Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 2)

C O L L E C T E D WORKS OF B E R N A R D

LONERGAN VERBUM: WORD AND IDEA IN AQUINAS edited by

Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran

Published for Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto by University of Toronto Press Toronto Buffalo London

COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN

VOLUME 2 VERBUM:

WORD AND IDEA INhgiAQUINAS

www.utppublishing.com Bernard Lonergan Estate 1997 Printed in Canada ISBN 0-8020-4144-2 (cloth) ISBN 0-8020-7988-1 (paper) Reprinted 2005

Printed on acid-free paper Requests for permission to quote from the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan should be addressed to University of Toronto Press.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Lonergan, BernardJ.F. (BernardJoseph Francis), 1904-1984 Collected works of Bernard Lonergan Vol. 4, 2nd ed., rev. and aug. First ed. (1967) published separately. Vol. 5, 2nd ed., rev. and aug. First ed. (1980). Vol. 3, 5th ed., rev. and aug. First ed. (1957). Vol. 10. Revising and augmenting the unpublished text. Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: v. 2. Verbum : word and idea in Aquinas. ISBN 0-8020-4144-2 (v. 2 : bound) ISBN 08020-7988-1 (v. 2 : pbk.) I. Theology-2Oth century. 2. Catholic Church. I. Crowe, Frederick E., 1915II. Doran, Robert M., 1939- . III. Lonergan Research Institute. FV. Title. 6x891.L595 1988 230 088-093328-3 rev. The Lonergan Research Institute gratefully acknowledges the generous contribution of the MALLINER CHARITABLE FOUNDATION, which has made possible the production of this entire series. The Lonergan Research Institute gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance of the JESUITS OF LOYOLA, MONTREAL, provided by the Loyola Jesuits Special Fund, toward the publication of this volume of the Collected Works. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its publishing activities of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP).

Contents

Editors' Preface, FREDERICK E. CROWE / vii Introduction: Subject and Soul / 3 1

Verbum: Definition and Understanding / 12 1 The General Notion of an Inner Word / 13 2 Definition / 24 3 Quod Quid Est / 29 4 Insight into Phantasm / 38 5 Emanatio Intelligibilis / 46 6 Conclusion / 59

2

Verbum: Reflection and Judgment / 60 1 Composition or Division / 61 2 Judgment / 71 3 Wisdom / 78 4 Self-knowledge of Soul / 87 5 The Unity of Wisdom / 99 6 Conclusion / 104

3

Procession and Related Notions / 106 1 Procession / 107 2 Actus Perfecti / no 3 Pali / 116

vi

Contents

4 5 6 7 8 9

Potentia Activa / 121 Duplex Actio / 128 Species, Intelligere / 133 Object/ 138 Nature and Efficiency / 143 Conclusions / 148

4

Verbum and Abstraction / 152 1 The Analogy of Matter / 154 2 The Immateriality of Knowing / 158 3 Formative Abstraction / 162 4 Apprehensive Abstraction / 168 5 Sense and Understanding / 179 6 Conclusion / 186

5

Imago Dei / 191 1 Ipsum Intelligere / 192 2 The Necessity of Verbum / 199 3 £b Magis Unum / 204 4 Amor Procedens / 209 5 Via Doctrinae / 213 6 Epilogue / 222 Appendix / 229 Editorial Notes, FREDERICK E. CROWE / 253 Works of Lonergan Referred to in Editors' Preface and Notes / 263 Bibliography of the Works of St Thomas Aquinas / 267 Index of Concepts and Names, FREDERICK E. CROWE / 269 Index of Loci, ROBERT M. DORAN and JOHN DOOL / 291 Lexicon of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases, FREDERICK E. CROWE / 305

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Editors' Preface

The posthumous discovery in Bernard Lonergan's papers of his student writings of the 1930s1 has led us to revise considerably our view of the course of his life and career, and in particular of the place in it of the work presented here in a new edition. For some time the assumption prevailed that he had begun his academic life as a Thomist, with the five verbum articles marking the completion of this phase, and from that basis had gone on to incorporate into his thinking developments of the seven centuries that followed Thomas. But we know now that his interests in the 19305 were economic, political, sociological, cultural, historical, religious, rather than gnoseological and metaphysical. The latter aspects always figured largely in his thought - and in 1927 he had expressed an initial interest, which he never lost, in cognitional theory2 - but their context was found in thinkers like Hegel and Marx and Spengler, and somewhat later Toynbee, rather than in Aristotle and Thomas. The restoration of all things in Christ (Ephesians 1.10) was closer to a motto for him than 'thoroughly understand what it is to understand.' The human good proved to be more of a 1 A manila folder, which Lonergan numbered 713 in the organization of his papers and labeled simply 'History.' It contains unpublished student writings from 1935 on; we follow the custom of referring to it as File 713. 2 A letter Lonergan wrote to his Jesuit friend, Henry Smeaton, dated 20 June (1927). See also Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, Cathleen Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982) 45, 49, 51. (All letters referred to in these notes are to be found in the Lonergan Archives. Letters identified only by their date are from Lonergan to F. Crowe.)

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magnet than was cognitional theory. It was in the social order that the restoration would take place and the human good be realized, so there was a crying need for a summa sociological All this emerges from examination of his student writings. In the hindsight they provide, we are able to discover this early interest running like a thread through the period from the 1930s to the igSos, appearing in previously unnoticed ways in his writings and lectures. The need for a summa sociologica translates nearly forty years later into general statements like the following: 'There is the love that is loyalty to one's fellows: it reaches out through kinsmen, friends, acquaintances, through all the bonds - cultural, social, civil, economic, technological - of human cooperation, to unite ever more members of the human race in the acceptance of a common lot, in sharing a burden to be borne by all, in building a common future for themselves and future generations.'4 It translates in a much more specific way into - what may otherwise appear as a mere foible - his return to economics in the last years of his life.5 For this is found to form a close unity with his beginnings; the need remained what he had seen it to be fifty years earlier, the dialectic of history working itself out in the life of everyone but especially in the technological, economic, social, cultural, and religious spheres of human endeavor. Having said all this to put the present work in the perspective of Lonergan's life history I must complement it with an insistence on the foundational character of this verbum study. There are those who would rate it as the fundamental breakthrough in the history of his thought. Certainly, it holds a key position in sequence with the two masterpieces that followed it. If it is true that for a thorough understanding of Method in Theology^ we

3 'Panton Anakephalaiosis,' a paper in File 713 dated 28 April 1935, published in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9:2 (October 1991) 139-72, at 156. 4 'Variations in Fundamental Theology,' a lecture of 1973 at Trinity College, Toronto, p. 10 of the autograph; see also p. 11 on 'the programs of economic, social, and ecological reformers.' (The lecture was repeated with some revisions at New Haven in 1974.) 5 This was his preoccupation from 1975 to 1983, while he was Visiting Distinguished Professor at Boston College; his courses there will be published as volume 15 of the Collected Works. We speak of a 'return' because his interest goes back to the 19305, and in 1944 he produced a manuscript 'Essay in Circulation Analysis,' which figured largely in his Boston College courses. 6 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Barton, Longman & Todd, and New York: Herder and Herder, 1972; 2nd ed., 1973; reprint of 2nd ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990, 1994, 1996).

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must go back to Insight: A Study of Human Understanding,1 it is also true that our understanding of Insight is greatly deepened by a grasp of the work on verbum; to see that, we have only to realize that the simple phrase 'insight and formulation,' 8 which is so central to Insight, encapsulates in three words the main point of the two hundred pages of verbum. i

Developing Acquaintance with Thomas Aquinas

So how did Lonergan get to the verbum study? To broaden the question, what led him from the general background of his early interests to invest eleven of the best years of his life (1938-49) in 'apprenticeship' 9 to Thomas Aquinas? The cause, it seems, was simply a happy accident. In the summer of 1938 he had finished the regular course of Jesuit formation and was awaiting the new academic year in order to proceed to Rome and begin, as mandated by his religious superiors, doctorate studies in philosophy. We do not know whether he had a specific topic in mind for a dissertation. We do know that his particular interest at this time was the philosophy of history, and though he did not hope to focus on that area immediately,10 it seems likely that he would look for something in the circle of his interests at the time. Unexpectedly, however, and for reasons that had to do with the needs of the Gregorian University, where he was slated to teach on completion of his doctorate, he was switched from philosophy to theology." In consequence he arrived in Rome somewhat at a loss for a dissertation topic, and so readily accepted a suggestion of Professor Charles Boyer that he study a knotty question of divine grace in the writings of St Thomas.12 It was by this happy accident that Thomas came to dominate his 7 Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (London: Longmans, Green & Co., and New York: Philosophical Library, 1957; 2nd ed., 1958; 5th ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992). 8 Insight 298-302. Our references are to the 1992 edition. 9 I borrow the term from William Mathews, his biographer, who, however, applies it more widely: 'Lonergan's Apprenticeship 1904-46 ...,' Lonergan Workshop^ (1993) 43-8710 Letter to Henry Keane, his Provincial Superior, written from Milltown Park, Ireland, 10 August 1938: 'As philosophy of history is as yet not recognised as the essential branch of philosophy that it is, I hardly expect to have it assigned me as my subject during the biennium [of doctoral studies].' 11 Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection 266 (in 'Insight Revisited'). 12 Notes made by Lonergan in preparation for the defense of his dissertation, Lonergan Archives, Batch I-A, Folder 16.

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thinking for several years, while he finished his dissertation (1938-40),13 rewrote it for publication (1941-42),14 began that research into the Thomist intelligere which I will presently describe, and so came to write the verbum articles that became the present volume. What was Lonergan's acquaintance with Thomas in the fall of 1938? It does not seem to have been very extensive or profound. The philosophy taught at Heythrop College, England (1926-29), was not Thomist.15 His regency (1930-33), a period of teaching between philosophy and theology that was part of Jesuit training, was not a time of study. And when he was free to return to study in the summer of 1933, it was Augustine he worked on.16 At that point he did finally turn to Thomas and found him better than he had been led to believe,17 but there is no evidence of the fascination Thomas held for him after his doctoral work. But after two months of theology in Montreal at the College of the Immaculate Conception (where he was later to begin his career as professor of theology), his religious superiors transferred him to Rome to continue his basic theology (1933-37), and go on to a doctorate in philosophy at the Gregorian University.18 New influences now came into play. There was, to begin with, an article by Peter Hoenen (it is just possible that Lonergan had already read this before leaving Montreal): In !933 I had been much struck by an article of Peter Hoenen's in Gregorianum arguing that intellect abstracted from phantasm not only 13 He had finished his dissertation in 1940 and was waiting in Rome to defend it when the war took a sudden turn and his superiors at one day's notice ordered him back to Canada. In the turmoil of the times he did not defend the thesis until 1943, when the Gregorian University authorized the College of the Immaculate Conception in Montreal to hear his defense. The doctorate itself was not granted until 1946, when he was able to submit the required copies of his dissertation to the Gregorian. 14 Bernard Lonergan, 'St. Thomas' Thought on Gratia Operans,' Theological Studies 2 (1941) 289-324; 3 (1942) 69-88, 375-402, 533-78. Published in book form as Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. J. Patout Burns (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, and New York: Herder and Herder, 1971). 15 'Insight Revisited' 263. 16 Letter to Henry Keane, January 1935, p. 3. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.: 'At this juncture FT Hingston [then Provincial Superior] paid a flying visit to the Immaculate where I had begun my theology. I was to go to Rome. I was to do a biennium in philosophy.'

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terms but also the nexus between them. He held that that certainly was the view of Cajetan and probably of Aquinas ... So about 1943 I began collecting materials for an account of Aquinas' views on understanding and the inner word. The result was a series of articles that appeared in Theological Studies from 1946 to 1949.19 Other Roman influences are expressly acknowledged. I was sent to Rome for theology, and there I was subject to two important influences. One was from an Athenian, Stefanos Stefanu, who had entered the Jesuit Sicilian province and had been sent to Louvain to study philosophy at a time when Marechal taught psychology to the Jesuit students and the other professors at the scholasticate taught Marechal ... It was through Stefanu ... that I learnt to speak of human knowledge as not intuitive but discursive ... This view was confirmed by my familiarity with Augustine's key notion, veritas, and the whole was rounded out by Bernard Leeming's course on the Incarnate Word, which convinced me that there could not be a hypostatic union without a real distinction between essence and existence. This, of course, was all the more acceptable, since Aquinas' esse corresponded to Augustine's veritas and both harmonized with Marechal's view of judgment.20 There are some hints of Thomist influence in Lonergan's unpublished writings of the time. His letter to Henry Keane (Provincial Religious Superior) speaks confldendy of the errors of the Thomists and of his ability to prove them wrong out of Thomas himself.21 Three months later, in the carefully dated student writing Panton Anakephalaiosis ..., he uses a text

19 'Insight Revisited' 266-67. Note his criticism of Hoenen as using Scotist language: 'Hoenen's point that intellect abstracted both terms and nexus from phantasm was regarded as Scotist language, both terms and nexus belong to the conceptual order; what Aristotle and Aquinas held was that intellect abstracted from phantasm a preconceptual form or species of quod quid erat esse, whence both terms and nexus were inwardly spoken.' Ibid. 267. The Manning interview (see note 28 below) says: '... then about 1944 I started ... working on Thomas on verbum,' but the date 1943 occurs in a carefully written account rather than an interview. 20 'Insight Revisited' 265. 21 Letter to Keane (1935) 4.

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from Thomas as a motto; but, significantly, the text is not on cognitional theory but on the development of the human mind.*2 It does not appear, then, that up to 1938 Lonergan's acquaintance with Thomas was at all thorough or that he had yet developed his high regard for Thomas. All that changed with his doctoral studies, at the end of which he could write the moving paragraphs which conclude his articles on gratia operans^ then go on to pronounce a similar eulogy at the end of the verbum articles,24 and to speak in Insight of his 'years reaching up to the mind of Aquinas.' 25 With that we come to his study of Thomist cognitional theory and the actual preparation of the present work, which appeared first as a series of articles under the title 'The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,' 2h before being published in book form under the title VERBUM: Word and Idea in Aquinas.*7 2

The Genesis of Lonergan's Thought on Thomist Understanding

According to the title of the articles (neatly broadened in that of the book) the topic is verbum, the word, but one soon learns that the focus is really on the origin of the word or verbum in understanding or intelligere. There is a history to Lonergan's discovery of understanding, and it follows a curious course (curious, as running counter to our expectations), from Plato through Augustine to Aquinas and Aristotle. It begins with his reaction, during his philosophy studies at Heythrop College (1926-29), against the dominance of universal concepts: 'In philosophy I had no use whatsoever for all this talk about universals. A razor blade cuts anybody's beard, it is a universal.'2X The 'insight into phantasm' 22 Panton 139; the text on intellectual development quoted as a motto is Summa theologiae 1, q. 85, a. 3 c. 23 Grace and Freedom 139-45. 24 Theological Studies 10 (1949) 388-93; in the present book 222-27. 25 Insight 769. 26 Theological Studies 7 (1946) 349-92; 8 (1947) 35~79, 4°4~44; 1O U949) 3~4O, 359-9327 See below, note 55. 28 Interview with Paul Manning, 30 August 1978, p. 4 (transcript in Lonergan Archives). Several scattered statements help us trace Lonergan's reaction against universals, his discovery of intelligere in Augustine and Thomas, and his turn to work on the verbum.

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that would force universals to the sidelines was already implicit in a student essay of 1928,29 but it remained unthematized at the time. Newman was, of course, a strong positive influence, but in the area of real assent and judgment (Lonergan's reflective understanding and its word) rather than in that of direct understanding. 3 " It is ironic, or at any rate curious, given his opposition to Platonic knowing as confrontation, that it is through Plato, rather than through Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, that he makes the specific discovery of understanding. Thus, he says of his conversion from nominalism: 'I believed in intelligence and I found concepts were overrated. When I found in Stewart's Plato's Doctrine of Ideas that an idea, for Plato, was like Descartes' equation for the circle, I was home. You get to the equation of the circle just by understanding.' S1 His dissertation took him from Augustine to Thomas in the history we

There was remote preparation when Lonergan was a pupil at Loyola College, 1918-22: 'I acquired great respect for intelligence' (Caring 142; on Caring see note 2 above). In 'Insight Revisited' we find: 'Augustine was so concerned with understanding, so unmindful of universal concepts, that I began a long period of trying to write an intelligible account of my convictions' (A Second Collection 265)In Caring: 'I did my dissertation on Aquinas ... Then I recalled that Augustine talked a lot about intelligere and that Thomas didn't talk much about universals — though knowledge of universals was supposed to be the be-all and end-all of science' (51). Ibid.: 'I was teaching the Sacrament of marriage ... and I wrote the article for Theological Studies ['Finality, Love, Marriage,' 1943] - After that I got interested in verbvim in Aquinas and worked at that for five years' (264). The materials Lonergan collected for the work are probably extant still in his card indices, not yet studied, in the Lonergan Archives. 29 'The Form of Mathematical Inference,' Blandyke Papers (student journal, handwritten, Heythrop College), no. 283 (January 1928) 126-37. 30 Lonergan's relation to Newman is a topic passim in the interviews published as Caring about Meaning: general influence in cognitional theory, 13-15; especially in regard to judgment, 45-46, 107; bvit Lonergan had his own input, ill; help from Newman in more personal way, 257. See also the references to Newman in the present volume, and our editorial notes to the Introduction and to chapter 2. 31 Caring 44. The book referred to is J.A. Stewart, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1909). See also 'Insight Revisited' 264; Lonergan's interview with students and professors of McMaster University, 6 February 1973, p. 14; the Manning interview, 4: 'I found that Augustine never talked about universals, he is always talking about intelligere.'

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are tracking. As he reports in Caring: 'From Stewart I went to Plato and read a number of Platonic Dialogues, and then when I went to the Immaculate [College of the Immaculate Conception] to study theology I started reading Augustine there - the dialogues of Cassiciacum, the early dialogues. He was talking about intelligere all the time, you see. Later, after I had finished my dissertation on gratia operans I remembered that Thomas too talks a lot about intelligere and he hasn't much to say about universals! So I went to work on that.'32 The last and perhaps most important event in Lonergan's developing view on understanding is almost lost to history: his discovery in Aristotle of insight into phantasm. The repercussions of this discovery are many. A text from Aristotle on this act of insight will adorn the frontispiece of Insight: 'forms are grasped by mind in images,'33 or, 'the faculty of understanding grasps the forms in images,'34 to use two translations of Lonergan himself. Further, he will refer over and over to this great discovery made by Aristotle.35 But we have only meager data on Lonergan's own discovery of Aristotle's discovery, and what little we have reveals the curious fact that not only was Aristotle the last in the chain of discoveries that ran for Lonergan from Plato through Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, but the event itself is treated in the most casual manner: 'And I discovered, perhaps not then [that is, when he was reading Augustine], it was later on when I was doing the Verbum articles, you get the same thing in Aristotle.36 '... you get the same thing in Aristotle': this lone reference, oblique enough at that, records what we would suppose to have been a rather thrilling event in his intellectual history. At any rate some time during his 'apprenticeship' his early interest in 32 Caring 22. 33 Insight frontispiece: 'ta men oun eide to noetikon en tois phantasmasi noei'; Aristotle, De anima, III, 7, 43ib 2. '... forms are grasped by mind in images,' Insight (1992) 699-700. 34 Bernard Lonergan, Collection (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 138 (in 'Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought'). 35 Ibid.; see also 135. Ten times at least there is a similar reference in Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on INSIGHT (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); see p. 18: 'I believe that the fact of insight is explicitly and with complete universality acknowledged by Aristotle and determinative in Aristotle's thought'; ibid., 30: 'Aristotle's "matter and form" distinctionis tied right in with insight'; ibid., 31: 'Kant, Aristotle, and St Thomas all knew about insight'; and see pp. 48-52, 119, 199 n.24, 213, 238, 268, 290. 36 Manning interview, 24.

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cognitional theory revived. So he noticed now and later began to collect data in Thomas on intelligere and verbum to add to what he had found in Augustine, and so set out on the way to the verbum articles.37 The meaning these two masters gave to the term intelligere was quite remote from that of the universal concepts which so dominated Scholastic thinking. Thomism, of course, as study of the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, had had a checkered history. Somewhat in decline in the nineteenth century, it had received new stimulus from the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1879, and it was flourishing strongly in Lonergan's youth. The new Thomism, however, differed from that of the great commentators of previous centuries. The advent of the historical approach in other fields of thought had deeply affected the study of Thomas too, and Lonergan was able to enter wholeheartedly into this new mentality. The first paragraph of his doctoral dissertation in its published form (Grace and Freedom), with its references to the historical studies of Schupp, Doms, Landgraf, and Lottin, provides the clearest possible evidence of what his own approach will be. Nevertheless, Thomism remained a doctrine, prescribed by the Roman Catholic Church to be taught in its seminaries, and here Lonergan found himself completely at odds with what was currently being taught in regard to cognitional theory. He labeled the latter conceptualism, a line of thought characterized by its concern with concepts, with the joining of concepts in propositions, and with the linking of propositions in syllogisms to give a logical system. What was lacking in this was the fertile source of it all: understanding, or insight into phantasm. And this lack was to be met with a new interpretation of Thomas deriving from his discovery of the real meaning of the Thomist intelligere. Lonergan records some of the Thomist elements that entered into his Insight: 'the distinctions between the understanding and the concept, and the reflective understanding and the judgement, and then between the question of value and the judgement of value ,..'38 There is also a general statement of his debt: 'Now it is true that I spent a great deal of time in the study of St. Thomas and that I know I owe a great deal to him.'39 But 37 "Insight Revisited' 267: 'So about 1943 I began collecting materials for an account of Aquinas' views on understanding and the inner word. The result was a series of articles that appeared in Theological Studies from 1946 to 1949.' 38 Caring 21. 39 A Second Collection 38 (in Theories of Inquiry: Responses to a Symposium' 33-42, the 1967 convention of the American Catholic Philosophical Association).

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beyond elements and general statements, there are specific consequences of fundamental significance. One of these is the resulting epistemology, quite different from one that supposes an intuition of being.40 But there were unexpected fruits of his apprenticeship in other areas, as he realized later; speaking of his eleven years of research on Thomas, he wrote late in life: 'it is from the mind set of research that one most easily learns what Method is about: surmounting differences in historicity.'4 ' This fits into the wide context of his views on Thomas, when he refers to what Thomas did to meet the challenge of his time, and the bearing his achievement might have on the tasks of our time.42 3

The Articles in Theological Studies

The actual writing of the articles was rather long drawn out. In his course De methodo theologiae at the Gregorian University, Rome, 1963-64, when he wished to illustrate how rapidly work moves forward once one grasps the idea, Lonergan remarked that it took him a year to write the first verbum article, even after the data had been collected, and only two weeks to write the second.4H So from about 1943 (or perhaps 1944) he collected and tried to organize his material, and spent most of 1945 getting the first article the way he wanted it. One clue to the reason for the delay is found at the end of the first article: 'I have begun, not from the metaphysical framework, but from the psychological content of Thomist theory of intellect: logic might favor the opposite procedure but, after attempting it in a variety of ways, I found it 40 Understanding and Being 19: 'if you frankly acknowledge that intellect is intelligence, you discover that you have terrific problems in epistemology'; see 2OO, 216, 277, 293-94, 350-52, 359, and editorial note c to Discussion 2, p. 425. 41 Letter of 3 March 1980. This remark is to be taken very seriously; a context may be found in a student of culture who considerably influenced Lonergan, Christopher Dawson; see, for example, the latter's statement in his The Crisis of Western Education (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961) 113: 'Until a man acquires some knowledge of another culture, he cannot be said to be educated, since his whole outlook is so conditioned by his own social environment that he does not realize its limitations' - a view found passim in Dawson. 42 A Second Collection 44 (in 'The Future of Thomism,' a lecture of 1968); also A Third Collection (New York: Paulist Press, 1985) 51-53 (in 'Aquinas Today ...'). 43 Recorded in notes taken by Thomas Daly, p. 41; after all his material was collected, and indices made, Lonergan still struggled with the question, Where is one to begin?

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unmanageable.'44 The fact is, as it turned out, Lonergan was struggling not merely with the order of these articles but with the great turn from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis, from substance to subject, that will characterize his work from now on.45 A further delay shows up in the later articles, for the first three came out in quick succession, 1946-47, but the last two only two years later in 1949-4'1 With an exception to be noticed in our next section, there is no information about the course of publication; no letters are extant from the correspondence with the editors. There are backward-looking remarks in the 44 See below, at the end of chapter l, p. 59. Two items in the archival papers show traces of this struggle. The first, published here as an appendix, is a file (Batch I-B, Folder 13) of scattered pages with the title The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,' which is clearly an early draft of the first two articles. 48 pages remain of a total of 102: pp. l, 16-22, 60-72, 90-102 - these were kept in order — plus 73, 74, 75, and 77 excerpted, it seems, for use as scrap (some have Lonergan's scribbles on the back). They belong to two articles, for the footnotes reach number 270 at p. 75, but continue on p. 90 after the lost interval at number loo; further, starting a concluding summary on p. 100, he writes, 'The chief aim in this second part...' And he already envisaged more, for p. 102 has 'to be continued.' It is clear that this draft was written in the context of trinitarian doctrine: ' [I may] have given some of the evidence for the interpretation of Thomist Trinitarian theory at which I am aiming' (102); and see the last line of p. 99: 'The human analogy to the divine processions has gone up in metaphysical smoke' (with John of St Thomas et al.). The last point on p. 102 begins: 'Fourthly, there is the outstanding problem of the processio operati according to the will.' The second archival item showing signs of his struggle consists of notes (Lonergan's own, plus a report byj. Martin O'Hara) of a course on Thought and Reality that he gave at Thomas More Institute, Montreal, in the academic year 1945-46. Though we must allow for repetitions due to pedagogical reasons (questions raised in class, etc.) the notes do seem to show an oscillation between the cognitional and the ontological. In contrast, notes of a talk he gave at Regis College, Toronto, on 26 February 1947, entitled (probably) 'Nature of Intellect,' seem to follow the order of the articles he was just then writing. 45 He was to realize later that the move had already been made in Insight;see 'Insight Revisited' 277: 'while I still spoke in terms of a faculty psychology, in reality I had moved out of its influence and was conducting an intentionality analysis.' 46 Possibly a heavy teaching load was partly responsible for the delay of the last two articles. Lonergan does mention in regard to his years in Montreal that from 1940 on 'for six years I had considerable opportunities to add research and writing to my duties as a professor' (A Second Collection 266, in 'Insight Revisited'). From 1947 to 1953 he taught at Toronto, where the teaching load was at first heavier, especially in 1947-48.

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articles themselves that clarify his progress, but these we will see in their proper place. 4

The Articles in Book Form

The process leading up to the publication of the articles in book form some years later is better documented. Heavy demands soon depleted the stock both of the back issues of Theological Studies and of the generous supply of offprints that had been given to Lonergan. There was pressure on him, then, to reissue the articles, and his letters begin to discuss the possibility as far back as ig6o.47 But he had in mind to include the gratia operans articles along with the verbum set, and spoke in 1962 of issuing the pair as Two Thomist Studies.'48 Meanwhile Henri Niel had proposed a French translation of the articles to be done by M. Regnier (whose mother was English), assisted by students at the Jesuit philosophate in Chantilly (near Paris) .49 This project went forward with relative speed, the first article of 'La notion de verbe dans les ecrits de Saint Thomas d'Aquin' appearing in 1963, and the fifth in 1965.5° The following year Tour repondre a de nombreuses demandes,' the five articles were issued in book form.51 For this book Lonergan wrote an Introduction, sending it off to the translators in late 1964. Then in response to a 47 Letter of 26 September 1960. 48 Letter of 11 December 1962; in 1963 (letter of 9 June) he wrote, 'I have been thinking that the thing to do is to have "Two Thomist Studies" edited by you [F. Crowe].' 49 This had started as a project to translate Insight into French: letter of Henri Niel to Lonergan, lOjune 1960. That was still the primary intention two years later, but now Niel has added a proposal to have the verbum articles translated also (letter of 11 December 1962); in the end it was the articles that got done. I may note here that in 1952 an unpublished French translation, Le Concept de Verbum dans les Ecrits de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, had been made by Jacques Tremblay at Jean-de-Brebeuf College in Montreal; did this figure in the Regnier translation? was he aware of its existence? Lonergan himself had found some deficiencies in the Tremblay translation (letter of 25 May 1958), but does not specify what they were. 50 Archives de philosophic 26 (1963) 163-203, 570-620; 27 (1964) 238-285; 28 (1965)206-50,510-52. 51 La notion de verbe dans les ecrits de Saint Thomas d'Aquin. (Bibliotheque des Archives de Philosophic: Nouvelle serie 5.) Paris: Beauchesne, 1966.

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request received, he offered this introduction to Philippine Studies, where it appeared in 1965 with the illuminating title 'Subject and Soul.'52 The very next month Lonergan received a letter from David Burrell of the University of Notre Dame, offering to find collaborators there and put out the verbum articles in book form in English. Lonergan had some hesitation: This means separating from Gratia operans. I have my reasons for wanting them together, but though I see the moon I do not reach for it.'53 Soon, however, he was ready to accept the offer and wrote on i April to Burrell: 'Are you and your friends still ready to edit Verbum? If so, I shall send you a list of corrections (text and footnotes) that have accumulated over the years; also, an Introduction that I wrote for the French translation.'54 The work of Burrell and his team came out in 1967, under the title: VERBUM: Word and Idea in Aquinas. British publication of the Notre Dame work followed a year later under the same tide but with a number of new corrections (see our next section).55 5

The Text of the Present Edition

The foregoing history with its reference to various corrections and revisions gives some indication of the task before us, which is not merely to make Lonergan's original work available again, but also to document significant changes he made in it, and to put on record the history of the text. For this task the first need is a list of sources for the readings in our edition; it is rather long in relation to the results arrived at, and some sources make a negligible input to the text, but that latter fact has also to be recorded in order to close off useless lines of investigation. 52 Bernard Lonergan, 'Subject and Soul,' Philippine Studies 13 (1965) 576-85. Data on this request and Lonergan's response: letter of 29 December 1964. 53 Letter of l January 1965. Further, Lonergan felt the job was still mine if I wanted it, but I was quite content to leave the task to the University of Notre Dame team. 54 Letter to David Burrell of l April 1965. The 'list of corrections' will concern us later; it is the list that had already gone to Fr Regnier, for the same corrections (with one exception - also to be discussed later) appear in the French and the English. 55 Bernard Lonergan, VERBUM: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. David B. Burrell (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967; London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968).

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Editors' Preface

The first source is obvious enough: the work as it first appeared in Theological Studies in five articles spread over the years 1946-49. This, of course, is our basic text, and we would not expect it to be in itself a source of its own correction; but two factors complicate in an important way this simple picture. The first is Lonergan's revision of his own thought, as found in corrections internal to the articles themselves;5*' these we shall notice as we come to them in the text. The other is a rather surprising criticism of the way his footnotes were rearranged editorially in one of the articles.57 Next in importance are the marginally annotated offprints of his articles on which Lonergan recorded corrections to be made. There are two sets of these, each with his annotations. We shall designate the original articles as cv-A, the first set of offprints as cv-B, and the second set as CV-c. The main importance attaches to the set CV-B, which is the basis for the corrections made by Regnier and Burrell. 5X The second set, cv-C, has a few further corrections, made presumably when Lonergan did not have CV-B at hand. These two sets of corrections will be noticed, insofar as they rate a mention, as we come to them. Our third source is the French translation, as published in Paris by Archives de Philosophic, first as articles, then as a book.59 These show significant changes from the original English, but they are mostly omissions and so of no importance for the present purpose of establishing the text. It would, of course, be important for students of the French text to know the 5(1 For example, in the fifth article, Theological Studies 10 (1949) 372, note 59; the point is made again in Collection 144, note 4 (in 'Insight: Preface to a Discussion,' a paper of 1958 for the American Catholic Philosophical Association). Lonergan did not rewrite the faulty passage for the hook publication, but left it in place with this monitum. 57 Letter to David Burrell, l April 1965: 'There is one article (third or fourth), in which an over-zealous stylist at TS put my references in chronological order; they had been in order of relevance; if this is noticed in checking, it would be well to change order back to relevance.' (The evidence of the footnotes themselves suggests that it was the third article that was tampered with, but we have not imposed our guesses on the text.) There is also a second, rather sharper remark on the same point in an interview (Caring 102), indeed unusually sharp, given Lonergan's good relations with Theological Studies- see his laudatory remark later (ibid. 159). 58 It has been saved for us by Elizabeth and Mark Morelli, who received the set as a gift from Lonergan in the 1970s, and left it with us on loan for our present task of editing. 59 Reference to the Tremblay translation remains useful for the passages omitted by the Regnier team.

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situation, so I quote a letter Regnier sent to Lonergan with the translation of the first article: 'As suggested by Pere Niel I have left out the few references to Kant and shortened some paragraphs, but, of course, I shall rely entirely on your judgment. I have also omitted the introduction which was meant for theologians.'()() There is no record of Lonergan's reply; presumably he accepted Regnier's work.'" But there is in the translation at least one very significant change of a positive nature, an addition rather than an omission: the French has a precious note on cognitional acts with respect to being that curiously is not found in any of the three English publications.()2 This we shall notice in due course (see note 206 to chapter i). The University of Notre Dame edition of 1967 revises the text according to the 'list of corrections' Lonergan had sent the editors; it adds a Foreword by the editor and of course Lonergan's new Introduction. The British edition of this volume appeared the next year, with some differences from the American.(>:i Lonergan received two copies each of the British and American editions, and three of these have his marginal notations, the vast majority of which, however, are mere corrections of typos. A final source may be mentioned: the two publications in English of the new Introduction are a check on one another, and, in fact, its appearance as the article

60 Letter of M. Regnier to Lonergan, 12 May 1963. Three important references to Kant were indeed omitted, and there were other cuts here and there. 61 Lonergan again received not only offprints of his articles but the whole issue of Archives de Philosophic, in which the articles appeared; the latter reveal that he checked the first article, for the pages are cut and he made a marginal correction on p. 186; but the pages for the second, third, and fourth articles are not even cut (the fifth article is missing from Lonergan's set). The French book left unchanged some notes that refer back to the pages of the journal rather than to those of the book, a negligence that the editors apologetically admit. An insert lists some fifty errata; this presumably was due to the checking of the editors. Again, however, Lonergan himself did some casual checking of the book, at least of the Introduction, for his copy has corrections noted on pages iii and iv. 62 Page 44 of La notion ..., note 196. Let it also be noted on the positive side that the marginal corrections Lonergan noted on CV-B were faithfully followed in the French; presumably, the same set of corrections went to Paris and to Notre Dame. 63 To eliminate some puzzles future researchers might have, we may record the reason for these differences: Lonergan made a list of errata in the University of Notre Dame edition as soon as it appeared, and sent it to Bun ell, who was able to have fresh lines of print set up before the work was photographed for the lithography process in England.

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Editors' Preface

'Subject and Soul' in Philippine Studies confirms a minor correction that the sense itself required us to make in the English Introduction. A quite different line is not the investigation of sources for our reading of Lonergan, but the investigation of Lonergan's own sources for the verbum articles and of his other writings and lectures at the time. This is not a study to be squeezed into an editorial preface to Verbum, but a project for a doctoral dissertation. Nevertheless I may be permitted to indicate the wealth of material available. For example, there are in the Archives extensive notes on primary and secondary writings under such headings as Scotus,64 Writers on Verbum,65 imago Dei,66 Trinitarian History,67 Aristotelian/ Augustinian Conflict,68 Godfrey of Fontaine,69 and Varia on Aquinas70 files made presumably while Lonergan was researching the articles. There

64 Batch II, File Q. 65 Ibid. File 10. Much of this archival material consists of quotations laboriously typed out, but there are also reflections on the data collected, for example, a page headed, Why Aquinas did not hit off 'to ti en einai'; it runs in part as follows. 1. He did not investigate the Aristotelian text from the view-point of the usage of technical terms. There was no Bonitz index. Aquinas was not a philologist. He dealt with meanings: in immediate sentences; in the inter-relation of sentences, paragraphs, etc. 2. He was interested in the metaphysical aspects of the issues: Avicenna and Averroes. In epistemology he was interested predominantly in the relation between universal terms and reality, not in the intervening mechanism. He did not perhaps go in for introspection, and certainly he no more thought of introspective description than did Aristotle. 3. Now to hit off 'to ti en einai' is a matter of introspective description of the most exacting sort; the insight of understanding is 'pre-conceptual' and as such to put it into words is to transform it into the resultant concepts; it can be described only on the understanding, on the part of both writer and reader, that one is describing the principle of description before it causes description. This aspect is sufficiently plain from the account of 'verbum' 4. When to ti en einai is one of the four causes, Aq outright that it is form. But when it is principle of definition, the key to defining, the prior insight to the act of defining, it becomes the quod quid est or the quidditas (concrete or abstract general essence). 66 Batch II, File 16. 67 Ibid. File 41. 68 Ibid. File 42. 69 Ibid. File 43. 70 Ibid. File 48.

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are also extensive fragments of an early draft of his verbum study, and over six hundred index cards (5-by-8) detailing his research on Aquinas and Aristotle.71 And I should list the notes taken by Walter Principe on a course Lonergan gave at the Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto while he was writing the articles.72 There is no one way to handle these various sources. Simple typos are corrected without comment. Sometimes there is an editorial addition (in square brackets) to the footnotes. Sometimes the point at issue is important enough to rate an editorial note. 6

Other Editorial Tasks

Of other recurring editorial problems the first and greatest was that of handling Lonergan's numerous references to Thomas Aquinas (over fifteen hundred by rough count) and to Aristotle. The accuracy of the references was checked twice, first by Gregory Carruthers and then by Robert Doran. Fr Carruthers also provided invaluable assistance by photocopying every text of Aquinas to which Lonergan refers or which Lonergan quotes, and arranging these in a set of ordered files that made subsequent editing far easier than it would otherwise have been. The list of Thomas's works at the end of this volume indicates the edition or editions that we used in our editing. In the footnotes as well as in the list, we indicate first the title of a given work as assigned in the folio volumes of the Leonine edition, and then, where necessary, our shorthand way of referring to the work. For the texts of Aristotle we relied principally on Richard McKeon's edition of The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941). There is, too, the problem regularly found in the early Lonergan but more acutely experienced here, of what to do with his Latin and Greek phrases and quotations for a public that to such a large extent cannot handle those languages. Our decision (reached with some prodding from veteran Lonergan students) was to leave Lonergan the way we found him (the Greek, however, in roman transcription) with longer quotations translated in square brackets in the footnotes, and the shorter (except where there is special need) referred to a lexicon at the very end of the book. 71 See note 44 above, and Appendix below, pp. 229-52. 72 The seminar, conducted in the spring term of 1947, was on the trinitarian theology of St Thomas; Fr Principe's notes show links passim with the articles, sometimes explicitly.

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We also checked Lonergan's references to other authors, and where necessary added bibliographical data that might be of assistance to readers. In only a very few instances were we not able to locate the relevant references. Chapter tides, when missing in the original, are those of the 1967 edition. The titles of the subdivisions are those of the original articles, with one insignificant exception, though we cannot be sure they are Lonergan's own. For the details of editing we follow the now established policy of the Collected Works: spelling as in the Oxford American Dictionary; stylistic matters as in the Chicago Manual of Style; ML for Migne's Patrologia latina, and DB (DS) for the Denzinger Enchiridion; no change in Lonergan's gender usage; etc. As for the material at the back, we return to our practice of writing editorial notes where they seem helpful (the figures in square brackets at the end of each note refer to the relevant page of the text), adding a list of the works of Lonergan referred to in these notes as well as in this Preface. The usual index of names and subjects is supplemented by an index of Loci Thornistici and Loci Aristotelici, as was the case in the earlier edition. For a brief time we had hoped to include an appendix with all of the texts of Aquinas to which Lonergan refers, and we did in fact transcribe onto computer the texts for the first chapter and for part of the second, before realizing that the appendix would be far longer than the text itself and that the work of assembling the texts was starting to yield diminishing returns, at least as far as the purposes of the present volume are concerned. One important editorial task (we should rather say privilege) remains: that of thanking those who have contributed to this edition: Marcela Dayao, who typed the whole work onto computer; Elizabeth and Mark Morelli for the loan of those precious offprints on which Lonergan recorded his revisions; Gregory Carruthers, whose work is mentioned above; Philip McShane, who read the whole work in typescript, including this Preface, and provided advice on certain knotty problems; many others who contributed in various ways: Charles Hefling, Joseph Komonchak, Gerard Whelan, Marc Brousseau, John Dool, Robert Croken, Michael Shields, the library staff of Regis College (Toronto), and the late Walter Principe. Thanks, finally, to those who have made letters or interviews available to fill in Lonergan's history. FREDERICK E. CROWE (for the editors)

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VERBUM: WORD AND IDEA IN AQUINAS

Introduction: Subject and Soul'

In working out his concept of verbum Aquinas was engaged not merely in fitting an original Augustinian creation into an Aristotelian framework but also in attempting, however remotely and implicitly, to fuse together what to us may seem so disparate: a phenomenology of the subject with a psychology of the soul. The Aristotelian framework was impressive. First, it was a general theory of being, a metaphysics. Secondly, it was a general theory of movement, a physics in that now antiquated sense. Thirdly, it was a general theory of life, a biology. Fourthly, it was a general theory of sensitivity and intelligence, a psychology. Since in this framework the prior components are comprehensive, the later are not pure but cumulative. Because movements exist, physical statements are not just physical; they are determinations added to metaphysical statements. Because living things move, biological statements are not just biological; they are determinations added to metaphysical and physical statements. Because sentient and intelligent beings are alive, psychological statements are not purely psychological; they presuppose and employ and determine what already has been settled in metaphysics, physics, and biology. The use of such a framework gave Aristotelian thought its majestic coherence and comprehensiveness. The interlocking of each part with all the others precluded the possibility of merely patchwork revisions. As Professor Butterfield has observed, to correct Aristotle effectively, one must go beyond him; and to go beyond him is to set up a system equal in compre-

4

Introduction

hensiveness and more successful in inner coherence and in conformity with fact.1 Still, such attempts have been made and, indeed, in two quite different manners. There have been open repudiations of Aristotle, as in modern science and in much modern philosophy. There also has been the more delicate procedure of sublation1' that developed and transformed Aristotelian positions to the point where the incorporation of further and profounder doctrines became possible. Such was the method of Aquinas, and our immediate concern is to find in Aristotle the point of insertion for Augustinian thought. It is not difficult to discern. I distinguished above four components in the Aristotelian framework. I must hasten to add that, in a sense, the distinction between the third and fourth, between biology and psychology, is not as clear, as sharp, as fully developed as may be desired. For Aristotle's De anima is at once biological and psychological. It does not confuse plants, animals, and men. At the same time, it fails to bring out effectively the essential difference between an investigation of plant life and an investigation of the human mind; much less does it work out the methodological implications of that essential difference. The De anima is about soul. If the Platonic nauta in navi is suggestive of the subject, the Aristotelian soul is not. It is an inner principle, constituent of life. It is defined as the first act of an organic body.2 It is found in all organic bodies, in plants no less than in animals and men. Moreover, a single method is worked out for determining the differences of souls and so for investigating each species of the genus. Souls are differentiated by their potencies; potencies are known by their acts; acts are specified by their objects.^ But what is meant by an object? That is the decisive question. For the meaning given the term 'object' will settle the specification given acts; the specification of acts will setde the distinction between potencies; and the distinction between potencies will settle the essential differences between the souls of plants, animals, and men. A modern reader is apt to take it for granted that by an object Aristotle must mean the intentional term of a conscious act. But quite evidently Aquinas was of a different opinion. In his commentary he defines objects

1 The point is made repeatedly by Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800 (New York: The Free Press, 1966). 2 Aristotle, De anima, II, l, 412 b 4-5. 3 Ibid. II, 4, 4153 14-20.

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Introduction

in terms, not of intentionality, but of causality:1 an object is either the efficient or the final cause of the occurrence of an act in a potency.4 Nor is it easy to disagree with Aquinas. He goes beyond what is explicit in the text. But as the book of definitions in the Metaphysiics\\\reveals, Aristotle used his\ word for object, to antikeimenon, in a great variety of meanings. In the immediate context in the De anima he illustrates objects not only by the sensible and the intelligible, which are the intentional terms of conscious acts, but also by nutriment, which in the case of plants has not an intentional but only a causal relation to acts. It is at this point that there comes to light the problem to which I have already alluded. No one will complain that Aristotle did not employ introspective techniques in his study of plant life. But one could well complain if a method suitable for the study of plants were alone employed in the study of human sensitivity and human intelligence. If the objects of vegetative activity are causal, it remains that the objects of sensitive and intellectual activity are also intentional. If vegetative acts are not accessible to introspection, sensitive and intellectual acts are among the immediate data of consciousness; they can be reached not only by deduction from their objects but also in themselves as given in consciousness. Finally, when conscious acts are studied by introspection, one discovers not only the acts and their intentional terms but also the intending subject, and there arises the problem of the relation of subject to soul, of the Augustinian mens or animus to the Aristotelian anima. If in Scholastic circles such a Problematik is contemporary and indeed, for many, still novel, it is plain that neither Aristotle nor Aquinas handled the matter in a triumphantly definitive fashion. This is not to say, of course, that they anticipated positivists and behaviorists by systematically avoiding any use of introspection or any appeal to the data of consciousness. As we shall see, Aquinas explicitly appealed to inner experience and, I submit, Aristotle's account of intelligence, of insight into phantasm, and of the fact that intellect knows itself, not by a species of itself, but by a species of its object, has too uncanny an accuracy to be possible without the greatest introspective skill. But if Aristotle and Aquinas used introspection and did 4 Sententia libriDe anima, 2, lect. 6, §305 in the Marietti edition. [Henceforth our reference to the commentary on the De anima will be in the form In IIDe anima; the paragraph numbers that Lonergan gives are from the Marietti edition.] 5 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 1O.

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Introduction

so brilliantly, it remains that they did not thematize their use, did not elevate it into a reflectively elaborated technique, did not work out a proper method for psychology, and thereby lay the groundwork for the contemporary distinctions between nature and spirit and between the natural and the human sciences. It is time to turn to Augustine: a convert from nature to spirit; a person that, by God's grace, made himself what he was; a subject that may be studied but, most of all, must be encountered01 in the outpouring of his selfrevelation and self-communication. The context of his thought on verbum was trinitarian, and its underlying preoccupation was anti-Arian. It followed that the prologue to the fourth Gospel had to be freed from any Arian implication. To achieve this end Augustine did not employ our contemporary techniques of linguistic and literary history. He did not attempt a fresh translation of the Greek word logos, but retained the traditional verbum. Church tradition, perhaps, precluded any appeal to the Stoic distinction between verbum prolatum and verbum insitum.6 In any case he cut between these Stoic terms to discover a third verbum that was neither the verbum prolatum of human speech nor the verbum insitum of man's native rationality but an intermediate verbum intus prolatum. Naturally enough, as Augustine's discovery was part and parcel of his own mind's knowledge of itself, so he begged his readers to look within themselves and there to discover the speech of spirit within spirit, an inner verbum prior to any use of language, yet distinct both from the mind itself and from its memory or its present apprehension of objects. Though I cannot attempt here to do justice to the wealth of Augustine's thought or to the variety of its expression,7 at least it will serve to illustrate my meaning if, however arbitrarily, I select and briefly comment on a single passage. 6 On the distinction, Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theologische Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1942) 84, lines 12-14, in the section 'Der Logos in Griechentum und Hellenismus' by Hermann Kleinknecht [in English, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 4, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1967) 85]; M. Schmaus, Die psychologische Trinitdtslehre des hi. Augustinus (Munster: Aschendorff, 1927) 33 n. ll. On the tradition, see St Ambrose, Defide ad Gratianum Augustum libri quinque, IV, vii; ML 16, 631, §72; also DS 140, canon 8. 7 I would like in this connection to draw attention to a forthcoming work in the series, Analecta Gregoriana: S. Biolo, La coscienza nel 'De Trinitate'di S. Agostino. [Biolo's book appeared later as vol. 172 in the Analecta Gregoriana series (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1969); it was originally a doctoral dissertation directed by Lonergan.]

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Introduction

Haec igitur omnia, et quae per se ipsum, et quae per sensus sui corporis, et quae testimoniis aliorum percepta scit animus humanus, thesauro memoriae condita tenet, ex quibus gignitur verbum verum, quando quod scimus loquimur, sed verbum ante omnem sonum, ante omnem cogitationem soni. Tune enim est verbum simillimum rei notae, de qua gignitur, et imago eius, quoniam de visione scientiae visio cogitationis exoritur, quod est verbum linguae nullius, verbum verum de re vera, nihil de suo habens, sed totum de ilia scientia de qua nascitur. Nee interest quando id didicerit, qui quod scit loquitur (aliquando enim statim ut discit, hoc dicit), dum tamen verbum sit verum, id est, de nods rebus exortum.8 In this passage, then, the Augustinian verbumis a nonlinguistic utterance of truth. It differs from expression in any language, for it is linguae nullius. It is not primitive but derived: gignitur, exoritur, nascitur. Its dependence is total: nihil de suo habens, sed totum de ilia scientia de qua nascitur. This total dependence is, not blind or automadc, but conscious and cognitive: quod scimus loquimur, de visione scientiae visio cogitationis exoritur; qui quod scit loquitur. Finally, this total dependence as conscious and known is the essendal

8 ['All these things, therefore, those perceived (by the human mind) through itself, and those perceived through the senses of its body, and those perceived by the witness of others, all these things which the human mind knows, it holds firmly established in the treasury of memory; from these is brought forth a true word when we utter what we know, but a word that is before all sound, (indeed) before all thought of sound. For then a word is most like the known thing from which it is brought forth and most an image of that thing, since from the vision of knowledge a vision of thought arises, which is a word of no language, a true word of a true thing, having nothing of its own, but everything from that knowledge from which it is born. Nor does it matter when the one who utters what he knows learned it - for sometimes he speaks as soon as he learns - provided however that the word is true, that is, having its origin in things known'] Augustine, De trinitate, XV, xii, 22; ML 42, 1075. [We add an English translation of Latin words and phrases in Lonergan's next paragraph: linguae nullius, of no language; gignitur, is brought forth; nascitur, is born; nihil de suo habens, having nothing of its own; sed totum de ilia scientia de qua nascitur, but everything from that knowledge from which it is born; quod scimus loquimur, we utter what we know; de visione scientiae visio cogitationis exoritur, from the vision of knowledge a vision of thought arises; qui quod scit loquitur, who utters what he knows; verbum simillimum rei notae, a word most like the known thing; imago eius, an image of [that thing]; verbum verum de re vera, a true word of a true thing; dum tamen verbum sit verum, id est, de notis rebus exortum, provided however that the word is true, that is, having its origin in things known.]

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H

Introduction

point. It makes no difference whether the verbum has its ground in memory or in recently acquired knowledge. What counts is its truth, its correspondence with things as known: verbum simillimum rei notae; imago eius; verbum verurn de re vera, nihil de suo habens, sed totum de ilia scientia de qua nascitur; dum tamen verbum sit verum, id est, de notis rebus exortum. Such, at least in one passage, is what Augustine had to say about verbum. Many more passages might be cited, and they would reveal him saying different things or the same things in a different manner. But sooner or later it would be necessary to advance from the simpler question of what he said to the more difficult question of what he meant. Since I am writing not a study of Augustine but an introduction to a study of Aquinas, I must leap at once to the more difficult question, though not to answer it in detail, but only to indicate the source from which the answer must proceed. A blind man may listen to a disquisition on color, but he is bound to find it obscure. A person who is deaf may read a book on music, but he will have a hard time deciding whether the author is talking sense or nonsense. In similar fashion it is only by introspection that one can discover what an introspective psychologist is talking about. If what Augustine had to say about verbum was true, then it corresponded exactly to what Augustine knew went on in his own mind. If what Augustine had to say about verbum was universally true, then it corresponds exactly to what Augustine knew goes on in any human mind. If one supposes Augustine to be right and, at the same time, entertains an admiration for Newman, one is going to ask whether the Augustinian couplet of memoria and verbum is parallel to Newman's couplet of illative sense and unconditional assent.c But if one desires to get beyond words and suppositions to meanings and facts, then one has to explore one's own mind and find out for oneself what there is to be meant; and until one does so, one is in the unhappy position of the blind man hearing about colors and the deaf man reading about counterpoint. About such matters Augustine was explicit. Unde enim mens aliquam mentem novit, si se non novit ? Neque enim ut oculus corporis videt alias oculos et se non videt... Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic in corporearum per semetipsam. Ergo et semetipsam per se ipsam novit .. .9 9 ['For whence does the mind know some (other) mind, if it does not know itself? Nor (does it see) the way the eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself... Our mind itself therefore, as it gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so also (does it gather knowledge) of incorporeal things through itself. Therefore it knows itself too through itself] Ibid. IX, iii, 3; ML 42, 962 f.

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9

Introduction

Moreover, for Augustine, the mind's self-knowledge was basic; it was the rock of certitude on which shattered Academic doubt; it provided the ground from which one could argue to the validity both of the senses of one's own body and, with the mediation of testimony, of the senses of the bodies of others. So the passage we have quoted and explained begins with this threefold enumeration: quaeper se ipsum, et quae per sensus sui corporis, et quae testimoniis aliorum percepta scit animus humanus. The enumeration merely summarizes what had been set forth at greater length in the immediately preceding paragraph;10 and that paragraph, of course, only resumes a theme that is recurrent from Augustine's earliest writings on. Clearly enough, it was neither per sensus sui corporis nor by alienorum corporum sensus that Augustine knew of a verbum that was neither Latin nor Greek, neither sound nor even the thought of sound. The Augustinian affirmation of verbum was itself a verbum. For it to be true, on Augustine's own showing, it had to be totally dependent on what Augustine's mind knew through itself about itself. On the existence and nature of such knowledge Augustine had a great deal to say, and there is no need for us to attempt to repeat it here. Though it cannot be claimed that Augustine elevated introspection into a scientific technique, it cannot be doubted that he purported to report in his literary language what his own mind knew immediately about itself. So we come to Aquinas. Because he conceived theology as in some sense a science, he needed Aristotle, who more than anyone had worked out and applied the implications of the Greek ideal of science. Because his theology was essentially the expression of a traditional faith, he needed Augustine, the Father of the West, whose trinitarian thought was the high-water mark in Christian attempts to reach an understanding of faith. Because Aquinas himself was a genius, he experienced no great difficulty either in adapting Aristotle to his purpose or in reaching a refinement in his account of rational process - the emanatio intelligibilis - that made explicit what Augustine could only suggest. Because, finally, Aquinas was a man of his time, he had to leave to a later age the task of acknowledging the discontinuity of natural and of human science and of working out its

10 Ibid. XV, xii, 21; ML 42, 1073-75. [Translation of Latin in text: 'those things which the human mind perceives through itself, and those it perceives through the senses of its body, and those it perceives by the witness of others, all these things which the human mind knows']

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Introduction

methodological implications. For performance must precede reflection on performance, and method is the fruit of that reflection. Aquinas had to be content to perform. The present study is divided into five chapters, and the division is dictated by the quite different systematic contexts in which Thomist statements about verbum are involved. Already I have noted the cumulative character of Aristotelian categories, in which psychological statements presuppose biological, biological presuppose physical, and physical presuppose metaphysical. In a somewhat similar fashion Thomist statements about verbum will be theological in their primary intent; they will involve technical terms drawn from physics and metaphysics; their meaning will turn on metaphysical explanations of gnoseological possibility; and embedded in this structural complexity there will be a core of psychological fact. To reach even an approximation to what Aquinas meant, it is necessary to explore separately the several hermeneutical circles that in cumulative fashion are relevant to an interpretation. The first two chapters are concerned with the core of psychological fact. Aquinas identified verbum with the immanent terminal object of intellectual operation; he distinguished two intellectual operations, a first in answer to the question quid sit, and a second in answer to the question an sit. So we have a first chapter on verbum as definition, and a second on verbum as compositio vel divisio. Throughout the first two chapters the reader will be troubled by the recurrence of technical terms of a metaphysical or physical origin. Quite apart from any intrinsic difficulty they may offer, the determination of their meaning is enormously complicated, first, by Aristotle's efforts to adapt the Greek language to his own technical purposes, secondly, by the imperfect coincidence of the earlier Latin equivalents, mediated by Arabic culture, and the later fruits of direct translation from the Greek, and thirdly, for those who approach Aquinas through manuals and commentaries quite innocent of the methods of literary and historical research, by such interpreters' proclivity to smooth out linguistic oddities by giving free rein to their talent for speculative invention. The third chapter is an effort to cut through this jungle. Our fourth chapter deals with matters intermediate between metaphysics and psychology. Such is the doctrine of abstraction from matter. Such also are the relations between immateriality and knowledge. Finally, St Thomas's thought on verbum occurs, for the most part, in a trinitarian context. If Thomist philosophers, quite comprehensibly, are

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Introduction

reluctant to venture into this field, it remains that a historian must do so. St Thomas was a theologian. His thought on verbumwas, in the main, a statement for his technically minded age of the psychological analogy of the trinitarian processions. Its simplicity, its profundity, and its brilliance have long been obscured by interpreters unaware of the relevant psychological facts and unequal to the task of handling merely linguistic problems.11 So it is that our final chapter deals with the trinitarian meaning of imago Dei, and as there the many levels of our study come together, so there also, I hope, the reader will find some compensation for the heavy labor of ploughing through the preceding pages. In closing I should, perhaps, note that the present introduction is an afterthought written over fifteen years after the original text was completed and published in Theological Studies. May I take this occasion to thank Rev. John Courtney Murray, then as now editor of that review, for allowing this edition.

11 This may appear harsh, but I find no other explanation for the startling discrepancies that exist. In his account of intellectual procession no less eminent a theologian than L. Billot could write, 'Et simile omnino est in imaginatione' [see below, chapter l, note 2]. But St Thomas explicitly restricted the trinitarian analogy to the minds of rational creatures. Summa theologiae, l, q. 93, a. 6 c.: '... nee in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem' [see below, chapter l, note 3]. See also Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 3, a. l; De veritate, q. 1O, aa. l and 7; Depotentia, q. 9, a. 9 ad fin.; Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. n.f

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

1 Verbum: Definition and Understanding'

It is almost a decade since M. T.-L. Penido published his 'Closes sur la procession d'amour dans la Trinite.'1 As the reader may recall, the article dealt with the speculative aspect of the second divine procession, passed in review the efforts of a very large number of theologians to attain a coherent statement, and found them all wanting. Briefly and bluntly, for Penido theologians on this issue fall into two classes: those who did not pretend to grasp the matter and those who did but failed to be convincing. The indictment is startling.b Let us turn at once to what may appear a quite different matter. In his account of intellectual procession, L. Billot remarked: 'Et simile omnino est in imaginatione.'* On its author's suppositions, this remark is quite accurate; for intellectual procession is conceived not as a peculiarity of intellect but as a necessary consequent in the metaphysical analysis of a cognitional act with respect to an object that may be absent; since these conditions are fulfilled not only in conception but also in imagination, the parallel is quite justified. But if one turns to the writings of St Thomas Aquinas, one would be very hard put to find any inkling of such a parallel; indeed, one would be led to deny its existence. For Aquinas distinguished between image and vestige of the

1 Maurilio T.-L. Penido, 'Closes sur la procession d'amour dans la Trinite,' Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses 14 (1937) 33-68. 2 ['And it is wholly the same in the imagination.'] Ludovicus Billot, DeDeo uno et trino (Rome: Gregorian University Press, iqio) ^^.

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Blessed Trinity; and image he found only in rational creatures and, indeed, only in their minds.3 Further, as is quite apparent from the scale of increasing capacity for reflection outlined in the Contra Gentiles*general metaphysical analysis of cognitional acts is not immediately relevant to Thomist trinitarian theory; the point made in that passage is to the effect that no sensitive potency reflects on itself; that human intellect does reflect on itself, but still man does not know himself by his essence; that angelic intellect is reflective, and, further, the angel knows himself by his essence but still the intentio intelkcta is not the essence; that in God alone is there perfect reflection, in which principle and term, essence and intentio intellecta, are identical. Quite clearly, this is not a theory of the procession of the Word in which imagination provides as good a starting point as intellect; it is a theory that extrapolates solely from the nature of rational consciousness. Let us now revert to Penido's contention, though only to ask a question. By definition, the will is a rational appetite. Might it not be that the procession according to the will is to be grasped only in terms of an analysis of rationality and rational consciousness? Might it not be that Penido found so many theologians unsatisfactory on this point for the very reasons that have just led us to discern a difference between Billot and Aquinas on intellectual procession, namely, neglect of what is peculiar to rational creatures? I believe these questions to be significant. It is to discuss them that I have undertaken the present inquiry into the concept of verbum in the writings of St Thomas. 1

The General Notion of an Inner Wordc

Etymology and biblical English both favor writing 'inner word' or simply 'word' as equivalent to the Thomist synonyms verbum interius, verbum cordis, 3 Summa theologiae, l, q. 93, a. 6 c.: '... nee in ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem' ['nor is there found an image of God in the rational creature except in the mind']. See Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 3, a. l; De veritate, q. 1O, aa. l and 7; Depotentia, q. 9, a. 9, c. ad fin. 4 Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, §§4-5 (ed. Leon., XV, 32a 37 - 32b 25). [Lonergan's way of locating texts in the Summa contra Gentiles changed as he wrote the verbum articles. In the first two articles, he refers to the folio edition of the Leonine text, in the manner contained in the round brackets in this note: the volume number (e.g., XV), page (32), column (a), and line (37). In the last three articles, he counts paragraphs in the Leonine manual edition. Where Lonergan gives the folio reference, we have retained it just as he gave it, but we have added to these references the paragraph numbers that later became his usual manner of referring to these texts; thus the '§§4-5' added here.]

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Verbum

verbum mentis, and, most common of all, simply verbum. The only complication arises in connection with the division of words into simple and compound. It is odd, indeed, to speak of a compound word and mean a sentence or judgment; but such speech will be rare; and the disadvantage of its oddity is outweighed, I think, by the convenience of having an English term for the main matter of the discussion.d The first element in the general notion of an inner word is had from a contrast with outer words - spoken, written, imagined, or meant. Spoken words are sounds with a meaning: as sounds, they are produced in the respiratory tract; as possessing a meaning, they are due to imagination according to Aristotle, or, as Aquinas seems to have preferred, to soul; it is meaning that differentiates spoken words from other sounds, such as coughing, which also are produced in the respiratory tract.5 Written words are simply signs of spoken words;6 the issue was uncomplicated by Chinese ideograms. A similar simplicity is the refreshing characteristic of the account of imaginatio vocis:7 a term that seems to embrace the whole mnemonic mass and sensitive mechanism of motor, auditory, and visual images connected with language. Finally, the outer word that is some external thing or action meant by a word is dismissed as a mere figure of speech.8 There is a twofold relation between inner and outer words: the inner word is an efficient cause of the outer; and the inner word is what is meant immediately by the outer. The aspect of efficient causality seems to be the only one noticed in the commentary on the Sentences: the inner word is compared to the major premise of a syllogism; the imagined word to the minor premise; and the spoken word to the conclusion.9 Later works do 5 InllDeanima, lect. 18, §4776 In Aristotelis libros Peri hermeneias, l, lect. 2, § 17: '... nomina et verba quae scribuntur, signa sunt eorum nominum et verborum quae sunt in voce' ['names and words that are written are signs of those names and words that are spoken']. [Henceforth our reference to this text will be in the form In I Peri herm.; the paragraph numbers that Lonergan gives are from the Marietti edition.] 7 Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. l sol. Summa theologian, l, q. 34, a. l c.

8 Summa theologiae, l, q. 34, a. l c.: 'Dicitur autem figurative quarto modo verbum, id quod verbo significatur vel efficitur; sicut consuevimus dicere, hoc est verbum quod dixi tibi, vel quod mandavit rex, demonstrato aliquo facto quod verbo significatum est vel simpliciter enuntiantis, vel etiam imperantis' ['Word is said figuratively in a fourth manner, of that which is meant or effected by a word: as we are accustomed to say, "This is the word that I told you of," or "This is the word the king commanded," as we point out the matter signified by the word in our remark or in the command.']. 9 Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. l sol.

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not deny this aspect10 but I think I may say that subsequently the whole emphasis shifted to the second of the two relations mentioned above. Repeatedly one reads that the inner word is what can be meant (significabile) or what is meant (significatum) by outer words, and inversely, that the outer word is what can mean (significativum) or what does mean (significant) the inner word.11 There is no doubt about this matter, though, frankly, it is just the opposite of what one would expect. One is apt to think of the inner word, not as what is meant by the outer, but as what means the outer; the outer word has meaning in virtue of the inner; therefore, the inner is meaning essentially while the outer has meaning by participation. That is all very true, and St Thomas knew it.12 But commonly he asked what outer words meant and answered that, in the first instance, they meant inner words. The proof was quite simple. We discourse on 'man' and on the 'triangle.' What are we talking about? Certainly, we are not talking about real things directly, else we should all be Platonists. Directly, we are talking about objects of thought, inner words, and only indirectly, only insofar as our inner words have an objective reference, are we talking of real things.13 The same point might be made in another fashion. Logical positivists to the contrary, false propositions are not meaningless; they mean something; what they mean is an inner word, and only because that inner word is false, does the false proposition lack objective reference.14 Such is the first element in the general notion of an inner word. It is connected with the well-known anti-Platonist thesis on abstraction that the mode of knowing need not be identical with the mode of reality, that 10 Efficient causality is mentioned in Super loannem, c. i, lect. l. 11 De veritate., q. 4, a. 2 c.: '... sive sit conceptio significabilis per vocem incomplexam ... sive per vocem complexam ...' ['whether it be a conception that can be meant by a simple word ... or one that can be meant by a complex word']; Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. ll, §6 (ed. Leon., XV, 32b 30 ff.): '... est quaedam similitudo concepta... quam voces exteriores significant; unde et ipsa intentio verbum interius nominatur, quod est exteriori verbo significatum' ['it is some conceived likeness ... which outer words mean; thus the intention itself is called an inner word, which is meant by the outer word']. See Depotentia, q. 8, a. l c.; q. 9, a. 5 c.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 27, a. l c.; q. 34, a. l c.; q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9 c.; Super loannem, c. l, lect. l. 12 See De veritate, q. 4, a. l, ad 7m. 13 In I Peri herm., lect. 2, § 15. 14 Ibid., lect. 3, §31: '... haec vox "homo est asinus" est vere vox et vere signum; sed quia est signum falsi, ideo dicitur falsa' ['this expression "man is an ass" is truly a word and truly a sign; but because it is a sign of something false, therefore it is called false'].

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Verbum

knowledge may be abstract and universal though all realities are particular and concrete. It also is connected with the familiar Aristotelian statement that 'bonum et malum sunt in rebus, sed verum et falsum sunt in mente.'15 Because outer words may be abstract, and true or false, because real things are neither abstract nor true nor false, the immediate reference of their meaning is to an inner word. The second element to be considered is the nature of the correspondence between inner and outer words. Grammarians divide the latter into eight, or sometimes ten, parts of speech; of these the Aristotelian Peri hermeneias bothered to notice only nouns and verbs, and included both under the same rubric of the element of meaning.16 Aquinas, in his commentary, denied a point-to-point correspondence between inner and outer words, arguing that inner words correspond to realities, while outer words are the products of convention and custom, and so vary with different peoples.17 However, since the inner word is in the intellect, and since apprehension of the singular involves the use of a sensitive potency,18 it should seem that the correspondence of realities to inner words is, at best, like the correspondence between a function and its derivative; as the derivative, so 15 ['Good and evil are in things, but true and false are in the mind'] Sententia libri Metaphysicae, lib. 6, lect. 4, §§ 1230-31; see lib. 5, lect. 9, §§895-96 [henceforth our usage will be In VIMetaphys.; the paragraph numbers that Lonergan gives are from the Marietti edition]; Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. i sol.; De veritate, q. l, a. 2 c.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 16, a. i c. 16 The Aristotelian division is of conventionally significant sounds: if the parts have meaning, not merely per accidens as 'heat' in 'cheat,' there is a logos, which is subdivided into indicative, optative, imperative, etc.; if the parts have no meaning, the division is into names and verbs. See Aristotle, On Interpretation, 2-4 [2, l6a 19 - 4, l6b 35; in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941) 40-42]. 17 In I Peri herm., lect. 2, §§ 19, 21: '... ostendit passiones animae naturaliter esse sicut res per hoc quod sunt eaedem apud omnes ... [M]elius dicendum est quod intentio Aristotelis non est asserere identitatem conceptionis animae per comparationem ad vocem, ut scilicet unius vocis sit una conceptio, quia voces sunt diversae apud diversos: sed intendit asserere identitatem conceptionum animae per comparationes ad res ...' ['he shows that the passions of the soul are naturally like things, in that they are the same among all... Better, the intention of Aristotle is not to assert that conceptions of the soul have their identity in correspondence with an outer word, so that there would be one concept corresponding to each word, since outer words are different among different peoples: but he intends to assert that conceptions of the soul have their identity in correspondence to things'] See Aristotle, On Interpretation, i, i6a 5-8. 18 See, for example, Summa theologiae, l, q. 86, a. l, objection l, c., and ad 2m.

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the inner word is outside all particular cases and refers to all from some higher viewpoint. A third element in fixing the nature of the inner word is connected intimately with the preceding. What is the division of inner words? On this question, four major works of Aquinas and a large number of his commentators are silent.19 On the other hand, silence is no argument against positive statement. Four other works of recognized standing divide inner words into the two classes of definitions and judgments, and three of these recall the parallel of the Aristotelian twofold operation of the mind.20 Moreover, the De veritate argues that there is a processio operati in the intellect, though not in the will, on the ground that 'bonum et malum sunt in rebus, sed verum et falsum sunt in mente.' 21 This clearly supposes that the judgment is an inner word, for only in the judgment is there truth or falsity. On the other hand, while Aquinas does refer frequently to the inner word as a conceptio, conceptum, conceptus?2 one must not give this term its current exclusive connotation; Aquinas employed it to denote judgments.23 Finally, as stated above, the correspondence of inner words is mainly, not to outer words, but to reality; but reality divides into essence and existence; and of the two Aristotelian operations of the mind 'prima operatic respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius.'24 It seems beyond doubt that an 19 The four works are the Sentences, the Contra Gentiles — which, however, mentions definition but not judgment (l, c. 53; 4, c. ll), the Summa (but see i, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m), and the Compendium theologiae. With regard to the commentators, it is simplest to note that Ferrariensis acknowledges the twofold inner word (In C. Gent., l, 53, §IV ad fin. - ed. Leon., XIII, 152). 20 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c.; q. 3, a. 2 c.; Depotentia, q. 8, a. 1 c.; q. Q, a. 5 c.; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9 c.; Superloannem, c. l, lect. l. 21 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad ym. 22 Summa theologiae, l, q. 27, a. l; q. 34, a. 1; and passim. 23 See, for example, De veritate, q. ll, a. l c. '... primae conceptiones intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur ... sive sint complexa, vit dignitates, sive incomplexa, sicut ratio entis' ['the first conceptions of intellect, which are known immediately by the light of agent intellect... whether they be complex, as first principles, or simple, such as the concept of being ...' (Ratio is a difficult word to translate, and we will be translating it variously as concept, reason, intelligibility, essence, meaning, the what, nature, form, formality, formal property, object of thought, idea)]. 24 ['the first operation regards the quiddity of the thing; the second regards its existence'] Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l, ad 7m. Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate, q, 5, a. 3 c. init. (ed. Mandonnet, III, no) [henceforth our reference will be in the form In Boet. De Trin. Lonergan refers to the Mandonnet edition of this work (see bibliography) until chapter 4, where he begins to use other editions on selected questions (see below, chapter 4, note 65).]

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account of the Thomist inner word has to be an account of judgments no less than of the formation of definitions.e A fourth element in the general notion of an inner word is that it supplies the object of thought. What is abstract, what is true or false is not, as such, either a real thing or a mere copy of a real thing. It is a product of the mind. It is not merely a product but also a known product; and as known, it is an object. The illuminating parallel is from technical invention. What the inventor comes to know is not some already existing reality; it is simply the idea of what will be a reality if financial backing and a demand on the market are forthcoming; and in itself, apart from practical economic considerations, the invention known by the inventor is merely an idea. Such ideas are the products and fruits of a thinking out, an excogitare: certain general principles are known; the inventor's task is to work out practicable applications, to proceed from the properties of uranium to the atomic bomb. A similar process of thought is involved in the plans of every architect, the prescription of every doctor, the reflective pause of every craftsman and mechanic before he sets to work. In invention, creative imagination is needed; in the practical arts, imagination moves in the worn grooves of custom and routine; but in both cases there is the same general form of intellectual process, for in both certain general principles are known, in both a determinate end is envisaged, in both the principles are applied to the attainment of the end, and in both this application leads to a plan of operations that as such is, not knowing what is, but only knowing the idea of what one may do. Aquinas was aware of this. Aristotle in his Metaphysics had analyzed such thinking things out and had arrived at the conclusion that the end, which is first in intention, is last in execution, whereas what is first in execution is last to be arrived at in the order of thought.25 But Aquinas was troubled with a problem that had not concerned Aristotle, namely, how to reconcile the simplicity of God with the infinity of ideas known by God. To solve this problem, he generalized the Aristotelian theorem on the practical arts. It is not merely the prescription of the doctor, the plan of the architect, the idea of the inventor that, in the first instance, is a product and object of thought. The same holds for every definition and everyjudgment. As such, the definition is abstract; as such, the judgment is true or false; but no real thing is abstract; and no real thing is true or false in the relevant sense of truth or falsity. The foregoing, I believe, is a key element in the Thomist concept of inner word. Its principal expression is to be found, not in trinitarian pas25 In VIIMetaphys., lect. 6, §§ 1405-10.

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sages, but in the discussions of the plurality of divine ideas. It would be premature to attempt a detailed study of this matter at once, for it pertains properly to an account of the Thomist position on natural human knowledge of a divine word. On the other hand, the reader is urged to review at once the Thomist texts on the issue. The brilliant treatment is in the De veritate (q. 3, a. 2 c.). Detailed treatment is in the Contra Gentiles 1 (cc. 46-54) with the central issue in chapter 53. In the Summa, I should say that Aquinas handled the matter automatically, as one does a question that has ceased to be a real problem.26 In the Sentences, on the other hand, though the essential elements of the solution are present,271 fail to detect the mastery and effectiveness of the later discussions; on this the reader may check by looking up the objections of Scotus,28 and asking himself whether Super I Sententiarum (d. 36, q. 2, a. 2 sol.) really meets them. Though the principal account of the definition and judgment as both product and object of thought is to be found in the discussion of the divine ideas, parallel affirmations are to be had in passages dealing explicitly with the inner word. The most downright affirmation is the insistence of the De potential that the inner word is 'primo et per se intellectum.' But this view is already present in the De veritate?0 On the other hand, the Contra Gentiles, though holding the same position, distinguishes between 'res intellecta' and 'intentio intellecta': the 'intentio' is the inner word whereas the 'res' is the external thing, and the difference between understanding the former and understanding the latter is the difference between logic or psychology and, on the other hand, metaphysics.31 As the term 'intentio' refers to the 26 Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, aa. 5-6; q. 15, aa. 1-3; see q. 27, a. l, ad 3m, which connects the plurality of ideas with the divine procession of the Word. 27 See Super I Sententiarum, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2m; d. 35, q. l, a. 2. 28 See In I Sent. (Op. Ox.), d. 35, q. unica, n. 7 (ed. Vives, X, 544). Scotus argues that the divine ideas cannot be accounted for by adding notional relations to the divine essence; for the object precedes the knowing, and relations that precede knowing are not notional but real. The argument does not touch Aquinas's real position, which is that the object as known is not prior and that the relations pertain only to the object as known. 29 Depotentia, q. 9, a. 5 c. 30 De veritate, q. 4, a. l c.: the inner word is 'id quod intellectum est' ['that which is understood'], 'ipsum interim intellectum' ['that which is interiorly understood'], 'id quod actu consideratur per intellectum' ['that which is actually considered by intellect']; see ibid., a. 2 c.: it is 'id ad quod operatic nostri intellectus terminatur, quod est ipsum intellectum, quod dicitur conceptio intellectus' ['that at which the operation of our intellect terminates, which is what is understood, what is called the conception of the intellect']. 31 Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. ll, §6 (ed. Leon., XV, 32b 33~39)-

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inner word, so also and more frequently does the term 'ratio': white and black are outside the mind, but the 'ratio albi' is only in the mind.32 To close the circle, one has only to recall that the divine ideas, as principles of production, are exemplars, but as principles of speculative knowledge, properly are named 'ratio.'33 A fifth element in the general notion of an inner word is that in it and through it intellect comes to knowledge of things. As this threatens to engulf us in the epistemological bog, a brief orientation now may save endless confusion later. A useful preliminary is to note that animals know, not mere phenomena, but things: dogs know their masters, bones, other dogs, and not merely the appearances of these things. Now this sensitive integration of sensible data also exists in the human animal and even in the human philosopher. Take it as knowledge of reality, and there results the secular contrast between the solid sense of reality and the bloodless categories of the mind. Accept the sense of reality as criterion of reality, and you are a materialist, sensist, positivist, pragmatist, sentimentalist, and so on, as you please. Accept reason as a criterion but retain the sense of reality as what gives meaning to the term 'real,' and you are an idealist; for, like the sense of reality, the reality defined by it is nonrational. Insofar as I grasp it, the Thomist position is the clearheaded third position: reason is the criterion and, as well, it is reason not the sense of reality - that gives meaning to the term 'real.' The real is what is; and 'what is' is known in the rational act, judgment. The first act of intellect is knowledge of the quod quid est, to ti estin, the 'What is it?' By definition, this knowledge involves neither truth nor falsity,34 for the reason that the question of truth or falsity is not as yet raised, because as yet one knows, not the thing, but only the idea of the thing, because as yet one is in a purely logical order.35 Hence, 'scientia est de aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo primo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de universalibus rationibus super quas fundatur. Alio modo est de aliquibus secundario, et quasi per reflexionem quamdam, et sic est de rebus illis 32 In VIMetaphys., lect. 4, § 1230. The frequently repeated 'ratio quam nomen significat est defmitio rei' ['the concept which the name signifies is the definition of the thing'] stems from In IVMetaphys., lect. 16, §733. The initial statement on 'ratio' is to be found in Super I Sententiarum, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3 sol. init. 33 Summa theologiae, i, q. 15, a. 3 c. 34 InlllDeanima, lect. 11, §746. Parallels are common: Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l, ad 7m; Deveritate, q. i, a. 3; Summa theologiae, l, q. 16, a. 2; In W Metaphys., lect. 4, §§ 1231-36. 35 Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. i, ad 7m: '... quidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis' ['the being of a quiddity is a certain being of reason'].

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quarum sunt illae rationes ... Ratione enim universal! utitur sciens et ut re scita et ut medio sciendi.'36 As long as one is dealing with ideas as ideas, there is properly no question of truth or falsity and no use of the inner word as a medium of knowledge. On the other hand, the second operation of intellect - by the very nature of its reflective character,37 by the very fact that it raises the question of truth, which is conformity between mind and thing38 - introduces the duality of idea and thing and makes the former the medium in and through which one apprehends the latter. Thus, our knowledge of God's existence is just our knowledge of the truth of the judgment 'Deus est.'39 And, while this knowledge differs from other knowledge in most respects, it does not differ in the respect now in question. For just as the inner word is a medium between the meaning of outer words and the realities meant,40 so also the inner word is a medium between the intellect and the things that are understood.41 36 ['... there are two ways in which knowledge is about something. In one way, and first and foremost, knowledge is about the universal concepts on which it is founded. In another way, and secondarily, and as it were through a certain reflection, knowledge is about those things of which there are those concepts ... For the knower uses a universal concept both as a thing known and as a medium of knowing'] In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 2, ad 4m (ed. Mandonnet, III, 107). This is not contrary to Summa theologiae, i, q. 85, a. 2, which treats of the informing species and not of the consequent verbum, except by contrast in the ad 3m. See q. 15, a. 2 c.: 'ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est forma faciens intellectum in actu' ['the idea of the product is in the mind of the producer as that which is understood; but not as the species by which it is understood, which is the form bringing the intellect to act']. 37 On judicial reflection in general, see In VI Metaphys., lect. 4, § 1236; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 16, a. 2 c. Such reflection is pushed to the level of a critical problem in De veritate, q. l, a. 9 c. [In CV-C (see Editors' Preface) Lonergan changed 'the critical problem' to 'a critical problem.'] 38 De veritate, q. 1, a. l; Summa theologiae, l, q. 16, a. l; see Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l sol.

39 Summa theologiae, l, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m. 40 Depotentia, q. 9, a. 5 c.: '... vox exterior significat... conceptum intellectus quo mediante significat rem; ut cum dico "homo" vel "homo est animal"' ['the outer word means ... the concept of the intellect, through the mediation of which it means the thing; as when I say "man" or "man is an animal"']; De potentia, q. 8, a. l c.: '... vox enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum (the faculty), neque speciem intelligibilem, neque actum intellectus, sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem' ['the outer word does not mean the intellect nor the intelligible species nor the act of intellect but the conception of the intellect through the mediation of which it is related to the thing']. 41 De veritate, q. 3, a. 2 c.: '... quidditas ... compositio vel divisio ... quoddam operatum ipsius; per quod tamen intellectus venit in cognitionem rei exterioris'

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A sixth element in the general notion of an inner word is its necessity for an act termed intelligere, which, I believe, is to be taken as meaning 'understanding.'42 Quoad se, this necessity is universal, holding true in the case of God, of angels, and of men.43 However, so far as our natural knowledge of God goes, we cannot affirm that his understanding involves the procession of an inner word.44 Why that is so is to be explained, I believe, only by an exact grasp of the psychology of the inner word. A seventh element in the general notion is that the inner word of the human mind emerges at the end of a process of thoughtful inquiry,45 that,

['the quiddity (like) the composition or division (is) the product of the intellect, but through it the intellect comes to knowledge of the external thing']; De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3m: '... conceptio intellectus est media inter intellectum et rem intellectam, quia ea mediante operatio intellectus pertingit ad rem' ['the conception of the intellect mediates between the intellect and the thing understood, since through its mediation the operation of the intellect attains to the thing']; Depotentia, q. 8, a. l c.: '... conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem; propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat' ['the conception of the intellect is ordered to the thing understood as to an end; since the reason that the intellect forms in itself the conception of the thing is this, that it might know the thing understood']; Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 53: '... ex hoc quod intentio intellecta sit similis alicui rei, sequitur quod intellectus, formando huiusmodi intentionem, rem illam intelligat' ['from the fact that the understood intention is similar to something we know, it follows that the intellect, by forming an intention of this kind, understands the thing']; Quaestiones quodlibitales, 5, a. 9, ad im: '... intellectus ... format verbum ad hoc quod intelligat rem' ['the intellect... forms a word for this purpose, that it might understand the thing']; Superloannem, c. l, lect. l: '... in ipso expresso et formato videt naturam rei intellectae' ['in (the word) expressed and formed it sees the nature of the understood thing']. 42 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 5m; Depotentia, q. 8, a. l; q. 9, a. 5; Summa theologiae, l, q. 27, a. 1 c. 43 Super loannem, c. l, lect. l. 44 Depotentia, q. 8, a. l, ad 12m; De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 5m; see Summa theologiae, l, q. 32, a. l, ad 2m. 45 Super loannem, c. l, lect. l: '... cvim volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam: et sic est in omnibus aliis quae a nobis intelliguntur: nisi forte in primis principiis, quae cum sint simpliciter nota, absque discursu rationis statim sciuntur. Quamdiu ergo sic ratiocinando intellectus iactatur hac atque iliac, necdum formatio perfecta est, nisi quando ipsam rationem rei perfecte conceperit: et tune primo habet rationem rei perfectae, et tune primo habet rationem verbi. Et inde est quod in anima nostra est cogitatio, per quam significatur ipse discursus inquisitionis, et verbum, quod est iam formatum secundum perfectam contemplationem veritatis' ['when I want to conceive the intelligibility of a stone, it is necessary

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until it emerges, we do not yet understand but are thinking in order to understand,46 that it emerges simultaneously with the act of understanding,47 that it is distinct from understanding,48 that it is a product and effect of the act of understanding,49 that it is an expression of the cognitional con-

46

47

48 49

that I come to it by a process of reasoning; and so it is in all other things that are understood by us, except perhaps in the case of first principles, which, since they are known simply, are known at once without any discursive reasoning process. Therefore as long as the intellect is thrown this way and that in a process of reasoning, its formation is not yet finished, not until it conceives the intelligibility of the thing perfectly; and only then does it have the intelligibility of the complete thing, and only then does it have the intelligibility of the word. And therefore it is that in our soul we have thinking, by which is meant the discursive process of inquiry, and we have a word, which is now formed according to the perfect contemplation of the truth.'] Depotentia, q. 9, a. 9 c.: 'Ipsum enim intelligere non perficitur nisi aliquid in mente concipiatur, quod dicitur verbum; non enim dicimur intelligere, sed cogitare ad intelligendum, antequam conceptio aliqua in mente nostra stabiliatur' ['The act of understanding has not reached its completion unless something is conceived in the mind, which is called the word; for we are not said to understand, but to think for the sake of understanding, before some conception is established in our mind']. There is a variant - 'cognoscere potius aliquid intelligendo' ['to know rather by understanding something'] to be found in the compilation of texts, mostly from Aquinas, under the title De intellectu et intelligibili, Opusc. LXIII (ed. Mandonnet, V, 377). For the distinction between intelligere proprie and intelligere communiter, see De veritate, q. l, a. 12 c. See Super III Sententiarum, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2 sol. l; Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 8, a. l c. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 14, §3 (ed. Leon., XV, 563 5-10, 20-21): 'Similiter etiam verbum quod in mente nostra concipitur, non exit de potentia in actum nisi quatenus intellectus noster procedit de potentia in actum. Nee tamen verbum oritur ex intellectu nostro nisi prout existit in actu: simul autem cum in actu existit, est in eo verbum conceptum ... intellectus in actu nunquam est sine verbo' ['So too the word which is conceived in our mind does not pass from potency to act except insofar as our intellect passes from potency to act. But neither does the word arise from our intellect except insofar as it exists in act; but as soon as intellect exists in act, the word is conceived in it... the intellect in act is never without a word']. One may recite a definition by rote without understanding; but unless one really understands, one cannot define; and as soon as one understands, one has defined. Depotentia, q. 8, a. l c. and q. 9, a. 5 c. are the most insistent texts on this point. De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c.: Tpsa enim conceptio est effectus actus intelligendi' ['The concept is the effect of the act of understanding']. See q. 3, a. 2; q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m; Summa theologiae, l, q. 34, a. l, ad 3m: '... intellectus hominis verbo, quod concipit intelligendo lapidem, lapidem dicit' ['the intellect of man, by the word which it conceives by understanding a stone, expresses the stone'].

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tent of the act of understanding,50 that the more perfect the one act of understanding, the more numerous the inner words it embraces in a single view.51 The problem here is twofold: (i) Does intelligere mean understanding? (2) What is understanding both in itself and in its expression? The contention of this study will be that Aquinas was speaking of understanding and that an interpretation in terms of general metaphysics misses the point; to follow Aquinas here, one must practice introspective rational psychology; without that, one no more can know the created image of the Blessed Trinity, as Aquinas conceived it, than a blind man can know colors.1 2

Definition

In the foregoing section we approached the Thomist concept of inner word in the omnivorous fashion of the fact collector. Under seven headings we 50 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c.: '... aliquid expressum a notitia mentis' ['something expressed by the knowledge of the mind']. See Summa theologiae, l, q. 34, a. l c.: 'Ipse autem conceptus cordis de ratione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet a notitia concipientis' ['It is of the essence of the concept of the heart that it proceed from another, that is, from the knowledge of the one conceiving']. 51 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. 4; q. 55, a. 3; q. 58, aa. 2-4; q. 12, aa. 8, 1O. Parallels to these texts abound; see also the series on the plurality of divine ideas (note 26 above). Briefly, there are two points. The first (Sententia libriEthicorum, l, lect. 11 ad fin.) is that Trincipium enim videtur esse plus quam dimidium totius. Quia scilicet omnia alia quae restant continentur in principiis. Et hoc est quod subdit, quod per unum principium bene intellectum et consideratum, multa fiunt manifesta eorum quae quaeruntur in scientia' ['A principle seems to be more than half of the whole, since all the rest is contained in the principles. And this is what he adds, saying that through one principle well understood and considered, many of those things that are sought in knowledge are made manifest']. The second is that a process of reasoning ends, not in the multiplicity of the process, but in a synthetic view of the whole (Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, a. 7 c.): '... procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones non simul utrumque considerant... Unde manifestum est quod, quando cognoscitur prirnum, adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas; et tune cessat discursus' ['those proceeding from principles to conclusions do not consider the two simultaneously ... So it is clear that, when the first is known, the second is still not known. And thus the second is not known in the first, but from the first. But the term of the discursive process is reached when the second is seen in the first, after effects have been resolved into their causes: and then the discursive activity ceases']. Numerous texts on this matter have been collected byjulien Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio selon s. Thomas d'Aquin (Ottawa: Institut d'etudes medievales; Paris: Vrin, 1936) 247-80.

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listed most of the matter relevant to the inquiry, and in the references we supplied the reader with indicadons of the sources of fuller and more accurate information.5* From the catalogue there emerged our thesis, that we must begin by grasping the nature of the act of understanding, that thence we shall come to a grasp of the nature of inner words, their reladon to language, and their role in our knowledge of reality. Now understanding is of two kinds: there is the direct understanding, parent of the definition, in which the mind clicks, one gets the idea, one feels like shouting 'Eureka!' with Archimedes; there is also a reflective understanding, parent of judgment, in which one sees that one cannot but judge something to be so. Our first concern will be the former; our second chapter will deal with the latter; the third chapter will turn to the metaphysical analysis of intellect; the 52 It is to be observed that Aquinas discussed the inner word, not directly in his general treatments of intellect, but in trinitarian passages and in discussions of the plurality of divine ideas. I should say that the theological issues forced a development of the basic Aristotelian materials. Further, it is in the De veritateand in the discussion of the plurality of divine ideas (q. 3, a. 2) that the distinction between the twofold form or species is first enunciated effectively even though the general idea is not new (see Super I Sententiarum, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2m; d. 35, q. i, a. 2 sol.). Finally, though the idea of an inner word is basically the same in the Sentences and in later works, still, since the grip is not so firm, statements occur which hardly can be reconciled with the later position. The position is basically the same: a distinction is drawn between the act of understanding ('simplex intuitus intellectus in cognitione intelligibilis' ['the simple intuition of the intellect in the knowledge of the intelligible']) and the ordering of this intelligible to its manifestation; the inner word is some emanation from the intellect as making known (Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. i; Super IISententiarum, d. 11, q. 2, a. 3); it adds something like thought to the simple intuition of intellect (Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3m); it follows upon the intuition of intellect (ibid. q. 2, a. 3); it is the 'species concepta in qua est similitude eius quod dicitur' ['conceived species in which there is the likeness of that which is said'] and 'quaedam similitudo in intellectu ipsius rei intellectae' ['a certain likeness in the intellect of the thing itself that has been understood'] (ibid.); it follows upon some intellectual light - at least that of the agent intellect and of first principles; consequently, a conclusion is an inner word but not the principles themselves (d. 34, q. 2, a. unica, ad 2m). But I do not think that later Aquinas would have said that the 'species concepta interim' ['species inwardly conceived'] is not an inner word unless it is ordained to some manifestation (Super IISententiarum, d. 11, q. 2, a. 3 sol.), that it is not the divine essence as intellect or as understood, but as medium of understanding (Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. l, ad 4m), that it may be the operation of understanding as such (ibid., a. 2 sol. i). See J. Chenevert, 'Le verbum dans le Commentaire sur les Sentences de saint Thomas d'Aquin,' Sciences ecclesiastiques 13 (1961) 191-223; 359-90.

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fourth to issues that are at once metaphysical and psychological; the fifth to Thomist trinitarian theory. Such in outline is the plan.8 In his zeal to prick complacent bubbles of unconscious ignorance, Socrates made it a practice to ask people just what things are. What is virtue? What is moderation? courage? justice? What is science? On Plato's showing, Socrates had the formula for the sixty-four-dollar question,'1 but it was Aristotle who made capital of it. For Aristotle, it would seem, realized that the real catch was in the form of the question. It may be difficult to define this or that virtue; but what makes things hopeless is the difficulty of saying what one wishes to find out when one asks, even of the most familiar things, 'What is it?' Accordingly, one finds the second book of the Posterior Analytics opening with an attempt to fix the meaning of this type of question. Any question, we are told - and so any answer and any item of knowledge - can be listed under one of four headings. Either one asks (i) whether there is an X, or (2) what is an X, or (3) whether Xis Y, or (4) why Xis Y. The superficial eye will pair off the first two questions together and the last two; but the significant parallel is between the first and the third, and between the second and the fourth. In modern language the first and third are empirical questions: they ask about matters of fact; they can be answered by an appeal to observation or experiment. But the fourth question is not empirical; it asks for a cause or reason; and, at least in some cases, the second question is identical with the fourth, and hence it too is not empirical, but likewise asks for a cause or reason. Thus, 'Why does light refract?' and 'What is refraction?' are, not two questions, but one and the same. Again, to take Aristotle's stock example, 'What is an eclipse of the moon?' and 'Why is the moon thus darkened?' are, not two questions, but one and the same. Say that the earth intervenes between the sun and the moon, blocking off the light received by the latter from the former, and at once you know why the moon is thus darkened, and what an eclipse is. The second and fourth questions, then, ask about causes; but a cause supplies the middle term in the scientific syllogism; and if the cause exists, its consequent necessarily exists. Hence, all four questions are questions about the middle terms of scientific syllogisms. The first and third ask whether there is a relevant middle term; the second and fourth ask what the relevant middle term is.M 53 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 2, 8gb 36 - Qua 34 (Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Posteriorum analyticorum, 2, lect. i); any of the four causes may be a middle term (Posterior Analytics, II, 11, 94b 20-26; Aquinas, lect. 9). Aquinas (lect. l, § 408) remarked of the four questions: 'ad quae quattuor reduci potest quidquid est quaeribile vel scibile' ['to these four we can reduce whatever can be asked or whatever can be known'] and added that the four questions

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But this answer only raises a further question. Granted that we know what is meant by 'What is X?' when that question can be recast into an equivalent 'Why Vis X?' yet one may ask, quite legitimately, whether there always is a V. It is simple enough to substitute 'Why does light refract?' for 'What is refraction?' But tell me, please, what I am to substitute for 'What is a man?' or 'What is a house?' A good question needs a roundabout answer, and Aristotle considered that question good enough for the answer to be attempted, not in the Posterior Analytics, but only in the Metaphysics. Let us go back to Socrates. In the Meno he proved a reminiscence of the ideas by summoning a slave and questioning him about a diagram. Aristotle was impressed, more by the questions than by the alleged reminiscence, but most of all by the diagram.1 At least he made grasp of the intelligible a matter of insight into the sensible or the imagined.54 In the Posterior Analytics he remarked that, if a man were on the moon during its eclipse, he would not have to ask the first question - whether there is an eclipse - for the fact would be obvious; moreover, he would not even have to ask the second question - what an eclipse is - for that too would be obvious; he would see the earth cutting in between the sun and himself, and so at once would grasp the cause and the universal.55 Grasping the cause is, not an ocular vision, but an insight into the sensible data. Grasping the universal is the production of the inner word that expresses that insight. And, Aquinas explains, if one reached the universal from such brief acquaintance, that would be a matter of conjecturing that eclipses of the moon always occurred in that fashion.56 A similar point comes up in the Metaphysics, in the passage that is the source of Aquinas's repeated 'unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu.' Aristotle made this point from the instance of geometrical problems; they are difficult when the construction is merely in potency; but draw in the construction, and one solves the problem almost by inspection. Stare at a triangle as long as you please, and you will not be any nearer seeing that its three angles must equal two right assigned in the Topics are only subdivisions of the two empirical questions here considered. He employed the four questions in proving a natural desire for the beatific vision in the angels (Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 50). [Henceforth references to Aquinas's commentary on the Posterior Analytics will be given in the form In IIPost, anal.; the paragraph numbers that Lonergan gives are from the Marietti edition.] 54 Aristotle, De anima, III, 8, 432a 3-10; see also 7, 43ia 14, 43ib 2 (Aquinas, In III Deanima, lect. 13, §791; lect. 12, §§772, 777). 55 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 2, goa 24-31 (Aquinas, In IIPost, anal, lect. l, §416). 56 In IIPost, anal., lect. l, §417.

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angles. But through the vertex draw a line parallel to the base, and the equality of alternate angles ends the matter at once.57 The act of understanding leaps forth when the sensible data are in a suitable constellation. We may now revert to our main problem - how to transform questions of the second type into questions of the fourth type in such ultimate and simple cases as, What is a man? What is a house? The clue lies in the fact of insight into sensible data. For an insight, an act of understanding, is a matter of knowing a cause.58 Presumably, in ultimate and simple cases, the insight is the knowledge of a cause that stands between the sensible data and the concept whose definition is sought. Though Aristotle's predecessors knew little of such a cause - for the cause in question is the formal cause59 - Aristotle himself made it a key factor in his system; and it was to the formal cause that he appealed when, in the Metaphysics, he attempted to settle the meaning of such questions as, What is a man? What is a house?60 The meaning is, Why is this sort of body a man? Why are stones and bricks, arranged in a certain way, a house? What is it that causes the matter, sensibly perceived, to be a thing? To Scholastics the answers are self-evident. That which makes this type of body to be a man is a human soul. That which makes these stones and bricks to be a house is an artificial form. That which makes matter, in general, to be a thing is the causa essendi, the formal cause.61 The Aristotelian formulation of understanding is the scientific syllogism (syllogismus faciens scire), in which the middle term is the real cause of the presence of the predicate in the subject. But the genesis of the terms involved in scientific syllogisms follows the same model: sense provides the subject, insight into sensible data the middle, and conceptualization the predicate, which is the term whose genesis was sought. There remains a final note. The core of meaning in questions of the second type has been determined by transposing them into questions of the 57 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 9, 10513 22-33 (In IXMetaphys., lect. 10, §§ 1888-93). 58 The Aristotelian analysis of understanding (epistasthai), Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 7lb 9-19 (In I Post, anal, lect. 4), is first its identification with knowing a cause and secondly its expression in scientific syllogism. The Posterior Analytics simply rings the changes on that analysis; the rest of the logical works serve to narrow attention down to it as to the essential; the nonlogical works apply it. Hence, I should say that to miss the point here is the most effective way of missing everything. 59 Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 7, 988a 18 - 988b 5 (In IMetaphys., lect. ll, esp. § 175); Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 10, 9933 11-24 (In IMetaphys., lect. 17, esp. §272). 60 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 17, 10413 9-32 (In VIIMetaphys., lect. 17, § 1649-51). 61 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 17, 10410 4-8 (In VIIMetaphys., lect. 17, §§ 1666-68).

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fourth type. 'What is a man?' is equivalent to 'Why is Va man?' - where V stands for the sensible data of a man, and the answer is the formal cause, the soul. Now this does not imply that one is to answer the question, What is a man? by the proposition, A man is his soul. That answer is patently false. The formal cause is only part of the whole, and part can never be predicated of the whole. The fallacy that leads to this false conclusion is that, while we have transposed 'What is X?' into 'Why Vis X?' we have yet to transpose the formal cause, which answers 'Why Vis X?' back to the answer of 'What is X?' That transposition is from formal cause to essence or quiddity. Neglect of this second transposition by Aristotle has led to considerable obscurity: for among the meanings of 'substance' Aristotle will write the causa essendi, the to ti en einai, the form.62 Very accurately Aquinas hit upon the root of the confusion: 'Essentia enim et forma in hoc conveniunt quod secundum utrumque dicitur esse illud quo aliquid est. Sed forma refertur ad materiam, quam facit esse in actu; quidditas autem refertur ad suppositum, quod significatur ut habens talem essentiam.'63 Questions of the second type ask about the suppositum: for example, What is a man? Transposed to the fourth type, they ask about the matter: for example, Why is this type of body a man? Common to both questions is inquiry into the quo aliquid est, which, relative to the matter, is the form, but relative to the suppositum, is the essence, that is, the form plus the common matter.64 3

Quod Quid Est

Quod quid est is a medieval attempt to find three Latin words corresponding to the Greek to ti estin; similarly, quod quid erat esse is a literal translation of to 62 E.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 8, ioi7b 10-16. 63 ['Essence and form are alike in this, that that by which something is said to be can be understood of both of them. But form is related to matter, which it brings to act; and quiddity is related to the supposit, which is identified as having such and such an essence'] In VMetaphys., lect. 10, §904. 64 There is a parallel ambiguity with regard to species (In VIIMetaphys., lect. 9, § !473): 'Sciendum tamen est, quod nulla materia, nee communis, nee individuata, secundum se, se habet ad speciem prout sumitur pro forma. Sed secundum quod species sumitur pro universali, sicut hominem dicimus esse speciem, sic materia communis per se pertinet ad speciem, non autem materia individualis in qua natura speciei accipitur' ['It must be noted, however, that no matter, whether common or individual, in itself pertains to the species taken as the form. But insofar as the species is taken as the universal - for example, as when we say that 'man' is a species - the common matter pertains per se to the species, but not the individual matter in which the nature of the species is received'].

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ti en einai; finally, quidditas is of medieval coinage and differs from the preceding as abstract from concrete. It will be convenient to refer to these five as Qv 7\, Q2, T2, and Q3 respectively. For our present intention is to write a note on the usage of these terms, and in that our purpose is to confirm the interpretation of Aristotle set forth in the preceding section. The argument here invoked is, then, just a challenge: such and such are the pieces of this jigsaw puzzle; put them together in some other fashion if you can. T"j and T2 are twists of the Greek language which Aristotle turned to technical account. Though they have distinct spheres of influence, still their connotations are closely related and their denotations overlap. That both terms exist is to be accounted for, I would suggest, by the fact that 7\ - the question of the second type - has its meaning defined by transposition to a question of the fourth type, while the answer to this fourth-type question is properly T2. Thus the principal meaning of 7\ is essence, and the principal meaning of T2 is form; of this difference Aristotle was aware, but his emphasis was not on the difference but on the radical equivalence. His argument was against the Platonists, who failed to grasp both insight into phantasm and the idea of formal cause, who consequently wished to derive essences 7\ - not from insight into the form of sensible objects, but from a noetic heaven. Such a controversial interest would suffice to direct attention away from sharp and perfect differentiation, which, in any case, is more the work of the textbook-writing pedant than of the original genius.65 T2 ranges in meaning from the concrete and individual form of a particular thing to the abstract core of identical meaning in a scientific term. To begin from the latter, we learn in the Topics that the idion is convertible with its subject but does not reveal the T2 of the subject,66 while the hows is both convertible with the subject and reveals the T2 of the subject, so that its criterion is an identity of meaning with the meaning of the subject term.67 At the same time we are warned that if one has the horismos, then one will have identity of meaning; but the converse does not hold.68 Now this negative criterion of T2 is employed in the Metaphysics; consideration 65 J.H. Newman put the point, not without a touch of exaggeration, when he wrote, 'It is the second-rate men, though most useful in their place, who prove, reconcile, finish, and explain.' [John Henry Cardinal Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (first publication, London, 1870; Lonergan is quoting from this edition, p. 374).] 66 Aristotle, Topics, I, 5, iO2a 18; I, 8, 1030 9-10; V, 3, I3ib 37 - 1323 9; V, 4, 1333 i, 6, 9. 67 Ibid. I, 4, loib 19, 21; I, 5, lOib 39. 68 Ibid. I, 5, iO2a 14-17. On definition and its relation to scientific syllogism, see Posterior Analytics, II, 8-10 (Aquinas, In IIPost, anal., lect. 7 & 8).

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of the candidacy of T2 for the role of substance opens with some logical exercises to the effect that 'being you' is not 'being a musician,' and 'being a surface' is not 'being white.'69 But T2 is also a frequent name for the formal cause of a particular thing: if particulars are discrete from their formal causes, they could neither be nor be known.70 Is this merely a blind leap from the remotely abstract to the concrete? Hardly, for the proof in the Physics that there are just four causes turns upon a consideration of material cause, efficient cause, final cause, and, no doubt, what is meant is the formal cause, but the only thing mentioned is 7\: the cause from which the geometer argues is the definition.71 A similar tendency is to be observed in other treatments of the four causes, though in the other treatments the formal cause is named not 7\ but T2.72 The naturalness of such transitions appears more clearly in Aristotle's environment and problems than in an abstract discussion held over twenty centuries later. Let us turn to these antecedents. Aristotle rebuked Democritus for advancing the statement that the morphe was revealed by shape and color; the shape and color of a fresh corpse are the shape and color of a man; but a fresh corpse is not a man.73 On the other hand, Empedocles was applauded more than once for his discernment in affirming that the substance and nature of a bone is, not some one of its elements, or all of them, but the proportion of their combination.74 The proportion is named logos and T2, and Aristotle's objection was that Empedocles should have held, not just bones, but all natures to be such. Aristotle himself, after explaining the meaning of 7\ in the Metaphysics, went on to remark that a syllable is not just its component vowels and consonants, that flesh is not just fire and earth; there is a further factor, which is not an 69 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 4, iO2Qb 13-23 (Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 3, §§ 1308-10). 70 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 6 (Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 5). 71 Aristotle, Physics, II, 7, lQ8a 14-18; see Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Physicorum, II, lect. 10 ad fin., where Aquinas summarized the argument in terms of ontological form. [Subsequent references will be in the form In IlPhys.] 72 Aristotle, Physics, II, 3, I94b 16 - lQ5b 27 (Aquinas, In IlPhys., lect. 5); Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 11, 943 20-36 (Aquinas, In IIPost, anal, lect. 9); Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 3, 9833 26-31 (Aquinas, In I Metaphys., lect. 4, §70); Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 2, 10133 27, b 23, b 33 (Aquinas, In VMetaphys., lect. 2, §764; lect. 3, §779; ibid., §786). 73 Aristotle, Departibus animalium, I, i, 64Ob 31-36. See also ibid. 6413 18-21; and De anima, II, l, 412 b 2O-22 (Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 2, §239). 74 Aristotle, Departibus animalium, I, i, 6403 20-24: Metaphysics, I, 10, 9933 17 (Aquinas, In I Metaphys., lect. 17, §272); see Aristotle, Physics, II, 2, 1943 2O (Aquinas, In IlPhys., lect. 4).

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element, but a principle and cause - a causa essendi - which in natural things is the nature.75 Thus, a sense is an accidental form, for a sense is to its sense organ as soul is to body;76 but though a form, a sense is also named the logos, or proportion, of the organ;77 and this is considered to account for the fact that violent light, sound, heat, and so on, injure not merely the sense organ but the sense as well, or again for the fact that, though plants are alive and may freeze, yet they do not feel cold because their matter is not in the right proportion.78 But the crowning sample is the Aristotelian triumph, the definition of soul: soul is the substance as form of a natural body potentially alive;79 it is the first entelechy of a natural body potentially alive,80 or of a natural and organic body;81 it is the substance according to reason82 and that is the T2 of a body of such a kind,83 for if an eye were an animal, its soul would be sight.84 But one must not be content with an empirical definition.85 Just as 'squaring the rectangle' may be defined empirically as finding a square equal in area to a given rectangle, or causally as finding the mean proportional between the unequal sides of the rectangle - where the former definition follows logically from the latter (for if A : C:: C: B, then AB= C 2 ) 86 - so too the soul may be defined empirically as the first act of a natural and organic body, but causally as the ultimate principle of our living, feeling, and thinking - where the former 75 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 17, iO4ib 11-32 (Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 17, 1672-80). 76 Aristotle, Deanima, II, l, 412b 17-24 (Aquinas, InllDeanima, lect. 2, §239). If the whole soul is in each of the parts, it might seem to follow from this Aristotelian position that each of the parts of an animal was equally an animal. Hence, when he wrote Super I Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 5, a. 3 sol., Aquinas seems to have considered the Aristotelian position silly, but had found a saving distinction by the time he wrote Summa theologiae, l, q. 76, a. 8, ob. 3 and ad 3m. (In the Ottawa edition, 'anima' instead of 'animal' - last word in objection seems a mere misprint.) 77 Aristotle,Deanima, II, 12,424327 (Aquinas, InllDeanima, lect. 24, §555); Aristotle, De anima, III, 2, 426b 7 (Aquinas, In IIIDe anima, lect. 2, §598). The significant word is, of course, not the translation 'proportion,' but the Greek logos. 78 Aristotle, De anima, II, 12, 4243 28 - 424b 3 (Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 24, §§556-57). 79 Aristotle, De anima, II, l, 4123 20. 80 Ibid, a 27. 81 Ibid, b 5. 82 Ibid, b 9: ousia gar he hata ton logon. 83 Ibid, b 9-ll; see Metaphysics, VII, 10, lO35b 14 (Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 10, §1484). 84 Aristotle, De anima, II, l, 4l2b 18. 85 Ibid. II, 2, 4133 12. 86 Ibid.; see Posterior Analytics, II, 8-10 (Aquinas, In II Post, anal, lect. 7 & 8).

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definition follows logically from the latter (for the ultimate principle of our living is the first act of our matter.)87 Hence the soul is not matter or subject, but logos tis an eie kai eidos;^ again, the soul is an entelechy and the logos of what potentially has such a nature.89 Now I think the main point is merely missed by anyone who sees in such passages no more than confused leaping back and forth between ontological and logical considerations. Why was Aquinas able to affirm that intellect penetrates to the inwardness of things? Only because Aristode had made his point, against the old naturalists and with some help from number-loving Pythagoreans and defining Platonists,90 that what is known by intellect is a partial constituent of the realities first known by sense. For the materialist, the real is what he knows before he understands or thinks: it is the sensitively integrated object that is reality for a dog; it is the sure and firm-set earth on which I tread, which is so reassuring to the sense of reality; and on that showing, intellect does not penetrate to the inwardness of things but is a merely subjective, if highly useful, principle of activity. To the Pythagoreans the discovery of harmonic ratios revealed that numbers and their proportions, though primarily ideas, nonetheless have a role in making things what they are; and for Aristode the ratio of two to one was the form of the diaposon.91 Socratic interest in definition reinforced this tendency,92 but the Platonist sought the reality known by thought, not in this world, but in another. Aristotle's basic thesis was the objective reality of what is known by understanding: it was a commonsense position inasmuch as common sense always assumes that to be so; but it was not a commonsense position inasmuch as common sense would not be able J to enunciate it or even to know with any degree of accuracy just what it means and implies. Aristode is the representative of unconscious common sense; but conscious common sense found voice in the eminent Catholic doctor and professor of philosophy whom I heard ask, 'Will someone please tell me what all this fuss is about ms?'k When, then, Aristotle calls the soul a logos, 87 Aristotle, De anima, II, 2, 4l4a 4-27 (Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 4, §§27175). It is not Aristotle but Aquinas that dots the I's and crosses the T's on the twofold definition of soul as an application of the pure theory of the Posterior Analytics. 88 Aristotle, De anima, II, 2, 4143 14. 89 Ibid. 27. 90 Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 8, g8gb 29 - 99Oa 12 (Aquinas, In IMetaphys., lect. 13, §§202-203); Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 7, g88a 34 - g88b 5 (Aquinas, In I Metaphys., lect. ll, §§175-78). 91 Aristotle, Physics, II, 3, I94b 27-28 (Aquinas, In IlPhys., lect. 5); Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 2, ioi3b 33 (Aquinas, In VMetaphys., lect. 3, §786). 92 Aristotle, Metaphysics, XIII, 4, iO78b 9-34. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

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he is stating his highly original position, not indeed with the full accuracy which his thought alone made possible, but in a generic fashion which suited his immediate purpose; and it is that generic issue that remains the capital issue, for the denial of soul today is really the denial of the objectivity of the intelligible,1 the denial that understanding, knowing a cause, is knowing anything real. Aquinas employed quod quid est, quod quid erat esse, and quidditas - Q15 Q2, and Q3. But Q2 occurs only rarely outside the Aristotelian commentaries,93 and even there the whole tendency is to identify it with Qr A discussion will begin with Q2 as its topic, and a few lines later the discussion will be about Q^94 and however disconcerting this may be, at least it accounts for the emergence of such intermediate forms as quod quid est esse and quid est esse.951 have attempted to put together a representative, if not exhaustive, account of Thomist usage by listing the references to T2 in Ross's index to the Metaphysics and checking the corresponding passages in the Thomist commentary. In some instances of T2 Aquinas employed, not so much either Qj or Q 2 or Qy but/oma or causa formalist In other instances of T2 Aquinas employed Q2 where the meaning of the latter is form, formal cause, formal principle, though this may be obscured or may be made doubtful by a later switch from form to essence. Thus, we are told that Q2 was not employed by Aristotle in his Categories, that it means 'neque ... genus neque species neque individuum, sed horum omnium formale principium.'97 More or less in this sense, Q 2 is generated only per acddens;98 it is

93 Le 'De ente et essentia'de s. Thomas d'Aquin, ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (Kain, Belgium: Bibliotheque thomiste 8, 1926) c. i, p. 3. 'Et quia id per quod res constituitur in proprio genere uel specie est hoc quod significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essentie a philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur; et hoc est quod Philosophus frequenter nominal quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid' ['And since that through which a thing is constituted in its own genus or species is that which is meant by the definition that tells us what the thing is, thus it is that the word 'essence' is changed by philosophers into the word 'quiddity'; and this is also what the Philosopher frequently calls quod quid erat esse, that is, that through which a being exists with such and such a quiddity']. 94 For example, In VII Metaphys., lect. 3, §§ 1308-10; lect. 5, §§ 1363, 1366, 1378. 95 In IVMetaphys., lect. 7, §627; In VMetaphys., lect. 7, §864. 96 In I Metaphys., lect. 4, §70; lect. ll, § 175; lect. 17, §272. 97 ['neither genus nor species nor an individual but the formal principle of all these'] In VIIMetaphys., lect. 2, § 1275. Note that the question is the nature of substance; see § 1270, where the same term is taken as 'quidditas, vel essentia, sive natura rei' ['quiddity, or the essence or nature of a thing']. 98 Ibid. lect. 7, § 1421; but see § 1422, and lect. 15, § 1608.

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soul;99 it is the artist's idea;100 it is what pertains to form;101 it is proper to a single subject;102 it is a principle and cause.103 At the opposite pole, Q 2 ' s more or less the same as Qp and certainly it is not form, for it is predicable of the whole.104 In a passage in which Aristotle argued from the properties of 7\ to those of T2, Aquinas maintained a distinction between Q^ and <22, though it does not seem that Q 2 here means form.105 Finally, there is the identification of Q2with substance. This occasions no difficulty with regard to separate substances which are pure forms;106 but Metaphysics, book 7, deals with material substances,107 and a measure of ambiguity is introduced into the whole book by the fact that the center of interest is not the composite, nor the matter, but substance as form108 which shortly is referred to as T2.109To some extent this accounts for Thomist corrections of Aristotle's speech, so that the commentary states 'substantia, idest forma';110 however, the ambiguity is perhaps really more fundamental, for such corrections are not confined to book y. 111 It is to be noted that substance and Q2are not subjective universals but objective entities: 'quod quid erat esse est substantia, et ratio significativa eius est definitio'; 112 'substantia rei quae est quod quid erat esse est principium et causa.'113 Finally, with reference to the answer to the question, What is a man? there is a veritable cascade of terms: substantia, forma, species, causa materiae, principium et causa, quod quid erat esse, and quidditas all occur within the space of two short paragraphs.114 99 Ibid. lect. 10, § 1487; but see § 1491. 100 Ibid. lect. 6, § 1404; but recall that the artist's idea is an inner word that has been thought out and is not strictly a form. 101 Ibid. lect. 13, §1567. 102 Ibid. §1577. 103 Ibid. lect. 17, §§1648, 1668, 1678. 104 In FVMetaphys., lect. 7, §625; In VMetaphys., lect. 19, § 1048; In VIIMetaphys., lect. 3, § 1309; ibid., lect. 5, § 1378; ibid., lect. 7, § 1422; ibid., lect. 1O, § 1493. 105 In VIIMetaphys., lect. 4, §§1331~34, 1339-41, 1352-55106 In VIIIMetaphys., lect. 3, § 1709. 107 In VIIMetaphys., lect. 1, § 1269. 108 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 3, 10293 26-33. 109 Ibid. 4, iO29b 12. no In VIIMetaphys., lect. 10, §§1484, 1487. 111 In IXMetaphys., lect. 5, § 1828. 112 ['quod quid erat esseis substance, and the concept denoting it is a definition'] In VIII Metaphys., lect. l, § 1685. 113 ['the substance of the thing, which is the quod quid erat esse, is principle and cause'] In VIIMetaphys., lect. 17, §1649. 114 In VIIMetaphys., lect. 17, §§ 1667-68: 'Et similiter cum quaerimus quid est homo, idem est ac si quaereretur propter quid hoc, scilicet Socrates, est homo? quia scilicet inest ei quidditas hominis. Aut etiam idem est ac si quaereretur propter quid corpus sic se habens, ut puta organicum, est homo?

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Thus, I think, Thomist usage may be summarized as follows.111 Quod quid est (QJ is or corresponds to the essence or essential definition. Quod quid erat esse (Q2) is also the essence or essential definition, but with a very special reference to the ground of essential definition, namely, the formal cause, so that at times it almost is, or simply is, the formal cause;115 and perhaps because of this uncertainty and ambiguity, the term appears so rarely outside the Aristotelian commentaries. Quidditas (Q3) strictly is an abstract term with Q^ as the corresponding concrete term: thus Qo is to form, as humanity is to the human soul;116 unlike form, it includes common matter;117 but this is only the proper meaning of Q3, for at times it is indistinHaec enim est materia hominis, sicut lapides et lateres domus. Quare manifestum est quod in talibus quaestionibus quaeritur "causa materiae" idest propter quid materia pertingat ad naturam eius quod defmitur. Hoc autem quaesitum quod est causa materiae "est species" scilicet forma qua aliquid est. Hoc autem "est substantia" idest ipsa substantia quae est quod quid erat esse. Et sic relinquitur quod propositum erat ostendere, scilicet quod substantia sit principium et causa.' ['Similarly, when we ask, What is a man? it is the same as if we were to ask why this being, namely Socrates, is a man, the answer being that there is in him the quiddity of a man. And it is also the same as if we were to ask why a certain organic body is a man. For this is the matter of a man, as stones and bricks are the matter of a house. Thus it is clear that in such questions we are asking about the 'cause of the matter,' that is, why the matter pertains to the nature of that which is being defined. What we are looking for in asking about the cause of the matter is the species, that is, the form by which something is. But this is substance, that is, that substance which is quod quid erat esse. And so we have what we intended to show, namely, that substance is a principle and cause.'] 115 In VMetaphys., lect. 2, §764: 'Et, quia unumquodque consequitur naturam vel generis vel speciei per formam suam, natura autem generis vel speciei est id quod significat defmitio, dicens quid est res, ideo forma est ratio ipsius "quod quid erat esse," idest defmitio per quam scitur quid est res. Quamvis enim in definitione ponantur aliquae partes materiales, tamen id quod est principale, in definitione, oportet quod sit ex parte formae. Et ideo haec est ratio quare forma est causa, quia perficit rationem quidditatis rei.' ['Because it is through form that something attains the nature of a genus or of a species, while the nature of genus or species is that which the definition signifies, saying what the thing is, therefore form is the meaning of that "quod quid erat esse," namely, the definition through which we know what a thing is. For, although in the definition there are posited some material parts, nonetheless that which is principal in the definition must be on the side of form. And therefore this is the reason why form is a cause, namely, since it completes the meaning of the quiddity of the thing.'] See In I Metaphys., lect. 4, §70, where however 'quod quid erat esse occurs presumably in the text but not in the commentary. 116 In VMetaphys., lect. 10, §902. 117 In VIIMetaphys., lect. 9, § 1473. See also lect. 2, § 1270; lect. 10, § 1491; lect. 15, § 1606.

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guishable from Qly a fact to be explained, at least in part, because it can be manipulated grammatically while Qx was practically indeclinable.118 To a superficial thinker, whose grasp of philosophic thought begins and ends with an exact use of language, the foregoing will appear as a horrid blemish. But the fact is that the original genius, precisely because he is original, finds all current usage inept for his purposes and succeeds remarkably if there is any possibility of grasping his meaning from his words; the possibility of exact expression of a philosophic position arises only long after the philosopher's death when his influence has molded the culture which is the background and vehicle of such expression. This is all the more true in matters that are at the very center of philosophic synthesis, and the quod quid est is at the very center of Aristotelian and Thomist thought. For quod quid est is the first and immediate middle term of scientific syllogistic demonstration; simultaneously, it is the goal and term of all positive inquiry, which begins from wonder about data119 and proceeds to the search for causes - material, efficient, final, but principally formal; for the formal cause makes matter a thing and, combined with common matter, is the essence of the thing. The quod quid est is the key idea not only in all logic and methodology, but also in all metaphysics. Simpliciter it is substance; for substance alone is a quid without qualification; accidents, too, are instances of quid, but only after a fashion, for their intelligibility is not merely what they are, but also includes an added relation to their subject; and this difference in their intelligibility and essence involves a generically different modus essendi.120 There follows the logico-ontological parallel: as methodology moves to discovery of the quid, so motion and generation move towards its reality; as demonstration establishes properties from the quid, so real essences are the real grounds of real properties. Nor is there only parallel; there is also interaction: the real is the cause of knowledge;121 inversely, the idea of the technician or artist is the cause of the technical or artistic product;122 and for Aquinas the latter is 118 For example, De veritate, q. i, a. 12 c., where the argument moves from 'essentia' to 'quidditas,' and then on to 'quod quid est' without any apparent difference of meaning. 119 In IMetaphys., lect. l, §§2-4; lect. 3, §§54~55, §§66-67. 120 In VII Metaphys., lect. 4. A less dialectical instance than the snub nose may make the matter clearer: the intelligibility of circularity is its necessary consequence from equality of radii; but unless one adds the subject 'plane,' that intelligibility will not define the circle nor circularity. Substance is a quid on its own; but ontological accident is not. 121 In IXMetaphys., lect. ll, §§ 1897-1900. 122 In VIIMetaphys., lect. 8, §§ 1450-52. See the whole argument, Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 7-9 (Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 6-8).

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the prior consideration, for God is artisan of the universe. Even in this brief and rough delineation, one can perceive the magnificent sweep of genius. Now the issues we have been agitating in this section lie behind this synthesis: the essential definition proceeds from an act of understanding; the real thing is what it is because form has actuated matter. The Aristotelian term T2 was a logical effort to isolate understanding and form, and one has only to consider the difficulties of such isolation to grasp why Aquinas dropped this Aristotelian effort as abortive and proceeded on lines of his own. Because the act of understanding - the intelligere proprie - is prior to, and cause of, conceptualization, because expression is only through conceptualization, any attempt to fix the act of understanding, except by way of introspective description, involves its own partial failure; for any such attempt is an expression, and expression is no longer understanding and already concept. Again, in a sense, the act of understanding as an insight into phantasm is knowledge of form: but the form so known does not correspond to the philosophic concept of form;" insight is to phantasm as form is to matter; but in that proportion, form is related to prime matter, but insight is related to sensible qualities; strictly, then, it is not true that insight is grasp of form; rather, insight is the grasp of the object in an inward aspect such that the mind, pivoting0 on the insight, is able to conceive, not without labor, the philosophic concepts of form and matter. 4

Insight into Phantasm

Insight into phantasm is the first part of the process that moves from sense through understanding to essential definition. Though Aquinas derived the doctrine from Aristotle,123 he also affirmed it as a matter of experience: 'Quilibet in se ipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format sibi aliqua phantasmata per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod intelligere studet.' 124 However, to many profound minds, so brief a description seems to have been insufficient. Scotus flatly denied the fact of insight into phantasm.125 Kant, whose critique was

123 See above, note 54. 124 ['We can all experience in ourselves that, when we try to understand something, we form for ourselves images, by way of examples, in which as it were we inspect what we desire to understand'] Summa theologiae, i, q. 84, a. 7 c. 125 JoannisDuns Scoti... Opera omnia. Tome Q, Qiiaestiones in Librum Primum Sententiarum (Paris: Vives, 1893), d. 3, q. 6, §§ 10-12, pp. 250-51.

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not of the pure reason but of the human mind as conceived by Scotus,126 repeatedly affirmed that our intellects are purely discursive, that all intu126 Scotus posits concepts first, then the apprehension of nexus between concepts; see ibid., tome 7: Quaestiones ... superLibros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (Paris: Vives, 1891), book 2, q. i, §2, p. 96. His species intelligibilis is what is meant immediately by external words (ibid., tome l: De modis significandi... In Primum Librum Perihermenias [sic] Quaestiones [Paris: Vives: 1896], q. 2, §3, p. 541); it is proved to exist because knowing presupposes its object and indeed its object as present (ibid., tome 9, d. 3, q. 6, §§5-14, pp. 236-55); its production by agent intellect and phantasm is the first act of intellect, with knowing it as second act or inner word (ibid., tome 9, d. 3, q. 8, §3, p. 401); it is not necessarily an accident inhering in the intellect but necessarily only a sufficiently present agent cooperating with intellect in producing the act of knowing; ordinarily it is the subordinate, but may be the principal, agent (ibid., d. 3, q. 7, §§2i-22, pp. 362-63); sensitive knowledge is merely an occasion for scientific knowledge (ibid., d. 3, q. 4, §§ 7-8, pp. 173-76); as our inner word proceeds from the species, so the divine word proceeds from the divine essence (ibid., tome 8: Quaestiones in Primum Librum Sententiarum [Paris: Vives, 1893] > d. 2, q. 7, § 15, pp. 543-44). The Scotist rejection of insight into phantasm necessarily reduced the act of understanding to seeing a nexus between concepts; hence, while for Aquinas understanding precedes conceptualization which is rational, for Scotus understanding is preceded by conceptualization which is a matter of metaphysical mechanics. It is the latter position that gave Kant the analytic judgments which he criticized; and it is the real insufficiency of that position which led Kant to assert his synthetic a priori judgments; on the other hand, the Aristotelian and the Thomist positions both consider the Kantian assumption of purely discursive intellect to be false and, indeed, to be false, not as a point of theory, but as a matter of fact. While M. Gilson (Archives d 'histoiredoctrinaleet litterairedu moyen age l [1926] 6-128; 2 [1927] 89-149; 4 [1929] 5-149) has done splendid work on Scotist origins, there is needed an explanation of Scotist influence [Gilson's articles: 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critique saint Augustin,' 'Avicenne et le point de depart de Duns Scotus,' and 'Les sources Greco-Arabes de l'augustinisme Avicennisant']. Cajetan (Aquinas, Summa theologiae, l, q. 12, a. 2, § 14, editio Leonina cum Commentariis Cardinalis Cajetani; tome 4 [Romae: Ex typographia Polyglotta, 1888] 118) confessed that at one time he held, taught, and may even have published a Scotist view of the beatific vision and this view he names the common run of opinion (ibid.). Though Cajetan (ibid., q. 79, a. 2, § 13, ed. Leon., tome 5, p. 262) did not believe Scotus to have grasped Aristotle on intellect, Peter Hoenen (Gregorianum 14 [1933] 153-84; 19 U938] 498-514; 2O [1939] 19-54, 321-50) seems to have demonstrated conclusively that Cajetan has been overcome by Scotus on knowledge of principles [Hoenen's articles: 'De origine primorum principiorum scientiae,' 'De philosophia scholastica cognitionis geometricae,' 'De potestate necessitatis geometricae,' and 'De problemate exactitudinis geometricae']; see also Ephrem Longpre's remark (Laphilosophie du B. Duns Scot [Extrait des "Etudes Franciscaines." Paris: Societe et Librairie s. Francois d'Assise, 1924] 215). Innocently enough, R.P. [Parthenius] Minges ('Duns Scotus, John,' The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 5 [New York: Robert Appleton Co., 1909] 197) summed up the extent of Scotist influence: The psychology of Scotus is in its essentials the same as that of St. Thomas.' Really!

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ition is sensible.13 Though the point is elementary, still it is so important that I beg to be permitted to dwell on a plain matter of fact. The Platonists posited not only sensible objects and eternal Forms but also pure mathematical objects; their reason for adding the third category was the fact that mathematical objects are like the Forms by their necessity and immobility, but unlike the Forms and like sensible objects inasmuch as they are many of the same kind.127 One and one are two. But I plus myself am not two but one. For one and one to be two, the second 'one' cannot be identical with the first; but neither can it differ in meaning, in idea, in essence, from the first; else it would not be 'one' that was added to 'one,' but something else. When the geometer argues about two triangles similar in all respects, he deals with two triangles, and not with some one triangle; but if they are similar in all respects, then they do not differ in idea, in essence, in nature, or in any accidental characteristic; there is mere material multiplication. In Aristotelian and in Thomist psychology, the second 'one' or the second 'triangle' is accounted for, not by a second concept, but by the reflection of intellect^ back to phantasm where the many instances of the one idea are represented.128 Phantasm is involved not only in the employment of abstract concepts but also in their genesis. Euclid's first problem was to construct an equilateral triangle on a given base AB. His procedure was to draw two circles in the given plane, one with center at A and radius AB, the other with center at B and radius BA. The point of intersection C was then joined to A and to B, and that ABC was an equilateral triangle was proved from the equality of the radii AB and AC, BA and BC, and the axiom that things equal to the same are equal to each other. What Euclid failed to demonstrate was that the two circles would intersect; nor can it be demonstrated from abstract concepts; for there are not two abstract circles, and even if there were, they would be outside space, and so could not intersect. That the circles in question must intersect is known by insight into phantasm; draw or imagine the construction, and you will see this necessity; but you will see the two circles by a sensitive faculty, the necessity by an insight into the sensible presentation. Such insight is involved frequently enough in Euclidean proofs, but it is also involved in grasping primary definitions. A plane curve with neither bumps nor dents, of perfectly uniform curvature, cannot be 127 Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 6, 98yb 14-18 (Aquinas, In IMetaphys., lect. 10, § 157). For the distinction of different Platonist positions see Aristotle, Metaphysics, XIII, l, 10763 17-23. 128 In IIIDeanima, lect. 8, §713. Summa theologiae, l, q. 86, a. l; q. 84, a. 7; and passim.

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had if not all radii are equal, but must be had if all radii are equal; one sees the curve, the radii, their equality, the presence or absence of bumps or dents by one's eyes or imagination; one cannot know them in any other way, for there is only one abstract radius, and it does not move; but the impossibility or necessity of perfectly uniform curvature is known by intellect alone in the act of insight into phantasm. Aristotle grasped such facts. Intelligible objects, he maintained, do not exist apart from concrete extension but are in sensible forms and mathematical diagrams; accordingly, a person without sense perception would never learn anything or understand anything; further, speculative thought keeps an eye on phantasm for, in its case, phantasms play the role taken by sensible objects in sense perception.129 Aquinas repeats Aristotle in such a variety of ways that one can be certain that he grasped the issue himself and was not merely appealing to an authority. Phantasm is to intellect as object to potency, as sensible objects to sense, as color to vision.'^Phantasm is the object of intellect.131 It is also the mover of intellect, but it is not the object because it is the mover and so is the object perhaps only in some mechanical or metaphysical but nonpsychological sense; it is the mover because it is the object.132 Human intellect in this life needs phantasms as objects133 - indeed, as proper objects.134 Since knowledge requires an object, and since phantasm is the object of intellect, a phantasm is always necessary for intellectual activity, no matter how perfect the species intelligibilis:1^ '... potentiae sensitivae sunt necessariae animae ad intelligendum, non per accidens tamquam excitantes, ut Plato posuit; neque disponentes 129 See above, note 54. On insight into phantasm and modern scientific theory, see James Clerk Maxwell: A Commemoration Volume 1831-1931: Essays byJJ. Thomson et al. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1931) 31, 98, 104, 106. 130 Super IISententiarum, d. 17, q. 2, a. l sol.; d. 2O, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m; Super IV Sententiarum, d. 49, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3m; In Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 2 c. (ed. Mandonnet, III, 132); De veritate, q. 2, a. 6 c.; etc. 131 Super II Sententiarum, d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad im; Super HI Sententiarum, d. 14, q. l, a. 3 sol. 2. There is even the early and somewhat incautious statement Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 4, a. 3 sol.: '... oportet quod in definitione huius actus qui est intelligere, cadat phantasma, quod est obiectum eius, ut in III de An., text. 38, dicitur, quod per actum imaginationis repraesentatur intellectui' ['in the definition of the act of understanding we must include the phantasm, which is its object (as is said in the third book of the De anima, text. 38), the object that through the act of imagination is represented to the intellect']. See De veritate, q. 10, a. 2, ad ym (lae ser.). 132 Super IISententiarum, d. 17, q. 2, a. l sol. 133 De anima, a. 15, ad 3m. 134 De veritate, q. 18, a. 8, ad 4m. 135 De veritate, q. 1O, a. 2, ad 7m (lae ser.).

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tantum, sicut posuit Avicenna; sed ut repraesentantes animae intellectivae proprium obiectum, ut dicit Philosophus in III de Anima.'is6ln a word, one cannot understand without understanding something; and the something understood, the something whose intelligibility is actuated, is in the phantasm. To understand circularity is to grasp by intellect a necessary nexus between imagined equal radii and imagined uniform curvature. The terms to be connected are sensibly perceived; their relation, connection, unification is what insight knows in the sensitive presentation. Because the necessity of phantasm is the necessity of an object, that necessity regards not merely the genesis but also the use of scientific grasp.137 It makes no difference how spiritual the object, how far removed from sense; phantasm remains necessary; 'etiam Deus cognoscitur a nobis per phantasma sui effectus, inquantum cognoscimus Deum per negationem vel per causalitatem vel per excellentiam.'138 Habitual possession of scientific knowledge is useless without conversion to phantasm 'in quo resplendet species intelligibilis sicut exemplar in exemplato sive in imagine.'139 The difference between invention or learning and use of science is that, in the first instance, phantasm has to produce the act of insight whereas, in subsequent instances, informed intellect guides the production of an appropriate phantasm;140 in other words, in the first instance we are at the mercy of fortune, the subconscious, or a teacher's skill, for the emergence of an appropriate phantasm; we are in a ferment of trying to grasp we know not what; but once we have understood, then we can operate on our own, marshaling images to a habitually known end. The act of intellect with respect to phantasm is an insight: 'cum phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum ut obiecta in quibus inspicit omne quod 136 ['sensitive potencies are necessary if the soul is to understand, not per accidens as stimulating it, as Plato said, nor as only disposing it, as Avicenna said, but as representing to the intellective soul its proper object, as the Philosopher says in III De anima} De anima, a. 15 c. ad fin. 137 In Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 2, ad 5m (ed. Mandonnet, III, 154); De veritate, q. 10, a. 2, ad 7m (lae ser.); Summa theologiae, \, q. 84, a. 7; q. 85, a. l, ad 5m. 138 ['even God is known by us through the phantasm of his effect, insofar as we know God through negation, or through causality, or through excellence'] De malo, q. 16, a. 8, ad 3m; see Summa theologiae, l, q. 84, a. 7, ad 3m. 139 ['in which the intelligible species shines forth as an exemplar in the illustration or in the image'] Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 73, §38 (ed. Leon., XIII, 462b 11-13). 140 Ibid.; De veritate, q. 19, a. l c.; Super III Sententiarum, d. 14, q. l, a. 3 sol. 3; sol. 5, ad 3m; contrast Summa theologiae, 3, q. 12, a. 2 c., which modifies the position on Christ's human knowledge. See also In IIIDe anima, lect. 8,§§ 700-704; De malo, q. 16, a. 8.

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inspicit, vel secundum perfectam repraesentationem vel secundum negationem.'141 Though theoretical science proceeds from principles known of themselves, yet these principles are obtained from sense, as explained in the second book of the Posterior Analytics.142 There the account is of a process from many sensations to a memory, from many memories to an element of experience, and from many elements of experience to grasp of a universal.143 Aquinas noted the parallel in the beginning of the Metaphysics: the man of experience knows that such and such medicine cured such and such patients in such and such circumstances; but the technician knows that such a kind of medicine cures such a kind of disease.144 Like the senses,145 the man of experience merely knows quia;l46but the technician knows causes - propter quid - and so is able to teach and to solve objections.'47 In other words, the technician knows the abstract universal, which is an inner word consequent to insight. But the man of experience merely knows the universale in particulars, and that knowledge is not intellectual knowledge but exists in a sensitive potency variously named the ratio particularis, cogitativa, intellectus passivus. It carries on comparisons of particulars in virtue of the influence of intellect,148 and it knows Socrates and Callias, not merely as Socrates and Callias, but also as hi homines,14^ and without this sensitive apprehension of the universal in the particular it would be impossible for intellect to reach the abstract universal.150 141 ['since phantasms are related to intellect as objects in which it inspects everything that it inspects, either according to a complete representation or according to negation'] In Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 2, ad 5m; see Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 73. 142 Super IVSententiarum, d. 49, q. 2, a. 7, ad 12m; see De anima, a. 15, ad 2Om. 143 In IIPost, anal, lect. 2O. 144 In IMetaphys., lect. l, § 19. 145 Ibid. §30. 146 Ibid. §§23, 24, 29. 147 Ibid. 148 Summa theologiae, l, q. 78, a. 4 c., ob. 5 and ad 5m. 149 In IIPost, anal, lect. 2O; see In IIDe anima, lect. 13, §§396-98. 150 While Scotus posited a knowledge of the singular in intellect (see Charles Reginald Schiller Harris, Duns Scotus, vol. 2: The Philosophical Doctrines of Duns Scotus [Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1927] 20-26), Aquinas, at least when commenting on Aristotle, could affirm the necessity of some knowledge of the universal in sense (In IIPost, anal., lect. 20): 'Manifestum est enim quod singulare sentitur proprie et per se, sed tamen sensus est quodammodo et ipsius universalis. Cognoscit enim Calliam, non solum inquantum est Callias, sed etiam inquantum est hie homo; et similiter Socratem inquantum est hie homo. Et inde est quod tali acceptione sensus praeexistente, anima intellectiva potest considerare hominem in utroque. Si autem ita esset, quod sensus apprehenderet solum id quod est particularitatis, et nullo modo cum hoc

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This dependence of human intellect on sense for its object and for the preparatory elaboration of its object implies that human intellect is essentially intellect-in-process or reason. We do have occasional flashes of in-

apprehenderet universale in particulare, non esset possibile quod ex apprehensione sensus causaretur in nobis cognitio universalis' ['It is clear that the singular is sensed properly and per se, but sense is in a certain way also of the universal. For it knows Callias, not only as Callias, but also as this man; and similarly it knows Socrates as this man. And so it is that given such a preceding sense knowledge, the intellective soul can consider man in each of them. But if it were the case that sense apprehended only what pertains to particularity and that it in no way along with this apprehended the universal in the particular, it would not be possible that from sense apprehension there could be caused in us a universal knowledge']. This position is impossible if one defines intellect as that which alone knows the universal; it is inevitable if by intellect one means the faculty which is subject of acts of intelligence, understanding, etc. Naturally enough, crypto-Scotism would prefer to consider the passage just cited as representing the mind of Aristotle but not that of Aquinas. I would not contend that everything to be found in the Aristotelian commentaries is the mind of Aquinas. On the other hand, one must insist on some evidence before one can consider that an opinion is merely Aristotelian. With regard to the present question the following is perhaps significant (Deveritate, q. 8, a. ll c. ad fin.): '... omnis forma, inquantum huiusmodi, universalis est... Omnis autem actio est a forma; et ideo, quantum est ex virtute agentis, non fit aliqua forma a rebus in nobis nisi quae sit similitudo formae; sed per accidens contingit ut sit similitudo etiam materialium dispositionum, inquantum recipit in organo materiali, quia materialiter recipit, et sic retinentur aliquae conditiones materiae. Ex quo contingit quod sensus et imaginatio singularia cognoscunt' ['every form as such is universal... but every action is from form, and so, insofar as it is from the power of the agent, no form is produced in us from things unless it be a likeness of form; but per accidens it happens that there is a likeness also of material dispositions, insofar as it receives in a material organ, since it receives materially, and thus some conditions of matter are retained. From this it happens that sense and imagination know singular things.' (The emphasis seems to be Lonergan's)]. For a fuller account of this mechanism, see In IIDe anima, lect. 24, §§ 551-54. If sense knowledge of the singular is in some sense per accidens, it hardly is impossible a priori that a sensitive potency under the influence of intellect should know the universal in the particular. For a documented study of the cogitativa, seejulien Peghaire, 'A Forgotten Sense: The Cogitative, according to St. Thomas Aquinas,' The Modern Schoolman 20 (1943) 123-40; 211-29; on knowledge of universal, pp. 138-40. [In the CV-B set of offprints from Theological Studies (see Editors' Preface), there is inserted at this point (presumably by Lonergan) a small piece of paper, not his own work and probably given him by a reader who noticed its relevance, with a longish quotation from Super IVSententiarum, d. 50, q. i, a. 3 c., and a reference to ibid., ad l, and to Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 29, a. 6. The content indicates that the insert is to be attached to note 150.]

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sight; but angelic, and still more, divine knowledge is exclusively that sort of thing, a continuous blaze of the light of understanding. We shout our rare 'Eurekas' with Archimedes, but for the most part we have to reason: 'Nam cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam: et sic est in omnibus aliis quae a nobis intelliguntur; nisi forte in primis principiis, quae cum sint simpliciter nota, absque discursu rationis sciuntur.'151 This necessity of reasoning arises from the dependence of our intellects on sense: '... ex hoc ipso quod intellectus noster accipit a phantasmatibus, sequitur in ipso quod scientiam collativam habet, inquantum ex multis sensibus fit una memoria et ex multis memoriis fit unum experimentum et ex multis experimentis fit unum universale principium ex quo alia concludit; et sic acquirit scientiam, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. in prooem. et in fine Posteriorum.'152 Hence the theory of innate ideas - and, one may add, of Kantian a priori forms - contradicts the experience we all have of working from, and on, a sensible basis towards understanding.153 The Kantian a priori form of space has been junked by the geometers, and the Kantian a priori form of time has been junked by the physicists, for human understanding develops, and its posse omnia fieri knows no limit save that set by its natural object,154 which is ens. Now, just as human intellect is mainly reason, because it operates from sense as a starting point, so the quiddity known by the human intellect is different in kind from that known by the angelic.155 The angel has no senses, and so his acts of understanding cannot be insights into sensibly represented data; they must be pure acts, though limited, of understanding. Of 151 ['When I want to conceive the intelligibility of a stone, I must come to it by a process of reasoning; and so it is with everything else that we understand, except perhaps in the case of first principles, which, since they are known simpliciter, are known without any discursive activity of reason'] Super loannem, c. i, lect. l; see Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. l, a. 2. 152 ['From the fact that our intellect receives from phantasms, it follows that it has a knowledge that is assembled, insofar as from many sense data there emerges one memory and from many memories one element of experience and from many elements of experience one universal principle, from which it concludes to other things; and thus it acquires knowledge, as is said at the beginning of the Metaphysics and at the end of the Posterior Analytics'] Super III Sententiarum, d. 14, q. l, a. 3 sol. 3; see Super IISententiarum, d. 3, q. l, a. 2 sol.; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 56; Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 180, a. 6, ad 2m; see J. Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio 103-26. 153 SuperIVSententiarum, d. 50, q. l, a. l sol.; see ibid. d. 49, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3m. 154 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 83, §31 (ed. Leon., XIII, 523a 26-38). 155 De anima, a. 7, ad im; Compendium theologiae, c. 104; In Boet. De Trin,, q. 6, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 94, Traeterea'; 3, c. 41.

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this more will be said later, but its main Aristotelian elements can be noted at once. As soon as Aristotle arrived at the meaning of the question, What is a man? he immediately concluded that the separate substances must be objects of a different type of knowledge and inquiry.156 The Platonist extrapolation to higher regions was modeled on the universal concept, and Aristotle rightly criticized the anthropomorphism of such a procedure.157 Aristotle's own extrapolation is not from universal concepts, but from the act of insight: it consists in affirming the quality of understanding while removing the sensible object and limitation; the result is a noesis noeseos1^ in which understander and understood are identical.159 Thus the pure Aristotelian theory of intellect is to be sought in the Aristotelian account of his separate substances, and from that account O. Hamelin rightly derives the main features of his description of Aristotelian intellect.160 Similarly, the pure Thomist theory of intellect is to be sought in the Thomist account of angelic knowledge, and from that account J. Peghaire rightly begins his investigation of Thomist notions of intellect and reason.16' 5

Emanatio Intelligibilis

The procession of the inner word, we are told, is an emanatio intelligibilis.162 This brings us to our main point. All causation is intelligible, but there are three differences between natural process and the procession of an inner word. The intelligibility of natural process is passive and potential: it is what can be understood; it is not an understanding; it is a potential object of intellect, but it is not the very stuff of intellect. Again, the intelligibility of natural process is the intelligibility of some specific natural law, say, the law of inverse squares, but never the intelligibility of the very idea of intelligible law. Thirdly, the intelligibility of natural process is imposed from 156 157 158 159

In VIIMetaphys., lect. 17, §§1669-71. Ibid. lect. 16, §§1642-46. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, Q, lO74b 34; Aquinas, In XIIMetaphys., lect. 11. Aristotle, De anima, III, 4, 43oa 3; see Aquinas, Summa theologiae, i, q. 87, a. i, ad 3m; De veritate, q. 8, aa. 6 & 7; Desubstantiis separatis, c. 3 (ed. Mandonnet, I, 81); In IXMetaphys., lect. 11, § 1904. 160 Octave Hamelin, Le systeme d'Aristote (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1920), Huitieme lecon, 'Le concept,' pp. 108-27. 161 J. Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio 29-71. 162 Summa theologiae, l, q. 27, a. 1 c. ad fin.: '... secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente' [' (procession is to be understood, therefore) the way it is understood in intelligible emanation, namely, as the procession of an intelligible word from the one uttering it'].

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without: natures act intelligibly, not because they are intelligent, for they are not, but because they are concretions of divine ideas and a divine plan. On the other hand, the intelligibility of the procession of an inner word is not passive nor potential; it is active and actual; it is intelligible because it is the activity of intelligence in act; it is intelligible, not as the possible object of understanding is intelligible, but as understanding itself and the activity of understanding is intelligible. Again, its intelligibility defies formulation in any specific law; inner words proceed according to the principles of identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason; but these principles are not specific laws but the essential conditions of there being objects to be related by laws and relations to relate them. Thus the procession of an inner word is the pure case of intelligible law: one may say that such procession is a particular case of 'omne agens agit sibi simile'; but one has only to recall that this agent may be similar to anything, that it is 'potens omnia fieri,' to see that really one has here not a particular case but the resume of all possible cases. Thirdly, it is native and natural for the procession of inner word to be intelligible, actively intelligible, and the genus of all intelligible process; just as heat is native and natural to fire, so is intelligible procession to intelligence in act; for intelligence in act does not follow laws imposed from without, but rather it is the ground of the intelligibility in act of law, it is constitutive and, as it were, creative of law; and the laws of intelligible procession of an inner word are not any particular laws but the general constituents of any law, precisely because of this naturalness of intelligibility to intelligence, precisely because intelligence is to any conceived law as cause to effect. Now it is only to restate the basic contention of this and subsequent articles to observe that the human mind is an image, and not a mere vestige, of the Blessed Trinity because its processions are intelligible in a manner that is essentially different from, that transcends, the passive, specific, imposed intelligibility of other natural process. Any effect has a sufficient ground in its cause; but an inner word not merely has a sufficient ground in the act of understanding it expresses; it also has a knowing as sufficient ground, and that ground is operative precisely as a knowing, knowing itself to be sufficient. To introduce a term that will summarize this, we may say that the inner word is rational, not indeed with the derived rationality of discourse, of reasoning from premises to conclusions, but with the basic and essential rationality of rational consciousness, with the rationality that can be discerned in any judgment, with the rationality that now we have to observe in all concepts. For human understanding, though it has its object in the phantasm and knows it in the phantasm, yet is not content with an object Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

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in this state. It pivots on itself to produce for itself another object which is the inner word as ratio, intentio, definitio, quod quid est. And this pivoting and production is no mere matter of some metaphysical sausage machine, at one end slicing species off phantasm, and at the other popping out concepts; it is an operation of rational consciousness. I believe there cannot be any reasonable doubt that the foregoing represents the mind of Aquinas. It is true that he does not employ the term intelligere exclusively in the sense of understanding.163 It remains that the principal meaning of intelligere is understanding. Aquinas knew perfectly well what Aristotle meant by quod quid est, by the wonder that is the source of all science and philosophy, by insight into phantasm; he can take these positions, fuse and transform them, and come forth with a natural desire for the beatific vision,164 a position that is notoriously unintelligible to people who do not grasp just what understanding is. He repeatedly affirmed that the quod quid est is the proper object of intellect,165 and his affirmation carried with it all the implications of the Aristotelian ideal of science. A definition always rests on prior knowledge;166 to know the quiddity, to define, to conceive the form of the thing, are identified;167 to know the definition is 163 J. Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio 18-25, lists a dozen senses of intellectus in Aquinas. 164 A natural desire for the beatific vision is absent from the earlier writings: there is the silence of Super II Sententiarum, d. 33, q. 2, a. 2; Super IV Sententiarum, d. 49, q. 2, a. l; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 10, a. 7; De veritate, q. 8, a. i; furthermore, it seems positively excluded by De veritate, q. 14, a. 2, with which compare Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 4, a. l. Its first appearance would seem the masterly discussion of beatitude in Summa contra Gentiles, 3, cc. 25-63; see esp. cc. 25, 48, 50, 63. It is reaffirmed in Summa theologian, l, q. 12, a. l c.; a. 8, ad 4m; q. 62, a. l c.; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; Compendium theologiae, c. 104. The origin of the doctrine is Aristotle (In IMetaphys., lect. l, §§2-4; lect. 3, §§54-55; §§66-67). This appears most clearly in Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 50 and Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 8 c. 165 The source is In IIIDe anima, lect. 8, §§ 705-19, with the relevant statement in §717. Affirmations of this position are endlessly recurrent: see Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. l, a. 2 sol.; De veritate, q. l, a. 12 c.; q. 15, a. 2, ad 3m; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 56, 'Amplius'; Summa theologiae, l, q. 17, a. 3; q. 85, a. 6; q. 85, a. 8; q. 84, a. 7. 166 In Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 3, c. (ed. Mandonnet, III, 137). 'Oportet enim definitionum cognitionem, sicut et demonstrationum, ex aliqua praeexistenti cognitione initium sumere' ['The knowledge of definitions, as of demonstrations, must begin from some prior knowledge']. See ibid. a. 4 c. [p. 140]. 167 De veritate, q. 2, a. i, ad gm:'... tune intellectus dicitur scire de aliquo quid est, quando definit ipsum, id est quando concipit aliquam formam de ipsa re quae per omnia ipsi rei responded ['the intellect is said to know the "what it is" of something, when it defines it, that is, when it conceives some form of the thing which corresponds in every way to the thing itself].

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to know in potency the science that is demonstrated from the definition;'68 definition is comprehension, embracing the whole range of implications of the defined.l69 In the De veritate he considered as distinct potencies the scientificum and the ratiodnativum; by the former we know the necessary; by the latter we know the contingent; but it is the former that has as its object the quod quid est, that through definitions knows principles, and through principles knows conclusions; in other words the former is intellect in the sense of understanding.170 Later, in the Pars prima, he found his way to include knowledge of the contingent within the same potency, not indeed by changing his concept of intellect, but by admitting within its range imperfect instances of its object.'71 Whatever intellect knows, it knows through the quod quid est which is the substance of the object: just as whatever is known by sight is known through color, so what is known by intellect is known through the quod quid est. What cannot be known by intellect in that manner cannot be known at all. However, it is true that in the natural sciences, as opposed to the mathematical, intellect begins, not from the definition, but from sensible accidents; still, that does not affect the principle enunciated above; it occurs per accidens inasmuch as our intellectual knowledge proceeds from sense.'72 To grasp the meaning of these passages is 168 De veritate, q. 2, a. 7, ad 5m: '... qui cognoscit definitionem, cognoscit enuntiabilia in potentia, quae per definitionem demonstrantur' ['whoever knows a definition knows potentially the statements that are demonstrated through the definition']. Search Euclid for a property of the circle that is not demonstrated through the definition of the circle. 169 De veritate, q. 20, a. 5 c. ad fin.: 'Tune enim unaquaeque res comprehenditur, quando eius definitio scitur ... Cuiuslibet autem virtutis defmitio sumitur ex his ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, si anima Christi sciret omnia ad quae virtus Dei se extendit, comprehenderet omnino virtutem Dei; quod est omnino impossibile' ['A given thing is known comprehensively when its definition is known ... However, the definition of any power is taken from those things to which this power extends itself. Thus, if the soul of Christ knew everything to which the power of God extended itself, it would comprehend completely the power of God; and this is quite impossible']. 170 De veritate, q. 15, a. 2, ad 3m. 171 Summa theologiae, l, q. 79, a. 9, ad 3m. 172 Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 56: 'Amplius. Nulla virtus cognoscitiva cognoscit rem aliquam nisi secundum rationem proprii obiecti; non enim visu cognoscimus aliquid nisi inquantum est coloratum. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est quod quid est, idest substantia rei, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Igitur quidquid intellectus de aliqua re cognoscit, cognoscit per cognitionem substantiae illius rei: unde in qualibet demonstratione per quam innotescunt nobis propria accidentia, principium accipimus quod quid est, ut dicitur in I Posteriorum. Si autem substantiam alicuius rei intellectus cognoscat per accidentia, sicut dicitur in I de Anima quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt

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impossible, I believe, without also grasping that by intelligere Aquinas means understanding, the act which, if frequent, gains a man a reputation for intelligence and, if rare, gains him a reputation for stupidity. In the second place, Aquinas considered the inner word to be a product of the act of understanding;173 to be expressed from the knowledge posad cognoscendum quod quid est; hoc est per accidens, inquantum cognitio intellectus oritur a sensu, et sic per sensibilium accidentium cognitionem oportet ad substantiae intellectum pervenire; propter quod hoc non habet locum in mathematicis, sed in naturalibus tantum. Quicquid igitur est in re quod non potest cognosci per cognitionem substantiae eius, oportet esse intellectui ignotum' ['Again, no cognitive power knows anything except in relation to its proper object; for example, we do not know anything by sight unless it is colored. But the proper object of intellect is quod quid est, that is, the substance of the thing, as is said in the third book of the De anima. Therefore whatever the intellect knows about anything, it knows through knowledge of the substance of that thing: thus, in any demonstration whatever through which proper accidents become known to us, we take the quod quid est as principle, as is said in the first book of the Posterior Analytics. But if the intellect knows the substance of anything through the accidents, as it is said in the first book of the De anima that accidents play a large part in the knowledge of quod quid est, this is per accidens, insofar as the knowledge of intellect arises from sense, and so it is through the knowledge of sensible accidents that we must come to an understanding of substance; this type of knowledge has therefore no place in mathematics, but only in the natural sciences. So whatever there is of a thing that cannot be known through knowledge of its substance must remain unknown to intellect']. 173 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c.: 'Omne autem intellectum in nobis est aliquid realiter progrediens ab altero; vel sicut progrediuntur a principiis conceptiones conclusionum, vel sicut conceptiones quidditatum rerum posteriorum a quidditatibus priorum; vel saltern sicut conceptio actualis progreditur ab habituali cognitione. Et hoc universaliter verum est de omni quod a nobis intelligitur, sive per essentiam intelligatur, sive per similitudinem. Ipsa enim conceptio est effectus actus intelligendi' ['Every act of understanding in vis really proceeds from something else, whether as conceptions of conclusions proceed from principles, or as conceptions of the quiddities of later things proceed from the quiddities of prior things; or at least as actual conception proceeds from habitual knowledge. And this is universally true of everything which is understood by us, whether it is understood essentially or through some likeness. For conception itself is the effect of an act of understanding']. I do not believe that the three alternatives listed equate with the full range of possibilities, for they regard the deductions of an adult mind, which is the aspect of the matter Aquinas would have considered most familiar to his contemporaries. I do not believe that the general principle affirmed as without exception is to be restricted to the field illustrated by these examples. As to conception from habitual knowledge, it is true, on the one hand, that habitual possession of principles without explicit advertence to them controls actual thinking (De malo, q. 16, a. 6, ad 4m), but on the other hand, it is not trvie that there is ever conception without understanding in act as cause of the conception (Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 14, §3 - cited above, note 47).

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sessed by the mind;174 of its very nature to proceed from the knowledge of the person conceiving it.175 Of themselves, these statements do not give one a realization of emanatio intelligibilis. For that, examples and instances are necessary, and so we turn to the Thomist division of concepts. In this field the modern development of scientific methodology has added greatly to the precision of our knowledge; such precision no one will expect of Aquinas; but, on the other hand, no great discernment is required to see that his medieval grasp of the nature of intellect was sufficiently penetrating to enable him to anticipate what modern methodologists are apt to fancy a private preserve of their own. Apart from certain natural concepts, of which we shall speak later, it cannot even be suggested that Aquinas thought of conception as an automatic process. Conceptualization comes as the term and product of a process of reasoning.176 As long as the reasoning, the fluctuation of discourse, continues, the inner word is as yet unuttered.177 But it also is true that as long as the reasoning continues, we do not as yet understand; for until the inner word is uttered, we are not understanding but only thinking in order to understand.178 Hence understanding and inner word are simultaneous, the former being the ground and cause of the latter.179 What, it may be asked, can be the reasoning that is prior to the emergence of the term? Must there not be three terms before there can be any reasoning at all? Clearly such a difficulty is possible only if one's notions of rational psychology are limited to the data to be found in an abbreviated and very formal textbook on deductive logic. But if one is willing to take a broad view on reasoning, to conceive syllogism with some of the intellectual suppleness of Aristotle, one will be willing to grant that every question either asks whether there is a middle term, or asks what the middle term is; that when one asks what a stone is, one asks for the middle term between the sensible data and the essential definition of the stone; between those two, there has to occur an act of understanding, and leading up to such understanding there is the discourse or reasoning of scientific method; finally, such dis174 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c.: '... aliquid expressum a notitia mentis' ['something expressed from the knowledge possessed by the mind']. 175 Summa theologiae, l, q. 34, a. l c.: 'Ipse autem conceptus cordis de ratione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet a notitia concipientis' ['It belongs to the essence of the conception of the heart that it proceed from something else, that is, from the knowledge of the one conceiving']. 176 Superloannem, c. l, lect. l; cited above, note 45. 177 Ibid.; see also note 47 above. 178 See above, note 46. 179 See above, note 47.

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course differs with the progress of the human mind, for Aquinas, under the misapprehensions of Aristotelian physics, probably thought of stones as things while any modern thinker would pronounce them to be accidental aggregates. Already we have seen that from the fact that human understanding had its object in phantasm, Aquinas deduced that human intellect was mostly reason; one should not be surprised when he goes on to affirm that we have to reason in order to form concepts. The rational character of conceptualization has, as its corollary, human ignorance and human progress. The first philosophers were babbling babes,180 yet all our predecessors render us the double service either of hitting off the truth for us, or of missing the mark and so of challenging us to get to the root of the matter ourselves.181 No one knows truth perfectly, and no one knows none at all; individual contributions are inevitably small but the common sum is great.182 Ignorance may force us to use accidental in place of essential differences.l83 There are many properties of nature that are totally unknown, and even those that fall under our observation do not readily yield their secrets.184 There is no one who is not caught in some error, or is not at least ignorant of what he wishes to know or obliged to conjecture where he would have certitude.185 The fact of indefinite human progress precludes the possibility of beatitude being placed in this life.186 Tntellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium: unde possibilis nominaturkjk\ Besides implying human ignorance and progress, the rational character 180 181 182 183 184 185 186

187

In IMetaphys., lect. 17, §272; see Summa theologiae, l, q. 44, a. 2. In IIMetaphys.,klect. 1, §§287-88. Ibid. §§ 275-76. In VIIMetaphys., lect. 12, § 1552; De veritate, q. 10, a. l, ad 6m; Summa theologiae, l, q. 77, a. l, ad 7m. Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 3 ad fin. Ibid. 3, c. 48, Traeterea.' Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 48, § 12: 'Quandiu aliquid movetur ad perfectionem, nondum est in ultimo fine. Sed omnes homines in cognoscendo veritatem semper se habent ut moti et tendentes ad perfectionem: quia illi qui sequuntur, superinveniunt aliqua illis quae a prioribus sunt inventa, sicut dicitur in II Metaphysical ['As long as something is being moved to perfection, it is not yet at its ultimate end. But when it comes to knowing the truth, it belongs to the condition of human beings that they are all being moved and tending to perfection, since those who follow find something beyond what was found by those who preceded, as is said in the second book of the Metaphysics']. [The human intellect is in the order of intelligible things as a being that is only in potency, just as prime matter is in the order of sensible things: whence it is called possible'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 87, a. l c.

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of conceptualization also implies a psychological account of abstraction. No doubt, a great deal of what Aquinas has to say of abstraction is on the metaphysical level; to that we hope to attend, inasmuch as it enters into our inquiry, in due course. But our immediate concern is to observe that not a little of the Thomist theory of abstraction is psychological. As a preliminary, we may recall that knowing the universal in the particular, knowing what is common to the instances in the instances, is not abstraction at all; it is an operation attributed by Aquinas to the sensitive potency which he names the cogitativa. As a second preliminary, we may explain that by a psychological account of abstraction we mean the elimination by the understanding of the intellectually irrelevant because it is understood to be irrelevant. That, we submit, is the very point of the celebrated three degrees of abstraction. What is variously termed materia individualis, materia designata, materia signata, the hie et nunc, cannot be an explanatory factor in any science; it is irrelevant to all scientific explanation; it is irrelevant a priori; time and place as such explain nothing, for the reason for anything, the cause of anything, is never this instance at this place and time, but always a nature which, if found here, can be found elsewhere, if found now, can be found later. Hence natural scientist, mathematician, and metaphysician all abstract from individual matter,188 'quae est materia determinatis dimensionibus substans.'189 Intellect abstracts from the hie et nunc.igo One cannot account for divine or angelic knowledge of the particulars of sense by accumulating any number of universal predicates, for the resultant combination will not be singular but 'communicabile multis';191 it could occur in any number of other possible worlds or, on the ancient hypothesis, in any number of completely similar cycles of one world. The astronomer can predict all the eclipses of coming centuries; but his science as such will not give him knowledge of any particular eclipse as particular, 'sicut rusticus cognoscit';192 for insofar as the astronomer knows future eclipses as particular, it is only by relating his calculations to a sensibly given here and now. Properly, intellect does not remember; to know the past as past, like knowing the present, is the work of sense.193 188 Ibid. q. 85, a. l, ad 2m. 189 ['which is the underlying matter in its determinate dimensions'] De veritate, q. 10, a. 5 c. 190 De veritate, q. 2, a. 6, ad im; Summa theologiae, l, q. 57, a. 2 c. 191 Super IISententiarum, d. 3, q. 3, a. 3 sol. The basic discussion is Aristotle's argument that the Platonic Ideas, because singular things, do not admit definition. See In VII Metaphys., lect. 15; Aquinas drew the relevant conclusion in §1626. 192 ['as the simple peasant knows'] De veritate, q. 2, a. 5 c.; see De anima, a. 20 c. 193 De veritate, q. 10, a. 2 c.

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Why are all these statements made so confidently? Because it is common to all science to consider the per se and disregard the per accidens.194 In other words, the 'here and now,' or the 'there and then,' as such are irrelevant to understanding, explanation, the assigning of causes; and from them intellect abstracts, inasmuch as and because it understands that irrelevance. The datum 'round' is understood as necessitated by equal radii in a plane surface; 'equal radii in a plane surface' is abstracted as common matter from phantasm and spoken in an inner word; no more is abstracted, because no more is relevant, and proximately, because understanding grasps that no more is relevant. The theorem on abstraction from individual matter is a theorem with respect to all our acts of understanding, to the effect that the 'here and now' always pertains to the sensible residue and never enters into the relevant, the essential, that is abstracted. The second degree of abstraction is similar to the first: as all science prescinds from the 'here and now,'195 so all mathematics prescinds from all sensible qualities - from colors, sounds, tactile experiences, tastes, odors;196 the color of the geometrical figure, of the arithmetical or alge194 In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 3 c. ad fin.: 'Tertia secundum oppositionem universalis a particular!, et haec competit etiam physicae, et est communis omnibus scientiis, quia in omni scientia praetermittitur quod est per accidens, et accipitur quod est per se' ['The third (distinction) is based on the opposition of the universal and the particular; and this belongs even to physics, and is common to all sciences, since in every science what is per accidens is omitted and what is per se is accepted']. The whole of this opusculum, but especially questions 5 and 6, are a monument to Aquinas's devotion to Metaphysics, VII, 10-15 (In VII Metaphys., lect. 9-15). 195 It might be thought that, while Euclidean geometry abstracts from 'here' and 'there' in the sense that they are irrelevant to theorems, non-Euclidean geometry consists in attaching a significance to 'here' or 'there' as such. Such a view is mistaken. All geometries suppose a manifold of merely empirical differences which as such are not significant; the various geometries differ by the laws which relate the elements of the manifold; and Euclidean geometry has its unique position because it employs, for the most part unconsciously, the simplest laws. One cannot imagine, much less see, indefinitely large space; one imagines a certain amount and conceives the addition of further amounts according to some sets of laws which may be, but are not necessarily, of the type named Euclidean. 196 There is left the space-time continuum which is the pure matter of the sensibilia communia, namely, magnitude, shape, number, motion, rest. One cannot imagine any of these without also imagining some of the sensibilia propria; but while the sensibilia communia are essential to both pure and applied mathematics and enter into its object, the sensibilia propria, though necessarily present in imagination, are irrelevant to theorems.

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braic symbol, is never relevant to the mathematical theorem. The difference between a perspective geometry and a science of optics is that the manner in which light actually does move is relevant to the latter but irrelevant to the former;197 if it is true that light rays bend, then optics has to be corrected, but not perspective geometry; for the physicist that overlooks matters of sensible fact falls into error, but the theorem and the judgment of the geometer are independent of sensible fact and are content with imagination.198 Nor does the discovery of the more remote and generic types of non-Euclidean geometry invalidate this position: they still reduce to an imagination, though not to the imagination that we possess;r they presuppose an intellect capable of the third degree of abstraction, of transcending its own imagination; but they do not move within the third degree of abstraction, for they deal with a numerical multiplicity, not merely as a category - as does metaphysics - but as an essential factor in their proper object. Finally, the third degree of abstraction prescinds from all matter, individual and common, sensible and intelligible, to treat of 'ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi.'1" It does so, because metaphysical theorems are valid independently of any sensible matter of fact and of any condition of imagination. Conceptualization is the self-expression of an act of understanding; such self-expression is possible only because understanding is self-possessed, conscious of itself and its own conditions as understanding; insofar as the understanding has its conditions all within the intelligible order, the expression abstracts from all that is sensible and imaginable, and so is in the third degree; insofar as the understanding has conditions in the imaginable, but not in the empirical, order of sensible presentations, the abstraction is of the second degree; insofar as the understanding has con197 This probably was the occasion of the distinction between sensible and intelligible matter. See Aristotle, Physics, II, 2, lQ3b 23 - 1943 18 (Aquinas, In II Phys., lect. 3); In IMetaphys., lect. 10, § 157; In VIMetaphys., lect. l, § 1145; In VIIMetaphys., lect. 1O, §§ 1494-96; lect. l l , §§ 1507-1508; In VIIIMetaphys., lect. 5, § 1760; Aristotle, Metaphysics, XIII, 3, 10783 14-31; Aquinas, In Aristotelis Libros De caelo et mundo [henceforth In lib. De caelo, with paragraphs, as here, from the Marietti edition], l, lect. 19, §4; In III De anima, lect. 8, §§707-8, 714; In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 3; De veritate, q. 2, a. 6, ad im; Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. l, ad 2m; etc. 198 In Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 2 c. 199 [' De i n g> one, potency and act, and other concepts of this kind'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. l, ad 2m.

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ditions within the empirical order of sensible presentations, the abstraction is of the first degree; but there is always some abstraction; for the 'here and now' of sensible presentation or of imagination is never relevant to any understanding. The Aristotelian and Thomist theory of abstraction is not exclusively metaphysical; basically, it is psychological, that is, derived from the character of acts of understanding. On the other hand, it is in the self-possession of understanding as the ground of possible conceptualization that one may best discern what is meant by saying that the selfexpression of understanding is an emanatio intelligibilis, a procession from knowledge as knowledge, and because of knowledge as knowledge. The concept is the definition, provided there is a definition.200 Perhaps enough has been said to make the point that defining is a fruit of intelligence, the quid rei of understanding the thing, and the quid nominis of understanding the language. But what about ultimate concepts that defy definition? Are we to say that they too proceed from acts of understanding? Or must not some less psychological, some more purely metaphysical, process be invoked in their case? Let us consider them. Aristotle explained whence we obtain the ultimate concepts of potency and act. One begins from the sensible and concrete: '... inducendo in singularibus per exempla manifestari potest illud quod volumus dicere.'201 Relevant examples are the comparison of the sleeping and the waking, eyes closed but not blind and eyes that are seeing, the builder and the raw materials, the raw materials and the finished product. In these cases we are asked to notice a proportion and, indeed, different kinds of proportions. As eyes are to sight, so ears are to hearing (auditus, the faculty). As sight is to seeing, so hearing (auditus) is to hearing (audire) or - to adapt the example to the resources of our language - so taste is to tasting. The former is the proportion of matter to form; the latter is the proportion of operative potency to operation.202 Now, can this be put in different terms? I think so. One begins by imagining the instances. The comparisons of the cogitativa prepare one for an act of insight, seeing in the data what itself cannot be a datum; when we express this insight by a concept, we say 'possibility.' In closed eyes we discern the possibility of actual seeing; in eyes we discern the possibility of sight; what is possible is the act, and its possibility is the potency; both are 200 Super I Sententiarum, d. 2, q. l, a. 3 sol. 201 ['by reasoning from instances in singular things what we wish to say can be manifested'] In IXMetaphys., lect. 5, §1826. 202 Ibid. §§ 1827-29.

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objective, but the act is objective when it occurs, the potency when the act is possible; and that objectivity of possibility is, for instance, what makes the difference between an invention and a mere bright idea. Ultimate concepts, like derived concepts, proceed from understanding. I think much less ink would be spilt on the concept of ens were more attention paid to its origin in the act of understanding. Tell any bumpkin a plausible tale and he will remark, 'Well now, that may be so.' He is not perhaps exercising consciously the virtue of wisdom, which has the function of knowing the 'ratio ends et non ends.'203 But his understanding has expressed itself as grasp of possible being. Intelligibility is the ground of possibility, and possibility is the possibility of being; equally, unintelligibility is the ground of impossibility, and impossibility means impossibility of being. To affirm actual being, more than a plausible tale is wanted; for experience, though it is not as such the source of the concept of being else, as Kant held, the real would have to be confined to the field of possible experience - sdll it is the condidon of the transidon from the affirmation of the possibility to the affirmation of the actuality of being. Hence, the first operation of intellect regards quiddities, but the second, judgment, regards esse, the actus essendi.204 Note, however, that being is not reduced through possibility to intelligibility as to prior concepts; being is the first concept;205 what is prior to the first concept is, not a prior concept, but an act of understanding; and like other concepts, the concept of being is an effect of the act of understanding.206 Hence, when it was stated above that intellect from intelligibility through possibility reaches being, an 203 ['what it means to be and what it means not to be'] Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m. 204 Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l, ad 7m; In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 3 c. 205 Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l, ad 2m; In Boet. De Trin., q. i, a. 3, ob. 3; q. 6, a. 4 c.; De veritate, q. l, a. l; In IV Metaphys., lect. 6, 605; In I Post, anal, lect. 5; De ente et essentia, Proem.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 5, a. 2 c.; 1-2, q. 94, a. 2 c. 206 See note 173 above. [There is a long and very important addition to the French text here (La notion de verbe... 44, note 196); we transcribe it in full: 'Je distinguerais maintenant: (l) notion, (2) concept implicite, (3) connaissance, (4) idee et (5) theorie de 1'etre. La notion de 1'etre est desir intellectuel, la premiere source de 1'admiration, 1'origine de toutes les questions. Le concept implicite est n'importe quel concept se referant a une affirmation prospective: ens dicitur ab esse, et tout concept se referant a une affirmation prospective se refere a Vesse. La connaissance d'un etre se produit dans un jugement vrai, et la connaissance de 1'etre se produit dans la totalite des jugements vrais. L'idee de 1'etre est 1'essence divine comme species intelligibilis; c'est ce par quoi Dieu comprend le tout de tout. Finalement les theories de

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attempt was being made to describe the virtualities of the act of understanding in its self-possession, to conceptualize reflectively the preconceptual act of intelligence that utters itself in the concept 'being.' Now it is impossible to state that Aquinas himself attempted such descriptive psychology; but though he kept such matters secret, rather amazingly he hit off the implications of such an analytic description. From this it follows that the concept of being is natural to intellect; for intelligibility is natural to intellect, for it is its act; and conceptualization is natural to intellect, for it is its activity; but the concept of being, on the above showing, is the conceptualization of intelligibility as such, and so it too is natural to intellect.207 Again, it follows that the content of the concept of being is indeterminate;208 for it is conceived from any act of understanding whatever; it proceeds from intelligibility in act as such. Again, it follows that the concept of being cannot be unknown to intellect;209 for its sole condition is that intellect be in any act of understanding. Again, it follows that being is the object of intellect: for intellect would not be intellect were it not at least potens omnia fieri, in potency to any intelligibility;210 but what of its nature is potens omnia fieri must have being as its object.211 Finally, it is impossible to recount in a sentence or so the position of Aquinas on analogy; but one may note briefly that, on the above showing, the concept of being cannot but be analogous; being is always conceived in the same way as the expression of intelligibility or intelligence in act; but the content of one act of intelligibility or intelligence differs from the content of another; it is the identity of the process that necessitates the similarity of the propor-

207

208 209 210 211

1'etre sont celles qui rendent compte, bien ou mal, de ce qui precede.'5 Further, in the CV-B set of offprints (see Editors' Preface) there is written on the margin, in Lonergan's hand and probably with reference to note 206, 'cf. Peri Herm. i, lect. 6, §5.'] Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 83, §31 [ed. Leon., XIII, 5233 26-34]: '... est eius (intellectus) unum naturale objectum, cuius per se et naturaliter cognitionem habet... non est aliud quam ens. Naturaliter igitur intellectus noster cognoscit ens, et ea quae sunt per se ends inquantum huiusmodi...' ['there is one natural object of intellect, of which per se and naturally it has knowledge ... it is none other than being. Therefore our intellect naturally knows being, and those things which pertain per se to being as such ...'] Summa theologiae, \, q. 13, a. l i e . De veritate, q. 11, a. l, ad 3m. This underlies the argument of Super III Sententiarum, d. 14, q. unica, a. l sol. 2 c.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 79, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 98; see In IIIDe anima, lect. 13, §790; De veritate, q. l, a. 9 c. Summa theologiae, l, q. 79, a. 7 c.; De veritate, q. l, a. 2, ad 4m.

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tion, and it is the diversity of the content that makes the terms of the proportion different. In brief, we may not claim to have investigated the Thomist concept of being; but at least it is not plausible that the concept of being has to be ascribed to some metaphysical mechanism and must lie outside the field of introspective and analytic psychology. 6

Conclusion

The hypothesis on which we have been working is this: The human mind offers an analogy to the trinitarian processions because it is rational in its conceptualizations, in its judgments, in its acts of will. A fragment of the complicated evidence on the thought of Aquinas has been examined. There remain to be considered the psychology of judgment, the metaphysical analysis of insight, of conceptualization, and of judgment, and the metaphysical and psychological elements in the Thomist concept of God as known both naturally and through divine revelation. Until all the evidence on all these points has been passed in review, there can be no conclusions. I have begun, not from the metaphysical framework, but from the psychological content of Thomist theory of intellect: logic might favor the opposite procedure but, after attempting it in a variety of ways, I found it unmanageable.1 Though I do not expect every reader, at this stage, to see how objections - especially from the metaphysical quarter - might be answered, perhaps the following points may be granted. The Thomist concept of inner word is rich and nuanced: it is no mere metaphysical condition of a type of cognition; it aims at being a statement of psychological fact, and the precise nature of those facts can be ascertained only by ascertaining what was meant by intelligere. Behind the notion of quiddity there lies the speculative acdvity that began with Socrates, was pushed forward at the Academy, and culminated in Aristotle: the quod quid est is central to a logic, a psychology, a metaphysic, and an epistemology; and this unity is intimately connected both with the metaphysical concept of form and the psychological experience of understanding. This conclusion is reinforced by the insistence of Aquinas on insight into phantasm, by the turn he gave to the notion of an inner word, by the psychological nature of his theory of abstracdon. No less powerfully is it confirmed by the psychological wealth of his pages on intellect as contrasted with the psychological poverty of the pages of other writers who mean by intelligere, not principally the act of understanding, but any cognitional act of an alleged spiritual nature.

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2 Verbum: Reflection and Judgment

The plan of our inquiry has been, first, to determine the introspective psychological data involved in the Thomist concept of a verbum mentis or inner word; secondly, to review the metaphysical categories and theorems in which these introspective data were expressed by Aquinas; thirdly, to follow the extrapolation from the analysis of the human mind to the account of the divine intellect as known naturally; fourthly, to study the theory of the procession of the divine Word. The first task, of introspective psychology, fell into two parts corresponding to the two different types of inner word, namely, the definition and the compositio vel divisio or judgment. Both types proceed from an intelligere, but a difference of product postulates a difference of ground; in the preceding chapter of this book it was argued that the intelligere whence proceeds the definition is a direct act of understanding, an insight into phantasm; in the present chapter the contention will be that the intelligere from which the judgment proceeds is a reflective and critical act of understanding not unlike the act of Newman's illative sense.3 It may be helpful to indicate at once the parallel between the two types of procession of inner words. Both definition and judgment proceed from acts of understanding, but the former from direct, the latter from reflective understanding. Both acts of understanding have their principal cause in the agent intellect, but the direct act in the agent intellect as spirit of wonder and inquiry, the reflective act in the agent intellect as spirit of critical reflection, as virtus iudicativa.1 Again, both acts of understanding have i De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 10, ad 8m.

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their instrumental or material causes, but the direct act has this cause in a schematic image or phantasm, while the reflective act reviews not only imagination but also sense experience, and direct acts of understanding, and definitions, to find in all taken together the sufficient ground or evidence for a judgment. Hence, while the direct act of understanding generates in definition the expression of the intelligibility of a phantasm, the reflective act generates in judgment the expression of consciously possessed truth through which reality is both known and known to be known. 1

Composition or Division

Compositio vel divisio is the usual Thomist name for the second type of inner word. Its origin lies in the Aristotelian use of grammar for the specification of philosophic problems. In the Categories one is told to distinguish between simple and composite forms of speech: the latter are illustrated by 'the man runs,' 'the man wins'; the former by 'man,' 'runs,' 'wins.'2In the Peri hermeneias there is set forth the concomitance of truth or falsity in the mind and, on the other hand, linguistic synthesis: one means the true or false not by any single word, not even by the copula, but only by a conjunction of words; apparent exceptions arise, not because any single word by itself really means the true or false, but only because one can at times enounce a single word and have others, as the grammarians say, understood.3 This passage Aquinas discussed at length, drawing an illuminating distinction between the primary and the consequent meanings of the verb 'est.' Primarily, '... est, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse'; but consequently and implicitly, 'est' means the true or false. For the primary meaning of 'est' is the actuality of any form or act, substantial or accidental; but consequently (because actuality involves synthesis with the actuated), and implicitly (because the actuated subject is understood when actuality is affirmed), there is the connotation of truth or falsity in this and other verbs.4 This distinction may be paralleled by the standard Aristotelian and Thomist division of ens into ens that is equivalent to verum and, on the other hand, ens that is divided by the ten categories.5 But from the viewpoint of a genetic analysis of judgment a prior, though related, distinction must claim our immediate attention. As the name compositio suggests, there 2 3 4 5

Aristotle, Categories, 2, la 17. Aristotle, On Interpretation, 3, l6b 19-25. ['est, absolutely speaking, means actually to be'] In I Peri herm., lect. 5 ad fin. In VMetaphys., lect. 9, §§889-96; De ente et essentia, c. i init.; and passim.

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is to the judgment a purely synthetic element. It is on this ground that we are told that truth or falsity resides in the conjunction as such and not in the terms that are conjoined. However, besides this element of synthesis, there is to judgment a further element by which synthesis is posited. If one compares the terms of a judgment to matter and the synthesis of the terms to form, then this act of positing synthesis by affirmation or denial may be likened to existence, which actuates the conjunction of matter and form. Without such positing there may be synthesis, as in a question or a hypothesis, but as yet there is no judgment. Again, synthesis, though not posited, may be true or false, but as yet it is not known to be true or false. Finally, as long as synthesis is not posited, the peculiar objective reference of the judgment is lacking; as yet the primary meaning of 'est,' the affirmation (or negation) of an 'in actu esse,' is not involved. In Aristotle, it is true, this distinction between the merely synthetic element in judgment and, on the other hand, the positing of synthesis is not drawn clearly. In Thomist writings, I believe, the use of Aristotelian terminology obscures to some extent a more nuanced analysis. In any case it was only by making this distinction that I was able to organize the materials I had collected, and so the rest of this section will be devoted to the synthetic element in judgment, while following sections will take up successively different aspects of the more important and more difficult element by which synthesis is posited. With regard to the synthetic element in judgment, certain preliminary distinctions must be drawn: there is the real composition in things themselves; there is the composition of inner words in the mind; there is the composition of outer words in speech and writing. The last of these three is obvious: spoken words are conjoined in a vocal and temporal cadence; written words are joined by using punctuation marks. Roughly parallel to the composition of outer words is the composition of inner words, so that at times it may be difficult to say which composition is in question, as in the second part of the statement 'esse ... significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto.'6 However, there is no doubt about the existence of an inner composition: it arises from the discursive character of our intellects, which form separate concepts to know first the subject and then the accident, which move from knowledge of the one to knowledge of the other, which attain knowledge 6 ['"to be" ... means the composition of the proposition which the soul discovers in joining the predicate to the subject'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m.

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of the inherence of accidents in subjects by some sort of combination or union of species.7 Finally, the ground and cause of the composition that occurs in the mind and in speech is a real composition in the thing. Thus, the proposition 'Socrates is a man' has its ground and cause in the composition of a human form with the individual matter of Socrates; the proposition 'Socrates is white' has its ground and cause in the composition of a real accident 'whiteness' with a real subject 'Socrates.'8 The one point to be noted here is that truth is not merely the subjective, mental synthesis. It is the correspondence between mental and real synthesis. More accurately, in our knowledge of composite things, truth is the correspondence of mental composition with real composition or of mental division with real division; falsity is the noncorrespondence of mental composition to real division or of mental division to real composition.9 But besides our knowledge of composite substances there are three other cases in which the foregoing account of truth suffers modal variations: in our knowledge of simple substances the incompkxa are known complexe; inversely, when simple substances know composite objects, the complexa are known incomplexe;10 finally, in the self-knowledge of the absolutely simple substance, knowing and known are an identity, and so truth can be named a correspondence in that case only by the artifice of a double negation; one cannot say that divine intellect is similar to divine being, for similarity supposes duality; one can say only that divine intellect is not dissimilar to divine being. 11 However, for the present, the significance of these modal variations is merely that they serve to stress the fact that mental synthesis is one thing and that judgment involves another. Judgment includes knowledge of truth;12 but knowledge of truth is knowledge not merely of mental synthesis but essentially of the correspondence between mental synthesis and real synthesis. The immediate issue is the nature of the origin and genesis of the mental synthesis, of the conjunction simply as conjunction in the mind and so as prior to knowledge of its correspondence to real conjunction. Mental synthesis is of concepts. As one defined term proceeds from one 7 8 9 10

De veritate, q. 2, a. 7 c. post med. In IXMetaphys., lect. ll, § 1898. Ibid. § 1896; In VI Metaphys., lect. 4, §§ 1225-26. The basic discussion is In IXMetaphys., lect. ll, §§ 1901-1903; see De veritate., q. 2, a. 7; q. 8, aa. 14-15; Summa theologiae, i, q. 14, a. 14; q. 58, aa. 2-4; q. 85, aa. 4-5; 2-2, q. i, a. 2 c.; and parallel texts. 11 Summa theologiae, i, q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m. 12 Ibid. a. 2.

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insight into phantasm, so two defined terms proceed from two insights. Such multiple insights and definitions may be separate, isolated, atomic. But it also happens that one insight combines with another, or that a first develops so as to include a second. Such a process of developing insight is the whole task of catching on to a science; and perhaps it was this very point that obscurely was uppermost in Aristotle's mind when he drew his distinction between the two operations of intellect, namely, knowledge of the indivisible and knowledge of the composite. For he appealed to the naive evolutionary theory of Empedocles that fancied an initial state of nature in which heads existed apart from necks and trunks apart from limbs; later, concord brought such separate members together into the harmonious wholes of the animals that, by a well-known law, alone have survived. In like manner, Aristotle contended, intellect puts together what before were apart. It is one thing to understand that the diagonal stands to the side of a square as root two to unity; it is another to grasp that that proportion is an irrational; it is a third to see that an irrational cannot be a measure. One may understand in isolation both the nature of measurement and the ratio of the diagonal to the side. But if one also understands the nature of irrationals, one has the scientific middle term for grasping that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with its side; and in this final state one deals with concepts not in isolation but in intelligible unity; one sees, as it were in a single view, the diagonal as an irrational, and the irrational as an incommensurable.13 Note the nature of the conjunction: it is not that two concepts merge into one concept; that would be mere confusion; concepts remain eternally and immutably distinct.b But while two concepts remain distinct as concepts, they may cease to be two intelligibilities and merge into one. 'Symmetrum et diametrum aliquando separatim et seorsum intellectus intelligit, et tune sunt duo intelligibilia; quando autem componit, fit unum intelligibile et simul intelligitur ab intellectu.'14 How do two concepts 13 InlllDeanima, lect. 11, §§ 747-49; on irrationals, In VMetaphys., lect. 17, § 1020. 14 ['Sometimes the intellect understands "symmetrical" ("commensurable") and "diagonal" separately, each by itself, and then there are two intelligibilities; but when the intellect combines [two concepts], one intelligibility results, and the two are understood simultaneously by the intellect' - notice that Thomas regards this as a false combination; he had explained in the preceding paragraph that 'incommensurable' (or 'irrational') and 'diagonal' make a true combination, but 'commensurable' and 'diagonal' make a false one.] In IIIDe anima, lect. 11, §749.

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become one intelligibility? Not by a change in the concepts but by a coalescence or a development of insights: where before there were two acts of understanding, expressed singly in two concepts, now there is but one act of understanding, expressed in the combination of two concepts. This combination of two, as a combination, forms but a single intelligible, a single though composite object of a single act of understanding. The psychological fact that insights are not unrelated atoms, that they develop, coalesce, form higher unities, was fully familiar to Aquinas. Repeatedly he spoke of an intelligere multa per unum: many acts of understanding cannot be simultaneous in one intellect; but one act of understanding can and does grasp many objects in a single view. ^Understanding a house is not understanding severally the foundation, the walls, and the roof; it is understanding one whole.16 The object of judgment is not the several terms but the one proposition.17 Knowledge of first principles is not exclusively a matter of comparing abstract terms or concepts; no less than the terms, the nexus between them may be directly abstracted from phantasm, so that, just as the concept, so also the principle may be the expression of an insight into phantasm.18 The synthetic character of understanding is illustrated not only in the concept of a whole, such as a house, and in the grasp of a principle, but also in the learning of a science; for the less intelligent type of mind has to have things explained in painful detail, while the more intelligent catches on from a few indications.19 Moreover, it is this synthetic character of understanding that is peculiarly evident in the theory of angelic and of divine knowledge. Angels need species to know things other than themselves; but the higher angels are higher because they grasp more by fewer species than do the lower with more numerous species; their acts of understanding are wider in sweep and more profound in penetration.20 The summit of such sweep and penetra15 Super IISententiarum, d. 3, q. 3, a. 4; Super IIISententiarum, d. 14, q. l, a. 2 sol. 4 c. and ad im; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 7, a. 2; De veritate, q. 8, a. 14; Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 55; De anima, a. 18, ad 5m; Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. 4.

16 In VIMetaphys., lect. 4, § 122Q. 17 Ibid.; Super III Sententiarum, d. 14, q. l, a. 2 sol. 4; De veritate, q. 8, a. 14 c. ad fin.; Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 55, §2 (ed. Leon., XIII, I57a 22-25). 18 See Peter Hoenen, 'De Origine Primorum Principiorum Scientiae,' Gregorianum 14 (1933) 153-84; 19 U938) 498-514; 20 (1939) 19-54; 321-50 [see above, chapter l, note 126]. 19 Summa theologiae, l, q. 55, a. 3 c. 20 Ibid.; Super II Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2; De veritate, q. 8, a. 10; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 98.

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don is the divine intellect; for the divine act of understanding is one, yet it embraces in a single view all possibles and the prodigal multiplicity of actual beings.21 Finally, it is to such a view of all reality that human intellect naturally aspires. The specific drive of our nature is to understand,22 and indeed to understand everything, neither confusing the trees with the forest nor content to contemplate the forest without seeing all the trees. For the spirit of inquiry within us never calls a halt, never can be satisfied, until our intellects, united to God as body to soul,23 know ipsum intelligere and through that vision, though then knowing aught else is a trifle,24 contemplate the universe as well.25 If to thirst, however obscurely, for this consummation is natural, still to achieve it is supernatural.26 But besides supernatural, there is also natural achievement, progress in understanding within the natural ambit of our development. Such progress, as progressing, is reason; for reason is to understanding as motion is to rest. Reason is not one potency, and understanding another potency; on the level of potency the two are identical; they differ only as process to a term differs from achievement in the term.27 This point merits illustration. It is objected, frequently enough, that syllogism does not represent the manner in which, as a matter of fact, we learn and think. This difficulty has its ground, partly in the identity of reason and understanding, partly in the type of examples of syllogism commonly found in the textbooks. Syllogism may represent either reasoning or understanding. When we understand, we no longer are reasoning or learning; we have reached the term and apprehend the many as one; but the stock examples of syllogism represent acts of understanding, matters that may have puzzled us long ago but now 21 Summa contra Gentiles, l, cc. 46-52; Super I Sententiarum, dd. 35-36; De veritate, qq. 2-3; Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, aa. 5-6; q. 15, aa. 1-3. 22 De veritate, q. 14, a. i c.: '... intellectus ... proprium terminum ... qui est visio alicuius intelligibilis' ['the proper end of intellect, which is the vision of some intelligibility']. 23 Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 51. 24 Summa theologiae, l, q. 12, a. 8, ad 4m. 25 Ibid. 1-2, q. 3, a. 8. 26 Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 52; see Henri Rondet, 'Nature et surnaturel dans la theologie de s. Thomas d'Aquin,' Recherches de science religieuse 33 (1946) 56-91. 27 Super IISententiarum, d. 9, q. l, a. 8, ad im; De veritate, q. 15, a. l; Summa theologiae, l, q. 79, a. 8 c.; seej. Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio selon s. Thomas d'Aquin (see above, chapter l, note 51).

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are taken for granted. It follows that such syllogisms do not illustrate learning or reasoning for current consciousness. But take a syllogism in a field in which your grasp is not too ready; define the terms; demonstrate the premises; and you will find that this reasoning is bringing an understanding to birth and that, with understanding achieved, you no longer reason but apprehend the many in a synthetic unity. For instance, why is the diagonal of a square incommensurable with the side? First, what is a measurement? It is a fourfold proportion in which, where M and N are integers, M: N:: measurable object: standard unit. What is the ratio of the diagonal to the side? It is root two. Now demonstrate that there cannot be two integers Mand N, such that M/N=^[2. As long as reasoning continues, understanding is not achieved. But with the reasoning process successfully completed, understanding is achieved: ratio terminatur ad intellectum!2^ It is in its relation to the psychological experience of understanding that reasoning or discourse is characterized by Aquinas. There is a difference between knowing one thing in another, and knowing one thing from knowing another; the former involves a single movement of mind; the latter involves a twofold movement, as in syllogism where first one grasps principles and then conclusion.29 In the Summa the analysis is pushed further by the introduction of a distinction between the temporal and the causal elements in discursive knowledge. In discourse there is temporal succession, for we know first one thing and then another; there also is causal connection, for it is because we know the first that we come to know the second. But in God there is no temporal succession, for he knows all at 28 ['reasoning terminates at understanding'] Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 8, a. l, ad 2m: 'Dicendum quod discursus rationis semper incipit ab intellectu et terminatur ad intellectum; ratiocinamur enim procedendo ex quibusdam intellectis, et tune rationis discursus perficitur quando ad hoc pervenimus ut intelligamus id quod prius erat ignotum' ['discursive reasoning always begins from understanding and terminates at understanding; for we reason by proceeding from some things that are understood, and the discursive activity of understanding is completed when we arrive at an understanding of what before was unknown']. Note that the phrase 'terminatur ad intellectum' is ambiguous; very frequently it refers to a critical return to intellectus as habitus principiorum; in the text cited it has to mean the arrival at some hitherto unknown object of understanding, which cannot be the object of the naturally known first principles employed in all reasoning. On this issue, see J. Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio 261-72. With regard to the distinction between natural and chronological priority of knowledge of premises over knowledge of conclusions, see In I Post, anal., lect. 2. 29 Deveritate, q. 8, a. 15.

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once; and there is no causal connection between different acts of knowing, for his knowing is a single act. Still, though God's knowledge is uncaused, it does not follow that he does not know causes. For all discursive knowledge comes to a term in the intuitive apprehension of a field of implications, interrelations, dependencies; from knowing a second because we know a first, we move to knowing a second in the first; but in God that final state is eternal, for he knows all things in their cause, which is himself.30 Reasoning was not characterized by Aquinas with a reference to a text on formal logic; it was characterized as the development of understanding, as motion towards understanding. This fact throws a light backward on an issue raised in the preceding chapter. Conceive reasoning in terms of deductive logic and there can be no reasoning unless one already is in possession of the necessary three terms 'subject,' 'middle,' and 'predicate.' But conceive reasoning as understanding in development and there is not the slightest difficulty about the Thomist view that we have to reason to grasp even the terms: 'nam cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam; et sic est in omnibus aliis, quae a nobis intelliguntur, nisi forte in primis principiis.'31Just how Aquinas reasoned out his concept of a stone, I cannot say; but in the second book of the Contra Gentiles there is the magnificent reasoning out of the concept of the human soul; it runs through no less than forty-five chapters;32 and that long argument provides an excellent example of what exactly Aquinas meant by knowledge of essence. For him, understanding was a knowledge penetrating to the inward nature of a thing. Angels know such essences directly, for they have no senses; but men reach essences only through the sensible doors that surround them; they have to reason from effects to causes and from properties to natures. Hence properly human understanding is named reason, though - it is not to be forgotten - reasoning terminates in understanding inasmuch as inquiry eventually yields knowledge of essence.33 Reasoning not merely terminates in understanding; equally it begins from understanding; for unless we understood something, we never should begin to reason at all. Accordingly, to avoid an infinite regress, it is 30 31 32 33

Summa theologiae, i, q. 14, a. 7 c. [For translation, see above, chapter l, note 151.] Superloannem, c. i, lect. i. Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 46—90. Super IIISententiarum, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2 sol. l; see De veritate, q. l, a. 12 c.; Sententia libri Ethicorum, 6, lect. 5; Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 8, a. l c.

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necessary to posit a habitus prindpiorum, also termed intellectus, which naturally we possess." Such a natural habit differs both from acquired habit and from infused habit. The natural habit, though it has a determination from sense, results strictly from intellectual light alone; the acquired habit has in sense not only a determination but also a cause.34 Thus the natural habit is more like the infused than the acquired: the infused virtue of faith is not caused by, but only receives a determination from, the preaching of the gospel.35 This is very subtle introspective psychology. To grasp it one has to compare two types of first principle. Thus, there is at least a certain selfevidence to the principle of inverse squares; but it is not a self-evidence that can be apprehended without an image of spatial extension. On the other hand, the evidence of the principle of noncontradiction is of a different type; with regard to it, any sensible instance is equally relevant and none is more than an illustration; for this principle does not arise from an insight into sensible data but from the nature of intelligence as such; and so its field of application is not limited to the realm of possible human experience, as the principle of inverse squares is limited to the imaginable and as certain geometrical principles to the Euclidean imaginable. Nowhere, to my knowledge, did Aquinas offer to give a complete list of naturally known principles. His stock examples are the principle of noncontradiction and of the whole being greater than the part.36 But it does not follow that the list of such principles is quite indeterminate. As there are naturally known principles, so also there is an object which we know per se and naturally. That object is ens; and only principles founded upon our knowledge of ens are naturally known.37 The nature of our natural knowledge of ens already has been touched upon in the previous chapter,38 and to it we shall have to return later in this chapter. If we are correct in urging that intelligibility is the ground of possibility and that possibility is possibility of being, so that the concept of being is known naturally because it proceeds from any intelligibility in act (= any intelligence in act), then it is equally clear that the principle of noncontradiction is known naturally; for as that principle is the natural law of the

34 Super II Sententiarum, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3 sol.; De veritate, q. 8, a. 15 c. ad fin. 35 Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad im. 36 InIIMetaphys., lect. l, §277; InlVMetaphys., lect. 6, §605; SuperIISententiarum, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3 sol.; and passim. 37 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 83, §31 (ed. Leon., XIII, 523a 26-38). 38 See pages 57-59 above.

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procession of any concept from intelligence in act, so it is the first principle ruling all conceptualization; and as Aquinas affirmed,39 it is the first principle governing all judgment.d The other stock example of a naturally known principle is that the whole is greater than the part.40 However, quantitative wholes and quantitative parts are known, not naturally, but through insight into phantasm; and it seems difficult to show that the discovery of the relation of quantitative whole to quantitative part is not an ordinary coalescence of insights. Still, it does not follow that St Thomas was mistaken in stating that we naturally know the whole to be greater than the part. For, as every being is one, so every finite being is a whole compounded of parts, an ens quod made up of entia quibus. Moreover, we know this naturally. Natural form stands to natural matter, as intelligible form stands to sensible matter;41 and when by a natural spontaneity we ask quid sit, we reveal our natural knowledge that the material or sensible component is only a part and that the whole includes a formal component as well. Similarly, when by a natural spontaneity we ask an sit, we again reveal our natural knowledge that the whole is not just a quiddity but includes an actus essendi42as well.^ This section on the synthetic element involved in judgment may be concluded with a resume. Insight into phantasm expresses itself in a definition. Such an expression per se is neither true nor false. Next, many insights into many phantasms express themselves severally in many definitions; none of these singly is true or false; nor are all together true or false, for as yet they are not together. Thirdly, what brings definitions together is not some change in the definitions; it is a change in the insights whence they proceed. Insights coalesce and develop; they grow into apprehensions of intelligibility on a deeper level and with a wider sweep; and these profounder insights are expressed, at times indeed by the invention of such baffling abstractions as classicism or romanticism, education, evolution, or 39 In IVMetaphys., lect. 6, §605. 40 In IIMetaphys., lect. i, §277; SuperIISententiarum, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m. 41 Deveritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad im (lae sen). 42 In IVMetaphys., lect. 2, §553: 'Sciendum est enim quod hoc nomen Homo imponitur a quidditate sive a natura hominis; et hoc nomen Res imponitur a quidditate tan turn; hoc vero nomen Ens imponitur ab actu essendi' ['For it is to be noted that this term "man" is imposed by the quiddity or by the nature of man; and this term "thing" is imposed by the quiddity alone; but this term "being" is imposed by the act of being']. 43 For the original of this paragraph see Theological Studies 8 (1947).

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the philosophic, perennis, but more commonly and more satisfactorily by the combination, as combination, of simple concepts. Fourthly, such synthetic sweep and penetration comes at first blush to the angel, but man has to reason to it; his intellect is discursive. Still, it is not pure discourse. Without initial and natural acts of understanding, reasoning would never begin; nor would there be profit or term to reasoning, did it not naturally end in an act of understanding in which the multiple elements of the reasoning process come into focus in a single view. Fifthly, reasoning in its essence is simply the development of insight; it is motion towards understanding. In the concrete such development is a dialectical interplay of sense, memory, imagination, insight, definition, critical reflection, judgment; we bring to bear on the issue all the resources at our command. Still, the more intelligent we are, the more we are capable of knowing ex pede Hercukm; then the more rapid is our progress to the goal of understanding, and the less is our appeal to the stylized reasoning of textbooks on formal logic. Again, once we understand, we no longer bother to reason; we take in the whole at a glance. With remarkable penetration Aquinas refused to take as reason the formal affair that modern logicians invent machines to perform. He defined reason as development in understanding; and to that, formal reasoning is but an aid. 2

Judgment

The act of judgment is not merely synthesis but also positing of synthesis. The preceding section argued that the pure synthetic element in judgment arises on the level of direct understanding and consists in the development of insights into higher unities. The present section will study the more elementary aspects of the act of positing the synthesis. This act may be characterized by the fact that in it there emerges knowledge of truth. So far we have considered the mental compositio in its basic stage; we now have to consider knowledge of the correspondence between the mental and the real compositio. The issue, then, is not knowledge as true or false but knowledge as known to be true or false. Even sense knowledge may be true or false. Just as good and bad regard the perfection of the thing, so true and false regard the perfection of a knowing. True knowing is similar, false is dissimilar, to the known. But though sense knowledge must be either similar or dissimilar to its object, it neither does nor can include knowledge of its similarity or dissimilarity. Again, a concept must be either similar or dissim-

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ilar to its object; but intellectual operation on the level of conceptualization does not include knowledge of such similarity or dissimilarity. It is only in the second type of intellectual operation, only in the production of the second type of inner word, that intellect not merely attains similitude to its object but also reflects upon and judges that similitude.44 Such reflection presents a familiar puzzle. To judge that my knowing is similar to the known involves a comparison between the knowing and its standard; but either the standard is known or it is not known; if it is known, then really the comparison is between two items of knowledge, and one might better maintain that we know directly without any comparing; on the other hand, if the standard is not known, there cannot be a comparison. This dilemma of futility or impossibility frightens the naive realist, who consequently takes refuge in the flat affirmation that we know, and that is all there is about it. It perhaps will not be out of place to indicate at once that Aquinas met this issue in a different manner. He admitted the necessity of a standard in judgment: 'nomen mentis a mensurando est sumptum';45 'iudicium autem de unoquoque habetur secundum illud quod est mensura illius.'46 Not only did he admit the necessity of a standard, but also he does not seem to have considered as standard either of the alternatives against which the above dilemma is operative; for his standard was neither the thing-in-itself as thing-in-itself and so as unknown, nor was it some second inner representation of the thing-in-itself coming to the aid of the first in a futile and superfluous effort to be helpful. The Thomist standard lay in the principles of the intellect itself: 'nomen mentis ... dicitur in anima, sicut et nomen intellectus. Solum enim intellectus accipit cognitionem de rebus mensurando eas quasi ad sua principia.'47Just what is meant by intellect measuring things by its own principles can appear only in the sequel. Three points are to be considered, though only two of the three in the present section. First, something must be said on the effect of such measuring by a standard, namely, on assent and certitude. Secondly, something must be added with 44 In VIMetaphys., lect. 4, §§ 1232-36; Summa theologiae, l, q. 16, a. 2 c. 45 ['the term "mind" (mentis) is derived from "measuring" (mensurando)'] De veritate, q. 1O, a. 1 c. 46 ['judgment is had about anything according to that which is the measure of that thing'] Ibid. a. 9 c. 47 ['in what pertains to the soul, the term "mind" is used in the same way as the term "intellect." For only the intellect receives knowledge about things by measuring them as if by its own principles'] Ibid. a. i c.

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regard to such measurement on the common criteriological level; namely, granted that some judgments are true, how can we tell the true from the false? Or, in other words, even if no judgments really are true, still some are at least subjectively necessary; what then are the grounds and motives of such subjective necessity? Thirdly, there remains the critical issue; granted the subjective necessity of some judgments as knowable and known, how does the mind proceed from such immanent coercion to objective truth and, through truth, to knowledge of reality? In the investigation of Thomist thought on these questions we may hope to discover the nature of the procession of the second type of inner word from an intelligere. On assent we may be brief. It is an act of the possible intellect.48 It is, accordingly, contrasted with consent which is an act of the will. The good is in things, but the true is in the mind; consent is a motion of the will with respect to the thing, but assent is a motion of the intellect with respect to a conception.49 Again, the object of an assent is either side of a contradiction. We do not assent by defining; again, we do not assent when we doubt or merely opine. We assent to first principles, to demonstrable conclusions, to the affirmations of reliable authority.50 Assent occurs when we judge a conception of the thing to be true.51 It must be motivated; thus, intellectual light moves us to assent to first principles, and first principles in turn move us to assent to demonstrable conclusions.52 In a word, assent appears to be identical with judgment but to emphasize its subjective and reflective aspects; it is the judgment as a personal act, committing the person, and a responsibility of the person; it is the judgment as based upon an apprehension of evidence, as including an awareness of its own validity, as a truth in the subject rather than as a truth absolutely and as a medium in quo reality is apprehended.53 Assent or judgment, on the criteriological level, is reached by a resolutio in principia. Unfortunately, this expression is ambiguous. At times it is connected with the contrast between the via compositions and the via resolutio48 49 50 51 52 53

Ibid. q. 14, a. l c. De malo, q. 6, a. l, ad 14m. De veritate, q. 14, a. l c. De malp, q. 6, a. l, ad 14m. In Boet. De Trin., q. 3, a. l, ad 4m. See Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2 sol. 3; De veritate, q. 14, a. l; In Boet. De Trin., q. 3, a. l; Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 2, a. l. On truth as a medium in quo, see Summa theologiae, l, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m.

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nis, that is, between the different orders in which a science might be studied. Thus, one might study chemistry only in the laboratory in a series of experiments that followed the history of the development of the science; one would begin from common material objects, learn the arts of qualitative and quantitative analysis, and very gradually advance to the discovery of the periodic table and the subatomic structures. But one might begin at the other end with pure mathematics, then posit hypotheses regarding electrons and protons and neutrons, work out possible atomic and then molecular structures, develop a method of analysis, and finally turn for the first time to real material things. Both of these lines of approach are mere abstractions, for actual thinking oscillates dialectically between the two methods. Still, even if they are abstractions, they merit names, and the former is the via resolutionis while the latter is the via compositionis.54It is this via resolutionis that is meant by the resolutio in principia, when we are told that the right way to know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is not to take the proposition on faith but to resolve it as a conclusion to its first principles.55 However, there is another meaning to the expression resolutio in principia, and in this case it coincides with the via iudicii as opposed to the via inventionis vel inquisitionis. This is a distinct contrast, for the via inventionis may be the via composition^ and it may be the via resolutionis.^ On the other hand, the via iudicii has to do with the reflective activity of mind assaying its knowledge. There are truths that naturally are known; they form the touchstone of other truth; and judging is a matter of reducing other issues to the naturally known first principles.58 Thus, in demonstra54 In IIMetaphys., lect. l, §278. 55 De veritate, q. 12, a. l c.; q. 15, a. 3 c. 56 Summa theologiae, l, q. 79, a. 8 c.: 'Ratiocinatio humana secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima principia' ['Human reasoning, when it follows the way of inquiry or discovery, proceeds from certain things that are understood simply, which are the first principles']. 57 Ibid. a. Q c.: 'Secundum viam inventionis, per res temporales in cognitionem devenimus aeternorum, secundum illud Apostoli, "invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur"' ['Following the way of discovery, we go through temporal things to arrive at knowledge of eternal things, according to that saying of the Apostle, "(his eternal power and divine nature) invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made"']. 58 Ibid. a. 8 c.: 'Ratiocinatio humana ... in via iudicii resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat' ['Human reasoning, resolving in the

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tions certitude is attained by a resolution to first principles;59 such a resolution is the efficient cause of the certitude;60until the resolution reaches the first principles doubt is possible, but once it has reached them doubt is excluded.61 For in the demonstrative sciences the conclusions are so related to the principles that, were the conclusions false, the principles would have to be false; hence the mind is coerced by its own natural acceptance of the principles to accept the conclusions as well.62 With regard to the quod quid est and with regard to principles known immediately from such knowledge of quiddity, intellect is infallible; but with regard to further deductions intellect may err; still, such error is excluded absolutely, whenever a correct resolutio in principia is performed.63 This reflective activity of judging has its psychological conditions. People who syllogize in their sleep regularly find on awakening that they have been guilty of some fallacy.64 Though dreamers may be aware that they are dreaming,65 still their self-possession is never more than partial.66 It is because the ligature of the senses in sleep prevents proper judging that moral fault in that state is not imputed.67 The existence of such a psychological condition points to the conclusion that judging is an activity involving the whole man. Knowledge of the quod quid est takes us outside time and space; but the act of compositio vel divisio involves a return to the concrete. In particular, whatever may be hymned about eternal truths, human judgments always involve a specification of time.68 Indeed, since truth way of judgment, returns to first principles, with which it compares the things discovered']. Ibid. a. 12 c.: 'Ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili; et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum iudicamus per principia naturaliter nota de his quae ratiocinando inveniuntur' ['Man's reasoning, since it is a sort of movement, starts from an understanding of some things, namely, the things that are known naturally without the investigation of reason, and it also terminates in understanding, insofar as, through naturally known principles, we judge of those things which are discovered by reasoning']. See above, note 28. 59 Super II Sententiarum, d. 9, q. l, a. 8, ad im. 60 Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2 sol. l. 61 SuperIISententiarum, d. 7, q. l, a. l sol.

62 63 64 65 66 67 68

De veritate, q. 22, a. 6, ad 4m; q. 24, a. l, ad i8m. Ibid., q. l, a. 12 c. Summa theologiae, l, q. 84, a. 8, ad 2m. De veritate, q. 12, a. 3, ad 2m. Summa theologiae, l, q. 84, a. 8, ad 2m. Ibid. 'Sed contra.' In IIIDe anima, lect. ll, §§749-51; In IXMetaphys., lect. ll, §§ 1899-1900.

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exists only in a mind, and since only the mind of God is eternal, there can be but one eternal truth.69 In our minds truth ordinarily consists in the application of abstract universals to sensible things, and such an application involves a temporal qualification.70 Even when thought rises to the third degree of abstraction, our expressions retain a temporal connotation; and this is only natural, for the proper and proportionate object of our intellects is the nature of sensible things, and it is by an extrapolation from sensible natures that we conceive any other.71 A free and full control of our senses as well as of our intellects is, then, a necessary condition of judgment.72 But sense is relevant to judgment in another fashion, for sense is the beginning of our knowledge; what we know by sense determines judgment, though it does so decreasingly as we ascend the degrees of abstraction. Automatically, the natural scientist who neglects sense falls into error; his work is to judge things as they are presented to the senses. On the other hand, the mathematician is not to be criticized because no real plane surface touches no real sphere at just one point; the criterion of mathematical judgment is not sense but imagination. Similarly, metaphysical entities are not to be called into question because they cannot be imagined; for metaphysics transcends not only sense but imagination as well.73 Judgment, then, may be described as resulting remotely and, as it were, materially from developing insight, which unites distinct intelligibilities into single intelligibilities, but proximately and, as it were, formally from a reflective activity of reason. This reflective activity involves the whole man, and so it is conditioned psychologically by a necessity of being wide awake. Again, human knowledge has a twofold origin - an extrinsic origin in sensitive impressions, and an intrinsic origin in intellectual light in which virtually the whole of science is precontained.74 Hence the reflective activity whence judgment results is a return from the syntheses effected by devel69 70 71 72

Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. 3; Summa theologiae, l, q. 16, a. 7. Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 96 ad fin. (ed. Leon., XIII, 572b 18-38). Summa theologiae, l, q. 84, a. 7, ad 3m. Discussion of this issue had its origin in the sceptical problem, How do we know we are not asleep? See In IVMetaphys., lect. 14, §698; lect. 15, §§708-9. It was extended by a consideration of the resultant theological problem, How can we trust prophetic judgment performed in ecstatic trance? See Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 173, a. 3 c. and ad 3m; q. 172, a. l, ad 2m; De veritate, q. 12, a. 3, ad 2m. 73 In Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 2 c. (ed. Mandonnet, III, 132-33). 74 De veritate, q. 1O, a. 6 c. ad fin.

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oping insight to their sources in sense and in intellectual light. The latter element of the return is mentioned more frequently; it is described as an instance of 'ratio terminatur ad intellectum'; and as the context makes clear, the intellectus in question is the habitus prindpiorum,75 the naturally known first principles that peculiarly are an effect of intellectual light. However, as we have seen, the phrase 'ratio terminatur ad intellectum' has another and distinct meaning. It also refers to the fact that reason is understanding in process, that reasoning ends up as an act of understanding.76 This definition of reasoning holds no less of reflective than of direct thought; and we may infer that the reflective activity of reason returning from the synthesis of intelligibilities to its origin in sense and in naturally known principles terminates in a reflective act of understanding, in a single synthetic apprehension of all the motives for judgment, whether intellectual or sensitive, in a grasp of their sufficiency as motives and so of the necessity of passing judgment or assenting. For no less than the first type of inner word, the second also proceeds from an intelligere.77 No less than the procession of the first type, the procession of the second is an emanatio intelligibilis.78Indeed much more palpably in the latter than in the former is there the determination of reasonableness by sufficient reason, for clearly judgment arises only from at least supposed sufficient ground. We assent to first principles because of intellectual light, to conclusions because of their necessary connection with principles; but because of probabilities we no more than opine; for however strong probabilities may be, they are not a sufficient determinant of reason, do not coerce assent, do not yield a perfect judgment.79 The general outline of Thomist analysis of human intellect is now, perhaps, discernible. There are two levels of activity, the direct and the reflective. On the direct level there occur two types of events: there are insights into phantasm which express themselves in definitions; there is the coalescence or development of insights which provides the hypothetical syntheses of simple quiddities. On the reflective level these hypothetical syntheses are known as hypothetical; they become questions which are answered by

75 SeeJ. Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio 269-72. 76 Ibid. 261-72. See above, note 28. 77 De veritate, q. 3, a. 2 c.; q. 4, a. 2 c.; Depotentia, q. 8, a. 1 c.; q. 9, a. 5 c.; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9 c.; Super loannem, c. l, lect. l. 78 See pages 46-59 above. 79 In Boet. De Trin., q. 3, a. l, ad 4m (ed. Mandonnet, III, 64).

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the resolutio in principia. This return to sources terminates in a reflective act of understanding, which is a grasp of necessary connection between the sources and the hypothetical synthesis; from this grasp there proceeds its self-expression, which is the compositio vel divisio, the judgment, the assent. 3

Wisdom

We have now to penetrate more deeply into our subject. The finer points of Thomist trinitarian theory cannot be grasped from the analogy of the mere mechanism of human intellect. Again, without a consideration of profounder issues connected with the nature of judgment, it is impossible to assemble and present all the evidence to be found in Thomist writings for the interpretation of his thought that we are offering. Accordingly, an attempt is to be made to integrate with the foregoing what Aquinas has to say of the habit and virtue of wisdom. For wisdom is the virtue of right judgment.80 Wisdom has to do with knowledge of the real as real,81 while it is in judgment that we know reality.82 Indeed, I should say that wisdom, the act of reflective understanding, and the act of judgment are related as habit, second act, and the act that proceeds from act. 80 Summa theologiae, l, q. i, a. 6 c.: 'Sapientis est ordinare et iudicare' ['It belongs to the wise to (put thought in) order and to judge']. See ibid. q. 79, a. 10, ad 3m; 2-2, q. 45, a. l c.; aa. 2 and 5. 81 In LVMetaphys., lect. 5, § 593. Remember that first philosophy is really wisdom (In IMetaphys., lect. 3, §56). 82 Super ISententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l, ad 7m. '... cum sit duplex operatic intellectus: una quarum dicitur a quibusdam imaginatio intellectus, quam Philosophus (in III de An., lect. 11) nominal intelligentiam indivisibilium, quae consistit in apprehensione quidditatis simplicis, quae alio etiam nomine formatio dicitur; alia est quam dicunt fidem, quae consistit in compositione vel divisione propositionis: prima operatic respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius' ['there are two operations of intellect, one of which some call the "imagination" of intellect (which the Philosopher, in the third book of the De anima, calls understanding of the indivisibles), which consists in the apprehension of a simple quiddity, which by another name is called "formation," the other of which is what they call faith, which consists in the composition or division [found] in a proposition; hence the first operation regards the quiddity of a thing, the second regards the existence of that thing']. See In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 3. The duplex operatic corresponds to the twofold inner word; on the former, see also Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2 sol. l; De veritate, q. 14, a. l; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 9, ad 6m; In I Peri herm., prooemium and lect. 5; In I Post, anal., lect. l; In TV Metaphys., lect. 6, §605; In VIMetaphys., lect. 4, § 1232. M. Gaston Rabeau in his erudite and very stimulating work Species: Verbum (Bibl. thomiste XXII [Paris: Vrin, 1938] 159,

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There are, then, three habits of speculative intellect.83 Most easily recognized of the three is the habit of science, which has to do with the demonstration of conclusions. However, demonstration does not admit indefinite regress, and so there must be some prior habit that regards first principles. In fact, two such prior habits are affirmed, intellect and wisdom; and these two seem related much as are the two types of act already described, namely, the act of direct understanding and the act of reflective understanding. For the habit of intellect regards the first principles of demonstrations, while the habit of wisdom regards the first principles of reality. The habit of intellect is comparatively simple: grasp of first principles of demonstrations results from knowledge of their component terms; if one knows what a whole is and what a part is, one cannot but see that the whole must be greater than its part; the habit of such seeing is the habit of intellect. On the other hand, the habit of wisdom has a dual role. Principally, it regards the objective order of reality; but in some fashion it also has to do with the transition from the order of thought to the order of reality. Principally, it regards the objective order of reality; for the wise man contemplates the universal scheme of things and sees each in the perspective of its causes right up to the ultimate cause. While art orders human products, and prudence orders human conduct, science discovers the order which art prudently exploits; but there is a highest, architectonic science, a science of sciences - and that is wisdom. Still, wisdom is not merely an ontology or natural theology; it also has some of the characteristics of an epistemology. The habit of intellect is the note 5), would urge that there must be a species intelligibilis of existence prior to its affirmation in judgment. His argument is that to affirm existence of essence one must first have the species of existence. It overlooks the fact that existence is the act, the exercise, of essence; that to know essence is to know its order to its act of existence; but, though potential knowledge of existence is contained in the grounds of existential judgment and so is prior to judgment, actual knowledge of the act of existence of any given essence cannot be had prior to the judgment; and there is no existence that is not the act of some essence. To put the point differently, M. Rabeau might argue that without a prior species of existence one would not know what one was affirming when one affirmed it; but this is to overlook the essentially reflective character of the act of judgment, which proceeds from a grasp of sufficient grounds for itself. A third line of consideration is the following dilemma: Is the species of existence one or is it many? If one, what happens to the analogy of ens'? If many, how do the many differ from the content 'act of essence,' where act is an analogous concept and essence is any or all essences we know? 83 The following is based mainly on Sententia libri Ethicorum, 6, lect. 5.

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habit of knowing the first principles of demonstrations; but knowledge of first principles is just a function of knowledge of their component terms. If the simple apprehension of these terms is a matter of direct understanding, still it is wisdom that passes judgment on the validity of such apprehensions and so by validating the component terms validates even first principles themselves.84 Again, science depends upon the habit of intellect for the theorematic web of interconnections linking conclusions with principles; but wisdom passes judgment upon that connection. Hence both intellect and science depend upon the judgment of wisdom. Intellect depends upon wisdom for the validity of the component terms of principles; science depends upon wisdom for the validity of its consequence from intellect;85 so that wisdom, besides being in its own right the science of the real as real, also is 'virtus quaedam omnium scientiarum.'86 It would seem fair to conclude that, with regard to speculative intellectual habits, Aquinas drew the same distinctions that, in the preceding section, we were led to draw with regard to speculative intellectual acts. Where Aquinas spoke of the habits of intellect, science, and wisdom, we were led to distinguish between direct understanding, the development of direct understanding, and reflective understanding. For the characteristics ascribed by Aquinas to the habits of intellect, science, and wisdom may be ascribed also to acts of direct understanding that grasp the intelligibility of data represented schematically in the imagination, to acts of developing understanding that spin the logical network of science, and to acts of reflective understanding in which judgment is passed upon the validity of direct understanding and of its development, and thereby the transition is effected from a mental construction on an imagined basis to knowledge through truth of reality. Acknowledgment of an epistemological element in the habit of wisdom goes back to its classical exposition in the Metaphysics of Aristotle. First philosophy really is wisdom; only the pretensions of the Sophists led the wise to name their pursuit not wisdom itself but love of wisdom.87 The comparison of lower and higher animals, of animals and men, of men of experience with men of science, brings one to the conclusion that wisdom is a matter of knowing causes.88 Again, the six characteristics which common 84 85 86 87 88

Ibid. See also Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m. Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2m. ['a sort of mastery of all the sciences'] Sententia libri Ethicorum, 6, lect. 5. In IMetaphys., lect. 3, §56. Ibid. lect. i.

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consent would attribute to the wise man may all be deduced from the assumption that wisdom is a speculative science concerned with ultimate causes and principles.89 Further, it is the desire to know causes that moves men, as of old so also today, to the search and study of philosophy;90 and it is the achievement of knowledge of causes that is meant by science.91 Hence, the remainder of the first book of the Metaphysics is devoted to an examination of the four causes. But for a resumption of the objective viewpoint so established, one must leap to book 6 (£). There one finds an account of the real, followed by accounts of substance or essence,9* of potency and act,93 of unity and opposition,94 and of the separate substances.95 But the intervening books 2 to 5 are gnoseological, methodological, almost epistemological. Knowledge of causes has to be true. But truth is peculiar; no one is totally without it, but no one possesses it in full.96 Again, no one can make any great contribution to it; but many in collaboration, especially in the collaboration that extends over time and operates through the accumulations of a stable culture, can assemble a rather notable achievement.97 One may say that philosophers are in the position of people walking the streets; to know the facades of houses is easy, but to know their interiors difficult. So too, there are palpable truths and hidden truths.98 In particular, knowledge of the separate substances is hard to come by, for in their regard we are just owls in daylight;99 for the separate substances are pure intelligibilities, but our intellects are built to know intelligibility, not in its pure form, but only as informing sensible matter. Still, the problem is not desperate; just as there exist dialectical techniques, unknown even at the time of Socrates, by which we can determine the methodology of the study of contraries without previous knowledge of their essences,100 so too may we approach the larger issue of universal reality even though much of it is hidden from us. Thus truth and reality are 89 go 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Ibid. lect. 2. Ibid. lect. 3. Ibid. lect. 4, §70. In V7/and VIII Metaphys. In IX Metaphys. In X Metaphys. In XII Metaphys. In IIMetaphys., lect. 1, §275. Ibid. §276. Ibid. §277. Ibid. §285. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XIII, 4, lO78b 25-28.

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parallel: what has a cause of its reality, also has a cause of its truth; 101 again, as the reality that grounds other reality is the more real, so the truth that grounds other truth is the more true;102as an infinite regress in the demonstration of truths is untenable, so also is an infinite regress in the grounding of one reality by another.103 There is, then, something of which the reality is most real and the truth most true, and it is the object of wisdom.104 There follow methodological considerations. Different sciences have to be tackled in different manners.105 The approach to metaphysics lies in collecting and completing the list of metaphysical problems.106 Such a list leads one to the definition of first philosophy: it is concerned with ultimate reality. But the science dealing with ultimate reality also will deal with any instance of the real as real,107 so that first philosophy is the science of being, substance and accident, unity, multiplicity, and opposition.108 Nor is this the whole story. The first philosopher has to treat, not only of the real as real, but also of the first principles of demonstrations.109 He is not to skimp this task. He must be satisfied with the validity of the principles of noncontradiction and excluded middle.110 He must envisage the problem of appearance and reality.111 Above all, he must scrutinize each of the terms entering into the first principles which intellect grasps and on which his science rests,112 for 'veritas et cognitio principiorum indemonstrabilium dependet ex ratione terminorum ... Cognoscere autem rationem ends et non ends, et totius et partis, et aliorum quae consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia, pertinet ad sapientiam.'113 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 no 111 112 113

In II Metaphys., lect. 2, §298. Ibid. §§ 292-98. Ibid. lect. 3 and 4. Ibid. lect. 2, §§292-98. Ibid. lect. 5. In IIIMetaphys., lect. 1-15. In IVMetaphys., lect. 5, §593. Ibid. lect. 1-4. Ibid. lect. 5, §595. Ibid. lect. 5-10, 16, 17. Ibid. lect. 11-15. In VMetaphys., lect. 1-22. ['truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms ... But to know the meaning of being and not being, of whole and part, and of other things which follow on being, from which as from (their) terms are constituted the indemonstrable principles - this pertains to wisdom'] Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m.

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It is to be observed that the Aristotelian concept of wisdom, or first philosophy, while it does contain an epistemological element, still can hardly be said to raise the critical problem. Aristotle was content with a generalization of the criteriological issue. For him it was enough that one cannot but think according to the principle of noncontradiction, and that that impossibility was only part of the more general impossibility that is known through knowing the principle itself.114 Again, the wise man knows the difference between appearance and reality. He is ready to refute the sophistries that would confound the two, but he is not prepared to discuss how our immanent activities also contain a transcendence. Aristotelian gnoseology is brilliant but it is not completed knowledge is by identity; the act of the thing as sensible is the act of sensation; the act of the thing as intelligible is the act of understanding; but the act of the thing as real is the esse naturale of the thing and, except in divine self-knowledge, that esse is not identical with knowing it. But while it should be granted that Aristotle was content with criteriology, it remains that he opened a door to further speculation along the same line. Such speculation may appear to modern Schoolmen a very alien thing, a fascinating but perilous distraction born of Cartesian doubt and Kantian criticism. But Aquinas could have had no such prejudice; his predecessors were neither Descartes nor Kant but Aristotle and Augustine. If the very logic of the Aristotelian position makes it clear that our knowledge of forms, whether sensible or intelligible, can be accounted for by identity, still the same logic forces the conclusion that our knowledge of essence and of existence has to be differently grounded. '... sensibile in actu est sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu. Ex hoc enim aliquid in actu sentimus vel intelligimus, quod intellectus noster vel sensus informatur in actu per speciem sensibilis vel intelligibilis. Et secundum hoc tan turn sensus vel intellectus aliud est a sensibili vel intelligibili, quia

114 In IV Metaphys., lect. 6, §606: 'Ex hoc enim quod impossibile est esse et non esse, sequitur quod impossibile sit contraria simul inesse eidem, ut infra dicetur. Et ex hoc quod contraria non possunt simul inesse, sequitur quod homo non possit habere contrarias opiniones, et per consequens quod non possit opinari contradictoria esse vera, ut ostensum est' ['For from the fact that it is impossible to be and not to be, it follows that it is impossible that contraries should be in a thing at the same time, as will be said below. And from the fact that contraries cannot be in the same thing at the same time, it follows that a man cannot hold contrary views, and consequently that he cannot judge contradictories to be true, as has been shown'].

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utrumque est in potentia.'115 But the problem of knowledge, once it is granted that knowledge is by identity, is knowledge of the other. As long as faculty and object are in potency to knowing and being known, there is as yet no knowledge. Inasmuch as faculty and object are in act identically, there is knowledge indeed as perfection but not yet knowledge of the other. Reflection is required, first, to combine sensible data with intellectual insight in the expression of a quod quid est, of an essence that prescinds from its being known, and then, on a deeper level, to affirm the existence of that essence. Only by reflection on the identity of act can one arrive at the difference of potency. And since reflection is not an identity, the Aristotelian theory of knowledge by identity is incomplete.116 But it is well to grasp just where the strength of the Aristotelian position lies. One might side with Plato and say knowing of its nature is knowing the other. But this brings up insoluble difficulties with regard to knowledge in the absolute being; for even Plato was forced to admit, in virtue of his assumptions, that absolute being, if it knows, must undergo motion.117 That difficulty does not exist for the Aristotelian. Maintain that knowing is identity, and it follows that 'in his quae sunt sine materia idem est intelligens et intellectum.'ll8The unmoved mover may remain unmoved and yet know, because, with knowing an identity, the being and knowing of the absolute coincide. Aquinas was quite aware of this profound cleavage between Platonist and Aristotelian gnoseology: 'Et hoc quidem oportet verum esse secundum sententiam Aristotelis, qui ponit quod intelligere contingit per hoc quod intellectum in actu sit unum cum intellectu in actu ... Secundum autem positionem Platonis, intelligere fit per contactum intellectus ad rem intelli115 ['the sensible in act is the sense in act, and the intelligible in act is the intellect in act. For we sense or understand something in act from this, that our intellect or sense is informed in act by the species of the sensible or the intelligible. And sense or intellect is other than the sensible or the intelligible only insofar as each is in potency'] Summa theologiae, i, q. 14, a. 2 c. 116 Hence to the Aristotelian theorem of knowledge by immateriality Aquinas had to add a further theorem of knowledge by intentionality. The difference between the two appears clearly in the case of one immaterial angel knowing another immaterial angel without the former's knowledge being the latter's reality. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 56, a. 2, ad 3m. 117 Plato, Sophist, 2486. 118 ['in the immaterial order, the understander and the understood are identical'] Aristotle, De anima, III, 4, 43Oa 3-4. See Summa theologiae, i, q. 87, a. l, ad 3m.

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gibilem ...'11Q Quite clearly, Aquinas opted systematically for the Aristotelian position. It was a problem for him that God should know anything distinct from the divine essence,120 and that problem he solved by appealing to the analogy of the human inner word.121 Rational reflection has to bear the weight of the transition from knowledge as a perfection to knowledge as of the other. The Thomist validation of rational reflection is connected with the Augustinian vision of eternal truth. Augustine had argued that we know truth not by looking without but by looking within ourselves. Still, we all may know the same truths, and you do not know them by looking within me, nor I by looking within you, so that knowledge of truth is not merely a matter of looking each within himself. Our inward glance really is direcdy upward to what is above us, and it is in a vision of one eternal truth that all can find the same truth. Now the Platonism of this position is palpable, for its ultimate answer is not something that we are but something that we see; it supposes that knowledge essentially is not identity with the known but some spiritual contact or confrontation with the known. Such a view Aquinas could not accept. One knows by what one is. Our knowledge of truth is not to be accounted for by any vision or contact or confrontation with the other, however lofty and sublime. The ultimate ground of our knowing is indeed God, the eternal Light; but the reason why we know is within us. It is the light of our own intellects; and by it we can know because 'ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati.'122 The act of the thing as sensible is the act of sensation; the act of the thing as intelligible is the act of understanding; but we can proceed from these identities to valid concepts of essence and true affirmations of existence, because such procession is in virtue of our intellectual light, which 119 ['And indeed this has to be true according to the opinion of Aristotle, who asserts that understanding occurs in this way, that the thing understood in act is one with the intellect in act... But according to the position of Plato, understanding is achieved through contact of the intellect with the intelligible thing'] Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 98 ad fin. (ed. Leon., XIII, 582b 13, 22). 120 Super I Sententiarum, d. 35, q. l, a. 2, ad im; De veritate, q. 2, a. 3, ad im; Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 51, 'Adhuc'; Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, a. 5, ad 2m. 121 De veritate, q. 3, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles, \, c. 53; Summa theologiae, l, q. 15, a. 2c. 122 ['the intellectual light itself which we have within us is nothing else than a certain participated likeness of the uncreated light'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 84, a. 5 c.

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is a participation of eternal Light. Such is the Thomist ontology of knowledge. But is there also a Thomist epistemology? It is all very well to validate rational reflection by attributing the light of our intellects to the eternal Light that is God. But such a procedure presupposes that already we know validly both ourselves and God. As an ontology of knowing it is satisfactory; as an epistemology it is null and void. Is one to say that Aquinas was innocent of modern critical complications? Or is one to say that, since we know by what we are, so also we know that we know by knowing what we are? While we cannot here discuss that issue to the satisfaction of epistemologists, neither can we omit it entirely; for it is the highest point in rational reflection, and it was in rational reflection that Aquinas found the created analogy to the eternal procession of the divine Word.123 Now there happens to be a text in which Aquinas did maintain that our knowledge of truth is derived from our knowledge of ourselves. Sense knowledge, because unreflective, is irrelevant to the procession of the Word.124 For exactly the same reason, namely, because it is not reflective, sense does not include knowledge of truth. On the other hand, intellect does include knowledge of truth because it does reflect upon itself: 'secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra se ipsum reflectitur.'125 Sense knowledge is true; sense is aware of its own acts of sensation. But sense, though true and though conscious, nevertheless is not conscious of its own truth; for sense does not know its own nature, nor the nature of its acts, nor their proportion to their objects. On the other hand, intellectual knowledge is not merely true but also aware of its own truth. It is not merely aware empirically of its acts but also reflects upon their nature; to know the nature of its acts, it has to know the nature of their active principle, which it itself is; and if it knows its own nature, intellect also knows its own proportion to knowledge of reality. Further, this difference between sense and intellect is a difference in reflective capacity. In knowing, we go outside ourselves; in reflecting, we return in upon ourselves. But the inward return of sense is incomplete, stopping short at a merely empirical awareness of the fact of sensation. But the intellectual 123 Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11. 124 Ibid. 125 ['intellect knows the truth in this way, that it reflects upon itself] De veritate, q. l, a. Qc.

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substance returns in upon itself completely. It is not content with mere empirical awareness; it penetrates to its own essence.126 I cannot take this passage as solely an affirmation of the reflective character found in every judgment.127 Not in every judgment do we reflect to the point of knowing our own essence and from that conclude our capacity to know truth. Rather, in this passage Aquinas subscribed, not obscurely, to the program of critical thought: to know truth we have to know ourselves and the nature of our knowledge, and the method to be employed is reflection. Still, it is one thing to subscribe to the critical program and quite another to execute it; to what extent such execution is to be found in the writings of Aquinas is the issue next before us. In tackling it, we shall have in view another end as well, namely, a justification of the procedure followed in these articles, a presentation of the evidence for our belief that the Thomist theory of intellect had an empirical and introspective basis. 4

Self-knowledge of Soul

From Aristotle Aquinas derived a method of empirical introspection. In the second book of the De anima, after defining soul in general, there arose the problem of distinguishing different kinds of soul. But souls differ by difference in their potencies. Since potency is knowable only inasmuch as it is in act, to know the different potencies it is necessary to know their acts. Again, since one act is distinguished from another by the difference of their respective objects, to know different kinds of acts it is necessary to discriminate between different kinds of objects. Knowledge of soul, then, begins from a distinction of objects; specifying objects leads to a discrimination between different kinds of act; different kinds of act reveal difference of potency; and the different combinations of potencies lead to knowledge of the different essences that satisfy the generic definition of soul.128 Thus the human soul does not know itself by a direct grasp of its own essence; that is the prerogative of God and of the angels.129 Did man know his own soul in such immediate fashion, the roundabout process through objects, acts, and potencies would be superfluous.130The fact is that human 126 Ibid.

127 128 129 130

See Summa theologiae, l, q. 16, a. 2, or In VIMetaphys., lect. 4, § 1236. In IIDe anima, lect. 6, §§304-8. In IIIDe anima, lect. 9, § 726. In IIDe anima, lect. 6, §308.

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intellect is in genere intelligibiliumjust a potency; unless its potency is reduced to act, it neither understands nor is understood.131 On the other hand, the acquisition of an understanding of anything, of any habitual scientific knowledge, makes our intellect habitually capable not only of understanding the scientific object in question but also of understanding itself.132 We can know what understanding is by understanding anything and reflecting on the nature of our understanding; for the species of the object understood also is the species of the understanding intellect. It was by scrutinizing both the object understood and the understanding intellect that Aristotle investigated the nature of possible intellect. And, indeed, we can have no knowledge of our intellects except by reflecting on our own acts of understanding.133 Evidently, the Aristotelian and Thomist program is not a matter of considering ocular vision and then conceiving an analogous spiritual vision that is attributed to a spiritual faculty named intellect. On the contrary, it is a process of introspection that discovers the act of insight into phantasm and the definition as an expression of the insight, that almost catches intellect in its forward movement towards defining and in its backward reference to sense for the concrete realization of the defined.134 If the commentary on the De anima adds to the Aristotelian text the enrichment due to a fully developed metaphysical system, there is to be found in the independent Thomist writings not a few additional points of introspective psychology. Of these the most fundamental is the distinction between what we should call an empirical awareness of our inner acts and a scientific grasp of their nature. The scientific grasp is in terms of objects, acts, potencies, essence of soul. It is reached only by study; it is a matter of which many are ignorant, on which many have erred; it is universal knowledge; it is knowledge that we attain only discursively, but angels and devils intuitively, so that even the devils know the essence of our souls better than we do ourselves.135 This scientific knowledge is what philosophers acquire by arguing from the universality of concepts to the immateriality and other properties of the soul;136 it is the knowledge that Aquinas himself set forth 131 132 133 134 135

In IIIDe anima, lect. 9, § 725. Ibid. lect. 8, §704. Ibid. lect. 9, §724Ibid. lect. 8, §713. Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5 sol.; Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. l, a. 2, ad 3m; De veritate, q. 10, a. 8 c.; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 75, § 13 (ed. Leon., XIII, 475a 45-4750 l); ibid. 3, c. 46; Summa theologiae, l, q. 87, aa. 1-4; and for the devils' knowledge of us, De malo, q. 16, a. 8, ad 7m. 136 De veritate, q. 1O, a. 8 c.

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in masterly fashion in the long argument that begins in chapter 46 of the second book of the Contra Gentiles to end only in chapter 90. On the other hand, empirical knowledge of our own souls is knowledge of the existence of their acts,137 knowledge of what is proper to the individual,138 knowledge of the inner movements of the heart which are hidden from the intuitive, but exclusively essential, knowledge of the devils.139 Of this self-knowledge Aristotle spoke in the Ethics when he remarked that one perceives one's own seeing and hearing and moving and understanding.140 When such knowledge is in act, it is a matter of our knowing ourselves as in act by our acts;141 for it is not the eye that sees nor the intellect that understands, but the man by means of his eyes sees and by means of his intellect understands.142 On the other hand, empirical self-knowledge may be considered not as act but as habit. Now, just as we habitually know that we possess a habit of science not by a further habit but simply by our ability to produce the acts of the habit, similarly for the habitual possession of empirical selfknowledge we need nothing more than the soul itself, which is present to itself and capable of eliciting conscious acts.143 The relation of empirical to scientific self-knowledge is charted clearly enough; the former is the basis of the latter. The appeal to experience in Thomist psychological theory, though without the benefit of a parade of modern methodology, nonetheless is frequent and even not inconspicuous. The standard argument against the Averroists was the affirmation 'hie homo intelligit': deny such a proposition, and since you too are an instance of hie homo, you put yourself out of court as one who understands nothing; but admit it, and you must also admit that each individual has his own private intellectus possibilis by which he understands.144 Equally, in 137 138 139 140 141 142

Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. i, a. 2, ad 3m. De veritate, q. 10, a. 8. De malo, q. 16, a. 8, ad 7m. Aristotle, Ethics, IX, 9, ll7Oa 29-34. De veritate, q. 10, a. 8. De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 10, ad 15m; see In IDe anima, lect. 10, § 152; De veritate, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3m; Summa theologiae, l, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2m. [CV-B (see Editors' Preface) has at this point in the margin: 'A, 4, 4080, 14.' The reference is to Aristotle's De anima: 'It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul.'] 143 De veritate, q. 10, a. 8; see Summa theologiae, i, q. 87, a. l. 144 In IIIDe anima, lect. 7, §690: 'Manifestum est enim quod hie homo intelligit. Si enim hoc negetur, tune dicens hanc opinionem non intelligit aliquid, et ideo non est audiendus; si autem intelligit, oportet quod aliquo formaliter

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affirming the immanence of an agent intellect in each of us, the appeal to experience is employed: if we had no experience of abstracting intelligibilities and receiving them in act, then it never would occur to us to talk and argue about them.145 Again, with regard to our knowledge of separate substances, the issue is settled 'secundum Aristotelis sententiam quam magis experimur,' and 'secundum modum cognitionis nobis expertum.'146 Finally, the introspective method employed in this and the preceding article may be said to rest upon an explicit statement: 'anima humana intelligit seipsam per suum intelligere, quod est actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam';147 grasp the nature of your acts of understanding, and you have the key to the whole of Thomist psychology. Indeed, you also have what Aquinas considered the key to Aristotelian psychology: 'Unde et supra Philosophus per ipsum intelligere et per illud quod intelligitur, scrutatus est naturam intellectus possibilis.'148 But, I think, one can go further than this. For Aquinas the term 'intellectual light' is not simply a synonym for the Aristotelian term 'agent intellect.' He debated with the Avicennists whether agent intellect was immanent or transcendent. But he never thought of debating whether intellectual light is immanent or transcendent. Indeed, when he argued

intelligat. Hie autem est intellectus possibilis, de quo Philosophus dicit: "Dico autem intellectum quo intelligit et opinatur anima"' ['For it is clear that this man understands. For if this is denied, then the one uttering this opinion does not understand anything, and so is not to be listened to; but if he understands, there must be a formal principle by means of which he understands. But this is the passive intellect, of which the Philosopher says: "I call intellect that by which the soul understands or forms an opinion"']. See Super IISententiarum, d. 17, q. 2, a. i; De unitate intellectus, §§ 71-79; De anima, a. 2; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 2; Compendium theologiae, c. 85; Summa theologiae, i, q. 76, a. i c. 145 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 76, § 17 (ed. Leon., XIII, 482a 35-41); De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 10 c.; De anima, a. 5 c.; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 4 c. ad fin. 146 ['according to the opinion of Aristotle, which agrees better with what we experience,' and 'according to the manner of knowing which we experience'] Summa theologiae, i, q. 88, a. l c. 147 ['the human soul understands itself by its understanding, which is its proper act, perfectly demonstrating its power and its nature'] Ibid. a. 2, ad 3m. Note that intelligere is the proprius actus not only of the human soul but of the separate substances as well (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 97). Also, that repeatedly God is ipsum intelligere. 148 ['And so the Philosopher (see above) studied the nature of passive intellect through (examination of) the act itself of understanding and through that which is understood'] In III De anima, lect. 9, §724.

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that agent intellect was immanent, he was arguing for an identification of agent intellect with the ground of intellectual light. Hence he could frame his conclusion in this significant fashion: 'Unde nihil prohibet ipsi lumini animae nostrae attribuere actionem intellectus agentis; et praecipue cum Aristoteles intellectum agentem comparet lumini.'149 Both the nature of agent intellect and, in particular, Aristotle's comparison of agent intellect with light, lead one to identify agent intellect with the immanent cause of what we call the flash of understanding, the light of reason. What is, then, this lumen animae nostrae? First, the mere fact that one is understanding something does not make it inevitable that one reflexly directs one's attention to the intellectual light involved in the act.150 Secondly, whenever an object is understood, it is understood only as illustrated by the light of agent intellect and received in possible intellect. Just as corporeal light is seen in seeing any color, so also intelligible light is seen in apprehending any intelligibility. Again, just as corporeal light is seen, not as an object, but in knowing an object, so also intelligible light is seen, not as an object, but 'in ratione medii cognoscendi.'151 Thirdly, intellectual light is a medium not in the sense that it is a known object by means of which another object is known; it is a medium in the sense that it makes other objects knowable. Just as the eye need not see light except insofar as colors are illuminated, so a medium in the given sense need not be known in itself but only in other known objects.152 Fourthly, with these restrictions we may say that the light of agent intellect is known per se ipsum. The soul does not know its own essence by its own essence; but in some fashion it does know its own intellectual light by its own intellectual light, not indeed to the extent that that light is an object, but inasmuch as that light is the element making species intelligible in act.153 There is, then, a manner in which the light of our souls enters within the range of introspective observation. The most conspicuous instance seems to be our grasp of first principles. Scientific conclusions are 149 ['And so nothing prevents our attributing the action of agent intellect to the light itself of our soul; and especially since Aristotle compares agent intellect to a light'] Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 77 ad fin. 150 Quaestiones quodlibetales, 10, a. 7, ad 2m. 151 ['under the aspect of a medium of knowing'] Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5 sol. 152 In Boet. De Trin., q. i, a. 3, ad im (ed. Mandonnet, III, 37). 153 Deveritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad 10m (2ae ser.).

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accepted because they are implied by first principles; but the assent to first principles has to have its motive too, for assent is rational; and that motive is the light that naturally is within us.154 Again, the light of agent intellect is said to manifest first principles, to make them evident.155 In that light the whole of science virtually is ours from the very start.156Just as conclusions are convincing because principles are convincing, so our intellectual light derives its efficacy from the prima lux which is God.157 Hence the divine and the human teachers may collaborate without any confusion of role. The human teacher teaches inasmuch as he reduces conclusions to principles; but all the certitude we possess, whether of conclusions or of principles, comes from the intellectual light within us by which God speaks to us.158 However, the experienced effects of intellectual light, as the evidence of principles, the motive of assent, the immanent ground of certitude, are not the only instances in which intellectual light, in its indirect fashion, enters into the range of consciousness. It is constitutive of our very power of understanding.159 It is the principle of inquiry and of discourse; man reasons discoursing and inquiring by his intellectual light, which is clouded with temporal continuity because man obtains his knowledge from sense and imagination.160 As the principle of inquiry, intellectual light is the source of that search for causes which reveals the natural desire of man for the beatific vision.161 Our knowledge has a twofold source - an extrinsic origin on the level of sense, but an intrinsic origin in the light of our intellects.162 Sense is only the materia causae of our knowledge.163 The object of understanding is supplied and offered to us, as it were materially, by the imagination; formally, as object of understanding, it is completed by intel154 In Boet. De Trin., q. 3, a. i, ad 401 (ed. Mandonnet, III, 64). 155 Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. 2, a. i, ad 401; see Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 46, 'Amplius.' 156 Deveritate, q. 1O, a. 6 c. ad fin.: '... in lumine intellectus agentis nobis est quodammodo omnis scientia originaliter indita ...' ['in the light of agent intellect all knowledge is originally in some way given to us interiorly']. 157 In Boet. De Trin., q. i, a. 3, ad im (ed. Mandonnet, III, 37). 158 Deveritate, q. 11, a. i, ad 13m. 159 In Boet. De Trin., q. i, a. 3 c. (ed. Mandonnet, III, 35): '... lux naturalis, per quam constituitur vis intellectiva' ['natural light, by which the power of understanding is constituted']. 160 SuperIISententiarum, d. 3, q. i, a. 2 sol. 161 Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 8 c. 162 De veritate, q. 10, a. 6 c. ad fin. 163 ['material basis of the cause'] Summa theologiae, i, q. 84, a. 6 c. ad fin.

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lectual light.164 Perhaps, agent intellect is to be given the function of the subconscious effect of ordering the phantasm to bring about the right schematic image that releases the flash of understanding; for agent intellect is to phantasm as art is to artificial products.165 When the soul is separated from the body, there are neither senses nor imagination; then species, bestowed by the separate substances, are received directly in the possible intellect; but the power of understanding is had by the agent intellect.166 With regard to the act of understanding itself, at all times a distinction is drawn between possible intellect, habit of science, and the actuation of this habit; but in earlier writings there is a further distinction introduced within the habit of science between an element of light and, on the other hand, species as element of determination.167 Though this distinction does not recur in the same form in later writings, equivalent affirmations are to be found. Both agent intellect and phantasm concur in producing the act of understanding, but in their cooperation each has its respective role. Just as corporal light, it was supposed, did not include in itself the various colors of the spectrum but only reduced to act either the colors themselves or the diaphanum through which the colors were perceived, similarly agent intellect did not include the specific determinations of the various natures of material things but only was capable of making any such nature intelligible in act.168 Hence, while phantasm caused in possible intellect the determination of the act of understanding, agent intellect caused the element of immaterialization, of intelligibility in act.169 This distinction seems relevant to the distinction between the [two types 164 Super II Sententiarum, d. 20, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m. One might suggest that sense data as not illuminated by agent intellect are the mere data of the positivist, whereas sense data as illuminated are partial knowledge of hylomorphically conceived reality. For the positivist, any knowledge apart from sense data is merely subjective; for the Aristotelian, intellectual knowledge is as objective as sensitive; and the illumination of phantasm is the assumption that there is an intelligibility to be known. 165 De anima, a. 5 c. It would seem that this influence of agent intellect on phantasm is mediated by the sensitive potency named the cogitativa. See Summa theologiae, i, q. 78, a. 4, ob. 5 and ad 5m. 166 De anima, a. 15, ad 9m. 167 Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 5, a. l, ad im; Super III Sententiarum, d. 14, q. i, a. l sol. 2; ibid. sol. 3; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 7, a. l; De veritate, q. 10, a. 6; q. 18, a. 8, ad 3m. 168 In IIIDe anima, lect. 10, §739; De malo, q. 16, a. 12, ad im and ad 2m. 169 In IIIDe anima, lect. 10, §§737~39; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 77; Summa theologiae, i, q. 79, a. 4, ad 4m; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 10, ad 4m; De anima, a. 5 c.

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of] inner word, between concept in the narrower modern sense and, on the other hand, judgment. For we read that human intellectual operation is perfected in two manners, by intelligible species and by intellectual light; in virtue of the former, we have our apprehensions of things; but in virtue of the latter, we pass judgment upon our apprehensions.170 Now we have seen that the inner word, whether definition or judgment, is the self-expression of the self-possessed act of understanding: the definition is the expression both of and by an insight into phantasm; the judgment is the expression both of and by a reflective act of understanding. On the division enounced above, these two types of expression have their grounds respectively in the two elements of determination and light found in the act of understanding. Inasmuch as the act of understanding grasps its own conditions as the understanding of this sort of thing, it abstracts from the irrelevant and expresses itself in a definition of essence. But inasmuch as the act of understanding grasps its own transcendence-in-immanence, its quality of intellectual light as a participation of the divine and uncreated Light, it expresses itself in judgment, in a positing of truth, in the affirmation or negation of reality. Now this relation of intellectual light to judgment goes beyond the Aristotelian theory of agent intellect. Aristotle had argued that, since we understand now in potency and now in act, there must be in us both an active and a passive principle of understanding.171 This active principle is like a habit, but as Aquinas noted, it is not to be confused with the habitus prindpiorum.172 Unlike Plato, Aristotle did not consider that the essences of material things existed separately, and were of themselves intelligible in act; hence he had to have a cause to effect their immaterialization, to reduce them from potential to actual intelligibility.173 Like the possible intellect, the agent intellect is separable, impassible, unconfused with matter; but as well it is of its nature ever in act.174Though it is a participation of the intellectual light of the separate substances, still it is an immanent and private possession of each of us.175 In a word, Aquinas had no scruples about fitting the Aristotelian text into a context of contemporary medieval 170 171 172 173 174

De malo, q. 16, a. 12 c. In IIIDe anima, lect. 10, §728. Ibid. §729; see Super IISententiarum, d. 17, q. 2, a. l sol.; De anima, a. 5 c. In HI De anima, lect. 10, §§730-31. Ibid. §§732-33. See Super II Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 3, a. 4, ad 4m; Super III Sententiarum, d. 14, q. i, a. i sol. 2, ad 2m; Deveritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad ilm (2ae ser.); Summa theologiae, \, q. 54, a. i, ad im. 175 In III De anima, lect. 10, §§734-39.

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speculation; but even so he did not manage in his commentary to relate agent intellect to judgment. That relation is affirmed clearly and repeatedly in his independent writings. For it is the light of intellect that replaces the Augustinian vision of eternal truth; and regularly one reads that we know, we understand, we judge all things by a created light within us which is a participation, a resultant, a similitude, an impression of the first and eternal light and truth.176 Nor is the relation of intellectual light to judgment confined to such general affirmations. The range of a cognitional potency is fixed by the light under which it operates: ocular vision extends to all colors; the human soul can know all that falls under the light of agent intellect; the prophet knows by the divine light that manifests anything, corporeal or spiritual, human or divine.177 Knowing truth is a use or act of intellectual light,178 and so judgment occurs according to the force of that light.179 Hence the prophet judges according to an infused light, and the essence of prophecy lies in such judgment; for a prophet need not be the recipient of a revelation but only pass judgment on data revealed to another; such was the case of Joseph, who judged Pharaoh's dreams;180 such also perhaps was the case of Solomon, who judged with greater certitude and from a divine instinct what naturally is known about nature and human morals. ' 8l In particular, there is a relevance of intellectual light to the critical problem, for it is by intellectual light that we can get beyond mere relativity to immutable truth and that we can discern appearance from reality. I8a As already has been seen, it is by reflection on the nature of intellect and especially on the nature of the active principle of intellectual light that we 176 Super IVSententiarum, d. 49, q. 2, a. 7, ad 9m; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 1O, a. 7 c.; In Boet. De Trin., q. l, a. 3, ad im; De veritate, q. l, a. 4, ad 5m; q. 1O, a. 8 c. ad fin.; q. ll, a. l c. ad fin.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 12, a. ll, ad 3m; q. 16, a. 6, ad im; q. 84, a. 5; q. 88, a. 3, ad im; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 10 c. and ad 8m. 177 Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 171, a. 3 c.; see 1-2, q. 109, a. l c. 178 Ibid. 1-2, q. 109, a. l c. init. 179 Ibid. 2-2, q. 173, a. 2 c. 180 De veritate, q. 12, a. 7 c. 181 Ibid. a. 12 c. 182 Summa theologiae, l, q. 84, a. 6, ad im: 'Requiritur enim lumen intellectus agentis per quod immutabiliter veritatem in rebus mutabilibus cognoscamus, et discernamus ipsas res a similitudinibus rerum' [Tor there is needed the light of agent intellect, by which in changeable things we may know the truth unchangeably, and distinguish things themselves from the likenesses of things'].

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come to know truth.183 But it is somewhat hazardous to attempt to specify the exact course of such reflection. Aquinas himself did not offer an account of the procedure he would follow; so it is only by piecing together scattered materials that one can arrive at an epistemological position that may be termed Thomistic but hardly Thomist. However, two basic points may be thought to be sufficiently clear. Epistemological reflection will involve a sort of reasoning, but that reasoning is not a deduction, since no premises may be assumed, but rather a development of understanding by which we come to grasp just how it is that our minds are proportionate to knowledge of reality. This point follows from the analysis of judgment already given; it squares with the nature of the problem; it need not be enlarged. The other point has to do with the precise content of the act of reflective and critical understanding. It should seem that this act consists in a grasp of the native infinity of intellect; for on the one hand, Thomist thought does stress that native infinity, and on the other hand, from such infinity one can grasp the capacity of the mind to know reality. Thomist thought stresses the native infinity of intellect; for the nature of intellect as active is potens omnia facere; as passive, it is potens omnia fieri. This is not merely an Aristotelian commonplace which Aquinas endlessly repeated; he also knew how to transpose and apply it in rather startling fashion. Any finite act of understanding has to be a pati, because intellect as intellect is infinite.184 Because of its infinite range, the object of intellect must be ms;l85this object cannot be unknown;l86it is known per se and naturally.187 As there are different types of intellect, so there are different modes of knowing ens. Since understanding is by identity and ens includes all reality, only infinite understanding can be the direct and immediate apprehension of the proper object of intellect, ens intelligibile.1** Man's intellect is potency. But as the hand is the instrument capable of using any instrument, so the human soul is the form capable of receiving any form.'89 While God is totum ens without qualification,I9° man is totum ens 183 De veritate, q. l, a. 9 c. 184 Super III Sententiarum, d. 14, a. l sol. 2; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 98; Summa theologiae, l, q. 79, a. 2 c. 185 De veritate, q. i, a. 2, ad 4m; Summa theologiae, i, q. 79, a. 7 c. 186 De veritate, q. 11, a. l, ad 3m. 187 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 83, §31 (ed. Leon., XIII, 523a 26-38). 188 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 98. 189 InlllDeanima, lect. 13, §790. 190 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 98.

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only quodammodo.191 Hence in his direct acts of understanding man enters into identity with the intelligibility of only this or that material nature; it is in an act of reflective understanding, in which the nature of understanding is itself understood as potens omniafacere et fieri, that man becomes capable of grasping the analogous concept of ens. For to know being and not-being, whole and part, and the other concepts that flow from the concept of being, pertains not to the direct habit of intellect nor to the derived habit of science but to the reflective and critical habit of wisdom.192 For the concept of ens is not just another concept, another quod quid est, another but most general essence; the concept of ens is any concept, any quod quid est, any essence, when considered, not as some highest common factor nor again simply in itself, but in its relation to its own actus essendi,1^ which is known in the act of judgment.194 Only on condition that human intellect is potens omniafacere et fieri is the concept of all concepts really commensurate with reality - really the concept of ens. On the other hand, if intellect is potens omniafacere et fieri, then since we know by what we are, per se and naturally we do know ens; further, since we know we know by knowing what we are, it is by reflection on the nature of intellect that we know our capacity for truth and for knowledge of reality.195 But the native infinity of intellect as intellect is a datum of rational consciousness. It appears in that resdess spirit of inquiry, that endless search for causes which, Aquinas argued, can rest and end only in a supernatural vision of God.196 It appears in the abso-

191 In IIIDe anima, lect. 13, §790. 192 Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 401. 193 De ente et essentia, c. l (ed. Roland-Gosselin [see above, chapter 1, note 93], p. 4). This is the account of ens in the principal meaning of the term: not as ens per accidens, nor as ens that is equivalent to the truth of a proposition (est in the sense of yes), but as ens that is divided by the ten categories. In this meaning ens is determined by real essence, and so there is the definition of essence: 'Essentia dicitur secundum quod per earn et in ea ens habet esse' ['We speak of essence insofar as through an essence and in an essence a being has its existence']. See In VMetaphys, lect. 9, for the classical account. 194 Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. i, ad 7m: Trima operatio (intellectus) respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius' ['The first operation (of intellect) regards the quiddity of a thing, the second regards the existence of that thing']. The esse known in the second operation (judgment) is the real; there is an esse pertaining to the quiddity as such, but (ibid.) 'quidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis' ['the being of a quiddity is a certain mental being']. 195 Hence De veritate, q. l, a. 9 c. 196 Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 8 c.

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lute exigence of reflective thought, which will assent only if the possibility of the contradictory proposition is excluded.197Just as Thomist thought is an ontology of knowledge inasmuch as intellectual light is referred to its origin in uncreated Light, so too it is more than an embryonic epistemology inasmuch as intellectual light reflectively grasps its own nature and the commensuration of that nature to the universe of reality.198 A comment may be permitted; for in the measure one grasps the character and implication of the act by which intellectual light reflects by intellectual light upon intellectual light to understand itself and pronounce its universal validity, in that measure one grasps one of the two outstanding analogies to the procession of an infinite Word from an infinite Understanding. On the other hand, the foregoing argument, precisely because it clung closely to Thomist texts to avoid all unnecessary appearance of airy speculation, is apt to find little echo in a modern mind. Two remarks may increase the resonance. First, our knowledge of the real is not knowledge of some note or aspect or quality of things. The whole of each thing is real; and by reality we mean nothing less than the universe in the multiplicity of its members, in the totality and individuality of each, in the interrelations of all. To know the real is to know the universe. As our intellects are potential, so our knowledge of the real is a development. The child has to learn to distinguish sharply between fact and fiction; the young man has not yet acquired a sufficiently nuanced grasp of human living for the study of ethics to be profitable; each of us, confronted with something outside the beaten track of our experience, turns to the expert to be taught just what it is. Still, in all this progress we are but discriminating, differentiating, categorizing the details of a scheme that somehow we possessed from the start. To say that any Xis real is just to assign it a place in that scheme; to deny the reality of any Fis to deny it a place in the universal scheme. But how do we grasp the scheme itself? At its root it is just the principle of excluded middle: X either is or else is not. And in its details the scheme is just the actuation of our capacity to conceive any essence and rationally affirm its existence and its relations. Since within that scheme both we ourselves and all our acts of conceiving and of judging are no more than particular and not too important items, the critical problem - and this is our second remark - is not a problem of moving from within outwards, of moving from a subject to an object outside the subject. It is a problem of moving 197 In Boet. De Trin., q. 3, a. i, ad 4m. 198 De veritate, q. i, a. 9 c.

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from above downwards, of moving from an infinite potentiality commensurate with the universe towards a rational apprehension that seizes the difference of subject and object in essentially the same way that it seizes any other real distinction. Thus realism is immediate, not because it is naive and unreasoned and blindly affirmed, but because we know the real before we know such a difference within the real as the difference between subject and object. Again, the critical problem has the appearance of insolubility only because the true concept of the real is hidden or obscured, and in its place there comes the false substitute that by the real we mean only another essence, or else that by the real we mean the object of modern existentialist experience - the mere givenness of inner or outer actuality, which truly is no more than the condition for the rational transition from the affirmation of possible to the affirmation of actual contingent being. 5

The Unity of Wisdom

Wisdom, as first philosophy, deals at once with the real as real and with the first principles of demonstrations.1" It is, in the very definition of its object, a duality. So far from mitigating that violent contrast of object and subject, the current pedagogical convenience of separate books and courses on metaphysics and on epistemology rather tends to make it appear ultimate and irreducible. But being is not just one thing, with knowing quite another. We know by what we are; we know we know by knowing what we are; and since even the knowing in 'knowing what we are' is by what we are, rational reflection on ourselves is a duplication of ourselves. In us the principle and term of that doubling are not identical. In the procession of the divine Word the principle and the term of the doubling are identical, but the relations of principle to term and of term to principle remain real, opposed, subsistent, eternal, equal personalities - Father and Son in the consubstantiality of intellectual generation.200 Even in the Godhead the duality of wisdom is not overcome utterly; even there in some sense one may speak of a sapientia genital But though the duality of wisdom never 199 In TVMetaphys., lect. 5, §595. 200 Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11. 201 The difficulty with this expression is that sapientia is identical with the divine essence, and the divine essence is neither generating nor generated. See Super I Sententiarum, d. 5, q. i, a. 2 sol.; d. 32, q. 2, aa. 1-2; De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2m; a. 4, ad 3m; a. 5 c. med.; Summa contra Gentiks, 4, c. 12; In I Cor., c. i, lect. 3 ad fin.; Summa theologiae, i, q. 34, a. l, ad 2m and ad 401.

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disappears totally, yet it tends towards that limit. Some remarks on the approach towards the limit are our concluding concern. There is a common element to all our acts of understanding. It is a pure quality, coming to be when we inquire quid sit and an sit, partially realized when we directly understand some essence and again when we reflectively understand the necessity of affirming its existence. This pure quality is intellectual light. But in its pure form we have no experience of it. It never is just inquiry but always inquiry about something. It never is pure understanding but always understanding this or understanding that. Even so, we may discern it introspectively, just as externally we discern light in seeing color. But while the external and corporeal light that strikes and stimulates our eyes could not be produced, even in fanciful thought, to an infinity, there is to intellectual light an inner nisus towards the infinite. Aristotle opened his Metaphysics with the remark that naturally all men desire to know. But Aquinas measured that desire, to find in the undying restlessness and absolute exigence of the human mind that intellect as intellect is infinite, that ipsum esse is ipsum intelligere and uncreated, unlimited Light, that though our intellects because potential cannot attain naturally to the vision of God, still our intellects as intellects have a dynamic orientation, a natural desire, that nothing short of that unknown vision can satisfy utterly. For Augustine our hearts are restless until they rest in God; for Aquinas, not our hearts, but first and most our minds are restless until they rest in seeing him. The basic duality of our wisdom is between our immanent intellectual light and the uncreated Light that is the object of its groping and its straining. The same duality is also the basic instance of the opposition and distinction between what is first quoad nos and what is first quoad se: ontologically the uncreated Light is first; epistemologically our own immanent light is first, for it is known not by some species but per se ipsum as the actuating element in all intelligible species. Known with this qualified immediacy, it justifies itself as the potentially boundless base whence we can posit, and through our positing know, the universe; and as the principle of our knowledge of reality, it also is the most convincing sample in us of the stuff of which the author of the universe and of our minds consists. Between these poles, the highest in us and in God the most like us, our wisdom moves to knowledge of itself and of its source. Were our wisdom substantial, it would not be subject to that type of duality. But in fact it is accidental, a perfection that relates us to Perfection. Not only is it accidental, but also it is acquired gradually. Towards it we are moved in a dialectical oscil-

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lation, envisaging more clearly now one pole and now another, with each addition to either at once throwing more light on the other and raising further questions with regard to it. Perhaps in this connection we may note most conveniently a particular aspect of the soul's self-knowledge. The most nuanced account of this is to be found in the De veritate,20'2 where three types of self-knowledge are distinguished. There is the empirical self-knowledge, actual or habitual, based upon the soul's presence to itself; there is the scientific and analytic selfknowledge that proceeds from objects to acts, from acts to potencies, from potencies to essence; but besides this pair, with which we are already familiar, there is also a third. It lies in the act of judgment which passes from the conception of essence to the affirmation of reality. Still, it is concerned not with this or that soul, but with what any soul ought to be according to the eternal reasons; and so the reality of soul that is envisaged is not sorry achievement but dynamic norm. Now knowledge of the norm, of the ought-to-be, cannot be had from what merely happens to be and, too often, falls far short of the norm. Normative knowledge has to rest upon the eternal reasons. But this resting, Aquinas explained, is not a vision of God but a participation and similitude of him by which we grasp first principles and judge all things by examining them in the light of principles.203 Wisdom through self-knowledge is not limited to the progress from empirical through scientific to normative knowledge. Beyond the wisdom we may attain by the natural light of our intellects, there is a further wisdom attained through the supernatural light of faith, when the humble surrender of our own light to the self-revealing uncreated Light makes the latter the loved law of all our assents. Rooted in this faith, supernatural wisdom has a twofold expansion. In its contact with human reason, it is the science of theology, which orders the data of revelation and passes judgment on all other science.204 But faith, besides involving a contact with reason, also involves a contact with God. On that side wisdom is a gift of the Holy Spirit, making us docile to his movements, in which, even perceptibly, one may be 'non solum discens sed et patiens divina.'205 202 203 204 205

De veritate, q. 10, a. 8 c. Ibid. Summa theologiae, l, q. i, a. 6 c. and ad 2m; see a. 8 c. ['not only learning but receiving divine things'] Super III Sententiarum, d. 15, q. 2, a. i, qc. 2; d. 35, q. 2, a. l; De veritate, q. 26, a. 3, ad l8m; Super Librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus, c. 2, lect. 4, § 191; Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 45, a. 2 c.

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Our account of the introspective data underlying an interpretation of Thomist trinitarian theory would be incomplete if it contained no mention of the possible relevance of mystical experience. Early in the Sentences,206 in discussing the imago Dei in the human soul, it is asked whether knowledge and love of God and of self are constantly in act. In the Summa this question is answered negatively for the peremptory reason that everyone now and then goes to sleep.207 But in the early work the answer is affirmative, and it is given in two forms - first in a context of Augustinian terms, secondly in a context of Aristotelian terms. It would seem that the difference between the two is not merely terminological; for the second account is introduced by the statement: 'Alio tamen modo secundum Philosophos intelligitur quod anima semper se intelligit.'208 Not only does this not sound like the preface to a repetition of the same doctrine in different terms, but also the view of the philosophers which follows seems to move on a different plane. It is no more than the view outlined above of our perception of intellectual light not as an object but as a medium in our acts of understanding. It amounts to saying that the soul is present to itself in rational consciousness. But from that presence to oneself it is not too easy a step to the presence of God to oneself. Philosophic thought can achieve it through the theorem, mentioned in the preceding article,209 of divine ubiquity. But it takes a rather marvelous grasp of that metaphysical theorem for constant actual knowledge and love of God to result. In fact, it is rather in the preceding, Augustinian statement that such knowledge and love receive attention. The knowledge in question is not a discernere which distinguishes one object from another, nor a cogitare which relates the parts of one object to the whole, nor any intelligere that fixes attention in a determinate fashion; what is affirmed is some simple and continuous intuition in virtue of presence by which the soul knows and loves both itself and God in some indeterminate manner. Now it is true that, apart from prying introspection, self-knowledge within rational consciousness is neither a discernere, nor a cogitare, nor an intelligere with a fixed object. But must one not enter into the domain of religious experience to find this awareness of 206 Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5 sol. 207 Summa theologiae, l, q. 93, a. 7, ad 4m. 208 ['But according to the Philosophers there is another way of understanding (the statement) that the soul always understands itself] Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5 sol. 209 Ibid. a. 4 sol.

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one's spiritual self prolonged into an awareness of God? That prolongation does not seem to be a datum within the range of ordinary introspection; on the other hand, one can give Aquinas's words a very satisfactory meaning if one reads the descriptions of mystical writers on the habitual felt presence of God.210 A similar, if less acute, question arises in the De veritate, where one reads that the presence of God in the mind is the memory of God in the mind.211 Such a statement has a mystical ring, inasmuch as a presence that is a memory seems to be a known presence. However, the same passage concludes with a remark that confines the interpreter within the range of ordinary experience. A necessary condition of understanding is within nature, and we are told that from the divine presence in the soul intellect receives the light necessary for understanding.212 Further, if one goes back to Aquinas's explicit accounts of the term memoria, one finds that it is habitual knowledge,213 and even that the mind is present to itself and God present to the mind before any species are received from sense, so that the human imago Dei has its constitutive memoria before any conscious intellectual act is elicited.214 To the casual reader it may seem that a presence of God which is a memory must be a known presence; but Aquinas's own explanation of his terms does not substantiate that conclusion. Perhaps the following series of propositions will do justice to the question, To what extent is mystical experience relevant to the Thomist concept of the imago Dei? First, the Thomist description of that experience, in its general form, does supply in an extremely simple fashion the required triad of the imago. Taste and see how the Lord is sweet.' Taste' refers to inner experience, to an experientia consortii divini; it supplies the memoria in act. 'See' refers to a consequent judgment, to a certitudo intellectus; it supplies the inner word. 'How the Lord is sweet' refers to the second effect of the experience, the ineffable act of love, the securitas affectus; it gives the 210 For example, Augustin-Francois Poulain, Des graces d'oraison: Traite de theologie mystique (nth ed. Paris: Beauchesne, 1931) chapters 5 and 6. [There is an English translation of the 6th edition, The Graces of Interior Prayer: A Treatise on Mystical Theology, trans. Leonora L. Yorke Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950).] 211 De veritate, q. 10, a. 7, ad 2m. 212 Ibid. 213 Ibid. a. 3 c. 214 Ibid. a. 2, ob. 5 and ad 5m.

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third element of the triad.215 Secondly, while one should admit the possible relevance of mystical experience to an interpretation of the imago and even the deep influence of mysticism upon Aquinas and his thought, one is not to leap from possibility to affirmation of fact. Whatever is true, Aquinas certainly was not exclusively a theologian of the mystical. He was deeply interested in nature; his merit lay in embracing all and in drawing all distinctions; and indubitable references to mystical experience in his discussions of the imago at best are few and, at least by later Teresan standards, anything but explicit. Finally, on Aquinas's own testimony, the image of God is found in men universally. It is found in those without the actual use of reason; it is found in sinners; it is found, clear and fair, in those in the state of grace.216 It should seem that essentially Thomist theory of the trinitarian processions is in its basic analogy not mystical but psychological. Though the created image becomes clearer as the use of reason develops, though it becomes fairer as grace is added to reason, though it becomes manifest as special graces reveal the potentialities of our consortium divinum, still these differences strictly are accidental; they have to do with the development of wisdom and of love in man and not with the essence of what develops. 6

Conclusion

These two chapters complete the first part of our inquiry into the concept of verbum in the writings of St Thomas. In this first part the principal aim has been to build a bridge from the mind of the twentieth-century reader to the mind of the thirteenth-century writer. Both possess psychological experience; in both that experience is essentially the same; both can by introspection observe and analyze such experience. At once the assumption of the method employed and the contention derived from the data assembled in these two chapters have been that Aquinas did practice psychological introspection and through that experimental knowledge of his own soul arrived at his highly nuanced, deeply penetrating, firmly outlined theory of the nature of human intellect. Hence the light of intellect,

215 In Ps. 55, v. 9. See F.D. Joret, La contemplation mystique d'apres saint Thomas d'Aquin (Bruxelles, 1923) 117, 126. [There is a revised edition, Lille-Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer, 1927, in which Lonergan's two references are found on pp. 112-13 and p- 122, both in chapter 6.] 216 Summa theologiae, l, q. 93, a. 8, ad 3m.

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insight into phantasm, acts of defining thought, reflective reasoning and understanding, acts of judgment are above all psychological facts. The inner word of definition is the expression of an insight into phantasm, and the insight is the goal towards which the wonder of inquiry tends. The inner word of judgment is the expression of a reflective act of understanding, and that reflective act is the goal towards which critical wonderf tends. The former answers the question, Quid sitfThe latter answers the question, An sit? No doubt, as expressed by Aquinas, these psychological facts are embedded in metaphysical categories and theorems. But without first grasping in some detail the empirical content so embedded, one risks, if not emptying the categories and theorems of all content, at least interpreting them with an impoverished generality that cannot bear the weight of the mighty superstructure of trinitarian theory. Conversely, it will be found, I believe, that our preliminary concern with psychological fact will lend a sureness, otherwise unattainable, to the interpretation of the metaphysical categories; for the Thomist application of metaphysics to the tasks of psychological analysis cannot be studied in some preliminary vacuum. That application exists only in psychological contexts; and it is easier to interpret metaphysics as applied to psychology when one is aware of the psychological facts involved. Without such awareness interpretation has to limp along on more or less remote and certainly nonpsychological analogies. Finally, we beg to observe, the point at which conclusions can be drawn has not yet been reached. If the interpretation of the applied metaphysics depends upon the psychology, so too the interpretation of the psychology depends upon the applied metaphysics. There remains, then, a whole series of questions to be considered before we may claim to have satisfied the data on verbum found in Thomist writings.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

3 Procession and Related Notions

Just as a modern exact science is generically mathematics and only specifically mechanics or physics or chemistry, so also the Thomist analysis of the verbum or inner word is generically metaphysics and only specifically psychology. Two chapters have been devoted to the psychological side of the issue before us. Attention must now be turned to the metaphysics, for the matters of fact that have been assembled in preceding chapters find their systematic formulation and structural interrelation in terms of potency, habit, operation, action, passion, object, species.1 Since in general it will be possible to assume that the reader is familiar with Thomist metaphysics, our concern in these pages will be with matters of detail. On its objective side the problem arises from the insufficient generality of Aristotelian analyses and from the concomitance in Aquinas of different terminologies which, unless distinguished carefully, yield a crop of pseudometaphysical issues. Perhaps the subjective side of the problem will offer greater real difficulty. For in Aquinas psychology and metaphysics as applied to psychology are so intimately related that any distortion of the one can be had only by a compensating distortion of the other. If, then, I have been correct in affirming a disregarded wealth in Thomist rational psychology,2 I now must argue for a simplification and clarification of 1 [On the order of psychology and metaphysics, see pp. 3-6, 10, 12-13, 24, 25-26, 41, 53-56, 60, 105 above; later chapters repeat the point: pp. 106-7, no, 149, 186, 187, 190, 224] 2 I find that similar views are advanced by Peter Hoenen, La theorie dujugement d'apres St. Thomas d'Aquin (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1946); this work is a brilliant complement to Hoenen's articles in Gregorianum already cited (above, chapter l, note 126). As I was indebted to the articles, so my

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metaphysics as applied to psychology. In the long run, I believe, simplicity and clarity must win out. In the short run there can hardly fail to occur not only the normal human resistance to change, which is a healthy conservative force, but also the difficulty of assimilating what has been long overlooked, of grasping its significance, of assessing exactly its import and implications. However, with such subjective difficulty I cannot deal here, except by the indirect method of setting forth, as accurately as I can, the historical evidence on an historical question. l

Procession

In the work on the Sentences two types of procession are distinguished: the first is local movement, properly the local movement of an animal; the second, which alone is considered relevant to the divine processions, is described as 'eductio principiati a suo principio,'3 and equivalently as 'exitus causati a causa.'4 In the De veritate thought is somewhat more refined. The distinction is drawn between 'processio operationis,' the emergence of a perfection from (and in) what is perfected, and 'processio operati,' the emergence of one thing from another. Next, it is argued that, since in God there is no capacity to be perfected, there can be in God no possibility of a 'processio operationis,' such as the procession of the act of understanding from the intellect or the procession of the act of love from the will. Accordingly, created analogy to the divine processions has to be sought in instances of 'processio operati,' such as the procession of the inner word in the intellect.5 One may find a parallel distinction to the above in the Contra Gentiles, where it is remarked that the origin of the divine Word is not of act from potency but 'sicut oritur actus ex actu.'6 On the other hand, a new approach is to be recognized in the Depotentia. Procession, it is said, primarily denotes a local movement from a starting point, through intermediate positions taken in their proper order, towards a goal. But this primary

3 4 5 6

own work is now supported by the book. Enter on the other side of the ledger, Matthew J. O'Connell, 'St. Thomas and the Verbum: An Interpretation,' The Modern Schoolman 24 (1946-1947) 224-34. ['the derivation from its principle of what follows from the principle'] Super I Sententiarum, d. 13, q. 1, a. l sol. ['the emergence from a cause of the thing that is caused'] Ibid. a. 3, ad 2m; see ibid. a. l, ad 3m. De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad ym. ['as act originates from act'] Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 14, §3.

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meaning is to be generalized until procession refers to 'omne illud in quo est aliquis ordo unius ex alio vel post aliud.' After a variety of examples of this generalized meaning, attention concentrates on the 'duplex operatic.'7 The Summa proceeds more peremptorily to the same conclusion: all procession is according to some action;8 and as there are actions that go forth into external matter, so also there are actions that remain in the agent. Is there any notable significance to be attached to the foregoing variations? I do not think so. In all cases the same term is reached, namely, opposed relations of origin. In earlier works they are reached more directly; for Aquinas there does not shrink from using such terms as 'causatum' and 'operatum.' In later works deference is paid to the usage of Latin Fathers and theologians who rarely or never apply the name 'cause' to the divine processions,9 while the required relations of origin are obtained by recalling the Aristotelian doctrine that relations are founded on actions10 or by stating that 'actio secundum primam nominis impositionem importat originem motus,'11 where perhaps only excessive subtlety could distinguish between 'origo motus' and the Aristotelian definition of efficient cause, 'a quo est principium motus.'12 On the other hand, what the De veritate obtains by denying 'processio operations' in God, namely, the absence of real relations between intellect and the act of understanding, between will and the act of willing, the Summa attains by a different route. It conveniently overlooks the definition of potency as 'principium actionis' to consider only 'principium agendi in aliud';13 and it insists on the identity of divine intellect with what is understood, of divine will with what is willed.14 However, it has been advanced that in one respect the position of the De veritate later underwent change, namely, in its negation of a 'processio operati' within the will.15 The passage that has so exercised Thomistic writers16 7 ['everything in which there is some relation of one thing to another as (being) from it or after it'; 'twofold operation'] Depotentia, q. 10, a. i c. 8 Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. i c. 9 Depotentia, q. 10, a. i, ad 8m; Summa theologiae, l, q. 33, a. i, ad im. 10 Depotentia, q. 8, a. l c.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 28, a. 4 c. 11 ['action, according to the primary force of the word, means the origin of movement'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 41, a. i, ad 2m. 12 ['from which one has the principle of movement'] In IIPhys., lect. 5, §5. 13 ['the principle of an action' and 'the principle of (one thing) acting on another'] Summa theologiae, i, q. 27, a. 5, ad im; cf. ibid. q. 25, a. i c. 14 Ibid. q. 28, a. 4, ad im; see Depotentia, q. 8, a. i, ad nm. 15 See Maurilio T.-L. Penido, 'Closes sur la procession d'amour dans la Trinite' (see above, chapter i, note i) 38. 16 Ibid. 37-48; see also Robert Morency, 'L'activite affective selon Jean de Saint Thomas,' Lavalphilosophique et theologique 2:i (1946) 143-74.

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reads as follows: 'et ideo voluntas non habet aliquid progrediens a seipsa quod in ea sit nisi per modum operationis; sed intellectus habet in seipso aliquid progrediens ab eo, non solum per modum operationis, sed etiam per modum rei operatae.'17 Now this passage gives rise to difficulty only inasmuch as one may assume that there should be a parallel between intellect and will, that as the inner word proceeds from the act of understanding, so within the will some distinct term proceeds from the act of love. This assumption would seem to be quite justified in interpreting the trinitarian writings of Henry of Ghent18 or of Scotus.19 But if one is to interpret Aquinas in the context of what he himself wrote, then the assumption in question is extremely doubtful. Not only does the passage in the De veritate explicitly deny such a parallelism of intellect and will, but Thomist trinitarian theory has no exigence for it. On the contrary, it seems a plain matter of fact that for Aquinas the second procession grounding real relations is not the procession of the act of love from the will, nor the procession of something else from the act of love within the will, but the procession in the will of the act of love from the inner word in the intellect.20 Advertence 17 ['and therefore there is nothing in the will that proceeds from the will itself, except what proceeds in the manner of an operation; but intellect does have within it something that proceeds from intellect itself, not only in the manner of an operation, but also in the manner of something produced by the operation'] De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m. The 'nisi' is not found in the printed editions but see Irenee Chevalier, 'Notule de critique textuelle thomiste: De veritate, Q. IV, Art. II, Ad 7,' Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 41 (1938) 63-68; Maurilio T.-L. Penido, 'A propos de la procession d'amour en Dieu,' Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses 15 (1938) 338-44 (see p. 339); also J.-A. Robilliard, review of Penido, 'Closes sur la procession ...' Bulletin thomiste 5 (1937-1939) 135-39; I. Dockx, 'Note sur la procession de terme dans la volonte,' Angelicum 15 (!93$) 419-28; Bernard Lonergan, DeDeo trino: II. Pars systematica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964) 109-14. 18 His views are summarized by Scotus, In I Sent. (Op. Ox.), d. 2, q. 7, n. 13 (ed. Vives, VIII, 534-36). P. Haring, S.A.C., has examined the microfilm copy of Henry of Ghent at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, and has assured me that Scotus gives a satisfactory account of Henry's views. 19 See Raymond de Courcerault, 'Duns Scot,' Dictionnaire de theologie catholique^ (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1939) cols. 1865-1947; see cols. 1882-83. 20 A detailed discussion cannot be undertaken here. See Super I Sententiarum, d. 11, q. l, a. i, ad 4m:'... aVerbo procedit Spiritus sanctus sicut a verbo mentali amor' ['the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word the way love proceeds from a mental word']; ibid. d. 27, q. 2, a. l sol.: '... quia potest esse duplex intuitus, vel veri simpliciter, vel ulterius secundum quod verum extenditur in bonum et conveniens, et haec est perfecta apprehensio; ideo est duplex verbum: scilicet rei prolatae quae placet, quod spiral amorem, et hoc est verbum perfectum; et verbum rei quae etiam displicet... aut non placet' ['since there can be a twofold apprehension, either of the simple truth or of the truth as it is

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to this repeatedly affirmed dependence of love on inner word puts an end, very simply and very clearly, I think, to an exceptional amount of labored interpretation. 2

Actus Perfecti

Excessive attention to the metaphysical framework with insufficient attention to the psychological content of the Thomist concept of verbum has led to a good deal of obscure profundity on the meaning of Aquinas's actusperfecti. It is necessary for us to set forth the evidence on the meaning of the expanded to take in the good and the fitting - and this latter is perfect apprehension - hence there is a twofold word, namely, of something pleasing that is set forth, a word that spirates love - and this is a perfect word - and the word of something also that displeases ... or does not please']; see In IIIDe anima, lect. 4, §§634-35. Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 24, § 12: 'Nam amor procedit a verbo: eo quod nihil amare possumus nisi verbo cordis illud concipiamus' [Tor love proceeds from a word, inasmuch as we cannot love anything unless we conceive it in a word of the heart']. Ibid. 4, c. 19, §8: 'Quod autem aliquid sit in voluntate ut amatum in amante, ordinem quemdam habet ad conceptionem qua ab intellectu concipitur ... non enim amaretur aliquid nisi aliquo modo cognosceretur' ['But that there is something in the will in the way a thing loved is in the one loving it (means that) it has a certain relation to the conception by which intellect conceives it... for something would not be loved unless it were in some way known']. Depotentia, q. 9, a. 9, ad 3m (2ae ser.): '... nihil enim potest amari cuius verbum in intellectu non praeconcipitur; et sic oportet quod ille qui procedit per modum voluntatis sit ab eo qui procedit per modum intellectus, et per consequens quod distinguatur ab eo' ['for nothing can be loved of which a word is not conceived beforehand in the intellect; and therefore it has to be that the one who proceeds in the way of the will is from the one who proceeds in the way of intellect, and consequently is distinguished from him']. See ibid. q. 10, a. 2 c.; ad 4m; ad 7m; a. 4 c.; a. 5 c.: 'Non enim potest esse nee intelligi quod amor sit alicuius quod non est intellectu praeconceptum: unde quilibet amor est ab aliquo verbo, loquendo de amore in intellectuali natura' ['For it cannot be nor can it be understood that there is love of a thing that is not conceived beforehand by the intellect; wherefore any love whatever is from some word - we are speaking of love in an intellectual nature']. Summa theologiae, i, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3m: '... de ratione amoris est quod non procedat nisi a conceptione intellectus' ['it belongs to the very essence of love that it does not proceed except from a conception of the intellect']; ibid. q. 36, a. 2 c.: 'Necesse est autem quod amor a verbo procedat: non enim aliquid amamus, nisi secundum quod conceptione mentis apprehendimus. Unde et secundum hoc manifestum est quod Spiritus sanctus procedat a Filio' ['But it has to be that love proceeds from a word; for we do not love a thing except insofar as we apprehend (it) by a conception of the intellect. Wherefore from this viewpoint too it is clear that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son']. Compendium theologiae, c. 49: '... Similiter

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phrase, and in doing so it will be well to begin from Aristotle, first because it is only a translation of Aristotle's energeia ton tetelesmenou,21 and secondly, because Aquinas, when first he uses it,22 takes it for granted that the reader knows his Aristotle and so knows what it means. Our account of Aristotle may be divided into three parts: general contrasts between operation (energeia) and movement (kinesis); the analysis of movement in the Physics; and the recurring embarrassment in the De anima occasioned by the specialization of terms in the Physics. In the Ethics there is considered a Platonist argument to the effect that pleasure is not the good because pleasure is a movement and so incomplete, while the good must be complete and perfect. It is met with the observation that all movements have velocities, that pleasure has no velocity, and so pleasure cannot be a movement nor be incomplete.23 On a later

etiam id quod amatur est in amante secundum quod amatur actu. Quod autem aliquid actu amatur, procedit et ex virtute amativa amantis, et ex bono amabili actu intellecto. Hoc igitur quod est esse amatum in amante, ex duobus procedit, scilicet ex principio amativo, et ex intelligibili apprehenso, quod est verbum conceptum de amabili' ['Similarly too that which is loved is in the one loving inasmuch as it is loved in act. But that a thing be loved in act proceeds from the loving capacity of the one loving, and from the lovable good understood in act. This being-loved, then, that is found in the one loving proceeds from two (sources), namely, from a loving principle, and from an apprehended intelligible (good), which is the word conceived about the lovable thing']. Derationibusfidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum, c. 4: 'Manifestum est autem, quod nihil amare possumus intelligibili et sancto amore, nisi quod actu per intellectum concipimus. Conceptio autem intellectus est verbum, unde oportet quod amor a verbo oriatur. Verbum autem Dei dicimus esse Filium, ex quo patet Spiritum sanctum esse a Filio' ['But it is clear that we cannot love anything with an intelligible and holy love, except what we conceive in act through intellect. But the conception of the intellect is a word, wherefore it must be that love has its origin in a word. But the Word of God we call the Son, from which it is evident that the Holy Spirit is from the Son']. In the Depotentia the procession of love from word is well integrated into general trinitarian theory; this cannot be said of the Sentences, as appears from Super I Sententiarum, d. 10, q. 1, a. 5 sol.; d. 12, q. l, a. l, ad 2m; ad 3m; a. 3, ad 3m; d. 13, q. l, a. 2 sol.; a. 3, ad 4m. [CV-B (see Editors' Preface) has a marginal notation added in Lonergan's hand: 'De Ver q. 10 aa 3c, 7c,' presumably indicating two loci he would have added to the list of note 2O.] 21 Aristotle, De anima, III, 7, 43ia 5-8. 22 Super I Sententiarum, d. 4, q. l, a. l, ad im. The correct reference in this text probably is not to Ethics V, but to Ethics X. 23 Aristotle, Ethics, X, 3, 11733 29-34; Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum, 10, lect. 3, 'non bene.'

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page the incompleteness of movement and the completeness of operation are described at greater length. A movement becomes in time; one part succeeds another; and a whole is to be had only in the whole of the time. On the other hand, an operation such as seeing or pleasure does not become in time but rather endures through time; at once it is all that it is to be; at each instant it is completely itself. In a movement one may assign instants in which what now is is not what later will be. In an operation there is no assignable instant in which what is occurring stands in need of something further that later will make it specifically complete.24 A similar general contrast occurs in the Metaphysics. There is a difference between action (praxis) distinct from its end and action coincident with its end. One cannot at once be walking a given distance and have walked it, be being cured and have been cured, be learning something and have learned it. But at once one is seeing and has seen, one is understanding and has understood, one is alive and has been alive, one is happy and has been happy. In the former instances there is a difference between action and end, and we have either what is not properly action or, at best, incomplete action - such are movements. In the latter instances action and end are coincident - such are operations.25 The characteristics of movement, described in the Ethics and the Metaphysics, are submitted to analysis in the Physics. The nature of movement is difficult to grasp because it is a reality that, as reality, is incomplete and so involves the indeterminate.26 Still, movement may be defined as the act of what is in potency inasmuch as it is in potency, or as the act of the movable just as movable.27 Again, one may say that what is about to be moved is in potency to two acts: one of these is complete and so admits categorial specification; but this act is the term of another which is incomplete and so does not admit categorial specification; movement is the latter, incomplete act.28 Since this definition does not presuppose the concept of time, it is employed in defining time.29 Next it is shown that the incomplete act, 24 Aristotle, Ethics, X, 4, H74a 14 - H74b 9; Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum, 10, lect. 525 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 6, lO48b 18-34; on the authenticity of the passage, see W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, vol. 2 (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1924) 253. Apparently Aquinas did not know it and does not comment on it; but the ideas were familiar to him. 26 Aristotle, Physics, III, 2, 2Olb 24-33. 27 Ibid, i, 2Oia 10-14. 28 In IHPhys., lect. 2, §5; see §3. 29 In IVPhys., lect. 16-22.

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movement, can occur in only three categories, namely, place, sensible quality, and physical size.30 It is insisted that movement can be had only in a corporeal, quantitative, indefinitely divisible subject.31 From the indefinite divisibility of distance and time it is concluded that in a local movement not only is there a moveri prior to every assignable motum esse but also there is an assignable motum esse prior to every assignable moveri?2 thus analysis pushes to the limit the descriptive contrast between the specific completeness of operation and the specific incompleteness, the categorial indeterminacy, of movement.33 But just how the demonstrable paradox of local movement was to be extended to alteration, growth, generation, and illumination was for the commentators an obscure and disputed point.34 As the Physics analyzes movement, so one might expect the De anima to analyze operation. But if that expectation is verified substantially,35 there is a far more conspicuous embarrassment caused by the specialization of terms in the Physics. For in the De anima, despite the alleged wealth of the Greek language, Aristotle needed such words as kinesis, alloiosis, pathesis, in a fresh set of meanings; but instead of working out the new meanings systematically, he was content, in general, to trust his reader's intelligence and, occasionally, to add an incidental warning or outburst. Three examples of this may be noted. First, there is the remark that, because movement (kinesis) is an act (energeia) even though it is an incomplete one, we may take it that undergoing change (paschein) and being moved (kineisthai) and operating (energein) are all the same thing.36 Again, there is the explanation that the phrase 'undergoing change' (paschein) is not univocal: when the scientist's science becomes 30 31 32 33

In VPhys., lect. 2-4; see In WllPhys., lect. 4-6. In VIPhys., lect. 5 and 12. Ibid. lect. 8, §5. That movement does not square with the categories of thought is accepted by Aristotle as well as by Bergson; because Bergson conceives the real as the empirically experienced, he concludes that the categories of thought fall short of the reality of movement; because Aristotle conceives the real as being, convertible with the true, he concludes that the reality of movement falls short of the reality corresponding to the categories of thought. 34 In VIPhys., lect. 5, §§ 11-16; lect. 8, § 15. 35 Movement supposes matter: In II Metaphys., lect. 4, §328; In VIII Metaphys., lect. i, § 1686; In XIIMetaphys., lect. 2, §2436. Sensation is without matter: Aristotle, De anima, II, 12, 4243 18; III, 8, 432a 10. Movement is incomplete and of the incompleted, sensation is of the completed: De anima, II, 5, 4173 16; III, 7, 43ia6. 36 Aristotle, De anima, II, 5, 4l7a 14-17; Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 10, §356.

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actual thought, the becoming is not an alteration or, if it is, then it is alteration of a distinct genus.37 In similar vein the third book of the De anima contains the statement to which Aquinas regularly referred38 when contrasting actus perfecti and actus imperfecti: the movement of a sense is movement of a distinct species; for movement has been defined as the operation or act (energeia) of the incomplete, but operation simply so called is of the completed.39 The substance of what Aquinas meant by actus perfecti and actus imperfecti is contained in the foregoing account of Aristotle. He referred to this contrast variously as a difference between operatio and motus40 or as a twofold operatio41 or finally as a twofold motus.42 Actus imperfecti was explained by noting that what is moved is in potency, that what is in potency is imperfect, and so that movement is the act of the imperfect.43 Both early and late works testify to a full awareness that movement is intrinsically temporal and specifically incomplete.44 In contrast the actus perfecti is defined as 'actus existentis in actu,'45 and even as 'actus existentis in actu secundum quod huiusmodi'; 4 '' it is specifically complete, an 'operatic consequens for-

37 Aristotle, De anima, II, 5, 4iyb 2-7 (see 14); Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 11, §§369-72. 38 Super I Sententiarum, d. 37, q. 4, a l, ad im; Super TV Sententiarum, d. 17, q. l, a. 5 sol. 3, ad im; Depotentia, q. 1O, a. 1 c.; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 82, § 17; Super Librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus, 4, lect. 7; In VIIPhys., lect. l, §7; Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 179, a. l, ad 3m; q. 180, a. 6 c. 39 Aristotle, De anima, III, 7, 43ia 5-8; Aquinas, In IIIDe anima, lect. 12, §766. 40 Super I Sententiarum, d. 4, q. l, a. l, ad im; d. 37, q. 4, a. l, ad im; Super II Sententiarum, d. 11, q. 2, a. l sol.; d. 15, q. 3, a. 2 sol.; Super III Sententiarum, d, 31, q. 2, a. l sol. 2; De veritate, q. 8, a. 15, ad 301; In IIIDe anima, lect. 12, §766. 41 De veritate, q. 8, a. 14, ad 12m. 42 Super FV Sententiarum, d. 17, q. l, a. 5 sol. 3, ad im; Super Librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus, 4, lect. 7; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 31, a. 2, ad im; 3, q. 21, a. l, ad 3m; see l, q. 18, a. l c.; q. 53, a. 1, ad 2m; q. 58, a. l, ad im. 43 Super I Sententiarum, d. 4, q. l, a. l, ad im; In IIIDe anima, lect. 12, §766. 44 Sententia libri Ethicorum, 10, lect. 5, 'videtur enim'; Super IVSententiarum, d. 17, q. l, a. 5 sol. 3, ad im; d. 49, q. 3, a. l sol. 3; De veritate, q. 8, a. 14, ad 12m; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 31, a. 2, ad im. 45 ['the act of something that exists in act'] Summa theologiae, 1, q. 18, a. 3, ad im; 1-2, q. 31, a. 2, ad im; 3, q. 21, a. l, ad 3m. 46 ['the act of something that exists in act, inasmuch as it exists in act'] Super TV Sententiarum, d. 49, q. 3, a. l sol. l, ob. 2; see 'actus perfecti inquantum huiusmodi' ['the act of something brought to completion inasmuch as it is complete'] (Super III Sententiarum, d. 31, q. 2, a. l sol. 2).

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mam,' 47 the 'operatic sensus iam facti in actu per suam speciem,'48 without need or anticipation of any ulterior complement to be itself,49 and intrinsically outside time.50 What, I may be asked, does this all amount to? In current terminology, then, it is a brilliant and penetrating negation of essentialism. There are elements in reality that correspond to what we know by defining; they are called essences; but they are not the whole of reality. There are also elements of reality that are less than essences, that are, as it were, essenceson-the-way; they are movements, acts that actualize incompletely, acts intrinsically in anticipation of completion and so intrinsically in time. But there also are elements of reality that are over and above essence; sight is an essence, but seeing is more than that essence; still, seeing is not a further essence, for seeing and sight have the same definition, which they share as act and potency; this more-than-essence is act, act of what already is completely in possession of essence, act that does not need or anticipate something further to become what it is to be, act that intrinsically stands outside time. Such is the substance of what Aquinas meant by actus perfecti and actus imperfecti. But there are also accidental variations; for, so far was Aquinas from the stereotyped terminology that sometimes is attributed to him that he could write 'sapientis enim est non curare de nominibus.'51 A first variation is had inasmuch as the term 'operatic' is suggestive of efficient causality; hence the contrast between operation and movement is taken as ground for denying that divine activity presupposes an uncreated matter.52 A second variation arises by a natural transition from the imperfection of the material continuum with its indefinite divisibility to the imperfection of anything that has not, as yet, attained its end; in this transferred sense the Sentences speak of an actus imperfecti,^ where also one may read the 47 ['an operation resulting from form'] Super IIISententiarum, d. 31, q. 2, a. l sol. 2. 48 ['the operation of a sense already brought to act by its species'] In IIIDe anima, lect. 12, §?66. 49 See footnote 44 above, with exception of Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 31, a. 2, ad im. 50 See footnote 44 above. 51 ['it is the part of a wise man not to worry about words'] Super II Sententiarum, d. 3, q. i, a. l sol. He is explaining the sense in which one might say that angels are composed of matter and form. 52 Super I Sententiarum, d. 7, q. l, a. l, ad 3m; see d. 42, q. l, a. l, ad 3m, which solves the same problem differently. 53 SuperIISententiarum, d. ll, q. 2, a. l sol.

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more cautious statement that the act of hope is 'quasi quidam motus' and 'sicut actus imperfecti.'54 A third variation arises from the fact that what exists in act is a ground of efficient causality; thus, an angel moves locally by an application of his virtue to a continuous series of places; this local movement is described as 'motus existentis in actu.'55 I believe that only poor judgment would desire to take such instances as these, not as incidental variations, but as key passages to the meaning of the repeated statement that sensation, understanding, and willing are actus perfecti. 3

Pati

There is no difficulty in thinking of movement in the strict sense of actus imperfecti as a pati. But there appears to be enormous difficulty in thinking of movement in the broad sense, which includes the actus perfecti, as a pati. Since that difficulty necessarily tends to the substitution of what someone else thinks for what Aquinas said, we must endeavor to surmount it at once. We begin from the variety of meanings of the term pati in Aquinas's source. In the Ethics Aristotle recognizes in the soul three things: potencies, habits, and pathe. The last are illustrated by desire, anger, fear, boldness, envy, joy, friendliness, hate, longing, rivalry, pity, and in general the feelings accompanied by pleasure or pain.56 Secondly, in a logical context Aristotle will speak of idia pathe, which are attributes or properties, even of ideal numbers.57 Thirdly, and this is the fundamental usage, pathos is connected with the species of movement called alteration. In general, alteration is defined as change of quality,58 but the quality subject to such change is restricted to the sensibilia per se et propria such as the white and black, the

54 ['as if it were a sort of movement' and 'like the act of something imperfect'] Super III Sententiarum, d. 31, q. 2, a. i sol. 2 c. See the use of 'existent! in potentia inquantum huiusmodi' ['a thing existing in potency inasmuch as it is in potency'] in Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 27, a. 3 c. 55 Summa theologiae, l, q. 53, a. 1, ad 3m; ad 2m. On angelic local movement: ibid. aa. 1-3; Super I Sententiarum, d. 37, q. 4, aa. 1-3; Quaestiones quodlibetales, l, a. 9; 9, a. 9; 11,3.4. 56 Aristotle, Ethics, II, 5, 11050 20-23. 57 E.g., Metaphysics, IV, 2, 10040 6, 10. 58 Aristotle, Physics, V, 2, 226a 26; Aquinas, In VPhys., lect. 4, §2. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 21, lO22b 15; XII, 2, lo6gb 12; XIV, l, io88a 32; but the apparent circle in defining (see Ross [see above, note 25] on lO22b 15) is solved by appeal to the sensibilia propria.

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heavy and light, the hot and cold, the hard and soft, and so forth.59 Pathe are such qualities as such; they are also the process of change of such qualities; especially, they are such change when it is for the worse.60 Fourthly, in close connection with the foregoing there is the account of the affective qualities in the Categories^ though the feelings of the Ethics are also relevant here.62 Fifthly, with reference to any movement in the strict sense Aristotle distinguishes the passive process (pathesis) and the received term (pathos) of the incomplete act, and these he maintains to be really identical with the production (poiesis) and the effected term (poiema) respectively of the same incomplete act.63 Sixthly, in an extended sense already noted, paschein is employed to denote sensation which is an act of the completed;64 it is to be observed that the theorem of the identity of action and passion is extended to this usage on the ground that without such an identity it would be necessary for every mover to be moved.65 The complexity of Aristotelian usage pours into the writings of Aquinas. In the Sentences some nine meanings of pati are distinguished; the basic meaning is considered to be 'alteration for the worse,' and other meanings are allowed greater or less propriety according to their approximation to what is considered basic.66 In later works this jungle growth is cut through with a distinction between pati proprie and pati communiter^ To pati proprie is assigned the province of Aristotelian physics and, as well, the linguistic associations of pati with suffering and of passio with human passions. On the other hand, pati communiteris a purely metaphysical idea; it is somewhat less general than 'being an effect,' for it presupposes a subject; it is described as recipere, as something found in every creature, as something 59 In VIIPhys., lect. 4, § 2; lect. 5 and 6; In Aristotelis libros De generatione et corruptione, l, lect. 1O, §§2, 7. 60 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 21, lO22b 15-21; Aquinas, In VMetaphys., lect. 2O, §§ 1065-69; note definition of predicament. 61 Aristotle, Categories, 8, 8b 28 - lOa 10. 62 See ibid, gb 27-34. 63 Aristotle, Physics, III, 3, 2O2a 23-24. Aquinas had only two terms to correspond to Aristotle's four. 64 Aristotle, De anima, II, 5, 4l6b 33; 4173 14; 4l7b 2; see III, 5, 43Oa 10-13. 65 Aristotle, De anima, III, 2, 426a 4-6; Aquinas, In IIIDe anima, lect. 2, §592; see Aristotle, De anima, II, 2, 4143 11; Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 4, § 272; De unitate intellectus, c. 3 (ed. Keeler, § 74); hence De anima, III, 4303 3; 4303 2O; 4313 l; 43lb 17; and 43lb 22. The spplicstion of 'sctio in pssso' to knowledge becomes complicsted with the doctrine of species; see Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, a. 2 c.; q. 87, a. l, ad 3m. 66 Super III Sententiarum, d. 15, q. 2, a. l sol. l and 2. 67 De veritate, q. 26, a. l c.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 79, a. 2 c.; 1-2, q. 22, 3. l c.

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following necessarily from the potentiality involved in every creature.68 However, there seems to be a concentration on the moment of reception,69 and it is pointed out that, since this pati involves no diminution of the recipient, it might be better named a perfid.70 The question before us is whether operation or action as actus perfecti can be called a pati in the sense of a received perfection. The difficulty here, insofar as I have been able to grasp it, lies in distinguishing between the grammatical subject of a transitive verb in the active voice and, on the other hand, the ontological subject of the exercise of efficient causality.a When it is true that 'I see,' it is also true that T is the grammatical subject of a transitive verb in the active voice. But it is mere confusion to conclude immediately that T also denotes the ontological subject of the exercise of efficient causality. Further, it may or may not be true that one must conclude mediately from the transitive verb to the efficient cause; with such abstract questions I am not concerned. But it is false to suppose that either Aristotle or Aquinas acknowledged or drew such a conclusion. I quote: Videbatur enim repugnare, quod sentire dicitur in actu, ei quod dictum est, quod sentire est quoddam pati et moveri. Esse enim in actu videtur magis pertinere ad agere. Et ideo ad hoc exponendum dicit [Aristoteles], quod ita dicimus sentire in actu, ac si dicamus, quod pad et moveri sint quoddam agere, idest quoddam esse in actu. Nam motus est quidam actus, sed imperfectus, ut dictum est in tertio Physicorurn. Est enim actus existentis in potentia, scilicet mobilis. Sicut igitur motus est actus, ita moveri et sentire est quoddam agere, vel esse secundum actum.71 68 De veritate, q. 26, a. i c. 69 Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 2 c. 70 Ibid. 1-2, q. 22, a. i c. Also of interest are: Super III Sententiarum, d. 26, q. l, a. l sol.; Super IVSententiarum, d. 44, q. 3, a. l sol. 3; De veritate, q. 26, aa. 2 and 3; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 15, a. 4 c.; In IDe anima, lect. 10, §§ 157-62; In IIDe anima, lect. 10, §350; lect. ll, §§365-72; lect. 12, §382; In III De anima, lect. 7, §676; §§687-88; lect. 9, §§720 and 722; lect. 12, §§765-66. 71 ['For to say that sensing is in act, seemed contradictory to what had been said, that sensing is a matter of undergoing change and being moved. For to be in act seems to pertain more to acting. And therefore, to explain this point, Aristotle says that we speak of sensing in act in the same way that we speak of undergoing change and being moved as a sort of acting, that is, a sort of being in act. For movement is a sort of act, but an imperfect one, as is stated in the third book of the Physics. For it is the act of something existing in potency, namely, of something movable. Therefore, just as movement is an act, so being moved and sensing are a sort of act, or the being that pertains to act'] In IIDe anima, lect. 10, §356.

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The question is, How can one speak of sensing in act, when one has maintained that sensing is a matter of undergoing change and being moved? For sensing in act seems to be just the opposite of being changed and being moved, namely, acting. The answer is that there is an acting which is simply being in act, and simply being in act is not opposed to being changed and being moved. On the contrary, movement itself is defined as an act. If there is no difficulty about defining movement as an act, though it is an imperfect one, there is no difficulty in saying that the pati of sensation is an act and in that sense an acting. Next, one may ask whether this Aristotelian viewpoint is to be found in Aquinas's independent writings. Let us begin by noting two senses of the term 'operatio.' In many contexts it denotes the exercise of efficient causality, for example, 'Deus operatur in omni operante.' But such usage certainly is not exclusive, and, I believe, it is not the most fundamental. For operatio also means simply 'being in act,' as does the etymologically parallel energeia; and in this sense it is a perfection which, in a creature, is received and so is a pati or a passio of the operating subject. Thus, Aquinas spoke of an 'operatio non activa sed receptiva.'72 He urged that the fact that sense had an operation did not make sense an active potency; for all powers of the soul have operations but most of them are passive potencies.73 He pointed out that nature provides suitable principles for operations; when the operation is an action, the principle is an active potency; and when the operation consists in a passion, the principle is a passive potency.74 He distinguished the operation of a mover, such as heating or cutting, the operation of what is moved, such as being heated or being cut, and the operation of what exists in act without tending to effect change.75 He defined potency as just the principle of operation, whether that be action or passion.76 Finally, so familiar to Aquinas was the notion of operation as passive, as something to be predicated not of the mover but of the moved, that in speaking of operative grace he found it necessary to explain that in this instance operation was to be attributed to the mover because it was the operation of an effect: 'operatio enim alicuius effectus non attribuitur

72 ['an operation that is not active but receptive'] Super I Sententiarum, d. 15, q. 5, a. 3, ad 4m. 73 De veritate, q. 16, a. l, ad 13m; q. 26, a. 3, ad 4m; see De virtutibus in communi, a. 3, ad 5m. 74 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 76, § 15. 75 Ibid. 3, c. 22, §2. 76 De anima, a. 12 c.

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rnobili, sed moventi.'77 That explanation would seem to be rather superfluous today when people think it a contradiction in terms to speak of the operating subject as being moved. What is true of operatio also is true of actio. In an early period these terms are contrasted,78 but later they are juxtaposed in opposition to factio,79 and such equivalence subsequently seems to be maintained. Frequently enough, then, actio means the exercise of efficient causality. But this meaning is not the only meaning. It also means simply actus. It is actio in the sense of actus that is the actuality of virtue, as being is the actuality of substance.80 It is actio in the sense of actus that is the complement of potency and stands to potency as second act to first.81 It is actio in the sense of actus that pertains to an active potency or to a passive potency.82 It is actio in the sense of actus that makes it possible to define passion as the actio of alterable quality,83 and as the actio of the patient.84 Finally, the action that goes forth into external matter would seem to have a prescriptive claim to denoting the exercise of efficient causality; but in an earlier work one may read that transient action is the act and perfection of the patient;85 and in later works one may read that transient action is the action and perfection of the patient,86 and the action and perfection of the transformed matter.87 Presumably, passive potencies and patients and transformed matter have an actio not in the sense that they are exercising efficient causality but in the sense that they are in act. To conclude, the influence of Aristotle did lead Aquinas to use operatio 77 ['the operation of some effects is attributed not to the movable thing but to the mover'] Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. I l l , a. 2 c. 78 Super I Sententiarum, d. 40, q. l, a. l, ad im; De veritate, q. 8, a. 6 c. 79 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 1, §4. 80 Summa theologiae, l, q. 54, a. l c. 81 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 9, §3. It maybe objected that shortly in §5 Aquinas mentiones actio as predicament. But this does not show that it is not an actus that is the complement of potency and stands to potency as second act to first. It may show, perhaps, that actio in the sense of act and actio in the sense of exercising efficient causality were not, at least on the verbal level, very sharply differentiated by Aquinas. But that happens to be what we are proving. Elsewhere we have discussed 'actio in agente and 'actio inpasso: see Theological Studies 3 (1942) 375-81 [Grace and Freedom 64-69]. 82 Summa theologiae, l, q. 77, a. 3 c. 83 In VMetaphys., lect. 20, § 1066. 84 Summa theologiae, l, q. 79, a. 4, ob. 5. 85 De potentia, q. 3, a. 15 c. 86 Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3m; In IX Metaphys., lect. 8, § 1864. 87 Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 31, a. 5 c.

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and actio in the sense of act or of being in act; and in that sense there is no absurdity - on the contrary, there is a necessity - in saying that such act in a creature is a pati communiter. However, before making any applications to the act, the action, the operation of understanding, it will be necessary to consider the notion of active potency. 4

Potentia Activaki

The ambiguity we have just noted in connection with operatio and actio becomes clear and systematic when we turn to the parallel ambiguity of the term 'potentia activa.' Fr Stufler has remarked that, while early works make the forma gravitatis an active principle, later works make the same form with the same functions in the context of the same theory a passive principle.88 The shift observed by Fr Stufler is but a particular case in a far more fundamental ambiguity. For in the writings of Aquinas there are two distinct definitions of potentia activa. There is an Aristotelian definition, 'principium transmutationis in aliud inquantum aliud,' which attains a certain dominance in later works. There is what may be called, though with diffidence, an Avicennist definition, 'principium operationis' or 'principium actionis,' which is dominant in earlier works and far from disappears in later ones. Since these definitions are not equivalent, it will be convenient to translate potentia activa, used in an Aristotelian sense, by 'efficient potency,' with the corresponding potentia passiva translated by 'receptive potency'; further, it will be convenient to translate potentia activa, used in the Avicennist sense, by 'active potency,' with the corresponding potentia passiva translated by 'passive potency.' Finally, there is to be noted a 'principium effectus,' which is concomitant with Avicennist active potency, is distinguished from it, and amounts to a generalization of Aristotelian efficient potency. These distinctions have now to be verified. In his account of relations in the Metaphysics, Aristotle recognized three 88 Johann Stufler, Gott, der erste Beweger aller Dinge: Ein neuer Beitrag zum Verstdndnis der Konkurslehre des hi. Thomas von Aquin (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1936) 34. Form is an active principle: Super III Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 2, a. l, ad 6m; d. 22, q. 3, a. 2 sol. i; Super IVSententiarum, d. 43, q. l, a. 1 sol. 3; De veritate, q. 12, a. 3 c.; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 23, §9; De potentia, q. 5, a. 5 c. Form is passive principle: InllPhys., lect. l, §4; In WIIPhys., lect. 8, §7; In VMetaphys., lect. 14, §955; In Lib. De caelo, l, lect. 3, §4; Summa theologiae, 3, q. 32, a. 4 c. The early active principle is a principium motus but not a motor: Super II Sententiarum, d. 14, q. l, a. 3 sol.; De veritate, q. 22, a. 3 c.; a. 5, ad 8m; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 23, §§4, 7, 8.

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types of ground, namely, quantity, action and passion, measure and measured. The second type included a subdivision according to potency and act. What can heat and what can be heated are related according to efficient and receptive potency; what is heating or cutting and what is being heated or being cut are related according to (efficient and receptive) act.89 This passage is noteworthy in two respects. First, it speaks not merely of dynamis but of dynamis poietike kai pathetike. Secondly, it makes quite clear the relational element in the Aristotelian concept of efficient potency and receptive potency: efficient potency is not conceived apart from a corresponding receptive potency; and receptive potency is not conceived apart from a corresponding efficient potency; to have either, one must have both. More explicit definitions respect this viewpoint. Efficient potency was defined as the principle of movement or of change in the other or, if in self, then in self as other.90 Receptive potency was defined as the principle of movement or of change by the other or, if by self, then by self as other.91 Clearly these definitions presuppose an objective duality; they do not exclude the occurrence of both efficient and receptive potency in the same subject, provided that subject has two parts, one to move and the other to be moved; but they do exclude the one subject as one from being both efficient and receptive. Complementary to these concepts of efficient and receptive potency, which necessarily involve some 'other,' was the concept of nature. Nature was the 'principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens.'92 Nature is not the thing but a principle in it; it is the matter of the thing, or its form, and its form rather than its matter.93 But above all, from our viewpoint, nature is a principle in the thing of movement in the thing; it is 'principium motus in eo in quo est motus.' It follows that nature is neither efficient potency nor receptive potency. It is not efficient potency; for that is the principle of movement, not in self as self, but 89 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V , 15, io2ia 15-18; Aquinas, In VMetaphys., lect. 17, §§1023-25. 90 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 12, loiga 15-21; Aquinas, In VMetaphys., lect. 14, §955; Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 1, 10463 9-16; Aquinas, In IXMetaphys., lect. i, §§1776-77. 91 Ibid. 92 ['the principle of movement and of rest in a thing in which it is found primarily and per se, and not accidentally'] Aristotle, Physics, II, i, 1920 21-22; Aquinas, In IIPhys., lect. i, §5. 93 In IIPhys., lect. 2.

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in the other or in self as other. It is not receptive potency; for that is the principle of movement, not in self as self, but by the other or by self as other. To this differentiation Aristode adverted more than once. The doctor that cures himself is mentioned, from opposite viewpoints, in both the Physics and the Metaphysics.^ The De caelo contrasts potency and nature.95 The ninth book of the Metaphysics, after defining efficient and receptive potency, goes on to employ the term 'potency' in a still broader sense to include nature as well.96 In his Metaphysics Avicenna distinguished a large number of meanings of what was translated by potentia but would seem better rendered by 'power.' They may be indicated as follows: (i) power, as an intensive form of strength, the opposite of weakness, the source of mighty actions within the genus of movement; (2) power as ease of performance with some immunity from suffering; (3) power simply as a notable immunity from suffering without an implication of performance; (4) power as complete immunity from suffering; (5) strength as capacity to act, though without action, on the ground that it is 'principium effectus'; (6) any disposition of a subject that is a 'principium variationis ab illo in aliud inquantum illud est aliud'; from the context this is clearly the Aristotelian efficient potency; (7) the possibility of receiving; the perfection of this possibility is named 'actus,' though it is said to be not an actus but a passio or else an acquisitio essendi; (8) various modal variadons of the foregoing and, as well, power in the sense of mathemadcal exponent; (9) the divisions of passive potency, that is, the possibility of receiving, into perfect and imperfect, proximate and remote; (10) the principle of acdon. This last is propounded separately in the form of a theorem. Provided the acdon of a body is neither violent nor per accidens, then it must be ascribed to a potency in the body; this is clear when the acdon is due to will and choice; it is no less true when the action is due to some other body or to some separate substance; for there must be in the thing some property that accounts for the action, else the acdon will be either accidental or violent.97 94 Aristotle, Physics, II, l, 1920 23; Metaphysics, V, 12, lOiga 17. 95 Aristotle, De caelo et mundo, III, 2, 3Olb 17-18. 96 Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, 8, 10490 5-11; Aquinas, In IXMetaphys., lect. 7, §§ 1844--4597 Avicenna, Metaphysica vel Philosophia Prima, (Opera [Venice, 1508] fol. 84 verso-85 verso). I am indebted to Fr Francis Firth, C.S.B., for a copy of these pages from the photostat reproduction of this edition in the library of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto.

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In the Sentences there is a discussion of the potency of God. Aquinas begins by referring to Avicenna: the name 'potentia' initially referred to powerful men and then was transferred to natural things; it means not only power to act but also immunity from suffering; on both counts it is to be attributed to God in a supreme degree.98 The first solution specifies more precisely the initial meaning of potency as 'principium actionis'; opposed to this active potency which has its complement in operation or action, there is a passive potency which receives action." The second solution repeats that potency is the principle of action and of acting; any such principle is termed 'potency'; even the divine essence, inasmuch as it is principle of operation, involves a potency, though not a potency distinct from the essence.10° The fourth solution identifies divine essence, existence, and operation; it then points out that, just as the divine essence is taken as a 'principium essendi,' so divine potency is taken as 'principium operandi et praeter hoc ut principium operati.'101 The fifth solution admits the real identity of divine potency and divine operation but denies eternal operation to involve eternal effects.102 We may observe at once that such contrasts between divine operation or action and, on the other hand, its operatum, effect, or term, are quite common. To confine our illustration to the Sentences, we find that the operation is necessary but the effects contingent;103 that the operation is eternal but the effects temporal;104 that the operation is one but the effects are many;105 that the operation has no ulterior end but the effects have;106 that omnipotence, which is the active potency of God, regards both operation and effects but, in the latter case, regards only creatures;107 that God rests by a cessation, not of his operation, but of fresh effects.108 It is now necessary to turn to the third objection and solution which were omitted above. The objection stems from the fifth book of Aristotle's

98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108

Super I Sententiarum, d. 42, q. 1, a. l sol. Ibid, ad im. Ibid, ad 2m; see a. 2 sol. Ibid. a. i, ad 4m. Ibid, ad 5m. Ibid. d. 43, q. 2, a. i, ad 3m. Ibid. d. 8, q. 3, a. i, ad 4m; d. 14, q. i, a. i, ad 3m; d. 35, q. i, a. 5, ad 3m. Ibid. d. 42, q. l, a. 2 sol. SuperIISententiarum, d. l, q. 2, a. i, ad 4m. Super I Sententiarum, d. 20, q. i, a. l, ad 4m. Super IISententiarum, d. 15, q. 3, a. l, ad 3m; a. 2 sol.

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Metaphysics; it argues that potency is either active or passive; that divine potency cannot be passive, for God cannot suffer change; nor can it be active for, according to Aristotle, that is the principle of change in the other as other, but divine activity does not presuppose any 'other.'109 This lack of generality in the Aristotelian concept of efficient potency had given rise to difficulty on a previous occasion. Then Aquinas had met the problem by admitting that divine potency was neither active nor passive and by claiming that it was superactiva, that is, not by way of movement but by way of operation.110 Now, however, he prefers to generalize the Aristotelian definition and, incidentally, to modify it into conformity with his own terminological preference: 'potentia activa est principium operationis in aliud sicut in effectum productum, non sicut in materiam transmutatam.'111 The nature of divine potency was examined again in the opening article of the De potentia. The Aristotelian definition of efficient potency appears in the third objection and in the fifteenth; but it has no influence either on the body of the article or on the solutions. The body of the article begins by pointing out that there are two distinct types of act: a first act which is form, and a second act which is operation. Corresponding to these two types of act, there are two types of potency: passive potency is the potency to receive form; active potency is the 'principium operationis' or, without apparent difference, the 'principium actionis.'112 In the context there is no mention of Avicenna, but a rather close parallel may be found in Aristotle's Metaphysics where the analogy of act is explained. Aristotle remarked that when A is in B as C is in D, the proportion is that of matter to essence (ousia), but when E is to .Fas G is to H, the proportion is that of potency to movement.113 This gives a twofold potency and a twofold act, and it does so 1OQ Super I Sententiarum, d. 42, q. l, a. l, ob. 3. no Ibid. d. 7, q. l, a. l, ad 3m. 111 ['active potency is a principle of operation on another as on the effect produced, not as on the matter undergoing change'] Ibid. d. 42, q. l, a. l, ad 3m. 112 De potentia, q. l, a. l c. 113 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 6, lO48b 6-9. Aquinas's illustration is of sight in the eyes and of seeing to sight (In IX Metaphys., lect. 5, §§ 1828-29). Compare the standard Aristotelian contrast of the learner to science and of the scientist to consideration: Physics, VIII, 4, 255a 30 - b 31 (Aquinas, In VIIIPhys., lect. 8); Aristotle, De anima, II, l, 4l2a 10, 22-27 (Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. l, §2l6; lect. 2, §239); Aristotle, De anima, II, 5, 4l7a 21 - 4l8a 6 (Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. ll and 12). The parallel in artefacts is of raw materials to product, and of product to use (In IIPhys., lect. 4, §8), for example, of materials

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without any mention of the 'other'; on both counts it resembles the analysis of the Depotentia. As in the Sentences, so here active potency, besides being 'principium operationis vel actionis,' also is 'principium effectus.' 114 But it is far clearer in the De potentia than in the Sentences that active potency is 'principium effectus' only by an accidental concomitance; one could have inferred as much from the earlier work; but one has only to read if one is to learn it from the latter. I quote: Potentia autem, licet sit principium quandoque et actionis et eius quod est per actionem productum, tamen unum accidit ei, alterum vero competit ei per se: non enim potentia activa semper, per suam actionem, aliquam rem producit quae sit terminus actionis, cum sint multae operationes quae non habent aliquid operatum, ut Philosophus dicit; semper enim potentia est actionis vel operationis principium.115 It would have been impossible to make the foregoing assertion of Aristotle's efficient potency; that, by definition, is principle of movement or change in the other, and so per se it looks towards an effect even though it may not actually produce one. But the active potency with which Aquinas is dealing is primarily principle of operation or action; such operation or action may involve an ulterior effect, as is the case when action goes forth into external matter; on the other hand, it may not involve anything over and above itself, as is the case when actions remain in the agent.116 Thus active potency in the De potentia is at once both Aristotle's natural potency to an act in the subject and Aristotle's efficient potency of a change in the other; spontaneously this ambivalence leads to Aquinas's repeated distinction of two kinds of action. to motorcar, and of car in garage to car on the road. However, the division of Depotentia, q. l, a. l c. is not purely Aristotelian; see Super ISententiarum, d. 42, q. l, a. l, ad im. 114 Depotentia, q. l, a. l, ad im; see footnotes 101-108 above; also Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 10; and Summa theologiae, l, q. 25, a. l, ad 3m. 115 ['But granted that potency is sometimes the principle both of action and of what is produced by the action, still the one is accidental to the potency, and the other belongs to it per se; for active potency does not always, by its action, produce something that is the term of its action, since, as the Philosopher says, there are many operations which do not produce an effect; but potency is always a principle of action or operation'] Depotentia, q. 2, a. 2 c. 116 See Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 30, §§ 12 and 13; and below on duplex actio.

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The Contra Gentiles introduces us to a reversal of roles. Hitherto we have noticed Aristotelian definitions only in objections. But now we find potentia activa defined not as principle of action but as 'principium agendi in aliud secundum quod est aliud.'117 Further, we read that potency in God is not a principle of action but a principle of a product, because the very definition of active potency involves a relation to some 'other.'118 It would seem to be a recognition of this relational element that underlies the statement, 'sicut potentia passiva sequitur ens in potentia, ita potentia activa sequitur ens in actu';119 for, while Aristotle's natural potency, like the active and passive potency of the De potentia, pertains to the thing considered in itself, Aristotle's efficient and receptive potencies pertain to the thing considered, not merely in itself, but also in its relation to the 'other' or to self as other; accordingly, it is not the ens actu but follows from it. The treatment of divine active potency in the Summa maintains this reversal of roles. The Aristotelian definitions of efficient and of receptive potency are the basis of argument in the body of the article.120 On the other hand, the Avicennist definition of principle of operation occurs only in the third objection.121 As when the waters of two rivers join to flow along side by side, so the two sets of definitions persist in the writings of Aquinas. He uses whichever suits his immediate purpose, and, as is the way with intelligent men, he does not allow a common name for different things to confuse his thinking. However, open conflict between the two systems does break out at least once, and naturally enough this occurs in commenting on the Aristotelian definition of efficient potency, namely, 'principium motus vel mutationis in alio inquantum est aliud.' Aquinas points out that in the thing that is changed there are two principles of movement - its matter and also the formal principle on which movement follows. Neither of these principles is potentia activa, for whatever is moved is moved by the other, and 117 ['a principle of (one thing) acting on another inasmuch as it is other'] Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 7, §2. 118 Ibid. 2, c. 10, §l. 119 ['as passive potency is a consequence of being in potency, so active potency is a consequence of being in act'] Ibid. 2, c. 7, §3. See Summa theologiae, \, q. 25, a. i, ad im: 'potentia activa non dividitur contra actum sed fundatur in eo' ['active potency is not set in contrast to act but is founded on act']; a relation is suggested by 'fundatur' even more than by 'sequitur.' 120 Summa theologiae, l, q. 25, a. l c.

121 Ibid. ob. 3.

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nothing moves itself unless it has two parts, one moving and the other moved; accordingly, insofar as potency is a principle of movement in what is moved, it pertains to potentia passiva rather than potentia activa.122 This passage brings into the open the latent ambiguity with which we have been dealing. But the tension is not maintained, for when later in the same work Aquinas has to characterize the potency of sight to seeing, he does not say that this potency is active and he does not say that it is passive; he introduces the terms, potentia motiva and potentia operativa;12^ it is a neat verbal solution to a merely verbal difficulty, and it must have pleased him; for we find potentia operativa employed in the Prima pars124 and in the De spiritualibus creaturis.12^ 5

Duplex Actio

Frequently Aquinas distinguished two types of actio, one which remains in its subject, another which goes forth into external matter to effect its transformation. This distinction has led subsequent writers to make metaphysical ultimates of what they term immanent and transient action, and, as not rarely happens, such speculative constructions are a barrier rather than a help to a grasp of St Thomas's thought, for they give an air of finality and completeness to what, in point of fact, contained not a little of the incidental and was not complete. Aquinas alleges two different sources in Aristotle for his duplex actio. Contrasts between actio and factio, and so between agere and facere, activum and factivum, agibile and factibile stem from Aristotle's Ethics.126 In the relevant passage Aristotle was distinguishing art, science, prudence, wisdom, 122 In VMetaphys., lect. 14, §955. Note that the shift is only terminological: what before was called active, here is called passive; but what before was called active, then was not intended to mean efficient; and the present use of 'passive' does not deny natural potency but only efficient potency. Early writings explicitly distinguish between principium operationis vel actionis and principium operati vel effectus (see above, footnotes 101-108, 115); similarly they distinguish between principium motus and the movens or motor (see above, footnote 88). 123 In IXMetaphys., lect. 5, § 1829. See arche kinetike (Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 8, lO49b 9); contrast kinetikon (Physics, III, 3, 2O2a 13). 124 Summa theologiae, i, q. 54, a. 3 c. 125 De spiritualibus creaturis, a. ll c. 126 Super II Sententiarum, d. 12, expositio textus; Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. l, a. 4 sol. 1, ad 4m; d. 33, q. 2, a. 2 sol. l; d. 35, q. l, a. 1 sol.; De veritate, q. 5, a. l c.

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and intellect; three of these (science, wisdom, and intellect) regard the necessary; the other pair (art and prudence) regard the contingent; the distinction between them is set forth by a parallel distinction between production (poiesis) and moral conduct (praxis).121 Now in medieval Latin both poiesis and praxis might be rendered by actio, and in such cases Aquinas's distinction was between the actio of moral conduct, which is a perfection of the agent, and the actio, more properly factio, which transforms external matter. A corollary may be noted. When Aquinas restricts actio to beings that have dominion over their acts, actio has at least an association with moral conduct. 'Bruta aguntur et non agunt,' because St John Damascene said so;128 but also because Aristotle remarked that sense is not a principle of moral conduct, since brutes have senses yet have no part in moral conduct.129 The 'non agunt' does not mean that brutes do not act in the sense of 'aliquam actionem exercere,' which may mean simply being in act;130 it does not even deny that brutes move themselves locally inasmuch as one part in act moves another part in potency. Evidently this source in the Ethics lacks generality.131 But the other source in the ninth book of the Metaphysics is so general that it deals not with action but with act. The problem under discussion is the essential priority of act over potency, because act is the end of potency, the end is a cause, and a cause is prior.132 The point was evident in cases in which only potency and act existed; but when besides potency and act there was also an ulterior product, the apparent difficulty was met by noting that then the act was in the thing produced and that it emerged simultaneously with the product.133 There followed the familiar corollary on the twofold subject of the act (energeia) ,134 127 Aristotle, Ethics, VI, 3,11390 14-18; see ibid. 4,11403 1-5; 5,11400 2-4; Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum, 6, lect. 3 (ed. Vives, XXV, 491); see lect. 2 (4883); lect. 4 (494»). 128 ['Brute animals are subjected to action; they do not act'] See De veritate, q. 5, a. 9, ad 4m ['... animalia bruta non agunt, sed aguntur']. 129 Aristotle, Ethics, VI, 2,1139a 19; referred to in Aquinas, De unione Verbi incarnati, a. 5 c. See Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. ill; c. 112, § l; In IlPhys., lect. 10, §4. 130 See above, footnotes 128 and 71. 131 The contrast really is threefold: speculative, active, and productive. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VI, 1, lO25b 19-26; Aquinas, In WMetaphys., lect. l, § 1152; In IX Metaphys., lect. 2, § 1788; In XIMetaphys., lect. 7, §2253. 132 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 8, 10503 3-9. 133 Ibid, lines 23-29. 134 Ibid, lines 30-37.

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The medieval translator laid no stress on actio: the energeia that is in the agent was translated by actio; the one that is in the product was translated by actus.isb The opposite usage may be found in the Primapars.136 General Thomist usage is variable. In the Sentences and in the De veritate an attempt is made to reserve operatic for the act that remains and actio for the act that goes forth.137 In the Contra Gentiles, factio is proposed for the act that goes forth and operatio or even actio for the act that remains.138 In the Depotentia, the Contra Gentiles, and the Prima pars, the distinction is drawn with respect to a duplex operatio.1'*9 However, it is duplex actio that is regular in the Prima pars.140 Still, in the Depotentia mention was made of a duplex actus secundus,141 and this viewpoint returns in the Prima secundae,14* where also one may find an identification of the act that goes forth with the actio in passo of the Physics.14'* As a final observation, one may note that Aquinas did not keep his two sources distinct; in both the Contra Gentiles and the Prima secundae he refers to the ninth book of the Metaphysics and proceeds to speak offactio, a term that implicitly is present in the Metaphysics but explicitly only in the Ethics.144 This fluidity of terminology is not surprising unless one indulges in an anachronistic projection of present usage upon the past. On the other hand, the meaning of these passages and their significance are quite clear. There is an act that remains in the agent and is the perfection of the agent; there is another act that goes forth into external matter and effects a change of it. The pair spontaneously come together in thought - grammatically because both are expressed by transitive verbs in the active voice, and historically because both proceed from the 'principium actionis' that was 135 See in Aristotle the text on which Aquinas comments in In IX Metaphys., lect. 8 (ed. Cathala) and as quoted by Aquinas, De unitate intellectus, c. 3 (ed. Keeler, §71). 136 Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87, a. 3 c. 137 Super I Sententiarum, d. 40, q. i, a. i, ad im; De veritate, q. 8, a. 6 c. 138 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. l, §4. 139 Depotentia, q. 10, a. i c.; q. g, a. 9, ad 4m (lae ser.); Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. i, §3; Summa theologiae, i, q. 14, a. 2 c.; see 1-2, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3m. 140 Summa theologiae, l, q. 18, a. 3, ad im; q. 23, a. 2, ad im; q. 27, a. i c.; a. 3 c.; a. 5 c.; q. 28, a. 4 c.; q. 54, a. l, ad 3m; a. 2 c.; q. 56, a. 1 c.; q. 85, a. 2 c. Also Super I Sententiarum, d. 40, q. l, a. 1, ad im; De veritate, q. 8, a. 6 c.; q. 14, a. 3 c.; De potentia, q. 3, a. 15 c.; q. 8, a. l c.; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 23, §5; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 2, ad 301; De unitate intellectus, c. 3 (ed. Keeler, §71). 141 De potentia, q. 5, a. 5, ad 14m. 142 Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 57, a. 4 c.; q. 74, a. l c.; see q. 31, a. 5 c. 143 Ibid. q. 74, a. i c. 144 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. l, §§2-4; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 57, a. 4 c.

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Aquinas's initial definition of active potency. Even though later Aquinas did manifest a preference for a different definition of potentia activa, there was a deeper root in Aristotle himself to keep the two types of act associated; for it is a form that is the principle both of the act remaining in the agent and of the act that goes forth. In the Physics it was pointed out that the mover possesses a form which is principle of movement; for it is a man in act that makes a man out of what is a man only in potency.145 In his Sentences Aquinas refers to this passage and applies it both to transient and to immanent acts: 'causa autem actionis est species, ut dicitur in III Phys.; quia unumquodque agit ratione formae alicuius quam habet... sicut ignis qui desiccat et calefacit per caliditatem et siccitatem, et homo audit et videt per auditum et visum."46 Even in his latest works Aquinas will speak of active potency as pertaining to things because of their forms,147 and will explain differences of efficacy because of differences in the perfection of forms; thus, fire heats and illuminates; what is so heated or illuminated can do the same but only in a lesser degree, while merely intentional forms cannot have natural effects.148 But form is not only the ground of efficiency but also the principle of operation: 'propria forma uniuscuiusque faciens ipsum esse in actu, est principium propriae operationis ipsius.1149 Such operation is the end of the operator and more perfect than his form;150 it is what is last and most perfect in each thing, and so it is compared to form as act to potency, as second act to first act.151 But however germane to Aquinas's thought as it actually developed, duplex actio is not a capsule of metaphysical ultimates. The act that goes 145 Aristotle, Physics, III, 2, 2O2a 9; Aquinas, In III Phys., lect. 4, §6. 146 ['but the cause of action is a species, as is said in the third book of the Physics; for everything acts by reason of some form that it has ... as fire dries and heats by (the forms of) heat and dryness, and a human being hears and sees through (the forms) of hearing and seeing'] Super IIISententiarum, d. 18, q. l, a. i sol. 147 Summa theologiae, 3, q. 13, a. l c.; In III Phys., lect. 4, §6; In VIII Phys., lect. 21, §9148 Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 5, a. 6, ad 2m; see In IIDe anima, lect. 14, §425. 149 ['the proper form of anything whatever causing it to be in act is the principle of the proper operation of that thing'] Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 179, a. l, ad im. 150 De potentia, q. 5, a. 5, ad 14m: '... obiectio ilia procedit de actu secundo, qui est operatic manens in operante, qui est finis operands, et per consequens excellentior quam forma operands' ['that objection is based on second act, which is an operation remaining in the one operating, which is the end of the one operating, and consequently more excellent than the form of the one operating']. 151 Super IV Sententiarum, d. 49, q. 3, a. 2 sol.: 'Uldmum autem et perfecdssimum

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forth into external matter corresponds to the predicament of action as defined in the Sentences: 'actio secundum quod est praedicamentum dicit aliquid fluens ab agente et cum motu.'152 But later Aquinas wrote that there are two actions, one that involves movement (in the sense of incomplete act), and another that does not, as when God causes grace in the soul. On the latter he remarked, 'Quod quidem difficile est ad intelligendum non valentibus abstrahere considerationem suam ab actionibus quae sunt cum motu.'153 This tart observation would seem to be relevant to the passage in the commentary on the Physics where, after explaining Aristotle's concept of action and passion,154 he goes on to give his own quite different and quite universal definitions of the predicament of action and passion.155 As causal efficiency does not require external matter and movement, so also it need not go forth: there is a 'processio operati' of the inner word within the intellect.156 On the other hand, actio that remains in the agent does not involve efficient causality inasmuch as it proceeds from form, species, or informed potency; for that procession is not 'processio

quod est in unoquoque est sua operatic; unde omnis forma inhaerens comparatur ad operationem quodammodo ut potentia ad actum; propter quod forma dicitur actus primus, ut scientia; et operatio actus secundus, ut considerare, ut patet in II de Anima' ['What is ultimate and most perfect in anything is its operation; wherefore every form inherent in a thing is compared to its operation somewhat as potency is compared to act; on this account form is called first act (for example, knowledge); and operation (for example, to consider) is called second act, as is evident in the second book of the De anima']. See also Super I Sententiarum, d. 35, q. l, a. 5, ad 4m; De malo, q. l, a. 5 c.; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 2; q. 49, a. 3, ad im; 3, q. 9, a. l c.; a. 4 c. See above, footnote 113. 152 ['action inasmuch as it is a predicament signifies something deriving from the agent and involving movement'] Super I Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3m. !53 t' a point which those who are unable to get their minds off actions that involve movement find very hard to understand'] Quaestiones quodlibetaks, 4, a. 9 c.; see Summa theologiae, l, q. 41, a. l, ad 2m. 154 In IHPhys., lect. 5, § 13. 155 Ibid. § 15: 'Sic igitur secundum quod aliquid denominatur a causa agente, est praedicamentum passionis, nam pati nihil est aliud quam suscipere aliquid ab agente: secundum autem quod e converso denominatur causa agens ab effectu, est praedicamentum actionis, nam actio est actus ab agente in aliud, ut supra dictum est' ['In this way, then, inasmuch as something takes its name from an agent cause, it is the category of passion, for passion is nothing else than the reception of something from an agent; but inasmuch as an agent cause takes its name from the effect, it is the category of action, for action is an act from an agent upon another, as was said above']. 156 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad ym.

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operati' but 'processio operationis';157 as we have just seen, operation is more perfect than form, and only an instrument is less perfect than its effect. The idea that efficient causality occurs in this type of actio has, I fear, little more basis than a failure to distinguish between the two different ways in which Aquinas defined his potentia activa. 6

Species, Intelligere

The Latin term species translates Aristotle's term eidos and shares its ambiguity. It may mean a form, and then it includes neither common nor individual matter; and it may mean a universal, and then it includes common but not individual matter.158 In cognitional contexts species occurs in both senses: 'similitude rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit';159 'intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individual!, non autem a materia sensibili communi."60 The former species is a form; the latter is a universal. To determine in which sense the term species is employed is not always as easy as in the above cases. However, our criteria may be extended: a form is known only by metaphysical analysis; but the universal enters into the knowledge of everyone. To the objection that intellect does not abstract species because, according to Aristotle, intellect knows species in the phantasm, Aquinas answered: Dicendum quod intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas rerum in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est.161 157 Ibid. For parallels to this distinction, see above, footnotes 101-108, 114, and 115158 In VII Metaphys., lect. 9, § 1473. 159 ['the likeness of the thing understood, which is the intelligible species, is the form according to which intellect understands'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 85* a. 2c. 160 ['the intellect therefore abstracts the species of a thing existing in nature from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter'] Ibid. a. l, ad 2m. 161 ['We have to say that our intellect both abstracts intelligible species from phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things as universals; and nevertheless understands them in phantasms, because it cannot understand even those things the species of which it abstracts, except by directing its attention to phantasms, as was said above'] Ibid, ad 5m.

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The generality of this statement, the fact that universals are being considered, the fact that the species are known in the phantasm, all favor taking species in the sense of a universal. On the other hand, to the objection that names signify things known and that, according to Aristotle, names are signs of the passions of the soul so that the things known are passions of the soul, Aquinas answered: Et utraque haec operatic coniungitur in intellect!!. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis, secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus format secundo vel defmitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen est defmitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles, sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus.162 Here we have metaphysical analysis revealing the passion of the possible intellect being informed by species and its activity in forming definitions and judgments; species means form, and though the universal is referred to as the 'ratio quam significat nomen,' it is not here called a species. Our present purpose is to discuss the relation between species as form and the act intelligere. Our view is that this relation is expressed by Aquinas 162 ['And these two operations are joined in the intellect. For to be considered first is the change of passive intellect, inasmuch as it is informed by an intelligible species. Then, secondly, being thus informed, it forms either a definition or a proposition that combines or divides; and what it forms is signified by a word. Wherefore the meaning signified by a noun is a definition; and a sentence signifies an intellectual operation of combining or dividing. Words therefore do not mean the intelligible species themselves, but mean what intellect forms for itself in order to judge about external things'] Ibid. a. 2, ad 3m. [In the original article Lonergan had inserted (in brackets, after 'Et utraque haec operatic') the following English phrase: 'that is, of external sense and of imagination.' This was retained in the book publications, both French and English. It is, however, misleading; the full and accurate phrase would be 'that is, the undergoing of change that we find in sense, and the formation of a further cognitional element that we find in imagination'; so that the insertion in brief form would be 'that is, being changed, and forming a further cognitional element.' Refer ahead to chapter 4, p. 117, where Lonergan confirms our interpretation here: '... on the sensitive level passive operations are found in the outer senses, constructive operations in the imagination; but on the level of intellect both the passive and constructive operations pertain to the same potency, possible intellect.']

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135 Procession and Related Notions in two different manners - one according to what we have ventured to name the Avicennist definition of active potency, the other according to the Aristotelian concept of form as natural potency. First, then, just as the De potentia conceives active potency as the principle of operation or action which takes place in virtue of form,163 so one may read that (intellect actuated by) species is the 'principium actus intelligendi,'164 the 'principium actionis,'165 the 'principium formale actionis,'166 the 'principium formale quo intellectus intelligit."67 Again, just as the De potentia conceives passive potency as potency to the reception of form,'68 and contrasts this passive potency with the active potency to operation and action, so one may read a parallel contrast between the reception of species, which is named a passio, and the subsequent operatic-, which is an actus perfecti.169 Thirdly, just as the De potentia distinguishes between 'principium 163 De potentia, q. l, a. l c. 164 ['principle of the act of understanding'] De veritate, q. 3, a. 2 c. 165 ['principle of action'] De potentia, q. 8, a. l c.; q. 9, a. 5 c.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, a. 5, ad 3m. ['Principium actionis' is found in Lonergan's first reference, but De potentia, q. 9, a. 5 c. has 'intelligendi principium' ('the principle of understanding') and Summa theologiae has 'principium intellectualis operationis' ('the principle of intellectual operation').] 166 ['formal principle of action'] Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 46, §2 [the actual text reads 'principium formale ... intellectualis operationis' ('the formal principle of intellectual operation')]; see Summa theologiae, l, q. 56, a. l c.; q. 85, a. 2 c.; note the introduction of'principium formale,' In V Metaphys., lect. 14, §955; In IIPhys., lect. l, §4, where it is opposed to 'potentia activa.' On the other hand, the 'principium formale' of act in the other, of heating in the heated, of specification of the act of will by the intellect, would correspond not to Aristotle's natural potency but to his efficient potency; see Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. ic.; the distinction between exercise and specification is parallel to the distinction between applying agent and form in l, q. 105, a. 5 c.; this triple distinction of end, applying agent, and form surpasses the twofold distinction of 1, q. 82, a. 4 c.; Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 72, §7; 3, c. 88, §5; which derives from In XIIMetaphys., lect. 7, §§2519-20. 'Finis operands' is somehow efficient: Super LibrumDe causis, lect. l. See below, footnote 209. 167 ['formal principle by which the intellect understands'] De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 9, ad 6m. 168 De potentia, q. l, a. 1 c.; see Super ISententiarum, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4m; d. 42, q. l, a. l, ad im. 169 Super I Sententiarum, d. 40, q. l, a. l, ad im. Though doubt is cast upon the authenticity of this part of the response (see ed. Mandonnet, I, 943), other passages are sufficiently similar, though perhaps not quite so explicit. [Lonergan refers here to a long paragraph that Mandonnet has in a footnote, where we do indeed find a contrast between the 'passio' of the reception of species and the 'actus perfecti' of the subsequent operation. But Mandonnet introduces the paragraph with the remark that it is found in the Parma edition of St Thomas but not in any of the ancient codices.]

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actionis' and 'principium effectus,'170 and again between action and the term of action,171 so there is a contrast between the form which is the principle of the act of understanding and the thought-out form of a house which is the term of the act of understanding and, as it were, its effect;172 similarly contrasted are the species which is the form that actuates the intellect and is its principle of action, the action of the intellect, and the inner word which is term to the action and, as it were, something constituted by it.173 Finally, while we have seen that the terms operatic and actio sometimes mean simply act or being in act and sometimes mean the exercise of efficient causality, we now find that the precision of trinitarian theory led Aquinas to distinguish exactly between these two meanings with regard to the operation or action of intellect; when that operation is meant in the sense of act, it is termed intelligere; but when by operation is meant that one act is grounding another, it is termed dicere.174 So much for a sketch of one scheme of metaphysical analysis applied by Aquinas to intellect. For it is only to be expected that there should be in his writings some evidence of another scheme of analysis that stands in more immediate conformity with Aristotelian thought. The most impressive example of such conformity occurs in the following incidental statement. ... forma recepta in aliquo non movet illud in quo recipitur; sed ipsum habere talem formam, est ipsum motum esse; sed movetur ab exteriori agente; sicut corpus quod calefit per ignern, non movetur a calore recepto, sed ab igne. Ita intellectus non movetur a specie iam recepta, vel a vero quod consequitur ipsam speciem; sed ab aliqua re exteriori quae imprimit in intellectum, sicut est intellectus agens, vel phantasia, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi.175

170 Depotentia, q. l, a. l, ad im. 171 Ibid. q. 2, a. 2 c. Cited above, footnote 115. 172 De veritate, q. 3, a. 2 c. The term 'form' is applied to the inner word here, not as form that is principle of the act of understanding, but as form that is principle of the artefact; see Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9 c., and 'idea operati,' Summa theologiae, 1, q. 15, a. 2 c. 173 Depotentia, q. 8, a. l c.; see q. 9, a. 5 c. 174 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4m: '... dicere autem nihil est aliud quam ex se emittere verbum' ['to utter is nothing else than to express a word from oneself']; see ibid, ad 5m; Depotentia, q. 9, a. 9, ad 8m (lae ser.); Summa theologiae, l, q. 34, a. l, ad 3m; ibid, ad 2m. 175 ['the form received in something does not move the thing that receives it;

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It may not be out of place to note how exactly this fits in both with general doctrine and with intellectual theory. It is in accord with the general doctrine that the efficient cause not merely produces the form but also produces the movement consequent to the form,176 that what produces the species should also produce the consequent intelligere. It is in accord with the general doctrine that form is less perfect than operation,177 and so not its proportionate cause, that the species should not move intellect to the act intelligere. It is in accord with the general doctrine 'quidquid movetur ab alio movetur'178 that intellect actuated by species should not produce its acts of understanding, just as the will actuated by a habit does not produce its act of willing the end; on the other hand, just as will actually willing the end moves itself to willing the means,179 so intellect actually understanding is able to utter, constitute, produce its inner word of definition or judgment. Further, the passage before us accords with specific intellectual doctrines. It makes it quite clear why the procession of the act of understanding is only a 'processio operationis,' while the procession of the act of defining or of judging is a 'processio operati.'180 It is quite in harmony with the statement, 'sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem,'181 for no form is efficient cause of its esse and similarly species is not the efficient cause of intelligere. Again, it harmonizes with the parallel statement that '... intelligere, quod ita se habet ad intellectum in actu, sicut esse ad ens in

but just to have that form is itself to have been moved; but the thing is moved by an external agent; just as a body which is heated by fire is not moved by the heat it receives but by the fire. So too intellect is not moved by the species it has already received, nor by the truth which is the result of that species; but by some external thing which leaves an impression on the intellect, as for example agent intellect, or phantasm, or something else of that nature'] De veritate, q. 22, a. 5, ad 8m. 176 Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 59, §4; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 23, a. 4 c.; q. 26, a. 2 c. See also any account of the theorem 'generans movet gravia et levia quoad locum' ['a generating (agent) moves heavy things and light things spatially']. 177 See above, footnotes 150 and 151. 178 ['whatever is moved is moved by something else'] Super I Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 3, a. i, ad 3m; and passim. [Lonergan is here quoting according to sense, not verbatim.] 179 De malo, q. 6, a. l c.; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. 3 c. This is a 'processio operati' within the will but it is not relevant to trinitarian theory. 180 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m. 181 ['as being (existence) results from form, so understanding results from an intelligible species'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, a. 4 c.

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actu';182 for the ens in actu is not the efficient cause of its esse. Finally, of course, there is no opposition between this scheme of analysis and the preceding; when (intellect actuated by) species is said to be the principle of action or the principle of operation, it is not said to be the principle of an effect; as we have seen, these two are repeatedly distinguished by St Thomas. 7

Object

The importance of recognizing the Aristotelian, as well as the Avicennist, scheme of analysis becomes fully apparent, however, only when one turns to the Thomist theory of the object. For this theory is Aristotelian. After defining soul generically, Aristotle had raised the problem of differentiating between the souls of plants, animals, and men.183 The distinction of these essences, he maintained, depended on the distinction of their respective potencies; the distinction of the potencies depended on the distinction of their acts; the distinction of the acts depended on the distinction of their objects.'84 This series of dependences provided Aquinas with his method to determine the nature of the human soul.185 The precise relation between object and act was described by Aquinas in terms of efficient causality. There were two opposite cases. On the one hand, the potency in question may be receptive, and then the object produces the act. On the other hand, the potency in question may be efficient, and then the act produces the object as its term. Since the former of these alternatives has been forced into oblivion by neglect of the Aristotelian scheme of analysis with a consequent misinterpretation of the implications of the Avicennist scheme, I had best quote. Omnis enim animae operatio, vel est actus potentiae activae, vel passivae. Obiecta quidem potentiarum passivarum comparantur ad operationes earum ut activa, quia reducunt potentias in actum, sicut visibile visum, et omne sensibile sensum. Obiecta vero potentiarum activarum comparantur ad operationes ipsarum 182 ['understanding, which is related to intellect in act in the same way that existence (esse) is related to being in act'] Ibid. q. 34, a. i, ad 2m. 183 Aristotle, De anima, II, 3, 4140 32 - 4153 13; Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 6, §299184 Aristotle, De anima, II, 4, 4153 14-22; Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 6, §§304-6. 185 Super IIISententiarum, d. 23, q. l, a. 2, ad 3m; Summa theologiae, l, q. 87, a. 3 c.

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ut fines. Obiecta enim potentiarum activarum sunt operata ipsarum.186 Non enim distinguitur potentia activa a passiva ex hoc quod habet operationem: quia, cum cuiuslibet potentiae animae tarn activae quam passivae sit operatic aliqua, quaelibet potentia animae esset activa. Cognoscitur autem eorum distinctio per comparationem potentiae ad obiectum. Si enim obiectum se habeat ad potentiam ut patiens et transmutatum, sic erit potentia activa; si autem e converse se habet ut agens et movens, sic erit potentia passiva ...l87 Actus autem ex obiectis speciem habent: nam si sint actus passivarum potentiarum, obiecta sunt activa; si autem sunt activarum potentiarum, obiecta sunt ut fines.188 Ratio autem actus diversificatur secundum diversam rationem obiecti. Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens; color enim inquantum movet visum, est principium visionis. Ad actum autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis; sicut augmentativae virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum, quod est finis augmenti.189 186 ['For every operation of soul is the act of either an active potency or a passive. Now the objects of passive potencies are compared to the operations of the potencies as active objects which reduce the potencies to act, as a visible object does for sight, and all sensible objects do for sense. But the objects of active potencies are compared to the operations of the potencies as ends, for the objects of active potencies are the things they produce'] In IIDe anima, lect. 6, §305. 187 [Tor an active potency is not distinguished from a passive by the fact that it has an operation: because, since there is some operation of any potency whatever, be it active or passive, any potency of the soul would be active. But the distinction of potencies is known by comparing the potency to its object. For if the object is related to the potency as something receiving an influence and undergoing change, then the potency will be active; but if, conversely, the object has the role of agent and moving influence, then the potency will be passive'] Deveritate, q. 16, a. l, ad 13m; see Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 18, a. 2, ad 3m. 188 ['But acts have their specification from their objects; for if they are the acts of passive potencies, the objects will be active; but if they are the acts of active potencies, the objects will have the role of ends'] De anima, a. 13 c. 189 ['But the nature of an act is differentiated according to the diverse nature of the object. For every action belongs either to an active potency or to a

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Equipped only with the Avicennist scheme of analysis, an interpreter will 'explain' these passages right up to the point where he debates whether Aquinas conceived the operation of sensation to terminate immanently at some species sensibilis expressa or else, without any such immanent product, to terminate with magnificent realism at the present external real thing. No doubt such a debate must arise if the object is always a term. No doubt the object must always be a term, if the potency can be passive only with respect to the reception of species, for then the active object can be active and so can be object only with respect to the species and not with respect to the subsequent act, action, or operation. No doubt, finally, one arrives at these conclusions when one proceeds in the light of general principles formulated by attending only to the Avicennist scheme of analysis. But I would submit that taking into consideration the Aristotelian scheme of analysis, one can omit such explanation and accept what Aquinas wrote as a satisfactory account of what Aquinas thought. In the passages quoted Aquinas states that the object of the passive potency is active, not with respect to the species alone, but with respect to the act, the action, the operation of the potency. The coherence of this

passive. But an object is compared to the act of a passive potency as principle and moving cause; for color is the principle of vision insofar as it moves the faculty of sight. But an object is compared to the act of an active potency as term and end; as the object of the faculty of growth is achieving its due quantity, which is the end of growth'] Summa theologiae, i, q. 77, a. 3 c. Observe that these definitions of 'object' do not contain the word 'attingere,' which is as much in need of definition as is 'object.' They are in terms of the elementary concepts 'active and passive potency,' 'agent,' 'effect,' and 'end.' Since receptive potency can be actuated only by agents of a given kind, and since limited efficient potency can produce effects only of a given kind, there is a 'ratio formalis obiecti' ['formal nature of an object'] (Summa theologiae, l, q. i, a. 3 c.), an 'obiectum ... sub cuius ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam vel habitum' ['object... under the formality of which everything is related to a potency or habit'] (ibid. a. 7 c.), a 'propria ratio obiecti' ['proper meaning of an object'] (ibid. q. 45, a. 4, ad lm), a 'ratio obiecti quam per se respicit... potentia ...' ['formal property of an object, that to which the potency is perse related'] (ibid. q. 77, a. 3, ad 4m; see ad 2m), a 'communis ratio obiecti' ['common nature of an object'] (ibid. q. 82, a. 4, ad lm) which defines the specific function relating object, act, and potency or habit. Detailed application of this analysis is made to the external senses: Summa theologiae, i, q. 78, a. 3 c. and ad 2m; In IIDe anima, lect. 13, §394. Though Aquinas employs the term 'object' in a general and metaphysically defined sense, I am not aware of any instance of 'object' being employed in a cognitional context and not meaning 'known object.'

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position with general Thomist doctrine has engaged us through considerations of actus perfecti, pati, potentia activa, and duplex actio. We may perhaps be permitted, after this somewhat lengthy preamble, to point out that Aquinas as a matter of fact actually does say that sentire is a pati and that intelligere is a pati, and then to present our daring hypothesis that perhaps Aquinas meant what he said. In the following passages the reader will note that Aquinas is speaking not of some prior condition of sensation but of sensation itself and that Aquinas does not say that sensation has a prior condition or cause in some change but that it consists in a change and is completed in a change. I quote: ... sentire consistit in moveri et pati.190 ... sentire consistit in quodam pati et alterari.'91 ... cognitio sensus perficitur in hoc ipso quod sensus a sensibili movetur.192 Anima igitur sensitiva non se habet in sentiendo sicut movens et agens, sed sicut id quo patiens patitur.193 ... si vero operatic ilia consistit in passione, adest ei principium passivum, sicut patet de principiis sensitivis in animalibus.194 ... sensum affici est ipsum eius sentire.195... sentire perficitur per actionem sensibilis in sensum.196 ... duplex operatic. Una secundum solam immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili.197 ... cognitio sensus exterioris perficitur per solam immutationem sensus a sensibili.198 190 ['sensing consists in being moved and receiving an influence'] In IIDe anima, lect. 10, §350. 191 ['sensing consists in a certain reception of an influence and undergoing change'] Ibid. lect. 13, §393. 192 ['sense knowledge is completed in this, that the sense is moved by the sensible thing'] Super IVSententiarum, d. 50, q. 1, a. 4 sol. 193 ['Sensitive soul, therefore, does not function in sensing as mover and agent, but as that by which the receiver of an influence receives it'] Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 57, §8. 194 ['but if that operation consists in receiving an influence, there is available to it a passive principle, as is evident for sensitive principles in animals'] Ibid. 2, c- ?6, §15!95 ['for a sense to be affected is the very sensing of the sense'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 17, a. 2, ad im. 196 ['sensing is completed by the action of the sensible thing on the sense'] Ibid, q. 27, a. 5 c. 197 ['a twofold operation. One consisting in alteration alone, and in this way the operation of a sense faculty is achieved in this, that it is changed by the sensible thing'] Ibid. q. 85, a. 2, ad gm. 198 ['knowledge in an external sense is constituted by this alone, that the sense is changed by the sensible thing'] Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9, ad 2m.

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With regard to external sense it would seem that the object is active, not merely inasmuch as it causes the species, but also inasmuch as it causes the act, action, operation of the sensitive potency. Aquinas had the habit of quoting Aristotle to the effect that 'intelligere est quoddam pati.' In the Sentences, discussing the mutability proper to creatures, he concludes that creatures are mutable both inasmuch as they can lose what they possess and inasmuch as they can acquire what they do not possess; the latter is a true mutability, though in a broad sense, as when all reception is said to be a pati and moveri, for example, 'intelligere quoddam pati est.'1" Again, discussing the meanings of pati, he urges that there is no pati proprie in the intellect because it is immaterial, but still there is there an element of passion inasmuch as there is reception; and that is the meaning of 'intelligere est pati quoddam.'20° Again, meeting the objection that the divine essence cannot be the object of created knowledge because the judged is to the judge as passive, he answered that on the contrary the sensible and intelligible objects are to sense and intellect as agent inasmuch as sentire and intelligere are a pati quoddam.201 Arguing against Averroes, he made an antithesis of agere and pati and then urged, 'Posse autem intelligere est posse pati: cum "intelligere quoddam pati sit."'202 Proving that the possible intellect was a passive potency, he concluded, 'Sic igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, secundum tertium modum passionis. Et per consequens intellectus est potentia passiva.'203 In these passages it is quite clear that Aquinas said that the act of understanding itself, intelligere, was a pati. Such statements fit in perfecdy with the general doctrine of agent object and passive potency; they fit in perfectly with the general Aristotelian scheme of analysis that distinguishes neatly between nature, which is a principle of movement in the thing moved, and

199 ['understanding is a certain reception of influence'] Super I Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 3, a. 2 sol. See Aristotle, De anima, III, 4, 429a 13-15 (Aquinas, In IIIDe anima, lect. 7, §§675-76); Aristotle, De anima, III, 4, 4290 22-25 (Aquinas, In IIIDe anima, lect. 9, §§ 720, 722). 200 Super III Sententiarum, d. 15, q. 2, a. i sol. 2. 201 ['sensing' and 'understanding' are a 'certain reception of influence'] De veritate, q. 8, a. 1, ad 14m. 202 ['To be able to understand is to be able to receive an influence, since "understanding is a certain reception of influence"'] Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 60, oo

203 ['It is thus evident that our understanding is a certain reception of influence, in the third manner of receiving an influence. And consequently, intellect in a passive potency'] Summa theologiae, i, q. 79, a. 2 c.

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efficient potency, which is a principle of movement in the other or, if in self, then in self as other; nor is there any incompatibility between them and the Avicennist scheme of analysis except the merely apparent incompatibility that arises from the blunder of confusing what Aquinas distinguished - active potency as the principle of an operation and active potency as the principle of an effect. But this, the reader will perhaps say, is all impossible. I am afraid I have not here the space to discuss abstract impossibilities. I am concerned with matters of fact, with what Aquinas said; and lest there be any misapprehension about Aquinas's ideas on the actio manens in agente, I proceed to observe that not only sentire and intelligere but also velle can be a pati.b For with respect to the interior act of the will, the grace of God is operative and the will of man is 'mota et non movens.'204 Though not stated so explicitly, the same is true with respect to the act of willing the end as conceived in the De malo and the Prima secundae; for in these works the will moves itself only inasmuch as it is in act with respect to the end, but to that act it is moved by an external principle, God.205 Finally, what is true of these later works with respect to willing the end is true more generally in earlier works in which there appears no mention of self-movement in the will.206 8

Nature and Efficiency

It has been seen that one of the difficulties Aquinas had in accepting Aristotle's definition of efficient potency was its lack of generality: it presupposed some 'other' to receive the effect. The same difficulty, in a more acute form, arose with Aristotle's concept of an efficient cause; in its general formulation it was 'unde principium motus';207 but in the concrete it is moving, a matter of pushing, pulling, twirling, or carrying;208 it is making, a matter of one contrary prevailing over its opposite - heat over cold, the wet

204 205 206 207

['moved and not a mover'] Ibid. 1-2, q. ill, a. 2 c. De malo, q. 6, a. l c.; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, aa. 3, 4, 6. See Theological Studies 3 (1942) 534-35 [ Grace and Freedom 95-96]. ['the source of the principle of motion'] Aristotle, Physics, II, 3, 1940 29-31 (Aquinas, InllPhys., lect. 5, §5); Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 3, 9833 30; 9843 27; V, 2, 10133 29-32 (Aquinas, In VMetaphys. lect. 2, §§ 765-70); see Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 4, 10700 22 and 28 (Aquinas, In XIIMetaphys., lect. 4, §§246872). 208 Aristotle, Physics, VII, 2, 243a 16-18 (Aquinas, In WIPhys., lect. 3, §§4-10); cf. push and pull of heart in In IIIDe anima, lect. 15, §835.

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over the dry, or vice versa;209 it is generation, which is the term of such alterations, and the generans is the per se mover of the heavy and light,210 just as the counsellor was of the actions of anyone following his advice.211 It is in the light of such conceptions that one can understand why Aquinas considered only one of his five ways of proving God's existence to be an argument from the efficient cause.212 Aristotelian influence gave formal causality a preponderant role. A cause is that on which the being of something else follows. Absolutely, the form is the cause, for it is the causa essendi. In considering the immobilia, only formal causality is relevant. But insofar as things become, three other causes are to be taken into account, the matter, the agent which reduces potency to act, and the end to which the action of the agent tends.213 It is this viewpoint that explains such statements as that form gives being, simply to substance, qualifiedly to accident,214 that form keeps things in being,215 that form has two effects, with esse as its first effect and operation as its second effect.216 It is in this sense of formal cause and formal effect that one has to understand the statement in the De veritate: action and passion are confined to the production and reception of species; the act of understanding follows upon that action or passion as effect follows cause.217 A more complex problem arises from the proof that potency is distinct from substance. In the Sentences it is argued that a proper and immediate effect must be proportionate to its cause; therefore, since operation is an accident, potency must also be an accident.218 Are cause and effect formal or efficient? In favor of the latter view is the fact that a response speaks of 'forma accidentalis ... per quam producitur operatic.'219 On the other 209 Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione, I, 7, 323b 17 - 3243 24. Aquinas's commentary does not go beyond chapter 5. However, this is the principal source of the idea of causality as the victory of the agent over the patient; for example, Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 30, § 13. It also is the context of the statement that the end is only metaphorically poietikon (3240 15). 210 In WHPhys., lect. 8. 211 In UPhys., lect. 5, §5. 212 Summa theologiae, l, q. 2, a. 3 c., 'Secunda via ...' 213 In IlPhys., lect. 1O, § 15. 214 Summa theologiae, \, q. 76, a. 4 c. 215 Ibid. q. 59, a. 2 c.; q. 9, a. 2 c. 216 Ibid. q. 42, a. l, ad im; 1-2, q. i l l , a. 2 c. 217 De veritate, q. 8, a. 6 c. 218 Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 sol. 219 ['an accidental form ... by which the operation is produced'] Ibid, ad 3m. See Summa theologiae, l, q. 77, a. l, ad 4m.

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hand, one may insist on the preposition 'per' and add that Aquinas shortly affirms 'quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur.'220 But that is not all. In the Summa and in the De spiritualibus creaturis, the potency to an accidental operation must itself be an accident because of the very Aristotelian rule221 that 'proprius actus fit in propria potentia.'222 There is, then, some evolution or at least clarification of thought. Nonetheless, one can read in the Summa that the substance is productive of its proper accidents.223 Does this productivum mean efficient causality? Hardly, for in answering the objection 'quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur,' Aquinas stated that the emanation of proper accidents from substance was not a transmutation - the term regularly employed in translating Aristotle's definition of efficient potency - but a natural resultance.224 To attempt to determine to just what extent the doctrine of the Summa revises the doctrine of the Sentences and, again, to what extent differences are merely verbal is too nice a question to be undertaken here. The De virtutibus commonly is considered to pertain to the second Paris period, but it has been noted to contain views not found outside the Sentences22^ It affirms that subject is to accident as cause to effect, because the subject is the per se principle of the accidents.226 This is quite compatible with natural resultance. But it also states that habits are the causae effectivae of acts, and the context parallels this relation with that of medicine to its effect, health.227 The passage is more than reminiscent of the statement in the Sentences that operation is produced through accidental form; but 220 ['whatever is moved is moved by something else'] Super I Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 3, a. l, ad 3m. 221 Aristotle, De anima, II, 2, 4143 25 (Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 4, §277; see lect. ll, §366; lect. 19, §§483-86). 222 ['a specific act occurs in its specific potency'] Summa theologiae, i, q. 54, a. 3 c. [actually, the Latin reads, 'proprius actus respondet propriae potentiae' ('a specific act corresponds to its specific potency')]; q. 77, a. i c.; q. 79, a. l c.; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 11 c. An intermediate position is given in Quaestiones quodlibetales, 10, a. 5, and perhaps also in De anima, a. 12 c. 223 Summa theologiae, l, q. 77, a. 6 c. 224 Ibid, ad 3m. 225 See Joseph de Guibert, Les doublets de saint Thomas d'Aquin. Leur etude methodique: Quelques reflections, quelques exemples (Paris: Beauchesne, 1926) 107-8, on De caritate, a. 2, ad 17m; also H.D. Simonin, 'Autour de la solution thomiste du probleme de 1'amour,' Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age 6 (1931) 174-276; see p. 179 on De spe, a. 3, and on De caritate, a. 3. 226 De virtutibus in communi, a. 3 c. 227 Ibid. a. 12, ad 5m; see a. i, ad 14111.

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really it can hardly mean anything very different from the statement of the Prima secundae that habit is a principium operationis.'22* It probably will occur to the reader that Aquinas would not have used the terms 'cause' and 'effect/ 'productive' and 'effective,' if he had not meant something very much like efficient causality. That is quite true. The difference between the efficient potency and the natural potency, if I may use that term, is not that the former is ontologically perfect while the latter is not; it is not that the former is a principle while the latter is not; it is not that the former is a principle of movement, in all or any of the senses of the word 'movement,' while the latter is not. The one difference is that efficient potency is a principle of movement in the other or in self as other, while natural potency is a principle of movement in the selfsame.229 That the greater ontological perfection and the greater contribution to the effect can pertain to the recipient is clear enough from sensation; for sensation is what it is because it is immaterial, and it is immaterial because of the mode of reception of the patient.230 Hence, in dealing with an Augustinian text that contained the Augustinian view of the activity of soul, Aquinas can concede that the species sensibilis as sensed is not due to the object but to the virtue of soul.231 With regard to intellect, unambiguous illustrations are hard to find because man possesses not only an intelkctus possibilis but also an intellectus agens. On the other hand, as soon as the theory of God moving the will to the act of willing the end was proposed, Aquinas immediately perceived a difficulty; that difficulty to a modern Scholastic would be in all probability that man must be the efficient cause of his own operation, action, act, willing; but to Aquinas the difficulty was that the act must be not violent but natural; he noticed it both in the De malo and in the Prima secundae, and his answers run as follows: ... voluntas aliquid confert cum a Deo movetur; ipsa enim est quae operatur sed mota a Deo; et ideo motus eius quamvis sit ab extrinseco sicut a primo principio non tamen est violentus.232 228 Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 49, a. 3, ad im. 229 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 8, iO4gb 5-10 (Aquinas, In IXMetaphys., lect. 7, §§l844-45)230 In IIDe anima, lect. 24, §§551-54. 231 De malo, q. 16, a. 12, ad 2m. 232 ['the will contributes something when it is moved by God; for it is the will which operates, but moved by God; and therefore its movement, though it be from outside as from a first principle, is nevertheless not violent'] Ibid. q. 6, a. i, ad 4m.

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... hoc non sufficit ad rationem violenti, quod principium sit extra, sed oportet addere quod nullam conferat vim patiens. Quod non contingit dum voluntas ab exteriori movetur; nam ipsa est quae vult, ab alio tamen mota.233 Now what does the patient, the will moved by God, when it is moved by God, while it is moved by God, confer or contribute? It operates. It wills. In this case the operation is an operatic receptiva, just as sentire is a pati of sense and just as intelligere is a pati of the possible intellect. The will operates inasmuch as it is the will that is actuated. The will contributes inasmuch as an act received in the will has to be a 'willing,' not because it is act, nor merely because of the extrinsic mover, but proximately because act is limited by the potency in which it is received. It is the reality of such and similar contributions that underlies the conception of potentia activa as principle of action and as formal principle of action; as well, it underlies the usage of cause and effect, productive and effective, that we have noted. Just as form is principle of action and formal principle of action, so too we may read that the substance or subject with respect to its accidents is a 'causa ... quodammodo activa' and a 'principium activum.'234 Just as the principle of action or operation is distinguished from the principle of an effect, so too the activity of the subject with respect to the emanation of its accidents is not efficiency but natural resultance.235 To complete the parallel, one need only add that the necessity of action proceeding from form is like the necessity of accidents proceeding from substance.236 But the necessity of an accident that emanates from substance does not make superfluous an efficient cause to produce the accident: there cannot be a creature without the dependence named

233 ['it does not suffice for the note of violence, that the principle be external, but one must add that the receiver of the influence make no contribution (to the operation). And this is not the case when the will is moved by an external agent; for it is the will that wills, though moved by something else'] Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. 4, ad 2m; see ad im and 3m; see also q. 6, aa. 4 and 5 (esp. a. 4, ad 2m). 234 ['cause ... in some way active' and 'active principle'] Ibid, l, q. 77, a. 6, ad 2m. 235 Ibid, ad 3m. See Aristotle, De anima, II, 4, 415b 8-28 (Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 7, §§319—23). See Joseph de Finance, Eire et agir dans la philosophic de saint Thomas (Paris: Beauchesne, 1945) 212 [2nd ed. (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1960) 217-18]. 236 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 30, § 12.

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'creatio passiva';237 but that relation is 'quoddam ... concreatum.'238 In like manner the necessity of an operation or action emanating from form, from its active principle, from its formal principle, from active potency, does not dispense with the necessity of an efficient potency. 9

Conclusions

First, there seem to be no notable variations in the concept of procession, and in particular there seems no reason for supposing that the doctrine of De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad ym was retracted or revised later: the act of love with respect to an end is, as proceeding from the will, 'processio operationis,' but as proceeding from the inner word, 'processio operati.' Second, the actio manens in agente is act and perfection; as act, it admits no further description; for description is of limitation, and limitation is due not to act but to potency; but as act of someone, it has the characteristic of being an ulterior actuation of what already is completed and perfected by the specific essence of the act; it is act beyond essence and so is contrasted with the act of the incomplete, which is act as process towards essence. Incidentally, it was Scotus who affirmed immanent action to lie in the first species of the predicament, quality.239 I have not noticed such a statement in Aquinas, but I suggest that it would be Thomistic to affirm that, as esse is substantial, so immanent act is qualitative;240 for the essence that esse actuates is substance and the essence that immanent act actuates is a quality. Thirdly, among the various meanings of passio, pati, many are opposed to immanent act; but pati in the metaphysical sense of receiving is opposed only to the exercise of efficient causality in an equally strict metaphysical sense; hence pati is not incompatible with immanent act or with actio or operatic in the sense of immanent act; on the contrary, inasmuch as immanent act is a perfection received in a creature, necessarily it is a pati. Fourthly, a distinction is necessary between efficient potency, principle of act in the other or in self as other, and natural potency, principle of act in the selfsame; the active and passive potencies of Depotentia, q. i, a. i, and the active and passive principles of Contra Gentiles, 3, c. 23, are subdivisions of natural potency, and so both are receptive potencies and principles; 237 238 239 240

['passive creation'] Quaestiones quodlibetales, 7, a. 10, ad 4m. ['a certain something ... that is co-created'] De potentia, q. 3, a. 3, ad 2m. Scotus, In I Sent. (Op. Ox.), d. 3, q. 6 (ed. Vives, IX, 304-5.). See footnotes 181 and 182 above.

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hence the apparent paradox that an active potency or principle is also receptive. This paradox is only apparent: what is opposed to receptive potency is efficient potency and not some subdivision of natural potency. On the other hand, the appearances are impressive: just as Aristotle was handicapped in writing his De anima by the technical elaborations of his Physics, so Aquinas was handicapped both by Aristotle's lack of generality in conceiving the efficient cause and by the initial strong influence of Avicenna; for him to clarify the notion of potentia activa by appealing to the notion of causal efficiency was impossible, for the latter notion was just as much in need of clarification; hence only indirectly can we observe differences that are crucial: inasmuch as 'principium motus' and even 'principium activum motus' is not the 'movens' or the 'motor'; inasmuch as 'principium operationis vel actionis' does not mean the same thing as 'principium effectus, operati, termini producti' and does not even necessarily imply it; inasmuch as form is cause of esseand operation; inasmuch as subject is cause, active principle, somehow active cause, and productive of accidents which nonetheless emanate by a natural resultance. Fifthly, the foregoing clarification of Thomist usage and principles is of paramount importance in grasping Thomist metaphysics as applied to psychology; a failure to distinguish between efficient and natural potency results in a negation of the division of objects into agent and terminal, and the elimination of the agent object provides a metaphysical scheme into which Thomist psychology does not fit; further, natural potency which, though receptive, nonetheless makes a most significant contribution to its act, tends to disappear to be replaced by efficient forms and habits in need of a divine praemotio physica which, I have argued elsewhere,241 cannot be said to be a doctrine stated or implied by Aquinas; and incidentally, we may ask whether this neglect of natural potency has not some bearing on unsatisfactory conceptions of obediential potency. The coherence of present conclusions with the psychological data already assembled may be noted briefly. The distinction between agent intellect and possible intellect is a distinction between an efficient potency that produces and a natural potency that receives. The distinction between the possible intellect of one that is learning and the possible intellect of one in possession of a science is a distinction between the De potential passive potency to the reception of form and its active potency to the exercise 241 Theological Studies 3 (1942) 375-402, 533-78 [Grace and Freedom, chapters 3, 4, and 5].

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of operation in virtue of form. The distinction between intelligere and dicere is a distinction between the two meanings of action, operation: intelligere is action in the sense of act; dicere is action in the sense of operating an effect. The distinction between agent object and terminal object is to be applied twice. On the level of intellectual apprehension the agent object is the quidditas rei materialis, not to ti estin but to ti en einai, known in and through a phantasm illuminated by agent intellect; this agent object is the obiectum proprium intellectus humani; it is the object of insight. Corresponding to this agent object there is the terminal object of the inner word; this is the concept, and the first of concepts is ens, the obiectum commune intellectus. Again, on the level of judgment the agent object is the objective evidence provided by sense and/or empirical consciousness, ordered conceptually and logically in a reductio ad principia, and moving to the critical act of understanding. Corresponding to this agent object, there is the other terminal object, the inner word of judgment, the verum, in and through which is known the final object, the ens reals. Here, as is apparent, metaphysics and psychology go hand in hand, and the metaphysical analysis is but the more general form of the psychological analysis. Souls are distinguished by their potencies, potencies by their acts, acts by their objects. The final object of intellect is the real; the real is known through an immanent object produced by intellect, the true; the true supposes a more elementary immanent object also produced by the intellect, the definition. This production is not merely utterance, dicere, but the utterance of intelligence in act, or rationally conscious disregard of the irrelevant, of critical evaluation of all that is relevant, of intelligere?'^ This intelligere can be what it is only if there are objects to move it as well as the objects that it produces: the intelligere that expresses itself in judgment is moved by the relevant evidence; the intelligere that expresses itself in definition is moved by illuminated phantasm. But evidence as relevant and phantasm as illuminated are not mere sensible data; hence besides the sensitive potencies and the possible intellect there is needed an agent intellect. Finally, as the contrast between the labor of study and the ease of subsequent mastery manifests, there are forms or habits to be developed in the possible intellect - understanding for the grasp of principles, science for

242 [Lonergan seems to mean, 'the utterance of intelligence in act, either in rationally conscious disregard of the irrelevant (level i) or in critical evaluation of all that is relevant (level 2).']

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the grasp of implications, wisdom for right judgment on the validity both of principles and of conclusions; they come to us through acts of understanding; they stand to acts of understanding as first act to second; and like the second acts, they are produced by agent objects which themselves are instruments of agent intellect.

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4 Verbum and Abstraction

Two general observations on Thomist trinitarian theory have inspired this inquiry into the concept of verbum? The first was that the analogy to the procession of the divine Word lies in the analysis, not of knowledge in general, but of intellectual reflection, of rational consciousness.1 The second was that the analogy to the procession of the Holy Spirit lies in the act of love, not as within the will for that is processio operationis, but as grounded in a perfect inner word, a judgment of value.2 Now because rational consciousness has received remarkably little attention from commentators and manual writers, not only in their trinitarian thought but also in their psychology and its corresponding metaphysics, a rather lengthy investigation has been forced upon us. The conclusions to which we have been brought may be summarized by stating (i) that there exists an act of understanding (intelligere), (2) that rational consciousness (dicere) is the act of understanding as ground and origin of inner words of conceptualization and judgment, and (3) that inner words proceed from acts of understanding, not on some obscure analogy of the emergence of terminal states at the end of material processes,3 but as actus ex artw.4Thus the center of Thomist5 analy1 See introduction to chapter i above. 2 See pp. 108-10 above. 3 When insight into phantasm is overlooked, the intelligere has to produce the verbum to have an object. It truly produces yet is not predicamental action (material movement as from the mover) except eminently: it has the virtue and actuality of producing without the potentiality, movement, imperfection of action. As looking at its object, it is a quality which is a second act. See John

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sis of intellect is held, not by such products of intelligence in act as concepts, nexus, judgments, syllogisms, but by intelligence in act itself. Even reasoning for Aquinas is not simply a matter of concepts and judgments but principally a progress from a less to a more complete act of understanding.6 Again, the speculative habits of intelkctus, scientia, sapientia stand to acts of understanding as first acts to second; and this relation is the same as that of species to intelligere, of form to esse, of principium actionis to actio manens in agente.7 Finally, the objects of Thomist intellect are the objects of understanding: first, there is the moving object of direct understanding, namely, the actuated intelligibility of what is presented by imagination; secondly, there is the terminal object of direct understanding, the essence expressed in a definition; thirdly, there is the moving object of reflective understanding, the aggregate of what is called the evidence on an issue; fourthly, there is the terminal object of reflective understanding, the verum expressed in a judgment; fifthly, there is the transcendent object 'reality,' known imperfectly in prior acts but perfectly only through the truth of judgment. 8 This intellectualist interpretation of Thomist thought runs counter throughout to the currently accepted conceptualist view, but the point of most apparent conflict lies in the issue to which conceptualists attend almost exclusively, the abstraction of concepts. To this issue we may now direct our attention, asking first, what is the matter from which intellect abstracts; secondly, what is the immateriality by which it knows; thirdly, what is the formative abstraction of the concept; fourthly, what is the prior apprehensive abstraction of insight into phantasm; and fifthly, what is intellectual knowledge of the singular.

4 5 6 7 8

of St Thomas, Cursus theologicus (Solesmes ed.); tome l (Paris: Desclee, 1946), disputatio 32, a. 5, §§ 18 (p. 74), 37 (p. 80). On our analysis an intelligere that is producing before being a knowing is merely spontaneous activity and not the ground of an emanatio intelligibilis. The intelligere exercises efficient causality; predicamental action, as defined, is the effect in fieri and so, even eminenter, does not include the exercise of efficient causality. Finally, a quality is an essence, and a second act is beyond essence; quality is to second act as habit to operation or as substantial essence to existence. ['act from act'] Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 14, §3. I wish to employ the distinction whereby 'Thomist' means 'of St Thomas' and 'Thomistic' means 'of his school.' Summa theologiae, l, q. 79, a. 8 c. See pp. 121-28, 133-38 above. See pp. 138-43 above.

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l

The Analogy of Matter

The old naturalists had concluded, not only from beds and tables to an underlying subject 'wood,' but also from wood and bones to an element 'earth' and from gold and bronze (they could be melted) to an element 'water.' Aristotle accepted the principle of such analysis: any change is defined for thought by stating the underlying subject and the variable determination or form; and what holds for defining thought, also holds for the real thing.9 But while he accepted the principle, he corrected the conclusion. The ultimate subject of change in the older philosophies had always been some sensible body; that was the stuff of the universe; it alone was substantial and permanent; all else was accidental and mutable.10 Against this materialism Aristotle argued that every assignable object was subject to change; the element 'air' could be changed into the element 'water'; and so he concluded that the ultimate subject of change could not be an assignable object; it could be neither quid nor quantum nor quak nor any other determinate type of reality;11 it could not, of itself, be knowable;12 its nature could be stated only by recourse to analogy. Quod igitur sic se habet ad ipsas substantias naturales, sicut se habet aes ad statuam et lignum ad lectum, et quodlibet materiale et informe ad formam, hoc dicimus esse materiam promam.13 ... materia prima ... se habet ad formas substantiates, sicut materiae sensibiles ad formas accidentales. '4

9 In IPhys., lect. 13, §2: 'Ea in quae resolvitur definitio alicuius rei, sunt compo nentia rem illam' ['Those (elements) into which the definition of a thing is resolved are the component elements of that thing']. 10 In IlPhys., lect. 2, § l. 11 ['(neither) a nature (nor) a quantity (nor) a quality'] Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 3, lO29a 20; Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 2, § 1285. 12 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 10, 10363 8; Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 10, § 1496. 13 ['What is related therefore to the natural substances themselves as bronze is related to a statue and wood to a bed and anything material and formless to a form, this we call prime matter'] In IPhys., lect. 13, §9. 14 ['prime matter ... is related to substantial form as sensible materials are to accidental forms'] Ibid. lect. 15, §10.

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Verbum and Abstraction ... (materia prima) ita se habet ad omnes formas et privationes, sicut se habet subiectum alterabile ad qualitates contrarias.15

Such is the defining analogy of matter. In its limit it defines prime matter, which is proportionate to substantial form. And as prime matter of itself is not knowable, so substantial form has the complementary distinction of being knowable by intellect alone.16 The full significance of this analogy is not easy to measure. It eliminates the materialism of the old naturalists for whom the real was the sensible.17 It corrects the misguided intellectualism of Plato, for whom the intelligible was real but not of this world. One might even say that by anticipation it puts in its proper place and perspective, that of prime matter, what Kant thought was the thing-in-itself. It does all this because it places in the most material of assignable material things an intelligible component known by our intellects and identifiable in our knowledge; that intelligible component, form, species, quiddity, has as much title to being named 'cause' and 'nature' as has matter itself; and what it is is fixed by its relation to the ratio rei, the ratio definitiva rei, the ratio quidditativa ra'.18 Conversely, it is only because Aristotle's real thing is not the materialists' real thing that Aristotle was able to satisfy his own epistemological law: unless particulars are identical, at least inadequately, with their quiddities, then the former cannot be objects of scientific knowledge and the latter cannot be realities.19 But the significance of the analogy is not confined to its metaphysical limit of prime matter and substantial form. Besides prime matter, there are sensible and intelligible matter, common and individual matter, appendages of matter, parts of the matter, material and individual conditions. What are all these? The answer is simple if one grasps that natural form stands to natural matter as the object of insight (forma intelligibilis) stands to the object of sense (materia sensibilis) .20 But to convince conceptualists, a more detailed approach is necessary. Just as the correspondence between 15 [' (prime matter) is related to all forms and privations (of form) as a changeable subject is to contrary qualities'] In VIIIMetaphys., lect. i, § 1689. 16 InllDeanima, lect. 14, §42O; lect. 13, §§395-98. 17 In VIIMetaphys., lect. 2, §1284. 18 ['the conceived essence of a thing'; 'the defining concept of a thing'; 'the specifying (quidditative) concept of a thing'] In IIPhys., lect. 2, §3; lect. 5, §§3-419 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 6, lO3ib 3-5; Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 5, §136320 ['intelligible form'; 'sensible matter'] Deveritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad im (lae ser.).

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definitions and things was the ultimate ground of the analysis of change into subject, privation, and form, 21 whence proceeded the notion of prime matter, so the more detailed correspondence between parts of the definition and parts of the thing should bring to light the other elements in the analogy. Accordingly we proceed to sample a lengthy and complex Aristotelian discussion.22 Segments are parts of circles, and letters are parts of syllables. Why is it that the definition of the circle makes no mention of segments, while the definition of the syllable must mention letters? A typical solution is found in the contrast between 'curvature' and 'snubness': curvature is curvature whether in a nose or not; but snubness is snubness only in a nose. In general one may say that, as without proportionate matter there cannot be the corresponding material form (just as without a proportionate phantasm there cannot be the corresponding insight), so for different forms different measures of matter are necessary. There must be letters if there are to be syllables; but the necessary letters are not necessarily in wax or in ink or in stone; hence letters are de ratione speciei or paries speciei; but letters as in wax or as in ink or as in stone are paries materiae. Similarly, one cannot have a particular circle without having potential segments; but the notion of circle is prior to the notion of segment, since the latter cannot be defined without presupposing the notion of the former; and so one can appeal either to the potentiality of the segments or to the priority of the definition of circle to conclude that segments are, with respect to the circle, paries materiae.^ The notion of priority is of wide and nuanced application. The right angle is prior to the acute; the circle to the semicircle; and man to hand or finger. In each of these instances the former is a whole and the latter a part; in each the definition of the former must be presupposed by a definition of the latter; in each, accordingly, the latter does not enter into the definition of the former and so is a pars materiae. But complex cases are not to be solved so simply. Parts of a living body cannot be defined without reference to their function in the whole; again, the whole itself cannot be defined without reference to its formal principle, which constitutes it as a whole; accordingly, the soul and its potencies must be prior to the body 21 See note 9 above. 22 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 10 and ll; see Aquinas, In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 3. 23 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 10, 10340 20 - 10350 l; Aquinas, In VII Metaphys., lect. 9, §§1461-63, 1474-81.

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and its parts. Still, it does not follow that parts of the body are mere paries materiae, that 'man' can be defined without bothering about corporeal parts just as 'circle' can be defined without bothering whether it be made of wood or of bronze. The difference arises because the principle of priority must here be complemented by the principle of proportion between form and matter; a circle requires no more than intelligible matter; man requires sensible matter;24 and so while bronze and wood are not de ratione speciei circuit still flesh and bones are de ratione speciei hominis.25 A sufficient sample has been taken from Aristotle's involved discussion to make it plain that matter is not merely prime matter but also the matter that is sensibly perceived and imaginatively represented. If further one wishes to understand why the discussion is so complex, why Aristotle warned against simple rules of solution,26 even perhaps a conceptualist might consider the hypothesis that the real principle of solution is neither one rule nor any set of rules but rather the fashioner of all rules, intelligence itself in act, determining what it takes as relevant to itself and so de ratione speciei and what it dismisses as irrelevant to itself and so pertaining to the paries materiae. In any case let us close this section with a summary account of the analogy of matter. In the first instance, matter is the matter of common sense, the wood of the table and the bronze in a statue. But unless corrected, that notion easily leads to materialism, whether the crude materialism of the old naturalists or the elaborate materialism of the nineteenth-century atomists, who equally considered the real to be the sensible. On the other hand, the material world is neither sheer flux, as for Plato, nor unknowable in itself, as for Kant. The higher synthesis of these opposites lies in defining matter as what is known by intellect indirectly. Directly intellect knows forms, species, quiddities; but these knowns have antecedent suppositions, simultaneous suppositions, and consequents, all of which, as such, are indirectly known. Antecedent suppositions are matter in the sense that genus is named matter and specific difference is named form, and again in the sense that substance is named matter and accident is named form; such usage is Aristotelian and Thomist but still somewhat improper. Simul-

24 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 10, lO35b 2-10, 14-32; ibid, ll, lO36b 24-29; Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 10, §§ 1483-91; lect. 11, § 1519. 25 ['pertaining to the concept of the species "circle"'; 'pertaining to the concept of the species "man"'] See Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. i, ad 2m. 26 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 10, lO36a 13-26.

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taneous suppositions fall into two classes: if they pertain to the intelligible unity of the form, as letters to syllable, they are parts of the form, de ratione speciei, and in Thomist usage common matter; if they do not pertain to the intelligible unity of the form yet are ever included in some fashion in the concrete presentation, they are paries materiae or material conditions or individual matter. Finally, consequents that are contingent and potential, as segments to circles, are again paries materiae. Clearly, it is the second of these three types of indirectly knowns that offers the principal meaning of the term 'matter,' and it is this meaning that the analogy of matter considers chiefly. The general analogy is the proportion of wood to tables and bronze to statues; but the specifically Aristotelian analogy is that natural form is to natural matter as intelligible form is to sensible matter,27 that is, as the object of insight is to the object of sense. 2

The Immateriality of Knowing

It will be most convenient to begin from the theorem that knowing involves an identity in act of knower and known. This identity is an extension of the theorem in the Physics that affirms the identity of action and passion; one and the same real movement as from the agent is action and as in the patient is passion.28 Now in the De anima it is seen that this theorem holds no less with regard to operations (actusperfecti) than with regard to movements (actus imperfecti)khhThe one operation 'sensation' is effected by the sensible object and received in the sensitive potency; as from the object, it is action; as in the subject, it is passion; thus sounding is the action of the object, and hearing the passion of the subject, and so, by the theorem of identity, sounding and hearing are not two realities but one and the same.30 From this theorem Aristotle immediately deduced, first, an alternative account of sensitive empirical consciousness,31 secondly, a solution to the question whether unseen things are colored,32 and 27 Deveritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad im (lae ser.). 28 Aristotle, Physics, III, 3, 2O2a 22 - b 29; Aquinas, In IHPhys., lect. 4 and 5; see Bernard Lonergan, 'St. Thomas' Theory of Operation,' Theological Studies 3 (1942) 377-8l [ Grace and Freedom 64-69]. 29 ['the act of something that is complete'; 'the act of something that is incomplete'] See pages 110-16 above. 30 Aristotle, De anima, III, 2, 425b 26 - 4263 26; Aquinas, In IIIDe anima, lect. 2, §§591-96. 31 Ibid. §591. 32 Ibid. §§594-96.

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thirdly, an explanation of the fact that excessive stimuli destroy senses.33 Aquinas fails to manifest the slightest difficulty concerning this theorem in his commentary, yet rarely if ever does he employ it in his independent writings. There one may read repeatedly that 'sensibile in actu est sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu.' But the meaning is not the original Aristotelian identity in second act34 but rather assimilation on the level of species.35 Quite probably the cause of this shift from identity to assimilation was the terminological imbroglio of 'action' to which we have referred already.36 That knowing is by assimilation is a theorem offering no special difficulty. It was a matter of common consent: 'hoc enim animis omnium communiter inditum fuit, quod simile simili cognoscitur.'37 Its grounds in specifically Aristotelian theory are reached easily: as the thing is the thing it is in virtue of its form or species, so too the knowing is the ontological reality it is in virtue of its own form or species; further, unless the form of the thing and the form of the knowing were similar, there would be no ground for affirming that the knowing was knowing the thing. It is a short step from a theorem of assimilation to a theorem of immaterial assimilation. If knower and known must be similar on the level of form, there is no necessity, indeed no possibility, of assimilation on the level of matter. The contrary view had been advanced by Empedocles, and against it Aristotle marshaled no less than ten arguments.38 His own view was in terms of potency and act, action and passion: the sense in potency

33 Ibid. §§597-98. 34 Ibid. §592: 'unus et idem est actus sensibilis et sentientis' ['the act of the sensible thing and the act of sensing is one and the same']. 35 Summa theologiae, \, q. 87, a. l, ad 3m: 'Dicendum quod verbum illud Philosophi universaliter verum est in omni intellectu. Sicut enim sensus in actu est sensibile, propter similitudinem sensibilis, quae est forma sensus in actu; ita intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu, propter similitudinem rei intellectae, quae est forma intellectus in actu' ['We have to say that this statement of the Philosopher is universally true in every intellect. For as a sense in act is the sensible thing because of its likeness to that sensible thing, which likeness is the form of the sense in act, so the understanding in act is the understood in act because of the likeness to the thing understood, which likeness is the form of the understanding in act']. 36 'St. Thomas' Theory of Operation,' Theological Studies 3 (1942) 375-81 [Grace and Freedom 64-69]; see pages 121-38 above. 37 ['for this is part of the received wisdom of the human race, that like is known by like'] Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 2 c. 38 Aristotle, De anima, I, 5, 4093 19 - 41 la 7.

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is unlike the sensible in potency;39 but the sense in act is like the sensible object on the general ground that effects are similar to their causes;40 it followed that the senses were receptive of sensible forms without the matter natural to those forms, much as wax is receptive of the imprint of a seal without being receptive of the gold of which the seal is made.41 In human intellect immaterial assimilation reaches its fulness in immaterial reception: not only is the matter of the agent not transferred to the recipient, as the gold of the seal is not transferred to the wax; not only is the form of the agent not reproduced in matter natural to it, as in sensation; but the form of the agent object is received in a strictly immaterial potency, the possible intellect. Thus the structures of sense and intellect differ radically. The sensitive potency, such as sight, is form of the sensitive organ, the eye; just as soul is the form of the body.42 Sensation itself is the operation not merely of the organ nor merely of the potency but of the compound of organ and potency.43 Directly, the sensible object acts on the sensitive organ;44 but since matter and form, organ and potency are one, the movement of the organ immediately involves the operation of its form, the sense.45 On the other hand, the possible intellect is not the form of any 39 In IIDe anima, lect. 12, §382. Nonetheless there must be a proportion and, in that sense, a similitude between object and potency, else eyes would hear and ears see. See ibid. lect. 11, §366; Summa theologiae, i, q. 12, aa. 2 and 5, applies this to the beatific vision. 40 Aristotle, De anima, II, 5, 4i6b 35 - 4173 2; 5, 4i?a 18; Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 10, §§351 and 357. 41 Aristotle, De anima, II, 12, 4243 17-23; Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 24, § 551. 42 Ibid. lect. 2, §§239, 241; Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. l c. 43 Depotentia, q. 3, a. 9, ad 22m; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 75, a. 2, ad 3m; a. 3; q. 77, a. 5, ad 3m; q. 84, a. 6; q. 89, a. l, ad im; In I De anima, lect. 2, §§ 19-20; lect. 10, § 159; In IIDe anima, lect. 2, §241; lect. 12, §377; In IIIDe anima, lect. 7, §§68488 (see §§679-82); Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 57, 82; see c. 49, §8; c. 50, §4. 44 De unitate intellectus, c. l (ed. Keeler, §24): 'Sensitiva enim pars non recipit in se species, sed in organo; pars autem intellectiva non recipit eas in organo, sed in se ipsa ...' ['For the sensitive part does not receive species in itself, but in an organ; the intellectual part, however, does not receive them in an organ but in itself] 45 Ibid. §23: 'Sensus enim proportionatur suo organo et trahitur quodammodo ad suam naturam; unde etiam secundum immutationem organi immutatur operatic sensus' ['For sense is proportioned to its organ and is in some way drawn to the nature of that organ; and therefore the operation of sense is also changed with change in the organ']. See §§35, 37, 38, 46. See the account of Cajetan's position in Yves Simon, 'Positions aristoteliciennes concernant le probleme de 1'activite du sens,' Revue dephilosophic4 (1933) 22958. Also see pages 140-42 above.

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organ;46 it has no other nature but ability to receive;47 it stands to all intelligible forms as prime matter stands to all sensible forms;48 and precisely because it is in act none of the things to be known, it offers no subjective resistance to objective knowing.49 Thus possible intellect stands to its first act, which is science, as the sensitive organ stands to its first act, which is the sensitive potency;50 both sensation and understanding are the operations of compounds, but sensation is the operation of a material compound, while understanding is the operation of an immaterial compound; since, then, operari sequitur esse, the substantial form of man must be subsistent but the substantial form of a brute cannot be subsistent.51 We have considered immaterial assimilation and immaterial reception; beyond these there is a general theorem that knowledge is by immateriality. If this general theorem is taken out of its historical context and made the premise of merely dialectical deductions, endless difficulties arise. But obviously the general theorem cannot have a different meaning from its particular applications. It does not mean, then, that other patients receive both matter and form from agents, but cognoscitive potencies receive only form: the wax does not receive the matter of the seal.52 It does not mean that other recipients are material but cognoscitive potencies are immaterial: both outer and inner senses are forms of corporeal organs; and they know the particular because the species they receive are individuated by the matter and the determinate dimensions of the organs they inform.53 It does not mean that objects have to be material to be really distinct from the subjects that know them: angels are immaterial and really distinct from the similitudes by which other angels know them.54 But if the object does not have to be material, nor the subject immaterial, and the action of the object on the subject has no particular claim to immateriality, what can be the meaning of the general theorem? In the first place, its meaning is negative; the knower need not be the known; assimilation indeed is necessary, but it is on the level 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

Summa theologiae, l, q. 75, a. 2 and passim. Aristotle, De anima, ill, 4, 4293 21-22; see 4290 30 - 4303 2. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87, a. l c. Ibid. q. 75, a. 2 c. Aristotle, De anima, II, 5, 417b 16-19; Aquinas, In IIDe anima, lect. 12, §§37374Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 57, 82; Summa theologiae, l, q. 75, aa. 3 and 6; De unitate intellectus, c. l (ed. Keeler, §§35-38). In IIDe anima, lect. 24, §§551-54Deveritate, q. 1O, a. 5 c.; q. 8, a. ll c. Summa theologiae, l, q. 56, a. 2, ad 3m; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 8, ad 14m.

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of form and not that of matter; complete assimilation, both material and formal, would make the knower be the known but would give no guarantee of knowledge. Out of this negative and anti-Empedoclean meaning there arises a positive meaning. The form of the knowing must be similar to the form of the known, but also it must be different; it must be similar essentially for the known to be known; but it must differ modally for the knower to know and not merely be the known. Modal difference of forms results from difference in recipients: the form of color exists naturally in the wall but intentionally in the eye because wall and eye are different kinds of recipient;55 similarly, angels have a natural existence on their own but an intentional existence in the intellects of other angels.56 Thus the negative concept 'immateriality' acquires a positive content of intentional existence; and intentional existence is a modal difference resulting from difference in the recipient. There remains a still further step to be taken. Why have forms two different modes of existence, natural or intentional, according to difference in recipients? It is because Thomist system conceives perfection as totality: if finite things which cannot be the totality are somehow to approximate towards perfection which is totality, they must somehow be capable not only of being themselves but also in some manner the others as others; but being themselves is natural existence, and being the others as others is intentional existence. Moreover, if potency and especially matter are the principles of limitation, tying things down to being merely the things they are, it follows that the intentional mode of existence results from the negation of potency and specifically from the negation of matter.57 It is only in the perspective of such systematic principles that the general theorem 'knowledge is by immateriality' can be understood. 3

Formative Abstraction

We have been considering the matter from which intellect abstracts, and we turn to abstraction itself. In this section we consider the abstraction that supposes the formation of an inner word and yields knowledge of 'rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit.'58 In the next section we shall consider a prior appre55 56 57 58

In IIDe anima, lect. 24, §§551-54; see Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 50, §5. Summa theologiae, l, q. 56, a. 2, ad 3m. Ibid. q. 84, a. 2 c.; De veritate, q. 2, a. 2 c. ['the thing as separated from the material conditions without which it does not exist in the natural world'] Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 53, §3.

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hensive abstraction, already described as insight into phantasm;59 its object differs modally from the object of formative abstraction, for by it man knows not the abstract object of thought, the universal that is common to many, but the universal existing in the particular,60 the 'quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens.'61 On the conceptualist interpretation of Aquinas, formative abstraction is unconscious and nonrational; it precedes apprehensive abstraction. On the intellectualist interpretation, which we find more in accord with the text of Aquinas, the apprehensive abstraction precedes and the consequent formative abstraction is an act of rational consciousness. In dealing with this issue we begin from the more obvious and proceed towards the more fundamental aspects of Thomist thought. Elementary reflection on abstraction is concerned with common names, the corresponding concepts, and the relation of concepts to reality. Two samples of Thomist treatment of these matters are given. In the Sentences it is explained that a ratio is what intellect apprehends of the meaning of a name. No ultimate difference arises whether the meaning be primitive or derived. In either case to attribute a ratio to a reality is to attribute not the active meaning (which is an act of the mind or the intention of an act) but the passive meant; it is to affirm that in the thing there is what corresponds to the concept, as what is signified or meant corresponds to sign or meaning.62 The same issue is treated more expeditiously in the Summa. Names are signs of meanings, and meanings are similitudes of things; it follows that names refer to things through concepts in our intellects; and so the measure of the use of names is the knowledge in our intellects. Because we know the essence of man, the name 'man' signifies the definition which expresses the essence of man. But we do not know the essence of God, and so since meaning is consequent to knowledge we cannot use names to express the essence of God.63 This clear reduction of meaning to knowledge suggests that one had better approach the problem of abstraction on a profounder level, namely, that of knowledge and especially that of science. Now science is of the necessary and universal; but all material things are contingent and particular. 59 60 61 62 63

See pp. 24-46 above. Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. 3, ad im; a. 2, ad 2m. ['quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter'] Ibid. q. 84, a. 7 c. Super I Sententiarum, d. 2, q. l, a. 3 sol. Summa theologiae, l, q. 13, a. l c.

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A man is composed not of this sort of form and this sort of matter but of this form and this matter.64 What, then, is the possibility of science? It was, we read, this very problem that forced Plato to posit his separate ideas. Since he accepted the opinion of Cratylus and Heraclitus that everything sensible was in a perpetual flux, he had to choose between denying the objectivity of definitions and of science and, on the other hand, positing universal and necessary objects. He chose the latter, but his choice was not really inevitable. It is true that all sensible things are subject to change, but such change is not absolute; one may distinguish between the composite thing and its ratio or form; the thing changes per se, but the form changes only per accidens. Since, then, intellect can prescind from all that does not per se pertain to a thing, it follows that intellect can define universally and deduce with necessity on the basis of the changeless forms of changing things.65 But one may ask what is the changeless form or ratio of a changing thing; the answer is to be had by working out the conditions of change. On Aristotelian physics every other change supposes local movement; in turn, local movement supposes a thing to be in a given place at a given time; and a thing is in a given place at a given time inasmuch as it is individuated by matter existing under assigned (as opposed to merely specified) dimensions. It follows that one considers the changeless ratio of a thing inasmuch as one considers the thing apart from assigned matter and so apart from the consequents of assigned matter, namely, determinate place, determinate time, and mobility. On the other hand, one is not to prescind from more than assigned matter; to do so would be to prescind from matter relevant to the form which by its proportion determines a measure of matter

64 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 10, lO35b 27-30; Aquinas, In WIMetaphys., lect. 10, § 1490. 65 In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 2 c. See the excellent text and annotations of questions 5 and 6 put out by Paul Wyser, O.P., 'Die wissenschaftstheoretischen Quaest. V u. VI in Boethium de Trinitate des hi. Thomas von Aquin,' Divus Thomas: Jahrbuch fur Philosophic und speculative Theologie [now Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophic und Theologie, Freiburg in der Schweiz] 25 (1947) 43785; 26 (1948) 74-98. [These articles were published in book form as Thomas von Aquin, In Librum Boethii de Trinitate Quaestiones Quinta et Sexta (Fribourg: Societe Philosophique, and Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1948). The Notre Dame edition of Verbum adds the note 'Now supplemented by the edition of Bruno Decker,' namely, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1955) - the Thomist work in full. For specific readings we will give references to Wyser (both the articles and the book) for questions 5 and 6, and to Decker for the full work. See above, chapter i, note 24.]

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proper to itself; thus, the definition of man and, as well, scientific knowledge of man prescind from these bones and this flesh but not from bones and flesh.66 After the problem of necessary science of contingent things, there comes the problem of universal science of particular things. The abstract rationes are considered and employed in two different manners. They may be considered in themselves and employed as objects of thought, and this is their first and principal use. But also, with the aid of sensitive potencies, they may be considered relatively, used as instrumental means of knowledge, and so applied with the aid of sense to particular things; this use is secondary and involves a measure of reflection.67 In this quite clear passage Aquinas settles a recurrent antinomy of Aristotelian thought: science is of the universal;68 all reality is particular;69 therefore science is not of reality. To this problem Aristotle adverted in his list of basic questions in the Metaphysics, book 3,7° and again in similar terms in books 11 and 13.71 The last of these is his fullest treatment: it distinguishes between science in potency and science in act; it affirms that science in potency is indeterminate and so of the indeterminate and universal, but science in act is determinate and of the determinate and particular; it concludes that in one manner science is of the universal and in another manner it is of the particular.72 Aquinas specified what these two manners were: primarily, science is concerned with universal objects of thought; secondarily, with the help of sense, intellect uses these universal objects as instrumental means and applies them to particular things. Nor is this solution of the In Boetium De Trinitate out of harmony with, much less contradicted by, later writings. The Contra Gentiles has it that by the use of inner words intellect is able to know 'rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit.'73The Pars prima affirms 'ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intel-

66 In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 2 c. 67 Ibid, and ad 4m. 68 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 15, lO3gb 27; XI, l, lO5Qb 26; Deanima, II, 5, 4l7b 22; see Posterior analytics, I, 31, 87b 27 - 88a 4. 69 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 13, iO38b 35, 70 Ibid. Ill, 6, !OO3a6-l7, esp. 14-17. 71 Ibid. XI, 2, I06ob 20-23; XIII, 1O, 10873 1O-2572 Ibid. See W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, vol. l (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1924) cviii-cx. 73 [See above, note 58.] Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 53, §3-

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ligitur.'74The fifth of the Quodlibeta, of Christmas 1271, advances that intellect understands in two manners: formally by the species actuating it; instrumentally by the inner word it employs to know the thing.75 Finally, it is plain that without instrumental objects of thought Aquinas could not have accounted as he did for the meaning of common names and false propositions.76 However, since an accusation of an implication of idealism has been tossed at me,b some explanation may not be out of place. First, the universal ratio or object of thought known by means of the inner word is not subjective but objective; it is not the thinking, meaning, defining, but the thought, meant, defined; but though it is objective, still it is universal, and all reality is particular; accordingly its immediate reference is not to the thing except potentially, inasmuch as reflection and the use of sense enable one to apply the universal ratio to particular things. Secondly, before anyone may quote such a passage as Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. i, ad im, against the clear statements of the In Boetium De Trinitate, he must show that both deal with formative abstraction; in fact, as will appear, the above cited passage from the Summa deals not with formative abstraction but with the prior apprehensive abstraction. Thirdly, it may be quite true that if the clear statements of the In Boetium De Trinitate are given the current conceptualist interpretation, then they do imply idealism. If formative abstraction is not preceded by apprehensive abstraction, by insight into phantasm, then the application of universal rationes to particular things must be blind; but that is a point against conceptualist interpretation. The intellectualist interpretation finds no implication of idealism in the In Boetium De Trinitate, because for it formative abstraction is not the only abstraction, just as the universal common to many is not the only universal;77 prior to knowledge of essences without existence through definitions, there are insights into phantasm in which are known universals, natures, quiddities existing in corporeal matter; and as such insight governs the formation of meanings and definitions, so also it governs the application of them to particular things. Two approaches to Thomist thought on formative abstraction have been considered, namely, through the meanings of common names and through 74 ['the idea of what is produced is in the mind that produces it as that which is understood; but not as the species by means of which it is understood'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 15, a. 2 c. 75 Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9, ad im. 76 In I Peri herm., lect. 2 and 3; see p. 15 above. 77 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. 3, ad im; a. 2, ad 2m.

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the possibility of necessary and universal knowledge of contingent and particular reality. A third approach is through the possibility of abstraction itself.78 The two operations of intellect are distinguished: the first is knowledge of quiddity; the second is knowledge of existence. To the latter operation are assigned distinctions that regard separate things, such as man and stone, and further, abstractions (more accurately separations) on the level of metaphysical or theological thought.79 But to the first operation, knowledge of quiddities, are assigned physical and mathematical abstractions. Their general possibility is accounted for by the nature of intelligibility and the laws of its unity. A thing is intelligible inasmuch as it is in act: accordingly we must understand the natures of things in one or more of three ways; for the thing itself may be act, as is the separate substance; or it may possess a constituent act, as the composite substance; or it may be related to act, as matter to form and a vacuum to what it might contain. Now inasmuch as the nature of a thing is constituted intelligibly by its relation to or dependence on something else, it is impossible to abstract from the something else; on the other hand, inasmuch as the nature of a thing is not dependent intelligibly on something else, in that measure it is possible to abstract from the something else. Thus, one can abstract 'animal' from 'foot' but not 'foot' from 'animal'; one can abstract 'whiteness' from 'man' and 'man' from 'whiteness'; one can abstract neither 'son' from 'father' nor 'father' from 'son,' and neither 'substantial form' from 'matter' nor 'matter' from 'substantial form.' Evidently, intelligibility governs abstraction on the level of the intelligentia indivisibilium; precisely because of intelligible unity, intelligence in act knows what intelligibly is indivisible and abstracts from all that does not pertain to that intelligible indivisibility. By this general principle, in a passage that more than recalls the complications of its parallel in the Metaphysics of Aristotle,80 both physical and mathematical abstraction are explained. In the order of intelligible priority, a thing is constituted, first by substance, secondly by quantity, thirdly by quality, fourthly by passions and movements. Now one cannot conceive the intelligibly posterior and prescind from the prior: substance enters into the definition of accident; 78 In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 3 c.; Wyser, Divus Thomas 25 (1Q47) 472-75; Wyser in book form 38-41; Decker 181-86. 79 Wyser, Divus Thomas 25 (1947) 472, lines 10-21; 474, lines 42-44; Wyser in book form 38, lines 10-21, and 40, lines 42-44; Decker 182, lines 9-20, and 186, lines 13-16; on the formation of metaphysical concepts, see pages 56-59, 96-99 above. 80 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 10 and ll.

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similarly, sensible qualities presuppose quantity, and changes presuppose sensible qualities; it follows that one cannot abstract accident from substance, sensible quality from quantity, change from sensible quality. On the other hand, one can conceive the intelligibly prior and prescind from the posterior. As we have seen, to abstract from assigned matter eliminates the possibility of change but leaves substance, quantity, and sensible quality; it leaves flesh and bones but not these bones nor this flesh. But one may go a step further to abstract not only from assigned matter but also from sensible quality or, as it is named, sensible matter.81 This leaves substance and quantity and the necessary consequents of quantity such as figure; it is the abstraction of the mathematician; and when it is named the abstraction of form from matter, what is meant is not the impossible abstraction of substantial form from its corresponding matter (the two are correlative) but the abstraction of the form of quantity and its consequent, figure, from sensible qualities such as the hard and soft, hot and cold.82 Finally, to advance beyond mathematical abstraction and prescind from quantity as well as sensible quality and the conditions of change is, Aquinas stated explicitly, not so much abstraction as separation; it pertains to the level of judgment and the fields of metaphysics and theology.83 4

Apprehensive Abstraction

Repeatedly in the neat treatise on human intellect in the Pars prime?4 one reads that the proper object of human intellect is the quidditas rei materialist This proper object is also the proportionate object of our intellects,86 their first object,87 their primo et per se cognitum,^ their object according to the state of the present life,89 and finally an object that can be known only by the conversion of intellect to phantasm.90 Reasons on a cosmic scale are 81 Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI, 3, io6ia 28 - io6ib 1; see XIII, 3, iO77b 17-23; De anima, III, 7, 43lb 15-16. 82 In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 3 c.; see Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. l, ad 2m. 83 Wyser, Divus Thomas 25 (1947) 474, lines 38-44; Wyser in book form 40, lines 38-44; Decker 186, lines 10-16. 84 Summa theologiae, 1, qq. 79, 84-89. 85 ['quiddity of a material thing'] Ibid. q. 84, a. 7; a. 8; q. 85, a. 5, ad 3m; a. 8; q. 86, a. 2; q. 87, a. 2, ad 2m; a. 3; q. 88, a. 3; see q. 12, a. 4; q. 85, a. l. 86 Ibid. q. 84, a. 8 c. 87 Ibid. q. 87, a. 3; q. 88, a. 3 c. 88 ['what is known primarily and per se'] Ibid. q. 85, a. 8 c. 89 Ibid, and q. 88, a. 3 c. 90 Ibid. q. 84, a. 7 c.

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assigned for this position. In the universal hierarchy of cognoscitive potencies human intellect holds an intermediate place. Sense is the first act of a material organ, and so its object is a form existing in matter as it exists in matter. Angelic intellect is the potency of a pure form, and so its object is a pure form. But human intellect is neither the act of an organ, as sense, nor the potency of a pure form, as angelic intellect; it is the potency of a form that actuates matter, and so its object must be a form, existing indeed in matter, but not as it exists in matter.91 Less striking reasons for the position are to be had in the historical order. In the incessantly quoted third book of Aristotle's De anima there is recalled the distinction of Metaphysics VII, 6, between water and the quiddity of water, magnitude and the quiddity of magnitude, Socrates and the quiddity of Socrates; then it is advanced that directly by sense we know water, magnitude, flesh, that directly by intellect we know the quiddities of water, magnitude, flesh, and that indirectly by intellect we know what directly we know by sense.92 From this passage Aquinas drew three conclusions, and of them the first regarded the proper object of human intellect. That object is the quidditas rei which is not separate from the thing, as the Platonists held, nor apart from sensible things, even though intellect apprehends it without apprehending the individual conditions it possesses in sensible things.93 It is perhaps clear enough that this proper object of human intellect is the same as the proper object defined in the Pars prima; equally clearly, its source is Aristotle, and its ultimate ground is the Aristotelian principle that quiddities and particulars must be identical (at least inadequately) if the former are to be realities and the latter are to be objects of science.94 It remains that there is an anomaly that must be removed. According to the De anima intellect 'directe apprehendit quidditatem carnis; per reflexionem autem, ipsam carnem.'95 According to the Pars prima intellect must convert to phantasm to know its proper object which still is the quiddity.96 91 Ibid. q. 85, a. l c.; see q. 12, a. 4 c. 92 Aristotle, De anima, III, 4, 42gb 10-21; Aquinas, In IIIDe anima, lect. 8, §§705-16. 93 Ibid. §717. 94 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 6, iO3lb 3-5; Aquinas, In VIIMetaphys., lect. 5, § 136395 ['apprehends directly the quiddity of flesh, but by reflexion, the flesh itself] In IIIDe anima, lect. 8, §713. 96 Summa theologiae, l, q. 84, a. 7 c. In this context and in general Aquinas's quidditas or quod quid est is objective; it is of the thing as intelligible, just as color is of the thing as visible. Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l, ad 7m: 'quidditatis

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It seems that direct apprehension is by conversion! Again, we read that the first object and the first known of intellect is the quiddity of a material thing.97 How can what is known not only directly but also first nonetheless be known only by a conversion to phantasm? To solve this difficulty one must first distinguish conversion to phantasm from reflection on phantasm, and secondly, settle precisely what is meant by conversion. Now conversion and reflection are quite distinct both in themselves and in their consequents. They are distinct in themselves: conversion to phantasm is necessary to know the quiddity, the proper object of human intellect;98 but reflection on phantasm presupposes not only conversion to phantasm but also knowledge of the quiddity; it is needed, not for knowledge of the proper object, but only for knowledge of the indirect object, the singular.99 This distinction between objects, and so between acts, results in a further distinction of problems regarding the separate soul: because the separate soul has no body and so no imagination, it might seem that it could not know the proper object of human intellect, which requires conversion to phantasm; for this reason Aquinas regularly asks whether the separate soul understands anything at all;100 again, because the separate soul has no imagination and so cannot reflect on phantasm, it might seem that even if it knew the proper object still it might not know the singular; and for this reason Aquinas regularly asks in a separate article whether the departed souls can know the singular.101 At least, then, conversion to phantasm is not the kind of reflection involved in knowing the singular. But is it in any manner a reflection? Certainly, there is an etymological suggestion of reflection in the name 'conversion'; on the other hand, there is a notable measure of Thomist usage

97 98 99 100 101

esse est quoddam esse rationis' ['the being of a quiddity is a certain being in the mind'] is exceptional; it refers to the act of defining and explains 'verum est in mente' ['truth is in the mind']; but the context also speaks of the quidditas and esse as components of the thing. When I wrote pages 36-37 above, I had not sufficiently adverted to this, nor to the nature of conversion to phantasm.0 Summa theologiae, i, q. 85, a. 8; q. 87, a. 3; q. 88, a. 3 c. Ibid. q. 84, a. 7 c. Ibid. q. 86, a. i c. SuperIVSententiarum, d. 50, q. i, a. l sol.; De veritate, q. 19, a. l c.; De anima, a. 15; Summa theologiae, i, q. 89, a. i c. Super TV Sententiarum, d. 50, q. i, a. 3; De veritate, q. 19, a. 2; De anima, a. 20; Summa theologiae, l, q. 89, a. 4.

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which excludes from conversion what is the essential implication of reflection, namely, the existence of other knowledge or activity prior to or supposed by the reflection. Thus, when Avicenna's possible intellect converts to his separate agent intellect for the reception of species,102 one cannot say that, prior to this conversion and reception, the possible intellect was engaged in any activity. Again, when Aquinas spoke of his own immanent agent intellect converting upon phantasms,103 there is no need to wonder what it converted from. More specifically, the conversion of possible intellect to phantasm is described by Aquinas neither as an activity nor as a shift in activity but as a natural orientation of human intellect in this life: it results from the perfection of the conjunction of soul to body;104 it consists in human intellect having its gaze (aspectus) turned to phantasms105 and to inferior things;1'* and this present state of intellect is contrasted with that of the next life when conversion is not to phantasms nor to bodies but to superior things and pure intelligibles.107 It may or may not be surprising that the term conversio should be used to name what strictly is a natural orientation but the facts already noted remain, and if one finds abstract statements more convincing, there are Aquinas's own words: ... nulla potentia potest aliquid cognoscere non convertendo se ad obiectum suum, ut visus nihil cognoscit nisi convertendo se ad colorem. Unde, cum phantasmata se habeant hoc modo ad intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ut patet per Philosophum in III deAnima, quantumcumque aliquam speciem intelligibilem apud se habeat, numquam tamen actu aliquid considerat secundum illam speciem, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et ideo, sicut intellectus noster secundum statum viae indiget phantasmatibus ad actu considerandum antequam accipiat habitum, ita et postquam acceperit.108 102 SuperIVSententiarum, d. 50, q. i, a. 2 sol.; De veritate, q. 1O, a. 2 c.; De anima, a. 15 c.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 84, a. 4 c. 103 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. l, ad 3m. 104 SuperIVSententiarum, d. 50, q. l, a. 2 sol. 105 De anima, a. 16 c. 106 Ibid. aa. 17 and 18 c. 107 Summa theologiae, l, q. 89, a. l c. and ad 3m. Note that Avicennist conversion is named simply conjunction, Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 74, §3. 108 ['no potency is able to know anything if it does not turn itself toward its object, as sight knows nothing except by turning itself toward color. And therefore, since phantasms are related to possible intellect in the same way as sensible things are to a sense (as is clear from the Philosopher in the third

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But plainly there is no difficulty in reconciling the necessity of sight converting to color with the fact that color is what sight first and directly knows; similarly, there is no difficulty in reconciling the necessity of possible intellect converting to phantasm to know the quiddity with the statement that possible intellect first and direcdy knows the quiddity in the phantasm. This account of conversion throws a new light on such a passage as Summa theologiae, i, q. 84, a. 7. The influence of the doubtful De natura verbi intellectus109 forced older interpreters to take it as genuinely Thomist that the verbum was formed prior to any understanding; in consequence they held that intellect first knew the quiddity in the verbum and then converted to phantasm to know it again existing in corporeal matter. But once the opusculum is recognized as doubtful, the whole position falls to the ground. Thomist conversion does not mean reflecting nor turning back but simply a natural orientation; q. 84 of the Pars prima does not seem to mention the verbum; indeed the whole treatise on human intellect in the Pars prima mentions the verbum only in incidental fashion.110 When, then, in Summa theologiae, i, q. 84, a. 7, Aquinas affirms the necessity of conversion to phantasm and of acts of imagination and other sensitive potencies both in the initial acquisition of science and in its subsequent use; when he argues both from the experimental fact that the lesion of a sensitive organ interferes with scientific knowledge, and again from the universal experience that whenever we try to understand we construct images in which, as it were, we inspect the solution; when he concludes that the proper object of human intellect in this life is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; when he maintains that true and complete knowledge of this object can be had only inasmuch as there is presupposed an act of imaginabook of the De anima), no matter how well endowed (intellect) is with some intelligible species it has within itself, nevertheless it does not actually consider anything in relation to that species except by turning its attention to phantasms; and therefore, just as our intellect in its present pilgrim state needs phantasms if there is to be any actual consideration before it has acquired a habit, so also it needs them after it has acquired the habit'] De veritate, q. 10, a. 2, ad 7m. 109 De natura verbi intellectus, ed. Mandonnet, V, 368-75, esp. 372-74. [The Regis College (Toronto) copy of this book has notes comparing Grabmann and Mandonnet, in Lonergan's hand, on the title page; also sidelining, which is probably his, on p. 374 of the 'De natura verbi...'] For instance, John of St Thomas appealed to this work, Cursus theologicus (Solesmes ed.); tome l (Paris: Desclee, 1946), disputatio 32, a. 5, §§12 (p. 70), 27 (p. 77), 28 (p. 77). no For example, Summa theologiae, i, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m.

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don or sense apprehending the material singular and there supervenes an act of intellect apprehending the universal nature existing in that particular; then Aquinas is describing in his manner what from a concatenation of texts we already have described as insight into phantasm.111 Let us turn to another point. It is remarkable that the description of the object of intellect as 'quidditas rei materialis' seems confined to the treatise on human intellect in the Pars prima. Elsewhere one can read that the object of intellect, the proper object of intellect, the object according to the third book of the De anima, is the 'quid,' or the 'quod quid est,' or the 'quidditas rei.'112 Again, elsewhere when need arises, the peculiarity of human intellect in this life is indicated by stating flatly that the object of human intellect is the phantasm.113 But it is in the Pars prima that one finds the synthesis of these two complementary streams of thought, for there we find that the proper object is not simply the 'quidditas rei' but the 'quidditas rei materialis,' and at the same time we are informed of the necessary condition of conversion to phantasm. The duality in Thomist writings has its source in Aristotle, who not only enlarged upon to ti estin and to ti en einai,114 but also insisted that the soul never understands without phan111 Ibid. q. 84, a. 7 c.; see pages 24-46 above. 112 Super I Sententiarum, d. 19, q. 5, a. l, ad 7m; Super II Sententiarum, d. 13, q. l, a. 3 sol.; Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. l, a. 2 sol.; d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, qc. l sol.; Super IVSententiarum, d. 12, q. l, a. l sol. 2, ad 2m; d. 49, q. 2, a. 3 sol.; a. 7, ad 6m; Deveritate, q. l, a. 12 c.; q. 8, a. 7, ad 4m (3ae ser.); q. 14, a. l c.; q. 15, a. 2, ad 3m; a. 3, ad im; q.25, a. 3 c.; In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 2, ad 2m; Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 58, §5; 3, c. 41, §3; c. 56, §5; c. 108, §4; Summa theologiae, l, q. 17, a. 3, ad im; q. 18, a. 2 c.; q. 57, a. l, ad 2m; q. 58, a. 5 c.; q. 67, a. 3 c.; q. 85, a. 5 c.; a. 6 c.; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8 c.; q. 10, a. l, ad 3m; q. 31, a. 5 c.; 2-2, q. 8, a. l c.; 3, q. 1O, a. 3, ad 2m; q. 76, a. 7 c.; Super Librum De causis, lect. 6 ad fin.; In I Peri herm., lect. 10, §5; In IIPost, anal., lect. 5, §9. Twenty of these texts refer to Aristotle's De anima; sixteen speak of the proper object of intellect; four name the object quid; one quod quid; twenty-one quod quid est; eight quidditas; the spread is random except for quid and quod quid, which are confined to earliest writings. Summa theologiae, 3, q. 75, a. 5, ad 2m states that the proper object of intellect according to the De anima is substantia. 113 Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 4, a. 3 sol.; Super II Sententiarum, d. 8, q. l, a. 5 sol.; d. 20, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3m; d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3m; Super III Sententiarum, d. 14, q. l, a. 3 sol. 2; d. 27, q. 3, a. l sol.; De veritate, q. 18, a. 8, ad 4m; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 73, §38; c. 80, §6; c. 81, §6; c. 96, §3; De anima, a. l, ad llm; a. 15 c., ad 3m, ad 8m; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 50, a. 4, ad im; De unitate intelkctus, c. l (ed. Keeler, §40); In Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 2 c. and ad 5m. There are a large number of equivalent texts with the Aristotelian parallel of phantasm standing to intellect as sensible to sense. 114 See pages 24-38 above.

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tasms,115 that phantasms are to the rational soul what sensible objects are to sense,116 that intellect understands species (eide) in phantasms.117 It is natural enough that this Aristotelian duality should reappear in Aquinas; it is no less natural that there should be in Thomist writings a series of attempts to break it down. In the Sentences one may read that phantasm is intelligible only in potency and so cannot be the proper and proximate object of intellect, which is the species intellects118 In the De veritate one finds a qualification of the Aristotelian parallel that phantasms are to intellect what sensible objects are to sense; for sense directly knows the sensible object, but intellect directly knows not phantasm but the thing that phantasm represents; accordingly, insight into phantasm is like looking in, not looking at, a mirror.119 In the Contra Gentiles the actual intelligibility of phantasm is clarified: in the dark colors are visible in potency; in daylight they are visible in act but seen in potency; they are seen in act only inasmuch as sight is in act; similarly, prior to the illumination of agent intellect, phantasms are intelligible in potency; by that illumination they become intelligible in act but understood only in potency; they are understood in act only inasmuch as the possible intellect is in act.120 Moreover, there occurs a description of the intelligibility in act of phantasm: the species intelligibilis is said to shine forth in phantasm as the exemplar does in the example or image.121 As has been already explained, the object of insight into phantasm is preconceptual, so that any expression of it is as conceived and not as such, just as any expression of the object of sight is of it as conceived and not as such.122 It is this fact that accounts for the variety of the descriptions one finds. Most commonly it is the intelligibility in act of phantasm. In the Pars prima it is the 'quidditas sive natura rei materialis in materia corporali 115 116 117 118

119 120 121 122

Aristotle, De anima, III, 7, 43ia 16. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 43lb 2. ['understood species'] Super III Sententiarum, d. 31, q. 2, a. 4, ad 5m; for similar modifications, see 'quasi obiecta' ['as objects' - the context shows the meaning of 'quasi' to be simply 'as' and not 'as if], Super IV Sententiarum, d. 50, q. i, a. 2 sol. ad fin.; De veritate, q. 10, a. 11 c.; also 'species phantasmatum quae sunt obiecta intellectus nostri' ['the species of phantasms, which species are the objects of our intellect'], Super II Sententiarum, d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad im. De veritate, q. 2, a. 6 c.; see q. 10, a. 9 c. Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 59, § 14. Ibid. c. 73, §38; see Super II Sententiarum, d. 2O, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m. See page 38 above.

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existens.' But there it also is the 'formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia.'123 In the In Boetium De Trinitate there occurs an identification of (i) 'forma intelligibilis,' (2) 'quidditas rei,' and (3) object of intellect.124 Since 'species' translates Aristotle's eidos, which regularly means form,125 it is not surprising that the object of insight should be named not only 'forma intelligibilis' but also 'species intelligibilis.' Thus, the species that shines forth in phantasm126 is an object of intellectual knowledge; again, the species that intellect understands, knows, apprehends in phantasm,127 plainly is an object; and in such statements not only the thought but also the expression is Aristotelian.128 Finally, the object of insight, besides being 'quidditas sive natura rei materialis,' 'forma intelligibilis,' and 'species intelligibilis,' also is the universal which is not posterior but prior, not with, but without the 'intentio universalitatis,' and concretely though inadequately identical with the particular material thing,129just as the Aristotelian quiddity is concretely though inadequately identical with the particular.130 We have been characterizing the agent object131 of apprehensive abstraction (insight) and now we turn to the act itself. This act is defined as a cognoscere or considerare.1^2 Not only is it itself cognitional, but what it abstracts from is also known, namely, the individual matter represented by the phan123 ['the quiddity or nature of a material thing existing in corporeal matter'; 'a form existing indeed individually in corporeal matter, but not in the way it exists there'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. l c. 124 In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 2, ad 2m; Wyser, Divus Thomas 25 (1947) 469; Wyser in book form 35; Decker 177. 125 A subsequent convention has tended to confine 'species' to meaning forms in the cognoscitive potencies. Aquinas can write, Super III Sententiarum., d. 18, q. l, a. l sol.: 'Causa autem actionis est species' ['But the cause of action is the species'], e.g., the form of heat in fire; Deveritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad lorn (2ae ser.): 'species lapidis non est in oculo sed similitude eius' ['the species of a stone is not in the eye, but its likeness (is)']; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 93, § 2: 'quidditates subsistentes sunt species subsistentes' ['subsistent quiddities are subsistent species']; In IIIDe anima, lect. 8, §707: 'naturalia habent speciem in materia' ['natural things have (their) species in matter']. 126 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 73, §38. 127 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. l, ob. 5 and ad 5m; q. 86, a. l c.; 3, q. 11, a. 2, ad im. 128 Aristotle, De anima, III, 7, 43ib 2; Aquinas, In IIIDe anima, lect. 12, §777129 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. 2, ad 2m; a. 3, ad im. 130 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 6; Aquinas, In VII Metaphys., lect. 5. 131 See pages 138-43 above. 132 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. l c. and ad im.

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tasm,133 or again the sensible matter of hot or cold, hard or soft,134 which may be equally imagined. But though apprehensive abstraction is itself cognitional and abstracts from sensibly known individual or sensible matter, still it may be considered insofar as it enters under metaphysical categories. From that viewpoint it is an operation, a second act, an actus perfecti.I35 Because it involves psychological necessity and universality, metaphysically the form whence it proceeds must be received universally, immaterially, and immovably; 'modus enim actionis est secundum modum formae agentis.'136Such a form is not the essence itself of the soul but an immaterial similitude of the form that is received materially in the known thing.137 It is not innate,138 nor derived from separate substances out of this world/39 nor consisting exclusively of intellectual light;140 but it is received from material things inasmuch as phantasms are made intelligible in act by agent intellect;141 hence neither the acquisition nor the use of science can occur without conversion to phantasm;142 nor can we even judge properly unless sense is functioning freely.143 Now this form also is called a 'species intelligibilis'; obviously it is quite different from the species of our preceding paragraph, which is an object. If the latter be named 'species quae,' then this form is 'species qua intelligitur'; the 'species quae' is one of various attempts to characterize the preconceptual object of insight; the

133 Ibid. c. 134 Ibid, ad 2m. 135 See pages 110-16 above. 136 ['for the mode of action follows the mode of the agent form'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 84, a. l c.; q. 76, a. 2, ad 3m; De unitate intellectus, c. 5 (ed. Keeler, §111). 137 Summa theologiae, l, q. 84, a. 2 c. 138 Ibid. a. 3 c. 139 Ibid. a. 4 c. 140 Ibid. a. 5 c. 141 Ibid. a. 6 c. 142 Ibid. a. 7 c. 143 Ibid. a. 8 c. Observe that q. 84 is titled wrongly in the editions. These titles do not pertain to the Thomist text but were picked out by an early editor from the summaries Aquinas placed prior to his questions (See Bernhardus Geyer, S. Thomae de Aquino Quaestiones de Trinitate divina: Summae de theologia 1.1, q. 27-32 [Bonn: Petrus Hanstein, 1934] 3. The printed title ('Quomodo anima coniuncta intelligat corporalia quae sunt infra ipsam' ['How the soul joined (to the body) understands corporeal things, which are beneath it']) refers not to q. 84 but to qq. 84-86. The correct title would be: 'Per quid ea cognoscit' ['By what means it knows them']. Thus the topic of q. 84 is the species: existence, aa. l, 2; origin, aa. 3-6; conditions of use, aa. 7-8.

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'species qua' is not a direct object but a conclusion of metaphysical reflection.'44 When the possible intellect is actuated by the 'species qua,' it is constituted in the first act of apprehensive abstraction; this first act of apprehensive abstraction stands to the second act as does form to esse and as principle of action to action.145 Finally, on the sensitive level passive operations are found in the outer senses, constructive operations in the imagination; but on the level of intellect both the passive and constructive operations pertain to the same potency, possible intellect; the reception of the 'species qua' is a passion,146 and the consequent second act is similarly a pati in the general sense of that term;147 by that second act the preconceptual 'quidditas rei materialis' or 'forma intelligibilis' or 'species quae' or universal in the particular is known; but in virtue of that second act there is formed the definition, the act of defining thought, the act of meaning;148 and this, at times, is said to be or to contain a third 'species intelligibilis,' which may be distinguished from the 'species quae' and the 'species qua' by being called a 'species in qua.'149 There remains the question, What is meant by the abstraction of species 144 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. 2 c.; see De veritate, q. 10, a. 4, ad im; a. 8, ad 2m (2ae ser.); ad Qm (lae ser.); a. 9 c., ad im, ad 3m, ad 5m, ad lorn; a. 11, ad 4m; in some of these passages the species is a medium to be known not directly but on reflection and so may be the same as the 'species quae' though differently conceived; see the earlier formulation, Quaestiones quodlibetales, 7, a. l c.; SuperIVSententiarum, d. 49, q. 2, a. l, ad 15m. 145 See pages 133-38 above. 146 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. 2 c. and ad 3m. 147 See pages 116-21, 133-38 above. 148 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3m. 149 In all but early writings the inner word is called a form or species only on the secondary ground that it is the form in virtue of which the artisan operates: see De veritate, q. 3, a. 2 c.; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9 c. As already noted, the early verbum is the later concept plus an ordination towards manifestation (Super II Sententiarum, d. ll, q. 2, a. 3 sol.; see Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. l sol.); what is conceived is the species intelligibilis (Super I Sententiarum, d. 27, q. 2, a. l, ob. 4; a. 2, ob. 4). Quaestiones quodlibetales, 8, a. 4, describes the formation of a classificatory definition of charity and calls it knowledge of the quiddity of charity; apparently the formed definition is to be identified with species intelligibilis; knowledge of the quid of charity is affirmed (Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. l, a. 2, ad im) but denied on the ground that we do not know its object, God, quidditatively (De veritate, q. 10, a. 10 c.). Quaestiones quodlibetales, 7, a. 2 c., speaks of knowledge in alleged Augustinian terms as an intentio coniungens [uniting intention]. Palemon Glorieux, 'Les Quodlibets VII-XI de s. Thomas d'Aquin,' (Recherches de theol. ancienne et medievale 13 [1946] 282-303) raises the possibility of doubting the authenticity of these

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from phantasm? The principal meaning clearly is that there is produced in the possible intellect a similitude of the thing presented by phantasm; this similitude is similar to the thing, not in all respects, but with regard only to its specific nature;150 it is to be identified with the 'species qua."51 Still this meaning is not exclusive; Aquinas himself wrote that 'hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a phantasmatibus, considerare scilicet naturam specie! absque consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur'; 152 and here the abstracting is the second act of considering, and what is abstracted from is said, indeed, to be phantasm but means the individual principles that the phantasm represents. Now when the abstracting is considering, the abstracted species would seem to be the considered species; the considered species might be the 'species in qua,' as conceptualist interpretation might prefer; but it is more plausible perhaps that the considered species is the 'species quae' which shines forth in phantasm; certainly, this would Qiiodlibeta. On the other hand, they perhaps throw some light on Super I Sententiarum, d. 35, q. i, a. 2 sol., which distinguishes the sensible species received in the pupil as a first seen and the external thing as a second seen and, similarly, a similitude received in the intellect as a first understood and the external thing itself as a second understood. See above, note 145. Finally, there is the species intellecta recurrent in the Sentences (especially II, d. 17, q. 2, a. l sol.) but later conspicuous only in discussions of Averroes (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 75, §3; see §7; hence De unitate intellectus, 5, § HO: 'De rebus enim est scientia naturalis et aliae scientiae, non de speciebus intellectis' ['For natural science and the other sciences too are about things and not about the understood species']; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 2 c.: 'species intellecta ['intellectiva' in the Leonine edition] secundario est id quod intelligitur' ['the understood species is what is understood secondarily']. The early species intellecta may be a concept but it may also be the species quae as suggested by Super IVSententiarum, d. 49, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3m: 'Facultas enim intellectus nostri determinatur ad formas sensibiles quae per intellectum agentem fiunt intellectae \v\ actu, eo quod phantasmata hoc modo se habent ad intellectum nostrum sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ut dicitur in III De animd ['For it is because phantasms are related to our intellect as sensible things are to sense that our faculty of intellect is determined to sensible forms which become actually understood through the agent intellect, as is said in the third book of the De anima}. However, too great a precision in early thought would be contradicted by Summa theologiae, i, q. 85, a. 3 c.d 150 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. 1, ad 3m. 151 Ibid. a. 2 c.; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 9, ad 6m. 152 ['this is what it is to abstract a universal from a particular, or an intelligible species from phantasms, namely, to consider the nature of a species without considering the individual principles which are represented by the phantasms'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. l, ad im.

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seem to be so when Aquinas rewrote Aristotle's 'species quidem igitur intellectivum in phantasmatibus intelligit' as 'pars animae intellectiva intelligit species a phantasmatibus abstractas.'153 5

Sense and Understanding

As the sensible is the object of sense, so the intelligible is the object of intellect.154 The sensible is confined to material reality, but the intelligible is coextensive with the universe: whatever can be can be understood.155 The supreme intelligible is the divine substance, which lies beyond the capacity of human intellect, not as sound lies outside the range of sight, but as excessive light blinds it.15<) Further, there are two classes of intelligibles and two modes of understanding: what is in itself intelligible is the direct object of the intellects of separate, spiritual substances; but what is not in itself actually intelligible but only made intelligible by agent intellect, namely, the material and sensible, is understood by intellect directly only inasmuch as it first is apprehended by sense, and represented by imagination, and illuminated by agent intellect.157 But while the difference between the two classes of intelligible is real and intrinsic, the difference between the two kinds of understanding is only a difference in mode; hence, whether the soul is in or out of the body, it is the same human intellect, specified by the same formal object, but operating under the modal difference that actual intelligibility is presented or is not presented in phantasms.158 Again, just as understanding the actuated intelligibility of sensible things abstracts from space and time,159 so the spiritual substances that are in themselves actually intelligible exist outside space and time.'60 From this it does not follow that the spiritual substances are not individ-

!53 ['therefore the faculty of understanding understands species in phantasms'; 'the intellectual part of the soul understands species abstracted from phantasms'] In IIIDe anima, lect. 12, §777154 155 156 157 158

Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 55, § 1O. Ibid. 2, c. 98, §9Ibid. 3, c. 54, §8. Ibid. 2, c. 91, §8; c. 94, §5; c. 96, §§3-5. De veritate, q. 19, a. i, ob. 4 and ad 4m; ob. 5 and ad 5m; De anima, a. 15, ad 8m and ad lorn. 159 In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 2 c.; De veritate, q. 2, a. 6, ad im; Summa theologiae, l, q. 57, a. 2 c.; q. 86, a. 4 c. 160 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 96, §§9-10.

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ual but only that they are not material.161 But it does follow that our direct intellectual knowledge of material things is incomplete; sense knows external accidents, and intellect knows the internal essence or quiddity;162 knowing the essence, intellect knows all that the essence involves; but while such knowledge of God would be comprehensive,163 it cannot include knowledge of contingent existence,164 nor of contingent acts of will,165 nor of material individuality. Thus our science is of the universal and necessary, and to account for a contingent and particular judgment, such as that Socrates lived at Athens, one must appeal to understanding as reflecting on sensitive knowledge.166 This indirect and reflective intellectual knowledge of the singular and contingent is presented by Aquinas in two manners. Earlier writings assign a series of steps: first, intellect grasps the universal; secondly, it reflects on the act by which it grasps the universal; thirdly, it comes to know the species that is the principle of that act; fourthly, it turns to the phantasm whence the species is derived; and fifthly, it comes to know the singular thing that is represented by the phantasm.167 At once one is struck with the parallel between this process of reflection and the reflection by which one arrives at scientific knowledge of the essence of the soul; as the reader will recall, that involved reflection first on the act, then on the potency, and finally on the essence of soul.168 Accordingly, I cannot agree with the contention of R.P. Webert that Thomist reflection on phantasm for knowledge of the singular is reflection in a unique sense and without a parallel in other types of reflection; indeed, though one may grant that the sidelong glance (regard devie) which he postulates would be unique, I think it also must be said that such a glance not only fails to meet theoretical requirements (intellect no more

161 De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 9, ad 15m. 162 De veritate, q. 8, a. 7, ad 4m (3ae ser.); q. 10, a. 4, ad im; In I Post, anal., lect. 42, §5163 De veritate, q. 20, a. 5 c. 164 Ibid. q. 15, a. 2, ad 3m. 165 Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 56, §5. 166 Summa theologiae, l, q. 86, aa. 1 and 3. 167 Super IVSententiarum, d. 50, q. l, a. 3 sol.; De veritate, q. 2, a. 6 c.; q. 10, a. 5 c.; De anima, a. 20, ad im (2ae ser.). 168 Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. l, a. 2, ad 3m; De veritate, q. 10, a. 8 c.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 87, aa. 1-4; In IIDe anima, lect. 6, §308; In IIIDe anima, lect. 9, §§721,724-25.

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glances than sight smells) but also has no basis in the texts.169 On the other hand, it is necessary to point out the difference between reflection that arrives merely at a general notion of singularity and reflection that arrives at this singular thing. Just as one can infer a universal nodon of matter from the universal notion of form,170 so also one can infer an abstract notion of singularity from the notion of quiddity or from any specific quiddity;171 but the abstract notion of matter does not suffice for knowledge of individual matter,1?ia and there is no apparent reason why an abstract notion of singularity should suffice for knowledge of concrete singular things. In any case the reflection that Aquinas describes is not from knowledge of quiddity to knowledge of a proportionate singularity; it is a reflection that proceeds from knowledge of quiddity to knowledge of the act by which the quiddity is known; that act is an immaterial singular; it is known in empirical consciousness as singular; from that singular act is known the singular species that is its principle, and then the singular phantasm that is its source, and so finally the singular thing. The process Aquinas described is truly of the singular, truly reflective, and truly intellectual. However, there is reason to believe that Aquinas later modified the above view. The reflection involved in at least three of die four passages cited above173 is metaphysical in character; it introduces the 'species qua' that is the principle of the act of understanding; it explains how a Thomist metaphysician might account for intellectual knowledge of the singular; but it does not explain how the mass of mankind is capable of affirming that Socrates lived in Athens. Whether Aquinas adverted to this difficulty 169 Except, of course, in so far as 'regard devie' is a devious manner of speaking of reflection on insight. See Jordanus Webert, '"Reflexio": Etude sur les operations reflexives dans la psychologic de saint Thomas d'Aquin,' Melanges Mandonnet: Etudes d'histoire litteraire et doctrinale du moyen age, tome i (Paris: Vrin, 1930) 285-325, see 307-10. 170 See De veritate, q. 10, a. 4 c. 171 See Cajetan's commentary on Summa theologiae, i, q. 86, a. l, §§6-8, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis ... Opera omnia, tome 5: Pars la, q. 50-119 (Romae: ex typographia Polyglotta, 1939) 348-49; Joseph de Tonquedec, La critique de la connaissance (Paris: Beauchesne, 1929) 146-50. 172 De veritate, q. 10, a. 5, ad im. 173 See note 167. All but De veritate, q. 2, a. 6 c., speak of the species which is principle of the act; knowledge of this species supposes metaphysical analysis and reflection; but notes 144 and 149 above, together with the complicated peculiarity of the agent object as object (see note 191 below), will supply the reader with materials for grasping why Aquinas should not have adverted to the obvious difficulty mentioned in the text above.

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or whether he was influenced by the Paraphrases of Themistius, which do not suppose metaphysical knowledge,174 can hardly be determined. But what is plain is that the Pars prima presents a significant variation. It mendons not merely the item of metaphysical knowledge, the 'species qua,' but also the item of anyone's knowledge, the 'species quae' that intellect understands in phantasm.175 Evidently this change accounts for the substitution of 'quasi quamdam reflexionem' for the elaborate process of reflection of earlier passages. Revert to the problem: man by his imagination knows a singular and by his intellect understands a universal nature; the question raised is how can he know that the universal nature he understands is the nature of the singular that he is imagining; the very terms of the question involve reflection on one's acts of understanding and imagining; and the very nature of understanding, which initially is insight into phantasm, supplies the answer. Intellectual knowledge of the contingent raises no further problem.176 But there does remain a prior issue, namely: How can the act existing in a material organ, such as the phantasm, be the agent object of immaterial intellect? Now Aquinas himself was concerned with this possibility. He pointed out that, since the objects of Platonist science were immaterial ideas, Platonist doctrine had no use for an agent intellect; on the other hand, since the objects of Aristotelian science were material things and only potentially intelligible, there had to be a power of the soul to illuminate phantasms, make them intelligible in act, make them objects in act,177 produce the immaterial in act,178 produce the universal,179 by way of abstracting species from individual matter or from material conditions.180 174 Themistii Paraphrases Aristotelis librorum quae supersunt; see In III de Anima, 4, ed. Leonardus Spengel (Leipzig: Teubner, 1866) 176, 18 - 178, 30. The date of the medieval Latin translation has been discovered recently in a Toledo MS. The translation was completed at Viterbo, Nov. 22, 1267. See Gerard Verbeke, 'Les sources et la chronologic de Commentaire de S. Thomas d'Aquin au De anima d'Aristote,' Revue philosophique de Louvain 45 (1947) 314-38; see P-317175 Summa theologiae, i, q. 86, a. l c. See ibid. q. 85, a. l, ad 5m; 3, q. 11, a. 2, ad im; etc. 176 Ibid, l, q. 86, a. 3 c. See pages 75-78 above. 177 Ibid. q. 79, a. 4, ad 3m; a. 7 c. 178 Ibid. a. 4, ad 4m. 179 Ibid. a. 5, ad 2m; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1O, ad 14m. 180 Summa theologiae, l, q. 79, aa. 3 et 4; In IIIDe anima, lect. 10; De spiritualibus creaturis, aa. 9 and 10; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 76-78.

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Such statements raise three questions: what precisely is illuminated, immaterialized, universalized; in what does the illumination, immaterialization, universalization consist; and how can that provide an object in act for the possible intellect? As to the first question, it is plain that phantasms are illuminated, immaterialized, universalized, made intelligible in act. Aquinas said so repeatedly. More precisely, it is phantasm, not in the sense of act of the imagination, but in the sense of what is imagined, that is illuminated; for what is illuminated is what will be known; and certainly, insights into phantasm are not insights into the nature of acts of imagination but insights into the nature of what imagination presents; as Aquinas put it, insight into phantasm is like looking in, not looking at, a mirror. |H| As to the second question, there is an interesting Thomist objection against a possible Averroist alternative that would account for our knowing by a separate possible intellect on the ground that species in the separate intellect irradiate our phantasms. The objection runs: Secundo, quod talis irradiatio phantasmatum non poterit facere quod phantasmata sint intelligibilia actu: non enim fmnt phantasmata intelligibilia actu nisi per abstractionem; hoc autem magis erit receptio quam abstractio. Et iterum, cum omnis receptio sit secundum naturam recepti,0 irradiatio specierum intelligibilium quae sunt in intellectu possibili, non erit in phantasmatibus quae sunt in nobis, intelligibiliter sed sensibiliter et materialiter ...lte From this passage it would seem that Aquinas did not consider his own theory to involve the reception in phantasm of some virtue or quality; what he affirmed was an abstraction that is opposed to reception. The foregoing is negative. On the positive side there is a list of four 181 De veritate, q. 2, a. 6 c. See q. 10, a. 9 c. 182 ['Secondly, (there is this) that such an illumination of phantasms cannot bring it about that the phantasms are actually intelligible; for phantasms do not become actually intelligible except through abstraction; but this (illumination) will be more a reception than an abstraction. And again, since all reception occurs according to the nature of what is received, the illumination (that comes from) the intelligible species which are in the possible intellect will not be intelligibly in the phantasms which are within us but (rather will be there) sensibly and materially'] De unitate intellectus, c. 4 (ed. Keeler, §98). The 'irradiatio phantasmatum' is an objective genitive; the 'irradiatio specierum' seems to be a genitive of origin.

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requirements: the presence of agent intellect; the presence of phantasms; proper dispositions of the sensitive faculties; and, inasmuch as understanding one thing depends on understanding another, practice.183 The first two requirements recur in a description of illumination of phantasm as a particular case of the general increase of sensitive power resulting from the conjunction of sense with intellect.184 The third requirement is connected with the work of the cogitativa which operates under the influence of intellect185 and prepares suitable phantasms;186 the significance of this preparation appears from the statement that different intelligible species result from different arrangements of phantasms just as different meanings result from different arrangements of letters.187 The fourth requirement is a matter of common experience: the expert can understand where the layman can be only puzzled; the expert sees problems where the layman can barely suspect them. The third question is whether the foregoing really suffices. It suffices if it enables one to distinguish between intelligible in potency, intelligible in act but understood in potency, and understood in act, just as clearly and precisely as we distinguish between colors in the dark, colors in daylight but not actually seen, and colors actually seen. Moreover, since the work of the cogitativa and the influence of past experience regard particular instances of understanding, the main burden of accounting for the threefold distinction must rest upon the prior requirements, namely, the presence of agent intellect and the presence of phantasms. Now I think that any reader who will recall what has been gathered from Aquinas's statements on intellectual light188 will also see that Aquinas in affirming an abstractive illumination of phantasm has left us not a puzzle but a solution. The imagined object as merely imagined and as present to a merely sensitive consciousness (subject) is not, properly speaking, intelligible in potency;189 but the same object present to a subject that is intelligent 183 184 185 186 187 188 189

Summa theologiae, \, q. 79, a. 4, ad 3m. Ibid. q. 85, a. l, ad 4m. Ibid. q. 78, a. 4, ob. 5 and ad 5m. Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 73, §§ 14-16 and 26-28. Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 173, a. 2 c. See pages 91-96 above. Depotentia, q. 7, a. 10 c.: 'ipsa res quae est extra animam, omnino est extra genus intelligibile' ['the thing which is outside the soul is altogether outside the intelligible genus']. The meaning is that material entities of themselves are not related to intellectual knowledge; the context deals with the nonreciprocal real relation of scientia ad scibile [knowledge to the knowable].

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as well as sensitive may fairly be described as intelligible in potency. Thus, pure reverie, in which image succeeds image in the inner human cinema with never a care for the why or wherefore, illustrates the intelligible in potency. But let active intelligence intervene:190 there is a care for the why and wherefore; there is wonder and inquiry; there is the alertness of the scientist or technician, the mathematician or philosopher, for whom the imagined object no longer is merely given but also a some thing-to-beunderstood. It is the imagined object as present to intelligent consciousness as something-to-be-understood that constitutes the intelligible in act. Further, this illumination of the imagined object, this reception of it within the field of intellectual light, has the characterisdc of being abstractive; for it is not the imagined object in all respects that is regarded as a somethingto-be-understood; no one spontaneously endeavors to understand why 'here' is 'here' and why 'now' is not 'then'; effort is confined to grasping natures, just as explanation is always in terms of the character of persons, the natures of things, the circumstances of events, but never in terms of their being then and there. Finally, inquiry and wonder give place to actual understanding; the imagined object no longer is something-to-be-understood but something actually understood;f this involves no difference in the phantasm but only in the possible intellect, just as the difference between colors in daylight and colors actually seen involves no difference in the colors but only in eyes and sight; accordingly, the intelligible 'species quae,' which is understood in phantasm, is like the actually seen color, which is seen in the colored thing.191 It remains that a note be added on the per se infallibility of intellect. In Aristode as well as Aquinas it is described by pointing out that definitions 190 This intervention would be what is meant by Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. i, ad 3m: 'ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata ...' ['from the (attention of) agent intellect being turned upon phantasms'] 191 'Actually seen' is predicated of color by extrinsic denomination;g similarly the actu intellectum [actually understood] is not a reality received in the phantasm. Hence the accuracy of the expression (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 59, § 14) that has phantasms actu intellecta [actually understood] inasmuch as they are one with the actuated possible intellect. This factor is to be borne in mind in connection with the problems raised by notes 34, 35, 144, 149, 173. Though I have spoken throughout in terms of what the species qua ultimately proves to be, namely, a principium formale quo [formal principle by which] (De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 9, ad 6m), accurate interpretation must include awareness of a gradual process of clarification and, no less, of the economic survival in later works of less accurate modes of speech which do not affect the immediate issue.

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are neither true nor false.I9a But infallibility seems to mean more than such a negation, and in fact there is another element to be observed in the original Aristotelian statement and in the Thomist commentary. It is that infallibility is with respect to the first object of intellect, the quod quid est, the to ti en einai; further, infallibility in direct understanding is like the infallibility of sight. Plainly, this seems to suggest that one examine insight for its infallibility; moreover, what one finds seems to me to provide a desired positive complement to the negation that definitions are neither true nor false. No one misunderstands things as he imagines them: for insight into phantasm to be erroneous either one must fancy what is not or else fail to imagine what is; of itself, per se, apart from errors in imagining, insight is infallible; and, were that not so, one would not expect to correct misunderstandings by pointing out what has been overlooked or by correcting what mistakenly has been fancied. 6

Conclusion

Abstraction is from matter, and matter is an analogous term. One makes an initial approximation to the analogy by considering the proportion of wood to tables and bronze to statues; this broad analogy makes matter the subject of change or of difference, and so substance and genus are instances of matter. But an observation made by Averroes and repeated by Aquinas193 fixes the proximately relevant analogy: natural form stands to natural matter as the object of insight (forma intelligibilis) stands to the object of imagination (materia sensibilis); the former part of this analogy supplies the basis for an account of the metaphysical conditions of abstraction; the latter part supplies the basis for its psychological description. On the metaphysical side, because the material thing has an intelligible component, form, it follows that what is known by understanding is real and not merely ideal as materialists, idealists, and pseudorealists are prone to assume. Again, because the thing is form and matter, there is a possible knowledge of the thing by abstraction of form from matter. Further, because matter is a principle of limitation, so that form of itself is universal,194 this abstract knowledge will be universal. But the act of knowing is as much an ontological reality as the known: as the thing is constituted deter192 In IIIDe anima, lect. 11, § 762. 193 Deveritate, q. 10, a. 8, ad im (lae ser.). 194 Ibid. q. 10, a. 5 c.

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minately by its form, so the knowing is constituted determinately by its form, which will be similar to the form of the known; on the other hand, there cannot be material as well as formal assimilation of knowing to known, else the knowing would be, but not know, the known; further, where the knowing has the characteristics of necessity and universality, its form must be received immaterially; finally, a general theorem that knowledge is by immateriality may be constructed within the assumptions of the Thomist system. On the psychological side, because the object of insight is the object of preconceptual knowing, there is a certain vacillation in its description. Primarily insight adds to our knowledge a grasp of intelligible unity in sensible multiplicity; as the grasp of this unity, it is intelligentia indivisibilium.19-1 Still, it is not any unity or unity in general that is grasped, but the unity specific and proportionate to the sensible multiplicity presented; further, this intelligible unity divides the sensible multiplicity into a part necessary for the unity to be the unity it is and, on the other hand, a residue that also happens to be given; the former part is described as paries speciei, de ratione speciei, materia communis; the latter residual part is described as paries materiae. The dividing line does not always fall in the same place: physical abstraction is from individual or assigned matter with its consequents of determinate place and time and the possibility of change; mathematical abstraction is from sensible matter (hot and cold, wet and dry, bright and dark, etc.) as well. The so-called third degree of abstraction is more properly named a separation; it is different in kind from the preceding; because it is a separation, disputes about real distinctions are disputes about the validity of metaphysical concepts. Forma intelligibilis would seem to be, at least normally, the specific intelligible unity. Quidditas rei materialis is the intelligible unity plus common matter; primarily, it is the quiddity of substance;196 but it is sound Aristotelian doctrine to speak of the quiddities of accidents.197 Species has both the meaning of form and the meaning of quiddity.198 There are three stages to physical and mathematical abstraction: the objective, the apprehensive, the formative. Objective abstraction is the illu-

195 Aristotle's study of unity is a study of the adiaireton; Metaphysics, X, 1, 10523 36; b 15. Hence, De anima, III, 6, 43Oa 26; 43Ob 5; Aquinas, In IIIDe anima, lect. 11. 196 Summa theologiae, l, q. 85, a. 5 c. 197 In VII Metaphys., lect. 4. 198 Ibid. lect. 9, § 1473.

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mination of phantasm, the imagined object; it consists in treating the imagined object as something to be understood as far as its specific nature goes; like action and passion, it is one reality with two aspects; as effected by agent intellect, it may be named efficient; as affecting the imagined object, it may be named instrumental. Next, with regard to apprehensive abstraction, one has to distinguish between first act and second act: first act is the possible intellect informed and actuated by a species qua; second act proceeds from first as esse from form and action from principle of action; accordingly, the procession is processio operationis; the second act consists in grasping, knowing, considering an intelligible species quaein the imagined object. Per se this second act is infallible; consequent to it by a sort of reflection, there is indirect, intellectual knowledge of the singular, that is, a reflective grasping that the universal nature understood is the nature of the particular imagined. Thirdly, there is the act of formative abstraction; this consists in an act of meaning or defining; but whenever there is an act of meaning or defining, by that very fact there is something meant or defined; accordingly, formative abstraction may also be described as positing a universal ratio or an intentio intellecta. The principal efficient cause of apprehensive abstraction is agent intellect; the instrumental efficient cause is the illuminated phantasm; hence not only is the impression of the species qua a passio but also the consequent second act, intelligere, is a pati; again, the procession of species qua and intelligere from agent intellect and phantasm is a processio operati; but, as already noted, the procession of intelligere from species qua is processio operationis. Now formative abstraction proceeds from apprehensive abstraction just as the apprehensive abstraction proceeds from agent intellect and phantasm; hence its procession is processio operati; and, as ground of this procession, intelligere is named dicere. However, the procession of the formative abstraction has a special property; it is an emanatio intelligibilis, an activity of rational consciousness, the production of a product because and inasmuch as the sufficiency of the sufficient grounds for the product are known. Just as we affirm existence because and inasmuch as we know the sufficiency of sufficient grounds for affirming it, so also we mean and define essences because and inasmuch as we understand them. In similar fashion by processio operati and emanatio intelligibilis a rational act of love proceeds from a judgment of value. Let us now compare objects. Objective abstraction, the illumination of phantasm, constitutes the imagined object as something to be understood with regard to its specific nature. Apprehensive abstraction, insight into

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phantasm, actually understands what objective abstraction presented to be understood. But what was presented to be understood was the imagined object, the phantasm; hence it was perfectly natural and no less reasonable for Aquinas so repeatedly to affirm that the object of human intellect in this life was the phantasm; if one cannot see that, then it would seem that one has very little idea of what Aquinas was talking about. But if what is understood is the phantasm, the imagined object, still what is added to knowledge, what is known, precisely by understanding is the forma intelligibilis, the quiddity, the species intelligibilis quae. This is known in phantasm just as actually seen colors are seen in colored things. It is not merely that there is the act of understanding and simultaneously the act of imagination, each with its respective object. But the two objects are intrinsically related: the imagined object is presented as something to be understood; and the insight or apprehensive abstraction grasps the intelligibility of the imagined object in the imagined object; thus, insight grasps imagined equal radii in a plane surface as the necessary and sufficient condition of an imagined uniform curve; imagination presents terms which insight intelligibly relates or unifies.1" Thus, while apprehensive abstraction is not of material conditions, still it is not of something apart from material conditions. It is formative abstraction that sets up the object that is apart from material conditions; it does so by meaning it or by defining it; one can mean 'circle' without meaning any particular instance of circle; but one cannot grasp, intuit, know by inspection the necessary and sufficient condition of circularity except in a diagram. In terms of the universal, apprehensive abstraction knows the universal in a particular instance; formative abstraction knows the universal that is common to many; and reflection on formative abstraction knows the universal as universal, the universal precisely as common to many. Again, the objects of apprehensive and of formative abstraction are essentially the same but modally different; they are essentially the same, for it is the same essence that is known; they are modally different, for what apprehensive abstraction knows only in the imagined instance, formative abstraction knows apart from any instances. On the other hand, though 199 This is the critical point in philosophy. For a materialist the terms are real, the intelligible unification subjective; for an idealist the terms cannot be reality, and the intelligible unification is not objective; for the Platonist the terms are not reality but the intelligible unifications are objective in another world; for the Aristotelian both are objective in this world; Thomism adds a third category, existence, to Aristotelian matter and form.

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apprehensive abstraction must be with respect to an instance it must always be of a universal for always the individual is pars materiae; but while formative abstraction can posit the universal apart from any instance, still the act of meaning can mean the individual just as easily as it can mean the universal; but it means the universal in virtue of apprehensive abstraction, and it means the particular in virtue of consequent indirect knowledge of the particular; and so while the particular can be meant, it cannot be defined explanatorily, quidditatively. Finally, there is the contrast between quidditas and res: apprehensive abstraction knows the quidditas such as humanitas; formative abstraction posits the res such as homo; again, apprehensive abstraction knows the forma intelligibilis, but formative abstraction posits the thing in which metaphysical analysis will uncover a forma naturalis. Our plan of operations has been to investigate, first, the psychology relevant to an account of the Thomist concept of verbum; secondly, the relevant metaphysics; thirdly, issues in which the relevant psychology and metaphysics are inextricably joined together; and fourthly, the application of this psychology and metaphysics to divine knowledge. This chapter concludes the first three sections of the investigation. All that has been said so far and all that remains to be said can be reduced to a single proposition that, when Aquinas used the term intelligibik, his primary meaning was not whatever can be conceived, such as matter, nothing, and sin, but whatever can be known by understanding. The proof of such a contention can only be inductive, that is, it increases cumulatively as the correspondence between the contention with its implications and, on the other hand, the statements of Aquinas is found to exist exactly, extensively, and illuminatively. But, may it be noted, the proof of any opposed view cannot but have the same inductive character; insofar as such proofs of opposed views exist, perhaps some readers will agree with me in not finding their correspondence with the statements of Aquinas to offer a comparable measure of exactitude, extent, and light.

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5 Imago Dei

... quia et illic intelligendo conspicimus tanquam dicentem, et verbum eius, id est, Patrem et Filium, atque inde procedentem charitatem utrique communem, scilicet Spiritum sanctum. St Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, vi, 10 (PL 42, 1064) ... primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus. St Thomas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 93, a. 7 c. Our inquiry began from the observation of a strange contrast.' St Augustine restricted the image of God within us to the ratio superior? St Thomas restricted the image to the principium verbi, verbum, and amor of rational 1 See the first three paragraphs of chapter i above. [The Augustine passage used as a motto for the chapter is translated as follows: '... because, if we use our understanding, we see one there who is speaking, and the word he utters, that is, the Father and the Son, and proceeding (from them) the charity that is common to the two, namely, the Holy Spirit.' And the Aquinas passage: '... the image of the Trinity in the mind is considered primarily and principally according to acts, namely, insofar as in our thinking we form an inner word from the knowledge we have, and from this we burst forth into love.'] 2 ['higher reason'] St Augustine, De Trinitate, XII, iv, 4; vii, 10 (PL 42, 1OOO, 1003-4).

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creatures.3 But in prevalent theological opinion there is as good an analogy to the procession of the Word in human imagination as in human intellect, while the analogy to the procession of the Holy Spirit is wrapped in deepest obscurity.4 It seemed possible to eliminate the obscurity connected with the second procession by eliminating the superficiality connected with opinions on the first. With this end in view we have devoted four chapters to an exploration of related points in Thomist metaphysics and rational psychology. We now turn to the imago Dei,5 which is the central issue both in Aquinas's thought on verbum and, as well, in our inquiry. l

Ipsum Intelligere

There are two radically opposed views of knowing.6 For the Platonist, knowing is primarily a confrontation;3 it supposes the duality of knower and known; it consists in a consequent, added movement. The supposition of duality appears in Plato's inference that, because we know ideas, therefore ideas subsist. The conception of knowing as movement appears in Plato's dilemma that the subsistent Idea of Being either must be in movement or else must be without knowing.7 The same dilemma forced Plotinus to place the One beyond knowing; Nous could not be first, because Nous could not be simple. In St Augustine the notion that knowing is by confrontation appears in the affirmation that we somehow see and consult the eternal reasons. In the medieval writers of the Augustinian reaction, knowing as confrontation reappears in the species impressa that is an object, and in the doctrine of intuitive, intellectual cognition of material and singular existents. To cut a long story short, contemporary dogmatic realists escape the critical problem by asserting a confrontation of intellect with concrete reality. For the Aristotelian, on the other hand, confrontation is secondary. Primarily and essentially, knowing is perfection, act, identity. Sense in act is 3 ['the principle of the word, the word, (and) love'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 93, a. 6 c. 4 [See Billot on the first point, and Penido on the second (references in notes l and 2 of chapter l, above).] 5 We refer to the imago similitudinis [image of likeness] of trinitarian theory. On the imago conformitatis [image of conformity], see P. Paluscsak, 'Imago Dei in homine,' Xenia Thomistica, ed. Sadoc Szabo (Romae: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1925) 119-54. 6 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 98, §§ 19-20. 7 Plato, Sophist, 2486.

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the sensible in act. Intellect in act is the intelligible in act. In this material world, of course, besides the knower in act and the known in act, there are also the knower in potency and the known in potency; and while the former are identical, still the latter are distinct. Nonetheless, potency is not essential to knowing, and therefore distinction is not essential to knowing. It follows that in immaterial substances, as one negates potency, so also one negates distinction: 'In his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intelligens et intellectum.'8 A Platonist subsistent Idea of Being would have to sacrifice immobility to have knowledge; but Aristotle, because he conceived knowing as primarily not confrontation but identity in act, was able to affirm the intelligence in act of his immovable mover. As there are two radically opposed views of knowing, so there are two radically opposed views of intellect. All men are aware of their sensations. All educated men, at least, are aware of their thoughts, and so of the division of thoughts into concepts, judgments, and inferences. But only Aristotelians are sufficiently aware of their intellects to turn this awareness to philosophic account. Between the activities of sense and, on the other hand, the concepts, judgments, and inferences that constitute thought, there stands the intellect itself. Unlike the natures of material things, which can be known only by what they do, human intellect can be known by what it is. Efficiently, it is the light of intelligence within us, the drive to wonder, to reflection, to criticism, the source of all science and philosophy. Receptively, it offers the three aspects of potency, habit, and act. As potency, human intellect is the capacity to understand; it is common to all men, for even the stupidest of men at least occasionally understand. As habit, human intellect is fivefold: it is nous, grasping the point; episteme, grasping its implications; reflective sophia and phronesis, understanding what is and what is to be done, and finally techne, grasping how to do it. These habits are not the habitual possession of concepts, judgments, syllogisms. A sergeant major with his manual-at-arms by rote knows his terms, his principles, his reasons; he expounds them with ea§e, with promptitude, and perhaps with pleasure; but he is exactly what is not meant by a man of developed intelligence. For intellectual habit is not possession of the book but freedom from the book. It is the birth and life in us of the light and evidence by which we operate on our own. It enables us to recast definitions, to adjust principles, to throw chains of reasoning into new perspectives 8 ['In the immaterial order, the understander and the understood are identical'] Aristotle, De anima, III, 4, 4303 3-5; Metaphysics, XII, 9, iO75a 3-4.

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according to variations of circumstance and exigencies of the occasion. As intellectual habit is freedom from the book, so its genesis is not tied to the book. In every first instance there were no books. In every second instance what is needed is not a book but a teacher, a man who understands, a man who can break down the book's explanation into still more numerous steps for the tardy, and contrariwise, for the intelligent reduce the book's excessive elaborateness to essentials. Intellectual habits, then, are not habits of concepts, judgments, inferences; they are habits of understanding; from them with promptitude, ease, pleasure, there results intelligence in act. Finally, it is intelligence in act that is the intellect, knowable and known by what it is, and so the known sufficient ground and cause of what it does. To define, not as a parrot but intelligently, intelligence must be in act; for definition is but the expression of intelligence in act. To infer, not as a mere logical exercise but as learning, intelligence in act must be developing and expressing its development in an inference. To judge rationally and responsibly, intelligence must reach the reflective act that terminates a sweep through all relevant evidence, past as well as present, sensible as well as intellectual, to grasp the sufficiency of the evidence for the judgment.9 Against this view of intellect, there stands only its privation. Conceptualists conceive human intellect only in terms of what it does; but their neglect of what intellect is, prior to what it does, has a variety of causes. Most commonly they do not advert to the act of understanding. They take concepts for granted; they are busy working out arguments to produce certitudes; they prolong their spontaneous tendencies to extroversion into philosophy, where they concentrate on metaphysics and neglect gnoseology. Still, a conceptualist can advert to the fact of understanding, to the difference between intelligent men and stupid men, to opposed manners of systematic conception with consequent oppositions in judgments and inferences. But advertence falls short of analysis. It is one thing to be aware of one's intelligence in act; it is another to distinguish agent and possible intellect, to compare possible intellect in potency, in habit, and in act, to relate intelligence in act, on the one hand, to sensible and imagined data and, on the other hand, to concepts, judgments, and inferences. Finally, one can advert to intelligence and know how it is analyzed and yet recoil from accepting the analysis. It is so much more difficult to do philosophy when's one's hands are tied by an array of facts; it is so much more easy to 9 See above, chapters i and 2.

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affirm an intellectual intuition of concrete reality, and thus eliminate so many problems, when the exact nature of the intellect is shrouded in obscurity. Such are the basic positions. The Platonist conceives knowing as primarily confrontation, but the Aristotelian conceives knowing as primarily perfection, act, identity; again, the conceptualist knows human intellect only by what it does, but the intellectualist knows and analyzes not only what intelligence in act does but also what it is. It is not too surprising that conceptualists, who do not advert to their own acts of understanding, fail to observe such advertence in Aristotle and in Aquinas. The logical consequences of such a failure have, quite fortunately for my purpose, been put down in black and white.10 Are not Aristode's forms just Plato's Ideas, plucked from their noetic heaven, and shoved into material things? Is not Aristotle's abstraction just a psychological fabrication, invented to provide us with knowledge of the Platonic Ideas thrust into material things? Let us add a third question: Does there not seem to be a Rube Goldberg love of complexity in distinguishing between agent intellect, illuminated phantasm, possible intellect, intelligible species, intellection as production, inner word, and intellection as knowing, when all that results is the same spiritual look at a universal that John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham attained so much more simply and directly? I do hope that conceptualist interpreters of Aristotle and Aquinas will read and study Fr Day's book and will be roused to something better than his and their suppositions. For the intellectualist, obviously, it is impossible to confuse the Aristotelian form with the Platonic Idea. Form is the ousia that is not a universal,11 but a cause of being.12 Ontologically it is intermediary between material multiplicity and flux and, on the other hand, that intelligible and determinate unity we call ens, unum, and quid. Form is what causes matter to be a thing. On the cognitional side, form is known in knowing the answer to the question, Why are these sensible data to be conceived as of one thing, of a man, of a house?13 But knowing why and knowing the cause, like knowing the reason and knowing the real reason, are descriptions of the act of 10 Sebastian J. Day, Intuitive Cognition, A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics (St Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1947) 30-31. 11 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 16, lO4ia 4. 12 Ibid. V, 8, lOl7b 14-16; VII, 17, 104139-10; lO4lb 7-8; 25-27. 13 Ibid. VII, 17, lO4ia 9 - I04lb 9.

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understanding. As, then, form mediates causally between matter and thing, so understanding mediates causally between sensible data and conception. By a stroke of genius Aristode replaced mythical Platonic anamnesis by psychological fact, and, to describe the psychological fact, eliminated the subsistent Ideas to introduce formal causes in material things. To complete the answer to Fr Day, one need only note that primarily intellect is understanding and that understanding of the material is universal.14 As the Aristotelian form differs from the Platonic Idea, so the Aristotelian separate substance differs from the Platonic separate Idea. The separate Idea is what is known by confrontation in conception. The separate substance is at once a pure form and a pure act of understanding. When we understand, we understand with respect to sensible data. But the separate substances understand, yet have no senses. As their understanding is not of this or that sensible presentation, so it is not potency but act, and not by confrontation with the other but by and in identity with the self. 'In his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intelligens et intellectum.' Aristotle did not anticipate Hegel to posit the Absolute thinking relative thought. He extrapolated from insight into phantasm to posit pure understanding unlimited by sensible presentation. If you object that modern interpreters translate noesis noeseos as 'thinking thought,' I readily grant what this implies, namely, that modern interpreters suppose Aristode to have been a conceptualist. But also I retort that medieval translators did not write 'cogitatio cogitationis' but 'intelligentia intelligentiae.'15It seems to follow that medieval translators did not regard Aristode as a conceptualist. Aquinas accepted and developed Aristotle. He took over the distinction between agent and possible intellect, the latter's dependence on phantasm, the account of its potency, habits, and acts, and the distinction between the two operations of intellect. From Augustinian speculation on the procession of the inner word, he was led to distinguish far more sharply than Aristotle did between intelligence in act and its products of definition and judgment. But his greater debt was to Augustinian theory of 14 See Fr Day's argument, Intuitive Cognition 3-36. For corrections of W.Jaeger, see Francois Nuyens, L'evolution de la psychologic d'Aristote (Louvain: L'Institut Superieur de Philosophic; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; and Paris: Vrin, 1948). 15 ['a thinking of thought'; 'an understanding of understanding'] In XII Metaphys,, lect. ll [both in the Latin translation of Aristotle published with Thomas's commentary, and in the latter at §2617]; Summa theologiae, \, q. 79, a. 10; De substantiis separatis, c. 12 (Mandonnet ed., I, 117).

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judgment with its appeal to the eternal reasons; Aquinas transposed this appeal into his own 'participatio creata lucis increatae' to secure for the Aristotelian theory of knowing by identity the possibility of self-transcendence in finite intellect.16 On his own, Aquinas identified intelligible species with intellectual habit to relate species to intelligere as form to esse,17 a parallel that supposes a grasp of the real distinction between finite essence and existence.18 While Aristotle had only one kind of separate substance, Aquinas worked out distinct theories of God as ipsum intelligere and of angels, in whom essence, existence, intellect, and intelligere are really distinct.19 From the Sentences he appreciated the advantage of knowing as identity in reconciling divine simplicity with divine knowledge.20 From the Sentences he appreciated the problem that knowing as identity creates for knowledge of the other.21 Still, there is to be discerned an increasing Aristotelianism. In the De veritate the appeal is to immateriality as principle of both knowing and being known;22 in the Contra Gentiles immateriality is one argument out of many,23 with Aristotelian considerations abundant;24 in the Summa theologiae this exuberance is pruned. Sense differs from the sensible, intellect differs from the intelligible, only inasmuch as they are in potency. But in God there is no potency. Hence in God substance, essence, esse, intellect, species, intelligere axe all one and the same.25 Indeed, in divine 16 ['a created participation of uncreated light'] See pages 94-99 above. See Luigi d'Izzalini, Ilprincipio intellettivo della ragione umana nelle Opere di S. Tommaso d'Aquino: Studio storico-speculativo (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1943-) 17 De veritate, q. 10, a. 2 c. ad fin.; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 4 c.; q. 34, a. i, ad 2m. Cajetan, In I, q. 12, a. 2, XVI (ed. Leon., rv, 119). 18 It is not surprising that Siger of Brabant and Godfrey of Fontaines, who denied the real distinction, also should deny such a distinction between species and intelligere. Nor again is it surprising that Herve de Nedellec, who denied the real distinction (see Edgar Hocedez, Aegidii Romani theoremata de esse et essentia [Louvain: Museum Lessianum, 1930] [92]-[94J), conceived the species as a movens (Josephus Koch, ed., Durandi de S. Porciano O.P., quaestio de natura cognitionis et Disputatio cum anonymo quodam necnon Determinatio Hervei Natalis O.P. [Opuscula et Textus (ed. M. Grabmann and F. Pelster) fasc. 6, Munster: Aschendorff, 1935] 67) contrary to De veritate, q. 22, a. 5, ad 8m. 19 Summa theologiae, 1, q. 54, aa. 1-3, and loca parallela. 20 Super I Sententiarum, d. 35, q. l, a. l, ad 3m. 21 Ibid. a. 2. 22 De veritate, q. 2, a. 2 c. 23 Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 44, §5. 24 Ibid. cc. 45-48. 25 Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, aa. 2, 4.

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self-knowledge it is impossible to say that knowing and known are similar, for similarity supposes duality, and until one reaches trinitarian doctrine, one knows nothing of more than one in God.26 When Aquinas spoke of God as ipsum intelligere, did he mean that God was a pure act of understanding? To that conclusion we have been working through four chapters. But to cap that cumulative argument, there comes the impossibility of Aquinas having meant anything else. Either ipsum intelligere is analogous to sensation, or it is analogous to understanding, or it is analogous to conception, or it is analogous to nothing that we know. No one will affirm that ipsum intelligere is analogous to sensation. But it cannot be analogous to conception; for it is the dicens, dicere, verbum of trinitarian theory that is analogous to conception; and ipsum intelligereis demonstrable by the natural light of reason, while trinitarian doctrine is not. Further, in trinitarian theory intelligere is essential act common to Father, Son, and Spirit, while dicere is notional act and proper to the Father. Finally, there is a divine knowing prior in the order of our conception to the divine utterance of verbum: 'Ipse autem conceptus cordis de ratione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet, a notitia concipientis';27 and that prior knowing, that prior notitia, cannot be conceptual; it cannot be conceptual in potency, for in God there is no potency; it cannot be conceptual in habit, for in God there is no habit; it cannot be conceptual in act, for then conception in act would be prior to itself. But if ipsum intelligere is analogous neither to sensation nor to conception, it is not a solution to say that it is analogous to nothing that we know; for what is unknown cannot be meant or even named.28 It remains that ipsum intelligere is analogous to understanding, that God is an infinite and substantial act of understanding, that as the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, so also each is one 26 Ibid. q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m. 27 ['but the interior concept itself has this in its very idea that it proceeds from another, namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving (the word)'] Ibid. q. 34, a. l c. 28 Ibid. q. 13, a. l c.: 'Secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, sic a nobis potest nominari' ['Insofar, therefore, as something can be known by us intellectually, it can also be named by us']. It may be said that the prior notitia is analogous to consciousness. But consciousness is either concomitant, reflective, or rational. Concomitant consciousness is awareness of one's act and oneself in knowing something else; this has no place in God, who knows first himself and then other things. Reflective consciousness supposes concomitant consciousness. Rational consciousness pertains to the intelligible procession of inner words, to the fact that they proceed from sufficient grounds because they are known to be sufficient.

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and the same infinite and substantial act of understanding, finally that, though each is the pure act of understanding, still only the Father understands as uttering the Word.29 2

The Necessity of Verbum

We began our inquiry by listing seven elements in the Thomist concept of an inner word.30 Six of these have been elucidated sufficiently. It remains that the necessity of the inner word be treated. A few elementary points may be mentioned briefly. We are not concerned with the concept of verbum in the commentary on the Sentences, in which Thomist thought on this issue had not yet matured.31 We are not concerned with the necessity of an object for a cognitional act. If there is an intelligere, there must be an intellectum as well as an intelligent, but this does not prove the necessity of a verbum; for a verbum has two notes; it is not only intellectum but also expressum ab alio?2 We are not concerned with the necessity of the occurrence of verbum in our minds. That is perfectly simple: Once one understands, the proportionate cause for the inner word exists; once the proportionate cause exists, the effect follows, unless some impediment intervenes; but no impediment can intervene between understanding and its inner word.33 Hence, granted we understand, it necessarily follows that we utter an inner word. We are not concerned with the necessity quoad se of the Word in God; whatever is in God is necessary. But we are concerned with the essential necessity of the inner word in us; why is our knowledge such that inner words are necessary in it? Next, we are concerned with the necessity quoad nos of an inner word in divine self29 Ibid. q. 34, a. l, ad 3m; a. 2, ad 4m. 30 See pages 13-24 above. 31 See above, p. 25, note 52. Scripture speaks not only of the Word of God (God the Son) but also of the word of God (God's revelation, manifestation). Both elements are found in St Augustine's account of verbum (M. Schmaus, Diepsychologische Trinitatslehre des hi. Augustinus [Miinster: Aschendorff, 1927] 331-61). This perhaps lies behind the notion of the Sentences that verbum is species as ordained to manifestation. 32 [' (not only) understood (but also) expressed by something else'] De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c. 33 The will can prevent the occurrence of intelligere by preventing the occurrence of a corresponding phantasm. Again, the will is the cause of an act of belief, but though the latter is a verbum, it is not a verbum proceeding directly from an intelligere. But we cannot permit the occurrence of intelligere and yet prevent the procession of its immediate verbum.

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knowledge and in divine knowledge of the other. Why cannot we establish by the light of natural reason that there is a Word in God? Even if Aristotle's theorem that knowing is by identity excludes our demonstrating the existence of the Word from divine self-knowledge, still why cannot we demonstrate it from divine knowledge of the other? The essential necessity of inner words in us appears as soon as Aquinas got beyond the initial period of the Sentences. In the De veritate the Aristotelian parallel between nature and art was given its complement by a parallel between speculative and practical intellect. Practical intellect thinks out plans, designs, programs. Such plans, say, of an architect are the form whence external operation proceeds. But they cannot be the form whence proceeds the 'thinking out' that evolves the plans. There must be a prior form, the intellectual habit of art, that stands to the thinking as the thought-out plan stands to the external operation. But if nature and art are parallel, so that nature is but God's artistry, it follows that there will be a parallel between speculative knowledge of nature and practical knowledge of art. Just as the habit of art results in the thinking out of plans whence artefacts are produced, so speculative habit or form, by which we understand in act, results in the quidditas formata and the compositio vel divisio by which we come to knowledge of external things.34 Needless to say, this intermediate role of the inner word between our understanding and the external thing does not disappear in later Thomist thought.35 Hence, to ask about the essential necessity of inner words in us is to ask about the essential necessity of our complementing acts of understanding with inner words to obtain knowledge of external things. The answer will be had by comparing the object of understanding with the external things. Now the first and proper object of understanding, the 'what is known inasmuch as one understands,' must be simply intelligible; accordingly, the proportionate object of our intellects is the quidditas rei materialist6 This quiddity prescinds from individual matter, for individual matter is not intelligible in itself but only in its relation to the per se universality of forms which it individuates. Again, the quiddity prescinds from contingent existence, for contingent existence is not intelligible in itself but only in its relation to the necessarily Existent which is final, exemplary, and efficient 34 De veritate, q. 3, a. 2 c. 35 Ibid. q. 4, a. 2, ad 3m; Depotentia, q. 8, a. l c.; Summa theologiae, i, q. 34, a. i, ad 3m ad fin.; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9, ad im; Superloannem, c. l, lect. i. 36 See pp. 168-79 above.

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cause of contingent beings. The essential necessity of inner words in our intellects is the necessity of effecting the transition from the preconceptual quidditas rei materialis, first to the res, secondly to the res particularis, thirdly to the res particularis existens. The transition from quidditas rei to res, say from humanitas to homo, occurs in conception, in which there emerges intellect's natural knowledge of ens?1 In virtue of this step, understanding moves from identity with its preconceptual object to confrontation with its conceived object;b but as yet the object is only object of thought.38 The second step is a reflection on phantasm that enables one to mean, though not understand nor explanatorily define, the material singular.39 In this step intellect moves from a universal to a particular object of thought. Finally, by a reflective act of understanding that sweeps through all relevant data, sensible and intelligible, present and remembered, and grasps understanding's proportion to the universe as well,40 there is uttered the existential judgment through which one knows concrete reality. We turn to our second question. Why cannot natural reason demonstrate the existence of the divine Word from the premise of divine selfknowledge? First, the demonstration cannot be effected by contrasting the proper object of understanding with the divine essence. God is simply intelligible. He is pure form identical with existence. There is no distinction between his essence or his existence or his intellect or his understanding.41 There is not even a distinction0 between his esse naturale and his esse intelligibik.^ Secondly, the demonstration cannot be effected by arguing that without an inner word there would be no confrontation between subject and object. For one cannot demonstrate that such confrontation is essential to knowledge. Primarily and essentially, knowing is by identity. The natural light of reason will never get beyond that identity in demonstrating the nature of self-knowledge in the infinite simplicity of God. We turn to the third question. If divine self-knowledge has no need of an inner word, as far as natural theology goes, because the knowing is pure understanding and the known is simply intelligible and knowledge is by identity, still divine knowledge of the other seems to require an inner

37 38 39 40 41 42

See pp. 96-99 above. See pp. 165-66 above. See pp. 179-82 above. See pages 71-99 above. Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, aa. 2, 4. Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 47, §5.

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word. For the other is not simply intelligible, nor always in act, nor identical with the knower. Further, in confirmation of this argument, there is the fact that Aquinas wrote some of his finest passages on verbum in the context of divine knowledge of the other.43 In additional confirmation there is the familiar doctrine that secondary elements in the beatific vision are known in Verbo. Let us begin by considering the confirming arguments. The connection between the divine Word and the divine Ideas pertains to the whole Christian Platonist tradition,44 and can be traced back to Philo's conception of the Logos as containing the Ideas.45 It follows that one cannot say that Aquinas by an intrinsic exigence of his own thought was led to treat verbum in the context of the divine ideas. There may exist such an exigence or there may exist no more than a traditional association. On the latter alternative the confirming arguments do not confirm, and we may expect the latter alternative to be the correct one. The Platonist assumption that knowledge involves confrontation led later Scholastics to attribute to the ideas an esse obiectivum.^ Certainly Aquinas was free from that error, and so he can be expected to apply the Aristotelian theorem of knowledge by identity to reconcile divine simplicity with divine knowledge of the other. To handle the issue as expeditiously as possible,47 let us proceed in two steps: first, we draw distinctions with respect to our knowledge; secondly, we proceed from the finite model to God. With regard to our knowledge, distinguish (i) the thing with its virtual!ties, (2) the act of understanding with its primary and its secondary objects, (3) the expression of both primary and secondary objects in inner words. For example, the human soul formally is

43 De veritate, q. 3, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles, i, c. 53; Summa theologiae, l, q. 15, a. 2. 44 Rene Arnou, 'Platonisme des Peres,' Dictionnaire de theologie catholique 12 (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1935) 2338-48; Zte 'Platonismo'Patrum (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1935). 45 Harry Austryn Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 2nd printing revised, vol. i (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948) 204-6, 229-40. 46 ['objective being'] Guillelmi Alnwick, Quaestiones disputatae de esse intettigibili et de Quodlibet, ed. Athanasius Ledoux (Ad Claras Aquas, Florence: Ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1937); p. l gives the basic references. Constantin Michalski, Les courants philosophiques a Oxford et a Paris pendant le XTV siecle (Cracow: Imprimerie de 1'universite, 1921) is hard to obtain. 47 Summa theologiae, l, q. 15, aa. l, 2; q. 14, aa. 5, 6; q. 12, aa. 8-10; and loca parallela, especially Summa contra Gentiles, l, cc. 48-55; De veritate, q. 2, a. 3; q. 3, a. 2.

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an intellective soul, subsistent, immortal; it is not formally a sensitive soul nor a vegetative soul; but virtually it does possess the perfection without the imperfection of sensitive and vegetative souls. When, however, we understand the human soul, we understand as primary object an intellective soul and as secondary object the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul; both objects are understood formally and actually, but the secondary object is understood in the primary and in virtue of understanding the primary. Further, once understanding of the human soul has developed, there are not two acts of understanding but one, which primarily is of intellective soul and secondarily, in the perfection of intellective soul, is of the sensitive and vegetative souls. Finally, our one act of understanding expresses itself in many inner words, in which are defined intellective, sensitive, and vegetative souls and the relations between them; further, these inner words are the esse intelligibile or the esse intentionale of soul as distinct both from the esse naturale of soul itself and from the esse intelkctum, which is an extrinsic denomination from an intelligere of soul whether real or intentional. Now on Thomist analysis the divine essence formally is itself but eminently it contains all perfection. The divine act of understanding primarily is of the divine essence but secondarily of its virtualities.48 The divine Word that is uttered is one, but what is uttered in the one Word is all that God knows.49 Moreover, the divine essence, the divine act of understanding, and the divine Word considered absolutely are one and the same reality; hence there can be no real distinction between 'contained eminently in the essence' and 'secondary object of the understanding' or between either of these and 'uttered in the one Word.' Further, utterance in the one Word does not confer on the ideas an esse intelligibile that otherwise they would not possess; for in God esse naturale and esse intelligibile are identical.50 It remains, then, that divine knowledge of the other provides no premise whence the procession of the divine Word could be established by natural reason. The plurality of divine ideas within divine simplicity is accounted for by an infinite act of understanding grasping as secondary objects the perfections eminently contained in the divine essence and virtually in divine omnipotence. 5 ' As we can understand multa per unum>* all the more so can God. 48 Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, a. 5, ad 3m. 49 Ibid. q. 34, a. l, ad 3m. 50 Summa contra Gentiles, 1, q. 47, §5.

51 Summa theologiae, l, q. 14, aa. 5, 6. 52 [many things (understood) through one] Ibid. q. 85, a. 4 c.

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Hence, though our intelligere is always a dicere, this cannot be demonstrated of God's.53 Though we can demonstrate that God understands, for understanding is pure perfection,d still we can no more than conjecture the mode of divine understanding and so cannot prove that there is a divine Word.54 Psychological trinitarian theory is not a conclusion that can be demonstrated but a hypothesis that squares with divine revelation without excluding the possibility of alternative hypotheses.55 Finally, Aquinas regularly writes as a theologian and not as a philosopher; hence regularly he simply states what simply is true, that in all intellects there is a procession of inner word.56 3

Eo Magis Unum

Scotus seems to have had no qualms in referring to the divine processions as productions.57 Aquinas is much more restrained. In the Summa one will find dicere and notionaliter diligere defined in terms of causality;58 one will find incidental statements in which a person that proceeds is said to be produced;59 but it seems clear that the movement of Thomist thought is definitely away from conceiving the divine processions as productions.60 Thus, the errors of Arius and Sabellius are reduced to the mistake of conceiving the divine processions in terms of agent and effect;61 and the Aristotelian efficient cause, 'principium agendi in aliud,' is regarded as relevant, not to the divine processions, but only to the production of creatures.62 But this is puzzling. Is it true or is it false that dicere is producere verbum? Or is it true in us but not in God? In that case what is the divine

53 54 55 56 57

58 59 60 61 62

De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 5m. Depotentia, q. 8, a. i, ad 12m. Summa theologiae, i, q. 32, a. l, ad 2m. Ibid. q. 27, a. i c. In I Sent. (Op. Oxon.), d. 2, qq. 4-7, aa. 2-3; ed. Marianus Fernandez Garcia (B. loannisDuns Scoti Commentaria Oxoniensia, Quaracchi: Ad Claras Aquas, 1Q12), vol. l, pp. 240-72; (= ed. Carolo Balic, loannisDuns Scoti Opera omnia [Vatican: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950], vol. 2, qq. 3-4, pp. 259-335). Summa theologiae, l, q. 37, a. 2, ad 2m. Ibid, ad 3m. See pages 107-10 above. I wish to note that when I wrote p. 108,1 had not yet adverted to the relation between emanatio intelligibitis and the disappearance in later works of processio operati. This will be corrected presently.e Summa theologiae, l, q. 27, a. l c. Ibid. a. 5, ad im.

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procession? We attempt an answer in three steps which, because of previous discussion,63 may be brief. Aristotle conceived the efficient cause as 'principium motus vel mutationis in alio vel qua aliud.' He conceived nature as 'principium motus in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens.' Plainly, efficient cause and nature are complementary and opposed. An efficient cause cannot be nature; nature cannot be an efficient cause; for inasmuch as movement proceeds per se from a principle in the subject in which the movement occurs, the principle is nature; but inasmuch as movement proceeds from a principle in another subject, the principle is an efficient cause; and inasmuch as movement proceeds per accidens from a principle in the subject in which the movement occurs, the principle again is an efficient cause. Now these definitions are not ultimately satisfactory;64 it remains that they are Aristotle's definitions; and they fully explain Aquinas's refusal to conceive the divine processions as instances of efficient causality. The proceeding Word and the proceeding Love are not from a principle outside God; nor are they per accidens from a principle within God; therefore, they are not from an efficient cause as conceived by Aristotle. Secondly, Aquinas developed a more general notion of efficient causality than that defined by Aristotle. Thus principium operati, principium effectus, processio operati include the idea of production but do not include the Aristotelian restrictions of in alio vel qua aliud. The act of understanding is to the possible intellect, the act of loving is to the will, as act to potency, as perfection to its perfectible; the procession is processio operationis and cannot be analogous to any real procession in God. But the inner word is to our intelligence in act as is act to act, perfection to proportionate perfec63 See above, chapter 3. 64 Godfrey of Fontaines exhibits their logical conclusion. See Les philosophes beiges: Textes et etudes. Tome III: Les quodlibets cinq, six et sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. de Wulf andj. Hoffmans (Louvain: Institut Superieur de Philosophic, 1914), Sextum quodlibet, Q. VII: Utrum voluntas potest se movere per aliquam dispositionem dato quod non potest sine dispositione (pp. 14872); ibid. Tome IV, Fascicle i: Le huitieme quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans (1924), Q. II: Utrum subiectum possit esse immediatum principium praecipue effectivum alicuius sui accidentis (pp. 18-33); ibid. Tome IV, fascicles 1-2: Les quodlibets onze-quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans (1932), Decimum tertium quodlibet, Q. Ill: Utrum aliqua substantia creata per se ipsam absque aliquo alio sibi addito possit esse principium immediatum alicuius operationis et praecipue transeuntis extra (pp. 190-213).

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don; in us the procession is processio operati; in us dicere is producere verbum, even though it is natural and not an instance of Aristotelian efficient causality. Inasmuch as dicere does not involve the imperfection of processio operationis it offers an analogy to the divine procession/'5 Thirdly, is the divine dicere a producere verbum'? Is there in God a processio operati'? Evidently there is an enormous difference between the procession of an inner word in us and the procession of the Word in God. In us there are two acts, first, an act of understanding, secondly, a really distinct act of defining or judging. In God there is but one act. But not only did Aquinas advert to this rather obvious fact but also he assigned the reason for the difference: 'id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili, non oportet esse diversum; imo, quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit.'66 One is apt to object that as the principle and term of a procession approach identity, the procession itself approaches nothingness. But this is simply to disregard what Aquinas most emphatically asserts. The analogy to the divine procession is found only in rational creatures. Not any procession ad intra but only intelligible procession is given the property of 'quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit.'67 In the Contra Gentiles Aquinas considered in turn minerals, plants, animals, men, angels, and God to show that in perfect intellectual reflection principle and term are identical without an elimination of the reflection and so without an elimination of the procession.68 In the Summa he is insistent on his point: 'secundum emanationem intelligibilem,' ^ 'processu intelligibili,'70 'per modum intelligibilem,'71 'per modum intelligibilis

65 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad ym. 66 ['it is not necessary that what proceeds interiorly in an intelligible procession be different; on the contrary, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more it will be one with that from which it proceeds'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 27, a. l, ad 2m. 67 Ibid. 68 Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. ll, §§ 1-7. Observe the initial thesis: 'secundum diversitatem naturarum diversus emanationis modus invenitur in rebus: et quanto aliqua natura est altior, tanto id quod ex ea emanat, magis ei est intimum' ['diverse kinds of emanation are found in things, according to the diversity of their natures; and the higher a particular nature is, the more that which proceeds from it will be intimately (one) with it']. 69 ['according to an intelligible emanation'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 27, a. l c. 70 ['by an intelligible procession'] Ibid, ad 2m. 71 ['in an intelligible manner'] Ibid, ad gm; a. 2, ob. 2.

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actionis,'72 'verbum intelligibiliter procedens,'7^ 'secundum actionem intelligibilem.'74 Obviously Aquinas thought he was making a point. What is it? There are two aspects to the procession of an inner word in us. There is the productive aspect; intelligence in act is proportionate to producing the inner word. There is also the intelligible aspect: inner words do not proceed with mere natural spontaneity as any effect does from any cause; they proceed with reflective rationality; they proceed not merely from a sufficient cause but from sufficient grounds known to be sufficient and because they are known to be sufficient. I can imagine a circle, and I can define a circle. In both cases there is efficient causality. But in the second case there is something more. I define the circle because I grasp in imagined data that, if the radii are equal, then the plane curve must be uniformly round. The inner word of defining not only is caused by but also is because o/the act of understanding. In the former aspect the procession is processio operati. In the latter aspect the procession is processio intelligibilis. Similarly, in us the act of judgment is caused by a reflective act of understanding, and so it is processio operati. But that is not all. The procession of judgment cannot be equated with procession from electromotive force or chemical action or biological process or even sensitive act. Judgment is judgment only if it proceeds from intellectual grasp of sufficient evidence as sufficient. Its procession also is processio intelligibilis. What, then, does Aquinas mean when he writes: 'id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili, non oportet esse diversum; imo, quanto perfectius procedit, tan to magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit'?75 He does not mean that there can be production, properly speaking, when principle and product are absolutely identical. He does mean that there can be processio intelligibilis without absolute diversity, indeed that the more perfect the processio intelligibilis is, the greater the approach to identity. In us inner word proceeds from act of understanding by a processio intelligibilis that also is a processio operati, for our inner word and act of understanding are two absolute entities really distinct. In God inner word proceeds from act of understanding as uttering by a processio intelligibilis that is not a processio operati, at

72 73 74 75

['in the manner of an intelligible action'] Ibid. a. 2 c. ['a word proceeding intelligibly'] Ibid, ad 3m. ['according to an intelligible action'] Ibid. a. 3 c. [see above, note 66] Ibid. a. i, ad 2m.

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least inasmuch as divine understanding and divine Word are not two absolute entities really distinct. It may be doubted that a pure processio intelligibilis is a real procession. If A is because of B without being caused by B, the dependence of A on B seems to be merely mental. It is true that a processio intelligibilis cannot be real except in a mind. On the other hand, in a mind it necessarily is real; just as the mind itself and its operation are real, so the intelligible procession within the mind and the consequent relations of origin are all real. 'Mental' is opposed to 'real' only inasmuch as one prescinds from the reality of mind. Indeed, the divine procession of the Word is not only real but also a natural generation.76In us that does not hold. Our intellects are not our substance; our acts of understanding are not our existence; and so our definitions and affirmations are not the essence and existence of our children. Our inner words are just thoughts, just esse intentionale of what we define and affirm, just intentio intdlecta and not res intellecta?1 But in God intellect is substance, and act of understanding is act of existence; it follows that the Word that proceeds in him is of the same nature and substance as its principle,78 that his thought of himself is himself, that his intentio intellecta of himself is also the res intellecta.79 As there is an analogy of ens and esse, so also there is an analogy of the intelligibly proceeding est. In us est is just a thought, a judgment. But in God not only is ipsum esse the ocean of all perfection,80 comprehensively grasped by ipsum intelligere?1 in complete identity,82 but also perfectly expressed in a single Word. That Word is thought, definition, judgment, and yet of the same nature as God, whose substance is intellect. Hence it is not mere thought as opposed to thing, not mere definition as opposed to defined, not mere judgment as opposed to judged. No less than what it perfectly expresses, it too is the ocean of all perfection. Still, though infinite esse and infinite est are identical absolutely, nonetheless truly there is an intelligible procession. The divine Word is because of the divine understanding as uttering, yet 'eo magis unum, quo perfectius procedit.' 76 Ibid. a. 2 c.

77 Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, §6. 78 Summa theologiae, i, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2m; q. 34, a. 2, ad im; Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, §§11, 17. 79 Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, §7. 80 Summa theologiae, l, q. 13, a. l i e . 81 Ibid. q. 14, a. 3 c. 82 Ibid. aa. 2, 4.

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4

Amor Procedens

As complete understanding not only grasps essence and, in essence, all properties, but also affirms existence and value, so also from understanding's self-expression in judgment of value there is an intelligible procession of love in the will. Evidently so, for without an intelligible procession of love in the will from the word of intellect, it would be impossible to define the will as rational appetite. Natural appetite is blind; sensitive appetite is spontaneous; but rational appetite can be moved only by the good that reason pronounces to be good. Because of the necessity of intelligible procession from intellect to will, sin is not act in the will but failure to act; it is failure to will to do the good that is commanded, or it is failure to will to inhibit tendencies that are judged to be wrong. Because of the same necessity of intelligible procession from intellect to will, the sinner is driven by a fine disquiet either to seek true peace of soul in repentance or else to obtain a simulated peace in the rationalization that corrupts reason by making the false appear true that wrong may appear right. Finally, however much it may be disputed whether there is any processio operati from the word of our intellects to the act in our wills, it cannot be denied that there is a processio intelligibilis from the word of intellect to the act of rational appetite.83 Let us now see how Aquinas accounted for the procession of the Holy Spirit. In the Contra Gentiks 4, c. 19, he inquired: 'Quomodo intelligenda sunt quae de Spiritu sancto dicuntur?' In the first paragraph he stated his intention. In paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, he examined the nature of love. In the remaining paragraphs, 5 to 12, he applied his analysis to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The three steps in his examination of love are as follows: first, he argued that in everyone who understands there must also be a will; secondly, he showed that the basic act, to which all other acts of will are to be reduced, is love; thirdly, he pointed out the difference between the presence of the beloved in the intellect and his presence in the will of the lover; in the intellect he is present 'per similitudinem speciei'; in the will he is present dynamically, as the term of a movement in the movement's proportionate principle. 83 On the controversy, see Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux Xlle et Xllle siecles. Tome I: Problemes de psychologic (Louvain: Abbe du Mont Cesar, and Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1942) 226-389; also Cajetan, In I, q. 27, a. 3, §§IX-XI; ed. Leon. (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1888) IV, 312.

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But what is this dynamic presence? How is the term of a movement in the movement's motive principle? Obviously, by final causality: the end determines the agent. Hence, 'Sicut autem influere causae efficientis est agere, ita influere causae finalis est appeti et desiderari.'84 From the term of movement there results by final causality an appeti of the term; but the appeti of the term is not in the term but in the motive principle. Similarly, by final causality there results from the beloved the amari of the beloved; and this amari of the beloved is not in the beloved but in the lover. Next, the appeti of the term in the motive principle is one and the same act as the appetere of the motive principle for the term; similarly, the amari of the beloved in the lover is one and the same act as the amare of the lover for the beloved. Hence 'Est autem amatum in amante secundum quod amatur';85 'id quod amatur est in amante secundum quod actu amatur';8h 'amor dicitur transformare amantem in amatum, inquantum per amorem movetur amans ad ipsam rem amatam.'87 Finally, if the presence of the beloved in the lover is exactly the same entity as the act of love in the lover, why does Aquinas bother about it? Obviously because he wishes to determine the nature of love and so to show that, while the procession of the Word is a generation, still the procession of Love is not. The object of intellect is in intellect 'per similitudinem speciei,' but the object of will or love is in the will not by reproduction but as a goal is in tendency to the goal.88 Paragraphs 5 to 12 of Contra Gentiles 4, c. 19, apply the foregoing analysis. First, it is shown that since God understands, he must have a will; further, this will cannot be distinct really from either the divine substance or the divine intellect. Secondly, the will of God cannot be mere potency or mere habit; it must be in act; and since the basic act of will is love, it must be actually loving. Thirdly, the proper object of divine love is the divine good84 ['but as the influence of an efficient cause consists in acting, so the influence of a final cause consists in being sought after and desired'] Deveritate, q. 22, a. 2 c. 85 ['but the thing loved is in the one loving it insofar as it is actually loved'] Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19, § 7. 86 ['that which is loved is in the one loving it insofar as it is actually loved'] Compendium theologiae, c. 49. 87 ['love is said to transform the one loving into the thing that is loved, insofar as the one loving is moved by love toward the thing itself which is loved'] De malo, q. 6, a. l, ad 131x1. See H.D. Simonin, 'Autour de la solution thomiste du probleme de 1'amour,' Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age6 (1931) 174-276. 88 Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 19, §§4, 9.

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ness which is identical with God; but love is dynamic presence; therefore the love of God for God involves the dynamic presence of God in God. Moreover, since divine loving, divine willing, divine being are identical, it follows that the dynamic presence of God in God is not mere dynamic presence but God. Just as God's thought of God is not mere thought but God, so God's love of God is not mere accidental act but God. Fourthly, the origin of divine love is treated. There cannot be the dynamic presence of the beloved in the lover's will, unless there first is intellectual conception. Further, it is not the concept but the conceived that is loved; hence divine love necessarily is related both to the Word and to God from whom the Word proceeds. The remaining four paragraphs explain why the procession of love is not a generation, why the Holy Spirit is named Spirit, and why he is named Holy. As was anticipated, once one grasps the processio intelligibilis of inner word from uttering act of understanding, there is not the slightest difficulty in grasping the simple, clear, straightforward account Aquinas offered of proceeding love. Difficulty arises in interpreting Aquinas on this issue from purely subjective sources. A conceptualist is not interested enough in human intellect to know what processio intelligibilis means; and so he is led to take advantage of the complexity of Thomist thought and terminology to invent pseudometaphysical theories about operatio and operaturn.89 After applying these theories to the procession of the inner word, he tries to apply them to the procession of love; and in this he is greatly encouraged by the post-Thomas Augustinian reaction which transformed Augustine's self-movement of soul into self-moving potencies and, above all, denied any influence from the intellect on the will in an alleged defence of the will's liberty.90 89 On the complexity see pages 110-48 above. QO Lottin, Psychologic et morale... (see note 83 above). Baltasar Perez Argos, S.I., La actividad cognoscitiva en los escolasticos del primer periodo postomista (Extract from doctoral dissertation, Colegio Maximo de S. Francisco Javier [Ona, Burgos], Madrid, 1948). Fr Petrus lohannis Olivi, O.F.M., Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, vol. 2, Quaestiones 4Q-71, ed. Bernardusjansen, S.I. (Ad Claras Aquas [Quaracchi]: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924) q. 58 c., pp. 409-14; ibid., ob. 13 and ad 13m, pp. 400-403, 437-61; ob. 14 and ad 14m, pp. 403-8, 461-515. Fr Gonsalvi Hispani, O.F.M., Quaestiones disputatae et Quodlibet, ed. cura Leonis Amoros, O.F.M. (Ad Claras Aquas, Florentiae: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1935) q. 3, pp. 27-49. It seems quite plain that the doctrine of vital act was an Augustinian argument against the Aristotelian pati. Godfrey of Fontaines, Thomas of Sutton, Nicolas Trivet were resolute Aristotelians. Herve de Nedellec yielded to Augustinian

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What Aquinas held is quite clear. In us there is a procession of love from the will, but that is processio operationis and irrelevant to trinitarian theory.91 In us there is a procession of one act of love from another, but that also is irrelevant to trinitarian theory.92 In us there is a procession of love from the inner word, and, as Aquinas very frequently repeated, that is the procession that is relevant to trinitarian theory.93 In this position Aquinas was following St Anselm.94 He was followed by Godfrey of Fontaines95 and John of Naples.96 The extent to which the notion was current merits special pressure to the extent of wishing for a sensus agens. See Durandi de S. Porciano ... (note 18 above) 69. Recall that Aquinas did not evolve a general notion of efficient causality but distinguished analogously the types of emanation on different levels of being (see chapter 3, pp. 143-48 above); this, I think, is relevant to understanding the Thomist contrast between movere per modum causae efficientis ['to move in the manner of an efficient cause'] and movere per modum finis ['to move in the manner of an end'] (Summa contra Gentiles, l, c. 72, §7; Summa theologiae, l, q. 82, a. 4 c.). See also Simonin, 'Autour de la solution ...' (note 87 above) 234-36. 91 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 701. 92 Summa theologiae, l, q. 27, a. 5, ad 3m. 93 See page 109-10 above, note 20. 94 Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion, c. 50 (Opera omnia, vol. l, ed. F.S. Schmitt [Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946] 65): Talam certe est rationem habenti eum non idcirco sui memorem esse aut se intelligere quia se amat, sed ideo se amare quia sui meminit et se intelligit; nee eum se posse amare, si sui non sit memor aut se non intelligat. Nulla enim res amatur sine eius memoria et intelligentia, et multa tenentur memoria aut intelliguntur, quae non amantur. Patet igitur amorem summi spiritus ex eo procedere, quia sui memor est et se intelligit. Quod si in memoria summi spiritus intelligitur pater, in intelligentia films: manifestum est quia a patre pariter et filio summi spiritus amor procedit' ['It is certainly clear to anyone with the use of reason that it is not because he loves himself that he has memory of himself and understands himself, but rather that he loves himself because he has memory of himself and understands himself; further, that he would not be able to love himself if he did not remember himself or did not understand himself. For nothing is loved without memory and understanding of it, and many things are held in the memory and are understood, which are not loved. It is evident then that love of the supreme spirit (that is, God) proceeds from him because he remembers himself and understands himself. And so if in the memory of the supreme spirit the Father is signified, and in understanding the Son (is signified), it is clear that love of the supreme spirit proceeds from Father and Son alike']. 95 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet^, q. 4; see Les philosophes beiges 3:293 (see above, note 64). 96 John of Naples, Quaestio disputata 13. Texts given by M. Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus, Teil II: Die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen (BGPTM2Q, Munster: Aschendorff, 1930), vol. 2, p. 132*, lines 11-21; p. 138*, lines i-ll; vol. l, p. 132, note 51 ad fin.

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investigation, but an indication of its currency may be had from a text published by Fr Balic. In his Opus Oxoniense Scotus conceived the procession of the Holy Spirit as procession of love from the will.97 In the text Fr Balic has published, Scotus got around to applying his doctrine of partial, concurrent, coordinate causes to the will. The act of will is caused partially by the will and partially by the object presented by the intellect; in confirmation the intention of Augustine is adduced that amor procedit a mente, and this is followed up by the contention that if the object is only sine quo non to the act of love, then the Word is only sine quo non to the procession of the Holy Spirit.98 5

Via Doctrinae

In his monumental work on medieval trinitarian thought,99 Dr Michael Schmaus followed the current division and devoted first over three hundred pages to 'die Trinitat in fieri,' and then almost two hundred to 'die Trinitat in esse.Jl°° But though Aquinas in his earlier works began from God the Father to treat next the generation of the Son and then the procession of the Holy Spirit, his Summa theologiae eliminated even the semblance of a logical fiction of a becoming in God. The Summa treated first God as one,101 to turn to God as triune 'secundum viam doctrinae.'102 In this presentation the starting point is not God the Father but God; the first question is not whether there is a procession from God the Father but whether there is a procession in God. After establishing two processions in God, the existence of real relations in God is treated. Only after both processions and relations have been treated is the question of persons raised.103 The significance of this procedure is that it places Thomist trinitarian theory in a class by itself. First of all, it eliminates what Dr Schmaus considers the crux Trinitatis.104 Either the Father is Father by a relation or for some other reason; but nei-

97 Duns Scotus, In I Sent. (Op. Oxon), d. 10, ed. Fernandez [see above, note 57], vol. i, pp. 678-79, ed. Balic [see above, note 57], vol. 4, p. 341. 98 Charles Balic, 'Une question inedite dej. Duns Scot sur la volonte,' Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 3 (1931) 191-208; see lines 418-26. 99 See above, note 96. 100 ['in becoming,' 'in being'] Schmaus, Der Liber... 46-379, 379-573. 101 Summa theologiae, 1, qq. 2-26. 102 ['according to the order of doctrine'] Ibid. q. 27, Introductio. 103 Ibid. qq. 27-29. 104 ['the central issue of the Trinity'] See Schmaus, Der Liber... 652.

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ther alternative is possible. If the Father is Father by a relation, then that relation supposes a procession, so that the Father has to generate before being constituted as Father. On the other hand, if the Father is Father not by a relation, then he must be Father either by something absolute or by a negation. Neither will do. The Thomist solution to this problem cannot be appreciated unless one grasps the Summa s structure, which implies a twofold ordering of our trinitarian concepts. There is the order of our concepts in fieri, and then processions precede relations and relations precede persons. There is the order of our concepts in facto esse, and then there are the persons as persons,105 the persons considered individually,106 the persons compared to the divine essence,107 to the relations,108 to the notional acts.109 Now these two orders are inverse. The processions and the notional acts are the same realities. But the processions are in God prior, in the first order of our concepts, to the constitution of the persons. On the other hand, the notional acts are acts of the persons and consequent to the persons conceived as constituted. Once one recognizes this twofold systematization of our concepts, it becomes apparent that Aquinas's solution to the crux Trinitatisis really satisfying. He maintained a distinction between the property of the Father as relation and the same property as constitutive of the Father. As relation, the property is subsequent to generation; as constitutive, the same property is prior to generation.110 But how can the same property be both prior and subsequent? The question is not about the property itself but about the systematic order of our concepts;111 and when there are two systematic and inverse orders, necessarily what is prior in one order will be subsequent in the other. Secondly, the procedure of the Summa reveals very clearly the exact point of application and the measure of significance of the psychological imago Dei in trinitarian thought. It reveals the exact point of application. We 105 Summa theologiae, 1, qq. 30-32.

106 Ibid. qq. 33-38107 108 1OQ no

Ibid. q. 39. Ibid. q. 40. Ibid. q. 41. Ibid. q. 40, a. 4 c. Materially the same distinction occurs in Depotentia, q. 8, a. 3, ad 7m; q. 10, a. 3; but there it lacks an ultimate basis. 111 The question is: 'Videtur quod actus notionales praeintelligantur proprietatibus' ['It seems that the notional acts are understood prior to the properties']. In God and quoad se there is 'ordo secundum originem absque prioritate' ['an order according to origin, without priority'] (Summa theologiae, i, q. 42, a. 3 c.; see ad 2m).

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desire to know quid sit Deus, but in this life the only understanding we can attain is through analogy. Philosophy proceeds from pure perfections by the ways of affirmation, negation, and eminence. Faith adds further data. Theology employs the Augustinian psychological analogy, just as philosophy employed the naturally known pure perfections. By natural reason we know that God is absolute being, absolute understanding, absolute truth, absolute love. But natural reason cannot establish that there are in God processiones intelligibiles, that the divine Word is because of divine understanding as uttering, that divine Love as proceeding is because of divine goodness and understanding and Word as spirating. Such further analogical knowledge of quid sit Deus pertains to the limited but most fruitful understanding that can be attained when reason operates in the light of faith. 112 Thus, the Augustinian psychological analogy makes trinitarian theology a prolongation of natural theology, a deeper insight into what God is. But the procedure of the Summa also reveals the measure of significance to be attached to the imago Dei. As we have seen, there is a twofold systematization: first, our concepts are in fieri; secondly, their order is reversed and they stand in facto esse. Now these two orders stand on different levels of thought. As long as our concepts are in development, the psychological analogy commands the situation. But once our concepts reach their term, the analogy is transcended and we are confronted with the mystery. In other words, the psychological analogy truly gives a deeper insight into what God is. Still, that insight stands upon analogy; it does not penetrate to the very core, the essence of God, in which alone trinitarian doctrine can be contemplated in its full intelligibility; grasping properly quid sit Deus is the beatific vision.1'3Just as an experimental physicist may not grasp most of quantum mathematics, but under the direction of a mathematician may very intelligently devise and perform experiments that advance the quantum theory, so also the theologian with no proper grasp of quid sit Deus but under the direction of divine revelation really operates in virtue of and towards an understanding that he personally in this life cannot possess."4 Hence it is that the psychological analogy enables one to argue that 112 ['what God is'] DB 1796 [£53016]. 113 Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 1 c.; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8 c. 114 Ibid, i, q. l, aa. 2, 7. Martin Grabmann, Die theologischeErkenntnis- undEinleitungslehre des heiligen Thomas von Aquin (Freiburg in der Schweiz: Paulusverlag, 1948). M.-J. Congar, 'Theologie,' Dictionnaire de theologie catholique 15 (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1946) 378-92. M.-D. Chenu, La theologie comme science au Xllle siecle, 3rd ed. (Paris:Vrin, 1957).

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there are two and only two processions in God, that the first is 'per modurn intelligibilis actionis' and a natural generation; that the second is 'per modum amoris' and not a generation; that there are four real relations in God and three of them really distinct;115 that the names verbum and imago are proper to the Son, while the names amor and donum are proper to the Holy Spirit.116 But do not think that Aquinas allows the psychological analogy to take the place of the divine essence as the one sufficient principle of explanation. The psychological analogy is just the side door through which we enter for an imperfect look. Thus, though the generation of the Son is 'per modum intelligibilis actionis,' though a proper name of the Son is the Word, still Aquinas did not conclude that the principle by which the Father generates is the divine intellect or the divine understanding. In us the inner word proceeds from understanding, and our understanding is really distinct from our substance, our being, our thought, our willing. But in God substance, being, understanding, thought, willing are absolutely one and the same reality. Accordingly, Aquinas not merely in his commentary on the Sentences117 but also in his Summa makes the divine essence the principle of divine generation. '... sicut Deus potest generare Filium, ita et vult. Sed voluntas generandi significat essentiam. Ergo et potentia generandi.'118 'Illud ergo est potentia generativa in aliquo generante, in quo generatum similatur generanti. Filius autem Dei similatur Patri gignenti in natura divina. Unde natura divina in Patre est potentia generandi in ipso.'119 '... id quo Pater 115 Summa theologiae, l, qq. 27, 28.

116 Ibid. q. 34, a. 2; q. 35, a. 2; q. 37, a. l; q. 38, a. 2. The difference between essential love and notional love is quite plainly the difference between love considered in its essence (the dynamic presence of the beloved) and love referred to its origin, its principle. The former relates lover to beloved; the latter proceeds. The same distinction might be put by comparing love to finis operationis ['the end of an operation'] and finis intentionis ['the end of an intention'] (De potentia, q. 3, a. 16 c.). God's love of God as finis operationis is identical with God, and so essential. God's love of God as finis intentionis is God as proceeding from God as Judge and Word, and so notional. 117 Super I Sententiarum, d. 7, q. 2, a. l sol. and ad 4m; ibid. q. l, aa. 1-3; ibid. d. 6, q. l, a. 3 sol. 118 ['As God is able to generate a Son, so also he wills to do so. But the will to generate signifies the essence. So also therefore does the ability to generate'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 41, a. 5, Sed contra. 119 [The generating power in one who generates is therefore that in which the generated is like the one generating. But the Son of God is like the generating Father in the divine nature. And therefore the divine nature in the Father is the power in him to generate'] Ibid. c.

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general est natura divina.' 12() The one divine essence is common to Father and to Son. As the Father's, the essence is the potency by which the Father generates; as the Son's, the essence is the potency by which the Son is generated.121 The potentia spirandi is conceived in parallel fashion. Father and Son are one principle because they are one God.122 They are 'duo spirantes' but 'unus spirator.'123 As the potentia generandi means the divine essence but connotes a personal property,124 so also does the virtus spira^t»a.125The procession of love is not voluntary but natural, even though it is 'per modum voluntatis.'12('The same argument in the same passages establishes the existence of both potentia generandi and potentia spirandi.1'21 If one disregards the tide of the next article, the contribution of a rubricist, and attends to Aquinas's own question, then its issue is: 'Videtur quod potentia generandi vel spirandi significet relationem et non essentiam.'128 It seems to follow that the divine essence is the principle by which the Father generates the Son and by which Father and Son spirate1 the Holy Spirit; that potentia generandi and potentia spirandi, while in recto they mean the same divine essence, still in obliquo connote different personal properties.129 This is all very far from the type of trinitarian theory in which the Word is generated by the divine intellect and proceeding Love is spirated by the divine will.130

120 ['That by which the Father generates is the divine nature'] Ibid. 121 Ibid. a. 6, ad im. 122 ['the power to spirate'] Ibid. q. 36, a. 4 c. 123 ['two who are spirating'; 'one spirator'] Ibid, ad 7m. 124 ['power to beget'] Ibid. q. 41, a. 5 c. 125 ['spirating power'] Ibid. q. 36, a. 4, ad im. 126 ['in the manner of the will'] Ibid. q. 41, a. 2, ad 3m. 127 Ibid. a. 4 c. 128 ['It seems that the power to generate or to spirate signifies a relation and not the essence'] Ibid. a. 5. 129 ['directly'; 'obliquely'] See q. 36, a. 4, ad im; q. 41, a. 5. As the Son understands essentially 'non ut producens verbum sed ut Verbum procedens' ['not as one producing a word but as the Word that proceeds'] (q. 34, a. 2, ad 4m), so the Holy Spirit loves essentially 'ut Amor procedens, non ut a quo procedit amor' ['as the Love that proceeds, not as the one from whom love proceeds'] (q. 37, a. i, ad 4m). Hence, as the divine essence is the Son's potency ut generetur [to be generated] (q. 41, a. 6, ad im), so also the divine essence is the Holy Spirit's potency ut spiretur [to be spirated]. 130 Dr Schmaus made the supposition that the criterion of Augustinian psychological theory lay in taking the divine intellect as the principle of divine generation, the divine will as the principle of divine spiration. In consequence he records his mounting surprise at the views of post-Thomas Dominicans

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Finally, as the reader may have gathered already, the via doctrinae of the Summa is a masterpiece of theology as science and the apex of trinitarian speculation. But I would not be misunderstood. Coherently enough on their position, conceptualists conceive science simply in terms of certitude. For them the scientific ideal is the certitude one has of the particular and contingent fact of one's own existence. For them the substance of theology is what they are certain about, while the separable accidents are what they consider probable. They cannot be expected to think much of Thomist trinitarian theory, which, on its own showing, is no more than a hypothesis which does not attempt to exclude the possibility of alternatives. '31 Still, without in any way deprecating certitude or even solidity, one may point out that the cult of certitude, the search for rigorous demonstration unaccompanied by a still greater effort to understand, has been tried and has been found wanting. It is the secret of fourteenth-century scepticism. Moreover, the same result follows from the same cause at any time; for one can be certain only because one understands, or else because one believes someone else who certainly understands. It is only inasmuch as different concepts proceed from one act of understanding that different concepts are seen to be joined by a necessary nexus. Remove the effort to understand, and understanding will decrease; as understanding decreases, fewer concepts are seen to be joined by a necessary nexus; and as this seeing decreases, certitudes decrease. To stop the process, either one must restore the effort to understand or one must appeal not to intellect but to some higher or lower power. Moreover, the conceptualist ideal of science is not the only ideal. For Aristotle perfect science is certain; but all science is knowledge through (see Der Liber Propugnatorius 125-34). Note especially the following from James of Metz: 'Sic ergo principium, quo procedit Filius a Patre in divinis, non est intellectus, sed natura et similiter principium quo procedit Spiritus sanctus ab utroque est natura non voluntas et hoc dixit (nach Clm. 14 383 steht hier frater) thomas parisius in scholis publice, quod non intelligebat Filium procedere a Patre per actum intellectus sicut audivit magister Albertus (Clm. 14 383: tambertus) ab eo' (ibid. 127-28, in note 48) [Thus, therefore, the principle by which the Son proceeds from the Father in the divinity is not the intellect but the nature; and likewise the principle by which the Holy Spirit proceeds from both is the nature, not the will; and Thomas said as much publicly in the schools at Paris, namely, that he did not understand the Son to proceed from the Father by an act of intellect as Master Albert heard from him']. Without insisting on James's accuracy, one cannot well refuse all significance to his testimony. 131 Summa theologiae, i, q. 32, a. i, ad 2m.

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causes, and knowledge through causes is understanding and so of the universal and necessary. Because the conceptualist accepts only one element of the Aristotelian ideal, while modern science realizes the other element, a quite unnecessary abyss has been dug by conceptualists between the Scholasticism they claim to represent and, on the other hand, the contemporary ideal of science. Further, the conceptualist ideal of science has no exclusive claim to represent the ideal of theology as science. St Augustine's Crede ut intelligas no more means 'Believe to be certain' than it means 'Believe to have an intellection'; it means 'Believe that you may understand.' When the Vatican Council affirms that reason illumined by faith and inquiring pie, sedulo, sobrie can attain some limited but most fruitful intelligentia of the mysteries of faith, intelligentia means not certitude, for by faith one already is certain, nor demonstration, for the mysteries cannot be demonstrated, nor intellection, for a mystery is not a universal, but rather obviously understanding. Nor was understanding as the ideal of scientific theology unknown to Aquinas, whose principles, method, and doctrine the church bids us follow. To ask quid sit is to ask why. To know quid sit is to know the cause above all, the formal cause in the only manner that causes are known, by understanding. Hence to ask quid sit Deus expresses a natural desire; but to know quid sit Deus defines a supernatural end. For knowing quid sit Deus is understanding God. That understanding cannot result from any finite species, but only inasmuch as God himself slips into and mysteriously actuates a finite intellect. But potency that no creature can actuate is obediential and its act, by definition, is supernatural. Short of this supernatural vision of God, we can know quid sit Deus only by analogy. But such analogical knowing moves on two levels. By the natural light of reason we argue from pure perfections to the pure act. In the subalternated science of theology we operate in virtue of ipsum intelligere, under the direction of divine revelation, without grasping the divine essence, yet truly understanding the relations of properties flowing from the essence, both from the connection between the mysteries and from the analogy of nature. Thus the ideal of theology as science is the subalternated and so limited, analogical, and so imperfect understanding of quid sit Deus, which, though incomparable with the vision of God, far surpasses what can be grasped by the unaided light of natural reason. By the measure of the intellectualist concept of theology, the via doctrinae of the Summa is a masterpiece. It knows just what the human mind can attain, and it attains it. It does not attempt to discover a synthetic principle

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whence all else follows. It knows that that principle is the divine essence and that, in this life, we cannot properly know it. On the other hand, it does not renounce all thought of synthesis to settle down to teaching catechism; for it knows that there is such a thing as imperfect understanding. Systematically it proceeds to that limited goal. It begins where natural theology leaves off. It employs the Augustinian psychological analogy as the natural theologian employs his pure perfections. It develops the key concepts of procession, relation, person. Then it shifts to a higher level, consciously confronts mystery as mystery, and so transposes relations to properties and processions to notional acts. The accurate grasp of the end guarantees the perfection of the method. The perfection of the method automatically assigns the imago Dei its proper function and limited significance and no less provides the solution to the crux Trinitatis. Imperfectly we grasp why God is Father, Word, and Spirit, inasmuch as we conceive God, not simply as identity of being, understanding, thought, and love, but as that identity, and yet with thought because of understanding, and love because of both, where 'because' means not the logical relation between propositions but the real processio intelligibilis of an intellectual substance. What is truly profound is also very simple. Yet into the simplicity of the via doctrinae in the Summa was poured the sum of previous trinitarian and philosophic achievement. Dogmatic development was from the apostolic symbol which briefly acknowledged God the Father Almighty, Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, and the Holy Ghost. Nicea affirmed the Son to be truly God, consubstantial with the Father. Constantinople affirmed the divinity of the Holy Ghost. Speculative thought, on the other hand, was clearly present as via inventionis in St Athanasius's deduction that immaterial generation must terminate in a consubstantial being; in the doctrine that distinction between the persons rests on relations as worked out by the Cappadocians132 and by St Augustine;133 in the elaboration of the notions of person and nature summarized for the East by St John Damascene134 and for the West in the influential, if not

132 Rene Arnou, DeDeo trino, Pars I: InFontibus revelationis (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1933) 130-40. 133 Irenee Chevalier, S. Augustin et la pensee grecque: Les relations trinitaires (Fribourg en Suisse: Librairie de 1'Universite, 1940). 134 J. Bilz, Die Trinitdtslehre des hi. Johannes vonDamaskus (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1909).

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altogether fortunate, work of Boethius;135 and, finally, in the threefold problem of person, nature, and relation that came to a head in Gilbert de laPorree.136 But more was needed to make Aquinas's via doctrinae possible. Augustine had to transfer the name 'God' from a proper name of the Father to a common name of the three persons, and he had to explore the possibilities of the psychological analogy. The systematic distinction between natural and supernatural and so between philosophy and theology had to be developed.137 Philosophy had to be cultivated to work out our natural knowledge of God and to place a scientific psychology at the disposal of theology's imago Dei. Theology had to discover its potentialities and its limitations as subalternated science. The last two of these requirements had to be met mainly by Aquinas himself. In Boetium De Trinitate, not so strangely perhaps, says nothing of the Trinity; it studies the nature of knowledge, science, faith, philosophy, theology. The De veritate was still engaged in the translator's task of assigning Aristotelian equivalents to Augustine's memoria, intelligentia, amor.138 Still, it offered assured promise of Aquinas's own triad of principium verbi, verbum, and awor,139 since at least implicitly it formulated the essentials of Thomist analysis of inner word as definition or judgment expressing understanding.140 It remains that the Contra Gentiles worked out the significance of rational reflection as in the limit involving

135 Viktor Schurr, Die Trinitdtslehre des Boethius im Lichte der 'skythischen Kontroversen' (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1935). 136 Andre Hayen, 'Le Concile de Reims et 1'erreur theologique de Gilbert de la Porree,' Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 1O-11 (1935-1936) 29-102. 137 On the development,8 see 'St. Thomas' Thought on Gratia operans,' Theological Studies 2 (1941) 301-306 [Grace and Freedom 13-19]. It was the lack of systematic notions on nature and the supernatural that gave St Anselm and Richard of St Victor their apparently rationalist mode of thought and speech. See J. Bayart, 'The Concept of Mystery according to St. Anselm of Canterbury,' Recherches de theologie ancienneet medieualeQ (1937) 125-66; A.-M. Ethier, Le 'De Trinitate' de Richard de Saint-Victor (Ottawa: Institut d'etudes medievales, and Paris: Vrin, 1939); Georges Fritz, 'Richard de Saint-Victor,' Dictionnaire de theologie catholique 13 (1937) 2691-93. 138 ['memory, understanding, love'] De veritate, q. 10, aa. 3, 7. 139 ['principle of a word, word, love'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 93, aa. 6-8. For Augustinian memoria Aquinas substituted intellectus in actu intelligens et dicens ['an intellect actually understanding and uttering']. For Augustinian intelligentia or notitia Aquinas substituted a verbum that was definition or judgment. 140 De veritate, q. 3, a. 2 c.; q. 4, a. 2.

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coincidence of principle and term;' 4 ' and that the De potentia, despite its Richardian elements, '4* not only provided the polished categorization of the factors in intellectual process,143 but also, by treating the relations before treating the persons,144 contained some dim anticipation of the master stroke of the Summa. Still, it is only the Summa with its modest appendage, the Compendium theologiae, beginning not from the Father but from God, that abandons the neo-Platonist self-diffusion of the good as explanatory principle; that not merely employs Augustinian analogy to advance from the concept of God as ipsum intelligere to the concept of God as the absolute thinking of absolute thought; but also does so in full accord with a concept of theology in which the Aristotelian notion of science is expanded to make room for the Augustinian Crede ut intelligas. 6

Epilogue

From different quarters and in different manners I have been asked to explain my purpose and my method.145 My purpose has been the Leonine purpose vetera novis augere et perficere, though with this modality that I believed the basic task still to be the determination of what the vetera really were. More specifically, my purpose has been to understand what Aquinas meant by the intelligible procession of an inner word. Naturally enough, my method had to be both consonant with my purpose and coherent with my conclusions. Now to understand what Aquinas meant and to understand as Aquinas understood are one and the same thing; for acts of meaning are inner words, and inner words proceed intelligibly from acts of understanding. Further, the acts of understanding in turn result from empirical data illuminated by agent intellect; and the relevant data for the 141 142 143 144 145

Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, §§ 1-7. On the development of Thomist trinitarian theory, see Paul Vanier, S.J., Theologie trinitaire chez Saint Thomas d 'Aquin: Evolution du concept d 'action notionnelle (Paris: Vrin, and Montreal: Institut d'etudes medievales, 1953). De potentia, q. 8, a. i c.; q. 9, a. 5 c. Ibid. q. 8 (on relations); q. 9 (on persons); but q. 10 (on processions) and q. 2 (on potentia generandi). MatthewJ. O'Connell, 'St. Thomas and the Verbum: An Interpretation,' The Modern Schoolman 24 (1946-47: May 1947) 224-34 [critique of the first verbum article, with a postscript on Lonergan's review of Eduardo Iglesias, DeDeo in operatione naturae vel voluntatis operante (Theological Studies 7, 1946, 602-13) ]; Lucien Roy, review of the first three verbum articles, Sciences ecclesiastiques l (1948) 225-28; F.V. [ = Vandenbroucke], review of the first verbum article, Bulletin de theologie ancienne et medievale 5 (1948) 335, §980.

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meaning of Aquinas are the written words of Aquinas. Inasmuch as one may suppose that one already possesses a habitual understanding similar to that of Aquinas, no method or effort is needed to understand as Aquinas understood; one has simply to read, and the proper acts of understanding and meaning will follow. But one may not be ready to make that assumption on one's own behalf. Then one has to learn. Only by the slow, repetitious, circular labor of going over and over the data, by catching here a little insight and there another, by following through false leads and profiting from many mistakes, by continuous adjustments and cumulative changes of one's initial suppositions and perspectives and concepts can one hope to attain such a development of one's own understanding as to hope to understand what Aquinas understood and meant. Such is the method I have employed, and it has been on the chance that others also might wish to employ it that this book has been written. The significance of this method is that it unites the ideals of the old-style manual written ad mentem Divi Thomae and, on the other hand, the ideal of contemporary historical study. To understand the text, to understand the meaning of the text, to understand the meaning of Aquinas, and to understand as Aquinas understood are but a series of different specifications of the same act. However, one cannot unite apparently opposed ideals without eliminating their really opposed defects. Method is a means to an end; it sets forth two sets of rules - rules that facilitate collaboration and continuity of effort, and rules that guide the effort itself. The latter aim at understanding, but since we cannot understand at will, they amount to rules for using chance to defeat mere chance. Still, if method is essential for the development of understanding, it is no less true that method is a mere superstition when the aim of understanding is excluded. Such exclusion is the historian's temptation to positivism. On the other hand, the temptation of the manual writer is to yield to the conceptualist illusion: to think that to interpret Aquinas he has merely to quote and then argue; to forget that there does exist an initial and enormous problem of developing one's understanding; to overlook the fact that, if he is content with the understanding he has and the concepts it utters, then all he can do is express his own incomprehension in the words but without the meaning uttered by the understanding of Aquinas. A method tinged with positivism would not undertake, a method affected by conceptualist illusion could not conceive, the task of developing one's own understanding so as to understand Aquinas's comprehension of understanding and of its intelligibly proceeding inner word. Since

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that statement of my objective is so impressive as to be misleading, I had best add at once how little I have attempted to do. Aquinas held that only rational creatures offer an analogy to the trinitarian processions. Clearly, then, the analogy lay in their rationality. At once it followed that a purely metaphysical scheme, such as the subtleties concerning operatic and operaturn, could not be relevant to trinitarian theory; for any such scheme can be applied no less to imagination than to conception, no less to sensitive desire than to rational love. Again, it followed at once that no conceptualist theory of human intellect could meet the case; for conceptualism consists precisely in the affirmation that concepts proceed not from intellectual knowledge and so intelligibly but, on the contrary, with the same natural spontaneity as images from imagination. I had, then, before me the negative task of detaching from Thomist interpretation the endless tendrils of an ivy mantle woven by oversubtle metaphysicians and conceptualist gnoseologists. This I undertook in positive fashion by writing a series of lexicographical notes on Thomist usage; their purpose was to preclude the misapprehensions on which misinterpretation thrives. By doing my negative work in positive fashion, I simultaneously furthered my own positive end, namely, to show that Aquinas adverted to the act of understanding and made it central in his rational psychology. This positive task had been anticipated. In his famous L'intellectualisme de saint Thomas, Pierre Rousselot maintained what was very obvious, however much overlooked, that in the writings of Aquinas it was not the rarely treated concept but the perpetually recurring intellect that was central and basic. If Rousselot was content with a metaphysical intellectualism, others were not. Peghaire's 'Intellectus et ratio' showed that understanding was both the principle and the term of all discursive thought, and, on the other hand, Hoenen's articles in Gregorianum brought to light both the necessity of some intellectual apprehension of nexus in phantasm and, as well, the recognition of this fact by Aristotle and by Aquinas. All that was needed was to put together what had lain apart, and it could not but come together easily. Aquinas's master St Albert the Great had no illusions about the basic nature of intellect. In that respect he divided men into three classes - those who had no need of teachers, those helped by teachers, and those who could not be helped. For such helplessness two causes were assigned - natural defect and bad habit. Among such bad habits was counted a prolonged study of laws without any inquiry into causes or reasons, so that a man became quite incapable of philosophy.14<) Plainly, 146 Beati Albert! Magni, Parva naturalia: Operum Tomus Quintus: De intellectu et

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Albert's view of intellect included understanding. Now Aquinas would not miss that point. In fact, when he was out to crush Averroism, he appealed to his stock argument: 'Hie homo intelligit.' He might have appealed to conceptual knowledge of universals; but it was so much more effective to appeal to the act of understanding: 'Si enim hoc negetur, tune dicens hanc opinionem non intelligit aliquid, et ideo non est audiendus.'147 It was a peremptory argument. It still is; for if men will doubt or deny that they have universal concepts, who will lay it down as evident that he understands nothing? Nor was Aquinas content to appeal to the intimate fact that we do understand; he made that fact the key to knowledge of the human soul: 'Dicendum quod anima humana intelligit seipsam per suum intelligere, quod est actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam.'148 But if understanding is the proper act of the human soul, much more so is it the proper act of the angels who 'nee habent aliam operationem vitae nisi intelligere.'149 Finally, it takes no great acumen to see that the very Platonist formula ipsum intelligere has no more a Platonist meaning than ipsum esse. As Aquinas did not conceive God as the subsistent Idea of being, so he did not conceive divine knowledge as the knowledgebeyond-knowledge attributed by Plotinus to the One and by the pseudoDionysius to God. It is not merely that Dionysian language was at hand and he did not use it, while Aristotelian arguments were unfamiliar yet he used them. It is that all he has to say about knowledge is based on the Aristotelian principle of identity; that he rejected the Platonist assumption that knowledge is by confrontation; that it is only that assumption which forces Platonists into the profundity beyond profundity of positing knowledge beyond knowledge to reach a meaning beyond meaning that certainly is mystifying and, at least for Aristotelians, likewise meaningless. We can conceive pure perfection without limitation; but once limits are denied, we have reached our limit and cannot go beyond the unlimited. Least of all

intelligibili, ed. Petrus Jammy (Lyons, 1651). Liber Primus, Tractatus III, c. Ill, pp. 251-52. 147 [This man understands ... For if this is denied, then the one uttering this view does not understand anything, and so is not to be listened to'] In IIIDe anima, lect. 7, §690. See pages 87-90 above. 148 ['We have to say that the human soul understands itself by its understanding, which is its proper act, perfectly demonstrating its power and nature'] Summa theologiae, l, q. 88, a. 2, ad 3m. 149 ['nor have they any other vital activity besides understanding'] Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 97, §3.

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could Aquinas have lost himself in the Platonist fog and at the same time steadily progressed from the Sentences towards the clear and calm, the economic and functional, the balanced and exact series of questions and articles of the via doctrinae in the Summa, in which the intellectualism of Aristode, made over into the intellectualism of St Thomas, shines as unmistakably as the sun on the noonday summer hills of Italy. It seems to me that intellectualism, if once it gains a foothold, never will be dislodged from the interpretation of Thomist trinitarian theory. If that is correct, I have reached my objective. Also, of course, if it is correct, many other things follow. To clarify the purpose of this book, I hasten to add that I have not been concerned with them. From the viewpoint of history there are many questions beyond the bald fact that Aquinas adverted to understanding and made it central in his psychology. But these questions are further questions. They presuppose the bald fact and ask about its measure and degree, its emergence and development, its reinforcement and weakening from combination and conflict with other influences in Thomist sources and the medieval milieu. From the writings of Aquinas one can extend inquiry to other writers, prior, contemporary, subsequent, eventually to invite some historian of the stature of M. Gilson to describe the historical experiment11 of understanding understanding and thinking thought. My aim has not been to treat such further questions but to raise the issue of such treatment by settling a preliminary fact and indicating elementary landmarks. Perhaps, however, I may express my conviction that many of the points studied in this book are very relevant to the history of the AristotelianAugustinian conflict. But over and above the historical, there is also a series of theoretical further questions. It was, I think, very important for me not to touch them, not merely because their expansion in all directions takes place with the immediacy of logical implication, but still more because die theoretical exposition of Thomist thought has already had its definitive edition from the hands of St Thomas himself. To put the same point in a slightly different manner, one may distinguish two developments of understanding. There is the development that aims at grasping what Pope Leo's vetera really were; there is the development that aims at effecting his vetera novis augere etperficere. To fail to distinguish between these two aims even materially, as in the inclusion of both within the covers of the same book, results not in economy but in confusion. The immediacy of logical implication has no respect for differences of place and time and no power of discrimination between different stages of development of an

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essentially identical philosophic or theological tradition. One can aim at understanding Aquinas; one can aim at a transposition of his position to meet the issues of our own day; but to aim at both simultaneously results inevitably, I believe, in substituting for the real Aquinas some abstract ideal of theoretical coherence that might, indeed, be named the Platonic Idea of Aquinas, were it not for the fact that a Platonic Idea is one, while such ideals of logical coherence happen to be disquietingly numerous. Plainly, there was only one real Aquinas; plainly, there can be many Thomistic developments. And though they are many, still there never will be any difficulty in distinguishing the genuine from the counterfeit. 'Ex operibus eorum cognoscetis eos.' A completely genuine development of the thought of St Thomas will command in all the universities of the modern world the same admiration and respect that St Thomas himself commanded in the medieval University of Paris. If the labors of Catholic scholars during the past seventy years have been great and their fruits already palpable, it remains that so sanguine an expectation has not yet been brought to birth. For that reason my purpose has been limited to determining on a restricted but, I believe, significant point what the vetera really were.

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Editors' Introduction

The following scattered pages are fragments of what was clearly an early draft of the first two articles of the verbum series (for details, see note 44 in the Editors' Preface). They illustrate Lonergan's concern for clarity: he would write and rewrite till he found the expression he wanted. But they have their own interest too, with ideas and developments not found in the final version. And they serve to illuminate passages treated more briefly in the latter. It seemed better, then, to publish them as an appendix to CWL 2, rather than to save them for a volume of archival material, when their publication would be separated by several years from their proper context. We have corrected obvious typos and changed spelling and punctuation to conform to the conventions adopted for the Collected Works, but we have not tried to finish Lonergan's incomplete sentences or to solve any of the puzzles that a draft of work in progress raises. The page number of the original typescript is given in square brackets at the beginning of that page. Lonergan's footnote numbers are included, but we have no record of the footnotes themselves. Lonergan's text is, of course, loaded with Latin. Translation of individual words and shorter phrases will be found in the Lexicon. Longer sentences and quotations are translated at the end of the Appendix, with the locus of the Latin identified by reference to the index number Lonergan planned to use for the footnote or by the index number closest to the quotation.

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[i] The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St Thomas Aquinas Direct discussion of the concept of verbum in the writings of St Thomas Aquinas is confined in the main to two series of questions, a first pertaining to divine knowledge of the ideas or possibles,1 a second pertaining to trinitarian theory.2 Both series are of notable difficulty: the complexity of trinitarian theory needs no emphasis; but the problem of divine knowledge of the ideas, that is, of the introduction of a multiplicity into the absolute simplicity of God, is cognate in nature and calls for notably refined thinking. In outline the Thomist procedure was, first, to analyze the act of human rational consciousness, dicere verbum, secondly to proceed by the methods of affirmation, negation, and eminence, to a divine intellectual consciousness, identical with divine being and so also identical with, and knowledge of all within the range of, divine omnipotence3 and, thirdly, on the authority of revela[Pages 2 to 15 are missing.] [16] not justify the affirmation, It is so. It justifies only the affirmation, It may be so. Because all one can say in virtue of insight is, It may be so, one is confronted with a new problem that is solved by definition, evaluation, and decision. The reflective activity of definition has been dealt with already in the discussion of abstraction, of analytic and of methodological concepts. Its function is to fix the matter for judgment as evaluation and decision. It may be taken narrowly, simply as the ideal definitions of perfect science that formulate the propter quid in a quod quid est. But it may be taken broadly as well: any question is a definition; any hypothesis is a definition; for questions and hypotheses determine the matter for judgment. It is true, of course, that questions and hypotheses are not definitions in a lexicographical sense; but we have remarked already that the problem of intellect is the problem not of language but of knowledge and of science. Upon the reflective activity of definition follows the critical activity of evaluation. The question or hypothesis enounces what may be or may not be. Evaluation proceeds in either of two directions: upwards to logical principles; downwards to matters of experience. If there can be a resolutio in principia, so that a negative or an affirmative answer is necessitated or excluded by one's acceptance of principles; if there can be a resolutio in sensum or, in the case of Euclidean geometry, a resolutio in imaginationem, so that again a negative or an affirmative answer is necessitated or excluded

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by these [17] sources of knowledge; then there will follow, first, a reflex act of understanding that sees the evidence as a whole and as a sufficient ground for the anticipated judgment, and secondly, from this critical act of understanding11 there will proceed the rational utterance of assent, the yes or no, the affirmation or negation, that is the specific contribution of judgment to knowledge and that stands to question or hypothesis or definition as act to potency. The judgment may be absolute or modal: it is absolute as simple affirmation, as Est, Est or Non, Non; it is modal if qualified as merely probable or as merely possible and so forth. But in another sense judgment is always absolute: it proceeds from an infinite potentiality of inquiry that ranges without bounds; it is attained only by the exclusion of the possibility of its contradictory, for even modal judgments exclude the possibility of impossibility or of improbability as the case may be; and between the initial infinite potentiality and the ultimate unqualified determination the gap is absolute. It is because that gap is absolute that truth is absolute; and it is because truth is absolute, that any truth, no matter how trifling, is true for the whole actual universe through all space and time and for the whole of all possible universes. With regard to truth, distinguish three things: its approximate criteria; its inner essence; its effect. [18] A judgment is true because it satisfies criteria, because a reflex act of critical understanding sees a necessary consequence linking first principles of thought or data of sense and of internal experience to the projected judgment. Because a judgment is true in that criteriological sense, it is a necessary event; it is what the mind cannot but utter; it is an instance of what we cannot help thinking. But a true judgment is more than a necessary event that occurs in our minds; still it is more, not from the nature of the criteria on which any particular judgment as a particular judgment is based, but from the nature of the mind itself. The ultimate validation of knowledge is not something that we know (as is implied in St Augustine's postulate of a vision of the eternal reasons) but in something that we are. The ultimate validation of our knowledge cannot be in something we know, for that knowing and known must themselves be validated in an ultimate validation. The ultimate validation lies in what we are, namely, something attuned to the absolute, something in inner harmony with the ground of the actual and all possible universes. This inner essence of truth lies in the nature of its emergence in us, in its procession from the infinite potentiality of unbounded inquiry which might end up anywhere, in its terminus in sufficient reason determining reasonableness by the exclusion of the possibility of other determination.

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Such a mode of determination from such a range of potentiality [19] cannot be merely a subjectively necessary event. It spans an infinite gap, consciously, intelligibly, rationally, and there is no possibility of assigning any meaning to the term 'merely subjective' except by setting that term in opposition to what spans an infinite gap consciously, intelligibly, rationally. The third aspect of truth is its effect. In true judgment, as in a medium, we contemplate reality. Truth is the correspondence between reality and knowledge: quoad se, the real is prior to the true, for the true adds a relation of conformity to the real; but quoad nos the true is prior to the real, for we know reality, as reality, through the medium of true judgment; and we know judgment is true by reflecting on its proximate grounds in criteria, and ultimately, by reflecting on the nature of the mind. Realism is immediate, not by a process of self-stultification that supposes a comparison between the real as known and the real as unknown, not by force of sheer assertion that realism is obvious and anything else is idealism or materialism, but because we know that the real cannot be other than what is affirmed in true judgment. To posit any other as the real is to posit the unknowable as the real - and that is gratuitous nonsense - and further it is to posit the impossible as the real, for true judgment can affirm anything possible. [20] Before going more particularly into the concept of reality, let us review this outline of mind. First, then, intellect is not the faculty of merely empirical knowledge: it is not the principle by which we know without knowing why but merely as a matter of brute fact; it is not external sense, nor memory, nor imagination, nor instinctive valuations and correlations; properly it [is] not the mere awareness of our internal acts, as far as cognitional theory is concerned, though ontological analysis would attribute to intellect the mere awareness of acts of intellect itself. Secondly, intellect as active is inquiry, wonder, the drive to knowledge of causes that can be satiated - according to Aquinas12 - only by the beatific vision of the first cause and last end of all. Thirdly, the first terminus of this drive is insight into phantasm; the second terminus is the critical understanding that necessitates judgment; the third terminus is the contemplative understanding that regards reality through intelligible truth. Fourthly, intellect as act is insight, critical understanding, contemplative understanding; but intellect as a process through inquiry to insight, from insight to critical understanding, from critical to contemplative understanding is reason, rational consciousness, thought, consideration, method, logic, dialectic - any name will do, as long as one grasps the idea of process from one act of intellect to another.

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[21] By the concept of reality I mean the answer to the question, What is reality? To that question we have already given an answer by affirming that the real is what is known through true judgment; hence one may also say that the real is 'what is,' that it is 'the defined and judged, as opposed to the definition or judgment,' that it is 'any possible object of true judgment,' that it is 'being, ens, id quod est vet esse potest.' There are two other ways of specifying the concept of reality; the first is to explain the relation of this concept to its grounds in empirical knowledge and in insight; the second is to discuss the denotation of the concept. We shall consider both in turn. The concept of being emerges with an evident ideological anticipation of the judgment; 'being' as a noun is what can be affirmed in true judgment. But the concept of being is not merely a ideological anticipation bul also has a proportionate efficient cause. It emerges the instanl lhat rational reflection proceeds to integrate the insight with the rest of knowledge, for at that instanl rational reflection ullers lhal the insight gives only a 'may be,' a 'can be' and not yet an 'is.' That utterance goes beyond the insight: ihe insight as such is prior to utterance; il is an intelligibility in act, a ground of utterance, but nol ulterance itself. Further, there is utterance lhat merely expresses the insight, for example, the concept of form and, more particularly, ihe concepl of soul; for ihe actus primus corporis naturalis organici is whal is known by insighl inlo a sensitive or imaginal presentation [22] of a natural, organic body.13 But again there is utterance that goes beyond the insight as such, as in the concept of an essence which combines form with common matter or in the concept of an individual thing which combines form with individual matter. Now the concept of being emerges not as an utterance expressing the content of insight as insight nor again as utterance expressing insight along with its necessary conditions of common matter or along with its concrete condition of individual matter but as an utterance expressing the relation of insight, of intelligibility, to the absolute standards of rational consciousness. Thus, being is the utterance expressing the intelligible as related to an absolute. That affirmation needs amplification. The simplest way to provoke the concept of being is to tell a plausible story to a man with a critical mind. He will say that what has been related may be so and, as well, it may not be so. If he is an empiricist, he will place the whole meaning of the verification he still desires in a possible experience. For him, being is just another name for what he can experience; all that is uttered by the concept 'being' is the possibility of various items of empirical knowledge, the data of external

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sense, of memory, of instinctive valuations and correlations, of internal awareness. But for the realist these experiences are not the meaning of being; they are merely conditions in certain cases for the rational transition from 'may be' to 'is.' Knowledge of the actuality of contingent being, or contingent knowledge of necessary [Pages 23 to 59 are missing.] [60] For greater detail on the relations between phantasm, understanding, and concept, we have only to turn to the Thomist account of abstraction. Six different aspects are to be distinguished. There is abstraction of species intelligibilis, a metaphysical entity that is a component in the act of understanding; as such, it is not a datum of consciousness; a discussion of it pertains to Thomist psychology as metaphysical analysis and so does not pertain to the present essay. Secondly, there is the potential abstraction of the act of insight into phantasm: as insight into phantasm, the act of understanding is the understanding of particular data; but any data, sufficiently similar, would be understood in the same way; grasping by insight the intelligibility of any 'this' is potentially to grasp the abstract nature of anything sufficiently similar to 'this.' Thirdly, there is abstraction as the activity of forming the concept by expressing the act of understanding along with the elements in phantasm that are essential to that act of understanding; this is coincident with defining; defining the circle proceeds from the insight that the uniform curvature of this plane curve is necessitated by the equality of its radii; defining the circle is expressing this intelligibility with its 'common matter,' with all and no more than the elements given in phantasm that condition such intelligibility. This definition is abstract, apart, and its being apart may be viewed as separate for understanding, separate for consideration, and separate for judgment; these three constitute the fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of [61] abstraction. Now, of course, St Thomas did not draw up the foregoing lisfof aspects of abstraction; the point we wish to make is that to follow St Thomas in his discussions of abstraction, one has to draw up some such list for oneself. The simplest contrast occurs in answering the objection that abstraction involves falsity in intellect. Then it is pointed out that to judge as separate what are not separate really, does involve falsity; but to consider separately one aspect of a thing while disregarding others, that does not necessarily involve falsity. This contrast is between the fifth and sixth aspects of abstraction, between the concept as object of consideration and the con-

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cept as entering into a judgment. Were this all that Aquinas had to say about abstraction, it would be difficult to suppose that he based abstraction upon insight; on the contrary, it would be natural to take it for granted that Aquinas, like Scotus, made abstraction a mere matter of metaphysical mechanics. But the fact is that the foregoing contrast is but a minor corollary in the Thomist theory of abstraction. The basic element in Thomist theory is abstraction from matter. There is no difficulty in considering materia prima by itself, but one cannot abstract it; one has no species intelligibilis of it; when one abstracts, it is what one leaves behind; and insofar as one knows it, one knows it by its proportion to form.21'1 Now the role of prime matter in the metaphysics of knowledge is paralleled by the role of what is termed 'individual matter' within the data of consciousness. [62] Natural philosopher, mathematician, and metaphysician all abstract from individual matter.214 To abstract the universal from the particular is common to all science which considers the per se and disregards the per acridens.21^ Intellect abstracts from the hie et nunc.'2l(] One cannot account for divine or angelic knowledge of the singular by accumulating any number of universal predicates, for the resultant combination will not be singular but' communicabilis multis.'*11 The astronomer can predict all the eclipses of coming centuries; but his science by itself will not give him the knowledge of particular eclipses as particular 'sicut rusticus cognoscit';218 for insofar as he knows particular future eclipses it is by relating his calculations to a sensibly given here and now. Properly, intellect does not remember; for to know the past as past, like knowing the present as present, is the work of sense.219 But how is [it] that Aquinas is so certain that intellect abstracts from the here and now, from the 'materia individualis, quae est materia determinatis dimensionibus substans'?220 Presumably because it is universally per accidens, because time and place as such explain nothing, because the reason for anything is never in terms of this instance at this time but always in terms of a nature that, if found here, can be found elsewhere, and if found now, can be found later. In other words, the basic element in Thomist theory of abstraction is derived from a property of our way of understanding. The 'here and now' of the phantasmal presentation never is a factor in the insight; it always pertains to the purely sensuous residue that is irrelevant [63] to insight as insight, that is not essential to the occurrence of the insight (as are equal radii and plane curve to understanding this uniform curvature) but always accidental to the occurrence of the insight (as white radii on a black background in understanding this circle).

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Now the mathematician abstracts not only from individual but also from sensible matter; and in this he differs from the natural philosopher. By sensible matter is meant the aggregate of the sensibilia propria; eliminate from a phantasmal presentation all colors, sounds, tastes, odors, and tactile qualities such as rough and smooth, hard and soft, and one has left the average man's idea of nothing, namely, the space-time continuum, the pure matter of the sensibilia communia, namely, shape, size, number, motion, and rest. This pure matter is termed materia intelligibilis; it is necessary to give the geometer a second triangle, similar in all respects to a first, and to give the mathematician a second 'two' that can be added to a first, yet in meaning and definition is identical with the first.221 Now the difference between the first and second degrees of abstraction is a difference in what one is attempting to understand. What is the main difference between a projective geometry and a science of optics? Simply that in the former one is not while in the latter one is attempting to settle properties of light rays; in the former case one disregards light rays not only in one's concepts but also in one's judgments; in the latter case such disregard is ruinous. Hence 'qui sensum negligit in naturalibus, incidit in errorem'; on the other [64] hand 'in mathematicis enim oportet cognitionem secundum iudicium terminari ad imaginationem, non ad sensum' for sense will not give a straight line touching a circle at only one point.222 The third degree of abstraction prescinds from all matter, particular, common, individual, sensible, intelligible; it deals with such concepts as 'ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi.'223 Such concepts, accordingly, proceed from understanding, not as understanding of phantasm, but simply as understanding. They are absolutely universal, because they proceed from any understanding, any intelligibility in act. They may be utterly concrete, because what is understood may be utterly concrete. They are analogous, for each is derived in its own way from intelligibility in act and so possesses its peculiar habitudo to intelligibility in act, while at the same time each varies in content as the intelligibility from which it is derived varies in content. Intelligibility is the possibility of being, as unintelligibility is the impossibility of being; and this reflection of intelligence in act on intelligibility in act is the most fundamental and first of concepts, ens, id quod est vel esse potest.22* So intimate is the relation of ens to intelligibile in actu and to quod quid est that all three are named the object of intellect:225 the relations between them should be clear, for the intelligible in act is what insight knows in phantasm and the anima separata knows without phantasm; the quod quid est is the conception of intelligibility in act as this particular instance of intelligibility; ens is the

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conception of the [65] basis of all intelligibility; 'quidquid esse potest, intelligi potest,'226 and conversely 'quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens.'227 The concepts unum, verum, bonum are convertible with ens for, like ens, they express what is proper to the intelligible as such. Aristotle's 'indivisibilium intelligentia' is of the indivisibles that are indivisible because intelligible;228 the intelligible is always a unity; and indivisibility is identical with unity.229 Next, because ens and unum proceed from intelligibility, they must be commensurable to intellect, and so verum. Finally, because the real is grounded in intelligibility, and intelligibility is system, mutual adaptation, and coherence, it follows that the real is good, 'conveniens appetitui.'230 As the transcendental concepts proceed from intelligibility as such, so also do the basic analytic categories of potency and act; they cannot be defined, Aristotle maintained, but are known by a proportion that may be seen in examples;231 in fact, they are known by insight that grasps in the data what might be there, that grasps possibility; what is possible is the act, and that it is merely possible is the potency; and in a contingent universe such categories have a universal range. But to pursue this topic any further would be to write a summary of Thomist metaphysic; enough has been said to illustrate the point at issue, that the Thomist theory of abstraction is not some obscure matter of metaphysical mechanism but basically a statement of the data of consciousness: 'homo enim abstrahit a phantasmatibus, et recipit mente intelligibilia in actu; non enim aliter in notitiam harum actionum venissemus nisi eas in [66] nobis experiremur.'232 Abstracting from individual matter is grasping the irrelevance for science of the hie et nunc. Abstracting from sensible matter is grasping the irrelevance for mathematics of empirical data as such. Abstracting from all matter is grasping the ultimate irrelevance of the merely empirical, the transcendence of intelligibility, the possibility of metaphysics. In each case the activity of abstraction is the activity of intelligence in act knowing the intelligible in act and rationally stating, analyzing, determining what it is; the term of the activity is the 'conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia procedens.'233 The relation of insight to concepts is not one-to-one but one-to-many, for many concepts are needed to express one insight, as is evident from the very structure of a definition. The more powerful the intellect the greater the extent of distinct detail that it masters and correlates in a single view. Hence the repeated affirmation that the higher angels know more by fewer species than the lower, and the repeated confirmation that the same is observed among men since the less intelligent need detailed explanations

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but the more intelligent grasp the whole from a hint.234 Less grandiose is the illustration from propositions, which involve at least two terms, subject and predicate, but can involve only one act of understanding, since intellect can have only one act of understanding at a time.235 This recalls two points already made, that the conceptualization of understanding is, when fully developed, a system and that one must advert to the [67] implication of systematic knowledge in the Aristotelian and Thomist quod quid est if one would grasp the precise nature of the concept; the concept emerges from understanding, not an isolated atom detached from all context, but precisely as part of a context, loaded with the relations that belong to it in virtue of a source which is equally the source of other concepts. From this follows the second observation, namely, the apparent paradox of stating that distinct terms cannot be abstracted from one another: as distinct terms, they are abstracted from one another in the sense that they can be objects of distinct acts of attention or consideration; but it does not follow that one can understand the one without introducing the other, and in this sense they cannot be abstracted one from the other.235 A final observation is, of course, that if one starts out to determine the nature of intellect by examining concepts taken in isolation, one almost inevitably ends up with a mere logical machine dignified with the name of intellect. To follow the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas, it is necessary to follow their method of introspection; and that they proclaimed: one knows intellect by reflecting on its act, intelligere.2^6 [68] Verbutn Verum per Scientiam The second of Aristotle's operations of intellect, which Aquinas identified with verbum and frequently refers to as a conceptio, conceptus, conceptum,^7 is the compositio et divisio in which truth and falsity are found.238 As the first operation corresponds to the quiddity of the thing, so the second corresponds to its existence.239 In God both operations are a single act, but completing the first leaves us in potency to performing the second;240 for just as human intellect introduces a complexity into its knowledge of simple things, so divine intellect knows the complexa incomplexe.241 The beginning of our knowledge is sense; its development is through sensitive elaboration, through understanding and reasoning; its term and perfection is judgment.242 This term, as a determinatio intellectus ad unum, is certitude.243 More generally, this term is assent, which includes not only certain judgments but also opinions accepted provisionally and with a fear of error.244

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Just as the intelligentia indivisibilium directly expresses and knows an abstract quod quid est and has to pivot back to the phantasm to know indirectly the abstract quiddity in the concrete,245 so in judgment a fuller use of the unity of consciousness246 occurs, for then intellect must refer back to external sense; hence one cannot judge when one is asleep.247 Again, just as one has to distinguish the reasoning that leads up to an insight from the insight, and the insight from the concept, so also one has to distinguish preparatory thinking from assent,248 and, I believe, advert to the different kinds of insight that occur in the preparatory [69] thinking. It is easy enough to distinguish the two basic meanings of composition: there is the ontological composition of the real thing, of form in matter, or of accidents in substance; there is the conceptual composition of true judgment which affirms this ontological composition; and quoad se the former is the cause of the latter; 'dispositio rei est causa veritatis in opinione et oratione.'249 However, that causation is not immediate: it is mediated by sense, memory, and the cogitative, the phantasm, insights, and reasoning. Nowjust as reasoning helps one to understand in the first instance, so also reasoning prepares the way for a special type of understanding that is the coalescence into a single view of what previously were distinct insights. Logicians, precisely because they deal with worn instances, easily come to the conclusion that by deduction we learn nothing; the reason for this is the fact that in the worn instance the insight is already developed into the coalescence of minor insights. On the other hand, any competent teacher knows that reasoning with pupils helps them to understand, helps them to learn; the reason for this is that in the pupil there has not yet taken place the coalescence of minor insights into a major insight, that is one to a greater many. Here we have a composition that is distinct both from the ontological composition in the real object and the conceptual composition in the judgment; it is an intellectual composition in developing understanding. [70] Now while the quod quid est cannot demonstrated, though it can be presented in a syllogism,250 the coalescence of insights runs parallel to the scientific syllogism which Aquinas called 'syllogismus faciens scire.' Indeed, when Aristotle discusses the twofold operation of intellect in the De anima, the compositio et divisio that at least initially is uppermost in mind is not the judgment but the development of understanding. This appears in the example from Empedoclean evolutionary theory which supposed that first there were heads without necks, and legs without feet, and then concord brought these disiecta membra together. 'Sicut ergo Empedocles

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posuit quod amicitia composuit multas partes, et constituit ex eis unum animal, ita et intellectus multa imcomplexa prius separata componit et facit ex eis unum intellectum ...'2&1 If the term intellectum suggests the concept rather than the insight, clearly it is the latter that is referred to in the following passage; 'Symmetrum et diametrum aliquando separatim et seorsum intellectus intelligit, et tune sunt duo intelligibilia: quando autem componit, fit unum intelligibile, et simul intelligitur ab intellectu.'252 Presumably the two concepts do not fuse into one concept; they remain two but for understanding become one; and they become, one by the scientific syllogism, namely, an irrational cannot be measured, but the diagonal of a square is an irrational, and so it cannot be measured.253 One must not conclude, however, that as the simple insight expresses itself in a definition, so the compounded insight expresses itself in a judgment; what corresponds to [71] the compounded insight is not yet an assent but only a conclusion. Moreover, it should seem that judgment can follow not only compounded but also simple insight and that its immediate ground is neither of these but rather what I may term a critical act of understanding. In the writings of Aquinas this critical act is acknowledged implicitly rather than explicitly, a fact to be explained, perhaps, by the tendency of Aquinas to cover his personal developments of what is at best rudimentary in Aristotle by restricting himself, insofar as possible, to Aristotelian terminology. The existence of this critical act of understanding, which stands to the judgment as Newman's illative sense to Newman's assent,254 may be argued as follows. There exists, first, the judgment as a content: it is what is true or false, in the full sense of these terms; and on this ground it is distinguished from the Aristotelian intelligentia indivisibilium?^ Secondly, the judgment is not only a content but also an act of a subject, personally committing the subject; under this aspect, judgment is assent; and as assent, it is divided into scientific certitude, opinion, belief.256 Thirdly, the division of assents is based upon their motives or grounds which, from the nature of the case, are within knowledge and consciousness and, also, prior to the judgment itself; they are constitutive of judging in the sense in which judging is assembling the evidence and weighing it with a view to effecting the determination that is assent. Of this activity, prior to the judgment and cause of it, Aquinas speaks as a resolutio in [72] principia. Generally, this resolution is conceived as a reduction of the conclusion to principia per se nota, so that one sees that to deny the conclusion would necessitate denying the principles and so committing intellectual suicide.257 Still, these passages cannot

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be taken in an exclusive sense; for the resolution is not only to abstract principles but also to concrete sensible data.258 Further, the three degrees of abstraction are not merely types of conceptualization but also norms of judgment: while metaphysics reduces its conclusions to pure intellect, Euclidean geometry judges by a reduction to imagination, and positive science must include a reduction to sensible data.259 Thus Aquinas appears fully aware of the fact that the act of judgment is preceded by a marshaling of all the relevant evidence. But in what precisely does this marshaling and weighing the evidence consist? It cannot be a mere presenting in empirical consciousness, concomitant or reflective, for it is not enough to know the evidence without knowing that the evidence necessitates the projected judgment. To grasp a necessary nexus between the evidence, on the one hand, and the projected judgment, on the other, is to understand; it is a reflective act of understanding, for the matter understood is what is given within the field of knowledge relevant to a projected judgment; it is a critical act of understanding, inasmuch as a failure to grasp the necessity of the judgment in the grounds means that the judging will be unfavorable and judgment will not be forthcoming. [73] Of the reflective and critical nature of judging, Aquinas was quite aware: 'Intellectus autem habet apud se similitudinem rei intellectae, secundum quod rationes incomplexorum concipit; non tamen propter hoc ipsam similitudinem diiudicat, sed solum cum componit vel dividit ... et ideo in hac sola secunda operatione intellectus est veritas vel falsitas, secundum quam non solum intellectus habet similtudinem rei intellectae, sed etiam super ipsam similitudinem reflectitur, cognoscendo et diiudicando ipsam.'26° Moreover, though one might urge that the resolutio in principia is simply a process of reasoning,261 still it is reasoning only as long as it is process; in its term reasoning is understanding, for while reasoning proceeds from one element to another, still it reaches its goal with a many integrated into a single view; and that single view is understanding.262 Perhaps the Thomist name for this critical act of understanding is the 'intellectus ut terminus rationis.'263 The most convincing text would be: 'est enim rationis proprium circa multa diffundi, et ex eis unam simplicem cognitionem colligere ... rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem terminatur secundum viam resolutionis, inquantum ex multis ratio colligit unam et simplicem veritatem.'2''4 However, the distinctions are not drawn all at once and explicitly: there is the critical act of understanding, which is prior to the act of judgment-assent; there is the act of judgment-assent which is the verbum of the critical act; there is concomitant consciousness and also

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reflective consciousness (explicit consideration) of the judgment-assent; there is the contemplative act of understanding which [74] uses the verbum as its instrument through which it regards intelligible reality.2*'5 The lastnamed, contemplative act of understanding also seems to stand within the connotation of the 'intellectus ut terminus rationis.' There is another approach to the critical act of understanding: for it would seem to be the second act to which the intellectual virtues of prudence and especially wisdom are first act. These virtues regard judging as an active resolutio inprincipia and not judgment as the passive reception of a verbum. One might say that there is a virtue of intellectual honesty, of submitting readily to what one sees must be so; such a virtue would regard not the act whence judgment proceeds but the reception of the act that is judgment itself; but most probably its subject would be not the intellect but the will, since its concern would be to prevent undue interference from the will. Again, one might be able to argue that the virtue of faith regards the passive rather than the active side of judgment-assent. But prudence and wisdom are concerned with marshaling and weighing the evidence: prudence is a sort of counsel in contingent matters;2'1*' while wisdom conducts the resolutio to ultimate causes.2*'7 Further, by their closer relation to judgment, prudence and wisdom are distinct from understanding in the basic sense of insight,2''8 and from the logical consequent of insight which J • • yfio is science. Hence, just as the mathematician at work actuates the insights he possesses habitually, so the critical act of understanding is an actuation of the virtues of prudence and wisdom that one may possess. Further, the only difference [75] between these virtues and the critical act will be that between first and second act; from the character of the former, as described by Aquinas, we can infer the character of the latter; for in the first instance, habits, like potencies, are known from their acts. Now it happens that we find Aquinas describing prudence and wisdom in terms that apply very aptly to the critical act of understanding. Critical understanding is the resolutio in principia as the final grasp of the whole in a single view: it sees at once first principles and sensible data; it sees all that are relevant; it sees them not in themselves merely but in their implication of a projected judgment; and it sees what follows from this implication, namely, that not to assent to the projected judgment would involve the rejection of principles and data. It is the full act of intellectual consciousness, that is, of consciousness not merely as an awareness or as an introspective reflection but principally as a reflective act of understanding. Just as the activity of abstraction proceeds from the

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243 Appendix self-possession of intelligence in act, grasping and defining the conditions of its act, so critical understanding is a much fuller self-possession of intelligence in act, reaching back to sense data, looking forward to a projected judgment, and measuring all by the absolute standard of necessity; for it is the necessity grasped by critical understanding that will give the judgmentcontent the absolute quality of truth, and that will give the assent its freedom from the formido contradictorii.27" [Page 76 is missing] [77] principles as do the sciences but also passes judgment on them and defends them against objections.28" Obviously, what passes judgment on indemonstrable first principles is critical in the fullest sense of that supposedly modern term. What is the judgment to be passed on first principles? At the level at which we approached the critical act of understanding, we saw that it involved a resolutio in principia that set the alternatives of either making a given judgment or committing intellectual suicide. Now this establishes a subjective necessity of judgment, but it falls short of the idea of truth, which holds objecdvely, absolutely, eternally, and it falls short of the idea of knowledge of reality, which is not immanent and within the subject from every viewpoint but, through truth, 281 transcendent. It is up to wisdom to effect the transition from the subjective to the objecdve, from the relative to the absolute and eternal, from the immanent to the transcendent if, indeed, wisdom passes judgment on the first principles through which all other knowledge is knowledge. 'Nomen mentis a mensurando est sumptum';282 hence 'iudicium autem de unoquoque habetur secundum illud quod est mensura illius.'283 By what measure can one judge first principles? To what higher standard can one appeal? Prior to and cause of our knowledge of first principles is the light of intellect itself;284 species determine acts of understanding, but the light of intellect 'facit intelligentem simpliciter';285 it enables us to grasp immutable truth in mutable realities and to discern appearance from reality;286 it is the manifestation [Pages 78 to 89 are missing; footnote indices indicate that the rest of the material belongs to a new chapter.] [90] patic position 'quia, ut puto, latuit eum.'100 It would be difficult to be

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more devastating in fewer words. As far as Cajetan could see, utputo, Scotus just did not know what Aristotle was talking about. With regard to the Scotist esse cognitum, Cajetan is eloquent: 'Ego autem, peripatetico lacte educatus, ac in acre, ut aiunt, loqui nesciens, praeter latitudinem ends realis, solum ens rationis novi. Ens autem rationis relationem aut negationem a s. Thoma didici, in Qu. de Ver., qu. xxi, a. 1. Unde cum esse obiectivum non sit modus essendi secundum rem, neque sit negatio, restat quod sit esse relativum secundum rationem, in communi loquendo.'101 On what seem to me to be the two central issues, Cajetan is resolutely and wholeheartedly anti-Scotist. But Cajetan was not born an anti-Scotist. He underwent an intellectual conversion. In listing opinions on the nature of the beatific vision he set forth an obviously Scotist view in terms of the cooperation of the object and the faculty in producing the act. But he does not name it Scotist; he names it the communis cursus iudicantium. Not merely does he name it common opinion, but he also acknowledges that at one time he himself held it, that he taught it, that even perhaps it crept into his writings.102 But if Cajetan had to have a conversion to grasp the Aristotelian theory of knowledge by identity, may one not say that that theory is anything but obvious? If Cajetan was exceptionally intelligent, if his [91] commentary was chosen for the Leonine edition, can one place implicit reliance on lesser commentators who fail to betray an appreciation of the subjective difficulties involved in grasping the issues? One may, if one pleases, deprecate Cajetan's dedain coutumierfor the material mindedness of men, but I think it much more relevant to observe that it is not a question of disdain at all; it is a frankly humble recognition of the difficulty of the issues and a friendly warning against a trap which he knew because he himself had fallen into it. If anything Cajetan does too fine a job of putting together the various metaphysical strands in Thomist cognitional theory. Aristotelian identity derives from the analysis of motion in the Physics: motion as from the agent is action; as in the patient is passion; so that the one act, motion, is the act both of agent and of patient. Explicitly it is this analysis that yields 'sensibile in actu est sensus in actu.'103 And it is an extension of the same analysis that yields 'intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu.'104 Aristotlelian immateriality [92] is another equally simple thing: 'quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur' and, on the other hand, the agent acts by its form and reproduces not its matter but its form; trees are alive and freeze but they do not feel cold, because they receive the form 'coldness' not immaterially but only in different matter; knowing is immaterial reception

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245 Appendix of form.105 Cajetan with an appeal to Averroes fixes the specific characteristic of immaterial reception: matter does not become form; what becomes is a third, the composite of matter and form; on the contrary, the actuation of intellectus by the intellectum does not yield a third, but the intellectus becomes the intellectum; that is the idea of Aristotle's affirmation that 'anima est quodammodo omnia.' Hence, in every case, 'cognoscens est ipsum cognitum, actu vel potentia.' The knower, intellectus, is the very known.106 But it may be the known in either of two ways. Here there comes into operation the Thomist idea of the intentional. The knower may be the known ontologically: God is his own substance; eminenter he is all being; hence God knows all things by what he is really. Similarly, the angel is his own substance, and that is a pure form, an intelligibibility, so that the angel knows himself by his own substance. But to know other angels and other things, the angel's own substance does not suffice. It has to be eked out by species, similar to the known, more or less comprehensive. Species are intentional reality, the reality of the known in a knower who is not knowing in virtue of his own natural, ontological perfection.107 [93] This is brilliant. It runs true to the basic exigences of the problem. It clearly grasps both the theorem of immaterial identity and the distinct theorem of intentioriality to account for identity in subordinate cases. But from the viewpoint of Cajetan's own difficulty in coming to grasp it, and still more from the viewpoint of later history, its very brilliance is a defect. For the practical role of epistemology is not to inquire into mind as mind but to bring my mind to a grasp of the manner in which really I do know, to purge from it illusions about knowledge that too easily I may entertain. To that end a purely metaphysical account of knowledge is not particularly helpful, and an extremely elegant synthesis of the whole of gnoseological metaphysics is apt to be even less helpful, for it will encourage others to fancy things much simpler than really they are. It would be anachronistic to expect to find in Cajetan an epistemologist. But one may say that it is regrettable that he is so jejune in his treatment of the Thomist transposition of the Augustinian theory of truth,108 or that he affirms the need of an intentional identity for knowledge to be knowledge because all sound philosophers take it for granted that simile simili cognoscitur.109 For had Cajetan been more interested in knowledge simply as knowledge, it would not have been possible for him to think out so accurately the nature of the analogy of being without recalling the twofold verbum of definition regarding natura rei and judgment regarding esse rei. Cajetan's analysis of the concept of being squares perfectly with [94] the analysis of rational consciousness,

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first by reflection fixing on an essence, and then by affirmation positing an existence. But Cajetan, commenting on the Summa, writes of the Thomist verbum without any advertence to definition and judgment, indeed he writes as though he were describing a Scotist species. '... sciendum est quod in parte intellectiva, praeter potentias, actus et habitus, posuit terminum actus, ea necessitate, ut obiectum actus secundi haberetur praesens ipsi actui obiective.'110 Why the intellect has not in the phantasm its present object is not explained though Cajetan could advance that'... splendet in phantasmate intelligibile in actu, natura scilicet abstrahens ab hie et nunc: et tale intelligibile in actu movet intellectum possibilem.'111 On the other hand, how we get beyond the immanent object to the real thing, Cajetan does explain by recalling Aristotle's remark in the De memoria et reminiscentia: 'idem est motus in imaginem et rem cuius est imago.'112 That may do for animal faith; but it hardly does justice to the verbum of rational consciousness, or to Cajetan himself. [95] When one turns to John of St Thomas, one still finds epistemology neglected and, as well, the fruit of that neglect. For John immateriality and intentionality are synonymous: immateriality is not the mere negation of matter but a mode of the reception of forms; spiritual beings receive forms in two ways, entitatively to make them what they are, on the other hand intentionally, representatively, immaterially.113 This is Cajetan with a difference. The difference is that Aristotle and the ultimate identity of knower and known, the ultimate transcendence of the distinction between subject and object, have passed out of the picture. For John knowledge is knowledge of the other. Commenting on i, q. 14, a. 1, he does not turn for light to the next article, but goes to the De veritate, q. 2, a. 2, where knowledge of the other is in the foreground.1'4 Defining the formal concept of understanding, he writes: '... illud est formaliter intelligere, ex quo formaliter et immediate sequitur intelligi in obiecto et attingentia illius in subiecto, ita quod constituatur intellectus attingens obiectum; tune enim principaliter denominatur intelligens, quando constituitur apprehendens obiectum.'115 Again, 'Quare principalis ratio intellectionis, ut intellectio est, non est ipsa egressio seu origo ab operante, sed actuatio ipsa qua in genere intelligibili constituit intellectum in actu secundo coniunctum ipsi obiecto seu tendens ad illud intentionaliter et intelligibiliter.'116 Might I suggest that a more obvious context for that notion of intellect is not a [96] commentary on St Thomas but a commentary on Scotus. In his Quodlibetum XIII Scotus examines in detail his interesting compound of immanent operation and consequent relation to the object; he carefully distinguishes between intuitive knowledge in which the

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object must be real and abstractive knowledge in which the object need not be real;"7 from this there follows a distinction in the relations. In either case two relations are involved: 'Una potest dici relatio mensurati, vel verius mensurabilis ad mensuram. Alia potest dici relatio unientis formaliter in ratione medii ad terminum, ad quern unit, et ista relatio medii unientis specialiori nomine potest dici relatio attingentiae alterius, ut termini, vel tendentiae in alterum, ut in terminum.' 118 Now when there is no real object, the cognitional act is rather the measure; when there is, it is the measurable.1'9 But in both cases there is the unio, attingentia, tendentia, and this relation is real in the case of a real object;120 otherwise, it is notional, namely, between the knowing and the esse cognitum of the object in the knowing.1"1 It is, then, a quite accurate account of Scotist intellection to say that '... illud est formaliter intelligere, ex quo formaliter et immediate sequitur intelligi in obiecto et attingentia illius in subiecto ...' and '... principalis ratio intellectionis ... constituit intellectum in actu secundo coniunctum ipsi obiecto seu tendens ad illud intentionaliter et intelligibiliter.' But whether Scotus is simply a faithful and humble disciple of St Thomas on this point is a further question. [97] Scotus was content with the actio of knowing as the esse cognitum of the known: if there is a knowing of the object, then the object is known. But John of St Thomas, for obvious reasons, needed a verbum distinct from the intelligere and consequent to it. Hence among other arguments he advances: 'Ad haec si obiectum est absens, ita ut in seipso terminare non possit cognitionem, necessario requiritur, quod haec terminatio suppleatur in aliqua representatione. Nee sufficit ipse actus intelligendi, quia ipse est ipsa cognitio, non res ipsa cognita . ,.' 122 That he is not thinking of definition or judgment as the intentional essence and existence of the thing within the intellect and distinct from the act of understanding, appears partly from silence and partly from the fact that he does not consider his verbum to lie within internal experience. To an objection on that score he answers: '... imago est duplex. Alia exterior et instrumentalis, quae ut cognita ducit in cognitionem obiecti, et talis imago prius debet attingi et cognosci quam obiectum ipsum. Alia est interior et formalis, quae non est obiectum cognitum, sed ipsa est ratio et forma terminans cognitionem, et haec non debet esse cognita obiective, sed solum cognitionem reddere terminatam formaliter respectu obiecti.'12;5 Thus his verbum would seem to be the metaphysical condition of it being true that the object is known; and this is to be taken in an absolute sense, for there is no need of a verbum in the beatific vision because of himself God is known while the vision adds

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[98] only another instance with respect to which 'God is known' is true.124 Indeed one might say that John's verbum is a sort of metaphysical reduplication of the distinction between subject and object: so ultimate and paramount is that distinction that mere knowing does not suffice to make the object known; hence '... esse intellectum in actu dupliciter dici potest, vel respectu obiecti, quia de se solum est intelligibile in actu primo, redditur autem in actu ultimo intellectum; vel respectu subiecti quia applicata ad istud subiectum redditur intellectum, idest apprehensum et tentum ab ipso. Dicimus ergo, quod verbum ponitur, ut reddat obiectum intellectum in actu ultimo ex parte obiecti, secundum quod intellectum in actu ultimo contradividitur contra intelligibile in actu primo.'125 Now there are two meanings to the distinction between intelligibile and intellectum. What I shall contend is the pertinent Thomist meaning, has intelligibile as what is known by understanding, for example, a form as opposed to matter and to contingent existence, for matter and contingence are not in themselves intelligible but only as related to form or to necessary being respectively; on the same view, the intellectum is the thing, form existing in matter; on the same view, the necessity of a verbum is, on the one hand, the impossibility of our knowing a contingent material thing directly and exclusively by understanding, for that type of thing is not in itself intelligible, and, on the other hand, the necessity of acts of rational consciousness, of thought, to reflect and judge if one is to proceed from understanding to knowledge of the thing, the intellectum. [99] Thus, I should say that a Thomist distinction would have to do with different objects of intellect: the intelligible is the quidditas; but the intellectum as conceived is ens and as affirmed is verum. On the other hand, the Scotist distinction does not involve different objects but different stages of the same object: the actu intelligibile is the species produced by agent intellect and phantasm; the actualis intellect™ is the verbum, the act of taking a look at the species.1'2*" The position of John of St Thomas is a modification of the latter view: John was not speaking of the transition from the object known in understanding to the object known by rational consciousness, from the intrinsic intelligibility of the thing to the compound of form and matter, essence and existence: he was speaking of the same psychological event as Scotus was, namely, knowing a concept: his intelligibik in actu primo is parallel to the Scotist species, and his intellectum in actu secundo is parallel to the verbum; and neither is an event within psychological consciousness. The human analogy to the divine processions has gone up in metaphysical smoke.

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Conclusions

The chief aim in this second part has been to indicate the issues behind the various theories of verbum. According to Scotus the verbum is a knowing proceeding from a known. According to Thomistic writers the verbum is a known as known, or the formal condition of a known as known proceeding from a knowing. According to the interpretation we wish to put forward the verbum is an act of rational consciousness proceeding from an act of understanding. Common to the two positions that are in possession of the contemporary field is the Platonist duality of subject and object, knowing and known. On both positions that distinction has to be ultimate; it has to be such that it can be verified within the pure act; were it true that the distinction between knowing and known had no real meaning within the selfknowledge of the pure act, then both positions simultaneously would fall and for the same reason. Now if one is an Aristotelian, that distinction must really vanish: '... secundum sententiam Aristotelis ... intelligere contingit per hoc quod intellectum in actu fit unum cum intellectu in actu.'127 On the other hand, if one is a Platonist, the distinction cannot really vanish: 'secundum autem positionem Platonis intelligere fit per contactum intellectus ad rem intelligibilem;"28 and so Plato had to hold that ideal being would be eternally asleep were it without motion.'129 [101] If a new star has arisen in the philosophic firmament to ground a third position, let us get out our telescopes and inspect it. But meanwhile we can be quite certain where Aquinas stands in this matter. He is uncompromisingly Aristotelian: "Et secundum hoc tantum sensus vel intellectus aliud est a sensibili vel intelligibili, quia utrumque est in potentia. Cum igitur Deus nihil potentialitatis habeat, sed sit actus purus, oportet quod in eo intellectus et intellectum sint idem omnibus modis ...'13° There is no potency in God, and so there is not an absolutely ultimate distinction between subject and object, knowing and known. Now this Platonism of Scotist and Thomistic trinitarian theory is not due to Plato; it is due to the same cause as Plato's Platonism is due, to naive realism, to the illegitimate and unconscious transference into analytic thought of what seems obvious to common sense. For common sense, knowing is identical with knowing an object, contacting an object, being in the presence of an object, being confronted with an object, standing opposite an object.'3' Knowing is attingentia obiecti for common sense, for Scotus, for John of St Thomas, and for not a few of my prospective readers. It was

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necessary to begin by attacking that notion. It was necessary to make plain that it is possible to conceive knowing as not necessarily and invariably and, above all, unquestionably attingentia obiecti. Without making that point endless texts from St Thomas would seem to the reader to be no more than strange and paradoxical. Without making it one would plough the ocean. Quidquid recipitur... [102] If I have made any headway, then it also will be true that I have given some of the evidence for the interpretation of Thomist trinitarian theory at which I am aiming. First, there is the point that the distinction between subject and object, knowing and known, is irrelevant to trinitarian theory; it vanishes when one considers the self-knowledge of the pure act. Secondly, there is the point that the Thomist verbum is an act of rational consciousness; for it is a definition or a judgment; both are acts of rational consciousness; both suppose and proceed from understanding; for if one does not understand, one may still prattle, but one can neither define132 nor judge. Thirdly, it should be clear that the emanatio intelligibilis of the eternal Word is not a passive intelligibility such as is found in material causality, but an active intelligibility such as is proper only to intelligence in act and acting as intelligence; such proper activity of intelligence in act is rational utterance, dicere; and that is the reason why the human mind is uniquely an image of God; in it alone, in our material universe, is there active intelligence in act.134 Fourthly, there is the outstanding problem of the processio operati according to the will; but with verbum conceived as rational act, it is natural to conceive love as rational act; as verbum proceeds from understanding, is 'because' of understanding, so love proceeds from both, is 'because' of both. (to be continued)

NOTES TO A P P E N D I X

22O materia individualis ...: individual matter, which is the underlying matter in its determinate dimensions 222 qui sensum negligit...: anyone who neglects the senses in the study of nature falls into error 222 in mathematicis ...: in mathematics the knowledge we have through judgment has to terminate in the imagination, not in the senses 232 homo enim ...: the human way is to abstract from phantasms and to receive

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Appendix mentally the intelligibles in act; for in no other way would we have come to knowledge of these actions except by experiencing them in ourselves conceptio rei...: conception of the thing that is understood, coming from intellective power and proceeding from knowledge of it dispositio rei...: the way things are is the cause of truth in opinion and in assertion Sicut ergo ...: Therefore, as Empedocles took the position that friendship brings together many parts and out of them constitutes one animal, so also the intellect brings together many simple elements that were separate before and makes from them one understanding Symmetrum et... : See above, chapter 2, note 14 Intellectus autem habet...: the intellect has within itself a similitude of the thing that is understood; but it is not in this activity that it passes judgment on that similitude, but only when it combines or divides ... and so it is only in this second operation of the intellect that truth or falsity is found, for in truth and falsity the intellect not only has a similitude of the thing that is understood, but reflects on that similitude, knowing and judging it est enim rationis...: for it belongs to reason to be dispersed over a multitude of things, and out of them to gather one simple item of knowledge ... rational consideration terminates at intellectual following the way of resolution, insofar as from a multitude it gathers a truth that is one and simple

[The remainder of the quotations are from a new chapter.] 101 Ego autem ...: But I was nurtured on the milk of the Peripatetic school and do not know how to make sounds, as they say, in the air; so, besides the wide extent of real being, I know only mental being. But I learned from St Thomas, in De veritate, q. 21, a. i, that mental being is either a relation or a negation. And therefore, since 'objective being' is not a mode of being of real things, and is not a negation, there remains only that it has the mental being of a relation, speaking in general 11O ... sciendum est...: it is to be noted that in the intellective faculty, beside potencies, acts, and habits, he affirmed a term of the act; this is required in order that the object of second act be present objectively to the act itself 111 ... splendet in ...: the intelligible in act shines forth in the phantasm, naturally abstracting of course from the here and now 115 ... illud est... understanding is formally that from which there follows formally and immediately: (i) in the object, that it is understood, and (2) in the subject, that it attains this object, so that intellect is constituted as attaining the object; for that is principally [the justification for] using the word 'intelligent,' when apprehension of the object is realized 116 Quare principalis ...: And therefore the main feature of intellection, insofar as

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it is intellection, is not its emergence from or origin in the one acting, but the actuation itself by which in the intelligible order it constitutes the intellect in second act, either conjoined to the object itself, or tending to it intentionally and intelligibly 118 Una potest did ...: One of them could be called a relation of the measured, or more accurately a relation of the measurable, to the measure. The other could be called the relation of what formally, precisely as medium, unites [a thing] to the term to which it unites; and this relation of a uniting medium can be called in a more special way the relation of the attaining of another as term, or of tending to another as to a term 121 ... illud est...: translation given above at note 115 121 ... principalis ratio ...: translation given above at note 116 122 Ad haec...: For this, if the object is absent so that it cannot in itself terminate knowledge, it is necessarily required that this termination be supplied in some representation. Nor does the act itself of understanding suffice, for it is knowledge itself, not the thing itself that is known 123 ... imago est duplex ...: ... images are of two kinds. One is external and instrumental, and as known this leads to knowledge of the object; this kind of image must be attained and known before the object itself is [attained and known]. The other is internal and formal, and this is not the object known but is the reason and form terminating knowledge; and this need not be known objectively but needs only to constitute knowledge as formally terminated in regard to the object 125 ... esse intelkctum ...: to be understood in act can be spoken of in two ways: either with respect to the object, because of itself the object is only intelligible in first act and becomes understood in the final act; or with respect to the subject, because when applied to that subject it becomes understood, that is, apprehended or attained by [the subject]. We say, then, that the word is posited in order to make the object understood in the final act on the side of the object, according to the [thinking] in which understood in final act is contradistinguished from intelligible in first act 127, 128 ... secundum sententiam Aristotelis ... secundum autempositionem Platonis: see above, chapter 2, note 119 130 Et secundum hoc...: And sense or intellect is other than the sensible or the intelligible only insofar as each is in potency. Therefore, since there is no potentiality in God but only pure act, it necessarily follows that in him understanding and understood are the same in every way

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Editorial Notes

Introduction a Introduction: Subject and Soul: when Lonergan agreed to the publication of his verbum articles in book form, first in French and then in English, he provided a few pages that he might have called ' Verbum Revisited' but instead named simply 'Introduction.' Preparation of both books was going forward when he was asked by Fr C.G. Arevalo, editor of Philippine Studies, for an article to be included in a special issue of that journal that would feature Karl Rahner along with Lonergan and the 'Lumen Gentium' of the Second Vatican Council. Lonergan responded by sending a copy of the introduction he had written for the verbum book; obviously, he could not give that title to an article, and so the happy result of this little problem was the very appropriate title 'Subject and Soul.' That fits the content perfectly, so in including it in the new edition of Verbum, we have simply combined the two titles to give the new one, 'Introduction: Subject and Soul.' [3] b sublation: this may be the first appeal in Lonergan's published work to the notion of sublation. It is also an unusual application. Regularly from now on it will be applied to the levels of consciousness; for example, in 'The Subject,' a lecture of 1968: 'the intelligent subject sublates the experiential ... the rational subject sublates the intelligent and experiential subject... rational consciousness is sublated by rational self-consciousness' (A Second Collection 80). The peculiarity of the present usage is the application to stages of history as represented by Aristotle and Aquinas; such an understanding is perhaps implicit in Lonergan's critique of Hegel's sublation, Insight 446-47; the notion of 'higher viewpoint' in Insight is also relevant to this piece of history. [4]

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Editorial Notes c objects ... causality: relevant here is the great shift in Lonergan from faculty psychology and its metaphysics to intentionality analysis and consciousness. The shift is nearing completion in the 1959 lectures; see the section headed (by the editors) 'From Faculty Psychology to Flow of Consciousness,' Topics in Education 82-85. [5] d must be encountered: another instance of a newly emerging line of thought that will assume major importance in Lonergan's Method in Theology (see chapter 10 on Dialectic). It might be said that in Insight, despite some remarkable passages on intersubjectivity, one's encounter is objectively with the real and subjectively with oneself, rather than with persons; but in the Gonzaga University lecture of 1963 on Mediation (in the institute Knowledge and Learning), the occasion of mutual self-mediation is asserted to be 'the encounter, the meeting, keeping company, living together,' and that ties in with encountering Augustine, as described in this Introduction of one year later. [6] e illative sense and unconditional assent: regularly Lonergan likens his reflective understanding to Newman's illative sense (see our editorial note a to chapter 2 below). But this illuminating passage goes a step further to find both Augustine and Newman linking reflective insight to the uttered word of judgment, and thus pointing to the procession of emanatio intelligibilis. See also Lonergan's early draft of these articles: 'this critical act of understanding ... stands to the judgment as Newman's illative sense to Newman's assent' (p. 71 of the autograph, p. 240 in the appendix above). [8] f Note 11: This note was designed, it seems, to fill in the gap created by the omission of the original opening paragraphs in chapter i. See editorial note b to that chapter, [ll] Chapter i a Verbum: Definition and Understanding: articles i and 2 lacked individual titles when they originally appeared in Theological Studies (7 [1946] 349 arid 8 [1947] 35); the titles used in this edition were added in the 1967 book publication, pp. l and 47; the titles of chapters 3, 4, and 5 are those of the original articles. [12] b startling: The first three paragraphs of the verbum articles (Theological Studies 7 [1946] 349-50) were omitted by the French translators (letter of M. Regnier to Lonergan, 12 May 1963), first in the periodical Archives de philosophic and then in the book La notion deverbe ...; Lonergan accepted this omission for the French and presumably also for the English book publication. Our rationale for the Collected Works requires their restoration. Further, they explain otherwise puzzling references to the Trinity here and there in the volume (pp. 24, 47, 59, and passim) and a specific reference to these

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c d e

f

g

h

i

paragraphs (p. 152). See also Lonergan's reference in his Introduction (above, p. 11) to the trinitarian context of the whole study (though he wrote this for a volume that omitted the original opening paragraphs). [12] l... Word: the English book publication (1967) begins here (VERBUM i). [13] discussion: the French translation, La notion de verbe dans les ecrits de saint Thomas d'Aquin, begins after this paragraph. [14] formation of definitions: the original reading was 'the formation of definitions or quiddities'; a marginal correction in CV-B 354 reads 'the formation of definitions signifying quiddities'; CV-C, however, has 'the formation of definitions,' and this became the final reading. Similar changes were made passim in the margins of CV-B: for example, near the end of the next paragraph The same holds for every quiddity' became 'The same holds for every definition'; and 'As such, the quiddity is abstract' became 'As such, the definition is abstract.' See also editorial note m to this chapter. [18] without... colors: see the conclusion of chapter l on efforts to start with metaphysics: 'after attempting it in a variety of ways, I found it unmanageable' (p. 59 above). The decision to start with psychology and provide a basis in cognitional structures for metaphysics became programmatic for later work; see Insight 5, 424-26 and passim. [24] Such ... is the plan: the plan is followed closely enough in material content, but is later stated in various ways that are helpful for our understanding of the way Lonergan conceived his task. For example, the divisions are otherwise named in the conclusion to chapter l: parts 4 and 5 become 'the metaphysical and psychological elements in the Thomist concept of God as known both naturally and through divine revelation' (p. 59) Then, at the start of chapter 2: parts l and 2 are collapsed into one ('first'), parts 3 and 4 are collapsed into another ('secondly'), and the material of part 5 is divided into two: 'thirdly, to follow the extrapolation from the analysis of the human mind to the account of the divine intellect as known naturally; fourthly, to study the theory of the procession of the divine Word' (p. 60). At the end of chapter 4, parts l and 2 are again collapsed to give four parts in all (p. 190). See also p. 199: 'We began our inquiry by listing seven elements ... Six ... have been elucidated ...' Finally, there is the plan as Lonergan saw it over fifteen years later and sketched it in his Introduction above (pp. 10-11). [26] sixty-four-dollar question: a phrase that dates the 'here and now' of Lonergan's writing; in 1946 a radio quiz program was giving prizes that grew with each right answer to the grand total of sixty-four dollars. It seems incredible now that such a paltry sum could so excite the contestants, and in fact, the amount quickly became sixty-four thousand dollars. [26] diagram: Lonergan's repeated use of the diagram is a major clue to the meaning of 'insight.' See our editorial note d to chapter l of Insight, p. 781, and note k to Lecture l of Understanding and Being, pp. 402-3. [27]

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j would not be able: CV-C changed 'would be able' to 'would not be able,' but in fact the ambiguity of 'inasmuch as' allows us to give the same sense to either reading: in the original 'inasmuch as' is understood as 'in the sense that,' and in the correction is understood as 'because.' [33] k the eminent doctor ... ens: the 'eminent... doctor' is Msgr (later Bishop) Fulton J. Sheen (personal communication). Lonergan is probably referring to a lecture heard when he taught theology in Montreal (1940-46); four times in the relevant period Sheen lectured at Loyola College in that city; see The News-Letter [Jesuit]: Province of Upper Canada May 1941, May 1943, May 1944, October 1946. [33] 1 objectivity of the intelligible: the objectivity of the intelligible is a key notion in Lonergan's cognitional theory, opposed on one side to the restriction of objectivity to sensitive intuition and on the other to the extension of intellectual intuition to the act of being. [34] m follows: there is a reference to this paragraph in note 96 of the fourth article (written three years later in 1949) of the verbum series. The note reads as follows: 'In this context and in general Aquinas' quidditas or quod quid est is objective; it is of the thing as intelligible, just as color is of the thing as visible. In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. i ad ym: "quidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis" is exceptional; it refers to the act of defining and explains "verum est in mente"; but the context also speaks of the quidditas and esse as components of the thing. When I wrote Theological Studies, VII (1946), 370 lines 17 ff., I had not sufficiently adverted to this, nor to the nature of conversion to phantasm.' Two of Lonergan's revisions in the 1967 book that result from this later advertence appear in the next two sentences of the present paragraph: the line 'Quod quid est... is the essential definition as inner word' became the present 'Quod quid est... is or corresponds to the essence or essential definition' (on this see note n, immediately below); and the line ' Quod quid erat esse ... is also the essential definition as inner word' became the present 'Quod quid erat esse is also the essence or essential definition.' Further, several passages where definition and quiddity had been made interchangeable were likewise revised; see editorial note e to this chapter. [36] n the form ... concept of form: CV-A had 'the form so known is not the philosophic concept of form,' which was corrected in CV-B to the present reading, 'the form so known does not correspond to the philosophic concept of form.' The new reading seems in conflict with Lonergan's isomorphism of the cognitional and ontological, in which the form grasped by insight does correspond to the metaphysical form of philosophy; a possible explanation is that the primary purpose underlying Lonergan's language here is still the elimination of any identification of quiddity and definition, and so also any identification of quod quid erat esse with the corresponding cognitional form. [38] o pivoting: 'pivoting' is a favorite metaphor in this context; see also p. 48

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p

q

r

s

t

above: 'human understanding ... pivots on itself to produce ... the inner word ... And this pivoting... is an operation of rational consciousness.' See page 88: 'intellect in its forward movement towards defining and in its backward reference to sense'; and also the editorial note cto chapter l of Insight, p. 781. [38] Kant... sensible: Lonergan's full position on Kant is complex; see Understanding and Being30-31 ('Insight in Kant'). For light on this point, the editors consulted Giovanni Sala; see his reply, 'Kant and Lonergan on Insight into the Sensible,' METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 13 (1995) 89-97. [40] reflection of intellect: a clearer understanding of 'conversion to phantasm' (see editorial note m above) led Lonergan (CV-B) to change 'the reflection or conversion of intellect' to the present reading, 'the reflection of intellect.' [40] they still reduce ... the imagination that we possess: what is this imagination that we do not possess but somehow have access to? Philip McShane responded to our question as follows. 'The keyword here is "reduce." See Lonergan, "A Note on Geometrical Possibility" (Collection [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988, 92-107, at 105-6]) on the technique of reduction, discussed within the context of possibility secundum quid. Reduction is a recognized strategy in the move to some certainty regarding the possibility secundum quid of non-Euclidean geometries. (See McShane, 'The Foundations of Mathematics,' The Modem Schoolman 40 [1962-63] 373-87 (reprinted as chapter 2 in Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy [Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980], with special attention to the reference in note 10.) But the reduction is to an imagination that is, ontologically and psychically, approximately Euclidean. We can, however, transcend that imagination to grasp the secundum quid possibility of a finite non-Euclidean materiality grounding the possibility of an isomorphic psyche.' [55] precede: this highly instructive list of the various cognitional acts that refer to being had its predecessor in Insight 665; for a longer collection of such lists, see Lonergan Studies Newsletter 16 (1995) 9-1O. [58] unmanageable: there is some evidence of this struggle in the lectures 'Thought and Reality,' given at Thomas More Institute, Montreal, 1945-46; see the notes taken byj. Martin O'Hara (Lonergan Archives, Toronto), and Lonergan's own notes for those lectures (ibid. Box 14 in the catalogue of Lonergan's effects made by J.I. Hochban). Also relevant is his narrative on the struggle to write the first article compared to the relative speed with which he wrote the second; see our editorial preface to this volume, § 3, where there is reference to his course De methodo theologiae at the Gregorian University 1963-64. [59] Chapter 2

a illative sense: here, as elsewhere, Newman's illative sense is likened to Loner-

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Editorial Notes gan's reflective understanding (and see our editorial note e to the Introduction for a hint in Newman of the emanatio intelligibilis). The early history of the illative sense in Lonergan's thinking may be indicated here. He had written a student essay in the Blandyke Papers, 'True Judgment and Science,' which studied Newman's thought on judgment, but his first reference in print to the illative sense seems to be in 'The Form of Inference,' an essay of 1943 (reprinted in Collection, see pp. 3, 6-8; also 'Finality, Love, Marriage,' ibid. 48, n. 75) with its own roots in the Blandyke Papers ('The Syllogism'). From then on references occur passim; see our editorial note b to chapter l, Collection 257. [60] b concepts ... distinct: this is one side of the story; historical consciousness adds the complementary side: 'concepts are functions of time ... they change and develop with every advance of understanding' (the 1959 lecture on 'Method in Catholic Theology,' Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964 29-53, at 46). Course lectures the same year at the Gregorian University put the two sides together: 'there is no history in concepts when they are considered from a logical viewpoint. But if they are considered as they exist in the human mind, there is continual variation' (De intellectu et methodo 24, editor's translation). From this time on Lonergan's position is stabilized; see the indices to Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964, to A Second Collection, and to Method in Theology. [64] c which naturally we possess: this touches on what, in the Halifax lectures on Insight, Lonergan calls 'the real issue' in regard to Kant's a priori: 'How much of knowing is from the subject, and how much is from the object?' Understanding and Being 159; pp. 159-70 are devoted to answering this question. [69] d all judgment: Lonergan's next paragraph ('The other stock example ...') was completely rewritten for Verbum 1967, apparently the result of having the question put to him whether Aquinas's whole and part were not to be understood in simple quantitative terms. CV-B has inserted here a typed page (Lonergan's own work) with the revised paragraph as printed except for one small but significant difference: the typed page reads 'and so discovery of the relation of quantitative whole to quantitative part would seem to be an ordinary coalescence of insight'; the revision of this revision for Verbum ('it seems difficult to show ...') reveals Lonergan still tentative on his position. See his cautious statement in Understanding and Being 168, and ibid., our editorial note/ to Lecture 7, p. 416. For the original paragraph see Theological Studies 8 (1947) 45- [?o] e brilliant... but not complete: we have here another case of a complementary aspect: the role of confrontation (objectification) in reaching knowledge of the other is complementary to the role of identity in understanding of forms. The point is made concisely in Topics in Education 215-16: '... if knowledge is merely identity, you are never knowing anything. You have to go beyond that

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259 Editorial Notes initial identity to reach a knowledge of some thing.' See 'Christology Today ...,' A Third Collection 92: 'For Aristotle coincidence preceded distinction ... Today detailed cognitional theory complements this Aristotelian opinion by conceiving human knowledge as a process of objectification.' Also, 'Consciousness and the Trinity,' Philosophical and Theological Papers ig^8-lQ64 138: Aristotle's view 'is a basic analysis of knowledge, but it doesn't deal with the problem of objectivity. Analysis of the judgment has to be added.' In the present volume see also pp. 83-85, 158-59, 2OO-2O1. [83] f wonder of inquiry ... critical wonder: a pair of terms worth noticing, since wonder is often associated with the first question of intelligence (quid sit?) and that can easily become an exclusive use; here we have a clear use of it for the second question (an sit?). In the magisterial exposition of Insight, the two aspects of intellectual dynamism (one: inquiring, the other: critical) are presented in terms of questions for intelligence and questions for reflection; see p. 299: 'by the question is meant the attitude of the inquiring mind that effects the transition from the first level to the second, and again the attitude of the critical mind that effects the transition from the second level to the third.' [105]

Chapter 3 a efficient causality: Lonergan's struggle with those who make T an efficient cause in 'I see' and similar cases shows up passim in his writings at this time; see his book review of 1946, published as 'On God and Secondary Causes,' Collection 53-65, at 57; the point is treated at length in the notes he wrote for his students that same year, De ente supernaturali ('De actibus supernaturalibus qua vitalibus,' Scholion II to Thesis IV, pp. 42-49 in the Regis edition of 1973)! als° m the notes, De sanctissima Trinitate: Supplementum quoddam, pp. 68; and in Divinarum personarum conceptio analogica, 'Actus vitalis,' pp. 247-50; the groundwork had been done in his 1940 dissertation, published in revised form as Grace and Freedom; see the index under Causality and under Efficent. [118] b velle can be a pati: in the book review referred to in our previous note Lonergan had written 'in later Thomist doctrine not only is such passivity incompatible with freedom, but also ... the act of willing an end is not free'; in publication 'incompatible' became 'compatible' (TheologicalStudies 7 [1946] 6ll); Lonergan pointed out the error in the third verbum article (ibid. 8 [1947] 437> n. 204); this fragment of history was omitted from the book publication (VERBUM [1967] 132, n. 204) but is worth recording. [143]

Chapter 4 a the concept of verbum: the omission from the original book publication, both

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260 Editorial Notes French and English, of the first three paragraphs of the original articles deprived this sentence of a proper referent in the text; see editorial note b to chapter i above. [152] b accusation ... idealism ... tossed at me: Matthew J. O'Connell, The Modern Schoolman 24 (1946-47) 228, after quoting a statement of Lonergan's, added: 'Need we remark that such a statement, with its logical implications, contains all the requisites for idealism?' The statement had to do with the distinction between knowing the thing and knowing the idea of the thing. [166] c conversion to phantasm: for changes in regard to quiddity as a result of this new understanding, see our note m to chapter l above; and for changes in regard to conversion on phantasm, see our note qto the same chapter. [170 n.Q8] d Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 3 c.: the relevant part of this text says that 'our intellect progresses from potency to act. But everything that progresses from potency to act arrives first at an incomplete act... Now an incomplete act is imperfect science, through which things are known indistinctly and with a certain confusion.' Lonergan's laconic reference to this conceals the important fact that it was not first the great Thomist texts on insight into phantasm that caught his interest, but the Thomist view of intellectual development; see the use of this text in 'Panton Anakephalaiosis,' an essay of 1935 published in 1991 (see p. 139), and recall that Lonergan's interest in the 19305 was strongly focused on the philosophy of history and the development of ideas. [178 n. 149] e omnis receptio sit secundum naturam recepti: this is no misprint, though the standard position is that everything is received 'secundum modum recipientis'; the apparent opposition is rather a matter of complementarity; see Lonergan's remark in note 39: 'there must be a proportion and, in that sense, a similitude between object and potency, else eyes would hear and ears see' the object gives the 'naturam recepti,' the potency gives the 'modum recipientis.' [183] f actually understood: the four stages of the not intelligible, the potentially intelligible, the actually intelligible, the actually understood, are sometimes telescoped in Lonergan according to the intention of the moment; see Understanding and Being 165, and our editorial note d to Lecture 7, p. 415. [185] g extrinsic denomination: this is a concept Lonergan uses in Grace and Freedom (104, 106), deriving it from Thomas's position on causation; 'causation must not be thought to involve any real change in the cause as cause ... the objective difference between posse agereand actu agereis attained without any change emerging in the cause as such' (Grace andFreedom 68-69, and see note 26, ibid.: 'to later scholastics this seemed impossible a priori: they held that "Peter not acting" must be really different from "Peter acting." They refused to believe that St. Thomas could disagree with them on this; in fact, St. Thomas disagreed'). There is an application of this idea in chapter 5 above,

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Editorial Notes where esse intellectum is an extrinsic denomination from an intelligere (see p. 203). One can readily see the importance of this for a doctrine on God. Is there a real objective difference between God moving me to action and God not moving me to action? Yes, but not in God; the real difference is in the created order; that God moves me to action is true of him by extrinsic denomination. The idea becomes important for Lonergan's treatment of the divine missions; see DeDeo trino: Pars systematica, Assertum XV, p. 217. [185 n.

191]

Chapter 5 a confrontation: in his lectures on Intelligence and Reality, Lonergan provided a long list of 'Historical Illustrations of Confrontationism': Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, Avicenna, Scotus, Ockham, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Kant, and philosophies of idealism and of irrationalism' (pp. 19-20 of the autograph notes); reasons are briefly sketched in each case. [192] b confrontation with its conceived object: here we have the further complementary aspect of knowing; understanding is by identity, conceiving and judging are objectifying acts, and so there is confrontation with the conceived or affirmed object. See note e to chapter 2 above. [2Ol] c distinction: three paragraphs later in the text Lonergan seems to equate esse intelligibile and esse intentionale; both phrases refer to inner words and are distinguished from the esse naturale of the soul and the esse intellectum which is an extrinsic denomination (see note gto chapter 4 above) from an intelligere. On the complexities of esse naturale and esse reale, see our footnote in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964 105, n. 16. [201] d pure perfection: compare the Thomist 'actus purus.' Lonergan's counterpart to 'pure' is found in some interesting applications: his autograph notes for the lectures Intelligence and Reality (p. 15) distinguish the pure notion of being (the unrestricted desire to know) from the composite notion (the desire in conjunction with elements towards answers or with answers); and his notes De scientia atque voluntateDei distinguish the 'usus purus' and the 'usus coniunctus' of divine dominion: 'duplex usus divini dominii transcendentis: usus coniunctus et usus purus' (§47). One might also notice in his introduction to this volume (p. 3) his contrast of the 'pure' components of a general theory of being with the 'cumulative' components; likewise, here in chapter 5 the conclusion of the preceding four chapters that God is 'a pure act of understanding' (p. 198), and, in the appendix, 'pure matter' (p. 236). [204] e corrected presently: pages 206-8 (above) make the correction, it seems. [204 n. 60]

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Editorial Notes f Father and Son spirate: 'spirate' is not found in the most common manual dictionaries of English, nor is 'spirare' found in C.T. Lewis, A Latin Dictionary for Schools. The words had to be created for purposes of trinitarian theology. The fundamental difficulty, however, is not linguistic, nor is it theological; it is philosophical. One has only to read the article by Penido which Lonergan makes his point of departure for this study to discover the poverty of philosophical thought on what we have to call 'spirare'; it is that poverty that Lonergan set about to remedy in this study. [217] g development: Lonergan's early focus was on theology as fides quaerens intellectum, that is, theology as understanding and, indeed, systematic understanding; for this development of theology, in which it became a 'system,' the theorem of the supernatural was crucial: 'The discovery of the notion of the supernatural makes a fundamental dividing line in the history of theology' (Topics in Education 243). A good exposition of this view is found in the Nottingham lecture of the same year, 'Method in Catholic Theology,' Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964; see the second precept, 'Understand Systematically,' pp. 44-46. With this focus Lonergan can speak indifferently of 'theology' and 'systematic theology.' Later writings did not change his position on systematic theology, but in his later 'greatly enlarged notion of theology' ('Bernard Lonergan Responds,' Foundations of Theology 224) seven other functions were added to the systematic; Lonergan would now be more likely to speak of a dividing line in the history of systematic theology. [221 n. 137] h historical experiment: Gilson in The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. vi, had called the philosophies he studied there 'a series of concrete philosophical experiments'; Lonergan had had a fascination with history since the 19305, and it was natural for him to latch onto this phrase in Gilson; in his review of Gilson's Being and Some Philosophers he speaks of those 'who can learn a lesson from the experiments conducted by history'; and in Insight he referred again to 'what M. Gilson would call the experiment of history in ancient, medieval and modern philosophy' (p. 15). [226]

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Works of Lonergan Referred to in Editors' Preface and Editorial Notes

'Bernard Lonergan Responds.' In Foundations of Theology, edited by Philip McShane, 223-34. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972 (CWL 17). Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan. Edited by Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, Cathleen Going. Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers/82, 1982. Collection. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988 (CWL 4). Articles: 'Finality, Love, Marriage,' 'The Form of Inference,' 'Insight: Preface to a Discussion,' 'Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought,' 'A Note on Geometrical Possibility,' 'On God and Secondary Causes.' 'The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas' (series of five articles). Theological Studies 7 (1946) to 10 (1949) (CWL 2). DeDeo trino: Pars systematica. 3rd ed. Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964 (CWL 9). De ente supernaturali: Supplementum schematicum. Notes for students, College of the Immaculate Conception, Montreal, 1946. Edited with introduction and notes, Toronto: Regis College, 1973 (CWL 16). 'The Form of Mathematical Inference.' Blandyke Papers, no. 283 (January 1928) 126-37 (CWL 17). De intellectu et methodo. Notes by students of theology course, Gregorian University, 1959 (CWL 19). De methodo theologiae. Notes by students of theology course, Gregorian University, 1962 (CWL 19). De sanctissima Trinitate: Supplementum schematicum. Notes for students, Gregorian University, 1955 (CWL 16).

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264

Works of Lonergan Referred to in Editors' Preface and Notes

De scientia atque voluntate Dei: Supplementum schematicum. Notes for students, Regis College, Toronto, 1950. Edited with introduction and notes, Toronto: Regis College, 1973 (CWL 16). Divinarum personarum conceptionem analogicam evolvit Bernardus Lonergan, S.I. (= De Deo Trino, Pars systematica, 1st ed.)- Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1957. Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Edited by J. Patout Burns. London: Barton, Longman & Todd, and New York: Herder and Herder, 1971 (CWL l). Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. 5th ed. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992 (CWL 3). 1st ed., London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957. Intelligence and Reality. Notes for lectures at the Thomas More Institute, Montreal, March-May 1951 (CWL Archival Material). Knowledge and Learning. Notes for lectures in the Graduate School of Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington, 15-26July 1963 (CWL Archival Material). Method in Theology. London: Barton, Longman & Todd, and New York: Herder and Herder, 1972. 2nd revised ed., 1973. Latest reprint, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996 (CWL 12). 'La notion de verbe dans les ecrits de saint Thomas d'Aquin.' Archives dephilosophic (Paris) 26 (1963) 163-203, 570-620; 27 (1964) 238-85; 28 (1965) 206-50, 510-52. See next item. La notion de verbe dans les ecrits de saint Thomas d'Aquin. French translation of 'The Concept of Verbum ...' Paris: Beauchesne, 1966. 'Panton Anakephalaiosis.' METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9:2 (1991) 139-72 (CWL Archival Material). Philosophical and Theological Papers ig^8-ig64. Edited by Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Boran. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996 (CWL 6). Articles: 'Consciousness and the Trinity,' 'Method in Catholic Theology.' Review of Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers. The Ensign (a Montreal journal) 28 May 1949, p. 10 (CWL 17). 'St. Thomas' Thought on Gratia Operans,' Theological Studies 2 (1941) 289-324; 3 (1942) 69-88, 375-402, 533-78 (CWL i). A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. Edited by William F. J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell. London: Barton, Longman & Todd, and Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974 (CWL ll). Latest reprint, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996. Articles: The Future of Thomism,' 'Insight Revisited,' The Subject,' Theories of Inquiry: Responses to a Symposium.' 'Subject and Soul.' Philippine Studies 13 (1965) 576-85. Written as introduction for the English and French editions in book form of the verbum articles (CWL 2). The Syllogism.' BlandykePapers, no. 285 (March 1928) 33-64 (CWL 17). A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe.

The Robert Mollot Collection

265

Works of Lonergan Referred to in Editors' Preface and Notes

Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985 (CWL 13). Articles: 'Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation,' 'Christology Today.' Thought and Reality. Notes for lectures at the Thomas More Institute, Montreal, 1945-46 (CWL Archival Material). Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of igtjg on the Philosophy of Education. Edited by Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993 (CWL 10). 'True Judgment and Science.' Blandyke Papers, no. 291 (February 1929) 195-216 (CWL 17). Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on INSIGHT. Edited by Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli. Revised and augmented by Frederick E. Crowe with the collaboration of Elizabeth A. Morelli, Mark D. Morelli, Robert M. Doran, and Thomas V. Daly. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990 (CWL 5). 'Variations in Fundamental Theology.' Lecture at Trinity College, Toronto, 13 November 1973 (CWL 14). VERBUM: Word and Idea in Aquinas. Edited by David B. Burrell. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967; London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968 (CWL 2).

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Bibliography of the Works of St Thomas Aquinas

We give first the Leonine title of the work as this is found in the list at the end of the folio volumes of the Leonine editions. Then we indicate the edition or editions that we used most frequently in our editing, including editions specifically mentioned by Lonergan. Compendium theologiae. Opera omnia, vol. 42. Leonine ed. Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1979. De ente et essentia. Opuscula omnia, vol. i. Edited by Pierre Mandonnet. Paris: Lethielleux, 1927. Also: Opera omnia, vol. 43. Leonine ed. Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976. Also: Le 'De ente et essentia' de s. Thomas d'Aquin. Edited by M.-D. Roland-Gosselin. Kain, Belgium: Bibliotheque thomiste 8, 1926. De intellectu et intelligibili. Opuscula omnia, vol. 5. Edited by Pierre Mandonnet. Paris: Lethielleux, 1927. De natura verbi intellectus (spur.). Opuscula omnia, vol. 5. Edited by Pierre Mandonnet. Paris: Lethielleux, 1927. De rationibus fidei. Opera omnia, vol. 40. Leonine ed. Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969. De substantiis separatis. Opera omnia, vol. 40. Leonine ed. Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969. Also: Opuscula omnia, vol. i. Edited by Pierre Mandonnet. Paris: Lethielleux, 1927. De unitate intellectus. Edited by Leo W. Keeler. Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1940. Also: Opera omnia, vol. 43. Leonine ed. Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976. In Aristotelis libros De caelo et mundo, De generatione et conuptione, et Meteorologicorum. Opera omnia, vol. 3. Leonine ed. Rome: Ex Typographia Polygotta, 1886. In Aristotelis libros Peri hermeneias et Posteriorum analyticorum. Edited by R.M. Spiazzi. Turin: Marietti, 1955.

268

Bibliography of Works of St Thomas Aquinas

In Aristotelis libros Physicorum. In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio. Edited by P.M. Maggiolo. Turin: Marietti, 1954. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, de malo, de spiritualibus creaturis, de anima, de unione Verbi incarnati, de virtutibus in communi, de caritate, de spe. Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2. Edited by P. Bazzi, M. Calcaterra, T.S. Centi, E. Odetto, and P.M. Pession. Turin: Marietti, 1949. Quaestiones disputatae de veritate. Quaestiones disputatae, vol. i. Edited by R.M. Spiazzi. Turin: Marietti, 1949. Quaestiones quodlibetales. Edited by R.M. Spiazzi. Turin: Marietti, 1949. Sententia libri De anima. In Aristotelis librum De anima. Edited by A.M. Pirotta. Turin: Marietti, 1948. Sententia libri Ethicorum. In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio. Edited by A.M. Pirotta. Turin: Marietti, 1934. Also: Opera omnia, vol. 25. Vives ed. Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vives, 1875. Sententia libri Metaphysicae. In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio. Edited by R.M. Spiazzi. Turin: Marietti, 1950. Also: In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria. Edited by M.-R. Cathala. Turin: Marietti, 1935. Summa contra Gentiles. Opera omnia, vols. 13-15. Leonine ed. Rome: Typis Riccardi Garroni, 1918-30. Also: Leonine manual edition, Rome: Apud Sedem Commissionis Leoninae, 1934. Summa theologiae. Opera omnia, vols. 4-12. Leonine ed. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1888-1906. SuperEpistolas Pauli Apostoli. Opera omnia, vol. 13. Parma ed. Parma: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1862. Super loannem. Opera omnia, vol. 10. Parma ed. Parma: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1866. Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate. Opuscula omnia, vol. 3. Edited by Pierre Mandonnet. Paris: Lethielleux, 1927. Also: Paul Wyser, 'Die wissenschaftstheoretischen Quaest. V u. VI in Boethium de Trinitate des hi. Thomas von Aquin,' Divus Thomas: Jahrbuch fur Philosophic und spekulative Theologie2o (1947) 437-85; 26 (1948) 74-98 (in book form, Thomas von Aquin, In Librum Boethii de Trinitate Quaestiones Quinta et Sexta [Fribourg: Societe Philosophique, and Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1948]). Also: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate. Edited by Bruno Decker. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1955. Super Librum De causis. Opuscula omnia, vol. i. Edited by Pierre Mandonnet. Paris: Lethielleux, 1927. Super Librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus. Opera omnia, vol. 15. Parma ed. Parma: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1864. Super IVSententiarum. For books i and 2: Scriptum super libros sententiarum, lib. I, II. Edited by Pierre Mandonnet. 2 vols. Paris: Lethielleux, 1929. For book 3 and part l of book 4: Scriptum super sententiis, lib. Ill, IV (part i). Edited by Maria Fabianus Moos. 2 vols. Paris: Lethielleux, 1933, 1947- F°r part 2 of book 4: Opera omnia, vol. ll. Vives ed. Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vives, 1874.

The Robert Mollot Collection

Index of Concepts and Names

Abstraction: apprehensive a., 168-79, 188-90 [compared to formative a., 162-63, i66; as insight into phantasm, 163, 166; as operation, actus perfecti, 176]; degrees of a., 53-56 [first, from individual matter, 53-54, 55-56; second, from sensible qualities, but not from imagination, 54—55; third, from all matter, sensible and imaginable, 55]; a. of forma, species from phantasm, 177-79; formative a., 162-68, 188-90; a. governed by intelligibility, 167; a. and mode of knowing, mode of reality, 16; objective a., 182-85, 187-88; a. from phantasm, 177-79; physical, mathematical, metaphysical a., 167-68, 187; possibility, impossibility of, 167-68; principal meaning of, 178; psychological account of, 53-55, 55-56; sense, judgment, and degrees of, 76; verbum and, ch. 4. See also Geometry; Object; Quality; Science; Singular; Truth Academy, Academic, 9 (A. doubt), 59 Actio: a., actus, 120-21; duplex a., 128-33;

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

a.,factio, operatic, 120, 128-30; a. manens in agente, 130, 140, 148; a. in passo, 117 n. 65, 12O n. 81 Action: and form, 131; identity of a. and passion, 117; immanent vs transient a., 128, 132-33; a. remaining in the agent, 130, 140, 148 Actus perfecti, 110-16 Aegidius Romanus (Giles of Rome), 197 n. 18 Agent intellect, 89-91, 93, 188; experienced, 89-90; and intellectual light, 93» 94. 193". and phantasm, 93; and possible intellect, 89-90, 91, 93, 94, 149-50; as spirit of wonder, inquiry, critical reflection, 60-61, 185. See also Aristotle; Illumination; Immateriality; Intellect; Sensible Albert the Great, St, 218 n. 130; on understanding, 224 Alnwick, William, 202 n. 46 Ambrose, St, 6 n. 6 Amorprocedens, 209-13. See also Love; Processions; Spirit, Holy; Trinitarian theory Amoros, Leo, 211 n. 90

270

Index of Concepts and Names

An sit? Quid sit? 10-11, 70, 100, 105. See also Questions; Two levels Anachronism in interpreting Aquinas, 130 Analogy: of concept of being, 58-59; of est, 208; of matter, 154-58, 186; and mystery, 215, 219-20 Angelic knowledge, understanding, see those words Animals know things, not just appearances, 20 Anselm of Canterbury, St, 212 & n. 94, 221 n. 137 Anti-Platonist, 15 Apostles' Creed, 22O Appearance and reality, 82, 83, 95 Appetite: natural vs rational, 209; and final causality, 21O Application of insights, concepts to sensible, particular, 40, 42, 69, 76, 165-66, 176 Apprehensive abstraction, see Abstraction Aquinas, see Thomas Aquinas, St Archimedes' 'eureka,' 25, 45 Aristotle (passim in book, esp. in chs l, 3; a few select headings are indexed here): actus, operatio, 111-14; agent intellect, 90, 94; Avicenna, 121-28; Bergson, 113 n. 33; critical question, 83; duplex actio, 128-33; efficient cause, 121-28, 143-44, 204-5; epistemological law, 155; four causes, 144; grammar in philosophy, 48; insight, 14 n. 54, 27-28, 38-46, 168-79; knowledge by identity, see Knowledge; knowledge by immateriality, 84 n. 116; metaphysics, 106-7; object, 138-43; pati, 116-21; Plato, 192-98; questions (four kinds), 26-29; scientific ideal, 218-19; soul, 3-6; understanding,

analysis of, 28 n. 58; words, division of, 16 n. 16 Anus, Arians, 6, 204 Arnou, Rene, 202 n. 44, 22O n. 132 Artificer's idea, 18, 21 n. 36, 35 n. 100, 37-38, 43. 136 n. 172 Assent, 73; and consent, 73; and illative sense (Newman), 8; not had in defin-

ing. 73 Assimilation, knowing by, 159-61, 178, 187 [except in God, 63, 197-98] Athanasius, St, 22O Augustine, St, 6-9 & nn. 6-10, 83, 102, 177 n. 149, 191-92, 219; amorprocedit a mente, 213; confrontation theory of knowledge, 192; crede ut intelligas, 219, 222; divine processions, 196; eternal reasons, e. truths, 85 (Platonist), 196-97; introspection, 8-9; mens, 5; psychological analogy, 220; soul's activity, 146; trinitarian theory, 6-9 & nn. 6-10, 196, 220 & n. 133, 221, 222; verbum, 199 n. 31 Augustinian reaction after Aquinas, 211 &n. 90 Averroes, Averroism, 89, 142, 183 (separate intellect), 186, 225 Avicenna, 121-28; active potency, 135-36, 138, 143, 148; conversion to intelligibles, 171 n. 107; possible intellect, 171; terms of A. and Aristotle merge in Aquinas, 127-28 Awareness: empirical of inner acts, 86, 88, 101, 158, 193, 198 n. 28; of God present to soul, 102-4 Balic Charles, 204 n. 57, 213 & n. 98 Bayart, J., 221 n. 137 Beatific vision, 48 n. 164, 66, 92, 100, 2O2, 215-16, 219. See also Desire; Quid sit Deus Because of vs caused by, 207, 22O

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Index of Concepts and Names

Behaviorists, 5 Being the object of intellect, 58, 69-70, 96-98, 201. See also Concept of being; Ens; Experience; Truth; Wisdom Bergson, Henri, and Aristotle on movement and thought, 113 n. 33 Billot, Louis, 11 n. 11, 12 & n. 2, 13 Bilz, Jakob, 22O n. 134 Biolo, Salvino, 6 n. 7 Boethius, 221 & n. 135 Bonum et malum in rebus, verum etfalsum in mente, 16, 17 Butter-field, Herbert, 3-4 & n. i Cajetan, 39 n. 126, 160 n. 45, 181 n. 171, 197 n. 17, 211 n. 83 Cappadocians, 220 Cartesian doubt, 83 Categories, ens divided by, 61 Cathala, M.R., 130 n. 135 Causa: essendi, 29, 32; formalis, 29-38 (see also Formal cause) Causality: vs intentionality, 4-5; and procession, 108 Cause(s): Aristotle's four, 31, 144; insight and c., 27-28; questions ask for, 26-29, 219. See also Causa; Efficient c.; Final causality; Formal c. Caused by vs because of, 207, 22O Certitude, 9, 72, 74~75, 92, 95. 103, 194, 218-19; and conceptualism, 194, 2l8; by resolution to first principles, 74-75 Change, conditions of, 164 Chemistry, two orders in study of, 73-74 Chenevert, Jacques, 25 n. 52 Chenu, Marie-Dominique, 215 n. 114 Chevalier, Irenee, 109 n. 17, 22O n. 133 Christ's human knowledge, 42 n. 140 Circle and insight, 40-41, 54 . Coalescence of insights, see Insights; Synthesis

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Cogitativa, 43 & n. 150, 53, 56, 93 n. 165, 184 Common sense on reality, 33 Communicabile multis, 53 Compositio vel divisio (composition or division), 61-71; in inner words, in outer words, 62-63; in things, 62-63; involves return to concrete, 75. See also Judgment; Synthesis; Truth Concept: as definition, 56; of God, 59; as immutable and distinct, 64-65; and insight, 45-46, 150-51, 174-75, 189-90; as instrument of knowledge, 165-66; c., judgment, inference, as products of intellect, 193-94; twofold order of trinitarian c., 213-14; ultimate c., 56-57. See also Concept of being; Insight; Preconceptual; Two levels Concept of being, 57-59; analogous, 58-59; the conceptualization of intelligibility as such, 58; and experience, 57; the first concept, 57; indeterminate, 58; natural to intellect, 58, 69-70, 96-98, 201. See also Ens Conceptualism, 194-95,196,211,218-19, 223-24; and certitude, 194, 218 Conceptualization, 51-59; term of process of reasoning, 51-52, 55 Conclusions, 66-68, 73, 74-75, 77, 79, 80, 92. See also Discursive; Inferences Concrete, return to in judgment, 75, 2Ol. See also Compositio; Identity Confrontation, knowledge by, see Knowledge Congar, Yves, 215 n. 114 Consciousness, 158,198 n. 28; data of, 5. See also Awareness; God; Rational c. Constantinople (Council of), 220 Contingent, knowledge of, 163-65, 180-82. See also Knowledge ... of particular

272

InHex of Concepts and Names

Continuum, space-time, 54 n. 196 Conversion: to intelligibles (Avicenna), 171 n. 107; to phantasm, 168, 169-70 n. 96, 169-73 tas natural orientation, 171-72; vs reflection, 170-71] Corporeal light, 91, 93. See also Intellectual light Cratylus, 164 Crede ut intelligas, 219, 222

Criteriological, 73-78 Criterion of reality: reason as, 2O; sense as, 20 Critical: c. point in philosophy, 189 n. 199; c. problem not raised in Aristotle, 83; c. problem and subject-object, 98-99; c. reflection, see Agent intellect; c. thought in Aquinas, 86-87. See also Intellectual light Crux Trinitatis, 213-14, 22O Crypto-Scotism, 43 n. 150 Data: illuminated, see Illumination; and insight, 27-28; and wonder, 37, 185 Day, Sebastian, 195 & n. 10, 196 & n. 14 de Courcerault, Raymond, 109 n. 19 de Finance, Joseph, 147 n. 235 de Guibert, Joseph, 145 n. 225 De natura verbi intellectus not Thomist, 172 De ratione speciei, 156, 157, 158, 187 de Tonquedec, Joseph, 181 n. 171 de Wulf, Maurice, 205 n. 64 Definition, 24-29; and insight, 11-16, 38, 40-41, 47-49, 56, 60-61, 77, 177; and judgment, products and objects of thought, 18; parts of, see Parts; and science, 48-49; and understanding, ch. l. See also Concept; Insight; Two levels Democritus, 31 Demonstrations, 37-38, 74-75, 79, 80, 82. See also Resolutio in principia

Denomination, extrinsic, see Extrinsic Descartes, 83 Desire: to know, 37, 105, 185 (see also Wonder); natural d. to see God, 27 n. 53, 48 & n. 164, 66, 92, 219 [d. natural, achievement supernatural, 66, loo, 219]; d. for understanding unlimited, 66 Development: in Aquinas's own thinking, passim, with reference to Summa theol. l, q. 85, a. 3 for principle of d., 178 n. 149; d. of Aquinas's thought by Thomists, 227; d. as human progress, 52; of knowledge, 52, 81, 98; of position of Pope Leo XIII, 226; of trinitarian theology, 22O-22; of understanding, 63-66, 70-71, 80, 98 (see also Insights, coalescence of) Devil's knowledge of us, 88 & n. 135 Diagram and insight (Aristotle), 27-28 Dialectical techniques unknown at time of Socrates, 81 Dicere: as notional act proper to Father, 198; in trinitarian theory, 198, 204-8, 214 n. 138; d. vs intelligere, 136, 150, 152, 188; d. verbum vs producere v. 204-7 Direct and reflective understanding, see Concept; Inner word (s); Insight; Judgment; Two levels; Understanding Discursive character of our intellects, 62-63, 71; Kant's view, 39-40 & n. 126 Distinction between essence and existence, 197 & n. 18 Divine ideas, knowledge, processions, self-knowledge, see those words; also God; Spirit, Holy; Trinity; Word d'Izzalini, Luigi, 197 n. 16 Dockx, I., 109 n. 17 Doctrina, see Via doctrinae

Doubt, see Academic; Cartesian; Certitude

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Index of Concepts and Names

duplex actio, see Actio Durandus, 197 n. 18, 212 n. 90

193; e. obiectivum (of ideas), 202 Essence: divine e., existence, operation, 124; e. and existence, 17, 78 n. 82, 84, Eclipse, what is an? 27 85, 95 & n. 192, 101 [real distinction Effects, see Potency of, 197 & n. 18]; e., existence, species, 78-79 n. 82; e., existence and twofold Efficient causality, 121-28, 143-44, 146, 204-6, 212 n. 90; and grammatical operation of intellect, 17, 84, 85, 100, subject, 118-19. See also Final c.; For167, 188, 189 n. 199, 196-97; e., form, mal cause; Nature; Operatio matter, 112, 125, 155, 186; e. and formal cause, 28, 34; human, angelic Eidos, 33, 133, 174-75 Emanatio intelligibilis, 9, 46-59, 77, 188; knowledge of e., 68, 179-80 from insight, see Inner word; and pro- Essential and notional acts, w Trinitarcessio operati, 204 n. 60; procession of ian theory Love as, 211; p. of Word as, 206-8. See Essentialism, Thomist negation of, 115 also Rational consciousness Est: analogy of, 208; in God, 208; priEmpedocles, 64, 159, 162 mary and secondary meanings of, 61, Empirical: definitions, 32; questions, 26. 62; as 'yes,' 97 n. 193 See also Awareness; Consciousness Eternal: participation in e. Light, 197; End: as act of potency, 129; and action e. truth in God only, 75-76; vision of (distinct from, coincident with), 112; e. t. (Augustine), 85, 95 Ethier, Albert-Marie, 221 n. 137 e., agent, form, 135 n. 166; first in Etymology of verbum, 13 intention, last in execution, 18; as poietikon, 144 n. 209 Euclid, 40, 49 n. 168, 54 n. 195, 69. See Energeia, ill, 113, 114, 119, 129 also Non-Euclidean Ens: concept of, see Concept of being; as Eureka, 25 (Archimedes), 45 divided by ten categories, 6l; as equiv- Evidence, 61, 73, 77, 150, 153, 194, 207. See also Judgment; Understanding ... alent to verum, 6l; fuss about, 33; as reflective object of understanding, see UnderEx multis sensibus ..., see Many sensastanding; principal meaning of, 97 n. tions 193; e- quod, entia quibus, 70; and quod Excluded middle, principle of, 47, 82, quid est, 97. See also Being; Esse; Est; Intellect 98 Exercise vs specification of act of will, Eo magis unum, 204-8 135 n. 166 Episteme, 28 n. 58, 193 Existence, seeEsse; Essence; Est; JudgEpistemology: in Aquinas, 86-87; bog ment; Two levels of, 20; wisdom and, 79-83 Experience: and concept of being, 57; Esse: as act of substance, 148; follows insights based on nature of intellect form, 137-38; e. intelligibile, e. intentioapplicable beyond e., 69; mystical e., nale, 203; ipsum e. (God), 100, 208, 102-4; e- and self-knowledge, 89-90, 225; e. naturale, 83; e. naturale, e. intelli91-92. See also Awareness; Consciousgibilein God, 2O1, 203; e. object of secness; Insight... as experienced ond operation of intellect, 57, 97 & n.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

274

Index of Concepts and Names

Expression of understanding, inner word as, see Inner word; Self-possession, self-expression; Word in God Extrinsic: denomination, 185 n. 191, 203; e., intrinsic origins of knowledge, 76-77, 92-93 Factio, see Actio Faith: and theology, 215; and supernatural wisdom, 101 Falsity, 15, 21, 61, 62, 63, 71, 72, 73, 166, 185-86. See also Truth Fernandez Garcia, Marianus, 204 n. 57, 213 n. 97 Ferrariensis (Francesco Silvestri) and inner word, 17 n. 19 Final causality: and dynamic presence, 210; and efficient c., 212 n. 90 Finis operantis, 135 n. 166 First: f. act, second act (as in sight - seeing, form - operation), 39 n. 126, 78, 120 & n. 81, 125, 131 & n. 151, 144, 151, 152 n. 3, 153, 176 & n. 135, 177 & n. 145, 178, 188; f. philosophy, see Wisdom; f. principles of demonstrations, of reality, 79 (see also Resolutio in principia) Firth, Francis, 123 n. 97 Form: as active, as passive, 121 n. 88; as cause, 28-29, 36, 144, 195-96; and efficient causality, 137; f., end, agent, 135 n. 166; and intelligere, 134-38; Kantian a priori f., 45; f. to matter as insight to sense, 36, 70, 155, 186; f., not matter, assimilated in knowing, 159, 186-87; as ontological, as cognitional, 175 n. 125, 195-96; and operation, 130-31, 134-38, 147-48, 149-50; and prime matter, 38; as principle of artefact, 136 n. 172; pure f., 35; Why, f. answer to, 195-96. See also First act, second act

Forma intelligibilis, f. naturalis, 190; / L, species i., 175-77, 187, 189 Formal cause and essence, quiddity, substance, thing, 28-29, 35-38, 186-87, 195-96. See also Causa formalis Formative abstraction, see Abstraction Fritz, Georges, 221 n. 137 Genius, original, and language, 37-38 Geometry: abstraction and nonEuclidean g., 54 n. 195; and definition, 31; and imagination, 54-55; and optics, 55. See also Circle; Diagram; Euclid; Rectangle; Triangle Geyer, Bernhardus, 176 n. 143 Gilbert de la Porree, 221 & n. 136 Giles of Rome, s^Aegidius Romanus Gilson, Etienne, 39 n. 126, 226 Givenness is not the real, 99 Glorieux, Palemon, 177 n. 149 Gnoseological, 81, 83 God: artisan of the universe, 38; consciousness in, 198 n. 28; existence known in judgment, God is, 21 [and by use of phantasm, 42]; ideas in, 18-20, 46-47, 202, 203 [as exemplars, as plural, as principles, 19 & n. 26, 25 n. 52; infinity of vs simplicity of G., 18-19, 203]; imago Dei, ch. 5; knowledge in, 18-19, 22, 65, 67-68, 84 (Platonic view), 85, 192 (Plotinian view), 197, 202-3 [self-k., 201-2; k. of other, 84, 201-4]; Love in, 209-13; moves human will, 146-47; potency in, 124-27, 216-17 (generating, spirating); presence to soul, our awareness of, 102-4; no processio operationis in, 107, 152, 205-6, 212; relations in G. transposed to properties, processions to notional acts, 220; simplicity of, 2Ol, 203; truth in G. affirmed by double negation, 63, 197-98; will in,

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Index of Concepts and Names

209-11; Word in, necessity not demonstrated, 22, 199, 201-4. See also Esse; Intettigere; Spirit, Holy; Trinitarian theory; Trinity; Word in God Godfrey of Fontaines, 197 n. 18, 205 n. 64, 211 n. 90, 212 & n. 95 Gonsalvus Hispanus, 211 n. 90 Grabmann, Martin, 197 n. 18, 215 n. 114 Grammar and philosophy, 61 (Aristotle), 118,130-31 Habit(s): and consciousness, 88-89; five h. of intellect, 128-29, !93l natural h., 69; h. of science, 93; three h. of speculative intellect, 79-80, 150-51, 153; three h. and three acts, 79-80; h. and understanding (direct, developed, reflective), 80. See also Habitual; Habitus; Intellect... as h. Habitual knowledge, 42 Habitusprincipiorum, 67 n. 28, 69, 77, 79, 94 Hamelin, Octave, 46 & n. 160 Haring, Nicholas, 109 n. 18 Harris, Charles R.S., 43 n. 150 Hayen, Andre, 221 n. 136 Hegel, G.W.F., 196 Henry of Ghent, 109 & n. 18 Heraclitus, 164 Herve de Nedellec, 197 n. 18, 211 n. 90 Hie et nunc, and materia designata, signata, individualis, 53~54, 56. See also Irrelevant; Knowledge ... of particular; Space; Time Hie homo intelligit, 89, 225 Historical study, method of, 223-24 Hocedez, Edgar, 197 n. 18 Hoenen, Peter, 39 n. 126, 65 n. 18, 106-7 n. 2, 224 Hoffmans,Jean, 205 n. 64 Holy Spirit, see Spirit, Holy Hows, horismos, 30

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Human ignorance and human progress, 52. See also Development Hypotheses: on God, 204, 218; h. vs judgment, 62, 77-78 I in 'I see' not efficient cause, 118 Idealism, charge of, 166 Idealist, 20, 186, 189 n. 199 Ideas: divine i., see God; not innate, 45; and material multiplication, 40; as object of thought, 18, 2O-21; Platonic i., 53 n. 91, 164, 182, 192, 193, 195, 2O2, 225; and practical arts, 18, 21 n. 36, 35 n. 100, 37, 43, 136 n. 172. See also Species Identity: of action and passion, 117,158, 187-88; i., confrontation, and knowledge of concrete, 201; of knower and known, 158; knowledge by i., see Knowledge; principle of i., 47; i. of principle and term of procession in God, 206, 210-11 Idion (proprium), 30 Iglesias, Eduardo, 222 n. 145 Ignorance and progress, human, 52 Illative sense, assent (Newman), 8, 60 Illumination by agent intellect (of phantasm, of sense data, etc.), 93 n. 164, 150, 174, 179, 182-85, 188, 222. See also Intellectual light Image vs vestige of Trinity, 12-13. See also Imago Imaginatio vocis, 14 Imagination: as constructive, 177; i. criterion of mathematics, sense of science, 76; i. and geometry, 54-55; processions in, 11 n. 11, 12 (Billot); and reflection on singular, 180-81. See also Diagram; Geometry; Phantasm Imago Dei, ch. 5; in human mind, 103-4; restricted to rational creatures, 11 n.

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11, 12-13, 191-92; in trinitarian theology (function and limitation), 22O Imago similitudinis, conformitatis, 192 n. 5 Immateriality: of intellect, 160-61; and intelligibility, 93, 94; i. (Aristotle) vs intentionality (Aquinas), 84 n. 116; i. of knowing, 84 n. 116, 158-62, 182-83 (through agent intellect), 187, 197; i. of reception, in sense, in intellect, 160-62; i. of sensation, 146; i. of soul, see Universal... concepts Individuation by materia signata, 164-65. See also Hie et nunc Infallibility of intellect, 75, 185-86, 188 Inferences, 193-94. See also Conclusions; Discursive Infinite regress in reasoning, 68 Innate forms, ideas, 45, 176 Inner word(s): compound, simple, 14; context for Thomist discussion, 25 n. 52; correspondence to reality (function and derivative), 16-17; division of, 17-18, 93-94, 150; as end of process, 22-23; as expression of understanding, see Self-possession, selfexpression; Ferrariensis and, 17 n. 19; as form, species, 78-79 n. 82, 177-78 n. 149; general notion of (seven elements), 13-24, 25 n. 52, 59, 199; and grammarians, 16; and knowledge of things, 20; as (ordered to) manifestation, 25 n. 52, 177 n. 149, 199 n. 31; as meant, 15, 163-66; as medium between mind and reality, 21, 73, 91, 102, 200; necessity of in every intellect, 199-204; object of thought, 18, 150, 165,199-201; objective not subjective, 166; i. and outer words [i. cause of o., 14; correspondence of i. and o., 16-17; i. meant by o., 15]; primo et per se intellectum, 19; procession of from insight, intelligere, understanding,

27-28, 38, 46-59. 77, 150, 198 n. 28, 199, 207-8; procession of as rational, 47, 50-52, 59, 152, 188, 198 n. 28, 207, 223-24; i. w. as product of thought, 18, 27, 150, 207; relation to reality (medium), 15-16, 21, 166; Scotus's view, 39 n. 126; two types of (definitions and judgments), 17-18, 60-61, 72, 78 n. 82; and understanding, insight, 22-24, 25, 50-56, 222-23. See also Concept; Definition; Emanatio intelligibilis; judgment; Two levels; Verbum; Word Inquiry, see Questions; Wonder Insight(s): and application of definitions, 166; as apprehensive abstraction, 163, 166, 188-89; based on nature of intellect applicable beyond field of experience, 69; and cause, 27-28; and circle, 40-41, 54; coalescence of, 63-65, 70-71, 77; and concept, 45-46, 150-51, 174-75, 189-90; and conception, judgment, 150; and data, 27-28; and definition, 11-16, 38, 40-41, 47-49, 56, 60-61, 77, 177; and diagram (Aristotle), 27-28; as experienced, 38, 45, 59; and form, 38; and infallibility, 185-86; and inner words, see Inner words ... procession; and irrationals, 64; as knowledge of cause, 26-28, 37-38; mediates between sense and concept, 195-96 (see also Pivot); and nexus, 39 n. 126, 42,65; object of, see Object; into phantasm, see Phantasm; and sensible data, 27-28; and triangle, 27-28, 40. See also Intellect; Kant; Scotus; Understanding Instruments of knowledge, 20-21,60-61 (of direct, of reflective understanding), 165-66 (universals), 188 (illumination of phantasm). See also Concept; Understanding

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Intellect: i. in act is the intelligible in act, 83-84, 84, 159, 193. 196, 197 (see also Sense in act); and being, ens, 96-98; as efficient, as receptive, 193; as habit (nous, episteme, sophia, phronesis, techne), 128-29, 193~94; infallibility of, 75, 185-86, 188; infinity of, 96-98, 1OO; as known by what it is, prior to what it does, 194; knows its proportion to reality, 86, 98, 2Ol; nature of, 169; object of, see Object; penetrating to inwardness of things, 33,68, 81, 86,180; possible and agent, see Agent i.; as potens omnia facere, fieri, 45, 47, 96, 97; reflects on itself, 13, 86-87; i., science, wisdom (habits of), 80; vs sense, 86, 169, 180; between sense and products of i., 193; speculative, practical (nature, art), 200; two opposed views of, 193-95; as understanding, 193-94. See also Intellectualism; Intelkctus; Intelligence; Intelligere; Two levels; Understanding. Intellectual light, 90-99, 100-101; and corporeal light, 91, 93; and critical problem, 95-98; as experienced in consciousness, 91-93, lOO-loi; as illuminating phantasm and sense data, 91, 93 & n. 164; infused, supernatural, 95, 101; and judgment, 94-95; as known per se ipsum, 90-93, loo-ioi; as manifesting first principles, 91-92; as medium of knowledge, 91, 102; and native infinity of intellect, 95-98, 100; as origin of knowledge and principle of inquiry, containing whole of science virtually, 76-77, 92, 98, loo-ioi, 193; as participation of eternal Light, 85-86, 94, 95, 98, 100-101; and prophecy, 95; and understanding, 92-93, lOO-ioi; and wonder, critical reflection, 193. See also Illumination

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Intellectualism of Aquinas, 224-26 Intellectualist vs conceptualist interpretation of Aquinas, 153, 155, 157, 163, 166 Intellectus as habitus principiorum, 69 Intelligence vs products of intelligence, 152-53 Intelligentia: i. intelligentiae, medieval translation of noesis noeseos, 196; i. mysteriorum (Vatican I), 219 Intelligere: and dicere, 136, 150, 152, 188, 198, 204-8, 221 n. 139; and form, 134-38; ipsum i. (God's), 66, 100, 19299, 208, 219, 222, 225 (see also Ipsum esse); ipsum i. (human), 90, 192-99; i. multa per unum, 65, 203; as pati, 141-43, 147; proper act of soul, 90 n. 147, 225; and species, 133-38; as understanding, 22-24, 48-50, 50, 59, 60; two kinds of, 60-61 (se&'alsoTwo levels). Intelligibility: belongs to act, 167; governs abstraction, 167; ground of possibility, 57, 69; i. of procession of inner word (q.v.) vs i. of natural process, 46-47, 207; of phantasm (in potency, in act), 93, 173-74, 182-85 Intelligible: i. component of material things, 155, 186; i. directly, indirectly, 179—80; matter and contingent existence not i. in themselves, 200-201; i. in potency, in act vs understood in p., in a., 184—85 Intentio: i. intellecta, 13, 188; i., ratio, and res, 19-20 Intentional (vs natural) existence, 162. See also Esse intelligibile Intentionality vs causality, 4-5 Interpretation of Aquinas, see Thomas ... interpretation of Introspection: in Aristotle and Aquinas, 5-6, 24, 58, 69, 87-93; m Augustine, 8-9; and presence of God to soul,

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102-4; and rational psychology, 24, 60, 69. See also Psychology ... metaphysics Intuition: of intellect, 25 n. 52; for Kant, 38-39; as term of discourse, 69 Ipsum esse, i. intelligere, see those words Irrationals: and measurement, 64 & n. 13, 67; and insight, see Insight Irrelevant intellectually (place and time, hie et nunc), 53-54, 94, 150, 157 Jaeger, Werner W., 196 n. 14 James of Metz, 218 n. 130 Jammy, Petrus, 225 n- 146 Jansen, Bernard, 211 n. 90 John Damascene, St, 129, 22O & n. 134 John of Naples, 212 & n. 96 John of St Thomas, 108 n. 16, 152-53 n. 3, 172 n. 109 Judgment, 71-78; an activity involving whole man, 75; as compositio, 71; critical aspect of, 83-87; excludes contradictory, 97-98; for Kant, 39 n. 126; as knowledge of the concrete, of esse, of the real, of truth, 20-21, 57, 62 (objective reference), 63, 75 (concrete), 78, 93-94, 97, 150, 200-201; motives for, 77; in mystical experience, 103; as personal act, 73; as positing synthesis, 62, 71 ;j. of probability, 77; in prophet, 76 n. 72, 95; psychological conditions of, 7, 75-76; reflection andj., ch. 2; reflective activity of, 74-75, 76-77; senses, control of as condition for, 76; in sleep, 75, 76 & n. 72; standard (measure, criterion) in, 72-73; sufficient ground for, 61 (see also Evidence); synthesis in, 61-71; j. of value, 152, 209. See also Intellectual light; True and false; Two levels; Understanding (reflective); Wisdom

Kant: and a priori forms (space, time), 45; and criticism, 83; and discursive intellect, 39-40 & n. 126; and insight, 38-39 & n. 126; and real confined to field of possible experience, 57; and thing-in-itself, 155, 157 Keeler, Leo W., 117 n. 65, 130 nn. 135 & 140, 160 n. 44, 161 n. 51, 173 n. 113, 176 n. 136, 183 n. 182 Kinesis (and cognates), 111-15, 128 n. 123 Kittel, Gerhard, 6 n. 6 Kleinknecht, Hermann, 6 n. 6 Knowledge: angelic, 65, 169, 197, 225; animal, 20; of complexa incomplexe, of incomplexa complexe, 63; k. by confrontation (Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, medieval Augustinians, contemporary dogmatic realists) vs k. by identity (Aristotle, Aquinas), 85, 192-93, 196, 197, 2O2, 225-26; development (progress) of, 52, 81, 98; divine k., see God; k. of essence and existence, 83; k. of form (direct), of matter, particular, singular (indirect), 157—58; k. of form (identity), of other (confrontation) , 83-85 [k. by identity (Aristotle's) incomplete, 83, 85, 196-97]; of God's existence in judgment, Deus est, 21; immateriality of, 158-62; necessary and universal k. of particular, 163-64; k. of particular, singular, contingent: 163-64, 165-66, 180-82, 187, 188 [by application of insights, concepts to sensible, particular, 40, 42, 69, 76, 165-66, 176]; k. as perfection vs k. of other, 84, 197; Platonist view (k. a duality), 192; of the real, 98-99; requires reflection on sense, sensitive apprehension of universal by ratio particularis, 43, 180; Scotist view, 38-41 & nn. 125-26; as true, as known to be

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true, 62, 72-78; two opposed views of k., of intellect, 192-95; twofold origin of, 76-77, 91-92; of universal in instance, 175, 189; universal as instrument for, 165-66; by what we are, 86, 97, 99. See also Assimilation; Epistemology; Immateriality (Aristotle); Judgment; Science; Self-knowledge; Truth; Two levels Koch.Josephus, 197 n. 18 Law, in natural process, in procession of inner word, 46-47, 69 Learning: and syllogisms, see Syllogisms; 1. to understand Aquinas, 223; 1. vs use of knowledge, 42, 150-51 Ledoux, Athanasius, 2O2 n. 46 Leo XIII, 222, 226 Light, see Corporeal; Illumination; Intellectual 1. Logic, reason in, see Reason Logical: implication, immediacy of, 226-27; and ontological, 33, 37, 86, 87; 1. positivists and the meaningless, 15. See also Preconceptual; Syllogism Logos, 16 n. 16, 31-32,32-33 & n. 77, 202 (Philo) Lonergan, B., 109 n. 17, 120 n. 81, 143 n. 206, 149 n. 241, 158 n. 28, 159 n. 36 Longpre, Ephrem, 39 n. 126 Lottin, Odon, 209 n. 83, 211 n. 90 Love: basic act of will, 209; as dynamic presence, 209-11; essential vs notional in God, 216 n. 116; in mystical experience, 102-3; procession of, 12, 13, 108-10, 152, 188, 205, 209-13 Man and soul, see Soul Mandonnet, Pierre, 76 n. 73, 77 n. 79, 92 n. 154 (& nn. 157, 159), 135 n. 169, 172 n. 109, 181 n. 169, 196 n. 15

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Manifestation of first principles, 92. See also Inner word Many sensations ... many memories ... many elements of experience ... grasp of universal (ex multis sensibus ...), 43, 45 Materia designata, signata, individualis,

53-54 Materialism, 20, 33, 157, 186, 189 n. 199 Mathematics: and abstraction, 54-55; m. and science have different criteria, 76 Matter: abstraction and, 53-55, 133, 153-57, 167-68, 181, 186-88; analogy of (form to matter as object of insight to o. of imagination), 154-58, 186; common, individual, 53-54, 55-56, 133, 155, l8l, 186-88; m. and contingent existence not intelligible in themselves, 200-201; and intelligible component of material things, 155, 186; m. and form, 28-29, 36-38, 56-57,154-57,186-87 [proportion of, 156, 157, 164-65]; individual, 53-54, 55-56; and movement, sensation, 113 n. 35; parts of, 156-58; prime m., 154-55 [and substantial form, 155]; principal meaning of m., 158; sensible vs intelligible m., 55 n. 197, 155 Maxwell, James Clerk, 41 n. 129 Meaning: act of, 177, 190, 222-23; °f Aquinas's text, 222-23; of false propositions, 15, 61, 166; individual, universal, 189-90; and inner words, 14-15, 222-23; and names, words, concepts, 14-15, 163, 222; and understanding, 222-23 Measuring: irrationals, 64 & n. 13, 67; truth, 72-73 Medium, medium, mental acts as: see Inner word; Instruments of knowledge; Intellectual light; Real; Species; Truth

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Index of Concepts and Names

Memoria, intelligentia, amor (Augustine), 221 Memory: m., experience, understanding, 43, 45; m. of God in the soul, 103; m. work not of intellect but of sense,

53 Meno, 27 Mental not opposed to real, 208 Metaphysical: and abstraction, 55; conceptualization as m. mechanics, 39 n. 126, 48; m. vs psychological, see Psychology; not limited to sense and imagination, 55, 69, 76; and quod quid est, 37 Method: of historical study, 223-24; of study of Aquinas, 222-24 Methodology of science, 37 Michalski, Constantin, 202 n. 46 Minges, Parthenius, 39 n. 126 Morency, Robert, 108 n. 16 Morphe, 31 Motives for judgment, 77 Movement: in God (for Platonist, for Aristotelian, for Aquinas), 84-85; m. (kinesis) and operation (energeia), 111-15; and thought (Aristotle, Bergson), 113 n. 33; two principles of (matter, form), 127-28; various principles of, 205 Multa per unum, 203 Murray, John Courtney, 11 Mystery: and analogy, 215, 219-20; not a universal, 219 Mystical experience, 102-4 Naive realism, 72 Names (words): and meaning, 14-15, 163, 222; proper n. in Trinity, 216, 221 Native infinity of intellect, 95-98, 100. See also Intellectual light Natural: n. desire for beatific vision, see

Desire; and human sciences, 6, 9-10; n. vs intentional existence, 162; n. light of reason and God, 201, 204, 214-15, 219-20, 221; n. object of intellect is ens, 45, 69, 96; n. orientation of intellect, see Conversion to phantasm; n. process, intelligibility of, 46-47, 207; n. resultance, 144-48,149. See also Esse intelligibile... naturale; Naturally known; Supernatural Naturalists, 33, 154, 155, 157 Naturally known principles, truths, 69-70, 74-75, 77. See also First principles; Resolutio in prindpia Nature (s): and art, 200; concretions of divine ideas, 47; and efficient, receptive potency, 122-27, 143-48, 148-49, 205, 205-6, 211-12 & n. 90 (Aquinas); and formal causality, 144-45; as God's artistry, 37-38, 200; and natural resultance, 144-48. See also Form; Operatio Necessary: and contingent, 49; intellectual habits for n., 128-29; n - science of contingent things, 163-65 Necessity of verbum, 199-204; in us, 199, 200-201; as proceeding from understanding, 199 & n. 33 Negation: truth in God affirmed by double n., 63, 197-98 Neo-Platonist, 222 Newman, John Henry, 8, 30 n. 65, 60. See also Illative sense Nexus: between concepts, 39 n. 126; of equal radii and curve, 40-42 Nicea (Council of), 22O Nicolas Trivet, 211 n. 90 Noesis noeseos, 46, 196 Noncontradiction, principle of, 47, 69, 82 Non-Euclidean geometry, 55 Notional and essential acts, .w Trinitarian theory

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Nous and One (Plotinus), 192 Number (Pythagoreans), 33 Nuyens, Francois, 196 n. 14

128, 130, 132-33, 140, 148; as passive, 116-21; potentia receptiva, 119, 122-23, 127, 135, 138, 140, 147, 148-49 Operation: divine, and effects, 124; O'Connell, MatthewJ., 107 n. 2, 222 n. o. (energeia} and movement (kinesis), 111-15; and possibility, 56-57; two 145 Obediential potency, 149, 219 senses of (efficient cause, being in act), 119-21; twofold, of intellect, 17, Object(s), 4-5, 138-43- 149. 150; and acts, potencies, essences, 4, 87-89, 57, 64, 70, 72, 77, 78 n. 82, 93~94, 97 138-40, 150; being, ens, the o. of inteln. 194, 104-5, 15°, 167. See also Actio; lect, 45, 58, 69-70, 96-98, 2Ol (see also Pati; Two levels Ens; Phantasm; Understanding); o. of Other: being o. (esse intentionale), divine love, 210-11; o. and efficient 161-62; efficient causality and, 122, causality, 138-40 & n. 189, 142-43; 123, 125, 126, 127, 135 n. 166, 143, o. of formative, vs o. of apprehensive 146, 148; knowledge of as problem, abstraction, 163, 188-89; of human 84; k. of and God, 202-204; potency intellect, 41-44 [agent, terminal, tranof God and, 124-28 scendent, 149-50, 152-53, 182-85; Outer words: division of, 16; product of direct vs indirect, 157-58; for John convention, 16; spoken, written, imagined, meant, 14. See also Inner of St Thomas, 152-53 n. 4; as phanword tasm, 41-44,173-74,182-85; for Plato, 40; as quidditas rei materialis, 168-69, Paluscsak, P., 192 n. 5 173-75]; inner word as o. of thought, Paris, University of, 227 18-20; o. of insight, 150, 158, 174-77, 187-89 (wa/soPreconceptual); intel- Participation: in eternal Light, 85, 86, lectual light not an o. but a medium, 94, 95, 197; in God, 101; in meaning, 15. See also Intellectual light 91, 102; o., subject, and critical probParticular (individual, singular), see lem, 98-99; o. as term, as agent, 138; Knowledge ... of particular o. of understanding, 153, 188-89, Parts of definitions, parts of things, 202-3 (primary, secondary) Objective reality: of knowledge, 33-34, 155-57, 187 Pati, 116-21; actus perfectly, 116-19; and 62, 79, 93 n. 164, 164; of possibility, immanent act, 148; as recipere, 117, 56-57 118, 119, 140, 148; sentireand intelligere Ockham, William of, 195 as, 141-43, 147; various meanings of, Olivi, see Peter John Olivi 117-18; vellezs, 143, 146-47 One and many, material multiplication, Peghaire, Julien, 24 n. 51, 44 n. 150, 45 40 n. 152, 46 & n. 161, 48 n. 163, 66 n. 27, Ontology of knowledge and epistemol67 n. 28, 77 nn. 75-76, 224 ogy in Aquinas, 86-87 Pelster, Franz, 197 n. 18 Operatic, energeia, actio, actus, 110-16; as an Penido, Maurilio T.-L., 12 & n. l, 13, duplex actio, 128-33; d efficient cau108 n. 15, 109 n. 17 sality, 115; as immanent, transient,

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Index of Concepts and Names

Perez Argos, Naltasar, 211 n. 90 Perfection as totality, 162 Persons, notional acts in God, see Trinitarian theory Peter John Olivi, 211 n. 90 Phantasm: and habitual knowledge, 42; illumination of by agent intellect, 92-93, 150, 182-85; insight into (for both genesis and use of concepts), 27, 30, 38-46, 47-48, 59, 70-71, 152 & n. 3, 155, 156, 173-74, 176, 186, 187; instrumental cause of insight, 60-61, 188; intelligibility of (potential, actual), 173-74, 185 & n. 191; and knowledge of God, 42; as object of intellect, 41; prepared by cogitativa (q.v.) for insight, 56, 93 n. 165, 184; is to speculative thought as sense to sensible objects, 41, 171, 173 n. 113, 174. See also Abstraction; Conversion Phenomenology of subject and psychology of soul, 3 Philo, 202 Philosophy: critical point of, 189; first (wisdom), 80, 82; as knowledge of hidden truths, of separate substances, 81; Sophist pretensions to, 80; and theology, 221 Pivot between sense, phantasm and concept, inner word, 38, 47-48, 88, 194 (relation of insight: to data, to concept), 195-96 (mediates) Place and time irrelevant to explanation, 53, 54, 56, 164, 187. See also Hie et nunc Plan and purpose of this book, 25-26, 59, 60, 104-5, 106, 190, 222-23 Plato, Platonic, Platonist, 15, 26, 30, 33, 40 & n. 127, 41-42, 46, 53 "• 191, 94, ill, 155, 157, 164, 169, 182, 189 n. 199, 192, 193, 195, 196, 202, 225; gnoseology, 84-85; and knowledge of

other, 84; nauta in nave, 4; 'Platonic Idea' of Aquinas, 227; on pleasure, in; on real, 155, 157; on separate ideas, 164, 169. See also Anti-Platonist; Ideas; Knowledge ... by confontation; Neo-Platonist Plotinus, 192, 225 Plurality of divine ideas, 19 & n. 26, 25 n. 52. See also God Poesis (and cognates), 117, 122, 129, 144 n. 209 Positivism, 15, 2O, 223 Possibility: and impossibility, 57; and insight, 56-57; intelligibility of, 56-57, 69; of knowing contingent and particular, 163-64; objectivity of, 56-57 Possible intellect: and agent intellect, see Agent i.; as natural potency, 146, 148-49; its nature understood from object and act, 88; its object produces species and act, 140-41; passivity of, 142; as private, individual, 89-90 Potency: and act, 56-57, 129, 147-48; as active, 124-27; and effects, 123-24; efficient vs natural, 146, 149; efficient vs receptive (Aristotle), active vs passive (Avicenna), 121, 149; p. of God, 124-25; p., habit, act in intellect, 193; to knowing, being known, 84, 84-85; to movement, 112-14, 125 & n. 113. See also Obediential; Object(s) ... and acts, potencies; Potens; Potentia Potens omnia facere, fieri, 96, 97 Potentia: activa, 121-28 [two definitions (Aristotelian, Avicennist), 121; various meanings of (Avicenna), 123]; generandi, spirandi, 217 Poulain, Augustin-Francois, 103 n. 210 Praxis, 112, 129 Preconceptual act of understanding, 38, 57-58, 174, 187, 198, 201 Presence: of beloved in intellect of

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lover, in will, 209; dynamic, 209, 21O-11, 216 n. 116; of God to soul, 102-4; of soul to self, 102 Principium verbi, verbum, amor (Augustine, Aquinas), 191, 221 & n. 139 Principle(s): naturally known, 69-70, 74-78; of identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle, 47, 69, 82; and ratio terminaturad intellectum, 67 & n. 28, 68, 77-78; of sufficient reason, 47-48; p. and term of divine processions approaching identity, 204-8. See also First; Procession Priority (cognitional, ontological), 67 n. 28,129, 156-57, 167-68 Probable judgments, 77, 218 Processio intelligibilis, seeEmanatio intelligibilis Processio operationis, p. operati, 17, 107, 108-10 & n. 20, 132-33, 137, 148, 152, 188, 205-6, 207-8, 212 Procession: of act from act, 107, 212; and causation, 108; contrast with natural process, 46-47; as emanatio intelligibilis, 206-8; general notion of, 107-10; in imagination, in intellect, 12-13, 191, 224; of inner word, 46-59; in intellect, in will not parallel, 108-10; of love, 209-13; and principles of identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle, sufficient reason, 47; as production, 207-8; and related notions, ch. 3; two types of, 60-61; in will, 209-13. See also Emanatio intelligibilis; Processio operationis; Rational consciousness; Two levels Procession (s) in God, 12-13, 19 n. 26, 98,99, 107-10 (109 &n. 20), 152,191, 198-99, 204-22; of Holy Spirit, 12-13, 209-11; pure as real, 208; and productions, 204; p. and relations, persons, notional acts (via doctrinae), 213-22;

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

of Word as generation, 208. See also Trinitarian; Trinity Progress, see Human ignorance Prophecy, 95. See also Intellectual lighf Proportion: irrational p., 64, 67; p. as logos, 31-33; of matter and form, 46-47,156, 157, 164-65, 186; of object and potency, 160 n. 39; of phantasm and insight, 156, 158; of potency and act, 56-57, 58-59 Pseudo-Dionysius, 225 Psychological: p. analogy for Trinity, see Trinitarian theory; p. conditions of judgment, 75; p. introspection vs metaphysics, 104-5 (see also Psychology and metaphysics) Psychology: and metaphysics (in cognitional theory, in study of soul), 3-6 (Aristotle), 10, 12-13, 24, 25-26, 41, 53-56, 59, 60, 105, 106-7, no, 149, 186, 187, 190, 224; of soul and phenomenology of subject, 3 Pythagoreans, 33 Quality: abstraction from, 54-55; as essence, 152-53 n. 3; and quantity, 167; Scotus on, 148 Question(s): Aristotle's critical q., 83; ask for causes, 26-29, 219; empirical, 26; four (two) kinds of q. and their transposition, 26-29 (Aristotle), 26 n. 53 (Aquinas), 51; resolutio inprincipia as answering, 77-78; what? (Socrates) and why?, 26-29. See also An sit; Quid sit Quia and propter quid, 43 Quid, quid sit, quidditas (rei materialis), quidditativa, quiddity, quod quid erat esse, quod quid est, 2O, 29-38, 48, 49, 50 n. 172, 57, 59, 70, 75, 84, 97, 100, 105, 150, 155, 157, 163,166, 167, 168, 169 & n. 96, 170, 172, 173 & n. 112,

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Index of Concepts and Names

174-75, 175> 177 & n. 149, 180, 181, 186, 187, 189, 190, 195, 200, 201, 215, 219; infallibility in knowledge of, 75; object of intellect, 168,173-75, 200; as objective, 169 n. 96; prescinds from contingent existence, from individual matter, 200; takes us outside space and time, 75; transition from to res particularis existens, 2OO-2O1. See also Causa formalis; Insight; Questions; Understanding Quid rei, quid nominis (understanding of things, of names), 56 Quid sitDeus, 215, 219 Quod quid est, 29-38. See also Quid Rabeau, Gaston, 78-79 n. 82 Ratio: as abstract definition, meaning, inner word, 17 n. 23, 48, 155, 163, 164, 165; initial statement on, 20 & n. 32; particularis, 43; superior; 191; terminatur ad intellectum, 77 Rational consciousness: and procession of inner word, 47, 50-52, 59, 152, 188, 198 n. 28, 207, 223-24; and procession of love in will, 12, 13, 108-10, 152, 188, 205, 209-13. See also Emanatio intelligibilis Rationality, basic and derived, 47 Real, reality: appearance and, 82, 83, 95; Aristotle vs Bergson on, 113 n. 33; common sense on, 33; correspondence of mental with, 16-17 [of mental composition with r. c., 63]; distinction of essence and existence, 197 & n. 18; distinctions and metaphysics, 187; essences not the whole of, 115 (wa&oEssentialism); first principles of, 79; givenness is not the r., 99; inner word, truth, as medium between mind and, 21, 73; intellect knows its proportion to (knowledge

of), 86, 98, 201; judgment as knowledge of (of r., of esse, of truth), 20-21, 57,62,63, 78,93-94,97,150, 200-201; Kant and r. confined to field of possible experience, 57; knowledge of as objective, 33-34, 62, 79, 93 n. 164, 164; knowlege of precedes k. of subject, object, 99; meaning of, 20; mode of knowing, mode of r., 16; in movement incomplete, 112-13; not opposed to mental, 208; Plato on, 33, 155, 157; pure processions as, 208; reason, sense as criterion of, 20; truth and, 81-82; understanding knows objective r., 33; wisdom and knowledge of r. as r., 78. See also Realism Realism: dogmatic, 192; as immediate, 99; naive, 72, 99; pseudo, 140, 193 Reason (s): begins from understanding, 68-69, 7i; and concept of soul, 68; eternal, 101, 192, 197; as intellect, understanding in process, 44-45, 51, 63-68, 70-71, 77; r. in logic vs r. in developing understanding, 69; principle of sufficient r., 47-48; and progress in understanding, 68, 70-71, 153; terminates in understanding, 66-68, 71, 77; and theology, 9, 101, 213-22 Rectangle, squaring, 32 Reduction, resolution to first principles, See Resolutio in principia Reflection: and Aristotle's knowledge by identity, 84; and the critical problem, 2O n. 37, 87, 95-96; as duplication of ourselves, 99; of intellect on itself, 13, 86-87; in judgment, 74-75, 76-77; and knowledge as perfection, k. as of other, 85; perfect in God alone, 13; on phantasm for knowledge of singular, 40, 169, 170, 180, 188, 201; on phantasm vs conversion to p., 170-71;

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Index of Concepts and Names

of sense incomplete, 86-87; and via iudicii, 74-75, 79 n. 82 Reflective and direct understanding, see Understanding Reims, Council of, 221 n. 136 Relation(s): and Aristotle's Metaphysics, 121-22; in God, 19 n. 28 (Scotus), 99, 108, 213-14; nonreciprocal real r. of scientia ad scibile, 184 n. 189 Resolutio in principia, its ambiguity, 73-75; as answer to questions, 77-78; as via iudicii, 74-75 Resultance, see Natural resultance Richard of St Victor, 221 n. 137, 222 Robilliard,J.-A., 109 n. 17 Roland-Gosselin, Marie-Dominique, 34 n. 93, 97 n. 193 Rondet, Henri, 66 n. 26 Ross, William David, 34, 112 n. 25, 116 n. 58, 165 n. 72 Rousselot, Pierre, 224 Roy, Lucien, 222 n. 145 Sabellius, 204 Scepticism of fourteenth century, 218 Schmaus, Michael, 6 n. 6, 199 n. 31, 212 n. 96, 213-14 & nn. 100 & 104, 217-18 n. 130 Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius, 212 n. 94 Scholastics, 5, 28, 83, 146, 202, 219 Schurr, Viktor, 221 n. 135 Science: and abstraction, 53; Aristotelian vs Platonist, 182; and coalescence of insights, 64-65; and conceptualism, 218; criteria of s. and mathematics, 76; habit of, 79, 153, 193; insight and modern s., 41 n. 129; and intellectualism, 219-20; as knowledge through causes (Aristotle), 218-19; natural s., human s., 6, 9-10; necessary s. of contingent, 163-65; as of necessary and universal, 163-67, 180;

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

theology as (Aquinas), 9, 219 (subalternated s. of God) Scientificum and ratiocinativum potencies, 49 Scotus, 109 & nn. 18-19, 148,195, 212 n. 96, 213 & nn. 97-98; and divine ideas, 19 n. 28; and divine processions as productions, 204 & n. 57; and insight, 38-39 & n. 126; and Kant, 38-39 & n. 126; and knowledge of singular, 43-44 n. 150; and spiritual look at universal, 195; on will and causes, 213. See also Crypto-Scotism Second act, see First act Self-diffusion of good and Trinity, 222 Self-knowledge: of mind, of soul, 9 (Aquinas), 8-9 (Augustine), 87-99, 180, 225; divine, see God; empirical awareness vs scientific grasp of, 88-90; empirical, scientific, normative, 101, 180; as habitual, 89; had from objects, acts, potencies, essence, 87-88, 101, 180; s.-k. and self-presence, 102-4; understanding source of, 88, 90, 225; and wisdom, 101-2 Self-possession, s.-expression of mind (inner word), 6-9, 23-24, 27, 38, 47, 50-51, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60-61,65, 70, 77, 78, 84, 88, 94, 105, 150, 153, 163, 174, 194, 1Q9, 2O2-3, 209, 221. See also Emanatio intelligibilis Sensation: as action, passion, 158; immateriality of, 146, 159-60; as moveri, 118-19 Sense: s. in act is the sensible in act, 83-84, 159, 192-93, 197 (see also Intellect in act); as criterion of reality, 20, 33; as criterion of science, 76; destroyed by violence, 32, 158-59; as form of organ, 32; needed for judgment, 75-76; reflects on itself, but incompletely, 86-87; true and false in

286

Index of Concepts and Names

s.-knowledge, 71, 86; s. and understanding, 41-42, 45-46, 159-61, 169, 172-73, 179-86 Sensible: abstraction from, 53-55, 76, 178; apprehended by sense, represented by imagination, illuminated and made intelligible by agent intellect, 179 Separate: Idea (Plato), 196; soul, knowledge in, 93, 170; substance (Aristotle), 46, 196 Separations and distinctions, 167, 187 Siger of Brabant, 197 n. 18 Sight and seeing as illustrating potency, act, 32, 56, 115, 125 n. 113, 128, 131, 160 & n. 39, 174, 185 Signs, names and spoken words as, 14, 163 Silvestri, Francesco, see Ferrariensis Similitude and knowledge, 71-72, 133, 159-61, 178, 187. See also Imago similitudinis Simon, Yves, 160 n. 45 Simonin, H.-D., 145 n. 225, 210 n. 87, 212 n. 90 Sin and its rationalization, 209 Singular (individual, particular): knowledge of, see Knowledge ... of particular; medieval Augustinians on, 192; Scotus on knowledge of, 43-44 n. 150; 'this' s. vs abstract s., 181-82 Snubness vs curvature, 156 Socrates, 26, 27, 33, 43, 59, 63, 81, 169, 180, 181; and the Academy, Aristotle, 59; and Callias, hi homines, 43; and interest in definition, 33; and question 'What?' 26; and reminiscence of ideas, 27 Sophist pretensions to philosophy, 80 Soul: in animal parts, 32 & n. 76; and body, 32-33; definition of, Aristotle's, 32-33 & n. 83 (Aquinas); kinds

of, 87, 138; as intellective, sensitive, vegetative, 4-5, 202-3; man and, 28, 33-34 & n. 87; reasoning to concept of, 68; self-knowledge of, 87-99, 138, 225; specification of through objects, acts, potencies, essence, 87-88, 101, 138; and subject, 3-11 Space: and Kant, 45; quod quid est takes us outside s. and time, 75. See also Hie et nunc; Irrelevant; Time Space-time continuum, 54 n. 196 Species, species: ambiguity of (form, universal), 133-34; as Aristotle's eidos, 133; s., essence, existence, 78-79 n. 82; s. of intellect, of its object, 5; and intelligere, 133-38; as known in phantasm, 174, 176, 182, 185, 188-89; as medium known on reflection, 177 n. 144 Species impressa, 192 Species quae, qua, in qua, 176-77, 178-79, 188 Specification: of act of will (vs exercise), 135 n. 166; of soul through objects, acts, potencies, essence, 87-88, 101, 138 Spengel, Leonardus, 182 n. 174 Spirit, Holy: 109 n. 20, 209-13; procession of as problem, 12-13; and spiration, 217. See also Procession (s) in God; Trinitarian theory; Trinity Stoics, 6 Stone, reasoning to definition of, 51-52, 68 Stufler, Johann, 121 & n. 88 Subject: conscious, 5, 184 (see also Awareness); grammatical s. and efficient cause, 118-19; metaphysical (of accidents, of change, of movement, of pati, of properties), 30-31, 37, 6l, 62, 63, 113, 117, 119, 122, 126, 128, 145, 147, 149, 154, 156, 158, l6l, 186,

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Index of Concepts and Names

205; s., object and critical problem, 98-99; and soul, 3-11 Subjective and knowledge, 33, 73, 93 n. 164, 166,211 Substance, 35, 37; knowledge of, 63; and quod quid est, 31, 35, 37; various meanings in Aristotle, 29. See also Separate Sufficient: ground, known as s., 47; principle of s. reason, 47-48. See also Emanatio intelligibilis; Procession; Rational consciousness Supernatural, 66, 97, 101, 219, 221 & n. 137 Syllogism, 51; and learning, 66-67, 93-94; scientific, 26, 28 & n. 58, 37 Synthesis: of concepts, 63-65; in judgment, 61-71 (synthetic apprehension of motives for, 77); as posited, 62, 71 Szabo, Sadoc, 192 n. 5

Tambertus (for Albertus), 218 n. 130 Teacher, 194; divine, human t., 92. See also Via doctrinae Teresa (of Avila), 104 Term of discourse, reasoning, 67, 68, 71, 77; principle and t. in divine processions, 204-8 Themistius, Paraphrases, 182 n. 174 Theology: development of trinitarian, 220-22; faith and, 215; philosophy and, 221; reason and, 9, 101, 213-22; as science (Aquinas), 9, 219 (subalternated s. of God) Thing(s): animals know t., 2O; t. and formal cause, 37, 186-87; t.-in-itself, 71, 155, 157; parts of, 155-57, 187; quiddity of (quid rei, quid nominis), 56. See also Parts of definitions, of t. Thomas Anglicus, 212 n. 96 Thomas Aquinas (these references on matters marginal to doctrines; on doctrines see whole index). Aristotle

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

and T.: 9-10 (A. and Augustine), 43-44 n. 150 (his commentary, his own mind), 62 (his thought sometimes obscured by his use of A.), 117 n. 63 (lacked A.'s wealth of language), 127-28 (verbal difficulties in A. and Avicenna; see also 149), 165 (settles recurrent antinomy in A.), 174-75 (duality of object of intellect due to A.), 196-97 (debt to A. and Augustine in trinitarian theory). Interpretation of T.: 128 (misunderstanding of his metaphysics), 130 (anachronism in), 149 (wrong application of his metaphysics to his psychology), 152-53 (intellectual vs conceptualist; see also 163), 190 (inductive proof of anyone's i.), 211 (conceptualist complication of his view on love), 222-23 (data for his meaning in his written words), 223 (manuals ad mentem divi Thomae; effort needed to understand him), 224 (lexicography in), 226-27 (differs from development of Thomist doctrine). Method and thought of T.: 56 (introspection; see also 58, 86-87, 88, 104-5, no), 86-87 (epistemology), 104 (interest in nature), 108 (deference to Fathers), 115-16 (terminology not stereotyped), 128 (thought sometimes incomplete), 130 (fluid terminology), 181 n. 173 (perhaps did not advert to a difficulty), 199 (thought on verbum not mature in Sentences period), 204 (regularly writes as theologian), 213 (trinitarian theory in a class by itself), 226 (intellectualism made over from Aristotle's). Works of T.: 145 (2nd Paris period), 172 (Denaturaverbiintellectus not authentic), 176 n. 143 (errors by

288

Index of Concepts and Names

in facto esse), 214, 215. See also Dicere\ his editors; see also 217), 178-79 n. 149 Procession (on authenticity of a Quodlibet). See Trinity: not demonstrable by reason, also Development 204, 218; image of (rational creaThomas of Sutton, 211 n. 90 tures), 12-13, 24, 47, 59; introspecThomist vs Thomistic, 96, 148, 153 n. 5 tion and conception of, 24; proper Thompson, J.J., 41 n. 129 Three habits of speculative intellect names in, 216, 221; vestige of, 12-13, 47. See also Spirit, Holy; Trinitarian (intellect, wisdom, science), 79 theory; Word Time: an element in judgment, 76; and Truth, 15, 16, 17, 20-21, 61, 62, 63, 71, Kant, 45; and movement, 112-15; quod quid est takes us outside space 72, 73, 150, 166, 185-86; as application of abstract to sensible, 76; as corand t., 75. See also Hie et nunc; Irrelerespondence of mind and reality, 21, vant; Space-time continuum To ti estin, to ti en einai, 20, 29-38, 150, 63, 71-72, 81-82; as convertible with being, 113 n. 33; as correspondence 173,186 of mental with real composition, Totality, perfection as, 162 Transposing questions from type to 63; eternal (Augustine), 75-76, 85, 196-97; t. in intellect, good in things, type, 26-29 Triangle and insight, 27-28, 40 16, 17; t. and intellectual light, 93-94; as medium in quo reality is known, 73; Trinitarian theory, 6-9 (Augustine), 10-11 (Aquinas), 12-13, 78, 102, 104, naturally known t. touchstone for 105, 109, 136, 152, 204, 213-22; and other t, 74-75; as result of collaboracrux Trinitatis, 213-14, 22O; dogmatic tion, 81; relative vs immutable, 95; in development and, 220-22; essential second operation of intellect (judgand notional acts, persons, 198, ment) not first, 2O-21, 62, 71; t. as in 213-14, 216 n. 116, 217 n. 129, 220; a subject vs t. absolutely, 73; not in finis operationis, finis intentionis, 216 n. synthesis but in positing, 62; not in 116; potentia generandi, potentia spi'what', 21. See also Falsity; Judgment; randi, 216-17; processions (Word, Two levels Holy Spirit), 12-13, 19 n. 26, 98, 99, Two levels: of inner word (concept107-10 (109 & n. 20), 152, 191, definition, judgment-truth), 17198-99, 204-22 [pure p. as real, 208; 18, 60-61, 72, 78 n. 82, 93-94; and p. and relations, persons, notional two operations of intellect, 17, 57, acts (via doctrinae), 213-22; p. of 78 n. 82 [two o. regard quiddity Word as generation, 208]; psychologiand existence, 167]; and types of cal analogy, 214-17, 22O, 224 [found understanding (direct, reflective), only in rational creatures, 11 n. ll, 25, 60-61, 77-78, 80, 97, 150, 153, 12-13, 191-92, 206; and intellectual2Ol. See also Intelligere; Judgment; ism, 226; and mystery, 215-16, 219, Procession 22O]; and self-diffusion of good, 222; Two orders in study of a science, 74 and theology as science, 218-19; twofold ordering of t. concepts (in fieri, Ultimate concepts (potency and act),

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289

Index of Concepts and Names

56-59. See also Naturally known concepts Understanding: and Albert the Great, 224; angelic, 38, 60-61, 70, 225; Aristotle's analysis of, 28 n. 58; u., concept, expression, 38, 6o-6l, 70; desire for, unlimited, 66; development of, 63-66, 70-71, 80, 98 (see also Insights ... coalescence of); divine, 66, 100, 197-99, 203-4, 208, 219, 222, 225; u. God by analogy (Vatican I), 215, 219; habitual, 5^Habit(s); identical with understood, 83-85, 159, 193, 196; and inner word, 22-24, 25, 47, 50-51, 152-53: instrumental causes of, 60-61; and intellect, 193-94; and intelligere, 22-24, 48-49, 152-53; as knowing the cause, 195-96; mediates (pivots) between data and concept, 38, 47-48, 88, 194, 195-96; knows objective reality, 33; and meaning, 222-23; object of (ens, phantasm, primary-secondary, quod quid est), 29-38, 41,45. 48-49, 59, 153, 188-89, 202-3; and posse, potens omnia fieri, 45, 47; as preconceptual, 57-58; as proper act of human soul, 90 n. 147, 225; reason as u. in process, 77; Scotus's view of, 39 n. 126; sense and, 41-42, 161, 169, 172-73, 179-86; of things, of names (quid rei, quid nominis), 56; u. Thomas Aquinas, 222-23; two kinds of, direct and reflective, 25, 60-61, 77, 80, 97, 150, 153, 201; of ultimate concepts, 56-59; u. understanding vs thinking thought, 46, 196, 226. See also Insight; Intellectual light; Intelligere; Judgment; Phantasm Unity, seeEo magis unurn; Multa per unum; Wisdom Universal: u. concept and immateriality of soul, 88-89; u. in instance vs u. as

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

u., 175, 189; as instrument for particular knowledge, 165-66; and knowledge of particular things, 43-44 & n. 150, 53, 163, 165-66, 175, 177, 178, 187, 189-90; sensitive apprehension of, 43 (see also Cogitativa; Ratio particularis); not subjective but objective, 166; u. vs understanding in extrapolation to other worlds, 46, 196; u. without the intentio universalitatis, 175, 189 Universale in particulari, 43 Universe known from start, 76, 92, 98, 1OO-1O1 Unum (ens, quid), 195; eo magis u., 204-8 Value and procession of love, 152, 209 Vandenbroucke, Francois, 222 n. 145 Vanier, Paul, 222 n. 142 Vatican I, 215 n. 112, 219 Verbeke, Gerard, 182 n. 174 Verbum: dicens v., 198; expressum ab alio, 199; interius (cordis, mentis), 13-14, 60; intusprolatum (Augustine), 6-9; and ipsum intelligere in trinitarian theory, 198-99; necessity of, 199-204; principium verbi, v., amor (Augustine, Aquinas), 191, 221 & n. 139; as proper name of Son, 216. See also Inner word; Self-possession, s.-expression; Word Verum etfalsum in mente, bonum et malum in rebus, 16, 17 Vestige vs image of Trinity, 12-13 Vetera novis augere et per/icere, 222, 226 Via compositionis, v. resolutionis, 73-74 Via doctrinae, 213-22, 226; and v. inventionis (on Trinity), 22O Via inventionis, via compositionis, via resolutionis, 74-75 Via iudicii, see Resolutio in principia Violent action vs natural, 146-47 Vital act (Augustinian) vs pati (Aristotelian), 211 n. 90

2QO

Index of Concepts and Names

Virtus: iudicativa, 60; spiritiva, 217 (see also Potentia generandi, spirdndf) Webert, Jordanus, 180-81 & n. 169 What? and why? questions, 26-29 What is it? and first act of intellect, 20-21 Whole greater than part, 70 Whole of science virtually contained in intellectual light, 76. See also Universe Will: in all who understand, 209; causes act of belief, 199 n. 33; can prevent intelligere, 199 n. 33; processio operati within, 137 n. 179 (see also Processio operationis, p. operati); procession (of love) in, 107-10, 152, 209-13; procession in w., in intellect not parallel, 108-10; a rational appetite, 13, 209; Scotus and cause in, 213; w. wills, though moved by God, 146-47 William of Ockham, 195 Willing: of end, of means, 137, 143, 146-47; as operation, 147 Wisdom, 78-87; acquired gradually, 100-101; duality of, 100-101; and epistemology, 78-83; and faith, 101; as first philosophy, 80, 82, 83, 99; and knowledge of causes, 79-81; and k. of ratio entis et non entis (being and notbeing), 57, 97; and k. of real (as real),

?8, 79, 99; and other virtues (art, prudence, science ...), 79, 80, 128-29, 150-51, 193; and right judgment, 78, 150-51; as science of sciences, 79, 80; and self-knowledge, 101-2; supernatural (gift of Spirit), 101; unity of, 99-104; validates principles and terms, 78-80,150-51 Wolfson, Harry A., 2O2 n. 45 Wonder, desire to know, inquiry, questions: 37, 105, 185; and agent intellect, intellectual light, 60-61, 185, 193; and data, 37, 185; and natural desire to see God, 27 n. 53, 48 & n. 164, 66, 92, 219; has understanding as goal, 105; source of all science and philosophy, 48, 81 Word in God, 13, 98, 152, 199; cannot be demonstrated by reason, 200-204; and divine ideas, 202; is perfect expression of ipsum esse, 207-8; procession of, 86, 98, 99 & n. 201. See also Dicere; Inner word; Trinitarian theory; Trinity; Verbum Word in human mind, see Inner word Wyser, Paul, 164 n. 65, 167 nn. 78-79, 168 n. 83, 175 n. 124 Yorke Smith, Leonora L., 103 n. 210

The Robert Mollot Collection

Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

General references to whole works (or major parts) of Thomas Aquinas Compendium theologiae: 17 n. 19, 222 De malo: 143, 146 De natura verbi intellectus (spurious): 172 & n. 109 Depotentia: 19, 107, Hi n. 20, 126, 127,

Super L. BoethiiDe trinitate: 54 n. 194, 166, 175, 221 Super Libros Sententiarum: 14, 17 n. 19, 25 n. 52, 1O2, 107, 115, 117, 124, 126, 130, 131, 132, 142, 144, 145, 163, 174, 197, 199 & n. 31, 200, 216, 226 Specific references to texts of Thomas Aquinas

130, 135, 221-2

De spiritualibus creaturis: 128, 145 Deveritate: 17, 19, 49, lOl, 103, 107, 108-10, 130, 134, 174, 197, 200, 221 De virtutibus: 145 In Aristotelis libros Physicorum: 132 Sententia libriDe anima: 88, 95, 186 Summa contra Gentiles: 17 n. 19, 19, 68, 89, 107, 127, 130, 165, 174, 197, 206, 221 Summa theologiae: 17 nn. 19 and 22, 67, 102, 108, 127, 145, 163, 197, 204, 206-7, 213, 214,215, 226, 246 Primapars: 49, 128, 130, 165, 168-9, 172,173, 182 Prima secundae: 130, 143, 146

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Compendium theologiae: c. 49, l lO-l l n. 2O, 210 n. 86; c. 85, 90 n. 144; c. 104, 45 n. 155, 48 n. 164 De anima: a. l, ad urn, 173 n. 113; a. 2, 90 n. 144; a. 5 c., 90 n. 145, 93 nn. 165 and 169, 94 n. 172; a. 7, ad im, 45 n. 155; a. 12 c., 119 n. 76, 145 n. 222; a. 13 c-» 139 n. 188; a. 15, 170 n. 100; c., 42 n. 136, 171 n. 102,173 n. 113; ad 3m, 41 n. 133, 173 n. 113; ad 8m, 173 n. 113, 179 n. 158; ad gm, 93 n. 166; ad lorn, 179 n. 158; ad 2Om, 43 n. 142; a. 16 c., 171 n. 105; a. 17, 171 n. 106; a. 18 c., 171 n. 106; ad 5m, 65 n. 15; a. 20, 170 n. 101; c., 53 n. 192; ad im (2ae ser.), 180 n. 167, 181 n. 173

292

Index ol Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

De caritate: a. 2, ad 1701, 145 n. 225; a. 3, 145 n. 225 De ente et essentia: Proem., 57 n. 205; c. 1, 34 n. 93, 61 n. 5, 97 n. 193 De intellectu et intelligibili (opus spur.): 23 n. 46 De malo: q. 1, a. 5 c., 132 n. 151; q. 6, a. l c., 137 n. 179, 143 n. 205; ad 4m, 146 n. 232; ad 13m, 210 n. 87; ad 1401, 73 nn. 49 and 51; q. 16, a. 6, ad 4m, 50 n. 173; q. 16, a. 8, 42 n. 140; ad 3m, 42 n. 138; ad 7m, 88 n. 135, 89 n. 139; q. 16, a. 12 c., 94 n. 170; ad im, 93 n. 168; ad 2m, 93 n. 168, 146 n. 231 De natura verbi intellectus (opus spur.): 172 n. 109 Depotentia: q. l, a. l, 148 text; c., 125 text& n. 112, 126 n. 113, 135 nn. 163 and 168; ad im, 126 n. 114, 136 n. 170; q. 2, 222 n. 144; q. 2, a. 2 c., 126 n. 115, 136 n. 171; q. 3, a. 3, ad 2m, 148 n. 238; q. 3, a. 9, ad 22m, 160 n. 43; q. 3, a. 15 c., 120 n. 85, 130 n. 140; q. 3, a. 16 c., 216 n. 116; q. 5, a. 5 c., 121 n. 88; ad 14m, 130 n. 141, 131 n. 1 5°. 137 n. 177; q. 7, a. 10 c., 184 n. 189; q. 8, 222 n. 144; q. 8, a. 1, 22 n. 42; c., 15 n. 11, 17 n. 20, 21 n. 40, 22 n. 41, 23 n. 48, 77 n. 77, 108 n. 10, 130 n. HO, 135 "• 165, 136 n. 173, 200 n. 35, 222 n. 143; ad urn, 108 n. 14; ad 12m, 22 n. 44, 204 n. 54; q. 8, a. 3, ad 7m, 214 n. no; q. 9, 222 n. 144; q. 9, a. 5 c., 15 n. 11, 17 n. 20, 19 n. 29, 21 n. 40, 22 n. 42, 23 n. 48, 77 n. 77, 135 n. 165, 136 n. 173, 222 n. 143; q. 9, a. 9 c., 13 n. 3, 23 n. 46, 51 n. 178; ad 4m (lae ser.), 13011. 139; ad 8m (laeser.), 136 n. 174; ad 3111 (2ae ser.), 110 n. 2(); q. 1O, 222 n. 144; q. 10, a. l c., 108 n. 7, 114 n. 38, 130 n. 139; ad 8m, 108 n. 9; q. 10, a. 2 c., no n. 20; ad 4111, 110 n.

2O; ad 7m, 110 n. 20; q. 1O, a. 3, 214 n. 110; q. 10, a. 4 c., 110 n. 20; q. 10, a. 5 c., lion. 20 Derationibusfidei: c. 4, i l l n. 2() De spe: a. 3, 145 n. 225 De spiritualibus creaturis: a. 2, 90 n. 144; a. 8, ad 14111, 161 n. 54; a. 9, 182 n. 180; ad 6m, 78 n. 82, 135 n. 167, 178 n. 151; ad 15m, 180 n. 161, 185 n. 191; a. 10, 182 n. 180; c., 90 n. 145, 95 n. 176; ad 4m, 93 n. 169; ad 8m, 60 n. l, 95 n. 176; ad 14m, 182 n. 179; ad 15111, 89 n. 142; a. 11 c., 128 n. 125, 145 n. 222 De substantiis separatis; c. 3, 46 n. 159; c. 12, 196 n. 15 De unione Verbi incarnati: a. 5 c., 129 n. 129 De unitate intellectus (ed. Keeler): c. l, § 23, 160 n. 45; § 24, 160 n. 44; §§ 35-38, 161 n. 51; § 35, 160 n. 45; § 37, 160 n. 45; § 38, 160 n. 45; § 4«, 173 n. 113; §46, i6on. 45;c. 3, §§ 71-79, 90 n. 144; § 71, 130 nn. 135 and 140; § 74, 117 n. 65; c. 4, § 98, 183 n. 182; c. 5, § no, 178 n. 149; §111, 176 n. 136 De veritate: q. l, a. l, 21 n. 38, 57 n. 205; q. l, a. 2c., 16 n. 15; ad 4m, 58 n. 211, 96 n. 185; q. 1, a. 3, 2O n. 34; q. 1, a. 4, ad 5m, 95 n. 176; q. l, a. 9 c., 21 n. 37, 58 n. 210, 86 n. 125, 87 n. 126, 96 n. 183, 97 n. 195, 98 n. 198; q. 1, a. 12 c., 23 n. 46,37 n. 118, 48 n. 165, 68 n. 33, 75 n. 63, 173 n. 112; qq. 2-3, 66 n. 21; q. 2, a. 1, ad 9m, 48 n. 167; q. 2, a. 2, 246 text; c., 162 n. 57, 197 n. 22; q. 2, a. 3, 202 n. 47; ad im, 85 n. 12O; q. 2, a - 5 c., 53 n. 192; q. 2, a. 6 c., 41 n. 130, 174 n. 119, 180 n. 167, 181 n. 173, 183 n. 181; ad im, 53 n. 190, 55 n. 197, 179 n. 159; ad 3m, 89 n. 142; q. 2, a. 7, 63 n. 10; c., 63 n. 7; ad 5m, 49 n. 168; q.

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3, a. 2, 19 text, 23 n. 49, 25 n. 52, 85 n. 121, 202 nn. 43 and 47; c., 17 n. 20, 21 n. 41, 77 n. 77, 135 n. 164, 136 n. 17 177 n. 149, 200 n. 34, 221 n. 140; q. a. 1 c., 19 n. 30; ad 7m, 15 n. 12; q. 4, a. 2, 221 n. 140; c., 15 n. ll, 17 n. 20, 19 n. 30, 23 n. 49, 24 n. 50, 50 n. 173 51 n. 174, 77 n. 77, 199 n. 32; ad 2m 99 n. 201; ad 3m, 22 n. 41, 200 n. 35 ad 4m, 136 n. 174; ad 5m, 22 nn. 4 and 44, 136 n. 174, 148 text, 204 n. 53 ad 7m, 17 n. 21, 23 n. 49, 107 n. 5, 109 n. 17, 132 n. 156, 133 n. 157, 137 180, 206 n. 65, 212 n. 91; q. 4, a. 4, ad 3m, 99 n. 201; q. 4, a. 5 c., 99 n. 201; 5, a. i c., 128 n. 126; q. 5, a. 9, ad 4m, 129 n. 128; q. 8, a. l, 48 n. 164; ad 14m, 142 n. 2Ol; q. 8, a. 6, 46 n. 15 c., 120 n. 78, 130 nn. 137 and 140, 14 n. 217; q. 8, a. 7, 46 n. 159; ad 4m ( ser.), 173 n. 112, 180 n. 162; q. 8, 10, 65 n. 20; q. 8, a. ll c., 44 n. 150, 161 n. 53; q. 8, aa. 14-15, 63 n. 10; q. 8, a. 14, 65 n. 15; c., 65 n. 17; ad 12m, 114 nn. 41 and 44, 115 nn. 49 and 50; q. 8, a. 15, 67 n. 29; c., 69 n. 34; ad 3m 114 n. 40; q. 10, a. i, 13 n.$; c., 72 nn. 45 and 47; ad 6m, 52 n. 183; q. 1O, 2, oh. 5, 103 n. 214; c., 53 n. 193, 1 n. 102, 197 n. 17; ad 5m, 103 n. 21 ad 7m (lae ser.), 41 nn. 131 and 135, 42 n. 137, 171-72 n. 108; q. 1O, a. 221 n. 138; c., 103 n. 213, 111 n. 2O; 10, a. 4 c., 181 n. 170; ad im, 177 144, 180 n. 162; q. 1O, a. 5 c., 53 n 189, 161 n. 53, 180 n. 167, 181 n. 17 186 n. 194; ad im, 181 n. 172; q. 10 6, 93 n. 167; c., 76 n. 74, 92 nn. 156 and 162; q. 10, a. 7, 13 n. 3, 221 n. 1 c., in n. 20; ad 2m, 103 nn. 211 and 212; q. 1O, a. 8, 89 nn. 138, 141, an 143; < •< 88 nn. 135 and 136, 95 n. 17

Collected Works of Bernard I onerqan

101 nn. 202 and 203, 180 n. 168; a im (lae ser.), 70 n. 41, 155 n. 20, 158 n. 27, 186 n. 193; ad 9m (lae ser.), 177 n. 144; ad 2m (2ae ser.), 177 n. 144; ad 10m (2ae ser.), 91 n. 153, 175 n. 125; ad urn (2ae ser.), 94 n. 174; 10, a. 9 c., 72 n. 46, 174 n. 119, 177 n. 144, 183 n. 181; ad im, 177 n. 144; ad 3m, 177 n. 144; ad 5m, 177 n. 144; ad lorn, 177 n. 144; q. 10, a. 10 c., 177 n. 149; q. 10, a. ll c., 174 n. 118; ad 4m, 177 n. 144; q. ll, a. 1 c., 17 n. 23, 95 n. 176; ad 3m, 58 n. 209, 96 n. 186; ad 13m, 92 n. 158; q. 12, a. l c., 74 n. 55; q. 12, a. 3 c., 121 n. 88; ad 2m, 75 n. 65, 76 n. 72; q. 12, a. 7 c., 95 n. 180; q. 12, a. 12 c., 95 n. 181; q. 14, a. l, 73 n. 53, 78 n. 82; c., 66 n. 22, 73 nn. 48 and 50, 173 n. 112; q. 14, a. 2, 48 n. 164; q 14, a. 3 c., 130 n. 140; q. 15, a. i, 66 n 27; q. 15, a. 2, ad 3m, 48 n. 165, 49 170, 173 n. 112, 180 n. 164; q. 15, a. c., 55 n. 74; ad im, 173 n. 112; q. 16, a l, ad 13m, 119 n. 73, 139 n. 187; q. a. 8, ad 3m, 93 n. 167; ad 4m, 41 n 134, 173 n. 113; q. 19, a. i, ob. 4, 179 n. 158; ob. 5, 179 n. 158; c., 42 n. 140 170 n. i(X); ad 4m, 179 n. 158; ad 5m 179 n. 158; q. 19, a. 2, 170 n. 101; q 2O, a. 5 c., 49 n. 169, 180 n. 163; q. 2 a. 2 c-., 210 n. 84; q. 22, a. 3 c., 121 n. 88; q. 22, a. 5, ad 8m, 121 n. 88, 13(1-7 n. 175, 197 n. 18; q. 22, a. 6, ad 4m, 7 n. 62; q. 24, a. 1, ad l8m, 75 n. 62; 25, a. 3c., 173 n. ll2;q. 26, a. l c., 117 nn. 67 and 68; q. 26, aa. 2-3, 118 n. 70; q. 26, a. 3, ad 4m, 119 n. 73; ad l8m, 101 n. 205 Derirtutibus in communi: a. l, ad 14m, 145 n. 227; a. 3 (., 145 n. 226; ad 119 n. 73; a. 12, ad 5m, 145 n. 227 //( Ari\totcli\ libros l)e caelo et mundo: c. 1,

294

Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

lect. 3, § 4, 121 n. 88; lect. 19, § 4, 55 n. 197 In Aristotelis libros De generatione et corruptione: c. 1, lect. 10, § 2,116 n. 59; §7, 116 n. 59 In Aristotelis libros Peri hermeneias: prooemium, 78 n. 82; c. 1, lect. 2, 166 n. 76; § 15, 15 n. 13; § 17, 14 n. 6; §§ 19 & 21, 16 n. 17; lect. 3, 166 n. 76; §31, 15 n. 14; lect. 5, 61 n. 4, 78 n. 82; lect. 10, §5, 173 n. 112 In Aristotelis libros Posteriorum analyticorum: In I, lect. l, 78 n. 82; lect. 2, 67 n. 28; lect. 4, 28 n. 58; lect. 5, 57 n. 205; lect. 42, § 5, 180 n. 162; In II, lect. i, 26 n. 53; § 408, 26 n. 53; § 416, 27 n. 55; §417, 27 n. 56; lect. 5, §9, 173 n. 112; lect. 7, 30 n. 68, 32 n. 86; lect. 8, 30 n. 68, 32 n. 86; lect. 9, 26 n. 53, 31 n. 72; lect. 20, 43 nn - H3, 149, and 150 In Aristotelis libros Physicorum: In I, lect. 13. § 2, 154 n. 9, 156 n. 21; § 9, 154 n. 13; lect. 15, § 10, 154 n. 14; In II, lect. l, § 4, 121 n. 88, 135 n. 166; § 5, 122 n. 92; lect. 2, 122 n. 93; § l, 154 n. 10; §3, 155 n. 18; lect. 3, 55 n. 197; lect. 4, 31 n. 74; §6, 131 n. 145; §8, 125 n. 113; lect. 5, 31 n. 72, 33 n. 91; §§ 3-4, 155 n. 18; § 5, 108 n. 12, 143 n. 207, 144 n. 2li; lect. 10, 31 n. 71; §4, 129 n. 129; §15, 144 n. 213; In III, lect. 2, §3, 112 n. 28; § 5, 112 n. 28; lect. 4-5, 158 n. 28; lect. 4, § 6, 131 nn. 145 and 147; lect. 5, § 13, 132 n. 154; § 15, 132 n. 155; In IV, lect. 16-22, 112 n. 29; In V, lect. 2-4, 113 n. 30; lect. 4, § 2, 116 n. 58; In VI, lect. 5, 113 n. 31; §§ 11-16, 113 n. 34; lect. 8, § 5, 113 n. 32; § 15, 113 n. 34; lect. 12, 113 n. 31; In VII, lect. l, § 7, 114 n. 38; lect. 3, §§ 4-10, 143 n. 208; lect. 4, § 2, 116 n. 59; lect.

5-6, 116 n. 59; In VIII, lect. i, § 7, 114 n. 38; lect. 4-6, 113 n. 30; lect. 8, 125 n. 113, 144 n. 210; § 7, 121 n. 88; lect. 21, §9, 131 n. 147 In Psalmos, 33, v. 9, 104 n. 215 Quaestiones quodlibetales (vetus divisio): q. l, a. 9, 116 n. 55; q. 4, a. 9 c., 132 n. 153; q- 5, »• 9 c., 15 n. 11, 17 n. 20, 77 n. 77,136 n. 172,177 n. 149; ad im, 22 n. 41, 166 & n. 75, 2OO n. 35; ad 2m, 141 n. 198; q. 7, a. l, 93 n. 167; c., 177 n. 144; q. 7, a. 2, 65 n. 15; c., 177 n. 149; q- 7.a-10, ad 4m, 148 n. 237; q. 8, a. 4, 177 n. 149; q. 9, a. 9, 116 n. 55; q. 10, a. 5, 145 n. 222; q. 10, a. 7, 48 n. 164; c., 95 n. 176; ad 2m, 91 n. 150; q. 11, a. 4, n6n. 55 Sententia libriDe anima: In I, lect. 2, §§ 19-20, 160 n. 43; lect. 10, § 152, 89 n. 142; §§ 157-62,118 n. 70; § 159,160 n. 43; In II, lect. i, § 216, 125 n. 113; lect. 2, § 239, 31 n. 73, 32 n. 76, 125 n. 113, 160 n. 42; § 241, 160 nn. 42 and 43; lect. 4, §§ 271-75, 33 n. 87; § 272, 117 n. 65; §277, 145 n. 221; lect. 6, § 299, 138 n. 183; §§ 304-6, 138 n. 184; §§ 304-8, 87 n. 128; § 305, 5 n. 4, 139 n. 186; § 308, 87 n. 130, 180 n. 168; lect. 7, §§319-23, 147 n. 235; lect. 10, §350, 118 n. 70, 141 n. 190; §351, 160 n. 40; §356,113 n. 36, u8n. 7i;§357, 160 n. 40; lect. 11, 125 n. 113; §§36572, 118 n. 70; § 366, 145 n. 221, 160 n. 39; §§369-72, 114 n. 37; lect. 12, 125 n. 113; §373-74, 161 n. 50; §377, 160 n- 43; §382, 118 n. 70, 160 n. 39; lect. 13, §393,141 n. 191; §394, Hon. 189; §§ 395-98, 155 n. 16; §§ 396-98, 43 n. 149; lect. 14, §420, 155 n. 16; §425, 131 n. 148; lect. 18, § 477, 14 n. 5; lect. 19, §§483-86, 145 n. 221; lect. 24, § 551, 160 n. 41; §§ 551-54, 44 n. 150,

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146 n. 230, 161 n. 52, 162 n. 55; § 555, 32 n. 77; §§ 556-57, 32 n. 78; In III, lect. 2, § 591, 158 n. 31; §§ 591-96,158 n. 3»; § 592, H7 n. 65, 159 n. 34; §§ 594-96,158 n. 32; §§ 597-98,159 n. 33; § 598, 32 n. 77; lect. 4, §§ 634-35, no n. 20; lect. 7, §§675-76, 142 n. 1991 § 676, 118 n. 70; §§ 679-82,160 n. 43; §§684-88, 160 n. 43; §§687-88, 118 n. 70; §690, 89 n. 144, 225 n. 147; lect. 8, §§ 700-704, 42 n. 140; § 704,88 n. 132; §§ 705-16, 169 n. 92; §§ 70519, 48 n. 165; § 707, 175 n. 125; §§ 707-8, 55 n. 197; § 713, 40 n. 128, 88 n. 134, 169 n. 95; § 714, 55 n. 197; § 717, 48 n. 165, 169 n. 93; lect. 9, §720, n8n. 70, 142 n. 199; §721, 180 n. 168; § 722, 118 n. 70, 142 n. 199; §§ 724-25,180 n. 168; § 724, 88 n. 133, 90 n. 148; § 725, 99 n. 131; § 726,87 n. 129; lect. 10, 182 n. 180; § 728, 94 n. 171; § 729, 94 n. 172; §§ 730-3L 94 n. 173; §§ 732-33, 94 n. 174; §§ 734-39, 94 n. 175; §§ 737-39, 93 n. 169; § 739, 93 n. 168; lect. 11, 78 n. 82, 187 n. 195; § 724, 88 n. 133; § 725, 88 n. 131; § 726, 87 n. 129; § 746, 20 n. 34; §§ 747-49, 64 n. 13; § 749, 64 n. 14; §§ 749-51, 75 n. 68; § 762, 186 n. 192; lect. 12, §§ 765-66, 118 n. 70; § 766, 114 nn. 39,40 and 43,115 n. 48; §772, 27 n. 54; § 777, 27 n. 54, 175 n. 128, 179 n. 153; lect. 13, § 790, 58 n. 210, 96 n. 189, 97 n. 191; § 791, 27 n. 54; lect. 15, § 835, 143 n. 208 Sententia libri Ethicorum: In I, lect. 11 ad fin., 24 n. 51; In VI, lect. 2, 3, and 4, 129 n. 127; lect. 5, 68 n. 33, 79 n. 83, 80 n. 84, 80 n. 86; InX, lect 3, i l l n. 23; lect. 5, 112 n. 24, 114 n. 44, 115 nn. 49 and 50 Sententia libri Metaphysicae: In I, lect. 1,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

80 n. 88; §§ 2-4, 37 n. 119, 48 n. 164; § 19, 43 n. 144; § 23, 43 nn. 146 and H7; § 24, 43 nn. 146 and 147; § 29, 43 nn. 146 and 147; §30, 43 n. 145; lect. 2, 81 n. 89; lect. 3, 81 n. 90; § 54~55, 37 n. 119, 48 n. 164; § 56, 78 n. 81, 80 n. 87; §§66-67, 37 n. 119, 48 n. 164; lect. 4, § 70, 31 n. 72, 34 n. 96, 36 n. 115,81 n. 91; lect. 1O, §157, 40 n. 127, 55 n. 197; lect. 11, § 175, 28 n. 59, 34 n. 96; §§ 175-78, 33 n. 90; lect 13, § 202-3, 33 n. 90; lect. 17, § 272, 28 n. 59, 31 n. 74, 34 n. 96, 52 n. 180; In II, lect. i, §§ 275-76, 52 n. 182; § 275, 81 n. 96; § 276, 81 n. 97; § 277, 69 n. 36, 70 n. 40, 81 n. 98; § 278, 74 n. 54; § 285, 81 n. 99; §§ 287-88, 52 n. 181; §§ 292-98, 82 nn. 102 and 104; § 298, 82 n. 101; lect 3, 82 n. 103; lect. 4, 82 n. 103; § 328, 113 n. 35; lect. 5, 82 n. 105; In III, lect 1-15, 82 n. 106; In IV, lect 1-4, 82 n. 108; lect. 2, § 553, 70 n. 42; lect. 5-10, 82 n. no; lect 5, § 593, 78 n. 81, 82 n. 107; § 595, 82 n. 109,99 n. 199; lect 6, § 605, 57 n. 205, 69 n. 36, 70 n. 39, 78 n. 82; § 606, 83 n. 114; lect. 7,34 n. 95; § 625, 35 n. 104; § 627, 34 n. 95; lect. 11-15, 82 n. in; lect 14, § 698, 76 n. 72; lect. 15, §§ 708-9, 76 n. 72; lect. 16, 82 n. 110; § 733, 20 n. 32; lect. 17, 82 n. no; In V, lect. l22, 82 n. 112; lect. 2, § 764, 31 n. 72, 36 n. 115; §§ 765-70, 143 n. 207; lect. 3, § 779, 31 n. 72; § 786, 31 n. 72, 33 n. 91; lect. 7, § 864, 34 n. 95; lect. 9, 97 n. 193: §§889-96, 61 n. 5; §§895-96, 16 n. 15; lect. 10, § 902, 36 n. 116; § 904, 29 n. 63; lect. 14, §955, 121 n. 88, 122 nn. 90 and 91, 128 n. 122, 135 n. 166; lect 17, § 1020, 64 n. 13; §§ 1023-25, 122 n. 89; lect. 19, § 1048, 35 n. 104; lect. 20, §§ 1065-69, 117 n. 60; § 1066,

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lect. 3, § 1709, 35 n. 106; lect. 5, 120 n. 83; In VI, lect. 1, § 1145, 55 n. § 1760, 55 n. 197; In IX, 81 n. 93; lect. 197; § 1152, 129 n. 131; lect. 4, § 122526, 63 n. 9; § 1229, 65 nn. 16 and 17; 1, §§ 1776-77, 122 nn. 90 and 91; lect. 2, § 1788, 129 n. 131; lect. 5, § 1826, 56 § 1230, 20 n. 32; §§ 1230-31, 16 n. 15; n. 201; §§ 1827-29, 56 n. 202; § 1828, §§ 1231-36, 2O n. 34; § 1232, 78 n. 82; §§ 1232-36, 72 n. 44; § 1236, 21 n. 37, 35 n. ill; §§ 1828-29, 125 n. 113; § 1829, 128 n. 123; lect. 7, §§ 1844-45, 87 n. 127; In VII, 81 n. 92; lect. l, 123 n. 96, 146 n. 229; lect. 8, 130 n. § 1269, 35 n. 107; lect. 2, § 1270, 34 n. 135; § 1864, 120 n. 86; lect. 10, § 188897, 36 n. 117; § 1275, 34 n. 97; § 1284, 93, 28 n. 57; lect. 11, § 1896, 63 n. 9; 115 n. 17; § 1285, 154 n. ll; lect. 3, §§ 1897-1900, 37 n. 121; § 1898, 63 n. §§ 1308-10, 31 n. 69, 34 n. 94; § 1309, 35 n. 104; lect. 4,37 n. 120, 187 n. 19 8; §§ 1899-1900, 75 n. 68; §§ 1901-3, 63 n. 10; § 1904, 46 n. 159; InX, 81 n. §§ 1331-34, 35 n. 105; §§ 1339-41, 3 94; In XI, lect. 7, § 2253,129 n. 131; In n. 105; §§ 1352-55, 35 n. 105; lect XII, 81 n. 95; lect. 2, § 2436, 113 n. 35; 31 n. 70, 175 n. 130; § 1363, 34 n. 9 lect. 4, §§ 2468-72, 143 n. 207; lect. 7, 155 n. 19, 169 n. 94; § 1366, 34 n. 94 §§ 2519-20, 135 n. 166; lect. ll, 46 n. § 1378, 34 n. 94, 35 n. 104; lect. 6-8 37 n. 122; lect. 6, § 1404, 35 n. 100; 158; 196 n. 15; § 2617, 196 n. 15 Summa contra Gentiles: Book l, c. 3, 52 n. §§ 1405-10, 18 n. 25; lect. 7, § 1421, n. 98; § 1422, 34 n. 98, 35 n. 104; lec 184; c. 44, § 5, 197 n. 23; cc. 45~48, 197 n. 24; cc. 46-52, 66 n. 21; cc. 468, §§ 1450-52, 37 n. 122; lect. 9-15, 54 54, 19 text; c. 47, § 5, 201 n. 42, 203 n. n. 194; lect. 9, §§ 1461-63, 156 n. 23; 50; cc. 48-55, 202 n. 47; c. 51, 85 n. § 1473, 29 n. 64, 36 n. 117, 133 n. 15 120; c. 53, 17 n. 19, 19 text, 22 n. 41, 187 n. 198; §§ 1474-81, 156 n. 23; lect. 85 n. 121, 202 n. 43; § 3, 162 n. 58, 165 10, §§ 1483-91, 157 n. 24; § 1484, 32 n. n. 73; c. 55, 65 n. 15; § 2, 65 n. 17; c. 83, 35 n. lio; § 1487, 35 n. 99, 35 n. 110; § 1490, 164 n. 64; § 1491, 35 n. 9 58, § 5, 173 n. 112; c. 72, § 7, 135 n. 166, 212 n. 90; Book 2, c. l, §§ 2-4, § 1493, 35 n. 104; §§ 1494-96, 55 n. 130 n. 144; § 3, 130 n. 139; § 4, 120 197; § 1496, 154 n. 12; lect. ll, §§ 1507-8, 55 n. 197; § 1519, 157 n. 79, 130 n. 138; § 5, 130 n. 138; c. 7, § 2, 127 n. 117; § 3, 127 n. 119; c. 9, § 3, lect. 12, § 1552, 52 n. 183; lect. 13, § 1567, 35 n. 101; § 1577, 35 n. 120 n. 81; § 5, 120 n. 81; c. 10, 126 n. lect. 15, 53 n. 191; § 1606, 36 n. 117; 114; § l, 127 n. 118; c. 23, §5, 130 n. § 1608, 34 n. 98; § 1626, 53 n. 191; lect. 140; c. 30, § 12, 126 n. 116, 147 n. 236; 16, §§ 1642-46, 46 n. 157; lect. 17, § 13, 126 n. 116, 144 n. 209; cc. 46-90, 68 n. 32; c. 46, § 2, 135 n. 166; c. 49, § 1648, 35 n. 103; § 1649, 35 n. 113; §§ 1649-51, 28 n. 60; §§ 1666-68, 28 n. § 8, 160 n. 43; c. 50, § 4, 160 n. 43; § 5, 61; §§ 1667-68, 35 n. 114; § 1668, 35 n. 162 n. 55; c. 55, § 10, 179 n. 154; c. 57, i°3; §§ 1669-71, 46 n. 156; §§ 1672160 n. 43, 161 n. 51; §8, 141 n. 193; c. 80, 32 n. 75; § 1678, 35 n. 103; In VIII, 59, § 14, 174 n. 120, 185 n. 191; c. 60, 81 n. 92; lect. l, § 1685, 35 n. 112; §8, 142 n. 202; c. 73, 43 n. 141; §§ 14§ 1686, 113 n. 35; § 1689, 155 n. 15; 16, 184 n. 186; §§26-28, 184 n. 186;

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2Q7

Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

§ 38, 42 nn. 139 and 140, 173 n. 11 174 n. 121,175 n. 126; c. 74, § 3, 171 107; c. 75, § 3, 178 n. 149; § 7, 178 149; § 13, 88 n. 135; cc. 76-78, 182 180; c. 76, § 15, 119 n. 74, 141 n. 194 § 17, 90 n. 145; c. 77, 91 n. 149. 93 169; c. 80, § 6, 173 n. 113; c. 81, § 6 173 n. 113; c. 82, 160 n. 43, 161 n. 51; §17, U4n. 38; c. 83, § 3i.45n. 15 58 n. 207, 69 n. 37, 96 n. 187; c. §8,179 n. 157; c. 93, §2, 175 n. 125; c 94, 45 n. 155; § 5, 179 n. 157; c. 96, n. 70; §§3-5, 179 n. 157; §3, 173 n H3; §§9-io, i79n. 160; c. 97, 90 147; § 3, 225 n. 149; c. 98, 58 n. 210, n. 20, 85 n. 119, 96 nn. 184, 188, a 190; §9, 179 n. 155; §§ 19-20,192 n. Book 3, c. 22, § 2, 119 n. 75; c. 23, 148 text; §4, 121 n. 88; §7, 121 n. 88; §8, 121 n. 88; § 9, 121 n. 88; c. 25, 48 n. 164; cc. 25-63, 48 n. 164; c. 41, 45 n. 155; §3,173 n. ii2;c.46,88n. 135,92 n. 155; c. 48, 48 n. 164, 52 n. 185; 52 n. 186; c. 50, 27 n. 53, 48 n. 164; 51, 66 n. 23; c. 52, 66 n. 26; c. 54, § 8 179 n. 156; c. 56, 45 n. 152, 48 n. 1 49-50 n. 172; § 5, 173 n. 112, 180 165; c. 63, 48 n. 164; c. 88, § 5, 135 166; c. 108, §4, 173 n. 112; c. ill, 12 n. 129; c. 112, § i, 129 n. 129; Book c. ll, 17 n. 19, 86 nn. 123 and 124, 99 n. 200; §§ 1-7, 206 n. 68, 222 n. 141; §§4-5, 13 n. 4; §6, 15 n. ll, 19 n. 31, 208 n. 77; § 7, 208 n. 79; § 11, 208 n. 78; § 17, 208 n. 78; c. 12, 99 n. 201; c. 14, § 3, 23 n. 47, 50 n. 173, 51 nn. 177 and 179; 107 n. 6, 153 n. 4; c. 19, 209 text; § 4, 210 n. 88, § 7, 210 n. 85, § 8, 110 n. 20, § 9, 210 n. 88; c. 24, § 12, 110 n. 20; c. 59, § 4, 137 n. 176 Summa theologiae, Prima pars: q. 1, a. 2, 215 n. 114; c.,63n. lO;q. 1, a. 30., 1

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

n. 189; q. 1, a. 6 c., 78 n. 80, 101 n 204; ad 2m, 1O1 n. 204; q. 1, a. 7, 21 n. 114; c., 140 n. 189; q. 1, a. 8 c., 10 n. 204; qq. 2-26, 213 n. 1O1; q. 2, a. c., 144 n. 212; q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m, 21 n 39, 62 n. 6, 73 n. 53; q. 5, a. 2 c., 57 n. 205; q. 9, a. 2 c., 144 n. 215; q. 12, a. l c., 48 n. 164, 215 n. 113; q. 12, a. 2, 160 n. 39; q. 12, a. 4, 168 n. 85; c., 169 n. 91; q. 12, a. 5, 160 n. 39; q. 12, aa. 8-10, 2O2 n. 47; q. 12, a. 8, 24 n. 51; ad 4m, 48 n. 164, 66 n. 24; q. 12, a. 10, 24 n. 51; q. 12, a. 11, ad 3m, 95 n. 176; q. 13, a. l c., 163 n. 63, 198 n. 28; q. 13, a. 11 c., 58 n. 208, 208 n. 80; q. 14, a. l, 246 text; q. 14, a. 2, 197 n. 25, 201 n. 41, 208 n. 82; c., 84 n. 115, 117 n. 65, 130 n. 139; q. 14, a. 3 c., 208 n. 81; q. 14, a. 4, 197 n. 25, 201 n. 41, 208 n. 82; c., 137 n. 181, 148 n. 240, 197 n. 17; 14, aa. 5-6, 19 n. 26, 66 n. 21, 202 n. 47, 203 n. 51; q. 14, a. 5, 19 n. 26, 202 n. 47, 203 n. 51; ad 2m, 85 n. 120; ad 3m, 135 n. 165, 203 n. 48; q. 14, a. 19 n. 26, 202 n. 47, 203 n. 51; q. 14, a 7 c., 24 n. 51, 68 n. 30; q. 14, a. 14, 63 n. 10; q. 15, aa. 1-3, 19 n. 26, 66 n. 202 nn. 43 and 47; q. 15, a. l, 66 n. 21 2O2 n. 47; q. 15, a. 2, 66 n. 21, 202 nn. 43 and 47; c., 21 n. 36, 85 n. 121, 136 n. 172, 166 n. 74; q. 15, a. 3, 66 n. 21; c., 20 n. 33; q. 16, a. l, 21 n. 38; c., 16 n. 15; q. 16, a. 2, 2O n. 34, 63 n. 12, 87 n. 127; c., 21 n. 37, 72 n. 44; q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m, 63 n. 11, 198 n. 26; q. 16, a. 6, ad im, 95 n. 176; q. 16, a. 7, 76 n. 69; q. 17, a. 2, ad im, 141 n. 195; q. 17, a. 3, 48 n. 165; ad im, 173 n. 112; q. 18, a. l c., 114 n. 42; q. 18, a. 2 c., 173 n. 112; q. 18, a. 3, ad im, 114 n. 45, 130 n. 140; q. 23, a. 2, ad im, 130 n. 14 q. 25, a. l, oh. 3, 127 n. 121; c., 108 n.

298

Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

13, 127 n. 120; ad im, 127 n. 119; ad 3m, 126 n. 114, 133 n. 157; qq. 587-29, 213 n. 103; q. 27, 2l6 n. 115; intr 213 n. 102; q. 27, a. 1, 17 n. 22; c., 15 n. 11, 22 n. 42, 46 n. 162, 108 n. 8, 13 n. 140, 204 nn. 56 and 6l, 206 n. 69 ad 2m, 206 nn. 66, 67, and 70, 207 75; ad 3m, 19 n. 26, 206 n. 71; q. 27, 2, ob. 2, 206 n. 71; c., 207 n. 72, 208 n. 76; ad 2m, 208 n. 78; ad 3m, 207 n. q. 27, a. 3 c., 130 n. 140, 207 n. 74; a 3m, no n. 20; q. 27, a. 5 c., 130 n. 141 n. 196; ad im, 108 n. 13, 204 n. ad 3m, 212 n. 92; q. 28, 2l6 n. 115; q. 28, a. 4 c., 108 n. 10, 130 n. 140; ad im, 108 n. 14; qq. 30-32, 214 n. 105; q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m, 22 n. 44, 204 n. 55, 2l8 n. 131; qq. 33-38, 214 n. 106; q. 33, a. l, ad im, 108 n. 9; q. 34, a. i, 17 n. 22; c., 14 nn. 7 and 8, 15 n. 11, 24 n. 50, 51 n. 175, 198 n. 27; ad 2m, 99 n. 201,136 n. 174, 138 n. 182, 148 n. 24 197 n. 17; ad 3m, 23 n. 49, 136 n. 174, 199 n. 29, 2OO n. 35, 203 n. 49; ad 4m, 99 n. 201; q. 34, a. 2, 2l6 n. 116; ad im, 208 n. 78; ad 4m, 199 n. 29, 217 n. 129; q. 35, a. 2, 2l6 n. 116; q. 36, a. 2 c., 110 n. 2O; q. 36, a. 4 c., 217 n. 122; ad im, 217 nn. 125 and 129; ad 7m, 217 n. 123; q. 37, a. l, 216 n. 116; ad 4m, 217 n. 129; q. 37, a. 2, ad 2m, 204 n. 58; ad 3m, 204 n. 59; q. 38, a. 2, 216 n. 116; q. 39, 214 n. 107; q. 40, 214 n. 108; q. 40, a. 4 c., 214 n. no; q. 41, 214 n. 109; q. 41, a. l, ad 2m, 108 n. 11, 132 n. 153; q. 41, a. 2, ad 3m, 217 n. 126; q. 41, a. 4 c., 217 n. 127; q. 4 a. 5, 217 nn. 128 and 129; sed con., 216 n. 118; c., 216 n. 119, 217 nn. 120 and 124; q. 41, a. 6, ad im, 217 121 and 129; q. 42, a. l, ad im, 144 216; q. 42, a. 3 c., 214 n. in; ad 2m,

214 n. Ill; q. 44, a. 2, 52 n. 180; q. 4 a. 4, ad im, 140 n. 189; q. 53, aa. 1116 n. 55; q. 53, a. l, ad 2m, 114 n. 42 116 n. 55; ad 3m, 116 n. 55; q. 54, aa 1-3, 197 n. 19; q. 54, a. l c., 120 n. 80 ad im, 94 n. 174; ad 3m, 130 n. 140; 54, a. 2 c., 130 n. 140; q. 54, a. 3 c., n. 124, 145 n. 222; q. 55, a. 3, 24 n. c., 65 nn. 19 and 20; q. 56, a. l c., 130 n. 140, 135 n. 166; q. 56, a. 2, ad 84 n. 116, 161 n. 54, 162 n. 56; q. 57, a l, ad 2m, 173 n. 112; q. 57, a. 2 c., 5 n. 190, 179 n. 159; q. 58, a. l, ad i 114 n. 42; q. 58, aa. 2-4, 24 n. 51, 63 10; q. 58, a. 5 c., 173 n. 112; q. 59, a. c., 144 n. 215; q. 62, a. l c., 48 n. 16 q. 67, a. 3 c., 173 n. 112; q. 75, a. 161 n. 46; c., 161 n. 49; ad 2m, 89 n. 142; ad 3m, 160 n. 43; q. 75, a. 3, 160 n. 43, 161 n. 51; q. 75, a. 6, 161 n. 51; q. 76, a. l c., 90 n. 144; q. 76, a. 2, ad 3m, 176 n. 136; q. 76, a. 4 c., 144 n 214; q. 76, a. 8, ob. 3, 32 n. 76; ad 32 n. 76; q. 77, a. l c., 145 n. 222; ad 4m, 144 n. 219; ad 7m, 52 n. 183; 77, a. 3 c., 120 n. 82, 140 n. 189; a 2m, 140 n. 189; ad 4m, 140 n. 189; 77, a. 5, ad 3m, 160 n. 43; q. 77, a. 145 n. 223; ad 2m, 147 n. 234; ad 145 n. 224, 177 n. 235; q. 78, a. 3 140 n. 189; ad 2m, 140 n. 189; 4, ob. 5, 43 n. 148, 93 n. 165, 18 185; c., 43 n. 148; ad 5m, 43 n. 148, n. 165, 184 n. 185; q. 79, 168 n. 84; 79, a. l c., 145 n. 222; q. 79, a. 2, 58 n. 210; c., 96 n. 184, 117 n. 67, 118 n. 69, 142 n. 203; q. 79, a. 3, 182 n. 180; 79, a. 4, 182 n. 180; ob. 5, 120 n. 84; c 90 n. 145; ad 3m, 182 n. 177, 184 183; ad 4m, 93 n. 169, 182 n. 178; 79, a. 5, ad 2m, 182 n. 179; q. 79, c., 58 n. 211, 96 n. 185, 182 n. 177;

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79, a. 8 c., 66 n. 27, 74 n. 56, 74~75 n. 173 n. 112, 187 n. 196; ad 3m, 168 n. 58, 153 n. 6; q. 79, a. 9 c., 74 n. 57; ad 85; q. 85, a. 6, 48 n. 165; c., 173 n. 11 3m, 49 n. 171; q. 79, a. 10, 196 n. 15; q. 85, a. 8, 48 n. 165, 168 n. 85, 170 ad 3m, 78 n. 80; q. 79, a. 12 c., 74~75 97; c., 168 nn. 88 and 89; q. 86, a. i, 40 n. 58; q. 82, a. 4 c., 135 n. 166, 212 n. 128, 180 n. 166; ob. i, 16 n. 18; c., 90; ad im, 140 n. 189; qq. 84-86, 1 16 n. 18, 170 n. 99, 175 n. 127, 182 n. n. 143; qq. 84-89, 168 n. 84; q. 84, 17 175; ad 2m, 16 n. 18; q. 86, a. 2, 168 n. text, 176 n. 143; q. 84, aa. 1-2, 176 85; q. 86, a. 3, 180 n. 166; c., 182 n 176; q. 86, a. 4 c., 179 n. 159; q. 87, a 143; q- 84, a. 1 c., 176 n. 136; q. 84, a 2 c., 159 n. 37, 162 n. 57, 176 n. 137; q. 1-4, 88 n. 135, 180 n. 168; q. 87, a 84, aa. 3-6, 176 n. 143; q. 84, a. 3 c., 89 n. 143; c., 52 n. 187, 161 n. 48; a 176 n. 138; q. 84, a. 4 c., 171 n. 10 3m, 46 n. 159, 84 n. 118,117 n. 65,15 176 n. 139; q. 84, a. 5, 95 n. 176; c., 85 n. 35, 181 n. 173, 185 n. 19; q. 87, a. n. 122, 176 n. 140; q. 84, a. 6, 160 ad 2m, 168 n. 85; q. 87, a. 3, 168 nn. 43; c., 92 n. 163, 176 n. 141; ad im, 85 and 87, 170 n. 97; c., 130 n. 136, n. 182; q. 84, aa. 7-8, 176 n. 143; q. 8 138 n. 185; q. 88, a. 1 c., 90 n. 146; a. 7, 40 n. 128, 42 n. 137, 48 n. 1 88, a. 2, ad 3m, 90 n. 147, 225 n. 1 168 n. 85,172 text; c., 38 n. 124, 163 n q. 88, a. 3, 168 n. 85; c., 168 nn. 87 61, 168 n. 90, 169 n. 96, 170 n. 98, 173 and 89, 170 n. 97; ad im, 95 n. 176; q. n. ill, 176 n. 142; ad 3m, 42 n. 138, 7 89, a. l c., 170 n. loo, 171 n. 107; ad im, 160 n. 43; ad 3m, 171 n. 107; q. n. 71; q. 84, a. 8, 168 n. 85; Sed con., 75 n. 67; c., 168 n. 86, 176 n. 143; ad 89, a. 4, 170 n. 101; q. 93, aa. 6-8, 221 n. 139; q. 93, a. 6 c., 13 n. 3, 192 n. 3; 2m, 75 nn. 64 and 66; q. 85, a. l, 168 n. 85; ob. 5, 175 n. 127; c., 160 n. 42, q- 93. a. 7 c-> !Q1 text & n. l; ad 4m, 102 n. 207; q. 97, a. 8, ad 3m, 104 n. 169 n. 91, 175 nn. 123 and 132, 176 n 133; ad im, 175 n. 132, 178 n. 152, 1 2l6; q. 105, a. 5 c., 135 n. 166 Summa theologiae, Prima secundae: q. 3, text; ad 2m, 53 n. 188, 55 nn. 197 an a. 2, 132 n. 151; ad 3m, 12O n. 86, 130 199, 133 n. 160, 157 n. 25, 168 n. 8 nn. 139 and 140; q. 3, a. 8, 48 n. 164, 176 n. 134; ad 3m, 171 n. 103, 178 150, 185 n. 190; ad 4m, 184 n. 184; 66 n. 25; c., 48 n. 164, 92 n. 161, 97 n. 196, 173 n. 112; q. 5, a. 6, ad 2m, 131 5m, 42 n. 137, 133 n. 161, 175 n. 1 n. 148; q. 6, a. 4, 147 n. 233; ad 2 182 n. 175; q. 85, a. 2, 21 n. 36, c., 130 n. 140, 133 n. 159, 135 n. 166, 177 147 n. 233; q. 6, a. 5, 147 n. 233; q. 9 a. l c., 135 n. 166, q. 9, a. 3, 143 n. 144 and 146, 178 nn. 149 and 151, 1 205; c., 137 n. 179; q. 9, a. 4, 143 n. n. 173, 185 n. 191; ad 2m, 163 n. 60, 205; ad im, 147 n. 233; ad 2m, 147 n. 166 n. 77, 175 n. 129; ad 3m, 15 n. 11, 233; ad 301, 147 n. 233; q. 9, a. 6, 143 17 n. 19, 134 n. 162, 141 n. 197, 172 n. 205; q. 10, a. l, ad 3m, 173 n. 11 no, 177 nn. 146 and 148; q. 85, a. 3 q. 18, a. 2, ad 3m, 139 n. 187; q. 22, a. 178 n. 149, 181 n. 173, 185 n. 191; l c., 117 n. 67, 118 n. 70; q. 23, a. 4 c., im, 163 n. 60, 166 n. 77, 175 n. 129; q. 137 n. 176; q. 26, a. 2 c., 137 n. 176; q 85, aa. 4-5, 63 n. 10; q. 85, a. 4, 24 27, a. 3 c., 116 n. 54; q. 29, a. 6, 44 n. 51, 65 n. 15; c., 203 n. 52; q. 85, a. 5 c

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300

Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

15°; q- 31. a- 2, ad im, 114 nn. 42, 44, and 45, 115 n. 50; q. 31, a. 5 c., 120 n. 87, 130 n. 142, 173 n. 112; q. 49, a. 3, ad im, 132 n. 151, 146 n. 228; q. 50, a. 4, ad im, 173 n. 113; q. 57, a. 2, ad 2m, 80 n. 85; q. 57, a. 4 c., 130 nn. 142 and 144; q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m, 57 n. 203, 70 n. 40, 80 n. 84, 82 n. 113, 97 n. 192; q. 74, a. l c., 130 nn. 142 and 143; q. 94, a. 2 c., 57 n. 205; q. 109, a. l c., 95 nn. 177 and 178; q. ill, a. 2 c., 120 n. 77, 143 n. 204, 144 n. 216 Summa theologiae, Secunda secundae: q. 1, a. 2 c., 63 n. 10; q. 2, a. 1, 73 n. 53; q. 4, a. l, 48 n. 164; q. 8, a. l c., 23 n. 46, 68 n. 33, 173 n. 112; ad 2m, 67 n. 28, 75 n. 58; q. 45, a. l c., 78 n. 80, q. 45, a. 2, 78 n. 80; c., 101 n. 205; q. 45, a. 5, 78 n. 80; q. 171, a. 3 c., 95 n. 177; q. 172, a. 1, ad 2m, 76 n. 72; q. 173, a. 2 <:., 95 n- 179> i#4 n. 187; q. 173, a. 3 c., 76 n. 72; ad 3m, 76 n. 72; q. 179,a1, ad im, 131 n. 149; ad 3m, 114 n. 38; q. 180, a. 6 c., 114 n. 38; ad 2m, 45 n. 152 Summa theologiae, Tertia pars: q. 9, a. 1 c., 132 n. 151; q. 9, a. 4 c., 132 n. 151; q. 1O, a. 3, ad 2m, 173 n. 112; q. 11, a. 2, ad im, 175 n. 127, 182 n. 175; q. 12, a. 2 (., 42 n. 140; q. 13, a. l c:., 131 n. 147; q. 15, a. 4 c., 118 n. 70; q. 21, a. l, ad 3m, 114 nn. 42 and 45; q. 32, a. 4 c . , 121 n. 88; q. 75, a. 5, ad 2m, 173 n. 112; q. 76, a. 7 < . , 173 n. 112 Super I Sententtarum: d. 2, q. 1, a. 3 sol., 2() n. 32, 56 n. 200, 163 n. 62; d. 3, q. 3, a. l, 13 n-3; d. 3, q. 4, a. 2 sol., 144 n. 218; ad 3111, 144 n. 219; ad 4m, 135 n. 168; d. 3, q. 4, a. 3 sol., 41 n. 131, 173 n. 113; d. 3, q. 4, a. 4 sol., 102 n. 209; d. 3, q. 4, a. 5 sol., 88 n. 135, 91 n. 151, 102 nn. 200 and 208; d. 3, q. 5, a.

l, ad im, 93 n. 167; d. 4, q. l, a. l, ad im, 111 n. 22, 114 nn. 40 and 43; d. 5, q. 1, a. 2 sol., 99 n. 2Ol; d. 6, q. 1, a. 3 sol., 2l6 n. 117; d. 7, q. 1, aa. 1-3, 2l6 n. 117; d. 7, q. l, a. l, ad 3m, 115 n. 52, 125 n. HO; d. 7, q. 2, a. l sol., 216 n. 117; ad 4m, 216 n. 117; d. 8, q. 3, a. l, ad 3m, 137 n. 178, 145 n. 220; ad 4m, 124 n. 104; d. 8, q. 3, a. 2 sol., 142 n. 199; d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3m, 132 n. 152; d. 8, q. 5, a. 3 sol., 32 n. 76; d. 10, q. 1, a. 5 sol., 111 n. 2O; d. 11, q. 1, a. l, ad 4m, 109 n. 2O; d. 12, q. l, a. l, ad 2m, 111 n. 2O; ad 3m, 111 n. 2O; d. 12, q. l, a. 3, ad 3m, 111 n. 20; d. 13, q. l, a. l sol., 107 n. 3; ad 3m, 107 n. 4; d. 13, q. 1, a. 2 sol., 111 n. 2O; d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2m, 107 n. 4; ad 4m, 111 n. 20; d. 14, q. l, a. l, ad 3m, 124 n. 104; d. 15, q- 5, a- 3, ad 4m, 119 n. 72; d. 19, q. 5, a. l sol., 16 n. 15, 21 n. 38; ad 2m, 57 n. 205; ad 7m, 17 n. 24, 20 nn. 34 and 35, 57 n. 204, 78 n. 82, 97 n. 194, 169-70 n. 96, 173 n. 112; d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, 76 n. 69; d. 2O, q. 1, a. l, ad 4m, 124 n. 107; d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2m, 19 n. 27, 25 n. 52; d. 27, q. 2, a. l, 25 n. 52; oh. 4, 177 n. 149; sol., 14 nn. 7 and 9, 109 n. 20, 177 n. 149; ad 3m, 25 n. 52; ad 4m, 25 n. 52; d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, oh. 4, 177 n. 149; sol. i, 25 n. 52; d. 27, q. 2, a. 3, 25 n. 52; d. 32, q. 2, aa. 1-2, 99 n. 201; d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2m, 25 n. 52; dd. 35-36, 66 n. 21; d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3m, 197 n. 20; d. 35, q. l, a. 2, 19 n. 27, 197 n. 21; sol., 25 n. 52, 178 n. 149; ad im, 85 n. 120; d. 35, q. l, a. 5, ad 3m, 124 n. 104; ad 4m, 132 n. 151; d. 36, q. 2, a. 2 sol., 19 text; d. 37, q. 4, a. l, ad im, 114 nn. 38 and 40; d. 37, q. 4, aa. 1-3, 116 n. 55; d. 40, q. 1, a. l, ad im, 120 n. 78, 130 nn. 137 and 140,

The Robert Mollot Collection

3O1

Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

135 n. 169; d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, ob. 3, 125 n. 109; sol., 124 n. 98; ad im, 124 n. 99, 126 n. 113, 135 n. 168; ad 2m, 124 n. 100; ad 3m, 115 n. 52, 125 n. i l l ; ad 4m, 124 n. 101; ad 5m, 124 n. 1O2; d. 42, q. 1, a. 2 sol., 124 nn. 1OO and 105; ad 4m, 124 n. 101; ad 5m, 124 n. 102; d. 43, q. 2, a. l, ad 3m, 124 n. 103 Super IISententiarum: d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4m, 124 n. 106; d. 3, q. l, a. l sol., 115 n. 51; d. 3, q. 1, a. 2 sol., 45 n. 152, 92 n. 160; d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, 65 n. 2O; d. 3, q. 3, a. 3 sol., 53 n. 191; d. 3, q. 3, a. 4, 65 n. 15; ad 4m, 94 n. 174; d. 7, q. l, a. l sol., 75 n. 61; d. 8, q. 1, a. 5 sol., 173 n. 113; d. 9, q. l, a. 8, ad im, 66 n. 27, 75 n. 59; d. ll, q. 2, a. l sol., 114 n. 40, 115 n. 53; d. 11, q. 2, a. 3 sol., 25 n. 52, 177 n. 149; d. 12, 128 n. 126; d. 13, q. 1, a. 3 sol., 173 n. 112; d. 14, q. l, a. 3 sol., 121 n. 88; d. 15, q. 3, a. l, ad 3m, 124 n. 108; d. 15, q. 3, a. 2 sol., 114 n. 40, 124 n. 108; d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, 90 n. 144; sol., 41 nn. 130 and 132, 94 n. 172, 178 n. 149; d. 20, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2m, 41 n. 130, 93 n. 164, 174 n. 121; ad 3m, 173 "• US; d. 23, q- 2, a. 2, ad 3m, 173 n. 113; d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad im, 41 n. 131, 174 n. 118; d. 24, q. 2, a. 3, 70 n. 40; sol., 69 nn. 34 and 36; d. 33, q. 2, a. 2, 48 n. 164 Super III Sententiarum: d. 3, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6m, 121 n. 88; d. 14, q. l, a. l sol. 2, 58 n. 210, 93 n. 167, 96 n. 184; sol. 2, ad 2m, 94 n. 174; sol. 3, 93 n. 167; d. 14, q. 1, a. 2 sol. 4, 65 nn. 15 and 17; sol. 4, ad irn, 65 n. 15; d. 14, q. 1, a. 3 sol. 2, 41 n. 131, 173 n. 113; sol. 3, 42 n. 140,45 n. 152; sol. 5, ad 3m, 42 n. 14 d. 15, q. 2, a. l, qc. 2, lOl n. 205; sol. l, 117 n. 66; sol. 2, 117 n. 66, 142 n.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

200; d. 18, q. l, a. l sol., 131 n. 146, 175 n. 125; d. 22, q. 3, a. 2 sol. l, 121 n. 88; d. 23, q. l, a. 2, 45 n. 151; sol., 48 n. 165, 173 n. 112; ad im, 177 n. 149; ad 3m, 88 n. 135, 89 n. 137, 138 185, 180 n. 168; d. 23, q. l, a. 4 sol. ad 4m, 128 n. 126; d. 23, q. 2, a. l, 4m, 92 n. 155; d. 23, q- 2, a. 2 sol. l, n. 60, 78 n. 82; sol. 3, 73 n. 53; d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad im, 69 n. 35; d. 26, q. l, a. sol., 118 n. 70; d. 27, q. 3, a. 1 sol., 173 n. 113; d. 31, q. 2, a. 1 sol. 2, 114 nn. 40 and 46, 115 n. 47, 116 n. 54; d. 31, q. 2, a. 4, ad 5m, 174 n. 118; d. 33, q. 2, a. 2 sol. 1, 128 n. 126; d. 35, q. 1, l sol., 128 n. 126; d. 35, q. 2, a. l, 10 n. 205; d. 35, q. 2, a. 2 sol. l, 23 n. 46 68 n. 33, 173 n. 112 Super IVSententiarum: d. 12, q. 1, a. 1 sol 2, ad 2m, 173 n. 112; d. 17, q. l, a. sol. 3, ad im, 114 nn. 38, 42, and 44 115 nn. 49 and 50; d. 43, q. l, a. l sol 3, 121 n. 88; d. 44, q. 3, a. l sol. 3, 118 n. 70; d. 49, q. 2, a. l, 48 n. 164; a 15m, 177 n. 144; d. 49, q. 2, a. 3 so 173 n. 112; d. 49, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3m, 4 n. 130, 45 n. 153, 178 n. 149; d. 49 2, a. 7, ad 6m, 173 n. 112; ad gm, 95 176; ad 12m, 43 n. 142; d. 49, q. 3, a. sol. l, ob. 2, 114 n. 46; sol. 3, 114 n 44, 115 nn. 49 and 50; d. 49, q. 3, a. sol., 131 n. 151, 137 n. 177; d. 50, q. a. l sol., 45 n. 153, 170 n. 1OO; d. 50, q I, a. 2 sol., 171 nn. 102 and 104, 174 118; d. 50, q. 1, a. 3, 170 n. 101; sol., 44 n. 150, 180 n. 167, 181 n. 173; im, 44 n. 150; d. 50, q. l, a. 4 sol., n. 192 Super Epistolas Pauli, In I (lor.: c. 1, lect. 3, 99 n. 201 Super loannem: c. 1, lect. l, 15 nn. loand II, 17 n. 20, 22 nn. 41, 43, and 45, 45

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n. 151, 51 nn. 176 and 177, 68 n. 31, 77 n. 77, 200 n. 35 Super librum BoethiiDe trinitate: q. 1, a. 3, ob. 3, 57 n. 205; c., 92 n. 159; ad im, 91 n. 152, 92 n. 157, 95 n. 176; q. 3, a. 1, 73 n. 53; ad 4m, 73 n. 52, 77 n. 79, 92 n. 154, 98 n. 197; qq. 5-6, 54 n. 194; q. 5, a. 2 c., 164 n. 65, 165 nn. 66 and 67, 179 n. 159; ad 2m, 173 n. 112, 175 n. 124; ad 4m, 21 n. 36, 165 n. 67; q. 5, a. 3, 55 n. 197, 78 n. 82, 156 n. 22; c.,

17 n. 24, 54 n. 194, 57 n. 204, 167 nn. 78 and 79,168 nn. 82 and 83; q. 6, a. 2 c., 41 n. 130, 55 n. 198, 76 n. 73,173 n. 113; ad 5m, 42 n. 137,43 n. 141,173 n. 113; q. 6, a. 3 c., 48 n. 166; q. 6, a. 4, 45 n. 155; c., 48 n. 166, 57 n. 205 Super librumDecausis: lect. 1, 135 n. 166; lect. 6, 173 n. 112 Super librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus: c. 2, lect. 4, § 191, 101 n. 205; c. 4, lect. 7, 114 nn. 38 and 42

References to Aristotle Categories: 34, 61, 117, 239; c. 2, la 17, 61 n. 2; c. 8, 8b28- loa 10, H7n. 6i;gb 27-34, 117 n. 62 Deanima: 4, 5, ill, 113-14, 149, 169; Book II, 87; Book III, 114, 158, 169, 173; I, c. 4, 4o8b 14, 89 n. 142; c. 5, 4093 19 - 41 la 7, 159 n. 38; n, c. i, 4i2a 10, 125 n. 113; 4i2a 20, 32 n. 79; 4i2a 22-27, 125 n. 113; 4i2a 27, 32 n. 80; 4i2b 4-5, 4 n. 2, 4i2b 5, 32 n. 81; 4l2b 9, 32 n. 82; 4l2b 9-11, 32 n. 83; 4l2b 17-24, 32 n. 76; 4i2b 18, 32 n. 84; 412b 2O-22, 31 n. 73; c. 2, 4133 12, 32 nn. 85 and 86; 4143 4-27, 33 n. 87; 4143 11, 117 n. 65; 4143 14, 33 n. 88; 4143 25, 145 n. 22i; 4Ha 27, 33 n. 89; c. 3, 414 b 32 - 4i5a 13, 138 n. 183; c. 4, 4153 14-20, 4 n. 3; 4153 14-22, 138 n. 184; 4l5b 8-28, 147 n. 235; c. 5, 4i6b33, ii7n. 64;4i6b35-4i7a2, 160 n. 40; 4173 14, 117 n. 64; 4173 1417, 113 n. 36; 4173 16, 113 n. 35; 4173 18, 160 n. 40; 4173 21 - 4183 6, 125 n. 113; 4l7b 2, 117 n. 64; 4l7b 2-7, 114 n. 37; 4i7b 14, H4 n. 37; 4170 16-19, 161 n. 50; 4i7b 22, 165 n. 68; c. 12, 4243 17-23, 160 n. 41; 4243 18, 113 n. 35; 4243 27, 32 n. 77; 4243 28 - 4240 3,

32 n. 78; in, c. 2, 425b 26 - 426a 26, 158 n. 30; 4263 4-6, 117 n. 65; 426b 7, 32 n. 77; c. 4, 4293 13-15, 142 n. 199; 4293 21-22,161 n. 47; 42gb 10-21,169 n. 92; 429b 22-25, 142 n. 199; 42gb 30 - 4303 2, 161 n. 47; 4303 3, 46 n. 159, 117 n. 65; 4303 3-4, 84 n. 118; 43Oa 35, 193 n. 8; c. 5, 4303 10-13, u? n. 64; 4303 20,117 n. 65; c. 6,43Oa 26, 187 n. 195; 43ob 5, 187 n. 195; c. 7, 431* 1, 117 n. 65; 4313 5-8, ill n. 21, 114 n. 39; 4313 6,113 n. 35; 4313 14, 27 n. 54, 41 n. 129, 174 n. 116; 4313 16, 174 n. 115; 43ib 2, 27 n. 54, 41 n. 129, 174 n. 117, 175 n. 128; 43ib 15-16, 168 n. 81; 43ib 17, 117 n. 65; c. 8, 43ib 22, 117 n. 65; 4323 3-10, 27 n. 54, 38 n. 123, 41 n. I29l432aio, 113^35 De caelo et mundo: m, c. 2, 3Olb 17-18, 123 n. 95 De generatione et corruptione: I, c. 7, 323b 17 - 3243 24, 144 n. 209; 324b 15, 144 n. 209 Departibus animalium: I, c. 1, 6403 20-24, 31 n. 74; 640b 31-36, 31 n. 73; 6413 18-21,31 n. 73 Ethics: II, c. 5, iiosb 20-23, 116 & n. 56; V, ill n. 22; VI, c. 2, ll^Qa 1Q. 12Q n.

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28 n. 60; 10413 9 - iO4ib 9, 195 n. 1 129; c. 3,11390 14-18,129 n. 127; c. 4, 11403 1-5, 129 n. 127; c. 5, 11400 iO4ib 4-8, 28 n. 61; iO4ib 7-8, 195 n. 2-4, 129 n. 127; IX, c. 9, 11703 29-34, 12; iO4ib 11-32, 32 n. 75; iO4ib 2589 & n. 140; X, ill n. 22; c. 3, 11733 27, 195 n. 12; K, c. l, 10463 9-16, 1 nn. 90 and 91; c. 6, iO48b 6-9,125 n. 29-34, in Sen. 23; c. 4, 11743 14-b 9, 112 n. 24 113; iO48b 18-34, 112 n. 25; c. 8, iO49b 5-10, 146 n. 229; iO49b 5-11, Metaphysics: 18, 27, 43, 121, 130, 167; Book I, 43; Book III, 165; Bookv, 1 123 n. 96; iO49b 9, 128 n. 123; 10503 25; Book IX, 114, 129-30; Book XI, 3-9, 129 n. 132; I050a 23-29, 129 n. 165; Book XIII, 165; I, c. 3, 9833 26-31, 133; 10503 30-37, 129 n. 134; c. 9, 10513 22-33, 28 n. 57; X, c. l, 10523 31 n. 72; 9833 30, 143 n. 207; 9843 27, 143 n. 207; c. 6, 987b 14-18, 40 n. 1 36, 187 n. 195; I052b 15, 187 n. 195; c. 7, 9883 18 - 988b 5, 28 n. 59; 9883 XI, c. l, iO5gb 26, 165 n. 68; c. 2, 34 - 988b 5, 33 n. 90; c. 8, g8gb io6ob 20-23, 165 n. 71; c. 3, 10613 28 - io6ib l, 168 n. 81; XII, c. 2, io69b 9903 12, 33 n. 90; c. 10,993* 11-24, 28 12, 116 n. 58; c. 4, iO7Ob 22, 143 n. n. 59; 993a 17, 31 n. 74; HI, c. 6, 10033 207; iO7Ob 28, 143 n. 207; c. 9, 10743 6-17, 165 n. 70; 10033 14-17, 165 n. 70; IV, c. 2, !OO4b 6, 116 n. 57; !OO4b 3-4, 193 n. 8; iO74b 34, 46 n. 158; c. 10, 10753 34, 193 n. 8; xni, c. l, 10763 10, 116 n. 57; V, c. 2, 10133 27, 31 n. 72; 10133 29-32,143 n. 207; ioi3b 23, 17-23, 40 n. 127; c. 3, iO77b 17-23, 168 n. 81; 10783 14-31, 55 n. 197; c. 4, 31 n. 72; ioi3b 33, 31 n. 72, 33 n. 91; i078b 9-34, 33 n. 92; io78b 25-28, 81 c. 8, ioi7b 10-16, 29 n. 62; ioi7b 1416, 195 n. 12; c. 10, 5 & n. 5; c. n. 100; c. 10, 10873 10-25, 165 n. 71; 10193 15-21, 122 nn. 90 and 91; 10193 XTV, c. l, 10883 32, 116 n. 58 On Interpretation: c. l, 163 5-8, 16 n. 17; 17, 123 n. 94; c. 15, iO2ia 15-18, 122 c. 2, 163 19 - 4, i6b 35, 16 n. 16; c. 3, n. 89; c. 21, I022b 15,116 n. 58; iO22b 15-21, 117 n. 60; VI, c. l, iO25b 19-26, i6b 19-25, 61 n. 3 129 n. 131; VII, c. 3, 10293 20, 154 n. Physics: 31, ill, 112, 113, 123, 130, 131, 11; 10293 26-33, 35 n. 108; c. 4, iO2gb 149, 158, 244; II, c. 1, 192b, 21-22, 122 12, 35 n. 109; I029b 13-23, 31 n. 69; c. n. 92; I92b 23, 123 n. 94; c. 2, I93b 23 6, 31 n. 70, 169, 175 n. 130; iO3ib 3-5, - 1943 18, 55 n. 197; 1943 20, 31 n. 155 n. 19, 169 n. 94; cc. 7-9, 37 n. 122; c. 3, I94b 16 - I95b 27, 31 n. 72; I94b cc. 10-11, 156 n. 22, 167 n. 80; cc. 1027-28, 33 n. 91; I94b 29-31, 143 n. 207; c. 7, 1983 14-18, 31 n. 71; HI, c. l, 15. 54 n. 194; c. 10, I034b 20 - iO35b 2013 10-14, 112 n. 27; c. 2, 2Oib 24i, 156 n. 23; I035b 2-10, 157 n. 24; 33, 112 n. 26; 2023 9, 131 n. 145; c. 3, 10350 14, 32 n. 83; I035b 14-32, 157 2O23 13, 128 n. 123; 2O23 22 - b 29, n. 24; I035b 27-30, 164 n. 64; 10363 8, 158 n. 28; 2023 23-24, 117 n. 63; V, c. 154 n. 12; 10363 13-26, 157 n. 26; c. 2, 2263 26, 116 n. 58; VII, c. 2, 2433 1611, iO36b 24-29,157 n. 24; c. 13, 18, 143 n. 208; VIII, c. 4, 2553 30 - b I038b 35, 165 n. 69; c. 15, losgb 27, 31, 125 n. 113 165 n. 68; c. 16, 10413 4, 195 n. 11; c. 17, 10413 9-10, 195 n. 12; 10413 9-32, Posterior Analytics: 26, 27, 28 n. 58, 43,

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Index of Loci in Aquinas and Aristotle

45 & n. 152, 28 n. 58; I, c. 2, ?lb 9-19, 28 n. 58; c. 31, 87b 27 - 88a 4, 165 n. 68; n, c. 2, 8gb 36 - goa 34, 26 n. 53; goa 24-31, 27 n. 55; 8-10, 30 n. 68, 32 n. 86; c. ll, 943 20-36, 31 n. 72; 94b 20-26, 26 n. 53

Topics: 27 n. 53, 30; I, c. 4, loib 19 and 21, 30 n. 67; c. 5, loib 39, 30 n. 67; iO2a 14-17, 30 n. 68; iO2a 18, 30 n. 66; c. 8,103 9-10, 30 n. 66; V, c. 3, 131!) 37 - 1323 9, 30 n. 66; c. 4, 1333 i, 6, and 9, 30 n. 66

The Robert Mollot Collection

Lexicon of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases

Translations and/or explanations were sometimes given in a free style by Lonergan himself, amd we use these (indicated by 'L') when possible. Note that the lexicon sometimes repeats translations given above in text or notes. Latin Words and Prases a quo est principium motus: (that) from which comes the origin of motion [L: 'the Aristotelian definition of efficient cause'] acquisitio essendi: the acquisition of being actio: action, activity actio in passo: action (is) in the recipient actio manens in agente: action remaining in the agent actio secundum primam nominis impositionem importat originem motus: action in the primary use of the word means the origin of motion activum: active actu intelligibile: intelligible in act actualis intellectio: actual understanding actus: act actus essendi: act of being, of existing actus existentis in actu: act of something existing in act actus existentis in actu secundum quod huiusmodi: act of something existing in act insofar as it is in act actus imperfecti: act of an incomplete being [L: 'act of the incomplete'] actus perfecti: act of a complete being actus primus corporis naturalis organici: first act of a natural organic body ad intra: toward the interior

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

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Index of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases

ad mentem Divi Thomae: according to the mind of St Thomas agere: to act, activity agibile: action that may be taken alia huiusmodi: other things of this sort aliquam actionem exercere: to exercise some activity amare: to love amari: to be loved amor: love amor dicitur transformare amantem in amatum, inquantum per amorem movetur amans ad ipsam rem amatarn: love is said to transform the one loving into the loved, insofar as the one loving is moved by love toward that thing which is loved amor procedens: love that proceeds amor procedit a mente: love proceeds from the mind an sit: is it? whether it is anima est quodammodo omnia: in a certain way the soul is all things anima separata: soul separated (from the body) appetere: to desire appeti: to be desired aspectus: look [L (active sense): 'gaze'] attingentia: an attaining attingentia obiecti: attaining an object audire: to hear auditus: hearing [L: 'the faculty'] bonum et malum sunt in rebus, sed verum et falsum sunt in mente: good and evil are in things but truth and falsity are in the mind bruta aguntur et non agunt: brutes are acted on and do not act causa ... quodammodo activa: cause ... in some way active causa essendi: cause of being causa formalis: formal cause causa materiae: cause of matter [i.e., giving matter a certain form; not to be confused with 'materia causae'] causae effectivae: effective causes causatum: something caused certitudo intellectus: certitude of intellect cogitare: to think cogitatio cogitationis: the thinking of thought cogitativa: the cogitative (faculty) [L: 'a sensitive potency ... which operates under the influence of intellect and prepares suitable phantasms'] cognoscens est ipsum cognitum, actu vel potentia: the knower is the known itself, in act or in potency

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Index of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases

cognoscere: to know communicabile (or communicabilis) multis: communicable to many conununis cursus iudicantium: the common run of those judging complexa: complex things complexa incomplexe: (knowing) complex things without complexity (in the knowing) compositio: composition compositio vel divisio: composition or division (of subject and predicate) conceptio: (mental) conception conceptio, conceptus, conceptum: conceiving, concept, what is conceived considerare: to consider consortium divintun: divine society conveniens appetitui: suited to the appetite creatio passiva: passive creation crede ut intelligas: 'believe that you may understand' [L] crux Trinitatis: the crucial question on the Trinity de ratione specie!: belonging to the idea of the species de ratione specie! circuli: belonging to the idea of the species, circle de ratione specie! hominis: belonging to the idea of the species, man definitio: definition determinatio intellectus ad unum: fixing the intellect on one (object) Deus est: God is, exists Deus operatur in omni operante: God is active in everything acting diaphanum: diaphanous dicens: speaking, the one speaking dicere: to speak, to utter (a word) dicere verbum: to utter a word directe apprehendit quidditatem carnis; per reflexionem autem, ipsam carnem: apprehends directly the quiddity of flesh; but apprehends by reflexion the flesh itself discernere: to discern disiecta membra: scattered members donum: gift duo spirantes: two who spirate duplex actio: twofold action duplex actus secundus: twofold second act duplex operatic: twofold operation, action eductio principiati a suo principio: the drawing forth from its principle of what is caused by the principle emanatio intelligibilis: intelligible emanation eminenter: eminently

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

308

Index of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases

ens: being, a being, something that exists ens actu: an actually existing being ens, id quod est vel esse potest: being, that which is or can be ens in actu: being existing in act ens intelligibile: intelligible being ens quod: a being which ens reale: real being ens, ununi, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi: see separate entries for each entia quibus: beings by which eo rnagis unum: thereby more one, more unified eo magis unum, quo perfectius procedit: to the extent that it proceeds more perfectly, it is thereby more one (with that from which it proceeds); see also quanto perfectius procedit esse: to be, to exist, being, existence esse cognitum: known being (or, to be known) esse intellectum: to be understood, the fact of being understood [L: an extrinsic denomination of a thing that is understood] esse intelligibile: intelligible being esse intentionale: intentional being esse naturale: the being a thing has in the order of nature [as distinct Irom its being in the mind of a knower] esse obiectivum: objective being esse rei: being of a thing esse ... significat compositionem propositionis: to be ... signifies the combining (of subject and predicate) in a proposition est: is est autem amatum in arnante secundum quod amatur: the thing loved is in the one loving inasmuch as it is loved Est, Est: Yes, Yes (It is, It is) est simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse: 'is' said without qualification means being in actuality ex operibus eorum cognoscetis eos: from their woiks [scripture: 'fruits'] you will know them ex pede Herculem: (to know) the whole from the part [lit.: Hercules from his foot] excogitate: to think out [L: 'a thinking out'] exitus causati a causa: emergence of the thing caused l i m n the cause experieiitia consortii divini: experience of divine society fxpr«rssum ab alio f-xpi'-s^ed In a n o t h c t facere: to make facit intelligentem simpliciter: it makes a person intelligent without qualification factibile: something that can be made

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Index of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases

factio: a making factivum: a making agent forma: form forma accidentalis ... per quam producitur operatic: accidental form ... through which an operation is produced forma gravitatis: form of gravity forma intelligibilis: intelligible form forma naturalis: natural form formam in materia quidem corporal! individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia: form existing indeed individually in corporeal matter, but not in the way it is in such matter formido contradictorii: fear of the contradictory generans: the one generating habitudo: relationship habitus principiorum: habit of principles [L: 'habit of intellect'] hi homines: these men hie et nunc: here and now hie homo: this man hie homo intelligit: this man understands hoc enim animis omnium communiter inditum fuit, quod simile simili cognoscitur: for this is given innately in everyone's mind that like is known by like homo: man human!tas: humanity id quod amatur est hi amante secundum quod actu amatur: that which is loved is in the one loving insofar as it is actually loved idem est motus in imaginem et rem cuius est imago: movement lowaid th« iiii,.^'c is identical with movement toward the thing that is imaged imaginatio vocis: image of a (spoken) wo id imago: image imago Dei: image of God immobilia: immovable things in actu esse: to be in act in alio vel qua aliud: in another or as other hi facto esse: in (a state) of actual being (as opposed to becoming) in fieri: in (a state) of becoming (as opposed to being) in genere intelligibilium: in the genus of intelligible things in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intelligens et intellectum: in the immaterial order the one understanding and the thing understood are identical [L (Understanding and Being): 'in things that are without matter the one that understands and what is understood are identical'] hi obliquo: obliquely

Collected Works of Bernard I onf;i(|.in

3io

Index of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases

in ratione tnedii cognoscendi: belonging to the idea of a medium of knowing in recto: directly in Verbo: in the (eternal) Word incomplexa: things constituted simply incomplexe: without complexity indivisibilium intelligentia: see intelligentia indivisibilium intellectum: understood intellectual in actu secundo: understood in second act intellectus: intellect, the habit of understanding, the faculty of understanding [noun]; understood [participle] intellectus agens: agent intellect intellectus passivus: passive intellect intellectus possibilis: potential intellect intellectus ut terminus rationis: understanding as term of reasoning intelligens: intelligent, the one understanding intelligentia: 'understanding' [L] intelligentia indivisibilium: understanding of noncomposite things intelligentia intelligentiae: understanding of understanding intelligere: to understand [L: 'the principal meaning of intelligere is understanding'] intelligere est pati quoddam (est quoddam pati, quoddam pati est): to understand is to be changed (to receive an effect) in some way intelligere multa per unum: to understand many things through one intelligere proprie: understanding in the proper sense intelligibile: something intelligible intelligibile in actu: intelligible in act intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu: the intelligible in act is the intellect in act intelligibile in actu primo: intelligible in first act intentio: intention, mental word intentio intellecta: mental word understood intentio universalitatis: intention of universality ipse autem conceptus cordis de ratione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet, a notitia concipientis: but the interior concept has (the implication), as pertaining to its very idea, that it proceeds from another, namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving ipsum esse: being itself [used of God: subsistent being; used of human beings, has a reflexive sense] ipsum intelligere: understanding itself [used of God: subsistent understanding; used of human beings, has a reflexive sense] iudicium autem de unoquoque habetur secundum illud quod est mensura illius: but judgment is made about each thing according to that which is its measure lumen animae nostrae: the light of our soul

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materia causae: matter for a cause [see Summa theologiae i, q. 84, a. 6 c.: sense knowledge is not the total cause of intellectual knowledge but in a certain way is matter for the cause] materia communis: common matter materia designata (or materia signata): designated matter [that is, 'this' matter] materia individualis: individual matter materia intelligibilis: intelligible matter materia prima: prime matter materia sensibilis: sensible matter materia signata: see materia designata medium in quo: medium in which memoria: memory memoria, intelligentia, amor: memory, understanding, love modus enim actionis est secundum modum formae agentis: for the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the form of the agent modus essendi: mode of being mota et non movens: moved and not moving [transitive sense] motor: mover, moving agent motum esse: to be moved motus: movement motus existentis in actu: movement of a thing existing in act movens: moving [transitive sense] moveri: to be moved multa per unum: many things through one natura rei: the nature of a thing nee habent aliam operationem vitae nisi intelligere: nor have they (angels) any other vital activity besides understanding nomen mentis a mensurando est sumptum: the word 'mind' is taken from (the act of) measuring Non, Non: No, No non agunt: see bruta aguntur non soluni discens sed et patiens divina: not only learning divine things but also receiving them notionaliter diligere: to love understood in the notional sense notitia: knowledge obiectum commune intellectus: common object of (every) intellect obiectum proprium intellectus humani: proper object of human intellect omne agens agit sibi simile: everything acting produces something similar to itself omne illud in quo est aliquis ordo unius ex alio vel post aliud: everything in which there is some order of one thing from another or after another

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operari sequitur esse: activity follows being operatic: operation, activity, etc. [L: 'in many contexts it denotes the exercise of efficient causality ... also means simply "being in act" ...'] operatic consequens formam: activity following form operatic enim alicuius effectus attribuitur non mobili sed moventi: for the production of any effect is attributed not to the thing that can be moved but to the thing moving (it) operatic non activa sed receptiva: not an active operation but a receptive one operatic receptiva: receptive operation operatic sensus iam facti in actu per suarn speciem: operation of sense already brought to act by its species operation: the effect produced, the term reached [L: 'effect,or term'] opusculum: small (written) work origo motus: origin of movement pars animae intellectiva intelligit species a phantasmatibus abstractas: the intellective part of the soul understands species abstracted from phantasms pars materiae: part of the matter partes materiae: parts of the matter partes specie!: parts of the species participatio creata lucis increatae: created participation of uncreated light passio: passion, effect caused, movement produced pati: to be changed, moved, to receive, to suffer [L: 'In the Sentences some nine meanings ... distinguished ... the basic meaning is considered to be "alteration for the worse" ...'] pati communiter: pati in most general sense pati proprie: pati in proper sense pati quoddam: a kind of pati per: through, by per accidens: (occurring) by chance per modum amoris: by the mode of love per modum intelligibilem: by the intelligible mode per modum intelligibilis actionis: by the mode of intelligible action per modum voluntatis: by the mode of the will per se ipsum: by itself, of itself per se nota: see principia per se nota per similitudinem speciei: by the likeness of the species perfici: to be completed, perfected philosophia perennis: perennial philosophy pie, sedulo, sobrie: with piety, diligence, moderation [the correct order is 'sedulo, pie, et sobrie'] posse omnia fieri: to be able to become all things

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potens omnia facere: able to make all things potens omnia facere et fieri: able to make or become all things potentia: potency [L (on Avicenna's usage): 'a large number of meanings ... better rendered by "power" ... initially referred to powerful men'] potentia activa: active potency ['Aristotelian sense ... "efficient potency" ... Avicennist sense ... "active potency" ...'] potentia activa est principiium operationis in aliud sicut in effectum production, non sicut in materiam transmutatam: an active potency is a principle of operation on another as on the effect produced, not as on the matter that is changed potentia et actus: potency and act potentia generandi: potency to generate potentia motiva: potency that moves [transitive sense] potentia operativa: potency that operates potentia passiva: passive potency ['Aristotelian sense ... "receptive potency" ... Avicennist sense ... "passive potency" ...'] potentia spirandi: potency to spirate praemotio physica: physical premotion praxis: action (moral conduct) prima lux: first light (God) prima operatic respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius: the first operation regards the quiddity of the thing, the second regards its existence primo et per se cognitum: what is known first and of itself primo et per se intellectum: what is understood first and of itself principia per se nota: principles known of themselves, self-evident principles principium: principle principium actionis: principle of action principium activum: active principle principium activum motus: active principle of change principium actus intelligendi: principle of the act of understanding principium agendi in aliud: principle of acting upon another principium agendi in aliud secundum quod est aliud: principle of acting upon another insofar as it is other principium effectus: principle of an effect [L: 'amounts to a generalization of Aristotelian efficient potency'] principium effectus, operati, termini producti: principle of an effect, of something done, of a term produced principium essendi: principle of being principium et causa: principle and cause principium formale actionis: formal principle of action principium formale quo intellectus intelligit: formal principle by which intellect understands principium motus: principle of motion

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principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens: principle of motion and rest within the thing in which it occurs first and per se and not by accident [L: 'nature'] principium motus in eo in quo est motus: principle of motion in that in which the mo ton occurs [L: 'nature'] principium motus in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens: principle of motion in that in which the motion occurs first and per se and not by accident principium motus vel mutationis in alio inquantum est aliud: principle of motion or change in another insofar as it is other [L: 'the Aristotelian definition of efficent potency'] principium motus vel mutationis in alio vel qua aliud: principle of motion or change in another or as another [L: Aristotle's 'efficient cause'] principium operandi et praeter hoc ut principium operati: principle of operation and besides this as a principle of the thing produced by the operation principium operati: principle of a thing produced by an operation principium operationis: principle of operation principium operationis vel actionis: principle of operation or action principium transmutationis in aliud inquantum aliud: principle of change in another insofar as it is other principium variationis ab illo in aliud inquantum illud est aliud: principle of variation from one thing to another insofar as that is other [L: 'clearly the Aristotelian efficient potency'] principium verbi: principle of a word principium, verbum, amor: principle, word, love processio intelligibilis: intelligible procession processio operati: procession of something produced by an operation [L: 'the emergence of one thing from another'] processio operationis: 'the emergence of a perfection from (and in) what is perfected' [L] processiones intelligibiles: intelligible processions processu intelligibili: by intelligible procession producere verbum: to produce a word productivum: productive proprius actus fit in propria potentia: the act proper to a potency occurs in its proper potency propter quid: the reason why, the cause

qua: as quae: which quae est materia determinatis dimensionibus substans: which is the matter that is the subject of determinate dimensions [L: 'individual matter']

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quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens: any nature whatever is essentially being quale: such, of a certain kind (see also quid, quantum) quanto perfectins procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit: the more perfectly it proceeds, the more it is one with that from which it proceeds (see also eo magis unum) quantum: a certain quantity (see also quid, quale) quasi quamdam reflexionem: like a sort of reflexion quasi quidam motus: like a sort of motion quia: because [thus literally, but in a certain context it means 'that,' where knowing 'that' is distinguished from knowing 'why'] quia, ut puto, latuit eum: because, as I think, it escaped his notice quid: what quid est esse (rei): what the being (of a thing) is [see Aquinas on the Metaphysics, §864] quid nominis: what the name means [definition of the name] quid rei: what the thing is [definition of the thing] quid sit: what is it? what it is quid sit Deus: what God is quidditas: quiddity, essence quidditas formata: formed quiddity, essence conceived quidditas rei: quiddity of a thing quidditas rei materialis: quiddity of a material thing quidditas sive natura in materia corporal! existens: quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter quidditas sive natura rei materialis: quiddity or nature of a material thing quidditas sive natura rei materialis in materia corporali existens: quiddity or nature of a material thing existing in corporeal matter quidquid esse potest, intelligi potest: whatever can be can be understood quidquid movetur ab alio movetur: whatever is moved is moved by another quidquid recipitur: whatever is received quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur: whatever is received is received in the way proper to the receiver quo aliquid est: (that) by which something is quoad nos: in regard to us [in relation to our perception, etc.] quoad se: in regard to (what things are in) themselves quod quid erat esse: formal cause [approximately; L: 'essence or essential definition, but with a very special reference to the ground of essential definition, namely, the formal cause'] quod quid erat esse est substantia, et ratio significativa eius est definitio: the formal cause is substance, and the concept that signifies it is a definition quod quid est: what something is [L: 'is or corresponds to the essence or essential definition']

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quod quid est esse (rei): what the being (of a thing) is [see Aquinas on the Metaphysics, § 627] quoddam ... concreatum: something co-created quodammodo: in a way quomodo intelligenda sunt quae de Spiritu Sancto dicuntur? how are the things said about the Holy Spirit to be understood? ratio: cause, concept, definition, essence, form, formal property, formality, idea, intelligibility, meaning, nature, object of thought, reason, the what of a thing [any of above, according to the context] ratio albi: idea of white ratio definitiva rei: defining idea of a thing ratio ends et non entis: concept of being and not being ratio particularis: (faculty of) particular reason ratio quam significat nomen: concept which the name signifies ratio quidditativa rei: essential idea of a thing ratio rei: idea of a (certain) thing ratio superior: (faculty of) higher reason ratio terminatur ad intellectum: reason terminates in understanding [L: 'with the reasoning process successfully completed, understanding is achieved ... reasoning terminates in understanding inasmuch as inquiry eventually yields knowledge of essence ... reason is understanding in process ... reasoning ends up as an act of understanding'] ratiocinativum: reasoning faculty [L: 'the scientificum and the ratiocinativum; by the former we know the necessary; by the latter we know the contingent'] rationes: concepts [L: 'application of universal rationes to particular things'] recipere: to receive reductio ad principia: reduction to principles rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus sine quibus in reruni natura non existit: the thing as separated from the material conditions without which it docs not exist in reality res: thing res intellecta: thing understood res particularis: particular thing res particularis existens: an existing particular thing resolutio: resolution, reduction (to its elements) resolutio in imaginationem: reduction to the imagination resolutio in principia: reduction to principles resolutio in sensum: reduction to sense sapientia: wisdom sapientia genita: wisdom begotten

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sapientis enim est de nominibus non curare: for it is the mark of a wise person not to be fussy about words scientia: science scientificum: the faculty by which we know the necessary [see also ratiocinativum] secundum actionem intelligibilem: according to intelligible action secundum Aristotelis sententiam quam magis experimur: according to the view of Aristotle which agrees better with our experience secundum emanationem intelligibilem: according to intelligible emanation secundum modum cognitionis nobis expertum: according to the mode of cognition we experience secundum viarn doctrinae: according to the order used in teaching securitas affectus: security of affection sensibile in actu est sensus in actu: the thing sensed in act is the sense in act sensibile in actu est sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu: the thing sensed in act is the sense in act, and the intelligible in act is the intellect in act sensibilia communia: things that can be sensed in common [by a number of senses] sensibilia per se et propria: sensible things that are sensible per se and by the sense proper to them sensibilia propria: things that can be sensed by a sense proper to them sentire: to sense sicut actus imperfecti: as of an imperfect act sicut oritur actus ex actu: as act originates from act sicut potentia passiva sequitur ens in potentia, ita potentia activa sequitur ens in actu: as passive potency follows being in potency, so active potency follows being in act sicut rusticus cognoscit: the way a rustic person knows significabile: 'what can be meant' [L] significans: meaning (as participle) significativum: having a meaning [L: 'what can mean'] signiflcatum: 'what is meant' [L] simile omnino est in irnaginatione: it is exactly similar in the imagination simile simili cognoscitur: like is known by like simpliciter: simply, without qualification sine quo non: (a condition) without which there is no (act, procession) sophia: wisdom [L: 'understanding what is'] species: species species impressa: impressed species species in qua: species in which species intellecta: species understood species intelligibilis: intelligible species species intelligibilis quae: intelligible species which

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species qua: species by which

species qua intelligitur: species by which (a thing) is understood species quae: species which species quidem igitur intellectivum in phantasmatibus intelligit: the intellective faculty therefore understands species in phantasms species sensibilis: sensible species species sensibilis expressa: expressed sensible species substantial substance substantia, idest forma: substance, that is, form substantia rei quae est quod quid erat esse est principium et causa: the substance of a thing which is its formal cause is a principle and a cause superactiva: superactive supposition!: supposit [Scholastic term for the subject of all predications] syllogismus faciens scire: scientific or explanatory syllogism [giving knowledge] tendentia: a tending (toward) totum ens: total being (L: 'While God is totum ens without qualification, man is totum ens only quodammodo) wide principium motus: whence comes the principle of motion ['the primary source of the change': Phys. II, 3, I94b, 29 in the McKeon edition of Aristotle] unio: union unio, attingentia, tendentia: see those words universali in particular!: the universal in the particular unum: one unus spirator: one spirator ut puto: as I think velle: to will verbum: word

verbum cordis: interior word [literally, word of the heart] verbum intelligibiliter procedens: intelligibly proceeding word verbum interius: internal word verbum mentis: mental word verum: true (thing) vetera: old things vetera novis augere et perficere: to add to and perfect the old by means of the new via compositions: way (order) of composition, of synthesis via doctrinae: order of teaching via inventionis: order of discovery via inventionis vel inquisitionis: order of discovery or inquiry via iudicii: method of judging [L: 'has to do with the reflective activity of mind assaying its knowledge']

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via resolutionis: order of resolving [as resolving a proposition to first principles; in a second meaning, it is the same as via iudicii] videtur quod potentia generandi vel spirandi significet relationem et non essentiam: it seems that the potency to generate or spirate signifies a relation and not the essence virtus iudicativa: capacity to judge [L: has its main cause in 'agent intellect as spirit of critical reflection' ] virtus quaedam omnium scientiarum: a certain capacity containing all the sciences [L: said of wisdom as 'highest, architectonic science, a science of sciences'] virtus spirativa: capacity to spirate Greek Words and Phrases adiaireton: indivisible alloiosis: alteration anamnesis: a calling to mind arke kinetike: 'a principle of movement' [Metaphysics IX, 8, 10490 9, in McKeon edition of Aristotle] dunamis: power dunamis poietike kai pathetike: power that is (both) efficient and receptive eide: species (plural), forms eidos: species (singular), form energeia: act, operation energeia tou tetelesmenou: act of a completed thing energein: to operate episteme: grasping the implications of an idea horismos: definition horos: definition idiapathe: proper marks, characteristics [L: 'attributes or properties'] idion: property, peculiarity kineisthai: to be moved [L: 'being moved'] kinesis:'movement' [L] kinetikon: moving (causing motion) logos: word, thought, reason logos ti an eie kai eidos: 'ratio or formulable essence' [On the Soulii, 2, 4143 14, in McKeon edition of Aristotle]

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

32O Index of Latin and Greek Words and Phrases tnorphe: form, shape, figure noesis noeseos: understanding of understanding nous: mind, understanding ousia: formal cause, essence paschein: to undergo change [L: 'undergoing change'] pathe: changes undergone by a subject [L: 'such qualities as such ... the process of change of such qualities, especially ... such change when it is for the worse'] pathesis: 'passive process' of being changed [L] pathos: 'received term' in process of change [L] phronesis: 'understanding what is to be done' [L] poiema: 'the effected term' [L] poiesis: 'production' [L] tekhne: 'grasping how to do (something)' [L] to ti en einai: formal cause [approximately; L: 'the essence, what a thing was to be'; see quod quid erat esse] to ti estin: what something is

The Robert Mollot Collection