Redesigning Human Systems

Redesigning Human Systems

Enid Mumford Information Science Publishing

Redesigning Human Systems Enid Mumford Manchester University, UK

Information Science Publishing Hershey • London • Melbourne • Singapore • Beijing

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Published in the United States of America by Information Science Publishing (an imprint of Idea Group Inc.) 701 E. Chocolate Avenue, Suite 200 Hershey PA 17033 Tel: 717-533-8845 Fax: 717-533-8661 E-mail: [email protected] Web site: http://www.idea-group.com and in the United Kingdom by Information Science Publishing (an imprint of Idea Group Inc.) 3 Henrietta Street Covent Garden London WC2E 8LU Tel: 44 20 7240 0856 Fax: 44 20 7379 3313 Web site: http://www.eurospan.co.uk Copyright © 2003 by Idea Group Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without written permission from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Redesigning human systems / Enid Mumford. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-59140-118-6 (hard cover) — ISBN 1-59140-119-4 (ebook) 1. Organizational change. I. Title. HD58.8 .M85 2003 658.4’06—dc21 2002153249 eISBN British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

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Redesigning Human Systems Table of Contents Preface ..................................................................................................... vi PART ONE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIO-TECHNICAL DESIGN Chapter 1 The Problems of Managing Change ........................................................... 1 Chapter 2 Socio-Technical Design: Its Early History ................................................ 12 Chapter 3 Participation in Practice ........................................................................... 33 PART TWO: DESIGNING FOR MANUAL WORKERS Chapter 4 Analysing Problem Situations: The Dock Workers of Liverpool ............... 52 Chapter 5 Work Design in the Coal Industry ........................................................... 70 Chapter 6 Considering Structure: Different Organizational Solutions in Automobiles .. 89 PART THREE: DESIGNING FOR OFFICE WORKERS Chapter 7 New Problems in Banking ..................................................................... 108

Chapter 8 Involving Employees in Design: Rolls Royce .......................................... 129 Chapter 9 Designing an Expert System .................................................................. 147 PART FOUR: DESIGNING FOR COMPANIES Chapter 10 Senior Management, Decision Making and Design ................................. 170 Chapter 11 Company-Wide Participation in Air Products ........................................ 193 Chapter 12 Quality and Environmental Issues in Shell International ........................... 209 PART FIVE: DESIGNING FOR THE FUTURE Chapter 13 Designing for Problem Prevention .......................................................... 233 Chapter 14 Designing for an Uncertain Future .......................................................... 248 Appendix: Methods and Tools .............................................................. 264 About the Author .................................................................................. 284 Index ................................................................................................... 285

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Preface

This book is about managing change, one of the most difficult, and sometimes dangerous, activities that most of us have to handle occasionally and some of us most of the time. The objective of the book is twofold. First, to try to provide all readers with an understanding of the complexity of the change process and second to provide some practical guidance to those who are trying to mould change so that it can offer a route to a better quality of life. In order to do this, the book will draw on the experiences of the past and the present and see how these can provide lessons for the future. It will examine and describe what has been called the socio-technical philosophy of always taking account of the needs of people when new work systems are being introduced. It will use as guiding case studies some of the firms with which I have personally been involved over the years. These will describe and discuss participative and humanistic change projects in different companies and industries in the UK, Scandinavia and the Netherlands. Most of these have had the introduction of new technology as part of the change process. I believe that the methods and approaches that assisted their implementation and use will be even more relevant to industry in the years ahead. I hope that this book will be read and found useful by many different groups of readers. A first, and very important group, is those who are responsible for introducing change and seeing that it is used effectively and has beneficial consequences. These will be the managers and specialists who design and introduce it. Just as important will be the groups who are affected by the change and have to alter their normal practices to cope. We need to find out if the change has brought them major advantages both in their personal lives and in the environment in which they live and work. If this is not the case what are the reasons for failing to do so. Two other important groups will be those who wish to learn about change and its management although they do not yet have the responsibility to practice this knowledge. These include students taking technical and management courses at universities and colleges. The general public is also very interested in change as most people are on its receiving end, although often without the power and influence to affect its consequences.

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For many people change that involves technological and economic developments will be most acceptable when it is seen to have a firm, and generally supported, ethical base. One important aspect of this ethical base may be the ability to influence the change consequences. We are reluctant to become the slaves of developments we have no influence over, even though we may see many of these as nonthreatening. We strive to be in a position to regulate important aspects of our own lives and to be able to mould our own futures and destinies. The democratic principles and approaches that are described in this book can provide guidelines for increasing our personal control of the future. A second important need for both individuals and organizations is that of efficiency—the need to create innovation that produces the intended and desired results. Things must work well if we are to enjoy using them. Yet recent history is dogged by example after example of vastly expensive large-scale projects either failing to be introduced at all or not working successfully once they are installed. Here, I shall argue that the democratic involvement of future users in the design and implementation of new systems can help these kinds of problems to be avoided. It must be stressed that although some of the technical applications described in the pages that follow may seem dated in today’s fast-moving world, the participative processes used to introduce them have not aged in any way. In fact they are more relevant now than in the past as the consequences of poorly managed change become ever more expensive with whole industries, even countries, likely to be affected by unsuccessful projects. Also, we have now moved out of the macho nineties with their focus on financial success at any price, even if this required the drastic reduction of staff numbers as a means to raise a company’s share price. Today, especially after the September 11 disaster, we are in a situation where cooperative personal relationships and mutual support are seen by very many people as necessary and important. We also seek more opportunities for self-development and creativity and an absence of work stress. All of these are assisted by some personal control over what happens in our work and life situations. This book will describe an approach for assisting the achievement of these things. It also seems that many large companies are now thinking carefully about how they want the world to see them in ethical and human terms. As a result they are publicising carefully thought-out strategies for taking care of social, organizational and environmental problems. They have perhaps been shocked into doing this by the criticism industry has received for its concentration on short-term financial gains and its reluctance to take account of human costs such as atmospheric pollution and the widening gap between the rich and the poor. Nevertheless the result is a welcome new focus on issues other than those of the balance sheet. This means that approaches and methods for improving the quality of life for employees, customers and society as a whole are likely to be welcomed and adopted.

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The chapters that follow will provide a practical approach for handling change effectively, ethically and participatively. The case studies will attempt to show how participative strategies for meeting human needs at work can achieve higher morale, more job satisfaction, greater efficiency and an improved quality of life, even though there may be difficulties along the route to success. Each chapter will describe a problem associated with the management of change. This will be described by an employee who was a part of the change process. My role will be to describe the methods and tools that helped the realisation of the change objectives. The early case studies are related to work in blue-collar environments and show some of the attempts to solve the problems associated with this. Computers were not involved as few existed at the time. The later ones all incorporate the introduction of new technology into different white-collar environments. The last two examine current change as a company-wide or environmental problem. Chapter 1 looks at the past, the present and the future and argues that in the future quality of working life issues will be even more important than in the past. Chapter 2 looks at the history of socio-technical design and describes its popularity and use in many different countries in the seventies and eighties. Chapter 3 describes different ways of organizing participation and discusses roles and relationships in participative design groups. Chapter 4 stresses the importance of understanding the “big picture”—the total problem situation—when introducing change into complex industries. Chapter 5 shows how good organizational design is a critical factor in success. Chapter 6 looks at alternative designs and weighs up their advantages and disadvantages. The book next considers computer technology and information systems— how these impact on white-collar work and how employees can play a major role in good systems design by deciding on efficient yet people-friendly forms of work organization to associate with them. Chapter 7 describes the impact of early computer systems on banks. Chapter 8 shows how a group of employees can create an efficient, multiskilled work system for an office environment. Chapter 9 moves from small to large projects and describes an important participative project to assist the sales force of a large corporation in the United States. Chapter 10 covers the nineties and shows how the humanisation of work took a step backwards through a corrupted form of business process reengineering and the introduction of call centres. At this time my own area of interest changed from shop floor, clerical and sales groups to managers and I became associated with a Dutch software company developing management information systems. The objective of the research now became how to help managers gain a thorough understanding of their own roles and responsibilities as a preliminary to specifying their information needs.

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We now come to the present and in Chapter 11 describe the large-groupintervention programmes of an American multinational that in 2000 received an award for Excellence in Practice from the American Society for Training and Development. Chapter 12 examines how Shell, one of the pioneers of participative design, is applying the same ideas both to its internal management and to environmental issues. Chapters 13 and 14 discuss how effective problem solving and design must today take account of negative as well as positive environmental factors. Chapter 14 brings the book to a close by examining the advantages and challenges of managing change participatively. My conclusion is that we now live in a very uncertain and dangerous world, which greatly complicates problem solving and which makes forecasts about the future both difficult and suspect. Projections from the present may be nothing better then doubtful hypotheses or overoptimistic best-case scenarios. Nevertheless change goes on and has to be encouraged. The Appendix shows some of the tools I and others have developed to assist problem solving and the management of change process. The key question the book asks and tries to answer is, Can greater employee participation and humanisation of work help make industry more efficient, more people-friendly and better able to deal with the challenges of the future?

Acknowledgments The author would like to offer her grateful thanks to the many people who have helped with the creation of this book. In particular to Ian Newsome of the West Yorkshire Police, to George Gates, managing director of the Core-R.O.I. consultancy, and to Chris Gillies, Jane Hansell and Murray Jones of Shell International. She would also like to thank the many companies in Europe and the United States who participated enthusiastically in the research on participative design. There were a great number of these although only a few are provided as case studies here.

PART ONE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIO-TECHNICAL DESIGN

The Problems of Managing Change 1

Chapter 1

The Problems of Managing Change The world changes and technology comes and goes but human problems remain the same.

MANAGING CHANGE AS PROBLEM SOLVING Managing change of any kind requires effective problem solving. This is especially the case when the change involves designing and implementing new work systems or rethinking current organizational structures. We know that problem solving is a difficult and complex process, yet too often it seems to be limited to a fast decision to do something followed by a series of actions which intuition suggests will achieve the desired result. This is very similar to shooting in the dark. There is no way of knowing that the proposed actions will lead to a solution or even that the problem can be solved. The alternative, whenever possible, is to create a well thought-out, logical path to a desired result. Effective problem solving requires the control of “entropy.” Entropy is a term used by physicists to describe energy that exists but is unavailable for productive use. When applied to problem solving it can be described as energy that is time-wasting because it is not being used to good effect. The word covers Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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inappropriate strategies and actions that make little or no contribution to solving the problem. Energy of this kind can lead to chaos. The problem becomes increasingly confused and insoluble and ideas on how to deal with it become more and more clouded and uncertain (Mumford, 1999). The first message of this book is that effective problem solving requires an avoidance of inappropriate or redundant activity and its replacement by efficient and ethical strategies so that appropriate goals are both set and met (Mumford, 1999).

COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING Problem solving with difficult and complex problems requires recognition of the interaction that is taking place between psychological, economic, technical, cultural and political factors. Questions that need to be asked and answered are, Who wants to solve this problem? Who will pay the costs of a solution? Can technology assist a solution? What kinds of solutions will be culturally, socially and politically acceptable? (Forrester, 1969). Another feature of complex problems is that they are rarely stable but tend to alter over time. Changes in the environment, particularly in its economic context, may cause problems to be rethought and redefined. Where technical change is concerned innovative new developments can also affect the nature of the problems that have to be solved. Very complex problem solving is often a balancing act with problems being partially solved then returning in new forms, some of which may be as difficult or more difficult to solve than the original dilemma. Many solutions that are politically attractive because they are cheap and acceptable to industry and government can lead in the wrong direction. The early responses to mad cow disease provide many examples. Symptoms but not causes were being addressed. The answer is in understanding the social dynamics of the problem and identifying the pressure points where improvement can be secured. Designing a problem-solving programme or strategy is communicating an ethical position, a set of values, and a series of practical operations designed to achieve a desired result. This communication stretches from those designing and implementing the programme to those benefiting from its results. If time is available, a safe strategy is to proceed in stages so that each part of a programme can be tested out before the next is implemented. It can then be reversed if it has proved to be a mistake. Another useful strategy is looking for “amplification,” an amplifier being a device that, if given a small amount of something, will emit much more. Dedicated users can be human amplifiers.

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The Problems of Managing Change 3

Appropriate first problem-solving steps at an early stage can lead to a continuation of good ideas throughout the project.

Managing Complexity Many very complex problems seem to have similar characteristics. They are pervasive, spreading unhindered into regions, countries and economic activities that seem powerless to resist the invasion. International criminal activities are an example. They are difficult, if not impossible, to control without major changes in human behaviour and government priorities, and those which serve illegal consumer markets are very big money earners. Some receive tremendous attention and there is a strong public pressure to remove or reduce them. This is true of health problems, particularly those caused by contaminated food where almost anyone in a community can be at risk. Some initially lack clarity as to their causes and effects and there is uncertainty on how to approach them. These would include most environmental threats. Others are almost invisible except to specialist groups. Cyber crime would come into this category as did the millennium computer bug that was wrongly seen as likely to cause systems to crash if software was not redesigned to prevent this. Many new problems are extremely complex and poorly understood. This is true of global warming. It will take time to discover its consequences. A lack of knowledge makes the first steps in the problem-solving process, those of clarification and description, very difficult. There can be uncertainty over what kind of a problem has occurred, what has caused it, who is affected by it and who is best qualified to address it. Many routes to a solution can be blocked because of lack of knowledge or through political, security or financial constraints. With food contamination problems the solution is known to be better hygiene right along the food chain, yet despite a proliferation of regulations, remedies are extremely difficult to apply. The changing structure of work is an example of a day-to-day activity with a potential for new and serious problems. The end of secure jobs for many groups that have become accustomed to them and the absence of jobs for young unskilled men could lead to greatly increased crime and social disturbance together with a major growth in the size of what today is called the “socially excluded” class. The global market, although hailed as a great opportunity, is unlikely to be a source of continuing social stability. Alliances between firms, industries and countries will lead to successes for some, but disasters for others. There will be both winners and losers. Also, because the global production system is now so interlinked, a problem in one national area

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may easily spread to others. The 1997 over-investment problems in the Far East and their consequences for European industry illustrate this fact.

Recognising and Describing Problems An important skill for individuals responsible for problem solving as well as a necessary capability for their employing organizations is the ability to recognise when a problem exists and to understand its nature. Many problems, such as those concerned with health issues, are immediately evident while others, like certain kinds of cyber crime or money laundering, have to be sought out. In either of these situations there is a need to obtain as complete a picture as possible of the problem’s nature, extent and consequences. This is known as taking a “holistic” approach, and it differs greatly from traditional science approaches of dividing large problems into small sections and giving each part to a different group for solution. A holistic approach enables the causes of the problem, its spread and its consequences for different situations and groups to be seen as an interlinked whole. Although very complex problems are too large and intractable to be treated as single entities for problem solving, they still need to be understood as linked systems with the likelihood that addressing one will affect some or all of the others. Much thought, analysis and discussion is required to agree the nature of many of today’s complex problems, the kinds of solutions that are feasible and the best means for achieving these. There must also be a correct assessment of the likely consequences of any chosen strategy, as its implementation may result in a raft of new problems being released. Some of these may be as serious and difficult as those already successfully tackled. All decisions have consequences. For example, if an important industry decides to move a factory from the United States to a less-developed country to reduce costs, many thousands of US workers are going to lose their jobs. Sometimes problems lead to crises that have to be tackled immediately. There may be no time to proceed through a sequence of problem-solving steps and stages; quick, immediate action has to be taken. The techniques of “pattern recognition” used by physicians and surgeons may now be the best way forward. When a patient first arrives in the consulting room the doctor asks questions but also looks for presenting physical signs and symptoms. These are then compared mentally with similar cases the doctor has encountered in the past. This approach can often provide a quick route to a diagnosis. The same technique can be used with other kinds of problems in situations where fast action is required. The problem solver will ask the question, Have I experienced a similar problem before or do I know of anyone who has? If the answer Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

The Problems of Managing Change 5

is yes, he or she will proceed by taking the actions that produced a solution in that situation. This approach is now being used by emergency teams such as the Fire Service. But to be successful it requires problem solvers with considerable experience in crisis situations (Watt & Tissington, 1998). Obtaining a complete picture of a new major problem is often not possible in the early stages of addressing it. This understanding may only arrive after a great deal of time and research. Nevertheless, at the beginning of any project if the situation is not a crisis one requiring immediate action, as full a picture as possible should be obtained, mapped out and discussed with all individuals and groups affected by it and likely to contribute to its solution.

Skills that Aid Problem Solving In order to assist the understanding of the problem-solving process and how it is practiced, a simple analytical framework can be helpful. Here is one. Organizations or groups employing problem solvers are seen as needing certain capabilities, often of a resource nature, to enable them to work efficiently; for example, information, time, and equipment. “Capability” is having the power, capacity and knowledge to achieve desired objectives (Kay, 1996). This concept can be applied to the organizations introducing major change and to their ability to provide the necessary and appropriate knowledge and support both for those using the new system and for the groups who are responsible for its design and implementation (Mumford, 1999). The approach used in this book is called socio-technical design and will be described in the next chapter. If this philosophy is part of a change programme then an important capability will be to give both internal and external users an improvement in those aspects of their lives that they regard as important in work or in the home and local community. John Kay suggests that capabilities can be viewed as essential assets. It is important for them to be identified and their relationship to successful strategy formulation or problem solving recognised. A report published by the British Government House of Commons Public Accounts Select Committee in 1999 described how the failure of many government computer systems is, in the committee’s view, due to managerial incompetence. The report described how the implementation of more than 25 public sector IT systems resulted in “delay, confusions, and inconvenience to the citizen” and “poor value for money” (PASC, 1999). The problem solvers themselves will require certain competencies or skills which help them to understand the problem and to make effective choices on how it can be solved. These will include an ability to appreciate the total Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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picture of the problem and its environment and also an ability to map a route to a successful solution, to develop a broad overall strategy with clear ethical components, to prioritise subproblems, and to work with colleagues to achieve an agreed solution. Finally, they must be able to implement the system with care, caution and an absence of victims and to monitor its operation and evaluate its success. Certain psychological attributes are also seen as assisting problem solving. These are commitment to achieve a solution and, in high-risk situations, considerable courage. Competence has been defined by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle as “knowing how” (Ryle, 1949). He argues that in everyday life we are much more concerned with people’s competencies than with their intellectual brilliance or with their beliefs. What people can do is often more important than what they know, for knowledge is only useful if it is applied. Competence implies that a person presented with a problem can think things through logically and get results. Socio-technical competence requires knowledge of how to achieve social and organizational as well as technical goals. “Coordination” is the third important socio-technical concept in problem solving and is particularly relevant to the design and implementation of information technology where designers and users must collaborate closely if systems are to succeed. By coordination is meant the ability to work closely, democratically and creatively with other groups. This is an important sociotechnical value and is seen by some management gurus as the one most related to organizational success in today’s complex world (Castells, 1996). It is interesting that many of today’s commentators do not see technology as a major driving force for change or even as a major source of future problems. Their view is that technology acts as a facilitator by increasing output, reducing the number of employees required and assisting the movement of capital across the world, but it is not the primary influence. This is the pursuit of money and the development of a system that increases the possibility of a group of people making money in large quantities. For many, this is the ideology that drives today’s definition of progress. It leaves many intractable problems for those concerned with the welfare of citizens and the more equitable distribution of wealth.

ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS There are also major organizational changes within industries that bring with them new and unfamiliar problems. Many companies are moving away from hierarchies to networks (Castells, 1996) and from centralised to Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

The Problems of Managing Change 7

decentralised structures in which parts of a company are run as semiautonomous units. These changes are not necessarily new. When Ken Olsen created the Digital Equipment Corporation in Boston in the 1950s his original format was a decentralised network structure, each part responsible for its own management, products and profits. As the firm grew this was changed to a more conventional hierarchical structure. The network approach was found to lead to duplication of resources and dysfunctional competition between the different units (Mumford & McDonald, 1989). Again, vast numbers of businesses are now trading on-line. This means that there is a need to create a global environment in which people and businesses can seize the opportunities created by economic and technical change, construct a market framework for economic success and help people make sense of the economic and social transformations taking place. It is suggested by many commentators that the future depends on “groupwork.” Both the small entrepreneurial company and the large multinational will depend for their success on the collaboration of coalitions of small groups; employees, customers and suppliers are three examples. The optimistic belief is that all of these will be working together positively and democratically to further the interests of their employing company. Jeff Papows (1998) maintains that all companies in the future will have flatter organization structures, communication that is more horizontal than vertical and the removal of barriers from between functions such as sales, marketing and customer service. He sees the structure of tomorrow’s companies as fluid and based on different levels of information. First, and at an early stage in these new developments, there will be the necessary exchange of information between groups responsible for basic activities. This may be physical or virtual, formal or informal. Information will now progress to team members who make use of each other’s private expertise through on-line discussion groups, which lead to mutual discovery and innovation. Next the company will develop and nurture its collective intelligence—broad databases which are accessible to the enterprise as a whole. Finally the groupware concept will reach maturity and most decisions will be made by groups working in collaborative networks. These are likely to take the form of federations of companies and also trade unions, which come together for a variety of mutual interest purposes. Worldwide competitive pressures appear to be encouraging these developments. But their social and organizational consequences are largely unknown. There is clearly a problem in managing these new organizational forms that we do not yet fully understand. For example, who is responsible for major decisions and how is performance evaluated? (Dicken,1999). Yet, the theory Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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behind network structures is very appealing. There is a belief that complexity can be managed through freedom, that cooperation is economically efficient and that knowledge comes from attitude and opportunity (Halal, 1999). As yet there are few examples of these principles influencing the operation of large multinational companies but we can learn from the Scandinavian countries that for many years have managed to combine efficiency with democracy. Proponents of a more democratic approach and new organizational structures argue that the present industrial situation is becoming less and less tenable. There is resistance to change, poor economic gains and alienated staff. It seems many organizations are pulling in conflicting directions. Managing the problems of complexity requires flexibility and diversity while profit generation requires efficiency and control. These two sets of needs are difficult to combine. Also, networks and democracy run counter to the ideology of capitalism, where the principal objective of industry is profit for the shareholders. In recent years there has been a move from manufacturing to service jobs and from blue- collar to white-collar occupations. There has also been a growth in highly skilled knowledge- based jobs and in part-time employment, particularly for women (DTI, 1999). These developments have removed some of the early change problems but have replaced these with new, often psychological ones, such as an increase in the stress of work.

NEW PROBLEMS WITH NEW TECHNOLOGY The success of today’s and tomorrow’s enterprises appears to depend, even more than in the past, on the establishment and continuation of mutually beneficial relationships. If the employee-employer relationship is viewed as a contract then employers will want employees who are loyal, skilful and dedicated to the interests of the company. In return employees will want employers who provide them with acceptable remuneration, job satisfaction, a good quality of working life and the degree of job security that each individual regards as necessary to personal comfort. Negative visions of the future suggest that there is a great deal of conflict and social unrest ahead with many new problems that have to be addressed and solved. Global competition provides employment for many but it also results in unemployment for those who do not have the skills to participate in the world of the future. If firms continually move to those parts of the world where labour is cheapest, there will be growing inequality in income and wealth with, possibly, the disappearance of the middle class. Thore (1999) suggests that the Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

The Problems of Managing Change 9

only occupations that can resist being shifted to cheap labour areas are those where physical contact is an essential element, as in the professions and the service sector. Another negative factor in the work situation of tomorrow is that the quality of work is unlikely to improve for all groups. For many years those associated with the socio-technical movement strove to persuade industry that interesting and challenging work at all levels would lead to more satisfied and productive employees. Many middle-level employees now experience this through the introduction of enhanced responsibility, discretion and teamwork, but this is often accompanied by considerable overwork and increased stress. Change has also caused problems for some groups. An example is teleworking, particularly that associated with selling and answering services. This has brought with it new and unpleasant forms of routine work. The socio-technical pioneers challenged the value of routine work consisting of simple manual activities repeated constantly during the working day. These were monotonous, did not allow for personal development and subordinated the worker to the machine, but they were not usually antisocial. I have worked on many assembly lines where routine mechanical tasks were accompanied by pleasant social chitchat between adjoining workers. The advent of computers introduced a new, more constrained form of routine work which required data to be inputted manually so that it could be processed electronically. This needed concentration and accuracy and talking on the job was not possible. Today, with teleworking, we have the problem of a new even more onerous form of routine work which requires employees in call centres to constantly answer or make telephone calls to potential customers. Often the number of calls handled is electronically monitored and the kind of responses the operator makes is listened to by a supervisor. Even worse it is now thought that constant use of the telephone can affect an operator’s hearing, leading to deafness.

WHAT KIND OF PROBLEMS WILL HAVE TO BE SOLVED IN THE FUTURE? These we can guess at but we do not really know and will have to wait and see. Whatever they are, an important question for the future to answer will be, How can we develop more generally accepted humanistic values? Many of us seek a freer society, one in which people are released from unnecessarily burdensome work, from exploitation and from major differences in access to

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resources and rewards. But the achievement of this requires shared values and mutual understanding. It also requires good problem solving and excellent communication so that values are discussed, agreed and become part of culture. One of the hardest challenges for today’s and tomorrow’s companies will be building and retaining teams with the vision, competence and loyalty to navigate an organization through uncharted waters with no guaranteed safe haven on the far side. Without a trusted team, including a “family” of regular contractors and strategic partners, the organization will not have much of a future. Critical skills will be the ability to inspire loyalty, trust, motivation and vision, the ability to see where the organization is going and a knowledge of the best route to take it there. Problem solving in industry requires both knowledge and a vision of the future. Problem solvers must understand the needs of the larger system of which they are a part. They must also understand the needs of the different interest groups, both inside and outside the company. And they also need to understand their own needs and how these can be achieved while contributing to the needs and objectives of their colleagues. People must be involved in change and prepared to be involved. In the right environment, most people welcome and enjoy this. They like the sense of having responsibility and of learning and interacting successfully and positively with other members of a group. The big question is, How can we substitute a freer, more people-friendly environment for the control, coercion and even fear which still dominate many organizations? Helping liberate others requires that we also liberate ourselves. Selfdevelopment involves the creation of new abilities and the enrichment of existing ones; in other words, a general enhancement of the quality of individual, group and organizational life. This, in turn, requires some generally agreed values; for example, an acceptance of a work ethic which requires personal independence to be associated with the desire to do a job well, and a restriction on untrammelled self-indulgence so that the needs of the group are in harmony with the needs of the individual.

REFERENCES Castells, M. (1996). The rise of the network society. London: Blackwell. Department of Trade and Industry. (1999). Work in the knowledge-driven economy. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Dicken, P. (1999). Globalization: An economic-geographical perspective. In

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W. E. Halal & K. B. Taylor (Eds.), 21st Century Economics. London: Macmillan, pp. 31-51. Forrester, J. (1969). Planning under the dynamic influences of complex social systems. In E. Jantsch (Ed.), Perspectives of Planning (pp. 237-256). Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Halal, W. E. (1999). The infinite resource: Mastering the boundless power of knowledge. In W. E. Halal & K. B. Taylor (Eds.), 21st Century Economics. London: Macmillan, pp. 53-75. Kay, J. (1996). The business of economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mumford, E. (1999). Dangerous decisions: Problem solving in tomorrow’s world. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum. Mumford, E., & McDonald, B. (1989). XSEL’S progress. London: Wiley. Papows, J. (1998). Enterprise.Com. Reading, MA: Perseus Books. Public Accounts Committee. (1999). Improving the delivery of government IT projects. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson. Thore, S. E. (1999). Enterprise in the information age. In W. E. Halal & K. B. Taylor (Eds.), 21st Century Economics. London: Macmillan, pp. 131153. Watt, F., & Tissington, P. (1998 ). Making decisions in emergencies. Intersec, 8(1), 13-15.

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Chapter 2

Socio-Technical Design: Its Early History Life is understood backwards but must be lived forwards. Soren Kierkegaard

INTRODUCTION In order to understand the present and predict the future we need to learn from the past. A major part of this book will examine how ideas derived from an approach called socio-technical design can be used to improve the quality of working life for people at every level and in almost any kind of work situation.

HISTORY MATTERS Socio-technical design, as its name implies, gives as much weight to the needs of people as to economics or production. It is now more than 50 years old. It started when a group of therapists, researchers and consultants decided to use their skills in the postwar world. They had acquired these skills while assisting war-damaged soldiers to regain their psychological health and return

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to civilian life. This group, most of whom had been associated with the London Tavistock Clinic before the war and some of whom were medically qualified, believed that the therapeutic tools and techniques they had developed could usefully be applied to the organization of work in industry. They saw this as restricting and degrading many lower rank employees, who were forced to spend their days carrying out simple, routine tasks with no possibility of personal development or job satisfaction The Tavistock Institute of Human Relations was founded by this group in London in 1946 with the aid of a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. It was set up to bring together the psychological and social sciences in a way that benefited society. In 1948, when the Tavistock Clinic became part of the Health Service, the institute became a separate organization (Trist & Murray, 1993). Because many of the original members were psychiatrists, all early members of staff were required to undergo psychoanalysis. There was a belief that they had to understand themselves before they could assist with the problems of others. Both the clinic and the institute focused on group rather than individual treatment. This was partly because of a shortage of staff but also because group therapy was a recognised and successful method of helping with problems. This therapeutic background meant that the staff was interested in results as well as theories. This led them in the direction of “action research,” in which analysis and theory is associated with remedial change. The institute believed that there should be “no therapy without research and no research without therapy.” Today this could be restated as “no theory without practice, no practice without research.” In 1947 a publishing company, Tavistock Publications, was founded and a new journal, Human Relations, was created in association with a research group led by Kurt Lewin and located at the Centre for Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan. In 1972 the socio-technical movement was formally internationalised by the creation of a Council for the Quality of Working Life, which I was invited to join. This council had members, usually academics, from many countries throughout the world. A number of academic groups became actively interested in socio-technical research. These included the Work Research Institute, Oslo, and groups at the University of Pennsylvania in the United States, York University in Toronto, Canada, and the Centre for Continuing Education in Canberra, Australia. Kurt Lewin at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor also had a considerable influence on thinking and action. Socio-technical systems design throughout most of its history has had two important components. One, which came first, was the need to humanise work Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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through the redesign of jobs. Work must be made intellectually stimulating and fulfilling. The second, which arrived later, was democracy at work. Employees should be able to influence the design of their own jobs and of the workplace The objective of socio-technical design has always been “the joint optimisation of the social and technical systems.” Human needs must not be forgotten when technical systems are introduced. They should, whenever possible, be given equal weight. Over the years this objective has been interpreted in many different ways but it is still an important design principle. Here is a brief history of how socio-technical design has developed.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES In Europe in the 1950s and 1960s industry was weak and was being rebuilt. The strength and productivity of the United States were greatly envied and believed to be a product of better management. European industry was seen as centralised and authoritarian, while American industry was becoming more democratic through the influence of the human relations movement (Heller, Pusic, Strauss, & Wilpert, 1998). In 1960 Fred Emery, who was on sabbatical from the Tavistock Institute at Stanford University, was influenced by US thinking and began some pioneering projects in Norway with Einar Thorsrud of the Norwegian Institute for Industrial Social Research. These spread to other parts of Scandinavia. The approaches in the Scandinavian countries had marked similarities. Norway, Sweden and Denmark, although using different methods and emphasising different aspects of work, all had a common set of values on what they hoped to achieve (Cooper & Mumford, 1979). These values were made explicit in legislation, and management and trade unions were required to cooperate in achieving improvements in the work situation. Different groups were interested in these European experiments for different reasons. Industry was expanding and many firms had labour difficulties. They had problems in obtaining staff and were scared of losing those they had. At the same time technologists and engineers were presented with new design options and many were becoming interested in developing more flexible and friendly production systems than those currently in use. Professor Howard Rosenbrock at Manchester University, England, was a notable pioneer here. Ergonomists interested in man-machine interaction also wanted to understand the socio-technical approach, while many more academics were becoming concerned with research in industry. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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In academic circles, there was a great deal of optimism. Geert Hofstede, a Dutch expert, believed the humanisation of work could become the third industrial revolution. He saw the first as the move from muscle power to machinery in the nineteenth century, the second as the arrival of information technology and the third as these new approaches to work (Hofstede, 1979). Let us now examine the experiences of a number of these countries in more detail.

Norway Norway was a major pioneer in the humanisation of work. In 1962 a group of Norwegian researchers, headed by Einar Thorsrud assisted by Fred Emery then at the Tavistock Institute, initiated what was called the Norwegian Industrial Democracy Programme. This was a three-phase programme focusing on, first, creating improved representative systems of joint consultation. These involved the creation of worker directors. Next the programme progressed to workplace democracy with employees gaining the authority, power and resources to change their own work organization, when and where this was appropriate. This led to four major experiments in work restructuring in Norwegian industry. A national strategy for the humanisation of work was a product of these initiatives. This incorporated a Norwegian law on working conditions which gave workers the right to demand jobs conforming to socio-technical principles of good work practice—variety, learning opportunity, own decision power, organizational support, social recognition and a desirable future. Following on and responding to this came a programme for increasing trade union knowledge about technology and, as a result, union bargaining power. This programme was led by a group at the Norwegian Computing Centre headed by Christen Nygaard (Eldon, 1979). The industrial democracy project was stimulated by the fact that in the seventies much of Norwegian industry was being taken over by multinationals and the environment had become very turbulent. Although the work design experiments were generally successful, Norway experienced two kinds of resistance to the democratisation of work. There was a general belief on the part of workers that any management-inspired change must be for the worse, while engineers and technologists saw some of the changes as threatening to their positions and status. These problems have dogged many other change programmes (Emery, 1978).

Sweden Sweden was in the same situation as Norway and copied its example. By 1973 between 500 and 1,000 work improvement projects were taking place Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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in Swedish industry. Sweden had made its first efforts towards the democratisation of working life through the establishment of joint industrial councils in 1946. In the 1970s the Swedish government took this further by introducing the Joint Regulation of Working Life Act. This was implemented in 1977. Both management and unions now needed some guidance on how to proceed in the new areas of codetermination. These were wide-ranging, covering the interests of employees, with an emphasis on self-managing groups. They also included better personnel management, better strategic planning and increased productivity (Apslund & Otter, 1979). A programme was agreed that encouraged unions and management to broaden the activities of joint councils so that these could develop new strategies for organizational redesign and business improvement. It was also agreed that unions did not have to rely on the goodwill of management. If management did not make sufficient progress with implementation then the unions could apply pressure. A major breakthrough was a move from job design to organizational design. It was in the later seventies that Per Gyllenhammer created his new “dock assembly” work system at Volvo’s Kalmar Plant, described in Chapter 6. This removed the traditional flow-line system of car production and substituted groupworking, with a single group assembling an entire car (Lindholm & Norstedt, 1975). The project also developed the idea of worker directors, which the Swedish government required in state enterprises. An important piece of knowledge acquired during this project was that self-managing groups separated by space and time have more difficulty in coordinating and controlling their activities than those organized bureaucratically. They require excellent information systems to assist their self-management. These groups must also be able to set clear production objectives that are acceptable to management. Another problem is how to manage the interface between the workers and the technical systems when there are no foremen, production planners or quality controllers. The group has to manage all these activities itself. Negotiation now has to replace orders as the primary tool of management and this in itself is very difficult to manage. Success with these new work systems requires the enthusiasm of both management and unions.

Denmark Formal management-worker cooperation on job content and job design began in Danish companies after the Second World War. An agreement in 1947 led to consultative committees with equal numbers of employer and employee representatives being set up in a number of large companies (Larsen, 1979). In 1970 a new agreement was made between the Danish Employers’ Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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Confederation and the Danish Federation of Trade Unions. This required a focus on both production and job satisfaction. It also gave employees the opportunity to become decision partners in the design of their own work situations. A number of factors influenced this move towards work humanisation. They included increased interest from management and unions, who both saw advantages in a more contented workforce. Stable conditions of employment also played their part. The results, although encouraging, indicated that work humanisation could not be achieved without overcoming a number of difficulties. Not all groups of employees had the same interests and wanted the same solutions. A lack of support from senior management or from the trade unions could also slow down progress, as could changes in a company’s marketing or economic situation. Danish experience suggested that certain conditions were required for success. These included company stability and financial health. Change was extremely difficult if workers were being laid off. As in Sweden, good relationships and a history of cooperation together with an enthusiastic top management and positive union officials were also necessary. Technology must not act as a design constraint and there must be a wage payment system that reinforced group working. Employees should also have a good level of education.

France In the seventies France too was interested in the humanisation of work. A survey of 18 companies in 1975 and 1976 showed that a great many jobs had now been enlarged, enriched or rotated (Trepo, 1979). The principal reasons for this effort were a search for production gains together with recognition of the need to reduce labour problems, which included absenteeism, industrial conflict and poor quality work. In an attempt to overcome these the French government introduced legislation requiring employers to demonstrate how they had improved working conditions and how they proposed to improve these further. But the French trade unions were suspicious of these job design efforts, seeing them as yet another possible means to exploit workers.

Italy Italy was a rather different situation from France. In Italy the existing rigidly structured and tightly controlled form of work organization, often called Taylorism, was seen as a product of Fascism. The Italian unions, in contrast to unions in other countries, were prepared to fight against this and were determined to secure control over the organization of work (Rollier, 1979). The initiative for change therefore came from the unions with management as Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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reluctant partners. The union became a major force pressing for change and also the focal point for the promotion and spread of organizational research. Agreements in the early seventies with companies such as Olivetti and Fiat paved the way for experiments similar to those at Volvo with “production islands” and flexible work cycles. As might be expected there was resistance from employers although Olivetti was an exception. The company was converting from engineering to electronics and needed new forms of work organization. All large Italian companies were afraid of the trade unions and most produced suggestions for work changes, but there was little conviction that the new work system would lead to increases in production. In 1974 Italy had a major economic crisis. Management became frightened of the economic situation and started reshaping their production systems with the aim of breaking the unions. This meant restoring the old Taylorist model and abandoning the proposed changes.

Germany Strategies to improve the humanisation of work in West Germany began in the early seventies. These were strengthened, in 1973, by a major strike in AG Metall over the humanisation of work and worker participation. The result of this was that works councils now had a say in corporate developments and that these subjects became a part of collective bargaining. They also led to discussions between parliament, government and the trade unions (Leminsky, 1975). It was increasingly recognised that work was of central importance to a satisfactory life and that rewarding work must contain opportunities for autonomy, freedom and choice. This meant that the content of work had to be changed. There must be better training, job enrichment and the organization of work around groups. Production, repairs and control would now all be carried out by these groups. These reforms were implemented through new laws and by making works councils responsible for their introduction and for monitoring their effectiveness. A programme for the humanisation of work was introduced by the Federal Ministries of Labour and of Science and Technology in May 1974. This programme had three components: first, the development of standards and minimum requirements for machines and workplaces; second, the development of technologies to meet human requirements (this included computers); and third, case studies and models for the organization of work based on the sociotechnical analysis used in Britain and in Norway. Firms which were willing to introduce new forms of group work that included more job variety would receive subsidies to meet part of the cost of these experiments. These changes were facilitated by new legislation that formalised and ratified workers’ rights. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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Works councils were the principal change agents and any plans for reorganization made by the employer had to be agreed by the works council. This meant that the trade unions had to train their works council members in the management of change and in how to influence policy. The unions also succeeded in gaining Mitbestimmung—the equal representation of labour on supervisory boards and labour directors on executive boards. These became the new worker directors. This humanisation of work programme continued successfully for some years but was criticised by socio-technical consultants in other countries for excluding the worker on the shop floor from discussions. Everything was left to the trade unions.

Netherlands A major European pioneer in socio-technical design in the sixties and seventies was Philips in Eindhoven. The company had many programmes that incorporated what the firm called work restructuring and work consultation (Mumford & Beekman, 1994). Today we might call these work design and participation. These programmes were the responsibility of a special department called Technical Efficiency and Organization. The commitment of this department to technical change began in the sixties when the company first noted signs of unrest amongst blue-collar workers who were doing boring and monotonous jobs. Management and in particular the director of TEO were determined to overcome this. Philips believed strongly in the socio-technical principle that the social must have the same importance as the technical and they also understood the relevance of the social sciences to good management. In the seventies and eighties most manufacturing companies defined industrial engineering as a form of work study. Philips adopted a quite different approach. Management saw the behavioural sciences as providing a supporting and humanising underpinning for industrial engineering. Philips hoped that as a result of this philosophy all kinds of new organizational forms would emerge and be tried out. The result of this development and experimentation would then be a flexible and organizationally advanced company. Philips recognised that work restructuring and participation required major change in attitude from both management and workers. This new perspective was achieved through meetings, discussions and lectures, all of which included the works council and the trade unions. Although in the eighties many of these high hopes for the spread of job enrichment and employee participation diminished for harsh economic reasons, in the seventies Philips was providing an inspiring example of socio-technical design. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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United States In the sixties and seventies the notions of organizational development and the human relations model were extremely popular in the United States, but as the business environment changed these became less relevant. In 1972 interest in the socio-technical approach was awakened. A decline in productivity was associated with unhappy employees who were alienated from their work. At the same time competition from Japan and West Germany was increasing. Socio-technical projects in the United States were usually initiated by management without union or worker participation and were directed at increasing organizational effectiveness as well as the quality of working life. Most unions viewed these new policies with suspicion, seeing them as an attempt to undermine their interests or to increase productivity to the disadvantage of the worker (Davis & Cherns, 1975). But there were exceptions. The United Automobile Workers’ Union negotiated contracts with General Motors, Ford and Chrysler in which clauses were included establishing joint managementunion committees to improve the quality of working life and to encourage and monitor experiments in job redesign. These projects continued for a number of years. In the 1980s an influential group of American researchers, managers and consultants formed themselves into the Socio-technical Round Table. This group was originally sponsored by the Society of Manufacturing Engineers, and managers from both the Digital Equipment Corporation and General Motors played a major part in its early activities. Socio-technical researchers and practitioners from other countries were invited to join. It played an important role in communicating the socio-technical message to American industry. This group is still active today.

India Socio-technical projects were not restricted to Europe and the United States; India was one of the pioneers in work redesign. An early project was carried out in a cotton mill in Ahmedabad. Here a group of workers became responsible for a group of looms, work was reorganized, and an increase in productivity occurred (Rice, 1958). These new methods did not last and a follow-up visit to the firm by Tavistock researcher A. K. Rice in 1963 found that the old methods had returned. A new management was reluctant to give up power. However socio-technical initiatives continued, led by an Indian supporter of the Tavistock approach, Professor Nitish De (De, 1984). In the sixties, despite the setbacks experienced by socio-technical supporters in the different countries there was considerable optimism that the Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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principles and values of the approach would continue and become more relevant. The industrial environment was seen as becoming increasingly complex and turbulent, and the belief was that, as a result, it would need great flexibility and highly committed workers (Davis & Taylor, 1972).

United Kingdom In 1949 the Tavistock Institute in London pioneered two action research projects. One was a study of joint consultation at the Glacier Metal Company; the other was an investigation of the organization of work in the newly nationalised Coal Board (Jacques, 1951). The chief researcher in the first project was Elliott Jacques and in the second, Ken Bamforth, who had worked as a miner and found many ideas for the redesign of work in his mining experiences (Trist & Murray, 1993). These projects were both successes and failures. New patterns of consultation worked successfully at Glacier but were restricted by the authoritarian attitudes of senior management. Jacques eventually left the Tavistock as he came to believe that the authority structure of British industry, supported by a legal framework, made any fundamental employee democracy difficult if not impossible. The coalmine research had a mixed reception, which will be described in more detail later. In Britain in 1965, a large-scale socio-technical project took place in Shell with the assistance of the Tavistock. This is described in more detail in Chapter 12. Shell UK was interested in a new management philosophy which incorporated the idea that “the resources of a company are also the resources of society” (Hill, 1971). The company set out to redefine its objectives in terms of this philosophy. It was decided that these social and business objectives could best be achieved through the use of socio-technical concepts. An important factor here was the need to rethink the operation of the plant and its production equipment prior to further automation (Davis & Cherns, 1975). Management had become concerned that its employees were both alienated and performing badly, yet it needed to have a totally committed workforce if it was to automate its refineries. It was decided that there must be changes in the attitudes of management and workers, a participative management philosophy and style must be introduced, and proposals must be drawn up for target setting and performance review. The primary objective was to maximise Shell UK’s contribution to the group’s long-term profitability through the efficient use of resources. A policy and objectives achievement programme was drawn up to be the focal point of the development programme. The Tavistock principle of seeking to achieve the joint optimisation of technical and human Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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factors was to guide implementation of the programme. This project lasted for four years in the UK and the experiments then continued in Shell plants in Austria, Holland and Canada. They are still taking place. By the end of the seventies there was evidence that socio-technical ideas were becoming accepted. Projects were spreading from manufacturing to service industries and it appeared that workers were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the old methods of production. The socio-technical supporters believed that “quality of working life” was an emergent value and that human development could be fostered through work. In their view, the technical imperative would eventually fade away, and labour and management would not continue to operate in an adversarial mode. They must and could collaborate. This was happening in Scandinavia, and Germany had many examples of codetermination. But the socio-technical group was overoptimistic. Progress was not as great as its members believed. It was true that many projects were taking place but these were usually on a laissez-faire basis. Innovative managers were allowed to go ahead but without organizational support. Initiatives usually came from individuals at the top of a company anxious to achieve stability and harmony and, even more important, to reduce labour shortages. These initiatives would become fewer once the labour market changed and many were seeking work. A major difficulty during this period was that few trade unions embraced the socio-technical concept. Many saw this as a threat to their power and influence. Socio-technical systems design in the seventies had many of the characteristics of a new social movement. Social movements have usually been examined in political terms but they can also be described as knowledge producers and looked at from three angles—as worldwide influences and as technological and organizational innovators. Movements of this kind are fertile environments for the development and propagation of new policies and values as well as providing contexts in which ideas can be shaped or constructed. The Quality of Working Life Council acted as an effective communicator and facilitator for socio-technical design at this time. The international group was drawn from many different European countries as well as India, North America and Australia. It was chaired by Einar Thorsrud, a leading Norwegian academic, and spread the quality of work message throughout the world through meetings, training sessions, books and articles. Its members worked with many different companies, initially helping them to introduce sociotechnical projects onto their shop floors and later into offices. Einar Thorsrud had work design projects in Norwegian schools and in the Norwegian shipping industry. Group relationships were nourished and sustained by Dr. Tommy Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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Wilson, one of the founders of the Tavistock Institute who later became social science adviser to Unilever. This group was very influential. It had a common purpose and a strong network of relationships. The members acted as information conduits in their respective countries and through attendance at international conferences.

SOCIO-TECHNICAL THEORY Socio-technical researchers have always used their research projects to test and develop theory. One of their first important concepts was the notion of “open systems.” This recognised that every socio-technical system is embedded in an environment that affects the way it behaves. If this environment is the department of a firm, it will include the other surrounding departments and all other activities that enable the company to run effectively. It will also include the environment external to the firm. This notion of an “open system” was greatly influenced by the work of an Austrian biologist called von Bertalanffy (1950). The open system concept, as formulated at this time, accepted the theory of “homeostasis.” This suggests that systems evolve and become increasingly complex but eventually settle for a steady state in which they can accommodate change without disruption (Davis & Taylor, 1972). The notion of homeostasis is questioned today. It is now argued that stability is not inevitable. Systems can become increasingly chaotic as they progress from one state to another. The open systems concept considered technical structures and work roles as two systems which were both part of one inclusive system. The researcher or consultant must always consider them together. Relationships between the two systems, and between them and the outside environment, must also be carefully analysed. This approach led to the development of a complex method for analysing work systems, which went through a number of stages. Unit operations, or groups of tasks which fitted logically together into a discrete work activity, were first identified. Each of these unit operations was made the responsibility of a work group. Next variances, problem areas where what did happen deviated from what should happen, were noted as areas for improved control by the work group. Supporting activities such as maintenance and the acquisition of supplies were also brought into the analysis. All of these were to become the responsibility of the work group. Key executive functions such as coordination and control of the wider system were left as the prerogatives of management. Some, but not a great deal, of attention was paid to personal relationships although workers were asked to describe how they saw their Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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roles. The underlying theory here was that alienation and job dissatisfaction were a result of a lack of personal control. These design principles were constantly added to as research and action progressed. Many were due to the creative thinking of Fred Emery, an early member of the Tavistock who later moved to Australia (Emery, 1978). He produced the notion of “redundancy of functions,” or multiskilling. Groups and individuals should have the ability to carry out a number of different tasks even though they do not always need to use these. The greater the redundancy, the more reliable the system, as it can now cope with unexpected occurrences. Redundancy also means that if one part of a system fails it can be replaced by another. This provides greater security. Errors can be accepted without disaster. However redundancy requires control mechanisms to be present so failure can be noted and substitute parts activated. Emery believed that turbulent environments require redundancy as this enables them to be adaptive, and that redundancy is easier to achieve in self-managing groups than in individual work activities. These ideas led to a principle of “adaptive strategic planning.” Planning now had to fit the values and goals of the organization. It required the identification of shared values. Another new concept was that of “minimal critical specifications.” This was developed by David Herbst (1974), who maintained that over-specified work designs were obsolete. Workers should be told what to do but not how to do it. Deciding this should be left to their initiative. He also produced an alternative to work hierarchies that is still in favour today. This involved primary work groups, matrices and networks. Primary groups are when all the members can learn all the tasks; matrices are when some tasks are done by everyone but others require specialists; and networks are when people do not know each other and may be physically distant, yet they are still able to collaborate (Davis & Taylor, 1972). These principles were used and developed in the 1962 Norwegian Industrial Democracy Project. Albert Cherns, an associate of the Tavistock Institute, brought all of these principles together in an article in Human Relations (Cherns, 1976). These were now listed as: Principle 1. Compatibility. The process of design must be compatible with its objectives. Principle 2. Minimal Critical Specification. No more should be specified than is absolutely essential. But the essential must be specified. Principle 3. The Socio-technical Criterion. Variances, if they cannot be eliminated, must be controlled as close to their point of origin as possible. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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Principle 4. The Multifunctionality Principle. Work needs a redundancy of functions for adaptability and learning. Principle 5. Boundary Location. Boundaries should facilitate the sharing of knowledge and experience. They should occur where there is a natural discontinuity—time, technology change, etc. Principle 6. Information must go, in the first place, to the place where it is needed for action. Principle 7. Support Congruence. Systems of social support must be designed to reinforce the desired social behaviour. Principle 8. Design and Human Values. High quality work requires: • jobs to be reasonably demanding; • opportunity to learn; • an area of decision-making; • social support; • the opportunity to relate work to social life; and • a job that leads to a desirable future. Principle 9. Incompletion. The recognition that design is an iterative process. William Pasmore, writing in Human Relations (1985), gives a very positive assessment of what the socio-technical approach has achieved over the years. He describes the key insights provided by the early researchers as: 1. The work system should be seen as a set of activities contributing to an integrated whole and not as a set of individual jobs. 2. The work group is more important than individual job holders. 3. The work system should be regulated by its members, not by external supervisors. 4. The design philosophy of the work system should be that of redundancy. Its members should have more skills than the system normally requires. (This is multiskilling.) 5. The members should have as many discretionary tasks to perform as prescribed tasks. 6. The individual member is seen as complementary to any machine, not subordinate to it. 7. The design of work should lead to an increasing amount of variety for the individual and group so that learning can take place. At a later date Fred Emery added to these insights by stating that each member of the work group should have: Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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1. An optimal level of variety 2. Learning opportunities 3. Scope for making decisions 4. Organizational support—training, good supervision, etc. 5. A job recognised as important by the outside world 6. The potential for making progress in the future The technical system covered technology and associated work structure. The social system was seen as including the grouping of individuals in different roles into teams, coordination, control, boundary management, and also the delegation of responsibility to the work group and a reliance on its judgment for many operational decisions. A distinction was made between semiautonomous groups and self-managing groups. The former are given authority for decision -making but may lack the means to achieve this, for example, an effective information system. The latter have both authority and the necessary knowledge to control their own activities.

PROMISES AND POSSIBILITIES But socio-technical design has not always lived up to expectations. When it was first developed after the Second World War, it was seen by its creators as a means for optimising the intelligence and skills of human beings and associating these with new technologies which would revolutionise the way we live and work. This did happen for a while in the 1970s when many industries tried to implement socio-technical methods of working. But initiatives gradually faded away so that today, when we are in the twenty-first century, we have many people working on jobs that are routine and tightly controlled and provide few opportunities for personal development. What are the reasons for this unwillingness to grasp an opportunity that appeared to offer so much? Are they economic, cultural or social? We need to understand why the use of sociotechnical approaches has ebbed and flowed over the years. Here are some suggestions. All businesses are surrounded by powerful economic climates that greatly affect the way they operate. They also have strong cultures that have developed over time and are difficult to change. There has been a belief that the efficient production of goods and services requires the clear specification of goals, prescribed ways of doing things to achieve these, and controls to ensure that deviations do not occur. Although visionary groups have suggested that goals

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can be achieved in different ways, much of industry has believed that there is “one best way” which is based on an adherence to bureaucracy. This has often meant that social risks and problems were neglected or not seen. When the labour market was tight there was an unspoken belief that they, the workers, will put up with almost anything provided that jobs are available. The socio-technical school has always wanted to change these perceptions. Its members believe in flexibility and intellectual growth, that individuals and groups can reorganize and redevelop to meet new challenges in changing environments, and that this change process need not be too demanding and difficult. Many companies have accepted this message and tried to restructure their procedures and change their cultures to meet new kinds of objectives, both human and technical. But in the recent past, few of these endeavours have had any long-term success. The attraction and validity of bureaucracy were seen as stronger and safer and the new humanistic approaches as over-risky. However we are now in a new industrial era with new objectives and horizons and a new, more people-friendly technology. It is time for a new socio-technical resurrection.

WHAT CAN SOCIO-TECHNICAL DESIGN CONTRIBUTE? The most important thing it can contribute is its value system. This tells us that although technology and organizational structures may change, the rights and needs of the employee must be given as high a priority as those of the nonhuman parts of the system. This principle must also be applied to those who are not privileged to have paid employment and rely on the state for security. The predictions of the sixties and seventies that technology would bring many of us an idyllic life of leisure and wealth in the future appear to have little validity. A second fundamental socio-technical value is that of democracy. Employees should be allowed and encouraged to participate in, and influence, decisions that concern them. In the seventies and eighties these decisions were seen as primarily concerned with work organization. Today, they would have a much wider area of application and be concerned with health and comfort issues as well as the present and future environment. Other socio-technical design principles need applying more generally. The importance of creating and developing knowledge and the advantage of working in teams, all important aspects of socio-technical design, are now accepted for elite groups but are not yet a general policy to be applied to

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everyone. This needs to happen. At present, for many groups, the employeremployee work contract has greatly deteriorated from the employee’s point of view and this could lead to severe industrial conflict in the future if a balance is not restored. But how can we make this socio-technical revival come about? It is important to do so, for we are now in a period of major change and change is always difficult. If mishandled, major change can be so difficult that it leads to social breakdown rather than an easy route to success. Can industrial companies handle revolutionary change without motivated workers and inspired leadership? Do today’s managers have the knowledge to create bottom-up, entrepreneurial organizations (Bruyn, 1999)? Perhaps a socio-technical revival can help them do so. There are a number of models of how change can be managed without excessive trauma. Socio-technical supporters have always argued that the means are as important as the ends. If the desired end product is to be a humanised, efficient and innovative workplace then humanistic strategies must accompany the change process. Yet it will not be easy to achieve these. A publication by the British Demos Group describes some of the problems of implementing major change (Murray, 1999). First, there is the problem of inflexibility; many companies find it difficult to change. This may not be true of small, creative organizations but change will not be easy for those in the global market category. Organizational change is often stimulated and reinforced by companies that take the lead and are prepared to take risks. Where do we find these firms? Government commitment to change is also a major factor, and governments are not always knowledgeable on what are appropriate strategies at particular moments of time when faced with unforeseen circumstances. Change is also stimulated by the thinking and writing of consultants and academics and by the behaviour of competitors. But this kind of change can be just the latest fad of a powerful communicator, one who has little understanding of the consequences of what he or she is recommending. There are also the very difficult problems of personal relationships. The socio-technical approach recommends the participation of lower-level groups in decision making, yet the reality of power structures is that innovation is often halted when it is successful enough to threaten existing authority structures. Most challenging is that all change involves risk, and this is something most large companies try to avoid. It is critical that all companies in the future, whether part of the “wired world” or “built to last,” spend time and effort building the competencies that are required to handle change without excessive stress, trauma and failure. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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The world of socio-technical design is democratic and humanistic and provides both freedom and knowledge to those who are part of it. These concepts are not new; many others support them. Etzioni (1999) describes an approach that he calls “voluntary simplicity.” Voluntary simplicity describes a set of values that is prepared to limit expenditure on consumer goods while emphasising the importance of quality of life, self-expression and participation. It is a manner of living that is outwardly more simple and inwardly more rich (Elgin, 1981). This is not very different from some of the concepts in the Christian Bible. Matthew in the Sermon on the Mount says: Do not store up treasure for yourself on earth where moths and wood worm destroy them and thieves can break in and steal. … You cannot be the slave of both God and money.… Think of the flowers in the fields, they never have to work or spin; yet I assure you that not even Solomon in all his regalia was robed like one of these. (Matthew 6: 19-29) Another approach to humanistic values is called “associative democracy.” This aims to change the relationship between the state and its citizens by creating a participative welfare society (Pestoff, 1999). It does this by giving citizens a more powerful voice in decisions on publicly financed social services. This is possible in a community-oriented economy which transfers power from big government to civic groups and from big corporations to self-governing local organizations (Bruyn, 1999). Pestoff, commenting on the Swedish experience, maintains that democracy rests on a moral base that grows when used but dwindles when ignored. For it to work, citizens must participate in real-world situations where, sometimes, they are forced to make hard choices (Pestoff, 1999). Profit sharing and co-ownership can make industrial and commercial enterprises more democratic. The best-known European example here is the Mondragon Corporation. First set up in 1956 as a worker cooperative, today Mondragon is one of Spain’s leading companies. Cooperatives of this kind have strong links to their local communities and this influences the strategic decisions that they take. They are not primarily concerned with shareholder value (Whyte & Whyte, 1992). These examples, together with the socio-technical approach, would all fit into a humanistic value system that placed great importance on democracy, the equitable distribution of assets, and a concern for personal development and happiness. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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The models are there. How likely are we to adopt them in the twenty-first century? Can we, as with socio-technical design in the seventies, find enlightened firms and communities anxious to accept democratic value systems of this kind? Will they be the opinion leaders or models for the majority? How can we persuade companies to place as much or more importance on their employees and customers as on their profit and loss accounts and the price of their shares? Major human relations change often comes from a shift of values resulting from a severe problem of some kind. Democracy and humanism may happen on an increasing scale in the future, but this will not be solely for ethical reasons but because, as in the seventies, valuable, highly skilled labour needed to be attracted to the company and retained once it was there. However the sociotechnical approach is always tightly wedded to its ethical base. Its guiding principles are an improved quality of life, especially in the work situation, and the opportunity to participate in decisions that affect this (Trist & Murray, 1993).

REFERENCES Apslund, C., & Otter, C. V. (1979). Codetermination through collective effort. In C. L. Cooper & E. Mumford (Eds.), The Quality of Working Life in Western and Eastern Europe. London: Associated Business Press, pp. 258-279. Bertalanffy, L. von. (1950). The theory of open systems in physics and biology. Science, 3, 23-29. Bruyn, S.T. (1999). A community-oriented economy. In W. E. Halal & K. B. Taylor (Eds.), 21st Century Economics. London: Macmillan, 369-392. Cherns, A. (1976). Principles of socio-technical design. Human Relations, 2(9), 783-792. Cooper, C. L., & Mumford, E. (1979). Introduction. In C. L. Cooper & E. Mumford (Eds.), The Quality of Working Life in Western and Eastern Europe. London: Associated Business Press, pp. xv-xviii. Davis, L. (1971). Job satisfaction research: The Post Industrial view. Industrial Relations, 10: 176-93 Davis, L., & Cherns, A. (1975). Quality of Working Life (Vol. 2). New York: Free Press of Glencoe. Davis, L., & Taylor, J. (1972). Design of jobs. Penguin Books. De, N. R. (1984). Alternative designs of human organizations. New Delhi, India: Sage. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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Eldon, M. (1979). Three generations of work democracy experiments in Norway: Beyond classical socio-technical system design. In C. L. Cooper & E. Mumford (Eds.), The Quality of Working Life in Western and Eastern Europe (chap. 11). London: Associated Business Press, pp. 226-257. Elgin, D. (1981). Voluntary simplicity: Towards a way of life that is outwardly simple, inwardly rich. New York: William Morrow. Emery, F. (1978). The emergence of a new paradigm of work. Canberra: Australian National University. Etzioni, A. (1999). The third way to a good society. London: Demos. Heller, F., Pusic, E., Strauss, G., & Wilpert, B. (1998). Organizational participation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Herbst, P. G. (1974). Designing with minimal critical specifications. In P. G. Herbst (Ed.), Socio-technical Design: Strategies in Multidisciplinary Research. London: Tavistock, pp. 294-302. Hill, P. (1971). Towards a new philosophy of management. London: Gower Press. Hofstede, G. (1979). Humanization of work: The role of Values in a third industrial revolution. In C. L. Cooper & E. Mumford (Eds.), The Quality of Working Life in Western and Eastern Europe (chap. 2). London: Associated Business Press, pp. 18-37. Jacques, E. (1951). The changing culture of a factory. London: Tavistock. Larsen, H. H. (1979). Humanisation of the work environment in Denmark. In C. L. Cooper & E. Mumford (Eds.), The Quality of Working Life in Western and Eastern Europe (chap. 7). London: Associated Business Press, pp. 124-158. Leminsky, G. (1975). Trade union strategies for the humanisation of work in the FRG. In E. Mumford & H. Sackman (Eds.), Human Choice and Computers. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 157-167. Lindholm, R., & Norstedt, J. P. (1975). The Volvo report. Stockholm: Swedish Employers’ Confederation. Mumford, E., & Beekman, G. J. (1994). Tools for change and progress. Amsterdam: CSG. Murray, R. (1999). Creating wealth from waste. London: Demos. Pasmore, W. A. (1985). Social science transformer: The socio-technical perspective. Human Relations, 48(1), 1-22. Pestoff, V. A. (1999). Social enterprises and civil democracy in Sweden: Developing a participatory welfare society in the twenty-first century. In W. E. Halal & K. B. Taylor (Eds.), 21st Century Economics. London: Macmillan, pp. 301-326. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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Rice, A. K. (1958). Productivity and Social Organisation: The Ahmedabad Experiment. London: Tavistock Publications. Rollier, M. (1979). Taylorism and the Italian unions. In C. L. Cooper & E. Mumford (Eds.), The Quality of Working Life in Western and Eastern Europe. London: Associated Business Press, pp.214-225. Trepo, G. (1979). Improvement of working conditions and job design in France. In C. L. Cooper & E. Mumford (Eds.), The Quality of Working Life in Western and Eastern Europe. London: Associated Business Press. Trist, E., & Murray, H. (1993). The social engagement of social science: Vol. 2. The socio-technical perspective. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Whyte, W. F., & Whyte, K. K. (1992). Making Mondragon: The growth and dynamics of the worker cooperative complex. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.

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Chapter 3

Participation in Practice

INTRODUCTION As the case studies in the chapters that follow are all examples of participative organizational and systems design, I will now describe the processes of participation and how these can differ according to the group and company using them and the situation in which they are used.

What is Participation? The one certain thing about participation is that it is not a new concept, although it may sometimes have been given other names such as democracy, involvement, sharing, co-operation, etc. The Greeks used it to describe a certain kind of decision taking. For them a decision was participatively taken if the answer to the question “Who takes it?” was “more or less everybody.” This kind of democratic decision taking contrasted with meritocratic, in which

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decisions were taken by an elite, and with autocratic, in which they were taken by one person. Later writers on participation have been of a very different kind from the early philosophers. Many were contributors to the human relations movement in industry and they include such famous names from the United States as Elton Mayo, Douglas McGregor and Rensis Likert. The Tavistock Institute in England had a major influence on organizational participation from the 1950s onwards as did Norwegian social scientists such as Einer Thorsrud and P. G. Herbst. These influential academics were interested in questions of authority, motivation and job satisfaction at work. They all believed that quality of working life could be increased through greater employee participation in decisions that concerned the work environment. Mayo’s (1969) very broad definition of participation is that it takes many forms. It cannot be represented in an organizational chart or engineering blueprint. A democratic system has no fixed concentration of authority at the top. On the contrary, the focus of authority moves from place to place according to the demands of the situation. McGregor’s (1960) more conservative model is that participation creates opportunities under suitable conditions for people to influence decisions which affect them, while Likert (1967) describes his model of participation as all subordinates in a work group who are affected by a decision are involved in it (a work group is defined as a superior and all the subordinates who report to him). A simple definition that fits user involvement in organizational design defines participation as a process in which two or more parties influence each other in making plans, policies or decisions. It is restricted to decisions that have future effects on all those making them or on those represented by the decision takers. All definitions recognise that participation involves more than one set of interests and that it is concerned with decision taking. There is, however, little discussion of the nature of the different interests involved or of the subjects with which the decision taking is or should be concerned. I found that before I could use a participative approach it was necessary to consider carefully the kind of participation that could best be associated with the introduction and management of change in the firms I was working with.

Why have Participation? The arguments of the classical theorists were based on a vision of a “common good” and on how universal involvement in decision taking could help secure this. The nation state was seen as committed to ideas of justice and freedom; its problem was how to realise these. Parallel notions were concerned Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

Participation in Practice 35

with the rights of the individual and the importance of personal autonomy, which could only be secured if men could decide for themselves what they wanted to do (Heller, Pusic, Strauss & Wilpert, 1998). The arguments for participation today tend to be rather different and participation is supported for many different reasons. Management may decide to try a participative approach because they agree with the early philosophers that participation is morally right—people should be able to determine their own destinies. Or they may see participation as helping to produce a workforce committed to change and therefore furthering the avoidance of employee resistance. They may believe that participation is a valuable educational experience and provides understanding and knowledge that can assist an organization to more effectively realise its objectives or, alternatively, that such knowledge will enable any negotiating that takes place to do so with all interest groups operating from an informed position. These are all positive reasons for participation. It is clear, however, that some managements favour participation for what could be regarded as negative reasons. They see it as a way of persuading their employees to accept changes that otherwise might be rejected. Participation then becomes a manipulative tool and is carried out without any serious attempt to make it truly democratic. Trade union arguments for participation can be equally varied. Unions may encourage participation because they see it as a lever for increasing shop-floor control over the work situation. They may also support it because they believe it will contribute to industrial democracy and the more equitable sharing of power. But, in the past, some unions have rejected participation, stating that it is their responsibility and right to represent the interests of their members and that they can do this effectively without involving these members. Employees are usually interested in participation for different reasons. They see it as a protective device that will enable them to prevent things that they believe to be undesirable from happening. They want to avoid being made redundant, or deskilled. They also hope to have more interesting jobs, more discretion at work, better opportunities for promotion, and an improved quality of working life. They believe participation may assist them to achieve these. Outside industry politicians and community leaders can have another set of objectives for participation. They may believe that active participation leads people to accept responsibility, enhances group harmony, develops a sense of cooperation and of community, and produces a willingness to accept group decisions. They also believe that participation can produce valuable information, hence, the recent use of focus groups. Other arguments for participation are related less to the achievement of specific objectives and more to subjective Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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individual feelings, for example, that it enables people to feel free and to be their own masters and in control of their own destinies. Again educationalists might be interested in the arguments for the character-building aspects of participation—that it assists people to develop active, non-servile characters and democratic personality structures and also enables them to broaden their horizons and appreciate the viewpoints and perspectives of others. Participation then can have different meanings for every individual or group concerned with it. Each interest group is likely to define the word in a different way and to use participation for very different objectives. The challenge for any organization that decides to try participation as a strategy is to create the kinds of structures and processes that will assist all the different stakeholders to obtain some gains from using this approach. These gains will not necessarily be all of the same kind but they should enable each group to say with conviction, “Participation has clear benefits for us.”

Participation Structure, Content and Process The discussion so far highlights the difficulty of trying to arrive at precise definitions of participation. Equal difficulty is likely to be experienced when considering how participation can be applied. What should it be used for and how can it best be used? The traditional answer is that participation is concerned with decision taking and with the representation of different interests and points of view. The theory here is that a decision publicly arrived at is better understood and therefore likely to be better carried out. But this says nothing about who implements these decisions once they are taken. Participation is seen as an expression of consent to something being done. It says nothing about how it is done or who does it. Yet these are important decisions that companies have to take. Any practical discussion of participation to be used in problem solving situations such as organizational design needs to cover the structure of participation, the content of participation and the process of participation. The structure of participation is concerned with how people are organized to enable participation to take place. Different models include consultative, representative or consensus forms of participation. There can be “consultative” participation in which the participants give evidence to the decision makers, this evidence being taken into account when decisions are taken. Representative participation is when influence is exerted through intermediaries such as a design group. If a representative group is chosen as the vehicle for decision making, then attention has to be paid to such matters as ensuring that all interests are in fact represented and deciding how the members of the group are selected Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

Participation in Practice 37

or elected and whether a number of groups at different organizational levels is required. Consensus participation is when everyone with an interest in a problem can exert influence on decision taking. Here agreement has now to be reached on how far the decision process extends. Consensus participation can allow all participants to have an equal voice in agreeing decision strategy but they do not actually take the final decision. In contrast participants can be given full authority for evaluating options and taking a final decision unconstrained by any laid-down procedures or taboo subjects. Groups such as senior doctors and police are likely to have this degree of freedom. A variety of consensus participation, sometimes called the conference model, is very popular with major American companies at present. This is used primarily for obtaining ideas and sanctions for new organizational strategies (Axelrod, 1992). I have used a number of different participative structures in the firms in which I acted as a change facilitator. These were not always my decisions but also depended very much on the wishes and interests of the company. A choice has to be made on whether to use consultative, representative or consensus approaches, with some companies handling complex change using all three at the same time. This is true of the final case studies in the book, Air Products, the British police force and Shell International. They would bring together large numbers of their employees from all levels and departments, together with key customers and suppliers, so that a “company” view could be obtained which would help the development of change strategy (Axelrod,1992). These options of “consultative,” “representative” and “consensus” participation can also be used at different organizational levels in the company. The content of participation is the nature of the issues discussed and about which decisions are taken. It also involves a consideration of decision boundaries; that is, what subjects can be considered participatively and what subjects are outside the jurisdiction of the participative group and are seen as executive decisions which are not taken democratically. The process of participation involves the ongoing acquisition of knowledge so that decisions are taken from an informed position. It involves learning, the development of effective working relationships over time, the setting and achieving of goals, and the implementation of solutions. It is also concerned with power, and in true participation all the parties will have equal power. If power within a participative group is not equal then the interests of a faction can unduly influence decisions. Where power is equal but there are conflicts of interest, the outcome will be negotiated and is likely to be a compromise. Occasionally a meta-solution may be striven for and achieved. By meta-solution is meant a solution that is so effective that it succeeds in meeting the objectives of all the stakeholders. Occasionally a Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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group may find it is impossible to arrive at any solution and the outcome then is a product of default, not intention.

Participation as a Contribution to Effective Organizational Change If one ceases to consider participation as a blanket activity applied to all decision taking and considers it in relation to a specific set of needs and problems, then it becomes easier to discuss it with clarity. I have been particularly concerned with using participation to assist the design of new work systems involving the use of new technology. This task is very appropriate for a participative approach for the following reasons. It involves a number of interest groups (management, systems designers, clerical or shop-floor users, trade unions, customers, etc.). It requires knowledge and this knowledge is likely to be spread throughout the different interest groups and not be located solely in one. Any design task is complex and takes time. Participation enables a shared learning process to take place in which each of the interest groups can contribute to the problem solving process. The various interest groups are likely to have different values, needs and objectives, and these can be brought out into the open, discussed and attempts made to reconcile them. Participation used for design tasks therefore involves discussions over time and not merely the giving of an opinion at one moment in time. This kind of participation requires a high commitment from those involved, who may be concerned with all aspects of organizational change including analysis, design, construction, implementation and evaluation. Irrespective of whether a consultative, representative or consensus approach is adopted, experience has shown that agreement on a system solution does not always emerge easily and conflicts which result from different interests within a department may have to be resolved first. One objective of a participative approach to organizational design is that few must suffer and as many as possible must gain from the change. When new systems are being introduced there is frequently a potential for reducing the numbers of staff, and agreed strategies must be developed to safeguard the interests of those who have to move on. A participative approach has also to be acceptable to top and departmental management, who must be convinced that it will lead to both efficiency gains and to the creation of a more desirable work environment that will help attract and keep staff. In the companies I worked with I found that, as well as a design group, it was always desirable to create a project steering group from those for whom the proposed change was of particular importance. The steering group acted Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

Participation in Practice 39

as a direct link between the senior management of the organization and the team responsible for the detailed design. It set the basic organizational objectives and constraints under which the new system was to be developed and could have as its members one or two senior managers, the managers of affected departments, official representatives of trade unions, and any other major interests affected by the new system. But it was the design team that was responsible for the design and implementation of the new system and this consisted of members of those departments where the new system was to be introduced. This team agreed the scope of the local problem, scanned the environment for new opportunities or changing constraints, analysed deficiencies in current systems, defined development goals in consultation with other groups likely to be affected, provided decision makers with assessments of the likely impacts of alternative strategies on these goals, and finally created the work organization and task structures associated with it. I found that in unionised situations both representative and consensus participation need to have trade union support and involvement if design groups are to succeed.

SOME PROBLEMS OF USING A PARTICIPATIVE DESIGN APPROACH A participative approach, while producing great benefits and easing the acceptance and efficient use of a new work system, like any other innovation is not free from problems. Here are some of them, derived from my own experience. First, it must not be assumed that because a group of employees agree to be involved in participative design that this means that they are convinced of management’s good intentions. In Rolls Royce, an engineering firm, suspicion of management’s motives in permitting this unusual degree of democracy lasted for some time. It required many assurances from management that it had no evil intent for trust to be established. Second, while I strongly believe that if consensus or representative design is used then the design group should be democratically elected, this is not always possible. In the engineering firm, managers were worried that an election would lead to the recruitment of the most militant rather than the most effective members of staff. They therefore preferred to select the members of the group themselves. Although this produced an admirable representation of the different interests in the department, for some time the design group members were seen as management favourites, or “blue eyes,” and this affected their relationships with their colleagues. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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Third, in most change situations there will inevitably be some conflicts of interest. It cannot be assumed that the members of any group will all have the same objectives or favour the same design solutions. With any of the participative design approaches these conflicts of interest will quickly surface and will have to be discussed and negotiated. This is not an easy task for a new design group. Fourth, a design group formed from clerical or shop-floor workers has “no place to hide.” Whereas a professional group of technical specialists can return to their own department and “close the door” when relationships become difficult, the members of a participative design group must continue to work side by side with their colleagues throughout the design process. As this inevitably has its conflict periods, they are likely to experience interpersonal stress from time to time and this is something they may not be used to. Fifth, in order to reduce conflicts of interest and problems of stress, design groups need to have or develop some skills in communication and consultation. In my experience it is more difficult to transfer such skills to a design group than it is to give them design expertise. Sixth, the role of the professional experts in the situation will change. Instead of being “designers” in the traditional sense they become consultants to the design group. Some may regard this change of role as a threat to their authority and status. Finally, the role of departmental or middle mangers may temporarily become more difficult. Ideally these should have close contact with the work of a design group but without being full-time members. Some departmental managers may decide not to become permanent members of a design group because they believe that their presence will have an inhibiting effect on discussion. If this is the case then they must always be kept in touch with what is taking place. An effective strategy is for them to join the group for part of each meeting or for a full meeting at regular intervals. They must also approve the solution that is eventually chosen by their departmental staff.

THE ROLE OF THE FACILITATOR An important role in participative design is that of group “facilitator.” The facilitator can be an external consultant or an internal employee of the company, although if this last is the case then, ideally, he or she should not be from any of the future user departments or from the group immediately responsible for technical design. The facilitator needs to have a neutral status and preferably to come from a part of the firm, such as personnel or management services, which Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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crosses many departmental boundaries in its activities. The facilitator’s role is to help the design group to choose and implement an appropriate problemsolving methodology, to keep the members interested and motivated towards the design task, to help them resolve any conflicts, and to make sure that important design factors are not forgotten or overlooked. The facilitator must in no circumstances take decisions for the design group or persuade them that certain things should be done or not done. The facilitator’s role is to help the design group systematically to analyse their own problems and needs and arrive at an organizational solution that solves the problems and meets the needs. Here I must make my own role clear. I was a facilitator in most of the projects described in this book but I always saw my principal role as that of researcher, trying through action research to obtain a better understanding of the dynamic of problem solving when new systems are being introduced. This means that I did not receive any personal fees but the firms could, and often did, make contributions to my university, and as director of a university research unit I was also able to receive grants from national and international funding bodies. However in the case studies that follow I have kept my own role in the background and in each case have asked an employee of the case study company to provide comments on what took place from their point of view. The facilitator can help a group in many different ways. At the start of a project, new design groups are usually confused about the nature of the task upon which they are embarking and uncertain of their ability to tackle it. The facilitator can assist them to overcome these doubts. One useful way of doing this is to show how a group in another company has approached a similar design problem. Also, when organizational alternatives are being considered for the new system, it can help the learning process for the facilitator to arrange for the group to visit other companies and see how they have solved similar problems. The facilitator can also invite experts to talk to the group about different aspects of the design task and the possible organizational and technical options that they might wish to consider. The facilitator has a very important role in keeping the design group’s morale high. Participative design groups seem to go through four distinct psychological stages during a project. At the start there is anxiety and uncertainty about their ability to take on the task. Then, as data collecting proves interesting, enjoyable and relatively easy, the group gains confidence and morale is high. However, about halfway through most projects there is a slump in morale. This demoralisation can be caused by a number of different factors. It may be stimulated by the reaction of other groups who become aware of the project after it has started and question its legitimacy. It may be Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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due to the fact that some of the information the design group needs is hard to obtain, or there may be relationship problems within the design group or between the design group and the steering group. Once these are overcome and the group moves on from the problem analysis into the design phase of the project, high morale usually returns and lasts until the end of the project. However, whereas usually there are no serious difficulties in assisting a design group to acquire the skills necessary to design their own work situation in association with an established technology or known form of work organization, difficulties increase when technology is developing very rapidly and pioneering projects appear which few people in the company understand. A great deal of learning and expert advice is now necessary. The facilitator will need a number of social skills, including flexibility and tact. All groups are different and the individual members may take time to learn each other’s perspectives and objectives. They may have to be helped to communicate easily and accurately with each other. New groups often go through four psychological stages before they become mature problem solvers. At the start there can be uncertainty and anxiety as each group member wonders if he or she can handle the design task and if they are going to be able to work with each other. Once this is overcome, morale can be high as addressing the problem gets underway but may slump as the complexity and difficulty of the task become increasingly apparent. This can later improve again as decisions are taken to initially focus on those aspects of the problem where the group believes faster progress can be made. Each of these stages can be helped by a leader who is a good facilitator. An effective facilitator will make certain that the group has access to any external information it requires and will ensure that its discussions and decisions are communicated to other interested groups and to the steering group. The facilitator should also help the group to achieve the following: • • • • • • • •

Ensure that all relevant issues are raised and discussed Arrive at an agreed definition of the aspect of the problem they wish to tackle at a particular moment in time Understand what is involved in focusing on this issue Agree short- and long-term objectives Accept disagreement and tolerate conflict Value reasoned debate on all relevant issues Strive for equality of contribution Resist external pressures to conform to particular prejudices or beliefs

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Facilitators also require good social skills. They must get on well with people, have easy and pleasant social manners, and be able to run a meeting democratically and ensure that relationships within the group stay friendly and constructive. Acting as a facilitator is not easy. It requires patience, control, enthusiasm and the ability to create and maintain positive attitudes. The most difficult task is likely to be helping to resolve conflicts of ideas and perceptions in a group representing different interests. These will have to be reconciled if a consensus on subsequent action is to be arrived at. Most group processes involve a degree of negotiation. Conflicts of ideas and interests need to be recognised, brought out into the open and discussed, and solutions must be arrived at which meet with the approval of all members. A good facilitator will ensure that the group works as a team and will help the members to acquire relevant knowledge about the problem they are addressing. He or she will also assist it to use its resources efficiently and to address effectively the issues it regards as most important. Information on progress will also need to be disseminated regularly to other interested groups and to the company as a whole. A choice may have to be made between focusing on short- or long-term objectives or trying to achieve both at the same time. Most important these leaders should, ideally, have a personal ethical position and a vision that they can share with the group, together with a clear sense of purpose. This description of the desired attributes of a facilitator may seem idealistic and such a person hard to find. Surprisingly there are many such people around and I have met many of them in industry and in universities, but they have to be sought out and persuaded to take on a difficult but very worthwhile role.

UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGE ENVIRONMENT Successful problem solving for change and changing needs the ability to understand the situation into which change is being introduced and to recognise the factors in it that will either help or hinder success. This is the focus of the case study in the next chapter. It requires both a knowledge of the present and an ability to foresee the future. Many of today’s work situations are both complex and dynamic—employees come and go with some rapidity, and competitors appear and disappear—yet the successful assimilation of change usually requires a degree of stability.

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A good understanding of the environment in which the problem is located will assist the choice of strategies and methods that can lead to a solution. Any new work system should be acceptable to employees, efficient in fulfilling its functions and able to provide satisfying tasks for those who have to use it. Meeting these objectives requires a good assessment of all environmental factors that will affect the new system’s acceptance and use, together with an estimate of their relevance to successful change. This diagnosis will include an appreciation of the stability or volatility of the situation into which the new system is to be introduced. Are the employees there used to change and unlikely to reject it or will they greet it with suspicion or antagonism? And the reasons for change, are these positive or negative? Is the company one with a long, stable history and a secure future that is accepting change to make itself even more successful? Or is the change a response to increased competition that the company is having difficulty in responding to and which may threaten its future survival? Here innovation may be a symptom of fear rather than confidence and employee attitudes may reflect this.

The Nature of the Change— Why is Change Being Introduced? The reason for the change will greatly affect its nature. Is it a product of past success leading to a desire for more growth and diversity? Is it a result of new and more advanced technical developments that must be taken advantage of and introduced? Or is it for negative reasons such as economic or efficiency problems that require the company to rethink its activities and options? Change can also take many different forms. It may need to be sustainable so that it lasts a long time or temporary to solve a short-term problem. It may be badly wanted or seen as unnecessary. Its size will also be a major factor. Is it small and bounded such as a new computer system for a particular function or department? Or is it a revolutionary change that is going to affect everywhere and everyone? Companies which attempt to change their work cultures to make themselves more responsive to external demands or increased competition often fall into this category. Until recently, with some exceptions, most change was not all-embracing. It was more likely to be limited in its impact. Today, large companies are increasingly trying to introduce change that is large-scale and pervasive. Shell International, under pressure to become more environmentally friendly, is an example here. Change is also more likely to be difficult than easy. In recent years many countries, including Britain, have experienced serious problems with new computer systems that were introduced to improve public services yet did not Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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fulfil the promises that were made when they were ordered. These failures greatly raised costs, alienated both staff and the public, and gave the national authority a reputation for incompetence. The change process was chaotic rather than controlled. It is clear that right from the start of any change programme there are two difficult and associated influences that are likely to affect its success. These are the nature of the change that is to take place and the positive or negative success factors operating in the environment it will enter. Those responsible for implementation are already facing a complex and uncertain change situation.

The Groups Affected— How Will They React to Change? There is still more uncertainty to come. An important factor will be the reactions of the group, or groups, that will be affected by the change. Change is disturbing for most people, whether it is viewed as positive or negative. It moves the individual or group into unfamiliar situations which they may see as challenging or threatening. It disturbs existing social relationships and it requires coping mechanisms which not all people will have. This means it greatly increases the complexity of the employment world and can cause much stress and anxiety. Employees are not all the same. They vary greatly in terms of their personalities, needs, competencies and interests. Professions such as teaching and medicine have been fortunate, in the past, to attract or develop individuals who can be described as “dedicated.” They are prepared to work night and day for their employing organization; they are totally immersed in its activities and highly supportive of its objectives. Both have the same values and goals. Unfortunately this seems to be a scarce and diminishing group as the environment of hospitals, schools and similar institutions becomes increasingly unattractive and the psychological rewards diminish. The group now turns into one that feels increasingly exploited. The rewards of the job no longer match the dedication and effort that is required. California’s Silicon Valley and similar fast-moving environments are made up of highly entrepreneurial individuals. We sometimes call them portfolio workers. They are fast thinkers, very mobile and constantly seeking new opportunities. They are looking for both mental stimulation and good financial rewards. They may prefer short-term contract work to long-term secure employment, and they are risk takers. They are also usually young, clever, and with few family responsibilities. In contrast, a very different group is those working for large companies but coming increasingly to dislike their job. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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Surveys have shown that this is now true of many managers. This group will be older, with families, and its members will value job security. Other stressed groups are women with small children who may be single parents and who are often overcome with exhaustion as they try to manage both work and family. Finally there is the large and increasing group of low-level workers employed by telephone or computer call centres and other service industries. These frequently have both boring work and low pay. They are little different from the workers tied to the moving assembly line of 20 years ago. Each of these groups will have their own anxieties, problems and needs when faced with a change in their work situation. With the exception of the portfolio group, most are unlikely to welcome this. An extremely important and immediate question for most employees faced with major change is: Will we lose our jobs? Will there be redundancy as a result of the change in the work situation? If the answer is yes, the result is likely to be great anxiety and a drop in morale. The socially responsible firm will try to offer ways of countering this negative response through schemes such as voluntary redundancy, the opportunity to transfer to another job in the company, or appropriate financial compensation. It will also recognise that those that stay may suffer from feelings of guilt because their old colleagues have been removed. This can cause drops in morale and antagonism towards the new system. Some groups, particularly if they are unionised, will want to fight new circumstances which are seen as having a negative effect. Some may go out on strike. Others will leave the situation and look for new jobs, in this way making the change difficult for management to introduce. Or there may be mixed reactions, individuals and groups who are prepared to wait and see what happens and others determined not to cooperate with something they do not understand. These adverse reactions will not just come from employees. Customers may also react with hostility as may suppliers. A critical factor in attitudes to change will be relations between the different groups, especially workers and management. Here the popular but trite words “trust” and “communication” are likely to be significant. Change will be accepted more readily if the reasons for it are understood and believed even if the change itself is not welcomed. This requires management to provide honest and open communication which is recognised as such by those who receive it. But how many managers are prepared to do this? Even though good communication is generally seen by management as essential it may not always occur. Some managers may assume, usually

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wrongly, that there will be fewer problems if employees are not told everything. They explain that they operate a “need to know” policy. Alternatively, they may want to keep the fact of change secret from the press or their competitors. Or they may simply be naive, have few communication skills and can not understand the need to talk with staff, to explain and reassure. Some may even still hold to the old autocratic attitude of “We tell our employees what to do and they do it.” Today, we know a great deal about how to communicate. Even so, when large, complex, unfamiliar changes are being made, effective communication may not be easy. It will require skill, knowledge, conviction and perseverance, attributes that are often in short supply.

Change Skills To match the variety of attitudes to change they may encounter, those involved with its design and management will need certain skills. These will include an ability to think creatively and to approach new problems without prejudice and from different angles; the breadth of vision to provide a range of possible scenarios relevant to the change situation; a good understanding of the different factors likely to affect attitudes to the change problem; and the ability to perceive what will work well and be generally acceptable. Those following the principles of socio-technical design required skills which include management, technical, organizational, social and possibly economic knowledge. Social skills will include the ability to understand, motivate and encourage those groups involved in, or affected by, the change process. Effective change agents also require the willingness and ability to continually learn from experience, to apply this new knowledge and to monitor the results. In situations where few of these skills exist we may have a badly chosen new system being placed in an environment that is unsuitable and into which it does not fit easily. Even worse, those managing the change are unable to persuade the staff involved that change is in their interests. Can this worst-case scenario be prevented or ameliorated? One answer is to ensure there is a good match between the skills of the change agents and the complexity of the situation. A successful change programme always requires the ability to get individuals and groups working cooperatively together. This, in turn, requires an understanding of social processes—people’s visions, interests, intentions, attitudes and emotions. These are much more difficult to handle than new work structures but just as important. They will influence whether the new system is received with enthusiasm or gloom and dismay. Positive attitudes are a result

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of involvement, communication, motivation and good timing. They are the means for making things happen, the “levers” which enable change to be successfully introduced. A major influence on how change is handled and received will be the values of those in influential positions. Powerful senior managers can try to ensure that all staff operate on the basis of a set of beliefs regarding what is right and wrong for the company. Some, and Shell International is an example, publicise these as a set of business principles so that staff, customers and any other group that has a relationship with the firm know exactly what to expect in terms of company behaviour. Although there have always been companies operating with a strong social, if paternalist, ethic and the Quaker-owned firms in Britain provide examples, there have not been many of these. In the past a command and control management philosophy often based on work study meant that those at the bottom of the employee hierarchy were undervalued. The human being was not seen as an individual requiring caring and support. Rather he or she was viewed as an operating unit that could be adjusted through training and incentives to meet the needs of the organization. These needs were usually related to costs and economic efficiency.

CONCLUSIONS ON PARTICIPATION Today the reality of most change situations is one of negotiation, not instruction or persuasion. There is a recognition of different interests, and a more equal distribution of knowledge and power within organizations means that groups which previously would have passively submitted to a major alteration in their work situation may now question and even fight a change which they think is against their interests. Some managements may resent protracted negotiations which they see as due to the new “cussedness” of the labour force and which they would have preferred to avoid. But other, more enlightened managements will recognise that successful change requires the identification and resolution of conflicts of interest and may also perceive that such conflicts of interest are not solely between management and subordinates but can occur between members of different specialisms, grades or functions who perceive a change in relationships as jeopardising their interests versus those of another group. It can therefore be argued that participative methods for introducing change which assist the identification of different interests and the resolution of these through joint discussion and negotiation will assist the production of a form of change which most people in the situation will either welcome or not wish to oppose actively. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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The participative approach described in this book is one way of bringing about such an acceptable change process, although it is not free from problems and the very fact of bringing differences and conflicts of interest into the open may produce a series of stressful relationships, which management may believe a more traditional approach would have avoided. The counterargument is that the stress will be both temporary and functional as its existence implies that conflicts of interest are out in the open and, given goodwill by all parties, can be resolved. The arguments for a participative approach therefore run as follows. All change involves some conflicts of interest. To be resolved, these conflicts need to be recognised, brought out into the open, and negotiated, and a solution needs to be arrived at which largely meets the interests of all parties in the situation. Differences of interest will not be confined to management and subordinates but will occur between employees at different hierarchical levels and in different functions. Therefore successful change strategies require institutional mechanisms that enable all of these interests to be represented. Participation provides these. Arguments against participation put forward by managements who have not tried it are that it will be slow and expensive. In the author’s experience it will require longer elapsed time at the design stage than conventional approaches, but implementation will be faster and easier. There is no reason why higher costs should be incurred. Today, participation is viewed both pragmatically and ideologically by companies which use it as something that helps efficiency, satisfaction and progress but which is also morally right. Participation can take many forms, but at the lower levels of a company it is increasingly concerned with the relationship between individuals and their work environment. It must be stressed, however, that if employees are to be able to exercise some control over this then they need opportunity, confidence and competence, and methods for achieving the two last need careful thought. One prerequisite for a participatory community is that it shall be generally desired and accepted, and this requires the development of some shared values and objectives concerning participation. Political parties have these in their manifestos; it is important for industry to adopt them also.

REFERENCES Axelrod, D. (1992). Getting everyone involved: How one organization involved its employees, supervisors and managers in redesigning the organization. Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, 28(4), 499-509. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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Heller, F., Pusic, E., Strauss, G., & Wilpert, B. (1998). Organizational participation. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Likert, R. (1967). The human organization. New York: McGraw-Hill. Mayo, E. (1969). The social problems of an industrial organization. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. McGregor, D. (1960). The human side of enterprise. New York: McGrawHill.

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PART TWO: DESIGNING FOR MANUAL WORKERS

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Chapter 4

Analysing Problem Situations: The Dock Workers of Liverpool Where shall wisdom be found? Where is the place of understanding? Book of Job

UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM The book now introduces some case studies on organizational design and asks you to think what you would do if you were a manager, researcher or consultant in the same situation. As we have seen, change and its environment are often complex and difficult to understand. The change initiators, frequently management, may know what they are trying to achieve but may have little understanding of the problems involved in the introduction of a new system or of the uncertain reception it may be given. Wise change agents will start by obtaining a comprehensive understanding of the situation that will receive the change and of the problems that may accompany its early use. This information, if wisely applied, will assist the creation of well thought-out strategies that lead to effective application. Successful change depends on comprehensive knowledge. Without this, decisions will be taken in the dark and lead to consequences

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which are undesirable and little understood. Metaphors may be helpful here. Gaining an understanding of a problem situation can be seen as similar to a rock climber working out the route for a future climb or an army commander making a battle plan before moving into action. What I am proposing is the creation of a “management map” before any implementation action is taken. I would also like to stress the importance of knowledge and experience of the kind of problem in which many variables may affect the outcome. This could be especially useful for those implementing technical systems such as information technology. Technical problem solvers frequently see technology as the dominant variable and give it exclusive attention. The consequence is that a neglect of other interacting variables, especially those relating to people, can lead to system failure.

THE LIVERPOOL DOCKS AND THE DOCKERS WHO WORKED THERE The case study I will use as an example of how to gain an understanding of a complex change problem is the port of Liverpool and the loading and unloading of ships there in the 1950s. This university-based research gave me my first real understanding of the complexity of introducing change and of the need to understand the change situation (Simey, 1954). It can appear a dated case study but it is interesting and useful to look at unfamiliar situations. Also, it may turn out to have great relevance to change in the future. Ulrich Beck, the well-known German sociologist, in his new book The Brave New World of Work suggests that the full employment society will soon vanish (Beck, 2000). He believes that life is becoming increasingly insecure and that those factors that used to complement and reinforce each other—full employment, guaranteed pensions and high tax revenue—are now being threatened. In the future, he claims, we will all experience considerable insecurity and risk in our working lives. He sees this threat as a result of unregulated global capitalism which, in Europe, is breaking the historical bonds between capitalism, the welfare state and democracy. He believes that a likely scenario for the future is a return to uncertain and volatile situations similar to that of the Liverpool docks in this case study. In his opinion, technology will provide no solution to an improvement in the quality of working life as technology raises productivity while reducing the value of man. We now have the capacity to increase productivity without work. Everyone, like the dockers, is looking for the next job.

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At the time of the research, the Liverpool docks, which are located along the river Mersey, had a volatile employment situation in which morale was low, strikes were frequent and relations between the different groups employed there were often hostile. My role was to try and gain an in-depth understanding of the problems of dock work for those who made it their living as a preliminary to advising management and the trade union how the situation might be improved. At the same time some of my research colleagues were carrying out a conventional attitude survey on a sample of dockers. In order to get close to life on the docks it seemed essential for me to work there, but there were only two female roles. One was a boat cleaner and involved scrubbing out the interior of boats that were in dock unloading their cargo. This was a very arduous job usually carried out by elderly women. It had little appeal and also the serious disadvantage of not bringing the worker into contact with dockers. They were on the quay and on the deck while she was in the interior of the boat. A better job for establishing contact was that of canteen assistant. The six miles of the Liverpool docks had a string of canteens along their length so that the dockers could eat between shifts. These were run, not by the employing Dock Labour Board, but by local catering organizations. Some, such as the Women’s Temperance Organization, had higher motives than just providing food.

WORK AS A CANTEEN ASSISTANT I decided to work in three of these. First at one in the north end of the docks where the large merchant carriers were moored, a second in the south end where smaller ships brought in grain and cargoes such as bananas, and one on the other side of the river where the docks were close to a large shipyard. I soon discovered that the most important talent required of Liverpool canteen assistants was not skill in serving meals, but skill in repartee. When a docker made a provocative or flirty remark, as many did, it was essential to make a fast, pithy yet humorous put-down, reducing him to shuffling embarrassment. It took me a long time to acquire this skill. By the time I’d thought of a smart reply the docker had usually long gone and was back at his ship. I came to realise that this talent, which all the canteen girls had, was one of the reasons Liverpool has produced so many world-class comedians. I found that, at the time the research took place, the Port of Liverpool had 18,000 registered dockers, all of whom could be employed anywhere along the six miles of docks. The docks were divided into four distinct sections according

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to the ships and cargoes that docked there. These were the north end, the south end, a small dock for banana boats and a large dock on the other side of the river. Each had its own traditions and particular ways of doing things. In order to maintain the independence of the research it was funded by an independent research organization, the Nuffield Foundation, rather than by the Dock Labour Board, the trade unions or the shipping companies. It was the need to make the best use of available labour during the 1939– 1945 war that gave a final push to the decasualisation of dock labour. During the war, work on Merseyside was regulated by means of schemes entered into voluntarily by the dock workers and their shipping company employers and administered by the Ministry of War Transport. All these schemes included registers of employers and workers, a guaranteed weekly wage for dockers and arrangements to ensure the mobility of labour between one port and another. These schemes were to act as the foundation for a new permanent structure for eliminating casual labour that was introduced after the war. In 1947 the National Dock Labour Scheme came into operation based on a number of local boards which were responsible for keeping the registers of dockers and employers and for allocating dock workers to employers at particular ports. They also had responsibility for paying wages, national insurance, etc., and for breaches of discipline. Local boards consisted of an equal number of persons representing employers and workers in each port. Wage rates were agreed by a National Joint Council and local negotiating committees. The National Dock Labour Scheme was the latest of several earlier efforts to try and organize dock work so that it was not entirely carried out by casual labour. The idea was to provide some regularity and order in a situation which was essentially irregular and uncertain yet on which the British ports depended for their economic efficiency and success. Problems were caused by the fact that the movement of ships was dependent on weather and tide and also on the nature and volume of the cargo carried as well as the economic circumstances of the vendor and purchaser countries. Despite greatly varying conditions, ships must be turned round in the fastest possible time and there must always be sufficient labour available to enable this to happen. Shipping companies wanted skilled and reliable men to be available at all times although the labour requirements of the port varied according to the number of ships in dock. The idea was to improve the management of an unwieldy and unregulated labour force through the registration of dockers as “official dock workers” while at the same time giving them greater security of employment. The

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National Dock Labour Scheme provided for a national board, together with a number of local boards made up of equal numbers representing employers and dock workers. The local boards acted as agents of the employers by paying out the dockers’ earnings, They also had welfare and training responsibilities. But they were not responsible for rates of pay or conditions of work. These were negotiated by the National Joint Council and local joint negotiating committees. In Liverpool the National Dock Labour Scheme was an attempt to meet the demand and need for decasualisation without impairing the economic efficiency of the port. But it was complex and reduced the authority and independence of the port employers. It was also difficult for the dockers to understand. The old clear-cut distinctions between management and men no longer existed. There was a great deal of conflict. Strike action was the traditional method employed by the dock workers to handle their grievances, although the trade unions discouraged irresponsible strikes. Unfortunately relations between the dockers and their principal union— the Transport and General Workers—were not always good. The T and GW looked after many different groups from many different industries, and the dockers felt that the union did not take enough account of their particular interests. As a result, despite its good intentions, the scheme encountered many problems and did little to improve the uneasy relations between men and management and between the men and their union.

THE O’KEEFE FAMILY Let us now look at the dock situation through the eyes of two of the dockers who worked there. Their opinions are typical of most dockers. I met Michael and Suan through my job as a canteen assistant in one of the dock canteens and got to know them well. The O’Keefe family had left Ballymena in Northern Ireland in 1930 seeking a better life in England. They were lucky enough to find a small house to rent near the docks in Liverpool, and Michael, the father, soon found casual work at the north end of the docks, where the large merchant boats were unloaded and loaded. Marie, the mother, got parttime evening work at a local factory, J. Bibby and Sons, which made cattle food. Their two sons, Suan and John, who were 10 and 12, enrolled at the local school. Life for the family proved hard but manageable for, although earnings were low, they were still considerably better than those offered in Ballymena. The O’Keefes found that their neighbours were mostly dock workers and many lived in a part of Liverpool called Bootle, within a mile of the north end Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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dock gates. Their street, like other streets near the docks, was lined by small terraced houses of a two rooms up, two down variety. In the past, because of religious divisions, it had been known as a protestant street but the separation of local residents into Protestant and Catholic areas was becoming less significant, although Liverpool still had its celebration of King Billy and the Irish Battle of the Boyne once a year. The dockers were a well-knit social group within the wider community. This social integration had been reinforced by the fact that the Liverpool docks were bombed extensively by the Germans in the early 1940s and many people in the area had been killed and injured. Mutual support during this period brought people together and this closeness endured. The area contained the local informal leaders for any disputes at work and also for matters of concern to the local community. These men were unusual in that they were regular attenders at trade union and open-air mass meetings. But there were few formal leaders in the group. Trade union officials lived outside the dock area and had other occupational groups to look after as well as the dockers. Dock foremen also lived further away in a somewhat vain attempt to bolster their loss of authority. The new scheme meant that they were now neither bosses nor dock workers. They had lost their traditional role and were unsure about their new one. Most dockers were family men and in close touch with their families. Because of the irregular patterns of work, they were in and out of their homes at different times of the day. Most wives did not work full time but followed the routine of their husbands. The children also saw a lot of their father and became interested and knowledgeable about the comings and goings of different ships. Many became office boys or messengers on the dock estate when they left school and before they acquired the much sought after registration as an official dock worker. Sons followed fathers onto the docks with the intention of becoming registered dock workers. This was not difficult as they were given employment priority. Dockers also tried hard to raise the status of their children. There was pressure on them to do well and get to the local high school. When they did achieve this, most wives had to go out to work full time to pay for uniforms and other school expenses. The O’Keefes found that their neighbours were pleasant and intelligent and bore little resemblance to the dock workers described by the writer William Mayhew in 1861 as “a striking instance of mere brute force with brute appetite, as unskilled as the force of the hurricane.” They also found that the docks had their own strong culture and that this was very different from the small Northern Irish town they had recently left. On the docks loyalty to the men and to the gang was stronger than loyalty to the church. The families of strike leaders were Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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given high status, were treated with respect and often became leaders of the local community. But the family of the “black leg,” who remained at work when others were on strike, was subject to abuse and ignominy, as was the man himself. Most of the older men had become dock workers because the work was available and convenient, because they had family or friends who worked on the docks and because the wages were good, providing overtime was available. Family and friends had the strongest influence. Dock work had become attractive when a minimum weekly wage and a regular week’s work became available. This happened in 1947 when the National Dock Labour Scheme was started.

Suan’s First Day Soon after his 18th birthday in 1948 Suan received a letter telling him that he was now a registered dock worker and must report to his nearest manning point the following Monday. The manning point was a brick building near the north end dock gate and it was here that the foremen selected the men who were to work in their gangs. This process took place twice a day, in the morning and afternoon. Suan was lucky in that his father was able to accompany him on his first day and they arrived early so that he could settle his nerves by having a cup of tea in an adjoining dock canteen. The canteens opened at 6:30 in the morning. Dockers arrived at work around 7:30 a.m. The system required men seeking work go to the manning centre while men in the middle of a job went straight to the quay side or to the ship and clocked on at a time station . Suan was apprehensive about his first visit to the manning point. He knew that it was much disliked by the dockers. They called it “the pen” and compared their experience there to cattle being sold in a cattle market. On entering he found it as unpleasant and intimidating as he had expected. The building was small, drab and depressing. It was also smoke-laden. In shape it was an oblong shed containing two elevated gangways that ran down the length of each side. The men stood in the centre of the pen, while the foremen stood on each gangway. Suan’s father told him that one was for ship cargo foremen, and the other for shed and warehouse work. He also told him that most men had to report to the manning point once or twice a week for assignment to a new job. Loading or discharge operations might take anything from one to 12 days to complete. Suan was greatly shocked by this intimidating situation and showed this. The men standing beside him sympathised. One said, “People squabble like a lot of monkeys here to do themselves a bit of good.” Another complained, “Men hate being chased like sheep around the pen; a better system could be found. It is a terrible place.” Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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All the foremen starting a new job and wanting to recruit workers were in the manning stand. Each foreman already knew where he would be working, the kind of cargoes he would be handling, and the number and size of the gangs he would require. As the selection process got under way each foreman gave a chosen docker a metal tally in exchange for his record book and told him where to report for work. Suan wondered, with some anxiety, what would happen to him? As a newcomer would he be given any work? He was to learn later that the foremen tended to specialise—some worked on ships, others in sheds. Some were expert on loading, others on unloading, and some were skilled with special cargoes. The dockers also had a very good knowledge of what kind of work was available and needed. Suan knew, from many previous visits to the docks, that a blackboard was displayed in the dock office window indicating the arrival of ships and their ports of origin. The likely berth for the ship and the cargo being carried could be deduced from this information. This knowledge was important to the dockers because not all jobs were equally acceptable. They could vary greatly in terms of what they paid and the conditions of work. Carbon black was an especially disliked cargo because of the dirt and the likelihood that many of the bags holding it would burst open, but it paid good rates. Also some ships had more overtime and night rates than others and there was competition for these. Both the foremen and men in the call centre knew the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different jobs although choice was restricted by the calling on procedure. Suan found that this had three stages. First, each foreman accepted the books of the men he was particularly anxious to employ, ignoring other books. These were his permanent followers, his “top six.” They were a group of six to 12 dock workers who worked with him almost continuously, following him from job to job. Suan saw that this group were all waiting for their foreman near what appeared to be his regular spot on the gang way. There were also some semipermanent men there whom he recruited when extra help was needed. The dockers still seeking work after the permanent followers had been allocated jobs now knew what was on offer. Each foreman was supposed to accept any books offered to him but he could still discriminate in favour of men known to be good workers. But at this point, to Suan’s dismay, the relatively orderly selection process broke down and mayhem broke out. Men rushed forward, pushing others out of the way, in their efforts to get their books accepted by foremen known to still have good jobs on offer. The dockers left without jobs, of which Suan was one, would get the remaining least desirable jobs. The Dock Labour Board official, who had been Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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present throughout the selection process, collected the books of the men who remained and handed them to foremen who still required labour. Suan was fortunate enough to be one of these. The books of the few men who did not get jobs at all were collected so that they could obtain attendance money. Suan found that his first job would be stowing cargo in one of the dock sheds. This would not pay well but at least it would be a start until he got to know some of the dock foremen better. When he arrived at the shed, which was both cold and windy, the foreman set Suan and the other men to work stowing a cargo of railway sleepers which had arrived from France. He organized them into gangs and allocated them particular tasks, following manning scales agreed by the company and the local branch of the trade union. Suan was to find later that any attempts to change the manning scales met with strong resistance from the dockers and serious disputes involving stoppage of work could arise over these. Suan also found that the work was hard, tiring and unsafe as cargo frequently slipped off the cranes and forklift trucks used to move it. Many dockers had lost fingers and toes as a result of these accidents. As the weeks passed and he became familiar with the manning point procedure Suan realised that the men were divided into three different groups. First, there was the prestigious group of men who had been able to attach themselves to a particular foreman and had established good relations with him and with the other members of his gang. Next there were the men who preferred to move around and were called “floaters.” They had the advantage that, because they were not tied to a foreman, they could actively seek the best jobs. But they lost the advantage of the stable relationships which came through working with the same foreman and gang. Suan, at least for the time being, was in this group. Third, there was a group known as “drifters.” These were men with poor reputations who could not get themselves accepted as permanent members of any gang. This was an unhappy group who had few regular relationships at work and tended to see themselves as rejects. As Suan became used to the manning procedure he began to recognise its defects. A major problem was that it caused excessive competition between the men, and this stressful struggle for jobs was worsened by the conditions in which it took place. There was a belief that favouritism was rife and that a foreman’s permanent gang, who were called “blue eyes,” got this position through visiting the right pubs and generally toadying to particular foremen. But Suan recognised that there were few examples of actual corruption. Being a member of a permanent gang gave a dock worker a degree of security and

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protected him from the hazards of the call centre procedure. He hoped one day to achieve this position himself. He became convinced that the scheme was too rigid. It recognised only three categories of dock worker—labourers, cranedrivers and checkers—and assumed that all men registered as dock labourers were interchangeable. In fact this was not the case. Some were particularly skilled at stowing cargoes; some were better at work in the sheds. Some made a speciality of handling timber; others of gear storage and servicing. Although the complex work of the Port of Liverpool required many skills, the scheme flattened out all port workers to one undifferentiated mass. It was the same with personal relationships. Many men liked working with a particular foreman, following him loyally through the good and the bad cargoes. These regular “gangs” had both the highest morale and were the most efficient. But port organization meant that they had to be unofficial and were liable to be broken up by a few days’ sickness or some other unavoidable absence. It seemed to Suan that the disruption of a gang in this way had several unfortunate consequences, of which the worst was the creation of a group of dissatisfied men. He felt that the Dock Labour Scheme was in principal a good one, particularly its objective of removing casual labour. Its failure came from the methods used to apply it. Suan had obtained a limited amount of job security through the scheme. But he still saw himself as a casual worker. The docker’s prewar struggle to get a job of any kind had been replaced by a scarcely less bitter struggle to get a job that was well paid and attractive. The creation of the Dock Labour Board made it very difficult to establish normal working relations between the employer and the docker; the employer before the introduction of the scheme being the shipping company. Suan, like many dockers, was for a while uncertain whom he was employed by. Was it the Dock Labour Board, the trade union or the ship owner? Yet his earnings were quite good because his overtime rates were high. Overtime rates made up 29% of the port’s total wage bill and piecework bonuses made up 11%. A mate told Suan, “You practically have to sleep here to get a good wage.” Suan soon discovered that the docks had their own unofficial work culture. For example many dockers did not work nonstop all day long. A practice called “welting” was quite common. Welting involved working an hour and then resting an hour. This was organized informally on a gang basis with half the gang at work and the other half at rest, perhaps having a cup of tea in the nearest dock canteen. The practice of welting had come about because of ships with refrigerated cargo. It was only possible for the dockers to work for short

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periods in the extreme cold of the holds, and the practice of working for an hour and then resting for the next hour became common. The Liverpool dockers, not being slow to take advantage of a good idea, adopted the practice for all ships in the port and apparently managed to maintain it without too many objections from foremen or shipping companies. Summer days on the Liverpool docks often looked like the beach at the neighbouring resort of New Brighton, with large numbers of dockers sunning themselves on the quay side. Another aspect of the culture that surprised Suan was the prevalence of the “wild cat” strike. Dockers did not accept problems, particularly problems over wages, quietly and stoically. They protested by immediately removing their labour and the cry “all out” was often heard at the dock gates. Most of these strikes were associated with particular gangs or cargoes and settled without much difficulty by the local Dock Labour Board. But there was the occasional major strike. One of these occurred in 1951 and lasted six weeks. It came about because of dissatisfaction with a wage increase agreed by the National Docks Delegate Conference on the recommendation of the trade union. The men were bitterly disappointed with this and indignant with the trade union for accepting it. The Merseyside Port Workers’ Committee brought all the Merseyside dockers out on strike and all work stopped in the port.

WHAT DID I MAKE OF THE LIVERPOOL DOCKS SITUATION? It is important to note here that while I did this analysis it could have been done equally well, if not better, by a participative design group of dockers. However, this first project was not a participative one. My objective in the research was to obtain a good understanding of the factors influencing attitudes and behaviour on the dock estate and later to suggest change that could improve morale and cooperation and reduce the number of strikes. This first stage of getting a comprehensive understanding of the dock situation and the attitudes of those who worked there would greatly assist the next stage of identifying appropriate strategies which might contribute to a solution. This chapter deals only with stage one.

About the Work Environment An early understanding of the change area will assist the later choice of strategies and methods that can lead to a solution. The Liverpool docks environment was difficult, hard and unfriendly, especially in winter. The men

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were out in all weathers and chest complaints were common. Accidents were also common and usually occurred through cargo falling off slings or proving difficult to handle. Many dockers had missing fingers and toes, although this was not a major source of complaint. The men accepted these risks as part of the job (Simey, 1954).

About Management Objectives The objectives of the Dock Labour Board in Liverpool were, first, to restore some order and control to a chaotic work situation and at the same time to increase economic returns for the shipping companies and the port; second, to improve the quality of working life for an underprivileged group, the dockers, through removing casual labour and providing better job security (this was a social objective); and third, to facilitate cooperation between management and trade unions through their joint administration of the Dock Labour Scheme, an industrial relations objective. How successful was the port in achieving these? It was certainly partially successful. The loading and unloading of ships were facilitated by the new ability to provide the necessary number of dockers at the times when these were required. And the dockers now had a degree of job security that was not present in the past. If work was not available they were still kept on the register of dockers and paid an attendance allowance, providing they reported to the manning centre. Also the Dock Labour Board management and the trade union representatives, on the whole, worked amicably together running the scheme while the ship owners had the convenience of paying money owed direct to a single body, the Dock Labour Board. But there were still many problems. One was the ambiguity of the scheme. The dockers were unsure who employed them. Was it the Dock Labour Board or the trade union or was it, perhaps, the shipping companies? The situation was never clarified. A second was the stress of daily uncertainty about work. Dock labourers never knew whether they would be given a job at the manning centre or whether they would be sent away empty-handed.

About Conditions of Work The men complained bitterly about the degrading and, in their view, unfair organization of the manning process which led to competition for jobs often resulting in violence. The bitter dislike of the manning point and its procedures led to antagonism towards both Dock Labour Board personnel and the trade union. A further serious problem was the fact that although completely casual Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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work had now been removed, the men still regarded the new situation as unpredictable and very unsatisfactory. They never knew whether work would be available or whether they would be sent back home. This caused a great deal of stress as the attendance allowance was low and most men relied on overtime to achieve wages they regarded as reasonable. Married men with young children were especially anxious about this degree of uncertainty.

About Technology There was a great deal of technology on the docks but it was not computerbased and a great deal of it was dangerous. It mostly consisted of cranes and conveyor belts used to move cargo from the ships to the docks and then into warehouses or lorries. The aim of management was to increase the use of containers on ships as this would greatly reduce the number of dockers required. Like Beck’s evaluation of present-day technology this was a development which would both reduce costs and reduce work. It would benefit the management and ship owners but not the dockers (Beck, 2000).

About Social Relations Between the Dockers Although few men had the stability of being a member of a regular gang, there was a great deal of social cohesiveness among the dockers. It only required one man to run to one of the dock gates and shout “all out” for all the men in that area to cease work and proceed to the dock gates or the canteen. They were now on unofficial strike. With the exception of a few privileged dockers who were in permanent gangs, dockers were constantly being moved from one gang to another according to the manning centre hiring process on a particular day. This meant that they never knew who they were working with and could not develop close working relationships. This was a factor of some importance in a work situation that was always dangerous. It was interesting to find that the survey of docker opinion carried out by my research colleagues, although it produced impressive statistics, had the defect that it was designed as a random sample and in consequence missed out on how the dockers’ gangs related to each other. A statistical sample based on gangs would have identified this.

About Relations with the Trade Union Relations between the dockers and the Transport and General Workers’ Union were never very good. The dockers felt the union neglected them as it had other occupational groups to look after. There were moves by the men to

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try and establish a union solely for dockers. The divided control between the board and the union also made consultation between men and management difficult and it hampered communication. A source of many difficulties and misunderstandings was the fact that most of the time the men just did not know what was happening. The poor communication was made worse by the dockers’ reluctance to attend trade union meetings or to vote on important issues. The union was seen as unsympathetic and remote. At this point it is suggested that you, the reader, do your own analysis of the problem situation and make a personal management map as a preliminary guide to developing a viable strategy for change. How do you see the change problems and their causes?

UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM What can anyone who wishes to introduce change on the docks, or anywhere else, learn from this scenario? One important lesson is that change is not going to be easy. The most desirable change from management’s point of view would be an increase in containerisation, a reduction in strikes and a better motivated labour force This would mean that more cargo would be handled and also packed in large wooden crates instead of fragile bags and other soft containers. But this change would reduce the number of men required and would be bitterly opposed. From the men’s point of view, better working conditions would come from improvements in the manning centres, in more regular work and in membership of permanent gangs. When the National Dock Labour Scheme was introduced, government intentions were good, particularly the need to remove the old casual labour system. The solution offered with joint administration by a local Dock Labour Board and trade union officials was also, in theory, good. Nonetheless the new system was not warmly welcomed by the dockers and was often bitterly criticised. One problem that emerged was that while the scheme was directed at improving economic security for dock workers, it did not take much, if any, account of social needs. A second lesson is that major change is complex and often poorly understood. A comprehensive knowledge of the change situation will at least make anyone wishing to improve it aware of the problems he or she is likely to meet. These may prove difficult, even impossible, to solve but they at least be will be known. The message from this chapter is that before commencing any change project it is essential to get as much information as possible on the

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situation into which the change is to be introduced. An excellent way of doing this is to spend time working in the situation and getting close to those who are there every day.

TAKING THE NEXT STEP Once the problem and its environment are understood the next step is to consider strategy. A decision has to be taken on where to start the problem-solving process, what aspects to make priorities, what action to take and who to involve. The answers to these questions will reflect the knowledge of the situation that has now been acquired. The next chapter on coal mining will address an aspect of strategy.

THE THEORY BEHIND THE APPROACH Trying to understand problems as complex sets of variables, each interacting on the others, has an interesting theoretical basis derived from cybernetics and developed originally by two distinguished academics, Stafford Beer and Ross Ashby. Professor Stafford Beer (1975) argues that a problem in all current change processes is the management of complexity. He believes that this is the major problem of our age and maintains that one way of handling complexity is through the recognition of requisite variety. The notion, or law, of requisite variety was first developed in the 1950s by Professor Ross Ashby (1956), a cybernetician who argued that variety can only be controlled by variety. By this he meant that the solution to a complex problem requires the problem solvers to be able to understand and influence all the variables contained in the problem. This, in turn, requires both perception and organization—the ability to recognise, describe and manipulate the different components of the problem. Finding a solution is greatly assisted by what Beer calls “adaptive feedback.” This, put simply, is the ability to learn from experience and to use this learning to rethink and adjust further action. Beer also provides us with the notion of a viable system. This is a system which contains its own problem-solving capacity because it has the capacity to adapt. It can maintain stability by responding effectively to unexpected disturbances (Espejo & Harnden,1989). This capacity for adjustment makes it capable of a degree of self-regulation (see the Appendix). Once a problem is recognised and a decision taken to reduce or remove it, an understanding of its complexity will assist the choice of strategies and Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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methods that can lead to a solution. At this stage there are always two options. One is to reduce the variety of the problem by simplifying it. This, at the same time, reduces the variety of knowledge required of the problem solver. The other is to accept that the problem cannot be simplified and to ensure that the variety it contains is recognised and matched in the knowledge of the problem solver. This choice will be influenced by the values and skills of the problem solver and by the attitudes and interests of those affected by the solution. The danger arises when a complex problem is seen as simpler than it really is. Here is a version of the viable system concept which may assist the simplification of the problem if you wish to do this (see also the Appendix).

A VIABLE SYSTEM Stafford Beer’s notion of a viable system can be a useful tool for reducing the size of the problem for explanation purposes, as it enables clear, simple and logical descriptions of work activities to be made. A firm, department or work process is now described as a hierarchy of five levels of activity. Good systems design will requires each of these levels to be recognised, designed and managed, and each must interact smoothly with the others if the change process is to proceed at a high level of performance. The diagram below shows the five levels in the model. A Viable System Level 5: CONTROL Meeting targets and standards ......................................... Level 4: DEVELOPMENT New thinking ............................................ Level 3: OPTIMISATION Adding value ............................................ Level 2: ANTI-OSCILLATION Preventing and solving problems ..................................................... Level 1: OPERATIONAL Day-to-day tasks

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The viable system model can be used both to help define the necessary components of the eventual system and the requirements of the problemsolving process. The five levels of a viable system to assist problem solving on the dock estate could be the following: 1. Identifying the basic, often routine tasks that have to be identified to understand the change problem. These are moving cargo, hiring dockers and providing land transport. 2. Thinking through the likely difficulties that may occur and inhibit the successful completion of these tasks, for example, accidents, poor working conditions and demotivated employees. These must be prevented. 3. Identifying the critical success factors that provide guidance on those aspects of the problem that must be given priority or maximum attention. These include regular employment, membership of permanent gangs, and safety provisions. 4. Understanding the nature of the information that needs to be collected and disseminated as the design process progresses, for example, how other ports tackle these problems. Manchester, 50 miles away, has better morale and better working conditions. It is a much smaller port. 5. Creating methods for evaluating success. These are monitoring checks and measures that can show if progress is being made and goals are being achieved, for example, a reduction in the number of strikes, less absenteeism and fewer accidents (Espejo & Harnden,1989).

CONCLUSIONS: THE DOCK INDUSTRY AND THE SOCIO-TECHNICAL APPROACH For many years supporters of the socio-technical approach have claimed that problem solving must take account of human as well as technical needs. Efforts must be made to improve the quality of working life through a humanistic organization of work and of the way technology is designed and used. This approach was, and is, seen as both contributing to efficiency and to job satisfaction. Today, the design boundaries are being extended through the notion of sustainability. A sustainable society has been defined as one that can endure by adjusting itself to cope with the future. It contains the means of its own adaptation (Torchtermann, 2001). A sustainable society requires a broad mix of characteristics that enable it to survive and flourish in its environment and

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contribute to its major goal of creating a sustainable world (Beer, 1975). Gaining a good understanding of the problem and its environment as the first stage in problem solving can enable the complexity of the problem to be recognised before strategies for its solution begin to be identified. It is critical that this should be done.

REFERENCES Ashby, W. R. (1956). An introduction to cybernetics. London: Chapman & Hall. Beck, U. (2000). The brave new world of work. London: Polity Press. Beer, S. (1975). Platform for change. London: Wiley. Espejo, R., & Harnden, R. (1989). The viable system model. London: Wiley. Simey, T. (1954). The dockworker. Liverpool, England: Liverpool University Press. Torchtermann, K. (2001). Greening the super highway: Practical steps to sustainability in the information society. Foresight, 3(2), 113-121.

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Chapter 5

Work Design in the Coal Industry Technical change provides opportunities for social change. Eric Trist

WHAT IS STRATEGY? Once you have obtained a reasonably good understanding of the problem to be tackled, the next step is to decide what to do and how to do it. This requires developing a strategy for action. Ideally strategies should be simple rather than complex and should be capable of being implemented without too much difficulty and stress. They should also fit with the culture of an organization as well as with its problems. Participative design can play a useful part here, both by getting ideas from groups with different roles and responsibilities and by ensuring that there is general agreement on what is to be changed before this change takes place. This will enable the change to take place in a favourable environment. However with major decisions that affect the running of a company, it is usually desirable that top management makes the final decision. Strategy also needs to be continually reviewed as it can easily lose its relevance if the environment changes or if a closer acquaintance with the Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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problem leads to greater understanding of the problem situation. Increasing knowledge will help identify those factors in the change situation which will be easiest to reform and those which are likely to prove more difficult (Markides, 2001). It must also be recognised that while change is desirable it is also disruptive. This fact will influence the “how” factor. How can this change be introduced without impeding normal production activities and without disturbances that lower morale? Strategy should also take account of the future as well as the present. What kinds of circumstances are like to alter and may require a total rethink of strategy. Once again, I suggest that this case study is very relevant for students and practitioners working in areas such as information technology where human factors are sometimes neglected by those responsible for change. As this book is focusing on organizational problems, many of which arrive through the introduction of new technology, it is often wise to start the learning process by considering solutions that have already been tried and proved successful in similar situations. One of these might work again in the new situation, although it must be recognised that every change environment is different, modifications will almost certainly be needed and failure is always a possibility. The next case study incorporates a review of previous strategies. Looking at the past will also bring a recognition that the new situation differs in important aspects from the old and that a different approach is required. This, in itself, is an important lesson.

EARLY SOCIO-TECHNICAL DESIGN The early socio-technical work on organizational design and the management of change was carried out in the British coal industry by members of the Tavistock Institute soon after the end of the Second World War. In the late 1940s the new British National Coal Board approached the London-based institute and asked the researchers there to undertake some research into the health of coal miners. Poor health was causing absenteeism and this, in turn, was affecting output at a time when coal was very important. A number of articles describing these health problems had appeared in the British Medical Journal, and these motivated the National Coal Board to try and solve them. They asked the Tavistock for help. The Tavistock team diagnosed much of this sickness as psychological in origin and related to the organization of work underground. They had a theory that health at work was adversely affected by the miners’ belief that new technology had caused them to have little control over their work or work situation (Trist, Higgin, Murray, & Pollock, 1963). Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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In the early days of coal mining, men had worked in small groups, often family groups, using simple tools such as picks and shovels to move the coal from the face into tubs that were then pulled to the pit bottom by horses or women and children. Each of these groups was responsible for a certain section of the coal face and they were usually very protective of the men who made up their team. They had close relationships with each other and were often members of the same family or close friends. The pit owners paid a weekly wage for the output of coal and this was distributed by the gaffer, or group leader. Each of these teams had a section of the coal face to manage, and the work was principally cutting the coal with pickaxes, loading it into tubs with shovels, erecting new pit props to hold the roof up, and removing the old ones to let the roof of the worked face fall in (Scott, Mumford, McGivering, & Kirkby, 1963). The mining industry, like dock work, was regarded by the postwar British government as a problem industry with very poor industrial relations. It was nationalised in 1947 and a public body called the National Coal Board took over. This was a change that, at first, many miners overoptimistically saw as “giving the pits to the workers.” In reality, from the miners’ point of view, little changed. The industry was important, complex, difficult and dangerous, and the only men who had the knowledge to run it on a day-to-day basis were the existing colliery managers—the men who had managed the pits for the previous private coal owners. And so they remained as unloved and unwanted managers in the new nationalised industry. An important improvement was that nationalisation created an official system of joint consultation. The miners also now had the advantage of belonging to a single trade union, the National Union of Mineworkers. This was formed in 1944 from the Mineworkers Federation of Great Britain, a federation of virtually independent district unions.

WORK ORGANIZATION The arrival of moving conveyor belts in factories and their adoption underground also changed the work situation and caused new and unanticipated problems. British coal mines now adopted a three-shift system called the long-wall method of mining, which was seen as dramatically increasing coal production. This system required a different activity to be carried out on each shift. On the first, early morning shift, a group of skilled men called shot firers went along the coal face drilling holes and placing an explosive in each of these. This explosive was then detonated so that the coal broke up into small pieces. The loose coal was then shovelled onto the new conveyor belts by miners called “fillers” because they filled the moving conveyor belts with the loose coal. These Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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men were strung out along the coal face at nine-yard intervals. Given the dark, cramped nature and noisiness of the underground situation, this meant that communication between one man and another was extremely difficult. The men were isolated and stressed. Work underground was also still as dangerous and unhealthy as it had ever been. There were many accidents and most miners suffered from diseases of the lungs through constantly breathing in coal dust. After the fillers had finished their job, another group of men appeared on the afternoon shift. They were known as conveyor movers. Because the removal of loose coal in the morning had led to the coal face “advancing” forward by a number of feet, the conveyor belt now needed to be taken apart and reassembled along the new face. This took another shift to accomplish. Finally, on the night shift, a group of young men called packers arrived, pulled out the pit props from the worked face, and let the roof fall in. As this process could lead to subsidence on the surface and damage to buildings located overhead, packs of stone were built along the worked face so that the roof could fall in a controlled manner. A final operation was carried out by a skilled man who operated a cutting machine. This cut a slice along the bottom of the new face so that when the coal was shot-fired in the morning there would be a gap for it to fall into. And so the production of coal moved from a small-group multiskilled activity to an unsociable series of specialist activities which allowed little opportunity for interpersonal interaction. The Tavistock group believed that this new long-wall work system was the cause of the health problems. It had removed most of the social aspects of coal getting, including all the benefits of working as a member of a small, close-knit group. The question they wanted to answer was, Could a close-knit, supportive group situation with a satisfying mix of work activities be restored? This kind of solution would fit closely with the Tavistock values of concern for people. They decided to create small, multiskilled teams of miners who could handle all three underground tasks of “filling,” “conveyor moving” and “packing.” Each of these teams would be given a length of face, probably around nine yards, for which they were totally responsible. All would receive the same pay, whereas with the normal long-wall system, fillers, conveyor movers and packers were all on different rates. And they would have responsibility for managing their section of face on all three shifts. For example, if on a particular day they knew it was going to be difficult to work because of bands of stone in the coal face or belowground water, they could bring more of their team in on each shift and use the extra manpower to solve the problems. New teams on a number of trial faces were therefore made multiskilled, all the members were given the same rates of pay, and the numbers required to work their section of face could be adjusted on each shift to meet particular face Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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conditions. There were now opportunities for work flexibility, control, learning, the use of several skills, and positive social interaction. Later, as it became known, this kind of group became accepted by many industries in Europe, India, Australia and the United States. It was seen as a beneficial work structure for many kinds of jobs. Whereas the moving assembly line both under and above ground had effectively controlled the worker and turned him or her into a servant of the machine, the Tavistock group structure restored much of the positive benefits which lead to a good quality of working life.

UNION REJECTION Surprisingly the one industry that did not readily accept these improvements was coal. The Tavistock used the multiskilled team approach successfully on a number of experimental faces, although my own knowledge of work underground suggests that these must have been very short ones. It would have been difficult to coordinate these groups on long faces while using a three-shift system. However, it was the miners’ own union that brought the experiments to a halt. The new groups, because of their flexibility, were able to handle more coal than single coal miners and so could work larger stints than the normal nineyard length of coal face. This meant that they earned more money. The National Union of Mineworkers refused to accept this pay differentiation, believing that all men doing the same job should get the same pay however the work was organized. Management did not want to have conflict with the trade union so soon after nationalisation, and the men themselves were not very enthusiastic. They preferred the current system in which they could get promoted from packer to filler to conveyor mover with pay raises for each move. And so the system was quietly dropped in the mines. Soon after, new technology that automatically cut the face and loaded coal onto belts made the three-shift work system redundant. Socio-technical design now moved to Scandinavia. Here was a strategy that failed because it did not fit with the culture and objectives of a critical group. The original definition of the problem had not taken account of the likely reactions of the trade union, and in fact, it had not been consulted.

MAYPOLE COLLIERY Towards the end of the 1950s the board asked the Tavistock group for a second study. This was to be a continuation of the first one but focused on management-worker relationships and the reasons why the coal industry had

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such an appalling strike record. The Tavistock researchers decided not to accept this invitation. Because they wanted their research to be neutral and independent they were reluctant to do work funded by management. Their first study had been funded independently by the British Medical Research Council and by a general grant to the Institute from the Rockefeller Foundation. The coal board now approached a research group at Liverpool University, of which I was a member. We accepted the project. The problem this time was defined by the coal board as attitudes and behaviour rather than health. The board wanted to discover why certain pits were extremely strike-prone, while other similar pits in the same area were relatively free of strikes. Strikes greatly reduced the ability of a colliery to produce coal. This resulted in myself and two colleagues spending three years working in the North West coal field. Two pits near Wigan were selected for study. One, called Chanters, was seen by the board as the “virtuous” pit, as it had relatively few strikes. The other, Maypole, was regarded as the “wicked” pit, as it had frequent strikes. I was given Maypole to look after, and my two male colleagues went to Chanters. This led to one of the most interesting, enjoyable and intellectually rewarding research experiences of my career. It also led to my spending almost a year underground and becoming intimate with the long-wall method of coal mining.

Problems for the Researcher It immediately became clear to me that it was pointless interviewing miners on the surface. There would be no way of getting an understanding of the nature of their lives underground. I therefore asked to see each miner chosen for interview at their underground place of work. This immediately created some interesting challenges. My pit, Maypole, was old and it was necessary to walk for about a mile before the working coal faces were reached. This was not easy, as a low roof meant that one walked bent double on the roadways that took the coal from the coal faces to the pit bottom. Many of the faces were so low that it was necessary to crawl along them, and many miners had to be interviewed with the interviewer and the interviewee lying on their backs side by side and in the dark, except for the lamp we each had in our helmets. The pit was also dangerous one. There were many accidents and 50 years earlier there had been a bad explosion, due to methane gas becoming ignited, in which almost all the workers had been killed. So Maypole had a bad reputation and many miners tried to avoid working there (Scott et al., 1963). The miners were at first startled and then intrigued to have a woman underground, but all were very pleasant and friendly. However, some of the Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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problems of being an action researcher now began to surface, especially those of easy acceptance into a new group. The first was language, both understanding this and its nature. It took me about three months to became familiar with the local dialect and with some of the local words and phrases. The miners constantly referred to “playing” and it was some time before I realised that this meant being absent from work. They also all used very colourful, and unprintable, words when dealing with awkward machinery. However, some years ago, if not today, this was masculine language and not to be used when women were around. This presented them with a problem. What were they to do if a woman was underground? For a while all bad language stopped, a situation that was unsustainable. Then the underground telephone system was used as a means of relaying a warning, “Watch out she is coming this way.” At this point I decided I had to do something about the situation myself. The result was an effective socio-technical solution. Miners, to stay alive underground, have to have air, and most collieries have complex circulation systems in which air is blown into the pit down one air shaft, travels round the different underground workings and emerges through a second air shaft. Anyone travelling underground moves with the air, and so smell is very strong and penetrating. My strategy was to cover myself with Chanel No 9 perfume before going underground. This meant that the miners were forewarned of my presence through a sharp blast of perfume. I followed behind the perfume. My next problem was an ethical one and not so easily solved. Miners work on three shifts, day, evening and night, and I had to interview a number of miners on each shift. The night shift was very different from the day. It was manned mainly by relatively young boys on their first underground job. The coal face moved forward as coal was cut, placed first on a moving assembly line, then in bogies and taken to the pit bottom, where it was transported up to the surface. As this advance took place, the old worked face had to be packed with loose rubble and stones and the pit props removed so that the roof could fall in. This packing process prevented subsidence, which would have damaged buildings on the ground above. Apart from the young lads, there were few men underground and little supervision. This meant that men could, from time to time, have a short sleep unnoticed before resuming their work. One night when I was walking along the exit roadways with one of the miners I asked why there were so few men around. His startling and frightening reply was that some would be asleep, others would be having a smoke. This in a pit that was full of gas and had blown up in the past killing everyone underground. I wondered, first, if he was joking and next what I should do about this information.

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Given the bad relations between men and management, passing the information on to supervision would be seen as a betrayal of confidence and could lead to the termination of the research. I thought long and hard and decided that I must tell management; there was too great a risk of a very bad accident. And so the next morning I went to see the pit underground manager and told him that I believed some of the men were smoking on the night shift. He did not treat the information as a joke but said he had had suspicions about this for some time. I explained that my telling him of the problem would jeopardise my personal relations with the men and asked if he could keep me out of the situation. He responded, very cleverly, by sending himself an anonymous note saying, “Men are smoking at the coal face, you must do something.” After this episode, very careful searches were carried out on all the men before they went underground. In this project, as in the docks, research data were fed back to, and discussed with, management and the trade unions, but the miners as a group did not contribute to the solution of underground production and industrial relations problems. These early examples of participant observation research on the docks and in a coal mine were very valuable learning experiences for me and greatly helped my subsequent action research on information systems. They taught me that in-depth research is unlikely to be free from ethical, political and practical problems, all of which must be handled with skill if the researcher wants to remain in the research situation. They also taught me that this kind of research is extremely tiring. The researcher not only has to collect the research data for later analysis, she has to write it up in the evening after work so that she maintains an accurate record of events. But I also learned what a valuable experience it was in providing the researcher with a comprehensive and detailed understanding of the activities, attitudes and emotions of the group that is being studied. The researcher learns what is important and meaningful to the group she is studying.

THE MINERS’ VIEWPOINT Let us now look at the Maypole situation through the eyes of one of the men who worked there and also consider if the Tavistock strategy of creating sociotechnical, multiskilled-group forms of organization could have been used there or if other solutions were required.

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John Crawley John Crawley, like the O’Keefes, had also moved from Northern Ireland to England and taken a job on the docks in the smaller port of Manchester, 30 miles from Liverpool. But he didn’t like the cold, and after a while, he found the harsh, windy, often icy conditions of the dock estate hard to tolerate. In 1957, aged 28 he decided to try to find a warmer occupation. He moved to a small Lancashire village called Abram, which was close to the town of Wigan, where he got a job in a local pit. Mining was also a very tough occupation but at least working underground was always warm. The miners had very difficult conditions to contend with, but wind and cold were not a part of these. John’s pit, Maypole, was an old, deep coal mine with poor, unstable underground conditions. Work was made very difficult by the volatility and complexity of the underground environment. Conditions could change in minutes from stability and safety to extreme danger. The pit also had a bad history, as in 1915 it had had a major gas explosion and all men working underground had been killed, with the exception of two who managed to crawl through some old, discarded workings into an adjoining pit. The Maypole disaster was part of local history and many miners avoided working there, regarding it as an unlucky pit (Mumford, 1997). Most of the miners working at Maypole lived in Abram. There was little local industry here other than the colliery, usually called the “pit,” and despite the claims of many fathers that, “No son of mine shall go down the pit,” many sons did in fact do this. In addition to the difficult day-to-day physical hazards, the men, like all underground workers, were susceptible to lung disease through the long-term effects of breathing in coal-dust-contaminated air. Most ended up as invalids in their old age. A friend of John had little difficulty in introducing him to the local trade union and to the colliery management and getting him accepted as an underground worker. John’s first day underground was an eye-opener. He was used to the wide-open spaces of the Manchester docks, and the experience of getting in a small cage and being dropped half a mile underground was a totally new and frightening experience. His first sensation at the pit bottom was that of a strange odour. Maypole had a graveyard smell of damp earth and decaying vegetation. It was also very dark. The main roadways leading from the pit bottom and the winding cage did have some lights but they were few, dull and scattered. On the coal faces the only light came from the lamp that each miner wore in his pit helmet, lit by a battery attached to his waist belt. John had been told that he could not become a legitimate underground worker until he had completed his face training. This consisted of working with Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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an experienced miner on a training face until he had the knowledge and confidence to do the job. An understanding of underground hazards would come later. Danger underground was principally signalled through noise, and experienced miners were always listening for overhead creaks, which might suggest a fall of roof was imminent, or for muffled thuds, which could indicate a gas explosion. Deputies, the underground foremen of the mining industry, always carried lamps that would turn blue if gas was present. There was also a group of canaries in a cage on the surface. Canaries cannot tolerate methane gas and their sudden death when brought underground would indicate a serious problem. Right from his first week in the pit John realised that, like the docks, mining was a dangerous industry in which it was easier to have an accident than to avoid one.

Difficult Conditions John also soon learned that Maypole was a difficult pit to work. Although called “the pit” it was, in fact, two pits, or two underground workings, and in both, seams of coal were narrow and contaminated with bands of stone. It was also an old pit, having been opened soon after the turn of the century. Because it was old it had narrow and low roadways, which required a crouching position when walking. John learned that a problem with all coal mines is that the forces of nature exert continual pressure on the roof and floor, causing the roof to dip and the floor to rise. The total collapse of roadways is only prevented by the insertion of large, curved metal bands which hold the roof up and the floor down. The easiest roadways to walk along are those in pits that have, or had, ponies underground. Ponies have to be provided with adequate walking space, while this is not so necessary for humans. John soon realised, with some dismay, that work at the coal face had to be carried out either bent double or kneeling down. This was because of the low height of the seams of coal. Maypole coal faces could be of any length from 50 to over 300 yards. They varied in height from three to five feet and it was impossible to stand upright in any of them.

The Long-Wall Method John learned that the system of mining practiced at Maypole, as in all local pits, was called the long-wall method. This was the same three-shift system that the Tavistock researchers had experienced. There were three underground shifts: six in the morning until two in the afternoon, two until 10 at night, and 10 until six in the morning. The fillers on the six to 10 early morning shift shovelled loose coal onto moving belts, which took the coal to the pit bottom, where it Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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was transferred into metal tubs. These were then rolled into the “cage,” which acted as a lift and took the coal up to the surface. John, when his face training was completed, would become a filler. It was a job that required considerable physical strength. He had this as a result of his earlier work on the Manchester docks. John found the start of the shift shot-firing activity frightening and disturbing. The use of explosives in a narrow, confined space underground was noisy and sometimes unpredictable. It could precipitate an uncontrolled fall of roof, something that miners were scared of as men could be badly injured. Once shot firing was completed, each man had to move his nine-yard stint of loose coal. Most days it was possible to achieve this, but if face conditions deteriorated, then the men could not finish the job before the end of the shift and coal would be left on the face for the conveyor movers to deal with. This infuriated the conveyor movers. The fillers also had to ensure that the newly exposed roof was made stable by placing pit props under it as the face moved forward. Metal pit props were now starting to replace the wooden ones that had been used in the past, although Maypole still used many wooden props. Nothing resembling the dockers’ gang existed. The men worked in isolation from each other and only cooperated as a group if there was an accident or underground conditions suddenly became dangerous. As Maypole was such an old pit, considerable walking was required before the coal faces were reached, and as the pit did not have any man-riding facilities, this meant walking in a stooped position for up to an hour, both going to the face and returning from it. The result was that the actual working time underground was about six hours, with a break for a sandwich and a drink, which the men brought with them. Eating this was called “snap” time. John soon learned about all these things as he gradually became a miner. When the fillers completed their work at around 1 o’clock, they would start walking back to the pit bottom, passing on the way a long line of dark figures coming in the opposite direction. These were the next shift of conveyor movers. Their job was to move the conveyors, which carried the coal away from the faces, forward several yards. The packers arrived at 10 p.m. These were usually young men in their late teens and early twenties who were on their first underground job. Their task was to remove the pit props furthest away from the worked face and allow the roof to fall in. There were two other groups of men working underground. One was a highly skilled group of men with tunnelling experience called rippers, who were responsible for driving the new roadways necessary to enable the face workers to travel forward with the advancing face. These worked in small, tightly knit Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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teams. The second was a group of men who looked after the haulage and ensured that all the conveyor belts and tubs taking the coal from the faces to the pit bottom were kept moving. These were usually older men who could no longer meet the heavy demands of face work or youngsters in their first job after joining the colliery. In addition there were maintenance groups of electricians, fitters, etc., who, strangely, were located on the surface until they were needed underground. When a breakdown of underground equipment occurred, hours could be wasted moving the maintenance men from the surface to where they were required underground. Lastly, there were a group of winders, who were responsible for winding the cage up and down. Underground supervision was an undermanager responsible for the running of the pit; two overmen, who were assistants to the undermanager; and a group of deputies, acting as foremen. These had the very difficult task of ensuring high coal output and a safe working environment—two objectives that were usually incompatible.

Work Problems When John finished his face training and took his place on the morning shift as a filler, he found that the practice of mining was very different from the theory. The reality of the old Maypole coal seams was that they were very difficult to handle. The group of men working with him on the face constantly had to deal with unexpected problems such as water; dirt, which was the miners’ word for unwanted substances such as bands of stone; loose stones; and difficult roof conditions. He quickly learned that the overhead roof made strange creaking and groaning sounds. Some, which experienced miners were quick to recognise, meant, “Get out—There is likely to be a roof fall.” Problems such as these caused the coal-mining work cycles to get out of phase. Quite often John and his mates could not finish shovelling the coal onto the belts before the end of the shift. This could be due to unavoidable natural causes, but sometimes a belt stoppage was engineered by the miners themselves when they wanted a rest. They could achieve this by placing extra large lumps of coal on the belt, causing it to break. An engineering fitter then had to leave the surface, descend in the cage and travel to the problem area. Everyone stopped work until he arrived. The conveyor movers would often arrive to deal with the belts only to find that they had to complete the fillers’ shovelling task before they could start their job. This meant their work too could not be completed, and some belts would be left unassembled when they departed at the end of their shift. The packers then arrived and found, to their great annoyance, that they had to complete belt Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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assembly before they could start their packing job. The transfer of work from one group to another would continue until the weekend when the cycle would be restored to normal. This constant overlapping of work caused great fury between the different face working groups, who regarded each other as lazy, stupid and incompetent. Here was the principal source of the industrial relations problems at Maypole.

Relationships All of these difficulties affected the social relations between the different groups and between the men and the management. The frequent need to push work from one group onto another caused immense anger because each occupational group received a different level of earnings. All were on piecework, with the rate for a particular face being agreed between the management, the men and the trade union when the new face was first opened. The fillers received the highest rate of pay of the face workers. The conveyor movers got more than the packers, and the packers got the lowest rate of all because of their status of young men on their first face work job. Each group made frequent attempts to cause trouble for the others. It was not unknown for the conveyor movers to deliberately leave some of the bolts on the belt undone when they finished the shift. This meant that the belts would fall apart when the fillers shovelled coal onto them the next morning. This hostility was worsened by the fact that these different groups of men never met face-to-face in the work situation and did not know each other. Each regarded the other as “the enemy.” Because they all worked on permanent shifts, there was no personal contact. The only meeting places would be outside the colliery if they were neighbours or if they went to the Miners’ Social Club on a Saturday night. John found this situation strange and uncomfortable. Although there had been some hostility between men and foremen on the docks, relations between the dockers were generally supportive and good. Their common enemy, when it was an enemy, was the National Dock Labour Board and, on occasion, the trade union. John was surprised to find that the miners also regarded management as “the enemy” and were even more hostile to colliery management than the dockers were to the Dock Labour Board. This was because many of the managers had worked for the old, hated coal owners and also because they constantly pressured the men for higher output. Whereas the dockers had been reluctantly forced to take days off when there was an absence of work, many miners had a low degree of commitment to the job and stayed away from work on Fridays. Thursday was the day on which they were paid. Many were also Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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absent on a Monday, as the faces were difficult to work after the weekend break. Similarly, as on the docks, the trade union did not get a great deal of support. This was because the local NUM hierarchy tended to respond to the grievances of the most powerful underground groups but to ignore the problems of those with less power and less pay. John also found that another great similarity between miners and dockers was the use of the unofficial “wild cat” strike as a bargaining tactic. Again the major source of trouble was pay. Just as the dockers’ earnings had varied according to the kind of cargo they were loading, so the miners’ earnings varied according to the difficulties they experienced when working a particular face. If bad conditions made it impossible to earn the agreed piece rate, then management could add a sum of money to make up for the discrepancy. The amount offered was always a matter of great dispute, and whereas unhappy dockers walked out of the ship or shed, the miners downed tools, walked to the pit bottom and then took the cage up to the surface. John was surprised to find that strike behaviour was related to the power of the group. His own mates, the fillers, were very strike-prone as their earnings were the most affected by difficult face conditions. Rippers, who created the new roadways as the faces advanced, had few strikes as management could not afford for them to stop working and tended to put right their grievances immediately. Haulage men also had few, if any, strikes although for a very different reason. They were lowpaid, weekly wage employees and could not afford to go on strike. The research challenge for myself and the other members of the research team was, first, to gain an understanding of why underground relationships were so bad and, second, to suggest ways for ensuring improvement. Most problems were caused by the way work was organized and by the fluidity of the work situation that continually caused this to be disturbed. The result was antagonistic and warring relationships between management and men and between one occupational group and another.

COULD THE TAVISTOCK SOLUTION HAVE WORKED IN MAYPOLE? Yes, theoretically it could have improved the situation in some respects. The face workers could have been trained to become multiskilled and been organized into small groups, each responsible for a section of the coal face and all receiving the same rates of pay. This would have removed many of the factors causing disputes over earnings, and a degree of flexibility would have

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been introduced into managing underground work. But this kind of change would have been difficult to implement at Maypole as the coal faces were long and required good horizontal organization along their length. Independent small groups could have made this difficult to achieve. It also would have been too revolutionary for management and the trade union to accept. Both would have opposed this kind of change. A simpler, more conservative and more acceptable solution to the industrial relations problems at Maypole was not a major reorganization of work but a rethink of the wage payment system. Earnings could have been made more consistent through a compensation system of which the men understood and approved. This would operate when poor face conditions impeded normal working. Unfortunately a lack of consultation, few incentives to change and the poor relationships meant that no one was prepared to alter the present system. The union was used to the weekly payment battles and felt these gave it a role. Management had difficulty in changing anything without the approval of the regional officials of the coal board. The result was that pay system was not improved, problems were never solved and the colliery eventually closed.

DOCK WORK VERSUS COAL MINING John often wondered if his move from the docks to the mines had been of any advantage to him. He felt that there were both pluses and minuses. Although working underground was cramped, difficult and often dangerous, it had the advantage of always being warm. He had found the continual exposure to the elements on the Liverpool docks very hard to take. He missed the camaraderie of the dockers’ gang, even though the membership of this could change as jobs changed. He found the strung out and individual work of the coal face less social, cohesive and friendly. But the coal board offered good training opportunities. Young men who expressed a wish to move into management could have a day a week off to attend a mining course at the local technical college. John was interested in taking advantage of this some time in the future. Industrial relations behaviour in the two situations was similar. Both dockers and miners had many wildcat strikes and seemed to enjoy the stimulus and excitement of waging a continual war game with management. Both also had the occasional trade-union-supported major strike, which affected all workers. Social life outside the workplace was less good in the mining area than on the docks. Manchester and Liverpool had far more to offer in terms of entertainment than Abram and Wigan. Also there was little work for women in the Wigan area and John’s wife would have liked to have had a job. Few Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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miners’ wives did work. John soon had two young children himself and he too made the traditional miner’s promise, “No son of mine shall go down the pit.” The technical and human problems of the cyclical method of mining were eventually lessened. However, this was not by a socio-technical strategy but by new technology. The cutting machine that sliced away at the bottom of the face to provide a space for the loose coal to drop into after the face had been drilled and shot-fired became obsolete. It was replaced by a sophisticated machine called a power loader, or a cutter loader. This swept along the coal face cutting the coal and then loading it onto the moving belts. The old wooden pit props were replaced by sophisticated metal ones that moved themselves forward automatically as the face advanced. There was no longer any need to complete different operations on each shift. The cutting/loading operation could take place on all three shifts while the jobs of filler and conveyor mover were no longer necessary. A team of men could follow behind the new machine, checking that everything worked smoothly. The belief in the eighties, expressed by the then British National Coal Board chairman, Lord Robens, was that the coal industry would eventually become totally automated with few men required underground. In fact this never happened; cheap coal from overseas, together with the general use of other forms of energy, led to the death of the industry. The cry of miners that “No son of mine shall work underground” soon became a fact, as there were very few mines offering work. Many proud miners, including John, eventually found that the only employment available was a packing job in the local supermarket.

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? What can we learn from John’s experiences? One is that a socio-technical approach used as a strategy for improving efficiency and working conditions may not be possible and appropriate everywhere. It requires the kind of work environment in which small, multiskilled groups can work effectively and in a relatively autonomous way. This had been the case in the early “hand got” mining days. It was less possible with the long-wall method of mining, where a large number of individuals had to carry out the same activities at the same time. It became more feasible with the next semiautomated stage of mechanisation, but by then the mines were being closed down. The government was supporting other forms of energy generation. Another important lesson is that a socio-technical strategy, which requires both goodwill and active collaboration, may not be possible in situations where Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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waging a war with management is seen as an attractive and stimulating activity. This is especially true when the work itself has little to offer in terms of day-today interest or skill. Ill thought-out payment systems and their deficiencies are almost always a source of dispute and can cause discontented workers and major long-term industrial relations problems. This was the case in Maypole, where a better strategy would have been rethinking the structure of the wage payment system. Other grievances were relatively unimportant compared with wages, although wage issues seemed to be symptoms of other underlying problems, especially poor relations with management. If one group designates another as “the enemy,” then there is likely to be a continual search for issues which can disturb, even rout, this enemy. It is also unlikely that the trade union would have accepted a sociotechnical approach. The common payment system, with all men in a group receiving the same pay, would have conflicted with wage negotiations which were based on graded work structures. Nor would the coal board have been enthusiastic. It did not want more industrial relations trouble with the unions or to try out a system of work with which it was unfamiliar. A major cause of the Tavistock project failure was because the union had not been adequately consulted. Union officials would not accept a system of work that gave some groups of men the opportunity of earning more than others. This was a problem that was to frustrate many later socio-technical projects. Groups not involved in work redesign often become jealous and antagonistic toward those who are involved and are seen as getting preferential treatment. The final lesson is that in difficult, hard to control, work situations an understanding, quick-reacting and employee-focused management is essential if good relations are to be created and sustained. But, despite all these problems, most of the men at Maypole were proud to be miners and felt that they were making an important contribution to the quality of British life. Unfortunately, Maypole closed for economic reasons in 1963. It was losing money on every ton of coal it produced. John lost his job but secured temporary employment as a warehouse man in the newly opened Heinz factory in Wigan. This was a total change from the pit and he did not enjoy the new environment. The reasons Chanters, the pit adjoining Maypole and researched by my colleagues, had so few strikes were because it was a much easier pit to work. Underground conditions were more stable and, as a result, earnings did not fluctuate as they did at Maypole. This meant that there was less industrial unrest. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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Although the Scandinavians soon after embraced the socio-technical approach with enthusiasm in many industries, later experiments in coal mining in the United States in the seventies encountered similar problems to those in the first socio-technical project. Successful experiments had to be discontinued because the trade union objected to the experimental groups getting higher pay than the regular workers (Mumford, 1997). The message here is that changes in working practice in difficult situations require careful discussion, negotiation and general acceptance before they can be introduced. In both the docks and the coal mine the research team spent some time interviewing a sample of the workers to see how they saw their quality of working life. Their views were mixed but mainly negative. Both groups were frequent absentees from work. In the coal mine this was called “playing” and regarded as a normal part of the work situation. There was little management could do about it. Fillers were most critical of management as they were the group most likely to lose pay if face conditions deteriorated. But few of the men wanted to move to other industries. The Liverpool docks and Maypole are both examples of very intractable problem situations. It is argued here that time spent in gaining an understanding of the complexity of the total situation, as recommended in both the last chapter and this one, is of great help to management, men and researchers in establishing at an early stage what is possible in difficult situations requiring change. It is also useful for companies and industries experiencing very difficult problems to see how other organizations have solved similar problems and to consider if these would be appropriate in a different situation. An important lesson from these case studies is that every situation is different. Strategies for change that work well in one situation may have no chance of success in another, although it is important to know about their experience. Strategies, to be successful, need to be supported by an appropriate organizational environment and receptive culture. Firms need to create these first. This would have been difficult, if not impossible, in both the dock and the coal mine environments with their cultures of aggressive warfare against management and their very difficult and dangerous work environments.

REFERENCES Markides, C. (2001). What is strategy and how do you know if you have one? In S. Crainer & D. Dearlove (Eds.), The Financial Times Handbook of Management. London: Prentice Hall, pp. 230-242. Mumford, E. (1997). Assisting work restructuring in complex and volatile Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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situations. In J. Neumann, K. Kellner, & A. Dawson-Shepherd (Eds,), Developing Organizational Consultancy. London: Routledge, pp. 228249. Scott, W. H., Mumford, E., McGivering, I., & Kirkby, J. (1963). Coal and Conflict. Liverpool, England: Liverpool University Press. Trist, E., Higgin, G. W., Murray, H., & Pollock, A. B. (1963). Organization Choice. London: Tavistock.

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Chapter 6

Considering Structure: Different Organizational Solutions in Automobiles Work cooperatively, look 20 years ahead, pay particular attention to social development. Volvo management directive

INTRODUCTION The last two case studies showed the importance of understanding a problem before embarking on its solution and the need to develop an appropriate strategy before making any change. Here it was suggested that it was good policy to take account of two things. These were relevant strategic thinking, such as that developed by the Tavistock Institute, and how to use this for particular problems and appropriate industries. The next step in problem solving for change is structure. Choosing an appropriate organizational structure to accompany and accommodate change is always difficult. There will be many constraints, including the skills and availability of labour, the requirements of technology and the knowledge of management. Despite these problems, there will usually be a number of different options available. The excellent manager will have the ability to distinguish good organizational design from bad.

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Sometimes this has to be a result of trial and error, but as the last chapter suggested, a useful first strategy is to investigate what other companies have done and evaluate the different organizational options they have used.

THE CAR INDUSTRY My introduction to the car industry came in the late seventies when I was at the Manchester Business School. Research provided an opportunity to compare the traditional, technology-based organization of plants in the industry with the new socio-technical approach used by plants in Scandinavia. The opportunity for this research came as a result of my association with the Vienna Centre, an international body set up by UNESCO after the Second World War to encourage collaborative research on social science issues between East and West. The Vienna Centre was interested in the increasing but little understood effects of automation on industry. It gathered together a group of around 15 academics, trade unionists and industrialists representing different countries in East and West Europe, together with delegates from the United States and Japan, and asked them to agree a subject for joint research. After much discussion it was decided that a suitable subject should be the development of automation in the automobile industry. This subject was chosen, not because the automobile industry was seen as advanced in automation (in fact at that time it was rather backward), but because almost every country taking part in the research had that industry. Some were now embarking on collaborative ventures between East and West, for example, Polski-Fiat in Poland and a similar initiative with another Western manufacturer in Russia. The technology initially selected for study was called numerically controlled transfer technology, or NC machine tools. NC machines were of two basic types. First, there were machines for forming engine blocks, heads, gear boxes and other castings. These machines consisted of a long line of singlepurpose machine tools that milled, drilled, broached, bored, reamed, tapped and honed the components going through (Christensen, 1968). Machines of this type when installed in automobile manufacturers could perform more than 20 separate operations on one component, and one operation could involve drilling all the holes for the head studs simultaneously. The other type of transfer machine used by the motor industry worked on a “merry-go-round” principle. The machining stations were arranged so that the engine blocks could move around a central hub. Transfer lines replaced a large number of different singleand multipurpose machine tools, drills, milling machines, boring machines, etc.

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These new automated machines were introduced into British car plants in the 1950s but, because of their cost, only into large factories employing several thousand workers. Firms in other countries soon followed suit and by the late seventies they were in common use everywhere. The international research project had as its principal objective a study of how this kind of automation had affected work in the different countries. Had some workers, moved from operating single-purpose machines to automated lines, lost their skills without replacing them with new ones? Had automation of this kind also caused a reduction in available jobs? The earlier automobile production system had consisted of single-purpose machines operated by a semiskilled worker; these skills were no longer required. Our research was to show that the principal effect of transfer lines was on maintenance electricians and fitters, who now had to deal with more complex machines and often with integrated electromechanical control systems. But this change presented few dilemmas. The critical organizational problem in the car industry was not automated transfer lines but the continuing use of the Henry Ford moving assembly line. A later question was, What could be done about these? The first part of the research involved visiting motor manufacturers in East and West Europe and in the United States. We found that most manufacturers in both East and West had the same machine-paced organization of assembly work throughout their plants. But there were exceptions. Volvo in Sweden was now trying to replace parts of the line with teams of workers who assembled whole cars instead of single components. At the same time the Japanese were developing a “speed up” production process later called lean manufacturing (Walker & Guest, 1952). The research group decided to jointly develop a questionnaire on work organization and the quality of working life. Car workers in all countries would be asked the same questions. Each researcher now had to find a motor manufacturer in his or her own country who would agree to the study. The British group was offered cooperation by British Leyland at its Longbridge plant near Birmingham. Leyland, at this time, was experiencing serious industrial relations difficulties. Management and the trade unions were in a permanent state of confrontation. The senior trade union convener, Derek Robinson, had just been fired and strikes were a common event. At the same time, a new managing director, Michael Edwardes, was reducing staff numbers and some unprofitable plants, such as Speke outside Liverpool, were being closed. Because management and workers were at loggerheads with each other, I was told by management that I would have to get agreement from the trade unions myself. Fortunately I was

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able to meet the Shop Stewards Committee with an ace in my hand. I explained to those present that their Russian comrades would also be taking part in the research and that they would be asked exactly the same questions as the British Leyland workers. This information was received with interest and approval. The Shop Stewards Committee immediately gave the research a go-ahead but insisted that separate reports on the results should be written for both the management and the unions. While the British were negotiating with Leyland, the Swedish representative in the international group persuaded Volvo to take part in the project. Volvo was, at this time, experimenting with its new production approach based on the socio-technical principles of teamwork, multiskilling and worker autonomy. This enabled useful comparisons to be made between the traditional production system, based on a moving conveyor line and paced work, and the more flexible and user-friendly structures of the Swedish company. Here is an account of one worker’s experience at British Leyland, Longbridge, in 1978 together with descriptions of socio-technical work structures at Volvo.

Jim Bentley Jim Bentley was a local man who was in his early twenties when he joined the Longbridge plant of British Leyland in 1978. He was attracted by the good pay that the company offered, even though he knew that working conditions and management-worker relations were regarded locally as unsatisfactory. He was given a job on the main body assembly line, where he found a work situation in serious disarray. British Leyland was having difficulty selling its cars. The company was bankrupt and in the throes of being nationalised. Even worse, there was a new managing director who had a reputation for toughness and who was threatening to make some workers redundant. Jim found that industrial relations were even worse than he had imagined. A well-liked works convener known as “Red Robbo” had recently been fired and the trade unions, of which there were 17, were determined to make things as difficult as possible for the management. As a result, strikes were a frequent event. Jim also found that work on the assembly line was extremely boring, exacting and stressful. Each man was responsible for a single assembly activity, usually involving around five tasks. These were easily and quickly learned but had to be repeated over and over as each car passed. The men worked under continual pressure as they tried to keep up with the speed of the moving line. The line never stopped and a relief worker had to be found if a man needed to leave it for any reason. Surprisingly and illogically, as production was entirely controlled by the speed of the line, the men were paid on piecework. Jim found Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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that this led to undesirable work practices. The men tried to beat the line by manually pushing cars further along it so that more bodies could be dealt with and wages would be higher. This, in turn, led to poor standards of work. There was a vehicle called a “Friday car,” which was produced when the men struggled to achieve the necessary output and, at the same time, to stop the line early for the weekend. The Friday car was an example both of fast and sloppy work and of poor inspection at the end of the line. Jim also found to his dismay that the body shop was not a social environment. Like the fillers on the coal face, the men were strung out along the line at distances too great for them to talk to each other. They had to spend most of the working day alone with their own thoughts. Jim noticed that all the men on the line were young, usually in their twenties. Some had given up skilled or semiskilled work, attracted by the higher earnings at Leyland. They were prepared to give up a greater degree of personal freedom and less stress elsewhere in order to earn more money. He found that no one liked the moving belt and most felt exhausted at the end of the day. His own assembly task was routine but involved a great deal of heavy lifting. The only man with some job variety on the line was the relief worker. He had to be multiskilled in order to cover all the different assembly tasks. He also had the double advantage of both job and social variety as he moved around to fill in for men who needed to leave the line. At break time on his first day Jim was warned of the stresses of the job. He was told, “It’s rush, rush, rush all day long, and this is even worse than the monotony,” and “You don’t dare stop. If you get behind you have a hard time catching up.” Unlike the miners, the car workers were not able to give themselves a rest by placing a heavy piece of coal on the belt and causing it to break. Stopping the assembly line belt was strictly forbidden unless carried out by a supervisor. However, the boredom of work was alleviated for many by the opportunity to take part in both official and unofficial worker-management disputes. British Leyland had many strikes and the workers believed that management was not always too worried about these. A strike was useful when model sales were poor. It meant that the company did not have to pay the men’s wages. For most of the time the hostile relationships between management and men were very dysfunctional as they prevented attempts to jointly solve the many shop-floor problems. His coworkers told Jim that many organizational problems could easily be solved if the management consulted the workers and if the workers were prepared to share their ideas with management. But neither side spoke to each other in anything other than a confrontational manner. The Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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British Labour Government, in office at the time, despaired at what it regarded as the trade unions’ irresponsibility. The result was that by 1975 British Leyland was under government control (Sampson, 1982). Unfortunately the firm did not inspire enough confidence in either the government or private investors to qualify for more than the minimal amount of assistance required to keep it going. Nor could the government tackle its fundamental problem—an outdated and dysfunctional mass production system that could no longer compete in the world market. The recently installed new management had instructions to make the firm efficient or close it down (Womack, Jones, & Roos, 1990). Jim was a very intelligent young man and he wondered if the harsh, machine-dominated assembly process used at Leyland was the only way of organizing a car factory. He had heard that things were different in Sweden and he decided to find out. He did this by using the library of his local technical college, attending classes there and asking Swedish friends if they could find out more about the organization of Volvo, the foremost Swedish car company. He learned that Volvo had started to manufacture cars in 1927 and that the men they employed at that time were skilled craftsmen. They were coach makers, who had previously built horse-drawn carriages in small workshops and forges. These men had joined Volvo with a great deal of experience and a strong professional identity, all based on their tradition of craftsmanship. At this early stage of car production, the coach makers worked in teams of between five and eight people and they built their vehicles onto stationary bodies. Jim discovered that it was not until the early thirties that Volvo followed the American model developed by Henry Ford and adopted the production line principle. But the company soon became dissatisfied with this. Absenteeism was high and it was difficult to recruit labour. Ideas for a new work system were discussed with employees at Volvo’s original Torslanda car assembly plant in Gothenburg, which had come into operation in 1964. These discussions involved industrial engineers, supervisors and trade union representatives. At that time Torslanda was a modern and efficient plant but it was organized around a traditional production line with short and simple tasks. Everyone felt there must be a better way, and there were external pressures that reinforced this belief. Many Swedish firms in the mid-seventies had very serious personnel problems often caused by disaffected and alienated labour forces. There was relatively full employment, yet at the same time serious industrial relations problems. There was also a strengthening movement for more industrial democracy in industry. Volvo management believed that if work could be reorganized so as to increase job satisfaction this might reduce absenteeism, improve quality, reduce labour turnover and improve the overall industrial relations climate. Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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Jim learned that in the early seventies Volvo had started to plan for a new assembly plant in Kalmar with a new production system. This plant, which went into operation in 1974, had many new features that made it different from the traditional moving assembly line, although it was still based on the assembly line principle. A more flexible and efficient method of building cars was created with teamwork and longer work cycles. Pehr Gyllenhammar, president of Kalmar, told his employees: At Kalmar, the objective is to organize automobile production in such a way that employees can find meaning and satisfaction in their work. This is a factory that, without any sacrifice of efficiency or financial results, will give employees the opportunity to work in groups, to communicate freely, to move among work assignments, to vary their pace, to identify themselves with the product, to be conscious of responsibility for quality, and to influence their own work environment. Gyllenhammar believed that when a product is manufactured by workers who find their work meaningful, it will inevitably be a product of high quality. These words expressed all the socio-technical values and principles. Jim, who was now on the works committee, suggested that British Leyland should send a group over to Sweden to look at the Volvo Kalmar assembly process. This was immediately rejected by management who could see no benefits in changing the present system. In any case they had no money to do so. In 1985 Jim decided to go and see for himself what was happening in Sweden. His next holiday included a visit to Kalmar. He found a powerful set of unusual management values there. A senior manager gave him a description of the plant that mirrored the words of the president. However, Jim also learned that because Kalmar still had many of the problems of a conventional car plant, its management and workers were planning a more revolutionary approach. Jim found that Volvo was designing a new plant in Uddevalla and that the workers, union representatives and management were all involved in the planning process. Assembly line thinking had now been abandoned and it was intended that production should be carried out by autonomous teams consisting of “car builders.” These would receive 16 months of training. The intention was to create a plant that would be producing 40,000 cars a year by 1993. Assembly at Uddevalla was to be divided into six different sections known as product plants. These would be grouped together in two buildings, with each plant manned by eight assembly teams of eight to 10 people. Assembly would Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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be on stationary bodies with parts laid out on a special system of racks. Automatic carriers moved along magnetic tracks to deliver these to the appropriate team in the production plant. The time of the work cycle now became three hours. Before leaving Sweden Jim asked a trade union official to tell him more about the Uddevalla plant. He found that the fundamental principle at Uddevalla was to carry out assembly on stationary bodies. This meant that the work cycle for an individual worker was three hours instead of minutes as in the traditional car assembly plant. And it was the team as a whole which bore the prime responsibility for solving problems as they arose. The team was also responsible for achieving established quality and productivity goals. Each team had a spokesperson in contact with the plant manager and other officials. This position rotated amongst the team workers. Jim was told that not everyone liked the system. It required the worker to take considerable responsibility and not everyone wanted this. Those that didn’t like the situation left. He was also told that the trade unions had played a very important part in the development process for the new plant. Jim returned to British Leyland at Longbridge full of enthusiasm for the Volvo approach but received little interest from either his colleagues on the line or the trade unions. However British Leyland was not able to completely ignore the Swedish production system. In the late eighties Volvo acquired Leyland’s bus and truck division and a British plant was refitted to make Volvo chassis. Volvo introduced there the same concept of long-cycle stationary assembly in small teams that it used in Sweden. It had two objectives in doing this. First, it wanted to spread the system of dock assembly to the production of British buses and improve their quality. Second, it wanted to achieve symmetry between its manufacturing systems. As time passed Jim discovered that this flexible, multiskilled type production scheme had its own problems. These were mainly to do with achieving quality standards and with training workers to be multiskilled. As the market tightened for Volvo and output figures became a priority, the company reluctantly reverted to the old moving line production process (Berggren, 1992; Lindholm & Norstedt, 1975). Reports were now appearing in the press describing the success of Japanese car plants in producing the same number of cars as European plants with very much less effort. The best Japanese plant required 16 hours to assemble a car, the best European 23 hours. Japanese performance was greatly influenced by the fact that plants were using what was called a lean/ flexible production system. This integrated both technological and organizaCopyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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tional capabilities. It was “lean” in its avoidance of problem-hiding buffers and, it was claimed, flexible in its willingness to rely on a skilled and motivated workforce for problem solving and continuous improvement. In contrast British Leyland, like other European and American manufacturers, had attempted to protect the production process from variations in effort or skill through the use of buffer stocks, narrowly defined jobs, inflexible work organization and close supervision. However, given its problems, there seemed little chance of British Leyland changing its car production system in the near future. British Leyland did eventually follow the Japanese lean production model. It removed its buffer stocks and required suppliers to provide parts on demand. This speeded up production and increased profits but put an increased strain on Longbridge workers, who now had even less work flexibility than before. After spending eight years in the car industry, Jim decided that he had had enough. He bought his own business, selling and repairing bicycles.

WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THIS PROJECT? The most important message from this project is that very different organizational structures can be associated with the manufacture of the same product, although this may require a change in the technology that is used. British Leyland used the traditional moving line developed initially by Henry Ford. The most important technology for Volvo was a system that transported different sections of the car to the group assembly point. An important consequence of this difference in technology was who or what was in control. With the Leyland system the speed of the belt controlled production and the human workers had no say. This was a source of low job satisfaction in all car plants that used the moving line. In Volvo, in contrast, the workers controlled the speed of production through their assembly efficiency. This was popular with the workers but could cause management output problems if the work group was slow to complete the task. The solution eventually arrived at by Volvo was to use the team solution for expensive cars but not for popular models where speed of output was essential. The international project showed that car production was not very different throughout the world, and although companies were at different stages of technical development, most, with the exception of Volvo, used the same flow-line organizational arrangements.

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The British research group was fascinated to find that many of the machines in the Russian car plant had been made in Brighton, England. Employees in most countries had the same complaints about machine-paced routine work. The exception here was Russia, where the workers appeared to have much more job satisfaction. The international research team wondered if these results could be taken at their face value. The research showed that the change over from semiskilled work on individual machines to an automated assembly line process in the engine shop had not caused problems. The workers liked the higher pay and there was little nostalgia for the lost skills. In this part of the production process, the carmanufacturing world had moved forward and its employees had moved forward with it. However, this was true only of the engine shop. In the body assembly areas, all the workers complained of how they were treated. Some attention was paid to conditions of work and the prevention of accidents but no more than was required by the law and the trade unions. Even Volvo’s progressive human relations policy was not entirely altruistic. A major factor in Pehr Gyllenhammar’s policy was the need to attract workers in a tight labour market. Nevertheless the Volvo organizational design approach was an excellent example of socio-technical thinking and it was greatly influenced by the earlier socio-technical experiments in coal mining. Another lesson is that even production systems that are poor in human terms can be improved. In the 1970s the American car industry, in particular General Motors, tried to do this through a collaboration between management and the trade union, the United Auto Workers of America. The union claimed that the initiative for what was called a Quality of Working Life Programme came from them, rather than from management. The vice president of the union told a conference in 1980: We’re going to give workers more freedom, a little bit more say, and some input into the decision making process—a brand-new world for workers. They never had those rights before. When I was hired, a worker in our plants was told to do everything by management. The philosophy was to break the job down into its smallest parts, tell them what to do and make sure they do it. Workers don’t need any brains. (Horner, 1980) Saab also used the same concept of enriched jobs as Volvo but took a more conservative approach to the organization of work. The Italian and Japanese car plants were also interested, although the Japanese introduced Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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more automation than the other countries. Two things were happening in car plants throughout the world at this time. There was growing appreciation of the importance of good work organization, and responsibility for this was transferred from middle management to top management. There was also a growing appreciation of the importance of enriching the jobs of men working on the line so as to reduce absenteeism and increase worker motivation.

WORK ORGANIZATION TODAY Thinking about work organization and its impact on people is even more important today when new technology is constantly being introduced and firms are changing their shape to meet new environmental conditions and customer demands. In order to improve the organization of work and make this more people-friendly, managers and unions need to understand what their particular group of workers regard as good working conditions and an effective organization of work. The imperatives of task and technology will always constrain the design of organizational structures but other aspects of work are more flexible. When considering structure, here are some questions that a management, participative design group or others concerned with change can usefully ask of their colleagues when new work systems are being designed and implemented. The answers to these will influence the decisions on work structure that are then taken. Most people have knowledge needs. They want to learn, either through training or experience, and become better at what they are doing. This is as true of the young man selling drugs on the street as of the MBA graduate starting his or her new job. Any group likely to use or be affected by a new system should be asked to specify the kinds of opportunities its members would like to have to learn, to become more skilled and to move on to better jobs and how the new system could help provide this. This requires both designers and users to be aware of the possibilities and constraints that it has to offer. Perhaps surprisingly, in the case studies that have been described it was the coal industry that offered the best training possibilities. Any young man who wished to get formal qualifications was allowed to take one day a week off work to attend the local technical college and get a mining diploma. This would enable him eventually to move up the mining hierarchy to supervisory status. Most people also have effectiveness needs—the ability to perform well through having the right tools, good training, supervisory or colleague assistance when needed, and a well-designed job that they are competent to carry out. Again a company needs to know, or find out, how its staff defines these Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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things. This is what Volvo and the other car firms did before introducing their new assembly structures. The achievement of economic needs is, of course, also of great importance to everyone. We need enough money to live on, to provide for our families and to enable us to save for our old age. For some an ever-increasing salary is an important end in itself. For others the interest and social value of a job may compensate for its low rewards. Important decisions have to be taken on the nature and structure of financial rewards. There are also environmental needs, for example, a need for good conditions in the workplace and a concern for any external environmental effects the new system may have. The definition of what these are may vary greatly from one group to another. Some may regard being safe from accident as the most important criterion; others may want comfort, cleanliness and attractive surroundings. Customers and other members of the public may feel strongly about the external environment. Also, and most important, there are ethical needs. We want to be treated in what we regard as the “right way” by our colleagues and our bosses. We want to be communicated with, and consulted and treated with respect and dignity. How do the staff who will be affected by the new system see these things? What are their priorities? My own research has indicated that in many situations this is an extremely important, perhaps the most important, need. Low pay and bad working conditions can often be tolerated, providing we are treated as valued human beings. And, lastly, we have psychological needs, although these too may differ greatly from one person to another. Most of us, although not all, still want a degree of security so that we can plan the future. We would also prefer a pleasant, friendly work environment to one where dispute and argument are the norm. Many today also want freedom from psychological stress and overwork. Appropriately the first letter of all these needs spells KEEEEP, reminding us that in order to “keep” valued, and possibly scarce, labour each employee will require an employer to meet their definition of the required need cluster and their emphasis on some needs more than others (see the section on job satisfaction in the Appendix). If a participative design group is used for the change and the company is following the socio-technical approach of concern for people in parallel with concern for new technology, then it will be its responsibility to obtain information on the priorities of employees and how these can best be met. Let us see how our tough dock, mine and car plant situations measured up in these terms.

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Knowledge Needs Like a great deal of production work, none of the three industries offered the ordinary worker much in the way of training, although the docks and the coal mine did offer some learning through experience. Dock work required an ability to handle heavy cargo without spills or accidents, while the most important learning experience for miners was getting to grips with the dangers of working underground. A man’s life could depend on understanding the creaks made by the roof of the coal face or recognising that when a deputy’s lamp turned blue it meant, “Get out quick—Gas is present.” Many collieries had canaries underground as these birds were sensitive to methane gas and would keel over unconscious when it was present. Probably the worst situation from a learning point of view was the body assembly line of the car industry. Here the men were like robots, dominated by the pace of the line and able to perform only a limited number of specified operations before the car body moved on to the next man. Subsequent technical developments did not greatly increase the opportunity for learning. In the docks, containerisation took over from bags and loose material, simplifying the loading process but also making it heavier to handle. In the mines, power loading increasingly mechanised face work and gave the miner a wider range of tasks to look after. In the British car industry, lean production was adopted but not usually with the teamworking and increased skills of the Japanese car worker. The basic tasks on lean lines did not require problem solving but the execution of standardised tasks at an intense tempo (Berggren, 1992). The great exception here was Volvo, where attitude surveys were carried out in both the Kalmar and the Uddevalla plants. These showed that enhanced job responsibilities and teamworking were seen by Swedish workers as providing good opportunities for learning new skills. But Volvo experienced some criticisms. Its management was accused of confusing “participative management” with “democratic management.” Participative management calls for consultation of subordinates during the decisionmaking process, but not for the abdication of the management decision-making responsibility, which would be the result of democratic management. It was pointed out that both systems can work simultaneously but it was essential that everyone involved knew which types of decisions were to be made participatively and which democratically. In Volvo this did not always happen. All three industries—docks, mining and cars—in their traditional form did not offer what today’s employees, whether shop floor or clerical, would regard as opportunities for learning and personal development. The docks offered just

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a job; the coal mines too offered a job but one which also gave the men the pride of doing something the rest of the world thought was difficult and dangerous. The car industry in Britain offered little other than superior earnings to what many other industries could provide. Volvo, the exception, was able to offer its workers much more than this.

Economic Needs For many people earning money is the only reason for working. There is no way of achieving other benefits such as an increase in knowledge, and they have little desire to do so. This may be because the nature of their work situation forces them to have low expectations and aspirations, they can expect nothing better. Or it may be that they have other more important outside interests and are happy with the present situation. However, although some groups would not want the nature and content of their work to change, most would like an increase in pay. Pay is usually linked to status, irrespective of the nature of the job. The more you are paid, the more you are respected, perhaps even valued. For many managements it is also linked to output and is seen as the principal motivator for higher production. All three work situations, the docks, the coal mine and the British car factory, had incentive-based wage systems, even though the moving assembly line in the car factory was the major determinant of output. In many jobs, however, incentives of this kind often have the disadvantage of reducing quality, and tight quality inspection schemes have to be in place to ensure that poor work does not slip through to the customer. In all three situations, earnings were negotiated between the trade unions and the management and were a major source of conflict. Most wild cat and official strikes had pay as an important component. Disputes raged over differentials between one group and another, unplanned for changes in conditions of work, and agreements for particular cargoes, faces or production targets. Sometimes these disputes added a degree of interest and excitement to a normally dull and boring work situation. They provided mental stimulus and welcome opportunities for confrontation and aggression that both management and men seemed to enjoy. War games were much more interesting than routine work. Deciding on appropriate wage payment schemes for the shop floor has always been a headache for management, and incentive schemes have varied from those based entirely on the worker’s output to those in which employees are paid a flat rate but there is an incentive element. This can be quite large or quite small. In recent years it has been common to offer group incentives based Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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on the work of the team as a whole. These would often form part of a sociotechnical approach. But they too can have disadvantages. While they can motivate groups to produce more, they may also lead to individual workers being victimised by their mates because they cannot meet the output of the rest of the group. Clerical workers, in contrast, have usually been paid a straight weekly wage. Their jobs vary so much in content that it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the amount of work they produce. A wage system much favoured by practitioners of the socio-technical school is “payment for knowledge.” Pay is now related to what you know rather than to what you do. Increases come through training, vocational courses, university degrees and valued experience. Pay is seen by some commentators as being a source of problems and contention in the future (Beck, 2001). For many groups it is seen as dropping rather than rising as advancing technology increasingly replaces human workers. The short-term job contract seems also to be one of today’s innovations. This can bring freedom for some but it can also lead to fear, insecurity and uncertainty for others.

Effectiveness Needs Although dockers, miners and car workers were not averse to a fight with management (in fact many welcomed these), all of them had a degree of pride in their work. The dockers and miners thought, rightly, that their work was important to the commercial success of the country and were proud of the fact that they worked in tough environments that other workers would be unable to tolerate. The British Leyland Longbridge workers were proud of the cars they were producing and wanted these to sell well and have high status in the market. All three groups required certain things from management to enable them to work effectively and became very frustrated when these were not provided. Among these were supervisory assistants, a knowledgeable deputy or foreman who could provide help when problems occurred, and the necessary tools for the job. The miners required essential face equipment such as pit props, the dockers needed pallets and cranes, and the British Leyland workers wanted assembly lines that did not continually break down and stop production. Effectiveness would also have been increased by good working conditions, a benefit that none of these groups enjoyed. The dockers and miners could also suffer from serious medical problems because of poor working conditions. Some dockers had pulmonary conditions through constant working in the cold; others had accidents from mishandled cargo and could lose fingers and toes because of these. The miners, because Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.

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of constantly breathing in dust underground, were all prone to the dreaded pneumococcus, which could cripple and possibly kill them in old age. An additional hazard was that Maypole colliery had the worst accident record of mines in the area. The British Leyland workers were less prone to physical risks but many suffered from tiredness and mental stress because of continually having to work at the pace of the moving line. Effectiveness needs cover training which provides the competences to do the job safely and efficiently. Training for safety was mixed and mostly came from experience of doing the job. The dockers had to avoid accidents, such as falling cargo, that caused personal injury, while the colliery