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Whatever the outcome of the current constitutional reforms, the Soviet Union remains a military superpower with global security interests. The doctrines, practices, and capabilities of its still formidable armed forces are shaping world politics just at the time that the future of the country that created them is in doubt. This is the first book to examine the Soviet defense outlook and military forces in the light of these developments. In Soviet strategy and new military thinking, a group of leading strategists and
Sovietologists, writing from within the US national security community, analyzes the unprecedented changes, as well as the troubling continuities, that characterize Soviet military thinking during the 1990s. The authors confront the range of Soviet military strengths, including intercontinental nuclear power, conventional ground forces, and naval capabilities and special operations. They address questions of weapons research and development, military planning and policy-making, and the role of civilian critics on Soviet military objectives. Other chapters explore the Soviet Army's diminished influence on Eastern Europe as well as the lessons of Afghanistan. Based on primary Soviet sources and extensive personal experiences, Soviet strategy and new military thinking is an authoritative and comprehen-
sive evaluation of Soviet military power amid kaleidoscopic political and strategic change. It will guide a wide range of readers through largely unmapped oceans. Soviet strategy will be studied by specialists in international and Soviet affairs (including journalists and both political and military leaders), as well as by businessmen and other concerned citizens whose own well-being may be shaped by the Soviet future.
Soviet strategy and new military thinking
For Nancy Hemingway, Katharine, and their mom, JW: Peace hath her victories no less renowned than war
Soviet strategy and new military thinking Edited by Derek Leebaert and Timothy Dickinson
The right of the University of Cambridge to print and sell all manner of books was granted by Henry VIII in 1534. The University has printed and published continuously since 1584.
Cambridge University Press New York Port Chester Melbourne Sydney
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www. Cambridge. org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521404297 © Cambridge University Press 1992 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1992 A catalogue recordfor this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Soviet strategy and new military thinking / edited by Derek Leebaert and Timothy Dickinson. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 0 521 40429 0 (hard). - ISBN 0 521 40769 9 (paper) I. Soviet Union - Military policy. 2. Strategy. I. Leebaert, Derek. II. Dickinson, Timothy, 1943UA770.S669 1991 355'.033547-dc20 90-19959 CIP ISBN 978-0-521-40429-7 hardback ISBN 978-0-521-40769-4 paperback Transferred to digital printing 2008
Contents
Notes on contributors Foreword Acknowledgements 1
The stakes of power DEREK LEEBAERT
Part I
Soviet nuclear strategy and new military thinking COLIN S. GRAY 3 The tightening frame: mutual security and the future of strategic arms limitation RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Soviet theater forces on a descending path EDWARD B. ATKESON 5 Protection from one's friends: the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact CHRISTOPHER JONES 6 Red Star of the sea: the Soviet Navy and strategic policy GAEL DONELAN TARLETON
7
29
57
Below the threshold
4
Part III
1
The instruments of power
2
Part II
page ix xii xv
81
100 127
Managing the mission
Counter-insurgency and the lessons of Afghanistan DAVID ISBY 8 New weapons and the attempts at technical change MIKHAIL TSYPKIN
157 187
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Contents
9
A generation too late: civilian analysis and Soviet military thinking BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH 10 The other side of the hill: Soviet military foresight and forecasting JACOB W. KIPP Index
217
248
276
Notes on contributors
The Editors DEREK LEEBAERT is a professor of management in Georgetown University's Graduate School of Business Administration. He also works on strategic planning, and on technology issues and applications, for the US Department of Defense and for industry. While a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs in the 1970s, Professor Leebaert was a founding editor of both International Security and the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. He was also a founding editor of The International Economy in 1987. He has a DPhil in economics from Oxford University and previously was a Ford Fellow at MIT. graduated from Magdalen College, Oxford, where he studied with A. J. P. Taylor. He has been an editor of Harper's magazine and of the Paris Review, He has taught military strategy at the MidCareer Officer's Program in the US Department of Defense, and he serves as a management consultant in the financial and information technology services sectors.
TIMOTHY DICKINSON
The Authors COLIN GRAY is president of the National Institute for Public Policy. He served on the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament from 1982 until 1987, and has also served on advisory panels for Congress' Office of Technology Assessment, the Department of the Army, and the Department of the Air Force. He teaches National Security Studies at Georgetown University. Dr. Gray has been Assistant Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) and Director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute. He has a DPhil from Oxford, and his books include The Geopolitics of Super Power, Strategy for War and Peace, and Nuclear Strategy and National Style. ix
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Notes on contributors
RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, having retired from the US Foreign Service in which he last served as ambassador to Bulgaria. In the 1970s, he was the Executive Secretary and Senior Advisor on the SALT I delegation, and served as Deputy Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. He has a PhD in political science from Yale and is the author of several landmark books, including Detente and Confrontation, Soviet Military Policy, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, Soviet Military Doctrine, and Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. EDWARD B. ATKESON is a professor at the Defense Intelligence College in Washington, DC. From 1982-84, he served as the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces at the CIA, being the principal advisor and assistant to the Director on matters concerning foreign general purpose forces. Previous responsibilities include being Commanding General of the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Europe, Director of the Office of Policy and Planning for the Intelligence Community Staff in Washington, and Deputy Director of the US Army War College. General Atkeson's books are Thinking Red in War Games and The Final Argument of Kings: Reflections on the Art of War. He has been a Fellow at the Center for International Affairs and is a graduate of the Advanced Management Program, both at Harvard University. He has a BS from the US Military Academy and an MBA from Syracuse University. CHRISTOPHER JONES is a professor at the Jackson School of International
Studies of the University of Washington. From 1977-81, Dr. Jones was a Fellow at Harvard University's Russian Research Center. He is author of Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact and co-author with Professor Teresa Rakowska Harmstone of The Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, vols. 1-4. is a policy analyst at Science Applications International Corporation. Until 1991, she served as Chief of the Strategic Analysis Office at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. She has analyzed Soviet strategic issues within the intelligence community for over a decade.
GAEL TARLETON
DAVID ISBY is a Washington, DC attorney and a national security analyst for
unattributable US government agencies. His books include Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army and War in a Distant Country: Afghanistan's Invasion and Resistance. He has traveled extensively with the Afghan resistance.
Notes on contributors
xi
MIKHAIL TSYPKIN is Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs, and Coordinator of Soviet and East European Studies, at the Naval Post Graduate School. He consults for the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the US Naval War College, and for System Planning Corporation in Washington, DC. He has a PhD in Political Science, and an MA in Soviet Studies, from Harvard University. is Senior Social Scientist at The Rand Corporation, where he has served for more than fifteen years, recently as Director, International Security and Defense Policy Program. He has an extensive background in military aeronautics as a pilot and theorist. Dr. Lambeth's latest book is Understanding Soviet Defense Policy. He has a PhD in political science from Harvard and an MA from Georgetown University.
BENJAMIN LAMBETH
JACOB w. KIPP is Senior Analyst at the Soviet Army Studies Office, US Army Combined Arms Center, at Fort Leavenworth, and a professor of history at the University of Kansas. He also serves as the assistant editor of The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, and has held a Fulbright Fellowship in Poland. Dr. Kipp edited the book Soviet Aviation and Airpower. His PhD and MA in history are from Pennsylvania State University. Foreword is a recent Chairman of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is a Deputy Chairman of the Midland Bank, Chairman of Samuel Montagu & Co. Limited, and a director of a number of other companies. He was Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office from 1975-82.
THE RIGHT HON. SIR MICHAEL PALLISER GCMG
Foreword
Into an Unmapped Ocean For over half a century the world has accepted at face value the description of that vast land mass stretching from Eastern Europe to the Far East as "a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." This has been in spite of the exceptional variety of ethnic, cultural and climatic diversity within that presumed monolith. A unitary view of the Soviet Union has its roots in the long development of Tsarist Russian colonial-style empire followed, after 1917, by its brutal integration and consolidation under Lenin and Stalin and the almost equally brutal extension of that empire into Europe after World War II. Despite the appalling damage the Soviet Union suffered during the war, it emerged as a looming menace and awesome power - one which soon included nuclear power. Its vast resources were coupled with clearly stated malevolence towards the West. We knew Khrushchev was wrong when he proclaimed in 1961 that the Soviet Union would "bury" the West economically. But his arrogant claim had a certain plausibility to the so-called non-aligned world, which itself included countries slowly emerging from the West's own colonial rule. It carried conviction too within the Soviet Union, where claims of that sort were most needed to reassure peoples still forced to accept hopelessly a minimal standard of living. Thirty years ago now seems like ancient history. The emptiness of Khrushchev's boast increasingly became evident to the Soviet citizens themselves and to the world outside. But Moscow continued to govern in a style that discouraged any honest political or economic introspection. Meanwhile, the West saw commitments of Soviet resources to military programs as well as continuing Soviet efforts to destabilize those parts of the world where Western interests were at stake. Recent change in the Soviet Union has been so fundamental in scale and scope - political, military and economic - as to be difficult to comprehend. Perhaps it is even more difficult for Soviet citizens to comprehend - let alone to manage - the change. Political freedom and economic realism are a heady mix for a huge and turbulent country that has never known either. xii
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We go further into the 1990s with a singular and disquieting uncertainty about the likely future of the world's second superpower, if indeed it is still possible so to describe it. Nor is it reassuring to observe that no one inside the Soviet Union is much clearer about it than we are. Many in the West have applauded Gorbachev's declared objectives in his own country and would like to help - without knowing precisely what that might imply. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether Gorbachev or any other Soviet leader is carrying the majority of the people with him. What are the implications for "the West" - a term that I believe still has meaning, even if developments in Eastern Europe tend to blur boundaries and widen definitions? We must address two issues - the first primarily politico-military, the second primarily politico-economic. The issues are equally important and are, in essence, two sides of a coin. They involve our mutual security and, as in this book, they need to be addressed simultaneously. We face a politico-military dilemma. It arises out of the justifiable and correct sense among our peoples that, if the cold war is over and the Warsaw Pact dissolved, we should finally be able to beat our swords into plowshares; or most of them. The dilemma is how to respond to that popular expression of good sense, while at the same time insuring militarily against the unpredictable. Clearly, the Soviet future is dangerously unpredictable. And the invasion of Kuwait reminds us of the range of terrifying unpredictabilities elsewhere. So there is a continuing need for a sustained, if modified, Western security policy and defense effort. Above all, there is the need for a continuing alliance - political, military and economic - between North America and Western Europe, and between them and Japan, which, after all is not only Asia's dominant economic force but also the militarily potent eastern neighbor of the Soviet Union and China. Whatever happens, the Soviet Union (or whatever might emerge) will remain huge in resources and in military, nuclear power. We simply cannot tell whether such power will remain quiescent, or for how long. That is why this volume's comprehensive analysis of Soviet force and doctrine in the 1990s is so important. The politico-economic unpredictabilities underlying Soviet strategy are just as evident as the military ones. Comecon has unwound along with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, the countries of Eastern Europe look to the West for political models and economic support. Moscow itself faces a far more dire economic crisis and more staggering difficulties in trying to meet it, not least because of the social upheavals throughout its vast territories in the aftermath of glasnost. The Western economic model in general, and the striking advances achieved by the European Community in particular, have had a magnetic
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effect on the East. It is essential for the West to sustain its economic success. The European Community, in economic partnership with the United States and Japan, is as crucial to the peaceful development of relations with the Soviet Union as a continuing transatlantic alliance is to sustaining the West's essential defense requirements. What, then, is really "essential", both militarily and economically? It is certainly essential to pursue with vigor the various arms control negotiations made possible by changes in Soviet policies. But this must not mean the end of any effective Western defense: the North Atlantic Treaty will remain at the core of collective security. There is also a self-evident need for adapting the Treaty as well as for the European members to play a more effective part in organizing their own security. The twenty-threemember Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe may be an excellent forum for closer cooperation among all parties; and it should include Japan. But CSCE cannot be the instrument for upholding the West's appropriate defense capabilities. Judging from Soviet capabilities, if not intentions, the authors show that there is much to defend against. Siren voices call on the European Community to stop "deepening" its process of politico-economic integration so as to enable the early "broadening" of the Community by including some Eastern Europe's fledgling democracies. This concept is misguided. It both represents a false antithesis and is cruelly misleading to the Eastern countries. "Broadening" of that kind is barely conceivable in the nineties, though "broadening" to include Western countries such as Austria or Norway certainly is. The Community needs throughout this decade to strengthen its own political, economic, monetary and institutional integration, while developing a pattern of economic links with its Eastern neighbors, and an ever more liberal economic relationship with the rest of the world. This is a cornerstone of the Western strategic response to the immense Soviet changes we are witnessing. These are brave words and challenging objectives. It will be difficult and perhaps dangerous to meet them. We face justifiable demands for deep defense spending cuts together with the prospect of slower growth as well as gross uncertainty about the supply and cost of oil. As we approach the end of one of history's bloodiest centuries, the greatest challenge to Western leaders isfinallyto reach the millennium in peace and with wider world prosperity. But it would be premature and reckless not to examine our own defense strategy, let alone that of the Soviet Union - or of whatever succeeds it. We can only hope, if with limited confidence, that our leaders will be equal to the challenge. Sir Michael Palliser
Acknowledgements
Numerous friends encouraged me to keep pursuing this work despite kaleidoscopic change in Soviet life. All of the authors in this collective effort were themselves amid constant editorial revisions and updating. But we believe that we have a book which offers enduring insights about Soviet military thinking in the 1990s. Several US government officials were particularly encouraging, as well as generous in sharing their own perspectives: Bruce Weinrod and Dale Vesser from the US Department of Defense, John Hauge from the US Treasury, Ambassador Jim Woolsey and David Webster from the State Department, David Rivkin from the Department of Energy, and Colonel of Marines Murph McCloy. Academic colleagues who have patiently discussed Soviet affairs with me include Jim Billington, Michael Mandelbaum, Leon Aron, Greg Treverton, Steve Canby and Edward Luttwak, Yves Boyer, and my first professor in Soviet politics, Columbia University's Marshall Shulman as well as my former Harvard colleague Richard Pipes. I'm also grateful to Georgetown University deans John Onto and Ali Fekrat. Several leaders in international finance and technology also served as valuable critics: IBM's Denos Gazis, president of the Advisory Board David G. Bradley, Covington & Burling's Jim Snipes, CBEMA's Anne McCormick, Jeff Bellin, David Bruce, Phil Odeen, as well as both Ed Stephenson and Maurice Zilber. Timothy Dickinson - friend, advisor, and brilliant editor - emphasizes the indispensably creative roles of Alana Boyd, Colin Clark, Naum Jasny, Jack and Barbara Chatfield, Robert H. Mitchell, and of Grenville Leyshon and Elizabeth Dickinson. Robert Ellsworth, the current chairman of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Ambassador to NATO, has long been a guide for many of us in politics and strategy. Derek Leebaert Summer, 1991 xv
1
The stakes of power Derek Leebaert
A classic mark of a state's greatness is that one fears it when it is strong and weak alike. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet economy have undercut familiar military reckonings of the cold war. But new menaces emerge. The world remains Herman Kahn's "dangerous neighborhood" despite summit declarations of a "qualitatively new relationship" between the superpowers. The US and the Soviet Union are metamorphosing at biological speed rather than at the geological rates of most such political correlations. The US is moving back into the rich, benevolent island far out to sea that it traditionally longed to be. The Soviet Union is becoming an undoubted nuclear stockpile around which people anxiously seek to discern a more or less legitimate government. It is still a formidable military power with global security interests, the more pressing because they are less easy to defend. How does Moscow imagine its strategic capacities amid the clamor about "new phases" in international cooperation? Now that the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff describes the Soviet Union as a "business competitor" rather than an enemy, what do the leading US experts on the Soviet military predict? Where are changes in direct relationships and in their fundamental resources - wealth, knowledge, authority, will - taking East/West relations? Such sweeping issues are best organized at the hands of a group of long-time scholars of Soviet strength and vulnerability, each focusing on a central area of military expertise. "There is no such thing as an expert on Russia," observed US Ambassador Charles "Chip" Bohlen, "only various degrees of ignorance." Nothing confirmed his quip more vividly than the West's icy shock of recognition at the "drizzle of empire," to borrow from Churchill, that has masked the Communist landscape since 1988. Cholerton, the Daily Telegraph's Moscow correspondent said of the 1930s purge trials, "In this country you can believe everything except the facts." The degree of articulate anger in the Soviet Union had been seen in the democracies as Turgenevian alienation, not as the spiritual quest of "Birth of Our Power." Strength in 1
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bitterness is perhaps rightly ominous to decent accommodating constitutional states. Because it is so difficult to foresee even the direction let alone the outcome of these assertions of sovereignty within an empire, it is more than ever important to examine Moscow's philosophy of force. Different experiences and approaches are called for to examine the range of strategic nuclear power, conventional capabilities, and military organization. To this end, we interrogate the operational details within the new strategic environment as we draw tentative conclusions about Soviet strategy and military thinking in the 1990s. The maxim that defense policy must be based on an opponent's capabilities rather than on its intentions is easily forgotten amid excitement about "the end of the cold war." But how is the high level of defense policy in that security-obsessed realm actually changing from argument to doctrine in this kaleidoscope? The better to highlight the new, our authors have developed the most comprehensive recent exposition of earlier Soviet operational deployments and technologies. One great contribution of Marxism is its extension of our sense of the material context of human choice and imagination. Moscow did not just roll over in bed and awake from "the nightmare of history" to try to become a geographically isolated bourgeois democracy. The last great empire of the nineteenth century has thoroughly practical - indeed pressing - reasons to enter the international division of labor. The Soviet autarchy is beset by a cumulating host of economic, political, and military pressures. Only by overcoming them can it hope to see the twenty-first century. Otherwise, this state at least may wither away ahead of schedule. We are dealing not with the bankruptcy of strategy, but with the strategy of bankruptcy. Like any other great intellectual undertaking, strategy dissolves upon inspection into a matrix of component disciplines and passions, resources, circumstances, and desires. Strategy is the shorthand for a state's organized pursuit of its interests once its leaders have concluded that they face inescapable resistance or political threat in the larger world. It also involves the peacetime combination and orchestration of nations. The strategy of one power acts upon the foreign policies of many others as all try to balance commitments and capabilities while holding a surplus of strength in reserve. We emphasize strategy, rather than doctrine only, because questions of military capability are inseparable from geography and politics - at no time more than in the years approaching. Since 1945, strategy in East and West alike has sought nuclear stability and sometimes ascendancy. Deterrence brought some degree of stability as the great powers learned that they dared only to use their might tactically, however far away the theater of conflict.
The stakes of power
3
The elucidations of doctrines of deterrence which have shaped East/West conflict have always been conducted at high levels of abstraction. Commanders on both sides had very similar roles in holding back from escalation to the thermonuclear level. Strategic choices before 1945 were qualified by the "terrible ifs" of war. Thereafter, they were subject to the assumed certainty of virtual ruin. The system must be guarded against its own final logic. The powers and temptations of great nations are rarely symmetrical. Russia has cherished its power for three reasons: first, military power has supported expansion in whatever guise - conquest, Leninist revolution, or a post-Stalin contest for assets and influences; second, military power has been imperative for maintaining order within that land of subjection, so long called "the prison house of nations"; and third, military power is needed for defending the so often invaded and devastated rodina. What main influences are altering Moscow's philosophy of force in the early 1990s? Again, there are three: first, the evaporation of presence abroad, authority at home, and legitimacy everywhere; second, the break-up of the Warsaw Pact which strips the Soviet Union of its massive conventional ascendancy over Western Europe - this reinforced by the relative demographic decline of Great Russia in the union; and, third, the capabilities steadily gained by the Soviet fleet which is the one great success story in the Soviet military establishment in this generation. The strategic kaleidoscope "Cold war" was shorthand for predictably safe main frontiers and seas during conflict both indirect and afar. Such predictability is essential to deterrence. Lines of demarcation must be established in practice and theorized about in public. The fear of what would result from a major trespass led in the late 1940s to the Great Simplification: the two superpower blocs were cemented with certain stabilizing benefits. The cold war could then be defined as an epoch in which peace in the normal sense of the term was impossible while war in the normal sense of the term was improbable. A term coined for the specific victors' quarrel which followed the war, deterrence also cemented the nuclear powers' central interests while opening opportunities for maneuver on the periphery. The Great Simplification was born of at least half a lifetime of international disorder - from 1914 until 1945. Europe was clearly divided, the Soviet Union unable to extend power across the oceans. The Great Simplification was also solidified as Japan began to develop, as the rapid collapse of the Chinese Nationalists mercifully kept the US from trying to "save" Nanking, and as South Korea became a buffer. The main tear in this
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simple tapestry of stability soon became the Sino-Soviet split. But China was in no position to initiate hostilities against the Soviet Union. Soviet consolidation of Eastern Europe under the Warsaw Pact as well as Communist control of China bracketed the ideological and strategic no-man's-land of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa - while Latin America eventually yielded its anomalous position as a non-belligerent in the cold war. Soviet power sank as ruined Japan and anarchic China gained. Under every regime, Russia gets the neighbor attitudes that it deserves. The nature of cold war, however, emphasized the limited utility of military confrontation at whatever level of violence. Therefore, the US and the West in general needed to ensure their prosperity. Sound economies both guaranteed resources for distant involvements and could also exert some attraction for developing states. Again, the US needed to exploit the contradictions between communism as an international creed on the one hand and Soviet national aggrandizement on the other. Meanwhile, the founding axiom of Soviet grand strategy - that of a regime created by the attempted suicide of the West in 1914 - anticipated a final crisis for the capitalist world. Mounting internal conflicts with their consequent social catastrophes would inflame and divide the West. When they came, the Soviet Union would be well positioned to exploit them: it was a centralized state resting upon heavy industry, possessed of increasing nuclear and conventional forces, and paradoxically confident in its "scientific world outlook." The Soviets have also had a Russian patience and a Hegelian sense of the spiral nature of dialectical advance. If history in its deepest direction pursues the one certain critical path, what does it matter if it passes through the barracks of right-wing dictatorships as long as it is suitably employed by the enthusiasts of Marxism-Leninism? Ideological detachment was one of the benefits of a Marxist education as both power blocs collected incongruous allies. Moscow has been better able to assume a high degree of diplomatic return upon its politico-military dispositions. The US knew that it confronted a regime that had minimal accountability. Washington was more susceptible to real time pressures, as in arms control negotiations and in Vietnam. The most significant Soviet gains, for example, coincided with the West's tortured introspections of the 1970s.1 Detente was later explained by its architects as an attempt to shore up the fading consensus for containment and to avoid ever repeating the Vietnam war's devastating unanticipated sacrifices, what in the fifties would have been called a "fringe war." "We'll see who can pound longest," said Wellington. The Soviets through the Brezhnev era believed that it would be they who could pound longest: the collapse of socialism showed by the
The stakes of power
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1990s that it was the West. "Dictatorships are like great trees," said Stanley Baldwin: "all very fine and mighty, and then they blow down - and there's nothing growing underneath." The ordinary great game of nations should not, however, be generalized into so imprecise a term as "cold war." These were years of stark ideological-military-reconstructive conflict which followed the greatest war in history. Several dates can be given for the separation of the cold war's head-to-head antagonism into a more precedented, though uniquely planetary, ballet of rivalries: 1956 when the US remained faithful to Europe's implicit division by abandoning promises to Hungary, or 1965 after which no demarcation lines were altered, with the dubious exception of Vietnam - a national conflict which might have afforded a potential frontier of ideological advance, but which the US held until Southeast Asia stabilized. Afghanistan, in turn, was not a part of the US defense perimeter. The erosion and above all the diffusion of forces which upheld the Great Simplification has led in the early 1990s to what can be called the Great Complication in world affairs. There are new and acute sources of international disorder. The two great Eurasian power systems are each coming under increasing stress: China facing the possibility of descending into warlordism should its army groups again divide between different power centers as in 1989; the Soviet Union, faced by a rabble of internal dangers as diverse as Russian chauvinism and Moslem discontent. The historic Eurasian cauldron of perpetual and perilous rivalries now touches two more foci of intense unpredictable change. Japan, territorially confined, its nationalism strongly reviving, has functionally surpassed the Soviet Union in all spheres but the military. To the West, the Soviet Union sees the likelihood of a German-centered Common Europe with its own foreign policy, and, most disconcerting, its own Ostpolitik. The once confident Soviet state which for a generation pioneered equally the artificial satellite and the Eurodollar meanwhile sinks all the faster into technological and institutional obsolescence. The growing instabilities pushing us into the Great Complication increase as the international roles of both the United States and the Soviet Union diminish. Vietnam and Afghanistan showed each superpower the limits of force against "invertebrate" states. The absence of both powers from the 1980s Iran/Iraq war underscored the hopes in both Washington and Moscow for fewer third-world imbroglios. There are more serious threats to peace in the third world today than forty years ago because there are more resources to reach out with gas, plutonium, or bacteria as some village quarrel is forced upon the whole fabric of nations. The world is moving into an age for which there is no vocabulary. The
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political euphemisms of the 1990s - the counterparts of such terms as extended deterrence, counter-value, fire-break, half-war, police action, and the like - have yet to be coined. The world remains bipolar only in thermonuclear terms. It is ever less so where it comes to conventional - or biochemical - weapons. A new distribution of power arises because industrial states recognize the limits of force in dealing with invertebrate ones, or those with few hostages to the future. There are now many militarily autonomous areas in the world. For example, the US would not forcefully inject itself between Brazil and Argentina. The further down one goes on the scale of violence, the greater the level of complexity. Enemies will also be harder to discern with more porous borders and with new more portable weapons of mass destruction. War games between immense Red and Blue teams over exhaustively mapped European terrain are anachronistic. Instead, the likelihood remains of an international dimension to convulsion in southern Africa; it is highly unlikely that this generation has seen the last Middle East war; and the demographics of Latin America grow increasingly desperate, at least while its current institutional fabrics are in place. Crises spring up out of the ground, swifter in their coming than in their departure - a sharp contrast of experience with the hopes for peace and demobilization worldwide. During the Great Simplification, the US and Soviet Union at least represented world alternatives in imagination as well as in power. The stark differences between these two models of development and governance are now also eroding. The world is arriving at a time when allegiances change at the pace of technology - that is, faster than ever before - and where strategic surprises may be imminent. It is not just the distribution of power which is changing, but its nature. Alliance commitments, for example, will age faster as the strength and vulnerabilities of the participants rise and fall ever more rapidly. So much that once was reckoned as essentially strategic - resource differentials, geographic distance, structure of rival (and allied) societies - is seen as transient and migrates into the tactical. The Soviet Union faces vital threats as the Great Complication unfolds, in contrast to the relatively simple challenges that Moscow confronted during the cold war. The country is in no position to adjust only at the present rate, let alone to catch its breath. Its imperatives to change whipsaw it between dynamic accommodation and a reaffirmation of fading unity and certainty. Yet the Soviet regime can no longer defend itself at home by appealing to dangers abroad, yet alone uphold the ideology Solzhenitsyn called "the scaffolding of lies." Nor can the Soviet authorities count on having their conventional strength leveraged by Warsaw Pact forces to a point of preponderance that shakes political concessions and economic subsidy from the West. Most of all, the Soviet Union must weigh its
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military spending - "the cost of empire" - against its hopes of becoming a power of the third industrial revolution. The US can meet its own domestic problems and pursue a minimalist international role with relative ease. It faces no major threats in its hemisphere, although like the whole humane, socially complex West, it is highly vulnerable to septic small war crises whether from direct terror or from the exigencies of sea lanes and access. By contrast, the Soviet Union is so configured that, excepting only Afghanistan, there are no possibilities of merely small wars on its borders. Conflict with Japan, China, any European country, or Iran would all represent a general security crisis to the West. As NATO and the Warsaw Pact each erode in their different ways, and for different causes, both the US and the Soviet Union will have to rework their strategic positions to compensate for losses in relative military power, geographic facility, and political primacy. So far as can be seen, the "new" Soviet military thinking has been tactical. It is primarily an acceptance, at least for the moment, of such new realities as independence in Eastern Europe: not so much a doctrinal reversal as an acceptance of the "re-correlation of forces" emerging in the mid-1980s - about when Soviet strategic writings ironically began to draw a close connection between theory and concrete international behavior.2 In the 1990s, the West needs not just to adapt to a more chastened Soviet doctrine, but to a different Soviet position in this "correlation of forces" originally, a Soviet concept referring to the dynamic and developing aspects of the international system. The dangers offered by the period from America's bitter revulsion after the fall of Saigon to the acceptance of INF by NATO were induced by the reawakening of a predatory consciousness in power at the center of the international system. One power occupied Eastern Europe, leaned against Western Europe, fomented violence on four continents, and spent treasuries to keep its impoverished people from talking and then more treasuries to find out what they were thinking. But the 1990s and beyond will be more vulnerable to a centerless lack of order - an "international anarchy." The Soviet Union must face a substantially more dangerous and complex world at the same time that the US, Europe, and Japan have to face a more markedly unstable Soviet Union. Soviet military doctrine The military jockeyings of the US and the Soviet Union make no sense without one another, but have never run parallel. Soviet force levels and increases of military spending have gone up for many reasons, but have not gone down when American spending has. Soviet expenditures have been
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wobbingly one directional: America's have been saw-edged. However, the Soviet force posture has been flexible: when the US invested in bombers, for example, Moscow made PVO-Strany a separate service. The US pattern has been the reverse. US spending varies not merely by Washington's interpretation of Soviet actions, but by its interpretation of Soviet attitude. Each service and each arm of each service receives pretty much the same proportion of spending whatever the absolute magnitude of defense appropriation. America's spending policies sieve through an institutional mesh which includes endless Congressional subcommittees, as well as the Joint Chiefs, veteran organizations, and Rand. No two great military organizations think, remember, or feel alike. History, culture, and geography must all be different. It should be even less surprising that two very different political systems developed great defense establishments of very different patterns. In the early days, a president of the US could manage the cold war with a firm and single hand. But such autonomy was only acceptable to Americans when the going was simultaneously critical and easy. The Soviet Union, in turn, has consciously maintained much more unity between military and political doctrine - a unity which has brought the Soviets rewards abroad and which never could have been obtained through military strength alone. The original US theorists of nuclear war undertook to work out the basic grim common sense of the atomic age. The crystalline principles of deterrence theory could never be coarsened down into empiric geography and politics. Nor could a workable deterrent operate in a world of real catastrophe on any formulations not radically simple in their context. This leads many Western observers to assume that Soviet planners have had to share most of the West's key military beliefs. But instead, the Soviet efforts to penetrate the necessities of war - and to emancipate the optimum principles of force, for itself, here and now - have been woven into an entire science possessing natural laws and an elaborate body of extensive theory seeking to govern all aspects of armed conflict and national mobilization. Objectives are formulated in the light of state and revolution, not just of autonomous military analysis. Even in the 1920s, such studies were designated "war work," voynii trud, to show that they were a proper part of socialist thought. This has but the palest of counterparts in the West. Ideology is no longer the heart of the Soviet system, if it ever was. And glasnost and perestroika - as understood in the West - are incompatible with what has been known of socialism. But Soviet doctrine retains far more consciously a great operationally formulated body of the directives and views of the ruling party on all aspects of preparation and state activity in wartime.
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There is not just a constitutional assumption of civil supremacy but a day-to-day invigilation appropriate to an originally intellectual police state's observation of its most powerful institutional arm. No junior civilian defense intellectuals have until very recently injected themselves into high decisions, no patronizing diplomats proffered alternative expertise. And as the armed forces undertake ever more responsibilities for the state, relations between the military and the civilian leadership interpenetrate to the point of unprecedented opacity. State Department appointees can declare that "Gorbachev has the military firmly under control. They are by no means resurgent." 3 But the Soviet military probably has never sought to overshadow civilian preeminence. The harshly anti-Caesarian tone of Russian life - militarized but not ruled by generals - has been too often emphasized in blood. Red Army marshals routinely hold the leadership of the civil department charged with military matters, a position prohibited by statute to even retired general and flag officers in the US. But the Soviet military may find themselves somewhat like the Chinese armed forces during the worst stages of the Cultural Revolution, the receivers in insolvency of their society. The Soviets still regard military doctrine as "the sum total of scientifically based views accepted by the country and its armed forces on the nature of contemporary wars that might be unleashed against the USSR, and the goals and missions of the armed forces in such a war, on the methods of waging it, and also on the demands which flow from such views, for the preparation of the country and the armed forces." Since 1987, however, they have assigned the preeminent place to the prevention of war. 4 Strategy, in turn, is intended to implement doctrine and is the instrument for war plans and the preparation of the country for war. Should war come, doctrine holds that high commands are managers of violence and resources policy. All complex doctrines have their deep ambiguities. Here, distinctions are made between military art (the theory and practice of preparing and conducting military operations) and military science (the system of knowledge about the character and laws of war) which comprises inter alia the strategic, operational, and tactical theory of military art. These distinctions may appear scholastic, but they constantly surface in the most practically oriented Soviet discussions of military decision-making. Western critics offer many explanations for the singularities of Soviet doctrine: bureaucratic inefficiency, the military's chauvinism, ignorance about the implications of new weapons, the nation's confidence in its ability to endure punishment, and the amazing stagnancy of Soviet intellectual life where it is a question of genuinely responding to the "world elsewhere." Officially, Soviet views on war and deterrence derive from constant
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theoretical refinement in the senior service academies, in the military's main political administrations, and in the operations directorate of the general staff. Views are also shaped by progress and refinements in weapon development as well as by analysis of the conduct of potential enemies. The military-technical side of Soviet doctrine then addresses the methods of waging war, of military organization, and of combat readiness. The Defense Ministry eventually integrates doctrine with deployment and procurement, although now its traditional centrality is waning, and thence to the high Party-formulated doctrines of policy, embracing assertions of comparative economic power and technological development as well as the states of unity (or disunity) in the East and West. Delving into Soviet writings on the significance of these often arcane definitions has long been a substantial part of the stock-in-trade of Western intelligence agencies, defense departments, and scholars. The academic swordplay of marshaling footnotes is particularly fierce. The different levels of authority which are ascribed to these Soviet lucubrations, and the quarrels which result, have been tellingly analogized to the debates among sixteenth-century Western observers of the Muscovite state. 5 Soviet doctrine is certainly specific about geography. For example, a strategic axis (SN) is part of a theater of military action itself encompassing a broad zone of terrain with its adjacent sea and airspace. Along such a strategic axis, operations are to be conducted by military entities large enough to be assigned strategic missions. Such a theater of war (TV), in turn, usually includes several theaters of action (TVD) and embraces up to a continent. The Soviets divide their frontiers into five principal theaters: the Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern - which extends from the Arctic to the Black Sea; the Southern, from the Black Sea to the intersection of the Soviet, Chinese, and Afghan borders; and the Eastern for the rest of the country and Mongolia, including Pacific territorial waters. To each theater, a high command: subordinate headquarters may be established to coordinate the actions within a theater and along a strategic axis, of which there may be more than one within the theater. Forces within these theaters are centrally controlled and coordinated to integrate all elements assigned to a given mission.6 A Table of Organization and Equipment emerges - believable only in a country which for over a generation has not fought a technologically comparable enemy. Any actual combat command structure is likely to be recast fast and agonizingly in the furnace of war. The Soviet high commands in both the revolution and World War II were entirely improvised
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- Trotsky racing around in trains, as well as the startled new faces which had to replace those officers slaughtered by Stalin in the 1930s, and indeed after the war had begun. The reverse arrangement entails long, formal service in well-known slots. We can gauge neither the practical implications of this difference nor tell at what point in conflict new leaders and lines of authority would be forced through the smooth face of theory - going by the French experience in 1914 and 1940, it could be within days. Nor do we know the consequences of long peace for the Soviet high command. Behind a cool analytical description of military organization and modernization there is likely to be tension and fury. Time has been unkind to so many early Soviet military anticipations: the capitalists are unlikely to turn on each other over resources; the masses of an invaded country will not rally to their liberators, and so on. Even though the Soviet Union is a state built on theory, little is known about current theoretical debates within the general staff or between the military and political leaderships. The so-called revolution in warfare of the 1980s boils down to an implosion in the time available for decision and response. The Soviet Union has always had months to prepare, even when taken by surprise as in 1941. Where will power ultimately rest to make and act upon tremendously fast decisions forced by future conflict? And how might such conflicts be conducted? The instruments of power The Soviet Union's strategic problems remain those of the Muscovite state writ large - frontiers, development, nationalities. Problems are not likely to be resolved, whether with Germany, the Ukraine, the Baltic republics, or the eastern borders. These problems, all hope, will just grimly be lived through. The Soviet Union has traditionally been forced to contain and suppress its problems. The US, on the contrary, has the offshore power's instinct to avoid pushing events to their final conclusion. The Russian/ Soviet experience is that the state eventually pays a high price for merely alleviating troubles. There comes a point when, if the opportunity arises for an apparently definitive conclusion, events will be pushed to the utmost. These cultural distinctions are apparent in the different ways the two countries think about nuclear war. For the US, doctrines of nuclear deterrence have always been an intellectual construct with origins in psychological or game theory, and formulated by civilians. The Soviets, in their turn, emphasize military science and have been prepared to wage war at all levels: they have had to endure war to the enemy's worst capacities as in 1941-45. Different systems of strategic belief lead to different
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perspectives on the consequences of central nuclear war, on stability, on the connection between intercontinental and regional strategic security systems, and on the limitation of strategic conflict.7 Geography does not permit a land-bound power such as the Soviet Union more than minimal distinctions between strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. The Soviets understandably insist that strategic interests start at their frontiers no matter whether they are struck by an ICBM, an intermediate range missile from Europe, or a nuclear bomb from a US carrier, or perhaps fallout from some convulsion across the frontier. All Soviet force elements are therefore treated as parts of a unified strategic purpose. There are no tortured disputes as in the West over the "coupling" of strategic and theater forces. All great Russian triumphs to date have begun with the shattering of the enemy on Russian soil. Apart from the defeat of decaying states such as Turkey and Persia, the enemy was drawn into the bear-hug. World War II is canonized as the Great Patriotic War because in it the Russian people worked their own deliverance, as Stalin quite unideologically put it in the moment of victory. There was no longer any reason for the Soviets to filter their doctrine through analogy with the German War once they attained ICBM capability and all but the most suicidal enemy could be deterred at the frontiers. But equally the question arose of the enemy's ICBMs. Determining whether Moscow imparts any special doctrinal categories either to the waging or the consequences of nuclear war - and whether it thinks there is some rational working out of state interests in the event of such catastrophe - has been the subject of fierce debate in the US. For the Soviets, deterrence may be neither the only nor the last objective of strategy - a possible difference which has also inflamed convoluted discussions about the Soviet philosophy of war. "Of course we talk about 'warwinning,' " Colonel General Milstein told me in 1976 as detente continued to unravel, "What do you expect us to talk about, 'war-losing'?". The Soviets implicitly cling to the axiom of Adam Smith, "There is a lot of ruin in a country." As the levels of internal criticism roared upward a dozen years later, several Soviet commentators acknowledged that Moscow had all along entertained a notion of "victory in nuclear war." 8 Of all the Soviet defense capacities, Moscow's relative strategic nuclear standing has been least affected by the upheavals of these years. Lines of communication have been ruined for Soviet tank armies in Europe, and a failing economy forces the leadership to reassess the consequences of committing 25 percent of GNP to military budgets - mostly spent on inefficient conventional forces. Such pressures will compel Moscow to rely more rather than less on nuclear weapons just as nuclear dangers accelerate toward the periphery as new states and sub-national entities achieve such capabilities.
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Colin Gray and Raymond Garthoff show two contrasting interpretations and methods in seeking to explain Soviet thinking on nuclear war. The intellectual underpinnings of Soviet nuclear policy are interesting. But it may be more important to triangulate from the historical patterns of Russian dispositions. It is more difficult to lay out the occasions when military writings have flowered into policy. Even in vastly better documented America, we still cannot establish what the US leadership might actually do when facing nuclear war any more than we could have gauged the administration's stance on October 28, 1962 from that of October 21. Nuclear strategies are surely also a mystery to their own practitioners. "You give battle," said Bonaparte, "and then you work it out." US endeavors to standardize doctrine into procedure by way of escalation ladders and limited nuclear options recall Bismarck's observation that every treaty has written at the bottom in invisible ink "Providing things remain the way they are." No one can imagine a central nuclear war except as a convulsion of nature like a collision with an asteroid. There is a difference between strategic doctrine as an ornamental waterspout and the battle force as it strikes home. Should we assume that there is some esoteric Soviet nuclear strategy awaiting its epiphany? Or is it as likely to be as convoluted, historically conditioned, and contradictory as is nuclear doctrine in the West? Nuclear planners on both sides continue to fumble through a labyrinth of technological fluidity and moral inconceivability. It is unlikely that there is a "smoking bomb" behind the nuclear doctrine of either state. Except for very brief and very quickly abandoned junctures in the past thirty-five years, US nuclear doctrine has not sought "victory" as traditionally understood. Soviet nuclear doctrine has, however, been envisioned as a quest for victory to the extent that threats specifically nuclear have their operational place in Soviet general strategy. The Soviets have always used their nuclear potency as an instrument of political ascendancy. A strategic victory, if achieved, would be a Clausewitzian "continuation of policy." The Russians usually push hard once determined upon a foreign adventure, but will more or less yield and wait when they encounter resistance. Two steps forward, one back. Unlike Americans, they do not regard failure as an existential disaster. No ancient power on a great plain has that luxury. At the same time, the Soviet elites have always made it clear that their people are relatively expendable - much like the nineteenth-century Earl of Erne who warned the Irish nationalists that if they thought to intimidate him by shooting his bailiffs they were much mistaken. Being the survivor in that northern vastness does not come from defensive skills alone. The formulation of nuclear strategy in the American managerial idiom
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has no place in Soviet vocabulary. Russian great war thinking was chewed into shape by the teeth of the beast in the 1940s. For the Soviets, the elegant politico-military dance for strategic advantage occurs not as the nuclear bases go on special alert but rather on the leisurely, pre-industrial perspective of political conflict, indirection, and ruthless waiting, not at the nuclear planning level but on the pre-conflict political level. For the Americans, the search for doctrinal precision is far more evident in the event that deterrence fails. These comparisons also raise the question of protracted war, or at least of prolonged crisis. Moscow's likely opponents, except for China, are constitutional powers with a relatively low tolerance for strain and dislocation. Is it now any more unthinkable than in the recent past to consider which polity might best endure a six-month nuclear alert? Modern strategy has been recast by nuclear weapons. "The life of the law has not been logic," Justice Holmes taught us, "it has been experience." The possibility that a state can be destroyed in days, or in hours, has changed strategy if only because the control of two societies over several years of war is certain to be very different from controlling them over a few days of immediate destruction. Gray and Garthoff come to contrary conclusions about the key question of US-Soviet nuclear relations: do the opponents envision stalemate as a way of life or envision discontinuity and checkmate when deterrence breaks down and two states still possessing about 50,000 nuclear warheads meet head to head? Below the threshold The Soviet Union has conceded tactical power in Europe. The theater redraws itself as we watch. Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe mean that military pressure on the West would now have to start at the nuclear threshold. Escalating tensions along an intra-European frontier, with intimidating flights over Denmark and harassments over Berlin, crumbled into the archives once the Soviet Union eschewed the line "from Stettin to Trieste" that Marx had already anticipated for Tsarist Russia in 1853. The arithmetic of conventional forces has become less pressing than has the fate of an evolving cordon sanitaire. No serving US officer has ever seen combat in Europe, nor have more than a handful of Soviet officers - with the exception of having fought brave amateurs in 1956 and fired on a few crowds in 1968. Yet the Soviets rationalized maintaining forces in Eastern Europe decades after Germany's defeat by emphasizing a fictitious NATO doctrine of invasion. In fact, Moscow has long understood the advantage of facing a coalition in which NATO's fear of the great menace did not anaesthetize secondary divisions
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of interest. As Clemenceau's respect for Bonaparte diminished once he learned that all of the emperor's victories had been against coalitions, so too must the post-war Red Army marshals have had a certain confidence in "the single, brief, big strike" against NATO's national layer-cake of troops thinly arrayed along the intra-German border. 9 In the early 1980s, Moscow was confident it could just sit back and watch NATO percolate. Paul Nitze, who would soon lead the US intermediate nuclear force negotiations, and David Proektor, the head of European studies at Moscow's Institute for World Economy, each believed that the alliance would "tear itself apart" if the US insisted on deploying its intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe: and both were proved wrong. 10 But Moscow was confident that its "peace offensive," replete with hooks as well as doves, could prevent US weapon deployment while further eroding NATO's public support. This strategy of playing upon foreign opinions was what Le Monde in the late 1940s correctly identified as a new style of conflict, one which could leave the rest of Europe just as vulnerable as it had been against the German blitzkrieg of 1940. The value to Moscow of nuclear weapons targeted on Europe was not to ensure strategic stability amid regional conventional victories. Instead, much as Berlin deployed the idea of the Luftwaffe in 1938, well-publicized Soviet nuclear dispositions were planned to obviate conventional conflict while achieving strategic successes. What the Soviets began calling their new doctrine in the late 1980s has been primarily tactical. Highly maneuverable and offensively-trained Soviet armored divisions depart from the "satellites." The West, in turn, needs to adapt not to a more passive Soviet conventional doctrine but to a different Soviet position of power. Trying to distinguish between "offensive" and "defensive" Soviet operational planning for Europe is difficult: so much of what appears defensive was formulated before the Warsaw Pact fell apart; and what has been called highly offensive can derive from the fact that no country wants to fight on its own soil. The profound change, however, is that the retreat from Eastern Europe dispels by acts not words and for the first time in a generation, Western fears that "the air fleets and tank armies of the Soviet Union [can] throw themselves upon us with a velocity and fury far eclipsing any Blitzkrieg of World War II." 1 1 Gross organizational inefficiencies characterize Soviet society as a whole. To impose any additional demands on the corroding infrastructure would strip more gears than anyone has been able to determine. Specifically, Soviet mobilization planning would likely jam before troops could even arrive at the depot. The Soviets can no longer hope of "winning with the last million men," as Kitchener believed the British Empire's sheer numbers and brute force would do in World War I, and as Russia actually
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did by throwing numbers of the order of a national migration into the grinders during World War II. The Red Army's problems of mobilization and of geography are now compounded by those of demography: conscripts from the Asian republics compose more than half the army drawn from rising populations long disdained by Great Russia. Even a Mongolfeatured participant in the Potemkin mutiny was promptly furnished with Slav features in the "history" books. Conscription itself is becoming problematic. Another tactical constraint is that Soviet intelligence has lost its reserve army of ideologues, misfits, and fifth columnists. In the past, the Soviet Union had stunning opportunities as its operatives recruited ideologues and fifth columnists in the West. Since it is unlikely that there are many more Philbys and Cambridge Apostles, espionage will now be less dramatic and, for the Soviets, less effective. Atkeson examines the significance of both the types and numbers of forces which Moscow is reducing. But what are the new operational concepts that must accompany these changes? What the Soviets call defensive operations, after all, still involve potent combinations of nuclear and conventional weapons, maneuver, and "a single system" composed of "massed, multi-layered fire from all types of weapons." 12 Whatever "counter-offensive" means today in the current Soviet lexicon, its implications are less threatening for Western Europe than in the past. Determining what the Voroshilov General Staff Academy believes is "offensive" or "defensive" may be little more than a state of mind. Such terminological disagreement has existed ever since Thucydides. The changes in Soviet conventional capabilities, however, may also produce leaner and substantially more formidable forces. There is nothing new in the Soviets emphasizing tactical excellence. The more credible the conventional force, the more distressingly real becomes the contingency that the NATO allies might have to play the ultimate nuclear card. Nor does a restructuring of forces mean that the Soviets are excluding the possibility of nuclear war in Europe. A terrain seared by nuclear fires would be so dreadful that merely to follow up would require conventional forces to be superbly effective. The urgency qualitatively to transform the Soviet fighting instrument was pushed in the mid-1980s by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. As in the rest of Soviet life, obsolescent practices had to be dropped. The Soviet military has understood preeminently the need for short-term sacrifices for longterm gain. Russia, after all, has traded numbers for efficiency with increasingly less reward for 200 years. In an idiom that now seems archaic, even so eminent an officer of the general staff as Ogarkov could speak in 1985 of exposing "the historical
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futility of the capitalist system because the correlation of forces in the international arena has changed irreversibly." 13 In a finite battleground, or, indeed, planet, qualitative changes in conventional munitions would bring these weapons closer in devastating power to their nuclear sisters, making all combat potentially "strategic." This would alter the nature of war. 14 In new and even ironic circumstances, the Soviet military establishment is urgently pursuing a high technology arsenal. The Red Army is no longer the army of the Great Patriotic War. But it still expects to throw itself on (obrushit' sya na) an opponent through a series of insistent (nastoichivyi), never ceasing (neprekrashchayushchyisya) attacks. The Soviet military can become more formidably professional. It has before it the example of a comic opera Russian navy - disastrous even in home waters which turned itself into a great world-girdling fleet in half a lifetime. Other Soviet writings stress the indivisible link between technology and the battlefield, noting "the leading role computer technology plays in the growing defense of our country" and the fact that technology provides "one of the controllable and economically beneficial paths" in dealing "with the current high cost of weapons." 15 But technology can not be confined to enhancing military efficiency. In fact, technology's permeation had long presaged the collapse of Leninist command economies.16 The vision of social comprehensiveness which was originally undertaken and defended in command terms of war and revolution is instead available in the early 1990s in terms of growth, productivity, and inventiveness. Nearly every objective set by political revolution has been transcended by technological improvement. Computer and communication technologies raise effectiveness by dispersing power as much on the battlefield as in the factory and in the rest of society, with untenable consequences for centralization and hierarchy. It is ironic to recall that in his first speech as General Secretary, Gorbachev pledged to maintain a firm grip on the "socialist camp." But he also acknowledged the prime necessity of greater economic growth. 17 Now Christopher Jones shows how Moscow allowed Eastern Europe to become independent after decades in the coils of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. Jurists in Eastern Europe inaugurated the 1990s by debating the Pact's legality and the means which dissolved it. Soviet military doctrine had been predicated for forty years on the assumption that most of the client state armies, highly integrated into Soviet command and logistical structures, would be generally reliable in combat. The Soviet Union can not now raise sufficient divisions, no matter how their readiness is defined, to maintain the conventional posture it exploited for forty years. Free elections in Eastern Europe came with the suddenness of earlier metamorphoses. Moscow by the late 1980s understood what it had only
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glimpsed when it considered using force against Poland in 1981 - that the political, economic, and military consequences of exercising anything like the Brezhnev Doctrine had become insurmountable. In any conflict Westward, Moscow's lines of communication across its old empire through Eastern Europe would be highly vulnerable - at best. Moreover, armies returning from lost frontiers have for centuries been the carriers of disruptive ideas - even the hard-won Russian victory of 1878 shook the land for years. Alexander II paid with his life in part for Russian soldiers discovering that they were worse off than Bulgarian peasants under the hated Turk. Having stunted the societies to its immediate west during the world's greatest half-century of growth, Moscow can be reasonably certain that the West itself will not allow the logical consequences of Soviet conduct to develop in Eastern Europe. For forty years, the US could do little there other than to try to "encourage the union of western Europe to go beyond the moral limits and get themselves buttoned up in a military alliance." 18 Now a diffuse and even contentious Eastern Europe is acceptable to Moscow because the West, through aid and investment, would not let these just decommunized states become dictatorships - not that Moscow at its most hypocritical fears any of them but Germany. NATO, in turn, has become increasingly less central to US strategy. Similarly, it is unlikely that Central Front issues in fact remain central to Soviet calculations. Both superpowers have a wider 'geographic scope. Russia's eclipse as a forward land power, for example, brings seapower into more urgent focus. New Soviet naval capabilities can alter the pace and nature of future confrontation. A prolonged guerre de course at sea, with endless incidents and collisions, could itself obviate any actual clash in Europe as the West's political loyalties were unwound by ratcheting. War at sea can give conflict another dimension: as in the past, it can force the decision to escalate upon the West, recalling Cavour's maneuvering "They cannot get out without firing the cannon." Gael Tarleton studies the fleet's role in Soviet strategy. The capabilities of the Navy (Voyenno-Morskoy Flot) vastly increased during the 1970s and 80s. To what extent should the navy be regarded as "offensive" or "defensive" in the 1990s? Throughout the cold war, the great land power was vulnerable to the great sea power. The Soviet view of seapower has been entirely different from that of the US. The US Navy's emphasis upon the seas as highways was simply more spacious: Russia's historic deployment of fleets was directly upon peripheral land objectives from Navarino through Tsushima. Comparing two superpowers at sea is less a technological discussion than an anthropological one: it is one about two different systems. The last Russian naval victory was in 1853 when a Turkish fleet was destroyed at
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Sinop. In World War II, the Soviets had only one effective submarine squadron. The other six would better have been deployed as light infantry. The navy has never contributed to the Russian tradition of winning annihilating battles. And Moscow has never had the island power's view of striking with the needle rather than with the axe. The US-Soviet rivalry at sea has therefore been a vastly magnified version of Sebastopol in 1854: the liberal seapower coming right through by sea to bleed a continental empire. It has also exemplified the pressures that can be imposed by a technologically more advanced, mobile power. The only landlocked country toward which the US has a military commitment is Luxembourg. No accident: seapowers dislike getting too deep inland. American naval power has ensured Japan's independence and would later cover China's autonomy. But the 1962 Missile Crisis was the catalyst for a Soviet blue ocean navy, transcending the cruiser force of the 1950s. The strategic consequences were apparent by the 1970s: in the maintenance of a Cuban army in Angola, in the 1973 maneuvers and signals during the Middle East war, and in the general staff's assertion that "the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted to their function in defending our Motherland" but in opposing "the export of counterrevolution . . . in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear." 19 A relatively weak power at sea goes for disruption rather than counterfleet capabilities. Just so, America employed commerce destroyers to deadly effect in the war of 1812, not dreaming of matching the Royal Navy anywhere. Soviet naval theorists in the 1920s shaped their planning against the greatest of commercial powers, not its proud fleets. They emulated the approach of France's jeune ecole: instead of boldly confronting Britain's preeminence, France had forced the Royal Navy to disperse its resources. Outside of a few bases, the Soviet Navy is homeless beyond its coasts. It has to be self-contained. Unlike the 1970s, its hopes for warm water ports are in abeyance, and the fleet's Marine component, the "white berets," is only of divisional strength. The dislocation of alliances in Europe has much less effect on the Soviet Navy than on the army. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, however, Moscow may concentrate more heavily on the northern flank, and thus need more protection at sea. An intention to interdict the Baltic and North Atlantic sealanes may be one explanation for the Soviet submarine penetration of Swedish waters while the rest of Europe demobilized.20 Modern Soviet naval doctrine has so far been relatively autonomous. Barely visible to traditionalists it was shaped under Admiral Gorshkov's domination rather than as a facet of high international security policy. Overall, Tarleton addresses the meaning of change in Eastern Europe for
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the fleet, as well as the implications of recently available Russian naval writings. With the Soviet fleet and air force having attained such prominence, however, can we still assume that the Red Army has the central role in Soviet strategy, or that the presence of a Soviet general as defense minister still unambiguously reflects the hierarchy of military leadership? The command education of this military leadership, as of the US and Soviet armies, has been gained against dispersed, invertebrate, third world opponents, who won. David Isby now uses the Soviet experience in Afghanistan to illuminate the role of Moscow's previously concealed special operations forces. Until perestroika, Moscow insisted that such forces were only to be found among foreign armies. Such secrecy may have been due to the unique offensive role of these outfits, offensive to the point that in the mid-1980s West Germany claimed that commandos regularly penetrated the country to familiarize themselves with strategic targets and that, in a prewar crisis, commandos would be infiltrated in Western uniforms to disrupt NATO's rear by assassinating or kidnapping political leaders. 21 The lessons of Afghanistan go wider than questions of tactics or of power projection. In the aftermath of successful conventional force reductions in Europe, special operations would be far more powerfully levered than would tanks and artillery. Since Soviet troops would no longer be deployed forward, there will also be a premium on forces which can be immediately injected - or which could defend Soviet supply lines from former allies seeking neutrality. Special operations forces are now only projecting their power inward. The elite airborne, air assault, and spetsnaz units are among the rather short list of units reliably available to the Soviet government to support local policy and anti-riot internal troop formations. The Ministry of the Interior, for example, has realized the limitations of its regular troops and has formed its own special operations army. In spring 1989, airborne units were first used to suppress massive demonstrations in Tbilisi and were later used to enforce martial law in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Army patrols were included in early 1991. This may be a sign of renewed strength and wills. Managing the mission Moscow entered the 1990s with its paradox of being a third world economy with first world weapons. Less than a decade earlier, Brezhnev's successors could each assert in the old idiom that the Soviet Union exerted its main influence on the world revolutionary process through its economic policies. In fact, military power has been Moscow's only claim to a global role trying to maintain that power has steadily compromised the economy. So much
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for the Leninist maxim that modern war cannot be waged without serious economic preparation. 22 Ironically, it was the US that first dreaded being economically buried by the military technology competition with the Soviet Union. NATO from the beginning felt that Moscow was inducing the allies to spend themselves into inflationary deficits and economic oblivion through unmanageable defense budgets. 23 As the information age approaches the millennium, the West has shown that prosperity and innovation can only come from dispersing initiative through countless decentralized, individual, random decisions. This is compatible only with an open society in contrast to the Soviet system of vertical structures, rigid production schedules, and an inability to measure opportunity. The Soviet Union is in a desperate race between economic disintegration and the creation of a political consensus which can endure the agonies of economic change as bitter as those of a bad frostbite. If the economy collapses and the entities to administer it before legitimate political structures come into place, "this military 'superpower' in possession of over 12,000 nuclear charges, [could] plunge into violent political chaos, a Lebanon-like war of all against all." 24 Wellington noted 175 years ago that "The Russians have no wealth or trade, all they have is 400,000 men about whom they talk all too much." At best, the hopelessness of Soviet economics and development will continue to constrain the potential of Russian force. The Soviet military has so far conceded that short-term sacrifices in its development are necessary for long-term benefits in capability. Mikhail Tsypkin addresses the combined military and economic questions of Soviet weapon development amid these transformations. Soviet scientists draw heavily upon historic precedent when discussing military R&D. 25 The 1930s and World War II, for example, are recalled as times of military innovation under the greatest of stress. Despite a demolished economy, the Soviet Union was able to "independently develop weapons and technologies to surpass and defeat Germany." Can the Soviets achieve new qualitative and even quantitative leaps under current constraints? Tsypkin examines an apparent contradiction: is the Soviet military R&D system being tasked with developing weapons for the twenty-first century while at the same time facing budget cuts and talk of a diminished national role? Russia for 200 years has had a sense of technical inferiority to the West and, more recently, towards Japan. Russians have never been convinced of their old intonement, nashe luchshe, "ours is best," even when it happened to be true. Underestimating Soviet military technical excellence - whether in jet engines, atomic power, rocket technology, or remote guidance - has been a chronic failing in the West's net assessments.
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The effect of new influences and institutions upon the military is evident in the unprecedented civilian challenge to traditional military responsibilities. Far more is being questioned than problems of weapons development. Gorbachev originally expanded and intellectualized the old procedures. A military monopoly was diluted while criticism arose from civilian research institutions and analysts. This was only possible among much wider social and political changes. Ben Lambeth articulates the unprecedented assertiveness of Soviet defense intellectuals who aspire to a role not dissimilar from their US counterparts. Old inhibitions and hierarchies were removed, and newly emboldened contestants have entered the arena. Tension then mounts. The civilian analysts have an independent expertise not just in arms control and procurement but also in battlefield questions such as force effectiveness. They emphasize quantitative modeling, or systems analysis, and have their own points of contact with Western civilian analysts. They have new access to their own Russian sources upon which the military previously had a proprietary grip. The result is what Lambeth calls a "civilian onslaught." Competition in military analysis also arises from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, the general staff has the deepest foreboding as it tries to protect its pride of place. There are constant reciprocal challenges to competence and credentials. But never before has there been an independent civilian filter between the military and the highest political leadership. New civilian critics have compared their research institutes to Rand and Hudson. These civilian defense analysts were profoundly frustrated until the mid-1980s. Theirs was largely a propaganda role exercising the most minimal influence upon the leadership. When I first encountered them in 1969 in Moscow, they spent much of their time creating psychological profiles of US national security policy-makers as well as many less prominent Americans involved in the contemporary defense debate. Twelve years later, the institutes were still on the fringes of policy as they compiled biographies of the new US appointees whom they denounced as "strategists of empire." By the early 1990s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself joined hands with these increasingly well-prepared non-military defense experts in a contest of influence with the Defense Ministry. Edmund Wilson wrote that "One of the elements of the Russian character to which it is most difficult for the Westerner to adjust himself is the passion for self-immolation." These new civilian defense-policy critics became intertwined with the new regime and were risking their careers, at least, in challenging military competence. International security now embraces all of those influences which have a
The stakes of power
23
direct bearing on the structure of the nation state system, whose members increasingly define their security not only in the conventional modes of military strength, economic vigor, and government stability but also in terms of environment, science and technology, cultural vitality, and natural resources. Such complexity requires more than traditional general staff planning. But Soviet military forecasters are adapting their own methods to new planning techniques. Jacob Kipp expands on the military's anxious role in shaping Soviet strategy "in an era of restructuring," to "survey mankind from China to Peru." Military foresight must range over not just the scientists in weapons development but also the social scientists in the institutes and bureaucracy. Conclusion Soviet strategists have little reason for optimism as they look ahead. Strategy until a quarter century ago was conducted in a world of specific fronts: Europe, China, and the timeless path to warm water ports. From the fall of Japan until the 1970s, the Soviet Union did not face the prospect of a two front war. Now the possibility of China again throwing itself into chaos reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution is by no means unimaginable (although it was during the Cultural Revolution, we should recall, that China combined with the US). The high politics of Central Asia are again in play. And the possibility of a new, authoritarian "government of order" in the Soviet Union is regarded fearfully by everyone, particularly China. The number of unsettling forces and influences - whether economic, demographic, technological, or historic - will increase prodigiously upon the Soviet state (or its successor) irrespective of new borders or forms of government. In fact, the rise of a liberal Indian superstate, with its increasing command of the talents and technologies of the information age, might be a far greater threat to the Soviet future than would be a strengthening of merely contiguous China. Everywhere the familiar lines of demarcation are disappearing. They no longer clearly indicate those areas at the margin where the powers might probe with impunity. The moves of chess are being replaced as the analogy of world conflict by the processes of go.
If the Soviet Union wants to return to anything like its global role over the last forty years, it must rely more on strategic nuclear power. It has conceded its tactical position in Europe, and is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain its conventional forces. The diplomatic dividends of strategic nuclear power would be different depending on whom such power would be used; in Europe, against NATO, which is less likely to dissolve than to become a Hobbesian wraith; in the East, against Japan which is
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superbly conventionally well-armed; and in the Indian Ocean where a Soviet role is possible given Australia's focus on Southeast Asia and South Africa's internal problems. There is a nest of potential conflicts. Nearly every objective set for political revolution has been transcended by technological improvement. Communism set out to overthrow the separation of the country and the city, as well as of such constraints as class and religion. But this was not enough as people - whole societies - insisted on finding individual goals, defining themselves by their enmities. So Moscow place-names are changed from ideologically charged Karl Marx Prospect to the pastoral Okhotny Ryad ("Hunter's Row") and from Cheka police chief "Dzerzhinsky" square to "Lubyanka." The political economy of the information era is about human possibilities and about ever greater degrees of freedom. Technology diminishes the need for the heroic central decision-maker. The information era which was spawned by war is now transforming the Soviet Union in the 1990s. But there remains a caveat. Soviet strategists may know it best of all. History is not marked by gentleness or persuasion. Seventy years ago, the foreign minister of another doomed empire summed up the departure from the world stage that his order had taken: "It was left to us to choose the manner of our passing; and we chose the most agonizing means of death." Notes 1 Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). 2 V. V. Zagladin, "Correlation of Forces in the International Arena and the Development of International Relations," International Affairs, Moscow, February 1985. 3 The New York Times, May 21, 1990. 4 Soviet Military Dictionary (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1987). 5 Edward L. Keenan, Russian Political Culture, US Department of State, Contract no. 1722-420119, 1976. 6 Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change (US Government Printing Office, 1989). 7 Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in Soviet and American Strategic Thought," in Derek Leebaert (ed.), Soviet Military Thinking (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981). 8 I. Kulkow, Kommunist, no. 7 (April 1989), 21; V. Zagladin, Pravda, June 13, 1988. 9 Nathan Leites, "The Soviet Style of War," in Leebaert (ed.), Soviet Military Thinking. 10 Author's discussions with D. Proektor, IMEMO, Moscow, April 1981, and with Paul Nitze, CSIA Arms Control Seminar, Harvard University, March 1981. 11 Ma j or General F. W. von Mellinthin, Panzer Battles: A S tudy of the Employment
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12 13 14 15
16 17 18 19
20 21 22
23 24 25
25
of Armor in the Second World War (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956). G. Ionin, "Foundations of Modern Defensive Battle," Voyennyy Vestnik, March 1988, reported in FBIS-SOV-89-014, July 18, 1989, p. 4. The Times, April 22, 1985. N. V. Ogarkov, History Teaches Vigilance (Moscow: Voyenzadat, 1985), p. 57. Pravda, "Computers and People," February 6, 1985 and Major General M. Yasyukov, "The Military Policy of the CPSU," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh, October 20, 1985. George Paloczi-Horvath, The Facts Rebel (London: Cassell, 1963). Kommunist, no. 5 (1985), 9; FBIS-SU, May 22, 1985. R4. Daily Log Sheet, March 4, 1948, Lovett Papers, New York Historical Society, NY. See "The Fleets in the Local Wars of Imperialism," in S. G. Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, 2nd edn (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1979), as well as Marshal Grechko, "The Leading Role of the CPSU in Building the Army of a Developed Socialist Society," Problems of the History of the CPSU, May 1974. Gordon McCormick, Stranger than Fiction: Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1990), R-3776. General Robert Close, Europe Without Defense? (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979). The current economic predicament bears out those Soviet military economists who already two decades ago insisted that there was a "national limit" to military expenditures at the national economic growth rate, and that exceeding this limit would ruin the overall economic base from which military spending is extracted. See "Analytic Notes," AN-0184, October 1984, Russian Studies Center (Bethesda, MD: Booz Allen & Hamilton, 1984). Public Record Office (UK), October 1, 1949, FO 371/71672, N 10581, and Harry S. Truman Library, PSF, Fofrestal to President, November 20, 1948. Leon Aron, "Waiting for Yeltsin," The National Interest, Summer 1990. A. Aleksandrov, interview, Izvestiya, June 10, 1985.
Parti
The instruments of power
2
Soviet nuclear strategy and new military thinking Colin S. Gray
It would be a major error to approach Soviet nuclear strategy as if it were an extant mosaic to be uncovered by the prodigious scholarly efforts of Western archaeologist-strategists. Bearing in mind the fact that the Soviet Government says next to nothing about its current thinking on its contingent nuclear operations, one should approach the subject expecting a quality of evidence more suitable for the securing, by analogy, of conviction in a civil, than in a criminal, case. There is, and is going to be, no "smoking gun," in the form of Soviet public explanation and defense of the equivalent of a NSDM-242, or a PD-59. 1 Many of the people who, understandably, debate Soviet nuclear strategy in a necessarily inexpert manner, often are less than reliably informed about the doctrine which helps shape current US (and NATO) nuclear contingency plans. These plans and related matters are the most closely guarded of state secrets - in the United States as well as in the USSR. There is a night and day difference between the quality and quantity of information officially released by the US and the Soviet governments on current (and past) nuclear doctrine and strategy. None the less, this is a subject that rightly attracts the most strenuous of official discouragement of release of classified data. Whether or not, or to what degree, the deeply classified details of nuclear targeting really matter, has to depend upon the level of questions posed. Fortunately, the more interesting issues of strategy that bear directly upon nuclear contingency planning and force structure planning do not require debate at the level of highly classified detail. The discussion immediately below identifies the diverse sources of evidence for Soviet nuclear strategy. Nine sources are registered, though these are not rigorously exclusive. Tactical capability For reasons of redundant plausible causation, it is not wholly true to claim that policy and strategy can be inferred logically from military programs. However, strategy is a practical art and the realm of tactics - of the actual 29
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use of armed force of all kinds - determines that which is possible for operational artists and strategists. Good strategy and inspired operational artistry can provide some compensation for tactical deficiencies, but it is a useful general rule that if a military operation does not work tactically then it will be a forlorn hope in strategic terms. The tactical fighting value of Soviet central nuclear forces does not dictate Soviet operational and strategic choice, but it does rule out certain objectives. Save in some exceedingly far fetched scenarios of fine-tuned C3I decapitation attacks, Soviet nuclear-armed forces simply cannot win a classic military victory.2 It is important to know if Soviet nuclear forces are capable of being employed in a highly discriminate mode against, say, hardened or otherwise elusive military targets over a period of days or even weeks. However, to pass judgment on whether or not Soviet forces would be so employed is quite a different matter. The beginning of all wisdom concerning Soviet strategy for central nuclear war is recognition that Soviet nuclear-armed forces cannot function reliably as an instrument of military decision over the United States. Their prospective tactical accomplishments would fall lamentably short of producing the necessary strategic effect for outright victory. Analogically, the great armies of 1914—early Fall 1918, were tactically incapable of delivering what operational and strategic direction asked of them. Recognition in Britain (and belatedly in the United States) in 1942^3 that Anglo-American (and Canadian) landpower and airpower simply were not sufficiently tactically effective to confront with confidence the Germans in the main theater of operations, similarly was an appreciation critical for the design and success of strategy.3 Strategic culture and national style
It is a hypothesis of increasing respectability to suggest that each national security community - Russian in this instance - has a more or less distinctive strategic culture, whence derives a discernible national style. The concepts of strategic culture and national style, as with their close cousins from the realm of geopolitical analysis, do not point to allegedly essential truths which determine thought and behavior. Instead, they indicate non-random preferences and persisting tendencies.4 The most relevant hypothesis is that the Russian/Soviet past has bequeathed to the present modes of thought, sets of attitudes, patterns of behavior, and institutions which express and propagate those learned ideas and procedures. Depending, inter alia> upon its geostrategic character - for example, is it a maritime or a continental community (or does it have an ambivalent status between the two)? - a state will tend to be better at some
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kinds of national security activity than at others. 5 As the saying goes, "it is no accident" that the Soviet/Russian army has been a more impressive fighting instrument than the navy, or that the British and US navies have been in a different league of excellence than generally have been their armies. There is some general transcultural logic to strategy at a level of arid abstraction. But, as Christopher Donnelly has emphasized, indeed possibly overemphasized, the roots of military thought and behavior are lodged in a particular stream of historical experience and in a unique geographical setting. 6 It would be a mistake to approach Soviet nuclear strategy as a local sub-set of some generic nuclear strategy. Writing of Soviet national security policy, James Sherr has offered the pithy judgment that "in any explanation of Soviet military power and its application, geopolitics may come up trumps." He is probably correct. It is scarcely less plausible to suggest that over many issues of military strategy, Soviet/Russian strategic culture and national style are likely to come up trumps. 7 Of course nuclear weapons are different, even "revolutionary," in their implications for policy, strategy, operations and tactics.8 But, that difference is treated and managed in a Soviet way. A strategic culture and national style shaped and reshaped by a millennium of deeply continentalist experience is not swept away by the advent of new weapon (and other) technologies. The functioning of culture and style is important in any national security community, but Western sensitivity to their operation in the Soviet context is unusually important because of the acute shortage of other more tangible, and reliable, sources of evidence (or just insight) on thought and contingent behavior. History Reference to a state's history as a source of evidence on future thought and behavior really means reference to that "history" as interpreted by favored historians. In Oscar Wilde's apposite words, "[a]ny fool can make history, but it takes a genius to write it." 9 Soviet military professionals are second to none in the respect they accord historical study. Unlike much of their curious passion for a mathematical science of war, 10 their pedagogical utilization of historical experience - particularly of the Great Patriotic War - warrants study in the West. 11 Of outstanding interest for Western defense planners is the unsettled issue of whether Soviet defense professionals truly have a competent grasp of the likely realities of global war against the greatest mixed maritime-continental coalition in history. 12 One need hardly add that coalitions invite enemy grand strategies of divide and conquer. The nominal aggregate strength of the US-led
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coalition would likely be quite scenario-dependent. The deep, narrow and highly competent analysis of what was a one-front war against a landpower foe whose homeland fortress could be taken by the Soviet/Russian instrument of military excellence, the army, may not provide a very healthy bedrock of history-based learning for a candidate (global) World War III. Continental-minded defense expertise tends to be dismissive of the threat posed by navies, not realizing how superior seapower - broadly understood - can shape the course and structure, and hence the outcome, of (protracted) conflict. All national security communities learn from, and to a degree express, their historical experience. There are clues to current and future Soviet strategic thought and behavior in Soviet understanding o/Soviet history. It is a matter of great importance that the USSR has never waged war against a sea-based enemy whose homeland could not plausibly be reached save by engines of very long-range bombardment. Great institutions have a way of preparing to do that which they know how to do well. If the new "Red God of War," 13 the long range, nuclear-armed missiles of the Strategic Rocket Forces, are denied the license to conduct a classic (preemptive) kontrpodgotovka - a break-up barrage - wherein lies the Soviet theory of victory? Soviet strategists have to cope with a putative enemy whose strategic geography as a coalition and whose strategic preferences (which rest in part upon the very different culture, style, and historical experience of the United States) have a rather different structure from those of Moscow.14 Notwithstanding the universally acknowledged novelty of nuclear weapons, defense planners have a way of learning from history how to win against yesterday's enemy. The USSR believes that it knows how to beat a great continental power. It is less obvious that Soviet defense professionals know how to beat the extra-Eurasian United States (assuming that a SIOPRISOP "exchange" is ultra vires - a subject in need of careful treatment). Weapons and other military equipment The technical detail of Soviet weaponry does not speak eloquently to the realms of policy purpose and strategy design.15 Provided the operational context is specified - variations on the themes of first strike or first use knowledge of Soviet nuclear-armed weapon systems provides the basis for reasonable judgment as to their tactical utility against particular target sets with familiar (if often assumed) characteristics.16 But to know what a weapon system could do is not to know how it would be used. In short, Soviet operational nuclear strategy cannot be read reliably from the details of Soviet force posture - suggestive though those details certainly appear to be.
Soviet nuclear strategy
33
The Soviet strategic forces' posture, considered in the context of what broadly may be called war survival measures, is the posture of a state with a thoroughgoing "war-fighting" approach to deterrence. That Soviet posture implies the beliefs (or working hypotheses) that: large-scale nuclear war could occur; the USSR, by its unilateral efforts, could (or might) enforce a range of different outcomes; and that the differences among those outcomes could matter. One must hasten to add that it is not claimed here that the USSR believes: that nuclear war will occur; that any large-scale East-West war must be a nuclear war; or necessarily that it would secure any reasonable facsimile of victory in a nuclear war. At the level of policy declaration as contrasted somewhat with policy as capability, there is not a great deal to distinguish major aspects of Soviet, from US, nuclear strategy. The USSR has expended vastly greater assets for the physical protection of leadership cadres than has the United States indeed, there is no comparison between the two. The USSR has sought to provide for the survival in nuclear war of all key assets of the state; the United States does not try. 17 But US policy as declaration is scarcely less devoted to the idea of continuity of government than is Soviet policy. Soviet and US military styles in operational nuclear strategy would probably differ markedly. However, what is there about the Soviet nuclear-armed force posture and its support (and other relevant) systems from which the grand design of Soviet nuclear strategy might be deduced? In overall size, at approximately 11,500 plus weapons, Soviet strategic nuclear forces effectively are on a rough numerical par with those of the United States. In diversity, the Soviet triad is unbalanced in favor of its landbased missile leg. However, the US triad is unbalanced in the low warhead allocation to its ICBM force - allowing numerical pride of place to the SLBM force. While the USSR has provided for pre-launch survivability in a probable START era by agility as well as silo hardening for its longest suit, ICBMs, the United States is committed unhealthily to high concentration of SLBM warheads in relatively few Ohio class SSBN hulls. The USSR has dedicated such a wealth of assets to strategic C3I that that area, for all its undoubted significance, may not carry the promise of high reward to US nuclear targeteers. In the 1980s, in particular, the United States committed itself to making a reality of the principle that minimum essential C3I must survive as long as the forces that they serve.18 That worthy ambition is challenged by the fact that the strategic forces are inherently more survivable than is their C 3 I: still, much progress has been made.
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The USSR has purchased such offensive and defensive counterforce capability as the state of their technical art has permitted. As a matter of strategic objectives, the United States is scarcely less dedicated to the performance of counterforce missions than is the USSR. Those strategic objectives may be inferred from Soviet force acquisitions that make no sense if they are not dedicated to the prosecution of technically stressful counterforce operations. In practice for twenty years the United States has all but eschewed defensive counterforce for central war (though not for regional conflicts). But, with the SDI the United States, if anything, is even more strongly committed (rhetorically, at least) to the idea of defensive counterforce than is the USSR. Whereas policies and strategies usefully can be labelled offensive or defensive, individual weapons have no inherently offensive or defensive, meaning; the context is everything. 19 An MX or an SS-18 mod 5ICBM is as entirely suitable for a variety of operational styles in nuclear strategy, as it is for the support of an offensive or a defensive national security policy. Other military capabilities Nuclear war, nuclear weapons, and nuclear strategy are not subjects isolated from war, weapons, and strategy more generally. The non-nuclear preference which appeared to dominate Soviet strategic thinking - though not planning or posture - in the 1980s, was an expression of new-found, if distinctly fragile, confidence both in conventional options and in nuclear counterdeterrence. 20 From the early 1970s to the early 1980s the Soviet Union sought to acquire the means both to wage and win regional Blitzkrieg campaigns around the Eurasian periphery of its imperium, and to deny the Western Alliance any contingently attractive options for nuclear employment. It is probably true to say that Soviet nuclear weapons in the 1980s were allocated the potentially decisive role of deterring attempts at "decision" via nuclear use by an enemy. One can infer reasonably that Soviet nuclear weapons of all kinds were charged primarily, though certainly not exclusively, with holding the ring square for the achievement and consolidation of regional conventional victories. This is not to evade the question of how the Soviet military establishment would be permitted to wage nuclear conflict in the event. But is is to claim that the event of nuclear conflict has come to be viewed in Moscow as being imbued far more with peril than with opportunity. The unmistakable preference for non-nuclear options in Soviet strategy
Soviet nuclear strategy
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in the 1980s undoubtedly reflected mature consideration of the associated dangers. However, that preference was encouraged by the contemporary Soviet belief in conventional alternatives for swift success in land warfare. The somewhat exaggerated, at least over-heated, Soviet anxiety over the West's advanced conventional munitions (ACMs), the multiplying geostrategic uncertainties about the shaky terms and vanishing future of the Warsaw Pact and the evolving balance of military force levels, may well induce Soviet reconsideration of the unique merit (as well as demerit) in nuclear ordnance. 21 In the context of CFE I, let alone an ambitiously mooted CFE II, and enormous uncertainties over the future structure of security in Europe, Moscow already has signaled some lessening of enthusiasm for truly thoroughgoing regional nuclear disarmament (for the leading example, the "third zero," for battlefield nuclear-capable weapon systems). A mix of NATO's ACMs (and their improvements), the newly adverse strategic geography of European conflict imposed by the demise of the Warsaw Pact, and the need for domestic economy, may well produce a Soviet Army radically less capable of rapidly overrunning West-Central Europe that has been the case until recently. But, even though such a noteworthy adverse change in the net combat prowess of Soviet landpower could imply a need for new nuclear competence, such competence would be unlikely to be achievable. That which is strategically very desirable, even necessary, is not necessarily tactically or operationally feasible. Intelligence When one considers the totality of the US, and other allies' (and functionally friendly), intelligence effort, the scale, diversity and sheer professionalism of the multi-form effort, it can be difficult to accept the fact of the severe limitations upon what is reliably knowable concerning the subjects of most importance. "Overhead" assets of many kinds can count most installations and pieces of hardware (provided they do not move) though deception remains a severe problem in monitoring things Soviet but those tend not to be the categories of knowledge with history-turning implications. The things that can be imaged one way or another, counted and more or less reliably monitored, indeed the entire world of "indications and warning" ("I and W") activity, can provide invaluable input for strategic and policy judgment, if one knows how to interpret what one sees or hears. Similarly, given the necessary ambiguity of policy intentions, or even over strategic objectives, there is everything to be said in favor of the real-time tactical monitoring of the adversary's behavior. (Even if Soviet policy
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motives are an enigma, it is essential to know if their Northern and Baltic fleets are surging into the Atlantic and North Seas.) Questions of outstanding interest for this inquiry include the following. Over what issues would the USSR choose to fight; when would it have resort to nuclear weapons; how would it wage nuclear war; how responsive would it be to some de facto guidelines for the practical control of the dangers of nuclear escalation, and so forth? Alas, none of the answers to questions such as these lends itself reliably to discovery by the intelligence community via imaging, listening, counting, and such like. The rounded study of Soviet/Russian phenomena, as well as the achievement of some intellectual grip on the subject of strategy, should educate a person to the point where his or her guesses concerning Soviet operational nuclear strategy ought to command a respectful audience. But, some of the more important issues may well be beyond study, though not beyond educated guesswork. For example, to what extent would the Soviet General Staff be permitted to wage war, nuclear and other, without detailed real-time guidance/interference by political leaders?22 Or, if the United States flexed an "extended (nuclear) deterrent" muscle in a substantial, but still highly constrained manner, how would the USSR respond? Pending the greatly undesired event, there can be no authoritative answer to questions such as these. Exercises Along with recent defectors with military, or other defense related, experience, electronic oversight of various kinds, and the typically ambiguous implications of military posture, military exercises are a prime source of information and disinformation. The dilemma in the design and conduct of exercises is a classic one. Armed forces require realistic preparation for mobilization, for crisis-time deployment, and war. But, the more realistic the exercise scenario and the conduct of training "games," the more an alert putative enemy might learn. Generally, there are important data to be gathered from exercises. There have to be. If exercises are important to the exerciser - as they have to be, else why hold them? - then they have to be a source of important information to interested foreigners. All levels of relevant information may be gathered: technological, tactical, operational, and strategic. Even attempts at deception can be revealing (why are they trying to hide what they appear to be trying to hide?). When, on what scale, and particularly whether, nuclear weapons play an active role in Soviet military exercises, are significant issues well worth watching (as, of course, we do). Both historical experience and common sense suggest that the wise way
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to use exercises deceptively is not to train forces in wholly fanciful maneuvers, but rather to conceal blueprints for contingent action among a variety of activities. Troops have to be trained realistically, but that training need not be conducted in such a way that its operational, let alone strategic and policy, implications are transparently obvious. It is worth mentioning that an actual intention to attack might be concealed within a large-scale military, naval, and strategic-forces' exercise. As the superpowers thin-out their forces in Central Europe, perhaps even disengage from the erstwhile line of scrimmage, the strategic advantage to be gained by an attack transitioning out of an exercise should be increased, even though it should become geographically more difficult to effect. Soviet military thinking, new or otherwise, does not need education in the value of maskirovka - or surprise and surprise effect overall. Writings and statements Glasnost may well destabilize the Soviet polity and its imperium more thoroughly than perestroika and other efforts at centrally managed, measured reform can possibly handle. To date, notwithstanding the nominal (though far short of actual) 50 percent reductions agreed to for START-accountable warhead totals which could slash the size of strategicforce stockpiles, "new thinking" on nuclear strategy is less than massively apparent in responsible circles. There has been some talk about minimum deterrence at low levels of nuclear weaponry, but nothing with self-evident policy or military-professional authority. Given the predominance of anodyne cliches about being ready to deliver a staggering rebuff to the enemies of the USSR and of peace, the eager Western Soviet-watcher finds little of much interest on Soviet nuclear strategy from the Soviet printed page. In the mid-1970s, and particularly following Leonid Brezhnev's Tula speech of January 1977, much of the color and life went out of Western-accessible Soviet writings on the subject of the utility of nuclear weapons in war. 23 There can be little doubt that Soviet leaders were embarrassed by the propaganda (and US defense budget-support) value of Soviet writings on the prospects for victory in nuclear war. But also it would seem to have been the case that in the USSR, as - somewhat later - in the West, operational military interest in nuclear weapons waned severely. After the mid-1970s the USSR imposed a much stronger discipline on its military writers. While alert to deception campaigns and to the seduction of fashion, still as Peter Vigor points out 24 - rules of scholarship should enable Western Soviet-watchers to make disciplined use of Soviet writings and statements.
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Because interpretations of the putative Soviet enemy play as a factor in internal US defense and foreign policy debate, all kinds of lawyers' tricks are employed in order to make the particular case desired at the moment. The overwhelming bulk of the inordinately tedious professional Soviet military literature that is available in the West should be taken at face value. That literature is fostered to further the professional education of an intensely professional defense community, not to deceive Western commentators. Such relative, if dated, gems as the Officer's Library series,25 or, more especially, the 1973-75 lectures smuggled out of the Voroshilov Academy (of the General Staff), are entirely credible and somewhat informative.26 However, direct Soviet commentary on the design of Soviet nuclear strategy, or even on the factors which bear on such design, is distinguished by its rarity. Analogically, Western seekers after knowledge of Soviet nuclear strategy have to shift tons of earth or very low grade ore before, if ever, they discover truly precious metal. Common sense and general knowledge
Whether it was the Marquis de Custine in 1839, or Tibor Szamuely in 1974, insightful commentators on matters Russian have a healthy habit of emphasizing the cultural particularity of their subject. Tinted though Soviet military spectacles have been by ideological and Great Russian national cultural perspectives, still the Soviet defense community is immensely respectful of what it understands by objective conditions. In his flawed masterpiece, Strategy: The Logic of Peace and War27 - following some of the major themes introduced by Carl von Clausewitz in On War Edward N. Luttwak posits and explores enduring relations among different levels of analysis and treats a paradoxical, quintessentially strategic, logic at every level (technical, tactical, operational, theater, and grand strategic). There is some value to general knowledge of strategic phenomena - a general knowledge that can be applied to the Soviet case. It should be noted that Soviet foreign policy similarly is all but fully explicable with reference to the general workings of international security politics. There is no such phenomenon as a distinctively socialist (or pseudo-socialist) defense strategy, any more than there is a socialist foreign policy (this is one of Francis Fukuyama's minor errors). It must never be forgotten that Soviet military thinking and planning, in very large part indeed, is the thinking and the planning of the world's greatest continental power, reasoning imperially. But, as this chapter has suggested already, there is much common ground between the current superpowers on matters of nuclear strategy, even if their particular
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strategic cultures encourage them to seek to plant rather different strategy designs in that ground. For reasons of history, geography, and what may be termed the distinctively Soviet/Russian politics of defense planning and strategymaking, it is probable that Soviet operational responses to some of the major questions posed by nuclear weapons for policy, grand and military strategy, are different from those which comprise orthodox wisdom among the cognoscenti of Washington, DC, and Santa Monica. However, those operational responses certainly are founded upon a rigorous and clear-eyed study of what are believed to be objective conditions, and where different from the gospel according to Thomas Schelling, Glenn Kent, or Albert Wohlstetter, will not be idiosyncratically different.28 Questions that matter and questions that do not Can the USSR compete effectively in strategic nuclear forces? Viewed as two science-based defense industrial systems, the Western World and what tentatively remains of the Soviet empire are an order of magnitude apart in high-technological competence. 29 If the comparison is made much more broadly between "the West" (including both actual and strategically functional allies in East Asia) and the USSR with reference to defense mobilization potential of all kinds, the second-class character of the Soviet competitor is revealed even more starkly. However, notwithstanding the current time of admittedly severe troubles in the East (in the territorial as well as the all but defunct hegemonic empire), several factors have enabled the Soviet Union to play much above her innate scientific-economic strength. Specifically: the Western foe comprises a coalition which generates security at a level far below the sum of its many parts; the superpower competitor is a popular democracy politically unable to sustain a very high level of commitment to military competition; the nuclear thread seems to contradict much of the traditional logic of military competition; the strategic geography of the Soviet imperium provides - or provided - a concentration of threat via a medium (landpower) wherein Soviet competitive disadvantage was minimized; the Soviet command economy can focus its energies effectively, if not efficiently, on matters of high state priority in the security field; and in its several major non-military aspects, Soviet grand strategy can provide some compensation for the weaknesses of Soviet laboratories and factories.30 Provided one important, if arguable, caveat is not forgotten, the answer to the question "can the USSR compete effectively in strategic nuclear forces?" has to be in the affirmative. The caveat pertains to the US ability and willingness to react, indeed overreact, to belatedly determined identifi-
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cation of threat. Thus far, at least, certainly for a quarter-century, nuclear armaments have not lent themselves to exploitation as an instrument of military decision. The Soviet Union can menace the pre-launch survivability of most US ICBMs in silos, SSBNs in port, and some fraction of the manned bomber force on runways. But, no combination of quantity of nuclear firepower or attainable quality in weapon systems, has carried a plausible promise of classical style victory. The Soviet experience of the 1970s and 1980s was that more or less disputable advantage31 could be secured through prowess in its traditional arm of excellence, very long range artillery (ICBMs). But, the theoretical gain in net hard-target counterforce capability was both swamped by its limited military (and political) significance, and served eventually to trigger potentially very disadvantageous US competitive responses. To date, the Soviet Union knows that it could not design, build and operate a strategic defensive architecture against long-range ballistic missiles which would achieve strategically significant kill ratios. However, Soviet scientists and defense planners appear to have been convinced that the United States - let alone the West (including Japanese, West German, and Israeli hightechnology industries) more generally - just might succeed in constructing an SDI which could fulfill truly ambitious design goals.32 The argument must not be overstated. Soviet political leaders and defense planners seem to have been operating of very recent years upon the basis of the beliefs that they could not build a central Soviet war-winning offense-defense military posture, but that the United States just might be able to do so. Moreover, Moscow also has come to appreciate that the truly dedicated pursuit of military and political advantage over the United States is impracticable, given the current unsatisfactory terms of competition. Furthermore, frantic overt competition is counterproductive in that it prods the Western giant into a quantity and quality of competitive behavior that the USSR cannot possibly match. The much vilified idea attributed to the Reagan Administration in 1981-82 of, in effect, spending the USSR into bankruptcy, no longer looks quite so primitive or foolish. Where else did perestroika and glasnost come from if not from desperate Soviet recognition that, unreformed, they were outclassed in their ability to compete? To provide an intelligent answer to the question, "Can the Soviet Union compete?", it is necessary to ask, "compete to achieve what?" Moscow cannot compete to achieve the ability to wage and win a central nuclear war. But, even the United States would seem to be unable to achieve such a military-technical capability. Victory or defeat in war has rarely been strictly a matter of the economic ability to compete (though 1914-18 was an approximation of such a case). It is possible that the ability to wage central
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war to a favorable decision will be reacquired at some point in the next century. The Soviet Union knows that it must stay in touch with the highest of high technologies for that reason, if for no others. However, in order to compete satisfactorily in strategic nuclear arms, the Soviet Union does not require that its nuclear-armed forces be able to win a classical victory. Instead, those forces must be able to deny US - or any other country's statecraft and strategy coercive benefit from nuclear threat or actual nuclear use. Ideally, in Moscow's perspective, Soviet nuclear-armed forces would deny foes nuclear compellent options either as an instrument for gain or, more likely, as a tool of controlled escalation intended to thwart Soviet nonnuclear action. 33 Can START help Soviet statecraft and strategy? START, as with CFE, makes sense only within a framework of competition in strategic relations. If political peace truly breaks out, then START and CFE would be irrelevant at best and an actual hindrance to improving relations, at worst. START should be regarded in the West grand-strategically as an element of the arms control instrument of Soviet policy. START is of great importance in Soviet statecraft because: it treats the weapons which have come almost to define superpower status; it addresses the realm of military competition to which Americans are most sensitive; and it speaks to that aspect of the overall strategic rivalry (except for the naval dimension) in which the Soviet Union is most at a structural competitive disadvantage. Above all else, the START process is helpful to Soviet statecraft and strategy as a net dampener of US strategic competitive effort. Soviet leaders, unlike many conservative and liberal commentators in the United States, know that START is insignificant for political issues of peace or war and bears scarcely worth mentioning upon matters of military advantage. Given that the unpredictability of the United States has been a cause of occasional alarm in Moscow, it is important to note the standard claim that arms control benefits stability because it increases the predictability of behavior by the High Contracting Parties. This claim is not a very persuasive one, historically and logically appraised. If the will to compete is still present, then arms control agreements channel competition into areas that remain unlicensed (large cruisers in the 1920s, intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the 1970s). Furthermore, no arms control regime could serve to offset a US unpredictability that reflected genuine security alarm. Moscow may have hopes, but can hardly have expectations, that START would effect the "lulling" of Western foes.34 Rather, START provides
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some rules for the conduct of the strategic arms competition which, though of little significance for great or less great issues of stability, do themselves, and by the tone they set, help to inhibit Western competitive prowess. In other words, it is not necessarily the Soviet purpose to employ START to set snares and create or feed delusions in the United States. But, along with domestic economic considerations, START could be a significant inhibitor of US military-technical programs. Moscow does not rely upon START to preclude the United States from developing the ability to win a World War III, let alone - through a pattern of cheating and illicit technical acquisition across frontiers - to allow the Soviet Union to acquire the weapons which might deliver a major military advantage. At least until the political melt-down of the structure of Soviet authority in East-Central Europe, Soviet-American military competition was conducted on two very uneven playing fields. Because of the geopolitics of superpower rivalry and the truly coalition character of the West the playing field of West-Central Europe was very uneven in the Soviet favor, while the playing field of the scientific-industrial bases was distinctly uneven to the Soviet disadvantage. START, which many Americans think of as a contribution to a deeply technical idea of strategic stability, instead - in Soviet perspective - is a thoroughly political institution intended by the Soviet Union to encourage the United States to play below its true capabilities. In the context of the Western Alliance, though not vis-a-vis China, Moscow does not appear to believe that nuclear weapons are very useful for any strategic purpose more ambitious than the deterrence of nuclear use by others. However, it remains the Soviet way to seek such military advantage as incompetent foreign negotiators or treaty-terms verifiers, and a slack pace of US force modernization, permit. The on-going and impending changes in the military balance in Europe will need to be considered both in the round, which is to say with respect to developments on both sides, not just to the East, and with reference to Mikhail Gorbachev's range of practicable alternatives. The 1989 admission of felonious conduct with the Krasnoyarsk PAR (phased-array radar) was something less than a resounding change of Soviet heart or policy. Moscow owned up, very belatedly, to the fact that Krasnoyarsk was a massive violation of the ABM treaty of 1972. But, the admission of guilt was forthcoming only when it became apparent that progress in START would be politically impossible in the absence of such a Soviet mea culpa. Notwithstanding occasional rhetorical claims to the contrary, the United States does not conduct defense postural and arms control planning as a
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single broad enterprise. 35 The result, inevitably, is that military planners have to do the best with the quantitative and qualitative constraints that proved negotiable (or intellectually fashionable). Because of weapon system design from a previous era of assumptions, and because of the politics of defense budgeting in an era of arguable peace, it is a virtual certainty that the START process, as usual with the arms control, will tend to aggravate rather than alleviate existing military-technical problems. Conservatives will claim, with some justice that - for example - START will worsen the high-quality warhead to hard target ratio to the US disadvantage; that a reduced SSBN fleet will have to contend with unconstrained Soviet ASW capability; and that large-scale offensive missile reductions would enhance the strategic value of a Soviet BMD ("Red Shield") break-out from the ABM treaty regime. These claims are not without merit, but they would leave the USSR still so far distant from a reliable war-winning force that they should be discounted heavily as arguments leading Moscow to favor a START treaty. As suggested above, the real strategic value of START to the USSR almost certainly lies in its worth as a net dampener of the pace and the quantity of US competitive performance. How would the Soviet Union attempt to wage a central nuclear war? Western scholars, and most Soviet scholars, do not know the answer to this critically important question. The direct evidence on the basis of which an answer might be constructed ranges from the poor to the very poor (see the quality of evidence provided for the> relevant writings of William T. Lee, Notra Trulock, Edward Warner, Steven Meyer, and Joseph Douglass inter alia).36 The evidence that can be assembled in support of an answer to the question tends to contradict common sense. Rather after the fashion of some historians of early medieval times, Western commentators on Soviet nuclear strategy have no choice other than to exceed the strict bounds of the evidence available. Broadly speaking, there are two schools of Western thought on Soviet nuclear strategy for central war. The first school, led most copiously in terms of publications by Notra Trulock, 37 holds that the Soviet Union probably would attempt to wage what could be called a limited (central) nuclear war. Such a Soviet approach would endeavor to wage as little war as would be compatible with war aims. Moscow, recognizing that it could not win a war if US retaliation was unrestrained, would seek to confine its targeting rigorously to US military assets, and probably would risk paying some military price as an inescapable consequence of an attempt to leave
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the US national command authorities (NCA) intact. It is readily apparent that this view of central nuclear war, in the absence of direct evidence of Soviet intentions, amounts both to the projection of dominant American ideas on nuclear strategy, escalation control, and war termination, upon the USSR, and to recognition of an ancient maxim that an enemy should be left an alternative to a fight to the death. The second school of thought on Soviet nuclear strategy holds that Soviet strategic culture denies, or at least very strongly encourages the denial of, the possibility of limited central nuclear war. In this view of the Soviet official mind-set, a nuclear assault upon the homeland would be interpreted on the receiving end as a bid for complete victory.38 The context could be all important, but it may be that nuclear assault on the Soviet homeland itself would define the context and the terms of engagement. Politically, too much would be at stake for the superpowers to fight each other at home according to some variant of the caricature of eighteenth-century war doctrine which helped inspire Western limited-war theory in the 1950s. None the less, Soviet military planners and operators would treat nuclear-armed forces as scarce assets to be employed cost-effectively; that is to say efficiently. However, in the view of this second school of thought Soviet strategy would not be concerned to control escalation (save by brute force) or to establish favorable conditions for a negotiated "war termination." Instead, Soviet military power would be applied for the proximate goal of securing a clear, favorable military decision. Common sense suggests that the first school of thought ought to be correct. Is it reasonable to believe that the same Soviet Union which would be very reluctant to have resort to nuclear weapons in a regional conflict,39 and which has claimed authoritatively that it would control such nuclear resort carefully, would wage a central nuclear conflict as if it were an old fashioned war which could be won decisively? Furthermore, even if the military professionals on the General Staff are the sole authors and would be the authoritative executors of the war plans, is it reasonable to believe that political leaders on the wartime Stavka would not intrude themselves into some critical details of nuclear force application?40 Though with generally poor results, Joseph Stalin attempted to play field commander in 1941-42 (and subsequently he certainly monitored very closely the performance of those to whom he had delegated operational command). 41 Is it likely that a future Soviet/Russian president would not endeavor to do likewise, given what would be at stake? Indeed, after 1914 generals lost their licenses to conduct war according to the dictates of military expediency. It is entirely possible, for example, that a US president would find none of the pre-planned SIOP options to be responsive to his policy needs.
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Four points warrant citation as bearing upon, or answering directly, the question posed about Soviet choice of strategy for the conduct of central Soviet war. First, Soviet military and civilian capabilities for waging and surviving war are inherently ambiguous. Improvements in Soviet strategic C 3 I, in the technical reliability of their weapon systems on alert, in the pre-launch survivability of forces, and in the accuracy with which weapons can be laid down at great distances - are all points which lend themselves to alternative interpretation vis-d-vis Soviet preferences in strategy. Second, it would seem to be sensible, or perhaps just prudent, to take Soviet leaders and commentators at face value when they make the logical, if potentially very dangerous, argument that the conduct of war must be governed by its political purposes. That view is both an unintelligent, even fatalistic, reading of Clausewitz and is historically less than fully persuasive. Clausewitz's "grammar" of war may make no sense without reference to policy, but - as the master noted - war does have a grammar, a nature, of its own which "policy" needs to understand. None the less, Soviet leaders and commentators have offered no encouragement to the idea that a central war could be waged to any conclusion other than the defeat of one side or the other (or both). Defeat, of course, can have different meanings for different polities. Third, as best one can tell from the evidence available, the Soviet approach to war does not include education in the supposedly strategic theories and processes of crisis management, threshold observance for escalation control, and war termination. In practice, of course the Soviet Union manages crises, recognizes the salience of some thresholds for the control of violence, and seeks to terminate conflicts. However, Soviet strategic culture approaches those functions in a distinctly unAmerican manner. As a caveat, one should not lightly project Soviet style in regional crises or conflicts for the shaping of US expectations of Soviet style in the conduct of central nuclear war. Fourth, whether or not the result would be a foredoomed attempt to "conventionalize" that which inherently is not conventional,42 Soviet statements of all kinds are consistent only with the view that should they ever be compelled, very reluctantly, to wage central nuclear war, they would seek, though not confidently expect to achieve, a clear military (and hence political) decision. One cannot and should not predict that the USSR assuredly would seek to win a war which its experts, as well as common sense, would deny could be won. But, the canons of scholarship, and a concern lest national strategic cultural assumptions not mislead, oblige us to behave as if the USSR would seek to win a World War III in a classical military fashion. There are obvious commonsense, practical reasons why
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Soviet leaders should take a distinctly non-traditional view of central nuclear war (with the West if not with China) - which is to say a view of such a war which eschews interest in seeking military victory (but not in avoiding defeat). Moreover, those are reasons sufficiently powerful for the United States to be motivated to offer at least the possibility of a structure of conflict that need not lead to a general catastrophe. It is one thing to endorse a strategy that could fail deadly; it is quite another to endorse a strategy that, if tested, must fail deadly. This fourth point amounts to the advice: prepare for the worst, but make some intelligent provision to facilitate a less bad sequence of events. Has Soviet nuclear strategy changed? Contingency plans for the application of nuclear firepower are always changing in detail, as the inventory of weapons and the target base evolve. However, given the difficulty described above of understanding Soviet nuclear strategy, there is no evidence of recent years of any noteworthy change in that strategy for the conduct of central nuclear war. Indeed, there is no reason why evidence of such change may be awaiting discovery. Not only is there no evidence of authoritative (as opposed to civilian speculative) new military thinking pertaining to nuclear strategy for central war, in addition it is not obvious that there is room for new thinking. Long before the advent of the much heralded "new thinking," Soviet leaders would seem to have decided that although the USSR should endeavor to secure the best military outcome available in the event of general war, bilateral disaster was the most probable result of such a conflict. Notwithstanding the Soviet effort to secure such advantage as might be secured through vigorous offensive-defensive strategic-forces' competition, the overriding purpose of that competition has been, and remains, the negative one of deterring US (inter alia) initiatives. Should Soviet leaders come to feel an unaccustomed lack of coercive options on the ground as the structure of European security changes, then it is possible that more demanding (i.e. compellent) missions may be asked of their "strategic" (perhaps just nuclear-armed) forces. Lest the thoughts just expressed should seem unduly conservative, readers should consider the major continuities in US central-war strategy and nuclear targeting from the revision of the first SIOP (1960) in 1961 (SIOP-62) until SIOP-6F of 1989.43 Enough has been published about US targeting policy to support the point that even in a country where ideas on central war strategy are debated intensively, and where ideas come and go as fashions, relatively little of major significance has changed over the
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decades. Weapon systems phase in and are phased out (some come and stay), and the tactical feasibility of particular missions will fluctuate technically, but truly "new thinking" about nuclear strategy is a rarity indeed and there is little in evidence in Moscow today. Undoubtedly there is considerable flux and uncertainty in the militarytechnical dimension of Soviet military doctrine. That uncertainty pertains both to attempts to respond to political insistence upon a less offensive orientation to force posture and plans, and to the proper meaning of the latest technical revolution in military affairs.44 Many Soviet military theorists believe that formerly valid distinctions between offensive and defensive weapons are in the process of definitive erosion. Also, they believe that NATO's (future) arsenal of ACMs, heavily grouped into "strike-reconnaissance complexes," could thwart the operational designs of Soviet ground forces. Overall, pending the need to accommodate new (Soviet) defensive weapons (ground and space-based), and perhaps to plan opportunistically to take advantage of new possibilities for damage limitation granted by unwise (past, present, and future) US decisions on strategic force posture under the influence of START, one should not anticipate important change in Soviet strategy for the conduct of central nuclear war. The realm of sensible choice for the Soviet Union is far less over strategic forces than it is over general purpose forces; an important point, albeit not unique to the Soviet case. After all, what might constitute the strategic-force equivalent of the military evacuation of East-Central Europe? (Possibly the endorsement of some concept of a "minimum deterrent.") But a Soviet Union acutely aware that it was surrendering the strategic leverage of a landpower previously plainly superior in Europe, would not be likely to be a Soviet Union willing to choose to reduce the military rationality of its central-war forces. However, crystal balls quite aside, as of this time of writing there is no authoritative Soviet evidence indicating anything resembling radical "new thinking" on nuclear strategy for central war. The four questions addressed above are all important and merit attention. The three remaining questions are none of them important, because the answers are quite trivially obvious in Soviet perspective. But, so many Western commentators believe that these questions - and the answers - are significant, that it is necessary to treat them here, if only very briefly. First, could a nuclear war be won? Soviet and US leaders recognize that a war in which some nuclear weapons were used could be won. The superpowers, inter alia, could use nuclear weapons and win a war. However, both sides tacitly agree that an attempt to secure a classic military victory with the outright, definitive defeat of the other superpower, is, pro
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tern, at least, impractical. Soviet leaders give every evidence of believing that nuclear war could occur, that a range of outcomes is possible, that the differences on that range could matter enormously, and that it is the duty of a nuclear-armed state to make militarily intelligent contingency plans for the efficient employment of nuclear weapons. Second, must the USSR compete with the United States? Notwithstanding domestic perestroika and "new thinking" on foreign and military affairs, there is no sign that Mikhail Gorbachev is suffering from galloping naivetethe classic ailment of Western liberals. Security is always relative, and relations of influence and anxiety are ever dynamic. The current upheaval in the Soviet empire would appear to have been caused predominantly by the felt need of the Soviet leadership to improve the competitive trim of their imperial polity. The fact that perestroika has led to the catastrophic demotion of the CPSU was not predictable long in advance; neither was it intended by Gorbachev. Reform and revolution can have a dynamic all their own. In order to effect the necessary reforms (the scope of which has changed over the years), the USSR elected to destabilize its own hegemonic empire in East-Central Europe (which is to say to deny support to non-reformminded leaders), and (hopefully) maintain sufficient geopolitical dominance as to yield her the kind of political influence in Europe that her security requires. Far from constituting evidence of the future irrelevance of superpower competition, Gorbachev's new thinking provides the most convincing proof of Soviet determination so to reform that they will be able to compete effectively in the next century. As Stalin so wisely said, "[t]hose who fall behind get beaten." T h i r d , is there an arms control alternative
to the superpower
military
competition? Soviet strategic culture has its blind spots - as with its often misplaced enthusiasm for a quantifiably "scientific" approach to many matters of defense analysis which transcend the purely tactical (which is quantifiable). However, it is a great strength of Soviet strategic culture that it tends not to confuse the political with the administrative. Soviet leaders have never endorsed or encouraged the very American idea that some of the political duties of the two security communities can be devolved upon technical experts. 45 If anything, traditionally the USSR has overcentralized at the top. Moscow has taken an unreasonably and impractically extensive view of what constitutes properly political, as contrasted with technical administrative, subjects. In Soviet strategic culture the idea is close to absurd that there is, or could be, an arms control process with a distinctive militarytechnical logic of stability, through which the superpowers could channel much of their strategic relationship. There is a logic of power politics and
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there is an evolving correlation of forces, including a multi-faceted relationship, which must influence policy choice. But, the notion that there is a military-technical theory of strategic stability that can be applied, or, as it were, administered, by experts in an arms control process, is simply unSoviet. It should be recalled that what Soviet authorities refer to as their military doctrine has a military-technical dimension; that dimension is subordinate to high political direction. In Soviet strategic culture and consequently in day-by-day practice, arms control is a valued instrument of grand strategy. Arms control cannot have a strategic logic of its own. Arms control cannot function as an effective substitute for military competition in the way that such competition can substitute for war, because a "process" of arms control engagement has meaning only as an expression of a political urge to compete. If the urge to compete erodes and vanishes, then an arms control nexus becomes irrelevant. Conclusions Seven major points stand out as worth citing as conclusions to this chapter. First, the scope for opinion on Soviet nuclear strategy remains uncomfortably high. Direct evidence on Soviet preferences, let alone clear choices, in nuclear strategy, is all but totally absent. Western governments know a great deal about the capabilities and standard procedures of Soviet nucleararmed forces, and from intelligence data of all kinds they can make some plausible guesses about Soviet crisis-time moves. But, in answer to the question, "how would Moscow choose to fight its nuclear-armed central war forces in face of an enemy endeavoring to wage nuclear war with considerable targeting restraint?" one is in the realm only of guesswork. To date, Soviet defense professionals have not debated Soviet centralwar strategy in public. Large and flexibly capable land forces are to some degree constrained in their operational choices by the demands of terrain and weather. Central-war nuclear forces, with only modest exceptions, are not severely limited by physical geography in the choices they provide to policymakers. 46 Second, the cultural factors which influence perception are disciplined, to the degree that they are not themselves shaped, by objective conditions. Those conditions (the width of the Pacific Ocean, the general level of national technical and managerial competence, and so forth) will both affect what is perceived to be possible and, of course, will influence strongly what is practicably achievable. Soviet military doctrine, and certainly Soviet nuclear strategy, manifestly has been shaped by some highly plausible appreciations, or perceptions, of objective conditions. Objective
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conditions are dynamic. Net military competence varies from period to period (consider the combat prowess, qualitatively and quantitatively, of the Soviet Army, over the years 1939 - as revealed in Finland - to 1945). Whatever one discovers at the present time about Soviet strategic culture, or about technical developments in Soviet ICBMs, defense radars, and the like, Soviet military doctrine is dominated by the objective condition - and recognition of the same - that nuclear war against the United States cannot reliably be waged to achieve a classic military victory. Nuclear war should function to the net Soviet tactical and operational advantage in most circumstances at sea. But that judgment is overborne in significance by the strong probability that a Western Alliance unable to use its transAtlantic or transpacific sea lines of communication, would have prompt resort to nuclear weapons on land. 47 Third, within the severe constraints imposed by tolerably accurate recognition of objective conditions, the strategic culture that is the product of centuries of more or less unique historical experience works to fashion preferences and actual choices. It is a reality that a full-scale, or even much of, a SIOP-RISOP "exchange," must prove to be mutually self-defeating, but the culturally distinctive superpowers have reacted to that frustrating apparent fact in rather different ways (at least in so far as one can tell from open sources on the US side, and from the highly ambiguous evidence on the Soviet side). The USSR consistently has said that it rejects American strategic ideas on the controlled conduct of limited central war. On the one hand there lurks the probably unrealistic US aspiration for escalation control in a carefully conducted central nuclear war. On the other hand there hovers the Soviet aspiration that somehow, on the night and contrary to analysisbased judgment and common sense, Soviet nuclear arms could enforce a useful level of damage limitation. In practice, neither superpower has a militarily sufficiently useful central nuclear war posture as reliably to be able to coerce, or just bludgeon, its way to victory. Everybody knows this, but responsible defense officials must do their best with the technically, and hence tactically, inadequate military tools extant (and hope for a more counterforce-capable tomorrow). Fourth, although the Soviet Union of the early 1990s appears to be willing, even eager, to reduce nuclear-armed central-war forces by a nominal 50 percent (in START) or more (a START II), the political, strategic, operational, and tactical fundamentals of long-range nuclear forces have yet to be debated publicly. If there is a great Soviet debate underway on the utility or character of the strategic forces, it has yet to be monitored in the West. Already, Soviet postural evolution seems intelligently to have anticipated probable START limits (consider the case of
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the road-mobile single-warhead SS-25, for example).48 The (new) thinking that really mattered about the strategic utility, and hence policy and strategic purposes of central-war nuclear forces, appears to have been settled as of the close of the 1970s at the latest. If the United States could not be deterred from taking nuclear initiatives, then Soviet nuclear-armed forces would be charged to do their best to achieve the military conditions for an overall political victory. Fifth, a mixture of strategic-cultural preference and recognition of objective conditions renders it unlikely that Soviet nuclear strategy for central war will change radically in the 1990s. The political possibility of a superpower central war may alter, but that is a very different matter. So long as the USSR retains a nuclear arsenal it must enjoy the services of strategy for the contingent employment of that arsenal. Everything in Russian history tells its contemporary legatees to attempt to prepare for war in as militarily rational a manner as possible. Far from seeking to accommodate radical change in their nuclear strategy, Soviet leaders are struggling politically - thus far successfully - to avoid having to adjust precipitately to cumulatively dramatic change in the central-war threat posed by the United States. Specifically, Soviet diplomacy has been waging political warfare against the rather vague US proposal, or threat, to deploy new strategic defenses. Sixth, a possible START treaty regime which might well reduce the US central war arsenal to approximately 9,500 weapons (including nonSTART-accountable warheads) is unlikely to trigger drastic, or even very noticeable, change in Soviet nuclear strategy. It is very probable that the USSR, though economically generally embarrassed, will compete under START more vigorously and less legally than will the United States. Such is the historical pattern of behavior under formal arms control restraint. There is nothing in the structure of the pending START treaty, particularly if treaty adherence is linked more or less formally to continued self-restraint in BMD testing and deployment, which should lend itself to exploitation for the effecting of very important changes in Soviet nuclear strategy. Seventh and finally, the point cannot be overemphasized that the nuclear strategy of the USSR, or of a successor state to the USSR, must be a subject of permanent interest. That superpower, deeply troubled or not, will remain heavily nuclear armed and in need of the services of strategic ideas and plans for the contingent operational direction of its nuclear arsenal. The terms and conditions of the US-Soviet security relationship could range from a freely expressed enmity to entente (or even alliance). However, Soviet nuclear strategy will remain both culturally stamped and responsible to a general logic which binds strategy to policy purpose.
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1 National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242 of 1974 and Presidential Directive (PD)-59, and related matters of US strategic nuclear targeting policy, are treated in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (eds.), Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986). 2 For a detailed examination of this issue, see Colin S. Gray, "ICBM's and Deterrence: The Controversy Over Prompt Launch," The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 10, no. 3 (September 1987), 285-309. 3 See Michael Howard, History of the Second World War: Grand Strategy. Vol. iv, August 1942-September 1943 (London: HMSO, 1970). Soviet ground and air forces similarly were unfit in 1941 for trial by battle with the Wehrmacht- but they had no choice. 4 See Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, vol. 10, no. 1 (January-March 1991), 3-23; and Joseph Rothschild, "Culture and War," in Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy (eds.), The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World: Vol. n. Comparative Dimensions (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 53-72. Also see the collection of essays, Williamson Murray and Alvin H. Bernstein (eds.), The Making of Strategy (Boston: Allen and Unwin, forthcoming). 5 See Colin Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990). 6 "Yet just as individuals are conditioned by the environment in which they grow up, so are governments conditioned by the same environment, and reflect, as well as reflect upon, national characteristics. These characteristics are shaped by geography, climate, historical experiences, and religious beliefs, which in turn determine economic circumstances, national prejudices, ideals or ideologies." Christopher N. Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Coulsdon [UK]: Jane's Information Group, 1988), p. 13. 7 James Sherr, Soviet Power: The Continuing Challenge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 111. 8 Probably the most rigorous and insightful treatment of the "revolutionary" thesis is Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). 9 Quoted in Peter P. Witonski (ed.), Gibbon for Moderns: The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, with Lessons for America Today (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House Publishers, 1974), p. 15. 10 For a good example, see V. V. Druzhinin and D. S. Kontorov, Decision Making and Automation: Concept, Algorithm, Decision (A Soviet View). Soviet Military Thought Series of the US Air Force, no. 6 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975; Moscow, 1972). Note Christopher Donnelly's comments on the Soviet reliance upon mathematical calculation in "The Development of Military Policy Under Gorbachev," in Donnelly (ed.), Gorbachev's Revolution: Economic Pressures and Defence Realities (Coulsdon [UK]: Jane's Information Group, 1989), pp. 124, 136. According to Donnelly, "Military Policy under Gorbachev," this operational-level reliance is "almost total" (p. 136). 11 As John Erickson has noted, Soviet scholars are wont to use the Great Patriotic War "as a vast data base." The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War With Germany,
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13 14
15
16 17
18
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Vol. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), p. viii. For a useful collection of essays by Western scholars, see Jonathan R. Adelman and Christann Lea Gibson (eds.), Contemporary Soviet Military Affairs: The Legacy of World War II (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). Maritime-slanted Western analyses relevant to an attempt to answer this question include Michael McGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987); and Colin S. Gray, Competitive Grand Strategies and The Roles of the Navy (Fairfax, VA: National Security Research, January 1989). See Chris Bellamy, Red God of War: Soviet Artillery and Rocket Forces (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986). This is not to deny that the vulnerable forward-continentalist perspectives of some European allies, not to mention the enduring continentalist urges of the United States itself, could overcome the global-maritime concepts which might encourage Washington to seek to wage a protracted conflict. American history has taught its policymaking legatees to seek swift solutions to complex problems by means of the shortest route. Anglo-American strategy arguments in 1942-44 reflected the clash between somewhat differing theories of victory, which expressed differences between British and American strategic culture. See Samuel P. Huntington, American Military Strategy, Policy Papers in International Affairs, no. 28 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1986); and Colin S. Gray, "Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States, 1945-1990," in Murray and Bernstein (eds.), The Making of Strategy. Aside from such standard sources as the annual US official Soviet Military Power (1981-90, to date), and the trade press (Aviation Week and Jane's Defence Weekly, preeminently), readers should consult the excellent source book, Thomas B. Cochrane et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. iv: Soviet Nuclear Weapons (New York: Harper and Row, 1989). For plausible estimates of gross stockpile numbers, see "Estimated Soviet Nuclear Stockpile (July 1990)," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 46, no. 6 (July/August 1990), 49. Following common usage, a first strike is an attempt to disarm an enemy. First use, in contrast, is an attempt to coerce. See US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat, 1988 (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1988), pp. 59-62; and Soviet Military Power; Prospects for Change, 1989 (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1989), pp. 52-53. See Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985); and the more recent study, Kurt Gottfried and Bruce G. Blair (eds.), Crisis Stability and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Samuel P. Huntington, "US Defense Strategy: The Strategic Innovations of the Reagan Years," in Joseph Kruzel (ed.), American Defense Annual, 1987-1988 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 23-43. The relationship between offense and defense is among the least well appreciated conceptual matters with which US defense professionals are obliged to grapple. See N. V. Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland, JPRS L/10412 (Washington, DC: FBIS, March 25, 1982); and Makhmut Akhmeto-
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23
24
25
26
27
28
29
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Colin S. Gray vich Gareev, M. V. Frunze: Military Theorist (Washington, DC: PergamonBrassey's, 1988; first pub. 1984). These works, let it be noted, were more than just "period pieces." An outstanding Western interpretation of the recent evolution in Soviet military doctrine - reflecting, inter alia, some (not the Warsaw Pact melt down) of the factors cited in the text - is William E. Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine," Foreign Affairs, vol. 67, no. 2 (Winter 1988/89), 114-134. For speculation on this question see Condolezza Rice, "The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union," World Politics, vol. 40, no. 1 (October 1987), 55-81. Also see David Holloway and Condoleezza Rice, "The Evolution of Soviet Forces, Strategy, and Command," in Gottfried and Blair (eds.)j Crisis Stability and Nuclear War, pp. 116-158. In his Tula speech Brezhnev formally disavowed the goal of strategic superiority and argued that nuclear war could not be won. See the analysis in Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Has Soviet Nuclear Strategy Changed?" in Roman Kolkowicz (ed.), The Logic of Nuclear Terror (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), particularly pp. 213-219. Peter Vigor, "Western Perceptions of Soviet Strategic Thought and Doctrine," in Gregory Flynn (ed.), Soviet Military Doctrine and Western Policy (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 79-105. For a comprehensive listing of the "Officer's Library" series, those available in the West and those not, see Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and Dissemination (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), "Appendix D: Original Plan of the Officer's Library Series," pp. 275-277. Graham Hall Turbiville, Jr. (ed.), (compiled by Ghulam Dastagar Wardak), The Voroshilov Lectures, Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy: Vol. i. Issues of Soviet Military Strategy (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989). Luttwak's Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), is flawed by its resolute refusal to provide definitions of key concepts, by its elevation of a powerful insight (that war, really conflict, is pervaded by a paradoxical logic) to a status of theoretical workhorse that exceeds its capacity, and by its lack of a sure intellectual grip of both maritime and nuclear matters. For all that, the book is an outstanding achievement that deservedly will be read long after the critical reviews are forgotten. For example: Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Glenn Kent et al., A Calculus of First-Strike Stability, N-2526-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, June 1988); and Albert Wohlstetter, "Between an Unfree World and None," Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 5 (Summer 1985), 962-994. On the military-technological competition, see David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983); and Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union (London: Weiden-
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34
35
36
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feld and Nicolson, 1983), though seriously dated, is still crammed with valuable insight. For an example of pseudo-measurement, see Dean Wilkening et al., Strategic Defense and Crisis Stability, N-2511-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, April 1989). Also see Kent, A Calculus of First-Strike Stability, for a further example from the same intellectual stable. No quality or quantity of fancy graphics can overcome the fact that strategic stability is not measurable period. See Benjamin S. Lambeth and Kevin N. Lewis, The Strategic Defense Initiative in Soviet Planning and Policy, R-355O-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, January 1988). Characteristic Soviet blasts against SDI included: "Star Wars": Delusions and Dangers (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1985); and Evgeni Velikhov et al., (eds.), Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security (Moscow: Mir Publishing, 1987), chapter 4. See the contrasting views in Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). See Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Lulling and Stimulating Effects of Arms Control," in Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass (eds.), Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 223-273. By way of quite sharp contrast, Donnelly is right to note, even if he overstates, what he calls "an innate Russian ability to see the 'big picture' to subordinate short-term needs to long-term goals." Red Banner, p. 31. The Soviet strength in holistic approaches, whether or not it is "innately Russian," certainly is encouraged by the dialectical method of inquiry which their now practically defunct, though still (barely) authoritative state religion inherited from Nineteenth Century German philosophers. Turbiville (ed.), The Voroshilov Lectures, Vol. i, provides an excellent example of Soviet holism. "All forms of strategic action are interrelated and are conducted on the basis of a unified plan, under the control of the Supreme High Command, to achieve the general aim of the war." p. 252. William T. Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy," in Ball and Richelson (eds.), Strategic Nuclear Targeting, pp. 84-108, 326-329; Notra Trulock III, "Soviet Perspectives on Limited Nuclear Warfare," in Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, and Davis S. Yost (eds.), Swords and Shields: NATO, the USSR and New Choices for Long-Range Offense and Defense (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 53-85; Edward I. Warner III, Soviet Concepts and Capabilities for Limited Nuclear War: What We Know and How We Know It, N-2769-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation); Stephen Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations," in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (eds.), Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 470-531; and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Nuclear War Termination: Soviet Style," in Cimbala and Douglass (eds.), Ending a Nuclear War, pp. 19-43. Unlike Peter Vigor ("Western Perceptions"), my point at this juncture is not that these people are poor scholars, but rather that what they most seek to know is not knowable by the research means available to them (and they all have access to highly classified information).
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37 For example, Notra Trulock III, "Emerging Technologies and Future War: A Soviet View," in Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, The Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, October, 1988), pp. 97-163. The same view pervades Albert Wohlstetter and Richard Brody, "Continuing Control as a Requirement for Deterring," in Carter, Steinbruner, and Zraket (eds.), Managing Nuclear Operations, pp. 142-196. 38 Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations," p. 514. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "On Thresholds in Soviet Military Thought," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 1984), 69-76, also is highly relevant (and disturbingly plausible). 39 But, see the very careful analysis in Stephen Meyer, Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces, Part i: Development of Doctrine and Objectives, and Part n: Capabilities and Implications, Adelphi Papers nos. 187 and 188 (London: IISS, 1984). 40 See Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations," p. 512. 41 See Seweryn Bialer (ed.), Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II (New York: Pegasus, 1969); Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad; and Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-45 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970). 42 Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, pp. 56-63. 43 See Sagan, Moving Targets, chapter 1; Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal; and (with some skepticism) Desmond Ball and Robert C. Toth, "Revising the SIOP: Taking War-Fighting to Dangerous Extremes," International Security, vol. 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990), 65-92. 44 See Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine." 45 For a book length treatment of this point, see Robin Ranger, Arms and Politics, 1958-1978: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979). 46 But see Desmond Ball, "Modern Technology and Geopolitics," in Ciro E. Zoppo and Charles Zorgbibe (eds.), On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 171-199; and Colin S. Gray, "Geography and Grand Strategy," in John B. Hattendorf and Malcolm H. Murfett (eds.), Limitations of Military Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990). 47 An excellent analysis is Donald C. F. Daniel, "The Soviet Navy and Tactical Nuclear War at Sea," Survival, vol. 29, no. 4 (July/August 1987), 318-335. 48 See Michael Brower, "Targeting Soviet Mobile Missiles: Prospects and Implications," Survival, vol. 31, no. 5 (September/October 1989), 433-445.
3
The tightening frame: mutual security and the future of strategic arms limitation Raymond L. Garthoff
Nearly fifteen years ago I published an essay under a similar title at a time when there remained doubt as to whether the Soviet leadership accepted mutual deterrence and was seriously interested in strategic arms reductions and other limitations.1 There is now less doubt as to Soviet interest in deterrence and arms limitation. Today the real questions are, first, whether Soviet "new thinking" offers a way to go beyond stabilization of mutual deterrence through strategic arms limitations toward mutual security through nuclear disarmament, and second whether the United States is ready to do so. Indeed, if a decade ago it could be asked whether the Soviet Union was prepared to join the United States in arms control, the question now is whether the United States is ready to join the Soviet Union in going beyond mere arms control. This discussion will concentrate on the changes in Soviet political, military and security thinking that now pose the challenge, rather than on the American policy response. The Soviets also see other important ideologically sanctioned uses of military force, but the basic Marxist-Leninist ideological framework predicates a fundamentally deterrent role for Soviet military power.2 The Soviets have, none the less, faced a doctrinal dilemma. While jettisoning Stalinist views on the inevitability of war and the necessary or desirable role of war as a catalyst of socialist advance in the world, as Communists they were predisposed to assume that socialism would be destined to survive and to triumph, even if a world nuclear catastrophe occurs. If they openly discarded that view, they long believed, it could place in question not only their whole world-view but also their basis for legitimacy. Hence from the late 1950s through to the mid-1980s there were occasional reaffirmations of confidence in the ultimate triumph of socialism even if a world nuclear war should, despite Soviet efforts to prevent it, occur. Such confidence was expressed in the Party Program adopted in 1961. The Soviet leaders acknowledged that general nuclear war would threaten the whole existence and future of world civilization and mankind. From the late 1960s they began to draw further conclusions from that fact, deepening Soviet interest in strategic arms limitations and reductions, and in prevention of any 57
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nuclear war. Ultimately, in the later 1980s, "new thinking" on this matter led to a new conception of requirements for security. Lenin embraced the observation of Clausewitz that "war is a continuation of policy by other means," and this indeed represents a natural Marxist-Leninist conception. Some Soviet writers, mainly but not exclusively civilians, as early as the 1960s were so impressed by the inexpediency and enormous dangers of any nuclear world war (or indeed any war which could escalate into such a war) that they seemed to challenge this view. They, in turn, were sometimes criticized and refuted by other spokesmen, mainly military. Yet the question kept arising. Why? Mainly because the two sides were not engaged in a theoretical disputation, but in a political argument with considerable potential importance for military programs and policy. In fact, both sides accepted the basic premise that war is a matter of policy or political motivation; both sides also have accepted the fact that resort to nuclear war would not be expedient as a matter of policy. The real underlying debate has been over whether war is recognized as so unpromising and dangerous that it can never occur. Such a question has profound implications for military requirements. Is a force dedicated to deterrence enough? Or, if war were to occur, despite Soviet efforts to prevent it, is a war-waging capability needed to seek a Pyrrhic "victory?" Soviet military power, and the constant enhancement of its capability and readiness, has been justified primarily for deterrence, but also to wage a defensive war if one should come despite Soviet efforts to prevent it. This view was consistently held by the Soviet military and political leaders from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s. It is not accurate, as some Western commentators have done, to counterpose Soviet military interest in a "war-fighting" (and hopefully "war-winning") posture to a "deterrent" one. At least until very recently, the Soviets have seen the former capability as providing the most credible deterrent, as well as serving a contingent resort in the event of war. The emphasis, however, steadily shifted from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s toward the absolute need to prevent nuclear war, even to the extent of repeated authoritative statements by successive Soviet leaders, and military chiefs, on the unwinnability of nuclear war. It is clear from Soviet military and political discussions that acceptance of the Clausewitzian (and Leninist) conceptions of the nature and role of war is not only compatible with mutual deterrence, but reinforces its paramount feature: recognition of the necessity of avoiding and preventing general nuclear war. The most important aspect of this particular question is the unfounded contention of some prominent Western commentators, such as Professor Richard Pipes, widely cited, that "as long as the Russians persist in adhering to the Clausewitzian maxim on the function of war, mutual deterrence does not really exist." 3 On the contrary, the Soviet
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professional literature clearly shows that there is no contradiction between being "Clausewitzian" and recognizing the validity of mutual deterrence. Mutual deterrence in Soviet writings has usually been expressed in terms of assured retaliatory capability which would devastate the aggressor, because this formulation (rather than "mutual assured destruction" capability) is more responsive to ideological sensitivity over the idea that the USSR could be considered a potential aggressor and thus needs to be deterred. (Only adversaries - the United States, more broadly the imperialists, and for a time also the Chinese communists - are described as potential aggressors.) In addition, this formulation avoids identification with the specific content of the American concept of "mutual assured destruction," often expressed in terms of a countervalue capability for destroying a specified percentage of the opponent's industry and population. This US interpretation is more limited than the Soviet recognition of mutual deterrence, which rests simply on mutual capability for devastating retaliation unacceptable to a rational potential initiator of war, without calculations of arbitrary industrial and population losses that theoretically would be acceptable costs.4 Some observers have posited a possible Soviet conception of "deterrence by denial," as contrasted with the American conception of "deterrence by punishment." (Neither, of course, is a Soviet, or for that matter an official American, expression.) "Deterrence by denial" is conceived as seeking to deter by maintaining a capability for thwarting and defeating a potential attack; "deterrence by punishment" seeks to deter by relying instead on a capability for devastating punitive retaliation. Soviet force posture and "war-waging" military doctrine have suggested the possible applicability of this idea, but Soviet statements on deterrence have invariably been couched in terms of retaliatory punishment, and there is no indication that such a distinction reflects a Soviet way of thinking. The political leaders in their programmatic statements have endorsed the idea that deterrence requires strong and ready combat capability, but have never gone on to discuss meeting requirements for waging and winning a war. Brezhnev, for example, on a number of occasions stated simply: "Any potential aggressor is well aware that any attempt to launch a nuclear missile attack on our country would be met by devastating retaliation."5 In the Soviet view - shared by military and civilian leaders - just as in the mainstream of thinking in the United States in the 1970s, overall "parity" has existed for twenty years. There have been those - again, both in Moscow and in Washington, especially by the end of the 1970s - who were apprehensive as to whether this parity would be upset by some successful effort of the other side. But successive US secretaries of defense and
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chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed, even when sounding such an alarm for the future (fortunately, one that seems each few years to recede to a few years hence), that "at present" there is an overall strategic parity that while each side has certain areas of superiority they balance out to yield overall deterrent parity. Parity was, of course, for the Soviet side a significant advance over the previous US unilateral superiority. Soviet political leaders from the ebullient Khrushchev of the late 1950s on had been prematurely claiming various partial superiorities and overall parity. But only in the early to mid-1970s did the Soviet military leaders admit that an assured retaliatory capability for the USSR had not come about until "the 1960s," or the late 1960s. By the late 1970s and early 1980s commentators began to acknowledge that it was only in the early 1970s that "the USSR achieved nuclear missile parity with the United States." 6 This became the standard view in the 1980s. And the Soviet military have acknowledged that while each side has certain areas of superiority, these balance out to yield an overall parity. Nevertheless, uncertainties remain in the 1990s. Maintaining mutual deterrence The Soviet leadership, like its US counterpart, has always looked in the first instance and in the final account to its own unilateral military strength as the guarantor of deterrence of the other side and, hence, of mutual deterrence. Soviet generals in the 1970s often cited a statement made by General Secretary Brezhnev in 1970: "We have created strategic forces which constitute a reliable means of deterring any aggressor. We shall respond to any and all attempts from any quarter to obtain military superiority over the USSR with a suitable increase in military strength to guarantee our defense. We cannot do otherwise." 7 This, of course, remains a postulate of Soviet defense policy - as, indeed, of parallel US policy. In both the Soviet Union and the United States, elements of the professional military leadership, especially at the outset, were somewhat skeptical of the role that arms control - especially bilateral (or multilateral) negotiated commitments to strategic arms limitations - can play in securing such deterrence. At the same time, there is good evidence that national leaderships, including senior professional military men, came increasingly in the 1970s to accept negotiated strategic arms limitations as a contributing element in providing more stable and less costly deterrent military forces. Let us recall the important discussion by General Zemskov in Military Thought in 1969. He spoke of the particular importance of the possible "disruption" of the nuclear balance in case of "the creation by one of the sides of highly effective means of anti-ballistic missile defense while the
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other side lags considerably in solution of these tasks" and that it would "increase greatly the danger of a nuclear war" if the West achieved such an advantage. 8 It is clear that this reflected a view held at the highest political and military levels, and the congruence of Soviet and American views and objectives led to the ABM Treaty signed in May 1972. Many Soviet writers have noted the effect of SALT in reflecting and supporting parity and the nuclear balance. Trofimenko expressed with particular precision the effect of the ABM Treaty on mutual deterrence, as seen by the Soviets. He described "a situation of equality of strategic capabilities of the USSR and the United States stemming from the essential equality in the balance of strategic arms (in particular, since each of the sides under any circumstances retains the capability for a retaliatory strike on the vital centers of the other)." While this situation had developed by the late 1960s, and was only implicitly codified in the SALT I agreements in late 1972, Trofimenko spoke of "the equalizing of capabilities of the USSR and the US for a retaliatory strike (in particular as a result of the prohibition on the creation of nation-wide ABM systems through the 1972 Treaty)," 9 and further "By relinquishing deployment of nation-wide ABM systems, the two sides eliminated one of the main motivating stimuli to the further build-up of efforts in the field of offensive systems." 10 This recognition of the key significance of the ABM Treaty in "preventing the emergence of a chain reaction of competition between offensive and defensive arms" was specifically cited by Marshal Grechko, then Minister of Defense, and General of the Army (now Marshal) Kulikov, then Chief of the General Staff, in 1972 in endorsing the treaty when it was formally considered by the Supreme Soviet in the ratification process. 11 Aleksandr Bovin, following the signing of the SALT II treaty in 1979, similarly commented on the contribution of the SALT I ABM treaty. 12 We should recall the second element in General Zemskov's analysis in 1969. In addition to noting the possibility of the disruption of the nuclear balance if one side obtained an effective ABM capability and the other did not, he also had noted such a danger "in case of a further sharp increase of nuclear [strike] potential" by one side. 13 Specifically, the great threat seen in the 1970s was MIRV. General Cherednichenko spelled it out in another article in Military Thought in 1974, referring to the so-called "Schlesinger Doctrine." He stated that while the counterforce conception was not new in American military thinking, in the 1960s a disarming strike had not been a real possibility, but with MIRV a disarming strike could be envisaged. And as he saw it, "the new US nuclear strategy is focused on a preventive preemptive strike. It is of a patently aggressive character and aims at increasing the possibilities for initiating a nuclear world war." 14 This is the
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danger Soviet military planners have seen in the qualitative and quantitative superiority of the United States in MIRVed systems throughout the 1970s, and in other new offensive systems in the 1980s, especially coupled with prospective new strategic defensive spaced-based systems in the 1990s or beyond. The main concern of the Soviet leadership is US political-military strategic intention. They have also been concerned over growing US counterforce capabilities and parallel US advocacy of counterforce concepts, both because of threatened destabilization of the existing balance and because of what they suspect as to the underlying US intentions. Dr. Trofimenko, for example, concludes that the "genuine parity" reflected and bolstered by the SALT ABM treaty "does not suit American theoreticians." He has argued that: The true nature of American strategic missile targeting is a most important state secret, and the American command can target its missiles in any way it wishes without speaking out publicly about it. Hence the public campaign of the Pentagon connected with the advertised "retargeting" [of the Schlesinger Doctrine] is . . . a conscious effort to put psychological pressure on the other side.15 The reversal of US stated policy on the destabilizing nature of counterforce capabilities and the open pursuit of such capabilities after 1974 considerably raised Soviet suspicions, especially because it initially accompanied the failure in the latter half of the 1970s to reach a SALT agreement based on the Vladivostok accords. In the Soviet perception, the United States continued, notwithstanding SALT and detente, to seek military superiority even in the 1970s, and more openly in the 1980s. Although some highly placed US leaders and others are considered to have "soberly" evaluated the strategic situation and given up pursuit of supremacy in the 1970s, powerful forces are believed to have continued to seek advantage and superiority in order to compel Soviet acquiescence in US policy preferences. Moreover, actual American military policy and programs have been seen as seeking to upset or to circumvent the nuclear mutual deterrence balance. American counterforce capabilities developed and deployed since the mid-1970s constitute a powerful threat to the overall Soviet ICBM force, bomber force and submarine force (particularly since the latter two are not kept on the same degree of airfield alert or deployment at sea as are their US counterparts). While Americans have focused on growing Minuteman vulnerability, the Soviets recognize that ICBMs are less than one fourth of the US strategic force, and it is far more ominous for the Soviet side that its ICBM force has become increasingly vulnerable, because far more Soviet strategic eggs are in the fixed land-based ICBM force basket - nearly
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70 percent of their total strategic warheads. Also, as noted above, other Soviet intercontinental forces are less numerous, less capable and even more vulnerable. Given the concerns in the United States over the Soviet threat to US ICBMs, it is no wonder that conservative Soviet military planners and responsive political leaders would be concerned over existing and growing US capabilities. From the vantage-point of Moscow, while a general nuclear balance had come into being by the beginning of the 1970s, and parity was recognized in the SALT accords and consolidated by Soviet military modernization programs of the 1970s, major continuing Soviet efforts were needed to keep up the balance. We in the United States are accustomed to regarding the later 1970s as a time of a "relentless Soviet military buildup," and of American relaxation in military programs - in the eyes of the Reagan Administration a decade of neglect and passivity. Yet, in fact, the United States added more strategic warheads to its force during the decade of the 1970s, the decade of detente and SALT, than did the Soviet Union. Moreover, we now know that while catching up with the United States by deploying its own MIRVed missiles the Soviet Union was cutting back in the pace of its overall military procurement. In 1976, the Soviet leadership made a decision of considerable importance: to reduce military spending from an annual rate of increase of four to five percent to about two percent, and to level off the procurement of military weapons and equipment. Paradoxically, just as this policy began to be implemented in 1976-77 the United States began to publicize a campaign decrying a spending gap, and depicting an allegedly undiminished Soviet rate of military spending as evidence of a relentless Soviet military buildup despite detente and SALT. 16 Regrettably, United States intelligence estimators did not detect and establish this Soviet cutback until 1982-83 - but to the Soviets it appeared that the United States was using a false charge of a growing Soviet military buildup that began in the late 1970s and burgeoned in the 1980s.17 The Soviet perspective, while no doubt biased, is more readily understood against this background. It should be emphasized that measuring a military balance and parity is a far more subjective matter than most people realize. Moreover, adversaries are bound not only to see the balance differently, but to resolve uncertainties in favor of the other side in the interests of prudence - and then, often, to use such "worst case" estimates not only for hedging in setting their own military requirements, but also to infer the adversaries' intentions as well as capabilities from such weighted estimates. 18 And Soviet and American military and political leaders have seen the military balance very differently - each side tends to look at the balance as if through the two ends of a telescope, at the adversary's capabilities through a magnifying lens and
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then at one's own forces through the minifying reverse lens. Moreover, different historical, cultural-ideological, geopolitical and other filters importantly affect judgments. This occurred on both sides in the last half of the 1970s with respect to buildup and capabilities, and in the first half of the 1980s also with respect to intentions. 19 The process of "hedging" on parity by seeking a margin of insurance is occasionally recognized by Soviet commentators, but without much sympathy and without admitting that it affects their own defense programming. Indeed, it is usually dismissed as a US pretext for seeking superiority. 20 But it does tend to influence military force planning in both countries. There is, in addition, a strong temptation more or less consciously to manipulate "the threat" by the other side to justify one's own military programs. This also has been only too evident on both sides in this period, especially in the 1980s. Thus, from their perspective Soviet leaders and military and political commentators since the late 1970s have perceived the leaders of the United States to be following a "course directed at overthrowing the existing approximate balance of forces between the USSR and the United States and at achieving American military superiority." 21 The Central Committee in June 1980 charged that the United States was seeking to upset "the existing strategic balance in the world," and reaffirmed the need for strengthened Soviet defense capability "to defeat imperialist plans to attain military superiority." 22 Many Soviet commentators referred to the alleged US attempt "to destabilize global strategic parity in its own favor," and failure to recognize that "security in the age of nuclear parity is based on stability, and stability is based on the mutual acknowledgement of equality and on abandoning the aspiration for superiority." 23 Beginning in 1980-81, Soviet military men began to become increasingly concerned as the United States buildup became large and sustained. Yet successive Soviet leaderships under Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev, while vowing to maintain parity and continuing Soviet strategic modernization programs, did not accept plans for a comparable Soviet buildup. Military leaders, and other Soviet leaders and commentators, have displayed considerable suspicion of US intentions, and concern not only over growing US capabilities, but also as to why this continued increase in capabilities is sought. To be sure, some of these expressions of concern doubtless serve other purposes, such as argument to support requested Soviet military programs. But many have the ring of sincerity about them and many cite incontrovertible evidence to support their arguments on capabilities, as well as "evidence" which to the Soviets seem to be convincing signs of nefarious US objectives and intentions. 24 During the first Reagan Administration the sustained American military
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buildup stilled any doubts in Moscow that there was a major United States effort to regain strategic superiority. While seeing the Reagan Administration's military program as essentially continuing and building on those of its predecessor, Soviet observers saw radical change in two other respects, changes that imparted a still more ominous cast to the whole direction of US military strategy. The first significant new departure was the attitude toward strategic arms limitation. The second significant new departure of the Reagan Administration was the president's flamboyant advocacy of a strategic defense initiative (SDI), as it came to be called officially, better known (and termed in most Soviet commentary) as "Star Wars." The Star Wars initiative directly challenged the whole rationale of the ABM Treaty banning a ballistic missile defense of the territories of the two countries. Thus, the real American objective was perceived as a defensive shield to augment a strengthened sword and permit use politically, or even militarily, of a coercive first strike capability.25 This aim seemed strengthened in later months and years as US spokesmen increasingly shied away from the idea that the SDI could replace a nuclear offensive deterrent, as Reagan had suggested, and claimed instead it would supplement offensive forces and strengthen deterrence (interpreted by the Soviets to mean coercion). Space weapons, seen as a principal element in the SDI, have come to be suspected of development also as offensive arms, "space strike weapons." Thus, for example, Marshal Akhromeyev, then first deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff, wrote that: "Reagan's so-called 'Strategic Defense Initiative,' which envisages the creation of a large-scale ABM defense system and, most important, the deployment of strike weapons in space, also pursues aggressive aims. The main purpose of this program is perfectly clear: to make possible a sudden nuclear attack on the Soviet Union with minimal risk to the United States." 26 Then Defense Minister Marshal Sergei Sokolov similarly declared in 1985 that "From the military view-point, the American 'Star Wars' plan is an integral part of US nuclear strategy, a.first-strike strategy." 27 The Soviet military, as well as political, leaders see the Star Wars program as a US attempt to capitalize on technological superiorities in seeking a military superiority in order to gain political dominance. Even if doomed to failure (and the Soviets may not be quite so certain of this outcome as they say), it would at least disrupt the offensive - defensive connection stability by the ABM Treaty. Again, Marshal Sokolov stressed that "the creation by one of the sides of a large-scale ABM system will break this interconnection ['that objectively exists between offensive and defensive arms'], will destabilize the strategic situation, and will require the other side to reestablish the situation either by building up its strategic
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offensive arms, or supplementing them with antiballistic missile systems, or most likely both." 28 The SDI is also seen as both undermining the existing ABM Treaty, and precluding further steps in strategic offensive arms limitations. As General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev put it: "The creation of space weapons can have only one result: the arms race will become even more intensive and will embrace new spheres." 29 Indeed, Soviet commentators not only see an intensification of the arms race as the inescapable result of the SDI, but also as part of at least its initial purpose: "The real purpose behind Reagan's space fantasies is to pave the way for renouncing existing accords and whipping up the arms race in all kinds of strategic weapons, offensive and defensive." 30 Finally, complementing and supporting both the American abandonment of serious arms control, and the intention to escape the constraints of the ABM Treaty, was an escalation of charges of Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty, SALT II, and other arms control agreements. The Soviet leaders explicitly tied these military developments to the aims of the Reagan Administration to mount a "crusade" against Soviet socialism, and "to destroy socialism as a social-political system." 31 Thus in addition to intensifying military competition, and making arms control impossible, the US Star Wars program has been seen as reflecting and intensifying political confrontation. By coincidence the resumption of arms negotiations occurred just as Gorbachev became the Soviet leader. Initially, for the first year, only minor steps were taken by either side - the United States was not really prepared to negotiate any constraints on strategic defenses and space weapons, and the Soviet Union was not prepared to move on strategic arms reductions in the absence of such constraints. Even the restoration of highest-level contact in the summit meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at Geneva in November 1985 only produced another papering over of that basic divergence, rather than a step toward its resolution. On January 15,1986, Gorbachev unilaterally proposed a plan for gradual staged elimination of all nuclear weapons in fifteen years, by the end of the century. 32 While widely regarded at the time as primarily a propaganda initiative, it provided a framework for partial agreements, and directly contributed to the later INF Treaty, the proposed 50 percent reduction in strategic arms, and the new readiness for on-site inspection that made that progress possible.33 The Reykjavik summit in October 1986 represented a spectacular failure in an over-ambitious attempt to reach a very far-reaching reduction of nuclear arms, caused by an impasse over the question of strategic defense and space weapons. None the less, there was real progress in negotiation of
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many elements for a 50 percent strategic arms reduction agreement, and toward the eventual INF Treaty. In December 1987 the INF Treaty was signed, and in May 1988 ratified, while negotiation continued on a 50 percent reduction in strategic arms. Meanwhile, attention increasingly turned toward forthcoming talks on conventional arms in Europe. This was given an impetus by a major unilateral reduction, including six forward-deployed Soviet tank divisions in Central Europe, announced by Gorbachev in a speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1988.34 Arms control and reductions, an uncertain prospect in 1980-81, and indeed until 1986-87, became a growing concern. To be sure, there remains serious technical difficulties over verification of some measures, but not because of political reticence. There also remain important differences over evaluations of requirements for deterrence and stability based on the differing geostrategic perspectives of the two sides. The questions of continued commitment to the ABM Treaty and to the strategic design it embodies remain. But Soviet interest in strategic arms limitations and reductions is not an issue. Mutual deterrence, despite differences over the respective weight to be accorded to unilateral defense or negotiated reduction, is accepted by both sides. There has, however, been an interesting and significant transformation underway on the Soviet side. From mutual deterrence toward mutual security As early as the mid-1970s, arguments began to appear in some Soviet writings on the need to go beyond codification of a nuclear balance on the basis of parity at the very high levels currently existing. A writer in Pravda in 1976 argued: "Trying to justify the arms race, certain political circles in Western countries propagandize some sort of balance of terror which is supposedly necessary to maintain peace and to ensure the security of peoples. But such a balance is an unreliable foundation for security. The real way to achieve security is to observe the principle of the non-use of force."35 These commentators did not oppose a nuclear balance based on parity from the standpoint of seeking superiority, but rather argued for a need to go beyond it to disarmament.36 Soviet objections to the "balance of terror" and indefinite reliance on mutual deterrence extend beyond concerns and continuing risks of possible resort to nuclear warfare or accidental occurrence precipitating nuclear war. "The conception of preserving peace on the basis of an 'equilibrium of fear' or 'balance of terror' occupies an important place in the arsenal of the enemies of disarmament."37 The concept of the "balance of terror" and
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mutual deterrence is, it is argued, used by Western opponents of detente and disarmament to legitimize the arms race. 38 Nevertheless, Soviet critics note that while the "balance of terror" is an uneasy peace owing to the tension engendered by being under a nuclear sword of Damocles, and much less satisfactory than one marked by trust and disarmament, still "such a balance is peace." 39 Thus, the Soviet position has been to accept that "nuclear missile parity is a condition contributing to the success of a policy of peace," and that detente in the 1970s reflected the strategic nuclear balance of parity, while advocating steps beyond that situation toward greater cooperation and disarmament. 40 By the time of the 26th Party Congress in 1981, Brezhnev declared that "to count on victory in a nuclear war is dangerous madness." 41 A few months later he repeated that statement, and added that "only he who has decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging a victor. No matter what strength an attacker possesses, no matter what method of unleashing war he chooses, he will not attain his aims. Retribution will inevitably ensue." 42 Party leaders Andropov and Chernenko made similar statements in major party pronouncements on Lenin's anniversary, and Chernenko stressed that it would be "criminal" to view nuclear war as a "rational, almost 'legitimate' continuation of policy." 43 At the Geneva Summit meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, it was reportedly Gorbachev who took the initiative in proposing inclusion in the joint statement that the two sides "agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought," as well as reaffirming that they would "not seek to achieve military superiority." 44 By the mid-1980s even Soviet military spokesmen were saying that today "what is at issue is no longer victory or defeat, but annihilation or existence." Lieutenant General Dmitri Volkogonov, then deputy chief of the Main Political Administration and a well-known military theorist, made that statement in 1985 in a major article on "War and Peace in the 'Nuclear Age'" on the seventieth anniversary of Lenin's principal military writing, "Socialism and War." 45 He reaffirmed as valid today Lenin's Clausewitzian definition of war as the continuation of policy by violent means, but went on to stress that "it is becoming increasingly obvious that a nuclear war can no longer be used by an aggressor as a means for resolving political tasks." He cited Brezhnev's 26th Congress statement that "counting on victory in a nuclear war is dangerous madness," and as noted above went beyond to question even the concept of "victory" for anyone. He also repeated the judgment that "The arms buildup above a certain level ceases to play a decisive military role." As he put it, "Indeed, life on earth can be annihilated only once, not twice or three times over." And he cited a
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statement attributed to Lenin that the militarization of science and technology can undermine "the very conditions of the existence of human society," which he depicted as displaying striking sagacity. No matter how one interprets this or other statements by Lenin, what is significant is the ideological basis being provided to support the current Soviet view and to discourage any challenges to it. Deterrence is the underlying military policy, and "the only objective material basis for deterrence of war today is the capability of socialism to maintain strategic parity in nuclear means." General Volkogonov emphasized, as do all Soviet writers, the existence of a "prevailing approximate parity in strategic nuclear forces" as depriving the imperialists of any realistic hope for achieving victory and thus deterring war and preserving the peace. Far from seeing this as a transient development, he drew from it a far-reaching theoretical proposition: "Essentially, this dialectical interconnection between a balance of strategic forces and attainment of international security emerges as one of the laws governing the preservation of peace in the world." But while deterrence is seen as the necessary bedrock, Volkogonov also stressed that "the dominating imperative of 'the nuclear age' is that real security lies not in the search for ways to achieve victory in war, but in the ability to prevent a nuclear cataclysm." 46 This discussion is indicative of the trend in Soviet military and political thinking by the mid-1980s.47 This general approach had received authoritative advocacy from successive Soviet political leaders. Gorbachev, however, appears to have carried this line of thinking further. Gorbachev and the "new thinking" on security By the time of the 27th Party Congress in 1986, Gorbachev not only spoke of "the complete unacceptability of nuclear war," but also of the insufficiency for security of defense or deterrence in the nuclear age. "The character of contemporary weapons," he said, "does not permit any state hope of defending itself by military-technical means alone, even by creating the most powerful defense." 48 While accepting the reality of mutual deterrence "when the whole world has become a nuclear hostage," he argued that "security cannot indefinitely be built on fear of retaliation, that is on doctrines of 'deterrence' or 'intimidation.'" Moreover, "these doctrines [deterrence] encourage the arms race, which sooner or later can get out of control." Rather, "Ensuring security more and more becomes a political task and can only be solved by political means. Above all, the will is needed to take the path of disarmament." 49 And "it is more than time to begin a practical withdrawal from balancing on the brink of war, from a
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balance of terror, to normal civilized forms of mutual relations between states of the two systems." 50 By this time the Soviet leadership had established the maintenance of strategic parity with the United States as a foundation for stability, deterrence, arms control, and security, and endorsed all these aims. An article in May 1986 in the authoritative journal Kommunist is worth citing at some length: Life has so developed that both of our countries must proceed from the fact that strategic parity is a natural condition. Without a military-strategic balance the maintenance of international stability is unthinkable. Without it it would hardly have been possible to conclude a number of treaties and agreements on the limitation of the arms race. An approximate equivalence of forces must be accepted as a foundation for international security, as a self-evident imperative. But for this new thinking, it is necessary to understand that for reliable defense today a considerably reduced number of arms is sufficient. Indeed, and this is obvious to everyone, the present level of the balance of nuclear potentials of the two sides is much too high. For the present this ensures both sides with equal danger. But only for the time being. A continuation of the arms race will inevitably increase this equal danger and it could lead to such extremes that even parity would cease to be a military-political deterrent.51 Similarly, the new Party Program adopted at the 27th Party Congress in 1986 described "The establishment of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and NATO" not only as "a historic achievement of socialism," but also argued that the preservation of parity is "an important factor for safeguarding peace and international security." 52 It is difficult to overstate the importance of strategic parity in Soviet thinking. For example, a leading Soviet academician described as an "epic of the twentieth century," ranking along with the Bolshevik Revolution and the Soviet victory in World War II, "the achievement of militarystrategic parity with the strongest and most mighty capitalist power, the United States, permitting mankind to keep peace on earth and to save civilization from a nuclear missile catastrophe." 53 Yet parity itself, as traditionally conceived, has come under challenge by the new thinking. In delivering the Political Report of the Central Committee to the Party Congress, Gorbachev introduced the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" as a criterion in determining military requirements. 54 He did not spell out how reasonable sufficiency itself would be determined, and encouraged an open discussion of the issue. The military soon began to stress that the foundation for reasonable sufficiency was maintaining strategic parity. 55 General of the Army Dmitri Yazov, minister of defense, emphatically expressed the continuing view that "Military
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strategic parity remains the decisive factor in preventing war at the present time," that is, serves as the key to deterrence of war. 56 Debate, indirectly expressed, none the less continued on whether "parity" meant quantitative equality in strategic forces, or qualitative equality in the ability to deliver a retaliatory strike - that is, a parity in deterrent capability. While the minority of civilian commentators who came close to espousing a doctrine of minimum deterrence with inferior forces has not prevailed in the debate, the idea of qualitative rather than quantitative parity has. Thus even a relatively conservative military writer by 1989 accepted the idea that the traditional quantitative approach must be replaced by a qualitative one based on "reasonable sufficiency for defense," although "the measure of reasonable sufficiency is defined not only by us but also by the other side's actions." Most important, however, is the recognition that parity is defined in mutual deterrent capabilities. The new approach "requires that parity be regarded as a correlation of the two sides' strategic potential that provides capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor in a retaliatory strike." 57 This acceptance of a retaliatory deterrent capability as the essence of parity has also been reflected in confidential internal military discussions. For example, in 1988 this approach was made crystal clear in a discussion in the General Staff journal Military Thought: "Military strategic parity between the USSR and the USA, and between the WTO and NATO, has decisive significance for deterrence of aggression and prevention of war. Maintaining military-strategic parity doesn't mean an absolute equality of forces, but requires capabilities for assured dealing of an unstoppable retaliatory strike." 58 The acceptance by the military of mutual assured destruction capability as the foundation for parity and reasonable sufficiency of strategic forces underlies military support for Gorbachev's efforts to reduce strategic nuclear weapons (and indeed all nuclear weapons) on both sides to the fullest extent negotiable. The new thinking also calls for going beyond mutual deterrence to mutual security. Again, the basis for a new approach was provided by Gorbachev's earlier cited declaration at the Party Congress that "security cannot indefinitely be built on . . . doctrines of'deterrence'...," but "more and more becomes a political task," based on recognition that "security can only be mutual" or general. 59 How do the Soviets envisage mutual security serving as a replacement for mutual deterrence? While various Soviet writers have stressed different aspects of this matter, the overall conception that has been emerging has four elements: strategic stability, national interests of the parties, increased reliance on international institutions, and increased trust. These are
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mutually reinforcing elements, and movement in each can have a synergistic effect on the others. A military balance, and strategic parity in a qualitative deterrent sense, retains an important, and at least initially crucial, role. As Colonel Strebkov has put it, "a qualitative approach to parity requires the creation of an integral system of strategic stability on the basis of military equilibrium." As the military factor diminishes in importance, "as parity falls to lower and lower levels, on the basis of reasonable sufficiency for defense and a balance of interests, there will be a corresponding increase in stability in relations between the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and NATO as a whole. A policy of strength will give way to political and legal means of settling problems that arise." 60 Stressing the role of reliance on reasonable sufficiency in reducing mutual threat perceptions and thereby lowering tension, Soviet analysts have begun to emphasize the need to accommodate the national interests of the sides. "Reasonable sufficiency," they note, "presupposes that in order to prevent aggression it is necessary not only to balance forces, and to evaluate the hypothetical capabilities of the other side, but above all to restrain its leadership from unleashing war, by taking into account its real intentions, and most important its interests." 61 The combination of reciprocally reducing and restructuring military forces in accordance with reasonable sufficiency, and political measures based on mutual accommodation of national interests, would thus become "the shaping of a new model for ensuring security not by means of mutual deterrence but by the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust." 62 Finally, as a concomitant to this diminished military capability and diminished perception of a threat, with increased mutual trust and accommodation, the very role of deterrence will be increasingly assumed by the changing world order and "the role of deterrence in the new world order will no doubt have to be played by political and legal instruments. An important role must be played by international law and international institutions." 63 The increased attention being given by the Soviet Union to international institutions, including the resolution of regional conflicts, is relevant in this connection. The role of strategic arms limitations and reductions in helping to secure parity at even lower levels is obvious. As with other aspects of the changing Soviet military doctrine, some things can be done unilaterally but much can only be done reciprocally by tacit agreement or more likely by formal negotiated accords. Gorbachev's dramatic proposal on January 15, 1986, for elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of this century was perhaps too dramatic, too theatrical. But at Reykjavik in August it became clear that the Soviet Union was prepared to agree on eliminating all nuclear
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weapons. And as less far-reaching interim steps, the Soviets proposed reductions of 50 percent, and soon thereafter agreed to a separate "zero option" elimination of intermediate and lesser range missiles. Parallel with these developments, General Kozlov, former first deputy chief of the General Staff, wrote in the confidential journal Military Thought, not for a public audience, that both parity and mutual deterrence while necessary for the present were not the Soviet preferred state of affairs. The Soviet Union, he stated, "considers military-strategic parity only as a definite frontier beyond which it is necessary to move to achieve a reduction, and ultimately even a complete elimination, of the threat of nuclear war." "Our country," he continued, "is doing everything possible to get out of the situation of 'mutual assured destruction.5 The aim of the policy of the USSR is to exclude nuclear weapons from the arsenals of states and in the final account their complete elimination." 64 In the meantime, the Soviet Union is also moving to change its military objective not only in terms of parity at reduced levels, a defensive and strategic doctrine, and reducing and restructuring elements of their force posture that appear especially threatening to the West (and to China), but also is designing its strategic concept to facilitate conflict termination, rather than victory, as the operative objective in case hostilities were to occur. That, however, is a subject beyond the scope of this discussion. Conclusion Soviet acceptance of parity and mutual deterrence, renunciation of the goal of superiority, and positive interest in negotiated strategic arms limitations and reductions are now much clearer than they were when SALT began more than twenty years ago. Those American commentators who long argued that the Soviets, and in particular the Soviet military, reject mutual deterrence, and who have therefore questioned the basis for mutually useful strategic arms limitations, were evidently not sufficiently aware of the record. Allegations that Soviet statements on mutual deterrence and the unacceptability of general nuclear war were "for export," and contrasting them with selected Soviet military statements on war-waging doctrine, have been either misconceived or mischievous. Authoritative statements of successive Soviet political leaders on such occasions as Party Congresses, and by Soviet military leaders, and finally the evidence from such sources as the confidential USSR Ministry of Defense organ Military Thought, dispel such erroneous assumptions. The record as well as the rhetoric indicates that the Soviet political and military leadership accepts a strategic nuclear balance and parity between
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the USSR and the United States not only as a fact, but as the realistic prospect for the foreseeable future, until it can gradually be superseded by an evolving new world order. They are pursuing extensive military programs to ensure that they do not fail to maintain their side of the balance, which they see as in some jeopardy given US programs, especially the SDL But there is reason to credit their statements that they seek to stabilize and to maintain parity and mutual deterrence at the lowest possible level, and that they desire balanced and verified strategic arms reductions. Moreover, the Soviets are now seeking ways to move from reliance on mutual deterrence to greater reliance on mutual security. Recognition by the Gorbachev regime of the economic problems of the country add powerfully to other incentives to reach agreed arms limitations and major reductions. Finally, it is simply not the case that such avowed Soviet objectives are inconsistent with Soviet military doctrine or with communist ideology. In Marxist-Leninist eyes, military power is not and should not be the driving element in world politics. With "imperialist" military power held in check, the decisive social-economic forces of history, they believe, would determine the future of the world. Surely we can be no less confident in letting history decide. Nuclear war is the one threat to any ideological goal. The intensified efforts of both sides in the late 1970s and much of the 1980s to rely more upon unilateral military programs than on negotiated constraints to secure deterrence compounded the difficulty of a serious negotiation of strategic arms limitations and reductions. So does the inexorable march of military technology. None the less, that process is again underway and the INF Treaty is a solid, if modest, step. A START agreement building on the negotiation since Reykjavik would be an appropriate next step. Negotiating agreed constraints, while the best way to support parity and mutual deterrence, is not easy. Still more difficult is a process of building sufficient trust to move gradually toward mutual security based on minimal deterrent capabilities or even supplanting them altogether. Yet that is now the avowed Soviet aim, and one that we too should consider seriously in determining how best our own security can be served. Notes 1 Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," International Security, vol. 3, no. 1 (Summer 1978), 112-147. 2 In addition to the very summary discussion in these paragraphs, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1966), chapters 1, 4, 10 and 12.
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3 Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, vol. 72, no. 7 (July 1977), 34. 4 This distinction of the US and Soviet formulations of mutual deterrence was expressed in this way in my earlier article (International Security, Summer 1978, p. 124), with no specific Soviet source references. Five years later, a Soviet analyst used almost exactly the same terms to describe the US and Soviet conceptions: "Then, as now, both sides in the nuclear confrontation possessed an assumed capability to inflict an annihilating retaliatory strike on an aggressor (the Soviet formulation), or to inflict 'unacceptable damage' on the attacker as long as the situation of 'mutual assured destruction' exists (the American formulation)." See G. Gerasimov, "Current Problems of World Politics," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya [The World Economy and International Relations], no. 7 (July 1983), 99. The parenthetical identifications of Soviet and American formulations are Gerasimov's. Some Soviet accounts in discussing American policy debates endorse "mutual assured destruction" as a "positive, constructive" conception underlying mutual deterrence, and explicitly endorse "the principle of 'the mutual vulnerability of the sides,' which underlies the existing Soviet-American disarmament agreements." See "The Establishment of the Military-Political Strategy of the Reagan Administration," SShA (USA), no. 5 (May 1982), 125, and no. 6 (June 1982), 118-19. 5 L. I. Brezhnev, in Materialy xxiv s'yezda KPSS (Materials of the 24th Congress of the CPSU) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971), p. 81. 6 See Kortunov, Kommunist, no. 10 (1980), 99. 7 L. I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom [A Leninist Course], vol. 3 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), p. 541. 8 Zemskov, Voyennaya mysV, no. 5 (1969), 59. 9 Trofimenko, SShA: Politika, voina, ideologiya, pp. 317, 318. 10 Trofimenko, SShA: Politika, voina, ideologiya, pp. 324-25. 11 The quotation is from General of the Army Viktor G. Kulikov, cited in Izvestiya, August 24, 1972; a similar statement by Marshal Andrei A. Grechko appears in Pravda, September 30, 1972. 12 A. Bovin, "Internationalism and Coexistence," Novoye vremya [New Times], no. 30 (July 1973). 13 Zemskov, Voyennaya mysV, no. 5 (1969), 59. 14 Maj. Gen. M. Cherednichenko, "The Evolution of Views on the Content and Functions of Military Strategy," Voyennaya mysV, no. 12 (December 1974), 23-24. 15 Trofimenko, SShA: Politika, voina, ideologiya, p. 319. 16 See Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 794-96. 17 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 795 and 800. 18 See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Worst-Case Assumptions: Uses, Abuses and Consequences," in Gwyn Prins (ed.), The Nuclear Crisis Reader (New York, NY: Vintage/Random House, 1984), pp. 98-108. 19 For a more comprehensive discussion of the problem of determining a military strategic balance, and of conflicting Soviet and American viewpoints, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Perspectives on the Strategic Balance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983), and for further discussion of diverging American
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22 23 24
25
26 27
28 29 30 31
Raymond L. Garthoff and Soviet military thinking and views of the strategic balance, see Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 768-800. V. Nekrasov, "An Absurd but Dangerous Myth," Kommunist, no. 12 (August 1979), 98. Editorial, "On the US President's State of the Union Message," Pravda, January 29, 1980. In this connection it cited the president's statement that the United States should be prepared to pay any price that may be required to remain "the strongest country in the world." Kommunist, no. 10 (July 1980), 8 and 10. Vladimir B. Lomeyko, "International Observers Roundtable," Radio Moscow, Domestic Service, February 10, 1980. For a comprehensive analysis of Soviet perceptions of American military policy and doctrine, see Raymond L. Garthoff, "Soviet Perceptions of Western Strategic Thought and Doctrine," in Soviet Military Doctrine and Western Policy (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 197-309. The paragraphs following draw upon that analysis. The most authoritative and complete Soviet analysis has been a report prepared by a distinguished group of Soviet scientists led by R. A. Sagdeyev, Director of the Institute of Space Research, and A. A. Kokoshin, a deputy director of the Institute of USA and Canada, under the auspices of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War. The report is titled: Strategicheskiye i mezhdunarodno-politicheskiye posledstviya sozdaniya kosmicheskoi protivoraketnoi sistemy s ispol'sovaniyam oruzhiya napravlennoi peredachi energii [Strategic and International-Political Consequences of the Creation of a Space-based Antiballistic Missile System Using Directed Energy Weapons] (Moscow: Institute kosmicheskikh issledovanii Akademiya Nauk, 1984, 42 pp.). This interpretation had been given authoritatively by General Secretary Yury Andropov only a few days after the Star Wars speech; see "Replies of Yu. V. Andropov to Questions from a Correspondent of Pravda," Pravda, March 27, 1983. Marshal S. Akhromeyev, "A Great Victory and Its Lessons," Izvestiya, May 7, 1985. "Replies of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov, Minister of Defense of the USSR to Questions of a TASS Correspondent," Krasnaya zvezda, May 5, 1985. Ibid. "Interview of M. S. Gorbachev with the Editor of Pravda," Pravda, April 8, 1985. A. Bovin, "Fantasies and Reality," Izvestiya, April 21, 1985. See Marshal S. L. Sokolov, "Great Victory: Conclusions and Lessons," Kommunist, no. 6 (April 1985), 64-65; and Marshal S. Akhromeyev, Izvestiya, May 7, 1985. The Star Wars speech of March 1983 had followed closely after the most direct political challenge by Reagan to the legitimacy of Soviet rule, a speech in which he declared the Soviet leaders to be "the focus of evil in the world," and the Soviet Union "an evil empire." And in a third speech a week later, nominally addressed to arms control, the president attacked what he called a "relentless military buildup" by the Soviet Union, and called for "peace through [American
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military] strength," rather than arms control. See President Reagan, "National Security, Address to the Nation," March 23, 1983, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, no. 19 (March 28, 1983), 4 4 2 ^ 8 ; "Remarks at the Annual Convention [of the National Association of Evangelicals] in Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, no. 19 (March 14,1983), 369; and "Remarks to the Los Angeles World Affairs, March 31, 1983, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, no. 19 (April 4, 1983), 484. 32 Gorbachev, Pravda, January 16, 1986. 33 See Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Gorbachev Proposal and Prospects for Arms Control," Arms Control Today, vol. 16, no. 1 (January-February 1986), 3-6. 34 Gorbachev, Pravda, December 8, 1988. 35 V. Larin, "A Topical Proposal," Pravda, October 27, 1976; see also A. Bovin, Radio Moscow, June 19, 1979; B. Andrianov and V. Nekrasov, Radio Moscow, June 18, 1979; G. Shakhnazarov, "The Arms Race Is a Danger to the Peoples," Krasnaya zvezda, June 14, 1979; and Dr. [Colonel] V. Kulish, "A Balance of Trust and not a Balance of Terror," Novoye vremya, no. 22 (May 1979), 4—6. 36 Kulish, "A Balance of Trust." 37 N. I. Lebedev and S. V. Kortunov, "The Problem of Disarmament and the Ideological Struggle - A Critique of the Apologists for the Arms Race," Novaya i noveishaya istoriya [Modern and Contemporary History], no. 4 (July-August 1980), 8-9. 38 Lebedev and Kortunov, "Problem of Disarmament"; and see Milovidov and Zhadanov, Voprosyfilosofii,no. 10 (1980), 49. 39 Bovin, Kommunist, no. 10 (1980), 78. 40 Bovin, Kommunist, no. 10 (1980), 78; and see the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, June 23, 1980, text in Kommunist, no. 10 (July 1980), 8-10. 41 L. Brezhnev, Pravda, February 24, 1981. 42 L. Brezhnev, Pravda, October 21, 1981. 43 K. U. Chernenko, Pravda, April 23, 1981; and see Yu. V. Andropov, Pravda, April 23, 1982. 44 "Joint Statement, Nov. 21, 1985," Department of State Bulletin, vol. 86, no. 2,106 (January 1986), 8. Gorbachev's initiative in seeking inclusion of these statements was disclosed to this writer by a Soviet participant in the delegation and confirmed by an American participant. 45 Lt. Gen. D. Volkogonov, "War and Peace in the 'Nuclear Age,'" Kraznaya zvezda, August 30, 1985. All subsequent quotations in this and the succeeding paragraph are from this article. 46 Volkogonov, "War and Peace." 47 Parity and its implications are also included in public information efforts. For example, a feature documentary set of filmed interviews by Izvestiya political observer Aleksandr Ye. Bovin with a "soldier" (Major General Viktor M. Tatarnikov of the General Staff), a "historian" (Dr. Vitaly V. Zhurkin of the USA Institute), and a "political figure" (Vadim Zagladin, of the Central Committee), on Moscow Television, November 12, 1985. 48 M. S. Gorbachev, Politicheskii doklad tsental'nogo komiteta KPSS xxvn s'yezdu kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza [Political Report of the Central
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50 51
52 53
54 55
56 57 58 59 60 61
62
63
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Raymond L. Garthoff Committee of the CPSU to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), pp. 15 and 81. Gorbachev, Politicheskii doklad, pp. 81-82. It is of interest that Gorbachev is aware of the distinction between the two terms used in Russian to represent "deterrence," and intentionally covers both. Gorbachev, Politicheskii doklad, p. 15. L. Tolkunov, "The Dilemma of the Age," Kommunist, no. 7 (May 1986), 85-86. Lev Tolkunov is chairman of one of the houses of the Supreme Soviet, and an influential member of the Party Central Committee. "Program of the CPSU, New Edition, Adopted by the 27th Congress of the CPSU," Pravda, March 7, 1986. S. Tikhvinsky, "Soviet Historical Science at the Threshold of the 27th Party Congress," Kommunist, no. 1 (January 1986), 99. Tikhvinsky is a prominent historian and has been head of the Historical Diplomatic Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gorbachev, Politicheskii doklad, p. 85. See the discussion in Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly, vol. 21 (Summer 1988), 136-45. One of the first was Gen. Army Mikhail M. Kozlov, "The Preservation of Military Strategic Parity - A Serious Factor in Assuring Peace and International Security," Voyennaya mysl', no. 12 (December 1986), 3-13. Gen. Army D. T. Yazov, "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, a Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism," Pravda, July 27, 1987. Col. V. Strebkov, "From the Standpoint of the New Thinking: Military Parity Yesterday and Today," Krasnaya zvezda, January 3, 1989. Col. Gen. V. V. Korobushin, "On Raising the Effectiveness of Military Scientific Research," Voyennaya mysV, no. 5 (May 1988), 40. Gorbachev, Politicheskii doklad, pp. 15 and 81-82. Strebkov, Krasnaya zvezda, January 3, 1989. Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov and Andrei Kortunov, "Reasonable Sufficiency, Or How to Break the Vicious Circle," Novoye vremya, no. 40 (October 2, 1987), 13. "Authoritative Opinion: Clear Skies over Europe," Interview of Mikhail P. Shelepin by Yury Popov, Komsomol'akaya Pravda (Komsomol Pravda), December 28, 1988. Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir F. Petrovsky, in a roundtable discussion on the "International Program" on Moscow Television, March 11, 1989. Petrovsky's career and current responsibilities lead him to stress international institutions, but he has been a leading contributor to the new thinking even before the Gorbachev administration, and has been promoted under it. Kozlov, Voyennaya mysV, December 1986, p. 12.
Part II
Below the threshold
Soviet theater forces on a descending path Edward B. Atkeson
Moscow's decision by Summer 1991 to abide by the terms of an agreement restricting conventional forces in Europe (CFE) caused new thinking among allied governments about the nature of new East-West security arrangements. A year and a half earlier, the former chief of the Soviet General Staff, and presently close advisor to General Secretary Gorbachev, Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, remarked that the new Soviet political thinking and defense doctrine were inseparably connected. The companion foreign policy he described as threefold: demilitarization, democratization, and de-ideologization. The first element, he said, effectively excludes the use of force in relations with other countries. The second establishes the principle of equality in Soviet dealings with other countries, large and small. The third removes the ideological aspect in international relations in favor of greater reliance upon international law.1 The impact of this policy on the Soviet war machine, and, indeed, upon the political structure and forces of the entire Warsaw Pact, has been dramatic. In consequence, as Soviet theater forces enter the final decade of the twentieth century, they find themselves marching to an unfamiliar drummer along a path winding through doctrinal terra incognita. The shell of the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and the myth of socialist solidarity and brothers-in-arms among the troops of the East European states has been shattered. The armies of the USSR's "allies" have undergone steep reductions in practically all dimensions, and the political milieu has changed so precipitously that the remaining forces share little more than the most superficial common grounds for coordinated action with their former masters. If there were no other stimulus for the adoption of a new military doctrine by the Soviets, the virtual evaporation of any hope that their allies' forces might play a significant part in an offensive against NATO would be reason enough to turn to a defensive posture. Soviet theater forces must now turn much of their energy to compliance with directives for internal reorganizations and disassembly of their offensive prowess, so carefully nurtured over the past four and one half decades. The political leadership has made it clear that the forces' 81
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impressive capabilities for intimidation and invasion of neighboring states have become more of a burden than an asset to the nation. However reluctantly, the Soviet military has been obliged first to trim its offensive power unilaterally, and then to submit to international negotiations designed to disassemble much of its apparatus for waging the types of warfare for which it was designed. This chapter examines the new mandate for Soviet theater forces and the developing concept for the posture they are to assume under the new military doctrine. Further, it assesses the feasibility of the doctrine for fulfilling the security needs of the USSR, recognizing the manifold difficulties the country faces in social, economic and technological spheres. The new direction The new direction for the forces was set by the political leadership in 1986 with the promulgation of the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" in meeting military requirements. The following year, on May 29, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact ratified a paper entitled, "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member Countries." Of particular note in the paper were these points: - "Never and under no circumstances shall we begin hostilities against any state or any alliance of states unless we ourselves come under attack." - "We have no territorial claims to any state . . . [and] do not look on any state or any people as an enemy." - "[We] do not strive to have more armed forces that necessary for defense. [The Warsaw Pact Powers] will strictly adhere to the principle of sufficiency in protecting their security." 2 Important as the document was for the alliance, it was particularly noteworthy as a formal representation of a new Soviet doctrine. Pact doctrine is an extension of Soviet doctrine, and Soviet military doctrine is the linchpin of the entire theoretical structure of Soviet military science.3 Soviet military doctrine is composed of two principal branches, one political, the other military-technical. The former has traditionally had a defensive bias and has served the declaratory policy of the state. Its principal thrust has been to avoid open conflict with the West while permitting exploitation of promising politico-military opportunities. The latter, which has served as the basic guidance for the development of the forces, has been highly offensive. It has held that in case of conflict, the forces would rapidly seize the initiative and carry the battle forward into the opponent's territory to victory.4 The new doctrine reverses the latter guidance, mandating a defensive posture for the forces. If the Soviet Armed Forces are to fulfill their instructions, changes must be made, not
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only in force structure, but in strategy, operational thinking, plans and practices, some dating back almost half a century. The defense minister, Army General Dmitri T. Yazov, summarized the thrust of the new thinking as the assumption of a posture which would provide the Soviet Union with "the magnitude of armed forces necessary to defend [itself] from attack from the outside." In the future, he wrote, the Soviet aim would be to reduce the forces of the two great alliances facing each other in Central Europe "to such a level where neither of the sides, while insuring its defense, has the forces or means enabling it to mount offensive operations." 5 In addition to the adoption of defensive posture and the reduction of forces, new guidance from the Kremlin includes a novel responsibility for the Armed forces to avoid war. As General Yazov has pointed out, Warsaw Pact military doctrine (and hence, Soviet doctrine) "is subordinated to the task of preventing war." 6 Soviet military leaders have traditionally assumed avoidance of war to be a diplomatic or political function, thus it came as some surprise that they would find it a charge of their own as well. While they may not be completely comfortable with the mission, they have devised a working list of specific measures for the forces to pursue: maintenance of parity with the West in both nuclear and nonnuclear spheres, participation by military officials in the verification of arms control and confidence-building accords, greater military participation in diplomatic meetings and discussions, improved planning for military participation in disaster relief, reorientation of operational and tactical concepts for defensive operations. 7 Many other functional matters, however, remain unclear. The Soviets still have much work to do in theoretical areas to integrate the specific changes they are making in their forces into a coherent whole. As Army General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff, has pointed out: Nearly all the tenets of strategy, operational art, and tactics are undergoing radical changes, under the influence of both military-technical and military-political factors. Basically a new theory of military art is being created.8 It is important to note, however, that the programs for removing military material from the forward area and destroying equipment are not directly linked. Defense Minister Yazov made this clear in a radio phone-in program in February 1990 when he replied to a questioner: As for the reductions and scrapping of military hardware, yes indeed some of the hardware that has seen out its prescribed service life is being destroyed, sent for melting down. But what tanks are these? The T-34, T-54, old models of the T-55,
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T-10. But, all the new hardware will remain. Moreover, any hardware that is still serviceable is not being withdrawn from the Armed Forces. As you recommend, it is being mothballed and, should the need arise, will be used.9 Gorbachev had promised a reorganization of the remaining forces, indicating a likelihood that the remaining tanks would be redistributed. General Yazov explained that the Soviet motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) stationed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia would be stripped of their tank regiments and that the remaining tank divisions (TDs) would each lose one of their three tank regiments. These reductions, he said, would represent a 40 percent decrease in tanks for the MRDs and a 20 percent cut for the TDs. To off-set the loss of tank-killing power in the divisions, they would be allocated additional infantry and anti-tank weapons. Also, he said, their air defense and engineer mining and entrenching capabilities would be enhanced. 10 In addition to these alterations, but without indicating any specific timetable for the change, General Yazov stated that as many as half of the Soviet MRDs would be converted to "machine gun/artillery" divisions for positional and area defense missions. Information from other sources indicates that these units may be located in border districts in the Soviet Union and that they may have no more than a single battalion of tanks, greatly restricting their offensive potential. 11 While the details remain unclear, it is apparent that most - and very likely all - of the Soviet maneuver divisions (MRD and TD) remaining in the forward area in 1992 will possess an additional motorized rifle regiment, equipped with BMP infantry fighting vehicles, to replace the withdrawn tank regiments. The divisions are expected to gain in manpower, BMPs, mortars and some other small weapons as a result of the conversion. The net result will be a loss in some offensive capability, but a considerable increase in defensive staying power, with essentially no change in overall combat capability.12 Soviet operational concepts under a defensive military doctrine As clear as the Soviet retrenchment of forces appears, there is ample evidence that the Soviets have every intention of continuing to meet practical requirements for conducting respectable military operations at tactical (division and below) and operational (army and front) levels. Soviet military leaders believe it essential to maintain an ability to halt and to reverse a foreign attack, and to carry the conflict to a successful conclusion against any invader. As General Yazov has pointed out, "it is impossible to rout an aggressor with defense alone . . . After an attack has been repelled,
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the troops and naval forces must be able to conduct a decisive offensive [emphasis in original]. The switch to an offensive will be in the form of a counteroffensi ve."13 In this connection, a number of Soviet authors have resurrected accounts of battles of the Great Patriotic War to undergird their theses. Army General E. F. Ivanovskii, former Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces, has cited the Battle of Stalingrad as an example of how victory can be achieved through a massive counteroffensive after the enemy has become bogged down in the defenses.14 Similarly, prominent academics, A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, have cited the Battle of Kursk as a model of advantageous use of the counteroffensive for decisive defeat of an attacking enemy force.15 The debate over the application of the new doctrine has been lively. Some senior officers, such as Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, former Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, have argued that Soviet doctrine has always been defensive, implying that no changes in operational procedures are necessary. Army General Ivan Tretyak, Commander-inChief of Air Defense Forces (PVO) has written: Any changes in our Army should be considered a thousand times over before they are decided upon. Temporary benefits are a great lure. But I repeat once again - the most important thing is to have a reliable defense. If we were not so strong, imperialism would not hesitate to change the world.16
Others, particularly civilian academics who have gained new influence under the Gorbachev leadership, insist that much restructuring and reduction of forces is necessary and that it would be better done sooner than later. For example, Dr. Lev Semeyko argues: The military might of a state or coalition of states should be maintained at a level that would give no one any reason for fear, even imaginary, for one's security. It is not enough to declare one's doctrine defensive, the way NATO did. One should confirm the defensive orientation of one's doctrine by the size and deployment of one's troops, their structure and armaments and military activities. Without this declarations would be merely declarations.17
It appears that both sides in the debate are realizing some points. Force reductions and restructuring are proceeding apace. On the other hand, the concept of decisive offensive operations, if only in a counteroffensive mode, remains deeply rooted in Soviet military culture and has not been abandoned. The new defensive doctrine also impacts Soviet thinking about the utility of airborne forces, designed as they are for offensive operations. (Western sources claim that the Soviets have some seven airborne divisions; the Soviets counter that they have but five. All are small, elite organizations
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routinely held in high states of readiness.) General Albert Slyusarev, Commandant of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School has commented, "We are training officers to be able to carry out offensive operations with a defensive force, ready to respond to attack . . . The aim is still to destroy the enemy, and, like the infantry, our men are still suited to counteroffensive actions." 18 Some insight into the practical impact of the doctrine on the forces was given by Lieutenant General V. Achlov, Commander of Airborne Forces (VDV), during a visit to the United States in 1989. He is reported to have said to an escort officer that one half of the airborne (air assault) units presently deployed in the forward area would be withdrawn, that the remaining units would be withdrawn from control of front and army commanders, and that the maximum doctrinal ranges of airborne operations would be cut in half.19 Soviet airborne forces have never enjoyed a reputation for long strategic reach comparable to that of their Western counterparts. On the other hand, they tend to be far more heavily equipped, more closely resembling Western armored cavalry regiments than airborne infantry, possessing many light armored vehicles, including assault guns. This characteristic has tended to give them high tactical mobility (once on the ground), but at the expense of strategic reach because of their weight. 20 The implications of General Achlov's remarks would seem to be that the Soviets were reducing the scale of their dependence upon airborne forces, not only in expected frequency of commitment, but in depth of operation as well. At the tactical level new Soviet literature is focusing upon activism in defensive operations. Major General I. Vorob'yev, a doctor of military science and prominent writer on operational matters, argues that maneuver is crucial to the success of a defense. It permits, he says, the defender "to evade the blow of the superior enemy forces, to maintain combat capability, and, having won time, to achieve a breakthrough in the course of the battle." 21 General Vorob'yev argues that maneuver and positional defensive tactics are not mutually exclusive, but can be "applied in close coordination." He cites as an example of such coordination in operations a security force forward of a main defensive zone. In the general's view the principal purpose of a maneuver defense is to create "the right conditions" for the main defensive grouping "to subsequently rebuff the enemy's attack." 22 General Vorob'yev believes that maneuver defensive operations are highly complex, and he expresses concern over the adequacy of current training of the officer corps for fulfilling its responsibilities in this area. He concludes his writing with the thought that "if we are seriously thinking of the priority of active tactics in defense," there must be a concerted effort to develop the requisite skills among the officers involved.23
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The feasibility of the new doctrine Intelligence. Soviet foreign intelligence agencies have a time-honored tradition of high quality service to both the Kremlin political and military leadership. There is little reason to believe that the foreign intelligence wings of the KGB and military intelligence (GRU) are unlikely to be undercut by unilateral or negotiated reduction of forces. Withdrawals of troops from the forward area, of course, will reduce the operational base structure of military reconnaissance activities, including ground and airborne signals intelligence collectors, but advances in space-based systems are likely to off-set much of the losses which might otherwise result. Further, proposals for mutual "open sky" overflight rights and on-sight inspections of designated zones in border areas under negotiated confidence building measures may largely obviate the need for continuance of the older practices. With respect to longer range, strategic intelligence, the Chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, claims to have made an effort to reduce or eliminate much of the former emphasis on domestic intelligence and to shift the focus abroad. He has argued that in today's climate "it is the external aspect [of KGB activities] that largely dominates."24 Whether or not he accurately portrays the current trends on the domestic side is not material here. Certainly, there has been no reduction in KGB efforts abroad. Mobilization for Defense. The Soviets place great emphasis on historical examples for defining the military requirements to deal with threats to their borders. One volume of the official Soviet officer's library series, devoted exclusively to the initial period of WWII, draws eleven of its thirteen chapters from this experience. While the work was published in 1974, it has increased in importance under the new doctrine because of its emphasis on Soviet operations while the country was on the strategic defensive.25 Notable in this regard is a comment in the concluding section of the book that during the period of initial defensive operations "it was possible to weaken a strong enemy's offensive capabilities and ultimately to halt its advance only after the entry into battle of major strategic reserves."26 Accordingly, the Soviets look to the speed of their mobilization and reinforcement of the front by reserve forces to buttress their defense. In the past, Western estimates of Soviet requirements for preparation time for mounting an attack on NATO have included some very short periods, measured in hours, for the highly ready forces stationed in the forward area to cross into West Germany. In 1977 the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) cited forty-eight hours as "rock bottom" for Warsaw Pact preparation. At the same time, a preparation period of 8-14 days was cited as a more likely scenario because in that time the Pact
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might achieve maximum relative strength vis-d-vis NATO. 2 7 In late 1989, however, the US Intelligence Community altered its estimate of the likely minimum warning time to something in excess of one month, possibly 33-44 days. NATO did not officially adopt the American view as it became known, but it is apparent that there is widespread agreement among the NATO partners that the likely warning period is substantially longer than previously considered. 28 Soviet Ground Forces are composed primarily of some 190 tank and motorized rifle divisions. Only about 40 percent of these forces are maintained in ready condition (i.e. having most of their equipment and at least half of their authorized complement of personnel). 29 It is expected that, in time of emergency, the remainder of the units would be filled with reservists, given rudimentary training, and shipped forward to the battle area. As Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai V. Ogarkov, former Chief of the General Staff, has written: a high degree of combat readiness of troops and naval forces is inconceivable without well organized mobilization preparation, directed toward ensuring prompt and timely shifting of military forces from a peacetime to a wartime footing.30 The principal reinforcement units for a defense of the western frontier would come from the six western military districts (Leningrad, Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev and Odessa) and the two districts of the Central Strategic Reserve (Moscow and Volga-Ural). In recent years these eight districts have been estimated to be capable of providing as many as 82 ground maneuver divisions, 5 airborne and 9 artillery divisions.31 However, not all of the divisions would be expected to be employed in Central Europe. Deployments would likely be spread from above the Arctic Circle, in the north, to the Balkans, in the south, with the heaviest concentration in the center in the region designated by the Soviets as the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD). During the Cold War, the Soviets recognized that a requirement for mobilization could develop quickly, placing enormous strains on the national system for the preparation of the country for war, and upon the transportation system in particular. The shift to a defensive doctrine, and, presumably, to more reactive operational concepts, intensifies the transportation question in some respects. They have devised plans for incremental mobilization for less than maximum threats and for gradual preparation for general mobilization.32 In accordance with the teachings of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy: the most important requirement of the operational deployment of the Armed Forces is that it be done rapidly, secretly, and in a timely manner to establish
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strong groups of forces against attacking enemy in order to repel the attack and inflict decisive losses on his forces.33 Few countries are as dependent upon their railways for moving both passengers and freight as the USSR. The enormous distances, the poor road network, and the dominant north-south orientation of the rivers, coupled with their frequent blockage by ice, oblige the Soviets to look to their railroads as their primary east-west arteries for movement of heavy goods, both civil and military. 34 The demands are so great that most trunk lines run at 95 to 100 percent of capacity.35 Western analysts have traditionally ascribed to the Soviets a capability for moving their high priority military cargo in time of crisis in sufficient quantities such that transportation was not the principal determinant of success or failure of their plans. One reason for this was that the Soviets amassed very large stocks of war supplies in the forward area, especially ammunition and petroleum products. These were estimated to be sufficient for some 60-90 days of wartime requirements. 36 As late as January 1990 there was no indication of Soviet intention to withdraw the supplies as part of the unilateral reduction in force.37 However, it seems reasonable to expect that most will be moved as the troops withdraw, at least to the Western Military Districts. The principal consideration in most transport system assessments has been the quantity of tracked military vehicles (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, etc.) to be moved. At the peak of the 1989 riots in the Transcaucasus, however, railyards were snarled around Moscow, Leningrad, Volgograd, and many other cities.38 Further, the back-up extended into the East European states, as far as the DDR. The Poles would not permit East German freight trains to transit their country because they could not be accommodated at Brest and the Poles did not want to clog their lines with trains which could not enter the USSR. 39 In Czechoslovakia there were some fifty-two trains held on sidings at Cierna and Tisou awaiting arrival of Soviet carriages on which the goods could be transported to their destination. 40 A group of railroad employees in the central office became so exasperated with conditions and with lack of response by Soviet authorities that they wrote an open letter in Pravda to the Union Republic Councils of Ministers, pointing out the problems which the tie-up was causing: station warehouses arefilledto the brim... Thousands of railroad cars, which are in short supply, have become warehouses on wheels. For example, more than one million tons of freight and 185,000 containers are waiting at railroad station warehouses and container depots. . . . An especially large quantity of freight has accumulated at the Moscow railroad junction. As of 19 October, there were 25,200 tons of freight plus 18,700 containers awaiting shipment. There are 1,392 idle
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container cars waiting for the freight backlog to be cleared. A similar situation prevails at the Leningrad junction.41 While much of the problem was attributed to strikes and other labor difficulties, there were serious systemic difficulties identified around Leningrad. "Primitive handling equipment" which "frequently broke down" and the "very defective" central planning system which tended to send "surprise" plans to the provinces "completely disrupted" schedules. The USSR Deputy Minister of Railways indicated that the problem was not an isolated case. Speaking about the situation around Kuzbass he said: The clots that occur every year are evidence of chronic vascular disease in transport. There are still piles of industrial goods and even food at the oblast goods station.42 While the railroad crisis may give military analysts in both East and West cause for closer assessment of Soviet mobilization capabilities, the Soviets have other means for moving units from the interior. For many years they have expected that most units in the first operational echelon - those deployed in the forward area - would use organic transportation. In addition, units in the second operational echelon moving forward from permanent garrisons and mobilization areas in the homeland might also use organic transportation, especially if they were not able to complete movement prior to the outbreak of hostilities. All field units are expected to be capable of moving 300-400 km per day by road march. 43 The principal difficulty with such marches is the wear and tear on vehicles, particularly tracked vehicles, and the consequent degradation in combat readiness. This can be alleviated to some extent by the use of heavy truck tractors with trailers for movement of tanks and other armored vehicles. These were used extensively for heavy haul work in connection with the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Recent estimates place the total Soviet inventory of such vehicles at about 3,500, with some 2,300 devoted to support of the High Command of Forces in the Western TVD. The latter number is capable of lifting simultaneously all of the tracked vehicles often tank regiments, or of two or three tank or motorized divisions. At a standard road march speed of 25 to 30 km per hour for twelve hours per day, the vehicles could deliver their payloads a distance of 1,000 km from stations deep in the interior to forward assembly areas in a period of 72 hours. By surging the traffic with 24 hour driving, the performance could be increased for a short period of time. Clearly the transporters are not a substitute for the railroads, but they afford substantial flexibility to the transport system.44 Transportation problems could recede in importance if the Soviets were to constrict the periphery of the landmass envisioned for defense. As Soviet troops are withdrawn from the forward area it is likely that the General Staff will be obliged to draft plans with the assumption that the defense
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might have to be conducted within the borders of the Soviet Union rather than on lines drawn further forward. This would be a less desirable option, but would alleviate certain mobilization difficulties. Most units would find that they had shorter moves to reach their assigned defensive positions, and the complexities of rail switch-over from wide to standard gauge track, which now occur at the Polish and Czechoslovakian borders, would be eliminated. Human Factors. Troop motivation has become a major problem in the Armed Forces. Ethnic prejudices, hazing of new conscripts, emerging awareness of nationalism among non-Russian soldiers, and a growing sense of professional insecurity among officers have greatly complicated morale. Further, new laws exempting students from the draft have affected the numbers of high-quality young men available for the semi-annual conscription call-up. Compounding all the other problems, a demographic sea change has occurred in the mix of Slavic and non- Slavic young men entering the Armed Forces. The shift in the proportion of draft-age males (18-21 years) in the Soviet Union coming from the seven republics of Transcaucasus and Central Asia in the last decade has jumped from 28 percent to 37 percent (a development which had not previously been expected before the year 2000). While fertility trends throughout the country are presently on the increase, the number of women of child-bearing ages in the Slavic areas is expected to drop precipitously in the mid-1990s as a result of decreases in fertility rates in those areas in the early 1970s.45 Some 90 percent of rural youths from Central Asia (who make up the vast majority of the 37 percent figure) either speak no Russian or speak it very poorly. 46 In the past they could be assigned to non-technical tasks in the combat arms or to labor units in the construction and railway branches. As their representation in each six-month draft cohort increases, however, the burden of training sufficient soldiers to fill the more complicated and sensitive duties will become more taxing. Soviet military leaders are concerned about the poor quality of recruits. The Chief of the Main Political Directorate, General Aleksi Lizichev, addressed the Congress of People's Deputies saying: We are once again calling up quite a sizable proportion of young people - primarily into the construction troops - who already have a criminal record, have moral and physical defects, and who are already familiar with both drugs and alcohol.47 Defense Minister Yazov has echoed the complaint in speaking to the Supreme Soviet, reporting that "zonal political detachments have been created" to deal with discipline specifically in the construction troops, but
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"unfortunately we cannot assign an officer to every platoon of construction sub-units." 48 While the complaints have thus far focused on the construction troops, the demographic trends will spread the difficulties throughout the Armed Forces, particularly the Ground Forces. Compounding the problem is likely to be the impact of the law exempting university students from the call-up or deferring their service. According to Viktor A. Sadovnich, first vice chancellor of Lomonosov Moscow State University, some hundreds of thousands of students are affected.49 Defense Minister Yazov has allowed that the deferment of 340,000 students of higher educational institutions and 30,000 in secondary institutions can presently be accommodated because of the current program for reduction of 500,000 in the authorized strength of the Armed Forces. 50 However, the matter is likely to generate recurring problems unless the forces are substantially further reduced through the international negotiations process. It is a frequent practice to grant full service duty exemption to highly skilled workers, such as the university students are likely to become upon completion of their studies. Moreover, the law is likely to exacerbate the growing ethnic mix problem in the services because many more Slavs than non-Slavs gain entry to institutions of higher learning with their linguistic capabilities and generally superior educational backgrounds. Air Defense. Under its traditional offensive doctrine, the Soviets counted on attacking NATO airfields with a concerted effort of combined armed forces.51 In addition to mounting a large offensive counterair operation at the outset of hostilities with tactical aircraft and bombers, the Soviets have expected that surface-to-surface missile systems might be employed once the ground forces had advanced to positions from which the fields would be in range of these weapons systems. They have also anticipated that fast moving forward detachments or operational maneuver groups (OMG) might be used to overrun the airfields.52 While NATO airfields continue to be suitable targets for offensive air strikes under the defensive doctrine, (and possibly by airborne troops in special cases), these operations would be much more difficult under the new doctrine than the old. Further, if the Soviet defensive effort were to be based upon Soviet territory, rather than upon that of its East European allies, the difficulties would be more difficult still because of the greater ranges involved. As one analyst has pointed out, the reorganization of Soviet divisions is likely to increase their organic air defense capability by at least 18 hand-held SA-7 or SA-14 short-range surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems. This will automatically occur as a consequence of the conversion of one tank regiment in each division to a motorized rifle regiment. Presumably these weapons will be replaced by the new SA-16, a new
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system of greater length and accuracy than either the 7 or 14. In addition, the current ZSU-23-4 air defense guns and the SA-9 SAMs of the SAM battalions in tank and motorized rifle regiments are being replaced by 2S6 vehicles (which mount twin 30mm guns and SA-19 missiles) and SA-13 missile systems. 53 In addition to these weapons, each Soviet maneuver division is authorized a SAM regiment equipped with the 18.5 mile range SA-6 or the shorter range SA-8. These weapons are scheduled to be replaced by the new mobile SA-15 low to medium altitude system. At army and front level the Soviets currently field SAM brigades with SA-4s and 12s. A longer-range, high altitude version of the SA-12 (12B) is considered capable of intercepting some types of ballistic missiles. Also, the Soviets have recently begun deployment of a mobile version of their strategic, high speed (Mach 6), all-altitude SA-10, designated 10B. These systems could be deployed with the theater forces to further bolster the air defenses.54 While the tactical air defense structure may remain unsettled for some period while the General Staff adjusts to other aspects of the total reorganization, it appears that the momentum of past Soviet SAM research and development efforts has been adequate to carry the field forces through the transitional period. The effects of this momentum could be reinforced if the Soviets were to place additional emphasis on fielding late model air superiority aircraft to ensure adequate coverage of anticipated battle areas and the lines of communication leading forward from the Soviet homeland. Technology. Major General V. V. Larionov, one of the authors of the landmark Soviet work of the 1960s, Military Strategy, recently identified four principal aspects of technological advancement in conventional weaponry: First. An increase in the mobility of military systems and their combat readiness. The time for getting weapons ready for combat, specialists estimate, has been reduced overall by a factor of 3-4, and in air defense systems - by an order of magnitude. Second. An increase in the yield and kill capability of charges with conventional explosives, to such an extent that their upper limit today approaches the lower yield of nuclear munitions. . . . Third. An increase in the ability to aim weapons (high-precision land-based and air-based weapons, reconnaissance/strike and fire systems) . . . Finally, the fourth and most significant change. . . . conventional weapons, as well as nuclear weapons, today are capable of participating, figuratively speaking, in "non-contact actions," when an enemy's combat assets are hit without direct clashes between people on the ground or at sea (that is, without penetrating enemy territory,flyinginto enemy airspace, or invading enemy waters).55 Much Soviet military thinking about exploitation of new technologies springs from the fertile mind of the former chief of the General Staff,
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Marshal Ogarkov. However, the Marshal's view of future warfare, incorporating high technology, may have carried with it the seeds of its own frustration. The devices envisioned are enormously costly and some may be beyond the capabilities of the Soviet Union to produce in the foreseeable future. Secretary Gorbachev identified "the stresses created by scientific and technological advancement" as a primary stimulus for the perestroika initiative in the first place. Clearly he hoped that by reducing Western perceptions of the Warsaw Pact threat through unilateral reductions he could slow the pace of arms competition to more manageable proportions. He as much as said so when he identified a need for "normal international conditions for internal progress" and "new political thinking" with an emphasis on disarmament. The Ogarkov formula would have placed the emphasis on expansion and competition with the West in the area of high technology where the USSR enjoys no relative advantage. But perhaps more important, the path which Ogarkov favored would have placed increasing emphasis on tactical and operational ballistic and cruise missile systems. Given the difficulty in discerning the differences between missiles with nuclear warheads and those with conventional charges, his case ran afoul of Soviet desires for elimination of short range nuclear delivery systems from the European theater. Paradoxically, Ogarkov's formula could have led to a perpetuation of reliance on nuclear weapons rather than a curtailment. As long as missile systems maintain a range and payload great enough to be considered potential nuclear weapons carriers, there may continue to be a reluctance on both sides to move entirely away from a nuclear posture. Nevertheless, as the Soviets move further into the realm of defensively oriented forces they may find that they are stuck with the Ogarkov thesis. A recent Warsaw Pact analysis of the implications of high technology weaponry indicates that new, longer range and more lethal conventional weapons could afford a defender opportunities to strike the attacker before the battle is joined. While in the past, it said, a defender might select only the locale of the engagement, the new technologies afford him options as to the timing of the action as well.56 Further, with his longer range systems, the defender may no longer have to occupy all of the areas to be defended, but might deny the attacker access by fire. As much as the Soviets may wish to do away with short range missiles on the battlefield because of their nuclear implications, the study indicates that the Soviets and their Pact allies may be forced to retain them for conventional defensive purposes. Moral and Budgetary Support. In late 1989, Defense Minister Yazov complained to an interviewer that: manifestations of anti-army feelings have recently become more frequent in a number of regions of the country. Their initiators, instigators, and organizers are nationalist, extremist, separatist forces who pass themselves off as the champion of
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'nationalist interests' and try, on the pretext of'protecting' these interests, to set the people against the army and erase from people's minds the ideas of patriotism, internationalism, military duty, and responsibility for the Motherland's fate and for its defense. They have assumed the most acute, peremptory forms in the republics of the Baltic and Transcaucasia and some of the regions of Moldavia and the Central Asian republics.57 Much of the alienation has occurred as part of the emergence of nationalist spirit, as mentioned by General Yazov. With considerable reluctance, regular units of the Soviet Army have been called in for riot suppressive duty. With the notable exception of Azerbaijan, Secretary Gorbachev's move to restore order in that republic in January 1990 received warm applause according to contemporary man-inthe-street interviews around the country. Typical of citizen remarks were those of Alexander Demenov, a construction worker from southern Moscow. 'There was no choice," he said, "but to stabilize the situation. Many people do not always agree with Gorbachev, but what I think you will not find is anyone who will criticize him in this situation." 58 US intelligence agencies have attempted comparisons of US and Soviet defense budgets in the past, but the results have been highly controversial and may contain inaccuracies "substantially greater" than 15 percent according to the authors. 59 The real intent of Kremlin decision makers regarding the magnitude of the defense effort may only become apparent in time, assuming they continue to publish comparable budgets in the future. In this connection, it is unlikely that the costs of "offensive" and "defensive" equipment in the hands of theater force troops can usefully be compared. In most cases weapons can be used in either an attack or defensive mode. Besides, modern tanks and ground attack aircraft (which might be considered "offensive") can be quite expensive, but so can anti-tank and air defense guided missiles and other "defensive" weapons. While reductions in the size of the Soviet forces will, of course, affect the defense budget, it seems less likely that the defensive doctrine will have a recognizable impact in this area. On balance it appears that the Soviet leadership has directed the country's theater forces down a path which seems reasonable for its security and feasible for its capabilities. While there are pockets of resistance to aspects of the move, the path seems clear. The belief of many in the ultimate superiority of the offensive is satisfied to some extent by provision for strong counteroffensive operations. Others may accept the defensive doctrine simply as the outer limit of Soviet capabilities under the new economic conditions at home and the practical loss of allies abroad. While earlier concepts for offensive operations against the West may have made sense in their time, they can pass the tests neither of reasonableness nor feasibility today. Secretary Gorbachev's expressed desire to turn the
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Warsaw Pact into an alliance of more political than military weight makes virtue of necessity. Without the cooperation of the non- Soviet members, an offensive against NATO would have very poor chances of success, and in any event would likely turn into a lengthy conflict in which victor and vanquished would suffer indistinguishable losses. The Soviets make a persuasive case that the day of difference between conventional and theater nuclear war is waning, if not vanishing. With conventional weapons of ever greater effectiveness coming to hand and some 200 nuclear power plants - all potential Chernobyl-like disaster centers - in operation in the region, they argue, all war in Central Europe must be avoided. The security of one state is to be had through the strengthening of the security of all, ally and adversary alike. In January 1991 the Soviet Defense Ministry released a draft 10-year reform plan for the Soviet Armed Forces. If it survives review, and is implemented essentially as written, the physical size of the forces will continue to diminish over the course of the 1990s. The strength in the year 2000 is envisioned as one-third less than a decade earlier. But the changes are not expected to be limited to the size of the establishment. The Defense Ministry has evidenced an acceptance, at least in principle, of a concept of legislative oversight - preferably by the Supreme Soviet rather than by the more liberal Congress of Peoples Deputies. 60 If the legislative assemblies take root as active and useful partners with the political leadership, there may develop some basis for hope that the Soviet Armed Forces could evolve as legitimate defenders of the peoples they have long claimed to serve. If this comes to pass, the descending path which the forces have been following could turn out to be concerned with little more than physical size. Many other aspects, such as force legitimacy, troop morale, and popular support, could be substantially enhanced through the process. But this is a big "if." Notes 1 V. Pogrebenkov, "Our Military Doctrine," Agitator armii i Flota, no. 24 (1989), (Moscow), 2-4; reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Soviet Union, FBIS-SOV-90-021, January 31, 1990, p. 114. 2 "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member States," Pravda, May 31,1989, pp. 1-2; reported in FBIS-SOV-89-104, June 1,1989, pp. BB19-22. 3 See discussion of Soviet military doctrine in S. N. Kozlov (ed.), The Officer's Handbook (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971), translated by DGIS Multilingual Section, Translation Bureau, Secretary of State Department, Ottawa, Canada, and published under the auspices of the US Air Force, pp. 61-66. 4 Kozlov (ed.), The Officer's Handbook. 5 Dmitri T. Yazov, Pravda, July 27 1987, as reported by Don Oberdofer, "Shift in Military Policy: Gorbachev, Aides Emphasizing Idea of 'Reasonable Sufficiency'," The Washington Post, November 30, 1987, p. A6.
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6 Yazov, On Guard Over Socialism and Peace (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987); JPRS-UMA-88-001-L, p. 10. 7 From private discussions by the author with Soviet general officers in Moscow on January 23 and 24, 1989. 8 "From Defensive Doctrine Positions. Colonel General M.A. Moiseyev, Candidate USSR People's Deputy, Meets Communists From the USSR Armed Forces General Staff," Krasnaya zvezda, February 10 1989, translated in Federal Broadcast Information Service Soviet Report, FBIS-SOV-89-028, February 13, 1989, p. 80. 9 "Ostankino Radio Studio on the Line," Moscow Domestic Service, February 17 1990, reported in FBIS-SOV-90-036, February 22, 1990, p. 107. 10 "USSR Defense Minister Army General D. T. Yazov Answers Questions by an Izvestiya Correspondent: 'In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace'," Izvestiya, February 28, 1989, p. 3, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-038, February 28, 1989, p. 3. 11 "USSR Defense Minister Army General D. T. Yazov Answers Questions . . . " (FBIS-SOV-89-038) and Phillip A. Karber, "Soviet Implementation of the Gorbachev Unilateral Military Reductions: Implications for Conventional Arms Control in Europe," testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee, March 14, 1989; BDM Corporation, unpublished charts, p. 6. Mr. Karber quoted Soviet Major General Batenin speaking to FRG parliamentarians in February 1989: "In the Soviet border defense districts - the Baltic, the Carpathian, and the Belorussian defense districts, most districts would be restructured on the model of the machine gun/artillery divisions which the Soviet Union once had. These divisions are good from the defense of fortified regions or bastions. They will have lower mobility, and hence are more oriented for defense." On the face of the descriptions of the new divisions thus far, however, the Southern and Far Eastern TVDs would seem to offer the best opportunities for their employment. 12 Phillip A. Karber, "The Gorbachev Unilateral Reductions and the Restructuring of Soviet/Warsaw Pact Forces," testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 13, 1989; BDM Corporation, unpublished charts, p. 3. 13 D. T. Yazov, Na strazhe sotsializma i mira [On Guard over Socialism and Peace] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987), p. 34, cited in Edward L. Warner III, "New Thinking and Old Realities in Soviet Defense Policy," Survival, January/ February 1989, p. 23. 14 E. F. Ivanovskii, "The Outstanding Victory of the Soviet Army," Voennoostoricheskiy Zhurnal, November 1987, pp. 44-53, cited in Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviet High Command Looks at Gorbachev," International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Papers, no. 235 (Spring 1989), 55. 15 A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "The Battle of Kursk in Light of Today's Defensive Doctrine," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, August 1987, pp. 32-33, cited in Herspring, "The Soviet High Command." 16 Aleksandr Savelyev, "Debate of Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine in USSR and Socialist Pluralism," APN Military Bulletin, no. 10 (May 1988), pp. 5-8; reported in JPRS-UMA-88-017, August 1, 1988, p. 4. 17 Savelyev, "Debate of Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine." 18 Jacques Isnard, "Red Army in Throes of Restructuring," Le Monde, April 4, 1989, p. 6; translated in FBIS-SOV-89-071.
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19 David P. Grogan, unpublished paper, "The Impact of Soviet Defensive Doctrine on Their Airborne and Air Assault Forces," Defense Intelligence College, p. 17. 20 Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Divisional Organizational Guide, pp. 82-88; and DOD, SMP 1986, p. 69. 21 I. Vorob'yev, "Mobile, Active, Maneuver (Defense) . . . , " Krasnaya Zvezda, September 27, 1989, p. 2; translated with commentary by Soviet Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, November 1989 (ADVAB 00427). 22 Vorob'yev, "Mobile, Active, Maneuver." 23 Vorob'yev, "Mobile, Active, Maneuver." 24 "Kryuchkov Discusses Reform, Oversight of KGB," Moscow New Times, no. 32, 8-14, pp. 5-8, reported in FBIS-SOV-89-176, 13 September 1989, p. 71. 25 S. P. Ivanov, The Initial Period of War (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1974), translated and published under the auspices of the US Air Force, 1986. 26 Ivanov, The Initial Period of War, p. 306. 27 John M. Collins, US-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 19601980 (New York: McGraw-Hill Publications Co., 1980), p. 310. 28 Barbara Starr, "NATO Will Get '1 Month Warning of Attack'," Jane's Defense Weekly, December 23,1989. Some estimates run much longer - up to two years. See James J. Tritten, America Promises to Come Back: A New National Strategy, US Naval Postgraduate School, December 26, 1990, pp. 32-34. 29 US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1990, p. 77. 30 Nikolai Ogarkov, Vsegda v Gotovnosti k Zashchite Otechestva (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982), pp. 58-59; cited in John J. Yurechko, "Soviet Reinforcement and Mobilization Issues," in Jeffry Simon (ed.), NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988), p. 96. 31 Yurechko, "Soviet Reinforcement," pp. 80-81. The Volga-Ural Military District was formed on 1 September 1989 through amalgamation of the Volga and Ural districts; see S. Mostovshchikov, "Ural Military District Abolished," Izvestiya, September 5, 1989, morning edition, p. 2; reported in FBIS-SOV89- 171, September 6, 1989, p. 89. 32 See Yurechko, "Soviet Reinforcement," for description of Soviet mobilization system. 33 Ghulam War dak (compiler) and Graham Turbiville (ed.), The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy, Vol. 1, Issues of Soviet Military Strategy (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989), p. 218. 34 Jane's World Railways 1988-89 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1988), p. 722. 35 "Responses by N. I. Ruzhkov to Questions by Gudok," Gudok, 3 December 1989, p. 1; reported in FBIS-SOV-90-002, January 3, 1990, p. 93. 36 US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1987, p. 95. 37 Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets Still Stocking Ammunition, US Says," New York Times, January 11, 1990, p. A15. 38 Ye. Mironova, Moscow Television 1800 GMT October 21, 1989; reported in FBIS-SOV-89-203, October 23, 1989, p. 64. 39 S. Baygarov, "Impasse on . . . the Border: Why Freightcars Have Accumulated
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43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51
52 53 54 55
at GDR Stations," Pravda, October 24 1989, second edition, p. 5.; reported in FBIS-SOV-89-205, p. 31. Prague Television Service, 1830 GMT, October 20, 1989; reported in FBISSOV-89-209, October 31, 1989, p. 13. "Letter to Pravda," Pravda, October 22, 1989, second edition, p. 1; reported in FBIS-SOV-89-207, October 27, 1989, pp. 77-78. L. Frolov et al., "Tropical Reportage," Sovetskaya Rossiya, November 4,1989, second edition, p. 1; reported in FBIS-SOV-89-218, November 14, 1989, pp. 79-80. Wardak and Turbiville, Voroshilov Lectures, pp. 222-224. Kenneth M. Keltner and Graham H. Turbiville, "Soviet Reinforcement in Europe," Military Review, April 1987, pp. 34-43. Murray Feshback, "Demographic Trends in the Soviet Union: Serious Implications for the Soviet Military," NATO Review, October 1989, pp. 11-12. Feshback, "Demographic Trends." "Poor Quality of Soviet Conscripts," Jane's Defense Weekly, September 16, 1989, p. 504. "Poor Quality of Soviet Conscripts." "The Army Reduction and the Students," Literaturnaya Gazeta, April 5, 1989, p. 13; reported in FBIS-SOV-89-072, April 17, 1989, p. 107. Moscow Domestic (broadcast) Service, 1400 GMT, July 3, 1989; reported in FBIS-SOV-89-127, July 5, 1989, p. 40. Wardak and Turbiville, Voroshilov Lectures, pp. 321-322. Also see John G. Hines and Phillip A. Peterson, "The Warsaw Pact Strategic Offensive: The OMG in Context," International Defense Review, October 1983, pp. 1,3911,392. Hines and Peterson, "Warsaw Pact Strategic Offensive," p. 1,392. John W. R. Taylor, "Gallery of Soviet Aerospace Weapons," Air Force Magazine, March 1989, p. 102. Taylor, "Soviet Aerospace Weapons." V. V. Larionov, "The Problems of Preventing Conventional War in Europe," Mirovaya
56
57
58 59
60
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ekonomika
i mezhdunarodnyye
otnosheniya,
no. 7 (1989), 31-^4-3;
published in Soviet Press Selected Translations, US Air Force Intelligence Agency, November/December 1989, p. 138. Stanislaw Koziej, "Anticipated Directions for Change in Tactics of Ground Troops," Ground Forces Review (Poland), September 1986, p. 4, cited in Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Truloc III, "A 'New' Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins and Implications," Soviet Studies Research Center, RMA Sandhurst, document C68, summer 1988, p. 20. "The Defense of the Fatherland Brooks No Parochialism, Egotism, or Selfinterest . . . , " Pravda, 13 November 1989, first edition, p. 3; reported in FBIS-SOV-89-217, November 13, 1989, p. 104. Esther B. Fein, "Soviet Citizens Back Gorbachev on Use of Troops in Azerbaijan," The San Francisco Chronicle, January 18, 1990, p. A16. US National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, "Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1971-80: A Dollar Cost Comparison," SR81-1OOO5, January 1981, pp. 10-11. Steven J. Zaloge, "Soviets Draft Reform Plan," Armed Forces Journal International, February 1991, p. 16.
5
Protection from one's friends: the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact Christopher Jones
The Warsaw Pact ended in July 1991. Nineteen months earlier in the city of Warsaw itself, however, the Pact had actually surrendered to the peoples of Eastern Europe. The Polish foreign minister, Krzyztof Skubiszewski, accepted the surrender on behalf of the Solidarity government formed in late August. Skubiszewski, the first non-communist foreign minister in Eastern Europe since 1948, acknowledged the capitulation of the Soviet alliance system by signing a communique of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The communique stated: despite all the ambiguities of the situation, the conditions in Europe have ripened for a radical turning point in relations among the countries of the continent and for a gradual overcoming of its divisions and for a final eradication of the Cold War. One of the basic conditions for the construction of a secure, peaceful, undivided Europe is recognition of the rights of each nation to independent determination of its fate, to the free choice of the path of its social, political and economic development without interference from outside.1 The Warsaw Pact statement followed by one day a declaration by the Soviet government that it had renounced its claim to a right of military intervention in Eastern Europe. The Soviet renunciation of the "Brezhnev doctrine" came in a joint Finnish-Soviet statement of October 26, 1989 which in effect announced the "Finlandization" of Eastern Europe. In a joint statement on Europe, both signatories pledged Unconditional respect for the principle of the freedom of socio-political choice, the de-ideolization and humanization of international relations, the subordination of all foreign policy activities to international law, and the supremacy of all-human interests and values.2 At a December session of the Political Consultative Committee convened in Moscow for the ostensible purpose of de-briefing Gorbachev on the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Malta, the PPC affirmed the October declaration of the WTP Foreign Ministers by issuing a condemnation of the 1968 WTO intervention in Czechoslovakia.3 Gorbachev reconfirmed the Soviet pledge not to intervene in Eastern 100
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Europe in his opening speech to the December, 1989 session of the USSR's Congress of People's Deputies. Gorbachev also acknowledged the consequences of the revocation of the Soviet security guarantee: Fraternal parties are no longer ruling in Poland and Hungary. Our friends in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia have largely lost their positions. New political forces have emerged in the arena. They include both those who support the socialist idea and those who seek other ways of social development The Soviet Union is building its relations with East European countries - whether they have been carrying out transformations for quite some time, or have only embarked on that road, or are yet to do so - on a single position of respect for sovereignty, non-interference and recognition of freedom of choice. We proceed from the fact that any nation has the right to decide its fate itself, including the choice of a system and the ways, pace and methods of its development.4 The choices of Gorbachev The "ambiguities of the situation" recognized by the Committee of Foreign Ministers on October 27 was that the unexpected parliamentary victories of Solidarity forced Gorbachev to decide in late August whether to accept the formation of the Solidarity-dominated government in Poland headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki. This decision in turn required Gorbachev to decide if the USSR would continue to use military force to maintain communist parties in power in Eastern Europe. By late October, Gorbachev had decided to rule out the use of force to maintain communist parties in power. In making this decision, Gorbachev left the communist regimes of East Europe to begin hasty negotiations with their alienated societies over the terms under which they would surrender their political monopolies. In revoking the Soviet security guarantee to ruling parties, Gorbachev had also put an end to the Warsaw Pact as an alliance of ruling parties. As an alliance of ruling communist parties,5 the Warsaw Pact had been bound together by the parties' common fear of their own societies and their common dependence on a highly-visible USSR/WTO capability for military intervention. These parties had also been bound together by their fear of German reunification. German reunification was a threat to the survival of one of the interdependent ruling parties, the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic. German reunification also threatened the
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emergence of a German economic/technological/cultural superpower almost certain to displace the dominant influence of the Soviet Union over the non-military affairs of the region. Whether or not Gorbachev realized the full implications of his decision, the revocation of the Soviet security guarantee 6 constituted the abolition of the Warsaw Pact - national military forces would never again be integrated into a Soviet-dominated command structure. 7 From the Brezhnev doctrine to the Sinatra doctrine: the role of military doctrine in the Warsaw Pact The Soviet security guarantee to the ruling communist parties of Eastern Europe had required these parties to impose on their national defense ministries a common WTO military doctrine virtually identical with Soviet doctrine. WTO doctrine had two mutually-dependent elements, a militarypolitical component and a military-technical component. The military-political component of the common doctrine required the member states to prepare for "joint defense of the gains of socialism against internal or external reaction." 8 This principle in turn required that the military-technical component of doctrine provide for a series of joint WTO agencies and programs that linked the key structures of national defense systems to the corresponding structures of the Soviet forces assigned to the European theater. The practical effect of the common WTO doctrine was to fragment national control over national armed forces. WTO doctrine thus preempted organized national military resistance to USSR/WTO interventions. The client regimes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union supported the common doctrine of the WTO precisely because it preempted national defense systems capable of resisting Soviet interventions in support of the local party or the pro-Soviet faction of the local party. Romania, formally a member of the WTO, had adopted a doctrine of national resistance to such interventions, as had Albania, a former member of the Warsaw Pact, and Yugoslavia, the first communist state of Eastern Europe to demonstrate that national sovereignty was based on national control over national armed forces. Each of these communist regimes was willing to run the risk that these national defense systems might provide shields behind which local anti-communist forces might challenge the local party. Each of these three independent parties denied the WTO the use of its national armed forces for use in joint activities aimed at enhancing the Soviet offensive threat to NATO. Each of these parties also pursued an independent European security policy that challenged the legitimacy of
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both the NATO and Warsaw Pact military alliance systems. The emerging independent regimes of East Europe are likely to adopt the kind of territorial defense doctrines typical of the independent communist and non-communist states along the current East-West divide. The common WTO doctrine had also enabled the Soviets to detach the elite components of the loyal East European forces from national control and combine them into a "Greater Socialist Army" 9 formally designated by the WTO as the Combined Armed Forces (CAF). 10 The CAF in turn had guaranteed the survival of the East German state by projecting an offensive threat against the Federal Republic of Germany and its NATO allies. The USSR/WTO offensive threat compelled the Eastern and Western states of Europe to accept a political status quo that lacked indigenous support in the two Germanys and Eastern Europe. By revoking the Soviet security guarantee to the ruling East European parties, Gorbachev destroyed the capability of these parties to maintain the WTO agencies and joint programs required by the common military doctrine. Gorbachev did not withdraw the USSR/WTO military guarantee to ruling communist parties because of any failure on the part of USSR/WTO forces. There was no sudden disintegration of command structures, discipline, reliability, technology or intelligence (although ethnic tensions within the Soviet Army had become greatly exacerbated during 1988-89.) n There was no "doctrinal rebellion" like that attempted by the Czechoslovak officer corps in 196812 or the Polish officer corps in the early 1960s.13 The Warsaw Pact in late October, 1979 remained capable of initiating a military intervention to save any East European communist party from a popular uprising. What failed was the capacity of the Polish United Workers Party to survive in the process of carrying out a reform program personally blessed by Gorbachev as the test case of perestroika in Eastern Europe. There was no popular uprising to put down in Poland. But neither was there a functioning communist party to prop up. The impact of the creation of a Solidarity-dominated government in Poland on the WTO resulted from the interaction of the events in Poland with three bloc-wide processes. The first was the negotiation of new social contracts between the alienated societies of the Soviet empire and ruling "ethnic" communist parties in both Eastern Europe and the union republics of the USSR. The second was the diplomatic program designed to build "a common European home" from the Atlantic to the Urals. The third program, which linked Gorbachev's intra-bloc and East-West policies, was the security program based on NATO-Warsaw Pact arms control and the adoption of a
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new USSR/WTO military doctrine of "reasonable and reliable sufficiency." Gorbachev had hoped to find a solution to the interlocking domestic crises of the Soviet bloc through reform programs in the USSR, Poland and Hungary. Perestroika in these states sought a middle ground between the political monopoly of ruling communist parties and the political participation of previously alienated societies. The communist regimes in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria sought no such middle ground, evidently on the assumption, probably accurate, that no such ground existed. The Ceausescu regime emphatically rejected even consideration of a reform program for Romania. Gorbachev hoped he could lead his reformist colleagues in East Europe along afineline between sharing power and surrendering power. This line eventually led to the August crisis over the formation of a Polish government dominated by Solidarity. In the common European home the subjects of the Soviet empire were to support the policies of perestroika in exchange for honorary citizenship in a new Europe relatively open to the free movement of people, goods and even ideas. In the common European home the work force of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was to learn the self-discipline and respect for "the rule of law" characteristic of the Western labor force of the European Community. To guard against an unwelcome increase in Western political and cultural influence in a common European home Gorbachev simultaneously sought an extraordinary expansion of intra-bloc programs aimed at intensified integration of economic, scientific, technical and military institutions of the WTO states.14 As in the USSR, Gorbachev sought to diminish the role of the party apparat in bloc affairs in favor of more "organic" ties of corresponding institutions with common interests. The goal was to promote the emergence of genuinely competent regimes in East Europe which would free the USSR of the economic burden of subsidizing poorly-managed socialist economic systems. Gorbachev expected the member states of the EC and NATO to subsidize perestroika in Eastern Europe and the USSR in exchange for substantial reductions of WTO offensive capabilities and substantial mutual reductions in military spending. These expectations were summed up accurately, if awkwardly, in the title of the July, 1989 Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact: "For A Stable and Secure Europe, Free From Nuclear and Chemical Weapons, For a Substantial Reduction of Armed Forces, Armaments and Military Expenditures."15 In his arms control program, which he began to develop in January of
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1986,16 Gorbachev had sought a more rational and proportionate relationship between the conservative political objectives of the USSR in Europe and the explosive and expensive dynamics of the NATO-WTO military confrontation. That is, he wanted to disengage Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe from the East-West arms race but leave them in place to provide security guarantees to the ruling East European parties. This revised USSR/WTO military posture was based on a new military doctrine that emerged in late May, 1987. The new doctrine sought to combine a "defensive" posture toward NATO as a whole with a "counteroffensive" capability in Central Europe. The justification for the counteroffensive capability was the alleged threat of "German revanchism." The practical effect of the counteroffensive capability was to maintain the Soviet security guarantee to the ruling parties of the Soviet bloc.17 His arms control policy toward the West called for disproportionately large reductions of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces in Europe in exchange for Western support for "stability" in Eastern Europe. In July of 1989, in a speech to the West European parliamentary assembly in Strasbourg, he promised both Western and Eastern audiences that the USSR would no longer execute military interventions against ruling communist parties,18 as the USSR did in 1968 against the Dubcek government in Czechoslovakia.19 Gorbachev's objective in the spring and summer of 1989 was to stabilize and revitalize the internal political systems of Eastern Europe by transforming NATO-Warsaw Pact relations through arms control agreements and by transforming the EC and CMEA blocs into a "common European home." On the eve of Gorbachev's 1989 trips to Bonn, Paris and Strasbourg to promote both his arms control agenda and the concept of a common European home, Vitalii Zhurkin, director of Moscow's new institute on European affairs, explained in Pravda how East and West were to conduct themselves after the achievement of substantial arms reductions: The complex of relations that has been established in the West is an important element in the stability of the situation as a whole. Therefore, the East must conduct itself in such a way that this stability is not disturbed; it must proceed from the premise that the status and development of relations among the Atlantic states are the West's concern. This applies equally to stability in Eastern Europe. And we in turn have a right to expect the same attitude on the part of the West.20
But Gorbachev's programs for arms control, for construction of a common European home and for domestic reforms within the Soviet bloc were not only interdependent but mutually contradictory. And each of the three lines of policy had become hostage to the other two.21 The Polish political
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crisis of August 18-19 forced Gorbachev to acknowledge the contradictory directions of his policies and to choose which he would continue to follow. For Gorbachev to have used armed force against the Mazowiecki government would simply have been to exacerbate the intractable socioeconomic crisis in Poland that had festered since the declaration of martial law in 1981. 22 Armed repression of the Solidarity government almost certainly would have put a halt to Gorbachev's domestic reform programs in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Military action would have unquestionably destroyed all of the arms control and diplomatic policies aimed at securing Western support for perestroika and the construction of "a common European home." When Gorbachev announced his epochal decision not to use Soviet military power to keep East European regimes in power, his press spokesman, Gennady Gerasimov, breezily described the new Soviet policy as "the Sinatra doctrine." Gerasimov explained that he was referring to the classic Frank Sinatra song, "My Way." According to Gerasimov, Gorbachev had authorized Poland, Hungary and other East European states to conduct their affairs "their way." 23 Gorbachev's promulgation of the Sinatra doctrine was the obituary of the Warsaw Pact as it had been structured from 1955 to 1989. Gerasimov's casual explanation of Gorbachev's historic declaration was delivered with a nonchalance worthy of Sinatra himself. But a reference to T. S. Eliot might have been more appropriate: the East European empire of the Soviet Union ended not with a bang but a whimper. The end of the Warsaw Pact As an alliance of ruling parties, the Warsaw Pact had pursued the security interests of regimes supported by Soviet military power. The previous security policies could not possibly endure beyond the collapse of the communist parties that had endorsed these policies. With the collapse of the fraternal parties noted by Gorbachev in his speech of early December, 1989 the entire interlocking system of military doctrine, alliance agencies and force postures began to disintegrate during 1990, leading to the Pact's dissolution in Spring 1991. After October 27, 1989 the Warsaw Pact could have
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Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, where the removal of the Soviet threat removed the credibility of Ceausescu's claim that his regime was necessary to secure national independence against the Soviet threat; (2) the question of the GDR's merger with the Federal Republic; (3) the question of whether the nations that make up the USSR, in particular Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, will also obtain the right of national self-determination. In Finland, after announcing the "Finlandization" of Eastern Europe, Gorbachev called for a "Helsinki Two" conference on the model of the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). "Helsinki One" had produced a framework for all-European cooperation on security, economic and cultural issues based on having 35 nations, including the US and Canada, recognize the "inviolability" of existing borders. Gorbachev wanted a second CSCE conference to define a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals in which there were two German states and a USSR in its present borders. His call for such a conference was an appeal to the members of the Warsaw Pact, of NATO, and of the neutral democracies to agree with him that the principle of national self-determination in Europe would not apply to what were the two Germanys or to the nationalities of the USSR. 24 In the event, at least four possible security systems might emerge among the former WTO members. One is the development of an all-European collective security system through the mechanisms of the "Helsinki Two" conference Gorbachev has called for. An enduring critical issue in such a conference would be the status of the non-Russian republics of the USSR in a European collective security system. A second possible security system for Eastern Europe would be the adoption of non-aligned security postures by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. Such security policies would put these states in a loose association with Albania, Yugoslavia and Romania. This loose association already includes the neutral democracies along the present East-West divide - Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland. Gorbachev may have anticipated such a neutral zone between the USSR and NATO during his October, 1989 statements in Finland. In addition to issuing the joint Soviet-Finnish declaration on the "Finlandization" of Eastern Europe, Gorbachev also provided Helsinki with the first unconditional Soviet recognition of Finland's absolute right to military neutrality. Gorbachev may not, however, tolerate the attempts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to secede from the USSR and adopt similar neutralist postures in the neutral zone between NATO and the USSR. Aother possible security system for Eastern Europe might be a voluntary union of various
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national states all committed to the preservation of existing territorial boundaries and mutual respect for national sovereignty. A fourth possible security system in East Europe might be the construction of an overlapping system of bilateral treaties among all those states fearful of German claims on territories ceded at the end of World War II. Moscow's previous solution to the problem of "German revanchism" was to commit military power to maintaining "ethnic" communist parties in power in the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia and to link the fates of these parties with the fates of all the other "ethnic" communist parties of the WTO, including those of the union republics of the Soviet federation. In evading the political crisis in Poland by granting East European nations the right of self-determination, Gorbachev linked the possibility of the reunification of Germany to the possibility of the disintegration of the USSR. The promulgation of the "Sinatra doctrine" was not only a revocation of the Soviet security guarantee to the ruling parties of Eastern Europe. It was also a revocation of all the military doctrines adopted by the USSR to manage a European security dilemma that had crystallized in 1955 and lasted until 1989: the fusion of the "German question" with the survival of communist regimes. This dilemma emerged with the entry of the Federal Republic into NATO and the signing of the Warsaw Treaty on May 14, 1955. The crystallization of the European security dilemma of the USSR, 1955-60 After the FRG joined NATO the Soviets retaliated by forming the Warsaw Pact and then promoting the East German Barracked Police to the status of National People's Army (January, 1956). Possession of a national military force gave the GDR all the symbols of sovereignty enjoyed by the other people's democracies. Sandwiched in between the entry of the FRG into NATO and the creation of the WTO was the hastily-concluded Austrian State Treaty, an effort of the USSR to prevent a fusion of pan-German issues with the Soviet-NATO confrontation. The Austrian State Treaty secured the withdrawal of Moscow's troops from the Soviet occupation zone of Austria in return for Vienna's pledge not to join NATO or to merge politically with the Federal Republic. But, infinalizingthe status of the GDR as a separate German state and a separate socialist state, the Soviets fused the chronic threat posed by the instability of East European regimes to the recurring question of German reunification. From 1956 to 1961 the response of the East Germans to their
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new status as a permanent part of the East European system was mass flight to West Germany, mainly through Berlin, legally an open city under four-power occupation. The size and composition of this frantic emigration was so great that it threatened the survival of the GDR. Khrushchev's repeated failures to find a diplomatic solution to the Berlin crisis finally ended with the construction of the Berlin Wall, a barrier that East and West eventually came to regard as a distasteful but useful means of stabilizing inter-German relations and inter-alliance tensions. During the same period of 1955 to 1961 Eastern Europe as a whole also experienced tremendous turmoil. In October, 1956 the Polish communist party and the Polish army almost went to war against the USSR over the installation of Wladyslaw Gomulka as the new leader of the Polish party. In November, 1956, the Hungarians rose up in an anti-communist revolt that the Soviet army had to suppress. In 1957 Tito launched a second Yugoslav campaign against Soviet hegemony over the world communist movement. In 1959-61 the Albanians broke with the USSR, carried out a de facto withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and won Chinese support for their stand against the USSR. In the early 1960s the Romanians vocally rejected Khrushchev's plans for the economic integration of the USSR and Eastern Europe; Bucharest even had the temerity to pose as a mediator between the Soviet Union and China. From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, the independent communist states of Yugoslavia and Albania (a WTO member until 1968) began modernization of their "territorial defense doctrines". The Romanians undertook similar measures and the Polish military sought to establish an independent "Polish Front" within the Warsaw Pact. 25 These efforts to adopt independent national military doctrines posed a threat to the internal cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. During the era of US nuclear superiority at the theater and global levels, the only way the Soviets could make a reasonably plausible claim of neutralizing American nuclear superiority was to adopt declaratory strategies of preemptive attack or launch under attack. As the Soviets approached global nuclear parity, such claims became highly provocative in the European theater, particularly because of Soviet conventional superiority. Once the USSR had achieved undisputed nuclear parity, as recognized by the SALT II Treaty of 1979, Soviet leaders let the fact of parity speak for the neutralization of US nuclear forces. In public, they took the position of abjuring the first use of nuclear weapons. 26 The Americans, not the Soviet, were responsible for the globalization of European security policy. Under the doctrines of "massive retaliation" and
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"flexible response" the Americans attempted to offset the regional Soviet advantage in European theater conventional forces with a global threat of nuclear retaliation. The American policy was based in part on what David Calleo has called "hegemony on the cheap", 27 that is, a primarily fiscal decision to substitute "cheap" nuclear weapons for the expensive conventional forces needed for conventional deterrence of a Soviet attack on Europe. But the underlying logic for the American reliance on global nuclear deterrence as the solution for NATO's security problem probably grew out of the American understanding of the political reasons for American participation in two world wars. Americans had come to believe that a battle for domination of Europe was in fact the central front of a battle for world domination. It made sense to Washington, from both strategic and fiscal standpoints, to regard nuclear deterrence in Europe as tantamount to deterrence of a world war. Not to commit US nuclear weapons to the deterrence of a Soviet attack on Europe was seen as the equivalent of an American invitation to Moscow to conquer NATO by conventional means. 28 For the USSR, the dynamic of Soviet-American global deterrence maintained since 1960 a gross and irrational disproportion between the limited, conservative political objectives of the USSR in the European theater and the apocalyptic military means employed to pursue these objectives.29 The globalization of Soviet security policy in Europe also brought with it two additional problems. Globalization replicated in regions of much less political importance to the USSR the same gross disproportion between military means and political ends. It also risked importing third world Soviet-American military conflicts into Europe because the logic of global nuclear war had transformed Europe from the primary political arena of East-West conflict into the globe's decisive military theater by virtue of the concentration of enormous conventional and nuclear firepower in Central Europe. This offensive posture, enshrined in a common WTO doctrine, also preempted independent East European capabilities for the defense of national territory. The East European states that had adopted such doctrines of "territorial defense" (Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania) denied the USSR use of their national military forces to enhance the WTO threat to NATO. The self-destruction of unreasonable sufficiency When in the late 1970s, after Grechko's death, Soviet military capabilities
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finally began to match doctrinal requirements, the doctrine of unreasonable sufficiency proved self-defeating in regard to its military and political objectives. Grechko's unilateral military solution to the USSR's political problems in Eastern and Central Europe produced three counterproductive military results. The first is what Soviet analysts writing during the Gorbachev era have called "self-encirclement." That is, the USSR provoked the formation of a global anti-Soviet coalition consisting of all the states threatened by Soviet global capabilities, including China and Japan. By Soviet accounts, this coalition possessed four or five times the economic and technological resources of the Soviet bloc. The costs of conducting an arms race against this anti-Soviet coalition wreaked enormous damage on the Soviet economy.30 Second, Grechko's doctrine accepted the American strategy of globalizing the NATO-WTO confrontation and shifting the terms of the European stand-off to a competition in high technology. The Americans thus were able to "set the rules of the game", a frequent complaint lodged against American policy makers by Soviet analysts. 31 The Americans constantly forced the Soviets to validate their European strategy by countering the US global strategies and new technologies aimed at vulnerable Soviet flanks inside and outside Europe. This meant that the pursuit of limited objectives in Europe required a global military posture based on high technology.32 To be sure, the acquisition of a global military capability supported Soviet security objectives in regions outside Europe. But this benefit came at the cost of importing risks in these regions into the European security equation. 33 Third, Grechko's doctrine set in motion a recurring and futile cycle of conventional and nuclear strategies. Soviet conventional capabilities in Europe provoked an American nuclear warfighting strategy aimed at Soviet forces both in Europe and throughout the USSR. The Soviets responded with nuclear warfighting capabilities aimed at Western Europe and North America. Fear of nuclear war drove both sides towards arms control policies based on mutual nuclear deterrence. The Soviets found that mutual deterrence at the nuclear level implied mutual paralysis at the conventional level in Europe. Paralysis undercut the validity of the Soviet security guarantee to the ruling East European parties. This realization forced the Soviets to reaffirm a conventional option for the European theater. The Americans then responded with new concepts of nuclear warfighting and even more exotic conventional technologies. The cycle then resumed. 34 By 1985 the Grechko legacy had revealed that there were no permanent military solutions to the linked problems of political instability in Eastern
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Europe, the "German question", and the confrontation with the military allies of the FRG. Grechko's military solution had only compounded the underlying socio-economic causes of instability in East Europe and had fused these volatile processes to a global arms race that promised economic ruin in peacetime and catastrophe in war. 35 Gorbachev and his advisors began a search for political solutions to the linked problems of instability in East Europe, the division of Germany and the NATO-WTO confrontation.36 The transition between the Grechko and Gorbachev solutions to the USSR's European security dilemma required a new USSR/WTO military doctrine. 37 The role of military doctrine in the Warsaw Pact before the "Sinatra doctrine" The Soviets and the fraternal parties of Eastern Europe relied on a common WTO doctrine as both charter and justification for two missions: (1) assuring an unopposed Soviet capability for military intervention by configuring Soviet forces for offense and preempting East European capabilities of defense; (2) mobilizing the elite units of the East European forces to enhance the credibility of the USSR/WTO forces directed against the FRG and NATO as a whole. NATO's military response to the WTO posture in turn provided a retroactive justification for USSR/WTO doctrine. For Soviet purposes, the most critical issue in defining WTO military doctrine was not whether the doctrine was offensive, defensive, counteroffensive, nuclear or conventional. The most critical issue was whether there was one coalition doctrine or a series of independent national military doctrines. 38 The Soviet position, resisted by the Romanians, was that there should be one common doctrine for the entire alliance.39 In the Soviet definition, a state's military doctrine had two elements: a military-political component and a military-technical component. Although these two components were said to be mutually dependent, the Soviets claimed that the military-political component was the more decisive in the formulation of the overall military doctrine of a state. In the case of the Warsaw Pact states, this claim was entirely justified. The military-political component of USSR/WTO doctrine consisted of a circular set of axioms variously described as "the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and armed forces," 40 "joint defense of the gains of socialism against internal and external reaction", an obligation stipulated in the Soviet bilateral treaties with every WTO state except Romania41 or "the joint defense of the socialist fatherland", an entity the Soviets defined very broadly. 42 In a Soviet volume published in 1988, The International
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Defense of the Socialist Fatherland, General N. R. Pankratov of the Soviet Main Political Administration explained: With the signing of the Warsaw Treaty, the system of the collective defense of socialism was organized . . . The defense of the gains of socialism from the encroachments of internal and external enemies is carried out not only within the borders of the USSR, but of all the other fraternal socialist countries, on the scale of the socialist commonwealth as a whole. The defense of socialism is now based on the total might of all the fraternal governments.43 The commitment to joint defense of socialism within the collective borders of the socialist commonwealth against the encroachments of internal and external enemies was a Soviet security guarantee to the ruling communist parties that accepted the common WTO doctrine. By endorsing the military-political component of the common WTO doctrine, these parties imposed on their national defense ministries a common military-technical component of doctrine. The military-technical component of the common WTO doctrine consisted of four constantly-evolving "theories." 44 Their practical effect was to fragment national control over national armed forces and to integrate elite Soviet and East European units into a "greater socialist army." The four theories were those of the organization of a national defense system, military economics, troop training, and military art. 45 The theory of the organization of a national defense system (voennoe stroitel stvo) required national defense ministries to be constructed on the Soviet model (organization of the general staff, types of service branches and specialized troops, use of the military district system, organization of the manpower draft, maintaining paramilitary youth organizations, and the very large part-time "militia" organizations that drew personnel from the local party and had close organizational links with national interior ministries, national armed forces and the Soviet garrisons based in East Europe.) The similarity of organizational structures (despite vast differences in population and geography) permitted the construction of WTO agencies which linked corresponding Soviet and East European agencies. (This did not apply to Romania, which had an independent military doctrine and a very different national defense structure.) The Joint Command of the WTO linked corresponding service branches and specialized troops, usually under the command of the corresponding chief of the appropriate Soviet service branch. The Commander-in-Chief of the WTO presided over the Joint Command and in addition had special liaison staffs assigned to the East European defense ministries. 46
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The WTO Commander, always a Soviet officer with the title of Deputy Defense Minister of the USSR, also had at his disposal the WTO Staff, headed by his first deputy, also a Soviet officer. The WTO Staff (responsible for joint exercises and a multitude of joint activities)47 pre-empted the responsibilities of national general staffs. The linkage of corresponding Soviet and East European military bureaucracies through the agencies of the WTO would not have been possible without a common theory of the organization of a national defense system. The theory of military economics required a common arsenal, common production facilities and a common logistics system. This theory also justified a series of joint agencies: the Technical Committee (in charge of standardizing weapons systems and introducing new technology into the existing force structure), the Military-Technical Scientific Committee (in charge of coordinating military R&D), and the Military-Industrial Commission of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (responsible for coordinating weapons production). 48 Participation in this system - which Romania avoided - left each loyal WTO military absolutely dependent on Soviet sources of armament and technology. The theory of troop training and military education justified the existence of the WTO's Military Council, an agency in charge of coordinating national training programs and preparing national forces for bilateral and multilateral exercises.49 The decisions of the Military Council were only "advisory," a formula that permitted the Romanians to avoid the recommendations of the Military Council. Romanian objections probably prevented the formal recognition of two de facto agencies concerned with the implementation of theory of troop training and military education. One of these was a commission of the chiefs of the WTO Main Political Administrations. This commission, which met publicly, conducted a wide range of activities based on the common military-political component of WTO doctrine. 50 These activities included the political indoctrination of WTO personnel, the monitoring of the political attitudes of WTO officers and the writing of joint works on WTO military affairs. During joint exercises, joint MPA commanders were established to manage joint political activities and the complexities of multi-national/multi-lingual interaction.51 A de facto agency coordinated the curricula of WTO officer educational institutions at all levels. The system of officer education in practice reserved the top commands of the WTO armies for the graduates of mid-career Soviet academies and of the Soviet general staff academy.52 These institutions trained cohorts of East European officers for the joint exercises of the elite forces of the WTO and for the joint agencies of the Warsaw Pact. The subject of study at all WTO military-educational
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institutions, except Romania's, was the common military doctrine of the WTO. Junior officers studied "tactics"; mid-career officers studied "operational art"; and only senior officers were permitted to study "strategy." The fourth theory of the military technical component of doctrine was "military art." Military art consisted of three sub-theories: tactics, operational art (large-scale actions within a theater) and strategy. The "offensive" nature of WTO military art before the announcement of a new WTO doctrine in 1987 and the post-1987 "defensive/counteroffensive" military art both had the practical effect of keeping Soviet forces poised for offensive actions against East Europe and West Germany while simultaneously denying East European defense ministries (except Romania's) the right to plan national defense of national territory by national means. These objectives were accomplished through the system of bilateral (Soviet-East European) and multilateral WTO exercises based on the common military art of the alliance.53 In the joint exercises, Soviet forces, accompanied by other WTO troops, were able to practice the invasion of East European states. Soviet political officers, as part of the WTO MPA system, regularly practiced the political liaison functions with East European military and civilian personnel that would be crucial to managing an open military occupation. At the same time, the joint exercises preempted East European capabilities for the defense of national territory. This was accomplished in two ways. One was by proscribing the practice of the independent organization of national defense of national territory. The other was in fragmenting national command and control capabilities by assigning elite East European units to bilateral and multilateral formations for the practice of offensive actions on foreign territory under the command of WTO agencies.54 The circular logic of a failed doctrine As noted by NATO's hawks, doves and self-spotted owls, WTO military art (not military doctrine) was concerned with fighting an external opponent. This is why NATO has consistently treated WTO military art as if it were the whole of WTO military doctrine. USSR/WTO military art constantly changed in response to technological innovations on both sides and in response to "doctrinal" changes within NATO. But as long as the other three theories of the military-technical component of doctrine remained coordinated with the theory of military art, the WTO command structures were able to adjust to changes in "military art" at any level - strategic, operational, or tactical. This was because the WTO retained its common military-political component, the mission of the
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joint defense of the gains of socialism against internal and external reaction. WTO doctrine was thus part of a self-reinforcing circle of policies. Soviet offensive capabilities guaranteed the survival of East European communist regimes against internal and external threats. The ruling parties imposed the common WTO doctrine on their defense ministries. The common doctrine deprived national defense ministries of the capacity to resist Soviet interventions. The common doctrine also required the East European militaries to commit elite units to augmenting the Soviet offensive capability against West Germany and NATO. The NATO military deployments made in response to the WTO threat in turn provided a political justification for maintaining the Warsaw Pact. Within the WTO, common doctrine required comparable administrative structures that could be subordinated to WTO agencies that were extensions of the Soviet defense ministry. These agencies presided over joint activities, particularly joint exercises, that fragmented national control over national armed forces by requiring the integration of elite national units into a greater socialist army. East European officers rose through the ranks of the greater socialist army by attending Soviet military academies where they were taught to execute the joint missions required by the common doctrine. The Sovieteducated alumni of this greater socialist officer corps then defended the doctrine that subordinated them to Soviet commanders. Threats to a common WTO doctrine Before Gorbachev's promulgation of the "Sinatra doctrine", the primary threat to the common military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact had been the alternative doctrines of territorial defense adopted by Romania, formally a member of the WTO, Albania, a former member, and Yugoslavia.55 Two other WTO states had tried, unsuccessfully, to adopt such doctrines: Poland in the late 1950s and early 1960s and Czechoslovakia in 1968.56 The territorial defense doctrines adopted by East European states secured for these states national control over national armed forces. Although the primary mission of the three national doctrines of territorial defense was to deter USSR/WTO military interventions against independent communist leaderships, a secondary effect of these doctrines was also to deny the Warsaw Pact use of these national forces for offensive purposes in either East or West Europe. Another result of the adoption of independent military doctrines by Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania was the pursuit of independent policies in European security affairs and international diplomacy. These indepen-
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dent diplomatic stands by Yugoslavia and Romania were standing invitations to the loyal members of the WTO to defect from the Soviet bloc. With the promulgation of the "Sinatra doctrine" all the previously loyal defense ministries of the WTO could to cut their administrative linkages to the central WTO command and assert national control over national armed forces. The next logical step for these newly-independent defense ministries was to focus their efforts on the defense of national territory by national means. This implied a national security policy outside an alliance framework. Such a policy could lead to a loose diplomatic association with Romania and the various European neutral states, such as Yugoslavia, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland. Before October, 1989, the risk of deploying territorial defense postures was not only in provoking a preemptive WTO intervention but also in erecting defense systems that could just as easily shield anti-communist successor regimes as well as "national communists" asserting their independence of the USSR. The political objective of the territorial defense postures originally deployed by Tito in Yugoslavia, Hoxha in Albania and Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu in Romania was to deny the Soviets the same political objective which the Mujahideen denied the Soviets in Afghanistan: the installation of a pro-Soviet communist party sufficiently legitimate to govern without daily armed conflict between Soviet troops and the local population. The extreme difficulty in using military force to legitimize a local communist regime is evident even in the case of the WTO's most successful action in defense of the gains of socialism - the suppression of Solidarity in 1981 by a Polish declaration of martial law backed up by a Soviet readiness to intervene if necessary.57 Eight years after this perfectly-executed military operation, General Jaruzelski, with Gorbachev's acquiescence, conceded his inability to govern by military force alone and invited Solidarity to join his government. Strategies of territorial defense The territorial defense strategies of East European communist states sought to defend neither the territories nor the peoples of East Europe but the political leadership under assault by the USSR. The strategy was to guarantee a minimum level of continuing bloodshed between Soviet occupation forces and the local population. The defenders counted on sustained bloodshed to achieve the following goals:58 1 to delegitimize the local communist leadership supported by the USSR; 2 to legitimize the anti-Soviet resistance leadership to both domestic and foreign constituencies;
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3 to make the central issue of the conflict the right of an East European state to national sovereignty, a right formally acknowledged by the USSR; 4 to generate symbolic and substantive international support for the resistance movement as the defender of national sovereignty and cultural survival; and also to generate international condemnation of the USSR and its East European collaborators; 5 to demoralize Soviet soldiers and civilians during the course of a protracted struggle in which they came to doubt Moscow's justifications for the deaths of Soviet soldiers and East European citizens. The prospect of such a war may have deterred Soviet interventions against Yugoslavia in 1948-52, Poland in October, 1956, Albania in 1959-61 and Romania since the mid-1960s. The conduct of such a war in Afghanistan proved more than the Soviet regime could sustain. Ryzard Kuklinski, a Polish colonel responsible for preparing Polish troops for the imposition of martial law in 1981, declared after his defection to the West that the Poles could have deterred a threatened USSR/WTO intervention in 1980-1981 by planning armed resistance led by Polish officers. Another observer in fact argues that the Soviet officers overseeing the preparation of martial law were fearful that the authority being concentrated in the Polish general staff would allow the Polish general staff to defend Poland against the Soviets.59 Kuklinski made the following argument: Had the leadership duo of Kania-Jaruzelski said " N O " to the Soviets from the very start, then Solidarity, under the pressure of Moscow's overt attacks and threats, would have had to change the front off struggle and first off stand up for the country's sovereignty and integrity. I am convinced that it [Solidarity] would have been more open to compromise [with Jaruzelski] and the Soviet Union would have backed down if the partymilitary leadership and the population were to form a common front. Even Stalin did not militarily attack Yugoslavia. The same was true of Albania and, in the last years, Romania, when Ceausescu refused to obey Moscow and rejected the possibility of submitting his armed forces to the Soviet Union . . . Moscow most certainly did not want or could not afford to have a war with Poland where the opposite side would have been made up of the leadership, the army and the population. Even if this would have been a very short war, the Soviets would have had to pay too dearly for it. 60
The Warsaw Pact and the revolutions of 1989-90 The consequences of the revocation of the Soviet military security guarantee to ruling communist parties were epochal. By mid-June of 1990 the
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communist parties in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany had almost completely disappeared, leaving elected non-communist governments in power. In late 1989 popular uprisings swept away the Ceausescu and Zhivkov dynasties in Romania and Bulgaria. But renamed communist parties, the National Salvation Front in Romania and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, clung tenuously to power during 1990 in uneasy truces with their societies. Gorbachev's revocation of the Soviet military security guarantee to ethnic communist parties in Eastern Europe and his endorsement of the principle of national self-determination then produced events of even greater significance: the unification of Germany and the beginning of the disintegration of the USSR. Without the support of the Western Group of Forces (formerly the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany), the Socialist Unity Party (SED) collapsed in early 1990. The collapse of the SED in turn resulted in the rapid collapse of the state structures of the German Democratic Republic. A series of plebiscites culminating in the all-German elections of December 1990 transferred power to parties advocating incorporation of the GDR into the Federal Republic. In the USSR, ethnic communist parties disintegrated in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia and Georgia, followed shortly by the collapse of the local political structures previously sustained by the communist parties of the union republics. Plebiscites brought non-communist organizations into power and into direct confrontation with the central government of the USSR. In a declaration of independence (March, 1990) the non-communist successor government of Lithuania claimed the same right of complete national self-determination ceded by Gorbachev to several of the other East European states recognized by the 1918 Treaty of Versailles. The Warsaw Pact had been an alliance of sovereign states. It had been an alliance by ruling of communist parties, each of which was ultimately sustained by military forces directly linked to the Soviet Defense Ministry. If the Warsaw Pact, as an alliance of ruling communist parties, had not actually surrendered in October 1989, the surrender of the WTO was incontestable by June of 1990 at the Moscow meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC). The heads of four noncommunist governments - a voting majority - dismissed a communique prepared by Gorbachev and set their own agenda. The communique, written by Czechs and Hungarians, declared the Cold War over, called for drastic reduction in deployed armed forces of the WTO members and recommended the rapid dissolution of the Warsaw Pact itself. The most striking symbol of the disintegration of the WTO was the
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new head of the GDR Defense Ministry, Ranier Epplemann, a clergyman who had previously led the East German pacifist movement. Following the merger of the National People's Army into the Bundeswehr in September of 1990 sharp differences emerged in the WTO over the quota for Soviet troop levels in the zones to established by thefinalround of the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The differences were between the Soviets on the one side and, on the other, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks. Earlier in 1990 the Soviets had signed agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary to withdraw all Soviet forces by July 1, 1990. Soviet troops were to withdraw from Germany by 1994 under terms set by the SovietGerman agreement of September, 1989 which provided for payments of 12 billion marks to maintain and relocate the WGF on Soviet soil over a four-year period. Following the conclusion of the CFE Treaty, the Poles began negotiating with the USSR for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. Just prior to the conclusion of the CFE Treaty, barely a year after the PCC meeting in Warsaw, low-level representatives of the WTO met in Budapest to abolish the Warsaw Pact. The WTO representatives agreed to complete the dismantling of the former communist alliance system no later than July 1, 1990. Six weeks later the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance also agreed to disband. The CFE Treaty, signed in Paris at the November session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) set equal levels for tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, aircraft, and helicopters between the sixteen nations of NATO on one side and, on the other, the six surviving members of what had been the WTO. The Soviets were awarded twothirds of the total allocated to the six Eastern states; put another way, the USSR was allocated one-third of all military forces in the entire CFE zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. Even with this CSCE guarantee of the USSR's status as the sole European military superpower, the CFE Treaty required enormous reductions in the inventory of Soviet weapons. Following the CFE Treaty, the US and USSR appeared on the verge of signing a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty that would cut the number of strategic nuclear warheads by almost 50 percent on each side. At the November CSCE session, the participants also signed "The Charter of Paris", a diplomatic document symbolically ending the Cold War. The Charter of Paris established three new CSCE agencies: in Prague, a permanent secretariat for a newly-created Council of the CSCE; in Warsaw, an Office for Free Elections; and in Vienna, a Conflict Resolution Centre to monitor military-security issues. The Charter also provided for a series of conferences on human rights and the rights of religious and national
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minorities that may eventually result in the establishment of a European Human Rights Commission. The CSCE session also refused, under heavy pressure from Gorbachev, to seat representatives of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The underlying argument here is that the Cold War began and ended in Eastern Europe. The military-political dynamics of the USSR's policies in Central Europe may have unintentionally precipitated a global militarypolitical struggle which, once begun, seemed to have no identifiable beginning or end, no more than a sphere has an identifiable beginning or end. RIP, Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989 The military doctrine of the USSR/WTO system in 1989 continued to require military action against any possible challenge from within Eastern Europe. The USSR/WTO system remained capable of meeting this requirement. The one contingency Soviet/War saw Pact doctrine did not anticipate was a challenge from the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In confronting in Poland the results of his attempt to come to a political solution of his security dilemmas in Eastern and Western Europe, Gorbachev appears to have reached a conclusion unthinkable for the authors of the previous military doctrine of unreasonable sufficiency: the greatest enemy of Soviet interests in Europe was the Soviet imperial system itself. In revoking the security guarantee to the Soviet viceroys in Eastern Europe Gorbachev revoked the rationale for not only an offensive Soviet military posture toward both halves of Europe but also for the "counteroffensive" posture adopted in 1987. But in abandoning the ruling communist parties of Eastern Europe, Gorbachev put the CPSU on a collision with the dynamics of national self-determination in the two Germanys and the USSR itself. The resolution of these questions will determine the futures of the USSR, the Warsaw Pact and the European security system. Notes 1 "Kommunike Komiteta ministrov innostrannykh del gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo dogovora [Communique of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact]," Pravda, October 28, 1989, p. 4. 2 "Sovetsko-finliandskaia deklaratsiia: nove myshlenie v deistvii [Soviet-Finnish Declaration: New Thinking in Action]," Izvestiia, October 27, 1989, p. 1. 3 See "Warsaw Pact Statement" (Distributed by Tass), New York Times, Dec. 5, 1989, p. 7. 4 "Excerpts From Speech by Gorbachev on Bloc" (English translation by Tass, Dec. 11, 1989), New York Times, Dec. 12, 1989, p. A-10.
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5 Authoritative statements on the WTO have invariably stressed the primacy of ruling parties as the sine qua non of the alliance. See, for example, V. G. Kulikov (Commander-in-Chief of the WTO) (ed.), Varshavskii dogovor - soiuz vo imiia mira i sotsializma [The Warsaw Pact - Alliance in the Name of Peace and Socialism] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980). 6 The importance of this guarantee to the ruling communist parties of the Warsaw Pact state now appears in retrospect to have been the sine qua non of communist rule in Eastern Europe. Testimony to this dynamic is available in the following passage on the role of the Soviet Union in keeping the Polish United Workers Party in power during the 1980s when it was challenged by Solidarity. The passage in question is by I. A. Poliakov, "Mezhdunarodnyi imperializm - glavnyi organizator bor'ba protiv sotsialisticheskikh revoliutsii" ["International Imperialism - the Main Organizer of the Struggle Against Socialist Revolutions"]," in I. I. Mintz (ed.), Zashchita zavoevanii sotsialisticheskikh revoliutsii [Defense of the Gains of Socialist Revolutions] (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), p. 62. 7 For other views of the WTO see Dale R. Her spring, Ivan Volgyes, CivilMilitary Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder: Westview, 1978); Herspring and Volgyes, "Political Reliability in Eastern European Warsaw Pact Armies", Armed Forces and Society, Winter, 1980; William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms Doctrine and Strategy (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982); A. Ross Johnson, Alexander Alexiev and Robert W. Dean, East European Military Establishments: The Northern Tier (New York: Crane and Russack, 1982); Ivan Volgyes, The Political Reliability of Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982); David Holloway and Jane Sharp (eds.), The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Daniel N . Nelson, Alliance Behavior in the Warsaw Pact (Boulder: Westview, 1986); Christopher Coker (ed.), Drifting Apart: The Superpowers and their European Allies (London: Brasseys, 1989); Jonathan Eyal, Warsaw Pact Military Expenditures (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's/RUSI, 1988). 8 This formula appears in official WTO documents, bilateral treaties and other authoritative WTO statements, as will be seen in numerous citations of this paper. For a full explication of this formula see the following text published under the editorship of the former WTO Commander-in-Chief: chapter 2 in V. G. Kulikov (ed.), Kollektivnaia zashchita sotsializma (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982). This chapter is entitled, "The International Character of the Defense of Socialist Gains." 9 See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Christopher D. Jones, John Jaworsky and Ivan Sylvain, The Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase n, Vol. i: The Greater Socialist Army: Integration and Reliability (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defense, 1984). 10 See Jeffrey Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985). 11 See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Soviet Armed Forces: The Challenge of Reform and the Ethnic Factor," revised version of paper presented at the Conference, "The Soviet Empire and the Challenge of the National and Democratic Movements", Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy, Boston University, Nov. 8, 1989.
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12 See Condoleeza Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-83 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 133-138. 13 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Poland," in Harmstone et al. (eds.), The Warsaw Pact (Phase Two, vol. 2), pp. 65-75. 14 Three surveys of the coordinated Soviet programs for intensified integration of the Soviet bloc in the period before 1989 are: B. S. Popov (ed.), Internatsionalizatsiia opyta stran sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva: ekonomika, politika, ideologiia [Internationalization of the Experience of the Countries of the Socialist Confederation: Economics, Politics and Ideology] (Moscow: Nauka, 1987). 15 See Ivestiia, July 9, 1989. 16 For a discussion of the intellectual and analytical origins of the new policy, see Stephen Shenfield, The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology (London: Chatham House/Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987). 17 The section below on the doctrine of "reasonable and reliable sufficiency" will offer detailed documentation for this argument. Following the adoption of the new military doctrine, the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces published a book encapsulating these arguments: G. I. Demin (ed.), XXVII s"ezda KPSS o sovetskoi voennoi doktrine - boevoe sodruzhestvo armii bratsksikh sotsialisticheskikh stran [The 27th Congress of the CPSU on Soviet Military Doctrine - The Combat Confederation of the Armed Forces of the Fraternal Socialist Countries] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987). 18 Mark Kramer argues in "Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine: A New Era in Soviet-East European Relations", paper presented at the J-5 Strategy Development Conference, The Pentagon, Nov. 8, 1989, to be published under the editorship of Jeffrey Simon, that Gorbachev had been in 1988 and 1989 moving toward an unqualified policy of non-intervention in Eastern Europe. In my view, Gorbachev was moving toward a policy of non-intervention against ruling communist parties on the assumption that these parties would not confront internal uprisings if the USSR gave them a free hand. Kramer argues that Gorbachev wanted to avoid both popular uprisings and Soviet interventions. However, in my view, Gorbachev deliberately relied on a residual threat to intervene against anti-communist uprisings as an incentive offered to East European populations to embrace their local communist parties as the agents of reform. He expressed this position by insisting that the existing social systems in Europe were "realities." However, Gorbachev promised no military interventions against ruling parties. The ambiguities and contradictions in a policy of not intervening against ruling parties yet preserving a commitment to the existing systems comes through in his speech to the European parliament in Strasbourg on July 6, 1989, as indicated in the passages cited below. The text is taken from "Gorbachev Addresses the Council of Europe" from Pravda, July 7, 1989 in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), vol. 41, no. 27 (August 2, 1989), 6. 19 The post-invasion analysis shared by both the Husak regime and the USSR was that a group of "right-wing opportunists" had seized the party leadership and that the WTO intervention had restored to power the "internationalist" wing of the party. See a reprint of the Husak analyses in Pravda (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971). 20 Vitalii Zhurkin, "A Common House for Europe: Reflections on How to Build It", Pravda, May 17,1989, p. 4, in CDSP, vol. 41, no. 22 (June 29,1989), 16.
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21 See "Gorbachev Addresses the Council of Europe", CDSP, vol. 41, no. 27 (August 2, 1989), 6. 22 See J. F. Brown, Poland Since Martial Law (Santa Monica, CA: Rand N-2822 RC, D e c , 1988). 23 Bill Keller, "Gorbachev, in Finland, Disavows Any Right of Regional Intervention", New York Times, Oct. 26, 1989, p. 1: "[Gorbachev's] spokesman embroidered the theme jokingly, saying that Moscow had adopted 'the Sinatra doctrine' in Eastern Europe. 'You know the Frank Sinatra song, "I Did It My Way"', said Gennadi I. Gerasimov to reporters, 'Hungary and Poland are doing it their way. I think the Brezhnev doctrine is dead," he added, using the Western term from the previous Soviet policy of armed intervention . . . " 24 For a discussion of these issues, see Christopher Jones, "The Unification of Germany and the Disintegration of the USSR", The World and / , February, 1990. 25 For documentation of this analysis see Christopher D. Jones, Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Praeger, 1981), chapter 3. 26 See a discussion of the development of a Soviet declaratory posture of no first use of nuclear weapons in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine (19S9), pp. 124-125. 27 David Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 4i_43 and ff. 28 This line of thinking is the basis of the seminal American intellectual treatise of the period, Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 29 This is one way to read a passage from Gorbachev's address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. See the passages from this speech cited in note 20 of this paper. 30 These arguments are drawn directly from Vyacheslav Dashichev, "The Search for New East-West Relations", Literaturnaia Gazeta, May 18, 1988, in CDSP, vol. 40, no. 24 (July 13, 1988)> 1-5. 31 See Ye. Primakov, "A New Philosophy of Foreign Policy," Pravda, July 10, 1987, in CDSP, vol. 39, no. 28 (August 12, 1987). This article was an authoritative commentary on the new USSR/WTO military doctrine by the director of the Institute of World Relations and International Economics who became the chairman of the USSR's Council of Nationalities. On p. 4 of this text, Primakov noted, "The introduction of the principle of reasonable sufficiency will prevent the US from setting the rules of all-out military competition harmful for the USSR." 32 Primakov, "A New Philosophy," p. 3: There is no reliable alternative to political measures in the field of security. 33 Primakov, "A New Philosophy," p. 4. On the Gorbachev effort to de-link regional and global security policies see Mark N. Katz, Gorbachev's Military Policy in the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1989). 34 Two studies that document recurrent cycles in nuclear and conventional strategies are Lawrence Freedom, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's, 1983) and Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983). For a similar analysis by a Soviet scholar, see Alexei
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G. Arbatov, Lethal Frontiers: A Soviet View of Nuclear Strategy, Weapons and Negotiations (New York: Praeger, 1988). 35 In my reading, the entire Primakov essay, "A New Philosophy of Foreign Policy" seeks the disengagement of these issues. 36 Primakov, "A New Philosophy." 37 Primakov, "A New Philosophy." 38 See D. A. Volkogonov (ed.), Armii stran Varshavskogo dogovora [The Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 18. 39 In 1985 General A. I. Sorokin wrote condemning "nationalist, revisionist, opportunist conceptions which break the internationalist basis of the defense of revolutionary socialist gains. These conceptions propagate doctrines of national exclusivity, of isolation in the cause of the defense of each country, and they lead to the breaking up of the common efforts of the fraternal countries of socialism in the struggle against the aggression of international imperialism." See p. 233 in A. I. Sorokin (ed.), Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily v usloviakh razvitogo sotsializma [The Soviet Armed Forces in the Conditions of Developed Socialism] (Moscow: Nauka, 1985). 40 S. A. Tiushkevich (ed.), Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii [Marxism-Leninism on War and the Armed Forces] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972). 41 For the relevant passages from these treaties, see Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, pp. 274—277. 42 See chapter 3 in V. T. Login (ed.), Opyt voin v zashchitu sotsialisticheskogo otechestva [The Experience of Wars in Defense of the Socialist Fatherland] (Moscow: Nauka, 1985). 43 N. R. Pankratov, chapter 1 in G. V. Sredin (ed.), InternatsionaVnyi kharakter zashchita sotsialisticheskogo otechestva [The International Charucter of the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988). 44 See "Voennaia nauka" (military science) in A. A. Grechko (ed.), Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia vol. 2, p. 184 and ff. 45 Grechko, Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia vol. 2. 46 Volkogonov (ed.), Armii stran varshavsksog dogovora, pp. 25-28. 47 Volkogonov (ed.), Armii stran varshavsksog dogovora, ibid. p. 29. 48 See A. A. Gurev, chapter 2, section 4: "The Development of Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation in the Interest of the Defense of the Gains of Socialism," in G. V. Sredin (ed.), InternatsionaV nyi khrarakter zashchity sotsialisticheskogo otechestva (1988). 49 See P. A. Kocherga, "The Cooperation of the Fraternal Armed Forces in the Improvement of Combat and Operational Training of Troops and Fleets," in A. V. Antosiac (ed.), Voenno-politicheskoe sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran [Military-Political Cooperation of the Socialist Countries] (Moscow: Nauka, 1988). 50 See V. V. Semin, "Cooperation of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Countries in the Improvement of Ideological Work Among Troops and Fleets," in Antosiac (ed.), Voenno-politicheskoe sotrudnichestvo. 51 Semin, "Cooperation of the Armed Forces." 52 V. G. Kulikov (ed.), Akademiia general'nogo shtaba [The General StaffAcademy] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), chapter 7. See also P. A. Kocherga, "Cooperation of the Socialist Countries in the Training of Military Cadres," in Antosiac (ed.), Voenno-politicheskoe sotrudnichestvo, pp. 209-220.
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53 Lt. General Iu. A. Khvorost'ianov, Dep. Chief of Staff, WTO, "Use of the Experience of the Great Fatherland War in the Preparation of the Combined Armed Forces of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [The Military Historical Journal], no. 7 (1985). This article emphasizes the importance of a common military doctrine for the conduct of joint exercises and itemizes the many activities that take place during such exercises. 54 Christopher D. Jones, "Warsaw Pact Exercises: The Genesis of a Greater Socialist Army," in Harmstone et al., The Warsaw Pact, Phase 2, Vol. 1. 55 See chapter 3 of Jones, Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe. 56 Jones, Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe. 57 Ryszard J. Kuklinski, "The War Against the Nation Seen From the Inside", Kultura (Paris) No. 4/475, from Orbis, Winter, 1988, p. 16. 58 Jones, Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe, chapter 3. 59 Andrew A. Michta, Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), chapter 8, "The Soviet Role in The Crisis". 60 Kuklinski, "War Against the Nation", pp. 12-13. In an earlier passage Kuklinski also argued that Gomulka and General Spychalski had deterred a Soviet military intervention in 1956 by threatening to lead the party, army and people in a war in defense of national sovereignty.
Red Star of the sea: the Soviet Navy and strategic policy Gael Donelan Tarleton
At the beginning of a new decade, and with a new Soviet leadership intent on restructuring the military, the future of the Soviet Navy none the less promises to be much like its past. Soviet naval power has historically been viewed as a by-product - rather than as a central fixture - of Soviet superpower status. Although the 1990s will see highly capable and technologically sophisticated fleet forces, these will affect Soviet warfighting objectives only peripherally, with, of course, one exception - the strategic sea-based ballistic missile force. The challenge for the Navy (VoyennoMorskoy Flot) in this decade will be to establish its contribution to the program of "reliable defense sufficiency."1 It must not only defend Soviet territory but must participate in operations which deny the enemy control of critical regions. As the Soviet military confronts immense ferment in force development and strategic thought (perhaps only comparable to the original "revolution in military affairs") the Navy remains stuck in its traditional role as the "last among equals" in the five-service Armed Forces. The Soviet Navy is simply not viewed as a pivotal player in accomplishing decisive wartime tasks. Soviet naval strategists seek to make the Navy a central participant in the ongoing internal security debate. This effort has been strengthened by the 1988 publication of The Navy: Its Role, Its Prospects for Development, and Its Employment (hereafter, The Navy).2 Although this book may not be an official statement by the Soviet Navy's current leadership, it is remarkably candid in evaluating the future of the Navy, the directions of naval force acquisition and employment under the conditions of "reliable defense sufficiency," and future naval missions within the context of evolving Soviet military doctrine and strategy. The foreword to The Navy is the final written work by the late Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov before his death in May 1988, and has set the stage for intense examination in the West of plans for the Soviet Navy through the 1990s.3 As a focal point for directing attention to the Soviet Navy's role in a future war, the authors of this work timed their presentation perfectly. 127
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Planning for the 13th five-year plan for 1991-95 was at a critical juncture; the Soviet military's conceptualization of and response to Gorbachev's proposals for "new thinking on security" remained unsettled; and decisions on formulating potential strategic and conventional arms control agreements demanded immediate calculations of future force requirements. The Navy staked its position against the backdrop of serious and frequently controversial defense discussions involving participants from both civilian institutes and senior military officials.4 While The Navy's authors argue that naval forces will play key roles in future Soviet strategic missions, the nature of the debates on defense requirements and alternative force structures suggests that traditional strategic missions may be redefined.5 Moreover, in the unlikely event that naval arms reductions occur and agreements on restricted naval peacetime operating areas are reached, the Soviet Navy's leadership will be faced with the prospect of restructuring the fleets to meet new responsibilities. The Soviet naval leadership clearly sees the years immediately ahead as central to shaping the fleet for the next two decades. Procurement decisions and operational requirements will dictate the pace of force modernization as well as the Navy's contribution to Soviet strategy. Strategic and conventional arms control negotiations may alter decisions made today. None the less, Soviet naval priorities will reflect several vital missions, and they also will identify the forces required to fulfill these missions. Identifying the Navy's missions for the 1990s requires first an understanding of the Soviet perspective on the nature of a future war as well as of potential distinctions between wars in various regions, and of views on those forces best suited to combat. Soviet naval development for three decades was overseen by Admiral Gorshkov. He was summarily replaced in 1985 by Admiral Chernavin, his chief of the Naval Main Staff and former commander of the preeminent Northern Fleet. Despite the leadership change and the loss of a vocal and effective proponent, the Soviet Navy's missions historically have remained relatively constant since the 1960s, emphasizing sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) strikes against enemy territory and defense of territorial waters. Chernavin must now persuade the Soviet political and military leadership not just that this stability is warranted but that the Navy can offer new and significant security benefits. How will the Navy's roles and missions evolve in relation to Soviet military strategy? Gorshkov never exclusively directed the course of Soviet naval development. He was instead an extremely effective implementor. As the Navy transitions to new generations of platforms and weapons in the 1990s, it is useful to address three critical points: the formulation and evolution of Soviet naval strategy and perspectives on the nature of war; the principles which are integral to Soviet strategic planning generally and to
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Soviet naval wartime missions; and the potential impact of naval arms reductions on traditional patterns of US-Soviet naval deployments, training, and preparation for wartime operations. Developing Soviet naval strategy Although every military service is represented on the Soviet General Staff, the traditional Russian and Soviet preoccupation with continental warfare has meant that this planning body is dominated by strategists who see ground and air forces as the primary determinants of national security. Naval concerns have traditionally influenced strategic priorities but have not determined what those priorities must be. Indeed, the longstanding view of naval forces as an appendage to a ground forces-dominated military strategy persists today. For example, former Minister of Defense Andrei Grechko once described the operational art of the Navy as standing "somewhat apart" from that of the other military services. 6 These perspectives tend to emphasize the Navy's role as an "orphan" within the Soviet Armed Forces. Yet under Gorshkov the Navy grew from a force capable only of operating close to shore, to one capable of operating both in distant oceans as well as protecting critical regions closer to home. Most important, Gorshkov ensured the commitment to a sea-based strategic strike force with the construction of three classes of modern strategic submarines (YANKEE, DELTA, and TYPHOON). Gorshkov spent a career explaining the place of a modern navy within a military dominated by Ground Forces' generals who had fought in the great land campaigns of 1941-45. His writings provide a glimpse into the Navy's struggle to influence Soviet strategy. The fact that he published under his name two major book-length works since 1972, extolling the virtues of seapower, and that he edited The Navy, are significant. Underlying these works is an effort to instruct a wide audience on the role of the Soviet Navy. No other service chief for at least three decades has found the need to do the same for his own service. Early in the first of Gorshkov's works, a series of eleven articles collectively entitled Navies in War and Peace, he wrote of "Russia's Difficult Road to the Sea." He argued that the "opponents of Russian seapower have widely used and are widely using falsification of its military history. In particular, they assert that all of Russia's victories have been gained only by the Army and that it can be powerful only by strengthening the Army at the expense of the Navy." 7 In the second edition of his second major effort, Sea Power of the State, Gorshkov included a section on "The Strategic Employment of the Fleet." He emphasized the unity of Soviet military strategy, but he did it in such a
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way as to leave the impression that he was not entirely satisfied with the role assigned to oceanic as well as to land theaters. He was critical of Napoleon for failing to recognize the contribution that naval forces could have made to France's military campaigns, and also was critical of Tzarist leadership at the time of Russia's 1904-5 defeat by Japan. While the land strategy for that war had, he writes, "been thoroughly worked out in Russia," naval strategy had not been developed because "at the end of the nineteenth century in Tzarist Russia insufficient attention was being devoted to theoretical thinking on the patterns of armed combat in sea theaters." 8 Throughout Gorshkov's tenure in the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet military thought recognized the expansion in the Navy's wartime role. Important theoretical refinements included defining continental and oceanic theaters of military operations, elaborating the principles of strategic operations in these continental and oceanic TVDs, and considering the Navy's role in limited wars (such as the 1973 Arab Israeli Conflict). Development and procurement policies paralleled this evolution. The Navy acquired vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft carriers, modern nuclear attack and ballistic missile-equipped submarines, and formidable anti-ship missilecarrying bombers. The Navy also purchased numerous platforms with a multi-mission function, such as surface ships and submarines that were equipped with torpedoes for antisubmarine warfare cruise missiles for anti-ship attack, air defense systems for self-protection, and advanced electronics for command and control and electronic warfare. These forces ensure the flexible use of Soviet power in selected regions, accommodating the operational conditions and range of missions that might be required in any potential area of conflict. Nevertheless, any future use of naval power will be considered by a General Staff and political leadership which will remain committed to a continental rather than to a maritime perspective. However, future developments in Soviet military thinking may prove to be the greatest constraint on the Soviet Navy's missions in any future conflict. The Soviet Navy's strategic traditions9 Soviet warfighting concepts from the mid-1960s up to the early-1970s assumed the use of nuclear weapons virtually from the start of combat. Moscow believed that any conflict in Europe would quickly escalate to a global war and that such a war would be the final and ultimate clash between two opposing social systems. This perspective was mirrored in force procurement and training, in research and development programs, and in definitions of the basic types of naval operations. Among the most important acquisitions were missile-armed submarines,
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surface ships, and aircraft. Cruise missiles were placed on all of these platforms and ballistic missiles were deployed on submarines. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, both ballistic missile and cruise missile submarines were intended for use against land targets. But as they achieved the ability to track mobile at-sea targets, all cruise missile units were dedicated principally to striking high-value surface ships. The most important targets were enemy aircraft carriers, since the carriers could launch nuclear-armed aircraft against the Soviet homeland. In addition, cruise-missile-carrying submarines could patrol in more restricted waters, such as around the Kurile Islands in the Sea of Okhotsk, and could threaten US merchant ships attempting to resupply Europe. While Soviet strategists expected that the initial nuclear strikes could determine the outcome of a conflict, they also acknowledged that the armed forces must be prepared to conduct follow-on conventional operations in the final phases of a war. Yet Soviet naval forces constructed during the late 1960s suffered from both technical limitations and from clear qualitative inferiority. Although the Northern Fleet could deploy many diesel submarines and destroyers, they carried few, if any, weapons for reloading after the first salvo. Ships in the Baltic and Black Seas, in the Pacific Ocean Fleet, or deployed in the Mediterranean, were essentially restricted to protecting Soviet borders and were extremely vulnerable to carrier-based air attacks or to antisubmarine warfare. Naval research and development during the late 1950s and early 1960s focused on developing both cruise and ballistic missile systems, particularly in order to achieve improved guidance systems for anti-ship cruise missiles. Some of these missiles were designed for underwater launch from submarines, thereby enhancing the survivability of the submerged platform. This launch capability was also incorporated into submarinelaunched ballistic missile technology. Technical limitations, operational considerations, and political calculations were all responsible for the Soviet Navy's forward deployment into open-ocean areas during the 1970s. Strategic ballistic missile submarines were forced to deploy in more vulnerable regions along the US coasts in order to be within missile range of their intended targets. Advances in technology eventually led to the design and deployment of longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This development, in turn, improved the targeting flexibility and survivability of Soviet strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), allowing them to operate in more secure waters off the Soviet coast while still in range of their primary targets. As a result, the Soviets gradually diminished the number of submarine patrols off the US coasts, a trend which has been observed over the last decade and a half. Naval research also stressed detecting and
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tracking surface ships, especially aircraft carriers, and - apparently with only very limited success - US SSBNs. Indeed, the Soviet effort in strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) has been long and extensive. The technological barriers are daunting, but the potential for a breakthrough - probably not conceivable until the next century - has huge implications. The Soviets view the threat from Western ballistic missile submarines as equivalent to, if not greater than, that from US land-based strategic missiles. A program to develop an effective strategic ASW capability therefore remains a long-term commitment. Soviet anticarrier and antisubmarine warfare tactics also contributed to the forward deployment of surface ships and submarines. In the Soviet view, enemy platforms could be attacked most effectively if engaged before they launched their weapons. Given this requirement, Soviet naval forces would be forward-deployed to open-ocean areas where enemy forces could be intercepted and destroyed. Forward deployments also were instrumental to the Soviet foreign policy agenda of the 1970s. The permanent peacetime presence of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, West and North African ports, and the North and South Atlantic and Pacific Oceans reinforced the USSR's image as a superpower. Visits to foreign ports also served as a reminder of Soviet support for socialist regimes in developing countries. However, Moscow's view of the seas has always stressed their contiguity to the Soviet landmass. In the 1960s, this resulted in the adoption of an operational horizon for the Soviet Navy that had an outer perimeter of up to 2,000 kilometers from Soviet territory. This philosophy of protecting Soviet borders (and engaging forces in anticipated operating areas) resulted in a regular presence in the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas. A series of large exercises throughout the 1960s, culminating in Okean-70> reflected the essentially limited objectives of strikes against enemy aircraft carriers and other surface ships, consonant with the modest technological capabilities of the fleet and with the perception of naval operations as being peripheral to combat on land. Apparently the decision was made to concentrate the bulk of the best of the Navy's operational ASW platforms closer to the homeland rather than to disperse them throughout the oceans in an essentially fruitless search for difficult-to-locate US SSBNs, which at the time carried missiles having a 4,600 kilometer range. This decision to concentrate forces in the maritime regions abutting the USSR probably reflected operational decisions reached in the late 1960s or early 1970s, which remain applicable today. Soviet doctrine came to acknowledge the possibility that future wars would not necessarily be short and decisive, nor necessarily involve the immediate use of nuclear weapons, but could involve a protracted non-nuclear phase
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of combat. Moreover, this shift of ASW assets toward Soviet territory coincided with the shift of SSBN deployment areas to more protected regions. At this juncture, Soviet views on the nature of a future war, and methods for waging it, represented the first of several important refinements to Soviet military doctrine and strategy. A new role for the Soviet Navy The Navy reasserted itself as Soviet military planners reevaluated the nature of war in the 1970s. Soviet strategy accepted that war could begin conventionally, and that it would not necessarily become global. 10 This evolution in strategic thought had a direct impact on the development and use of the Navy. Naval wartime missions had to be more flexibly defined if they were to be performed under either conventional and nuclear conditions, and naval platforms had to be designed to operate in forward areas for sustained periods. Soviet recognition and elaboration of the concept of a non-nuclear conventional phase is significant for several reasons. Among these is the imperative to avoid (and to prevent) enemy nuclear attacks against Soviet territory and against Warsaw Pact forces conducting operations in the continental theaters on the Soviet periphery. The Soviets also apparently attempted to correct a major shortcoming in their planning, which had not incorporated the possibility of extended conventional operations, and which had not considered the impact on operational requirements for Warsaw Pact theater forces. Moreover, the issue of controlling nuclear use once the threshold had been crossed was not (and still is not) resolved. By planning for extended conventional operations, Soviet military theorists could, in effect, put off the need to confront the escalation issue. The evolution of Soviet strategy and planning for non-nuclear war has directly affected naval force planning. The most likely wartime tasks of the Soviet Navy are circumscribed by these formalized views on strategy, which also emphasize the interaction of all services. Current Soviet planning for conventional operations in Europe, and the Navy's potential role, may indicate a radical departure from the strategic missions that were paramount in the 1970s and 1980s. Through the late 1980s, Soviet military strategy focused on three types of strategic military action: strategic nuclear operations by the Strategic Rocket Forces, ballistic missile submarines, and Long-Range Aviation; strategic operations in continental and oceanic theaters, where naval forces would conduct both joint and independent actions; and operations to defend against enemy aerospace attack. Soviet strategy for theater warfare assumed a cohesive Soviet/Warsaw Pact that would operate according to a unified plan of action.
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The disintegration of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and the ramifications of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact jeopardize the fundamental concepts for Soviet theater strategy far more deeply that even the 1987 adoption of a "defensive doctrine" by the Warsaw Pact. Thus, the Navy, along with the Soviet Armed Forces as a whole, faces the prospect of a completely redefined wartime mission, especially with respect to the general purpose forces operating in support of land-based theater forces. To date, the Soviets apparently do not anticipate a radical departure in Soviet strategic force operations, even in the event of a negotiated fifty percent reduction in strategic offensive systems. Therefore, Soviet SSBNs would retain their traditional missions. Whereas in the past, the Navy would have been used in continental theaters jointly with Warsaw Pact ground and air forces and elements of the Polish and East German navies in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, the Navy's future role in these areas probably should assume: no joint operations; protection of Soviet (as opposed to Warsaw Pact) territory; and defense and control of Soviet maritime zones contiguous to Soviet territory. It still would be accurate, none the less, to define the Navy's principal nonstrategic mission as one of support to land-based theater force operations: It is believed that naval assistance to ground forces is most effective within the framework of a unified operation in a continental TVD, where ground forces must play the principal role and the Navy (and other branches of the armed forces) must aid in achieving the operation's objectives.11 Support would include gunfire, amphibious landings, transporting troops and materiel, protecting coastal sea lines of communications, and engaging any enemy naval and maritime forces in the area.12 In addition, naval special forces may act against coastal targets such as ports, maritime intelligence collection, as well as against command, control, and communications (C3) sites and other naval facilities. Defining naval force operations in oceanic theaters becomes much more ambiguous as Soviet military strategy evolves. Traditional planning called for naval forces to be used jointly with air forces against US carrier battle groups, for interdiction of critical sea lanes, and for hunting down US SSBNs. Under these conditions, the Soviet Navy would have established defensive perimeters which Western analysts have characterized as encompassing two areas: an inner "sea-control" zone where Soviet forces probably expected to control the ocean's surface and the air above it, and an outer sea-control zone which probably was viewed as too distant for long-term, complete Soviet control (at least in the initial period of war) but not so distant that the Soviet Navy could not have contested an opponent's attempt at long-term control.
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Immediately beyond these sea-control zones would be the "sea-denial" zone - ocean areas that the Navy would attempt to turn into "no-man's water," where neither the Soviet Navy nor opposing naval forces would be able to retain control during a protracted, non-nuclear conflict at sea. It is uncertain as to exactly how naval planners defined the outer limits of this zone. From the Soviet perspective, it would have been ideal if Soviet naval and air forces could prevent US aircraft carriers, other surface ships, and submarines from approaching close enough to launch either aircraft (on a one-way mission) or land-attack cruise missiles against the USSR. This would mean attacking US forces as far as 1,200 to 1,500 nautical miles from Soviet territory - an extremely ambitious undertaking. The evolution of a sea-control/sea-denial perimeter concept developed in Western analyses as the result of observing Soviet naval operating patterns and force acquisition decisions over a period of two decades. It seemed to capture the essence of Soviet naval behavior: naval forces had the primary mission of strategic defense of the homeland and defense of ballistic missile submarines ("sea control"), and the secondary responsibility for extended defense against and disruption of US reinforcement efforts ("sea denial"). Although the inner and outer limits of these maritime defense perimeters undoubtedly will change as Soviet strategy adjusts to radical changes in the European landscape, the Navy's role in strategic defense is probably secure. Force reductions and reorientation of fleet missions will influence how the perimeter boundaries are defined, but the Navy's longstanding strategic defense mission is certainly consistent with the new Soviet military doctrine and should continue to endure. Soviet naval forces and fleet capabilities The Soviet Navy operates out of four fleet areas: in the northwest USSR on the Kola Peninsula, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Pacific Ocean. It also maintains forces at the Leningrad Naval Base and the Caspian Sea Flotilla within the USSR, and from 1979 to 1989 it operated its only foreign base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. For the first time in decades, the Navy may be faced with significant adjustments in fleet organization. The retirement of GOLF II ballistic missile submarines (late 1950s generation) from the Baltic Sea Fleet, as well as elimination of obsolete platforms such as the WHISKEY class attack submarine, will alter the size and structure of the fleets. In addition, the Soviets have begun the process of departing from Cam Ranh Bay, including the transfer back to the Soviet Union of long-range aircraft, surface ships, and submarines that operated primarily out of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. It is not yet clear how the abandonment of Cam Ranh will affect the Pacific
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Ocean Fleet's ability to sustain forces on station in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. The decision to withdraw may foreshadow a shift in Soviet naval deployments where patrols in forward regions either cease or are substantially reduced. 13 The current four-fleet structure none the less should remain effective for the near term, at least, precisely because it affords the Soviet Union protection against any sector of potential sea-based attack. Furthermore, as long as the US maintains naval bases in forward areas - such as the Pacific, Mediterranean, and North Atlantic - the Soviet Navy will continue to argue it represents the first line of defense against attack from the sea. A decade of improvements in and modernization of naval force capabilities has had a direct impact on the Navy's ability to operate within the theaters that each fleet supports. Beginning in the late 1970s, Soviet ships and submarines have become larger and more sophisticated, with much greater sustainability and firepower than their predecessors. For example, the 37,000-ton KIEV class VTOL aircraft carriers were not only the first fixed-wing carriers in the Soviet Navy, but also its largest-ever surface combatants. The 25,000-ton nuclear-powered KIROV battle cruisers are the heaviest combatants other than aircraft carriers found in modern navies. New Soviet conventionally-powered cruisers now average 12,000 tons displacement and destroyers about 8,000 compared to roughly 8,000 and 4,000 tons respectively for units produced in the early 1970s. Both the 25,000 tons submerged displacement TYPHOON ballistic missile submarine and the 14,000-ton OSCAR antiship cruise missile submarine are respectively the largest strategic and general purpose submersibles ever built. Supplementing these sea-based platforms are air-to-surface missileequipped BACKFIRE bombers, which have nearly double the radius of earlier land-based naval anti-ship aircraft. In short, it is no longer appropriate to regard the Soviet Navy as an expendable force. In any future conflict, especially one in which the Soviets would strive to keep combat at the conventional level, naval forces require sustainability, particularly since the Navy has a critical mission: that is, guarding Moscow's sea-based strategic nuclear ballistic missiles. Until the early 1970s, Soviet SSBNs were probably intended to participate in both the initial and follow-on strikes of a strategic nuclear war. But as the Soviets expanded their land-based arsenal throughout the 1970s, military planners contemplated retaining a sizeable SSBN strategic missile reserve force. Indeed, these SSBNs would strive for "maximum preservation of concealment" during this initial period. To increase SSBN "combat stability," an array of naval forces will be assigned to protect SSBN combat patrol areas from Western ASW forces. These secure strategic nuclear assets ensure that, despite even a scenario in which an
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enemy might launch a strategic strike without warning, the Soviets will always be assured a residual capability to respond. 14 Soviet SSBNs are among Moscow's most survivable strategic forces (along with land-based mobile missiles). As the more modern DELTA and TYPHOON classes have been deployed, and as the YANKEE class is dismantled to comply with SALT provisions, the percentage of SSBNs conducting patrols in exposed regions off the US coast has been substantially reduced. To provide a reliable strategic reserve, these submarines now operate regularly in protected areas where they are far less vulnerable to US and NATO ASW forces. From these locations, SSBNs are within missile range of their target set in the United States, Western Europe, and the Far East. In either a conventional or nuclear war, most of these submarines will be deployed to areas protected by general purpose naval forces. Indeed, the most modern and capable of the Navy's ASW assets will not be out on the high seas attempting to seek out and destroy US SSBNs. Instead, as the US Defense Department has pointed out, they will be retained generally near or in the maritime approaches to the USSR in order to protect Soviet ballistic missile submarines from highly capable Western ASW forces.15 The Soviet Navy thus has entered the 1990s equipped with the most adaptive and powerful fleet in its history - a fleet capable of accommodating changes in structure potentially resulting from arms control and economic constraints, as well as changes in Soviet military strategy. Current plans for military "restructuring" and for reevaluating Soviet warfighting requirements undoubtedly affect naval planning. As part of planning a future fleet, the Soviets carefully examine how forces can be used most effectively to accomplish key wartime missions. Perhaps one of the most important issues raised in The Navy is its characterization of future naval missions as either "vitally important" or as "alternative." While it is unclear whether this terminology has been adopted officially in Soviet naval planning, the categorization might well affect naval resource allocation in the longer term. The distinction between "vitally important" and "alternative" missions implies that in a fiscallyconstrained or arms control-constrained planning environment, mission tradeoffs are necessary. Thus, planning must account for distinctions in mission criticality: Missions customarily are subdivided into those vitally important for the state and having a scope and level which cannot be reduced and alternative missions which can be adjusted in the process of coordinating missions with allocated resources.16 The Soviet Navy could follow several directions given today's capabilities
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and planning environment. Exploring these alternative postures illuminates the range of potential future naval missions in wartime. Alternative paths for Soviet naval strategy* Roughly a decade ago, an interpretation began to prevail among Western analysts as to how the Soviet Navy would operate both before and during the initial period of a war involving NATO. This view postulated that the SSBNs would be dispersed to protected deployment areas prior to the start of combat and would then prepare to launch their missiles as quickly as possible. While some might participate in an initial strike, many missile submarines would remain in reserve. Ballistic missile submarines could be vulnerable to conventional attrition from Western attack submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. But dispersed submarines would be relatively invulnerable in zones controlled by friendly forces. The Navy would attempt to control all or most of the Kara, Barents, Norwegian, Greenland, Baltic, Black, Japan, and Okhotsk Seas, as well as the waters adjacent to the Kamchatka Peninsula. It would also seek to deny its enemies access to the waters extending some 2,000 kilometers or more from Soviet territory. All (or nearly all) units in the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets would remain within the defensive perimeter; so too would "virtually all available Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet surface combatants [and] combat aircraft, and about 75 percent of available attack submarines." 17 The number of units expected to remain within the perimeter would mean that vital Western sea lanes of communication (or SLOCs) "will initially be threatened by relatively few forces." 18 A more potent threat probably would arise only during a protracted war where SLOCs became critical to the outcome. This assessment assumed that most Soviet naval forces deployed within the defense perimeter would simultaneously perform numerous tasks, including: Dedicated escort of some (possibly most) SSBNs Defense-in-depth of approaches to SSBN deployment areas Augmenting communications paths for SSBN command and control Early warning of and defense against enemy bomber and cruise missile attacks * The author gratefully acknowledges the substantial contributions of Dr. Donald Daniel of the Naval War College to this section. His writings have described the two analytical views that emerged during the 1970s.
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Destroying enemy aircraft carriers and land-attack cruise missile ships or submarines Protecting coastal sea, land, and air lines of communication, and Providing amphibious, gunfire, logistical, transportation and other support to ground forces operating in coastal regions. Many Western analysts reacted skeptically when this paradigm of Soviet naval behavior was first advanced - these traditionalists expected a major Soviet assault on the sea lanes from the first moment of the next global conflict, reminiscent of the North Atlantic convoy battles of World War II. Lending credence to their view was the Navy's increased peacetime operating tempo since the mid-1960s, the cutbacks suffered by the US Navy in the early through mid-1970s, and the improvements in Soviet capabilities that posed serious threats not only to the sea lanes but also to aircraft carriers and other high-value surface combatants. Nevertheless, the strategically defensive orientation was accepted as the dominant view of Soviet naval behavior in wartime. In contrast with alternative explanations, it seemed corroborated by Soviet naval writings, by hardware developments, and by deployment and exercise patterns. Most resistance to this assessment of Soviet operating philosophy stemmed from its inconsistency with US attitudes and expectations about the use of naval power: in essence, the Soviet Navy did not conform to generally-held Western assumptions of great power navy behavior - that is, forward deployments into open regions for offensive operations. In addition, a defense orientation at sea seemed to be inconsistent with Soviet military strategy for operations in continental theaters, which postulated large-scale offensive operations executed to the depths of the European continent. Although the new view was widely held, many analysts remained unconvinced. Adopting more of a "worst-case" analytical approach, they stressed the possibility that the Navy would assume an offensive posture based on submarine operations, in order to hotly contest the sea lanes from the onset of war. The case for a Soviet naval offensive Several arguments supported the view that a militarily prudent basis for Western planning during the era of NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation would be to anticipate a major Soviet naval offensive (at least in selected regions), particularly during a prolonged conventional conflict. Since the Soviets would have sought to keep a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict at the conventional level, and Soviet military strategy explicitly acknowledged that such a war could have lasted weeks or months, a major effort to interdict the sea lanes, executed in the initial period of the war, could have
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seriously disrupted NATO resupply operations. The viability of NATO's strategy would have depended largely on implementing the Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP) before the outbreak of war. Political or technical delays were plausible; if further impeded by a major Soviet SLOC offensive, the impact on NATO's ability to prosecute a war might have been devastating. This scenario seemed to be reinforced by Soviet writings in the 1980s, which seemed indicative of a heightened interest in contesting the sea lanes. According to some US analysts, this approach is evident in the quantity and the content of relevant articles in the official Navy journal, Morskoy Sbornik. As analyst David Hildebrant explains, the "interdiction mission was a topic of lively discussion, perhaps even debate, in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik between 1981 and 1984, with some . . . authors appearing to refer to it as 'strategic'." 19 He adds that the topic seemed to languish subsequently, until it received renewed focus in the 1987 public statements of the Navy's recently appointed Commander in Chief, Fleet Admiral V. N. Chernavin. In addition, The Navy occasionally expresses the view that NATO's sea lanes are particularly important. It also predicts that "the trend toward an expansion of warfare on the ocean and sea LOCs and an increase in its significance will be maintained in the future as well." 20 While the characterization of the "trend" may be arguable under current conditions, the discussion does indicate that interdiction campaigns do at least remain an item of controversy. Undoubtedly, the SLOC issue reasserted itself with the last year's two-part article on "The Struggle for the Sea Lanes of Communication: Lessons of Wars and the Modern Era." 21 Fleet Admiral Chernavin, the author, defines a set of criteria for attempting to measure the beneficial effects of SLOC interdiction on operations in an adjacent continental theater. However, he concludes that "At the present time, views on the role and place of sea lanes of communication in modern war are being reviewed" - a curiously noncommittal and ambiguous commentary on the potential significance of SLOC campaigns in a future conflict. Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of an offensive-oriented strategy in the future is that a large-scale early threat to the sea lanes, evidenced by the approach of many Soviet submarines during a crisis, may be the most viable option available to the Soviet Navy to pre-empt or "outflank" the US Navy's Maritime Strategy and put NATO's navies on the defensive. Since US planners originally designed the Maritime Strategy to capitalize on the strategic defensive posture of the Soviet Navy, the most effective method for the Soviets to disrupt US naval strategy may be to take the offensive early in a conflict. NATO naval forces would confront direct naval opposition in the region the Soviets have designated as sea-denial zones.
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Central to this argument is the assertion that unless the Soviet Navy is tied down within its own defense perimeter NATO will lose the SLOC war for lack of enough escorts to guard its transports. A Soviet naval offensive strategy also cannot be ruled out because the Navy clearly has sufficient numbers of attack submarines to mount a viable SLOC threat. The Northern Fleet (which would have to provide nearly all the units assigned to the anti-SLOC operations in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean) possesses some 75 nuclear-powered and 40 diesel-powered cruise missile or torpedo firing submarines. Since open-ocean ASW is highly labor-intensive (involving detection, classification, localization, and attack), NATO's navies would be straining to deal with the approximately 100 Soviet submarines which probably would be a