should be seen as supplementing those actions already taken by the EU to better integrate its peacebuilding activities such as the establishment of the civil-military cell mentioned earlier and the packaging of civilian peacebuilding resources in the form of multi-functional response teams. To begin with, we suggest that when more than one ESDP mission is involved in policing reforms, as for instance in the case of the EUPM and EUFOR Althea, clearer mandates as to the role of each actor and their relationship would be helpful. The recent decision to have a joint review, as opposed to separate ones, of the two operations in the PSC is a precedent that should become the rule. Also, innovative initiatives such as the pooling of the political, legal and press departments of EUPM II with those of the office of the EUSR promise greater effectiveness, coherence and costefficiency. The option of full integration, whereby a small ESDP civilian mission is incorporated into the EUSR office should not be discarded either, as it creates a unified and thus strengthened public profile, shortened lines of communication and the ability to draw on common resources. As to the interaction between ESDP and Commission peacebuilding, Civcom should play a more proactive role in carrying out its inter-pillar co-ordination function. In this it could be assisted by a Brussels-based ad-hoc co-ordination structure in the form of a joint Council Secretariat–Commission task force established for the entire duration of each ESDP police mission. Finally, an assessment of concluded civilian missions by academics and independent experts such as those affiliated with the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy or the German Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze would add a more analytical perspective to the lessons-learned process of the Council of the EU.

8

Conclusion

International peacebuilding embodies care for the other that crosses political boundaries. It is a practice of international solidarity that, it can legitimately be argued, contributes to a global civilizing process. Peacebuilders work to pacify, democratize, humanize and in general improve life in societies emerging from crisis or violence by disciplining disorderly and securityendangering conduct and repositioning, reorganizing and mobilizing locals through (biopolitical) investments in the processes and conditions of indigenous life – political life, professional life, psychological life and so forth. Yet peacebuilding is not only embodied care for the other. It has, we argued, a double-sided nature. It is also embodied authority over others, a form of pastorship, benign in its intention but potentially distorting in its impact on host societies. The downside of peacebuilding is that it may develop a heavy footprint, evolving, at the limit, into a form of post-modern imperialism that in the name of a civilizing process imposes Western institutions on disorderly local ones. The pastorship in peacebuilding, therefore, acts as a reminder of the hubris to which the will to improve may give rise and of the risk of governing too much. The hubris resides in the transcendentalization of contingent Western practices as good governance and, to paraphrase Robert Cooper, Solana’s right-hand man on politico-military affairs in the EU Council Secretariat, in the ensuing reluctance of peacebuilders to communicate with the local population and to listen to their opinions and needs (Crisis Management Initiative 2004: 12). The risk is that the efforts required to bring good governance to crisis areas populated by potentially recalcitrant locals congeal into patterns of pastoral power (cf. Ahtisaari 2004). The power in peacebuilding can constructively be engaged through a dialectical critique that seeks to amplify its emancipatory potential and to limit its pastoral ambitions. Governmentality theory is well suited for this task. Its framing of power renders visible the pastoral relations in international peacebuilding and it clears a conceptual space for envisaging reforms that limit their constraining effects. Power understood as a strategic relationship brings into focus the reciprocal attempt of people to shape each other’s conduct and the correlated

Conclusion 143 games of control and resistance. Relations of power of this kind are changeable, reversible and unstable. Foucault contrasts them with states of domination, which are asymmetric, institutionalized patterns of interaction, say, between the pastor and her/his flock. Strategic power and domination form the two poles on the continuum of possible power relations. Governmental technologies – the ways and means by virtue of which individuals and institutions, including the state, seek to conduct the conduct of people – play the key role in determining where on this continuum particular relationships are situated. Governmental technologies are the third concept of power in Foucault’s theory. In this book, we drew on these concepts to analyse how ESDP police missions go about making police forces in countries in crisis or emerging from violence fit for liberal peace. We documented the political technologies and knowledges by virtue of which they carry out their ethical projects of creating a professional and effective police service with human rights at its core. Missions transform the difference that without doubt separates local policing from practices in Europe into risky otherness, which they then discipline. Such powerful interventions are indispensable for transforming police forces in an improving direction, but they may be in tension or opposition with missions having a ‘light expatriate footprint’, to use a phrase introduced into the peacebuilding vocabulary by Lakhdar Brahimi (2002). Without wishing to overplay this argument, we do submit that there is leeway for extending the emancipatory moment of EU peacebuilding. ESDP police missions could enhance their contribution to the global civilizing process if they adapt their police aid mentality and recalibrate the use of their reformatory technologies with a view to inscribing their interactions with locals in relations that valorize strategic openness and reversibility. To advance the agenda of what we referred to as police aid lite, we recommended some modifications to the current configuration of ESDP missions. Drawing on our analysis of the power effects generated by the EU police reforms in Bosnia and Macedonia, we identified two distinct sites in the police aid complex at which the play of domination and freedom can be configured differently: the relationship between ESDP missions and local police forces, and the indigenous police–subject relations incited by police assistance. To reduce the salience of pastoral power in local police–subject relations, we suggested that ESDP missions place more emphasis on community policing understood as the co-determination of policing priorities and strategies by the police, citizens and non-governmental organizations. To lessen the scope of the pastorship in the relationship between EU police missions and those to be improved, we developed a limited reform agenda aimed at inscribing an ethos of agonistic respect for difference in the ethico-political horizon within which EU peacebuilders engage locals. At a minimum, this implies a great sensibility on the part of mission members for the importance of quickly limiting the pastoral relations that initially may be needed

144 Conclusion to reign in an abusive police force. They would cultivate an attitude that acknowledges that if the universal promoted by them in the name of liberal peace and best practice fails to give voice to those brought under its purview, it may appear ‘as something violent and extraneous’ (T. Adorno, quoted in Butler 2005: 5). More concretely, we argued that ESDP police missions could develop mechanisms and practices that acknowledge the ‘provincial’ and contingent character of best European practices. We thus recommended a move towards interventions based on indirect and persuasive forms of co-location, the mobilization of local knowledges and concerns and the radicalization of the commitment by the EU to the local ownership of policing reforms, including the participation of citizens and non-governmental actors in the process. By affirming self-restrictions in the way they engage locals, missions would open up new possibilities for the democratic contestation of policing in countries in crisis or emerging from violence. To make the case for such a reform agenda, we developed two lines of argumentation, one functional and one normative. First, drawing on empirical and theoretical insights, we maintained that an overly pastoral approach to policing reforms runs the risk of undermining their effectiveness and sustainability once the international involvement in the host country ended. Second, we appropriated the political language of liberalism that infuses the hybrid political rationality of peacebuilding, which precariously combines the pastorate with its opposite: liberalism. By reading the liberal moment of peacebuilding through the lens of Foucault’s political ethics, we amplified the former’s critical ethos and deployed it to interrogate ESDP practices that tilt towards the side of too much governance. We thus opened up a moral space for an immanent critique that emphasizes the importance of listening to the voices of locals who call for a future constructed according to their own vernacular design. To conclude, we want to reiterate that the manner in which we analysed EU peacebuilding in the policing field and our prescriptive engagement with it can be generalized beyond the EU and police aid. An ethically reinforced governmentality theory has much to contribute to the study and practice of peace support operations. While these operations advance a global civilizing process by limiting the moral and political significance of the difference between citizens and foreigners, they also create the risk of a heavy expatriate footprint. Governmentality theory provides a toolbox to analyse and criticize the potential downsides of peace missions. In particular, it brings into relief the micro-practices through which peacebuilding operates; the mentality animating them; the diffuse forms of non-sovereign power that operate in the interstices of legal norms or infiltrate them and make them tactics of power; the subjectification of individuals and the regularization of societies, both of which narrow the range of acceptable heterogeneity; and the contingency of universalizing notions such as professional expertise and best practice. Furthermore, governmentality theory makes possible the strategic deployment of an amplified liberal rationality to criticize pastoral

Conclusion 145 relations produced and sustained by peacebuilding and thus constitutes a powerful tool to drive cracks into their solidity. Yet the theory, provided it is equipped with an ethico-political horizon, is more than a means of analysis and criticism. It provides scholars and practitioners with a conceptual apparatus to reconfigure peace support missions with a view to strengthening their emancipatory potential.

Notes

1 Introduction 1 During the Cold War, the delivery of police assistance to violently divided countries was often designed to strengthen client regimes against subversion by the Cold War enemy. See Huggins (1998). 2 For a few signposts of this voluminous literature, see Biscop (2004), Bono (2004), Cornish and Edwards (2001, 2005), Deighton (2002), Dwan (2004), Sangiovanni (2003), Howorth (2003/4), Howorth and Keeler (2003), Menon (2004), Missiroli (2003) and Shepherd (2003).

2 Power and governmentality 1 A crucial early agenda-setter was Boutros-Ghali (1992). The UN peace operations in Cambodia and El Salvador were the first ‘multidimensional’ interventions characterized by the will to carry out a series of political, institutional and economic transformations in the target countries (cf. Doyle, Johnstone and Orr 1997). For the post-Cold War development of UN peace operations see Goulding (1993) or Griffin (1999). 2 This orthodoxy ‘gives priority to the rule of law rather than social justice, to quickfix elections rather than political accountability, to neoliberal economics rather than state direction (dirigisme) to increase purchasing power, and to widening external influences rather than strengthening autonomy in the undeveloped world’ (Pugh and Cooper 2004: 6). 3 For a useful discussion of various conceptualizations, see Cousens (2001). 4 For a sampling, see Cousens and Kumar (2001), Doyle, Johnstone and Orr (1997), Jeong (2002a), Keating and Knight (2004), Lederach (1997), Newman and Schnabel (2002), Reychler (1999) and Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens (2002). Interestingly enough, there is not much cross-fertilization between comparative politics and peacebuilding research even though both study, in their own ways, post-conflict transitions to democracy. For a plea for more co-operation, see Call and Cook (2003). 5 Cf. Cockell (2003), Krasno, Hayes and Daniel (2003), Kühne (1996), K. Kumar (1997), Smith (2003) and Thayer (1998); see also the Brahimi Report (United Nations 2000). 6 This research, we believe, would benefit from being brought into contact with (Foucauldian) examinations of developmentalism and post-coloniality. See for instance Chakrabarty (2000), Escobar (1995), Ferguson (1997) and Scott (1999). 7 We borrow the term ‘European Elsewhere’ from Michael Taussig (1997).

Notes 147 8 Diez, while acknowledging that normative power is tied to othering, fails to thematize the power effects of this process. 9 However, the United Nations had already deployed police officers in the early 1960s in its peacekeeping operations in Congo, Irian Jaya (West Papua) and Cyprus. For details, see Schmidl (2002). 10 Executive policing refers to the ‘power and practice of law enforcement by international police within a particular territory’ (Dwan 2003: 1). 11 However, individual EU member states already had experience in this field, notably as a result of their contributions to UN Civpol operations and OSCE police missions. The European Commission, for its part, gained valuable experience in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1998, where it financed police equipment and training programmes covering subjects like human rights and ethics. Since 2000, it has been supporting police reforms in the Western Balkans through its Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme. Also, the Council of Europe, while not having any operational police assistance capabilities, has become an important reference point for policing reforms in Europe and elsewhere by virtue of the European Code of Police Ethics which it developed. The Code delineates common European principles and guidelines concerning the objectives, performance and accountability of the police. For a brief discussion of the Council of Europe’s role in police reforms, see Leuprecht (1997). 12 For the locus classicus of the functionalist interpretation of policing, see Bittner (1979). 13 Also, to protect the existing order (democratic or otherwise), the police routinely use repression against those engaged in asocial behaviour, criminal conduct or certain forms of mobilization against (aspects of) the existing order. Consequently, policing work, in Western democracies and elsewhere, falls on a continuum between repression and protection. 14 For a more general argument along these lines, see Duffield (2002) and Paris (2002). 15 For a programmatic defence of this limitation, see Miller (1987), Valverde and Mopas (2004) and Wickham (1986). Conversely, post-colonial studies informed by governmentality theory tend to pay close attention to the violence (figuratively and literal) flowing from the productivity of modern power (Scott 1995).

3 The EU’s peace support agenda: The development of ESDP policy machinery, capabilities and styles of thought 1 The 10 peace missions were the peacekeeping force in Bosnia (EUFOR Althea); the police mission in Bosnia (EUPM); the police mission in Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima), which ended on 14 December 2005 and was followed by the EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT); the police mission in Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa); the security sector reform mission in Congo (EUSEC); the integrated rule-oflaw mission for Iraq (EUJUST Lex); the Aceh monitoring mission in Indonesia (AMM); the border assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EU BAM); the border assistance mission at Rafah (BAM Rafah); and the rule-of-law mission in Georgia (EUJUST Themis), which ended in July 2005. 2 On the notion of EU actorness in foreign affairs, see Bretherton and Vogler (1999). 3 An early manifestation of this emerging role conception was the EC’s role in the negotiations on the Helsinki Final Act. See Thomas (2001). 4 Reflecting the continuing reluctance of many member states to move ahead quickly on the issue of security integration, the driving force behind the legal

148 Notes

5 6 7

8 9

10

11

12 13

14 15 16

definition of the EU’s role as crisis manager were Sweden and Finland rather than the major players in the security field. On the epistemic communities in Paris and London involved in the St Malo paradigm shift, see Howorth (2004a). This development was facilitated by the mutual experience of peacekeeping in Bosnia, which brought France and the United Kingdom closer together, both at the political and at the military levels (Treacher 2004: 61). NATO’s development of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) concept, which began in 1993–94, was an early manifestation of this concern with burdensharing in the new post-Cold War era. While initially motivated by concerns about NATO’s ability to run out-of-area operations, the potential of the concept to promote the Europeanization of NATO, and thus the redistribution of the costs of maintaining European security, was quickly realized. On CJTFs, see Terriff (2003). A first public manifestation of London’s ‘new thinking’ on the militarization of the EU came at the informal European Council in Pörtschach, Austria, in the fall of 1998. It is this ambiguity inscribed in ESDP – it can be used as either a supplement or an alternative to NATO – which renders intelligible Washington’s somewhat split reaction to the acquisition and deployment of operational capabilities by the EU. As Chris Patten (2000) nicely put it, ‘our American friends don’t know whether to laugh or cry’. Since then Berlin has become one of the lead states in international peacebuilding, thus ensuring that Germany remains very interested in ESDP as one of the frameworks within which it can deploy its forces. Also, the two main Christian conservative parties are broadly supportive of the ESDP. The European Council in Vienna in December 1998 had welcomed the conclusions of the Franco-British summit and invited the German Presidency to pursue the issue. The Cologne summit ushered in the beginning of the end of NATO’s ESDI. The ESDP, while drawing on key elements of ESDI, notably the 1996 Berlin agreement between NATO and the WEU to allow the Europeans to use NATO assets for WEU operations, was to be located within the EU rather than the transatlantic alliance. In the period between the two summits, the WEU Council of Ministers gave the EU direct access to its operational structures, including its secretariat, military staff and satellite centre. The European Commission, concerned about the impact of the emerging civilian ESDP on its own role in external relations, began to highlight and upgrade its competencies as peacebuilder. First, it pointed out that it had available a wide range of civilian instruments, which had proven their efficacy at different stages in the conflict cycle. Second, it played up its budgetary powers, insisting on its control of the finances of civilian ESDP missions. Third, it began to take measures aimed at strengthening its existing acquis in the peacebuilding field by enhancing the speed at which it could implement measures such as mine clearance, humanitarian aid or demobilization, disarmament and reintegration. These ‘competitive’ efforts, in turn, provided a stimulus to the development of the civilian ESDP as the Council tried to establish itself as a credible actor in this field. This point is frequently emphasized by EU officials (cf. Financial Times 2005). Dr Solana assumed his new duties in October 1999. He was re-appointed for a second five-year term in July 2004. In line with the introduction into the EU draft constitution of a provision on an European foreign minister who would also act as vice-president of the Commission, the European External Action Service was conceived as a body which would

Notes 149

17

18

19

20

21 22 23

24

25

26 27

assist the minister in fulfilling his/her responsibilities. Although the scope and form of the service were not defined, the idea that its staff should be drawn from the Council Secretariat, the Commission and national foreign ministries received wide support as it was and, despite the rejection of the constitution in referenda in France and the Netherlands, continues to be considered an important step in improving consistency and coherence in EU external actions. Taking account of the preparatory, including legal, work that needed to be done to formally establish all three bodies – the PSC and the two military organs – the Helsinki Council agreed to set them up on an interim basis beginning in March 2000. The bodies became permanent in 2001. However, the summit agreed to establish a co-ordinating mechanism in the Council Secretariat to run, among other things, a database on pre-identified national crisis management experts and civilian assets that could be deployed under the ESDP. The original Swedish–British proposal for the establishment of Civcom called for giving the committee the competence to advise the Council on Community peacebuilding activities. While the proposal, if it had been accepted, would have enhanced inter-pillar coherence, it would also have led to a further shift in power from the Commission to the Council as it would have empowered the latter to supervise what the former does in this issue-area. The incorporation of WEU functions into the EU created a series of problems related to the differential membership of the two organizations. The lengthy negotiations about the modification of the 1996 NATO–WEU agreement, which pitted the EU against Turkey, an associate member of the WEU, attest to these problems. The unit has significantly less personnel than the EUMS. At the time of writing, the latter had about 130 personnel, and the Police Unit had a staff of only eight (six police officers and two civilians). For instance, the evaluation of EUPOL Proxima in the second half of 2004 or of EUPM in 2005 was carried out in close co-operation by members of the Police Unit and the Policy Unit / Western Balkans Team. Berlin Plus, which draws on the already mentioned 1996 NATO–WEU accord, refers to a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and the EU, which includes, inter alia, the NATO–EU security agreement, assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led peace support and other crisis management operations, and the availability of NATO assets and capabilities for such EU missions. The Berlin Plus agreement entered into force following an exchange of letters between EU security policy supremo Solana and NATO’s civilian boss Scheffer on 17 March 2003. ECAP is based on a disjointed, bottom–up approach to developing joint military capabilities. ECAP project groups, which are made up of representatives of the member states, elaborate concrete projects to fill particular capability gaps through procurement and non-procurement initiatives, say, the development of procedures and doctrines. The discrepancies between, on the one hand, the Helsinki Headline Catalogue, which specified in detail the operational requirements for the implementation of the headline goal and, on the other, actual capabilities were listed in the Helsinki Progress Catalogue 2003. The Headline Goal 2010 was agreed by EU defence ministers in May 2004 and endorsed by the subsequent European Council. Battle groups are rapid reaction forces that are expected to be on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decided to launch a military operation. They are sustainable for initially 30 days and, if re-supplied, extendable to 120 days. In November 2004, the EU member states agreed to create a total of 13 battle groups.

150 Notes 28 The agency is tasked with ‘promoting and proposing new multilateral co-operative projects to meet ESDP capability requirements’ and with ‘working for co-ordination of existing programmes implemented by member states’ (Council of the EU 2004a). 29 The action plan specified, among other things, the need for mechanisms for planning and conducting police operations, including command and control procedures and the elaboration of a model status-of-forces agreement. 30 At the capability commitment conference, 505 monitors were pledged in addition to 391 experts in, inter alia, security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. These experts are available for rapid deployment to upgrade ESDP support capabilities. 31 Thus, as in the military field, the civilian headline goal process is guided by a Capabilities Improvement Action Plan. The fact that the civilian headline goal process is modelled on the military one is criticized by some participants who argue that ‘focusing on numbers is unjustifiable because they cannot be taken with the same degree of certainty as in the military field’. Interview with a senior Civcom delegate, Brussels, 11 November 2005. 32 Induction training for team members will be carried out under the aegis of the EC project on training for civilian aspects of crisis management (Interview with a Civcom delegate, Brussels, 9 November 2005). The training courses will be implemented by the EU Group on Training – an informal network of EU-wide institutions such as the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy and the German Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze.

4 The EUPM in Bosnia 1 There is disagreement about the precise number of casualties of the war. Estimates differ widely, from a low 25,000 to a high 250,000. About 1 million refugees fled the country and about an additional 1.5 million were internally displaced persons. Under the auspices of the United States, a Muslim–Croat alliance was formed in March 1994. 2 For a detailed account of the Dayton negotiations as well as the diplomacy leading up to them, see Holbrooke (1999). 3 Although not mentioned in the DPA, there is also another distinct territorial unit, the separately administered Brˇcko District, which links the two halves of the Republika Srpska. For a detailed account of Brˇcko’s status, see ICG (2003). 4 The Steering Board (SB) members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the EU, the European Commission and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which is represented by Turkey. The EU funds 53 per cent of the budget of the OHR. The OHR is scheduled to be phased out in 2007. 5 On the implications of this fact for the democratization of the country, see the Venice Commission, which concluded that the use of the Bonn powers did ‘not correspond to democratic principles when exercised without due process and the possibility of judicial control’ (2005a: 24). 6 The executive involvement of the OHR in support of criminal law enforcement ended at the end of 2005. 7 As these reforms required a transfer of competencies from entity to state level, and hence a change to the DPA, they were vehemently opposed by the Republika Srpska. A political agreement to go ahead with the reforms was reached in October 2005. 8 Already in its first year of operation, the mission problematized the fragmentation of policing structures in Bosnia as a factor degrading the crime-fighting

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18

19 20 21

capacity of the indigenous police. However, since police restructuring was not in its mandate, the mission was prevented from assuming a leading role in this issue-area. Interview with the head of the EUPM, Kevin Carty, on the local television station RTRS, 10 March 2005. Interviews with EUPM personnel, Sarajevo, 11 February 2005. The mandate gave IFOR the authority to assist in the civilian implementation of the DPA rather than oblige it to do so. This provision was the result of a compromise within the US administration between those who wanted a minimalist IFOR mission and those who preferred a maximalist one, which included civilian peacebuilding tasks (Daalder 2000: 145–7). Additional units came from Hungary, Slovenia and Romania. NATO did not withdraw from Bosnia completely, but rather decided to retain a residual military presence in the country with a view to providing guidance to local military reforms and preparing the country for membership in its partnership for peace programme. As part of these activities, it took the lead in pushing through another major security sector reform: the centralization of defence. By the end of 2005, the entity defence ministries were dissolved and the armed forces, around 12,000 troops compared to the wartime figure of about 400,000, were brought under exclusive state control. For details on the Berlin Plus agreement, see Chapter 3. The composition of the IPU is identical with that of the MSU. As there was a major disagreement among EU member states about the wisdom of attaching a constabulary with executive policing powers to EUFOR while at the same time having the non-executive, civilian EUPM on the ground, a compromise was reached that stipulated a six-monthly review of the IPU’s institutional affiliation. Interestingly enough, the pre-war Yugoslav police was ‘well-educated, welltrained and effective, with a distinct professional identity’ (Hansen 2002: 23–4). During the war, the initially coherent and professional Bosnian police force dissolved and split along ethnic lines. An integral part of this disintegration process was the influx of a large number of badly trained recruits who contributed to the widespread police misconduct (cf. Dziedzic and Bair 2002: 264). The reforms carried out by the IPTF, and later by the EUPM, were complemented by technical assistance and material aid in support of policing changes provided by a series of foreign donors such as the European Commission, OSCE and Council of Europe. Bilateral donors included numerous EU member states and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme of the USA. The latter, the principal bilateral donor in the country, has been active on the ground since 1996, when it provided a police expert to serve as an advisor to the IPTF. Subsequently, it expanded its involvement, focusing its assistance on police information management and the fight against financial crime. Decertification entailed withdrawal of the authorization to exercize police powers. Moreover, as underlined in the standard decertification notification issued by the IPTF, it precluded the concerned officer to take up employment with any law enforcement agency in the country in the future. Also, certification was not a one-off measure. Already certified police officers could be decertified if they repeatedly received ‘non-compliance reports’ (ICG 1999: 119–20). Interview with a member of the EUPM planning team, Sarajevo, 6 September 2005. These and other statistics mentioned in this paragraph, unless if otherwise noted, are quoted in a review of the Bosnian police, which was initiated and funded by the European Commission (ICMPD and TC Consult 2004). Thus, in the Federation 63.4 per cent of all crimes were solved in 2003 while in Berlin the success rate was 52 per cent. The figure for Bosnia is based on data gathered by ICMPD and TC Consult and quoted in the aforementioned study.

152 Notes 22 OSCE, CIO.GAL/11/02, 22 February 2002. 23 Interview with a senior EU Council official, 27 October 2004, Brussels. 24 Interview with a member of the EUPM planning team, Sarajevo, 6 September 2005. 25 At one point in 2002 it seemed that a gap might open up between the withdrawal of the IPTF and the deployment of the EUPM. As the mandate of the IPTF expired in July 2002, its periodic renewal by the Security Council, which until then had been a routine matter, suddenly became uncertain because the USA indicated that it might veto the renewal to express its objection to the position of its partners on the International Criminal Court. To avoid a deployment gap, the EU began contingency planning for an interim mission. In the end, the Security Council did extend the IPTF mandate until the end of December, and the interim mission was never deployed. 26 Interview, Brussels, 16 November 2004. 27 The CONOPS of the EUPM took account of the preparatory OSCE work on a post-IPTF police mission. 28 One of the principal legacies of the IPTF, which the EUPM was committed to uphold, was the (de-)certification of local police officers. However, in 2003, this process was called into question by a large number of legal challenges before local courts against the dismissals of non-certified officers on the ground that they violated due process, e.g. by not being in line with local labour laws. In addition, some officers had never undergone the full certification process. Either they were not reported to the IPTF by their ministry of interior and thus were not subjected to the vetting process or they were provisionally authorized to work by the IPTF but were then overlooked in the final stage of the certification process. Fearing that the law suits might undermine the ongoing police reforms carried out under the aegis of the EUPM, the OHR asked the United Nations to authoritatively state the legality of its earlier decertification decisions. At the end of June 2004, a UN Security Council Presidential Statement on the issue was delivered. It expressed concern at the failure of Bosnia to implement the IPTF’s decertification decisions. The statement called on local ‘authorities to ensure, including through the adoption or amendment of domestic legislation, that all IPTF certification decisions [were] fully and effectively implemented’ (United Nations 2004). However, to the disappointment of the EUPM, the statement did not refer to a possible review mechanism to overcome the flaws of the IPTF process. At the request of Bosnian Prime Minister Terzi´c, the Venice Commission (2005b) issued an opinion on a possible solution to the decertification issue. It stated that ‘it is appropriate that the United Nations carry out a review process’. 29 Interview with a senior civilian EUPM staffer (staffer 1), Sarajevo, 6 September 2005. 30 Interview, Sarajevo, 14 September 2005. See also Jakobsen (2004). 31 In addition, the mission also provided bi-weekly situation reports and weekly personnel reports to the Police Unit. 32 In the discussions about a post-IPTF civilian police mission, the United States (2002) suggested it should have an armed component. Comprised of about 200 officers, the armed police would be used in large-scale crisis situations as a back-up for local police, thus reducing the need for a response by NATO’s SFOR. 33 In the Federation, the EUPM was co-located with each of the 10 cantonal ministries of interior. In the Republika Srpska, it was co-located with the five public security centres and the two public security stations that link the entity ministry of interior to the local police stations. 34 In the first year of operation, the total expenditure of the EUPM charged to the CFSP budget was nearly EUR 20 million. It was subsequently reduced to

Notes 153

35

36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45

46

47 48 49 50 51 52

EUR 17.5 million in 2004 and 17.4 million the year thereafter. The third states contributing to the EUPM were Bulgaria, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Romania, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. The Steering Board did not have any legal competences as it was not based on local laws. It was thus not a formal decision-making body but rather a venue for discussion and consultation. The secretariat of the Steering Board was provided by the EUPM programme development department. Initially, SBS and SIPA projects were outside the purview of the PSB. It was only at the end of 2004 that they, too, were brought under this local ownership structure. The decision to do so was taken at a senior EUPM management conference in Neum held in June 2004. The issues covered by these programmes were those UNMIBH (2001) had earlier recommended for a follow-on police mission. Approved PIPs were sent from the EUPM headquarters to the co-locations, where they were handed over to the local police. Interview with senior EUPM police officer, Sarajevo, 14 September 2005. Interview with senior civilian EUPM staffer (staffer 1), Sarajevo, 6 September 2005. The projects also reflected standards of the Council of Europe and the conditions set by the European Commission in the context of the Stabilization and Association process. Reporting was centralized and rationalized in the wake of the Neum management conference with a view to providing more analytical and structured feedback to Brussels. Interview with Kevin Carty on the local television station RTRS, 10 March 2005. The Anti-Human Trafficking and Sexual Offences units were the cornerstone of another special crime police project, the Fight and Intervention Against Human Trafficking (FIGHT) project. The project oversaw the establishment of FIGHT units and contributed to the creation of a FIGHT manual for local officers investigating relevant cases. The hotline was implemented in co-operation with ICITAP. At the beginning of 2005, it was transferred from its initial location in the EUPM headquarters to SIPA from where it continued to operate after the mandate of the mission expired in 2005. The approach relies on investigative techniques such as the use of undercover agents, interception of electronic communication, technical surveillance, working with informants and so forth to collect the intelligence that provides the basis for the subsequent risk-based policing decisions. This MOC sub-project was closely tied to another crime police project, which contributed to the establishment of a country-wide computer network to handle crime-related intelligence and information. Interview with senior civilian EUPM staffer (staffer 2), Sarajevo, 1 September 2005. The selection of members of the public complaints bureaux is made by the parliamentary assemblies, with the ministry simply appointing the selected individuals. Interview with senior civilian EUPM staffer (staffer 3), Sarajevo, 27 September 2005. In the final year of the EUPM’s mandate, ethnic imbalances remained a reality at lower levels of policing. As part of the project, the EUPM insisted on the adoption by police administrations of austerity financial action plans. The plans reduced expenditures by focusing on issues such as the electricity consumption in police stations, the use

154 Notes

53

54 55

56 57 58 59 60

61 62 63 64 65

66 67

by officers of mobile and landline telephones and the substitution of electrical heating by coal, wood or oil heating. One goal of the project was the harmonization of the take-home pay of police officers across Bosnia. This could not be achieved. However, the planned centralization of the police and the creation of one state-level policing budget is intended to do away with the salary difference across regions and police forces. A related project focused mainly on sporting events and developed guidelines aimed at preventing serious disturbances and at ensuring the safety of spectators. Though not covered by a reform programme, EUPM co-locators were also deployed in the new ministry of security that is responsible for the political oversight and guidance of state-level police agencies. Moreover, the mission supported the capacity-building project targeting the Bosnian Interpol Office. Bosnia is a transit country with around 400 border crossing points. Also, the SBS, just like SIPA, was used by the EUPM to reinforce and consolidate the multi-ethnic composition of Bosnian institutions. Interview with senior civilian EUPM staffer (staffer 3), Sarajevo, 27 September 2005. The agency was then called the State Information and Protection Agency. It had three directors but no staff. Lord Ashdown was succeeded in both his functions by Dr Schwarz-Schilling in January 2006. At the Feira European Council in June 2000, the status of potential candidates for EU membership was conferred on all SAp countries. Three years later at the Thessaloniki summit, which concluded that ‘the future of the Western Balkans is within the EU’, the SAp was enriched with elements drawn from the enlargement process, including the establishment of European Partnerships, the promotion of high-level political dialogue and the possibility of participating in some European Commission programmes. CARDS was set up in 2001. Between 1991 and 2005, Community assistance to Bosnia amounted to about EUR 2.5 billion. Interview, Sarajevo, 5 September 2005. Ibid. Interview with senior civilian EUPM staffer (staffer 2), Sarajevo, 1 September 2005. The EUMM replaced the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), which was established in 1991 to observe ceasefire agreements in the then ongoing wars in Croatia and Bosnia. The budget of the EUMM for 2005 was around EUR 4.2 million. Its overall operational strength in 2005 was about 85 seconded monitors, 9 of whom operated in Bosnia. Interview with a staff member of the EUMM, Sarajevo, 4 March 2005. For instance, the 2004 state budget left the two institutions under-funded by about 50 per cent. In 2005, SBS was understaffed by some 500 and SIPA by about 1000 officers.

5 EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia 1 Macedonia was the only republic to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from its territory. 2 According to the official 1994 census, the ethnic Albanians constitute 23 per cent of the population. They are largely concentrated in north-western Macedonia along the border with Kosovo and Albania. 3 The admission was held up by objections by Greece over Macedonia’s name. Macedonia was granted ‘silent’ observer status in the CSCE in 1993 after a compromise on the name issue. In June 1994 it became a regular observer and

Notes 155

4 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

in the fall of 1995 it was finally admitted as a full member to the institution, which, by then, had been renamed OSCE. From 1993 onwards, the C/OSCE office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities began to develop its own intensive preventive diplomacy in the country. On the conflict between Macedonia and Greece and the ethnic nationalism that lies at its heart, see Danforth (1995). From December 1991 onwards, President Gligorov had repeatedly called on the United Nations to send peacekeepers to his country (Ackermann 2000: 84). The inflow of weapons and former KLA militants was facilitated by the withdrawal of UN troops in February 1999. Despite the Kosovo crisis and the threat of a spillover into Macedonia, the operation was not prolonged by the Security Council because of a veto by the Chinese, who were unhappy about the fact that earlier the Macedonian government had established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Another destabilizing factor was the re-entry in March of Serbian security forces into the Preševo valley on the border with Macedonia from which they had earlier withdrawn under NATO pressure. When the alliance agreed to the re-deployment of Serb troops to the area, the ethnic Albanian fighters from the Preševo-Medvedja-Bujanovac Liberation Army, who had in the meantime established themselves there, moved across the border into Macedonia, where they joined local radicals. At first the NLA was also denounced by the existing Albanian parties. As it gained ground in its armed struggle against the government and increasing support among the ethnic Albanian population, the two principal Albanian parties agreed on a programme of common action with the fighters. The deal, which sought to bring the NLA into the regular political process, was brokered by the American head of the OSCE mission to the country, Robert Frowick. About 200 people were killed in the ethnic fighting. There were over 100,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (Zucconi 2002: 87). In the wake of the Ohrid accord, some renegade NLA fighters formed their own splinter groups such as the Albanian National Army (ANA) and the National Committee for the Liberation of Albanian lands (KKCMTSH), which remained committed to armed struggle against the Slav majority. Also, the government committed itself to ensuring that the re-deployed police teams were multi-ethnic in composition. As to the contested amnesty issue, the government issued an amnesty decree in October 2001, which, however, fell short of the expectations of the ethnic Albanians. In December, President Trajkovski began to pardon the first prisoners. Finally, in March 2002 the parliament adopted a comprehensive amnesty law, which covers a range of criminal conduct, ranging from draft evasion, desertion to terrorist acts. However, the category of war crimes was excluded and remained a contested issue for some time, not least because Ali Ahmeti, the former leader of the NLA who subsequently became the head of the pro-Ohrid Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), was indicted on this charge. The initial phase in the extension of state policing to the former conflict areas was launched by a pilot project, which saw the police enter five carefully selected villages. The main phase of the phased re-deployment of law enforcement personnel began only in mid-December. The EUSR in Macedonia, the OSCE and NATO played a crucial role in determining the precise schedule of the re-entry into particular villages. The police academy had ceased nearly all its activities in the period from 1995 to 2001. The first courses after the ethnic fighting had ended were conducted by ICITAP. The first class of police officers graduated from the new police academy in December 2001. The first OSCE-run training course started in February 2002. The government began to implement the police reform strategy in January 2005.

156 Notes 12 Interview with a civilian Proxima staffer, Sarajevo, 26 September 2005. 13 This was even acknowledged, albeit indirectly, by the political opposition in Skopje. ‘The right of equitable representation for Albanians’, one opposition politician said in a roundtable meeting in December 2003, ‘has been reduced to the police forces level’ (Project on Ethnic Relations 2004: 14). 14 Interview, Sarajevo, 29 November 2005. 15 This assessment was confirmed, albeit indirectly, by Solana (2003) on the occasion of the termination of the military operation Concordia, when he highlighted in an article in a local newspaper that ‘the process towards stabilisation and normalisation [had] reached a point where the country [was] in a position to wish good-bye to foreign troops


Fear and anger no longer prevail[ed].’ 16 Interview with a civilian Proxima staffer, Sarajevo, 26 September 2005. 17 Interview with a civilian Proxima staffer, Sarajevo, 14 July 2005. 18 Interview with a civilian Proxima staffer, Sarajevo, 18 February 2005. 19 Interview with a senior EU Council official, Brussels, 16 November 2004. 20 The Protection Element was discontinued in June 2004. 21 Third states participating in Proxima were Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. 22 In mission parlance, this was the Mission Standard Working Programme. The five priorities, which were outlined in what the mission called the Mission Strategic Document, were basically those listed in the mandate. 23 The decision to reorganize the mission was taken at a strategic management retreat on 10 June 2004. In its wake, the commissioner set up a Task Force Organisational Change with the mandate to develop specific proposal for change. 24 Interview with a civilian Proxima staffer, Sarajevo, 18 February 2005. The quotation refers to the UN police mission in Bosnia. 25 Interview with a civilian Proxima staffer, Sarajevo, 14 July 2005. 26 The production of these handbooks was financed by the French embassy in Skopje. 27 The government adopted a strategy for integrated border management in December 2003. 28 The British REFLEX project provided funding for the purchase of the required IT hardware and software. 29 During the monitoring phase, co-locators had heard complaints that some police stations refused to accept and process written complaints against their officers. Proxima’s work in this area supplemented the activities of ICITAP, which introduced and funded a computerized reporting system in the professional standards units to aid inspectors and enable them to better assess police conduct across police stations. The complementarity of their projects of improvement notwithstanding, in the second half of 2004, the information exchange and co-operation between ICITAP and Proxima temporarily broke down. 30 In view of Macedonia’s progress on the road to EU integration, the European Commission, at least informally, expressed its doubts about the necessity of prolonging the mission as well as about the continuing need to have an EUSR in the country. 31 Interview with a civilian Proxima staffer, Sarajevo, 18 February 2005. Part of the problem was that existing procedures prevented the incoming head of mission from playing an active role in the preparations. 32 Six field offices were established to cover the central and eastern parts of Macedonia. 33 The transition process was hampered by the replacement of most of the international staff at the end of the mandate of Proxima I. This negatively affected the programme development of the follow-on mission and its interaction with the

Notes 157 local police. The strength of the mission was gradually reduced from 180 at the end of Proxima I to 140 at the end of 2005. 34 Formally, this was the only programme that had three projects. The confidencerelated activities grouped under this programme were given the status of a special project. 35 The EUMM’s tasks in Macedonia, where it has 13 monitors deployed in Skopje, Kumanovo, Struga and Tetovo, are the same as in Bosnia. 36 Interview with a civilian Proxima staffer, 18 February 2005. 6 Power/knowledge in ESDP police aid 1 By singling out the importance of the figure of truth in professionalization, we only wish to highlight that the technology employs ‘truth’ strategically in a particular manner. In general, each regime of practices and the technical means used to sustain it are enfolded in knowledge and, in turn, produce effects of veridiction. See Foucault (1991c; more generally, 1980). 2 In the case of the EUPM, the mandate included a reference to inspection, a term which has since then not been employed in the tasking of any other EU police mission. 3 Interview with an EUPM co-locator, Sarajevo, 22 February 2005. 4 We want to emphasize that pastoral relations are not purely instrumental. Thus, while the control element is pronounced in the relationship between a shepherd and her or his flock, it also entails a caring and sympathetic element. In the case of EU police missions, the development of sympathy is facilitated by the common policing backgrounds of co-locators and supervisees and by the physical ‘intimacy’ of the relationship. 5 At the time of writing, work was underway in the EU Council Secretariat to codify this contingent amalgam and define an authoritative set of best European practices. One can expect that over time this codification will become taken for granted and its origins will be forgotten. 6 Such an approach also informed the evaluation of the Bosnian policy by ICMPD and TC Consult (2004), which was funded by the European Commission. 7 These structural reforms were accompanied by an austerity financial action plan to create immediate savings. 8 The ‘consistency of [these] themes across national and criminal justice system boundaries provides compelling evidence that the problems confronting policing are neither isolated nor simply “events” ’ (Neyroud and Beckley 2001: 13). For a brief discussion of the crisis of policing in the West, see also Wright (2002: 16–20). 9 For a discussion of policing in Northern Ireland, see Weitzer (1995). For a critique of the distinction between a divided society model of policing and a liberal democracy model of policing that underpins his analysis, see Waddington (2003: 84–6). 10 On the notion of the telos of political mentalities, see Dean (1999: 33). 11 It is important to note that by locating the policing style promoted by ESDP missions in the matrix of care and control, we do not suggest that policing practices can be reduced to any one style. For instance, a police force that prioritizes the fight against crime (control) also ensures decent minimum standards of individual security (care). 12 A good illustration of this economic understanding of crime are the annual EU-organized crime reports published by Europol. They circulate a conception of criminal activity that is marked by the abstract logic of rational choice and expressed in the language of commerce and industry. For instance, in the 2003 report we read of ‘criminal goods and services’ and the relocation of

158 Notes the activities of organized crime groups in search of better ‘criminal market opportunities’. Organized crime, which is referred to as a ‘complex industry’ comprising ‘suppliers and sub-contractors’, is said to pursue ‘diversification into multi-crime activities’ and to ‘exploit the absence or delay of political [crimereducing] initiatives’ (Europol 2003). 7 Towards peacebuilding lite: A limited reform agenda for ESDP police missions 1 As we saw in Chapter 4, in the case of the EUPM, the power in co-location was further strengthened by the protectorate-like status of Bosnia. Local police officers who resisted the disciplinary gaze of co-locators could in principle be dismissed by the High Representative, against whose decisions there was no recourse. In the case of the EUPM, therefore, police officers were subjected not just to the panoptic power of their co-locators but, via them, also to the legal power of the OHR. 2 Commissioner Carty’s case for the proposal was based on, among other things, expected improvements in co-ordination and communication among mission experts dealing with different functional aspects of the Bosnian police. 3 Cf. Winfried Nachtwei (2004). As we saw in Chapter 4, certain Bosnian colocations were indeed ‘owned’ by particular member states that treated them as their babies, to use the phrase used by one of the EUPM staffers we interviewed. 4 This is a widespread problem of international donors wishing to support reforms in countries in transition. See Ottaway (2002). 5 We return to this issue further below when we discuss the quality and training of mission staff. 6 This quote from the Norwegian EUPM co-locator Roar Pedersen was taken from a story about him on the EUPM webpage in 2005. The story was removed from the site when the mandate of EUPM I expired. 7 Indeed, the EU could even go further than the OSCE and involve local communities, especially members of ethnic minorities, in police training. This would allow cadets to learn from citizens and their experience with police and crime and citizens to influence what cadets study (cf. Oakley 1994: 101). 8 The fact-finding missions also drew on reports on Bosnian policing prepared for the OSCE by the former IPTF Commissioner Richard Monk. 9 This is not to say that we believe such a policing model is a panacea. For a critical view of its transformational effects in divided societies and countries in transition, see Gordon (2001) and Weitzer (1995). On the problem of implementing community policing in police assistance programmes, see Mobekk (2002). 10 The fact-finding mission underestimated the number of computers that would be required. Thus, after the first tender, an additional tender for 225 computers had to be opened. The EUPM received all the required computers only in February 2004, more than a year after the launch of the operation. 11 However, even in the case of the EUPM, it turned out to be impossible to achieve full deployment of personnel in the first 100 days of the mission. 12 There is a growing recognition in the EU of the need to address this problem. Although the draft Constitutional Treaty, rejected by French and Dutch voters, did not have all the answers, it would have addressed some of the principal problems causing delays in the EU decision-making process. For discussions of the changes proposed in the draft Constitutional Treaty and their implications for ESDP, see Howorth (2004b), Missiroli (2004). 13 Interview, Brussels, 11 November 2005. 14 In both the EUPM and Proxima, a tour of duty for police officers typically lasted one year. Civilian experts (seconded and contracted) often go on longer missions than police officers. Thus, the more international civilians a mission

Notes 159 has, the less frequent are rotation-related disruptions. Incidentally, the first year of EUPM operations revealed the need for a significant amount of civilian experts in ESDP police missions, e.g. as programme and project managers. 15 There is a widespread agreement among researchers that to be effective peacebuilders need to develop a more systematic approach that takes account of the interdependence of the various elements and phases of the construction of liberal peace (Jeong 2002c).

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Index

Action Plan for Civilian Aspect of ESDP (2004) 48 Adler, E. 129 Adorno, T. 144 Agamben, G. 21, 25 Ahtisaari, M. 138, 142 Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) 81 Allied Harmony (Macedonia) 83 Amsterdam Treaty (1997) 38 Anderson, M.B. 50 Anglo-French démarche see St Malo initiative Annan, K. 58 Ashdown, P. 55, 72, 73, 154(n59) Balalovska, K. et al 81 Barnett, M.N. 11; and Duvall, R. 12 Barry, A. et al 21 Bascone, F. 103 Bayley, D.H. 18; and Shearing, C.D. 133 Beck, A. and Chistyakova, Y. 115 Bellamy, A.J. 13 Berlin Plus 44, 149(n23) Bernauer, J. 5, 20 Bertram, E. 11 Bevir, M. 20, 26 Bigo, D. 22 Biscop, S. 146 Blazevska, K. and Mehmeti, K. 80 Blyth, A. 132 Bono, G. 146 Bosnia 4, 8, 35, 52; EUFOR Althea in 56–7; EUPM reforms in 64–72, 153–4(n43–n58); familial/other relations in 72–6, 154(n59–n66);

international governance of 54–6, 150–1(n5–n10); and mandate/deployment of EUPM 60–2, 152–3(n25–n34); NATO troops in 56–7; and office of high representative 54–6; operationalization of mission mandate 62–4, 153(n35–n41); police/policing reforms 57–8, 151(n16–n18); reasons for deployment in 76–8; security transition 56–7, 151(n11–n15); state of policing after seven years 58–60, 151–2(n19–n24); war/peace in 53–4, 150(n1–n4) Boutros-Ghali, B. 146 Brahimi, L. 122, 143 Brahimi report (2000) 48 Brenner, N. 25 Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. 147 Brewer, J. 115 Brogden, M. 19 Brown, K.S. 81 Bull, H. 15 Burchell, G. 26, 30; et al 21 Butler, J. 21, 25, 26, 144 Call, C.T. 18; and Barnett, M.N. 19; and Cook, S.E. 146; and Stanley, W. 18 Callon, M. 92 cameralism 21, 23 Caparini, M. and Marenin, O. 115 CARDS projects 74–5, 85, 100, 102 Carpenter, T.G. 13 Carty, K. 61, 65, 73, 151(n9), 153(n43)

178 Index CFSP see Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Chakrabarty, D. 146 Chandler, D. 13, 14, 50 Checkel, J.T. 127, 129 Chopra, J. and Hohe, T. 131 Civcom see Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom) Civilian Headline Goal 46, 48 civilian peacebuilding, administration 47; autonomous/aegis of UN deployment 49; bare life/ governmental missions 49–50; concepts 46–9; enforcement gap/capacity-building measures 47–8; governmental ambitions 49–51; humanitarian consensus on 50–1; and integrating of resources 48; monitoring missions/generic mission support 48; protection missions 47; and rapid deployment 48–9, 150(n32); rule-of-law missions 47; strengthening of 48; and supposability/imposability of EU’s intrusive will 50, see also peacebuilding civilizing process 3 co-location 104, 105–7, 157(n4); mentoring 105, 106; monitoring 105–6, 157(n2); reform agenda 126–8, 158(n1) Cockell, J.G. 146 Cold War 39–40, 50 Coles, R. 5, 28 Cologne European Council (1999) 41, 148(n11) Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom) 43, 149(n19) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 34, 35, 38, 41, 89 community policing 132–6 Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 34, 80 Congo 4 Connolly, W. 5, 26, 27, 28 CONOPS 6 Contact Group 35 Cooper, R. 137 Cordone, C. 58 Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. 146 Council of Europe 109

Cousens, E.M. 146; and Cater, C.K. 56, 57, 59; and Kumar, C. 146 crime 18, 22, 54, 57, 65–6, 93 Crime Strategy Group 73 Cross, P. and Nassauer, O. 40, 41 Cruikshank, B. 21 CSCE see Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Daalder, I.H. 151 Danforth, L.M. 155 Danicic, M. et al 60 David, C.P. 11 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) 53–4, 57, 150(n2, n3) Dean, M. 21, 24, 25, 26, 30, 110, 157; and Hindess, B. 21 Debiel, T. and Fischer, M. 41 Debrix, F. 13 D’Hooge, B. 88, 90, 97 Deighton, A. 40, 146 Diez, T. 15, 16, 17, 22 Dillon, M. and Reid, J. 22 Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management 43 domination 7, 12, 28, 31 Doyle, M.W. et al 146 DPA see Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) Dreyfus, H.L. and Rabinow, P. 27 Duchêne, F. 14, 15 Duffield, M. 13, 37, 50, 147 Duke, S. 34 Dupont, D. and Pearce, F. 25 Dwan, R. 18, 146, 147 Dziedzic, M.J. 1, 47; and Bair, A. 58, 151 EAR see European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) ECAP see European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) ECJHAT see European Commission Justice and Home Affairs Team (ECJHAT) Economic Community/European Union (EC/EU), bystander role 35; conduct in Yugoslavia/Western Balkans 35–7; and conflict management 37; and future interventions 37; and identity 36; and need for co-operation 37; security role of 36; and territorial defence 37

Index 179 EDA see European Defence Agency (EDA) EFP see European foreign policy (EFP) Eide, E.B. and Holm, T.T. 1 Elias, N. 2 Emsley, C. 19 Escobar, A. 146 ESDP see European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) ethical security 3 EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) 4, 102 EUFOR Althea 56–7, 73, 75–6, 141 EUJUST Lex 4 EUPAT see EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) EUPM II 77 EUPM see European Union Police Mission (EUPM) EUPOL Copps 4 EUPOL Kinshasa 4 EUPOL Proxima 4, 8, 79, 138, 139, 149(n22); Border Police Programme 93–4; co-locators of fight against crime 93; in context of European integration 99–102; Criminal Police Programme 93; and EU fact-finding mission 86–8; Internal Control/Law enforcement Monitoring Programme 96–7; and Macedonian intelligence agency 95; mandate, planning, deployment of 88–9, 156(n20, n21); and police institutional rivalry/duplication 85; problems encountered 91–2; projects of improvement 93–7; reform programme 90–1; Uniformed Police Programme 94–6, 98 EUPOL Proxima II 97–9 European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) 100, 101 European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) 44, 45, 149(n24) European Commission 1, 36, 37, 55, 69, 73, 74, 100, 138; Feasibility Study (Bosnia) 55 European Commission Justice and Home Affairs Team (ECJHAT) 85 European Commission Police Reform Project 96 European Community (EC) 14 European Community/European Union (EC/EU), cosmopolitan obligations

36–7, 147(n3); and Europeanization of security 37–8, 147–8(n4) European Defence Agency (EDA) 45, 150(n28) European Defence Community 34 European External Action Service 42, 148–9(n16) European foreign policy (EFP) 1; normative impulse 2; strategic calculations/instrumental rationality 2 European Gendamerie Force 46 European Police Academy 138 European Political Co-operation (EPC) 34 European Security and Defence College 138 European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 38 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 1–2, 102; Anglo-French initiative 38–40; and Bosnia 76–8; capabilities–expectations gap 44–5; civilian field 43–4, 45–6, 150(n31); and civilian peacebuilding 40–2, 46–51; co-operation with NATO 44, 149(n23); deployment of capabilities 6; development of 33; and diverse pool of specialists 45–6, 150(n30); emancipatory effect of 8–9; ethical aspirations 2, 3; and ethos of care 3; EU-NATO co-operation 44; and European security integration 33–5; and Europeanization of Anglo-French démarche 40–2; evolving institutional machinery/capabilities of 42–6, 148–50(n15–n31); German support for 40–1, 148(n10); and governmental ambitions 49–51; normative impulse 2; peace missions 33, 147(n1); and peace support agenda 35–8; performativity of 6–7; policing 45; and power 5; priority areas 44–5; and rule-of-law missions 45; and satellite centre/institute of security studies 43 European Union (EU) 1, 4; actorness of 36, 147(n2); corporate identity of 36; development of peace support agenda 35–8; and NATO 39–40, 148(n7–n9); as normative power 14–17; as security actor 8

180 Index European Union Military Committee (EUMC) 43 European Union Military Staff (EUMS) 43 European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) 73, 82, 100, 136 European Union Police Mission (EUPM) 4, 8, 55–6, 57, 73–6, 136, 137, 138, 139; Administration Programme 68–9, 153–4(n52, n53); creation of police reform model 62–4, 153(n35–n41); Crime Police Programme 65–6, 153(n42–n47); Criminal Justice Programme 66–7; Education and Training Programme 67; and European integration 72–6, 154(n59–n66); Internal Affairs Programme 67–8; major and organized crime (MOC) 65–6, 153(n47); mandate/deployment of 60–2, 152–3(n27–n34); and professionalization 108–9; Public Order and Security Programme 69–70, 154(n54); SBS/SIPA programmes 70–2, 154(n55–n58); two-pillar structure 64–5 European Union Police Mission in Macedonia see EUPOL Proxima EUSR 73, 74, 100, 141 EU–Western Balkans Summit (2003) 74 Everts, D. 129 Farrell, C. and Morris, J. 110 Feira European Council 45, 136 Ferguson, J. 146 Fetherston, A.B. 13 Fleming, R. 84 Foucault, M. 3, 7, 10, 16, 20–2, 24–31, 103, 105, 108 Fournier, V. 107 Fraser, N. 25 Galtung, J. 11 Garland, D. 25, 26, 121, 133 gaze see also surveillance Gordon, D.R. 31, 110, 158 Göteborg European Summit (2001) 45 Goulding, M. 146 Gourlay, C. 140

governmentality theory 20–5, 31–2, 144–5; and domination 25–6; Foucauldian 20–1; historical context 21; and improvement 21; limitations of 25–7; and peacebuilding 28–9; and political rationality 22–3; and political technologies 23–5; and power 21–2, 26, 147(n15); and reformatory discourse 26–7; shortcomings of literature on 22; and social relations 26 governmentalization 104, 110–12, 143; financial instruments 112; legal instruments 111–12; and reform agenda 129–32 Gregory, F. 18 Griffin, M. 146 Grignon, F. 6

Habermas, J. 26 Hansen, A.S. 18 Headline Goal 2010 44, 45, 149 Helsinki European Council 41–2, 43, 45, 148(n12–n14) Helsinki Headline Goal 44–5 Herbert, S. 133 High Representative see Office of High Representative (OHR) Hill, C. 44 Hindess, B. 30 Hockenos, P. 40 Holbrooke, R. 150 Holdaway, S. 118, 119, 127 Holm, T.T. and Eide, E.B. 18 Howorth, J. 33, 39, 146, 148, 158; and Keeler, J.T.S. 146 Huggins, M.K. 146 Hulsman, J.C. 14 Hyde-Price, A. 15 ICITAP see International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP) Ignatieff, M. 11 Implementation Force/Stabilisation Force (IFOR/SFOR) 56 Integrated Police Unit (IPU) 57, 151(n15) International Crime Victimization Survey of Bosnia 59–60

Index 181 International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP) 18, 72, 85, 94, 95, 108, 156(n29) International Police Task Force (IPTF) 57–63, 108, 151(n17, n18), 152(n28) IPTF see International Police Task Force (IPTF) Iraq 2, 4 Jeong, H.-W.

127, 146, 159

Kádár, A. 115 Kagan, R. 15 Kaldor, M. 37 Keane, R. 6 Keating, T. and Knight, W.A. 146 Klein, J. 58 Knaus, G. 60; and Martin, F. 13, 55 knowledge 113; EU standard of civilized policing 115–17; and framing policing deviance 113–15; telos of ESDP police interventions 118–22, see also power Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 81, 155(n5) Krasno, J. et al 146 Kühne, W. 146 Kumar, K. 146 Kumar, R. 57, 59 Laffan, B. et al 33 Lederach, J.P. 128, 146 Lemke, T. et al 26 Leuprecht, P. 147 liberal international theory 3 liberal peacebuilding 6; construction of 17–20 Linklater, A. 2, 15, 16 Lippert, R. 22 Lisbon Council (2000) 43 Loader, I. and Walker, N. 134 Longmore, C. 132 Maastricht Treaty (1992/3) 34, 35 McConville, M. et al 127 Mace, C. 6 Macedonia 4, 8; devising policing interventions in 90–2, 156(n22, n23); ethnic tensions/insecurity in 80–2, 154–5(n1–n7); EU’s

problematization of policing in 86–8; forms of intervention 93–7, 156(n26–n28); mandate, planning, deployment of EUPOL Proxima in 88–9, 156(n20, n21); Proxima II 97–9, 156–7(n30–n34); restoring peace in 82–3, 155(n8, n9); role of internationals in 82–3, 155–6(n10–n15); security sector reform 84–6 Macedonia’s intelligence agency (UBK) 95, 98–9 Manners, I. 14, 15, 34 Marenin, O. 115, 129 Maull, H. 14 Menon, A. 146 mentality 114, 118, 120, 121, 128, 133 Meredyth, D. 24 Merlingen, M. 22; et al 128; and Ostrauskait˙e, R. 6, 18, 22, 84, 128 Miller, P. 147 Missiroli, A. 146, 158 Nachtwei, W. 126, 158 NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Neild, R. 1, 18 New York consensus 6, 11, 12 Newman, F. and Schnabel, A. 146 Neyroud, P. and Beckley, A. 134, 157 Nicolaïdis, K. and Howse, R. 15, 17 NLA 82, 155(n6, n7) norm 3, 7, 11, 15, 16, 25 normalization 16, 17 normative power Europe, benefits of 16; and civilian peacebuilding 14–17; civilizing influence 16; downside of 16–17; as force for good 15; ideational force 15; and image of EU 15; key elements 14; origins of concept 14; othering process 15–16, 147(n8); and privileging of physical power 14–15; representationalist orientation 17; two-sided process 16 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 34, 35, 43, 100, 136; and Bosnia 56–7, 151(n13); co-operation with ESDP 44, 149(n23); and Macedonia 82, 83; relations with EU 39–40, 148(n7–n9)

182 Index Nuttall, S.J. 34 Nye, J.S. 17 Oakley, R.B. et al 18 Office of High Representative (OHR) 42, 43, 54, 55–6, 73, 111, 148(n15), 150(n4) OHR see Office of High Representative (OHR) Ohrid peace accord (2001) 81–2, 83 O’Malley, P. 21 Ong, A. and Collier, S.J. 22 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 18, 60, 82, 84, 94, 100, 128 OSCE see Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Ottaway, M. 11, 130 Palestine 4 Palmer, L.K. 59 Pappas, S.A. and Vanhoonacker, S. 37 Paris, R. 1, 11, 12, 147 Patten, C. 20, 42 Peace Implementation Council (PIC) 54, 73 peacebuilding 144–5; analyses of shortcomings of 11–12; and care for others 142; civilian 14–17; civilizational agenda 11, 146(n1); colonial similarities 13, 14; as contested concept 11; critical-normative research 12–14; and cult of policy relevance 12; definition 1; dichotomous elements/tendencies 3; dilemma of 29–32; double-sided nature 142; enabling effects of 9; and free persons 31; governmental ambitions of EU 49–51; and governmental technologies 143; and governmentality 28–9; and humanist values 12–13; laissez-faire approach 31; liberal 30; literature on 5–7, 11, 146(n4); as mechanism of power 3; normalizing mode 3; origins 10–11; pastorate in 31–2; and paternal/dominant patterns 3; and political limits 3; and positive peace 11, 146(n2); power in 142–3; rationality in 29–31; and securing of negative peace 11; as shared destiny 5; and totalizing

interventions 13, see also civilian peacebuilding, administration Perry, R.W. and Maurer, B. 22 Petersberg tasks 38, 41 Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. 34 PIC see Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Police Action Plan 45 police missions 8; analysis of 7; and bilateral aid/Civpol missions 18; co-location, professionalization, governmentalization 104; and construction of liberal peace 17–20; de-politicization of 111–12; definition 19; domestic missionary image 19; during the Cold War 146(n1); executive powers 18, 147(n10); internal/external factors 24; international consensus on 3–4; Janus-faced nature of 20; and local resistance 4–5; major missions 4; operational challenges 9; origins of 17–18; and OSCE 18; as outside mainstream projects 18; particularizing nature of projects 147(n13); and power 4, 8; as principal component of ESDP 4; reform agenda for 5; and relations of dominance 4; repression–protection continuum 20, 147(n13); and the UN 18, 147(n8); training/recruitment of personnel 46; and transition from violence 18–19; and use of calculative techniques/legal norms 24, see also Bosnia police reform, and care-control matrix 118–19, 157(n11); and civilized European policing 115–17, 157(n8, n9); and criminal knowledge 120–1, 157–8(n12); and deviance/otherness of policing 113–15; and environment 114–15; and legacies of authoritarian regimes 114; and low-skilled/morally negligent officer 113–14; and organizational structure/management culture 114; and policing styles 118; and policy/priorities 114; and presumption of crime 120; and professionalism 119–20; and sovereign law-enforcement 121; and state-centrism 120; telos of interventions 118–22, 157(n10)

Index 183 Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) 55, 56 Police Unit 43, 44, 56, 77, 93, 137 Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy Unit) 42, 43–4, 137, 149(n21, n22) Political and Security Committee (PSC) 42–3, 46 political rationality 22–3, 113 political technologies 23–5; of agency 24; of performance 24 politics, Foucauldian 28 power 7, 10, 103–4, 142–3; autocratic exercize of 13; diffuse 21; and discipline 104–12; double-sided 8; Foucauldian 27–8; governmentality/sovereignty distinction 21–2; and governmentalization 110–12; in international peacebuilding 10–14; and knowledge 22; minimization of 13; normative 14–17; pastoral 30, 31; physical 14–15; and professionalization 107–10; rationalities of 22–3; and vision 105–7, see also knowledge Power, M. 24 PRC see Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) problematization 86–8, 118–22 professionalization 104, 107–10; and police reform agenda 128–9; and truth 104, 157(n1) Proxima see EUPOL Proxima PSC see Political and Security Committee (PSC) Pugh, M. 13, 131; and Cooper, N. 13, 146 Pupavac, V. 14 Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) 41, 85; battle-groups 44, 149(n27) rationality, political 22–3 realist international theory 2–3 reform agenda 143–4; background 123–5; business ethos 130–1; and collegial relationships 126; cross-cutting operational issues 136–41; democratic post-conflict policing 132–6; and intra-EU co-ordination 139–41; lightening panoptic gaze 125–8, 158(n1–n5); and local ownership 131–2; local/international relationships

127–8, 131, 143–4; and mentoring 126; and paternalism 126–7; and personnel 138–9; planning 137; prescription/mutual learning 128–9, 158(n6, n7); and professionalization 128–9; and reconfiguring governmentalization 129–32, 158(n8); and respect for local integrity 130; and speed 136–8; standardized programme development 137–8; sustainability of 126–8 Regelsberger, E. et al 34 Reiner, R. 117 Reychler, L. 146 Richmond, O.P. 13 Rieff, D. 49 Rose, N. 21, 132; and Miller, P. 23 Rosecrance, R. 16 RRF see Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) SAA see Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) St Malo initiative 38–41, 42, 148(n5, n6) Sangiovanni, M. 146 SBS see State Border Service (SBS) Schmidl, E.A. 147 Scholz, J. 90, 94, 96 Schoolman, M. 28 Schuman, R. 136 Scott, D. 3, 31, 146, 147 SFOR 75 Shelley, L.I. 115 Shepherd, A.J.K. 41, 146 Sheptycki, J.W.E. 19, 116 Simon, J. 7, 26, 28 SIPA 70–2, 73 Sjursen, H. 15 Smith, M. 25, 146 Smith, K. 15, 34 Solana, J. 42, 48, 60, 62, 136, 148(n15) Sörensen, S. 13 Spillover Monitoring Mission 84 Spivak, G. 9 SPMU see Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 55, 74, 100 Stanley, W. 18, 132 State Border Service (SBS) 54, 70–2, 73, 154(n56)

184 Index State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) 54 Stedman, S.J. et al 146 Stenson, K. 6, 26, 32, 132; and Edwards, A. 132; and Watt, P. 23 Stephens, M. and Becker, S. 118 Stodiek, T. 18 Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) 18, 133–4 surveillance 30, 93, 105, 107, 109, 121, 125 subjectification 30, 144 subjection 16, 107, 108 subjectivity 24, 49, 104, 106 Taussig, M. 146 Thayer, C.A. 146 Thiele, L.P. 28 Thomas, D.C. 147 Treacher, A. 35 Treaty on European Union (1993) 53 Trojanowicz, R. and Bucqueroux, B. 132 truth 22, 104, 106 Tziampiris, A. 81 UN Civilian Police (Civpol) Mission, Haiti 18 UN Police Support Group, Eastern Slavonia 18 United Nations (UN) 2, 3, 156–7(n30–n34); and police aid 18, 147(n8) United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) 57–9

UNMIBH see United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) Uvin, P. 50 Valverde, M. 21, 24, 30; and Mopas, M. 147 Waddington, P.A.J. 19, 20, 116, 120, 157 Walker, N. 119 Walters, W. and Haahr, J.H. 22 Walzer, M. 27 Webber, M. et al 33 Weitzer, R. 115, 157, 158 Wessel, R.A. 38 Western Balkans see Bosnia; Macedonia; Yugoslavia Western European Union (WEU) 35, 43, 149(n20) Westphalian/post-Westphalian system 1, 11 WEU see Western European Union (WEU) White, B. 35 White, S. 27 Whitman, R. 35 Wright, A. 157 Youngs, R. 2, 15 Yugoslavia 35–7, see also Bosnia; Macedonia Yusufi, I. 87 Zielonka, J.

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