Multicultural America
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Multicultural America AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEWEST AMERICANS Volume 1
Ronald H. Bayor, Editor
Copyright 2011 by Ronald H. Bayor All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Multicultural America : an encyclopedia of the newest Americans / Ronald H. Bayor, editor. v. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-313-35786-2 (hard copy : alk. paper) · ISBN 978-0-313-35787-9 (ebook) 1. Cultural pluralism·United States·Encyclopedias. 2. Multiculturalism·United States·Encyclopedias. 3. Immigrants·United States·Encyclopedias. 4. Ethnology· United States·Encyclopedias. 5. Minorities·United States·Encyclopedias. 6. United States·Ethnic relations·Encyclopedias. 7. United States·Race relations·Encyclopedias. I. Bayor, Ronald H., 1944E184.A1M813 2011 305.800973·dc22 2011004677 ISBN: 978-0-313-35786-2 EISBN: 978-0-313-35787-9 15
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Contents
Preface, ix Introduction, xiii Chronology, xxvii Afghan Immigrants, 1 Ceri Oeppen Argentinian Immigrants, 39 Judith Ann Warner Bahamian Immigrants, 79 Kathryn Beard Bangladeshi Immigrants, 109 Ahrar Ahmad Brazilian Immigrants, 149 Franklin Goza Cambodian Immigrants, 205 Justin Corfield Chilean Immigrants, 237 Cristián Doña-Reveco Chinese Immigrants, 277 Jonathan H. X. Lee Colombian Immigrants, 353 Enrique S. Pumar Costa Rican Immigrants, 381 Thea S. Alvarado v
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Cuban Immigrants, 413 Guillermo J. Grenier Dominican Immigrants, 471 Ramona Hernández and Anthony Stevens-Acevedo Ecuadorian Immigrants, 533 Kenneth Kincaid Egyptian Immigrants, 577 Caroline Nagel Eritrean Immigrants, 617 Tricia Redeker Hepner Ethiopian Immigrants, 657 Solomon Addis Getahun Filipino Immigrants, 701 Maria Paz Gutierrez Esguerra Ghanaian Immigrants, 753 Baffour K. Takyi Guatemalan Immigrants, 799 Timothy Steigenga and Sandra Lazo de la Vega Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants, 845 Stephen J. Sills and Natassaja Chowthi Haitian Immigrants, 887 Bertin M. Louis Jr. Honduran Immigrants, 933 Suyapa G. Portillo Villeda Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants, 969 Karen Isaksen Leonard Indonesian Immigrants, 1027 Jennifer Cho Iranian Immigrants, 1069 Maboud Ansari Iraqi Immigrants, 1111 Mary C. Sengstock
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Israeli Jewish Immigrants, 1149 Steven J. Gold Jamaican Immigrants, 1189 Alwyn D. Gilkes Japanese Immigrants, 1247 Eiichiro Azuma Kenyan Immigrants, 1287 Nicole C. D’Errico and Scott G. Feinstein Korean Immigrants, 1329 Won Moo Hurh Laotian Immigrants, 1397 Helen K. Kim Lebanese Immigrants, 1427 Stephen J. Sills Liberian Immigrants, 1459 Hana Brown Mexican Immigrants, 1493 Alma M. Garcia Nicaraguan Immigrants, 1557 Lisa Konczal Nigerian Immigrants, 1595 Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome Pakistani Immigrants, 1655 Kathleen M. Moore Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants, 1695 Randa Bassem Serhan Panamanian Immigrants, 1731 Joanna Doran and Anulkah Thomas Peruvian Immigrants, 1777 Erika Busse-Cárdenas and Rodrigo Lovatón Dávila Puerto Ricans, 1843 María E. Pérez y González
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Salvadoran Immigrants, 1903 Carlos B. Cordova Somalian Immigrants, 1965 Franklin Goza Sudanese Immigrants, 2013 Deidre Ann Tyler Taiwanese Immigrants, 2043 Franklin Ng Thai Immigrants, 2097 Jenjira Yahirun Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants, 2135 Teruyuki Tsuji Venezuelan Immigrants, 2191 Magaly Sanchez-R. Vietnamese Immigrants, 2229 Hien Duc Do Selected Bibliography, 2277 About the Editor and Contributors, 2279 Index, 2287
Preface
Most Americans are aware of the many new immigrants arriving in the United States but know little about them. This encyclopedia was planned to provide thorough studies of these newest immigrants, who have come mainly after the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. After that legislation, America shifted from a country that excluded people on the basis of national origins to a more inclusive society that welcomed people from many lands. Never before had so many immigrants arrived from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These volumes are directed toward readers who want comprehensive narrative information, along with a set of special features to bring these new groups to life. Statistics are provided, but the text emphasizes history, identity, and culture. The four volumes include 50 country entries, ranging alphabetically from Afghanistan to Vietnam. Relatively little-known immigrant-sending nations such as Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Nigeria, and Thailand are covered, along with well-known and major senders like China, Dominican Republic, India, Jamaica, Mexico, and Taiwan. All are covered in great detail. Readers can easily search for a country and find information under topic sections within the country essay. Most essays are from 10,000 to 20,000 words each, with scholars, many from the nations being discussed, providing knowledgeable analyses of the countries. Authors include sociologists, historians, anthropologists, political scientists, geographers, ethnic studies experts, and other social scientists. Each author was asked to divide the essay into seven categories followed by appendices. The main categories are Background, covering geography and history; Causes and Waves of Migration, focusing on early and later immigration, especially after 1965; Demographic Profile, concentrating on population size, age, educational and economic attainment, and health; Adjustment and Adaptation, centering on family, life-cycle rituals, changing gender relations, links to the ancestral home, social organizations, religion, language, the ethnic press, food, music, and holidays. Section 5, Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture, depicts the immigrant groupÊs path toward citizenship, intergroup relations, forging an American identity, political
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participation, and return immigration; the last two sections present information on The Second and Later Generations, with such issues as ethnic identity, cultural identification, and educational attainment, and Issues in Relations between the United States and the Country of Origin, looking at forecasts for the 21st century. Furthermore, each essay chapter has various statistical tables, chosen individually by each author, relating to the immigrants and their community, a list of notable Americans from that nationality, either U.S.-born or with careers based in America, a glossary of pertinent words, references used in the chapter, and an annotated further readings list for those who wish to pursue study of the group. Finally, authors were asked to provide sidebars, particularly of young individuals who were willing to tell their immigration and adjustment stories. This aspect personalizes the immigrant experience for each nation and allows the reader to connect with the immigrantÊs world. Readers will be able to acquire a full understanding of these newest Americans: who they are; why they came to America; what is their culture; what are their skills and educational levels; whether they still have links to the Old World; and if there has been a development of a new American identity. These questions are essential for understanding the immigrantsÊ experiences, and what impact they are having on the United States. The encyclopedia is the first book to bring together all this information for ready reference, and it reveals interesting but little-known facts about our new immigrants. For example, many of the newest immigrants come with higher skills and more education than their European predecessors; they are often upwardly mobile at a faster rate; and they are frequently bilingual into succeeding generations. Gender roles have changed very quickly as immigrant women entered the U.S. labor force and secured new family authority. Accepting American social mores brought significant change to family dynamics. In specific cases, the essays show many intriguing aspects of the new immigrants. For example, Ghanaians and other Africans have had a mixed response from U.S.-born African Americans; Iraqi immigrants have included Christians, Muslims, and Jews; Indonesia is the worldÊs largest Muslim country, but a significant number of Indonesians in the United States are Protestant or Catholic; many Israeli immigrants return to Israel, which is not the usual pattern for immigrants to the United States; Kenyans, as with most east Africans, have very high rates of educational attainment in the United States; American anti-Muslim attitudes have deeply affected immigrants from Muslim nations such as Pakistan and have made adjustment more difficult even for the 25 percent of Pakistanis born in the United States; and Argentina and Brazil, major immigrant-receiving nations for most of their histories, suddenly became significant sending nations to the United States in the late 20th century. Many revelations in this reference work will surprise the reader but also increase their understanding of what America is and who is an American. Connections with previous immigrant waves are also described.
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Immigrants from AmericaÊs past arrivals and those coming since 1965 formed migration chains, found both hostility and acceptance in America, had to adjust to a new culture and learn a new language, found ethnic niches in the economy, developed an ethnic press, retained many of their food choices, entered into American politics, and maintained emotional links to the Old World. As always, each made a contribution to American life and enhanced U.S. society and culture.
Acknowledgments A project such as an encyclopedia depends on the work of many people besides the editor and contributors. Some essays have incorporated but updated some material found in Greenwood PressÊs New Americans Series, including „Cuban Immigrants‰ by Guillermo J. Grenier, with material from The Cuban Americans by Miguel Gonzáles-Pando, and „Haitian Immigrants‰ by Bertin M. Louis Jr., with material from The Haitian Americans by Flore Zéphir. Other essays that have been thoroughly updated with substantially new content by the original authors are The Dominican Americans by Ramona Hernández and Anthony Stevens-Acevedo; The Mexican Americans by Alma M. Garcia; Puerto Ricans in the United States by Maria E. Perez Gonzales; The Salvadoran Americans by Carlos B. Cordova; The South Asian Americans in the „Indian Immigrants‰ essay by Karen Leonard; and The Vietnamese Americans by Hien Duc Do. The Encyclopedia had its beginnings with a suggestion from Sandy Towers, senior acquisitions editor for Greenwood Press, now ABC-CLIO, and her support for this project is appreciated. I would also like to acknowledge the help of developmental editor Lindsay Claire, and especially Anne Thompson. Anne had a special role to play in the completion of this work, and I doubt it would have seen publication without her guidance and assistance. Thanks as well go to the essay authors, particularly those who were prompt in their submissions and cooperative in regard to revisions. Finally, my wife, Leslie N. Bayor, deserves thanks for her love and support.
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Introduction
It is well known that America is a nation of immigrants, but less understood are the patterns, laws, and effects of that immigration. The multitude and variety of AmericaÊs immigrants have shaped the country from the colonial period to the present. Although the sending countries have changed over the years, the reasons for coming to America have not. This introduction provides a short history of immigration, with special attention to the period after 1965, when new laws restructured the immigration process. Individuals from the colonizing European powers settled colonial America. The majority were from England but included as well settlers from such countries as Spain, France, Holland, Sweden, the German states, and, as forced immigrants, those from various African areas (Daniels 1990). Except for numerous people brought as slaves, immigrants have generally seen America as a land of opportunity, where they could start new lives. Immigration was a product of being pushed from the Old World countries and pulled toward America. The push factors could be lack of employment and land, wars, oppressive governments, discrimination, overpopulation, and the impact of the Industrial Revolution. Factors in AmericaÊs pull could be individual and generational opportunity, a rise in class status, property ownership, and freedom of religion (Daniels 1990). Not all immigrants stayed; some colonies failed, and many immigrants at various periods in American history returned to their ancestral homes. Some came with no intention of staying and planned only to spend a few years in North America, make some money, and return home to buy property. But for those who stayed, whether the Irish famine immigrants of the 1840s, the Cubans fleeing CastroÊs revolution in the 1960s, or the Ethiopians responding to war in the 1990s (see Cuban and Ethiopian chapters), commonality existed in regard to the elements of their push pull histories. It was also usual for immigrants to form chain migrations, in which one family or town member would arrive first and then other family or townspeople would follow, often going to the same American location (Daniels 1990).
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Immigration meant a difficult journey, but immigration laws did not hamper arrival at first. In fact, there were few restrictions on those arriving, and there was no one who was an illegal immigrant. Quotas and limits on the total number who could be admitted were for future times. Immigrants could even include convicts and debtors. Entry was easy, unless a colony or state quarantined a ship due to disease. Restrictive laws did not appear until well into the 19th century. The tribulations of the passage over were also very different in the initial years. Coming by sail and later steamship, traveling in cargo or passenger ships, immigrants had rough journeys to the New World. They were routinely placed in the steerage areas, below the water line and where the steering mechanisms had once been housed. Jammed together with little light and air, immigrants sometimes faced disease, particularly typhus and smallpox, as they crossed the ocean to America. Arrival locations for cargo ships were based on where they dropped off European manufactured goods and picked up American raw material. Later in the century, steamships had regular service and stopped at numerous ports. By the end of the 19th century, travel time could be from a few days to two weeks (Kraut 1982). This is a different experience from immigrants arriving by airplane or through overland routes in contemporary times. The laws governing immigration became increasingly severe as the country experienced more immigrants and more diversity. While naturalization laws dealing with securing citizenship became an issue as early as the beginning of the 19th century, the first federal immigration law did not appear until 1882, after the Supreme Court deemed that immigration was a federal, not a state matter. The Chinese were the first ethnic group to be singled out for restriction and exclusion. While nativists feared Irish Catholics becoming citizens, it was the Chinese who were banned from even coming to America. Ostensibly directed only at Chinese laborers and initially passed for a ten-year period, it had the effect of barring most Chinese and was eventually extended indefinitely. Chinese already in America but China-born could not become citizens, a situation that was evident after 1870 (Daniels 1990; 2004). The entry of a racial/ethnic factor in immigration was new but indicated a sense of the countryÊs prejudices and a precursor to what was to be legislated later. Further legislation in the 1880s and 1890s prevented the entry of such categories of people as contract laborers, the insane, diseased individuals, criminals, polygamists, and those who might become charity cases. A few years later came restrictions against anarchists or others who would support the overthrow of the U.S. government. Within these years of individual-based restrictions, the second attempt to bar an Asian group was secured. The GentlemenÊs Agreement with Japan of 1907 1908 prevented Japanese laborers from entering the United States Through this pact, Japan also would not allow laborers to leave their country. As a result of this agreement, only a very small number of Japanese would be able to enter the United States (Daniels 1990).
Introduction | xv
By the end of the 19th century two important changes had occurred in relation to immigration. The federal government opened New YorkÊs Ellis Island immigration reception center in 1892, indicating the federal control of immigration processing, and immigration patterns had shifted away from Northern and Western Europe to Eastern and Southern Europe. Ellis Island became the gateway to America for most Europeans. In 1910, the Angel Island processing center in San Francisco Bay was opened for primarily Asian immigrants. The differences between the two centers illustrate the American attitudes toward European and Asian immigrants. Ellis Island allowed most immigrants through relatively easily, while Angel Island largely became a detention center. As immigration shifted to Eastern and Southern Europe, the country saw an increasing number of Jews and Italians. Large numbers of both groups arrived in the United States from the 1880s to the beginning of World War I in 1914. Both these white groups, like the Irish before them, were met with great hostility. Considered as not white enough, and representing races and cultures that nativists felt were unassimilable and would overwhelm and outbreed Anglo-Saxon Protestant America, these immigrants inspired new restrictionist laws, the first against Europeans. Starting with congressional attempts in the 1890s to secure a literacy test for arriving immigrants (the legislation was passed in 1917), the hostility finally resulted in oppressive national quota laws by the 1920s. The Literacy Act required the immigrant „to read any recognized language‰ and also included an Asiatic Barred Zone to bar more Asian immigrant (Daniels 2004). The 1920s legislation set the immigration patterns for the next 40 years. New strategies to limit immigration came into play in 1921 with the Emergency Quota Act, which was extended to 1924. Fearful that immigration would increase too much after the war, Congress reacted to the nationÊs general desire to limit the immigrant numbers and control their origins. A numerical cap (357,000) was placed on immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere, while no limitation was put on immigration from the Western Hemisphere: Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada. A countryÊs quota was set at three percent of that countryÊs nationals living in the United States as of the 1910 census. The intent was to give preference to Northern and Western European immigrants. The lawÊs purpose was also to restrict Eastern and Southern Europeans from entering the United States, and to limit others planning to arrive. This legislation was considered temporary and was replaced by a much more stringent National Origins Act in 1924. In 1924, after the nationÊs rising concern with radicalism in the United States, and worries about the new immigrants overtaking AmericaÊs culture, politics, and so-called genetic purity, Congress passed new legislation that closely followed the wishes of the Ku Klux Klan. Historian Roger Daniels calls the 1924 act „the greatest triumph of nativism‰ (Daniels 2004). This law, which was set to go fully into effect in 1929, set an immigration cap of approximately 150,000 and nationality
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quotas based on two percent of a countryÊs citizens as enumerated in the 1890 U.S. census, before the wave of Eastern and Southern Europeans had arrived. The lawÊs results were once again to give preference to Northern and Western Europe and to further restrict Jewish and Italian immigration. Asians were virtually excluded, while Western Hemisphere immigrants had no numerical cap. For example, Great Britain received a large percentage of the immigration total, while Italian immigration was cut by about 150,000 (Barkan 1996). The law as it was fully enacted in 1929 set quotas based on a convoluted knowledge of the ethnic origins of the American people and used the 1920 census as the guide. The United States stood in the 1920s as a country that wished to have only those who reflected the original settlers. In an environment that was anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic and considered Asians as excludable inferiors, the country was not immigrant-friendly. These attitudes were borne out further in the 1930s Depression years, as the nation closed its doors to refugees fleeing Nazism and Fascism and repatriated/deported more than 500,000 Mexicans Americans, both those born in the United States and in Mexico (Barkan 1996). For a nation of immigrants, these were sorry days, and for a nation that was soon to be the worldÊs leader, the immigration laws became more and more a relic of a discriminatory past. Interestingly, many of the anti-immigration fears and arguments heard in contemporary times were evident in the 1920s and before. Immigrants as disease carriers, as criminals, taking jobs away from native-born Americans, changing the countryÊs ethnic and racial make-up, bringing radicalism (terrorism) to the United States, and introducing people who could not be assimilated were all aspects of nativism then and now. As the United States became more cognizant of the rest of the world and AmericaÊs allies, features of the immigration laws underwent change. The first indication of new thinking related to China, fighting alongside the United States against Japan in World War II. In 1943, the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed, although the quota for China (105 immigrants) was very low. However, Chinese-born individuals could now become naturalized citizens, a goal that had been denied to them earlier. A few years later, Filipinos and East Indians, also allies, were allowed small quotas (Barkan 1996). While the Chinese-related changes indicated an attempt to foster unity among the allies and among the American people and minimize ethnic hostility, other events showed another American attitude. The incarceration of about 110,000 West Coast Japanese Americans during the war, citizens and noncitizens, demonstrated the prejudices still evident. Also the Zoot-suit riots in Los Angeles, in which U.S. servicemen attacked Mexican American youth, illustrated negative attitudes toward this group. Yet, this was also a time when the United States was in desperate need of workers, due to the shortage caused by the entry of many Americans into the armed forces and by the Japanese American imprisonment. As a result, the Bracero program was started in 1943 and lasted in various forms until 1964. The Bracero plan
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was a temporary worker program that allowed large numbers of primarily Mexican laborers to come to the United States to work and then return to Mexico. Undocumented Mexicans also came into the country illegally in an effort to avoid the literacy law and an immigrant head tax. The illegal immigrants were not yet an issue for the United States, due to the effectiveness of the Bracero program and its outreach to Mexicans who wanted to work and earn in the United States (Daniels 1990; Reimers 1992). Other than the War Brides Act in 1945, which provided entry for American military spouses and children, the major postwar immigration controversy involved the refugees displaced by the war. Humanitarian concerns about the war-ravaged refugees prompted an effort to open the immigration gates, but anxiety about assimilation and political ideology brought opposition. After heated congressional debate, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 was passed. What was unusual about the legislation is that it focused on refugees rather than immigrants, but nonetheless it eased entry into the United States for some. The United States allowed almost onehalf million refugees into the country from 1948 to 1952, raising many issues about immigration policy, particularly the topic of nationality quotas. Due to the refugee situation, some countriesÊ quotas were filled far into the future (Barkan 1996). The United States after World War II became the leader of the free world, representing a counterpoint to the Soviet Union and communism. The Cold War brought these two powers into competition, and immigration, as well as American racial policy, became more serious international issues. The American people during the early 1950s McCarthy years found themselves trying to present the face of equality to the world while still mired in racial segregation, and fear of unassimilable and ideologically suspect newcomers. Congress reflected these fears while pursuing refugee and immigration solutions. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act) brought significant policy changes but maintained the controversial quota system. It did, however, remove all race/nationality barriers to immigration and naturalization. Some groups still had very small quotas, particularly those coming from the AsiaPacific Triangle (mostly East Asian countries such as Korea and Japan), but nobody was excluded. However, a racial bias was clear. For example, a Chinese individual born in and living in a country with a substantial quota would still be considered Chinese and part of ChinaÊs small quota (Daniels 2004; Barkan 1996). Furthermore, family reunification as a nonquota immigration category became a stronger aspect of U.S. policy. Antisubversive provisions were also part of this act in relation to the spread of communism. The 1952 act can be regarded as an interim step toward the substantial modifications of the 1965 Immigration Act. As the country moved toward the liberalization found in the 1965 act, it was clear that there were a number of stepping stones. America as a world power meant paying attention to refugee issues, special skills needed in the United States, and
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family reunification. These concerns resulted in more nontraditional immigrants, many of whom came in as nonquota. Favored consideration in the 1950s and early 1960s was given to refugees from such areas as Hong Kong, Hungary, Cuba, the Middle East, and Africa through the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, the Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957, and special admission programs. A significant change was that Asians could be admitted as refugees (Daniels 2004; Barkan 1996). There were in essence two immigration policies that were operative: one based on immigration and quotas, the other on refugees and nonquota entry. The ceiling or maximum for those coming to America was shifting rapidly. The total amount allowed into the United States through the McCarran-Walter Act became meaningless as refugee admissions through presidential declarations or congressional legislation increased the number. The immigration policy shift was due not only to AmericaÊs new place in the world and Cold War influence, but also to a perceptible awakening to issues of diversity and civil rights during the late 1950s and into the 1960s. The Civil Rights movement brought enhanced concerns about racial/ethnic discrimination in relation to voting and public accommodations but also to immigration issues. John F. KennedyÊs election as president in 1960 brought to the White House someone who was deeply interested in immigration. After KennedyÊs assassination, Lyndon Johnson carried forward the plans for a new immigration act. A robust economy also helped to secure public support for more new Americans. The intent of the 1965 legislation, as noted in congressional debates, was to do away with discriminatory quotas, thereby ending an inequitable system. However, there was no desire to change migration patterns. The assumption was that Eastern and Southern Europeans, previously disfavored, would now find a new opening to enter the United States. Political leaders did not expect to see Asians, Hispanics, and Africans benefiting the most from this law (Reimers 1992). America was still Europe-oriented, but this act was to change immigration patterns and some attitudes as well as reinvigorate the nativist opposition. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 stressed family reunification as a preference, which was thought of as a way to help such countries as Poland and Italy, with large backlogs of prospective immigrants and with family ties to the United States. Parents, spouses, and young children would be nonquota immigrants who could enter beyond the maximum allowed. Also, preference was given to certain skills needed in the United States. Most importantly, the Act ended the national origins quota system. There was no longer a discrimination-based policy on where an individual was born. Initially the Western Hemisphere had no country limit and no preference system, which helped those Latin American countries sending significant numbers. In the Eastern Hemisphere, each country had a 20,000-person cap and preferences that favored family reunification. In 1978, a change resulted in every country around the world having a 20,000-person limit. This shift meant
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that the Asian-Pacific TriangleÊs low quotas were eliminated, and these countries also had a 20,000 immigrant quota. A major change was to impose a controversial ceiling on Western Hemisphere immigration, similar to what had been done previously for the Eastern Hemisphere. A political compromise to secure the end of the national origins quotas led to this provision. While eventually each nation was to have a cap, there was also immediate interest in providing a limit on total immigration. Ending quotas did not diminish the concern with the total numbers arriving. Ceilings of 170,000 for the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 for the Western Hemisphere were written into the legislation. In 1978, a worldwide cap of 290,000 was set and then later changed to 270,000. However, parents, spouses, and children could still enter as nonquota (Daniels 1990; Reimers 1992). The attempt to impose a ceiling convinced many Americans that immigration could be controlled while still providing a nondiscriminatory policy. The surprise came with the large numbers who entered as nonquota immigrants beyond the hemisphere and individual country caps. Also, special refugee admittances, as with the Vietnamese during the late 1970s, continued. The limit on the Western Hemisphere also came at the same time as the end of the Bracero program. Large numbers of Mexicans still wanted to work and earn in the United States, but all could not enter legally (Daniels 2004; Reimers 1992). The undocumented immigrant issue began to take shape by 1969. Furthermore, as Great Britain restricted immigrants from former Caribbean colonies, many migrants came to the United States instead. Immigration patterns would change relatively quickly as the new sending countries became mainly those in South and Central America, the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa. The United States began to see more arrivals from Mexico, Vietnam, Korea, India, China, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Nigeria. In 1950, the two leading sending nations were Poland and Germany; by 1980, they were Mexico and Vietnam (Barkan 1996). Through immigrant networks and chain migrations, more non-Europeans began to dominate the immigrant flow and develop concentrations in certain U.S. areas. In the case of Asians, for example, skill preferences in the Act brought many to America and, once permanent immigrant status was achieved, relatives could arrive using family reunification preferences. Refugees were also part of the Asian migration, especially after the Vietnam War had ended. A similar situation developed for Hispanics and West Indians. While a maximum existed, many arrived as nonquota immigrants due to family ties, and refugee admittances, or as poverty-driven undocumented aliens. Given world problems due to wars, natural disasters, and poverty, the United States began to admit more refugees from troubled areas (Reimers 1992). The refugee increase explains a great deal about the shifting patterns and larger numbers of immigrants. An indication of changing policies came with the Refugee Act of 1980. This legislation altered the definition of refugee to include not only those fleeing
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communism but also people needing entrée due to political or other persecution. The Act introduced the „right of asylum, and created a new legal category of refugee, an Âasylee,Ê ‰ especially in regard to political asylum, even for political refugees already in the United States. It increased the refugee numbers that could be admitted and provided for possible special emergency cases. Refugees could become legal resident aliens after one rather than two years, which meant that their road to citizenship was set and family members would soon be eligible for admittance (Daniels 1990; Reimers 1992). The Refugee ActÊs importance was that it set the stage for Haitians and others fleeing poverty and oppression to eventually be admitted as easily as Cubans escaping communism. But this change did not come until later, and meanwhile these so-called economic refugees had great difficulty entering the United States legally through the 1980s. Americans felt growing concern with immigration and refugee policies in the 1980s and after, as it appeared to many that our borders were porous. The problem was not in border control, but rather the same push-pull factors that drew earlier migrants. Poverty, the need of jobs, the desire to seek economic opportunity, and freedom from oppressive governments pushed and pulled immigrants to America seeking a better life. They would come legally or illegally. Some overstayed tourist or student visas; others crossed mainly the southern border but also that in the north. Jobs were available in agriculture, in the garment industry, in poultry production, in hotel work and other service industries; and employment even with harsh conditions and low wages still offered more opportunity than in the sending countries (Barkan 1996). Trying to secure some control over the immigrant numbers and deal with the need for agricultural laborers, Congress thought it had an answer in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). The act created an amnesty program that allowed undocumented aliens who had taken up residence in the United States before January 1, 1982, and stayed in the country since that time to be legitimized. Almost three million individuals secured permanent status as a result of this legislation (Barkan 1996). Temporary agricultural workers could also secure amnesty if they had labored for at least 90 days from May 1985 to May 1986. They would be designated as temporary aliens and could then become permanent resident aliens. The ActÊs intent was to satisfy both the public in regard to hopefully solving the illegal immigrant issue, and the growers who needed this labor. This provision was particularly controversial because it did not stop the undocumented flow but merely served to legitimize those already in the United States. The arbitrary date could also divide families by allowing for the deportation of some family members and thereby creating an unfair situation (Reimers 1992). Amnesty remains a contentious issue into the present time. Employer sanctions were the other main IRCA issue. In an effort to force employers to discontinue the hiring of undocumented aliens, fines and jail time could
Introduction | xxi
be implemented. Employers were designated as responsible for checking employee documents, but this presented problems. Immigration and other documents such as Social Security cards could be forged, and employers were not always interested in, nor were they mandated to make sure that, the papers were legitimate. Furthermore, rather than checking documents, employers might simply refuse to hire Hispanics so as to avoid any investigation that would lead to penalties (Reimers 1992). The success or failure of the IRCA rested more on the state of the economy and society than on other issues in both Mexico/Central America and the United States. If jobs were available in the United States and employers needed workers, no law would stop the flow from the south. The undocumented kept arriving even after the border patrol was strengthened and the journey led to some immigrant deaths (Reimers 1992). It should be noted as well that Hispanics were not the only ones to enter the country illegally. Europeans such as the Irish also showed up at the border, and due to the same economic push-pull factors (Daniels 1990). This Act also began a lottery to help nations that the 1965 Immigration Act had negatively affected. Generally this applied to countries such as Ireland, whose immigration numbers had decreased. With the lottery, they could enter without regard to any preference category (Daniels 2004). IRCA was generally a failure, since it stopped neither the border crossings nor the hiring of undocumented employees. While many legal and illegal immigrants were adjusting well, acculturating to American society, and adding to the U.S. economy and society, the American public was not satisfied on a number of points. Anger existed in regard to the governmentÊs failure to control U.S. borders, the growing Hispanic influence on American culture and language, and continued immigrant ties to the old country. Nativist concerns of earlier years reappeared in the form of fears of the new Americans out-breeding and overwhelming the traditional Americans of European ancestry, and fears of the quickly increasing foreign-born in such regions as the American South, which had not been significant immigrant receiving areas previously (Barkan 1996). While it is very clear that Cubans revitalized Miami and South Florida and Koreans emerged to provide merchant services in depressed minority neighborhoods that virtually saved the economic life of these areas, ethnic conflict emerged as a by-product of the new immigrant waves (Reimers 1992). As always, new immigrants and older groups fought over resources: schools, neighborhoods, government aid, politics, and jobs. Korean grocers and the surrounding black population did not always get along, nor did Hispanics and blacks who fought over political power and neighborhood control (Foner 2000). Controversies regarding racial identity also reappeared. Many African, Caribbean, and Hispanic newcomers were surprised at the level of racial discrimination and consciousness still evident in the United States For those who had come from allblack nations or from areas that were biracial, the intensity of white American attitudes toward skin color was astonishing (Foner 2000). This issue was readily
xxii | Introduction
apparent in immigration policy in regard to the welcome given to white Cubans as opposed to black Haitians. In a further effort to clarify immigration policy and deal with recurrent problems, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990. Family reunification was again the main focus, along with job skills. An amnesty was approved for immigrant familiesÊ undocumented relatives denied legalization due to the arbitrary date of the IRCA amnesty provision. These relatives had to have arrived in the United States by May 1988 (Reimers 1992). The law also set a 700,000 (later 675,000) cap on total immigration, although the maximum did not include „refugees, asylees, and IRCA legalizations,‰ as well as close relatives and special cases of nonquota immigrants. Each country has a 25,620 limit rather than the 20,000 noted earlier. Provision was made for more asylum visas, and the category „temporary protected status‰ was introduced to deal with emergency cases (Barkan 1996). The IRCA lottery concept endured from that earlier legislation. The American public and politicians focused more strongly on the undocumented immigrants during the 1990s and after, particularly so after 9/11. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) was the 1990s response, as were various attempts to deny not only illegal immigrants, but initially even legal immigrants, from securing government benefits (Daniels 2004). The IIRIRA dealt with increasing border control, streamlining and strengthening deportation procedures and adding further reasons for deportation, preventing aliens from being smuggled into the United States, making the granting of asylum more onerous, and providing better employer substantiation of immigrant workerÊs documents (Siskind Susser Bland). As the New York Times reported, the „law eliminates broad class-action lawsuits . . . by groups complaining of illegal conduct over issues including warrantless searches of farm workersÊ homes and lawsuits on behalf of Haitian, Guatemalan and Salvadoran asylum seekers‰ (Johnston 1996). Immigration by itself was no longer as important an issue as how the immigrants arrived in America (legal or undocumented). The country grew anxious about porous borders and illegal immigrants, especially after 9/11. A frightening concept for many Americans was in not knowing who was coming over the border. Muslim immigrants were immediately placed in a new category and received more scrutiny. Many men here on student, tourist, and other temporary visas were arrested and placed in long-term detention while they were being screened. Most were deported (Sachs 2002; Lichtblau 2003). Muslim men who were to be deported but evaded the order received special Justice Department attention to find them (Lewis 2002). Also, in November 2001, „the State Department said . . . that it would slow the process for granting visas to young men of Arab and Moslem nations in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks‰ (Lewis and Marquis 2001). In essence, all Muslim and Arab immigrants were considered terrorists until proven otherwise. Muslim immigration declined temporarily after 9/11 but picked up again by 2006. Clearly facing
Introduction | xxiii
a more hostile American public, the majority still sought American life for the usual reasons: „economic opportunity and political freedom‰ (Elliott 2006). As a result of the attack on the Twin Towers and already evident resentment against all, and especially undocumented, immigrants, various states and the federal government passed laws making it more difficult for legal and illegal immigrants to secure driverÊs licenses, and for employers to hire illegal aliens. Some state legislatures also disallowed undocumented immigrants from receiving unemployment insurance. Federal law made citizenship mandatory for all airport screeners and legal immigration required for any other airport worker (Swarns 2003). The new Department of Homeland Security also had an impact on immigrants, and particularly those from certain nations. Since 2003, Homeland Security has been in charge of enforcing the immigration laws. The Immigration and Naturalization Service was placed under the new Department of Homeland Security and renamed the Immigration and Customs Enforcement division (ICE). This had an effect on immigrant detentions, asylum seekers, and employers of illegal immigrants, who faced more investigations and raids (Bernstein 2004; Editorial 2009; Manrique 2009; Preston 2006; Preston 2007). Controversy remains strong, particularly on the undocumented immigration issue, and Congress has yet to develop a new comprehensive immigration act. Meanwhile, due to congressional inaction, more states, particularly on the Mexican U.S. border, have begun to formulate tougher laws. Arizona in 2010 passed the nationÊs most severe law dealing with illegal immigrants. The law, which is considered „the broadest and strictest immigration measure in generations,‰ increases police authority over illegal immigrants and requires immigrants to be able to prove their legal status in this country if the police stop them for a legal violation. Opponents felt that these provisions would lead to ethnic profiling and allow the police to harass legitimate Hispanic immigrants as well as U.S. citizens (Archibold 2010). U.S. government lawyers have challenged the law on the basis that it is unconstitutional, since past Supreme Court decisions have authorized only the federal government to regulate immigration. In July 2010, U.S. District Court Judge Susan Bolton suspended the implementation of significant parts of the law. Arizona is filing an appeal (Reuters 2010). The many and diverse immigrants who have arrived in America since 1965 indicate in some ways a divergence from the last period of large-scale immigration in the 1880 1920 period. Besides coming from different world regions, they are generally better educated and higher skilled and thereby more upwardly mobile. The immigration laws now stress family reunification, which encourages chain migration and networks. The job preference aspects bring in a greater variety of occupational skills than before. Many immigrants already have a familiarity with English and with American culture due to American movies and TV programs. Assimilation into American life can be easier and quicker. Furthermore, there is less
xxiv | Introduction
sense of dislocation, since modern technology allows constant contact with family members and friends left behind (Foner 2000). Immigration has met with hostility and fear due to 9/11, the economic recession, and concerns about an open border and about the effect on American culture. Nativistic attitudes will always exist. Yet, contemporary immigrants, whether from Nigeria, China, or Colombia, bring to the United States needed skills and labor and a desire to fit into the countryÊs life. America still has a great pull on people, evident since colonial days. Ronald H. Bayor References Archibold, Randal C. 2010. „Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration.‰ New York Times, April 23. Barkan, Elliott Robert. 1996. And Still They Come: Immigrants and American Society, 1920 to the 1990s. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson. Bernstein, Nina. 2004. „Out of Repression, into Jail: Detention for Asylum-Seekers Is Routine, but U.S. Is Taking Another Look.‰ New York Times, July 15. Daniels, Roger. 1990. Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life. New York: Harper Perennial. Daniels, Roger. 2004. Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants since 1882. New York: Hill and Wang. Editorial. 2009. „More Immigration Non-Solutions.‰ New York Times, July 12. Elliott, Andrea. 2006. „More Muslims Arrive in U.S., after 9/11 Dip.‰ New York Times, September 10. Foner, Nancy. 2000. From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s Two Great Waves of Immigration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Johnston, David. 1996. „Government Is Quickly Using Power of New Immigration Law.‰ New York Times, October 22. Kraut, Alan. 1982. The Huddled Masses: The Immigrant in American Society, 1880–1921. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson. Lewis, Neil A. 2002. „A Nation Challenged: Immigration Control; I.N.S. to Focus on Muslims Who Evade Deportation.‰ New York Times, January 9. Lewis, Neil A., and Christopher Marquis. 2001. „A Nation Challenged: Immigration; Longer Waits for Arabs; Stir Over U.S. Eavesdropping.‰ New York Times, November 10. Lichtblau, Eric. 2003. „Threats and Responses: Government Report; U.S. Report Faults The Roundup of Illegal Immigrants after 9/11.‰ New York Times, June 3. Manrique, Jenny. 2009. „Detained Asylum-Seekers Find It Harder to Win Release.‰ New York Times, June 1. Preston, Julia. 2006. „U.S. Puts Onus on Employers of Immigrants.‰ New York Times, July 31.
Introduction | xxv Preston, Julia. 2007. „Surge in Immigration Laws around U.S.‰ New York Times, August 6. Reimers, David M. 1992. Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press. Reuters. 2010.‰Key Parts of Arizona Anti-Immigration Law Blocked.‰ New York Times, July 29. Sachs, Susan. 2002. „A Nation Challenged: Detainees; Civil Rights Group to Sue over U.S. Handling of Muslim Men.‰ New York Times, April 17. Siskind Sesser Bland. IIRIRA 96: A Summary of the New Immigration Bill. [Online information; retrieved 7/10.] http://www.visalaw.com/96nov/3nov96.html. Swarns, Rachel. 2003. „Threats and Responses: Security Concerns; Immigrants Feel the Pinch of Post 9/11 Laws.‰ New York Times, June 25.
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Chronology
1500s–1600s
European settlers in America, introduction of Africans as slaves.
1820s–1840s
Large-scale migration from Ireland.
1880s–1910s
Immigration patterns change to Southern and Eastern Europe.
1882
Federal government passes first immigration restriction act, Chinese Exclusion Act.
1892
Federal depot for processing immigrant arrivals: Ellis Island opens.
1880s–early 1900s
Restrictive laws barring various categories of immigrants: insane, criminals, those with certain diseases, anarchists, and so on.
1907–1908
GentlemanÊs Agreement with Japan barring Japanese laborers.
1910
Angel Island immigrant depot opens.
1917
Literacy requirement for immigrants; Asiatic Barred Zone created.
1921
Emergency Quota Act.
1924–1929
National Origins Quota Act, favoring Northern and Western Europe over Eastern and Southern Europe, Asians largely excluded.
1930s
Great Depression, few immigrants arrive, U.S. refusal to permit entry of many refugees fleeing Nazism and Fascism.
1942
Incarceration of Japanese Americans.
1943
Chinese Exclusion Act repealed. xxvii
xxviii | Chronology
1943
Bracero program started, bringing Mexican laborers into the United States.
1945
War Brides Act, allowing entry of military spouses and children.
1948
Passage of Displaced Persons Act.
1952
Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act), maintaining national origins quotas but ending Asian exclusion.
1950–1960
Refugee policy developed to deal with emergency cases in China, Hungary, Indonesia, and Cuba through Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957, and Cuban Refugee Program.
1964
Bracero Program ended.
1965
Immigration and Nationality Act, ending national origins quota system.
1970s–present
Immigration patterns shift from Europe to Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
1980
Refugee Act, setting policy on refugee admittance.
1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), establishing amnesty program.
1990
Immigration Act of 1990, further efforts to control immigration.
1996
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act passed, designed to eliminate undocumented immigrant entry.
2001, September 11
Terrorist attack raises concerns about border control and immigration.
2003
Immigration and Naturalization Service put under Department of Homeland Security and renamed the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division.
2010
Arizona passes law against undocumented immigrants; federal government challenges law; U.S. District Court rules against parts of law.
Afghan Immigrants by Ceri Oeppen
Introduction There are an estimated one hundred to one hundred and fifty thousand Afghans living in the United States (Oeppen 2009). Afghans first started fleeing Afghanistan in sizeable numbers in response to its occupation by Soviet forces (1979 1989); prior to that small numbers of Afghans had travelled to the United States, mainly for education purposes. After the Soviet withdrawal, the number of Afghan arrivals lessened but the subsequent civil war and Taliban regime meant that few Afghan Americans returned and instead arranged for family members to join them, where possible. The majority of Afghans came as refugees but many have now been naturalized. Afghans are living throughout the United States, mainly in urban areas, with key concentrations including the San Francisco Bay Area, New York City, and the Washington, D.C., area. Ethnographic fieldwork with Afghans in the San Francisco Bay Area, conducted by the author in 2006 2007, is combined with secondary sources to form the basis for this chapter. Between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001, Afghanistan dropped somewhat from public consciousness. However, following the U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan, political events in the United States and Afghanistan are once more intertwined. Since 2002, some Afghan Americans have returned to work, at least temporarily, for the Afghan government or for international and nongovernmental organizations working on humanitarian projects in Afghanistan. However, there has been no large-scale return movement.
Chronology Afghanistan has a long and complex history. Here a chronology is provided to indicate some key events that may be significant as a cause for Afghan migration, including to the United States. Others have provided more detailed histories (see Dorronsoro 2005; Dupree 1973; Hyman 1992; Omrani and Leeming 2005). 1919–1929
Reign of King Amanullah, who tried to modernize Afghanistan, including provisions for womenÊs rights and a Western-style education system. 1
Chronology | 3
1921
King AmanullahÊs government establishes a program to send students overseas for educational purposes.
From the 1940s
More students are sent to countries such as the United States as well as the USSR, Germany, and France for university education.
1973
King Zahir Shah is ousted by his cousin, Prime Minister Daoud. Daoud then declared Afghanistan a republic, and himself president.
1978
President Daoud and his family killed in a coup („the Saur Revolution‰) led by Taraki and Amin, members of the Leftist PeopleÊs Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
1979
Political parties are formed in exile, especially in Peshawar, Pakistan. Soviet troops enter Afghanistan to support the Communist government and install Karmal as President.
1980–1989
War between the Soviets and the mujahideen. Throughout this period, four to six million refugees flee Afghanistan.
1986
Najibullah, chief of the intelligence service „KhAD,‰ takes power, as Karmal resigns.
1989
The Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan.
1990–1992
NajibullahÊs government and the mujahideen fight for control of Afghanistan. The refugee population reaches a peak of over 6 million, as many flee rocket attacks on Kabul.
1992
The mujahideen take control of Afghanistan.
1993–1994
Factional fighting for control of Kabul intensifies between different mujahideen groups.
1994
The Taliban emerge from religious schools in Pakistan and capture Kandahar.
1995
The Taliban capture Herat.
1996
The Taliban capture Kabul, thus consolidating their control.
1996–2001
The Taliban bring a degree of stability to Afghanistan but their methods of control are brutal and disregard human rights.
2000–2002
Severe drought affects much of the country, particularly the north.
2001
Terrorist attacks of September 11. U.S.-led coalition forces and the Northern Alliance cause the Taliban to flee.
4 | Afghan Immigrants
2002–2003
Some 2 million refugees return to Afghanistan, mainly from Pakistan and Iran. With international assistance security improves in Kabul, but the central government has little control outside Kabul.
2004
The leader of the transitional government, Hamid Karzai, is elected as president.
2005
Parliamentary elections are held.
2005-date
The Afghan government and international forces led by NATO struggle to contain the Taliban, whose hold over the country, particularly in the south and east, continues to grow in strength.
2009
Presidential elections are held. Incumbent Hamid Karzai wins amidst widespread allegations of electoral fraud.
2010
President Barack Obama announces plans to begin withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan beginning in July 2011.
Background Geography Afghanistan is a landlocked country slightly smaller in area than the state of Texas, bordered to the west by Iran, to the east by Pakistan, and to the north by Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and in the northeast, it shares a short border with China. The landscape and environment of Afghanistan is variable but much of the country is mountainous, with the Hindu Kush (an extension of the Himalaya range) dominating from the northeast to the center of the country. The climate is arid or semi-arid, with hot summers and cold winters. In low-lying areas, agriculture, particularly production of fruit, nuts, and wheat, is made possible by extensive irrigation. Afghanistan is famous in the region for its melons and grapes although the years of conflict have destroyed intricate irrigation systems in many areas, and now Afghanistan has become infamous for its opium poppy crop, which requires little water or investment. In hillier areas, pastoral grazing is available for goats and sheep, and karakul lamb skins are a source of export income. Afghanistan also contains many mineral and energy resources including natural gas and apparently the worldÊs finest emeralds and lapis lazuli. Many of these resources are either not utilized or are exploited in a dangerous and haphazard manner. Environmental hazards include earthquakes, drought, floods, and extremely cold winters, which are especially significant for internally displaced people and
Background | 5
returned refugees who do not have access to adequate shelter. In cities, pollution and lack of adequate sanitation are also a hazard.
History of Afghanistan Archaeologists have found evidence of human activity in what is now called Afghanistan from the Middle Paleolithic (Dupree 1973). Omrani and Leeming write that by 1500 B.C.E. when Aryan tribes from Central Asia crossed into the region, there had already been „for more than a thousand years, the domestication of animals, agricultural cultivation of the land, and settlements in small villages and urban conurbations‰ (2005, 31). They continue by noting that the trade connections of this civilization reached from Mesopotamia to the Indus Valley (Omrani and Leeming 2005). The use of the Afghan stone lapis lazuli in the sarcophagus of Tutankhamen gives an indication of the reach of Afghan products in ancient times. By the first century C.E., Afghanistan was a key location on the Silk Road, a series of trade connections that linked China to Rome. The countryÊs history as well as its current situation owes much to its geopolitical location. Afghanistan has often been the furthest reach, or the buffer, of great empires. The Persians, Alexander the Great, the Indian Mauryans, the Arabs (bringing with them Islam), and Ghengis Khan have all laid claim to parts or all of what is now called Afghanistan. It was not until the mid-18th century that Ahmad Shah Durrani, a Pashtun tribal leader, consolidated a region that came to be known as Afghanistan, or land of the Afghans (Afghan being another name for Pashtun at the time). In the process of consolidation, he gradually brought other groups in the region, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen, under his control. By the 19th century, Afghanistan was a key arena in „the Great Game,‰ the vying for power and influence between Tsarist Russia and Imperial Britain. AfghanistanÊs role as a buffer between „empires‰ continued into the 20th century, as the Soviets tried to extend their control into South Asia, and the West tried to prevent the spread of Communism. Both sides in the Cold War used aid and technical assistance to try and influence Afghan leaders and gain their support. Whereas AfghanistanÊs geopolitical location has allowed savvy Afghan leaders to play foreign powers off against each other, it has also been a key factor in causing conflict there. The recent history of Afghanistan, particularly the last 30 years of conflict, is more significant in terms of providing a context for Afghan migration to the United States. Although individuals and small groups had been forced to leave Afghanistan as refugees prior to the late 1970s for dissent against those in power or in response to localized family feuds or discrimination, it was the coup of April 1978 (or „the Saur Revolution‰) that can be seen as the starting point for mass persecution and refugee flight. The coup was led by Amin and Taraki of the PeopleÊs Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a pro-Moscow Leftist/Communist party. The PDPA
6 | Afghan Immigrants
was supported by outside sources, namely Moscow, and did not enjoy the support of the majority of people (Dorronsoro 2005; Kakar 1995). After the coup, antiCommunist parties began to establish themselves in refugee settlements in Peshawar, Pakistan, and people in the countryside began to rebel against the authoritarian regime that pushed land reform and other Soviet-backed programs onto a largely unsupportive rural population. At the same time, divisions within the PDPA between the Khalq and Parcham factions led to the suppression and exile of people from within the party. In autumn 1979, Taraki died (allegedly murdered) and Amin took power. The PDPA became increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union, as resistance against it in the countryside increased. In December 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan; Amin was killed and the Soviet Union installed Babrak Karmal from the Parcham faction as president. Between the Saur revolution in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in 1979, it is estimated that „between 50,000 and 100,000 people disappeared or were eliminated‰ (Dupree and Hatch Dupree 1988, 17). The war fought between the mujahideen (the Afghan resistance) and the Soviet Union and Soviet Union sponsored Afghan government lasted almost 10 years, and during that time, millions of Afghans were killed or injured, or fled the country, most of them to camps in Pakistan or urban areas in Iran. For those with significant money or connections, the threat of targeted attacks was greater; however, for the majority of Afghans, fear of conscription into the National Army or being caught in cross fire between the mujahideen and the army and Soviet forces were greater threats. Although the war was centered around the conflict between the mujahideen and the Soviet occupying forces and the Afghan PDPA government, there is no doubt that the significance of the conflict was felt further afield. Afghanistan became a key battlefield in the Cold War, with the United States and other Western states funding and arming the mujahideen for their own strategic reasons. The significance of the jihad against the atheist Communists was also important for those in Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, as well as for other Muslim resistance fighters in the Soviet Republics of Central Asia. These supporters were not only a source of financial support but some (including Osama Bin Laden) travelled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets themselves, the effects of which are still felt today. The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in January 1989. Although the Communist Najibullah remained president, the mujahideen political parties became stronger, and in 1992, NajibullahÊs government fell. This prompted a return of over 2 million refugees (Maley and Schmeidl 2008) who had originally left due to the Communist government. However, it also set off a new flow of refugees: those who were associated, or perceived to be associated, with the PDPAÊs regime. In addition, the fall of the PDPA led to a new turn in the conflict as the competition between different mujahideen parties initiated a civil war. Friction between the
Background | 7
An Afghan mujahideen (“one engaged in struggle” or jihad ) demonstrates the firing technique for a surface-to-air Stinger missile in 1988, when the United States supported the mujahideen against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The Soviets withdrew the next year. (U.S. Department of Defense)
different mujahideen groups had always been there but the removal of a common enemy made it impossible for them to work together, despite efforts at forming a coalition government starting with Sibghatullah Mujaddidi as transitional leader, followed by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Whereas much of the jihad against the Soviets had taken place in the countryside, the civil war was fought largely over cities, especially Kabul. The conflict also changed in nature, from guerrilla-style to more „conventional‰ warfare, and the groups fighting for Kabul used airborne bombing to devastating effect. While the West lost interest in Afghanistan in the post Cold War era, regional powers such as Iran, Uzbekistan, India and Russia increased their influence over key Afghan political groups; supporting the parties with military and financial resources, as well as pursuing their own national strategic goals. These factors, combined with the conservative Islamist or fundamentalist ideology of some of the mujahideen parties and the lack of effective national government leading to lawlessness and banditry, meant that despite some return migration, the refugee population exceeded 6 million people in the early 1990s (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] 2000).
8 | Afghan Immigrants
Throughout the 1990s, Afghans in Afghanistan and the refugee settlements in Pakistan, Iran, and further afield became more and more disillusioned with the actions of the former freedom fighters of the mujahideen. In 1994 a group of young men, mainly Pashtun and from the refugee settlements of Pakistan, emerged as the Taliban, led by Mullah Mohammad Omar. They were welcomed by many in the southern majority Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, where their strict adherence to Sharia law curtailed banditry and their Pashtun ethnicity appealed to Pashtun nationalists. In 1995 they captured Herat in northwestern Afghanistan, and their control was cemented when they captured Kabul in September 1996. By the late 1990s, they controlled all of Afghanistan except the area around the Panjshir Valley in northeast Afghanistan. The Taliban were antimodern fundamentalist Deobandi Islamists whose governance of Afghanistan was based on a combination of their interpretations of Sharia and Pashtunwali, the tribal code of the Pashtuns. The draconian nature of their rule was particularly felt by those in urban areas who had been used to a less conservative lifestyle. Their rules against women working or travelling unaccompanied; against kite flying, music and other entertainment; their control of dress and appearance for men and women; as well as their persecution of specific ethnic groups such as the Hazara all contributed to the refugee crisis; while some who supported the TalibanÊs goals returned to Afghanistan, others left. The Taliban were supported financially and ideologically by a number of outside actors, including the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency of Pakistan and al-Qaida. According to Dorronsoro (2005, 236), in 1999 up to a third of Taliban fighters were „foreign fundamentalists.‰ When al-Qaida attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, Mullah Mohammad Omar and the Taliban refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden, citing the code of Pashtunwali regarding his status as „a guest.‰ In retaliation a U.S.-led coalition, with on-the-ground fighting conducted largely by the Northern Alliance, attacked the Taliban; and by November 2001, the coalition had captured most of the key strategic sites in Afghanistan. These attacks led to further refugee flight, as civilians fled the coalition bombing and those associated with the Taliban regime fled the Northern Alliance. However, at the same time huge numbers of refugees started to return to Afghanistan; over 4 million refugees had returned by 2005, predominantly from Pakistan and Iran (based on UNHCR data, amalgamated by Kronenfeld 2008). In December 2001 the United Nations organized Bonn Agreement established the Afghan Interim Authority with Hamid Karzai as its leader, whilst the international community pledged billions of dollars to help reconstruct Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai was later elected as head of the Afghan Transitional Authority until presidential elections took place in October 2004, when he was elected president. At the time of writing, almost a decade after the Taliban retreat, despite largescale returns of refugees, there remains a large population of Afghan refugees,
Causes and Waves of Migration | 9
almost three million according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2009). The Taliban is currently gaining strength, and security in Afghanistan is deteriorating day by day. The lack of security discourages return and may lead to increased refugee flows once again. At the same time, poverty and lack of employment opportunities in Afghanistan cause people to travel abroad, making it difficult to identify whether people are leaving due to the political or the economic climate. This section has summarized a hugely complicated history and conflict; war in Afghanistan has been on so many fronts for so many reasons·ideology, ethnicity, class, tribe, access to resources, local feuds, regional or international disputes· and it is impossible to do justice to the variety of factors involved and the evolution of the conflict in such a short space. More importantly, reporting on the political history of the conflict and numbers of refugees certainly does not do justice to the bravery, suffering, injury, and deaths of millions of Afghan individuals. Some Afghans living in the United States have published their memoirs or family stories (Anwar 2004; Qudrat Aseel 2003; Saed and Muradi 2010; Sultan 2006), which provide a more personal account of the conflict, as do books based on fieldwork in Afghanistan and neighboring countries (Harpviken 2009; Klaits and Gulmamadova-Klaits 2006; Monsutti 2005).
Causes and Waves of Migration Before the late 1970s there were very few Afghans in the United States; the small number of Afghans who were in the United States before the late 1970s were generally students (which is discussed further on in this chapter).
Later Waves of Immigration According to Eigo (2000), 200 Pashtuns (Afghans) arrived in the United States in the 1920s, probably from British India but very little is known about these travelers. Eigo also states that 230 Afghans were naturalized as U.S. citizens between 1953 and the early 1970s, but most migration between Afghanistan and the United States prior to the 1980s was temporary and based on studentships and training. During his reign (1919 1929), King Amanullah established a program of sending students abroad for training; this was expanded by later governments. From the 1940s onwards American geopolitical interests in Afghanistan were increasing. At the same time the United States strengthened trade relations with Afghanistan, and by the 1950s 20 percent of Afghan exports (by value) were going to the United States, second only to the USSR (Eltezam 1966). In partnership with the Afghan government, students and young professionals were sent to the United
10 | Afghan Immigrants
States to further their training. After World War II, other countries such as Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, and the USSR were also arranging student exchanges and training young Afghans. These countries and the United States were also playing an important role in developing Kabul University, with specific faculties being in partnership with foreign universities. Universities in the United States were partnered with the agriculture, engineering, and architecture departments (Cowen and McLean 1984). Prior to the early 1980s, only a small number of Afghans were living in the United States·including some Afghan students and even fewer Afghans married to U.S. citizens. With the 1978 coup in Afghanistan and the subsequent Soviet invasion in 1979, hundreds of thousands of Afghans fled Afghanistan as refugees. Although the vast majority of Afghan refugees went to Pakistan and Iran, those who had the necessary financial and social capital traveled farther afield, particularly to the then Federal Republic of Germany, which in the early years of the Soviet occupation had only minimal entry requirements for Afghans. Many Afghans now living in the United States spent at least some time in Pakistan and sometimes also European countries such as Germany before their arrival in the United States. Others were able to travel out of Afghanistan directly to the United States, ostensibly for business or family reasons, and then apply for asylum after arrival, but this was more difficult as the PDPA made it very difficult for people to leave the country. In the early 1980s, Afghan refugees arriving in the United States were predominantly educated professionals, some of whom had been educated abroad, including in the United States. Many had worked for the Afghan government or had other highstatus employment positions such as university professors, doctors, and lawyers. As they established themselves in the United States, they were able to sponsor less well-off family members to join them, which meant that later arrivals were generally less educated and had fewer resources. Figure 1 shows the number of Afghanborn arrivals in the United States since 1982. By the 1990s, the end of the Cold War lessened the U.S. governmentÊs strategic interest in Afghanistan and with it the political symbolism of refugees fleeing Communist countries. Consequently, the numbers of Afghans accepted by the United States as refugees decreased, and by the late 1990s, family reunification was the main migration route for Afghans arriving in the United States; with only 40 to 60 Afghans arriving each year under the diversity program (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1992 2001). By the year 2000, the numbers of Afghans being accepted as refugees began to rise again as American awareness about the TalibanÊs abuse of human rights, and particularly subjugation of women, began to grow. Since 1999, the United States has run a resettlement program for Afghan refugees in Pakistan who have been identified as having special protection needs by the UNHCR. Robson et al. (2002) suggest that these new arrivals can be divided into two groups: victims of torture, racial, and political persecution, where
Demographic Profile | 11
the main applicant is usually a male head of household; and „women-at-risk‰ cases, often widows and/or the victims of domestic violence, sexual exploitation, or other human rights abuses.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community The 2000 U.S. Census records forty-five thousand Afghan-born in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2008b). This is an undercount of the total population of Afghan descent, as it is based on numbers born in Afghanistan so will not include the children born of Afghan parents in the United States or in refugee settlements elsewhere. The 2000 Census records just over seventeen thousand Afghan-born householders, with an average household size of four. Based on this, a total Afghan population of over sixty-eight thousand can be estimated. However, even this is likely to be a conservative estimate and is certainly lower than estimates given by Afghan community organizations. According to Lipson and Omidian (1997) and Yollin (2002), some Afghans have avoided taking part in censuses or have misunderstood the questions. In addition, population estimates based on data from 2000 are out of date given the increase in Afghan arrivals seen since then (see Figure 1). Taking into account the new arrivals it can be estimated that the Afghan population in the United States is between one hundred and one hundred and fifty thousand (Oeppen 2009). California, particularly the San Francisco Bay Area, has the greatest concentration of Afghans in the United States. Alongside California, other key states include New York, New Jersey, Virginia, and Maryland: these five states accounted for almost 80 percent of the Afghan-born in 2000 (Migration Policy Institute 2008b). Afghan refugee arrivals given resettlement assistance by organizations such as Catholic Charities have been placed in a variety of urban areas, but the importance of social networks, as well as the role of family reunification as a migration route means that over time Afghans have grouped together in particular urban areas, including the San Francisco Bay Area, areas around New York City, and around Washington, D.C. However, this pattern may change over time as changing priorities, particularly the desire to buy an affordable home, cause younger Afghans to disperse somewhat. In the San Francisco Bay Area, Afghans are gradually moving out of what used to be the „hub‰ of the community, the Fremont/Hayward area, dispersing to other towns further inland, in search of more affordable homes. See Tables 1 and 5 for figures on legal permanent resident status for Afghans. For information on refugee settlement, see Tables 3 and 4. The term Afghan comprises a number of ethnic groups, the population of Afghanistan being extremely heterogeneous. Within Afghanistan, the most populous
12 | Afghan Immigrants
Two Afghan American women walk past an American flag October 24, 2001, in the “Little Kabul” district of Fremont, California. The Afghan community in Fremont is showing support for the United States by displaying flags. Fremont has one of the largest Afghan communities in the United States. (Justin Sullivan /Getty Images)
ethnic groups include Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluchi, along with many other smaller groups. The majority of the Afghan population is Sunni Muslim, although some groups, in particular people of Hazara ethnicity, are ShiÊa. Alongside ethnic and religious variety, there are a variety of tribal, political, and class divisions; divisions between urban and rural; and divisions by region·all of which contribute to the heterogeneity of the Afghan American population, as some people from all groups and backgrounds have made their way to the United States. These internal differences and divisions should be kept in mind when referring to the „Afghan American community.‰
Age and Family Structure Ethnographic research with Afghans in the United States suggests that the majority of Afghans have migrated in family groups (see Lindgren 2004; Oeppen 2009; Omidian 1996; Smith 2008; Zulfacar 1998); however, it is sometimes the case that one family member will travel first and make arrangements for the rest of the family to follow. Consequently, there are Afghans of all age ranges living in the United States, and the gender balance is almost equal, being 51 percent male (U.S. Census Bureau 2008b). Data from the 2000 U.S. Census show a large proportion of middleage Afghans but this is because it is based on people born in Afghanistan, not all
Demographic Profile | 13
those of Afghan descent. The „women-at-risk‰ refugee resettlement category may lead to a small increase in female-headed households, as will the temporary return migration of a small number of Afghan males, but the majority of Afghan households are based on married-couple families.
Educational Attainment The vast majority of Afghans who arrived in the United States in the early 1980s were educated to a high standard at Kabul University and/or universities in Europe or North America and came from the middle or upper classes of urban Afghanistan. Both men and women were well-educated, and most men, and some women, had professional careers. As they established themselves, they were able to sponsor the migration of poorer or less well-connected relatives and consequently, Afghans who arrived later tend to be less educated; however, this is a generalization and not true for all. Afghans who have arrived since 1999 through the „women-at-risk‰ program follow a similar pattern (Robson et al. 2002). Those who arrived in 1999 and 2000 were largely professionals or highly skilled, whereas those who arrived later were more likely to be from the lower or middle socioeconomic classes. According to the 2000 Census, almost 30 percent of the Afghan-born population over 25 years old have a bachelorÊs degree or higher (U.S. Census Bureau 2008b). Although this is lower than many immigrant populations from Asia, it is high for a refugee population and higher than the 24 percent of the total U.S. population who have a bachelorÊs degree or higher (U.S. Census Bureau 2008a). Many Afghans have found that their educational qualifications are not recognized by U.S. employers. Some have gone back to university or night school, but for most, the economic responsibility of supporting family in the United States and in Afghanistan or Pakistan has made going back to school impossible. Instead, some Afghans transfer their hopes and expectations onto their childrenÊs educational and employment achievements.
Economic Attainment Afghans have taken on a variety of employments in the United States, and their economic attainment is also varied. For those that came from a low-income situation in Afghanistan, even an income from public welfare may represent an increase in their household income. For the majority from middle- or upper-class backgrounds, however, finding employment commensurate with their Afghan qualifications and work experience has been difficult. Ethnographic research with Afghans in the United States suggests that men, in particular, have found this downward mobility difficult and in comparison to Afghan women have been more resistant to taking on low-status employment.
14 | Afghan Immigrants
However, in an effort to regain status and to support family, many Afghans work extremely hard, often in more than one job. For those who have been in the United States since the 1980s, over time they have been able to work their way up from menial jobs such as restaurant waiting staff, taxi drivers, child minders, and shop assistants to higher-status and higher-income positions. For some this has meant buying their own business, such as a restaurant or grocery store. Others have been able to achieve professional careers although often not in the area they had worked in Afghanistan. In California, for example, some Afghans have found work in social welfare organizations assisting with the resettlement of new refugees. Others have been able to work in a similar field to their previous employment in Afghanistan although not to as high a level; for example, someone who worked as a university professor in Afghanistan may work in the United States as a school teacher, or someone who worked as a doctor may work as a medical examiner for an insurance company. Afghans in the United States often say that Afghans „have to be the boss,‰ and while said with good humor, many Afghans, in the San Francisco Bay Area at least, do work for their own or family businesses or work as semi-independent agents for larger companies such as insurance or real estate companies. Those who have been in the United States since the 1980s are often „comfortably‰ well-off. Most have the attributes of a „typical‰ American family, their own cars, a mortgage, and comfortable homes. However, some still feel nostalgic for their previous status as the urban elite of Afghanistan.
Health Statistics and Issues Specific health issues for Afghans in the United States are arguably related to their experiences of conflict in Afghanistan and the difficulties associated with refugee flight. On arrival, problems related to the difficulties of travelling out of Afghanistan, often on foot, and living in unsanitary conditions in refugee settlements in Pakistan, may include gastrointestinal complaints, respiratory illness, measles, and malnutrition (Robson et al. 2002). In the longer term, related to the often traumatic events Afghans have witnessed or been victim of, health complaints are more likely to be related to psychological distress. According to Lipson and Omidian (1997), based on community surveys of Afghans in the San Francisco Bay Area in the mid1990s, the most common longer-term health complaints are stress, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Key issues for Afghans accessing health care in the United States are the cost of health insurance or the availability of Medicaid. Additional problems include the lack of qualified medical interpreters and frequent misunderstandings between Afghan patients and non-Afghan health care professionals over cultural differences related to the understanding of diagnosis, illness, and treatment (see Lipson et al. 1995; Lipson and Omidian 1997; Omidian and Lipson 1996).
Adjustment and Adaptation | 15
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Life-cycle rituals are key social events in Afghanistan, bringing together large extended families. They also represent an opportunity to demonstrate family wealth and hospitality by hosting parties. Specific practices vary in different regions of the country and particularly between rural and urban areas but have their basis in Islamic rituals and are usually led by a mullah (a religious official). They may also vary between different ethnic groups and between Sunni and ShiÊa Afghans. The birth of a first child, especially if a son, is a cause for day-long celebrations, as is a sonÊs circumcision, which occurs before their seventh birthday. Engagements and marriages are almost always arranged by families rather than between the bride and groom, and marriages are generally seen as a union between families rather than between individuals. The preferred marriage arrangement is between parallel cousins (e.g., a son to their fatherÊs brotherÊs daughter) but not all Afghan marriages are between cousins, as urbanization, modernization, and migration have made this type of arrangement more difficult. Death and funerals are also surrounded by set rituals that vary by region but are based on Islamic beliefs about Judgment Day. The body of the deceased is washed by close relatives of the same sex, wrapped in white cloth, and buried before sundown. Post burial ceremonies are traditionally held by family at 14 days, 40 days, and one year after the death (Dupree 1973). In the United States, Afghans perform these rituals but adapt them to their new environment. Engagement parties and weddings are the most overtly celebrated life-cycle rituals. Afghan entrepreneurs have taken advantage of this opportunity by setting up banqueting halls with all the facilities to host these ceremonies, which often involve hundreds of people. As well as the rituals associated with the ceremony itself these events usually involve a sit-down meal, live music, and dancing. In more conservative families, celebrations may have separate areas for women and men, but this appears to be increasingly rare. In the United States, there is greater opportunity for young Afghan men and women to meet each other. In addition, the dispersal of Afghan families and social groups through migration can also make arranging marriages between family members more difficult. Consequently, the rate of arranged marriage is decreasing, although most young Afghans would seek family approval for their marriage even if they chose their spouse themselves. Transnational arranged marriage, particularly between Afghan men living in America and Afghan women living in Pakistan or Afghanistan also occurs. Marriage between Afghans and non-Afghans is still relatively rare, but this may change as the second generation grows up. In areas of the United States with large Afghan populations, there are Afghanrun mosques where funereal rituals can take place. Otherwise they may take place
16 | Afghan Immigrants
With Afghan performer Mahwash singing in Farsi from a stage behind her, two-year-old Nadia Khawja dances on the edge of the dance floor during a wedding reception in Hayward, California, November 11, 2001. (AP Photo/Julie Jacobson)
at the family home or in a mosque run by another Muslim group, although this can cause problems because of variations in funeral practices between different Muslim cultures. In some cases Afghans accompany their deceased relatives to be buried in Afghanistan, or they may travel to Afghanistan or elsewhere to hold a prayer ceremony with relatives.
Families and Changing Gender Relations For most Afghans, in Afghanistan and the United States, the family is the most important social unit. Often, the value many Americans put on individualism and independence seems alien. The Afghan American author Tamin Ansary describes individuals as „buds or leaves‰ on the „larger branch‰ of „their people,‰ or their family (Ansary 2002, 16 19). Traditionally in Afghanistan, extended families lived together in one compound or at least in one village or valley. By the 20th century, this was beginning to change, especially with rural-urban migration and later, the conflict and refugee crisis. Many Afghans in the United States have extended family spread between Asia, Europe, America, the Middle East, and Australasia; the telephone and Internet provide a way to keep in touch, and family events such as weddings provide an opportunity to see each other for those who can afford the
Adjustment and Adaptation | 17
airfare. Over time many Afghan refugees have re-migrated in order to be closer to their family members. Afghan families tend to be hierarchical, with elders (grandparents) playing an important role in family decisions and in passing on traditions to grandchildren when parents are too busy working to do so. They also tend to be patriarchal, with male members representing the family to the outside world, although women may play a more important role in the private sphere. Refugee migration and adaptation to life in a different socioeconomic environment has caused „traditional‰ family roles and relationships to shift. Elder Afghans may find themselves bored and isolated, as their children are at work and grandchildren at school. They also find what they perceive to be a lack of respect to older people in American society distressing and fear that their grandchildren will not respect them. The power relations between spouses may also change, as women are more likely to have to work full-time in the United States than in Afghanistan and their contribution toward family income becomes more significant. In her ethnographic study of Afghans in the San Francisco Bay Area Aging and Family in an Afghan Refugee Community, Omidian (1996) looks at intergenerational and gender relations in more detail.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity In the „early years,‰ the 1980s, Afghans in the United States focused on survival, finding jobs and accommodation, and supporting the migration of family members. As numbers of Afghans in certain areas such as California, New York, and Virginia increased, some Afghans formed community organizations to arrange social events, to support new arrivals and raise money and awareness for the situation in Afghanistan. Communities also began to raise money to build Afghan mosques. Afghan entrepreneurs opened Afghan grocery stores and restaurants. During the jihad against the Soviets the presence of a common enemy brought together Afghans of differing social and ethno-linguistic backgrounds, to some extent. However, during the civil war, political differences between ethno-linguistic groups became exacerbated, and the tension was felt amongst Afghans in the United States also, although perhaps to a lesser extent, as many came from an urban educated background where different ethnic groups were more mixed, including through intermarriage. For Afghans in the United States, „retaining‰ a sense of national culture and identity means holding on to the Afghanistan they remember; for many, the Afghanistan they remember means is more closely related to the Afghanistan of what some refer to as „the golden era‰ of the 1960s and 1970s, rather than Afghanistan as it is today. The celebration of national holidays, speaking national languages, eating Afghan food, and attending Afghan events such as weddings are all ways in which Afghans living in the United States link to their sense of Afghan-ness.
18 | Afghan Immigrants
Afghan Americans also connect to Afghanistan by partaking in transnational activities such as sending remittances, raising money and awareness for humanitarian projects in Afghanistan, and making short-term return visits. All these activities were apparent during ethnographic fieldwork with Afghans in California (Oeppen 2010).
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media Subscription-based Dari- and Pashto-printed newsletters exist, as do community radio stations but the key sources of media are the Internet (for those with access to it) and satellite and cable television. Local Afghan communities take advantage of community cable television to show Afghan music videos, discuss the news in Afghanistan and the diaspora, and provide other information (e.g., about local businesses and events). Since the expansion of the media in Afghanistan, satellite television directly from Afghanistan has become increasingly popular. The British Broadcasting CorporationÊs (BBC) Persian and Pashto language services also provide an important source of current news and comment from Afghanistan, as does their Web site.
Celebration of National Holidays The holidays celebrated by Afghans in the United States can be divided into three categories: Afghan, Islamic, and American. The key Afghan holiday of Now Ruz (New Year), celebrated on the vernal equinox, is also celebrated by Iranians. This holiday is celebrated by Afghans of all backgrounds. Special food is prepared including haft mewa („seven fruits,‰ compote made of dried fruits in their own syrup). Many Afghans celebrate the coming of spring with a picnic, if the weather allows. In California, there is an annual outdoors festival, which attracts thousands of Afghans, with concerts, poetry readings, and food and handicraft stalls. Also in California, Afghan community organizations have successfully lobbied the State Legislature to recognize Now Ruz as an Afghan holiday (California Legislative Assembly 2002). Another Afghan national holiday is August 19, when Afghans celebrate independence from Britain. Although Afghanistan was never formally conquered by the British, August 19, 1919, is recognized as the date that Britain gave up on trying to gain official control of Afghanistan. Afghans, as a predominantly Muslim population, also celebrate Islamic holidays, especially Eid al-Fitr, held at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan. Afghans living in the United States also take advantage of American national holidays such as Christmas and Thanksgiving as an opportunity to take time off work and spend time with their families. Afghan children have also got involved in other American holidays such as ValentineÊs Day, Halloween, and MotherÊs Day, largely through the influence of the American media and school activities.
Adjustment and Adaptation | 19
Foodways Afghan food bears testament to AfghanistanÊs geographic position and history. Influences from Indian, Persian, Tibetan, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern food can all be identified in a national cuisine, which is at the same time uniquely Afghan. The staple food, depending on region, is one of the various types of bread or rice (either plain or as a pilau), which are supplemented by qormas (stews containing meat, vegetables, and/or pulses, and sometimes fruit and nuts) or kebabs. Afghan cuisine also includes aushak and mantu, which could be described as „stuffed dumplings‰; various pickles and chutneys; and dairy products. Fresh and dried fruits, nuts, pastries, and candies provide snacks. Tea, either black or green, and sometimes flavored with cardamom, is the staple drink and drunk throughout the day. The book Afghan Food and Cookery by Saberi (2000) is a wonderful source of recipes and cultural information about Afghan food. Afghans in the United States cook and eat Afghan food alongside the variety of other cuisines in America. Afghan restaurants in the United States often specialize in the Afghan dishes that are more difficult to cook at home such as kebabs, and some Afghan grocery stores have in-store bakeries to provide Afghan bread that is difficult to cook in a domestic oven. Indian, Pakistani, and Middle Eastern restaurants are also popular amongst Afghans, especially those who prefer to eat only halal food.
Yusef Rouzy, from Afghanistan, has cooked for 20 years at the Afghan Kebab House #1, a restaurant serving Afghan cuisine on Ninth Avenue in New York City. (Gabe Palacio/Getty Images)
20 | Afghan Immigrants
Some Afghan foods can be time-consuming to prepare, and those who work fulltime take full advantage of time-saving kitchen equipment such as food processors. Afghan American cooks can also use shortcuts to produce Afghan food, such as wonton wrappers to make mantu and uncooked tortillas to make bolani, a kind of vegetable-stuffed bread.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Afghanistan has a long history of musical and artistic culture, again influenced by its geographic location and history. As in other Islamic countries, music and musicians tread a difficult path. On the one hand, music is an important component of cultural identity and widely played at parties and ceremonies. On the other hand, being a professional musician is sometimes seen as a low-status position, even though their skills are respected and sought after. The ethnomusicologist John Baily was trained in classical Afghan music in the 1970s and has since written about the role of music for Afghan refugees in exile, including in the United States (Baily 1999, 2005). Baily suggests that music plays a therapeutic role for Afghan refugees and is also a source of cultural identification. Weddings are a key venue for Afghan musicians in the United States, as are commercial concerts, which sometimes involve bringing over Afghan musicians from Pakistan and other sites in the Afghan diaspora such as Germany. Although there are traditional Afghan musical instruments such as the rubab, dutar, and tabla, Afghan music in the United States has been influenced by Western pop music and Afghan musicians now often use electric keyboards and drum machines to play Afghan music. Afghan musicians commonly play traditional „folk‰ tunes, as well as their own compositions. Musical sets often include the attan, the national dance of Afghanistan.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Based on data from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service yearbooks and the Migration Policy Institute (2008a), between 1971 and 2005, almost thirty-three thousand people born in Afghanistan acquired U.S. citizenship; a majority of the forty-five thousand Afghan-born recorded in the 2000 U.S. Census. The main path to U.S. citizenship for Afghans is through naturalization. The naturalization oath requires the potential U.S. citizen to forgo other national allegiances (Bloemraad 2006), but in practice dual citizenship is „tolerated‰ and individuals have not been prosecuted for maintaining dual citizenship for decades (Kivisto and Faist 2007).
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 21
Initially, many Afghans in the United States intended to return to Afghanistan after the Soviets left the country, but the subsequent civil war and Taliban rule discouraged many from returning, and acquiring U.S. citizenship became the pragmatic option. In particular, whereas legal permanent residents can only sponsor the immigration of their spouse or unmarried children, citizens can sponsor a wider range of relatives for family reunification including married children, parents, and siblings.
Intergroup Relations A basis for social interaction and relations between groups is shared language and the majority of Afghans who have been in the United States since the 1980s speak good English. Those who had been educated in English-medium schools in Kabul or had traveled for university to Britain or the United States were, understandably, more fluent. The United States is a multicultural society and also home to a large number of Iranian and Pakistani immigrants. Iranian Farsi and Afghan Dari are mutually understandable, some Pakistanis speak Pashto, and those Afghans who had spent time in Pakistan can communicate with Urdu speakers. For some Afghans, an enthusiasm for Bollywood films means they can converse with Hindi-speaking immigrants as well. The events of September 11, 2001, had the potential to completely ruin relations between Afghans living in the United States and their non-Afghan neighbors. Some Afghans were the victims of increased suspicion, especially when traveling and at airports, and some were the victims of racism that also affected others who looked like they might be connected with Islamic countries. However, the aftermath of September 11, 2001, despite provoking fear and suspicion between Afghans and non-Afghans, also had the opposite effect, opening doors for Afghan Americans to present their point of view to the American public. Writing in the Afghan online magazine Lemar-Aftaab, Maiwandi (2001) writes: [I]n the midst of all the tension, a tremendous thing started to happen: The level of activism in the Afghan-American community grew exponentially . . . Afghans joined existing groups, created new ones, and became first-time activists, granting interviews and taking to public speaking to get the word out. We swallowed our nervousness and put our suffering people in front of ourselves. Lindgren (2004), who was carrying out ethnographic fieldwork into Afghan womenÊs community participation in 2001, notes that both AfghansÊ and AmericansÊ interest in Afghanistan and Afghan Americans grew massively. For the Afghan women in LindgrenÊs study, outsider interest in the Afghan community gave them new experiences in public speaking and networking with non-Afghans and had a positive impact on inter-group relations. Lindgren (2004) also wrote that particularly after September 11, 2001, greater efforts were made by Afghan community
22 | Afghan Immigrants
organizations to cooperate with other Muslim South Asian communities who were also afraid of retaliation.
Forging a New American Political Identity Afghan political identity in the United States has largely been shaped by events in Afghanistan. In the 1980s, Afghans in the United States would host visits from mujahideen leaders, who were seen as „freedom fighters‰ by American media, to raise awareness and funds for the jihad against the Communists. During the civil war of the early 1990s, Afghans were dismayed by what some saw as the abandonment of Afghanistan by Western powers after the end of the Cold War, and the politics of Afghan communities in the United States became more internalized. With the emergence of the Taliban, some groups lobbied the U.S. authorities, particularly regarding the TalibanÊs abuse of human rights, while others who supported the TalibanÊs Pashtun nationalist goals hosted publicity and fundraising visits from Taliban officials to the United States. After September 11, 2001, many Afghans tried to downplay internal ethnic divisions and portray a united community of Afghan Americans in order to maximize their impact on U.S. authorities, with mixed success. Afghan involvement in domestic U.S. politics is mixed. Younger Afghans have been involved in voter registration drives and supporting various politicians; however, it appears that large numbers of Afghans do not vote in American elections, although large-scale data do not exist to supplement this ethnographic observation. American politicians who have shown support or interest in Afghanistan such as Nancy Pelosi and Barbara Boxer have been more successful in interacting with Afghans on local domestic issues; and it is at the scale of local politics that a small number of Afghans are more active. Examples include sister-city campaigns such as the successful one between Hayward, California, and Ghazni, Afghanistan; or the campaigning of organizations such as the Afghan Health Partnership Program in California to obtain higher quality access to health care through the increased availability and training of health interpreters.
Return Immigration Whatever their feelings about the post 9/11 so-called war on terror, most Afghans agree that they now have an enhanced opportunity to visit Afghanistan·in comparison to during the Soviet-Mujahideen war, civil war, or Taliban rule periods. Since 2002, large numbers have taken the opportunity to visit Afghanistan, but the trips have generally not involved a permanent return migration. Most trips are short-term visits to see family and friends or simply to see how things have changed. Small numbers of Afghan Americans, from all age groups have returned for medium-term trips to work in the new government or to participate in reconstruction projects, but in most cases, the visitors have kept „a base‰ in the United States and do not travel
The Second and Later Generations | 23
with their entire family. The Afghan government, through the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C., has been active in encouraging skilled professionals to return, to assist with reconstruction and development (Oeppen 2010). Data on return visits by Afghans in the United States are limited. As an indication of the volume of return trips from the San Francisco Bay Area, during 2006, staff at an Afghan travel agency in Fremont, California, reported selling an average of two to three hundred tickets to Kabul per month, but these are most likely to be for visits rather than long-term return. The owner of a travel agency in Virginia that sells tickets to customers across the United States estimates that about ten to fifteen thousand are sold to Afghans yearly but that in the years 2002 and 2003 that figure was much higher. These figures only give an indication, as returnees may book their tickets online or through other sources, or fly to Pakistan or Iran and travel overland from there. Ethnographic research with Afghans in California suggests that Afghans who have lived in the United States since the 1980s may find return a difficult and emotional experience. Returning often acts as a catalyst for the returnee to consider not only how Afghanistan has changed but also how much they have changed during their life in the United States (Oeppen 2009).
The Second and Later Generations Afghans have only been living in the United States in sizeable numbers since the 1980s; consequently, there is little information about the second generation, and
Views of Afghan elders on the cultural identity of the second generation: “The thing is to introduce our culture and religious priorities to our kids, for our kids to learn Afghan culture and raise them somehow as American Afghans. I know that won’t last generations. Maybe, if we didn’t do anything this would be the end of our culture here and the Americanization process would start but we would like to somehow prolong this transfer . . . The culture in Afghanistan is very rich.” (Male interviewee, interview with the author, California, 2006) “Our children are in the position to pick and choose aspects of Afghan and American culture, we just hope they pick the best bits of both, and leave the bad bits.” (Female interviewee, interview with the author, California, 2006
24 | Afghan Immigrants
the third generation will only emerge in future years. What has been written about the younger generations tends to focus on the concerns of older generations regarding Americanization and declining respect for elders and Afghan cultural traditions amongst younger Afghans (Omidian 1996). Younger Afghans appear to be less interested in differences between Afghan ethnic groups and political affiliations and are more likely to refer to themselves as Afghan Americans or Americans. Through school and university, they are also more likely to spend more time with non-Afghans, who may influence their views and approaches to situations; however, due to the importance of family, parents and relativesÊ social and political viewpoints are likely to have a strong influence in young Afghan AmericansÊ lives. Educational attainment is an important status indicator for many Afghans, and Afghan parents encourage their children to work hard in school and achieve the
Afghan students, Arezo Kohistani, left, Nadima Sahar, center, and Mahbooba Babrakzai stand in front of the DOW and NASDAQ tickers at the business school at Roger Williams University in Bristol, Rhode Island, May 3, 2006. Babrakzai and Kohistani are business majors, while Sahar is working on a business minor to go with her politcal science degree. The three Afghan women were given free tuition to school as part of a program started by Paula Nirschel, wife of Roger Williams University president Roy Nirschel, after the September 11, 2001, attacks to educate Afghan women in American institutions. (AP Photo/Stew Milne)
The Second and Later Generations | 25
Youth Profile The First Publisher of an Afghan Journal in the United States at the Age of 18 Mizgon Zahir was born in Hayward, California, on May 11, 1983, to an Afghan family. She was the first of her family to be born in the United States. Mizgon knew from a young age that she wanted to be a journalist. In grade school she had an advice column for her school paper called “Ms. Know it All.” At the age of 13 she was introduced to Farida Anwary, who was amongst one of the first women in Afghanistan to pursue journalism. Farida Anwary had a 24-hour satellite radio program on which she allowed Mizgon to start her own radio show. Ayenda, meaning “future,” was the first Afghan American live radio program produced to bridge the intergenerational divides within the Afghan community. Her radio program was a success, but more conservative Afghans met it with much resistance. The radio station eventually met its end because of financing issues, but by this time Mizgon was onto her next journalistic venture. She was writing for Pacifi c News Service’s Youth Outlook magazine regarding the lives of young Afghan Americans. In August of 2001, Mizgon introduced the idea of Afghan Journal to Sandy Close, the executive director of Pacifi c News Service. After the events of September 11, 2001, the funding became available to publish the magazine. Mizgon was 18 years old and the publisher of the first intergenerational Afghan American magazine in the United States. Her magazine highlighted the voices of the least understood but most newsworthy population at the moment. Mizgon missed her first day as a freshman at Cal State University East Bay to talk on a panel regarding hate crimes. She became the voice that would put a face other than that of terrorism to the Afghan community in Fremont, California. Mizgon published, and is continuing to publish, articles regularly in newspapers and magazines regarding the issues faced by Afghans in diaspora. She has spoken at numerous universities, newsrooms, and community centers regarding the media coverage of Afghan Americans post–9/11. In December of 2005 Mizgon completed her undergraduate education at Cal State University East Bay with a bachelor of arts in English literature and began a master of science program at Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. Mizgon completed her studies at the journalism school in October 2009. Her master’s project covers the secret lives of Afghan American women in the United States. Mizgon is one of the first Afghan Americans to attend the journalism school at Columbia University. She is currently authoring a book on the lives of Afghan American women and continuing her career as a freelance journalist.
26 | Afghan Immigrants
professional careers that many Afghan parents in the United States had, or hoped to have, before they left Afghanistan. However, despite this goal, many Afghan parents work long hours, sometimes in multiple jobs and do not always have the time, or in some cases, the English-language skills to support their childrenÊs education. Some parents have also sent their children to supplementary school to study Afghan languages or Islam. For some parents in California, having their children learn more about Islam has had unintended results: wanting their children to be aware of their religious heritage, they sent them to a local Islamic institute for supplementary classes, only to be dismayed when their children started demanding behavior from the rest of their family that parents perceived to be based on an overly strict interpretation of Islamic practice, influenced by what they saw as Arab interpretations of Islam.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Afghanistan The key issue for relations between the United States and Afghanistan is the ongoing war in Afghanistan between the United States (alongside NATO forces) and the insurgency, led by the Taliban. Although many Afghans living in the United States initially welcomed the U.S.-led invasion and removal of the Taliban, the slow pace of reconstruction, the growing strength of the Taliban, corruption in the Afghan government, and civilian casualties have all lessened Afghan American support for the war. At the same time, slow progress and military casualties have also lessened mainstream American support for the war. In addition to the war, the United States is a significant donor to Afghanistan and the Afghan government, as Afghanistan represents an economic and geostrategic opportunity for the United States. Arguably the intensity of, and challenges faced by, relations between the United States and Afghanistan will continue for the foreseeable future.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 1 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status in the United States: Fiscal years 2000–2009 Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
1,011
1,202
1,759
1,252
2,137
4,749
3,417
1,753
2,813
3,165
Country of birth: Afghanistan
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2009).
Table 2 Naturalization of people of previous Afghan nationality in the United States, 1971–2005 Year
Number
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
14 12 23 18 14 38 26 48 83 71 83 77 61 82 154 297 528 905 1,051 1,141 1,392 1,047 1,539 1,994 2,014 3,936 1,724 1,693 2,638 2,738 1,938 1,424 1,235 1,323 1,464 32,825
Source: Collated from U.S. INS yearbooks (1981–2006) and Migration Policy Institute data (2008a).
28
Table 3 Refugee admissions of Afghan-born to the United States, 1980–2005
Total arrivals
Refugees
Refugees as percentage of total arrivals
1980
722
250
35
1981
1,881
1,604
85
1982
1,569
1,340
85
1983
2,430
2,321
96
1984
3,222
3,032
94
1985
—
—
—
1986
2,831
2,600
92
1987
2,424
2,141
88
1988
2,873
2,597
90
1989
3,232
2,606
81
1990
—
—
—
1991
2,879
2,100
73
1992
2,685
2,082
78
1993
2,964
2,233
75
1994
2,344
1,665
71
1995
—
616
—
1996
—
369
—
1997
1,129
356
32
1998
831
137
16
1999
878
54
6
2000
1,012
113
11
2001
1,207
257
21
2002
1,764
1,044
59
2003
—
716
—
2004
2,137
1,418
66
2005
4,749
4,049
85
Total
45,763
35,700
78
Note: (–) data not available. Source: Collated from U.S. INS yearbooks (1981–2006).
29
Table 4 Afghan refugee resettlement by state, top 10, 2000–2008 U.S. State
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total
California
202
346
157
205
96
60
63
38
44
1,211
Texas
134
269
147
113
51
125
82
54
21
996
Arizona
134
288
162
130
59
125
—
22
66
986
Virginia
168
233
85
86
73
38
71
33
47
834
Missouri
186
180
114
74
52
74
34
27
6
747
New York
108
113
73
75
50
51
62
35
58
625
Georgia
122
154
73
79
35
75
44
16
23
621
48
151
85
79
21
22
40
34
74
554
65
168
80
21
61
30
8
8
4
445
109
108
60
41
57
27
5
4
4
415
Idaho Florida Massachusetts
Source: Collated from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2009).
Table 5 Persons born in Afghanistan obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009, by state of residence and gender
Leading states of residence
Total
Male
Female
Arizona
102
50
52
California
982
514
468
Colorado
65
29
36
Connecticut
42
23
19
Florida
55
28
27
Georgia
88
49
39
Illinois
36
21
15
Maryland
74
50
24
Massachusetts
14
7
7
Michigan
29
12
17
Nevada
35
13
22
New Jersey
44
23
21
New York
340
190
150
36
19
17
North Carolina Ohio
16
13
3
Pennsylvania
64
37
27
Texas
164
99
65
Virginia
521
285
236
55
27
28
Other
403
243
160
Total
3,165
1,732
1,433
Washington
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2009).
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics | 31
Arrivals of Afghan-born in the USA, 1982–2005 4,500 4,000 3,500
Arrivals
3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
Figure 1 Arrivals of Afghan-born in the United States, 1982–2005 Source: Collated from U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) yearbooks (1983–2004)
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics It is possible to identify people born in Afghanistan in the 2000 U.S. Census, although the accuracy of these data has been contested by Afghan community organizations, who argue that the census figures underestimate the size of the Afghan population (for example, see Yollin 2002); however, as the only nationwide source of data on Afghans in the United States, the census data can give some useful indicators on things such as educational attainment and occupation sector. Table 6 Educational attainment of Afghan-born in the United States (25 years and over), 2000 Education attainment Less than 9th grade
Number
Percentage
4,345
13
9th to 12th grade, no diploma
4,145
12
High school graduate
7,560
22
Some college, no degree
6,035
17
Associate degree
2,340
7
Bachelor's degree
6,315
18
Graduate or professional degree
3,855
11
34,595
100
Total Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2008b).
32 | Afghan Immigrants Table 7 Occupation sector of employed Afghan-born in the United States (16 years and over), 2000 Occupation sector
Number
Percentage
Management, professional, and related
6,330
28
Service
3,495
16
Sales and office
7,895
35
4
—
Construction, extraction, and maintenance
1,200
5
Production, transportation, and material moving
3,445
15
22,369
100
Farming, fishing, and forestry
Total Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2008b).
Appendix III: Notable Afghan Americans As many Afghans who migrated to the United States came from the educated elite of Afghanistan, it is not surprising that Afghan Americans have made notable contributions to U.S. cultural, economic, intellectual, and social life. What follows is a short description of a limited selection of these people, focusing on their activities in the United States. Tamim Ansary. Author and columnist. Author of East of Kabul, West of New York and Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes. Samira Atash. Fashion designer, actress, producer, and ethical entrepreneur specializing in fair-trade fashion products. Farhad Darya. Pop musician and fundraiser. Arezow Doost. News anchor and reporter for CBS and Fox News. Ashraf Ghani. Anthropologist at the World Bank. Nominated for position of UN Secretary General. Candidate in 2009 Afghan presidential elections. Khaled Hosseini. Doctor and author. Author of the bestsellers The Kite Runner and A Thousand Splendid Suns. Goodwill ambassador for UNHCR. Ali Ahmad Jalali. Broadcaster for Voice of America, Distinguished Professor at the National Defense University. Zalmay Khalilzad. Highest ranking Afghan American in the government of George W. Bush, serving as Ambassador to the UN, Iraq, and Afghanistan from 2005 to 2009.
References | 33
Habib Qaderi. Pop musician. Nazif Shahrani. Professor of anthropology at Indiana University, Bloomington. Baktash Zaher. Actor, pilot, and businessman. CEO of Paramount Business Jets.
Glossary Deobandi: Someone who follows the Deoband Islamic movement. Halal: From the Arabic word for „lawful,‰ generally used to refer to food that is lawful for Muslims to eat. For example, food that does not contain pork products or alcohol. Jihad: From the Arabic word for „struggle,‰ generally used to refer to a (military) campaign fought on religious grounds. Khalq: Meaning „people‰ or „masses,‰ a wing of the PeopleÊs Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Mujahideen: A fighter in a jihad. Parcham: Meaning „banner‰ or „flag,‰ a wing of the PeopleÊs Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Pashtunwali: The code of honor associated with the Pashtun tribal group of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pilau: A rice dish, where the rice is flavored with spices and is often cooked in meat broth. Afghan pilaus usually contain pieces of meat and often nuts and/or dried fruit. Saur Revolution: Saur is an Afghan month that corresponds with the zodiac month of Taurus. In that month in 1978, the PeopleÊs Democratic Party of Afghanistan took power, killing the then president, Daoud.
References Ansary, T. 2002. West of Kabul, East of New York. New York: Picador. Anwar, M. H. 2004. Memories of Afghanistan. Bloomington, IN: Author House. Baily, J. 1999. „Music and Refugee Lives: Afghans in Eastern Iran and California.‰ Forced Migration Review 6: 10 13. Baily, J. 2005. „So Near, So Far: KabulÊs Music in Exile.‰ Ethnomusicology Forum 14 (2): 213 33. Bloemraad, I. 2006. „Becoming a Citizen in the United States and Canada: Structured Mobilization and Immigrant Political Incorporation.‰ Social Forces 85 (2): 667 95. California Legislative Assembly. 2002. „Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 155· Relative to Afghan New Year.‰ In Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 155; Resolution Chapter 17. Sacramento: California Legislative Assembly.
34 | Afghan Immigrants Cowen, R., and M. McLean, eds. 1984. International Handbook of Education Systems: Volume III Asia, Australasia and Latin America. Chichester, UK: Wiley. Dorronsoro, G. 2005. Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Present. New York: Columbia University Press. Dupree, L. 1973. Afghanistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dupree, L., and N. Hatch Dupree. 1988. „Afghan Refugees in Pakistan.‰ In U.S. Committee for Refugees 1987 World Refugee Survey. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees. Eigo, T. 2000. „Afghan Americans.‰ In Gale Encyclopedia of Multicultural America, edited by J. Lehman, 16 27. Detroit: Gale. Eltezam, Z. A. 1966. „Economic Review: AfghanistanÊs Foreign Trade.‰ Middle East Journal 20 (1): 95 103. Harpviken, K. B. 2009. Social Networks and Migration in Wartime Afghanistan. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Hyman, A. 1992. Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964–91. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. Kakar, M. H. 1995. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979– 1982. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kivisto, P., and T. Faist. 2007. Citizenship: Discourse, Theory, and Transnational Prospects. Oxford: Blackwell. Klaits, A., and G. Gulmamadova-Klaits. 2006. Love and War in Afghanistan. New York: Seven Stories Press. Kronenfeld, D. A. 2008. „Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Not All Refugees, Not Always in Pakistan, Not Necessarily Afghan?‰ Journal of Refugee Studies 21 (1): 43 63. Lindgren, T. G. 2004. „Impact of Afghan WomenÊs Community Participation: An Ethnographic Inquiry.‰ DPhil. diss., Department of Community Health Systems Nursing, University of California, San Francisco. Lipson, J. G., T. Hosseini, S. Kabir, P. A. Omidian, and F. Edmonston. 1995. „Health Issues among Afghan Women in California.‰ Health Care Women International 16 (4): 279 86. Lipson, J. G., and P. A. Omidian. 1997. „Afghan Refugees in the U.S. Social Environment.‰ Western Journal of Nursing Research 19 (1): 110 26. Maiwandi, N. A. 2001. „The Afghan-American Response.‰ Lemar-Aftaab, January December [Online article retrieved 10/08.] http://afghanmagazine.com/2001/essay/ nadia.html. Maley, W., and S. Schmeidl. 2008. „Finding Durable Solutions in Contested Transitions: The Case of the Afghan Refugee Population.‰ Presented at the ISAÊs 49th Annual Convention, March 26, San Francisco, California. Migration Policy Institute. 2008a. „United States: Acquisition of Citizenship by Country of Former Nationality, 1987 to 2005.‰ [Online article retrieved 10/08.] http://www. migrationinformation.org/datahub/countrydata/data.cfm.
References | 35 Migration Policy Institute. 2008b. „WhoÊs Where in the United States?‰ [Online article retrieved 10/08.] http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/whoswhere.cfm. Monsutti, A. 2005. War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the Hazaras of Afghanistan. London: Routledge. Oeppen, C. 2009. „A Stranger at Home: Integration, Transnationalism and the Afghan Elite.‰ DPhil. thesis, Department of Migration Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom. Oeppen, C. 2010. „The Afghan Diaspora and Its Involvement in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan.‰ In Beyond the “Wild Tribes”: Understanding Modern Afghanistan and Its Diaspora, edited by C. Oeppen and A. Schlenkhoff, 141 56. New York: Columbia University Press. Omidian, P. 1996. Aging and Family in an Afghan Refugee Community: Transitions and Transformations. New York: Garland. Omidian, P., and J. G. Lipson. 1996. „Ethnic Coalitions and Public Health: Delights and Dilemmas with the Afghan Health Education Project in Northern California.‰ Human Organization 55 (3): 355 60. Omrani, B., and M. Leeming. 2005. Afghanistan: A Companion and Guide. Hong Kong: Odyssey Books and Guides. Qudrat Aseel, M. 2003. Torn between Two Cultures: An Afghan-American Woman Speaks Out. Sterling, VA: Capital. Robson, B., J. G. Lipson, F. Younos, and M. Mehdi. 2002. „The Afghan: Their History and Culture, a Culture Profile for the Cultural Orientation Resource Center.‰ [Online article retrieved 10/08.] http://www.cal.org/CO/afghan/index.html. Saberi, H. 2000. Afghan Food and Cookery. New York: Hippocrene. Saed, Z., and S. Muradi. 2010. One Story, Thirty Stories: An Anthology of Contemporary Afghan American Literature. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. Smith, V. J. 2008. „The Information Needs and Associated Communicative Behaviors of Female Afghan Refugees in the San Francisco Bay Area.‰ PhD thesis, Department of School of Communication and the Arts, Regent University, Virginia Beach, Virginia. Sultan, M. 2006. My War at Home: A Memoir. New York: Washington Square Press. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2000. The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2009. „UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2009.‰ [Online article retrieved 12/10]. http://www.unhcr.org/4ce532ff9.html. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1981 2002. Statistical Yearbooks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 2003 2004. Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
36 | Afghan Immigrants U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 2006. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2004. Washington, D.C.: Office of Immigration Statistics. U.S. Census Bureau. 2008a. „American FactFinder, Census 2000.‰ [Online article retrieved 10/08]. http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en. U.S. Census Bureau. 2008b. „Foreign-born Profiles (STP-159).‰ [Online article retrieved 12/08]. http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign/STP-159-2000tl.html. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2009. „Refugee Arrival Data.‰ [Online article retrieved 07/09]. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/refugee_arrival_data.htm. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2009. „Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents.‰ [Online article retrieved 07/09]. http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/data/dslpr.shtm. Yollin, P. 2002. „Wide Array of Estimates of Bay Area Afghans: Little Kabul Gets Even Littler‰ San Francisco Chronicle, November 5. [Online article retrieved 10/08]. http:// articles.sfgate.com/2002-11-05/bay-area/17570868_1_afghan-american-associationcensus-bureau-kabul. Zulfacar, M. 1998. Afghan Immigrants in the U.S.A and Germany: A Comparative Analysis of the Use of Ethnic Social Capital. Münster: Lit Verlag.
Further Reading Akbar, Said Hyder, and Susan Burton. 2005. Come Back to Afghanistan: A California Teenager’s Story. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing. The story of Said Hyder Akbar, a young Afghan American college student whose father worked as a spokesman for Afghan president Hamid Karzai in the years following September 11, 2001. A personalized source of information on the situation in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban and the identity struggles faced by Afghan Americans returning to Afghanistan. Ansary, Tamin. 2002. West of Kabul, East of New York. New York: Picador. A memoir by Tamin Ansary, born in Afghanistan to an Afghan father and American mother. Ansary describes his childhood in Afghanistan and his journeys as a young man through the Islamic world, during which he tried to learn more about his background and identity. Dorronsoro, Gilles. 2005. Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Present. New York: Columbia University Press. An authoritative yet nuanced account of the events in Afghanistan over the last 30 years. Essential reading to understand the background of conflict that foreshadows the situation in contemporary Afghanistan. Dupree, Louis. 1973. Afghanistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. This almost encyclopedic work on Afghanistan was published before the Soviet occupation, authored by an American academic who spent much of his professional life living and working in Afghanistan. Although published in the 1970s it remains the most comprehensive all-round book on Afghanistan, providing rich details on environmental, historical, social, and cultural aspects of life in Afghanistan.
Further Reading | 37 Hosseini, Khaled. 2003. The Kite Runner. London: Bloomsbury. This international bestseller (and film, directed by Marc Foster) tells the story of Amir, who grew up as part of the wealthy elite of Kabul but fled with his father as refugees in response to the Soviet occupation. He and his father settle in the San Francisco Bay Area, but Amir finds it difficult to come to terms with his past and eventually decides to revisit Afghanistan. Kakar, M. H. 1995. Afghanistan: The Soviet invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982. Berkeley: University of California Press. A historical account of a key period in AfghanistanÊs modern history. Brought to life by the author, an Afghan academic (now living in the United States), who was imprisoned by the Communist government for criticizing the regime. This book is partly an academic book and partly a personal account based on his own and his fellow prisonersÊ experiences. Omidian, Patricia A. 1996. Aging and Family in an Afghan Refugee Community: Transitions and Transformations. New York: Garland. The key ethnographic account of Afghan Americans in the San Francisco Bay Area, California. Provides an important reference point for comparing the situation of Afghan Americans in the early to mid-1990s to their current situation, particularly following September 11, 2001. Qudrat Aseel, Maryam. 2003. Torn between Two Cultures: An Afghan-American Woman Speaks Out. Sterling, VA: Capital. A memoir written by an Afghan American woman born in the United States. Maryam Qudrat Aseel reflects on her familyÊs background as educated urban Afghans, very different from Western stereotypes of Muslim Afghanistan. She also writes about her experiences as a Muslim woman living in the United States after September 11, 2001. Saberi, Helen. 2000. Afghan Food and Cookery. New York: Hippocrene. Helen Saberi married an Afghan and lived in Afghanistan for 10 years. This excellent recipe book contains a wide variety of Afghan dishes (adjusted for the American cook) and a wealth of cultural information about the significance of different Afghan holidays and the food associated with them. Sultan, Masuda. 2006. My War at Home: A Memoir. New York: Washington Square Press. Masuda Sultan was born in Afghanistan but fled with her family to the United States as a young child. This memoir charts her journey to becoming a confident human rights advocate, via her arranged marriage, learning more about her Muslim Afghan American identity, and her return visits to Afghanistan.
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Argentinean Immigrants by Judith Ann Warner
Introduction The Latin word for silver is argentum, and Argentina is occasionally referred to as the „Land of Silver.‰ The Republic of Argentina is located on the southernmost portion of the Americas and covers 15 percent of its land mass. It has a population of over 41 million and the vast majority are Roman Catholic. Originally colonized by the Spanish, Argentina has been a major immigrant receiving nation. During the time period of the second stream of immigration to the United States (1880 1920), Argentina was a primary destination of Spanish and Italian émigrés. Although Argentina is viewed as a Spanish-speaking country with a Spanish cultural tradition, the reality is that it is ethnically diverse. Nationalities of late 19th- and early 20thcentury immigrant groups included Czechs, Danish, French, Germans, Hungarians, Jews, Japanese, Irish, Koreans, Lebanese, Poles, Swiss, and Welsh. Many of these immigrants came as sojourners and almost half returned to their original homeland. Many stayed because of their investment in time and labor or because their families and children had become attached to their new country. Argentine culture is imbued with nostalgia because of the impossibility of return to the sending country. In the 21st century, Argentina continues to support immigration, although recent arrivals originate from the other Southern Cone countries of Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Peru. The Southern Cone comprises the southernmost countries of Latin America and, as a political designation, is typically used to refer to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Argentina has developed into an immigrant sending country. Repeated economic turmoil during the 20th and 21st centuries has motivated certain of ArgentinaÊs educated and skilled immigrants to leave the county for better opportunities. Contemporary destinations include the United States, Spain, and Italy. Many Argentinean Americans are highly educated professionals who came to the United States as foreign students or with needed occupational skills. About 144,000 Argentine immigrants reside in the United States and, due to small population size, this group is under-studied. In the United States, this group is classified as „Hispanic/ Latino‰ but the diversity of ArgentinaÊs own immigrant population calls into question whether Argentine immigrants will embrace this designation or participate in Hispanic political groups. A major issue for the United States and Argentina is the
39
Chronology | 41
consequences of an outflow of skilled workers. As a developing country, Argentina has lost some of its best and brightest due to a 20th- and 21st-century history of economic troubles.
Chronology 1516
Discovery by Juan Díaz de Solís.
1542
Viceroyalty of Peru is established and includes territory later known as Argentina.
1580
Permanent Spanish colony established in Buenos Aires as part of the dependency of Rio de la Plata.
1776
Rio de La Plata becomes a viceroyalty.
1814–1817
Argentinean War of Independence.
1816
United Provinces of the Rio Plata declaration of independence from Spain.
1860–1930
Postcolonial immigration from Spain and Italy.
1946
General Perón is elected and institutes a pro-urban development policy, nationalizing industry and services and destabilizing the peso.
1950–1969
First phase of Argentinean immigration to the United States.
1955
Argentinean military coup removes Perón.
1970s–1980s Second phase of Argentinean immigration to the United States occurs in response to political and economic troubles. 1973
Perón is recalled from exile to serve as president.
1974
Isabel Perón becomes president after her husband dies.
1976
Argentinean military junta stages a coup.
1976–1982
Military dictatorship and „Dirty War‰ of political repression of dissidents.
1982
Argentinean military forcibly occupies the Falkland Islands on the basis of a territorial claim and Britain enters into war, inflicting defeat.
1983
Democratic elections return to Argentina.
2001–2002
Economic crisis prompts presidential resignations, violent popular protest, and international immigration.
42 | Argentinean Immigrants
Third phase of Argentine immigration to the United States begins in response to economic troubles. 2007
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner is elected. The wife of former president Néstor Kirchner, she is the first female president of Argentina.
Background Geography of Argentina Argentina is the eighth largest country in the world and second largest South American country (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] 2010). The internationally recognized surface area of Argentina is 1,068,302.7 square miles. Approximately 1 percent (11,700 square miles) is water. Argentina has a boundary with the Atlantic and Antarctic oceans that is 2,899 miles long. It contains both the highest and lowest points of land on the South American continent. Cerro Aconcagua, at 22,834 feet, is the highest peak in the Americas while Laguna del Carbón is located at ⫺344 feet below sea level, the lowest point in South America. Argentina is divided into six regions: (a) The Pampas is an area west and south of the capital, Buenos Aires. It contains a humid pampa and a dry pampa, famous for its grazing and beef production and a source of oil deposits; (b) Gran Chaco in the north is a seasonally dry or wet area used for livestock and cotton; (c) Mesopotamia is located between the Paraná and Uruguay rivers and includes grazing zones and subtropical rainforests; (d) Patagonia is a semiarid steppe region that includes the otherwise cool and wet Tierra del Fuego; (e) Cuyo is located in the Andes mountains, which provides water for irrigation in a fruit and wine region; and (f) The Northwest (NOA) contains parallel Andean mountain regions up to 20,000 feet and river valleys suitable for agriculture. Two-thirds of ArgentinaÊs population lives in the Pampas region (Rodriguez 2000).
History of Argentina Prior to European contact, Amerindians lived in at least 10 cultural and social population groups of varying means of subsistence. After discovery by Juan Díaz de Solís in 1516, Spain came to designate the area now known as Argentina as within the Viceroyalty of Peru by 1542 (Ferradás 2003). A Buenos Aires colony was established in 1580 within the dependency of Rio de la Plata, which was elevated to a viceroyalty in 1776. Spanish men were accompanied by Spanish women, and Creole (Spaniards born in the New World) families developed. Children of Spanish men and Indian women were known as meztizos. Mestizos became urban artisans
Background | 43
and laborers and rural herders. In the 17th and 18th centuries, African slaves were imported and worked in agriculture and as servants. The decline of Spain fostered South American revolutions of independence and, in 1816, Rio de la Plata evolved toward separate nationhood. Initially, Spanish settlers, their descendents, and indigenous peoples comprised the population. Periodic assaults on Amerindians fragmented their societies and cultures while decimating their population (Floria and Belsunce 1971). After 1870, European investment and immigration led Argentina to economic prominence as the 10th wealthiest country in the world. Meat and grain production led an agricultural export driven economy based on British and French investment (Lewis 1990). At the 1900 millennium, Argentina ranked as one of the worldÊs wealthiest nations. In the 20th and 21st centuries, it has suffered recurrent financial crises due to government deficits, extraordinary rates of monetary inflation, external debt, and investorÊs withdrawal of money from the nationÊs banks (CIA 2010). During the 20th century, Argentinean decline was based on reduced pricing for agricultural exports and increased demand for return on foreign investment. During World War I and World War II, Argentina exported food, but the world economy was undergoing transformation. In 1946, Argentinean General Juan Perón was elected and, with the efforts of First Lady Eva Perón, began the social movement called „Peronism.‰ Perón promoted urban industrial development, nationalized key industries and services, and improved wages and working conditions. This economic reorganization destabilized prices and exchange rates, causing the peso to greatly lose value and inflation to dramatically increase. The remainder of 20th-century Argentinean history is marked by military coups dÊétat and repeated returns to democratization related to conflicts between conservatives allied with the military and Peronists. In 1966, the military staged another coup and, although repressive, the military invested in public works and reduced a trade deficit. Military government led to political violence, and Perón was recalled from exile in 1973 and was democratically elected. His death in 1974 led to his replacement by his third wife, Isabel Perón. In 1976, renewed financial crisis led to the return of military government. The junta designated a national organization renewal process that fostered repression of dissidents in what has been termed the „dirty war‰ (Anderson 1993). Alleged and forensic evidence has partially proven that thousands of dissidents were „disappeared.‰ Financial crisis and a disastrous effort in 1982 to establish ArgentinaÊs claim on the Maldives (Falkland Islands) led to democratic elections in 1983. The military dictatorship had deregulated finance, deindustrialized, repeatedly frozen wages, and run up a record foreign debt. This pattern of financial imbalance has persisted into the 21st century. In 2001, interim president Adolfo Rodriguez Saa defaulted on foreign debt owed by the government. In 2002, Eduardo Duhalde presided over a country in which
44 | Argentinean Immigrants
Juan Perón, shown here with his wife, Eva, was the dominant figure in Argentine politics from 1946 until his death in 1974. (AFP/Getty Images)
60 percent of the population had incomes below the poverty line. The GNP grew at a rate of 8.5 percent annually over the next six years. Debt restructuring, which reduced payment burden; resurgent industry; and monetary expansion allowed renewed growth, but inflation reoccurred and, in 2007, business and export taxes were invoked and economic growth slowed as the world entered recession. In 2009, per capita income was $13,800, and 13.9 percent of the population have below poverty level incomes. Public debt was estimated at 49.1 percent of GNP.
Ethnic Relations Argentina was originally lightly populated by Amerindian groups. Spanish colonization brought disease and forced labor or population movement that decimated the indigenous peoples. Surviving indigenous groups were subject to genocidal military campaigns throughout the 1880s. At present, Amerindians are thought to be less than 1 percent of the Argentine population although statistics on Amerindians residing in urban areas are inaccurate and there may be more (Ferradás 2003). From the late 1800s to the mid-1900s, the Rio de la Plata region was the site of slave trade (Ferradás 2003). Estimates are that blacks and mulattoes of African and
Background | 45
European origin constituted 25 30 percent of the Buenos Aires population. The size of the Buenos Aires Afro Argentine population dramatically declined in the 19th century until only 8,005 Afro Argentines were enumerated in a population of 433,375. It is thought that urban epidemics, civil war, and intermarriage accounts for this steep decline in population. By 2000, less than 4 percent of the Buenos Aires population claimed Afro Argentine ancestry. In the 19th century, European immigrants competed with the Afro Argentine and mestizo population for work and housing (Ferradás 2003). Immigrants came to outnumber native-born Argentineans. The displacement of Amerindians and Afro Argentines combined with the massive immigrant population growth to impact on Argentine identity. Ethnically, Argentineans identify as white of European descent. This view is based on the Buenos Aires population and discounts both the indigenous presence in rural provinces and the in-migration of mestizos from neighboring nations as well as mulattoes and blacks from Brazil and Uruguay. Ethno-racial conflict ensued, and immigrants were stereotyped as lower class and criminals. Although the world views Argentina as a Spanish country, it has been a destination for an ethnically diverse immigrant population. Ninety percent of the Argentinean population originates from Italy and Spain (Ferradás 2003). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Argentina received immigrants from Europe (Germans, Poles, Welsh, Irish, Hungarians, Czechs, Danish, French, Jews, and Swiss); Asia (Koreans, Japanese); and the Middle East (Lebanese). Although up to one half of these immigrants returned to their homelands, many stayed in Argentina because of investments or family ties.
Immigration to Argentina Historically, Argentina has been a major immigrant receiving nation. Today, it is a site of immigration, transit, and emigration (Jachimowitz 2006). In the 1800s, Argentina experienced a wave of immigration parallel to the second wave occurring in the United States (INDEC 2004, 1). The expansion of the industrial age and postcolonial migration brought an increase in the foreign-born population from 12.1 percent in 1869 to 25.4 percent in 1895. Foreign immigrants peaked at 29.9 percent in 1914 prior to the worldwide drop in movement associated with World War I and World War II. After World War II, immigrants constituted 15.3 percent of ArgentinaÊs population and then dropped to 13 percent in 1960. By the time of the Argentine economic crisis in 2001 2002, the number of foreign-born in the population had dropped to 5 percent (Williams and Hatton 2005). As a developing nation, Argentina does not attract the volume of immigration of the United States, but it continues to have immigration receptive policies and attracts people, albeit at a declining rate. In 1970, 9.5 percent of the population was foreign-born, decreasing to 6.8 percent in 1980, and 5 percent in 1991. Argentina
46 | Argentinean Immigrants
An immigrant family at their homestead in about 1920. Argentina’s robust agricultural economy attracted a large immigrant influx, resulting in mixed-ethnicity populations. (Library of Congress)
has steadily gained immigrants from its neighbors Paraguay, Chile, and Uruguay (Ferradás 2003). Like many Latin American countries, Argentina has experienced an internationalization of its labor market (Lattes, Santibanez, and Castillo 1998), but it chiefly attracts migrants from the neighboring Southern Cone countries and is part of a regional migration subsystem (Massey et al. 1998). This population movement is thought to be a part of the trend in rural to urban migration in Latin America, but instead of migrating to cities within their country, many immigrants are choosing to go to cities across borders (Massey et al. 1998). Historically, demand for labor in Buenos Aires and other Argentine cities drew other Southern Cone migrants. From the mid-1800s through the present, approximately 2 to almost 3 percent of its foreign-born population originated from bordering nations. The Southern Cone population also includes unauthorized immigrants who were legalized in amnesties given in 1974 and 1984. Amnesty recipients were from Chile (35%), Paraguay (33%), Uruguay (13%), and Bolivia (14%) (Massey et al. 1998, 201). Recently, the MERCOSUR agreement has strengthened economic and labor market ties with nearby countries. MERCOSUR established a free-trade zone including Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, and Uruguay. Overall, the 2001 Argentine census found that immigrants constituted 1,531,940 of the Argentinean population (INDEC 2004, 2). Immigration from bordering
Background | 47
countries is becoming more important. Paraguayan immigration has been steadily increasing from 13.8 percent of the population in 1980 (13.8%) to 325,046 (21.2%) in 2001. Bolivians numbered 118, 141 (6.2%) in 1980 and 233,464 (15.2%) in 2001. Paraguay and Bolivia account for over one-third of ArgentinaÊs foreignborn population. Indeed, South American immigration has displaced Europe as the source of Argentine immigration. In 1980, Italian immigrants comprised 488,271 (25.7%) but dropped to 216,718 (14.1%) in 2001. Similarly, Spanish immigrants totaled 373,984 (19.7%) in 1980 and decreased to 134,417 (8.8%) in the 2001 census. Immigration from Poland and Germany also declined along with Chile, the only neighboring nation to show a decline in immigration rates to Argentina. Overall, the number of foreign-born individuals in Argentina showed a drop through 2001; however, certain bordering or nearby Southern Cone countries, including Peru, are an increasing component of ArgentinaÊs third wave of immigration. After 1950, international migration from bordering countries such as Paraguay was unregulated (Parrado and Cerrutti 2003). Individuals from countries bordering on Argentina are not required to obtain a visa, although visitors are not permitted to work. Employers are seldom sanctioned, because unauthorized hiring and periodic amnesties (which occurred in 1964, 1974, 1984, and 1992) legalized the status of Southern Cone labor migrants who stay. Paraguayan male migrants are positively selected in terms of education and skill. Typically, they have education past primary school and labor specialization, such as leather work. If they can expect a better return on their labor, they invest in a trip to Argentina (Parrado and Cerrutti 2003). In Paraguay, limited access to land and credit prompts migrants to seek economic improvement abroad. Differences in economic conditions fluctuate, and migrants seek to use differentials, such as overvaluation of the Argentine peso, to accumulate income. Unequal patterns of development between neighboring countries foster labor migration. Argentina attracts unskilled foreign workers. Many of these workers are shortterm unskilled labor migrants who anticipate working in Argentina for short periods of time and then returning to the homeland or migrating to another country (Jachimowitz 2006). From 1950 to 1974, import substitution industrialization, a policy to develop Argentine industry and reduce reliance on exports (Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2009), was relatively successful, and per capita income in Argentina increased by 50 percent from $5,000 to $7,000 dollars (Parrado and Cerrutti 2003, 107). This period was characterized by demand for low-skilled and manual labor migrants. In the mid-1970s, economic stagnation occurred and income leveled off, followed by an economic downturn in the 1980s when per capita income declined from $7,600 to $5,600. In the 1990s, Argentine per capita income began to increase again. Labor migration fluctuates in relation to economic conditions in Argentina and differences in wages in other Southern Cone countries. Many unskilled migrants are coming to stay permanently.
48 | Argentinean Immigrants
The 2010 population of Argentina is estimated at 41,343,201 (CIA 2010). In 2010, 97 percent of the Argentinean population was racially classified as „white‰ and 3 percent as mestizo (white and Amerindian) or Amerindian. The 2011 Argentinean census is likely to determine that immigration is growing as 953,363 applied for permanent residency from 2000 to 2008. The greatest number of applications is from South American countries: Paraguay (319,492), Bolivia (240,467), Peru (138,355), Chile (23,231), Uruguay (22,733), Brazil (19,547), Columbia (16,539), Ecuador (6,564), and Venezuela (4,618). The globalization of international migration has resulted in the generation of flows between Asian countries and Argentina. China is the fourth-ranked sending nation, with 34,746 immigrants, and South Korea is tenth, with 10,279 immigrants. Intriguingly, the United States is the fifth ranked sending country (with 24,626 immigrants)·it is a nation of modest emigration patterns as individuals and families seek success worldwide.
Human Trafficking Human traffickers use Argentina as both a source and destination for men, women, and children subject to forced labor and sexual exploitation (CIA 2010). The victims originate in rural areas and are brought to urban areas to be taken abroad or locally impounded. Child sex tourism is a known social problem, and Argentina is a receiving nation for women and children from Paraguay, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic. Argentinean women and girls are sent to neighboring countries, Mexico, and western Europe by sex traffickers. In turn, men and women from Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay are brought for forced labor in agriculture, sweatshops, and domestic service. Because of this illegal migratory transit pattern, Argentina is on the United StatesÊ Tier 2 Watch List for lack of results in suppressing human trafficking due to lack of services for victims and local corrupt involvement of officials with traffickers. In 2009, the Argentine Congress passed a federal anti-trafficking law.
Waves and Causes of Immigration The first phase of Argentinean immigration to the United States began in the 1950s. Argentinean industrialization was economically problematic and income, working conditions, and quality of life issues prompted professionals to emigrate (Marrow 2007a). From 1960 to 1970, 185,000 Argentineans left, primarily choosing the United States and Spain as destinations (Jachimowitz 2006). These individuals were highly skilled native-born citizens. Professionals, including medical doctors and scientists, left Argentina. The United States received 16,246 (Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2008, 6 11). Detailed statistics on Argentineans in the United States did not become available until 1970, the end of this first phase, when the U.S. Census added the category „Other Hispanics.‰ From 1960 to 1969, 49,384
Background | 49
applied for and received legal permanent residence (Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2008, 6 11). The second phase of Argentinean immigration began in the mid-1970s, when a wave of emigration from Argentina occurred in reaction to the „Dirty War‰ (1976 1983), acts of repression orchestrated by a military dictatorship. Emigrating Argentineans were fleeing political persecution and had less education than the population of their new homelands, although they had more education than the average Argentinean. Certain petitions for political asylum were granted to Argentineans (Reimers 2005). From 1970 to 1979, 30,303 Argentineans applied for and received permanent residency (Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2008, 6 11). Doctors, university professors, health professionals, and teachers predominated (Pellegrino 2000). In the 1980s, emigration continued as hyperinflation reduced buying power of the Argentine peso and the economy continued to suffer. From 1980 to 1989, 23,442 Argentineans were admitted as permanent residents (Pellegrino 2000). This flow was primarily constituted of unskilled laborers, but the high proportion of professionals resulted in classification of emigration losses as a „brain drain‰ (Marrow 2007a). Beginning in the 1980s, engineers and teachers were especially likely to emigrate. After the military dictatorship was replaced by a democratic government, many exiles remained in new host societies. From 1990 to 1999, an additional 30,065 were admitted to the United States (Pellegrino 2000). The third phase of Argentinean emigration is connected to economic issues. In the 2001 2002 Argentinean economic crisis, due to lack of funds for $100 billion in external debt payments, many Argentineans responded to high unemployment and inflation by considering emigration. They left for Spain, Italy, the United States, Canada, Australia, and Israel (Marrow 2007a). The middle class suffered a reduced quality of life as half of the population experienced poverty and unemployment rose to 20 percent. ArgentinaÊs finances improved by 2004, but ArgentinaÊs National Migration Directorate (cited in Marrow 2007a) indicates that 255,000 left as emigrants from 2001 to mid-2003, and estimates are that 300,000 had left by 2005 (Jachimowitz 2006). This was six times the number of Argentinean emigrants from 1993 to 2000. A 2002 survey recorded that one-third of ArgentinaÊs population would leave if they could (Marrow 2007a). The United States does not act to welcome economic migrants. It embraces regulated immigration based on family reunification and job preference rankings oriented toward admission of skilled labor (Warner 2009). The United States Justice DepartmentÊs response was to limit temporary visas for business and tourism due to a concern that Argentineans would overstay and become undocumented immigrants (Reimers 2005). Argentineans continued to enter the United States and reports indicated settlement in Florida and New York. Unofficial estimates counted 40,000 to 180,000 Argentines in Florida in 2002 (Marrow 2007a). At that time, the
50 | Argentinean Immigrants
Argentine government requested that the United States authorize temporary protected status (TPS) for Argentineans living in the United States without documents. This was declined. Argentina attracts migrants of working-class and agricultural backgrounds from neighboring Southern Cone countries, but skilled emigrants tend to settle in developed nations, particularly the United States (Massey et al. 1998). Lack of economic opportunity in Argentina pushes Argentineans to emigrate to destinations like the U.S. and European nations perceived to have the pull of more economic opportunity. Like other Latin American countries, the young and skilled workers seek to improve their lives abroad (Jachimowitz 2006). As of March 2005, over one million Argentineans had left the country to various destinations due to its economic problems. Economic pressures on the middle class; structural tensions in terms of the number of individuals with higher education and positions available; and salary and promotion opportunity differentials have all contributed to brain drain. The United States continues to be a major receiving nation, and the number of Argentine arrivals has increased in the first decade of the 21st century. In 1999, 1,393 Argentineans were admitted as permanent immigrants, increasing to 5,170 in 2008 (Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2008, 12 15). The majority of Argentinean immigrants arriving in 2008 came as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (2,783) or under family-sponsored preferences (181) (Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2008, 27 30). Significantly, 1,944 Argentineans were sponsored under the employment preference category of U.S. immigration law. Many Argentineans enter the United States on business, tourism, and other temporary visas each year, ranging from 539,304 in 1999 to 383,803 in 2008 (Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2008, 67 70). Prior to the economic troubles of 2001 2002, 546,796 entered the United States on visas in 2001 (67 70). This dropped to 252,233 in 2002 because of U.S. policy to restrict entrants considered possible to become unauthorized immigrants and has only rebounded somewhat by 2007 2008 (67 70). The brain drain is facilitated by a process in which individuals who are allowed to enter as non-immigrants are able to transition their status to permanent residents. For example, 10,140 Argentineans entered as students and exchange visitors in 2008 (76 79). An additional 22,684 came under the visa category for temporary workers and their families (76 79). In 2008, temporary workers primarily entered with H1B visas as members of specialty occupations (6,583); workers with extraordinary ability/achievement (1,078); athletes, artists, or entertainers (1,451); intracompany transferees (5,427); and treaty traders and investors (1,558) (Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2008, 84 87). Although many students and professionals may later return to Argentina, initial entrance facilitates the accumulation of social capital and ties facilitating immigration, including sponsorship by employers. The American public understands that the immigration system is primarily based on numerical quotas by hemisphere and country. Nevertheless, these caps are not
Demographic Profile | 51
always the basis by which individuals are admitted. Temporary visa holders can apply to adjust their status to permanent resident (Warner 2009). If an Argentine foreign student completes a PhD in a scientific or high technology field of high demand, they may find an employer willing to sponsor them. More than half of immigrants who become permanent residents are status adjusters. This calls into question how the system impacts those on country waiting lists, who may have applied earlier but have to wait longer. The United States is perceived to need skilled professionals but Congressional action to facilitate legislation to enable their entrance has not passed.
Demographic Profile Argentinean Americans are primarily descended from Spanish, Italian, and other European immigrants to Argentina. Among these entrants were Jews and thirdgeneration descendents of Italians. Argentinean Americans tend to be better educated than other Latin American immigrants and to be active as professionals and in business (Marshall 1988). Argentinean Americans originate from a Spanishspeaking country in South America, but in many ways their traits resemble that of second-stream European immigrants (Reimers 2005).
Size and Composition of the Community Argentinean immigrants are a component of the South American population in the United States. In 2007, the American Community Survey found that South American immigrants and their foreign-born children numbered 2,499,000 of the total U.S. Population (Greico 2010, 6). Argentinean immigrants and their descendents numbered 194,000. Sixty percent of Argentinean Americans live in three major immigrant receiving states: California, Florida, and New York (Jachimowitz 2006). There are sizable numbers of Argentinean immigrants in the New York City, Miami Beach, and Los Angeles metropolitan regions. Most come under the family reunification provision of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, but an indirect method of emigrating is to initially arrive as a skilled worker (using an H-1b Visa), exchange visitors (J-1 Visa), or on an L-1 visa for a company transfer. These individuals later adjust their status to permanent resident. Recent Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics (2010) data indicates that 2,317 Argentineans received legal permanent resident alien status in 2000. Applications peaked in 2006 at 7,327 and dropped in 2007 through 2009. Argentineans receiving legal permanent resident alien status numbered 5,780. The leading state of residence for Argentinean new permanent residents was Florida, with 2,392. See Table 16 for a list of the leading states of residence for Argentineans obtaining legal permanent resident status in 2009.
Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and country of birth
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
2,317
3,297
3,661
3,129
4,805
7,081
7,327
5,645
5,353
5,780
REGION Total Argentina
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Demographic Profile | 53
Abelardo Abraham (left) and an unidentified friend eat in an Argentine cafe on Miami Beach, Florida, April 29, 2008. The two men now live in Miami after moving from Argentina. Since 2000, south Florida has seen an increase in immigration from South American countries such as Colombia, Venezuela, and Argentina. (AP Photo/J. Pat Carter)
Age and Family Structure The Argentinean immigrant population is not sufficiently large to receive a separate census enumeration like that of Mexico. The 2000 U.S. Census provides an online 5 percent PUMS microdata sample, which can be analyzed using the SAS statistics program. The PEW Hispanic Center provides demographic profiles of the 10 largest „Other Hispanic‰ groupings in the United States, but Argentineans did not fall under this category. It would be useful to enumerate the demographic composition of all Other Hispanic population groupings to determine age, family structure, and the impact these categories have on U.S. immigration preferences as well as on the development of families in the United States.
Educational Attainment Argentina was one of the earliest countries in Latin America to expand education in the 20th century. Argentineans value education, which is mandatory from age 6 to 14. Argentina made available universal primary and secondary education. Based on
54 | Argentinean Immigrants
financial ability, families choose between a variety of public and private schools for elementary, high school, and college education. Public universities do not require tuition. Bilingual schools have been increasing and include Spanish and English, Spanish and Italian, and Spanish and German alternatives. Many students choose to study medicine, law, and technological careers such as engineering. Argentine public universities have promoted scientific and technical research, particularly in physics and biology. By the 1980s, three Argentineans had won Nobel prizes: Bernardo Houssay (1947), Luis Leloir (1970), and Cesar Milstein (1984). Educational attainment facilitates the assimilation of Argentinean immigrants in the United States. Latino immigrants to the United States are increasing in education and Argentinean immigrants bolster the overall educational level of this U.S. Census designated group (Lowell and Suro 2002). Approximately 38 percent of Argentinean immigrants have some college education and 50 percent have secondary education (Lowell and Suro 2002, 10). Overall, 35 percent of South American immigrants and 33 percent of Argentineans have completed a college education. Argentineans may come as students studying professions in demand before becoming immigrants (Tremblay 2005). Student mobility is involved in high skilled migration, and the U.S. employment preference category for immigration facilitates adjustment to permanent resident status. Qualified individuals are more easily assimilated into the labor markets of their adoptive countries. Proficiency in the language of the host country and possession of a degree from that country gives these student migrants an advantage in obtaining work and eventual permission to legalize a long-term stay. The United States is often chosen as a country for study and retains many foreign students who may begin the immigration process with an H1B Visa for skilled workers in demand. A survey undertaken by the National Science Board (2000) indicates that over 60 percent of Argentinean students studying in the United States had some plans to migrate and that over 30 percent had definite plans. The gain of professionals benefits the United States but deprives Argentina of skilled labor, a situation conceptually referred to as brain drain.
Economic Attainment Argentinean Americans tend to have higher education and are skilled workers and professionals. About one-half of Argentineans arriving from 1965 to 1970 were unskilled workers (Rodriguez 2000). Both skilled and unskilled Argentineans have been pushed toward emigration by economic and political instability. Better educated individuals often have greater resources to sustain migration, and by 1970, the percentage of Argentine origin immigrants with more than 10 years of education was four times greater in the United States than in Argentina. The 1990 census indicated that 21 percent of Argentinean immigrants in metropolitan Los Angeles and New York had a BA or other higher education.
Adjustment and Adaptation | 55
By 2002, more than two-thirds of Argentine immigrants worked in professional and supervisory jobs and less than one-third in unskilled work (Canales 2007). This pattern matches educational levels. Average earnings were almost $30,000 a year. Approximately 15 percent of Argentinean immigrantsÊ earnings were below poverty level as compared to 8 percent of the native-born. Almost 15 percent of Argentinean immigrants earned at 1 to 1.5 times poverty level income. Mean per capita income was $23,589.99 (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2008). Male Argentinean immigrants worked in manufacturing, construction, business, transportation, and communication. Reflecting the high level of urbanization of the Argentine population, they were less likely to be employed in agriculture. Gender patterns in the United States have changed, and more women work, including immigrant women. The 1980 census indicated that 58 percent of Argentinean women immigrants aged 25 59 were in the labor force while 52 percent of native-born women worked outside the home. A majority of Argentinean immigrants are employed as managerial and professional workers (39.77%) or in sales and office work (24.68%). Other areas with sizeable employment are services (14.84%); and production, transport, and material moving (10.96%) (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2008, 159)
Health Statistics, Issues Life expectancy in Argentina is 72 years for men and 78 years for women (World Health Organization 2010). The top four causes of death are ischemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, lower respiratory infections, and diabetes mellitus. ArgentinaÊs health patterns parallel those of developed nations due to their investment in medical training and research. As the size of the Argentine population increases in the United States, it would be useful to collect data on health trends in this population.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Argentine families are very influenced by Spanish and Italian cultural tradition. They involve close nuclear family relationships and extended family ties to aunts, uncles, cousins, and in-laws. Grandfathers and grandmothers are respected and weekly family reunions on Sundays with an asado (barbecue) or Italian pasta are common (Palermo 2003). American families are often geographically dispersed in the same community, state, or nation due to employment. Adult children separate to go to college or otherwise live on their own. After marriage, the Argentinean family is a focal point of
56 | Argentinean Immigrants
life, and children reside with their parents past the age that adult children have left in the United States (Palermo 2003). Both the economics of household formation and gender bias has a role in living with parents until marriage. Women may chose to co-reside with parents to avoid being stigmatized for living alone, although urban women on their own are more tolerated, if viewed as odd. Argentina has undergone a demographic transition. At the end of the 19th century, the birth rate began to drop and it has fluctuated during the 20th century, stabilizing at a lower rate by 1982, when Argentineans began having fewer children (Palermo 2003). After 1970, teenage pregnancy has increased, especially among lower socioeconomic status individuals. This decrease in the birth rate has been paralleled by a decrease in mortality, particularly for women, who are living longer. Periodic economic crises, political instability, and changes in lifestyle associated with modernization have impacted the Argentine family. The nuclear family has been the most frequent family form but is decreasing relative to individual households. Regardless, the Information, Evaluation, and Monitoring System of Social Programs at the Argentine Ministry of Social Development indicate that extended and compound families increased (Palermo 2003). Changes in Argentinean family structure include: (a) increases in common law marriage paralleled by decrease in legal marriage; (b) an increase in common-law or legal first marriage; (c) men marry at an older age, women at a younger age; (d) legally married couples may be childless or have children at a later age; (e) more children are being born out of wedlock; (f) an increase in separations; (g) an increase in remarriage and reconstituted families; (h) an increase in individual households largely due to marriage break-ups; and (i) an increase in common-law marriage or reconstituted families that are nuclear but smaller with some instability (Palermo 2003). Economic crises and high unemployment have been reshaping Argentine families (Palermo 2003). Men are no longer the sole income providers for families and women partners may earn more than some men. As in the United States, women carry greater responsibility for household tasks and childcare than men, but some negotiation is occurring. If men are unemployed and women are working, men may have reduced authority and greater new task assignment. Nevertheless, changes in menÊs familial status can result in conflict, domestic violence, separation, and divorce. The increase in poverty is associated with the emergence of more femaleheaded households. Marriage is becoming less formalized and more unstable.
Childhood and Baptism Argentineans value children and seek to protect them within the family (Rodriguez 2000). Many holidays and celebrations are oriented toward children: the Day of the Children, Epiphany, Christmas, and baptism. Baptism is the initial Catholic ceremony in which a newborn is ceremonially placed in sanctified water and presented
Adjustment and Adaptation | 57
with godparents. Godparenting sustains a social relationship between relatives of friends of the family and a child. Godparents spiritually advise a child and occasionally look after children if the parents unexpectedly die. Traditionally godparenthood was more than a symbol of a bond with the child and parents.
Coming-of-Age The Latino quinceanara, called Los Quince in Argentina, marks when a girl makes a transition from adolescence to becoming a woman. On the 15th birthday, friends and relatives gather to celebrate. The teenage girl wears a special dress as ornate as a bridal gown, but instead of the traditional bridal white, the gown can come in various colors. In Argentina, fathers, godparents, and friends dance with her while others watch. Some families may attend church mass before this event.
Weddings Weddings are divided into three parts: (a) a surprise shower for the bride and bridegroom; (b) a formal wedding before a justice of the peace or state officer at the civil registry; and (c) a church wedding ceremony for the legal union (Rodriguez 2000). It is considered bad luck for the bridegroom to see the bride before the religious ceremony. They prepare at their homes and meet at the church. After the ceremony, rice, symbolic of financial success, is thrown. Afterwards, a reception party occurs with a wedding cake and dancing. Argentinean wedding cakes have strings attached to gifts. Single women tug on the strings and receive a gift that portends the future. A ring indicates a woman will marry next while a thimble indicates she will not marry. A small lock indicates that parents will not allow a marriage in the immediate future.
Funerals After death, the deceased are displayed for people to pay their respects at a funeral home or their original home (Rodriguez 2000). Only coffee is served. In northeastern Argentina, velorio del angelito, special ceremonies for children, are held.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Gendered relationships are changing worldwide. Individualization and autonomy of the young and women are emergent social patterns (Palermo 2003). Fathers are losing absolute authority, and the patriarchal family model is in decline. Young people experience a period of independence, living on their own, whether or not they have formed a couple. The Argentinean economic crisis of the waning 20th century postponed steady employment and independence for young people.
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Argentinean women are becoming educated and active in the labor market (Palermo 2003). The feminist movement and birth control have changed the playing field for men and women. In turn, Argentine law has modified womenÊs status in the family. For example, men had patria potestas, special authority over their children; but new legislation has granted the father and mother equal authority. A child is not allowed to go abroad with one parent without the otherÊs permission. During the mid-1970s, ArgentinaÊs recurrent economic crisis led more married and cohabiting women to work, and male unemployment rose (Palermo 2003). Women with greater formal education were especially likely to enter the labor force as well as divorced and separated women. Many women are pursuing careers in economics, engineering, politics, and law (Rodriguez 2000). Argentina was actually the first country in the Americas to have a woman be president. In the United States, Argentinean women are subject to more restrictions (Rodriguez 2000). Husbands may forbid them to work or go out alone. Unmarried Argentinean women were happier because they experienced less family pressure and had more freedom. For women with children, there was less social support for child caretaking from kin and friends. Working women found that they needed to be on the job even if ill.
Argentinean immigrants Angel Ribulotta, real estate agent and restaurant owner, with his wife Valentina (center) and daughter Rosana, at the restaurant they opened with money they made investing in real estate. Called the Argentine Cafe, the restaurant specializes in Argentinean food and wine. (Susan Biddle/The Washington Post/Getty Images)
Adjustment and Adaptation | 59
Argentinean Football (Soccer) Argentineans love soccer and their national football team has won 25 major titles including 2 FIFA World Cups, 2 Olympic Gold Medals, and 14 Copa Americas. In the 2010 World Cup, they advanced to the quarter finals but were beaten by Germany. Argentina has 331,811 registered football players, and increasingly, women and girls are joining. In 2006, the Argentine women’s team were South American champions. Over one thousand Argentine players are on European and other extra-national teams.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Continued Links to Nation of Origin Argentinean Americans are active in maintaining ethnic organizations to promote their culture. Both football (soccer in the United States) and tango are activities they enjoy.
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background Argentine Association of Los Angeles. http://www.aalaonline.com/sitio/estat uto.php This group organizes and supports Argentinean American events in Los Angeles. The Web site (2010) indicates its purpose as: To encourage development of friendship and mutual help among Argentine [sic] nationals residing in California. To give advice and help Argentine [sic] nationals in need. To establish cultural exchange with other argentine [sic] institutions and from other nationalities, to promote goodwill and mutual understanding. To develop cultural, educational and social activities and promote sports, and to engage in any lawful act or activity for which a corporation may be organized under such Law. To lessen neighborhood tension and eliminate discrimination and prejudice among people. To lessen the burdens of the United States Government in assisting foreign nationals in need. To promote the development of the arts and cultural exchange programs.
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Casa Argentina Casa Argentina is an organization for Argentinean immigrants and Hispanics that has centers in the United States and Spain. It organizes educational and cultural activities including music, dances, and movies. American locations include New Jersey, Texas, and Louisiana.
Religion Catholicism is the main religion in Argentina (Ferradás 2003). The preface to the Argentinean constitution, a declaration of rights, specifies that Roman Catholicism is protected by the state as a majority of Argentineans are believers. The Argentine constitution further stipulates that the president must be a Roman Catholic. In Argentina, as around the world, there has been a decline in church attendance and very limited recruitment of seminary students. As a result, many Argentineans claim Roman Catholic faith but are not very involved with the church. This tendency is found among Argentinean immigrants as well.
National/Regional Language Press and Other Media The majority of Argentineans speak Spanish and the official language is Castilian Spanish. Because Argentineans are a highly educated and skilled population, it is likely that this population has bilingual ability. Research is needed to establish how language shift occurs in this population. Argentineans can listen to Univision, Telemundo, and other Spanish language stations in the united States. Argentinean cable networks include Fox Sports on Espanol, MTV Argentina, and the news network Todos Noticias.
Celebration of National Holidays January 6: Epiphany (Day of the Three Wise Men). April 2: Sovereignty Day. May 25: The Anniversary of the May Revolution of 1810 when Argentina appointed a government is celebrated. June 20: Argentine Flag Day commemorates Manuel Belgrano, who designed it. July 9: Argentine Independence Day commemorates when Argentinean province representatives declared independence from Spain. November 10: Day of Tradition. December 25: Christmas.
Adjustment and Adaptation | 61
Mate Mate is both an Argentinean herbal tea and the type of container it is prepared and served in. The drink is a stimulant made with the leaves of yerba mate (ilex paraguaiensis), a plant cultivated in the north. The container might be a gourd or an ornate holder crafted from silver. The leaves are steeped in warm water as boiling water brings out bitterness. A metal straw is used with a filter at one end to prevent the leaves from entering the liquid to be drunk. Argentineans meet to drink mate in the way that American friends gather to drink coffee. The drink contains caffeine, theobromine, and theophyline, although at a lower stimulant content than coffee. Studies are examining its antioxidant and anticarcinogenic potential. It is available at health food stores in the United States.
Foodways Argentine cuisine emphasizes beef and pasta dishes with Spanish and Italian influences (Rodriguez 2000). Locro is a special dish made with corn, meat, chorizo (pork sausage), pumpkin, and sweet potatoes. Mazamorra is a corn dish. Empanadas are meat turnovers, which can be filled with beef, cheese, corn, ham, chicken, or other ingredients. Argentinean beef has a worldwide reputation for excellence, and Argentine style steak houses are becoming more common in the United States. Asado (barbecue grilled meat), parrillada (mixed barbecue), and empanadas are featured. The Italian influence is seen in the popularity of gelato (Italian ice cream), and the Spanish dulce de leche, a caramel condensed milk and sugar spread, is used on toast and in pastry. Jamón serrano (salted pork ham) is becoming known as a gourmet item in the United States.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Tango is ArgentinaÊs most famous cultural export. It began in the 1880s in lowerand working-class areas of Argentina in bars frequented by prostitutes and in brothels. At that time the relations between men and women were very formalized, and a public embrace was not socially acceptable. The dance was considered scandalous and men began to perfect it by dancing with each other! Immigrants arriving in Argentina were attracted to the tango although the aristocracy remained aloof from it. In the early 20th century, Argentinean prosperity fostered European ties and a cleaned-up version of the tango became popular in Europe. At that time, tango was accepted by the Argentine upper classes and became the international dance form known today as a cultural symbol of Argentina.
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Profile: Tita Merello and Argentine Tango Tita Merello (1904–2002) was a popular woman tango vocalist of the “Golden Age” who rebelled against conventional ideals of femininity. Although she was not considered beautiful, she was attractive and ambitious and presented herself as a woman with an alternative standard of femininity. Se Dice de Mi (It is Being Said about Me) was her autobiographic signature song and immortalized in the movie Mercardo del Abasto (Albasto Market). Tita was a working-class heroine who achieved fame despite her lack of refined feminine mannerisms. She showed that Argentine women of various social strata could achieve recognition and upward social mobility. “Neither a Victorian fragile character nor an exquisite feminine character, she invented herself as an ‘ugly, defiant beauty,’ thus confronting dominant feminine standards of refinement, sweetness, and submission.” Source: Viladrich, Anahi. 2006. “Neither Virgins Nor Whores: Tango Lyrics and Gender Representations in the Tango World.” Journal of Popular Culture 39(2): 272–93.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship The United States permits permanent residents to apply for naturalization after five years of residency (Mohmen 2009). Applicants must prove that they are of good moral character during residency although the Department of Homeland Security has the right to investigate any period in an individualÊs life span. A criminal conviction, whether for a felony (more than one year prison term) or a misdemeanor, will disqualify a person to obtain naturalization. Evidence of bad moral character includes failure to support dependents and convictions for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Character evaluations are made by immigration officials on a case-by-case basis. After acceptance, Argentineans and other immigrants must take a citizenship test with questions about United States history. Argentinean immigrants take an oath and recite the pledge of allegiance to prove their loyalty.
Naturalization Argentine immigrants must give up their original citizenship to become naturalized in the United States. The United States and Argentina do not have a dual citizenship agreement. Relative to their low percentage in the foreign-born population,
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 63
Argentineans naturalize at very high rates. Figures have ranged from 3,351 in 1999 to 4,170 in 2008 (DHS Office of Immigration Statistics 2008). Research is needed to determine if higher education and skill levels are associated with this rate of naturalization. Although the rate of Argentine immigration is low relative to Mexican and Central American rates, a small ethnic Argentine population has developed in the United States. The Current Population Survey (November 1996/2000) shows that 37.5 percent of individuals identifying as of Argentine ancestry were not immigrants (Jones-Correa 2007, 29 30). Almost 39 percent were U.S. born citizens, and 25 percent were naturalized citizens. Approximately 37 percent were non-citizens. Approximately 2 percent arrived prior to 1950 and 2.7 percent during the 1950s. In the 1960s, 12.5 percent emigrated, followed by 14.3 percent in the 1970s and 15.2 percent in the 1980s. Almost 10 percent had been in the United States sufficient time (five years) to qualify for naturalization application, and 8 percent had not been present for sufficient time.
Intergroup Relations Argentinean immigrants are settled in metropolitan areas such as New York, Miami, and Los Angeles, which have high levels of Latino presence. There is a lack of research on the degree to which they are politically integrated with Latino political organizations.
Forging a New American Political Identity: Civic and Electoral Participation United States voter turnout has averaged 60 percent for national elections (JonesCorrea 2007). Argentine ancestry voters have a higher rate. According to JonesCorrea (2007), the Current Population Survey (1996/2000) indicated 73.1 percent of Argentineans had voted in the previous November national election. Approximately 74 percent of U.S. born citizens and 76 percent of naturalized Argentine origin citizens voted. Further research should examine how the Argentine ethnic group, members of the population designated „Other Latinos,‰ integrate into the electoral system as potential members of a Latino voting block. Once naturalized, Argentinean Americans vote at a higher rate than many other Latino groups with new immigrant members. Michael Jones-Correa (2007) considers that the emergence of Argentine and other Latinos will end the political hegemony of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans, and introduce new political concerns and ways of thought. These groups may coalesce or fragment Latino voting patterns unless coalition-building is prioritized.
64 | Argentinean Immigrants
Second and Later Generations Acculturation and Assimilation South Americans in the United States tend to be primarily first generation (JonesCorrea 2007). The Current Population Survey (November 1996/2000) indicated that 56.5 percent of Argentineans sampled were first generation (Jones-Correa 2007, 28). Argentineans may have a larger second generation developing than other South American immigrant groups such as Bolivians, Chileans, and Uruguayans, where the first generation outnumbers the second generation by two to one. Both parents were born in Argentina for 11 percent of second-generation immigrants, and 32.5 percent had only one U.S. born parent.
Ethnic Identity and Cultural Identification Argentineans are placed into the category „Other Latinos,‰ which includes Caribbean (Dominican Republic) and South Americans (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, among others). Historically, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans have been the dominant Latino ethnicities. Argentineans, among other South Americans, will come to modify the content of what the census calls „Hispanic/Latino origin‰ ethnicity (Marrow 2007b). For instance, although Argentina is perceived to be a Spanish-speaking nation of Spanish culture, a major portion of its immigrants were from Italy and identify as of Italian European descent. Upon arrival in the United States, all immigrants from Spanish-speaking Latin America become classified by the supranational term „Latinos,‰ but this is not the way that many South Americans of varying nationalities think about their ethnicity (Marrow 2007b). Rumbaut (1996) states: The terms Hispanic and Latino . . . are recent . . . neologisms . . . that seek to lump together millions of U.S. residents, immigrants or not, who trace their ancestry to the Spanish-speaking societies of „Latin‰ America (a term itself in many ways a misnomer, promoted by the French in their period of imperial control over Mexico in the 19th century). The vast region thus labeled encompasses extremely diverse peoples from many countries whose histories are obliterated when they are forced into a one size fits all pan-ethnic category; and the vast majority of people labeled Hispanic or Latino in the United States do not, in fact, identify themselves by either of these intergenerational terms. TodayÊs polemics about the „politically correct‰ usage of „Latino‰ or „Hispanic‰ ignore the most fundamental point that such labels are historically and empirically incorrect. (1) Helen B. Marrow (2007b) points out that the U.S. Office of Management and the Budget originally categorized Hispanics as any person of Mexican, Puerto Rican,
Second and Later Generations | 65
Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of race. Marrow argues that a coalition of Mexican American and Puerto Rican leaders used this term to racialize (racially classify) a Spanish origin or culture political minority group in order to legally claim racial discrimination similar to that of African Americans in the civil rights movement. Furthermore, she points out that Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans constituted native U.S. minority groups (Puerto Rico and a portion of Mexico had become U.S. territory in the 19th century), and immigration from Latin America was at a very low level. Marrow points out that the category Hispanic has American origin and is not based on the self-identification of new Latino immigrant groups. This term was meant to identify racial discrimination on the basis of physical appearance against Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in the United States. Its use has now spread to designate individuals from Spanish-speaking countries with complex multicultural and multiracial immigration histories. Argentineans are predominately of Spanish and Italian origin. „Hispanic‰ originally refers to the Latin term „Hispania‰ associated with the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) (Rodriguez 2000). The portion of the Argentine population of Italian descent is excluded by the U.S. Census term. In the 1990 U.S. Census, 82.3 percent of Argentinean descent individuals identified themselves as „Other Hispanic-Hispanic‰ and 0.2 percent as „Other Hispanic-Non-Hispanic.‰ Approximately 16 percent said they were not Hispanic (Marrow 2007b). Although Argentinean immigrants and their descendents are classified as „Hispanic,‰ they do not necessarily see themselves as such. An individual originating from Argentina may be of European, Amerindian, Asian, Middle Eastern, or mixed descent. Marrow (2007b) believes „there is no real or definitive boundary separating Hispanic from non-Hispanic immigrants‰ (45). In 1997, the Office of Management and the Budget officially incorporated „Latino‰ into the definition of „Hispanic origin ethnicity.‰ In the 2000 Census, a Hispanic/Latino was any person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central and South American and other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race. Helen B. Marrow (2007b) considers that an artificial boundary between Hispanics/Latinos and non-Hispanics/Latinos was further solidified. Argentineans may also find it problematic to identify as „Latino‰ (Rodriguez 2000) as indigenous Amerindian groups and other European descent groups are left out. The ethnic diversity of Argentina makes it difficult to classify its internal population, let alone Argentinean Americans. United States racial history has been based on an either-or binary distinction between black and white. The U.S. Census allowed „Hispanic/Latino‰ respondents to self racially classify choosing from the following categories: white, black, Native American, Asian/Pacific islander, or „other‰ race categories in 1990. In 2000, individuals could chose more than one of these categories on the long census form
66 | Argentinean Immigrants
to indicate multiracial origins. In 1990, 87.7 percent of Argentineans classified themselves as white, 0.4 percent as black/Negro, 0.6 percent as Asian/Pacific Islander and 11.2 percent as „other race‰ (Marrow 2007b, 47). The preponderance of identification as white is associated with the history or predominately European immigration to Argentina and other countries in the Southern Cone. U.S. government officials have developed a pattern of classifying immigrants on the basis of their culture of origin with hyphenated identities such as Hispanic/Latino American and Argentine American. This assumes that nations of origin have an original, distinct, and unified national culture. The reality of globalization and international migration is that many national cultures have become hybridized and have diverse sources. In the case of Argentina, Spanish and indigenous culture was augmented by Italian and other European cultures as well as new Asian and Middle Eastern immigration and variants introduced from other Southern Cone neighbors (Paraguay, Uruguay, etc.). An Argentine individual can identify as Argentine but not necessarily as Hispanic or Latino with some justification because of that countryÊs own immigrant heritage. The complexity introduced by centuries of international migration calls into question the attempt to create general pan-ethnic categories for Argentinean Americans and other groups. Reverting to just identification on the basis of national origin, however, clouds understanding of culturally hybrid ethnic origins.
Elba and Jorge Lopez, Argentineans living in Queens, dance down Fifth Avenue in New York during the Hispanic Day Parade on October 12, 2003. (AP Photo/Gregory Bull)
Issues in Relations between the United States and Argentina
| 67
The U.S. practice of ethno-racial classification may actually push Argentinean immigrants toward a Latino/Hispanic classification on the basis of being Spanish speaking or simply from a Spanish-speaking country (Marrow 2007b). Marrow suggests that if Argentineans and other new Latino groups „want to resist incorporation as Latinos/Hispanics, they may have to work harder at it‰ (2007b, 64). At present, it is difficult to predict what Argentine origins will mean in terms of panethnic Latino or Hispanic identity in the future. The second and later generations will play a decisive role in deciding the future of ethno-racial Argentine identity.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Argentina Forecasts for the 21st Century During periods of growth in the world economy, globalization and the revolution in information and communication technology has increased migration of skilled labor. Developed countries like the United States have made it easier for professionals to gain temporary visas and permanent residency. Excess demand for skilled labor is being met by immigration from developing countries, depriving them of skilled labor input for their own development (Pellegrino 2002). In Argentina, the brain drain is a source of concern and debate. The developed countries have been criticized by the International Organization for Migration for not being more concerned about skilled labor needs of developing countries. Other than the United States, destinations for Argentine professionals to emigrate to include Europe, Australia, and Canada. Argentina has lost individuals in the areas of scientific research, art, and literature to emigration. As a developing country, Argentina is not in a position to challenge the United States regarding brain drain. It is understood that periods of political repression and economic turmoil fostered skilled labor emigration (Pelligrino 2002), and Argentina has tried to bring scientists and luminaries back during periods of democratization. One positive aspect of having Argentine professional émigrés in countries like the United States is that information and communication technology permits them to communicate and share their knowledge with Argentineans and integrate them into the world scientific community. Professionals employed by multinational corporations are becoming transnational connectors between developed and developing countries (Pelligrino 2002). It has been suggested that scientific cooperation programs linking countries would further this goal.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 8 United States (1953–2008): Immigrants admitted by country or region of birth and historical period of arrival Years 1953–1973
Country of birth
Place of birth
Total
Argentina
61,430
Chile
Average
Total
1983–1990
Average
Total
1991–2008
Average
33,329
2,381
Totala
68
2,925
23,584
2,620
21,688
3,098
64,706
4,622
171,408
18,956
903
18,612
2,068
19,554
2,793
33,329
2,381
90,451
5,885
280
7,845
872
6,518
931
13,444
960
33,692
Other South America
267,938
12,759
245,298
27,255
337,749
48,250
1,145,053
81,790
1,996,038
South America
354,209
16,867
295,339
32,815
385,510
55,073
1,256,532
89,752
2,291,590
2,473,949
117,807
1,576,184
175,132
2,764,286
394,898
6,813,891
486,707
13,628,310
72,700
3,462
100,707
11,190
162,205
23,172
1,015,397
72,528
1,351,009
917,594
43,695
1,862,755
206,973
2,240,078
320,011
5,748,315
410,594
10,768,742
2,666,674
126,984
657,468
73,052
568,375
81,196
2,470,115
176,437
6,362,632
35,750
1,702
35,892
3,988
33,400
4,771
95,295
6,807
200,337
269
13
24
3
192
27
23,818
1,701
24,303
6,521,145
310,531
4,528,369
503,152
6,154,045
879,149
17,423,363
1,244,526
34,626,922
Uruguay
b
North America Region of birth
1974–1982
Africa Asia Europe Oceania Unknown Total
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Yearbook, Table 14 (1962–1978), Table 13 (1979–1981), Table IMM 1.3 (1982–1984), Table 3 (1997–2004). a Total does not imply that the mentioned number of immigrants are today residing in the United States. b From North America included Canada, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.
Appendix II: Demographic/Census Statistics
Table 9 Argentineans obtaining legal permanent residence: Fiscal years 1930 to 2009 Decade
Number
1930 to 1939
1,067
1940 to 1949
3,108
1950 to 1959
16,346
1960 to 1969
49,384
1970 to 1979
30,303
1980 to 1989
23,442
1990 to 1999
30,065
2000 to 2009
47,955
Source: Adapted from DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2008, Table 2, pp. 6–11; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2010, Table 3.
Table 10 Inflow of Argentine permanent immigrants to the United States, 1999 to 2008 Year
Inflow
1999
1,393
2000
2,331
2001
3,328
2002
3,685
2003
3,157
2004
4,805
2005
6,945
2006
7,239
2007
5,375
2008
5,170
Source: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2008, Table 3, pp. 12–15.
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Table 11 Argentineans obtaining general admission by broad class of admission: Fiscal year 2009 Region and country of birth Total Argentina
Total
Refugees Employment- Immediate Familyand asylum relatives of based sponsored seekers Other preferences preferences U.S. citizens Diversity
1,130,818
211,859
144,034
535,554
47,879
177,368
14,124
5,780
160
1,635
3,413
52
498
22
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2009, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 10.
Table 12 Argentine nonimmigrant admissions: Fiscal years 1999–2008
Year
Number of Argentine Nonimmigrant Admissions
1999
539,304
2000
546,796
2001
541,493
2002
252,233
2003
241,352
2004
242,103
2005
256,680
2006
275,778
2007
337,511
2008
383,803
Source: Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2008, Table 26, pp. 67–70.
Table 13 Argentinean nonimmigrant admissions: Fiscal year 2008 Category
Number
Tourists and business travelers
338,510
Students and exchange visitors
10,140
Temporary workers and families
22,684
Diplomats/other representatives
5,739
Unknown
3,107
Source: Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2008, Table 28, pp. 76–79.
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Table 14 Nonimmigrant temporary worker admissions: Fiscal year 2008 Category
Number
Total temporary workers and families Workers in specialty occupations (H1B) Seasonal agricultural workers (H2A) Seasonal nonagricultural workers (H2A)
22,684 6,583 19 541
Workers with extraordinary ability/achievement
1,078
Athletes, artists, and entertainers (P1 to P3)
1,451
Intra-company transferees (L1)
5,427
Treaty traders and investors (E1 to E3)
1,558
Other
6,027
Source: Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2008, Table 32, pp. 84–87.
Table 15 Occupational status of Argentineans in the United States, 2000 Category
Percent
Managerial and professional
39.77
Sales and office
24.68
Services
14.84
Production,transport, and material moving
10.96
Construction, extraction, and maintenance
9.24
Farming, forestry, and fishing
0.51
Source: 2000 PUMS Microdata sample reported in Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich (2008, 159).
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Table 16 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence region/country: Argentina Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Leading states of residence 42
18
24
California
Arizona
713
380
333
Colorado
47
22
25
Connecticut Florida Georgia
92
46
46
2,392
1,240
1,152
88
49
39
Illinois
82
39
43
Maryland
81
43
38
Massachusetts
87
47
40
Michigan
44
27
17
Nevada
70
28
42
New Jersey
325
160
165
New York
513
265
248
North Carolina
54
26
28
Ohio
55
29
26
Pennsylvania
71
31
40
Texas
295
149
146
Virginia
128
54
74
67
32
35
534
264
270
Washington Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix III: Notable Argentine Americans | 73
Appendix III: Notable Argentine Americans Mario Davidovsky is an Argentine American composer who emigrated to the United States in 1960. He is a pioneer of electro-acoustic music and his compositions, called Synchronisms, incorporate both acoustic instruments and electroacoustic sounds played from a tape in live performance. Among his many awards, in 1971, Synchronisms #6 won the Pulitzer Prize. Currently, he writes non-electronic compositions. Enrique A. J. Marcatili is an Argentinean-born physicist who was a pioneer in optical fiber research. In 1975 he became a member of the National Academy of Engineering. Along with Stewart E. Miller, he won IEEEÊs Baker Prize in 1975. Carlos Alberto Pelligrino, M.D., F.A.C., is an Argentinean-born immigrant who received a medical degree in 1971 and surgical training at the University of Rosario. Because of dissatisfaction with ArgentinaÊs military government, he migrated to the United States in 1975 at the conclusion of his education. He is a former president of the American Surgical Association and the Henry N. Harkins Professor and Chair of Surgery at the University of Washington. Pelligrino is a regent of the American College of Surgeons and a director of the American Board of Surgery. Lalo Schifrin is an Argentinean-born composer, arranger, pianist, and conductor who is best known for the theme for Mission: Impossible. He has written the scores for films such as The Cincinnati Kid, Bullitt, Cool Hand Luke, Dirty Harry, and Enter the Dragon. He has recorded orchestral jazz albums and is active in composing classical music. Pablo Vila is a sociologist at the University of Texas San Antonio who has published 29 works in 41 publications and in four languages. He is best known for his books Crossing Borders, Reinforcing Borders: Social Categories, Metaphors, and Narrative Identities on the U.S.-Mexico Frontier and Border Identifications: Narratives of Religion, Gender, and Class on the U.S.-Mexico Border. Anahi Viladrich is a sociologist whose research and writing has focused on cultural influences on gender roles, reproductive health, and immigration and health in her homeland, Argentina, and the United States. After receiving training in sociology in Argentina, she came to the United States in 1994, where she received a MA from the New School for Social Research and an MPhil and PhD in sociomedical sciences at Columbia University. She has been an assistant professor at the School for Health Sciences, Hunter College of the City University of New York, where she directed the Immigration and Health Initiative. For her research, she received the Marisa de Castro Benton Prize, and her dissertation was awarded distinction by Columbia University
74 | Argentinean Immigrants
in 2003. She examined how Argentine immigrants use social networks to access health care despite barriers.
Glossary Amerindian: Ethnic designation for a person of indigenous descent in South America. Asado: Barbecue. Chorizo: Pork sausage. Criollo: Person of Spanish descent born in the New World during the time of Spanish colonization. Dulce de Leche: Caramel milk spread. Empanadas: Meat turnovers. Gelato: Italian ice cream. Jamón Serrano: Salted pork ham. Locro: Corn, meat, chorizo, pumpkin, and sweet potato dish. Mazamora: Corn dish. Mestizo: A person of mixed Spanish and Amerindian descent. Pampas: A world-renowned area in Argentina known for grazing, grain, and beef production. Parrillarda: Mixed barbecue. Quinceanara: A girlÊs coming-of-age celebration held at her 15th birthday. Southern Cone: A term designating countries located in the southernmost region of South America (i.e., Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay).
References Anderson, Martin. 1993. Dossier Secreto. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, and David R. Dietrich. 2008. „The Latin Americanization of Racial Stratification in the U.S.‰ In Racism in the 21st Century, edited by R. E. Hall, 151 70. New York: Springer Science and Business Media. Canales, Alejandro I. 2007. „Inclusion and Segregation: The Incorporation of Latin American Immigrants into the U.S. Labor Market,‰ translated by Carlos Perez. Latin American Perspectives 34(1): 73 82. Central Intelligence Agency. 2010. Argentina: World Factbook. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ar.html. DHS Office of Immigration Statistics. 2008. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security.
References | 75 Ferradás, Carmen Alicia. 2001. „Argentina.‰ In Countries and Their Cultures, vol. 1, edited by Carol R. Ember and Melvin Ember, 77 92. New York: Macmillan Reference. Floria, Carlos A., and César A. García Belsunce. 1971. Historia de los Argentinos I and II. Buenos Aires: Kapeluz. Greico, Elizabeth M. 2010. Race and Hispanic Origin of the Foreign-Born Population: 2007. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] http:// www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acs-11.pdf. INDEC. 2004. Tendencias Receintes de la Immigracion Internacional. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] http://www.indec.gov.ar/webcenso/aquisecuenta/Aqui12.pdf. Jachimowitz, Maia. 2006. Argentina: A New Era of Migration and Migration Policy. Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] http://www. migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=374. Jones-Correa, Michael. 2007. „Swimming in the Latino Sea: The Other Latinos and Politics.‰ In The Other Latinos: Central and South Americans in the United States, edited by Jose Luis Falconi and Jose Antonio Mazzotti, 21 38. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lattes, A. E., J. Santibanez, and M. A. Castillo, eds. 1998. Migracion y Fronteras. Tijuana: El Colegio de La Frontera Norte, Asociacion Latinoamerica de Sociologia, El Colegio de Mexico. Lewis, Paul. 1990. The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism. Durham: University of North Carolina Press. Lowell, B. Lindsay, and Robert Suro. 2002. The Improving Educational Profile of Latino Immigrants. Washington, D.C.: PEW Hispanic Center. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/14.pdf. Marrow, Helen B. 2007a. „South America: Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela.‰ In The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration Since 1965, edited by Mary C. Waters and Reed Ueda, 593 611. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Marrow, Helen B. 2007b. „Who are the Other Latinos and Why.‰ In The Other Latinos: Central and South Americans in the United States, edited by Jose Luis Falconi and Jose Antonio Mazzotti, 39 77. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Marshall, Adriana. 1988. „Emigration of Argentines to the United States.‰ In When Borders Don’t Divide: Labor Migration and Refugee Movements in the Americas, edited by Patricia R. Pessar, 129 31. New York: Center for Migration Studies. Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor. 1998. World in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium. Oxford, UK: Clarendon. Mohmen, Menaaz. 2009. „Naturalization and Immigrant Loyalty.‰ In Battleground Immigration, vol. 2, edited by Judith Ann Warner, 574 81. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. National Science Board. 2000. Science and Engineering Indicators. Washington, D.C.: National Science Board. Palermo, Alicia Itatí. „Argentina.‰ In International Encyclopedia of Marriage and Family, 2nd ed., vol. 1, edited by James J. Ponzetti, 78 82. New York: Macmillan Reference.
76 | Argentinean Immigrants Parrado, Emilio A., and Marcela Cerrutti. 2003. „Labor Migration Between Developing Countries: The Case of Paraguay and Argentina.‰ International Migration Review 37(1): 101 32. Pellegrino, Adela. 2002. Skilled Labor Migration from Developing Countries: Study on Argentina and Uruguay. International Labor Program. Geneva: International Labor Office. [Online article retrieved 06/2010.] http://www.ilo.int/public/english/protection/ migrant/download/imp/imp58e.pdf. Reimers, David M. 2005. Other Immigrants: The Global Origins of the American People. New York: New York University Press. Rodriguez, Julio. 2000. „Argentinean Americans.‰ In Gale Encyclopedia of Multicultural America, 2nd ed., vol. 1, edited by Jeffrey Lehman, 123 32. Detroit: Gale. Skidmore, Thomas, Peter Smith, and James Green. 2009. Modern Latin America, 7th ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Tremblay, Karine. 2005. „Academic Mobility and Immigration.‰ Journal of Studies in International Education 9(3): 196 228. Warner, Judith Ann. 2009. „Legal Immigration System.‰ In Battleground Immigration, vol. 1, edited by Judith Ann Warner, 469 82. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Williamson, Jeffrey G., and Timothy J. Hatton. 2005. Global Migration and the World Economy: Two Centuries of Policy and Performance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. World Health Organization. 2010. „Argentina.‰ [Online article; retrieved 06/2010.] http:// www.who.int/countries/arg/en/.
Further Reading Baily, Samuel L. 1999. Immigrants in the Land of Promise: Italians in Buenos Aires and New York City, 1870–1914. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. This comparative study analyzes the role of social and institutional capital facilitating integration of Italians into American and Argentine society during the second stream of world immigration. In Argentina, mutual aid societies and banks facilitated immigrant adaptation; and in New York, Italian immigrants made use of the Catholic Church and political parties. New York Italians were originally sojourners and sent money to Italy while Argentine Italians intended to stay and accumulated resources more rapidly. In comparison to New York City, Buenos Aires was actually the most promising immigrant destination with both a skilled and semi-skilled labor market. Foster, David William, Melissa Fitch Lockhart, and Darrell B. Lockhart. 1998. Culture and Customs of Argentina. Westport, CT: Greenwood. This work synthesizes published secondary sources in English and Spanish on Argentine social customs, religion, broadcasting and print media, cinema, literature, art, and the performing arts. It examines Spanish, Italian, Jewish, and Amerindian influences. Hines, Barbara. 2010. „The Right to Migrate as a Human Right: The Current Argentine Immigration Law.‰ [Online article retrieved 06/2010.] http://works.bepress.com/ barbara_hines/1.
Further Reading | 77 Argentine Law 25.871, enacted in January 2004 establishes that migration is a human right, a principle not expressed in U.S. or other developed nationÊs immigration law or explicitly stated in human rights conventions. The law serves as an example of how to implement immigration reform recognizing immigrant rights. Moya, Jose C. 1998. Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850– 1930. Berkeley: University of California Press. This research monograph examines how formation of micro-migrant networks that circulated information in Spain and between Spain and Argentina facilitated immigration. In Argentina, mutual aid societies and banks also facilitated Spanish immigrantÊs assimilation. Immigrants faced anti-Spanish feeling in the post-revolutionary period and evolved into a people perceived as strangers. They were eventually embraced as cousins along with the countryÊs Spanish heritage. Pellegrino, Adela. 2000. Skilled Labor Migration From Developing Countries: Study On Argentina and Uruguay. International Labor Program. Geneva: International Labor Office. [Online article retrieved 06/2010.] http://www.ilo.int/public/english/protection/ migrant/download/imp/imp58e.pdf. This study of emigration from Argentina and Uruguay examines linkages between developed and developing countries. Rodriguez, Julio. 2000. „Argentinean Americans.‰ In Gale Encyclopedia of Multicultural America, 2nd ed., vol. 1, edited by Jeffrey Lehman. Detroit: Gale. [Online article retrieved 06/2010.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/A-Br/Argentinean-Americans.html. This is a concise description of Argentine culture and immigration to the United States through the 1990 census. Savigliano, Marta. 1995. Tango and the Political Economy of Passion. Boulder, CO: Westview. The tango is ArgentinaÊs most famous cultural export. Marta Savigliano has written a post-structuralist examination of tango as a commercialized form of popular culture subject to the „colonizing gaze.‰ The dance; its styles; and the racial, social, and national origins of its participants are examined. Savigliano argues that tango became popular internationally because of its passion and exoticism. She states that „tango as a musical and danceable commodity, has been produced, distributed and consumed within a capitalist market economy hegemonized by [imperialist] powers‰ (204). The book contains illustrations of tango steps and clothing at various times in various countries and feminist and deconstructivist interpretations of lyrics.
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Bahamian Immigrants by Kathryn Beard
Introduction As one of the United StatesÊ nearest neighbors in the Caribbean basin, the Bahamas and the United States have historically remained closely linked societies. The archipelagic nature of the Bahamas has contributed to its very unique development between two distinctively different societies, the cosmopolitan urban centers and the less populated and isolated outlying islands, where the inhabitants are known for their self-sufficiency and independence.
Chronology 1492
Columbus arrives in the New World at San Salvador Island in the Bahamas.
1525
Native Lucayan population largely exterminated.
1648
The Eleutherian Adventurers migrate from Bermuda.
1670
King Charles II grants the islands to the Lords Proprietors of the Carolinas. Piracy becomes a common feature in the Bahamas.
1718
The Bahamas becomes a British Crown Colony.
1776–1783
American naval forces target Bahamian islands and occupy the islandsÊ capital, Nassau.
1784
Loyalists fleeing the United States begin to immigrate to the Bahamas.
1807
Liberated Africans settle in the Bahamas with British abolition of the slave trade.
1834
Emancipation of slaves in British Caribbean.
1840s–1900
Bahamians begin migrating to Key West.
1860–1865
Nassau prospers from transshipment of goods resulting from Union blockade of the Confederate States during the American Civil War. 79
Background | 81
1880s
Beginnings of tourist industry in the colony.
1900–1920
Large-scale Bahamian migration to Miami.
1912
Nassau Bahamas Association forms in Harlem.
1919–1933
Volstead Act results in prosperity in Bahamas, which profits from rum running.
1942–1945
United States uses the Bahamas as strategic base of operations during World War II.
1943–1963
Contract labor of Bahamian laborers to United States.
1953
Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) forms.
1958
United Bahamian Party (UBP) forms.
1964
Internal self-government under UBP leader Roland Symonette.
1967
Election of PLP leader Lynden Pindling as first black premier (prime minister in 1968) ends white minority rule.
1973
Full independence and membership in the Commonwealth of Nations.
1970s–1980s
Drug trafficking in the Bahamas becomes problematic.
2002
Nassau Bahamas Association reorganizes as Bahamian American Association Incorporated (BAAI).
2008
U.S. geological survey renews American interest in Bahamian offshore oil reserves.
Background Geography The 33 islands and over 650 cays, or low-lying sand or coral reefs, comprising the Commonwealth of the Bahamas are located in the western Atlantic Ocean. The archipelago lies to the southeast of the United States and to the northeast of Cuba and the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The Bahamian chain of islands includes the Turks and Caicos Islands, located to the west of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. As British Crown colonies, the Turks and Caicos Islands are politically distinct from the Bahamian commonwealth (Craton and Saunders 1999). The archipelago of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas extends more than 100,000 square miles. It has a combined landmass of less than 5,400 square miles. Great Inagua, the second largest island of the Bahamas, lies furthest to the southeast in the chain, while the three islands known as Bimini are located approximately
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50 miles east of Miami, Florida, which makes it nearest to the United States. Andros Island is the largest island of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, although Grand Bahama is referred to as the „Big Island‰ and is the location of Freeport, the second largest city of the Bahamas. The capital of the Bahamas and its largest city, Nassau, is located on the island of New Providence. Other islands comprising the Commonwealth of the Bahamas include Abaco, located to the east of Grand Bahama, as well as Eleuthera, Mayaguana, San Salvador Island, Cat Island, Acklins, Crooked Island, Long Island, the Berry Islands, Harbour Island, and Exuma. These islands are known collectively as the „Out Islands.‰ The islands of the Bahamas are generally low and flat, with the highest point of elevation found at Mount Alvernia on Cat Island at just over 200 feet above sea level. In addition, virtually no fresh water sources are found on the islands; with the exception of Andros Island and a small spring on Mayaguana, there are no rivers or streams in the Bahamian archipelago. The climate of the Bahamas is semitropical, and the waters of the Gulf Stream have a significant effect. The Gulf Stream creates mild winters with temperatures ranging from 59■ to 75■ F. Summers are generally are generally humid, with temperatures ranging between 70■ and 93■ F. An annual rainfall of approximately 52 inches is common. There are two seasons (from May to June and from September to October) when there are brief, but frequent rainstorms. The Gulf Stream also produces hurricanes throughout the Bahamian archipelago between the months of June and November, with most hurricanes occurring between July and October.
History of the Bahamas Arawak Settlement to the Abolition of Slavery Arawak Amerindians first inhabited the islands of the Bahamas and are known as Lucayans. Archaeologists and anthropologists believe that between 700 and 1000 C.E. an Antillean Arawak population migrated to the Bahamas to procure salt that was (and remains) plentiful throughout the archipelago. A second wave of Antillean immigrants brought Taino culture to the islands by 1000 C.E. and remained in existence until the Colombian period of the late 15th century. On October 12, 1492, Christopher Columbus arrived on the island known to the Arawaks as Guanahani, which he named San Salvador. In the 1500s and 1600s early settlers and those obtaining goods such as sarsaparilla, sassafras, and ambergris included Spaniards and English. In scattered rural households, the patriarchs of these families presided over extended households, which included servants and slaves. In contrast to the elite, an underclass developed due to Bermudians regard for the Bahamas as a location to discard undesirable members of their colony. In addition to whites that polite society had judged as unwelcome, nonwhites including
Background | 83
rebellious slaves were included in the discards from Bermuda. Free blacks and coloreds comprised the largest number of all the underclass imported from Bermuda among these nonwhite arrivals and both groups were deemed valuable to Bahamians (Craton and Saunders 1999). The relevant characteristics of life in the Bahamas for these early settlers had been established by the last quarter of the 17th century. Because soils were generally poor, a maritime economy emerged, including the collection of ambergris, the hunting of turtles, and salt raking. Not until the 1800s did agriculture in the Bahamas progress pass the point of mere subsistence. Settlers lived with material scarcity and poverty was common (Miller 1945). Piracy was an issue in the 1700s. The growth of piracy was related to the loss of opportunities for quasi-legitimate privateers and concurrently a huge reduction in the manpower of the Royal Navy at the end of the war. Of the estimated five thousand men whose livelihoods came from piracy during its zenith, up to one thousand made their base in the Bahamas and over 20 captains of pirate ships were known to operate out of the colony between 1714 and 1722. By the end of the first quarter of the 18th century, Bahamian piracy was on the wane, as the Hanoverian kings and their prime minister brought the colony more firmly into the British Empire. In July 1718, the crown appointed the first royal governor, Woodes Rogers, with orders to institute a well-organized system of government, put an end to piracy, and improve the economic conditions in the colony. In spite of the growing number of enslaved black laborers in the colony, the Bahamian economy remained insubstantial. Significantly, for much of the 1720s, colonial officials calculated the total value of imports from England at less than £2,500. The import/export trade was inadequate, and ships that departed from Nassau went little further than Jamaica, where salt and timber were exchanged for rum and sugar. Some Bahamian ships ventured north to South Carolina to trade turtle meat and fruits for more varied rations, indicating a dearth of even the most basic provisions in the colony. What few luxury items and most of the basic supplies imported in the colonies came from England via the American colonies or Bermuda, and the ships seen most often in NassauÊs harbor had sailed from New England, New York, or Rhode Island. After the Revolutionary War in the United States, a flood of Loyalists, their slaves, and free blacks tripled the population of the colony. These newcomers increased the settlement of the Out Islands, where their slaves cleared undeveloped lands and firmly established a black majority in the colony. American slaves freed by their service to the British cause augmented those blacks who arrived with the white Loyalist refugees, who quickly attempted to return them to slavery. During his rule as the Loyalist governor of Virginia, John Murray, or Lord Dunmore decreed freedom for slaves in that colony in return for military service. When he became governor of the Bahamas in 1787, he established a court to hear the freedmenÊs
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Continental sailors and Marines land on New Providence Island in the Bahamas on March 3, 1776. There they seized Fort Montagu and took away military supplies. (Naval Historical Society)
claims; however, in opposition to his previous policies, he frequently ruled against the slaves who had been emancipated by his decree. By the end of the decade, the blacks population, which included those who owed their nominal freedom to DunmoreÊs proclamation, comprised the majority of the residents of Nassau. Planters used much of the Crown lands they purchased for the production of Sea Island cotton, first cultivated by the Arawaks. Salt production supplemented cotton production for several planters and guarded against periods of economic downturn when profits from cotton faced competition in the market or when depleted soils decreased yield (Craton and Saunders 1999). The abolition of the slave trade in 1807 had little impact in the Bahamas because very few slaves there were imported directly from Africa; however, some six thousand liberated Africans, captives freed from illegally operated Spanish and Portuguese slave ships, did end up in the colony between 1811 and 1860. As in all of the British West Indian colonies, an imperial act emancipated slaves in the Bahamas on August 1, 1834, with a transitional four-year apprenticeship, which quickly proved unfeasible and the Colonial Office ended in 1836 (Johnson 1988).
Background | 85
Post-Emancipation Period The education of Bahamians, black and white, left much room for improvement and illustrated class, racial, and gender biases throughout the remainder of the 19th century and through much of the 20th century as well. In 1835, the Board of Education was created to provide a rudimentary education to the children of the former slaves. Until 1869, the Anglican Church assumed the duties of educating Bahamian youth; and as other denominations established church schools, better educational opportunities emerged for black and colored children. Nevertheless, the Board of Education remained a low priority in the allocation of public funds, and those who were wealthy enough to afford it sent their children abroad for education. Economically, the post-emancipation Bahamas differed from the sugar colonies of the British West Indies in that the plantation economy based on cotton production had failed prior to the end of slavery. In place of a plantocracy, a landowning merchant class assumed political and economic control of the colony until well into the 20th century. Very few opportunities for wage labor existed in the post-emancipation period. Well into the 20th century, residents of Nassau and the Out Islands depended on boatbuilding to provide their livelihoods. People of all races engaged in the construction of boats in the colony.
The Era between 1900 and World War II Between the turn of the century and World War I, Bahamians continued to become more interconnected with and influenced by the economies and sociopolitical events of the United States and other regions of the British Empire. World War II introduced the Bahamian black majority to ideas of the political rights of the masses, the rejection of colonialism, and the Pan-African interests found throughout an increasingly decrepit British empire. However, the effects of these ideas had less impact in the Bahamas, mitigated by another period of economic development related to the growth of tourism and the emergence of the international banking system in the colony. The lack of educational opportunities for the majority of Bahamians prevented the awareness and dissemination of information that would promote demand for sociopolitical change. In addition, the lack of industry in the colony thwarted the development of a radical working class.
The Postwar Era to Bahamian Independence As a result of the introduction of new sociopolitical philosophies and an attempt to garner some of the economic benefits that materialized, Afro-Bahamians formed the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) in 1953, spearheaded by Henry Taylor as chairman
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Lynden Pindling served as prime minister of the Bahamas from 1967 to 1992, leading the islands from limited self-government to full independence from Great Britain in 1973. (Embassy of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas)
and Cyril Stevenson as secretary-general. The PLP presented a direct challenge to the United Bahamian Party (UBP), an organization dominated by whites. Because of the location of the headquarters in Nassau, the UBP became known as the „Bay Street Boys.‰ The UBP, under Roland Symonette as first premier, attempted to maintain the political and socioeconomic status quo, although the party did usher in political autonomy within the colony as well as develop a comprehensive social welfare system during the early 1960s. As a result of improved communication technologies, black Bahamians were made aware of the decline of British imperialism and the Black Power movement in the United States. In 1967, black majority rule was brought about under the auspices of the PLP. Both the PLP and UBP behaved with restraint during the change from white oligarchic rule of the UBP to an internal government controlled by the black PLP, with Lynden Pindling as the first black prime minister. The political transformation resulted in revolutionary economic and social changes in Bahamian society. On July 10, 1973, the Bahamas gained political independence from England as a parliamentary democracy and, as a member in the Commonwealth of Nations, a constitutional monarchy (Craton and Saunders 2000).
Causes and Waves of Migration During the 19th century, Bahamians engaged in what would become a traditional pattern of permanent and temporary emigration for economic and sociopolitical
Causes and Waves of Migration | 87
reasons. The period between 1900 and 1920 witnessed the highest incidence of long-term emigration from the Bahamas, as well as a steady labor migration throughout and after World War I and World War II. Migration served to decrease population pressures as well as allowed immigrants the opportunity to earn wages considerably higher than those paid in the Bahamas. Both permanent and short-term migrants could then remit financial assistance to family members who remained in the source country.
Early Immigration: 1820s to 1924 Poor whites known as „Conches‰ or „Conchy Joes‰ first began to emigrate from the Out Islands, especially the island of Abaco, between the 1820s and 1830s. Key West, Florida, became the destination of this first wave of migrants, where they established themselves as salvagers of vessels wrecked in the region and as fishermen. The early post-emancipation era witnessed the increased emigration of poor whites, who felt economic pressure from competition with the former slaves. Many whites felt racially superior to the former slaves, and this prejudice deterred their willingness to view blacks as their equals. The white Bahamians who immigrated to the Florida Keys during this phase appreciated the Southern American racial mores. By 1849, roughly two-thirds of whites from Abaco had immigrated to the United States (Craton and Saunders 2000). The economic growth of Key West during the 1870s and 1880s drew additional Bahamian white emigrants to Florida. Especially in the 1880s,the sponging and cigar industries there drew workers left unemployed as the pineapple industry, most notably in Eleuthera, began to fail. Industries connected to the pineapple industry, such as shipbuilding, also lost workers to emigration. Although the majority of emigrants in this period were whites from the Out Islands, blacks from Nassau began to migrate as well, especially with the emancipation of slaves in the United States in 1865; and by 1885, Bahamian blacks had established a clear pattern of temporary and permanent emigration. For the black emigrants who left the Bahamas during the 19th century, most did so only temporarily as crewmen on steamships or migrant labor to Cuba or other regions of the Caribbean. During the first unsuccessful attempts to construct the Panama Canal, black Bahamian emigrants went to Central America in search of works. Those few blacks who emigrated and settled on a permanent basis tended to emerge out of the colonyÊs nascent black middle class and included such prominent figures as Anglican minister Robert Love, who became a radical voice for black equality in Jamaica and a mentor of Marcus Garvey. Other examples of this first cohort of emigrants included vaudeville performer Bert Williams; as well as the parents of James Weldon Johnson, Helen Louise Dillet and James Johnson, who immigrated to Florida, where Helen Louise became the first black woman employed in the stateÊs public school system.
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By the 1890s, Bahamians began to emigrate from the island of Bimini to Key West as the wrecking industry went into decline and few other employment opportunities remained. Throughout the final quarter of the 19th century, system employersÊ reliance on the truck system as an alternative to wage payments resulted in increased emigration, especially for laborers employed in the pineapple, sponging, and sisal industries. Economic conditions in the colony proved so dire that little return migration occurred and most emigrants that left did so in family groups. By the early 1890s, some eight thousand Bahamians resided in Key West (Johnson 1986; Craton and Saunders 2000). After the turn of turn of the century, Miami replaced Key West as the destination for the majority of Bahamian immigrants. A substantial number had previously migrated to Key West, and when the cigar industry there began to decline, in a process of step migration, they continued on to southern Florida. Migration to Miami became so common between 1900 and 1924, the practice developed into what Bahamians called the „Miami Craze,‰ which peaked around 1911, when the economy of the colony entered into a bust cycle. So many Bahamians left the colony for Miami that the British consul in Washington, D.C., frequently interceded in local events involving the Floridian immigrants and suggested the appointment of a vice-consul to manage the situation. Many of the unskilled laborers who migrated to Miami during this phase found employment in construction, especially on railroads, and as farm workers. Wages paid in Miami greatly exceeded those paid in the Bahamas, at times with immigrant workers earning three times their island counterparts. Many of the immigrants were actually migrant laborers with no intention of permanently settling in the United States. The practice became so common that on some of the Out Islands, all the men of working age left their communities. Bahamian women migrated to find employment as domestic servants, but generally, unlike the earlier migrants to Key West, initially young men without their families immigrated to Miami. Immigration officials in Miami tended to discourage the migration of unmarried women for fear they actually intended to work as prostitutes rather than in more legitimate forms of employment. Black women interested in migration to Miami were especially suspected. Two black Bahamian immigrant enclaves developed by 1920: Coconut Grove, along the waterfront in the southern part of the city; and Overtown, first known as „Colored Town,‰ located northeast of the cityÊs center. As more Afro-Bahamians immigrated to Florida, they established communities in Fort Lauderdale, West Palm Beach, Daytona Beach, Dania, Fort Pierce, and other towns of the state easily accessible by railroad lines. The immigrants brought their distinctive culture and traditional Afro-Bahamian customs to the region, and they participated in ethnic festivals, such as Junkanoo, Emancipation Day, and Guy Fawkes celebrations, to the enjoyment of local blacks and consternation of resident whites.
Causes and Waves of Migration | 89
George Blakely George Blakely is a professionally trained vocalist born in Nassau, Bahamas. He migrated from Nassau to become a member of a small theater company. After some time in Nassau, he relocated to Los Angeles to receive vocal training with Israeli opera singer, Shoshana Shoshana. He then moved to New York City to further his professional career as an entertainer. Blakely’s performances encompass a variety of musical styles, including jazz, urban contemporary, and blues. He has performed at a number of venues in New York and other locations within the United States, including St. James Presbyterian Church, St. Peter’s Lutheran Church, the Museum of the City of New York, Martin Hall in St. Phillips Church, Franklin Plaza Amphitheatre, 1199 Amphitheatre, Lincoln Center, and Birdland. New York Channel 67’s featured Blakely on the video series “The Best Kept Secret.”
Some of the immigrants continued to the industrialized urban regions in the North, such as New York, and especially Harlem, where West Indian immigrants had long resided. Noted Bahamians in this group included the Adderleys, including the famous jazz musicians Julius „Cannonball‰ Adderley and Nat Adderley. Bahamian immigrant Fred A. Toote, one of Marcus GarveyÊs four „lieutenants‰ and son of noted Bahamian businessman and politician T. W. „Sankey‰ Toote, migrated to Harlem during this period as well. Bahamian immigration to Miami and other regions of the United States decreased sharply after 1917, but continued on a limited scale due to a wartime demand for labor from the colony. By 1920 quota restrictions prevented large numbers of Bahamians from entering the United States, and the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 barred natives from the Bahamas just as the Volstead Act, the legislation that implemented Prohibition, brought the colony into an economic boom cycle. A healthy economy ameliorated the worst of the conditions that had acted as push factors of Bahamian emigration (Craton and Saunders 2000).
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separatism For the earliest of Bahamian immigrants to America, the white „Conches‰ or „Conchy Joes,‰ assimilation proved relatively effortless, as they shared the views of white superiority and racial segregation of Southern American whites. Their settlements in Key West resembled strongly their hometown Out Island communities of Abaco, Eleuthera, Bimini, and Harbour Island. Known for their fierce independence and close-knit kin networks and communities, poor whites who emigrated
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from the Bahamas most often moved in family groups. These early immigrants established themselves in a number of occupations, such as fishermen, ship salvagers, pilots on riverboats and sea-going vessels, lumbermen, and the better-paid positions in the construction industry. For all laborers, without distinction to race, the incentive of cash wages in Key West and other areas in Florida, rather than payment in truck, was a decisive factor in emigration from the colony. For black immigrants, assimilation into American society was not nearly as trouble-free. White employers found black Bahamian workers generally congenial and less problematic than American blacks. While the stance of accommodation Afro-Bahamian immigrants took had its origins in the deference expected by whites in the sending society, the virulence and violence of southern white racism could lead to confrontation. Largely because of the rigid system of racial segregation in the American South, Bahamian immigrants were able to replicate their culture without excessive interference from whites. Some exceptions did occur. For example, black immigrants had long celebrated Guy Fawkes Night in Florida until the 1930s, when local whites realized Afro-Bahamians burned an image of Fawkes, a white man, during the festivities and prohibited the practice. Ultimately, some advantages accrued from segregation for black Bahamian immigrants. They established an economic niche as skilled laborers and service providers in communities of native-born and immigrant blacks, and because racism reduced their economic and social opportunities, they tended to develop industrious habits and avoided spending their earnings frivolously, which allowed them to remit money to relatives who remained in the Bahamas. Also, for those immigrants involved in a pattern of step migration, it allowed them to become acculturated to American society before they continued on to more urban industrialized regions of the country. The proximity of the islands to Florida and regularly scheduled transportation aboard steamships allowed frequent travel between the two countries. AfroBahamians who came to the United States as migrant laborers provided a perennial cultural infusion and created extended kin and friendship networks, which linked the immigrants to the sending society and people in the Bahamas to the United States. These networks spread news of loved ones, information that concerned employment opportunities and housing availability, advice about survival in the racially volatile environment, as well as remittances of Yankee dollars and goods. In the post World War I period, the emergence of Garveyism altered the lives of Afro-Bahamians in the Bahamas itself, as well as in immigrant enclaves in Florida and in urban areas in Northern states. Marcus Garvey arrived in the United States from Jamaica in 1916 to introduce and implement a program of Pan-African politics and economics to unite blacks in Africa with those in the African diaspora. In a 10-year span, he created and led an international organization that had no rival, the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). Garvey spoke in Key West
Causes and Waves of Migration | 91
and Miami in 1921, and black Bahamians comprised a significant proportion of the membership of the 12 divisions of the UNIA founded in southern Florida. According to white observers, GarveyÊs influence made blacks in Florida as well as those in the Bahamas less accommodating and more willing to challenge the racial status quo. American anti-immigrant legislation in the 1920s severely curtailed AfroBahamians ability to earn high wages from migrant labor, and the Great Depression adversely affected their capacity to remit money to kin in the islands. Immigrants had little incentive to return to the Bahamas, as in 1936, the Bahamian government fixed the pay rate for unskilled laborers at four shillings for an eight-hour day, wages that allowed only for the barest subsistence. Not until the entry of the United States in the World War II would economic conditions improve for native Bahamians and Bahamian immigrants.
Later Waves of Immigration World War II to 1965 Immigration Act AmericaÊs entry into World War II precipitated another wave of labor migration to the United States. In 1943, the governor, the Duke of Windsor, the abdicated Edward VIII, arranged with the United States government for the employment of roughly 5,000 migrants to work as agricultural laborers. The program served as an extension of the bracero program implemented by the United States government in 1942 to admit workers, mostly from Mexico, on a short-term basis. Bahamians referred to the arrangement as either „the Project‰ or „the Contract,‰ and during the 20 years it existed, it had a far-ranging impact on the lives of Bahamians at home and abroad. By July 1944, over five thousand and seven hundred Bahamians were employed as contract laborers in Florida, but the United States government began to send them to farms in the upper south, upstate New York, and the Midwest. Afro-Bahamian men comprised the majority of the contract workers, but women increasingly joined the ranks, often accompanying their husbands as farm laborers. In 1945, Bahamian officials selected 91 Conchy Joes from the Out Islands for employment in the American dairy industry in the Midwest. The white workers found the climate disagreeable and returned to the Bahamas the next year. Most of the Afro-Bahamian contract laborers viewed their temporary sojourn in the United States as a means to improve their lives upon their return to the islands, and most proved successful in achieving their goals. In the postwar era, Bahamians increasingly immigrated to the United Kingdom and Canada. More Bahamians came to the southern United States for education at historically black colleges. Census records illustrate that between 1953 and 1963, during the final years of the contract labor program, emigration from the island
92 | Bahamian Immigrants
decreased significantly as material conditions of the colony improved and AfroBahamians began to play a larger role politically with the founding of the PLP and the advent of majority rule in 1967. The Bahamas began to receive a greater number of immigrants, but an internal migration from the Out Islands to New Providence/Nassau and Grand Bahama/Freeport-Lucaya tended to replace emigration as an option for the majority of Bahamians. For this reason, the passage of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act in the United States had less impact in the Bahamas than in other regions of the British West Indies. By 1980, slightly less than 9,000 Bahamian immigrants resided in the United States and 5,765 of them had become naturalized U.S. citizens.
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) to Present According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 28,075 people born in the Bahamas lived in the United States. Of these Bahamian immigrants residing in the United States, 10,490 had become American citizens. Of the 7,810 Bahamians who immigrated between 1980 and 1989, some 2,985 had become citizens. An additional 11,380 Bahamian immigrants arrived between 1990 and 2000, with 1,740 becoming citizens by 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of the Community Ethnically, Afro-Bahamians comprised the majority of immigrants who arrived in the United States in the two decades after 1980. Bahamian immigrants of African ancestry totaled 23,225, whereas white Bahamian immigrants totaled 2,245, with a small number of Asians and other races completing the racial demographic. More females immigrated than males, with women comprising 55.5 percent of Bahamian immigrants, and males, 44.5 percent (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004).
Age and Family Structure Bahamian immigrants between the ages of 25 to 34 made up the largest cohort at slightly higher than 27 percent. Immigrants between the ages of 35 to 44 comprised the next largest group with 17.3 percent. Immigrants between the ages of 20 and 24 ranked third and comprised 14.4 percent of the Bahamian population in the United States. The smallest cohorts of immigrants by age were the very elderly, over the age of 85 (at 0.7%); the very young, under the age of 5 (at 0.9%); people between the ages of 60 and 64 (at 2.5%); and children between the ages of 5 and
Adjustment and Adaptation | 93
9 (at 3.4%). Bahamians who had never married or were divorced, separated, or widowed included 60.6 percent of the immigrant community, while those married comprised 39.4 percent (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004).
Educational Attainment Educationally, 76.9 percent of the immigrants had graduated from high school; 20.2 percent had obtained a bachelorÊs degree; 21.4 percent had attended college but had not completed the requirements to obtain a degree; 51.8 percent were enrolled in college or graduate programs; and 6.4 percent of Bahamian immigrants had obtained a graduate or professional degree.
Economic Attainment In regard to economic attainment, 66.5 percent of Bahamian immigrants between the ages of 21 and 64 years old had some form of gainful employment. The majority of Bahamian immigrants, at 31.5 percent, were employed in management and professional occupations; an additional 30.5 percent had sales and office occupations; 18.9 percent of Bahamian immigrants worked in service industries; 9.7 percent in production, transportation, and material moving occupations; and another 9.0 percent in maintenance, extraction, and construction industries. Less than 0.5 percent of Bahamian immigrants were employed in farming, fishing, and forestry occupations (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). The majority of Bahamian immigrants resided in household earning less than $10,000 in 1999 (17.1%) and 7.2 percent earned $10,000 $14,000. The median household income was $31,044 in 1999.
Health Statistics and Issues In the 21 to 64 years old age group, 21.5 percent of the immigrant population listed some type of medical disability. Of those Bahamian immigrants with disabilities, 62.5 percent were employed.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals The contract labor system established a pattern of female-headed households in the Bahamas, at least temporarily while Bahamian men worked stateside. The inclination of Bahamian women to behave in a very independent manner developed as a result of the long- and short-term absence of men involved in contract labor
94 | Bahamian Immigrants
programs. The predisposition of immigrant women to act independently continued when they emigrate from the Bahamas. Census records indicate that married couples comprise the majority Bahamian immigrant households in the United States, but a significant number of women act as heads of single-parent households. A relatively high percentage of Bahamian immigrants have never married, and when separated, divorced, and widowed immigrants are included, the figure becomes significantly higher, which suggests they view marriage as a low priority (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity The large Bahamian immigrant community located in Florida has retained much of its national culture and identity. In particular, the neighborhood settled by Bahamian immigrants in the 1880s known as Coconut Grove is a location where immigrants have retained their culture and identity. Bahamian culture is highlighted annually in mid-June, when immigrants stage a Goombay Festival on Grand Avenue with Bahamian music, food, and costumes. In New York and Florida, Independence Day celebrations also promote retention of national culture and identity.
Continued Links to Country of Origin The proximity of the Bahamas to southern Florida allows immigrants to travel frequently to their country of origin. This continual flow of immigrants back and forth has provided an infusion of culture to the area, as well as helped Bahamians in Florida to retain their national identity. While the largest contingent of Bahamian Americans in Florida reside in or near Miami, other immigrant communities have emerged in the state and in Georgia as well.
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background In 1912, 10 Bahamian immigrants in Harlem founded a social club called the Nassau Bahamas Association of New York to bring solidarity to the local community, as well as provide links to their country of origin. Incorporated under its present name, Bahamian American Association Incorporated (BAAI), in 2002, the association sponsors annual „meet and greet‰ events, grants academic scholarships to aspiring Bahamian American scholars, and provides social services to benefit senior citizens and children in the community. The organization works closely with businesses and government agencies in the Bahamas for funding and promotion of events. The Bahamian American Cultural Society, which is also based in New York, has similar aims (Bahamian American Association, Inc.). Another cultural/national organization founded by Bahamian immigrants is the Bahamas Junkanoo Group of Metro D.C. (BJAM-DC), founded in 2005 in
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 95
Washington, D.C., to sponsor Junkanoo Festivals each June in the nationÊs capital. The organization targets Bahamian Americans in the metro DC area, as well as the smaller communities located in Maryland and Virginia. Like the other groups mentioned, the organization exists largely as cultural and social entities, with few political objectives (Bahamian Village).
Language Issues As Bahamian Americans are from the Anglophone Caribbean, no language barriers exist, although many immigrants retain the use of Creole or Bahamian patois. Although no Bahamian American newspapers or periodicals are published currently, immigrants have access to several Internet sources of information. Web sites on the Internet, such as the Bahamian American Association Web page, the Bahamian American Cultural Society Web page, and the Bahamas Weekly.com, provide information pertaining to both immigrant communities as well as news and information related to the Bahamas.
Foodways Foods associated with Bahamian culture are generally dishes prepared with fish and seafood, especially conch, which is pronounced „conk.‰ Dishes featuring roasted beef and pork are common, as are spiedies·marinated and roasted beef cubes cooked on skewers and eaten as an open-faced sandwich. Other foods from the wider Caribbean are also staples of the Bahamian diet, including peas and rice, curried foods, as well as dishes featuring tropical fruits and vegetables such as breadfruit, avocado, banana and plantain, okra, and mango. A desert pastry called guava duff is a traditional favorite. Although the foodways of Bahamians have many distinctive elements, the proximity to American goods and culture have led them to adopt foods such as lasagna, stroganoff, meatloaf, pizza, and the like into their diets (St. AndrewÊs School Committee 1983).
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Like marriage, naturalization is not a significant goal for the majority of Bahamian immigrants. The largest group of non-citizens arrived in the United States between 1990 and 2000, but a significant number who entered the country in the preceding decade, or even prior to 1980, have opted to retain Bahamian citizenship. This low rate of naturalization perhaps is related to the rather strict rules of citizenship in the Bahamas, which forbids the holding of dual citizenship. As with many Caribbean
96 | Bahamian Immigrants
nationals, the goal of living and working in the United States throughout adulthood and returning to the country of origin after retirement may play a role in the low rates of naturalization among Bahamian immigrants (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004).
Intergroup Relations The proximity between the Bahamas and the United States has made American culture very accessible to the people of the Bahamas, even prior to migration. Historically, improved technologies from steamships to satellite dishes have made Bahamians very familiar with the lifestyles and mores of Americans. This proximity has resulted in generally trouble-free relations between Bahamian immigrants and Americans.
Forging a New American Political Identity The low rate of naturalization among Bahamians affects their level of political participation as well. As resident aliens, they are unable to participate in the electoral process and tend to remain tied to political developments in the Bahamas. As noted, none of the national organizations in the United States make political involvement a priority; they focus instead on cultural and social service issues. Naturalized Bahamian Americans generally tend to belong to the Democratic Party, and in the 2008 presidential election, Bahamian immigrants in Florida voted overwhelmingly for Democratic candidate Barack Obama.
The Second and Later Generations In cities with large contingents of Bahamian immigrants, ethnic identity is reinforced in the second later generations through membership in national/cultural organizations and in participation in cultural events, such as Junkanoo or MiamiÊs Goombay Festival. For example, Bahamian American students and young professionals were responsible for the creation of the Washington, D.C. based BJAM-DC to promote Bahamian culture in that city. In those areas where the Bahamian American remains small, such as Detroit, kin relationships serve to reinforce cultural and ethnic identity, as does inclusion in a wider Pan-Caribbean community. Second generation immigrants of Afro-Caribbean descent face the same issues of discrimination as African Americans. No extant research provides details of the experiences of the offspring of Bahamian immigrants or of the educational and career opportunities of first- and second-generation Bahamian Americans. The experience of BJAM-DC co-chair Khandra Sears, a PhD student at the University
The Second and Later Generations | 97
Youth Profile Young Bahamian Helping to Combat Typhus Fever Khandra Sears was born and raised on the island of New Providence, Bahamas. After graduating from high school she attended the Cave Hill, Barbados Campus of the University of the West Indies (UWI), where she earned a B.Sc. in Microbiology. The research she did in her senior year at Cave Hill inspired her to further her education in microbiology, but she was away from school for a year while she considered attending graduate school. During this year off, she remained active in her field, working for a year with Dr. Gregory Carey, then at the American Red Cross Holland Labs in Rockville, Maryland, where she began research of the anticarcinogenic properties of specific antibiotics. Her involvement in this research convinced her she wanted to attend graduate school, and she is currently a fifth-year student in the Graduate Program in Life Sciences (GPILS) program in microbiology and immunology at the University of Maryland-Baltimore. Her present research project involves work to help combat typhus fever. She is active in student government at the university, where she served as a graduate school senator in the 2008–2009 academic year. She enjoys living in Baltimore but remains very connected to her Bahamian origins and was a key member in BJAM-DC, which helped organize the Junkanoo festivities in the city’s annual June celebration of Caribbean culture.
Parade-goers in colorful costumes at the Goombay Festival, a Bahamian neighborhood cultural event, Coconut Grove, Florida. (Jeff Greenberg/The Image Works)
98 | Bahamian Immigrants
of Maryland and the daughter of the Bahamian ambassador to the United States, Joshua Sears, may exist as an exception rather than the rule (University of MarylandBaltimore).
Issues in Relations between the United States and the Bahamas With an estimate 60 percent of the Bahamian economy dependent on tourism-, construction-, and travel-related service industries, the recent economic downturn in the United States has severely handicapped the industry. American tourists have less money to travel as a result of the economic recession. Moreover, fewer Bahamian Americans have the financial resources to return home for visits or remit money to family and friends. A U.S. geological survey compiled in 2008 has heightened interest in offshore oil reserves in the waters surrounding the Bahamas. The last exploratory searches for gas and oil reserves occurred in 1987, and the renewed interest in the region suggests the United States may consider establishing a Bahamian oil industry. However, marine biologists have long studied the reefs of the Bahamas and their flora and fauna, and environmentalists involved in protecting certain species of plants and animals, for example sea turtles, may offer strong opposition to offshore drilling („BPC Eyes Bahamas‰ 2009). In 2007, the Bush administration brokered a deal with a firm based in Hong Kong to identify nuclear materials in cargo departing from the Bahamas en route to the United States. Critics of the plan questioned the wisdom of allowing a foreign firm such a high level of participation in issues of American national security. A formerly classified 1999 U.S. military intelligence document named the firm, Hutchison Whampoa Ltd, as a threat to national security for its potential to smuggle weapons and other banned equipment into the United States from the Bahamas („U.S. Hiring Hong Kong‰ 2006).
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 17 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and Country of Birth Total Bahamas
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
766
924
808
423
586
698
847
738
682
751
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 18 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence region/country: Bahamas Characteristic Total
Total
Male
Female
751
357
394
Leading states of residence California
11
6
5
Colorado
D
—
D
Connecticut
6
D
D
Florida
467
215
252
Georgia
56
23
33
Illinois
7
3
4
Maryland
9
6
3
Massachusetts
7
D
D
Michigan
7
3
4
Minnesota
4
D
D
Nevada
D
—
D
New Jersey
7
3
4
New York
30
20
10
North Carolina
27
12
15
7
D
D
Pennsylvania
10
6
4
Texas
28
17
11
Virginia
D
D
D
Washington
D
D
D
Other
61
32
29
Ohio
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009. Note: D ⫽ data withheld to limit disclosure.
Appendix III: Notable Bahamian Americans | 101
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 19 Bahamian immigrant population, U.S. citizenship and period of entry, prior to 1980 to 2000 Total population of Bahamians in United States
28,075
U.S. citizenship Naturalized U.S. citizen
10,490
Period of entry 1990–2000
1,740
1980–1989
2,985
Before 1980
5,765
Not a U.S. citizen
17,585
Period of entry 1990–2000
9,640
1980–1989
4,825
Before 1980
3,120
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2000). Note: The government tracks the Bahamian immigrant population using information compiled from the American Community Survey, which contain basic demographic, economic, social, and housing data. Data from the 2000 Census are available for the nation, states, counties, towns, cities, zip codes, and census tracts. Data from the American Community Survey are available for geographic areas with a population of 65,000 or more.
Appendix III: Notable Bahamian Americans As a result of the historic interaction between the two countries, many Bahamian Americans have become well-known figures in American society; however, many Americans are unaware of the origins of several notable Afro-Bahamian immigrants. Notable African Americans of Bahamian origins include: Julian “Cannonball” Adderley (September 15, 1928 August 8, 1975) was a musician of the style of jazz known as hard bop. Adderley played alto saxophone. He began his musical career in Tallahassee, Florida, as a member of Ray CharlesÊs band. His brother, Nat Adderley, played cornet in the band as well. In 1955, Julian and Nat moved to New York City, where they formed a jazz band, which attracted the attention of Miles Davis. Julian Adderley joined DavisÊs sextet in 1957. In the early 1960s, Adderley and brother Nat
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formed their own band, The Cannonball Adderley Quintet, which gained a respectable following among pop fans, as well as jazz aficionados. James Weldon Johnson (June 17, 1871 June 26, 1938) was an author, composer, and educator. Johnson was educated by his mother and at the age of 16, entered Atlanta University, from which he graduated in 1894. After working for Theodore RooseveltÊs 1904 presidential campaign, Roosevelt appointed Johnson as a U.S. consul in Venezuela from 1906 to 1908 and then in Nicaragua from 1909 to 1913. In 1916, Johnson became the national organizer for the NAACP and later became the organizationÊs executive secretary, a position he held until 1930. He authored several written works, including the novel The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man (1912). He and brother J. Rosamond Johnson composed what has become known to African Americans as the „black national anthem,‰ the song „Lift EvÊry Voice and Sing‰ (1899). Sidney Poitier (born February 20, 1927) was born on Cat Island in the Bahamas and early in his life moved to Nassau. He became a major stage and film actor, film director, and diplomat. In 1997, Poitier was appointed Bahamian ambassador to Japan. He was also the first black actor to win an Academy Award for Best Actor, for his role in Lilies of the Field in 1963. Roxie Roker (August 28, 1929 December 2, 1995) played the character Helen Willis on the long-running television program The Jeffersons. Her role, as a black wife in an interracial couple, was a first for prime-time television sitcoms. Roker grew up in Brooklyn, New York, and attended Howard University. Prior to her work on television, she acted in theater and worked as a newscaster at a New York station in the 1970s. Her son, Lenny Kravitz, is a renowned musician, and she is a cousin of meteorologist and television personality Al Roker. Esther Rolle (November 8, 1920 November 17, 1998) was an actress best known for role as Florida Evans on the television sitcoms Maude (1972) and Good Times (1974). After migrating from Pompano Beach, Florida, to New York City, Rolle attended Hunter College while working days in the cityÊs garment district. She developed an interest in theater, had several stage roles with the Negro Ensemble Company, and made her stage debut in 1962 in the play The Blacks. After several other stage roles, Rolle was cast on the television sitcom Maude as housekeeper Florida Evans and reprised the role in Good Times, a spin-off of the earlier show. In 1975, she was nominated for a Golden Globe Award for her role in the series in the category of Best Actress in a Comedy/Musical. After leaving the sitcom, Rolle made appearances in several films including Maya AngelouÊs I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings (1979), Driving Miss Daisy (1989), and Rosewood (1997).
References
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Glossary Conchy or Conchy Joe: A term used to describe poor whites who typically lived in isolated, Out Island settlements. May also refer to whites in general or non-whites who adopt white mores and behaviors. Goombay: A style of African-derived Bahamian music. Also refers to the goatskin drum used in Goombay music. Guy Fawkes Night: An annual celebration held on November 5 in commemoration of a plot on that night in 1605 by Catholic conspirators, including Guy Fawkes, who were accused of attempting to blow up the Houses of Parliament in London. In the Bahamas, the celebration involves masked performers, bonfires, and a ritual burning Fawkes in effigy. Junkanoo: Known also as John Canoe or Jonkannu, the celebration is held in many islands of the British West Indies and in parts of North Carolina, as well. Traditionally celebrated the day after Christmas (Boxing Day), more recently the Junkanoo has been held on New YearÊs Day or in the warmer summer months in West Indian communities in North America. The celebrations consists of masked bands in elaborate costumes, which parade through the streets accompanied by Goombay music. Some bands are large formally organized groups, while others are smaller, more spontaneous, and less costumed. Liberated Africans: Captured Africans freed by the Royal Navy and British Vice-Admiralty Courts from illegally operating slave ships after 1807, when England abolished the Atlantic slave trade. Liberated Africans were resettled in the colony of Sierra Leone or contracted as indentured laborers in the British West Indies. Lucayans: Name given to the Arawak Amerindian population of the Bahamas. Out Islands: Islands of the Bahamas other than New Providence and Grand Bahama Islands. Some of the larger Out Islands include the Abacos, Acklins, Andros, Bimini, Cat Island, Eleuthera, Harbour, the Exumas, and Long Island. Truck system: An exploitive credit system in which wages were paid in goods and commodities or in an alternate to standard currency, rather than in cash.
References Bahamian American Association, Inc. [Online article; retrieved 8/09.] http://www.bahami anamericanassociation.org/html/history.html. Bahamian American Cultural Society. [Online article; retrieved 8/09.] http://www.bahami anamericanculturalsociety.org/. Bahamian Village. „Bahamians in U.S. Preparing for Caribbean Street Carnival.‰ [Online article; retrieved 8/09.] http://www.bahamianvillage.com/article49.html.
104 | Bahamian Immigrants „BPC Eyes Bahamas Exploration Revival with Statoil.‰ 2009. Reuters, May 18. [Online article; retrieved 8/09.] http://www.reuters.com/article/OILPRD/idUSLI46872720090518. Craton, Michael, and Gail Saunders. 1999. Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People (From Aboriginal Times to the End of Slavery). Athens: University of Georgia Press. Craton, Michael, and Gail Saunders. 2000. Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People (From the Ending of Slavery to the Twenty-First Century). Athens: University of Georgia Press. Johnson, Howard. 1986. „A Modified Form of Slavery: The Credit and Truck Systems in the Bahamas in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries.‰ Comparative Studies in Society and History 28(4): 729 53 Miller, W. Hubert. 1945. „The Colonization of the Bahamas, 1647 1670.‰ William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 2(1): 33 46. St. AndrewÊs School Committee. 1983. It’s Cookin’ in the Bahamas. Nassau: Bahamian News. University of Maryland-Baltimore, University Student Government Association. 2008 2009. Khandra Sears. [Online article; retrieved 8/09.] http://www.umaryland.edu/ usga/08_09cyndi/senators/khandrasears. U.S. Census Bureau. 2000. Census 2000 Special Tabulations (STP-159). Table FBP-1. Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristic. [Online article; retrieved 8/09.] http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/stp159-bahamas.pdf. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2004. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2004. Table 3. [Online article; retrieved 8/09.] http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sta tistics/yearbook/2004/Yearbook2004.pdf. „U.S. Hiring Hong Kong to Scan Nukes.‰ 2006. USAToday, March 23. [Online article; retrieved 8/09.] http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-03-23-ports-hongkong_x.htm.
Further Reading Adderley, Rosanne. 2006. New Negroes from Africa: Free African Immigrants in the Nineteenth-century Caribbean (Blacks in the Diaspora). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. A comprehensive cultural study of Liberated Africans in the Bahamas and Trinidad, with a focus on the interaction between English-speaking colonists, Creoles, the new African immigrants, and the communities they created. Albury, Paul. 1979. „Some Aspects of Shipbuilding in the Bahamas.‰ Journal of the Bahamas Historical Society 1(1): 9 11. A brief historical review of the Out Islands shipbuilding industry that was crucial to the inhabitants of the islands self-reliant economic position.
Further Reading
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Alexander, M. Jacqui. 1994. „Not Just (Any) Body Can Be a Citizen: The Politics of Law, Sexuality and Postcoloniality in Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas.‰ Feminist Review, No. 48, The New Politics of Sex and the State (Autumn): 5 23. A comparative feminist critique of the criminal penalties of homosexuality in postcolonial Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, and the United States as a means of structuring power and maintaining the marginalized positions of racial and sexual „others.‰ Brown, Susan Love. 2005. „Solidarity and Individualism in an Archipelago State: A Bahamian Cultural Model in Historical Context.‰ Journal of Caribbean Studies 19(3): 129 50. An interdisciplinary study addressing the factors contributing to the cohesiveness of Afro-Bahamian society and the contrasting role of self-reliance valued by the countryÊs people. Craton, Michael. 1983. „ ÂWe Shall Not Be MovedÊ: PompeyÊs Slave Revolt in Exuma Island, Bahamas, 1830.‰ West Indian Guide 57(18): 19 35. An examination of Bahamian slave resistance that contributed to ameliorative policies and emancipation in the British West Indies that focuses on the goals and aims of the enslaved who participated. Craton, Michael. 1995. „The Bahamian Self and the Haitian Other: The Migration of Haitians to and through the Bahamas, 1950 2000.‰ Immigrants and Minorities 14(3): 265 88. A historical and contemporary study of the construction of Bahamian national identity as contrasted with the outsider status of Haitian immigrants. Craton, Michael, and Gail Saunders.1999. Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People (From Aboriginal Times to the End of Slavery). Athens: University of Georgia Press. The first volume of a comprehensive history of the Bahamas that chronicles the peopling of the islands from the earliest period of settlement to the end of the slave era, focusing on cultural history and the political economy. Craton, Michael, and Gail Saunders. 2000. Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People (From the Ending of Slavery to the Twenty-First Century). Athens: University of Georgia Press. The second volume of a comprehensive history of the Bahamas that chronicles the interaction of the various inhabitants of the islands in the post-slavery era and the creation of BahamiansÊ national and political identity, with special attention given to the demise of white minority rule and the economic and social difficulties the country faced after independence. Finlay, H. H. 1925. „Folklore from Eleuthera, Bahamas.‰ Journal of American Folklore 38(148): 293 99. A compilation of Afro-Bahamian traditional stories, many with African origins, written in dialectic style collected by an anthropologist in the early 20th century.
106 | Bahamian Immigrants Howard, Rosalyn. 2002. Black Seminoles in the Bahamas. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. An ethnographic study of the descendents of the Seminole Indians who emigrated from Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina and the process of cultural transformation that occurred. Hudson, Alan. 1998. „Reshaping the Regulatory Landscape: Border Skirmishes around the Bahamas and Cayman Offshore Financial Centres.‰ Review of International Political Economy 5(3): 534 64. An examination of how the processes of globalization affect spatial context and reorganize geopolitical borders in regard to the banking industries of the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. Johnson, Howard. 1983. „Labour on the Move: West Indian Migration to the Bahamas, 1922 1930.‰ Revista/Review Interamericana 13: 85 98. An examination of the causes and practice of Afro-Caribbean laborers moving from other islands to the Bahamas during the economic boom ushered in by Prohibition in the United States. Johnson, Howard. 1986. „A Modified Form of Slavery: The Credit and Truck Systems in the Bahamas in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries.‰ Comparative Studies in Society and History 28(4): 729 53. An examination of post-emancipation economic and political controls by the white minority elite through the implementation of a credit system as an alternative to wages for Bahamian laborers. Johnson, Howard. 1986. „ ÂSafeguarding Our TradersÊ: The Beginnings of Immigration Restrictions in the Bahamas, 1925 33,‰ Immigrants and Minorities 5: 5 27. An examination of the early efforts of Bahamian colonial authorities to limit migrant laborers during the economic growth associated with Prohibition and the intensified efforts of immigration restriction that occurred with the onset of the Great Depression. Johnson, Howard. 1988. „Bahamian Labor Migration to Florida in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries.‰ International Migration Review 22(1): 84 103. An immigration study contrasting the causes and experiences of labor migrants from the Bahamas to southern Florida with the more common experience of labor migration within the Caribbean during the post-emancipation era until the end of the World War I. Johnson, Howard. 1988. „The Liberated Africans in the Bahamas, 1811 1860.‰ In After the Crossing: Immigrants and Minorities in Caribbean Creole Society, edited by Howard Johnson, 16 40. London: Frank Cass. Historical analysis if the impact of Liberated African indentured laborers and their relationship to the emergence of the truck credit system in the Bahamas. Johnson, Howard. 1989. „The Emergence of a Peasantry in the Bahamas during Slavery.‰ Slavery and Abolition 10: 172 86.
Further Reading | 107 This article explains how slaves in the Bahamas had access to land that allowed for the emergence of a land-based subsistence economy during the slavery era. Johnson, Howard. 1995. „A Slow and Extended Abolition: The Case of the Bahamas, 1800 1838.‰ In From Chattel to Wage Slavery: The Dynamics of Labour Bargaining in the Americas, edited by Mary Turner, 165 82. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. A socioeconomic analysis of the relationship between the surplus of labor and the collapse of cotton production in the Bahamas by the beginning of the 19th century and the development of labor systems during slavery and the emancipation period. Johnson, Howard. 1995. „Slave Life and Leisure in Nassau, Bahamas 1783 1838.‰ Slavery and Abolition 16(1): 45 64. A sociocultural study of urban slaves and their role in the colonial economy of the Bahamas and their use of economic activities to mitigate and resist the dehumanization of chattel slavery after the institution became formalized by Loyalist planters from the American South. Johnson, Howard. 1996. The Bahamas from Slavery to Servitude, 1783–1933. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. A socioeconomic history of the final phases of slavery in the Bahamas and the equally exploitative systems of labor that emerged in the post-emancipation period. Johnson, Whittington B. 2000. Race Relations in the Bahamas, 1784–1834: The Nonviolent Transformation from a Slave to a Free Society (Black Community Studies). Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. A historical account of the role of the Afro-Bahamian church as a modifying agent during the transition from slavery to emancipation. Keegan, William F. 1984. „Columbus and the City of God.‰ Journal of the Bahamas Historical Society 6(1): 34 39. A historical analysis of the implications of presumed cultural superiority by European explorers and the resulting treatment and subsequent extermination of the indigenous population of the Bahamian archipelago. MacIntosh, Roderick J. 2000. „Trades and Occupations of Runaway Slaves in the Bahamas.‰ Journal of the Bahamas Historical Society 6(1): 7 14. A historical study of the manner in which runaway slaves created a self-reliant economy during the first half of the 19th century; the study describes the types of skilled labor of enslaved Afro-Bahamians. Miller, W. Hubert. 1945. „The Colonization of the Bahamas, 1647 1670.‰ William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 2(1): 33 46. A Eurocentric political and economic history of permanent settlement of the Bahamian islands by English colonists from South Carolina in the mid-17th century that addresses the development of the colony under proprietary rule. Mohl, Raymond A. 1987. „Black Immigrants: Bahamians in Early Twentieth-Century Miami.‰ Florida Historical Quarterly 65(3): 271 97.
108 | Bahamian Immigrants A historical examination of the role played by Afro-Bahamian migrants to southern Florida in establishing cultural diversity in the cityÊs population. Rommen, Timothy. 1999. „Home Sweet Home: Junkanoo as National Discourse in the Bahamas.‰ Black Music Research Journal 19(1): 71 92. An ethnographic study focusing on the ways Junkanoo and the music associated with its celebration helps native Bahamians and Bahamians throughout the diaspora maintain their national and cultural identity. Storr, Virgil Henry. 2004. Enterprising Slaves and Master Pirates: Understanding Economic Life in the Bahamas. New York: Peter Lang. An economic history of the Bahamas with emphasis on the marginal role of the plantation system in the colony and the significance of privateering as its replacement in the economy and piracyÊs sanction by early colonial officials and inhabitants of the islands. Strachan, Ian Gregory. 2002. Paradise and Plantation: Tourism and Culture in the Anglophone Caribbean. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. An interdisciplinary study written from the perspective of a native Bahamian concerning the myth of the Bahamas as an idyllic Caribbean paradise as promoted by the tourist industry as contrasted with the stark economic realities of the country. Sullivan, Shaun O., and William H. Sears. 1978. „Bahamas Prehistory,‰ American Antiquity 43(1): 3 25. An archaeological study that chronicles the migration of the Arawaks and the examination of sites in the Bahamas that illustrate the indigenous populationÊs adaptation to the environment prior to the period of European contact. Williams, Patrice M. 1984. „From Punishment to Cruelty: Treatment of Slaves in the Bahamas, 1723 1832.‰ Journal of the Bahamas Historical Society 6(1): 30 33. A social and cultural history written as a refutation to earlier depictions of slavery as milder and less brutal in the Bahamas as a result of the failure of a viable plantation economy to develop. This study illustrates how slavery in the colony was as harsh as in other slave societies.
Bangladeshi Immigrants by Ahrar Ahmad
Introduction Bangladeshi Americans are a relatively recent addition to the multicultural vibrancy that the United States represents. It is instructive to point out that until 1947 Bangladesh was part of India as the eastern part of the province of Bengal, and between 1947 and 1971, it was a part of Pakistan as the province of East Pakistan. It became a sovereign country in December 1971. Since it had been a part of different political entities at various times, the history of immigration can sometimes be a bit confusing, and the historical data sometimes difficult to disaggregate. It is also important to point out that the vast majority of Bangladeshis (more than 85%) are Muslims, but, at the same time, they are very proud and enthusiastic about their linguistic and cultural traditions that are distinctive (more than 95% speak Bengali, the language that anchors an ancient and glorious heritage). Thus, their identity represents a constantly negotiated balance between their commitment to the universal claims of Islam and their engagement in the particular demands of their cultural uniqueness. However, regardless of such ambiguities, it is clear that the number of emigrants from Bangladesh who have immigrated to the United States has demonstrated almost spectacular growth over the decades beginning in the 1990s. This increase has been accompanied by some changes in their demographic profile. Till the 1980s they were usually educated, upwardly mobile professionals, mostly immigrating on employer-based preferences, or as students who, upon completion of their degrees here, adjusted their visa status. Starting in the 1990s, the phenomenal increase in emigrants from Bangladesh to the United States has been based on family-based preferences and the „green card lottery visas,‰ and, therefore, there were significant numbers who had less academic and social capital at their disposal than the previous cohorts. However, overall, Bangladeshi Americans remain „model minorities‰ known for their industry, strong family values, and demonstrable desire to assimilate politically into the American mainstream; despite their desire to assimilate, they are also known to zealously cling to the cultural markers and traditions that allow them to stand apart. Given the patterns established over the last two decades, it may be safe to project that Bangladeshi Americans will exercise a more robust presence in the U.S. social landscape and will contribute to the richness and vitality that new immigrants have traditionally brought to the American meta-narrative.
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Chronology | 111
Chronology 1875
First South Asians arrive in United States, mostly from Punjab. Many settle in the West Coast.
1913
Bengali South Asian wins court case to gain citizenship.
1923
Court reverses itself and does not allow citizenship rights to South Asians.
1946
South Asians are allowed the right to seek naturalization. Immigration quota is fixed at 105.
1947
India is divided into two countries. East Bengal becomes East Pakistan.
1965
U.S. Act ends racial quotas, expands employer based preferences, helps South Asian immigration.
1971
Pakistan military annuls election. East Pakistan declares independence. Civil war ensues.
December 16, 1971
Pakistani military surrenders to Indian and Bangladeshi forces. Bangladesh is liberated.
April 4, 1972
United States recognizes Bangladesh.
1972
Small number of professionals begin to migrate. Many students seek higher education in the United States.
April 13, 1974
First official U.S. Ambassador appointed to Dhaka.
September 17, 1974
Bangladesh becomes a full member of the United Nations.
August 15, 1975
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib, first civilian president, is assassinated.
1975–1991
Several military leaders come to power, float own parties, and become civilian presidents.
1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) facilitates some Bangladeshi immigration.
1990–1991
OP 1 (Opportunity) Visa category initiated; „green card lottery system‰ opens doors for many.
1991
Democracy restored through fair, open elections.
April 3, 1995
First Lady Hillary Clinton visits Bangladesh.
1995–1996
DV 1 (Diversity) Visa category allows even more Bangladeshis to migrate.
March 20, 2000
President Clinton visits Bangladesh.
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2001
Tragedy of 9/11 affects Bangladeshi immigration negatively. Immigration bounces back by 2004.
June 2003
Secretary of State Colin Powell visits Bangladesh.
June 2004
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visits Bangladesh.
November 2007
U.S. Marines actively assist Bangladesh military in humanitarian efforts after a devastating cyclone.
August 2009
President Obama awards Presidential Medal of Freedom to Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Prize laureate from Bangladesh.
September 2010
U.S. Congress passes resolution to award Congressional Gold Medal to Muhammad Yunus in 2011.
Background Geography and History of Bangladesh Bangladesh, with an area of 55,813 square miles, is a low-lying riparian country located about 23 north latitude, 90 east longitude, on the northern littoral of the Bay of Bengal in South Asia. Most of its land area is surrounded by India (with which it shares a border of almost 2,518 miles), while only approximately 120 miles of its borders are shared with Myanmar (previously Burma) in the southeast. The land constitutes a huge drainage system for several large rivers that flow from the Himalayas into the Bay of Bengal. It is therefore mostly a deltaic plain with some hilly areas in the northern and eastern parts, and some forest lands in the middle and southern zones (where the coastal mangrove forests, known as the Sundarbans, are home to the magnificent Royal Bengal Tigers, the distinctive spotted deer, and a variety of unique flora and fauna). The country straddles the Tropic of Cancer, thus occupying a typically monsoonal climatic zone characterized by high humidity, warm temperatures, and heavy seasonal rainfalls. It is vulnerable to periodic flooding and to weather-related turbulence emanating from the Bay of Bengal. Its relatively pristine coastline offers some of the longest white-sand sea beaches in the world, but the poverty of the country, and its image abroad, have prevented it from fully utilizing this potential tourist attraction (Ahmad 2008). Even though Bangladesh has been a sovereign republic only since 1971, it is a land with very old cultural traditions and a complex political history. There are references to the land as early as 1000 B.C.E. Early Buddhist and later Hindu influences gradually gave way to the religion of Islam between the 14th and 17th centuries. It is noteworthy that Islam spread in this part of India not through forced conversion
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but largely (though not exclusively) through the influence of Sufis (Islamic mystics) and saints who settled in various parts of this area and served as teachers and exemplars of a very enlightened, tolerant, and spiritual approach to their faith. Islam became more prevalent in the eastern part of the province of Bengal in India, the region that eventually became Bangladesh (Eaton 1993). The British arrived as traders in the 17th century, and by 1757 the East India Company asserted administrative and fiscal control over the Bengal Presidency. After the abortive Sepoy (SoldierÊs) Mutiny against Company rule in 1857, the British Crown began to exercise direct control over India. Because of growing misunderstandings and tensions between the Hindus and Muslims in India over power, privilege, and protection, the land was divided in 1947 when British rule formally ended. The Muslim majority provinces in the eastern and western parts of India combined to form the country of Pakistan with its eastern and western „wings‰ separated by about 1,000 miles of Indian territories. The peoples of West and East Pakistan were united by their common Islamic faith but were different in language, ethnicity, and traditions. Widespread complaints of political unfairness, economic discrimination, and cultural indifference generated aggressive demands for provincial autonomy in the east. The Awami League, the political party that championed the cause of autonomy, won a clear mandate in the national elections held in 1970 by winning almost all the seats from East Pakistan. Since the seats were allocated on the basis of population (and East Pakistan had more people than West Pakistan), Awami LeagueÊs victory meant that it captured the majority of seats in the Pakistan National Assembly, which was going to formulate a new constitution for the state. The results of the elections were nullified by the military regime that ruled Pakistan at the time, and the country was plunged into a severe and intractable constitutional and political crisis (Mallick and Husain 2004). East Pakistan declared independence from Pakistan on March 25, 1971. This was met with an overwhelming military response from the Pakistani Army intent on keeping the country united. A short but brutal civil war ensued in which enormous numbers of Bangladeshis were killed, millions fled to neighboring India, and thousands joined the Mukti Bahini (the Liberation Forces, which carried out various acts of guerrilla resistance and was gradually organizing itself along more conventional lines). Eventually India intervened in this troubled situation in favor of Bangladesh, and the West Pakistani military surrendered to a joint command of Bangladeshi and Indian forces on December 16, 1971. Bangladesh established its status in the world as a sovereign country, was recognized by the United States in April 1972, and became a full member of the UN in September 1974 (Ahmed 2002; Baxter 1997; Sisson and Rose 1990; Ziring 1992; Mascarenhas 1986; Novak 1993; OÊDonnel 1984; van Schendel 2009; London 2004).
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Crowds cheer the acting Bangladeshi president and the acting government during a meeting in Jessore, East Pakistan, on December 11, 1971. Visible in the background is City Hall with Indian soldiers standing guard on the roof. At left a Mukti Bahini soldier tries to keep the crowd under control. (AP Photo)
Causes and Waves of Migration According the census of 2001, the population of Bangladesh was calculated to be approximately 123.9 million, and by 2008 it was estimated to be around 150 million. Given the fact that its land size is less than the state of Wisconsin, Bangladesh remains one of the most densely populated countries in the world (Jahan 2001). In the context of the fact that it is also a relatively poor country with severely constrained resources (its per capita GDP was calculated to be around $406 in 2006, or approximately $1,870 according to the Purchasing Power Parity measures endorsed by the UN, which is considered a more accurate, and a comparatively more meaningful, measure of the buying power of the local currency expressed in dollars), its people have, for obvious reasons, sought to emigrate, or at least temporarily relocate, to other countries in order to pursue educational opportunities, economic prosperity, and·in the context of frequent military regimes and a difficult law and order situation that occasionally exists in the country·political freedom and social stability. BangladeshisÊ „discovery‰ of America as a potential target of migration was probably a bit late and tentative. Many more Bangladeshis moved to Middle
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Eastern countries and the United Kingdom, where familiarity, historical ties, and family connections facilitated their transition as emigrants. While the history of Bangladeshi emigration to the United States in sizable numbers is relatively recent, their presence here is increasingly obvious and demonstrably growing.
Early Immigration Immigrants from India began to come to the United States in the late 19th century. Most of them were Punjabis, though there were a few, such as Taraknath Das (a radical activist who began as a community organizer; got his PhD in political science from the University of Washington; and taught at Columbia University) and Kumar Ghosal and Shailendranath Ghose (who were active in leftist politics), who came from the Bengal region of India. Most of these migrants settled in small farming enclaves in the West Coast. They were frustrated in their efforts to become American citizens by a host of policies and acts such as the restrictive Immigration Acts of 1917 and 1924; CaliforniaÊs Alien Land Laws of 1913 and 1921, which curtailed their ability to own land; and miscegenation laws that did not permit them to have white wives (and therefore many married black or Latina women). Even the judicial system remained unclear about their status. In 1913, another Bengali, Akhay Kumar Mazumdar, successfully argued in the U.S. courts that, anthropologically, Indians were Caucasian and hence could not be barred from citizenship, but by 1923 in the Bhagat Singh Thind case, the court reversed itself and held that Indians could be classified as „Caucasian‰ but not „white‰ and hence were ineligible for citizenship (Islam 1997). Finally, with the passage of the Luce-Celler Bill in 1946, naturalization rights were conferred on Indians, and a quota of 105 was set as the total number of migrants to be allowed from that country (Leonard 1997). Obviously, immigration from India and Pakistan was a mere trickle; and the number from the part that became East Pakistan (and later Bangladesh) constituted no more than a few drops in that meager flow.
The Immigration Act of 1965 The Immigration Act of 1965 changed the racial quota system that governed previous immigration into the United States, and the need for professionals in various fields dictated an increase in the number of migrants through employer-based preferences. Consequently, many more Indians and Pakistanis (some, presumably, from East Pakistan/Bangladesh as well), usually from middle-class and professional backgrounds, took advantage of the increasing opportunities for working and settling in the United States. The total number of immigrants to the United States from the area that became Bangladesh was probably not more than a thousand or so in 1971 (i.e., when civil
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war broke out, and East Pakistan became Bangladesh). Many of them became concerned with the situation in the country in 1971, and some became involved in trying to assist the „Liberation Struggle‰ against the Pakistani Army by holding news conferences, publishing reports, lobbying Congress, and collecting funds and relief materials (for the refugees who fled to India). Even though their numbers were small, their impact was probably quite substantial. The actual number of Bangladeshis in the United States showed remarkable increases in subsequent decades. In 1973 there were 154 immigrants from Bangladesh that were allowed into the United States; in 1974 there were 147; in 1975, 404; and in 1976, 590 (Jones 2008). Many of them were pharmacists (indeed the entire graduating class of pharmacists from Dhaka University in 1973, except for one female graduate, became immigrants to the United States the following year) and workers in other health-related fields. By 1980 it is estimated that there were approximately a total of 5,880 Bangladeshis living in the United States (Kibria 2007).
Through IRCA to the Present The increase in numbers since then has been truly spectacular. The population of Bangladeshi Americans leaped to almost 21,749 in 1990 and to 92,235 in 2000, an increase of almost 1,469 percent in the two decades from 1980 to 2000 (Kibria 2007). U.S. Census data indicates that this number further increased to about 143,619 in 2007 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) played some role in this phenomenal increase by allowing people to apply for immigrant status who may have entered the country on some other category or whose residency documentation may not have been very clear or complete. However, most of the increases over the last two decades can be attributed to family-based preferences that began with IRCA but were significantly relaxed and expanded in the 1990s, or the popularly known „green card lottery visas‰ that were instituted by the U.S. government through the Opportunity Visa (OP-1, 1990 1991) and Diversity Visa (DV-1, 1995 1996) categories. Between 1996 and 2002, of the total number of 51,447 Bangladeshis admitted into the country as legal residents, 29,559 (or 57.4%) came through family-sponsored preferences and as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, and 15,700 (or 30.5%) came through the Diversity Visa programs (Kibria 2007). The tragic events of September 11, 2001, were clearly expected to exert a dampening effect on the numbers of Bangladeshi immigrants because of U.S. wariness about Muslims: special registration, surveillance, and background checks generated an environment that provided disincentives to new migrants from Muslim countries. While there may have been a temporary downturn in the number of migrants in the years immediately following 2001 (decreasing from 7,171 in 2001 to 5,492 in 2002 and 4,625 in 2003), the numbers have bounced back to register
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robust growth: 8,061 people of Bangladeshi origin obtained legal permanent status in 2004; 11,487 in 2005; 14,644 in 2006; 12,074 in 2007; and 11,753 in 2008 (Office of Homeland Security 2009). There are some other categories of people from Bangladesh residing in the United States whose numbers may not be captured by Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) statistics. There are a few thousand refugees and asylees from Bangladesh in the United States primarily because of political instability at home, minority status in Bangladesh, or status as potential victims of perceived threats and other felt anxieties (Office of Homeland Security 2008). The procedures through which aslyee requests are handled are typically outside the normal jurisdiction of the INS. As pointed out earlier, there are probably several thousand students from Bangladesh in the United States on temporary (F-1 or H-1) visas, and, consistent with previous experience, it is expected that most will regularize their stay here eventually. It is also noteworthy that there are probably thousands of Bangladeshi undocumented workers/residents in the United States today (some of whom infiltrated from third countries such as Mexico and countries in the Caribbean islands, and many came here on temporary visitor visas and never returned). Most undocumented workers are in the process of getting their „legal papers‰ through the long and complex legal channels that are available. It is impossible to be exact about these numbers, but some estimates suggest that there may be more than 50,000 undocumented Bangladeshis in New York City alone and between 100,000 to 150,000 nationally ( Paul 2008; Harris 1997). Consequently the actual number of Bangladeshis residing in the United States today will be higher than the figures reported by the INS. Bangladeshi Americans are disproportionately clustered in a few identifiable zones. The vast majority are concentrated in the two coasts (specifically in the New York/New Jersey corridor and in California) and recently in southern states like Florida, Texas, and Georgia. Like other migrants they tend to gravitate to areas where there are pre-existing enclaves of their own communities. There is, understandably, some comfort and support in residing in an area that can sustain native food habits and cultural events; however, comfort and support are not the only factors for immigrants determining where to reside in their new country. The „ethnic economies‰ that typically develop (restaurants, grocery stores, real estate, legal, medical, travel agency services, and so on) are often more able to absorb new arrivals into low-paying service sector jobs (Light and Gold 2000).
Demographic Profile Age and Family Structure According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2007), there were approximately 143,619 people of Bangladeshi origin legally residing in the United States in 2007:
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53.8 percent were men, and 46.2 percent were women. (All statistics quoted here and in the subsequent paragraphs are taken from U.S. Census Bureau 2007.) Their median age was 36.9 years; approximately two-thirds of them were between 25 and 54 years; and whereas 12.5 percent of Americans were over the age of 65, only 3.6 percent of people of Bangladeshi origin legally residing in the United States fall in that category. These statistics are expected and is consistent with the recent pattern of new migration of able-bodied people into the country. Only 18.3 percent of the people entered the country before 1990. Bangladeshi Americans tend to be very family oriented: 71.5 percent were married, and the number of widowed, divorced, or separated persons collectively constitutes only about 5 percent of the total. Seventy-nine percent lived as a married couple unit, 87.3 percent lived in family households, and 66 percent were households in which children under the age of 18 lived together with both their parents at home (compared to only 31.1% of the national average).
Bangladeshi immigrant Rahima Begum sits in the doorway at her home in Woburn, Massachusetts, with grandson Jeeshan Wahab, as daughter-inlaw Shaheen Wahab (rear) looks on, July 28, 2009. (AP Photo/Eric J. Shelton)
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Educational Attainment Traditionally, Bangladeshis revere education. Consequently, Bangladeshi Americans emphasize higher education (45% have bachelors degree or higher, compared to 27.1% nationally), but, curiously, they tend not to enroll their children in nursery school or kindergarten (e.g., only 2% of them are in such school environments, compared to 11.3% nationally). Gender disparities are evident as 52.1 percent of the males have a bachelorÊs degree or higher, in contrast to the 36 percent of women who do. (It should be clarified that many respondents who claim to have a bachelorÊs degree or higher may be referring to BA degrees they may have received in the home country, which is not always comparable to U.S. degrees). A crushing socioeconomic disadvantage that Bangladeshi Americans share with many recent immigrant groups is that 94.5 percent of them speak a language other than English at home, and fully 55.7 percent speak English less than „very well‰ (Census Profile: New York Cities Bangladesh American Population 2007)
Economic Attainment Bangladeshi Americans are engaged in a range of occupations: 28.3 percent of Bangladeshi Americans are in management, professional, or related occupations; 17 percent are occupied in service sectors; and almost 36 percent work in sales and office occupations (the last category is dominated by women). It is quite striking that almost 26 percent of Bangladeshi Americans are in retail trade, while only about 11.4 percent of the U.S. population is involved in this occupational category. This occupational profile partly explains why, in spite of the fact that the percentage of Bangladeshi Americans with college degrees is higher than the national average, their aggregate incomes do not reflect that advantage. Thus, whereas the median family income of Bangladeshi Americans is $45,821 (in 2007 inflation adjusted dollars), the national average was $61,173; and whereas per capita income for Bangladeshi American individuals was $22,210, the national average was $26,688. Less than 45 percent of Bangladeshi Americans live in owner-occupied units, with an average household size of 4.12 people, but 67.2 percent of the U.S. population lives in owner-occupied units, with an average household size of 2.7 people. While only 13 percent of the people at the national level live under the poverty line, fully 20.2 percent of Bangladeshi Americans do so.
Health Issues There are no outstanding health issues relevant to Bangladeshi Americans. There are no diseases specific to the group nor any medical vulnerability that they
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collectively demonstrate. However, given the fact that the last wave of migrants does not have the educational and professional backgrounds that earlier groups possessed, they are hesitant to seek preventive care, have annual examinations, or visit the doctor at the onslaught of any medical condition. Some of them may simply be intimidated by the health care system here, some may not be insured, and some may have inadequate language skills. There also may be a few who seek alternative health care systems (which may be „homeopathic,‰ „herbal,‰ „folk,‰ or „faith-based‰) that may not have solid scientific foundations but are popular among some. Whenever possible most Bangladeshi Americans prefer to see Bangladeshi (or, at least, South Asian) health care providers. The quality of health care that women receive is often inferior to that of men because women are traditionally taught to be indifferent to their medical needs (being socially conditioned to suffer rather than being a burden on others), and also because so many of them feel awkward about being examined by, or even visiting, a male physician.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals As indicated previously, family structures are enormously important to Bangladeshis and become the focal point in terms of their social life and cultural interactions. Moreover, since they recently won their independence essentially based on issues of linguistic and cultural nationalism, there is a strong drive to preserve their distinctive traditions by maintaining the habits, practices, and customs that have been important to their identity and evolution. As many Bangladeshis frequently and proudly proclaim: „we may have left Bangladesh, but Bangladesh has not left us.‰ It is important to point out that the life-cycle events discussed here are those practiced by Muslim Bangladeshi Americans, not by the Hindus, Christians, or Buddhists who have migrated from Bangladesh to the United States, who have their own distinctive traditions and practices.
Birth The birth of a child is obviously an occasion for great joy. Before the birth of the baby there is a party for the mother comparable to a „baby shower‰ (usually, but not always, restricted to women), where some gifts may be given to the mother, but the emphasis is on preparing foods by others specifically according to the motherÊs preferences and tastes. At the birth of the child, even when it takes place in a hospital where most births do, most Muslim families will, as unobtrusively as
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Israt Jahan, 17, a junior from Bangladesh, meets with Nancy King Wang, an assistant principal at Newton High School in New York on March 19, 2004. Jahan says her parents do not attend parent–teacher conferences because they do not speak English. (AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews)
possible, whisper the Muslim call to prayer into the childÊs ear soon after birth (in an attempt to ensure that the first brief words the child hears is a call to the faithful). Male children are circumcised. The naming ceremony is held later by the childÊs parents, and a feast is served. Traditionally, lambs and goats are slaughtered for the purpose, but since this is usually not possible in the United States, many families will simply request friends and family in Bangladesh to perform this ritual there and donate the meat to poor people. The celebration of birthdays is not a typical practice in their native lands except among the upper classes. However, in the United States, particularly in the first few years of the child, they are observed by many families, with the degree of participation and fanfare depending upon social and economic status.
Marriages Marriages in the Islamic tradition are contractual arrangements and require neither social sanction nor sacramental blessings. Therefore, although celebrations may be long, loud, and complex, and although some religious rituals may provide some
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solemnity and grace to the ceremonies, ultimately the marriage rests upon the bride and groom consenting to the details of their marital understandings as worked out, usually, by the elders of both families. The consent must be given freely in front of witnesses and recorded by the marriage registrar as part of the required formalities: and details may include references to the dowry, conditions for divorce, or the level of upkeep for the bride, among other things. It should be pointed out that most marriages are still „arranged‰ by the guardians though, in the United States, the arrangements are made typically with the coupleÊs knowledge and agreement. At times, the couple may choose their own partners, then get the approval of their parents, and let the parents determine the process from that time on. Marriage outside the community is rare and while some young men may break that norm and choose spouses from other ethnic groups, very few women can be so defiant of social conventions. During the wedding ceremonies the couple put on traditional clothes, with the bride usually wearing a richly embroidered sari and lots of jewelry, and the groom a distinctive head-dress and a sherwani, which is a longish coat that reaches down to the knees. The wedding dinner is always hosted by the brideÊs family as they bid her goodbye, but after two or three days, the groomÊs family returns the favor. Friends and family bring gifts for the couple at either of these functions. There are other get-togethers before and after marriage that are dictated by family traditions or regional customs, and a variety of wedding songs are sung by friends and family (usually with more enthusiasm than ability). Some Western influences are apparent in the increasing popularity of dancing at these wedding ceremonies, particularly among the young, and the practice of going on a honeymoon, neither of which are native customs.
Funerals Death is always hard on the Bangladeshi American community. Muslim law requires that a dead body be prepared for burial as soon as possible after death; mandated cleansing procedures be followed; passages from the Quran (Holy Scripture) be recited almost continuously; and special prayer services be held before the body is lowered into an unmarked grave. The existence of a mosque and the services of an Imam (a community prayer leader) are very useful at such times in providing psychological and logistical support in facilitating the entire process and in ensuring that everything is in accordance with proper Islamic rites and rituals. Many Bangladeshi Americans will utilize the Muslim graveyards if the community is large enough to sustain one, or buy some plots in Christian cemeteries, where they are usually allowed to follow their own burial routines. There is usually little or no cooking in the grief-stricken house for almost three days, and friends and family take turns in feeding the grieving household during that period. Even though the
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practice is not universal, many families will offer special prayers on the 3rd day and then again on the 40th day of the burial, which marks the end of the grieving period. After a death in the family, it is customary to make donations to, or feed, the poor, and because this is difficult to fulfill in the West, many families will write home to ensure that this is done in the deceased personÊs name and special prayers offered on his or her behalf.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Extended family networks are cherished and zealously pursued by Bangladeshi Americans. Family interests and honor take precedence over individual needs and prerogatives, and family obligations are accepted without overt complaints (e.g., elderly parents will frequently live with their grown children; or helping out new kin folk who have arrived becomes a matter of shared responsibility). It is also for this reason that family-based preferences are so frequently and eagerly used by Bangladeshi Americans to sponsor family members for immigration into the country as soon as legally possible. Patriarchy is deeply rooted in Bangladeshi society. Even though a determined and energetic womenÊs movement·buttressed by the progressive work of many nongovernmental organizations that operate in Bangladesh·have been responsible for making gradual changes in womenÊs legal and social standing, their position in terms of education, employment, and empowerment remain secondary and vulnerable. Unfortunately, the same gender asymmetries tend to be reproduced even when they move to the West (Abraham 2002; Baluja 2003). There are some moderating influences provided by education, economic opportunities, and, at times, legal protections. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, 52 percent of men have graduate degrees compared to only 36 percent for women; 51.6 percent of the women work in sales and office occupations as opposed to 28.7 percent of men (where minimal skills are required and upward mobility severely restricted), and the percentage of men with full-time jobs is significantly higher than the proportion of women with full-time jobs. Interestingly, the economic disparity between them is less striking if we compare the annual median salaries of full-time Bangladeshi men and women workers. The former, on average, make $33,639, and the latter $28,776, a pay differential that is actually lower than the one between men and women nationally. This is not a result of Bangladeshi women doing comparatively better than the national average but of Bangladeshi men doing substantially worse. There is some disagreement about whether migrating to the West contributes to the liberation of women or to greater marginalization, given the fact that they often do not have as extensive family networks to help provide support and strength, or the fact that most middle-class Bangladeshi American families have no access to
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the domestic help that is almost ubiquitous in the home country. Moreover, while so many women seek an education and want (or, at times, are forced by circumstances) to work outside the home, they are still expected to fulfill all the traditional responsibilities of a wife, live up to idealized and almost unrealistic expectations of „womanhood,‰ and carry the additional burden of ensuring a proper cultural identity for the children (Baluja 2003; Dasgupta and Dasgupta 1996). However, while male children are still highly valued, and male accomplishments disproportionately favored, attitudinal and behavioral changes are occurring that are both obvious and refreshing. The pressure on young women to marry and have children is becoming far less intense than it used to be, and womenÊs educational and professional achievements are gradually becoming a source of pride for many families. Incidentally, cultural norms do not encourage Bangladeshi women to participate in any sports or athletic events.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Continued Links to Bangladesh Most Bangladeshis regularly return home for short visits. Many of them will bring videos, CDs, tapes, books, and magazines when they come back, and many will even bring back various ethnic spices, fruits, and sweetmeats, which they will, almost always, share with others on their return back to the United States. Most Bangladeshi American families subscribe to satellite channels through which they can watch TV programs from their home country. Many Bangladeshis will also routinely send back remittances from their earnings here either to help immediate family members, to invest in real estate (having a house, or some property in Bangladesh, remains a dream of many), or for charitable purposes (Siddiqui 2004).
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background It is famously said that if there are three Bangladeshis in one area, there will be at least two different organizations. They are notorious for forming organizations and almost all states and big cities in the United States can boast of at least one, if not more, such associations. These organizations are quite active, hold various social and cultural events, try to look after the interests of the community, and seek to elevate BangladeshÊs image and promote its cultural richness abroad. Elections to the governing boards and executive committees of these organizations often generate lively competition. Social and cultural organizations are multi-layered. First, there are region-based organizations representing specific districts within Bangladesh. For example, people from the districts of Dhaka, or Noakhali or Sylhet, and so on, may sometimes
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be further subdivided into narrower, more geographically focused, constituencies (e.g., people from Feni, which is a part of the district of Noakhali, or Habiganj, which is a part of the district of Sylhet, and so on, have their own organizations). Second, there are larger organizations at the state, city, or regional levels that are more inclusive (e.g., Bangladeshi Association of Greater Florida, Bay Area Bangladeshi Association, Bangladeshi Association of Chicagoland, and so on). Many of these organizations, and others, maintain rich and lively Web sites. For example, the Bangladesh American Literary, Art and Cultural Organization in Houston has a Web site at www.balaca.org; the Bangladesh Association of America Inc (with members drawn from the Washington, D.C., area, Virginia, and Maryland) has a Web site at www.baaidc.com; the Minnesota Bangladeshi Society has a Web site at www.mnbds.org. Third, there are national organizations that sometimes function as umbrella bodies such as the Federation of Bangladeshi-Americans in North America (FOBANA) or Bangladeshi-American Foundation Inc (BAFI) or Expatriate Bangladesh 2000 (EB2000), which promote Bangladeshi culture in the United States and also tries to contribute to the home country in various ways. The annual convention of FOBANA (which consists of almost 31 member organizations) is a particularly glittering affair, where several thousand participants from all over North America gather to enjoy cultural performances provided by notable entertainers from Bangladesh, as well as locally nurtured talent in the United States. Moreover, there are opportunities for engaging in intellectual discussions, networking, and purchasing various ethnic products. Other organizations are formed with diverse agendas, many inspired by the need to „do something for the homeland.‰ Organizations like Drishtipat, Bangladesh Environment Network (BEN), and the U.S. chapter of Human Rights Congress for Bangladesh Minorities (HRCBM) are all involved in human rights, environmental concerns, and the protection of minority populations. Groups such as the Volunteer Association of Bangladesh (VAB), Adhunika, and the Optimists try to provide computers and technical education to disadvantaged groups, sponsor childrenÊs or womenÊs education, and provide disaster relief. Apart from professional organizations of Bangladeshis (such as those of Bangladeshi doctors, engineers, pharmacists, and so on), there are associations of social scientists and economists actively engaged in doing research on substantive issues affecting Bangladesh. They organize meetings and conferences; publish journals and books; maintain contacts with American academics; and build relationships with university faculty, development practitioners, and media personalities in Bangladesh. These include organizations such as the Bangladesh Development Initiative (BDI), the Association of Economic and Development Studies on Bangladesh (AEDSB), Democracy and Development Fund (DDBF), and Center for Development and Governance (CDG), among others. Again, and typically, most of these organizations have Web sites that are easy to visit and navigate.
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Religion Bangladesh occupies a unique place in the world, being a predominantly Muslim country with pronouncedly secular state structures. More than 85 percent of the people belong to the Islamic faith and practice their religion with the same commitment and piety as Muslims everywhere else. There are also small minorities that are Hindus, Christians, Buddhists, and others. While tensions with the Hindu community may sometimes erupt, and there are some „extremists‰ who may display bigoted attitudes, religion in Bangladesh is generally tolerant, moderate, and democratically oriented (Uddin 2006; Reaz and Fair 2011). Bangladeshi Americans reflect the same attitudes and sensibilities. Many of them go to mosques to offer prayers (particularly the Friday noon prayer, which is usually offered in large congregations) and participate in the various mandated rituals (e.g., practicing the „five pillars‰ with full faith and care). The practice of eating only halal (kosher or religiously acceptable) meat that is available in Muslim grocery stores is gradually becoming more popular among older groups. Some women may wear a hijab (head covering) to demonstrate public modesty as required by their faith, but it is not a practice widely prevalent in Bangladesh, nor is it in much evidence among Bangladeshis in the United States. However, it must be pointed out that residence in the West may have, paradoxically, contributed to a hardening of the faith and commitments in some, and this is sometimes reflected in more overt displays of public ritual and personal piety (Chaudhury and Miller 2008; Kibria 2008; Rahman 2011).
Language Issues As indicated earlier, Bangladeshis are proud of their rich, old, and complex language. Their language, in many ways, forms the basis of their linguistic identity and cultural nationalism. It is also true that Bengal was the first province colonized by the British, and therefore Bangladeshis have had a close contact with the English language for well over 250 years. There is hardly any Bangladeshi with a college degree who will not know at least some English. However, while Bangladeshis have some familiarity with the English language, their English usage is sometimes limited and occasionally inflected by British rhetorical and writing conventions. There are many who have cognitive ability in the language (i.e., may be able to read it and write it) but, at the same time, have restricted capabilities in terms of speaking it or understanding it when it is spoken (because of lack of practice). The vast majority of Bangladeshi Americans speak mostly Bangla at home, and less than 50 percent speak English „very well‰ with confidence and clarity. Their language is dear to them, but most of them are gradually facing up to the reality of learning (sometimes „re-learning‰) English to advance socially and economically.
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National/Regional Press and Other Media There is a plethora of avenues through which Bangladeshis communicate amongst themselves in the United States. New York is home to several regularly published weeklies (e.g., Akhon Samoy, Bangalee, Bangladesh, Banglapatrika, Darpon, New Probashi, Parichoy, and Thikana), and the weekly Bangla Barta is published from Los Angeles. Many of these are available online. There are several e-journals, Webbased discussion forums, and blogs that crackle with energy and engagement (e.g., Muktomona, Shetubondhan, Nabic, Bangla Community, among others). Bangladeshis tend to think of themselves as being very romantic, aesthetically inclined, and culturally refined, and therefore there are many groups that frequently (though irregularly) publish literary and cultural magazines in which essays, poems, short stories, and transcripts of plays find expression. There are limited radio and television time that is allocated to Bangladeshis over the public channels in the New York and New Jersey region for discussion and entertainment shows. The Bangla language programs broadcast over the Voice of America are also available to local audiences in the East Coast particularly around the Washington, D.C., area. The peer-reviewed Journal of Bangladesh Studies publishes scholarly articles on aspects of BangladeshÊs political economy from a sophisticated academic perspective.
Celebration of National Holidays There are both secular and religious national holidays that Bangladeshis (and Bangladeshi Americans) celebrate. March 25 is considered Independence Day because the relevant proclamation was announced on that day. December 16 is celebrated as Victory Day, to commemorate when the Pakistan Army surrendered to a joint command of Indian and Bangladeshi forces in 1971. February 21 is commemorated as Language Day, to pay homage to those who sacrificed their lives in 1952 to protect their linguistic identity when it was threatened by the language policies of the Pakistani government. The two religious holidays that are universally celebrated by Muslim Bangladeshis are the Eid-ul-Fitr (coming after the fasting period of the month of Ramadan) and the Eid-ul-Adha (coming after the end of the pilgrimage to Mecca). Both of these events are celebrated with due solemnity and high merriment. Men will go to the mosque for special morning prayers, gifts will be exchanged among friends and family, new clothes will be worn, and almost every home will cook a variety of meats and sweets for guests that are expected to visit throughout the day. During the Eid-ul-Adha celebrations, goats and cattle are ritually slaughtered to commemorate AbrahamÊs readiness to sacrifice his own son to demonstrate his unquestioning obedience to God. Again, since this is difficult to perform in the West, many
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families will send money home so that this sacrifice can be done in their familiesÊ names. Hindu Bangladeshis celebrate Durga and Saraswati pujas, Buddhists celebrate Buddhopurnima, Christian Bangladeshis (predominantly Catholic) celebrate Easter and Christmas with proper solemnity and joy, and all these days are national holidays in Bangladesh.
Foodways Bangladesh sits at the crossroads of two very distinct culinary traditions·a very rich and spicy North Indian cuisine, in which different preparations are based on onions, ginger, and garlic with various garam masala (hot spices) for flavor; and a lighter and more delicate indigenous cooking style. North Indian style cuisine is used in most meat preparations and for special occasions, and the lighter indigenous style is used with fish and vegetable dishes made for daily consumption. The first is associated with the indulgent habits of the Mughal nobility (hence it is sometimes referred to as Mughlai food), the latter with simpler traditions of the residents of the deltaic land. In both kinds of cooking, there will almost always be some gravy in the dishes, even though some kinds of kebabs and deep fried fish are also made. Contrary to popular Western belief, there is no spice called „curry‰ that is used in Bangladeshi cooking (a curry is a particular mix of spices relevant to a specific dish; sometimes it refers to the gravy that results from the spice mix). Rice is the universal staple, even though various kinds of homemade flat breads are also common. Rice, unless it is cooked as a pilaf or biriyani (with meat mixed in), is usually served with soupy lentils on the side. There is a bewildering variety of fish that are available, and many ethnic groceries will carry different kinds of frozen freshwater fish to cater to Bangladeshi tastes. Chicken is the most popular source of meat, though beef and mutton are also consumed in large quantities. Muslims do not eat pork. Many Bangladeshi Americans will eat salads, but it is served during the meal (and not before or after) as part of the range of foods that is presented on the table. They relish milk-based sweets for dessert, and spicy homemade snack foods are also popular. The beverage of choice is tea rather than coffee, and alcohol is avoided by most Bangladeshis.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Bangladeshis appreciate different genres of music. If we arrange the musical styles in a hierarchic structure, at the very top will be the North Indian (Hindustani), ragabased, classical tradition with its rigorous rules, grammar, and delivery styles. Appreciating this music requires some degree of preparation and sophistication, and while its role and significance is vital, its popularity is limited. Second, there are
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lighter variations on the classical tradition such as thumris, kheyals, and ghazals that incorporate the principles of classical music but render them in a more easily accessible form. Third, there are the distinctive songs written by great Bengali poets particularly the Nobel Prize laureate Rabindranath Tagore and the „rebel poet‰ Kazi Nazrul Islam, whose music defines (perhaps envelops) middle-class Bangladeshi cultural sensibilities. There are very few educated Bengalis who do not know the lyrics of many of these several thousand songs or who are not be able to hum along with most. In the urban areas, and particularly among the young, there is the prevalence of adhunik (modern) music that is freer, more experimental, and responsive to Western rhythms and harmonies. And finally, there are „folk‰ tunes, melodies, and compositions, which utilize simpler vocal arrangements and indigenous instruments that are popular in the countryside. All these forms are not mutually exclusive, and most Bangladeshi Americans will appreciate several musical styles. Many regional organizations in the United States will have their own musical troupes, and there is hardly any big gathering of Bangladeshis where some form of musical entertainment is not provided. While music remains the centerpiece of any cultural program that are organized by Bangladeshi Americans, dancing, mostly performed by children, may be presented on a stage (that can be classical as well as „folk‰); poems are recited with great gusto and passion; and plays may be staged. While Muslims have some restrictions on paintings of human portraits, there is a bustling art scene in Dhaka, and many expatriate Bangladeshis become generous patron of the arts by buying many such works often beyond the reach of most Bangladeshi people. Most Bangladeshi homes will have access to some satellite channels for news and entertainment from home, but many will also subscribe to Hindi (i.e., essentially Bollywood) channels for films, music videos, and serials. Incidentally, few first-generation Bangladeshi Americans have learned to appreciate popular American sports (football, baseball, or basketball), and most remain fixated on soccer and cricket as the primary sports that they enjoy watching on TV or discussing or even playing among themselves when possible.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship As pointed out earlier, the initial group of Bangladeshi Americans came here essentially as graduate students. In the 1960s and 1970s, most of these students came to the United States on scholarships either sponsored by U.S. foundations (e.g., Ford, Fulbright, Asia, Population Council, and others) or by the government itself, and both funding sources usually stipulated that the students return to their home
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country after graduation. However, by the mid 1970s and 1980s, the academic situation in U.S. universities had begun to change. Graduate programs had burgeoned in the 1960s and 1970s for social and demographic reasons, but by the 1980s, the presence of the baby boomer generation in the colleges tapered off, and more research and teaching assistantships were available for foreign students. Thus, students from Bangladesh (like students from other countries) could come to pursue higher education in the United States unencumbered by any contractual obligation to return. It is also worth mentioning that, beginning in the late 1970s, there was a significant influx of undergraduate students from Bangladesh who came through private funding. The vast majority of students who came after the mid-1970s, were able to stay back, change their visa from F-1 or H-1 to B-1 (with temporary work permits), start the process toward naturalization, and then gradually move toward citizenship (Siddiqui 2004). As noted earlier, there has been a huge shift in that pattern. Many Bangladeshi Americans, who came here on family-based preferences and through „green card lottery‰ visas are conflicted about applying for citizenship (Paul 2008; Rahman 2011). On the one hand there are obvious advantages that citizenship can bring· such as the right to vote, some economic opportunities, and the ability to sponsor other family members to come to the United States. On the other hand, there is some ambivalence about giving up their previous legal identity (for many, their passports become symbols of their psychological commitments and patriotic sentiments), and some are not comfortable to shift their legal allegiance to a country that they have not fully integrated into. Bangladeshi Americans do have the opportunity to pursue the possibility of dual citizenship, but the process is not automatic and involves some degree of legal complexity.
Intergroup Relations Interactions with other groups are uneven. First, given the fact that the vast majority are Muslims, Bangladeshi Americans are inevitably drawn to mosques and Muslim groups to facilitate their participation in collective religious observances. They will frequently belong to organizations formed to protect and advance the interests of Muslims in the United States such as the Muslim American Task Force (AMT) or the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). Second, there are relationships with Bengalis from West Bengal in India, with whom they share the same language, cultural traditions, and many food habits, and both may belong to the same organizations and jointly participate in many functions and events. The annual Bengal Studies Conference, which has been held almost every year since 1968, brings together scholars who specialize in either Bangladesh or West Bengal for serious academic presentations and intellectual camaraderie. Some Bangladeshi Americans are also involved in groups relating to the Indian subcontinent as a whole, such as the South Asian-
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Americans Leading Together (SAALT), and Manavi (dealing with womenÊs issues). Third, unless dictated by professional considerations and unique circumstances, the interactions with „others‰ (i.e., the diverse communities that constitute the United States) may be correct and polite but awkward and distant, and there are few Bangladeshis who voluntarily cultivate personal relationships or eagerly socialize outside the community. The situation is changing because Bangladeshi children mingle with other students in school, develop friendly relations, and sometimes help their parents to break down internal barriers and hesitations.
Forging a New American Political Identity Bangladeshis are quintessentially political animals who delight in discussing politics, following political issues and trends with keen attention, and holding fairly sophisticated opinions on political matters. It is to be expected that they will participate in the American system with enthusiasm and engagement. However, although there is rich anecdotal evidence that they would be active in American politics, there is very little empirical proof regarding their political and civic involvements in the United States. There are two different political strands that are simultaneously pursued. First, many Bangladeshi Americans relish the opportunity to vote, and voting participation rates are high in Bangladesh and, presumably, in the United States as well. Some organizations have been recently formed to educate and mobilize Bangladeshi Americans to participate in the U.S. political process. These include U.S. Bangladeshi Advisory Council (USBAC), Bangladesh-American Public Affairs Committee (BAPAC), and Bangladesh American National Alliance (BANA), all of which have been active in this regard. Some Bangladeshi Americans have been able to meet with members of Congress and have been instrumental in the formation of the Bangladeshi caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives, chaired by Rep. Joseph Crowley, a Democrat from the Fifth district in New York. Some of them have been elected to school boards and city councils, and some serve as county chairs or precinct captains for political parties (predominantly Democratic). The first, and only, Bangladeshi American to serve in any state legislature is Senator Hansen Clarke in Michigan (whose father was Bangladeshi). However, while Bangladeshi Americans are eager to integrate themselves into the American political process, they have not yet developed the resources, skills, fund-raising abilities, or organizational salience that marks the success of several other ethnic communities in the United States. The second political strand they pursue, perhaps with greater passion, is the politics in their home country. They follow the news from Bangladesh religiously, participate in animated discussions both in electronic and face-to-face environments, and sometimes reproduce the political tensions in Bangladesh into their communities here. The two major parties in Bangladesh (the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party) have branches in several U.S. states, and they raise funds,
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sponsor political guests from home, arrange discussion sessions, and mobilize the party faithful. It is interesting to point out that the children of many notable members of the political elite in Bangladesh are citizens or permanent residents in the United States. Bangladeshi Americans may not hold very powerful positions in the United States, but some do exert significant political influence in their home country either as advisors or consultants appointed by various governments or through family connections. Bangladeshi Americans are involved with issues relating to immigration, legal rights, racial justice, and better relations with the Muslim world. Their ability to affect public policy has been rather limited, but given their meager numbers (less than 0.1% of the U.S. population) and their relatively recent arrival in the United States, their presence in the political arena has not been altogether unimpressive.
Return Immigration Return immigration is rare (though returning for a year or two is sometimes practiced). There may be some examples of Bangladeshi Americans going back either to be with ailing parents, manage family estates, or take advantage of their family connections to reap economic or political benefits. There may be a few who are inspired by altruistic sentiments to serve their home country after acquiring education, work experience, and savings in the West. There are some who may be driven by religious factors and want their children to grow up in a more Islamic environment. And some may be forced to go back because they suffer from the „crisis of rising expectations‰ and may be frustrated at the economic challenges or cultural alienation they may face in the West.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Most Bangladeshi Americans are first-generation immigrants (almost 80% have arrived here after 1990) and are going through the process of adjustment and the resolution of identity anxieties. Many are subject to the same inherent tension between the linguistic and cultural identity they cannot give up, and the economic and social realities they cannot ignore, which afflicts most recent migrants. Nowhere is this struggle manifested with greater poignancy and intensity than in the relationship between parents and their children, particularly in the areas of cuisine and language. Bangladeshi parents insist that the children must speak to them in their native language and must eat the traditional foods they themselves love to consume. Oftentimes, the children prefer to speak the language of their school, friends, and TV, and would much rather eat pasta, burgers, and pizza. Adolescence creates another source of generational difficulties. Parents want to monitor gender relations rather strictly, and usual American teenage practices,
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Youth Profile One of the Inventors of YouTube Jawed Karim, born of a Bangladeshi father who works at 3M and an American mother who teaches at the University of Minnesota, dropped out of the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, and joined PayPal with his good friends Chad Hurley and Steven Chen in 2000. When PayPal was acquired by eBay in 2002, all three cashed in their stock options, left PayPal, and began to consider innovative ways they could use their talents. After many brainstorming sessions, they founded YouTube, which quickly became an international phenomenon. Google acquired YouTube in 2006 for $1.6 billion. While he is bashful about how much money he received as part of his settlement, there is no doubt that it was substantial. While the other two members of the YouTube trio became media celebrities and went on to other entrepreneurial ventures, Karim quietly went back to school at Stanford pursuing a graduate degree in computer science. (He had earlier finished his undergraduate degree at Santa Clara University.) While he does not dismiss the prospect of other exciting opportunities that may beckon, this unpretentious, soft-spoken young man is intent on becoming a university professor, teaching students, pursuing research, and serving the public in various ways.
such as dating, partying, hanging out, and so on, are discouraged (more so for females). It is interesting to point out that in a limited study (of less than 25 respondents in New York), the majority of both male and female young adults admitted to dating non-Bangladeshi persons, but, at the same time, while 100 percent of the males indicated that their parents would support marriage outside the community as long as the woman was Muslim, only 7 percent of the females thought that such support would be forthcoming regardless of the religion of the man (Chowdhury 2005). However, such problems between parents and children do not cause irreparable damage to family integrity. Family bonds are strong, divorce rates are low, children are adored, and eventually the tensions play out through various compromises and understandings. There is minimal antisocial, pathological, or addictive behavior demonstrated by young Bangladeshi adults. Like other stereotypical Asian parents (captured in the current discussion about „Tiger Moms‰), Bangladeshi Americans are deeply, sometimes desperately, involved in the academic success of their children while engagement in other areas is often relatively ignored (sports, arts, public services, and so on). Many of the children graduate comfortably from high schools, enroll in better colleges, and work toward professional success. That, after all, is the American dream, and Bangladeshi American parents willingly engage in the sacrifices and deprivations to make it possible for their children. However, it must also be pointed out that this dream is pursued with greater confidence and ability by the children of economically
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Youth Profile Teenage Music Sensation In 2009, Palbasha Siddique was a 17-year-old Bangladeshi American senior at Southwest High School in Minneapolis. She paired with Matt Harding, a video game designer and video maker, to record a music video called “Pran” (which means “life” in Bangla) for YouTube. It was uploaded on June 20, 2008, and within one week, it had more than a million hits (in current parlance, it “went viral”). It ranked among the top 10 soundtrack downloads and top 100 MP3s overall on Amazon’s MP3 store (i.e., over Madonna and Mariah Carey). She sings in her local language (Bangla) and some of the lyrics are drawn from the Nobel Prize laureate Rabindranath Tagore, but she uses instruments, stylistic conventions, and rhythms borrowed from the West. She recorded her first CD when she was 7 and sang “God Bless America” before a Twins game when she was 11. She has already participated in other videos (some available on YouTube), and a record deal is imminent. Regardless of her current musical success and future potentials, her ambition is to go to Harvard Law School to eventually pursue a career in the legal profession.
affluent parents (who are typically better educated as well), while those who do not live in such favorable material and psychological circumstances have to bear the burden of more difficult, and often frustrating, struggles. All of them understand that America is the „land of the free,‰ but they also quickly learn that some kinds of freedom are more accessible to some than to others.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Bangladesh BangladeshÊs relationship with the United States had difficult beginnings. The U.S. support for Pakistan during BangladeshÊs liberation struggle, its delay in providing food assistance to Bangladesh during the flood/famine conditions in 1974, and its expressed annoyance at Bangladesh for selling jute bags to Cuba in the same year, all combined to complicate the early relationship. However, as the initial influence of the Soviet bloc countries over Bangladesh abated in the mid-1970s and U.S. generosity became more manifest, the relationship evolved in friendlier directions. Between 1972 and 1995, the United States became the largest contributor in terms of food aid (providing more than $1.6 billion in this area) and developmental assistance (making available more than $3 billion in grants and loans) (Huq and Abrar 1999).
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U.S. contributions tapered off in the 21st century, but other forms of interactions developed. The United States is one of the largest foreign direct investors in Bangladesh (even though the amount is not very impressive), and the American Chamber of Commerce in Bangladesh (AmCham) functions to encourage greater trade and commerce. Bangladesh currently exports almost $2 billion worth of products to the United States (almost 40% of its total export earnings) and imports products worth almost $200 million, thus having a healthy trade balance in its favor. Hillary Clinton as the First Lady visited the country in 1995, followed by President Clinton in 2000. Their welcome was elaborate and warm (Bhardwaj 2002; Datta 2004; Rashid 2005). It is noteworthy that Bangladesh was part of the coalition forces in Operation Desert Shield led by the United States against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991; Bangladeshi forces suffered 43 casualties. It is also a moderate and democratic Islamic state that cooperates fully with the United States in the war against terrorism not only through routine consultations but also in officially supporting the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003. However, while American people remain respected and popular, and American cultural influence among the youth is obvious and growing, the policies of the American government (e.g., the tensions with the Muslim world; or the perception of AmericaÊs arrogance, militarist orientations, corporate compulsions, and hegemonic ambitions) can sometimes create misunderstandings and misgivings. There are several key issues in terms of the relationship between the United States and Bangladesh. First, Bangladesh seeks greater access to the American market in order to be able to sell its products, particularly readymade garments and other manufactured items (Sobhan 1990; Islam 2004). Second, Bangladesh wants U.S. help in meeting its UN initiated Millennium Development Goals, which would reduce poverty in the country, improve education and health, and provide for basic needs for the majority of the population. Third, Bangladesh wants cooperation from the United States on some specific areas such as dealing with climate change, combating extremism in the country, and upholding the rule of law universally. Finally, Bangladesh wants easier travel and immigration possibilities. Giving amnesty to undocumented Bangladeshis, allowing more students to study in the United States, and increasing the Opportunity and Diversity Visa quotas are typical demands that have originated from Bangladeshis in the United States. The relationship between the United States and Bangladesh appears to be excellent. Both countries are committed to the principles of democracy, both benefit from each otherÊs friendship, and both look forward to closer cooperation in areas of common interest. Most Bangladeshi Americans hope that the relationship between the country of their origin and the country of their choice remains strong and mutually beneficial.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 20 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009
136
Region and country of birth Total Bangladesh
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
7,204
7,152
5,483
4,616
8,061
11,487
14,644
12,074
11,753
16,651
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 21 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Region/ country: Bangladesh Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
16,651
8,517
8,133
Leading states of residence Arizona
103
51
52
California
958
473
485
Connecticut
299
143
156
Florida
625
329
296
Georgia
518
265
253
Illinois
162
77
85
Maryland
282
137
145
Massachusetts
263
127
136
Michigan
908
469
439
Minnesota
70
31
39
Nevada
51
27
24
New Jersey
1,237
616
621
New York
8,529
4,460
4,068
North Carolina
60
32
28
Ohio
119
63
56
Pennsylvania
465
239
226
Texas
717
346
371
Virginia
631
306
325
67
36
31
587
290
297
Washington Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
137
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 22 Census figures: Bangladeshi Americans (compared to national statistics) Subject
Total population
Bangladesh
301,621,159
143,619
Male
49.30%
53.80%
Female
50.70%
46.20%
36.7
36.9
75.50%
88.10%
Total population Sex and age
Median age 18 years and over 65 years and over
12.50%
3.60%
73,907,975
17,085
Male
51.20%
52.60%
Female
48.80%
47.40%
112,377,977
49,300
Family households
66.80%
87.30%
With own children under 18yrs
31.10%
66%
Married couple family
49.70%
79.10%
Male householder
15.40%
9.70%
Female householder
17.80%
3.00%
Population 15 years and over
240,724,018
133,291
Now married, except separated
50.20%
71.50%
Under 18 years
Households by type Households
Marital status
Widowed, divorced, and separated Never married
19%
5.1%
30.80%
23.50%
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT Population 25 years and over
197,892,369
110,861
Less than high school diploma
15.50%
17.20%
High School Graduate or higher
84.50%
82.80%
Male High school graduate or higher
83.90%
88.30%
85%
75.80%
Bachelor's Degree or higher
27.50%
45.00%
Male Bachelor's degree or higher
28.20%
52.10%
Female Bachelor's degree or higher
26.70%
36%
Entered 2000 or later
27.70%
32.90%
Entered 1990 to 1999
29.40%
48.80%
Female high school graduate or higher
YEAR OF ENTRY
(Continued )
138
Table 22 Census figures: Bangladeshi Americans (compared to national statistics) (Continued ) Subject
Total population
Bangladesh
42.90%
18.30%
English only
80.30%
5.40%
Language other than English
19.70%
94.60%
8.70%
55.70%
64.80%
65.70%
58.60%
45.40%
34.60%
28.30%
Entered before 1990 LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME AND ABILITY TO SPEAK ENGLISH
Speak English less than "very well" EMPLOYMENT STATUS Population 16 years and over In labor force FEMALES 16 YEARS AND OVER In labor force OCCUPATION Management, professional, and related occupations Service occupations
16.70%
17%
Sales and office occupations
25.60%
35.70%
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
0.70%
0%
Construction, extraction, maintenance, and repair occupations
9.70%
5.40%
12.70%
13.50%
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations INCOME IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS (2007 INFLATION ADJUSTED $) Median household income (dollars)
50,740
45,033
61,173
45,821
26,688
22,210
FAMILIES Median family income (dollars) INDIVIDUAL Per capita income (dollars) POVERTY RATES FOR FAMILIES AND PEOPLE WHOM POVERTY STATUS IS DETERMINED All families
9.50%
18.60%
Married-couple family
4.50%
17.20%
28.20%
61.90%
13%
20.20%
Female householder, no husband present, family All People Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2007).
139
Table 23 Persons obtaining legal status by broad use of admission and region by country of birth: Bangladesh 2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
5,083 (63.1%)
7,743 (67.4%)
9,420 (64.3%)
7,123 (59%)
7,093 (60.4%)
963 (11.9%)
1,520 (13.2%)
1,060 (7.2%)
1,165 (9.6%)
1,304 (11.1%)
Diversity
1,756 (21.8%)
1,753 (15.3%)
3,093 (21.1%)
3,254 (27%)
2,930 (24.9%)
Refugees
198 (2.5%)
405 (3.5%)
981 (6.7%)
475 (3.9%)
385 (3.3%)
Others
36 (.44%)
66 (.57%)
90 (.61%)
52 (.43%)
41 (.35%)
Total
8,061
11,487
12,074
11,573
Family-sponsored preferences and immediate relatives of the United States Employment-based preferences
14,644
Source: Office of Homeland Security (2008, Table 10).
Table 24 Persons obtaining permanent resident status by state or territory of residence and region or country of birth, fiscal year 2008
State New York
States drawing the highest number of Bangladeshi immigrants in the year 2008 5,744
State Montana
States drawing the least number of Bangladeshi immigrants in the year 2008 0
New Jersey
784
North Dakota
0
California
736
Utah
0
Texas
663
Vermont
0
Florida
537
Wyoming
0
Michigan
495
West Virginia
3
Virginia
480
Hawaii
4
Pennsylvania
344
New Hampshire
5
Georgia
340
South Dakota
5
Maryland
255
Alaska
6
Source: Office of Homeland Security (2009, Supplemental Table 1).
Appendix III: Notable Bangladeshi Americans | 141
Appendix III: Notable Bangladeshi Americans Dr. Saad Andaleeb came to the United States in 1974 and is currently professor and director of graduate studies of business administration at Pennsylvania State University, Erie. Apart from numerous teaching and research awards, he has edited or co-edited four books on development issues relating to Bangladesh, has been the editor of the Journal of Bangladesh Studies since its inception in 1999, and as the president of the Bangladesh Development Initiative has organized two highly successful conferences on Bangladesh at Harvard University. Mr. Hansen Clarke was born of a Bangladeshi father and American mother. He studied at Cornell University for a degree in fine arts and went to Georgetown for his juris doctorate. He was first elected as a Democrat to the Michigan House of Representatives in 1990, and then to the Michigan Senate in 2002 and 2006. In both his senatorial elections, he received more than 90 percent of the popular vote in his district. He is probably the only Bangladeshi American to hold an elected seat at the state level. Dr. Fazle Hasan received his PhD from Stanford University in 1969 and is the Cullen Distinguished Professor and Director of Fluid Dynamics and Turbulence at the University of Houston, Texas. He has won many honors and awards from various national and international bodies in his field and was named as one of the top 10 Asians in the United States in ShellÊs tribute to Asian Americans in May 2003. He was presented with the Scholar of the Year Award by the government of Bangladesh in 2007. Dr. Abul Hussam came to the United States in 1978 and is a professor of chemistry at George Mason University in Virginia. In 2007 the National Academy of Engineering in the United States awarded him with the Grainger Challenge Prize for Sustainability, worth about $1 million, for devising the simple and eco-friendly Sono Arsenic Filter that could remove arsenic from contaminated water that had, till then, severely affected millions of his countrymen. He used most of that money to provide filters for the poor. Dr. Rounaq Jahan received her PhD from Harvard in 1970. She has served in various capacities in many international bodies and UN agencies, and currently teaches and researches at the South Asia Institute at Columbia University, New York. She has written many books on politics, development, and gender issues in Bangladesh and is one of the pre-eminent social scientists from South Asia in the United States today. Dr. Fazlur Rahman Khan (1929 1982) is often regarded as the „Einstein of structural engineering,‰ and his pioneering ideas in skyscraper construction were reflected in the Sears Tower and the John Hancock Building in Chicago.
142 | Bangladeshi Immigrants
The Bangladesh government honored him with the Independence Day Medal, the highest civilian award in the country, and he was named by Bangladesh American Foundation Inc. as the most famous Bangladeshi American of the 20th century. Iqbal Quadir, born in Bangladesh in 1958, became a rich investment banker in Wall Street in the 1990s. He gave it up to pioneer the hugely successful Grameen Phone project in Bangladesh, through which poor people could have access to cell phone services. He is currently the founder-director of the Legatum Center for Development and Entrepreneurship at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1999 he was selected as a „Global Leader for Tomorrow‰ by the World Economic Forum in Geneva. Monica Yunus was born in Bangladesh in 1979, daughter of the Bangladeshi Nobel Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus (who also received the U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2009). She lived with her American mother in New Jersey and graduated with a masterÊs in vocal performance from the Juilliard School in New York. With a voice that has been described as „utterly winning‰ and „destined for stardom‰ by critics, she has performed as a soprano in major productions. After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, she, along with fellow musicians, helped to found „Sing for Hope‰ to raise funds for humanitarian purposes.
Glossary Adhunik: Modern. Biriyani: In Bangladesh, rice and meat (sometimes potatoes) cooked together as a spicy mix. Buddhopurnima: The day when the Buddha was born, gained enlightenment, and achieved Nirvana. Durga puja: Worship of the Mother Goddess, the biggest celebration among Bengali Hindus. Eid-ul-Adha: Muslim celebration that marks the end of the month of Ramadan (month of fasting). Eid-ul-Fitr: Muslim celebration after the Hajj (pilgrimage). Garam masala: A term that literally translates as mixture of „hot spices,‰ usually based on a mix of bay leaves, cardamoms, cloves, and cinnamon. Ghazals: Technically romantic and spiritual poetry, usually sung in a semiclassical style. Halal: That which is allowed in Islam, for example in food (comparable to kosher among Jewish people).
References
| 143
Hijab: A head cover for Muslim women. Imam: Technically anyone who leads a Muslim prayer, usually the spiritual leader of a mosque. Kheyals: A raga-based musical form that is sophisticated but accessible to a broad public. Mughlai: Pertaining to the traditions and tastes of the Mughals (who ruled India 16th 19th centuries). Mukti Bahini: Bangladeshi freedom fighters who fought against the Pakistani army in 1971. Pilaf/Polau: Rice cooked in clarified butter usually with saffron and light garam masala. Pran: A Bengali word that means „life‰. Punjabis: People from the province of Punjab in India and Pakistan. Saraswati: Hindu goddess of learning revered in Bengal. Sepoy: Soldiers (usually referring to Indian soldiers in the British military). Sherwani: A longish coat reaching down to the knees worn by men on formal occasions. Sufis: Muslims whose music, poetry, and spiritual yearnings are based on a mystical tradition. Thumris: Light classical music.
References Abraham, M. 2002. Speaking the Unspeakable: Marital Violence Among South Asian Immigrants in the United States. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Ahmad, Ahrar. 2008. „Bangladesh.‰ In International Security and the United States, edited by Karl deRouen and Paul Bellamy, 83 101. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. Ahmed, Moudud. 2002. South Asia, the Crisis of Development: The Case of Bangladesh. Dhaka: University Press. Baluja, Kaari F. 2003. Gender Roles at Home and Abroad: The Adaption of Bangladeshi Immigrants. New York: LFB Scholarly. Baxter, Craig. 1997. Bangladesh. Boulder, CO: Westview. Bhardwaj, Sanjay. 2002. Bangladesh-U.S. Relations: From Cooperation to Partnership. Delhi: Kalinga. Chowdhury, N. 2005. „The Assimilation of Bengali Immigrants in the United States.‰ Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Marriott Hotel, Loews Philadelphia Hotel, Philadelphia.
144 | Bangladeshi Immigrants Chaudhury, Safia, and Lisa Miller. 2008, July. „Religious Identity Formation among Bangladeshi American Muslim Adolescents. Journal of Adolescent Research 23 (4): 383 410. Dasgupta S., and Dasgupta S. D. 1996. „Women in Exile: Gender Relations in the AsianIndian Community in the U.S.‰ In Contours of the Heart: South Asians Map North America, edited by S. Maria and R. Srikanth. New York: Asian American Writers Workshop. Datta, Sreedhar. 2004. Bangladesh: A Fragile Democracy. New Delhi: Shipra Publishers. Eaton, Richard. 1993. The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier. Berkeley: University of California Press. Harris, Michael, S. 1997. „Bangladeshis.‰ In American Immigrant Cultures: Builders of a Nation, edited by David Levinson and Melvin Embers. New York: McMillan Reference. Huq. M., and C. Abrar. 1999. Aid, Development, and Diplomacy: Need for an Aid Policy. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Islam, Naheed. 1997. „Bengalis.‰ In American Immigrant Cultures: Builders of a Nation, edited by David Levinson and Melvin Embers. New York: McMillan Reference. Islam, Nurul. 2004. Looking Outward: Bangladesh in the World Economy. Dhaka: University Press Limited. Jahan, Rounaq. 2001. Bangladesh: Promise and Performance. London: Zed Books Jones, J. Sydney. 2008. „Bangladeshi Americans.‰ Multicultural America. [Online article retrieved 07/1/09.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/A-BR/Bangladeshi Americans.html. Kibria, Nazli. 2005. „South Asian Americans.‰ In Asian Americans: Contemporary Trends and Issues, edited by Pyong Gap Min, 206 27. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. Kibria, Nazli. 2007. „South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal.‰ In The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration Since 1965, edited by Mary Waters and Reed Ueda, 612 23. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kibria, Nazli. 2008. „The ÂNew IslamÊ and Bangladeshi Youth in Britain and the United States.‰ Ethnic and Racial Studies 31(2): 243 266. Leonard, Karin. 1997. The South Asian Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Light, I., and Gold, S. J. 2000. Ethnic Economies. San Diego: Academic Press. London, Ellen. 2004. Bangladesh. Countries of the World Series. Milwaukee, WI: Gareth Stevens Publishing. Mallick, A. R., and Syed Anwar Husain. 2004. „Bengali Nationalism and the Emergence of Bangladesh.‰ In Bangladesh—National Culture and Heritage: An Introductory Reader, edited by Salahuddin Ahmed and Bazlul Mobin Chowdhury, 186 204, Dhaka: Independent University of Bangladesh. Mascarenhas, A. 1986. Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Further Reading
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Novak, J. J. 1993. Bangladesh: Reflections on the Water. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. OÊDonnel, C. P. 1984. Bangladesh: Biography of a Muslim Nation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Office of Homeland Security. 2008. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Press. Office of Homeland Security. 2009. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Press. Paul, Bimal Kanti. 2008. „Bangladeshi Americans.‰ In Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Society, vol. 3, edited by Richard Schaefer, 132 33. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Rahman, Shafiqur. 2011. The Bangladeshi Diaspora in the United States after 9/11: From Obscurity to High Visibility. El Paso TX: Lfb Library of Scholarly Publications, Reaz, Ali, and Christine Fair, eds. 2011. Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh. New York: Routledge. Rashid, Harunur. 2005. Bangladesh Foreign Policy: Realities, Priorities, and Challenges. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Academic Press and Publishers Library. Siddiqui, Tasneem. 2004. Institutionalizing Diaspora Linkage: The Emigrant Bangladeshis in UK and USA. Ministry of Expatriates Welfare and Overseas Employment of Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka: International Organization for Migration. Sisson, R., and Rose, L. 1990. War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. Berkeley: University of California Press. Sobhan, R., ed. 1990. From Aid Dependence to Reliance: Development Options for Bangladesh. Dhaka, Bangladesh: University Press Limited. Uddin, Sufia. 2006. Constructing Bangladesh: Religion, Ethnicity and Language in an Islamic Nation. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. U.S. Census Bureau. 2007. Selected Population Profile in the United States, Country of Birth: Bangladesh, Data Set: 2007. American Community Survey. [Online article; retrieved 07/09.] http://factfinder.census.gov. U.S. Census Bureau. „Census Profile: New York Cities Bangladeshi American Population.‰ [Online article; retrieved 07/09.] http://aafny.org/cic/briefs/Bangladesh/pdf. Van Schendel, Willem. 2009. A History of Bangladesh: Politics, Economics and Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ziring, Lawrence. 1992. Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad: An Interpretive Study. Delhi: Oxford.
Further Reading Ali, Monica. 2003. Brick Lane. New York: Scribner. This is a celebrated first novel by a young Bangladeshi writer about the Bengali immigrant experience in London focusing mostly on women.
146 | Bangladeshi Immigrants Ali, Riaz. 2004. God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. A political scientist explores the rise of religious groups in Bangladesh. Anam, Tahmima. 2007. A Golden Age. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. An award-winning novel about the harrowing birth of Bangladesh in 1971. Centre for Policy Dialogue. 2006. State of the Bangladesh Economy 2004 2005, and Outlook for 2005 2006. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Center for Policy Dialogue. This is a rich annual publication that provides relevant data and sound analysis on issues relating to Bangladesh development. Glassie, Henry. 1997. Art and Life in Bangladesh. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. A handsomely produced book about Bangladeshi art and culture. Hartman, B., and J. Boyce. 1998. Quiet Violence: View From a Bangladesh Village. San Francisco: Food First Books. A sociological and anthropological study that explores issues of inequity and poverty in rural Bangladesh. Hossain, Hameeda, ed. 2006. Human Rights in Bangladesh 2005. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Ain O Salish Kendra. This is one issue of a reliable annual publication that provides meticulous data about human rights abuses and violations in Bangladesh, particularly good on minority and womenÊs issues. Gardner, Katy. 1995. Global Migrants, Local Lives: Travel and Transformation in Rural Bangladesh. Oxford: Clarendon Press. An anthropological study of the impact of emigration on the social and cultural lives of the people and places they have left. Iftekharuzzaman. 1994. South Asia’s Security: Primacy of the Internal Dimension. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Academic Publishers. Wide-ranging discussion about the context of foreign policy formation in Bangladesh. Jannuzi, F. T., and J. T. Peach. 1980. The Agrarian Structure of Bangladesh. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. A sophisticated and rigorous analysis of rural Bangladesh. Kabir, M. M. 2006. The Politics and Development of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh. Dhaka, Bangladesh: A. H. Development Publishing House. Analyzes the rise and role of a religious party in Bangladesh that some claim is extremist. Lahiri, Jhumpa. 2003. Namesake. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. A Pulitzer prize winning novelist writes about the joys and struggles of transition as a Bengali family from Kolkata migrates to the United States. Mohsin, A. 2003. Chittagong Hills Tracts in Bangladesh: A Difficult Road to Peace. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner.
Further Reading
| 147
A sensitive examination of the difficulties faced by the „tribal‰ populations living in the Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, the turbulence in the region, and the hopes for peace. Milam, William B. 2009. Bangladesh and Pakistan: Flirting with Failure in South Asia. New York: Columbia Press. A fairly optimistic account by a previous U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh and Pakistan in the context of the weaknesses and problems faced by both countries. Prashad, Vijay. 2000. The Karma of Brown Folk. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. A classic book, from a progressive perspective, about the lives and times of the South Asians in the United States.
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Brazilian Immigrants by Franklin Goza
Introduction The number of Brazilians in the United States has grown rapidly over the past 25 years, and their numbers continue to steadily increase. U.S. government statistics reveal that since the mid-1980s Brazilians have relocated to the United States in record numbers. Prior to that time this movement was almost nonexistent. The main reason for this tremendous increase, which began approximately 25 years ago, was the worsening Brazilian economy (Goza 1992, 1994a; Margolis 1994). Although the economic situation in Brazil has stabilized, the social networks now in place facilitate the integration of additional newcomers and the continued expansion of this immigrant flow. As such, it is very likely that this population will continue to grow for at least the foreseeable future. In order to document the Brazilian experience in the United States, this study will primarily use data from the 2000 U.S. Census of Population. These data will enable me to present a comprehensive overview of all Brazilians in the United States. The 2000 Census data will also be contrasted with data from the 1980 and 1990 censuses in order to document the evolution and expansion of this immigrant group. This census information will be supplemented with my own primary data collected from the hundreds of Brazilians living in the United States. Together these data will enable me to depict a wide-ranging portrait of Brazilian Americans. This presentation begins by providing an overview of BrazilÊs geography, demography, and history. The focus then turns to discussing the nature of BrazilÊs immigration stream to the United states, its rapid increase, and the difficulties involved with its measurement. A demographic synopsis of these immigrants is then presented, and preferred places of geographic residence and their shifts over time are documented. Attention next turns to the family structure of these immigrants, revealing how most come with numerous other family members. Aspects of this groupÊs social assimilation and economic outcomes are outlined. To do this I examine a number of key measures including their English ability, naturalization status, employment and occupational status, poverty rates, and future prospects. The picture that emerges from this examination is one of an extremely diverse population that now resides in almost every area of the United States. Although many Brazilians appear to be doing relatively well both socially and economically,
149
Chronology | 151
a sizeable contingent runs the risk of being left behind and failing to achieve their dreams of success in the United States, as they lack the English ability and formal education required to compete effectively for well-paying jobs in the U.S. labor market. Regardless of the observed bifurcation that is occurring among the Brazilian American immigrant population, it is likely that this group will continue to grow for the foreseeable future.
Chronology pre-1500
Brazil is populated by thousands of tribes whose numbers are estimated to total at least one million.
1500
The Portuguese explorer Pedro ˘lvares Cabral arrives at Porto Seguro, Bahia, in northeast Brazil.
1538
The first African slaves arrive in Brazil.
1549
Salvador da Bahia is established as the nationÊs first capital.
1565
Rio de Janeiro is founded.
1580
Portugal comes under Spanish rule.
1623–1654
The Dutch occupy the northeast, controlling the key cities of Salvador and Recife.
1640
Portugal becomes independent from Spain.
1750
The Treaty of Madrid establishes new boundaries for Spain and Portugal, which allow for further expansion of the Portuguese empire in South America.
1763
The capital is moved to Rio de Janeiro.
1789
The Inconfidencia uprising in Minas Gerais is exposed.
1792
Tiradentes, one of the leaders of the Inconfidencia, is executed.
1815
Brazil is recognized as PortugalÊs most valuable colony and raised to kingdom status.
1822
The Empire of Brazil is founded by Dom Pedro I. Independence from Portugal is declared on September 7, 1822.
1825–1828
War occurs between Argentina and Brazil.
1850
The importation of slaves to Brazil is forbidden.
1865–1870
The War of the Triple Alliance (Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay) against Paraguay nearly destroys that nation.
152 | Brazilian Immigrants
1880s–1940s
Brazil experiences a period of massive immigration, especially from Italy, Portugal, Germany, Japan, Lebanon, and Spain.
1888
Slavery is abolished in Brazil.
1889
Dom Pedro II is deposed by a military coup led by Marshal Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca, who then becomes the republicÊs first president.
1891
The first constitution is created based on that of the United States.
1930
The First Republic ends with a military takeover lead by Getúlio Vargas.
1942
Brazil enters World War II after several of its merchant ships are sunk by German submarines.
1954
Getúlio Vargas is deposed and commits suicide.
1960
The federal capital is moved to Brasília.
1964
A military dictatorship is imposed with General Humberto Castelo Branco as leader and president.
1964–1985
A time of censorship, repression, and suspension of civil liberties. Dissidents are tortured, imprisoned, and exiled.
1968–1974
The Brazilian „economic miracle‰ promotes large-scale economic development and industrialization.
1979
The abertura begins the process of restoring political rights.
1980s
The so-called Lost Decade, in which hyperinflation and recession prevail, stimulates the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Brazilians.
1985
Military rule ends as Tancredo Neves is elected president. He dies before assuming office, leaving that position to José Sarney.
1994
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a sociologist and a university professor, is elected president.
1998
Fernando Henrique Cardoso is re-elected president.
2002
Luiz Inácio da Silva, a former president of a steel workersÊ union, is elected president.
2004
Brazil selected to host 2014 FIFA World Cup soccer tournament.
2006
Luiz Inácio da Silva is reelected president.
2009
Brazil selected to host 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.
Background | 153
2010
Dilma Vana Rousseff, the daughter of a Bulgarian immigrant, is elected BrazilÊs first woman president.
Background Geography and Population Geographically and demographically Brazil is South AmericaÊs largest country. Brazil occupies nearly 3.3 million square miles, making it the worldÊs fifth largest nation, larger even than the continental United States. In 2010 its population was 193.3 million (Population Reference Bureau [PRB] 2010), also making it the worldÊs fifth most populous nation. Both BrazilÊs geography and population are extremely diverse. Brazil occupies nearly 3.3 million square miles, a land mass so large that it accounts for 47 percent of the South American continent. To provide an idea of this nationÊs size, Marajó Island, which is located at the mouth of the Amazon River, is barely noticeable on a map of Brazil, yet this island is only slightly smaller than the nation of Switzerland. Brazil also borders 10 other nations, including every South American country except for Ecuador and Chile. BrazilÊs Atlantic coastline is approximately 5,000 miles long extending from nearly 620 miles north of the equator to more than 1,000 miles south of the Tropic of Capricorn. In many of the northern and northeastern states, the sun-drenched beaches are nearly pristine and arguably among the finest in the world. Certainly the city of Rio de Janeiro is home to some of the worldÊs most famous beaches, including Copacabana and Ipanema. In addition to beaches, Brazil is also home to the Amazon River. Located primarily in the northern states of Pará and Amazonas, the Amazon River runs from west to east for approximately 4,000 miles and is located 2 to 4 degrees south of the equator. Because of different measurement techniques, some scholars call the Amazon the worldÊs longest river while others give this distinction to the Nile. Regardless of which river is the longest, all agree that the Amazon carries the most water, as the Amazon Basin drains the entire northern half of South America, making it the largest drainage basin in the world, as it stretches almost all the way across the width of South America. This basin contains nearly 20 percent of the worldÊs freshwater, and this riverÊs estuary is an amazing 200 miles wide. Surrounding the Amazon River is the Amazon Rainforest. This tropical rainforest is the worldÊs largest and is home to many plants and animals not found elsewhere. It is also home to many indigenous tribes, some that subsist as hunters and gatherers. Still others, like the Yanomami, utilize „slash and burn‰ technology that dates back to the Paleolithic Era. The Yanomami are also skilled horticulturalists
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whose culture and knowledge of crops have enabled them to flourish with the rainforest environment in which they live. That said, all residents of the Amazon, the people, the plants, and the animals are now at risk from the settlers who are relocating to this region in massive numbers to exploit the opportunities they believe are available. Many have relocated there from BrazilÊs southern and eastern states in search of their own small farms; a dream most could never realize in their states of origin. Those with more resources have sought to develop cattle ranches in this area, while miners (garimpeiros) come in search of the regionÊs mineral wealth. Although the exact rate at which this rainforest is being destroyed is unknown, it is estimated that since 1980, an area roughly equivalent to the size of Spain has been deforested (Cimitile 2009). Deforestation has led to decimation of Amazon tribes, loss of biodiversity (from plant and animal extinction), malaria epidemics, increased release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, and increased threat of global warming. While the Brazilian government and other international agencies are attempting to control this situation, it has proven to be extremely difficult given the size of the region and the amount of resources believed to be available. Brazil is also home to another unique ecosystem, the Pantanal. The Pantanal is the worldÊs largest wetland and is primarily located in the southwestern states of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul, although it also stretches into parts of Bolivia and Paraguay. During the wet season, this enormous floodplain is estimated to occupy between 54,000 and 81,000 square miles. This unique ecosystem is home to many birds, fish, and mammalian species that are not found elsewhere. Brazil is divided in five major regions. These regions were created as statistical units by the Brazilian census bureau (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [IBGE]) in 1969. These statistical units are extremely useful for providing an overview of BrazilÊs population and its geography. The first major region is the North, which contains the Amazon River and much of its basin. While occupying over 45 percent of the nationÊs land mass, in the year 2000, the North was home to only 8 percent of its population. The second major region, the Northeast, contains nine states that each border a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. This region possesses an area four times the size of California. In 2000, this major regionÊs population accounted for 28 percent of the national total. This was the first major region settled by the Portuguese 510 years ago. Consequently much of it was deforested long ago. Today this major regionÊs land is primarily used to grow sugar cane, cacao, beans, corn, and cotton. Rainfall oftentimes is very scarce, especially in the inland areas. The resulting dry, sometimes desert-like landscape that characterizes much of the „interior‰ is referred to as the sertão. Since the 1970s, millions of low-skilled workers have fled this region in search of better employment opportunities in the large urban centers of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte. The Center-West is the third major region. It contains three states (Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Goiás) and the Federal District of Brasília. Located in this major region
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is the Pantanal. Although this major region occupies about 19 percent of the nationÊs land mass, it contains only about 7 percent of the population. The main crops grown by this major regionÊs farmers include corn, rice, cotton, coffee, soy, cassava, pumpkin, and almonds. The region also possesses numerous cattle ranches and some mineral wealth. Much of this region is on a plateau, with altitudes occasionally rising to almost 3,000 feet. The fourth major region, the Southeast, is the nationÊs smallest but the most populous. More specifically, although this region occupies just 10 percent of the countryÊs land, it was home to nearly 43 percent of the population in 2000. That is because it contains the four populous states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espirito Santo, and Minas Gerais. This region is the industrial heart of Brazil. In it are found most of the nationÊs steel mills, automobile factories, oil refineries, furniture factories, and soft drink and beer plants. Consequently, its population is the most urban (90.5%) of any major region, and its residents enjoy the nationÊs highest per capita income. However, this regionÊs economy is extremely diverse. Because it is rich in minerals such as manganese, iron, gold, and precious and semiprecious stones, extractive industries are found throughout the region. Furthermore, the high level of development experienced by the regionÊs cities also extends to its agriculture. The main crops from this region are coffee, cotton, corn, rice, beans, fruits, nuts, and sugar cane. Some of the wealthiest producers own million-dollar machines that are capable of harvesting the sugar cane they plant in fields irrigated by the worldÊs most modern irrigation systems. Still in an effort to generate as much revenue as possible, these cane producers prefer to hire temporary migrant workers, who manually cut down the cane with long machetes. This is a region of contradictions. For example, extremely large farms using firstworld farming techniques might be bordered by extremely small subsistence farms that operate without any mechanization. Similarly, the regionÊs largest cities are filled with the most opulent high-rises imaginable, while the poor reside in favelas (slums) and the streets abound with the homeless and street urchins. The South is the fifth and final major region. This small region borders Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina. It occupies about 7 percent of the land mass and is home to 15 percent of the population. Almost everyone in this region in able to read and write, and average income is the highest in the nation. This region is also home to large numbers of Italian and German immigrants. Consequently, there are some cities that look very European (e.g., Blumenau) and where one can speak either German or Italian with many of the locals. This is also the „whitest‰ region of Brazil (84%). This region is characterized by several plateaus as well as some mountains, the highest of which is Pico Paraná, at over 6,000 feet. The region is also home to beautiful Atlantic beaches and the Iguaçu waterfalls. These falls are located at the international border shared by Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. Considered to be among the most spectacular waterfalls on earth, they were recently selected as one of the seven new wonders of the world. In sharp contrast to the countryÊs tropical regions,
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the winter temperatures in this region are cold enough that it occasionally snows, requiring residents to turn on the heating in their homes. The main crops grown in this region are soy, corn, wheat, rice, and tobacco. Cattle raising is also important to the region, and it is the nationÊs largest producer of pigs and their by-products. Although BrazilÊs 2010 population was more than 193 million (PRB 2010), as recently as 1950 it was less than 53 million (Merrick and Graham 1979). However, because of a rapid rate of natural increase the population grew to 92 million by 1970 (Merrick and Graham 1979). Rapid natural increase continued such that by 1991, the population increased to 143 million (IBGE 2008). Until 1991 the countryÊs age structure was typical of a developing nation as it resembled a pyramid with a large base (consisting of the nationÊs young) that tapered to a small point on top (where the relatively few elderly were clustered). Since 1991, however, both mortality and fertility rates have declined significantly leading to a population with fewer young and more elderly. The nationÊs mortality decline began slowly in the 1940s and gradually increased due to major improvements in economic conditions, public health, and sanitation. As a result, Brazilian life expectancy increased from approximately 40 years in 1940 (Merrick and Graham 1979) to more than 73 years in 2010 (PRB 2010), when women enjoyed an eight-year advantage in life expectancy (77) over men (69). In 2000, life expectancy ranged from a low of 63.2 years in Alagoas (in the Northeast) to 71.3 years in Santa Catarina (in the South) (Messias 2003). As recently as 1970, the infant mortality rate was still approximately 100 deaths per 1,000 live births. By 2010, however, the infant mortality rate had dropped to only 24 deaths per 1,000 live births (PRB 2010). BrazilÊs total fertility rate (the average number of children born per woman) declined from nearly 6 in the 1940s to 2.0 in 2010. Consequently, the tails of the population pyramid have been eliminated as BrazilÊs population and age structure is transforming itself to look more like the cylinder shape characteristic of the population structures found in developed nations. In addition, because the nationÊs total fertility rate is now below 2.1, a figure that is required for a population to replace itself, Brazil should soon see its population count stabilize and then begin to decline; unless of course large-scale immigration to the country resumes. Although BrazilÊs population is now very urban (84%), as recently as 1940 only 31 percent of the population lived in urban areas. Furthermore, until about 1960 approximately 80 percent of BrazilÊs population lived on a narrow strip of land within 100 miles of the Atlantic coast. The establishment of Brasília in 1960 was designed to get people to populate the inner hinterlands, and this plan largely succeeded. Similarly, the construction of both the Trans-Amazonian Highway and the BR 364 (which moved settlers from Brasília to Porto Velho, a major city on the western edge of the Amazon basin) in the early 1970s were responsible for the relocation of large numbers of internal migrants (Goza 1994b). Thus over the course of the
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past 50 years, Brazil has become a predominately urban nation whose population is now more evenly dispersed throughout its 26 states and federal district. As mentioned previously, Brazil is a nation of contrasts. These contrasts also extend to the demographic realm. For example, in 2000 the total fertility rate in rural areas (3.5) was much higher than in urban areas (2.2). Similarly, the more developed regions of the country also have lower total fertility rates than do the poorer regions (e.g., 2.1 in São Paulo and 4.9 in Acre). Rural residents also typically have much lower levels of education than do urban residents. For example, in 2007, 23 percent of the adult rural population was illiterate, whereas among urban residents the corresponding figure was 8 percent (Ripsa 2008). Those in more developed areas also score higher on a number of other socioeconomic measures including income and life expectancy. Brazil is a multiethnic, multiracial society, arguably unlike any other nation on the planet. Over the course of the past 510 years, a great deal of miscegenation has occurred among all of the various races located there, including whites, blacks, Asians, and indigenous peoples. Consequently, the second largest race in Brazil is brown (pardo), a category that resulted because of miscegenation. Furthermore, because of the various (im)migration patterns that have evolved, the nationÊs racial composition varies greatly from one state to the next. For example, in Bahia, the first state settled and the one closest to Africa, one finds the nationÊs highest percentage of black and brown races (73% in 2000). Of course, this is because many slaves were first brought to this state and region. In the South, on the other hand, because of the large-scale immigration of Germans and Italians, the racial composition is extremely different, as that region contains the nationÊs highest percentage of whites. For example, in the state of Santa Catarina, whites comprised more than 89 percent of the population in 2000. In this major region, one finds many residents with blond hair and blues eyes. There it is also possible to find cities and villages where people still can conduct many of their daily affairs speaking either German or Italian. Meanwhile Brazil is also home to a sizable contingent of Japanese Brazilians. Many first-generation Japanese immigrants to Brazil began working in agriculture in the Amazon region and in São Paulo state; however, during the past century, large numbers have relocated to the city of São Paulo, where there is a major Japanese enclave. Finally, although their numbers have been greatly reduced due to disease, violence, and intermarriage, there remains a large population of indigenous Brazilians. Most of their protected lands are in the North, where they account for about 15 percent of the territory. The largest single reserve is the 9.6 million hectare Yanomami territory, which is located in the northern states of Amazonas and Roraima. Other large indigenous reserves are also found in many other states including Rondônia, Acre, Amapá, Pará, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Goiás.
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Brazilian society is highly stratified on many distinct levels, one of which is race. This stratification began with the slave system that existed for 350 years. Although some claim that Brazil is color-blind (with no racial discrimination), many others disagree and have produced empirical evidence to support their claims (e.g., Telles 2004). In addition, Brazil suffers from pronounced socioeconomic stratification as reflected by its highly skewed income distribution. The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality that ranges from 0 in a society with complete equality to 1 in a society with complete inequality. In 2005, BrazilÊs Gini coefficient was 0.58, the tenth highest in the world (CIA Factbook 2010) and indicative of a nation where a relative few are extremely wealthy and many others have very little. This inequality is clearly reflected in the nationÊs poverty rates. As recently as 2003, 35 percent of the nationÊs population was considered poor. As in the United States, people of color are most likely to find themselves in this situation. The nationÊs educational system is also highly skewed. While many private schools offer high-quality education, public schools are sometimes of questionable quality. Consequently, parents with sufficient resources often opt to send their children to private schools. Sadly, many of BrazilÊs children are unable to even complete grade school, regardless of the quality of their school. In 2007, illiteracy rates ranged from less than 4 percent in the Federal District to a high of 25 percent in the impoverished state of Alagoas located in the northeast (Ripsa 2008). Almost 100 percent of the population speaks Portuguese. Those who do not speak this language are recent immigrants and some indigenous groups. The main languages spoken by the indigenous peoples are Tupí, Arawak, Carib, and Gê.
History of Brazil Although by most accounts Brazil was unknown to Europeans until 1500, it was inhabited by indigenous peoples long before. Schmitz (1987) has used carbon-14 to demonstrate that some areas in the Amazon region may have been inhabited as early as approximately 11000 B.C.E. Rock paintings and engravings in northern areas date back to at least 5000 B.C.E. By approximately 2000 B.C.E., there is evidence that hunters and gatherers inhabited states throughout the entire Southeast major region. While it is impossible to determine the size of BrazilÊs population at the time of ˘lvares CabralÊs arrival in 1500, most agree that it was at least one million with some estimating that there were as many as five million. It is also estimated that in 1500, there were thousands of tribes who spoke hundreds of distinct languages. On April 22, 1500, the Portuguese explorer Pedro ˘lvares Cabral arrived at Porto Seguro, Bahia, in northeast Brazil. He believed he had discovered an island, which he named the Island of Vera Cruz (true cross). For the first decades that followed little colonization occurred. However, during this time a tree called paubrasil (Brazilwood) became highly valued because of the reddish dye that could be
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extracted from the core of the treeÊs trunk. So prized was this tree that it became the chief export during this period. It was so valued that it nearly became extinct due to overharvesting. Nonetheless, this treeÊs lasting legacy would be the name that it was to bestow on South AmericaÊs largest nation. In the 1530s, several important developments occurred. Exploratory forays by the French and Dutch on BrazilÊs northeast coast lead to a reaction by PortugalÊs King João III, who in 1530 sent a large number of troops to Brazil to protect this Portuguese territory. In 1532 the first permanent colony was established in São Vicente. The settlers in this town supported themselves with the sugar cane plantations (fazendas) they established. Then in 1538 the first African slaves were imported from Angola. As in North America, the colonists had earlier attempted to enslave the indigenous inhabitants. However, they proved unsuitable slaves as they resisted, often escaped to rejoin their tribes, or became sick and died due to the illnesses brought by the Europeans. Thus BrazilÊs experience with importing African slaves began. This trafficking continued until 1850 when the Queiroz Law prohibited the importation of additional African slaves. During this 312-year period, it is estimated that Brazil received more than 3 million slaves (Telles 2004), obtaining approximately 35 percent of the entire Atlantic slave trade. The Brazilian historian Taunay estimated that 100,000 African slaves arrived in Brazil in the 16th century; 600,000 in 17th century; 1.3 million in 18th century; and 1.6 million in the 19th century. As in the United States, slavery would forever affect and shape BrazilÊs history and socioeconomic structure. Beginning in the 16th century and for many years to come, slavery would be an extremely important part of the Brazilian economy, especially sugar cane production. In 1549, Salvador da Bahia, in the northeastern state of Bahia, became the nationÊs first capital. It also soon became an important port and the center for the sugar and slave trades. Around this time, several other coastal towns also begin to prosper largely because of their sugar cane production. In 1578, King Sebastian of Portugal died without an heir. Consequently, Portugal fell under Spanish rule and this dual monarchy lasted from 1580 to 1640. During this period, Brazil was allowed a great deal of political autonomy. In 1621, largely as a consequence of its growing importance and recognition of its mammoth size, Brazil was divided into two Brazils, the states of Maranhão and Brazil. Both Brazils had their own governments and governors-general. The State of Maranhão consisted of the present states of Ceará, Maranhão, Piauí, and Pará. It remained independent until 1774, when it was incorporated in the State of Brazil. During the dual monarchy period, the French and Dutch would occasionally occupy parts of the northeast region. The French founded the city of São Luis do Maranhão, originally a Tupinambá tribal village, in 1612. However, their attempt at colonization failed when they were expelled by the Portuguese in 1615. The Dutch occupation was more successful, enabling them to control the important colonial
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cities of Salvador and Recife. Salvador was briefly occupied from 1623 to 1624 and Recife from 1630 to 1654. Once the Dutch were expelled, Brazil would never again be threatened by a foreign takeover. During the Dutch occupation, the first Jews were allowed to immigrate to Brazil. The Dutch permitted them to openly practice their religion, and in Recife two synagogues were built. In 1640, Portugal regained its independence. The Spanish were unable to prevent this as they were engaged in other political and military undertakings. The Portuguese also benefited from the support of the English, who viewed a weakened Spain as advantageous. The ensuing period witnessed the continued exploration of the Brazilian territory. In the north, the Amazon was explored, and the river cities of Santarém and Manaus were established in 1640 and 1660, respectively. Meanwhile in the south, the bandeirantes (callous flag-carrying pioneers) explored the interior regions in search of indigenous peoples who they could enslave. Their slaving explorations paved the way for future settlers and the additional development of previously unknown regions. In the late 17th century, gold was discovered in the present State of Minas Gerais (general mines). This set off a gold rush responsible for sending over 300,000 Portuguese to Brazil in search of their fortunes. This influx of migrants lead to a tenfold increase in the population of Minas and also made it BrazilÊs new economic center. This importance further increased when in 1729 diamonds were also discovered in Minas. Because Minas Gerais is south and west of Bahia, it also resulted in the 1763 transfer of the stateÊs capital from Salvador to Rio de Janeiro, a more southerly coastal city and one closer to Minas Gerais. In addition, those in search of mineral wealth continued to move further inland in search of their fortunes, paving the way for the additional settlement and continued development of the hinterlands. In 1774, the State of Maranhão was incorporated into the State of Brazil. From this point forward there would be only one government and one Brazil. However, within this one Brazil not everyone was of one mind. Because of the ever higher taxes being imposed on the colony a small insurgency developed (the Inconfidencia) in Minas Gerais designed to overthrow the Portuguese and to declare Brazil an independent republic. The Inconfidencia conspiracy was discovered in 1789, and one its leaders, Tiradentes, was publicly hanged and his body quartered in 1792. Today Tiradentes is a national hero. His birthday is celebrated as a national holiday, and there is a city in Minas Gerais named after him. In November 1807, the French Emperor Napoleon I invaded Portugal because it refused to participate in the economic blockade of Britain. To avoid capture, Prince João (the future King João VI and the present regent acting on behalf of his incapacitated mother Queen Maria I [i.e., Mad Maria]), the rest of the Portuguese royal family, and approximately 15,000 others fled Portugal for Brazil. They arrived in Brazil on January 22, 1808. With Dom JoãoÊs relocation to Rio de Janeiro, Rio
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became the new center of the Portuguese empire, and he the first monarch to rule his European state from a colony. He immediately opened all of BrazilÊs ports to international trade. His later contributions included the introduction of the printing press, the countryÊs first newspapers, and the establishment of BrazilÊs first institutions of higher education. In 1815 Dom João elevated Brazil from colony to kingdom status. In 1816, after his mother MariaÊs death, Dom João was officially recognized as King João VI of Portugal. The king returned to Portugal in 1821, leaving his son Prince Pedro de Alcântara to rule Brazil. With his returned to Portugal, King João VI attempted to rescind many of the privileges he had earlier granted Brazil and to once again return Brazil to its former status as a colony. The Brazilians refused and, with the support of Prince Pedro, declared their independence on September 7, 1822. Prince Pedro was declared the first emperor of Brazil and crowned Dom Pedro I on December 1, 1822. Unlike other South American nations, BrazilÊs independence was a rather peaceful occurrence. Dom Pedro IÊs son, Dom Pedro II, was born in Rio de Janeiro in 1825 and would serve as BrazilÊs regent for 58 years, from 1831 to 1889. Dom Pedro II was the second and last emperor of Brazil and has been referred to as a truly enlightened monarch. His policies were largely responsible for shaping Brazil and making it the nation that it is today. He provided the nation with stability and guided them through many difficult growing pains. He was able to successfully put down
On September 7, 1822, after continuing assaults on his rule by the Portuguese authorities, Pedro I asserts the independence of Brazil with his famous proclamation on the banks of the Ipiranga River, “independence or death.” (National Library of Brazil/Library of Congress)
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rebellions (e.g., the Farrapos Revolt) and to direct his nation in time of war (i.e., War of the Triple Alliance). He also freed his slaves at a young age and forbade the importation of new slaves into Brazil in 1850. Slavery was also officially abolished while he was still emperor in 1888. During his reign Brazil also began experiencing the large-scale immigration of Europeans. Dom Pedro IIÊs reign ended when he was overthrown on November 15, 1889. Although still extremely popular with his subjects, he had developed numerous enemies, including military leaders; former slave owners who resented the abolition of slavery; and the republicans seeking a new national political system. In addition, Dom Pedro IIÊs mental and physical health had apparently deteriorated to the point that he was detached from his regal duties. His removal from office was just as peaceful as when as Brazil acquired its independence from Portugal. The following 41-year period, from 1889 to 1930, is usually referred to as the Old Republic (República Velha). This era is sometimes referred to as the period of oligarchies or the coffee-and-milk era (São Paulo was the largest producer of coffee in Brazil, and Minas is the largest producer of milk), since the two most powerful states took turns installing the nationÊs president. The coffee-and-milk era ended in 1930 when a military coup installed a new dictator. The often turbulent period of the Old Republic in Brazil witnessed the creation of a constitution (in 1891) that established the Republic of the United States of Brazil and restored autonomy to the nationÊs states; the election of its first civilian president (in 1894); new immigration from Japan; continued immigration from Europe; a rubber boom in the Amazon; the expansion of the coffee, cotton, and textile sectors; and BrazilÊs participation in World War I. Still, when the Old Republic ended, Brazil remained largely a nation of haves and have-nots, a nation where the legacy of slavery had resulted in the extreme concentration of wealth and land in the hands of a few; a legacy that to this day continues·indicated by the nationÊs highly skewed Gini coefficient. In 1930, yet another peaceful political takeover occurred. This time a civilian politician by the name of Getúlio Vargas was put into power by a military junta. At the time of the coup, the junta was supported by a group of disaffected political constituencies consisting of various emerging classes (e.g., industrial workers and mid-sized farmers). Vargas was expected to be in power and serving their needs for only a relatively short time. However, he proved to be more adept than anyone had expected. In fact, he was a powerful national figure until his suicide in 1954. During his time in power, he was able to affect the condition of Brazil in several important ways. First, he instituted the countryÊs first minimum wage and passed additional labor laws, some of which are still in effect today. Because of this legislation, he is often referred to as BrazilÊs Father of the Poor. Second, he created the DASP (i.e., Administrative Department of Public Service), which was the beginning of the professionalization of Brazilian civil servants. Prior to this time, one needed to be well connected in order to be hired into one of these positions.
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Third, the middle-class, part of the proletariat, and some women received the right to vote. Fourth, he centralized political power throughout Brazil unlike any other prior political leader. When Vargas committed suicide in 1954, his government was in a crisis situation with a military takeover looming. Over the course of the next 10 years, there would be seven presidents. All of these served very short terms with the exception of Juscelino Kubitschek, who was president from 1956 to 1961. KubitschekÊs claim to fame was the construction of Brasília, which was built in only 41 months and inaugurated as the nationÊs capital on April 21, 1960. In 1964 the military overthrew the left-leaning president João Goulart. This bloodless coup began a repressive military dictatorship that endured until 1985. During much of this time, the civil rights of Brazilians were suspended and all political parties abolished. The conservative rule enforced during this period was responsible for the torture, exile, and disappearance of those who posed any type of perceived threat. Those affected included many musicians, writers, artists, filmmakers, students, and politicians. In spite of the political repression, or perhaps because of it, BrazilÊs economy flourished during the first half of the militaryÊs rule. From 1968 to1974, the Brazilian economy experienced annual rates of economic growth of 10 percent or higher, growth that lead some to refer to this period as the Brazilian „economic miracle.‰ Still, the economic policies of the time were regressive, favoring the upper and middle classes to the detriment of the poor and working classes. These regressive policies led to a worsening income distribution and a very high Gini coefficient. The military leaders at this time decided that the nation should secure the Amazon Rainforest area. In 1970, a serious attempt at integrating the northern frontier began. The cornerstone of the plan was the National Integration Program, a failed colonization project that was originally designed to resettle a million families (Goza 1994b). The new inhabitants were to be resettled along the expanding TransAmazonian highway, a project begun in 1970 that was to stretch over 3,300 miles and reach from the Atlantic coast to near the Peruvian border. However, because of military mismanagement of the economy, the early 1980s were characterized by extremely high inflation and economic stagnation, leading the 1980s to be referred to as the Lost Decade. In an effort to maintain their previous lifestyle, thousands of middle-class Brazilians began considering their employment options in other nations. Thus in approximately 1985 the large-scale emigration of middle-class Brazilians to North America and elsewhere began (Goza 1994a). Beginning in the early 1980s, a political process called the abertura (political opening) began. The culmination of this process was when Tancredo Neves was elected president on January 15, 1985. Despite being elected, he died prior to his inauguration. Consequently, his vice-president, José Sarney, became the first civilian president since 1964. In 1988, a new democratic constitution was ratified. Since
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then, five presidents have been freely elected, the first of whom, Fernando Collor de Mello, resigned in order to avoid being impeached. Both Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995 2003) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003 2011) were elected to serve two four-year terms. The current president, Dilma Vana Rousseff, is BrazilÊs first woman president, and her first term began on January 1, 2011.
Causes and Waves of Migration The passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act meant that earlier excluded groups were now for the first time able to immigrate to the United States. This legislation abolished the national-origin quotas that had been in place since the 1920s and in effect opened U.S. immigration portals to all newcomers. However, this earlier legislation did not affect Brazilians, as Brazil is part of the Western Hemisphere, an area to which this legislation did not apply. Even though Brazilians had the possibility of immigrating to the United States, relatively few took advantage of this possibility as throughout much of the 20th century Brazil, remained a nation of immigrants, not emigrants. That said, Table 25 presents 1980 U.S. census data to show that more than 64 percent of the Brazilians enumerated that year had arrived in the United States between 1965 and 1980. These and later increases may be at least partially due to the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act. Table 25 also reveals that in 2000 most Brazilian Americans, 81 percent, were relative newcomers, having arrived between 1985 and 2000. In many of the sections that follow, data from the 2000 U.S. Census of Population will be used to detail the socioeconomic and geo-demographic situation of the Brazilian American population. Also note that since 2000, many more Brazilians have immigrated to the United States, and it is expected that statistics collected by the U.S. Census department will enumerate well over a million Brazilian-born residents of the United States by the end of 2010.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of the Community Before discussing the situation of those included in the census, it is important to note that many Brazilians residing in the United States were missed by prior U.S. censuses. There are many reasons for the Brazilian undercount, but perhaps the most significant is that many were undocumented residents who were fearful of all government officials, even those from the Census Bureau (Goza 1994; Margolis 1994). More specifically, my research revealed that more than 56 percent of the Brazilians interviewed were missed by the 1990 census. Because more than
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half of my sample lacked proper documentation, this is not surprising. At other times, Brazilians were miscounted as they were mistaken for Hispanics or African Americans. Finally, they were also undercounted because they sometimes resided in urban, inner city neighborhoods and were relatively poor; precisely those population segments most likely to be undercounted by the U.S. Census (Anderson and Fienberg 1999). From 1980 to 1998, the number of Brazilian citizens entering the United States with non-immigrant visas increased continuously almost every year. In 1998, over 935,000 nonimmigrant visas were issued to Brazilians (U.S. Department of Justice [USDJ] 2000). That year, only five nations received more of these visas than Brazil. Data from 2009 indicate that, although BrazilÊs ranking fell from 6 to 7, the total number of nonimmigrants to the United States increased to 959,448 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010). This is the type of visa typically given to tourists or people traveling on business affairs; those who generally come to the United States for a relatively short stay and then depart. While many Brazilians use this visa type for its intended purpose, some do not. In fact, my research and that of others has revealed a large number of Brazilians who entered the United States legally, but then overstayed their visas. Furthermore, in most instances those entering with this visa type are clearly forbidden from working in the United States; a caveat that many have chosen to ignore as they also opted to overstay their visas. Specifically, my research revealed that 77 percent of the women and 58 percent of the men entered the United States this way. All of these individuals would later seek and find U.S. employment. U.S. immigration statistics also reveal a slow but consistent increase in the number of Brazilians who entered the United States legally as permanent immigrants; in 2009, for example, 14,701 Brazilians arrived with this visa type (USDHS 2010). While this may seem like a relatively small number, it is important to note that this figure represents an increase of approximately 323 percent since 1995 (USDHS 2006). Furthermore, the number of Brazilians entering the United States as permanent immigrants is virtually guaranteed to increase for many years as these new arrivals will soon also be able to sponsor the immigration of additional relatives. As such, current numbers contain a built-in multiplier effect since each new immigrant cohort can, and likely will, sponsor even larger future cohorts. The 2000 U.S. Census recorded a total of 247,020 people who were either born in Brazil or the children of such individuals. Please note that all of the data analyzed in this study were generated by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (see http://www.IPUMS.org). For 1980 and 1990, we used the 5 percent sample, and for 2000, the 1 percent sample. For additional information on the IPUMS data see Ruggles et al. (2008). As discussed previously, many, perhaps even a majority of, Brazilians residing in the United States were missed by recent U.S. censuses (Goza 1994a; Margolis
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1994). Magno de Carvalho (1996) reinforced this conclusion with analyses of Brazilian census data that suggested significantly more Brazilians resided abroad than were actually counted. Hence, if 2000 census estimates were doubled, that would mean approximately 500,000 first- or second-generation Brazilians were present in the United States in 2000. Such a possibility is further supported by a 2001 report of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which estimated that over 799,000 Brazilians resided in the United States in 2000 (Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2001). Table 26 documents the extremely rapid growth of Brazilian Americans. This population more than doubled from 1980 to 1990 and then grew by another 150 percent from 1990 to 2000. Table 26 shows that because of the large number of Brazilian-born individuals entering each year, the native-born or second-generation population still remained at only about one of every eight people in 2000. Table 25 clearly reveals the newness of this population. With the exception of 1980, those who arrived prior to 1950 represent a miniscule percentage for each census. Of course, many earlier arrivals may have long since departed the United States, while still others may have died, thereby reducing the immigrant counts for the earlier years. Nonetheless, the 1980 data reveal that this population was in a strong growth mode, as 45 percent of the entire group arrived just 10 years prior to the census. Strong growth was also evident in 1990 as fully 49 percent arrived between 1985 and 1990, exactly the period BrazilÊs economic crisis worsened. Furthermore, 64 percent of those counted in 1990 arrived during the preceding 10-year period. An amazingly similar pattern was observed in 2000 as 44 percent arrived 5 years prior to the census, and 65 percent during just the preceding 10 years. In fact, 87 percent of those counted in 2000 had arrived since 1980; a statistic that serves to highlight the newness of this group in the United States.
Place of Residence Where are Brazilian immigrants settling? Tables 27 and 28 indicate their primary states of residence. The most popular states in 1980 were California and New York; together these two locations accounted for over 35 percent of all Brazilians present in the United States. By 1990, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Florida had emerged as other important destinations, as each accounted for over 10 percent of the Brazilian American total. By 2000, however, California and New York fell from the top positions as Florida moved into first place, with nearly 20 percent of the total, and Massachusetts secured second place with 17 percent. Although there was a repositioning of Brazilians across these five states, their concentrations within them continued to increase. By 2009, the top state figures were Florida, Massachusetts, California, New Jersey, and New York, in that order. Table 29 reveals the specific metropolitan areas within the United States where Brazilians were most likely to reside. In 1980, the New York City metro region
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had the largest concentration (14%) followed by Los Angeles (7%). However, since then their share of the total has declined significantly. By 2000, Boston had emerged as the metropolitan area most preferred by Brazilians (12%) while New York City fell to number two (7%). Two Florida areas, Fort Lauderdale and Miami, both experienced strong growth, while Newark continued stable with approximately 5 percent of the total. Table 29 also reveals that by 2000, these eight metropolitan areas together accounted for over 42 percent of all Brazilian Americans. Of the many possible locations in the United States, why did Brazilians chose the ones they did? Much of this has to do with transportation systems and social networks. For nearly 40 years BrazilÊs upper- and upper-middle classes have been taking their children on vacation trips to Disney World. Usually this would mean flying through Miami at some point. This helps explain the 20 percent of the Brazilian American population residing in that state. But why Massachusetts, especially the Boston area? This is largely explained by understanding how social networks work. According to social network theory, people will go where they have contacts and are welcome. Originally, there were no Brazilians in this part of the United States but there were many Portuguese immigrants. The Portuguese share a common language and history with the Brazilians. Thus, the Portuguese community and its residents were able to provide some initial support to many of earliest waves of Brazilians to relocate to this area. In fact, many found their initial jobs and places to live because of the „Portuguese connection.‰ Thus, no English was required, and while getting paid less than the minimum wage, the undocumented workers were still getting paid more than they had earned in Brazil. Both sides were winning. Once an initial foothold was established with the Portuguese community, then additional relatives from Brazil could be summoned and also quickly employed. This symbiotic relationship with the Portuguese has been noted in numerous communities in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Toronto, Ontario (Goza 1999). The pull and attraction of these networks is very strong, and they could almost guarantee access to the employment sought by these immigrants. Furthermore, these social networks were so efficient that approximately 50 percent of the 200 people I interviewed had been able to begin working within two weeks of arriving in the United States, some beginning the very same day they arrived. From these early centers of concentration, the Brazilian American population has fanned out to other locations taking with them the experiences that they initially acquired under the auspices of their Portuguese sponsors.
Age and Family Structure Who are these Brazilian Americans? Table 30 reveals that they are more likely to be female than male. In all three census years there were more women than men, while in both 1980 and 2000 women outnumbered men by approximately 10 percent.
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Not only are there more women, there are also many more young people. Table 31 documents the evolution of this populationÊs age structure. In 1980, it was fairly well balanced, as over 30 percent were less than age 20 and over 18 percent were more than 50 years old. By 2000, less than 25 percent were under 20, and only 11 percent were older than 50. The increasing proportion of those between the ages of 20 and 49, the prime labor force years, clearly suggests that this is primarily a movement of people who are immigrating with one motive in mind·to seek better opportunities, especially in the employment realm. The mean age of foreignborn Brazilians living in the United States for all three census years was always between 33 and 35 years of age, whereas, among the native-born, it ranged from 8 to 10 years of age. The results suggest that the majority of these immigrants are primarily labor migrants. Are they permanent or temporary labor migrants? Are they coming alone or with other family members? Temporary labor migrants frequently undertake moves by themselves and only later reunite with their families. Thus, perhaps the easiest way to examine this question is to review the marital status of those 18 and older. A flow of temporary labor migrants would probably be indicated by a large number of married individuals who were living apart from their spouses. Table 32 reveals that in 1980 and 2000, over 60 percent of all adults were married and living with their spouse. In fact, in 2000, almost all married Brazilians resided with their spouse. In the other two years slightly higher, but still relatively insignificant numbers of couples lived apart. This suggests that these couples are here for an extended, if not permanent stay. Table 32 also documents a sizable contingent of those never married and divorced. Perhaps these individuals did come by themselves for only a temporary stay in the United States. Another possibility that will be discussed in additional detail is that some of these divorced individuals came to the United States married and then divorced in this country. Tables 33 and 34 enable us to delve a bit deeper into the structure of the Brazilian American family. Table 33 reveals that in each census year between 16 and 23 percent lived apart from other family members. On the other hand, for all three census periods at least 77 percent did reside with at least one other relative. Furthermore, at all three times between 40 and 48 percent lived with three or more family members. These results are consistent with my primary data that revealed 74 percent of those interviewed had at least one relative in the United States, while 21 percent reported that they had six or more relatives present (Goza 1994a). This suggests that there may be two types of Brazilian immigrants, those who possess numerous friends and relatives in the United States and those who do not. The latter group may have traveled alone or with friends, but regardless, may lack access to a kinship-based support network·something available to the former group. Table 34 documents the specific relationship of all Brazilian Americans to the person identified by the census as the household head. Nearly 50 percent of the
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males in each census year were identified as the head of household, whereas among women, the corresponding figure increased from 14 to 18 percent. Those identified as children accounted for between 26 and 33 percent of the respective populations. Not all heads were married or had spouses present, and as such the figure for spouses is between 5 and 9 percentage points lower than it is for heads. The figures for the categories „other relatives‰ and „siblings‰ slowly increased over the 20-year period examined, whereas the figure for the category „parents‰ declined slightly. When combined, the categories head, spouse, and child account for a total of between 80 and 89 percent of all Brazilian Americans. This is indicative of the immigration of nuclear family units and is suggestive of those who have undertaken a permanent international move. It is also in keeping with the high value Brazilians place on family and kinship relations.
Educational Attainment Another important measure that facilitates assimilation and promotes economic well-being is education. Following generally accepted norms, the statistics presented here focus on the education of those who were at least 25 years of age at the time the census data were collected. Table 35 presents results for the three census years. These data reveal a great deal of promise for the Brazilian American population. Brazilian immigrants to the United States have been and continue to be a relatively well-educated group. Not only are their educational levels higher than the Brazilian norm, but they are also higher than those of the native-born, non-Hispanic white population in the United States. Furthermore, the educational attainment levels of these immigrants have consistently improved over time. For example, in 1980, 26 percent of all Brazilians had completed at least a four-year college degree. By 2000, the figure had increased to 34.5 percent, which again is higher than that of the native-born U.S. population. Likewise, those with at least a high school degree increased from 71.3 percent in 1980 to 88.7 percent in 2000. Furthermore, the figure has consistently increased since 1980. As a consequence, in 2000, only 11.3 percent of Brazilian American adults had not completed at least high school. This figure is a significant decrease from the appalling figure of 28.7 percent, which was observed in 1980. Although these results are very promising, it is worth noting that a high school education is no guarantee of a good job in this country, especially if that education was received in another country in another language. Therefore, 43 percent of this immigrant population should be concerned that they may lack the required education to compete effectively in this country. On the other hand, as mentioned before, because the remaining 57 percent of the population does have at least some college training, the Brazilian American educational picture, although bifurcated, is a positive one that bodes well for future success.
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Economic Attainment For an immigrant, economic attainment is one of the most important aspects of an immigrantÊs life in a new country. How and to what degree have Brazilians been able to integrate themselves into the economy of this host nation? In an attempt to answer these questions, various auxiliary tables were created and examined. The first measure examined the ability to locate gainful employment. The auxiliary tables examining Brazilians aged 18 and over reveal that in 1979, 1989, and 1999, approximately 20 percent more men were employed than women. However, these supplementary tables also revealed a 7 percent decrease in the number of men employed from 1990 to 2000. During the same time period, there was also a 7 percent increase in the number of men out of the labor force; a rather disturbing result. On the positive side, however, for all three census years, the unemployment levels for both men and women were below the national average. That said, the decreasing employment level and the increasing percentage of men outside of the labor force may be responsible for the higher levels of return migration that have been observed in the past decade. The issue of return migration will be discussed in additional detail further on in this chapter. As mentioned previously in the context of social networks, this immigrant group is very motivated to find employment and succeed in the workforce. In fact, 28 percent of the men and 18 percent of the women began their first U.S. jobs less than one week after arriving (Goza 1994a). Social networks also operated in another important way: they helped those who were unemployed find work more quickly. More specifically, those Brazilians who worked primarily with other co-ethnics were more likely to become re-employed than those who did not (Goza and DeMaris 1999). Regardless of the ethnicity of co-workers, the Brazilians also demonstrated themselves to be stable and reliable workers as over 20 percent had been at their current job for at least a year at the time of interview. This suggests that, given their motivation to work and prior job histories, once the economy stabilizes, this group will again return to the workforce and attain a lower unemployment rate than the general population.
Occupational Patterns What positions did Brazilian men and women who were gainfully employed occupy in 2000? Table 36 shows the top 20 occupations separately for men and women. This fascinating table defies simple stereotypes. In it, we see both men and women occupying highly skilled positions. For example, among men 16 percent worked as manager and professionals, and the corresponding figure for women was 9.8 percent. Regardless of gender, many were also engaged in the same occupations long occupied by recent immigrants. For instance, the number one profession among
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women was private household worker or maid (12%), while many men found employment as cooks, drivers, laborers, janitors, and gardeners. Although is it likely that these immigrants have experienced a great deal of mobility within the work force, census data restrict the exploration of that question as they only provide information on current occupation. My research, however, did employ labor force work histories that enabled me to track Brazilian immigrantsÊ entire U.S. employment history. This data revealed a great deal of downward mobility, especially among those formerly employed in Brazil as professionals. There were observed instances of lawyers and doctors either driving cabs or working in restaurants. Although they may have been working „beneath their status,‰ they were always earning more than they had in Brazil at the time of their departure. My data also revealed that some individuals experienced significant mobility in a relatively brief period of time. Several had created businesses and were now employing numerous other immigrants. Typically this occurred in the construction sector, where skills many times are transferable. Similarly, several women had been able to establish small enterprises cleaning homes or businesses. In both of these examples, they were then able to hire other Brazilians and benefit financially from the labor of their co-ethnics.
Income Patterns Census data clearly document how very important employment is to income. The number one reason people are in poverty is because they donÊt work or because they are a dependent in a household where those responsible for their well-being do not work. Over 17 percent of all Brazilian Americans lived below the poverty line in 2000. Although this number is lower than corresponding figures for Hispanics and African Americans, it was double that of native-born whites. An examination of foreign-born Brazilians over the age of 21 reveals exactly how important a job is, as almost 60 percent of the subset in poverty did not work the week before the census. Although this explains the lionÊs share of those in poverty, an additional 16 percent did work 40 hours and still could not rise above the poverty line. Adult women were slightly more likely to be poor (18%) than men (16%). However, when examining all of the foreign-born an interesting pattern emerges. The groups most likely to be poor were those under 20 (25%) and those over 60 (20%). At the opposite end of the financial spectrum, 20 percent of all Brazilian Americans were in situations where their income was at least five times that of the poverty level. Five times the poverty level is as high as this measure goes, so it is possible that their incomes were even much higher. Thus, as in the case with education and occupation measures, there also appears to be a bifurcation that has developed among Brazilian American income patterns. Additional variables were examined in an attempt to gain further insights into the causes of unemployment. Not surprisingly, time in the United States was a factor.
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Those in the United States less than five years were six times as likely to be unemployed as those with longer U.S. tenures. Likewise, naturalized U.S. citizens, who by default have been in the United States at least five years, experienced only onefourth the unemployment of Brazilians who were not U.S. citizens. Older individuals experienced slightly higher levels of unemployment than younger people. This, too, is to be expected, especially when people immigrate at older ages and possess fewer transferable skills (e.g., English ability and computer skills).
Health Issues In general Brazilian Americans do not possess any special health issues. A recent study conducted among various immigrant groups in Massachusetts (Marcelli et al. 2009) concurred and found that the Brazilian adult immigrants in the study were generally healthier than the other immigrant groups examined. Still, the same study reveals several key concerns as the Brazilians studied experienced above average levels of psychological stress and 60 percent lacked health insurance, 27 percent smoked, and only 19 percent exercised weekly. In addition, recent immigrants also often experience a longing for their homeland and those left behind. In my surveys, this was the number one mental health concern reported. In Portuguese, this longing is referred to as saudades, which has been translated many ways including „longing,‰ „nostalgia,‰ „the blues,‰ or „lingering emptiness.‰ In more severe cases, this can result in clinical depression that may require a doctorÊs help and treatment with anti-depressants. With the passage of time and acculturation to the American way of life, the affects of these saudades tend to lessen. Still, some immigrants are never quite able to cope. Perhaps that is why the reason most often cited for desiring to return to Brazil was saudades. Following are several quotes from various Brazilian immigrant respondents on saudades and their effects. These thoughts are from a middle-aged woman that I interviewed in Governador Valadares, Minas Gerais, nearly one year after her return to Brazil. She had lived and worked in the United States approximately three years. Saudades. In that country the thing that really kills us is saudades. O my God! You are practically isolated there. Do you understand? There the Brazilian is super isolated! When youÊre there you only talk with other Brazilians. What American doesnÊt converse with other Americans? For the majority of Brazilians there itÊs very rare to have a relationship with an American. It only happens after a lot of time there. Like in the case of my cousin, she was in the U.S. 10 years, so she had relationships with Americans. But for me who was just passing through, I had no real personal contacts. It was just the job and work, work, work.
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Adjustment and Adaptation Families and Changing Gender Relations Some Brazilian American families and households have been transformed in important ways. One key example of this transformation is that some Brazilian women in the United States have become empowered in ways that had not been possible for them in Brazil. In some Brazilian homes, men are still viewed as the primary decision makers and the ones with the power, while women take the lead in caring for the home and children. In the United States, many women have acquired more power and authority. Many also indicated that they found their new freedoms in the United States to be liberating. Here is how one middle-aged woman summed up the situation approximately six months after her return to Brazil. She had lived and worked in the United States almost 10 years. Personally, I believe that in Brazil women just arenÊt considered to be worth much. Men beat them whenever they want and they are always right. Machismo is everywhere in Brazil, thatÊs the way it is. While I was in the U.S., I saw the way women there lived and it made me envious. I never experienced that way of life in Brazil, never. Because of the new roles women have assumed in the United States, numerous conflicts have occurred. The following quote is from an interview I conducted with a Brazilian woman in her 20s who had recently returned to Brazil. It details one case of jealousy and violence. ThereÊs a lawyer in Valadares [a well-known city from which emigrants embark in Brazil] who has one of his sons doing life in prison in the Boston area. He killed his girlfriend in his apartment there. Man . . . it was jealousy. ItÊs that thing about women becoming too independent. He just wouldnÊt allow it, while she was getting more and more that way. Because she had a job, a car, she was able to divide the rent on a house. Then this guy begins getting jealous, even at her boss. ThereÊs a lot of this going on up there too. This example of violence had a terrible ending. Although not all acts of violence in the Brazilian American community end as horribly, my research did record dozens of cases of violence because of a womanÊs perceived independence. All respondents were asked a series of questions about their future plans including whether they intended to permanently remain in the United States. A significantly higher percentage of women revealed that they intended to permanently remain. Similar results have been documented among other immigrant women in the United States (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991).
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Without a doubt, exposure to new social contexts had a significant effect on relationships between men and women and sometimes resulted in important transformations. Many women opted to assert themselves in important ways, one being that some have decided to end their marriages. In other cases, more egalitarian relationships have developed among Brazilian American men and women.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Brazilians are extremely proud of their homeland and their national identity. In addition, all Brazilians are very proud of the specific area of Brazil that they call home, and most continue to refer to themselves with these labels (e.g., a woman from Rio de Janeiro is a Carioca). Because most Americans perceive of Brazil and Brazilians as friendly and sympathetic, it has not been that difficult for Brazilian Americans to retain a strong sense of national culture and to proudly display their Brazilian identity whenever the opportunity presents itself. So pronounced is their ethnic pride, that it has been well documented exactly how upset they can get when confused with those from other Latin American countries (Margolis 2009). They are quick to let the uninformed know, with pride, that they do not speak Spanish in Brazil and that they are not Hispanics. Part of this is because of ethnic stereotyping on the BraziliansÊ part. Many believe that they are superior to Hispanics because they are better educated and from better backgrounds. They also believe that they are treated better when the appropriate distinction has been made. Another reason for their pride is that they believe their country and their people are unique and should not be lumped into a large sweeping category such as Hispanic.
Continued Links to Brazil Many Brazilians continue to maintain very strong ties to their homeland. Most notably this is demonstrated by the fact that 60 percent of all adults regularly send remittances to their family members still living in Brazil (Goza and Ryabov forthcoming). Those remitting on average sent back roughly $260 per month. In some cases this imposed a severe financial strain on the remitters, yet they say that the recipients might not survive without these extra funds. This point becomes more believable when one considers that nearly 70 percent of all remittances were destined for basic consumption activities. Remitters also explain that were the roles reversed, the recipients would do the same for the remitters. In 2006, the last year for which data are available, the amount remitted to Brazil via official channels was nearly US$3 billion (International Monetary Fund 2007). While the specific source of these funds is impossible to determine, these remittances certainly account for a large portion of the income of many Brazilian households. Furthermore, not all
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remittances are purely altruistic gifts. Many send these funds because they desire to maintain strong ties and their social prestige within their origin area community, and one way to do this is by remitting. The strength of U.S.-Brazilian ties is perhaps strongest in the Brazilian municipality of Governador Valadares, located in the state of Minas Gerais. Scholars, the popular press, and even Brazilian television shows have long recognized the unique position Governador Valadares occupies as BrazilÊs primary region of emigration. For this reason numerous scholars (e.g., Goza 1994a; Margolis 1994; Sales 2003) have gone there to study this phenomenon firsthand. Strong links have existed between Valadares and the United States since at least the 1940s. Today this region is much more developed in the area of international migration than any other in Brazil. Those who are able to pass through the Valadares migration hub are able to tap into various well-established social networks and use these to facilitate numerous aspects of their international move on both the sending and receiving ends. The distribution of these privileges continues to fan out as each successive group of immigrants similarly assists those closest to them who chose to follow in their footsteps. In this way strong ties between the sending and destination communities are continuously reinforced.
Social Organizations In the relatively brief time Brazilians have resided in the United States, numerous forms of social organizations have emerged to assist them in various ways. At the upper end of the spectrum is the Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce, of New York City. According to their Web site, they have „emerged as one of the most active international business organizations in the country in recent years‰ (Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce [BACC] 2010). Although an independent, nonprofit business organization, they only cater to well established business interests, such as Fortune 500 corporations, as they seek to „promote trade and investment flows between Brazil and the United States and to forge closer ties between the business communities of both nations‰ (BACC 2010). The less privileged have their own social organizations to which they may also turn for assistance. The earliest Brazilians in Massachusetts may have received assistance from the Massachusetts Alliance of Portuguese Speakers. This nongovernmental organization has served Portuguese speakers in the areas of health and human services since the 1970s. Similarly, the earliest Brazilian Americans found that local churches served not only as places of worship but also as clearing houses of information and friendship. Initially, the parishes they frequented were largely populated by the ethnic Portuguese, and occasionally mass at these locales was given in Portuguese. With time and the arrival of more Brazilians to the United States, they were able to effectively take control of local churches and turn them
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into locales where Brazilians could meet socially (Sales 2003). With the continued growth of the Brazilian population, there are now other options, especially in the densely populated Brazilian centers of Massachusetts and Connecticut. For example, there is the Brazilian Immigrant Center (BIC), which was founded to fight workplace abuse. More specifically, BICÊs mission is to unite Brazilian immigrants to organize against economic, social, and political exclusion and to help create a just society. Their mission later expanded, and they are now able to assist Brazilian immigrants in addressing a wide range of social issues, including how to master the English language. There are other similar organizations that also help workingclass Brazilians. These include the Centro do Trabalhador Brasileiro (the Brazilian Worker Center), the Brazilian WomenÊs Group, and the Brazilian American Association. The mission of the latter organization is „to organize the Brazilian community in order to build an identity in the American Society‰ (BRAMAS 2010).
Religion Religion is another area where Brazil demonstrates some diversity. Until recently almost all Brazilians declared themselves to be Christians, with the majority declaring Roman Catholicism as their religion. Still, in the past few decades those practicing Catholicism has declined, dropping from 93 percent in 1960 to 83 percent in 1991. One reason for this decline appears to be the recent spread of Protestantism. More specifically, the 1960 census revealed that 4 percent of the population practiced this faith. However, by 1991, this figure had increased to 9 percent. In addition to Christianity, a number of other faiths are practiced in Brazil. The most important of these smaller religions are the Afro-Brazilian ones known as candomblé or umbanda. These syncretistic religions are primarily practiced in the northeast and other regions where those originally from the northeast now reside. These religions resulted when the slaves mixed their African practices with those of the Roman Catholic faith. These less-practiced religions, along with others such as Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism, together account for the religions practiced by approximately 3 to 5 percent of the population.
Language Issues In order to communicate with the majority population in the United States, it is extremely important to be able to speak the English language. The 2000 Census was used to monitor the English speaking ability of Brazilians over the age of five. This five-category ordinal measure ranges from „does not speak English‰ to „speaks only English.‰ Table 37 indicates that there is reason for concern. This is because the number of individuals who either „speak no English‰ or „speak English poorly‰ (these categories are the exact ones used by the 2000 Census) has
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Sport Capoeira is a Brazilian form of martial art that recent Brazilian emigrants brought with them to all of the many destination nations in which they now reside— including the United States. Although unknown until recently in most nations, it is believed that this art form is at least 500 years old. Some believe that capoeira originated in Africa, likely in the region today occupied by Angola, while others believe that this art form is uniquely Brazilian. Unlike many martial art forms, capoeira is not designed to injure the foe; instead, the emphasis is on skill development. To the casual observer, capoeira resembles a dance, with the capoeiristas swinging their legs in sweeping motions over their opponent’s head. The legs generate most of the action as the capoeiristas demonstrate frequent leaps, flips, kicks, and sweeps. Less common techniques include hand punches and slaps. Capoeira is also always accompanied with music and song. The instrument always used to make this music is the berimbau. The berimbau consists of a wooden bow, three- to five-feet long that has a single steel string attached to it. At the bottom of the bow a hollowed out gourd is attached. This gourd serves to amplify the sound of the string being hit. A small woven basket with seeds or pebbles inside serves as a rattle, and this is held in the same hand that holds the stick used to strike the metal string. These brightly decorated instruments can be played very quickly or slowly, loudly or softly, as they set the rhythm followed by the capoeiristas. Variations on capoeira are now offered in some U.S. gyms as a fitness class. Soccer, which in Brazil is known as futebol, is without doubt the national pastime. This sport is practiced virtually everywhere and by everyone. Because all that is required is a ball and some space, it can even be played by Brazil’s poorest children without shoes on unkempt city streets or rocky rural fields. Organized soccer exists at every level. Because so many continuously practice this sport from almost the time they learn to walk, Brazilian expertise at this game is considered by many to be the best on the planet. It is so good that Brazil has won the World Cup, the pinnacle of soccer success, five times. This record of success is unequalled by any other nation. In addition, its players are sought after by professional teams everywhere. Pelé, who is arguably the best soccer player ever and the only player to have played on three winning World Cup teams, was brought to the United States in 1975 in an attempt to generate and expand U.S. interest in soccer. For three years he played on the New York Cosmos of the North American Soccer League, and although during that time he was already past his prime, he is credited with having expanded U.S. awareness of his sport.
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increased in recent years. In 2000, 23 percent of those who were five and older fell into these categories. This is a significant increase over the 12 percent observed in 1980. Individuals in this situation, especially adults, will generally have a very difficult time interacting and making friends with host society members, and perhaps more importantly, finding desirable employment that pays well. On the other hand, in 2000, 77 percent spoke English quite well. Thus it appears that there is a bifurcation of English speaking skills among the Brazilians present in the United States. Auxiliary analyses examining the effect of time in the United States not surprisingly yielded extremely significant results, indicating the more time people spend in the United States, the better their English ability becomes.
Celebration of National Holidays The most celebrated holiday in Brazil is Carnaval (Carnival), which is held 40 days before Easter. So large is this celebration that the entire country comes to a virtual halt for the better part of a week. In the United States, this type of celebration only occurs in New Orleans, and that event long preceded the arrival of Brazilians in this country. The one major Brazilian holiday that is celebrated in this country is Independence Day or September 7. In New York City, this has become a major event. Back in 1984 when it began, it was a relatively modest affair. Since then, it has continued
Participants in the 22nd Annual Brazilian Day Festival react to the music as they crowd the area called Little Brazil in Midtown Manhattan, September 3, 2006. (AP Photo/Dima Gavrysh)
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to grow and become more elaborate every year. In 2008, the New York Police Department estimated that over 1.5 million people attended this one-day event, which occurs in the heart of Little Brazil on West 46th Street between 5th and 6th avenues. It is attended not only by Brazilian Americans but also by those who like Brazil as well as those simply looking to be entertained. At this event, there are numerous bands and entertainers, not to mention venders selling all things Brazilian. This free event, which is designed to celebrate Brazil, now does much more, as it creates good will between the Brazilians and their American hosts.
Foodways Brazil is a nation with foods as distinct as the people who inhabit this gargantuan land. Furthermore, because of the nationÊs large size, each region produces different edible items, making variations of each edible theme endless. Still, there are some common foods shared by most Brazilians. These include rice, beans, and farofa (roasted manioc flour). These staples are served with virtually every meal, with the exception of the Euro-Brazilians who reside in the South. There the Germans, the Slavs, and the Italians would likely prefer potatoes and pasta to rice. And the beans served throughout the rest of Brazil will not easily be found in the South; instead of beans, cabbage and slaw would be served. Regardless of region, Brazilians enjoy a plethora of fresh fruits and vegetables. Near the Amazon, one finds fruit options that only exist in that region, such as açaí, palm hearts, cupuaçu, papaya, guava, passion fruit, and hog plum. In other regions more familiar fruits such as the orange, pineapple, watermelon, cantaloupe, banana, and mango are readily available. Because of BrazilÊs 3,300 mile coastline, fresh seafood is available in most regions. A multitude of fish, lobster, crabs, and shrimp are all key ingredients in hundreds of regional dishes. In the Amazon, even more exotic fish, some with names that have not yet been translated to English, are readily consumed by locals. In that region jacaré (a type of small alligator) and paca (the worldÊs largest rodent, weighing up to 29 pounds) are also frequently consumed. In the far south, Brazilian barbeque or churrasco is a key part of the local fare. Much like the residents of neighboring Argentina and Uruguay, Brazilians in this region love to consume numerous varieties of grilled meat. This type of barbeque has now spread throughout much of the land and is available in churrasquerias (Brazilian steakhouses) everywhere. In the heartland of Brazil, rice, beans, chicken, beef, and pork are king. Every state builds on these staples with their own regional flair. In Minas Gerais, for example, two delicacies are frango ao molho pardo (chicken in blood sauce) and feijão tropeiro (a regional bean dish). In addition, Minas is famous for its feijoada (beef stew). These main courses are always accompanied with plenty of vegetables. Next, bread is added. Baguettes are now popular in many regions as are numerous
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Foods Most agree that feijoada is Brazil’s national dish. Certainly, those that disagree must conclude that it is one of the nation’s most popular dishes. While many variations of this recipe exist, feijoada always begins with a core of black beans and meat. While some argue that this dish is Portuguese in origin, more would argue that the origin of this dish goes back to the days of Brazilian slavery. The latter explanation claims that the recipe’s key ingredients were developed from the leftovers often given to slaves by their masters. As such, all cuts of pork (butt, ears, feet, shoulder, tail) and beef (tongue) can be included. Sausage, ham, and bacon are also often added to the mix. A typical feijoada meal is a social experience and may require several hours. The meal often begins with a bean soup. This is then followed by the feijoada stew, which is typically served in a clay pot. Numerous side dishes accompany the feijoada itself. These may include white rice, farofa (roasted manioc flour), farofa with hard-boiled egg slices, farofa with banana slices, stir-fried cabbage, and orange slices. Feijoada was historically only served on Saturdays; however, in some places that cater to tourists, this is no longer the case. When consuming a feijoada, it is common to quench your thirst with frequent drinks of cachaça, Brazil’s national drink. Churrasco or Brazilian barbeque is an extremely popular way to consume grilled meat in Brazil. Although many people prepare their churrasco in their homes, others frequent churrasquerias (Brazilian steakhouses), where they can leave the preparation to others. Regardless of where the churrasco is prepared, the diner will be in for a lengthy dining experience. In churrasquerias, the waiters stroll from table to table with skewers in their hands slicing off whatever form of grilled meat they are then carrying on the diners’ plates. This continues until the diner says no. In Brazil, this style of service is called rodizio, and various Brazilian churrasqueria chains with rodizio-style service have made their way to all major U.S. cities. The grilled offerings at these locations likely include: filet mignon wrapped with bacon, various types of top sirloin (alcatra, picanha), bottom sirloin, rib eye steak, leg of lamb, pork tenderloin, pork ribs, beef ribs, sausage, chicken hearts, and chicken legs. Many sidebar offerings are also available, including fresh salads, rice, beans, farofa, mozzarella balls, fried bananas, fruits, Brazilian cheese bread, prosciutto, palm hearts, artichokes, sundried tomatoes, salami, and asparagus. As in the case of the feijoada meal, plan on spending several hours with friends at a churrasqueria, where is it also likely that at least a little beer or cachaça will be consumed.
other fresh baked varieties of bread. Pão de queijo (cheese bread) is one variety that is popular throughout much of Brazil. Some regions are also famous for the cheese they produce. In Minas, queijo mineiro (Minas cheese), a white, low-fat cheese that comes as a small round loaf, is produced.
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Drinks Cachaça is Brazil’s national liquor and its history goes back over 400 years. Cachaça, also commonly referred to as pinga, is made from the juice of the first pressing of sugarcane. After the cane is washed, pressed, and filtered, it then ferments between one and three days. Cachaça is technically a brandy and a member of the aguardente family. Similar to brandy, most fine cachaças are aged in high-quality wooden barrels. The quality of the barrel and the time in storage enhance the flavor, taste, and color of the cachaça. Most commercially available cachaças are roughly about 80 proof. The most sought-after varieties are produced in very small quantities by small farmers who reside in the extremely hilly region of the state of Minas Gerais known as the Jequitinhonha Valley. A single bottle of one of the most sought-after varieties sells for approximately $100. If cachaça is Brazil’s national drink, then the caipirinha is the nation’s favorite mixed drink. Cachaça is the main ingredient in a caipirinha. The other ingredients are cut-up pieces of lime and several tablespoons of sugar. These are crushed together before the glass is filled with ice and several ounces of cachaça. Next, the caipirinha is either shaken or stirred before being garnished with a slice of lime. These drinks are extremely popular on Brazilian beaches and at parties and in bars. Guaraná is both a plant native to the Amazon Basin. It is also a very popular sugared soft drink made from this plant that is now consumed in many nations around the world, including the United States. The plant itself is a climbing vine that produces red fruit about the size of coffee beans. The fruit are ground up to produce a powder that can be used a variety of different ways. In Brazil, guaraná is primarily used to produce flavored soft drinks that outsell all cola-flavored drinks sold. More recently, a number of energy drinks have begun including guaraná as the guaraná bean contains about twice the caffeine found in coffee beans. Other products to recently emerge in the United States tout guaraná as a useful supplement for those attempting to lose weight. Cafezinho, or “little coffee,” is probably the way most Brazilians prefer to consume their favorite caffeinated beverage. A cafezinho is usually only about three ounces of strong espresso-like coffee. Although some drink their cafezinhos black (puro), most prefer to add lots of sugar and some also add a bit of milk or crème to it. Cafezinhos are served throughout the day. During “official” coffee breaks, they are often served with various types of small cookies or sweets.
Most meals are finished with either a dessert (e.g., Brazilian bolos [cakes] and doces [sweets] are extremely rich and tasty and again are different from one region to the next) or a fruit. This is followed by a cafezinho (a Brazilian espresso). During the meal, adults often partake of one of BrazilÊs many high-quality domestic beers or wines.
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Music, Arts, and Entertainment Brazilians are extremely artistic people who love their music and their entertainment. Carmen Miranda was likely the first Brazilian entertainer to experience significant success in the United States. Although Portuguese by birth, she was raised in Brazil and would later be known as the „Brazilian Bombshell.‰ She would star in 16 films from 1940 to 1953 and was HollywoodÊs highest paid entertainer for several of those years. Similarly, Brazilian musicians have long infatuated U.S. listeners. In the late 1950s, João Gilberto and Antônio Carlos Jobim helped bring the bossa nova here. In 1963, Gilberto and Stan Getz, an American tenor saxophonist, recorded one of the best-selling jazz albums of all time, Getz/Gilberto. This album helped firmly cement the bossa nova in the U.S. musical mindset as it included several classic songs, including the „Girl from Ipanema.‰ Currently a wide variety of Brazilian musicians tour the United States on a regular basis. Many of these individuals began their musical careers in the 1960s and are the stars of what is referred to as MPB (música popular Brasileira, or „Brazilian popular music‰). Musicians like Milton Nascimento, Gal Costa, Caetano Veloso, Chico Buarque de Holanda, and Gilberto Gil play to sold-out crowds at places like Carnegie Hall and the Blue Note Jazz Club in New York City or the Arsht Center in Miami, Florida. Some, like Dori Caymmi, permanently reside and work in the United States. Many Brazilian writers have also found fame in the United States, but certainly the most popular Brazilian writer today is Paulo Coelho. Coelho, a native of Rio de Janeiro, has become very well-known in the United States for his many novels. His 1988 book The Alchemist has reportedly sold 65 million copies, one of the bestselling books in history, and has been translated into more than 67 languages. His 30 books have sold more than 100 million copies in over 150 countries.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society Paths toward Citizenship Naturalization U.S. citizenship gives a naturalized citizen a U.S. passport, the right to vote in U.S. elections, and access to government benefits. In addition, U.S. citizens are able to solicit immigrant visas for relatives living elsewhere. Recall also that in most cases, one must be a legal U.S. resident for five years before being able to become a naturalized citizen. The 2000 U.S. Census reports on immigrant naturalization status. It reveals that 20 percent of those born in Brazil had become naturalized citizens. Although this
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society | 183
Army Specialist Erika Devasconcolos of Brazil, holds her citizenship papers while receiving an American flag from seven-year-old Romie Williams during a welcome home naturalization ceremony for about 70 soldiers in the U.S. military, Atlanta, September 29, 2003. (AP Photo/ John Amis)
number might seem low, the exact opposite seems to be true. Table 25 shows that 44 percent of all Brazilian immigrants arrived within the last five years. These individuals were not yet eligible to become citizens. That leaves only 56 percent of all Brazilians eligible to naturalize. However, not all of this 56 percent, were legally in the United States. If we assume that one-half of this group was undocumented, a possibility earlier discussed, then only 28 percent of the total were eligible to become citizens, and 20 percent of the total did exactly this. Hence it could be argued that the observed 20 percent represents a very high proportion (i.e., 71%) of those eligible to become naturalized citizens; an indication that these individuals are attempting to forge strong links to their new homeland and become well-integrated members of U.S. society.
Dual Citizenship Brazilian citizens can acquire U.S. citizenship a variety of ways (e.g., by marriage or through naturalization). Some naturalized U.S. citizens may lose citizenship in their country of birth depending on the specific laws in effect in that country. U.S.
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law, however, rarely mentions dual nationality. Still, U.S. citizens could lose their citizenship if they voluntarily apply for foreign citizenship. In actuality, however, few of the U.S. born who opt to acquire a second citizenship are ever prosecuted. In the case of Brazilian immigrants, many opt to become dual nationals as Brazil also takes a laissez-faire attitude towards dual citizenship. Thus, all those who become naturalized Americans are technically dual nationals, unless of course they have some specific reason for renouncing their Brazilian citizenship. In addition, children born in the United States to Brazilian nationals are also eligible to become dual nationals. This is because they automatically receive U.S. citizenship by virtue of their place of birth, and because they were born to Brazilian nationals, they also have the right to request a Brazilian passport. Having both passports makes it extremely convenient when making multiple trips between the United States and Brazil. As travel visas for these two nations are now approximately $100 each and good for just a relatively brief period, this is an option that many Brazilian Americans have selected.
Intergroup Relations Brazilian adjustment to life in the United States has not been without problems. As discussed previously, some Brazilians believe they are superior to Hispanics because they perceive themselves to be better educated and from better backgrounds. Such an attitude has not always been well-received by Hispanics and has been known to result in less than positive interactions. Similarly, Brazilians occasionally offend non-Hispanic whites who mistakenly refer to them as Hispanics or Spanish speakers. However, my research based on hundreds of interviews revealed that their most significant difficulties occurred not with whites, blacks, or Hispanics, but with the ethnic Portuguese. As discussed earlier, Brazilian and Portuguese ethnics interact a great deal because of their shared culture and language. In addition, some Portuguese firms employ a large number of Brazilians. Because of their shared linguistic and cultural roots, this is not very surprising. What is surprising is that a large number of Brazilians indicated that they were exploited by the Portuguese in one of various ways. They believed that this discrimination might have occurred because of jealousy or simple greed. In the words of one man whom I interviewed in Governador Valadares, Minas Gerais, several years after his return from a multiyear sojourn in the United States: The exploitation that I encountered in the US really wasnÊt because of the Americans. Instead, the greatest exploitation I experienced was at the hands of the Portuguese. I always said, come on guys, donÊt rent from the Portuguese. But,
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probably because of their inability to speak English, and the difficulties that caused, they ended up falling into the hands of the Portuguese. Many Brazilian immigrants initially viewed the Portuguese as their benefactors because the Portuguese could help them find both a place to live and employment. Thus the oft-heard expression „o Português da sombra ao Brasileiro‰ (i.e., „the Portuguese provides shade for the Brazilian,‰ or in other words, because of cultural and linguistic ties, the Portuguese provide Brazilians with various types of support). However, there were numerous instances of the Portuguese reporting their Brazilian undocumented workers on pay day so that they would not have to pay them, or Portuguese landlords taking advantage when renting to Brazilians.
Forging a New American Political Identity Political and Student Associations While the development of political associations among Brazilian Americans appears to be in its infancy, Brazilian American student associations have been present in this country for many years. These associations exist on dozens of U.S. campuses in all areas of the country. Examples of these universities include: Stanford, the University of Chicago, Texas A&M, the University of Georgia, Indiana University, University of Kansas, Louisiana State University, the University of Michigan, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. One of the oldest associations, if not the oldest, is at Texas A&M and dates back to 1982. Each of these student associations has their own mission and specific aims, but all seem to overlap a great deal. The following objectives come from the University of MichiganÊs Brasilian (spelled with an „s‰ not a „z‰) Student Association and serve as an example of those found elsewhere. Our objectives are to promote an environment where Brazilian culture can thrive and where Portuguese can be spoken, educate the campus about Brazil, its culture, and its language, and finally provide an environment where friendships can be made. (University of Michigan 2010)
Civic and Electoral Participation In Brazil, it is a national requirement that every adult of legal age must vote. Those who do not are subject to fines. In addition, Election Day is essentially a holiday as most businesses are closed enabling every one the time necessary to get to the polls. Consequently, Brazilians are well-versed in how to participate in the election process. However, there is little documentation available on their level of participation
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in U.S. elections. Of course, in the United States, only those who are U.S. citizens are able to vote. Anecdotal evidence suggests that those who do vote prefer the Democratic Party. This author is unaware of any Brazilian Americans who have run for political office in this county.
Return Immigration Many of the earliest Brazilian immigrants were characterized as target earners (Goza 1994a), that is, those who came here with a set financial plan that they hoped to complete. Once their goal or target earnings were attained, then their plan was to return to Brazil and invest the nest egg they had amassed. Still, in many cases this never happened as target earners, for whatever reason, became long-time if not permanent immigrants. However, because as many as one-half of all Brazilian immigrants lacked proper documentation, their legal status was always very precarious. Consequently, to avoid persecution there have always been Brazilians returning to Brazil. Many hoped to find a way to legalize their status and return to the United States legally. Others returned with no intention of ever coming back to the United States. However, in the early 2000s, many Brazilians began to voluntarily return to Brazil. The flow of those returning appears to have remained constant for much of the past decade, likely due to the worsening U.S. economy and the post 9/11 crackdown on undocumented immigrants. For the most part, those departing have been the ones lacking proper legal documentation, as those legally in this country have more employment options.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Ethnic pride and ethnic identity remain strong among second-generation Brazilian Americans. Many have visited Brazil with their parents, and some return on a frequent basis. As children, they almost certainly heard their parents and other friends and relatives speaking Portuguese around their homes. Many among the second generation are heritage speakers who are fluent in the language, although perhaps a bit rusty from not practicing it on a regular basis. Many also celebrate Brazilian holidays and festivals as a way of confirming their ethnicity. Furthermore, most Brazilian Americans born in this country are dual nationals. That is, they have a U.S. passport by virtue of being born here and, if desired, are also able to obtain a Brazilian passport by virtue of their parents being Brazilian. Neither the United States nor Brazil has strict laws prohibiting dual national status. Thus, while second-generation Brazilian Americans are proud of their Brazilian heritage, they are also proud of the fact that they are Americans living in this country. At present, there are very few third-generation Brazilian Americans.
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A member of the Afro Brazilian dance group called Mandingueiros Dospalmares performs capoeira, a combination of dance and self-defense, during a rally and multicultural show in support of higher education and legalization for immigrant students, Boston, May 10, 2003. (AP Photo/Lisa Poole)
It is likely that the experiences of the second generation will be significantly different from those of the first generation. Many of the first generation entered this nation without proper legal documents. Some still lack them and live in fear of being deported. Their children, on the other hand, by virtue of being born in this nation are U.S. citizens. Thus, unlike their parents they will never know the fear that comes with being an undocumented immigrant or experience the saudades that come from undertaking a long-term international move. Also, because they did not grow up in Brazil, their attachments to that country will never be as strong as they are for their parents.
Educational Attainment The 2000 Census reveals that 94 percent of the Brazilian Americans born in the United States over the age of 24 have acquired at least a high school education. In fact, regardless of gender, approximately 30 percent have attended some college. In addition, 45 percent of the women and 42 percent of the men have completed four years of college. This college graduation rate is much higher than that of native-born, non-Hispanic whites. This generation is also better educated than their parents, who recall were also well educated by both Brazilian and U.S. standards. These second-generation children are clearly benefiting from the aspirations of their parents and the many sacrifices that they often had to endure (e.g., crossing a
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Youth Profile From Public Schools in Brazil to Harvard University The path taken by Brazilian Marcia Caldas de Castro started in public schools in Brazil and led eventually to Harvard University. Today Marcia is an assistant professor of demography in the Department of Global Health and Population and an associate faculty at the Harvard University Center for the Environment. She is also a member of the steering committee of the Harvard Center for Geographic Analysis and a member of the Faculty Advisory Committee and the Program Steering Group of the Brazil Studies Program at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies. As a child growing up in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil such (Courtesy of Marcia C. Castro) professional accolades no doubt seemed a world away. Marcia’s initial studies were all undertaken in Rio de Janeiro. She began her studies in the city’s grade schools. She then attended a technical high school, where she received a technical degree in statistics. While still in high school, she began her first internship. At that time, she also realized she had a special interest in regional studies and health—a focus that continues to hold her professional interest. In high school she also played basketball, a sport that she would play competitively throughout high school and her first years of college. Upon graduation from high school, Marcia went on to study statistics at the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ). While there, she also had multiple internships. In 1987, when she graduated with a BA in statistics from the UERJ, Marcia began working for the Social Security Data Processing Enterprise, a governmental institution. That job opened her eyes to the field of demography. In 1991, she began the MA program at CEDEPLAR (the Center for Planning and Regional Development) at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) located in Belo Horizonte. CEDEPLAR has a fine reputation and is known as the premier demography program in South America. Eager for additional knowledge and hoping to find a way for her research to have a more significant impact,
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she applied to Princeton University’s PhD program in demography. She was accepted to this highly competitive program and began her studies there in 1998. She arrived at Princeton with two suitcases and many dreams. Princeton did a wonderful job of connecting her with other international students and providing important “survival tips.” However, in the beginning she missed the warmth of the Brazilian people. Initially, it was easier for her to make friends with international students, perhaps because they had similar difficulties and sharing these helped everyone to adapt and move on. When classes began, she realized that despite having good English speaking and writing skills, she did not read as fast as native-born Americans. Reading more than 600 pages per week for her classes took up virtually all of her time, and she found that she did not have much time to relax. Still, six months into grad school, she felt she had almost adapted. The friendships she made then still remain strong today. Her hard work in graduate school enabled her to receive the Charles Westoff prize for writing the best student paper of the year in demography and to get hired for her present position. Her passion for health-related issues returned with a vengeance during her PhD studies, and she became involved with the study of malaria. This research focus has brought her to Tanzania, Ghana, and the Brazilian Amazon. She teaches a winter course in Brazil that brings together Brazilian students with students from Harvard University. They are all offered the opportunity to acquire valuable fieldwork experience in the area of infectious diseases, where they study dengue, schistosomiasis, leishmaniasis, HIV/AIDS, and leptospirosis. While she is unsure how long she will remain in the United States, she continues to develop projects and get involved with research that will lead to better programs to control the spread of malaria.
border illegally or their saudades) to ensure that their children would have the opportunity to attain as much education as possible. In this case, the sacrifices of the parents will likely ensure that this second generation also experiences a great deal of future success in many other realms.
Cultural Identification Second-generation Brazilian Americans have had a relatively straightforward time adapting to U.S. culture. Since this is where they were born and grew up, they identify primarily with the United States and only secondly with Brazil. However, of course their experience has been affected by the experiences their immigrant parents and other immigrant friends and relatives. Furthermore, because of the relative newness of this ethnic group, it remains in a state of development. Still, some
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second-generation Brazilian Americans, like Breno Giacomini, are truly living the American dream and have completely accepted U.S. culture as part of their identity. This young man received a college scholarship to play football at the University of Louisville, where he was a bona fide star on their offensive line. For his stellar college performance, he was drafted by the Green Bay Packers in the fifth round of the 2008 NFL Draft. While not yet an NFL starter, he has the potential. This is truly amazing as he is getting paid a tremendous amount of money, likely making more in a year than his father will in his entire career, to play a sport that his parents did not even fully understand at the time of their arrival. While the success of Giacomini is atypical, it does show how adaptive second-generation Brazilian Americans are and how well they are at adjusting to and becoming part of mainstream U.S. culture.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Brazil Forecasts for the 21st Century Brazil and the United States are two world powers that for all practical purposes get along very well. Former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso has lived in the United States and lectured at some of our best universities including Stanford University, the University of California, Berkeley, and Brown UniversityÊs Watson Institute for International Studies. In some ways, he is BrazilÊs version of Bill Clinton. Both are highly intelligent and thoughtful men. Although he is no longer president, he is just one of many Brazilians who will see to it that both nations continue to respect each other and to work together cooperatively in years to come. In 2014, Brazil will host the World Cup in soccer and then two years later it will host the 2016 summer Olympics. ItÊs likely that tens of thousands of U.S. citizens will travel to Brazil to enjoy these events. ItÊs also possible that their experiences with the people of Brazil will make Americans more sensitive to their concerns and issues, thereby reinforcing the positive links between these two nations. Furthermore, because the Brazilian American population now numbers more than one million and because they remit to Brazil more than one billion dollars per year, itÊs probable that our present tradition of mutual respect will continue for many years to come.
Conclusions The Brazilian American population continues to grow and evolve. Their sizable presence is now felt in many regions of the United States as they begin to branch out and move beyond their initial strongholds of New York City, Boston, and Los
Appendix I: Migration Statistics | 191
Angeles. A relatively small but growing native-born second generation has also emerged. Given the large numbers of Brazilians who have already opted to become naturalized U.S. citizens, the ease with which they can now sponsor additional relatives, and the extended social networks already in place, it is likely that many more Brazilians will try to discover their future in the United States, regardless of whether or not they are adequately prepared for this movement. The future looks bright for many Brazilian immigrants, especially those who are well educated. However, as was documented previously, a strong bifurcation exists within this population. More specifically, key measures such as education, occupation, English ability, and income reveal that there are large groups of both haves and have-nots. The latter group represents a sizable contingent that will likely experience tough financial and social times in the United States as they do not possess enough formal education or English ability to compete for the most desirable jobs. Many in this group also confront the additional burden of being without the proper documentation that would significantly improve their socioeconomic condition in this country.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 25 Year of U.S. arrival in percentages, in 1980, 1990, and 2000 Year of arrival
1980
1990
2000
11.5
2.9
0.4
1950–1959
9.5
4.2
1.7
1960–1964
11.5
6.3
2.2
1965–1969
19.1
7.8
3.3
1970–1974
16.6
6.7
2.6
1975–1979 (or 1980)
28.4
8.2
2.8
1980–1984
—
15.5
6.0
1985–1989 (or 1990)
—
48.5
15.6
1991–1995
—
—
21.5
1996–2000
—
—
43.9
100.0
100.1
100.0
Before 1950
Total
Source: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000).
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics
Table 26 Distribution of Brazilian Americans by place of birth in 1980, 1990, and 2000, in percents Place of birth
1980
1990
2000
Brazil (first generation)
85.3
88.7
87.0
United States (second or later generation)
14.7
11.3
12.5
47,965
98,089
[N]
247,020
Source: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000).
Table 27 U.S. state of residence for Brazilian Americans in 1980, 1990, and 2000, in percents State
1980
1990
2000
California
18.1
15.6
12.0
Florida
6.3
10.5
19.9
Massachusetts
6.0
11.9
17.1
New Jersey
10.0
12.1
10.2
New York
17.4
17.0
10.1
Total in these states
57.8
67.1
69.7
Source: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000).
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Table 28 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 by region/country of birth and selected characteristics region/country: Brazil Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
14,701
5,752
8,949
Leading states of residence Arizona
116
33
83
California
1,680
695
985
Colorado
106
29
77
Connecticut
552
238
314
3,620
1,511
2,109
Georgia
594
246
348
Illinois
199
62
137
Maryland
229
81
148
2,025
838
1,187
Michigan
160
52
108
Nevada
98
31
67
New Jersey
1,157
434
723
New York
1,085
411
674
North Carolina
221
77
144
Ohio
112
38
74
Pennsylvania
219
76
143
Texas
619
234
385
Virginia
243
74
169
Washington
197
77
120
1,469
515
954
Florida
Massachusetts
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
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Table 29 Metropolitan areas where Brazilian Americans resided in 1980, 1990, and 2000, in percents Metropolitan area
1980
1990
2000
Boston
3.0
8.7
12.0
Fort Lauderdale, Florida
0.0
2.9
6.8
Jersey City, New Jersey
1.4
2.0
2.0
Los Angeles-Long Beach
7.1
6.2
2.8
Miami-Hialeah
2.3
3.8
4.5
13.8
14.0
7.4
Newark, New Jersey
5.7
5.9
5.4
San Francisco
2.9
1.8
1.2
36.2
45.3
42.1
New York
TOTAL Source: U.S. Census of Population (1980, 1990, 2000).
Table 30 Sex distribution of Brazilian Americans in 1980, 1990, and 2000, in percents Sex
1980
1990
2000
Male
44.9
48.3
45.8
Female
55.1
51.7
54.2
47,965
98,089
[N]
247,020
Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1980, 1990 and 2000.
Table 31 Age distribution of all Brazilian Americans in 1980, 1990, and 2000, in percents Age
1980
1990
2000
Less than 10
13.9
12.4
12.5
10 to 19
16.3
12.4
12.4
20 to 29
20.5
26.4
22.3
30 to 39
18.7
24.3
26.1
40 to 49
12.1
10.4
15.3
50 to 59
8.1
6.9
7.3
60 and over Total [N]
10.3
7.1
4.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
47,965
98,089
Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1980, 1990, 2000.
194
247,020
Table 32 Marital status of Brazilian Americans 18 and older, in 1980, 1990, and 2000, in percents Marital status
1980
1990
2000
Married, spouse present
62.3
52.7
60.3
Married, spouse absent
1.5
4.5
0.0
Separated
2.2
2.8
2.9
Divorced
5.2
7.9
7.5
Widowed Never married/single (N/A) Total %
5.6
3.0
2.3
23.1
29.1
27.0
100.0
100.0
100
[N]
3,060
76,485
209,612
Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1980, 1990, 2000.
Table 33 Number of own family members in household, in 1980, 1990, and 2000, in percents Number of family members
1980
1990
2000
1
16.1
23.2
19.7
2
18.7
19.4
19.8
3
16.9
18.3
20.0
4
24.9
20.9
23.8
5
14.5
10.7
12.2
6
6.1
4.1
2.1
7+
2.7
3.5
2.5
mean Total % [N]
3.3
3.0
2.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
47,965
98,089
247,020
Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1980, 1990, 2000. Note: The respondent also is counted as a family member. Thus N ⫽ 1 means that the respondent does not live with any other family members.
195
Table 34 Relationship to household head in 1980, 1990, and 2000, in percents 1980 Household head relationship Heads
1990
Sex Male
2000
Sex
Female
Total
Male
Sex
Female
Total
Male
Female
Total
196
50.5
14.1
30.5
47.6
18.7
32.7
49.6
18.3
32.6
Spouses
1.5
46.5
26.3
3.8
39.5
22.3
5.3
40.2
24.2
Children
37.8
28.5
32.7
28.2
23.4
25.7
27.0
24.8
25.8
Parents
0.8
2.4
1.7
0.5
2.2
1.4
0.5
1.9
1.2
Siblings
1.1
1.4
1.3
2.8
2.7
2.7
2.8
2.3
2.5
Other Relatives
0.6
1.2
0.9
2.1
2.2
2.1
3.0
2.0
2.5
10.5
11.1
Non-relatives Total % [N]
7.7
5.9
6.7
15.0
11.3
13.1
11.7
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
21,553
26,412
47,965
47,340
50,749
98,089
113,144
133,876
247,020
Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1980, 1990, 2000.
Table 35 Years of schooling completed for Brazilian Americans age 25 and older in 1980, 1990, and 2000, in percents Years of schooling
1980
None
1990
2000
2.3
1.8
1.2
Grades 1 to 8
18.0
8.9
6.1
Grades 9 to 11
8.4
5.9
4.0
Grade 12
27.2
30.0
31.9
1 to 3 years of college
18.2
22.9
22.3
4+ years of college
26.0
30.4
34.5
Total %
100.0
[N]
100.0
28,952
63,199
100.0 161,317
Source: U.S. Census of Population 1980, 1990, 2000.
Table 36 Top 20 occupations reported, by sex, for foreign-born Brazilian Americans age 18 and older in 2000, in percents Rank
Top 20 occupations for men
%
Top 20 occupations for women
%
1
Managers, officials, and proprietors
9.8
Private household workers
2
Professional and technical workers
6.1
Managers, officials, and proprietors
5.7
3
Operative and kindred workers
4.8
Clerical and kindred workers
5.4
4
Cooks, except private household
4.5
Professional and technical workers
4.1
5
Painters, construction, and maintenance
4.3
Attendants and personal service
3.8
6
Truck and tractor drivers
3.9
Salesmen and sales clerks
3.7
7
Clerical and kindred workers
3.7
Teachers
3.5
8
Laborers
3.7
Operative and kindred workers
3.0
9
Carpenters
3.2
Cashiers
2.9
10
Salesmen and sales clerks
2.8
Waiters and waitresses
2.4
11
Foremen
2.7
Stenographers, typists, and secretaries
2.3
12
Janitors and sextons
1.9
Janitors and sextons
2.1
13
Gardeners and groundskeepers
1.9
Service workers, except private household
2.0
14
Service workers, except private household
1.9
Professors and instructors
1.4
15
Private household workers
1.7
Attendants, hospital, and other institutions
1.4
197
11.9
198 | Brazilian Immigrants Table 36 Top 20 occupations reported, by sex, for foreign-born Brazilian Americans age 18 and older in 2000, in percents (Continued ) Rank
Top 20 occupations for men
%
Top 20 occupations for women
%
16
Teachers
1.5
Cooks, except private household
1.4
17
Testing-technicians
1.5
Buyers and dept heads, store
0.9
18
Buyers and dept heads, store
1.4
Barbers, beauticians, and manicurists
0.9
19
Waiters and waitresses
1.3
Accountants and auditors
0.9
20
Automobile-mechanics and repairmen
1.2
Nurses, professional
0.9
Total percent
63.8
Total percent
60.5
Source: U.S. Census of Population 2000.
Table 37 English speaking ability for those age 5 and older, in 1980, 1990, and 2000, in percents
English speaking ability
1980
1990
2000
Percent
Percent
Percent
Does not speak English
2.2
3.6
5.6
Not well
9.7
16.9
17.3
Speaks well
28.1
26.3
24.3
Speaks very well
41.6
40.3
43.8
Speaks only English
18.4
12.9
9.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1980, 1990, 2000.
Appendix III: Notable Brazilian Americans Sônia Braga was born in born in Maringá in the state of Paraná, Brazil, on June 8, 1950. She is best known in the United States as an acclaimed actor; however, in Brazil she is also well-known as a model. In addition, she has also begun producing films. In the early 1970s, she worked on a number of Brazilian TV shows, including Sesame Street (Vila Sesamo). She was a popular actor in Brazilian soap operas when she began starring in feature films as few years later. Her first major success was in the 1976 film Dona Flor and Her Two Husbands (Dona Flor e Seus Dois Maridos), in which she starred as Dona Flor. In the early 1980s, she moved to the United States. Since then she has starred in dozens of films and TV shows. For her role in the 1985 movie Kiss of the Spider Woman, she was nominated for the Golden Globe award as best supporting actress. In 1989, she was again nominated for the same award, this time for the movie Moon over Parador. She has
Appendix III: Notable Brazilian Americans | 199
also appeared in CSI: Miami, Sex and the City, and The Cosby Show. She now lives on Roosevelt Island in New York. Gisele Bündchen was born in Horizontina, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul on July 20, 1980. She is a supermodel, considered one of the best working today. Rolling Stone magazine called her the „most beautiful girl in the world.‰ In 1996, she moved to the United States to begin working in New York City. Since then she has appeared on hundreds of magazine covers around the world. She is estimated to be worth $150 million as she is one of the worldÊs highest paid models. In 2009, she married Tom Brady, the star quarterback for the NFLÊs New England Patriots. She gave birth to a son in December 2009. The family resides in the greater Boston metropolitan area. Dori Caymmi, a musician who resides in Los Angeles, is the son of Dorival Caymmi, one of BrazilÊs most famous songwriters. Dori was born in Rio de Janeiro in 1943 and began following in his fatherÊs footsteps at a very early age. He is praised for his work as a composer, music director, and arranger, having worked with some of BrazilÊs best musicians including Caetano Veloso, Gilberto Gil, and Gal Costa. He has won two Grammy awards, one for Best Latin Song and the other for Best Latin Samba Recording. He has also been nominated for several other Grammy awards. He continues to write and perform his music, often playing a guitar, wherever there are large Brazilian American communities. João de Matos is a Brazilian businessman who has lived in New York City area for more than 30 years. He is the president and owner of a travel agency that he established not long after arriving in the City. His agency employs a staff of about 35 and is located in the heart of Little Brazil, West 46th Street between 5th and 6th avenues. For many years, he has been the publisher of a newspaper published in New York City called the Brasilians. This paper focuses exclusively on topics of interest to Brazilian Americans. He is also one of the founders of the Brazilian Day Festival in New York City. Breno Giacomini was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in September 1985, not long after his parents moved there from Brazil. He is currently a professional football play in the NFL. He was raised in Malden, Massachusetts, where he played both football and basketball for his high school team. He received a college scholarship to play football at the University of Louisville, where he played right tackle on their offensive line. After an exceptional college career, he was selected by the Green Bay Packers in the in the fifth round of the 2008 NFL Draft. His base salary in 2010 was reported to be $470,000. He continues to live in Malden. Anderson Varejão was born in Colatina in the state of Espírito Santo, Brazil, on September 28, 1982. He is now a professional basketball player in the NBA. As a young man, he played for the Franca Basquetebol Clube in
200 | Brazilian Immigrants
the city of Franca, São Paulo. From there, he moved to Europe where he played professionally for a team from Barcelona, Spain. In 2003, he played on the Brazilian national team that won the gold medal at the Pan American Games. In 2004, he was drafted in the second round of the NBA draft. Since then he has played for the Cleveland Cavaliers. For his efforts, Varejão recently signed a six-year contract worth $42.5 million. A very personable guy, his friends call him „Andy,‰ and the press often refers to him as „wild thing‰ because of his long curly hair. He lives in Cleveland much of the year.
Glossary Cachaça: BrazilÊs national drink (a distilled spirit). Cachaça is made from fermented sugar cane juice (see sidebar). Cafezinho: Brazilian-style espresso (see sidebar). Caipirinha: BrazilÊs favorite mixed drink. It consists of cachaça poured over lime pieces crushed with sugar (see sidebar). Capoeira: An Afro-Brazilian form of martial arts (see sidebar). Feijoada: BrazilÊs national dish. A type of stew that starts with a foundation of black beans and meat. Other items that may be added include pork (butt, ears, feet, shoulder, tail), beef (tongue), sausage, ham, and bacon (see sidebar). Futebol: The Portuguese term for soccer, which is BrazilÊs national sport (see sidebar). Garimpeiros: Brazilian miners. Remittances: Money sent back to the homeland, in this case Brazil, from those living elsewhere. Sertão: A Portuguese term that roughly translates as „hinterland,‰ „backwoods,‰ „backcountry,‰ or „bush.‰ It is often used in reference to the dry interior region of northeastern Brazil. Social network: The web of family, friends, community, and church organizations that regularly offers emotional, financial, material, and informational assistance. This form of network assumes that individuals both give and receive through their connections with the other network participants. Target Earners: Sojourners who intend to work until they have acquired the amount of savings that represents their target. The intention of target earners is that once their target has been attained, they will return home; however, life does not always go as planned.
References
| 201
References Anderson, M., and S. Fienberg. 1999. Who Counts? The Politics of Census-Taking in Contemporary America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. BRAMAS. 2010. Our Mission. [Online article or information; retrieved 02/20/10.] http:// www.framingham.com/org/bramas.htm. Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce. 2010. Our Organization. [Online article or information; retrieved 02/20/10.] http://www.brazilcham.com/default.asp?id=222. Carvalho, J. 1996. „O saldo dos fluxos migratórios internacionais no Brasil na década de 80: uma tentativa de estimação.‰ Revista Brasileira de Estudos de População 13: 3 14. CIA Factbook. 2010. The World Factbook. [Online article or information; retrieved 02/20/10.] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/ 2172rank.html. Cimitile, M. 2009. Amazon Deforestation: Earth’s Heart and Lungs Dismembered. [Online article or information; retrieved 02/20/10.] http://www.livescience.com/ environment/090109-bts-deforestation.html. Goza, F. 1992. „A Imigração Brasileira na América do Norte.‰ Revista Brasileira de Estudos de População 9: 65 82. Goza, F. 1994a. „Brazilian Immigration to North America.‰ International Migration Review 28: 136 52. Goza, F. 1994b. „Brazilian Frontier Settlement: The Case of Rondônia.‰ Population and Environment 16: 561 84. Goza, F. 1999. „Brazilian Immigration to Ontario.‰ International Migration 37: 765 89. Goza, F., and A. DeMaris. 1999. „Unemployment Transitions among Brazilians in the U.S. and Canada.‰ International Migration 41: 127 52. Goza, F., and I. Ryabov. Forthcoming. „Remittance Activity among Brazilians in the U.S. and Canada.‰ International Migration. Grasmuck, S., and P. Pessar. 1991. Between Two Islands: Dominican International Migration. Berkeley: University of California Press. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. 2008. Brazil in Figures. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. International Monetary Fund. 2007. Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, Volume 58, Part 1: Country Tables. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. Marcelli, E., L. Holmes, D. Estella, F. da Rocha, P. Granberry, and O. Buxton. 2009. (In) Visible (Im)Migrants: The Health and Socioeconomic Integration of Brazilians in Metropolitan Boston. San Diego, CA: Center for Behavioral and Community Health Studies, San Diego State University. Margolis, M. 1994. Little Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Margolis, M. 2009. An Invisible Minority: Brazilians in New York City. Gainesville: University of Florida Press. Merrick, T., and D. Graham. 1979. Population and Economic Development in Brazil: 1800 to the Present. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
202 | Brazilian Immigrants Messias, Erick. 2003. „Income Inequality, Illiteracy Rate, and Life Expectancy in Brazil.‰ American Journal of Public Health 938: 1294 96. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. 2001. Brasileiros residentes no exterior—Tabelas. [Online article or information; retrieved 03/03/04]. www.mre.gov.br. Population Reference Bureau. 2010. 2010 World Population Data Sheet. Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau. Ripsa. 2008. IDB 2007 Brasil: Indicadores e Dados Básicos para a Saúde. Rio de Janeiro: Rede Interagencial de Informações para a Saúde. Ruggles, S., M. Sobek, T. Alexander, C. Fitch, R. Goeken, P. Hall, M. King, and C. Ronnander. 2008. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 4.0 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor]. Sales, T. 2003. Brazilians Away from Home. New York: Center for Migration Studies. Schmitz, P. 1987. „Prehistoric Hunters and Gatherers of Brazil.‰ Journal of World Prehistory 1: 53 126. Telles, Edward. 2004. Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. U.S. Department of Justice. 2000. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1998. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2006. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2004. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2010. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2009. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. University of Michigan. 2010. Brasilian Student Association. [Online article or information; retrieved 02/15/10.] http://uuis.umich.edu/maizepgs/view.cfm?orgID=10003963.
Further Reading Braga Martes, Ana Cristina, and Soraya Fleischer, eds. 2003. Fronteiras Cruzadas: Etnicidade, família e redes sociais (Borders Traversed: Ethnicity, Family and Social Networks). São Paulo: Paz e Terra. This important book contains nearly a dozen chapters written by experts on Brazilian immigration. Unfortunately, the book has not yet been translated to English. However, those able to read Portuguese will encounter a wealth of information on the Brazilian immigrant experience. Each chapter focuses on a distinct theme, examining topics as diverse as the life of Brazilian families in a new social context, second-generation immigrants, social networks, and transnationalism. Goza, Franklin. 1994. „Brazilian Immigration to North America.‰ International Migration Review 28(1): 136 52. This article was the first published in English on Brazilian immigrants in North America. It uses a variety of primary data and government statistics to compare and contrast the experiences of Brazilians in Toronto and a mid-sized U.S. city. The article traces the origins of these movements as well as their early experiences. Next, it examines a
Further Reading
| 203
number of labor force measures before moving to a review of various measures of social adaptation, including variables that monitor cultural and linguistic adaptation. The future plans of these immigrants are also reviewed. Interestingly, some important differences are found among the two groups. For example, most U.S. immigrants were target earners·those who intend to return home once they save a predetermined amount. Meanwhile the Toronto residents were more likely to desire to become Canadian citizens and permanently remain in that nation. Margolis, Maxine. 1994. Little Brazil: An Ethnography of Brazilian Immigrants in New York City. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. In this book, Margolis, an American anthropologist, presents a detailed study of Brazilians in New York City. The fieldwork for this book was undertaken when most of these immigrants were relatively new to the city. Thus, we are able to learn a great deal about their initial U.S. experiences. The book is written so that advanced high school students will have no difficulty following the discussion. It also contains many photographs that document the world of these immigrants. Margolis visits her respondents where they live, work, and play. In it, we learn about the diverse range of occupations filled that range from shoeshine „boys‰ to go-go „girls.‰ This well-written book serves as a solid introduction for the novice seeking to learn more about this population. Sales, Teresa. 2003. Brazilians Away from Home. New York: Center for Migration Studies. First published in Portuguese in 1999, this book examines the lives of Brazilian residents of Framingham, Massachusetts, a city located approximately 22 miles west of Boston. This study, which is largely based on fieldwork undertaken by the author in this community, documents the experiences of Brazilians not long after their arrival in the United States. Sales attempts to study the social identity of these immigrants as she monitors the ways in which they redefine their self-image, the ways in which they view Brazil, and the evolution of their interactions with other groups in the United States. Telles, Edward. 2004. Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Although this award-winning book is not designed for the introductory student, it is extremely well-written and is worth the time and effort required to understand its content. In this book, Telles presents an amazingly detailed account of race in Brazil. Some will even argue that this is the best volume ever written on the subject of Brazilian race relations. This work was written with one lofty goal in mind: Telles desires to develop a new theoretical paradigm for understanding race in Brazil. In the process, however, he provides much more as he elaborates comprehensive empirical analyses of Brazilian race-related issues. He then uses these results to compare and contrast the race-based socioeconomic disparities that exist in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States. He next synthesizes and modifies extant sociological theory in „the interest of building a universal sociology of race relations‰ (2). The author makes a major contribution to the understanding of race relations, making this book required reading for anyone interested in the topics of race or Brazil.
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Cambodian Immigrants by Justin Corfield
Introduction During the latter part of the Vietnam War, the United States became heavily involved in Cambodia supporting the pro-Western government of Prime Minister, then Marshal, and later President Lon Nol. The defeat of Lon NolÊs Khmer Republic in April 1975 led to large numbers of Cambodians seeking refuge in the United States, with many more arriving during the late 1970s and during the 1980s from refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border where they had fled to in order to escape from the Communist governments in control of the country. Some managed to escape to the border in 1975, and others were only able to escape after the Vietnamese invasion of December 1978 January 1979. Subsequently, more Cambodians have moved to the United States settling throughout the country, but particularly at Long Beach, California, which now has the largest concentration of Cambodians outside Cambodia, and Lowell, Massachusetts, where there is also a significant Cambodian American population. Other Cambodian Americans live throughout the major urban areas on the West Coast and in large cities such as New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago.
Chronology 802
The emergence of the Devaraja („God-King‰) system of government under King Jayavarman II.
1432
Destruction of the Cambodian capital of Angkor.
1528
Foundation of the future city of Phnom Penh.
1749
King of Cambodia cedes southern Mekong delta region to Vietnam.
1835–1840
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.
1848
Coronation of King Ang Duong.
1860
Death of King Ang Duong. Accession of King Norodom I.
1863
King Norodom agrees to the establishment of a French protectorate over Cambodia. 205
Chronology | 207
1865
Phnom Penh established as the capital of Cambodia.
1904
Death of King Norodom I. Accession of King Sisowath.
1916
Major protest against higher taxes imposed in World War I.
1927
Death of King Sisowath. Accession of his son Sisowath Monivong.
1940
French authorities in Indochina allow Japanese to establish bases in Cambodia.
1941
Death of King Sisowath Monivong; accession of his grandson Norodom Sihanouk.
1945
Cambodia briefly becomes independent. French rule restored.
1946–1954
First Indochina War with nationalists in Cambodia. Vietnam and Laos fight the French.
1946
First elections held in Cambodia with Democrat Party winning control of the constituent assembly.
1953
Cambodia gains its independence as the Kingdom of Cambodia.
1954
Cambodian independence is formally recognized by the major world powers meeting at Geneva.
1955
Sihanouk abdicates. Government political movement Sangkum wins elections and dominates Cambodia until 1970.
1959
Two U.S.-supported plots to overthrow Sihanouk.
1965
Cambodia breaks diplomatic relations with the United States.
1969
U.S. forces from Vietnam start secretly bombing parts of Cambodia.
1970
Overthrow of Sihanouk supported by the United States. Installation of the pro-U.S. Lon Nol government. Civil war starts.
1973
U.S. bombing of Cambodia stopped by U.S. Congress.
1975
Khmer Rouge (Communists) wins the civil war and evacuates the entire population of Phnom Penh and other cities, in order to create a rural peasant society. This symbolizes the start of the so-called Killing Fields, in which up to 1.5 million people were murdered or left to die through overwork, preventable diseases, or broken heart. Their government is closely allied to the PeopleÊs Republic of China.
208 | Cambodian Immigrants
December 1978
Vietnamese (Communist) forces invade Cambodia.
1979
Pro-Vietnamese PeopleÊs Republic of Kampuchea (P.R.K.) is established with support from the U.S.S.R. Start of a new civil war. Tens of thousands of refugees head for Thailand.
1983
Formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (C.G.D.K.) brings together anti-P.R.K. groups. The C.G.D.K. is recognized by the United States and the United Nations.
1985
Hun Sen, the foreign minister, becomes prime minister of the P.R.K.
1989
Anticipating the end of Communism, Hun Sen renames P.R.K. as the State of Cambodia and renounces Communist principles.
1991
Paris Peace Agreements turn Cambodia over to the United Nations.
1993
Elections in Cambodia won by the Royalist FUNCINPEC Party of Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Hun Sen refuses to hand over power; formation of a coalition government. There is also a reestablishment of the Cambodian monarchy with Norodom Sihanouk becoming, once again, king.
1995
Former FUNCINPEC finance minister Sam Rainsy forms opposition party (now the Sam Rainsy Party).
1997
Hand grenade attack on Sam Rainsy injures a U.S. citizen. FBI blames killing on members of the Cambodian PeopleÊs Party (CPP). Hun Sen launches overthrow of his coalition partner Prince Norodom Ranariddh; many Royalists killed.
1998
Death of Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot. Hun SenÊs CPP claims victory in elections amid widespread election irregularities.
1999
Cambodia becomes a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2000–2002
Major breakdown in law and order in Cambodia with a number of politically motivated assassinations. Conservation groups condemn the clearing of the rainforests.
2003
Hun SenÊs CPP again proclaims victory in new elections.
2004
King Norodom Sihanouk abdicates the throne, leading to the convening of the Throne Council, which chooses his youngest son Prince Norodom Sihamoni to become king.
Background | 209
2008
In elections, Hun SenÊs CPP are again victorious against fragmented opposition, and the Sam Rainsy Party emerges as the major opposition party in the country.
2009
Former prime minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh, half-brother of King Norodom Sihamoni, is appointed as president of the privy council.
Background Geography and Demography Located in mainland Southeast Asia, Cambodia shares land borders with Thailand to the west, Vietnam to the east, and Laos to the north. The predominant ethnic group in Cambodia is the Khmer people. They were initially Hindu, but under King Jayavarman VII (reigned 1178 c.1220), the rulers and then the populace converted to Buddhism, and since then the vast majority of Khmers follow Theravada Buddhism. Since ancient times, Chinese traders have lived in Cambodia, and there are now many Sino-Khmers·Cambodians of joint Chinese and Khmer ancestry·and for the last 150 years they formed a major business class in the country. In medieval times, the Kingdom of Angkor dominated the region and covered what is now Cambodia, parts of Thailand, Laos, and much of southern Vietnam. As a result there are Cambodian-speaking minorities outside Cambodia, especially the Khmer Krom in southern Vietnam. Although many speak Vietnamese as a first language, they are ethnically Khmer, and many identify as Cambodians. Within Cambodia there are also some minority groups. Many Chams, descendants of the medieval Kingdom of Champa, live in the east of the country. Their ancestral homeland was what is now central Vietnam but it was invaded and occupied by the Vietnamese in late medieval times causing the Chams to flee westwards to Cambodia, although many of the Chams were killed by the Communists during the late 1970s. There have also been many Vietnamese in Cambodia. Most came during the French period and were either employed as civil servants and low-level administrators or as workers in the rubber plantations in the east of the country, along the border with Vietnam. There are also small numbers of Cambodians of Thai or Lao ethnicity. And there are a small number of Cambodians who descend from the hill tribes who lived in the country before the Khmers and who, in recent centuries, have generally lived in the jungles and the mountains; the French called them the „Montagnards.‰ Within Cambodia, the major city is the capital, Phnom Penh, in the center of the country. Currently it accounts for 8.6 percent of the countryÊs population (1.2 million of 14 million), about the same percentage as in 1970 when it had a population
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of only 600,000, and the countryÊs population was 7 million. Around Phnom Penh are a number of other towns. Some such as Udong (formerly Oudong) and Lovek were former capitals in early modern times, and others such as Takhmau were prosperous market towns. The second largest city in the country is Battambang, in the west; it is the capital of a province of the same name. North of Phnom Penh and east of Battambang is Siemreap, now emerging as an important city on the basis of the tourist trade. The city is located very close to the remains of great temples, the most famous being Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom. Other large towns around the countryside include Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Speu, Kampong Thom, Kampot, Koh Kong, and Svay Rieng. All these are large market towns, and all are capitals of provinces that have the same name as them (Mabbett and Chandler 1995).
History of Cambodia From the ninth century, the Kingdom of Angkor dominated much of the region, and in 1432, the capital was sacked by the Siamese from modern-day Thailand. The country then became susceptible to attacks from both the Siamese and the Vietnamese. By the 18th century, the country was about to be partitioned between those two powers but was saved by the Burmese sacking of the Siamese capital and by the civil wars breaking out in Vietnam, which were to lead to the rise of the Nguyen dynasty in the late 1790s. By the 1840s, the King of Cambodia, Ang Duong, was worried that his country might be partitioned again, and he sought European support. This policy of trying to get foreign involvement continued under his son King Norodom I. Initially, the British in Singapore were approached, and then the French. The latter established the Protectorate of Cambodia in 1863, and over the next 30 years, they established French Indochina, an entity that brought together Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (then divided into Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) under French rule. With the fall of France to Germany in 1940, the Japanese managed to move their armed forces into French Indochina and used Cambodia as a base for their attacks on British Malaya. In March 1945, they took over and forced the Cambodian King, Norodom Sihanouk, to declare independence. This was short-lived because in September of that year the French returned and reestablished their colonial rule. However, many Cambodians resented French rule, and the people started to support the Khmer Issarak (Free Khmer) movement, which started to fight a small-scale guerilla war against the French at the same time that the Viet Minh were fighting the French in Vietnam. In November 1953, the French granted Cambodia independence, and this was accepted internationally at the Geneva Conference held in 1954. In the following year, King Norodom Sihanouk abdicated the throne and became leader of the government, dominating the country for the next 15 years. The country followed a neutralist foreign policy with support from the PeopleÊs
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Republic of China. Initially, it was easy to stay neutral but as the fighting from Vietnam occasionally spilled over into Cambodia in the late 1960s, it became extremely difficult. On March 18, 1970, the pro-Western prime minister of Cambodia, Lon Nol, overthrew Prince Sihanouk, who was in Moscow heading back to Cambodia at the time. In October, the country was renamed the Khmer Republic, and over the next five years, there was a bitter civil war, with Lon Nol being backed by the United States. The war led to a devastation of much of the countryside, with vast numbers of refugees fleeing to the cities under government control. On April 17, 1975, the Communists (who had formed a tactical alliance with Sihanouk) captured Phnom Penh and took control of the country. Sihanouk had earlier dubbed these Communists the „Khmer Rouge‰ („Red Cambodians‰). After helping Sihanouk take control of the country, the Khmer Rouge eased him out of power, and over the next three-and-a-half years, they turned Cambodia into a giant labor camp resulting in the deaths of as many as 1.5 million Cambodians (from a population of 7.3 million) and causing many others to flee to Thailand. Of those who died, some 100,000 to 150,000 were murdered. Most of the others died from preventable diseases, overwork, and maladministration, causing many to die of broken hearts. The Khmer
A wounded Cambodian government soldier is carried off a river patrol boat after his unit was hit while trying to wrest back an island from the Khmer Rouge south of Phnom Penh, August 25, 1974. (AP Photo/Tea Kim Heang)
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Rouge saw Vietnam as their great enemy, and in late 1978, they invaded, but their army was surrounded and destroyed. The Vietnamese then launched their counterattack. This saw them, in a fortnight, overrunning almost all of Cambodia and establishing a pro-Vietnamese communist government in power. This precipitated another civil war, with hundreds of thousands of Cambodians fleeing to massive refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. Although many of the refugees were resettled, as the war progressed, many more headed towards the border camps to escape from the fighting and from Communist rule (Chan 2004). In 1991, the Paris Peace Settlement ended the war and after about 18n months of control by the United Nations, elections were held. The Royalist FUNCINPEC Party won, but the pro-Vietnamese, formerly Communist, CPP (formerly the PeopleÊs Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea) under Hun Sen, refused to accept the results and forced themselves into a coalition government. In 1996, Hun Sen staged a military coup, and·with many irregularities·won the election in the following year, and the elections held in 2003 and 2008 (Chandler 1972, 1991; Tully 2005).
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration The first Cambodians to settle in the United States were, by and large, students who went to study in U.S. institutions under a variety of scholarships offered by the U.S. government. One of the early groups was a number of Cambodians who studied at California State University at Long Beach in the early 1960s (Bunte and Joseph 1992). The students amounted to only a handful of individuals, and after a major diplomatic row between the two countries, Prince Norodom Sihanouk renounced U.S. aid in 1963, breaking relations two years later. In 1969 the situation changed, and once again a number of Cambodians were able to study in the United States, and this increased during the Lon Nol government (1970 1975), when its strong support of the foreign policy of the United States saw many more Cambodians studying in the United States, many on scholarships offered by either the U.S. or the Cambodian governments, but many others self-funded. The decline and fall of the Lon Nol government in 1975 caused many other Cambodians to seek refuge in the United States. The U.S. government felt a strong obligation to help these refugees after its extensive involvement in the region. Some other refugees who managed to escape Communist rule in Cambodia in the late 1970s went to the United States, with others managing to settle in France, Canada (especially Quebec, owing to French being the second language in Cambodia), or Australia. Because of the small community already established at Long Beach, many of the later Cambodian migrants also settled there.
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A large number of the leaders of the Cambodian community settled in the United States during this period. Lon Nol himself first lived in Hawaii and then in Fullerton, California, where he died in 1985. His brother, Lon Keng, lived in New York, where he worked for the United Nations. However, neither became involved in the Cambodian communities. Cheng Heng, the head of state of Cambodia/Khmer Republic from 1970 until 1972; Saukham Khoy, the acting president in April 1975; Sak Suthsakhan, the last head of state of the Khmer Republic in April 1975; and Chhang Song, the last minister of information of the Khmer Republic, also settled in the United States; they became active community leaders, as did Thach Reng, the last head of the Khmer RepublicÊs special forces, and Dien Del, a senior army commander in the Khmer Republic (Corfield and Summers 2003). Mention should also be made of the family of Dith Pran, a translator and assistant to New York Times journalist Sydney H. Schanberg. Pran and Schanberg were evacuated by the Americans in April 1975 although Pran was to remain in Cambodia until he managed to escape four years later; his story is told in the film The Killing Fields (1984), although the last part of the story as related in the film is inaccurate (Dith 1997; Kamm 1998; Schanberg 1985).
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separatism Many of the early Cambodian migrants found it hard to live in the United States. Few Americans knew of Cambodia, and the small number of Cambodian immigrants that existed were scattered throughout the country (Corfield and Summers 2003). Many had come from wealthy families in Cambodia and some found it hard to survive without servants. Lon NolÊs own family was a case in point. In Cambodia, Lon Nol had held senior political positions since the 1940s·and was a cabinet minister for much of the 1950s and 1960s. He had maintained a significant household in Phnom Penh with many servants; large numbers of his extended family always stayed in his house; and itinerant Buddhist monks were regularly allowed to stay at his house. When he arrived in the United States with his second wife and their children, he found it hard to manage even with the money he had managed to take with him when he departed. It was not long before his wife forced some of their children to do the housework all night, and they started to fall behind with their schoolwork and sometimes fell asleep at school exhausted. Social services intervened and took the children away at different times, incidents that were extensively covered in the local and international press (Corfield 2009a). Lon NolÊs family is an extreme case. Most of the others learned English as quickly as they could, and the children who started attending U.S. schools often assimilated far better and far more easily than their parents. The older generation
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spoke of their great desire to return to Cambodia, and by 1978, some were clearly involved in organizing the funding for a guerilla group, the Khmer PeopleÊs National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), which was launched in the following year. As well as the Cambodian political and military figures who moved to the United States in the years 1975 1976, there were also a number of poorer Cambodians who managed to flee their country for the small refugee camps along the ThaiCambodian border (Chan and Kim 2003). Some of these were resettled in the United States. One of the Cambodian refugees who moved to the United States during this time was the four-year-old Kris Dim and his family who settled in Arlington, Virginia, later moving to Sacramento, California. He later became a bodybuilder, appearing on the cover of FLEX magazine.
Later Waves of Immigration The fall of the hard-line Communist government known as Democratic Kampuchea in January 1979 caused vast numbers of Cambodians to head for the border with Thailand. By the end of 1979, some 750,000 were living in refugee camps along the border, and while many supported resistance groups such as the KPNLAF, some of these and many others tried to get resettlement overseas. Those who had family in France, Canada, or the United States managed to get through the paperwork with help from their relatives. This immediately saw tens of thousands of Cambodians settling in the United States during the 1980s. Some 9.9 percent of American Cambodians in the 2000 Census had settled in the United States before 1980 (many migrating in 1979), with 73.9 percent settling in the period from 1980 to 1989 (Sheehy 1984). With the support of his former employer, the New York Times, translator Dith Pran was able to get into the United States in 1979. The Times immediately offered him a position as a photojournalist based in New York, and it was not long before he was active helping other Cambodians settling in the United States, especially after he became famous through the film The Killing Fields. The man who played Dith Pran in the film had also come to the United States in 1980. Haing S. Ngor, the actor, was from a wealthy Sino-Khmer family, but the Communists had killed all his relatives. In the United States, he finished his training as a doctor, and after his film debut, became very active in the Cambodian community and in the World Anti-Communist League. He was murdered in a street robbery in 1996 in Los Angeles. Many of the more recent Cambodian American migrants are relatives of previous migrants·the more recent ones being sponsored by those who have gained U.S. citizenship. In addition, a number of Cambodian Americans who have gone
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back to Cambodia have returned to the United States with Cambodian wives or husbands.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community It was estimated in 2007 that there were 247,487 Cambodian Americans in the United States, or 0.08 percent of the total U.S. population. The largest community is in Long Beach, California (36,233), but there are also sizeable numbers in many other places including Boston (17,301), mainly around Lowell and Lynn; Seattle, Washington (12,391); and Oakland, California (10,552). Other Cambodian American communities exist in Providence, Rhode Island (9,330); Stockton, California (9,313); Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (7,790); Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas (5,596); Orange County, California (4,441); San Diego, California (4,314); Fresno, California (4,173); Minneapolis, Minnesota (4,149); New York City (4,060); Modesto, California (2,959); and Chicago, Illinois (2,764).
Age and Family Structure In terms of age, the median age of Cambodian Americans is 25.3 years (as against 36.4 years for all Americans). This is largely because there are far fewer older Cambodian Americans than their counterparts in the rest of the community·only 4.49 percent of all Cambodian Americans are aged 65 years or over vs. 12.05 percent of the overall population (and 3.8% of Cambodian Americans in 2000). In that age group, there are slightly less males (40.9% of Cambodian Americans vs. 42.7% of all Americans). The remaining figures for the population are 34.94 percent of Cambodian Americans are aged under 18 (vs. 25.36% of the overall population), compared to 38.6 percent of Cambodian Americans in the 2000 Census. Also 28.32 percent are aged between 18 and 34 (vs. 22.56% of all Americans); and 32.25 percent are aged between 35 and 64 (vs. 40.02% of all Americans). Overall there is a slight gender bias in favor of females (51.7% vs. 51.0% of all Americans). In terms of family structure, the overwhelming majority of Cambodians live in family households (85.5% vs. 66.9% of all Americans), with only 5.9 percent of Cambodians living alone (vs. 11.9% in the overall community). However, it is also interesting to note that for the population aged 15 or over, 40.7 percent of Cambodian Americans are unmarried, vs. 28.1 percent in the overall community (and 38.9% of Cambodian Americans in 2000).
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Sophea Srun (left) who moved from Cambodia, shares a laugh with her daughters Madeline and Leakhena (right) at St. Julie Asian Center in Lowell, Massachusetts, August 24, 2006. Sophea and Madeline studied at the Center. (AP Photo/Chitose Suzuki)
Educational Attainment In terms of educational attainment, many Cambodian Americans have seen the way to success as coming from education. Teeda Butt Mam, the daughter of a member of the Cambodian national assembly during the 1960s, arrived in California as a refugee in March 1980, and in 1983, completed an associate degree as a computer programmer and started work in Silicon Valley (Criddle 1992; Criddle and Mam 1987). Author Theary C. Seng worked hard at school and managed to get a private school education courtesy of the Christian Education Fund. She became a lawyer and a member of the New York Bar Association and the American Bar Association (Seng 2005). The urge to succeed is also present in orphans. The Khmer Rouge killed all of Loung UngÊs family. She was able to move to the United States and go to school. In her memoir First They Killed My Father (2000), she thanked her ninth-grade teacher at Essex Junction High School for her first A+ for an essay (Ung 2000, 2005). In terms of success, the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh has highlighted the career of Paul Thai, who was 16 when he and his family arrived as refugees in the United States. He went on to gain a degree in criminal justice and
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became a lieutenant with the Dallas Police Department (Embassy of the United States 2008). Despite the successes of some, the socioeconomic status of many Cambodian Americans is low: 40.9 percent have less than a high school diploma (vs. 15.8% of Americans); 20.2 percent have a college or associate degree (vs. 27.5% of all Americans); 11.1 percent have a bachelorÊs degree (vs. 17.2% of Americans); and only 3 percent have a graduate or professional degree (vs. 10% of Americans). The statistics remain marked for females: only 11.1 percent have a bachelorÊs degree or higher (vs. 26% of female Americans), whereas 17.5 percent of males have a bachelorÊs degree of higher (vs. 28.5% of male Americans).
Economic Attainment Much has often been made of the economic success of immigrants to the United States, and within the Cambodian American population, there have been many examples of people arriving with little and becoming wealthy. Initially, the language barrier proved a problem, but many Cambodian Americans have built businesses working with other Cambodian Americans or other Asians. Although 19.3 percent of all Cambodian American families are deemed to be living in poverty (vs. 10.2% of all American families), considering that the majority of Cambodian American migrants arrived as refugees, this is still a reasonably good record. Some 52.1 percent of Cambodian Americans live in owner-occupied homes (vs. 66.9% of all Americans), and 90.4 percent of Cambodian American families own one or more cars (as against 91.1% of all Americans) (Reeves and Bennett 2004; U.S. Census Bureau 2007).
Occupation and Income Patterns Many of the first Cambodian American immigrants found work in relatively poorly paid manual laboring jobs. However, the statistics show a gradual transformation in occupational patterns. There are now 9.9 percent of Cambodian Americans working for the government (vs. 14.6% of Americans), and 5.2 percent of Cambodian Americans are self-employed (vs. 6.9% of Americans). In 2005, the median household income of Cambodian Americans in the previous 12 months was $44,955 (vs. $46,242 for Americans), although this statistic is partly disguised by the fact that, on average, Cambodian American households are larger than those of many other communities. There are now Cambodians in many different positions throughout the United States, with 19.3 percent of them involved in management, professional, and related occupations (vs. 31.3% of Americans), with 37.3 percent still working in production, transportation, and material moving occupations (vs. 18.7% of Americans).
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Health Statistics and Related Issues Many Cambodians settling in the United States have endured some period in a refugee camp, and there has long been a worry of tuberculosis. However, mental health has been a much more major problem. This is largely explained by the extreme trauma that many Cambodian Americans have been through, especially during the period of Communist rule in Cambodia. These psychiatric problems have often manifested themselves in depression (Berthold et al. 2007; Marshal et al. 2005). Many Cambodian Americans who arrived as refugees sought treatment from alternative health care providers and those providing complementary medicine. For others, the psychiatric problems have resulted in alcohol and drug abuse, and there is a heavy proclivity to gambling among some Cambodian Americans. This has led to a large number of social problems, which has caused community leaders (from both within the Cambodian American community and the wider community) to try to get young Cambodian Americans to identify more with „mainstream America‰ than be marginalized in gang „sub-cultures‰ (Chang, Rhee, and Berthold 2008; DÊAmico et al. 2007; Hinton et al. 2008, 2009). Chanrithy Him, who migrated to the United States after spending time in a refugee camp along the Thai-Cambodian border and then a processing center in the Philippines, moved to Eugene, Oregon, and worked for the Khmer Adolescent Project, where she has been involved in studying post-traumatic stress disorder among Cambodians who survived the Killing Fields (Hin 2000). For womenÊs health, fertility is fairly close to the national average (30.9% of Cambodian Americans vs. 30.6% of Americans). There have also been far more problems explaining to women the availability of medical care than there has been to men, although this is changing with time.
Adjustment and Adaption Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Cambodians who have settled in the United States came from a wide variety of socioeconomic backgrounds. Many of the earlier migrants were from urban backgrounds, coming from Phnom Penh and also other cities and towns in the country. A large number of these had already lived a partly westernized lifestyle in Cambodia. For them, the change was not that great·except for the weather and, initially, the lack of Cambodian food. Others from the countryside had far more problems adapting to life in the United States. Most Cambodian families have tried to celebrate the major festivals, especially New Year and PÊChum Ben, but many of the large and more elaborate gatherings are limited to Long Beach and other places with large Cambodian populations.
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Elders and leaders from Long Beach’s Cambodian community receive a blessing from Buddhist monks before the Cambodian New Year’s Parade in Long Beach, California, April 24, 2005. (AP Photo/Chris Carlson)
Many second-generation Cambodians, educated at U.S. schools, learned about customs and Cambodian culture from their parents and older relatives; but thirdgeneration Cambodians have often been far more separated from their Cambodian culture, although many of them have been able to visit Cambodia.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Most Cambodian Americans live in extended families, and as mentioned earlier, there is a far higher percentage of Cambodian Americans living in extended families than in the overall U.S. population. This has helped with the preservation of familial and community values. Because many of the Cambodian Americans arrived as refugees, it was common for both men and women to find work. In traditional Cambodian societies, although women usually worked in family farms, it was very unusual for most Cambodian women to work for other employers. Socioeconomic circumstances in the United States meant that this tradition was often quickly discarded, and it often left the rearing of smaller children to their grandparents or older family members or family friends. This in turn has led to a major transformation in the gender relations of Cambodian American families.
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Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Since the first Cambodians settled in the United States, there has been many attempts to preserve national and cultural identity. This has involved reading (and writing) in Khmer, which has been made easier by the development of Cambodian fonts for computer laser and bubble-jet printers. One of the early Cambodian Americans, Bhante Dharmawara (d. 1999) was a prominent Buddhist monk who had been born in Cambodia. For many decades he was involved in the resettling of many Cambodian refugees in the United States; he founded the first Cambodian Buddhist temple in the United States, located in Washington, D.C.; and later on, he established Wat Dharawararam at Stockton, California. Gradually the efforts of Bhante Dharmawara encouraged the establishment of other temples and self-help groups·especially involved in planning for funerals, etc.·and this did much to preserve both Cambodian and also ethnic Khmer cultural identity. Indeed, the United Cambodia Community was established in Long Beach in 1977 as a self-help organization. Over successive years, as the Cambodian American population increased, it became possible to publish books in the United States to preserve culture, as prior to this time, dictionaries·such as those by Franklin E. Huffman of Yale University· were far too expensive for the many Cambodians who had arrived as poor refugees. Another Cambodian active in Khmer culture has been Arn Chorn-Pond, a human rights activist, whose family was killed by the Khmer Rouge. Adopted by the Reverend Peter L. Pond, Chorn-Pond moved to the United States, where he has been active in preserving Cambodian music, especially flute music. In 2004, two museums were established devoted to aspects of Cambodian American heritage. They are the Cambodian Cultural Museum and Killing Fields Memorial in Seattle, established by Dara Duong; and the Cambodian American Heritage Museum and Killing Fields Memorial in Chicago. A number of libraries used by the American Cambodian communities have Khmer language books, with the Mark Twain Library at 1401 Anaheim Street, Long Beach, having a large holding of Cambodian-language books.
National-Language Press and Other Media Although as of June 2009, there are some 274 registered Cambodian-language newspapers in Cambodia, there has not been any major Cambodian-language newspaper in the United States. Many of those which started·especially in California· did not last long, and with wider access to the Internet, it has been easier to publish Cambodian-language material on the Internet. In terms of radio broadcasts, Radio Free Asia broadcasts regularly in Khmer and is widely listened to by Cambodian Americans and Cambodians from around the world. There are also a number of
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publishers, such as and Shorthand Publications Ltd. and Mimosa Publications Pty Ltd., both of Crystal Lake, and Bayon Market of Long Beach, which have published many books in the Khmer language.
Celebration of National Holidays There are a number of major national holidays in Cambodia, many of which are commemorated by American Cambodians. Cambodia operate on the Lunar Calendar, so the dates according to the Solar Calendar change each year. On Chinese New Year, many Sino-Khmers celebrate what is known in Cambodia as Chaul Chnam Chen. This holiday takes place sometime from late-January to mid-February. The Khmer Krom often refer to it by the Vietnamese name of Tet. In mid-April the major national holiday of the year, known as Khmer New Year, or Chaul Chnam Khmer, is celebrated. In early May the Royal Ploughing Ceremony takes place. This ceremony involves the king cutting the first furrow, celebrating the start of the agricultural year. In late May or June is Visakha Puja, the day to commemorate the birth of Lord Buddha. In September/October is PÊChum Ben, the Festival of the Dead, when offerings are made for those departed at Buddhist temples. In October/November is Bon Om Tuk, or the Water Festival, which
Gloria Keo (left) and Samchay Anongthep perform the blessing dance during Cambodian New Year festivities in Long Beach, California, April 8, 2000. Long Beach is home to the largest Cambodian community in the United States. (AP Photo/Chris Lee)
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Cambodian New Year Although Cambodian communities throughout the United States celebrate the Cambodian New Year, at Long Beach, more than 20,000 Cambodians and their friends gather to celebrate, making it the largest regular gathering of Cambodians anywhere in the United States. The events are usually split over the two weekends closest to the New Year itself. These involve a parade along Anaheim Street. Although most Cambodians are Buddhist, because increasing numbers are Christian—and there has long been a small Muslim minority—the event has long been a multifaith gathering. The celebrations usually end with as many as 15,000 to 20,000 people meeting at El Dorado Park, where there are performances, some by important artists including classical dance troupes. Cambodian food is also available, although many families bring their own food.
celebrates the naval victory of King Jayavarman VII over the Chams in 1177, and also the reversal of the current of the Tonlé Sap River. In addition to these traditional holidays, there are also a number of other events and commemorations of a political nature. The most important of these is on November 9, the anniversary of independence (which occurred in 1953). Cambodian Republicans tended to commemorate March 18 as the date of the overthrow of Sihanouk in 1970; and on April 17, the anniversary of the day in 1975 that the Khmer Rouge Communists won the civil war, is commemorated with prayers·as it also marks the start of the rule of the Khmer Rouge, which saw the deaths of as many as 1.5 million people.
Foodways Initially many of the Cambodians in the United States were Sino-Khmers (Cambodians of Chinese ancestry), and the ready availability of Chinese food made it easy for them to find food in cities, although those in smaller towns did face some problems. Gradually with the increasing numbers of Cambodians in some cities, especially Long Beach, California, meant that it was possible to establish dozens of shops selling Cambodian food specialties, especially lemongrass and fish sauce, two ingredients that are used in many Cambodian dishes. Some Cambodian recipe books were published that managed to get many other Americans interested in Cambodian food. The book by Princess Norodom Rasmi Sobhana was published by Cambodians in exile, and it has been followed up by a number of other cookbooks. Gradually, many Cambodian Americans also came to eat North American food. The lawyer and author Theary C. Seng recorded in her memoirs that her family spent their first evening in the United States eating apples (Seng 2005; Sheehy 1986).
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Music, Arts, and Entertainment Because many Cambodians had left their country as refugees, many of the Cambodian music recordings and cultural items that were available in the United States came from the Cambodian community in France, in particular the cultural group and company CEDOREK. As the Cambodian community in the United States grew during the 1980s, especially in places such as Long Beach, it became possible to produce books and record music locally. And in terms of preserving Cambodian and Khmer musicology, Dr. Sam-Ang Sam has done much to preserve classical music and performing arts through the Sam-Ang Sam Ensemble and his book Traditional Music of Cambodia (1987). Soon after the founding of the Sam-Ang Sam Ensemble, a number of dance groups started to be formed, and it was not long before there were regular local music and arts festivals for Cambodians at which non-Cambodians were also welcomed. Initially, the effort to form Cambodian dance groups stemmed from the desire to replicate Cambodian culture through village and more formal dancing. However, the music and arts gradually became influenced by U.S. society, and Cambodian Americans began to produce a second generation of music and art. The Classical Dance Company of Cambodia, including the renowned Sophiline Cheam Shapiro, has been active in the United States and in other countries around the world. Mention should also be made of the artists Monirith Chhea, a visual artist who worked in charcoal; Chanthou Oeur, a painter and sculptor who has been involved in the SmithsonianÊs Natural History exhibit „Across the Seas and Over the Mountains‰; and Narath Tan, who worked as a sculptor and artist in Chicago. TanÊs work adapts the Khmer style with Western techniques and has been seen as a mix of Cambodian and American styles.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Many of the early Cambodian American immigrants were connected with government circles in Cambodia/Khmer Republic, and as a result, they were able to get official sponsorship for U.S. citizenship. From 1975 on, some immigrants were evacuated as refugees, but most of those who arrived from 1979 to 1980 had spent some time in refugee camps. Many of the refugees were sponsored by missionary and welfare organizations, such as the Catholic Social Services, Church World Services, and the Cambodian American National Development Organization, with some Cambodians becoming involved in these groups, which then organized current members to sponsor new immigrants. Even those with families in the United States, such as the family of Theary C. Seng, sponsorship in the United States was provided by church or welfare
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organizations. In SengÊs familyÊs case, a church group from Grand Rapids, Michigan·the Millbrook Christian Reformed Church·sponsored their arrival. Many of the refugees quickly sought U.S. citizenship. For example, Teeda Butt Mam, who arrived in the United States as a refugee in 1980, gained U.S. citizenship in 1986. There have also been many adoptions. For example, after years of working with refugees along the Thai-Cambodian border, Reverend Peter L. Pond, a New England clergyman, adopted 16 Cambodian children. In 2000, some 34.2 percent of Cambodian Americans were born in the United States; 30 percent were foreign born who had gained U.S. citizenship; and 35.8 percent were born overseas and had not taken up U.S. citizenship.
Intergroup Relations Cambodian Americans have been involved in a variety of community groups. A number of Sino-Khmers identify with the American Chinese community, and as a result, many prefer to be associated with American Chinese (rather than American Cambodian) organizations. Similarly, Khmer Krom, often speaking Vietnamese as their first language, may identify with Vietnamese; and the Chams, a Muslim minority from central Vietnam and eastern Cambodia, also often identify with the Vietnamese. There are also a number of Montagnards, the jungle people of Cambodia who identify with other Montagnards from both Vietnam and Laos. Some sections of the Cambodian community, such as Cambodian war veterans, identify with South Vietnamese war veterans, alongside whom they fought during 1970 1975. They maintain ties with organizations maintained by U.S. veterans. There are also a number of Cambodians of mixed descent, the most famous probably being Francois Chau, a Cambodian American actor of both Chinese and Vietnamese descent, who became famous after he played the Shredder in Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles II: The Secret of the Ooze (1991). Although there has been much antagonism between Cambodia and Vietnam, not many problems exist between Cambodians and Vietnamese in the United States. This is mainly because most Vietnamese Americans were supporters of South Vietnam and, hence, allies for the anti-Communist Lon Nol government in Cambodia, which many of the original Cambodian American migrants had supported.
Forging a New American Political Identity Many Cambodian Americans have been involved in Cambodian politics since the 1970s. Indeed a number of senior Cambodian politicians lived in the United States for longer or shorter periods. Brigadier General Lon Non, younger brother of President Lon Nol and probably the first Cambodian politician to live in the United States, lived in Silver Springs, Maryland. He returned to Cambodia in 1974, and
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the Khmer Rouge murdered him in the following year. The events of 1975 caused leading politicians Lon Nol, Chhang Song, Cheng Heng, Sak Suthsakhan, and Um Sim, and soldiers Dien Del, Thach Reng, and Jean Fernandez to seek asylum in the United States. It was not long before Sak Suthsakhan, Dien Del, and Thach Reng became active in the establishment of the anti-Communist KPNLAF and its later political movement the Khmer PeopleÊs National Liberation Front (KPNLF) (Corfield 2009b, in press). Chhun Yasith was another Cambodian American who became heavily involved in Cambodian politics. After becoming an immigrant to the United States in 1982, he worked as a tax accountant in Long Beach, California, and returned to Cambodia, where he was initially involved in the main opposition party, the Sam Rainsy Party, and then established the Cambodian Freedom Fighters with the aim of overthrowing the Hun Sen government. In April 2008, he was convicted in the United States of being behind a 2000 coup attempt. There have been many other Cambodian Americans who have returned to Cambodia and held appointments in the government, including Pou Sohtireak, who holds joint Cambodian and U.S. citizenship, was active in the Royalist FUNCINPEC Party, and was minister for Industry, Mines, and Energy. In spite of this strong involvement of Cambodian Americans in Cambodian politics, few have been active in U.S. politics. One exception is Chanrithy Uong, who was elected in 1998 to the city council of Lowell, Massachusetts. There was also Dr. Haing S. Ngor, famous for his acting role in The Killing Fields— the first Cambodian American to win an Academy Award·who became heavily involved in the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), taking part in many speaking engagements in the United States and elsewhere. Jean Fernandez has also been active with Cambodian war veterans in the United States. And Navy Dy, who moved to the United States in 1981, moved to Virginia and worked initially in the U.S. Congress and then at the Pentagon. Sichan Siv was the son of a police officer in Cambodia. When he managed to escape to the United States, he found work as an apple picker and then a „burger flipper‰ in Connecticut, before becoming a cab driver in New York. He managed to complete a masterÊs of international affairs at Columbia University and was an alternate U.S. representative at the United Nations General Assembly from 2001 until 2006 (Siv 2008).
Return Immigration After the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 1979, there was a reticence on the part of many American Cambodians to return to Cambodia, even for a holiday. However, as the government in Phnom Penh became more moderate from 1989, and tourism was encouraged, there were significant numbers who did return to
226 | Cambodian Immigrants
Cambodia for brief trips. During the period of United Nations rule from 1991, and after the 1993 elections, which saw the victory of the Royalist FUNCINPEC party, who were heavily supported by many American Cambodians, many more started returning to Cambodia for extended stays and some moved back to Cambodia permanently. This return immigration continued even after the 1997 coup dÊétat. One of those Cambodian Americans who did return to Cambodia was Chath Piersath. He had moved to the United States with his brother and sister in 1981, initially settling in Boulder, Colorado, where he later became a prominent poet. In 1994 he returned to Cambodia for the first time since 1981 and became a volunteer with the Cambodian American National Development Organization (CANDO), later working with other groups including the Human Rights Vigilance of Cambodia while living permanently in Phnom Penh. There has been significant publicity in the media concerning Cambodians who settled in the United States but who have been deported from the United States after criminal activity on U.S. territory under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. However, in spite of many news stories, the numbers affected remain very small, with only 127 Cambodian Americans being deported between 1996 and 2005.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity The second generation of American Cambodians consists of those born in refugee camps who grew up in the United States and completed their schooling in the United States; or those born in the United States after the migration of their parents. In most cases, both their parents are Cambodians and the sense of ethnic and cultural identity is strong. The strong sense of Cambodian identity has dissipated in young generations, and the lack of identity is especially noticeable in Cambodian American families who do not live in an area with a large ethnic Cambodian population and hence have greater pressures to assimilate. The drive to assimilate is even more pronounced in third-generation Cambodian Americans, especially when one parent is not an ethnic Cambodian.
Educational Attainment It has been much easier for the second- and third-generation Cambodian Americans to gain education in the United States. These have been able to attend U.S. public schools, with some managing to get into private schools. As a result of hard work, many have then been able to proceed to higher education, either in colleges or universities. Fluency in the English language and the ability to strive to do well
The Second and Later Generations | 227
through a strong work ethic has helped many Cambodian Americans complete university and get managerial positions in U.S. society. An example is Soben Huon, who was born in Long Beach and attended Millikan High School. After high school, she moved to Utah, where she studied political science and international relations at Brigham Young University. In 2005, she was voted Miss Utah in 2006 (the first member of a minority community to do so) and was also a competitor in the Miss USA Competition. She was also a dancer with the Cambodian Classical Ballet. Another example is Whitney Ping, who when she was only 10 years old managed to defeat at table tennis her father, Ken Ping, a former Cambodian refugee and keen table tennis player. Whitney Ping went on to represent the United States at the Athens Olympics in 2004.
Youth Profile A Beauty Contest Winner Now Studying Broadcast Journalism Born on February 26, 1983, in Dallas, Texas, Soben Huon, the daughter of Cambodian migrants Matthew K. Huon and Sambath (née Dip), attended Millikan High School in Long Beach, California. She worked hard at school and was also active in community work and training within the local Cambodian Classical Ballet. Combining her school work with playing the violin, she also taught herself to play the piano. After completing her high school, she went to Brigham Young University where she studied for her BA in political science and international relations. While studying, she was also active in a number of charities such as the Red Cross and also others connected with helping impoverished people. It was while studying at Brigham Young University-Provo, Utah that she competed in a beauty competition and was chosen as Miss Utah 2006 in November 2005, the first from a minority group to get the title. The award was made not only for her beauty, but also her involvement in community and charitable groups, ensuring that she would be a good role model. After her crowning as Miss Utah, she represented her state in the Miss USA pageant, being one of the twenty-six delegates to be chosen to appear on the television game show Deal or No Deal. The only member of her family to join the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, she has always been passionately interested in politics and became a firm admirer of Condoleezza Rice, Madeleine Albright, and other women political figures. After graduating from Brigham Young University, Soben Huon went to Berlin, Germany, to study for a MA in journalism and TV broadcasting. As well as English, Khmer, and German, she also speaks some French and Spanish.
228 | Cambodian Immigrants
Cultural Identification The growing assimilation of the second- and third-generation Cambodian Americans has led to a transformation with many now identifying culturally with the mainstream United States, or with a range of other Asian subcultures, such as those within Chinese or Vietnamese communities. At the same time, for the wealthier Cambodian Americans it has become easier and cheaper to visit Cambodia, and as a result, many have been able to go to Cambodia and reconnect with Cambodian culture in a way that was not previously possible. In the 2000 Census, of people aged 5 and older, some 8.4 percent of Cambodian Americans spoke English at home, with 38.1 percent speaking English well but tending not to speak it at home. The remainder, 53.5 percent, did not speak English at home and spoke it less than „very well.‰
Appendix I: Migration Statistics The vast majority of Cambodian Americans who were born overseas migrated to the United States from 1979 on. The figures published in the 2000 Census list those who migrated before 1980 (9.9%), between 1980 and 1989 (73.9%), and from 1990 until 2000 (16.1%). For numbers of Cambodians who achieved permanent legal status between 2000 and 2009, see Table 38.
Table 38 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and country of birth
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Cambodia
2,138
2,462
2,800
2,263
3,553
4,022
5,773
4,246
3,713
3,771
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Table 3).
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics According to the U.S. Census returns, the number of people identifying as Cambodian Americans has risen markedly. In the 2000 Census, some 178,043 were identified as solely as Cambodian Americans, with 212,633 identifying wholly or partly as Cambodian Americans, as opposed to 241,025 in the 2007 report of the U.S. Census Bureau based on projections and other data. Given the historical circumstances
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics | 229
of many Cambodian Americans following the rule of the Khmer Rouge, it is believed that there are probably more Cambodian Americans than shown on census figures as census collectors often found people missing when they called or relationships being „mixed up‰ on completed census forms. For figures on permanent residents of Cambodian origin and their broad class of admission·or reasons for admission, see Table 40.
Table 39 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 region/ country: Cambodia Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
3,771
1,341
2,430
33
5
28
1,202
428
774
Leading states of residence Arizona California Colorado
37
13
24
Connecticut
55
22
33
Florida
95
29
66
Georgia
88
35
53
Illinois
50
14
36
Maryland
33
8
25
400
164
236
Michigan
Massachusetts
25
4
21
Minnesota
231
89
142
Nevada
26
6
20
New York
71
25
46
North Carolina
53
20
33
Ohio
91
33
58
Pennsylvania
167
61
106
Texas
277
105
172
Virginia
79
28
51
Washington
318
118
200
Other
440
134
306
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
230 | Cambodian Immigrants Table 40 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by broad class of admission and region and country of birth: Fiscal year 2009 Region and Familycountry of sponsored birth Total preferences Cambodia
3,771
383
Employment- Immediate based relatives of Refugees preferences U.S. citizens Diversity and asylees 63
3,063
72
Other
166
24
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Table 10).
Appendix III: Notable Cambodian Americans Abdulgaffar Peang Meth. Political activist and university lecturer. Resident in Michigan; Guam. Butt Mam, Teeda. Author and public advocate for Cambodian community. Resident in California. Chanthou Oeur. Painter and sculptor. Resident in Long Beach, California. Cheng Heng. Head of State of Cambodia, 1970 1975. Resident of Dallas, Texas. Died in 1996. Chhang Song. Minister of Information 1974 1975, founder of Save Cambodia Inc. Resident in Maryland. Chhea, Monirith. Artist. Resident in California. Dim, Kris. Professional bodybuilder with the National Physique Committee. Resident in Arlington, Virginia; Sacramento, California. Dith Pran. Journalist and photojournalist, as well as prominent advocate for the Cambodian community through the Dith Pran Holocaust Awareness Project. Resident in New York; then Woodbridge, New Jersey. Died in 2008. Huon, Soben. Miss Utah 2006. Resident in Long Beach, California; Salt Lake City, Utah. In Tam. Provincial governor; Prime Minister of Cambodia, 1973. Resident in Chandler, Arizona. Died in 2006. Lon Keng. United Nations Official (and brother of Lon Nol). Resident in New York. Lon Nol. Prime Minister of Cambodia (Khmer Republic from 1970) 1966 1967, 1969 1972, President of the Khmer Republic 1972 1975. Resident in Hawaii; then Fullerton, California. Died 1985. Narath Tan. Sculptor and artist. Resident in Chicago, Illinois.
Glossary | 231
Ngor, Haing S. Doctor and actor. Resident in Los Angeles, California. Murdered in 1996. Sak Suthsakhan. Army commander. Head of State of Khmer Republic 1975, co-founder of KPNLAF. Died in 1994. Sam-Ang Sam. Ethnomusicologist and classical musician. Resident in Maryland. Sichan Siv. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 2001 2006. Sophiline Cheam Shapiro. Cambodian classical dancer. Thach Reng. Special Forces Commander 1972 1975; co-founder of KPNLAF. Died in 2002. Theary C. Seng. Cambodian American lawyer and author of Daughter of the Killing Fields (2005). Resident in Grand Rapids, Michigan; later New York. Whitney Ping. Table tennis player and participant in 2004 Athens Olympics.
Glossary Cambodge: The French name for Cambodia. Cambodian People’s Party (CPP): Formerly the PeopleÊs Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, effectively the ruling party in Cambodia from 1979 (in coalition 1993 1998). FUNCINPEC: The Royalist Political Party, with the name in full standing for National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia. Kampuchea: Another name for Cambodia used mainly by Communists. Khmer Krom: Ethnic Khmers from southern Vietnam. Khmer Leou: See Montagnards. Khmer Republic: The official name of Cambodia from its proclamation in October 1970, until its overthrow by the Khmer Rouge in April 1975. Khmer Rouge: „Red Cambodians,‰ that is, Cambodian Communists, especially the pro-Chinese Cambodian Communists under Pol Pot. Khmer Serei: Free Khmers, anti-Communist Cambodians during the 1960s. Montagnards: „Mountain people,‰ that is, Cambodian hill tribes and jungle peoples (also known as Khmer Loeu).
232 | Cambodian Immigrants
References Berthold, S. M., E. C. Wong, T. L. Schell, G. N. Marshall, M. N. Elliott, D. Takeuchi, and K. Hambarsoomians. 2007. „U.S. Cambodian RefugeesÊ Use of Complementary and Alternative Medicine for Mental Health Problems.‰ Psychiatric Services 58(9): 1212 18. Bunte, Pamela A., and Rebecca M. Joseph. 1992. The Cambodian Community of Long Beach: An Ethnographic Analysis of Factors Leading to Census Undercount. Washington, D.C.: Center for Survey Methods Research, Bureau of the Census. [Online article retrieved 04/11.] http://www.census.gov/srd/papers/pdf/ev92-09.pdf. Chan, Sucheng. 2004. Survivors: Cambodian Refugees in the United States. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Chan, Sucheng, and Audrey Kim. 2003. Not Just Victims: Conversations with Cambodian Community Leaders in the United States. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Chandler, David P. 1972. The Land and People of Cambodia. Portraits of the Nations Series. New York: J. B. Lippincott Company. Chandler, David P. 1991. The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution since 1945. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chang, J., S. Rhee, and S. M. Berthold. 2008. „Child Abuse and Neglect in Cambodian Refugee Families: Characteristics and Implications for Practice.‰ Child Welfare 87(1): 141 60. Corfield, Justin. 2009a. The History of Cambodia. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press. Corfield, Justin. 2009b. „Cambodia War Veterans.‰ In Encyclopedia of American Veterans, vol. 1, edited by William Pencak, 117 18. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Corfield, Justin. In press. „Cambodian American Experience: History and Culture.‰ In Asian American History and Culture: An Encyclopedia, edited by Huping Ling and Allan Austin. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Corfield, Justin, and Laura Summers. 2003. Historical Dictionary of Cambodia. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press. Criddle, JoAn D. 1992. Bamboo and Butterflies: From Refugee to Citizen. Dixon, CA: East/West Bridge. Criddle, JoAn D., and Teeda Butt Mam. 1987. To Destroy You Is No Loss: The Odyssey of a Cambodian Family. New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press. DÊAmico, E. J., T. L. Schell, G. N. Marshall, and K. Hambarsoomians. 2007. „Problem Drinking among Cambodian Refugees in the United States: How Big of a Problem Is It?‰ Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs 68(1): 11 17. Dith Pran, comp. 1997. Children of Cambodia’s Killing Fields: Memoirs by Survivors. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Embassy of the United States, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 2008. Contributions of Asian Americans to U.S. Society Honored in May. [Online article retrieved 12/09.] http://cam bodia.usembassy.gov/2008_asia_pacific_month.html.
Further Reading | 233 Hin, Chanrithy. 2000. When Broken Glass Floats: Growing Up under the Khmer Rouge. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Hinton, D. E., S. D. Hinton, R. J. Loeum, V. Pich, and M. H. Pollack. 2008. „The Multiplex Model of Somatic Symptoms: Application to Tinnitus among Traumatized Cambodian Refugees.‰ Transcultural Psychiatry 45(2): 287 317. Hinton, D. E., A. L. Hinton, V. Pich, J. R. Loeum, and M. H. Pollack. 2009. „Nightmares among Cambodian Refugees: The Breaching of Concentric Ontological Security.‰ Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 33(2): 219 65. Kamm, Henry. 1998. Cambodia: Report from a Stricken Land. New York: Arcade. Mabbett, Ian, and David Chandler. 1995. The Khmers. Oxford: Blackwell. Marshal, Grant N., Terry L. Schell, Marc N. Elliott, Megan S. Berthold, and Chi-Ah Chun. 2005. „Mental Health of Cambodian Refugees Two Decades after Resettlement in the United States.‰ Journal of the American Medical Association 294(5): 571 79. Reeves, Terrance J., and Claudette E. Bennett. 2004. We the People: Asians in the United States—Census 2000 Special Reports. [Online article retrieved 12/09.] http://www. census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr-17.pdf. Schanberg, Sydney H. 1985. The Death and Life of Dith Pran. New York: Elisabeth Sefton Books/Viking. Seng, Theary C. 2005. Daughter of the Killing Fields: Asrei’s Story. London: Fusion Press. Sheehy, Gail. 1984. „A Home for CambodiaÊs Children.‰ The New York Times, September 23, 50. Sheehy, Gail. 1986. Spirit of Survival. New York: William Morrow. Siv, Sichan. 2008. Golden Bones: An Extraordinary Journey from Hell in Cambodia to a New Life in America. New York: Harper. Tully, John. 2005. A Short History of Cambodia: From Empire to Survival. Crows Nest, NSW, Australia: Allen and Unwin. Ung, Loung. 2000. First They Killed My Father: A Daughter of Cambodia Remembers. New York: HarperCollins. Ung, Loung. 2005. Lucky Child: A Daughter of Cambodia Reunites with the Sister She Left Behind. New York: Harper Collins. United States Census Bureau. 2007. Selected Population Profile in the United States. S0201. Selected Population Profile in the United States Population Group: Cambodian alone or in any combination Data Set: 2005 American Community Survey. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau.
Further Reading Burke, Todd, and DeAnn Burke. 1977. Anointed for Burial: Cambodia’s Like a Mighty Wind. Plainfield, NJ: Logos International.
234 | Cambodian Immigrants This book is by U.S. Protestant missionaries who went to Cambodia during the Khmer Republic 1970 1975. Harris, Ian. 2005. Cambodian Buddhism: History and Practice. Honolulu: University of HawaiÊi Press. This book covers the history of Buddhism in Cambodia and in Cambodian communities overseas, including the United States. Her Story, Her Struggle: Khmer American Women and Girls’ Oral History Project. 2000. Long Beach, CA: Asians and Pacific Islanders for Reproductive Health. A research project into the experiences of women from Cambodia who have moved to Long Beach, California. Khmer Court Dance. 1995. Media Generation ; Montpelier, VT: Multicultural Media, VHS videotape. This provides details on the training of Cambodian Americans in traditional court dancing styles. Lafreniere, Bree. 2000. Music through the Dark: A Tale of Survival in Cambodia. Honolulu: University of HawaiÊi Press. An account of music in Cambodia, and the survival of traditional techniques in overseas communities, especially in the United States. Ong, Aiwha. 2003. Buddha Is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America. Berkeley: University of California Press. A detailed account of how refugees settled into U.S. society. Pa, Chileng. 2008. Escaping the Khmer Rouge: A Cambodian Memoir. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. An autobiography covering life in Cambodia and in the United States. Phim, Navy. 2007. Reflections of a Khmer Soul. Tucson, AZ: Wheatmark. An autobiographical account which contains the experiences faced by the author in the United States. Sam, Sam-Ang. 1987. Traditional Music of Cambodia. Middletown, CT: Center for the Study of Khmer Culture. This book provides details on the teaching of traditional Cambodian music styles in the United States. Samuel, P. S., J. P. Pringle, N. W. James, S. J. Fielding, and K. M. Fairfield. 2009. „Breast, Cervical, and Colorectal Cancer Screening Rates amongst Female Cambodian, Somali, and Vietnamese Immigrants in the U.S.A.‰ International Journal of Equity Health 14: 30. A detailed study of the problems in the screening of Cambodian and other women for breast cancer.
Further Reading | 235 Smith-Hefner, Nancy Joan. 1999. Khmer American: Identity and Moral Education in a Diasporic Community. Berkeley: University of California Press. A sympathetic study of the Cambodian American community. Thach Sira. 1997. Khmer Krom Suffering [in Khmer]. Lincoln Village, OH: Sira Thach. A reflection on Khmer Krom and Cambodian society contrasted with life in the United States. Yang Sam. 1987. Khmer Buddhism and Politics from 1954 to 1984. Newington, CT: Khmer Studies Institute. An early study of Cambodian Buddhist documenting its survival in the communities in the United States.
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Chilean Immigrants by Cristián Doña-Reveco
Introduction Chilean migration to the United States has its historical origins in the population exchanges of the 19th century and the Gold Rush in California. Post-1960s emigration from Chile has developed in relation to socioeconomic and political changes in Chile, which have been influenced in varying degrees by the foreign policies of the United States. Although the United States is the second largest receiving country of Chilean immigrants, this group represents less than 1 percent of all the immigrants in the United States. Most migrants are located in the traditional receiving states of Latin American migrants: Texas, California, Florida, New York, and New Jersey. In many cities these immigrants have created organized communities that help in the integration of newcomers and that provide social services in Chile. Chilean immigrants to the United States have a comparatively higher educational level and income than other immigrants from Latin America. Due to the small number of Chilean American immigrants, there is little information about return patterns, civic participation, and integration to host societies.
Chronology 1536
Diego de Almagro arrives to ChileÊs central valley. He is the first Spanish explorer to reach mainland Chile. Magellan had sighted southern Chile in 1520.
1541
Pedro de Valdivia founds Santiago del Nuevo Extremo, capital city of the Reyno de Chile during colonial times and capital of Chile.
1810
First Junta de Gobierno. Independence war against Spain begins.
1818
Proclamation of Independence.
1879–1884
War of the Pacific against Peru and Bolivia. Chile obtains rich territories in the Atacama Desert.
1891
Rivalries between the president and congress detonate a civil war. Its origins can be linked to a possible nationalization of nitrate 237
Chronology | 239
companies. More Chileans die in this eight-month war than in the 1879 1884 conflict. 1924–1932
Period of social and political crisis. There are six presidents in eight years. Chile is the hardest hit country in the world by the crash of 1929 and the subsequent economic depression of the 1930s.
1948
„Ley maldita‰ (Defense of Democracy Law) is passed by congress. At the beginnings of the Cold War, Chile decides to outlaw the Communist Party, which had been part of the governing coalition. This law remains in effect until 1958.
1961
The conservative government of Jorge Alessandri puts into effect the first agrarian reform.
1964
Election of Eduardo Frei Montalva. Agrarian reforms deepen. Chile becomes the third largest receiving country of Alliance for Progress funds. The nationalization of copper companies begins.
1970
Allende is elected. He is the first democratically elected president from a Communist-Socialist/left wing coalition in the world. Agrarian reforms deepen. Copper mines and other U.S.-owned companies are completely nationalized. Kissinger states, „I donÊt see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves.‰ (Muñoz, 2008, 85).
1973
Military coup is headed by Augusto Pinochet. Beginning of the largest exile in Chilean history. Assassinations, concentration camps, and multiple other violations to human rights are undertaken by government officials.
1976
Orlando Letelier, AllendeÊs former secretary of state, is killed in Washington, D.C., along with her assistant, a U.S. citizen, by members of PinochetÊs secret police. This assassination marks a change in the support given by the U.S. government to the Chilean dictatorship.
1982
External debt economic crisis. First national protest against Pinochet. Openings to the return of exiles.
1988
Plebiscite to vote continuation of the dictatorship or free elections. The option „no‰ to Pinochet wins.
1989
Free elections. The Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia formed by Christian Democrats, Socialists, Radicals, and others win the election. Patricio Aylwin Azócar, a Christian Democrat, is elected president.
240 | Chilean Immigrants
1990
Aylwin creates the Oficina Nacional de Retorno to provide assistance in the return of exiles. The Dirección para las Comunidades Chilenas en el Exterior (DICOEX), part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is also created. Its role is to maintain contact with Chilean communities abroad.
1994
Eduadro Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Concertación) is elected president. During his government, Chile begins to negotiate its participation in a free trade agreement with the United States. At the end of his government, Pinochet is arrested in London.
1999
Ricardo Lagos is elected president (Concertación). First socialist since Allende. Chile signs a Free Trade agreement with the United States. This treaty includes a special type of visa for Chilean professionals. Pinochet is released from imprisonment in London on medical grounds and returns to Chile.
2003–2004
The government of Chile through the DICOEX applies a registry or census of Chileans and their descendants living abroad. A minimum of 762,151 people report to recognize themselves as Chileans residing in other countries. This represents about 5 percent of the Chilean population.
2005
Michelle Bachelet (Concertación), former political prisoner and exile, is elected president. She is the first woman to be elected president of Chile.
2006
Augusto Pinochet dies.
2010
Sebastián Piñera (Alianza) is elected president in a conglomerate of right, center right parties, and former Concertación politicians. This is the first time since 1958 that center right and right-wing parties win a presidential election.
Background Geography Chile is located in the southwestern corner of South America. It is a long and narrow country with an approximate length of 2,700 miles and an average width of 109 miles. Its total landmass of 287,187 square miles is about twice the size of Montana. Located in the Pacific Rim, its coastline of 3,999 miles provides the country with privileged access to sea routes and oceanic resources. It shares borders with Peru in the north, Bolivia in the northeast, and Argentina in the east.
Background | 241
The estimated population of the country as of 2007 was 16,598,074 people; 40 percent of which lived in the metropolitan area of Santiago, the capital. The population growth is amongst the lowest in Latin America, at around 0.97 percent, and comes in third only to Uruguay and Cuba. Chile has the highest human development index of Latin America (0.878), with 96 percent of its population literate, a low infant mortality rate (8.36 per 1,000 live births), and high life expectancy at birth (76.96 years). Form east to west, Chile can be divided into three morphologic regions: the Andes mountain range, the Central Valley, and the coastal mountain range. From north to south it is possible to distinguish three geographic regions: the dry north, the Mediterranean central region, and the temperate oceanic in the south. Despite running almost 4,000 miles from the northernmost tip to the southernmost tip, Chile presents a remarkable thermal homogeneity. The average difference in the median temperature between the most northern and southern cities is only 59ÀF (15ÀC); a small value for a difference in latitude of 39À between both cities. The length of the country creates a geographical diversity that allows for the existence of several natural resources; most of them area specific. Chile is the worldÊs largest producer of copper. Most of the production is located in the arid north, close to the mountain ranges. With almost half of the exports, Chile is also the largest fruit producer in the southern hemisphere; most of the fruit production occurs in the Central Valley. Other relevant exports are forestry and wood products, processed food, fishmeal (worldÊs 2nd largest producer) and seafood, and wine (worldÊs 10th largest producer). Chile is located in the Pacific Ring of Fire. This zone is where most earthquakes occur, and it is the site of the most active volcanoes in the world. In fact, 3 of the largest 10 earthquakes recorded happened in Chile in 1960 (magnitude 9.5 and the largest on record), 2010 (magnitude 8.8), and 1922 (magnitude 8.5). At least 17 other earthquakes magnitude 7.5 and above have been felt in the country since the arrival of the Spaniard colonizers in the first half of the 16th century. The deadliest of these earthquakes occurred in Chillán (south central Chile) in 1939; it destroyed most of the city and killed more than 30,000 people. Spanish is the official language of Chile, although there are some other languages spoken by different ethnic groups. These ethnic groups are formed by descendants of the peoples that lived in the territory of Chile previous to the Spanish colonization. As of 2002 they represented less than 5 percent of the countryÊs population. The largest group is the Mapuche (87.3%), followed by the Aymara (7%). Although the statistics differ, more than half of the Chilean population define themselves as white; while a third considers themselves mestizo (mixed white and Amerindian). These populations share a mostly Spanish origin with some small influences from German, Italian, French, Palestine, and Sirio-Lebanese migrations.
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History of Chile The period since the 1930s in the history of Chile can be divided into three subperiods: (a) industrialization by import substitution and the Alliance for Progress (1930 1973); (b) military governments and exile (1973 1990); and (c) democratization processes and neoliberal economic policies (1990 to date). The relations between Chile and the United States have influenced the continuities and changes of these three periods. In this sense the hegemonic influence that the United States has tried to achieve in the Americas is not new and does not start with the Cold War. This is a long time process that can be traced back to the Monroe Doctrine, the first Pan-American meetings, the independence of Panama, and the power vacancy left by the British Empire after the World War I.
Industrialization by Import Substitution and the Alliance for Progress (1930–1973) The economic crisis of the 1930s, which began in the industrialized countries, presented Chile, as well as other Latin American governments, with the need to change the development policies that had been being applied up to then. New development policies centered on the creation of national industries and intended to reduce the dependence of national economies from foreign manufactured products. Their main objective was to build up a national industry that would lead the countryÊs path to development. Although the new set of policies, known as the ISI model (acronym in Spanish for Industrialization by Import Substitution) had different impacts and outcomes in different countries of Latin America, Chile under the ISI model had been able to maintain, between the late 1930s and 1973, on average, a sustained economic growth. During this period, Chile, along with the other Southern Cone countries, underwent what has been referred to as the second stage of the demographic transition, which is defined by low mortality, high fertility, and an increase in total population; and the enormous social changes happening in the country since the 1940s led to an increase in migration from rural areas, which in turn resulted in an increased urbanization, a larger participation of women in politics and the labor force, the development of strong unions and labor movements, and in general the development of important social movements. By the 1970s, however, the ISI model had begun to fail. Despite growth, the Chilean economy did not have the market size to consume all the production; and the ISI model suffered from a structural dilemma that finally caused its fall. One of the pillars of this model was protecting the national industry through high import taxes. This meant that every part of the manufacturing process had to be locally produced, including machinery and its components. Replacements parts, necessary to keep the manufacturing process in function, were too expensive to be imported
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and they were not produced in the country. Factories began to close; government subsidies stopped due to lack of income, and a new economic crisis began. This crisis had major effects not only in the economies of the countries but also in their social and political systems. The end of U.S. foreign aid destined for development and the increment of direct political intervention and military aid to „loyal‰ armed forces had a direct impact on the countries of the Southern Cone. The role of the United States in this period is principally marked by the Alliance for Progress. This was a program established by President Kennedy in the 1960s to promote development and social justice in the continent through loans that had to be targeted to rural areas. The Alliance for Progress can be easily understood as a second stage of the good neighbor policy. This U.S. foreign policy was designed to deter and oppose the spread of communism and the Cuban revolution in other Latin-American countries. Chile was probably the most benefited by this program. By the time it was ended, Chile had received the largest share of loans in proportion to its size. Its main problem was that it consisted mainly of tied aid. This meant that economic resources were poorly used to buy expensive and monopolized agricultural equipment and to pay high interest on loans obtained in U.S. banks. The
Cooperative market in Santiago, Chile, late 1960s. This was one in a network of customerowned supermarkets founded under the Alliance for Progress, enabling low-income families to achieve sizeable savings on food purchases. (National Archives)
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Nixon era during the late 1960s produced a decline in the official support for the Alliance for Progress, and foreign policy changed provide more military support and direct support to right-wing politicians and paramilitary groups. By 1970 it was clear that the Alliance had failed and was never implemented again. Military support through educational exchange between military schools and equipment sales that had as an objective the indoctrination of Latin-American militaries in U.S. policies was not new; it started in the 1950s with the founding of the so-called School of the Americas. Its objective had been to train Latin American militaries in contra-insurgency, antiterrorism, and anticommunist ideologies. Many officers from this education center emerged later on to help lead the military coups, direct the secret police; and design what in 1975 became Operation Condor, a joint effort of the military of the Southern Cone to eliminate left-wing dissidents in any country of the region without considering their nationality (Loveman 2001). This had deep consequences for Chile and the rest of the countries of the Southern Cone and represented a much more direct influence than the good-willed „Trojan horse‰ of the Alliance for Progress.
Military Governments and Exile In September 1973, a military coup deposed Allende, and the dictatorship that ensued was the most repressive and bloodiest that ever existed in the country. Although it is not possible to prove that the United States government directly participated in the coup, it has been proven that the United States gave direct support to the military and provided support for antigovernment forces. The Chilean dictatorship defined itself as the bearers of a historical project, and their leaders portrayed themselves as new liberators: always comparing themselves with the founding fathers of the nation. They argued that they were destined to save the country from the claws of Marxism and from moral, social, and economic decadence (Bethell 1993). Even if they were not supported by the United States at the moment of the coup, they were tolerated and even applauded by the United States, at least until the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Besides being a regime of torture and murder, the dictatorship was also responsible for the largest political exile in the history of the country. Although estimations vary, the number of exiles and émigrés that had to leave the country between 1973 and the mid-1980s for political or related reasons lies somewhere between 400,000 and 600,000 people (Eastmond 1997). This is a significant number, considering that the total population of Chile according to the 1982 census was close to 11.3 million people (between 3.6% and 5.3%). A significant number of these exiles never returned to Chile. In fact, only 5 percent of those who were exiled used the policies developed by the democratic governments since 1990 to assist in their return to Chile and help in their incorporation into Chilean society.
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During this period, Latin America and Chile in particular experienced crises of external debt. The crisis began in 1982 in Mexico and rapidly spread to the rest of the continent. In every country in the region, unemployment soared, poverty increased, and social discontent grew. The 1980s have been called the „lost decade‰ due to the lasting impact of this crisis in the development of Latin America. This economic crisis, the lack of support of the U.S. government to the military dictatorships after 1980, and specific internal political problems led to the beginning of the democratization processes in Chile. Open and national „days of protest‰ began in 1982. In 1988, the plebiscite defeated Pinochet, and in 1990 the free elections were held. Despite the victory, the dictatorship had already put in place several constrictions to avoid changing the economic and political structures that had been developed by the military and to evade being judged for crimes against humanity.
Democratization Processes The democratization process has been an ongoing struggle between maintaining and changing the economic and social structures inherited from the military government. This has lead to processes of creating a new national identity and coping with the human rights abuses of the dictatorship, economic crisis, and migration. The economic system, based on the neoliberal approaches applied during the dictatorship, has had mixed results in Chile. These policies have allowed having an aboveaverage growth, with national companies expanding and investing in other countries in the Americas. It has also helped to reduce poverty levels since the 1990s. Despite these gains, the old policies have not diminished the income inequality in the country, one of the worst in Latin America and the worst among OECD countries. It has also defined at least three new forms of migration: transnational executives, tertiary education students, and those that do not fit or are left out of economic growth. With regards to immigration, return policies were implemented in order to recover some of its populations that were exiled·with some success. Chile has begun to receive new migration flows, especially from neighboring countries, pulled by an over-publicized socioeconomic tranquility and stable political order.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration Although Chileans had traveled to the United States since independence, the earliest recognized mass migration began in the late 1840s. As European and East Coast U.S. travelers on their way to California reached the port of Valparaiso, news of the gold rush spread throughout Chile. This created the first migration of Chileans to
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a country on the northern hemisphere. By the second half of the century, the Chilean American community comprised between 4,000 and 5,000 people, and was the second largest Hispanic American group after Mexicans. While this migration was formed mainly by laborers from central Chile with little education, some businessmen also migrated and used this opportunity to export wheat and other staple products to California. This early Chilean migration left important marks on the history of California. In late 1849 and early 1850, the „War of Calaveras‰ or „Chilean War‰ took place as a result of the refusal of Chilean miners to leave an area wanted by Anglo-American miners. From a different perspective, an important number of families stayed in California and helped develop towns, unions, businesses, and newspapers. There is little record of how many descendants of these families remain in California. Even today, however, it is possible to find people in California who reminisce about the Chilean migration and its relevance.
Later Waves of Immigration Migration from Chile to the United States since the 1950s can be divided into three periods. The first period, from 1953 to 1973, is characterized by a process of modernization in Chilean society, as well as by a growing influence of the United States on Chilean politics. The second period, 1973 1990, overlaps with the dictatorship of General Pinochet. It is during this period that the largest exile in the history of Chile occurs. This period can be divided into two subperiods: the first, between the 1973 coup and the global crisis of 1982; and the second, between 1982 and the return to democracy in 1990. The third period begins with the election of Aylwin in December 1990, and it is marked by democratic governments, an economic system centered in the role of the market, and a growing social participation of the state.
Migration in the Context of Modernization The decade of the 1950s marked a change in the migration flows to and from Chile. Although this country never received the volume or proportion of migrants that other countries in the region received·namely Argentina and Uruguay·it is still considered an important country of reception of European and Mediterranean migrants. Shortly after World War II, this migration stopped and new flows began or become more prominent. First, Argentina consolidated as the main receiving country of labor migration from Chile. Between 40 percent and 60 percent of the close to 858,000 estimated Chilean emigrants reside in that country. Second, emigrants began settling in countries such as Venezuela, Canada, and Australia, which were
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in need of labor due to modernization and industrialization processes. It is in this context that migration to the United States gains relevance. Beginning in the early 1950s, the number of Chileans admitted with immigrant visas to the United States increased steadily. From close to 400 migrants a year in 1953 and 1954, Chilean immigration to the United States grew to a maximum of almost 2,000 in 1965. That number declined in the following years and remained close to 1,000 admissions per year until 1973. The total number of Chileans who entered the United States in the period from 1953 to 1973 was 18,956 people, an average of 903 a year. About 40 percent of the immigrants that arrived in this period participated in the labor force. The high percentage of dependants recorded implies that this was mostly a family migration. About two out of every five migrants who worked were occupied in management and professional occupations, which suggests this was a migration of highly qualified individuals.
The Centrality of Exile On September 11, 1973, the Chilean army, with General Pinochet at the head, led a coup dÊétat again President AllendeÊs democratically elected government. Repression of Allende supporters began immediately, and although it never stopped during PinochetÊs rule, the great majority of tortures, summary killings, and disappearances happened between 1973 and 1978. For the first two years, there were between 20,000 and 30,000 exiles; 80,000 political prisoners; and an unknown the number of deaths, estimated at a low of 3,000 to a high of 30,000. The governing bodies of the political parties that formed the governing coalition under Allende, namely the Socialist, Communist, and other smaller parties were completely destroyed, and their members were either murdered, disappeared, or exiled. Only six months after the coup, in March 1974, the military government stated that they would not set timetables for their government, since they had the task to rebuild the nation morally, institutionally, and economically. This rebuilding involved replacing Marxism with conservative Catholic and Chilean nationalistic values. The Chilean exile had two origins. First, during the first month after the coup, a number of Chileans composed mostly of the political elite of the government that had survived the coup and avoided the first waves of detentions asked for diplomatic asylum in many embassies. They were joined there by middle-level political activists and by foreigners. In the years that followed the coup, many other Chileans who had been detained in concentration camps were expelled from the country. It is estimated that close to 76 percent of the exiles left the country with their families: 52 percent left Chile between 1973 and 1976; 16.3 percent between 1977 and
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1980; and close to 10 percent between 1980 and 1984 (Wright and Oñate 1998). This last group was comprised also of economic exiles that due to their political beliefs had no opportunity of getting a job in Chile. Psychological problems were common among the exiles with higher than normal proportions of alcoholism and depression, with some deaths attributable to suicide and alcohol-related diseases (Norambuena Carrasco 2000). For most Chileans, the exile to the United States was complicated. After all, many refugees had been politically antagonistic to U.S. policies, which had helped in the fall of Allende. Although the United States did not develop a specific refugee status for Chileans, it received close to 400 exiles in 1976 as „paroles refugees,‰ while their families were admitted on a conditional residence status. Available data show that between 1975 and 1984, 794 former Chilean refugees and asylees were granted lawful permanent resident status. These refugee visas were usually granted to free, formerly imprisoned, Chileans using visas that NGOs and U.S. congressmen had obtained by pressuring Kissinger. Unlike other refugees, however, Chileans did not receive any assistance from the state or federal level·in food, housing, or education programs. They were only helped by charity organizations and NGOs (Muñoz 2008; Eastmond 1997). With regards to those Chileans who entered the United States with immigrant visas, the first two years of the dictatorship showed a steady but slow increase in the number of admissions. In this period about 1,300 immigrants were admitted every year; this number more than doubled in 1976 and 1977. Available data also show a high level of qualifications among them: close to 35 percent worked in a management and professional occupation. The percentage of dependants also diminished to almost 55 percent of the total admitted. Finally, the period between the foreign debt crisis and the return to democracy shows a steady influx of migrants to the United States. An average of 2,793 Chileans were admitted to the country every year. Only after 1988, the year of the plebiscite that defeated Pinochet, is it possible to observe a sudden increase in the number of immigrants admitted. This number increases to a little more than 3,000 by 1989 and to over 4,000 in 1990, the first year of the new democratic government. This last year represents the highest number of Chilean immigrant admissions ever. Migration since 1990 has continued at a level between 1,000 and 2,000 admissions a year. This migration is mainly by highly educated migrants who come to work at U.S. companies as expats or by traditional economic migrants in search of the American dream. According to the 2007 American Community Survey almost 20 percent of Chileans had arrived less than five years earlier in the United States, which means that they had arrived since the 2000 Census. The group of immigrants that came in the 2000s maintains the general characteristics of the previous migrant groups: about a third have four or more years of college and about a quarter have at least some college.
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Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community The relative importance of the Chilean population in the United States, in relation to other migrants from South America, has decreased since the 1960s. With a total population of 80,804·according to the 2000 Census·Chilean Americans represent only a little over 4 percent of South Americans in the United States. Although these numbers are small, Chilean Americans have never had a large representation; the highest proportion on record was around 7 percent, as recorded in the 1960 Census. As with other countries in the Southern Cone (Argentina and Uruguay) and South America, the growth between censuses of the Chilean-born population in the United States has also followed a constant decline. Between 1960 and 1970, the population grew at a rate of 8.44 percent per year, while 40 years later that growth had reduced to 3.68 percent. According to the American Community Survey, as of 2008, there are 91,590 Chileans in the United States. According to the Registro de Chilenos en el Exterior carried by the DICOEX in 2004, there are 113,934 Chileans in the United States. This makes
Jose Luis Briones watches television news in Miami’s Sabores Chilenos restaurant, October 13, 2010. South Florida’s Chilean community was celebrating the rescue of 33 miners who spent more than three agonizing months underground. (AP Photo/J. Pat Carter)
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the United States the second largest receiver of Chileans migrants in the world after Argentina. The distribution of Chilean migration in the United States centers mostly on the traditional migrant receiving states. The northeast corridor, between Massachusetts and Virginia, accounts for a third of the Chilean migrants (36.6%). In this area, New York and New Jersey hold 23.3 percent, the largest concentration of Chileans in the United States. Florida is the single state with the largest proportion of Chileans, almost one out of every five of those born in Chile reside there, followed closely by California (19.3%). With the exception of Texas (4.8%), only in a handful of other states can we find between 1 percent and 2 percent of the Chileans in the United States. The remaining states have less that 1 percent of the Chilean population residing in the United States as of the 2000 Census.
Age and Family Structure With a median age of 40 years, the Chilean migration is six years older than that of the aggregate for Latin America. This statistic could suggest two things: first, in general the Chilean migration is older, and second, that this migration has been and still is comprised mostly of families. Both statements are true. About two-thirds of these migrants arrived before 1990 compared with little over 50 percent in the case of other Latin Americans. As of 2000, 60 percent of Chileans were married, which is slightly higher than the Latin-American percentage (57.7%). With regards to gender, a little over 50 percent of this population is female. Three-quarters of the Chilean-born population are between 20 and 64 years of age, while 8.6 percent are over 65 years of age. There is no scientific data on the number of Chileans that decide to retire in Chile, but anecdotal information shows a relevant number of families have bought houses and apartments in Chile with this objective.
Educational Attainment An old migration law states that the level of education increases with the distance between countries of origin and destination. This seems to be true for the case of those born in Chile and in the Southern Cone. According to the 2000 Census, only 19 percent of Chileans have less than a high school diploma, while those with an associate, bachelor, or postgraduate degree account for close to 37 percent of those 25 years and older. As a comparison, 51 percent of migrants from Latin America have less than a high school diploma and only 13 percent have completed studies beyond high school. The question that remains is whether Chilean migrants achieved comparatively higher levels of education in the United States or in Chile.
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If they were educated in the United States, then Chileans would be more prone to upward assimilation compared to other Latin Americans. On the other hand, if they were educated in Chile, then the migration would have been a product of what is called a brain drain, or a loss of educated workers due to lack of employment opportunities in the home country. According to the 2000 Census, a majority of Chilean migrants are employed in the tertiary sector (61%). Within the service sector, a third work in educational, health, and other social services, while 18 percent work in professional and scientific areas. Unlike other Latin Americans, less that 1 percent are working in primary extraction activities.
Economic Attainment Most likely due to the aggregate higher educational levels of this group, Chilean Americans have achieved a comparatively high economic attainment as compared to other Latin-American immigrant groups. A third of all Chilean immigrants have occupations in management or professional fields (34%). This percentage more than doubles that of Latin America as a whole (14%), although it is relatively smaller when compared to other regions of the world. Only about 1 in 10 Chileans work in construction and related occupations, and a little over 12 percent in occupations that are in the transportation subsector. Census data shows a high propensity among Chileans of being self-employed. A little over 10 percent of workers fall in this category. Although this percentage is higher than for any other region as a whole, when each country is analyzed by itself and compared to Chile, some differences become clear. For example, this same proportion is higher among Uruguayans in the United States (close to 13%). Those born in Chile generally earn more money than those born in Latin Americans. According to the 2000 Census, when analyzed by household, the median income of Chilean Americans is $9,000 higher than the Latin-American median. Almost three-quarters of Chilean Americans have a household income of more than $25,000 a year, which would imply that only a quarter live in poverty.
Health Statistics and Issues Due to the small proportion of Chilean Americans among the total foreign-born population, there are no reliable data on health problems or health access. Because of the similarities on socioeconomic variables such as income and educational levels, it is possible to hypothesize that the general health conditions of Chileans is closer to that of the natives·again, relative to socioeconomic position·than to the Latin-American immigrants in general.
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Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals As with the other countries in the Southern Cone, Chile has been historically more influenced by western European countries than by the United States. This has been changing since the 1960s, although a mixture of influences is still perceivable. In general, the celebration of mayor U.S. holidays (Halloween, Thanksgiving) depends on particular families and their degree of assimilation to the U.S. society. There are no major differences in the celebrations of birthdays. Giving presents and having a dinner or some sort of meal is customary. Weddings in Chile are in general religious celebrations. Because the majority of the country is Catholic or share some Catholic beliefs, most weddings and baptisms are performed in the Catholic Church, even if the bride and groom or parents are not strict Catholics. In the last 20 to 30 years, there has been a growth of participation in Christian churches throughout Chile; most ceremonies and traditions, however, remain similar.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Since the 1960s, families have been going through important changes in Chile. Currently, despite being one of the most conservative countries in the Americas, most women participate actively in the labor force; however, there are several gender inequalities on salaries and responsibilities. In general the characteristics of Chilean American families are very similar to the other families in the United States. Chileans, however, tend to have a lower divorce rate than their U.S. counterpart. There is no information on whether same sex couples are more common in Chilean families in the United States than in Chile. Chilean families in the United States tend to maintain accepted gender roles. Men are usually better paid than women and this had resulted in the development of a „second shift,‰ in which women work both outside and inside the home.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Chilean American communities are usually formed by city or metropolitan area of residency. Most communities have developed good informative Web site and Facebook groups. Not every Chilean participates in these groups. Only a minority are active participants. Chilean Americans tend to get together for national holidays and for relevant sports competitions. Soccer matches in which the Chilean national team competes are eagerly followed at Chilean restaurants and homes. They also participate actively when a Chilean player has engaged in tennis competitions played in the United States, such as the U.S. Open or Indian Wells. Chilean American
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communities also participate actively in raising funds for social organizations in Chile. Most communities provide support to the Chilean Teletón, which has worked with handicapped children for over 30 years. After the earthquake of 2010 an important number of Chilean organizations in the United States promoted social and cultural activities to raise funds to help Chilean cities and communities in distress. From a governmental perspective, DICOEX has been active in trying to maintain a sense of being Chilean. This organization provides funds on a competitive basis for Chilean groups interested in presenting or developing their cultural ties to Chile. A few organizations of Chileans abroad have tried to create an online gathering place to discuss voting rights, the loss of citizenship, and other political aspects of emigrant life. Finally, most communities have within them folkloric groups that try to keep Chilean musical traditions alive.
National /Regional-Language Press and Other Media There are no Chilean newspapers in the United States at the national level. Most city-based communities have their own Web sites on which they post relevant news from the home country. Major Chilean newspapers have good and active Web sites free of charge where most people get their news. The two main television channels have Web sites with specific programs for Chileans abroad. Most of this material, however, can only be accessed through a satellite company.
Celebration of National Holidays Although the Chilean proclamation of independence was signed on February 12, 1818, the country celebrates its national day on September 18 and 19. The first day commemorates the establishment of the first Junta in 1810: the first step in becoming an independent nation. The second date is the day of the army, and it is when this component of the armed forces celebrates its history. These two days are probably the most important of the Chilean holidays. They are celebrated by most Chileans residing in the United States. Individuals get together to have a barbeque; state- or city-based communities might hold a formal dinner with some national foods and drinks. The Chilean consul participates actively in these parties, and more recently, the consul reads a letter sent by the president to the Chilean communities abroad, in which the notions of being part of an „imagined community‰ are celebrated. A less important holiday, but one that is also celebrated abroad, is the Glories of the Navy, which commemorates a naval battle that occurred on May 21 during the 1879 War. This holiday celebrates the history of the Chilean navy. Chilean Americans also celebrate Christmas ( December 24 25) and New YearÊs Day (January 1).
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Foodways Chilean food is comprised mostly of meat (mostly beef ) as well as fish and seafood. These proteins are usually accompanied by potatoes, rice, or salad. Common national dishes are empanadas (pastries filled with meat, seafood, or cheese), corn pie, and bean stew. There are a few regional differences that are not usually transferred abroad. There are several online stores where is possible to find Chilean brand canned seafood, marmalades, wines, sweets, and other foods. Delivery is expensive because of weight. Chilean wine can be found in most supermarkets chains in the United States.
Chilean Food and the Role of Restaurants As in most immigrant communities, restaurants play a very important role among different Chilean American groups. Currently, it is possible to find at least one Chilean restaurant in every major community in the United States, including in Los Angeles, Boston, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Miami, Houston, and Washington, D.C. There are small restaurants that serve only sandwiches to more upscale places that have sophisticated versions of Chilean food. Regardless of size, these places fulfill their as role as a gathering place for Chilean immigrants and as keepers of certain traditions. Although Chilean food varies somewhat with the location, there are some dishes that are always present in Chilean restaurants in the United States. Empanadas, pastel de choclo, and diverse preparation of fish and seafood such as the caldillo de congrio are probably the most common dishes. Although some restaurants have as their purpose introducing Chilean cuisine in the United States, the scant number of restaurants and the competition of other more “developed” ethnic cuisines from Latin America (Mexico and Brazil, among others) or from other regions of the world have impeded an expansion of Chilean cuisine in the United States. Most Chilean restaurants are devoted to the communities where they are located, and only a handful are intended to be upscale restaurants for U.S. gourmands. As part of the community, Chilean restaurants provide immigrants with foods and drinks that are not normally prepared at home. They also allow Chileans to introduce friends from the United States or other countries to Chilean food. Restaurants also participate in activities of the Chilean communities by providing catering of traditional foods or having stands to sell them. In this sense, they help maintain certain chilenidad (Chilenity) through food. Finally, as a meeting place, restaurants have been venues where members of the community gather to watch soccer games, in particular those of the World Cup qualifiers. These occasions also help to introduce recently arrived members and returning members to the community; and promote conversations about social changes in Chile, politics, and Chilean current events.
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Music, Arts, and Entertainment Chile has a very rich folklore that has different manifestations and that varies with the territory. In almost every community it is possible to find a group of people that keep musical traditions by participating in national celebrations and other activities. These groups are usually guitar based and play traditional songs as well as perform the national dance, la cueca. It is possible to find in some stores in the United States that sell handicrafts made by Chilean artisans. These are not common, however, and many times can be mixed with those from such other Andean countries as Peru and Bolivia. Chile has a growing independent cinema industry that has received international praise and has even won some competitions in the United States. Some of these movies have made it to the independent circuit and are also widely available on DVD. Chilean narrative has always been well recognized and considered in the United States. Authors such as Isabel Allende, Ariel Dorfman, José Donoso, Alberto Fuguet, and Roberto Ampuero have lived and taught at some point during their lives in universities in the United States.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship According to the 2000 Census, a little over a third of the Chilean born population (35%) arrived in this country before 1980. This statistic implies that this migration is older than most other Latin-American immigrant groups. As of 2007, however, still less than half of Chilean immigrants have become citizens (41%). As is common to almost every migrant group, those Chileans who have naturalized are those who have been in the country longer. Of all those that have become naturalized, 61 percent arrived to the United States before 1980 however, only one out every four migrants from Chile who are currently in the United States arrived in that period. The availability of a specific visa for Chilean professionals within the Free Trade Agreement between the two countries would most likely increase the number of migrants who do not become citizens in the future, particularly since this visa does not allow for changing to a citizen status. This form of admittance is recent, however, and has not been fully used. Because it has not been measured by any census, there is little information on its impact. The last 10 years have shown, according to the Department of Homeland Security, a continuous but small increase of legal residencies obtained by Chilean immigrants: from 1,700 in the year 2000 to 2,250 in 2009 with a peak of 2,774 in 2006. The number of Chilean immigrants with legal residencies still represents less that
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U.S. Army major Petros Kosmas Chapanos, M.D., a native of Chile, wipes away tears as he prepares to take the oath of allegiance to become a United States citizen during a naturalization ceremony in Dallas, November 5, 2008. (AP Photo/Tony Gutierrez)
1 percent (0.22%) of the total legal residences given the last decade. According to the last available data from 2009, Chileans obtaining legal resident status are living in the traditional immigration states for this population: Florida, California, New York, New Jersey, and Texas.
Intergroup Relations Chilean American immigrants and their communities tend to establish ties with immigrants from other Latin-American countries. Two approaches have been observed. On the one hand, some Chilean Americans tend to go beyond historical animosities between countries by embracing a pan Latin-American identity and becoming part of different Latino groups. On the other, Chileans participate with other migrants from countries that are considered to be more „racially similar,‰ since more than 70 percent of Chileans consider themselves white, and even a somewhat large percentage consider themselves non-Hispanic (Marrow 2007), such as western Europeans, Argentineans, Uruguayan, and Anglo-Americans. The origins to this last approach can be found the country of origin, Chile. It is common for many Chileans, particularly in the higher classes, to identify solely with their white European ancestors and to disregard any possible native or even mestizo ancestry. With this they create a particular habitus, a structure of establishing
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relationships with other social groups based in this self-identification. Chileans in Chile also hold some well-developed stereotypes in regards to other Latin Americans, which some Chileans have transported with them to the United States.
Forging a New American Political Identity Chilean immigrants have participated actively in political activities in the United States. With the help of NGOs and charity organizations, several groups were formed during the dictatorship to help jailed Chileans and to help exiles who arrive in the United States. These groups also participated in movements with similar groups from Argentina and Uruguay. Currently there are a few organizations that have tried to lobby the Chilean parliament from the United States to improve the rights of citizens abroad. So far, and only recently (2005), have these groups helped to put in place constitutional changes in Chile that allow for the children of emigrants who have at least one Chilean parent to be recognized as Chilean citizens. Previously, children had to spend a least one year in Chile to be considered citizens. There are still rights that have not been approved, such as voting from overseas. Another constitutional change is required for voting rights, and it has yet
Chilean immigrants Betty Granadidim, Betty Martinez, and Maurilio Coelho join others at a nationwide rally calling on Congress to stop H.R. bill 4437, Boston, Massachusetts, April 10, 2006. The bill would criminalize undocumented immigrants and the people who help them. (Joe Raedle/Getty Images)
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to be approved: this has become a contentious and electoral matter. The new government sworn in March 2010 made a campaign promise to make advances in this issue. Some of his coalition members, however, have proposed that voting rights for Chileans abroad have to be tied to showing a permanent connection with the country, such as yearly or frequent visits to the country. There is little information with regards to the participation of Chilean Americans in the United StateÊs political life. In most cases, Chileans have been active in secondary positions at the local level, as in the case of Ximena Hartsock; or in advisory positions in the state department, as in the case of Arturo Valenzuela.
Return Immigration The democratic government elected in 1990 created an institutional office to facilitate the return of former exiles to Chile. Despite the good intentions of the Oficina Nacional del Retorno (National Office for Return) and the economic incentives to return, only a small percentage did return (between 8% and 10% of all estimated exiles). Although there is no information specific to the United States, there are personal narratives and other sources that show that there was some who returned among those that resided in the United States. Most of these, however, are cases of people who have achieved a high level of education or have become successful businesspeople. Evidence from other countries of immigration suggests that for many returnees this has been a traumatic process due to the cultural changes in Chile in the last 30 years. Anecdotal evidence suggests that an important number of those who returned eventually went back to their countries of immigration. As with other communities, there are some transnational activities among Chilean migrants. Transnational activities, however, are generally available only to those who have developed successful businesses and are not common practices in the overall population. There are also some temporary return trips, particularly during end-of-the-year holidays. Some older migrants have suggested the possibility of retiring in Chile. To do this, some have bought houses in their hometowns or in coastal areas of the country. The lack of data makes it hard to determine whether this a common practice.
The Second and Later Generations Unlike other countries where the Chilean migrants are more statistically relevant, there are no studies on second-generation Chileans in the United States. Observation in Chilean American communities allows one to argue that the incorporation of these second-generation individuals has more to do with class status than with participation in a specific migrant group. As such, the children of Chilean migrants would tend to follow the patterns of U.S. youth.
The Second and Later Generations | 259
Youth Profile A Chilean Girl in Economic Need Grows Up to Gain Doctorate in Engineering Field In 1985, shortly before her 10th birthday, Thelma Valdes arrived in the United States. Her father, an accountant, had lost his job when the company he worked for went bankrupt during the 1982 economic crisis. Although he had tried to begin his own business, the difficult economic times that Chile was going through in the early part of the decade had made it impossible for him to succeed. Because of Chile’s tough economic climate, Thelma’s father decided Chile offered no future for his daughter. Thus, he decided to migrate to the United States in order to create better opportunities for his family. The first few months in the United States were extremely difficult for Thelma and her family. They lived in a friend’s house in Queens, New York. For a short while, Thelma had to sleep on a makeshift bed; her first birthday present in the United States was a bed. The area of the city where they were living was not safe. For instance, every night they would hear gunshots being fired and the sound of ambulance sirens. As a way of getting Thelma and her family out of this danger, her mother searched for jobs, and her dad worked as a waiter. Thelma’s mother found a job cleaning and caring for a mansion in upstate New York. Finally, the family decided to relocate to a town three hours away from the city. The town where they relocated is rural and fairly homogeneous. There are a handful of families from Latin America, and people would turn around to look whenever someone spoke Spanish in the streets. Thelma enrolled in the fifth grade at the local Catholic school. Thelma’s mother, an English teacher in Chile, helped her understand and translate her homework throughout the year. By her sixth year of middle school, Thelma had already learned English and earned good grades at school. That year, she received the school’s award for having the highest grades in her class. According to Thelma, family life stabilized by 1990. A couple of years after her mother gave birth to Thelma’s only sister, they could afford to buy a house in the town. Her father became a successful, (Courtesy of Thelma Valdes)
260 | Chilean Immigrants
independent contractor, and her mother secured a job teaching Spanish in an elementary school teaching. By that time, Thelma decided to continue her high school education a half an hour away in a larger city, graduating in 1993 from a Catholic high school. The following year she was accepted in the biomedical engineering undergraduate program at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., with a scholarship. As with most students leaving home for the first time, her initial semesters at the university were difficult. Because her parents were not well-versed on the university culture in the United States, Thelma felt that she could have done better during the first couple of semesters. Nevertheless, she was persistent, and after taking a biomaterials class, she decided to apply for a MS degree to pursue her interests in that field. In 1997, Thelma was accepted at the University of Connecticut to work in the area of implantable devices, tissue regeneration, and biomaterials. After she graduated in 1999 graduating, she applied and was accepted into the doctoral program at the University of Connecticut, where she received her PhD in 2005. Because her main advisor relocated to the University of Washington Engineered Biomaterials Center in 2003, Thelma finished her work in Seattle and moved back to the East Coast in the beginning of 2006, where she found work in a medical technology company as a senior engineer. Thelma believes that any individual, particularly in the difficult conditions that surround his or her migration, can continue studying and move forward, but only if the conditions to do so exist. According to her, her ability to succeed was made possible because she was given a stable household and her family was economically comfortable enough that she was able to continue her education. She says that if her family had been in economic need, she would have stopped her PhD to try to help them.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Chile Since the last decade of the previous century, the United States has considered Chile a model of democracy, economic policy, and development in Latin America. Regardless of a few critical moments, the relationship between both nations has been extraordinarily good since the return to democracy (Mares and Rojas Aravena 2001). This was not necessarily the case during PinochetÊs dictatorship. Beside the initial support given by the Nixon administration, the relationship shattered after the 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier, AllendeÊs former secretary of state, in Washington, D.C. CarterÊs administration gave support to human rights groups working in Chile and brought LetelierÊs assassins to justice in the United States, although the administration maintained diplomatic relations with Chile. ReaganÊs
Issues in Relations between the United States and Chile | 261
policy towards Chile was ambiguous. On the one hand, it provided help for the return to democracy and applauded ChileÊs economic reforms; on the other, it only recognized the dictatorship as an authoritarian state. This was a euphemistic concept to differentiate pro-Soviet dictatorships (totalitarian) from pro-U.S. dictatorships (authoritarian). A return to democracy in Chile marked a change in the relationship with the United States. Chile was promoted as an example for other Latin-American nations. In fact, the Washington Consensus (the basic set of policies towards Latin America in the early 1990s that was promoted by international financial institutions in Washington, D.C.) was based on the democratic values, fiscal policies, trade liberalization, and general economic neoliberalism promoted in Chile by the center-left governing coalition. This led the United States to offer Chile a free trade agreement similar to NAFTA. Negotiations began in the mid-1990s and entered into force in 2004. This treaty includes a particular type of visa for Chilean professionals to work in the United States without the possibility of becoming citizens. Chile and the United States have disagreed on foreign policy issues during the last decade; particularly in relation to the Iraq War. Regardless of the support that Chile gave to the United States after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Chilean government did not consider the attacks to be related in any way to the intention of the United States to invade Iraq. Thus, Chile, being a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council at the time, voted against the resolution invoked by the United States to invade and declare war on Iraq. For some in the Chilean foreign policy community, this was going to create unnecessary problems in the signature of the free trade agreement. This was not the case, and the United States did not take any action against Chile for this vote.
Forecasts for the 21st Century The beginning of the 21st century show two highly integrated countries although Chile does not depend economically or politically on the United States as it once did, for example, during the 1960s. If this integration continues, migration flows will tend to follow similar patterns that have been evident in the last 15 years. Information is available that suggests that migration from Chile will increase disproportionally in the coming years. Most likely this migration will continue having three component faces: 1. Considering that the U.S. government has continuously increased the number and quality of scholarships available for Chilean graduates, Chile will continue sending students for postgraduate studies in the United States 2. ChileÊs economic growth and development policies have placed the country in a good position to become a developed nation. In fact, Chile became a
262 | Chilean Immigrants
member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in early 2010. This will probably increase the number of people with incentives to invest in the United States and to be hired in management and professional occupations in this country 3. Economic growth and a failure to reduce social inequality have created a propensity in some segments of the population to migrate·not only to the United States but also·and mainly·to western Europe. Changes in the social role of the state in economic policies could decrease or increment such migration patterns Despite its small numbers, Chilean migration to the United States is highly relevant for the sending country since the United States is the second largest receiver of Chilean migrants in the world. And there is still lot to learn. There are no data on cases of undocumented or overstayed migrants, although some Chilean newspapers have presented cases of possible disappearances in the southern U.S. border area. There is also no data on remittances of any kind that might be sent from the Chilean communities. Second-generation and return migration have also received little attention from scholars in either country. Hopefully, the active economic integration process that both countries are pursuing will also bring more social and cultural integration, which would benefit both societies.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Chilean immigrants admitted to the USA by year, 1953–2008 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 1953
Figure 2
1958
1963
1968
1973
1978
1983
1988
1993
1998
2003
Chilean immigrants admitted to the United States by year (1953–2008)
2008
Table 41 United States (1953–2008): Immigrants admitted by country or region of birth (Chile) and historical period of arrival Years 1953–1973
Country of birth
1983–1990
1991–2008
Total
Average
Total
Average
Total
Average
33,329
2,381
Totala
Argentina
61,430
2,925
23,584
2,620
21,688
3,098
64,706
4,622
171,408
Chile
18,956
903
18,612
2,068
19,554
2,793
33,329
2,381
90,451
5,885
280
7,845
872
6,518
931
13,444
960
33,692
Other South America
267,938
12,759
245,298
27,255
337,749
48,250
1,145,053
81,790
1,996,038
South America
354,209
16,867
295,339
32,815
385,510
55,073
1,256,532
89,752
2,291,590
2,473,949
117,807
1,576,184
175,132
2,764,286
394,898
6,813,891
486,707
13,628,310
72,700
3,462
100,707
11,190
162,205
23,172
1,015,397
72,528
1,351,009
917,594
43,695
1,862,755
206,973
2,240,078
320,011
5,748,315
410,594
10,768,742
2,666,674
126,984
657,468
73,052
568,375
81,196
2,470,115
176,437
6,362,632
35,750
1,702
35,892
3,988
33,400
4,771
95,295
6,807
200,337
269
13
24
3
192
27
23,818
1,701
24,303
6,521,145
310,531
4,528,369
503,152
6,154,045
879,149
17,423,363
1,244,526
34,626,922
Place of birth
Uruguay
North America Africa Region of birth
1974–1982
Asia Europe Oceania Unknown Total
b
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Yearbook, Table 14 (1962–1978), Table 13 (1979–1981), Table IMM 1.3 (1982–1984), Table 3 (1997–2004). a Total does not implies that the mentioned number of immigrants are today residing in the United States. b From North America included Canada, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.
Table 42 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000–2009 Region and country of birth
264
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
Chile
1,700
1,921
1,839
1,310
1,810
2,404
2,774
2,274
2,017
2,250
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 43 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence: region/country: Chile State of residence
Total
Male
Female
Total
2,250
1,026
1,224
28
9
19
California
341
150
191
Colorado
46
20
26
Connecticut
51
21
30
Florida
596
260
336
Georgia
34
12
22
Illinois
38
20
18
Maryland
60
30
30
Massachusetts
44
22
22
Minnesota
28
19
9
Arizona
Nevada
26
14
12
New Jersey
117
51
66
New York
217
110
107
North Carolina
42
14
28
Ohio
25
8
17
Pennsylvania
67
36
31
Texas
111
51
60
Virginia
43
17
26
Washington
42
17
25
294
145
149
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
265
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics
Table 44 United States (1960–2000): Foreign-born population by country or region of birth Census year Place of birth
1960
Argentina
Number
Chile
Number Percentage
Uruguay
Number Percentage
Other South America
Number Percentage
South America
Number Percentage
Region of birth
266
Country of birth
Percentage
Central America and the Caribbean
Number Percentage
North America
a
Number Percentage
Africa
Number Percentage
16,579 18.52 6,259 6.99 1,170 1.31 65,528 73.19 89,536 0.93 242,871 2.51 1,528,402 15.79 35,355 0.37
1970 44,803 17.55 15,393 6.03 5,092 2.00 189,950 74.42 255,238 2.74 789,021 8.48 1,572,132 16.90 80,143 0.86
1980 68,887 12.28 35,127 6.26 13,278 2.37 443,719 79.09 561,011 4.25 1,612,255 12.22 3,052,648 23.14 199,723 1.51
1990 92,563 8.92 55,681 5.37 20,766 2.00 868,487 83.71 1,037,497 5.47 3,072,326 16.20 5,051,931 26.65 363,819 1.92
2000 125,218 6.49 80,804 4.19 25,038 1.30 1,699,211 88.03 1,930,271 6.21 4,979,216 16.01 10,006,929 32.17 881,300 2.83
(Continued )
Table 44 United States (1960–2000): Foreign-born population by country or region of birth (Continued ) Census year Place of birth
1960
Asia
Number
Europe
Number
267
Region of birth
Percentage Percentage Oceania
Number Percentage
Total
Number Percentage
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006). a North America includes Mexico, Canada, and the Atlantic islands.
490,996 5.07 7,256,311 74.98 34,730 0.36 9,678,201 100.00
1970
1980
1990
2000
824,887
2,539,777
4,979,037
8,226,254
8.87 5,740,891 61.71 41,258 0.44 9,303,570 100.00
19.25 5,149,572 39.03 77,577 0.59 13,192,563 100.00
26.26 4,350,403 22.95 104,145 0.55 18,959,158 100.00
26.44 4,915,557 15.80 168,046 0.54 31,107,573 100.00
Table 45 United States (1960–2000): Intercensal growth of the foreign-born population by country or region of birth Census years Place of birth Country of birth
Argentina Chile
1970–1980
1980–1990
1990–2000
9.20
4.24
2.93
3.00
8.44
7.81
4.53
3.68
12.53
8.91
4.40
1.87
Other South American Countries
9.74
8.01
6.47
6.47
South America
9.61
7.49
5.96
6.02
10.59
6.86
6.23
4.74
North Americaa
0.28
6.40
4.93
6.58
Africa
7.76
8.55
5.82
8.31
Asia
5.07
10.19
6.49
4.92
Europe
-2.33
-1.09
-1.68
1.22
Oceania
1.72
6.11
2.92
4.70
Total
-0.39
3.46
3.59
4.85
Total
Sex ratio
Uruguay
Region of birth
1960–1970
Central America and the Caribbean
Source: Calculations based on data presented in Table 44. a North America includes Mexico, Canada, and the Atlantic islands.
Table 46 United States foreign-born population by sex, 2000 Sex Place of birth Country of birth
Male Argentina
61,950
63,270
125,220
97.91
Chile
39,245
41,560
80,805
94.43
Uruguay Region of birth
Female
Latin America North America Africa
12,655
12,385
25,040
102.18
8,392,945
7,694,030
16,086,975
109.08
365,025
464,420
829,445
78.60
484,790
396,510
881,300
122.26
Asia
3,932,835
4,293,420
8,226,255
91.60
Europe
2,222,910
2,692,650
4,915,560
82.55
Oceania Total
80,150
87,895
168,045
91.19
15,478,655
15,628,925
31,107,580
99.04
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special tabulations (Stp—159).
268
Table 47 United States foreign-born population by educational attainment, 2000. Population 25 years and older Educational attainment
Country of birth
Place of birth
269 Region of birth
Argentina
Less than 9th grade 8,980
9th to 12th grade, no diploma
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
Some college, no degree
12,640
21,720
20,280
Associate degree
Bachelor’s degree
5,500
16,460
Graduate or professional degree 19,955
Total 105,535
Chile
4,680
7,745
15,095
13,910
4,760
10,315
8,890
65,395
Uruguay
2,570
3,675
5,505
4,280
1,185
2,470
2,405
22,090
Latin America
4,223,665
2,428,595
2,253,220
1,391,230
420,900
681,400
455,100
11,854,110
North America
39,925
87,280
148,945
152,895
53,090
138,690
102,555
723,380
Africa
39,990
52,990
122,810
119,790
56,455
166,370
127,540
685,945
Asia
770,955
638,265
1,071,810
896,385
422,445
1,701,360
1,180,685
6,681,905
Europe
524,430
481,845
1,067,680
698,900
263,100
630,385
621,720
4,288,060
9,015
17,195
33,020
26,435
8,880
22,555
15,295
132,395
5,607,980
3,706,170
4,697,485
3,285,635
1,224,870
3,340,760
2,502,895
Oceania Total
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special tabulations (Stp—159).
24,365,795
Table 48 United States foreign-born population by U.S. citizenship and period of U.S. entry, 2000
Region of birth
Country of birth
Citizenship status and year of entry/Place of birth
Naturalized U.S. citizen Entered 1990 to 2000
Entered 1980 to 1989
Entered before 1980
Total
Argentina
4,200
12,630
43,340
60,170
Chile
3,610
9,180
20,440
33,230
770
3,575
8,345
12,690
Latin America
669,640
1,587,775
2,600,180
4,857,595
North America
21,735
32,655
327,710
382,100
Africa
64,810
129,830
123,525
318,165
Asia
702,060
1,673,490
1,803,485
4,179,035
Europe
291,455
337,695
2,118,885
2,748,035
9,650
16,000
31,795
57,445
1,759,350
3,777,445
7,005,580
12,542,375
Uruguay
270
Oceania Total
Not a U.S. citizen
Region of birth
Country of birth
Citizenship status and year of entry/Place of birth
Entered 1990 to 2000
Entered 1980 to 1989
Entered before 1980
Total
Argentina
41,275
13,730
10,050
65,055
Chile
27,790
11,920
7,865
47,575
Uruguay Latin America North America Africa Asia
6,170
4,175
2,000
12,345
6,536,265
3,221,205
1,471,905
11,229,375
224,420
69,410
153,515
447,345
434,115
97,100
31,920
563,135
2,830,950
930,540
285,730
4,047,220 (Continued )
Table 48 United States foreign-born population by U.S. citizenship and period of U.S. entry, 2000 (Continued) Europe Oceania Total
345,965
497,230
2,167,520
68,775
23,080
18,740
110,595
11,418,850
4,687,300
2,459,040
18,565,190
Entered before 1980
Total
Total Entered 1990 to 2000
Entered 1980 to 1989
Argentina
45,475
26,360
Chile
31,400
21,100
28,305
80,805
6,940
7,750
10,345
25,035
7,205,905
4,808,980
4,072,085
16,086,970
246,155
102,065
481,225
829,445
Uruguay Latin America North America Africa
Region of birth
271
Country of birth
Citizenship status and year of entry/Place of birth
1,324,325
53,390
125,225
498,925
226,930
155,445
881,300
Asia
3,533,010
2,604,030
2,089,215
8,226,255
Europe
1,615,780
683,660
2,616,115
4,915,555
Oceania Total
78,425
39,080
50,535
168,040
13,178,200
8,464,745
9,464,620
31,107,565
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special tabulations (Stp—159).
272 | Chilean Immigrants
Appendix III: Notable Chilean Americans Despite the fact that the numerical contribution to the immigration stocks in the United States has been limited compared to other Latin-American countries, an important number of Chilean artists, writers, and intellectuals have resided and currently reside in the United States. A non exhaustive list of those currently residing in the United States include the actresses Leonor Varela and Coté de Pablo; rock star Tom Araya (Slayer); television host Mario Kreutzberger (Don Francisco); actress Leonor Varela; writer Ariel Dorfman, artist Alfredo Jaar; political scientist Arturo Valenzuela; and writer Isabel Allende. A brief biography of these last three individuals follows. Isabel Allende is probably the best known Chilean in the United States and arguably the best known living Chilean writer in the world. She was born of Chilean parents in 1942 in Lima, Peru, where her father, first cousin of Salvador Allende, was a posted as diplomat at the time. Her literary career began in Chile, where she worked as a journalist and published her first books and plays. Allende left Chile shortly after the military coup of 1973 for Venezuela, where she would live and work for 13 years. Her post-1973 works began with the famous The House of the Spirits (1981), which has been translated into 20 languages and has been made into a movie and a play. This book was followed by 16 other books so far, which have been translated into more than 27 languages; some of these works have also been adapted for film and theater adaptations. She has received numerous awards and honors in Chile, the United States, and at least seven other countries. Allende currently lives in San Jose, California. Alfredo Jaar is an artist, architect, and filmmaker born in Santiago, Chile, in 1956. In his art, he depicts real events through installations and interventions, usually related to the impact of war and globalization. Among his most famous works are: „A Logo for America Project‰ (1987), which delivered a message about identity replacing the idea of the country „America‰ for the continent America; the Rwanda Project (1994 2000), which is about genocide in that country; and Project Emergencia (2000), an online installation on the topic of Aids in Africa. He received a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1985 and a MacArthur Fellowship in 2005. He resides in New York. Arturo Valenzuela is a political scientist born in Concepción, Chile, in 1944. He has lived in the United States since the 1960s. Valenzuela holds a PhD in political science from Columbia University. He has taught as professor or visiting professor in several universities in the United States, Europe, and Latin America. His research deals with the origins and consolidation of democracy, Latin American politics, and regime transitions. His book The Breakdown of
Glossary | 273
Democracy in Chile (1978) is considered a classic on the political analysis of the Chilean military coup of 1973. He is currently on leave as director of the Center for Latin American Studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Valenzuela was the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere affairs between 2009 and 2011: the highest political position any Chilean has held in the U.S. government. He has also served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council during the second term of the Clinton presidency and as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs in the U.S. Department of State in ClintonÊs first term.
Glossary Cachai: Part of Chilean slang. According to some people, it derives from the English verb „to catch‰ and it means „to understand.‰ Sometimes it is used as a filler word that can be translated as „you know.‰ Caldillo de congrio: One of the many ways to prepare and serve Chilean seafood, in this case eel. Pablo Neruda composed an ode to this dish, which probably helped make it a classic. Carrete: „Party.‰ Used most often by young people, it refers to any kind of party where there will be drinking and dancing. Ce-ache-i (CHI): The Chilean sports chant. It is a spelling of the countryÊs name: „Ce-ache-I: Chi; le: le; chi-chi-chi; le-le-le, viva Chile.‰ Used frequently during a sports match. Cueca: Chilean national dance that is almost always danced by a couple; it emulates the courting of the rooster and the chicken. It has Spanish and African origins. Curanto (or pulmay): A meal from Chiloe, the second largest island in continental Chile. Curanto traditionally is prepared in a hole in the ground (pulmay is made in a large stew pot), and it contains beef, chicken, pork, and different kinds of potato pies, fish, and other seafood. It is served with a lot of wine, and the preparations (and the party surrounding it) might last for hours. Dieciocho: „The 18.‰ The name given to the period of celebration of ChileÊs independence from Spain. It gets the name from the date that commemorates the beginning of the process that led to the countryÊs independence on September 18, 1810. Empanada: A pastry filled with mincemeat, cheese, or seafood. It is cooked in a clay oven or fried. Although empanadas are made in almost every South American country, the specific recipes for the pastry and the fillings have fairly specific national origins.
274 | Chilean Immigrants
Pastel de choclo: Traditional in the summer time (the winter version is made with potato), this corn pie is one of the most recognizable foods in Chilean restaurants. It is filled with the same mincemeat that is used in empanadas and is covered with a corn paste. It is similar to the Irish ShepherdÊs pie. Pisco: Although this spirit made of distilled grapes is originally from Peru, Chile has become a leading producer and exporter of this product. With this spirit is made Pisco Sour, an aperitif very common in Chilean restaurants.
References Bethell, Leslie. 1993. Chile since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eastmond, Marita. 1997. The Dilemmas of Exile: Chilean Refugees in the U.S.A. Gothenburg Studies in Social Anthropology, 13. Göteborg, Sweden: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis. Loveman, Brian. 2001. Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism. Latin American Histories. New York: Oxford University Press. Mares, David R., and Francisco Rojas Aravena. 2001. The United States and Chile: Coming in from the Cold. Contemporary Inter-American Relations. New York: Routledge. Marrow, Helen B. 2007. „Who Are the Other Latinos, and Why?.‰ In The Other Latinos: Central and South Americans in the United States, edited by J. L. Falconi and J. A. Mazzotti, 39 77. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Muñoz, Heraldo. 2008. The Dictator’s Shadow: Life under Augusto Pinochet. New York: Basic Books. Norambuena Carrasco, Carmen. 2000. „Exilio y Retorno. Chile 1973 1994.‰ In Memoria para un Nuevo Siglo: Chile, miradas a la segunda mitad del siglo XX, edited by M. Garcés and M. Olguín, 165 72. Santiago, Chile: Lom Ediciones. United States. 1963–2008. Statistical yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Washington, D.C.: The Service. Wright, Thomas C. and Rody Oñate. 1998. Flight from Chile: Voices of Exile. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
Further Reading Bethell, Leslie. 1993. Chile since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This book is a great resource on the history of Chile from a political and economic perspective. It is organized by historical periods. Bunster, Enrique. 1954. Chilenos en California. Presencia del pasado, 3. Santiago de Chile: Editorial del Pacífico. Among only a handful of books on the topic, this is a classic in the stories of Chilean 49rs in California.
Further Reading | 275 Eastmond, Marita. 1997. The Dilemmas of Exile: Chilean Refugees in the U.S.A. Gothenburg studies in social anthropology, 13. Göteborg, Sweden: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis. This is a study on the contexts of reception and analysis of the circumstances regarding Chilean refugees in the United States. Hite, Katherine. 2000. When the Romance Ended: Leaders of the Chilean Left, 1968–1998. New York: Columbia University Press. This book provides sociopolitical analysis of the role of exile as one component in the political transformation of the Chilean left. Kornbluh, Peter. 2003. The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New York: New Press. This book provides analysis of CIA documents regarding Pinochet, the years before the military coup, and the dictatorship. López-Calvo, Ignacio. 2001. Written in Exile: Chilean Fiction from 1973–Present. New York: Routledge. An interesting book on the role of the military dictatorship in the changes of Chilean narrative and fiction since 1973. Loveman, Brian. 2001. Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism. Latin American Histories. New York: Oxford University Press. A classic textbook on Chilean history. Wright, Thomas C., and Rody Oñate. 1998. Flight from Chile: Voices of Exile. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press. A study of the Chilean exile during the dictatorship using oral histories and testimonies.
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Chinese Immigrants by Jonathan H. X. Lee
Introduction The Chinese were the first Asian immigrants to come to the United States. To date, the Chinese have lived in America for over 150 years. Today, about 35 million Chinese live outside of China in over 130 countries. As of 2009, the total population in China is 1,338,612,968. Chinese Americans are a complex and highly diverse ethnic and culture group. Their statistical data shows that they straddle both ends of the sociological spectrum, from rich to poor, from college graduates to illiterate dropouts, from doctors and lawyers to sweat shop workers, and from high-tech professionals to no-tech workers. Currently, 59.6 percent of the Chinese immigrants in the United States are from mainland China, 15.9 percent from Taiwan, and 9.4 percent from Hong Kong. The surge in immigrants from mainland China reflects improved geopolitical relations with the Communist government since the 1980s. Among the Chinese Americans, about 190,000 are undocumented residents. Four out of five Chinese Americans are bilingual, and three out of four are U.S. citizens.
Chronology 1785
Earliest record of Chinese in the continental United States. Three seamen from ship Pallas land in Baltimore.
1842
First Opium War (1840 1842) ends.
1848
Gold discovered in California sparks a gold rush by Americans, immigrant Chinese, and others.
1850
The Taiping Rebellion, large-scale revolt against Qing government, occurs.
1852
First group of 195 Chinese contract laborers land in Hawaii.
1854
People v. Hall rules that Chinese cannot give testimony in court.
1862
The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, the Chinese Six Companies is established. California passes a „police tax‰ of $2.50 a month on every Chinese resident. 277
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1863
Thousands of Chinese workers are recruited to build the western section of the Transcontinental Railroad.
1867
In June, 2,000 Chinese railroad workers stage a one-week strike.
1868
The Burlingame-Seward Treaty is signed to facilitate trading and emigration between the United States and China to guarantee adequate supply of Chinese labor for railroad.
1869
The Transcontinental Railroad is completed, a year ahead of schedule. Anti-Chinese riots start to erupt throughout the West, until the turn of the 20th century.
1870
California passes a law against the importation of Chinese, Japanese, and „Mongolian‰ women for the purpose of prostitution.
1871
Los Angeles, California, becomes a site of anti-Chinese violence.
1875
The Page Law, which bars Asian women suspected of prostitution and attempts to regulate contract labor from China, is enacted.
1877
Chico, California, becomes a site of anti-Chinese violence.
1878
The California Circuit Court ruling In re Ah Yup declares that Chinese are not white and therefore ineligible to apply for naturalization.
1880
United States and China sign treaty giving the United States the right to limit but „not absolutely prohibit‰ Chinese immigration. The CaliforniaÊs Civil Code passes antimiscegenation law prohibiting Chinese men from marrying white women.
1882
The U.S. Congress enacts the Chinese Exclusion Act, which bans immigration of laborers and their wives from China for 10 years. It also bans Chinese immigrants from becoming naturalized citizens.
1885
Rock Springs, Wyoming, becomes the site of one of the worst instances of anti-Chinese violence. On September 2, white miners attack Chinese miners in Rock Springs. Twenty-eight Chinese miners are murdered, and 75 Chinese homes are burned.
1886
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, invokes the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect Chinese laundry owners against
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an ordinance that on its face is race neutral but is applied in a prejudicial manner. 1888
The Scott Act, unanimously enacted by the House, and with slight resistance from the Senate, is passed. It prohibits Chinese laborers and return of Chinese laborers from entering or re-entering the United States. The Act also ends the certification (exit visa) process.
1892
The Geary Act is enacted by Congress. It requires all Chinese residents of the United States to carry an identification card called the resident permit. Failure to carry the permit at all times is punishable by deportation or a year at hard labor. In addition, Chinese are not allowed to bear witness in court and can not receive bail in habeas corpus proceedings.
1893
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court declares Congress has the right to legislate expulsion through executive orders. The Chinese community raised money to bring this before the court to test the Geary Act. Congress amends the Geary Act to make it more difficult for Chinese businessmen to enter this country.
1898
In United States v. Wong Kim Art, the Supreme Court rules that a person born in the United States of Chinese parents is of American nationality by birth.
1900
San Francisco Chinatown is quarantined during bubonic plague scare; Hawaiian Organic Act provides U.S. government territory of Hawaii, and Chinese residents are required to apply for certificate of residence.
1902
Chinese exclusion extends for another 10 years.
1904
Chinese exclusion extends indefinitely. All Chinese immigrants are excluded from the United States, Washington, D.C., and all U.S. territories.
1905
Boycott of American products by Chinese in the United States and China.
1906
San Francisco earthquake and fire destroy government documents. The missing documents open the way for Chinese immigrants to come as „paper sons‰ claiming birthrights. Asian Indians denied U.S. citizenship.
1910
Angel Island opens as an official immigration station and functions as a prison for thousands of Chinese immigrants. By
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1940, roughly 175,000 Chinese immigrants are detained and processed. 1911
The Republic of China is established under leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
1921
The Chinese Communist Party is founded in Shanghai, China.
1924
Congress enacts the first permanent immigration quota law, which establishes a preference quota system.
1925
In Chang Chan et al. v. John D. Nagle, the Supreme Court rules that Chinese wives of American citizens are not entitled to enter the United States.
1928
In Lam Mow v. Nagle, the Supreme Court rules that children born of Chinese parents on American vessels on high seas were not born in the United States and are thus not citizens.
1936
American Ruth Harkness brings the first giant Chinese panda, named Su-lin, from China to America.
1941
United States declares war on Japan. Chinese Americans start to volunteer and are drafted to serve as U.S. military personnel.
1943
The Magnuson Act repeals the Chinese Exclusion Act for military, political, and economic reasons. A token 100 Chinese immigrants are permitted to enter the United States annually. Chiang Kai-shekÊs wife, Soong Meiling, is invited to address the U.S. Congress. She speaks against the Japanese and appeals to the United States for support, which establishes good will between China and the United States.
1945
World War II ends. Congress enacts the War Brides Act, which allow spouses and children of American service men to enter the United States. Among them are 722 Chinese immigrants.
1946
Wives and children of Chinese American citizens are allowed to apply as no quota immigrants.
1947
Japanese Americans who renounced their citizenship have it restored.
1948
Displaced Persons Act allows, for a limited time, 15,000 Chinese residents to change their status in the United States.
1949
Communist victory occurs in China. Chiang Kai-shek establishes exile government in Taiwan. The United States recognizes Taiwan as an official government.
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1950
The Second Displaced Persons Act further help Chinese in the United States to change their status as a result of the Communist victory in China. McCarthyism leads to Chinese Americans being viewed as disloyal and threatening to U.S. national security.
1952
The McCarran-Walter Act, also known as the Immigration and Nationality Act, revises and consolidates all previous laws regarding immigration and naturalization.
1965
The Immigration and Nationality Act eliminates national origins quotas: 20,000 people per country allowed to entry annually. Priority is given to those with skills or with family in the United States.
1972
President Richard Nixon visits China.
1982
Chinese American Vincent Chin is brutally murdered in Detroit by two white men (Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz), who mistake him as Japanese. Ebens and Nitz blame the Japanese for losing their jobs in the auto industry.
1987
Kentucky Fried Chicken, the first American fast-food restaurant, opens in China.
1989
Tiananmen student protest occurs in China. President George H. W. Bush issues an executive order that allowed tens of thousands of Chinese students to permanently stay in the United States.
1997
Hong Kong returns to China and becomes a special administrative region.
1999
Taiwanese American scientist Wen Ho Lee is arrested and accused of giving U.S. nuclear secrets to China. All charges are dropped, and the judge on the case issues an apology.
2009
Two Chinese Americans, Steven Chu and Gary Locke, are appointed to serve in President Barack ObamaÊs administration.
Background Geography of China China is the third largest country in the world. Its geographic landmass is 3,657,765 square miles, which is as large as all of Europe or the United States. China is bordered by Russia and Mongolia on the north. North Korea, South Korea, and Siberia
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are its northwestern neighbors. To the west, it shares boundaries with India, Nepal, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. To the southwest, it is bordered by Bhutan. To the south, China is bordered by Vietnam, Laos, and Burma (Myanmar). Japan is its neighbor to the west, separated by the Sea of Japan. Taiwan is its neighbor to the southwest, separated by the Taiwan Straits. Because China is so large, its terrain includes dense forests, broad plains with rolling plateaus, expansive deserts, high mountain ranges, subtropical areas, fertile lowlands, and vast inhabitable and uninhabitable lands. The eastern half of China is coastal, running along the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the South China Sea. High plateaus are located in the Tibetan region to the south. North of the Tibetan Plateau is the Gobi and Taklamakan deserts, which extends through Mongolia, part of the ancient Silk Road network. On ChinaÊs border with Nepal is Mount Everest, the worldÊs tallest peak.
Rivers China possesses two of the worldÊs greatest rivers: the Yellow River (Huanghe) in the north and the Yangtze (Yangzi) River to the south. The Yangtze River begins high up on the Tibetan Plateau, moves eastward, and is joined by countless tributaries before depositing its rich silt along the fertile East China Plains and exits to the East China Sea. The Yangtze River is about 3,915 miles long. It is the longest river in Asia and the third longest river in the world. The Yellow River is the second longest river in China and stretches about 3,395 miles. It is considered the cradle of Chinese civilization, and by extension, one of the cradles of civilization in world history (e.g., the Nile cradle in Egypt).
China’s Natural Resources Because ChinaÊs landmass is so large, it contains a lot of natural resources, such as coal, natural gas, aluminum, zinc, lead, uranium, petroleum, iron ore mercury, tin, molybdenum, manganese, tungsten, antimony, vanadium, magnetite, and hydropower. ChinaÊs hydropower potential is enormous. China has harnessed the power of the Yangtze River with the construction of two of the worldÊs largest hydropower generating dams: The Three Gorges Dam and the Gezhouba Dam. As of 2009, the total generating capacity of these two dams is 21,515 mega watts of electricity. The entire project is expected to be completed in 2011, at which time it will generate 25,615 mega watts of hydroelectric energy.
Natural Disasters Along coastal China, there are frequent typhoons·an average of five per year. In the plains area, there are yearly floods and droughts. China also has a lot of
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earthquakes. The most recent was the Great Sichuan 8.0 earthquake in 2008 that killed more than 70,000 people, injured an additional 380,000, and left 4.8 million people homeless; and 18,222 people are still listed as missing.
Languages For thousands of years, classical Chinese was the written standard form of Chinese. Because the spoken forms were mutually unintelligible, many people from all over China communicated with each other in writing. Vernacular Chinese, Baihua, is the written standard based on Mandarin from the Ming Dynasty (1368 1644). This was adopted in the early 20th century as the national vernacular, Guoyu. Seventy percent of the Chinese populations speak Mandarin, Putonghua, the national language. There are several major linguistic groups in China, most of them belonging to the Sino-Tibetan language family: Mandarin, Wu (Shanghainese), Yue (Cantonese), northern and southern Min (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, and Kejia (Hakka). There are also non-Sinitic languages spoken by ChinaÊs ethnic minorities: Zhuang (Thai), Mongolian, Tibetan, Uyghur (Turkic), Hui, Yi, Miao, Hmong, and Korean.
Peoples China maintains the worldÊs largest population at 1.3 billion. This is one-fifth of the worldÊs peoples. Ninety-four percent of them are Han Chinese. The remaining 6 percent is composed of 55 non-Han minorities, of which the major ones are: Tibetans, Zhuang, Hui, Korean, Mongolian, Yao, Uighur, Yi, Manchu, and Miao.
History of China Spanning 5,000 years, the Middle Kingdom (Zhonguo) of China has the longest continuous recorded history in the world and one of the worldÊs oldest written language systems. ChinaÊs cultural influences and footprints encompass all of East Asia and parts of Southeast Asia, and for centuries, Chinese civilization developed at its own pace, so that, to most Westerners, this ancient civilization seemed a world apart. Archeologists and historians agree that Chinese civilization began in the inland valleys of the Yellow River and the Wei River. This area is considered to be the cradle of Chinese civilization. According to legends, the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi) defeated his rival tribes and established the first Chinese kingdom. In so doing, he established himself as the Son of Heaven (tianzi). The first dynasty to be described in the ancient Chinese Historical Records (Shiji), attributed to the grand historian Sima Qian (b. 145 B.C.E.), is the Xia Dynasty (2100 1600 B.C.E.). The ancient Chinese peoples were composed
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of many different tribes, some of which began to grow grains and vegetables and to raise domesticated animals, such as chickens, pigs, and dogs., Gathered together in little villages near their fields, these people lived in small homes made of mud bricks. Slowly, as the population grew, some of the villages got larger and started to build walls, and pottery factories and markets developed. By 1500 B.C.E. some tribal chiefs in the northern plain had gained so much power and wealth that they formed new forms of sociopolitical organizations and a powerful state, led by hereditary kings. This was the beginnings of the Shang Dynasty (1766 1122 B.C.E.), named after one of its capital cities. The Shang Dynasty was ruled by a group of elite aristocrats who had large landholdings and had an army that controlled the people and attacked surrounding tribes for territory, swag, and prisoners to use as slaves and sacrificial offerings. The rulers relied on priests for predictions on government matters and the outcome of warfare. The priests applied hot rods to the bones of cattle, sheep, or tortoise shell until they cracked, which were then interpreted by the priests as portents from the spirits or from heaven (tian). The Shang Dynasty is the earliest authenticated ruling house in China. Bronze vessels, used in religious and political rituals, cast in pottery molds and elaborately decorated, testify to the high level of technology and aesthetic sensibilities of this period. The Shang Dynasty was replaced with the Zhou Dynasty (1122 256 B.C.E.). The Zhou Dynasty is the longest lasting dynasty in Chinese history. The dynasty was based on a feudal system that eventually was composed of several individual smaller states. It consisted of kings who ruled over nobles with semi-independent territories of their own, all of them holding power through inheritance rights, passed down from father to eldest son. Chinese culture, literature, and philosophies originated and developed during this period. Most notable are the teachings of Lao-tzu, which developed into a religious philosophical school known as Daoism; and the teachings of Confucius, known as Confucianism. During this period, the doctrine of the Son of Heaven who receives a „Mandate from Heaven‰ to rule was formalized. A period of turmoil, known as the Spring and Autumn period (722 481 B.C.E.) and Warring States period (403 221 B.C.E.), was marked by perpetual warfare among the various kingdoms. The violence and unsteady nature of the period is reflected in the contrast between spring and autumn. Although it was a period of constant warfare and social political instability, there was unprecedented development in agriculture, science, and technology. Moreover, written history, literature, and philosophies, centered on ethics and morals, blossomed. Confucius was born during the Zhou period in the sixth century B.C.E. to a humble family in the State of Lu. Confucius developed a humanistic code of conduct and moral behavior in service of the state as a means to restore peace and harmony to society. Another great philosopher by the name of Mozi advocated universal love on the basis that heaven created the world and loved its people and wanted them
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to prosper and be at peace. To rival the teachings of Confucius and Mozi, the socalled legalist school advocated a strict system of punishment to control the people and agricultural production. Lao-tzu, the founder of Daoism, sought to escape all the political and social disharmony by abandoning society and personal will to be one with nature and the Way (Dao), thus making it possible to have mystical relationships with nature and heaven. The Zhou Dynasty ended when Qinshi Huangdi (the first emperor of China) defeated and united all the rival states in 221 B.C.E., thus ushering in the Qin Dynasty (221 206 B.C.E.). During this period, China extended its borders; imposed strict legal codes; completed the Great Wall with forced labor from hundreds of thousands of people; built transportation networks; and standardized its weights and measure systems, currency, and writing. The ruthlessness of this period led to countless rebellions and eventually was replaced by the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E. 220 C.E.). The Han Dynasty, founded by rebel military leaders settled down and became the large, semicontinental state it is today. Today, 94 percent of the Chinese people call themselves the „people of Han‰ (hanren). Han rule was relatively stable. The new rulers sent expeditions and settlers out to Central Asia and down the Pearl River Delta. China came into contact with the Roman Empire and India during this period. By the second century C.E., the government started to loosen its grip because of weak emperors who neglected their duties and because of conflicts among groups of officials in the imperial court. Protests and rebellion broke out, culminating in 184 C.E. in a religious upraising known as the Yellow Turbans. The rebellion ushered in an era of warlords. In a long succession of dynasties, resulting from conquest and civil strife, social and political fragmentation, China was once again united with establishment of the Sui Dynasty (589 618) and the Tang Dynasty (618 907). The Tang period was a prosperous period. The population rose to over 60 million, and the arts and literature flourished once more. Buddhism, a religious tradition that had originated in India, was introduced to China during the Han dynasty; blended with local beliefs and practices, Chinese-style Buddhism became uniquely Chinese and was adopted by the imperial family during this period. Because of the development of the Silk Road network and ChinaÊs extensive trade by sea, Islam, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Christianity were introduced into China. Silk production thrived, along with new technologies in sailing and agriculture. After the Tang Dynasty, there was a half century of disunity between the north and south. The Song Dynasty (960 1279) brought a reunited China. The civil-service examination system was developed during this period, based on a new merit system that marked an end to the old aristocratic order. Song China became a rich and cosmopolitan realm, with Asian traders arriving by land in the northwest and Arabs by sea in the southeast. Song China began to decline in 1211, when Genghis Khan, a
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Mongolian leader, began the invasion into China from the north. His conquest was complete in 1279 under Kublai Khan, his grandson, who established the Yuan Dynasty (1271 1368). During this period of Mongolian rule, China extended trade with Europe, and Marco Polo brought ChinaÊs achievements to EuropeÊs attention. Another rebellion led to the fall of the Yuan Dynasty and raise of the Ming Dynasty (1368 1644). The Ming emperor constructed a new capital in Peking (present-day Beijing), with the Forbidden City at its center. Rice and tea became major agricultural products in the southern area of Hangzhou. Commerce flourished, chief among them was the export of blue-and-white porcelain known in Europe as „chinaware.‰ The decline of Ming China lead to its conquest from another northern invader: the Manchu. The Manchu established the Qing Dynasty (1644 1911) and again expanded ChinaÊs borders. Even though Qing China was non-Han, it adapted and accepted the Chinese social and political order expressed in the Confucian conception of social order. However, it failed in its reform efforts. It suffered from internal pressures; rebellions; growing external pressures from the major western European colonial powers; and defeat by Japan in 1895, all of which resulted in China becoming increasingly weak and isolated. This isolation was broken when Great Britain defeated China in the Opium War (1839 1842), forcing China to open its ports to international trade and exposing China for the next one hundred years to Western imperialism and colonization. Utterly weak and damaged by the Taiping Rebellion (1851 1864), the Qing Dynasty finally collapsed in 1911 in a revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The revolution marked the end of imperial rule in China.
Causes and Waves of Migration Push-Pull Factors of Chinese Immigration By 1800 China faced a bleak future. Its military was weak and unable to protect its people from Western colonial powers. Its rulers and cultural consciousness was too strong to surrender to the political visions of Chinese modernizers. According to Benson Tong, „in the absence of modernization, its people were forced to look elsewhere for a livelihood‰ (2000, 22). Thus began the movement of Chinese immigrants to America. Tong argues that: ChinaÊs educated elite spent so much of their time and energy trying to attain the status and prestige of the scholar-official class that it had to sideline endeavors that might have fostered economic and technological change. Heavy government exactions, but without an erection of an infrastructure for trade, on private wealth and investments also dampened the sprit of entrepreneurship. Perhaps the most convincing explanations for ChinaÊs inhibited industrialization was the
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relative stability of the market demand, which offered little stimulus for radical technological change and attending higher productivity. Even in agriculture, rapid commercialization did little to transform small-scale subsistence farming. (Tong 2000, 22) Population growth and pressure exacerbated ChinaÊs inability to protect its people from internal and external pressures. By 1800 the population of China totaled 300 million, representing a two-fold increase since the 1660s (Tong 2000, 18). Agricultural land did not develop with this population growth because so much of China consisted of arid and mountainous land. Between 1661 and 1812, the population increased by more than 100 percent, while arable land had only increased by less than 50 percent (Tong 2000). For instance, in Guangdong province, one of the fastest growing provinces in China, population growth increased by 79.5 percent, while ChinaÊs total national average increased by 47 percent between 1787 and 1850 (Tong 2000, 21). Population growth became a significant social, economic, and political problem for China because the economic system did not develop, and the impact of the global industrial revolution was not significantly felt. In order to survive, the displaced Chinese, the poor, and the unemployed were forced to commit social vices, such as banditry or rebellion, or move. All these problems·faltering administration, widespread corruption, degeneration of the military, and the pressures of a rising population·indicated that the ruling power had passed its peak. Ironically, internal economic and social changes, not unlike those taking place in Europe, only served to highlight the ineptness of the state. Since late Ming times, China had experienced a series of intertwined pre-capitalist changes, including significant urbanization, especially in the lower Yangzi area; the increasing role of a monetary economy; the development of regional and long-distance trade; the emergence of a countrywide market for commodities; more geographical mobility; the expansion of popular literacy; the growing heterogeneity of the gentry class; and the professionalization of some managerial activities. In this context of fluid social relations and gradual disintegration of the old order, the country by 1800 had become vulnerable to both internal rebellion and external invasion. In this milieu, social dislocations intensified and, against such a backdrop, both migration and emigration became viable, even necessary possibilities [for survival]. (Tong 2000, 19) Population growth exacerbated harsh economic conditions. The British Opium Wars of 1893 1842 and 1856 1860 forced China to pay large indemnities to the Western imperialist colonial powers and drained the Chinese spirit as opium was imported into China to advance British economic interest. This resulted in the Qing governmentÊs high taxation on peasant farmers, who, unable to pay their taxes, lost
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their land. Once displaced from their land, they were unable to find employment elsewhere because ChinaÊs industrial sector was underdeveloped, a result of foreign competition imposed on China after the Opium Wars had undermined domestic industries such as silk production. In fact, according to Tong, Guangdong produced many massproduced goods, but foreign goods flooded the local markets, limiting the demand for Chinese-made goods, such as premodern Chinese handicrafts. The rapid growth of the colonized islands of Macao and Hong Kong, by as early as the mid-1850s, captured much trade from Guangdong. By 1870, free trade and competition from other coastal ports in China exacerbated the unemployment rate for the urban proletariat in Guangdong. Unemployment, high taxation, growing population pressure, and natural disasters such as flooding deepened the problems of hunger and poverty in the Guangdong province. Tong notes that one flood in Guangdong was so severe that, according to one imperial account, the „rivers and the sea and the streams have joined in one sheet over the land for several hundred li‰ (one li equals a third of a mile) (Tong 2000, 23). The hardest hit population was the subsistence-based peasantry, who also bore the heaviest taxation. These immigrants defied Chinese law, since the Ming and Qing dynasties forbid overseas travel on pain of death. They were willing to take the risk of disobeying the law in light of the turmoil in the economy and the hostile ecological and climatic conditions, which led to destitution and deprivation. The greatest outflow of Chinese immigrants occurred between the 1840 and 1900. An estimated 2.5 million people left China and went to the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Southeast Asia, the West Indies, South America, and Africa. During this early period, the majority traveled to the Kingdom of Hawaii and the mainland United States. Civil unrest and political and military chaos pushed Chinese immigrants out of their country to seek sanctuary elsewhere. Virtually all the Chinese who emigrated came from only five small regions in the two provinces of Fujian and Guangdong and the island of Hainan. Three of the groups settled mainly in Southeast Asia, while the other two traveled across the Pacific to Hawaii and mainland United States. A vast majority of the first wave of Chinese immigrants who landed in California during the 19th century came from the Guangdong Province. The Guangdong natives in the United States can, in turn, be divided into three subgroups, each speaking its own Chinese dialect. Sanyi people came from three districts immediately south and west of the city of Guangzhou, in the Pearl River Delta; Siyi inhabitants hailed from four districts to the southeast of Sanyi; and Xiangshan natives originated from a district between Guangzhou and the Portuguese colony of Macau, some 40 miles west of Xianggang (Hong Kong). To Cantonese migrants, emigration represented a means for a better life in the face of population pressure, economic hardship, political upheaval, religious persecution, and natural disasters. Although aspiring emigrants had many places to choose from, places where gold had been reportedly discovered·most notably California, Australia, and the Fraser River Valley of British Columbia·were the most alluring.
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The discovery of gold at SutterÊs Mill in 1848 provoked a distant gaze of desire toward the West Coast, including the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia. Australia was also a central object of the gold craze. San Francisco was known as „Old Gold Mountain‰ (Jiujinshan), while Australia was known as „New Gold Mountain‰ (Xinjinshan) (Chan 1991). Between 1848 and 1882, waves of Chinese immigrants, predominantly from the southern provinces of Guangdong (also known as Canton) and Fujian, came to California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho in search of gold. Although their search was for gold, many ended up in coal mines, railroad construction, and other service work (e.g., as cooks, laundry workers, and shopkeepers). Chinese pioneers began to establish Chinatowns, either by necessity or by choice, and started to recreate and reproduce a perception of community. A high percentage of these immigrants were young men in their working prime, chosen by their families to journey to Gold Mountain (Mandarin: Jinshan; Cantonese Gam San); they held high hopes of making it rich and returning home after several years aboard. San Francisco was a major port of entry for Chinese immigrants during the early period of the gold rush. In the latter part of the 1840s, there were approximately 325 Chinese forty-niners in the United States. By 1851, there were 2,716. By 1852, there were 20,026 Chinese immigrants residing in the United States.
Chinese grocery store in San Francisco’s Chinatown, about 1904. (Library of Congress)
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In 1876, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company began regularly scheduled runs between Hong Kong and San Francisco, and, as a result, between 1870 and 1883, an average of 12,000 Chinese immigrants were arriving through the port of San Francisco each year. Before the steamship, the voyage took from 55 to 100 days. With the advent of the steamship, and the famous China route that began in 1867 and lasted until the turn of the century, the time taken to reach San Francisco from China shortened to weeks. Not only were steamships faster than traditional sailing ships, but they also could hold more passengers. Immigration was further encouraged when the price of the tickets for the steamship dropped threefold. By 1870, there were 63,000 Chinese immigrants living on American soil·between 75 and 80 percent living in California, with sizeable communities in Idaho, Montana, and other areas in the southwest and New England. For this reason, along the West Coast, but primarily in California, there were many Chinese communities of various sizes, as far south as Baja, California, and San Diego, and as far north as Vancouver, Canada. Starting in the late 18th century, a major pull factor for the Chinese to uproot and relocate to distant lands was the exaggerated tales of the riches of America, on Gold Mountain. The people of Guangdong had been exposed to American influences by way of Yankee traders and missionaries. Early Chinese immigrants in the 19th century who chose to journey to Gold Mountain, known as gam san haak (Cantonese for „travelers to Gold Mountain‰), often found only hek fu („taking in pain‰) (Tong 2000, 21). Prejudice, disfranchisement, and social exclusion marked their daily existence and Gold Mountain dreams. This movement of Chinese laborers is concomitant with the rise of global capitalistic economy. Tong notes, „the global expansion of European and American capitalism had necessitated the movement of workers, capital, and technology across borders so that investors and businesspeople could tap into the natural resources and markets of the underdeveloped countries. The eventual immigration of those from Guangdong to Gold Mountain was part of a larger diaspora that involved as many as 2.5 million between 1840 and 1900‰ (22 23).
Early Immigration The travelers were mainly poverty-stricken young men. Some of them were married, generally illiterate, or unschooled, but all were inspired by the tales of Gold Mountain. There was more than just gold to be mined, but employment opportunities as well. The poor peasants entered into contract, a form of forced slave labor, to afford their passage to the Kingdom of Hawaii and the United States. For example, arrangements for their Pacific passage were often made by emigration brokers, who represented the sugar plantation owners in Hawaii. The peasants were offered „free passage‰ to the island in exchange for their labor. The terms of the contracts
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usually lasted five years and included shelter, food, and medical care. The other way to finance passage to the States was through the „credit-ticket system.‰ Here, a broker would loan money to the migrant, who would later pay off the loan with interest out of his earnings. Coolies is the term for people who are kidnapped and forced into labor through coercion, and unlike the so-called coolie trade of Africans to Cuba and Peru, the Chinese were not coolies. Chinese laborers voluntarily left their villages in hopes of making money and riches to support their families in China. Many also simply borrowed money from their relatives for their transPacific journey. The coolie trade was finally banned in 1862 with the passage of the Act to Prohibit Coolie Trade. Chinese immigration also included merchants. They were venture capitalists seeking new opportunities in a foreign land. Like the peasant laborers, this class of people were also mostly, if not all, men. Single women did not travel alone to distant foreign lands. The married ones often stayed home to care for their families and elders. They also stayed behind because the family simply could not afford their passage. Because husbands and sons where separated from wives and families, the Chinese immigrants are described as sojourners. Sojourners are people involved in temporary migration who plan to eventually return to those they left behind. A third of the Chinese sojourners did just that, similar to the way European immigrants engaged in return migration as well (Tong 2000, 25) „This phenomenon, known as return migration, also characterized turn-of-the-century European immigration to the New World‰ (Tong 2000, 25). Despite many returning to China, two-thirds remained in America·for legal, financial, or personal reasons·to live, work, and settle.
Chinese in Hawaii versus California The experience of the Chinese in Hawaii is much different than their co-ethnic experience over on the mainland. Chinese laborers in Hawaii were more likely to have their wives with them. In 1900, of the 25,767 Chinese in Hawaii, 3,471 or 13.5 percent were female, but of the 89,683 Chinese on the U.S. mainland, only 4,522, or 5 percent, were female. One reason for the differences in sex ratio is the ethnic makeup of the two groups of immigrants. The Chinese in California were mainly Punti, whereas most of their counterparts in Hawaii were Hakka. Hakka society did not practice foot-binding, and Hakka women had greater freedom of mobility. Moreover, immigration conditions and policies also affected the sex ratio difference between the Chinese immigrant populations in Hawaii and the mainland. Starting in 1864, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser expressed angst about the predominate male Chinese population and encouraged plantation owners to import Chinese women as a way to control the men and the social problems and vices that results from a bachelor society. The plantations owners believed that Chinese women could be used to control
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the men, better than any regulation that they could enforce. Chinese women who immigrated to Hawaii did so under the same circumstances as Chinese men: labor contracts. They were supposed to engage in „light labor‰ only and not be separated from their husbands. Chinese women were paid less than their male counterparts.
Chinese Women in Hawaii versus California The combination of missionary concern and employer self-interest did not encourage the immigration of Chinese women into the mainland, as it had in Hawaii. In fact, the opposite occurred because employers viewed Chinese male laborers as sojourners, temporary and migratory. California employers wanted a workforce of single men. They wanted a mobile workforce that could move from one location to the next for construction and harvesting. Chinese men worked on the railroad and as migrant farm laborers. The differences in gender ratio of the Chinese community in Hawaii and California influenced the way they were perceived: on Hawaii they were not seen as competitors in the labor market, whereas in California they were. This perception of Chinese immigrants as competitors in the California labor market led the white Californians to view the Chinese as a racialized group, and Chinese immigrants became targets of prejudice, hostility, and violence. By the 1880s, the white community in California represented 87 percent of the population and saw Chinese women and their families as a threat to racial purity and what they considered to be a „white manÊs country.‰ Besides coming as wives, Chinese women were also imported to America and forced into the lucrative prostitution trade, regardless of the final destination: Hawaii or California. Chinese prostitutes lived and worked as slaves to their owners and usually did not survive more than six years. The prostitutes ranged from age 16 to 25. The majority could not read the terms of the contracts they were forced to sign with their thumbprint. The lowest level prostitutes were forced to work and live in cribs, rooms no larger than four-by-six feet. They were forced to sell themselves to poor laborers, teenage boys, sailors, and drunks for a little as 25 to 50 cents. If infected with disease, they were left to die. Prostitutes forced to work in the mining camps lived short and harsh lives. Prostitutes who revolted were physically punished. Some would try to run away, but their owners would track them down because they were highly valued. Their condition was, in large measure, a result of the demographics of the society. Chinese women were viewed as exotic curios on the East Coast, but things were different on the West Coast as gold started to run low. The rising hostility towards Chinese immigration on the West Coast correlates with the rise of racialized and debased descriptions of Chinese women in the media of the time. In 1870, of the 3,536 Chinese women in California, 2,157, roughly 60 percent, were prostitutes. Because the Chinese population in California was mostly men,
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Chinese prostitutes were in high demand. Anti-Chinese sentiments among white Californians were fueled by reports of Chinese prostitution, and in 1875, the Page Law was designed to halt the flow of Chinese prostitutes to America, who were seen as a great threat to white manhood, health, morality, and family life (Tong 2000, 28). „Chinese men, bereft of family life and denied conjugal ties, sought prostitutes or baak baak chai (a derogatory Cantonese phrase for Âone hundred menÊs wifeÊ)·as they did opium smoking and gambling·for entertainment. Applied stringently, the Page Law excluded wives and single women with legitimate claims. Immigration officials believed that prostitutes typically posed as wives, sisters, or daughters of sojourners already in America. Officials consequently assumed that all Chinese women seeking entry into the United States were potential prostitutes‰ (Tong 2000, 28). In San Francisco, Chinese prostitutes became the first immigrant group in the host society to be targets for removal or confinement in geographic locality. This movement to isolate Chinese prostitutes in the municipality of San Francisco extended into a larger effort to isolate all Chinese in America. By the mid-1890s, an unexpected health concern made it possible for city health officers to force the Chinese into a specific geographical locality. The bubonic plague provided the city officers with a reason to isolate the Chinese. The Burlingame Treaty (1868) between China and the United States repealed the century-old prohibitory emigration law of the Qing government and secured the right of Chinese to open and voluntary migration to America. More importantly, the treaty offered Chinese immigrants in America equal protection of all legal rights enjoyed by other foreigners residing in the United States. By the early 1870s, the U.S. federal courts interpreted the treaty to also provide for the rights of the Chinese to live and work in America. The treatyÊs spirit of equality and fair treatment for the Chinese was soon overturned as anti-Chinese sentiments along the Pacific Coast swelled.
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separatism Chinese immigration to the United States can be divided into three stages: the first stage ranges from 1840 to 1882; the second stage ranges from 1882 to 1965, and the third stage ranges from 1965 to the present.
1840–1882 The gold on Gold Mountain was not as plentiful as the embellished tales described. The very first wave of Chinese immigrants who landed in the port of San Francisco were viewed favorably, as celestials and strangers who would eventually become good Americans. When California celebrated its admission into the Union in 1850,
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the Chinese participated in the ceremonies alongside white Americans. Justice Nathaniel Bennett declared that even though the Chinese were born and raised under different governments, they stood as brothers, respected as equals, who shared one country, one hope, and one destiny. This sentiment of inclusiveness quickly changed as nativist cries got louder and louder. White American miners demanded that Chinese miners, along with Mexican, Hawaiian, French, and Chilean miners, be banned from mining. Shortly after the discovery of gold, there were an estimated 2,400 Chinese miners, nearly two-thirds of the Chinese in America, mining for gold in the American West. Competition intensified and the Chinese miners became the targets of hostility, and faced rigid racial prejudice from competing white miners, as well as from local and state governments. The best example of this can be seen when the California state legislature passed the Foreign MinerÊs Tax of 1852, which was chiefly enforced against Chinese miners, who often had to pay more than once. In theory, the foreign minerÊs tax was ostensibly imposed on all miners who did not desire to become naturalized citizens. Lawmakers knew, of course, that the Chinese could not gain citizenship, due to the 1790 Nationality Act, which excluded nonwhites from being able to become a naturalized citizen. The foreign minerÊs tax remained intact until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1870. By that time, the state of California had collected from Chinese miners a total of $5 million, a sum representing 25 to 50 percent of the state revenue. In 1855, the California state legislature passed a law known as „An Act to Discourage the Immigration to this State of Persons Who Cannot Become Citizens Thereof.‰ This law imposed a landing tax of $50 for each passenger ineligible to become naturalized citizens; the tax was charged not to the passengers, but to the master or owner of the ship. By the late 1850s, early 1860s, there were 24,000 Chinese miners, two-thirds of whom were mining in California. Many of the Chinese miners organized themselves into small groups, composed of up to 40 members, while others formed their own companies. Most of the Chinese miners were also independent prospectors. Chinese miners in the Yuba County obtained their placer claims through preemption rather than purchase. Chinese miners filed a required application in the countryÊs recordÊs office and marked the boundaries of their claim in the preemption claim procedure. As a result of exclusion from mining and of a decrease in gold, during the mid1860s, the Chinese left the mines and ventured into fishing. Eventually, Chinese fishing activities stretched from the Oregon boundary down to Baja, California, and also along the Sacramento River delta. By the 1870s, a number of them concentrated on catching and processing shrimp in the San Francisco Bay, while others collected abalone off the coast of Southern California. A large portion of the Chinese immigrants established their residence along the California coast and began the business of gathering, drying, and exporting seafood resources, namely sea lettuce (ulva), kelp, and abalone back to China. One of these thriving communities
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was in Cambria. Prior to 1866, when the little community of Cambria was officially established, the Chinese immigrants in California were already living along the coastal bluffs in San Luis Obispo County. The Chinese seaweed farmers found the rocky coastal area of San Luis Obispo County ideal for their trade. The ulva, a sea lettuce, already grew but competed with many other forms of algae. In order to encourage luxurious and fast growth, the Chinese made sure the rocks preferred by the ulva were plentiful and strategically placed to receive the full benefit of wave action and sun. The selected rocks were thoroughly cleaned by scorching or burning, originally accomplished by pine shavings smoldering in a wire basket held against the rocks. In later years, a blow torch was used, eliminating the job of scraping the dead algae away. Besides the venture into the fishing industries, large numbers of Chinese workers were employed in the railroad industries. In February 1865, 50 Chinese workers were hired by the Central Pacific Railroad to help lay the tracks for the transcontinental line leading east from Sacramento. The Chinese laborers were praised by Leland Stanford, the company president, and Charles Crocker, the companyÊs superintendent, as hardworking, amiable, and quiet·workers who learned any skill quickly and efficiently. They even went as far as to suggest that Chinese workers were more productive and reliable compared to white workers. The Chinese laborers were trained for all aspects of railroad construction: blasting through mountains, driving horses, handling rocks with picks and shovels. Animosity and hostility from white railroad laborers developed, which resulted in the white workers demanding that the company stop hiring Chinese. Within a two-year period, the company employed 12,000 Chinese laborers, roughly 90 percent of their workforce. Not only were the Chinese laborers fast workers, but their employment saved the company a lot of money because the Chinese laborers were paid $31 dollars a month, while their white co-workers were paid $45 dollars a month. White workers also demanded lodging. Because the Central Pacific managers wanted to accelerate construction, they forced Chinese workers to work through the winter of 1866. Time was a big concern for the company because the amount of payment it received in land and subsidy from the federal government was determined by the miles of tracks they were able to build. The Chinese workers lived and worked in tunnels under the snow. Snowslides and landslides occasionally buried the camps and crews. In the spring, thawing corpses, motionless, with shovels and picks in their hands were discovered. That spring, 5,000 Chinese workers went on strike and demanded eight-hour days and $45 a month. The strike was advertised through a Chinese-language newspaper. The Central Pacific managers blamed their rival Union Pacific for masterminding the strike. This allowed them to negate the possibility that the Chinese workers were capable of acting on their own benefit and behalf. As a possible solution to the Chinese strike, the Central Pacific sent a wire to New York, inquiring about
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the feasibility of sending 10,000 blacks to replace the striking Chinese. Superintendent Crocker responded to the Chinese strikers by cutting off their food supplies; this strategy worked because weeks later, virtually imprisoned in their camps on the mountains of the Sierras, the starving strikers went back to work. In 1869, the Transcontinental Railroad was completed. The completion of the Transcontinental Railroad is often cited as a symbol of AmericaÊs manifest destiny. The construction of the Central Pacific Railroad line was a Chinese achievement, but this fact remains unnoticed and invisible. Released from railroad construction, the Chinese laborers moved into agriculture. In CaliforniaÊs Sacramento-San Joaquin River delta region, they constructed irrigation channels, reclaimed swamplands, and built the levees, dikes, and ditches. As tenant farmers or sharecroppers, the Chinese introduced new varieties of fruits and vegetables for the local markets. The majority were laborers who toiled in orchards, vineyards, and hop fields. By 1870, the Chinese constitute 18 percent of all farm laborers in California; by 1880, they represented 86 percent of the agricultural laborers. Economic disparity in pay existed in this industry as well. Employers of Chinese laborers paid lower wages than white workers. The Chinese workers were trapped in a racially based dual-wage system, where they were paid less than white workers for doing the same job. In 1880, Chinese pickers in Santa Clara County, California, went on strike, demanding increased compensation for the fruit they harvested. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act reduced the supply of Chinese farm laborers, so they recognized the increased need for their labor and demanded higher wages as a result. Other ex-miners began working in the salmon canneries on the coastal bays and streams from central California to western Alaska. Others traveled to the Pacific Northwest after being recruited to build the North Pacific line or to run lumber mills. Still others worked in small businesses: laundries, restaurants, and dry good stores, owned by Chinese merchants. During the 1870s, Chinese workers were recruited to replace the emancipated black slaves for plantation work and railroad building in the South: in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida. The Chinese did not stay on the plantations long. As early as 1871, the New Orleans Times noted that Chinese preferred to work in the small trades and industries in the city rather than toil in the fields. By 1880, there were a recorded 50 Chinese in Mississippi, 133 in Arkansas, 489 in Louisiana, and 95 in New Orleans; they worked as laundry men, cigar-makers, shoemakers, cooks, and woodcarvers. Chinese workers were also recruited to the Northeast (in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) as scabs to break striking shoemakers, steam launderers, and cutlery makers·most of whom were Irish immigrants. By then, there were 500 Chinese in New York, and about 900 in Boston (Tong 2000, 33). San Francisco, also known as Dai Fow (Cantonese for „Big City‰), became a destination city for those seeking employment opportunities. The so-called ethnic
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antagonism, which pitted one ethnic group against another to keep wages low and resulted in strong anti-Chinese sentiments and violence, drove many Chinese immigrants into self-employment. The Chinese laundry was chief among them. The Chinese laundryman was an American phenomenon. It does not exist in China: in fact, there are no laundries in China. Back in China, women do the washing, not men. Opening a laundry in America required little capital because the materials were simple: a stove, trough, dry room, sleeping area, a sign, and some English skills. Besides low capital investment demands, the Chinese were pushed into this line of work because it was one of the few that was open to them, besides restaurants. In 1900, one out of four employed Chinese males worked as a laundryman. After working on the railroad and in mining, the Chinese population became an urban population because many were „driven out‰ of rural areas as a result of economic competition and racial discrimination. San FranciscoÊs Chinese population went from 2,719 in 1860 to 12,022 in 1870. Similarly, Los AngelesÊs Chinese population went from 605 in 1880 to 1,817 in 1890 (Tong 2000, 33). In the 1870s, the urban Chinese population moved into manufacturing and once again found themselves caught in a racially segregated labor market with low wages. Often Chinese laborers occupied menial positions in the woolen mills, paper mills, knitting mills, and tanneries, while European Americans took the skilled jobs. In instances where they held the same position as whites, the Chinese were paid less for the same work. In the early 1880s, Chinese men earned one dollar a day as factory workers, while white men earned two dollars (Tong 2000, 34). Throughout much of this early period, anti-Chinese sentiments informed much of the public policies and popular racism that discriminated against the Chinese living in America.
1882–1965 By 1882, the Chinese population in the United States was about 110,000, or onefifth of one percent, of the total U.S. population. When Chinese laborers were no longer needed, political agitation against the Chinese intensified, and beginning in 1882, the U.S. Congress enacted a series of very harsh anti-Chinese laws designed to exclude Chinese immigrants and deny their naturalization rights and basic rights. The centerpiece of the legislation was the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. In 1888, the Chinese Exclusion Act was extended to include all Chinese, not just laborers. It was renewed by the Geary Act of 1892 and extended indefinitely in 1902. The Chinese Exclusion Act was the first U.S. law ever passed to prevent immigration and naturalization on the basis of race, which later was extended and expanded to include other Asian immigrants, such as the Japanese, Korean, and Indian. The exclusionist policies led to an immediate and sharp decline in the Chinese population: from 105,465 in 1880 to 89,863 in 1900 to 61,639 in 1920.
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This demographic decline resulted in the steady disappearance of Chinatowns throughout America. For example, the Chinese communities in California towns such as Cambria, Riverside, Yosemite, Hanford, Mendocino, Santa Barbara, Ventura, and San Luis Obispo slowly disappeared as the remaining Chinese moved northward to San Francisco or southward to Los Angeles, two cities with major Chinese centers and more possibilities for employment. Chinatown communities in Evanston, Wyoming; Silver City, Idaho; and Walla Walla, Washington gradually disappeared as well. It is estimated that by 1900, nearly 45 percent of Chinese immigrants resided in the San Francisco Bay Area. In the 1880s, cities and towns with a Chinatown were scattered throughout the West, though the Chinatown might consist of only a street or a few stores and its inhabitants might number only a few hundred. Eventually, these enclaves disappeared altogether. By 1940 only 28 cities with Chinatowns could be identified; by 1955, only 16. Enforcement of the exclusion laws by immigration officials resulted in additional exclusionary measures that doubly hindered Chinese immigration but also reinforced the popular conceptions and construction of the Chinese as „Orientals‰ and foreign „others‰ who threatened the American landscape. At the same time, those years witnessed an increasing number of Chinese American families, which resulted in a new generation of acculturated English-speaking Chinese Americans who grew up between the 1930s and 1940s. In response to the systemic decimation and exclusion, the Chinese Six Companies, also known as the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, was formed to advocate for Chinese rights in the United States. In an 1876 letter to President Ulysses Grant, the Chinese Six Companies urged the president to remember the contributions Chinese immigrants had made to the development and expansion of America. The Chinese Six Companies also publicly denounced mob violence against the Chinese. The Chinese also employed the U.S. court system in their protest. In 1855, Chan Yong applied for citizenship in San FranciscoÊs federal district court and was denied citizenship on the basis of the 1790 Naturalization Law, which limited naturalization rights to „whites‰ only. Since the Chinese were not „white,‰ they were, therefore, unable to become naturalized citizens. In 1862, Ling Sing sued the San Francisco tax collector, challenging a $2.50 capitation tax levied on the Chinese on the basis that it was unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court, in Ling Sing v. Washburn, ruled that while the Chinese could be taxed as „other residents,‰ they could not be set apart as „special subjects of taxation.‰ In 1868, the Chinese Six Companies lobbied for inclusion of a provision to protect the Chinese American immigrants in negotiations between the United States and China. They argued that federal protection of Chinese Americans would protect Chinese American lives and properties in the United States and promote Chinese investments in the country and promote trade between America and China. The Burlingame Treaty of 1868 recognized the „free migration and emigration‰
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of the Chinese to the United States as visitors, traders, and permanent residents. It also provided the Chinese with rights and privileges of movement and residency as subjects of the „most favored nation.‰ The flow of immigration (encouraged by the Burlingame Treaty) was stopped by the Chinese Exclusion Act. The Chinese population declined until the act was repealed in 1943 by the Magnuson Act. Official discrimination was evident in the highest offices of the U.S. government, including U.S. President Grover Cleveland, who, in 1888, supported the Chinese Exclusion Act, and proclaimed the Chinese „an element ignorant of our constitution and laws, impossible of assimilation with our people and dangerous to our peace and welfare‰ („Chinese Immigration‰ 2003). The Civil Rights Act of 1870 contained references to the Chinese in America. This act nullified the decision in People v. Hall (1854), which had made it illegal for Chinese to testify against a white person in court. On August 9, 1853, George Hall, a white miner, accompanied by his brother and one other man, assaulted and robbed a Chinese placer miner on the Bear River in Nevada County, California. Ling Sing left his tent after hearing the sound of gun fire and was shot and killed by Hall. The sheriff arrested Hall and his companions. Hall was later tried and found guilty based on the testimony of three Chinese witnesses. The judge sentenced Hall to death by hanging. However, chief justice of the California Supreme Court Hugh Murray overturned the conviction on the basis that „Asiatics‰ were „Indians‰ and therefore unable to testify against a white man in court. Murray argued that „Asiatics‰ long ago traveled over the Bering Strait and „descended‰ into Indians. Indians were not allowed to testify in court against a white man, so since „Asiatics‰ (in this case, the Chinese eyewitnesses) were Indians, they too, could not testify in court against a white man. Fear of the bubonic plague at the beginning of the 20th century fueled anti-Chinese sentiments and the efforts to „drive them out‰ or to confine them to a certain geographic locality. In 1894, the plague was found in Canton and Hong Kong. In 1896, the San Francisco board of health ordered that all passengers arriving from China and Japan be detained and quarantined because the plaque was present in those countries. Two cases of the plague discovered in HonoluluÊs Chinatown resulted in the removal of 4,500 Chinese into a quarantine camp. In San Francisco, there was suspicion that a Chinese man died of the plague because his autopsy revealed enlarged lymph nodes, so Surgeon General Walter Wyman ordered San FranciscoÊs Chinatown to be placed under quarantine. Health and city officials immediately cordoned off Chinatown and forbade Chinese to travel outside of California without a certificate of health. Growing anti-Chinese sentiment that resulted from economic competition and racism coupled with the fear of the bubonic plague resulted in large-scale efforts to „drive out‰ the Chinese residents in smaller rural townships, most often by burning down the Chinatowns. This pushed Chinese immigrants to urban areas like San Francisco. In response to the forced quarantine in San Francisco, the Chinese residents, supported
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by Governor Henry Gage (1899 1903) and local businesses, fought the quarantine through numerous federal court battles, claiming the U.S. Marine Hospital Service was violating their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He did not do this because he was champion of the civil rights of Chinese American residents. Instead, he feared the economic damage to the city and stateÊs economy if rumors of the bubonic plague was made public. The courts initially agreed with Governor Gage and Chinatown residents, citing that the quarantine violated their civil rights, yet most of these lawsuits were eventually thrown out of court on later dates.
1906 San Francisco Earthquake, Angel Island, and Paper Sons Due to exclusionary immigration laws, the majority of Chinese men in America believed they would never be able to bring their wives and or family to America. However, on April 18, 1906, things changed. Early that morning an earthquake shook San Francisco. Fires broke out and destroyed much of the city along with the municipal records. Without records, the Chinese living in United States could claim they were born here and thus were citizens who could sponsor their wives and children to the United States. Before the earthquake and fire, the number of Chinese women remained around 5 percent or less of the total Chinese population. In 1900, there were 4,522 Chinese women living in America. After the earthquake and fire, Chinese women began arriving in much larger numbers: in 1910, 219 women arrived; in 1915, 356 women arrived; in 1920, 573 women arrived; in 1922, 1,050 women arrived; by 1924, 1,893 women arrived. In the years 1907 1925, roughly 10,000 Chinese women came to the United States. A 1924 immigration act stopped the inflow of Chinese women because it prohibited entry of immigrants who were ineligible to become citizens and instituted a permanent quota that provided preferences to immigrants from certain parts of Europe. Meanwhile, Chinese sons were also entering the United States as well. U.S. law stipulates that children of American-born citizens are automatically granted citizenship status, even if they are born in foreign countries. These Chinese children of self-proclaimed American-born Chinese fathers were legally allowed to enter the United States. Many children who came were legitimate, whereas others were imposters known as „paper sons‰ and sometimes „paper daughters.‰ Immigration officials knew of the paper sons and did not trust that all Chinese women were wives of Chinese American men, so they were detained at Angel Island. Angel Island is the largest island in the San Francisco Bay. Nearly 300,000 immigrants passed through Angel Island Immigration Station during its heyday. Angel Island Immigration StationÊs goal was to exclude the entry of Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Indians, and other Asian immigrants. While detained on Angel Island, real sons and paper sons, along with mothers and wives, were asked a series of questions to determine whether the kin relationship was real or fake: What is your motherÊs
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name? What kind of feet does she have? Had your father any brothers or sisters? What are their names? WhatÊs the name of your fatherÊs or husbandÊs native village? How long has he been away? How many floors did your house have? On what floor did you live? What feast did you celebrate? Who attended the celebration? Living in America was difficult. Attempts to settle and create families was not easy, especially with the passage of alien land laws that made it illegal for immigrants ineligible to become naturalized citizens from buying and owning real estate. In 1913, California passed its first alien land law. This law also stipulates that aliens ineligible for citizenship could not lease land for agriculture for terms longer than three years. This, along with violence and attacks fueled by anti-Chinese sentiments, pushed Chinese laborers out of the agricultural industries and into the urban ghettos of San FranciscoÊs Chinatown. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s and into the 1940s, Chinatowns in urban communities grew and became tourist economies. As Chinese immigrants were not welcome to make homes elsewhere in America, they were forced to survive in Chinatowns. The majority were employed in the self-service industries: restaurants, laundries, and so on. American-born Chinese children were also forced to attend segregated schools.
Miss April Lou, teacher at PS 1 in Manhattan, poses with six Chinese children, recent arrivals from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The students hold placards giving his or her Chinese name (both in ideographs and in transliteration), and the name to be entered in the official school records, 1964. (Library of Congress)
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Conditions for Chinese Americans began to improve in the 1940s. The United States and China became allies during World War II, which brought about changes in restrictive immigration policies, changes in naturalization rights, and, eventually, the end of antimiscegenation laws prohibiting the marriage of a Chinese to a white person. In 1943, Chinese immigration to the United States was once again permitted with the passage of the Magnuson Act, which repealed 61 years of official racial discrimination against the Chinese. With the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which lifted national origin quotas, large-scale Chinese immigration to the United States resumed.
1965 to the Present Chinese exclusion was finally annulled with the passages of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Reform Acts, which lifted the anti-Chinese feature of U.S. immigration policy. The repeal of Chinese exclusion impacted the Chinese American landscape significantly: The population increased from 106,334 in 1940 to more than over 2.4 million in 2000, most of whom are recent immigrants. As a result, the last four decades have witnessed profound transformations and restructuring among and within Chinese American religious communities and landscape (Hing 1993). The liberalization of immigration policy after 1965 paralleled the changing mainstream attitudes, perceptions, and conceptions of American culture. The initial American perception of Chinese immigrants was ambiguously affirmative: they were seen as industrious and hygienic, capable of becoming good citizens. But once economic competition in agriculture and gold mining increased, the attitude quickly shifted to one of discrimination, followed by total exclusion that was informed by fervent xenophobia. The first decade of the 20th century had ushered in the great image of the melting pot, a process of assimilation by which diverse peoples from around the world assembled on American soil and, over a period of time, acculturated themselves into mainstream American life. Chinese immigrants, however, did not straightforwardly melt into American mainstream society. In terms of their religious practices, the first generation of Chinese Americans displayed creativity in their attempts at „blending in.‰ This is well illustrated with the use of the term „church‰ instead of „temple‰ for their religious institutions. For example, the historic Taoist Temple located in Hanford, California, was formally represented as the „Taoist Church‰ up until the late 1970s. In spite of these attempts, Chinese immigrants found it difficult to assimilate. Mainstream American society assumed that due to their physical, cultural, and linguistic differences, the Chinese were purposefully resisting assimilation. Consequently, they were perceived as potentially dangerous and subversive to the American way of life. The end of the World War II ushered in the countercultural movements that began to question the normative perception and conception of American social
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life and brought with it a reevaluation of the expectation that immigrants should assimilate into mainstream society. The civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s did not merely express dissatisfaction with racial and prejudicial beliefs and public policies, but it also revealed a deep-seated quandary with the principle of assimilation. To the extent that the American way of life was normatively white and middle class, it was unfeasible for various segments of the population to ever become completely „American.‰ The imagined consensus promoted by those who favored assimilation could only be sustained by excluding people with dark skin, non-European ancestries, and limited incomes·including Asian immigrants. The civil rights movement not only insisted on sensible changes in public policies, it also demanded a transformation and reconstitution of American national selfidentity; it insisted that America recognize and reconstitute itself to be a pluralistic society and that there are manifold and legitimate alternative ways of being American. This produced the pluralistic attitude of American life, one that resembled a „salad bar,‰ in which Americans and American life is multifarious·culturally, religiously, linguistically, ethnically, politically, sexually, socially, economically, and nationally. Between 1882 and 1965, exclusionist ideologies gave way to the melting pot attitude, which then gave way, starting in the 1980s, to the ideology of cultural pluralism, which continues to dominate public discourse. Since 1965, there has been a rejuvenation of Chinatown communities across the United States, especially in large metropolitan areas such San Francisco, Los Angeles, Boston, New York, Chicago, and Houston. At the same time, these regions have also experienced the formation of „new‰ Chinatowns in rural areas. In all these areas, the development of new Chinatowns has taken place and continues to occur because of a continual flow of Chinese immigrants from Taiwan, Hong Kong, mainland China, and various Indo-Chinese subpopulations from Southeast Asia (e.g., Sino-Vietnamese, Sino-Malaysians, Sino-Khmers, and Sino-Thais). In these younger communities, temples and religious businesses have rapidly been established and are able to impact the future contours of the pluralistic American landscape. Contemporary Chinatown communities are multigenerational, multinational, multiethnic, and multilingual, reflecting the heterogeneous demographics of Chinese America. Chinese immigrants are creating and living in „culturally Chinese‰ communities outside of mainland China, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. It is even possible for them to live without having to learn English and, by extension, to maintain continuity between the United States and their homeland. Since 1965, immigrants from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have contributed to the rejuvenation of Chinatowns in San Francisco, New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. After World War II, these Chinatowns had begun to shrink and even disappear as the older immigrants died. The first signs of their
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revival appeared in the early 1960s with the admission of refugees from mainland China.
Demographic Profile Post-1965 Profile Of all the Asian ethnic groups in America, the Chinese Americans are the largest. Chinese Americans are also the oldest Asian ethnic group in the United States. They began to immigrate to the United States in significant numbers in the late 1840s. They experienced 61 years of legal exclusion (from 1882 to 1943). Since World War II, changes in immigration policies have renewed the Chinese American population: it ballooned from 237,292 in 1960 to roughly 2.9 million in 2000. This expansion of the Chinese American population is in large measure a reflection of the changes in immigration policies and the end to exclusionary legislation. Between 1961 and 1998, 1,465,117 Chinese immigrants from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan entered the United States as permanent residents. In 1990, there were more foreign-born Chinese than American-born Chinese. By 2000, there was a slight change in this composition, as the percentage of foreign-born Chinese Americans decreased to 47 percent. Even so, the Chinese American population is still dominated by immigrants. Japanese Americans immigrated to the United States after the Chinese but are now entering into the third and fourth generation. On the other hand, the Chinese American communities are dominated by the foreign-born first generation. There are 20 percent who are American-born with foreign-born parents. Third-generation American-born Chinese with American-born parents accounts for 33 percent of the population. The Chinese immigrantsÊ first wave was fairly homogenous in that they came from the Pearl River Delta region of Canton China and consisted of mostly men. Most were sojourners with peasant backgrounds and low levels of education. There was a small merchant class in the mix. The Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 transformed the homogenous Chinese American society into a heterogeneous one reflecting diversity in religious, social, economic, educational, linguistic, and ethnic backgrounds. The majority before 1965 spoke Taishan and Canton dialects. Today, there is an increase in Mandarin, Chaozhou, Fujianese, Hakka, and Shanghai dialects among the Chinese American populations whose countries of origins include: mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia. There is also a sizable sector of the population who are ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asia (mainly from Vietnam and Cambodia) who entered the United States as refugees after the Fall of Saigon in 1975. Chinese immigrants from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore come from higher social-cultural backgrounds with higher educational levels. As such, they tend to enter into professional white collar jobs. In 1990, 40 percent of
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immigrants from mainland China did not have high school diplomas, compared to only 8 percent from Taiwan, 22 percent from Hong Kong, or 22 percent of the national average in America. Historically, a gender imbalance was evident in Chinese American communities. The passage of the Page Law in 1857 made the gender imbalance even more distinct. During and after World War II, more and more Chinese immigrants were admitted into the United States as war brides. After the Communist victory in China in 1949, hundreds of refugees and their families entered the United States as political refugees. The overall increase in Chinese women led to the increase in American-born Chinese between the 1940s and the 1960s. As such, in 1960, over 60 percent of the Chinese American population was American born. Further indications of growth are evident in the increase in population by 28.5 percent from 2000 to 2006.
Size and Composition of Community Recent Chinese immigrants continue to gather in metropolitan areas along the East and West coasts: New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles maintain Chinese American populations of over 100,000. Old Chinatown communities in these major metropolitan areas continue to receive recent immigrants. Chinese immigrants arriving with more human capital, wealth, and education are moving into new Chinatown communities in the suburbs of San Francisco and Los Angeles. Contemporary Chinese American life has been shaped by immigration policies that favor family reunification. Therefore, by the early 1970s, the sex ratio of Chinese America had changed. Once a society dominated by male bachelors, Chinese American society is now one rooted in families. One immediate impact of more Chinese American families is the shift in the sex ratio, whereby Chinese American women now outnumber Chinese American men. TodayÊs Chinese American families have distinctive characteristics, including low rates of divorce, low rates of juvenile delinquency, retention of Chinese values, the use of Mandarin or a Chinese dialect at home, and female subordination. This bustling community has played an important role in shaping AmericaÊs multicultural dynamics. According to the 2000 U.S. Census data, Chinese Americans form roughly 24 percent of the entire Asian American population with an estimated population size of 2,432,585. The Chinese immigrant population is 47 percent of the Chinese American population. California has the highest number of Chinese Americans: 1,122,187 (46.1% of the total); New York is second with 451,859; third is Hawaii with 170,803; fourth is Texas with 121,588; and fifth is New Jersey with 110,263. Overall, the largest concentrations of Chinese Americans reside on the West Coast (including Hawaii) and the East Coast; however, Illinois and Texas are exceptions
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to this trend. In 2009, California slipped to second place, with New York having the most Chinese legal permanent residents, with Texas, New Jersey, and Massachusetts having significant concentrations. Significant Chinatown communities can be found in Chicago; Houston; Las Vegas; Los Angeles; New York City; Philadelphia; Portland, Oregon; Oakland and San Francisco; and Washington, D.C. Within the Chinese American communities, 29.4 percent are American-born Chinese Americans. Of the American born Chinese Americans, 53.8 percent where born in California and New York. A large part of the Chinese American population are foreign-born, 47 percent. Of the foreign-born, 97 percent come from only 15 countries. Of these 15 countries, 85 percent come from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
Chinatowns In the past 20 years, many Chinese Americans have moved away from the ethnic enclave communities known as Chinatowns. At the same time, new Chinese immigrants will live nearby in ethnic enclave communities known as Chinatowns. Chinatowns in the United States are urban ethnic enclaves found in every major city and composed of Americans of Chinese ancestry and ethnic Chinese immigrants from mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia. These enclaves of residences, retail areas, places of worship, and often tourism, originated in the mid19th century with the arrival of Chinese laborers and some merchants. Sojourners, men who planned to return home after making their fortune, came to work in the gold mines, on transcontinental railroads, and farms. Early Chinatown communities were formed largely in response to racism and the Chinese need for a community with shared language and cultural traditions. Some of the oldest and largest Chinatowns are those in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Oakland, California; Honolulu, Hawaii; New York City; Chicago; Boston; and Seattle.
Family Structure Based on the 2000 U.S. Census data, nationwide, the average household size for Chinese American families is 3.8 people per household compared to 3.2 for the U.S. national average. The percentage of Chinese American women is larger than Chinese American men: 52 percent female, 48 percent male. Among first-generation Chinese immigrant households, families tend to be extended, whereby several generations of kinfolk live in one household. For example, a typical household may include grandparents, parents, uncles, aunts, cousins, children, in addition to a newlywed couple and their family. However, this pattern changes for second and subsequent generations of Chinese Americans because they adopt the mainstream
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American nuclear family structure. Moreover, many move away for college and work, and start new families away from their parents and extended kinfolks.
Educational Attainment Several months after sociologist William Petersen published „Success Story: Japanese American Style‰ on January 9, 1966, in the New York Times Magazine, a staff reporter for the U.S. News and World Report made similar conclusions about the Chinese Americans: they both are successful minority groups in America. In light of racial discrimination, the Japanese and Chinese Americans endured hardship, but with strong family values, strict discipline, strong work ethics, and respect for education, they have been able to overcome their obstacles and achieve the American dream. This image, this stereotype of Chinese Americans as a model minority, has been popular ever since. The image is misleading if the data compare native-born Chinese Americans to immigrant Chinese Americans. According to the 1990 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 37.5 percent of the Chinese American population had a bachelorÊs degree, which is 25.4 percent higher than the white population. However, in terms of the rate of illiteracy, or those who possess zero to four years of education, the Chinese American population is four times greater than the whites: 10.3 percent Chinese Americans are illiterate, while only 2.6 percent of whites are illiterate. According to 2006 U.S. Census data, more than half of Chinese American adults have college degrees (51.7%), twice the proportion of the general population (27%). But one-fifth did not complete high school, one of the highest rates among Asian American groups. Chinese Americans differ with respect to educational achievement based on their country of origins: 68.9 percent of the Chinese Americans from Taiwan have college educations compared to 53.7 percent from Hong Kong. Only 44 percent of Chinese Americans from mainland China have college educations.
Employment According to 2006 U.S. Census data more than half the Chinese American population works in managerial and professional careers, but a considerable number have blue-collar jobs. The top three occupations for Chinese American men, for instance, are restaurants cooks, computer software developers, and managers/ administrators. As of 2008, 53.4 percent of the Chinese American populations were in managerial and professional occupations, compared to 34.2 percent of the total population. Many work in the computer industries as software developers or in the financial industries as accountants and auditors. Conversely, in the low skill, low-pay employment sectors, many are waiters, sweat-shop sewing women, and cooks. When
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examining employment based on country of origins, Chinese Americans from Taiwan have the highest ratio in professional and managerial occupations because they also have the highest level of educational attainment. This is followed by Chinese Americans from Hong Kong, then mainland China. Native-born Chinese Americans are concentrated in professional and managerial occupations as well and do not straddle from the high and low spectrum of employment, which foreign-born Chinese Americans do. The majority of Chinese Americans, foreign and native born, work in the private sector·80.4 percent·while only 13.2 percent are employed in the public sector. Only 6.1 percent of the Chinese American population is self-employed. Even less, 4.2 percent of the second-generation American-born Chinese Americans are self-employed.
Economic Attainment As of 2000, at the national level, Chinese Americans have higher median family income, per capital income, and mean wage and salary earnings than that of the general population. However, when compared to non-Hispanic whites, the Chinese Americans consistently make lower incomes, regardless of educational levels. The median family income of Chinese Americans was $62,705, compared with the national median of $48,451. On average, Chinese Americans in legal and medical fields earned as much as 44 percent less than their non-Hispanic white counterparts. The Chinese American home ownership rate is 65 percent, compared to 54 percent for the national average. Compared to 8.2 percent for non-Hispanic whites, 9.4 percent of the Chinese American population lives in poverty. The population most affected by poverty within the Chinese American population is the elderly: 50 percent of Chinese American elders live in poverty and 47 percent of them live alone.
Health Statistics and Issues Prior to 1985, studies concluded that the Chinese American population is at a lower risk for disease and death. In contrast, newer studies see a trend towards poorer health status within the Chinese American population in general, especially among those who live in poverty, lack insurance, and do not have access to health care. Two major health and medical issues among the Chinese American population are depression and suicide among Chinese American women 65 years old and over. They are three times more likely to commit suicide compared to white women. For Chinese American women over 75 years old, the rate is seven times that of white women. Chinese American women tend to hang themselves, while Chinese men tend to overdose on medication. A large majority of Chinese Americans who commit suicide are foreign born. Because Chinese American elders are less likely to communicate their intentions to commit suicide to family, friends, or medical
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professionals, intervention is often not possible. A major cause of suicide is related to the low rate of depression diagnosis and treatment among this particular segment of the Chinese American population. Taiwan has the worldÊs highest rate of hepatitis B infections. It is also a major public issue in China. Therefore, it is not surprising that hepatitis B infection is prevalent among the Chinese American population, which leads to high rates of liver cancer cases. In fact, Chinese Americans have the highest rate of liver cancer among all ethnic and racial groups in the United States. Other cancers are higher for Chinese Americans than Chinese in Asia. For example, the rate of breast cancer cases is higher among Chinese Americans than for Chinese living in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Medical professionals predict that the ratio may be higher because Chinese American women are less likely to receive mammograms than white women. More Chinese Americans are diagnosed with prostate and colon cancer than Chinese in Asia. The lung cancer rate among Chinese Americans is lower than that of Chinese in Asia. This is most likely related to the overall decrease in smoking in the United States compared to Asia.
Adjustment and Adaptation The first group of Chinese immigrants viewed themselves not as immigrants, but as sojourners, who would make money and return to China in three to five years. Many of the early pioneers maintained strong Chinese identity, cultural practices, and life-ways because of the robust anti-Chinese sentiments that enveloped the local and national levels of American sociopolitics. World War II is a watershed period that inspired American patriotism within the Chinese American communities, because China and America were allies fighting Japanese imperialism. From 1942 to 1945, as many as 20,000 Chinese Americans joined the U.S. military. The early years of the Cold War pushed the Chinese American communities to assimilate into American society and culture even more for fear of being charged as un-American Communist sympathizers. Overall, second-, third-, and fourth-generation Chinese Americans have adapted to life in America as Americans of Chinese decent. However, the influx of Chinese immigrants from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, as well as Sino-Southeast Asian refugees, have changed the degree of cultural acculturation and assimilation because there are more foreign-born Chinese Americans than there are native born, which results in a stereotype of Chinese Americans, regardless of their time in America, as „perpetual foreigners.‰ The problem with adjustment and adaptation is made more complex because Chinese Americans are considered a „model minority‰ in American society. As a result, racial discrimination and prejudice targeting Chinese Americans are understudied, invisible, and muted in discussions of American racial conflicts.
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Two recent incidents of racial discrimination aimed at Chinese Americans are the 1982 Vincent Chin beating and murder, and the 1999 unsubstantiated charges of spying against renowned nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee. One of the main challenges for the future of Chinese Americans is their ability to undo the label of being „perpetual foreigners.‰
Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Births Life cycle rituals are more prevalent among recent Chinese American immigrants than Chinese immigrants who arrived earlier because of the differences in degrees of assimilation and acculturation. One example of this is the celebration of a babyÊs first month of life. Traditionally, when a newborn becomes one month old, the family invites family and friends over to celebrate her life. They share a meal of dishes that symbolizes good health and long life, which they wish on the newborn. Red envelopes stuffed with money are also gifted to the baby to ensure he is materially comfortable. This is the babyÊs coming-out party and her first step into joining the larger family and community. This rite of passage is typically not celebrated by second- and third-generation Chinese Americans, especially if there are not elders in their family to organize it.
Chinese American Weddings In the old days, arranged marriages were common practice. Here again, there will be a difference between recent immigrants versus American-born Chinese Americans. For recent immigrants, once a committed couple accepts proposals of marriage, they seek advice from their elders regarding the best date and time for the ceremony. The elders seek the consultation of a fortune teller to see if the union is a compatible one that will lead to success, grandchildren, and wealth. In a traditional Chinese wedding, the bride wears red, a color symbolizing blood, which means life, fertility, and good health. The wedding ceremony is usually performed at home where the bride and groom presents a cup of tea to all their elders, who bless their union and gift them gold and red envelopes stuffed with money to start their new life together. This is followed by a big banquet, usually at a Chinese restaurant. For entertainment, the banquet might include karaoke singing and popular American wedding games. Few will include dancing. Among Chinese Americans who are Christians, their wedding takes place at a church, followed by a banquet. There is a large-scale family dinner that unites not only the newlyweds but the two families. A popular trend among younger Chinese American brides is to wear a white Western-style wedding dress, followed by a
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traditional Chinese red wedding dress called „qipao‰ at the banquet. Compared to the general population, once they marry, Chinese Americans tend to stay married; the divorce rate is less than half that of the general population (4.4% vs. 10%).
Funerals and Death Rituals Death rituals and funerals are important life-cycle moments for all people in the world. Within the Chinese American population and communities, they may take various forms. For Chinese Americans who are Christian, a conventional Christian burial is performed followed by either cremation or burial at the cemetery. For Chinese Americans who are Buddhist, monks are called in to perform the death ritual and the body is cremated. The ash of the person is then placed at a Buddhist mausoleum or on the family altar. This act is important because it symbolizes that the deceased has now become an ancestor, who can, if properly taken care of, protect the living family from misfortune and disharmony. The majority of recent Chinese American immigrants will be informed by Confucian values and customs, and, therefore, will invite a Buddhist monk or Daoist priest to perform the death ritual, usually at a local temple or at home, followed by a burial. The name of the dead person is written on a tablet that will be placed on the familyÊs ancestral altar.
Chinese American funeral ritual, Los Angeles, California. Family and friends present food and paper models of houses and servants. (Courtesy of Jonathan H. X. Lee)
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Traditionally, the living survivors will wear white, which symbolizes death because blood is no longer flowing through the body. This is unlike the Western tradition of wearing black. Food is prepared; and paper money and paper models of material goods, such as houses, cars, clothes, TVs, and so on, are purchased and offered to the dead during the funeral ritual. The climax of the ritual is when all the paper goods are burned, which symbolizes that it is being transformed and delivered to the spirit world. The food offering is thus shared by the living and is considered to be blessed. The relationship between the living and the dead is based on a principle of reciprocity and exchange. Each year, during Chinese New Year, the anniversary of the personÊs death, Qingming, and other festival occasions, the living will prepare food, usually the personÊs favorite dishes while alive, and paper goods (such as money and clothes) to offer to the dead ancestor. Incense is burned and used to deliver the votive offerings, prayers, and wishes that the living descendent has made during the ritual to the ancestor. In return for taking care of the ancestors in the spirit world, the ancestors provide good fortune, harmony, and health for the family. However, if the family neglects their duties, the ancestors can cause the family to be chaotic, ill, and poor. Overall, funeral rituals and rituals to commemorate the dead reinforce family solidarity. It provides a way for the living to remember the dead and to bring all living members together to share stories and food. Among recent immigrant Chinese Americans, this practice causes them a lot of concern and anxiety. This is especially true for the elderly who fear their Americanized children and grandchildren will not remember them and therefore, will not honor them as ancestors. If they are not taken care of as ancestors, they become hungry ghosts. Hence, many are concerned about their otherworldly future in America.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Because the first wave of Chinese immigrants were mostly males, there were almost no Chinese American families in the United States in the early days of immigration. For the Chinese males who were able to start families, it was most likely not with a Chinese woman because there were very few of them in America; nor was it with a white woman because of antimiscegenation laws, which prohibited Chinese men from marrying white women. In Hawaii, Chinese men married native Hawaiian or other Asian immigrant women, for example, Japanese, Korean, or Indian. On the West Coast and in the Southwest, they married Native American and Mexican women. During the period of exclusion, 1882 1943, though Chinese immigration nearly stopped, it was the period that witnessed the growth and development of the first generation of American-born Chinese Americans. This period was also the period of paper sons. The War Brides Act of 1945 significantly changed the demographics of Chinese America, because Chinese American soldiers who
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went to battle in China, against the Japanese, married Chinese women, whom they later sponsored to come to the United States through the family reunification clause. In Chinese culture, sex is considered a private matter and is rarely discussed between parent and child. Research indicates that Chinese Americans (and Asian Americans in general) are less likely to engage in premarital sex, have fewer sexual partners, and are often more conservative when it comes to sexual behaviors, attitudes, and practices. Same-sex relationships are often hidden from the family or rarely acknowledged, making it difficult for the adjustment of gay and lesbian children of Chinese American parents, especially if the parents are foreign-born Chinese Americans. Moreover, cases of sexual abuse and violence often remain a secret since acknowledgment would bring shame to the family.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Chinese Americans, both recent immigrants and older generations, are able to maintain some sense of Chinese cultural practices and identity. Some of this might be an effect of vibrant Chinatown communities throughout all metropolitan cities. In some places, such as Chicago and San Francisco, public schools are offering Chinese-language classes, which provide many second- and third-generation
Children in New York’s Chinatown take part in a lion dance, performed to chase out evil spirits, during Lunar New Year, February 10, 2002. (AP Photo/Graham Morrison)
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Chinese American youth the opportunity to maintain a sense of Chinese cultural identity. Many Chinese Americans take an interest in Chinese American history in high school and college, and will identify as Chinese American and take an active interest in Chinese American social issues and politics. Some Chinese American youths are learning about Chinese legends and heroic figures through popular multimedia video games, like Dynasty Warriors. Moreover, because Chinese festivals and holidays are generally celebrated and observed in communities where there are sizable Chinese American populations, it is easier for Chinese American youths to maintain cultural awareness and identity.
Continued Links to Country of Origin There are many reasons for Chinese Americans to maintain ties to China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Singapore. Many of the recent Chinese immigrants are transnational immigrants who live and work in both Asia and America. They therefore have the human capital: educational, language, and technological skills to maintain strong transnational ties and connections. In the 1980s and 1990s, second- and third-generation Chinese Americans took an active interest in their Chinese heritage. The civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s had given gave birth to Asian American Studies at San Francisco State University in 1969. With a new consciousness and awareness of themselves as Chinese and American, many youth traveled back to China to research their ancestral villages and family histories. New immigrant Chinese American parents will send their children back to China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan to learn Chinese. For Taiwanese American youth, the Love Boat (otherwise formally known as the Overseas Compatriot Youth Formosa Study Tour to Taiwan) is an example of this. The Love Boat provides Taiwanese Americans an opportunity to learn Chinese language and culture. At the same time, it is now an infamous way for young Taiwanese Americans to meet other Taiwanese Americans. It is common for participants to meet on the Love Boat and later get married. Chinese American youths also employ the Internet and social networking sites to stay connected to family and friends in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. Because of ChinaÊs recent economic development and potential domination of the global economy, many Chinese American parents are encouraging their children to learn Chinese so as to have career opportunities in China in the future. Culturally, Chinese Americans have maintained strong connections to the old country. For instance, there is an elaborate belief and ritual tradition associated with ancestral veneration. During the Qingming Festival, many Chinese Americans will travel back to China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Singapore to visit the gravesites of their ancestors to sweep their grave and share a communal meal together. Thus,
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cultural responsibilities and practices are a strong force that keeps Chinese and Chinese American family members connected.
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background There are many family, district, and clan associations in Chinese America. Family associations or mutual aid associations are based on family lineage and dates back to the early period of Chinese immigration to America. Family associations assisted many new immigrants to adapt to life in America; this is especially important in the early days when anti-Chinese sentiments were red hot. Family associations were based on family names or surnames (e.g., Yee Family Association, Lee Family Association, Wong Family Association, and so on). Membership in the family association is not voluntary but assumed upon arrival. The next associational level is known as huiguan, an association is composed of groups of family associations who share the same surname. The principle of the huiguan is that people with the same surnames are somehow related and a link may be traced back to the same ancestor. So, even though members of the huiguan are not closely related, they are considered part of the same family. Like family associations, membership is not voluntary but assumed upon arrival. In the 1950s, family associations and huiguan came under fire because of largescale fraud and false claims of family relationships that resulted in so-called paper sons and paper families. In 1956, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a blanket subpoena for all the records of the family associations in New York and San Francisco. The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Society challenged the subpoena and were able to maintain their private records. The San Yap and Sze Yap are two district associations that played important roles in early Chinese America. Both were founded in San Francisco, in 1851, for the purpose of defending themselves against white anti-Chinese sentiments and discrimination. The San Yap association is composed of immigrants from three districts: Nanhai, Panyu, and Shunde. While the Sze Yap is composed of immigrant members from four districts: Taishan, Xinhui, Kaiping, and Enping. Both are originally from the Pearl River Delta region of Guangdong. Lastly, there are tongs, secret societies founded by Chinese immigrants in the United States. The original tongs were based on triad societies in China that were founded in the 18th and 19th centuries, who were opposed to the Qing Dynasty and European colonialism. Like the family and district associations and huiguans, tongs provided mutual aid and support for the Chinese immigrants. Tongs provided social services and security for the immigrant Chinese populations. They protected Chinese immigrant communities from attacks. Shortly after their formation, tongs became associated with criminal activities. Eventually, the various tongs competed with one another and resulted in what was called the „tong wars.‰
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Since 1965, many family and district associations remain. The tongs became more focused on mutual aid, but the negative image of criminal activities remains. In 1996, the Hip Sing Tong headquarter in San Francisco changed its name to Hip Sing Association. Even so, it was raided by the police in a major drug bust. Besides family associations, huiguans, and tongs, there are also new religious institutions, mostly Buddhist, that provide the same kind of mutual and social services that earlier ethnic associations provided to early immigrants.
Chinese American Religions Among the influx of Asian immigrants entering the United States, the Chinese were the first to arrive. A vast majority of the first wave of Chinese immigrants who landed in California during the 19th century came from Guangdong Province. Many came with aspirations of finding gold and returning to China, but many ended up settling in farming communities in gold rush towns and around railroads, or along the western coastline, extending from Baja, California, to Vancouver, Canada. The Chinese pioneers were quartered off in so-called Chinatowns, where they established businesses, schools, and religious centers. Chinese American communities comprise a culturally distinct population outside the PeopleÊs Republic of China, the Republic of China of Taiwan, and the states and territories where ethnic Chinese are either a majority population or a significant cultural force (e.g., Singapore). Like migrants the world over, the Chinese brought their religious rituals and beliefs with them. The principal religions of China are Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, jointly practiced in combination with popular folk traditions and rituals. The majority of the early Chinese would have practiced all of them at sometime. Privately, Chinese religion is practiced at home, around the family altar, with shrines dedicated to Tudi Gong (the Earth God), ancestors, and, depending on inclination, various other deities·both Buddhist and/or Daoist. In 19th- and early 20th-century China, it would have been unthinkable for a community not to have a Buddhist temple. However, for many years, the various exclusionary acts barred Buddhist monks from coming to America to establish temples and serve the immigrant Chinese population. In contrast, Daoist temples do not require the presence of a resident priest, such that a temple committee can oversee its daily functions. In the absence of Daoist priests, temple caretakers made sure that the temple was maintained in proper ritual condition. The heart of the Chinese temple is not the main shrine to the deity, but rather, the incense burner, or brazier·the indispensable furnishing of every temple·holding sticks of incense presented to the deity communicating the officiatesÊ prayers. If possible, ashes from a „mother‰ temple in China would have been placed in the new „daughter‰ incense burner to enliven the magical powers of the deity. Curling smoke flows upward to vanish into the other realm, carrying with it the prayers,
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hopes, and wishes of devotees. Hence, it is the lighting and placement of the incense in the urn that is significant. As wishes and prayers are answered, as people live another day, another month, another year, they return to express gratitude, to inquire about the future, to seek assistance. The ashes that accumulate gain magical potency and may be used to make talismans or are used in medicinal potions. To most Chinese and early Chinese Americans, religious life and ritual was not confined to a particular religious faith (unless they were Christian or they solely identified as Buddhists or Daoists). Still, Chinese religions and religious specialists provided services in the spiritual marketplace, whereby a client would seek the most efficacious ritual specialists. A community facing draughts or floods, a family facing hard times and illness might call upon a Daoist priest to exorcise demons and ghosts deemed to be the cause of suffering. A family in need of a funerary ritual, blessing, or purification might call upon a Buddhist monk. Together, Buddhism and Daoism provide the community with ritual specialists for various reasons and at various passages of life. Daoism in particular stresses change and transformation from one season to the next, from one form to another, from one way of life (Chinese) to another (American)·the transition facilitated by the gods and goddesses. The Daoist pantheon is vast and encompasses gods from all periods of Chinese history. Some were real historical figures, others deifications of natural phenomena (such as planets and stars), still others are the embodiment of fear and plagues. Daoism is a religion well structured to meet the new immigrantsÊ needs and, as conditions and needs change, there is always room on a Daoist altar for a new deity. Two of the most popular deities in early Chinese immigrant communities were Guangong (a.k.a. Guangdi), the martial emperor of literature, wealth, and social harmony; and Tianhou (a.k.a. Mazu), the goddess of the sea, the empress of heaven, who safely guided ships to America. Buddhism meets the needs of immigrants in similar fashion. It also offers a vast pantheon of deities in the form of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, beings of great merit who compassionately postponed their own enlightenment to save all beings from suffering. Although the Buddhas and bodhisattvas are all mythical figures, they too are adaptable and are worshipped jointly with their Daoist counterparts. The most popular bodhisattva is Guanyin, the bodhisattva of compassion who is enshrined in all Chinese temples in America and popularly venerated at many home altars. Buddhism also reinforces the importance placed on ancestral veneration, offering rituals that surviving family members can perform to benefit their ancestorsÊ souls, and possibly enhance their chances for a better rebirth·maintaining family solidarity through memory. The hardest religion to discern is Confucianism, commonly considered the „invisible‰ tradition, as it has neither deities nor priests. Confucian temples in China are called wenmiao (Temples of Culture) to underscore their function in honoring
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Confucius as a great teacher. Confucian ethics and values are expressed in family and social relationships, in day-to-day human interaction. According to Confucianism, the „authentic‰ person is one who fulfills all her social obligations. All people have multiple social ties to one another: we are simultaneously parents and children, teachers and students, older and younger within the fabric of our community, and we are spouses, partners, and friends. The goal then is to perfect oneself through learning, to carry out the duties that these multiple relationships entail·to be a truly devoted spouse, a loving child, a true friend, and so forth. It is a difficult project, but with help from family members, teachers, neighbors, and friends, it is a collective effort. The Confucian traditions provided for social familial harmony and ancestral veneration. From the beginning, Chinese pioneers in America have established family and clan associations, connected to a religious center, as was the case with the Auburn Joss House, founded by a group of brothers in Auburn, California. Others were established based on common place of origin such as HanfordÊs San Yup Association and Taoist Temple. Through the relationships cultivated by these religious-community associations, newcomers could find support and comfort as they built a new life. Although Christianity is not a traditional Chinese religion, it has had a huge impact on Chinese religious life in cultural China and America. Early Chinese Christian churches were established by missionaries of American dominations. One of the first Chinese Christian churches was founded in San FranciscoÊs Chinatown in the early 1850s. Many new churches established by Chinese Americans are nondenominational and tend to be conservative in religious and political ideology. By the mid-1990s, there were more than 800 churches founded by the immigrant Chinese themselves. Like Chinese temples, some churches preserve select Confucian values (e.g., respect for elders) and hold Chinese language classes.
Language Issues The majority of first-generation Chinese American youth will be bilingual, speaking English as well as some dialect of Chinese: Cantonese, Mandarin, or Taiwanese. Language barriers between first- and second-generation Chinese Americans are the primary cause of generational conflicts. Many Chinese American parents, especially recent immigrants, will demand that their children only speak Chinese at home. In addition, they are required to attend Chinese language schools on the weekends. Second- and third-generation Chinese Americans are more likely to not be able to speak, read, or write Chinese. For some, this may cause an identity crisis.
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media The Golden Hill News, established in San Francisco in 1854, and the Oriental, established in 1856, are the two oldest Chinese-language newspapers in America.
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These two newspapers flourished until the turn of the 20th century. The Chinese Times and Chinese Pacific Weekly succeeded them. These two focused much of their reporting on immigration issues. By 1999, there were 40 Chinese language newspapers in the United States reaching nearly one million readers. In the 1990s, Ming Pao, a Chinese-language newspaper based in Hong Kong, established two overseas branches in the United States: Ming Pao New York and Ming Pao San Francisco. Both cover local news, collect local advertisements, and provide independent reporting and journalism. By 2009, both Ming Pao New York and Ming Pao San Francisco ceased operations. Chinese Americans can also receive newspapers from Taiwan, China, Singapore, and Hong Kong. For example, Renmi ri bao is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China; Ming Pao reports daily news from Hong Kong; Lianhe zaobao is a daily newspaper from Singapore; and Taipei Times and the China Post are from Taiwan. Today, many Chinese Americans who are not bilingual in English can get local, national, and global news through various ethnic Chinese media outlets. Many of them are available through cable television in metropolitan areas where there are sizable Chinese American populations: for example, China Central Television (CCT) from China or Chung TÊien Television (CTi TV) based in Taiwan. ETTV America is a Chinese-language news broadcasting channel in the United States that is a subsidiary of Eastern Television of Taiwan. Chinese ethnic media in the United States allows many recent immigrants to obtain important news about their local communities, U.S. national news, and news about their home country that are important to their lives. Chinese ethnic media in America has also encouraged Chinese Americans to vote and participate in politics as a way to fight discrimination aimed at Chinese residents in America.
Celebration of National Holidays Chinese Americans, from recent immigrants to fourth-generation Americans, continue to maintain some traditional Chinese holidays and festivals; many also celebrate Western and American holidays as well, such as Thanksgiving and July 4 Independence Day. The most popular Chinese holiday celebrated within the United States is the Chinese Lunar New Year, or Spring Festival, which commences on the first day of the first lunar month (generally corresponding to the end of January or beginning of February in the Gregorian solar calendar). Traditional activities are informed by Chinese myths, folklore, and folk customs, which emphasize luck and prosperity of the New Year. For example, popular activities include: wearing red, which symbolizes blood and life; eating oranges, which symbolize nuggets of gold and wealth; and setting firecrackers to scare away evil spirits and bad luck, and to make room for fortune and good energy. Homes will be cleaned from top to bottom to start the New
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Year fresh and clean. Today, the largest Chinese New Year celebration takes place in San Francisco. This San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade is televised globally and is one of the biggest cultural civil celebrations of its kind in the city. One celebration that is not as public as the Chinese New Year celebration is the Lantern Festival, which marks the end of the New Year. The Lantern Festival is celebrated on a smaller scale, through families and locally in Chinatowns across America. Other Chinese festivals celebrated on a smaller scale within Chinese American communities across the United States include the Qingming Festival (Clear and Bright Festival), a day devoted to remembering and venerating ancestors. Many recent Chinese American immigrants will return to China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong to celebrate this holiday. The other popular celebration is the Mid-Autumn Festival, a day connected to celebration of the harvest moon, where family members gather to view the beauty and magnificence of the full moon. One main similarity between Chinese festivals and holidays and American and Western festivals and holidays is the emphasis on family gathering and solidarity. The continuation of Chinese cultural festivals and holidays are key ways to educate younger Chinese Americans about the customs and heritages of cultural China. It reinforces their identity and identification with the Chinese American communities and reinforces the importance of multicultural celebrations as a means of being people together.
Foodways There are roughly 41,000 Chinese restaurants in the United States, three times the number of McDonaldsÊ franchise units. Chinese food has long been available in a form that suits American tastes, which is more correctly called „Chinese American food‰ because it has been purposely adapted to meet the needs of non-Chinese customers. Due to changes in immigration policies that revived Chinatown communities and changed the demographic composition of Chinese America, both more authentic Chinese cuisine and American versions are available at restaurants in large cities like San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Boston, and Chicago. Some Chinese American dishes are created in America (e.g., chop suey, made of finely chopped meat (usually pork) and vegetables, mixed in a brown sauce). The other famous Chinese American invention is the fortune cookie. Common dishes available at a Chinese American restaurant, such as the popular Panda Express or P.F. ChangÊs China Bistro, are: wanton or egg drop soup, fried rice, egg foo young (a thick omelet served in a brown sauce), chow mein, moo goo gai pan (sautéed chicken with crispy vegetables in a white sauce), several sweet-and-sour dishes, among others. Most dishes are served with white rice. The biggest influence in
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Fortune Cookies Every Americanized Chinese restaurant in the United States serves its customers a complimentary fortune cookie. These cookies are folded into a curved shape, resembling an ancient Chinese gold nugget. They are light yellow, sweet, and crisp, made from white flour, vanilla, oil, and sugar. Each one contains a “fortune,” a strip of paper with a prediction, a Chinese proverb, and lottery numbers. Early fortune cookies featured biblical quotes, whereas their contemporary versions are much less serious. The fortunes are usually mystifying and funny, including sagely advice attributed to Confucius. Many Americans think the fortune cookie is a Chinese invention, an import from China from the early days. It is not. In fact, it is a Chinese American invention. The fortune cookie was not introduced to China until the 1990s, and even then, it was advertised as “Genuine American Fortune Cookies.” The fortune cookie was most likely invented in San Francisco’s Chinatown. The inventor of the cookie is still unknown. As far back as the 19th century, Japan had a similar cookie called omikuji. Many Japanese bakers claimed that they modified the cookie in America. David Jung, founder of the Hong Kong Noodle Company, claims he invented the cookie back in 1918. Fortune cookies were originally all handmade with chopsticks until the late 1960s. Founder of the Lotus Fortune Cookie Company Edward Louie invented the first fortune cookie folding machine in San Francisco, California. These days, some 3 billion fortune cookies are produced annually in the United States. Wonton Food, based in Brooklyn, New York, is the largest fortune cookie manufacture in the world and makes 4.5 million cookies a year. Fortune cookies have become an iconic symbol of Chinese American cuisine.
Chinese American food is Cantonese because early Chinese immigrants were from the Canton region of the Pearl River Delta. After 1965, food lovers wanting an authentic Chinese food experience could find it at Chinese restaurants in the rejuvenated Chinatowns or suburban Chinese communities. There are many Chinese farms in the United States selling Chinese vegetables, such as bok choy, Chinese broccoli, bitter melon, and bean sprouts. There are large supermarkets selling Chinese ingredients and condiments. There are even Chinese herbal stores that sell Chinese luxury spices and herbs, including shark fins. Besides Cantonese-style cuisine, Americans can find other authentic ethnic Chinese foods, such as Hunan-, Taiwan-, Sichuan-, Nanjing-, Shanghaistyle restaurants and foods. Sino-Southeast Asian restaurants offer another level
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of diversity and flavor profile for American food lovers. Dim sum has become a popular tradition among many in the United States. Dim sum literally translates to „little hearts‰ or „little eats‰ and is a popular brunch option for Chinese American families, regardless of their time in the United States. The small dishes are similar to Spanish tapas, served with tea, and eaten with family and friends. The Chinese wok, soy sauce, oyster sauce, and black bean sauce are now common items in many homes. Several cooking shows, the most famous of which is PBSÊs Martin Yang Can Cook, brought Chinese cooking techniques and dishes to many American homes.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment There are several institutions in Chinese America devoted to traditional forms of Chinese music. The most notable is the Chinese Music Society of North America and Chinese Performing Artists of America. The North American Guqin Association is directed by Wang Fei and celebrates the guqin instrument: a seven-stringed plucked zither that goes back 5,000 years. Most Chinese folk music is performed during holiday celebrations, such as Lunar New Year celebration, Autumn Festival, and weddings. The most famous Chinese American musician today is French-born and American-based cello master, Yo-Yo Ma. Yo-Yo MaÊs music reflects his classical training and interest in musical styles from America, Central Asia, and South America. He is a Grammy Award winner who has produced more than 70 albums and currently performs with the Silk Road Ensemble, a collective of musicians from dozens of countries. Some Chinese American rapper and hip-hop artists are creating a niche for themselves in the American popular music scene. The Mountain Brothers were a hip-hop act that was active from 1991 to 2003, based in Pennsylvania. Jin is a rapper from New York. The only other popular Chinese Filipino American hip-hop musician is FloridaÊs SouthStar, who had a top 40 hit, „Tell Me,‰ in 2002. Historically, and unfortunately, even today, Chinese Americans have been stereotypically represented in entertainment. Chinese American men are represented as being mousy, untrustworthy, weak, and effeminate. Chinese American women are represented as immoral, hypersexual, and seductive. Early on, Chinese American actors and actresses were not hired to play Chinese roles; instead, white actors were hired. They work „yellow-face‰ make-up, fake queues, and traditional Chinese clothes. The Flower Drum Song (1961) was made into a motion picture. Though the cast was not all Chinese, it was the first musical and motion picture to be about a Chinese American family in Chinatown. Bruce Lee became a big international kung fu superstar, and his fame within Chinese America remains. To combat the negative stereotypes and racialized images of Chinese Americans in
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entertainment, Chinese American filmmaker Wayne Wang, among others, made his own film, the best known being the adaptation of the best-selling novel by Chinese American author Amy Tan, The Joy Luck Club (1993). Recently, Justin Lin, a Taiwanese American filmmaker, independently funded and directed Better Luck Tomorrow (2002). Better Luck Tomorrow was very popular among Asian American youths because it portrayed Asian American overachievers who were involved in petty crime and material excess. Maya Ying Lin is a Chinese American architect and sculptor who is best known for designing the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the Washington Mall. I. M. Pei is another world-famous Chinese American architect best known for his sleek modernist steel and glass skyscrapers. Vera Wang is a popular fashion designer based in New York. Vera Wang became popular with her luxurious high-end wedding dresses. In addition, there are a lot of great Chinese American literary figures: Jade Snow Wong (author of Fifth Chinese Daughter [1950]), Maxine Hong Kingston (author of Women Warrior: Memoirs of a Girlhood Among Ghosts [1976]), Amy Tan (author of The Joy Luck Club [1989]), and Shawn Wong (author of Homebase [1979]), just to name a few. They have all explored the meaning of being Chinese in America and the complex issues of cultural identity and generational conflicts.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Second and subsequent generations of Chinese Americans have less political interest in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore because they identify themselves as American and consider the United States their homeland. Generally speaking Chinese Americans, especially recent immigrants from China, tend to favor American presidents who have actively promoted diplomatic relations with China. Taiwanese Americans favor presidents who are public about their support of TaiwanÊs autonomy, regardless of political affiliation. Chinese American integration into American society has been faced with many barriers. While some Chinese Americans have established themselves and achieved their own versions of the „American dream‰ of home ownership, a comfortable family life, and financial stability, discrimination has prevented many from achieving personal and career goals. Historically, Chinese immigrants were prevented from owning land and acquiring citizenship through naturalization because they were not „white.‰ While there are no such laws today, there are still unofficial barriers to success. A „bamboo ceiling‰ prevents many Chinese Americans from reaching upper levels of management, and they are underrepresented in certain industries. Portrayals of Chinese Americans in the media have also drawn upon racist and stereotypical caricatures, such as the evil Fu Manchu, the domineering dragon lady, and the submissive butterfly.
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Paths Toward Citizenship Citizenship and Naturalization Legally all ethnic Chinese born in the United States are American citizens as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1898 United States v. Wong Kim Ark Supreme Court decision. Wong Kim Ark was a Chinese American born in San Francisco. His parents moved back to China in 1890. In 1895, after coming back from visiting his parents in China, Wong was detained and denied entry, based on the fact that he was of Chinese decent, even though he was born in San Francisco. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized Wong as a U.S. citizen because of the Fourteenth Amendment, because he was born in America. It also declared the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act could not be retroactively used to deny American-born Chinese their rights to citizenship. Things did not change for Chinese immigrants until the passage of the 1943 Magnuson Act, which permitted naturalization of Asian immigrants, repealing the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The Immigration Act of 1965 finally allowed all Asian immigrants, regardless of their country of origin, immigration and naturalization rights. Today, nearly three-quarters (70.2%) of the Chinese American population are U.S. citizens; 58.8 percent of them are naturalized citizens. Chinese Americans generally exhibit very high rates of naturalization; however, this is less true among the recent immigrants who have been slower to seek citizenship.
Dual Citizenship Upon naturalization, Chinese immigrants are required to renounce their former citizenship. Mainland China, the PeopleÊs Republic of China (PRC), does not recognize dual citizenship and considers this oath a renunciation of PRC citizenship and rights. Conversely, Chinese American immigrants from Taiwan are allowed dual citizenship because Taiwan allows it.
Intergroup Relations Although there is a lot of diversity among the various Chinese American communities, these communities do come together smoothly because they share a common Chinese heritage and history. Though they may disagree about politics in their home countries, they experience similar challenges in America, which connects them. Although homeland politics, such as the politics between China and Taiwan, may cause tension among first-generation Chinese Americans, it does not appear to have as strong a force among second- and third-generation Chinese Americans.
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Forging a New American Political Identity Early Chinese American immigrants were banned from political participation because they were not allowed to become naturalized citizens. This did not change until 1943 when the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed for military, political, and economic reasons. In the early 20th century, West Coast and East Coast Chinese Americans united to establish the Chinese American Citizens Alliance (CACA) to organize voter registrations among Chinese Americans. The CACA were instrumental in getting Congress to repeal the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act that banned Chinese immigration until 1943. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s drew more Chinese Americans into American politics, at which time the Chinese for Affirmative Action and the Chinese Progressive Association were both founded in San Francisco. They fought for greater political enfranchisement and better working and living conditions. The violent killing of Vincent Chin in 1982, again, fueled many Chinese Americans to become politically active, especially with regards to civil rights struggles. Gradually, Chinese American political participation and identity is shifting from the local to the national, especially in cities where there are sizable Chinese American populations. On the national scene, Daniel K. Akaka, part Chinese and part native Hawaiian, was the first to be elected to the U.S. House of Representative in 1976. Akaka was also elected to the U.S. Senate in 1990. Chinese American Gary Faye Locke was elected the 21st governor of Washington state on November 5, 1996. Locke is the current United States Secretary of Commerce in President Barack ObamaÊs administration. Steven Chu is the 1997 Nobel Prize physicist who was named Secretary of Energy in President ObamaÊs administration.
Public Policies and Political Representation Chinese American political participation is complex when considering the type of political activity and political affiliation. Chinese Americans may seem to be less inclined to attend political rallies, but they are more inclined, compared to other ethnic groups, to donate money to candidates running for office. Chinese Americans also have a strong rate of party loyalty. In 1984, a San Francisco study showed that more Chinese Americans are registered Democrats (36.4%), as compared to Republicans (21.4%). In 1984, Chinese Americans voted for Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan over Democratic candidate Walter Mondale by 67 to 32 percent. In 1992, President William Clinton got 39 percent of the Chinese American vote, while George H. W. Bush received 33 percent. In 2000, 64 percent of Chinese Americans voted for Al Gore, while George W. Bush received 21 percent of their vote. Similarly, in 2004, Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry received the majority of Chinese American votes. Democrats continued to receive
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the majority of Chinese American support in 2008, when they overwhelming voted for President Barack Obama. In the realm of public policy, Chinese American voters tend to be conservative on favoring the death penalty and not giving amnesty to undocumented aliens. However, they are progressive when it comes to bilingual education and universal health care. It appears that Chinese Americans do not vote based on party line, but rather on the merits of each individual issue.
Return Immigration There are intense transnational activities among Chinese American peoples. Most of it is economic in nature as many Chinese technocrats live and work between Asia and the United States. A large percentage of Chinese immigrants from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore who arrive in the United States are armed with well-developed cultural capital, technologically sophisticated skills, and material wealth; these economic advantages make them different from earlier Chinese immigrants. They have been described as high-tech transnationals of todayÊs booming Chinese American „ethnoburbs.‰ They are able to utilize their political, educational, and economic capital to circumvent bureaucratic red tape and benefit from different nation-state regimes by selecting multiple sites for investments, work, and family relocation. This has created transnational Chinese American families, who are „split‰ between China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States. Transnationalism among Chinese American families is also affecting the sphere of politics: In the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections in Taiwan, many Taiwanese Americans traveled back to the island to vote because absentee voting is not allowed, but Taiwanese Americans who hold a Taiwan passport may return to Taiwan to vote in elections. There were approximately 2,000 Taiwanese New Yorkers who returned to vote in 2004; and nearly 10,000 Taiwanese Americans from California returned to Taiwan in 2008 to vote. Scholars call this phenomenon „political transnationalism,‰ whereby Chinese Americans from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan actively participate through donations and votes in the politics of their native countries, especially with regard to U.S. foreign policy. Recently, because China is developing and modernizing at tremendous levels, some Chinese American scientists and engineers are returning to China to take high-status and high-paying positions. For example, Dr. Shi Yigong resigned from Princeton University to work as dean of life sciences at Tsinghua University in Beijing. It is predicted that more and more Chinese American scientists will return to China to work because in China, their career will not be limited by the so-called bamboo ceiling.
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The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Even though the majority of Chinese Americans are foreign-born first-generation immigrants, roughly 25 percent are American-born or American-raised children of immigrant parents. The preponderance of them have grown up in two-parent nuclear families, with only a small number raised in extended families, and even less in transnationally „split families.‰ Exposed to two different cultures, Chinese and American, Eastern and Western, these Chinese Americans must negotiate their two worlds. Chinese immigrant families play an important role in socializing and transmitting Chinese values, norms, and ideals to the younger generation. In these households, immigrant parents expect their children to behave in accordance with the Confucian virtues that emphasize filial piety, respect for elders, self-discipline, studiousness, sacrifice, and hard work. Many Chinese immigrants attach great significance to their childrenÊs educational achievements and expect them to move up socioeconomically through determined efforts, with the hope that their next generation will bring honor to the family and take care of them in old age. A childÊs failure to live up to cultural expectations is often attributed to the flaws of American and Western norms and values, in addition to a childÊs laziness or lack of self-discipline. Structural and institutional obstacles also exist in U.S. society that limit the ability of American-born-and-raised Chinese American youths from acculturating and assimilating fully into the mainstream American culture. The stereotypical representation of Chinese Americans and other Asian Americans as a racialized model minority artificially homogenizes all Asian American communities as being the same, and it is employed as a weapon to incite interethnic racial conflicts. The model minority stereotypes unfairly lays blame on blacks, Latinos, and Native American Indians for not succeeding educationally and socioeconomically because their cultural values do not focus on education, such as the Asian Americans. This line of thinking leads to racial divisions and heightens racial conflicts among ethnic minorities in the United States. With multiple institutional forces that operate simultaneously to pull in or push out second and subsequent generations of Chinese Americans, they find themselves in the ongoing process of defining who they are. Accordingly, they have developed a continuum of identities, ranging from a complete identification with mainstream Euro-America to an adherence to the pan-ethnic Asian American identity. This process of self-definition is full of conflicts and reconciliations. Navigating two different worlds, Chinese American children and youths have already noted that there is a cultural gap between themselves and their immigrant parents, and this gap can translate into intergenerational conflicts and arguments over some issues, such as consumption behavior, dating, marriage, education, career, and cultural expressions.
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Youth Profile A Chinese Cambodian Makes His Way in Chicago Johnny Ngo was born in Evanston, Illinois, in May 1994. Both his parents are Chinese Cambodians who were born in Cambodia. Johnny’s father lived in Cambodia and grew up there until his late twenties when he immigrated to the United States. His mother’s family escaped Cambodia as refugees following the Fall of Saigon in April 1975. Johnny’s mother lived in Cambodian until she was 11 or 12 years old. Both his parents immigrated to America as refugees in 1981. Upon arriving in the United States, Johnny’s mother’s family settled in California, first in San Francisco, but since the weather was too cold for his grandmother, (Courtesy of Johnny M. Ngo) who was used to the tropical heat and humidity of Southeast Asia, they relocated to Los Angeles. Johnny’s father resettled in Chicago, where he was able to find a job in a factory making hearing aids. Johnny has two siblings, a younger brother and a younger sister. Johnny is the oldest and therefore has a lot of responsibilities as he is expected to be a good role model for his siblings. Johnny attends Whitney M. Young Magnet High School in Chicago, and his interests are music, science, computers, and Chinese. He also participates in the Asian American Culture Club at his school. At home, Johnny’s parents usually speak to him in Cantonese and sometimes English. At school, Johnny is studying Mandarin Chinese. Johnny admits that Cantonese is his first language, and even though his parents speak to him in Cantonese, he is unable, for the most part, to speak to them, although is he able to understand most of what they say. Today, Johnny mainly considers himself to be Asian American because he is not just Chinese, but also part Vietnamese and Cambodian. Johnny’s heritage is mainly Chinese, but since he is not fully Chinese, he does not want to ignore his Cambodian and Vietnamese heritage, of which he is proud.
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In the future, Johnny hopes to be able to travel to Taiwan and China. He wants to go to college but does not know what he wants to study because he does not know what he wants to be in the future. He would like to move to California and live with his grandfather in Los Angeles. In his spare time, Johnny likes to explore the inside of his computer. He is also good at computer technology and knows how to get rid of viruses that appear on home computers. He is good at troubleshooting when there are problems on his home computers, which his mother is very happy about. Johnny has studied piano since he was 6 or 7 years old and has been playing the flute since he was 10 years old. He also likes to play Ping-Pong with his friends. In addition, he likes Japanese anime comics such as Yu-Gi-Oh! and Pokemon video games. Living in a metropolitan city like Chicago, Johnny finds it easy to be Chinese/ Asian American. He sometimes gets remarks about his darker skin tone, since other Chinese, especially if they are from the northern parts of mainland China, have lighter skin tone. Johnny is often times mistaken as Filipino and sometimes even Mexican. Most people he meets find his mixed-heritage of Chinese, Cambodian, and Vietnamese backgrounds unique and interesting.
An eight-year-old Chinese American girl reviews homework for her Chinese language and culture class with her immigrant grandfather in Schenectady, New York. (Ellen B. Senisi/The Image Works)
The Second and Later Generations | 331
Youth Profile Traveling Beckons Sailing Tang was born in Riverside, California, in July 1996. She currently attends Patriot High School. Sailing has four siblings: two sisters and two brothers. She is the middle child. Sailing’s favorite subject is algebra. She likes to go to school not only to learn, but to spend time with her friends. Sailing’s father immigrated to America from Hong Kong to get his education. Her mother, a Chinese Cambodian, immigrated to America to escape the Khmer Rouge’s Killing Fields. The Killing Fields is the name of a historical period of genocide in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge regime, Democratic Kampuchea, lasted from April 1975 until January 1979. It would become one of the most radical and brutal periods in world history. There (Courtesy of Sailing Jane Tang) were four years of starvation and slavery. It is estimated that 1.5 to 2 million Cambodians died under the Khmer Rouge. Historians have called it the Cambodian Holocaust, a pogrom of ethnic cleansing and societal reform that still haunts many survivors and their descendants. Sailing does not speak Chinese, although she is able to understand some Cantonese because her mother and father speak to her in that language. She is also able to understand a little Chaozhou, another dialect of Chinese that her grandmother and grandfather use to speak to her. She sometimes speaks Cantonese with her grandfather, but mostly speaks English with her siblings, friends, and even with her parents, although they will reply to her in Cantonese. Sailing self-identifies as being Chinese American and sometimes Asian American. She wishes there were more Asian American actors and actresses on TV and in the movies, saying that it is hard for her to be Asian since there are no role models. She is aware that there are not a lot of famous Chinese Americans, especially where she lives in Riverside. She says that there are not a lot of Asian Americans where she lives, so it is difficult for her to relate to others.
332 | Chinese Immigrants
Sailing’s favorite hobbies are swimming and going to the beach. She likes any sport that has to do with water. She has been camping in Yosemite State Park and has been to Las Vegas, Nevada, several times. Sailing wants to travel to Hong Kong or China one day. She plans on going to college and wants to be able to travel the world and visit all the beaches.
Cultural Identification Living across borders, Chinese American transnationals break down the identification of nation and state. Geographic boundaries no longer solely define citizenship, nationality, and identity. Chinese and Chinese American identities are now increasingly defined more by culture and less by nation-state. Future generations of Chinese Americans might come to conclude that there is no such thing as authentic „Chinese-ness‰ because the notion of what it means to be Chinese or Chinese American is fluid and ever-changing.
Issues in Relations between the United States and China President Richard Nixon made a historic state visit to China in February 21, 1972, to meet with Chairman Mao Zedong. This visit and the Ping-Pong diplomacy of 1971 paved the way for normalization of Sino-American diplomatic relations in 1979. In recent years, China has demonstrated strong support in the United States led flight against global terrorism. ChinaÊs recent economic development requires that strong U.S.-China relations continue well into the future. President Barack ObamaÊs administration has expanded dialogue with China to actively engage the Chinese government in critical issues facing the world today, as well as the prosperity of both nations: politics, military, global trade, energy, climate change, human rights, and regional security, all of which are important for the peace and security of not only China and the United States, but for the world. There are other issues that depend on positive U.S.-China relations, such as American families adopting Chinese babies. During periods of economic downturn, U.S.-China foreign relations must remain strong and positive because Chinese Americans have historically been employed as scapegoats during these periods. U.S.-China policy must also keep in mind U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations, as China-Taiwan conflicts are ripe with potential pitfalls.
Forecasts for the 21st Century Chinese America is very diverse, linguistically, culturally, generationally, socioeconomically, politically, religiously, and ethnically. The demographic indicators show
Appendix I: Migration Statistics | 333
that in the 21st century, the Chinese American population will shift from being predominately foreign born to American born. Issues and concerns over immigration reform and policies will occupy a central place in American public discourse. As Chinese Americans move further into AmericaÊs heartland, interethnic and interracial challenges will arise, alongside community coalition building. Chinese Americans will continue to struggle against negative stereotypes of them as „perpetual foreigners‰ and therefore unassimilable and un-American, especially as China becomes a larger economic and political competitor to the United States in the global arena. Chinese Americans will need to continue to advance themselves in the political arenas domestically to ensure civil rights protection, social equality, educational opportunities, and economic equity in terms of pay. Registered Chinese American voters will also need to address the issue of undocumented Chinese residents when they vote on immigration reform. The Queer Chinese American movement will become more public and visible in the future. Future generations of Chinese Americans will negotiate the complex identities as both Chinese and American in an ever-changing social, political, economic, and global context. Therefore, Chinese American communities and peoples will remain, now and into the future, an interesting topic of research and scholarship.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics
Table 49 Chinese American population by leading U.S. states. Data based on 2000 U.S. Census State California
Population 1,122,187
New York
451,859
Hawaii
170,803
Texas
121,588
New Jersey
110,263
Massachusetts
92,380
Illinois
86,095
Washington
75,884
Florida
59,280
Pennsylvania
56,831
Source: U.S. Census (2000).
Table 50 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Region/country: China Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
64,238
27,989
36,249
Leading states of residence Arizona
499
162
337
17,139
7,471
9,668
616
249
367
1,366
519
847
Georgia
859
343
516
Hawaii
605
293
312
Illinois
1,739
704
1,035
Maryland
1,195
492
703
Massachusetts
2,202
947
1,255
Michigan
711
259
452
Minnesota
524
195
329
Nevada
518
201
317
New Jersey
2,271
930
1,341
New York
California Connecticut Florida
19,921
9,906
10,015
North Carolina
709
245
464
Ohio
774
270
504
Pennsylvania
1,620
704
916
Texas
2,616
1,053
1,563
Virginia
1,126
420
706
Washington
1,474
522
952
Other
5754
2,104
3,650
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
334
Table 51 Chinese American population by leading U.S. cities City
Population
San Francisco, California
160,947
Queens Borough, New York
147,037
Brooklyn Borough, New York
125,358
Manhattan Borough, New York
91,588
Los Angeles, California
73,868
Honolulu, Hawaii
68,849
Source: U.S. Census (2000). Note: Table includes only cities with a total Chinese population of over 30,000.
335
Table 52 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by broad class of admission and region and country of birth: Fiscal year 2009 Region and country of birth
Total
Family-sponsored preferences
Employmentbased preferences
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens
Diversity
Refugees and asylees
Other
Region Total
1,130,818
211,859
144,034
535,554
47,879
177,368
14,124
Africa
127,050
5,450
5,707
45,823
24,122
45,315
633
Asia
413,312
81,218
78,881
168,366
13,536
69,561
1,750
336
Europe
105,398
4,393
23,529
55,844
8,737
10,453
2,442
North America
375,236
106,602
19,839
196,817
437
42,700
8,841
5,578
404
1,075
3,357
582
139
21
102,878
13,665
14,856
64,611
414
8,926
406
1,366
127
147
736
51
274
31
64,238
11,013
11,295
23,244
28
18,486
172
2,651
1,101
657
842
37
7
7
Macau
158
93
22
40
Taiwan
8,038
1,884
2,519
3,372
Oceania South America Unknown Country China, People's Republic Hong Kong
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Table 10).
D 251
D
— 5
7
Table 53 Chinese arrivals in the United States by region and country of nationality: 1999 to 2008
337
Country of nationality
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Region Total
85,076
72,143
68,925
26,776
28,304
52,837
53,738
41,150
48,218
60,108
Africa
13,048
17,624
19,070
2,551
10,719
29,110
20,746
18,185
17,486
8,943
Asia
14,041
13,622
15,356
6,886
5,862
10,896
14,977
9,245
23,195
44,545
Europe
55,877
37,664
31,526
15,407
11,269
9,254
11,316
10,456
4,561
2,343
D
3,233
2,968
1,924
305
2,998
6,368
3,145
2,922
4,177
North America Oceania
0
South America
D
Country China, People’s Republic
D
D
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
8
149
579
331
119
54
100
12
9
9
3
13
21
27
50
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS). Note: Excludes Amerasian Immigrants. D ⫽ data withheld to limit disclosure.
Table 54 Chinese orphans adopted by U.S. citizens by gender, age, and country of birth: Fiscal year 2008. Gender
Age
Region and country of birth
Total
Male
Female
Under 1 year
1 to 4 years
5 years and over
Region Total
17,229
7,221
10,008
5,830
8,218
3,181
Asia
6,735
2,291
4,444
2,517
3,448
770
Europe
3,074
1,569
1,505
282
1,856
936
North America
4,630
2,064
2,566
2,329
1,851
450
12
7
5
7
D
D
439
188
251
92
123
224
24
10
14
6
11
7
3,852
822
3,030
925
2,533
394
16
11
5
7
9
262
133
129
70
41
Oceania South America Unknown County China, People’s Republic Hong Kong Taiwan
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008 Yearbook. Note: D ⫽ data withheld to limit disclosure; – represents zero.
338
151
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 55 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000–2009
339
Region and country of birth All Countries Total China (excluding Hong Kong) Taiwan
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
45,585
56,267
61,082
40,568
55,494
69,933
87,307
76,655
80,271
64,238
9,019
12,120
9,775
6,917
9,005
9,196
8,086
8,990
9,073
8,038
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 56 Chinese American general characteristics Total population
Chinese American population
Total general population
2,432,585
281,421,906
Male
1,176,913
138,053,563
Female
1,255,672
143,368,343
Median age (years) Under 5 years 18 years and over 65 years and over Household population
35
35
149,193
19,175,798
1,913,278
209,128,094
235,995
34,991,753
2,383,622
273,643,273
3
3
Average household size
3
3
Male, now married 15 years and over
Average family size
595,273
60,720,716
Female, now married 15 years and over
640,853
59,510,557
Occupied housing units
803,746
105,480,101
Owner-occupied housing units
469,583
69,815,753
Renter-occupied housing units
334,163
35,664,348
1,662,423
182,211,639
43,600
26,403,703
310,124
49,746,248
Foreign born
1,716,682
31,107,889
Speak a language other
1,943,644
46,951,595
1,280,259
146,496,014
798,828
44,642,605
1,231,698
138,820,935
31
26
51,444
50,046
Social characteristics Population 25 years and over Civilian veterans (18 years and over) Disability status (5 years and over)
than English at home Education High school graduate or higher Bachelor’s graduate or higher Economic Characteristics In labor force (population 16 years and over) Mean travel time to work in minutes (population 16 years and over) Median household income (1999 in dollars) (Continued )
340
Table 56 Chinese American general characteristics (Continued ) Total population Median family income
Chinese American population
Total general population
60,058
50,046
23,756
21,587
60,878
6,620,945
320,577
33,899,812
383,381
55,212,108
(1999 in dollars) Per capita income (1999 in dollars) Families below poverty level Individuals below poverty level Housing Characteristics Single-family owner-occupied homes Source: U.S. Census (2000).
341
Table 57 Chinese American economic statistics 2000 Census Subject
Number
Percent
EMPLOYMENT STATUS Population 16 years and over In labor force Civilian labor force Employed Unemployed Percent of civilian labor force
217,168,077
100.0
138,820,935
63.9
137,668,798
63.4
129,721,512
59.7
7,947,286
3.7
5.8
NA
Armed Forces
1,152,137
0.5
Not in labor force
78,347,142
36.1
112,185,795
100.0
64,547,732
57.5
64,383,493
57.4
60,630,069
54.0
21,833,613
100.0
12,787,501
58.6
128,279,228
100.0
Car, truck, or van -- drove alone
97,102,050
75.7
Car, truck, or van -- carpooled
Females 16 years and over In labor force Civilian labor force Employed Own children under 6 years All parents in family in labor force COMMUTING TO WORK Workers 16 years and over
15,634,051
12.2
Public transportation (including taxicab)
6,067,703
4.7
Walked
3,758,982
2.9
Other means
1,532,219
1.2
Worked at home
4,184,223
3.3
Mean travel time to work (minutes)
25.5
Employed civilian population 16 years and over
NA
129,721,512
100.0
Management, professional, and related occupations
43,646,731
33.6
Service occupations
19,276,947
14.9
Sales and office occupations
34,621,390
26.7
OCCUPATION
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations Construction, extraction, and maintenance occupations
951,810
0.7
12,256,138
9.4 (Continued )
342
Table 57 Chinese American economic statistics 2000 Census (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations
18,968,496
14.6
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining
2,426,053
1.9
Construction
8,801,507
6.8
Manufacturing
18,286,005
14.1
INDUSTRY
Wholesale trade
4,666,757
3.6
15,221,716
11.7
Transportation and warehousing, and utilities
6,740,102
5.2
Information
3,996,564
3.1
Finance, insurance, real estate, and rental and leasing
8,934,972
6.9
Professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services
12,061,865
9.3
Educational, health and social services
25,843,029
19.9
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services
10,210,295
7.9
Other services (except public administration)
6,320,632
4.9
Public administration
6,212,015
4.8
101,794,361
78.5
18,923,353
14.6
8,603,761
6.6
400,037
0.3
Households
105,539,122
100.0
Less than $10,000
10,067,027
9.5
Retail trade
CLASS OF WORKER Private wage and salary workers Government workers Self-employed workers in own not incorporated business Unpaid family workers INCOME IN 1999
$10,000 to $14,999
6,657,228
6.3
$15,000 to $24,999
13,536,965
12.8
$25,000 to $34,999
13,519,242
12.8
$35,000 to $49,999
17,446,272
16.5
$50,000 to $74,999
20,540,604
19.5
$75,000 to $99,999
10,799,245
10.2
8,147,826
7.7
$100,000 to $149,999
(Continued )
343
Table 57 Chinese American economic statistics 2000 Census (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
$150,000 to $199,999
2,322,038
2.2
$200,000 or more
2,502,675
2.4
Median household income (dollars)
41,994
With earnings
84,962,743
Mean earnings (dollars)
56,604
With Social Security income
27,084,417
Mean Social Security income (dollars)
11,320
With Supplemental Security Income
4,615,885
Mean Supplemental Security Income (dollars)
6,320
With public assistance income
3,629,732
Mean public assistance income (dollars)
3,032
With retirement income
17,659,058
Mean retirement income (dollars)
17,376
Families
NA 80.5 NA 25.7 NA 4.4 NA 3.4 NA 16.7 NA
72,261,780
100.0
Less than $10,000
4,155,386
5.8
$10,000 to $14,999
3,115,586
4.3
$15,000 to $24,999
7,757,397
10.7
$25,000 to $34,999
8,684,429
12.0
$35,000 to $49,999
12,377,108
17.1
$50,000 to $74,999
16,130,100
22.3
$75,000 to $99,999
9,009,327
12.5
$100,000 to $149,999
6,936,210
9.6
$150,000 to $199,999
1,983,673
2.7
$200,000 or more
2,112,564
2.9
Median family income (dollars)
50,046
NA
Per capita income (dollars)
21,587
NA
Median earnings (dollars): Male full-time, year-round workers
37,057
NA
Female full-time, year-round workers
27,194
NA
6,620,945
NA
POVERTY STATUS IN 1999 (below poverty level) Families Percent below poverty level
NA
With related children under 18 years
5,155,866
9.2 NA (Continued )
344
Table 57 Chinese American economic statistics 2000 Census (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent below poverty level
NA
With related children under 5 years
2,562,263
Percent below poverty level
NA
Families with female householder, no husband present Percent below poverty level
3,315,916 NA
With related children under 18 years
2,940,459
Percent below poverty level
NA
With related children under 5 years
1,401,493
Percent below poverty level
NA
Individuals
33,899,812
Percent below poverty level
NA
18 years and over
22,152,954
Percent below poverty level
NA
65 years and over
3,287,774
Percent below poverty level
NA
Related children under 18 years
11,386,031
Percent below poverty level
NA
Related children 5 to 17 years
7,974,006
Percent below poverty level
NA
Unrelated individuals 15 years and over
10,721,935
Percent below poverty level
NA
Source: U.S. Census (2000). Note: NA ⫽ not applicable.
345
Percent 13.6 NA 17.0 NA 26.5 NA 34.3 NA 46.4 NA 12.4 NA 10.9 NA 9.9 NA 16.1 NA 15.4 NA 22.7
Table 58 Chinese American educational attainment Subject
Number
Percent
76,632,927
100.0
Nursery school, preschool
4,957,582
6.5
Kindergarten
4,157,491
5.4
Elementary school (grades 1-8)
33,653,641
43.9
High school (grades 9-12)
16,380,951
21.4
College or graduate school
17,483,262
22.8
182,211,639
100.0
School enrollment Total population 3 years and over enrolled in school
Educational attainment Total population 25 years and over Less than 9th grade
13,755,477
7.5
9th to 12th grade, no diploma
21,960,148
12.1
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
52,168,981
28.6
Some college, no degree
38,351,595
21.0
Associate degree
11,512,833
6.3
Bachelor's degree
28,317,792
15.5
Graduate or professional degree
16,144,813
8.9
Percent high school graduate or higher
80.4
NA
Percent bachelor's degree or higher
24.4
NA
Source: U.S. Census (2000). Note: NA ⫽ not applicable.
Table 59 Chinese American marital status (population 15 years and older)
Total Never married
Number
Percent
221,148,671
100.0
59,913,370
27.1
120,231,273
54.4
Separated
4,769,220
2.2
Widowed
14,674,500
6.6
Female
11,975,325
5.4
Divorced
21,560,308
9.7
Female
12,305,294
5.6
Now married, except separated
Source: U.S. Census (2000).
346
Table 60 Nativity and place of birth Number
Percent
Total population
281,421,906
100.0
Native
250,314,017
88.9
Born in United States
246,786,466
87.7
State of residence
168,729,388
60.0
78,057,078
27.7
3,527,551
1.3
Different state Born outside United States Foreign born
31,107,889
11.1
13,178,276
4.7
Naturalized citizen
12,542,626
4.5
Not a citizen
18,565,263
6.6
Entered 1990 to March 2000
Source: U.S. Census (2000).
Table 61 Language spoken at home (five years and older) Number
Percent
Total
262,375,152
100.0
English only
215,423,557
82.1
46,951,595
17.9
21,320,407
8.1
28,101,052
10.7
13,751,256
5.2
10,017,989
3.8
3,390,301
1.3
6,960,065
2.7
3,590,024
1.4
Language other than English Speaks English less than “very well” Spanish Speaks English less than “very well” Other Indo-European languages Speaks English less than “very well” Asian and Pacific Island languages Speaks English less than “very well” Source: U.S. Census (2000).
347
348 | Chinese Immigrants
Appendix III: Notable Chinese Americans Sucheng Chan (b. 1941 ). Chan is a professor of Chinese and Asian American history. She is a prolific author who has written or edited over 17 books. Some of her most notable works are Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (1991), Entry Denied (1994), Remapping Asian American History (2003), Hmong Means Free: Life in Laos and America (1994), and Survivors: Cambodian Refugees in the United States (2004). In addition, she has authored hundreds of articles and essays. ChanÊs contribution to the field of Chinese and Asian American studies is beyond measure and will continue to inspire and guide students for decades to come. Michael Te-Pei Chang (b. 1972 ). Chang, author of Holding Serve: Persevering On and Off the Court (2002) is the youngest American to win a Grand Slam singles title in tennis. In 1989, when Chang was only 17 years old, he won the French Open. In 2003, Chang retired from tennis but had already earned 34 top-level professional singles titles and earned close to $20 million in prize money. Iris Shun-Ru Chang (1968 2004). Before her untimely death, Chang was considered one of AmericaÊs leading young historians and journalists. She authored The Rape of Nanking (1997) and made international headlines. She also provided a meticulous account of Chinese immigration and experience in America with The Chinese in America: A Narrative History (2003). Andrew J. C. Cherng (b. 1948 ). Cherng is a restaurant entrepreneur and inspiring corporate leader. He is the founder of the Chinese fast-food franchise Panda Express. He opened his first restaurant in 1983, serving a blend of Mandarin- and Szechwan-style Chinese food that most Americans will be familiar with, since it is located in shopping malls throughout the United States. Today, there are more than one thousand Panda Express restaurants in the United States and Puerto Rico. Vincent “Randy” Chin (1937 2003). Chin was a musician and international music producer. In 1959, he opened a record shop called Randy Records in Kingston, Jamaica. Years later, he opened a small recording studio and produced Afro-Caribbean music. In 1962, he produced Lord Creator’s, which celebrated JamaicaÊs independence from the United Kingdom. Island Records, the largest independent record label in the world, released ChinÊs work as their first album. ChinÊs success made it possible for him to open a bigger recording studio called RandyÊs Studio 17 in 1968. Bob Marley and the Wailers recorded their earliest hits with Chin. Chin and his family moved to Queens, New York, in 1977 due to political and social unrest in Jamaica. In 1979, they opened VP Records. Shortly afterward, VP Records became
Glossary | 349
the worldÊs leading distributor of music from Jamaica and other Caribbean islands. Michelle Kwan (b. 1980 ). Kwan is best known as one of AmericaÊs greatest figure skater. She has won five World Championship titles (1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2003). In addition, she won nine U.S. Figure Skating Championships (1996, 1998 2005) and is a three-time World Champion (1998, 2000, 2003). Kwan has a silver medal from the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics and a bronze medal from the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. Him Mark Lai (1925 2009). Before his passing, Lai was named Dean of Chinese American Studies. He had a background in mechanical engineering but became a community activist and historian. In 1969, Lai and architect Philip Choy co-taught Chinese Americans for the first time at San Francisco State UniversityÊs newly created Asian American Studies Department. LaiÊs contribution to the field of Chinese American studies and history is immeasurable and will inspire generations of future scholars and students. Anna May Wong (1905 1961). Wong was an actress and considered to be the first Chinese American movie star. She was also the first Chinese American television star, starring in The Gallery of Madame Liu-Tsong. She starred in The Toll of the Sea (1923), and The Thief of Baghdad (1924). Laurence Michael Yep (b. 1948 ). Yep is an author of childrenÊs books. Yep writes about Asian American history, and many of her books are about children who struggle with being Asian and American. Yep has authored over 60 books, including: Dragonwings (1977), Dragon’s Gate (1995), The Traitor: Gold Mountain Chronicles: 1885 (2004), Tiger’s Blood (2004), Ribbons (1997), and the autobiographical The Lost Garden (1996).
Glossary bachelor society: Describes the early demographics of Chinese communities, which mainly consisted of unmarried men. Baihua: Means „vernacular Chinese.‰ Bodhisattvas: Enlightened Buddhist figures of great merit who compassionately postponed their own final enlightenment to save all beings from suffering. Buddha: Enlightened being, the Enlightened One. Gam San: Cantonese for „Gold Mountain.‰ Gam san haak: Cantonese for „travelers to Gold Mountain.‰ Guoyu: Refers to Mandarin, the national language in China.
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Hanren: Literal translation is „people of Han.‰ Most Chinese today consider themselves Han Chinese. Huangdi: The Yellow Emperor.
Huiguan: Chinese/Chinese American association composed of groups of family associations who share the same surname. Jinshan: Mandarin for „Gold Mountain.‰ Qipao: Traditional Chinese dress for women. Shiji: Ancient Chinese historical records. Sojourners: Migrants who do not plan on resettling permanently in host country, instead, will return to home country after several years. Tian: Heaven. Tianzi: Literal translation is the „son of heaven.‰ Tongs: Chinese/Chinese American secret societies. Wenmiao: Confucian temples, literally translated as „Temples of Culture.‰ Zhonguo: Literally translated as „middle kingdom‰ in Mandarin Chinese.
References Chan, Sucheng. 1991. Asian Americans: An Interpretive History. New York: Twayne Publishers. „Chinese Immigration: A Ragged Tale of Riches.‰ 2003. The Economist. June 19. [Online article or information; retrieved 05/19/11.] http://www.economist.com/node/1858 795?Story_ID=1858795. Hing, Bill O.1993. Making and Remaking Asian American Through Immigration Policy 1850–1990. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Pfaelzer, Jean. 2009. Driven Out: The Forgotten War Against Chinese Americans. Berkeley: University of California Press. Tong, Benson. 2000. The New Americans: The Chinese Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Further Reading Chinese Americans in the Columbia River Basin. [Online article or information; retrieved 03/30/10.] http://www.vancouver.wsu.edu/crbeha/ca/ca.htm#earl. The Columbia River Basin Ethnic History Archive (CRBEHA) is a project of Washington State University Vancouver, the Idaho State Historical Society, Oregon Historical Society, Washington State Historical Society, and Washington State University Pullman. Funded by a grant from the Institute for Museum and Library Services, the collaborative project sought to create a database with thematic coherence that would engage
Further Reading | 351 online researchers in thinking more deeply about the significance of the rich primary resources available in museums, libraries, and historical societies. Chinese-American Museum of Chicago. [Online article or information; retrieved 03/30/10.] http://www.ccamuseum.org/. The mission of the museum is to preserve the history of Chinese Americans in Chicago. This Web page contains resources on Chinese American history, and the midwestern United States, with a particular focus on Chicago. The museum holds and sponsors exhibitions, educational events, and research related to Chinese American culture and history in the midwestern United States. Chung, Sue Fawn, and Priscilla Wegars, eds. 2005. Chinese American Death Rituals: Respecting the Ancestors. New York: AltaMira Press. An edited anthology with interdisciplinary chapters on Chinese American death and dying. Friends of the Yee Fow Museum. [Online article or information; retrieved 03/30/10.] http:// www.yeefowmuseum.org/. The Friends of the Yee Fow Museum provides detailed information on the Chinese community of Sacramento, California. Jochim, Christian. 1986. Chinese Religions: A Cultural Perspective. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Introductory level book on Chinese religions and religious development in China from ancient times to modern times. Kingston, Maxine Hong. 1980. China Men. New York: Vintage Books. A seminal work of historical fiction about the Chinese American experience. Kwong, Peter. 1979. Chinatown, New York: Labor and Politics, 1930–1950. New York: Monthly Review Press. Provides an analysis of Chinatown in New York. Kwong, Peter. 1996. The New Chinatown. New York: Hill and Wang. A follow-up to his 1979 book on New YorkÊs Chinatown, with discussions about newer Chinatown communities in New York and California. Lee, Jonathan H. X. 2006. „Contemporary Chinese-American Religious Life.‰ In Chinese Religions in Contemporary Societies, edited by James Miller, 235 56. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Discusses the history and contemporary practice of Chinese religion in America from a community-based perspective. Oroville Chinese Temple. [Online article or information; retrieved 03/30/10.] http:// bancroft.berkeley.edu/collections/oroville/. The Oroville Chinese Temple Web site provides digital images of all artifacts in the temple. It also documents the history of the Chinese in Oroville, California. Pan, Erica Y. Z. 1995. The Impact of the 1906 Earthquake on San Francisco’s Chinatown. San Francisco: Peter Lang.
352 | Chinese Immigrants Provides a detailed discussion of the effects on San FranciscoÊs Chinatown after the historic earthquake and fire of 1906 that gave birth to the „paper son‰ phenomena. Parrenas, Rhacel, and Lok C. D. Siu, eds. 2007. Asian Diasporas: New Formations, New Conceptions. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. An anthology with essays by scholars on global Chinese diasporas. Pfaelzer, Jean. 2009. Driven Out: The Forgotten War Against Chinese Americans. Berkeley: University of California Press. Provides a historical analysis on anti-Chinese violence in California in the 19th and early 20th centuries through primary sources such as local newspapers. Southwest Airlines San Francisco Chinese New Year Festival and Parade. [Online article or information; retrieved 03/30/10.] http://www.chineseparade.com/. Contains information about the history of the parade. Takaki, Ronald. 1998. A History of Asian Americans: Strangers From A Different Shore. Updated and revised. Boston: Back Bay Books. A standard textbook on Asian American history that employs oral history, literature, and other archival material to narrate the Asian American historical experience. Weaverville Joss House. [Online article or information; retrieved 03/30/10.] http://users. snowcrest.net/wb6fzh/tcjoss4.html. Provides detailed information on the Chinese community in Weaverville, California. Has digital images of the temple. Wong, K. Scott. 2005, reprinted 2008. Americans First: Chinese Americans and the Second World War. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Provides a discussion of Chinese American cultural and political identities, during and after World War II. Yang, Fenggang. 1999. Chinese Christians in America: Conversion, Assimilation, and Adhesive Identities. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Discusses the history and unique characteristics of Chinese American Christians and Christian communities. Yeh, Chiou-ling. 2008. Making an American Festival: Chinese New Year in San Francisco’s Chinatown. Berkeley: University of California Press. Provides a critical analysis of the making of the Chinese New Year Festival and Parade in San Francisco, California. This book explores issues of national, cultural, and sexuality identities and politics during and World War II and the Cold War. Zhou, Min. 2009. Contemporary Chinese America: Immigration, Identity, and Community Transformation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Provides an updated study of the demographics and communities of various Chinese American communities in New York and California, deconstructing the monolithic image of „Chinese‰ as one homogenous group.
Colombian Immigrants by Enrique S. Pumar
Introduction Colombian migration to the United States is a relatively recent phenomenon in American migration history. Colombians began to migrate to the United States in significant numbers during the early 1980s. ColombiaÊs rapidly deteriorating political situation, the resulting rise of personal insecurity, and the economic troubles Latin America experienced during the 1980s and early 1990s contributed to this increase in migration. Once in the United States, like other ethnic groups, Colombians tended to concentrate in ethnic enclaves in major metropolitan regions such as south Florida, northern New Jersey, and New York City. In comparison to other Hispanic groups, Colombians represent a much smaller percentage of the overall immigrants residing, whether legally or illegally, in the United States. Moreover, compared to other Hispanics, Colombians tend to enjoy higher incomes, be less likely to live in poverty, achieve higher educational attainment and professional status, become naturalized citizens at a much higher rate, and assimilate at a much faster rate. All of these demographic characteristics indicate that Colombians experience more opportunities for upward mobility and higher socioeconomic status than almost every other Hispanic group residing in the United States. Since 2002, Colombia itself has enjoyed the benefits of a special relationship with the United States.
Chronology 1538
Spanish conquistadores reach the city of Bogota.
1819
Colombia gains independence from colonial Spain as part of the Greater Colombia territory.
1830
Greater Colombia dissolves, and Colombia becomes a sovereign nation.
1899
A civil war starts with the fueling of the two major political parties.
1902
The United States seizes a western part of the national territory to build the Panama Canal. After a revolt, Panama gains independence a year later. 353
Chronology | 355
1948
Another civil war erupts, ushered in by hostilities between the Liberal and Conservative parties. This period known as „La Violencia‰ leaves around 300,000 dead and gives way to the military coup headed by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.
1958
Rojas Pinilla steps down after political negotiations that led to the formation of the National Front agreement between Liberals and Conservatives.
1962
The Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army; ELN), a guerrilla group inspired by the Cuban Revolution, begins to operate in the countryÊs interior.
1966
Manuel Marulanda Velez organizes the oldest and more established of the Communist guerrilla groups in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Another insurgent group, the M-19, takes up arms in 1973.
1974
Democratic elections are held ending the National Front.
1980s
Drug trafficking, guerrilla activity, and violence flourish throughout the country causing a jump in the levels of migration to the United States.
1982
Belisario Betancur assumes the presidency and begins peace negotiations with all guerrilla groups eventually reaching a cease-fire agreement.
1989
President Virgilio Barco declares war against the drug cartels after a prolonged period of violence that included the kidnapping and extortion of political figures in the capital city of Bogota.
1990
The M-19 insurgency takes advantage of a government-sponsored amnesty and demobilization program and agrees to participate in the electoral system.
1991
A constitutional reform gives way to the current constitution.
1993
Security forces kill Pablo Escobar, perhaps the most famous Colombian drug kingpin, effectively harming the Medellin cartel.
1995
Colombian security forces dismantle the Cali cartel.
1998
President Andres Pastrana begins negotiations with the FARC. As part of the peace negotiations, Pastrana cedes a demilitarized zone to guerrilla commanders consisting of about 16,000
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square miles in five municipalities in the central region of the country. 1999
Plan Colombia is unveiled. The U.S.-sponsored plan aims to support political order in Colombia by curbing drug smuggling and building the capacity of the armed forces to fight the guerrillas.
2001
The FARC and the government agree to renew peace talks. The ELN agrees to a cease-fire and signs the Declaration of Havana.
2002
The FARC hijacks a domestic airliner and kidnaps Colombian Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay. Senator and presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt is kidnapped while campaigning in the former demilitarized zone. President Pastrana ends negotiations and cease-fire with the FARC.
2002
President Alvaro Uribe Velez assumes the presidency of the country.
2006
President Uribe is overwhelmingly re-elected.
2009
President George W. Bush awards the Presidential Medal of Freedom to President Alvaro Uribe.
Background Geography Colombia is located in the northwest corner of South America, bordering the Caribbean Sea to the north, Venezuela and Brazil to the east, Peru and Ecuador to the south, and Panama to the west. Its national territory comprises some 440,839 square miles, and in 2009, Colombia had a total estimated population of 45,644,023 or 104 inhabitants per square mile. The majority of the population is concentrated along the coast, especially in the northwest coastal region, and throughout the central highlands. Bogota, the capital city, is the administrative and economic nerve of the country and with a population of close to 7 million is the most populous city. Other important cities are Medellin, Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Cali. The ethnic composition of the country consists of 58 percent mestizo, 20 percent white, 14 percent mulatto, 4 percent black, 3 percent mixed black-Amerindian, and 1 percent Amerindian. With a 74 percent urban population, Colombia is one of the most urban nations in the world. The majority of Colombians (65.4%) are between the ages of 15 and 64 years old.
Background | 357
History of Colombia The path of national development in Colombia could not be more arduous. Like Peru, Colombia has experienced a mixture of structural factors and triggering mechanisms to give rise to the longest operating Marxist terrorist organization in the Western Hemisphere, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC. Also like their neighbors in Peru, Colombian insurgent groups have employed indiscriminative and widespread uses of terror, including kidnappings, bombings, and extortion against civilians, in a sustained campaign to destabilize the government. Colombian terrorist insurgencies have financed their operations by profiting from alliances with narco-traffickers. President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia, like many of his counterparts in the region before him (especially in Peru), allied himself with the United States in an effort to control the flow of drugs and defeat the guerrillas. ColombiaÊs political history is as unstable and violent as some of its South American neighbors. After achieving independence, political forces quickly organized around two rival political parties, the Conservative and the Liberal parties. These inter-party contentions have marked the political life of Colombia ever since. As in other developing societies, these traditional parties represent the middle class and elite while the disenfranchised are left disconnected from and frustrated by the constant political clashes. Conservatives in Colombia tend to identify themselves with the rich and small landholders. They foster alliances with traditional elites and organizations in the country and generally advocate for a strong central government. Liberals, on the other hand, work hard to support a decentralized federation of government and political freedoms, two of the core interests espoused by the urban middle class, small businesses, and professionals. Following a prolonged civil war at the turn of the century, which among other things brought about the independence of Panama, both political parties were able to maintain a tenuous truce until 1930. Between 1930 and 1946, the country experienced a number of reforms inspired by FDRÊs New Deal and the Aprista movement in Peru. However, the jockeying for power soon became violent again in 1948 when the populist politico Jorge Gaitan, a charismatic Liberal Party leader, was assassinated, crushing the hopes of many urbanites for further political reforms. The resulting period of political mobilization and violence lasted for a decade and brought about the only recent military junta to have ruled Colombia. In addition, this period, known as „La Violencia,‰ resulted in about 300,000 civilian deaths and became the most unprecedented violent episode in contemporary Colombian political history. More importantly, the Bogotazo, as the 1948 political disturbance is also known, triggered much discontent among the youth followers of Gaitan. These followers saw their aspirations frustrated not just by the death of their leader but by the
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View from the Granada Hotel looking down Avenida Jimenez da Quesada in downtown Bogota, Colombia. Looters and rioters set fire and overturn street cars on April 9, 1948, during a period known as “La Violencia.” (AP/Wide World Photos)
political arrangement both parties crafted to overcome this crisis and the political repression that ensued. In 1958, towards the end of the ruling junta of General Rojas Pinilla, representatives from both parties met in Spain to draft a bipartisan agreement to share power and end the period of distrust and violence that had characterized Colombian politics until then. Lasting until 1974, the National Front, as this agreement is known, brought much needed civility to the nationÊs political affairs at the expense of popular mobilization. Since the mid-1970s, Colombia has been ruled by a series of uninterrupted democratically elected governments. While the National Front succeeded in bringing about a much-needed political order between Conservatives and Liberals and facilitated the transition to democracy in the mid 1970s, this pact also incurred a hefty political cost for the country. The bourgeoning urban middle-class explosion, alleged rampant political corruption, and the inability of the government to manage the economy equitably resulted in increasing calls for political change. The opening of the political system allowed reform-minded parties and individuals to compete in open and fair elections. Parallel to this mobilization, a band of Communists headed by Manuel Marulanda Velez and inspired by other upheavals throughout Latin America after the Cuban revolution, organized the FARC in 1966. For the next two years, the
Background | 359
guerrillas followed a strict Marxist-Leninist orientation. However, an effective counterinsurgency, guided in part by the United StatesÊ low intensity conflict doctrines of peripheral containment and in part by the re-establishment of relations between Colombia and the Soviet Union, substantially weakened the operations of the group. During the 1960s, the FARC was one of three distinct revolutionary guerrilla groups operating in Colombia. In addition to the FARC, who received aid from the Soviets, Castro backed the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Chinese supported the Popular Liberation Army (ELP). The uprising of these three guerrilla movements was mainly concentrated in the countryside and away from principal cities until the middle of the 1980s. The FARC operated zones in the less populated southern and eastern provinces of the country, where the effects of the conditions of economic deprivation, social isolation, and political alienation were more evident. While Colombia has shown noticeable improvements in many social development indicators, the benefits of these indicators are not evenly distributed throughout the country as areas in the interior showed much lower improvement than any major urban center. According to estimates, in the late 1980s, about 90 percent of the children residing in urban centers between the ages of 7 and 11 attended primary school, while 70 percent from rural areas and below 50 percent in more isolated communities in the southeastern regions of the country received an education. The resurgence of FARC activities after the mid-1970s presented a new challenge for the Colombian political establishment and the international community. It is estimated that the FARC grew from 350 fighters during the early 1960s to as many as 15,000 to 20,000 in 2000. During its second phase in the mid-1970s, the group was not confined to just resisting the governmentÊs counterinsurgency policies, and it spread through the Colombia territory with the opening of several new fronts that eventually amounted to about 70 fronts in 2000. No doubt this new strategy was designed not just to undermine the democratic process but also to assure the survival of the organization in light of the persistent activities of the other two revolutionary rivals, the ELN and ELP. Attempts to mediate and coordinate activities among the three groups failed consistently because of the deep ideological rift that existed between them. Moreover, the FARC came back more organized and had a different military strategy. In 1974, the group established a general staff and a secretariat to direct political activities. Shortly thereafter, the FARC embarked on its campaign of terror using indiscriminate violence against civilians, kidnappings, and sabotages to show the weaknesses of the civilian governments and underscore the ineffectiveness of national security forces. The human cost of the internal civil war is unprecedented. ColombiaÊs chief prosecutor estimates that there are still about 10,000 people buried in unmarked graves throughout the national territory. A group calling themselves Justice for Colombia reports that since the insertion of the terrorist campaign in the mid-1970s,
360 | Colombian Immigrants
some 15,600 cases of forced disappearances have not yet been resolved. Since President Uribe came to office in 2002, there have been an estimated 30,000 still missing. The Colombian Commission of Jurists and the Association of Families of the Disappeared (ASFADDES) has found that between 2007 and 2008 alone, around 7,763 people disappeared. Although the total count of the disappeared is the subject of much scrutiny, it is certain that the fighting between the Marxist terrorist groups and the right-wing paramilitaries made Colombia one of the most dangerous societies in the world. The total number of internally displaced Colombians since the internal civil war started has been estimated to be around 3.5 million. The figure increased dramatically between 1996 and 2002, when it peaked at 412,553. Several factors fueled the FARCÊs terrorist campaign. First, a strategic alliance was forged between the FARC and drug traffickers during the mid-1980s. Until 1981, the guerrillas viewed any association with traffickers and coca producers as counterrevolutionary. Fearing the loss of support from this group to the growing paramilitary forces, the FARC began to actively provide security and protection to drug contrabandists in exchange for taxes and a share of the profits. In addition to the revenues from drug trafficking, the FARC also derived substantial income from extortion and kidnappings. In 2000, an estimated 1,559 people were kidnapped by the FARC. Another factor that aided the guerrillas was the decision by President Belisario Betancur to enter into a cease-fire agreement between 1984 and 1987. The cease-fire allowed the FARC to regroup and increased their operations in coca crop growing regions east of the Andes. This action also amounted to a tacit recognition of the movement. In addition, several attempts by the government to negotiate with the FARC emboldened the organization. Despite the embarrassingly high levels of personal crime that remain in the country since 2000, the Colombian government has gradually gained the upper hand in its fight against terrorism. In 2000, the United States unveiled Plan Colombia, a program that would allocate $2.5 billion in a counterdrug initiative. Taken together with the military aid Colombia received from the United States, the level of American aid to Colombia increased to some $4.5 billion between 2000 and 2005. According to United Nations estimates, coca plantings fell by 18 percent between 2007 and 2008. The American aid signaled not just the unconditional support for Colombia but new levels of cooperation with the countryÊs armed forces in its fight against Marxist terrorist groups. In 2005, paramilitary groups agreed to demobilize. Since 1994, the ELP remains inconsequential and localized in the western region of Colombia, and the ELN has been in and out of negotiations with the government. Thus, the only terrorist group stubbornly holding on is the FARC. The government recently stepped up its campaign against the group, with the announcement of Plan Patriota, a campaign aimed at recapturing the territory controlled by the group and demobilizing its forces. The Colombian government estimated that by 2005, it was able
Causes and Waves of Migration | 361
to reduce the FARC ranks by 6,000. More recently, the group is fighting for its survival after its enigmatic head and founder passed away from an apparent heart attack in the jungle and other senior leaders have been captured. Since 1998 the government of Colombia has attempted to negotiate a peace process with the various guerrilla groups in the county. President Pastrana jump-started negotiations with the FARC in 1998 and conceded five municipalities to the guerrillas as part of a demilitarized zone in the center of the country. Four years later, Pastrana broke all contacts with the FARC after the guerrillas began a new wave of violence with multiple kidnappings including the abduction of two prominent politicos, Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay and the presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who was also running in the election that would bring President Alvaro Uribe to power. Toward the end of his mandate, Pastrana negotiated a peace accord with the ELN called the Declaration of Havana, an accord that included an international verification regime. Since 1990, the government of Colombia has a workable amnesty program that offers any insurgency that demobilizes its troops the opportunity to participate in civil society and compete for office in elections. Thus far, only one group has taken advantage of this program, the M-19 insurgency. Despite the tumultuous path to democracy in Colombia and the grim challenges the growing insurgency represents, the democratic regime in Colombia has functioned remarkably well since the end of the National Front. Elections have been held as scheduled uninterrupted since the mid-1970s; there have been rotation of political leaders in office, until the election of Uribe, when the two traditional parties continued to dominate the presidency; political participation remains steady; former guerrillas who chose to demobilize are now elected to office as part of a popular demobilization plan; and even when Uribe amended the constitution to allow for his reelection, this process was accomplished following the rules set by the constitution. The core issues that remain in Colombian politics are the constant allegations of official corruption and human rights violations.
Causes and Waves of Migration Colombian migration to the United States experienced a big jump after the 1980s. Several factors account for this trend. The most obvious is the rise of violence throughout the country, especially the major cities. The increase in urban crime in Colombia was the direct result of a concerted effort by the guerillas to destabilize the fragile Colombian democracy in one of two ways. One, by terrorizing the base of support for national government among the urban upper and middle classes, the guerrillas hoped to create a favorable political climate and a state of siege that would increase their leverage in any foreseeable attempts to negotiate with the regime. Another reason for the indiscriminate use of terror was to discredit the government by
362 | Colombian Immigrants
challenging its claim to govern. The guerillas hoped to encourage people to question the capacity of the government to safeguard the security and livability of cities, particularly the capital. Before this campaign, fighting with guerrillas mostly took place in the interior of the country and was not an everyday concern for the majority of the people living in or around major metropolitan regions. Violence in Colombia was widespread, and the guerrillas were only one of the parties to this conflict as the growth of right-wing paramilitary groups contributed to the increase in violence. Personal insecurity also resulted as a byproduct of the transformation of drug production in Colombia. In the 1980s, ColombiaÊs drug exports increasingly became associated with cocaine. The business of cocaine trade adversely impacted levels of violence because it had larger profit margins. Cocaine also required a more sophisticated production network and export mechanisms that required large labor and entrepreneurial forces. As a result, a continuous cycle of violence between cartels, particularly the Medellin and Cali cartels, developed. Revenues from drug trafficking also spilled over into the political arena thus compromising the effectiveness of security forces that were supposed to protect citizens. The high levels of political corruption associated with drug money further aggravated this sense of despair. Despite concerted efforts by the government of Colombia to combat corruption, as was evident with the enactment of a new constitution in 1991 that set the regulatory norms behind the National Integrity System, the country was ranked 70th in the world in 2008 by Transparency International with a corruption perception index of 3.8 out of 10. In addition to the national compulsions experienced by the nation, the effects of the debilitating economic depression that hit the region during the 1980s also adversely affected Colombians. The vulnerability of Colombians to the effects of economic deprivation caused by exogenous spillovers from the external crisis was evident in the jump of the national poverty rate. According to United States Agency for International Development (USAID) data, the countryÊs poverty rate increased by almost 14 percent during the 1980s from 42.3 percent in 1980 to 56.1 percent in 1991. During the mid-1990s, the high toll of the internal war affected the economy causing a sharp drop in the gross domestic product (GDP) and elevated the unemployment rate to double digits.
Demographic Profile In the United States, the majority of Colombian immigrants (67%) reside in New York, New Jersey, and Florida. As of 2009, very few Colombians tended to migrate to southwestern states or states on the West Coast, with the exception of Texas and California, and practically none migrate to the northern plains or the Pacific Northwest (see Table 64). In the Midwest, the largest concentrations live in or around
Demographic Profile | 363
Chicago. This residential distribution is consistent with other migrants from the Caribbean basin and historical and social network ties sustain it. In the 19th century, when Latin Americans were fighting for independence against Spain, large communities of political exiles formed in New York City, Florida, and Philadelphia. These enclaves played a significant role fostering financial support for independence struggle and galvanizing political support for the insurgents abroad. The Colombian community residing in the United States shares many demographic characteristics with other Latino residents. According to the 2000 Census, Colombians are about four years older than the average Latino, are slightly less likely to speak some English at home, have similar gender breakdowns, tend to live in married households, and are as stationary as other Latinos. However, when one takes into consideration socioeconomic status, the evidence of the effects of the civil war begins to become evident. Colombians are more likely to have completed college and earn professional degrees, are 15 percent more likely to hold whitecollar jobs, are about 10 times more likely to be in the middle and upper classes, and are about six times less likely to live in poverty despite having similar levels
Marta Ballesteros holds a stack of freshly made tortillas as she poses with her husband Alberto Piedrahita, at their tortilla business in southwest Miami-Dade County in Florida, January 31, 2006. The couple emigrated from Colombia and opened the business out of their garage in the mid-1990s. By 2006 they were selling about 31 million tortillas a year to supermarkets and restaurants throughout southern Florida. (AP Photo/Lynne Sladky)
364 | Colombian Immigrants
The majority of Colombians who landed in the United States arrived before 1990 (44.3%). The percentage of Colombians residing in the states has declined steadily from 32.6 percent between 1990 and 1999 to 23.1 percent after 2000. Colombians enjoy one of the highest levels of educational attainment among Latinos with 29.4 percent of them graduating from college. After Cuban Americans, Colombians show the highest percentage of home ownership; almost half own their own home.
of labor force participation as other Latinos. Recent Homeland Security statistics show that the number of Colombians obtaining legal permanent resident status in the United States has almost doubled between 2000 and 2009. The reason for this contradictory profile is that Colombians are usually political migrants who leave their homes in search of peace and stability. This population is more diverse and tends to have higher levels of human capital than economic migrants who migrate primarily in search of jobs. Given the economic structure of Latin America today, many of the economic migrants come from the lower end of the labor force, those who could not find jobs in the competitive and increasingly more depleted pools of jobs in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. The significance of the transferability of human capital among migrant communities should not be underestimated. When one compares Colombians to others Latin migrants, it is evident that the former tend to occupy jobs that demand higher levels of education and human capital accumulation. Hence, the number of Colombians employed in professional, scientific, management, administrative, finance, education, and health surpasses other Latinos. In addition, all the economic indicators also point to one startling fact, Colombians score better than other LatinAmerican migrants in any of the measurements related to poverty whether it is household composition or a specific demographic population group. These statistics indicate that Colombians tend to economically outperform their counterparts.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Colombian cultural rituals are among the most colorful in Latin America. This rich diversity of culture relates to how different geographical regions of the country immerse themselves in the Spanish colonial heritage. This cultural diversity manifests itself in the culinary templates, festivals, and even the music of the country. Colombians residing in the United States, proud of their regional identity, have attempted
Adjustment and Adaptation | 365
to replicate cultural artifacts from their own region making their communities diverse and culturally rich. Colombians from different regions of the country share a common history, language, and religion while retaining their local rituals with pride. The city of Medellin is known for its typical dish named bandeja paisa, consisting of a mixture of meat, eggs, arepa, and chicharron mixed with other spices and vegetables. The region around Cali is popular for its chicken, plantain, corn, and yuca soup. In the capital and the central Andean region, the ajiaco is the traditional dish. Along the northern coast, spicy cooking and fish are common. The plains are known for their selection of meats. In the Amazonas, the cuisine is influenced by Amerindian Brazilian and Peruvian traditions and reflects the mix of cultures as well as the ecology in the region. Colombians showcase their culture through different parades that are supposed to represent many of the local festive carnivals through the country. Because the demographic composition of Colombian communities tends to be a collage of different regions, festive parades represent the cultural identity of all community groups and organizations. Usually, Colombians celebrate national holidays such as the traditional Day of the Three Kinds or Colombian Independence Day on July 20, and they join in major Latino celebrations in their respective communities, for example, the El Desfile de la Hispanidad in New York City or the Orange Bowl Parade in south Florida. Among the typical types of Colombian music celebrated in the United States, the Vallenato and the Cumbia are the most popular. The Vallenato is a traditional rhythm that originated on the northern coastal region that mixes traditional and Caribbean beats. This genre is built around three instruments, the accordion, the guiro, and the caja. More contemporary performers, like Carlos Vives, mixes the traditional Vallenato with pop. This genre was considered for many years a lower-class popular music performed in carnivals and parties but today its popularity has penetrated all social strata and groups. The other musical and folk dance is the Cumbia, a very popular genre in the central and southern regions of the country. Cumbia rhythms reflect the interactions of three distinct cultural traditions, African, Amerindian, and European. This music originated around the city of Cartagena as a courtship ritual before it made its way to the center of the country.
Family and Changing Gender Relations The notion of family for Colombians, like for most Latinos, comprises the immediate and extended family. Despite the importance of the extended family in Colombian culture, very few extended families have managed to migrate together and live near each other in the United States. It is fairly common to see traditional notions of the family split between the United States and Colombia and to see second-generation
366 | Colombian Immigrants
immigrants break away from family ties and living in states and cities away from their parents. In 2004, Colombians enjoyed one of the highest percentages of married couples (50%). The percentage of female households without husbands was 16.3 and the percentage of male households without wives was 6.6. These percentages are among the lowest of any Latino group except Cuban Americans. Finally, the average household size was comparable to that of other Latino groups. Perhaps one of the reasons for keeping the family unit together despite the intricacies associated with the migration exodus is the influence of the Catholic Church. Colombia has one of the most conservative church establishments anywhere in Latin America with one of the highest percentages of loyal churchgoers despite espousing its share of activist priests, including some who advocated liberation theology. Among first-generation families, gender roles seem to follow similar characteristics as in other Latin-American migrant households. The division of labor in these households tends to be organized along traditional lines with women participating both in the formal economy and carrying out most of the unremunerated activities as well. Among these families, however, women participate in civic activities in large numbers. This follows a long-standing effort by Colombian authorities to promote the participation of women in community programs. In Colombia, womenÊs rights groups count the support of many women. The longer these families reside in the United States, the more traditional conceptions of gender roles tend to dissipate. This has a lot to do with the changing value systems these families encounter once they settle in or around major cities and the physical, temporal, and cultural distance they experience from their hometowns. Although Colombians generally seem to be very urbane, traditional gender roles among first-generation families show in a variety of ways. In education, women focus on fields with traditionally large concentrations of women professionals such as health, education, social work, and other vocational training, whereas men are disproportionately represented in the hard sciences such as medicine. Colombian women generally earn less than men, and the majority of women tend to concentrate on occupations requiring lower entry barriers. Part of the reason for this pattern is a legacy of the gender disparities in education and labor force participation. Between 1995 and 1998, levels of enrollment between men and women 18 years of age or older were fairly similar in Colombia. The big discrepancy was between enrollment dispersion between men and women in urban and rural areas. Despite this trend, gender accounted for the different career and vocational paths of graduates.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity There are many indications that Colombians residing in the United States maintain a strong sense of cultural identity built by transnational ties with their homeland. One indication of the close cultural identity in the Colombian community is that
Adjustment and Adaptation | 367
despite their high socioeconomic status, Colombians residing in the United States still retain their native language. Evidence suggests that although the majority of Colombians speak at least some English at home, the language of choice continues to be Spanish. In addition, they maintain close ties with their homeland because of the frequent availability of travels and communication. Many of these contacts are facilitated by programs sponsored or created by Colombian government agencies in recognition of the growing significance of the Colombian community in the United States. The Colombian Foreign Minister created the Colombia nos Une (Colombia Unites Us) program to reach out to Colombian migrants. As part of this program, a Web platform named Redes Colombia was created for the purpose of „offering possibilities for contacts, cooperation and participation to foster social contacts among Colombians via the internet‰ (Redes Colombia). The Web site also promotes a service of free telephone calls for migrants who want to call relatives back home. In addition, the ministry opened an office in the capital city to welcome migrants that decide to return and settle back in the country.
New York governor George Pataki (center right) stands with officials from New York’s Colombian community after presenting a proclamation declaring July 27 as Colombian Day in New York State, July 25, 2003. Valentina Upegui, Queen of the Colombian Day Parade, and Rafael Castelar, president of the Colombian Cultural Center, presented Pataki with a model of a typical Colombian house. (AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews)
368 | Colombian Immigrants
More evidence in support of these ongoing transnational links is the amount of remittances sent home by Colombians residing abroad. According to a study by the Latin American Economic System (2005), from1998 to 2005, the value of remittances sent home had steadily increased. In 2003, the country received a total of $3 billion in remittances, surpassing the revenues from all major exports. Other mechanisms that strengthen the sense of national culture and identity among Colombians are their participation in national elections. All Colombians, whether they reside in the country or abroad, retain the right to vote in national elections as long as they are registered with one of the consulates. Citizens living throughout the United States are always encouraged to participate in Colombian elections as part of their civic duty. Through voting, Colombian migrants keep in touch with national events and the political alternatives proposed for the future. Social networks among Colombians are also extensive. Professional associations, soccer leagues, social clubs, and community associations solidify informal social ties among different Colombian groups and reinforce their sense of regional identity. These groups also advocate for the interests of the Colombian community especially at state and local political forums. For example, in the summer of 2009 when the popular singer Juanes organized a free concert in Cuba and was loudly condemned by some Cuban Americans in Miami, the community group Colombianos Rompiendo Barreras from New Jersey came to the performerÊs support with a public advocacy campaign primarily mounted on the Web.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Colombians demonstrate a very high index of civic activism. This is explained in part by their relatively high level of socioeconomic status. Populations with high levels of human capital tend to be engaged in civic organizations because they possess the skills and social capital necessary to run and manage community groups. For instance, the Colombian Embassy in Washington, D.C., lists 393 registered civil organizations throughout the United States with the majority operating in the three states with the largest concentration of Colombians. A case in point is the association of Colombian Professionals and Students Abroad (PECX) founded in 1991 by Angel Catellanos, a physics doctorate student residing in New York City. This association provides a number of cultural- and immigration-related services to Colombians residing throughout the New YorkNew Jersey metropolitan area. Like other Latin American migrants, Colombians have often experienced ethnic tensions with other Hispanic and minority groups. These strains are fueled by the general competition for jobs, economic empowerment, and political power among migrants, and the distinct circumstances of their migration. Because Colombians
The Second and Later Generations | 369
came primarily to escape the intensification of the countryÊs civil war and the economic deprivation brought about by this conflict, the Colombian community possesses higher human capital and income than other Latinos. Therefore, Colombians also defend different interests and tend to have a different general outlook of American society. Whereas many Latin Americans are very skeptical of the United StatesÊ role in Latin America, Colombians tend to support U.S. policy in the region, especially when it comes to fostering peace and stopping the violence brought about by insurgent groups such as those they experienced in their own territory. Colombians also have a long literary tradition. For example, the Colombian Gabriel Garcia-Marquez is the last Latin American to have won a Nobel Prize in literature. Colombians have made major contributions to journalism, both print and electronic, in their communities. Most, if not all, of the major newspapers, such as El Diario La Prensa in New York City and El Nuevo Herald in Miami, and news television programs from both national Spanish-language networks have Colombian correspondents.
The Second and Later Generations There is evidence to suggest that second-generation Colombians tend to follow a pattern of segmented assimilation into American society. As shown earlier, Colombian families in the United States have already attained a fairly high degree of human capital, diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, and social capital that they pass on to the next generation. However, their children are also raised in an environment with loose mechanisms of social control from decentralized family structures.
Youth Profile Outstanding Colombian Athlete at the University of Maryland– Eastern Shore Martha Perez personifies the educational and personal accomplishments of the Colombia community and the intricate transnational links that persists between this community and their homeland. Martha was born in Bogota, Colombia, in 1987. She is now in college, majoring in sociology at the University of Maryland– Eastern Shore. Martha is also an accomplished student-athlete, who is a member of both the Colombian National Bowling Team and one of the leaders of the university bowling team. She has earned Academic All American Honors and Mid-Eastern Conference (MEAC) Outstanding Athlete while capturing Colombia’s National Youth Championship in 2009.
370 | Colombian Immigrants
Colombian immigrant Martha Hernandez of Boston and her twin daughters, Genesis (left) and Paloma, applaud a speaker at an ceremony commemorating Immigrants’ Day at the State House in Boston, April 7, 2004. (AP Photo/Robert Spencer)
Alejandro Portes and Ruben RumbautÊs (2001) longitudinal study of secondgeneration immigrants supports this pattern of segmented assimilation. According to the study, Colombians surveyed from south Florida have a fairly high education attainment status (only 17% have high school or less); the majority are bilingual; they earn slightly above the Florida medium income; and they have one of the lowest unemployment rates; however, the men have a higher rate of incarceration than the general male population in Florida.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Colombia Colombia is an indubitable ally of the Unites States today. However, warm relations between the two countries have not been the norm throughout their history. For many Colombian nationalists, the United StatesÊ involvement in promoting the secession and eventual independence of Panama from Colombia in 1903 is
Issues in Relations between the United States and Colombia
| 371
still a point of much contention. In addition, for much of the 20th century, perhaps with the exception of 1948 1949, Colombia did not figure prominently in U.S. Latin-American policy as the ColombiaÊs internal political jockeying was not much different than many of its neighbors and did not interfere with the political and commercial interests of the United States in the region. Finally, more pressing political developments elsewhere throughout Latin America took attention away from Colombia in the eyes of U.S. State Department officials in charge of the region. More recently, closer ties between the two nations were fostered by a number of factors. First is the common threat that drug trafficking poses to both countries. Starting in the 1970s, Colombia became a major exporter of marijuana to the United States. But it was in the next decade that Colombia was transformed into a major grower and exporter of cocaine destined for the U.S. market. During the 1980s, as the civil war in Colombia reached disproportionate levels of violence, profits derived from cocaine trafficking bankrolled guerrillas and paramilitary militia operations as many growers contracted one or the other for protection. Statistics published by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) bear the extent of the threat. According to the DEA, the number of drug-related arrests in the United States jumped from 19,884 in 1986 to 26,485 in 2008. In addition, cocaine seizure by the DEA during the same period ballooned from 29,389 to 49,823 kilograms. United StatesÊ government sources estimate that Colombia alone accounts for 90 percent of all the cocaine and a significant source of the heroin entering the United States and 60 percent of all the cocaine in the world market. Another factor that contributed to the warming of bilateral relations between Colombia and the United States was the election of President Alvaro Uribe. It is important to point out that before Uribe assumed office, relations between the two countries were improving briskly; however, the United States found President Uribe to be an unyielding supporter in the war against traffickers and guerrillas. President Uribe did not hesitated to widen relations with the United States, seeking more assistance and collaboration in his effort to restore peace in the country and even extraditing drug kingpins to the United States despite internal opposition. More significant has been President UribeÊs shared vision with the United States about the transnational threat drugs and terrorism pose on the Western Hemisphere. Adam Isacson, a Colombian expert with the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C., said that until recently „Colombia and maybe El Salvador were the only significant friends we had left·the only two who would work with us on everything unconditionally‰ (Washington Post June 29, 2009, A6). One of the most palpable results of this close relation has been the continuation of Plan Colombia. An initiative approved by Congress on July 13, 2000, Plan Colombia is one of the largest and most comprehensive efforts by the United States to assist any ally in Latin America dealing with the ramifications of a civil strife fueled by drug money.
372 | Colombian Immigrants
Since the U.S. Congress enacted the Plan Colombia legislation, the Colombian government was transformed from being regarded as a weak and corrupt state to a strong democracy with an improving economy and reduced levels of violence. Since 2000, the U.S. Government has assisted Colombia with a comprehensive strategy that encompasses eradication, interdiction, and organizational attacks with the goal of solidifying the rule of law and the established democratic institutions, thus effectively expanding the stateÊs capacity to handle the menacing threats from criminal narco-terrorist guerrillas and the paramilitary. Since 2002, several violent indicators have been reduced to their lowest levels in decades. According to U.S. government reports, homicides in Colombia have decreased by 40 percent, kidnappings by 83 percent, national terrorist attacks by 76 percent, and sabotages against the countryÊs infrastructure by 60 percent. The future of U.S.-Colombian relations looks bright. Many political leaders, particularly President Uribe, have come to the realization that the United States is an indispensable partner to assure the national security of Colombia as the country faces multiple internal and external threats. Among the internal threats, Colombia continues to struggle to pacify the country and to get rid of drug production and trafficking. Externally, ColombiaÊs recurrent feuds with its neighbors, principally Venezuela and Ecuador, could potentially destabilize its frontiers. In addition, President Uribe at times has been isolated diplomatically and ideologically in regional and international forums from leftist populist leaders elected throughout the region. An example of the security challenges faced by Colombia is the recent agreement signed in 2009 between Colombia and the United States that allows the U.S. armed forces to utilize the military bases of Malango, Palanquero, and Apiay. This could potentially include two additional bases inside Colombia territory even though the government of Ecuador denied the United States access to the military base in Manta. The agreement assures Colombia of its continuous command over the operation of the bases and solidifies a much closer cooperation with the United States in its fight against guerrillas and drug trafficking. Yet ColombiaÊs neighbors indicted the move as more evidence of American colonialism in the region. President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela went as far to mobilize his armed forces in the event of a war with his neighbor.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 62 2003 residential dispersion Estimated number of Colombian citizens residing abroad
4,243,208
Places of residents
48% United Statesand Canada 40% Latin American and the Caribbean 11% Europe
American states with largest concentration of Colombian aliens
Florida 30% New York 23% New Jersey 14% Texas, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Connecticut 20%
European countries with largest concentration of Colombians
Spain 51% United Kingdom 19% Italy 13% Holland 6%
Latin American countries with largest concentration of Colombians
Venezuela 84% Ecuador 12% Brazil 1%
Other countries
Australia 39% Japan 31% Israel 25%
Source: Colombian Foreign Ministry.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 63 2000 demographic profile of Colombians residing in the United States in comparison with other Latin Americans Key indicators Citizenship Naturalized U.S. citizens Not a U.S. citizen Median age
Number
Percent
Percent of Latin Americans
206,300 303,575
40.5 59.5
30.2 69.8
38.6 a
34.2
Speak some English at home
339,250
67.5
74.7
Live in married household
259,900
55.4
57.7
Reside in same residence in 1995
181,535
36.1
39.7
Gender Males Females
230,075 279,795
45.1 54.9
52.2 47.8
28,230 50,270
25.1 44.8
31.0 29.4
190,335 76,075
71.4 28.5
56.6 43.4
Educational attainment High school graduates Graduate or professional degree Occupationb White-collar Blue-collar
(Continued )
Table 63 2000 demographic profile of Colombians residing in the United States in comparison with other Latin Americans (Continued ) Key indicators Income $100,000 or higher Between $50,000 and $99,999 Less than $50,000 Labor force participation 16 years and older Families living in poverty
Percent
Percent of Latin Americans
14,315 40,350 90,335
9.9 27.9 62.1
6.4 23.3 70.4
290,865
62.7
61.2
21,190
14.6
20.7
Number
Source: U.S. Census 2000. Table FBP-1. a This is a composite measure of two categories from the language spoken at home “English only” and “Speak English less than well.” b White-collar occupations include management, professional, and related occupations; service occupations; and sales and office occupations. Blue-collar occupations include farming, fishing, forestry, construction, extraction, maintenance, production, transportation, and material moving occupations.
Table 64 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009: Colombia Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
27,849
11,297
16,552
Leading states of residence 192
70
122
California
Arizona
1,386
518
868
Colorado
119
32
87
548
230
318
Florida
Connecticut
11,139
4,519
6,620
Georgia
1,009
455
554
456
176
280
Illinois Maryland
374
153
221
Massachusetts
788
330
458
Minnesota
118
48
70
Nevada
161
49
112
New Jersey
2,867
1,232
1,635
New York
3,422
1,428
1,994
North Carolina
575
224
351
Ohio
133
52
81
Pennsylvania
384
136
248
1,513
609
904
Virginia
Texas
403
134
269
Washington
150
58
92
2,112
844
1,268
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix III: Notable Colombian Americans | 375 Table 65 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000–2005 Region and country of birth Total Colombia
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
14,427
16,627
18,758
14,720
18,846
25,566
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 66 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2006–2009 Region and country of birth Total Colombia
2006
2007
2008
2009
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
43,144
33,187
30,213
27,849
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Appendix III: Notable Colombian Americans The recent wave of Colombian migration to the United States and their relatively small numbers in comparison with other Latin-American migrants and the general American population make the number of notable Colombian Americans quite small. However, this number is likely to increase in the near future given the relative ease of this group to assimilate into American society. The following individuals represent a few notable Colombian Americans who have already made a noteworthy contribution. Moises Arias is an actor born in New York City of Colombian parents. Arias has appeared in multiple shows with the Disney Channel, movies, and several music videos. In the summer of 2009, he was a sideline reporter in the Little League World Series. Juanes Esteban Aristizabal Vasquez is an internationally known Latin pop musician that goes by the name of Juanes. Juanes has won three Latin Grammy Awards and is one of the best-selling musicians from Colombia. He also started his own foundation, the Mi Sangre Foundation, to help victims of land mines. Orlando Cabrera is a Major League Baseball shortstop who has played with multiple teams including the 2004 World Champions, the Boston Red Sox. He made his major league debut in 1997 with the Montréal Expos.
376 | Colombian Immigrants
Scott Gomez is a professional hockey player of mixed Colombian and Mexican descent. Since turning pro in 1999, he has played with the New Jersey Devils, New York Rangers, and most recently the Montreal Canadians. In his rookie season, he was awarded the Calder Trophy as the National Hockey League top rookie and went on to play in the All Star Game that season Soray Raquel Lamilla Cuevas was a singer, songwriter, performer, and producer. She produced the 2005 Latin Grammy Awards Ceremony and was nominated for one of her albums. Soraya died of breast cancer at the early age of 37 years of old John Leguizamo is a popular actor who has performed in a number of venues and genres including one-man comedy shows on Broadway and several motion pictures. Shakira Isabel Mebarak Ripoll, born in Barranquilla, is a composer, singer producer, and performer of international fame. Shakira has won many awards including two Grammys and seven Latin Grammys, in addition of selling millions of albums worldwide. Juan Pablo Montoya is a successful NASCAR race car driver who finished in the top five in six of his races in 2009. In addition, he and his wife created the sports education foundation Formula Smiles to improve the quality of life of Colombian children living in vulnerable conditions. Edgar Renteria is considered one of the finest professional baseball player in his position, and he has played in the Major Leagues since his debut with the Florida Marlins in the mid-1990s. He has played shortstop for a number of teams in the National League and currently plays for the San Francisco Giants. George David Zamka is a NASA astronaut of Colombian and Polish descent. In October 2007, he piloted the Space Shuttle Discovery mission to the International Space Station. He is a U.S. Marine Corps pilot and a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and the Florida Institute of Technology. He has received several commendations including a NASA Superior Accomplishment Award.
Glossary arepa: Arepas are simple corn breads made from precooked corn flour, water, and salt and cooked on a griddle. Cali Cartel: The Cali Cartel is a drug cartel based in the Southern Colombian city of Cali. The cartel was founded by the Rodríguez Orejuela family and their associates. For most of the 1980s, this group was responsible for most of the cocaine exported to Latin America and the United States.
References | 377
chicarrón: Chicharrón, or fried pork belly, is a typical dish from ColombiaÊs Andean region and is one of the main components of the famous Colombian „Bandeja Paisa‰ cuisine. counterrevolutionary: The Colombian guerrillas designated this term to those citizens and groups who actively opposed the Colombian insurgency. It usually connotes an attempt to stop revolutionary progress. cumbia: This dance emerged during colonial times in the Atlantic coast region of Colombia as a form of courtship. Today it is one of the most popular dance styles among Colombians. Cumbia is a fusion of African and Indigenous rhythms. Day of the Three Kings: The Epiphany is a Christian holiday celebrated on January 6 to mark the revelation of Jesus Christ. In Colombia and other Hispanic societies, this day is a national holiday on which gifts are exchanged. FARC: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia is the oldest guerrilla group still operating on the continent. Despite recent setbacks, the group continues to operate in Colombian territory, occasionally conducting attacks that disrupt the daily life in many cities around the country. M-19 Insurgency: The 19th of April Movement was a second guerrilla organization in Colombia that operated independently of the FARC. After its demobilization during the late 1980s, it became a political party and today still participates in the civic life of the country. Medellín Cartel: This drug cartel operated out of the city of Medellín. Organized by the drug king Pablo Escobar, the network operated one of the largest and most profitable drug trafficking operations in the Americas. By 1993, the government of Colombia managed to dismantle the cartel with the assistance of the United States. National Front: The National Front was a power-sharing political regime negotiated by ColombiaÊs two principal political parties to end the rule of dictator General Rojas Pinilla. For some, this accord laid the foundations for ColombiaÊs competitive democracy today. vallenato: Today it is one of the most popular folk music rhythms from Colombia. This musical genre is native to ColombiaÊs Caribbean provinces.
References Center of International Policy. Colombian Program. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] http:// www.ciponline.org/colombia/index.htm. CIA Factbook. Colombia. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html. Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos F. 1976. Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Colombia. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
378 | Colombian Immigrants Dugas, John C. 2006. „Colombia.‰ In Politics of Latin America: The Power Game, 2nd ed., edited by Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost, 497 525. New York: Oxford University Press. Latin American Economic System. 2005. Migrations and remittances in Latin America and the Caribbean: Intra-regional Flows and Macroeconomics Determinants. Caracas, Venezuela. Report # SP/CL/XXXI.O/Di No 9-05 / Rev. 1 Library of Congress Country Report. Colombia. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] http:// lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cotoc.html. Migration Information Source. Colombia. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] http://migration information.org/resources/colombia.cfm. Office of National Drug Control Policy. Country Source: Cocaine Smuggling 2007. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] http://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/pdf/cocaine_ smuggling07.pdf. Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben Rumbaut. 2001. Legacies. The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rabasa, Angel, and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombia Labyrinth. The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications of Regional Stability. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation. Redes Colombia. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] http://www.redescolombia.org. Transparency International. 2008. Corruption Perception Index. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008.
Further Reading Bushnell, Herbert. 2003. The Making of Modern Colombia. A Nation in Spike of Itself. Berkeley: University of California Press. A history of Colombian national development from independence to the present emphasizing the struggle for democracy in the midst of such challenges as cocaine wars, guerrilla terror, and past political instability. Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos F. 1976. Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Colombia. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. Perhaps one of the more penetrating political economic analyses of ColombiaÊs economic development, it documents how recurrent economic failures undermined the political arrangement of the National Front. Dix, Robert. 1987. The Politics of Colombia. New York: Praeger. A succinct study of political contestation in Colombia through the 1986 election. The book also discusses the economic and social pressures on political development. Dudley, Steven. 2004. Walking Ghost: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. New York: Routledge. A chronicle of the political violence in recent years and its deadly dimensions, which were often exacerbated by the inner fighting among drug kingpins and efforts by the guerrilla to disrupt civil society.
Further Reading | 379 Fals Borda, Orlando. 1969. Subversion and Social Change in Colombia. New York: Columbia University Press. A classic study of the underpinnings of power and the efforts to promote social change in Colombia. Hartlyn, Jonathan. 1988. The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia. New York: Cambridge University Press. The book analyzes the shifting interests and coalition politics from 1958 through 1986 with emphasis on the formation and evolution of the National Front regime. Hartlyn, Jonathan, and John Dugas. 1999. „Colombia: The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation.‰ In Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, 2nd ed., edited by Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset, 249 308. Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener. This chapter is part of a multivolume study of the tensions, crises, and challenges facing democratic regimes in developing nations. Kline, Harvey. 1999. State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Kline analyzes the different strategies and failed efforts undertaken by elected democratic governments to contain the guerrilla war between 1986 and 1994. Martz, John. 1997. The Politics of Clientalism. Democracy and the State in Colombia. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. This studies the exchange of political favors among the elite in Colombia and how political leaders affirmed their loyalty to their respective parties from 1958 through 1997. An underlying assumption of this study is that clientalism sustained the political maneuvers in Colombia since the 1950s. Maulin, Richard. 1971. Soldiers, Guerrillas and Politics in Colombia. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation. R-630-ARPA. This report by Maulin was one of the first and most influential studies of the eruption of guerrilla activity and of how the guerrilla movements operate in Colombia. Mcllwaine, Cathy, and Caroline Moser. 2003. „Poverty, Violence and Livelihood Security in Urban Colombia and Guatemala.‰ Progress in Development Studies 3: 113 30. This comparative study of violence documents how the rising levels of insecurity in Latin American nations undermine poverty relief efforts. Rabasa, Angel, and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombia Labyrinth. The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications of Regional Stability. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation. Perhaps one of the most authoritative studies of the insurgency movement and the governmentÊs battle to eradicate it. The book emphasizes the conditions that gave rise to the insurgency in the 1960s and the tensions between the three main guerrilla groups leading up to the election of President Uribe. Randall, Stephen. 1992. Colombia and the United States. Hegemony and Interdependence. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
380 | Colombian Immigrants A history of the perceptions and misperceptions that ruled Colombian American relations since independence to the late 1980s. Shifter, Michael. 1999. „Colombia at War.‰ Current History 99/634: 116 21. Colombia at war is a study of the political violence that dominates the country with special attention given to the rising violence during the period of democratic politics. Transparency International. 2001. National Integrity System Country Report. Colombia. [Online article retrieved 00/00.] http://www.transparency.org. This report documents the levels of corruption and political integrity in Colombia and its deteriorating effects on the political legitimacy of democratically elected regimes. Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. 1992. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. This is the defining study of comparative guerrilla movements in Latin America during the 1960s and up to the Nicaraguan conflict.
Costa Rican Immigrants by Thea S. Alvarado
Introduction Costa Rica, or the Rich Coast, is a small country in Central America. Formally known as the Republic of Costa Rica, its land mass is slightly smaller than the state of West Virginia. Costa Rican migrants form one of the smaller Central American immigrant communities in the United States. As such, they are often grouped together with other Central American migrants in population data and statistics. However, Costa Ricans have a distinct culture and background. Costa Rica covers a small area, but its people are well-known for their politeness and generosity. Very traditional in speech and customs, Costa Ricans also have a flair for fun and entertainment. Costa Ricans, or Ticos, feel a sense of cohesiveness unparalleled by most other nations. Although the leadership of Costa Rica has suffered many changes in its past, the country enjoys a level of economic stability. Well-grounded social welfare programs have also ensured that Costa Ricans have the benefit of a relatively high standard of living compared to most other Central American countries. Costa Ricans also enjoy a fairly egalitarian society. A tax-funded public education system ensures that Costa Ricans are literate and well-educated. Historically dominated by indigenous tribes, Costa Rica was first colonized by the Spanish is the early 16th century. Although much of its indigenous influence can no longer be seen, the location of Costa Rica affords it a unique Caribbean flair, which is commonly displayed in the art, music, food, and customs of people along the coast. Costa Rica is a popular destination for tourism, and many travelers make the trip to absorb the rich biodiversity. Its unique climate also makes Costa Rica a popular place to retire. Costa Rica and the United States have a long history of trade relations, with Costa Rica supplying a sizeable percentage of U.S. agricultural imports. The United States, in turn, supplies Costa Rica with scholars and a burgeoning tourist market. Quick to help one another in need, the amiable relations between the United States and Costa Rica ensure that a considerable number of Costa Ricans now call the United States their home.
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Chronology | 383
Chronology pre-1500
Costa Rica is inhabited by indigenous tribes.
1502
Christopher Columbus lands on the shores of Costa Rica, in modernday Limón.
1510
Diego de Nicuesa explores the Caribbean coast.
1523
Spanish set up first permanent colonies along Pacific coast.
1541
Diego de Gutiérrez serves as appointed head of state.
1563
The city of Cartago is established.
1572
The city of Cartago is moved.
1574
The city of Cartago is moved again.
1633
English occupy Providence Island. Pirate raids begin.
1723
Volcán Irazú erupts.
1736
The city of Villanueva, now San José, is established.
1820
First recorded export of coffee, to Panama.
1821
Central America declares its independence from Spain.
1823
Residents of Cartago fight residents of San José in the Battle of Ochomongo. San José is named the new capital of Costa Rica.
1824
Slavery is abolished in Costa Rica.
1825
Juan Mora Fernández is elected first head of state. Costa Rica annexes Guanacaste.
1836
Costa Rica is established as an independent country.
1838
Costa Rica formally withdraws from the Central American Federation.
1841
Cartago is destroyed in an earthquake but is later rebuilt.
1847
José María Castro Madriz is elected the first president.
1848
The first Protestant church is established in Costa Rica. Costa Rica officially becomes a republic. Costa RicaÊs first „reformed‰ constitution is adopted.
1855
Costa Ricans fight the invasion of William Walker, an American entrepreneur.
1863
Costa Rica establishes its first bank, Banco Anglo-Costaricense.
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1869
Public education is established for elementary through high school.
1870
Tomás Guardia establishes himself as dictator.
1881
Bananas are first exported to New York.
1899
United Fruit Company established.
1910
Cartago is destroyed by an earthquake but is later rebuilt.
1918
War on Germany is declared.
1934
The Great Atlantic Banana Plantation strike.
1937
Interamerican Highway construction begins.
1940
University of Costa Rica is established.
1948
The military is dissolved, in favor of a national police force.
1949
The newest revision to the constitution is adopted. WomenÊs suffrage is granted.
1963
Volcán Irazú erupts.
1971
National Parks are created.
1987
President Arias is awarded Nobel Peace Prize for his peace plan.
1988
Hurricane Joan kills 28 people in Costa Rica.
1997
Hurricane Cesar strikes, killing 29 people.
2006
Oscar Arias Sanchez elected president.
2007
Costa Rica approves Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).
2009
Cinchona earthquake kills 34 in Costa Rica.
Background Geography Costa Rica has a varied geography of beaches, central plains, and rugged mountains. Measuring just 19,652 square miles, Costa Rica is boarded by Nicaragua to the north and Panama to the south. The climate of Costa Rica is mainly tropic and subtropical. There are three mountain ranges than run the length of the country: the Guanacaste Mountain Range, the Central Mountain Range, and the Talamanca Mountain Range. The countryÊs highest mountain is Chirripó Hill, which rises to an elevation of 12,529 feet above sea level. The majority of the population lives in the Central Valley, yet a significant number of people also live on the Caribbean coast,
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which stretches 130 miles on the Atlantic side. Costa Rica experiences a rainy season between May and November, where areas on the coast and along rivers can be subject to flooding. Limón, the countryÊs main Caribbean port, is especially prone to seasonal flooding. The national average rainfall is 100 inches per year. Officially, Costa Rica has one of the highest areas of protected land in the world. As such, it is host to some of the greatest biodiversity in the world. Many species of birds, plants, and other wildlife flourish in this climate, including several endangered species. In fact, although small, Costa Rica has more butterflies than the entire United States. The largest natural attractions are Manuel Antonio National Park, Braulio Carillo National Park, Irazú Volcano National Park, Poás Volcano National Park, and Tortuguero National Park. Tortuguero National Park is an area of rainforests, swamps, and beaches that is home to macaws, jaguars, monkeys, lizards, sloths, crocodiles, caimans, manatees, and green sea turtles, among many other animals. Although it can only be reached by boat or plane, this park has 50,000 visitors each year. Many researchers and conservationists make their living by studying Costa RicaÊs diversity and sharing it with the world. However, everincreasing tourism draws concerns about sustainability and humansÊ impact on the natural resources. Due to its geography, Costa Rica is susceptible to earthquakes, volcanoes, and hurricanes. Located close to several tectonic plates, the country of Costa Rica is prone to earthquakes. Although most tremors are too weak to be felt, destructive earthquakes strike this country every few years. A large earthquake struck in 1991, measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale. In 1999, a 6.7 magnitude earthquake again
Earthquakes in Costa Rica Costa Rica experienced its most recent large earthquake on January 8, 2009. The earthquake cut off power to most of the residents of San José and destroyed buildings and houses, and residents continued to feel aftershocks for many days afterward. Massive landslides also trapped people living in mountainous regions. At a resort in Vara Blanca, close to 200 Costa Ricans and foreign tourists were trapped at the La Paz Waterfall Gardens Hotel. The Cinchona earthquake registered 6.1 on the Richter scale. This massive natural disaster ultimately caused the death of 34 people and affected thousands of others. Over 200 houses, nine bridges, and 20 aqueducts were destroyed, and the region known as Cinchona, where the earthquake originated, is considered inhabitable. The government of Costa Rica declared a state of emergency, and the United States was the first country to offer aid, giving $50,000 for helicopters and fuel to help the relief effort.
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shook the area. The most recent earthquake struck Costa Rica in January of 2009. In addition to earthquakes, several active volcanoes are also located along the plains. Volcán Irazú erupted in 1723. Again it erupted in 1963 and continued to damage crops and homes by spewing ash for two years. Hurricanes also contribute to the areaÊs dangerous weather conditions. Hurricane Cesar struck Costa Rica in 1997, causing widespread damage and destruction.
History of Costa Rica Christopher Columbus landed on the shores of Costa Rica in 1502, on his fourth voyage to the Americas. The current currency, the colón, is named after him. It wasnÊt until 1523 that the Spanish set up their first permanent colonies along the Pacific coast. There is evidence that that area of Costa Rica was inhabited for several thousands of years before Spanish colonization. Many art forms have been found in the area, dating back as far as 10,000 years. One of the most well-known pre-Columbian works of art discovered in the area is the bolas, or large stone balls, that are still on display today. There were several Indian tribes living in Costa Rica when the colonizers arrived, yet many of them died off shortly due to enslavement and diseases such as smallpox that were brought along with the colonizers. As indigenous populations dwindled, Spaniards brought in Africans to serve as slaves. Their descendants still inhabit the area, yet generations of intermarriage have resulted in many people of mixed race. Costa Rica developed separately from the countries around it. Rough terrain, undeveloped land, and the rainy season made travel difficult between settlements. Settlements were limited to small isolated subsistence farms. With few natural resources to make use of, SpainÊs interests were diverted to other countries. Costa Rica did not obtain its first permanent Spanish settlement until 1523. The city of Cartago followed soon after in 1563, yet it had to be reestablished at a different location many years later. San José, Costa RicaÊs most populous city, wasnÊt established until 1736. Central America declared its independence from Spain in 1821. In 1823, however, residents of Cartago, who wanted to remain joined with Mexico, and residents of San José, who wished to be autonomous, fought in the Battle of Ochomongo. As San José emerged victorious from Costa RicaÊs first civil war, it was named the new capital. The Republic of Costa Rica has had several forms of governance in its history. It was originally colonized by Spain from 1506 to 1821. From 1823 until 1838, Costa Rica belonged to the Central American Federation. It has been an independent country since 1836 and was proclaimed a republic in 1848. The first elected head of state in Costa Rica was Juan Mora Fernández, who served from 1825 until 1833, but political leadership remained somewhat unstable for several decades afterward. During this period, dictators and corrupt politicians would seize power, only to be
Background | 387
overthrown by the next rebel group. Between 1855 and 1856, Costa Ricans fought the North American entrepreneur William Walker, who wanted to establish himself as president. Around this time, many Costa Ricans died of cholera, a bacterial infection commonly transmitted through infected water sources. In 1870, General Tomás Guardia seized control of the government, establishing himself as dictator. José María Castro Madriz was the first president to serve in the Republic of Costa Rica, after the adoption of the constitution. He served two nonconsecutive terms in office, in 1847 1849 and again in 1866 1868. The democratic government of Costa Rica has three distinct branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. There have been several changes to the constitution. The constitution currently in use was adopted in 1949. The elected president serves a term of four years, with the aid of two vice presidents. From 2006 to 2010, the president of Costa Rica was Oscar Arias Sanchez. Laura Chinchilla Miranda was elected in 2010. Costa Rica currently permits its president to serve in office for four years. There is a high level of political activism in the country, as all Costa Ricans over the age of 18 are required to vote in national elections. Although Costa Ricans employ a national police force, there has been no military in the country
Depiction of the Battle of Rivas in 1856. American Confederate William Walker had seized control of Nicaragua in 1855 and then entered Costa Rica. Costa Rican president Juan Rafael Mora gathered a Central American coalition army and defeated Walker at the Battle of Rivas, pushing him back into Nicaraguan territory. (Library of Congress)
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since 1949. The present constitution abolished the army so that spending could be diverted to social programs, such as health care and education. Most Costa Ricans are employed on small farms. Coffee, known as the grano oro or „golden bean,‰ was one of the first and only cash crops established in Costa Rica and is still one of the largest exports today. In the 1830s, dictator Braulio Carrillo gave the coffee plants away for free, hoping to establish a large crop for export to Europe. Many early workers built the railroad system that now runs on the Caribbean coast. Textiles, coffee, and bananas are the countryÊs main exports today; 41 percent of exports from Costa Rica are traded to the United States. Mexico, Venezuela, Japan, and China are also large importers of Costa Rican products. Tourism, especially ecotourism, is becoming increasingly profitable. The United Fruit Company was established in Costa Rica in 1899. It helped to propel bananas as one of Costa RicaÊs chief exports. In 1934, Costa Ricans participated in the Great Atlantic Banana Plantation strike. This strike was one of the largest in Latin America against a North American owned company. Close to 10,000 workers walked out, at a time when the population of Costa Rica was only half a million people total. The strike continued for four weeks. Although the workers were close to an agreement, accusations of foul play on both sides led to another two weeks of violence, with the United Fruit Company eventually backing down. Although the organizers of the strike were punished for their participation, the workers made a powerful statement in protest of unfair wages and abysmal working conditions. The strike today is seen as a pivotal moment in the nationÊs history, driven by the labor movement and communist ideals. Along with tourism and agriculture, Costa RicaÊs economy also relies on the export of electronics, which can be made more cheaply than in industrialized countries. Despite a booming trade economy, however, one in five Costa Ricans are in poverty. They cannot afford a comfortable standard of living. Although the government has, in the past, implemented many welfare programs, funds for social services have been cut in recent years. Free-trade zones have also attracted foreign investors. In 2003, the United States strongly pursued a trade agreement known as the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). By 2007, several countries, including El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic had signed on. Initially, Costa Ricans voiced opposition against the agreement, and public sentiment against the DR-CAFTA is still strong. In the 2006 presidential elections, DR-CAFTA was widely debated. Costa Rica joined DR-CAFTA on January 1, 2009. Costa Ricans refer to themselves as Ticos and have culture distinct from other Central Americans. Although most Costa Ricans consider themselves to be racially white, many identify ethnically as Costa Rican. The Costa Rican population would actually be considered racially mestizo by social scientists today, since most are a mix of Spanish and indigenous ancestry. Within the home country,
Causes and Waves of Migration | 389
many mestizo Costa Ricans look down on anyone of obvious indigenous heritage. There are eight main indigenous groups in Costa Rica: the Bribris, Borucas or Bruncas, Cabecares, Chorotegas, Guayamis or Ngöbe Buglé, Huetares, Malokus or Malekus, and Teribes. Less than 1 out of 100 of Costa Ricans identify with one of these eight tribes of indigenous people. Dark-skinned Costa Ricans are also a stigmatized population. Although Costa Rica had a large slave population, today most dark-skinned inhabitants who live in the Caribbean coastal areas are not descendants of slave populations. There is a sizeable population of Chinese in Costa Rica, many of whom established residence early on, after obtaining work in fields or on the railroad. Most of them today own small shops and are considered ethnically distinct. Many immigrants, both legal and illegal, enter Costa Rica from Nicaragua and El Salvador. Most of these immigrants came to the country as a result of civil unrest or for employment reasons. Nicaraguans typically have darker skin. They, like the Salvadorans, are a stigmatized population. Costa Ricans, even in the United States, might have a prejudice against darker-skinned peoples because of their experience with these populations within their home countries. Costa Rica also has a large population of Columbian refugees. Strife in Columbia and a dangerous drug trade has led many people to flee to surrounding countries seeking asylum. Over four million people call Costa Rica home. This is roughly the size of the population of Los Angeles, or half the population of New York City. The population of Costa Rica is expected to rise to five million by 2025.
Causes and Waves of Migration Unlike immigration from Mexico and most of Central America, Costa Rican immigration to the United States is remarkable in that it has occurred more as a constant trickle than several distinct waves. An exit visa is required to leave Costa Rica. This law was enacted in order to deter child abduction and applies to dual citizens as well as U.S. citizens living in Costa Rica. Most Costa Ricans who enter the United States do so for family reunification or employment reasons. Costa Ricans may seek entry after marrying a U.S. citizen, or because they have relatives residing in the United States. Many younger Costa Ricans will come to the United States in order to obtain a university education and will remain after graduation in order to pursue a graduate education, research opportunities, or employment in high-skill job sectors. Costa Ricans who are employed abroad by American companies may find it easier to enter the United States seeking work. The Costa Rican community in the United States is small relative to other Hispanic groups. Costa Ricans who do settle in the United States tend to live in large urban centers rather than
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rural areas. According to data from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the largest immigrant receiving states during 2009 were Florida, New Jersey, and California. Large Costa Rican ethnic enclaves are also located in North Carolina, New York, and Texas.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community According to the 2000 U.S. Census, there are 68,588 Costa Ricans living in the United States. Approximately half of the population is male, yet there are slightly more female Costa Ricans in the United States. The Costa Rican population in the United States is younger, on average, than the mainstream population. The median age of Costa Ricans residing in the United States is 31. This is several years younger than the median age of the total population of U.S. residents, which is 35. The largest age group of Costa Ricans is 18 and over. Approximately 52,886 members of the community fit into this category. In the United States, there are 4,218 children under the age of 5 that were identified as Costa Rican. Additionally, there is a sizeable population of elderly Costa Ricans, age 65 and older. In 2000, they numbered 3,242. Approximately 30,000 Costa Rican-Americans aged 15 and over are married. The average household size for Costa Ricans is three, and the average family size is four. This indicates that family members may not all share the same household. The life expectancy for males is 75 years; females are expected to live 80 years.
Age and Family Structure, Educational Attainment, and Economic Attainment The 2000 Census reports that 45,376 Costa Rican Americans are 25 years of age or older. Approximately 33,000 have earned at least a high school diploma, and, of these, more than 9,500 have bachelorÊs degrees or higher. In 1999, they had a slightly lower median family income than the total population (a difference of $1,953). The most recent American Community Survey (2005 2007) estimates that there are approximately 110,000 Costa Ricans living in the United States. Costa Rica has one of the highest literacy rates in the developing world. Approximately 95 percent of the country is able to read. Although schools are well-funded, most Costa Ricans do not continue to attend classes past primary school. In the United States, Costa Ricans obtain higher levels of education. Many students travel from Costa Rica on exchange programs in order to attend universities in the United States.
Adjustment and Adaptation | 391
Health Statistics and Issues The leading cause of death for adult Costa Ricans is diseases of the circulatory system, followed by neoplasm and external causes. Infant mortality is close to 10 per 1,000 births. Malaria, although a serious disease of the past, is no longer a major concern, as swift medical attention and education has minimalized its impact. Tuberculosis is still a concern, and the risk of HIV/AIDS, influenza, obesity, and breast and lung cancer is growing. Costa Rica is the only country in Central America that allows universal treatment for HIV/AIDS infection. Typhoid, hepatitis A, hepatitis B, and yellow fever are also concerns for people traveling between Costa Rica and the United States. Water access and sanitation services are good, and Costa Rica consistently ranks high on the United NationsÊ Human Development Index (HDI) and the Gender-related Development Index (GDI). The HDI takes into account life expectancy, health, education, and standard of living measures. In 2008, the United States ranked 15th on this list, and Costa Rica was not far behind at number 50 (United Nations 2008). The birth rate for Costa Ricans is slowly declining, due to public health campaigns and increasing access to birth control and education. Although Costa Ricans have a high standard of living compared to other Central America countries, they are still susceptible to common contagious diseases, especially if they are arriving to the United States from rural areas in Costa Rica. Costa Ricans do not have any higher rates of particular genetic diseases, however, and are subject to environmental diseases similar to any other group of Americans once arriving to the United States.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Costa Ricans value peace; they generally avoid confrontation with one another. They also highly value the family. In fact, Costa Ricans will agree to most anything just to keep the peace, even if they donÊt intend to fulfill that agreement. This act is done with community interests in heart, not with any intentional act of deception. Rather than disagree, Costa Ricans will go along with the status quo and deal with the consequences at a later date. This makes everyone happy in the present, and hopefully, the thinking goes, whatever the issue is, it can be resolved at a later date. This need to quedar bien (stay well) drives social interaction in Costa Rican communities. Birth and baptism rituals in the United States follow strict Catholic guidelines. New mothers are quick to introduce their children to friends and family, who help out with cooking, housework, and provision of gifts. Shortly after birth, a child is
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taken to the church to be blessed by a priest. This first baptism ensures that the child will enter heaven, rather than purgatory, should he or she die at an early age. At the baptism, children are usually appointed a set of godparents. Traditionally, godparents served as spiritual guides who would take a child in should tragedy befall their parents. Childhood is an important time in the life of a Costa Rican. During this period, children are socialized by their family members to take on the roles of adulthood. This is typically also the time when Costa Rican Americans may teach their children about the culture of their home country. Adolescence is a period in later childhood that has recently gained acceptance by older Costa Ricans. Although females have a coming of age ceremony, men do not. On their 15th birthdays, Costa Rican women are welcomed to adulthood with an elaborate ceremony known as a quinceñera. By no means unique to Costa Ricans, this practice is a part of Latin American culture as well. A quinceñera is similar to a wedding in its planning and execution. The young lady will typically purchase an intricately decorated dress to wear during the festivities. She will also pick several young men and women to act as her attendants. Her family helps to make arrangements for invitations, the location for the party, food, and music. Quinceñeras usually start with a religious ceremony. The girl, her family, and guests attend mass before heading to the celebration. Live entertainment is usually provided in the form of a mariachi band or more recently a DJ, and dancing can go on well into the night. Family rituals such as birthdays, baptisms, confirmations, wedding showers, weddings, and holiday gatherings require a considerable amount of energy and resources. These events allow Costa Ricans to reinforce ties with their family members and friends. The rituals reaffirm the solidarity of the family unit and require a considerable amount of time and planning. Many of these events also include a religious foundation. Holidays are a regular occasion for family gatherings, and many secondary events may be interspersed throughout the year. The smaller family units may also have their own informal gatherings for less important events such as anniversaries and birthdays. Weddings and funerals have similar religious roots, both requiring a homily to be said by the priest. Before seeking marriage, Costa Rican men and women must consult a priest to ask for approval of the union. Typically, they are required to attend a workshop or weekend retreat hosted by the Catholic Church to teach them about their new responsibilities. Weddings are usually elaborate events, where extended family and friends gather for an all-day celebration. Several traditional rituals are carried out over the course of the ceremony. The bride and groom may be walked down the aisle by both parents, or the bride may walk with just her father. A groom may present his bride with coins, to symbolize that he will provide for her. The priest will wrap the couple in a lasso to symbolize their bonding together. They may also present a bouquet of flowers to the Virgin Mary as an offering to
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bless their marriage. In the United States, Costa Ricans may light a unity candle as well, to symbolize the bonding of their two families. Traditionally, the mothers of the bride and groom each light a candle. The bride and groom use those flames to simultaneously light a candle of their own, signifying their unity. The tradition of tossing a bouquet was recently accepted in Costa Rica, although its practice was likely imported from the United States. Funerals are also an occasion for family gatherings, with similar religious undertones. Wakes had previously been common practice, taking place in the home of family members. Today, if they are carried out, they take place in a funeral home. The bodies of loved ones are rarely embalmed, unless they must be preserved to allow for the arrival of out-of-town mourners. A casket is typical and can range from a cheap wooden box to an intricately carved wooden or metal casing. Bodies are typically buried in the ground, although the more prosperous may opt for an above-ground vault. After the funeral, the family typically brings the casket to its final resting place by procession, and a hearse with flowers may accompany them. Funerals are simple, and many Costa Ricans choose not to plan their own funeral arrangements before their death. After death, however, the family will engage in several smaller ceremonies to mourn the passing of a loved one and to honor their memory. Friends and acquaintances will put out obituaries in the local newspapers. Catholics will continue to say the rosary for the departed, and a monthly mass will mark the date of death for a year, and then annually thereafter. Older Costa Ricans adhere more strictly to the rules of conduct following a death, sometimes donning a black wardrobe, but younger Costa Ricans demonstrate more informal ways of grieving.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Costa Ricans maintain very conservative nuclear families, where the male is the head of the household. The elderly are respected, and it is not uncommon to have several generations living under one roof; however, the patriarchal family structure is changing, especially within the United States. Increasingly, Costa Ricans have single-parent households, and grandparents are moved to senior residences. There are strict gender roles for both men and women, who treat one another cordially. In Costa Rica, it is not considered impolite for men to heckle women in the streets, and this machismo follows Costa Rican immigrants to the United States, although to a somewhat lesser degree.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity The small numbers of Costa Rican immigrants to the United States allows migrants to acculturate at a much faster rate than those who reside in large ethnic enclaves.
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The Costa Rican Flag The Costa Rican flag can be seen flying on government buildings. It has two official versions. The one that depicts the coat of arms is most commonly used for public display. Private citizens fly the same flag, although theirs may omit the coat of arms. The flag is red, white, and blue. It contains five unequal horizontal stripes. The two outermost stripes are blue, and the innermost and largest stripe is red. Costa Rica first adopted its official flag when it became independent from Mexico in 1823. At the time, its national flag was based on the flag of Argentina, which is also white and blue. In the early 1840s, the flag had just three stripes of white and blue. The large red stripe was added in 1848 to symbolize true independence and civilization. Its colors were inspired by the French flag, which symbolizes freedom, equality, and brotherhood. The coat of arms has undergone several revisions, most recently in 1964. Currently, it portrays three mountains on a green island, in between two blue seas. On each body of water is a ship, and a yellow sun can be seen setting in the background. Seven stars represent the seven provinces of the republic: Alajuela, Cartago, Guanacaste, Heredia, Limón, Puntarenas, and San José. A white banner at the top of the scene reads: “Republic of Costa Rica.” A blue banner above the coat of arms states “Central America” in homage to the interconnectedness of several nations in the geographic area.
Costa Rican immigrants are quick to adapt and acculturate to life in the United States. This may be because Costa Ricans feel little stigma attached to their ethnic identity. Most Costa Ricans identify themselves as white, rather than Hispanic, so they are more easily absorbed into mainstream American society. Since there are so few Costa Ricans living in the United States, however, recent immigrants may also be absorbed into the larger Hispanic culture. Within a short period of time, though, they usually acculturate into mainstream American society. Costa Rican parents typically choose to teach their children English, rather than Spanish, to aid in their acculturation, although a large number of Costa Rican migrants are also bilingual.
Continued Links to Costa Rica Due to the proximity of Costa Rica to the United States, transnational migrants are common. Convenient airfare, inexpensive forms of communication, and safe travel arrangements make international travel between the two countries especially widespread. Almost half of the tourists that enter Costa Rica each year are from the United States. Likewise, Costa Ricans sometimes enter the United States to attend Disney World on their honeymoon, an increasing practice among newly married
Adjustment and Adaptation | 395
couples. Many Costa Ricans residing in the United States maintain ties with their home countries. They are engaged in politics and occasionally make the trip back to Costa Rica for important family events, such as births, deaths, and marriages. Immigrants with jobs in the United States may also send money, known as remittances, back to their families abroad.
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background Although no large national organizations exist in the United States solely for Costa Ricans, there are several large national organizations that exist to provide Hispanic youth with special opportunities in the United States. The National Council of La Raza (NCLR) is a civil rights and advocacy organization for Hispanic youth. NCLR partners with many smaller organizations designed to offer Hispanic youth opportunities throughout the United States. One of these organizations is the Central American Resources Center (CARECEN), founded in 1981. Although originally designed to aid Central Americans fleeing civil strife in their home countries, this organization exists today to help facilitate the transition of immigrant youth to a life in the United States. They provide information, skills, and training to assist youth in strengthening their community. A similar organization operating in New England called Centro Presente focuses on community education and development, leadership, and legal services for Central American youth.
Religion Catholicism is the official religion of Costa Rica: 80 90 percent of Costa Ricans follow the Roman Catholic religion, although they may not attend religious services regularly. There is an indirect relationship between church and state in Costa Rica, although several national holidays are based around religious events. Protestantism, including Baptist, Methodist, Mormon, and Seventh-Day Adventist denominations, is followed to a lesser degree. There is also a distinct body of Costa Rican Jews. Other religions, including Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam, are gaining popularity among Costa Ricans. As is true for many areas around the world, older Costa Ricans are often more pious and religious than the youth. It is often the elderly that continue on many of the religious traditions in Costa Rica, in the hopes that younger generations will continue the rituals.
Language Issues Spanish is the official language of Costa Rica, yet a small population along the Caribbean coast also speaks a Caribbean dialect of English. Residents in larger urban cities will be familiar with English, but few will speak it in the rural areas. Many
396 | Costa Rican Immigrants
educated Costa Ricans are familiar with the English language before coming to the United States. A small number of indigenous rural Costa Ricans speak antiquated native dialects, but these dialects are dying out. Costa Ricans speak Spanish slower and more clearly than other Central American residents. Costa Rican Spanish is often much more polite and formal than typical dialects. There are also several words present in the language that are unique to Costa Rica. For example, the ending „tico‰ or „titico‰ may be added to any word for emphasis. Terms of endearment are also common, as are nicknames based on appearance or nationality. Language schools proliferate in Costa Rica, and many Americans have found work teaching English to Costa Rican residents seeking a competitive edge in business negotiations. Likewise, Americans can easily find schools designed to provide short, intensive courses in the Costa Rican dialect.
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media One of the main newspapers in Costa Rica, the Tico Times, is written solely in English for a mainly foreign population. There are several other large national papers, but several have been criticized as being under the control of the national government. Costa RicaÊs principal national newspaper is La Nación. It contains news on Costa Rica and other parts of the world, and is distributed in Spanish and in English translation in several countries. The Costa Rica News is another English weekly newspaper. It, and several other newspapers aimed at foreign residents and nationals, is available online. A variety of radio and television channels are available for news, education, culture, and entertainment. TELETICA is one such television channel that broadcasts Spanish- and English-language content. It was the first station available in Costa Rica. Another popular channel is UCR, the channel broadcast by the University of Costa Rica. Conexion TV broadcasts sports, and occasionally music, from Costa Rica and abroad. Pop, oldies, and modern rock dominate a multiplicity of highquality radio stations. Radio Reloj and Radio Monumental are two well-known choices. Many Costa Rican radio stations are available worldwide, as they are also broadcast on the Internet.
Celebration of National Holidays Many of the national holidays in Costa Rica are based on religious holidays. National holidays are seen as a period of rest and fun, and are typically centered on the family. Buses, banks, offices, and businesses typically close down for national holidays. Semana Santa, or the Holy Week, is celebrated the week before Easter. Many Costa Ricans take this time for vacationing, and head to the beach for relaxation. Christmas through New Years is often a period for vacationing as well,
Adjustment and Adaptation | 397
although most employers do not formally give the entire period off. Other notable holidays include March 19, St. JosephÊs Day, and April 11, Juan Santamaria Day. St. Joseph is considered the Catholic patron saint of San José, Costa RicanÊs largest city. Juan Santamaria is a national hero, remembered for his victory in 1856 at the battle of Rivas against William Walker, the American who wanted to establish himself as president of Costa Rica. Costa Ricans celebrate Labor Day on May 1, which is known as the Dia de los Trabajadores, or the Day of the Workers. In July, Guanacaste Day is celebrated to mark the annexation of Guanacaste from Nicaragua. In August, Virgin of Los Angeles Day is celebrated to pay homage to the patron saint of Costa Rica, La Negrita. On this day, special masses take place and a procession runs from San José to the Basilica of Cartago. Religious pilgrims migrate to celebrate this mass at Cartago. Later in the month, Costa Ricans celebrate MotherÊs Day and the Feast of the Assumption. Independence Day is the next large national holiday, during which time large parades celebrate Costa RicaÊs independence from Spain. In 2021, Costa Rica will celebrate its 200th year of independence. In October, the Dia de la Raza, also known as Columbus Day, is celebrated in Limón. It follows a week of carnival on the Caribbean coast. Dia de los Muertos, or All SoulÊs Day, is a commonly celebrated holiday in many Central and Latin American nations. Catholic masses are a common occurrence on this day. Many Costa Ricans make the trip to visit the gravesites of loved ones, and alters are set up in remembrance of family and friends that have passed. The celebration of national holidays allows Costa Ricans to retain a sense of national culture and identity, wherever they may be living.
Independence Day The biggest celebrations in Costa Rica are held each year on September 15. This national holiday commemorates the day when Costa Ricans won independence from Spain in 1821, although Costa Rica did not become fully independent until 1838. On September 13, a traditional torch-lighting ceremony takes place, where it is passed from the border to the nation’s capital, San José. Costa Ricans also carry decorative lanterns for a march down the main streets. Celebrations may start on the previous evening with large parades. It is not uncommon to hear the national anthem sung as people proudly wave the Costa Rican flag. Children in the community commonly participate in the festivities by marching and baton twirling. Girls may take on a more traditional garb, with colorful, full-length skirts made for dancing. Salsa, meringue, and calypso are popular dances for the celebration. Other activities may also be scheduled, and businesses, government offices, and schools close for the festivities. It is in San José where the largest parades can be seen, although the entire country joins in on the merriment and celebration.
398 | Costa Rican Immigrants
Following is a list of Costa Rican holidays. The dates for Holy Week/Semana Santa, Holy Thursday, and Easter change each year between March and April. January 1 March 19 April 11 May 1 June (date varies) June 29 July 25 August 2 August 15 September 15 October 12 November 2 December 24 December 25
New YearÊs Day St. JosephÊs Day Juan Santamaria Day Labor Day Corpus Christi St. Peter and St. PaulÊs Day Guanacaste Day Lady of the AngelsÊ Day MotherÊs Day/Assumption Independence Day Dia de la Raza/Columbus Day All SoulÊs Day Christmas Eve Christmas Day
Foodways The most common food staples in Costa Rican cuisine are rice and black beans. Known as gallo pinto, this is most typically eaten for breakfast but can be consumed with meals throughout the day. Tamales are also popular for special occasions, such as family gatherings and holidays. Beef, fish, and chicken are the most popular meat entrees. Most meals are simple and reasonably priced, with a home-cooked flair. Areas with a Caribbean influence may also add coconut dishes to their menu. Fruit is the most popular dessert, although pastries, flan, and ice cream may also be served. Common drinks in Costa Rica include horchata, made of corn meal or rice flavored with cinnamon, and fruit-flavored fresco de frutas. Chan, made of seeds and mixed with water and syrup, is another common beverage. Guaro is an alcoholic drink that is nearly tasteless but very potent. Originally, guaro was made from sugar cane, but this term can also be used in Costa Rica to describe any alcoholic beverage. Although most of the best coffee is exported, it is still a popular drink for Costa Ricans. It is typically served very strong with hot milk. Local wines are typically made from fruit, not grapes, and beer is also very popular.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Literature from Costa Rica has never reached the acclaim of more well-known Mexican writers, yet several contemporary literary works show promise for revitalization. Dancing, however, is very popular among all Costa Ricans. Dance moves, whether for entertainment or traditional ceremonies, show African, indigenous, and
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 399
Caribbean flavor. Folkloric dancing is also widely performed. Many Costa Ricans are absorbed into mainstream American entertainment culture. Within Costa Rica and the United States, youth listen to popular American rap and pop artists. Hard rock and reggae are also well-liked tunes for Costa Ricans. The National Symphony Orchestra has received acclaim in recent years as well. Several museums showcase Costa Rican artistry. Although most of the pre-Columbian art was focused on crafts, photography, painting, and sculpture have come to the forefront in recent years. Most Costa Rican art features landscape scenes or abstract portrayals of everyday life. Craftwork has recently bolstered a cultural revolution for Costa Ricans. Pottery, ceramics, baskets, and engravings are common wares seen in tourist areas. Leather purses and jewelry are also popular trinkets. Contoured bowls, serving dishes, and oxcarts are among the most detailed forms of local art, and some craftsmen will grant access to their shops as they practice their craft. Sadly, indigenous art is often difficult to find in the present day. In 1992, the International Art Festival began to showcase art from around the world. The art festival takes place in the nationÊs capital, San José. During the festival, drama, dance, and music take center stage. The Costa Rica Art Festival, or Festival Internacional de las Artes, showcases more than 5,000 artists and is growing each year. Many countries take place in the festivities, which include parades, music, dance, theater, opera, film, and other activities. The Costa Rican government invests over a million dollars annually in this week-long event. Most of the events take place in the open air, but other exhibits may be featured in smaller nearby venues. In 2008, China was the guest of honor. The event attracts close to a million people, looking for a low-cost yet exhilarating cultural experience. Also located in San José, the National Theatre hosts shows several times per week. First constructed in 1897 during the booming coffee economy, the theater is now a national monument due to its exquisite furnishings and ceiling murals. Costa Rican rodeos and bullfights are also popular, as are the large parades. Some of the largest parades occur at the end of the year, in November and December. The Oxcart Parade features colorful and intricately decorated carts. Many of them are hand painted and can be seen as they are hauled through the streets. The oxcart is a popular symbol of Costa Rican culture, as they were previously used to haul coffee beans from location to location. Another large festival is the Festival of the Light. This event takes place in San José annually and tends to draw large crowds of people.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture According to the U.S. Census (2000), from 1996 to 2005, 14,514 immigrants born in Costa Rica became naturalized citizens of the United States. Although Costa
400 | Costa Rican Immigrants
Ricans predominantly enter the United States legally, naturalization rates are quite low when compared to other countries, as many Costa Ricans prefer to return to their country of origin after a period of residence in the United States. Costa Rican citizens enter the United States under travel visas at large rates. The census also reports that from 1996 to 2005, between 119,053 and 171,867 Costa Ricans entered the United States using non-immigrant I-94 visas. In 2005, 160,270 Costa Rican citizens obtained entry. Of these, 148,682 entered as tourists and business travelers and 11,588 Costa Rican citizens entered under different categories of admission, as students, temporary workers, diplomats, or other classes. Although strong political organizations exist in Costa Rica as well as the United States, there are no well-known political organizations established solely for Costa Ricans residing in the United States. Rather, Costa Ricans are more apt to enter mainstream American political organizations or to join organizations directed toward Hispanic or Latino youth in the United States. Costa Ricans can acquire citizenship through naturalization, through birth, through marriage, or through family status, if one of their parents is a U.S. citizen. Since June 27, 1995, the governments of Costa Rica and the United States have permitted dual citizenship agreements between the two countries. Costa Ricans are permitted to retain their Costa Rican citizenship upon naturalization in the United
Costa Rican immigrant family, parents Marvin and Marina Gonzalez and their daughter Marie, pose in Washington, D.C., on June 28, 2005. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security ordered the immediate deportation of the two parents on July 5, 2005, but gave Marie a one-year reprieve. Marie Gonzalez, 19, who was voted Latina of the Year in 2004, has lived illegally in the United States with her family since she was five. (Nicholas Kamm/AFP/Getty Images)
The Second and Later Generations | 401
States, thus taking on the rights and responsibilities of both countries. Dual citizenship allows Costa Ricans to retain their nationality, while also expressing their loyalty to the ideals of the United States. Dual citizenship has legal as well as personal ramifications: dual citizens are permitted to travel freely between the two countries but are subject to the laws of both.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Of the Costa Ricans living in the United States in the year 2000, 50,920 are foreign born and 17,668 of the Costa Ricans born in the United States still self-identify as ethnically Costa Rican, even though they are considered U.S. citizens by birth. Of the total population, close to 56,000 speak a language other than English at home, most likely Spanish (U.S. Census Bureau 2005 2007). The small numbers of Costa Ricans and people of Costa Rican descent in the United States make it difficult for second and later generations to retain a distinctly Costa Rican ethnic identity. Although Costa Ricans, on average, obtain high levels of educational attainment while in the United States, their cultural identification remains ambiguous. Most Costa Ricans are absorbed into the mainstream American culture. A small, but significant, number of them may also identify with other Hispanic Americans.
Educational Attainment Costa Ricans are one of the smaller immigrant groups from Central America, yet immigrants from Costa Rica and Panama have some of the highest high school and college graduation rates of the Central American immigrant groups. Among the foreign born from Costa Rica in the United States, 68.9 percent have an earned high school diploma, and 18 percent have completed a bachelorÊs degree. This is well above the average for Central American immigrants, as only 19.5 percent of Central Americans living in the United States have a high school diploma, and only 5.3 percent have a bachelorÊs degree. For comparison, immigrants from El Salvador have a high school graduation rate of 34.8 percent, and 4.9 percent have completed a bachelorÊs degree. Immigrants from Panama have the highest completion rates of Central American immigrants: 82.7 percent have a high school diploma, and close to 30 percent have received a bachelorÊs degree (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).
Cultural Identification Unlike the Mexican American population, Costa Ricans do not have many organizations and institutions devoted to keeping their cultural identity alive in the United
402 | Costa Rican Immigrants
Youth Profile A Young Tico from Tennessee Stuart Vinson is a second generation Costa Rican living in the United States. His father was born in the United States, and his mother is from Ciudad Quesada, Costa Rica. Stuart was born in Chattanooga, Tennessee. He recently graduated from Stetson University in DeLand, Florida, with a major in international business. Stuart’s family got its start in Costa Rica, where his parents first met. When his mother was in her late teens, she volunteered as a translator. The group that she was helping was an American group of optometrists. These doctors were giving free clinics in rural areas in Costa Rica. Stuart’s Stuart Vinson (far right) with his brother, Mark, father was one of the doctors, and and mother, Rosa. (Courtesy of Stuart Vinson) eventually his parents got to know one another. Stuart tells the story of how his parents first met: “My father was only there for two weeks so when he left, he asked for her address and began writing to her from the United States. They wrote to each other every week for a whole year, until he was able to save up enough money to buy her a plane ticket to come visit the United States. After she traveled to meet the family, he decided to go back with her and ask for her hand in marriage. It is customary to ask the bride-to-be’s father before asking her to marry him. Soon after, they were married—first in Costa Rica, then in the United States a month later. She didn’t speak any English, so she learned by watching soap operas on TV.” Two years after their move to the United States, Stuart was born. As a Costa Rican American, Stuart frequently takes trips to his mother’s home country to visit relatives and friends as a Tico. (Telephone interview, February 2009)
States. As a result, Costa Rican youth may be adopted into the lifestyle of other notable Latin and Central American groups. However, the proximity of the United States to Costa Rica and affable relations between the two countries makes it easier for Costa Ricans born in the United States to travel back and forth between the two countries. This permits American-born children the ability to get to know their
Issues in Relations between the United States and Costa Rica
| 403
close relatives and extended family living abroad. After extensive visits, these children are likely to adopt some of the cultural patterns of their home countries and bring those experiences back with them to the United States. Parents in the United States, likewise, try to share some of their cultural heritage with their children by celebrating Costa Rican national holidays, preparing ethnic foods, and keeping in touch with relatives abroad. One way for Costa Rican Americans to stay connected with their home country is through sports. Soccer is a beloved sport for native Costa Ricans, as well as many Americans. Soccer first came to Costa Rica at the end of the 1800s, as wealthy students brought it home after returning from their studies abroad. The National Soccer League was established in 1921. In 2006, when Costa Rica played Germany in the World Cup, many schools and government offices closed their doors so that Costa Ricans could return home to watch the game. Soccer remains an avenue for Costa Ricans to express their connectedness. It is a temporary distraction from the negative issues dominating society. For many youth, it is an arena for selfexpression and social cohesiveness.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Costa Rica Forecasts for the 21st Century There are several Costa Rican consulates in the United States that exist to help travelers between the two countries. Consulate offices are located in large urban areas, including Atlanta, Denver, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Juan (Puerto Rico), Washington, D.C., and San Francisco. There are also honorary consulates in Dallas, Minnesota, and Tucson. Consulate offices exist to act as intermediaries between two countries·in this case, Costa Rica and the United States. Costa Rican nationals can go to a consulate office if they need assistance or protection. These official representatives also facilitate trade and good relations between the two countries. Consulates can be useful for bureaucratic assistance for traveling, living, and trade. Costa Rica has a unique pro-American stance. The two countries have a longstanding bond, and foreign policies between the two nations are mutually beneficial. The United States played a large role in keeping communist groups from establishing themselves within Costa Rica. They have also been one of the biggest senders of foreign aid to the country, for use on everything from social services to disaster relief. This amiable relationship can be seen as the United States continues to assist Costa Rica in establishing new infrastructure. For example, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services marked the opening of the new Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Regional Office for Latin America with a
404 | Costa Rican Immigrants
ribbon-cutting ceremony at the U.S. Embassy in San José. This relationship is not always helpful, however. The Costa Rican government is criticized for allowing too much foreign investment. Indeed, much of the production in Costa Rica is owned by foreign companies. Additionally, foreign investors, especially from the United States, own much of the real estate property on the coastal areas. Real estate agents target wealthy Americans, and advertisements are put out in English. Most Costa Ricans cannot afford to live in these developed areas, as great demand for prime real estate has driven up prices in the areas, and tourism continues to flourish. While a global economic recession damages the standard of living in many countries, one can only imagine that the dependence of Costa Rica on foreign aid and loans will only deepen. Costa Rica has established itself as a debtor nation. Originally relying on foreign trade to provide sustenance for its population, the emergence of new producers on the global market puts pressure on Costa Rica to outdo fierce competition.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics
Migration Statistics 190,000
180,000
170,000
160,000
150,000
140,000 1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 3 Costa Rican short-term and temporary visa admissions to United States, 1998–2007 Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Table 67 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and selected country of last residence: Fiscal years 1930–1999
Central America
1930 to 1939
1940 to 1949
1950 to 1959
1960 to 1969
1970 to 1979
1980 to 1989
1990 to 1999
6,840
20,135
40,201
98,560
120,374
339,376
610,189
Belize
193
433
1,133
4,185
6,747
14,964
12,600
Costa Rica
431
1,965
4,044
17,975
12,405
25,017
17,054
El Salvador
597
4,885
5,094
14,405
29,428
137,418
273,017
Guatemala
423
1,303
4,197
14,357
23,837
58,847
126,043
Honduras
679
1,874
5,320
15,078
15,651
39,071
72,880
Nicaragua
405
4,393
7,812
10,383
10,911
31,102
80,446
Panama
1,452
5,282
12,601
22,177
21,395
32,957
28,149
Other Central America
2,660
—
—
—
—
—
—
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (adapted from Table 2).
Table 68 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and selected country of last residence: Fiscal years 2000–2009 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
60,331
72,504
66,298
53,283
61,253
52,629
74,244
53,834
49,741
47,013
774
982
983
616
888
901
1,263
1,089
1,113
1,073
Costa Rica
1,390
1,863
1,686
1,322
1,811
2,479
3,459
2,722
2,287
2,552
El Salvador
22,301
30,876
30,472
27,854
29,297
20,891
31,258
20,009
18,937
19,342
Guatemala
9,861
13,399
15,870
14,195
18,655
16,468
23,674
17,198
15,791
11,881
Honduras
5,851
6,546
6,355
4,582
5,339
6,825
8,036
7,300
6,389
6,290
Nicaragua
18,258
16,908
9,171
3,503
3,842
3,196
4,035
3,587
3,486
4,029
1,896
1,930
1,761
1,211
1,421
1,869
2,519
1,929
1,738
1,846
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Central America Belize
Panama Other Central America
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (adapted from Table 2).
—
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics | 407 Table 69 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009: Region/ country: Costa Rica Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
2,384
1,089
1,295
25
10
15
Leading states of residence Arizona California
191
78
113
Colorado
23
10
13
Connecticut
27
12
15
Florida
519
229
290
Georgia
87
42
45
Illinois
25
11
14
Maryland
44
14
30
Massachusetts
53
22
31
Michigan
19
9
10
Minnesota
13
3
10
Nevada
24
8
16
New Jersey
490
268
222
New York
149
62
87
North Carolina
174
80
94
61
35
26
104
43
61
Pennsylvania Texas Virginia
56
25
31
Washington
26
11
15
274
117
157
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Costa Ricans are counted in the same manner as the general population. Every 10 years, they are counted in the U.S. Census. The American Community Survey also keeps track of them on an ongoing basis, along with the general population. Self-identified Costa Ricans are counted as an ethnic group and may racially consider themselves white, black, or another race.
408 | Costa Rican Immigrants Table 70 General characteristics of Costa Ricans in the United States Total population Male Female
68,588 33,255 35,333
Foreign born
50,920
Median age (years) Under 5 years
31 4,218
18 years and over
52,886
65 years and over
3,242
Household population
67,501
Average household size
3
Average family size
4
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights.
Table 71 Social and economic characteristics of Costa Ricans in the United States Population 25 and over High school graduate or higher Bachelor’s degree or higher
45,376 32,927 9,537
Married (except separated, population 15 years and older)
30,002
Speak a language other than English at home (population 5 years and older)
55,971
In labor force (population 16 and older)
39,351
Median family income in 1999 (dollars)
41,718
Per capita income in 1999 (dollars)
16,197
Individuals below poverty level
11,397
Families below poverty level
2,268
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights.
Appendix III: Notable Costa Rican Americans Franklin Chang-Diaz is of mixed Chinese and Costa Rican ancestry. He was born in San José, Costa Rica, on April 5, 1950. In 1972, Chang-Diaz received a bachelor of science in mechanical engineering. He then went on to earn a doctorate in physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1977. He was an astronaut for NASA from 1981 until his retirement in July 2005. During that time, he logged over 1,800 hours of flight time. He is considered one of the most well-known Costa Rican Americans.
Glossary | 409
José María Figueres Olsen was born in San José on December 24, 1954. He is the son of former President of Costa Rica José Figueres Ferrer and First Lady Karen Olsen Beck. His mother was born in the United States and is of Danish ancestry. José María Figueres Olsen graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1979 with a major in industrial engineering. He also possesses a masterÊs in public administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. After returning to Costa Rica, he served as the minister of foreign trade and the minister of Agriculture before serving one term as the president of Costa Rica between 1994 and 1998. Madeleine Stowe is an American actress of mixed descent. Her father is British, and her mother is Costa Rican. She acted in movies such as Stakeout, Short Cuts, The General’s Daughter, 12 Monkeys, and The Last of the Mohicans. Stowe grew up in Los Angeles and studied cinema and theater at the University of Southern California. She was nominated for an American Latino Media Arts (ALMA) award in 2000 for her part in The General’s Daughter.
Glossary Bolas: Large stone balls, pre-Columbian works of art. Festival Internacional de las Artes: A Costa Rican art festival showcasing artists from around the world. Gallo pinto: A typical Costa Rican breakfast made of rice and black beans. Grano oro: „The‰ golden bean, or coffee. Quedar bien: A cultural attitude among Costa Ricans that emphasizes peace. Quinceñera: A coming-of-age ceremony for female Costa Ricans. Machismo: A cultural attitude emphasizing masculinity. Mestizo: A mix of Spanish and indigenous ancestry. Remittances: Funds sent from immigrants working abroad back to their home countries. San José: The capital of Costa Rica. Semana Santa: The Holy Week, a holiday celebrated the week before Easter. Ticos: Costa Ricans. Transnational migrant: An immigrant who maintains connections with their home country.
410 | Costa Rican Immigrants
References Barry, Tom. 1989. Costa Rica: A Country Guide. Albuquerque, NM: The InterHemispheric Education Resource Center. Bean, Frank, Jurgen Schmandt, and Sidney Weintraub. 1989. Mexican and Central American Population and U.S. Immigration Policy. Austin: University of Texas Press. Bean, Frank, and Gillian Stevens. 2003. America’s Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Biesanz, Mavis Hiltunen, Richard Biesanz, and Karen Zubris Biesanz. 1999. The Ticos: Culture and Social Change in Costa Rica. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Blutstein, Howard, Lynne Andersen, Elinor Betters, John Dombrowski, and Charles Townsend. 1970. Area Handbook for Costa Rica. Washington, D.C.: The American University. Chacón, José Andrés. 1978. Hispanic Nohos in the United States of America. Albuquerque, NM: Saguaro Publications. Chinchilla, Norma Stoltz, and Nora Hamilton. 2007. „Central America.‰ In The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration Since 1965, edited by Mary Waters and Reed Ueda, 328 39. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. „Costa Rica.‰ 2008. The World Factbook. Washington, D.C.: CIA. „Costa Rica.‰ 2009. Encyclopedia Britannica. [Online article retrieved 1/13/09.] www. britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/139528/Costa-Rica. Creedman, Theodore S. 1991. Historical Dictionary of Costa Rica, 2nd ed. Latin American Historical Dictionaries 16. Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press. Davy, Megan. 2006. Migration Information Source: The Central American Foreign Born in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute. Diaz-Briquets, Sergio, and Sidney Weintraub, eds. 1991. Determinants of Emigration from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, vol. 1. San Francisco: Westview Press. Edelman, Marc, and Joanne Kenen, eds. 1989. The Costa Rica Reader. New York: Grove Weidenfeld. Hirschman, Charles, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind, eds. 1999. The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Jamison, Leslie, ed. 2005. Let’s Go Travel Guide: Costa Rica. New York: St. MartinÊs Press. Lansford, Jennifer, Kirby Deater-Deckard, and Marc Bornstein, eds. 2007. Immigrant Families in Contemporary Society. New York: The Gilford Press. Lynch, James P., and Rita J. Simon. 2003. Immigration the World Over: Statutes, Policies, and Practices. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Meissner, Doris, Deborah Meyers, Demetrios Papademetriou, and Michael Fix. 2006. Immigration and America’s Future: A New Chapter. Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute.
Further Reading | 411 Mitchell, Meg T., and Scott Pentzer. 2008. Costa Rica: A Global Studies Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. „Republic of Costa Rica-United States of America: Consular Convention.‰ 1950. The American Journal of International Law 44(3, suppl.): 90 103. Sheck, Ree S. 1994. Costa Rica: A Natural Destination, 3rd ed. Santa Fe, NM: John Muir Publications. United Nations. 2001, December. „International Migration and the Development in the Americas.‰ Symposium on International Migration in the Americas, San José de Costa Rica, September 2000. United Nations. 2008. „Human Development Reports: Costa Rica.‰ [Online article; retrieved 6/11.] http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/about/. U.S. Census Bureau. 2000. „Fact Sheet: Costa Ricans.‰ Census 2000. [Online article; retrieved 00/00.] http://www.census.gov/. U.S. Census Bureau. 2005 2007. „Hispanic or Latino Origin by Specific Origin.‰ American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates. [Online article; retrieved 00/00.] http://www. census.gov/. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2006. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2005. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. World Health Organization. 2002. Health in the Americas, vol. 1. Scientific and Technical Publication No. 587. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Health Organization. World Health Organization. 2007. „Country Cooperation Strategy: At a Glance.‰ Costa Rica. [Online article; retrieved 6/11.] http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ ccsbrief_cri_en.pdf.
Further Reading Biesanz, Mavis Hiltunen, Richard Biesanz, and Karen Zubris Biesanz. 1999. The Ticos: Culture and Social Change in Costa Rica. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. A collaboration by three authors, this book is considered the foremost authority on Costa Rica, its people, and its culture. Freeman, Jo. 2008. A Friend Laughs. YouWriteOn Publishing. This easy-to-read novel documents the true story of a Londoner and her family as they move to the jungles of Costa Rica to start a new and adventurous life. Guardia, Ricardo Fernandez. 2009. Cuentos Ticos: Short Stories of Costa Rica. Charleston, SC: BiblioBazaar. This wonderfully descriptive book contains 10 short stories translated into English, on heroes, politics, chivalry, and other topics. Kohan, Michele. 2006. Chronicles of the Jungle Mom: Notes From the Jungle. BookSurge Publishing. Michele KohanÊs wit shines through this story of her move from central Florida to a new life in Costa Rica.
412 | Costa Rican Immigrants Purcell, Trevor. 1993. Banana Fallout: Class, Color, and Culture among West Indians in Costa Rica. Berkeley: University of California Press. This book is an anthropological analysis of an historic event, surrounded by conflict between West Indian blacks and Hispanic Costa Ricans. Stocker, Karen. 2005. I Won’t Stay Indian, I’ll Keep Studying: Race, Place, and Discrimination in a Costa Rican High School. University Press of Colorado. Karen StockerÊs teaching and research in a Costa Rican high school color this text on identity and discrimination. U.S. Embassy. 2010. „San José, Costa Rica.‰ [Online article retrieved 8/09.] http://sanjose. usembassy.gov/. This Web site contains up-to-date information on U.S. Costa Rican relations.
Cuban Immigrants by Guillermo J. Grenier
Introduction Since 1960, Cuban Americans have attracted more than their share of attention from both the press and the scholarly community. Their visibility has exceeded the demographic reality. The slightly more than 1.5 million persons of Cuban origin or descent account for approximately 3.5 percent of the Hispanic-origin population of the United States. Demographics aside, however, there are good explanations for the relatively conspicuous presence of Cuban Americans within the U.S. Latino population. Most of those explanations are rooted in three basis characteristics of the Cuban presence in the United States: 1. Cuban Americans are primarily responsible for the growth and development of the third-largest Latino community in the United States. Their concentration in the greater Miami area has created a Latino presence that accounts for over half of the total population of a metropolitan area that is frequently regarded as a harbinger of immigrant America in the 21st century. 2. The traditional socioeconomic selectivity of migration from Cuba during the past 50 years has created a community with relatively large numbers of professionals and entrepreneurs. This socioeconomic profile, although at times overstated, has had implications for the participation of Cubans in leadership positions within the American Latino population, especially in such visible sectors as media and government. 3. As a self-defined exile community, Cuban Americans have developed a set of political institutions and political culture that are sharply differentiated from those institutions and culture among other Latino groups. The political behavior of Cuban Americans has garnered considerable attention from the press, and many of the leading political figures and organizations of the Cuban American community have been prominent at the national level in furthering the exile political agenda. While the most significant wave of Cuban immigrants arrived in the United States after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Cubans and the United 413
Chronology | 415
States have a long history of interaction. To understand the development of this community, its present characteristics and the changes that the future hold, we must understand this history of interaction as well as the social forces that shape the current community.
Chronology October 28, 1492
Christopher Columbus lands in east Cuba.
1511
The first governor of Cuba, the Spanish conquistador Diego Velázquez de Cuéllar, leads a group of settlers in Baracoa, the first permanent settlement in Cuba.
1607
Havana is officially named capital of Cuba.
January 28, 1853
José Julián Martí Pérez is born in Havana.
1868–1878
First war of Cuban independence (the Ten YearsÊ War).
October 10, 1868
Grito de Yara. Revolutionaries under the leadership of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes proclaims Cuban independence.
February 8, 1878
Pact of Zanjón ends Ten YearsÊ War.
August 1879
A second uprising („The Little War‰), led by Antonio Maceo and Calixto García, begins. The uprising is defeated in autumn 1880.
1886
Slavery is abolished.
February 23, 1895
Resumption of the Cuban revolution, under the leadership of José Martí and General Máximo Gómez y Báez.
May 19, 1895
José Martí killed in battle with Spanish troops at the Battle of Dos Ríos.
December 10, 1898
Treaty of Peace in Paris ends the Spanish-American War.
December 23, 1899
Leonard Wood becomes U.S. provisional governor of Cuba.
March 2, 1901
Platt Amendment passed in the United States stipulating the conditions for the withdrawal of United States troops, assuring U.S. control over Cuban affairs.
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May 20, 1902
The Cuban republic is instituted under the presidency of Tomás Estrada Palma.
August 13, 1926
Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz is born in the province of Holguín.
June 14, 1928
Ernesto Guevara de la Serna (Che Guevara) is born in Rosario, Argentina.
March 1952
Former president Batista, supported by the army, seizes power.
July 26, 1953
Some 160 revolutionaries under the command of Fidel Castro launch an attack on the Moncada barracks in Santiago de Cuba.
May 1955
Fidel and surviving members of his movement are released from prison under an amnesty from Batista.
December 2, 1956
Granma lands in Oriente Province.
March 13, 1958
United States suspends shipments of arms to BatistaÊs forces.
March 17, 1958
Castro calls for a general revolt.
January 1, 1959
President Batista resigns and flees the country. Fidel CastroÊs column enters Santiago de Cuba.
February 16, 1959
Fidel Castro becomes premier of Cuba.
March 17, 1960
U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower orders CIA director Allen Dulles to train Cuban exiles for a covert invasion of Cuba.
July 5–October 31, 1960
All U.S. businesses and commercial property in Cuba are nationalized.
October 19, 1960
United States imposes embargo prohibiting all exports to Cuba except foodstuffs and medical supplies.
December 26, 1960
Operation Peter Pan (Operación Pedro Pan) begins; the operation transports 14,000 children of parents opposed to the new government. Airlift continues until U.S. airports are closed to Cuban flights in 1962.
April 15, 1961
Bay of Pigs invasion (Bahia de Cochinos).
May 1, 1961
Fidel Castro declares the Cuban Revolution a „Socialist‰ Revolution.
1961
U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is tightened.
Chronology | 417
October 23, 1962
United States establishes air and sea blockade in response to reports of Soviet missile bases under construction in Cuba. United States threatens to invade Cuba if the bases are not dismantled and warns that an attack launched from Cuba would be considered a Soviet attack requiring full retaliation.
October 28, 1962
Khrushchev agrees to remove offensive weapons from Cuba; the United States agrees to remove missiles from Turkey and promises not to invade Cuba.
November 21, 1962
United States ends Cuban blockade.
December 1965
Freedom Flights (Puente Aereo/Air Bridge) begin. Twice a week flights to Miami from Havana take 245,805 Cubans from the island until the flights are terminated in 1973.
April 1980
Mariel boat lift. Cuban Government announces that anyone wishing to leave Cuba may depart by boat from Mariel port, prompting an exodus of up to 125,000 people to the United States.
1994
In what becomes known as the Rafter Crisis (Crisis de los Balseros), 37,000 Cuban rafters are intercepted at sea and relocated in the U.S. base at Guantánamo. Eventually all are allowed into the United States.
1995
U.S./Cuba migration agreement assures the orderly migration of at least 20,000 Cubans annually.
March 12, 1996
The Helms-Burton Act, which extends the U.S. embargo against Cuba to foreign companies, is passed.
July 31, 2006
Raúl Castro assumes presidential duties as Fidel Castro recovers from an emergency operation.
February 19, 2008
Fidel Castro announces he would not reprise his role as president of Cuba and refuses to be reelected again.
April 13, 2009
President Obama lifts restrictions on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans with family members on the island. The restrictions had been implemented under George W. Bush in 2003.
September 2010
Cuba announces plans to expand its private sector and issues guidelines for the establishment of free enterprise relationships in 178 economic fields.
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Background Cuba is the largest island in the Caribbean, and its people and culture have had a long relationship with the United State, largely because of its proximity to the United States. Because only the Straits of Florida separates the island of Cuba from the Florida peninsula, their territories were coveted by both the Spanish and British colonial empires, which alternately governed Florida until it became a U.S. territory in 1821. The Spanish flag waved over Florida from 1513 to 1763 and, again, from 1783 to 1821·a longer period, in fact, than has the American flag. During those two intervals of Spanish domination, 52 Florida governors (4 of whom were born in Havana) ruled the peninsula, and there were long stretches during which both Spanish colonies shared the same governor (Gonzalez-Pando 1998). In 1763, when England acquired Florida from Spain, most Floridians escaped to Cuba, where each refugee family received 32 acres of land and a black slave to help them settle on the island. Cubans participated on the side of the fledging republic during the American Revolution, when many Floridians sought refuge from the war in Cuba. A century later, CubaÊs own wars of independence forced tens of thousands of Cubans and Spaniards in the opposite direction. The struggle to oust Spain was an arduous and protracted one, lasting from the early stirrings of separatism early in the 19th century to the armed conflicts that started in 1868 and 1895 and culminated in the Spanish-Cuban-American War of 1898 and the subsequent U.S. occupation of the island. Cubans would have to wait until 1902 before they could finally have their own government. When Cuba finally won its independence in 1902, some of those Cuban exiles never returned to their homeland, opting instead to stay in Key West, Tampa, Jacksonville, and Ocala (first named „Marti City‰ by its Cuban founders). After that time, Cubans frequently came to Florida as students, tourists, immigrants, or political exiles; during the revolutions against Cuban dictators Gerardo Machado in the 1930s and Fulgencio Batista in the 1950s, thousands of Cubans again sought haven in Florida from the islandÊs political upheavals. The most significant migration reached American shores after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in 1959. Today, Cubans, first, second and third generation, make up the third largest Latino group in the United States and have an influence, some would say, beyond their numbers in American politics, particularly foreign policy.
History of Cuba Two major themes that have been dominant in the analysis of Cuban history and culture: exceptionalism and diversity. Despite the intricacies of Cuban culture, these are identifiable tendencies, deeply rooted in Cuban history, that have clear and consequential manifestations in the culture of Cubans in the United States.
Background | 419
Followers of Fidel Castro pose with rifles on a monument in Matanzas, Cuba, in 1959. The sculptures are of freedom-fighter José Martí and a female allegorical figure of “Liberty” brandishing broken chains. (Library of Congress)
Exceptionalism All peoples believe that their culture is unique, unlike any other. It is part of the ethnocentrism that is found in all cultures. With Cubans, however, that sense of uniqueness is elevated to the point where it is a defining national characteristic that influences CubansÊ perceptions of their country, and themselves, in the world at large and in their relations with their neighbors. It is what can be called a culture of exceptionalism, a shared perception that the national experience has been different from that of any other people. Consider the following statements comparing the history and culture of Cuba with those of its neighbors in this hemisphere: Cuba is perhaps the only country of Latin America in which the impact of its aboriginal cultures is viewed as insignificant and has been virtually erased from the national consciousness. Cuba is the most „Spanish‰ country of Latin America. Cuba is the most „African‰ country of Spanish America. Cuba is the Latin American country first and most profoundly affected by the spread of U.S. economic, political, social, and cultural institutions and influences before, and during, the 20th century. During the past four decades, Cuba has been isolated from most its neighbors; it has a political and economic system creatively borrowed from the Soviet
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Union, Eastern Europe, and China. It is the only country in the hemisphere presumably guided by socialist principles and the only Latin American country that has undertaken a large military campaign outside the hemisphere (and in Africa, at that). Even if some of the previous statements are arguable, the fact that one can seriously apply all five of them to one country gives some idea of the extraordinary and conflicting forces that have shaped Cuban culture. The sense of exceptionalism imbedded in Cuban culture and history has deep roots. It was felt among the habaneros of the 19th century who perceived that they occupied a privileged position within the Spanish empire. It is also present among contemporary Cubans in Miami who, defying efforts to be placed under a pan-ethnic label, believe that their experience is quite different from that of other Latino immigrants. While ethnocentrism is an important element in the creation of a sense of exceptionalism, in the case of Cubans, ethnocentrism has been reinforced by the objective historical reality. The fact is that 19th-century habaneros did occupy a unique position within the Spanish empire, and Cubans in Miami have had a qualitatively different experience from that of other Latino immigrants. The origins of Cuban exceptionalism can be found almost at the very outset of the Spanish colonization of the island and are linked to the location of the island. The treasures in gold and silver found among the aboriginal civilizations of Mexico, Central America, and South America had to be shipped home through waters that were becoming increasingly infested with pirates eager to lighten the load of the Spanish galleons. A convoy system was established by which the ships leaving the two principal mainland ports, Veracruz and Cartagena de Indias, would meet in a Caribbean port and then proceed together, escorted by warships, across the Atlantic. It was called the flota system. The route through the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida favored the settlement and development of an excellent harbor that was located in just the right place: the northwestern coast of Cuba. It was a large, deep, and well-protected harbor, with a narrow entrance that facilitated its defense. In 1514, the city of San Cristóbal de La Habana was established on that harbor. For centuries after that, Havana would be the pivotal axis for virtually all travel and trade between Spain and its colonies in the Caribbean and the circum-Caribbean. When the United States acquired Cuba through the war against Spain in 1898, it ruled the island until 1902, and again from 1906 to 1909. Nowhere in Latin America did the United States have such an early and predominant presence as in Cuba. By the middle of the 20th century, Cuba was at the cutting-edge of the modernizing influence that had spread from the United States to the rest of the hemisphere. The island, and especially its capital city, was awash in the culture,
Background | 421
technology, and consumer goods that poured in from the most powerful country in the world. That pervasive U.S. influence was dramatically replaced, starting in 1959, with a political and economic system that, in a different way, would push to new heights the CubansÊ sense of exceptionalism. In the thick of the Cold War, a centrally planned economic system closely allied with the Soviet bloc (who had hostile relations with the United States) was adopted at the doorstep of the United States. This transition placed Cuba near the center of superpower confrontations. The greatest debacle of the Kennedy administration was the Bay of Pigs. The closest the world has come to nuclear war (in October 1962) was over Cuba. Not content to be a mere pawn in the conflict between superpowers, Cuba deployed tens of thousands of troops to Africa in the 1970s, becoming an important player in the political resolution of the status of Namibia. Even CubaÊs emigration is exceptional. The revolution produced an exodus that has maintained an exile ethos, created a powerful ethnic enclave, and exhibits relatively high levels of economic and political influence at both the local and national levels. Any overview of U.S. immigration or of the Latino population is likely to have the footnote that the experience of Cubans has been different.
Diversity It is not surprising that a Cuban anthropologist would be one of the first intellectual voices of the 20th century to challenge the adequacy of the concept of „acculturation.‰ Viewing it as a „process of transfer from one culture to another,‰ Fernando Ortiz found it to be an inappropriate term to describe the development of Cuban culture. Instead, he coined, in 1940, a term he called „transculturation,‰ which he felt better described the entirety of the process of cultural change and development that has occurred in Cuba as a result of the constant contact with peoples with different cultural origins. Acquiring new cultural traits, acculturation, is only the beginning. The cultures in contact also lose part of their cultures, and eventually there is the creation of a new culture, with traits from the original cultures, but distinct from them: „We have selected the term transculturation to express the extremely varied phenomena that originate in Cuba through the very complex transmutations of culture that take place here, without which it is impossible to understand the evolution of the Cuban people . . . the true history of Cuba is the history of its very intricate transculturations‰ (Ortiz 1940, 99).
The Spanish It is not difficult to trace the reasons for the extraordinary influence of Spain on Cuban culture. Spain colonized an island with an indigenous population that was relatively small, and which virtually disappeared soon after colonization, and ruled
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it for four centuries. The flota system established a special direct relationship between Spain and Cuba, as Havana became the point of contact between Madrid and most of its New World colonies. When the bulk of those colonies gained their independence in the early 19th century, Cuba remained in the Spanish empire almost into the 20th century. It is estimated that during the last three decades of the 19th century, one million Spaniards migrated to Cuba. More than half of them were soldiers (Moreno Fraginals 1995, 296). When the protracted struggle for independence broke out in 1868 and continued for three decades, the conflict was over national sovereignty and self-determination. Spain was never viewed as representing a foreign culture. There was therefore no trace of a cultural conflict or of a rejection of the culture of the colonial power anywhere in the independence movement. The end of Spanish rule in Cuba did not sever ties between the two countries. As the United States acquired the island from Spain in 1898, it sought to maintain the existing property rights. The Spanish largely retained their physical and economic presence in Cuba into the 20th century (Moreno Fraginals 1995, 296). The continued demographic and economic Spanish presence in Cuba, coupled by the prosperity during the initial decades of the 20th century, produced a massive new wave of Spanish migration to the island. A 1919 census found more than 245,000 Spanish-born persons living in Cuba (Census National Board of Cuba 1920, 432).
The Africans Music, art, religion, food and diet, idioms and jargon, norms and values: is there any aspect of Cuban culture that does not show the influence of the cultures the African slaves took with them to Cuba? Many observers of modern Cuba have noted the vitality and evident presence of African cultural traits in the islandÊs culture. The explanation lies in the size and timing of the arrival of the waves of Africans to Cuba. Nowhere in Latin America did such large amounts of Africans arrive so late in the colonial era. Africans started arriving in Cuba not long after the Spanish. But it was not until the late 18th century that the importation of African slaves took on massive proportions. Until that time, the soil of Cuba was not intensively cultivated nor was the island densely settled. The sugar revolution that started in the late 18th century and lasted until the middle of the 19th changed all that. It was the most significant economic and social phenomenon of colonial Cuba (Moreno Fraginals 1978). The huge landholdings where sugar cane was processed required more labor, and thus, the massive importation of African slaves. By 1841 the population of the island had multiplied and passed the one million mark. Slaves accounted for 44 percent of the population (Knight 1970, 22).
Causes and Waves of Migration | 423
Aside from the sheer volume of the African arrivals, the manner in which the slaves were introduced into Cuba conditioned the subsequent impact of their culture on Cuba. During the sugar revolution, there was no longer the pretense that slavery served to „civilize‰ the heathen. Gone were the paternalistic efforts to „civilize‰ slaves. In other words, there was no interest in the „acculturation‰ of the Africans. This made possible the retention and continued vitality of African culture. The impact of retaining African culture on the transculturation process that led to the creation of the modern culture of Cuba cannot be underestimated. The best example of its impact is the music that Cubans created largely during the first half of the 20th century. A result of the mixture of African and European elements and instrumentation, it is CubaÊs most important contribution to universal culture.
Other Influences Despite the predominance of the Spanish/African mix, the Cuban cultural landscape would not be as „intricate‰ if it did not have greater complexity. Cuba received many other cultures who left an indelible mark on the transculturation process. Foremost among them were the Chinese, who came in two waves. The first came in the mid-19th century as coolies under labor contracts, to supplement the African workforce in agriculture. In 1877, there were more than 40,000 Chinese-born persons living in Cuba, almost all male. The second wave came during the initial decades of the 20th century and engaged primarily in small-scale entrepreneurship in the large cities (Guanche 1996, 84 87). By mid-century, Havana boasted one of the largest Chinatowns in Latin America (Baltar Rodríguez 1997, 89 90). Other cultures have contributed to the intricacies of Cuban culture, mostly as a result of migration to the island during the first half of the 20th century. West Indians (especially Jamaicans and Haitians) went to eastern Cuba to cut sugarcane (Guanche 1996, 96). Eastern European Jews came to represent a numerous and visible community in Havana, and later, in Miami (Levine 1993; Bettinger-López 2000). Other groups came from the Middle East and even the United States. In 1931, 11 percent of the Cuban population was foreign born.
Causes and Waves of Migration Cuban Migration to the United States before 1959 It is widely recognized that the contemporary Cuban presence in the United States is linked to the conditions created by the Revolution of 1959. The flow of Cubans to the United States, however, dates back to the 19th century.
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New York’s 19th-Century Exiles The severely autocratic nature of Spanish rule in Cuba created an important presence of exiles in the United States, and it was in this country, especially in New York, that many important chapters of Cuban history were written (Poyo 1989). During the 19th century, almost every prominent Cuban separatist found himself at one time or another in New York in response to the political situation in Cuba (Pérez 1994a, 160 61). In 1870, the year of the first decennial U.S. census that tabulated the Cuban born separately, New York City (including Brooklyn) had 1,565 Cubans, by far the largest of all concentrations of Cubans in the United States. In 1880, the census counted more than 2,000 Cubans in that city (Pérez 2000, 17). It was in that year that José Martí, the architect of the Cuban struggle for independence, arrived in New York: he would spend the next 15 years living in New York, returning to his native Cuba in 1895, only five weeks before his a death on a battlefield.
The Florida Cigarmaking Communities Among MartíÊs staunchest supporters were Cuban cigarworkers in the United States. During the 10-year conflict that started in 1868, cigar manufacturers found it increasingly difficult to maintain normal business operations, especially since the Spanish government had placed high tariffs on all exported tobacco products. Many relocated their factories to New York and Key West. Their employees followed them there, and by the 1870s, both communities had a sizable number of cigarworkers. One of the cigar manufacturers who left the island was Vicente Martínez Ybor, the owner of the well-known El Príncipe de Gales brand of cigars. Persecuted by the Spanish government for his so-called pro-Cuban tendencies, he relocated his factory to Key West, Florida. Other manufacturers followed YborÊs example. By 1870, Key West was a boomtown and a leading center for cigar production in the United States. The census that year counted more than 1,000 Cuban-born persons living in Key West (Pérez 2000, 17). Only New York had a larger Cuban community. A Cuban was elected mayor in 1876, and eventually Cubans would occupy positions as county judges, city commissioners, and representatives to the state legislature (Castellanos 1935, 176). By the 1880s, Ybor was looking to move to a location that would offer better transportation links to New York, yet be small enough so that it could be developed into a „company town,‰ following the model used by other industries in the United States to keep out unions, which he hated. He settled on Tampa, a fishing village located on a harbor on FloridaÊs Gulf coast. In 1885, Martínez Ybor bought 40 acres northeast of Tampa, enough land to build not only cigar factories, but an entire town (Westfall 1977, 61 63). It would be known as Ybor City, and it would rapidly become the largest 19th-century community of Cuban Americans. Once
Causes and Waves of Migration | 425
the armed struggle erupted in Cuba in 1895, Ybor City became a hotbed of revolutionary activity (Rivero Muñiz 1958, 77 105). By the census of 1900, Ybor City had more Cuban-born residents than New York, and it would continue to grow: the 1910 U.S. Census counted more than 6,000 Cuban-born persons in the community (Pérez 2000, 18). By 1930, the Cuban-born population of Ybor City had declined, and New York had regained its historical primacy as the most important Cuban American community. During the Depression and World War II, Cuban immigration to the United States reached all-time lows but travel between the two countries increased. Americans went to the island for business and pleasure, and Cubans came to the United States on a temporary basis seeking to develop their careers, either in U.S. schools, in music, in the entertainment industry, or in professional sports, notably baseball and boxing (Pérez 1994a, 184 88). Three Cuban presidents and members of their governments felt compelled to leave Cuba for the United States after abandoning power. The first of them, Gerardo Machado, CubaÊs first dictator, is buried in Miami next to a friend, the mayor of Santiago de Cuba during his administration, who also left the island after MachadoÊs ouster. The mayor was accompanied to the United States by his musically talented teenage son, who would become a successful bandleader and a familiar face on American television: Desiderio (Desi) Arnaz, Jr. (Pérez Firmat 1994, 48 76).
Migration to the United States after 1959: The Cold War and Beyond The most visible and recurring manifestation of the Cuban saga over the past five decades has been emigration. The waves of migration from the island since 1959 have all taken place within that enduring climate of hostility and international confrontation. The timing, length, intensity, and characteristics of each wave have largely been consequences of the conditions under which the migration from Cuba to the United States was allowed to take place. There have been four major and distinct mass migration waves to the United States from Cuba since the rise of the present Cuban government in 1959: (a) the early exiles, 1959 1962; (b) the „airlift,‰ 1965 1973; (c) Mariel, 1980; and (d) the Rafter Crisis, 1994.
The Early Exiles, 1959–1962 The first wave of migration from Cuba to the United States involved about 200,000 persons (Pérez 1986a, 129). The U.S. government facilitated the migrantsÊ entry by granting them refugee status, allowing them to enter without the restrictions imposed on most other nationality groups (Masud-Piloto 1988, 32 35). A program
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was established to assist in the resettlement and economic adjustment of the arrivals (Pedraza-Bailey 1985, 40 52). In this initial wave CubaÊs displaced and alienated elite tended to predominate among the migrants. The contentious transition from capitalism to socialism affected first and foremost the upper sectors of Cuban society (Fagen, Brody, and OÊLeary 1968, 19 22). Consequently, families of upper socioeconomic status with children under 18 years old are overrepresented in this wave. As many as 14,000 unaccompanied children also arrived during this period. The importance of this first wave in shaping the character of the Cuban presence in the United States cannot be overstated. The immigrants who came over during this time possessed skills and attitudes that would facilitate their adjustment to life in the United States and give their life an enduring political and economic hegemony within the Cuban American community (Portes and Stepick 1993, 123 49). Labeled the „Golden Exile,‰ it is the wave that has been most economically successful (Portes 1969).
The Airlift, 1965–1973 The second major wave started in the fall of 1965 when the Cuban government opened a port and allowed persons from the United States to go to Cuba to pick up relatives who wanted to leave the country. Some 5,000 persons left from the port of Camarioca before the United States and Cuba halted the boatlift and agreed to an orderly airlift. The airlift started in December 1965 and lasted until 1973. The twice-daily flights from Cuba to Miami brought 260,500 persons during those years, making this period the largest of all the waves (Pérez 1986a, 130). The Cuban government was able to pick and choose who would receive departure permits from a large pool of applicants. Males of military age were excluded, and the government expedited the applications of the elderly. With a predominance of females and elderly, airlift arrivals had a profile that was very different from the typical immigrant to the United States. In its first few years, the airlift brought the remnants of CubaÊs upper classes, but by the late 1960s, with the advent of sustained austerity in Cuba, the airlift started to peel away at the middle sectors of CubaÊs social class structure (Pedraza 1996, 267). By 1973, both governments agreed to terminate the airlift.
Mariel, 1980 By 1980, the pressure within Cuba for emigration rose once again. The number of unauthorized departures increased. On April 1, a group of six persons violently entered the Peruvian embassy in Havana seeking asylum, resulting in the death of one
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of the embassyÊs Cuban guards. The Cuban government withdrew all guards from the Peruvian compound, an action that caused the embassy to flood with more than 10,000 people seeking to leave the country. The Cuban government responded to the crisis by opening the port of Mariel for unrestricted migration. In a manner uncontrolled by the United States, more than 125,000 Cubans came into the country. It was not as large as the previous waves, but it took place during only five months. The Mariel boatlift originated and unfolded in a dramatic fashion. Thousands of Mariel arrivals were interned in refugee camps in the United States until sponsors could be found for them. Those who were classified as criminals and therefore „excludable‰ from the United States were never released. Nearly 1,000 of them were eventually deported to Cuba under an agreement with the Cuban government (Pérez 1999, 199).
In 1980 some 125,000 Cuban refugees poured into the United States during the Mariel boatlift—Fidel Castro’s invitation to Cuban-Americans to travel to Mariel Harbor and take any of their friends and relatives back to the United States. Though an apparent sign of relaxed restrictions, it later became evident that the event was orchestrated to purge Cuba of political dissidents, criminals, and the mentally ill. (U.S. Coast Guard)
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The Rafter Crisis, 1994 Throughout the rest of the 1980s and the early 1990s, only about 2,000 Cubans were admitted by the United States each year. The pressure for massive emigration rose once again during the first few months of 1994, when there were a number of dramatic and violent incidents as Cubans seeking to leave crashed into embassies; commandeered planes, helicopters, and boats to the United States; and departed in makeshift rafts. As happened in 1980, the unauthorized departures resulted in tragedy: a Cuban vessel attempted to stop a hijacked tugboat, and more than 40 of its occupants drowned, including children. Another hijacking resulted in the death of a Cuban police officer. The Cuban government responded by announcing on August 11 that it would not detain anyone trying to leave Cuba in a raft or other vessel. As a result, nearly 37,000 Cubans were rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard in less than a month. The bulk of the arrivals were detained for more than a year in camps at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo. The absence of alternative destinations for the rafters, as well as the deteriorating conditions in the camps, eventually prompted the United States to admit them into the country. The Rafter Crisis of 1994 was halted after only one month when negotiations between the two countries resulted in an agreement whereby the United States committed to admitting at least 20,000 Cubans a year through the normal visa process. For their part, the Cubans agreed to accept the return of any future unauthorized emigrants interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard before reaching U.S. shores.
21st-Century Migration On September 9, 1994, the United States and Cuba agreed to „normalize‰ migration between the two countries. Cuba agreed to discourage its citizens from sailing to the United States, and the United States committed to admitting a minimum of 20,000 Cuban immigrants per year. A second agreement on May 2, 1995, established a new policy of directly repatriating Cubans interdicted at sea to Cuba. These agreements led to what has been called the „wet foot, dry foot‰ policy, whereby Cubans who make it to shore can stay in the United States·likely becoming eligible to adjust to permanent residence under the Cuban Adjustment Act·whereas those who do not make it to dry land are repatriated unless they can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Cuba. More Cubans have come to the United States in the first decade of the new century than during any of the previous major waves. According to the figures compiled by the Office of Immigration Statistics, over 303,778 Cubans gained legal resident status between 1999 and 2009 (Office of Immigration Statistics 2009, 12; see Table 76).
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While the administration of Barack Obama has emphasized unwillingness to lift the economic embargo on the island, some of the restrictions imposed by the George W. Bush administration in 2003 have been lifted. In September 2009, the administration of Barack Obama lifted all restrictions on family visits and remittances by Cuban Americans to the island and has authorized the licensing of telecommunications business dealings with technology partners on the island.
Demographic Profile According to the American Community Survey (U.S. Bureau of Census 2008), there are approximately 1.6 million Cuban Americans in the United States; approximately 3.5 percent of the Hispanic American population. Over two-thirds of Cuban Americans (68%) live in Florida with other large concentrations found in New Jersey (82,000), New York (68,000), California (77,000), and Texas (44,000). While migration from Cuba has increased since the 1995 agreements, about a third of all Cuban Americans (39%) are born in the United States. Among the foreign born, approximately 57 percent entered the United States before 1990; 20 percent entered between 1990 and 1999; and 22 percent entered after 1999. As a group, Cuban Americans are considerably older than the rest of the Hispanic population in the United States. The median age of Cuban Americans is 41, which is comparable to the non-Hispanic American white population (median age 36) but above the median age of other Hispanic Americans (27). According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2006), about 58 percent of foreignborn Cuban Americans are U.S. citizens, which is double the rate for other Hispanic Americans (26%) and higher than for non-Hispanic Americans, foreign-born whites (56%). About 9 out of every 10 Cuban Americans who arrived before 1990 are U.S. citizens, whereas only 18 percent of the post-1990 cohorts are citizens. In the 2004 Census data, about 86 percent of Cuban Americans identified themselves as white, compared with 60 percent of Mexican Americans, 53 percent of other Central and South American Americans, and 50 percent of Puerto Rican Americans. The Pew Hispanic Center also notes that the median household income for Cuban Americans is $42,000, slightly higher than for all Hispanic Americans ($41,470) but lower than for non-Hispanic American whites ($52,029). Native-born Cuban Americans have a higher median income than non-Hispanic American whites ($50,000 vs. $48,000) (Pew Hispanic Center 2006). Poverty rates for Cuban Americans are generally lower than for other Hispanic Americans, but comparable to the U.S. general population. The share of Cuban Americans who live in poverty, 13.2 percent, is similar to that of the general U.S. population (12.7%) and below the 20.7 percent among all Hispanic Americans (Pew Hispanic Center 2006).
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One out of four Cuban Americans 25 and older is a college graduate, more than double the rate among other Hispanic Americans (12%) but lower than among nonHispanic American whites in the same age group (30%). Among native-born Cuban Americans 25 and older, 39 percent are college graduates compared with 22 percent among foreign-born Cuban Americans. In 2008, almost half of all Cuban Americans (49%) 15 and older were married, about the same as the general U.S. population (50%) but higher than all Hispanic Americans (46%). In 2008, 13 percent of Cuban Americans 15 and older were divorced, higher than among other Hispanic Americans (8%) and about the same as the general U.S. population (11%). In 2008, 27 percent of all Cuban Americans had never married, compared with 38 percent of other Hispanic Americans and 31 percent of the general U.S. population. Cuban American citizens make up 6 percent of the Latino electorate in the United States. In the 2006 National Survey of Latinos, 28 percent of Cuban Americans said they considered themselves Republicans, 20 percent consider themselves Democrats, and 27 percent consider themselves Independent (Pew Hispanic Center 2006).
Adjustment and Adaptation The initial wave of Cubans coming into the United States after the Cuban Revolution arrived at the ideal time. The civil rights movement had been hard at work busting the soil for over a decade to make minority rights a reality and take root in the Great Society Project and the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Cubans arrived as a tailor-made minority: white, skilled, and, so all thought, temporary. The fact that they were fleeing communism at the height of the Cold War increased the value of their stock as well.
Migration and Family Structure Gender relations in Cuba were strongly influenced by the forces of modernity resulting from the pervasive influence of the United States. The modernization of 20th-century Cuba is especially apparent in the family-related legislation enacted from the 1930s to the 1950s; legislation that significantly altered and liberalized the very traditional Spanish Civil Code. A 1930 law, for example, made „mutual consent‰ a valid ground for divorce and permitted the granting of divorces simply upon the request of both parties (República de Cuba 1939, 2189 93). The 1940 Constitution included a clause that affirmed a married womanÊs full civil status, recognizing her right to freely engage in business as well as to freely dispose of the fruits of her labor. The constitution also eliminated distinctions between „legitimate‰ and „illegitimate‰ children for the purposes of inheritance.
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A 1950 law introduced the following reforms: (1) patria potestas, or legal authority over children, was to be exercised jointly by the father and the mother; (2) spouses were designated joint administrators of the community property, and one spouse could not dispose of the property without the consent of the other; and (3) in a broad and sweeping clause, the law abrogated any existing provisions that in any way diminished equality between men and women (República de Cuba 1950, 27553 54). Neolocality, where newly married couples reside away from natal households, became the norm, and the transition was underway from the traditional patriarchal marriage to one based more on egalitarianism and companionship (Aguirre 1981, 400). While the social reality fell far short of the attempts to legislate equality between men and women, these progressive family statutes reflected a society that by mid-20th century was at the vanguard of most of Latin America in the level of modernization of its values and norms. Those indicators of modernization were not, of course, equally evident throughout the social class system, but it was precisely the most modernized sectors of Cuban society that participated massively in the postrevolutionary exodus.
The Demographic Selectivity of the Post-1959 Migration If there is such a thing as a „typical‰ U.S. immigrant, it is likely to be a young unmarried male migrating without a family. While there are increasing exceptions to this profile, that combination of age, sex, and marital status continues to be the norm, especially among labor migrants. The post-1959 exodus from Cuba has a profile that is diametrically opposed to that „typical‰ profile. The revolutionary transformation led to a migration in which young families tended to predominate. In fact, thousands of unaccompanied children were sent ahead to the United States to await reunification with their parents. The political context of the Cuban exodus meant that there was a very high number of entire family units within the migration flow from Cuba, especially in the early years. The airlift period (1965 1973) brought a disproportionately large number of women and the elderly. The result is that the Cuban population of the United States is older and with proportionately more females than most immigrant groups. In 1980 (the year of the first U.S. census after the end of the airlift and before the Mariel boatlift), the median age of the Cuban-born population living in America was already 43, and 13.8 percent were over 65 years old. That year, the median age of the total U.S. population was 30, and the percent over 65 was 11.3. As noted in the demographic data, that trend continues to this day. The 1980 U.S. Census contains an extraordinary finding. One-fourth of all Cuban-born persons 65 years of age and over living in the United States lived in households in which they were parents or parents-in-law of the head of the
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household. By comparison, less than 8 percent of all elderly persons in the United States lived in such household arrangements. Furthermore, although in 1980, 6 percent of all elderly in this country lived in „group quarters‰ (such as nursing homes), less than 1 percent of Cuban-born elderly Americans lived in group quarters. According to the 1980 U.S. Census, the proportion of Cuban households receiving public assistance was relatively high, and nearly three-fourths of households receiving such assistance were above the poverty level. This datum is consistent with the relative importance of the three-generation family among Cubans, in that the income of the elderly was more likely to contribute to a household that included employed persons. The number of three-generation families has declined among American Cubans. In the late 1990s, the number of Cuban-born elderly Americans living with their children was at about 16 percent, a figure that is still much higher than that for the total U.S. population.
Aging and Retirement The aging of the earliest waves of Cuban Americans is one of the most important features of the Cuban American population. Coming in the 1960s as young adults, and especially as parents of young children, they are the largest cohort among Cuban Americans. Now between the ages of 60 and 80, they account for more than one-fourth of all Cuban-origin persons and nearly one-half of all the Cuban-born in the United States. Presently, about 30 percent of Cuban-born Americans are over 65. The aging of this large cohort is most evident in southern Florida, where providing services for the elderly is a booming business. In comparison with Cubans living elsewhere in the United States, the population of Cubans in southern Florida is even older. In fact, the rapid aging of the population has even contributed to the process of concentration in southern Florida.
Female Employment By 1979, slightly more than 55 percent of all Cuban-origin American women above 15 years of age were in the labor force, compared with exactly 50 percent of all U.S. women above that age. Not only were Cuban American women more likely to be working, they were also more likely to be working full-time year-round. Relatively high female labor force participation rates continue to characterize the Cuban American population. By the beginning of the 21st century, 55 percent of all Cubanorigin women in the United States were economically active. That number is now under the national norm; 60 percent of all U.S. women are in the labor force. Although Cuban migrants to the United States were disproportionately drawn from the most modernized sectors of Cuban society, it would be a mistake to attribute the high rates of female labor force participation in the United States to
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egalitarianism in gender-role definitions. Female employment has been largely viewed as purely instrumental in assisting and furthering the familyÊs economic status (Ferree 1979, 44 45; Prieto 1987, 85). Women who arrived as adults from Cuba during the post-1959 migrations had probably never worked outside the home in Cuba, and they usually settled into blue-collar jobs without aspirations for career advancement (Portes and Stepick 1993, 128). The Cuban enclave in Miami facilitated the entry of women into the labor force, providing employment venues that were deemed as „acceptable‰ within a traditional gender-role context. The high incidence of family businesses, in which women can be employed within the context of a family enterprise, has been one such venue. The bulk of the factorías usually had Cuban managers, its workforce was homogenous in terms of both ethnicity and gender, and recruitment was made through informal networks, guaranteeing that the women working there were surrounded by relatives or friends. A contributing factor is south FloridaÊs economy, with its predominance of precisely those sectors that have historically employed women: retail sales, services, and nondurable manufacturing (Pérez 1986b, 17). Blue-collar employment continues to be important among women who arrive from Cuba as adults, especially the post-Mariel arrivals. Younger generations of Cuban women, however, those born in the United States or arriving very young from the island, are likely to have obtained the training and education to enter the professional ranks.
Low Birthrate The 1980 U.S. Census revealed that the number of children ever born to women of Cuban origin is extraordinarily low, lower even than the number of children born to non-Hispanic white women living in U.S. metropolitan areas (Pérez 1994b, 101). The 1990 Census showed that it was an enduring trend, extending to a younger generation of Cuban American women. According to the 1990 Census, all Cubanorigin American women 15 years of age and above had given birth during their lifetimes to an average of only 1.56 children. That average was lowest (about 1.0) among women between the ages of 20 and 39. Today, the fertility of Cuban women remains the lowest of all Hispanic groups (53.2 per 1,000 as compared to 68.4 per 1,000 for Puerto Rican women and 106.8 per 1,000 for Mexican females.)
Marital Instability While data by national origin are not available from the official divorce statistics, indication of the incidence of marital disruption is available from the figures on marital status from the U.S. decennial censuses. In 1980, 9.3 percent of all Cubanorigin American women 15 years of age and above were classified as „divorced,‰
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a much higher percentage than in the total U.S. population and even higher than in the Puerto Rican population of the United States (Pérez 1994b, 99). By 1990, the percent of all women divorced increased notably. According to the 1990 Census, 11.9 percent of all Cuban-origin American women over 15 were divorced, with an additional 2.9 percent separated from their spouse. The 1997 Current Population Survey placed the percent of women either divorced or separated at 17.6 percent. In 2008, that figure remained surprisingly similar at 17.9 percent. Clearly, the newer generations of Cuban American entering the marital ages have experienced a high incidence of marital dissolution.
The Family and Economic Adjustment Although the Cuban „success story‰ in the United States has frequently been exaggerated, the data do indicate that along every measure of family income and economic well-being, there is some basis for that image of a successful adjustment. The initial socioeconomic selectivity of the migration and the subsequent establishment of a thriving enclave in Miami are undoubtedly major factors responsible for that success. But it is also important to recognize that those factors have largely operated through the family, which has evident organizational features that facilitate upward mobility. Data on individual (not family) income suggest that the CubansÊ comparatively high family income is largely not the result of high
Evarista Martinez (right); her husband, Ciero Mojica; their son, Duenas Martinez; and his wife, Marta, pose in their apartment in Hialeah, Florida, on April 28, 1995. They were among 20,000 Cubans allowed to immigrate to the United States under an accord announced by the Clinton Administration. (AP Photo/ Lauren Crigler)
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individual income. The key to the economic achievements of Cuban immigrants lies in the apparently high degree of economic cooperation within the family. The Cuban American familyÊs principal characteristics are tailored to facilitate upward mobility: a relatively large number of workers; high rates of female employment; the presence, at least initially, of an elderly generation that contributed directly and indirectly to the householdÊs financial resources; and high levels of school enrollment. Cuban Americans are not unique among immigrant groups in having high expectations and aspirations for upward mobility in their adopted country. In the case of Cubans, however, the initial socioeconomic selectivity of the migration and the accompanying high levels of modernity and secularism that have characterized it have permitted the enactment of family strategies consistent with those expectations and aspirations. Other immigrant groups are not as culturally, economically nor demographically equipped, upon first arriving, to have such features as a low birthrate, high rates of female employment, and a contributing elderly generation in the household. Those same correlates of modernity and secularism that have served Cuban Americans well in the process of economic adjustment have also, however, resulted in a higher incidence of marital instability.
Exile Identity and Culture The Cuban American identity since 1959 has been forged by the social forces associated with a mostly willful exile from the homeland. While most Cubans were not forced out of their homeland under a threat of extermination, the social world that had framed their existence in the homeland clearly changed. Cuban Americans who came during the first wave, and their children, feel as if they were „pushed‰ out of their homeland. Thus, the Cuban American identity is one of political exiles (Garcia 1996). That was the identity first chosen by the initial exodus upon arriving in the United States, and regardless of contrasting experiences in America or the time that has elapsed since then, this definition is consistent with the fact that their shared predicament was perceivably forced upon them by political events in Cuba. Once so designated, most have overtly or intimately remained Cuban political exiles, although no longer exclusively. Defining the émigrés as Cuban political exiles, however, seemed much more fitting in the case of those who left their country right after CastroÊs revolutionary takeover. That first wave after CastroÊs rise to power most closely conformed to the standard definition of „exiles‰ as people politically coerced to flee their country with the expectation of returning. That has not been the condition under which later waves of Cubans left their homeland. Although in all cases political events were responsible for the entire emigration, the historic circumstances, as well as the
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motivations for leaving, have certainly kept changing over the five decades during which the revolutionary government has remained in power. The Pew Hispanic CenterÊs 2006 National Survey of Latinos asked respondents whether they considered the United States or their country of origin to be their real homeland. More than half (52%) of Cuban Americans said they considered the United States their real homeland, again significantly higher than Mexicans (36%), Central and South Americans (35%), and Puerto Ricans (33%)·the latter U.S. citizens by birth (PEW Hispanic Center 2006).
Language The first Cuban émigrés retained the Spanish language to protect their identity from the contextual forces compelling them to surrender their cubanía in America. That belief, whether clearly or tacitly expressed, found justification in the shared expectation of an eventual return to Cuba. The extended-family structure prevalent among the early exiles provided a constant reinforcement of the Cuban identity and language. In addition to its obvious economic advantages, the three-generation family acquired cultural viability as a repository of popular tales, folklore, rituals, and myths, lending coherence to the collective actions of el exilio. The young quickly learned English, but among the elderly, learning a new language was far from a priority, particularly given the institutional completeness of the enclave social structure. To them, in fact, English represented more than just a practical obstacle; it challenged the affective and symbolic underpinnings of a past they revered. English also threatened to estrange them from the world of their grandchildren. The fear of losing the young to the American culture caused grandparents to „push‰ Spanish on the grandchildren; consequently, the mother tongue·the grandmotherÊs tongue, in this case·remains the language predominantly spoken at home to this day. More than two-thirds (69%) of Cubans under 18 speak a language other than English at home, about the same as other Hispanics (67%). Among those 18 and older, about 89 percent of Cubans speak a language other than English at home, a higher rate than among Hispanics (80%) (PEW Hispanic Center 2006). Because the identity of exiles is so deeply rooted in the current Cuban American population, they directly reject the motivations and behaviors associated with „typical‰ immigrants. Immigrants, in contrast to exiles, generally want to come to this country; that is, immigrants react to the seductive „pull‰ of AmericaÊs society. Cubans, on the other hand, largely feel they were reluctantly „pushed‰ out of their homeland. Hence, as exiles, they always rejected for themselves the immigrantsÊ mythical concept of the „melting pot.‰ To them, the process of melting ultimately would have led to the disappearance of their groupÊs unique
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identity. Maintaining the language became a symbol of an identity that cannot be „melted‰ away.
Religion As in most of Latin America, the predominant religion in Cuba during the last 500 years is Roman Catholicism. Throughout most of its history in Cuba, however, the Church has not had the influence it enjoyed throughout the rest of the area. In August 1880, after eight months on the job, HavanaÊs Spanish-born bishop, Ramón Fernández Piérola y López de Luzuriaga, wrote a letter to a colleague back home in which he expressed this forlorn conclusion about Cuba: „I have come to believe that in this country there has never been a religious base; that is to say, that we Spanish have not been fortunate, for that which characterizes us and which we have taken everywhere, religion, we did not bring here‰ (Maza Miquel 1990, 12, quoted in Grenier and Pérez 2003, 41). The influence of Catholicism was further weakened in the 19th century by the entry of large numbers of African slaves and during the 20th century as well as by the U.S. influence. During the 20th century, sizable migrations from China, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the English and French Caribbean served to increase the non-Catholic population. The religions from West Africa eventually blended their traditions with many Catholic practices, resulting in a syncretism of West African and Roman Catholic religious vocabularies, beliefs, and practices. The Santeria faithful seek the guidance, protection, and intervention in their lives of orishas·divinities who trace their lineage both to Yoruba West African gods and Roman Catholic saints. The sacrificial aspect of Santeria practice has caused controversy. In leaders of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Lukumi Babalu Aye, led by Ernesto Pichardo, challenged a local ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice. In 1993, the Supreme Court ruled that the city of Hialeah ordinances against the ritual animal sacrifice in the Santeria church was unconstitutional and that practitioners of this religion were entitled to conduct their ceremonies as prescribed by their African traditions and customs. In the United States, Cubans are, by all measures, the most secular of Latino groups. Fewer (58%) consider religion „very important‰ in their lives (the Latino average is 68%) or attend church weekly (39% compared to the 44% Latino average). When asked about religious affiliation, however, Cuban Americans overwhelmingly identify themselves as Roman Catholics. Approximately 60 percent of Cuban Americans identify as Catholics, 14 percent are evangelicals, and 7 percent follow mainline Protestant denominations. The Miami Jewish Federation reported in 1984 that there were 5,000 Jewish Cubans living in the Miami area.
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Holidays, Celebrations, and Cuisine National holidays practiced on the island often differ from those observed in the Cuban American community. Christmas is the only one of the governmentrecognized religious holidays (reinstated as such following Pope John Paul IIÊs official visit to Cuba in 1998), but there are several national holidays recognized on the island that are, for the most part, ignored in the diaspora. The May 1 Día de los Trabajadores (Day of the Workers) and the July 26 Day of the National Rebellion are the most significant. On January 28, all Cubans, on and off the island, celebrate the birth of national hero José Martí, but only those on the island celebrate October 8 to honor the death of Ernesto „Che‰ Guevara. Two days later, however, on October 10, all join to commemorate the day in 1868 that led to the Independence War against Spain and eventually the Ten YearsÊ War. May 20 is recognized by all sides as the birth of Cuba as an independent republic in 1902, although under the patrimony of the United States. Similarly, April 19 lives in glory as the day of victory at the Bay of Pigs for Cubans on the island and in infamy among those in Miami. The first of January is New YearÊs Day everywhere, but on the island itÊs also the day of the Triumph of the Revolution. Cuban Americans have embraced most traditional holidays and celebrations of their adopted country without giving up the ones that they brought from the homeland. It is common for Cuban Americans, for instance, to commemorate such American holidays as Independence Day, Labor Day, and Thanksgiving, although
Calle Ocho Festival In 1978, the Kiwanis Club of Little Havana initiated a street fair designed to showcase the continuation of Cuban culture in Miami. Today, the Calle Ocho Festival is touted as the “world’s largest street party” as well as a major celebration of Cuban cultural traditions. While the festival has expanded into a 23 block long Pan-Latino affair encompassing Latino performers, food vendors, and a wide range of activities, it has retained its identity as a Cuban festival. It takes place in the heart of Little Havana. Participants can find hand-rolled cigars, botanicas, Cuban restaurants with their cafecitos windows facing the sidewalk of the Paseo de las Estrellas (Walk of Stars), and old timers playing dominos daily in Maximo Gomez Park at the beginning of Monument Boulevard. Along the tree-lined boulevard are monuments commemorating a variety of Cuban cultural events and figures (the Bay of Pigs invasion, José Martí, Antonio Maceo). More than a million people come to Miami during March to participate in the Calle Ocho Festival. In 1998, 119,000 people joined in the world’s longest conga line, as recorded in the Guinness Book of World Records.
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Susana Rivero, a member of the Key West Comparsa Dancers, prances down Duval Street with hundreds of other dancers during the Key West Cuban-American Heritage Festival’s “Coast-to-Coast Conga Line,” June 21, 2002. The festival also featured a street fiesta, a celebrity boxing exhibition, a salsa dance contest, a concert starring Jon Secada, and a ceremony honoring Cuban patriot José Martí. (AP Photo/Florida Keys News Bureau, Roberto Rodriguez)
the typical American turkey dinner is frequently replaced with the traditional Cuban lechoncito (roasted pig), congri (rice and black beans), and yuca ( a distant cousin of the potato). The biggest celebration of the year is Nochebuena, the Christmas Eve party that is mostly a family affair that brings together all relatives. During the weeks prior to this celebration, Cuban supermarkets become stocked with such seasonal delicacies as sidra (Spanish cider), chestnuts, walnuts, and turrones (rich-tasting nougat usually imported from Spain). Traditional Cuban food is the product of the mingling of Spanish and West African cuisines. Pork and beef are the most common meats in the traditional Cuban diet. Rice, beans, and root vegetables usually accompany such dishes. As a rule, Cuban food is not spicy and the necessary ingredients are not difficult to find in typical grocery stores. Most Cuban Americans, especially those who have been raised in the United States, eat the full culinary spectrum of „American‰ foods and tend to reserve traditional cooking for special occasions.
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Cuban Food: No Chili, Plenty of Flavor Typical Cuban food has roots in European and African traditions and works in a bit of the South American through corn tamales and fried plantains. There are three things that are seldom found in Cuban food: creams and milk products, cheeses in heavy sauces, and spicy chilies typical of some Mexican and Meso American dishes. Typical Cuban foods include black beans, white rice, yellow rice, citrus marinades, garlic, and fried sliced banana (plantain). Olive oil and garlic marinades are often used as sauces. Typical spices used liberally are cumin, cayenne, and coriander (cilantro). Tubers such as yucca and boniato are a staple along with the rice and beans. Meats are often prepared roasted with a creole, tomato-based sauce or with a mojo, an olive oil and garlic sauce/marinade, that is found throughout the Caribbean. Pork and chicken are considered the preferred meats, although no one is going to turn down a perfectly seasoned “palomilla” (a thick steak cut from the bottom round).
Music As has been mentioned, in few countries of Latin America has the process of transculturation produced a culture that so clearly manifests its African lineage. A good example of the impact of transculturation is the music that Cubans created largely during the first half of the 20th century. A result of the mixture of African and European elements and instrumentation, it is CubaÊs most important contribution to universal culture. The music of Cuba has had such an impact throughout the world because it represents a unique sound, a sound the world had not heard before. The exceptional quality is rooted in the diverse elements that came together to create something new, but something still reflects the different lineages that combine to create it. There are rhumba and comparsa compositions, for example, that fuse Spanish melodies and instrumentations with African percussion and feature a Chinese „cornet.‰ The core of the Cuban sound is the intricate overlaying of various rhythm lines within a single tempo. The result is a myriad of complex music forms that defy neat categorizations. It is a distinctly secular music, even more, a sensual music, very much of this world. It is the music of love, seduction, dancing; music for the nightclub, the smoke-filled bar, the jam-session, the carnaval. It is not the music of the church choir, the altar, nor the divine. It is, in other words, the music of an „immoral‰ port culture perennially at a crossroads. The music produced by Cubans in the United States is deeply rooted in the Cuban tradition, but it has undergone its own unavoidable process of transculturation in
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this country. Even if it is somewhat muted, the African contribution to Cuban culture is present among Cubans in the United States, if only because it has become part of Cuban culture, the same culture the exiles strive hard to maintain in the United States. The so-called „Miami Sound,‰ for example, is, above anything else, Cuban music, but it shows a clear influence of 1960s rock, and the lyrics are frequently in English.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture The Cuban American Enclave MiamiÊs Cuban community is regarded as the foremost example in the United States of a true ethnic enclave. An ethnic enclave is „a distinctive economic formation, characterized by the spatial concentration of immigrants who organize a variety of enterprises to serve their own ethnic market and the general population‰ (Portes and Bach 1985, 203). The foundation of the enclave is not simply its size or scale, but its highly differentiated nature. The sheer numbers, nonetheless, are impressive. By 1990, 42 percent of all enterprises in Miami-Dade County were Hispanic-owned, and the absolute number of Hispanic-owned businesses in the area was second only to Los Angeles, which has a much larger Hispanic population. Today, the trend continues. Three-quarters of Hispanic-owned enterprises in Miami are controlled by Cubans. The second and most important overall feature of the Cuban economic enclave in Miami is its institutional range. The variety of sales and services controlled by Cubans, as well as their penetration into the professions, is so extensive that some claim it is possible for Miami Cubans to completely live and deal within their own ethnic community. That is not literally true. Almost all Cubans interact extensively with mainstream American institutions, specifically the state, to which they pay taxes and which educates most of their children. But the claim does reflect something about the extensiveness of the Cuban economic enclave. The relatively all-encompassing character of the enclave somewhat insulates the newly arrived Cuban immigrants against the usual vicissitudes of the secondary labor market. In contrast to Mexican immigrants, for example, who join the labor market in peripheral sectors of the economy throughout the country dominated by Anglos and with little informal support, many recent Cuban immigrants enter the labor market largely through businesses owned or operated by earlier arrivals. Although wages may not be higher in the enclave, ethnic bonds provide informal networks of support that facilitate the learning of new skills, access of resources, and the overall process of economic adjustment. These positive implications have helped Cuban Americans attain a socioeconomic position that
442 | Cuban Immigrants
is relatively high in comparison with most immigrant groups (Portes and Bach 1985). While Cuban American entrepreneurship is impressive, it should be noted that most businesses are small and family owned. Only one out of seven Hispanic businesses in 1990 had paid employees, and together they generated only 30,000 paid jobs (Metro-Dade 1993). Latinos remain underrepresented in the fastest growing industries, especially the financial services. Although their representation has increased, they continue to be outnumbered by Anglos in professional and executive occupations. Cubans in Miami remain overrepresented in manual occupations, working primarily as laborers, craftsmen, and service workers (Stepick et al. 2003). The enclave seems to provide a leg up for many new arrivals. For example, immigrants who arrived in the mid-1970s and the Mariel Cubans who arrived in 1980 both had poverty level incomes for a few years after they arrived. But within three years, their incomes had improved notably, with 1970s immigrant Cubans advancing more quickly than a comparable group of Mexican immigrants and 1980 Mariel Cubans outstripping comparative Haitian immigrants in Miami (Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Stepick 1985). The enclave at its inception benefited male workers over female workers. In contrast to Cuban male migrants, Cuban females generally continue to have low incomes long after they arrive. Cuban female annual income in 1979 was scarcely higher than for the total U.S. Hispanic female population (Pérez 1986a, 10; Bernal 1982; Ferree 1979; Kurtines and Miranda 1980; Prieto 1987; Szapocznik, Scopetta, and Tillman 1978; Szapocznik and Hernandez 1988). While both male and female Cuban immigrants may begin working in informal jobs in the enclave, men appear to be more capable of advancing out of those jobs, whereas women remain within them. Success has not been shared by all Cuban Americans. The typical Cuban American is more likely to be working class, and, nationally, poverty among Cuban American is nearly twice as high as among white, non-Hispanic Americans (Grenier 1992). Females earn low incomes as do new immigrants and the Cuban elderly have higher poverty rates than MiamiÊs African Americans. Yet, in spite of these working-class and poverty-stricken members of the Cuban community, Cubans have not become welfare dependent and have achieved more on average than other American Hispanics. This is largely due to the types of capital that the Cubans have been able to exploit.
Types of Capital There were considerable macro social, political, and economic conditions that welcomed the Cubans to the United States. Although these are important and certainly
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 443
helped shape the fate of the Cuban immigrants, the immigrants had skills and talents that allowed them to take advantage of the favorable conditions. Cubans have had three forms of capital: economic, political, and social. By capital, I mean the available resources that can be invested or utilized to produce even more assets. The three types of capital interacted to construct an ethnic solidarity that in turn reinforced that capital.
Economic Capital Cubans arriving in the United States in the 1960s, when the foundations for community were laid, were disproportionately drawn from the upper sectors of Cuban society. Many were professionals or entrepreneurs and had university degrees. A significant proportion of them had previous business experience, and more than a few had contacts with U.S. companies that had done business in Cuba before the revolution. Most shared a belief in the superiority of capitalism, a confidence in their own abilities, and a positive regard for the United States. As elites, they often had close personal and family ties with others that had arrived earlier, and some had moved their economic capital to the United States prior to their arrival, depositing it in banks or investing in real estate. Yet others were able to land jobs with American companies (Pérez-Stable and Uriarte 1990, 5). This fortunate minority sometimes provided a leg up for later arrivals, furnishing „character loans‰ based less on income statements than on trust, honor, and personal knowledge that the individuals in question were skilled and motivated and with a history of business success in pre-revolutionary Cuba (Portes and Stepick 1993, 132 34).
Political Capital Refugee communities frequently garner political capital since the very status of refugee reflects a political decision by the receiving state. In the United States, groups designated as refugees are offered special governmental assistance when they arrive that is not available to other immigrant flows (Loescher and Scanlan 1986). Such was the case with the Cubans. The U.S. government created for the arriving Cubans an unprecedented direct and indirect assistance program, the Cuban Refugee Program that spent nearly $1 billion between 1965 and 1976 (Pedraza-Bailey 1985, 41). The federal government provided transportation costs from Cuba, financial assistance to needy refugees and to state and local public agencies that provided services for refugees, and employment and professional training courses for refugees. During the 1960s, the IRS allowed Cuban Americans to declare capital losses for properties in Cuba (Pérez-Stable and Uriarte 1990, 6). Even in programs not especially designed for them, Cubans seemed to benefit. From 1968 to 1980, Hispanics (almost all Cubans)
444 | Cuban Immigrants
received 46.9 percent of all Small Business Administration loans in Dade County (Porter and Dunn 1984, 196). A second government program that unintentionally provided resources that assisted Cuban American success was the U.S. covert war against the Castro government. The vast operation run out of Miami by the CIA in the early 1960s meant an infusion of cash into the local Cuban community. The University of Miami had the largest CIA station in the world outside of the organizationÊs headquarters in Virginia. At one point in the early 1960s, with perhaps as many as 12,000 Cubans in Miami on the CIA payroll, it was one of the largest employers in the state of Florida. It supported what was described as the third-largest navy in the world and over 50 front businesses: CIA boat shops, CIA gun shops, CIA travel agencies, CIA detective agencies, and CIA real estate agencies (Didion 1987, 90 91; Rieff 1987, 193 207; Rich 1974, 7 9). In addition, hundreds of Cubans were trained in undercover operations, and when the U.S. government cut off funding in the late 1960s, some of them became involved in the lucrative drug trade. While it is a gross distortion to see the Cuban success story as a mere result of U.S. government support based on Cold War considerations plus CIA and drug money, there is little doubt that these factors contributed seed capital for at least some legitimate enterprises (Grenier and Stepick 1992, 5 7). These benefits, moreover, were not limited to those the federal government provided. The State of Florida passed laws that made it easier for Cuban professionals, especially medical doctors, to re-certify themselves to practice in the United States. At the county level, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 53 percent of minority contracts for Dade CountyÊs rapid transit system went to Hispanic firms. Dade County Schools led the nation in bilingual education by introducing it for the first wave of Cuban refugees in 1960. The Dade County Commission also designated the county officially bilingual in the mid-1970s. Cubans in Miami had available especially for them language classes, vocational training, business education, and varied adult education programs (Mohl 1990, 49). In sum, the total benefits available to the Cuban community appear to surpass those available to other U.S. minority groups. About 75 percent of Cuban immigrants who arrived in the United States before 1974 directly received some kind of state-provided benefits (Pedraza-Bailey 1985, 40).
Social Capital Cuban Miami is a prime example of an immigrant community high in social capital. Portes defines social capital as „the ability to command scarce resources by virtue of membership in networks or broader social structures‰ (1995, 257). The economic and political capital, previously discussed, establishes the basis for a social capital that is not limited, both in its origins and consequences, to the political and economic spheres.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 445
At the core of the formation of immigrant social capital is a solidarity that is „grounded in a common cultural memory and the replication of home country institutions‰ (Portes 1995, 258). In the case of Cuban Miami, that solidarity is bonded even stronger than in many other immigrant communities by the experience of exile, which sharpens the CubansÊ sense of a common history and, even further, of a common purpose as a group. Portes and Stepick viewed this as a major feature of the Cuban enclave in Miami and labeled it „the moral community‰ (1993, 137 38). Furthermore, exiles, holding out for the hope of recovering the homeland, strive to transplant and replicate the institutions of the country of origin, contributing to that sense of solidarity. This degree of solidarity is further reinforced by the economic benefits of the enclave, resulting in a multiplication of social networks within the community. The dense social networks of Cuban Miami provide a tremendous capital with which members of the community can advance their agenda of upward mobility for themselves and, especially, for their children (Portes 1995, 258). It also reinforces the immigrantsÊ values, norms, and ideology, and shields them from discrimination from the dominant society. In short, what the Cuban American social capital has done is give a positive value to being a Cuban in Miami.
Exile Politics and the Persistence of the Exile Ideology In every facet of their experience in exile, Cubans obsessively have held on to that sense of political identity; it characterizes them, it sets them apart from other Hispanics, and it provides the strength for their existence in the United States (Garcia 1996). To them, being political exiles has meant reaffirming the notion that although they were defeated in the struggle against Castro, they have never given up. Despite mounting evidence that most exiles may never go back to the home they once left, their mostly rhetorical war to liberate Cuba continues. The forging and maintenance of the exile identity have contributed to the creation of a particularly „Cuban‰ way of looking at their social and political environment. Analysts refer to this vision of the world as the Exile Ideology (Pérez 1992; Grenier 2007; Grenier and Pérez 2003). In many ways, this worldview differentiates Cuban Americans from non-Cubans in both Miami and the rest of the country. Not all Cubans in the United States share this ideology, but it is a critical reference point that serves to define the identity of Cuban Americans. The exile ideology is a basic ingredient in the development of a „moral community‰ that serves to build political capital and a sense of solidarity in the enclave. Whatever image most Americans have of Cuban Americans is probably constituted, more than anything else, by political traits: staunch anti-Castroism, militancy, conservatism, and affiliation with the Republican Party. These assumed political features of the community result from and reinforce the one characteristic
446 | Cuban Immigrants
An American and a Cuban flag are held together as approximately 300 people show support for Cubans, but dislike for their leader, Fidel Castro, March 2, 1996, in Los Angeles. The protest was in response to the Cuban government’s downing of two civilian planes carrying four exile pilots. (AP/ Wide World Photos)
that gives the community its identity: an obsession with the past, present, and future of Cuba. Anti-Castroism might well be considered to be the master status of the community, establishing the limits and potentials for all group activity. The exile ideology has three principal and interrelated characteristics: (1) the primacy of the homeland; (2) uncompromising hostility towards the Castro government; and (3) emotionalism, irrationality, and intolerance.
The Primacy of the Homeland In exile ideology, the affairs of the homeland represent the communityÊs foremost priority. The public discourse is largely preoccupied with the political status of the homeland. A key element of any exile consciousness is the fact that the community was forced out of its country; emigration was not a choice, as is the case with immigrants, but a survival strategy allowing them to live and fight another day. It is an enduring conflict. During the past 40 years, there has been a protracted continuation of the intense conflict that occurred from about 1960 and 1962, when CastroÊs regime was fortifying itself against the various and serious attempts by the U.S.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 447
government and various sectors of Cuban society to overthrow it. For many Cubans who „lost‰ that conflict and went into exile, the struggle has not ended, and they have tried, with amazing success, to keep the conflict alive. The importance of Cuba for the Cuban American community is often ridiculed since the Cuba issue seems to work itself into venues far removed from having any type of foreign policy implication, at least to the general public. For example, Miami-Dade County was the only county in the country that had an ordinance preventing county funds from being used in any business activity involving Cuban nationals. In most situations, this prohibition was redundant with the federal trade sanctions currently in place but often the ordinance had a direct impact on cultural organizations working within the legal limits of the federal trade sanctions. Organizations promoting cultural exchanges, musical or in the plastic arts, faced the prospect of having their county funds suspended or at least publicly scrutinized if Cuban artists were involved in local activities. Although the ordinance was judged to be unconstitutional in 2000, support for it did not go away. When asked in the FIU Cuba Poll 2000 if they supported the principles of the revoked ordinance, 49 percent of Cuban Americans said that they did, as compared to 25 percent of nonCubans in Miami-Dade (Grenier and Gladwin 2000). This obsession with Cuba spills over into the political process in another way. Many Cuban Americans use the Cuba issue as a litmus test for evaluating candidates for local office. In the Cuba Poll 2000 question measuring the salience of Cuba on local politics, 77 percent of Cuban Americans said that a candidateÊs position on Cuba was important in determining their votes (Grenier and Gladwin 2000). The primacy of the homeland explains the overwhelming preference for the Republican Party, a trait that sets Cubans apart from other Latino groups. Registered Republicans far outnumber registered Democrats among Cubans in Miami, to the tune of approximately 67 percent Republicans and 17 percent Democrats. In the mind of a typical Cuban American, loyalty to the Republican Party demonstrates the importance of international issues in the political agenda of Cubans. If a substantial number of that community did not agree with the elements of the exile ideology, or if there was a greater balance in that agenda, with importance given to purely domestic issues, the Democratic Party would have made greater inroads. In fact, if Cuban Americans were to view themselves as immigrants in this country, rather than as political exiles, and made judgments about political parties based upon their needs and aspirations as immigrants in the United States, they would be Democrats in overwhelming numbers. This would be true not only because of the general social agenda of the Democrats but also specifically because of the experience of Cuban migration. The measures that have greatly facilitated Cuban immigration and the adjustment of Cuban Americans in the United States have all been enacted by Democratic administrations: the Cuban Refugee Emergency Program
448 | Cuban Immigrants
and its resettlement efforts; the assistance given to the Cuban elderly and the dependent; the establishment of the Airlift or Freedom Flights; and the allowance for the Mariel boatlift to take place; among others.
Uncompromising Hostility toward the Castro Government The goal of the Cuban exile is the overthrow of Fidel Castro. This is to be accomplished through hostility and isolation, not rapprochement. Such an ideology has, in general terms, been consistent with United States policy towards Cuba over the past 40 years. In fact, it is generally accepted that pressure from Cuban Americans has been the major factor that has kept the United StatesÊ Cuba policy essentially immutable for five decades and focused on a strategy of isolating Cuba. Cuban Americans did not begin to exert a significant influence on U.S.-Cuban policy until after 1980. The catalyst for the shift was the presidential election of 1980. The candidacy and election of Ronald Reagan had two consequences: it dramatically increased the participation of Cuban Americans in the U.S. electoral system, and it prompted the formation of an exile lobby group in Washington. The Republican candidate was viewed as an ideologically committed anticommunist who would be really tough on Castro. Becoming U.S. citizens and voting in the presidential election, far from being an indication of assimilation in the United States, was actually a strategy within the traditional exile agenda. The surge in 1980 in Cuban American voting strength created, by the mid-to-late 1980s, considerable forces against softening the United StatesÊ Cuba policy. One such force was the creation of a noticeable Cuban American voting bloc in Florida and, to a lesser extent, in New Jersey, both key electoral states. Politicians quickly learned, correctly, that those blocs were easily swayed by supporting a hardline attitude against the Cuban government. That tactic has been widely used by congressional as well as presidential candidates, both Republican and Democrat. A related development, starting in the late 1980s, was the election of Cuban Americans to Congress. Numbering five at present, the Cuban Americans in Congress have placed a priority on maintaining and strengthening current policy towards Cuba, thereby forming a very committed core of members within Congress working to keep that policy from changing. The election of Ronald Reagan created the conditions for the development of yet another important vehicle for exiles to capture the direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba. By 1980, a successful entrepreneurial class with accumulated surplus capital had emerged within the Cuban American community. This new prosperity could be tapped to create a presence in Washington to further the anti-Castro agenda, and the election of a president perceived as friendly to that cause seemed a propitious moment for such a step. This convergence of economic and political conditions made possible the creation of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF).
The Second and Later Generations | 449
The CANF followed the traditional formula of legitimate U.S. interest groups: campaign contributions, political fundraisers, lobbying, information dissemination, media relations, and so forth. It was anti-Castroism „the American way.‰ The CANF played a critical role in the passage of both the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (or the Torricelli Act) and the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (or the Helms-Burton Act), both of which tightened the U.S. embargo on Cuba. It was largely responsible for the establishment by the U.S. government of Radio and TV Martí, which broadcast to Cuba. By the 1980s, therefore, Cuban exiles had become major players in sustaining and strengthening the policy that the United States had established some 40 years ago towards the island. Their increasing influence in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s through the ballot box, representation in Congress, and lobbying, constitute the principal force for inertia in the United StatesÊ policy of hostility toward Cuba.
The Second and Later Generations For the second generation and beyond, one of the salient points in the process of incorporation centers on the implications for the enclave. As mentioned, the dynamics of the enclave established the parameters for cultural, economic, political, and social integration of first-generation Cuban Americans into the U.S. system. How do these dynamics translate to second and future generations? One would expect that the influence of the enclave and the success that it has facilitated among firstgeneration Cubans would be a positive one. One would also expect that the insularity of the enclave, along with its density of social networks, would reinforce the Cuban cultural memory and facilitate the transmission of Cuban traits and identity. While the literature in immigrant incorporation would lead us to expect an eventual melding, if not melting, of Cubans into the social fiber of the United States, the Children of Immigrants project raises some interesting questions about the future of Cubans, at least those living in the Miami area(Portes and Rumbaut 2001). When it comes to ethnic identification, second-generation Cuban Americans were the most likely to identify themselves as hyphenated Americans than any other national immigrant group in the sample. Furthermore, they were more likely to identify themselves as American than any other group and least likely to identify themselves with a non-national identity (e.g., Cubans). Portes and MacLeod, analyzing the results of the first wave of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey (CILS) (1996) argued that groups that are more advantaged and had lengthier stays in the United States exhibit a greater tendency to identify as American (Pérez 2001). Between the first and second surveys, however, there was a significant increase in the number of respondents embracing the pan-ethnic label of Hispanic.
450 | Cuban Immigrants
Second-generation Cubans also reported the lowest perception of discrimination of any CILS group. This is considered to be a result both of the relative advantage of Cubans and the insularity of the enclave. This insularity has the strongest explanatory power when one considers the children of Mariel refugees, who received the most negative reception at the national level but managed to benefit from the enclaveÊs capacity to shield its members from discrimination by the host society (Pérez 2001).
The Achievement Paradox Although Cuban American children have comparably high aspirations, their achievements fall short when compared to the children of other immigrant groups. The GPA of Cuban American students falls significantly below those of other immigrant groups. Even the group with the highest GPA, the children of the early exiles, are below the CILS mean (Pérez 2001, 117). Turning to the dropout rates, the results are even more surprising. Cubans had the highest dropout rates of all the nationalities in the CILS. Cubans were the only group with school attrition rates in double figures. These limited achievement measures were surprising in a population expected to reap the rewards from a relatively favorable immigration and reception experience. Pérez forwards two tentative and complementary explanations for this achievement paradox. One is that Cubans, with a relatively advantaged and long period of acculturation, have simply acculturated to the American normative pattern of school behavior. That is, Cubans are moving away from the model of academic achievement that characterizes most immigrant children and are starting to follow the mainstream American pattern in which aspirations remain high but do not correlate necessarily with academic achievement. In this interpretative framework, assimilation would be bad for academic achievement, a pattern that Rumbaut identifies as one of the main „paradoxes of assimilation‰ (Rumbaut 1997, 92). The second possible interpretation, according to Pérez, is rooted in the dynamics of the enclave. The confidence of second-generation Cubans to succeed without extraordinary academic effort is rooted in their position as the dominant immigrant group in the Miami area. This dominance comes with the perception of control over the resources necessary for upward mobility. Those resources, specifically the availability of employment within the enclave, give children the perception of viable options for upward mobility that do not require the educational route. As Pérez states, „The enclave . . . may function not as a golden springboard for the second generation but as a basic safety net‰ (2001, 122). What is clear is that the adaptation process of the children of Cuban immigrants may be quite different from that of their first-generation parents. They are one of
Issues in Relations between the United States and Cuba | 451
the major forces changing the profile of Cubans in the United States. The other major force is the continued immigration from the island. Together, these two social forces will shape the future of U.S.-Cuban relations.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Cuba An exile identity has colored all aspects of the life of Cubans in the United States. It has resulted in an inordinate allocation of resources, including emotional energy, towards the primary task of reclaiming the homeland; it has shaped the social life of the community and the focus of its voluntary associations; it has reinforced a sense of exceptionalism in the community, setting the community apart from other immigrant and Latino groups; it has made the relationship with the government of the homeland a perennially conflictive one; and it has determined the nature of their participation in the political life of the new country. In short, the condition of exile has defined the purpose of the Cuban American community and its reason for being here. And it is the condition that has largely shaped the image most Americans have of them. If indeed exile has defined the condition of Cubans in the United States, then the biggest issue as we look toward the future is: What will happen when they are no longer exiles? That is, what will this group look like when the entire context that has shaped their very identity changes dramatically? There is a combination of ways in which the context of the exile condition may change. One is through a generational transition. The other is through a fundamental change in the relationship with the homeland. The predominant force in the creation of the world of Cuban Americans is the early wave of exiles, displaced elites, and others marked by the confrontation of the early 1960s. They have been the keepers of the flame of the anti-Castro struggle. They established the bases for the creation of the enclave. But that was over 50 years ago. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, however, the growth of the U.S.-born and the arrival of new waves of Cuban immigrants to the states had combined with mortality to whittle down the proportion of those early exiles. Those arriving from 1960 to 1964 and during the airlift barely accounted for a third of all Cubans in the United States in 1997. And the first decade of the new century promises to be the most active in Cuban migration history (Wassen 2009, 15). Along with the second- and third-generation Cuban Americans, this transitional force is certain to reshape the „exilic‰ foundations of the Cuban American community. Evidence of this transition is found in the research focusing on the Cuban American communityÊs attitudes towards the island government.
452 | Cuban Immigrants
Based on the results of the 2004 Cuba Poll (Grenier and Gladwin 2004), the largest poll ever conducted of Cuban American political attitudes towards Cuba, the Table 73 shows the percentage of Cuban Americans supporting the embargo and other indicators of the exile ideology, broken down for eight waves of immigration and by generation. The figures show a considerable gap between peak support for anti-Castro policies in the first two postrevolutionary waves (1959 1964 and 1965 1973) and the lowest level of support in the last two waves (1990 1995 and 1996 2004). The tendency, then, is for more recent migrants from the island to be more supportive of engagement and less supportive of the hardline measures put in place during the 1960s. The demographic developments served to broaden the ideological spectrum of Cuban exile politics, creating new voices that argued against a continuation of the current U.S. policy. These new elements have failed to gain much traction on Cuba policy design, yet they have served to challenge what had been a monolithic image of exile politics, and they provide support for initiatives that challenge the traditional course of U.S.-Cuba relations. In addition to the rise of moderate political voices and organizations, perhaps an even greater challenge to the continuation of a policy of isolation towards Cuba has developed within the exile community. Cuban Americans whose only motivation is to visit and help family and friends on the island represent a major point of contact between the two countries. Remittances and family visits provide Cuba with more foreign exchange than its tourism industry and fuel the development of a more moderate voice within the Miami community. For this demographic transition to have an impact on policy makers and ultimately policy, the key variable is voter registration. And hereÊs the problem. As the citizenship information in the Table 74 shows that, while attitudes might be changing, voter registration is lagging behind. Recent arrivals are less likely to be registered voters, thus making their opinions about policy concern inconsequential. Only 18 percent of Cubans arriving after 1990 are citizens (American Community Survey 2004). When the 2003 restrictions on travel and remittances were established, there were voices of dissent in the Cuban American community. Yet these voices were muted because of their lack of voting power. Sixty-four percent of Cuban Americans opposed restrictions on travel and remittance; yet, most were new arrivals with no political clout (Grenier and Gladwin 2008). In addition to the new arrivals, two other important sectors of the Cuban population of the United States tend to add diversity to the political culture: the new generations and those living outside of Miami. The research shows that members of the second generation born in the United States are much more conciliatory in their views towards island politics than their parents. The same is true of Cubans who do not live within the insularity of the Miami enclave and are therefore less
Issues in Relations between the United States and Cuba | 453
likely to have maintained an exile ideology (Girard and Grenier 2008). According to the 1995 poll, Cubans living in New Jersey are more likely to favor a dialogue with the Castro regime than those living in Miami. Similarly, New Jersey Cubans are less likely to be influenced by a candidateÊs position on Cuba as they cast their vote in local and national elections. As the process of concentration in south Florida continues, the arrival in Miami of Cubans who have lived elsewhere in the United States adds yet another source of pluralism to the political landscape. Of course, one way for things to change much more dramatically is for there to be a transformation in the relationship with the homeland. That could happen with the death of Fidel Castro, for in that case, the „personalized‰ conflict would be over, especially if Cuba undergoes a significant transformation as a result of such an event. The exile ideology has a strong oppositional nature. It would not be sustainable without its nemesis. Another way the relationship with the homeland could change, not necessarily unrelated to the death of Castro, is through a normalization of relations between the two countries. Ending the isolation of Cuba would potentially permit a normal flow of people and goods between the two countries. There would be a boom in that flow and Cuban Americans would be in the thick of it, given their interest in their homeland and the likelihood that Miami will be the axis of that expanded contact. Will many Cuban Americans return to Cuba permanently once these conditions occur? For decades polls have shown that only about 20 percent of Cubans interviewed said they would. Moving back permanently may not be necessary to fulfill the exile dream of „recovering‰ Cuba. The distance between Havana and Miami is much closer than the distance from Miami to, say, Disney World in Orlando. The aerial jump across the Florida Straits takes all of 20 minutes. With 1.6 million persons of Cuban origin living in the United States, a majority of them in Miami, and with the opening of Cuba as a tourist destination for Americans, there will probably be an air shuttle system between Miami and Havana that rivals that the shuttle system between New York and Washington. Such a development would fundamentally transform Cuba and Miami. When they largely cease to be exiles, Cubans in the United States will no doubt start moving closer to other U.S. immigrant groups in terms of their political, social, and economic agenda. There will probably be a greater cultural and political integration with other Latino groups. There are already indications that the pan-ethnic labels so vehemently rejected by the first generation have made inroads among Cuban Americans born in this country. The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study found that among the Cuban-origin American children in senior high school, 30 percent identified as „Hispanic‰ or „Latino‰ (Pérez 2001, 107 8). It is an identity not derived from their parents. Virtually none of those children indicated that their Cuban-born parents identified as anything other than „Cuban.‰
454 | Cuban Immigrants
But there probably will be limits to the degree of integration and identification with other immigrant and Latino groups. A strong insular identity and a sense of exceptionalism are firm tenets of Cuban culture, preceding, by centuries, the creation of the modern Cuban presence in the United States. The bumper sticker „I am not Hispanic, I am Cuban,‰ is likely to be around somewhere in the United States for a long time to come.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Cuban Immigration by Major Wave, 1959−2008
317,468 270,247 245,864
130,000
125,000
24,659 1959–1964
Figure 4
1965–1973
1974–1979
24,659 1980
1981–1989
1990–2000
2001–2008
Cuban migration by major wave: 1959–2008
Table 72 Regional dispersion U.S. population Northeast
All Hispanics
Cuban population
54,925,000
6,405,000
185,000
New Jersey
8,683,000
1,424,000
82,000
New York
19,490,000
3,232,000
68,000
66,561,000
4,252,000
62,000
111,719,000
16,441,000
1,260,000
Florida
18,328,000
3,845,000
1,117,000
Texas
24,327,000
8,816,000
44,000
70,855,000
19,224,000
123,000
36,757,000
13,435,000
77,000
Midwest South
West California
Source: Pew Hispanic Center. Hispanics of Cuban Origin in the United States, 2008: Fact Sheet. April 22, 2010. Tabulated from American Community Survey 1 percent PUMS Sample.
Table 73 Percentage supporting the exile ideology, 1991–2008 Measures of the exile ideology
March 1991
October 1991
June 1993
March 1995
June 1997
October 2000
March 2004
March 2007
December 2008
Embargo
86.6
77.0
84.8
83.4
78.2
62.4
66.0
57.5
45
No dialogue
60.2
50.7
57.0
59.5
48.5
48.4
44.5
35.0
50.2
38.2
44.5
34.0
30.6
28.3
76.6
71.6
59.7
43.7
45.2
38.0
59.7
63.2
47.2
53.7
44.8
34
57.3
42.6
35
68.5
66.1
52
No medicine No food No travel
54.7
50.2
No diplomacy a
Republican a
69.5
67.0
Percent registered as a Democrat: 3/91: 16.3, 10/91: 17.2, 3/04:17.7, 3/07: 18.3, 12/08: 27; percent registered as an independent: 3/91: 14.2, 10/91: 14.4, 3/04: 12.9, 3/07: 15.2, 12/08: 21.
Table 74 Cuban citizenship status by wave of arrival Cuban Citizenship Status, 2004
Yes
No
Cuban foreign born
60%
40%
Entered before 1980
90%
10%
Entered 1980–1990
60%
40%
Entered after 1990
18%
82%
Non-Cuban Hispanic foreign born
26%
74%
Non-Hispanic white foreign born
56%
44%
All other foreign born
53%
4%
Total foreign born
42%
58%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. American Community Survey, 2004.
Table 75 Cuban migration by major wave: 1959–2008 Year
Number
1959–1964
270,247
1965–1973
317,468
1974–1979
24,659
1980
125,000
1981–1989
24,659
1990–2000
130,000
2001–2008
245,864
Total
1,137,897
Source: Nackerud, Springer, Larrison, and Issac (1999).
456
Table 76 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000–2009
457
Region and country of birth
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
Total
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
10,299,430
Cuba
18,960
27,453
28,182
9,262
20,488
36,261
45,614
29,104
49,500
38,954
303,778
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 77 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Region/ country: Cuba Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
38,954
20,725
18,229
Leading states of residence Arizona
293
176
117
California
451
239
212
Colorado
64
41
23
Connecticut
45
29
16
31,928
16,835
15,093
Georgia
255
139
116
Illinois
Florida
150
75
75
Maryland
27
15
12
Massachusetts
54
28
26
Michigan
114
57
57
Nevada
735
403
332
New Jersey
880
446
434
New York
416
215
201
North Carolina
149
85
64
25
17
8
163
93
70
1,192
705
487
147
89
58
64
36
28
1,802
1,002
800
Ohio Pennsylvania Texas Virginia Washington Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
458
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 78 Population characteristics of Hispanics of Cuban origin U.S. population
All Hispanics
Cuban origin
304,059,728
46,891,456
1,617,010
Male
49.30%
51.60%
50.20%
Female
50.70%
48.40%
49.80%
Native born
266,098,793
29,080,677
651,239
Foreign born
37,960,935
17,810,779
965,771
36.9
27.5
41.4
Under 5 years
6.90%
11.20%
6.40%
5 to 17 years
17.40%
23.00%
14.60%
18 to 24 years
9.90%
11.30%
8.50%
25 to 34 years
13.30%
17.20%
10.70%
35 to 44 years
14.10%
15.00%
16.00%
45 to 54 years
14.60%
10.60%
14.40%
55 to 64 years
11.10%
6.10%
10.20%
65 to 74 years
6.60%
3.20%
9.40%
75 years and over
6.10%
2.40%
9.80%
49.70%
46.40%
49.20%
Widowed
6.20%
3.60%
7.90%
Divorced
10.70%
8.10%
12.70%
Separated
2.10%
3.50%
2.80%
Never married
31.2%
38.40%
27.30%
75,960,920
12,172,896
371,692
Women 15 to 50 years who had a birth in the past 12 months
4,436,577
953,713
17,546
Unmarried women 15 to 50 years who had a birth in the past 12 months
1,521,094
369,184
4,176
Percent of all women with a birth in the past 12 months
34.30%
38.70%
23.80%
79,854,557
14,439,583
375,936
Total population Gender
Nativity
Age Median age (years) Age groups
Marital Status (15 and older) Married
Fertility Women 15 to 50 years
School Enrollment Population 3 years and over enrolled in school
(Continued )
459
Table 78 Population characteristics of Hispanics of Cuban origin (Continued ) U.S. population
All Hispanics
Cuban origin
Nursery school, preschool
6.40%
6.60%
7.20%
Kindergarten
5.10%
6.40%
4.60%
Elementary school (grades 1–8)
40.30%
46.80%
37.60%
High school (grades 9–12)
21.50%
22.30%
20.90%
College or graduate school
26.70%
17.80%
29.60%
Educational attainment (ages 25 and older) Population 25 years and over
200,030,018
25,557,507
1,139,940
Less than high school diploma
15.00%
39.20%
24.40%
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
28.50%
26.00%
27.30%
Some college or associate’s degree
28.80%
21.90%
22.90%
Bachelor’s degree
17.50%
8.90%
15.90%
Graduate or professional degree
10.20%
4.00%
9.50%
High school graduate or higher
85.00%
60.80%
75.60%
Bachelor’s degree or higher
27.70%
12.90%
25.40%
Male
45,556
30,842
38,526
Female
35,471
26,593
31,348
52,029
41,470
42,724
All people
13.20%
21.30%
14.20%
Under 18 years
18.20%
28.00%
14.00%
18 years and over
11.60%
17.80%
14.30%
18 to 64 years
11.90%
17.60%
11.50%
65 years and over
9.90%
19.60%
22.90%
People in families
10.70%
19.80%
10.30%
46,729,000
14,852,000
370,000
7,354,000
2,985,000
49,000
Median earnings (dollars) full-time, year-round workers
Median household income (dollars) Persons in Poverty
Health Insurance Uninsured, all ages Uninsured, younger than 18 Population in households
295,812,890
45,998,740
1,571,249
Average household size
2.62
3.47
2.7
Average family size
3.22
3.92
3.3
16,329,909
5,111,667
564,248
Citizenship Foreign born; naturalized U.S. citizen
(Continued )
Appendix III: Notable Cuban Americans | 461 Table 78 Population characteristics of Hispanics of Cuban origin (Continued ) U.S. population Male Female
46.30%
All Hispanics 47.70%
Cuban origin 45.80%
53.70%
52.30%
54.20%
21,631,026
12,699,112
401,523
Male
53.10%
56.00%
55.70%
Female
46.90%
44.00%
44.30%
Foreign born; not a U.S. citizen
Language spoken at home and ability to speak Population 5 years and over
283,149,507
41,638,535
1,513,610
English only
80.30%
23.70%
16.60%
Language other than English
19.70%
76.30%
83.40%
8.60%
37.30%
41.70%
37,960,935
17,810,779
965,771
Entered 2000 or later
29.50%
31.10%
22.30%
Entered 1990 to 1999
28.60%
30.20%
20.30%
Entered before 1990
41.90%
38.70%
57.40%
Speak English less than “very well” Year of Entry: Population born outside the United States
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census (2008).
Appendix III: Notable Cuban Americans Desi Arnaz (March 2, 1917 December 2, 1986). Cuban-born musician, actor, and television producer who gained fame as Ricky Ricardo on the American TV series I Love Lucy, with Lucille Ball, to whom he was married at the time. Celia Cruz. Born Ðrsula Hilaria Celia de la Caridad Cruz Alfonso in Havana, on October 21, 1925, Celia Cruz became known as the „Queen of Salsa‰ and was one of the most successful Latino performers in the United States. She was renowned internationally and her 23 gold albums made her name synonymous with salsa. She lived most of her career in New Jersey and died in 1993. Lincoln Díaz-Balart. Born Lincoln Rafael Díaz-Balart Caballero in Havana, Cuba, on August 13, 1954, Lincoln Díaz-Balart is a Cuban American politician and lawyer whose aunt, Mirta Díaz-Balart, was the first wife of Fidel Castro. Díaz-Balart is a former member of the Florida House of Representatives, the Florida Senate, and since 1993, has been a Republican member of the United States House of Representatives, representing FloridaÊs 21st congressional district in Miami.
462 | Cuban Immigrants
Mario Diaz-Balart. Born in South Florida (Fort Lauderdale) in September 25, 1961, Mario Diaz-Balart is a Cuban American politician. Since 2003, he has been a Republican member of the United States House of Representatives, representing FloridaÊs 25th congressional district, which includes western Miami-Dade County, the mainland portion of Monroe County, and much of eastern Collier County. He left the 25th district seat in 2010 to run in the neighboring 21st district, which was vacated by his brother, Lincoln DiazBalart upon his retirement. Mario Diaz-Balart won the race to replace his brother. Gloria Estefan. Born Gloria María Milagrosa Fajardo García on September 1, 1957, Gloria Estefan is one of the most successful and popular contemporary musical performers in the United States. Working with husband Emilio Estefan, Gloria has won seven Grammy awards, starting with the „Miami Sound Machine‰ and working through a successful solo career. Her seven Grammies make her one of the most successful crossover performers in Latin music. Andy García. Born Andrés Arturo García Menéndez in Havana in 1956. A Cuban American actor nominated for an Academy Award for Best Supporting Actor for his role in The Godfather Part III. Roberto Goizueta. Born in Havana, Cuba (November 18, 1931), Goizueta served as CEO of the Coca-Cola Company from 1980 until his death in 1997. Mel Martinez. Born Melquíades Rafael Martínez Ruiz (October 23, 1946), Martinez is a former United States senator from Florida and served as chairman of the Republican Party from November 2006 until October 19, 2007. He was the first Latino to serve as chairman of a major party. Martínez has also served as the secretary of housing and urban development under former president George W. Bush. Robert “Bob” Menendez. Born on January 1, 1954, in New York City, Bob Menendez is the junior United States Senator from New Jersey and a member of the Democratic Party. In December 2005, he was appointed by Jon Corzine to fill the U.S. Senate seat vacated by Corzine, who resigned upon being elected governor of New Jersey. Menendez was elected to his own full sixyear term in the 2006 U.S. Senate election. He is the first Latino to represent New Jersey in the U.S. Senate. Prior to his appointment to the U.S. Senate, Menendez was a member of the United States House of Representatives, representing New JerseyÊs 13th congressional district from 1993 to 2006. Antonio Prohías (February 24, 1998). Born in Cienfuegos, Cuba, in 1921, Prohias was the creator of the iconic comic strip Spy vs. Spy for MAD Magazine. The bulk of his work was done in Cuba, where he worked for various
Glossary | 463
newspapers and established his style in comic strips such as El Hombre Siniestro, La Mujer Siniestra, and Tovarich. He moved to New York City after the revolution and died in 1998. He is buried in Miami. Jennifer Rodriguez. Cuban American speed skater who, after becoming inline speed skating champion (1993), successfully switched to ice skating and represented the United States in the 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010 Winter Olympics. She won two bronze medals in the Salt Lake City Olympics (2002). Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Born Ileana Ros y Adata on July 15, 1952, in Havana, Cuba. She is a Cuban American politician. Since 1989, she has been a Republican member of the United States House of Representatives, representing FloridaÊs 18th congressional district. Ros-Lehtinen is the ranking member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee for the 111th Congress and the most senior Republican woman in the U.S. House. Ros-Lehtinen was the first Republican woman elected to the House of Representatives from Florida.
Glossary Botánicas: Shops that sell the goods and paraphernalia associated with the practice of Afro-Cuban religions. El exilio: Exile. Ethnic enclave: A socio/economic formation, characterized by the concentration of immigrants in specific geographic areas who organize a broad range of enterprises to serve their ethnic market as well as the general population. Exceptionalism: Sense of uniqueness. For Cubans, exceptionalism has been elevated to the point where it is a defining national characteristic, a part of the national consciousness that influences CubansÊ perception of their country, and themselves, in the world at large and their relations with their neighbors. Exile ideology: The beliefs and values that characterize the members of the early waves of postrevolutionary Cuban migration. The exile ideology has three principal and interrelated characteristics: (1) the primacy of the homeland; (2) uncompromising hostility towards the Castro government; and (3) emotionalism, irrationality, and intolerance. “Freedom flights:” The nickname given to the airlift established between the United States and Cuba that brought 260,000 Cubans to the United States between December 1965 and 1973. “Golden Exiles:” The nickname given to the first wave of Cuban immigrants to the United States after the revolution whose ranks were overrepresented by members of the professional and business middle-class community in Cuba.
464 | Cuban Immigrants
Habaneros: Residents of Havana, Cuba. Mariel: A Cuban port west of Havana that gave its name to the boatlift that brought, in a manner uncontrolled by the United States, more than 125,000 Cubans into the country during five months in 1980. Nochebuena: Christmas Eve. patria potestas: Parental rights. Santeria: A synthesis of West African and Roman Catholic religious vocabularies, beliefs, and practices with followers in Cuba and in the Cuban diaspora. Transculturation: The term coined by Fernando Ortiz to describe the process where cultures interact resulting in the creation of a new culture, with traits from the original cultures, but distinct from them. Ybor City: Cigar-making community established in Florida, near Tampa, by Vicente Martínez Ybor, that became the largest 19th-century community of Cuban Americans in the United States.
References Aguirre, Benigno E. 1981. „The Marital Stability of Cubans in the United States.‰ Ethnicity 8: 387 405. Baltar Rodríguez, José. 1997. Los chinos de Cuba: Apuntes etnográficos. La Habana: Fundación Fernando Ortiz. Bernal, Guillermo. 1982. „Cuban Families.‰ In Ethnicity and Family Therapy, edited by Monica McGoldrick, John Pearce, and Joseph Giordano, 187 207. New York: Guilford Press. Bettinger-López, Caroline. 2000. Cuban-Jewish Journeys: Searching for Identity, Home, and History in Miami. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Castellanos, Gerardo. 1935. Motivos de Cayo Hueso. La Habana: Ucar, García y Cía. Census National Board of Cuba. 1920. Census of the Republic of Cuba 1919. La Habana: Maza, Arroyo, y Caso. Clark, Juan. 1975. The Exodus from Revolutionary Cuba (1959–1974): A Sociological Analysis. Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, Gainesville. Didion, Joan. 1987. Miami. New York: Simon and Schuster. Fagen, Richard R., Richard A. Brody, and Thomas J. OÊLeary. 1968. Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Ferree, Myra Marx. 1979. „Employment Without Liberation: Cuban Women in the United States.‰ Social Science Quarterly 60: 35 50. García, María Cristina. 1996. Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959–1994. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gonzalez-Pando, Miguel. 1998. The Cuban Americans: New American Series. New York: Greenwood Publishing Group.
References | 465 Grenier, Guillermo, and Hugh Gladwin. 2000 FIU Cuba Poll. Miami: Institute of Public Opinion Research (IPOR). [Online article retrieved 6/11.] http://www2.fiu.edu/~ipor/ cuba2000/index.html Grenier, Guillermo, and Hugh Gladwin. 2007 FIU Cuba Poll. Miami: Institute of Public Opinion Research (IPOR). [Online article retrieved 6/11.] http://www2.fiu.edu/~ipor/ cuba8/ Grenier, Guillermo J., and Lisandro Pérez. 1996. „Miami Spice: The Ethnic Cauldron Simmers.‰ In Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America, edited by Silvia Pedraza and Rubén G. Rumbaut, 360 72. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Grenier, Guillermo J., and Lisandro Pérez. 2003. Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States. New York: Allyn and Bacon. Guanche, Jesús. 1996. Componentes étnicos de la nación cubana. La Habana: Ediciones Unión. Knight, Franklin W. 1970. Slave Society in Cuba During the Nineteenth Century. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Kurtines, William M., and Luke Miranda. 1980. „Differences in Self and Family Role Perception among Acculturating Cuban-American College Students: Implications for the Etiology of Family Disruption among Migrant Groups.‰ International Journal of Intercultural Relations 4: 167 84. Levine, Robert M. 1993. Tropical Diaspora: The Jewish Experience in Cuba. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Loescher, Gilbert, and John Scanlan. 1986. Calculated Kindness: Refugees and the HalfOpen Door, 1945 to the Present. New York: The Free Press. Masud-Piloto, Felix Roberto. 1988. With Open Arms: Cuban Migration to the United States. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. Metro-Dade County. 1993. A Minority-owned and Women-owned Business Discrimination Study: Executive Summary. Miami: Metro-Dade County. Mohl, Raymond A. 1990. „On the Edge: Blacks and Hispanics in Metropolitan Miami Since 1959.‰ Florida Historical Quarterly 69(1), 37 56. Moreno Fraginals, Manuel. 1978. El ingenio, complejo económico social cubano del azúcar, rev. edition, 3 vols. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales. Moreno Fraginals, Manue. 1995. Cuba/España, España/Cuba: Historia común. Barcelona: Giraldo Mondadori, S.A. Nackerud, Larry, A. Springer, C. Larrison, and A. Issac. 1999. „The End of Cuban Contradiction in U.S. Refugee Policy.‰ International Migration Review 33: 176 92. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2009. 2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Ortiz, Fernando. 1940. Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar. Reprint. Santa Clara: Universidad Central de Las Villas, 1963.
466 | Cuban Immigrants Pedraza, Silvia. 1996. „CubaÊs Refugees: Manifold Migrations.‰ In Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America, edited by Silvia Pedraza and Rubén G. Rumbaut, 263 79. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Pedraza-Bailey, Silvia. 1985. Political and Economic Migrants in America: Cubans and Mexicans. Austin: University of Texas Press. Pérez, Lisandro. 1986a. „Cubans in the United States.‰ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 487 (September): 126 37. Pérez, Lisandro. 1986b. „Immigrant Economic Adjustment and Family Organization: The Cuban Success Story Reexamined.‰ International Migration Review 20(1): 4 20. Pérez, Lisandro. 1992. „Cuban Miami.‰ In Miami Now!: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Social Change, edited by Guillermo J. Grenier and Alex Stepick III, 83 108. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Pérez, Lisandro. 1994a. „Cuban Catholics in the United States.‰ In Puerto Rican and Cuban Catholics in the U.S., 1900–1965, edited by Jay P. Dolan and Jaime R. Vidal, 145 208. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Pérez, Lisandro. 1994b. „Cuban Families in the United States.‰ In Minority Families in the United States: A Multicultural Perspective, edited by Ronald L. Taylor, 95 112. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Pérez, Lisandro. 1996. „The Households of Children of Immigrants in South Florida: An Exploratory Study of Extended Family Arrangements.‰ In The New Second Generation, edited by Alejandro Portes, 108 18. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Pérez, Lisandro. 2000. „De Nueva York a Miami: El desarrollo demográfico de las comunidades cubanas en Estados Unidos.‰ Revista Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana 15(Winter): 13 23. Pérez, Lisandro. 2001. „Growing Up in Cuban Miami: Immigration, the Enclave, and New Generations.‰ In Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America, edited by Rubén G. Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, 91 125. Berkeley and New York: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation. Pérez Firmat, Gustavo. 1994. Life on the Hyphen: The Cuban-American Way. Austin: University of Texas Press. Pérez-Stable, Marifeli, and Miren Uriarte. 1990. „Latinos in a Changing U.S. Economy: Cuban-Americans in Miami‰. Unpublished paper, SUNY, Old Westbury. Pew Hispanic Center. 2006. Cubans in the United States: Fact Sheet. 2006. Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center. Porter, Bruce, and Marvin Dunn. 1984. The Miami Riot of 1980: Crossing the Bounds. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Portes, Alejandro. 1969. „Dilemmas of a Golden Exile: Integration of Cuban Refugee Families in Milwaukee.‰ American Sociological Review 34: 505 18. Portes, Ajejandro. 1995. „Children of Immigrants: Segmented Assimilation and its Determinants.‰ In The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity,
References | 467 and Entrepreneurship, edited by Alejandro Portes, 248 80. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Portes, Alejandro, and Robert L. Bach. 1985. Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States. Berkeley: University of California Press. Portes, Alejandro, and Douglas MacLeod. 1996. „What Shall I Call Myself? Hispanic Identity Formation in the Second Generation.‰ Ethnic and Racial Studies 19(3): 523 47. Portes, Alejandro, and Alex Stepick. 1985. „Unwelcome Immigrants: The Labor Market Experiences of 1980 (Mariel) Cuban and Haitian Refugees in South Florida.‰ American Sociological Review 50(August): 493 514. Portes, Alejandro, and Alex Stepick. 1993. City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami. Berkeley: University of California Press. Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben Rumbaut. 2001. Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley: University of California Press and Russel Sage Foundation. Poyo, Gerald E. 1989. “With All, and for the Good of All”: The Emergence of Popular Nationalism in the Cuban Communities of the United States, 1848–1898. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Prieto, Yolanda. 1987. „Cuban Women in the U.S. Labor Force: Perspectives on the Nature of Change.‰ Cuban Studies 17: 73 91. República de Cuba. 1939. Gaceta Oficial 28: 2189 93. República de Cuba. 1950. Gaceta Oficial 48: 27553 554. Rieff, David. 1987. Going to Miami: Exiles, Tourists, and Refugees in the New America. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Rivero Muñiz, José. 1958. „Los cubanos en Tampa.‰ Revista Bimestre Cubana 74 (January June): 5 140. Rumbaut, Ruben. 1997. „Assimilation and Its Discontents: Between Rhetoric and Reality.‰ International Migration Review 31(4): 923 60. Szapocznik, Jose, Mercedes A. Scopetta, and Wayne Tillman. 1978. „What Changes, What Remains the Same, and What Affects Acculturative Change in Cuban Immigrant Families.‰ In Cuban Americans: Acculturation, Adjustment and the Family, edited by José Szapocznik and Maria Cristina Herrera, 35 49. Washington, D.C.: National Coalition of Hispanic Mental Health and Human Services Organization. Szapocznik, Jose, and Roberto Hernandez. 1988. „The Cuban American Family.‰ In Ethnic Families in America, 3rd ed., edited by Charles H. Mindel, Robert W. Habenstein, and Roosevelt Wright, Jr., 160 72. New York: Elsevier. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2008. American Community Survey. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2004. American Community Survey. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Wassen, Ruth Ellen. 2009. Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends. Congressional Research Service. CRS Report for Congress 7 5700; R40566.
468 | Cuban Immigrants Westfall, L. Glenn. 1977. Don Vicente Martínez Ybor, the Man and his Empire: Development of the Clear Havana Industry in Cuba and Florida in the Nineteenth Century. Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, Gainesville.
Further Reading Cobas, Jose A., and Duany, Jorge. 1997. Cubans in Puerto Rico: Ethnic Economy and Cultural Identity. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Cobas and DuanyÊs study examines the social and economic experiences of Cubans in Puerto Rico, comparing them with Cuban populations in Miami and other U.S. cities. Eckstein, Susan Eva. 2009. The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the U.S. and Their Homeland. New York: Routledge. This book focuses primarily on the Miami Cuban migration and integration experience. Fernández, Damian J., ed. 1992. Cuban Studies Since the Revolution. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. This volume presents an overview of the research done on both Cubans and Cuban Americans. García, María Cristina. 1996. Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959–1994. Berkeley: University of California Press. GarcíaÊs work focuses on the immigration and adaptation experience of postrevolutionary Cuban migration up to and including the 1980 Mariel boatlift. Grenier, Guillermo J., and Lisandro Pérez. 2003. Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States. New York: Allyn and Bacon. The theme of the book is that the Cuban presence in the United States has been shaped, historically and contemporaneously, by the experience of exile. The authors present the Cuban case in the context of the dynamics of U.S. immigration policy; the differences between immigrants and exiles; interethnic relations among newcomers and established residents; and the economic development of immigrant communities. Grenier, Guillermo J., and A. Stepick III, eds. 1992. Miami Now!: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Social Change. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Miami Now! gathers together the research of scholarsÊ living in Miami, and affiliated with Florida International University. Each chapter examines one or more of the cityÊs predominant communities: non-Hispanic whites, blacks, Cubans and Cuban Americans, and Haitians and Haitian Americans. The editors note that „Miami is thus riven by two fundamental divisions; black versus white and U.S.-born Americans versus immigrants.‰ González-Pando, M. 1998. The Cuban Americans. The New Americans Series. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. This study succeeds in presenting the reader with an accessible account of the history and successes of Cuban Americans.
Further Reading | 469 Masud-Piloto, Felix Roberto. 1996. From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. This study analyzes the political dynamics at work during the migration of more than one million Cubans to the United States from 1959 to 1995, especially the reasons, motivations, and circumstances for the migration. Pérez, Louis A. 1995. Essays on Cuban History: Historiography and Research. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. This volume focuses on the long history of interaction between Cubans and U.S. citizens. The 18 essays in the volume cover the earliest Cuban communities in the United States as well as the causes and results of migrations to Cuban cultural development. Pérez, Louis A. 1999. On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. This is an epic work exploring the many dimensions of U.S.-Cuban relations and their impact on the development of the Cuban character. Pérez Firmat, G. 1995. Next Year in Cuba: A Cubano’s Coming of Age in America. New York: Anchor Books. Throughout this work the author provides candid and often poignant portrayals of himself and his family living first in Little Havana enclave and then in other, less Cuban regions of the United States. Pérez Firmat, G. 1994. Life on the Hyphen: The Cuban-American Way., Austin: University of Texas Press. This volume consists of six essays, each devoted to some aspect of Cuban American culture and the exploration of the importance of the „1.5 generation‰ (Cubans born on the island who came to the United States as children or adolescents) to its development. Portes, A., and Stepick, Alex III. 1993. City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami. Berkeley University of California Press. City on the Edge provides the history of Miami and the people who populate that city: Anglos, Jews, African Americans, Cubans and Cuban Americans, Haitians and Haitian Americans, and Nicaraguans. Poyo, Gerald E. 1991. „The Cuban Experience in the United States, 1865 1940: Migration, Community, and Identity.‰ Cuban Studies 21: 19 36; and Poyo, Gerald E. 1989. “With All, and for the Good of All”: The Emergence of Popular Nationalism in the Cuban Communities of the United States, 1848–1998. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. In both publications, Poyo presents the Cuban experience in the United States as not an exclusively post-1959 phenomenon; rather, it should be understood from its origins in the 19th century. Prieto, Yolanda. 2009. The Cubans of Union City: Immigrants and Exiles in a New Jersey Community. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. In The Cubans of Union City, Prieto draws a moving, decades-long history of the Cuban immigration to Union City. Prieto draws from a lifetime of living and researching in
470 | Cuban Immigrants Union City to present a rich portrait of an immigrant community built from the many strands of Cuban society, both before and after the advent of the revolution. Rumbaut, Ruben, and Alejandro Portes. 2001. Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in the United States. Berkley: University of California Press. The contributors to this volume explore the adaptation patterns and trajectories of the second generation of specific ethnic groups: Mexican, Cuban, Nicaraguan, Filipino, Vietnamese, Haitian, Jamaican, and other West Indians.
Dominican Immigrants by Ramona Hernández and Anthony Stevens-Acevedo
Introduction As the first European colony in the Americas, the Dominican Republic bears a distinct history from the rest of the New World. La Española, as the country was baptized by the Spaniards, witnessed the encounter of the peoples and development of the institutions that laid the ground for what would subsequently become the Americas as we know it today. This essay attempts to construct a narrative that covers the beginnings of the Dominican Republic, including colonization, independence, and present history. Most of the writing is devoted to understanding the relationships between the Dominican Republic and the United States during the 20th century. Particular attention is paid to Dominican migration to the United States and the subsequent development of a rooted community of people of Dominican ancestry who has both retained its national culture and created a new identity. The symbolic and tangible representations of Dominican culture, lo dominicano, in Dominican neighborhoods, show both the reality of settling in a new space and the desire to maintain a distinctive cultural identity within it. As the Dominican community in the United States continues to grow and mature with a wider geographical dispersion and the proliferation of the third generation, it remains to be seen whether people of Dominican descent in the United States will continue to maintain the cultural balance between the values of their ancestral land and their new one.
Chronology 1492
Spaniards led by Columbus arrive for the first time at the island they baptized La Española (the Spanish One).
1493–1606
La Española becomes the first European colony in the Americas of modern times. The Amerindian Taíno population is exterminated
Acknowledgments: Nelson Santana, assistant librarian at the CUNY Dominican Studies Institute contributed the section on „Expanding the Scope of Music: From Dancing Tunes to Production.‰
471
Chronology | 473
by mistreatment and diseases, and black Africans begin to be imported to the colony as slaves, initiating the history of the Middle Passage in the Americas. La Española becomes the first racially mixed, black-majority society on the continent. 1605–1606
Forceful depopulation and abandonment of the western part of La Española ordered by the Spanish Crown creates a void that subsequently allows for a settlement by the French, under the name „Saint Domingue.‰
1613
Juan Rodríguez, the first-known Dominican immigrant to New York City arrives on a Dutch ship at Hudson Harbor, later called New Amsterdam (present-day New York City).
1697
Treaty between Spain and France legitimizes FranceÊs ownership of Saint Domingue, western territory of La Española.
1804
Resulting from the first black-led antislavery revolution in the Americas, the Republic of Haiti (former Saint Domingue) is established.
1821
Amid rumors of an upcoming Haitian invasion, a group of residents of Santo Domingo proclaim independence from Spain under the name „Independent State of Spanish Haiti.‰
1822–1844
Two months after proclaiming independence, the Independent State of Spanish Haiti is taken over and occupied by the Haitian government that alleges fear of a French reinvasion via Santo Domingo.
1844
Dominicans proclaim independence from the Haitian occupation.
1861–1865
Annexation of the Dominican Republic by Spain led by conservative Dominicans.
1863–1865
Liberal-nationalist Dominicans rebel against Spain and proclaim independence again.
1892
First recorded large migration of Dominicans to the United States begins, particularly through Ellis Island, New York. This firstknown wave of immigration continues at least until 1924.
1898
Spanish American War.
1912
With a Dominican Republic seemingly unable to establish political stability, burdened by foreign debt, internal fighting, and violence in a cycle of rebellions, so-called revolutions, and elections, the United States threatens occupation of the nation if no peace is reached.
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1916–1924
President Woodrow Wilson officially announces U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916; the United States controls the Dominican Republic until 1924.
1924–1930
With the end of U.S. occupation, Horacio VasquezÊs government gets elected and promotes infrastructure construction.
1930–1961
Rafael Trujillo wins election with a terror-led campaign and rules a one-party dictatorship for the next 30 years, until·in the midst of a growing opposition movement·some members of his own regime ultimately kill him.
1962
In the first democratic elections in 30 years, Juan Bosch gets elected, but within a year, a military coup led by remnants of TrujilloÊs regime ousts Bosch.
1965
A rebellion is launched by a liberal sector of the armed forces, the constitucionalistas, to reinstate the democratic government of Bosch and the 1963 constitution. Resistance by conservative factions of the armed forces leads to a civil war, the Revolution of 1965. Backed by a U.S. military intervention, conservative forces win the war, and an interim government calls for elections.
1966
Amongst repression against the more liberal sectors, Joaquín Balaguer is elected. With U.S. aid, infrastructure expansion is promoted and a small middle class grows, but public liberties are repressed, and widespread poverty and unemployment persists. To prevent social unrest, BalaguerÊs government encourages migration and makes passport-issuing policies easy. Dominicans begin to arrive in the United States in high numbers.
1970s–1990s Dominicans become the largest immigrant group arriving in New York City. 2009
Dominicans constitute the fifth-largest Hispanic/Latino group in the United States and quickly grow toward becoming the third largest on the East Coast in the foreseeable future.
Background Geography of the Dominican Republic Relative to other countries across the globe, the Dominican Republic, the country where Dominicans originate, is relatively small both territorially and population wise. Located in the Caribbean Sea southeast of North America and northeast of
Background | 475
South America, it lies between Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Dominican Republic occupies the easternmost two-thirds of the Island of La Española (Hispaniola, in English), and contiguous to it territorially is the Republic of Haiti, which occupies the westernmost third of the island. Probably the most salient geographic features of the country are its orography, which includes hot and humid coastal plains and slopes as well as a core of longitudinally distributed interior mountains (some of the tallest of the entire Caribbean) and valleys whose temperatures range from warm to mildly cool. Because the largest urban center, Santo Domingo, as well as a number of important cities and towns (including all the major beach-tourism centers and most of the assembly-industry areas, key to the countryÊs current economy) are located on the coastal plains, in many ways the hot-humid climate characterizes the life of most Dominicans today. Those living in the high interior areas, including the second-largest urban center, Santiago de los Caballeros, and other inland towns and provinces, experience mild weather.
History of the Dominican Republic The Spaniards and the First European Colony of the Americas The name of Christopher Columbus happens to be inherently associated to that of the Dominican Republic and, especially, to its long-lived name of La Española, not only because it was on its territory where Columbus founded the first colonial village of the Americas of modern times in 1493 (La Isabela), but also because Columbus himself gave the island the name La Española (translated literally as „the Spanish One‰). The Amerindians that Christopher Columbus and his Spanish companions encountered in La Española were the Taínos, as well as smaller remnant groups of three other ethnicities: Ciguayos, Macorijes, and Caribs. As Columbus and the initial Spanish settlers expanded inland and tried to impose service and taxes on the indigenous inhabitants, the Taíno resistance this generated was met with considerable military cruelty by the Spaniards. This conquest was violent and many of La EspañolaÊs Taíno population became increasingly subjugated into forced labor, particularly in alluvial gold mining. In addition to creating a more subjected native labor force, the Spaniards adapted many of their fundamental political, economic, and cultural institutions to these new local realities and a colonial society thus developed in La Española. However, together with the impact of European germs for which the Taínos had no biological immunity, the gold-centered economic process that unfolded on the island eventually disrupted and exhausted so much of the native labor force that an intense death toll provoked a sharp decline in the Taíno population. Almost concomitantly with the aboriginal labor force, La EspañolaÊs alluvial gold also reached exhaustion. The response was the launching
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of a less rich, but still marketable and profitable, cane-sugar industry supported by an alternate labor force: enslaved sub-Saharan black Africans.
The Africans and the Birth of Black Slavery in the Americas By the mid-1510s, the Spanish Crown was offering loans to those in La Española who were willing to locally cofinance the sugar plantation business. Following successful manufacturing models from the Canary Islands, members of the small colonial elite decided to develop sugar production and in the ensuing years created dozens of functioning centers of extensive cane sugar plantations. La Española thus became the largest American exporter of cane sugar to Europe in the entire 16th century. Triggered by the already mentioned desperate colonial need for massive labor in this new early modern capitalist-colonial economy of the Americas, La Española became the first place in the Americas to become a permanent home of black people (free or enslaved). Equally determinant in the long run, the early sugar-plantation economy of the 16th century and its importation of African slaves converted La Española into a black and mulatto majority-society (and therefore into an Afro-descending-majority society) for hundreds of years to come. The Dominican Republic is therefore, historically, the first black-majority Creole society to appear in the Americas. Despite its fundamental role as the center of the early development and expansion of the Spanish empire and despite its following sugar „boom,‰ La EspañolaÊs overall imperial-strategic importance continued to diminish quickly after the local gold exhaustion in the 1510s. Sugar exporting was able to retain only a relatively small population of Spaniards and their creole children; and any potential new settlers encountered tight control and power exerted by the small local colonial elite, leaving little space for local competitors. In this context, only the mostly darkskinned population of blacks and mulattoes, free or enslaved, with less options or resources to leave, seems to have grown more or less steadily in the colony.
A Colony That Became Two: La Española and the Birth of Saint Domingue As sugar production declined on the south-central and eastern areas of the colony, a unique scenario developed on the westernmost territories of La Española during the second half of the 16th century. Isolated by mountains from Santo Domingo, the settlers there engaged in widespread smuggling with none other than Spanish enemies of the French, the Dutch, the British, and, to a certain extent, the Portuguese. By the end of the century, the crownÊs contempt of the settlersÊ tax evasion and their blatant amicable engagement with imperial enemies, in addition to the local Catholic ChurchÊs indignation at the settlersÊ exposure to the European smugglersÊ
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non-Catholic Christianity, resulted in an order from the crown to forcefully depopulate the westernmost third of the colony. SpainÊs forcefully imposed depopulation of the western part of La Española in 1605 1606 eventually constituted·in practical terms·a relinquishing of that same territory to those same enemies. The French in particular had not achieved any other foothold on the region and were attracted to unprotected territories in the Caribbean from where they could further attack the Spaniards and access some of the areaÊs resources. Therefore, during the first half of the 17th century, the French, through a persistent campaign of occupation and despite occasional attacks by the Spaniards, successfully established a permanent colony on western La Española, naming it Saint Domingue, the French version of Santo Domingo, the original Spanish name of La EspañolaÊs capital city. After the French occupation, La Española as a colony was reduced to roughly the two easternmost thirds of its original territory, which later would become what is today the Dominican Republic. An intensive plantation-based colony mostly devoted to the production of cane sugar and other agricultural raw materials, made on the shoulders of hundreds of thousands of blacks taken from different parts of Africa and forced into slavery, would eventually develop in Saint Domingue. Cattle ranching and timber felling, together with small-plot agriculture, would become dominant on the Santo Domingo side. Occasional hostilities, alternated with periods of commercial exchanges between the peoples west and east of the island of La Española, would continue even after the signing of a treaty in 1697 between Spain and France that legitimized FranceÊs ownership of Saint Domingue. By the following century, the latter would become the most valuable and productive of FranceÊs few colonies, while Santo Domingo would remain pretty much a location of secondary economic importance within a vast Spanish empire. Two differentiated national ethnicities would develop on each territory, one predominantly Afro-French, the other one predominantly Afro-Spanish, giving birth to the neighbor nations of the Republic of Haiti in 1804 (the first black republic on the continent) and the Dominican Republic in 1844.
Dominicans and Haitians: 1822–1844 Under the influence of both the Haitian independence (1804) and the South American independence movements (1810s), by 1821, different groups of Dominicans were considering proclaiming independence from Spain. In late 1821, one Dominican group proclaimed the Independent State of Spanish Haiti, but by then the radically nationalistic Haitians had decided to invade and occupy the eastern Spanish colony, which they did from early 1822 to 1844. During this period, Haitians made a fundamental long-term contribution to Dominican society by abolishing slavery from the start·and with it the fundamental human indignities that such a
478 | Dominican Immigrants
system represents. Yet, other measures adopted by the Haitians during the occupation undermined the economic interests of the Dominican elite and compromised the cultural and historical traditions of the Dominican people as a whole. These factors further strengthened the development of an ethno-nationalist mentality that had been unfolding since colonial times in Santo Domingo and provoked a strong opposition movement of Dominicans against the Haitian occupation. Among those sectors, the most radically nationalist, liberal, and republican one was that of the Trinitarios, led by Juan Pablo Duarte, a Dominican middle-class creole residing in Santo Domingo. Due to infighting among factions inside Haiti, the Haitian governmentÊs power had begun to weaken over the occupied Dominican territory; taking advantage of the Haitian governmentÊs weaknesses, pro-independence groups led by the Trinitarios took to the streets and proclaimed Dominican independence on February 27, 1844. The constitution proclaimed began with a declaration of civil equality for all Dominicans, the abolition of absolutism, and the creation of a republic, with separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers with a bicameral legislative branch.
The Republic and Beyond In the years after the first proclamation of Dominican independence of 1844 up until 1861, the political scene was dominated by intense confrontation for power between the more liberal and the more conservative groups in Dominican society. The liberals were associated with owners of small or midsized capitalist agricultural production units (mostly coffee and tobacco); they had a stronger sense of personal independence and briefly headed the national government. The conservatives were represented by the hateros, owners of large cattle ranching and timber estates, where big owners controlled large numbers of fieldhands and pawns under a caudillo-like, paternalistic, and clientelistic system typical of the rural world of colonial times and often nostalgic of the protective relationships with some of the old-time colonial powers. In 1861, President Pedro Santana, an hatero fearful of a Haitian invasion and nostalgic of the Spanish empire, persuaded the Spanish Monarchy to re-annex the Dominican Republic. Once on their former colony again, though, the Spanish forces·many of which came from slavery-dominated Cuba·implemented a very tight and ethnically exclusive control of the country, imposing additional taxes, considerably limiting the access of their Dominican allies to the posts of the new colonial public administration, and alienating scores of dark-skinned Dominicans with harshly antiblack attitudes and comments. After roughly 20 years of Dominican self-rule, and with official slavery abolished since at least 40 years before, these practices soon generated widespread popular rejection, and local resistance emerged throughout the country, quickly taking the form of open rebellion by August 1863. A popular
Background | 479
anticolonial national war ensued, aimed at restoring independence, thus its popular name, „Guerra de la Restauración‰ (Restoration War), and the Spaniards, defeated, had to leave the country for good in 1865. Of all its leaders, the black Gregorio Luperón would emerge as the most conspicuous one for his military leadership and acceptance of liberal ideals. After the Restoration, the August 16, 1863, proclamations that marked its beginning would be celebrated ever since as a national holiday by Dominicans, with as much intensity and pride as February 27 (1844), which became the official Independence Day. That is why Dominicans, unlike most peoples of the world, currently commemorate the achievement of their sovereignty twice every year: in February and in August.
The First U.S. Military Occupation: 1916–1924 After reformist President Cáceres was assassinated, factional sectarian infighting broke out again in the Dominican Republic. In 1912, the infighting unleashed what in the view of some historians was the worst civil war in Dominican history, which led to a cycle of rebellions or so-called revolutions followed by elections followed by abusive sectarian government rule and political repression followed by new rebellions. The conflicts were often motivated by the expectations of different political factions to use the public administration to assign jobs and guarantee an income to their members. Civil war, besides diverting all the public funds to the governmentsÊ military attempts to keep order, paralyzed the economy, further reducing government revenues. The United States, which by then owned many of the new Dominican corporations and controlled the main economic sectors of the country, worried about the effects that the war would have on their local investments. This led U.S. President William Taft to send a „pacification commission‰ backed by 750 marines to arrange a peace agreement amongst the warring parties, with the threat of a U.S. military occupation if no agreement was reached. By 1915, however, the United States had invaded Haiti based on the same concerns about internal instability and violence, and by the fall of 1916, with the United States about to enter World War I and with U.S. marines already deployed in the Dominican Republic, the new president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, officially announced the occupation and control of the Dominican Republic by the U.S. forces. Once officially installed, the U.S. military government proceeded to launch an intense and, on occasion, violent disarmament campaign that imposed censorship on all information outlets and created a National Guard/National Police (1917 1921) whose job was to prevent the old „revolutions.‰ Road construction and public works that had been left unfinished were revamped. Hundreds of new public schools were constructed throughout the country. New taxes were imposed, and a Land Registration Law was passed in 1920 that helped further dismantle the old local tradition of communal lands, the last vestige of the colonial land-tenure system; this in turn
480 | Dominican Immigrants
U.S. Marine Corps patrol boats on the Ozoma River, Santo Domingo, about 1919. The United States maintained a military presence in the Dominican Republic from 1916 until 1924. (National Archives)
allowed the large U.S. corporations to more easily take over the best agricultural lands. In the spring of 1917, when the United States entered World War I against Germany, all Dominican commercial transactions with Germany were officially banned. Therefore, during the war, the only export option for Dominican producers was the U.S. market, ultimately initiating economic and political ties that would remain long after the war. In 1919, a Customs Tariff Act was passed that declared almost one thousand U.S. products either duty-free or having reduced tax. World War I, during the combat years and immediately afterwards, generated a favorable international setting for Dominican traditional agricultural products like cane sugar, tobacco, cocoa, and coffee. In the particular case of cane sugar, due in part to the war-related destruction of the beet-sugar industry in Europe, international prices soared. A period of about eight years of generalized expansion and wealth creation (the so-called Dance of the Millions) ensued, during which almost all social sectors in Dominican society associated to the exports economy benefited, with corporations generating more profits and workers earning better salaries. Yet in 1922, the trend reached a peak and was quickly followed by a sudden collapse that brought the economy to a crisis. By 1922, international output was so high that the global market became saturated; prices fell sharply; and producers, the Dominican Republic amongst them, entered a sudden acute crisis. Bankruptcies, sharp
Background | 481
decline of the value of Dominican exports, and decline in the customsÊ revenues brought impoverishment and a new strained economic situation for the military occupation government. Meanwhile, in the U.S. political environment, strong opposition to the occupation began. Warren Harding, the newly elected U.S. president in 1922, shared those views. His arrival in government happened to coincide with the international economic crisis that ended the global sugar boom that the Dominican Republic and its U.S. occupation government had taken advantage of. By inundating the country with duty-free U.S. exports, the early local industry was ruined, and many Dominicans became accustomed to consuming U.S. brands. On the other hand, the nation remained under the protectorate of the United States and had its customs still controlled by them.
The Generalísimo Rafael Leónidas Trujillo At the end of the occupation, elections were held in 1924, and Horacio Vásquez was elected president. Horacio VásquezÊs government respected public liberties and was able to negotiate with the opposition a new foreign loan that was used to launch a renewed public works program, which by 1927 coincided with another period of increased public revenue from rising international sugar prices. By then, however, a new political alignment had formed around upcoming military leader Rafael Trujillo, who had been trained by the U.S. Marine occupation forces and had been left in charge of supplying the Dominican National Police after the U.S. troops left. Through thug-like and often bloody street political tactics, General Rafael Leónidas Trujillo and his supporters were able to win the 1930 elections from which all opposing parties had withdrawn from fear. Only occasionally objecting to TrujilloÊs initiatives, the United States took no systematic action to intervene against this shattering of Dominican democracy. During the three decades of TrujilloÊs implacable rule, the Dominican RepublicÊ s economy went through considerable internal growth, in part benefiting from the high prices of agricultural products in the international market during World War II. The dictator devoted considerable resources to training and equipping the armed forces and the police under his control. This allowed Trujillo to effectively curtail internal resistance for the time being, as well as foreign-launched armed attempts by Dominican exiles against his regime. He secured the support of the elite through a system of terror that killed anyone perceived to be an enemy or threat; he led an elite corrupted group that along with him cheated and robbed the Dominican people. In 1937, Trujillo ordered the cold massacre of thousands of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic; In 1961, as part of a wave of increased repression following a failed anti-Trujillo armed invasion by Dominican exiles in 1959, members of his regime assassinated three young women from the Cibao rural middle class
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known for their activism in the internal resistance movement, the Mirabal sisters. After visiting their husbands, incarcerated by the regime in the northern coastal town of Puerto Plata, they and their male chauffeur were assaulted during their ride back home to their home town of Salcedo by a gang of TrujilloÊs thugs and beaten to death, their necks broken. The assassination further fueled the repudiation of the regime by many Dominicans from different social sectors. Yet, in the end, on May 30, 1961, the all-confident Trujillo, facing a growing internal opposition movement that had been encouraged by the overthrow of Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista, was killed in an ambush organized by some disgruntled members of his own regime. The group found support in Dominican citizens who were tired of being repressed, and finally, the American government decided to cut off its ties with the tyrannical man it had helped to create and support for three long decades.
Juan Bosch and the First Constitutional Election Immediately after TrujilloÊs demise and the fall of his dictatorial state, prodemocracy Dominicans were able to elect Juan Bosch as the new president, the first freely elected president in more than 30 years. Bosch·an accomplished selftaught scholar and writer whose narrations would become classics of Dominican literature·had been one of the main leaders of the exiled Partido Revolucionario Dominicano and of the Dominican exilesÊ anti-Trujillo movement. Once elected in 1962, Bosch restored political freedoms and pushed for economic initiatives that irritated the Dominican oligarchy who had survived Trujillo as well as many conservative high-ranking officers in the armed forces. These forces began to plot against BoschÊs government, and in November 1963, a few days after a high-level U.S. military envoy had a secluded meeting in Santo Domingo with the top leaders of the Dominican Armed Forces, a military coup ousted him. A conservative triumvirate was installed, but in April 1965, a more liberal sector of the armed forces launched a rebellion in Santo Domingo City to reinstate the democratically elected government of 1963. They called themselves „constitutionalists‰ to indicate their intention to restore the freedoms of the 1963 constitution. The rebellion faced the resistance of those in power and the conservative military who were loyal to them, and thus led to a civil war, known by most Dominicans as AprilÊs War, the April 1965 War, or the Revolution of 1965.
The 1965 Revolution and U.S. Occupation When the constitutionalist forces seemed to be winning the civil war, the U.S. government led by Lyndon B. Johnson became explicitly involved in the Dominican RepublicÊs internal affairs by sending 40,000 marines in support of the conservative forces that had ousted Juan Bosch. The U.S. military invasion, and its decisive
Causes and Waves of Migration | 483
contribution to the shattering of the Dominican democratic experiment of 1963, essentially contrary to the democratic values predicated by the United States internationally, was justified by the excuse that the United States was helping to prevent the development of „another Cuba in the Caribbean‰ (the United States feared that pro-Cuban left-wing groups among the constitutionalist would take control of the rebellion). Such a risk in the region, would compromise the U.S. global strategy after 1959 within the context of the Cold War. The military occupation was the second U.S. violation of Dominican sovereignty in 50 years. With the overwhelming U.S. force against them, the Constitutionalists were defeated and their main leaders, including army colonel Francisco Caamaño, were sent into exile. A provisional government was established, and elections were called for June 1966. With the progressive and leftist forces disbanded, incarcerated, or pushed out of the country, and among an atmosphere of increased anticommunist antileft-wing propaganda and under the watchful eye of the United States, TrujilloÊs former chief administrator and long-time supporter, Dr. Joaquín Balaguer, won the elections. Balaguer would remain in power for three consecutive four-year terms, from 1966 to 1978, during which the basis of contemporary history of the Dominican Republic would be established, including massive migration to the United States.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration: Dominicans through Ellis Island Thanks to pioneering research currently being conducted at the CUNY Dominican Studies Institute at the City College of New York, we have information pertaining to approximately 5,000 individuals from the Dominican Republic who traveled to New York City through Ellis Island during three decades from 1892 to 1924, a period that covers events like the Spanish-American War, the first U.S. intervention of Dominican customs (in 1905), World War I, the Dominican sugar export boom of the early 1920s, and the eight-year-long U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Republic (1916 1924). Preliminary analysis of more than two-thirds of the data reveals that many Dominicans came to stay permanently, that they settled in the eastern part of Manhattan, suggesting an early Dominican enclave in that area, and that the number of those arriving would reach a record high (as compared to previous years) during the U.S. military occupation between 1916 and 1924. In addition, a demographic analysis shows that most migrants were male, single, and fairly young, between the ages of 18 and 34; most had skills, including high professions such as lawyers; the majority were described as dark, black, and mulatto; and most traveled in first-class cabins and declared to have over $50 with them at the time of arrival. It is noteworthy to mention that a good number of those who came during this period were single women who traveled unaccompanied.
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In spite of the high number of Dominicans who came through Ellis Island and their settlement in popular neighborhoods, scholarly studies and government reports detailing the influx of migrants at the turn of century paid no attention to the group, which ironically, 50 years later, would come in mass and would be described as „new migrants.‰
Immigration after 1965 With the support from the United States, in 1966 President Joaquín Balaguer put in place a plan that sought to pacify and modernize the country within a capitalist model of development. Some of the measures taken included eliminating political opposition, undermining civil liberties, and encouraging people to leave home for good. Along this plan, Dominican left wingers and liberals were targeted, and many were murdered allegedly by „uncontrollable forces‰; many others were imprisoned indefinitely, while others were deported. The countryÊs economy grew remarkably as compared to previous years and neighboring countries in Latin American and the Caribbean due to revenues generated by special access to the U.S. market given to sugar exports generated by government-controlled sugar mills; U.S. foreign investments, particularly in industrial free-trade zones; economic aid from the United States; and successive international loans. Yet, economic growth did not generate an improvement for the majority of the Dominican people and further emphasized the gap between those who had and those who had not. The socioeconomic polarization of Dominican society was especially visible in the massive precarious settlements of the impoverished rural populations in shanty towns outside of the city and depressed areas popularly known as „marginalized neighborhoods.‰ Levels of poverty increased through increasing unemployment, generalized underemployment, and the inability of the economy to create enough jobs to absorb the new entrants into the labor force. The political decision to control unwanted possible social unrest was to open the door for people to leave their homeland in search for a better life. The aperture happened surreptitiously. A generous passport issuing policy was adopted that concretely symbolized the opening of doors for people to migrate. The passing in the United States of the Family Reunification Immigration Act in 1965, which facilitated the entrance of people who were related by blood or marriage, came in handy to aid President BalaguerÊs hidden agenda of encouraging Dominicans to leave home.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community Between 2000 and 2007, the number of Dominicans in the United States rose by a robust 16 percent, from 1,041,910 to 1,208,060. By comparison, the overall
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population of the United States increased by only 7.2 percent during these years. Dominicans now constitute the fifth-largest Hispanic/Latino group in the United States, following Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Salvadorans (see Figure 5). As in the past, a major source of Dominican population growth in the United States in recent years has been immigration. In fact, the number of Dominican migrants entering the United States has remained more or less stable in recent years, after a significant drop that started in the second half of the 1990s. Figure 6 shows the surge of Dominican migration to the United States. In the period of fiscal years 2000 to 2008, a total of 242,112 Dominicans were admitted as immigrants. If these numbers were to continue, Dominican immigration to the United States in the first decade of the new millennium would continue to be significant, although its volume would decline considerably as compared to the last decade of the previous millennium, in the 1990s, a record decade of Dominican migration to the United States.
Geographical Distribution In 1980, three out of four Dominicans in the United States resided in New York. But this has changed. By 2007, the Dominican population in New York accounted for close to half of all Dominicans in the United States. Table 79 presents the states with the largest Dominican population in 1990, 2000, and 2007. In 2007, close to 52.2 percent of all Dominicans resided in New York State, down from approximately 70 percent in 1990. Following New York is New Jersey, which accounted for close to 14.2 percent of the Dominican population in 2007. Populations are swelling in Florida, where there were 141,948 Dominicans residing in 2007, up from less than 100,000 in 2000; in Massachusetts, where 83,758 Dominicans resided in 2007; in Pennsylvania, where the Dominican population nearly tripled, from 13,667 in 2000 to 35,694 in 2007. There are substantial numbers in other states as well, including Rhode Island, Maryland, and a multitude of other states·from Texas to Illinois· with budding Dominican communities. The geographical dispersal of Dominicans is reflected by their growth in or near major metropolitan areas of the eastern United States. Table 80 shows the top counties of Dominican concentration in 2000. New York City continues to be the top location of residence, with 604,844 Dominicans residing in the five boroughs/counties of the Big Apple in 2007. This is followed by Miami-Dade County in Florida, with 54,374 Dominicans, and the county of Essex in Massachusetts, home of the city of Lawrence, which houses 45,526 Dominicans. One also finds growth in several counties in New Jersey, including the county of Passaic, which includes the city of Paterson, where 44,424 Dominicans resided in 2007; and Hudson County, where 36,454 Dominicans resided in 2007 (this county comprises Jersey City and Union City). The next major concentration of Dominicans is in Providence, Rhode Island, where there were 31,578 in 2007. Other counties with major Dominican concentrations incorporate the cities of Perth
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Amboy and Newark in New Jersey; Orlando and Tampa in Florida; Yonkers in New York; and Philadelphia in Pennsylvania. Overall, data on geographic mobility indicate that the geographic distribution has changed in the past few years, showing new patterns of settlements, with increases and declines of population in certain areas. Dominicans have moved around the country as well as within the cities where they have lived for decades. In the past, the focus was almost exclusively on New York City, especially the concentration of Dominicans in Manhattan, particularly in the popular neighborhood of Washington Heights. Indeed, the strong presence of Dominicans in Washington Heights gave way to a widespread belief that all Dominicans living in the United States somehow resided in this neighborhood alone. This view was even held among Dominicans who lived in other parts of the United States, among people in the Dominican Republic, and among other Dominicans who lived in countries like Puerto Rico, Spain, and Venezuela. Dominican New Yorkers have not remained still in New York City and have begun to move around internally throughout all boroughs. Manhattan lost its preponderance of Dominican inhabitants, and the Bronx is now the area of the largest Dominican population in New York City and nationally. In 2007, there were
Dominican immigrant Elena Clarisa Sepulveda (right) and fellow Dominican Lidia Maria Veras speak to a reporter in an English as a Second Language classroom in Lynn, Massachusetts, on April 19, 2006. (AP Photo/Josh Reynolds)
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213,859 Dominican New Yorkers in the Bronx, a sharp increase relative to the 181,450 located there in 2000. At the same time, the Dominican populations in Manhattan, Queens, and Brooklyn have remained static or experienced negative growth. Within the Bronx, there are large settlements in Morris Heights, Highbridge, University Heights, the Concourse, Fordham, Bedford Park, and Marble Hill. In Manhattan, the overwhelming focus of location remains the Washington Heights/Inwood area. In Queens, there is a significant community located in Corona, while in Brooklyn the salient areas are Williamsburg, Bushwick, Sunset Park, and Cypress Hills. The implications of the new geographical rearrangement remain to be seen. For now one thing is clear and that is that the Dominican population in the Bronx is positioned to continue to grow at a faster rate than it is growing now. Entire Dominican families are moving from other places into the Bronx lured by a large housing stock that includes spacious, older apartments for rents that are cheaper than other places in the city, particularly as compared to Manhattan and Queens. The Bronx also houses the largest Puerto Rican population in the United States, and Dominicans have been shown to adapt extremely well in neighborhoods populated predominantly by Puerto Ricans. The increased complexity of the Dominican experience in the United States is not only geographical, it also reflects changes in nativity or the place where Dominicans were born. In the past, studies of Dominicans focused almost exclusively on analyzing immigrants. This reflected the predominance within the American community of those born in the Dominican Republic. But this has also changed. U.S.born Dominicans now account for the largest proportion of population growth. There were 481,810 U.S.-born Dominicans in the country in 2007, representing 39.9 percent of overall Dominican population, up from 33.2 percent in 2000. Indeed, of the increase in the Dominican population of 166,150 in the period from 2000 to 2007, a total of 135,896 were born in the United States, accounting for over three-quarters of the population increase. This means that a vigorously growing second generation is becoming a major demographic force rapidly approaching the 50 percent mark as reflected in Figure 7. The rise of U.S.-born Dominicans is a pattern that we anticipate will continue in the coming decades. The growth of a substantial second·and third·generation should be clearly one of the priorities in the agenda of both academic researchers and policy-makers in the United States as well as in the Dominican Republic. Dominicans are no longer only migrants, and it is likely that the second generation will develop its own ways to connect with the Dominican Republic. Research focusing on remittances or transnational practices, for instance, should account for distinctions between immigrant and native-born Dominican Americans. In the meantime, later sections will provide a demographic profile of U.S.-born Dominicans and· given their young mean age·their educational prospects.
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The growing and changing nature of the Dominican population in the United States triggers a number of questions concerning the groupÊs overall socioeconomic standing. What do the changes described previously imply about the situation of the Dominican population in the United States? Do Dominicans in New York differ from Dominicans settling in other parts of the country, such as Florida or New Jersey? How does time spent in the United States impact the lives of the Dominican people altogether? How do Dominicans measure up as compared to other groups, including other Latinos? Is the growing second-generation performing better in education and labor markets outcomes than their parents did? We think that addressing some of these questions would help researchers to construct a more complete picture of the Dominican people today.
Patterns of Settlement A closer look at the areas where Dominicans are growing reveals a complex pattern of settlement that reflect a tendency of higher concentration on one side and dispersion to new areas on the other. In general Dominicans are staying in the same states and the same region where large concentrations of Dominicans already existed. This residential pattern tends to emphasize the level of concentration in Dominican neighborhoods and, consequently, expand their population in the city and the states where they live. There are sharply increasing populations in areas that were not in the top 10 locations in 2000, such as Orlando and Tampa in Florida, where the population more than doubled between 2000 and 2006; and in Berks and Lehigh counties, on the eastern part of Pennsylvania near the border with New Jersey, where the Dominican population also more than doubled since 2000. Dominicans who settle in new counties and cities tend to move into neighborhoods that are predominantly populated by other Latinos, particularly Puerto Ricans (such as Broward County and Palm Beach, which border Miami, or in locations in Pennsylvania, which border New Jersey). Finally, while some areas have started to experience some decline as a result of very little population growth combined with the number of Dominicans who are moving out of these places (such as Queens in New York City), overall the Dominican population has continued to increase. The first decade of the 21st century has been characterized by a tremendous internal mobility among Dominicans in the United States. Dominicans have replenished old and new neighborhoods and have brought with them their lifestyle and their dreams and aspirations. We still need to explain what propels Dominicans to move internally and whether the new settlements provide adequate resources for Dominicans to remain there if they so desire. We also need to understand whether mobility includes a return to the homeland, and if a return occurs, who may be likely to return.
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Educational Attainment Modern societies tend to value the attainment of formal education over any other credential in the labor market. Many would agree that the most critical variable explaining poverty is low educational attainment and the poor labor market outcomes associated with it. For instance, there is strong positive correlation between earnings and schooling. Higher educational attainment raises worker productivity and leads to increased wages. Education is also used by employers as a screening device, with less-educated workers outranked by more-educated workers in the rationing of entry-level jobs and higher-paying promotions (Hernández and RiveraBatiz 2003). The analysis of educational attainment among various groups in New York City shows that Dominicans are lagging behind. In 1980, 72.0 percent of the Dominican population 25 years of age or older did not have a high school diploma. By 1990, the percentage of non-high school graduates had significantly declined to 61.5 percent, and by 2000, it dropped to 52.8 percent. On the other hand, the percentage of those with „College or More‰ increased from 3.8 percent in 1980 to 6.1 percent in 1990 and to 9.1 percent in 2000. Despite the positive gains, it is important to note that Dominicans are represented in the two extremes of the educational pyramid: they show a disproportionate representation among those who have not completed a high school education and a very low representation among those who possess higher education. DominicansÊ low educational achievement matters in a society that increasingly privileges the attainment of formal schooling and validates knowledge that has been certified through educational degrees. The valorization of formal education started long before the massive arrival of Dominicans. In 1988, an editorial published in the Washington Post described the state of affairs in the labor market by arguing that unskilled workers had a tough time finding good-paying jobs: „The education-linked difficulty facing the large number of workers in this country, who, not that long ago, could qualify for a wide range of entry level, decently paying jobs without sophisticated technical skills or in many cases a high school diploma. As we constantly hear, those jobs are mostly gone, replaced by more technically demanding and autonomous jobs that need employees with higher-order skills‰ (October 29, 1988).
Economic Attainment What is the current socioeconomic status of the Dominican population in the United States? How does it compare with that of other groups in the country? Most experts utilize per capita mean household income in comparing the average standard of living of various groups in the population. But in intergroup
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comparisons, one should consider the fact that the number of people residing in a household may vary within and across groups. Because of this variability, two households with identical income may have widely different standards of living. If one household has 10 people living in it while the other has only 3, the standard of living is much higher in the latter and researchers must account for and factor in this variability to present a more accurate picture of the households compared. In 2000, the average household size among Dominicans in the United States was 3.6, but for the overall United States it was lower, equal to 2.6. Table 81 presents the differences in annual household income per capita prevailing in the United States in 2000 and 2007. Note that the income differentials between the population of Dominican ethnicity and the rest of the population are substantial. In 2000, Dominicans had an annual household income per capita of $11,065, which was about half of the per capita income of the average household in the country. The gap is slightly lower when compared to the overall Latino/Hispanic population, whose mean per capita income in 2000 was $12,483. In 2007, the income gap between the average household in the country and the Dominican population persisted, as reflected in Table 81. The socioeconomic status of Dominicans varies dramatically by state of residence. Table 82 presents the average annual household income per capita of Dominicans in the states with the largest Dominican population. In 2000, Florida displays the highest income, with $12,886, and Rhode Island the lowest, with $8,560. This represents tremendous inequality: the average income of Dominicans in Florida was 33.6 percent higher than that of Dominicans in Rhode Island. The table also compares data from 2000 and 2007 and shows that the alignment of the annual household income among Dominicans in the compared states remained the same in a period of seven years, with Florida at the top and Rhode Island at the bottom. At the time of this writing we had begun further analysis of the household income differences among Dominicans in the various states compared and found that higher household income among the groups in Florida and New Jersey as compared to in New York, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island is positively correlated to type of family, or in other words, families headed by a single woman·no husband present·and families headed by married couples. In both Florida and New Jersey, Dominicans have a much higher percentage of families headed by married couples than in the other three states.
Poverty Poverty status is determined by comparing the income of the family where the person lives with an income threshold measuring the amount of financial resources that a family needs in order to pay for a basic, minimum food basket and other
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necessities, including housing. This threshold varies with the number of persons in the family, number of children, and age of family members. For instance, the average income threshold for a family consisting of two adults with one child in 1999 was $13,410, but for a family of two adults and three children, the threshold rises to $19,882. The poverty rate is the percentage of persons living in families with income below the poverty income threshold. Dominicans are among the groups with the highest poverty rates in New York City. About one out of every three Dominicans in New York City lived in families with income under the poverty line. Overall, Dominicans and Hispanics had poverty rates well above the average and three times higher than non-Hispanic whites, the group with the lowest level of poverty. There are many reasons that can explain poverty among a given group. For the sake of brevity, however, in this writing we will focus on how family structure, unemployment levels, and educational background among Dominicans factor into the groupÊs poor economic outcomes. Another word concerning poverty: persistent high levels of poverty among Dominicans challenge mechanistic views about the benefits involved in migrating from a poor to a rich country. Improved standards of living are not guaranteed through the difficult act of migration. A constant in migration, however, is the specific interest of the parts: on one hand, we find the concerns of migrants, their aspirations and desire to secure a better life through the act of migration; and on the other, we find the firm decision of the receiving society to control and regulate not only migrantÊs life but the migration act itself. And of course, the positions of both parties are not always in agreement about the logistics of migration, including time, volume, and duration.
Unemployment In 1990, 15.7 percent of Dominican males and 18.4 percent of Dominican females were unemployed. In 2000, 8.9 percent of Dominican males and 13.1 percent of Dominican females were unemployed. Note that in 1990 both Dominican men and women had the highest unemployment rate among all groups and that while in 2000 the unemployment rate of Dominican males was only second to nonHispanic blacks, Dominican women continued to have the highest unemployment level among all women compared. Data show that in 2005 unemployment levels increased for both sexes, to 11.4 for males and to 13.3 for females. Persistent above-average unemployment rates among Dominican workers suggest that unemployment among the group is not seasonal or frictional but structural. That is to say that the loss of jobs among the group is caused by a contraction produced on the demand side of the labor market. The shifting of the economy from manufacturing to service produced a sharp decline of blue-collar jobs, particularly
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those associated with the manufacturing sector. The increasing loss of blue-collar, low-skilled jobs had a devastating effect on Dominican immigrants, who have been mostly attached to jobs in the declining sector. Table 83 presents data on the decline of manufacturing in New York City and the share of the population employed in that sector. As reflected on the table, almost one in two Dominicans in New York City was employed in the manufacturing sector in 1980. Furthermore, by 2000, the representation of Dominicans in the manufacturing sector had precipitously declined to 12.4 percent or to four times less than what they had in 1980 (48.6%). Unemployment among Dominicans resulted when displaced workers could not find jobs in the other growing job sectors of the economy either because they did not have the educational or training qualifications required for those jobs or because there were not enough jobs that Dominicans qualified for. The inability of the U.S. economy to produce enough blue-collar, low-skilled jobs at a pace capable of matching the needs of the labor force is an issue that seldom appears in the writings among scholars of migration studies. A superficial look at the U.S. economy may lead one to miss the disparity between supply and demand in certain sectors of the labor market, particularly before the facts that immigrant, job-seekers keep coming and that the United States continues to create jobs in every sector of the economy. But of course, the question is not whether people come or do not come or whether a number of jobs are created regularly. The question lies, rather, among other things, on whether job-seekers get jobs, on the number of those who do not, and on an empirical analysis of the elasticity of the labor markets where immigrants tend to be hired. Such analysis needs to take into account the needs of the immigrant population and other labor groups who may compete with immigrants for the same jobs.
Dominican Middle Class and Dominican-owned Businesses Despite high levels of poverty, there is a rising segment of middle-class Dominican skilled professionals and entrepreneurs. Economic diversity in Dominican communities would include an increasing middle class, made up of college graduates and people with skills who hold well-paid jobs and whose household incomes range between $65,000 and $100,000 per year. Among this group we can also include executives in the private sector·from banks and insurance to real estate; elected politicians; people who work in education and academia; and the heads of community-based organizations, which in the particular case of New York City, account for generating almost one-third of jobs held by Dominicans employed in the nonfor-profit sector. In addition, there is a group of entrepreneur Dominicans who own their businesses; while most Dominican American business owners own businesses in Dominican-dominated communities, a few others have penetrated the commercial sector of mainstream America.
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Ezequiel Vasquez, a 26-year resident of Danbury, Connecticut, of Dominican descent, talks with a reporter about immigration issues in Polla’s Supermarket on Main Street in Danbury on August 11, 2009. (AP Photo/George Ruhe)
The president of the Association of Dominican Bodegas Owners (ADB), Mr. Ramon Murphy, reports that there are over 7,000 registered bodegas owned and operated by Dominicans throughout New York City. The president of the National Supermarket Association (NSA), Mr. William Rodríguez, asserts that the association includes a membership list of 400 supermarkets whose owners are of Dominican ancestry, and whose businesses are found in all five states with the largest Dominican concentrations, from New York to Rhode Island, as well as in other states where the Dominican population has just started to emerge, such as North Carolina. In public forums, both the representatives of the ADB and NSA have stated that their business operations represent enormous commercial activities, with annual sales amounting to over $4 billion for the ADB and over $2 billion for the NSA. Dominican business owners enjoy considerable visibility and respect among Dominican people. They are often seen as role models and are often called upon to sit on the most prestigious boards, representing institutions from the Dominican communities, cities, and states where they reside. U.S. census data estimate that in 2000, approximately 7 percent of the total Dominican population residing in the United States identified themselves as being selfemployed, which in turn implies the existence of roughly 84,000 people of Dominican ancestry are involved in entrepreneur activities (Hernández and Rivera-Batiz 2003).
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Besides the gross data given by the Census Bureau and the accounts offered by the leadership of the business groups, no formal study has been done profiling Dominican-owned businesses in the United States. The only documentation we have regarding the business sector comes from a few academic studies that provide some details about the status of the Dominican business community at a regional level. Luis GuarnizoÊs study looked at 90 Dominican businesses established in New York City and in the Dominican Republic. GuarnizoÊs study found that a good proportion of returnee migrants tended to establish new businesses in the Dominican Republic and that a commercial nexus was created among returnee business owners and Dominicans in the United States (Portes and Guarnizo 1991). In „Diaspora, Trade, and Investment: Strategies for New York and the Dominican Republic,‰ Lenora Suki analyzed trade activities between the United States and the Dominican Republic. Suki reviewed institutional data gathered from the U.S. Department of Commerce and found that while New YorkÊs Dominican population was almost six times that of FloridaÊs Dominican population, Florida had a much more robust import and export business trade with the Dominican Republic than New York. Indeed, Suki found that trade between Florida and the Dominican Republic was three times higher than between New York and the Dominican Republic (Suki 2004). In a similar study, Andrea Ryan found that people of Dominican ancestry owned 95 percent of all the Hispanic businesses registered in the city of Lawrence, Massachusetts. Lawrence is the city with the highest percentage of Hispanic people in the United States, and Dominicans in Lawrence have reached considerable political muscle and a respected level of business activities. RyanÊs study included an inventory of all the businesses in the city of Lawrence and provided information about the cityÊs commercial strength and the entrepreneurship of the different racial groups (Ryan 2007). In spite of the vitality and the tenacity shown by the Dominican business sector, important challenges remain ahead, which, if not addressed in a timely manner, may undermine the growth of entrepreneurial activities among the group. Observers have identified the lack of institutional information about Dominican businesses as the most urgent obstacle to be resolved. Basic information·such as the size of the businesses, the number of employees, the amount of capital, the types of businesses, the number of assets·is missing from published reports and data regularly compiled by U.S. Department of Commerce and other governmental institutions. The five-year business census generates information about businesses and their owners in general as well as a number of separate data sets for firms owned by racial minority groups, women, and Hispanics. In the volume Hispanic-Owned Firms, while people of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban ancestries are counted and listed as distinct business groups, Dominican business owners are lumped under the categories of „Hispanic or Latino‰ or under „Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino,‰
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making it virtually impossible to draw any specific information about Dominican entrepreneur activities in any part of the United States. Curiously enough, the business activities of ethnic groups who are demographically smaller than Dominicans, like the Spaniards, are disaggregated and reported. The lack of information may prevent the business sector from maximizing the potential for networking, developing collaborative initiatives, and creating and pursuing new business interests. In addition, lack of knowledge about the U.S. Dominican business community may impact on its capacity to remain up-to-date concerning the growth and the challenges of businesses even if they are located in Dominican communities. In the long run, not having institutional information readily available for perusal also undermines the capacity of the Dominican American business sector to present itself as an organized, diverse body that can negotiate with other larger minority business organizations, the U.S. business community at large, and the international sector, including the Dominican Republic.
Adjustment and Adaptation Who Is Dominican? When speaking about Dominicans in the United States, we find it appropriate to provide an operational definition about the group that may serve as a departing point in creating an understanding about their identity. In defining the social identity of an immigrant group, researchers run the risk of composing an image that is based on details that may represent extremes instead of the different layers that may describe the groupÊs identity. Observers may opt also for composing a collective view of a given group based on transitory stages that may disappear with time as the group ages and adapts in the new abode. In addition, readers should keep in mind that social identity is a two-way street representing two perceptions: that of us about ourselves and that of the others about us. In this writing we have opted for including a definition of Dominicans that is based on two elements: on standard institutional explanation and on selected cultural manifestations of the group as they establish roots in New York City, perhaps the most familiar city where they have settled in the United States. While the first definition is arbitrary and is connected to DominicansÊ country of origins, the second is spontaneous and a willful social construction of the groupÊs desire to be recognized as Dominicans.
Institutional Definition As with any other ethnic group the number of Dominicans in the United States is an estimate based on the instruments used to collect demographic information in the nation. Each decade, the Census Bureau enumerates the population of the United
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States and its various racial and ethnic groups. In addition, estimates of the population are made yearly from data gathered through various surveys conducted by the Census Bureau based on a sample of the population. Of course, any population count based on the Census Bureau represents just an estimate and it is likely to be an undercount of the true number of Dominicans in the United States. In some cases, an undercount occurs because people are reluctant to provide personal information to the government under the belief that this constitutes a violation of their privacy as individuals. In Latino and immigrant communities, undercounts are also associated with two other reasons: a systematic failure on the part of the U.S. Census Bureau to penetrate Latino neighborhoods and the hesitation of undocumented immigrants to complete census forms for fear of deportation. As compared to other groups, however, the number of undocumented Dominicans is relatively small. In 2000, the Department of Homeland Security estimated that there were 91,000 undocumented Dominican migrants residing in the United States, compared to 46,000 in 1990. Since a substantial fraction of undocumented immigrants are indeed counted by the census, it is not clear that a serious Dominican undercount exists based on immigration status. Rather, it is likely that current undercounts among Dominicans result from the omission of the word „Dominican‰ from the list of samples provided in the census questionnaires for respondents to select their national identity or ethnic ancestry, and the failure of the group to „write in‰ their ethnicity or ancestry. In using data gathered by the Census Bureau, most researchers define Dominicans using the following categories: (1) persons who self-identify and write in „Dominican‰ in any of the surveys conducted by the Census Bureau; (2) persons who self-identify as „Other Hispanic‰ and did not write-in any specific Hispanic category and declare their place of birth to be the Dominican Republic or their first or second ancestry to be Dominican. The computation of these numbers is defined as the number of Dominicans residing in the United States. Beyond institutional data, Dominicans also express their identity through concrete cultural symbols and manifestations that clearly show others how they perceive themselves from a national and ethnic stance. What follows is a description of Dominicans in New York City as they evolve, establish roots, create a community, and distinguish themselves from others through their ethnic identity.
Retaining a Sense of National Identity and Forming a Distinctiveness: The Case of New York City In 1990, 15 percent of all immigrants coming to the United States settled in New York City. New immigrants, mostly Caribbean and Central and South American, slowly began to arrive after 1965 and share the immigrant spaces with Puerto Ricans,
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the oldest of the larger Latino groups in the city. In 1990, Puerto Ricans made up the largest Hispanic group in the city with almost 900,000 people. According to historian Virginia Sánchez Korrol, Puerto Ricans came to New York City in the early 1950s and established the strongest presence in neighborhoods in Manhattan and the Bronx (Sánchez Korrol 1983). Thousands of Dominicans began to arrive to New York City in the middle of the 1960s, and by 1990, their population size had grown sizably like the Puerto Ricans. The number of Dominicans had increased dramatically from 332,713 in 1990 to 554,638 in 2000, becoming the second-largest Hispanic group in New York City. Data from the Department of City Planning shows that the Dominican Republic was the number one country of origin for immigrants to New York City from the 1970s through the 1990s (New York City 1992, 1996). As with other Hispanic immigrants, the remarkable increase in the number of Dominicans in New York City is also attributed to high fertility rates among young Dominican women, who since 1990 have been among the ethnic groups with the highest fertility rate in New York City. The 1970s can be summarily characterized as the period in which Dominicans in the United States started building and consolidating a Dominican community/ identity by initiating a systematic appropriation of both physical and symbolic spaces in the neighborhoods where they lived. The overwhelming presence of Dominicans in New York City, particularly their high concentration in neighborhoods such as Washington Heights/Inwood, in Upper Manhattan, affected the entire ethnic/cultural fabric of the city and, more importantly, the very social landscape of the neighborhoods where Dominicans settled. The desire of Dominicans to distinguish themselves became apparent in the naming of their businesses and civic and cultural organizations with names that were related to Dominican culture, history, and the like. In addition, Dominicans created organizations that catered specifically to Dominicans such as Alianza Dominicana, Centro de Desarrollo de la Mujer Dominicana, and Asociación Comunal de Dominicanos Progresistas. Whereas some may argue that many of the organizations were created more as a response to a demand for services, (whether social or personal), we argue that the development of these entities also reflected a process of settlement and community building and, ultimately, an appropriation of space for lo dominicano. Indeed, lo dominicano, which ranged from the concrete·establishments owned or operated by Dominicans, the placing of the Dominican flag subversively on a lamp post on a given street, or on a window of any building·to the abstract and symbolic·a sense of awareness about the group in the larger society·increasingly became tangible and concrete in many places in the city (e.g., the Dominican flag on Broadway and 137th Street). A pioneer study of voluntary associations among Dominicans residing in New York City found that in 1978 as many as 36 voluntary associations existed in Washington Heights/Inwood. The author believed that most Dominican organizations were affective, serving as a gathering place for recreational and cultural reaffirmation rather than as a vehicle for integration into American society (Sassen-Koob
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1987). Other observers have found, however, that membership in cultural or affective organizations·that is, groupings that are primarily organized on the basis of ethnic identity and with the purpose to maintain cultural and historical legacy· influence the likelihood of integration into society through social involvement. Members of affective organizations have shown high interest in political involvement, particularly in participating in electoral processes (Verba and Nie 1972; Díaz 1996; Leighley and Nagler 1999). Indeed, as time went on, many of the affective community organizations began to shift their orientation. They transformed from affective organizations into community-based organizations (CBOs), or community agencies that sought public and private funding to create social programs to satisfy the unmet needs of the Dominican community. This transformation, it could be argued, was probably an indication of a politicization of sorts already in the works, since the creation of CBOs implies a necessary level of awareness about legal issues and public as well as private potential sources of funding, which in turn entail a likely interaction with elected and appointed officials more or less in charge of approving, officializing, or supporting the creation of these CBOs. Not surprisingly, some of the CBOs experienced further transformation in the previously mentioned direction as time went on. In their new role as service agencies, some CBOs also nurtured grassroots leaders who eventually were elected to public office, while others became community activists who enjoyed national recognition as a legitimate voice of the Dominican people in the United States. The development of CBOs in Dominican neighborhoods undoubtedly revealed a mentality of permanence among Dominicans; a mentality that reflected a desire to solve problems affecting Dominicans here through the use of social programs that were recognized and used by more established immigrant communities and other groups at large. The establishment of CBOs also revealed its membersÊ interest in becoming direct agents and leading actors in securing the necessary resources for the Dominican community. This protagonist role also implies that Dominicans were interested, for better or for worse, in becoming their own voice to vouch on behalf of Dominicans before other groups and before the larger society. During the 1980s, Dominicans continued to demarcate their neighborhoods with manifestations of symbolic icons. At this time, cultural organizations begin to transform into community service agencies to satisfy the Dominican peopleÊs growing social needs, which many people argued were not being addressed. Many civic organizations supported the development of an effervescent literary activism that included publishing texts and organizing groups of writers, readings, and literary conferences with emerging voices from the community and well-known writers from the homeland (Torres-Saillant 1999, 383; Cocco DeFillipis 1997; Cocco DeFillipis and Ballantyne 1994; Cocco DeFillipis and Robinett 1988). The production of literary texts, commercial advertisements, and flyers announcing activities
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were decisive in the development of a printing/publishing industry in the hands of Dominicans; such industry contributed to the expansion and diversification of the Dominican business sector, which, at the time, included mostly bodegas, restaurants, garment factories, livery taxi and limousine services, and beauty parlors. Researchers would find evidence to support the argument that during this time Dominicans seemed interested in forging an ethnic consciousness that was seeking to establish itself beyond the borders of an immigrant community and penetrate the social fabric of the city, particularly the places that could influence the younger Dominican generations. Thus, Dominicans insisted, for instance, on encouraging highranking politicians and school officials to celebrate and recognize the Dominican Independence Day. Consequently, the celebration of banquets and other gatherings at City Hall to honor Dominican Independence Day on February 27 became a new local custom. Presidents of boroughs with high concentration of Dominicans followed suit and very soon it was clear that the issue was not whether the mayor of New York City or any other elected officials might organize celebrations in commemoration of an important historical Dominican date; rather, the issue was how many elected officials did the same. Similarly, naming public schools after Dominican historic figures and placing Dominican symbols in important parks in the city became rallying causes and concrete manifestations of permanence and community building that united Dominicans regardless of class status, gender, or race. The rallying cries were testament to how the force of ethnicity could be used as a distinct social agent. By the early 1990s, the process of lo dominicano accelerated and became more sharply defined. Dominicans, now with a clearer understanding of the significance of their presence in the city, were no longer necessarily interested in naming local institutions after Dominican patriotic or historic figures of their native land. Dominicans had now turned their interests to local people of the community (defined broadly in order to include Dominicans from any state or region of the United States) whom they deemed honorable enough to deserve recognition for their historical importance. Part of this new ethnic-consciousness was reflected in the struggle to name an intermediate school after a young Dominican man who died prematurely. For some, Luis Belliard, the young man in question, had paid his dues in building the Dominican community and deserved to be remembered by every Dominican child in the city. There was strong disagreement among various Dominican sectors as to whether Luis Belliard deserved such an honor due to the brevity of his service to the community and his clear adherence to the then-in-power New York City councilman, Guillermo Linares, a Dominican. The opposing sector tried to defeat BelliardÊs nomination by proposing the name of the Mirabal sisters, the legendary and hugely respected Dominican national heroines. Yet, the proponents of BelliardÊs nomination, systematically arguing the validity of a diaspora-grown figure, stood their ground. The debate engulfed the entire School District 6 community and lasted for
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weeks, so much so that in the end, the school districtÊs authorities resorted to what seemed at the time a totally unexpected recourse: nominating two of the new districtÊs schools instead of one, respectively, after each of the two Dominican names proposed. Though initially a big surprise to all camps involved in the heated debate, when it came to the community school boardÊs vote on the matter at a public meeting, an agreement had been forged between the two Dominican opposing camps to support each otherÊs nomination in tandem, thus securing a collective gain out of what initially felt like a bitter internal confrontation. This unified strategy, while allowing a respite to worried local authorities, showed several interesting aspects of Dominican ethnic identity dynamics in the making: the growing rootedness of the immigrant community in the receiving society; the intensity of the persistent cultural links with the country of origin; the capacity of both trends to coexist; and the growing influence of the Dominican community per se at a local level in the receiving society, where authorities felt the need to go to great lengths in responding to the communityÊs demands, even when apparently conflicting. As of this writing, Dominicans have managed to name six New York City public schools after important Dominican figures: Juan Pablo Duarte, Salomé Ureña de Henríquez, General Gregorio Luperón, Hermanas Mirabal, Luis Belliard, and Juan Bosch. In the summer of 2000, a portion of an important street in Washington Heights/ Inwood, the historic neighborhood with the highest concentration of Dominicans in the United States, was named Juan Pablo Duarte Boulevard, after the founding father of the Dominican Republic. As in the case of the Luis Belliard public school, various important sectors of the Dominican community were opposed to the naming of the street after Juan Pablo Duarte. In this case, the dissension had nothing to do with the merit of Juan Pablo Duarte. The disagreement had to do with whether the street selected to carry Juan Pablo DuarteÊs name was important enough and whether the portion of the street designated by the City Council was large enough to merit the Dominican leaderÊs name. Yet, no member of the Dominican community opposed the naming of the street after Juan Pablo Duarte. In the end, for Dominicans, marking the space with a Dominican symbol was much more important than the differences they may have had concerning the issue. More recently, in June 2009, both a park and a portion of street have been named after Professor Juan Bosch. Similar efforts to represent Dominican culture and history have flourished in many cities throughout the United States: projects in cities range from featuring busts of historical figures to naming parks after Dominicans to holding parades and other public celebrations indicating support and acknowledgement about Dominican culture and history. A question worth asking at this point is whether the evolution of Dominican cultural identity in New York City is connected to their large numeric presence and the pressure that the group may put on the larger society to accommodate their specific interests, or whether their cultural development is the result of a natural desire on
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the part of the group to preserve their cultural and historical legacy through passing it to their children born in the new land? We think that both questions can be answered in the affirmative. Whether consciously or not, or perhaps in response to societyÊs expectations, Dominicans themselves have contributed to feeding the existing generalized perception about the alleged power behind numbers by making reference to the increasing growth of the Dominican population in New York City and by simultaneously equating growth with the rights to entitlements. Moreover, the idea is that demographic growth bears unity and that every cause and demand undertaken by any Dominican group is unquestionably supported by most Dominicans, and possible differences of opinion based on profound ideological or political views are underplayed. If by any chance differences of opinion become notably visible within the group, the „lack of unity discourse‰ takes precedence among all other possible explanations as the reason for the groupÊs lack of success. It is interesting to note that in New York City, Dominicans commonly manage to motivate and attract large number of Dominican individuals and organizations when pursuing social causes. As suggested by some sociologists, we would venture to say that the weight of their demographic size and spatial concentration have played a decisive role in enabling Dominicans in the United States to maintain and develop an ethnic cultural identity connected to the Dominican Republic. Yet, evidence suggests that for Dominicans, creating and sustaining their identity goes beyond using demographic growth, an enlarged population, and the pressures of a society as bargaining chips to secure entitlements. As mentioned earlier, landmarks associated with Dominican culture and history have been established in remote places throughout the United States with scarce or pocket-sized Dominican populations. These symbols include parks and streets named after Dominicans, busts erected bearing the name of prominent Dominican figures, and the organization of annual events, parades, and festivals. The desire to preserve the groupÊs history reflects a valorization of Dominican culture that transcends demographic size, and it may be that embedded in every Dominican is the feeling that being Dominican means to act in tangible ways on behalf of the preservation of the Dominican culture.
Gendering Migration: Dominican Women The popular belief that „behind a great man there is a great woman‰ may very well describe one of the public positions Dominican women, as compared to men, hold in many communities in the United States. A brief look at a very public Dominican event may reveal the previously mentioned relationships among the sexes. Dominican parades have become a tradition in many cities today in the United States. Organizing a parade looks simple but in reality is complicated and often takes a yearlong commitment. The parade group requires the support of an organization
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that is legitimately established, that has a leadership in place that becomes responsible for securing all appropriate permits required to hold a public event using public spaces and involving an emotional crowd that brings together people from all sorts of walks of life, both young and old. A succinct glance at the leadership of the organizing committee of most parades would reveal a traditional hierarchy with Dominican men holding the top positions, usually the presidency and vice presidency in the organization and with women taking less important posts. Not surprisingly, most women will be left out of the public speeches and the newspaper photographs. They may not even have the opportunity to rub elbows with prominent invitees and the highest-ranking elected officials who partake in the parade as they walk dispensing greetings to viewers who line up all along the sidewalks to enjoy the parade. If digging beyond the public frontage, however, astute researchers may discover a private space full of interesting contradictions, where women and men play different roles. In the non-public space, most Dominicans would know that the women who are behind the scenes are the movers and the shakers of the organization; that they are capable of mobilizing people; and that they have become indispensable for the internal running and stability of many Dominican organizations. A closer scrutiny would also reveal that womenÊs actions behind the scenes would compete with their actions in open spaces. Eventually, women would create an array of womenÊs organizations whose mission was to advance the interests of women and bring parity among the sexes at all levels. In passing, through pushing an agenda of their own, in establishing hierarchies with women in all leading posts, and in taking control of the organizationÊs public space, Dominican women have undermined the traditional arrangement that positions women behind menÊs public actions (see for instance, Centro de Desarrollo de la Mujer Dominicana, Grupo de Mujeres Dominicanas, and Asociación de Mujeres Progresistas). In fact, womenÊs activism in the Dominican community has taken a front seat. Once in the United States, Dominican women have already gone through the peripeteia of migration, a journey that is likely to endow migrants with experience and wisdom that may be familiar only to other migrants who have gone through similar process. In addition, migration offers them the opportunity to start all over again, to build homes that would house the Dominican people and lay the grounds for the emergence of the community. That community, we may add, is permeated by the many families that are headed by single women, a decisive fact that proposes not only an alternative definition of the family, but also a way of life and a mode of behavior in which women play the leading role when recreating Dominican cultural values, among other things. Dominican migration to the United States is also dominated predominately by women. For every 100 people who come to the United States from the Dominican Republic, between 52 and 54 are women in any given year. In 2000, 52 percent of the Dominican population in the United States were women as compared to 48 percent who were men; and by 2007, the Dominican female population was 53.4
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percent compared to the male, 46.6 percent. But the preponderance of women goes beyond representing a larger share of the population. Dominican women are also the first in the family to make the decision to migrate and are likely to undertake the journey alone. Dominican women have played a fundamental role in the institutionalization of the Dominican community. Their involvement and their desire to transmit their cultural values, to secure better schools for their children, to secure services and protection for their families have provided the grounds for the development of many of the voluntary associations in Dominican communities in the United States. That has been the case in New York City; Lawrence, Massachusetts; Philadelphia; and Miami. For instance Dominican women participated in the life of the community at levels that are commensurable to the courage they show when they make the decision to migrate to another society, to take risks, and to face uncertainties in pursuit of a better future. In general, academic research has paid little attention to Dominican women despite their protagonist role in the migration process to the United States and in the formation of the Dominican community. An important exception in this respect is the work of Patricia R. Pessar, an anthropologist who has devoted a good amount of time to the study of Dominican migration in general and, in particular, of the role of women in the same. Her work about women is pioneering and points at key elements in womenÊs attitudes and perceptions about their migration process. In a study looking at Dominican women workers both in their homes and at work, Pessar found that men and women did not think alike when it came to the idea of returning to the Dominican Republic. While men were likely to have set dates in mind about returning and looked forward going back home, women were likely to prolong the familyÊs stay in the United States and to postpone, in turn, the idea to return to the Dominican Republic anticipated by the men in their families (Pessar 1982). Without subscribing to PessarÊs conclusions as to why Dominican women choose to stay in the United States, the bottom line is their decision reinforces the settlement process and the formation of a rooted Dominican community. Milagros Ricourt and Ruby Danta have recounted similar community activism on the part of Dominican women in a monograph about the involvement of Latina women in community formation in Corona, a popular neighborhood in Queens in New York City. The ethnographic study discusses the role of these women in the emergence of a pan-ethnic movement in a neighborhood whose population had been radically transformed in the 1980s from a single Hispanic group, Puerto Rican, to one highly diverse, with the influx of various Latino groups, including Dominicans, Colombians, and Ecuadorians. Corona women found ways to work together through a movement that privileged a diverse array of voices, which gave way to what academics termed as a pan-ethnic movement that reflected unity and cooperation to pursue greater social goods, instead of conflicts and antagonism among the different groups (Ricourt and Danta 2003).
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Dominican womenÊs activism in community building took several forms. There is evidence that the idea of creating many of the civic organizations we find today throughout many Dominican communities emerged during kitchen conversations while women reflected about the painful realities of missing their homeland, losing their cultural traditions, and feeling the need to tell others about their valuable history. The formation of many of the Dominican organizations took place precisely at a time of massive migration that brought many Hispanic groups who settled in the same or nearby neighborhoods, in which each replicated cultural traditions of their own. The times were then conducive for women to help fill the space with Dominican symbols and, in the process, demarcate a space for things Dominican that would also help to soothe their spirits. Ideas and desires materialized, and the apartments of many Dominican women became recognized places of action: for meetings and for planning all kinds of events, from parades to beauty contests to fundraising parties. The names of the late Ana Monción and Normandía Maldonado come to mind as women whose homes were instrumental in the creation of todayÊs Instituto Duartiano, which, established in 1966, is the second-oldest Dominican cultural organization in the United States. The activism of women has continued through a new breed of young women of the second generation. Among those who have followed in the footsteps of older generations are Raysa Castillo, the president of the Dominican Bar Association, a professional organization of practicing lawyers and judges; Laura Acosta, founder and executive director of Juan Pablo Duarte Foundation, a non-for-profit cultural organization that promotes Dominican cultural traditions among school children; Margarita Cepeda, the executive director of the Dominican American Foundation in Miami, Florida, and a founding member of the Dominican American National Roundtable, the only national non-for-profit Dominican organization in the United States; and Julissa Reynoso, who helped found Dominicans 2000, a youth organization made up mostly of second-generation Dominicans who sought to impact the younger generations by getting them involved in community activism. These women hold advanced college degrees, and their educational levels place them above most Dominicans. They also have skills that make them highly competitive in mainstream society. Contrary to their predecessors then, they had the opportunity to leave behind the Dominican community and pursue their lives unattached and disconnected from community activism. They chose otherwise. There is also a generation of younger women who are actively involved in local politics and who have gone beyond the boundaries of the Dominican community to establish themselves. They have pursued a political career seeking electoral posts or have become strong players in the political game. New York City Council member, Diana Reyna, for instance, is the first woman of Dominican ancestry to be elected to an office in the city. She was born and raised in Brooklyn to Dominican immigrant parents, her mother worked as a seamstress and her father drove a taxi for a living. Dominican young women have held the highest executive post at Latina Political
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Action Committee (Latina PAC) in New York City for several years now. Latina PAC was founded by a group of young women of Latina ancestry, most of whom were of Dominican descent. The group has aggressively carved a space in local politics and boosts an impressive list of members, most of whom are college graduates who work in white-collar jobs in the private and the public sectors. Candidates running for office routinely pursue public endorsement from the group, which they see as decisive in securing votes in Latino communities as well as among female voters of all walks of life. Today there is no doubt that Dominican women have been actively involved in building the community, in struggling to keep their cultural heritage alive, and in keeping families together by bridging the gap between Dominicans from the homeland and those who live in the United States. What remains to be seen is whether Dominican women of the younger generations will pass onto their children the torch of duty and responsibility of moving the Dominican community forward as such and getting involved in its future, or whether their blending and natural assimilation process will transform the essential features identified today in the community as lo dominicano.
Family Structure A high proportion of the Dominican population living under poverty consists of female-headed families. These families, headed by separated or divorced women, as well as single women with children, tend to have lower income and higher poverty rates than other families, particularly married couple families. Families headed by single women are affected, in part, by the fact that in general women tend to receive less income in the labor market as compared to men for similar jobs demanding similar experience and skills. This inequality impacts on womenÊs capacity as providers to cover the needs of their families on their own. The proportion of persons living in families headed by a single woman is substantially higher among Dominicans as compared to other groups. Among Dominicans in the United States, 32.5 percent lived in female-headed families in 2000. The proportion was higher for Dominican New Yorkers: 38.2 percent of Dominican New Yorkers lived in female-headed families that same year. These rates are substantially higher than those for the overall population, although they remain lower than those for black Americans.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture More and more Dominicans are becoming citizens of the United States, and many more are actively participating in local politics, while at the same time the number of Dominicans entering and graduating from college are growing. These are good
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signs that we hope will lead the group to having a better future in the United States. The following descriptions provide details about these three aspects.
Citizenship in the United States and Dominican Attachment The number of Dominicans who are becoming citizens of the United States has been on the rise. By becoming citizen of the United States, Dominicans qualify for better-paying jobs that are often reserved for citizens; these include low-end and intermediate jobs in the public sector that do not require much formal education and degrees. Table 84 shows the proportion of Dominicans who have become citizens of the United States in the last 20 years. The table shows that the longer Dominicans live in the United States, the higher the proportion of those who become citizens. Such a revelation problematizes the long-held belief that Dominicans were not interested in setting roots in the United States because they were too attached to the homeland and always treasured the idea of their return. Of course, such a posture finds credence in that Dominicans in the United States are often serious about recreating their cultural heritage, traveling back the Dominican Republic, and keeping connected to families through remittances.
Santo Silvester, an immigrant from the Dominican Republic, raises his hand while taking the oath of citizenship during a naturalization ceremony in Boston, April 11, 2006. (AP Photo/ Steven Senne)
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Dominicans may indeed remain attached to their homeland as argued by some observers, but we suspect that such attachment may be similar to that of any other group that values their cultural and historical past and wants to keep the past alive and pass it onto their future generations. Attachment may also camouflage the fact that most Dominican migrants remain responsible for the economic well-being of family members left in the homeland, and they either send remittances or they do not. We also need to consider that their desire to maintain cultural traditions alive and keep commitment to family members in the homeland may not preclude Dominicans from developing sentiments of attachment to the immigrant abode that may be as strong and as solid as the ones they may feel for their ancestral land. Of course, Dominican immigrants would find in both societies hyper-nationalists and ethnocentricists who would question and challenge the legitimacy of their attachments and loyalties to either place. It would be fair to think that there may be multiple factors motivating Dominicans to become citizens of the United States, including a pragmatic approach to life and a desire to increase access to the rewards of living in the United States. There is also the possibility that Dominicans are looking for ways to ensure some stability in a society whose leadership seems to hold an ambivalent politics of love and hate towards immigrants. And of course, the increases in naturalization may also reflect the ineludible fact that migration becomes, at the end of the day, a final destination for many who initially left home with the idea that they would eventually return.
Political Participation Another sign for hope is the growing number of Dominicans who are actively participating in the institutional political process in the United States, with an increasing number of Dominicans being elected or designated to local, county, and state government offices. Since the 1980s, and in a more accelerated fashion in the 1990s and 2000s, Dominicans have been elected to community school boards, city councils, state assemblies, and state senates; or appointed as members of community-planning boards, city-wide commissioners, judges, prosecutors, or state-level executive branch officials. The election of Dominicans has mostly occurred in electoral districts or jurisdictions in the northeastern and eastern United States, where the higher levels of concentration of the Dominican population has allowed for these candidates to count on votes from their own ethnically Dominican communities to help them reach elective posts. Appointments of Dominicans to the local executive and judiciary branches seem as well somewhat related, though not necessarily so, to the more or less large presence of Dominicans in certain governmental districts. This does not preclude, of course, political careers of Dominicans who do not necessarily have a strong electoral connection with Dominican-majority districts, like the recent cases of
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President ObamaÊs appointment of Thomas Pérez as U.S. assistant attorney general for the Civil Rights Division; and New Jersey Governor Jon CorzineÊs appointment of Camelia Valdes as Passaic County prosecutor. Thomas Pérez was confirmed by Congress on October 6, 2009, achieving the honor of becoming the first person of Dominican descent in the highest level of U.S. government so far. Valdes, in turn, has also made history by becoming the first person of Dominican ancestry to head a prosecutorÊs office in the United States. Pérez was born in the Dominican Republic and grew up in Buffalo, New York, while Valdes is a native of the Bronx, New York, and was raised in Newark, New Jersey. As of March 2011, a total of 39 Dominicans had been recorded as elected to public posts in the United States. As per levels of authority or representation, there are 3 state senators and 3 mayors; the rest are divided between the lower chambers of state government and city posts. Rhode Island boasts the first elected highest-ranking Dominican representative nationwide, state senator Juan Pichardo, who was born in the Dominican Republic and immigrated to the United States at the age of nine. The states with the largest total number of elected officials of Dominican descent at different levels are New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, in that order. New Jersey elected the first Dominican to an executive branch post at a local level: Alex Blanco, mayor of the city of Passaic. In addition to Mayor Blanco, there is a growing number of Dominican judges, elected or appointed, who are leaving their marks on the various municipal, state, and federal courts where they serve (DANR 2009). Within the context of political ethnic participation and representation in todayÊs United States, the correlation between electing representatives of Dominican ancestry and subsequent improvements in heavily Dominican communities seems more or less evident, at least in some degree and in specific cases, like that of New York City council members and state assembly members of Dominican ancestry, who seem to have achieved a larger or more visible allocation of public funds for the largely Dominican districts they represent, where a sense of government neglect prevailed before such representation was achieved. Their presence has also allowed for specific concerns on the part of the Dominican communities to be voiced more loudly within the public discourse, a factor that increases the chances for those concerns to be addressed by authorities. On the other hand, the presence in elected governmental posts seems to increase the level of attention that other non-Dominican or more ethnically mainstream elected officials show and/or deliver to the Dominican communities; this is true for incumbents as well as aspirants and had even been the case at the federal level (in the case of congressional and senatorial districts with large contingents of Dominicans and with Dominicans already elected to lower levels of political representation). For example, in the case of federal initiatives or legislative bills, there has been a greater response to items of high concern for U.S. Dominican communities,
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such as the DR-CAFTA trade agreement and legislative bills calling upon the U.S. Bureau of the Census to include a specific check-off box on the census forms for Dominicans to mark their self-perceived ethnicity rather than a blank space for a spelled-out, handwritten description. In addition, the increased participation and sharing of power of Dominicans has led non-Dominican elected officials to increase their collaboration efforts (or promises) with the Dominican Republic. A number of them, especially those representing districts with large concentrations of Dominicans, and often in collaboration with their fellow Dominican elected representatives, regularly travel to the Dominican Republic to meet with members of the government and elected officials to promote collaborative agreements with them. Also, they have been instrumental in facilitating city-to-city equipment donations between the United States and the Dominican Republic and have mobilized resources to aid the Dominican Republic when it has been affected by natural disasters.
The Second and Later Generations Education as a Stepping Stone The fact that increasing numbers of Dominicans are reaching educational levels never even dreamt of by most Dominican migrants when they first arrived in the United States represents perhaps the most important element the group can count on to improve their socioeconomic standing. An examination of Dominican students at the City University of New York (CUNY), the largest urban public university system in the United States, and the conditions they have come from, leaves one with a pleasant impression. CUNY serves nearly half of all the students enrolled in colleges and universities in New York City. Students of Dominican ancestry represent the largest single national group at CUNY. In the fall of 2002, there were a total of 197,074 students enrolled in degree-credit programs at CUNY. In the fall of 2007, the total number of students had increased to 231,960. During 2002 and 2007, Hispanic students represented 23.5 percent and 25.8 percent respectively of the total student body, and almost one in two Hispanic students were of Dominican origins in both years (CUNY 1994 2001, 2002 2007). As documented in Against All Odds: Dominicans in Higher Education, the increasing number of Dominicans attending college is a testament of the groupÊs resilience in undermining obstacles that predispose them to failure. For instance, Dominican students have parents who lack the educational background that would enable them to guide them effectively to deal with high school or college. In comparing the educational attainment of parents of CUNY students, among all the groups compared, Dominican students have the highest percentage of mothers
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and fathers with an educational attainment of eighth grade or less and the lowest percentage of mothers and fathers who had completed a high school education: 39 percent of Dominican fathers and 36 percent of Dominican mothers had an educational attainment of eighth grade or less as compared to 29 percent of total Hispanic fathers and 26 percent of total Hispanic mothers, the subgroup with the second-highest percentage of parents in this category. In looking at the college graduate educational category, Dominican parents had the lowest representation among those who were college graduates. Only 5 percent of Dominican mothers had obtained a college degree while 7 percent of Dominican fathers had obtained the same level of education (Hernández and Stevens 2004). Research shows that having parents who have achieved a college education tends to impact positively on studentsÊ high school completion and college education. Researchers have found that „college students with parents who earned bachelorÊs degrees have a higher probability of graduating than students whose parents attended college but left without degrees, and students whose parents never attended college have the lowest probability of graduating‰ (García 2001, 32).
Cindy Luzon, age 17, tutors a female student as part of Project Adelante at Kean University in Union County, New Jersey, on March 24, 2001. Luzon, who grew up in the Dominican Republic, is herself a graduate of Project Adelante, which provides tutoring in science, math, and English for Hispanic girls and boys in an effort to keep them in school. (AP Photo/Jill C Becker)
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The case of the Dominican second generation in education is even more remarkable. Table 85 indicates that U.S.-born Dominicans have a high school completion rate that slightly exceeds the average for the United States. In 2000, only 19.4 percent of U.S.-born Dominicans 25 years of age or older had not completed high school, while the corresponding figure for the overall United States was 19.6 percent. Table 86 compares the educational attainment of the Hispanic/Latino second generation, disaggregated into the major ethnic groups in that population. Only U.S.-born Cubans have greater schooling than U.S.-born Dominicans. For instance, the proportion of U.S.-born Dominicans with a college degree in 2000 was equal to 21.9 percent, compared to 13.3 percent for U.S.-born Mexicans, 12.1 percent for U.S.-born Puerto Ricans, and 36.2 percent for U.S.-born Cubans. This national pattern also applies to New York City. U.S.-born Dominicans have substantially greater schooling than immigrant Dominicans. In 1980, the proportion of U.S.-born Dominicans 25 years of age or older who had attained a college education (with or without completing it) was 31.7 percent. By 1990, the percentage had increased to 42.8 percent. And by 2000, the proportion was equal to 55.1 percent. In 2005, the educational achievement of U.S.-born Dominicans continues, jumping to 57.5 percent for those who had attained some college or have completed a college degree. College students of Dominican ancestry (whether immigrant or second generation) represent today a source of inspiration and hope for the Dominican people in the United Sates. The group has shown impressive levels of resilience and has surpassed their parents by graduating from high school and entering college. These students have managed to accomplish important educational steps and move up in the educational ladder. They have taken by surprise experts who predict educational outcomes based on family structure, socioeconomic standing, and the educational accomplishments or failures of studentÊs parents. Furthermore, these students come from homes with the lowest income or economic outcome, which has also proved to be a barrier in predicting completion of high school and a college education. The study mentioned before by Hernández and Stevens found that Dominican students were the poorest students as compared to others and that almost one in four Dominican students lived in families whose incomes were less than $10,000 per year (Hernández and Stevens 2004). How they do it and what motivates these students to keep going against all odds are still important questions for future studies. Future researchers should also keep in mind that measuring DominicansÊ socioeconomic advancement against DominicansÊ own socioeconomic stock only serves as an indicator to see whether the group has moved forward or not as compared to previous years and the point from where they started. Yet, this type of comparison, whether educational or economic, will not help Dominicans or researchers
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Youth Profile From the South Bronx to Harvard and the State Department Julissa Reynoso was born in the rural village of Salcedo in the Dominican Republic. She was raised by her great-grandmother and grandfather before immigrating to the United States in 1982 to join her parents who were already living in New York City. At a young age, Julissa faced the cultural and socioeconomic challenges of integrating and adjusting to life in the South Bronx (Longwood section). In spite of poverty and language barriers, Julissa was inspired by the strength of her family, particularly the women, and committed herself to her education. Graduating Magna Cum Laude in 1997 from Harvard University was only the beginning of her remarkable accomplishments. Julissa went on to get her master’s from the University of Cambridge and ultimately, graduated from Columbia University Law School in 2001. Her pioneering academic accomplishments are evidenced by the numerous publications for which she’s written including the Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Harvard Latino Law Review, and El Diario La Prensa. As a lawyer, Julissa has stayed connected to her intimate experience as an immigrant by co-founding a legal clinic in the Bronx through the Northern Manhattan Coalition for Immigrant Rights. She has served as an advisor to the Movement of Dominican-Haitian Women and founded an organization encouraging young Dominicans to become involved in community activism. Vigorously engaged within and for the Dominican community, Julissa serves as a model of inspiration and hope not only for Dominican females, but also for all second generation Latinos. In 2009, she was appointed to be the Deputy Special Envoy to the Americas and Senior Advisor of the U.S. State Department and is part of a group of female immigrants who are carving out a future space in politics and government.
understand whether the group has moved forward as compared to other groups, minority and non-minority. This is an important distinction many researchers miss when writing about Dominicans, and we hope it will be addressed in future studies. Despite DominicansÊ increases in college entrance and graduation rates, Dominicans still lag behind in entering graduate programs in the United States. If the number of Dominicans entering graduate school remains at its current rate, chances are that very few Dominicans will be able to compete for prestigious, high-paying jobs currently produced in the U.S. labor market at a rate comparable to that of the other larger Latino groups. The lag in graduate studies among Dominicans also means that Dominicans will have to conform to increasing their representation among workers who hold jobs that are at an intermediate level of
The Second and Later Generations | 513
knowledge/skills and at intermediate level salaries on the earning echelon. Thus, a very important question to pursue in the future is whether Dominicans will increase their access to graduate and post-graduate levels of education at least in proportions similar to the mainstream population of the nation, and whether educational achievement among Dominicans would help them occupy better positions in the labor market. In addition, future studies should examine whether the current educational trend had continued and measure the specific level of progress derived from such accomplishment for individuals as well as the group and how that translates into securing better socioeconomic outcomes for the groups as compared to others. Finally, it is important to stress that regardless of which angle one looks at it, the remarkable gains of Dominicans in education are positive and represent a tremendous source of pride and hope. Dominican college students have already increased the educational stock of their individual families as well as the educational stock of the Dominican people as a whole, and this is no small accomplishment.
Expanding the Scope of Music: From Dancing Tunes to Production One of the clearest milestones in the development of Dominican music outside of the Dominican Republic was the rise of the group Milly, Jocelyn y Los Vecinos in the 1980s. Made up of four siblings·two brothers as musicians and Milly and her sister Jocelyn as vocalists·the group originated in New York. The involvement of relatives to set up the venture of a musical organization highlights the role of the family as the core of entrepreneurial activity for many Dominican immigrants in the United States. By the same token, the leadership of Milly and Jocelyn as vibrant vocalists accentuates the position of women in the artistic undertakings of the Dominican community, which comes as no surprise given the numerical superiority of women over men in the migratory movement. Milly is reported to be „the first woman to sing down-home merengue commercially‰ (Hanley 1991, 44). Many of the songs made popular by Milly, Jocelyn y Los Vecinos deal with issues related to the tensions and transformations emanating from the experience of immigration (Del Castillo and García Arévalo 1988, 90). MillyÊs songs have a special appeal to women. A commentator who attended her concerts in a tour in Santo Domingo noted that „itÊs the women who push closest to Milly, making a kind of chorus in front of the band . . . itÊs mostly about ladies leaving their machista men that Milly sings‰ (Hanley 1991, 44). Another observer of the Latin music scene has noted the extent to which Milly opened doors for women, even back in the home country, where the success of the all-female band Las Chicas del Can and the presence of women as lead singers in mixed bands suggests that merengue now presents real opportunities to women (Holston 1990, 54). Following in the wake of MillyÊs success, a number of New York based Dominican music bands have since then
514 | Dominican Immigrants
proliferated on the show business market, including: the New York Band, La Gran Manzana, Oro Sólido, La Banda Loca, and Aventura (Torres-Saillant and Hernandez 1998, 136). Raúl Acosta was born in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. When he was nine years old, he moved with his family to Jersey City, New Jersey. In 1994, at the age of 23, Acosta formed Oro Sólido, a merengue band whose first hit „Ta Cache‰ would follow in the footsteps of Milly and would further revolutionize the genreÊs lyrics and rhythms, giving them an authenticity and legitimacy as a musical creation coming from New York. That first album, self-titled Oro Sólido, introduced a new style of merengue that combined different elements including playing an upbeat fast-paced syncopated rhythm that put less emphasis on vocals and allowed the singer to sing about virtually any topic, emphasizing repetitions of a given refrain (Guillén 2002, 20). In addition, contrary to traditional merengue, the lyrics are secondary to the music though the lyrics are usually to the publicÊs liking. Acosta introduced a lower pitched saxophone, making this instrument a protagonist among the instruments used in the song. Criticisms made by the older generation of traditional merengue listeners are ignored by those who enjoy Oro SólidoÊs music, usually the younger Dominican/Latino generations. The popularity of „Ta Cache‰ was overwhelming and unprecedented. After the success, an abundance of new merengue groups burst onto the scene including Soberbia, Oro Duro, La Banda Chula, and Amarfis y La Banda de Atakke. All these groups, mostly New York based, have remained competitive and have reached some level of international visibility. Other established merengue groups such as La Banda Loca, seeking to captivate a larger audience and similar levels of popularity, slightly altered or completely changed their techniques following Oro SólidoÊs musical style. Other small groups such as La Banda Lexus, La Banda Flakka, and Los Deskkontrolados followed suit but were less fortunate in their success. They produced a single hit and while some have disappeared completely, others are still trying to survive by making appearances in local venues of limited outreach. In addition to revolutionizing merengue, Oro Sólido also became the first merengue band to perform on Fox 5 News New York and the Jerry Lewis Telethon. The group has shared the stage with renowned non-Dominican artists as Celia Cruz, Marc Anthony, Tito Puente, 50 Cent, and the Temptations. Some of Oro SólidoÊs biggest hits were played in English-speaking radio stations at the time of billboard popularity. Popular Spanish-speaking radio stations, however, continue to play the biggest hits in response to demands from listeners who remain enthusiastic about the peculiar and contagious music created by Oro Sólido. The innovative, New York style continued through the contributions of Aventura, a quartet composed of four friends: Lenny Santos, Max Santos, and Anthony
The Second and Later Generations | 515
„Romeo‰ Santos, all born and raised in the Bronx; and Henry Santos Jeter, born in the Dominican Republic, in the town of Moca. Aventura pursued the genre of bachata, with painful, sad love lyrics. Bachata originated in the popular, poor neighborhoods in the Dominican Republic and was first introduced to the mainstream audience in the United States by Juan Luis Guerra y Su 440. Some of AventuraÊs successful hits, such as „Obsession,‰ „El Perdedor,‰ „Mi Corazoncito,‰ „Por Un Segundo,‰ and „All Up to You,‰ as well as their most recent album released in June 2009, The Last, clearly reveal a style that combines Spanish and English. The group speaks to the Dominican second generation and other Latinos born in the United States, and they have brought bachata to a new audience, whose primary language is no longer Spanish. Officially formed in 1999, AventuraÊs impact in music is so profound that other musicians and groups have emulated them and have attempted to recreate their musical style, however, with less success. Aventura set the stage for future bachata groups such as X-treme, Nueva Era, Optimo, Marcy Place, Huellas Del Tiempo, Roba Corazones, and many others. AventuraÊs impact in the Dominican music genre of bachata is unparallel to any other artist. The group revolutionized the onceostracized genre by introducing it to an international and mainstream U.S. audience (New York Times, June 3, 2009, AR1). Of course, this was made possible by their incorporation of elements of other music genres such as R&B, hip-hop, pop, and rock into their songs. Dominicans also penetrated the music industry from the business angle creating a name on their own right as competitive entrepreneurs. Ralph Mercado was born in New York City to a Puerto Rican mother and a Dominican father. Mercado was one of the most influential promoters of Latin jazz, Latin rock, merengue, and salsa. His empire grew into a network of businesses that included concert promotion, artist management, a record label and film company, nightclubs, and restaurants. Mercado discovered an array of artists who went on to become highly successful in their craft, such as the legendary „salsero‰ Hector Lavoe, La India, and Marc Anthony, among others. Mercado began his first management, booking, and promotion company in a basement where he also held social events, called Showstoppers. Through it, he booked some of R&BÊs biggest acts, including James Brown, Aretha Franklin, Gladys Knight & the Pips. In 1972, he started the Ralph Mercado Management (RMM), representing Eddie Palmieri and Ray Barretto. Eventually, he went on to manage virtually every name in the industry. By the early 1990s, Mercado had expanded his venture into numerous companies including RMM Records, RMM Film works, and two publishing houses. RMM records had signed over 140 artists and sold millions of records on a yearly basis, establishing trends still hard to duplicate.
516 | Dominican Immigrants
Mercado was also one of the first promoters to showcase Latin music concerts at prestigious venues including Radio City Music Hall, Lincoln CenterÊs Avery Fischer Hall, the Beacon Theater, and Madison Square Garden. He was instrumental in putting salsa on the map at a world level, from Africa to Europe, but particularly in the United States. Celia Cruz, Tito Puente, La Fania, Johnny Pacheco, and other of the biggest names in salsa performed on Ralph Mercado stages. Some say what Mercado has done for salsa and popular music in general is similar to what Steven Spielberg has done for the movie industry. Mercado passed away on Tuesday, March 10, 2009 (New York Times, March 12, 2009, B12).
Appendix I: Migration Statistics
Five Largest Hispanic/Latino Population in the US, 2000 and 2007 30 29,166,981 25
Population in millions
20,900,102 20
2000
2007
15
10 4,120,205 3,403,510
5
1,611,478 1,249,820
1,474,342 997,862
1,208,060 1,041,910
0 Mexican
Puerto Rican
Cuban
Salvadorian
Dominican
Figure 5 Five largest Hispanic/Latino populations in the United States, 2000 and 2007 Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population, PUMS, and American Community Survey (ACS) 2007.
Immigrants Admitted from the Dominican Republic by decade from 1960–2008 400 359,818
Number of Immigrants in thousands
350 300 250 242,112
221,552
200 150 139,249 100 83,552 50 0 1960–1969
1970–1979
1980–1989
1990–1999
2000–2008
Figure 6 Immigrants admitted from the Dominican Republic, by decade, 1960–2008. Source: Annual Reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Services, Department of Justice, 1961–1978; Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, 1979–2003; Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Office of Immigration Statistics, Homeland Security, 2004–2008
US Born Dominicans vs Dominican Immigrants in the US, 2000 and 2007 1,208,060 1,200,000 1,041,910 1,000,000
2000
2007
800,000 695,996
726,250
600,000 481,810 345,914
400,000
200,000
0 Total Dominicans
Born in the US
Immigrants
Figure 7 U.S.-born Dominicans vs. Dominican immigrants in the United States, 2000 and 2007 Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population, PUMS and American Community Survey (ACS) 2007.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 79 Geographical distribution of Dominicans by state—1990, 2000, and 2007 1990
% of Total
2000
% of Total
2007
Total
511,297
100%
New York
357,868
70%
New Jersey
52,807
10.3%
% of Total
1,041,901
100%
1,208,060
100%
617,901
59.3%
630,742
52.2%
136,529
13.1%
171,001
14.2%
Florida
34,268
6.7%
98,410
9.4%
141,948
11.8%
Massachusetts
30,177
5.9%
69,502
6.7%
83,758
6.9%
Rhode Island
9,374
1.8%
24,588
2.4%
33,229
2.8%
Pennsylvania
3,687
0.7%
13,667
1.3%
35,694
3%
Connecticut
3,946
0.8%
12,830
1.2%
7,888
1.5%
Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population, PUMS, and American Community Survey (ACS) 2007.
Table 80 Top counties with Dominican concentration—2000 and 2007
New York City Counties, NY Miami-Dade County, FL
2000
2007
554,638
604,844
51,854
54,373
Essex (Lawrence-Haverhill), MA
37,714
45,526
Hudson (Jersey City, Union City), NJ
36,022
36,454
Passaic (Paterson), NJ
35,040
44,424
Providence, RI
25,895
31,578
Middlesex (Perth Amboy), NJ
18,829
25,265
Broward County, FL
13,912
32,268
Suffolk County (Boston), MA
22,560
24,636
Nassau (Long Island), NY
13,199
20,149
8,053
11,063
Orange County (Orlando), FL Westchester County (Yonkers), NY
16,965
123,914
Suffolk County, NY
14,220
15,823
Bergen, NJ
12,227
20,729
Essex (Newark), NJ
11,374
15,446
Union County (Elizabeth, Linden), NJ
7,074
9,461
Palm Beach, FL
4,666
10,179 (Continued )
518
Table 80 Top counties with Dominican concentration—2000 and 2007 (Continued) 2000
2007
Hillsborough (Tampa), FL
5,047
9,807
Philadelphia, PA
6,172
7,972
Lehigh, PA
2,596
7,500
Osceola, FL
3,208
8,104
Worcester, MA
3,701
6,508
Middlesex (Cambridge, Lowell), MA
3,712
3,843
Camden, NJ
3,045
3,775
New Haven, CT
3,871
5,465
Fairfield (Bridgeport), CT
5,175
7,131
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census of Population, PUMS, and American Community Survey (ACS) 2007.
Table 81 Mean annual household income per capita in the United States by race/ ethnicity—2000 and 2007 2000
2007
Dominican Population in the U.S.
$11,065
$14,412
United States Average
$22,086
$26,688
Non-Hispanic White Population
$25,187
$31,813
Non-Hispanic Black Population
$14,516
$17,267
Non-Hispanic Asian Population
$22,260
$28,334
Hispanic/Latino Population
$12,483
$15,502
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census of Population, PUMS, and American Community Survey (ACS) 2007.
Table 82 Average annual household income per capita for Dominicans in the United States by state—2000 and 2007 2000
2007*
Total U.S.
$11,065
$14,295
New York
$10,173
$13,162
New Jersey
$11,980
$15,914
Florida
$12,886
$16,880
Massachusetts
$10,147
$12,448
Rhode Island
$ 8,560
$11,009
Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population, PUMS, and American Community Survey (ACS) 2005 & 2007. * 2007 numbers represent the average of 2005 and 2007.
519
Table 83 Persons in the labor force: The decline of manufacturing in New York City—1980, 1990, 2000, and 2007 Share of labor force
1980
Proportion of New York City Labor Force Proportion of Dominican
1990
2000
2007*
18%
12.1%
6.6%
7.1%
48.6%
25.7%
12.4%
10.4%
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census of Population, PUMS and American Community Survey (ACS) 2005 & 2007. * 2007 numbers represent the average of 2005 and 2007.
Table 84 Dominican naturalization rate in the United States U.S. citizen by naturalization
Not a U.S citizen
All foreign-born Dominicans
Naturalization rate
Arrived 2001 to 2005
12,276
102,746
115,022
10.7%
Arrived 1990 to 2000
91,991
175,238
267,229
34.4%
Arrived 1980 to 1989
108,494
82,258
190,752
56.9%
Arrived Before 1980
125,643
41,156
166,799
75.3%
Total Foreign Born
338,404
401,398
739,802
45.7%
Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population, PUMS and American Community Survey (ACS) 2005. Note: Excluded those born in Puerto Rico and born abroad of American parents.
Table 85 The educational status of the Dominican population—2000 and 2005 Percentage of the population over 25 years of age with Less than H.S.
High school
Some college
College or more
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
19.6%
15.8%
28.6%
29.6%
27.4%
27.5%
24.4%
27.2%
49%
44%
20.5%
24.6%
19.9%
19.6%
10.6
11.8%
Immigrant Dominican
51.7%
43.3%
20.5%
24.6%
18.3%
17.5%
9.5%
9.6%
Born in the U.S.
19.4%
17.7%
21%
24.8%
37.7%
32.3%
21.9%
25.2%
U.S. Average Overall Dominican
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census of Population, PUMS, and American Community Survey (ACS) 2005.
Appendix III: Notable Dominican Americans | 521 Table 86 The educational status of the Hispanic/Latinos born in the United States—2000 and 2005 Percentage of the U.S born Hispanic population over 25 years of age with Less than H.S.
High school
Some college
College or more
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
2000
2005
Latino Average
31.4%
24.8%
27.6%
30.6%
27.7%
28.8%
13.2%
15.8%
Dominican
19.4%
15.7%
21%
24.6%
37.7%
33.8%
21.9%
25.9%
Cuban
14.6%
9.2%
18.3%
20.6%
30.9%
32%
36.2%
38.2%
Mexican
31.2%
25.5%
28.4%
31.5%
28.1%
29.2%
13.3%
13.8%
Puerto Rican
36.6%
28.8%
26.3%
30.1%
25%
26%
12.1%
15.1%
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census of Population, PUMS, and American Community Survey (ACS) 2005.
Appendix III: Notable Dominican Americans Luis A. Canela. Born in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, Luis A. Canela began his banking career serving the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. In 1980, Mr. Canela joined the bank holding company Grupo Financiero Popular, where he organized and opened Banco Popular Dominicano Panama and served as its first general manager and CEO. His banking experience led Dominican Republic President Joaquín Balaguer to appoint him general manager and chief executive officer of the largest commercial bank of the Dominican Republic, Banco de Reservas, where he served as CEO from 1986 to 1988. Mr. Canela immigrated to the United States and served as president and CEO of BPD Bank from 1988 to 2009, when he retired. He remains the vice chairman of BPD Bank. He is also the managing director, head of Latin America investment banking for Kaufman Bros. Raysa Castillo. Born in the Dominican Republic, Raysa Castillo immigrated to Brooklyn, New York, at age 13 and was raised by her mother, her aunt, and the women in her motherÊs family. Her interest in politics and strong sense of justice led her to graduate from the College of Staten Island with a BA in political science and Spanish, with a concentration in public administration. While in college, she founded the first Latin American Club and was active in student government. Upon graduating, she studied law and became an attorney. She is currently the founder, president, and chief attorney of her own law firm, Castillo & Associates. In addition, Ms. Castillo serves as the president of the Dominican WomenÊs Caucus, located in Washington Heights, New York, and is the president of the Dominican Bar Association. Today, she is married to a first-generation American and is the mother of two children.
522 | Dominican Immigrants
Dr. Margarita Cepeda-Leonardo. Dr. Cepeda-Leonardo was born in San Francisco de Macoris, Dominican Republic, and immigrated to the United States during infancy. As a young woman, she completed her education at Rhode Island Community College and Bryant College, where she studied management. In 1995, Dr. Cepeda-Leonardo served as founding executive director of the Miami Beach Hispanic Community Center Unidad of Miami Beach, the first Hispanic social service agency in the city, which offers a variety of programs and services. In 1997, she began working with the Dominican American National Roundtable, an organization that serves the interests of Dominicans in the United States, and ultimately became president of the organization from 2002 to 2003. Among other distinctions, she has served on the Rhode Island State Commission on Hispanic Affairs Advisory Board, and she won the R.I. Citizen Citation award. Daisy Cocco DeFillipis. In 2008, the board of trustees for Connecticut Community Colleges selected Daisy DeFillipis to serve as the president of Naugatuck Valley Community College, in Waterbury, Connecticut. Dr. DeFillipis holds a Ph.D. in Spanish language and an M. Phil. in Spanish literature from the Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York (CUNY). Dr. DeFillipis has been provost and senior vice president for academic affairs at Eugenio Maria de Hostos Community College of CUNY. She began her career at York College as an adjunct lecturer in 1978, advancing to become a professor of Spanish and ultimately serving as the chair of the department of foreign languages, ESL, and humanities from 1995 to 2002. At York, she also served as the acting assistant dean for academic affairs (1991) and associate dean for academic affairs (1993 1994). She is a frequent presenter at conferences and has authored or edited numerous books and published articles. Junot Díaz. Born in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, he immigrated to Parlin, New Jersey when he was six years old. He completed a BA in English at Rutgers University, and an MFA at Cornell University. He is the author of Drown, a critically acclaimed book of short stories, and The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao, which received the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction in 2008, the John Sargent Sr. First Novel Prize, the National Book Critics Circle Award, the Anisfield-Wolf Book Award, and the Dayton Literary Peace Prize. Junot Díaz is only the second Hispanic writer to win the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction. He is also recipient of numerous prestigious fellowships, and his fiction has appeared in The New Yorker, African Voices, Best American Short Stories (1996, 1997, 1999, 2000), in Pushcart Prize XXII, and in the OÊHenry Prize Stories 2009. On April 22, 2008, the House of Representatives of the Congress in Dominican Republic bestowed Junot Diaz with the title „Cultural
Appendix III: Notable Dominican Americans | 523
Ambassador of the Dominican Republic before the World,‰ one of the highest distinctions awarded by the Dominican Government. Junot Díaz maintains a very close relationship with the Dominican community, organizing fundraising events for community-based organizations that provide social services to women, children, and the elderly. Junot Díaz is currently the Rudge and Nancy Allen Professor of Writing at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Dr. Ramon García, M.D., F.A.C.P. Dr. Ramon García was educated at the Universidad Nacional Pedro Henriquez Ureña and did his residency at Cook County Hospital. He specialized in internal medicine gastroenterology and is board certified in internal medicine. Dr. García is the owner of, and a practicing physician at, García Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois. He has significant experience in diagnostic and therapeutic endoscopy and preventative health care management. The mission of García Medical Center is to provide patients and the community with the highest, most comprehensive quality of gastrointestinal diagnosis and treatment options available. Dr. García is also an assistant clinical professor of medicine at the University of Illinois at Chicago, through the division of gastroenterology and nutrition. He is part of the American Society for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy and the American College of Physicians. Benny Lorenzo. Benny Lorenzo received an MBA from Harvard University and a B.S. degree in Industrial Engineering/Operations Research from Cornell University. He is one of the first Dominicans to have a major hold in a bank and currently serves as the chairman and chief executive officer of Kaufman Bros., which is the countryÊs largest minority-owned and -operated investment banking and advisory firm. Mr. Lorenzo has over 30 years of business leadership, including roles with leading information technology companies and Wall Street firms. He has held various manufacturing, engineering, sales, marketing, and product management positions with AT&T and IBM in the United States. Mr. LorenzoÊs Wall Street career includes senior and partner level positions with both buy-side and sell-side institutions, including P.A.W. Capital Partners; B. L. Capital Partners; Dillon, Reed & Co.; Volpe, Welty & Co.; and LF Rothschild & Co. Elaine Montilla. Born in the Dominican Republic, Elaine Montilla migrated to New York as a teenager and graduated from Eugenio Maria de Hostos Community College of CUNY. She continued to pursue higher education and attained a BA/MA from Baruch College. With almost 10 years of experience, Elaine Montilla currently serves as one of five information technology directors of the Graduate Center User Services at CUNY. Montilla is skilled in designing infrastructure and implementing technology to support large user
524 | Dominican Immigrants
groups, users at corporate headquarters as well as at multiple remote locations. She has translated business needs into technology requirements in order to support the institutionÊs business objectives. She successfully manages all phases of IT projects from needs analysis and requirements definition to vendor selection, implementation, and training. Dr. Anny Morrobel-Sosa. Dr. Morrobel-Sosa Dean holds a B.Sc. in physics and chemistry (majors) and mathematics (minor) from the University of Puerto Rico. She continued on to obtain her M.Sc. from the State University of New York at Stony Brook and a Ph.D. in physical chemistry from the University of Southern California. Dr. Morrobel-Sosa served as a professor of materials engineering at California Polytechnic State University and a professor in chemistry at Georgia Southern University. For three years, she worked as the interim associate vice provost of academic programs at Cal Poly. In 2003, she gained the distinction of being appointed dean of the Allen E. Paulson College of Science and Technology at Georgia Southern University and served as dean until 2006. In 2007, Dr. Morrobel-Sosa moved onto the University of Texas at El Paso, where she was appointed dean of the College of Science and where she currently serves. Thomas Perez. Born in Buffalo, New York, Thomas Perez received an A.B. in international relations and political science from Brown University and continued on to obtain his J.D. cum laude from Harvard Law School and a masterÊs in public policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government. He spent 12 years in federal public service, mostly as a federal prosecutor for the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. He was deputy assistant attorney general under the Clinton administration and special counsel and principal adviser to Senator Edward Kennedy on civil rights, criminal justice, and constitutional issues. In January 2007, he was appointed secretary of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (DLLR) of the State of Maryland. In March 2009, he was nominated by President Barack Obama as the assistant attorney general for the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and was confirmed in the post by the U.S. Senate in October of that year. Senator Juan M. Pichardo. On January 7, 2003, Juan M. Pichardo was sworn in as the state senator representing the Second Senatorial District in Rhode Island. In the general assembly, he serves as senate deputy majority leader and as a member of the Senate Committee on Finance, where he serves as chairman of the subcommittee on Human Services and Transportation. In addition, Senator Pichardo serves as secretary of the Health and Human Services Committee. He has the distinction of being the first Latino elected to a R.I. Senate seat and the first Dominican American elected to a state Senate seat in the United States. In addition to these accomplishments, Senator Pichardo
Glossary | 525
serves on the Rhode Island Permanent Commission on Civic Education as a commissioner and on the National Hispanic Caucus of State Legislators as an executive board member. In 2004, he was a delegate to the Democratic National Convention. Diccia T. Pineda-Kirwan. Born in Baitoa, Santiago, in the Dominican Republic, Diccia T. Pineda-Kirwan emigrated to the United States with her family when she was nine years old. Since then, she attended Queens College as an undergraduate and also obtained her law degree there. In November 2002, Judge Pineda-Kirwan received the distinction of being elected to the Civil Court of the City of New York as the first Dominican-born judge in the state of New York, as well as the first Latina elected to the bench and to public office in the history of Queens County. In 2009, Judge Pineda-Kirwan was elected as the first and only Latina woman to serve in New YorkÊs Supreme Court. Before these elections, she worked in the Queens court system for over 13 years as a court attorney in civil court and as a principal law clerk in the N.Y. State Supreme Court. She also co-founded the Latino LawyersÊ Association of Queens County. Rosita Romero. Born in the Dominican Republic, Rosita Romero moved to the United States in 1979. She completed her BA from University of New Haven, Connecticut, and later obtained an MSW from Hunter College. Romero is the executive director and co-founder of the Dominican WomenÊs Development Center, a 16-year-old multiservice agency that empowers Dominican/Latina women in the Washington Heights/Inwood area. This is the largest communitybased organization in the United States serving Latinas, particularly Dominican women. Ms. Romero is a well-respected and accomplished community leader that has led positive social change in the areas of housing, womenÊs issues, immigration, and family matters. She is the recipient of numerous awards, was profiled as a Hispanic Role Model on WCBS-TIV, and named one of the 25 most influential Dominican leaders by Enlace magazine and the NY Post.
Glossary Bachata: A popular genre of music and dance from the Dominican Republic originating in the mid-20th century. Traditionally romantic, the genre employs melodies usually led by guitars. Bodega: A small grocery store. Caudillo: A military and/or civic leader, whose influence is usually based on personal charisma and economic or political power and is usually exercised through a clientelistic and paternalistic interaction with his followers.
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Creole: People born and raised in the former colonies or the current nations of Latin America, who are usually of mixed Amerindian-European or Afro-European ancestry. Encomenderos: Nouveau landowners of colonial times to whom colonial authorities assigned the native labor force to toil on agricultural farms or in search of alluvial gold. La Española (see also Hispaniola): „The Spanish One.‰ The name given by Christopher Columbus to the island he encountered in 1492, home of present-day the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti. Lo dominicano: ‰That which is Dominican.‰ The tangible as well as symbolic elements that constitute Dominican culture. Hatero: Owner of large cattle ranching estates during the colonial times and early national period, usually with strong political influence over his estateÊs field hands. Hispaniola (see also La Española): English translation of „La Española.‰ La Isabela: Short-lived first urban settlement or village founded by the Europeans in the Americas, named after Queen Isabella I of Spain, and located on the northern coast of La Española. Machismo: Behavior containing an exaggerated show of masculinity, which values and highlights the masculine while openly or implicitly devaluing the feminine. Machista: A person or behavior that reflects machismo. Merengue: Genre of music and dance from the Dominican Republic with usually festive lyrics. The tambora or Dominican drum often plays a fundamental role in the merengue sound. Mulatto: Having both black and white racial ancestries. Salsa: A genre of music and dance originating in the Caribbean, mainly in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Salsero/a: A person who dances and/or sings salsa. Santo Domingo: The earliest permanent settlement or village founded by Europeans on the southern coast of La Española after the abandonment of La Isabela. It became the capital city of La Española and has remained the capital of the Dominican Republic until the present. La Semana Dominicana: Week-long ethnic holiday that Dominicans celebrate in the United States around the Dominican Independence Day. Taíno: The Amerindian ethnicity that occupied most of the territory of La Española at the time Columbus disembarked on the island.
References | 527
Trinitarios: The liberal, republican, and nationalist Dominican pro-independence group led by Juan Pablo Duarte that spearheaded the independence gained by Dominicans from Haitian occupancy on February 27, 1844.
References Cocco DeFillipis, Daisy. 1997. Tertuliando/Hanging Out, Dominicanas & Friends. Santo Domingo: Comisión Permanente de la Feria del Libro Dominicano; New York: CUNY Caribbean, Exchange Program. Cocco DeFillipis, Daisy, and M. Ballantyne. 1994. Historia de Washington Heights y otros rincones del mundo/Stories From Washington Heights and Other Corners of the World. New York: Latino Press. Cocco DeFillipis, Daisy, and E. J. Robinett. 1988. Poems of Exile and Other Concerns/ Poemas del exilio y de otras inquietudes/ Selección bilingüe de poemas escritos por dominicanos en los Estados Unidos. New York: Alcance. City University of New York (CUNY), 1994 2001. Trends in First-Time Freshman Enrollment for Hispanics at CUNY Senior Colleges, 1994-2001. Office of Institutional Research and Assessment. AuthorÊs tabulations. City University of New York (CUNY), 2002 2007. CUNY Degree-Credit Student Enrollment. Office of Institutional Research and Assessment. Author's tabulations. Del Castillo, José, and Manuel García Arévalo. 1988. Antología del merengue. Santo Domingo: Banco Antillano. Diaz, William, A. 1996. „Latino Participation in America: Association and Political Roles.‰ Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 18: 154 74. Dominican American National Roundtable. 2009. [Online article retrieved 06/02/2009.] http://www.danr.org/ip.asp?o=Elected. García, Philip. 2001. „Understanding Obstacles and Barriers to Hispanic Baccalaureates.‰ Inter-University Program for Latino Research and Institute for Latino Studies, University of Notre Dame. Hispanic Scholarship Fund Institute. Guillén, Juan. 2002. „Raul Acosta: A Look at Merengue for Mainstream.‰ Dominican Times (Spring): 21. Hanley, Elizabeth. 1991. „MillyÊs Merengue.‰ Mother Jones 16: 44 45. Hernández, Ramona, and Francisco Rivera-Batiz. 2003. Dominicans in the United States: A Socioeconomic Profile, 2000. Dominican Research Monograph Series. New York: The CUNY-Dominican Studies Institute. Hernández, Ramona, and Anthony Stevens. 2004. „Against All Odds: Dominican Students in Higher Education in New York‰ CUNY Dominican Studies Institute Research Monograph Series. New York: CUNY-Dominican Studies Institute. Holston, Mark. 1990. „The Women of Merengue.‰ Américas 42(3): 54 55. Leighley, J. E., and J. Nagler. 1992. „Individual and Systemic Influence on Turnout: Who Votes?‰ Journal of Politics 54(3): 718 40.
528 | Dominican Immigrants New York City Department of City Planning. 1992. The Newest New Yorkers: An Analysis of Immigration into New York City During the 1980s. New York: City of New York. New York City Department of City Planning. 1996. The Newest New Yorkers: An Analysis of Immigration into New York City in the Early 1990s. New York: City of New York. Pessar, Patricia R. 1982. „The Role of Households in International Migration: The Case of U.S.-Bound Migrants from the Dominican Republic.‰ International Migration Review 16(2): 342 62. Portes, Alejandro, and Luis. E. Guarnizo. 1991. Capitalistas del trópico: La inmigración en los Estados Unidos y el desarrollo de la pequeña empresa en la República Dominicana. Santo Domingo: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales/Proyecto República Dominicana. Ricourt, Milagros, and Ruby Danta. 2003. Hispanas de Queens: Latino Panethnicity in a New York City Neighborhood. New York: Cornell University Press. Ryan, Andrea D. 2007. „Not My BrotherÊs Keeper: Ethnic Individualism, Civic, and the Reinvention of Community in an Old Mill City.‰ Ph.D. diss., Boston University. Sassen-Koob, Saskia. 1987. „Formal and Informal Associations: Dominicans and Colombians in New York.‰ In Caribbean Life in New York City: Sociocultural Dimensions, edited by C. R. Sutton and E. M. Chaney, eds., 278 96. New York: Center for Migration Studies. Suki, Leonora. 2004. „Diaspora, Trade, and Investment: Strategies for New York and the Dominican Republic.‰ In The Dominican Republic-New York: Building Partnership for Economic Development, edited by María Elizabeth Rodríguez and Ramona Hernández, 235 68. Santo Domingo: Fundación Global Democracia y Desarrollo. Torres-Saillant, Silvio. 1999. El retorno de las yolas: Ensayos sobre diáspora, democracia y dominicanidad. Santo Domingo: Ediciones Librería La Trinitaria and Editora Manatí. Unidad de Investigaciones Económicas. 1992. Evaluación de la Economía Dominicana durante el 1991 y sus Perspectivas. Santo Domingo: Universitaria-U. Autónoma de Santo Domingo, 1992. U.S. Census Bureau. 2009. America Community Survey Summary data (ACS) 2007, (2007 ACS 1-Year Estimates). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census. [Online article retrieved 06/08/2009.] http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IPGeoSearchByListServlet?ds_ name=ACS_2007_1YR_G00_&_lang=en&_ts=266777982859. U.S. Census Bureau. 2009. Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) 2005 and 2007, Custom Tabulations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census. U.S. Department of Commerce. 1993. 1990 U.S. Census of Population and Housing, 5% Public Use Microdata Set. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census. U.S. Department of Commerce. 1994. 1990 U.S. Census of Population and Housing, 5% Public Use Microdata Set. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census. U.S. Department of Commerce. 1996. Demographic Analysis of the 1990 Census of Population, 5% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census.
Further Reading | 529 U.S. Department of Commerce. 2003a. 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing: Summary File 4. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census. U.S. Department of Commerce. 2003b. 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing: 1% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS), 2000. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census. U.S. Department of Commerce. 2003c. 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing: 5% Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS), 2000. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census. [Online article retrieved 06/08/2009.] http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html. U.S. Census Bureau. 1980; 1990. Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) 1980 and 1990. Department of Commerce, Custom Tabulations. [Online articles retrieved 06/09/2009.] http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen1980.html http://www.census.gov/main/www/ cen1990.html U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services. 2003, January. „Estimate of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: 1990 to 2000.‰ Offices of Policy and Planning, INS. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services. 1979 2003; 1997; 2009. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security. Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper and Row.
Further Reading Aparicio, Ana. 2006. Dominican-Americans and the Politics of Empowerment. Gainesville: University of Florida. Dominicans have been migrating to the United States for decades. This book examines the ways first- and second-generation Dominican Americans in Washington Heights have shaped a new Dominican presence in New York City politics. Austerlitz, Paul. 1997. Merengue Dominican Music and Dominican Identity. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Merengue is the quintessential music of the Dominican Republic as it is the national dance and the most popular music genre in the Dominican Republic and transnational Dominican communities. The author examines the historical and contemporary context of merengueÊs complex history including its roots, how it has been used politically, and its impact on society, among other things. Bosch, Juan. 1970. De Cristóbal Colón a Fidel Castro: El Caribe, Frontera Imperial. Madrid: Alfaguara. An historic panorama encompassing aspects spanning from the time Christopher Columbus made contact with the inhabitants of the so-called New World to Fidel CastroÊs Communist Revolution. Through this work, renowned Dominican president and writer Juan Bosch discusses the social history of Latin America. Cassá, Roberto. 2000. Historia Social y económica. Santo Domingo: Alfa y Omega.
530 | Dominican Immigrants This book explains the social and economic histories of the Dominican Republic, from the time the Spaniards landed in the island of Hispaniola through the middle of the 1990s, when the book was published. Candelario, Ginetta. 2007. Black Behind the Ears. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. The Dominican people are a mixed ethnic group. This book is an historical and ethnographic examination of the Dominican identity formation in the Dominican Republic and the United States. Chaljub Mejía, Rafael. 2002. Antes de que te vayas: Trayectoria del merengue folclórico. Santo Domingo: Grupo León Jímenes. This book deals exclusively with merengue típico, a Dominican music genre. In addition to providing detailed information about the history of this genre, the book also provides biographical information for the most popular musicians and other prominent and perhaps not-so-prominent figures within merengue típico. Deive, Carlos Esteban. 1981. „La herencia africana en la cultura dominicana actual.‰ In Ensayos sobre cultura dominicana, edited by Bernardo Vega, 105 41. Santo Domingo: Ediciones del Museo del Hombre Dominicano. This essay was first presented as a lecture by Dr. Carlos Esteban in a conference held in the Dominican Republic on May 29, 1981. Through this essay, Dr. Esteban discusses the presence of African heritage in todayÊs Dominican culture. Franco, Franklyn. 1993. Historia del pueblo dominicano. 2 vols. Santo Domingo: Sociedad Editorial Dominicana. This two-volume textbook covers the history of the Dominican Republic from the time Christopher Columbus set foot on the nation through 1965, at the midst of the Dominican Civil War and U.S. occupation. Hernández, Ramona. 2002. The Mobility of Workers Under Advanced Capitalism. New York: Columbia University Press. The Dominican population that migrates to the United States finds it difficult to get jobs and secure a higher standard of living. The author challenges the presumption of a straightforward relationship between supply and demand in the job markets of the receiving society. In addition to discussing the history of Dominicans in both the Dominican Republic and the United States, this book also profiles the socioeconomic status of Dominicans in the United States. López, Nancy. 2003. Hopeful Girls, Troubled Boys: Race and Gender Disparity in Urban Education. New York: Routledge. This book explores the race and gender disparity that occurs among Caribbean youth in urban education. The author examines the day-to-day practices and classroom dynamics that challenge previous conclusions made by educational research that link failure rates among Caribbean youth. Martínez Almánzar, Juan F. 1996. Manual de historia crítica dominicana. Santo Domingo: Centro de Adiestramiento e Investigación Social.
Further Reading | 531 A history textbook that discusses the most significant occurrences in Dominican history from the Euro civilization through the Dominican Civil War of 1965. Questions and assignments are provided at the end of each chapter for the reader. Metz, H. C., ed. 2001. Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. For more than five centuries the island of Hispaniola has played host to two separate societies: Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This text provides the reader with socioeconomic, cultural, geographic, and political history pertaining to both nations. Moya Pons, Frank. 1981. „Modernización y cambios en la República Dominicana.‰ In Ensayos sobre la cultura dominicana, edited by Bernardo Vega, 211 45. Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana. This essay was first presented as a lecture by Dr. Frank Moya Pons in a conference held in the Dominican Republic on March 27, 1980. The essay explains the transformation of the Dominican Republic from an agricultural society to a capitalist one between 1880 and 1980. Dr. Moya Pons also discusses the transformationÊs impact on modern-day society. Moya Pons, Frank. 1986. El pasado dominicano. Santo Domingo: Fundación J. A. Carlo ˘lvarez. This book is a compilation of Dr. Moya PonsÊs essays, speeches, and lectures (presented in classrooms, conferences, and symposiums) in which he discusses a wide range of topics including but not limited to the history of the Dominican Church, the province of La Vega, and the relationship between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Moya Pons, Frank. 1995. Manual de historia dominicana. Santo Domingo: Caribbean Publishers. The most detailed narrative about the history of the Dominican Republic, Manual de la Historia Dominicana has become the standard textbook in Dominican universities. It is the only history book to include in one volume the economic, social, political, and cultural histories of the Dominican Republic. Moya Pons, Frank. 1998. The Dominican Republic: A National History. Princeton: Markus Wiener. An authoritative book about Dominican history in the English language that has become the standard reading in academia throughout the United States. Moya Pons covers the major points in the history of the Dominican Republic from when the Taínos roamed the island of Hispaniola until the final presidency of Joaquín Balaguer. Pacini Hernandez, Deborah. 1995. Bachata: A Social History of a Dominican Popular Music. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Bachata is the second-most important music genre in the Dominican Republic and in recent years has made waves almost surpassing merengue as the most popular genre among Dominicans and non-Dominicans alike. In addition to tracing the origins and history of bachata, this work also examines the impact of political upheaval and rural migration
532 | Dominican Immigrants on the development of bachata and Dominican music in general, including issues of sex and gender as expressed in bachata songs. Ricourt, Milagros, and Ruby Danta. 2003. Hispanas de Queens: Latino Panethnicity in a New York City Neighborhood. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. New York City has been referred to as a melting pot of immigrants. This book documents what transpires when Latina women from diverse national origins live in close proximity to one another. The book also focuses on the places where women gather in the Queens neighborhood of Corona: bodegas, hospitals, schoolyards, and churches, among other places. Rosen, Jody. 2009. „Crossover Dreams of a Bronx Bachatero.‰ New York Times. June 3: AR1 This article features Aventura, a Dominican American group that has revolutionized the once-ostracized music genre of bachata. In the past decade, Aventura has sold millions of albums and have taken bachata music to new frontiers. Sánchez Korrol, Virginia. 1983. From Colonia to Community: The History of Puerto Ricans in New York City, 1917–1948. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. This book is a seminal study of the settlement and history of Puerto Ricans in the United States, particularly the Puerto Rican communityÊs development, cultural growth, and struggle to claim their place in New York City. Torres-Saillant, Silvio, and Ramona Hernández. 1998. The Dominican Americans, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. This is a pioneering book in the field of Dominican studies that presents a view of the Dominican people in the United States prior to their migration and as a settled community. Vega, Bernardo, ed. 2007. Dominican Cultures: The Making of a Caribbean Society. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers. A compilation of essays that explain the heritage of the three predominant groups in the Dominican Republic: Taíno, African, and Spanish. The various essays also give the reader an understanding of todayÊs present-day Dominican society in general.
Ecuadorian Immigrants by Kenneth Kincaid
Introduction Ecuadorians represent a small minority within the Hispanic population of the United States; however, their presence in the United States reflects an important demographic and economic development in Ecuador as upwards of one-fifth of that nationÊs population of 14 million currently resides beyond its border (in the United States and Spain), and the revenue generated from overseas remittances is second only to that produced by oil. Moreover, issues such as the significant growth in migration and attempted migration, the underlying causes that drive people to leave their native lands, the hurdles that Ecuadorian immigrants must clear, and the challenges that the present holds for emigration and immigration authorities are important and represent potential trends that might become more generalized. The numbers of Ecuadorians residing in the United States, legally and illegally, has grown tremendously in the last three decades, making Ecuadorians one of the largest immigrant communities in major metropolises such as New York and Chicago.
Chronology 1809
First call for Ecuadorian independence from Spain.
1822
Ecuador wins independence and becomes part of Gran Colombia.
1830
Ecuador becomes completely sovereign.
1950s
Panama hat industry collapses. First significant wave of Ecuadorian immigration to the United States.
1964
Agrarian Reform and Colonization Law phases out huasipungo and other forms of debt peonage and unremunerated labor. The attempts to implement limited agrarian reform ultimately fail to address social and economic issues of rural populace.
1965
U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act revokes immigration quotas based on existing ethnic proportions, thereby 533
Background | 535
increasing immigration opportunities for those in nonEuropean nations. 1970s
Oil prices fall. Economic crisis propels a second wave of Ecuadorians to the United States.
1990
Confederación de las Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, CONAIE) leads nationÊs first large-scale indigenous rebellion.
1990s–2000
Economic and banking crises. EcuadorÊs national currency, the sucre, loses 500 percent of its value to the dollar, before the country dollarizes its economy.
2005
Ecuador passes legislation granting Ecuadorians living abroad the right to vote in presidential elections.
2008
EcuadorÊs Ministry of Foreign Relations, Commerce and Integration creates a virtual consulate (Consulado Virtual) to address questions and issues for those living outside of Ecuador.
Background Ecuador is a representative democratic republic situated along the northwestern coast of South America. Peru borders it to the south and east, Colombia to the north and east, and the Pacific Ocean to the west. In addition, the equator bisects the country just outside of Quito, its capital; and it is from this latitudinal delineation that the country gets its name. The Galapagos Islands, located about 600 miles from EcuadorÊs mainland, also belong to this small Andean country. Ecuador has a landmass of 109,415 square miles, making it a little larger than the state of Colorado. Census data reports a population of over 14 million Ecuadorians, residing principally in the capital Quito (1.8 million) and Guayaquil (2.3 million). Other cities with populations over 200,000 include Cuenca, Portoviejo, Machala, Santo Domingo, Ambato, Manta, and Eloy Alfaro. Geographically, Ecuador is divided into four regions: the coast, the Andes highlands (the sierra), the Amazon lowlands (the Oriente), and the Galapagos Islands. The climate of EcuadorÊs coast is tropical all along the seaboard. However, the amount of precipitation varies considerably as parts of the north resemble a tropical rainforest, while parts of the south, especially close to the Peru border, are arid and savannah like. EcuadorÊs southern coast, much like PeruÊs northern coast, is susceptible to the periodic El Niño phenomena; these events can produce torrential
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rains in areas that rarely receive more than light showers and are responsible for much devastation in the region. As varied as EcuadorÊs lands and climates are, even more so are its people. More than 50 percent of EcuadorÊs population identifies as mestizo, at least 30 percent as indigenous or Amerindian, 7 percent as pureblood European or white, and 3 percent as Afro-Ecuadorian or black. The indigenous population of this small Andean country is second only to Bolivia among South American nations. Though oftentimes glossed over as one homogeneous group, EcuadorÊs indigenous population is, in fact, a variety of different ethnicities. Three different ethnic groups reside on the coast, the Awá, Chachi, and Tsachila; six are situated in the Oriente, the Quichuas, Shuar, Huaoraní, Siona-Secoya, AÊi (Cofán), and Achuar; and a variety of Quichua-speaking peoples make the sierras their home. Sierra or highland Quichua-speakers represent EcuadorÊs largest indigenous group. Whereas the number of native peoples along the coast and the Oriente is relatively small, accounting for less than 3 percent of EcuadorÊs total indigenous population, the number of Quichua-speakers of the highland regions is as high as 4 million. However, it is important to note that despite the present ubiquity of the Quichua language, many groups of Quichua-speakers descend from ethnic groups that either adopted the idiom for practical reasons or had it imposed upon them as was imperial policy and a consequence of the mitmaq, a system of population control designed to facilitate assimilation and reduce the threat of rebellion by forcibly relocating new subject peoples to regions with strong Incan support and transferring loyal communities (either entire or partial) to areas recently conquered. This imperial language also served the interests of the Spanish colonizers whose missionaries employed it as a lengua general (lingua franca) to indoctrinate the indigenes into Christianity and as a means to facilitate coerced labor practices and the collection of tribute. EcuadorÊs highland peoples, though predominately Quichua speaking, exhibit distinct characteristics through their customs, clothes, cosmologies, and economic activities. The Cañaris in southern Ecuador have a unique style of dress and celebration of carnival that sets them apart from other indigenous groups. They have also become expert Panama hat weavers, a talent that began as survival strategy to offset reduced landholdings in the 19th century. For over a century, the Saraguros in the Loja Province have colonized lands in the Yacuambi River valley located in the upper Amazon basin. Although these soils are part of the Shuar territory, Saraguros have managed to claim areas of the tropical rainforest to raise cattle. As a result, many Saraguros today have accumulated large landholdings, putting them at odds with poorer Saraguros, whose access to fertile soils is much more limited, and the Shuar, who protest this violation of their patrimony. In the province of Imbabura, the Otavalos have carved their niche in Ecuadorian society as peerless artisans and merchants. A significant number of the 40,000 indigenes residing
Background | 537
in the 75 communities scattered throughout the valley make their living through the manufacture and marketing of textiles or other crafts, and/or as performers of Andean music. The Otavalos have a distinct appearance: women wear anakus (embroidered blouses), chumbis (woven belts), mullus (glass bead necklaces), alpargatas (sandals), and fachalinas (shawls that are either folded or worn over their heads); men don white pants, white shirts, navy blue ponchos, alpargatas, and dark fedoras. Both men and women wear their hair long and braided. Their skills as artisans, merchants, and musicians have provided many Otavalos with the opportunity to travel abroad and, as such, have made them EcuadorÊs most identifiable cultural and ethnic ambassadors. The Incan empire of Tahuantinsuyu extended throughout most of the Andes from its capital city of Cusco. It stretched over three thousand miles and included perhaps as many as 10 million inhabitants. Incan expansion occurred in waves and commenced with the ascension to power of Pachacuti Inca Yupanqui, who extended Incan influence from Cusco to Lake Titicaca in the south and to Quito in the north, under the military leadership of his son and heir Tupa Inca Yupanqui. When Tupa became Inca (lord of Tahuantinsuyu), he continued the advancement of the empire through the Ecuadorian sierra as did his son and heir Inca Huayna Capac. Incan territorial expansion came to a halt after Huayna CapacÊs death from smallpox in 1525, when competing claims by sons Huascar, from the imperial family in Cusco, and Atahualpa, whose mother was the princess of the Kingdom of Quito, plunged the empire into a bloody civil war. It was at this historical juncture that Spanish conquistadors arrived on the Pacific coast of Peru looking for the fabled riches that had stirred their imaginations when they were in Panama. Employing untold treachery and exploiting the divisions in the Incan empire, the Spanish were able to overthrow the Incan state, executing its last ruler, Inca Tupac Amaru, in 1572. Spanish colonial society attempted to make use of the same mechanisms for controlling populations and extracting tribute that the Incan state had utilized. In order to facilitate indigenous conversion and to better control labor practices, the Spanish forcibly relocated indigenous peoples into reducciones or large Spanish-style towns. They also implemented coercive labor practices such as the encomienda, which granted conquistadors a certain number of indigenes to provide work or tribute as compensation for their services to the Crown, and the m’ita system, which required indigenous communities to provide labor for colonial elites for periods of time ranging from six months to a year on a rotational basis. Territorially, all of South America (except Brazil) was under the jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of Peru. These lands were divided into audiencias, which were governed by judicial courts. The lands of contemporary Ecuador were established as the Audiencia of Quito in 1563. In the late 18th century, the Viceroyalty of Peru was divided into the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata to the south and the Viceroyalty of New Granada to the north, of which Ecuador became a part. Colonial
538 | Ecuadorian Immigrants
society privileged those born in Spain, peninsulares, and those of pure Spanish blood born in the Americas, creoles. Mestizos or people of combined indigenous and European origins and castas·others of mixed ancestry·found themselves only slightly better off than indigenes and African slaves or their offspring. The decision to gear colonial economies towards African slavery resulted from the labor crisis that hit the Americas as Europeans virtually annihilated indigenous populations through overwork and epidemics. Notwithstanding the demographic collapse of native peoples, coerced indigenous labor was still used in the Potosí silver mines as well as in the obrajes or textile-producing sweatshops found throughout the Andes, and indigenous communities were still required to make their tribute payments to Spanish authorities. The start of the 18th century saw a change in dynastic rule in Spain as the Hapsburgs were replaced by the Bourbons. The transition also ushered in an era of political, social, and economic reform as the new monarchs considered colonial America to be undisciplined and inefficient. One of its first acts was to reestablish the privileges and monopolies that peninsulares claimed were theirs and that had been usurped to varying degrees by creoles. In addition, they also implemented laws that increased sales taxes and tributes and the numbers of customs houses, and encouraged new mining technologies. These efforts to make the Andes more profitable, however, led to a series of rebellions against colonial authority, including most famously, the Tupac Amaru II insurrection. Though it failed, it signaled the beginning of the end for Spanish control of the Americas. In the early 19th century, calls for independence from Spain resonated throughout the Americas as Napoleon Bonaparte exerted control over both Portugal and Spain. In modernday Ecuador, the first call for independence was made from the city of Quito on August 10, 1809. Though it was quickly put down, it was repeated in Guayaquil in 1820 and then spread to other cities. South American successes over Spanish royalists in the first two decades of the 19th century, by Simón BolívarÊs army in the north and José de San MartínÊs in the south, set the stage for patriot victory, led by Antonio José de Sucre in the Battle of Pichincha on May 24, 1822, and independence for the entire Audiencia of Quito. Afterwards, Ecuador became part of Gran Colombia, which also included modern-day Venezuela and Colombia. This lasted until 1830 when the tripartite state disintegrated, leaving the three to become sovereign republics. The Republic of EcuadorÊs economy can be characterized as based on monoculture as it has primarily revolved around export crops and natural resources, such as cacao, sugar, rubber, bananas, and oil. Also significant to the highland economies were textiles (in north-central Ecuador) and Panama hats (in south-central Ecuador). Hacienda work on the coast often served as a lure for potential migrants and provided wages that highlanders sometimes needed. The collapse of the Panama hat industry in the 1950s precipitated the seasonal migration of thousands of
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highlanders from the Azuay-Cañar province to the coast to work on banana and sugar plantations (Kyle 2000, 14). In 1964, in adherence with the stipulations for economic and developmental assistance offered by the United States Alliance for Progress, EcuadorÊs national government implemented agrarian reform in the creation of the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC). It attempted to address the problems of land tenure by breaking up haciendas. It also made illegal the practice of debt peonage, such as huasipungo, which bound indigenes to haciendas, requiring them to provide free labor in exchange for access to small plots of land, water, firewood, and/or pasture lands. For rural peasants the new laws did discontinue coerced labor practices, but the benefits of land redistribution were limited, as less than 10 percent of lands belonging to haciendas with estates exceeding 500 hectares were redistributed. Ultimately, the 1964 agrarian reform law had the effect of incorporating indigenous peoples into the capitalist economy by forcing them to purchase lands and rights to water, firewood, and pasturelands (Becker 2008, 137 39). Since the new laws ultimately failed to address the land strains created by growing rural populations and limited access to lands, IERAC shifted its policy to encouraging indigenous peoples to lay claim to lands that were not being used, such as those in the Amazon. Encroachment onto Amazonian indigenesÊ lands, first by missionaries and oil companies and later by colonists, led indigenous peoples to organize politically and form the Shuar Confederation in 1965. In 1972, highland indigenes in Chimborazo organized to create Ecuarunari, Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (ECUARUNARI, a Quichua phrase meaning „to awaken the Ecuadorian Indians‰). Finally, in 1986, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador was created as an umbrella organization of all of the indigenous organizations in Ecuador with the goal of unifying the different movements and providing greater political and social representation for EcuadorÊs native peoples. These organizations have put indigenous concerns at the forefront of Ecuadorian politics and have instilled pride in these groups (Gerlach 2003, 67). The failure of agrarian reform to address limited access to lands in a meaningful way has condemned generations of highland peasants to lives alienated from the source of their indigenous identity, the land. Minifundio, the holding of small plots of lands, was viewed as a solution to the plight of landless native peoples, following the abolition of huasipungo. However, the parcelization and reparcelization of tracts of land with each passing generation has created an untenable situation for highland peasant families. By the 1970s and 1980s, many indigenes found that their plots could no longer provide adequately for their families and, thus, decided to sell their holdings and look for work in the cities, primarily Quito. National politics in Ecuador have been characterized by instability from the dawn of the republic to the dawn of the 21st century. On one hand, Ecuador is regionally fragmented, as the coastal economic powerhouse of Guayaquil vies with
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the highland political capital of Quito to lead the nation. Turn-of-the-20th-century presidential politics provide the clearest illustration of this. The latter part of the 19th century was controlled by the highland Conservative Catholic President Gabriel García Moreno, whose policies favored highland development over coastal interests. In 1895, Eloy Alfaro led the liberal revolution against Conservative rule. The Alfaro government secularized the state, expropriated lands belonging to the Catholic Church while also stripping it of many of the privileges that it had enjoyed, abolished all forms of coerced labor, promoted modernization, and established coastal control of Ecuadorian politics. This lasted until 1925 when a military coup ended the hegemony of the coastal liberal oligarchy. The officers who led the Julian Revolution made the case that they were acting on behalf of the people and set out to modernize economic relations through the foundation of a national bank, the creation of a Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and promulgation of laws designed to protect workers. These populist reforms found their most charismatic and iconic figure in the person of José María Velasco Ibarra, who was elected president of the republic on five different occasions. His ability to inspire political support from the masses was manifested most clearly in a line he once spoke: „Give me a balcony and I will become president.‰ However, his inability to deliver on the promises that he made, such as land reform, and his penchant for assuming dictatorial powers when faced with opposition often alienated his base of support, leading ultimately to his overthrow as was the case in four of his five terms in office. In 1944, Ecuador experienced another revolution. Led by different social organizations, including indigenous groups, Ecuadorians overthrew the government of the fraudulently elected Carlos Arroyo del Río, who had not only lost a war with Peru in 1941 but had also lost nearly half of EcuadorÊs territory in the conflict. Benefitting from the „Glorious May Revolution,‰ as the 1944 rebellion was called, was Velasco Ibarra, who was named supreme chief of the republic. Also emerging more powerful after the revolution were workers and indigenes. The Confederación de Trabajadores del Ecuador (Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers, CTE) was founded, becoming a significant advocate for leftist politics in Ecuador. And for the first time on a national stage were indigenous actors who organized the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (Ecuadorian Federation of Indians, FEI). FEI worked closely with EcuadorÊs Communist Party in promoting political and social reform that addressed the needs most felt by EcuadorÊs indigenous peoples, such as coerced labor, land reform, water rights, and education. FEI would set the foundations for subsequent indigenous organizing in the 1960s and then again in the 1980s. In 1990, Ecuador was the site of a massive indigenous rebellion led by CONAIE. It was the biggest the country had ever seen. The rest of the decade witnessed constant indigenous unrest stemming from a variety of social and economic concerns. In January 2000, these tensions were brought to a head as the removal of state subsidies on cooking gas (causing its price to skyrocket by 500%); the freezing of bank
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José María Velasco Ibarra was a dominant political figure in Ecuador in the mid-20th century. During his five presidential terms, he promulgated policies that represented a “third path between capitalism and communism.” (Hulton/Archive by Getty Images)
accounts; the fivefold devaluation of EcuadorÊs currency, the sucre; the collapse of the banking system; and plans to dollarize the economy precipitated an insurrection that overthrew EcuadorÊs President Jamil Mahuad Witt and brought to power an indigenous leader, Antonio Vargas, as part of a ruling triumvirate. The coup, however, was condemned by the United States, who demanded that the country return to constitutional rule, resulting in the ascension to the presidency of Vice President Gustavo Noboa. In the 2002 presidential election, Lucio Gutiérrez, one of the leaders of the coup against Mahuad Witt, was victorious. Having won the presidency with support from social organizations and popular movements, including many indigenous groups, Gutiérrez soon alienated them by embracing the neoliberal reforms that Mahuad had supported. By 2005, amidst a variety of charges of corruption, embezzlement of state funds, treason, and the dissolution of the Supreme Court so that he could select new judges that would drop criminal charges against former president Abdalá Bucaram (who had been in exile since 1997 after also facing charges of corruption), it was clear that GutiérrezÊs presidency was in trouble. In April 2005, in response to several protests in Quito, Gutiérrez called a state of emergency. With the military refusing to obey GutiérrezÊs orders, members of Congress voted to remove him from office and named vice president Alfredo Palacio as the new president. Afterwards, Gutiérrez sought and received asylum in Brazil.
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In 2006, former finance minister Rafael Correa was elected president of Ecuador. Correra ran as the candidate of Alianza PAIS Patria Altiva y Soberana (Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance)·a party that he created himself. PAIS adopted a platform of political sovereignty, regional integration, and economic relief for the poor. In addition to proposing a constituent assembly to rewrite EcuadorÊs constitution, Correa also called for reform of the oil industry, profound changes to EcuadorÊs financial sector, and the restructuring of debt in such a way that would reduce EcuadorÊs foreign loan service.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration Migration patterns between the United States and Ecuador were practically nonexistent until the 1930s. In that decade, a couple hundred Ecuadorians were able to get resident visas. The 1940s saw the number of Ecuadorians receiving lawful, permanent resident status rise to over 2,200. The following decade saw the number with legal U.S. residency jump by almost 400 percent to 8,574 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010, 9). The central cause of the increase in emigration was the bottoming out of the important Panama hat trade in the 1950s. This global industry dated back to the mid-19th century and had as its epicenter the Azuay province. Though these finely woven hats were crafted in highland Ecuador, they became popular in Panama and, hence, got their name (Kyle 2000, 4). Demand for the hats escalated with the discovery of gold in California in the 1850s as miners sought cheap protection from the sun. Over the next 100 years, demand for the hat became global and New York City became its import hub and broker to the world. However, following World War II, the United States reduced tariffs on Asian imports as part of a policy designed to reconstruct the region and, thus, began importing cheaper straw hats from Asian countries (Kyle 2000, 56). The disappearance of this market devastated the economy of the south-central highlands of Ecuador as it had become dependent on the revenues that this industry generated. In 1965, the U.S. government implemented immigration reform. The Immigration and Nationality Act did away with the National Origins Formula, which had set immigration limits based on the existing ethnic composition of the United States. The new law reduced the opportunities for western Europeans to immigrate to the United States and increased the opportunities for those individuals from Asia and Latin America. With the changes to U.S. immigration law that increased immigration quotas and with the escalation of the Vietnam War in 1966 (which spurred the United States
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to encourage immigration of young, skilled Latin American men), Ecuadorians increasingly found themselves being pulled towards the United States. As such, hundreds of Ecuadorians from the coast, especially Guayaquil, travelled north and served in the U.S. armed forces. After the war ended in 1973, many Ecuadorians who fought in Vietnam stayed in the United States and invited their family and friends to visit as tourists. However, many overstayed their visas and thus initiated the practice of migration as undocumented immigrants. The decade of the 1960s produced over 34,000 new legal Ecuadorian residents in the United States, tripling that of the previous decade (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010, 9). The new Americans established themselves in small communities in large cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. In the 1970s, more than 47,000 Ecuadorians received legal residency. The factors that led to this immigration spike vary. For one, the Ecuador immigration quota increased, and many applied for visas based on family reunification provisions. Second, the banana bust of the 1960s and then the abandonment of the Tenguel Hacienda by Standard Fruit in the 1970s, coupled with the lure of the U.S. lifestyle as presented to employers by the banana companies, drove many mid-management Ecuadorians from the province of Guayas to the United States, ending up either on the Pacific coast, in cities such as Los Angeles or San Francisco, or on the Atlantic coast, in Miami or New York.
Subsequent Waves of Migration The second wave of Ecuadorian migration corresponds to the decade of the 1980s (often referred to as Latin AmericaÊs Lost Decade, due to increased national debts, inflation, and austerity measures designed to reduce expenditures on public welfare programs). Central to the economic crises of the 1980s was EcuadorÊs overdependence on revenue created by oil sales. Whereas the early 1970s represented good years for the oil industry (net foreign-exchange earnings jumped from $43 in 1971 to $350 million in 1974), the 1980s saw EcuadorÊs economy stagnate as the international price of oil dropped precipitously in the 1980s, drying up oil revenues, and forcing Ecuador to rely on credit, thereby increasing its debt burden and leading to increased inflation coupled with a significant decline in wages (Kyle 2000, 24). Especially hard hit were the peasant communities of Azuay and Cañar in EcuadorÊs southern highlands. Still reeling from the collapse of the Panama hat industry of the 1950s, peasants from the south-central Andes also had to deal with poor and damaged harvests, the loss of overseas markets for some export goods, a land crisis that stemmed from the practice of repeatedly subdividing plots amongst heirs, and the drying up of internal migration opportunities. Consequently, many peasants from Azuay and Cañar decided to emigrate.
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What started as a trickle soon became a torrent. The fact that in the 1980s, over 48,000 Ecuadorians received legal residency status in the United States (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2009, 9) does not reflect the immense migration that was taking place. Even the 1990 U.S. Census, which reported that there were 143,000 Ecuadorians living legally in the United States (an increase of almost 70%), grossly underestimated the Ecuadorian immigrant population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993, 50). It would be in the 1990s that the full magnitude of the mass departure would start to set in. Though the increase in the number of Ecuadorians being granted legal residency in the 1970s and 1980s was significant, the numbers paled in comparison to what loomed ahead. The decades of the 1990s and 2000s produced new highs in legal Ecuadorian residency in the United States, as over 81,000 were granted legal status in the 1990s and over 91,000 in the 2000s (United States Department of Homeland Security 2009, 9). Ecuadorian immigration to the United States has taken three forms: (a) as permanent legal residents; (b) as temporary legal nonimmigrants; and (c) or as undocumented immigrants who either overstayed his/her visa or who traveled to the United States illegally by way of illicit routes through Central America and Mexico. In 1998, 6,840 Ecuadorians received permanent legal residency. That number jumped by almost 30 percent in 1999 to just over 8,900 as the crisis worsened. Following a dip in 2000, the number rose again to 9,654 in 2001 and to 10,524 in 2002. Though the number of new Ecuadorian legal residents receded in 2003 and 2004 to precrisis levels, in 2005, once more it spiked, and then in 2006, it skyrocketed to 17,624, its highest mark (see Figure 9). A second legal option for leaving Ecuador was via a nonimmigrant visa, such as tourist, cultural, student, or fiancée. The number of those receiving nonimmigrant visas was a little over 105,000 in 1996. From 1996 to 1998, that number grew by almost 50 percent. After slight declines in 1999 and 2000, the number of Ecuadorians receiving nonimmigrant visas soared in 2001 to 167,000 and again in 2002 to 174,000. Since then, the number has been fairly consistent in the range of 150,000 to 180,000 per year (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, 2010). Though these Ecuadorians are not classified as permanent residents, they are an important part of the Ecuadorian American community and contribute to this culture. The final index that reflects Ecuadorian decisions to migrate to the United States is in the number of illegal or undocumented Ecuadorian immigrants that exist in the United States. The statistics that have been cited for immigration patterns up until this point reflect those Ecuadorians who migrated to the United States and became lawful residents or those who have been able to travel temporarily to the United States with a nonimmigrant visa. The number of Ecuadorians who have overstayed visas or illegally immigrated to the United States is not represented in these statistics. Because of the clandestine nature of their migration, actual numbers
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are difficult to ascertain, but a variety of estimates put that number in the hundreds of thousands.
Undocumented Immigrants In 1998, according to the INS, Ecuador ranked 11th on the list of nations with the most nationals apprehended by U.S. immigration agents, with 655 picked up. In 1999, that number almost doubled to 1,159, placing Ecuador fifth worldwide, and in 2000, it jumped again to 1,798, and in 2001 to 1,944. Since then the number of apprehended Ecuadorians has fluctuated between 800 and 2,000. Ecuador actually ranks first among nations with the most nationals intercepted by the INS attempting to arrive by sea. These figures are not exact as many Ecuadorian deportees attempt pass as Mexican in order to be deported to Mexico where they can attempt to enter the United States again without having to endure the much longer trip from Ecuador. The estimates that the INS has published regarding the number of illegal Ecuadorians in the United States have varied over time. For example, the INS estimated that 55,000 Ecuadorians were living in the United States illegally in 1996 (U.S. Department of Justice 1999, 200). In 2000, the number of illegal Ecuadorians in the United States was estimated at 110,000 (double the number than was estimated in 1996). A decade later the number had jumped another 55 percent to 170,000 (Hoefner, Rytina, and Baker 2010, 4).
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community Census figures provide the best estimates of the Ecuadorian population in the United States; however, due to the relatively small number of Ecuadorians in the country and the open-ended census questions about country of origin and race, even these figures do not provide a full or detailed view of the Ecuadorian population in the United States. In 2005, the official number of Ecuadorians living in the United States was 436,000. The number rises from 550,000 to 600,000 when illegal or undocumented Ecuadorians are taken into account (Jokisch 2007). Ecuadorian community organizations estimate that the number is higher, placing the total number of Ecuador-born immigrants in the United States at almost one million. Like most Latin American immigrants, Ecuadorians have tended to settle in larger cities of the United States, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami, Houston, and the New York New Jersey metropolitan areas. New York State, for example, according to Jason Pribilsky, citing the 2000 Census, had 122,472 Ecuadorians,
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of which 60 percent lived in New York City (Pribilsky 2008, 233). More striking, however, are the reports that indicate that 70 percent of the Ecuadorian population in New York is undocumented. Even before EcuadorÊs late 1990s financial crisis, approximations of the number of Ecuadorians in New York City, documented and undocumented, reached as high as 400,000 (Carpio 1995, 7), giving New York the distinction of having more Ecuadorians than any other city except for Quito and Guayaquil. Moreover, most indigenous migrants from the Deleg canton in the Azuay-Cañar provinces have settled in north-central Queens, such as in the Elmhurst-Corona neighborhoods, where the number of Ecuadorians might be as high as 8,000 (Pribilsky 2007, 173 74). A study of migrant settlement patterns also leads to a discussion of class and ethnicity. Whereas earlier (pre-1980) waves of immigration were primarily middle-class white and mestizo, the 1980s signaled a new era of immigration as poor indigenes began looking to immigrate to the United States either legally or illegally. Many of these individuals came from the Azuay-Cañar and Otavalo regions. A smaller population of Saraguros from Loja also migrated into the Washington, D.C., area in this period. This trend would continue until the late 1990s, when EcuadorÊs economic crisis opened up the immigration floodgates again, and a greater number of highly educated and skilled whites and mestizos joined the exodus. The migration patterns of EcuadorÊs indigenous peoples also shed light on issues related to class and ethnicity. Whereas indigenous migrants from Azuay and Cañar tend to be male, seek as their destination the U.S. northeast, and have been driven to migrate by EcuadorÊs economic instability, the migrants from Otavalo include a greater number of females, are not drawn to one region, and are primarily driven by a search for markets. In looking at why rural Ecuadorians have attempted to migrate to the United States, most studies have focused principally on economic factors. In fact, many of these investigations rightfully point out that decisions to relocate are often closely connected to problems associated with land tenure. Jason PribilskyÊs La Chulla Vida argues that another factor that draws highlanders from Azuay and Cañar to the United States is the desire for adventure and for American (specifically New York) modernity. For highlanders, the opportunity to make it in the United States (however slim) outweighs the realities of a future in agriculture and pasturing.
Age and Family Structure Historically, immigration to the United States for the most part has been a male endeavor. However the last two decades has seen a significant shift as more and more women have gone to the United States either following the males of their households or in search of the same opportunities as their male counterparts. Illegal immigration, however, remains primarily the domain of men.
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The majority of Ecuadorians receiving legal permanent residency status is between the ages of 25 and 34 and female. However, the most recent wave of Ecuadorian immigrants to the United States has been in part driven by young males in search of employment opportunities abroad. In the Azuay-Cañar province, young men often view travel to the United States as a rite of passage in becoming a modern indigenous man and an essential step towards marriage and family life. For these migrants, the majority of whom are between the ages of 18 and 25, the hope is to stay in the United States for only enough time to improve their and their familiesÊ (or future familiesÊ) well-being in Ecuador. While in the United States, their financial responsibilities include payments to those who subsidized their trip to the United States (chulqueros), basic living expenses sufficient to continue to work, and periodic remittances to family in Ecuador. These contributions are so important that they might constitute up to half of a householdÊs monthly income, if not more. According to PribilskyÊs study of migration from the Deleg canton in highland Ecuador to the United States, he finds that the remittances sent by migrants, on average about $200 to $250 a month, constitute over 55 percent of the monthly income for those households that receive them (Pribilsky 2007, 74). Most of the migrants do not intend on staying in the United States permanently, though many do.
Educational Attainment Characterizing early waves of Ecuadorian immigration to the United States were migrants who were more skilled and better educated than the general population. Many of these people had middle-management jobs that disappeared, forcing them to look for opportunities outside of Ecuador. This pattern changed in the 1980s as many of the new immigrants, especially those who migrated illicitly, arrived with less schooling and offered few skills other than manual labor. Most of these arrivals came from extremely rural conditions in the highlands. The financial freefall of the 1990s, however, changed the face of immigration again. Many middle-class, educated men and women facing an uncertain future opted to leave Ecuador. Their educational achievement and employment skills were higher than the average for the rest of Ecuador (Gratton 2007, 282). In EcuadorÊs 2001 Census, of the male emigrant population headed for the United States, 46 percent indicated that their highest level of education was primary, and 32 percent said it was secondary. This number pales significantly when compared to the male emigrant population headed for Spain or Italy, where over half of those men finished high school. Female emigrants, on the other hand, were much better educated than their male counterparts, as 70 percent indicated that they had either finished high school or finished college. This percentage dwarfs
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the male population, which had only 19 percent either finishing high school or college. Though many more women went to Spain than to the United States, the ratio of women who had finished college before leaving Ecuador was much higher for those headed to the United States than to Spain (Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas and FLACSO 2006, 32). For immigrant children who attend school in the United States, they face cultural and linguistic challenges. Behaviors that were not considered inappropriate in their native Ecuador (physical contact, handholding) are deemed out of place in the United States. Ecuadorian Americans are also usually lumped into categories, either mislabeled as Mexican or dumped into that amorphous pool of Spanishspeaking immigrants called Hispanic or Latino.
Economic Attainment The majority of Ecuadorian men, particularly those who are undocumented, work in seasonal occupations or within the service sector of the U.S. economy. These include jobs in construction, as day laborers, in grocery stories and garment factories, as commercial cleaners, and as commercial drivers (taxis) (Pribilsky 2007, 184). In Los Angeles, unlike New York, factory and production work draws a significant percentage of the Ecuadorian work force (Gratton 2007, 584). These occupations pay little compared to the jobs that legal migrants can get. Day laborers on average get paid between $50 and $100 per day and garment workers might make $5 to $7 per hour (Pribilsky 2007, 187, 194). Women, on the other hand, tend to work in the garment industry and in domestic service. They also take jobs in restaurants, though to a lesser degree than do men. In New York, about 20 percent of the women have jobs as bookkeepers, teachers, and other white-collar jobs. A significant percentage of women also take so-called pink-collar jobs such as clerks, salespersons, and legal and medical aides. (Gratton 2007, 584). Moreover, there is a tendency among Ecuadorian women, and men for that matter, to take jobs where most of their coworkers are of the same ethnicity (585).
Health Statistics and Issues Ecuadorian Americans, like most first-generation Latinos, demonstrate good general health compared to national averages in the United States. Recent immigrants have lower mortality rates, and infant mortality rates are also lower than the general U.S. population. However, in comparison to the general population, many are not immunized and are prone to diseases like malaria, typhoid, hepatitis B, and tuberculosis. Moreover, as they acculturate, they begin falling victim to chronic
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and infectious diseases in the United States. Incidences of obesity, diabetes, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and depression, brought on, in part, by a change in diet, less exercise, and a greater inclination to smoke, outpace those of the white population, as do sexually transmitted diseases (including AIDS) (Pew Hispanic Center 2010).
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals For Ecuadorian Americans, despite having distanced themselves from relatives in their native country, family ties are still very important, and, for most, the improvement of family status or welfare through work in the United States is the primary reason that they decided to leave Ecuador in the first place. Moreover, as the Ecuadorian American community has grown, so too has the likelihood that an Ecuadorian migrant will have relatives in the United States. Consequently, the Ecuadorian American enclaves that exist in the United States are often composed of networks of families. Families are not only defined by bloodlines and matrimony, but they also include fictive kin through godparentage and compadrazco. The birth of a child is typically followed by baptism, as is Catholic practice. Playing an important part in the event and subsequent celebration are the godparents. Other occasions that might warrant the naming of godparents are the first hair-cutting and nail-clipping. Unlike in the United States, where godparental responsibilities are often limited to the spiritual and moral guidance of a godchild, in Latin America, the responsibilities are much more secular. Generally speaking, godparents might be called upon to provide financial assistance, to facilitate contacts that could lead to jobs or educational opportunities, or to help find a place to live. For the Ecuadorian wishing to immigrate to the United States, the godparent is usually the first person contacted when organizing the trip. As such, they are treated as family members and are accorded due respect. Birthdays are opportunities to celebrate amongst family and friends, and often involve food, parties, festive decorations, piñatas, music and dance, and, perhaps, gifts (though not on the scale that they are given in the United States). Though the gathering is held to commemorate the birth of the child and his/her saint, the celebration is much more family- and community-oriented than what is common for childrenÊs birthday parties as celebrated by the general American population. Patronal fiestas (celebrations of patron saints) are as vibrant a part of the Ecuadorian American community as they are in Ecuador and typically require at least one godparent or sponsor. These public commemorations are usually spectacles to
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Ecuadorian immigrant parents baptize their firstborn child at a Catholic church in Brooklyn, New York, 2010. (David M. Grossman/The Image Works)
be enjoyed by the general public and can include a parade, floats, bands, the naming of an event queen, games, vendors, and a dance. In Ecuador, men and women establish their unions in a variety of ways. On one hand, some couples begin cohabitation and raising a family without a formal ceremony. However, the majority marry. Weddings in Ecuador can be performed by civil authorities or by religious ones. The ritual is similar to what is common in the United States. The reception, however, can be as short as a few hours or as long as three days. Many poorer families forego the Catholic wedding ceremony in favor of a civil one and an elaborate reception. In the United States, however, Ecuadorian Americans meld Ecuadorian traditions with American traditions. Weddings frequently occur in Catholic churches and follow traditional church protocol. As with traditional Ecuadorian weddings, the ceremony is followed by dancing, food, singing, and music. In Ecuadorian communities, death and funerals are not only characterized by grief and mourning but they are also punctuated by Catholic and popular rituals. Typical funerary rites include vigils or wakes, the funeral, and a requiem mass. Flowers are common at the funerals and grieving family members might wear black
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for a determined period of time. For many undocumented Ecuadorian immigrants, the passing of a family member back home represents a difficult time. Though they might prefer to travel to Ecuador to be with loved ones, the distance, cost and uncertainty of being able to cross back into the United States forces most to forego a return visit. Instead, they are more likely to stay in the United States, mourning their loss, while sending large remittances to cover expenses. In some indigenous communities, it is customary to place a wreath upon the head of a deceased child, while dressing him or her in new or baptismal clothing. This is followed by prayers and a funeral and, lastly, a procession of dancing as the family returns home. This lasts until nightfall (Meisch 1987, 150).
Families and Changing Gender Relations Due to the mass exodus of Ecuadorians who have departed from their home soil, the traditional family structure has been significantly disrupted over the last 20 years. As a result, the extended family has assumed more responsibility for taking care of children in Ecuadorian communities. As such, it is not uncommon to find the children of Ecuadorian emigrants residing with family members. The impact that emigration has had on the Ecuadorian family is extraordinary. According to a 1991 national survey in Ecuador, 17,000 children indicated that they had at least one parent overseas. By the year 2000, that number had skyrocketed to 150,000 (Herrera, Carrillo and Torres 2005, 21). In the Azuay-Cañar provinces over one in three households have at least one family member in the United States (Pribilsky 2007, 68). Traditionally, immigration to the United States has been a male-dominated activity. In the 1930s, this began to change (though illegal immigration was still almost exclusively male). Most women immigrated, however, as part of family reunification. This trend continued through World War II and then accelerated in the 1980s (Gratton 2007, 583). A consequence of migration has been the transformation of gender roles. Typically, gender relations in Ecuador have followed the model established by Spain in the colonization of the Americas. The public life is the domain of men, and the private (including emotional) is that of the women. In Andean communities, this is frequently the case; however, remnants of parallel gender relations do remain where many tasks and responsibilities are complementary. In recent years, however, women have made noticeable strides in some aspects of gender equality. Female politicians and community leaders (both mestizo and indigenous) have emerged in the last two decades and have challenged the hegemony enjoyed by men. One example is Nina Pacari. In 1998, she became the first indigenous woman to be elected to Ecuadorian parliament and in 2007 became a Supreme Court judge. That being said, these women are still the exception to the rule. This is particularly
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true in rural and highland communities as marianismo·the notion that womenÊs ultimate responsibility is to her children and household·still holds strong. However, according to Jason Pribilsky, migration to the United States has served to transform gender relations. As men have moved to the United States in search of jobs in order to improve the lives of their families in Ecuador, they have had to assume domestic responsibilities that traditionally had been relegated to the women of the household. Women likewise have had to take on many of the public duties of their husbands (Pribilsky 2007, 251). In recent years, this dynamic has undergone another change as many young women have begun to make the trip north themselves (Meisch 2002, 195). This is borne out in data published by the Department of Homeland Security on legal residency and gender. According to data published by the Department of Homeland Security on immigration, from 2003 to 2009, almost 81,000 Ecuadorians obtained legal residency in the United States, and of those 54.7 percent were women (see Table 89). This suggests that the status of Ecuadorian American women in general is more stable than that of men and that they might be able to establish themselves in the public sphere in ways that men cannot. Ecuadorian American women have demonstrated leadership roles in the United States through their creation and participation in a number of regional organizations, such as the Club de Damas Protectoras de la Niñez (the Female Protectors of Children Club), Acción de Mujeres Ecuatorianas Miami (Action of Ecuadorian Women Miami), Asociación de Damas Ecuatorianas en Washington, D.C. (ADEW, the Association of Ecuadorian Ladies in Washington), Fundación María Dolores Blaschke (María Dolores Blaschke Foundation), and Charity in Action. In fact, of the 92 leaders of Ecuadorian American organizations listed on the Web site www.ecuador.us/org.htm on July 18, 2010, almost one-third of them are women. ADEW is one of the oldest of these, being created in 1986. Its mission is to raise funds to help needy institutions in Ecuador, such as orphanages, facilities for the blind and handicapped, nursing homes, and schools for impaired and abandoned children as well as victims of natural disasters (http://adew-us.org).
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Ecuadorian immigrants wish to maintain personal and cultural ties to their native country. Advances in the telecommunications industry and international phone cards have reduced the cost of staying in touch with family, friends, and community in Ecuador. The Internet offers the means for immigrants to contact people in their country of origin and offers virtual venues for being part of both the Ecuadorian as well as the Ecuadorian American communities, such as Comunidades de Migrantes Ecuador (Ecuadorian Migrant Communities), which maintains a site at www. migrantesecuador.com. Because of the importance of remittances to family, regional and national economies, international money transferring services have established
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themselves as an essential component in the life of the Ecuadorian migrant. Ecuadorian Americans also send items to family members especially when they are more expensive in Ecuador to purchase than they are to acquire and send from the United States. Ecuadorian migrants in New York have another option for sending household appliances to family back home. Créditos Económicos (Economic Credit) is a binational department store in New York where clients purchase household items, in-store and on-line, and then have them delivered from a warehouse in Ecuador. Virtually all Ecuadorian Americans speak Spanish. Many from the highlands also speak Quichua, and there may be some who speak an Amazonian language. Churches in different migrant communities have tried to reach out to their Ecuadorian American congregations by bringing in visiting Ecuadorian priests and ministers for certain periods of time, thus having the effect of reinforcing their national identity. Many other churches work with members of their congregations to develop projects and establish different types of missions in Ecuador. As is the case for most of Latin America, Catholicism still plays an important role in everyday life, despite the inroads that Protestant religions have made in recent years. What is significant is that the Catholicism that was introduced by the Spanish has experienced significant syncretization over time as native peoples and those of African descent have adapted the Catholic norms and practices to their beliefs and traditions. As a result, patron saints frequently reflect the localized experiences and culture of the towns and communities that adopt them. For migrant communities in New York, two extremely important symbols that they have transported with them to the United States are the Virgin de las nubes (Our Lady of the Clouds) and the Virgin del cisne (Virgin of the Swan). Our Lady of the Clouds refers to a vision of the Virgin Mary in a cloud formation observed by peasants in the Azogues region prior to World War II. Over time her appearance has become increasingly indigenized as today she is often depicted with a Panama hat over long dark braids. The Virgin of the Swan is one of the oldest Marian devotions. Legend has it that in the 1550s, a native youth from Loja attempted to capture a swan in a highland lagoon that not only escaped but then ascended into the air transforming itself into the Virgin Mary. Since 1995, thousands of statues of the Virgin of the Swan have been brought to the United States and are often visible at Ecuadorian masses, parades, and other events. The Virgin of the Swan is considered the protector of all absent Ecuadorians, a title it received by the Bishop of Ecuador while saying mass at Saint PatrickÊs Church in Manhattan (Pribilsky 2007, 179, 181). Lastly, regional identity is often reinforced as communities celebrate feast days for patron saints. Throughout the United States, Ecuadorian American communities have social, political, and cultural organizations. In New York and New Jersey, there exists Casas de Culture (Cultural Centers). These institutions are designed to promote and foster the cultural and educational development of the Ecuadorian
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Community residing both in the United States and in Ecuador. They create opportunities for cultural producers to develop their craft and to showcase their work and organize cultural and educational forums and events for the Ecuadorian and Ecuadorian American communities as well as other Hispanic communities (www. ccecultura-nj.org, www.ecuatorianet.com/cceniny.html).
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media Ecuadorian Americans have access to a significant array of national media outlets. Readers can find Quito newspapers Diario Hoy, El Comercio, and La Hora, Guayaquil newspapers El Telégrafo, El Universo, and Expreso, as well as a variety of other regional papers. Popular academic journals that address Ecuadorian and Ecuadorian American issues include Ecuador Debate and ICONOS published by FLACSO. Ecuadorian Americans also have access to on-line journals and blogs that address issues important to them. Ecuador News (www.ecuadornews.com.ec) is the self-proclaimed voice of the Ecuadorian immigrant. It publishes weekly and has offices in New York and Guayaquil. The official organ of the Casa de Cultura is EcuaYork (ecuayork.homestead.com/montesinos.html). Another on-line journal is Ecuatorianet (Ecuatorianet.com), the Ecuadorian cultural review of New York and New Jersey. It has been in existence since 2004. In addition to publishing articles, Ecuatorianet also maintains a YouTube channel and Facebook site to publicize news and activities (www.ecuatorianet.com/cceniny.html).
Celebration of National Holidays As a consequence of EcuadorÊs long colonial history under Spanish rule, Roman Catholicism continues to play a major role in the cycle of national holidays. These include New YearÊs Day, the Epiphany (Three Kings Day), Carnival, Holy Week, All SoulÊs Day, and Christmas. Other days that are celebrated are May Day, MotherÊs Day, Battle of Pichincha Day, Inti Raymi (Quichua for „Festival of the Sun‰; EcuadorÊs winter solstice), Simón BolívarÊs Birthday, and Independence Day (August 10). Ecuadorians mark these days in a variety of ways, from intimate gatherings amongst family and friends to large-scale parades. In New York, Ecuadorians from all immigration statuses gather for the August 10 Independence Day parades, allegorical floats, traditional food vendors, and fellowship. Ecuadorian American organizations in other cities conduct similar events. Regional independence days (such as Ambato, Cuenca, Quito, Guayaquil) and pre-Columbian celebrations are often observed in Ecuadorian American communities as well. In New Jersey, for example the Ecuadorian American community celebrates AmbatoÊs independence with a parade and the election of the Queen of Tungurahua. Inti Raymi has been celebrated in Chicago at least since 2008 and includes a parade of sports teams, the
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blessing of games, the election of a sports queen (ñusta in Quichua), soccer, basketball and volleyball games, gala balls, dance concerts, and Andean music. Ecuadorians often observe Christmas on the evening of December 24 by attending mass, gathering the entire family, enjoying a large meal, and then attending parties or dances. The exchange of presents is not common; however, children might receive a gift on the Epiphany. Holy Week is honored with fanesca, a dish prepared exclusively for this holiday. Carnival is celebrated with alcohol, dance, and pranks, such as the dousing of unsuspecting victims with water balloons. The infusion of Ecuadorians in major U.S. cities has given them an economic and social base large enough to sponsor large public events in celebration of their holidays. At the same time, Ecuadorian Americans have had to harness some of their enthusiasm for their national holidays and have adopted American traditions and holidays. For example, Ecuadorian American children tend to expect gifts on Christmas morning and typically do want to participate in Halloween.
Foodways In Ecuador, potatoes, corn, cassava, sweet potatoes, rice, and beans are staples and are probably consumed every day. Accompanying these starches are proteins, such as fish and chicken, and to a lesser extent pork, beef, goat, and cuy, or guinea pig. EcuadorÊs proximity to the Pacific Ocean and its export seafood industry has given rise to a number of seafood dishes. Principal among these is ceviche. Ecuadorian ceviche frequently uses shrimp as its base and includes tomatoes, red onions, cilantro, and lime juice. Corn is used in a variety of ways in Ecuador. Typically, it is boiled and dekerneled (mote) or served on the cob (choclo). It might also be ground such as in the preparation of humitas (tamales). It can be used to make chicha, a fermented corn drink. Another popular corn-based drink is moroche de leche (spiced hot milk with corn). Kernels of corn also accompany a variety of different meat-based soups and stews, sometimes with yucca and plantains. The importance of potatoes to the Andean diet is hard to ignore. This is certainly the case for Ecuador. Different varieties of potatoes and other tubers (oca and ullucu) are used for different dishes. Frequently boiled, they accompany most dishes with salt and cheese. Potatoes are the main ingredient in llapingachos (grilled potato patties) as well as in locro de papas (creamy potato soup). A dish where both potatoes and corn, freshly cooked and toasted, are present but are not the main ingredients is fritada, in which roasted pork rib tips are accompanied by the Andean staples. Though starchy foods are often the base of the diet, meats are also fairly often consumed, principally chicken. Beef and pork are also part of the diet and together make up the popular pincho (skewered meat).
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Other than llapingachos, a dish that is uniquely Ecuadorian is fanesca. It is a traditional soup that is usually prepared during Holy Week (the week before Easter). As such, it is imbued with religious significance. Its ingredients vary depending on the region where it is prepared and what is available. The primary ingredients, however, include figleaf gourd (sambo), pumpkin (zapallo), fava beans, milk, and 12 different types of grains (representing the 12 disciples of Jesus), including chochos, habas, lentils, peas, and corn. In compliance with Catholic doctrine that prohibits consumption of red meat during Holy Week, the soup is cooked with fish, preferably cod. The dish is also often garnished with hard-boiled eggs and fried plantains, as well as herbs. Another dish that is central to Andean celebrations, and certainly this is true for Ecuador, that reflects some of the challenges of replicating Andean society in the United States is cuy (or guinea pig). For Ecuadorians, especially highlanders, the consumption of cuy is often associated with special events, such as baptisms, birthdays, weddings, and so forth. It is typically roasted, though highlanders are also known to prepare it as a collada (quinoa-based soup). The problem for Ecuadorian Americans craving this food is that the consumption of this animal, often kept as pets in the United States, is considered taboo, if not illegal in some parts. In 2004, for example, the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation stopped vendors from serving guinea pig at an Ecuadorian event in Flushing Meadows Park. At the time, New York State allowed the consumption of guinea pigs, but New York City prohibited it. Despite these prohibitions, Ecuadorian Americans continued to consume guinea pigs, oftentimes raising them themselves. Since then, New York City has given permission to restaurants to serve guinea pig.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Ecuadorians enjoy a variety of musical styles. The musical preferences of young coastal Ecuadorans often lean toward Afro-Caribbean dance rhythms, such as salsa and merengue, as well as cumbia. However it is the pasillo, made famous by Julio Jaramillo from the 1950s to the 1970s, that evokes Ecuadorian nationalist spirit. The pasillo is down tempo, played primarily with a guitar, and may be accompanied by other instruments, such as a rondin·a type of panpipe·or a mandolin. The lyrics of the pasillo are often sentimental and poetic, while the melodies tend to be melancholic. JaramilloÊs music is still listened to by Ecuadorian Americans, and he has been called the Ecuadorian Frank Sinatra. In the highlands, especially in northern Ecuador, Andean music, especially sanjuanitos, is the music of choice. This genre draws from the sounds of woodwind instruments, such as rondadores and zampoñas (types of panpipes), as well as quenas (flutes), stringed instruments such as charangos and guitars, and a variety of percussion instruments. Andean music is extremely popular amongst the
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Ecuadorian American émigré community, especially in areas where members of the migrant community are native to the highlands, such as the Otavalos. In addition to their commercial acumen selling woven textiles at fairs, festivals, and stores throughout the world, Otavaleños have also been able to establish a presence in the folk music community as performers of Andean music. One of the better-known Andean bands is Andes Manta, based in New York. Performed by the four Lopez brothers, they have performed at venues from Carnegie Hall to the Discovery Channel. Other notable Otavalo bands that have resided in the United States for periods of time include Yahuar Wauky, Inti Raymi, Quillas, and Quichua Mashis (Meisch 2002, 190 97).
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Acculturation Ecuadorians have found that life in the United States means that their national identity and culture is under constant pressure from a variety of sources. For some, acculturation begins even before departing for the United States, as is often the case for EcuadorÊs indigenous populations who attempt to immigrate illegally as they are often instructed by coyotes to get their hair cut and to only speak Spanish. As for Ecuadorians in the United States (both documented and undocumented), they are inundated with images, entertainment, and consumer culture that attempt to lure them into embracing „American culture.‰ Moreover, multiculturalism has had the effect of creating a Hispanic or Latino identification that is all too often equated with being Mexican or Mexican American. As such, Ecuadorian Americans often find themselves adopting aspects of mainstream and Hispanic culture that are not necessarily Ecuadorian. A good example is the practice of the quinceañera. For Ecuadorians, the quinceañera, or the 15th birthday, is an important celebration that marks the coming-of-age of a female. Though it is significant, it is comparable to other important milestones in a girlÊs life. For those of Mexican ancestry, the quinceañera is often a magnanimous event that frequently resembles a gala ball, with long lists of guests, formal attire, an orchestra, and a sumptuous feast. Next to her wedding day, it is the most important day in a young womanÊs life (Mumford 2009). Another gauge for assessing Ecuadorian American acculturation is in naturalization rates. Because citizenship is not required to reside on U.S. soil, the decision to become a citizen reflects a greater sense of U.S. identity, especially since naturalization is a long, expensive, and difficult process that includes an exam over sometimes arcane facets of American politics and history (Sontag 1993). Those who do become naturalized U.S. citizens often do so to enjoy political rights in their
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adoptive country and ease of travel to other countries. Having said that, many who naturalize also wish to preserve aspects of their Ecuadorian identity.
Paths toward Citizenship According to the Department of Homeland Security, from 1989 to 2009, over 129,000 Ecuadorian immigrants obtained U.S. citizenship (see Table 87). In 2005, well over 50 percent of these new citizens were residing in the New York New Jersey area (see Table 88). Other states with significant numbers of newly naturalized Ecuadorian Americans were Florida, California, Connecticut, North Carolina, Illinois, Texas, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland (see Table 88). Most were between 25 and 44 years of age, married, and female. With the ratification of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution, the Ecuadorian state established the principles of universal citizenship and free movement throughout the world. Consistent with the constitutionÊs principles have been its policies regarding foreign immigrants on Ecuadorian soil and Ecuadorian émigré communities. The Ecuadorian government has supported its citizens abroad in their quest for U.S. citizenship, and it recognizes EcuadoriansÊ rights to dual citizenship. Since 2005, it has given Ecuadorians residing outside of the country the right to vote in presidential elections. In addition, in August 2008, EcuadorÊs Secretaría Nacional del Migrante (SENAMI, National Secretariat of the Migrant) created the Casa Ecuatoriana (Ecuadorian Home) in Corona, New York. Its purpose was to promote the plans, projects, and programs of the Ecuadorian government while helping Ecuadorians residing in the exterior to exercise their rights as citizens. Recognizing that many of the residents in New York have ambitions of becoming U.S. citizens, the Casa Ecuatoriana has partnered with nonprofit organizations in giving workshops and offering English classes. President CorreaÊs administration has also created the Consulado Virtual (Virtual Consulate) for Ecuadorians as a means of providing round-the-clock assistance to its émigré community throughout the world. In addition to the virtual consulate, the Ecuadorian government has also attempted to help the immigrant community through the maintenance of the Web site www. migrantecuatoriano.gov.ec.
Intergroup Relations Ecuadorian Americans have forged strong ties with other Latin American immigrant groups in the United States. Organizations and institutions that celebrate cultural diversity in the United States, especially Latin American, have served as channels for Ecuadorian Americans to interact with other groups. In Kansas City, the Ethnic Enrichment Commission sponsors a number of programs that bring members of the different ethnic communities together, including Ecuadorian Americans. The same
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is true for Catholic churches that provide Spanish-languages masses and organize solidarity drives to assist the needy in Ecuador. Some civil rights groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC), have offered their services to Ecuadorian Americans and have engaged in lobbying in support of the rights of all immigrants, against laws that promote racial profiling, and have sought to have hate crimes tried. The NYIC Youth Leadership Council has helped organize young people on immigrant issues, such as the DREAM ACT, which would give more undocumented students the opportunity to go to college by allowing them to pay in-state tuition.
Forging a New American Political Identity Data on Ecuadorian political and civic participation in the United States has really not materialized. As such, it is difficult to ascertain how often Ecuadorian Americans vote in elections, and it is equally unclear the extent to which Ecuadorians with U.S. citizenship get involved in political activism or civic groups. In 2010, Francisco Moya was elected to represent the 39th Assembly District, thus becoming the first Ecuadorian American to be elected to public office in the United States.
Gladys Prieto, a home healthcare aide from Ecuador who lives in Queens, leans over her husband as he fills out her New York State Voter Registration form following a large scale naturalization ceremony where she became a U.S. citizen, October 13, 2006. (AP Photo/Tina Fineberg)
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While official data on Ecuadorian civic and political participation in the United States is still lacking, there is a large network of Ecuadorian American social and political organizations throughout the United States. Estimates of the number of such organizations vary but are certain to be as high as several hundred. According to Jason Pribilsky, there were at least 125 Ecuadorian American organizations in New York City alone (2007, 175). Though these organizations vary with respect to membership sizes, degrees of civic involvement, and level of activity, together they provide a composite of a general desire amongst a wide range of Ecuadorians to present themselves as a unified community, for the ethnic and immigrant communities, for mainstream America, and for the peoples and institutions of Ecuador. In cities where the Ecuadorian American community is large, national associations also exist; however, they serve as umbrella groups for the preferred association, which is a regional one. As such, in the states of California, New York, New Jersey, and Florida, a variety of organizations exists representing immigrants from an array of Ecuadorian cities, provinces, and regions, such as Pichincha, Manabí, Alausi, Cotopaxi, Chimborazo, Quito, Tungurahua, Manta, Guayaquil, Guayas, and the Amazon. There have also been Ecuadorian groups defined along the lines of ethnicity. Two such examples include the Chinese Ecuadorian Association in New York and the Organization of Otavalo Indígenas Resident of New York. Though the names of these associations suggest that their primary mission is to bring together Ecuadorians from specific regions or ethnicities and to develop projects to support certain regions back in Ecuador, their membership tends to be broader than the names suggest, and the scope of their projects extends beyond the territories or ethnicities indicated in their names. Some of the better-known national organizations include the Federación de Entidades Ecuatorianas en el Exterior (Federation of Ecuadorian Entities in the Exterior, FEDEE) with chapters in Washington, Maryland, New York, Illinois, and Florida; the Comité Cívico Ecuatoriano (Ecuadorian Civic Center) with chapters in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and California (created in 1994 to unite the Ecuadorian American community of Danbury; and the Asociación Mundial De Ecuatorianos Residentes En El Exterior (World Association of Ecuadorian Residing Abroad). Other noteworthy Ecuadorian immigrant groups include Casa Ambato in Los Angeles, which has been in existence since 1971, Jovenes Por Ecuador (Youth for Ecuador) and Organización Juventud Ecuatoriana (Ecuadorian Youth Organization), both based in New York, which sponsor cultural and educational events and programs designed to instill in young Ecuadorian-Americans pride in their heritage, and the Profesionales Ecuatorianos en el Exterior (Ecuadorian Professionals Abroad, PROECUA), a business organization that lobbies on trade issues.
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Return Immigration Return immigration to Ecuador takes two forms. First, there are those who willingly return to Ecuador. Second are those whose immigration status has changed, either by having their immigration status revoked or by deportation as a consequence of not having the appropriate migration status. The reasons that immigrants freely choose to return to Ecuador vary, and the data that might explain this have yet to materialize. A struggling U.S. economy and high unemployment rates might induce some Ecuadorians to go back. Xenophobia and attacks on immigrants might also factor in the decision to return home. In 2008, for example, New York was the site of two different murders of Ecuadorian Americans and both incidents were investigated as hate crimes („Ecuador Burial‰ 2010). Another consideration that might sway immigrants in their decision of whether to stay in the United States or return to Ecuador has to do with family. Although most Ecuadorians who obtain „legal status in the United States remain there,‰ the children that they leave behind in Ecuador commonly face exclusion and are known derogatorily as rezis. As the separation continues, many of these „children or adolescents suffer from depression, lack of interest in school, and reportedly, a high rate of suicide‰ (Jokisch 2007). The homecoming of many Ecuadorian migrants often creates cultural upheavals that make it difficult for returnees to reintegrate. In the Azuay and Cañar provinces, for example, the economic success of those returning migrants of humble background and whose last names lacked status „caused resentment among some of the families that stayed‰ (Jokisch 2007).
The Second and Later Generations Generally speaking, little is known about second-generation Ecuadorian Americans since this immigrant community is still relatively new and small compared to other Hispanic communities. Having said that, the fact that Ecuadorians are the fourth-largest Latino group in New York City and the largest in Queens will certainly attract greater academic attention and more demographic studies. Moreover, recent spikes in the number of legal Ecuadorian immigrants in the United States will translate into an even larger data pool from which social scientists will be able to examine issues related to assimilation, ethnic and national identity, educational opportunities, occupational experiences; for further study, the emerging data for second-generation immigrants can be compared to the data of their parents.
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Youth Profile A Pre-Med Student with a Deep Sense of Community and Plans for Giving Back Ana Cisneros is the daughter of Ecuadorian immigrants who arrived in the United States in the 1980s. As a 17-year-old, she took part in the Science Talent Show, the most prestigious science competition in the United States. In addition to that, she and two other contestants, Harmain Khan and Kelydra Welcker, were asked to appear as the main characters in Whiz Kids, a documentary that spotlighted the participation of these three in the Science Talent Show. Since the completion of the competition and the film, Ana has graduated from Uniondale High School in Long Island, New York, as valedictorian of her class and has begun classes at Columbia University. Born into families of limited means, each of Ana’s parents migrated from Ecuador to the United States vis-à-vis Mexico in the 1980s in search of opportunity. Ana was born in 1989 in Hempstead, New York. As she grew up, her parents emphasized education and the appreciation of her Ecuadorian heritage, including maintaining some traditions of the Roman Catholic church in Ecuador, speaking Spanish that incorporates the Quichua language, and enjoying Ecuadorian food. Thanksgiving in the Cisneros household is celebrated with traditional Ecuadorian foods such as shrimp ceviche, tostado (fried corn kernels), and hornado (pork meat). In addition, Ana’s parents instilled in her the desire to be socially active through their participation in civic and cultural events, such as those organized by the Casa Ecuatoriana and the Organización Juventud Ecuatoriana (http:// www.juventudecuatoriana.org/) and by exercising their right to vote in Ecuadorian elections. Ana’s Ecuadorian identity has also been reinforced through regular trips with her parents to visit family and friends back home and through weekly Skype calls. In high school, Ana was drawn to science as she saw it as “a promising field that allows for collaborative work, discovery and has relevant applications for humanity.” As a researcher it was a way for her to think independently, be creative, and develop something of her own. Encouraged by Dr. Paul Lichtman, advisor to the Uniondale High School Science Research Program, Ana became a leader in her school’s science research program. Success continued for Ana as she either won or placed at several state science competitions, including the 16th Annual Science Competition at Manhattan College, where she placed first in the environmental category and in the overall competition. In 2007, she won a Helen Davis college scholarship through the Association for Women in Science. By her junior year, word was out about this aspiring young Ecuadorian American scientist, and she was approached
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with the idea of participating in the Science Talent Show. At about the same time, cameras started filming for the documentary Whiz Kids. Ana Cisnero’s Science Talent Show project focused on interplant communication of the same species, specifically how to manipulate crop-plant roots so that they do not perceive adjacent plants and stop growing. Though most of the students had limited access to resources, they were expected, nonetheless, to create their own opportunities to conduct independent research. Ana would use these experiences to springboard her into college at Columbia. She has decided to major in biology with the goal of becoming a physician and a community health advocate. For Ana, her Ecuadorian roots play an important part in her self-identity. Not only do they connect her to family and friends in the United States and in Ecuador, they also remind her of the importance of community and self-sacrifice. As such, when Ana finishes school, she plans to apply her skills and knowledge to help underserved communities in urban areas of the United States and in rural indigenous communities in Latin America, perhaps in Ecuador. Source: Personal interview with the author via e-mail message August 31, 2010.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Ecuador The United States and Ecuador have had relatively good relations throughout most of their histories. In the 1860s, U.S. ambassador to Ecuador under Abraham Lincoln, Friedrich Hassaurek, toured Ecuador extensively before writing his book Four Years among the Ecuadorians (1868). His observations and musings, some favorable and others critical, provide one of the first ethnographic depictions of this small nation. U.S.-Ecuadorian trade relations have historically been good. In 2009, the United States received about $4.6 billion in goods from Ecuador, making the United States EcuadorÊs principal trade partner. Ecuador received about $3.6 billion in trade goods from the United States, primarily in the form of machinery, fertilizers and chemicals, computers and electronics, petroleum products, transportation equipment, and paper. The United States has facilitated the importation of Ecuadorian goods in the United States over the last 15 years through the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), which gave duty-free status to certain Ecuadorian trade goods, and the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, which provided Ecuador with additional trade benefits in exchange for cooperation in helping eradicate
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drugs within its borders. Ecuadorian immigrants have been very active in facilitating commerce and promoting trade between the two countries. In addition to Hispanic Chambers of Commerce and Ecuadorian Chambers of Commerce, there are two Ecuadorian American Chambers of Commerce (one in Miami and another in Houston). There are also several other organizations that promote economic exchange between the two countries. In addition, Ecuadorian merchants (particularly indigenes from Otavalo) have established themselves throughout the United States as successful entertainers and artisan-merchants. U.S. assistance to Ecuador in 2009 amounted to about $60 million. This aid manifested itself in a variety of programs, trade and technology transfers, and credit, and was managed by organizations like the Agency for International Development, the Foreign Commercial Service, the Peace Corps, and the U.S. State Department. Today, the United States and Ecuador are working together on several policy issues. These include combating narco-trafficking, fostering EcuadorÊs economic development, reducing poverty, promoting trade between the two countries, and immigration.
Forecasts for the 21st Century The outlook for Ecuadorian immigration to the United States rests on several factors: EcuadorÊs economy and social development programs; the global economy; and new efforts in Spain and the United States to limit immigration, legal and illegal. First, the decision to emigrate or not has much to do with economic stability in this Andean country. If Ecuador is able to sustain economic growth and social development while avoiding the catastrophes that plagued it at the end of the 20th century, immigration to the United States will likely level out or decline. Second, EcuadorÊs skyrocketing emigration numbers were driven by economic opportunities in the United States and in Spain. The general health of the global economy has much to do with perceived economic opportunities in Spain and the United States, an important factor affecting immigration decisions. Economic growth in these countries will encourage greater immigration; stagnation or recession in these countries, on the other hand, will likely deter future immigration.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Number of Ecuadorians who received lawful permanent resident status in the US per decade, 1930 to present 91,962
100,000 81,358
Ecuadorians receiving permanent resident status
80,000 60,000
47,464 34,107
40,000
48,015
8,574
20,000 244
2,207
0 1930-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009
Figure 8 Number of Ecuadorians who received lawful permanent resident status in the United States per decade, 1930 to present Source: United States Department of Homeland Security. 2006. 2005 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics.
Number of Ecuadorians Receiving Legal Permanent Residency, 1996–2009 20,000 18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Figure 9 Number of Ecuadorians receiving legal permanent residency, 1996–2009 Sources: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 2002. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1999, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office; Department of Homeland Security. 2010. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics.
Ecuadorian Recipients of Nonimmigrant Visas, 1995–2009 200,000 177,441
180,000
174,421 179,450
160,000
155,488
151,937
140,000 135,053
120,000 100,000 80,000
100,495
103,227
77,962
60,000 40,000 20,000 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Figure 10 Ecuadorian recipients of nonimmigrant visas, 1995–2009 Source: Department of Homeland Security. 2010. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics.
Table 87 Number of naturalizations of Ecuadorian nationals, 1989 to 2009 Year
Naturalizations
1989
1,671
1990
2,052
1991
2,215
1992
1,857
1993
2,703
1994
3,951
1995
5,366
1996
14,206
1997
7,129
1998
4,539
1999
8,380
2000
9,454
2001
6,457
2002
6,392
2003
5,061 (Continued)
566
Table 87 Number of naturalizations of Ecuadorian nationals, 1989 to 2009 (Continued ) Year
Naturalizations
2004
5,616
2005
7,091
2006
8,231
2007
7,229
2008
11,908
2009
7,609
Source: United States Department of Homeland Security. 2010. 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics.
Table 88 States with most naturalizations of Ecuadorians in 2009 State
Naturalizations
New York
2,838
New Jersey
1,244
Florida
1,146
California
462
Connecticut
280
North Carolina
214
Illinois
191
Texas
134
Pennsylvania
120
Virginia
114
Maryland
101
Massachusetts
84
Minnesota
76
Overall
7,609
Source: United States Department of Homeland Security. 2010. “Profiles on Naturalized Citizens, 2009.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. [Online information: retrieved 08/12/10.]
567
568 | Ecuadorian Immigrants
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 89 Ecuadorians with legal permanent residency by gender, 2003–2009 Total
Male
Female
Unknown
2003
7,066
3,197
3,869
—
2004
8,611
3,967
4,643
1
2005
11,608
5,240
6,368
—
2006
17,490
8,026
9,464
—
2007
12,248
5,490
6,758
—
2008
11,663
5,289
6,374
—
2009
12,128
5,345
6,782
1
Total
80,814
36,554
44,258
45
55
Percent
Source: Department of Homeland Security. 2003–2009. “Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. [Online information: retrieved 08/12/10.]
Appendix III: Notable Ecuadorian Americans Christina Aguilera is a Grammy Award winning singer and songwriter. In addition to pop, her musical stylings include soul, jazz, and blues. Rolling Stone magazine ranked her 53rd on their list of One Hundred Greatest Singers of All Time, making her the youngest on the list. Aguilera is a second-generation Ecuadorian American, the daughter of Guayaquil-born Fausto Wagner Xavier Aguilera, a former sergeant in the U.S. Army and Shelly Loraine, a Spanish teacher. Adrienne Eliza Bailón is an actress, singer-songwriter, dancer, and television personality, and is most noted as a former Cheetah Girl as one of her roles in the Disney Channel Original Movie. Her father is Ecuadorian, and her mother is Puerto Rican. Hernán “Chico” Borja is a retired U.S.-Ecuadorian soccer player and current coach. He spent time in several U.S.-based leagues, including the North American Soccer League and the Major Indoor Soccer League. He was also a member of the U.S. national soccer team on 11 different occasions. Born in Quito, his family immigrated to the United States so that he could attend the
Appendix III: Notable Ecuadorian Americans | 569
New Jersey Institute of Technology, where he played on the soccer team. He would become a NCAA Division I All American and finish his career with his name in the NCAA record books for both single game and season scoring. Charles Castronovo is an internationally acclaimed opera singer. Born to an Ecuadorian mother and Sicilian father in New York, he grew up in Southern California. He attended California State University, Fullerton, to pursue a degree in classical voice. Dr. F. Javier Cevallos is the current president of Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, a position that he has held since 2002. He is also that schoolÊs first Hispanic president. Cevallos was born in Cuenca. Roberto De Villacis is a fashion designer and artist originally from Quito, Ecuador. His designs have been worn by such actresses as Penelope Cruz and Kirsten Dunst and supermodel Kate Moss. Raul J. Fernández, son of a Cuban father and Ecuadorian mother, is an entrepreneur and chairman and CEO of ObjectVideo and co-owner of the NHL Washington Capitals, the NBA Washington Wizards, and WNBA Washington Mystics. José Garcés is an Ecuadorian American chef, restaurant owner, and recently designated Iron Chef. He owns six restaurants in Philadelphia and one in Chicago and has been named best chef, Mid-Atlantic region by the James Beard Foundation. Andrés Gómez Santos, born in Guayaquil, was a professional tennis player who won the French Open in 1990. Jaime Jarrín is the Spanish-language voice of the Los Angeles Dodgers. Born in Cayambe, he became the announcer for EcuadorÊs National Congress. He immigrated to the United States in 1955 to Los Angeles. In 1958, when the Dodgers moved to Los Angeles, he was given a job as the Spanish-language announcer for the Dodger games, a position that he held from 1962 to 1984. Gerardo Mejía (better known simply as Gerardo) is a successful Latin rapper and singer who rode this fame to becoming a recording industry executive. He is a native of Guayaquil, Ecuador. Lloyd Monserratt, the eldest son of Ecuadorian immigrants, was a UCLA graduate and student body president. His involvement in student politics was followed by his participation in community activism and local politics. He would become the director of National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) and trained several future Latino politicians before his untimely death at the age of 27. Francisco Moya is a businessman, community activist, and life-long Queens resident, and in September 2010 he won the Democratic primary for New York State AssemblyÊs District 39 (Jackson Heights-Corona) and was unopposed
570 | Ecuadorian Immigrants
in the November 2010 general election, making him the first Ecuadorian American to be elected to public office. Gilo Muirraguí is author of several articles on participatory democracy. From 1963 to 1989, he was a senior economist at the International Monetary Fund. Born in Riobamba, Ecuador, he came to the United States to study economics at San Francisco State University before completing his postgraduate studies at Harvard University. Francisco “Pancho” Olegario Segura was born in Guayaquil and moved to the United States in the late 1930s before becoming one of the worldÊs finest amateur and, later, professional tennis players in the 1940s and 1950s. Albert Paulson (Paulsen), born in Guayaquil before leaving for New York in the early 1940s, was an actor appearing in such TV programs as Mission Impossible, Hawaii 5–0, and The Untouchables. Lady Pink (born Sandra Fabara) is a graffiti artist, born in Ambato, Ecuador, but raised in Queens, New York. While a student at the High School of Art and Design, she started writing graffiti, establishing a name for herself, and opening up the door to other female graffiti artists. Her work has been exhibited at such places as the Brooklyn Museum and the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Jenn Pinto is an actress, screenwriter, and cable television celebrity having appeared on Sesame Street as a child as well as on Viva Hollywood! She has also appeared on the VH1 Network, MTVÊs FEAR, and Comedy CentralÊs Politically Incorrect with Bill Maher. Fatima Ptacek is a child actor and is the daughter of an Ecuadorian mother and a father of Norwegian, Czechoslovakian, Irish, and Colombian ancestry. She has appeared on Saturday Night Live as well as Sesame Street and in over 50 television commercials. Emanuel Xavier is an Ecuadorian American poet, artist, writer, activist, actor, and recording artist. His early years were characterized by violence and drugdealing. He later drew from these experiences and politicized them in his art and activism. He has also produced events to benefit youth organizations throughout the United States.
Glossary Altiplano: Dry highland plateaus. Audiencia: High court in colonial Spanish America with powers to hear court cases and legislate. Also, the territorially defined jurisdiction of the high court. Ayllu: Basic social unit of Andean society, often defined by common ancestry.
Glossary | 571
Chicha: Andean beverage made from corn. Typically fermented, but also served unfermented as purple corn refreshment (chica morada). Choclo: Corn on the cob. Chulqueros: Quasi-illegal moneylenders. Compadrazco (compadrazgo): A system of fictive kinship between godparents and their godchildÊs parents that establishes mutual obligations.
Creole: Spaniards born in the New World. Cuy: Andean guinea pig.
Encomienda: Grants of indigenous towns to creoles or peninsulars who, in exchange for religious training and protection, received labor or tribute. Fanesca: Fish-based soup made especially during Holy Week. Fritada: Ecuadorian dish of roast pork tips with corn and potatoes. Huasipungo: System of coerced labor where indigenes were forced to provide unremunerated labor to an hacienda owner in exchange for water, firewood, pastureland, and/or a small plot of land. Marianismo: Catholic cult practice of deep devotion to motherhood based on the ideal of the Virgin Mary. Mestizo: Offspring of Spanish and indigenous parents or descendents of such unions. Minifundio: Small plot of land. M’ita: Colonial coercive labor draft that required that indigenes provide work at mines, obrajes, or haciendas for a specified period of time on a rotating basis. Mote: Dekerneled and boiled corn. Obraje: Textile factories that often relied on forced indigenous labor. Oriente: EcuadorÊs Amazon basin. Páramo: Highland grazing land. Pasillo: Style of music often associated with Ecuadorian national identity.
Peninsular: Spaniard born in Iberia. Quena: Andean flute. Reducción: Spanish-style resettlements of indigenous communities in colonial Latin America. Sanjuanitos: Type of Ecuadorian highland music. Sierra: Mountains or highlands. Sucre: EcuadorÊs monetary currency prior to 2000. Viceroy: Spanish monarchyÊs representative in the colonial Americas. Zampoña: Andean panflute.
572 | Ecuadorian Immigrants
References Becker, M. 2008. Indians and Leftists in the Making of Ecuador’s Modern Indigenous Movements. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Carpio, P. 1995. Entre pueblos y metropolis: La Migración Internacional en Comunidades Austroandinas en el Ecuador. Quito: Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales & Abya-Yala. „Ecuador Burial for Immigrant Killed in U.S.‰ 2010. Latin American Herald Tribune. [Online article: retrieved 09/20/10.] http://laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14089&A rticleId=323826. Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas (UNFPA) and FLACSO. 2006. Ecuador: Las cifras de la migración internacional. Quito: UNFPA and FLACSO. Gerlach, A. 2003. Indians, Oil, and Politics: A Recent History of Ecuador. Wilmington, DE: SR Books. Gratton, B. 2007. „Ecuadorians in the United States and Spain: History, Gender and Niche Formation.‰ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33(4): 581 99. Hanley, L. M., B. A. Ruble, and A. M. Garland, eds. 2008. Immigration and Integration in Urban Communities: Renegotiating the City. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Herrera, G., M. C. Carillo, and A. Torres. 2005. La migración ecuatoriana: transnacionalismo, redes, e identidades. Quito: FLACSO-Plan Migración, Comunicación y Desarrollo. Hoefer, M., N. Rytina, and B. Baker. 2010. Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2009. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. Jokisch, B. 2007. „Ecuador: Diversity in Migration.‰ Migration Information Source. [Online information: retrieved 06/29/10.] http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/ display.cfm?ID=575. Kyle, D. 2000. Transnational Peasants. Migrations, Networks, and Ethnicity in Andean Ecuador. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Meisch, L. 1987. Weaving, Costume and the Market. Quito: Libri Mundi. Meisch, L. 2002. Andean Entrepreneurs: Otavalo Merchants & Musicians in the Global Arena. Austin: University of Texas Press. Mumford, Jeremy. 2009. „Ecuadorian Americans.‰ Every Culture. [Online article: retrieved 07/15/10.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Du-Ha/Ecuadoran-Americans.html. Pew Hispanic Center. 2010. „Hispanic Health: Divergent and Changing.‰ [Online article: retrieved 09/15/10.] http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/1.pdf. Pribilsky, J. 2007. La Chulla Vida: Gender, Migration, and the Family in Andean Ecuador and New York City. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Pribilsky, J. 2008. „ ÂCommunityÊ Health and Transnational Communities: Undocumented Andean Migrants and Tuberculosis Control in a New Immigrant Gateway.‰ In Immigration and Integration in Urban Communities: Renegotiating the City, edited by L. M.
Further Reading | 573 Hanley, B. A. Ruble, and A. M. Garland, 197 236. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Sontag, Deborah. 1993. „Immigrants Forgoing Citizenship While Pursuing American Dream.‰ New York Times, July 25, 1. [Online article: retrieved 07/14/10.] http://query. nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CEED7163FF936A15754C0A965958260. Stauffer, W., J. Sellman, and P. Walker. 2004. „Biliary Liver Flukes (Opisthorchiasis and Clonorchiasis) in Immigrants in the United States: Often Subtle and Diagnosed Years After Arrival.‰ Journal of Travel Medicine 11: 157 60. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1993. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2003 2009. „Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents.‰ Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2006. 2005 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2010. 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. [Online information: retrieved 08/12/10.] http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/ publications/LPR09.shtm. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 2002. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1999, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. [Online information: retrieved 08/12/10.] http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/ yearbook/1999/FY99Yearbook.pdf. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 2009. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. [Online information: retrieved 08/12/10.] http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/ statistics/index.html.
Further Reading Becker, M. 2008. Indians and Leftists in the Making of Ecuador’s Modern Indigenous Movements. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. BeckerÊs Indians and Leftists argues convincingly that the origins of the contemporary indigenous movements can be traced back to the early 20th century as leftist organizers and indigenous communities partnered to advance the cause of social justice in highland Ecuador. Carpio, P. 1995. Entre pueblos y metropolis: La Migración Internacional en Comunidades Austroandinas en el Ecuador. Quito: Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales & Abya-Yala. This book examines migration from the Andean communities of Azuay and Cañar to the United States focusing on the differences between those who migrate and those who do not and between men and women.
574 | Ecuadorian Immigrants Cevallos, P. 2005. Un Lugar bajo el sol, o, EcuaYork. Chimborazo: Casa de la Cultura „Benjamín Carrión.‰ In this book, Petronio Rafael Cevallos shares an Ecua-Yorker perspective on a variety of topics, including Ecuadorian and Ecuadorian American history, as well as culture and society in New York. Colloredo-Mansfeld, R. 1999. The Native Leisure Class: Consumption and Cultural Creativity in the Andes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Colloredo-MansfeldÊs book The Native Leisure Class looks at the social and cultural effects of global tourism to Otavalo, Ecuador, and Otavaleño participation in an increasingly globalized textile market that requires transnational migration. Gerlach, A. 2003. Indians, Oil, and Politics: A Recent History of Ecuador. Wilmington, DE: SR Books. GerlachÊs book examines the political events of the 1970s to the 1990s through a sociohistorical lens that makes it clear that oil and the indigenous movement are the two most important factors in this history. Kyle, D. 2000. Transnational Peasants: Migrations, Networks, and Ethnicity in Andean Ecuador. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Transnational Peasants compares the immigration patterns of Ecuadorian indigenes from Azuay and from Otavalo and argues that transnational migration is not simply a by-product of globalization; rather, it is part of an evolution that has its antecedents in the pre-Columbian world and that varies by region and ethnicity. Meisch, L. 2002. Andean Entrepreneurs: Otavalo Merchants & Musicians in the Global Arena. Austin: University of Texas Press. This study examines how Otavaleños, arguably EcuadorÊs most recognizable indigenous group, tapped into their ethnic heritage as artisans, merchants, and musicians to draw large crowds to their markets, while also establishing their presence in several countries. Miles, A. 2004. From Cuenca to Queens: An Anthropology Study of Transnational Migration. Austin: University of Texas Press. MilesÊs book provides a rich ethnographical portrait of transnational migration by focusing on Vicente Quitasaca who left Ecuador for New York in 1995 and the impact that his decision has had on his family especially as the members attempt to deal with issues relating to social inequality and racism. Mumford, J. 2009. „Ecuadorian Americans.‰ Every Culture. [Online information: retrieved 07/15/10.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Du-Ha/Ecuadoran-Americans.html. An outstanding on-line resource that examines several facets of the Ecuadorian American experience from their heritage to contemporary issues. Pineo, R. 2007. Ecuador and the United States: Useful Strangers. Athens: University of Georgia Press. PineoÊs book makes a strong argument that the relationship between the United States and Ecuador is not one of complete dominance and hegemony from the north; it argues
Further Reading | 575 that the history of the two nations reveals conflicts and disagreements, fraught with unintended consequences, in which Ecuador, at times, has emerged in a more favorable position. Pribilsky, J. 2007. La Chulla Vida: Gender, Migration, and the Family in Andean Ecuador and New York City. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. A superb account of indigenous immigration from the highlands of Cañar and Azuay to New York, focusing primarily on its impact on family and gender. Sawyer, S. 2004. Crude Chronicles: Indigenous Politics, Multinational Oil, and Neoliberalism in Ecuador. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. This book presents the impact of U.S. oil interests and Ecuadorian neoliberalism on indigenous peoples of Ecuador and recounts their efforts to organize in response leading to the creation of one of the most powerful indigenous movements of the 20th century and the collapse of the Ecuadorian state. Striffler, S. 2002. In the Shadows of State and Capital: The United Fruit Company, Popular Struggle, and Agrarian Restructuring in Ecuador, 1900–1995. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. This book recounts the history of the Ecuadorian banana industry focusing on: (a) Ecuador as a contested terrain between the peasants who worked the field plantations and the United Fruit Company, which attempted to control all aspects of their workforce; (b) the creation of peasant cooperatives; and (c) the struggles between peasants and local Ecuadorian capitalists.
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Multicultural America
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Multicultural America AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEWEST AMERICANS Volume 2
Ronald H. Bayor, Editor
Copyright 2011 by Ronald H. Bayor All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Multicultural America : an encyclopedia of the newest Americans / Ronald H. Bayor, editor. v. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-313-35786-2 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-313-35787-9 (ebook) 1. Cultural pluralism—United States—Encyclopedias. 2. Multiculturalism—United States—Encyclopedias. 3. Immigrants—United States—Encyclopedias. 4. Ethnology— United States—Encyclopedias. 5. Minorities—United States—Encyclopedias. 6. United States—Ethnic relations—Encyclopedias. 7. United States—Race relations—Encyclopedias. I. Bayor, Ronald H., 1944E184.A1M813 2011 305.800973—dc22 2011004677 ISBN: 978-0-313-35786-2 EISBN: 978-0-313-35787-9 15
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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Greenwood An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America
Contents
Preface, ix Introduction, xiii Chronology, xxvii Afghan Immigrants, 1 Ceri Oeppen Argentinian Immigrants, 39 Judith Ann Warner Bahamian Immigrants, 79 Kathryn Beard Bangladeshi Immigrants, 109 Ahrar Ahmad Brazilian Immigrants, 149 Franklin Goza Cambodian Immigrants, 205 Justin Corfield Chilean Immigrants, 237 Cristián Doña-Reveco Chinese Immigrants, 277 Jonathan H. X. Lee Colombian Immigrants, 353 Enrique S. Pumar Costa Rican Immigrants, 381 Thea S. Alvarado v
vi | Contents
Cuban Immigrants, 413 Guillermo J. Grenier Dominican Immigrants, 471 Ramona Hernández and Anthony Stevens-Acevedo Ecuadorian Immigrants, 533 Kenneth Kincaid Egyptian Immigrants, 577 Caroline Nagel Eritrean Immigrants, 617 Tricia Redeker Hepner Ethiopian Immigrants, 657 Solomon Addis Getahun Filipino Immigrants, 701 Maria Paz Gutierrez Esguerra Ghanaian Immigrants, 753 Baffour K. Takyi Guatemalan Immigrants, 799 Timothy Steigenga and Sandra Lazo de la Vega Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants, 845 Stephen J. Sills and Natassaja Chowthi Haitian Immigrants, 887 Bertin M. Louis Jr. Honduran Immigrants, 933 Suyapa G. Portillo Villeda Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants, 969 Karen Isaksen Leonard Indonesian Immigrants, 1027 Jennifer Cho Iranian Immigrants, 1069 Maboud Ansari Iraqi Immigrants, 1111 Mary C. Sengstock
Contents | vii
Israeli Jewish Immigrants, 1149 Steven J. Gold Jamaican Immigrants, 1189 Alwyn D. Gilkes Japanese Immigrants, 1247 Eiichiro Azuma Kenyan Immigrants, 1287 Nicole C. D’Errico and Scott G. Feinstein Korean Immigrants, 1329 Won Moo Hurh Laotian Immigrants, 1397 Helen K. Kim Lebanese Immigrants, 1427 Stephen J. Sills Liberian Immigrants, 1459 Hana Brown Mexican Immigrants, 1493 Alma M. Garcia Nicaraguan Immigrants, 1557 Lisa Konczal Nigerian Immigrants, 1595 Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome Pakistani Immigrants, 1655 Kathleen M. Moore Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants, 1695 Randa Bassem Serhan Panamanian Immigrants, 1731 Joanna Doran and Anulkah Thomas Peruvian Immigrants, 1777 Erika Busse-Cárdenas and Rodrigo Lovatón Dávila Puerto Ricans, 1843 María E. Pérez y González
viii | Contents
Salvadoran Immigrants, 1903 Carlos B. Cordova Somalian Immigrants, 1965 Franklin Goza Sudanese Immigrants, 2013 Deidre Ann Tyler Taiwanese Immigrants, 2043 Franklin Ng Thai Immigrants, 2097 Jenjira Yahirun Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants, 2135 Teruyuki Tsuji Venezuelan Immigrants, 2191 Magaly Sanchez-R. Vietnamese Immigrants, 2229 Hien Duc Do Selected Bibliography, 2277 About the Editor and Contributors, 2279 Index, 2287
Egyptian Immigrants by Caroline Nagel
Introduction There are believed to be at least two million Egyptians today who live outside the Arab Republic of Egypt, making it one of the major sources of migrant workers in the contemporary global economy. The labor of these migrant workers brings in billions of dollars to the Egyptian economy—a crucial source of foreign exchange in an economy that has struggled for decades to generate sufficient jobs for its rapidly growing population. The vast majority of Egypt’s workers can be found in the Arab world, especially in oil-producing countries like Libya and Saudi Arabia. But a significant number have traveled farther afield, finding employment opportunities in the United States, Canada, Britain, and Australia. In the United States, many of these workers have settled permanently and have naturalized as American citizens. They tend to be found in the higher echelons of the labor market working in medicine, engineering, business, and other professions. By many socioeconomic measures, Egyptian Americans can be considered a successful immigrant group. Egyptian Americans, however, face some challenges that bear upon their well-being in the United States. In addition to the difficult adjustments that most immigrants face upon moving to a new society, Egyptian Americans must also negotiate a social and political context in which Arab and Muslim identities—both of which are important to many Egyptians—are seen by some to be at odds with so-called American values. This has especially been the case since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, an event that left many Muslim and Arabic-speaking immigrants feeling embattled and insecure. Since 2001, their efforts to legitimize their presence in the American tapestry and to formulate an American identity has taken on a new urgency, as it has for immigrants from Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and other Arabic-speaking countries. The issue of identity among Egyptian Americans becomes very complex when we consider the diversity that exists among them. For instance, while most Egyptian Americans are Muslim, there is a significant Coptic Christian community that maintains strong ties with Egypt through the Coptic Church hierarchy. Tensions between Copts and Muslims in Egypt have carried into the U.S. context, rendering relationships between diasporic Egyptians—and hence, Egyptian American identity—problematic. At the same time, there is growing diversity among Muslim
577
Chronology | 579
Egyptians, with some adhering to a secularist identity that confines religious practice and identity to the private realm, and others staking their claim in public life on the basis of their Muslim identity. This essay explores these complex dynamics and the range of experiences that emerge from them.
Chronology 1805
Formation of Egyptian state virtually independent of the Ottoman Empire.
1882
Battle of Tel el-Kebir, in which Britain establishes de facto control over Egypt.
1922
Egyptian parliament unilaterally declares independence from Britain.
1952
Coup d’état by Free Officers Movement deposes British-supported King Farouk.
1956
Assumption of power by Gamal abd al-Nasir and nationalization of Suez Canal.
1967
Six Day War between Arab armies and Israel.
1971
Succession to power of Anwar Sadat, followed by the initiation of pro-Western economic and foreign policy.
1975
Codification of the Egyptian Nationality Law, granting Egyptian citizens the right to dual citizenship.
1978–1980
Eruption of violence against Copts in Upper Egypt.
1981
House arrest of Coptic Pope Shenouda III and banishment of Coptic organizations by the Sadat regime.
1981
Assassination of Anwar Sadat and succession of Hosni Mubarak.
2005
Fifth consecutive “election” of Hosni Mubarak to the Egyptian presidency.
2009
U.S. President Barack Obama gives his Muslim World speech in Cairo, seeking better relations between the Arab/Muslim world and the United States.
2011
Mass demonstrations against President Mubarak take place in Cairo, Alexandria, and other Egyptian cities following popular uprisings in Tunisia. President Mubarak forced to step down after weeks of protest, leaving the country in a fragile political state.
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Background Geography The Arab Republic of Egypt covers an area of 390,000 square miles on the northeast corner of the African continent. It is bordered on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, on the northeast by Israel and the Palestinian-administered Gaza Strip, on the east by the Red Sea, on the south by Sudan, and on the west by Libya. Egypt is one of the most populous countries in Africa and the most populous in the Arabic-speaking world. The vast majority of the population lives within a few miles of the Nile River, which has been the lifeblood of civilization in Egypt for over 8,000 years. The great monuments of Egypt’s ancient civilizations still stand along the Nile, drawing in thousands of tourists every year and contributing significantly to the Egyptian economy. Egypt’s cultural landscape bears the imprint of many non-native groups who have conquered and occupied Egypt over the centuries, including the Persians, the Greco-Macedonians of Alexander the Great, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs, and the Turks. Arab Muslim rule, which lasted from the seventh century C.E. to 1250 C.E., had especially lasting legacies, including the spread of Islam and the use the Arabic language in Egypt. Today, the official language of Egypt is Arabic, and the Egyptian population is around 90 percent Muslim. Egypt is also home to al-Azhar, one of the oldest institutions of higher learning in the world and the preeminent center of Islamic scholarship. An important element of pre-Islamic heritage, however, remains firmly grounded in Egypt in the form of the Coptic Orthodox Church, whose members constitute about 10 percent of the Egyptian population. According to church tradition, the Coptic Orthodox Church was founded in the first century C.E. by St. Mark the Evangelist, and it is considered to be one of the oldest Christian churches in the world. The Coptic Church uses a liturgical language rooted in the language spoken in ancient Egypt. Early in its history, Coptic Christians devised a modified Greek alphabet to write the language. Under Muslim rule—first Arab and then Turkish— the Copts had the status of dhimmis, or members of a protected religious minority group. While in certain respects they were treated as second-class citizens, they also managed to rise to positions of political and economic prominence. Overall, Copts have occupied a similar range of socioeconomic levels as their Muslim compatriots, and outside of their liturgy, Copts speak Arabic and partake in most of the same cultural practices as Muslims. But as will be described in greater detail below, relations between Muslims and Copts have deteriorated since the 1970s, and violent attacks against Copts in Egypt have encouraged the migration of thousands of Coptic Christians to the United States and Canada. There is also a long history of Jews in Egypt, dating back to at least the 4th century B.C.E. Sephardic Jewish communities were joined in the early 20th century by
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Ashkenazi Jews fleeing persecution in Europe. Like Egypt’s Christians, the Jews enjoyed a relatively peaceful existence for centuries, and many achieved positions of influence and power; but they also endured discrimination and periods of persecution. Although some Egyptian Jews were involved in Egyptian nationalist movements, the creation of the state of Israel made life virtually impossible for them in Egypt after the World War II. From a population of perhaps 80,000 in the early 20th century, there are believed to be only a few hundred Jews remaining in Egypt today. One of the most notable features of modern Egyptian society has been the exponential increase in its population. In 1800, an estimated 3 million people lived in Egypt. The size of the Egyptian population doubled between 1897 and 1947, and nearly doubled again by 1976. By 1986 the population was 50.5 million; the population today is estimated to be over 80 million people. Much of this population growth has been channeled into urban areas. In 1907, for instance, approximately 17 percent of the Egyptian population lived in cities; by 1960, this figure was 30 percent. Today, over half of Egyptians live in urban areas (Feiler 1992). With limited land and water resources available for physical expansion, Egypt’s cities, and especially the capital, Cairo, are among the most densely populated urban centers in the world. While efforts have been made to improve city infrastructure, Egyptian cities are notorious for their crowded conditions and inadequate transportation networks. Egypt ranks 112th out of 177 countries according to the United Nations Human Development Index, which measures life expectancy, literacy, per capital income, and the like. Average life expectancy is 70.7 years, which is well above many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, but below that of wealthy postindustrial societies. The literacy rate is 71 percent. These general statistics, of course, mask many inequalities in Egyptian society—inequalities that have become more pronounced since the 1970s. Egypt’s contemporary economy rests on a combination of tourism, energy production (especially natural gas and hydro-electric power), manufacturing, and revenues from shipping traffic through the Suez Canal (a shipping channel connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean that was built in the 19th century with French capital and expertise). The country also has a strong media sector, and Egypt is a center of Arabic-language cinema, literature, and entertainment. Cotton production, while no longer the mainstay of the economy as it was in the 19th century, remains significant, and there is also a small but growing technology sector. While the economy is fairly diversified, a major problem is the inability for economic growth to keep pace with the population, leading to large-scale unemployment and underemployment. Free-market–based reforms intended to spur economic growth have, in many cases, served to exacerbate the inequalities created by this scenario. This pattern, as we will see below, has been an important factor in creating largescale migrant outflows from Egypt.
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History of Egypt Egypt’s modern history is very much tied to the broader history of the Arabicspeaking world, but also unique within it. Like much of the Arab world, it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century, but it attained virtual independence within it by the early 19th century, under the modernizing leadership of Muhammed ‘Ali (1805–1848). Long connected to the European economy through the production of cotton, as well as through its indebtedness to European banks, Egypt came under British colonial domination in the 1880s. By the early 20th century, anticolonial nationalist movements began to emerge among members of the educated urban classes, even as European social, political, economic, and legal norms became more deeply embedded in Egyptian society. Egypt gained formal independence from Britain in 1922, but remained under Britain’s sphere of influence until 1952, when nationalist forces, led by General Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, deposed the British-supported King Farouk (Hourani 1991). Under Nasir, Egypt followed a path of Arab socialism—a program combining the nationalization of economic resources, state-directed economic and social development, and a stridently anti-Western political agenda aimed at nationalizing the Suez Canal and returning historic Palestine to Arab control. Nasir’s ascent to power ushered in an era of industrialization, agricultural development, and urbanization in Egypt. Once a largely rural, peasant society, Egypt became more urbanized, with Cairo growing into one of the largest cities in the world through a combination of high fertility rates and rural-to-urban migration. Nasir also expanded the country’s educational system, and especially its university system, with the number of university graduates almost quadrupling between 1952 and 1969. Many of these graduates found employment in the burgeoning government bureaucracy and in other economic sectors supported by the state (Ayubi 1983). Nasir’s Arab socialist agenda, however, was short-lived. Nasir’s successor, Anwar Sadat, pursued a more pro-Western policy, opening up Egypt to freemarket forces and foreign investment and seeking accommodation with Israel and the United States. Sadat’s economic policies led to prosperity among some classes of Egyptians but also contributed to tremendous inequality. Especially negatively affected by Sadat’s reforms were the growing ranks of university graduates from middle- and lower-middle-class backgrounds, who had high expectations for economic mobility, but who could not find employment in either the state or private sector. Some of those marginalized by Sadat’s economic reforms were attracted to Islamist movements. “Islamism” is a catch-all term referring to those seeking to increase the role of Islamic law and Islamic values into public, political life. In Egypt and elsewhere, Islamist movements have been accompanied by a more general upsurge of religious observance, made visible in the growing use of the headscarf by
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Egyptian president Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir shakes hands with Japanese chief delegate Tatsunosuke Takasaki at the Afro-Asian Conference of 1960. (Library of Congress)
young urban women. Islamism had first appeared in Egypt in the 1920s, most notably in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood (known as the Ikhwan in Arabic). The early Islamists were adamantly opposed to British colonial domination of Egypt. But unlike the secular nationalists, they sought renewal of Egyptian society through a return to Islamic ways of life and the application of Islamic principles to modern economic and political systems. The Brotherhood and other Islamist groups were brutally repressed under the secularist Nasir regime of the 1950s and 1960s. Sadat, however, actively courted the Islamists, whom he viewed as an important counterweight to his left-wing Nasirist rivals. Most Islamists are peaceful organizations working through mainstream political channels; many, moreover, have provided essential services to the swelling ranks of the urban population who lack adequate housing, transportation, and work. But some have been more extreme and militant in their beliefs and tactics. In his effort to gain the support of Islamists, Sadat tacitly approved vitriolic anti-Coptic rhetoric and even violent attacks against Coptic citizens, especially in Upper Egypt, by radicalized segments of the Islamist movement. These episodes were extremely traumatic for the Coptic community. Sadat’s policy of courting the Islamists backfired, and he was assassinated by a radical Islamist group in 1981. His successor, President Hosni Mubarak, cracked down severely on Islamist groups, whom he saw as a potential threat to his rule;
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this policy led to a growing accommodation between the Egyptian state and Coptic Church leaders, who were keen to have their communities recognized as part and parcel of Egyptian society, rather than as a mere minority. Many middle-class Copts, though, continued to see the Mubarak regime, and Egyptian society in general, as a threat to the survival of the Coptic community (Sedra 1999). Copts participated en masse in the anti-Mubarak demonstrations in February 2011, and scenes of Christians and Muslims praying together in Cairo’s Tahrir Square during the uprisings raised hopes about improved relations between Muslims and Christians in the post-Mubarak era. The destruction of a Coptic church in March 2011 and renewed clashes between Copts and Muslims, however, have dampened some of this hope. The ongoing political turmoil in Egypt has had deleterious effects on Egyptian businesses, many of which remained closed weeks after Mubarak stepped down. Especially hard hit has been the tourism sector, which drives a significant portion of the country’s economy. These problems have compounded the country’s existing economic hardships, which include high levels of unemployment, inequality, and a stagnating quality of life for most Egyptians. It is unclear at this time how Egypt’s evolving political situation will affect the country’s economic prospects.
Causes and Waves of Migration It is against this backdrop of urbanization, population pressures, economic precariousness, and political unrest that Egypt has become an important source of migrant workers for regional and global labor markets. Up until 1967, the Egyptian government imposed a variety of legal and bureaucratic restrictions on emigration, but labor market pressures, and the reality of increasing migration, led to the lifting of restrictions and, indeed, to new legal protections for Egyptians working abroad. The 1971 Constitution, for instance, gave Egyptians the explicit right to emigrate and to return home, and it granted public sector employees the right to return to their jobs in Egypt within two years of emigrating (thereby encouraging them to go abroad as temporary workers). In 1981, the state established the Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs, which sponsored Egyptians working abroad on contracts and provided migrant workers with various services. Other laws in the 1980s specified and expanded the rights of migrant workers and attempted to coordinate and encourage migration. Large-scale emigration began in earnest in the early 1970s, when Egypt started to send large numbers of migrant workers to the Gulf states (especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), Iraq, and to neighboring Libya, whose oil wealth was fuelling ambitious development plans and creating demands for both skilled and unskilled workers. Thousands of Egyptians (as well as Palestinians, Jordanians, Yemenis, and
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Moroccans) found employment working on construction projects, in the oil fields, and in professional or technical sectors, including engineering, medicine, and education (over 20,000 Egyptian school teachers, for instance, were seconded to other Arab countries to fill employment gaps in 1975–1976 alone [Wahba 2004]). From 70,000 in 1970, the number of emigrant workers from Egypt increased to 1.4 million by 1976 (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003). The number Egyptians working abroad peaked in 1983 at 3.28 million (Ministry of Manpower and Emigration 2003). Data from the 1980s show that migrants were drawn from a wide spectrum of society, with almost 20 percent holding university degrees but almost one-third having no education at all. Migrant workers were overwhelmingly young men from both rural and urban backgrounds. Owing to the temporary nature of labor contracts in most oil-producing states, most workers stayed abroad between two and five years (Ministry of Manpower and Emigration 2003). The earnings of these workers became a crucial source of foreign currency in Egypt. As McCormick and Wabha report, remittances to Egypt during this period “were amongst the highest in the world, peaking at $6.1 billion in the early 1990s and ranging between 5–11 percent of GDP” (2004, 3). Starting in the early 1980s, however, the number of contracts granted to Egyptian workers in the Gulf states started to decline due to diminishing oil revenues and the consequent scaling back of construction projects. At the same time, Gulf Arab states began to replace Arab workers with Asian workers, who were generally viewed as more compliant, better trained, and cheaper. With the first Gulf War, most Egyptian workers in Iraq and Kuwait were forced to return to Egypt (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003). The loss of employment opportunities in the Gulf exacerbated poverty and underemployment in Egypt and exposed the country’s dependence on remittances. While numbers recovered after the war (there were still approximately 2 million Egyptian workers in the Gulf in the early 1990s), Arab workers overall in 2002 constituted only about a quarter of foreign workers in the Gulf. Still, even with the replacement of Arab workers in the Gulf, Egypt has remained a major labor exporter to the oil-producing states (al Khouri 2004). Significantly, though, the proportion of skilled professionals (e.g., scientists and technical workers) in these flows to the Gulf has increased dramatically, going from around 20 percent in 1985 to 40 percent in 2000 (Ministry of Manpower and Emigration 2003). Simultaneously, there has been an increase in the migration of unskilled workers from Egypt to non-oil-producing Arab states, including Lebanon and Jordan. Much of this migration is destined for the construction sector and takes place outside of formal, legal channels (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). Egyptian migration from the 1960s onward, therefore, has been largely a story of temporary labor flows in the Arab world. But this has not been the only story. An estimated 825,000 Egyptians have also migrated to the wealthy postindustrial world, and especially to Anglophone countries like the United States, Canada,
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Australia, and Britain (Baldwin-Edwards 2006; Ministry of Manpower and Emigration 2003). In the case of the United States, Canada, and Australia, the start of Egyptian immigration corresponded with, and was enabled by, the lifting of restrictions on non-Western European immigration. In the United States, these restrictions had been put in place with the National Origins Quota Act of 1924 amidst nativist fears of unchecked eastern and southern European immigration. National origins quotas were abolished with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965, ushering in a new wave of large-scale immigration, most of it non-European in origin and permanent in nature. The new immigration system gave overwhelming preference to family reunification, but 20 percent of permanent visas were set aside for those able to fill gaps in the labor market—a provision that benefited Egyptians armed with engineering and medical degrees. Egyptians also benefited in later years from the proliferation of temporary immigrant visas, many of them intended for skilled workers and researchers, and some of which were convertible to permanent visas. Both the Egyptian and American higher education systems must be recognized for their important role in the process of skilled migration. Through the 1970s, the Egyptian state sponsored, at great expense, thousands of students in overseas university programs, but an estimated 40 percent of these students did not return (Ayubi 1983). Instead, they found employment through engineering firms, research labs, hospitals, and universities in the United States (and other Anglophone countries) and applied for permanent residency and eventually citizenship. Their reasons for staying in the United States were obvious: a plethora of well-remunerated jobs matching their particular skills and, for many, better living conditions than were available in Egypt’s crowded cities, where housing, in particular, had become an expensive and scarce commodity even for the middle classes (see Feiler 1992). Although such generous subsidies for overseas university study no longer exist, Egyptian students (especially from the upper classes) continue to enroll at Anglophone universities, which are viewed as more prestigious than Egyptian institutions and which provide a foothold in the skilled labor markets of the Global North (i.e., the wealthy countries of Europe, North America, and Australasia) (Mahroom 1999). There is some suggestion that increasingly liberal skilled migration provisions in Britain, Canada, and Australia will make these countries more attractive to foreign graduate students and advanced-degree holders than the United States. The declining number of temporary U.S. visa applications by Egyptian nationals since the early 2000s seems to bear this out, yet the numbers of Egyptians applying for permanent residency in the United States remain buoyant (Department of Homeland Security 2008; for an overview of American skilled migration policies, see Papademetriou, Meissner, Rosenblum, and Sumption 2009). Unlike those finding employment in the Arab world, Egyptian migrants
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to the United States and other Anglophone countries tend to settle permanently owing to host society policies encouraging long-term residency and/or naturalization. Egypt’s loss of large numbers of highly skilled workers raises issues about “brain drain” and the loss of key skills crucial to economic development in Egypt (Ayubi 1983). Some scholars, though, question whether the brain drain is a significant problem in light of the chronic oversupply of university graduates in Egypt (see Baldwin-Edwards 2006). In concluding this discussion, it is important to note that not all Egyptians seeking work in the Global North are as privileged as those working in the United States and other Anglophone countries. In recent years, thousands of Egyptians and others from Arabic-speaking North Africa have been migrating illegally to Europe, taking up unskilled work regardless of their actual levels of education. Recent data from Italy, for instance, shows that 60 percent of undocumented immigrants intercepted by the police are Egyptians; in Malta, a Mediterranean country recently admitted into the European Union, this number is smaller, but still significant: 15 percent (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). These workers are increasingly vulnerable to government crackdowns on undocumented immigrants.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community The 2000 Census reports 113,396 people born in Egypt to be living in the United States; this figure represents a very small percentage (0.4% to be exact) of the foreign-born population in the United States, which numbers over 31 million people (U.S. Census 2000). This is likely to be an underestimate of the actual number of people born in Egypt currently residing in the United States; it should be noted, in this regard, that the Egyptian statistical agency in 2000 put at 318,000 the number of “permanent migrants” from Egypt in the United States (Ministry of Manpower and Emigration 2003, 37). Despite these discrepancies in data, the U.S. Census provides a useful overview of key characteristics of the Egyptian American population. As suggested previously, the vast majority of those Egyptians who have settled in the United States have arrived since the 1960s. Table 90 details the number of Egyptians obtaining legal permanent residency between 1920 and 1999 and illustrates well the surge in Egyptian migration that began in the1960s. Table 91 shows yearby-year the number of Egyptians obtaining permanent residency in the decade of 2000–2009 against total numbers of immigrants receiving permanent residence; here we see the most significant growth yet of a permanently settled Egyptian population, with numbers increasing by almost 70,000 over the course of the decade.
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Data on nonimmigrant (I-94) admissions from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2008) also indicate significant movement between Egypt and the United States. Non-immigrant admissions refer to those who enter into the United States on a temporary basis and for a specific reason. This can include temporary workers (such as skilled H1-B workers), students, and tourists. The peak number of I-94 admissions took place in 2001, when almost 62,000 Egyptians gained admittance in the United States. After 2001, however, numbers declined significantly, dropping to 31,447 in 2003, and never fully recovered; this decline is consistent with other Arab countries, whose citizens experienced heightened security measures in the aftermath of 9/11. (See Table 92 for more information.) As with most other immigrant groups, the majority of Egyptians can be found in a small number of highly populated and well-established immigrant gateways, including California (25,147), New Jersey (20,079), and New York (19,907). Sizable Egyptian communities can also be found in Florida (5,787) and Virginia (4,513) (U.S. Census 2000). (See Tables 95 and 96.) The latter is especially noteworthy, as Virginia has experienced a high rate of growth in its foreign-born population only in the last 20 years. Most of the foreign born in the state are concentrated in the District of Columbia’s increasingly diverse suburbs (see Friedman, Singer, Price, and Cheung 2005).
Educational and Economic Attainment The Egyptian American population today is more educated and prosperous than the American population at large. Perhaps the most striking statistic to compare is educational attainment. According to the 2000 Census, while 24.4 percent of Americans over the age of 25 have attained a bachelor’s degree or higher, 60 percent of those born in Egypt have done so; almost one-quarter, moreover, hold a graduate degree. As one might expect, median income in 1999 was approximately $8,000 more in Egyptian households than in all U.S. households; and while 12 percent of American households in 1999 earned over $100,000, 21 percent of Egyptian households did. Just over 50 percent of Egyptians are employed in management, professional, and related occupations. They are heavily overrepresented in scientific, educational, social service, and health fields. This is not to say, however, that all Egyptian Americans are affluent professionals. Close to 14 percent work in construction, maintenance, manufacturing, and transportation occupations. Moreover, just over 11 percent of households headed by Egyptian immigrants live below the poverty line. This is much lower than the poverty rate experienced by many immigrant groups, but it is higher than the poverty rate for American families overall (around 9% in 2000). As in the population at large, single women with children are much more likely than the wider population
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to be living at or below the poverty line. Single female-headed households with children under 18 years old are quite rare among Egyptian immigrants—the 2000 Census lists 1,475 such households, or 2.7 percent of all Egyptian family households. But around a third of such families are living below the poverty line. So while Egyptians can be considered a success story, it is important to recognize the existence of poverty among them and, as in the American population overall, the concentrated effects of poverty among women.
Health Statistics, Issues A review of the public health literature raises no particular health concerns with Egyptian Americans, though there has been some recognition recently of potentially high levels of hepatitis C infection in the community. The hepatitis C problem stems from public health efforts in Egypt in the 1970s to vaccinate people— especially those living in rural areas—against schistosomiasis, a water-borne parasitic disease. Many of these vaccinations were administered with used, unsterilized needles, leading to large-scale infection of the population with hepatitis C. The World Health Organization reports that approximately 20 percent of Egyptian blood donors test positive for the hepatitis C virus (this compares with a global infection rate of 3%). There are no statistics available for hepatitis C infection among Egyptian Americans, but it unlikely that infection rates are as high as they are in Egypt. Many Egyptian Americans are from middle-class, urban backgrounds; moreover, the vaccinations stopped several years ago, so recent immigrants are not as likely to be infected. Still, the rate of infection is believed to be higher than in the population at large, and steps have been taken by some Egyptian American organizations (including Coptic churches) to test members for the disease.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family and Culture As with all immigrant groups, the issue of cultural preservation and continuity has been an important one for Egyptians, especially as, for most of them, migration has been a permanent, rather than temporary, phenomenon. In addition to strong family life, Egyptian Americans draw on a variety of community resources to perpetuate customs and heritage. Like many contemporary immigrant groups who occupy a relatively high economic status, Egyptian Americans do not form residential clusters. There are no so-called ethnic neighborhoods or enclaves where Egyptian Americans simply reproduce Egyptian culture. But we can identify a cultural
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infrastructure in many large metropolitan areas—comprised of markets, restaurants, and shops selling consumer goods popular in Egypt—that sustain cultural traditions and tastes. Like Egyptian Americans themselves, these establishments tend to be dispersed in metropolitan areas and are often to be found in suburban strip malls. Many of these establishments, it must be emphasized, do not cater exclusively to Egyptians; rather, they serve multiple Arabic-speaking communities, including those from Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, who share similar tastes in food, films, music, and other cultural forms. Social life for Egyptians and other Arabic-speaking communities revolves largely around food, and food-based traditions are an important way that immigrant communities maintain cultural identity. Egyptians (and other Arabicspeaking communities) enjoy falafel, a fried patty made from chickpeas or fava beans and spices; shawarma, a sandwich made from shredded rotisseried meat; and kushari, a vegetarian dish of rice, lentils, chickpeas, and macaroni, which is considered the national dish of Egypt and is a favorite of Coptic Egyptians during the meatless season of Lent. Film and music are other important components of Egyptian culture. Egypt has a very rich cinematic tradition and has been the center of filmmaking in the Arab world since the early 20th century. Egyptians in the United States can access classic Egyptian films and contemporary dramas on satellite television (described below), through specialty video rental shops and, increasingly, over the Internet. Egyptian music, like Egyptian film, has produced several superstars who are well-loved throughout the Arab world. Among these is Umm Kulthum, whose recordings of classically inspired Arabic songs, dating mainly from the 1940s and 1950s, remain popular today. In describing these important elements of Egyptian culture, we should bear in mind that “culture” is not a static entity and cultural forms are constantly changing. In Egypt itself, film and music is quite varied and reflects the influence of popular forms from the United States, Europe, and elsewhere (contemporary Egyptian music, for instance, often mixes together folk music and Western pop forms). In the immigrant context, cultural forms hold different meanings for men and women, first- and second-generation immigrants, and for different class groups and religious groups. The music and films that evoke poignant memories for some might evoke anger, disapproval, or indifference in others. Moreover, young people born and raised in the United States may find Western dramas or more hybrid forms of music coming from the Arab world or from the Arab diaspora more compelling than the classics enjoyed by their parents. So in preserving Egyptian culture, Egyptian immigrants are not simply reproducing a monolithic, unchanging entity, but are formulating particular understandings of what it means to be Egyptian; and not all versions of Egyptian-ness will be embraced by all Egyptian Americans. This theme is developed more fully in the following sections.
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Families and Changing Gender Relations Immigrants from Egypt and other Arabic-speaking countries often cite strong family bonds as a defining feature of their cultural identity. Data from the 2000 Census indicates, albeit in an abstract way, the importance of family life and the family unit to Egyptian Americans. To illustrate, about 70 percent of immigrants 15 years old and over born in Egypt are married, compared with approximately 54 percent in the population at large; fewer than 20 percent of households of those born in Egypt are non-family households, compared with almost one-third of households in the population at large. Egyptian immigrants, in other words, are more likely than the wider population to be living in a family situation. Egyptian families, like many families in the United States, tend to be patriarchal in structure. The strength of patriarchal relations can be seen, in the first instance, in the pronounced gender imbalance among Egyptian immigrants. Whereas the American population overall is 49.1 percent male and 50.9 percent female, among Egyptian Americans, the corresponding figures are 58.6 percent and 41.4 percent. This pattern is not unique to Egyptian immigrants. Men, in general, are more likely than women to migrate as independent workers; women who do migrate tend to do so as the spouse of a primary migrant (though there are significant exceptions to this pattern) (Kofman, Philzaklea, Raghuram, and Sales 2000). The strength of the patriarchal family can also be seen in the fact that a miniscule percentage of Egyptian households (2.7%) consist of a female householder with children and no husband present. That fewer than a quarter of families with children under six have both parents in the labor force, moreover, points to the relatively low levels of labor force participation among Egyptian women (the corresponding figure in the population at large is 65%). So, too, does the fact that women’s labor force participation is 18 percentage points lower than in the Egyptian population as a whole. Still, it should be recognized that close to 47 percent of Egyptian-born women living in America do participate in the American labor force. Overall, there seem to be important shifts taking place in gender relationships and norms in Egyptian American communities (as there are in American society as a whole). Some scholarly discussion has brought to light the growing feminist consciousness among young, well-educated Muslim women in the West. This consciousness is linked to a wider social movement among Muslims, spearheaded by public intellectuals like Tariq Ramadan, to make Islam relevant to modern life in the West. This involves recovering what some consider a purer and more authentic version of Islam and shedding un-Islamic cultural practices and prejudices. Nadine Naber (2005) observes that many young Arab American Muslim women use of their faith to reject the racist, ethnocentric, and sexist attitudes present in their families. These women argue that Islam’s message of gender equality has been obscured by Arab cultural practices that place women in the domestic sphere and
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Gamalat Bayoumy and his wife, Mosad Mohamad, immigrated from Egypt to New York City where they earn a living as food cart vendors, July 4, 2009. (AP Photo/ Verena Dobnik)
that restrict their opportunities. Their Muslim identity and their strict adherence to an Islamic lifestyle (for instance, wearing modest clothing and refraining from dating) allows them to diminish parental control and to pursue higher education and careers. The argument that cultural practices must be distinguished from religious principles, especially when it comes to gender relations, has also been applied to the practice of female circumcision. Female circumcision—also known as female genital mutilation—has been practiced for centuries in Egypt and other parts of Africa in order to preserve girls’ sexual purity. The procedure typically is done in a nonmedical setting without anesthetics and often leads to infection and chronic sexual health problems. It has often been attributed to Islam, but, in fact, it is also widely practiced among Christians (conversely, the practice is unheard of in most parts of the Muslim world). The practice, which has been banned in Egypt and condemned by Muslim theologians, has come under the scrutiny of women’s rights groups and lawmakers in the United States, where several cases have been reported among diverse immigrant groups (Burstyn 1995). The practice certainly exists in Egyptian American families, but most Egyptian American and Coptic Web sites are virtually silent about the practice. It is not clear whether this silence is due to communal defensiveness or because the problem is not as widespread as it is among other African immigrant groups. Overall, rates of female circumcision are higher in Ethiopia and Somalia than in Egypt; this fact, along with the high levels of education among
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most Egyptian immigrants, may make the practice relatively uncommon in Egyptian American communities.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Continued Links to Country of Origin For many Egyptian Americans, maintaining an Egyptian cultural identity involves the fostering of direct linkages with Egypt itself. Many migration scholars have observed that immigrants’ ties to their homelands are denser and more persistent today than they were in the past. One reason given for this is the increasingly active role states play in fostering linkages with émigré communities (Itzigsohn 2000). In the case of Egypt, as the state recognized the potential value of the thousands of Egyptians working abroad in the 1970s, it began to grant émigrés a number of legal protections and privileges in order to cultivate émigré ties to the homeland. One of the most important laws affecting émigrés was the Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law of 1983, which granted migrants the right to dual citizenship (that is, the right to retain their Egyptian nationality upon becoming a citizen of the country of destination); this law also granted migrants exemptions from taxes and fees on remittances sent to Egyptian banks and gave migrants’ investments in the Egyptian economy the same advantages as foreign direct investment (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003, 28–29). This law has made it feasible and attractive for Egyptian Americans to invest and to participate actively in business ventures in Egypt. More recently, and following trends worldwide, the Egyptian state has made a more concerted effort to facilitate émigré investment in Egyptian industries. For instance, the Egyptian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology has launched an Internet portal to “create a continuous channel of cooperation and communication with Egyptian expatriates abroad” (2009). The Egyptian government uses this portal to advertise various networking events designed to bring together Egyptian émigrés working in high-technology fields, government officials working in the economic development field, and local (i.e., Canadian, British, and American) businesses for the purpose of enhancing investment in Egypt’s technology sector. (It should be noted that these efforts build upon earlier ventures, organized mainly by Egyptian expatriates and international institutions, to promote the transfer of knowledge and skills from émigré scientists and scholars to Egypt.) Additionally, the Egyptian state has attempted, through its Integrated Migration Information System, created in 2001 as part of the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, to “reinforce relationships between the Egyptian Diaspora and the home country” by strengthening ties with Egyptian nongovernmental organizations abroad and by offering forms of support (Ministry of Manpower and Emigration 2009).
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The actual impact of these policies and laws is difficult to ascertain. The role of the state in fostering transnational linkages, on the one hand, should not be overestimated. Zohry and Harrell-Bond (2003), for instance, suggest that few of the government’s proposals to aid migrants abroad and to offer professional training for potential migrants have ever been implemented. But, on the other hand, the state’s efforts to harness the economic power of migrants undoubtedly have helped to make Egypt one of the world’s largest recipients of remittances. According to data from the Central Bank of Egypt, the United States has become the single largest source of remittances to Egypt, providing over one-third of remittance dollars (cited in Ministry of Manpower and Emigration 2003, 52). Given that most Egyptian immigrants to the United States are skilled professionals who settle permanently with their families, it seems likely that at least some of these remittances are being funneled into real estate and business investments (as opposed to being used for household survival). In any event, it is clear that on a financial level, immigrants’ ties with Egypt remain strong. While economic ties are very much in evidence, the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian government has provided émigrés few opportunities to be formally engaged with the political process in Egypt. There are, however, numerous extragovernmental means through which Egyptian Americans maintain their relationship with and commitment to Egypt. Egyptian Americans, for instance, have formed community associations and nonprofit organizations for the purpose of perpetuating ties with Egypt. One example is the Egyptian American Community Foundation, a nonprofit organization based in New York City that supports philanthropic efforts in Egypt, mainly dealing with children and underprivileged groups. While these kinds of organizations are explicitly nonpolitical, they occasionally host ambassadors, consular officials, and other prominent figures in the Egyptian political establishment at conferences and community events. Egyptian American organizations are also oriented around cultural preservation, the promotion of the Arabic language, and the creation of social networks among Egyptians living in the United States. These latter goals become intertwined with conceptions of integration and assimilation in American society, themes to which we will return shortly.
Religion Religious institutions are especially important in sustaining community life and identity, though they do so in complex ways. There are, to begin, almost 200 Coptic churches outside of Egypt, approximately half of them in the United States, and Coptic churches are to be found in 20 states and the District of Columbia. Copts are 10 percent of the population in Egypt, but they are believed to constitute a larger component of the Egyptian-origin population in the United States. Indeed, some sources claim that Copts form a majority of Egyptian Americans. This claim is
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A ceremony inside St. Moses’ Church, located on the grounds of St. Antony’s Coptic Monastery in the Mojave Desert in southern California. St. Antony’s was the first recognized Coptic monastery outside of Egypt; its first monks arrived in 1989. (Courtesy of St. Antony’s Coptic Monastery
difficult to substantiate, but it is it is clear that the Coptic community in the United States is sizeable and thriving. As in Egypt, Coptic life in the United States revolves around a liturgical calendar of holy days, feasts, and fasting periods; such events, along with the Church’s unique and lengthy liturgy (which can last for several hours), serve to foster communal bonds and a sense of common identity. While maintaining ancient customs, the Coptic Church in Egypt has also modernized and revitalized itself in recent decades in order to strengthen community identity and solidarity in the face of communal tensions between Copts and Muslims. These transformations have shaped the Coptic Church in America. An important aspect of this revival has been the encouragement of extensive lay participation in Church life and the creation of an active youth ministry (see Van Doorn-Harder 2005; Smith 2005). With respect to the creation of an active youth ministry, Church activities foster the active involvement of young people in the Coptic community and their continued identification as Copts, even as their cultural frame of reference shifts to the United States. At the same time, the Church implores young people to maintain traditional values by refraining from dating, dancing, and wearing revealing clothing (see Coffman 2004),
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and it provides numerous opportunities (including on-line discussion forums) for young people to live their lives as Copts. Just as the Coptic Church is an important institution for building community among Egyptian Christians, mosques and Islamic centers serve as focal points of community identity among many Egyptian Muslims. Most mosques in the United States serve multiple ethnic groups, including nonimmigrant converts, though some mosques are dominated by particular cultural or linguistic groups (for instance, Arabs, South Asians, or African Americans). In general, mosques do not house regular congregations; instead, they serve as gathering places for Muslims who wish to partake in Friday prayers. But mosques are taking on more and more community functions, similar to those found in many churches. Some Islamic centers today, in addition to housing a mosque, host scout troops, Arabic language and cultural classes, citizenship classes, and community events. At the same time, mosques are becoming important sites in which gender relations are renegotiated in an American context. In many Arab countries, for instance, Friday prayers are attended mainly by men, with women fulfilling their religious obligations at home; when women attend mosque, they are relegated to a gallery at the back of the mosque. But in some American mosques today, one can find men and women arranged side-by-side, separated by a partition, in front of the prayer leader, signifying their spiritual and social equality. While being Muslim and attending mosque is an important aspect of identity of many Egyptian Americans, it is important to recognize the great diversity of religious practices and traditions that they follow. If for some, Islam is a complete way of life that requires regular and faithful observance of the five pillars of Islam (i.e., fasting during Ramadan, professing one’s faith, praying five times a day, undertaking a pilgrimage to Mecca, and offering alms to the poor); for others, being Muslim is more of a cultural identity expressed, for instance, through avoiding pork and alcohol or taking part in the celebration of major Islamic festivals. Still others, while identifying themselves nominally as Muslims, are adamantly secular in outlook and disavow most aspects of Muslim practice and belief. Patterns of belief and practice, then, can vary a great deal, even within families. Later in this essay, we examine how different identities inform political mobilization and civic participation among Egyptian Americans.
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media Perhaps more influential than either the state or nonprofit organizations in terms of keeping Egyptian Americans connected with Egypt are the dozens of Arabiclanguage television and radio stations that are increasingly available over satellite and the Internet 24 hours a day. The Dish Network, for instance, one of the nation’s largest satellite providers, offers an Arabic-language package that broadcasts
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dramas, films, and news from Egypt. Egyptian newspapers and magazines are also readily available over the Internet. It must be noted that Egyptian media were heavily censored by the state under the Mubarak regime, and there was limited content that challenged the state and its foreign and domestic policies. Several prominent Egyptian newscasters, however, openly broke with the government during the 2011 uprisings, and the media today appear to be operating in a much freer environment. At the same time, Al Jazeera, an international news organization based in Qatar, along with YouTube and various social media sites like Facebook and Twitter, are playing a crucial role in providing information to Egyptian communities abroad in the midst of rapidly changing political circumstances. In addition to news and entertainment outlets operating in Egypt, expatriate communities themselves provide a source of information and commentary about Egypt and the wider Arab world. Many such alternative news sources and Internet sites represent particular interest groups and organizations that were in conflict with the Egyptian state under the Mubarak regime. One such group is the Muslim Brotherhood, a moderate Islamist organization mentioned previously. Under Hosni Mubarak, the Brotherhood had been officially banned from Egyptian politics, but the organization had several legislators in the Egyptian parliament who stood as Independents. The Brotherhood has become, in many respects, a global organization, and it emphasizes the notion of a worldwide community of believers, or the ummah. Indeed, some scholars today see the Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations as part of a “Muslim diaspora,” rather than simply as part of an Egyptian diaspora (see Mandaville [2001] for a fuller discussion of transnational Muslim society). Still, the official English Web site of the Ikhwan (www.ikhwanweb.com), based in London, clearly speaks to an important diasporic Egyptian audience and addresses many issues that are specific to Egypt. Currently, the Ikhwan Web site is focusing intensively on political events unfolding in Egypt in the aftermath of the anti-Mubarak demonstrations, including ongoing efforts to prosecute members of the Mubarak regime, to amend Egypt’s constitution, and to quell violence between Muslims and Copts.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship While Egyptian Americans maintain their linkages with Egypt through a variety of channels, they are not simply or singularly transnationals. Their lives are rooted in an American context, as well as an Egyptian context, and they, like other immigrant groups, must negotiate their membership in American society. Part of this negotiation is the acquisition of American citizenship. Egyptian Americans, as we have seen, are a relatively privileged group who enter the United
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States mainly through legal channels. They therefore have ready access to American citizenship. The U.S. census shows remarkably high rates of naturalization among Egyptian Americans. Of the 37,625 Egyptian Americans counted in the census who entered the United States before 1980, 92 percent have naturalized as citizens; over three-quarters of those entering between 1980 and 1990 have done so. The Egyptian state’s acceptance of dual citizenship undoubtedly contributes to high rates of naturalization. Egyptian Americans, in other words, have nothing to lose by naturalizing as citizens, but much to gain in terms of rights and economic opportunities. Naturalization in the Egyptian American community, in this sense, can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Some Egyptians undoubtedly see an American passport as a convenience that provides access to the U.S. labor market and that grants legal protections that are nonexistent in Egypt. For many others, though, having American citizenship signifies an intention to incorporate themselves fully into the fabric of American society, even as they remain connected emotionally and materially with Egypt. How they choose to integrate, of course, is highly complex and requires an understanding of the different ways Egyptian Americans formulate public identities and position themselves in narratives of belonging in the United States.
Intergroup Relations A first step toward understanding public identities is to recognize the inter- and intra-group relationships in which Egyptian Americans are enmeshed. Many Egyptian immigrants see themselves not only as Egyptian Americans, but also as Arab Americans, and they engage in many formal and informal interactions with other Arab-origin groups, including Palestinian, Iraqi, and Lebanese Americans. The tendency for diverse Arab-origin groups to socialize with one another reflects the cultural traditions shared by these groups—relating, for instance, to language, literature, cinema, food, and norms of hospitality and family life. Arab cultural practices, as described earlier, are sustained in part by a cultural infrastructure comprised of Arab-oriented markets, shops, restaurants, Web sites, and media outlets. At the same time, a more politically tinged pan-Arab sentiment remains salient among Arabic-speaking immigrants and their children and may, in fact, be strengthening in light of the momentous political upheavals taking place throughout the Arab world today. This pan-Arab sentiment reflects a general sense, borne of 20th-century pannationalisms, that the problems afflicting the Arab world— for example, the conflicts in Palestine and Iraq and political repression in Saudi Arabia—are shared by all Arabs. Intergroup relationships involving Egyptian Americans also revolve around religious identities. As described above, while some mosques are dominated by a single language group (e.g., Arabs or Pakistanis), many of the large mosques and Islamic centers that have sprung up in American suburbs cater to a highly diverse
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group of Muslims, which include many nonimmigrant converts and African Americans. Mosques are spaces in which Egyptian Americans and other groups can think of themselves not just as Egyptian or Arab but as part of a larger Muslim community—one, indeed, that extends beyond the boundaries of the United States. Not all relationships serve to create solidarity among Egyptian Americans or to build linkages between them and other groups. Communal tensions between Muslims and Copts in Egypt, for instance, have carried over into American society and have strained relations among Egyptian Americans. An incident in New Jersey in 2005 involving the murder of a Coptic Christian family illustrates these strains. As reported in the New York Times, following the murder, rumors spread that the family’s father had “exchanged angry words with a Muslim on the Internet,” and many in the Coptic community felt that Muslims were behind the killings (Kelley 2005). When a Muslim cleric from New York came to the family’s funeral to pay his respects, he reportedly was threatened with violence and had to be escorted away by police. Police eventually charged two non-Muslim men—one of them living above the murdered family in a rented apartment—with the murder. But by this time, relationships between Copts and Muslims had been severely strained. A local interfaith coalition, involving Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and Christians, including Coptic leaders, gathered to sign a statement condemning “expressions of hate” and vowing to heal rifts between Muslims and Copts in New Jersey. The leader of a local Islamic center remarked at the time that Copts and Muslims had been working together for some years to build community solidarity, noting that “We come from the same country, from the same culture, for thousands of year, and we don’t have to bemoan our problems and differences” (Kelley 2005). But despite efforts to smooth over differences, it seems that Egyptian Copts are more inclined to build a separate identity and social support system around a Coptic identity.
Forging a New American Political Identity These diverse inter- and intra-groups relationships—between Egyptian Americans and other Arab Americans, between Muslims of different ethnic and national backgrounds, and between Copts and Egyptian Muslims—inform the ways in which Egyptian Americans negotiate their membership in the wider political sphere and position themselves as members of the American public. For some immigrants from Egypt, becoming part of American society involves adopting a hyphenated Egyptian American identity. This Egyptian American identity takes shape, in part, through organizations dedicated to community solidarity and cultural preservation. Some Egyptian American organizations, as we have seen, maintain direct ties with Egypt through philanthropic activities. Such organizations also serve to develop social networks among Egyptians in the United States and to familiarize the wider American public with cultural forms found in Egypt. Their aims, in other words, are centered
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on the realities of life in the United States as much as they are centered on Egypt itself. The Egyptian American Cultural Association, for instance, was founded by a group of Egyptian-born professionals in the Washington, D.C., area in the 1970s as a nonreligious, nonpolitical organization to promote interaction among Egyptianorigin people in the United States and to encourage second-generation Egyptian Americans to celebrate their cultural heritage. Their Web site (www.eacaonline.org) provides information about events throughout the Washington, D.C.—exhibitions, lectures, language classes, and weekend camps for Egyptian American children— that are intended to keep Egyptian Americans in touch with their community and heritage. The Web site also features links to Egyptian television stations, radio stations, and newspapers. For many Egyptian Americans, the process of weaving themselves into America’s multicultural fabric has involved not only creating a specifically Egyptian American associations and an Egyptian American identity, but also allying themselves with other Arab immigrant groups and mobilizing organizationally under the banner of the Arab American community. The history of Arab American organizations is a long and complex one (see Suleiman 1999); very briefly, Arab American organizations gained momentum mainly in response to on-going conflicts between Arab countries and Israel (a major ally of the United States), including the 1967 ArabIsraeli War (which ended in Arab defeat and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank) and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The Palestinian Intifadas, U.S. military involvements in Iraq, and the so-called War on Terror under the Bush Administration (2001–2009), combined with the growth of the Arab-origin population in the United States, have added further impetus to Arab American mobilization. Prominent Arab Americans organizations, such as Association of Arab-American University Graduates, the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, and the Arab American Institute, have always had a large contingent of Lebanese Americans (some of them the second-generation descendents of early 20th-century immigrants), but they have become increasingly diverse as the Iraqi, Palestinian, and Egyptian communities have grown in the decades after 1965. The centrality of Arab world events to Arab American political organizations suggests a strongly diasporic element to these groups. But it would be a mistake to view them entirely in diasporic terms. These organizations are very much oriented toward addressing American foreign policy in the Arab world through the American political process. At the same time, the War on Terror has created a number of purely domestic concerns among people of Arab origin in the United States. A major part of Arab American activism today involves civil rights and antidiscrimination activism, and Arab Americans have increasingly joined forces with other groups (e.g., Latinos and African Americans) to promote civil liberties and immigrant rights. Much of the discourse emanating from Arab American organizations revolves around incorporating Arab Americans into the mainstream political life and legitimizing Arab identities in America’s ethnically plural society.
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Not all Arab American organizations, of course, are politicized; many are oriented around cultural reproduction (though the promotion of culture is itself quite politically charged). Many Arab American organizations, like Egyptian American organizations, work to instill cultural pride and self-confidence in young, secondgeneration Arab Americans, who are often exposed to anti-Arab and anti-Muslim rhetoric in the media and in their local communities (see Abu El-Haj 2007). These organizations also seek to share aspects of Arab cultural life with the wider American society. Arab American organizations, for instance, often host language, cooking, and dance classes; art exhibits; and literary events that are open to the public; in some large cities, as well, Arab American groups host annual Arab cultural festivals and film festivals. There are many Arab American comedians, rappers, playwrights, poets, and novelists who articulate the Arab American experience to the wider society—an experience that revolves around an attachment to (and frustration with) the patriarchal family, a sense of personal loss vis-à-vis Palestine and Iraq, and a deep frustration with anti-Arab stereotypes. While the Arab American community encompasses many Egyptian Americans, it is clear that some Egyptian Americans seek to negotiate American society in other ways. Coptic Christians, for instance, identify strongly with Egypt, but their social and organizational relationships with non-Coptic Egyptians Americans, let
Kareem Loutfy, a senior at Carteret High School in New Jersey, sits with his prayer rug in the living room of his home May 18, 2006. Loutfy belongs to the Egyptian American Group, an interdenominational organization of New Jersey Muslims, Arab Americans, and South Asians. (AP Photo/Mike Derer)
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alone Arab Americans, seem tenuous. Most Egyptian American and Arab American organizations are explicitly and scrupulously nonreligious and nonsectarian, and there are Copts and other Christians involved in them. But interviews I have conducted with Arab American activists suggest that many Copts, like Chaldean Christians from Iraq and Maronite Christians from Lebanon, have pursued organizational solidarity apart from their Muslim compatriots as relationships between Muslims and Christians have become more contentious in countries of origin. As alluded to earlier, the Coptic Church in North America plays a crucial role in building community life among Coptic Egyptian Americans. The Church also has an important role in presenting their community to the mainstream public. Some scholars have noted that Coptic Web sites often highlight the pre-Islamic and Pharaonic heritage of the Copts; this heritage, Botros (2006) suggests, serves to separate them from other migrants from the Muslim world, thereby giving them an elevated status. Significantly, though, official church Web sites have, up until the present time, refrained from speaking about their persecution in modern Egypt, reflecting the alliance between the Coptic hierarchy and the Mubarak regime against radical Islamists. Lay Copts (i.e., those who are not part of the Church hierarchy) have been less inclined to keep quiet about the discrimination faced by their co-religionists in Egypt. Copts in the United States, many of whom left Egypt at the height of tensions between Copts and Muslims, opposed the accommodation between the Coptic Church hierarchy and the Mubarak regime, which it accused of supporting anti-Christian extremism, and formed lay organizations to generate opposition to the Mubarak regime among American legislators (Sedra 1999). Internet technologies have made these organizations quite effective in reaching influential political figures. One interesting example of Coptic technological savvy has been Coptic activists’ use of a U.S.-based wire service, the Christian NewsWire (www.christiannewswire.com), to publicize acts of violence and oppression against Copts in Egypt. The Christian NewsWire, which circulates news releases mainly for conservative Christian groups, has posted several articles written by members of Coptic activist groups describing the victimization of Christians by the Egyptian authorities and Islamist organizations. Also notable is the Web site for the U.S. Copts Association (www. copts.com), which claims to represent “all Christians in Egypt,” and which provides news clippings referring to the persecution of Christians worldwide at the hands of Islamic extremists. This activism had been criticized by the Coptic hierarchy in the United States, which reportedly forbade anti-Mubarak activists from publicizing activities or circulating petitions on Church grounds. It is not clear yet how relationships between lay organizations and the Coptic hierarchy will change in light of current political changes in Egypt, but it should be noted that Pope Shenouda III issued a letter supporting the anti-Mubarak demonstrations in 2011 and that members of the Coptic Church in Egypt are pressing for political equality in the post-Mubarak government.
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Adding to the diversity of political identities and mobilizations among Egyptian Americans has been the emergence of a Muslim American identity that reflects the growing salience of Islam to young Muslims in North America and Europe. There are today several large, multiethnic Muslim organizations and Islamic centers in the United States that are projecting a modern Muslim message and identity. These organizations are not explicitly political, but they are active in national political life through their public relations work and their efforts to build relations with legislators and political leaders. As with Arab American organizations, Muslim organizations engage with civil rights and antidiscrimination groups, and many are involved in interfaith networks, as well as in dialogue and outreach efforts with non-Muslim groups. Overall, they seek a place for Muslims in America’s pluralistic public sphere by actively challenging the many stereotypes of Islam that circulate in American society and by encouraging Muslims to be politically active. These organizations, and the wider movement of which they are part, are an important influence in the lives of some Egyptian Americans, and the emergence of a unique Muslim American identity adds another dimension to Egyptian Americans’ incorporation into American society.
The Second and Later Generations As we have seen, the statistics available on Egyptian Americans refer only to those born in Egypt; it is more difficult to find data specifically on second-generation Egyptian Americans in order to ascertain how they will fare, at least in socioeconomic terms, in American society. But if Egyptian Americans follow wider trends in American society, it is likely that the educational and economic status established by the first generation will carry into subsequent generations. Indeed, analyses of surveys on the Arab American population as a whole suggest that the children and grandchildren of Arab immigrants (Egyptian and otherwise) enjoy greater affluence and higher levels of education than the population at large. The political and cultural identity of Egyptian Americans is perhaps more difficult to predict. While Egyptian American organizations have been created to keep the second generation in touch with their specific heritage and identity, it may be that larger groupings—Arab American, Muslim American—or more specific groupings, like Copts, will be more compelling to the children of Egyptian immigrants. Egyptian immigrants seem to recognize that they are in America to stay, though many savor the thought of visiting Egypt every year or even retiring in Egypt. For their children, ties with Egypt, despite the availability of Arabiclanguage satellite, may become increasingly tenuous, and their sense of being a member of a minority group within the United States stronger. For these young people, being part of a larger category like Arab American can be more empowering
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and politically meaningful than being Egyptian American. Certainly the progressive and campus politics that many of them encounter when they enter university encourage the assertion of pan-identities and coalitions between a variety of minority groups. For young Copts, however, Arab American organizations, which tend to oppose Western interventions in Arab societies and to critique anti-Muslim rhetoric, might not be so attractive. It would not be surprising if these young people seek cultural validation by distancing themselves altogether from association with the Arab-Muslim world and emphasizing their pre-Pharaonic Egyptian-ness. It may
Youth Profile Biking across America and Working to Dispel Ignorance about Arab Americans Shareef Ghannam is a student at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, where he is studying public health and bioethics. He is also a student activist whose involvements range from researching cancer to participating in the student-run radio station to tutoring elementary school children in Baltimore. He is deeply committed to the Araband Egyptian American communities and to the wider community of which he is a part. Shareef’s viewpoints and experiences, while unique to him, provide insights into the ways that secondgeneration Egyptian Americans act upon their multiple identities and attachments to place. Shareef’s background is a familiar one in the Egyptian Ameri(Courtesy of Shareef Ghannam) can community. His father, who was born in Cairo, and his mother, who was born in London to Egyptian parents, met while studying electrical engineering at Cairo University. They married and immigrated to the United States shortly after Shareef’s oldest brother was born so that his father could attend graduate school in New York. After his father completed his Ph.D., the family eventually settled in the San Francisco Bay Area,
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and they remain very involved with the Egyptian American and Arab American communities. In high school, Shareef developed an interest in cancer biology and worked as a research assistant for a year in a cancer biology lab at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. In the summer before his sophomore year at Johns Hopkins, he bicycled from Baltimore to San Francisco in order to raise money for cancer research. His passion for cancer research, as one might expect, carries into his career plans: he hopes to complete a master’s degree in public health, to attend medical school, and to eventually become a pediatric oncologist. While many of his physical and intellectual energies are poured into cancer research, Shareef has strong personal attachments to his Egyptian and Arab heritage. Having grown up with the benefit of strong community ties, Shareef is concerned that his generation will allow these ties to languish. Visiting your homeland on occasion, as he puts it, is not the same as growing up in a community that actively fosters identity and heritage. This desire to strengthen community ties spurred Shareef to start the Arab Student Union at Johns Hopkins his freshman year, and his hope is to build the organization’s presence on campus. There are other motivations for forming an organization for Arab students relating to the anti-Arab stereotyping that many Arab Americans face. “Even at big name universities,” he states, “there is a lot of ignorance, and I’d like to change that.” Shareef’s understanding of himself as an Egyptian American—as both Egyptian and American—continues to evolve through his activities and experiences. Shareef’s 4,000-mile bicycle ride across America gave him the opportunity to ponder what it means to be an Egyptian American. He states that during the ride, “I came to realize that America is not all the same. All across the country, people come from very different backgrounds, but I think what makes us all uniquely American regardless of our heritage—whether Egyptian or Nebraskan—is that we can identify with something that is uniquely American, in that our origins are unimportant. I think you’d be hard-pressed to find another country in the world where this is true.” Source: Personal interview with the author, August 15, 2009.
be, however, that the revolution in Egypt, which has been supported by Coptic and Arab American organizations, may provide an opening for dialogue and interaction between different groups. We must also consider that these various identities—Egyptian, Muslim, Arab, Coptic—will cease to be important for some, even as the Egyptian American population continues to grow. Not all immigrants or American-born Egyptian Americans will wish to be politically active or to engage with particular groups. Many live
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in suburban areas where their connections with other Egyptians or Arabic-speaking groups might be minimal. As an affluent group that is generally coded as white, they are in a relatively privileged position, with more flexibility than many other immigrants groups to simply blend in and to keep identities in the background. Identity can become for them purely symbolic—something to be rolled out when the occasion calls for a celebration of diversity. Of course, external events have a way of re-activating dormant identities, as was seen with second- and thirdgeneration Lebanese Americans during Lebanon’s civil war (see the final section of this chapter). Regardless of how they choose to identify themselves, young Egyptian Americans will be required to navigate generational lines and gender expectations that are embedded in their families and communities. As noted earlier, labor force participation among female Egyptian immigrants is relatively low, but it is unclear whether these rates also apply to U.S.-born Egyptian Americans. It is also unclear at this point how particular religious trends—particularly the growing feminist
The EAS Café in San Francisco The EAS Café is an Internet portal developed in 2008 by the Egyptian American Society, a San Francisco Bay Area–based organization founded in the 1970s by Egyptian expatriates. The EAS café includes numerous links to articles and news pieces of interest to the community, and it provides a discussion board that allows members to express opinions about social and political issues, to advertise their work, or to tell their story to others. As an organization, the Egyptian American Society is explicitly nonreligious and nonpolitical, meaning that it does not represent any particular religious group or advocate a particular political agenda or party. But the EAS Café does not eschew political or religious subject matter all together. Magda Danish, the current president of the Egyptian American Society and one of the creative forces behind the EAS Café, states, “We link to articles about politics and religions all the time, but we try not to favor any publication or subject over another, and we tend to steer away from extreme opinions on both sides” (personal interview, 8/17/2009). Many of the articles posted on the EAS Café relate directly to Egypt. A perusal of the Web site in the summer of 2009 found articles on the effects of climate change on the Nile Delta, the economic disparities in Egypt, and President Mubarak’s visit to the White House. On religious matters, there were articles posted on the recent arrest of Islamist political figures in Egypt, on the controversial restoration of a synagogue in Cairo’s ancient Jewish quarter, and on the persecution of a convert to Christianity in Alexandria. Other articles dealt with the wider Arab world, especially with efforts to re-start Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.
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While many of the links on the EAS Café relate to Egypt and the Arab world, the Web site also informs its users of Egyptian- and Arab American events taking place locally in the San Francisco Bay Area. Local Coptic churches and mosques, for instance, use the Web site to publicize events and holidays. In the summer of 2009 the Web site had advertisements for a Coptic cultural festival and an Iftar celebration marking the end of Ramadan fasting. There were also postings about the Bay Area’s first annual Egyptian festival, a major Tutankhamen exhibit at a San Francisco museum, and several Arab American community events, including a “Middle Eastern comedy show” and the local premier of a film about a Palestinian immigrant family in Michigan. Regarding the importance of Arab American cultural events to Egyptian Americans, Magda Danish states, “You cannot separate Egyptian Americans from Arab Americans, particularly when culture is involved. We all have so much in common that the EAS website certainly projects all Arab American identities and addresses issues that are of interest to them, not only to Egyptian Americans.” In addition to providing information about local events, the EAS Café spotlights members of the Egyptian American community in the Bay Area. One profile describes Hala Fauzi, an Egyptian American woman who gave up her career as a Silicon Valley software engineer to pursue her love of Middle Eastern music and dance. She created her own dance troupe and studio, teaches dance at local colleges, and even hosts a semimonthly radio show, Mezzas and Tapas (referring to appetizers eaten in the Arab world and Spain) that showcases music from the Middle East, North Africa, and the Mediterranean basin. Overall, EAS leaders see the EAS Café as an instrument for bringing together members of the Egyptian American community, whether Coptic, Muslim, or nonreligious. The portal is intended to be evenhanded and, indeed, “to set an example of unity and tolerance for the new generation,” in the words of Magda Danish. The Web site projects an outlook that is secular, which for many Egyptian- and Arab Americans signifies not the avoidance of all discussion of religion or the pushing aside religious identities, but a rejection of divisive attitudes. Magda Danish feels that the EAS Café has succeeded in building a measure of unity among Egyptian Americans, even as wider trends in the community and in Egypt point to growing rancor. But she acknowledges that not all members of the community share the worldview of the Café’s users. For outside viewers, the EAS Café illustrates the multiple identities that exist among Egyptian Americans, and it speaks to their on-going connections to Egypt, as well as their rootedness in places of settlement. It represents the potential for new communications technologies to build community solidarity and to foster a sense of belonging that is simultaneously here and there. And finally, it provides glimpses into the activities—the festivals, exhibits, films, picnics, and networking events—through which Egyptian Americans maintain their heritage and negotiate their presence in America’s multicultural society. Source: Author’s personal interview with Magda Danish, August 10, 2009.
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consciousness among young Muslim women—might alter women’s educational and employment status and affect familial dynamics. The 2010 Census will provide some basic answers to these questions, but in-depth qualitative research is needed to understand how these processes will influence the daily lives of Egyptian Americans.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Egypt Relations between Egypt and the United States have been generally positive for decades, owing to Egypt’s recognition of Israel in the 1970s. Under Hosni Mubarak, Egypt assumed the role of broker between the Palestinians and the Israelis, criticizing the Israeli state for its marginalizing the Palestinians but also securing for Israel the sensitive border between Egypt and Gaza. Despite being a lynchpin in America’s strategy in the Middle East, however, Mubarak had come under criticism among politicians in the United States for his regime’s human rights violations and alleged support for anti-Christian extremism. Relations between the two allies had also become strained due to the decision of the Bush Administration in 2003 to invade Iraq. In August 2009, President Mubarak made his first visit to Washington in five years with the intention of reinvigorating his country’s relationship with the United States. Traveling with this son and presumed heir, Gamal Mubarak, President Mubarak met with President Obama to discuss Egypt’s role in upcoming peace negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. Relations between the two leaders seemed cordial despite President Obama’s much-vaunted commitment to human rights and democratization in the Arab world, which he had outlined in a speech in Cairo earlier that year. When mass protests against Mubarak began in January 2011, the Obama administration maintained its support for Mubarak, citing the importance of stability in Egypt for peace in the region, and especially for Israel’s security. But the Obama administration, despite grim warnings from Israel and America’s Gulf Arab allies, gradually withdrew its support for Mubarak when it became clear that the protestors would not be satisfied until Mubarak stepped down. The dramatic events in Egypt have generated a great deal of interest and concern among first- and second-generation Egyptian Americans, with some expressing their frustration at the Obama administration for its initial hesitation in supporting the protestors. How this political drama will play out—whether Islamists gain power; whether democratic freedoms are instituted; whether the Copts are included in a more equitable fashion in Egyptian society, and so on—will undoubtedly influence relationships in the Egyptian American community as much as it will influence relationships between the United States and Egypt.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 90 Persons of Egyptian nationality obtaining legal permanent residence by decade 1920–1999 Year
Number
1920–1929
1,063
1930–1939
781
1940–1949
1,613
1950–1959
1,996
1960–1969
5,581
1970–1979
23,543
1980–1989
26,744
1990–1999
44,604
2000–2009
81,564
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Table 92 Non-immigrant admissions (I-94 only) granted to Egyptian nationals 1999–2008 Year
Number
1999
57,646
2000
60,685
2001
61,854
2002
37,475
2003
31,447
2004
32,164
2005
34,659
2006
38,115
2007
43,139
2008
47,706
Source: Department of Homeland Security. Note: Non-immigrant admissions (I-94 only) counts those who are authorized to remain in the United States for a specified period of time; it can be granted to tourists, students, and temporary workers.
Table 91 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009
610
Region and country of birth
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
Egypt
4,450
5,159
4,852
3,348
5,522
7,905
10,500
9,267
8,712
8,844
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 93 Sex and age of Egyptian-born population Characteristic
Number
Percent
Total population
113,395
100.0
Male
66,490
58.6
Female
46,905
41.4
0–9 years
4,360
3.9
10–19 years
6,870
6.1
20–34 years
25,705
22.7
35–54 years
50,600
44.6
55–64 years
13,380
11.8
65–84 years
11,670
10.3
820
0.7
85 years and over Source: Adapted from 2000 U.S. Census.
Table 94 Educational attainment, Egyptian-born population aged 25 years and older
Population 25 year and older
Number
Percent
96,660
100.0
Less than 9th grade
3,480
3.6
9th to 12th grade, no diploma
4,395
4.5
High school graduate
13,615
14.1
Some college, no degree
11,510
11.9
Associate degree
5,960
6.2
Bachelor’s degree
34,720
35.9
Graduate or professional degree
22,985
23.8
High school graduate or higher
88,785
91.6
Bachelor’s degree or higher
57,705
59.7
Source: Adapted from 2000 U.S. Census.
611
Table 95 Five states with the largest Egyptian foreign-born populations Area United States California
Number
Percent
113,395
100.0
25,147
22.2
New Jersey
20,079
17.7
New York
19,905
17.6
Florida
5,784
5.1
Virginia
4,513
4.0
Source: Adapted from 2000 U.S. Census.
Table 96 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 leading states of residence region/country: Egypt Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
8,844
4,894
3,950
60
29
31
1,244
643
601
Arizona California Connecticut
89
49
40
Florida
379
218
161
Georgia
99
52
47
Illinois
263
136
127
Maryland
129
75
54
Massachusetts
254
139
115
Michigan
137
84
53
Minnesota
100
56
44
38
20
18
New Jersey
1,587
853
734
New York
Nevada
1,463
863
600
North Carolina
153
92
61
Ohio
182
105
77
Pennsylvania
323
181
142
Texas
369
190
179
Virginia
484
283
201
Washington Other
114
65
49
1,377
761
616
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Glossary | 613 Table 97 Occupation of people born in Egypt, aged 16 years and older Number
Percent
Employed civilian population 16 years and over
63,760
100.00
Management, professional, and related occupations
32,320
50.7
Service occupations
7,590
11.9
15,065
23.6
95
0.1
Construction, extraction, and maintenance occupations
2,110
3.3
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations
6,580
10.3
Sales and office occupations Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
Source: Adapted from 2000 U.S. Census.
Appendix III: Notable Egyptian Americans Leila Ahmed is a noted feminist scholar and author of the influential book Women and Gender in Islam. She currently holds the Victor S. Thomas Chair at Harvard University’s Divinity School. Farouk El-Baz is a geologist who worked with NASA on the Apollo space program in the late 1960s and early 1970s, training astronauts for lunar observation. A director of the National Air and Space Museum, Dr. El-Baz currently focuses his research on desert zones. Pauline Kaldas is an Egyptian-born, U.S.-raised poet and short-story writer who writes about the experience of being Arab American. Her latest book, Letters of Cairo (2006), recounts her time as a Fulbright Scholar in Cairo. Dalia Mogahed is the director of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, which led an unprecedented, representative survey of Muslims worldwide. She was appointed in 2009 to serve on President Obama’s Advisory Council on FaithBased and Neighborhood Partnerships. Laila Shereen Sakr is a poet, activist, and avant-garde performance artist, and the co-founder of the Washington, D.C., Guerilla Poetry Insurgency. She is currently involved in building a repository of Arab digital media. Ahmed Zewail is the 1999 recipient of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his work on chemical reactions using lasers. He is currently a professor at the California Institute of Technology.
Glossary Al-Ahram: Egypt’s leading newspaper, founded in 1875. Controlled by the Egyptian state, the paper has nonetheless been increasingly critical of the governing
614 | Egyptian Immigrants
regime. It has published an English-language weekly since 1991 and is an important source of information for Egyptians living in the United States and elsewhere. Azan (alternatively spelled adhan): The Islamic call to prayer. In Muslim-majority countries, the azan is broadcasted five times a day from a minaret, or a tower attached to a mosque. In the United States, however, local noise ordinances often require modification of the azan. Copts: The Orthodox Christian community established in Egypt in the first century C.E. The term “Copt” is derived from the Greek word for Egyptian. Iconostasis: A screen decorated with icons (ornate depictions of saints and other holy figures) used in Coptic Orthodox churches to separate the altar from the nave. Masjid: The Arabic word for a mosque, or the place where Muslims gather for worship. Misr: The Arabic word for Egypt. Shawarma: An Egyptian culinary favorite made from spiced strips of lamb roasted slowly on a vertical spit. The meat is shaved and placed in soft flatbread with condiments. Shawarma has become popular in many U.S. and European cities due to Arab immigration. Watan: the Arabic term used to refer to nation, homeland, or country.
References Abu El-Haj, T. R. 2007. “ ‘I Was Born Here, But My Home, It’s Not Here’: Educating for Democratic Citizenship in an Era of Transnational Migration and Global Conflict.” Harvard Educational Review 77 (3): 285–316. al Khouri, R. 2004. “Characteristics and Magnitude of Arab Migration Patterns in the Mashreq: South-South Context.” In Arab Migration in a Globalized World, 21–34. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. Ayubi, N. 1983. “The Egyptian ‘Brain Drain’: A Multidimensional Problem.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 15 (4): 431–50. Baldwin-Edwards, M. 2006. “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: North Africa as a Region of Emigration, Immigration, and Transit Migration.” Review of African Political Economy 33 (108): 311–24. Botros, G. 2006. “Religious Identity as an Historical Narrative: Coptic Orthodox Immigrant Churches and the Representation of History.” Journal of Historical Sociology 19 (2): 174–201. Burstyn, L. 1995. “Female Circumcision Comes to America.” Atlantic Monthly 276 (4): 28–35. Coffman, E. 2004. “Lost in America: Arab Christians in the U.S. Have a Rich Heritage and a Shaky Future.” Christianity Today (April): 39–42. Feiler, G. 1992. “Housing Policy in Egypt.” Middle Eastern Studies 28 (2): 295–312.
References | 615 Friedman, S., Singer, A., Price, M., and Cheung, I. 2005. “Race, Immigrants, and Residence: A New Racial Geography of Washington, D.C.” Geographical Review 95 (2): 210–30. Hourani, A. 1991. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Itzigsohn, J. 2000. “Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Institutions of Immigrants’ Political Transnationalism.” International Migration Review 34 (4): 1126–54. Kelley, T. 2005. “In Jersey City, Religious Leaders Vow Healing.” New York Times, April 21. [Online article or information; retrieved 6/6/09.] http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ fullpage.html?res=980DE6DC1731F932A15757C0A9639C8B63. Kofman, E., Phizaklea, A., Raghuram, P., and Sales, R. 2000. Gender and International Migration in Europe: Employment, Welfare, and Politics. New York; London: Routledge. Mahroom, S. 1999. “Highly Skilled Globetrotters: The International Migration of Human Capital.” Proceedings of the OECD International Workshop on Science and Technology (DSTI/STP/TIP(99)2) [Online article or information; retrieved 6/6/09.] www.oecd. org/dataoecd/35/6/2100652.pdf. Mandaville, P. 2001. Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma. Abingdon, UK; New York: Routledge. Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (Arab Republic of Egypt). 2009. [Online article or information; retrieved 7/25/09]. www.egyptexpats.com. Ministry of Manpower and Emigration (Arab Republic of Egypt). 2003. Contemporary Egyptian Migration (report produced in conjunction with the International Organization for Migration). [Online article or information; retrieved 7/7/09] http://www.emigration. gov.eg/Publications/DisplayPublications.aspx Ministry of Manpower and Emigration (Arab Republic of Egypt). 2009. [Online article or information; retrieved 7/7/2009] http://www.emigration.gov.eg. Naber, N. 2005. “Muslims First, Arabs Second: A Strategic Politics of Race and Gender.” Muslim World 95 (4): 479–95. Papademetriou, D., Meissner, D., Rosenblum, M., and Sumption, M. 2009. Aligning Temporary Visas With U.S. Labor Market Needs: The Case for a New System of Provisional Visas. Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute. Sedra, P. 1999. “Class Cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian Communities in Modern Egyptian Politics.” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 10 (2): 219–35. Smith, C. D. 2005. “The Egyptian Copts: Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Definition of Identity for a Religious Minority.” In Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies, edited by M. Shatzmiller, 58–84. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Suleiman, M. 1999. Arabs in America: Building a New Future. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. U.S. Census Bureau. 2000. Census 2000. [Online article or information; retrieved 6/6/2009]. www.census.gov.
616 | Egyptian Immigrants U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2008. 2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics [Online article or information; retrieved 7/5/2009]. http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/ publications/yearbook.shtm. Van Doorn-Harder, P. 2005. “Copts: Fully Egyptian But for a Tattoo?” In Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies, edited by M. Shatzmiller, 22–57. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Wahba, J. 2004. “Does International Migration Matter? A Study of Egyptian Return Migrants.” In Arab Migration in a Globalized World, 179–200. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. Zohry, A. and Harrell-Bond, B. 2003. “Contemporary Egyptian Migration: An Overview of Voluntary and Forced Migration.” Working paper issued by Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty, University of Sussex.
Further Reading Ahmed, L. 1993. Women and Gender in Islam. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. An excellent historical account of the status of women in Muslim societies. Written by an Egyptian American scholar, the book documents important social changes in Egypt in the 19th and 20th centuries, and helps to explain some of the views and experiences of young Muslim women today. Arab American Institute 2009. [Online article or information; retrieved7/7/10.]. http:// www.aaiusa.org. The Web site for one of the country’s major Arab American organizations. Contains a wealth of information about Arab Americans, including analyses of census and survey data on Arab American groups conducted by James Zogby, a well-respected pollster. Hourani, A. 1991. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard. An excellent overview of the history of the Arab world that situates Egypt in a wider regional perspective. Macleod, A. E. 1993. Accommodating Protest: Working Women and the New Veiling in Cairo. New York: Columbia University Press. A detailed study of the growing religiosity in contemporary Egypt and the mass adoption of Islamic clothing and headscarves by urban Egyptian women. The author argues that women today are both accommodating dominant gender norms and challenging them through their presence in public space. The author also suggests the need to be sensitive to the multiple meanings that veiling represents. Mandaville, P. 2001. Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma. Abingdon, UK; New York: Routledge. An interesting account of the emergence of a global Muslim consciousness, with special attention given to Muslims living in Western countries. Suleiman, M. 1999. Arabs in America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. A collection of essays on the experiences of Arab Americans. Provides several good chapters about the racial ambivalence of Arab Americans and about the community’s political mobilization.
Eritrean Immigrants by Tricia Redeker Hepner
Introduction Eritreans have been coming from the Horn of Africa to the United States for more than 50 years. While small numbers of Eritreans arrived in the 1960s and 1970s, often sent by the Ethiopian government to attend American universities, the majority arrived in the 1980s and early 1990s as refugees from the long war for Eritrean independence from Ethiopia. In the past decade, renewed conflict in the Horn of Africa and internal developments in Eritrea have led to renewed migration from the country. More than 36 thousand Eritrean refugees were in neighboring Ethiopia in mid-2010, and well over 100,000 remained in Sudan. In addition, an unknown number of Eritreans have made perilous journeys over great distances to try to reach North America or Europe, where they might apply for political asylum. In late 2008, the U.S. government agreed to accept up to 6,500 Eritreans residing in Shimelba refugee camp in Ethiopia, many of whom are highly educated, skilled young men and women. Because Eritreans were considered Ethiopians until the country’s independence in 1993, disaggregated data prior to 1993 is virtually nonexistent. Eritreans are a very small population overall, and little research has been done on Eritreans in the United States. As a result, much remains poorly understood with respect to basic demographic information. However, statistics published by the Department of Homeland Security in 2009 illustrating the numbers of Eritreans obtaining legal permanent resident (LPR) status from 2000 to 2009 and their leading states of residence provide some new insight. More information is also becoming available as Eritreans become more established, as researchers conduct further studies, and as more migrants arrive. Recent ethnographic work has highlighted the unique cultural characteristics of Eritrean Americans and their rich associational life, from religious institutions and community associations, to civic organizations and political parties. As a population, Eritreans remain strongly oriented towards their home country and share a well-developed national identity, which emerged out of Eritrea’s threedecade struggle for independence. Second- and third-generation Eritreans have a more complex identity, which recognizes not only their Eritrean heritage but also their identities as African Americans. The experience of Eritrean Americans highlights how the sending country and government continue to be influential in the lives of individuals and their changing communities in the United States.
617
Chronology | 619
Eritrean women celebrate their nation’s independence, which was declared on April 27, 1993. (Corel)
Chronology 6000 B.C.E.
Earliest cave paintings in Akele Guzai and Sahel provinces.
2500–1200 B.C.E. Egyptian and South Arabian contact with Red Sea coast. 230 B.C.E.
Port of Adulis is founded by Ptolemy.
100 C.E.
Rise of Axumite Empire.
325–360
Emperor Ezana’s conversion to Orthodox Christianity.
615
Arrival of Islam with Arabian refugees.
1520–1526
Portuguese expedition to highlands.
1533–1535
Islamic expansion under Ahmed al-Ghazali.
1557–1589
Ottoman Turks control coastal areas.
1813–1885
Egyptian occupation; further expansion of Islam.
1869
Italian shipping company purchases port of Assab.
1890
Italian colony of Eritrea formally established.
1941
British occupation of Eritrea.
1952
Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation takes effect.
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1961
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) launches armed struggle for independence from Ethiopia.
1967
Refugee flows from Eritrea begin.
1970–1972
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) forms.
1972–1980
Intermittent civil war between ELF and EPLF.
1980
United States passes Refugee Act.
1981
ELF is exiled into Sudan; further refugee flows.
1981–1993
Resettlement of Eritrean refugees in the United States.
1991
EPLF liberates Eritrea.
1993
Eritrean referendum establishes the independent state; Eritrea joins the United Nations.
1998–2000
Ethiopian-Eritrean border war.
2001
Political turmoil in Eritrea.
2002
Banning of minority religions.
2002–2008
Increase in refugee flows.
2008
United States agrees to accept up to 6,500 Eritrean refugees.
Background Geography of Eritrea Eritrea is the newest nation-state in Africa. It gained independence from Ethiopia following a 30-year war (1961–1991). An internationally recognized national referendum was held in April 1993, in which an estimated 99.8 percent of voters in Eritrea and the worldwide diaspora cast their ballots in favor of independence. Eritrea joined the United Nations on May 28, 1993. Situated in the northeastern region of the continent, in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea is geographically distinguished by its dramatic terrain and a regionally variable climate, with 670 miles of coastline along the Red Sea. Eritrea is bordered by Sudan to the north and west, Ethiopia to the south, and the small country of Djibouti at the southeastern tip. Beautiful, unspoiled coral reefs lie off the coast of the port city of Massawa along with hundreds of small, mostly uninhabited islands. The largest of these are the Dahlak archipelago. Covering nearly 48,000 square miles of landmass, Eritrea is one of the smallest countries in Africa and roughly the size of the state of Pennsylvania. Historically, the country was comprised of nine provinces: Akele Guzai, Barka, Denkel, Gash-Setit,
Background | 621
Hamasien, Sahel, Semhar, Senhit, and Seraye. Following independence, the country was reorganized into six administrative regions: Anseba, Debub (South), Debubawi Qeyih Bahri (Southern Red Sea), Gash-Barka, Maakel (Central), and Semienawi Qeyih Bahri (Northern Red Sea). However, many people continue to refer to regions of Eritrea by their former provincial names and trace their identities through their kin groups’ connections to rural lands. Also important to Eritrea’s geography are the differences in rainfall, climate, and population densities among the highland and lowland regions of the country. The highland regions, known as the kebessa, are an extension of the Great Rift of eastern Africa. Rising through the center of the country, the kebessa is mountainous and temperate, with greater rainfall, more intensive agriculture, and a higher population concentration. The capital city of Asmara, with an estimated population of 600,000, is located on the highland plateau, near the center of the country. The lowland regions to the east, south, and west, or metahit, are generally hot and dry, with less rainfall and a lower population density. There are many variations in climate, terrain, ecology, and livelihood as elevation changes. Along the southern Red Sea coast lies the Denkel Desert, where temperatures can rise as high as 122 degrees Fahrenheit. Eritrea’s geographical diversity forms four distinct ecological zones: the coastal plain, the central highlands, the northern highlands, and the western lowlands (Killion 1998, 2). In terms of human geography, Eritrea is similar to many other African countries in its striking linguistic and cultural diversity. An independent census has not yet been taken, but in 2008 the total population of Eritrea was estimated at about 4.5 to 5 million. Nine different ethnic groups or nationalities occupy Eritrea, and at least as many languages are spoken throughout the country. These ethno-linguistic groups and their estimated proportion of the total population of Eritrea include the Afar (3%), Bilen (5%), Hedareb (<1%), Kunama (3%), Nara (>1%), Rashaida (<1%), Saho (7%), Tigre (30%), and Tigrinya (50%) (Killion 1998, 5–6). In addition, Eritreans who were raised in Ethiopia form a unique population unto themselves, referred to as amiche, after a type of vehicle (AMCE) that was once imported through Eritrea and assembled in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. The major languages of Eritrea are Arabic and Tigrinya, though many people also speak Amharic (one of the major languages of Ethiopia) and some older people remember Italian (inherited from the colonial period). English is also widely used; secondary education and university has generally been provided in English, and many government offices utilize English as an international lingua franca. Because so many Eritreans migrated to other countries during the long independence war with Ethiopia, as will be discussed in detail in the following sections, it is not uncommon to hear Eritreans speaking languages like Dutch, German, Italian, Norwegian, and Swedish, especially those who were born and raised abroad.
622 | Eritrean Immigrants
Eritreans are divided fairly evenly among Sunni Islam and Christianity, and with some exceptions, the country remains exemplary for the peaceful coexistence between these two major religions. Islam was adopted in Eritrea in the ninth century and experienced its major growth period in the 1500s. Orthodox Christianity is the largest and oldest of the Christian traditions, having been indigenized in the fourth century C.E.; and Roman Catholicism and Swedish Evangelical Lutheranism have been present in Eritrea for hundreds of years. Other religions in Eritrea include Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-Day Adventists, and nondenominational evangelical or Pentecostal Christian congregations. Eritrea’s religious and cultural diversity continues to correspond to some degree to the geographical division of the country into the highland and lowland regions. Historically, Tigrinya-speaking Christians (and the minority Muslim population of the Tigrinya ethnic group, known as Jiberti) have tended to reside in the highland regions and practice sedentary farming and local trading, remaining deeply tied to their ancestral lands. Likewise, Muslims have tended to reside in the lowland regions, where they have long practiced agro-pastoralism and nomadic pastoralism and engaged in long-distance trade. While approximately 75–80 percent of Eritreans continue to reside in rural areas, urban centers like the cities of Asmara, Assab, Keren, and Massawa, are important locations for cultural integration and commerce.
History of Eritrea The name Eritrea is derived from the Greek word erythraeum, which means “red.” The region’s history can be dated at least as far back as 6000 B.C.E., when early dwellers left cave paintings in Akele Guzai and Sahel. Egyptian traders launched expeditions to the coastal regions of modern-day Eritrea beginning around 2500 B.C.E., overlapping with southern Arabian contact up through 1200 B.C.E. The ancient port town of Adulis was established around 230 B.C.E., and by 100 C.E. the rise of the trading empire known as Axum encompassed the burgeoning cultural and economic networks that spanned much of contemporary Eritrea. In 325 C.E. the Axumite emperor Ezana converted to Orthodox Christianity, establishing the highland regions as a center of Orthodox culture and influence. Beginning in the 700s, expanding Islamic empires from the north and west, such as the Beja kingdoms and the Funj dynasty of Sudan, extended their political, economic, and religious influence into Eritrea. These influences combined and competed with that of early Portuguese explorers, who arrived as early as 1520, bringing Catholicism with them. However, the Ottoman empire triumphed in establishing the greatest control over Eritrea in the 15th and 16th centuries, followed by the Egyptian occupation in the 1800s (see Killion 1998, xxiii–xxvii).
Background | 623
In 1869, an Italian shipping company purchased the port of Assab, which was later acquired by the Italian government in 1882. For several decades the Egyptians attempted to extend their influence from the coastal regions further into the highlands of Eritrea, which were fiercely defended by local rulers. In 1885, the Italians occupied the coastal town of Massawa, forcing the Egyptians to depart, and by 1890 the Italian colony of Eritrea was formally established. During the colonial period, Eritrea was a settler colony for Italians as well as an agricultural plantation economy and a source of industrial development, labor, and processing of raw materials for the metropole. Under Italian rule, extensive transport and communications facilities were created to enable the colonial economy. The most famous among these is a railway system, which has undergone rehabilitation and restoration in the postindependence period. Italian architects also experimented with different styles, making Asmara one of the most unique architectural cities in the world (Denison, Ren, and Gebremedhin 2003). Although Eritrean people experienced Italian rule differently depending on where they lived (Negash 1987; Murtaza 1998), the shared experience of oppression by foreign rulers helped create the beginnings of a common sense of Eritrean national identity. The creation of colonial infrastructure, and some limited access to education, also assisted Eritreans in articulating their emerging identity as a nation. During World War II, Italy lost its colonial holdings in Africa. Eritrea became important to the Allied forces, and especially the British and Americans, as a strategic post for monitoring communications and other political developments in the region (Wrong 2005). In 1941, the British Military Administration (BMA) began ruling Eritrea as a temporary protectorate. Eritreans took advantage of the political opportunity established under the BMA to organize their own parties, labor unions, and other voluntary associations, and these became vital for the development of early nationalism. Between 1941 and 1952, Eritreans from diverse backgrounds, both at home and in neighboring countries like Sudan, Egypt, and Syria, began participating in active political dialogue and debate about the future of their country. Some strongly favored joining Ethiopia, with which highland Eritrea especially had shared religious, cultural, and linguistic continuity for millennia. Others advocated Eritrean independence, given the transformation of the region during the colonial period and preceding occupations. In 1950 the United Nations passed a resolution that federated Eritrea with Ethiopia, with some regional autonomy for the former. The federal period was marked by increasing conflict and violence, as pro-independence nationalist factions and active civil society organizations and unions were repressed, and as Eritrea’s autonomy was eroded by loyalists to the Ethiopian monarchy (Negash 1997). In 1961, Emperor Haile Sellassie I of Ethiopia annexed Eritrea, thus disbanding the federation and attempting to re-absorb the country into the Ethiopian empire-state.
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However, an armed movement for Eritrean independence, known as the Eritrean Liberation Front, or ELF, had already formed in 1960 in the lowland regions near Sudan. In 1961, following annexation, armed struggle broke out between Ethiopian forces and Eritrean rebels. The 1960s witnessed some of the first flows of refugees, as tens of thousands of lowlanders fled across the border to Sudan, and scores of highlanders who supported independence were forced into exile. Among them were early nationalist leaders like Woldeab Woldemariam and Ibrahim Sultan. Eritrea’s three-decade struggle for independence (1961–1991) remains one of the longest wars in modern African history. It has indelibly shaped Eritrean identity, postindependence developments, and the patterns of migration that led Eritreans to form a global diaspora. From 1961 to 1970, the armed struggle for Eritrean independence was led by the ELF. In 1970, splinter factions within the ELF coalesced to form another proindependence movement, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF). In 1974, Emperor Haile Sellassie I of Ethiopia was deposed, and Ethiopia underwent its own internal revolution, leading to the rise of the Derg military regime under Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. In the ensuing decades, conflict wracked the Horn of Africa as the ELF and EPLF fought each other for control over the Eritrean nationalist movement, and at the same time fought against the Ethiopia Derg regime for Eritrean independence. Complicating matters was the global context of the Cold War, in which the Soviet Union backed Ethiopia militarily and politically. The struggle waged by tiny Eritrea, which lacked any superpower sponsorship or external assistance, required enormous sacrifices and commitment by Eritreans, as well as ingenuity and resourcefulness that inspired many observers (Cliffe and Davidson 1988; Connell 1997; Iyob 1995; Hepner 2009; Pateman 1993; Pool 2001). In 1991, after 30 years of warfare, the EPLF liberated Eritrea from Ethiopian rule. Eritreans emerged from the 30-year war dramatically transformed. The differences of region, religion, culture, ethnicity, and language among Eritreans had been overlaid by a common sense of purpose and nationalist unity that enabled the population to endure “against all odds” (Connell 1997). It also entailed some transformations in traditional gender roles (Bernal 2000; Müller 2005; Wilson 1991) and a reorganization of Eritrean society, which the ELF and EPLF initiated during the war in the regions of the country they administered in the shadow of Ethiopian occupation (Connell 1997; Pool 2001). However, some bitter legacies of the independence war lingered among Eritreans. The most significant of these was the intermittent civil war between the ELF and the EPLF (1970–1982) as both guerrilla armies vied for control over the nationalist movement. In 1981, the EPLF began driving the ELF out of Eritrea and into Sudan, where many ELF fighters, their families, and affiliated civilians became refugees. While some former ELF members rejoined the struggle with EPLF, others remained in Sudan or registered for refugee resettlement and began new lives
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in the United States, Canada, Europe, or Australia. In 1991, the EPLF became the Provisional Government of Eritrea, and in 1994, the Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice, or PFDJ, was formed as Eritrea’s ruling (and to date, only) political party. For all intents and purposes, the PFDJ is the postindependence incarnation of the EPLF and represents the transition of Eritrea’s leadership from a guerrilla movement to a government (Pool 2001).
Causes and Waves of Migration Migration from Eritrea has largely been involuntary, the result of warfare and political conflict in the Horn of Africa. The first large-scale waves of refugees fled the lowland areas of Eritrea in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of the rise of the pro-independence armed struggle and the violent efforts by the Ethiopian monarchy to stamp out resistance. Between 1967 and 1975, approximately 85,000 Eritreans fled to Sudan. By the end of 1981, 419,000 Eritrean refugees were in Sudan and tens of thousands more had fled to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (Killion 1998, 357–58). At the war’s end in 1991, an estimated 850,000 to 1 million refugees were outside Eritrea, with more than two-thirds of those in Sudan. While many of these refugees were ultimately resettled to places like the United States, Canada, Europe, and Australia, most Eritrean refugees in Sudan stayed there for the duration of the war and after independence (see Bariagaber 2006; Koehn 1991). Overall, an estimated one-quarter to one-third of the entire population left the country in 1961–1991 due to conflict and other exacerbating factors such as famine and drought, and hundreds of thousands more were internally displaced. Despite concerted efforts undertaken by the new Eritrean government to repatriate refugees from Sudan after independence, some unofficial figures published on Eritrean Web sites indicate that in 1997 as many 550,000 Eritreans still remained in Sudan. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) indicated that just over 300,000 refugees remained in Sudan in 1997 (see Figure 11). Both numbers contrast with the Eritrean government’s figures of only 150,000 remaining in Sudan that same year, following several years of repatriation programs designed to bring refugees back to Eritrea. The discrepancies in the various figures available for Eritrean refugee populations is a persistent problem in determining the total number of Eritreans in the diaspora, as well their distribution by world region or country. While it is clear that most Eritreans in the diaspora continue to reside in neighboring countries like Sudan and Ethiopia, the exact figures continue to elude researchers. The numbers are also complicated by the fact that refugee movements are unstable; people may flee the country and then return, only to leave again. Additionally, refugee numbers are often politically contentious and subject to either
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artificial inflation or de-emphasis depending upon the interests of the political actors, governments, and nongovernmental organizations involved. Figure 11 shows the numbers of Eritrean refugees in Sudan from 1991 to 2009. Migration from Eritrea slowed dramatically after independence, but less than a decade later began rising again. Two major developments in the postindependence period influenced further migration: the 1998–2000 Ethiopian-Eritrean border war, and internal political issues in Eritrea that came to a head in mid-2001. The Ethiopian-Eritrean border war began in May 1998 after a skirmish at the border town of Badme erupted into full-scale fighting. The ensuing war claimed as many as 100,000 lives; an estimated 60,000 of those were young Eritrean men and women. Despite a peace agreement signed at Algiers in December 2000, the demarcation of the border by an international boundary commission in 2006, and the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping mission (forced to withdraw in 2008), political relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia have remained tense and volatile. In addition to the displacement of an estimated 1 million people living on both sides of the border, more than 70,000 people of Eritrean background were forcibly deported from Ethiopia to Eritrea. Some of these deportees were born and raised in Ethiopia and had never lived in Eritrea. While some remained in Eritrea following deportation, others later fled back to Ethiopia and registered with the UNHCR as refugees. Some left the refugee camps or avoided them altogether and migrated back to urban centers like Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. In August 2010, the Ethiopian government announced an out-camping policy that allows UNHCRregistered Eritrean refugees to reside where they choose in Ethiopia if they are able to provide for themselves or have a relative or friend who commits to help support them (UNHCR 2010). While UNHCR estimates that more than 60,000 Eritreans fled to Ethiopia since the 1998–2000 border war with Ethiopia, only about half of those remain in Ethiopia today (UNHCR 2010). Figure 12 shows the UNHCR’s data on the numbers of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia since 2000. The consequences of the border war on Eritrean society have been negative. Initially, many Eritreans at home and in the diaspora responded with renewed nationalist commitment to defend the sovereignty of their country. Soon afterwards, however, critical questions about political reform and democratization were raised by members of the Eritrean government, journalists, religious leaders, university students, and Eritreans living in the diaspora. Although Eritrea’s constitution was ratified in 1997, the PFDJ government, led by President Isayas Afewerki, has not implemented it. Additionally, Eritrea’s first democratic elections scheduled for December 2001 were canceled, and the formation of competing political parties was banned by the only existing party, the ruling PFDJ. There were additional concerns about the fact that many people conscripted into the military and national service were being held there long after completing the required six months of combat training and 18 months of service.
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In mid-2001, criticisms of the PFDJ party, and especially of President Isayas Afewerki, became visible in Eritrea’s limited but lively public sphere. Fifteen members of the government authored a critical open letter wherein they called for liberal democratic reforms in the political and economic arenas. University students formed an independent union and protested mandatory summer work programs; the Catholic bishops condemned war and militarism in their 2001 pastoral letter; and the burgeoning independent media published articles and interviews related to these developments. Citing national security concerns, the government of Eritrea sent the university students to labor camps in the desert; silenced the Catholic bishops and other religious leaders; closed all private presses; and arrested most of the journalists and 11 of the government officials who had authored the open letter. In 2002, the PFDJ then implemented a strict policy on the registration and regulation of all religious bodies. Minority Christian churches (nondenominational evangelical and Pentecostal) were shut down and pastors and laypeople were arrested for allegedly failing to comply with the registration and regulation policies. The government also forbade home-based gatherings of minority Christians and banned the possession of Bibles or the holding of prayer groups among military conscripts. Many of those arrested remain in prison several years later with little likelihood of receiving a fair hearing. Recent refugees and asylum seekers from Eritrea who have been targeted for their religious beliefs or practices describe extremely harsh conditions in detention, including the use of torture (Amnesty International 2005). The government also asserted control over Islamic institutions, the Orthodox Church, and the Roman Catholic Church, including detaining Muslim clerics and practitioners without charge, removing the former patriarch of the Orthodox Church and placing him under house arrest, and requiring priests to enter the military. Human rights groups and the U.S. government have criticized Eritrea for violating fundamental rights to freedom of religion and conscience under the terms of international customary law and the binding international conventions the Eritrean government has signed. In 2004, the State Department designated Eritrea as a “Country of Particular Concern,” under recommendation from the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). Eritrea is currently ranked by international organizations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Reporters without Borders as among the most repressive governments in the world, with the highest number of journalists imprisoned on the African continent and third in the world behind North Korea and Turkmenistan in lack of press freedom. Forced migration from Eritrea has risen dramatically since 2000–2001, as a result of these developments. Many of those now leaving Eritrea are young men and women who were conscripted into the military for indefinite periods of time. In 2002, Eritrea ranked third among all countries with the highest net migration
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losses, with 13.6 people per 1,000 leaving the country annually (U.S. Agency for International Development 2004, 29). Sudan and Ethiopia continue to be the countries of first asylum for most new Eritrean refugees. Since 2000, as many as 18,000 Eritreans have registered in Shimelba refugee camp, located in northern Ethiopia, near the disputed border. An estimated 500–800 people continue to arrive in Ethiopia each month (with some figures as high as 1,500) and at least as many are estimated to flee across the Sudanese border (Harmon-Gross 2009; Refugees International 2008). While some remain in Sudan and Ethiopia to seek protection from the UNHCR, others undertake dangerous journeys to Egypt, in hopes of arriving in Israel, or to Libya, where they might attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe by way of Malta or the Italian island of Lampedusa. While en route, these refugees face harsh environmental conditions, extreme exploitation, vulnerability to trafficking, detention, rape, torture, and deportation. Many do not survive the journey, while others are forcibly returned to Eritrea, such as the more than 1,000 refugees who were deported from Egypt in 2008 (Amnesty International 2008).The primary reasons refugees give for their departure from Eritrea today are political repression, religious persecution, and forced conscription. Compounding factors include drought, severe food shortages, and general economic hardship.
Early Immigration Among the earliest migrants were those who left the country prior to the independence war, either to seek work or education in neighboring countries, or because their political opinions made them vulnerable to violence or persecution. Other early migrants left in the 1950s and early 1960s, under the auspices of Emperor Haile Selassie’s modernization programs, to become university students abroad (Balsvik 1985). Dozens of these privileged young people came to the United States, and many later became political activists on behalf of independence in Eritrea (Hepner 2009). But most migrants from Eritrea fit the definition of a refugee as specified in the 1951 International Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. By this definition, a refugee is anyone who crosses an international border and cannot return to his or her country of origin due to past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a social group. Under the 1965 Immigration Act, the United States mandated that a small percentage of all immigrants admitted could be those who fit the definition of a convention refugee. These were called “seventh-preference” immigrants, and a small number of Eritreans were admitted to the United States in the 1970s under this mandate (Koehn 1991, 151). Many of these people remained in the United States as conflict in the Horn of Africa escalated. They formed the
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foundations of the contemporary Eritrean diaspora and were instrumental in creating political and social organizations that supported the independence struggle in Eritrea (Hepner 2009).
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separatism Many of the earliest immigrants from Eritrea tended to identify as Ethiopians until around 1970, when the war of independence in Eritrea, and the nationalist movements leading it, reached a critical stage. At that point, Eritreans began separating from Ethiopians and formulating their own political and social organizations. These organizations’ agendas, and Eritrean nationalist identity in the United States, also took shape in relationship to post–civil rights movements, black nationalism, and various anticolonial struggles among immigrants from colonized countries.
Later Waves of Immigration Immigration Act of 1965 and Succeeding Legislation While very few Eritreans arrived under the provisions of the 1965 Immigration Act, most arrived in the United States following the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which opened the country to refugee resettlement from nations of the global South. Tens of thousands of Eritreans then came to the United States under the auspices of the UNHCR, the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR), and other voluntary agencies that sponsor and assist refugees. However, because Eritrea was not yet an independent country, determining exactly how many Eritreans were among those categorized as Ethiopians is impossible (Koehn 1991; Woldemikael 1998). Ethnographic research on Eritreans in the United States suggests that many of the Eritreans who were resettled as refugees from Sudan in the 1980s had been affiliated with the ELF either as fighters, family members of fighters, or affiliated civilians. Others had been affiliated with the EPLF, and still others simply fled the fighting in Eritrea and were not members of any political organizations.
From the Immigration Reform and Control Act to the Present The large-scale resettlement of Eritrean refugees ceased following independence in 1991–1993. However, migration continued through various avenues such as Family Reunification, a component of both the 1965 Immigration Act, wherein family members of resettled individuals were able to join their relatives in the United States, and also through the Diversity Visa lottery system, a component of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1990. Additionally, some individual Eritreans who arrived in the United States by their own means were able to seek legal status through asylum procedures or legal marriage to American citizens.
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The asylum process is a domestic one in which people may remain in the United States if they have been persecuted in their home country for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a social group, or if they fear future persecution on one or more of these grounds if they return home. According to statistics published by UNHCR, a total of 21,469 Eritreans filed for asylum in industrialized countries of the global North in 2007–2008, with an increase of 34 percent over the course of the year (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] 2009); 738 Eritreans applied for asylum in the United States in 2007 and 2008 (UNHCR 2009). Figure 13 shows the numbers of asylum applications filed by Eritreans in the United States from 1999 to 2009. Although the numbers of asylum applications filed are important indicators of the conditions that cause migration, they nonetheless represent a small percentage of the total numbers of migrants from Eritrea in recent years. The bulk of Eritreans who have left their country and would like to come to the United States must remain in refugee camps until they are accepted and formally resettled by the UNHCR and cooperating agencies. In July 2007, the United States began receiving the first of a total of 700 Eritrean refugees of Kunama ethnicity (UNHCR 2007), and in November 2008, it was announced that the United States would accept as many as 6,500 resettled refugees from Shimelba camp in northern Ethiopia in 2009–2010 (Harmon-Gross 2009). It is uncertain whether the United States will meet this stated figure. Moreover, U.S. policies adopted in the past decade, such as the Patriot Act and related legislation, as well as the increasing rates of detention at American ports of entry, have encouraged would-be migrants to apply for protection in states with more generous asylum laws, such as Canada and the United Kingdom.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community While the Eritrean population in the United States will continue to grow as new migrants arrive and as children are born to Eritrean parents already living in America, reliable figures remain elusive. The numbers available tend to vary considerably and represent little more than estimates. One problem is that Eritreans were counted as Ethiopians until 1993. Following independence, the Embassy of Eritrea gathered data on Eritreans in the United States for the purposes of the national referendum of 1993. Based upon those figures, the Embassy estimated the adult Eritrean population in 2003 at 30,000–40,000 (Hepner 2009, 106). However, many Eritreans did not register with the embassy for various reasons, so this number is probably low. In 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau indicated that the total Eritrean population in the United States was 17, 520—roughly half of the Eritrean Embassy’s figure of seven years earlier. Again, the U.S. Census data is likely much lower than the actual numbers of
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Eritreans living in America. Other estimates suggest as many as 100,000 Eritreans may live in the United States (Hepner and Conrad 2005). This high figure allows for undocumented migrants, unprocessed asylum seekers, children born in the United States who identify as ethnically Eritrean, and those who did not participate in either the Eritrean referendum or the 2000 Census. It is hoped that the 2010 Census will provide more reliable data on the total population of Eritreans in the United States. There are also no reliable figures on the highest concentrations of Eritreans by city, state, or region. Certain cities are informally recognized as hubs for Eritrean activity, however. These include Atlanta, Georgia; Dallas, Texas; the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Area (including San Jose); and the greater Washington, D.C., area (including Virginia and Maryland). However, many other U.S. cities (including Chicago, Illinois; Columbus, Ohio; Denver, Colorado; Seattle, Washington; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Indianapolis, Indiana; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Los Angeles and San Diego, California) also have Eritrean populations in the thousands. Indeed, there are Eritreans living in most if not all U.S. states, if only in very small numbers. Compared to other immigrant groups in the United States, Eritreans remain a very small population overall. These numbers and patterns of residential distribution by state are reflected in the 2009 data provided by the Department of Homeland Security on the numbers of Eritreans who obtained legal permanent resident (LPR) status in the United States from 2000 to 2009. Eritreans in America form a close-knit community. In particular, the war for independence from Ethiopia produced an extremely strong sense of national identity and a collective commitment to supporting the state. Sacrifice, resourcefulness, courage, self-reliance, and tenacity are some of the most highly valued Eritrean characteristics, and these have served people well both in Eritrea and in the United States. As black immigrants, Eritreans share some common experiences with other peoples of African descent, including racial discrimination and stereotyping. Many Eritrean American young people self-identify as African American while also embracing their Eritrean heritage. While some important differences among Eritreans exist based on region of origin, religion, ethnicity, language, and political opinion, Eritreans remain deeply attached to the unique cultural characteristics and historical experiences that define them as a national population. For most Eritreans, and especially those who were born in Eritrea, their lives and identities remain tightly bound to the home country. Many continue to hope that they will one day return to Eritrea permanently. More than half of all Eritreans participating in the 2000 Census reported that they were not naturalized U.S. citizens. Because of patterns of selection in U.S. refugee resettlement procedures, most Eritreans in the United States are Christian and hail from the highland, Tigrinyaspeaking regions of the country (Koehn 1991; Woldemikael 1998). While there are appreciable numbers of Muslims and people of non-Tigrinya ethnic backgrounds, the Eritrean American population is not representative of the diversity of Eritrea itself. Moreover, the historical experience of the independence war strongly
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Members of the Eritrean American community march near the White House in protest of the alleged occupation by the Ethiopian military of Eritrean sovereign territories, February 13, 2006. The hundreds of peaceful protestors demanded the U.S. government enforce the Eritrean-Ethiopian ruling demarcating the border. (AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta)
encouraged all Eritreans to de-emphasize their ethnic, regional, and religious identities in favor of the common national one. A positive aspect of nationalism has been a collective emphasis on unity and togetherness amid considerable crises and challenges, such as protracted war, famine, and forced migration. A negative effect has been an intense pressure to conform and a tendency to exclude or dismiss those individuals or groups who do not fit well into mainstream definitions of Eritrean identity. Subnational identities and loyalties continue to exist among Eritreans, and in recent years, there have been concerted efforts among some community leaders to draw attention to differences within the community as healthy and necessary for a tolerant, democratically oriented society. Some also view the strong form of nationalism inherited from the independence struggle as inhibiting to the development of social and political democratization in Eritrea.
Age and Family Structure According to the 2000 U.S. Census data, the median age of Eritreans in the United States is 36 years, and the majority of the adult population (55.6%) is married. However, there is a significant percentage of households that do not constitute families
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as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau (30.3%) and female-headed households with no husband present (12.5%).
Educational Attainment According to the 2000 U.S. Census data, Eritreans generally show high levels of educational attainment, with 72.2 percent completing high school, and 19.9 percent earning a college degree or higher. Ethnographic research in Eritrean American communities and anecdotal information indicates that Eritreans tend to place an extremely high premium on education, and many people born in the United States or who arrived as children have entered into the white-collar labor force as doctors, lawyers, engineers, and teachers or university professors. Many of those who arrived in the United States as adults have also attained high levels of education and entered white-collar professions, while many others, including those who came as resettled refugees, have found employment as hotel and hospitality workers, childcare givers, taxicab drivers, and restaurant staff. Because so many of the people now leaving Eritrea and seeking resettlement in the United States either through UNHCR sponsorship or domestic asylum claims are university educated (Refugees International 2008), we can expect both educational and income trajectories to increase in the coming decade.
Economic Attainment According to 2000 U.S. Census data, the median household income of Eritreans in America is reported to be $33,284, with 20 percent of all households reporting an income range of $50,000–$74,000; and 70.8 percent of the population is in the active labor force. The major occupational sectors for Eritreans include 24.9 percent in service occupations; 23.8 percent in management, professional and related occupations; 22.2 percent in production, transportation, and material moving occupations; and 22.1 percent in educational, health, and social services.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Extended ties of kinship are of central importance to Eritreans. In some ways, Eritreans view the entire national population both in Eritrea and the diaspora as one large family. Although regional, ethnic, and religious variations exist in marking life-cycle events, Eritreans of all backgrounds and political views typically come together for all kinds of occasions. Of notable importance are traditions such as the
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equb, or informal rotating credit pool, where community members contribute sums of money to assist with expenses for funerals, weddings, baptisms, and holiday celebrations. During the enda hazen, or funeral wake, large numbers of people visit the grieving family and bring contributions of money or food. Weddings (mera’a) are enormously popular affairs and in the Orthodox Christian Tigrinya tradition especially, entail three days of events, including a religious ceremony on the first day and the melsi, or “homecoming” party, for the bride and groom, on the second day. During the melsi, the bride and groom wear elaborate capes embroidered with thick gold thread and sit on a platform above their guests, who gather to eat traditional foods like injera (spongy pancake bread) and tsebhee (meat stew) on huge round platters set on colorful baskets called mesob, and to drink sewa (mead) or mies (honey wine). After the meal, people dance in the unique shoulder-jerking circular fashion called gwyla and play the keboro (drum) and traditional stringed instruments like the kraar (lyre).
Families and Changing Gender Relations Eritrean society is both hierarchical and patriarchal, with elder men typically holding the greatest power and prestige. Most Eritrean ethnic groups also trace descent patrilineally, or through the male line. While there are some variations among different Eritrean ethnic groups, such as the matrilineal Kunama and Nara, who trace descent through the female line (Favali and Pateman 2003), cultural norms have historically favored males over females. During the long war of independence from Ethiopia, the EPLF made considerable changes relating to gender and the family, including abolishing child betrothal, altering inheritance and land tenure practices that exclusively benefited males, and empowering women from the village to the national level. While these changes were widely lauded during the independence war (see Wilson 1991; Müller 2005), women’s gains have not been retained as extensively and effectively after independence (Bernal 2000). Elements of family and gender relations have continued to change as Eritreans have acculturated to the United States. Eritrean women have found many opportunities to excel in their educational and career choices in the United States and have enjoyed greater equity with men overall. At the same time, Eritrean American men and women often feel disquieted by what they feel is a discernible lack of respect for age and authority among American youth, and they strive to inculcate more traditional values of respect for age and authority in their children. Many Eritrean gatherings in the United States, especially those of a secular, political nature, are also overwhelmingly dominated by men with few women participating. Data on the most recent refugee movements from Eritrea also indicate that the bulk of those leaving Eritrea today are young men, which may further alter the gender, age, and family composition of Eritrean American communities.
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Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Eritrean Americans have a well-developed sense of national identity and are strongly oriented towards the culture and politics of their society of origin. The government of Eritrea also makes concerted efforts to maintain linkages with its citizens living in the United States and elsewhere (Hepner 2009). Secular social and political organizations are abundant among Eritrean Americans and have been a major feature of community life for decades. During the independence war, the EPLF established chapters of the front in the United States and in other diaspora locations, where people met to discuss political issues and raise funds for the independence movement. Additionally, the EPLF set up chapters of mass organizations that were initially founded in Eritrea; these include the National Union of Women and the National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students. Many Eritreans joined these mass organizations during the war, although they also remained popular after independence. Chapters of the Eritrean Relief Association were also active throughout the diaspora. In the late 1980s and 1990s, the EPLF and then the Provisional Government of Eritrea strongly encouraged the formation of Eritrean community associations worldwide, and these continue to function throughout the United States and elsewhere. After 1994, chapters of the EPLF became chapters of the PFDJ party. Members of the PFDJ are expected by the government of Eritrea and the Eritrean Embassy in the United States to actively recruit their compatriots and to take a leading role in organizing the Eritrean diaspora overall. In addition, the government of Eritrea, via the Embassy and the PFDJ chapters, levies a 2 percent annual flat tax on all Eritrean adults living in the diaspora. While the government does not necessarily enforce the payment of taxes, failure to meet one’s tax obligations can result in a lack of support or cooperation on the part of the embassy or the government of Eritrea. It has been estimated that at least 34.4 percent of Eritrea’s gross national product (GNP) comes from diaspora tax payments and other remittances (Fessehatzion 2005). Because the mass organizations and the political party chapters, as well as the community associations, were viewed as being controlled by the general administration of the Eritrean government, those Eritreans who wished to remain independent or were critical of EPLF and later PFDJ have resisted joining these organizations. In addition, because political parties and independent civil society organizations are not permitted to form in Eritrea itself, these have proliferated extensively in the diaspora. Many alternative social and political organizations have been created by Eritreans over the years, including chapters of the ELF and other parties such the Eritrean Peoples Party (EPP), the Eritrean Democratic Party (EDP), the Peoples Democratic Front for the Liberation of Eritrea (PDFLE), and others. Some of these have joined coalitions, such as the Eritrean Democratic Alliance, which has received some political and financial support from Ethiopia. Because the Eritrean
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and Ethiopian governments remain hostile to one another, Ethiopia has tended to support Eritrean opposition movements whose goal is regime change. In addition to political groups, civic associations have also formed, and in recent years, these have become important platforms for articulating Eritrean concerns about democratization and human rights. These civic organizations advocate establishing democratic “rules of the game” in both Eritrea and the diaspora and do not endorse any particular political group. They also strive to address issues of immediate concern to Eritreans in the United States, such as assisting newly arriving refugees and asylum seekers, and engaging in dialogue with the U.S. government regarding its policies in the Horn of Africa. These organizations also attempt to challenge the ability of the Eritrean government to affect the U.S. diaspora through taxation and what some regard as intimidation practices, which include the photographing and videotaping of people who attend political and social events that are not endorsed by the PFDJ.
Religion As noted earlier, Eritreans are religiously diverse and nearly evenly divided among Muslims and Christians. Most Eritreans in the United States are Christian, however, and belong to different traditions and denominations. The Eritrean Orthodox Church (Tewahdo) North American Diocese is based in Atlanta, with many satellite churches scattered throughout the United States. Since the 2006 deposing and house arrest of the Patriarch in Eritrea, Abune Antonios, a split has occurred among those Orthodox churches that continue to support Abune Antonios, and those that support the new church leadership in Eritrea. In many cities there are also Eritrean Catholic congregations and numerous nondenominational, evangelical, or Pentecostal congregations that conduct services in Tigrinya or other Eritrean languages. In cities without large Eritrean concentrations, people may attend Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Lutheran, or other nondenominational churches. Eritrean Muslims tend to worship in multi-ethnic mosques, although the Eritrean Muslim Council has held an annual meeting in the United States since 2002 to discuss issues of concern and coordinate activities within their respective communities. The most important religious holidays among Eritreans in America include Fasika (Orthodox Easter), Ledet (Christmas), Meskel (Day of the True Cross), Timkat (Day of Jesus’ Baptism), Ramadan (Muslim holy month), and Eid (the final day of Ramadan).
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media Although the media is restricted in Eritrea and all newspapers, television stations, and radio are government owned and operated, Eritreans in the United States and other diaspora locations have developed a lively public sphere that consists of perhaps
Adjustment and Adaptation | 637
Members of the Washington, D.C.-area Eritrean community gather to celebrate the 15th anniversary of Eritrean independence, May 28, 2006. (Marvin Joseph/The Washington Post/ Getty Images)
hundreds of Web sites and several radio stations. Some print newspapers in Tigrinya and Arabic are available in the United States, but Web sites and radio tend to be most popular among Eritrean Americans. Eritreans in the United States are able to access both state-run media from Eritrea as well as independent media operated from the global diaspora. Among the most well-trafficked of all Eritrean Web sites are www. asmarino.com, www.awate.com, www.shabait.com, and www.shaebia.org, which is the official Web site of the Eritrean government. In addition to the state-run Radio Dimtsi Hafash, which Eritreans in the United States may pick up on the Internet and in some local communities, there are at least two radio stations that utilize satellite and other technologies to reach Eritrea and its diaspora communities. These include the Voice of Meselna Delina (VoMD), which is broadcasted by Eritreans living in South Africa; and Radio Assenna, which airs from the United Kingdom. In a recent survey of Eritrean Internet usage in the diaspora, Stewart (2008) found that the Eritreans in the United States represented the majority (34.4%) of all users in the global diaspora. The demographic profile of Eritrean Internet users is largely males (82%) within the age range of 25–49, half of whom have completed a university education, and 45 percent of whom work in the professional or managerial sector. The vast majority of users reported daily Internet usage for the primary purpose of seeking news and information about Eritrea (Stewart 2008).
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Celebration of National Holidays The largest and most significant national holidays celebrated by Eritreans in America include Ma’alti Natsinet (Independence Day, May 24) and Ma’alti Sema’tat (Martyrs’ Day, June 20). Other holidays, such as International Women’s Day (March 8), are often celebrated by Eritreans as well. Most holiday celebrations include a party with live music, food, speeches or toasts, and collective dancing (gwyla).
Foodways Eritreans are renowned for their hospitality and their generosity with food, despite a history of cyclical famine and chronic food insecurity in the Horn of Africa. Eritrean cuisine is very similar to Ethiopian cuisine: large, round, spongy pancake-like bread (injera) made of fermented grain (teff, which is native to the region, or wheat) is placed on a large round platter, over which flavorful meat and vegetarian stews are ladled and then eaten collectively by hand, using small pieces of the injera to scoop up the stews. Most stews are prepared using spiced butter called tesmi and the unique spice blend known as berbere, consisting of red pepper, cardamom, cloves, and other spices. The act of eating together in groups from a single large platter is important for enacting ties of social solidarity, and eating companions will sometimes feed one another a bite in a gesture of affection known as gorsha. For breakfast, Eritreans enjoy foods like fool, or cooked fava beans served with spicy green pepper, melted butter, and yogurt; and frittata, or scrambled eggs with diced tomatoes, onions, and spicy green pepper, which is eaten by hand with freshly baked rolls. Italian cuisine such as spaghetti, lasagna, pizza, and pastries with cappuccino, espresso, or macchiato is also very popular. Perhaps one of the most famous of Eritrean traditions is the coffee (boon) ceremony. Prepared by women and girls for both everyday and special occasions, the green coffee beans are carefully roasted over a small coal fire or stove, and the fragrant smoke is wafted over the guests while incense is burned. The beans are then crushed and funneled into a clay coffee pot called djebena. The coffee is boiled and consumed in three separate rounds, sipped from small cups with or without sugar and milk. Popcorn, often with peanuts and raisins or simply sprinkled with sugar, is passed around with the coffee. Tea boiled with cardamom, cinnamon, and cloves (shahi) is also a popular drink, often enjoyed with thick, sweet bread called hembasha.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Eritreans adore the unique sounds of their cultural music, which varies from region to region, but overall reflects the twin influences of Arab and African. Drums known as keboro are more typically used for ritual occasions and holidays. Popular music
Adjustment and Adaptation | 639
tends to rely on synthesized beats with stringed instruments like guitars and the kraar, or traditional lyre, to which collective dancing known as gwyla is performed in a circle, with dancers jerking their shoulders to and fro, bending down low, or jumping high in the air, sometimes with great virtuosity. Features of music and dance common to Eritrea’s nine different ethnic groups, each celebrated in Eritrea for their uniqueness, nonetheless come together in an interesting blend of styles. In the United States and other parts of the diaspora, these styles not only blend with one another, but sometimes with other Afrocentric influences such as reggae and hip-hop. Eritrea has a long history of utilizing a specific artistic form that is most often exemplified in the iconography of the Orthodox Christian tradition. Beautiful stylized figures of dark-skinned people with large eyes, delicate features, and bushy hair
Mawi Asgedom An Eritrean Refugee Is Harvard Graduate and Guide to Success Mawi Asgedom came to the United States as a resettled refugee when he was a child and went on to graduate from Harvard University. Now a nationally recognized youth educator, Mawi is the founder of Mental Karate, a training organization that challenges youth to create their own inspiring journeys. He has written four books that are used in thousands of classrooms across North America and has spoken to over 500,000 students and educators. In addition to the bestselling memoir, Of Beetles and Angels: A Boy’s Remarkable Journey from a Refugee Camp to Harvard, Mawi has written three teen-success (Courtesy of Mawi Asgedom) guides, The Code, Win the Inner Battle, and Nothing is Impossible. Mawi has hosted a yearlong teen series on PBS Chicago and many prominent media outlets have featured him including The Oprah Winfrey Show, ESSENCE magazine’s “The 40 Most Inspiring African-Americans,” and Ebony magazine’s “30 Black Leaders Under 30.”
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dominate this “traditional” art form, which frequently appears in murals, triptychs, and other modes through which pictures narrate a story. In the religious context, the stories are often derived from the Bible, but this art form has also influenced contemporary artists. One such Eritrean American artist is Seattle resident Yegizaw “Yeggy” Michael, whose painting entitled “Apartment Life in Seattle” blends elements of traditional Eritrean art with modern international styles and offers a commentary on refugee and immigrant African life in the United States. Theater and film have also enjoyed a lively audience among Eritrean Americans, who are avid consumers of television dramas, feature-length films, and music videos produced in Eritrea and marketed in the United States and other diaspora locations. Being able to enjoy artistic productions from their home country has helped Eritrean Americans feel connected to their society and culture, and exposes younger people born and raised abroad to the musical, dramatic, and artistic styles of Eritrea.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths Toward Citizenship Naturalization As noted previously, U.S. Census data from 2000 indicates than less than half of all Eritreans in the United States have obtained American citizenship. This is not surprising, given the history of nationalist mobilization among Eritreans at home and abroad, and the institutionalized manner in which the EPLF and later the PFDJ exerted administrative and ideological influence in Eritrean American communities (Hepner 2009). One legacy of Eritrea’s independence struggle has been the tendency for Eritreans living in the United States to remain oriented towards Eritrea. With some exceptions, first-generation migrants from Eritrea have not yet fully entered into the mainstream of American political and social life, and most remain overwhelmingly concerned with developments in Eritrea. While some efforts have been made at interfacing with the U.S. government on American policy in Eritrea and the greater Horn of Africa, especially in the past few years, the Eritrean American community does not yet comprise a unified or consistently visible ethnic lobby.
Dual Citizenship The decision to secure American citizenship is likely affected by the policies of the Eritrean government. According to the 1992 Proclamation on Citizenship, the Eritrean government recognizes all people born to at least one Eritrean parent anywhere
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in the world as citizens of Eritrea, with the requisite rights and obligations (Hepner 2009, 155–56). According to the U.S. State Department, the Eritrean government does not recognize the renunciation of Eritrean citizenship. And while it does recognize dual citizenship of Eritreans residing in other countries, it reserves the right to treat all visiting Eritreans as if they were local residents, including drafting them into the military or requiring exit visas upon departure (U.S. Department of State 2008). For some Eritreans, becoming a U.S. citizen is undesirable because it suggests that one is no longer primarily committed to Eritrea. For others, U.S. citizenship represents an important declaration of autonomy or even political dissent. For still others, obtaining American citizenship is important for developing a more visible presence and forming an ethnic lobby in the United States.
Intergroup Relations By and large, Eritrean Americans remain oriented towards their own community and concerned with intragroup dynamics and relationships. And despite a long history of warfare and conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, ties of kinship and culture mean that Eritreans and Ethiopians continue to interact with one another in the United States to various degrees. Some sectors of the Eritrean American community advocate for strengthening ties with other Horn of Africa populations, including Ethiopians, Somalis, and Sudanese, or developing better relationships with African Americans. Overall this has not been a dominant trend.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Despite an enduring political and cultural orientation towards their country of origin, Eritreans have also forged a new American identity. This is especially true of second- and third-generation young people who were born and raised in the United States. As noted earlier, many American-born Eritreans identify simultaneously as Eritrean, American, and African American. For their Eritrean-born parents, these changing identities and the historical challenges associated with being black in America have sometimes been sources of anxiety and concern. Like many other immigrant groups, first-generation immigrants from Eritrea would like to see their children preserve their distinctive cultural identities, including language abilities and values like respect for elders and authority figures. Nevertheless, Eritrean families in the United States have had to face common problems of urban life in America, such as gang activity, drug use, teenage pregnancy, and suicide. This has been especially true in large cities like Seattle and Los Angeles.
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Educational Attainment At the same time, many Eritrean American youth have excelled in their educational and career choices, and Eritrean communities in the United States frequently organize ceremonies recognizing the achievements of their young people. As noted earlier, Eritreans place an extremely high premium on education and a strong work ethic, and children are supported and encouraged by their parents to set and achieve goals. It is not uncommon to find Eritrean American young people attending topnotch universities, such as Mawi Asgedom, who attended Harvard University.
Cultural Identification Some Eritrean communities in the United States have utilized the existing Eritrean community associations to provide support for Eritrean youth in America, and the U.S. branch of the Eritrea-based National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students purports to do the same. But because most established Eritrean institutions in the United States have historically been mandated by the EPLF or the PFDJ in Eritrea, considerable pressures are exerted on young people to remain oriented towards Eritrea. As a result, many Eritrean American youth have felt that their needs, concerns, and cultural realities in the United States have been inadequately addressed in their ethnic community at large. In addition, many American-born youth, and even those who migrated recently from Eritrea, have had trouble relating to the concerns of their elders vis-à-vis Eritrea. It should be noted, however, that Eritreans of all ages have made considerable, if not always lasting efforts, to effectively address the specific needs of Eritrean American young people. Recently, the PFDJ party has promoted a youth wing in diaspora communities known as the YPFDJ. It remains to be seen whether this organization will serve the needs of Eritrean Americans or represent another institutional avenue through which Eritreans in America are encouraged to remain oriented towards Eritrea and the current government.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Eritrea Since the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war of 1998–2000, relations between Eritrea and the United States have deteriorated. With the exception of the 1974–1991 era, when Ethiopia was supported by the Soviet Union, the United States has identified with Ethiopia as its primary ally in the Horn of Africa. Since relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia soured in 1998, the Eritrean government has perceived the United States as consistently favoring Ethiopia in the border dispute and in other important ways politically and economically.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Eritrea
Yegizaw Michael A Successful Young Eritrean Artist Yegizaw Michael, also known as Yeggy, is a successful artist whose work has been exhibited widely throughout Africa, Europe, and the United States of America. Eritrean by nationality, Yeggy was born in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where he grew up during the Eritrean struggle for independence. From 1987 to 1990, he attended the School of Fine Arts in Addis Ababa, before he fled to Kenya due to political unrest. In Kenya, Yeggy continued to develop and shape his unique artistic style, and in 1995 he won the “Best Artist of the Year” award. In 1997, Yeggy initiated, organized, and directed the “Artists Against AIDS” campaign in Eritrea. In 1996 and 1997 he consecutively won Eri(Courtesy of Yegizaw Michael) trea’s highest annual national art award, the Raimok Award. Yeggy came to the United States in 1998 as an International Artist-In-Residence, sponsored by the Africa World Press. He also did further work as a resident at Penn State University, Smith College, and the Griffis Art Center. Yeggy has created public art murals and mosaics that adorn banks, residences, restaurants, clubs, museums, and theater sets. In 2009, Yeggy’s paintings were exhibited in New York City, in a show entitled Crossings: A Visual Exploration of Crisis. The pieces presented in the exhibition, like much of Yeggy’s work, depict the challenges of migration from the Horn of Africa and of immigrant and refugee life in the United States of America. Yeggy has approached his art with a sense of purpose and a firm commitment to social justice and activism. He has organized art therapy workshops, art class for middle, high school, and community centers in his hometown of Seattle, WA. His Web site, www.yeggystudio.com, features information about his work, current and past exhibitions, and other activities and projects.
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Nonetheless, Eritrea was a member of the President G. W. Bush’s “Coalition of the Willing” at the start of the U.S.-led War on Terror, and in late 2002, President Isayas Afwerki engaged in dialogue with then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld regarding the potential establishment of an American military base on Eritrea’s coast. (The United States ultimately decided to partner with Eritrea’s smaller neighbor, Djibouti, rather than proceed in Eritrea). Thus, initial moves towards a stronger partnership between Eritrea and the United States were shunted. As the United States grew increasingly concerned with political developments in the Horn of Africa with respect to the War on Terror, Eritrea eventually emerged on the “wrong” side of the issues. In particular, U.S. intelligence sources have claimed that Eritrea has provided armaments and political support to the armed opposition in Somalia known as al-Shabab. The United States has supported the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, which has also been backed by Ethiopian forces, who entered Somalia at the invitation of the TFG to provide military support and help stem the growth of radical Islamist militias. Ethiopian forces began withdrawing in January 2009. Eritrea has denied allegations that it is supporting Somali militants, and has sharply condemned American interference in the Horn of Africa. Meanwhile, both the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) pressed the United Nations Security Council in mid-2009 for sanctions on Eritrea due to the allegations that it has armed militants in Somalia. Some observers have noted that both Ethiopia and Eritrea appear to be using Somalia as a proxy to work out their unresolved tensions over their common border; thus, a final resolution to the border issue is understood as key to resolving a host of problems in the Horn of Africa (Hepner and Fredriksson 2007). The United States’s impending resettlement of possibly thousands of Eritrean refugees currently living in Ethiopia is also viewed as a foreign policy choice unfavorable to Eritrea. Relations between the United States and Eritrea have been further embittered by the State Department’s critique of Eritrea’s human rights record. Both the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom have issued annual reports detailing the Eritrean government’s ongoing patterns of political repression, religious persecution, and abuses of military conscripts. The Eritrean government has rejected these critiques and pointed out the United States’s own record of severe human rights violations in relation to the War on Terror. President Isayas Afwerki has also stated that the C.I.A. is largely to blame for encouraging refugees to flee from Eritrea, especially young people who are absconding from the military. Some leaders in the Eritrean American community have asked the Obama administration to take a stronger stand and consider instituting more sanctions on Eritrea, while supporters of the Eritrean government have called for the United States to cease interfering in the Horn of Africa and place sanctions on Ethiopia for refusing
Appendix I: Migration Statistics | 645
the implement the border demarcation according to the ruling of the international boundary commission in 2006.
Forecasts for the 21st Century Eritreans in America are a dynamic, growing ethnic population in the United States. In the coming decades we can expect the Eritrean American community to continue changing, as a result of both new migration and deepening integration into American society. Since the election of Barack Obama as U.S. President in 2008, there have been renewed efforts by both the United States and Eritrea to improve their diplomatic relations, and many in the Eritrean American community are hopeful for the future.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics
Eritrean Refugees in Sudan, 1991–2009 600,000
Number of Refugees
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
19
9 1 9 9 2 9 9 3 9 9 4 9 9 5 9 9 6 9 9 7 9 9 8 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 007 0 0 8 0 0 9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Year
Figure 11 Eritrean refugees in Sudan, 1991–2009 Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Data extracted: 14/03/2010.
Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia, 2000–2009 40,000
Number of Refugees
35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004 2005 Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
Figure 12 Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, 2000–2009 Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Data extracted: 14/03/2010.
Eritrean Asylum Applications in the US, 1999–2009
Numbers of New Applications
600
500
400
300
200
100
0 1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004 Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
Figure 13 Eritrean asylum applications in the United States, 1999–2009 Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Data extracted: 14/03/2010.
646
2009
Table 98 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and country of birth
647
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
382
540
560
556
675
796
1,593
1,081
1,270
1,928
REGION Total Eritrea
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 99 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 by region/country of birth and selected characteristics region/country: Eritrea Leading states of residence Arizona
63
49
14
California
289
163
126
Colorado
114
70
44
Florida
23
14
9
Georgia
107
61
46
Illinois
49
29
20
Maryland
118
56
62
Massachusetts
52
34
18
Michigan
12
8
4
Minnesota
70
41
29
Nevada
78
42
36
New Jersey
13
7
6
New York
23
13
10
North Carolina
46
29
17
Ohio
40
19
21
Pennsylvania
24
15
9
Texas
152
92
60
Virginia
130
69
61
Washington
169
93
76
Other
356
220
136
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix III: Notable Eritrean Americans | 649
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics
Table 100 Selected demographic characteristics of Eritreans in America Sex and age Male
50.7%
Female
49.3%
Median age
36.4
Citizenship Naturalized U.S. citizen
47.3%
Not a U.S. citizen
52.7%
Educational Attainment High school graduate or higher
72.2%
Bachelor’s degree or higher
19.9%
Employment and Major Occupations In labor force
70.8%
Management, professional, and related occupations
23.8%
Service occupations
24.9%
Sales and office occupations
26.0%
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations
22.2%
Income Median household income
$33,284
Median family income
$38,100
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations.
Appendix III: Notable Eritrean Americans Mr. Kassahun Checole is the founder and proprietor of the Red Sea Press, Inc. and the Africa World Press, Inc. Since 1983, the two sister presses have published thousands of high-quality volumes on the history, culture, politics, arts, and literature of Africa and the Diaspora. In addition to its main publishing house in Trenton, New Jersey, the Red Sea Press, Inc. also has an office in the Eritrean capital, Asmara. The Web site of the press is www.africaworldpressbooks.com.
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Ruth Iyob earned her PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara. She is now associate professor of political science and research fellow in the Center for International Studies at the University of Washington, St. Louis. She has published widely on African politics, including the acclaimed volume The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, and Nationalism, 1941–1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1995). She was an observer in the United Nations-sponsored referendum on Eritrean independence in 1993. She has also held both a Mellon Fellowship and a Fulbright Fellowship. Bereket Habte Selassie is William E. Leuchtenburg Professor of African Studies and professor of law at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Perhaps best known for his role in drafting the Eritrean Constitution, he also teaches courses in African civilizations and comparative constitutional law at UNC-Chapel Hill. He has published widely on the historical, cultural, political, and legal issues in Africa and is a highly respected advocate for civil and human rights. Okbazghi (Obi) Sium earned a master of science degree in mechanics and hydraulics from the University of Iowa in 1975 and for 30 years has served as a water resources engineer, first with the Iowa Geological Survey and then the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR). In 2006, he ran for the Minnesota 4th Congressional District on the Republican Party ticket against incumbent Betty McCollum (D). Saleh Younis came to the United States as a resettled refugee in 1982. From 2002 to 2005, he founded and operated a computer aided design drafting (CAD) school called Adulis College, in Sacramento, California, and in 2005 he became president of Pinnacle College, the nation’s first audio engineering institution. Within the Eritrean American community, he is perhaps best known as a founding member of the Awate Foundation and the popular Web site www.Awate.com. He is a prolific and talented writer on matters of Eritrean culture, history, and politics, as well as issues facing the Eritrean American community. He has authored hundreds of essays over the years and in the mid-1990s produced a quarterly magazine called the Eritrean Exponent.
Glossary Abune: Patriarch (of the Orthodox Church). Amiche: An Eritrean person born and raised in Ethiopia. Berbere: Spicy red pepper blend.
Glossary | 651
Boon: Coffee. Djebena: Clay coffee pot. Eid: Muslim holiday; final day of Ramadan. Enda Hazen: Funeral wake. Equb: Informal, mutual rotating credit. Fasika: Orthodox Easter. Fool: Fava beans. Frittata: Fried egg dish with onions, tomatoes, and spicy green pepper. Gorsha: A bite of food placed in a companion’s mouth as a sign of affection. Gwyla: Circular dancing. Hembasha: Round, thick, semi-sweet bread. Injera: Flat, spongy pancake bread. Kebessa: Highlands. Keboro: Drum. Kraar: Stringed instrument similar to a lyre. Ledet: Christmas. Ma’alti Natsinet: Independence Day, May 24. Ma’alti Sema’tat: Martyrs’ Day, June 20. Melsi: Second day of wedding festivities. Mera’a: Wedding. Meskel: Day of the True Cross (Orthodox Christian holiday). Mesob: Large colorful basket used as a table. Metahit: Lowlands. Mies: Honey wine. Ramadan: Muslim holy month. Sewa: Mead. Shahi: Tea brewed with spices. Teff: Native grain to Eritrea and Ethiopia, used to make injera. Tesmi: Spiced butter. Tewahdo: Orthodox Church. Timkat: Baptism of John the Baptist (Orthodox Christian holiday). Tsebhee: Meat stew.
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References Amnesty International. 2005. “Religious Persecution in Eritrea.” AFR 64/031/2005. December 5. Amnesty International. 2008. “Egypt Continues to Deport Eritrean Asylum Seekers.” June 13. [Online article or information; retrieved 7/5/09.] http://www.amnesty.org/en/newsand-updates/news/egypt-must-stop-flights-to-torture-in-eritrea-20080613. Balsvik, Randi Rønning. 1985. Haile Sellassie’s Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to Revolution, 1952–1977. East Lansing: African Studies Center, Michigan State University. Bariagaber, Assefaw. 2006. Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile, and Repatriation in the Horn of Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate. Bernal, Victoria. 2000. “Equality to Die For? Women Guerrilla Fighters and Eritrea’s Cultural Revolution.” Political and Legal Anthropology Review (PoLAR) 23: 61–76. Cliffe, Lionel, and Basil Davidson, eds. 1988. The Long Struggle of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. Connell, Dan. 1997. Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. Denison, Edward, Guang Yu Ren, and Naigzy Gebremedhin. 2003. Asmara: Africa’s Secret Modernist City. London and New York: Merrell Publishing. Favali, Lyda, and Roy Pateman. 2003. Blood, Land and Sex: Legal and Political Pluralism in Eritrea. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Fessehatzion, Tekie. 2005. “Eritrea’s Remittance-based Economy: Ruminations and Conjectures.” Eritrean Studies Review 4 (2): 165–83. Harmon-Gross, Elizabeth. 2009. “Seeking Resettlement and Navigating Transnational Politics: The Intersection of Policies, Individuals, and Human Rights in Shimelba Refugee Camp.” M.A. thesis, University of Tennessee. Hepner, Tricia Redeker. 2009. Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hepner, Tricia Redeker, and Bettina Conrad. 2005. “Introduction: Eritrea Abroad.” Eritrean Studies Review 4 (2): v–xvii. Hepner, Tricia Redeker, and Lynn Fredriksson. 2007. “Regional Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa.” Africa Policy Journal 3 (Spring): 22–48. Iyob, Ruth. 1995. The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism 1941–1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Killion, Tom. 1998. Historical Dictionary of Eritrea. African Historical Dictionaries No. 5. Lanham, Md., And London: Scarecrow Press. Koehn, Peter. 1991. Refugees from Revolution: US Policy and Third World Migration. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Müller, Tanja R. 2005. The Making of Elite Women: Revolution and Nation Building in Eritrea. Boston, MA: Brill.
References | 653 Murtaza, Niaz. 1998. The Pillage of Sustainability in Eritrea, 1600s-1990s: Rural Communities and the Creeping Shadows of Hegemony. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Negash, Tekeste. 1987. Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882–1941: Policies, Praxis, and Impact. Uppsala: Uppsala University Press. Negash, Tekeste. 1997. Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience. New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Publishers. Pateman, Roy. 1993. Eritrea: Even the Stones are Burning. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. Pool, David. 2001. From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front. Oxford: James Currey. Refugees International. 2008. “Eritrea-Ethiopia: Shimelba Refugee Camp’s Intellectual Capital.” [Online article or information; retrieved 7/5/09.] http://www.refintl.org/blog/ eritrea-ethiopia-shimelba-refugee-camp%E2%80%99s-intellectual-capital. Stewart, Emma. 2008. “Eritreans in Cyberspace: Mapping Diaspora Networks.” Paper presented at the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration conference, Cairo, Egypt, January 5–12. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2007. “Eritrean Refugees in Shimelba Camp, Tigray Region, Ethiopia.” [Online article or information; retrieved 7/5/09.] http://www.unhcrrlo.org/BasicFacts/Docs/Eritrean%20Refugees%20in%20Ethiopia. pdf. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2009. “Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2008: Statistical Overview of Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe and Selected Non-European Countries.” [Online article or information; retrieved 7/5/09.] http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/49c796572.pdf. Accessed May 12, 2009. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2010. “UNHCR Welcomes Ethiopian Decision to Relax Encampment of Eritrean Refugees.” [Online article or information; accessed March 14, 2011.] http://www.unhcr.org/4c6128339.html. U.S. Agency for International Development/U.S. Department of Commerce (Census Bureau). 2004. Global Population Profile 2002. http://www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wp02/ wp-02.pdf. Accessed July 5, 2009. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. 2008. “Eritrea: Country Specific Information.” [Online article or information; retrieved 7/11/09.] http://travel.state.gov/ travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1111.html. Wilson, Amrit. 1991. The Challenge Road: Women in Eritrean Revolution. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. Woldemikael, Tekle M. 1998. “Eritrean and Ethiopian Refugees in the United States.” Eritrean Studies Review 4 (2): 143–64. Wrong, Michela. 2005. I Didn’t Do It For You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation. New York: Harper Perennial.
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Further Reading Connell, Dan. 1997. Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. An eyewitness account of the Eritrean struggle for independence, written by a veteran journalist and scholar of African politics who traveled with the EPLF and the ELF throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Hepner, Tricia Redeker. 2009. Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors, and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. The first full-length ethnography of the Eritrean war for independence written by an American anthropologist. The book explores the construction of nationalism and political power from the perspective of both Eritrea and its U.S. diaspora. Hill, Justin. 2002. Ciao Asmara: A Classic Account of Contemporary Africa. London: Abacus Books. Written by a British teacher who lived and worked in Eritrea following the end of the independence war and prior to the Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict, this book critically addresses Eritrean politics and history through sensitive firsthand narrative. Iyob, Ruth. 1995. The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism 1941–1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This book was the first comprehensive analysis to appear of modern Eritrean political history. It examines the origins and development of the nationalist movements and the groups contending for power within these movements, while addressing the regional and international context of the independence war. Killion, Tom. 1998. Historical Dictionary of Eritrea. African Historical Dictionaries No. 5. Lanham, MD, And London: Scarecrow Press. The only reference work of its kind, Tom Killion’s Historical Dictionary of Eritrea provides a wealth of information on hundreds of topics, as well as a comprehensive and detailed chronology and original maps drawn by the author. Mengisteab, Kidane, and Okbazghi Yohannes. 2005. Anatomy of an African Tragedy: Political, Economic, and Foreign Policy Crisis in Post-Independence Eritrea. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. An analysis of postliberation Eritrea, this book provides a critical assessment of developments in Eritrea’s political, economic, and foreign policy spheres. It addresses the structural and historical conditions and leadership patterns that have led to clear similarities between Eritrea and postcolonial African states. Pateman, Roy. 1993. Eritrea: Even the Stones are Burning. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. This book provides a historical and political analysis of the Eritrean response to Ethiopian occupation and the impact of various foreign policies on the Horn of Africa region. In addition to the development of nationalism, the military strategies used during the independence war, and the guerrilla movements’ objectives for a future state, the book also addresses the impact of famine and humanitarian disaster.
Further Reading | 655 Pool, David. 2000. From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front. Oxford: James Currey. The focus of this book is on the formation and development of the EPLF from the early 1970s to 1991, and its transformation from liberation front to ruling party and government of independent Eritrea. It provides an in-depth analysis of the historical, sociocultural, and political conditions that contributed to the nationalist movements. Wilson, Amrit. 1991. The Challenge Road: Women in Eritrean Revolution. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. This book is a unique account of the experience of women fighters in the EPLF, as told largely through narratives collected among Eritrean women themselves during the long war for independence. Woldemikael, Tekle M. 1998. “Eritrean and Ethiopian Refugees in the United States.” Eritrean Studies Review 4 (2): 143–64. A brief but comprehensive social scientific analyses of the demographic and ethnographic profile of Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in the United States, this essay was among the first focused treatments of the diaspora and provides a benchmark in the study of Eritrean and Ethiopian Americans. Wrong, Michela. 2005. I Didn’t Do It For You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation. New York: Harper Perennial. Written by a British journalist of Africa, this book addresses Eritrea as a case study in the colonial victimization and postcolonial trauma wrought on African countries subjected to European rule.
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Ethiopian Immigrants by Solomon Addis Getahun
Migration to the United States . . . may be seen as the complex and deeply ironic social consequences of the expansion of the nation to its post–World War II position of global hegemony. As the United States has become more deeply involved in the world, the world has become more deeply involved in America. Indeed, in diverse ways, it has come to America. (Rumbaut 1996, 24 [emphasis added])
Introduction The presence of Ethiopians in the United States has primarily been the consequence of the commencement of a diplomatic relationship between Ethiopia and the United States. This relationship began in 1903. The United States was then an emergent power. A couple of years earlier, the United States engaged Spain over Cuba and the Philippines. Later on, it sent its fledgling navy, the so-called Great White Fleet, beyond what it traditionally considered its backyard, the Americas. Thus, the diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, it seems, was part of this global projection of power. Ethiopia was emerging from a relative isolation. Emperor Menelik II (r. 1889–1913) was reaching out to the West with greater intensity than his predecessors. His efforts bore fruit after he defeated Italy at Adwa in 1896. Since then, the Europeans were flocking to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital, seeking economic opportunities and Menelik’s good will; many congratulated him on his victory. In the eyes of the Ethiopians, the arrival of an American mission, the Skinner Mission (named after the head of the American delegation, Mr. Robert P. Skinner, America’s Consul-General in Marseilles, France) in 1903, was part of the presence of Europeans in Ethiopia (Skinner 1906). In addition to establishing commerce between the two countries, Skinner advised the emperor on the advantages of modern education and the possibility of sending Ethiopians for education to the United States. Menelik appreciated Skinner’s proposal and promised to send Ethiopians to America. It was, however, his daughter Empress Zawditu (r. 1916–1930) who sent the first two Ethiopian students to attend schools in America. The sending of Ethiopian students that began in the
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1920s continued in the 1930s as well, though still a very limited number—five students—were sent. It was the post–1940s period that saw the presence of an everincreasing number of Ethiopian students in the United States. By 1973, there were more than a thousand Ethiopian students in America, which made Ethiopia one of the African countries with the largest number of students in America, following Nigeria and Egypt. Between the 1920s and 1975, the United States educated some 7,000 Ethiopian students (Getahun 2007a). In 1953, the United States and Ethiopia signed a mutual defense pact. As a consequence, between 1946 and 1972, the United States provided more than $180 million in military aid—a military assistance that made Ethiopia the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in Africa south of the Sahara. This aid accounted for 60 percent of the total U.S. military assistance for sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1950 and 1968, out of the 3,753 Africans trained under the International Military Education Training (IMET) program in the United States, 2,646 were Ethiopians. Of the 1,670 African military trainees who attended school in the United States between 1972 and 1976, more than half of them were Ethiopian officers. In sum, the number of Ethiopian military officers trained in the United States between 1950 and 1978 was almost 4,000. This figure remains even today the largest number for U.S.-trained military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa. By the time of the revolution, in 1974, the Ethiopian Armed Forces were totally dependent on the United States (AgyemanDuah 1994; Marcus 1983). As Haile Selassie’s quest for more weapons and trained manpower continued, the number of Americans sojourning in Ethiopia also increased. By 1970, there were about 170 members of American Military Advisory & Assistance Group (MAAG); and the number of the U.S. military personnel at Qagnaw Station (America’s military base in Asmara, Eritrea) increased from 1,300 in 1964 to 3,300 in 1970. In addition to the MAAG and Qagnaw military staff, there were 87 naval personnel working with the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit in Ethiopia. There were also 2,800 American business people and educators attached to the Agency for International Development. Furthermore, in the same year about 1,500 nonofficial Americans resided in Ethiopia. When the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution began taking a more radical posture that involved mass arrest and extrajudicial killings, almost all Ethiopians in America opted to stay in the United States. In the mean time, Ethiopian–American relations began to cool off. The military junta informed the State Department to close off the military base in Asmara and demanded that all Americans (now agents of U.S. imperialism) leave the country. These Americans, besides advocating for Ethiopian students who had now become asylum seekers in the United States, began providing shelter and assistance for some of these Ethiopians while others began sponsoring Ethiopians from abroad. These Ethiopians became the first immigrants and asylum seekers in America.
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Following the revolution, the country was beset with draught, famine, and civil wars. The situation was further exacerbated by Somali’s invasion of Ogaden, Ethiopia’s southeastern territory, in 1977. The instability in Ethiopia gave rise to another wave of Ethiopian migration to the United States, the refugees. These refugees were diverse in origin and levels of education. Through various resettlement agencies, some 30,000 Ethiopians were resettled between the 1980s and early 1990s from the neighboring countries, mainly Sudan. Until recently, these refugees accounted for the largest group of Ethiopians in America (Getahun 2007a, 2007b). In 1990, the U.S. government, through the Immigration Act of 1990, introduced the Diversity Visa Lottery program (DV), also known as Green Card Lottery. As a result of this program, an average of 4,000 or more Ethiopians are coming to the United States annually. Ethiopian DV winners comprise the third wave of Ethiopians in America. Various Ethiopian Community Association claim that today there are about a quarter of a million Ethiopians in America, though official U.S. figures for Ethiopians in America is much less than what Ethiopians assert. Be that as it may, Ethiopians account for the third-largest group (next to Nigeria and Egypt) of post–1960s African immigrants in the United States (Getahun 2007a).
Chronology 3.4 million years ago
Dinqnesh (Lucy), of the Australopithecus afarensis species, one of the oldest human ancestors, lives in Afar, in northeastern Ethiopia. (Fossils from her body are found in Ethiopia in 1975).
6000–3000 B.C.E.
The development of agricultural communities on highland Ethiopia. The domestication of teff (Eragrostis tef), enset (Ensete ventricosum), and coffee begins around this time.
950 B.C.E.
The Queen of Sheba, otherwise known as Makeda, rules Ethiopia. The legend has it that she has a son, Menelik I, by King Solomon. Ethiopian kings claim to be descendents of Menelik I.
10th–8th century B.C.E.
D’mt kingdom, a precursor of the Axumite Kingdom.
1000–500 B.C.E.
South Arabian laborers migrate to Ethiopia as employees of the royal court.
500 B.C.E.–100 C.E.
Rise of Axumite Kingdom.
fourth century C.E.
Ezana invades and destroys Meroe.
Chronology | 661
325–360
Emperor Ezana is converted to Christianity
fifth century
King Caleb conquers Arabia.
615
Ethiopia gives refugee for the relatives of the Prophet Mohammed—Islam is introduced into Ethiopia.
900–1000
The decline of Axum.
1137–1270
Ethiopia under the Zagwe Dynasty.
1270–1974
Ethiopia under the Solomonic Dynasty.
1434–1438
Emperor Zara Yaqob institutionalizes “Ethiopian” feudalism. He creates the Bahire-Negash title for the BahirMilash (Midr-Bahire) territory, present-day Eritrea.
1527–1544
Ahmad Gragn, otherwise known as Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim Al-Ghazi, defeats the Christian kings of Ethiopia and rules the country.
1541
A Portuguese military expedition led by Christopher da Gamma comes to Ethiopia to help the Christian king/ queen of Ethiopian.
1540s
The beginning of the Oromo migration to the highlands of Ethiopia.
1557–1589
Ottoman Turks annex Ethiopia’s coastal lands.
1599–1692
Zera Yacob (1599–1692), an Ethiopian philosopher, writes his 1667 treatise, Hatata. He is often compared with the French philosopher, René Descartes.
1620s–1630s
Catholicism becomes a state religion.
1630–1769
The restoration of Orthodox Christianity and the development of Gondar as a permanent capital of Ethiopia.
1769–1855
The Era of Princess, the Zemena Mesafint, the decline of central authority in Ethiopia. Oromos begins to play a prominent role in Ethiopian politics.
1855–1868
The rise of Tewodros II to the imperial throne and the reunification of Ethiopia.
1868
The British invade Ethiopia and defeat Tewodros at Magedla.
1869
An Italian shipping company purchases the port of Assab from Sulatan Ibrahim, a local chief.
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1869
Yohannis IV succeeds Tewodrs II as emperor of Ethiopia.
1875
Yohannis defeats the Egyptians at Gundat (also called Guda-gude), in Eritrea (the Battle of Gudat).
1876
Yohannis foiled another Egyptian attempt to annex parts of Eritrea at Gura (the Battle of Gura).
1870s
Ras Alula Aba Nega, the famous general of Emperor Yohannis IV, establishes Asmara and makes it his capital.
1884
Yohannis signs the Adwa (Hewitt) Treaty with the British. The latter promises Yohannis to have access to the sea.
1885
The Italians, with the tacit approval of the British, annex Massawa and proceed toward the highlands of Eritrea.
1887
Yohannis defeats the Italians at Dogali, Eritrea (the Battle of Dogali).
1889
Menelik of Shoa signs the infamous Wuchale Treaty with Italy. Yohannis IV dies at Metema, fighting the Mahdists. Menelik becomes King of Kings of Ethiopia.
1896
Menelik defeats the Italians at Adwa (the Battle of Adwa). Menelik gives the Bahire-Negash territory (Eritrea) to the Italians.
1900
Italians officially claims the Bahire-Negash territory and renames it Eritrea.
1913
Menelik dies and Lij Iyasu assumes power.
1916
Lij Iyasu is deposed, and Empress Zewditu becomes ruler of Ethiopia. Tefere becomes regent.
1930
Tefere is crowned as Emperor Haile Selassie I and begins ruling Ethiopia.
1936–1941
Italians invade and occupy Ethiopia.
1941
Ethiopians defeat Italy with the help of the British.
Chronology | 663
1941–1952
England retains Ogaden and Eritrea as occupied enemy territory (OET).
1952
Eritrea is federated with Ethiopia.
1953
Ethiopia sends four battalions to Korea to fight beside the UN.
1960
Mengestu Niway attempts a military coup.
1962
Haile Selassie ends the Eritrean federation. Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) launches the secessionist war.
1964
First Somali invasion of Ethiopia to annex Ogaden.
1974
Haile Selassie is overthrown—the end of the Solomonic Dynasty. A military junta, the Derg, takes power.
1974
The beginning of refugee flow from Ethiopia.
1977
Second Somali invasion of Ethiopia to annex Ogaden.
1977–1979
The Era of the Red Terror in Ethiopia. Tens of thousands of Ethiopians leave their country. The secessionist war intensifies in Eritrea. Qagnaw Station, the U.S. military base in Ethiopia, is closed.
1980
United States passes the Refugee Act.
1981
The beginning of Ethiopian refugee resettlement in the United States.
1991
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) liberate Ethiopia. EPRDF establishes an ethnic-based federation. Eritrea becomes a de facto state.
1993
UN observed referendum for Eritrean secession from Ethiopia is held.
1998–2000
Eritrea invades and occupies parts of Ethiopia. Operation Sunset ends Eritrean aggression and reclaims Ethiopia’s territory.
2005
Election-related political turmoil in Ethiopia.
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2007–2009
Ethiopia intervenes in Somalia.
2010
Disillusionment against the EPRDF continues in parts of Oromia and Ogaden. Ethiopian refugee flow continues though at a much smaller scale compared to the 1970s and 1980s. Network migration continues at an increasing rate.
Background Geography of Ethiopia Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa. The country covers 695,738 square miles, which is twice the size of Texas or France and four and half times the size of Great Britain. Ethiopia’s neighbors are Eritrea in the north and northeast, Somalia in the south and southeast, Djibouti in the east, Kenya in the south, and Sudan in the west and southwest. The Ethiopian Rift Valley, which is part of the Great Rift Valley that starts from Saudi Arabia and extends as far as South Africa, bisects the country from north to south. Ethiopia’s Rift Valley is a home of diverse fauna and flora, as well as eight lakes. Of these lakes, Abaya (722 square miles) is the largest while Shala (204 square miles) is the deepest. It is in the Rift Valley that the Dalol Depression, one of the lowest altitudes in the world (-100 meters below sea level), is found. Though the country is located 150 degrees north of the equator. It has mild climate due to its high altitude. In the highland plateau, the average temperature is around 65 degrees Fahrenheit. The country is full of mountains and plateaus. One of the tallest mountains in Africa, Ras Degen (Ras Dashen), which is part of the Semen Mountains, is more than 14,928 feet above sea level. The Ethiopian plateau is surrounded by lowlands whose temperature, during the summer season, can reach as high as 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Consequently, due to its elevation and location, the country has three climatic zones: Dega (colder), Winadega (temperate), and Qolla (hotter) (Mesfin 1972). Ethiopia is often referred as the “water tower of Africa.” And indeed, it is the source of more than seven international rivers, including the Blue Nile. The Blue Nile contributes 85 percent of the waters of the Nile, on which Egypt and Sudan depend for their survival. The source of the Blue Nile, locally known as Abbay, is Lake Tana, found in northwest Ethiopia. Except for the Baro River, none of Ethiopia’s rivers are navigable. Due to its diverse climate and topography, the country is endowed with one of the most diverse animal and bird species in the world. It is a home for 924 species of
Background | 665
birds of which 42 are endemic to the country and 3 are rare. Ethiopia is also ranked first in the number of cattle in Africa while it is among the top ten countries in the world. Among the wild animals, seven are endemic. The country has three animal sanctuaries, nine national parks, and eight game reserves (”Wildlife” 2010).
History of Ethiopia Ethiopia is one of the oldest countries on earth. Its history, some argue, could be traced to Lucy, Australopithecus afarensis, whose fossilized remains were discovered by American and Ethiopian archaeologists. Lucy, Ethiopians refer to her Dinqnesh, which means “the beautiful,” is believed to have lived in the Afar region of northeastern Ethiopia some 3.4 million years ago. Others, though they appreciate the Lucy connection, prefer to mark Ethiopia’s beginnings with the meeting of the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon. Yet still, there are some who claim that Ethiopia, like the rest of African states, is a by-product of European colonialism, and thus, they contend, Ethiopia’s history, as such, begins in the 1800s. They argue that Ethiopia is the result of Emperor Menelik II’s (r. 1889– 1913) imperial endeavor that conquered the greater half of present-day Ethiopia; and therefore, Ethiopia is a hotchpotch that was sewn together by sheer force, and the 80 or so ethnic groups and nationalities found in Ethiopia were and still are constantly vying for dominance amongst themselves (Teshale 1996; Marcus 2002; Sergew 1972). The diametrically opposing views regarding the history of Ethiopia reveal that Ethiopia, the nation-state, is unfinished business. It is a process in the making. This process, just looking at Ethiopia’s very recent past, has included military coups d’état and the emergence of half dozen secessionist movement or national liberation movements, whichever way one wants to look at it. The 1960s was an important decade for Ethiopia as it was for Africa as a whole, for different yet interrelated reasons. For Africa, the 1960s was a period of independence and thus of hope and optimism that was soon, however, followed by cynicism and apprehension. The continent was plagued by a series of military coups d’état and civil wars that dashed the hopes and aspirations of newly independent African countries. Ethiopia, though not colonized, had gone through many of the miseries that Africans suffered. Like many African countries, Ethiopia experienced a military takeover. The first military putsch was effected in December 1960. The coup makers were the Neway brothers, Germame and Mengistu Neway, and Worqneh Gebeyehu. The latter two were high-ranking military officers of the prestigious and the privileged section of the Imperial Ethiopian Armed Forces, the Imperial Bodyguard. The bodyguard’s main task was guaranteeing the safety of Emperor Haile Selassie’s monarchy—a monarchy that traces its origin to the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon.
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Both officers and their accomplice, Germame, were products of Ethiopia’s unequal association and partnership with the West, mainly the United States. Despite Haile Selassie’s trust in them and their close association with the West, the coup makers, like their contemporaries in Africa, the new African educated elite, were dissatisfied with the way things were. They saw corruption and mismanagement of resources of their country by the rulers. The coup makers promised to rectify the injustice by redistributing land and doing away the ancien regime. They aspired to establish a republic. Haile Selassie easily squashed the military coup. Some of the plotters were sent to jail; some died battling their pursuers; and Mengistu was hanged (Greenfield 1965; Clapham 1968). Though the coup failed, it showed the Ethiopian masses that the Solomonic Dynasty was no longer infallible. It could be challenged. Students of the Haile Selassie I University (HSIU) took the lead in confronting the old order. Something unique also happened following the 1960s coup d’état. After the coup, many people in Ethiopia as well as abroad believed that Haile Selassie would make certain reforms. Alas, their hopes were dashed as the emperor continued to crack down on his opponents and strengthen his hold on power. One such disappointed person was Brihanu Dinque, the Ethiopian Ambassador to the United States. In protest against Haile Selassie’s rule, Birhanu resigned from his post and sought asylum in the United States—an event that got little attention at that time but was a watershed for events yet to come in Ethiopia. The ambassador was the first asylum seeker of Ethiopian origin in the United States. Like many African countries, Ethiopia, too, experienced secessionist war or a war for national determination, depending on whichever way one wants to look at it. Two years after the attempted coup d’état, Haile Selassie ended the EthiopianEritrean federation, albeit with the support of some Eritreans. Present-day Eritrea was part of Ethiopia since time immemorial. In fact, with present-day Tigray, Eritrea constituted the nucleus of Ethiopia, the Axumite Kingdom—a kingdom that roughly existed between 500 B.C.E. and 900 C.E. At its height, Axum conquered the Kingdom of Meroe and ruled parts of southern Arabia. Axum was also one of the earliest Christian nations. Christianity was introduced into Ethiopia around 336 C.E. Axum was also one of the first to welcome Islam. The Prophet Mohammad, while he was being persecuted by his own Quraysh Tribe, sent his uncle to seek refugee in Ethiopia. The Axumites welcomed Mohammed’s uncle and his entourage and gave him refugee. Yet, the emergence of a strong Islamic state across the Red Sea dealt a mortal blow to Axum’s maritime trade and its dominance on the Red Sea. Due to this and internal disturbances, the Axumite Empire declined and finally collapsed around the 10th century. Though Axum was succeeded by the Zagewe Dynasty (1137–1270), which made its seat at Roha, Lalibella, located a few hundred miles south of Axum, the empire lost its hold on the Red Sea ports such as Adulis, at roughly present-day Mitswa (Massawa) (Sergew 1972; Kobishchanov 1979).
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The Solomonic Dynasty, interchangeably known as Amhara or Shoa Dynasty (1270–1974), which succeeded Zagwe, was able to restore Ethiopia’s glory of the Axumite times. Some of its emperors such as Amda Tsion (1314–1344) and Ze’ra Ya’kob (1434–1468) regained control of Ethiopia’s Red Sea coast. Ze’ra Ya’kob, who is credited for institutionalizing “Ethiopian” feudalism, assigned a governor over what is now Eritrea. While the title of the governor was Bahire-negash (king or ruler of the sea), the territory was named Bahir-milash or Midire-bahire (land adjoining the sea, or land off the sea). Though the rise of the Ottoman Empire and later on, Egypt denied Ethiopia of its coastal towns and ports. Highland Eritrea, especially the three districts such as Serae’, Hamsen and Aka’le Guza’i, remained parts of northern Ethiopia until 1896. In that year, though Emperor Menelik II successfully defeated the Italians at the Battle of Adwa, he gave up the Bahire-negash territory to the Italians. Menelik’s action has remained a controversial issue in Ethiopian history. Noted historians (Marcus 1995; Paulos and Getachew 2005) have argued that the Battle of Adwa was fought after the Great Ethiopian Famine of 1889. This famine totally devastated the country, especially northern Ethiopia, and thus when Adwa was fought on March 1, 1896, Ethiopians had not yet recovered fully from the scars of the famine. So much so, on the day of the battle, not all Ethiopian forces engaged the Italians. Some were looking for supplies in places as far as Telemt, southwest of Adawa, in Gondar province. Thus, had the war continued longer, Menelik would have found himself in a quagmire, to say the least. It was also in this circumstance that Menelik heard about the arrival of 15,000 fresh Italian solders at Asmara under General Antonio Baldissera. This, coupled with the war-fatigued rag-tag Ethiopian army’s desire to return home after eight months of grueling military campaign, convinced Menelik to return to Addis Ababa, his capital, than pursue the Italians and chase them out of Eritrea. Accordingly, Menelik decamped on March 20, 1896, and commenced his return journey. While the aforementioned variables were the reality on the ground, his return to Addis without reclaiming Eritrea (despite an enthusiastic support from Eritreans and the willingness of Ras Mengesha Yohannis and other notables of Tigray to continue fighting the Italians and dislodge them from Eritrea), had been viewed by some Ethiopians and Eritreans as sinister. Leaving Eritrea in Italian hands was advantageous for Menelik. It would divide Tigrigna-speaking Ethiopians into two, Tigray and Italian-colonized Eritrea, and thus weaken them from becoming a viable threat to Menelik. It should be noted that when Emperor Yohannis died at the Battle of Metema in 1889, the imperial throne should have been passed to his son, Mengesha. But, the Shoan king, Menelik, who was in a better military position than the embattled Mengesha Yohannes, proclaimed himself King of Kings of Ethiopia. Since then, Mengesha and the Tigray nobility were at loggerheads with Menelik. So much was their bitterness against Menelik, Mengesha and the Tigrian notables approached the then Italian governor of Eritrea, General Giuseppe Gandolfi, and
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signed the Mereb Convention in 1891. The convention was meant to create an alliance between Italy and Mengesha against Menelik. The alliance, however, did not materialize. When Mengesha and the Tigrian nobility realized the Italian insatiable appetite for colonies and their encroachment on Tigrian territory, they made peace with Menelik, the lesser evil, and bravely fought against the invading colonial army at Adwa (Marcus 1995; Paulos and Getachew 2005). After the signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Treaty between Menelik and the Italians, the latter changed the name of the province from Bahire-milash to Eritrea in 1900 and ruled it until 1941. After the defeat of the Italians in 1941, Ethiopia claimed Eritrea on historic grounds. But the British were reluctant to give up Eritrea. In fact, they claimed that both Ethiopia (it had been occupied by Italy between 1936 and 1941) and Eritrea were occupied enemy territories and thus should be under British administration until the end of World War II—a war that just began in Europe and who’s victors were not yet known! Haile Selassie, with the help of the emergent superpower, the United States was able to compel the British to relinquish Eritrea. Thus, after a UN–observed referendum, the majority of Eritreans voted to be federated with Ethiopia in 1958. However, from the beginning, the federal arrangement was doomed. The Soviet Union, who saw the federal arrangement as one more American success in the Cold War scheme of global dominance, was against it. The Muslim Arab world, which then was spearheaded by Egypt, considered Eritrea’s federation with Ethiopia as a continued domination of fellow Muslims by a Christian (the ELF to some degree the EPLF and the Arab world regarded Eritrea as Arab); and an obstacle to the centuries-old aspiration of Arabs that desires making the Red Sea an Arab lake. Egypt also felt that a united and strong Ethiopia was a grave threat to the flow of the waters of the Nile without which Egypt cannot exist (Ethiopia is the source for 85% of the Nile). The Unionist Party of Eritrea, which companied for absolute unity with Ethiopia, was unhappy by the UN decision. The Muslim League Party of Eritrea that battled for independence was also discontented by the federal formula. The Liberal Progressive Party, too, was not satisfied. Its objective was to establish an independent but Greater Eritrea that included the Tigrigna-speaking part of Ethiopia, the Tigray province. The emperor, who envisioned himself as Louis the XIV of Ethiopia, on his part, saw a federated Eritrea as an anomaly and an affront to his absolute imperial power. He was also afraid that Eritrea could set a “bad” example for the rest of Ethiopia—some, if not all, provinces might follow Eritrea’s example or demand autonomy. Therefore, all concerned parties immediately began working against the federal arrangement (Shumet 2007; Daniel 2005). It was Haile Selassie in particular and members of the Unionist Party in general that ultimately succeeded in undoing the federation. In 1962, Haile Selassie, with the help of members of the Unionist Party and with the tacit approval of the United States (it had established a military base in Asmara, the capital of Eritrea),
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Exiled Ethiopian leader Haile Selassie speaks before the League of Nations in 1936, urging the group to renounce Italy’s claim on Ethiopia. (Library of Congress)
abrogated the federation, dissolved the Eritrean parliament, and united Eritrea with Ethiopia. In the same year, some Eritreans took up arms and commenced the liberation struggle. While Egypt provided radio station and diplomatic support to the Eritrean Liberation Movement, Sudan served as a base of operation, a place to recoup, and a shelter in face of an Ethiopian attack. Nevertheless, due to Haile Selassie’s political stature in Africa and the world, the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) opposition to secessionist war, and the lack of mass support from among Eritreans, the secessionist war remained unnoticed in Ethiopia and beyond, until the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution. However, the beginning of the secessionist struggle, like the 1960s coup, resulted in migration, though limited. Some leaders of the liberation struggle fled Ethiopia for the neighboring countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Egypt. The monarchial system that began cracking in 1960 finally caved in 1974. Once again a group of army officers rebelled, this time supported by university students and the urban poor, and overthrew the Solomonic Dynasty in September 1974. The emperor was whisked away from his grand palace in a Volkswagen Beetle. The Ethiopian military, like all military regimes in Africa and parts of the world, promised to handover power to civilians as soon as possible. Meanwhile, it established a provisional military administration and named itself, Derg, meaning
670 | Ethiopian Immigrants
“committee,” and declared socialism—Ethiopian socialism—as its political ethos. The civilians, headed by Haile Selassie I University (now Addis Ababa University) and high school students, teachers, and others, demanded for the establishment of Provisional Peoples’ Government (a slogan that resonates among members of the Ethiopian diaspora in the United States even today), redistribution of land, nationalization of property, democratic rights, and the right of nations and nationalities up to and including secession (Andargachew 1993; Gebru 2009; Balsvik 1986). Soon, civilian political organization such as the EPRP, the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (AESM), and EDU appeared in the political arena. Individuals with ethno-national aspirations, who saw very little hope in the national political discourse or who were disillusioned with it, organized ethnic-based organizations. These included the Tigray Liberation Front (TLF), Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo Liberation Movement, the Ogaden Liberation Movement, and so forth. The whole country began seething. Somalia, which have had an irredentist aspiration over Ethiopia’s Ogaden territory, sought an opportunity in this turmoil. It launched a military campaign against Ethiopia in 1977. The situation was further aggravated by Cold War politics. Ethiopia is adjacent to the strategic waterways of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. This made the country in particular and the Horn of Africa in general a prime real estate for contending superpowers. Adding to the unrest was the instability caused by the country’s climate, which makes it prone to periodic droughts and famine. In fact, one of the immediate causes for the downfall of Haile Selassie’s regime was the 1974 famine in Ethiopia’s northeastern province, Wallo. Hundreds of thousands of peasants left their villages in search of food, some reaching Addis Ababa, the country’s capital. Therefore, the asylum seeking that started following the 1960 coup and picked in volume with the commencement of the Eritrean liberation struggle grew in the 1970s and 1980s.
Causes and Waves of Migration Revolution in Ethiopia: The Beginning of Migration and the Refugee Exodus to the United States By late 1970s, Ethiopian tourists, government functionaries, and students in the United States stood at about 5,000. The Ethiopian Community Development Council, which coordinated Ethiopian community associations’ activities and oversees refugee resettlement in America, estimated that between 15,000 and 25,000 Ethiopians resided in the United States in the mid-1980s. Some scholars who have studied the flight of educated Ethiopians believe that there were some 30,000 Ethiopians in America prior to the 1974 Revolution (Getachew and Maigenet 1991; Akalou 1989).
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Ethiopians in America and elsewhere were alarmed by the brutal measures of the military junta, Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), otherwise known as the Derg. During the first four years of the revolution, the junta was believed to have executed more than 30,000 people. As a consequence, by the early 1980s the majority of the students, businessmen, and Ethiopian tourists in America declined to return to Ethiopia, letting their temporary nonimmigrant visas expire. The migration of Western-educated Ethiopians and government functionaries had commenced. By 1986, an estimated 22 ambassadors, 40 senior diplomats, and 14 cabinet ministers had defected to the West, mainly to the United States. These became the first permanent Ethiopian Americans. Meanwhile, the struggle for power between the civilian political organization, such as the EPRP, the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), and the AESM, on one hand, and the military junta, on the other, intensified. The Derg, in order to squash opposition against its rule, banned peaceful demonstration and freedom of expression. It began what is known as the Red Terror, a period of extrajudicial killings and mass detention. The Red Terror coupled with the intensification of the secessionist war in Eritrea and Tigray and the Somali irredentist war in eastern and southeastern Ethiopia further aggravated the already tense political situation in the country. The Eritrean secessions movement that evolved into the EPLF and the ELF began fighting each other for supremacy in the province. At the same time, EPRP, EDU and the TPLF began fighting amongst themselves in northern and northwestern parts of the country. One consequence of the civil war was the mass flight of Ethiopians, educated and the uneducated, seeking refugee in neighboring countries, especially Sudan. In the early 1980s, there were about 2 million Ethiopian refugees in the neighboring countries. At the same period, Ethiopians comprised the largest group of refugees and the internally displaced people of any country in Africa. In August 1985, at the height of the Derg’s military offensive in Eritrea, between 400 and 700 refugees were flocking to Sudan every day. This was in just less than a decade after the Ethiopian Revolution (Koehn 1991; Getahun 2007a, 2007b)
The Coming of Refugees to America After the Derg’s seizure of political power in Ethiopia, diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Western countries, especially the United States, cooled off. Because of this and for ideological reasons, the Derg restricted permits to Ethiopians who were leaving the country for Western Europe and America. Anyone who attempted to immigrate to the west was considered a lackey of imperialism and thus reactionary. As a result, during the reign of the Derg many Ethiopians took the arduous journey across the porous border illegally. Many well-off Ethiopians who had relatives in America and Europe, and those who had successfully resettled in the United States and other places,
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encouraged their families in Ethiopia to leave for Sudan. From there, it was relatively easy for Ethiopians residing in America to sponsor relatives. American and other refugee agencies, such as the International Catholic Migration Committee (ICMC), the International Committee for Migration (ICM), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), came to Sudan with the express purpose of facilitating the resettlement of Ethiopians to America; the presence of these agencies in Sudan further intensified the attraction of Ethiopians towards Sudan. While the Ethiopian government considered Ethiopian refugees as counterrevolutionaries, the United States regarded these Ethiopians as people who voted against communism with their feet. Therefore, in early 1980s, the United States government decided to admit large numbers of Ethiopian refugees. Between October 1, 1980, and September 1981, the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS, now U.S. Homeland Security) approved 3,500 Ethiopians for resettlement in the United States. Since then, though the number varies, the United States continued to accept Ethiopian refuges and immigrants. As Figure 14 shows, between 1980 and 2008, an average of 1,660 Ethiopian refugees were admitted into the United States annually (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009). The higher number of Ethiopian refugees that left their country between 1980 and 2008 reflected the degree of political turmoil in Ethiopia. While the number of early 1980s refugees mirrors the immediate effects of the Red Terror and the military campaigns of the Derg against Somalia and the Eritrean secessionists, the number of refugees in the early 1990s points to the chaotic political atmosphere and the relative uncertainty associated with the ouster of the Derg and EPRDF’s ascent to the helm of power in 1991. The total number of refugees and asylum seekers who were admitted into the United States between 1944 and 2002, according to the 2002 INS report, were 40,555. While there was no figure for the years 1946–1950, there were 61 individuals for the years 1951–1960; and two individuals for the years 1961–1970. However, the largest number of Ethiopian refugees and immigrants were admitted after the 1974 revolution. Between 1981 and 1990, some 18,542 Ethiopians were admitted; and between 1991 and 2000, 17,865 were accepted. (See Figure 14, “Ethiopian Refugees by Year of Entry into United States.”) The continuous decline of Ethiopian refugees admitted into the United States after 1993 reflects the relative peace and stability that prevails in Ethiopia and the ease with which Ethiopians can leave their country. Unlike the Derg, the EPRDF does not restrict Ethiopians from leaving their country. Passport, unlike earlier times, was not a privilege that few has access to. In the new Ethiopia, passport is considered a mere identification card. In today’s Ethiopia, there is no visa restriction. Anyone who can afford to travel can have it too. The other reason is variations in U.S. refugee admittance policies. Aside from Cold War politics, the American government does not often accept refugees from “friendly” states. Therefore, while the United States viewed the Derg regime as Russia’s clique, and thus an unfriendly
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state, it considers the EPRDF government as one of the most dependable allies in the Horn of Africa. Due to America’s belief that peace and stability have prevailed in Ethiopia since EPRDF’s takeover of power, it does not accept as many refugees and asylum seekers as before. Even if America accepts refugees from Ethiopia, the number is limited and the process arduous. One fascinating consequence of such U.S. policy, which was also partly strengthened by events related to the September 11 terrorist attack on New York City, was that as the possibility of being admitted as a refugee into the United States became more difficult, some Ethiopians who were at loggerheads with the EPRDF sought other venues. Instead of waiting in refugee comps, they landed in America—seeking asylum. This alternative strategy, which costs a lot of money, including embarking on a more perilous journey across continents that involve human smugglers and traffickers in order to enter into the United States, circumvents the bureaucratic delays, various obstacles, and uncertainties that refugees encounter. (See Table 101.)
Demographic Profile: A Socioeconomic and Cultural Profile The local origin of the pre-1980s Ethiopians in America indicates a preponderance of people from Shoa (central Ethiopia, the province from where the majority of the ruling elite came from), followed by Eritrea (northern Ethiopia), and Wallega (western Ethiopia) provinces. This was so due to the availability and accessibility of modern education in these provinces, especially in Shoa. Kinship ties, which largely determined recruitment and promotion in government offices and awarding of scholarships, also favored people from Shoa. Consequently, throughout Emperor Haile Selassie’s rule, Shoa had the largest number of schools and universities. It also constituted more than two-thirds of Ethiopian officials, both noble and educated. The remaining officials were primarily from Eritrea and Wallega. The two provinces, in addition to the marital alliance with the Shoan ruling elite, were beneficiaries of missionary education. Protestant missionaries from Scandinavian countries and the United States had been operating in the said locals since the 19th century (Teshome 1990; Markakis 1974). In terms of education, while Ethiopian refugees in America represent a sizable group of the illiterate, semi-literate Ethiopians, the immigrants and asylees are, by and large, highly educated professionals. The Ethiopian refugees admitted in the 1980s, in addition to the educated, included a large number of illiterate peasants who left their domicile due to famine, those who fled from government-sponsored resettlement programs, and those who escaped the infighting between the various liberation fronts in northern and northwestern Ethiopia. There were also some peasants who sought refugee in Sudan and elsewhere rather than being recruited into the partisan
674 | Ethiopian Immigrants
armies. Nevertheless, given the U.S. criteria for winning/applying for Diversity Lottery (the lottery has been in place since 1990), almost all Ethiopian immigrants have completed high school, to say the least. Consequently, Ethiopians, like their fellow African immigrants in America, are among the most educated recent arrivals into the United States. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, more than 95 percent of Africans aged 25 and over have completed high school and more. The figure for the high school completion rate for the foreign born from Asia, Europe, and South America is 83.8 percent, 81.3 percent, and 79.6 percent respectively. This makes Africans one of most educated immigrant groups in America. Yet, the figure for income by household does not correspond with educational attainment. The African household income for the said period was $36,371 while it was $41,773 for Europeans, $51,633 for Asians, and $40,480 for South Americans (U.S. Census Bureau 2001). The age profile of Ethiopian refugees and immigrants in the United States indicates that the majority are between 20 and 45 years old. This segment is the most productive section of the population. Given the pyramidal population structure of Ethiopia, which is dominated by the 0–19 years age group at its base, the loss of the 20 and above age group is very extensive. Males dominate the pre-1970s and the 1980s refugee and immigrant Ethiopians in America. In pre-revolution Ethiopia, social and cultural norms favor males over females. While boys were encouraged to be aggressive, to go to school, and to engage in the outdoor lifestyle, girls were taught to be meek and submissive, and to learn domestic chores including how to be a good mother and wife. As a result, the country’s educational establishments, which were very few in number, were dominated by males in every level. The imbalance between males and females who were attending schools was even greater at the tertiary level. Fewer females were found in colleges and universities and even more so in graduate and postgraduate education. Because America’s refugee and immigrant admittance policy favors the educated, there are fewer Ethiopian females than males living in the United States. Nevertheless, as the availability of education increased and government and nongovernment agencies embarked in rectifying the gender inequity in education and other areas, more girls began attending schools in Ethiopia. The ratio between Ethiopian American females and males is narrowing. Also, these days, migration of Ethiopians to the United States has become more network driven than before. Consequently, the gender disparity among Ethiopians in America is narrowing.
Adjustment and Adaptation Ethiopians are found in almost every part of the United States, including Alaska. However, the Greater Washington area (District of Colombia, Virginia, and Maryland), California (Los Angeles and the Bay Area—San Francisco, Oakland, and
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San Jose), Washington (Seattle), Chicago (Illinois), and Atlanta (Georgia) account for the largest concentrations of Ethiopians in the United States. Of these, Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., compete for supremacy for being the largest hub for Ethiopians outside of Ethiopia, except Israel. The two cities allege to have more than 100,000 Ethiopians and have taken steps to host their own Little Ethiopias. In Los Angeles, Little Ethiopia, situated between Fairfax and Pico Avenues, and in Washington, Adams Morgan, between 18th and Columbia Avenue, are business centers for Ethiopians. However, in Washington, D.C., the Ethiopian community’s quest to officially claim Adams Morgan and its environs as Little Ethiopia met a stiff resistance from the African American community (Getahun 2007a). Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., strive for leadership, on political as well as religious issues that affect Eritreans and Ethiopians. They host the largest number of radio stations, they have the largest number of Ethiopian Orthodox Churches in America, and both host Ethiopian Embassy officials and offices. Both cities are in the forefront in staging either pro- or antigovernment events. The evolution and development of Little Ethiopias in American cities, in addition to displaying the growing influence and contribution of the Ethiopian refugee-
Wetbu Fikru (left) a native of Ethiopia, holds a poster of Ethiopian musician Dereje Degefaw with Hanna Addis, also from Ethiopia, as they decide where to post it at this music shop on Ninth Street in Washington, D.C., May 25, 2007. The neighborhood is home to a large Ethiopian community. (AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin)
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immigrant community in America, entails determinants of settlement patterns. American society is a race conscious society. Accordingly, a closer look at these Little Ethiopias and other areas where Ethiopians are found such as in Seattle (Washington), Chicago (Illinois), Dallas (Texas), and so forth, reveals that Ethiopians were resettled in neighborhoods primarily occupied or settled by African Americans. In so doing, refugee resettlement agencies paved the way, intentionally or innocently, for racial solidarity between Ethiopian immigrants and refugees and African American communities. This is especially true for second-generation Ethiopians. The second-generation Ethiopian Americans who grew up in a society that defines race in binary terms are more conscious of their blackness than their parents who did not experience the racial prejudices that their children encountered in schools and other arenas in America. Many first-generation Ethiopians, through their mutual community associations, churches, and social occasions, maintained a separate identity. Their children, however, often felt left out for they had very little in common with their parents. They are not sentimentally attached and thus nostalgic of their parents’ country of origin—despite their parents’ effort to make their offspring remain true to their Ethiopian identity. Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Columbus, Ohio, expose the prevalence of ethnic chasm and polarization among Ethiopians in America. While Minnesota is often referred to as the “Oromia capital in America,” Tigrigna-speaking Ethiopians, from Tigray, Gondar, and Wallo provinces, claimed Columbus as theirs. The Oromo, otherwise known as Galla (it has become a pejorative term as of late), are one of the major ethnic groups in Ethiopia. In both Minneapolis and Columbus, a sizable number of ethnic Somalis from Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and Somalia proper are found. Like Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, Minneapolis hosts mosques that both Oromos and Somalis use and political events that entertain either Somali or Oromo issues exclusively. Ethiopian communities in America are faced with religious division. Since the fourth century C.E., Ethiopia had been follower of the Orthodox Christen faith. Until the 1974 socialist revolution in Ethiopia, Orthodox Christianity was a state religion. So much so, despite the existence of a sizable Muslim population and a few hundred thousand Jews, the country was depicted, both by its leaders and foreigners, as a Christian island encircled by hostile Muslim neighbors and heathens. This erroneous picture alienated the Muslims of Ethiopia, the majority of whom are ethnic Oromos and Somalis. Upon coming to America, one of the things that Ethiopian Muslims did was to exercise their religious freedom, something that barley existed in prerevolutionary Ethiopia. Yet, compared to their Orthodox Christian brethren, Muslim Ethiopians are fewer in number. Their lack in numbers, which prevented them from having their own religious establishment, mosques and medrasas, encouraged Ethiopian Muslims to join their co-religions of other countries. The sense of “brotherhood” among Muslims is also another factor that made it easier for
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Ethiopians to join other Muslims in America, especially in the post–9/11 America. Muslims of Ethiopian origin (Oromos and Somalis) are increasingly being radicalized as a result of their association with other Muslims and Ethiopia’s active role in the war on terror. Ethiopians are followers of the Sunni Islamic sect, which is the dominant form of Islam in the world (Getahun 2007a). Until the secession of Eritrea in 1993, Ethiopian and Eritrean communities attended the same Orthodox Church. However, after the Eritrean independence, the immigrant-refugee church split between Eritrean and Ethiopian, though there were Ethiopians and Eritreans who attended the “other” church. The troubles of the Ethiopian Orthodox church in America did not end there. Due to the institutionalization of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia under the EPRDF government, followers of the Ethiopian Orthodox church are further divided based on ethnicity. Regional origin, and context of departure and arrival into the United States are other divisive variables. Thus, in a single American city, one often finds multiple churches bearing different (though at times similar) saint names dominated by a single ethnic group or refugees or immigrants and people from a certain province. Yet, in the eyes of an outsider, it sends the wrong idea—Ethiopians are very pious Christians who sacrificed a lot to build so many churches. But the reality, religious devotion aside, is that the proliferation of Ethiopian churches in the United States is partly a consequence of the continued division among Ethiopians. Religious institutions offer spiritual guidance and thus could provide a soft cushion for Ethiopian immigrant and refugees landing in America; however, due in part to the weakening of religious institutions, tensions between old and young generations of Ethiopian Americans and confrontations between spouses have often been left unattended. Like many immigrant and refugee communities in America, squabbles in Ethiopian families often arise due to “role reversal.” In patriarchal societies like Ethiopia, the young were groomed to be timid, modest, and respectful of elders, and not to speak unless spoken to. In America, however, children are encouraged to speak their mind. In America, often times, Ethiopian children serve as interpreters to parents who are illiterate in the English language. Such change empowers Ethiopian immigrant-refugee children. Ethiopian husbands, who were the sole bread winners in their country and thus the sole decision makers, often lose this privileged position in America. Professional accreditation requirements sometimes prevent husbands from securing better jobs vis-à-vis their semi-educated or illiterate spouses. In Ethiopia, due to cultural norms, females were not encouraged to be independent, and they were not provided with equal educational and job opportunities. In America, spouses could end up working similar jobs regardless of differences in their educational attainment. At other times, due to the relative availability of opportunities for women, wives could end up being the sole bread winner in America. Or, because women could work and earn a living in America, they may demand more respect and power within the relationship.
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The growing power of Ethiopian American women threatens the status quo, which in turn sets off marital disputes. The lack of community or religious intervention to stave off such problems and the culturally uninformed intervention of county, city, and state authorities in America make matters worse. As a result, many Ethiopian families end up in divorce, which in turn has made the divorce rate among Ethiopians in America much higher than the host society. Besides churches and mutual community organizations, Ethiopians in America have established a soccer federation, the Ethiopian Sports Federation in North America (ESFNA). The federation, which primarily facilitates soccer tournaments annually in one of the major American and Canadian cities, was established in 1982. Since then, it has become one of the most enduring Ethiopian immigrant associations in America while many others have failed. When established, it had less than five clubs but today it has more than 24 first- and second-division clubs (Getahun 2009). The soccer tournament has become more than just an event where various clubs engage in a soccer match. By bringing noted Ethiopians from Ethiopia and other parts of the world, the tournament introduces these distinguished Ethiopians to second-generation Ethiopian Americans. The communal aspect of the tournament encourages the younger generation to emulate these prominent Ethiopians and strengthens the bond between the country of origin and the settlement. An observation of the event reveals a community in the process of transition or Americanization. One notices Ethiopian traditional foods such as injera (a spongy, pita-like bread made of teff) with various types of wot (stew), kitfo (minced beef mixed with spiced butter), and so forth, competing against or supplementing American foods such as hotdogs, burgers, smoothies, and so forth. The tournament is indeed one place where one can observe Ethiopian identity affirmed as well as challenged by and reshaped into Ethiopian American identity. ESFNA is one of the multiethnic and religious organizations with little or no political affiliation either with the government or the opposition in the diaspora. However, like the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in America, it has its share of uncertainties. One such predicament occurred with the independence of Eritrea in 1993. Until that time many Eritreans played in one of the Ethiopian soccer clubs in America. However, after independence, these Eritreans were observed playing for Eritrean soccer clubs—Eritreans, too, have established their club after independence. While many Ethiopians felt betrayed by the actions of the Eritrean soccer players who also played for Eritrea, they were willing to forgive. But, the Eritrean sports federation was not as forgiving as the Ethiopians. Ethiopians who played soccer in Eritrean teams were purged. Faced with such problems and trying to maintain its apolitical stance, the ESFNA left the decision to keep or purge Eritrean players in their club to individual clubs—a smart judgment that saved the federation from disintegration.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 679
Redwan Hamza, spokesman for the Oromo Community of Minnesota, speaks in his office in Minneapolis about the influx of Ethiopians to Minnesota, July 14, 2006. Ethiopian refugees arriving in the state in 2005 increased 63 percent from the previous year. (AP Photo/Janet Hostetter)
In a similar fashion with Eritreans, Oromos, especially those who support the Oromo Liberation Movement (the organization fights for the independence of the Oromia state from Ethiopia) established Oromo Sports Federation in North America (OSFNA) in the 1990s. They, too, discouraged ethnic Oromos from playing for ESFNA. To dissuade some Oromo soccer players and fans from attending the ESFNA event, which was held in the week of July 4, the OSFNA often held their tournament in the same weekend. Despite such politically driven polarization, the majority of Ethiopians, Eritreans, and Oromos attend the soccer tournament regardless (Getahun 2009).
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture The 1990s in general and 1991 in particular was a critical period in Ethiopian history. The military junta that ruled the country for almost two decades was overthrown. In its place, a coalition of ethno-nationalist rebel movements, the EPRDF, came to power. For many Ethiopians in the diaspora, EPRDF’s ethnic policies and its willingness to accept the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia was unforgivable. Many Ethiopians in America also regarded the policies of the EPRDF government as anti-Ethiopian and undemocratic. Hence, for many Ethiopian refugees and
680 | Ethiopian Immigrants
asylees in America and elsewhere the hope and desire of going back to Ethiopia for good died with the coming to power of EPRDF. This could be best witnessed from the dramatic increase in the number of Ethiopians who become naturalized American citizens since the 1990s. There were less than 5,000 Ethiopians who became citizens prior to the 1990s, though there were Ethiopians who had been in the United States for more than two decades (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2009) (see Table 102). The Ethiopians who came to America before 1990, like many refugees and asylum seekers from other countries, had regarded their stay in America temporary. They believed that one day, when things get better back home, they would return. Thus, they were sojourners. Very few desired to be naturalized Americans despite the bleak political situation in Ethiopia between 1974 and 1991. But once their hope for returning to Ethiopia was shattered with the coming of EPRDF to power in 1991, many opted to become Americans. Aside from the continued antigovernment posture of Ethiopians in America, there are other variables that convinced Ethiopians to seek American citizenship. Like many immigrants and refugees that came to America before them, Ethiopians love America. As they enjoy the fruits of American democracy and the opportunities that America offers, they also want to contribute their share; and one of the best ways that they can return what America gave them is by becoming its citizen. Upon coming to power, the EPRDF, unlike the Derg that prevented the return of members of the Ethiopian diaspora to Ethiopia, was willing to accept Ethiopian returnees as visitors or for good. Yet, those Ethiopians who sought asylum or refugee status in the United States can no longer claim political persecution if they visit their country. The EPRDF government also enticed members of the diaspora, regardless of their political opinion, with free urban land and investment opportunities in Ethiopia. To have security while in Ethiopia and to facilitate their travel, many Ethiopians became naturalized American citizens. The 1998–2000 Eritrean and Ethiopian boundary conflict that evolved into a full-fledged battle made some Ethiopian asylees and refugees in America stateless. It should be noted that until 1993, Eritreans asylum seekers and refugees came to the United States as Ethiopians or immigrated to the United States with an Ethiopian passport. Even after the independence of Eritrea, there were many Eritreans who remained Ethiopians. However, as the war progressed, both Ethiopia and Eritrea began deporting each others’ citizens from their respective countries. The government of Ethiopia revoked Ethiopian citizenship of Eritreans who voted positively in Eritrea’s referendum for independence. In light of these circumstances, Eritreans of Ethiopian origin have two choices, either to become American or have the new Eritrean passport. Some chose the former. The post–Cold War period, which is often dubbed the Age of Globalization, also encouraged Ethiopians to seek American citizenship. American passport guarantees a relative safety and facilitates travel better than an
The Second and Later Generations | 681
Ethiopian passport. Also, 9/11 made it harder for asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrant aliens to find jobs. The best remedy was to become an American citizen. Since the introduction of the DV in early 1990s, many Ethiopians have benefited from it. Unlike the Ethiopian refugees and asylees of the pre-1990s, DV winners come to the United States willingly and thus are more eager to become naturalized Americans. Therefore, the number of Ethiopians who are becoming naturalized citizens of America is continually increasing. By 2008, their number eclipsed the total figure for Ethiopians who had been naturalized between 1940s and 1990.
The Second and Later Generations By and large, the Ethiopian society is patriarchal. Though women may have say in domestic affairs, men are the sole bread winners and hence the final decision makers. Social and cultural norms favor males over females. While boys are encouraged to be aggressive, go to school, and engage in outdoor activities, girls are taught to be meek and submissive, and to learn domestic chores including how to be a good wife and mother. While such norms reveal the prevalence of gender inequality in Ethiopia, there is also inequality based on generation. Overall, children are expected to be quiet, obedient, submissive, and respectful of elders. Children are instructed not to speak unless spoken to. American culture, relatively speaking, encourages equal opportunity regardless of gender and age. It encourages children to be self-reliant, expressive, and assertive. In light of this, second-generation Ethiopians are compelled to live in two different worlds, the world at home and that at school (McAdoo, Young, and Getahun 2007). Though the patriarchal order of things at home might vary depending on the Ethiopian parents’ level of education and degrees of exposure to Western culture prior to arrival to United States, fear of the unknown in America and the negative image that the media projects regarding African Americans, further strengthens patriarchy at home. Refugee resettlement agencies often resettle refugees in inner cities where the majority of the residents are African American and another ethnic minorities. Settlement in rundown ethnic-minority dominated neighborhoods often exposes second-generation Ethiopians, especially boys, to the harsh realities of the inner-city life. Consequently, Ethiopian parents continue to employ firm parental control. In the meantime, they also adapt a less engaging posture toward African Americans and other ethnic minorities. Thus, for Ethiopian parents as well as other Africans (depending upon their class and race consciousness) attaining the American dream means lessening their assimilation into the black American society. Despite parents’ desire to keep their children separate from African American culture, as indicated in previous sections, like other African immigrants, Ethiopian American immigrants are often swept up into the African American experience, often
682 | Ethiopian Immigrants
Youth Profile A Victim of the Military, She Speaks and Writes for Others Maaza Mengiste, whose family was one of the victims of the military junta, otherwise known as the Derg, left Ethiopia when she was four years old. Maaza graduated with an MFA in creative writing from New York University. Her first novel, Beneath the Lion’s Gaze, intimately relates the odyssey in an Ethiopian’s exile following the downfall of Haile Selassie and the rise of the military junta. Her book follows the path of her contemporaries, Dinaw Mengestu (The Beautiful Things That Heaven Bears) and Nega Mezlekia (Notes From the Hyena’s Belly), who are victims of the brutal rule of the Derg. All three writers left their country and live in exile in Europe and North America. Maaza received reviews that often complemented and compared her with young African writers the likes of Nigeria’s Chris Abani, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, Helon Habila, Uwem Akpan, and Uzodinma Iweala, as well as Sierra Leone’s Aminatta Forna. Maaza is often sought as a speaker by young Ethiopians attending schools throughout the United States. Maaza lives and works in Brooklyn, New York. Source: “Beneath the Lion’s Gaze Book Review.” NewsDire. [Online article retrieved 6/10.] http://www.newsdire.com/news/60-beneah-the-lions-gaze-by-meaza-mengiste-book-review. html.
times by choice and other times by default or external ascriptions. This is especially true of second-generation Ethiopians. The second-generation Ethiopian Americans who grow up in a society that defines race in binary terms are more conscious of their blackness than their parents who do not understand the racial prejudices that their children encounter in schools and other areas in the American society. Most often first-generation Ethiopian immigrants, through their mutual community associations, churches, and social occasions, are able to maintain their separate identity. Their children, however, can feel left out for they have very little in common with their parents. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church employs Geez, an ancient liturgical language, which few of its laity understands. It does not at all appeal to the younger generation. Going to church, the young generation often remarks, “is boring.” Community organizations have not yet given due attention to secondgeneration Ethiopian Americans. Almost all community associations in America are run by the old guard that still believes in authoritarian parenting and are very much involved in the politics at home rather than the well-being of the younger generation in America. Therefore, many second-generation Ethiopian Americans are not sentimentally attached to Ethiopia and thus lack their parents’ nostalgia for
The Second and Later Generations | 683
their country of origin—despite their parents’ efforts to make their offspring remain true to their Ethiopian identity (McAdoo, Young, and Getahun 2007). The existence of divergent cultural norms between Ethiopian parents and their children also has a bearing on socialization and marriage. The issue is further complicated for the following reasons. Like the rest of African immigrants and refugees in America, Ethiopians are ethnically diverse, and at times are acutely divided in terms of regional or ethnic origin. Ethiopians identify themselves, especially after 1991, as Amhara, Oromo, Tigray, and so forth. Accordingly, Ethiopian parents want their children to marry or socialize with Ethiopians, and after the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the heightened sense of ethno-nationalism among the old generation Ethiopians since then, parents prefer their children to socialize with their co-ethnics. The issue becomes very dicey when the children are of mixed parents. For instance, children of Eritrean and Ethiopian parents are expected to marry into the respective co-ethnics by both parents. If that is not possible, parents want their children to marry at least a person from their home province such as Shoa, Gondar, Eritrea, Wallega, Tigray, and so forth. In light of this, dating or marrying a fereng (an American or European) is unacceptable. However, the overall preponderance of single male Ethiopians vis-à-vis single female Ethiopians in America poses additional difficulty for the young generation. Thus, regardless of their parents’ desires, the children of Ethiopian immigrants who grow up in the United States seek mates who can relate to their own experiences. However, this is further complicated based on their area of residence; they often encounter difficulties if they don’t reside in one of the large metropolitan cities where a large proportion of Ethiopian immigrants reside. The second generation must choose whether they want to marry someone directly from their parents’ home country, someone more assimilated into the American society with a background similar to theirs, or whether they want to marry outside of their national and racial group altogether. In Ethiopia, education is the only means for upward mobility. In America, too, Ethiopian parents stress education as a means of upward mobility and emphasize the value of education to their children. They also advise their children to disregard racial discrimination and focus on their education in order to be successful, though success in education might not be as rewarding in America as it is in Ethiopia. The primary reason for the migration of many Africans, including Ethiopians, to America is political repression. Thus, Ethiopian immigrant parents in America, like many immigrants before them, are actively involved in politics at home. They want their children to be equally engaged with politics in Ethiopia. What these parents overlook is that their children are Americans with little or no sentimental attachment to the country of origin. Besides, the fractious political environment among Ethiopians discourages the younger generation from getting involved. For instance, while their parents are divided into Eritrean, Oromo, Tigrian, and so forth, and organize themselves as such, the younger generation prefer to coalesce under
684 | Ethiopian Immigrants
An Organizer for Grassroots Political and Civic Engagement Menna Demessie left Ethiopia at an early age with her father Engineer Akililu Demessie. Her life story, like Maaza’s, is intertwined with events related to the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia. Menna graduated with a BA degree in economics and law and society with honors from Oberlin College. In the college, she had served as a senior class president. Menna received her PhD in political science from the University of Michigan in 2010. Her dissertation was on legislative behavior, racial and ethnic politics, immigration, and the political participation of African immigrants in the United States. Menna was the 2006 Walter Rodney Prize Recipient at the University of Michigan. In 2005, she was part of the Ford School Public Policy team that traveled to Ethiopia to conduct social and economic analyses prior to the 2005 elections. She has also spoken at Capitol Hill about the need for grassroots political and civic engagement of Ethiopian Americans in the United States. Menna is the national youth coordinator of the Society of Ethiopians Established in the Diaspora (SEED). The organization is a nonprofit entity established in 1993 in the United States. It strives to enhance and cultivate the lives of Ethiopians and Ethiopian Americans in order for them to become productive citizens of society. Source: [Online article retrieved 6/10.] http://sitemaker.umich.edu/menna/home.
a pan-Ethiopian, pan-African, or African American identity. A good instance of this is the establishment of Ethiopian-Eritrean student association at Stanford University. The organization includes anyone from Ethiopia; however, the majority of the members are second-generation Ethiopian Americans. The formation of the East African gang in Seattle, Washington, whose membership includes Ethiopians, Somalis, and Eritreans, is a further testimony that the younger generation of Ethiopians, Eritreans, and Somalis are averse to division. The previously mentioned circumstances highlight the predicament that secondgeneration Ethiopian Americans might face. Yet, there is little study conducted on second-generation Ethiopian Americans. In fact, there is no research that examines Ethiopian immigrants on ethnic lines—though some Ethiopians will view such an endeavor as divisive and counterproductive. Until such study is conducted and the community is informed of the results, the predicaments of the younger generation will continue for sometime.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Ethiopia | 685
Two young girls watch from the front seat of a car as several hundred Ethiopian demonstrators protest outside the World Bank in Washington, D.C., on May 13, 2002. The protestors were expressing their outrage at Ethiopia’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) regime and the World Bank activity in Ethiopia. (Paul J. Richards/AFP/Getty Images)
Issues in Relations between the United States and Ethiopia The migration of Ethiopians to the United States, which began with a handful of students in 1920s, has dramatically changed in the past four or so decades. Initially, asylees and refugees were dominant among the Ethiopian immigrant community in America. In the past 10 years or so, however, the pattern increasingly shifted from asylees and refugees, who were reluctant sojourners in America, to network migrants. Consequently, either through family reunion or as DV lottery winners, an average of 5,000 Ethiopians are entering the United States annually since 1991. Today, Ethiopians in America account for the third-largest immigrant group from Africa. Also, unlike earlier times, more Ethiopians are becoming naturalized U.S. citizens (Getahun 2007a). In addition to the immigrant community, the global war on terror and regional stability are issues that will bind Ethiopia and the United States together for years to come. As in the Cold War period, the region has caught global attention. At first glance, the reason for the current attention to the region seems different than that of the past, but fundamentally, the issue remains the same: it has been and continues to
686 | Ethiopian Immigrants
be difficult to bring democratic governance and meaningful and substantial change to the multitude in the region. One of the casualties in the area is Somalia—it imploded. The country is now a battleground between Islamic fundamentals, who transcends clan- and state-based loyalties, and those who adhere to clan loyalty and those who try to resurrect the territorial-state. The dissolution of the territorial-state in Somalia, in addition to providing fertile ground for the radicalization of Islam in that country, resulted in the development of piracy as a means of sustenance. Sudan, though not imploded, is also on the verge of becoming another failed state. It is a country that has been oscillating between Arab and African identities and nationalisms. Such developments, which can be traced to its colonial past, might ultimately break the country into two: North and South Sudan. If this happens, there is no guarantee that Darfur and the Eastern Sudan will not follow the example of the South. Radical Islam has strong roots in Sudan. Hassan al-Turabi’s party is opposed to a secular state. Al-Turabi espouses a Muslim state for Sudan. At one time, Sudan served as a refuge for Osama bin Laden. The leader of the newly independent Eritrea, Isayas Afewerqi, squandered the goodwill of the world. Besides establishing a one-man rule in the mold of Mugabe, he instigated wars against his neighbors, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. His undemocratic practices, coupled with unfulfilled expectations on the aftermath of the country’s independence from Ethiopia, are making Eritrea vulnerable for ethnic as well as religious strife. Eritrea is a home for nine ethnic groups; the groups follow Islam, Christianity (Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant), and animism. Of these, Muslims, who roughly account for half of the population, are complaining of unfair treatment under Isayas Afewerqi’s Eritrea. Kenya, like its neighbors, is also susceptible to crisis. Recent events in Kenya revealed that the country is not immune from either the threats of Islamic radicalism or ethnic tensions. Ethiopia, though currently stable, is not an exception. The absence of democratic governance and lack of economic progress had already cost it a lofty price—Eritrea seceded. Unless the country’s leaders honor their promises of establishing a democratic order in Ethiopia, the country is vulnerable to the path that the Somalis took. In Ethiopia, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism is real. Like the United States, Ethiopia has a legitimate concern. The majority of Ethiopian Muslims reside in Oromia and Ogaden (Ethiopia’s Somali region). The regions adjoin the defunct Somali state where the al-shabab, which has close ties with al-qaida, operates. The al-shabab also claims Ethiopia’s Ogaden as part of Somalia; and people of the two regions who felt oppressed under the EPRDF regime have established the Ogaden and Oromo Liberation Fronts. Therefore, for its own survival and interest, Ethiopia is a party to the war on terror. As events in Somalia demonstrated, the implosion of Sudan or Eritrea is detrimental to its interest. Beside the burden for hosting millions of refugees, these
Issues in Relations between the United States and Ethiopia | 687
countries could become a staging ground for radical Islam and for proxy wars. For the United States, finding a stable ally in one of the most unstable, yet strategically important parts of the globe, is vital to its strategic interest. Yet, anchoring U.S. foreign policy options on the war on terror alone could be counter-productive. America’s promises of upholding democracy and civil liberties in the post-Cold War era should not be sidelined or simply become a rhetoric designed for local consumption. African leaders, who are willing to join the war on terror,” though they are noted for terrorizing their own people, are being touted as “new breed” and “visionary” leaders by the United States and given a red carpet welcome at Capitol Hill. The United States should condemn such leaders, to say the least. So far, as records of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa reveal, it is riddled with duplicity. America has a tendency to look the other way when African dictators trample upon human liberties as long as they serve its global politico-military strategic interest. Such leaders were and still are provided with substantial American military, economic as well as humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, such an oversight, on America’s part, is being challenged by transnational civic movements, organizations, and an increasing number of African immigrants (including Ethiopian Americans) who became naturalized U.S. citizens and thus use their vote to dissuade American foreign policy makers from following the well-trodden path.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics
4,300 4,100 3,900 3,700 3,500 3,300 3,100 2,900 2,700 2,500 2,300 2,100 1,900 1,700 1,500 1,300 1,100 900 700 500 100 0
19
80
-8 19 1 8 19 3 8 19 4 8 19 5 8 19 6 8 19 7 8 19 8 8 19 9 9 19 0 9 19 1 9 19 2 9 19 3 9 19 4 9 19 5 9 19 6 9 19 7 9 19 8 9 20 9 0 20 0 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 0 20 4 0 20 5 0 20 6 0 20 7 08
Number of Refugees
Ethiopian Refugees by Year of Entry into the US
Year
Figure 14 Ethiopian refugees by year of entry into United States Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2009).
688
Table 101 Ethiopian asylum seekers in the United States by year of entry Year
Asylum seekers
1996
823
1997
451
1998
551
1999
1,129
2000
1,439
2001
1,166
2002
1,047
2003
569
2004
750
2005
460
2006
430
2007
494
2008
588
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2009).
Table 102 Ethiopian immigrants admitted into the United States between 1992 and 2002 Year
Immigrants
1992
4,602
1993
5,191
1994
3,887
1995
5,960
1996
6,086
1997
5,904
1998
4,205
1999
4,272
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2002 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003)
689
Table 103 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth (Ethiopia): Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and country of birth
690
Total Ethiopia
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
4,053
5,092
7,565
6,635
8,286
10,571
16,152
12,786
12,917
15,462
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
2009
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Number of Naturalized Ethiopians in America 7,500
Number of Naturalized Ethiopians
7,000 6,500 6,000 5,500 5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500
08
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
20
99
20
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
19
19
19
90
1,000
Year
Figure 15 Number of naturalized Ethiopians in America Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2009).
691
692 | Ethiopian Immigrants Table 104 Ethiopian persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
233
114
119
Leading states of residence Arizona California
1,414
667
747
Colorado
718
345
373
Florida
193
98
95
Georgia
931
435
496
Illinois
393
210
183
1,440
726
714
Massachusetts
371
184
187
Michigan
196
107
89
1,614
789
825
Nevada
508
234
274
New Jersey
107
51
56
New York
337
168
169
North Carolina
216
115
101
Ohio
473
246
227
Pennsylvania
274
132
142
1,025
490
535
Maryland
Minnesota
Texas Virginia
1,302
643
659
Washington
1,168
571
597
Other
2,549
1,290
1,259
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009. Cobbook 73. 2010.
Appendix III: Notable Ethiopian Americans Much of the information for notable Ethiopian Americans is gleaned from Tadias, an online magazine that caters to the younger generation Ethiopians. For further information, see http://www.tadias.com/12/27/2009/tadias-top-20-most-readstories-of-the-year/. See also Cyber Ethiopi@ at http://cyberethiopia.com/home/ content/view/87/1/. Dr. Aklilu Habte served from 1958 to 1974 at the Haile Selassie University in many capacities including as a president of the university—the only university in the country in those days. Due to the military takeover of the country in 1974, Dr. Aklilu left Ethiopia for the United States. He joined the World Bank, where he served as the director of the education and training department
Appendix III: Notable Ethiopian Americans | 693
and as special advisor in human resources development to the vice president of the African region from 1987 to 1990. Between 1990 and 1993, he worked for the UNICEF as chief of education division and special advisor to the executive director of UNICEF. Dr. Gebisa Ejeta came to the United States in the 1970s for graduate studies and is a professor at Purdue University. In 2009, he won the World Food Prize for developing a sorghum hybrid. His research has increased the production and availability of one of the world’s five main grains and improved the food supply of hundreds of millions of people in sub-Saharan Africa as well as the world. Dr. Getachew Haile was an educator and researcher at Haile Selassie I University. After he had been tortured by the military junta that ruled the country between 1975 and 1991, he left for the United States in the early 1980s. He is currently a regents professor of medieval studies and cataloguer of oriental manuscripts at Hill Monastic Manuscript Library, College of St. Benedict, Saint John’s University (Minneapolis). Dr. Haile Gerima came to the United States in the 1960s. He studied film at UCLA. While there, he was a member of the Los Angeles School of Black Film Makers. He is currently a professor of film at Howard University. His cinema primarily focuses on Ethiopia’s past and the African American experience. He is one of a handful of African filmmakers to earn international fame and accolade. Dr. Ingida Asfaw came to Wayne State University and the Detroit Medical Center in 1967 for his general surgery residency. However, he decided to remain in the United States due to the political turmoil in Ethiopia. Since then, Dr. Ingida has become a prominent U.S. cardiac surgeon. In 2000, he and fellow Ethiopian medical professionals established the Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association, which annually provides a team of experts to conduct open heart surgery in Ethiopia for free. Dr. Ingida is the recipient of the Volvo for Life Award. (It is interesting to note that there are more Ethiopian medical doctors in the Washington, D.C., area alone than in Ethiopia.) Julie Mehretu came to the United States at early age with her father, Professor Assefa Mehretu in the 1970s. She studied art in the United States and Africa, and her work is featured at the Museum of Modern Art, New York—she is the only Ethiopian artist featured there. The subject of a PBS documentary that aired on October 28, 2009, she has had her art exhibited in many internationally recognized art venues such as the Whitney Biennial, the Istanbul Biennial, the Busan Biennale in Korea, and the Walker Art Center, and her work is currently on display at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art and the Museum of Contemporary Art in San Diego.
694 | Ethiopian Immigrants
Brig. General Legesse Tefera is often considered the hero of Ethiopia. He is a graduate of the prestigious Harar Military Academy, sometimes known as Haile Selassie Ist Military Academy. During the 1977 Somali invasion of Ethiopia, using his F5E fighter-interceptor plane, Legesse shot down two of Somali’s most advanced MIG 23 over its airspace; and then he bombed a factory deep inside Somalia where he was shot down and remained in captivity for 11 years. For his valor, Ethiopia honored Legesse with the highest military award. Since the 1990s, he and his family have lived in America. Many highranking officers of the Ethiopian Armed Forces reside in America. Liya Kebede, born and raised in Ethiopia, studied modeling in France and moved to the United States. In addition to being one of the highest paid top fashion models in the United States, Liya is a clothing designer and an actress. She is the first black face of Estée Lauder. In 2006, she set up the Liya Kebede Foundation, whose mission was to reduce maternal, newborn, and child mortality in Ethiopia and around the world. She has served as the WHO’s ambassador for maternal, newborn, and child health Chef Marcus Samuelsson was born in Ethiopia, and adopted and raised by Swedish parents. Samuelsson is one of the most noted chefs in New York City. U.S. President Obama invited him to prepare his first state dinner honoring the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh. First Lady Michelle Obama called Samuelsson “one of the finest chefs in the country.” He has recently opened a new restaurant in Harlem, where he now lives. Dr. Mehret Mandefro, who received a BA degree in anthropology and an MD from Harvard University, and an MS in public health from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine as a Fulbright scholar, is a primary care physician and HIV prevention researcher. President Obama named Mehret as one of the 2009/2010 White House Fellows for her research and accomplishments. She is also the founder of a nonprofit organization, TruthAIDS, which primarily deals with health literacy efforts among vulnerable populations. His Holiness Abune Merkorios was elected the fourth patriarch of the Holy Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in 1988. He is widely regarded as a liturgical expert. In 1991, he went into exile while others allege that he abdicated. Nevertheless, he still claims to be the legitimate Patriarch of Ethiopia and many in the diaspora, especially in America and Europe, consider him as such. Mimi Alemayhu has been nominated by President Obama to serve as executive vice president of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. She has served the U.S. government at various capacities in and outside of the United States. She was also the founder and managing partner of Trade Links, LLC, a development consulting firm that worked with clients on emerging markets
Glossary | 695
issues and promoting African exports under the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Judge Nina Ashenafi is the daughter of the late Professor Ashenasi Kebede. He was the director of the Center of African-American Culture at Florida State University (Tallahassee). Nina came to the United States at an early age with her father Prof. Ashenafi Kebede, an ethno-musicologist and composer. Judge Ashenafi is the first African American woman to head the Tallahassee Bar Association and the first African American to lead the Tallahassee Women Lawyers. Dr. Noah Samara was the founder, chairman, and the executive director of WorldSpace, an internationally known satellite company, at age 34. A graduate of Georgetown Law School, he played a prominent role in the establishment of the XM Satellite Radio. Dr. Sossina Haile came to the United States with her father Prof. Getachew Haile at an early age and received her BS and PhD (1992) from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She is currently a professor at UCLA. Sossina has received numerous awards and has been called “the power behind cooler, greener energy” in Newsweek magazine (Murr 2007). Dr. Teshome Wagaw is a professor of African and African American studies at the University of Michigan. Before he came to the United States in the early 1970s, he was the dean of students at the Haile Selassie I University (renamed Addis Ababa University). He has published numerous books and articles on the history of higher education in Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Jewish experience in Israel. In addition, Teshome is one of the founding members of the Ethiopian American Foundation—a nonprofit organization that provides help to students, universities, and colleges in Ethiopia. Dr. Yared Tekabe studies cardiovascular disease detection and prevention at Columbia University, and he has worked on a non-invasive atherosclerosis detection and molecular imaging technique. Dr. Yared hopes that in a few years time his work can help heart disease prevention efforts and early detection of atherosclerosis in humans.
Glossary Abba: Father. Abun: Pope. AESM: All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement. COR: Sudanese Commission of Refugees.
696 | Ethiopian Immigrants
Derg: Committee. ECDC: Ethiopian Community Development Council. EDU: Ethiopian Democratic Union. ELF: Eritrean Liberation Front. EOC: Ethiopian Orthodox Church. EPLF: Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. EPRDF: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. EPRP: Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party. ERA: Eritrean Relief Association. ESFNA: Ethiopian Sport Federation in North America. ESUNA: Ethiopian Students Union in North America. ICMC: International Catholic Migration Committee. INS: Immigration and Naturalization Services. IRC: International Rescue Committee. IRCA: Immigration Reform and Control Act. MAG: Military Advisory Group. OAU: Organization of African Union. OLF: Oromo Liberation Front. PFDJ: People’s Front for Democracy and Justice. PMAC: Provisional Military Administrative Council. PMGE: Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia. RST: Relief Society of Tigray. SPLA: Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army. TLF: Tigray Liberation Front. TPLF: Tigray Peoples Liberation Front. UNHCR: United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees.
References Agyeman-Duah, Baffour. 1994. The United States and Ethiopia: Military Assistance and the Quest for Security, 1953–1993. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Akalou, Wolde Micael. 1989. “Ethiopians and Afghans in the United States: A Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Northeast African Studies 2(1): 55–74. Andargachew, Tiruneh. 1993. The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974–1987: A Transformation From an Aristocratic to a to Totalitarian Autocracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
References | 697 Balsvik, Randi Rønning. 1985. Haile Selassie’s Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to Revolution, 1952–1977. East Lansing: African Studies Center, Michigan State University. Clapham, Christopher. 1968. “The Ethiopian Coup d’état of December 1960.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 6(4): 495–507. Daniel, Kendie. 2005. The Five Dimensions of the Eritrean Conflict, 1941–2004: Deciphering the Geo-Political Puzzle. Prairie View, AR: Signature Book. Gebru, Tareke. 2009. The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Getachew, Metaferia, and Shifferraw Maigenet. 1991. The Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 and the Exodus of Ethiopia’s Trained Human Resources. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press. Getahun, Solomon Addis. 2007a. The History of Ethiopian Immigrants and Refugees in America, 1900–2000: Patterns of Migration, Survival, and Adjustment. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing. Getahun, Solomon Addis. 2007b. “Determinants of Ethiopian Refugee Flow in the Horn of Africa, 1970–2000.” In The Human Cost of African Migrations, edited by Toyin Falola and Niyi Afolabi, 359–80. New York: Routledge. Getahun, Solomon Addis. 2009. “A History of Sport in Ethiopia.” In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, edited by Svein Ege, Harald Aspen, Birhanu Teferra, and Shiferaw Bekele, 409–18. Trondheim: Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Greenfield, Richard. 1965. Ethiopia: A New Political History. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Kobishchanov, Yuri M. 1979. Axum. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Koehn, Peter H. 1991. Refugee from Revolution: U.S. Policy and Third-World Migration. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Marcus, Harold G. 1983. The Politics of Empire: Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 1941–1974. Berkeley: University of California Press. Marcus, Harold G. 1995. The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844–1913. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. Marcus, Harold G. 2002. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press. Markakis, John. 1974. Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. McAdoo, Harriet P., Young, and Solomon A. Getahun. 2007. “Emerging Patterns and Characteristics of Parenting, Marriage and Socialization of Native African Americans, Contemporary African, and Caribbean Immigrants.” In The Other African Americans: Contemporary African and Caribbean Families in the United States, edited by Yoku Shaw-Taylor and Steven A. Tuch, 83–116. New York: Rowman Littlefield.
698 | Ethiopian Immigrants Mesfin, Wolde-Mariam. 1972. An Introductory Geography of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University. Murr, Andrew. 2007. “Sossina Haile: The Power Behind Cooler, Greener Energy.” Newsweek, December 22. [Online article retrieved 6/10.] http://www.newsweek. com/2007/12/22/sossina-haile-the-power-behind-cooler-greener-energy.html. Paulos, Milkias, and Metaferia Getachew. 2005. The Battle of Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopia’s Historic Victory against European Colonialism. New York: Algora Publishers. Rumbaut, Ruben G. 1996. “Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in Contemporary America.” In Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in America, edited by Silvia Pedraza and Ruben G. Rumbaut, 21–42. Belmont: Wadsworth. Sergew, Hable Selassie. 1972. Ancient and Medieval Ethiopian History to 1270. Addis Ababa: Union Printers. Shumet, Sishagne.2007. Unionists and Separatists: The Vagaries of Ethio-Eritrean Relation 1941–1991. Hollywood: Tsehai Publishers and Distributors. Skinner, Robert P. 1906. Abyssinia of To-day: An Account of the First Mission Sent by the American Government to the Court of the King of Kings, 1903–1904. New York: Longmans, Green. Teshale, Tibebu. 1996. “Ethiopia: The ‘Anomaly’ and ‘Paradox’ of Africa.” Journal of Black Studies 26(4): 414–30. Teshome, G. Wagaw.1990. The Development of Higher Education and Social Change: An Ethiopian Experience. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. U.S. Census Bureau. 2001. Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2000. Current Population Reports, Series P23–206. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2009. 2008 Year Book of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: Office of Immigration Statistics. “Wildlife.” Selamta. [Online article retrieved 06/10.] http://www.selamta.net/wildlife.htm. Wolde-Mariam, Mesfin. 1972. An Introductory Geography of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University.
Further Reading Andargachew, Tiruneh. 1993. The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974–1987: A Transformation From an Aristocratic to a to Totalitarian Autocracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The monograph is one the most comprehensive works on the Ethiopian revolution. Using primary sources written in Amharic and other languages, Andargachew provides a balanced view of the genesis of the revolution, the role of the various political parties and superpowers in the revolution, and the impact of the revolution on Ethiopian society.
Further Reading | 699 Agyeman-Duah, Baffour. 1994. The United States and Ethiopia: Military Assistance and the Quest for Security, 1953–1993. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. The book is among one of the two studies done by an African (from Ghana) on Ethiopia. The monograph reveals the deep involvement of the United States in Ethiopia during the height of the Cold War. The book examines in detail U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia. Getahun, Solomon Addis. 2007. The History of Ethiopian Immigrants and Refugees in America, 1900–2000: Patterns of Migration, Survival, and Adjustment. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing. This is one of the very few monographs that comprehensively examines the causes and process of migration of Ethiopians to the United States. In addition, Getahun provides an insight into the development or lack of Ethiopian community organizations in the United States and the impact of Ethiopian Americans on the country of origin. Greenfield, Richard. 1965. Ethiopia: A New Political History. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. So far, Greenfield’s work has remained the only published monograph that comprehensively discusses the 1960s military coups d’état against Haile Selassie’s monarchial rule. Tareke, Gebru. 2009. The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. This book is an impartial and a critical examination of socioeconomic, political, and military conditions in Ethiopia in relation to the success of the EPRDF and EPLF. The author displays the weakness and strengths of the various political parties in Ethiopia. Marcus, Harold G. 1983. The Politics of Empire: Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 1941–1974. Berkeley: University of California Press. Marcus examines Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia on the immediate aftermath of the Italian defeat and clearly displays the intricacies and the shaping of the post–World War II period. The struggle between the emergent global powers, the United States and USSR, and the declining colonial powers, England and Italy, and their desire to dominate the Horn of Africa, especially Ethiopia, has been aptly presented by Marcus. Marcus, Harold G. 1995. The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844–1913. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. This is one of the two books written on the political biography of Menelik. Marcus’s work examines the circumstances that led to the Battle of Adwa and the socioeconomic and political developments of its aftermath. It also exhibits Menelik’s Machiavellian skills in dealing with Emperor Yohannis, the Mahdists, the French, and the Italians. Marcus, Harold G. 2002. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press. The book is an exceptionally comprehensive and up-to-date text for Ethiopian history. Anyone who wants to learn about Ethiopia from pre-history to present, Marcus’s work is a must have.
700 | Ethiopian Immigrants Medhanie, Testfatsion. 1986. Eritrea: Dynamics of a National Question. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner. An exception among Eritrean intellectuals, Testfatsion Medhanie portrays the Eritrean struggle as a national a question that can be solved through class struggle instead of an ethno-nationalist revolt. His book remains one of the most influential works that has impacted the student movement in Ethiopia. Sergew Hable, Selassie, 1972. Ancient and Medieval Ethiopian History to 1270. Addis Ababa: Union Printers. It is an important monograph that provides a detailed account of Ethiopia from preAxumite times to the Zagwe Dynasty, roughly starting from 500 B.C.E. to 1270 C.E. The author tries to show Ethiopia’s strong ties with Judaism and the Semitic origin of Ethiopian civilization. Shumet, Sishagne. 2007. Unionists and Separatists: The Vagaries of Ethio-Eritrean Relation 1941–1991. Hollywood, CA: Tsehai Publishers and Distributors. Shumet’s work primarily deals with the events that led to the union between Ethiopia and Eritrea; he also explores how political actors from all sides (Ethiopians, Eritreans, the Arab, and Socialist world) worked to undo the federal arrangement. He presents an objective account of the genesis of the armed struggle in Eritrea. Skinner, Robert P. 1906. Abyssinia of To-day: An Account of the First Mission Sent by the American Government to the Court of the King of Kings, 1903–1904. New York: Longmans, Green. Skinner was the first American representative in Ethiopia. He provides invaluable firsthand information regarding early 20th-century Ethiopia, especially Menelik’s personality and his royal court and Ethiopia’s potential as a market for American goods. Tadesse, Medhane. 1999. The Eritrean-Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospects, 1991– 1998. Addis Ababa: Mega Printing. Tadesse’s work highlights the circumstances that led to the so-called border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, 1998–2000. He faults the inability of the EPLF, now the PFDJ (People’s Front for Democracy and Justice) to transform itself from a guerrilla movement to a viable state as one of the major causes of the war. Teshale, Tibebu. 1996. “Ethiopia: The ‘Anomaly’ and ‘Paradox’ of Africa.” Journal of Black Studies 26(4): 414–30. The article is a synopsis of his book, The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1896–1974. The author’s unique contribution to Ethiopian historiography is in his attempt to include the centrist and ethno-nationalist paradigms in understanding modern Ethiopia.
Filipino Immigrants by Maria Paz Gutierrez Esguerra
Introduction There are 2,364,185 Filipino Americans in the United States according to the 2000 U.S. Census. Representing almost 18 percent of the Asian American population, Filipino Americans are the second-largest Asian American group in the United States. The history of Filipino settlement in the United States began as early as the 18th century, but it was not until the 20th century, after U.S. annexation of the Philippines, that Filipino immigrants came in greater numbers. The consequences of America’s empire in the Philippines have shaped Filipino experiences of migration to and settlement in the United States. Today Filipinos in the United States make up the largest population of Filipinos living outside the Philippines.
Chronology 1763
Earliest known Filipino settlers in America establish fishing villages in the bayous of Louisiana.
1896
Emilio Aguinaldo leads a Filipino revolt against the Spanish rule that has colonized the Philippines since the 16th century.
1898
Spanish-American War ends. The United States signs the Paris Peace Treaty, and Spain cedes the Philippines for $20 million. The United States also annexes Cuba, Guam, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.
1899
Philippine-American War begins.
1900
President William McKinley establishes Philippine civil government and appoints William Howard Taft as governor-general of the Philippines.
1903
Pensionado program is established in the Philippines to provide educational scholarships to Filipino students for education in the United States. 701
Chronology | 703
1904
U.S. Navy begins recruitment of Filipinos.
1906
The Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association (HSPA) begins recruitment of Filipino laborers with recruitment centers in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and Cebu. First Filipino laborers arrive in Hawaii.
1909
Payne-Aldriff tariff establishes free trade between the United States and the Philippines.
1911
Filipino Federation of Labor founded in Hawaii.
1928
Filipino workers driven out of Yakima Valley, Washington, by mob violence.
1929
A mob of 300 men storm a Filipino labor camp and drive out 200 Filipino workers in a race riot in Exeter, California.
1930
Race riot in Watsonville, California, is recorded as the most explosive anti-Filipino riot in the United States. Racial tensions over employment disputes and white-Filipino interracial relations fuel the tension in the town of Watsonville. The two-day race riot resulted in the death of Fermin Tobera, a 22-year-old Filipino laborer.
1933
The state of California adds “Malay” as a category to its anti-miscegenation laws, and California Civil Code Sections 60 and 69 prohibit marriages between whites and Filipinos. In addition to California, 12 other states have anti-miscegenation laws against Filipinos.
1934
Tydings-McDuffie Act, also known as the PhilippineIndependence Act, is enacted into law. It allowed for a 10year transition to full independence and restricts immigration from the Philippines to a quota of 50 persons per year. Independence is delayed until 1946 due to World War II.
1935
Welch Repatriation Act offers Filipinos in the United States free one-way passage to return to the Philippines. Approximately 2,190 Filipinos repatriate.
1941
December 7: Japan bombs Pearl Harbor, and the United States gets involved in World War II.
December 8: Japan attacks Clark Air Field and invades the Philippines. 1942
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs the Selective Service Act, which permits Filipinos to serve in the U.S. Army without American citizenship. The 1st and 2nd Filipino Infantry
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Regiments of the U.S. Army forms with more than 7,000 Filipino and Filipino American soldiers serving. 1946
Philippine Independence proclaimed on July 4. War Brides Act and Fiancées Act permit entry of Filipino women into the United States despite quota restrictions. Luce-Celler Bill passes and allows Filipinos who arrived before the passing of the Tydings-McDuffie Act to apply for naturalized citizenship. Approximately 10,764 Filipinos become citizens.
1948
California repeals antimiscegenation law and becomes the first state to declare it unconstitutional.
1952
McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act ends anti-Asian immigration policies and lifts the ban on Asian exclusion. The 1952 Act also eliminates laws that prevent Asians from becoming naturalized citizens.
1965
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, also known as the Hart-Celler Act, passes in Congress. It abolishes the nationality quota system and establishes a preference system based on family reunification and occupational skills, which allows for larger numbers of Filipino professionals and families to migrate to the United States outside the yearly country limit of 20,000 people.
1972
President Ferdinand Marcos declares martial law in the Philippines resulting in political demonstrations and massive protests.
1986
People Power Revolution in the Philippines overthrows the Marcos regime and ends decades of martial law. Corazon Aquino becomes first female president of the Philippines.
1990
Immigration Act of 1990 increases total under flexible annual cap of 675,000 but ends unlimited immigration of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. The act revises all grounds for exclusion, amending the McCarran–Walter Act of 1952. Filipino World War II veterans are naturalized under the Immigration Act of 1990.
1992
Last U.S. military base closes in the Philippines.
1994
Benjamin Cayetano becomes first Filipino American elected as governor in the United States.
2000
U.S. Census records show 2.4 million Filipinos in the United States.
Background | 705
2003
The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 allows natural-born Filipinos naturalized in the United States and their unmarried minor children to reclaim Filipino nationality and hold dual citizenship.
2006
U.S. Congress passes legislation that commemorates 100 years of Filipino migration to the United States.
2009
President Barack Obama signs the stimulus bill, known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which provides Filipino World War II veterans with lumpsum compensation for their service to the United States. H. Res. 780 passes in U.S. Congress recognizing the celebration of Filipino American History Month during the month of October.
Background Geography of the Philippines The Republic of the Philippines is an archipelago located in Southeast Asia that spans 1,152 miles north to south and 688 miles east to west. It is surrounded by the Philippine Sea in the east, the China Sea in the west, and the Celebes Sea in the south. Comprised of over 7,000 islands the country is divided into three major geographic island clusters: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Luzon, located in the north, is home to the capital city of Manila; 6,000 islands including some of the largest—Palawan, Leyte, Samar, Bohol, and Cebu—make up the Visayan region. In the south, Mindanao is the easternmost island of the country. The geography includes coastal plains, valleys, dense rain forests, and mountain ranges. The Sierra Madre on the northeast coast island of Luzon is the longest and the largest landform in the country. Mt. Apo at 9,690 feet is a stratovolcano on Mindanao and the highest peak. The islands of the Philippines are chiefly of volcanic origin, and they are a part of a western Pacific arc comprised of active volcanoes. As such, the country is prone to earthquakes. Climate in the country differs by region although generally the Republic of the Philippines has a tropical marine climate that averages 80 degrees Fahrenheit. There are three seasons in the year, which can include rainy monsoons, hot humid weather, and a dry season.
History of the Philippines Present-day Philippines is the product of a long history of migration, settlement, and colonialism that began as early as the 14th century, when Arab traders from
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Malay and Borneo arrived to the southern islands. This was followed by early migration from neighboring countries like India and China who brought with them their religions, languages, foods, and culture. Filipino natives adopted some of these customs and incorporated them to native ways of life; many of these influences are still evident in contemporary Philippines. In pre-Spanish society Filipinos lived in small settlements called barangays, which consisted of families who lived together and supported one another. A chieftain, who was responsible for the protection of and the overall welfare of its members, ruled it. Agriculture was the main source of livelihood for the barangay as farmers grew rice, vegetables, and fruits for sustenance. Industries included lumbering, fishing, mining, and weaving, and the settlers sometimes traded these goods with neighboring countries like China, Siam (Thailand), Borneo, and Sumatra (Bautista 1998, 17). Religion also played an important role in barangay life. Natives practiced a religion that revered a supreme god known as Bathala, who created the heavens, Earth, and man. They honored the spirits of their ancestors with sacrifices and believed in the immortality of the human soul. Thus, prior to the arrival of Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan in 1521, who claimed discovery of the Philippines, Filipino society, religions, and culture were already established and well developed. Magellan stumbled upon the Philippines during a Spanish expedition to circumnavigate the globe but it was in a battle with a local leader, Lapu-Lapu, that he met an untimely death. Other Spanish expeditions followed including one led by Lopez de Villalobos, who named the archipelago after a young Philip II of Spain in 1542. Spanish settlement and colonization did not begin until the arrival of another expedition in Cebu Island in 1565. The expedition led by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was comprised of approximately 400 men. They established themselves in a small town called San Miguel (Rodell 2002, 10). By 1751 Legazpi and his troops had moved up to Luzon Island in Manila, where the Spanish colony would flourish. Manila grew as an international port that served Spain’s galleon trade between the Philippines and Mexico, which became the primary business for Spanish colonists in the Philippines. Most of the Spanish trade remained in Manila while Spanish missionaries dispersed throughout the archipelago to secure Spain’s goal of Christian conversion. Religious orders established themselves in small towns as they converted Filipino natives to Roman Catholicism. With the support of the Spanish crown, priests also oversaw all municipal affairs, which gave them both religious and political power and control over the towns and villages they lived in. The project of religious conversion was successful but destructive to established Filipino society. By the late 19th century, almost 80 percent of the population had converted to Christianity with the exception of Muslim peoples in the southern region of the country who resisted missionary efforts (Rodell 2002, 11). Spanish colonization did not go without Filipino resistance. Throughout much of Spain’s rule in the Philippines there were constant revolts and protests against
Background | 707
Spanish abuse. From 1565 to 1600 alone, there were 13 revolts (Bautista 1998, 34). Between the 16th to 19th centuries, the Spanish colonial government recorded approximately 124 revolts throughout the islands (Bautista 1998, 34). By the mid19th century, native priests were beginning to openly defy Spanish clergy while educated Filipino elites like national hero Jose Rizal critiqued Spanish colonial practices in his writings. Although sentiments of revolution brewed within nationalists, patriots, and secret societies, it was not until the Philippine Revolution in 1896 that Filipinos organized and fought against Spanish troops in military battle. Filipino nationalist and revolutionary Andres Bonifacio led the Katipuneros in battle although the superiority of Spanish weapons, skills, and resources caused the ultimate defeat of Filipino revolutionaries. In the meantime, international events involving the United States and Spain with regards to Cuba, another Spanish colony at the time, would change the trajectory of Philippine independence. U.S. intervention in the Philippines would be the result of the Spanish-American War, which began when the U.S. battleship Maine exploded in Cuba’s Havana Harbor in 1898 (Rodell 2002, 15). Filipino resistance against Spanish colonialism would attract U.S. attention, and Filipinos and American troops would ally together in the Philippines to defeat Spain. In June 12, 1898, Filipino independence leader Emilio Aguinaldo declared Philippine independence making it Asia’s first democratic government (Rodell 2002, 15). It was a shortlived victory as Spain ceded possession of the Philippines to the United States under the Treaty of Versailles. What followed was an oft forgotten event in American history: the PhilippineAmerican War of 1899, which resulted in the death of an estimated million Filipinos, the destruction of cities, and the territorial annexation of the Philippines (Espiritu 2003, 23). An expansion of the United States’ policy of Manifest Destiny, American forces immediately took over different parts of Philippine society and established a government structure that mimicked its own. To support American military forces, the colonial government also established military bases in the islands. But the impact of American colonization was most evident in Philippine cultural life (Roddell 2002, 17) where Filipinos were taught to embrace American culture. It introduced an American education system where English was its primary language of instruction. Filipino education under the tutelage of American teachers taught them a new culture and a way of life in which the United States was considered the measure of modernity and civilization. The relationship between the two countries was often tenuous, and American attitudes towards the annexation of the Philippines were ambiguous at best. U.S. colonialism was executed through “benevolent” means that were intended to win Filipino support, but Americans themselves were unsure about the role that the United States would play in empire. For Filipinos U.S. presence in the first half of the 20th century represented a barrier to full independence. Filipino aspirations
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Filipino prisoners during the Philippine-American War, about 1899. The United States helped liberate the Philippines, a possession of Spain since 1521, in the Spanish-American War of 1898. When the United States annexed the islands and refused to recognize Filipino revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo’s authority as president, Aguinaldo and his rebel troops took up arms against their erstwhile “ally” and precipitated a bloody insurrection that ended with Aguinaldo’s capture in 1902. (Library of Congress)
for independence never dissipated as the colonial government had hoped and instead remained despite continued American efforts to “Americanize” and “civilize” them. Transition to self-rule began in 1916 under President Woodrow Wilson with the passage of Jones Law, which provided the guidelines for Philippine independence, although it was not achieved until 1946, following the end of World War II. Even after the Philippines declared its independence, the influence of the American government, economy, military, and culture remained embedded in Philippine society. Immediately following the declaration of independence, Filipinos established a democratic government that mimicked the American model. Reconstructing the war-torn country was challenging not only due to the need for resources but also the uprising of Communist-dominated Hukbalahap guerrillas. Despite the support of the American government and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Philippine government did not capture the guerillas’ leader until 1964. Ferdinand E. Marcos became the president in the following year, and his popularity increased as programs helped to improve living conditions. Unfortunately, conditions deteriorated
Causes and Waves of Migration | 709
by the 1970s. On September 21, 1972, President Marcos declared martial law based on the growing threat of Communist movements in the country. Poverty and governmental corruption increased in this period, and it began to look as if President Marcos was using the martial law to remain in office beyond the expiration of his presidency as well as to silence any political opposition, especially Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino (Rodell 2002, 21). Aquino, who was a popular political leader, was a strong critic of the Marcos regime. Aquino’s assassination on August 21, 1983 at the Manila International Airport made him a martyr in death, and his assassination became the catalyst for a new political movement. This movement was headed by an unlikely candidate—the widow of Senator Aquino, Corazon “Cory” Aquino. Amidst controversy and government corruption but with the general support of the people, Cory Aquino emerged victorious after a contentious election and was inaugurated as the first female president of the Philippines in 1986. Her presidency faced tough challenges as it sought to rebuild the government, develop the economy, and improve living conditions for Filipinos who suffered under poverty and corruption. Much of the successes of President Aquino’s presidency were due to massive public support, foreign aid, and the loyalty of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Roddell 2002, 24). In 1992, President Aquino declined to run for reelection, and former Army Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos succeeded her in office. President Fidel Ramos sought to revitalize the nation’s economy through private investments and the deregulation of government. It was during his term that the geological disaster of Mount Pinatubo on the island of Luzon occurred, killing hundreds of people and destroying thousands of homes and businesses including the Clark Air Base. U.S. evacuation of military bases in 1992 followed after the Philippine Senate voted not to renew the contract. Jose Marcelo “Erap” Estrada won the presidency in 1998, but an illegal gambling scandal in 2000 led to his impeachment. Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded him, and in 2004 she was elected into a full term in office. Her administration, however, was marred with controversy as allegations that she rigged election votes spread. Numerous attempts to impeach President Macapagal-Arroyo failed, but these reflected popular discontent about the integrity of her administration. In the most recent election in 2010 Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III was elected into office. He is the son of late President Corazon Aquino and late Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration The earliest known Filipino settlers in the United States were subjects of the Spanish crown employed as sailors and crewmen of Spanish galleons that transported
710 | Filipino Immigrants
trade goods between Manila and the New World. Driven by a desire to escape harsh treatment from their colonial rulers, many of these men jumped ship to various ports in Mexico, California, Mississippi, and Louisiana. In the bayous of Louisiana, Filipino fishing and shrimping villages emerged, of which Saint Malo was the earliest (Espina 1988). Known as Louisiana’s “Manilamen,” these settlers constructed “communities of houses upon stilts . . . built in true Manila style, with immense hat-shaped eves and balconies” (Hearns 1883, 198). In these villages, the Manilamen lived in a homosocial world of men. Lafcadio Hearn, a journalist for Harper’s Weekly, provided the first-known written account of this lacustrine settlement of “Malay fishermen—Tagalas from the Philippine Islands” in 1833. Unfortunately, in 1915 a strong hurricane destroyed Saint Malo and along with it further evidence of its history. Although other villages like Saint Malo continued to exist into the 19th century, many of these communities met eventual decline. Despite an early history of Filipino settlement in the United States, it was not until after American colonization that migration to America increased. The early decades of the 20th century witnessed a sudden rise in Filipino migration to Hawaii and the continental United States, especially after the end of the PhilippineAmerican War in 1902. The American colonial government encouraged much of this early migration beginning with a government-sponsored education program that sent hundreds of Filipino students to study in select American colleges and universities. Termed pensionados for the scholarship funds they received, these students came as early as 1903 after Governor-General William Howard Taft’s administration approved the Pensionado Act. The program’s selectivity and the availability of funds limited the number of pensionados in the United States. During the program’s tenure the pensionado program sponsored over 500 Filipino students. As government-sponsored students they were required by the colonial government to return to the Philippines immediately after the completion of their degrees. Upon their return many of these pensionados served in different administrative, cultural, economic, and government positions with the aim of developing the insular country. By 1910, a majority of these students had returned to the Philippines. In addition to pensionado students, there were also non-sponsored students who came to United States with hopes of obtaining college degrees. Inspired by the successes of pensionados before them, these students migrated to the United States independently and without any funding from the colonial government. In America they attended universities throughout the country in metropolitan cities like Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Seattle. To fund their education many worked while attending school but lack of money, the demands of work life, and early encounters with discrimination limited their accomplishments. While some returned to the Philippines, many transitioned into full-time employment and later settled in the United States.
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Recruitment of Filipino laborers into Hawaiian plantations helped to boost the numbers of Filipino immigrants beginning as early as 1906. American companies desperate for cheap laborers turned to the newly acquired colony as a source of immigrant labor. Impending labor strikes in Hawaii and stringent anti-Asian immigration policies halted the supply of Chinese, Korean, and Japanese labor, which posed a dilemma for an agricultural industry that relied heavily on it. The American annexation of the Philippines as a territory offered a solution to Hawaii’s plantation owners. Filipinos were particularly attractive to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association (HSPA) because of their unique legal status as “American nationals.” As nationals, Filipinos enjoyed special privileges that allowed them to travel freely between the Philippines and the United States. By the mid-1910s and into the 1930s, Filipino migration continued to rise due to increasing recruitment of Filipino immigrant workers to Hawaii. The migration wave of non-sponsored students and workers in this period differed markedly from early pensionados in education, socioeconomic status, and Filipino ethnic affiliation. These migrants came from farming and working-class communities with large numbers from Ilokano-speaking provinces of northern Luzon. Economic and political circumstances in this region and the Philippines in general as a result of U.S. occupation had altered political and economic circumstances forcing workers to find alternative sources of employment. The combination of push-pull factors ensured that Hawaiian plantations had a steady and reliable labor source. Between 1909 and 1934, it is estimated that the HSPA recruited over “118, 556 sakadas into Hawaii—103,513 men, 8,952 women, and 6,091 children” (Posadas 1999, 15). Labor recruitment in Hawaii opened up other opportunities for Filipino migrants who sought employment in Western states like California, Washington, Oregon, and Alaska. In the mainland United States many Filipinos continued to work in the agricultural industry, and when the harvest was out of season, these same men went as far north as Alaska to secure jobs as miners and as workers in Alaska’s canneries. By the 1920s Filipinos were the largest group of Asian farm workers in the West Coast, while Filipinos in urban cities like Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle found work in hotels, restaurants, and domestic service. The United States Navy also recruited Filipinos into service; they were the only Asian ethnic group to serve in the U.S. armed forces without U.S. citizenship. The establishment of three U.S. military bases in the Philippines immediately following U.S. occupation made available certain opportunities for Filipinos in the navy. As U.S. nationals, Filipinos were able to secure work in Navy yards in a variety of occupations such as stewards, seamen, petty officers, machinists, and firefighters (Espiritu 2003). As a result of heavy labor recruitment and educational opportunities that were geared specifically towards young single Filipino men, it is not surprising that the Filipino immigrant population in the early decades of the 20th century was
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markedly skewed in age, gender, and occupation. This was evident in the disparity between the numbers of Filipino men and Filipina women who migrated in this early period. While a large number of Filipino men migrated for school and work, few Filipina women migrated independently or with their families. A few Filipina women who migrated between the 1920s and 1930s came as schoolteachers, pharmacists, and secretaries, but their numbers remained small (Cordova 1983). For example, in 1920s California, where the Filipino immigrant population was highest, 93.3 percent of Filipinos admitted into the state were men while only 6.7 percent were female (U.S. Department of Labor 1930, 32). A combination of family tradition, gender roles, and labor recruiting practices kept the Filipino female population low, and it was not until after World War II that their numbers would increase.
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separatism The unique relationship between the United States and the Philippines meant that Filipinos exercised special privileges that were unavailable to other immigrants in the early 20th century. As “American nationals,” they were able to migrate between the United States and the Philippines without restriction during a period of extreme anti-Asian immigration exclusion. Despite their unique status, however, many Filipinos found that they were not welcome in the United States as equal citizens. As native-born Filipinos, access to citizenship through naturalization was barred to them just like other Asian immigrants. As the number of Filipino immigrants in the mainland United States increased into the 1920s and the 1930s so did nativist resistance to Filipino migration. In the American West, where Filipino immigrant populations were highest, instances of social, economic, and legal harassment became commonplace (Melendy 1967, 144). Labor discrimination forced Filipinos into the agriculture and service industries where they worked as field hands, waiters, porters, and domestic servants while housing discrimination ensured that they lived in urban slums, rooming houses, and sheds (Burma 1951, 44; Melendy 1967, 146). Hostile propaganda against Filipino labor sometimes resulted in violent confrontations between whites and Filipino immigrants with some of the most infamous race riots against them occurring in the Western states of California and Washington state. Sociologists found that labor competition and Filipino-white interracial relations between men and women were some of the main causes for white disapproval (Melendy 1967, 144–45). Filipino experiences with discrimination during this period stood in direct conflict with what they learned about American values of equality, democracy, and freedom from their American teachers in the Philippines. And although President Theodore Roosevelt claimed Filipinos as America’s “little brown brothers,” in reality the U.S. annexation of the Philippines produced mixed reactions about territorial expansion. Discussions about what to do with the Philippines as a U.S. possession
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preoccupied much of the political debates in the 1930s. Concerns about unemployment and increasing migration from the Philippines at the onset of the Great Depression shaped much of these debates, with exclusionists lobbying for Filipino exclusion as one solution to the growing so-called Filipino Problem. Thus although Filipino migrants enjoyed the benefits of their special status as American nationals, it did little to protect them from the harsh realities of the racial discrimination they experienced. Ironically, Filipinos found little government support and protection in being a ward of the United States. By the mid-1930s economic and social discrimination manifested itself into law consequently making it difficult for Filipinos to own land, obtain marriage licenses, and naturalize. In 1934 the U.S. Congress passed the Philippines Independence Act, also known as the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which marked a dramatic shift in the relationship between the Philippines and the United States. While it promised a 10-year transition into full independence, it also immediately restricted Filipino migration to 50 people per year (Posadas 1999, 23). The Tydings-McDuffie Act was quickly followed by a piece of legislation introduced by Congressman Richard Welch. The Welch Repatriation Act of 1935, administered by the Immigration and Naturalization Services, would provide the financial means for Filipinos to voluntarily return to the Philippines (Ngai 2002). Approximately 2,190 Filipinos returned.
Later Waves of Immigration Phases to 1965 Immigration Act The period between 1945 and 1965 marked a period of important transformations for Filipinos both in the Philippines and the United States. Philippine independence, access to naturalized citizenship, formation of Filipino American families, and the expansion of Filipino American ethnic communities shaped the future of Filipinos in the United States. The beginning of World War II was an important turning point as Filipinos saw a shift in U.S.–Philippine relations. Because the Philippines was an American ally in the war, American hostilities against Filipinos lessened as U.S. involvement in World War II increased. Filipino loyalty to the United States during the war against Japan won American praise. Philippine involvement in World War II led to major policy decisions that incorporated the Philippine Armed Forces into the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE); this merger led to a massive recruitment of Filipinos into military service. In 1942 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed executive orders that allowed Filipino citizens to enlist for military service without citizenship. They would become the only immigrant group in the history of the U.S. military that would be allowed to do so. The Selective Service Act enabled Filipino noncitizens to serve in the segregated 1st and
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2nd Filipino Infantry Regiments. In an attempt to display U.S. commitments to “democracy,” rights to naturalization were also extended to Filipino service men that served during World War II. Approximately 10,737 Filipinos were naturalized (Posadas 1999, 26). Immediately following the end of the war, the United States granted Philippine independence on July 4, 1946, and Congress passed the LuceCeller Bill, which enabled all remaining Filipinos who arrived before the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act to naturalize. But this moment was also rife with tensions and contradictions for Philippine– U.S. relations. While the Luce-Celler Act offered opportunities for American citizenship, it simultaneously limited future Filipino immigration to 100 persons a year. Despite the quota, Filipinos found other opportunities for migration based on family and occupational preferences (Posadas 1999, 27). War brides and nurses accounted for a large amount of Filipino migration in the period following the passage of the Luce-Celler Bill. The Military War Brides Act of 1945 and the Fiancées Act of 1946 allowed for the migration of U.S. military servicemen’s Filipina wives and fiancées in numbers that exceeded the established quota of the Luce-Celler Bill. Approximately 118,000 spouses and children arrived due to this legislation (Posadas 1999, 28). In addition the Exchange Visitor Program (EVP) administered by the State Department in 1948 offered Filipino nurses the unique opportunity to pursue postgraduate study in American hospitals. The Philippines immediately became an important EVP partner for the United States due to previous colonial ties (Choy 2003). A visible result of the EVP, the War Bride Act, and the Fiancées Act was the increased migration of Filipina women who were absent in the early 20th century. New changes in immigration policies in the post–World War II period offered loopholes that would enable Filipinos to migrate to the United States outside the yearly quota. These new programs and laws also gave Filipino women a unique opportunity to migrate as independent migrants whether as students or professionals; or wives, or fiancées who were waiting to reunite with their families. In 1952 the United States passed the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act, which ended anti-Asian immigration policies and lifted the ban on race and sex as bars to exclusion. It also eliminated laws that prevented Asians from becoming naturalized citizens although it maintained race-based quotas previously in place. This act would once again transform international relations between the United States and the Philippines.
Immigration Act of 1965 and Succeeding Legislation Amendments to U.S. immigration policies and changing conditions in the Philippines shaped contemporary Filipino migration in the post-1965 period. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished national quotas implemented in the
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early 1920s, which it replaced with hemispheric caps instead. The annual cap for the Eastern Hemisphere was 170,000, and the Western Hemisphere was 120,000 with a limit of 20,000 annually for every country (Daniels 2008). Dramatic changes in the social, political, and economic conditions in the Philippines also played an important role in Filipinos’ decisions to migrate. Increasing political turmoil and unrest prompted by the regime of President Ferdinand Marcos resulted in economic instability and unemployment. This unstable government and the country’s unpredictable future forced many Filipinos to migrate to the United States. The implementation of the new immigration law aided this process. The 1965 Act established a set of preferences that facilitated family reunification and the recruitment of trained professionals. Two patterns of chain migration emerged from this: (1) family members in the Philippines came to reunite with Filipinos who had come to the United States prior to 1965 and (2) highly trained professionals came to seek out better work opportunities (Liu, Ong, and Rosenstein 1991, 488). Filipino immigrants unable to bring family members due to previous immigration restrictions took advantage of the new preferences and petitioned for relatives to join them in the United States. At the same time, shortages of medical professionals set in motion the recruitment of Filipino nurses, doctors, and other health-related professionals into American hospitals. The post-1960s migration differed markedly from previous waves of migration in this way. Unlike earlier Filipino immigrants who were primarily unskilled single male workers, post-1960s Filipino migrants came as highly trained skilled professionals indicating a dramatic shift in the demographics of new migrants’ occupations and marital statuses. The arrival of Filipina women in greater numbers also changed the demographic of this immigrant population. For the first time in Filipino immigration history, women comprised the larger group of migrants in the post-1965 era. Between 1966 and 1971, Filipino women in the United States far outnumbered men—66,517 to 47,599 (Takaki 1989, 432). A combination of families migrating as well as women dominating the health professional field contributed to this increase. Filipina nurses especially had become a principal part of the so-called brain drain generation with an estimated one-fifth of the 20,000 nurses graduating from Philippine schools migrating to the United States (Bautista 1998, 115). It was during this period that the Philippines became a major source of foreign-trained nurses in the United States. The arrival of families and professionals revitalized what were once declining Filipino American communities throughout the United States. Over 230,000 Filipinos migrated to the United States in the decade immediately following the 1965 Act (Posadas 1999, 35). By the 1970s the Philippines had sent the highest number of new immigrants to the United States from Asia (Liu, Ong, and Rosenstein 1991).
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Through IRCA to the Present The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was an attempt to address issues regarding illegal immigration during the 1980s. The new law sought to do three things: (1) restrict illegal immigration through more stringent enforcement, (2) enforce stricter penalties for employers who knowingly employ ineligible workers, and (3) provide amnesty for undocumented immigrants who have continuously resided in the United States since January 1, 1982 (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services n.d.). While Filipino immigrants were not the intended targets of the law, it did affect a small population of Filipinos who were living in the United States as undocumented immigrants. Many of them had entered the United States legally but “over stayed” past the expiration date of their tourist and temporary working visas (Posadas 1999, 130). By staying in the United States, these temporary migrants hoped that they would be able to accelerate the process of applying for permanent residency. Others chose different routes like entering into contracted marriages that enabled the undocumented immigrant to gain citizenship through a spouse. Between 1986 and 1999, approximately 27,696 Filipinos gained legal immigrant status under the IRCA (Posadas 1999, 40). The enactment of the IRCA was followed by amendments to existing immigration legislation. The Immigration Act of 1990 increased the number of legal immigrants allowed to enter the United States. As a result, changes in the preference system doubled the number of Filipinos admitted into the United States. The Immigration Act of 1990 also included a section that directly affected Filipino veterans. Section 540 allowed for the naturalization of surviving Philippine-born World War II veterans who fought for the U.S. Armed Forces between September 1, 1939, and December 31, 1946 (Posadas 1999, 43). Veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), the Philippine Army, and the Philippine Scout Rangers were granted the rare opportunity to apply for U.S. citizenship. In the 1990s the issue of illegal immigration resurfaced once again. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), passed in 1996, drastically changed the grounds for exclusion and deportation of legal and illegal immigrants. It enforced harsh penalties against identified undocumented immigrants and barred them from future entry into the United States. Although the IIRIRA was intended as an illegal immigration bill, its policies affected legal immigration as well. Legal immigrants faced stricter conditions that made sponsorship of new immigrants more difficult to achieve. Other aspects of the law underscored the importance of “immigrant responsibilities” intended to deter legal immigrants from access to the benefits of social services (Posadas 1999, 142). Overall the IIRIRA was designed to implement immigration policies that would restrict migration, deter illegal immigration, and impose stringent penalties on those who violated these laws.
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Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community U.S. census data provides the best estimates of the Filipino population in the United States. In 2000 the U.S. Census Bureau identified Filipinos as the second-largest detailed Asian group representing approximately 19.8 percent of the total Asian population in the United States. There is an estimated 2,364,815 people who identified as Filipino alone or in combination with one or more races making up almost 1 percent of the U.S. population (U.S. Census 2000a). Despite a long history of disproportioned male migration, the sex ratio amongst Filipino Americans is now in favor of women. Males make up 46 percent while women represent 54 percent of the total adult Filipino American population (U.S. Census 2000a). Filipino Americans live throughout the United States, but the West region has the highest concentration of the population with 68 percent. Approximately 14 percent of Filipino Americans live in the Southern region, while 10 percent are in the Northeast. The Midwest has the lowest percentage of the population with only 8 percent (U.S. Census 2000a). The top ten states with the highest population of Filipino Americans include: California (1,098,321), Hawaii (275,728), Illinois (100,338), New York (95,144), New Jersey (95,063), Washington (91,765), Texas (75,226), Florida (71,282), Virginia (59,374), and Nevada (51,318) (U.S. Census 2000a). Metropolitan regions and cities with the highest numbers of Filipino Americans are Los Angeles/Riverside/Orange County, California; San Francisco/ Oakland/San Jose, California; Honolulu, Hawaii; New York/Northern New Jersey/ Long Island, New York; San Diego, California; Chicago, Illinois/Gary, Indiana/ Kenosha, Wisconsin; and Seattle/Tacoma/Bremerton, Washington. (U.S. Census 2000a).
Age and Family Structure In 2000 Filipinos had a median age of 35.5 years, which is half a year older than the national median of 35 years. Following the trend of the overall population of the United States, 73 percent of Filipino Americans are over 18. Compared to other Asian ethnic groups the Filipino American population shows little signs of aging with only 8.7 percent of the population over 65 years old while children under 18 constitute 22.1 percent of the overall population (Reeves and Bennett 2004, 9). The family unit occupies a central space in Filipino American lives. It is a nuclear one that includes the father, mother, and their children. In 2000 approximately 58.8 percent of Filipino Americans of marriageable age were married, 61.7 percent of which maintained Filipino American households (U.S. Census 2000b). In addition to this nuclear family structure, the Filipino kinship structure is also a “bilateral” one that incorporates relatives from the maternal and paternal lines. Thus it is
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not unusual for Filipino American families to include grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins—both blood and fictive kin—within their households. This kind of extensive family structure accommodates multigenerational families into a household; a rate that is higher in Filipino American communities when compared to other immigrant groups. When compared with other Asian ethnic groups, Filipino Americans were more than twice as likely to live in families with six or more members (Barnes, Adams, and Powell-Griner 2008).
Educational Attainment Filipino Americans have a deep regard for education, which they view as a primary avenue for upward economic and social mobility. Historically the goal of obtaining a college degree has been a main driver for Filipino immigration to the United States beginning with American-sponsored pensionados. In contemporary times, Filipino immigrants continue to pursue the completion of college degrees or higher forms of education to achieve economic success and stability in the United States. It is believed that a good education presents opportunities for better jobs. In 2000 approximately 87.3 percent of Filipino Americans 25 and older had at least a high school education. For 37 percent of Filipino Americans a high school diploma was the highest level of education attained. Over 43 percent had a bachelor’s degree while 43.8 percent reported having achieved a bachelor’s degree or higher. Of the total population of Filipino Americans 25 and older, only 13 percent have less than a high school degree compared to 20 percent of the general U.S. population (Reeves and Bennett 2004, 12). The relatively high educational attainment of Filipino Americans can be attributed to selective migration, which has been a direct result of post-1960s Filipino immigration (Bankston 2006). As Filipino professionals arrived as a part of the brain drain of the 1960s, they came with high levels of education and training. Rates of educational attainment are especially high for foreign-born Filipino Americans when compared to their native-born counterparts. While 42.4 percent of foreignborn Filipino Americans hold a bachelor’s degree or higher, only 22.3 percent of the native-born Filipino American population have achieved the same level of educational attainment (Posadas 1999, 103).
Economic Attainment Occupation and Income Patterns In general Filipino American families have achieved a relatively comfortable economic attainment. The median family income for Filipino Americans in 1999 was $63,057, which is approximately $21,000 higher than the median income for the general U.S. population (U.S. Census 2000c). A relatively high median annual
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income for Filipino Americans can be attributed to their educational attainment as discussed earlier as well as the concentration of Filipino Americans in professional occupations. Another factor contributing to the higher median family income is the higher numbers of family members who work within the household. Seventy-one percent of Filipino American men above the age of 16 years old reported participating in the labor force earned $35,560 on average. Among women in the detailed Asian groups of the 2000 Census, Filipino American women had the highest labor force participation rate at 65.2 percent (Reeves and Bennett 2004, 13). The percentage of Filipino American women in the labor force exceeded that of all Asian ethnic women. On average Filipino American women earned $31,450 annually. In 1990 approximately 38 percent of Filipino Americans were employed in management and professional type occupations. Approximately 13.9 percent worked in the service industry, and 20.8 percent were in sales and office. Less than 20 percent of the total Filipino American population worked in the farming, construction, and production transportation industries (Reeves and Bennett 2004, 14). Although Filipino Americans are concentrated in professional occupations, they are
Filipino nurse Elmer Jacinto prepares medicine as he does his rounds at St. Vincent’s Midtown Hospital in New York, September 21, 2006. Jacinto could have remained a doctor in the Philippines but chose to become a nurse in the United States, making a higher salary than physicians in his homeland. (AP Photo/Paul Hawthorne)
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underrepresented in high-ranking leadership positions in both the public and private sectors. Filipinos are also less likely to become entrepreneurs and own businesses when compared to other Asian ethnic groups. Despite relatively high economic success, however, approximately 7 percent of Filipinos in the United States live below the federal poverty line (U.S. Census 2000c). Filipino Americans have a lower per capita income of $19,259 when compared to whites, who have an average of $24,819 (Asian Pacific Islander Health Forum [APIAHF] 2005). Research shows that native-born Filipino Americans tend to have higher poverty rates than the foreign born. Filipino Americans who lived in ethnic enclaves in Los Angeles were more likely to live in poverty than Filipino Americans who lived in other regions of the country (Bankston 2006, 193).
Health Statistics and Issues Health statistics for Filipino Americans offer limited findings because general studies on the Asian American population often do not differentiate between ethnic Asian groups (APIAHF 2005). Thus although Filipino Americans are the secondlargest Asian ethnic group in the United States, few studies have examined specific health issues that impact their community members. Because the U.S. Census does not collect health information on the U.S. population, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), which functions under the direction of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), offers the best analysis of Filipino American health characteristics. In 1994, according to the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), 37 percent of Filipino Americans interviewed described their health as “excellent,” 32 percent as “very good,” 24 percent as “good,” and 7 percent as “fair or poor” (APIAHF 2005). Reports on the general health conditions of Filipino American adults are good. The NCHS reports that 51 percent of the Filipino American adult population are in the healthy weight range and consumption of alcohol and rates of drug use are lower for Filipino American adults. But studies have also shown that amongst the Asian American population, the prevalence of obesity is higher with Filipino Americans. They are more than twice as likely to be obese (at 14%) when compared to other Asian ethnics (Barnes, Adams, and Powell-Griner 2008). There is also a high prevalence of diabetes amongst Filipino American adults. Heart disease is the leading cause of death while cancer is the second leading cause. Because there are relatively high rates of hypertension for both Filipino American men and women, they are at risk for stroke, which is another cause of mortality (APIAHF 2005). Access to proper health care and preventive treatment are keys to addressing such health issues. Like most Americans, Filipino Americans rely on job-based insurance coverage. A study done by the UCLA Center for Health Policy on racial and ethnic disparities and access to health care found that although Filipinos have
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the same employment-based coverage as whites (74% and 75% respectively), they have lower rates of Medicaid coverage and generally have higher uninsured rates (Brown, Ojeda, Wyn, and Levan 2000, 44, 59). The study concluded that factors related to ethnic background and socioeconomic status such as language proficiency, immigration status, and income contributed to disparities in health status and disproportionate access to health care.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals The most important life-cycle events for Filipinos include birth and baptism, marriage, and death. In celebrating life-cycle rituals religion plays a significant role, and many Filipino Americans honor rituals as prescribed by their respective religion. Because of the cultural, religious, and social significance of these events, it is generally celebrated in the presence of one’s extended family and kin network. The universal importance of these events in Filipino American lives often transcends the boundaries of class, regional loyalties, and religions. The arrival of a new baby is viewed with joy, as they are believed to complete the family unit and redefine familial roles. A childless couple assumes the responsibilities of parents and transitions from husband and wife to that of father and mother. Similarly, grandparents also take on new roles to support the newborn child. The naming of children is the first important event in the child’s early life. Filipino American families often assign a given first name, a middle name, and a family surname that often reflect one’s lineage, national heritage, and kinship ties (Posadas 1999, 48). In addition to their given names, many Filipinos also assign a nickname to their children that follows them into adulthood as a sign of affection and endearment. Filipino names are the product of the country’s diverse history. While some names may be considered “indigenous,” others are derived from Chinese and Spanish influences dating back to the period of colonization. This accounts for the majority of Spanish Filipino surnames. The arrival of Americans in the islands introduced Filipinos to the American versions of their Spanish first names, which some Filipinos have adopted. In the United States, Filipinos continue to name their children to reflect their Filipino heritage, which is often combined with more American first names. Because Filipinos inherit their parents’ religion, baptism is another significant event in a child’s young life. For Filipino Christians, baptism marks one’s transition from being non-Christian to becoming a Christian. The ritual is performed in accordance with the mandates of the church and in the presence of the family and the child’s sponsors. A celebration follows the church ceremony, as the child is welcomed into the faith community.
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The coming of age for young Filipinos is sometimes celebrated with a debut. A debut is a debutante ball that is held in honor of the young Filipino man or woman who is turning 18 years old. The purpose of the debut is to present the young woman or man to society. The tradition has its roots in the Philippines but Filipinos in the United States have embraced it also. The debut is often held in a ballroom where the celebrant has her cotillion court comprised of nine girls and nine boys. There is a cotillion dance, which is followed by a cake cutting ceremony and a formal dinner in honor of the debutante. Debuts, however, can be costly and can cause an economic strain on the family’s finances. Therefore, it is not something that everyone chooses to celebrate formally, and debuts have become optional celebrations for Filipino American families. As young adults transition into adulthood, they look to marriage as the next important rite of passage. The bonds of marriage and family are central components of Filipino American values and are special occasions for celebrations within the Filipino American community. Filipino Americans place a high value on the importance of marriage and family and see one’s marriage as an opportunity to establish new familial connections as well as expand the network kin. Thus marriage is foundational to the notion of family. Due to this Filipino Americans in general are less likely than the total population to be separated or divorced. Among Filipino Americans only approximately 12 percent of the total population are separated, widowed, or divorced (Reeves and Bennett 2004, 7). In the United States, as it is in the Philippines, marriage is preceded by a courtship and an engagement. Practices of courtship can sometimes be challenging when an individual decides to marry someone of another religion, another Asian ethnic group, or race. Filipino preferences for an endogamous marriage create difficult challenges for the couple and their families. Cultural differences and conflicting values are central to these concerns. Despite this, intermarriage rates for Filipinos in the United States are steadily increasing although their numbers are still lower when compared to other Asian ethnic groups. Between 1982 and 1990, 56 percent of U.S.-born Filipino American women and 48.4 percent of men in California married a non-Filipino American (Posadas 1999, 150). Among Asians, Filipino Americans are more likely to marry someone who is Caucasian rather than someone of the same ethnicity (National Healthy Marriage Resource Center 2009). Once the couple decides to marry and meets the approval of their families, weddings are performed in accordance with the law and the couple’s religion. Due to the influences of Spain and the United States, wedding celebrations often follow a Christian Western tradition. A religious ceremony precedes a dinner reception that celebrates the couple’s union. Filipino custom requires that the groom’s family is responsible for the costs of the wedding. In the United States, Filipino Americans continue to follow this tradition although the second and later generations are increasingly sharing wedding costs.
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While weddings are met with jubilation, the death of a relative or friend is an occasion of extreme sorrow. To honor the dead, Filipinos follow mandates of their religious affiliations. For Filipino Catholics, this includes the observance of a funeral mass in a Catholic church. In the United States, Filipino Americans have included Filipino traditions of family visits, food preparation, and collective prayers as significant components of honoring one’s passing. Mourning is seen a collective and community process for the family and its community.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Filipino Americans place a high value on family orientation, which is evident in the composition of their families and their extensive kinship networks. Due to colonial Spanish and American pasts, traditional notions of gender roles and familial responsibility influence the definitions of the family structure. Filipino tradition dictates a hierarchy in the family that requires familial responsibility to take precedence over personal preference or civic responsibility. Authority within the family is also often given to its adult members with respect to a hierarchy in gender and age. In the United States, these family structures are being challenged by contemporary American society and culture. Generational tensions and cultural conflicts between parents and their children have become contributing factors to these changing family dynamics. Differences in experiences, moral values, and cultural norms between the two generations have also presented conflicting definitions of responsibility to the family unit. As a result, relations and hierarchies within the family structures are shifting as Filipino American youth and their parents negotiate new boundaries. Gender relations between men and women are also changing. While authority has traditionally been ceded to the men of the family; in the United States, different demands of work and everyday living enable women to be equal partners in the family decision-making. In Filipino American households, an inversion of gender divisions in labor is beginning to take place. The predominance of Filipino American women in the workforce contributes to these changing dynamics and the negotiation of gender roles within family units.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Because of the diversity of America’s overall population, Filipino Americans throughout the United States have found a number of ways to maintain a sense of cultural identity. Advanced technology in the post-1960s period has made this process easier especially for recent immigrants. Sending remittances, communicating by telephone and Internet, as well as taking return trips home keep Filipino Americans connected to their country of origin. In the United States, community
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Children from the Filipiniana Dance Troupe wearing traditional Filipino dress prepare to perform a putong, or welcome dance, at the opening of the Filipino Community Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, on June 11, 2002. (AP Photo/B.J. Reyes)
building through formal means such as membership in social organizations, religious groups, and cultural celebrations have also played an important role in creating a sense of community. In regions and cities where large populations of Filipino Americans exist, hometown associations and community organizations provide formal spaces for community members to gather and celebrate. Informal networks based on ethnic affiliation and friendships also offer opportunities to maintain cultural ties to their home country. In addition the celebration of holidays, the performance of rituals, and the preparing and sharing of Filipino food also help to reinforce one’s ethnic identity.
Continued Links to the Philippines Filipino Americans exhibit a strong sense of loyalty to their country of origin, which is reflected in their continued involvement and support of the Philippines. For many foreign-born Filipino immigrants, this can mean financially supporting family members they left behind through the remittance of money. These remittances, which are intended to help families with living expenses, education, and medical care, reinforce the immigrants’ relationship not only to their own families but also to the Philippines. Remittances boost the foreign direct investment (FDI)
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of the home country’s economy, which the Philippines has increasingly relied on from overseas Filipinos. In addition to remittances in the form of money, Filipino Americans also send balikbayan boxes to family members that contain consumer goods such as clothes, toys, electronics, and even food. To cater to this need to send boxes to the Philippines, an industry of international shipping companies like Forex and LBC Mabuhay has emerged to serve the ethnic community. In addition to serving Filipino Americans these door-to-door delivery companies also serve Filipinos in Europe, the Middle East, Australia, and different parts of Asia. When possible Filipino Americans prefer to return to the Philippines for periodic visits or vacations. The “homecoming” of the balikbayan renews pre-existing bonds not only with the Philippines but also their families. Filipino Americans as balikbayans return with pasalubong, or gifts for family members and friends—a display not only of one’s generosity but also a reflection of one’s successes in the United States. But the notion of the pasalubong is also an expected responsibility from the balikbayan, which families anticipate and rely on. The financial strain on the balikbayan due to this is evident, sometimes forcing some Filipino Americans to hold off on visiting and deciding to send boxes home instead. On the occasion that they decide to return, the homecoming of the Filipino can be symbolic. In returning the Filipino maintains links between themselves and their country of origin. In this way the relationship of the balikbayan to the country is strengthened while familial relationships are restored. Due to the financial costs of taking a return trip back, however, not everyone is able to afford a trip to the Philippines. Thus for many Filipino Americans communicating by telephone and through the Internet is the most affordable way to maintain ties with family in the Philippines. Advanced technology has made this easier when return visits home are not possible. Filipino Americans rely on cheap phone plans to ensure that they can regularly communicate with family members although sending emails and text messages, video chatting, and connecting through social networking sites have also become commonplace.
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background Filipino American community organizations have played a significant role in the experiences of immigrants in the United States. In the early period of Filipino American settlement, social organizations served a number of purposes. The wide variety of associations and clubs affirmed ethnic ties and allowed its members to express their cultural identity in society that was determined on marginalizing them. In the early 20th century, Filipino fraternal organizations like the Caballeros de Dimas-Alang, Legionarios del Trabajo, and Jose Rizal societies were very popular. Much like other Asian immigrant community organizations of that time, fraternal
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organizations emphasized mutual aid, cultural preservation, and community building for its members. Equally important were hometown associations where membership was based on common locality or affiliation in the Philippines. During a period in which many immigrants were without community and familial ties these social organizations provided a necessary space for communal participation and belonging. In addition to “community,” membership also afforded access to financial and emotional support in times of crises. Mutual aid became synonymous with community, and Filipino immigrants found necessary support within their own. These organizations also provided spaces for the communal celebration of life-cycle rituals like births and baptisms, weddings and anniversaries, as well as the commemoration of important Filipino holidays. While very popular in the 1920s and 1930s, these organizations met a slow decline in numbers in the period following World War II. A combination of restrictive immigration laws and a declining population halted their growth, and participation in organizations would not again increase until after the post-1960s period. The post-1965 wave of Filipino immigration did much to revitalize these communities. In Hawaii and in the mainland United States new immigrants either created new organizations or revived inactive ones (Okamura 1984). But while Filipino American social organizations continued to play an important role in communities, their aims, goals, and purposes changed. Social organizations were no longer the central site for mutual aid or surrogate family support but were transformed in a way that met the new needs of its post-1965 community members. New Filipino American social organizations focused on the promotion and preservation of Filipino culture, youth education, and community gathering. Hometown associations—organized by regional and provincial affiliations—became the primary vehicles for this form of community building. They hosted the celebrations of Filipino holidays and hometown festivals, beauty pageants, banquets, picnics, and cultural performances to raise funds for community projects (Bonus 2000). Many associations used these funds to erect monuments and build schools, libraries, and even hospitals in their hometowns. When the construction of buildings was not possible or affordable, Filipino American groups sponsored local students and supported their schooling into their college years instead. Despite the popularity of social organizations, not all Filipino Americans joined, for a variety of reasons. Sometimes there was no need for association membership due to an extensive kin network. Others lived in cities and regions where the overall population was too scattered or too small. Many working-class immigrants found that they had limited time to commit to community membership while others expressed a general lack of interest in joining formal organizations. Instead, they connected to the community in more informal ways like getting together with Filipino American friends and engaging in different forms of ethnic affiliation such
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as attending cultural shows, watching Filipino movies, reading ethnic newspapers, and sending remittances home (Bonus 2000).
Religion Filipinos inherit the religion of their parents and bring it with them as they migrate to the United States. The impact of Spanish colonial Christianity in the Philippines remains to this day and is still an influential force in Filipino religious practices. American presence in the Philippines in the early 20th century introduced Protestantism (Baptist and Presbyterian churches), which later gave rise to other evangelical groups such as Iglesia ni Kristo and Aglipayan. After World War II, Christian sects that included Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Seventh-Day Adventists successfully proselytized in the Philippines. Due to these influences, the Philippines is the only predominantly Christian country in Asia. Today approximately 85 percent of the population are Christian, 10 percent Muslim, and 5 percent “other” religions (including Taoist-Buddhist, Agnostic, and “indigenous” religions). In the Philippines the church serves as an important space for community building and sociability that transcends social classes and provincial affiliations. In the United States church membership can bring Filipinos together in an ethnic community that helps to strengthen their ties to their homeland. Church activities and religious celebrations such as baptisms, weddings, and funerals are important opportunities for ethnic reinforcement and community building. Within these communities religion becomes more than just an affirmation of faith but also an affirmation of one’s ethnic identity.
Language Issues In general Filipino Americans exhibit a high proficiency of the English language, one of the highest amongst all Asian ethnic groups. In the 2000 Census, 47 percent of Filipino Americans aged 5 and older reported speaking English “very well” while almost 30 percent reported speaking only English at home (Reeves and Bennett 2004, 11). Filipino Americans’ strong proficiency of the English language can be seen as a legacy of their American colonial past that contributes to their strong command of the English language. In 1987 the Philippine Constitution declared Filipino and English as the two official languages of the country. Because of this, language proficiency amongst the Filipino foreign-born population in the United States is relatively high. Still, 24 percent of the Filipino American population reported speaking English “less than very well” with 7 percent of the foreign-born population reporting limited or no knowledge of English (U.S. Census 2000b). In the United States, Tagalog is becoming one of the most popular non-English languages spoken (Bankston 2006, 196). With over 1.2 million speakers it is the
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fifth-most spoken language in the United States. In the 2000 Census over 70 percent of the Filipino American population reported speaking a language other than English in their homes. Filipino Americans speak a variety of Filipino languages and dialects that include Tagalog, Ilokano, Kapampangan, and different variations of Visayan languages.
National/Regional-Language Press and other Media The Filipino American media in the United States began with local ethnic newspapers and magazines published in the early 20th century. Sociologist Emory Bogardus observed that in Los Angeles alone there were up to eight Filipino American newspaper-magazines in publication during the 1930s (Bogardus 1934). Almost all of them were small operations and often short lived due to lack of financial resources, but sociologists saw it as a testimony to “considerable intellectual activity” within the community (Bogardus 1934, 584). Geared towards the immigrant Filipino, the press focused on political matters that concerned Filipinos in the United States such as Philippine independence and U.S. colonialism. It sought to expose discrimination and inform readers about the social conditions of Filipino students and workers. The newspaper-magazines also included op-ed pieces, photographs, and literature. Most of the printed pieces were in English due to their facility of the language but occasionally included articles in Tagalog and other Filipino languages. In a period of limited technology and communication, these newspapers offered a community and a space where conversations about the state of Filipino America and the Philippines took center stage. Unlike mainstream papers that discussed little of what mattered to immigrants, these local ethnic newspapers catered to a specific population that longed to be in conversation with their homeland. Changes in the political state and Philippine-U.S. relations, however, altered the directions and purposes of the Filipino American press. In the period following World War II, with a smaller Filipino American population, the number of these community papers dwindled and did not rise again until the post-1965 era. In the post-1960s period, Filipino American newspapers continue to serve the population by providing local as well as international news. There is no national paper that is distributed throughout the country. Instead, states with high numbers of Filipino Americans publish and distribute their papers. In California, for example, there are approximately 11 newspapers in print that are distributed throughout Southern California and the Bay Area. Despite the proliferation of ethnic newspapers, however, access to the media in the age of the Internet and advanced technology has also changed the ways in which Filipino Americans gain access to the news. Today, Filipino Americans use the Internet to not only access online newspapers in the United States but also ones from the Philippines. In addition, Internet radio has
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become another popular news source. Radio Manila, based out of Los Angeles, offers programming that informs listeners all over the country about local news, immigration, religion, politics, and public affairs. The use of e-mail and the Internet also allows Filipinos throughout the world to communicate with each other. Blogs, Listservs, and social networking sites are increasingly becoming the most popular way of communicating, especially with Filipino American youth. But it is the Filipino cable networks that have brought the Philippines to every Filipino American home. ABS-CBN, the Philippine-based multimedia conglomerate, introduced The Filipino Channel (TCF) to cable subscribers in 1994. What started as a small and ambitious endeavor has transformed into a 24-hour cable network that airs Filipino movies, variety shows, news reports, TV sitcoms, and dramas. Other Filipino broadcast companies have since done the same. GMA Pinoy TV is a recent addition to American cable channel lineups. This premier international broadcasting channel offers 24 hours of Filipino programming that is not only broadcast in the United States but also anywhere in the world where potential Filipino subscribers might be. Together TFC and GMA Pinoy TV have revolutionized the Filipino American cable networks as Filipinos throughout the country have relied on these channels to keep them updated on everything that is happening in the Philippines.
Celebration of National Holidays In the United States, Filipino Americans celebrate July 4 not only as an American Independence Day but also as Philippine-American Friendship Day. Philippine independence from Spain is celebrated on June 12 every year. In addition, on December 30 each year, Filipino American clubs and associations celebrate Jose Rizal Day, which commemorates the Philippine national hero Jose Rizal. Filipino Americans have been observing this holiday since the early 20th century; it is a tradition that young Filipino students began in college campuses (Guyotte and Posadas 1995). The celebration of Rizal Day is more than just the remembering of a national hero. In honoring this holiday, Filipino Americans are also celebrating Filipino history and culture in the United States. These holidays are often observed with picnics, banquets, or cultural shows that combine its political and cultural significance. In addition to Filipino national holidays, Filipino Americans also celebrate provincial and religious holidays as is done in the Philippines. For example, hometown associations will observe their hometown’s local patron saint with a feast and a program that honors the saint and their local history. Combining cultural and religious celebrations is not uncommon for Filipino American communities in the United States. The celebration of Filipino holidays serves not only to affirm one’s ethnic identity but also to connect overseas Filipinos to the Philippines.
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The recent passage of H.R. 780 in Congress, which recognizes October to be Filipino American History month, adds to this list of Filipino national holidays. The dedication of October to Filipino American History month will allow for a full-month commemorative celebration of Filipino American history and culture. Advocates of the resolution see this as a small victory in honoring and memorializing the long history of Filipino immigrants in the United States.
Foodways The geography of the Philippines has shaped the staple diet of Filipinos. As in most countries in this region of Asia, rice serves as a staple with a typical meal consisting of rice and a meat or vegetable dish that supplements it. Filipinos customarily eat three meals a day that include breakfast, lunch, and dinner accompanied by a small snack at midday called a merienda. The popularity and preparation of Filipino dishes vary by region as they are influenced by its geographic location and its local history. Methods of preparing Filipino food range from simple boiling and frying to more complicated forms of stewing and roasting meats. One of the most popular Filipino dishes is the Filipino adobo. The preparation of the Filipino adobo differs remarkably from the Latin American variety of a similar name. This uniquely Filipino dish features the salty and sour combination of a soy sauce and vinegar marinade infused with crushed garlic and pepper. Pork and chicken are two popular meats often used in the dish, but Filipino cooks alter its style and tastes by using different ingredients available in mainstream grocery stores in the United States. Equally popular is the sinigang, which is a stew known for its sour broth base of tamarind, guava, or tomatoes. Sinigang is an adaptable dish that can include any meat, fish, or vegetable that the cook has readily available. Due to their adaptability and ease of preparation, adobo and sinigang are popular dishes in Filipino American households and restaurants. Filipino cuisine is also a fusion of Malayan, Chinese, and Spanish culinary influences that reflects a long and diverse history of cultural exchange and adaptation in the Philippines. The early migration of Malayan peoples from adjacent islands is among one of the earliest foreign influences on Philippine cuisine. Dishes of Malay origin—infused with spicy chili and prepared with coconuts and coconut milk—were incorporated into local Filipino dishes during these early encounters. The arrival of Chinese merchants into the Philippines also contributed to this early influence as new settlers introduced its Filipino trading partners to unique cooking and flavor styles, which natives adopted into the local cuisine. Filipinos slowly incorporated different variations of Chinese noodle and rice dishes, egg rolls, and steamed buns into Filipino cuisine, and these dishes continue to be some of the most popular dishes in the Philippines and in the United States today.
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During the period of Spanish colonization, Spanish cuisine became another culinary influence but only within an elite group. Because it was the cuisine of the colonizer, Spanish food was reserved for the upper classes. Spanish cooking also required distinctive ingredients such as olives, capers, and Spanish meats, which were not readily available in the islands. Prepared with unique spices, succulent meats, and seafood, these elaborate Spanish dishes were often reserved for fiestas and the celebration of very important occasions. Foreign culinary influences are also evident in Filipino desserts. While desserts are not a part of everyday meals due primarily to their tedious preparations they are still an important part of the Filipino culinary experience. Desserts like bibingka, kutsinta, biko, palitaw, and sapin-sapin are only a few examples of the regional varieties of rice cakes and puddings made with sticky rice mixed with fruits, grated coconut, and sweet beans. Other popular desserts include halo-halo (mix-mix), a sundae made with shaved ice, sweet beans, jackfruit, ice cream, and evaporated milk; leche flan, a caramel custard made of eggs, milk, and sugar with Spanish origins; and sorbetes, a uniquely Filipino type of ice cream. Filipinos have incorporated many of these foreign influences into the preparation of local dishes, which have become an important part of contemporary Filipino cuisine. In the United States, Filipino Americans find new ways to further adapt Filipino dishes and rituals into their daily lives. Cooks often prepare traditional dishes using American ingredients as substitutes. Filipino American families also incorporate typical American fare into regular meals based on convenience and preferences. As the population of Filipino Americans increases, so do the number of Filipino restaurants and markets, especially in the American West Coast. As a result, the availability of uniquely Filipino ingredients and prepared dishes has increased considerably in the recent past. In cities where Filipino oriented markets and restaurants are lacking, shopping online for Filipino groceries have become popular and have made these ingredients readily accessible.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment The knowledge and performance of Filipino music, dance, and art is perhaps one of the most popular ways in which Filipinos maintain a sense of ethnic and cultural identity. A staple in every Filipino American celebration, the performances of Filipino dance and music has become a part of their cultural landscape in the United States. These public expressions of cultural identity allow members of the community to participate as performers or as members of the audience. Traditional dance is popular especially with Filipino American youth. Whether performed in community centers or college campuses, dance offers young Filipino Americans an opportunity to participate in cultural preservation and celebration.
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Dance also allows for Filipino American interpretations of costumes and movements that reflect their experiences in the United States. Much like other forms of Filipino art and culture, these dances are highly influenced by the diversity of Filipino history. Dances that are popularly performed include tinikling (bamboo dance), singkil (Muslim royalty dance), and pandanggo sa ilaw (dance of lights). Sometimes these dances are infused with more contemporary dance styles and music, which reflect the multiple identities of Filipinos in the United States. The performance of Filipino music often accompanies the dance. The rondalla, a traditional form of Filipino folk music, is performed with stringed instruments and often consists of the guitar, the banduria, the laud, and the bass guitar. Another form of music that is popular in the United States is the kulintang, which originates from the southern region of the Philippines and is traditionally performed with gongs and drums, reflecting early Islamic influence. In addition to these more traditional forms of music, more contemporary genres include the original Pilipino music (OPM), Filipino rock, Pinoy hop-hop, and Philippine choral music. Through the performance of Filipino dance and music, Filipino Americans express a sense of ethnic identity that encourages their preservation and renewal. This is especially true for Filipino American youth who see these forms of art as an opportunity to explore and affirm their cultural identities. Filipino dance and music
Tinikling dance performed by Filipino American students in Celebration of Filipino Culture at California State University, San Bernardino. (Courtesy of Kathleen Nadeau)
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OPM: Old Pilipino Music In the years following Philippine Independence and into the 1960s Filipino music showed evidence of heavy American influence. The emergence of OPM as a uniquely Filipino genre of music introduced Filipinos to artists such the Apo Hiking Society, Basil Valdez, Freddie Aguilar, Rico J. Puno, Rey Valera, and Florante. These artists sang Tagalog songs that reflected their own experiences of love, home, and culture. The songs touched many Filipinos in the Philippines and abroad. As migration from the Philippines to the United States increased in the post-1965 period, many Filipinos brought this music with them. In the United States, OPM took on a new significance for Filipino Americans who saw it as a link back to the home country. In a period in which Filipinos were migrating to the United States en masse, OPM was a piece of home that they could bring with them. Today early OPM has become a part of classic Filipino music, and performers of this genre continue to entertain Filipino audiences with live concerts both in the Philippines and in the United States.
also brings the community together and often links the younger and older generations together. In the United States, cultural performances of Filipino dance and music have been incorporated into public holiday celebrations as well as Philippine Cultural Nights, which are popular in high schools and colleges across the country. For Filipino Americans this is significant because it offers a necessary link to the home country. Dance and music become a component of one’s group identity, a basis for sociopolitical and ethnic claims.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Naturalization Historically the path towards American citizenship for Filipinos has been one that is rife with contradictions reflecting a complex relationship between the United States and the Philippines. It was not until the passage of the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952 that Filipinos, like other Asian immigrants ineligible for citizenship, were able to apply for naturalization. This was something that many Filipinos who arrived in the early 20th century took advantage of. It is the same for post–1965 immigrants who have applied for U.S. citizenship in high numbers. According to estimates by the 2000 U.S. Census, over 73.9 percent of
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the Filipino American population are American citizens, of which 41.6 percent are foreign-born naturalized citizens (U.S. Census 2000b). Approximately 32.3 percent of the overall Filipino American population is native born, while only 26.1 percent are noncitizens. Among Asian ethnic groups, Filipino Americans have the lowest proportion of noncitizens (Reeves and Bennett 2004, 9). The high rates of naturalization can be attributed to a number of different factors. Naturalization secures their legal residency in the United States and affords the foreign-born rights that are reserved only for American citizens, such as access to certain health care benefits and social services. Citizenship also allows Filipino Americans to petition for family members in accordance with the family reunification preferences of post-1965 immigration laws. Sometimes Filipino Americans’ decision to naturalize is tied to their dissatisfaction with the overall political and economic conditions in the Philippines even though obtaining American citizenship and pledging allegiance to the United States do not stop them from participating in homeland politics.
Dual Citizenship Dual citizenship was not permitted for Filipinos who obtained foreign citizenship prior to 2003. It was not until Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law a bill that made permanent the national citizenship of Filipino citizens even after they acquired foreign citizenship. The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, popularly known as the Dual Citizenship Law, restored the rights of former Filipino citizens who lived or worked overseas. For Filipino Americans, this bill enables them to keep dual U.S. and Philippine citizenships without renouncing allegiance to the Philippines, as previously required. For Philippine citizens who may have lost their citizenship prior to 2003, the new law allows them to reacquire their citizenship by taking an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and to follow its laws. Retention of Philippine citizenship does two things: (1) it restores the Filipino American’s access to civil and political rights, and (2) it strengthens bonds of national belonging to the Philippines. Under the Dual Citizenship Law, Filipino citizens will be able to again own property in the Philippines, acquire a Philippine passport, practice their profession, and engage in business and commerce as a Filipino national. Individuals who are eligible to vote can now also exercise their right to suffrage by submitting an absentee ballot in accordance with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 has been seen as a step towards amending ties with overseas Filipinos who were alienated once they attainted foreign citizenship. This bill ensures that relationships between Filipinos and their country of origin are amended and restored.
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Intergroup Relations While Filipino Americans may be viewed as a homogeneous Asian immigrant group, the reality is quite the opposite. Post-1965 Filipino immigrants have come from all regions of the Philippines adding to the cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of the overall population. The proliferation of hometown associations and community organizations attest to the diversity of the Filipino American community in the United States and serves as one way to measure the state of relations amongst its members. Membership in Filipino American ethnic organizations illustrate immigrant loyalties to their hometowns and challenges American tendencies to “lump” all Filipinos together regardless of their hometown, regional affiliation, language or dialect spoken, and religion (Bonus 2000). Ethnic identities and shared experiences of migration, however, are not enough to determine intergroup relations because not everyone is a member of a community organization. Social organizations based on ethnic background have also been sites of tensions and divisions amongst its members due to competing ideas of identity and community. These conflicts are often rooted in personal differences that include one’s citizenship status, gender, educational attainment, class and occupation, political views, and even whether one is foreign or native born. Intergenerational conflicts mean that Filipino immigrants have unique perspectives shaped by their migration history and therefore experience the United States differently than those who are native born. Similarly, education and class differences can influence how Filipino Americans relate to one another; if simply on the basis of the work they do. In the post-1965 period, class differences between Filipino immigrants have become more dramatic between professionals and the working class (Espiritu 2003, 116). Tensions and conflicts concerning class can even arise within Filipino American families (Posadas 1999, 150). While differences highlight the disparateness in the community, this is also evidence of a growing diversity in Filipino American identities. Thus, within post-1965 Filipino American communities in the United States, there exists competing ideas of “cohesion and fragmentation” that have determined intergroup relations (Posadas 1999, 149).
Forging a New American Political Identity Legislative discrimination beginning with the Naturalization Act of 1790 made Asian immigrants ineligible for citizenship thus also ineligible to vote. Filipino access to naturalization was inconsistent prior to the 1960s and was subject to the changing political relationships between the United States and the Philippines. The inconsistencies on which Filipino immigrants could naturalize (and when) had a profound affect on their belief in the political system. Without being able to secure American citizenship, suffrage would have little meaning. But Filipino American
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political identity has not been defined simply by their ability or inability to vote but also by other (informal) forms of political participation. For many Filipinos political organizations, interest groups, and coalition politics provide alternative but necessary avenues to address important issues within their communities.
Political Associations and Organizations Limited opportunities available to Filipino Americans required that they seek alternative forms of political participation. For many Filipinos in the early 20th century, participation in labor politics became the main vehicle for political membership. As anti-immigration campaigns increased and work conditions worsened, Filipino labor leaders like Pablo Manlapit and Philip Vera Cruz encouraged immigrant political involvement by fighting discriminatory labor policies targeting migrant laborers. Thus labor politics became an important arena in which political battles would be fought. Although Filipino American labor activists worked outside the main arena of American politics, they displayed high levels of participation in the political process. Historically, labor organizing has been the most successful in advancing Filipino Americans’ economic and political interests. Filipino community associations and fraternal groups also filled in the gaps as Filipino Americans turned to local communities as a space for political involvement. Without the ability to attain leadership positions in mainstream American political organizations, Filipino Americans secured them through more local means. Because leadership positions are closed off to most Filipino immigrants, hometown and local Filipino American organizations have become important public venues in which to achieve political influence. This has been especially true for post-1965 immigrants who find limited options in the political arena. Joining Filipino community associations and securing a leadership position as president, vice-president, secretary, or treasurer is a popular way to ensure one’s position within the community. But because these leadership positions are limited, elections have been a source of tension within the groups themselves as members vie for a limited pool of political power (Okamura 1984). In reality, the extent of political power and influence afforded by these positions is restricted and often does not extend beyond the boundaries of the local group or community.
Civil and Electoral Politics The proliferation of Filipino community organizations and active labor activism set the stage for contemporary Filipino American politics. Instead of using political organizations and electoral politics as a way to address issues, Filipino Americans used grassroots organizing strategies. This kind of homegrown grassroots politics grew out of and in conjunction with a pan-Asian political movement in the
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late 1960s, organized around issues of community needs (Espiritu 1993). Filipino American youth in college campuses joined with local Filipino American community activists as well as other Asian ethnic minority groups to address growing political, social, and economic issues (Espiritu 1993; Posadas 1999, 85). This pan-Asian ethnic coalition provided the foundation for a different kind of political empowerment. In this way, participation in electoral politics was a relatively new concept to Filipino Americans, who had found that voting did not guarantee effective results in their communities. Thus, despite higher rates of citizenship and naturalization amongst Filipino Americans, few exercise their right to vote. A long history of political exclusion plays a significant role in this disinterest and distrust in American politics. Filipinos in the early 20th century despite their status as “American nationals” were prohibited from applying for naturalization in accordance with the 1790 Naturalization Act. Without access to citizenship, Filipino nationals found that they wielded little political power without the vote. Anti-immigrant campaigns and exclusion movements in the early 20th century further discouraged Filipino political participation marking them as outsiders to the process. This long history of political exclusion has shaped Filipino American attitudes about electoral politics as a means of affecting change in their communities. Today, low voting turnouts in local, state, and national elections are commonplace. As a result, Filipino American voters are not viewed as “politically aggressive” and therefore lack power as a voting bloc (Posadas 1999, 90). But a history of exclusion is only one explanation to this quandary. Lower participation in American politics is also affected by other factors such as the population’s age, noncitizen status, and the role of homeland politics in political identities. In 2000, 22.1 percent of Filipino Americans were under 18 years old, and 26.1 percent of the population over 18 years old were noncitizens (Reeves and Bennett 2004, 6, 9). Thus despite higher rates of naturalization compared to other Asian immigrant ethnic groups, a total of 48.2 percent of the overall Filipino American population was ineligible to vote. Participation in homeland politics especially for the foreign born can detract from participation in American electoral politics. Whether by voting overseas through an absentee ballot or by following international news, Filipino Americans continue to follow contemporary political conditions in the Philippines. While not unique to Filipino Americans, participation in the home country politics is one way in which they have maintained closer ties to their country of origin. During the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Filipino Americans became involved in political activism against U.S. government support of the Marcos regime. Many Filipino Americans showed their support for their fellow countrymen by raising awareness of political conditions in the Philippines, holding rallies, and publicly protesting U.S. support of a corrupt Filipino government.
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Public Policies and Political Representation For Filipino Americans voting alone does not ensure political power. Instead Filipino Americans have pursued other means of political engagement by participating in local interest groups that are directed toward local community empowerment. There is a growing concern about issue-oriented causes in Filipino American communities such as affirmative action, voter registration, health care, education, citizenship, and immigration policies especially with the increase in anti-immigrant legislation in the 1990s (Bonus 2000, 52). Advocacy organizations and civil rights groups have been instrumental in promoting economic and political concerns. As a result, not only are Filipino Americans beginning to become more involved they are also becoming more visible within their local and regional communities. Advocating for what might seem like simply local issues has had the effect of forcing public officials to recognize the needs of their Filipino American constituents. Some believe, however, that voting a Filipino American into office could lead to increased political power. The desire for a Filipino American representative is based on the hope that elected officials can more successfully advocate for community needs, which can result in increased social services and funding for community programs (Espiritu 1993). Although voting “one of their own” into a public office would be ideal, doing so presents a number of challenges. The candidate must not only secure Filipino American votes but also those of the general population by advocating for programs that cut across racial, gender, and class lines. Therefore, although some political candidates have been successful in securing a primary bid, they find it difficult to secure a victory in the general election that would put them in office. Not surprisingly, the number of Filipino American representatives in public office remains small and reflects a disproportion to the population. The election of Benjamin Cayetano in 1994 as Governor of Hawaii made him the first Filipino American governor in the country. A handful of Filipino Americans have been elected into government positions in states like California and Hawaii, where populations of Filipinos are higher, but instances like these are still uncommon (Bonus 2000, 59).
Return Immigration As conditions in the Philippines continue to deteriorate into the 21st century, the chances of Filipino Americans’ permanent return to the Philippines are becoming more and more unlikely. Unlike previous waves of migration who came under more temporary terms, the majority of post-1965 Filipino immigrants have settled permanently in the United States. Although they become permanent residents and citizens of the United States, many Filipino Americans continue to visit their homeland as balikbayans. This is typical for Filipino Americans with close connections to their families in the Philippines. For many, “going home” is necessary to maintain
The Second and Later Generations | 739
familial and ethnic ties after long absences. For others who do not have a similar connection visiting the Philippines can still be a unique experience, which serves to reconnect them or introduce them to their roots. Overall rates of permanent return migration are low for Filipino Americans when compared to other immigrant groups in the United States.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Filipino American youth ethnic identity is derived primarily from the family unit, which serves as a primary introduction to their Filipino heritage. The intimacy of the family determines how much Filipino American youth will identify with their ethnic heritage. The family also plays a key role in one’s introduction to the larger ethnic community because the presence of a strong ethnic community can affect how young Filipino Americans locate themselves within this space. While belonging in an ethnic community may be important for some, others are less inclined to do so especially when they live in cities where the general Filipino American population is relatively low. To supplement this void, Filipino American youth have turned to alternative forms of ethnic and community building. They supplement their ties to the ethnic community by forming relations with groups that fall outside the boundaries of their ethnic identity. This could mean developing relationships with non-Filipino friends or joining social and cultural organizations that are based on other interests. In expanding their social networks to include friendships and relationships that cross racial and class lines, Filipino American youth develop different aspects of their ethnic identity through various relationships with family, friends, and surrounding communities.
Educational Attainment Although Filipino Americans as a whole show high levels of educational attainment, the achievement level for Filipino American youth is somewhat lower when compared to other Asian ethnic groups. Second-generation Filipino Americans experience higher rates of high school dropout rates and lower rates of college admission (Posadas 1999, 105). The 2000 Census showed that there is a gap in educational achievement between the foreign and native born. Foreign-born Filipino Americans in general maintain a higher level of educational attainment than the native born. According to the census, approximately 41.1 percent of foreignborn Filipino American men and 46.9 percent of foreign-born Filipino American women received college degrees compared to 30.7 percent of second-generation
740 | Filipino Immigrants
Youth Profile The Filipino Founder of the Black Eyed Peas Allan Pineda Lindo, popularly known as apl.de.ap, is a founding member of the international hip-hop group Black Eyed Peas. Born in Angeles City, Pampanga, Philippines, Lindo is the son of a Filipina mother and an African American father. He came to the United States when he was 14 years old with the help of the Pearl S. Buck Foundation, an organization that advocates for Amerasian children. An adoption allowed Lindo to migrate to the United States, where he lived with his adoptive father Joe Ben Hudgens in Los Angeles, California. While the adoption separated him from his immediate family in the Philippines, Lindo continues to maintain close ties with them. In his work, Lindo incorporates his Filipino heritage into the music he produces as a way of introducing Filipino history and culture into the American mainstream. In 2003, he released “The Apl Song” in the Black Eyed Peas album Elephunk; and the 2005 Black Eyed Peas album Monkey Business included an all-Tagalog song “Bebot.” Lindo also added a dance song called “Mare” to their latest release. With a focus on Filipino and Filipino American cultures, these songs are tributes to the myriad experiences of Filipinos in the United States. In addition to working with the Black Eyed Peas, Lindo has launched his own music label, Jeepney Music, based out of Silver Lake, California. Under this label, Lindo has released songs such as “Mama Filipina,” “U Can Dream,” “Islands,” and “Take Me to the Philippines,” in which his Filipino heritage is featured prominently. More importantly, these songs touch on themes of belonging, identity, and homecoming. Lindo is also the founder of the Apl Foundation, a nonprofit organization that is committed to helping children and their communities in the Philippines. The foundation’s mission is to provide educational, financial, and material support to on-site charities that do work within local communities.
Filipino American men and on 32.3 percent of Filipino American women (Bankston 2006; U.S. Census 2000b). Post-1965 immigration accounts for the disparity in the educational attainments between the two generations and shows a trend that is unique to the Filipino American population when compared to other Asian American groups.
Cultural Identification For many Filipino American youth, culture is an important marker of one’s identity that offers a way to locate one’s place within the Filipino American community and restores ethnic ties to the Philippines. Participation in cultural shows, which are
Issues in Relations between the United States and the Philippines | 741
highly popular in American high schools and colleges, is one way to reaffirm cultural ties with the Filipino American community. It allows Filipino American youth to participate in cultural production by reinventing and re-imagining their place within a larger diaspora made up of Filipinos all over the world. Sometimes traditional Filipino dance and music are performed simultaneously with more popular contemporary American hip-hop or pop music. Reinterpretations of Filipino culture allow them to actively engage in a way that reflects their experiences as Filipino Americans. The combination of different cultures embraces both their Filipino and American identities. Filipino cultural identity can also be measured by one’s knowledge of Philippine history and a Filipino language or dialect. The ability to express this knowledge, however, can simultaneously act as a marker of belonging or exclusion from the ethnic community. Knowledge of a Filipino language, for example, can immediately mark one as a community member while one’s inability to speak a language can act as a barrier to belonging. The question surrounding “authenticity” is often at the center of these concerns. Does one’s ability to speak a Filipino language really mean that they are more Filipino than someone who cannot? Sometimes generational conflicts between first- and second-generation Filipino American youth can arise out of these cultural differences. To address these issues some Filipino American community centers hold classes on Philippine and Filipino American history for the younger generation. Some of these community centers also have language programs where Filipino is taught to students who are interested. The hope is that these classes can help reconnect Filipino American youth to their culture, their history, and their communities.
Issues in Relations between the United States and the Philippines Forecasts for the 21st Century Deep economic, military, political, and cultural ties with the United States ensure that ties between both countries will continue well into the 21st century. As economic and political conditions in the Philippines continue to deteriorate, the United States will remain an attractive option for the next generation of Filipino immigrants. Assuming that similar factors in Filipino immigration persist, Filipino migration will predictably continue to rise in the following decades. With the persistent immigration of Filipinos into the United States, demographers project that Filipino Americans will likely become the largest Asian American ethnic group in the United States. Growing anti-immigrant sentiment and the desire for stricter immigration policies, however, means that newly arrived Filipino immigrants and
742 | Filipino Immigrants
Filipino Americans can expect to experience some resistance and backlash against contemporary Filipino migration.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics
Table 105 Filipinos in the United States, 1910–2000 Year 1910
Population in United States 160
1920
5,603
1930
45,208
1940
45,563
1950
61,636a
1960
176,310
1970
343,060
1980
774,652
1990
1,406,770
2000
2,364,815
Source: Gibson, C., and K. Jung. 2002. Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970-1990, For The United States, Regions, Divisions, and States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau. a This number is an estimate. In 1950 the census data on Filipinos was not published in the general census volumes although the census did include a subject report on the geographic regions with the highest Filipino population in the United States.
Table 106 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and country of birth Total Philippines
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
42,343
52,919
51,040
45,250
57,846
60,746
74,606
72,596
54,030
60,029
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
744 | Filipino Immigrants Table 107 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence region/country: Philippines Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
60,029
22,307
37,722
877
282
595
24,937
9,981
14,956
370
138
232
2,193
735
1,458
568
173
395
Hawaii
4,013
1,661
2,352
Illinois
2,553
994
1,559
Maryland
1,157
442
715
Massachusetts
362
125
237
Michigan
586
177
409
Minnesota
383
109
274
Arizona California Connecticut Florida Georgia
Nevada
2,080
743
1,337
New Jersey
2,509
1,009
1,500
New York
2,572
971
1,601
North Carolina
506
139
367
Ohio
614
197
417
Pennsylvania
544
147
397
Texas
2,797
971
1,826
Virginia
1,503
532
971
Washington
2,169
771
1,398
10,749
3,671
7,078
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009. State of Residence, Stbk 15. 2010.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics The U.S. census provides the most accurate and detailed information on Filipinos in the United States. It defines the category of “Filipino” to include individuals “who indicate their race as ‘Filipino’ or who report entries such as Philipino, Philipine, or Filipino American” (U.S. Census 2000a, B-39). The census began to enumerate Filipinos beginning in 1910. It was in this decennial census that Asian and Pacific Islander categories such as Filipino, Hindu, and Korean were added to Chinese and Japanese. The census data collected on race in 1990 differs from the 2000 Census. The “Filipino” population had been identified under the race category of “Asian or
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics | 745
Pacific Islander” until 2000, when the U.S. Census Bureau separated it into “Asian” and “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander” (Reeves and Bennett 2004, 2). Due to these changes, census data on race in the 2000 Census cannot directly compare with that from 1999. It was also in this decennial survey that respondents were able to report more than one race for the first time. Filipinos who identified with more than one race category were referred to as the “race in combination population.” As a result, the population number between 1990 and 2000 increased dramatically within the decade to reflect single-race Filipinos and the “race in combination” population, which includes Filipinos who identify with another Asian ethnic population or another race.
Table 108 Primary census data in 2000 Subject
Number
Total population
2,364,815
Male
1,085,441
Female
1,279,374
Race One Asian category only: Filipino One or more Asian categories only: Filipino One or more Asian categories only: Filipino and another race
1,850,314 57,811 514, 501
Age Median age (years) Under 5 years
31 191,793
18 years and over
1,681,674
65 years and over
180,176
Household Household population
2,325,284
Average household size
3
Average family size
4
Median household income
$58,323
Median family income
$63,057
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Summary File 2 (SF2) and Summary File 4 (SF4).
746 | Filipino Immigrants Table 109 Occupation distribution of Filipino Americans in 2000 (employed civilian population 16 years and over) Occupation
Male
Female
Total
Management, professional, and related occupations
167,125
248,405
415,530
85,215
113,260
198,476
118,054
206,192
324,246
3,303
2,269
5,572
Construction, extraction, and maintenance
48,235
2,912
51,147
Production, transportation, and material moving
82,053
46,194
128,247
Service Sales and office Farming, fishing, and forestry
Employed civilian population 16 yrs and over
1,1,23217
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Summary File 4 (SF4).
Appendix III: Notable Filipino Americans Carlos Bulosan (1913–1956) is a renowned writer and poet who documented Filipino American experiences through his writings. Born in a small town in the Pangasinan province of Luzon, Bulosan migrated to the United States in 1930. Best known for his semiautobiographical work America Is in the Heart, Bulosan sought to expose the struggles and hardships experienced by Filipino immigrants in the early 20th century. His other works include The Laughter of My Father as well as his posthumously published The Cry and the Dedication. Benjamin Cayetano (1939–), governor of Hawaii, was the first governor in the country to be of Filipino ancestry. He is a graduate of the University of California, Los Angeles, where he received a bachelor’s degree in political science, and the Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, where he earned his juris doctorate. Prior to his election as governor, he served 12 years in the Hawaii state legislature. John Robert “J.R.” Celski (1990–) is a two-time medalist short track speed skater. He is the Polish Filipino American son of Robert and Sue Celski. He achieved international acclaim as a short track speed skater at the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, where he won a pair of bronze medals in the 1,500 meter and the 5,000 meter relay. Prior to his Olympic victories Celski held world championship titles in various short track speed skating events. Cristeta Comerford (1962–) has been the executive chef at the White House since 2005. She is the first woman to occupy this position and also the first to be of Filipino descent. After an extensive career as a chef in restaurants in
Appendix III: Notable Filipino Americans | 747
Chicago and Washington, D.C., Comerford joined the White House staff during the Clinton administration in 1995. Victoria Manalo Draves (1924–2010) made history by winning two gold medals in the 1948 Olympics in London held after World War II. She became the first woman to win two gold medals in diving. To honor her achievements, in 1969, she was elected into the International Swimming Hall of Fame in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Draves died at the age of 85 in April 2010. Roman Ildonzo Gabriel, Jr. (1949–) was the first Filipino American to start as a National Football League (NFL) quarterback. An alumna of North Carolina State University, Gabriel was an Academic All-American who was inducted into the College Football Hall of Fame in 1989. He began his professional career with the Los Angeles Rams in 1962. During his career with the Rams, he led the team to two division championships and was voted the NFL’s Most Valuable Player in 1969. After his retirement, Gabriel pursued a short acting career in Hollywood, and then he went on to become a sports analyst for CBS. Jessica Hagedorn (1949–) is a celebrated Filipino American poet, writer, and playwright. Her first novel, Dogeaters, won the American Book Award from the Before Columbus Foundation and was nominated for the 1990 National Book Award. Prior to the success of Dogeaters, Hagedorn began her career as a poet in San Francisco, where she published her first books of poetry. In 1993, she edited Charlie Chan Is Dead: An Anthology of Contemporary Asian American Fiction. Her second novel, The Gangster of Love, was published in 1996. Allan Pineda Lindo (1974–), popularly known as apl.de.ap, is a member of the international hip-hop group the Black Eyed Peas. Lindo continues to celebrate his Filipino heritage through his music. Black Eyed Peas’ albums Elephunk in 2003 and Monkey Business in 2005 both released two all-Tagalog songs entitled the “Apl Song” and “Bebot.” Michelle Malkin (1970–) is a columnist, political commentator, and blogger. Born in Philadelphia, Michelle Malkin is the daughter of Filipino citizens who came to the United States in 1970. Her career as a journalist began when she was a student at Oberlin College, and after graduation, she pursued a career in newspaper journalism with the Los Angeles Daily News. She is best known for her non-apologetic conservative political views. Malkin maintains a blog and a weekly syndicated column online and in newspapers across the country. Philip Vera Cruz (1904–1994), a long-time farm worker and labor leader, is best known for his activism and crusade to improve the lives of migrant workers. He helped to found the United Farm Workers Union, where he served as
748 | Filipino Immigrants
its second vice-president. However, he resigned in 1977 to protest the leadership of Cesar Chavez. He spent much of his life and career working to unite Filipino and Mexican labor unions and achieved much success through a series of labor strikes he helped to organize. In 1988, President Corazon Aquino bestowed upon him an award for his service to Filipinos in the United States. Vera Cruz died at the age of 89 in 1994.
Glossary Adobo: A popular dish of meat marinated in a sauce of vinegar, soy sauce, garlic, and pepper. Balikbayan: An overseas Filipino returning to the Philippines; also refers to a “homecoming.” Hiya: Shame or embarrassment. Kababayan: Fellow Filipino or someone who hails from a similar home city or town. Katipunero: Members of Andres Bonifacio’s revolutionary group Kataastaasang Kagalanggalangang Katipuanan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (KKK) established against Spanish rule in 1892. Lechon: A whole roasted pig. Leche flan: A rich egg custard with a soft caramelized topping of Spanish origin. Lumpia: A type of egg roll filled with meats and vegetables; can be served fried or fresh. Merienda: Mid-afternoon snack often eaten between lunch and dinner. Pakikisama: Cooperation; to get along with others. Pancit: Noodle dish with Chinese origin cooked with a variety of meats and vegetables. Pasalubong: Gifts to family and friends. Pensionado: U.S. government–sponsored students who came to the United States in the early 20th century to study in American colleges and universities. Pinoy: Slang term referring to Filipino men. Pinay: Slang term referring to Filipina women. Rondalla: A form of traditional Filipino music played by a string ensemble. Sakada: Filipino agricultural workers recruited to Hawaii by plantation owners in the early 20th century.
References | 749
Sawsawan: Any kind of condiment or dip used to enhance the flavor of Filipino dishes. Singkil: Traditional dance from the southern region of Mindanao that depicts the dance of Muslim royalty. Tinikling: National dance of the Philippines; an indigenous dance involving two people tapping a set of bamboo poles on the ground while dancers step over and dance in between the poles. Utang na loob: Debt of gratitude.
References Asian Pacific Islander Health Forum. “Filipinos in the United States.” [Online article retrieved 12/24/10.] http://www.apiahf.org/images/stories/Documents/publications_database/Filipinos_in_the_United_States.pdf. Bankston III, C. L. 2006. “Filipino Americans.” In Asian Americans: Contemporary Trends and Issues Second Edition, edited by P. G. Min. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications: 178–206. Barnes, P. M., P. F. Adams, and E. Powell-Griner. 2008. “Health Characteristics of the Asian Adult Population: United States, 2004–2006.” [Online article; retrieved 3/23/10.] www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad394.pdf. Bautista, V. B. 1998. The Filipino Americans: From 1763 to the Present Their History, Culture and Traditions. Farmington Hills, MI: Bookhaus Pub. Bogardus, E. 1934. “The Filipino Press in the United States.” Sociology and Social Research 18 (6): 581–85. Bonus, R. 2000. Locating Filipino Americans: Ethnicity and the Cultural Politics of Space. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Brown, E.R., V.D. Ojeda, R. Wyn, and R. Levan. 2000. Racial and ethnic disparities in access to health insurance and health care. [Online article; retrieved 8/11/10.] http://www. healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/RacialandEthnicDisparitiesReport.pdf Burma, J. H. 1951. “The Background of the Current Situation of Filipino-Americans.” Social Forces 30 (1): 42–48. Choy, C. 2003. Empire of Care: Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History. Durham: Duke University Press. Cordova, F. 1983. Filipinos, forgotten Asian Americans: A Pictorial Essay, 1763-circa 1963. Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Pub. Daniels, R. 2008. “The Immigration Act of 1965: Intended and Unintended Consequences of the 20th Century.” [Online article; retrieved 12/24/09.] http://www.america.gov/st/ educ-english/2008/April/20080423214226eaifas0.9637982.html Espina, M. 1988. Filipinos in Louisiana. New Orleans: A. F. Laborde. Espiritu, Y. L. 1993. Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
750 | Filipino Immigrants Espiritu, Y. L. 2003. Homeward Bound: Filipino American Lives Across Cultures, Communities, and Countries. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gibson, C., and K. Jung. 2002. Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970–1990, For The United States, Regions, Divisions, and States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau. Guyotte, R., and B. Posadas. 1995. “Celebrating Rizal Day: The Emergence of a Filipino Tradition in Twentieth Century Chicago.” In Feasts and Celebrations in North American Ethnic Communities, edited by R. Gutierrez and G. Fabre, 111-27. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. Hearns, L. 1883. “Saint Malo: A Lacustrine Village in Louisiana.” Harper’s Weekly, March 31, 196–99. Liu, J. M, P.M. Ong, and C. Rosenstein. 1991. “Dual Chain Migration: Post-1965 Filipino Immigration to the United States.” International Migration Review 25 (3): 143–69. Melendy, B. 1967. “California’s Discrimination Against Filipinos, 1927–1935.” In The Filipino Exclusion Movement, 1927–1935, edited J. M. Saniel, 141–51. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press. National Healthy Marriage Resource Center. 2009. “Marriage and Intermarriage Among Asian Americans: A Fact Sheet.” [Online information; retrieved 8/11/10.] http://www. acf.hhs.gov/healthymarriage/pdf/marriageamongasianamericans.pdf. Ngai, M. 2002. “From Colonial Subject to Undesirable Alien: Filipino, Migration, Exclusion, and Repatriation, 1920–1940.” In Re/collecting Early Asian America: Essays in Cultural History, edited by J. Lee, I. Lim, and Y. Matsukawa, 111–26. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Okamura, J. 1984. “Filipino Voluntary Associations and the Filipino Community in Hawaii.” Ethnic Groups 5(4): 279–305. Posadas, B. 1999. The Filipino Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Reeves, T. J., and C. Bennett. 2004. We the People: Asians in the United States. U.S. Census Bureau. Rodell, P. 2002. Culture and Customs of the Philippines. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Takaki, R. 1989. Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans. Boston: Little Brown. U.S. Census. 2000a. “Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1)—2000 Census of Population and Housing.” [Online information retrieved 2/7/10.] http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/ doc/sf1.pdf. U.S. Census. 2000b. “Census 2000 Summary File 4 (SF 4)—Sample Data.” [Online information retrieved 3/23/10.] www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf4.pdf. U.S. Census. 2000c. “Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights: Selected Population Group: Filipino Alone or In Any Combination.” [Online information retrieved 11/27/09.] http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFIteratedFacts?_event=&geo_id= 01000US&_geoContext=01000US&_street=&_county=&_cityTown=&_state=&_zip=
Further Reading | 751 &_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010&_submenu Id=factsheet_2&ds_name=DEC_2000_SAFF&_ci_nbr=019&qr_name=DEC_2000_ SAFF_R1010®=DEC_2000_SAFF_R1010%3A019&_keyword=&_industry=. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).” [Online information retrieved 11/28/09.] http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/ uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextchannel=b328194d3e88 d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextoid=04a295c4f635f010VgnVCM100000 0ecd190aRCRD.
Further Reading Bonus, R. 2000. Locating Filipino Americans: Ethnicity and the Cultural Politics of Space. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. In this ethnographic study of Filipino American communities in Los Angeles and San Diego, Rick Bonus focuses on commercial establishments and the media as public sites of ethnic immigrant identity formation. Through interviews, he examines the spatial and social meanings of places like “Oriental stores,” community centers, and newspapers that cater specifically to the Filipino and Filipino American population in Southern California. Place making, he argues, is an important part of Filipino American experiences. Bulosan, C. 1974. America Is in the Heart: A Personal History. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Famed novelist and poet Carlos Bulosan is best known for this semiautobiographical book. America is in the Heart offers an unparalleled Filipino immigrant perspective on early 20th-century America. Choy, C. 2003. Empire of Care: Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Notions of empire, labor, gender, and migration all come together in this transnational analysis of Filipina nurse migration. Empire of Care is a unique look at the labor migration of Filipina nurses to the United States that offers a compelling historical account of the processes behind the recruitment of Filipina women into American hospitals. Cordova, F. 1983. Filipinos, Forgotten Asian Americans: A Pictorial Essay, 1763-circa 1963. Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Pub. A pictorial essay dedicated to documenting the settlement of the Filipino “old timers” generation, this book is a great introduction to Filipino American culture and history. Fujita-Rony, D. 2003. American Workers, Colonial Power: Philippine Seattle and the Transpacific West, 1919–1941. Berkeley: University of California Press. American Workers, Colonial Power is a transnational look at the dual legacies of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines and the United States. This project examines how U.S. colonialism transformed the Filipino American community in Seattle and how in turn, this immigrant population influenced the colonial metropolis of Seattle.
752 | Filipino Immigrants Gonzalez, J. L. 2009. Filipino American Faith in Action: Immigration, Religion and Civic Engagement. New York: New York University Press. The discussion of religion as a part of Filipino American experiences is an understudied one. In this work, Gonzalez examines the Filipino American spiritual experience as a lens in which to consider the social, political, and cultural integration of Filipino immigrants into American society. Its focus on Filipino American religious experiences offers a unique insight to their experiences of migration, adaptation, and settlement in the United States. Kramer, P. A. 2006. The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. In this comprehensive study on race and government in the Philippines during the American colonial period, Paul Kramer presents a unique look at the complexities behind U.S.– Philippine relations. Melendy, H. B. 1977. Asians in America: Filipinos, Koreans, and East Asians. Boston: Twayne Publishers. This book, which deals primarily with early 20th-century history, examines the experiences of Filipino, Korean, and East Asian immigrants to the United States. It is filled with informative chapters on Filipino immigration history, adaptation, and discrimination against Filipinos. These chapters deal specifically with the pre-1965 Filipino immigration. The Philippine History Site. [Online information; retrieved 3/23/10.] http://opmanong.ssc. hawaii.edu/filipino/index.html. This site is dedicated to documenting Filipino and Filipino American history. Its content focuses specifically on the Philippine Revolution, the Philippine-American War, and Filipino migration to the United States. Posadas, B. 1999. The Filipino Americans (The New Americans). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. This book offers a detailed introduction into the history of Filipinos in the United States and serves as an important reference on Filipino American history. Shaw, A. V., and L. H. Francia. 2002. Vestiges of War: The Philippine—American War and the Aftermath of an Imperial Dream, 1899–1999. New York: New York University Press. This collection of essays, visual art, poetry, and literature explores U.S. intervention in the Philippines. Vestiges of War departs from traditional texts on the topic but brings a uniquely different perspective on U.S. colonization that addresses the complexities of this oft forgotten event. Smithsonian Filipino American Heritage Website. [Online information; retrieved 2/7/10.] http://filam.si.edu/. This site commemorates the centennial of Filipino migration to the United States. It includes a curriculum project that is designed to teach teachers and students about Filipino American history and culture.
Ghanaian Immigrants by Baffour K. Takyi
Introduction Even though the majority of Ghanaians move within the West African region, over the past two decades the number of Ghanaians who have moved beyond this region and have settled in countries such as the United States has also increased dramatically. Prior to the 1980s, the few Ghanaians in America were mostly foreign students or diplomats and government officials who were here for a specified time period. This pattern has changed in recent years as the Ghanaian community has increased significantly to encompass other social groupings besides those previously mentioned, and many of the newly immigrated Ghanaian Americans are less likely to consider themselves as “sojourners” and more likely to consider the United States as home. Recent Department of Homeland Security statistics show that the number of Ghanaians who have become permanent residents in America have nearly doubled between 2000 and 2009 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010). This chapter provides some insights about these newly immigrated Ghanaians, thereby contributing to the emerging discourse on America’s recent immigrant communities. In highlighting the Ghanaian immigrant experience in America, I take into cognizance the fact that the African immigrant community is not monolithic. They differ for example, on the way they arrived in America, their reasons for coming, their settlement patterns, and their mode of acceptance and incorporation into American society (see, e.g., Takyi 2000; Takyi and Boate 2006). My other reason for focusing on the Ghanaian diaspora is that the recent influx of immigrants from Africa to America is dominated by a select number of countries—primarily from Anglophone Africa. Ghana is one of these countries that have emerged as a major sender of African immigrants to the United States. As of 2000, Ghanaians were the sixth-largest group of recent immigrants from the continent of Africa in America. By 2007, it ranked fifth in terms of admissions. If the emphasis shifts to the black population only, then Ghana is ranked third in terms of the composition of Africanborn immigrants in the United States (Kent 2007, 8). As the Ghanaian community in the United States grows, scholars need to examine their pre- and post-immigration experiences. The aim of this chapter is to fill this knowledge gap and contribute to the literature on the major immigrant groups
753
Chronology | 755
from Africa to America. To provide a backdrop for looking at the Ghanaian experience in America, I provide the reader with some geographical and historical information about the country Ghana. Next, I explore the reasons why Ghanaians have come to America, the size of the community, as well as their adjustment process into American society.
Chronology 1820
Gold Coast—the colony comes under British Protectorate.
1900
Most areas of what is now Ghana become a British Protectorate.
1940s
Ghanaians who wish to pursue higher education go to England to further their education. Some Ghanaians, including Nkrumah, the future president of Ghana, come to school in the United States. Agitation for independence begins in earnest.
1957
End of British colonial rule in Ghana. Nkrumah assumes power. Ghanaian immigration to the United States is a trickle despite USAID scholarships to Ghanaians to study in America.
1966
The military overthrows Dr. Nkrumah’s government.
1970s
Ghana’s economy begins its slide and decline. Promulgation of the Alliance Compliance Order in Ghana. Exodus of large numbers of non-Ghanaians in the country. Formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
1980s
Economic decline and the political instability lead to the beginning of mass population movements of the people. Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire become favorite destinations for Ghanaian migrants. Movement to these countries facilitated by the passage of the ECOWAS treaty; one of the treaty’s principles is the freedom of movement for citizens of member countries.
1983
Nigeria deports its nonresident immigrants. Ghanaians are among the most affected West Africans who were deported. Prior to the 1980s, student migration to United States
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dominated. But Nigeria’s deportation of nonresidents begins the onset of massive waves of Ghanaian emigration to other parts of the world, including the United States—especially for those who could afford it. 1986
The Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) regularizes the status of undocumented immigrants in the United States. Several Ghanaians whose immigration status have changed since coming to the United States benefit from the amnesty and adjusts their status. These beneficiaries of IRCA begin to reunite with their families.
1990
Diversity lottery promulgated. Ghana becomes a major recipient of visas under the program. The number of Ghanaians in America increase significantly— due mainly to the diversity lottery.
1992
Ghana returns to Multi-Party Democracy (Fourth Republic). Passage of Dual Citizenship Act.
2000
The 2000 Census identifies over 60,000 Ghanaians in America.
2000s
Dual Citizenship Regulation Act passed in Ghana. Passage of Representation of the Peoples Amendment (ROOPA) bill in Ghana’s parliament.
Background Geography of Ghana The Republic of Ghana is located along the west coast of Africa. Geographically speaking, it covers an area of approximately 92,098 square miles and shares borders with Côte d’Ivoire in the west, Burkina Faso in the north, Togo in the east, and the Gulf of Guinea (Atlantic Ocean) in the south. For administrative purposes, the country is divided into 10 regions, and Accra is the main city and its capital. Besides Accra, the major cities in Ghana include the following: Kumasi, Tema, Tamale, Sekondi-Takoradi, Koforidua, and Sunyani. As in many Third World nations, Ghana is a raw material producer. Cocoa, timber products, gold, diamonds, bauxite, and manganese are among its main exports. Indeed, it is the world’s second-biggest cocoa producer and Africa’s second-biggest gold exporter. Recently, tourism has become one of its major foreign exchange earners as well, and the country is set to become the continent’s newest oil producer very soon.
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Ghana has an estimated population of 24 million people as of 2009, of which nearly 40 percent live in urban areas, making the country one of the most urbanized in Africa. Like most African nations, its population has been growing rapidly during the past four decades. At current rate of growth, it is projected that the number of Ghanaians will increase at a rapid pace, as with those who live in urban areas (the result of natural increase and rural-urban migration). In the 1960s Ghana’s population was 6.6 million people. The rapid population growth since the 1960s, which has averaged between 3 to 4 percent, is attributed to high birthrates and low contraceptive use patterns. More recently, fertility levels (measured by the total fertility rate [TFR], the average number of births to a woman if she were to live through her reproductive years [ages 15–49]) have begun to decline: from a reported high of 6.47 in 1980 to 4.55 by the late 1990s. Indeed according to preliminary data from the latest Ghana Demographic and Health Survey, which was conducted between June and July of 2008, TFR has declined further to about 4 births per woman.
History of Ghana Formerly called the Gold Coast, Ghana is a young republic and in 1957, it became the first black African nation to attain its political independence, after over 100 years of British colonial rule. It has to be pointed out that Ghana itself is a colonial creation, pieced together from numerous indigenous societies and ethnic groups that were living in various parts of modern-day Ghana prior to European colonial rule. While little written documentation exists of the region’s past before the advent of the Portuguese, the first Europeans to arrive on the shores of modern Ghana in the 15th century (due primarily of its riches in gold and other raw materials, later to include slaves) met some powerful inland kingdoms that had developed especially among the various Akan-speaking groups and neighboring groups. These developments invariably led to clashes between these indigenous powers and the various European powers (such as the Dutch, the Danes, and the British) between the 15th and 20th centuries. By the mid-19th century, the British had consolidated their position and had become the main power that ruled the region that later, after its independence, became known as Ghana. At the time of its independence in 1957, Ghana was one of the richest nations on the African continent: the world’s leading cocoa exporter and a major producer of a significant amount of the world’s gold and diamonds. Unfortunately, as the case is in many African countries, the postcolonial challenges that came with Ghanaian political independence were quite daunting and have led to failed promises and hopes for the people. Indeed, the political history of Ghana typifies the political turmoil and instability that has characterized several African countries since the 1960s. At different times since its political independence from Britain, it has been ruled by military governments: four military coups and the collapse of three republics.
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Indeed, its first coup occurred in 1966 when its first president and pan-Africanist hero, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, was deposed. The end of his rule was followed by years of mostly military rule. In 1981 Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings staged his second coup that deposed the then-civilian administration of Dr. Limann. Since 1992, when the military government at the time (led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings) agreed to a multi-party system of rule, it has successfully conducted five general elections that have been deemed fair and transparent by international and local observers. More importantly, the country has evolved an orderly political succession and a vibrant democratic culture; has been able to transfer power between two different parties during this period; and has been devoid in large part of the widespread fraud that was common in many African countries. Party elections have now become so routine and common in Ghana that it has become a beacon of hope for democratic activists in sub-Saharan Africa. One interesting aspect about Ghana’s postcolonial social and economic history that provides a context for scholars studying its migratory history is that the economic stagnation and political instability that characterized much of its early postcolonial period, and perhaps till today, have played a large role in decisions about whether its citizenry stay home or travel outside for the proverbial “greener
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, standing on stool, being sworn in by Arku Korsah as the first president of the Republic of Ghana, in Accra, 1960. (Library of Congress)
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pastures.” While it is true that Ghana was among the first African nations to experience political upheavals and later economic decay and stagnation, it was also one of those countries in the 1980s and 1990s that implemented an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) comprising of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) (with the support of the World Bank, the International Monetary Bank [IMF], the African Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Program) to reverse its economic misfortunes. These programs led to improvements in its macro indicators, but they led to massive layoffs of public sector employees as well. This is significant given that the public sector continues to be the major employer of Ghanaians—especially of the educated class—till today. Moreover, while the country was reporting some success at the macro levels, these changes did not translate into improved living conditions for the average Ghanaian. For the reasons cited above—retrenchments, limited job opportunities for its teeming youth and college graduates, political instability, and the absence of significant improvements in their well-being—many Ghanaians had no choice than to leave the country in search of greener pastures elsewhere.
Causes and Waves of Migration Immigration scholars have observed that the face of the United States is changing rapidly (see, e.g., Pedraza 2000). These changes in large part reflect the growing number of immigrants who have moved to the country during the past 40 years or so. Equally important is that the majority of these recent immigrants come primarily from non-European or Third World countries (Bouvier and Gardner 1986). As is happening among the general population, America’s black population and identity is also changing somewhat as a result of these recent waves of Third World immigration (see, e.g., Bryce-LaPorte 1977, 1993). This is especially the case with respect to immigration from Africa and other world regions—especially the Caribbean and Latin America—with a significant proportion of people of African ancestry. Based on recent developments and trends, some studies have indicated that about 7 percent of America’s total black population now consists of foreign-born blacks—up from 5 percent in 1990 (Logan, 2007; Dean and Logan 2003; Waters 1999). Admittedly, although the majority of these new foreign-born blacks are Afro-Caribbean, significant numbers have come from the continent of Africa itself. Among these recent African immigrants are Ghanaians. Historically speaking and until quite recently, Ghana was considered an immigrant receiving nation (Zachariah and Conde 1981). As a result of this history, it should come as no surprise that over 800,000 foreign-born nationals (representing 12% of its total population) were counted in its first postcolonial census, which was conducted in 1960. Some of these immigrants, however, left Ghana when it
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promulgated an Aliens Compliance Oder in the early 1970s during the administration of Dr. Busia’s Progress Party. As Ghana’s economic fortunes began to wane in the 1970s, some of its foreign-born population who had stayed after the promulgation of the Aliens Compliance Order also left the country. As a result of recent political and civil upheavals and wars in the West African region (especially during the 1980s and 1990s), several refugee groups from the region have found their way back to Ghana. This is especially true with Liberians. As a result, Ghana now hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the West African region (International Organization of Migration [IOM] 2009). Thus, for most of its history, until quite recently, Ghana received (rather than sent) people to other parts of the world. Due in part to the fact that it was a former British colony and its institutions were similar to what existed in Great Britain, the latter was the traditional destination of choice for most Ghanaians who traveled outside the country. The Ghanaians who left for a variety of reasons, but mainly for higher education. Because of limited and underdeveloped communication between Africa and America, during the colonial and early postcolonial period, those Ghanaians who had the chance to pursue higher education invariably went to England than the United States. A few people, including Kwame Nkrumah, found their way to America to attend universities, but in this first wave of immigration, the number of Ghanaians coming to America was quite small. Anarfi and Kwankye (2003) point to four different phases of emigration: minimal emigration, initial emigration, large-scale emigration, and massive emigrations. After independence, a few Ghanaians were sponsored by the government or were offered scholarships through the USAID and the Ford Foundation to attend American universities. These earlier immigrants tended to go back to Africa after their studies—due in large part to the fact that they had little problem securing well-paying jobs in the many state agencies or in the public sector at large. After all, not many Ghanaians had the higher level education that was needed at that time for the many positions that had become available with the departure of some European colonial workers. Though the historically established patterns has not changed that much as the United Kingdom continues to attract significant numbers of Ghanaians, in more recent years, the United States, Canada, Australia, the Middle East and other nonEuropean countries have increasingly become major destinations for Ghanaian immigrants. Now, partly as a result of several push factors (economic hardships and the demand for higher education) and pull factors (policy changes such as the diversity lottery), America is home to some 65,000 or more Americans of Ghanaian origin, the majority of whom are recent immigrants, having emigrated since the 1980s (Takyi 2002). Indeed Taylor (2009) points out that the United States and Canada have overtaken Europe as the preferred destination of Ghanaian immigrants in recent years. Orozco (2005) cites data on remittances to support the observation that there may be over 300,000 Ghanaians currently in America. These shifting patterns
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also correspond in no small way to the changing economic and political fortunes of Ghana during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, decades that coincide with new waves of emigration to America and the other parts of the world. Overall, Ghanaians in America are part of a growing number of African immigrants who now call Europe and North America home, estimated to number over 3 million today, (IOM 2003, Dean and Logan 2003). In America, it is estimated that about 1 million or more Africans have relocated to this country in recent years (see, e.g., Zeleza 2009, 2005; Konadu-Agyemang, Takyi and Arthur 2006; Dixon 2006; Roberts 2005; Eissa 2005; Dodoo and Takyi 2002; Takyi 2002; Gordon 1998; Dodoo 1997; Takougang 1995), with the bulk of these Africans coming in the 1980s and 1990s. In his analysis of recent data from the American Community Survey, Terrazas (2009) reported that the number of African immigrants in the United States grew nearly fortyfold between 1960 and 2007, from 35,355 to 1.4 million. Most of this growth, he concluded, has taken place since 1990. A recent New York Times article about the growing presence of African immigrants in New York suggested that more Africans have moved to this country voluntarily since the 1990s than at any other period since the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 (see Roberts 2005).
Joseph Mataley, a Ghanaian immigrant, poses with his four daughters, from left, Susana, Josephine, Beatrice, and Rosina, at their home in Denver, Colorado, on July 27, 2006. (AP Photo/Ed Andrieski)
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The New York City region is not the only place where these Africans can be found. Indeed, they have settled throughout the continental United States; however, the eastern seaboard region—especially New York/New Jersey, Massachusetts, and the Washington, D.C./Maryland/Virginia metropolitan areas seem to be the main destination for a significant number of Africans (Takyi 2002). Also some studies have reported that in all the top metropolitan regions that they have settled, their growth rate has exceeded the 100 percent threshold: in Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia, 148.9 percent; New York City, 134.2 percent; Atlanta, 284.6 percent; Minneapolis–St. Paul, 628.4 percent; Houston, 129.1 percent; Chicago, 122.5 percent; Boston, 102.1 percent; Dallas, 159.5 percent; and Philadelphia–New Jersey, 220.6 percent (see, e.g., Dean and Logan 2003). At the early stages of these population movements out of Ghana (later to become an “exodus” as a result of the sheer number of Ghanaians who were involved), the West African region, particularly the Côte d’Ivoire and the then-booming oil-rich nation of Nigeria, were the main destinations for these migrants. It is believed that between 1974 and 1981 about a million or more Ghanaian workers left Ghana; their primary destinations were Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire. Skilled Ghanaians such as teachers, doctors, and administrators moved to Nigeria, Uganda, Botswana, and Zambia. As of the mid-1980s, Ghanaians have increasingly migrated to a range of destinations in Europe and North America (Bump 2006). This is especially the case with some of the Ghanaian technocrats who fled Ghana for a variety of reasons (economic and political) during Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings’s provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) administration. Following the deportation of non-Nigerian nationals from Nigeria in 1983, some of those “deportees” who were able to do so left the African shores for Europe and North America. The United Nations reported that approximately 1.2 million Ghanaians returned to their homeland, either on land through Togo and Benin, or by sea during this expulsion (see, e.g., Brydon 1985). Some members of the latter, plus those few Ghanaians who came to America before the 1980s, were to serve as the seed for the growing community of Ghanaians now resident in America. Even though some consider the 1970s as a period of mass emigration from Ghana (the second wave), as a result of poor record keeping and the fact that some of these moves were undocumented, we know very little about the extent of the outflow during this era. Although the number of Ghanaians who left during this period, and continue to leave Ghana now, are still unknown, it appears that the Ghanaian diaspora is quite large and, as a community, very vibrant. The evidence for this assertion comes from the presence of many Ghanaian associations and organizations—town unions, ethnic associations, churches, and old student associations (e.g., town and ethnic associations, old boys/girls unions, etc.). For instance, the Ghanaian-Canadian Business Directory published in Toronto, Canada, is even bigger than some city telephone directories in the United States. More importantly, in the case of the
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United States, anecdotal evidence and other informal sources suggest that most of the winners of its diversity lottery actually did move out of Africa. In her study of Ghanaian immigrants based on data from the 1980s, Peil (1995) noted that about 10 percent of Ghana’s population of about 12 million in 1984 lived outside of Ghana. Data from several rudimentary sources—including those from Europe, Canada, and other parts of the world—suggest that the Ghanaian diaspora is quite large. Considering the fact that large-scale emigration has continued unabated since the beginning of the new century, it is true to suggest that at the moment, significant numbers of Ghanaians live outside the shores of West Africa. More important, and based largely on the locations where Ghanaians have settled in recent years, it is equally true that the destination for these immigrants have also become more diverse and not limited to traditional gateways and destinations in Europe, such as the United Kingdom. Indeed the existence of significant numbers of Ghanaian communities have been found in many places, including Canada, Japan, South Korea, and also China and many countries in the European Union (EU) (see, e.g., Bump 2006; Nieswand 2005; Ter Haar 1998.) Taylor (2009) points out that the United States and Canada have overtaken Europe as the preferred destination of Ghanaian immigrants in recent years. However, Orozco (2005) also suggests that there may be over 300,000 Ghanaians currently residing in America. A second aspect of the recent emigration trends that is different from earlier waves is that the majority of those who left Ghana prior to the 1970s invariably returned to the home country on a permanent basis. This is particularly true with respect to the educational migrants (i.e., students). This is not necessarily the case with recent waves of immigration as several of these people have become permanent fixtures in their adopted countries of residence. In large part it is those who fall within the purview of the recent wave that have become the foundation of the growing Ghanaian diaspora community. While the reported numbers in America may underestimate the true size of the Ghanaian diaspora, anecdotal evidence suggest that the community is growing quite rapidly, due in large part to their increased representation in the diversity lottery program, and the fact that the established immigrants have been bringing their family members to join them, given that American immigration policies still give preference to family reunification (see, e.g., Kent, 2007; Lobo, 2006). Based on these expectations, it is no surprise that more recent data from the American Community Survey suggests that there may be more Ghanaians in the country than has been earlier reported, with the largest concentrations found in the New York/New Jersey and Washington, D.C./Virginia regions. A third important difference between the earlier and recent waves of Ghanaian immigrants in North American cities such as Toronto and New York is that those who arrived in the 1980s were more diverse in terms of their social class and gender. In contrast, those Ghanaians who came to America before the 1980s were predominantly male students (Donkor 2005). Moreover, as Donkor notes, their reason
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for coming to America itself varies from period to period. For example, given that their earlier waves were composed of mainly students, they came here primarily to study. For the recent arrivals or cohorts (i.e., post 1980s), the group consists of students and non-students alike. The latter include economic and political refugees looking for job opportunities and a safe haven from the political instabilities of the 1980s and 1990s.
Explaining the Recent Waves of Ghanaian Emigration Why are more Ghanaians leaving that country to come to the United States? Answers to this simple question are not easy to come by and are multifaceted. Indeed as has been indicated earlier in this chapter, the appeal of America to many Ghanaians can be considered as a recent development or phenomenon (Arthur 2000, 2008, 2009; Takyi 2000, 2009; Manuh 1998; Ter Haar 1998; Owusu 1998; Peil 1995; Killingray 1994). This statement is particularly true when one considers Ghana’s social and political history. During its long colonial and early postcolonial history, Ghana’s relatively vibrant and booming economy (prior to the 1970s) made it an attractive destination for other Africans and non-African’s alike to settle in that country (Zachariah and Conde 1981).
Ghanaian Mary Gyimah is sworn in as a U.S. citizen during a naturalization ceremony on the National Mall in Washington, D.C. (Chris Maddaloni/Roll Call/Getty Images)
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So far, researchers who have examined Ghana’s immigration patterns draw in large part on some of the general reasons that have been identified in the literature to explain international migration (see, e.g., Arango, 2000; Massey 1999). Thus, as the case is with other immigrants in general, one cannot point to a single factor to explain recent migratory flows and patterns: both internal and external factors play key roles in the reasons behind migration flows (see, e.g., Takyi 2009; Peil 1995). Among the internal processes that have served as a catalyst for leaving Ghana, one can but only conclude that economic considerations—that is, the betterment of one’s economic situation—seem to be paramount when it comes to the decision to emigrate or not. For example, since the mid-1970s, and especially following the 1973 oil crisis, Ghana’s once buoyant economy began to strain and deteriorate. As a result, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the country went through a series of economic hardships, including high inflation, shortages of goods, and a rise of the unemployed and underemployed. These developments were compounded by severe droughts and bush-fires that swept the countryside in the early 1980s, destroying food and cash crops in many parts of the country, thereby straining the already critical food situation further. The changing economic fortunes of the nation also affect the educated class. Indeed, the rising educational levels and aspirations, as well as graduate unemployment and underemployment during this period when the economy stagnated (or contracted in some cases), created some of the pressures for the mass emigration that occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s—whether to neighboring countries or to countries outside Africa. Equally important in the discussion of education is the type of education Ghanaians and, for that matter, most Africans inherited from their colonial “masters.” Colonial and postcolonial education tend to prepare Africans for jobs that do not exist in their own countries, helping to fuel what others call the “brain drain.” A case in point is the fact that most Ghanaian University graduates are more likely to write and speak English better than their own native languages. Not surprisingly, graduates tend to know more about the Western societies than their own country. Some scholars also blame the IMF-sponsored SAPs, which were aimed at reversing Ghana’s economic decline and stagnation in the 1980s for contributing to the recent outflow of Ghanaians to other parts of the developed and developing world. According to those who subscribe to this view, the SAP initiatives had an unintended effect on employment patterns in the country; not only did the Ghana government downsize and de-emphasize its role in the country’s economy as a result of SAP, the downsizing trimmed the state bureaucracy, the main employer of university graduates in Ghana. Awuah (1997) has estimated that over 300,000 civil and public workers and those from the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were retrenched during the 1980s. These retrenchments increased the pool of unemployed people in the country and contributed in no small way to the exodus to the
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neighboring countries such as Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, and other parts of Africa, especially during the 1980s. Some evidence exists to support the economic motive for leaving Ghana. In his study of Ghanaians in Cincinnati, Ohio, Yeboah (2008) reported that a frequently cited reason among those he studied for coming to America was economic considerations. He noted that those surveyed suggested that their move was part of their overall strategy of improving their living standards and also bettering themselves and their families. To these Ghanaians, the availability of jobs in America and the opportunities available in this country for higher education, especially postgraduate education, appealed to them as they made their decisions to leave Ghana for America. Similar observations have been reported by Arthur (2009) in his study of some Ghanaians in the Minneapolis, Minnesota, area. On the question of “educational immigrants,” their situation has been facilitated by the fact that in the case of Ghana and those from the Anglophone world, the use of English in American universities means it is somewhat easier for them to study in the many universities dotted all over America. After their studies, some of these students—having landed jobs—did not go back to Ghana and choose instead to settle permanently in this country. In addition to economic factors, political instabilities and considerations have played a role in migratory decisions of some people, especially as pertains to immigrants who arrived post 1970s. During the late 1970s and the early1980s, the military regime at the time, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and later the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), carried out many arrests of people considered to be “economic and political saboteurs.” Among these perceived saboteurs were politicians, traders, and some intellectuals. The fear of arrest or persecution led to some Ghanaians fleeing the country during this period to settle in America. Not only that, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, those who were opposed to military rule became “enemies” of what was called the “revolution.” Some were persecuted and others became threatened enough to emigrate. Other researchers such as Massey (1995) and Amin (1974) have also argued that the current migratory patterns around the world draw from the outcome of colonial and neocolonial penetrations into the Third World regions. The thesis here is that the imposition of capitalism has led to unequal exchange, uneven development, and the neglect in world affairs of Third World regions such as Africa. As Amin (1974) argues, the uneven development was not only between Africa and the West, but also between the rural and urban areas. The colonial and postcolonial developmental policies’ emphasis on urban areas means rural folks often have to move to urban centers if they want to improve their quality of life. Because these policies are not decided by the people, it is accurate to suggest that internal and international migration of Africans may not necessarily be voluntary; the migration may simply be a response to the established unequal relationship that exist between the rich
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North (Western and industrial nations) and the poor South (Africa). These patterns have also been helped in no small ways by changes in technology and communication that have made it easier and cheaper for Africans to communicate or travel to America. The cultural expectations of Ghanaians also contribute to the outflow. This is because some are forced to leave the country in pursuit of a better life to safeguard against ridicule for being considered failures. This is true considering that until quite recently, educated people in Ghana were “expected” to be employed in the formal sector and be gainfully employed. This unrealistic expectation has forced a lot of people to leave Ghana for Europe and America to do jobs, in some cases, that are unrelated to their educational or vocational training. For some also, the whole idea of foreign travel (aburokyire) is captivating enough to force them to leave Ghana regardless of the obstacles that they go through in order to arrive at their destinations. Given the Ghanaian obsession with anything that is foreign, those who go to Europe and America tend to be treated with special respect and given recognition. In some cases, this has in recent years even affected the type of people that communities are willing to select to become traditional leaders (chiefs) in many parts of West Africa. All these factors have created a psychology of migration in most African societies whereby people are willing to abandon their home countries to undergo the challenges of moving to foreign countries, especially Europe and America. With respect to the external factors that have served as inducement for Ghanaians to come to the United States, changes in U.S. immigration policies and laws have had one of the major effects of drawing Ghanaians to America. For example, the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act repealed the national origins quota system that was put in place in the 1920s to limit non-European immigrations. The abolition of these laws paved the way for overall immigration from what is called the Third World regions. A second law that is important for African immigrants in general is the Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which regularized the status of those who were here “illegally” and came before 1982 and the 1990 Immigration and Nationality Act. A more recent legislation, which is particularly relevant to African immigrants in America, is the 1990 Immigration Reform and Nationalization Act. In addition to increasing the numbers of immigrants who could come in as “family sponsored,” this law has single handedly led to an increase in immigration from Africa. This is due to the fact that one of the provisions of the act created what has become known as the “Diversity Lottery,” which has benefited many Africans. Under the diversity immigrant visa program, which is based on a lottery system, 50,000 visas are made available annually to a select number of countries that are deemed as sending few immigrants to the United States. The winners are drawn randomly from entries from individuals from those selected countries. Indeed, since the early 1990s when this act became effective, more than 20,000 Africans have been granted permission to immigrate
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to the United States each year. While it is not clear whether all those who qualified and won the lottery under the system actually immigrated to the United States, it appears that most of the winners did leave Africa. If current patterns continue, the expectations are that the “neo-diaspora” of African immigrants will change significantly in size and dynamism. At the same time that U.S. immigration laws were becoming more open and liberal, the rules and regulations under which colonial subjects had used to emigrate in large numbers to European capitals were changed as part of overall immigration restrictions in the EU regions. With restrictions on immigration from their former colonies and the traditional destination for most Africans curtailed, other choices had to be found; and the United States became one of these new destination points. Thus, with the United States liberalizing its immigration policies, it emerged as a major country for higher learning and as a major recipient of refugees and political asylees; and Africans have turned increasingly to the United States as they flee their own countries for a variety of reasons. Improvements in communication between Africa and the rest of the world and also established networks of family and friends have all helped to facilitate African immigrations to America in recent years.
Demographic Profile A Snapshot of the Ghanaian Diaspora in America The recent attention to Ghanaian immigrants, and for that matter, African immigrants as a whole in America has something to do with their increasing numbers and its implication for black relations and interracial discourse in this country. Yet, as is true with America’s foreign-born population as a whole, accurate figures on the size of the Ghanaian diaspora in America are hard to determine. However, by all accounts this number ranges from the reported 65,000 who were enumerated in the 2000 Census to over 300,000 or more as reported by Orozco (2005), who used data on money transfers to Ghana. Relatively small by comparison to black immigrants from the Caribbean region, the number of Ghanaians who consider America as home now has increased sharply since the 1990s and continues to grow at the end of the first decade of this century. By all accounts, the recent increases have occurred mainly within the past decade. Its newness is quite striking. Indeed of the more than 60,000 Ghanaians who were enumerated in the 2000 Census, more than half (60.5%) came to America in the 1990s, nearly a quarter (24.3%) came during the 1980s, and less than a fifth (15.2%) came before the 1980s. In his analyses of 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census data, Takyi (2009, 2000) found that prior to the 1980s there were less than 10,000 Ghanaians in America, with this figure increasing to 20,863 (a 40% increase) in
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1990, and rising sharply to 68,122 by 2000. No doubt the growth that is evident since the 1990s is attributed in large part to the diversity visa, something that Lobo (2006) and others (see, e.g., Konadu-Agyemang, Takyi, and Arthur 2006) have alluded to in their studies on African immigrants. Based on the available data, it is accurate then to suggest that the number of Ghanaians admitted to the United States has increased every 10 years since the 1980s. Indeed, the rate of growth has more than doubled between 1990 and 2000 (Tables 115 and 116). For example, in 1990, about 15,950 Ghanaians were enumerated in the census. By 2000, this figured had risen to 39,685.
How They Came Though a community of Ghanaian immigrants has grown in recent years, how they have arrived on the shores of America is interlaced with a host of problems, including, for example, visa restrictions and regulations that limits who can come in and who cannot. As a result, these immigrants have relied on a variety of ways to arrive in America: some legal, others not. Some Ghanaians who came into the country legally (e.g., students) have found themselves for a variety of reasons in an undocumented status. Based in large part to the liberalization of visa requirements, many recent educational “immigrants” often come directly from Ghana; however, some studies have also reported that those who emigrated before the 1990s may have used a stepwise approach in coming to America (Konadu-Agyemang, Takyi, and Arthur 2006). According to this thesis, those who used this approach lived in another country (e.g., Nigeria, Zimbabwe, or South Africa) prior to either enrolling in American schools or settling permanently in America. While in these countries, these Ghanaians worked (as teachers or in the health sectors), saved money, and used their savings to obtain the necessary papers to emigrate. In some cases, though, not all these immigrants moved to other countries before coming to the United States. Rather, they moved from Ghana’s rural areas to the urban centers and worked hard to save enough to facilitate their departure. Some evidence exists to support the stepwise-migratory patterns. In their analysis of data on a sample of Ghanaians living in several northeastern cities, Konadu-Agyemang and Takyi (2001) and Konadu-Agyemang, Takyi, and Arthur (2006) concluded that several of the people they interviewed reported living in another country before coming to America. These immigrants, they pointed out, were more likely to have lived in the West African sub-region (especially Nigeria) first, made some money, and then continued their move out of the continent. More recent, Yeboah (2008) has also reported that among the Ghanaians he studied in Cincinnati, Ohio, a sizable proportion indicated to him that they arrived in
770 | Ghanaian Immigrants
the United States by a stepwise process. Finally, a good number of Ghanaians, he reported, arrived as visitors or students and ultimately overstayed their visa status and become part of the undocumented Ghanaian community. Fortunately for some of these undocumented immigrants, especially those who came here before the mid-1980s, the IRCA legalization program was used to regularize their stay. Another observation about the Ghanaian community, which contradicts with the popular view about African immigrants, is that very few came here as refugees. Citing data from a number of sources (e.g., the International Institute for Education [IIE]), Kent (2007) reported that Ghana is among the sub-Saharan African countries that send substantial number of foreign students, not refugees, to the United States. Between 2001 and 2005, for instance, she notes that about 3,053 Ghanaian students enrolled in American universities (see Kent 2007), which means several came here legally. After analyzing U.S. Immigration data, Eissa (2005) concluded that of all the refugees who were admitted to the United States between 1990 and 2000, only 10 percent were from Africa. He also points out that of the African immigrants in America who adjusted their status in 2003, only 16 percent were refugee and asylum adjustments. Indeed, the majority of recent Africans as a whole have come here by way of the diversity lottery visa, a pattern that applies to Ghanaians as well. In the case of Ghana, it is one of the major recipients of visas under the program. Arguably those Ghanaians who came prior to the tumultuous 1980s may have come as refugees, but the available data show that they do not matter with respect to refugee immigration from Africa (Kent 2007).
Where They Are Now: Settlement Patterns Researchers have observed that America’s immigrants tend to concentrate in a few immigrant receiving states. To a large extent, this general observation is rather true about the Ghanaian diaspora community in America. Although increasing numbers of Ghanaians have begun to move from the main gateway cities of New York and the Washington, D.C./Virginia areas to other midsize cities such as Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio (Yeboah 2008) and Minneapolis (Arthur 2009), the majority of Ghanaians in America have settled in only a handful of states. In their analysis of 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census data, Takyi (2000) and Takyi and Boate (2006) found that almost half (48%) of all Ghanaians live in the Northeastern region, with the highest concentrations reported in major metropolitan regions in the New York/New Jersey area, Maryland/Virginia region, and Massachusetts as well (Table 114). Not only that, Takyi (2009) concluded that a significant number (35%) reside in the central cities. But the picture becomes more interesting the deeper one looks at residential patterns by state and metropolitan region. In the Washington, D.C., area for instance, Kent (2007) reports
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that Africans are more likely to reside in the inner suburbs and central city than in the outlying regions.
Who Is Here: Characteristics of Ghanaians in America Consistent with studies dealing with contemporary international migrations, women feature prominently among the Ghanaians in America. As a result of selectivity, earlier waves of immigrants tended to be men. Thus of the more than 60,000 Ghanaians enumerated in the 2000 Census, slightly more than half were male (56%), but about 44 percent were female. This suggests that women have increasingly become major players in the emerging diaspora as well. Since migration tends to favor the young and the more agile, it is also not surprising that the majority of Ghanaians are young and in their working ages (18–64). Arthur (2008) reports that the Ghanaian community is made up of young people; especially those aged 25 to 35 years. One of the most pernicious images of Africa—at least as portrayed in the American media—is that it is a continent full of poor and uneducated people who are always fighting among themselves. As a result of their poverty levels and their high degree of intolerance, these Africans are always on the move—out of the continent when the opportunity arises. Suffice it to say that this portrayal does not accurately capture the realities of the Ghanaian community, which comprises of people from all walks of life, including a significant number of professionals (skilled immigrants). Going by educational credentials, 2000 Census data shows that 87.4 percent of the 53,245 Ghanaians aged 25 and over had a high school or higher level of education. Focusing specifically on higher education, the same data indicate that nearly a third (31.6%) of all Ghanaians have a bachelor’s degree or higher (see Table 117). This reported figure is slightly below the reported 38 percent for all Africans in America, but higher than those for all foreign-born residents (26%) and native-born Americans (16%) (Kent 2007). Indeed, it is the size of the so-called educated class, particularly that of skilled workers (e.g., engineers, accountants, computer scientists) and professionals (e.g., attorneys, physicians, nurses, teachers, professors) that has provoked a lively debate among many scholars and funding agencies as to the implications of such losses for Africa’s socioeconomic development (see, e.g., Kaba 2007; Ozden and Schiff 2006; Dodoo, Takyi, and Mann 2006; Saravia and Miranda 2004; Adepoju 2000; Carrington and Detragiache 1999; Logan 1990). This pattern of brain-drain is equally true of the Ghanaians who have left Africa to work in America as significant numbers work in professional settings (Table 118). According to a recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine, there are 532 Ghanaian doctors practicing in the United States. Although they represent a tiny fraction of the 800,000 U.S. physicians, their number is equivalent to 20 percent of Ghana’s medical capacity, for there are only 2,600 physicians in Ghana (Mullan 2007).
772 | Ghanaian Immigrants
Adjustment and Adaptation Culture: Foodways, Music, Art, and Celebrations As Africans living in America, Ghanaians are confronted daily with the negative images that are often portrayed in the U.S. media about Africa. It has been suggested that black immigrants in general are confronted with a host of issues when it comes to acculturation; one major issue concerns conforming to the larger American society or to black American society (see, e.g., the works of Bryce-Laporte). Notwithstanding the images about Africa and the pressures to conform to mainstream American or African American culture, researchers have observed that the typical Ghanaian immigrant is yet to do away with his/her “African or Ghanaian identity or culture” in America. Studies have reported, for instance, that Ghanaians in the diaspora, including those in America, have organized themselves into ethnic or national community groups to help fill in the void of their absent extended family members (see, e.g., Konadu-Agyemang, Takyi, and Arthur 2006; Donkor 2005). Members from such organizations have been instrumental in the provision of social support to their members in a variety of ways; including counseling the youth, resolving domestic conflict among families, and providing moral and financial support in times of crisis or death. In addition, members help each other celebrate joyous events such as weddings, births, and graduations. During celebrations, most Ghanaians showcase their traditions and culture to the wider audience of Americans. These events also provide a unique opportunity for their children (the second generation) to learn the traditions and values of their parents. This is especially true for the secondgeneration Ghanaians whose ties to Ghana may be tenuous or weak. Whether at birthday celebrations, wedding and cultural celebrations, or funeral services, popular Ghanaian dishes and foods are served liberally by the host. Traditional African practices and invocations are also used liberally to showcase the significance of the occasion. Guests listen and dance to Ghanaian music—from the traditional and popular highlife to its new forms, including hiplife (a variant or amalgam of highlife and hip-hop music popular in the United States). More likely than not, participants of these events tend to wear African/Ghanaian clothes—be it kente (for birthdays, church service, and other celebrations) or the black and red clothes favored for funeral and burial services. African and Ghanaian clothes and paraphernalia such as music and movies (DVDs) are readily available in the United States (through the mail/Internet) or can be bought from the many Ghanaian/African and ethnic stores that are found in cities such as New York and the metropolitan Washington, D.C., region, where many Ghanaians have settled. Many shops sell clothes, basic African cooking ingredients, familiar foodstuffs, meat, fish, and groceries from Ghana as well as the latest hits from Nollywood and
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Ghallywood, the Nigerian and Ghanaian equivalents to India’s Bollywood and America’s Hollywood. Another context where Ghanaian culture is likely to be displayed is in the churches. Indeed, the many Ghanaian Churches (especially mainstream Christian groups and Evangelical/Pentecostal ones) that have sprung up in the diaspora provide yet another environment (beside the home) for Ghanaians to speak their local dialects and wear their African clothes. Church services in some of these Ghanaian churches in the diaspora are conducted in English, but the use of the local Ghanaian dialects such as Twi (Akan) is also quite common.
Family and Intimate Life and Adjustment-Related Issues Numerous studies have pointed to the centrality of family to the lives of many Africans (see, e.g., Oheneba-Sakyi and Takyi 2006; Takyi and Dodoo 2005). The attachment to married and family life can equally be discerned among the Ghanaian diaspora as well. In a context where marriage is considered the preferred mode of reproduction, and where marriage is highly regarded, it should come as no surprise then that a good number of Ghanaians in America are married or live in married couple households. An analysis of family and household structure finds that about 57 percent of these immigrants were married and the rest were unmarried (including the widowed, the divorced, and the separated). Nearly 60 percent of Ghanaian households have young children. Only 2 percent of the households have no children. The average family size of the community is estimated at about four children, with levels of education attainment being a key factor in determining the size of the family. In a family where either of the parents, especially the wife, has postgraduate level of education, the average number of children is two. More important, the children of these Ghanaians tend to live in two-parent households. About 20 percent of the households have grandparents. These are at times first-generation immigrants or elderly parents of recent immigrants who in some cases have been invited by their married children in the diaspora to assist in taking care of their children (Arthur 2008, 47). The role of the elderly or grandparents in the Ghanaian immigrant households is economically beneficial as the husband and the wife can have free time to concentrate on their economic activities. For most households the presence of the grandparents also is an opportunity for the children to learn their native language and culture. Family life is central to many Ghanaians; however, by no means do we suggest that all their unions are stable. Scattered reports abound in the popular press and on the Internet that suggest that the Ghanaian family life in the diaspora may be under stress. There are indications of high levels of divorce and separation. Unfortunately, accurate data on marital and divorce patterns appears to be nonexistent. Going by the household composition, though, one can say that the percentage of households headed by females is not that large.
774 | Ghanaian Immigrants
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture: Intergroup Relations There is some interest in the nature and context of the relationships that exists between the new African immigrants and the “old” (native-born) African Americans or other people of Africa in the diasporas. Unfortunately, given the recent arrival of the Ghanaian diaspora in America, very few studies have looked at interethnic relations between these immigrants and their native-born counterparts, especially their African American brethren. Some studies, however, have pointed out that there may be some degree of misunderstanding and communication gaps between African immigrants and African Americans (see, e.g., Apraku 1991; Waters 1995; Takougang 1995). In part, these misunderstandings often deal with the issue of acceptance by their native-born black Americans as foreign-born African Americans are at times thought of as having sold their ancestors into slavery. Also, one cannot ignore the tension among the two groups over access to valued resources in our society. A typical example is the idea that these new immigrants and their children are unfairly benefitting from the legacies of the civil right movement, such as affirmative action programs. But as Yeboah (2008) notes in his work of Ghanaians in Cincinnati, recent immigrants of African origin are compelled by the realities of their new environment to negotiate their African heritage with their American experience. Among these daily realities are issues of race and identity. Just as native-born black Americans are burdened with stereotypes and discrimination that are associated with “blackness” in America, so too are foreign-born black Americans. However, in the case of foreign-born blacks, they also suffer from the negative images that are often associated with contemporary African societies. Moreover, African-born immigrants also are confronted with the problems and negative views some hold about immigrants in general. Yeboah claims that Ghanaians may be creating new or hybrid cultures that in large part are a reflection of how well they have adapted into American society. On the whole, Ghanaians feel welcomed in their communities, making, in some cases, their integration less traumatic. This is due in part to the fact many African Americans are also adopting African traditions. Indeed, for those Ghanaians who live in the big cities of New York and Washington, D.C., which have significant black populations, it is often difficult to tell who was born in Africa and who was not. People have interacted positively like brothers and sisters—on many levels. For example, one can see many African Americans eating in African restaurants around Harlem. But it is also true that some have questioned the overrepresentation of secondgeneration African immigrants in the Ivy League schools (Massey et al. 2007). On the political front, Ghanaians in the diaspora have become major players in the political process and discourse back home. Some have gone home to stand for
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elections, while others have donated their money and resources for the major political parties in the country: the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). These American branches of political parties have hosted most of the leadership who regularly come over to brief their “overseas” branches of developments back home and also to raise funds for campaigns. Using existing political structures back in Ghana, those in the diaspora are increasingly becoming involved in the on-going democratization that is currently underway after decades of military rule in Ghana. To the extent that this trend will continue, especially among the second generation is a subject of debate.
The Ties that Bind: Linkages and Other Issues Relating to Ghana Diasporan Ghanaians have not completely detached themselves from their towns and villages in Ghana. Even though nearly a third (31%) are naturalized citizens, when some are asked about where they consider “home,” often times they point to ‘here” and “there” (Africa, specifically Ghana) as their homes. As a result of living in America (based on how long they have been here), some Ghanaians have adopted some values, manners, and personality attitudes associated with America— including hard work and individualism. However, that has not meant that they have completely been detached from Ghana. Modern technology has made it easier today for immigrants to communicate with families and friends on the continent. Their affinity to Ghana is strong, and they are passionate and proud of their heritage as evidenced by their dressing habits, food preferences, and interest in “anything” to deal with Ghana. Indeed, the notion of separation which has been observed among some immigrant groups in America appears to be less applicable to this community of Ghanaians. Even some Ghanaians who die here have had their bodies shipped home for burial—the ultimate pride of most Ghanaian families. Ghanaian Americans have not completely ignored what goes on in Ghana itself as they are active participants in some of the sociopolitical developments back home. Indeed, some scholars have noted the extensive contacts that exist between Ghanaians in the diaspora and those back home in Ghana as these Ghanaians have continued to maintain strong cultural and sociopolitical ties in the United States as a means of cultural preservation and mutual support. This is particularly true about the first-generation Ghanaians in the diaspora whose ties to the “homeland” are more recent. Owusu (2003) and many others have reported that those in the diaspora have maintained strong ties to Ghana. This is evidenced, for example, by the number of homes they have built and maintained in Ghana. Indeed, it is believed that the on-going housing boom (especially the high-end houses in expensive neighborhoods such as East Legon in Accra) has something to do with the activities of Ghanaians in the diaspora. More importantly, a real estate market has arisen that caters for the housing needs of those in the diaspora as well.
776 | Ghanaian Immigrants
The need to maintain ties with Ghana and also develop a network of social support system in America (for cultural values and identity reasons) has led to the establishment of various voluntary associations (ethnic, religious, professional, political, and others) in many parts of North America where Ghanaians are found (Owusu, 2003; Agyemang and Atta-Poku 1996). In spite living abroad, Ghanaian Americans have never lost their sense of community, a phenomena that can be attributed to the cherished extended family systems and perhaps a slogan of “one people with a common destiny.” It is quite common to find these associations raising funds to help develop their communities of origin in Ghana. A typical example of this is my own hometown association: the Duayaw-Nkwanta Association of the United States and Canada (there is an international branch that also comprises other unions in Europe and around the world), which has been helping to initiate and fund development projects in that town in the Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana. Under the auspices of The National Council of Ghanaian Associations (NCOGA), several ethnic and national activities have been organized in major cities such as New York and Chicago on national events. Events such as Ghana’s Independence Day (March 6), Ghana’s Fiftieth Independence Anniversary (Ghana at 50), and other cultural relevant programming showcase the rich and vibrant culture of the country, making it an attractive place for non-Ghanaian tourists. Ethnic churches that cater primarily to immigrants have also sprung up and have become fixtures of the religious landscape in cities where Ghanaians have settled (e.g., Ghanaian Presbyterian Church of New York; the Black Catholic Apostolate of Albany, New York; and various Pentecostal and Evangelical denominations). Most churches, particularly those in the big cities, have separate services for different Ghanaian language groups, while others use English language for church service. Cadge and Ecklund (2007) observed that the Ghanaian Pentecostal churches in Chicago conduct services in English language so as to bridge the language gap and attract more people. These ties that these churches have established among themselves through their community and cultural organizations is perhaps one way for them to cope with the realities of their new environment and establish social networks that in the long run help in their adjustment to American society. It may also be that these people see themselves as sojourners who will one day go back to Ghana and as such want to maintain some ties in both worlds. Additionally, there has emerged an entrepreneurial class, one devoted to the provision of the traditional needs and foodstuffs of these immigrants. Consequent upon this, some Ghanaian immigrant entrepreneurs have recognized the business opportunities that the increase in the size of the community provides (see, e.g., Yeboah 2008; Amankwaa 2004). Thus, one can see several mom-and-pop shops or businesses that have been established in faraway places such as Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio. Even though the profit motive is behind the establishment of these businesses, at the same time they provide a direct link between those in the diaspora
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Home Away from Home: Ghanaian Voluntary and Ethnic Associations Over the past 15–20 years, many Ghanaians have settled in America. Among the Ghanaian community in America, one of the popular things to do is to belong to ethnic/hometown associations or other forms of voluntary associations (church, professional, etc.). As in other parts of the world where Ghanaians can be found, these hometown associations often draw their membership from migrants from the same place of origin or ethnic background. Even though ethnic affiliation is often a criterion for belonging to some of these associations, they do not necessarily rule out interaction with people of other backgrounds. This is to be expected as intermarriages and friendship ties (such as attending the same boarding schools, etc.) has led to the forging of identities and ties that cut across ethnic lines. Thus, despite the goals of the some of these ethnic associations, membership of the group can be viewed as opened or closed. An important feature of these ethnic associations is that most communicate in the local language spoken in the immigrants’ place of birth or origin. Why the need for these voluntary associations in the first place? First, as Ghanaians who have left their ancestral home, these voluntary associations provide members the opportunity to recreate their lost traditional families back home here in America. Second, like with the Ghanaian family, these organizations provide some form of socialization to members, including inculcating the values and culture of their specific cultural group to their children. Third, ethnic organizations such as the Duayaw-Nkwanta Citizens Union tend to come to the aid of their members when the need arises—both in joyful and sad moments. Members often share festive occasions such as births and marriages together and offer support in emergency situations (e.g., deaths, illness, or accidents) by offering community care and visits in some cases. Fourth, some of the ethnic associations have a developmental agenda as well. They help to mobilize their members to support or initiate development projects back home in Ghana. Fifth, at times, members devote attention to economic or political issues facing their areas and serve as a needed pressure group for monitoring socioeconomic developments back home in Ghana. Of the many benevolent roles these associations play, the provision of help for newly arrived immigrants and their families of members in times of distress may be considered one of the most important roles for their existence. For the most part, the various associations that have been formed by the diasporan Ghanaians are run by volunteers and are headed and staffed by officials elected by the membership as a whole. Through group activities, the associations are able to showcase their rich cultural heritage to the second generation and also the larger audience of Americans. More important, they also provide a useful link for Americans wanting to travel to Ghana or learn more about Ghanaian culture and history.
778 | Ghanaian Immigrants
and back home. They are places where Ghanaian foods and produce are transacted between those in Ghana and in the diaspora. More importantly, some of these businesses provide immigrants the opportunities to remit to their folks back home, or start a home—something most of these Ghanaians aspire to back home. One of the areas where the diaspora Ghanaian has contributed in no small way has to do with remittances. Several studies indicate that remittances of Ghanaians in the diaspora account for a significant part of the nongovernmental foreign direct investment. A recent report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that the Ghanaian diaspora, which is estimated to include between 1.5 million and 3 million people, is contributing financially to the well-being of the Ghanaian economy. The report quotes data from the Ghana Central Bank to indicate that Ghanaians abroad contributed about $2 billion in remittances in 2009, a huge increase compared to the $476 million they remitted in 1999. According to Akurang-Parry (2002), Ghanaian expatriates’ remittances to families and loved ones is one of the significant net gains from the brain drain. Diaspora remittances have helped Ghana in several ways as the projects they finance provide jobs for the otherwise jobless masons, electricians, carpenters, and many others in the country. These remittances intended for building projects, community development efforts, and educational and health facilities are the ultimate infrastructure in most rural areas abandoned by the central government, which tends to focus more on the urban areas. More importantly, and in several cases, these remittances to family members back home serve as the main source of income for many rural dwellers. Equally important besides remittances are the symbiotic, collaborative connections that have emerged between home-based Ghanaian professionals and their nonresident counterparts. Apart from books and articles, collaborative work between home-based professionals and expatriates has also been established in some cases. Indeed, several Ghanaian professionals, medical doctors, and university professors have been instrumental in helping to set up various exchange programs between Ghana and American institutions (e.g., the Regional Institute of Population at the University of Ghana and the Pennsylvania State University at State College). Others such as the EO group, for example, have been instrumental in linking up American businesses and their Ghanaian counterparts or the government itself (as is the case with Kosmos of Texas, the company that is involved in Ghana’s nascent oil industry). Thus, there have been some gains for Ghana as a result of the brain-drain.
The Second and Later Generations International migration has emerged as one of the major social forces in the early part of the 21st century and has led to transformations in many societies around the world. In the case of the United States, immigration from Africa is also helping
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to redefine black identities and social relations. Even though very little is known about the second generation of Ghanaians—partly due to the recent nature of their parents immigration and the relative small size of the community; which makes it difficult to get adequate and reliable sample size to study such a group—the limited studies that exist suggest that in terms of education, they may be doing relatively well. For example, like the educational experience of President Barack Obama (son of a Harvard-educated Kenyan father and a white American mother), a typical second-generation African in America is in many ways part of a new phenomenon that some scholars have observed with respect to higher education among black Americans—it has been noted that about 13 person of black students in elite colleges are first- or second-generation African immigrant such as Ghanaians. How these second-generation Ghanaian Americans will identify or relate to the mother country (Ghana) over time will need to be studied in the coming years. Will they see themselves as Americans first and Ghanaians second? Will they continue the tradition of remitting to relations back in Ghana or building homes in Ghana (something many first-generation Ghanaian immigrants cherish)?
Toward the Future Political boundaries that differentiate one African country from another have made it somewhat difficult to travel from one part of the continent to another. Despite the difficulties, the majority of African population movements are within the African region itself. Increasingly, this pattern is changing as there has been a significant increase in the number of Africans, including Ghanaians, who have moved beyond the borders of Africa to seek their fortunes in America. The new trend is attributed to a host of interrelated factors, including changing U.S. immigration policies that have eliminated restrictive laws, and growing economic and political problems in Africa that serve as a push factor for emigration. Overall, Ghana’s share of the total African immigrant population in the United States has increased over the past couple of decades. Still, the community is a recent development, given that very few have deep roots in America, if we define “roots” to imply years of residence in America. Going beyond the debate about the braindrain that has dominated the discourse on African immigrations in recent years, one can observe the diversity that is evident among the Ghanaian community as it encompasses all age and socioeconomic groupings. Finally, and as is also true with many new immigrant groups, these Ghanaians so far still see themselves as Ghanaians. They have, for the most part, not forgotten about their roots and have maintained and continued to maintain a strong attachment to their home country and have been engaged in some of the sociopolitical developments currently underway in Ghana. They continue to participate in the activities of the home country through several means, including remitting, joining political groupings, and
780 | Ghanaian Immigrants
A 19-Year-Old Scholar-Athlete Kofi Sarkodie is a junior at the University of Akron, Ohio, and is a soccer player for the highly ranked University of Akron Team called the Zips. Kofi played in the 2009 NCAA finals for the No. 1–ranked Zips soccer team that went to the finals last year. He also featured for the Zips soccer team that won the Mid-Atlantic Conference Champions in its 2009 season during his sophomore year. Kofi Sarkodie was born to Ghanaian immigrant parents and grew up outside of Dayton, Ohio. Even though his parents, Amaning and Olivia Sarkodie, are originally from Kumasi, Kofi (like his senior brother Ofori, also a soccer player) was born in the United University of Akron’s Kofi Sarkodie points to States. the sky after scoring during an NCAA college According to Kevin Crater, a soccer match against Michigan, December sportswriter for the Akron Bu10, 2010. (AP Photo/Mark J. Terrill) chetlite (the student newspaper), Kofi is a versatile player as he can play in the back and the midfield and also as a forward player. Kofi has represented the United States in various capacities; including being a member of its Youth National team. He spent the summer of 2008 competing in South America with the U-18 national team that played in the U-17 World Cup. Beyond his soccer skills, Kofi is a scholar-athlete as well. He is a member of the University of Akron’s Honors College. The prestigious Honors College caters primarily to highly motivated and achieving students who have demonstrated their abilities to excel. Only students with high GPAs are admitted into the honors program. He is quite sociable and gets along well with colleagues and faculty alike. Kofi Sarkodie aims to turn pro after college and anticipates a professional soccer career after graduating from Akron.
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also participating in voluntary organizations. To the extent that this high degree of engagement will continue is something one cannot easily predict—even though it may be relevant for future discourse on engagements with the mother country— especially with respect to the issue of remittances, which has become a major source of revenue to Ghana. However, as the first generation, with its strong attachment to Ghana, gets older and passes on, their children may be less likely to see themselves as Ghanaians to the extent that their parents viewed themselves but rather they may be more likely to see themselves as simply African Americans. If this occurs, perhaps these second- and third-generation Ghanaian Americans may be less likely to be so involved in some of the activities that their first-generation parents have been engaged in while here (e.g., homeownership in Ghana and remitting to family members back home). This could in turn change the nature of the relationship between those in the diaspora and in Ghana itself. As the community becomes bigger and more established, there are several unknown areas of study to be explored. For example, it is not clear how the second generation will feel about their ties to Ghana. Many first-generation Ghanaians in the United States also encounter racial discrimination; however, their attitudes toward race at times may be somewhat different from those of black Americans— given their different historical experiences. Studies are needed to understand how these attitudes affect their adaptation and acculturation into American society. Looking ahead, there is the need for valuable studies that provide in-depth analyses of a host of issues facing the Ghanaian community as they integrate into American society.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 110 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009
782
Region and country of birth Total Ghana
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
4,339
4,023
4,248
4,410
5,337
6,491
9,367
7,610
8,195
8,401
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 111 Trends in international migrant stock, Ghana 1990
1995
Estimated number of international migrants at mid-year
716,527
1,038,349
1,504,715
Estimated number of refugees at mid-year
4,102
98,433
12,991
47,795
39,948
Population at mid-year (thousands)
2000
2005 1,669,267
2010 1,851,814
14,968
17,246
19,529
21,915
24,333
Estimated number of female migrants at mid-year
317,902
447,152
628,951
697,731
774,034
Estimated number of male migrants at mid-year
398,625
591,197
875,764
971,536
1,077,780
International migrants as a percentage of the population Female migrants as percentage of all international migrants Refugees as a percentage of international migrants
Annual rate of change of the migrant stock (%)
4.8
6.0
7.7
7.6
7.6
44.4
43.1
41.8
41.8
41.8
0.6
9.5
0.9
2.9
2.2
1990–1995
1995–2000
2000–2005
2005–2010
7.4
7.4
2.1
2.1
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). The 2008 Revision, United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008.
783
Table 112 The distribution of refugees in Ghana by country of origin, 2001–2008 Country of origin
784
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Liberia
8,865
28,298
42,466
40,853
38,684
35,653
26,967
15,797
Sierra Leone
1,998
4,316
943
632
125
103
101
132
Sudan
16
23
3
12
579
600
595
392
Togo
842
819
534
542
14,136
8,517
7,243
1,796
Other
70
48
1
14
13
65
52
89
11,791
33,504
43,947
42,053
53,537
44,938
34,958
18,206
Total Source: IOM (2009, Table 15).
Table 113 Ghanaians living in Europe and North America, 1999–2006 Emigrants
Year
UK
96,650
2006
USA
67,190
2000
Italy
34,499
2005
Germany
20,636
2004
Canada
17,070
2001
Netherlands
12,196
2007
Spain
12,068
2006
France
4,096
1999
Source: IOM (2009, Table 20)
Table 114 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence region/country: Ghana Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
8,401
4,371
4,030
57
31
26
California
257
129
128
Colorado
151
82
69
Connecticut
203
110
93
Florida
156
89
67
Georgia
465
257
208
Illinois
301
149
152
Maryland
692
338
354
Massachusetts
Arizona
498
240
258
Michigan
73
35
38
Minnesota
154
77
77
New Jersey
745
384
361
New York
1,926
983
943
North Carolina
216
119
97
Ohio
538
308
230
Pennsylvania
251
125
126
Texas
323
176
147
Virginia
605
294
311
Washington Other
86
44
42
704
401
303
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009. Cobbook 82. 2010.
785
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics
Table 115 Ghanaians living in America
Total number of Africans
1980
1990
2000
Total
155,444
226,929
498,927
881,300
9,935
15,950
39,685
65,570
Total number of Ghanaians As a percent of all Africans
6.4
7.0
8.0
7.4
Source: Author’s Analysis of U.S. 2000 Census Data.
Table 116 When they came: Ghanaians in America 2000 Number
Percent
All Ghanaians Entered between 1990 and 2000
65,570 39,685
100.0 60.5
Entered between 1980 and 1989
15,960
24.3
9,935
15.2
Entered before 1980 Source: Author’s analysis of U.S. 2000 Census Data.
Table 117 Educational attainment of Ghanaians in America, 2000 Number Educational attainment (population 25 years and over)
Percent
53,245
100.0
Less than 9th grade
2,010
3.8
9th to 12th grade, no diploma
4,680
8.8
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
13,665
25.7
Some college, no degree
10,505
19.7
Associate degree
5,570
10.5
Bachelor’s degree
9,000
16.9
Graduate or professional degree
7,815
14.7
Percent high school graduate or higher
87.4
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher
31.6
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations (STP-159).
Table 118 Occupational distribution of Ghanaian immigrants in America, 1972–2000 Period 1972-1977 Annual average flow
1978-1989
237
1990-2000
528
1,271
Occupation (percent) Professional, managerial, and technical
40.8
28.3
Sales and adminstrative support
21.3
18.5
16.5
6.7
9.1
18.8
18.1
18.1
7.8
0.4
1.0
2.3
Precisiion, production, craft, and repair Operators, fabricators, and laborers Farming, forestry, and fishing Service occupations Total
31.7
12.7
25
22.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Source: Lobo (2006, Table 11.2)
Table 119 Marital status and household structure of Ghanaians in America, 2000 Number
Percent
61,400
100.0
Never married
17,065
27.8
Now married, excluding separated
34,975
57.0
Separated
3,515
5.7
Widowed
1,030
1.7
Female
820
1.3
Divorced
4,820
7.9
Female
2,070
3.4
30,010
100.0
20,820
69.4
13,495
45.0
14,180
47.3
9,685
32.3
3,515
11.7
24,50
8.2
9,190
30.6
6,900
23.0
Panel I Marital status Population 15 years and over
Panel II Households by type Total households Family households (families) With own children under 18 years Married-couple family With own children under 18 years Female householder, no husband present With own children under 18 years Nonfamily households Householder living alone. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations (STP-159).
Table 120 Household income of Ghanaians in America, 2000 Number
Percent
30,010
100
Less than $10,000
2,495
8.3
$10,000 to $14,999
1,410
4.7
$15,000 to $24,999
3,875
12.9
$25,000 to $34,999
4,335
14.4
$35,000 to $49,999
5,380
17.9
$50,000 to $74,999
6,370
21.2
$75,000 to $99,999
2,930
9.8
$100,000 to $149,999
2,230
7.4
$150,000 to $199,999
550
1.8
$200,000 or more
430
1.4
Income in 1999 Households
Median household income (dollars)
42,016
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations (STP-159).
Table 121 U.S. citizenship and period of entry, Ghanaians in America 2000
Total population
Number
Percent
65,570
100.0
U.S. citizenship and period of U.S. entry Naturalized U.S. citizen
20,655
31.5
Entered 1990 to 2000
4,210
6.4
Entered 1980 to 1989
8,945
13.6
Entered before 1980
7505
11.4
44,915
68.5
Entered 1990 to 2000
35,475
54.1
Entered 1980 to 1989
7,015
10.7
Entered before 1980
2,430
3.7
Not a U.S. citizen
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations (STP-159).
Appendix III: Notable Ghanaian Americans | 789 Table 122 Classes of admission, African immigrants to the United States by country of birth and period of arrival Annual average changes between
Annual average immigrant flow 1972–1977
1978–1989
1990–2000
1972–1977
1978–1989 Growth
Africa
7,420
15,466
35,080
8,046
100.0
Family
4,356
11,340
16,953
6,984
86.8
Employment
2,751
2,029
3,693
−722
−9.0
204
17,78
4,896
1,574
19.6
0
10
9,178
10
0.1
370
989
3,135
619
100.0
287
861
1,661
574
92.7
80
100
176
20
3.2
Refugee
0
8
44
8
1.3
Diversity
0
0
1,215
0
0.0
Refugee Diversity Ghana Family Employment
Source: Lobo (2006, Table 11.1).
Appendix III: Notable Ghanaian Americans Freddy Adu was top overall pick in the 2004 Major League Soccer draft for D.C. United. Adu represented the United States at the World under 17 and under 20 soccer cups. Indeed, he was the youngest person to play for the U.S. national soccer team when the United States played against Canada in January 2006. His soccer abilities made him one of the world’s most sought after players by the time he was 13. Reverend Bismarck Akomeah is the pastor of Jesus Power Assembly of God Church in Columbus, Ohio. He was ordained a reverend minister by the Ohio District Council of Assemblies of God in September of 2005. In that same year, the Jesus Power Assembly of God was recognized as one of the 14 Transformational churches by the General Council of Assembly of God, USA. Under his stewardship, his church has grown tremendously. He has also opened affiliate branches of his church in Atlanta, Georgia, and Cincinnati, Ohio. Not only that, he has also opened Swahili and French churches in Columbus, Ohio, and membership in his churches includes people from Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Tanzania, Haiti, St. Lucia, the United States, and Ghana.
790 | Ghanaian Immigrants
Professor Kwame Anthony Appiah was born in London to a Ghanaian father and a British mother. He moved to Ghana as a young child. He is currently a professor of philosophy at Princeton University in New Jersey and a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Prior to his current post, he taught at Duke University and also at Harvard. Professor Appiah has published widely in African and African American literary and cultural studies. His published works include the following: In My Father’s House, Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race, and Bu Me Bé: Proverbs of the Akan (co-edited with his mother). He has served on several boards, including the American Academy in Berlin, and was a trustee of Ashesi University College in Accra, Ghana, until 2009. Professor George Ayitteh is currently a distinguished Economist in Residence at the American University. And also the president of the Free Africa Foundation, a think tank devoted to reforms in Africa. He earned a B.Sc. degree from the University of Ghana, Legon; and an M.A. from the University of Western Ontario. He also holds a Ph.D. from the University of Manitoba in Canada. Among his publications are the following: Africa Betrayed, The Blueprint For Ghana’s Economic Recovery, Africa In Chaos, and Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Development. Kofi Boateng is the director of the Africa-America Institute in New York City. His undergraduate degrees are from Yale University. He also has an M.S. degree from Northeastern University Graduate School of Professional Accounting. He is a certified public accountant, a chartered life underwriter, and a chartered financial consultant. He is a member of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. He is an active member in the Ghanaian diaspora community. Dr. Kwame Bawuah Edusei is a medical practitioner, and he was Ghana’s Ambassador to the United States (2004–2008). He holds an M.D. from the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana. After completing his M.D., he proceeded to the United States, where he did his medical residency in family medicine at the Howard University Hospital in Washington, D.C. Prior to his appointment as ambassador to the United States, he served as a medical practitioner, businessman, and humanitarian both in Ghana and in the United States. Dr. Ave Kludze is one of NASA’s top strategists and engineers. He had his early education at Adisadel College in Cape Coast, from where he proceeded to the Rutgers University of New Jersey to further his studies. After receiving his bachelor of science degree in electrical and computer engineering, he proceeded to the John Hopkins University, where he obtained his master’s of science degree in engineering. For nearly 15 years he has helped develop
Glossary | 791
and launch spacecraft for NASA. He has also worked at NASA’s Langley Research Center in Virginia and the NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland. George Y. Owusu co-founded the EO Group, which deals with oil-related services. The EO group is a shareholder in Ghana’s nascent oil industry. Mr. Owusu served as the representative for Kosmos Energy in Ghana. Ms. Rose Quarshie is the current executive secretary general of the National Council of Ghanaian Associations (NCOGA). NCOGA is an umbrella organization that represents various associations of Ghanaians living outside Ghana. It serves as a clearing house for many Ghanaian ethnic and non-ethnic organizations (e.g., hometown associations) in America. Dr. David Sam is president of Elgin County Community College (Chicago). He attended Mfantsipim Secondary School in Cape Coast before enrolling for his undergraduate degree from the Illinois State University. He also holds a Ph.D. in international economics and political relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, an M.B.A. from the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, and a J.D. degree from the University of Akron Law School. Before his current position, he was the president of North Harris College in Houston (Texas) and dean of the Community and Technical College (now Summit College) at the University of Akron, Ohio. He also served as the vice-president for faculty and instruction at Harrisburg Area Community College in Pennsylvania.
Glossary Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC): The military junta that overthrew the political administration in Ghana in 1979. The junta was led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. It ruled for a short period and handed over power to the civilian administration after conducting what it termed a house-cleaning exercise. Aliens Compliance Order: An act promulgated in November 1969 that required foreign nationals in Ghana to either obtain residential and working permits or face deportation. The period subsequent to the passage of the law saw many foreign nationals leaving the country. Akans: People who speak the Akan (Twi) language. The Akans are the largest ethnic group in Ghana. Thus, a significant number of Ghanaians speak or understand the Akan language. Economic and political saboteurs: A term used to describe people whose actions were thought to have brought about economic stagnation and political instability in
792 | Ghanaian Immigrants
Ghana during the military regimes in that country. These people experienced a lot of persecutions and had to run away from the country. Ethnic associations: Nonprofit social- or ethnic-based organizations formed by the Ghanaian immigrant community (e.g., Duayaw-Nkwanta Citizen Unions of the United States and Canada). These ethnic groupings maintain their respective ethnic cultural identity. Ghanaian diaspora: The Ghanaian community residing outside Ghana. The majority of the Ghanaian diaspora can be found in Europe and recently North America, especially Canada and the United States. Recently there has been considerable number of Ghanaians living in Asia and the pacific regions. The Ghanaian diaspora still maintain strong ties to their home country. Inland kingdoms: The traditional ethnic states of the precolonial era. Notable among these kingdoms were the Ashanti, the Bono, the Gonja, and the Akims. These kingdoms still exist and function alongside the modern constitutional system. Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC): A revolutionary group led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, who overthrew the civilian administration in 1981. It ruled Ghana until 1992, when Ghana returned to civilian administration. State-owned enterprises (SOEs): These are businesses owned and run by the Ghanaian government. Most of these enterprises were established after political independence. In the early years of the 1980s, most of these government-owned businesses were considered inefficient due to large size of employees, corruption, and political interference.
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References | 795 Mullan, Fitzhugh. 2007. “Doctors and Soccer Players—African Professionals on the Move.” New England Journal of Medicine 356(5): 440–43. Nieswand, Boris. 2005. “Development and Diasporas: Ghana and Its Migrants.” Sociologus 59: 17–32. Oheneba-Sakyi, Yaw, and Baffour K. Takyi, eds. 2006. African Families at the Turn of the 21st Century. Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood. Orozco, Manuel. 2005. Diasporas, Development and Transnational Integration: Ghanaians in the U.S., U.K., and Germany. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of International Migration and Inter-American Dialogue. Owusu, Thomas. 1998. “To Buy or Not to Buy Determinants of Home Ownership among Ghanaian Immigrants in Toronto.” Canadian Geographer 42(1): 40–52. Owusu, Thomas. 2003. “Transnationalism among African Immigrants in North America: The Case of Ghanaians in Canada.” Journal of International Migration and Integration 4: 395–413. Ozden, Caglar, and Maurice Schiff, eds. 2006. International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain. Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank. Pedraza, Silvia. 2000. “Beyond Black and White.” Social Science History 24: 697–726. Peil, Margaret. 1995. “Ghanaians Abroad.” African Affairs 94: 345–67. Roberts, Sam. 2005. “More Africans Enter U.S. than in Days of Slavery.” New York Times. February 21: A1. Rumbaut, R. 1994. “Origins and Destinies: Immigration to the U.S. since World War II.” Sociological Forum 9(4): 583–22. Saravia, Nancy G., and Juan Francisco Miranda. 2004 “Plumbing the Brain Drain.” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 82: 608–15. Takougang, J. 1995. “Recent African Immigrants to the U.S.: A Historical Perspective.” Western Journal of Black Studies 19(1): 50–57. Takyi, Baffour K. 2000. “The African Diaspora: A Socio-Demographic Portrait of the Ghanaian Migrant Community in America.” Ghana Studies Journal 2: 35–56. Takyi, Baffour K. 2002. “The Making of the Second Diaspora: Emigration from Africa to the United States and Its Policy Implications.” Western Journal of Black Studies 26: 32–43. Takyi, Baffour K. 2009. Africans Abroad: Comparative Perspectives on America’s Postcolonial West Africans. In The New African Diaspora, edited by Isidore Okpewho and Nkiru Nzegwu, 236–54. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Takyi, Baffour K., and Kwame Safo Boate. 2006. “Location and Settlement Patterns of African Immigrants in the United States: Demographic and Spatial Context.” In The New African Diaspora in North America, edited by Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, Baffour K. Takyi and John Arthur, 50–67. Lanham, MD: Lexington. Takyi, Baffour K., and Francis N. A. Dodoo. 2005. “Gender, Lineage, and Fertility-Related Outcomes in Ghana.” Journal of Marriage and Family 67: 251–57.
796 | Ghanaian Immigrants Taylor, Linnet. 2009. Return Migrants in Ghana. Southampton, UK: Institute for Public Policy Research. Ter Haar, G. 1998. Halfway to Paradise: African Christians in Europe. Cardiff, Wales: Cardiff Academic Press. Terrazas, Aaron. 2009. African Immigrants in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute. U.S. Census Bureau. 2000. Census 2000 Special Tabulations (STP-159) Table FBP-1 to 3. Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics: 2000—Ghana. U.S. Census Bureau. 2007. American Community Survey 2007, Public Use Microdata, Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2010. Office of Immigration Statistics (Table 3). Waters, Mary. 1994. “Ethnic and Racial Identities of 2nd-Generation Black Immigrants in New York City.” International Migration Review 28(4): 795–820. Waters, Mary. 1999. Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Woldemikael, Tekle. 1996. Ethiopians and Eritreans. In Refugees in America in the 1990s, edited by David W. Haines, 147–69. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Yeboah, Ian E. A. 2008. Black African Neo-Diaspora: Ghanaian Immigrant Experiences in the Greater Cincinnati, Ohio Area. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Zachariah, K., and J. Conde. 1981. Migration in West Africa: Demographic Aspects. New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank. Zeleza, Paul T. 2005. “Rewriting the African Diaspora: Beyond the Black Atlantic.” Affairs 104: 35–68. Zeleza, Paul T. 2009. “Diaspora Dialogues: Engagement between Africa and its Diaspora.” In The New African Diaspora, edited by Isidore Okpewho and Nkiru Nzegwu, 31–58. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Further Reading Kent, Mary Mederios. 2007. “Immigration and America’s Black Population.” Population Bulletin 62: 1–17. In this bulletin, the author who is senior demographic and editor of the Population Bulletin series analyzes current data to provide a portrait of immigrants from predominantly black countries in the United States. The author argues that recent immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean are a growing component of the U.S. population and are helping to transform racial and ethnic identities in the United States. Even though these immigrants are far outnumbered by nonblack Hispanic and Asian immigrants, Mary Kent argues that the number of black immigrants is growing at a remarkable rate. She notes that more than one-fourth of the black population in New York, Boston, and Miami is foreign born. Overall, this issue of the Population Bulletin looks at black immigrants to
Further Reading | 797 the United States—what countries they are coming from, which states and metro areas they are living in, and what factors have affected their entry into the United States. Konadu-Agyemang, K., Baffour K. Takyi, and John Arthur, eds. 2006. The New African Diaspora in North America: Trends, Community Building and Adaptation. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. The authors of this edited volume have written extensively about recent African immigrants in America. Most of the contributors to this volume are social scientists from Africa who now work either in the United States or Canada. After an overview and a discussion of the theoretical debates about the causes of international migration as relates to Africans, the various chapters shed some light on the factors behind the increasing wave in African immigration to the United States and Canada; the socioeconomic characteristics of African immigrants; and their spatial distribution, obstacles, and adjustments patterns. Okpewho, Isidore, and Nkiru Nzegwu, eds. 2009. The New African Diaspora. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. This edited volume looks at the contemporary African immigrant in America. The book is the result of a symposium held at the Department of African Studies at Binghamton University in 2006 that dealt with the voluntary relocations or migrations of postcolonial Africans. The contributors, most of whom are African immigrants themselves, bring their own knowledge and firsthand experiences to discuss the new African diaspora. Ter Haar, G. 1998. Halfway to Paradise: African Christians in Europe. Cardiff, Wales: Cardiff Academic Press. For a variety of reasons, many Africans have left the continent to pursue their dreams outside Africa. The increased emigration has come at a time of an expanding Christianity in Africa. This book by Professor Gerrie Ter Haar, who has written extensively about religion in Ghana and Africa as a whole, looks at the growth of African Christian communities on the European continent (as a result of international migration). Her focus is on the large and growing Ghanaian immigrant community in the Netherlands, where several African-led churches, mostly founded by Ghanaians, have sprung up, particularly in the main cities. After providing a brief history of African migration to Europe, the book examines some of the African-led churches in the Netherlands, using data gathered in Ghana in 1994, and in the Netherlands since mid-1992. The book also examines the relationship that exist between the Dutch and African churches, pointing out that there is a general reluctance in both churches and other theological circles to enter into meaningful contact with African Christians and vice versa. Yeboah, Ian E. A. 2008. Black African Neo-Diaspora: Ghanaian Immigrant Experiences in the Greater Cincinnati, Ohio Area. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. This book is an intensive study of the experiences of one specific African immigrant group, Ghanaians living in Cincinnati, Ohio. Yeboah looks at how Ghanaians in Cincinnati are renegotiating the nexus of Ghanaian and American cultures. He presents issues of migration trajectory, associational life, gender renegotiation, business experiences, and second-generation socialization.
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Guatemalan Immigrants by Timothy Steigenga and Sandra Lazo de la Vega
Introduction Poverty is a fact of life for the majority of Guatemalans. The U.N. reports that 43 percent of children in Guatemala under the age of five suffer from chronic malnutrition. According to the 2009 Human Development Report, per capita GDP in Guatemala is $4,562, or approximately one-tenth of the $45,592 per capita GDP in the United States (United Nations Human Development Programme 2009). This figure is also less than one-third of the average annual per capita income reported for Guatemalans living in the United States (American Community Survey [ACS] 2008). Furthermore, Guatemala has a large and historically marginalized indigenous population. In Guatemala opportunities for upward social mobility for indigenous people are few. Given this scenario, it is not surprising that Guatemala ranks third in the list of countries sending undocumented migrants to the United States. Nearly 1 in 10 Guatemalans lives in the United States today. Despite the relatively high numbers, elusiveness is one of the primary defining characteristics of the Guatemalan community in the United States. Because many Guatemalan migrants work in informal or migratory labor settings, live in neighborhoods that generally are intermixed with other Central American and Mexican immigrants, and are reported under different ethnic and geographic categories in various surveys, generating specific numbers on Guatemalan migration to the United States is far from a precise science. Despite these limitations, this chapter provides a general overview of the best available data on the history, profile, challenges, and accomplishments of Guatemalans living in the United States.
Chronology 1821
Independence from Spain: Central American countries (including Guatemala) declare independence from Spain and form the United Provinces of Central America.
1838
The United Provinces of Central America break up into different countries due to a civil war. 799
Chronology | 801
1870
Coffee becomes Guatemala’s biggest export. During the Liberal Era that followed independence, exports of raw goods were a motor for development. In Guatemala exportproduction agriculture was focused on coffee, which continues to be the case until today.
1944
Jorge Ubico, dictator since 1931, is ousted by a coup d’état ushering in Guatemala’s “ten years of spring.”
1954
Jacobo Arbenz is ousted by a coup d’état backed by the CIA and the United Fruit Company.
1960
Civil war begins in Guatemala: Large portions of the population, especially the Maya, were displaced by the military. Over 40,000 Guatemalans fled their country during a war in which an estimated 200,000 were killed.
1976
Thousands die in a major earthquake that does great damage to the country’s infrastructure. Migration out of Guatemala spikes following this earthquake.
1982–1983
Evangelical military general Efrain Rios Montt becomes president following a military coup, ushering in one of the bloodiest periods of the war.
1991
The American Baptist Churches (ABC) Settlement Agreement is reached, following a lawsuit filed against the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) claiming discrimination against Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees and asylum seekers. Guatemalans who had been present in the United States prior to 1990 become eligible to have their asylum claims revisited.
1996
Peace accords are signed, officially ending the civil war.
1997
The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) passed in the United States, allowing Guatemalans protected under the ABC Settlement to apply for legal permanent resident status in the United States.
1998
Hurricane Mitch hits Guatemala. The Recovery of Historical Memory (REMHI) report is released with statements from thousands of victims of repression during the civil war placing the blame for the vast majority of the violations on the government and the army. Bishop Juan José Gerardi is murdered two days after announcing the results of the report.
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2001
The coffee crisis hits Guatemala: the prices for coffee, Guatemala’s main export, drop to their lowest level in decades (below the cost of production).
2005
Hurricane Stan hits Guatemala.
2006
The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) enters into effect in Guatemala.
2008
Nearly 300 Guatemalan immigrants are arrested in the largest immigration raid in U.S. history in a kosher meatpacking plant in Postville, Iowa. Families are abruptly separated, and those arrested are processed and deported within days of the raid. Controversy about the way in which the authorities handled the situation is cited as one of the reasons the Obama administration subsequently moved away from workplace immigration enforcement strategies.
2010
In December the number of Guatemalans deported from the United States reaches a new record of more than 28,051 during 2010.
Background Geography of Guatemala Guatemala’s national territory spans a little over 40,000 square miles in Central America. It shares an extensive border with Mexico to the northwest, and smaller borders with Belize to the northeast and with Honduras and El Salvador to the south. Guatemala has a relatively small Caribbean coast and a much larger Pacific coast region. Approximately one-third of Guatemala is mountainous. The Cuchumatan mountain range in the western region of the country is the most rugged portion of the Guatemalan territory and is home to a majority of Guatemala’s indigenous people (Handy 1984, 16). The ruggedness of the Cuchumatan mountains allows for a type of geographic isolation between villages or municipios within the Western Highlands. Due in part to this isolation, there are 22 different Mayan languages spoken today (Montejo 1999, 3). The Pacific coast is also an important geographical feature of Guatemala’s history of migration. Historically, peasants from the highlands migrated to the coast to work on seasonal crops of coffee, sugarcane, and corn (Handy 1984, 17). During the colonial period, indigenous people were forced to migrate with the crops, but after the colonial period, the system of seasonal migration to the coast became a standard survival strategy for highland farmers facing a shortage of land and poor crops (Piedrasanta 2007, 95–96).
Background | 803
Unlike the other regions of Guatemala, the lowlands of El Petén are not primarily agricultural. Rather, these lowlands are a tropical rainforest. Historically, this region has produced certain types of wood and rubber, and there has also been some limited production of oil (Handy 1984, 17). This area of the country is also the least densely populated area. In the past, the Petén region has been a destination for internal migrants in Guatemala. People came to the region following the different boom cycles (rubber, wood, etc.) and to work in construction. Guatemala’s geography has played an important role in its development and migratory history because the country is exposed and particularly vulnerable to multiple forms of natural disasters. Within Guatemala’s mountains there are over 30 volcanoes, 4 of which are currently active. Guatemala’s territory, which is divided between three plate tectonics, makes it prone to frequent tremors and earthquakes (Instituto Nacional de Sismología 2010). A spike in migration followed the particularly devastating earthquake that struck close to the capital city in 1976, killing thousands and destroying much of the country’s infrastructure. Guatemala’s location in the Caribbean also makes it vulnerable to hurricanes, frequent flooding, and landslides. Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and Hurricane Stan in 2005 caused massive flooding, landslides, thousands of deaths, and millions of dollars worth of damages (Reynoso, Castellanos, and Orantes 2005).
History of Guatemala Prior to the arrival of the Spanish, the present-day Guatemalan territory was dominated by the Maya empire. The Maya were accomplished mathematicians, astronomers, and architects. The Maya empire, however, was already in decline when the Spanish arrived. The Spanish encountered internal conflict between different ethnic and linguistic groups in Guatemala. They took advantage of these divisions and made strategic alliances with different groups to carry out the conquest. Robert Trudeau (2000, 497) explains that the Spanish attacked the Maya three ways: with war, with disease, and with cultural disruption. The Spanish were able to conquer Guatemala and remained in power for over three hundred years. In 1821, the Central American States declared their independence from the Spanish crown and formed the Federation of Central American States. This union was short-lived, as the modern Central American states broke away from the federation soon after its formation. The postcolonial period was a struggle of power between the conservatives and the liberals. Political power shifted from one side to the other, but the indigenous remained marginalized, subject to abuse and debt peonage long after the colonial period. Guatemala was dominated by a series of military rulers for years. In 1931, General Jorge Ubico was elected president. Ubico came from a wealthy family, and his
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rise through the ranks of the military was accompanied by praise from representatives of the United States in Guatemala. As president, Ubico signed an agreement with the United States that allowed coffee and bananas to enter the United States duty-free. The main benefactor of this agreement was the United Fruit Company (Handy 1984, 94). By this time, the United Fruit Company had an overpowering presence in Guatemala, controlling the majority of agricultural land and the railroad systems, among other key assets. Over time Ubico began to lose public support both within the country and from the United States. Facing violent protests of students, professionals, and young military officers in 1944, Ubico resigned and fled Guatemala (Handy 1984, 103). The decade that followed Ubico’s overthrow is often referred to as the “ten years of spring” because Guatemala witnessed greater political freedoms and progress in the areas of labor rights and land reform. In 1945, civilian Juan José Arévalo was elected to the presidency of Guatemala. Arévalo and his successor, Jacobo Arbenz, put several progressive measures into effect. These actions provoked strong criticism from the traditional elites. Arbenz’s plan for agrarian reform also encountered strong opposition from the United Fruit Company, backed by the United States, which understood the land reform as a threat to private ownership within the context of the Cold War. In 1954 after a decade of reform, a coup d’état (in which the CIA was a major actor) overthrew the Arbenz government (Schleisinger and Kinzer 1982). The events surrounding the 1954 coup created an environment that contributed to the Guatemalan civil war and initiated a series of military governments that would last into the 1980s. The civil war began in the early 1960s and officially ended with the signing of the 1996 peace accords. The primary conflict of the civil war was between a group of leftist guerrilla movements who eventually joined to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) and the right-wing militarized state. A series of military leaders dominated Guatemalan politics, crushing any form of opposition from the political left. Paramilitary squads were used throughout this period to terrorize political opponents. Efraín Rios Montt was president during one of the deadliest periods of the war (1982–1983). A born-again evangelical Christian and retired officer from the Guatemalan army, Rios Montt launched a counterinsurgency campaign to suppress support for the URNG in the rural areas of Guatemala. As part of this campaign, entire villages were destroyed and tens of thousands of people, especially the rural Maya, were killed or disappeared (Montejo 1999). As Maya anthropologist Victor Montejo recalls: “the army’s intent was to kill all suspected guerillas, and all Mayas were suspect” (52). The army created “model villages” that were modeled after strategic hamlets used by the United States in the Vietnam War. Tens of thousands of displaced Maya were forced to leave Guatemala as refugees. The persecution and displacement of the Maya during the civil war played a major role in the chain of migration to the United States.
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Though civilian control of the executive returned with the election of Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo in 1986, the military remains a very strong presence in Guatemala. The 1996 peace accords officially ended the internal conflict and the URNG laid down its arms and became a political party. However, concerns about the impunity of former military leaders, growing violence, and the overall stability of the democratic process in Guatemala remain. In 1998, shortly after announcing the findings of a major inquiry that found the military to be responsible for most of the human rights violations that occurred during the war, Bishop Juan José Gerardi was bludgeoned to death in the garage of his home. Three military officers and a priest were eventually convicted for the crime in 2001. Today, Guatemala continues to struggle to remain stable. As of March 2010, Alfonso Portillo, who was president from 2000 to 2004, was awaiting trial on charges of embezzlement and money laundering (Malkin 2010). Álvaro Colom (who became president on January of 2008) faced a short-lived political crisis in May of 2009, when, after the assassination of Rodrigo Rosenberg, a prominent Guatemalan lawyer, a video surfaced in which Rosenberg stated that he believed that he was going to be assassinated by orders of Colom and his associates.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration Until the late 1970s, migration from Guatemala was minimal and characterized primarily by upper- and middle-class Ladinos (Hong 2000, 767). However, following the 1976 earthquake and the subsequent forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of indigenous peoples in the civil war, immigration expanded rapidly, and Guatemala became the second-largest immigrant sending country in Central America (ACS 2008). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that following the earthquake, migration to the United States increased steadily in the following decades so that by 1990 the number of Guatemalans in the United States was five times greater than in 1980 (IOM 2003, 2). One major cause of the increase in migration was the internal conflict in Guatemala. The indigenous population was routinely targeted and persecuted as the military destroyed or relocated entire indigenous villages in the 1980s. Looking for safety, Guatemalan refugees fled to Mexico, the United States, and Canada throughout the conflict.
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separatism The initial flow of post-1980 Guatemalan migrants was made up of primarily Mayan war refugees. For the most part, these migrants gravitated to cities and agricultural areas that already had established Latino communities. Los Angeles,
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Houston, Chicago, New York, Washington, D.C., and some rural communities such as Indiantown and Immokalee in South Florida were early areas of settlement for Guatemalan immigrants. These early Mayan immigrants faced a host of daunting obstacles to the process of assimilation and acceptance. Because Spanish was not the first language of many of these individuals (and many did not speak or understand Spanish at all), early interactions with political and legal authorities, aid organizations, and even other Hispanic groups were strained and characterized by sometimes tragic misunderstandings. Allan Burns (2000, 166) recounts the story of a young Mayan mother in Indiantown, Florida, who was picked up by police and questioned while traveling to a clinic for treatment for postpartum depression. Unable to understand her, authorities placed her under psychiatric care claiming that she was “speaking in tongues” and held her for two weeks until she was located by someone from Indiantown. Such experiences were not uncommon for early Mayan migrants. Language issues were further complicated by fear and mistrust of political and legal authorities among early Mayan immigrants. After experiencing severe political violence at the hands of both Guatemalan and Mexican security forces (according to Eisenman et al. 2003, a full 7% of the Guatemalan migrants they studied in Los Angeles were victims of torture), many immigrants sought to avoid any interactions that would bring them in contact with law enforcement or any political authorities. Crimes against Guatemalans frequently went unreported, and when Mayan immigrants did come into contact with immigration or other law enforcement representatives, fear and communication issues frequently led to incarceration or even deportation. Language and cultural issues also impacted Mayan relations with other Hispanic groups. Mayan immigrants are frequently stereotyped as backward or unsophisticated by other Latinos. In some cases, other Latinos in positions as labor contractors, public notaries, or other intermediary roles actively exploited the new Mayan immigrants. Without their own established networks of support and immersed in communities with large Latino populations, Guatemalan migrants were both extremely vulnerable and largely invisible during the early stages of Guatemalan migration.
Later Waves of Immigration There were three important pieces of legislation that impacted Guatemalan immigration in the 1980s and early 1990s: the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the American Baptist Churches settlement (ABC), and the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). In 1986, the IRCA made it illegal to knowingly recruit or hire immigrants who were not authorized to work in the United States, but it also allowed undocumented immigrants who were in the
Demographic Profile | 807
country before January 1, 1982 (as well as some agricultural workers who came to the United States after that date) to apply to adjust their status. The IRCA benefited over 59,000 Guatemalans (Smith 2006). The second important piece of legislation is the ABC settlement. Post-1976 immigration was initially driven by the internal conflict. Unfortunately the cases of many Guatemalans seeking asylum in the United States were routinely dismissed without proper consideration by the INS. This situation ultimately led the American Baptist Churches (ABC) to file suit against the INS, charging that asylum status was being denied to Guatemalans (and other Central Americans) because the United States did not openly oppose the strongly anticommunist governments in the region at the time (Gzesh 2006). In 1991 the ABC case was settled, and the INS agreed to revisit the cases of thousands of Guatemalans whose asylum claims had been denied. In 1997 the NACARA was signed into law, further addressing the cases of Guatemalans and other Central American refugees. According to section 203 of NACARA, Guatemalans who had registered for benefits from the ABC settlement prior to 1991 or had entered the United States before 1990 were allowed certain immigration benefits, including the right to apply for permanent resident status (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services [USCIS] 2009). Though migration from Guatemala was relatively high during the years of the civil war, it actually grew much more in the years after the peace accords (Smith 2006). In 2000 and 2001 the price of Guatemala’s main export, coffee, dropped dramatically to its lowest point in decades. The price of coffee fell below the cost of production, which caused a grave economic crisis in the already shaken country (Varangis et al. 2003, 3). The postwar Guatemalan migrants have been called “economic refugees.” Though the civil war may have ended, the long period of fighting left the country’s economy and infrastructure badly damaged and incapable of providing opportunity for its citizens, which, combined with the coffee crisis, created ripe conditions for emigration. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that in 2009, 91 percent of Guatemalan emigrants left because they were either looking for work or for better pay, while less than one percent were traveling to escape violence (IOM 2009, 65).
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2008 American Community Survey (ACS), there were 985,601 Guatemalans living in the United States in 2008 (ACS 2008). This figure likely undercounts the actual number of Guatemalans living in the United States for several reasons. First, many Guatemalans currently living in the United States are unlikely to respond, or even to be reached by formal surveys.
808 | Guatemalan Immigrants
Many do not have regular status and consciously avoid polls or other forms of contact with the government. Also, the wording on surveys is unlikely to capture all people of Guatemalan origin given that many of them are Mayan, and they may not identify themselves as “Hispanic/Latino” or “Guatemalan.” Many Mayan immigrants identify themselves by their specific Mayan ethnic identity (Kanjobal, Quiche, Jacaltec, etc.) or as “indigenous” (Palma, Girón, and Steigenga 2009). The IOM reports different figures than the ACS. According to the IOM, there were 1,324,474 Guatemalans living in the United States in 2009. Unfortunately, because the IOM bases its count on surveys conducted with the family members of immigrants in Guatemala, these figures are also not completely reliable, but they are probably closer to the actual number than surveys carried out in the United States.
Age and Family Structure Though migration from Guatemala has been dominated by men, the gender gap has been narrowing recently. The 2008 ACS reported that approximately 57 percent of the Guatemalan population in the United States was male and 43 percent was female. The IOM (2009, 27) reports similar numbers regarding the gender of Guatemalan migrants to the United States but also found that of Guatemalans who express the intention to migrate, 53 percent were women and 47 percent were men (IOM 2009, 53). Though these figures only represent intent to migrate, they point to a potential change in future trends. Finding work remains the most important reason for migrating, but more women may be traveling to reunite with their husbands, as family reunification is becoming one of the important motors driving Guatemalan migration (Palma, Girón, and Steigenga 2009). Another defining characteristic of Guatemalan migration to the United States is that almost all the migrants are young. The ACS reports that the median age of the Guatemalan community in the United States is 28.1 years (ACS 2008), considerably younger than the 36.9 years of the general U.S. population. The IOM reports that 80.5 percent of Guatemalans who migrate are between 15 and 34 years of age (IOM 2009). According to the ACS data (2008), about half (44.5%) of Guatemalans over the age of 15 living in the United States are married. It is possible that this figure undercounts the large number of transnational marriages. The IOM reports that 44.8 percent of Guatemalan migrants are married and that 20.8 percent have partners but are not yet married (IOM 2009, 65). Furthermore, the IOM reports that 47.6 percent of migrant households faced a rupture in family structure due to migration (58). For migrant families, being separated creates a great deal of stress and anxiety for both the migrants and their family members in the communities of origin. Family disintegration is one of the biggest concerns for migrants and the organiza-
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tions that work with them both in Guatemala and the United States (Palma, Girón, and Steigenga 2009).
Educational Attainment According to the 2008 ACS, approximately 54.1 percent of Guatemalans living in the United States have not obtained at least a high school diploma. The IOM (2009) reports that 48.8 percent of Guatemalans who migrated had at least some elementary education (31% had completed elementary school and 17.8% had not), while only 12.3 percent had finished high school and 3 percent had never gone to school at all. Most first-generation Guatemalans who migrate to the United States are focused on working (mostly in manual labor), thus, very little time is left for education. Furthermore, English is a third language for many Guatemalan migrants who speak one of the 22 Maya languages as well as Spanish. Education, however, remains an important part of migration because immigrants often see improved educational opportunities for their children as an important factor influencing their decision to migrate. Nevertheless, Cecilia Menjívar argues that many Guatemalan children, even those born in the United States, find their educational opportunities truncated because of their “liminal legality.” In other words, though the legal status of their parents may not be an obstacle for children to complete high school, college may be out of reach because extensive documentation is required in order to obtain financial aid and other educational opportunities (Menjívar 2006, 1022–24).
Economic Attainment Most Guatemalans who migrate to the United States report that looking for work is the main reason they decided to migrate. Young people migrate in order to work and send money back to their home country to support those they left behind. In 2009, the IOM reported that $4.2 billion in remittances from the United States entered Guatemala, making up over 10 percent of the GDP (9). Unfortunately, Guatemalans tend to find work at the bottom of the U.S. labor market. According to the 2008 ACS, the median per capita income for Guatemalans in the United States was only $14,657. The same survey reported that 21.7 percent of Guatemalans live in poverty in the United States, compared with 13.2 percent of the general U.S. population. The IOM provides some figures on employment categories for Guatemalans, but these figures include all Guatemalans living outside the country. Based on the fact that 97 percent of the working-age population recorded in the survey lives in the United States, we roughly estimate the general employment categories breakdown for working-age Guatemalans in the United States to be: 35–40 percent as unskilled workers; 30–35 percent in manufacturing, machine operation, or artisanship;
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15–20 percent in services and sales; 3 percent in agriculture; 3–5 percent as technicians, clerks, or other mid-level professionals; and a small percentage as professionals and executives (IOM 2009, 63). These general trends are confirmed by the 2008 ACS data, though the absolute numbers and occupation categories vary slightly. The 2008 ACS reported 31.4 percent of Guatemalan respondents working in the service industry; 20.9 percent in production, transportation and material moving occupations; 21.6 percent in construction and maintenance; 14.7 percent in sales and as office employees; 9.5 percent as executives and professionals; and 1.9 percent in agriculture and fisheries. The higher figures for professionals and lower figures in agriculture are attributable to the respective sample biases in the IOM and 2008 ACS data. Since the IOM data is based on family member interviews in Guatemala, it likely undercounts the numbers of long-term Guatemalan residents working in professional positions. As we noted above, the ACS figures are likely biased in the opposite direction, severely undercounting the undocumented population, and therefore undercounting many Guatemalans who work in agriculture, processing, and other unskilled labor. The primary defining characteristics of the Guatemalan niche in U.S. labor markets are the difficulty of working conditions, the vulnerability of the workers, the lack of job security, and low wages. The specific industries that heavily utilize the Guatemalan labor pool vary by geographic area but share the general trends of job insecurity and low wages. In the traditional destinations of Los Angeles and New York, the garment and textile industries have long histories of employing Central American immigrants. More recently, Guatemalan workers have taken jobs in the meatpacking and poultry processing industries in Nebraska, Iowa, Georgia, Arkansas, Delaware, Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Carolinas. As with textiles, these jobs offer dangerous working conditions, little access to affordable insurance, and low wages; and are known to actively discourage labor union organizing (Fink 2003). To summarize, Guatemalans (along with other Central Americans) are primarily inserted at the bottom of what has become an increasingly polarized U.S. labor market. By polarization, we refer to the dual process of increased demand for flexible and low-wage labor along with the simultaneously growing population of aging high-income individuals who generate increasing demand for services and products. Thus, Guatemalans are frequently employed in the informal service sectors of the economy, working temporary jobs as day-laborers, maids, nannies, or other service jobs.
Health Statistics, Issues Because looking for work is one of the primary motivations for Guatemalans to migrate to the United States, the Guatemalan population tends to be younger and relatively healthy. The 2008 ACS reports that the rate of physical disability within the
Adjustment and Adaptation | 811
Guatemalan population is 4.7 percent, which is much lower than the 12.1 percent for the general U.S. population. At the same time, research suggests that the Guatemalan community is at a higher risk for some health complications. In the United States, many Guatemalan migrants have to cope with issues of family separation, and they often find themselves without a well-established support network to help them cope. Depression among the Guatemalan community may be aggravated by loneliness, lack of success in finding a job, shortages of money to send to relatives back home, and the general hardships of daily life as a migrant worker. Combined with fears of deportation, these stress factors contribute to potential psychological and substance abuse problems in the Guatemalan migrant population. The general demographic characteristics of the Guatemalan population in the United States (high levels of poverty, low levels of education, etc.) also decrease access to health services (Carrasquillo, Carrasquillo, and Shea 2000). Even when services are available, they may not reach large portions of the Guatemalan community. For example, some studies suggest that though the prevalence of HIV/AIDS may be high within the Guatemalan community, HIV/AIDS education may not be effective unless it is presented in a way that better reflects the cultural framework of the community (Schoorman, Acosta, and Sena 2008).
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals The family is of central importance in Guatemala, and it also plays an important role in migration to the United States. For many migrants who are away from their loved ones, thinking of their families back home serves as both coping mechanism to withstand the hardships of the migrant life and a constant reminder of what has been left behind in their home communities (Palma, Girón, and Steigenga 2009). Not surprisingly, Guatemalan migrants who have the ability to do so seek either to reunite their families in the United States or have plans to return to their communities of origin after working for five or six years in the United States. Today, more Guatemalan women and children are migrating to re-establish families that have been broken apart in the process of migration. Allan Burns notes that “life crisis events, such as births, baptisms, marriages and funerals are times when activities that are familiar parts of life in Guatemala can be adapted to life in the United States” (1993, 45). Baptism is one of the most important life-cycle rituals among Guatemalan migrants, not only because of its religious significance, but also because it strengthens bonds in a new community. Trying to recreate a sense of community, parents and couples who want to get married may ask their new friends in the United States to become the godparents of children during baptism or of the couple at a wedding. Burns argues that this bond
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of compadrazgo (godparenthood) is an effective tool to create networks of support for Guatemalan migrants in new places (46). Another ritual common among Mayan migrants is the repatriation of the dead. Among the Jacaltec Maya population, for example, a collection is generally taken to fund the process of sending the bodies of migrants who die in the United States back to their communities of origin in Guatemala for burial. This process cements bonds and networks not only within the migrant community but also between the migrants and their community of origin (Steigenga, Palma, and Girón 2008).
Families and Changing Gender Relations The centrality of the family unit in Guatemalan culture endures through the process of migration. Strong nuclear families are the ideal for Guatemalan migrants, but long periods away from family members can generate unrealistic expectations and other problems that may lead to conflict. Familial disintegration is a major area of concern reported by organizations who work in migrant sending communities. Unfortunately, it is often women who experience the most negative impact of migration both in sending and receiving communities. In receiving communities, Guatemalan men may seek to reassert their dominant role in unacceptable ways. Guatemalan women who migrate to reunite their families are often dependent on
Marco Grijalba plays on the floor of a Red Cross shelter in Brownsville, Texas, as his mother and infant sister sit on a cot in the background, February 24, 1989. (AP Photo/Pat Sullivan)
Adjustment and Adaptation | 813
their husbands (who may have more knowledge of life in the United States) and in some cases become victims of physical and emotional abuse (Palma, Girón, and Steigenga 2009). In communities of origin, women are affected by transnational gossip about their behavior that finds its way back to their husbands in the United States, in some cases causing them to isolate themselves in fear of risking their marriages. This isolation can cause many physical as well as psychological problems (Skolnik, Lazo de la Vega and Steigenga 2012 ). Children of Guatemalan immigrants face the challenge of maintaining a balance between the traditional family roles and structure of their home community while simultaneously adapting to the new behavioral norms of the United States. Tensions frequently arise between parents struggling to raise “good children” and adolescents struggling to adapt and grow up in between worlds.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Guatemalans in the United States maintain their connections with their hometowns and cultural identity in a number of ways. Many Guatemalan migrants participate in hometown associations; organizations dedicated to maintaining contacts or projects in communities of origin. While the absolute number of hometown associations is uncertain, Manuel Orozco and Eugenia Garcia-Zanello (2009) note that the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs counted 164 such Guatemalan organizations operating around the United States in 2006. Many of these organizations were initially organized as communities of migrants who came together to celebrate fiestas in honor of their town’s patron saint. Organizing for the celebration of the fiestas frequently evolves into organizing for other goals in both communities of origin and destination (Palma, Girón, and Steigenga 2009). As is the case in Guatemala, a large portion of community life for Guatemalan immigrants revolves around organized religion. While the majority of Guatemalan immigrants are Catholic, between 30 percent and 40 percent belong to various evangelical churches, with a majority of those in Pentecostal churches. Mayan Catholics from Guatemala maintain many of their traditional Mayan beliefs and customs within their practice of Catholicism, including the veneration of local saints, participation in dances and other elements of local fiestas (such as the dance of the deer), and other elements of costumbre. Some Guatemalan Mayan groups in the United States have made attempts to maintain indigenous languages in the second generation and to teach younger Guatemalan Americans about their indigenous culture. For example, Ajaw Kab’Awil is a nonprofit organization based in Indiantown, Florida, that helps young people maintain their Mayan cultural identity through dress, dance, music, and language. Ajaw Kab’Awil provides a space where Maya children growing up in the United States can learn and maintain a sense of Mayan identity within the larger context of migration.
814 | Guatemalan Immigrants
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media Spanish-language media in the United States is abundant, especially in states with large immigrant populations. Most commonly, Spanish-language media is targeted to the general Hispanic community, and not to people from one particular country. Some attempts, however, have been made by the Guatemalan community in the United States to publish newsletters that speak specifically to them as Guatemalans or as Maya, not just as Hispanic. The Movimiento de Immigrantes Guatemaltecos en los Estados Unidos (MIGUA) is an organization based in Chicago that publishes a monthly newsletter, Nahual Migrante, featuring news and articles for and about the Guatemalan immigrant community in the United States. The Nahual Migrante also features news from Guatemala, especially news relevant to the migrant community in the United States. The Nahual Migrante is available online through MIGUA’s blog, which also publishes stories and articles pertaining to the Guatemalan migrant community in the United States. Other important media outlets for the Guatemalan community in the United States include the radio show Hora Chapina, which airs on Saturday mornings in several cities in California via KATD 900 AM out of San Francisco; the radio show Noche De Fiesta Chapina, which airs on Saturday evenings via La Grande 1010 SF and 990 in Sacramento; and the magazine Enlace Guatemala, a monthly publication based in Chicago. Also, La Prensa Libre, the most prominent newspaper in Guatemala, continues to be popular with Guatemalans in the United States. La Prensa Libre is available online, where people who want to follow the news in Guatemala can access it free of charge.
Celebration of National Holidays The majority of holidays celebrated in the Guatemalan immigrant community relate to religious and regional celebrations. For Guatemalans of Mayan decent, celebrations of regional patron saints are critical annual events. For example, the Jacaltec community in Jupiter, Florida, celebrates the Virgin of Candelaria festival in February with a mass, a parade of the image of the Virgin of Candelaria, marimba, traditional dance, food, and a soccer game. Preparation for the celebration of the fiesta takes months and includes committees of volunteers to organize all aspects of the fiesta, including the food, flowers, dances, and so forth. The celebration in Jupiter takes place simultaneously with the celebration in Jacaltenango. Other Maya communities throughout the United States celebrate their regional holidays as well. Some Mayan immigrants in Houston, for example, travel to their home town to celebrate the Fiesta de Santiago, honoring their local patron saint (Hagan 1994). Many of the holidays recognized by the Guatemalan embassy are religious holidays, such as Christmas, semana santa (Holy Week), and All Saints’ Day. The most important nonreligious holiday is Guatemalan Independence Day on Sep-
Adjustment and Adaptation | 815
tember 15. The same date marks the beginning of Hispanic Heritage Month in the United States, and Guatemalans participate in many pan-Hispanic celebrations on that day as well.
Foodways Guatemalan cuisine is varied and readily available in the United States, especially in areas with high concentrations of migrants. Beans and corn tortillas are the staples of Guatemalan cuisine and remain popular with Guatemalan migrants. Traditional Guatemalan tortillas are relatively thick, formed by hand, and cooked on a comal. They accompany almost every meal. While in Guatemala fresh tortillas are either made at home or readily available at a local bodega, in the United States it is common for immigrants to buy premade tortillas, which are generally thinner than the handmade traditional tortillas. For special occasions and celebrations carne asada and pepián may also be available. Tamales are also popular for important celebrations, especially Christmas. Tamales vary regionally across Guatemala but are typically made with corn dough or masa and stuffed with chicken, pork, turkey, or beef. The filling is wrapped in the dough, which is then wrapped in a corn husk and cooked in large pots.
Pollo Campero, Guatemalan Fried Chicken The large influx of Guatemalan migrants to the United States has not gone unnoticed by the fast food industry. Pollo Campero, the most popular fried chicken chain in Guatemala, has recently expanded to the United States, opening 53 restaurants in 14 states and the District of Columbia (with a 54th restaurant scheduled to open in Walt Disney World in Orlando in late 2010). Not surprisingly, the state with the most Pollo Campero restaurants is California (14), where the majority of the Guatemalan population in the United States still resides. It took Pollo Campero only seven weeks to reach sales of $1 million in its first U.S. restaurant in Los Angeles in 2002 (Frumkin 2002). Undoubtedly these sales were propelled by the large Guatemalan population in the area. Pollo Campero is planning to continue its growth in the United States; some estimate a tenfold projected growth in the coming years (Arndt 2010). Pollo Campero’s growth in the U.S. market has the potential to rival long-standing fast food chains such as KFC. Pollo Campero is relatively more expensive than its competitors, but in 2010 it launched its new value menu with the tag line “More Campero for Less Dinero.” The tag line speaks to the desire of Pollo Campero to expand its market within the United States beyond its Guatemalan immigrant consumer base.
816 | Guatemalan Immigrants
Music, Arts, and Entertainment No traditional Guatemalan celebration would be complete without a marimba. Marimbas are large instruments that somewhat resemble xylophones, generally played by groups of three or four people rather than individuals. Marimbas are played at parties, special events, and cultural religious festivals by organizations of Guatemalan migrants all over the United States. Marimba classes and workshops have been used by migrant associations to reconnect young people with their home country (Burns 1993, 63). While the marimba is very popular, Guatemala’s most famous musician is the pop-rock singer Ricardo Arjona. Born near Antigua, Guatemala, Ricardo Arjona has become one of the most popular Spanish-language musicians in the United States and Latin America. Since starting his career in the early 1990s, Arjona has released 14 albums and won two Grammys. In 2005 he collaborated with Intocable (a Texano band) to make the song “Mojado” about the plight of undocumented immigrants who cross the U.S. border. The song became widely popular throughout the Americas. Another important form of artistic expression in Guatemala is textile design and weaving. In 2008 the Phoebe A. Hearst Museum of Anthropology at the University of California Berkley hosted a year of Guatemalan educational programs. The year-long event started with an exhibit entitled “Traje de la Vida: Maya Textiles of Guatemala,” showcasing some of the pieces from the museum’s permanent collection on Guatemalan textiles along with photographs and videos on the subject. Migration from Guatemala to the United States was the topic of the critically acclaimed film El Norte. Released in 1983, El Norte chronicles the journey of two young people (Rosa and Enrique) who escape their village in Guatemala during the civil war and make their way out of Guatemala, through Mexico, and into the United States, where they struggle to achieve the so-called American dream as undocumented migrants. The film contains dialogue in English, Spanish, and Quiche and delivers a realistic representation of the migrant journey. El Norte was released in DVD for the first time in 2009.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship The paths that Guatemalans may take towards attaining citizenship depend on the context and timing of their migration to the United States. Only a small portion of Guatemalans who live in the United States today arrived as refugees fleeing the 36-year civil war. This group is eligible to file legitimate political asylum claims, which makes it the group of Guatemalans with the highest likelihood of legalizing their immigration status. However, the majority of Guatemalans in the United
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 817
States came after the civil war as economic refugees and therefore, very few have a clear path toward citizenship. For Guatemalans who have become naturalized citizens of the United States, dual citizenship is not allowed by the Guatemalan constitution. The Oath of Allegiance that all naturalized American citizens must take requires that they renounce their allegiance to any other country (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service 2010). Decree 86–96 (which amends the citizenship section of the Guatemalan Constitution) explicitly states that Guatemalan persons who have become naturalized citizens of countries that require them to make such an oath automatically lose their Guatemalan citizenship (El Congreso de la Republica de Guatemala 1996). Article 144 of the Guatemalan Constitution grants Guatemalan citizenship to the children of Guatemalans born abroad (El Congreso de la Republica de Guatemala 1985). The Guatemalan state, however, requires that these U.S.-born children choose either Guatemalan or American citizenship upon reaching their 18th birthday (Menjívar 2002, 537).
Intergroup Relations Guatemalans frequently arrive and settle in locations that are home to many other Central American as well as Mexican migrants. While there are some tensions between national groups and Mexicans often compete with Guatemalans in certain labor markets (such as the orange-picking industry in South Florida), there are also many shared events, spaces, and positive intergroup relations. In many communities around the United States, soccer fields bring these groups together either through formal leagues or in pick-up games. Intermarriage between Mexicans, Guatemalans, and other Central Americans is relatively common. Group divisions within the Guatemalan community fall primarily along ethnic, class, and political lines. While the majority of business owners, managers, and other elites in the United States are Ladinos, the majority of Guatemalan immigrants come from Guatemala’s 22 different Mayan groups. Mayan leaders frequently complain that they are poorly represented by the national organizations that claim to speak for Guatemalan migrants as well as the formal representatives of the Guatemalan state present in the United States. Divisions stemming from Guatemala’s civil war also continue to impact group relations as victims of military violence, former guerrillas, and former military and civilian patrol members live in close proximity in many U.S. communities. Particularly in the Mayan communities, immigrants have to negotiate a continuing “minefield” of complex and painful relationships related to roles and events during the war.
Forging a New American Political Identity Due to the diversity within the population, Guatemalans in the United States do not share a single common political identity or program. While the civil war continued
818 | Guatemalan Immigrants
in Guatemala, most Guatemalan immigrant organizations focused their work on assisting new refugees, condemning human right abuses in Guatemala, and opposing U.S. support to the Guatemalan military. Following the signing of the peace agreements in 1996, the Coalition of Guatemalan Immigrants in the United States (CONGUATE) brought various groups together around the issues of immigrant rights and immigration reform. Along with other Guatemalan organizations, CONGUATE lobbied for temporary protective status (TPS) for Guatemalans in the United States following Hurricane Stan. The Movement of Guatemalan Immigrants in the United States (MIGUA) also focuses its agenda on immigration reform and stopping the immigration raids and detentions that have recently led to as many as 25,000 deportations to Guatemala per year.
Return Immigration The first major wave of return migration to Guatemala took place in the early 1990s through a refugee repatriation supervised by the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights. According to Victor Montejo (1999, 222–37) the process was fraught with complications and hurdles to resettlement for the refugees, many of whom had spent 10 years or more in Mexico or the United States. Beginning in the mid-1990s the U.S. policy focus on border enforcement combined with increasing numbers of economic refugees from Guatemala created a context in which return migration was delayed for many Guatemalan migrants. While many undocumented Guatemalan migrants come to the United States with the intention of returning once they have made enough money to build a house or start a small business back in their home community, that dream has become increasingly elusive. The costs and risks associated with crossing the border have increased dramatically in the past 15 years, causing migrants to incur larger debts and stay longer to pay them off. For some migrants, return to their home communities becomes increasingly difficult after spending more than seven or eight years in the United States. There are many cases of Guatemalan migrants who have returned to their home communities only to return to the United States again within a period of months or years. These individuals report that they returned home to find little economic opportunity and a social and cultural environment to which they are no longer fully accustomed. With the recent downturn in the U.S. economy, Guatemalan laborers have been particularly hard-hit. Because they occupy the most precarious positions in the labor market (frequently seeking work as day-laborers or part-time workers), Guatemalans were among the first to be let go as service industry companies began to cut back. The average monthly remittance amount that a household received in 2009 was $272, which is $73 less than in 2008 (IOM 2009, 68). Due to the difficult economic situation, increasing numbers of Guatemalans have decided to return home.
The Second and Later Generations | 819
Deportation, however, is the main reason for return migration. According to a recent report by the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services, Guatemala was the thirdleading country in the number of people removed in 2008, when more than 28,000 Guatemalans were deported. New legislation (such as 287(g) that allows local law enforcement to act on behalf of Immigration Customs and Enforcement) has certainly contributed to an increase in the number of arrests and deportations among the Guatemalan population. A large portion of the Guatemalan migrant community lives in constant fear of deportation. Workplace immigration raids, such as the Postville, Iowa, incident, aggravate these fears.
The Second and Later Generations Cultural and Ethnic Identity The migrant experience adds another layer to the already complex issue of ethnic and cultural identity in the Guatemalan diaspora. There are many ethnic Mayan groups in Guatemala, each with their own dialect, dress, and customs. There is also a relatively small population of Garifuna people in Guatemala. Garifuna people are of mixed African, Carib, and Arawak descent and live primarily on the Caribbean coastal region of Guatemala and other Central American countries. The socially
Residents of the largely Guatemalan Westlake neighborhood in Los Angeles eat at a Guatemalan restaurant, September 9, 2010. (AP Photo/Damian Dovarganes)
820 | Guatemalan Immigrants
Children Adopted from Guatemala Up until 2008, tens of thousands of Guatemalan children were adopted by American families every year. The relative ease of the adoption process in Guatemala made it one of the top countries for adoptions in the United States, behind much larger countries such as China. The Department of State reported that the number of Guatemalan adoptions was rising every year until the law changed in 2008. Adoptions became a lucrative business in Guatemala, with couples paying an average of $30,000 to private adoption agencies (Roig-Franzia 2007). Allegations of agencies and lawyers becoming “baby brokers” (buying babies from pregnant women in the countryside and then selling them to American couples) became rampant (Lacey 2006). In September 2008 the Guatemalan National Council on Adoption announced that it would not take any more cases in order to review the pending adoption cases and investigate allegations of illegal activities and infant trafficking. After a long period of investigation, international adoptions from Guatemala resumed in June 2010. The laws governing the process, however, have changed so that potential parents will be matched with a specific pool of available children (Llorca 2010). Adoption visas granted to Guatemalans: 2003–2009 Fiscal year
Adoption visas
2003
2,328
2004
3,264
2005
3,783
2006
4,135
2007
4,727
2008
4,122
2009
756
Source: U.S. Department of State. 2010. “Adoptions from Guatemala to the United States.”
dominant group in Guatemalan society is the Ladino group. Though the indigenous population is large, the Ladino population is disproportionally represented within the business and government elites. While large Mayan communities exist in Florida, Texas (Houston), North Carolina, and other states, the Garifuna Coalition USA (2010) estimates that the largest settlement of Garifunas in the United States is in the South Bronx, where approximately 200,000 Garifuna people live. Ladino Guatemalan migrants live spread throughout most of the major migrant-receiving communities from Los Angeles to the East Coast.
The Second and Later Generations | 821
Depending on their own background and personal preference, second-generation Guatemalan youth may identify as members of their individual Mayan group (Mam, Kanjobal, etc.), as indigenous, as Guatemalan, as members of a pan-ethnic Hispanic/Latino group, as African American (in the case of Garifuna), or as American. Most large-scale studies of the second generation of immigrants in the United States tend to study “Hispanics/Latinos” as one group instead of disaggregating them by the country of birth of their parents. Ethnographic data from small groups, however, can shed some light on the issue. Cecilia Menjívar (2002) carried out 26 in-depth interviews with Guatemalan children who were born in the United States or who migrated at a very young age. From her interviews, she concluded that while parents may encourage transnational activities and the maintenance of their ethnic identities, most of the second generation has little interest in these pursuits (indigenous Guatemalan migrants have marginally more success), choosing instead to focus on their lives in the United States. For example, most of the children in Menjívar’s study did not speak Spanish
Marvin Velasquez (left), Andy Thomas (center), and Pedro Velasquez wear traditional Maya outfits as they wait for festivities to begin at the San Miguel Fiesta in West Palm Beach, Florida, September 30, 2006. (AP Photo/Lynne Sladky)
822 | Guatemalan Immigrants
Youth Profile Helping to Meet Community Needs Jocelyn Skolnik was born and raised in Guatemala City. After high school, Jocelyn came to the United States to attend the Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College of Florida Atlantic University. During her college career, Jocelyn became involved with the Guatemalan immigrant community in South Florida, interning with a nonprofit organization (Corn-Maya Inc.) to coordinate and deliver services that met the community’s needs. Jocelyn was recognized with numerous awards for her academic excellence and community involvement during her years at the Wilkes Honors College. Upon graduating in 2007, she was hired (Courtesy of Sandra Lazo de la Vega) as coordinator of the El Sol Community Neighborhood Resource Center, a multifaceted 501(c)3 nonprofit whose mission is to assist Jupiter’s immigrant population to become an active and integrated part of the larger Jupiter community and to build bridges among the different ethnic, cultural, and religious groups in Jupiter, Florida. In 2008, Jocelyn was recognized in the Palm Beach Post as a nonprofit “business person to watch.” She was promoted to director of the center in 2009, where she now supervises three employees; directs a grant-writing team; manages the center’s educational, legal, health, and labor programs; and oversees a budget of $200,000. Under Jocelyn’s management, El Sol has become a model for other communities struggling to deal with issues of immigrant integration. Recognizing her achievements, Florida Atlantic University’s Alumni Association named her the Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College distinguished alumna of 2010.
fluently and had limited desire or opportunity to visit Guatemala, and most only kept in touch with events in Guatemala through their parents, if at all. The fact that the second generation of Guatemalans did not choose the ethnic identity of their parents does not mean that they fully embraced an American
Issues in Relations between the United States and Guatemala | 823
identity. Menjívar found that while the Spanish proficiency of her interviewees was limited, their English proficiency was not fully developed either. These Guatemalan children had developed the language skills necessary for communication with their immediate peers but “did not gain the language skills necessary to successfully participate in the wider society” (Menjívar 2002, 545). In other words, the secondgeneration Guatemalan youth that Menjívar studied suffer from what Portes and Rumbaut call dissonant acculturation or a “rupture of family ties and abandonment of ethnic community” (2001, 242).
Educational Attainment The ability to give one’s children greater opportunities is a major driving motor of Guatemalan migration to the United States. As is true of most immigrant groups, Guatemalan parents consider education a high priority for their children. Unfortunately, data on the education attainment of the second generation of Guatemalans in the United States is scarce, and what we do know does not measure up to the high expectations of Guatemalan parents. There are several situational factors that affect the educational attainment of the second generation of Guatemalans in the United States. A large portion of the second generation is growing up in poor neighborhoods, with inadequate schools (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Menjívar 2002). Even when students are resilient and manage to thrive academically, their educational options may be limited by their legal status. As Cecilia Menjívar (2006) explains, even if Guatemalan children are high achievers in high school, universities require legal residency in a state in order to qualify for in-state tuition rates, student loans, and other types of financial aid (1023). Furthermore, even if the student was born in the United States, extensive documents from parents are also needed in order to apply for financial aid, which parents either may not have or may be reluctant to produce for fear of deportation (1029).
Issues in Relations between the United States and Guatemala Forecasts for the 21st century Like other Central American countries, Guatemala’s political history has been closely tied to trends in U.S. foreign policy. The Monroe Doctrine, the Alliance for Progress, CAFTA, and U.S. Immigration Laws have all impacted Guatemala’s politics, development, economy, and ultimately the emigration of its citizens to the United States. In 1999, shortly after the release of the Guatemalan Truth and
824 | Guatemalan Immigrants
Reconciliation Committee report, president Bill Clinton apologized for U.S. support of military violence in Guatemala during the civil war and pledged to support Guatemala in its peace and reconciliation process (Broder 1999). According to the U.S. State Department, supporting the implementation of the Peace Accords continues to be one of the U.S. policy objectives towards Guatemala, along with issues of economic development, trade, and security cooperation to combat international crime, drug trafficking, and money laundering. On the issues of international crime and drugs, Guatemala is participating along with other Central American countries and Mexico in the controversial Merida Initiative, a comprehensive public security package designed to improve citizen security in the region through fighting organized crime, gangs, and the drug trade. The Guatemalan portion of the package has drawn criticism for emphasizing aid and equipment to police units rather than institutional police reform. In 2006 the CAFTA entered into effect in Guatemala. It lifted trade barriers between Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and the United States. One of the key effects of CAFTA is that it opens Central American markets to subsidized U.S. agricultural goods. In an economy driven by rural agriculture, this has meant dislocation for many Guatemalan farmers who cannot compete and look to migration as a survival strategy. The problem is compounded as those who migrate successfully inject remittances into the local economy in their home communities, driving up the price of land potentially encouraging further migration. Migration is the most important issue pertaining to United States–Guatemala relations. With nearly one-tenth of Guatemala’s population living in the United States, arriving at some type of favorable immigration reform should be one of the most pressing issues for the Guatemalan government. The Guatemalan National Council for Attention to Migrants (CONAMIGUA) was formed in 2007 to tend to the needs of Guatemalan migrants. According to its 2009 annual report, CONAMIGUA has and will continue to work to articulate a regional immigration reform proposal, asking for the regularization of the immigration status of Guatemalans and other Latin Americans currently living in the United States without the proper documents (Consejo Nacional de Atención al Migrante de Guatemala [CONAMIGUA] 2009). One of CONAMIGUA’s main tasks is to lobby countries that receive Guatemalan migrants to adopt an immigration reform policy that includes legalization and a family reunification program (CONAMIGUA 2009). In the case of the United States, advocates for immigration reform have also focused on the impact of immigration raids on the Guatemalan community, the need for TPS for Guatemalan immigrants impacted by natural disasters, and the problems associated with immigration enforcement strategies that rely on local police and sheriffs to carry out federal immigration law.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics | 825
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Migration statistics about Guatemalans are notoriously unreliable. The IOM collects data on Guatemalan emigrants but does not disaggregate them per country of destination. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security collects some migration statistics about Guatemalans in the United States, but most experts agree that the numbers reported undercount the Guatemalan population. The following tables summarize the statistics reported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (specifically the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service) on the Guatemalan population in the United States.
Table 123 Legal permanent residents 2008
Legal permanent residents Number Total in the U.S. Guatemala Source: Rytina 2009.
12,600,000 180,000
Percent 100 1.4
Legal permanent residents eligible to naturalize Number 8,160,000 110,000
Percent 100 1.3
Table 124 Legal permanent residents: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and country of birth Total Guatemala
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
9,942
13,496
16,178
14,386
18,920
16,818
24,133
17,908
16,182
12,187
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2009.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics | 827 Table 125 Estimated unauthorized immigrant population: January 2009 and 2000 Estimated population in January
All countries Guatemala
Percent of total
Percent change
Average annual change
2009
2000
2009
2000
2000–2009
2000–2009
10,750,000
8,460,000
100
100
27
250,000
480,000
290,000
4
3
65
20,000
Source: Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2010.
Table 126 Apprehensions: Fiscal years 2006–2008
Total apprehensions Guatemala
2008
2007
2006
791,568
960,756
1,206,457
22,670
23,907
25,135
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2008. July 2009.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Question number five of the 2008 ACS asks respondents about “Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin.” The available answers include broad Hispanic origin groups (e.g., Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban) as well as the option to write in individual answers, such as “Guatemalan.” The following table contains data on those who wrote in “Guatemalan” in question number five in the 2008 ACS.
Table 127 Basic census demographics of the Guatemalan population in the United States Subject
Guatemalan
Margin of error (+/-)
Total number of races reported Total population
991,871
One race
96.3%
32,016 0.6
Two races
3.4%
0.6
Three races
0.2%
0.1
Four or more races
0.0%
0.1
Sex and age Total population Male
991,871
32,016
57.1%
1
Female
42.9%
1
Under 5 years
11.7%
0.7
5 to 17 years
18.0%
0.8
18 to 24 years
12.6%
0.7
25 to 34 years
23.2%
0.9
35 to 44 years
17.4%
0.7
45 to 54 years
9.7%
0.6
55 to 64 years
4.8%
0.5
65 to 74 years
1.7%
0.2
75 years and over
1.1%
0.2
Median age (years)
28.1
18 years and over
70.4%
21 years and over
65.7%
62 years and over
3.8%
65 years and over
2.7%
Under 18 years
293,722
0.4 1 1 0.3 0.3 14,953
Male
51.3%
1.7
Female
48.7%
1.7
18 years and over
698,149
23,316
Male
59.5%
1
Female
40.5%
1
354,590
16,376
18 to 34 years Male
64.2%
1.4
Female
35.8%
1.4
35 to 64 years
316,315
12,569
Male
56.4%
1.6
Female
43.6%
1.6 (Continued )
828
Table 127 Basic census demographics of the Guatemalan population in the United States (Continued ) Subject 65 years and over
Guatemalan
Margin of error (+/-)
27,244
2,697
Male
34.4%
4.9
Female
65.6%
4.9
Households by type Households
247,786
Family households With own children under 18 years Married-couple family With own children under 18 years
7,991
78.2%
1.5
50.4%
2
46.5%
1.8
32.5%
1.7
Female householder, no husband present, family
16.0%
1.3
With own children under 18 years
10.4%
1.1
Nonfamily households
21.8%
1.5
Male householder
15.2%
1.5
Living alone
6.7%
0.9
Not living alone
8.5%
1
Female householder
6.6%
0.8
Living alone
4.7%
0.8
Not living alone
1.9%
0.4
Average household size
4.01
0.09
Average family size
4.12
0.08
Marital status Population 15 years and over
735,923
Now married, except separated
44.5%
24,211 1.3
Widowed
2.2%
0.3
Divorced
5.0%
0.6
Separated
3.5%
0.4
Never married
44.8%
Male 15 years and over
435,752
Now married, except separated
43.5%
1.3 17,048 1.5
Widowed
0.9%
0.3
Divorced
3.6%
0.6
Separated
2.7%
0.5
Never married
49.4%
Female 15 years and over
300,171
Now married, except separated
45.9%
1.4 11,528 1.8 (Continued )
829
Table 127 Basic census demographics of the Guatemalan population in the United States (Continued ) Subject
Guatemalan
Margin of error (+/-)
Widowed
4.1%
0.7
Divorced
7.1%
1
Separated
4.8%
0.7
38.2%
1.9
Never married School enrollment Population 3 years and over enrolled in school
237,594
11,835
Nursery school, preschool
8.1%
1
Kindergarten
7.6%
1.1
Elementary school (grades 1–8)
46.2%
2
High school (grades 9–12)
21.8%
1.6
College or graduate school
16.3%
1.8
Educational attainment Population 25 years and over
573,206
19,535
Less than high school diploma
54.1%
1.7
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
21.6%
1.2
15.4%
1
Some college or associate’s degree Bachelor’s degree
6.7%
0.6
Graduate or professional degree
2.1%
0.3
High school graduate or higher
45.9%
1.7
Male, high school graduate or higher
45.0%
2.2
Female, high school graduate or higher
47.2%
1.9
Bachelor’s degree or higher
8.9%
0.7
Male, bachelor’s degree or higher
8.6%
0.9
Female, bachelor’s degree or higher
9.3%
1.1
Fertility Women 15 to 50 years
241,239
9,950
20,118
2,415
Unmarried women 15 to 50 years who had a birth in the past 12 months
8,586
1,488
As a percent of all women with a birth in the past 12 months
42.7%
Women 15 to 50 years who had a birth in the past 12 months
6.5
Veteran status Civilian population 18 years and over
695,982
23,228 (Continued )
830
Table 127 Basic census demographics of the Guatemalan population in the United States (Continued ) Subject
Guatemalan
Civilian veteran
1.0%
Margin of error (+/-) 0.2
Disability status Total civilian noninstitutionalized population
983,526
With a disability
4.7%
31,961 0.4
Residence 1 year ago Population 1 year and over
971,458
31,609
Same house
82.3%
1.3
Different house in the United States
15.5%
1.3
Same county
11.1%
1.2
Different county
4.3%
0.6
Same state
2.6%
0.5
Different state
1.7%
0.4
Abroad
2.2%
0.4
Place of birth, citizenship status and year of entry Native
310,981
16,542
Male
51.7%
1.8
Female
48.3%
1.8
Foreign born
680,890
22,314
Male
59.5%
1.1
Female
40.5%
1.1
Foreign born; naturalized U.S. citizen
159,491
Male
47.5%
Female
52.5%
Foreign born; not a U.S. citizen
521,399
Male
63.2%
Female
36.8%
Population born outside the United States
680,890
Entered 2000 or later
41.3%
8,090 2.1 2.1 19,982 1.2 1.2 22,314 1.6
Entered 1990 to 1999
27.9%
1.2
Entered before 1990
30.8%
1.3
Language spoken at home and ability to speak English Population 5 years and over
876,217
English only
8.9%
27,781 0.7 (Continued )
831
Table 127 Basic census demographics of the Guatemalan population in the United States (Continued ) Subject
Guatemalan
Margin of error (+/-)
Language other than English
91.1%
0.7
Speak English less than “very well”
60.9%
1.3
Employment status Population 16 years and over
723,849
In labor force
23,598
77.6%
1.1
77.3%
1.1
71.8%
1.2
5.5%
0.5
Percent of civilian labor force
7.1%
0.7
Armed Forces
0.3%
0.1
Not in labor force
22.4%
1.1
Civilian labor force Employed Unemployed
Females 16 years and over
295,510
In labor force Civilian labor force Employed Unemployed Percent of civilian labor force
11,230
61.7%
1.8
61.5%
1.8
55.5%
1.8
6.0%
0.7
9.8%
1.2
Occupation Civilian employed population 16 years and over
519,911
Management, professional, and related occupations
19,018
9.5%
0.8
Service occupations
31.4%
1.5
Sales and office occupations
14.7%
1
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
1.9%
0.4
Construction, extraction, maintenance, and repair occupations
21.6%
1.4
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations
20.9%
1.3
Male civilian employed population 16 years and over
355,867
Management, professional, and related occupations
15,052
7.2%
0.9
25.9%
1.8
Sales and office occupations
9.8%
1.1
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
2.3%
0.6
Service occupations
(Continued )
832
Table 127 Basic census demographics of the Guatemalan population in the United States (Continued ) Subject
Guatemalan
Margin of error (+/-)
Construction, extraction, maintenance, and repair occupations
31.1%
1.9
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations
23.6%
1.6
Female civilian employed population 16 years and over
164,044
Management, professional, and related occupations
8,664
14.5%
1.5
Service occupations
43.4%
2.5
Sales and office occupations
25.2%
1.9
0.9%
0.4
1.1%
0.4
14.9%
1.7
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations Construction, extraction, maintenance, and repair occupations Production, transportation, and material moving occupations Industry Civilian employed population 16 years and over
519,911
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining
19,018
2.6%
0.6
Construction
18.9%
1.3
Manufacturing
13.5%
1.2
Wholesale trade
2.9%
0.5
Retail trade
9.1%
0.8
Transportation and warehousing, and utilities
4.1%
0.6
Information
0.8%
0.2
Finance and insurance, and real estate and rental and leasing
3.3%
0.4
Professional, scientific, and management, and administrative and waste management services
13.8%
1.3
Educational services, and health care and social assistance
8.9%
0.8
Arts, entertainment, and recreation, and accommodation and food services
12.9%
1.1
8.4%
0.6
0.8%
0.2
Other services (except public administration) Public administration
(Continued )
833
Table 127 Basic census demographics of the Guatemalan population in the United States (Continued ) Subject
Guatemalan
Margin of error (+/-)
Class of worker Civilian employed population 16 years and over
519,911
Private wage and salary workers
19,018
87.8%
0.9
Government workers
3.9%
0.5
Self-employed workers in own not incorporated business
8.1%
0.8
Unpaid family workers
0.2%
0.1
Income in the past 12 months (in 2008 inflation-adjusted dollars) Households Median household income (dollars) With earnings
247,786
7,991
41,225
1,241
95.9%
Mean earnings (dollars)
51,535
With Social Security income
7.1%
Mean Social Security income (dollars)
10,555
With Supplemental Security Income
1.6%
Mean Supplemental Security Income (dollars)
7,464
With cash public assistance income
2.1%
Mean cash public assistance income (dollars)
4,905
With retirement income
2.8%
Mean retirement income (dollars)
13,562
With Food Stamp benefits
9.0%
Families
0.7 1,556 0.7 899 0.4 1,007 0.5 1,014 0.6 4,333 1.1
193,840
7,298
39,699
1,424
Married-couple family
59.5%
2
Median income (dollars)
46,229
1,717
20.1%
2
35,806
1,837
Median family income (dollars)
Male householder, no spouse present, family Median income (dollars) Female householder, no husband present, family
20.4%
Median income (dollars) Individuals Per capita income (dollars)
1.6
25,996
2,593
991,871
32,016
14,657
409 (Continued )
834
Table 127 Basic census demographics of the Guatemalan population in the United States (Continued ) Subject
Guatemalan
Margin of error (+/-)
With earnings for full-time, year-round workers: Male
269,803
11,741
Female
103,646
6,684
Mean earnings (dollars) for full-time, yearround workers: Male
30,836
865
Female
28,393
1,498
Median earnings (dollars) full-time, yearround workers: Male
25,238
586
Female
22,139
773
Poverty rates for families and people for whom poverty status is determined All families With related children under 18 years With related children under 5 years only
19.3%
1.5
24.5%
2
26.6%
4.2
14.6%
1.7
With related children under 18 years
17.8%
2.3
With related children under 5 years only
Married-couple family
17.2%
4.3
Female householder, no husband present, family
37.0%
4.5
With related children under 18 years
45.1%
5.4
With related children under 5 years only All people Under 18 years
52.3%
10.9
21.7%
1.3
28.1%
2.4
Related children under 18 years
27.8%
2.4
Related children under 5 years
30.4%
2.7
Related children 5 to 17 years
26.1%
2.9
18 years and over
19.0%
1.2
18 to 64 years
19.0%
1.3
65 years and over
19.6%
4.7
People in families
19.2%
1.5
Unrelated individuals 15 years and over
32.4%
2.4
Source: American Community Survey (2008).
835
836 | Guatemalan Immigrants
Table 128 shows the leading states in the United States where those Guatemalans obtaining legal permanent residence in 2009 lived. Chief among them are California, Florida, New York, and Texas.
Table 128 Guatemalans obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 by state Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
12,187
5,826
6,361
189
109
80
California
4,282
1,981
2,301
Colorado
100
47
53
Connecticut
187
90
97
Florida
884
423
461
Georgia
368
189
179
Illinois
472
211
261
Maryland
308
153
155
Massachusetts
388
199
189
90
43
47
Nevada
227
115
112
New Jersey
499
238
261
New York
715
342
373
North Carolina
175
77
98
Arizona
Minnesota
Ohio
91
41
50
Pennsylvania
110
45
65
Texas
641
298
343
Virginia
389
196
193
Washington Other
198
109
89
1,874
920
954
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix III: Notable Guatemalan Americans | 837
Appendix III: Notable Guatemalan Americans David Campos, born in Izabal, Guatemala, came to the United States with his family when he was 14. Campos learned English and graduated at the top of his high school class in South Central California. He attended Stanford University, where he majored in political science and then went on to graduate from the Harvard Law School in 1996. Campos worked in the private sector for a few years before becoming a deputy city attorney in San Francisco. He continued in public service, where he has served as general counsel to the San Francisco Unified School District and as a member of the San Francisco Police Commission. Campos currently represents District 9 as a member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and is an elected member of the San Francisco Democratic County Central Committee (City and County of San Francisco Board of Supervisors 2010). Francisco Goldman was born in Boston to a Guatemalan mother and an American father. Goldman is the author of several novels, including The Long Night of White Chickens (1992). He also wrote The Art of Political Murder: Who Killed the Bishop? (2007), a nonfiction work about the 1998 murder of the Guatemalan bishop Juan Gerardi. Goldman’s work has been translated into 10 languages and he has received a multitude of awards, including the WOLADuke Award for the best book about human rights in Latin America for The Art of Political Murder (Fundación Nuevo Periodismo Iberoamericano 2010; Trinity News 2008) Victor Montejo is a Jacaltec Maya who fled Guatemala in 1982 after his brother’s assassination. In 1993, Montejo received his Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Connecticut. Montejo’s most important work is Voices from Exile: Violence and Survival in Modern Maya History (1999), which won the Race, Ethnicity and Politics Award from the American Political Science Association in 2000 (McConahay 2003; Native American Indigenous 2010). Luis Vasques-Ajmac moved to the United States from Guatemala at the age of six. Vasques-Ajmac is the founder of MAYA, a marketing agency that targets multicultural audiences. Vasques-Ajmac named his company MAYA to pay homage to his heritage. He has received multiple awards for his accomplishments in business, including the 1999 Small Business of the Year Award, the 2003 Hispanic Businessman of the Year Award, and the 1999 Vision Award (Reynolds School of Journalism 2010; Browne 2005). Luis von Ahn was born in Guatemala City. He is a professor of computer science at Carnegie Mellon University. He is best known for development of Captcha, a computer program that produces skewed images of letters that
838 | Guatemalan Immigrants
have to be transcribed by the user trying to access a variety of online services in order to thwart spambots. Captcha, ReCaptcha, and GWAP (Games With A Purpose), all created by Von Ahn, are used to garner the power of human intelligence to facilitate tasks that are too complex for computers to solve at this point, such as accurately scanning older texts to make them digitally available. Von Ahn is a recipient of the Macarthur Foundation Fellowship (2006–2011), Businessweek magazine called him a “pioneer of human computation,” and Discover magazine listed him as one of the “50 Best Brains in Science” in 2008 (Von Ahn 2010).
Glossary Comadre/compadre: Co-mother, co-father. When an individual becomes the godparent of a child, the individual and the child’s parents become compadres or comadres. Comal: A round cooking surface where tortillas are usually cooked. Costumbre: “Custom” or traditional cultural practices. For many indigenous Maya, costumbre reflects a mix of precolonial and Spanish religious and cultural traditions or practices. Ladino: In Guatemala Ladino is recognized as a formal (yet heterogeneous) ethnic group of mixed Hispanic and indigenous race who speak Spanish as their first language. In common usage, the term refers to nonindigenous Guatemalans as well as indigenous Guatemalans who have adopted nonindigenous forms of cultural expression (e.g., language, dress, etc.). Municipio: A municipality or village. Padrino/madrina: Godfather/godmother.
References American Community Survey. 2008. “S0201. Selected Population Profile in the United States. Population Group: Guatemalan.” [Online information, retrieved 03/15/10.] www.factfinder.census.gov. Arndt, Michael. 2010. “At Pollo Campero, Growth is on the Menu.” BusinessWeek Magazine. March 11. Broder, John. 1999. “Clinton Offers His Apologies to Guatemala.” New York Times March 11. [Online information retrieved 03/29/10.] www.nytimes.com. Browne, Andrea. 2005. “Small Business 101.” The Washington Post, November 11. [Online information, retrieved 03/29/10.] www.washingtonpost.com. Burns, Allan. 1993. Maya in Exile: Guatemalans in Florida. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
References | 839 Carrasquillo, Olveen, Angeles I. Carrasquillo, and Steven Shea. 2000. “Health Insurance Coverage of Immigrants Living in the United States: Differences by Citizenship Status and Country of Origin.” American Journal of Public Health 90(6): 917–23. City and County of San Francisco Board of Supervisors. 2010. “Supervisor Campos-About.” [Online information, retrieved 05/10/10.] http://www.sfbos.org/index.aspx?page=2127. Consejo Nacional de Atención al Migrante de Guatemala. 2009. Informe Ejecutivo de las Acciones de CONAMIGUA 2009. Guatemala. Eisenman, David P., Lilian Gelberg, Honghu Liu, and Martin F. Shapiro. 2003. “Mental Health and Health-Related Quality of Life Among Adult Latino Primary Care Patients Living in the United States With Previous Exposure to Political Violence.” JAMA 290(5): 627–34. El Congreso de la República de Guatemala. 1996. “Decreto Número 86–96: Reformas a la Ley de Nacionalidad, Decreto Número 1613 del Congreso de la República de Guatemala.” [Online information, retrieved 03/29/10.] http://www.congreso.gob.gt/archivos/ decretos/1996/gtdcx86–1996.pdf. El Congreso de la República de Guatemala. 1985. “Constitución Política de la República de Guatemala, Título III, Capítulo II: Nacionalidad y Ciudadanía.” [Online information, retrieved 03/29/10.] http://www.congreso.gob.gt/gt/constitucion2/Constitucion.pdf. Fink, Leon. 2003. The Maya of Morganton: Work and Community in the Nuevo New South. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Frumkin, Paul. 2002. “Pollo Campero Takes Wing in the United States.” Nation’s Restaurant News, September 23. Fundación Nuevo Periodismo Iberoamericano. 2010. Francisco Goldman. Nuestros Maestros. [Online information, retrieved 03/29/10.] http://www.fnpi.org/maestros/directoresde-talleres/francisco-goldman/. Garifuna Coalition USA. 2010. [Online information, retrieved 03/29/10.] www.garifunaco alition.org. Gzesh, Susan. 2006. Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era. Migration Information Resource. April. [Online information, retrieved 03/20/10.] http://www.mi grationinformation.org. Hagan, Jaqueline Maria. 1994. Deciding to be Legal. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Handy, Jim. 1984. Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala. Boston: South End Press. Hoefer, Michael, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker. 2010. “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2009.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. Population Estimates, January. Hong, Maria. 2000. “Guatemalan Americans.” In The Gale Encyclopedia of Multicultural America, 2nd Edition, edited by Jeffrey Lehman. Detroit: Gale. [Online information, retrieved 04/01/10.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Du-Ha/Guatemalan-Americans. html.
840 | Guatemalan Immigrants Instituto Nacional de Sismología, Vulcanología, Meteorología e Hidrología de Guatemala. 2010. “Sismología: Marco Tectonico para Guatemala.” [Online information, retrieved 03/15/10.] www.insivumeh.gob.gt/geofisica/indice%20sismo.htm. International Organization for Migration (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones). 2003. Cuadernos de Trabajo Sobre Migración 17: Encuesta Nacional Sobre Remesas Familiares. Guatemala: IOM. International Organization for Migration (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones). 2009. Cuadernos de Trabajo Sobre Migración 27: Encuesta Nacional Sobre Remesas 2009 Niñez y Adolescencia. Guatemala: IOM. Lacey, Mark. 2006. “Guatemalan System is Scrutinized as Americans Rush in to Adopt.” New York Times. November 5. Burns, Alan. 2000. “Indiantown, Florida: The Maya Diaspora and Applied Anthropology.” In The Maya Diaspora: Guatemalan Roots, New American Lives, edited by James Loucky and Marylin Moors, 152–71. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Llorca, Juan Carlos. 2010. “Guatemala to Resume International Adoptions in June.” Associated Press. March 17. Malkin, Elisabeth. 2010. “Guatemala: Ex-President Arrested on U.S. Warrant.” New York Times. January 26. McConahay, Mary Jo. 2003. “American Maya Goes to Guatemalan Congress.” Pacific News Service: News Feature, December 29. [Online information, retrieved 03/29/10.] http://news.newamericamedia.org. Menjívar, Cecilia. 2002. “Living in Two Worlds? Guatemalan-origin Children in the United States and Emerging Transnationalism.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28(3): 531–52. Menjívar, Cecilia. 2006. “Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United States.” American Journal of Sociology 111(4): 999–1037. Montejo, Victor. 1999. Voices from Exile: Violence and Survival in Modern Maya History. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Native American Indigenous Studies Association. 2010. “Victor Montejo: Biography.” [Online information, retrieved 03/29/10.] http://naisa.org/election/council/montejo. Orozco, Manuel, and Eugenia Garcia-Zanello. 2009. “Hometown Associations: Transnationalism, Philanthropy, and Development.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 15(2): 1–17. Palma, Irene, Carol Girón, and Timothy Steigenga. 2009. “From Jacaltennago to Jupiter: Negotiating the Concept of “Family” through Transnational Space and Time.” In A Place to Be: Brazilian, Guatemalan, and Mexican Immigrants in Florida’s New Destinations, edited by Phillip J. Williams, Timothy J. Steigenga, and Manuel A. Vázquez, 57–79. New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Rutgers University Press. Piedrasanta Herrera, Ruth. 2007. “Apuntes sobre transmigración y remesas entre los chuj de Huehuetenango.” In Comunidades en Movimiento: La migración internacional en el norte de Huehuetenango, edited by Manuela Camus, 95–112. Antigua, Guatemala: INCEDES, PCS, PROGOBIH.
References | 841 Reynolds School of Journalism News. 2010. “To Land a Job: Be Smart, Write Well and Keep a Positive Attitude.” March 3. [Online information, retrieved 03/29/10.] http:// journalism.unr.edu/latestnews. Reynoso, Conié, Amafredo Castellanos, and Coralia Orantes. 2005. “Tormenta Stan peor que Mitch.” Prensa Libre, Guatemala, October 9. Roig-Franzia, Manuel. 2007. “Guatemala Moves to Tighten Adoption Rules.” Washington Post. December 12. Rytina, Nancy. 2009. “Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population: 2008.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. Population Estimates, October. Schlesinger, Stephen, and Stephen Kinzer. 1982. Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala. New York: Doubleday. Schoorman, Dilys, Maria Cristina Acosta, and Sister Rachel Sena. 2008. “Implementing Freirian Perspectives in HIV-AIDS Education Among Preliterate Guatemalan Maya Immigrants.” Journal of Thought (Spring/Summer 2008): 41–54. Skolnik, Jocelyn, Sandra Lazo de la Vega, and Timothy J. Steigenga. 2012. “El Chisme across Borders: The Impact of Gossip in a Transnational Guatemalan Community.” Migraciones Internacionales 22. Smith, James. 2006. Guatemala: Economic Migrants Replace Political Refugees. Migration Information Resource. April. [Online information, retrieved 03/20/10.] http://www. migrationinformation.org. Steigenga, Timothy J., S. Irene Palma, and Carl L. Girón. 2008. “El transnacionalismo, la movilización colectiva de la comunidad maya en Jupiter, Florida. Ambigüedades en la identidad transnacional y la religión vivida” Migraciones Internacionales 4(4): 36–71. Trinity News. 2008. “More Accolades for Francisco Goldman’s The Art of Political Murder.” Trinity News Press Release. [Online information, retrieved 03/29/10.] http://www. trincoll.edu/AboutTrinity/News_Events/trinity_news/080808_Goldman.htm. Trudeau, Robert H. 2000. “Guatemala: Democratic Rebirth?” In Latin American Politics and Development, 5th ed., edited by Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, 493–511. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. United Nations Development Programme. 2009. Human Development Report 2009, Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development. [Online information; retrieved 03/01/10.] http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. 2009. Immigration through the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) Section 203. [Online information; retrieved 03/11/10.] http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem. 5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2ee215d27cf73210VgnVCM10 0000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=f39d3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca6 0aRCRD.
842 | Guatemalan Immigrants U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. 2010. “The Oath of Allegiance.” In A Guide to Naturalization. [Online information, retrieved 03/29/10.] http://www.uscis.gov/files/ article/M-476.pdf. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics. 2009. “Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2008.” July 2009. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2010. “Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.” Downloadable MSExcel file “Cobbook86.” [Online information; retrieved 03/16/10.] http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/data/DSLPR09c.shtm. U.S. Department of State. 2010. “Adoptions from Guatemala to the United States.” [Online information, retrieved 04/05/10.] http://adoption.state.gov/country/guatemala.html. Varangis, Panos, Paul Siegel, Daniel Giovanucci, and Brian Lewin. 2003. Dealing with the Coffee Crisis in Central America: Impacts and Strategies. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2993. Von Ahn, Luis. 2010. “Luis von Ahn’s Home Page.” Carnegie Mellon University [Online information, retrieved 03/29/10.] http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~biglou/.
Further Reading Burns, Allan. 1993. Maya in Exile: Guatemalans in Florida. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Maya in Exile tells the story of Maya refugees in Florida. Beginning in the early 1980s, Florida began receiving hundreds of thousands of Maya refugees fleeing the civil war in their homeland. Maya in Exile is an excellent ethnography of their lives and struggles to live in the United States. Handy, Jim. 1985. Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala. Boston: South End Press. Gift of the Devil provides an excellent historical overview of Guatemala, from the preColumbian legacy until the 1980s, when Guatemala was in the midst of its civil war. Gift of the Devil portrays an indigenous society in perpetual defense mode from outside forces that seek to destroy or possess the resources available in Guatemala. Marquardt, Marie, Timothy J. Steigenga, Philip J. Williams, Manuel Vásquez. 2011. Living “Illegal”: The Human Face of Unauthorized Immigration. New York: New Press. Living Illegal tells the stories of unauthorized Guatemalan and Mexican immigrants living in South Florida and Atlanta. The book details the process and forces propelling migration, tensions and mobilizations of migrants in new destination communities, and struggles to survive, integrate, and thrive in the face of an increasingly restrictionist national climate. Montejo, Victor. 1999. Voices from Exile: Violence and Survival in Modern Maya History. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Voices from Exile is also an excellent ethnography of Maya exiles living in the United States. Victor Montejo, a Maya exile himself, tells the story of a part of the modern Maya living in the United States today.
Further Reading | 843 Migration Information Source. [Online article; retrieved 03/11/11.] http://www.migration information.org. Migration Information Resource is an online resource provided by the Migration Policy Institute. It has valuable resources and information about different migrant groups, including Guatemalans who migrate to the United States. New articles with up-to-date information are routinely uploaded. Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (International Organization for Migration). Guatemala Country Web site. [Online article; retrieved 03/11/11.] http://www. oim.org.gt/. This Web site contains general information regarding migration issues in Guatemala. The OIM produces extensive yearly reports focused on one topic (women, children, climate change, etc.) within the larger context of migration out of Guatemala. The yearly reports include statistical data about the population of Guatemalans living abroad as well as their families in Guatemala. Pew Hispanic Center. Hispanics of Guatemalan Origin in the U.S. [Online article; retrieved 03/11/11.] http://pewhispanic.org. The Pew Hispanic Center’s website has valuable information about Hispanics in the United States, as well as information about individual population groups (including Guatemalans). The Pew Hispanic Center’s Web site also has general information about relevant topics involving the general Hispanic immigrant population in the United States, including religious behavior, voting trends, and so forth. Schleisinger, Stephen, and Stephen Kinzer. 1982. Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala. New York: Doubleday. Bitter Fruit is a classic of Guatemalan history about the 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz. Bitter Fruit tells the history of the United Fruit Company and of Guatemalan politics long before the 1954 events. The overthrow of Arbenz and the political turmoil that followed are not just the source of many of Guatemala’s present-day troubles, but they are also a main factor pushing immigration to the United States. Williams, Phillip, Timothy Steigenga, and Manuel A. Vásquez, eds. 2009. A Place to Be: Brazilian, Guatemalan, and Mexican Immigrants in Florida’s New Destinations. New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Rutgers University Press. This edited volume contains vital information on religion and transnational communities. The chapters about Guatemala deal with important issues, such as the meaning and importance of family in the process of migration.
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Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants by Stephen J. Sills and Natassaja Chowthi
Introduction Guyana is the only English-speaking country in South America. It is multiethnic and culturally Caribbean and has been nicknamed the “land of six peoples” due to its ethnic diversity. Guyana has been populated by Amerindians, white Europeans, Africans, Portuguese, Chinese, and East Indians. Most of these groups arrived in Guyana in the 17th century during its colonial period as a result of the British importation of labor. The largest of the ethnic groups in Guyana is from India. East Indian Guyanese are often referred to as Indo-Guyanese. This group has re-migrated from Guyana to the United States beginning in the 1960s in response to political changes, economic downturn, and interethnic conflict in Guyana. According to 2006 data from the American Community Survey of the U.S. Census Bureau, there are about 196,174 individuals of Guyanese ancestry in the United States. While they have encountered some barriers to upward mobility, over time Indo-Guyanese immigrants have achieved a high level of structural assimilation: they are welleducated, often own their own homes, and have multiple-income households with just above the median household income. Guyanese immigrants have established a transnational community in New York City known as Little Guyana. Their complex historical, ethnic, and national backgrounds are reconstructed within the United States and shaped by current conceptions of race, ethnicity, and immigration. The second generation, born in the United States, is characterized by its cosmopolitan, transnational, or hybrid identity. Although Indo-Guyanese are a new, and relatively invisible population, they are also a growing one. It was predicted that more Guyanese would reside outside of their country of origin than within by 2010.
Chronology 1498
Guyana is “discovered” by Spanish.
1580
Dutch trade outposts are established on Guyana.
1620
Dutch establish forts. West India Company imports slaves from Africa to work on the sugar plantations. 845
Background | 847
1763
Berbice Slave Uprising.
1814
Anglo-Dutch Treaty: the British gain control of Guyana.
1831
Colonies of Demerara-Essequibo and Berbice are united as British Guiana
1838
Slavery is abolished in Guyana. First East Indian indentured servants arrive in Guyana.
1917
Last shipments of East Indians to Guyana.
1964
Forbes Burnham and People’s National Congress (PNC) replaces Cheddi Jagan’s Progressive Party.
1965
U.S. immigration amendment stimulates mass migration from Guyana.
1966
Guyana’s independence, continued political corruption from the PNC.
1970s–1980s
Guyanese emigrate via backtrack rings. In the late 1980s, 10,000 to 30,000 Guyanese emigrate legally and illegally.
1990
Guyana’s debt reaches U.S. $2 billion, one of the highest debts in the world per capita.
1992
First fair election in Guyana since the 1960s; the Jagans return to office.
1999
Bharrat Jagdeo (People’s Progressive Party [PPP]) assumes presidency in Guyana.
2000
Over 160,000 documented Guyanese immigrants in the United States; nearly 70 percent of these immigrants in New York City alone.
2010
It is predicted that more Guyanese will reside outside of Guyana than inside it.
Background Geography of Guyana Guyana lies between Venezuela and Suriname. Brazil borders Guyana to the west and south. It is an area of approximately 133,576 square miles, about the size of Idaho. An Amerindian word that literally means the “land of many waters,” Guyana has four main rivers, three of which share the name of Guyana’s three counties: Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo. Demerara is sandwiched between Berbice and Essequibo counties and is the most densely populated county. Essequibo is located
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in western Guyana, its boundaries roughly delineated by the Essequibo River. It is the largest county with the smallest population. Guyana’s largest river, the Essequibo River, runs south from Brazil up north towards the Atlantic Ocean. This equatorial country has a tropical climate that is characterized by high temperatures, rainfall, and humidity. Guyana is comprised of three primary geographical regions: the coastal plain, the sand belt, and the interior highlands. The coastal plain is an area of fertile land that supports most of Guyana’s agriculture industry; over 80 percent of the rest of Guyana’s land is largely uninhabitable tropical rain forest. The coastal plain area lies below sea level. Tidal flooding makes agriculture here a challenge, and the seawall and drainage systems must be constantly maintained. Most of Guyana’s population is concentrated on this sliver of land and around Georgetown, the capital of Guyana. Markets, government offices, universities, and industries are centered here. Guyana’s tourism industry lags behind those of the more profitable Caribbean destinations such as Jamaica and Barbados. Between 1970 and 1990, Guyana’s tourism sector grew not even 2 percent annually. Its muddy beaches and dense forests appeal less to regular tourists but more to ecotourists who travel to pristine areas to observe natural wildlife. The Kaieteur Falls, one of the world’s largest waterfalls, is five times as large as Niagara Falls. Kaieteur Falls drops from the Potaro River at 741 feet. This majestic waterfall is located in the highlands region, a mostly unpopulated area consisting of dense forest, mountains, and plateaus. Amerindians mainly inhabited this area. The prominent Pakaraima Mountains, the rocky Kaieteur Plateau, and the low-lying Acarai Mountains dominate southern and western Guyana. The sand belt is an area of plateaus, hills, and white sands that lies between the coastal plain and the highland region. Guyanese mine bauxite deposits along this sand belt. Guyana has one of the largest bauxite reserves in the world, and bauxite was one of Guyana’s most important exports. However, bauxite production and exportation has stagnated in recent years. International competition from countries like China that produce bauxite at a lower price have caused layoffs at bauxite companies in Guyana. Other major exports in Guyana are gold, shrimp, rice, and sugar. The sugar industry was especially profitable in early Guyana. European colonialists imported slave labor to Guyana because of the abundance and profitability of sugar cane. In the 1980s, however, sugar production declined, harvests shrunk, and international competition grew. According to Guyasuco, Guyana’s largest sugar corporation, production grew in the 1990s, hit its peak in 1999, and dropped significantly in 2000.
History of Guyana Guyana’s ethnic diversity stretches back to Dutch colonization and the importation of human labor beginning in the 17th century. Europeans sought to settle the
Background | 849
Caribbean islands because they were beautiful, pristine lands full of natural resources, and especially suited for the production of sugar cane. Cultivation required a vast amount of human labor. When the Dutch first arrived, they enslaved the local Amerindian population and forced them to work in sugar cane fields. The Amerindian population suffered mass epidemics and genocidal conditions as a result of Dutch enslavement and exploitation. Lacking a sufficient labor force, the Dutch imported African slaves in order to increase sugar production and maintain a strong workforce. As a result of often brutal treatment, African slaves rebelled in 1763 in what has become known as the Berbice Slave Uprising. Under the leadership of a house slave named Cuffy (also spelled “Kofi” or “Coffy”) more than 500 slaves revolted. Cuffy is celebrated today as a national hero. By the 1800s, Dutch economic and colonial power began to wane. In 1814, under the terms of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, the British gained control of Guyana. They made it an official colony in 1831 and from then until independence in 1966, it was known as British Guiana. Guyana, at the time of British colonization, shared in a growing worldwide consciousness for emancipation. Slavery was abolished in 1838, 27 years before emancipation in the United States. However, colonial elites needed to ensure the continued prosperity of the agricultural sector, so they brought workers from India. India, as another British colony, had been made politically and economically weak. Indians were cheap sources of labor that the British could export to Guyana through a new indenture system. East Indian importation ensued from 1838 to 1917. During this time period, the British recruited about half a million East Indians to work under five-year labor contracts, though only about 200,000 made it to Guyana due to arduous travel conditions. Eighty-five percent of these Indians were recruited from India’s northern provinces of Bihar and Uttar-Pradesh. The British also recruited laborers from Portugal between 1835 and 1882 and from China between 1853 and 1884. This influx of laborers added to the diversity in the country. Harsh living conditions, difficult work, and maltreatment characterized plantation life for indentured servants. Estate owners physically and verbally abused workers, who were undefended and neglected by the justice system. Many immigrant workers died of diseases during travel and during residence in cramped double-storied barracks. On the plantation, estate owners used divide-and-conquer tactics to split the Indian and African groups against one another. Ethnic groups vied for scarce economic resources. Perhaps due to their European background, only the Portuguese fared well of all the ethnic groups in Guyana, securing economic wealth by controlling retail trade. Colonial elites used ethnic differences to their advantage and maintained an inequitable distribution of resources causing tensions that remain until today. For example, once indentured servants from India had fulfilled their labor contracts, they were promised return passage. However, estate owners needed these workers on their plantations.
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To keep them, estate owners drew up subcontracts that offered land grants in lieu of return passage. Rather than returning to their homeland, many Indians accepted these land grants and settled in Guyana. Yet, these land grants sparked resentment among African laborers. After emancipation, estate owners wanted to limit the economic power of African residents. Policies were enacted that restricted Africans from purchasing land. Therefore, after emancipation, many Africans deserted the plantations and established autonomous villages. However, colonial elites did not provide the maintenance, infrastructure, and vital services for these villages, and as a result, many African villagers fell further into poverty. East Indians were relative newcomers to Guyana, and their ownership of land offended the Afro-Guyanese. Africans had lived in Guyana for over two centuries and felt as though Guyana should be more readily claimed as their land. Over a century later, disparities in property ownership were still apparent. In the 1960s, upon independence from England, 85 percent of land owners were IndoGuyanese, while Afro-Guyanese only represented 13 percent of land owners. Interethnic conflict crystallized in the form of ethnicity-based politics. In the 1950s and 1960s, Guyana was preparing for independence from the British. The colonial political authority in Guyana restricted democratic participation, yet workers demanded improved work conditions and better pay. They formed unions, held strikes, and struggled against colonial rule. Emerging from these unions were political parties that vied for control. Cheddi Jagan, an influential Indo-Guyanese political leader, created the Political Affairs Committee (alternately referred to as the Political Action Committee or PAC in some texts) that called for Guyanese self-governance. The committee attracted Guyanese laborers and union organizers, and appealed to both Indo- and Afro-Guyanese. Forbes Burnham was an influential politician of Afro-Guyanese descent. Burnham joined with Jagan to transform the committee into the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in 1950. Jagan built the party based on socialist principles, which the United States and Britain disfavored. They viewed Jagan and the PPP as being pro-communist during this Cold War period. In 1953, Jagan, as the PPP candidate, was elected to chief minister under a prolabor platform. International actors sought to dissolve the party internally in favor of a more conservative base. The British suspended the Guyanese constitution, declared a state of emergency, and installed an interim government. The PPP began to break up internally. Forbes Burnham’s politics clashed with Jagan’s, and, in 1957, Burnham split with the PPP forming the People’s National Congress (PNC). British officials encouraged and advised Burnham in forming the PNC. They noted that working-class Afro-Guyanese were more likely to support the PNC, and that Burnham needed to attract middle- and upper-class Afro-Guyanese in order for his party to succeed in the 1964 election. Burnham thus began an appeal to co-ethnic solidarity in order to consolidate Afro-Guyanese votes (Abraham 2007; Federal Research Division 1992). Similarly, the PPP began to appeal to the Indian population. The political focus thus shifted from labor-based politics to ethnicity-based politics.
Background | 851
Cheddi Jagan attends his victory parade in Georgetown, following his win in British Guyana’s general elections on August 23, 1961. (AP Photo)
The 1960s saw the most violent racial conflicts; the intensity of the conflicts came to their height around the 1964 elections. Historians note that almost all ethnicity-related violence in Guyana is rooted in this election period. During these times the Afro-Guyanese minority fought with the Indian majority in Guyana. The PNC supporters looted Indian businesses, rioted in the streets, and led strikes against PPP-supported unions. Interethnic violence forced the population into segregated communities. Europeans emigrated from Guyana, resulting in a substantial white flight. The PNC formed a coalition with another independent, minority party, and in 1964, Burnham won the election. The Indo-Guyanese criticized the election as being fraudulent. In 1966, shortly after this contentious election, Guyana gained its independence from Britain. The country saw momentary stability, peace, and economic growth. However, Burnham’s moderate politics turned sharply leftist as he converted the state into an instrument of the PNC. Burnham ensured that the PPP would not win another election. The government gerrymandered voting districts to guarantee that the PNC’s political domination would be unsurpassed. For the next 20 years, Guyana remained under the authoritarian leadership of the PNC. During this period, many Indians were beaten and killed. The resulting ethnic division led some members of the Afro-Guyanese community to feel that “the PNC had betrayed the wishes of the African people to live in a multiracial society” (Abraham 2007, 117).
852 | Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants
In 1985, Vice President Desmond Hoyte assumed office after Burnham’s death. To rectify the corruption and equalize relations between the PPP and PNC, Hoyte conducted what was seen as the first fair elections since the 1960s. The Guyanese people voted Hoyte and the PNC out and elected PPP’s Cheddi Jagan. Indo-Guyanese saw Jagan’s return to office after 30 years as a victory. Yet, the 1992 and 1997 elections continued to spark election violence in Guyana. Today, Guyana is a semipresidential republic. Since 1999, the country has been presided over by President Bharrat Jagdeo (PPP) and Prime Minister Samuel Hinds (PPP). Although Guyana moves towards democracy, it has continued to struggle economically. During the reign of the PNC, the party had mismanaged the economic sector and Guyana became heavily indebted. From the late 1970s until the 1990s, living standards and the economy further declined. The Guyanese dollar (GYD) depreciated steadily. In 1985, one U.S. dollar was worth $4.25 GYD. As the currency slid, a U.S. dollar was up to about $40 GYD in 1990; and, by 2000, over $180 GYD. Guyana steadily became one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere. By the 1980s, Guyana had already received millions of dollars in aid from the United States. For example, in 1988 the United States provided about U.S. $7 million to Hoyte’s administration as part of an Economic Recovery Program. In 1990, Guyana’s debt was about U.S. $2 billion, over seven times its GDP. The government resorted to further loans from neighboring countries as well as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. As a condition of borrowing more funds, the World Bank required them to implement structural adjustment programs. Structural adjustment programs are programs that reorganize the internal economic structure of struggling countries, especially developing and debtor countries. These set of policies were set forth in Washington and implemented by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, two of the largest international economic institutions in the world. By reforming the economy, fledgling nations could repay their debts to loaner countries, like the United States. Yet, these programs only further depreciated public services and the quality of life in Guyana. Structural adjustment programs required reduced spending on public programs, tax reform, and privatization of state enterprises. Essential services such as health and education were no longer properly funded. The declining quality of life further incited Guyanese to migrate to the United States.
Causes and Waves of Migration Guyana suffered a tumultuous political and economic history, the after-effects of British imperialism and colonialism. Guyana’s history resembles that of other postcolonial nations wherein dislocated peoples must reorganize a socially disoriented and economically exploited country. In response to the political corruption,
Causes and Waves of Migration | 853
terrorization of Indians, and depreciating economy, many Indo-Guyanese chose to emigrate to seek a better life. Indo-Guyanese sought residence in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. Many have moved to other Caribbean islands. Beginning in the 1960s, Indo-Guyanese joined the wave of new migrants to the United States. The Indo-Caribbean wave of migration in the United States is a relatively new migrant wave compared to other migrant groups. The term “Indo-Caribbean” refers to immigrants of Indian descent from Guyana, Trinidad, and Tobago, or other Caribbean islands. Indo-Guyanese moved in response to the ethnic conflict and instability in Guyana. Many Guyanese no longer trusted the government, and instead they “voted with their feet.” They left a country in which they felt unsafe, unprotected, and underrepresented. Demographers estimate that as a result of this migration, more individuals of Guyanese ancestry reside outside of the country than within Guyana.
Post-1965 Migration Changes in United States immigration policy stimulated movement from Guyana to America. In 1965, the United States lifted immigration restrictions and expanded immigration allowances to the global “south,” a region which included Latin America and the Caribbean. The amendments to immigration legislation abolished the national origins quota system. Race and ancestry were no longer as important a basis for immigration. The new legislation allocated immigrant visas on a firstcome, first-served basis. Preference was given to relatives of U.S. citizens and persons with special occupational skills, abilities, or training. As a result of the liberalized policy, Indo-Guyanese intellectuals, medical professionals, and members of the Guyanese upper-middle class looked to the United States as a destination (rather than other countries in the British Commonwealth). Professionals migrated to seek better opportunities, and prospective students moved abroad to attend universities in the United States. The migration of Guyanese professionals and intellectuals resulted in a so-called brain drain in Guyana. After establishing residency, typically in the gateway city of New York, Guyanese immigrants then sent for their family members. Between the 1970s and late 1980s, over 10,000 Guyanese migrated per year. In 1976, 43 percent of Guyanese emigrants moved to the United States, 31 percent went to Canada, 10 percent migrated to Great Britain, and 9 percent moved to other Caribbean nations. In the late 1980s, 10,000 to 30,000 Guyanese emigrated per year both legally and illegally. Indo-Guyanese who became naturalized citizens of the United States were eligible to obtain family visas. They sponsored families and relatives to come to the United States. These existing networks abroad lowered the costs and risks of migration, making migration easier for future Indo-Guyanese immigrants. Entrepreneurs
854 | Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants
and professionals in the receiving areas established institutions, businesses, and organizations to satisfy the needs of the new Indo-Guyanese population. Networks and institutionalization encouraged and facilitated future migration. These changes indicated a pattern of cumulative causation in which migration altered the receiving context and made additional movement more likely. Cumulative causation stimulated a momentum that made immigration more resistant to government regulation. In this way, Indo-Guyanese constantly flowed into the United States.
Backtracking Once social networks had been established between professionals from Guyana living in the United States and those back in the home country, other social classes were able to migrate. A prospective immigrant to the United States could cash in on their assets and use the money to apply for a visa and purchase a home in the United States. They could also use the money to enter other immigration channels. For Indo-Guyanese, there are three typical paths to migration: through family sponsorship under U.S. immigration legislation; by obtaining a visa under immigration allowance; or through the “backtrack” method. Backtracking is an illegal enterprise that allows immigrants to enter through the “back door.” A backtracker first pays a fee to smugglers before leaving Guyana. Smugglers provide a valid passport of an actual U.S. resident whose photo is replaced with that of the backtracker. The backtracker enters an intermediate, or “pipeline,” country such as Brazil or Venezuela before arrival in the intended country. Backtrackers and other illegal immigrants also seek political asylum while in the United States. Political asylum may be granted to immigrants who flee their home country to escape political, religious, or other form of persecution.
Receiving Locations Most Guyanese reside on the East Coast, as far north as New York and as far south as Florida. Other than New York, which has the highest Guyanese population, New Jersey, Maryland, Georgia, and Florida have significant Guyanese populations. Indo-Guyanese have settled mainly in “gateway cities,” or large metropolises that tend to attract immigrants from around the world. The largest IndoGuyanese community in the United States is in New York City, in an area called Richmond Hill. Richmond Hill is located in Queens, which is New York’s most immigrant-populated borough. Locals in Queens refer to Richmond Hill as “Little Guyana.” Other ethnic groups previously populated the area, mainly Italian, Irish, and German immigrants. Richmond Hill drew Indo-Guyanese because of affordable home ownership. Due to family networks and expanding Indo-Caribbean businesses, Richmond Hill has grown into the large Indo-Caribbean community that it is today.
Demographic Profile | 855
Little Guyana in the Richmond Hill section of Queens, New York. (Courtesy of Natassaja Chowthi)
IRCA to the Present Migration to the United States continues, both legal and illegally. Both the United States and the Guyanese governments maintain migration statistics; however, it is hard to obtain accurate statistics for Indo-Guyanese because of backtrackers who evade the migration process. The Immigration Act of 1990 increased the overall immigration cap to an allowance of 675,000 new persons annually. Out of these 675,000 new immigrants, 480,000 could be family-sponsored. Post-1990 legislation has focused on illegal immigrants, criminals, and immigrants who overstayed their visas. The United States began to deport non-citizens sentenced to a year or more in prison. In 2001, the United States government refused to grant visas to Guyanese officials until the Guyanese government agreed to receive over 100 Guyanese deportees. Between 1997 and 2004, the United States deported a total of 1,400 Guyanese to Guyana.
Demographic Profile Demographics According to the latest Guyanese census, the population of the country is just over three-quarters of a million. This is nearly the population of South Dakota. Guyana
856 | Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants Ethnic composition in Guyana, 2002 Ethnicity
Population
Percentage
East Indian
326,277
43.45
African/Black
227,062
30.2
Mixed
125,727
16.73
Amerindian
68,675
9.16
Portuguese
1,497
0.2
Chinese
1,396
0.19
White
477
0.06
Other
112
0.01
Total population
751,223
100
Source: Guyana Census 2002.
is comprised of multiple and diverse ethnic groups including East Indians, Africans, Chinese, Europeans, Portuguese, and Amerindians. Guyana’s ethnic diversity makes up its rich cultural heritage yet has also been center focus for violence and political conflict. The two largest ethnic groups in Guyana are Indo-Guyanese and Guyanese of African descent, or Afro-Guyanese. In 2002, Indo-Guyanese made up about 43.5 percent of the population and Afro-Guyanese made up about 30 percent. About 9 percent of the population was Amerindian, and Europeans and Chinese comprised less than 1 percent of the population. About 17 percent of the remaining population were individuals of mixed heritage.
Size and Composition of Community in United States According to the 2000 Census, over 160,000 persons reported “Guyanese” as their national background. Yet others view this figure as low and place the total population of Guyanese descent at more than 300,000. It is difficult to ascertain the number of Indo-Guyanese versus Afro-Guyanese in the United States because these statistics lump them together into a single category. In 2000, over 130,000 Guyanese (as much as 80% of the population) resided in New York City alone. According to New York City’s Department of City Planning, Guyanese are the fourth-largest immigrant group in New York City. Thus, we will focus on data that comes from this area in order to provide a more accurate picture of this population. What makes statistics on this population even less reliable is the fact that census forms do not provide race categories applicable to Indo-Guyanese. Based on the race categories on the 2000 Census, Indo-Guyanese can choose from “Asian” or “some other race,” neither of which accurately describe Indo-Guyanese ethnic identity. The census also provides the option to select multiple categories or write
Demographic Profile | 857 Demographic changes of Richmond Hill from 1990 to 2000 Race/Hispanic origin
Number
Percent change 1990 to 2000
White non-Hispanic
⫺26,206
⫺39.5
2,175
28.7
13,230
134.4
652
192.3
4,917
894.0
23,150
84.2
Black/African American Asian and Pacific Islander American Indian and Alaskan Native Some other race Hispanic Total population in 2000
141,608
Source: United States Census 2000.
in a race or ethnicity. However, the 2000 Census tabulated individuals who selected two or more races as “multiracial.” In the Richmond Hill area, persons of “some other race” (thought to be primarily Guyanese immigrants) grew 894 percent between 1990 and 2000.
Age and Family Structure Guyanese are a relatively new immigrant population in the United States. This population generally consists of families with children; educated, working adults; and home owners. Family households made up almost three-quarters of the population. Almost half of these families consisted of children under the age of 18. For example, in the Richmond Hill area the average household size was three to four persons. Nearly two-thirds of the population was under the age of 40, and nearly half of the population was under the age of 34. In 2005, the median age for Guyanese in New York City was 36, on par with the city’s overall median age. The population structure also exhibited a “youth bulge” in which there were higher numbers of persons in the younger, middle-age groups (see Figure 16). Over 40 percent of the population was between 20 and 45 years old. This may indicate the age range at which most Indo-Guyanese immigrate.
Economic Attainment American society expects immigrants to contribute to the economy. Like many new immigrants, Indo-Guyanese work hard in the United States. They face the challenge of incorporation into the American workforce. In Guyana, many were teachers, professionals, and entrepreneurs. They may hold certifications and degrees from institutions and universities in Guyana. In the United States, however, these credentials are not accepted as equivalent to credentials granted here. These professionals must
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begin a new earning new degrees and certifications in the United States in order to qualify for the same jobs they had in Guyana. Because some new immigrants cannot immediately afford the cost of tuition at an American university or cannot invest the time for classes, many must accept lower-wage work. In 2000, the average Guyanese household in New York City had a median income of nearly $42,000, slightly higher than New York City’s overall median household income of $38,293. However, per capita income, or the average income per individual, was only about $20,000 (below the per capita income of $22,402 for New York). This indicates that Guyanese households are usually multiple-income households. Indeed, data show that more Guyanese women participated in the labor force than other ethnic groups except for Filipinas, Jamaicans, and Trinidadians. In New York City, immigrants are disproportionately represented in the manufacturing, construction, and service industries. A large percent also work in the educational, health, and social service sectors. Yet, about a quarter of the Guyanese in New York are employed in management and professional occupations. About 8 percent of Guyanese immigrants were unemployed, and a smaller proportion of Guyanese than native-born New Yorkers were in poverty in 2005. Guyanese were third, just behind Italians and Greeks, in home ownership. Guyanese had higher rates of home ownership because multiple-income households pool earnings to support mortgage payments and other living expenditures. Many of the Guyanese households in the United States contributed a portion of their income to overseas relatives. On average, families remit about U.S. $200 per month to assist with living expenses and utilities for relatives in Guyana. Poorer families in Guyana rely on these remittances from overseas family members, who also send Christmas and holiday gifts. Seventy percent of these remittances are sent via money transfer services such as Western Union and MoneyGram. Guyana’s economy also depends on these remittances. The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that in 2007 nearly 43 percent of the country’s GDP came in the form of remittances. The percent of remittances to Guyana have increased with the rising out-flow of Guyanese to the United States and other countries. However, due to the effect of the economic crisis on working Guyanese families in the United States, remittances to Guyana have declined since 2008.
Educational Attainment In 1990, Guyana had one of the highest literacy rates in the Western Hemisphere at over 98 percent. Guyana’s education system was derived from the British colonial system, in which education is highly regarded as an avenue for upward social mobility. Being a schoolteacher in Guyana is an esteemed profession. Because of the high emphasis placed on education, most Guyanese emigrated with a degree from
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a secondary school. More Guyanese than any other ethnic group in New York City held a high school diploma.
Adjustment and Adaptation For many immigrants, the initial experience after migrating to the United States is one of culture shock. When Indo-Guyanese began to migrate to the United States, it was a haven during the Burnham era in Guyana. They fled their country but continued to maintain links to Guyana. Little Guyana, the Indo-Caribbean transnational community in New York City, has a constant flow of information, people, and goods coming from Guyana, as well as information, remittances, and other resources streaming back to Guyana. Yet, New York City is also a new context with a high population density; a mix of ethnicities; and a colder, wintry climate as opposed to the warm, tropical climate of Guyana. When it comes to cultural adjustment, Indo-Guyanese do have several advantages over most immigrants. First, they are native English speakers and do not have the barrier of a foreign language. In addition, American culture is already an established influence in Guyana. Media and overseas relatives have, at least superficially, provided Indo-Guyanese with an idea of what American culture is like.
Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Indo-Guyanese religious practices are unique to Indo-Caribbeans and were shaped by social processes in Guyana. While the main religious affiliations among IndoGuyanese are Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam, the majority of Indo-Guyanese are Hindu. The Hinduism practiced by Indo-Guyanese is a modification of orthodox Hinduism. During the period of indentured servitude, East Indians lived in plantation households where estate owners restricted contact with extended kin and members of the same caste. They were exposed to other East Indians of various castes, dialects, and social backgrounds. As a result of the social mixing, the caste system collapsed and practices related to caste diminished. In addition, the British imported very few East Indian women to Guyana, limiting men’s choices for partners from their same caste and thus disrupting the inheritance of caste. East Indian transnational ties to India also faded during the postindependence Guyana as communications and travel were too expensive to maintain. As a result, the IndoGuyanese practice a variation of Hinduism that lacks the strict caste structure and has evolved away from the practices on the Indian subcontinent. Little Guyana supports and preserves the continuance of religious practice. In Richmond Hill there are several Guyanese Hindu temples where worship, prayer, and ceremony take place. These temples often serve as spaces for social events like weddings, religious holidays, and birthdays. The pandit, or Hindu priest, is
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highly regarded in the community. Pandits provide the spiritual guidance for IndoGuyanese. They are involved in weddings and other life rituals, provide counsel to families, and organize cultural activities. One of the key religious holidays for Indo-Caribbeans is Holi. This is a Hindu occasion that ushers in the new spring season in March. Holi is more popularly called Phagwah (pronounced “Pahg-wah”), a “festival of colors.” In Little Guyana, Indo-Caribbeans celebrate the event through a series of cultural festivals at local Hindu temples or mandirs. The festivals include food, dancing, and musical performances. Thousands of Indo-Caribbeans congregate at the Phagwah parade on Liberty Avenue, where the main shopping and business activities occur. The parade attracts Indo-Caribbeans and family members from around the United States and even Guyana. Religious songs are performed from parade floats sponsored by local mandirs. After the parade, a crowd meets at a local park where the celebrators playfully throw colored powders onto one another in festivity. Baby powder or liquid dye sprayed from bottles is often used. The tradition of playing with these colored powders represents joy, unity, and the colorfulness of spring. Tassa drumming is common at cultural and religious events. Tassa drums are specific to Indo-Caribbean culture. Drums are played in groups and range from
Indo-Caribbean cultural gathering at a mandir, or Hindu temple, in New York. (Courtesy of Natassaja Chowthi)
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high- to low-pitched sounds. The drumming is improvised and rhythmic, and often accompanied by dancing. Indo-Caribbeans also play tassa drums at Hindu weddings. Indo-Guyanese marriages are seen as rites of passage and a step into adulthood. Traditionally, parents select the partner and arrange the marriage. Elaborate Hindu weddings signify social prestige. It is traditional at Indo-Caribbean Hindu weddings for the bride to wear a sari, a wrap made from a long piece of colorful material. Weddings typically take place at a temple and proceed according to religious tradition. Funerals are another type of life event that is attended by family and extended networks of kin, friends, and associates. Kin serve as a support system to the family of the deceased. Grief is publicly articulated at funerals and wakes.
Family Indo-Guyanese families are typically patriarchic, or male-headed, and women and children are subordinate to the male. Marriage rates for Indo-Guyanese tend to be higher than that of Afro-Guyanese because Indo-Guyanese hold more conservative beliefs about relations between men and women. Many Indo-Guyanese practice Hinduism, which informs their beliefs regarding marriage. These beliefs also cast cohabitation, premarital sex, and adultery in a negative light. Family is important to Indo-Guyanese. Relatives who are newly arrived in the United States rely heavily on family who sponsor their migration. Family members work multiple jobs and pool earnings to contribute to the household. Relatives and grandparents may help with childrearing by looking after children while parents are at work. American society imposes different laws and social norms that affect family life for Indo-Guyanese. For example, Indo-Guyanese, and other West Indians, believe in the physical discipline of children. When children misbehave, parents use corporal punishment as a tool for discipline. Laws in the United States that limit physical discipline may see these actions as child abuse. American Indo-Guyanese parents are thus restricted in the way they discipline children. They are also limited in their involvement in children’s lives because of their busy work schedules. Parents may leave children temporarily unsupervised; therefore children have more freedom than they would in Guyana. In Guyana, support networks of kin, teachers, neighbors, and friends helped to raise children. There are villages in Guyana that shared beliefs and cultural context. In America, such villages do not exist in the way that they did in Guyana.
Changing Gender Relations Differences between American and Indo-Guyanese culture also influence the treatment of Indo-Guyanese women. In Guyana, physical abuse towards women was a common problem that may be traced back to its colonial history. During the East Indian indenture period, Europeans imported more East Indian men to Guyana than
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women. There was an overabundance of men that provided women a wide choice among partners. To bind women to the family and restrict social mobility, men asserted power upon women via physical violence. Women were victims of wifebeating, sexual abuse, infidelity, and men’s alcoholism. Alcoholism among Indians in Guyana has been problematic since the 1850s. During the indenture period, alcohol abuse was a response to the cultural disorientation of Indians and harsh living conditions on the plantation. There were reports of frequent intoxication and public drunkenness among Indian immigrant men during this time period. Today, drinking rum continues as part of Indo-Guyanese culture. Rum is often present at social events and is a custom especially among men. In Guyana, men dictate a woman’s life and restrict her decisions regarding employment and education. Women endure sometimes physically and emotionally abusive marriages because of religious beliefs, financial reliance on the husband, or the social stigma of divorce. While the Guyanese legal system prohibits domestic violence, the police poorly enforce the law. Indo-Guyanese women in the United States also experience many of the same abuses but are provided more protection and support options than in Guyana. In response to violence against women, several women’s support groups formed to serve female victims in the Queens area. Sakhi, meaning “women friend,” is an outreach organization against domestic violence that serves South Asian women in New York City. According to Sakhi’s Web site, the largest percent of all survivors of domestic violence come to Sakhi from Queens, where Little Guyana is located. Organization members and outreach activists operate in the community to support women victims. Although the family structure continues to be patriarchal, gender relations in Little Guyana are more equitable than those in Guyana. In Guyana, women achieve lower levels of educational attainment and face marginalization in the workforce. Indo-Guyanese women hold power only in the household realm and in managing relations with kin. Men, on the other hand, have free access to the public realms of the workforce and education. Yet, in New York City, more Guyanese women participate in the labor force than men. Women in New York City must work in order to provide enough earnings for the family. As a result, they gain more decision-making power in the United States than they had in Guyana. Indo-Guyanese women in Little Guyana manage businesses and own local shops and salons. More than homemakers, immigrant Indo-Guyanese women are actively involved in community organizations and a variety of occupations.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Like many other immigrant populations, Indo-Guyanese immigrants struggle to maintain their cultural identity in the United States. In Little Guyana, travel agencies advertise “rediscovery tours of India.” Interested travelers book trips to India
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where they can learn about their ethnic and cultural heritage. Local newspapers also print advertisements for “Indian investments,” in which moneyed investors can purchase acres of Indian land, reestablishing a tie to India. In the local context, Indo-Guyanese celebrate their heritage through cultural and national celebrations and maintain strong ties to Guyana via communications technologies and media. In addition to being a religious holiday, Phagwah for Indo-Guyanese is a cultural and national celebration. Phagwah reflects Indo-Caribbean preservation of transnational ties between Guyana, America, and India. At these events thousands of relatives and friends from Guyana, Toronto, and around the United States come to rejoin family. During the Phagwah parade, Indo-Guyanese wave Guyanese and American flags. In 2007, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg declared May 26 Guyana Independence Day for the city. The event was celebrated with annual concerts and presentations in New York City. Guyanese of all ethnic backgrounds joined to celebrate Guyana’s independence and culture. May 5 is annually observed as Indian Arrival Day, or the day in which indentured East Indians immigrated to Guyana in the 19th century. Indo-Guyanese celebrate this day as a reminder of their Indian ancestry. Another cultural event, the annual Duck Curry Competition, features West Indian foods, “chutney soca” dance performances, and other cultural events. Well-known Guyanese musicians often perform at these events. Another event, the Last Lap Lime is held annually in Toronto and attracts thousands of Guyanese from Canada and New York City. Events like these bring together Guyanese of all ethnic backgrounds and distant locations. Communication technologies also allow Indo-Guyanese to maintain virtual transnational ties. YouTube posts, Facebook groups, and personal blogs are popular not only among Americans. Indo-Guyanese constantly update and access these communication sites. YouTube broadcasts local, amateur videos of Indo-Guyanese weddings, parties, or vacation footage. Indo-Guyanese youth can be seen wearing the latest American fashions or dancing to hip-hop music. Reunification sites are numerous. These sites help relatives and old high school friends reunite online. There are also online directories of Guyanese abroad who voluntarily list their contact information online in hopes of reconnecting with lost or distant loved ones. Sites like Guyanaoutpost.com provide links to directories of Guyanese on the Internet. Online newspapers and journals inform distant Indo-Guyanese on current events in Guyana’s social and political scene. Stabroek News, Guyana Chronicle, and Kaieteur News are prominent online news sources in the Guyanese community. “Guyana community” Web sites feature travel information, recipes, Guyanese news, American news, and Guyanese literature and poetry. Many Indo-Guyanese cyber surfers have joined the intense online dialogue and comment on Guyanese issues. There are also several social and cultural organizations for Indo-Guyanese like the Indo-Caribbean Federation and the Association for Guyanese Americans. Such organizations work to bring awareness to the local Indo-Caribbean and broader
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Queens, New York, community. They promote education and Indo-Caribbean culture by hosting cultural events like Phagwah, Indian Arrival Day, and talent competitions. Local newspapers and journals such as the Caribbean New Yorker and Guyana Journal feature articles relevant to Indo-Caribbeans. These journals and newspapers connect Indo-Caribbeans in America to their West Indian and Indian roots. They include breaking stories and essays on Indian, West Indian, and American politics, government, and economy. Bollywood celebrity gossip and updates on international cricket matches contribute to the Indo-Caribbean community’s entertainment.
Foodways, Music, and Entertainment Liberty Avenue is the main shopping center in Little Guyana. Anything Guyanese can be bought or sold here. The area is especially busy in the summertime, when children are out of school, tourists are seeking a cultural spot to visit, and the weather is perfect for shopping. Numerous Guyanese restaurants, Indian clothing shops, open fresh-food markets, and stores that sell Guyanese gold line Liberty Avenue. Salons, real estate, mortgage, and insurance businesses are major services located in the area. Residential areas are located on either side of Liberty Avenue. These are mostly quiet, family-oriented neighborhoods. The A train runs directly over Liberty Avenue. It and the bus lines that run through this section of Queens provide the transportation for Little Guyana’s residents. Chutney soca and dancehall music resonates from the stereos of vehicles passing on Liberty Avenue. Chutney music is popular in Guyana, Trinidad, and in IndoCaribbean communities abroad. This rhythmic dance music blends West Indian calypso with Indian folk songs (Warikoo 2005). Chutney soca music and Indian folk songs often accompany Indo-Caribbean events. Indian folk songs and songs from Bollywood films are popular among Indo-Caribbeans, a market for India’s products. Older generations of Indo-Guyanese grew up watching Bollywood movies that consequently became part of Indo-Guyanese culture and entertainment. Local television stations in Little Guyana broadcast programming segments that feature Bollywood music videos and traditional Indian folk songs. Local shops also sell Bollywood movies and entertainment for the Indian and Indo-Caribbean communities. The Bollywood tradition that older generations were accustomed to has changed by becoming more westernized. Contemporary Bollywood movies incorporate hip-hop styled dances and more scandalous clothing for women, as opposed to traditional styles of dress. Cricket is a prominent pastime in Little Guyana. This sport originated in Europe and became a part of Indian culture when India was under British rule. When East Indians arrived in Guyana, cricket traveled with them. It continues as a major
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leisure activity in Guyana and Little Guyana. Families and other spectators meet at park fields in Richmond Hill to watch local cricket matches. These fields in Richmond Hill are the typical sporting venue for cricket matches. Members of the community play and organize cricket clubs. Some clubs consist of local businessmen preparing for annual competitions. Cricket is a pastime that connects the players, supporting families, and the community. One of the most distinct aspects of Indo-Caribbean culture is the uniqueness of the food. These foods combine Indian, West Indian, and Chinese ingredients and dishes. In Little Guyana, roti shops and Guyanese-Chinese restaurants receive high traffic daily. Roti is a round flatbread (similar to a tortilla) used for eating curry and other dishes. Curry and rice are common Indo-Guyanese dishes. Guyanese-Chinese food is Chinese food cooked Guyanese-style. It usually consists of fried rice, chow mein, and a mix of Indo-Guyanese foods, like Tandoori chicken. Tandoori chicken is an Indian dish in which chicken is marinated in a sauce that consists of spices, yogurt, peppers, and other various ingredients. Indo-Guyanese food also includes Caribbean foods like fried plantains and “cook-up.” Cook-up is a stew made of rice, coconut milk, black-eyed peas, and meats. Pepperpot is another distinctly Guyanese dish. It is a stew derived from Amerindian culture that includes various meats, peppers, and cassareep, a molasses-like preservative from the cassava fruit. Guyanese food in general reflects the ethnic diversity and cultural richness of Guyanese people.
Integration and Impact of U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship American society imposes certain expectations on immigrants, one of which is eventual naturalization. Naturalization entails continuous residence in the United States for five years and completion of a naturalization interview and application. Immigrants seeking naturalization must display certain qualities expected of American citizens. They must have entered the United States lawfully, show allegiance to the United States and understand the U.S. Constitution and history. They must also speak, understand, and write simple English (though some exemptions are made for those over 50 years old). One advantage that IndoGuyanese have over many immigrants in that they are English speaking. In Guyana English is the official language. According to the Department of Homeland Security, in 2009, over 6,600 Guyanese immigrants obtained legal permanent resident status and nearly 75,000 Guyanese immigrants have obtained this status since 2000.
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Intergroup Relations Although Indo-Caribbeans in New York City mostly live in Little Guyana, they work and do business in the larger American public, where they encounter intergroup boundaries, stereotypes, and interethnic relations. The relations between ethnic groups in the United States differ from those in Guyana because there are different groups in America, especially in New York City. Here different groups delineate social territories, or “turfs” that are often crossed. “Turf” refers to the physical or social territory claimed by a group. It can be allocated according to certain rules and governed by social boundaries. The United States provides new turf for Indo-Guyanese. In Guyana, the main ethnic conflict centered between Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese. In the United States, where there are other West Indians, Latinos, Asians, and many other race groups, the polarized Indo-Guyanese versus Afro-Guyanese conflict tends to recede. The new social context and wider social space lessens the conflict between the two groups. In addition, social interactions that occur during cultural or national celebrations create a shared sense of unity among Guyanese people. Indo- and Afro-Guyanese relationships and intermarriages are not unheard of; yet, group boundaries still remain. In New York City, these two groups continue to self-segregate. Overt interethnic conflict, although not widespread, happens in Little Guyana. According to local news sources in Queens, residents accused the police of racially profiling Guyanese people in Richmond Hill. Guyanese have been disproportionately targeted for minor traffic offenses and arrests. After September 11, 2001, Sikh men (who wear a turban) and other Indo-Guyanese were the targets of hostilities and racial violence due to their appearance, which was mistaken as a resemblance to Middle Easterners. In 2007, a plot that involved three Guyanese and Trinidadian men at the JFK International Airport in Queens stirred commotion and conversation in the media. American media associated Guyanese immigrants with Islamic terrorists. The event startled Americans and Indo-Guyanese alike, who view Little Guyana and other Guyanese neighborhoods as peaceful and multicultural communities. Although final investigations did not link the JFK plot to Little Guyana or the Guyanese community, the event unfortunately contributed to negative images of Guyana nationals. Indo-Guyanese immigrants also face the task of providing constant definitions of their ethnic identity for their American counterparts. Indo-Guyanese physically resemble other South Asians. However, their accent is West Indian. The geographical mismatch between Indo-Guyanese’s Indian appearance and West Indian language confuses many Americans. Indo-Guyanese must explain their Indian ancestry and Guyanese nationality. Job applications and college forms only provide a few racial categories, usually white, African American, Asian or Pacific Islander, American
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Indian, and Hispanic or Latino. Indo-Guyanese may select multiple categories that do not accurately fit their ethnic background. No category is specific to Guyana, which is culturally Caribbean, located in South America, but not Spanishspeaking. The creation of an Indo-Caribbean enclave has allowed Indo-Guyanese to create a sense of identity. It also provides a sense of comfort and familiarity. Like their American counterparts who settled into communities across the United States, Indo-Guyanese became comfortable in their community and around other people who share their culture, experiences, identity, language, and traditions. Some IndoGuyanese initially moved to Tampa, Florida, or other American cities, then later chose to move to New York because of the large Indo-Caribbean population there. Being among familiar faces makes the adjustment to American society less daunting than attempting to incorporate into a community of strangers. Indo-Guyanese often talk to one another in “old talk.” Old talk refers to the habitual, regional dialect in Guyana. This language is English, but it incorporates culture-specific words and phrases. This way of talking has its own rhythm and flow, and resembles other West Indian accents. Indo-Guyanese can make references to Guyana and tell stories to which Americans cannot relate. In addition, Indo-Guyanese participate in code switching. Code switching is the ability to converse in American Standard English when speaking to non-Guyanese Americans, then instinctively slipping into the Caribbean dialect or old talk when among family or close friends.
Political Associations and Organizations Political organizations in Little Guyana support community empowerment and provide a representative voice for Indo-Caribbeans in Queens. Local politicians include attorneys, business professionals, and community leaders. They encourage Indo-Caribbean self-awareness, education, and participation during election seasons. Political clubs meet on a regular basis and provide an outlet for community dialogue. Unfortunately, however, the Indo-Guyanese population is not very active in participating in formal political affairs of Richmond Hill. The reason for this owes to their lack of trust in Indo-Caribbean politicians. Political mistrust stems back to the political context in Guyana, where political actors utilized race as a tool for party antagonism and national division. Indo-Guyanese who migrated during the 1960s remembered the victimization of Indians in Guyana by PNC supporters. Those who fled during the Burnham era emigrated to escape political corruption. Although the American political system rests on principles of a representative democracy and provides a new political context for emerging leaders in Richmond Hill, Indo-Guyanese continue to doubt Indo-Caribbean politicians. For those eligible to vote, the structure of daily life also limits their opportunity to vote. After
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having to work long or multiple shifts during the day, by the time many IndoGuyanese commute home the polling stations are closed. In Richmond Hill, some organizations eventually collapse under the problems of regulation and management. Local politicians and other interest groups often seek out these organizations and monopolize meetings to gain public visibility or seek donations. In addition, residents in the local community may view these meetings as spaces in which they can voice their community complaints, rather than contribute to the community dialogue. These issues frustrate community leaders and politicians who seek to give political voice to Little Guyana. Yet, local leaders continue to work and encourage local Indo-Caribbean involvement in the political process even going door-to-door to register voters in Richmond Hill. As a result of limited political participation, Indo-Guyanese are not very well represented. American politicians lack the cultural expertise to reach out to the community, often overlooking the needs of Indo-Caribbeans. As a result, Richmond Hill lacks essential resources such as immigration support services, youth development facilities, and senior centers. After-school centers could provide a place for children who are unsupervised while parents are away at work. In the same way, when household members are out at work or in school, retired Guyanese immigrants remain home alone without medical assistance or social activities to engage them. Senior citizens are culturally integral to Indo-Guyanese families and the community because they help with child-rearing and pass along traditional values and cultural heritage. The inadequate senior centers in Richmond Hill are often underfunded and vandalized. Local Indo-Caribbean politicians try to bring these needs “to the table” during their campaigns, but without significant response from their constituents. Religion often plays a role in the political affairs of Richmond Hill. Religion has historically been an integral force in guiding the politics in Guyana. In the 1950s, the Catholic Church in Guyana publicly disapproved of the PPP’s socialist political stance. Other Christian denominations also censured the Guyanese government during the Burnham era. In the 1980s, religious councils and the government clashed on issues related to the failings of the PNC. In Richmond Hill, religion and politics continue their antagonistic relationship. Clergy perform the central role of leading the spiritual and social lives of Indo-Guyanese. When these leaders do not support particular Indo-Caribbean politicians, their stance influences those of the congregation. Religious and political leaders sometimes have conflicted on their interests for the community. Indo-Caribbean politicians often struggle in garnering support without the endorsement of religious leaders. At cultural events like Phagwah, parade organizers do not allow politicians to sponsor a float in the parade. The event is seen as a religious and cultural event and not a political one. Yet, the event does provide a space for local politicians to interact with residents.
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While Indo-Guyanese are not active in formal governance, it does not mean that they lack political power altogether. The Indo-Caribbean cultural and political organizations in Richmond Hill openly acknowledge Indo-Caribbean political identity as the focus of their work. Their publications place emphasis on their identity as an Indian diaspora with transnational political connections to India, Guyana, and the United States. Through initiating and building upon community dialogue, they have begun to mobilize Indo-Caribbean political power. Several organizations have been successful in mobilizing the community to engage in a reflection of Guyana’s political past in order to improve Indo-Guyanese Americans’ political future.
Return Migration In the 1990s the Guyanese government sought to re-attract overseas Guyanese through a “Remigration Scheme.” The plan mostly attracted Guyanese professionals and business persons. Indo-Guyanese professionals also periodically returned to Guyana to maintain their overseas businesses. Some Indo-Guyanese return to attend cricket finals, while others return to visit with family. These visits are temporary and usually not a sign of permanent return migration. Guyana continues to lose population to emigration. In 1960, Guyana’s population was about 630,000. By 1995, demographers estimated that it should have doubled to nearly 1.5 million. However, Guyana’s population has been hovering at only around 750,000 since 2000. Some Indo-Guyanese desire to return to Guyana. They experience a different America than the “melting pot” or “promised land” to which they looked forward. When they migrated to the United States, like many other Indo-Guyanese, they cashed in on their assets and used the money to purchase a home in the United States. In order to return to Guyana, they would have to resell their homes in Richmond Hill and use the money to re-purchase a home in Guyana. However, home values have inflated since they left Guyana leaving them unable to afford to repurchase a home in Guyana. They have become economically “stuck” in America. Still, Little Guyana has become a home-away-from-home for many IndoGuyanese. Since migrating, they have established businesses, started families, and created social connections in America. Older immigrant generations feel satisfied and rooted in Little Guyana. Little Guyana holds the potential as serving as a launching point for the second generation of Indo-Guyanese, who may eventually branch out into communities and cities across America if they follow a similar trajectory as other immigrant populations. The community provides resources and opportunities that allow future generations more opportunities than were available in Guyana. They can obtain jobs outside of Richmond Hill, enroll in American universities, and relocate to new cities in the United States. The
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older generation sees Little Guyana as a launching pad for younger generations’ success.
The Second and Later Generations The term “first generation” refers to the foreign-born group of Indo-Guyanese who migrated to the United States. Their children, born in the United States, are the second generation, and they have experiences, a culture, and an identity that is very different from that of their parents. In a recent study of the Indo-Guyanese community in Queens, a first-generation Indo-Guyanese interviewee expressed concern for the second generation: I’m kind of worried about my children. I grew up in a house that had no refrigerator. I mean ice for us was a big thing. You had to go to the store and buy ice. . . . And here my kids come home they open the refrigerator and there’s cold stuff there, and it’s like, and I’m not saying that they should be at a disadvantage, but I’m worried for them in the sense that—I never had a television in my house, we used to go to a neighbor’s house and watch television. We went to the movies, yeah, but we don’t come home and turn on the TV, you know, and were exposed to all these different things. And I think that help mold and shape who I am today. I don’t know how its gonna turn out for my children and our future generation if we’re living in conspicuous consumption or in an age of excess, I don’t know. (Chowthi 2009) The second generation did not experience life in Guyana. Although their parents told them stories about Guyana’s circumstances and educated them about their ethnic history, the second generation grew up in American society. Here, life is easier than life in Guyana. The second generation also grew up in a technological era of cell phones, laptop computers, Internet, and Facebook. The first generation values hard work and wants their children to realize the opportunity that America presents. Thus, there exists a degree of tension between the generations. The second generation also grew up in a racially diverse American society. At the schools they attend in New York City, they interact with many racial groups. Richmond Hill is not solely an Indo-Caribbean neighborhood; it is also comprised of Latinos, Asian Indians, African Americans, and whites. Indo-Guyanese youth can choose from various styles of dress, musical genres, and ways of communication from the diverse cultural tool kits available to them. They find a common way of interacting and find shared interests. Different styles of music other than chutney soca have become popular among Indo-Caribbean youth. As a result of diverse interactions and American cultural influence, second-generation youth in
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New York City are more cosmopolitan than their non-Indo-Guyanese American counterparts.
Ethnic Identity Second-generation Indo-Guyanese have a wide range of ethnic identities to select from. Identifying with just one racial or ethnic group is a challenge for these cosmopolitan youth. Like the first generation, second-generation Indo-Guyanese must create an identity for themselves within the context of the United States. They do not neatly fit into racial or ethnic categories like those presented on census forms; they form their own unique ethnic identity different than that of South Asians and other Guyanese. Indo-Guyanese who grow up in the United States have a fluid identity that is not easily defined. They incorporate diverse experiences and interactions with other ethnic groups into their sense of self, seeing themselves as IndoGuyanese and Americans. They often identify with other Indian Americans and with Afro-Caribbeans. Indo-Guyanese youth do, however, draw boundaries around what they are not. In high school, youth refer to stereotypes, use racial epithets, and make group distinctions. The word “coolie” is used in Indo-Caribbean communities. The word was used historically to refer to Indian indentured servants; however, when used by non-Indians, the term is pejorative and offensive to Guyanese of Indian decent. However, Indo-Guyanese also use the word among themselves to describe certain cultural behaviors. One can behave very much “like a coolie,” engaging in cultural-specific behaviors. Indo-Guyanese youth distinguish themselves from other groups; they are not entirely Indian, but of Indian ancestry. Similarly, they are not entirely West Indian or Guyanese because those labels hold the connotations of being of African ancestry. The second generation redefines itself in American society.
Cultural Identification Indo-Guyanese are a small and new population in the United States, and the second generation is still relatively young. Research on the Indo-Caribbean second generation explores how youth feel pulled in the direction of the mainstream culture of the United States while simultaneously being drawn back by cultures of their own people. The Indo-Guyanese second generation experiences diverse interactions in New York City that fosters fluid, hybrid, or cosmopolitan identities. They feel pulled between two cultures and redefine what it means to be American and Guyanese. Indo-Caribbean youth stay abreast of American trends, fashion, and popular culture. New immigrants learn about American culture through movies, music videos, and advertisements as sources of reference for the latest American trends. Indo-Guyanese youth incorporate the most recent fashion trend into their dress.
872 | Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants
Shundell Prasad, Filmmaker Shundell Prasad graduated from the highly acclaimed Tisch School of the Arts in New York, where she studied film and television production. She directed and produced Once More Removed: A Journey Back to India, her documentary film debut that tracked Prasad’s ethnic ancestry back to India. Prasad began her travels in the Indo-Caribbean community in Queens, New York, after which she journeyed to Guyana, her country of birth. Prasad located her family’s archived ship records and traced her heritage back to the Bihar province in India. The film reflects on the Indian diaspora, transnationalism, Indian indentureship, and the rich multicontinental cultural history of Indo-Guyanese people. Prasad pursued her ethnic lineage because of questions that she herself had about her ethnic identity, questions that she learned over 20 million other persons of the Indian diaspora shared. Prasad’s film career includes work with HBO’s documentary division and as an associate producer for CNN. Prasad also worked for the Wall Street Journal, A&E/The History Channel, and on CBS’s Emmy award–winning series The Amazing Race. Prasad has traveled to over 10 countries internationally, including Guyana, India, and countries in the Caribbean. She also speaks Hindi. Prasad is interested in issues of social significance such as Asian women’s rights, poverty, and slavery. Among all of her accomplishments, Prasad was invited by the Indian government to speak on the Indian diaspora at an international conference in 2006. She met with Guyana’s president Bharrat Jagdeo in working on her documentary film. In her mid-twenties, Prasad currently lives in New York and continues to travel and work in film. (http://www.oncemoreremoved.com/.)
Most recently, hip-hop clothing styles and basketball shoes are popular clothing styles among male youth. On Liberty Avenue, shoppers purchase American brands alongside Guyanese items. For Indo-Guyanese, American name brands are visible markers of identity. The fixation over these brand names was a common trend in Guyana influenced by the circulation between the countries. When a family member returned to Guyana to visit, they would “show off” their worldly, cosmopolitan lifestyle and status through their clothing. In this way, consumerism has become culturally ingrained among Indo-Guyanese and marks one’s entrance as an American. Those who do not own material objects that mark their success and status are seen as “lesser and incomplete” persons. The second generation in Little Guyana is more autonomous than youth in Guyana. Since both parents work and are unable to consistently monitor their child’s school progress and social activities, they often leave children unsupervised. The child lacks the “village,” or the tight network of neighbors, relatives, and community
The Second and Later Generations | 873
members that help with child-rearing in Guyana. While rum-drinking has always been a way of celebrating, especially during weddings, festivals, and family occasions in the Indo-Guyanese community, a new trend, especially among the younger second generation, is that of the party culture and nightclub industry. In Richmond Hill, Caribbean clubs, such as Club Tobago, are quite popular. At these clubs, DJs spin the latest dancehall and soca tracks. Newspapers and flyers use catchy slogans to advertise parties and special occasions. Celebration with alcohol combined with the nightclub industry keeps the “party lifestyle” a focus for many. There is gender variation in the way Indo-Caribbeans feel about their traditional culture. For example, Indo-Caribbean boys and girls include various styles of dress into their personal appearance. According to a 2005 study of gender and ethnic identity, Indo-Caribbean girls tended to identify more with Indian culture, while boys distanced themselves from it (Warikoo). Indo-Caribbean girls were more interested in Indian clothing, movies, music, and traditions. Boys on the other hand viewed Bollywood movies and Indian clothing as being traditionally feminine things. Boys associated Indian-ness with powerlessness. Boys preferred to identify with American cultural aspects, like hip-hop clothing and music. They viewed these physical appearances as being more masculine and cool.
A group of boys, one sporting a Guyanese flag, at a Phagwah festival in New York. (Courtesy of Natassaja Chowthi)
874 | Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants
However, at events like Phagwah, cultural, national, and transnational elements are woven together. In spite of the older generation’s concerns that younger generations forget or take their culture for granted, younger generations actively engage in Indo-Guyanese culture. Youth groups participate in Caribbean cultural groups and school activities at their high schools. Teenagers perform tassa drumming. They also participate in pageants and perform traditional dances at cultural festivals. They know the words to Indian folk songs and can sing along. Large numbers of youth attend the Phagwah parade, after which they congregate at a local park to continue the celebration. They represent “the colors” by sporting Guyanese flags.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Guyana In the past, the United States influenced Guyana’s political, governmental, and economic problems. When Cheddi Jagan took office in 1953, the United States feared him to be a communist supporter and radical socialist. Jagan was born in Guyana but spent many years in the United States, where he attended Howard University and Northwestern University. When Jagan returned to Guyana, he used his political awareness and experience in America to form a party centered on labor union rights. He identified with several political ideologies, calling himself a “Marxist and a left-wing socialist” (Rabe 2005). In the 1950s, the United States was especially keen to monitoring potential communist threats around the world. Jagan and other PPP members had visited Germany and had contacts in communist countries. In addition, PPP members had been invited to Cuba during the Cuban revolution. While the PPP never posed an overt communist threat, the United States dispatched international officials into Guyana to report on PPP party dealings. President John F. Kennedy kept a watchful eye on the goings-on between Guyana and the Soviet Union. The fear was that Soviet Russia would ally with Guyana and build a military base. Guyana was within closer proximity to the United States than Russia and thus could pose a security threat to the United States and allies in Central or South America. When the PPP entered office, the United States sought to oust the party in favor of a more conservative base. In the 1950s the British dispatched commissions to investigate the governmental affairs in Guyana. These commissions declared that PPP members were extremists, and Forbes Burnham was a less-threatening moderate, democratic socialist. These international commissions invited Burnham to leave the PPP or assume control of the party. London did not want to grant independence to a potentially dangerous and communist Guyana. In 1955, Burnham split with the PPP to form the PNC. International actors supported Burnham’s move to take control and develop an anticommunist Guyana. In cooperation with the British, Eisenhower’s administration
Issues in Relations between the United States and Guyana | 875
provided nearly a million dollars to assist with infrastructure and industry development in Guyana. While the Eisenhower administration merely supported the decisions made in London regarding Guyana’s independence, the subsequent Kennedy administration was more aggressive in its intervention in Guyana. The administration was wary of Guyana’s proximity to and sympathetic relations with Cuba. They warned against another “Castro” in the Western Hemisphere and organized CIA operations in Guyana. In 1961, Jagan met in Washington with President Kennedy and state department officials. Jagan assured the president of his democratic beliefs and asked for financial assistance for Guyana’s future. Shortly after the meeting in Washington, arsonists and rioters burned down the capital city of Georgetown, Guyana. AfroGuyanese terrorized Indians in the city streets, burned and looted Indian businesses. The city was in chaos, and PPP and PNC opposition aggravated ethnic tensions. Burnham organized mobs to “bring government down to the streets” (Rabe 2005). According to declassified CIA documents, the CIA aided in the Georgetown burning. The crisis prevented Jagan’s efforts to ameliorate the United States’ perceptions of the PPP. It also delayed Guyana’s independence, providing international actors the time to help install the PNC government, a safer choice than the PPP. State Department officials also influenced the result of the 1964 elections. Under the direction of the CIA, Burnham formed a coalition with a minority party, the United Front Party (UF) in order to win the majority of the vote. The CIA helped finance and advise the PNC-UF campaign. In addition, the Johnson administration offered over $10 million in economic aid after Burnham’s election. In the 1964 election, Burnham and the PNC won the majority of parliamentary seats. After the election President Johnson granted aid to Burnham for infrastructural development. The racial violence continued in Guyana but was of little concern to the United States, who was mainly concerned with limiting communist threats in the region. In the years that followed, the United States cooled its position towards Guyana, and tension between the two countries subsided. However, the social and economic situation in Guyana worsened. Elections continued to be rigged to ensure that Burnham would stay in power, and Afro-Guyanese victimization of Indians led to mass emigration. Guyana gained the most visibility by Americans not for its domestic ethnic tensions, nor its communist threat exaggerated by international actors, nor for its economic problems but for the sensational Jonestown Massacre of 1978. International media attention spotlighted Guyana when Reverend Jim Jones from San Francisco led over 900 American cult followers to their deaths in a mass suicide. The suicide plot was incited by Jones’s attempt to escape investigation for the murder of California congressman Leo Ryan. Ryan had traveled to Guyana to investigate Jones and the small commune that he had established in Guyana. In the early 1970s, Jones moved his followers from San Francisco to a remote location in Guyana he named
876 | Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants
Jonestown. Jones founded the small settlement in Guyana’s western countryside, out of eyesight of the majority of the Guyanese population. However, the PNC was aware of the Jonestown settlement. During Ryan’s investigation in Guyana, Jones and a cohort of supporters gunned down Ryan and his group. The event raised U.S. scrutiny of the PNC government. The United States continues to monitor elections and politics in Guyana to ensure organized and democratic governance. International actors have increasingly focused on human rights issues. In a 2008 human rights report by the U.S. State Department, police brutality and unlawful killing, continued government corruption, and abuses toward women and children were found to be pervasive rights violations in Guyana. Guyana’s inconsistent enforcement of laws has exacerbated the problems. Investigatory teams have been sent to observe the electoral process in Guyana. In a recent report from the Carter Center’s Global Development Initiative, the electoral process in Guyana was found to be significantly improved since the Burnham regime and previous administrations. However, the improvements in the election process had not alleviated Guyana’s economic dilemma, ethnic division, or government disorganization.
Forecasts for the 21st Century Even though Guyana’s government continues in its efforts towards rebuilding its economy and improving social relations, emigration will persist. By 2010 more Guyanese resided outside of Guyana than within the country. Migration to the United States from Guyana will continue to account for a large part of this diaspora. Political, economic, and social push factors will continue to fuel Indo-Guyanese mass movement to the United States. Migration will also be encouraged by the cumulative momentum of overseas networks and institutionalization in the United States. Naturalizations in the United States are expected to continue increasing. Likewise, the sociohistorical context of Guyana will continue to influence IndoGuyanese migrants in the United States: their political views, racial identity, gender relations, and multifaceted culture. It will influence the way in which the identity of the second generation is constructed. Moreover, places like Little Guyana in Richmond Hill, New York, will continue to serve as transnational communities facilitating immigrant incorporation into the United States.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics
Table 129 Guyanese naturalizations, 1999–2008 Year
Number of naturalizations
1999
10,347
2000
10,794
2001
7,038
2002
7,220
2003
4,929
2004
4,877
2005
5,543
2006
7,434
2007
5,631
2008
8,290
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Table 130 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and country of birth
878
Total Guyana
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
5,719
8,279
9,938
6,809
6,351
9,317
9,552
5,726
6,823
6,670
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 131 States with highest Guyanese populations, 2000 State
Population
Percentage
New York
109,104
67.16
New Jersey
14,296
8.80
Florida
11,842
7.29
Maryland
5,315
3.27
Georgia
3,779
2.33
18,120
11.15
All others United States total
162,456
100
Source: United States 2000 Census.
Table 132 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 leading states of residence region/country: Guyana Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
6,670
2,932
3,738
Arizona
9
D
D
California
71
34
37
Colorado
12
5
7
Connecticut
104
39
65
Florida
614
272
342
Georgia
144
58
86
16
5
11
Illinois Maryland
242
102
140
Massachusetts
58
25
33
Michigan
15
D
D
Minnesota
110
50
60
6
D
D
547
231
316
Nevada New Jersey New York
4,363
1,948
2,415
North Carolina
35
17
18
Ohio
37
14
23
Pennsylvania
75
34
41
Texas
58
23
35
Virginia
38
13
25
Other
116
49
67
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009. Cobbook 88. 2010. Note: D ⫽ Data withheld to limit disclosure.
879
880 | Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of Indo-Guyanese in the United States. Backtrackers and other illegal immigrants are not counted in migration statistics. The statistics available may omit significant numbers of Indo-Guyanese. These statistics generally refer to the entire “Guyanese” population and include Guyanese of all ethnic backgrounds. According to the 2000 Census, over 160,000 persons reported “Guyanese” as their national background. Guyanese are the fourth-largest immigrant group in New York City. In 2000, over 130,000 Guyanese resided in the New York City area alone. The relationship between the United States and Guyana is one of constant migration. In the late 1980s, 10,000 to 30,000 Guyanese emigrated legally and illegally. In 2008, over 8,000 Guyanese immigrants were naturalized. Over 60,000 Guyanese immigrants became naturalized citizens since 2000.
Age
2000 Population in Queens Community District 9 85 to 89 80 to 84 75 to 79 70 to 74 65 to 69 60 to 64 55 to 59 50 to 54 45 to 49 40 to 44 35 to 39 30 to 34 25 to 29 20 to 24 15 to 19 10 to 14 5 to 9 Under 5 0
2,000
4,000
6,000 8,000 Population
Figure 16 2000 population in Queens Community District 9.
10,000
12,000
14,000
Appendix III: Notable Indo-Guyanese Americans | 881 Table 133 Demographic features of Guyanese in 2000 Official population size in United States Median age Median household size Median household income Home ownership Poverty Education Naturalizations in the United States
162,456 36 3–4 persons $41,960 48.5% owner occupied 13.4% 65.4% high school graduate 72,103 since 1999
Source: United States 2000 Census and 2005 American Community Survey.
Appendix III: Notable Indo-Guyanese Americans Because Indo-Guyanese are a small and relatively new population in the United States, there are very few prominent Indo-Guyanese Americans. However, as the second generation ages and the population continue to grow, more notable IndoGuyanese will emerge in United States. This list includes prominent Indo-Guyanese from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Dave Baksh, Canadian, is former lead guitarist for Canadian rock band Sum 41. Sum 41 is also a rock band popular in the United States. Albert Baldeo is a rising Indo-Guyanese politician in Richmond Hill. Baldeo was born in Guyana and migrated to New York City, where he pursued a career in law. His practice focuses on immigration rights and reform, real estate, and other areas that affect the Indo-Caribbean community. Baldeo nearly won a democratic seat in the New York State Senate race in 2006. Shakira Caine is a former model, actress, and current wife of actor Michael Caine. Caine placed third in the 1967 Miss World pageant in London. David Dabydeen is a poet, novelist, and critic. Dabydeen is a professor at the University of Warwick, where he is also director of the Centre for Caribbean Studies. Dabydeen’s work has received numerous prizes and awards, including the Commonwealth Poetry Prize for his first book, Slave Song, a collection of poems, and the Anthony Sabga Prize for Literature in 2008. His work explores the history of Guyanese people and life experiences in Guyana. Dabydeen currently serves as the Guyanese Ambassador to UNESCO. Shundell Prasad is a filmmaker in New York City. Her documentary film work traces her ancestry back to India.
882 | Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants
Glossary Amerindians: The native inhabitants of Guyana who lived in indigenous lands. There are Amerindian reservations in central Guyana to preserve Amerindian culture and lands. Backtrack: An illegal enterprise that allows Guyanese immigrants to enter through the “back door.” A backtracker first pays a fee to smugglers before leaving Guyana. They are provided valid passports of actual U.S. residents whose photo is replaced with that of the backtracker. The backtracker enters an intermediate, or “pipeline,” country such as Brazil or Venezuela before arrival in the United States. Chutney soca: a popular musical genre in Guyana, Trinidad and among other Indo-Caribbean people. This rhythmic dance music blends West Indian calypso with Indian folk songs. Coolie: A term historically used to describe Indian indentured servants. Use of the term is usually pejorative and refers to individuals of Indian descent. The word “coolie” is both used as a racial epithet and to describe Indo-Guyanese cultural behaviors. To “act like a coolie” means to behave in a certain manner, or to act very Guyanese. Indo-Guyanese: Refers to the ethnic identity of Guyanese persons of East Indian descent. Pepperpot: A common Guyanese dish that derived from the Amerindian culture. Pepperpot is cooked by stewing various meats with peppers and cassareep, a seasoned molasses-like preservative from the cassava fruit. Phagwah: A religious holiday from the Hindu religion. Also called “Holi,” it is celebrated in March. Phagwah ushers in the new spring season and is celebrated by a “festival of colors.” In Little Guyana, Queens, New York, the event is observed by a series of cultural festivals that are filled with food, dance, and musical performances. The Phagwah parade on Liberty Avenue attracts Indo-Caribbeans, family members from Toronto and Guyana, and local New Yorkers. Tassa drums: Drums specific to Indo-Caribbean culture. Drums are played in groups and range from high- to low-pitched sounds. The drumming is improvised and rhythmic, and often accompanied by dancing.
References Abraham, Sara. 2001. “The Shifting Sources of Racial Definition in Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana: A Research Agenda.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24: 979. Abraham, Sara. 2007. Labour and the Multiracial Project in the Caribbean: Its History and Its Promise. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Berger, Joseph. 2004. “Indian Twice Removed.” New York Times. December 14. [Online article; retrieved 9/24/08.] http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/17/nyregion/17guyanese.html.
References | 883 Canterbury, Dennis C. 1997. “The Impact of Neoliberalism on Labour in Guyana: A Case from the Caribbean.” Labour, Capital & Society 30: 261–89. Carter Center, “International Peacemaking and Human Rights Programs, Guyana.” [Online article; retrieved 7/20/09.] http://www.cartercenter.org/countries/guyana.html. Chowthi, Natassaja. 2009. Changing Places and Questions of Identity: The Fluid Lives of First Generation Indo-Guyanese. Master’s thesis. [Online information; retrieved 5/27/11.] http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/listing.aspx?id=2436. Clement, R., S. S. Singh, and S. Gaudet. 2006. “Identity and Adaptation among Minority Indo-Guyanese: Influence of Generational Status, Gender, Reference Group and Situation.” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 9: 289–304. Dobnik, Verena. 2007. “Trying Times for NYC Guyanese Community.” Washington Post. June 7. [Online article; retrieved 7/20/09.] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2007/06/07/AR2007060700220.html. Fasanella, Richard. 2000. “Converting Queens, Needed Shelter or Potential Danger?” Queens Tribune. [Online article; retrieved 7/20/09.] http://www.queenstribune.com/ archives/featurearchive/feature2000/0217/index.html. Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. 1992. A Country Study: Guyana. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. Gowricharn, Ruben S. 2006. Caribbean Transnationalism: Migration, Pluralization, and Social Cohesion. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Griffith, Ivelaw L. 1997. “Political Change, Democracy, and Human Rights in Guyana.” Third World Quarterly 18: 267–85. Guyana Bureau of Statistics. “Population Composition.” 2002 Census. Georgetown, Guyana. [Online article; retrieved 7/20/09.] http://www.statisticsguyana.gov.gy/census. html. Guyana Chronicle. 2007. [Online article; retrieved 9/24/08.] http://www.guyanachronicle.com/. Guyana Journal. 2009. Site maintained by Gary Girdhari. [Online article; retrieved 9/24/08.] http://www.guyanajournal.com/. Guyana Outpost. 2009. Site maintained by Wayne Moses. [Online article; retrieved 9/24/08.] http://guyanaoutpost.com/guyana.shtml. Halstead, Narmala. 2005. “Branding ‘Perfection’: Foreign as Self; Self as ‘ForeignForeign.’ ” Journal of Material Culture 7(3): 273–93. Kasinitz, Philip, John Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters. 2004. Becoming New Yorkers: Ethnographies of the New Second Generation. New York: Russell Sage. Mangru, Brenda, and Pillai Madhu. Voices of New York: Indo-Guyanese, A LOTE speaking Community in Richmond Hill, NY. New York: New York University [Online article; retrieved 7/20/09.] http://www.nyu.edu/classes/blake.map2001/indo.html. Mars, P. 2001. “Ethnic Politics, Mediation, and Conflict Resolution: The Guyana experience.” Journal of Peace Research 38: 353–72. Massey, Douglas S. 1995. “The New Immigration and Ethnicity in the United States.” Population & Development Review 21: 631–52.
884 | Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants Misir, Prem, ed. 2006. Cultural Identity and Creolization in National Unity: The Multiethnic Caribbean. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Moore, Brian L. 1995. Cultural Power, Resistance, and Pluralism: Colonial Guyana, 1838–1900. Montreal; Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press; Barbados: Press University of the West Indies. Nettles, Kimberly D. 1995. “Home Work: An Examination of the Sexual Division of Labor in the Urban Households of the East Indian and African Guyanese.” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 26: 427. Peake, Linda, and Alissa Trotz. 1999. Gender, Ethnicity and Place: Women and Identities in Guyana. London: Routledge. Persaud, Farah. 2008. “Immigration and Women’s Empowerment: Indo-Caribbeans in New York City.” Honors College Theses. Paper 77. [Online article; retrieved 7/31/09.] http:// digitalcommons.pace.edu/honorscollege_theses/77. Plaza, Dwaine. 2006. “The Construction of a Segmented Hybrid Identity Among One-anda-Half-Generation and Second-Generation Indo-Caribbean and African Caribbean Canadians.” Identity 6: 207–29. Premdas, Ralph R. 1995. “Racism and Anti-Racism in the Caribbean.” In Racism and Anti-Racism in World Perspective, edited by B. P. Bowser, 241–60. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Rabe, Stephen G. 2005. U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story. University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, NC. Ramraj, Robert. 2003. Guyana: Population, Environment, Economic Activities. Greensboro, NC: Battleground Printing and Publishing. Roopnarine, Lomarsh. 2001. “Indo-Guyanese Migration: From Plantation to Metropolis.” Immigrants & Minorities 20: 1–25. Roopnarine, Lomarsh. 2005. “Indo-Caribbean Intra-Island Migration: Not So Marginalized!” Social and Economic Studies 52: 107–36. Roopnarine, Lomarsh. 2006. “Indo-Caribbean Social Identity.” Caribbean Quarterly 52: 1–10. Tanikella, Leela. 2009. “Voices from Home and Abroad: New York City’s Indo-Caribbean Media.” International Journal of Cultural Studies 12(2): 167–85. Trotz, D. A. 2005. “Rethinking Caribbean Transnational Connections: Conceptual Itineraries.” Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs 6: 41–59. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, Refugee, Asylum, and Parole System. “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008.” Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security. [Online article; retrieved 7/20/09.] http:// www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm. U.S. Department of State. “Human Right Report: Guyana. 2008.” Washington, D.C. [Online article; retrieved 7/20/09.] http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119162.htm. Vertovec, Steven. 2004. “Migrant Transnationalism and Modes of Transformation.” International Migration Review 38: 970–1001.
Further Reading | 885 Warikoo, Natasha. 2003. “The Importance of Social Context: Gendered Ethnic Identities among 1.5 and Second Generation Indo-Caribbeans.” In Conference Papers—American Sociological Association, 1–21. American Sociological Association. [Online article; retrieved 5/25/11.] http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p107867_index.html. Warikoo, Natasha. 2005. “Gender and Ethnic Identity among Second-generation IndoCaribbeans.” Ethnic & Racial Studies 28: 803–31. Waters, Mary C. 1990. Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Waters, Mary C. 2002. The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation. New York: Russell Sage Foundation
Further Reading Abraham, Sara. 2007. Labour and the Multiracial Project in the Caribbean: It History and Its Promise. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Covers political developments in Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana with focus on social movements and class formation. Coolies: How Britain Reinvented Slavery. BBC Documentary Film, 2005. Details British practice of indentured labor, which transported over 1 million Indian workers were around the world to replace African slaves. Khandelwal, Madhulika S. 2002. Becoming American, Being Indian: An Immigrant Community in New York City. Cornell University Press. Examines the development of identity and community among Indians living in Queens and Manhattan. Moore, Brian L. 1995. Cultural Power, Resistance, and Pluralism : Colonial Guyana, 1838–1900. Montreal; Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press; Barbados: Press University of the West Indies. Historical text focused on Guyana after the abolition of slavery examining the multiracial colonial society. New York City’s Department of City Planning. 2000. The Newest New Yorkers: Briefing Booklet, Immigrant New York in the New Millennium. [Online; retrieved 5/25/11.] http:// www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/census/nny_briefing_booklet.pdf Detailed demographic and socioeconomic profile of New York City’s 2.9-million foreign-born residents and their distribution throughout the city’s five boroughs. Rabe, Stephen G. 2005. U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Account of the U.S. covert intervention in British Guiana between 1953 and 1969. Ramraj, Robert. 2003. Guyana: Population, Environment, Economic Activities. Greensboro, NC: Battleground Printing and Publishing. A scholarly study of aspects of the country of Guyana.
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Haitian Immigrants by Bertin M. Louis Jr.
Introduction On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 earthquake devastated Port-au-Prince, Leogane, and other parts of Haiti. This natural disaster claimed more than 300,000 lives, according to the Haitian government, this catastrophe claimed more than 300,000 lives and left more than 1 million Haitians homeless. As Americans watched horrifying images of devastation, death, and destruction, Haitian Americans in Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and West Palm Beach, Florida; Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island, New York; and Chicago, Illinois, tried to contact their loved ones. Many people around the world wondered whether Haiti, with its history, political corruption, and geography was doomed to permanent poverty, governmental inefficiency, and misery. But other Haitian Americans returned to their homeland determined to contribute to earthquake relief and begin the long process of rebuilding and reshaping Haiti—a Haiti with a sustainable future. Many of those same Haitian Americans are glad that they are American citizens and can use their status in the United States as a way to help rebuild Haiti. This Haitian presence in the United States is not due to a recent migratory phenomenon, which occurred during a larger wave of immigration to the United States from Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s; Haitian presence is part of a larger trend that dates back to the inception of the United States as a country. Although many Haitians left their home country during periods of intense political and economic turmoil, they have persevered and flourished in the United States despite encounters with prejudice and racism. Haitian Americans have overcome these obstacles by leaning on varied aspects of their culture that make them a distinct ethnic group in the United States. Haitian Americans have gained employment in all sectors of American society and created institutions that connect them to each other across the United States as well as to their kin in their homeland. Haitians also wield significant political power in cities like Boston and Miami due to their strong civic and electoral participation. As President Obama mentioned in a 2009 statement about the significance of Haitian Flag Day (May 18), Haitian Americans contribute to the economic, social, cultural, scientific, and academic fabric of the United States (White House 2009). Haitian Americans are also involved in shaping the future of Haiti through contributions to their kin and through social and political organizations that attempt to stem the crisis that predated the 2010 earthquake. 887
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As the 21st century continues, the relationship between Haiti and the United States will be largely determined by the Haitian government, in cooperation with NGOs (non-governmental organizations), to execute some important programs that will help rebuild Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake. Additionally, Haiti will also need the assistance of the United States and the international community in rebuilding efforts, and the cooperation and expertise of Haitian Americans in the execution and support of programs designed to address critical infrastructural issues such as electricity, health care, and housing. Indeed, it is the hope of Haitians in the United States that the nation of Haiti will be rebuilt, and Haitians, regardless of geographical location, will obtain respect, dignity, and justice among the other nations of the world.
Chronology 1779
Freedmen from the French colony of Saint Domingue (colonial Haiti) fight at the Siege of Savannah.
1779
Jean Baptiste Pointe DuSable migrates from Saint Domingue and founds the city of Chicago.
1804
Haitian independence occurs as the result of a series of victories by slaves revolting against the French colonial powers.
1822
Haiti invades the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo (today’s Dominican Republic) and unifies the island under Haitian rule.
1838
France recognizes Haiti’s independence after ignoring its independence since 1804.
1862
President Abraham Lincoln grants Haiti formal diplomatic recognition.
1889
Frederick Douglass is appointed U.S. minister and consul general to Haiti.
1915
Haiti is invaded and occupied by U.S. Marines.
1934
The 19-year U.S. occupation of Haiti ends.
1957
Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier is elected president of Haiti.
1971
Francois Duvalier dies and is succeeded by his son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier.
1986
Baby Doc flees Haiti on February 7 in an American chartered jet and takes up exile in France.
1990
Jean-Bertrand Aristide is elected president of Haiti in midDecember.
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1991
Jean-Bertrand Aristide is deposed in a military coup d’état in late September. Aristide goes into exile in the United States.
1994
Aristide is restored to office of the presidency following a multinational military intervention in September sanctioned by the United Nations and led by the United States.
1996
Aristide completes his five-year term in office on February 7 and is succeeded by Rene Préval, who was elected in December 1995.
1999–2000
Haitian Americans are elected to state legislatures in Florida and Massachusetts and to key municipal posts in south Florida.
2001
Aristide is elected president of Haiti for the second time and succeeds Préval.
2004
Haitians around the world celebrate Haiti’s 200th anniversary of independence.
2004
In early February, Aristide is coerced into leaving Haiti after an armed insurgency erupts in the port city of Gonaïves.
2006
René Préval is elected president of Haiti in May as part of new political party called Lespwa (Hope).
2010
An earthquake of 7.0 magnitude destroys parts of Haiti, claims over 300,000 lives, and leaves more than a million Haitians homeless.
Background Geography of Haiti Haitians come from Hispaniola, an island in the Caribbean. The island of Hispaniola is the second-largest island in the Caribbean, after Cuba, and has an area of 29,418 square miles. Present-day Haiti occupies the western third of the island of Hispaniola. Haiti covers 10,695 square miles, roughly the size of the state of Maryland. The other two-thirds of the island is the Dominican Republic. To the north, Haiti is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean; to the south, the Caribbean Sea; to the east, the Dominican Republic; and to the west is the Windward Passage, which separates Haiti from the island nation of Cuba. There are also two small islands that are a part of Haiti. La Gonâve is the larger of these two islands and is located in the west. The island of La Tortue is in the north. The terrain of Haiti is covered with rugged mountains, small coastal plains, and river valleys. Haiti also has a large east-central elevated plateau. Haiti’s climate is warm and semiarid throughout the year, but there is also high humidity in many of Haiti’s coastal areas. The CIA Factbook notes as of October 2010 that there are approximately 9.6 million inhabitants in the country of Haiti.
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History of Haiti Haiti is derived from the word Ayti, which means “mountainous” and comes from the language of the indigenous people of the island. On December 5, 1492, Christopher Columbus encountered the Tainos, a branch of the Amerindian people called Arawaks. Columbus called the island Hispaniola (meaning “Little Spain”). Hispaniola’s Taino population ranged between 300,000 to 1 million people. While Columbus consolidated the first permanent European settlement in the Americas, Tainos were enslaved and forced to cultivate crops and prospect and extract gold from rivers, streams, and mines. Enslaved Tainos were forced to convert to Catholicism and were subject to physical and psychological violence. In response to their enslavement, many Tainos committed suicide, rebelled, and escaped to the mountains of the island they called Quisqueya. The Tainos also had no natural immunity against diseases carried by Europeans, such as smallpox, tuberculosis, typhus, and influenza. Consequently, by the middle of the 16th century, only a few hundred indigenous people remained on the entire island. After the indigenous population of Hispaniola was decimated, the Spanish brought in Africans, who were considered stronger workers than indigenous people, to replenish their labor supply. Africans were used as the next source of forced labor in Hispaniola and arrived on the island as early as 1501. Soon after their arrival, enslaved Africans and indentured servants were used throughout the colony to work on plantations. After time, the Spanish shifted their attention to their goldand silver-rich colonies of Cuba, Mexico, and Peru so much so that by the end of the 16th century large tracts of land in the western part of Hispaniola had been abandoned and taken over by European marauders. Many of them were of French origin and began to settle and cultivate vacant lands. In 1697, the Treaty of Ryswick ceded to France the western third of the island, later known as the French colony of Saint Domingue. In the 1780s, Saint Domingue was an object of international renown and in the words of one scholar, it was “the most fruitful and pleasant of Europe’s Caribbean colonies” (Geggus 1982, 12). At that time, Saint Domingue was also referred to as “the pearl of the Antilles” because of the wealth it generated for European planters and the French merchant bourgeoisie. The plantations produced coffee, sugar, tobacco, and indigo. At one point in its history, Saint Domingue produced about two-fifths of the world’s sugar and over half of the world’s coffee. Africans who survived the rigors of the passage from Africa to Saint Domingue were sold as chattel destined for life as slaves. Once they reached a plantation, West Africans from diverse tribes, such as Aradas, Congos, Bambaras, and Ibos, were assigned slave tutors who showed them how to perform different tasks necessary for the production of commodities that would eventually be consumed in Europe and throughout the world. Le Code Noir (The Black Code) prescribed baptism
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and instruction in the Catholic religion for all enslaved Africans and deemed assemblies of enslaved Africans for purposes other than Catholic worship as illegal (Simpson 1945). The disciplining of Africans to turn them into plantation laborers came in the forms of psychological and physical violence. It was not uncommon for planters and overseers, for example, to: Hang a slave by the ears, mutilate a leg, pull teeth out, gash open one’s side and pour melted lard into the incision, or mutilate genital organs. Still others used the torture of live burial, whereby the slave, in the presence of the rest of the slaves who were forced to bear witness, was made to dig his own grave . . . Women had their sexual parts burned by a smoldering log; others had hot wax splattered over hands, arms, and backs, or boiling cane syrup poured over their heads. (Dupuy 1989, 39) The physical brutality and mutilation of African peoples on plantations in Saint Domingue was an important part of the process that made them slaves. Without these violent mechanisms of labor control, it would have been extremely difficult for the interests of commodity production to coerce Africans into their roles as plantation laborers. Africans’ positions as slaves within sugar plantations were concretized by poor housing, diets that underfed and undernourished them, and the rule of the planters to control and restrict slave behavior. This whole complex, which was performed with the intention to extract the greatest amount of labor from slaves, had deleterious effects on Saint Domingue’s slave population. In her study of the Saint Domingue revolution, Carolyn Fick used Hilliard d’Auberteuil’s observations of Saint Domingue at that time to illustrate the deadly consequences of slave labor in this French colony. Hilliard d’Auberteuil noted during the years from 1680 to 1776 over 800,000 Africans had been imported from Africa to Saint Domingue. By the end of that period there were only 290,000 Africans in Saint Domingue (Fick 1990, 26). These figures demonstrate that Africans were not reproducing themselves quickly enough in Saint Domingue as a result of the effects of the process of slave-making and the physical demands of plantation labor. Over one-third of the Africans brought over to Saint Domingue usually died off in the first few years as a result of arduous labor processes and the accompanying violence that maintained them (26). Besides death and the production of commodities for world consumption, a religion was created on the plantations of Saint Domingue between 1750 and 1790 as the result of the combination of French authority, the culture of the indigenous people of Hispaniola, and the enslavement of assorted Africans on plantations in Saint Domingue: Vodou. Vodou is the Fongbe (Benin) term for “spirit” or “god.” Some scholars view Vodou as only “a genre of ritual music and dance performed in
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honor of a category of spirit” and tend not to view Vodou as a belief system (Richman 2005). Others view Vodou to stand for all African-derived religious practices in Haiti (Olmos and Paravisini-Gebert 2003, 102). Most scholars of Vodou would agree that it is the most maligned and misunderstood of all African-inspired religions in the Americas and one of the most complex religions in the region. Vodou liturgy and rituals revolve around a pantheon of spirits known as lwa (Olmos and Paravisini-Gebert 2003, 102). Lwa represent a fusion of African and Creole gods, the spirits of deified ancestors, and syncretized manifestations of Catholic saints, and they can be thought of as supernatural beings that possess its adherents (Richman 2005). Vodou served an important role in the eventual struggle for liberation that transformed Saint Domingue into Haiti. As one author writes, Haiti could not have become an independent nation as early as the nineteenth century without Vodou because its “rituals provided the spirit of kinship that fueled the slaves’ revolts against their colonial masters” (Desmangles 1992, 6). An example of how Vodou provided a spirit of kinship among enslaved Africans in Saint Domingue was the Bwa Kayiman Vodou Congress led by Boukman, a Maroon born in Jamaica who escaped from a plantation near Morne Rouge. C.L.R. James (1963) notes the importance of this historical moment in a stirring narrative that has also been noted by other scholars of Haiti: On the night of the 22nd (August 1791) a tropical storm raged, with lightning and gusts of wind and heavy showers of rain. Carrying torches to light their way, the leaders of the revolt met in an open space in the thick forests of the Morne Rouge, a mountain overlooking Le Cap. There Boukman gave the last instructions and, after Vodou incantations and the sucking of the blood of a stuck pig, he stimulated his followers by a prayer spoken in creole, which, like so much spoken on such occasions, has remained. “The god who created the sun which gives us light, who rouses the waves and rules the storm, though hidden in the clouds, he watches us. He sees all that the white man does. The god of the white man inspires us with crime, but our god calls upon us to do good works. Our god who is good to us orders us to revenge out wrongs. He will direct our arms and aid us. Throw away the symbol of the god of the whites who has caused us to weep, and listen to the voices of liberty, which speaks in the hearts of us all.” (87) Six days later, led by Boukman, slaves of the Turpin plantation indiscriminately massacred every white man, woman, and child they could (Simpson 1945). This began a general insurrection, which led to the Haitian Revolution, the first successful slave revolt in the Western Hemisphere that extended the “rights of Man”— liberty, equality, and brotherhood—beyond French males to the emancipated black and mulatto peoples of Haiti.
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As some scholars note, there were a number of reasons why the Haitian Revolution was a success. “The French Revolution weakened and divided the French in France and in Saint Domingue; the conflicts between free mulattoes and whites intensified; and Britain and Spain, the other colonial powers of the time, intervened to further their own interests. But above all else it was the role played by blacks that made the Haitian Revolution successful. During the war, the slaves defeated local whites, the forces of the French Crown, a Spanish and a British invasion and the massive expeditionary force sent by Napoleon Bonaparte” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 19–20). Toussaint Louverture rose to become the leader of the black armies and deserves credit for many of the military victories that led to the freeing of black slaves. Through the course of the Haitian Revolution, Toussaint united rebellious slaves into an efficient fighting force, invented guerilla warfare, and skillfully exploited the rivalries between all the other main players in the conflict (20). In 1802, Toussaint was taken prisoner by the French forces sent by Napoleon Bonaparte to restore slavery and French rule in Saint Domingue. “When he was put aboard a ship that would take him to his death in a dungeon in France, Toussaint uttered these prophetic words, ‘In overthrowing me, you have cut down only the tree of liberty in Saint Domingue. It will spring up again from the roots for they are numerous and deep’ ” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 20). Less than a year later, Jean-Jacques Dessalines united the black and mulatto forces and started a campaign against the French. In a decisive battle during the Haitian Revolution, Dessalines and his forces defeated the French at the Battle of Vertières. As a result, the last French regiments withdrew from the island. The Haitian Revolution ended with independence declared on January 1, 1804, and the world’s first black republic used the Taino term Ayti (or Haiti, meaning “mountainous”) as the name for a new nation of slaves who emancipated themselves. After the Haitian Revolution, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, governor-general-forlife and later emperor of Haiti, ordered the slaughter of the remaining French on the island. After he consolidated his power, Dessalines was faced with the task of building a new nation in the aftermath of a violent revolution that had decimated the country. “The colonial powers operating within the region were openly hostile to the world’s first black republic, and for several decades there was a constant threat of invasion. The plantations, on which the economic prosperity of the French colony had been based, were in ruins, and many towns had been razed to the ground” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 45). In addition to capital and labor shortages, many of the white planters fled the country, and war and disease reduced the population on the island to about a third of its original size. Among the Haitians who survived the revolution, two distinct and separate views of what the new society was going to look like divided the fledging nation along color lines and the ownership of land. The mulattoes, fair-skinned blacks of mixed African, European, and indigenous descent, were a small but powerful minority that
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consisted of free men and property owners before the revolution. They planned on inheriting the power and wealth of the defeated French colonists. The black exslaves, who formed the majority of the country, resisted the plantation system and hoped to farm their own land. “Under Dessalines a large portion of cultivated land was brought under state control, and he planned to continue with Toussaint’s attempts to revive large-scale agriculture as a way to sustain the nascent nation. But less than three years into his leadership, Dessalines was assassinated (October 17th, 1806) as the result of a power struggle which was linked to ownership of agricultural land and tensions between blacks and mulattoes” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 45). After the assassination of Dessalines, Haiti split into two separate entities. Henri Christophe was Dessalines’s successor and controlled blacks in the north. Alexandre Pétion controlled the mulattoes in the west and the south of Haiti. Christophe crowned himself king and created a black nobility. Using military force to resuscitate the plantation system and an export economy based on sugar and coffee, Christophe instituted a type of feudalism in the north in which military and state officers ran plantations. “This militarized agriculture generated large surpluses and the revenue was used to fortify Christophe’s army and build extensive fortifications in case of another French invasion. The most spectacular fortification built during Christophe’s reign was La Citadelle of La Ferrière (The Citadel)” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 46). Many men and women died building the Citadel due to a deadly admixture of forced labor, insufficient diets, exhaustion, and the toll of forcing stones and other heavy materials up the sides of a steep mountain. In 1820, Christophe, physically weakened by a catastrophic stroke, committed suicide as the result of an uprising against his forced labor policy. After the death of Christophe, Jean-Pierre Boyer, Pétion’s successor, brought the two parts of Haiti together as one country. As a way to remove the threat of foreign invasion, Boyer annexed the eastern part of the island of Hispaniola in 1822. The occupation of the eastern part of the island lasted until 1844, when an independent Dominican Republic was established. Boyer continued Pétion’s practice of allocating small parcels of land to members of the Haitian military and peasantry. Haiti was isolated economically and politically by the international community at the time, especially by the United States and France. So as an attempt to integrate Haiti into a larger world economy and to gain political recognition as a sovereign nation, Boyer began payment of 90 million gold francs, a massive indemnity that compensated French planters who made the lives of enslaved Africans hell. Overall, the socioeconomic legacy of the Haitian Revolution left the country in complete ruins. The agrarian system was nonfunctional, and the country was divided between the army and the peasants and between a mulatto and a black elite. “Since the mid-nineteenth century, Haitian politics has been dominated by the struggle between groups within the country’s small elite for control of the state
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apparatus through control of the presidency” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 47). These dynamics were reflected throughout 19th century and 20th century Haiti (Zéphir 2004, 43). This is illustrated by the fact that only two rulers managed to complete their terms in office between 1843 and 1915 (Arthur and Dash 1999, 47). During this period in Haitian history there were 22 heads of state; 14 of which were overthrown. “Up until 1915, the minority mulatto elite continued to exercise power while paying lip service to the political aspirations of the small number of black elite families and high-ranking black army officers. The ‘politique de doublure (government of the understudy)’ system saw black presidents in power but controlled and manipulated by mulatto politicians masking a continuing and deep-seated social antipathy between mulatto and black elites” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 47). “The acute political and economic instability of Haiti, particularly during 1911 and 1915 when six presidents succeeded one another in office, motivated the United States to invade Haiti” (Zéphir 2004, 45). The Haitian elite borrowed heavily from foreign powers such as particularly the United States, Germany, and France. American investors were eagerly looking for ways to have the monopoly of investments in the country. Also, after the establishment of the Monroe Doctrine, and later the Roosevelt Corollary, gaining absolute control of the Caribbean region became a fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy. So both financial interests and strategic factors weighed heavily in the U.S. decision to occupy Haiti, and on July 29, 1915, U.S. Marines landed in the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince, and a 19-year U.S. occupation began. The U.S occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 reignited deep-seated resentment of foreign occupation and reunited both sides of the divided Haitian elite in a nationalist movement, albeit temporarily. Once the Marines departed, old tensions between the two groups reappeared. “Those who favored the mulatto hegemony were opposed by those who championed a redistribution of economic and political power. This latter tendency was bolstered by an emerging black middle class of schoolteachers, clerks, civil servants and small businessmen” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 47–48). Also as a result of the occupation, administrative, economic, and political power was centralized in Port-au-Prince (the capital) and the influence of elite groups in coastal towns decreased. “As part of this process, the Haitian military was reorganized and became increasingly linked and involved with political affairs in the capital” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 48). An example of this involvement is the ousting of presidents Lescot (1946) and Estimé (1950) by the Haitian military. In 1957, François Duvalier won a general election and became president of Haiti. Duvalier was a physician who was part of a group of black middle-class intellectuals known as noiristes. “Noiristes mingled literary and ethnological interests, promoting the idea of Haiti’s essentially African identity and championing the black majority against the Europeanized elite” (Ferguson 1987, 33). Initially considered
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little more than a tool of the military, “Papa Doc,” as he became known, soon proved that he had his own political goals and methods that helped him maintain political power in Haiti. “François Duvalier, president for life of Haiti from 1957 to 1971, had his political opponents and their supporters arrested or driven into exile. Then, to guard against threats of military coups, Papa Doc transferred or replaced senior officers, and placed elite units under his direct command. The army leadership, François Duvalier’s own cabinet and inner circle were regularly purged” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 48). As a counterbalance to the Haitian military, Papa Doc created an irregular force of armed men called Tonton Macoutes. “The Tonton Macoutes became synonymous with François Duvalier’s type of state terrorism” (Ferguson 1987, 40). The Tonton Macoutes were Duvalier loyalists who provided information and detected subversion in every sphere of Haitian society. The tactics they used to maintain Papa Doc’s repressive regime included bullying, extortion, and murder
President François Duvalier is inaugurated “president for life,” June 22, 1964, in Haiti. (AP Photo)
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(Ferguson 1987, 40). Under François Duvalier’s regime, “trade unions were dismantled, progressive Catholic priests were expelled, newspapers were closed down and even the Boy Scouts were disbanded” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 48). Papa Doc’s 14-year-long dictatorship relied on extreme violence in order to maintain rule and probably claimed the lives of more than tens of thousands of Haitians. To complete his ascension, Duvalier proclaimed himself president-forlife with the power to designate his successor. The public treasury was siphoned and foreign aid diverted to pay off supporters, Macoutes, and high-ranking administrators. As the result of his regime, Haiti slid deeper into social and economic ruin and created a brain-drain that began during his regime and has continued unabated. “Between 30,000 and 60,000 people were killed by state terrorism during this period” (Ferguson 1987, 57). “When François Duvalier died in 1971, the disabling of all serious opposition, and the tacit endorsement of important power-brokers such as the United States, the military high command and much of the business community, ensured that power was transferred smoothly to his 19-year-old son, Jean-Claude. Under the new leader, dubbed ‘Baby Doc’ by the foreign media, the ruthless repression of internal dissent, both real and imagined, continued” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 49). Jean-Claude’s regime (1971–1986) was described as a “kleptocracy”—a state in which those in power exploit national resources and steal. Indeed, the process of stealing state revenues by those in the Duvalier regime reached new heights. “Hundreds of millions of dollars were stolen by Jean-Claude and his small circle of associates” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 49). In addition to maintaining a kleptocracy started by his father, Baby Doc encouraged offshore assembly industry under the guise of economic liberalization, which began towards the end of his father’s reign and accelerated the downward slide of Haiti becoming the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. At the end of Papa Doc’s tenure as Haitian head of state, offshore assembly for U.S. corporations and markets began. “In the assembly industry, materials produced in a well-to-do country are exported to a poor country to be assembled by the comparatively cheap and ‘disciplined’ labor there” (Farmer 1994, 115). This form of business did little to arrest an economy in free fall, and Haiti continued to sink deeper into debt. During Baby Doc’s tenure, a widening gap between the urban and rural areas forced Haitians living in the countryside to migrate to Port-au-Prince in search of jobs at factories. While Jean-Claude and members of his circle grew fabulously rich, the majority of Haitians slipped deeper into poverty. The percentage of the population living in extreme poverty rose from 48 percent in 1976 to 81 percent in 1985. Under the Duvaliers, Haiti became the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere; a description that accompanies contemporary media descriptions of Haiti. In other words, we can clearly see the connection between the Duvalier brand of state repression of the Haitian people, Duvalierist embezzlement
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of foreign aid and taxes, and how that contributed to creating extreme poverty in Haiti. During his continuation of his father’s dictatorship, Jean-Claude alienated important supporters among the old-guard noiristes and the black middle class by shifting his power base towards younger mulatto merchants and technocrats. “The alliance between the Mulatto and the new regime was sealed in May 1980 when Jean-Claude Duvalier married Michèle Bennett, daughter of a wealthy speculator” (Zéphir 2004, 50). As the regime faltered and an internal and external opposition movement grew, the U.S. and the Haitian military withdrew their support for Jean-Claude’s rule and Jean-Claude left Haiti aboard an American-chartered jet in February 1986. After Baby Doc’s departure, a four-year period in Haitian history known as “Duvalierism without Duvalier” ensued. Consisting of a series of military juntas headed by senior officers, this period was characterized by attempts to secure the former order in the face of challenges from the poor majority and a section of the elite (Arthur and Dash 1999, 49). During this time period, opposition grew between the masses seeking retribution against former Duvalierists and Tonton Macoutes. From 1986 to 1988, the hope for democracy in Haiti was crushed: in July 1987, peasant activists were massacred, and in November 1988, hundreds of voters waited to cast their ballots at the voting polls. After the fall of Jean-Claude, the elite were pushing for reforms to modernize the Haitian state. Part of these reforms, which were backed by the United States and international finance institutions, included a proposed transition to electoral democracy but the Duvalierists violently resisted changes to the political system. By 1990, internationally monitored democratic elections were held in Haiti and the late entry of the charismatic liberation theology priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the subsequent voter registration of tens of thousands of previously unregistered peasants and urban poor, threw a wrench in the plans of the Haitian elite. Aristide, the presidential candidate for the Lavalas party, won an overwhelming majority of the vote (Arthur and Dash 1999, 50). Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s victory in the 1990 elections represented the first serious challenge to the status quo and the reforms proposed by the Aristide government were enough to upset most sections of the elite (Arthur and Dash 1999, 50). For example, large landowners were disturbed by presidential rhetoric about agrarian reform. Industrialists were vexed by discussion of a proposed increase in the national minimum wage. The Haitian military, the institution that at many times in Haitian history was responsible for overthrowing numerous heads of state, was distressed by proposals that would separate the police from the army. Duvalierists were upset with talk of disbanding the section chief system and reform of corrupt state institutions. The Lavalas movement also threatened the conservative hierarchy of the Catholic Church and traditional politicians. These fears, manifested in elite and powerful sectors in Haitian society, manifested in a coup d’état that toppled Aristide.
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“Less than eight months after taking office, Aristide was overthrown by a military coup d’état which was rumored to have been financed by leading elite families” (Arthur and Dash 1999, 51). Aristide fled to the United States. The Haitian military and a resurgent Macoute sector carried out an intense and violent campaign of repression for the next three years against the popular organizations that had flourished since the fall of Baby Doc and had formed the foundation of the Lavalas movement. The international community supported an embargo, which did not weaken the military junta but exacerbated poverty among the poorest sectors of Haitian society. Subsequently, emigration from Haiti to other countries in the region, most notably the United States, intensified. Through assistance from the United Nations and the presidency of Bill Clinton, elected president of the United States in 1992, an agreement known as the Governors Island Accord was put together to solve the Haitian impasse. The accord stipulated that Aristide was to return to Haiti on October 30, 1993, accompanied by a United Nations peacekeeping force. Due to rising violence with the impending return of Aristide to Haiti, the Clinton administration issued a resolution in July 1994 authorizing a direct American military intervention in Haiti. The U.S. occupation was scheduled to begin on September 19, 1994. General Raoul Cédras, the head of the Haitian military junta, agreed to relinquish power in October 1994. Under the protection of the U.S. military, President Aristide returned to Haiti to finish his term, which expired on February 7, 1996. René Préval was elected the next president of Haiti, and then Aristide was re-elected in 2001 for a second term as president until February 2006. During his second term as president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s administration was cut short by two years. Aristide was coerced into leaving Haiti after an armed insurgency erupted in the port city of Gonaïves in early February 2004 (Dupuy 2005, 187). Gerald Latortue became the head of an interim government, and members and supporters of Aristide’s Lavalas party were summarily imprisoned and executed. René Préval was elected president of Haiti in May 2006 as part of new political party called Lespwa (Hope).
Causes and Waves of Migration Although Haitians are part of the wave of recent immigration to the United States in the 20th century, the Haitian presence in the United States is not a recent migratory phenomenon but part of a larger trend which dates back to the 18th century. We can view this history of Haitian immigration to the United States as an uninterrupted stream with high, low, and dormant periods (Laguerre 1998, 2). The peak periods of Haitian immigration to the United States roughly correspond to the following: the Haitian revolutionary era and aftermath (1791–1810); the period
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of American occupation of Haiti (1915–1934); the Duvalier and immediate postDuvalier era (1957–1994); and the times of stringent economic crisis and political unrest during the Aristide presidencies, military juntas, and Préval presidencies (1994–2009).
Early Immigration The early migration of Haitians to the United States consisted of different sectors of colonial Haitian society (1791–1803) who fled the island colony of Saint Domingue during revolutionary unrest, including French colonists, the slaves of French colonists, and free people of color. Some of these Haitian ancestors contributed to the revolutionary struggle of the United States during the 18th century. For example, 750 soldiers from Saint Domingue (Colonial Haiti) fought alongside American patriots against the British at the Siege of Savannah, in Georgia, on October 9, 1779. Currently, there is a monument in Savannah, Georgia, that commemorates Haitian involvement in the American War of Independence. Another example of how early Haitian immigration to the United States in the 18th century contributed to the social fabric of the United States is the life of Jean Baptiste Pointe DuSable. In 1779, Jean Baptiste Pointe DuSable migrated from the French colony of Saint Domingue and founded the city of Chicago. DuSable was born around 1745, and his birth was traced to the city of St. Marc, Haiti. He was born a free man, the son of a French sea captain and a Haitian slave. When he was young, DuSable’s father sent him to France for his education. It is reported that DuSable traveled with his father on his merchant ships and was injured aboard a ship on a voyage to New Orleans. However, when DuSable arrived there, he discovered that the city had been taken over by the Spanish and that he was in danger of enslavement. A local chapter of the French Jesuits hid him until he was well enough to travel on his own. He left New Orleans and headed north via the Mississippi River. Along the way he came in contact with French fur trappers and land speculators. DuSable settled in what is now known as Peoria, Illinois, and sold furs and bought large tracts of land. He became a wealthy businessman and headed north toward the Great Lakes and established his home, and a thriving trading post, on the bank of the Chicago River (Zéphir 2004, 12).
Later Waves of Immigration After the 18th and 19th centuries, Haitian immigration to the United States was low until the second half of the 20th century. During the U.S. occupation of Haiti (1915–1934), a group of Haitian immigrants from the urban areas of Haiti migrated to the United States. “The Immigration and Naturalization Service began separately recording Haitian immigration in 1932; for the period of 1932–1940, it recorded
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191 Haitian immigrants, and it recorded 911 between 1941 and 1950. From 1951 to 1960, 4,442 more Haitians were recorded” (Zéphir 2004, 17). However, as a result of the 1965 Immigration Act, which allowed the legal admission of hundreds of thousands of new immigrants per year beyond quotas, Haitian immigration to the United States increased dramatically. “From 1932 through 2000, a total of 414,401 Haitians immigrated legally to the United States” (Zéphir 2004, 17). Papa Doc’s regime caused massive numbers of people from all sectors of Haitian society to leave the country. Based on the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS’s) statistical yearbooks, over 40,000 Haitians legally migrated to the United States (40,011) from 1960 to 1971, and over 138,000 (138,157) were admitted to the United States on temporary visas during the same time period. During Baby Doc’s regime, the political and economic situation of Haiti worsened. Legal immigration of Haitians to the United States, therefore, increased steadily for most of Jean-Claude’s dictatorship. According to the Statistical Yearbooks of the INS, nearly 108,000 Haitians (107,818) migrated to the United States legally between 1972 and 1986. During this same time period, the INS reports that close to 625,000 Haitians (624,803) were admitted to the United States on temporary visas. The INS also reports that there are gaps in their record of nonimmigrant data for Haitians between 1980 and 1982, when, according to estimates by reporters and scholars, the highest number of undocumented Haitian immigrants came to the United States (INS Statistical Yearbook 2000). It must be noted that a substantial number of Haitians migrated to the United States illegally during Baby Doc’s dictatorship. Illegal Haitian migration to the United States coincided with the Duvalier dictatorship, especially during JeanClaude Duvalier’s reign (1971–1986). Many Haitians who visited the United States during this period overstayed their visas with the hope that they could legalize their status one day. One scholar of Haitian history notes that one of the most striking features of Jean-Claude’s time in power was the process of escape and voluntary exile of Haitians, many of whom were determined to reach the United States for the prospects of work and food (Ferguson 1987, 63). This process began in 1972. Many of these Haitians, peasants who were desperate to leave a cycle of drought and famine, were persuaded to sell their family smallholdings and any other possessions in return for a place on a boat bound for Miami. In 1981 it was estimated that there were at least 50 or 60 such boats operating from Haiti’s north coast, where cities such as Port-de-Paix and Cap Haitian are. These migrants were dubbed Haitian “boat people” in the media. The departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier from Haiti in 1986 led to more political and social chaos, as opposition grew between the masses seeking retribution against former Duvalierists and Tonton Macoutes. The brutal domination and oppression of Haitians during this time period is reflected in the elevated number of Haitians who migrated to the United States. In 1988, for example, the INS reported
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that 34,806 Haitians legally migrated to the United States and that 94,819 nonimmigrants were admitted on temporary visas. Another difficult year in Haitian history was 1991, the year that the democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by a military coup. Fearing for their lives, many of Aristide’s supporters fled the country. The INS records for 1991 reflect this migration pattern: 47,527 Haitians were admitted to the United States as immigrants while another 73,994 were admitted on temporary visas. As one scholar tells us, “let us remember a CNN report indicating that 67,000 boat people were intercepted during the same year” (Zéphir 2004, 71).
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community Census figures provide the best estimates of the Haitian population in the United States. According to the American Community Survey of the 2000 U.S. Census, which is compiled from census data, there were 694,123 Haitian-born blacks in the United States as of 2005.
Age and Family Structure Out of this population of 694,123 Haitians in the United States, the median age, as of 2005, was 28.4 years old; 10.4 percent were under 5 years old; 22.1 percent were 5 to 17 years old.; 11.9 percent were 18 to 24 years old; 15.2 percent were 25 to 34 years old; 13.8 percent were 35 to 44 years old; 14 percent were 45 to 54 years old; 7.1 percent were 55 to 64 years old; 3.7 percent were 65 to 74 years old; and those 75 years or old comprised 1.8 percent.
Educational Attainment According to the American Community Survey from 2005, approximately 386,000 of the 694,000 Haitians in the United States are 25 years or older. From that population, 23.1 percent has less than a high school education, and 30.3 percent are high school graduates (or the equivalency of a high school diploma); 28.5 percent of this population has some college or associate’s degree, and 13 percent has a bachelor’s degree; and 5.1 percent of the population of Haitians in the United States 25 years or older has a graduate or professional degree.
Occupation and Income Patterns According to the American Community Survey of 2005, out of the civilian population 16 years and older among Haitians in the United States (approximately
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326,000), approximately 36.6 percent were employed in service positions; 22.6 percent were employed in sales and office occupations; 21 percent were employed in management, professional, and related occupations; and 14.7 percent worked production, transportation, and material moving jobs. The remaining Haitians were employed in construction-related occupations and farming, fishing, and forestry occupations (5.1%). As of 2005, the median Haitian household income in the United States was approximately $40,000. In 2005, 45 percent of Haitians owned their own home as opposed to 55 percent of Haitians who rented.
Health Issues In Haiti, health is directly tied to one’s economic status. Haitians are exposed to numerous infectious diseases that accompany poverty and malnutrition such as infantile tetanus, tuberculosis, the HIV virus, and malaria. In the late 1970s, tuberculosis was allegedly endemic among Haitians; in the early 1980s, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) identified Haitians as one of the primary groups at risk for AIDS, along with homosexuals, hemophiliacs, and intravenous drug abusers. In spite of the removal of Haitians from that list, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the late 1980s officially refused to accept the donation of blood from individuals of Haitian descent (Stepick 1998, 2). Regardless of the stigma attached to Haitians, when Haitians migrate to the United States, they tend to become more affluent and their access to health care improves along with the quality of health care they receive. But even though the average lifespan of Haitians increases when they live in the United States, there are still diseases that affect their collective health. Bertin M. Louis, M.D., former chief of nephrology at Maimonides Medical Center of Brooklyn, New York, who has worked closely with the Haitian community of New York City, notes that the some of the diseases that afflict Haitians in the United States are hypertension (high blood pressure), diabetes mellitus (type 2 diabetes), and hyperlipidemia (high cholesterol).
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals “Families are the foundation for social networks that provide both material and emotional support, everything from temporary housing and food to how to find a job and get into school” (Stepick 1998, 16). When Haitian immigrants first arrive in the United States, they usually take temporary residence in the home of a relative (Stepick 1998, 17). These families, then, do not only consist of a mother, father, and
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children but at many times include grandparents, uncles and aunts, cousins, godchildren, and sometimes non-relatives from one’s hometown. These additional relatives temporarily reside with a relative and can move from household to household while working different jobs until they are able to rent or buy their own home.
Birth/Baptism, Coming of Age, Marriage, and Funerals In Haiti, the rites of passage that mark the lives of Haitians, such as baptism, marriage, and funerals, vary according to religious affiliation and whether they live in urban areas or in the Haitian countryside. A look at the Catholic and Protestant traditions of Haiti offers us a glimpse into the diversity of rituals associated with important milestones in human life. The majority of Haitians are Catholic. Haitian Catholics usually baptize their children a few months after birth in a ceremony at a Catholic church. At the age of seven years, young Haitian boys and girls are komune (receive communion). At the age of 13, young girls and boys are konfirme (consummated in the Catholic Church).
Father Ferry Brutus waves incense over the coffin during a funeral service at the Notre Dame D’Haiti Catholic Church in the Little Haiti neighborhood of Miami, April 21, 2007. (AP Photo/ Lynne Sladky)
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With regard to engagements and marriages, Haitian men ask Haitian women for their hand in marriage. It is traditional for Haitian men to ask permission from the family of the woman they intend to marry. In many cases, many Haitians do not have enough money associated with a large wedding. In this case, many Haitian women and men enter into common-law marriage, which is known as plasaj. The wedding ceremony is similar to what occurs in the United States. The groom wears a tuxedo and the bride wears an ornate white dress. As in the United States, the father of the bride gives the daughter away. After the wedding, the best man and the maid (or matron) of honor are consulted by the husband and wife when moments of marital discord occur within the marriage. Haitian funerals vary according to local traditions and religious affiliations. Wakes for people in the Haitian countryside are very animated. People entertain themselves by playing dominoes, singing, and telling flattering and honorific stories (bay blag) about the deceased. At the actual funeral in the Haitian countryside, the body of the deceased is carried on the shoulders of four males who sing and engage in a choreographed walk that is almost dance like. At some points during this animated funeral march, the corpse is transferred to another group of four men who continue with the body in a similar animated manner. People at the funeral are also served tafia (strong Haitian rum) after the body is interred. The behavior we find at funerals for Haitian Protestants varies according to one’s religious affiliation and stands in stark contrast to funerals in the Haitian countryside. At funerals for traditional Haitian Baptists, for example, the ceremony tends to be very sedate and reserved. Crying and screaming are viewed as inappropriate outbursts. However, at some Pentecostal and Charismatic Haitian funerals, funeral attendees are expected to faint, cry, and scream openly.
Families and Changing Gender Relations In a book about the relationship between Haitian Americans and Haiti, Dr. Georges Fouron, professor of education and Africana studies at Stony Brook University in Long Island, New York, wrote about the relationship he had growing up in Haiti with his mother. When he was a child, his mother was physically and emotionally abusive towards him. But when he moved to the United States and earned his PhD in education, his mother tried to reclaim him as her son. When Dr. Fouron brought his mother to the United States, her reaction to living in New York revealed something to him about gender relations in Haiti and how they can change when a Haitian woman moves to the United States. According to Dr. Fouron, his mother was totally transformed in New York. She lived with him, then his brother, found a job as a home health aide and earned her own income. One day, Dr. Fouron’s mother told him “This [the United States] is my country now. I will never return to Haiti” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001, 131).
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The revelation that Dr. Fouron made with regard to gender in Haiti and the Haitian diaspora is that his mother’s violent behavior towards him was due to her social condition. In other words, Dr. Fouron’s mother beat him because of her gender position (the fact that she was a woman in a repressive, patriarchal society) in a hierarchy that reinforces the exploitative class system of contemporary Haiti (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001, 132). The restrictions placed on the mobility of Dr. Fouron’s mother were lifted when she migrated from Haiti to the United States and gained economic independence. Unlike Dr. Fouron’s mother, other Haitian American women remain invested in Haiti although they are U.S. citizens. Glick Schiller and Fouron use the example of a Haitian American woman named Yvette to demonstrate that not all Haitian women in the United States reject Haiti. Yvette is obligated to take care of siblings, nieces, and nephews in Haiti whom she hardly knows (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001, 143). Yet Yvette’s skin had become gray from working overtime to pay the debts she had incurred sending money to Haiti. She told Dr. Fouron, “My body is like Haiti. It is tired and without hope” (144). Using the examples of these two Haitian women in the United States, we can see that there are contradictory results to the migration of Haitian women to the United States. Dr. Fouron’s mother considered herself to be independent and associated her life in Haiti with a lack of freedom and autonomy outside of marriage. The obligations that Yvette must meet for her siblings, nieces, and nephews were physically taxing, taking a toll on her health.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Haitian Americans retain a sense of national culture and identity through various practices, institutions, and through the maintenance of certain cultural traditions. Remittances from Haitian Americans to kin in Haiti sustain familial obligations. Hometown associations (groups that contribute to the upkeep and development of their towns and cities of birth) allow Haitians to position themselves in the United States as an ethnic group distinct from African Americans while reifying their identities as Haitian nationals. Haitian American service organizations and community centers throughout the United States serve as important institutions that diffuse Haitian culture and values, aid in the integration of new immigrants, and educated and defend members of its ethnic community. Religious practices help to maintain a Haitian identity that is distinct from other nationalities and ethnicities in the United States. The continued use of Haitian Creole by first- and second-generation Haitian Americans ensures the continued use of the language of the Haitian masses for future generations. The celebration of national holidays such as Haitian Independence Day, the preparation and consumption of Haitian cuisine, and the performance and support of Haitian artists and musicians also ensures that Haitians in the United States can celebrate their culture.
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Continued Links to Country of Origin: Remittances and Hometown Associations An important way that Haitian Americans are linked to Haiti is through the practice of sending remittances, which is the act of migrants sending money back to the place of their origin. In the 1990s, Haitians sent approximately $250 million to $350 million to Haiti per year in the form of remittances (Catanese 1999, 118). Many Haitian families have become transnational in nature. In other words, the families extend from one nation-state (the United States) to another (Haiti). Haitian families living in south Florida, for example, are linked to their kin in Haiti and are morally obligated to send their relatives money, clothes, and food. Many in Haiti, in the face of unemployment and poverty, are economically dependent on their overseas kin. Family members support and assist each other, both financially and emotionally. In addition to the economic dependence that Haitians have on Haitians in the United States, families also plan and finance the immigration of other family members. “Haitians in the United States are also expected to help with the future immigration of others, establishing a chain of immigrants” (Stepick 1998, 15). Numerous Haitian Americans also belong to hometown associations. Examples of Haitian hometown association activities are digging water wells in a Haitian village or building a school for children in Haiti. According to Pierre-Louis (2006), Haitian hometown associations emerged from the efforts of exile leaders in the 1980s to establish institutions in a foreign land and as an alternative form of organizing by immigrants who did not want to engage in open political activities against the Duvalier regime (27). Hometown associations allow Haitians to position themselves in the United States as an ethnic group distinct from African Americans, support the democratization process in Haiti, and address humanitarian crises there (Pierre-Louis 2006, 19). The Haitian Hometown Association Resource Group (http://haitirg.org/), formed in March 2008 to strengthen community development and alleviate poverty in Haiti; they partnered with the worldwide Vincentian Family, DePaul University, and Fonkoze (http://www.fonkoze.org/) to create Zafèn (https://www.zafen.org/), a new initiative that provides interest-free microloans to Haitians. Specifically, Zafèn enables lenders and donors to finance small- and medium-sized Haitian businesses. In addition to the material contributions that hometown associations make to Haiti, Haitian immigrants who face discrimination in the United States can always fall back on their homeland to maintain their culture and to ascertain their identities (Pierre-Louis 2006, 12). Emigrants who leave their homelands do not simply assimilate into a new, dominant culture but rather renegotiate their identities in relation to familial obligations, discrimination, and the culture that cultivated them. Involvement in their homeland culture helps Haitians maintain their ethnic identity.
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Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background Using the example of Haitians in New York, we can see that Haitians have formed several service organizations and community centers that are critical to the diffusion of Haitian culture and values. In New York City, the best known of these institutions is the Haitian Centers Council, established in 1982 and based in Brooklyn, which maintains eight centers throughout the New York metropolitan area. “Four are located in Brooklyn (the Flatbush Haitian center known as Brooklyn); one in Queens (the Haitian American United for Progress Community Center, or HAUP); one in Manhattan (the Haitian Neighborhood Service Center); one in Spring Valley (Rockland County); and the other also within the Greater New York metropolitan area” (Zéphir 2004, 94). These organizations centers focus on job training, immigration, refugee assistance, and employment. Based in Brooklyn, Dwa Fanm (Women’s Rights) is an organization that is committed to the rights of Haitian women and girls. “Another important agency that serves New York’s Haitian community is the National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR), which deals with matters of immigration, welfare and legal rights of Haitian immigrants. NCHR is also involved in fighting for Haitian boat people in detention centers and raises awareness about human rights abuses for Haitians living in other parts of the diaspora (stopping abuses against Haitians living in the Dominican Republic, for example)” (Zéphir 2004, 94).
Religion As one author correctly notes, Haitians are very religious people (Stepick 1998, 85). Most Haitians in the United States practice three major religions, all of which have roots in Haiti: Vodou, Catholicism, and Protestantism. Vodou, one of the most maligned and misunderstood of the African-derived religions in the Western Hemisphere, combines aspects of Roman Catholic, African, and indigenous religions. Its origins represent the hybrid nature of Haitian culture. Rituals of the religion involve reciting prayers in French and Creole, being possessed by lwa (spirits), singing, and dancing. Many Haitians who enter the United States are Roman Catholic. Slaves in colonial Haiti (Saint Domingue) were baptized and instructed in the Catholic religion (Simpson 1945). After Haitian independence in 1804, Catholicism became the religion of the Haitian state. Many Haitians living in the United States are practicing and nominal Catholics. The roots of Protestantism in Haiti can be traced as early as 1816, when Stephen Grellet and John Hancock, from the United States, visited Haiti for a meeting with Alexandre Pétion, the Haitian ruler at that time. Protestantism among Haitians in its diaspora scattered in the Caribbean (Brodwin 2003) and the United States (Richman 2005) is rising, and we are beginning to see Haitian Protestants outnumber
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Reverend Dr. Soliny Védrine In the United States, Protestantism is growing exponentially as a form of religious affiliation for Haitian Americans. An example of this growth can be seen in the work of one of Boston’s most dedicated community members, Reverend Dr. Soliny Védrine. Dr. Védrine is the head pastor of Boston Missionary Baptist Church, a Haitian Baptist Church founded in 1973. He is the director of Haitian Ministries International at Emmanuel Gospel Center in Boston and a cofounder of a Haitian Evangelical International Crusade, which occurs annually in New Providence, Bahamas. As part of Vision Globale de Protestantisme dans le Milieu Haïtien (Global Vision of Protestantism in the Haitian Context), Dr Védrine also coordinates efforts to spread Protestantism among Haitians in Haiti and its diaspora within North America and the Caribbean (including the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and St. Martin). Born in Lazile, Haiti, Dr. Védrine moved to Boston in 1972 with his wife Emmeline after they had lived in New York City. On March 15, 1973, Dr. Védrine and his wife were able to use an American church building to start a Haitian church group. This church became the Boston Missionary Baptist Church. Their congregation met in that church for almost eight years. Then they bought an old funeral home and the congregation called that home for 11 years. Then, the
Reverend Dr. Soliny Védrine and wife Emmeline. (Courtesy of Kloe York)
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funeral home was demolished and then the first Haitian church to be erected in New England was built for a cost of $1.2 million. At the time of an interview in 2004, Dr. Védrine stated that Boston Missionary Baptist Church had a congregation of about 600 at-large Haitian members and about 200 young Haitians who attended church regularly (Védrine 2004). As part of his ministry, Dr. Védrine assists Haitians who are need in the United States, the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and St. Martin. In each of these countries, Dr. Védrine brings Haitian pastors together for a program that includes preaching, medical work, and counseling for young people of Haitian descent and community leaders. Dr. Védrine also brings groups of Haitians in the United States to Haiti two or three times a year to finish construction on church buildings and clinics. Dr. Védrine will return to Haiti in summer 2010 to assist in relief and rebuilding.
Catholic Haitians in some locales. In a recent article about the spread of evangelism in Haitian American communities in New York City, Haitian Protestant churches (which were estimated to be more than 100) have grown to outnumber Catholic churches (Ng 2006). Although Protestants may not be the new religious majority among Haitians in New York City, the number of Haitians who attend Haitian Protestant churches is rising and that there may eventually be a new religious majority among Haitians in the New York City area. Overall, the religious needs of Haitian Americans are met by several Catholic and Protestant churches as well as Vodou practitioners.
Language Issues Haiti can best be described as a nation predominantly composed of two linguistic communities: a minority French bilingual elite and a monolingual Creole-speaking majority. In their study of language debates over Creole in Haiti, Schieffelin and Doucet (1994) remark that Haitian French used to be viewed as the high prestige form of language while Haitian Creole (Kreyòl) was considered the low prestige form (178). While Haitians of earlier generations still view French as a high prestige form of language among themselves, Kreyòl (Haitian Creole) has become the language of choice among the majority of Haitian Americans and a strong symbol of Haitian heritage. Haitian Creole was formed on the plantations of Saint Domingue and became a common language that linguistically united disparate Africans. Haitian Creole was an unwritten language until recently. There have been different ways of representing the spoken language of Haitian Creole over the years. In the 1980s, an orthographic system was established to represent Haitian Creole that
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is currently used among Haitian educators in the United States and is taught in Haiti. Each letter in the current Haitian Creole orthographic system only has one sound. Consonants are sounded as they are in English, every vowel is pronounced separately, and all the letters are pronounced in a word. For example, the word “activity” in English is pronounced “ak-tee-vee-tay” and written in Haitian Creole this way: aktivite. There are nasalized sounds in Haitian Creole, as well, like an in mouvman (“movement”), en in genyen (“to win, to beat”), and on like milyon (“million”). An additional sound in Haitian Creole, en, is not found in English. En is nasalized and is similar to the sound in the word envy. We find an example of that sound in the word gouvenen (“to govern, to direct”). Ch in Haitian Creole is pronounced like words beginning in “sh” in English like shower. An example of a ch word is chita (“sit”).
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media Along with restaurants, Haitians have established barber and beauty shops, music stores, and money transfer stores in major American cities such as Boston, New York City, and Miami. Haitians have also established their own community media—newspapers, radio, and television—that keeps them informed of daily events in the Haitian diaspora and in the homeland. Major Haitian newspapers produced in New York, for example, include the Haitian Times, Haïti Observateur, and Haïti Progrès, all located in Brooklyn. “In New York City’s Haitian community, for example, there are five radio stations which function on a 24-hour basis: Radio Triomphe Internationale, Radio Soleil, Radio Lakay, Radio Tropicale, and Radyo Pa Nou. Also, Haiti Dyaspo and La Lanterne Haïtienne are widely watched news magazine programs” (Zéphir 2004, 93). Another source of Haitian news and information, in the greater Boston area, is the Boston Haitian Reporter, established in 2000 by William Dorcena.
Celebration of National Holidays Two of the most important holidays that Haitian Americans celebrate are Haitian Independence Day (January 1) and Haitian Flag Day (May 18). Haitian Americans take great pride in Haitian Independence Day and visit each other to celebrate. It is also customary for many Haitian Americans to make a squash-based soup called joumou, which they share with company. It is said that the newly freed slaves who fought in the Haitian Revolution ate soup joumou on Independence Day as an act of defiance because the French did not allow slaves to eat the soup. In Haitian communities across America, thousands of Haitian Americans celebrate Haitian Flag Day (May 18) at concerts, festivals, and parades. On May 18, 1803, in the city of Archaie, not far from Port-au-Prince, Dessalines, the leader of the blacks, and Pétion, the leader of the mulattoes, agreed on an official flag, with blue and red bands placed vertically. Haiti’s first flag was sewn by Catherine
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Flon. “On Independence Day, however, the flag was modified again. The blue and the red bands were placed horizontally this time, with the blue band on top of the red band” (Fobrum 2002). Haiti used this flag until 1964, when François Duvalier used a vertical black and red flag and added a modified version of the arms of the republic. On February 25, 1986, after Jean-Claude Duvalier fled Haiti and the Duvalier regime fell apart, the Haitian people in its vast majority requested that the red and blue flag be brought back. The red and blue flag remains the official flag of Haiti.
Foodways Haitian cuisine is a mixture of African, French, and Caribbean influences. Djiri kole (literally “rice mixed with beans”) is a staple of the Haitian diet (as is rice and beans throughout the Caribbean). Haitians, however, have numerous unique versions of beans and rice, such as adding pigeon peas, djon djon (tiny black mushrooms), and green peas. Haitians also make chicken, goat, and beef in sauces that many times have a tomato paste base (sòs Kreyòl). Other Haitian specialties are banan pèze (fried plantains), griyo (fried pork), pate (Haitian pastries filled with fish, chicken,
A large Haitian flag flutters in the wind as revelers and floats pass by during the Haitian Day Parade in Brooklyn, New York, on May 30, 2004. The third annual parade also commemorates 200 years of the Caribbean nation’s independence. (AP Photo/Dean Cox)
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or spiced beef ), and lambi (conch). We find many Haitians throughout the United States dining on these Haitian delicacies. Many Haitians in the United States also enjoy akasan, a drink made of cinnamon, evaporated milk, flour, corn starch, star anise, and vanilla extract; and many imbibe Rhum Barbancourt, a rum produced in Haiti since 1862. In celebration of Haitian independence, Haitians in the United States commonly eat soup joumou (pumpkin soup), which is made with squash and is offered to guests who drop by to offer their best wishes for the upcoming year. Variations of soup joumou contain vegetables, beef, turkey, and thin pasta like macaroni and vermicelli.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Haiti has a longstanding tradition of artistic expression that is internationally recognized. Some of the prominent Haitian artists of the 20th century are Vodouist painter Hector Hyppolite and Georges Liautaud. The Galerie d’Art Nader, which opened in Port-au-Prince in 1966, has the finest collection of Haitian paintings in Haiti available for purchase, consequently contributing to the dissemination of Haitian art, as it receives hundreds of visitors and customers from around the world. “The Milwaukee Art Museum, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, is home to the largest collection of Haitian art in the world. This collection of Haitian art classics, named the Flagg collection, was originally purchased by the late multimillionaire Richard Flagg (and his wife, Erna) at the urging of his friend, Monsignor Alfred Voegeli, the Episcopalian Bishop of Haiti who was from Milwaukee” (Zéphir 2004, 63). The collection was donated to the Milwaukee Art Museum upon Richard Flagg’s death. Music is also another form of artistic expression that has brought increased visibility to Haitians. One popular form of Haitian music with deep roots in Haiti’s peasant class and is used in Vodou ceremonies is Rara. Rara bands perform in the streets of Haiti at various times when there are particular political events that incite grassroots movements. However, the established tradition of the Rara festival is during the Lent season, right after Carnival up until Easter Sunday. In the mid-1950s, another form of Haitian music called Konpa developed. Konpa is influenced by merengue, which is from the Dominican Republic. Konpa dominated the Haitian music scene with artists like Nemours Jean-Baptiste and Weber Sicot. Tabou Combo—which was formed in Haiti and relocated to New York when the political situation worsened in the late 1970s–and Miami-based T-Vice are two bands illustrative of this type of music. Mizik Rasin (roots music) developed in the late 1970s among Haitians. This musical form came about as the result of the interest of returning to Haitian folk forms such as Vodou and Rara musical traditions. The group Boukman Eksperyans (named after Boukman who presided over the Vodou ceremony that ignited the Haitian Revolution) started
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in 1978; they used their music to speak out against the abuses of the Duvalier regime and allied themselves with the struggles of the Haitian masses (Zéphir 2004, 64).
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Intergroup Relations Haitians in the United States have established ties to other Haitians through extended families and institutions. Many Haitians are concentrated along the Eastern seaboard of the United States in cities such as Boston; New York; Washington, D.C.; and Miami. Haitians frequently visit their relatives who live in each of these cities as well as kin who live within the greater metropolitan areas of the major cities that Haitians live in. For example, there are an estimated 25,000 Haitians in the greater Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, which includes Silver Spring, Langley Park, and Hyattsville, Maryland. Many of them have relatives in the greater New York metropolitan area, and they visit each other frequently by car. The institutions created by Haitians in the United States also provide ample opportunities for Haitians to congregate based on a shared ethnic identity. In the Washington, D.C., area, for example, Dr. Joseph Baptiste, responded to the coup d’état in Haiti in 1991 by founding the National Organization for the Advancement of Haitians (NOAH). NOAH is a nonprofit organization for social policy and economic development and allows Haitians from the Washington, D.C., area to interact and connect with Haitians living in other parts of the United States with the shared goal of the betterment of Haiti (http://www.noahhaiti.org). Since its inception, NOAH has responded to emergencies in Haiti including natural disasters such as the earthquake of January 2010. NOAH members set up water pumps for over 5,000 Haitians living in tent cities and delivered thousands of meals to people who had been affected by the quake. Additionally, NOAH has an earthquake action plan, which includes a medical action plan including triage, consultation, emergency interventions, and specialized medicine.
Political Associations and Organizations Since their migration to the United States, Haitians have created numerous professional organizations that help them maintain their ethnic identity, promote their interests, and continue links with their ancestral homeland. An example of a vibrant Haitian organization that helps Haitian Americans maintain their ethnic identity, assists members of the Haitian immigrant community, and continue links with Haiti is the AMHE, Association des Medecines Haïtiens à l’Étranger (the Associations of Haitian Physicians Abroad). According to the organization’s Web site, the AMHE
916 | Haitian Immigrants
was founded in August 1972 by a group of Haitian physicians determined to mark their presence as a growing ethnic entity in the United States, foster professional alliances, promote the health and interests of the Haitian immigrant community at large, and contribute to the health care needs of Haitians through medical student training and donations (www.amhe.org). Since the January 12, 2010, earthquake, countless members of the AMHE, as well as other Haitian Americans who work in health care, have returned to Haiti to contribute their medical expertise and care for Haitians who need medical attention for compound fractures, amputations, and mental illness.
Civic and Electoral Participation In the major American cities we find Haitians (Boston, Chicago, Miami, and New York, for example), Haitians have made an impact with regard to representing members of their community. Haitians also do this through increased electoral participation as a strategy in the shaping of their communities. The example of Haitian civic and electoral participation in Boston demonstrates this commitment. Haitian organizations emerged in the Boston area in the 1980s to serve the population. Examples of these organizations are AFAB, or Asosyasyon Fanm Ayisyenn Boston (Association of Haitian Women in Boston); the Haitian-American Public Health Initiative (HAPHI); the Haitian American Public Health Initiative; Haitian-Americans United; and the Haitian Multi-Service Center. These organizations mobilize their resources and experience to assist newcomers to Boston’s Haitian community. According to one author, Haitians in Boston have also had a strong voice in U.S. politics since 1999, when Democrat Marie St. Fleur was elected as state house representative from the Fifth Suffolk District, representing Dorchester and part of Roxbury. Marie St. Fleur campaigned as the “girl from the neighborhood” and gained numerous votes from Haitians, who are overwhelmingly represented in her district.
Public Policies and Political Representation Although Haitians have positively contributed to the creation of the United States and the communities which they live in, Haitians are continually stigmatized by negative stereotypes, especially in the latter 20th century. Indeed, no other American immigrant group in the 1970s and 1980s endured more prejudice and suffered more discrimination than Haitians (Stepick 1998, 2). For example, Haitians have the highest disapproval for political asylum requests of any national group. They have been disproportionately incarcerated in comparison to other nationalities seeking political asylum requests, and Haitians were identified as health risks for tuberculosis and AIDS during the 1970s and 1980s. As a result of this climate of discrimination, advocacy organizations that were disappointed that Haitians were not one
The Second and Later Generations | 917
of the nationalities benefiting from the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act put tremendous political pressure on the U.S. Congress to pass some type of benefit to the estimated 50,000 Haitian refugees living in the United States in 1988. Applicants eligible for permanent residence in the United States included those who (a) were living continuously in the United States since December 31, 1995; (b) were either orphaned or abandoned after entering the United States; (c) were determined to have a credible fear of persecution if returned to Haiti, (d) had applied for asylum before December 31, 1995; or (e) had previously been paroled into the United States by U.S. authorities for emergent reasons or reasons deemed to be in the national interest.
The Second and Later Generations Second-generation Haitian Americans are more numerous and heterogeneous that the first generation of Haitians that migrated to the United States. According to one scholar, the greater number of children of Haitian immigrants tends to fall within two broad categories: “(1) those who were born in the United States, who have always lived in this country and may or may not have had a chance to visit Haiti; and (2) those born in Haiti who came to the United States at an early age (usually before adolescence) and are schooled in the United States, and who may not have spent any time or significant amount of time in Haiti since their relocation” (Zéphir 2004, 129). They are fluent in English and some may have an active or passive knowledge of Haitian Creole (French in rare instances).
Ethnic Identity: Degrees of Haitianness Second-generation Haitian Americans can be divided into three broad categories with some overlap: “(1) those who display a strong form of Haitianness; (2) those who display a weaker form of Haitianness; and (3) those who have absolutely nothing to do with Haiti, the undercovers” (Zéphir 2004, 130). “Haitianness is demonstrated mostly through an intense involvement in the Haitian diasporic community and an interest in Haitian matters in the United States and Haiti. Haitianness can also be expressed by a preference for the label ‘Haitian’ as a self ethnic descriptor, an acknowledgement of one’s birthplace of Haiti and parents’ birthplace, length of residency in Haiti or repeated trips to Haiti, and a high level of fluency in Haitian Creole” (Zéphir 2004, 130–31). They speak Haitian Creole without the use of a lot of English to express their thoughts and are active in Haitian clubs and organizations. Second-generation Haitian Americans who exhibit a strong form of Haitianness also feel that it is their responsibility to educate Haitian American youth and the general public about Haiti. They defend Haiti from some
918 | Haitian Immigrants
Youth Profile A Haitian Star on the U.S. Men’s National Soccer Team Jozy Altidore (Josmer Volmy Altidore) is a 19-year-old forward for the U.S. Men’s National Soccer Team and a soccer prodigy of Haitian descent. He was born on November 6, 1989, in Livingston, New Jersey, to Joseph and Giselle Altidore, who were both born in Haiti. Jozy has made a huge impact on the U.S. Men’s National Soccer team although he has only been on the team for a relatively short time. He was the youngest player to score for the United States in a match with Mexico’s team. He also became the youngest United States player to score a hat trick, putting in all three goals in a 3–0 win over Trinidad and Tobago in April 2009. Jozy began his professional soccer career at the age of 16, when he was drafted by the MetroStars (now known as the New York Red Bulls) of Major League Soccer (MLS). Altidore had to miss most of his first season away from the MetroStars, however, while he worked toward his high school diploma in Florida. He made his first MLS appearance on September 9, 2006, as a substitute in the 81st minute. Although Jozy Altidore is an American and a prominent member of the U.S. Men’s National Team, he is also aware and proud of his Haitian roots. He counts his parents, Joseph and Giselle, as his role models, and in November 2006, Jozy went to Haiti along with his Red Bull teammates, Seth Stammler and HaitianAmerican soccer player Jerrod Laventure, as part of a six-day service trip for Yélé Haiti, the charitable organization of Wyclef Jean, the Grammy award– winning artist of Haitian descent. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jozy_Altidore—cite_note-6#cite_note-6.
of the negative accusations the country receives in the media. An example of a second-generation Haitian American who fits this description is Wyclef Jean, who is arguably the most prominent Haitian living in the United States. Wyclef Jean is an award-winning musician and producer, and he is a Haitian Goodwill Ambassador. He created a foundation called Yélé Haiti, which supports projects that improve the education of Haitian youth, the health of Haitians, the Haitian environment, and community development in Haiti. Since the 2010 earthquake Wyclef Jean, his wife Claudinette, and Yélé Haiti have distributed clothes, medical supplies, and over 80,000 hot meals across Haiti. Yélé Haiti also distributed tents to Haitians rendered homeless by the earthquake and has enacted a plan to augment Haiti’s agricultural production through a farming community outside of Port-auPrince in Croix-des-Bouquets. Finally, Yélé Haiti plans to build permanent housing for communities destroyed by the earthquake.
The Second and Later Generations | 919
Daphne Dorlean (left) and Albertha Roundtree, both from Shadowlawn Elementary School in the Little Haiti section of Miami, dance a Haitian compas dance as part of Haitian heritage celebrations in Miami, May 17, 2002. (AP Photo/Marta Lavandier)
“Second generation Haitian Americans who are positioned at the weaker end of the Haitianness axis define themselves as Haitian Americans” (Zéphir 2004, 133). There are various factors that explain this choice of identification. For example, the fact that some Haitian Americans were born in the United States, or lived in the United States since a young age, has given them a thorough knowledge of American and African American culture that surpasses their knowledge of Haitian culture. Also, their lack of a foreign accent may prevent them from sounding like other Haitians who speak accented English. They may like elements from Haitian culture such as cuisine and music, but they are less involved with Haitian diasporic matters, as well as those of Haiti. Haitian Americans who display this weaker form of Haitianness stand in stark contrast to those Americans of Haitian descent who cover up their ethnic heritage to deal with the reality of ethnic prejudice that is pervasive in the United States. One author refers to people of Haitian descent such as this as an undercover (130).
Educational Attainment The assistance of state and city agencies that have attended to the specific cultural needs of Haitians has facilitated the education of second-generation Haitian
920 | Haitian Immigrants
Youth Profile American Idol Finalist and Model Joanne Borgella is a singer of Haitian descent who was a finalist on season 7 of American Idol in 2008. She is also a plus-size model represented by Wilhelmina Models, one of the largest and most successful model management companies in the world. Joanne was born in Oyster Bay, Long Island, on May 29, 1982, to Joel Borgella MD and Paule Danielle Ford, who are both from Haiti. Her parents are the founders of Radio Tropicale, the first international Haitian radio station. Dr. Joel Borgella was also a presidential candidate in Haiti’s 2006 presidential elections. Joanne’s big break in the en(Courtesy of Willis Roberts) tertainment industry occurred in 2005 when Joanne earned one of the coveted spots on the Oxygen Channel’s groundbreaking special created by Mo’Nique of Queens of Comedy and The Parkers fame, entitled “Mo’Nique’s Fat Chance.” Joanne took the competition very seriously, and ended up victorious, winning the title of Miss F.A.T. (which stands for “Fabulous And T hick”). Joanne is represented by Wilhelmina 10/20 division in New York, Miami, and Los Angeles. Ms. Borgella is currently the face of Ashley Stewart, a nationwide plus-size retailer for urban women; Wal-Mart; and Macy’s. She is also currently one of the faces of Proctor & Gamble’s new campaign for African American women called “My Black is Beautiful,” which celebrates the diverse collective beauty of African American women and encourages black women to define and promote their own beauty standard. As the result of her modeling career, Joanne has been featured in African American magazines such as Essence and Jet. Joanne has also been the face of Torrid and Kohl’s department store and was featured in ads in Seventeen and In Style magazine. Joanne is also very proud of her Haitian roots. She has performed at numerous Haitian charity events as a special guest and has also donated food, gifts, and clothing to Gonaïves, Haiti, which was ravaged by numerous tropical storms and hurricanes in 2008.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Haiti | 921
Americans. In New York City, for example, “the large number of Haitian students attending public schools compelled the board of education to hire Haitian teachers and guidance counselors who could address the needs of Haitian students. Many of these Haitian teachers are used in bilingual education programs (Haitian Creole and English) that are designed to help Haitian children with limited English proficiency” (Zéphir 2004, 95). Programs such as these have helped many secondgeneration Haitian Americans to integrate into American educational systems and achieve at very high levels. Many second-generation Haitian Americans, whether they were born in Haiti and moved to the United States or were born in the United States, have done well in American schools and have gone on to obtain advanced American university degrees, which have secured them employment as doctors, engineers, nurses, lawyers, professors, and business owners.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Haiti Forecasts for the 21st Century: Hope for Post-Earthquake Haiti More than 200 years ago, the ancestors of Haitian Americans fought a revolution in which they defeated colonial powers that tried to reinstitute chattel slavery. The main lesson the Haitian Revolution taught the world is that black people (people of African descent) are human beings with the right to live dignified lives (Louis 2010). The Haitian Revolution was also supposed to allow Haitians to lead dignified lives, but as the January 12, 2010, earthquake in Haiti demonstrated, the majority of Haitians are still struggling to lead dignified lives. Haitian Americans reacted immediately to this unimaginable cataclysm in numerous ways. For example, Haitian Americas rushed to Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, and Leogane, the epicenter of the earthquake, to lend their expertise for Haitians trapped under rubble and injured by debris. Anesthesiologist Billy Ford, pediatric surgeon Henri Ford, and internist Jean Ford, Haitian brothers who migrated to the United States, all went back to Haiti after the earthquake and helped with medical treatment in Port-au-Prince. Andia Augustin, a doctoral candidate in French at Washington University in St. Louis, interrupted her studies and served as a translator for a medical team from Tennessee that provided medical care to Haitians injured in the earthquake. Guerda Nicolas used her expertise in psychology to help inform well-meaning relief organizations, missionary groups, and other groups with disaster counseling skills that American treatments for mental illness needs to integrate Haitian culture, Haitian folk medicine, and Haitian coping mechanisms (such as singing, dancing, praying, and receiving comfort from one’s minister) as ways to treat depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in Haiti.
922 | Haitian Immigrants
The cataclysm of January 12, 2010, overshadowed some of the good news that was coming out of Haiti with regard to its difficult past. Specifically, there was cause for hope for Haiti among Haitian Americans because the Obama administration took steps before the earthquake to ensure a brighter future for Haiti. For example, in 2009 President Obama appointed former president Bill Clinton as a special U.S. envoy to Haiti. One of the responsibilities for the former president was to see that international donors converted their collective pledge of $353 million into viable aid for Haiti. Since that appointment, former president Clinton visited Haiti in July 2009 to raise awareness about reconstruction efforts in Gonaïves, a battered seaside city that was nearly destroyed in 2008 by a series of tropical storms. During that visit, special envoy Clinton said the Haitian government and its international backers hoped to create 150,000 to 200,000 jobs in Haiti over the next two years. Many of those jobs were supposed to come from projects to rebuild roads and shore up erosion-prone hillsides (Katz 2009a). Before the earthquake, Haiti benefited from the presence of 9,000 United Nations peacekeeping troops, which helped with security matters. In addition, the U.S. Congress granted Haiti access to the American textiles market, allowing for the duty-free sale of Haitian textiles in the United States for a decade (as part of the Hope II Trade legislation). This policy added 12,000 jobs to Haiti. There were other areas of improvement that gave Haiti hope. Recently three international organizations (the Inter-American Monetary Fund, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank) canceled $1.2 billion of Haiti’s debt on June 30, 2009, freeing up approximately $50 million per year for spending to reduce poverty over the next 10 to 15 years (Katz 2009b). A significant portion of the debt dates back to loans that lined the pockets of Haiti’s dictators, especially François and Jean-Claude Duvalier. Before January 12, 2010, Haiti’s government embarked on a focused action plan to safeguard the gains already achieved and ensure that the country continues on a path towards economic security. This included job creation and infrastructural improvement, which was supposed to attract more foreign investment to Haiti. Since the earthquake, the international community, the U.S. government, and the Haitian diaspora (Haitian Americans) have helped to rebuild Haiti in different ways. The main contribution made by the international community to the rebuilding of Haiti is external debt relief. After the earthquake, Venezuela announced that it would cancel nearly $300 million in Haitian debt. Haiti owes Taiwan $88 million. On May 29, 2010, Taiwan announced that the Taiwanese government would shoulder the Haitian interest payments for five years as Haiti recovers from the earthquake. France promised €230 million (approximately $400 million) towards Haitian earthquake relief. Numerous telethons in the United States (HOPE FOR HAITI NOW telethon; S.O.S.—Saving Ourselves: Help for Haiti) raised millions of dollars for Haitian earthquake relief. On March 22, 2010, the Inter-American Development Bank agreed to forgive $479 million of Haiti’s debt. Additionally, the IADB will provide Haiti with $2 billion in loans over the next 10 years. And on May 28,
Issues in Relations between the United States and Haiti | 923
2010, the World Bank agreed to cancel approximately $36 million of Haitian debt. The World Bank also made $479 million in grants to support post-earthquake Haitian recovery and development through June 2011. Finally on March 31, 2010, over 150 countries pledged over $5.3 billion over the next 18 months to help rebuild Haiti. In addition to providing military and medical assistance in Haiti since January 12, 2010, the Obama administration granted temporary protected status to undocumented Haitians living in the United States. Temporary protected status protects undocumented Haitians from deportation for 18 months and allows them to continue to work in the United States. This special immigration status was extended to approximately 100,000 Haitians and 30,000 Haitians who were ordered to be deported. The protection status only applies to Haitians who were in the United States before January 12, 2010 (Wu 2010). President Obama also donated part of his Nobel Peace Prize Award to the Clinton Bush Haiti Fund. The Clinton Bush Haiti Fund distributes essential medical equipment to critically injured Haitians, creates clinics, and delivers relief supplies, including water purification tablets, hygiene kits, mosquito nets, and temporary latrines (http://www.clintonbushhaitifund.org/). The Haitian diaspora in the United States responded immediately to the earthquake as it has during past crises. In addition to Haitian American hometown associations and professional associations that went to Haiti to help with earthquake relief, Haitian Americans have contributed to rebuilding post-earthquake Haiti. Maurice Bonhomme and Jean Cayemitte, who work jobs as security guards and in the kitchen of an upscale French restaurant in Chicago, Illinois, returned to Petite Goave, Haiti, which was devastated by the earthquake (Lazar 2010). Between the two of them, Jean and Maurice raised enough money to get 500 tents to Petit Goave and are rebuilding a grammar school that they supported with their own money before the earthquake. Jean and Maurice’s story is an example of the power of Haitian Americans in rebuilding Haiti. According to a 2008 World Bank study, émigrés remittances made up roughly 30 percent of Haiti’s GDP (Lazar 2010). As the result of the earthquake, it would be safe to assume that Haitian Americans are sending even more money. Haiti was the first nation to articulate a general principle of common, unqualified equality for all of its citizens. The fundamental concept of a common humanity also ran deeply through the early Haitian constitutions. This belief is what connects Haitians with other people around the world, as was highlighted by U.S. President Barack Obama in a speech he delivered in the aftermath of the earthquake. In the coming months and years, Haitians will continue to struggle to live dignified lives in the midst of destroyed homes, deceased family and friends, infrastructural challenges, and possible waves of infectious diseases that could claim additional lives. But if most of the international aid that was pledged to Haiti is donated, if infrastructural improvements occur in Haiti, and if Haitian Americans continue to help rebuild Haiti, there may be reason for hope in post-earthquake Haiti.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 134 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009
924
Region and country of birth
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
Haiti
22,337
27,031
20,213
12,293
14,191
14,524
22,226
30,405
26,007
24,280
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 135 Persons naturalized by region/country of birth and selected characteristics (2003–2008). Region/country: Haiti
Year
Naturalized U.S. citizens from Haiti
2003
7,247
2004
8,215
2005
9,740
2006
15,979
2007
11,552
2008
21,229
Total
73,962
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.
Table 136 Nonimmigrant admissions by region and country of residence (Haiti): Fiscal years 1999 to 2008
Year
Nonimmigrant admissions from Haiti to the United States
1999
75,210
2000
76,185
2001
72,418
2002
68,725
2003
66,675
2004
70,187
2005
76,092
2006
62,650
2007
89,990
2008
103,784
Total
761,916
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Nonimmigrant Admissions (Table 27d).
925
926 | Haitian Immigrants Table 137 Individuals from Haiti granted asylum total: 1999 to 2008
Year
Individuals from Haiti granted asylum in the United States
1999
406
2000
985
2001
1,595
2002
1,478
2003
1,732
2004
2,313
2005
2,936
2006
2,995
2007
1,648
2008
1,237
Total
17,325
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Individuals Granted Asylum by Region and Country of Nationality: Fiscal Years 1999 to 2008 (Tables 17d and 19d).
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Census figures provide the best estimates of the Haitian population in the United States. According to the American Community Survey, which is compiled from Census data, there were 694,123 Haitian-born blacks in the United States as of 2005. Table 138 shows the leading states in the United States where those Haitians obtaining legal permanent residence in 2009 lived. Chief among them are Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts.
Appendix III: Notable Haitian Americans | 927 Table 138 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading States of Residence; Region/Country: Haiti Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
24,280
10,845
13,435
103
57
46
California Colorado
20
8
12
519
251
268
13,403
5,957
7,446
Georgia
333
157
176
Illinois
142
61
81
Maryland
288
126
162
1,948
840
1,108
Michigan
41
19
22
Minnesota
17
11
6
Nevada
20
7
13
Connecticut Florida
Massachusetts
New Jersey
1,775
789
986
New York
4,229
1,876
2,353
55
24
31
North Carolina Ohio
37
16
21
406
180
226
Texas
82
38
44
Virginia
82
39
43
Washington
44
20
24
736
369
367
Pennsylvania
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix III: Notable Haitian Americans A few notable Haitian Americans include the following individuals: Marleine Bastien is a social worker and founder and executive director of Fanm Ayisyen nan Miami (Haitian Women of Miami), which is also known as FANM (the Haitian Creole word for “woman”). She was born in Haiti in 1959 and immigrated to the United States in 1981. Edwidge Danticat was born in Haiti in 1969. She is arguably the most prominent Haitian American writer. Edwidge migrated to the United States in 1981 and earned a bachelor of arts degree in French translation and literature from Columbia University’s Barnard College in 1990 and earned an MFA degree
928 | Haitian Immigrants
in creative writing in 1993. She is a prolific writer who has published more than 40 essays and short stories and several novels that have garnered acclaim such as Breath, Eyes, Memory (1994), chosen by the Oprah Winfrey book club in 1998; and Krik Krak (1995), which was a finalist for the National Book Award. She is also very involved in the Haitian community, regularly organizing cultural programs and speaking to Haitian children and teenagers at public schools. Marie St. Fleur is a Massachusetts state house representative who served Dorchester for 11 years but now serves as Boston Mayor Thomas Menino’s chief of advocacy and strategic investment, which oversees many education, immigration, and antipoverty programs, according to the Boston Globe (April 24, 2010). She was born in Haiti in 1962 and immigrated to the United States in 1969. While attending the University of Massachusetts at Amherst she earned a BA in political science in 1984. In 1987 she earned her law degree after attending Boston College Law School. She has worked extensively in aiding the Haitian immigrant population in Boston, especially after the Haiti earthquake in 2010. Henri R. Ford, M.D., is vice president and chief of surgery of Children’s Hospital in Los Angeles, California, as well as vice-dean of medical education, professor, and vice chair for clinical affairs in the department of surgery and at the Keck School of Medicine of the University of Southern California. He received his BA in public and international affairs, cum laude, from Princeton University in 1980 and his MD from Harvard Medical School in 1984. Dr. Ford did his internship (1984–1985) and residency (1985–1987; 1989–1991) in general surgery at New York Hospital Cornell Medical College. He completed a research fellowship in immunology (1987–1989) in the department of surgery at the University of Pittsburgh and a clinical fellowship (1991–1993) in pediatric surgery at Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh. Abner Louima currently lives in Miami, where he is an advocate for Haitian refugees. In 1997, Louima was brutally attacked in one of the most outrageous cases of police brutality against black men, and Haitians. Louima was beaten and sodomized with a plunger handle by New York Police Department officers. As the result of this incident a series of trials occurred from 1999 to 2002. The four New York City police officers involved included Justin Volpe, who pleaded guilty to sodomizing Louima and who was sentenced to 30 years in prison. One other officer served five years in prison. Two others were fired from the New York Police Department and were not tried again after having their convictions overturned. On July 12, 2001, Abner Louima accepted a settlement of $8.7 million from the City of New York and the police union after he filed a civil suit.
References | 929
Glossary Brain drain: An out-migration of a country’s technical and intellectual professionals (such as doctors, engineers, lawyers, teachers, and nurses). Kleptocracy: A state in which those in power exploit national resources and steal.
Lavalas: Haitian Creole for a flood that washes everything away. Lwa: Spirits; associated with the practice of Vodou. Tonton Macoute: Name of a traditional bogeyman in Haiti. Also a Duvalier loyalist who provided information and detected subversion in every sphere of Haitian society through bullying, extortion, and murder.
References Arthur, Charles, and Michael Dash, eds. 1999. Libète: A Haiti Anthology. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers. Catanese, Anthony. 1999. Haitians: Migration and Diaspora. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook. [Online information; retrieved 08/07/09.] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html. Desmangles, Leslie. 1992. The Faces of the Gods: Vodou and Roman Catholicism in Haiti. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Dupuy, Alex. 1989. Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race and Underdevelopment since 1700. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Dupuy, Alex. 2005. “From Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Gerard Latortue: The Unending Crisis of Democratization in Haiti.” Journal of Latin American Anthropology 10(1): 186–205. Farmer, Paul. 1994. The Uses of Haiti. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press. Ferguson, James. 1987. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers. New York: Basil Blackwell. Fick, Carolyn. 1990. The Making of Haiti: The Saint-Domingue Revolution from Below. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Fobrum, Carl. 2002. “Haitian Flag Day Speech.” [Online information; retrieved 6/2/09.] http://www.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti-archive/msg11939.html. Geggus, David. 1982. Slavery, War and Revolution: The British Occupation of SaintDomingue, 1793–1798. New York: Oxford University Press. Glick Schiller, Nina, and Georges Fouron. 2001. Georges Woke Up Laughing: LongDistance Nationalism and the Search for Home. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 2000. Statistical Yearbook. James, C.L.R. 1963. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution. New York: Random House.
930 | Haitian Immigrants Katz, Jonathan. 2009a. “Clinton Draws Crowds on First Visit as Envoy.” [Online article; retrieved 8/7/09.] www.bostonhaitian.com/BHR%207-09web.pdf. Katz, Jonathan. 2009b. “1.2 Billion in Debts Canceled to Help Haiti.” [Online article; retrieved 8/7/09.] www.bostonhaitian.com/BHR%207-09web.pdf. Laguerre, Michel. 1998. Diasporic Citizenship: Haitian Americans in Transnational America. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Lazar, Elizabeth. 2010. “The Return of Jean and Maurice: How the Diaspora Will Rebuild Haiti.” [Online article; retrieved 6/3/10.] http://www.newint.org/features/webexclusive/2010/05/12/haiti-diaspora/. Louis, Jr., Bertin M. 2010. “Haiti’s Pact with the Devil (Some Haitians Believe This Too)?” [Online essay; retrieved 6/3/09.] http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/02/18/haitis-pact-withthe-devil-some-haitians-believe-this-too/. Ng, Alicia. 2006. “Evangelism Spreads Throughout Haitian Communities” [Online article; retrieved 6/23/09.] news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=764 eab64c5229a37356b9faf052bc638. Olmos, Margarite, and Lizabeth Paravisini-Gebert. 2003. Creole Religions of the Caribbean: An Introduction from Vodou and Santeria to Obeah and Espiritismo. New York: New York University Press. Pierre-Louis, François. 2006. Haitians in New York City: Transnationalism and Hometown Associations. Gainesville: University of Florida Press. Richman, Karen. 2005. “The Protestant Ethic and the Dis-Spirit of Vodou.” In Immigrant Faiths: Transforming Religious Life in America, edited by Karen I. Leonard, 165–85. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. Schieffelin, Bambi, and Rachelle Charlier Doucet. 1994. “The ‘Real’ Haitian Creole: Ideology, Metalinguistics and Orthographic Choice.” American Ethnologist 21(1): 176–200. Simpson, George E. 1945. “The Belief System of Haitian Vodoun.” American Anthropologist 47(1): 35–59. Stepick, Alex. 1998. Pride Against Prejudice: Haitians in the United States. Needham Heights: Allyn & Bacon. Védrine, Soliny. 2004. Life History Interview with Bertin M. Louis, Jr. Boston, MA. White House, 2010. “Remarks by the President on Rescue Efforts in Haiti.” [Online information; retrieved 6/3/10.] http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-rescue-efforts-haiti. White House. 2009. “Statement of President Barack Obama on Haitian Flag Day.” [Online information; retrieved 6/3/09.] www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ Statement-of-President-Barack-Obama-on-Haitian-Flag-Day/. Wu, Scott. 2010. “Temporary Protected Status for Haitians in the US for 18 Months.” [Online information; retrieved 6/3/10.] http://www.nowpublic.com/world/temporaryprotected-status-haitians-us-18-months. Zéphir, Flore. 2004. The Haitian Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
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Further Reading Farmer, Paul. 1994. The Uses of Haiti. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press. The Uses of Haiti uses the quest for human dignity of the majority of Haitian society (the Haitian poor) as a critical lens to analyze Haitian history. By reviewing the actions of nations, such as France and the United States, and particular actors in Haitian history, such as Toussaint Louverture, the Haitian upper class, the Haitian military, François and Jean-Claude Duvalier, Farmer’s goal is to reveal the structural issues (structural adjustment programs, an indemnity the Boyer administration paid France in the 19th century so that France would not invade Haiti, and the Duvalier kleptocracy) to answer why poverty and underdevelopment are persistent in Haiti. Glick Schiller, Nina, and Georges Fouron. 2001. Georges Woke Up Laughing: LongDistance Nationalism and the Search for Home. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Georges Woke Up Laughing is a superb ethnography that uses research in the United States and Haiti to demonstrate the continued ties between Haitians living in the United States and their homeland. Using the experiences and family history of Dr. Georges Fouron, a professor of education and Africana studies at Stony Brook University who is of Haitian descent, the text takes readers from the United States to Haiti to analyze gender, nationalism, and the relationship between later generations of Haitian Americans and Haiti. Pamphile, Leon. 2001. Haitians and African Americans: A Heritage of Tragedy and Hope. Gainesville: University of Florida Press. Haitians and African Americans is an informative text that demonstrates the long historical relationship between Haitians and African Americans. This book deals with the shared heritage of slavery for both groups and how the paths of African Americans and Haitians have crossed repeatedly in their dual quest for freedom from human bondage and equality. For example, this book recognizes some of important contributions made to American society by Haitians like the founding of Chicago by the Haitian Jean Baptiste Point du Sable. In addition, the text notes the African American political support of Haiti and Haitians especially during the Haitian boat crisis of the late 20th century. Zéphir, Flore. 2004. The Haitian Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. The Haitian Americans is the premier resource about the Haitian presence in the United States. The author provides a detailed history of Haiti, a history of Haitians in the United States, statistics about Haitian migration to the United States, information about established and growing Haitian communities across the United States, and short biographies about prominent Haitian Americans who contribute to the fabric of American society.
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Honduran Immigrants by Suyapa G. Portillo Villeda
Introduction Honduran immigrants are a small but growing community in the United States. Earlier waves of migration from Honduras date back to the early half of the 20th century. Many Honduran intellectuals arrived in New York and other cities, but migration by employees of the banana companies to New Orleans was the most prominent influx of Hondurans. Several major U.S. companies operated banana businesses in the North Coast of the country for the last 100 years. The Tela Railroad Company and the Truxillo Railroad Company, both subsidiaries of the United Fruit Company, began to operate there in 1912. The Standard Fruit and Steamship Company (began under the Vaccaro Brothers) operated business that purchased from local growers and resold bananas in the United States. For much of the 20th century Honduras was derogatorily referred to as the “Banana Republic,” a term used by United States citizens to refer to Honduras. The term is understood to mean not only that the main export of the country was bananas but also to mean that the banana companies controlled politics in the country. Nowadays, the country’s number one exported commodity is not bananas but people. Honduran society is complex and diverse, and this can be seen in the migratory networks of immigrants that come to the United States. Most of the 20th century has been a complex time for political affairs in Honduras. A series of military and political dictatorships stifled the development of national infrastructure and national industry. Honduras has also been a site of geopolitical interest by the United States. In the 1980s, the contras operated in Honduras to curtail the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran liberation forces (Lapper 1985, 84). Millions of dollars from the administration of Ronald Reagan supported military forces and training of the contras, the counterrevolutionary forces. Very little of this funding was invested in Honduran society and education. Today, Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin America. The infant mortality rate reported by the Honduran government in 2009 is of 25.82 deaths per 1,000 live births. Although all Hondurans, also known as catrachos, enjoy a publicly funded education in Honduras, many do not make it all the way to high school, having to work to support their families; 76.2 percent of the population over 15 years of age can read and write.
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Chronology | 935
Chronology 5th to 9th century
Mayan Empire in Copán.
pre-1500
Honduras is inhabited by Lencas, Tolupanes, Pech, Tawahkas, Chortís.
1502
Christopher Columbus lands in Trujillo on his fourth voyage.
1524
Hernán Cortés sends an expedition to Honduras, founding the North Coast towns of Puerto Caballos (Puerto Cortés) and Trujillo. Pedro de Alvarado leads an expedition to Honduras, founding San Pedro Sula.
1537
Governor Francisco de Montejano founds the city of Comayagua.
1797
Garifuna peoples arrive in Honduran Bay Islands and Roatán.
1821
The Central American Federation gains independence from Spain.
1839
Honduras becomes an independent republic.
1907
Sam Zemurray forms the Cuyamel Fruit Company in Honduras.
1911–1912
Zemurray, of the Cuyamel Fruit, attempts to oust President Davila because he was not favoring his company. The United States steps in to negotiate the situation. President Bonilla favors Zemurray’s company by giving him more concessions. U.S. invasion helps to secure U.S. control in the region.
1912
United Fruit Company is established in Honduras via the Tela and the Trujillo Railroad Company; land concessions are given by the Honduran government to build a railroad.
1929
United Fruit Company purchases Cuyamel Fruit Company; Zemurray is the largest shareholder and becomes general manager.
1932
Tiburcio Carias Andino takes the presidency and remains in power as a dictator for 16 years; his regime represses workers attempting to organize unions and Liberal party members.
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1949
Tiburcio Carias Andino dictatorship ends.
1954
Workers of the United Fruit Company lead the Great Banana Strike of 1954, a national general strike. Bilateral military training agreement is signed with the United States.
1955
Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Tela Railroad Company (SITRATERCO) is formed by United Fruit Company. Workers at the end of the strike.
1957
Ramon Villeda Morales takes the presidency in a power sharing government with the military. Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Social Security is formed.
1961
Agrarian Reform Program is introduced.
1963
Ramon Villeda Morales is ousted by a military coup led by military colonel Osvaldo López Arellano.
1969
“Soccer War” with El Salvador begins and lasts four days. Discrimination and exodus of Salvadoran citizens of Honduras begins.
1972–1978
The period of “Military Reformism” begins.
1974
Hurricane Fifi leaves 12,000 dead and 150,000 homeless.
1977
Worker-owned banana cooperative Las Isletas is invaded and destroyed by Honduran soldiers who arrive in Standard Fruit railroad cars.
1979
U.S. President Jimmy Carter strengthens ties to Honduras after the fall of Somoza in Nicaragua.
1980
Constitutional assembly elections. Treaty signed with El Salvador. Economic crisis hits all the Central American nations. U.S. military presence in Honduras begins for the purpose of funding the contras.
1981
President Suazo Cordova becomes first democratically elected president in 20 years. Military advisors arrive in Honduras.
1982
Constituent assembly ends in approval of the 14th Constitution.
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Reagan’s administration pledges 50 percent more military aid to Honduras. Four clandestine cemeteries full of bodies of activists found during the contra war. Strikes and land occupations are declared “subversive acts” in new decree. In June, Honduran army begins to cooperate with the United States in joint operations with the Salvadoran army against Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). In July, joint-U.S.-Honduran military operations along Nicaraguan border. In November, Newsweek reveals that U.S. Ambassador Negroponte in control of contra operations against Nicaragua. 1983
U.S. training base opens at Puerto Castillo.
1984
Sixty thousand demonstrators in Tegucigalpa and 40,000 in San Pedro Sula protest U.S. presence in Honduras. Kissinger Commission recommends $8 billion developmental aid to Central America and increased military assistance to Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
1998
Hurricane Mitch hits Central America, killing 7,000; 8,300 are missing. United States agrees to extend temporary protected status (TPS) to Honduran immigrants after Hurricane Mitch.
2009
President Manuel Zelaya Rosales is kidnapped and taken to Costa Rica in what is recognized by most of the international community as a political military coup d’état. During the coup, thousands of Hondurans protested in the streets of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. In November, illegal elections are held and President Pepe Lobo is elected by less than 40 percent of the population.
2010
By January, human rights organizations report 4,000 human rights violations and over 3,300 civil rights violations committed during the coup d’état. The National Front of Popular Resistance (FNRP) continues to fight for a national constitutional assembly to redraft the constitution in Honduras.
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Background Geography of Honduras Honduras has a diverse geography of valleys and mountains. Most of its land mass, 80 percent, is comprised of mountains. The mainland territory is 69,593 square miles in size. The territory has access to both the Caribbean Sea, with a coastline extending 457 miles, and the Pacific Ocean, with a coastline extending 95 miles along the Gulf of Fonseca. Honduras has an extensive border with Nicaragua, extending 573 miles along the southeast. On the southwest, Honduras and El Salvador share a 213-mile border. On the west, Honduras and Guatemala share a 159-mile border. Although Honduras has several islands and islets off its Caribbean Coast, the most important ones are the Islas de la Bahía (Bay Islands), comprised of Roatán, a large island about 31 miles long and 3 miles wide, and the smaller islands of Utila and Guanaja (Merrill 1995). Other islands are the Santanilla Islands (Swan Islands), where the United States and Honduras maintain a meteorological station in the Caribbean. Smaller keys, islets in the Caribbean, are Barbareta, Morat, Santa Elena, Cayos Zapotillos and Cayos Cochinos, the latter used for military exercises. In the Gulf of Fonseca, there are three islands: Tiger Island, Zacate Grande, and Exposición. The waterways and lakes in Honduras are extensive, though not all navigable. The rivers that end in the North Coast beaches have been an important source of water for the banana industry, for both local and foreign growers and companies. One of Honduras’ most important and largest rivers is the Río Patuca. Other rivers include the Río Grande to the south, the Río Coco bordering Nicaragua, the Río Lempa and the Río Guascarán on the border with El Salvador. Rivers are an important part of the life and work for farmers and workers in the North Coast region, where there are several rivers, the Río Ulúa, the Río Chamelecón, and the Río Aguán. The Río Plátano runs through the Río Plátano Biosphere Reserve. The largest lake is the Lake of Yojoa, at one time a water route between the coast and the capital in the center of the country. Honduras’ mountainous regions connect to the mountainous regions in Guatemala, from the western part of Honduras to the eastern side, to Nicaragua’s mountainous region. Deep valleys cut through the Honduran mountains and have been key for the large agricultural economy and the export economies. Mountainous regions have challenged the creation of roads and transportation routes. Roads were not officially built until 1957. Before there were paved highways, there was a system of dirt roads known as the Camino Real, linking the Central American territories during the colonial period. For most of the 20th century, the majority of the country has relied on subsistence farming despite booming periods of export by foreign-owned banana, coffee, and sugar companies. The North Coast of Honduras was developed in the
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20th century for the export of bananas by the foreign-owned companies. As the colonial rule matured, Honduras remained an mostly unexplored hinterland, yet it was an important source of mining. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the exploitation of mines continued. Toward the end of the 18th century, cattle ranching developed as important industry.
History of Honduras The region that is now Honduras was a region within the great Mayan empire up until 900 C.E. The Nahualt also had competing influence in the region. The Spanish found smaller tribes living in Honduras, as opposed to a huge empire comparable to the great empires of Mexico and Peru. Although Christopher Columbus landed in the Gulf of Honduras in 1502, on his fourth voyage, it was not until 1524 that an expedition set out to explore the Central American isthmus. A second expedition, led by a captain in the Pedrarías Dávila army named Francisco Hernández de Córdoba, set out from Panama to the north of the isthmus at the same time (Perez-Brignoli 1989, 34–35). But it was the expedition led by Hernán Cortés from Mexico that arrived first. Cortés founded Puerto Caballos (current-day Puerto Cortés) and Trujillo (35). One of Hernán Cortés lieutenants, Pedro de Alvarado, led a bloody expedition into Guatemala and later into Honduras founding San Pedro Sula and Gracias in 1524. Another expedition led by Governor Francisco de Montejano founded the city of Comayagua in 1537 (36). Indigenous peoples in Honduras revolted and challenged the Spanish incursions. Their resistance was debilitated not only by weapons but also by disease carried by the Spanish. The decimation of indigenous populations was extensive, believed to have been to disease, hard labor, and destruction of their habitat. Indigenous peoples were forced to work in the mines exploited for the Spanish crown as well as local farms and haciendas kept by the Spanish. At the same time, Christianization contributed to the pacification of the rebelling indigenous groups. Manuel de Jesus Subirana, a Spanish missionary, managed to move the Honduran government to give the indigenous communities communal land titles between 1862 and 1864 (Rivas 1993, 29). The Spanish began to import Africans as slaves to labor in the plantations of the Caribbean and Honduras. By the 18th century, the African population had surpassed one million in Central America (Perez-Brignoli 1989, 52). Honduras has a relatively short history of nationhood, winning independence alongside other Central American nations in 1821. From 1821 to 1839, Honduranborn liberator Francisco Morazán fought many wars to maintain the Central American isthmus united as a federation. Honduran itself experienced many civil wars and changes of regime between 1821 and 1876 (Lapper 1985, 19). By 1876 Liberal reformers Marco Aurelio Soto and Ramon Rosa were influencing politics and life in Honduras. They were known as Liberal reformers because they felt that the only way to advance Honduras was through the development of an export economy,
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which they believed required a national railroad (d’Ans 1997, 128–31; Meza 1991, ix). While other Latin American nations invested in the development of infrastructure and the development of rails in public-private partnerships, this process was illfated for Hondurans. First, Hondurans contracted with the British to build a railroad, but the money would be squandered, and Honduras was left with debt and without the promised railroad (d’Ans 1997, 106–7). Then Honduran presidents conceded land grants to banana companies in exchange for the building of railroads (145–47). These land grants produced rail, but only from banana plantations to the port cities and never linked the major cities or capital city to the rest of the country. The banana companies began to operate in the early 20th century. Among the main companies were the Cuyamel Fruit Company founded in 1907 (later incorporated into the Tela Railroad Company); the Vaccaro Brothers (later consolidated into the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company); and the Tela Railroad Company and the Truxillo Railroad Company (subsidiaries of the United Fruit Company). The United Fruit Company was created in 1899 and was the first company to create the process of vertical integration. The process of vertical integration demanded that the company control every step of production from planting and processing to shipping and distribution, affording the company complete control over the banana industry. Soon the United Fruit subsidiaries were buying and sometimes forcibly taking the land of small national banana producers. When they could not take the land, they financially broke local banana growers by not buying their product or by preventing them from transporting their product to the ports for sale (d’Ans 1997, 142–43). Local society in the first half of the 20th century was marked by infighting between two national parties, the Liberal Party and the Nationalist Party. In 1933, Tiburcio Carias Andino came to power and remained in dictatorial rule until 1949. His reign was marked by an iron-fisted rule with power centralized in Tegucigalpa, the capital. Liberal party members were constantly persecuted and worker movements were repressed. Carias Andino was a friend to the banana companies, and in this period, there were many more land concessions and powers granted to the banana companies by his presidency (Lapper 1985, 54). The United States embassy remained a watchdog on behalf of the banana companies and intervened for them with the Honduran government. By the end of World War II, the United States was no longer openly supporting dictatorships in Latin America. The McCarthy era in the United States, however, did influence relationships with Latin America and particularly Honduras. In order to prevent communism, the banana companies and U.S. embassy went to great lengths to repress workers’ efforts to organize unions. Manipulation of electoral politics and instability continued to plague Honduras throughout the 20th century. When Tiburcio Carias Andino stepped down, his handpicked successor was Juan Manuel Galvez, also a Nationalist Party member and former lawyer to the Tela Railroad Company (of the United Fruit Company). Free elections were held and won by Ramon Villeda Morales, a Liberal Party member, in 1954. He was perceived to be a threat and was prevented from taking
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power until 1957 in a power sharing government with the military (Dunkerly 1988, 527–28, 535). Villeda Morales would be removed in a coup d’état in 1962; the coup consolidated a set of military regimes that would last until 1982. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Honduran government, in collaboration with the U.S. embassy and U.S. companies, openly persecuted and incarcerated workers and activists perceived to be communist. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the U.S. embassy and the banana companies used the coercion and infiltration of labor movements as “prevention” measures against communism. Through the Inter-American Regional Organization of Labor (ORIT) and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) (Lapper 1985, 40), the U.S. embassy was able to influence and track organizers of the growing labor movement. A key event of the evolution of the labor movement was the 1954 banana strike, which became a national general strike. During the 69 days of the strike, 25,000 Tela Railroad workers and Standard Fruit workers stopped work demanding better wages and working conditions. The strike reverberated to other industries, foreign and national. This single event marked the emergence of the organized labor movement, the right to organize, and the creation of the Ministry of Labor and the adoption of the Labor Code of 1957.
Workers in Honduras unload the first shipment of bananas since ending their two-month strike against the Standard Fruit Company, September 3, 1954. The strike spread to other industries and eventually became a national general strike. It marked the beginning of the labor movement in Honduras. (AP Photo)
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Women had been fighting for suffrage since the early 1920s, but the women’s right to vote was not signed into law until 1957. While this was a project of elite and middle-class women, mostly led by educated teachers and wives of politicians, it also had dramatic effect on working-class women’s lives by enabling their potential participation in electoral campaigns. Women in general were taken more seriously by political parties as voting members of civil society. Although the official history claims that Hondurans come from a Mayan and indo-Hispanic past, Honduras is a society with many indigenous peoples. Honduras, in fact, is not a mestizo nation but rather a multiracial and ethnically diverse society with varied expressions of those identities. The following indigenous groups make up part of the Honduran society of today: the Chortís and the Lencas originating in the west and southwest of the country; the Tolupanes in the central region; the Pech in the eastern region, the Misquitos (Miskitos) in the very eastern region bordering Nicaragua; the Gariganu (plural for Garifuna) and the Isleños (Islanders) in the North Coast and Bay Islands (Rivas 1993, 22). The Central American isthmus, and Honduras in particular, is a racially and ethnic diverse region. In the early 20th century, as the nation began to consolidate, there was a prioritization of an ethnic and racial claim of an Indo-Hispanic past eliding the African and IndoCaribbean past (Andersen 2009, 78–79; Euraque 2003, 230–31). The Garifuna people attribute their heritage and language to the Caribs and the Arawak peoples who intermixed with escaped slaves of African descent in the Caribbean (Suazo 1997, 18, 23). The Caribbean island of Saint Vincent became the refuge for many escaped slaves and indigenous people rebelling against colonial rule. But this shared land was site of much conflict as indigenous peoples fought against British rule. In bitter rebellion against the British, the Garifuna people were led by Satuyé (also known as Chatoyer), a fierce leader who fought incessantly and was killed by a British soldier. In 1796, after the murder of Satuyé, the British began to look for suitable places to exile the bellicose Garifuna from the island of Saint Vincent (142). The British authorities ordered the Gariganu be exiled to the Bay Island of Roatán, which was under British control (now part of Honduras). The 2,248 Garifuna prisoners were forced into several ships. The voyage set out from Saint Vincent to the Bay Islands of Honduras on March 11, 1797, landing on the island of Roatán on April 12, 1797. One ship with 289 Gariganu on board was captured by the Spanish and forced to land in the port of Trujillo on the mainland of Honduras (Suazo 1997 150–51; Euraque 2003, 91). Of the 2,248 Gariganu on board during departure from Saint Vincent, 2,026 made it to either Port Royal in Roatán or Trujillo on the Honduran mainland. The Garifuna people, however, are not confined to the Honduran territory. Garifuna communities are found in Belize, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The Garifuna community is a vibrant community inhabiting 11 major villages in the North Coast of Honduras (Andersen 2009, 23). The small hamlets have been
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the home to Gariganu since the late 1700s. Historically, the Garifuna community is associated with the banana companies because they live in proximity to the ports and banana plantations. Gariganu experienced racial and labor discrimination by the banana companies where they sought work as stevedores or dock workers. The Honduran government has also not been very inclusive. In the 1926, in a debate over the national coin, the government declared itself a mestizo nation, claiming an IndoHispanic past, thereby eradicating the history and contributions of black and Garifuna people in the construction of the nation (Euraque 2003, 231; Andersen 2009, 78). To this day the Garifuna people are marginalized in Honduran society despite their large role in the North Coast labor and cultural history. The villages still rely on fishing and self-subsistence farming. The remaining Garifuna communities in Honduras are facing land evictions, a non-bilingual educational system that threatens their culture, and poor living and economic conditions in most of the villages, many of which lack paved roads and local development. Hotel resort builders and local elite have set their eyes on the Garifuna villages, seeking to turn the pristine local beaches into resorts and tourist havens. A major source of income for the villages is remittances from the heightened migration to favorite destination cities of New York, Los Angeles, and Houston in the United States. For much of the 1980s, the United States had its interests on Honduras. First, as a strategically important geopolitical location for the war against the liberation armed movements of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua, and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in Guatemala. Secondly, the United States has remained vigilant of its business interests. The banana companies continue to operate in the North Coast. There is also a growing export processing zone (known as parques industriales or maquiladoras) to Hondurans, which produce garments at half the price of those produced in other parts of Latin America. In 2003, a free-trade agreement was signed between the United States and all of the Central American nations further making labor and production laws more flexible in the country. Foreign-owned manufacturers were exempt from paying taxes to the government for up to 15 years. Droves of young women migrated to the North Coast as well as sectors outside of Tegucigalpa looking for work in these export processing zones. The export processing zones are manufacturing operations for assembly and sometimes dyeing of garments. Manufacturers do not own the land in which their factories are located, and the materials are imported from the United States. The export processing zones break government-established labor codes and do not allow unionization. According to watchdog groups, workers perceived to be unionizing are fired and often blacklisted, unable to get a job in the same industrial park (CDM Proyecto Mujer y Maquila 2007). In 2009, President Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a politico-military coup. President Zelaya was attempting to hold a mid-year ballot survey on June 29, 2009
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(known as the cuarta urna, fourth ballot box), in which Honduran citizen would be able to vote on whether or not to have a fourth ballot box in the November 2009 elections. In Honduras, during national elections, you typically have three ballot boxes at every voting booth, one to deposit the presidential vote, a second to vote for legislative representatives, and a third for the mayoral vote; in this case, the proposed fourth ballot box was be used to deposit the vote that sought to make possible a constitutional convention. The constitutional convention would bring together delegates and citizens to redraft the current constitution. The Honduran constitution was drafted in 1982, during the period of the Cold War. The constitutional assembly would rewrite the constitution in a process that would address issues that affect current present-day populations. President Zelaya’s proposed vote was threatening to the military, Liberal party elites, and business owners, who in collusion, took over the government. The Honduran Supreme Court accused Zelaya of wanting to redraft the constitution to prolong his presidency and remain in power for various other terms (in Honduras a president can only serve one term). Civil society protested and challenged the militarization of Honduran society. The Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular (FRNP), a peaceful, civil movement that aims at address the illegal coup and push for the constitutional assembly, was born out this situation. Despite international outcry and the sustained illegal and unconstitutional coup, elections were held by those in power in Honduras on November 2009, electing nationalist leader, Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo to the presidency.
Causes and Waves of Migration Honduran migration to the United States is best described as a series of migrations. Each wave has distinct historical roots and push pull factors. The following time periods are approximations of the Honduran migration waves: the first wave occurred from the early 1900s to 1963; the second wave, from 1963 to 1970s; the third wave, in the 1980s, during the civil wars in Central America; and the fourth wave runs from the 1990s through the present.
First Wave: Early Immigration The first migration, occurring in the early 1900s to 1963, was marked by travel related to banana industry work and recreation travel by elites, artists, and writers to New York. These elite writers and thinkers were cultural ambassadors who came sponsored by institutions or corporations. The only way for any Honduran to travel to the United States was aboard the steamships of the United Fruit Company’s White Fleet, company steamships that dominated the Caribbean seas. Hondurans’ long history of migration to the United States dates back to the early 1900s and
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coincides with the United Fruit Company and Standard Fruit Company’s development of the banana export economy. Honduran poets, elected officials, and local businessmen also travelled to New Orleans for work related to the fruit companies (Chinchilla and Hamilton 2001, 24–25); company employees were known as empleados de confianza, trusted employees. Although working-class migration has been sparsely documented throughout history, we know that many stevedores and dock and ship workers also worked on board of White Fleet as embarcados, ship workers. The North Coast’s historical significance as a port of entry for different people and ideas about modernity inspired working-class Hondurans to seek opportunities in the North Coast, and many eventually migrated to the United States. The banana companies presence and their domination of local and national politics influenced migration to and from the North Coast. Internal migration created the conditions for international migration to the United States and other countries.
Waves of Migration up to the 1965 Immigration Act The Second Migration, occurring from 1963 into the 1970s, began after the 1963 coup d’état, when dictator Oswaldo Lopez Arellano ousted Ramon Villeda Morales from the presidency, a power struggle that left Liberal party members and workers in jail or without work. The second migrations are characterized by male political exiles leaving the country during a politically unstable period, a continued migration by company empleados de confianza for work or pleasure, and a small but significant migration of women to work in the service industries. The Liberal party activists left Honduras, some to work in the United States and others to nearby countries to work for low wages. Many of these exiles were teachers and local activists; many were also working-class railroad workers and technicians and other laborers who worked for the fruit companies in the North Coast and had been disenfranchised because of their allegiance to the Liberal party. The second wave of migration points to the diversity and challenges of migration and exodus. State violence made it hard for local Liberal party activists and leftists to remain, but it also made it near impossible to leave; workers devised creative clandestine paths to exit the country and re-enter whenever necessary. The ousting of Ramon Villeda Morales formed a class of dissidents and disillusioned Liberal party members who fled Lopez Arellano’s military regime. The small Honduran community of the second-wave migrants provided a support network for other immigrants. One of the ways in which this small community may have been obscured was that in larger working-class Los Angeles, Hondurans were confused for Mexicans (Argueta 2007). The second wave was made up mostly of men, who often migrated for shorter periods due to political exile. There were also a growing number of women migrants to the United States who tended to remain in the settlement country to work in the service industry.
946 | Honduran Immigrants
Immigration Act of 1965 and Succeeding Legislation The third period of Honduran migration to the United States, during the 1980s, is marked by the carnage created by the wars in neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador. Hondurans migrated in large numbers during this period, but this migration was overshadowed by the large Salvadoran and Guatemalan migrations. The Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s was concerned with helping Salvadorans and Guatemalans obtain asylum and refuge from torture and brutality. True horror stories about the poor treatment and abuse of refugees by the contras and Honduran authorities were ubiquitous. Honduras was then seen by local activists of the Sanctuary Movement as complicit in the U.S.-backed campaign, and many believed their migration stories had perhaps been obfuscated. The reality is that Hondurans also had organized revolutionary movements during the 1980s. These movements, though small and localized, supported many of the organized movements of nearby El Salvador and Nicaragua (Hamilton and Stoltz Chinchilla 1991). The interethnic exchange between Hondurans and Salvadorans can be attributed in part to the legacy of Honduran and Salvadoran tensions since the 1969 Soccer War; the role of Honduras in then 1980s; and later territorial disputes over border regions and access to the Pacific Ocean. These state disputes had great impact on the local citizens and residents of border towns—as well as on Salvadoran migrants in the North Coast. Honduran authorities’ deported Salvadorans, in some cases violently, from the country without their belongings. Historical memory of events such as these are not easily erased and continue to create challenges in the relations among Central Americans; many immigrants may be descendants of people expelled from Honduras. Economic instability intensified as the banana companies began to threaten union stability and militancy with violence and massive firings. Workers’ livelihoods were threatened as well as their lives in the North Coast. A reluctance to confront this paradox of state-supported repression and worker resistance of the period further obscures Hondurans and their history of migration. Migration during the 1980s was difficult. People made their way however they could, riding on buses or on top of trains, or paying coyotes (who help bring people across the border) to smuggle them into the country (Escobar 2007). Honduran migrants sought out coyotes to bring them from Honduras directly to the Tijuana border (Velasquez 2007; Rodriguez 2007; Escobar 2007). Some of these experiences mirror those of other Central American immigrants of the time, but it is valuable to consider the distinct characteristics of Honduran immigrants. Honduran migrants, mostly economic migrants but also some fearing the political destabilization, migrated alongside Salvadorans and Guatemalans, traveled north and found a niche within the already existing Central American and Mexican communities in cities such as Los Angeles and New York. This generation of immigrants struggled side-by-side with Salvadoran and Guatemalan and Mexican undocumented immigrants, as none had access to any form of legalization.
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In 1986, the U.S. government passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which imposed employer sanctions for hiring undocumented workers. This period was a formative one for Honduran immigrants who arrived then, many of whom became active in the immigrant rights movement and in their labor unions, including those for janitors, garment workers, and domestic workers. The shared space with other Central Americans and Mexican undocumented immigrants created an opportunity for coalition building, but, at the same time, it marginalized Honduran voices due to their limited numbers compared to the large Mexican and Salvadoran populations. The shared work and living experiences, IRCA, and the constant deportations brought Hondurans to work collectively (Rodriguez 2007). These migrants were able to enter into Central American networks being formed at the time even though Hondurans were still lower in numbers. Hondurans learned to work under larger umbrella groups.
Honduran Migration: 1990s to Present The most recent Honduran migration to the United States, occurring from the 1990s to the present, is marked by growing instability created by natural disasters, the closing of banana plantations, the loss of stable union jobs in the North Coast, and neoliberal policies that have made it hard for subsistence farmers. At the same time, due to the decline of the banana industry, the North Coast has become the prime area for the development and proliferation of the export processing zones that employ many young women and men from the interior. This period is marked by significant migration to the United States, Mexico, and Spain. According to Honduran newspaper La Prensa (2006), one Honduran leaves the country every five minutes. The forms of migration are brutal, with men and women leaving the country with little money, expecting to work en route, and hopping trains for undetected and free passage. The well-known tragedy of Hurricane Mitch, which devastated Honduras, prompted the United States to pass the temporary protection status (TPS) policy, which answered Honduran advocates’ original requests to be included in the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), a program for asylees or potential asylees left out during the 1980s—mainly Guatemalans and Salvadorans and also controversially Nicaraguans. While Hondurans did not gain entry into NACARA (and all the benefits and resources this program provided), they gained TPS, which is essentially a one-year renewable work permit that allows Hondurans to work legally, process their taxes, and open bank accounts in the United States. While a step in the right direction for Honduran immigrants—many still failed to file taxes in time for fear of being deported. To this day 78,000 to 80,000 Hondurans are registered with the TPS program (Rodriguez 2007; Migration Policy Institute 2006), and every two years there is a long and drawn-out struggle to petition for its continuance and expansion, even though it was meant to be a temporary program.
948 | Honduran Immigrants
It is this set of circumstances that prompted the organization of HULA (Hondurans United in Los Angeles), taking the example of other Central American and Mexican groups to organize around immigration reform and services. Other organizations sprung up throughout the country in places like New York, Florida, Washington, and New Orleans (especially post Hurricane Mitch), among others. Another great accomplishment of Honduran groups occurred on October 19, 2007, when after lobbying for many years, this date was designated as the Día del Hondureño(a) (Day of the Honduran), voted in by the 14 city council representatives in the city of Los Angeles, a historically important city for Central American immigrants. The collective work with other Central American and broader immigrant coalitions continues—the stage is set to demand that the 78,000 Honduran tepesianos (TPS recipients) be made eligible for residency status.
Hurricane Mitch Hurricanes have been a part of Honduras history as its largest land area faces the Caribbean Sea. The North Coast residents and banana companies have been affected by hurricanes. The companies themselves have even used these natural disasters as excuses to close banana plantations. Such was the case when a 1954 Hurricane destroyed most of the Tela Railroad Company plantations; the Tela Railroad used this natural disaster to lay off union supporters. In 1974 Hurricane Fifi devastated the region again with similar circumstances. Once again in 1998, Hurricane Mitch destroyed most of the plantations and killed over 7,000 people in Honduras. Hurricane Mitch, a category five hurricane, affected all of Central America and the Caribbean. It devastated Honduras, destroying 80 percent of the banana fields and leaving thousands dead or orphaned. The hurricane washed away 25 small villages and leveled 70 percent of the infrastructure in its first days; roads, bridges, and telecommunications were unusable for months after. Although international relief poured in via religious groups and other organizations, the neediest places were hard to reach. After the hurricane, many more perished from illness and lack of food. This tragic natural disaster struck Central America and leveled the islands and the North Coast of Honduras—the regions once owned by the largest banana exporters in the world—Chiquita Bananas (formerly United Fruit company) and Dole (formerly Standard Fruit Company). This region is now Honduras’ largest immigrant sending regions. In 2005, another devastating natural disaster, Hurricane Gamma, caused floods and plantation closures. When the banana plantations are damaged, the banana companies either close the plantation and do not reopen or they sell the plantation to the workers or to local growers. Moving production out of the country and closing production centers for months at a time limits the earning ability for North Coast workers, both men and women, forcing them to migrate north for work.
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After Hurricane Mitch, U.S. immigration policy changed to include Hondurans in the TPS program; this change increased Honduran applicants to the program. While immediate relief and temporary aid alleviated dire conditions, longer term changes to address the fundamental causes of economic hardship and migration were elusive in the disaster response.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community Hondurans have been fairly “invisible” in the United States due to their relatively small documented population size. According to data from the American Community Survey 2006–2008 (three-year estimates), there are 543,274 Hondurans in the United States. The largest numbers of the Honduran population are spread out in three regions, the South, the Northeast, and the West. In the South, in the states of Florida, Texas, and Louisiana there are 286,000 Hondurans (Pew Hispanic Center 2009). In the West, there are 93,000 Hondurans, with California boasting 69,000 Hondurans (Pew Hispanic Center 2009). Of the total Honduran population of 543,274 (American Community Survey [ACS] 2006–2008), 383,962 were not born in the United States. Of those Hondurans not born in the United States, 41.2 percent entered the country in the year 2000 or later, while 34.2 percent entered between 1990 and 1999, and 24.6 percent entered the United States before 1990. According to figures held by the Honduran Consulate in Los Angeles, in 2007, there were 350,000 Hondurans in Southern California, including Los Angeles County and surrounding counties of Orange, San Fernando, and San Bernardino (Rodriguez 2007). This number is a significantly higher number than the 2000 Census data of 69,000 Hondurans in Los Angeles. This apparent discrepancy elucidates census undercount of undocumented immigrants. Other reasons for the discrepancy may be that Hondurans have intermarried and are not self-identified. The dispute over the Honduran consulate number of 350,000 reveals not only the potential inaccurate count of undocumented Hondurans in Southern California but also the inaccuracy of counts at time of exit in Honduras; many immigrants may not make it all the way to the United States. Many Hondurans overstay their visas, and there are just as many crossing the border via the coyote rings that span from home towns in Honduras to U.S. cities.
Age and Family Structure According to recent estimates, the population is younger than the overall population with a median age of 28.7 (ACS 2006–2008). Leah Schmalzbauer identified in her study (2004) that Honduran immigrants on the East Coast are transnational families
950 | Honduran Immigrants
in which “productive labor occurs in the host country and reproductive labor in the home country” (1317). Being transnational migrants, Hondurans sustain social familial and care-giving relations in the country of origin and the region of settlement (1319). Schmalzbauer claims that migration is a “response to structural inequalities that make it impossible for families to sustain them” (1319). The Honduran family, in the country of origin, usually has a member of the family working in the United States. The family member or members sends money home in remittances that average about $242 dollars a month (1325). The family structure of Hondurans can best be described as that of a transnational family, with one or two members of the family in the United States and the rest of the family members back in Honduras. Many migrants create alternate lives and families in the United States, but connection to family in the home country via remittances continues.
Educational Attainment Of the Honduran population that is 25 years and over in the United States, 49.3 percent (of 322,629) have not attained a high school diploma. Of the population of Hondurans that are five years and older, 91.9 percent (of 485,349) speak a language other than English. And 62.3 percent (of 485,349) of Honduran Americans over five years of age speak English less than “very well.” Of 126,998 Hondurans enrolled in school at the time of the survey analysis, 46.6 percent were enrolled in elementary school (grades 1–8), 6.8 percent were enrolled in preschool, 6.4 percent were enrolled in kindergarten; 22.9 percent were enrolled in high school; and 17.3 percent were enrolled in college or graduate school. While the educational attainment is low when compared to other Latino populations, the numbers also demonstrates the relative youth of the recent immigrant population.
Economic Attainment, Occupation and Income Patterns Of the 405,523 Honduran Americans that are 16 years and older, 282,673 participate in the labor force (ACS 2006–2008). Of the 282,673 who reported an occupation, 29.3 percent have service occupations and 28.6 percent work in construction, extraction, maintenance, and repair occupations. This is gendered with men predominantly employed in construction; of 173,170 employed males 16 years and older, 45.6 percent of them are employed in construction, extraction, maintenance, and repair jobs. Of the 109,503 employed women over 16 years old, 47.2 percent are employed in service occupations. Of the 282,673 employed Hondurans over the age of 16 years old, 86.5 percent work for private industry and are salary employees. Of 142,029 Hondurans who reported income, according to the American Community Survey analysis, the median household income is $38,662 a year (with 2008 inflation adjusted dollars). Perhaps the most striking statistic is the 22.4 percent
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poverty rate in Honduran households. There are 27.3 percent households living in poverty with children under 18 years of age. Of the households living in poverty, 41.4 percent of them are female-headed households with no husband present; 47.7 percent of those households are living with children under 18 years old.
Adjustment and Adaptation Immigrants from different periods of migration have different levels of involvement in the current immigration movement and reflect different levels of integration into U.S. society. The immigrants from the 1960s tend to be more acculturated; their incorporation may have happened in the 1960s and 1970s, when it was perceived as easier to legalize. The very recent wave of immigrants on the other hand are still at the margins of society and the immigrant rights movement—facing the everyday uncertainty of the current immigration climate and the threat of redadas, or deportation raid stings. Visibility is contingent on each immigrant period’s particular relationship with immigration status, acculturation to U.S. society, the size and history of the migration trajectory, and degree of involvement in the immigrant rights movement. Undocumented migration has as much to do with exit factors as it does with pull conditions and information flows from the new country. Tropes about life in the United States are deployed in a variety of ways depending on the time of arrival of the family member or friend. Immigrants that arrived during the Central American exodus of the 1980s, alongside Guatemalan and Salvadorans, tend to be more involved and participate in activism networks established by Central Americans and other Chicano and Mexican groups.
Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Hondurans for the most part identify as Catholic, with a Protestant minority. Honduran communities celebrate baptisms commonly within a year of the birth of the child. This is an opportunity for the child to have a padrino (godfather) and madrina (godmother), who would care for them in case of their parent’s death. The baptism is a great opportunity for Hondurans to reunite the family and have a big party. Confirmation, another Catholic rite of passage, is also celebrated, and the madrina and padrino are also chosen in this ritual. Slowly, the child is supposed to develop a network of family to support them throughout life. Birthdays, weddings, and quinciañeras (sweet 15 parties and coming-of-age rituals for women) are also celebrated and a good opportunity for family gatherings. Funerals are also important; they involve the viewing of the body, the funeral procession, and the nine-day prayer ritual (novena/novenario), which is attended by every family member immediately after burial.
952 | Honduran Immigrants
Garifuna people have more elaborate rituals that reflect syncretism between Catholic and Afro-Caribbean traditions. One important ritual to immigrants is known as the Dügü, or feasting of the dead. During this ceremony a family who is going through a tough period, a death or illness, asks their ancestors for advice and then throws a feast to appease them. The ancestors are seen as oracles in the Dügü ceremony. The family members ask the ancestors to tell them why sadness has befallen the family and ask for a feast to make better times come to the family. The Dügü lasts for two or four days. This Dügü practice continues among Garifuna immigrants in the United States, where instead of disrupting the ritual, it is re-conceptualized within a larger tradition of the African diasporic religion (Andersen 2009, 47).
Celebration of National Holidays Hondurans celebrate Independence Day on September 15. The Garifuna community celebrate the arrival of their people to Honduras every April 12 with festivals and cultural events. Catholic Hondurans celebrate Christmas, New Year’s Eve, and New Year’s Day, and on February 3, they celebrate the day of the Virgin of Suyapa on February 3. In Los Angeles and New York, local Catholic churches, such as the Saint Thomas parish in Pico Union in Los Angeles, celebrate masses to Central American saints, particularly the Virgin of Suyapa. There is a growing evangelical movement of Christian churches and missionaries in Honduras and in the United States; although exact figures are not available, this community’s power is growing.
Foodways Honduran cuisine is varied and depends on regional and ethnic traditions of cuisine, but some commonalities exist within each region. Beans, rice, tortillas, cheese, mantequilla (Honduran sour cream), eggs, and fried plantains are the typical cena (dinner plate). Soups are an important part of Honduran food fare: beef soup, chicken soup, mondongo soup (stomach-wall soup made with coconut milk), and conch and fish soups. Other Honduran favorites such as baleadas (a flour tortilla folded over beans and mantequilla) can be found in local Central American restaurants. The similarities with Salvadoran cooking are also evident, and many Hondurans use Salvadoran products to make their favorite meals, such as the frozen loroco and chipilín flower brought from El Salvador to make Honduran ticucos (small tamales) or pastelitos (fried beef pastries). Overall, a diverse cooking fare comes alive in new ways with the use of Mexican and Salvadoran products to recreate traditional favorites. Christmas and New Year’s are common times for nacatamales (tamales), made from cornmeal and pork or chicken, green olives, and raisins. Garifuna celebrations usually demand kassave, a tortilla-like patty
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made from pounded cassava root (yuca) plant. Seafood such as soups made of caracol (conch) and fish soups are very rich staples of the Garifuna celebrations. Rice cooked in coconut milk and served with beans is a typical North Coast and Bay Island dish known as “rice-n-beans.” Coconut bread is also found in Garifuna celebrations.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Honduran Garifuna music was extremely popular in dance clubs in Latin America and the Caribbean and United States throughout the 1990s. The sound that is most associated with Honduras is punta music. Punta is a traditional dance of courting for Gariganu in Central America. Traditional Garifuna dances are not well known in the United States, but in cities like New York and Los Angeles they are performed for special holidays around Independence Day and Garifuna festivals. Local bands began to incorporate Garifuna beats, made popular by local radio, with merengue and reggae sounds. Another piece of music associated with Honduras and Central America is what was originally called playero music in the late 1990s, now referred to as reguetón. Hondurans also enjoy tropical variations of merengue and salsa. Mexican boleros and ranchera music is also extremely popular among Hondurans both in Honduras and in the United States.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Hondurans are able to retain their Honduran citizenship when becoming citizens in the host country. This means that they are able still to participate in civic life in Honduras, retaining the right to vote in Honduran presidential elections. Many Hondurans, however, are not becoming U.S. citizens, as the most common but limited way to legalize their status in the United States is via the TPS program. An estimated 374,000 Central American are on TPS status; it is estimated that 80,000 of them are Hondurans (Migration Policy Institute 2006). Although immigrant Honduran organizations dedicate themselves to helping Hondurans process TPS, they also help by advocating and insisting that government authorities grant residency status to these Hondurans. Their reasoning is that many Hondurans pay the fees to file TPS every year, and for many years, they file taxes and report their stay to the government. Their lawful behavior should at least be rewarded with a path to legalization. Few Hondurans have gained permanent residency when compared to the rest of Latinos in the nation. The most common scenario Hondurans face is to live and work with undocumented status facing entrapment and detention by Homeland Security. The
954 | Honduran Immigrants
entrapment and deportation scenario for Hondurans is grim in the United States. Rates of deportation have increased drastically since 2000. In 2000, 4,768 people were deported to Honduras; by 2005, the rates of Honduran deportees had climbed to 15,572; by 2008, the numbers were at a staggering figure of 28,851; and by 2009 Homeland Security reported 19,959 Honduran deportees (Department of Homeland Security 2009). The Honduran government has entered into a “expedited Honduran removals” agreement with U.S. Homeland Security so that Honduran nationals facing deportation will only be held 15 days. This process involves video teleconferencing to advise detainees in order to issue them proper travel documents (Department of Homeland Security 2005). The Honduran government encourages Hondurans in the United States to apply for TPS. Many who arrived before 2001, however, may not be eligible for TPS, as this temporary program is hardly a catchall response to the massive Honduran migration. For the recent and growing Honduran community, the process of naturalization and permanent residency is only possible through intermarriage and family petition. According to the U.S. American Community Survey, 159,312 Hondurans were born in the United States. There are 383,962 foreign born; 78,459 of those foreign born have become naturalized U.S. citizens; and 305,503 foreign born are not U.S. citizens. The Honduran community, as evidenced by these numbers, is in a precarious situation in terms of their paths to naturalization.
Forging a New American Political Identity As we begin to scrutinize the presence and participation of the Honduran immigrant community in the United States, we see a small group dispersed within the larger Central American population. Hondurans living in the United States have only recently (post 1998) begun to claim a political identity, one that is informed by transnational politics and based on their historical memory of the home country. Whether it is demographics, intermarriage to other groups, or the limitations of racialized and gendered informal networks, the Honduran American community has been challenged in finding a voice and an identity within the predominantly Mexican and Salvadoran communities, the recognized representatives of the Latino community in the media and local politics. Los Angeles has been one of the major recipients of immigrants from the North Coast of Honduras, but a Honduran immigrant identity has been slow to emerge within a community dominated by other Central American groups, mainly Salvadorans and Guatemalans. Arriving in the United States, Hondurans came into existing Central American networks often obfuscating a larger Honduran political identity. The sharing of space among Central Americans and other recent immigrants, however, clearly set the framework for a strong network that supported recent immigrants by helping people find jobs and obtain immigration assistance; recruiting and guiding them toward local social
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and cultural groups and support organizations. The interactions with other Central Americans has been positive in that eventually Hondurans were able set up their own networks based on these earlier experiences in other communities where they worked to build greater local and political power. The Honduran immigrant political identity is now differentiating from the larger umbrella of the Central American political identity and from the Mexican immigrant and Mexican American political identity. Having learned the ropes from Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Mexicans on how to build immigrant rights groups and hometown associations, Hondurans have devised useful tactics to challenge the U.S. government and Honduran government to pay attention to the plight of the migration trajectory of Hondurans. A remaining need may be for the established Central American groups to contend with the acknowledgement and incorporation of racial and ethnic realities of Garifuna and indigenous Hondurans.
Political Associations and Organizations In 1997 Honduran organizers, as part of HULA, lobbied for TPS alongside Salvadoran activists in CARECEN (Central American Resource Center) but were stalled in their efforts until 1998, when Hurricane Mitch devastated Honduras. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, the Clinton administration granted the inclusion of
Orlando Cruz, from Honduras, carries a picture of the Statue of Liberty during a gathering of immigrants and supporters in a Washington, D.C., park to highlight their demand for legalization, May 1, 2006. (AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta)
956 | Honduran Immigrants
Honduran immigrants in the TPS program in 1998. Hondurans in Los Angeles attended meetings at CARECEN to learn about the required paperwork, but many still feared exposure as undocumented immigrants. Nevertheless, enough acquired TPS status that it has given Hondurans more of a presence within the local Los Angeles multiethnic immigrant rights and organizing community. The energy and interest generated helped Honduran activists and CARECEN organizers begin to conceive of a newly organized Honduran group. Sponsoring organizations, such as CARECEN, and hometown associations created the infrastructure for the development of leadership among Honduran activists. Hondurans in Los Angeles witnessed the Honduran government changing its attitude toward the diaspora in the United States during the 1990s. The change in attitude and policies in the consulates towards immigrants has been fueled by two growing areas of concern in the home country: remittances and gang violence. The Honduran embassy and consulates did not get involved in local immigrant issues; the consulates in particular saw themselves as providers of documentation. This demonstrated the Honduran government’s relative lack of involvement in the earlier years in the situation of immigration. Honduran immigrant advocates claim that the Honduran government began to care and get involved when immigrant remittances were the largest source of income (GDP) for the country (Rodriguez 2007; Velasquez 2007). Immigrant remittances to Honduras put immigrants in the United States on the map for local and state governments in Honduras. For the first time embassies and consulates were pulled into local debates on immigration in the big U.S. cities. Although advocacy in the United States is limited, organized groups have been able to press the consulate on their level of active involvement.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Of the 543,274 total Honduran population, 383,962 are foreign born and identify as Hondurans. Hondurans born in the United States consider themselves Honduran American. Hondurans see themselves as ethnically mestizo or may identify more ambiguously as Latinos or Hispanic. Garifuna people (also known as Gariganu when speaking in plural) self identify as Garifuna people from Honduras. Spanish is the main language spoken at home. Garifuna and black Hondurans, however, come into networks of other Garifuna multinational communities—possibly filtering into the U.S. racial binary of black and white. In the case of the Garifuna community in Los Angeles, their ethnoracial background serves as the network into which Garifuna people arrive in Los Angeles. In response to questions about Garifuna
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community, the organized Honduran groups, mostly mestizo, report that it is mostly during Independence Day celebrations or cultural festivals that they collaborate and that the immigration situations may be different in terms of language, access to legalization, and trajectory of migration; their push factors may also be different given the economic and political exclusion of Gariganu and black workers in the home country. Another reason cited for not working together is that Gariganu come into local L.A. networks based on similar cultural knowledge, language, and social political networks. They do not come just from Honduras; many are from Belize, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Garifuna culture practices and ethnoracial background unite these immigrants above nationality. Traditionally, Garifuna people have been migrants to the East Coast or New Orleans, but the community may be more established in Los Angeles than previously documented. Collective organizing with mestizos from Honduras is not charted, but it is evident that the Gariganu groups from Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua have formed organizations and networks that remain separate from the larger mestizo Honduran immigrant community and vice versa.
Educational Attainment Second-generation Hondurans in general have lower educational attainment than most Latinos in the nation. Of 322,629 individuals over 25 years old, only 25.6 percent have earned a high school degree or equivalency and 49.3 percent have not earned a high school degree; 25.1 percent of individuals older than 25 years of age
A Young Honduran Comes to Los Angeles Marina Argueta, now residing in northeast Los Angeles, came to the United States in the 1960s when her husband, who belonged to the Liberal party, saw that his career was over due to the coup d’état and dictatorship of Oswaldo Lopez Arellano in 1962 and he lost his job (Argueta 2007). The political situation resulted in her migration to the United States. She heard from a friend that she could find work and success in Los Angeles. Marina Argueta heard about Los Angeles being a good place to work from her network of friends, other Honduran women. These Honduran women helped her get a job and rent an apartment in the Rampart and Beverly area of Los Angeles. She brought two of her daughters and later the rest of her family. Although the clearest and fastest option was to work, like most of her friends, as a live-in maid in a house, Marina was lucky and ended up getting a job in a tent-making garment factory that was unionized in east Los Angeles. She rarely returns to Honduras; Hondurans and other Latinos in Los Angeles became her community and home.
958 | Honduran Immigrants
Jonadad Luque, a Honduran immigrant, reads to his daughter in their home in Nashville, Tennessee, July 10, 2007. (AP Photo/Mark Humphrey)
have continued on to higher education; 14.5 percent have obtained an associate’s degree or some college; 8.0 percent have obtained a bachelor’s degree; and 2.6 percent have earned a graduate or professional degree. Of individuals 5 years and older (total Hondurans that are 5 years and older is 485,349), 91.1 percent of Hondurans speak Spanish as a primary language in the household. Of the 126,998 Hondurans enrolled in school, the majority, 46.6 percent, are enrolled in high school (grades 9–12); and 17.3 percent of Hondurans are enrolled in higher education, college or graduate school.
Cultural Identification The later generations of Hondurans are developing pride in their heritage. The Honduran immigrant organizations, such as HULA and AHLA (Alianza Hondureña de Los Angeles) in Los Angeles, also have cultural events that allow the younger generations to learn about their cultural heritage. The Garifuna Heritage Foundation (GAHFU), in Los Angeles and New York, hold language and drumming classes for the younger generations on Saturdays. During the Independence Day parades and Garifuna celebrations, the younger generations participate in
Appendix I: Migration Statistics | 959
cultural dances and parade activities, exhibiting involvement in cultural activities and pride.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Honduras Forecasts for the 21st Century According to the Centro de Atención al Migrante Retornado (CARM) in Tegucigalpa, 500 Hondurans migrate daily to the United States. Many get deported in Mexico; it is estimated that 24,000 Hondurans are deported from Mexico (La Tribuna 2010). The voyage north through Mexico is treacherous, and many immigrants are mauled when they jump off and on the trains or are robbed by gangs. The following years will show an increased migration from Honduras due to economic and politically unstable conditions. The 2009 coup d’état in Honduras has created an unstable situation in Honduras. Because the coup created an unmitigated crisis, many people lost jobs and others were fired and many others were exiled. Human rights violations are increasing while Washington and the U.S. embassy claim there is democracy. The incongruity will be most apparent in the migration and exiled population growth. There is no commitment from Washington toward a comprehensive immigration reform in the next few years. Immigrants from Honduras will continue arriving and will continue to be deported as the TPS program is not applicable to all. Many of the local Honduran immigrant organizations and hometown groups sided with political parties during the coup d’état. Many of them, such as HULA and AHLA, actually aligned with the Honduran elite interests that supported the coup. As migrants from the economic and political fallout of the 2009 coup arrive as immigrants in the United States, new organizations will have to be created, ones that speak clearly and honestly about the connection between human rights violations in Honduras and human rights violations against immigrants in the United States. New organizations will also have to engage more directly in organizing around a comprehensive immigration reform instead of merely providing services during the application deadlines for TPS.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics The U.S. Department of Homeland Security maintains a tally of deportees and country of origin. Using this data we can get an approximation as to how many Hondurans leave Honduras and come to the United States. Keep in mind that
960 | Honduran Immigrants
many Hondurans who leave may not make it to the United States. Table 139 shows U.S. legal permanent resident status for those born in Honduras, for the years 2000–2009.
Deportation of Hondurans from 2000–2009 2009 2008
28,851 29,737
2007
27,060
Year
2006 15,572
2005 8,752
2004
8,182
2003 2002
4,496
2001
4,548
2000
4,768 0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
Total number of Hondurans deportees, 2000–2009
Figure 17 Deportation of Hondurans, 2000–2009. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2000–2009.
35,000
Table 139 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and country of birth Total Honduras
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
5,917
6,571
6,435
4,645
5,508
7,012
8,177
7,646
6,540
6,404
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
962 | Honduran Immigrants
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Hondurans self-identify in the 10-year census survey. The American Community Survey issues reports on Hondurans, and other groups, every one to three years. The Pew Hispanic Institute also analyzes the American Community Survey Data for Hondurans. Table 140 General statistics of Hondurans in the United States Description
Figures
Total population
543,274
Total population: Male
52.5%
Total population: Female
47.50%
Foreign born
383,962
Employed over 16 years of age
282,673
Employed male
173,170
Employed female
109,503
Median age (years)
28.7
Household population Average household size
148,029 4.12, owners (renters 3.53)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey, 2006–2009, three-year estimates.
Table 141 Social and economic characteristics of Hondurans in the United States Description
Figure
Total population over 25 years old
322,629
High school graduate or higher
25.6%
Less than high school diploma
49.3%
Speak a language other than English
91.9% (of 485,349, over 5 years old)
Poverty rate for families
22.4%
Female householder, no husband, children under 18 years
47.7%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey, 2006–2009, three-year estimates.
Appendix III: Notable Honduran Americans | 963 Table 142 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading States of Residence: Region/Country: Honduras Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
6,404
2,766
3,638
74
39
35
California
798
332
466
Colorado
39
17
22
Connecticut
53
25
28
1,381
538
843
Georgia
130
59
71
Illinois
134
56
78
Maryland
171
84
87
Massachusetts
Arizona
Florida
170
78
92
Minnesota
34
21
13
Nevada
55
16
39
New Jersey
404
182
222
New York
718
312
406
North Carolina
187
83
104
Ohio
31
16
15
Pennsylvania
57
32
25
Texas
818
370
448
Virginia
273
123
150
51
28
23
826
355
471
Washington Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix III: Notable Honduran Americans Dario Euraque is a Honduran historian and professor at Trinity College in Connecticut. In 2006, he was named director of the Honduran Institute of Anthropology and History (IHAH). Dr. Euraque was ousted by the coup d’état in Honduras in 2009. His written works focus on ethnicity, race, class, and identity in Honduras. He is a prolific writer in both English and Spanish; his well-known work is Reinterpreting the Banana Republic Region and State in Honduras, 1870–1972 (University of North Carolina Press, 1996). America Ferrera is an actress born in Los Angeles, California, on April 18, 1984. She is the daughter of Honduran parents who migrated in the
964 | Honduran Immigrants
mid-1970s. Her mother was a housekeeping staff director in a hotel in Los Angeles. She is best known for her role in the television series Ugly Betty on the ABC network. Carlos Mencia was born on October 22, 1967, in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, the 16th of 18 children. He immigrated to the United States with his parents early in his childhood. Mencia grew up living alternately in East Los Angeles and Honduras, and attended high school in Los Angeles. He attended California State University Los Angeles. He began his comedian career by performing at the major Los Angeles comedy clubs. He is now an established comedian in both Latino and United States mainstream media.
Glossary Baleadas: A fast food often purchased in the street; made with a flour tortilla folded over beans and Honduran mantequilla (sour cream). May contain more ingredients depending on the locale where it is made. Catrachas/os: Of Honduran descent; Hondurans. Campeños/campeñas: Hondurans that live in the North Coast of Honduras and work in the banana fields or for the foreign-owned banana companies. Dügü: A Garifuna ritual known as the feast for ancestors; it is performed when illness, death, or bad luck befall a family; ancestors are consulted and the celebration lasts two to four days. References Amaya Amador, Ramon. 1987. Prisión Verde. Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Editorial Universitaria. American Community Survey. 2006–2008. [Online information; retrieved on 8/16/10.] http://www.census.gov/acs/www/. Anderson, Mark. 2009. Black and Indigenous Garifuna Activism and Consumer Culture in Honduras. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Argueta, Marina. 2007. Immigrant and merchant in banana plantations of the United Fruit Company. Interviewed in Los Angeles, California. Arias, Arturo. 2003.”Central American-Americans: Invisibility, Power and Representation in the US Latino World.” Latino Studies 1: 168–87. Barahona, Marvin. 2002. Evolución Histórica De La Identidad Nacional. Tegucigalpa: Editorial Guaymuras. Barahona, Marvin. 2004. El Silencio Quedó Atrás Testimonio De La Huelga Bananera De 1954. Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Editorial Guaymuras.
References | 965 Barahona, Marvin. 2005. Honduras En El Siglo 20 Una Sintesis Histórica. Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Editorial Guaymuras. Barahona, Marvin. 1989. La Hegemonia De Los Estados Unidos En Honduras (1907– 1932). Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Centro de Documentación de Honduras. Barahona, Marvin. 2001. Memorias De Un Comunista Rigoberto Padilla Rush, Talanquera. Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Editorial Guaymuras. CDM Proyecto Mujer y Maquila. 2007. “Violación de las garantías constitucionales de libertad de petición y asociación: Represión y listas negras en las empresas maquiladoras de Honduras.” [Online information; retrieved 8/20/10.] http://www.derechosdelamujer. org/. d’Ans, André-Marcel. 1997. Honduras Emergencia Dificil De Una Nacion, De Un Estado. Paris: KARTHALA. Delgado, Hector L. 1993. New Immigrants, Old Unions Organizing Undocumented Workers in Los Angeles. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. “Department of Homeland Security Introduces New Procedure to Expedite Honduran Removals.” 2005. Press Release, April 19. [Online information; retrieved 8/20/01.] http:// www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0660.shtm Department of Homeland Security. 2009. [Online information; retrieved 8/20/10.] http:// www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/immigration.shtm. Dunkerley, James. 1988. Power in the Isthmus A Political History of Modern Central America. New York: Verso. Escobar, Julio. 2007. Member of Honduran United in Los Angeles (HULA). Interviewed in Los Angeles, September 23. Euraque, Dario A. 1993. “San Pedro Sula Actual Capital Industrial De Honduras: Entre Villorio Colonial y Emporio Bananero, 1536–1936.” Mesoámerica 26: 217–52. Euraque, Dario A. 1998. “The Banana Enclave, Nationalism, and Mestizaje in Honduras, 1910s–1930s.” In Identity and Struggle at the Margins of the Nation State the Laboring Peoples of Central America and the Hispanic Caribbean, edited by Aviva Chomsky and Aldo Lauria-Santiago, 169–95. Durham: Duke University Press. Euraque, Dario A. 2003. “The Threat of Blackness to the Mestizo Nation: Race and Ethnicity in the Honduran Banana Economy, 1920s–1930s.” In Bananan Wars Power Production and History in the Americas, edited by Steve Striffler and Mark Moberg, 229–49. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Euraque, Dario A. 2004. Conversaciones Historicas Con El Mestizaje Y Su Identidad Nacional En Honduras. San Pedro Sula, Honduras: Centro Editorial. Euraque, Dario A. 2007. “Free Pardos and Mulattoes Vanquish Indians Cultural Civility and Conquest and Modernity in Honduras.” In Beyond Slavery the Mulilayered Legacy of Africans in Latin America and the Caribbean, edited by Darién J. Davies, 81–105. New York: Rowan & Littlefield. ERIC-SJ (Equipo de Reflexión Investigación y Comunicación de la Compañía de Jesús en Honduras). 2004. “El uso de las remesas y su impacto en las familias de la colonia Berlin
966 | Honduran Immigrants en el Municipio de El Progreso en el departamento de Yoro, Honduras (un estudio de Caso).” 25. El Progreso, Yoro: ERIC-SJ. Hamilton, Nora, and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla. 1991. “Central American Migration: A Framework for Analysis.” Latin American Research Review 26(1): 75–110. Hamilton, Nora, and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla. 2001. Seeking Community in a Global City Guatemalans and Salvadorans in Los Angeles. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Lapper, Richard. 1985. Honduras State for Sale, edited by Latin American Bureau. London: Latin American Bureau. Menjivar, Cecilia. 2000. Fragmented Ties Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Merrill, Tim, ed. 1995. Honduras: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. [Online information; retrieved 8/20/10.] http://countrystudies.us/ honduras/. Meza, Victor. 1991. Historia Del Movimiento Obrero Hondureño. Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Centro de Documentación de Honduras (CEDOH). Migration Policy Institute. 2006. “The Central American Foreign Born in the United States.” [Online information; retrieved 8/22/10.] http://www.migrationpolicy.org/. Perez-Brignoli, Hector. 1989. A Brief History of Central America, translated by Ricardo B. Sawrey. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pew Hispanic Center. 2009. “Hispanics of Honduran Origin in the United States, 2007.” [Online information; retrieved 8/16/2010.] http://pewhispanic.org//files/factsheets/55.pdf. Rivas, Ramón D. 1993. Pueblos Indígenas y Garífuna de Honduras (Una Caracterización). Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Editorial Guaymuras. Rodriguez, Cecilia. 2007. President of Alianza Hondureña de Los Angeles (AHLA). Interviewed in Los Angeles, California, August 10. Suazo, E. Salvador. 1997. Los Deportados De San Vicente. Tegucigalpa: Editorial Guaymuras. Velasquez, Leoncio. 2007. President of Honduran United in Los Angeles (HULA). Interviewed in Los Angeles, California, September 1.
Further Reading Amaya Amador, Ramon. 1987. Prisión Verde. Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Editorial Universitaria. Prisión Verde is a classic novel in which Amador describes life in the banana fields and living quarters of the banana companies. This novel examines the challenges of local growers in the North Coast as they faced competition with large U.S.-owned companies. Amador details the loss of land and the shifting of power relations in the North Coast between local growers, workers, and the foreign-owned companies. The text has not been translated to English. Anderson, Mark. 2009. Black and Indigenous Garifuna Activism and Consumer Culture in Honduras. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Further Reading | 967 In this incisive study of Honduran Garifuna culture and Garifuna immigrants in the United States, Anderson explores indigeneity and blackness, which have historically been understood as contradictory identities. Anderson’s analysis of indigeneity and blackness, tradition and modernity, nativism, diaspora, and multiculturalism asserts that the Garifuna make a powerful claim on indigeneity as a cultural identity. Andersen’s rich use of ethnography also provides a good history of contemporary youth culture, consumerism, and local activism. Benjamin, Medea, ed. 1989. Don’t Be Afraid, Gringo: A Honduran Woman Speaks from the Heart: The Story of Elvia Alvarado. New York: Harper Perennial. This short but powerful book details the life of Elvia Alvarado, a campesina (farm worker) organizer, in her own words. The oral history, edited by Benjamin, is an ethnography of Alvarado’s life and traces her involvement in social movements, and her life as a woman, mother, and wife. The book introduces a discussion of social movements in Honduras during a period of the Cold War in the 1980s. The book also provides an analysis of gender relations in campesina life and in social movements. England, Sarah. 2006. Afro Central Americans in New York City: Garifuna Tales of Transnational Movements in Racialized Space. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. England uses ethnography to trace the lives and struggles of Gariganu in New York. The book explores the Gariganu’s negotiation of identities (nationality, gender, race, ethnicity, and class, etc.) necessary for survival and the relations of these identities to social movements. England points out that the Garifuna people’s history of migration is important to Garifuna culture, as their history involves migration first to Central America and then to the United States. This history of migration and transnationality informs the Garifuna communities and creates various avenues to engage in social movements as a community and as individuals. Euraque, Dario. 1996. Reinterpreting the Banana Republic Region and State in Honduras, 1870–1972. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Euraque provides an economic history of San Pedro Sula, Honduras, the North Coast city lauded as the industrial capital of the country. Euraque traces the history of the North Coast’s capitalist economic structure, labor and labor relations, and local and national bipartisan political dynamics. Euraque demonstrates the agency of Honduran government officials, local business elites, and the labor movement in determining Honduran history, along with the foreign-owned banana companies. Frank, Dana. 2005. Women Transforming the Banana Unions of Latin America. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. Frank writes about the formation of women’s committees within the largest banana union in Honduras, SITRATERCO (Tela Railroad Company Union) and the work of the coordinating body COSIBAH (Coordinating Body of the Banana Unions in Honduras). She traces the development of the women’s committees, the programs of these committees, leadership development, and the various roles of women in the current banana unions. Hamilton, Nora, and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla. 1991. “Central American Migration: A Framework for Analysis.” Latin American Research Review 26(1): 75–110.
968 | Honduran Immigrants This essay provides scholars, researchers, and students of Central American migration a good starting point in understanding the key issues facing Central Americans in the United States. Hamilton and Chinchilla provide a framework for understanding Central American migration as a result of political repression, aggravated by economic underdevelopment. The authors take into account historical and contemporary reasons for migration to present an interesting analysis of Central American migration, immigrant networks, and settlement. The essay analyzes the series of politically repressive governments and conditions and the economic neoliberal free-trade laws and underdevelopment in Central America that have made survival a challenge, and thus, migration an important outlet. Johnson, Paul Christopher. 2007. Diaspora Conversions: Black Carib Religion and the Recovery of Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press. Johnson explores Garifuna religiosity, the historical memory of religion among Garifuna, and the ways in which these are passed down and maintained after migration. Using ethnographic research, Johnson demonstrates how immigrant Garifuna communities change and adapt their religious beliefs in the new environment by using their memory of their religion to envision and create a new version of the religion. The Garifuna diaspora, he claims, re-conceptualizes their religion and the historical memory of religion to one that is more in line with an African diasporic religion. Johnson also provides a good history of the Garifuna past, their present, and their migration story. El Libertador. http://www.ellibertador.hn/. El Libertador is a monthly Spanish-language newspaper publication. It is a progressive news source that reflects the national Honduran reality. It is also a source of news in the country and analyses of everyday events. Although it is a monthly publication, it is updated daily online and provides sharp and critical analyses of Honduran issues as they occur. Perez-Brignoli, Hector. 1989. A Brief History of Central America. Translated by R. B. Sawrey. Berkeley: University of California Press. This now classic text translated from Spanish to English provides a sweeping history of Central America from the period of colonization to the 1980s. Perez-Brignoli traces the history of the various Central American nations individually and in relation to each other. The intra-Central American nations’ history includes an analysis of shared borders and debates of nationhood and sovereignty in the modern era. It is an easy and clear read, full of important facts. Schmalzbauer, Leah. 2004. “Searching for Wages and Mothering from Afar: The Case of Honduran Transnational Families.” Journal of Marriage and Family 66(5): 1317–31. In this essay Schmalzbauer traces the story of a Honduran transnational immigrant community in a suburb of Boston. In her research she traces Honduran immigrants’ ongoing social relations in the country of origin, demonstrating that immigrants in the United States maintain a transnational relationship to the home country. In the home country, she documents the ways in which extended family members take over mothering and care-taking roles for children who are left behind by migrant mothers.
Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants by Karen Isaksen Leonard
Introduction This essay focuses primarily on immigrants to the United States from post-1947 India, utilizing the census category of Asian Indian that best captures the Indian immigrant and ancestry population in the United States. There are striking differences between the Asian Indian immigrants who came before and after 1965, when the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act redressed the historic discrimination against Asians. The contrasts between the “old” and “new” (post-1965) Asian Indian immigrants are many, and most of the new immigrants are part of a highly cosmopolitan and well-placed immigrant population. Indian immigrants cluster in high-income professions and are very important to the American economy.
Chronology 1900–1910
The number of Indian immigrants rises from 200 to about 2,000, including mostly Punjabi farmers migrating to California.
1913
Alien Land Laws are enacted in California to prevent “aliens ineligible to citizenship” from owning or leasing agricultural land.
1917
“Barred Zone” act prevents most immigration from Asia.
1920–1921
Alien Land Laws strengthened.
1923
U.S. Supreme Court Thind decision makes Asian Indians ineligible for U.S. citizenship.
1924
National Origins Quota Act sets immigration quota for India at 105 per year.
1946
Luce Celler Bill makes citizenship by naturalization available to Asian Indians.
1947
Indian and Pakistani independence from British India.
1956
Dalip Singh Saund elected to the U.S. Congress from the Imperial Valley, California.
969
Background | 971
1965
Immigration and Naturalization Act gives preference to Asian immigrants with needed skills.
2003
The government of India begins working on an Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) category, which becomes operational in December 2005. This is not quite dual citizenship, which is not allowed in the Indian Constitution.
2005
India’s Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament, introduces a bill for the compulsory registration of all marriages.
2007
India’s Supreme Court rules that the marriages of couples belonging to all religions and communities in India, in the states and union territories, must be registered (it was ordered in 2006 that rules had to be framed to carry out compulsory registration of all marriages).
2011
Hindus were the second most affluent religious group in the U.S., with 65% of households surveyed by a Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life making more than $75,000 per year.
Background Geography of India Historically, the designation “India” was used to include the entire South Asian subcontinent. The Hindu Kush, Karakoram, and Himalayan mountains in the north prevent easy travel to Central Asia, Tibet, and China, and the Vindhya mountains in central India divide the northern Gangetic plain from central India and the coastal plains of southeastern India. Seaports along the western edge of the subcontinent connected historical India to the Persian Gulf, Middle East, and East Africa, while the Indus river system in the northwest and the Khyber and other passes through the mountain ranges along today’s Pakistan/Afghanistan border connected India to Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia. Wheat in the north and rice in the south are the staple crops. India’s 19 or so vernacular languages also reflect the north/south difference, with Indo-Aryan (a branch of Indo-European) languages spoken in the north and Dravidian languages in the south; there are also tribal languages spoken by populations in the far northeast and extending down through central India’s hills and forests. Modern states within both India and Pakistan have been formed along linguistic lines.
History of India India’s history is long and complex, and controversies centered on language, religion, and state policies concerning them are many. The earliest civilization in the Indian subcontinent, the Indus Valley civilization, is generally dated from 3000
972 | Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants
to 1700 B.C.E. This extensive series of urban centers and villages was based on the five rivers (called panch ab, meaning five waters, the Indus and its tributaries), a territory now divided between Pakistan’s Punjab state and India’s Punjab and Haryana states. The rediscovery of this civilization in the 1920s raised more questions than it answered, upsetting the then-prevalent “Aryan invasion” theory crediting IndoAryan language bearers from Central Asia and eastern Europe with initiating settled civilization in the Gangetic valley and writing down the sacred Sanskrit texts, the Vedas, transmitted orally by the priestly Brahmans for some one thousand years. But the Indus Valley civilization not only predated these postulated Aryans but had reached a level that Sanskritic civilization did not attain until at least 600 B.C.E. This early society was stable, highly centralized, and literate, but its pictographic script has not yet been deciphered; the script cannot be assigned conclusively to either the Indo-Aryan or Dravidian (South Indian) language families. The ending of the Indus Valley civilization is as mysterious as its origin, for scholars can point to no obvious cause for its decline. Issues centered on this earliest civilization continue to fuel political controversies with both linguistic and religious implications. The three great religions of South Asia—Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism— arose in the Gangetic valley in the sixth century B.C.E., a time of urbanization, political conflict, and social instability. The institution of caste developed within Hinduism; caste ranks people according on their standing in the four varnas or social orders and their performance of dharma or caste-ordained duty. The four varnas were the Brahmans or priests, Kshatriyas or warriors, Vaishyas or merchant financiers, and Sudras or peasants and artisans (the Untouchables fell below these). While one explanation of the caste system stressed occupational complementarity, another stressed relative purity and pollution: the Brahmans were at the top because they were considered to be the purest, pure enough to intercede with the gods on behalf of others. They knew Sanskrit, avoided intoxicating foods such as meat and liquor, and neither took food from nor ate with members of lower castes; they arranged their children’s marriages at an early age to guard against mixedcaste progeny and prohibited divorce and widow remarriage. Women, Sudras, and Untouchables were prohibited from studying the Vedas. The Untouchables were at the bottom because they worked with and ate polluting substances: their jobs included disposing of human excrement, washing dirty clothing (even menstrual cloths), cutting off and disposing of body hairs, delivering babies and cleaning up the blood of childbirth, disposing of dead human and animal bodies, making leather products from animal skins, and so on. Women ranked below men in all castes because they could not prevent the bodily production of polluting substances, such as menstrual blood and the blood of childbirth. The caste system explained and justified socioeconomic inequality in the world, yet individuals could look to the future with hope because one could achieve liberation after a series of increasingly higher births and rebirths. This fundamental assumption of inequality by birth also underlay Hinduism’s conceptual openness to
Background | 973
many ways of achieving salvation. In early Hinduism or Brahmanism, the emphasis was upon knowledge (jnana) and ritual actions (karma), paths to salvation best followed by higher caste men who could study the Sanskrit texts and carry out rituals and actions in the world. But over the centuries, a third bhakti path of devotion or faith reached out to all people. The bhakti movements, led by charismatic founders all over India beginning in the seventh century in the south, focused primarily on forms of Vishnu or Shiva and used the vernacular languages; they recognized the differential capacities of persons of various castes, genders, and stages of the life cycle and engaged ordinary people, women, and members of the low and Untouchable castes, in new kinds of devotional worship in temples and home settings without Brahman intermediaries. Whether early kingdoms were ruled by Hindus, Buddhists, or Jains, South Asian rulers traditionally showed tolerance for, even encouraged, all forms of religion. The royal role was that of patron of and mediator among religions. Important changes concerned the replacement of Sanskrit by Persian and then English as the language of rule and imperial power, as Muslim and Christian rulers came to power in India, but many argue that this tradition of tolerance continued (although this contention is controversial). A major new religion and civilization entered the subcontinent with Arab traders along the western coast from the eighth century. Turkish and Afghan warriors came through the Khyber pass from 1000 C.E. to rule parts of northern India for brief periods, while in the southern or Deccan plateau, Shia Muslim rulers of Iranian ancestry established several sultanates. In the 16th century, Babur, a young warrior from Central Asia descended from two world conquerors, the Turk Timur (Tamerlane in English) and the Mongol Genghis Khan, swept down into the north Indian plains and founded the Mughal empire in 1526. His grandson Akbar began ruling in 1556, followed by Akbar’s son Jehangir, grandson Shah Jahan, and great grandson Aurangzeb, whose rule ended in 1707. The Mughals employed many Muslim immigrants from Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia and also recruited heavily from the indigenous population. Persian, the courtly language most esteemed throughout the growing Muslim world, became India’s new central administrative language, and all aspiring officials learned it, including many Hindus. Preceding Mughal rule, the Deccani sultanates had begun patronizing a new vernacular language, Dakhni or Urdu, the language of the (military) camp. Most often written in the Arabic or Persian script, Urdu’s grammar was based on that of the Indo-Aryan vernaculars, but much of its vocabulary came from Persian. Urdu became the lingua franca throughout the Mughal empire. Mughal rule was followed by British rule. By the early 18th century, the Mughal power in Delhi declined and European seaborne trade brought private European companies to India’s coasts. In 1757, the British East India Company took Calcutta and was confirmed by the Mughal emperor in Delhi as Diwan, or revenue minister of Bengal. British rule spread, and at first the continuities between Mughal and British rule were striking: Persian remained the administrative language until 1833.
974 | Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants
However, after an unsuccessful uprising against the company in 1857, the British Crown stepped in and India became a colony of Great Britain. Some princely or native states were left unannexed, so the subcontinent was a patchwork of British direct rule and princely rule. British migration to India was minuscule compared to earlier Muslim migrations, and the Christian religion made little headway there compared to Islam. Yet the impact of colonial rule deepened as English became the language of administration, and education in English produced increasing numbers of Western-educated Indians who wanted a devolution of power and eventual independence for India. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885, and the nationalist movement developed under the leadership of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Unfortunately the Muslim League and its leaders, notably Muhamed Ali Jinnah, became alienated from the Congress and argued that Hindus and Muslims were two nations, not one. The League pushed successfully for a Muslim state and the partition of India into India and Pakistan when Britain granted independence in 1947. The partition was accompanied by bloodshed and mass migrations in the subcontinent as new political boundaries were established and new national languages set, Hindi for India and Urdu for Pakistan.
Mohandas Gandhi, with All-India Congress’s president Jawaharlal Nehru, at a meeting of the India Congress in Bombay in 1946. (Library of Congress)
Causes and Waves of Migration | 975
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration The “old” immigrants from British India constituted a relatively homogeneous group; they came to the United States at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century in relatively small numbers. The first migrants were almost all men and from only one part of India, the Punjab province along the northwestern frontier where the Punjabi language was spoken by Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims. From farming backgrounds, most of these men settled in California in the early 1900s and worked in agriculture and strove to become citizens, acquire land and status, and establish families in the United States. Yet the pioneer farmers encountered discriminatory laws, laws that effectively ended immigration in 1917 and affected their rights to gain citizenship, hold agricultural land, and marry whom they chose. Federal policies and laws included the 1917 Barred Zone Act, which barred most Asians from legal immigration; the 1924 National Origins Quota Act, which set a quota of only 105 immigrants per year from India; and the 1923 U.S. Supreme Court Thind decision, which declared Indians to be Caucasians but not “white” and therefore ineligible for U.S. citizenship. State policies and laws included California’s Alien Land Laws of 1913, 1920, and 1921, which prohibited noncitizens from owning and leasing agricultural land (and these were copied by other states) and various state antimiscegenation laws that prohibited marriages between people of different races.
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separation Despite the many legal constraints, many Punjabi pioneer immigrants, called “Hindus” by others (simply meaning “people from Hindustan” or India), stayed on. The laws against miscegenation encouraged most of them to marry women of Mexican ancestry: the Punjabi men and Mexican women looked racially similar to the county clerks issuing marriage licenses. The bi-ethnic couples produced many children, children with names like Maria Jesusita Singh, Jose Akbar Khan, and Carmelita Chand. These “Mexican-Hindu” children, mostly Catholic and bilingual in English and Spanish, called themselves Hindus and were extremely proud of their Indian heritage. Post-1965 Indian immigrants were usually unable to imagine the conditions in which the pioneers lived and found it hard to acknowledge these descendants of the Punjabi pioneers (most of whom were actually Sikhs) as “Hindus” or Indians.
Later Waves of Immigration: Up to 1965 Immigration Act Asian Indian immigration opened up again after passage of the Luce-Celler Bill in 1946. The result of successful lobbying by Indian immigrants in the United States,
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the bill gave Asian Indians the right to become naturalized U.S. citizens and use the quota of 105 per year set by the 1924 National Origins Quota Act (because of the Supreme Court Thind decision in 1923, this quota had been used only by whites born in India). Then, in 1947, Great Britain’s Indian empire gave way to the independent nations of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Burma. Once they took American citizenship, the pioneers could revisit their places of origin and sponsor relatives as immigrants, and their pride in their newly independent nations was an impetus to such reconnections. These political changes at the national level in both the United States and India made it possible for the old immigrants to reestablish connections with their homeland and for limited numbers of new immigrants to come.
Immigration Act of 1965 and Succeeding Legislation An even greater spur to new migration came with the 1965 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act. The legislation vastly increased the numbers of immigrants from Asia and set preferences that favored two types of immigrants, skilled professionals and the relatives of earlier immigrants. The new Asian Indian immigrants are strikingly diverse: they come from all of India’s states and speak many languages (India has some 19 major vernacular languages, and the political structure was realigned in 1956 so that internal state boundaries would reflect linguistic ones). In the United States, the most numerous regional groups are Gujaratis, Punjabis, and Malayalis, from the states of Gujarat, Punjab, and Kerala, respectively. The post-1965 immigrants are not rural people but predominantly urban, highly educated professionals. Unlike the bachelor pioneers, they typically migrate in family units, women and children accompanying the men. Adherents of many religions have migrated, Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, and Parsis (or Zoroastrians), and many so-called traditional caste and community categories still have significance in the lives of the immigrants, particularly for purposes of marriage.
Through IRCA to the Present While IRCA had no major impact upon the Asian Indian immigrants, changes on the international scene have produced ups and downs for them. The early 21st century, with an American and world economic crisis deepening in 2008–2009, has changed the patterns of migration for both education and jobs again. Fewer Indian students are applying to American graduate schools, although on the whole India continues to send high numbers of students to the United States (from 2001 to 2007 India was the leading place of origin for international students enrolled in American colleges and universities). Graduate school applicants from India had increased in 2006–2007 by 26 percent but increased only 2 percent in 2007–2008 and declined 9 percent in 2008–2009, according to the Council for Graduate Schools (Springer
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2009a, A4); the decline seems related to better prospects for career advancement in India and the global economy’s impact on students’ ability to borrow money and come to the United States. Furthermore, foreign students graduating from American universities and colleges with science and engineering degrees are leaving the United States to pursue jobs opportunities in their home countries, Indians among them. In contrast to past trends, only 6 percent of the Indian students interviewed in October 2006 in a study conducted by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation said they wanted to stay in the United States permanently (Springer 2009b, A44). This economic loss to the United States has prompted a bill in the U.S. House of Representatives to grant direct permanent residency to foreign students obtaining a PhD in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics in the United States. India and the United States formed, in 2009, a joint working group to focus on institutional linkages in the fields of secondary, higher, and vocational education; cooperation in this knowledge-driven era is deemed essential to both countries.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community The 2000 Census showed the population of Asian Indians had more than doubled since 1990, reaching almost 1.7 million and taking Asian Indians to third place among Asian American groups (the Chinese numbered 2.4 million and Filipinos 1.8 million). California again led the states with the largest number of Asian Indians, followed by New York, New Jersey, Texas, and Illinois, and Indians are now the largest Asian group in 19 states. By 2006, according to the American Community Survey of the Census Bureau (Springer 2007a), another 800,000 Indian Americans had been added, so the Indian American population reached nearly 2.5 million.
Age and Family Structure In terms of household characteristics and family stability, the immigrants from India led the foreign born in the 1990 Census in percent of population married and were at the bottom in percent of those separated and divorced. The most common household size was four. In the 2000 Census, immigrants from India continued to be among the highest of the foreign-born men and women in percent of population married and among the lowest of such men and women separated and divorced. There were slightly more men than women, 53.9 percent to 46.1 percent. Fertility was low, with 59 percent of Indian immigrant women having only one to two children and only 9 percent having more than three children. Indian Americans were and are typically not clustered in residential areas but dispersed; when Indian
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ethnic enclaves are mentioned, they are usually shopping enclaves, featuring businesses and not residences.
Educational Attainment In the 1990 Census, Asian Indians had the highest percentage with a bachelor’s degree or higher and the highest percentage in managerial and professional fields of any foreign-born group. Again in 2000, Asian Indians had the highest percentage of foreign-born Americans with a bachelor’s degree or higher and were among the highest percentages in managerial and professional fields. In both the 1990 and 2000 censuses, over 70 percent of Indian Americans were bilingual, using English and also a “heritage language.”
Economic Attainment: Occupation and Income Patterns The first wave of post-1965 immigrants set high socioeconomic standards, as evident in the 1990 Census: those immigrants born in India had the highest median household income, family income, and per capita income of any foreign-born group at that time. Also, in the 1990 Census, Asian Indians had the highest percentage in managerial and professional fields of any foreign-born group. The Asian Indians arriving since the mid-1980s brought the averages and medians down slightly, many of them coming in under the Family Reunification Act and not as well qualified as the earlier professional immigrants. There were recessions in the U.S. economy, and Indians arriving after 1985 showed a much lower percentage in managerial and professional jobs, a much lower median income, and a much higher unemployment rate. By the mid-1990s the percentage of South Asian families in poverty was high, putting those born in India 12th on the lists of both families in poverty and individuals in poverty. The U.S. Immigration Act of 1990 reversed the slight downward trend by sharply increasing the numbers of highly skilled immigrants from India (and Asia generally) at the expense of unskilled workers and nonemployed immigrants (parents and spouses of citizens). In the 2000 Census, immigrants born in India had the third-highest median household income (behind only South Africans and Britishers), the second-highest median family income (behind South Africans), and the second-highest median per capita income (behind Britishers) of the foreignborn groups. Again in 2000, Asian Indians held among the highest percentages in managerial and professional fields. Indian immigration to the United States continues to be high in the early 21st century, as the United States experiences a great surge in immigration (one in five residents is a recent immigrant or a close relative of one). Some 60,000 to 70,000 Indians enter the United States each year, many of them highly skilled workers on H-1B temporary visas that are good for up to six years. Many have become
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permanent residents or American citizens. In 2008, Indians cornered 38 percent of the H1-B visas, and they also accounted for the maximum number of people entering the United States on L-1 visas, primarily used for intra-company transferees. The H1-B visa proportion is down from the late 1990s, when Indians accounted for almost half of all such visas and India became the world’s fourth-largest economy; the so-called brain drain worked to India’s advantage, as remittances increased. The high socioeconomic profile of the immigrants in America has helped make India the top receiver of migrant remittances in the world: Indians overseas remitted a total of $27 billion to India in 2007, with the United States being the main remittance source (“India Top Receiver” 2008). The profile of foreign-born Indians in the United States in the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey of 2007 showed very significant contributions to the American economy and society. In the United States, foreign-born workers (17,553,000) constituted 17 percent of all workers, and the India-born 746,200 workers were in third place, behind those born in Mexico, 5,286,400, and the Philippines, 848,800. But Asian Indians ranked first in high-income occupations, some 40 percent of them in four occupational categories: 30 percent of all computer software developers were foreign born, and Indians dominated this group with 125,300 workers (Chinese, next, numbered only 39,200); and 16.8 percent of all foreign-born Indians were computer software developers. Of all doctors in the United States, 29 percent were foreign-born, and Indians led this category, with 40,000 doctors (Filipinos, next, numbered 12,800); 5.4 percent of all foreign-born Indians were doctors. Of engineers and architects, 20 percent were foreign-born, Indians leading with 46,500 (Chinese, next, numbered 30,300); 6.2 percent of all foreign-born Indians were engineers and architects. And 19 percent of all scientists and quantitative analysts were foreign-born, Indians again leading with 81,400 (Chinese, next, numbered 52,500); 10.9 percent of all foreign-born Indians were scientists and quantitative analysts. Indian doctors are a particularly large and important group, and many gained visas by serving in America’s rural areas. About 25 percent of doctors in the United States are international medical graduates, or IMGs, and Indians are the largest single group, about 20 percent of that. In 1999, 26,000 of America’s 600,000 doctors, or 4 percent, were of Indian origin. By 2007, 40,000 of 677,600 doctors in the United States were Indians, an increase from 4 percent to 6 percent of doctors in America. The largest ethnic body of doctors in the United States is the American Association of Physicians from India. These impressive figures continue in the second generation: in 1999, 1 of every 10 freshmen in U.S. medical colleges was an Indian American, showing that the second generation is heavily invested in medical careers; it is estimated that nearly half of these students are children of doctors or related to doctors. There are also are the Association of Indian Pharmacists in America and the Indo-American Physicians and Dentists Political Association.
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Another cluster of Indian Americans works in the hospitality industry in America, with more than 55 percent of the “economy lodging sector” (motels) owned by Indian immigrants from all over the world. They helped form, in 1985, what became the Indo American Hospitality Association and, in 1989, the Asian American Hotel Owners Association (AAHOA). These groups merged in 1994 as AAHOA and have over 9,000 members owning 22,000 hotels and motels in 2009. Most of the AAHOA officers, as well as the hotel and motel owners and managers, have last names of Patel and are of Gujarati ancestry. The movement of Patels into the motel business, not their traditional occupation in India, started in San Francisco even before the new immigration spurred by the 1965 immigration act. Indian immigrants also cluster in the Silicon Valley Internet-based economy, along with Chinese engineers and entrepreneurs. In 1998, 7 percent of the 774 companies in the valley were run by Indian Americans; the percentage of companies run by Indian and Chinese doubled from 1984 to 1999, to 25 percent. The high-tech firms there employed 58,000 workers in 1999 and accounted for over $17 billion in sales in 1998. The region’s scientific workforce was over 30 percent immigrants, again with the Chinese and Indians dominating. The Sunnyvale Hindu temple, one of the largest in California when it opened in 1994, was outgrown by 2001 as its membership grew from 380 families to 4,800. The tech market crashed in 2000, however, and while the setbacks were considerable, a 2007 survey showed Indians in a very good position again (Springer 2007a). Continuing patterns evidenced in the 1990 and 2000 censuses, India-born people led the United States in education and median income in 2006, according to the Census Bureau’s 2007 American Community Survey, a nationwide sample survey. A very high percentage of people born in India, 74 percent, had a bachelor’s degree or higher, more than people born in any other foreign country and more than natives. Median household income in 2006 for people born in India was $91,115, compared to $46,881 for the total foreign-born population, $51,249 for the native population, and $50,740 for the total population. The next highest foreign-born high income populations were those from Australia, South Africa, and the Philippines.
Health Statistics and Issues With respect to health, Asian Indians all over the globe are stricken by cardiovascular disease disproportionately; in the United States they suffer at a rate three to four times that of the general population. Their rates of diabetes, hypertension, and the metabolic syndrome are also higher than those of many other ethnic and immigrant groups. Puzzlingly, conventional cardiovascular risk factors do not explain the high rates of heart disease, and research is underway on Asian Indian diets, traditions, and cultural beliefs about health.
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Adjustment and Adaptation Families and Changing Gender Relations Asian Indians are settling into the United States in ways unanticipated only a few decades ago. With the achievement of dual citizenship options in 2003, more of the migrants are becoming U.S. citizens, and family dynamics are adjusting transnationally. Elderly parents are being brought from India to join their adult children in the United States, but too often they feel isolated from their old friends and former lives and find themselves stuck in the suburbs without access to shops or other people, serving as babysitters, phone answerers, perhaps even cooks, for their children. Clubs have been started for the aging parents in the United States. Even a few old-age homes (although this was initially thought unnecessary) and “temple tours” like those back in India that take seniors to various new Hindu temples are being established in the United States. When no relatives are there to help, servants cannot be afforded, and with Indian immigrant parents both working, other solutions are being found. One innovative company in California was started by a middle-aged mother of two to offer maids, nannies, chauffeurs, and cooks to Indian Americans. Gita Patel’s most popular service is the “Cook & Clean” team, featuring an Indian cook and a person who cleans. Gender issues loom large in Indian American life, with some communities strongly upholding patriarchy and gender complementarity (different male and female roles) in family and community, perceiving the dominant American values of gender equality and freedom of sexual expression as serious threats to ordered social life. Some fear American individualism, interpreted not as a moral ideal but as egoism that could lead to family and societal breakdown. Whether certain practices are religiously required or simply matters of culture can be vigorously debated, and gendered and generational tensions are shared to some extent by all Indian immigrants as they worry about emerging “problems” involving their children and whether these should be attributed to cultural and religious values brought from the homeland or to those of the host society. Just as the early Punjabi immigrants and their descendants redefined themselves, their families, and their work relationships, the post-1965 Indian immigrants are also defining and experiencing family and work relationships in new ways in the United States, and first-generation women often play key roles in these changes. Charged with embodying and transmitting “tradition,” many women are revising tradition as they contribute to the material prosperity of the family and become active agents of change in public as well as private life. Indian women making desirable, often necessary, contributions to family earnings are being empowered within the family. Women make more decisions about
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spending than do their mothers-in-law back home, and they make more decisions than do their visiting or even co-residing mothers-in-law in the United States. Parents come to visit or live with their immigrant daughters as well as their sons. The fact of Indian women working in the United States has different consequences from the fact of women working in India, where immediate and extended family members and servants can help diffuse responsibilities within a broad support network. Perhaps the consequences are more far-reaching for those women working in ethnic businesses, for an ethnic economy is almost by definition a gendered economy. Family businesses use women’s labor power as a cheap resource, keeping labor costs and wages low. It is also a new resource for many of the Indian immigrants, since women running groceries or restaurants in the United States would not have done this back in India. But the changes go beyond bringing women into family businesses, for even when family histories show a continuity of entrepreneurial activity, important changes in gender roles occur within the families. A study done in Los Angeles found that not all of the Indian women engaged in managing and working in ethnic business enterprises were doing so in their own family businesses. The model was not that of a mom-and-pop store, where both husband and wife worked in the store with the man clearly in charge. Instead, the characteristic pattern found husbands holding other full-time jobs while their wives opened and ran groceries, restaurants, or boutiques. Research on Gujarati motel owners also found women taking important roles in the business, while their men sometimes worked elsewhere. This marks a departure from employment patterns back in India, where private businesses, including family businesses, rarely employ women as managers and clerks. Indian American women participate prominently in public life, in activities ranging from political groups addressing themselves to the Indian and American governments to local vernacular and sectarian cultural and religious associations. They are providing support for battered South Asian women, educating them about physical and mental health issues, and working on legal issues connected with marriage, divorce, and migration. Women’s organizations actively addressing issues of domestic violence include Apne Ghar in Chicago, Sakhi in New York, Narika in Berkeley, and Manavi in New Jersey. President Obama appointed two Indian American women in 2009 to a faith-based advisory council, part of the White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships: Eboo S. Patel, founder and executive director of Interfaith Youth Core in Chicago, and Anju Bhargava, a Hindu woman priest who is also president of the New Jersey–based Asian Indian Women of America. In 2009, President Obama also appointed Farah Pandith, of Kashmiri origin, as a special Muslim representative for outreach to Muslims around the world.
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Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Continued Links to India Despite the many measures of economic success, post-1965 Indian immigrants did not immediately become American citizens, partly because many thought of themselves as economic migrants who would return one day and partly because India did not permit dual citizenship until very recently. Many migrants have family networks, financial interests, and political commitments that span two or more nations. As the population grew, Indian Americans formed many linguistic associations, ethnic organizations, and religious sectarian or guru-centered groups, many of them reproducing divisions important back in India and continuing to link Indians to India. For example, the Telugu Association of North America is dominated by members of the Kamma caste, while their rivals in the countryside of Andhra Pradesh (the Telugu-speaking state in South India), members of the Reddy caste, have formed the American Telugu Association; these organizations are transnational. Transnationalism is evident in all aspects of Indian American life, strengthening and revitalizing Indian culture in America but also infusing American culture into India. Retaining Indian culture and identity became easier for firstgeneration immigrants when India’s TV channels began invading the U.S. market in the 1990s. At the same time, a soap opera (Mausam, or “Seasons”) produced by nonresident Indians (NRIs) for the Indian TV market became successful there. Indian musicians and religious figures tour North America and Indian American artists flock to Chennai (Madras) for the Carnatic music concert season. On the Hollywood/Bollywood front, the triumph of the film Slumdog Millionaire internationally and in the 2009 American Academy Awards exemplifies the global scale of movie-making (the director was British, the music director was Indian, and most actors were Indian). In the spring of 2009, the Motion Picture Association of America opened its first office in India, serving as an advocate of American movies, videos, and television but also working against piracy by reducing market restrictions and taxes and strengthening intellectual property rights in the Indian law and courts.
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background Organizations seemingly based on occupation, like those of doctors, hospitality industry people, and software programmers are often old-boy and old-girl networks and emphasize social goals as well. Indians have formed a plethora of languageand caste-based organizations in the United States. Many religious organizations, as discussed in the following section, combine new and old immigrants from diverse countries in interesting ways.
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Religion The religious arena was an important site of change for the Indian immigrants even in the early 20th century and it is arguably even more important today. The early immigrants met together in houses, rented halls, or buildings purchased and adapted for purposes of worship. Sikh, Muslim, and Hindu, almost all had adopted practices characteristic of American churches such as sitting on chairs, leaving one’s shoes on, and seating men and women together as families. Now reversals are occurring as the post-1965 immigrants, larger in terms of both numbers and resources, build traditionally designed religious institutions and introduce “more authentic” practices from India. For example, the Punjabi pioneers had introduced chairs in their Stockton Sikh temple, shoes did not have to be taken off or heads covered, men and women sat together, and the prasad (consecrated sweets) was served on paper plates and eaten with utensils. The new Sikh immigrants, however, have removed the chairs, required shoe removal and head coverings, and instituted gendered seating, and they serve prasad on the hand to be eaten with fingers, as done in Indian gurdwaras or temples.
Madame Pandit (sister of Jawaharlal Nehru and India’s first prime minister to the United Nations) solicits funds at the Sikh temple in Stockton, California, about 1946. The first new East Indian women are in the front row. (Courtesy of Isabel Singh Garcia)
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Another early development was the arrival of charismatic Indian teachers who recruited non-Asian Americans into their religious movements. Swami Vivekananda’s impressive appearance at the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 inaugurated the Vedanta Society in the United States, although he did not stay to lead it. An early Muslim Sufi teacher and musician, Hazrat Inayat Khan, from India, founded the Sufi Order in the West in 1912. Attracting American followers in the early decades of the 20th century were Swami Paramahansa Yogananda, who taught Kriya Yoga and founded the Self Realization Fellowship in the 1920s, and Jiddu Krishnamurti, whose background in the Theosophical movement led him to stress self-reliance and inner reflection in his spiritual teachings. In the late 1960s, Indian religious figures could immigrate more easily and the American “counterculture generation” was receptive to their teachings. Yogi Bhajan, teaching Kundalini Yoga, founded Sikh Dharma in the West. His Los Angeles Sikh temple helped move Sikhism from a Punjabi religion to a world religion by being the first gurdwara to have non-Punjabi Sikhs (sometimes called gora or white Sikhs) conduct the Sikh initiation ceremony. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi founded the Transcendental Meditation movement, which now has about one hundred centers in North America and a university in Iowa. A Vaishnavite sanyasi Srila Prabhupada was sent from Calcutta to bring Krishna’s message to the West and founded ISKCON, or the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (the Hare Krishnas), in New York in 1966. ISKCON has not only gone back to India and founded temples there, but perhaps 50 percent of the U.S. followers are now of Indian origin. Religious preachers traveling to the United States from India in the 21st century address themselves to primarily Indian immigrant followers. Swami Chinmayananda, one of India’s most popular spiritual leaders, died in 1993 in San Diego, California, on one of the extensive overseas lecturing tours he had undertaken to establish missions and youth camps in the United States. Sikh congregations raise money to bring Punjabi preachers and hymn-singing groups for tours in North America, and Muslim groups also sponsor many visitors. All of these relatively new religions in the United States sponsor the immigration of “religious workers” to staff their institutions. While these Hindu priests, Sikh granthis, and Muslim moulvis are acceptable to first-generation congregation members, they are less satisfactory for members of the second generation, since they often do not speak English well and are not at home in the American environment. Sikh gurdwaras, Hindu and Jain temples, South Asian mosques, and Parsi fire temples are being built all over America, fueled by the relative prosperity of the post-1965 immigrants and the ease of securing the necessary materials, as well as the craftsmen, artisans, and religious specialists to put them together. Earlier Hindu temples, Sikh gurdwaras, and Muslim mosques tended to be older buildings taken over by immigrants, but now they are being newly constructed, and inconspicuous
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structures designed to blend in have given way to strong statements of pride and “authenticity.” Congregations that can afford it try to faithfully reproduce Indian structures in outer details. Sometimes municipal governments force changes in design: a Hindu temple in Norwalk, in southern California, had to adopt a Spanish mission style of architecture before its congregation got permission to build. Workmen and building materials can be brought from India, and the buildings are situated according to traditional preferences. For example, Hindu temples should be placed near water and mountains, such placements evoking home and recreating it in the new context. The first big Los Angeles Hindu temple was located in the Malibu hills near the ocean in 1984, modeled after the Tirupati Vaisnava temple in Andhra Pradesh devoted to a South Indian form of Vishnu. Craftsmen, materials, and continuing institutional ties help this temple reproduce that particular devotional tradition, but it has recruited north Indian members, installing new images that appeal to them as well. This broadening of appeal was partly inspired by the need to pay the mortgage. Similar innovations broaden other congregations: a Hindu Unity temple in Dallas has 11 deities from different regional and sectarian traditions and a Shiva/Vishnu temple in Livermore east of San Francisco has both a shikhara and a gopuram, central towers typical of north and south Indian temples, respectively. Temples and mosques present themselves differently in the United States than in the homeland. Often they are parts of “center” complexes or have enhanced roles as educational institutions; they are not just places of worship. Thus many mosques have shops with books and pamphlets about Islam. Some changes involve gender roles. At the Los Angeles Malibu Hindu temple, well-dressed Indian women sit at the doorway and give out pamphlets to all visitors. It is they, not the three South Indian priests (brought from India and not well-versed in English), who explain Hindu beliefs and rituals to casual visitors. Hindu temples in the United States have become the site of congregational worship and cultural as well as religious activities. In the Malibu temple basement, bharatnatyam (South Indian classical dance) performances are held, as professional Indian female dance teachers present their students’ arangetrams, or debuts. Temples in India were once the sites of bharatnatyam, and in the diaspora, temples and bharatnatyam are being reunited. Though held in “traditional” temple settings, the social aspects of such dance performances can be enhanced by a meal served in the interval or afterward, and many temples are being designed with internal non-sacred spaces that encourage recreational activities. Not only worship centers but Hindu and Islamic schools and institutes and producers of textbooks and TV shows suited for youngsters in the United States are springing up all over America. Sophisticated programs have been developed for computerized learning of the relevant languages and texts (particularly Sanskrit and Arabic; and the Bhagavad Gita and the Quran). Teaching materials of all sorts are
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available; for example, a Harvard project put lectures and information concerning South Asian religions on CD-ROM. Transnational religious networks circulate new media, videos, CDs, and DVDs throughout the Indian diaspora (like the TV series of the Indian epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, produced by India’s national television, Doordarshan, in the 1990s). The Internet gives easy access to some religious sites in India as well, allowing devotees to worship and make offerings from the United States. For Indian Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, Christians, Parsis, and possibly even Jains, changes from homeland practices are occurring in American religious spaces as congregants from different linguistic, caste, and sectarian backgrounds in India and elsewhere are brought together. Interactions between immigrant and indigenous American followers of the religions from the Indian subcontinent are more important for some communities than others. Looking first at the Sikhs and Hindus, one sees that these are primarily immigrant communities still strongly oriented toward India, but they are also flourishing in the United States. North American converts to Sikhism and Hinduism—members of Yogi Bhajan’s Sikh Dharma, the Ramakrishna Mission, the Transcendental Meditation movement, and the Hare Krishnas—form very small parts of the two communities. The American followers of Sikhism and Hinduism (and Islam) often differ strikingly from the Indian immigrants, and, depending on the interpreter, their beliefs and practices can be considered dangerously hybrid or more “authentic (text-based)” than those of the immigrants. The Punjabi Sikh immigrant community in the United States sees itself as a diaspora community, and many of its members also recast the “old Hindus,” or the pioneer Punjabi immigrants to North America, as “the Sikh diaspora.” The Indian Sikhs have a public profile marked by sharp, public disagreements over their place in India and the nature and extent of Sikh religious authority. Sikh minority status everywhere (they constitute some 2% of India’s population) and specific grievances in India exploded in the 1980s in demands for a Sikh homeland, or Khalistan (“land of the pure,” a Sikh state), by many North American Sikhs. Particularly after Indira Gandhi’s government sent the Indian Army into Amritsar’s Golden Temple to rout militant secessionists in 1984, damaging the holy shrine, Sikhs all over the world who had discarded the turban and beards adopted these outward markers again, enhancing their identity as Sikhs. The assassination of Indira Gandhi by two of her bodyguards, who were Sikhs, a few months later sent shock waves worldwide, with some outspoken Sikhs in America defending Gandhi’s killing while several thousand Sikhs in India were being slaughtered by their fellow citizens in retaliation for it. The head of the governing body in Amritsar tried to extend his influence over Sikhs outside India, and Sikh gurdwaras all over the United States saw takeovers or takeover attempts by Khalistani Sikhs. The Punjabi Sikhs are famous for rivalry and fighting in their gurdwaras outside India (this is not unknown
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in Hindu temples in the United States either). As Sikh militancy and orthodoxy has increased, the use of the external markers—the wearing of turbans or the carrying of kirpans, or swords—has sometimes been contested in American courts. Can Sikhs wear turbans when a job requires safety helmets, and can Sikh youngsters carry kirpans, knives which are usually small and symbolic but have been known to inflict damage, on school playgrounds? Sikhs have traditionally resisted outside authority from beyond their immediate community, but now Sikhs sometimes invoke outside authorities, including American courts and religious figures in the Punjab, to achieve religious or political control over American Sikh congregations. The decline of the Khalistan movement by the end of the 20th century has facilitated a closer integration of the Punjabi immigrant Sikhs with the small group of predominantly white American converts and that, along with converging secondgeneration conceptions of Sikhism as a world religion, has had impacts back in the Punjab. The Sikh Dharma group has become active in India, setting up a school in Amritsar and sending its children to learn Punjabi culture. Meanwhile, pressure for the gender equity promised by Sikhism has increased, partly because of convert Sikh expectations. Sikh Dharma women reportedly won the right for all Sikh women to perform certain previously male-only duties in the Golden Temple in Amritsar (Sikhism’s most holy site), but in practice this has not yet been honored. Hindus are the largest of the post-1965 Indian religious groups in the United States and constitute an overwhelmingly immigrant religious population, with Hindu politics in the United States focused primarily on goals in India. Some Hindu sectarian or caste groups in India do extend authority over members overseas, and Hindu religious specialists recruited from India staff the new temples in America. There are parallels to the Sikh court cases involving contested leadership of particular Hindu temples, but such cases are not part of a national or transnational pattern contesting the nature and extent of religious authority exercised from India. Hindu and Hindu-related associations are forming federations and coordinating religious, cultural, and political events. As in India, Hindu beliefs and practices are extremely diverse and religious authority is decentralized. Hinduism has not been promoted as a universal or world religion and does not seek converts. Nevertheless, it has had a major impact on American popular culture through yoga and “new age” meditation movements, ones so hybrid that they are no longer recognizably religious or Indian in nature. Some Hindus in America are seeking to unify and standardize Hinduism, focusing on the second generation, but efforts to build one unified Hindu community in the United States appear insignificant. The religious beliefs and practices designated as Hinduism have relied primarily on family- and caste-based rituals, and new temples in the United States were financed, at least initially, by particular regional and sectarian groups. Some of the many linguistic, regional, caste, occupational, and educational (old-boy and old-girl) associations to which Hindus in the United
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States belong crosscut religious boundaries, but others reinforce sectarian or caste boundaries, regulating marriages and conduct in the diaspora as in the homeland. However, new congregations and temples in the United States are combining deities, architectural styles, and language groups seldom combined in India. While changes in beliefs and practices are occurring among American Hindus, it is hard to generalize. Hindus in the United States deal in many ways with the increased demands on their time and the loss of family priests and other religious specialists available in the Indian context. Temples and temple priests have assumed increased importance, with temples often offering language and music classes. Daily rituals can be contracted, shortened on weekdays and lengthened on weekends, or they can be combined, with both morning and evening rituals performed in the evenings. Rituals can be temporarily suspended, perhaps by students in dormitories, and resumed upon return to the parental home. Ritual responsibility can be delegated to only one family member, perhaps an elderly mother, who performs religious observances on behalf of the entire family. Families can postpone all rituals to weekends, or they can rotate the observance of holiday rituals among a number of families, simplifying observances for any one family. Since the sacred fire altar cannot be used in many settings, incense or candles can be substituted. Hindus must make places in their American-designed homes for puja rooms or shrines, converting kitchen cupboards, closets, or studies into worship centers. Beliefs as well as practices are being adapted to the new setting. Hinduism has many sources of religious authority and first-generation Hindu immigrants generally accept numerous and diverse sources and follow a multiplicity of rituals and social practices. However, for second-generation Hindus being raised in the United States, such diffuseness is confusing. Growing up in a predominantly Christian context and knowing little about the conflict and diversity that has characterized the history of Christianity, the children of Hindu immigrants want to be presented with one easy set of beliefs and texts, analogous to Christianity and Islam (or so they think). To achieve this, the parents tend to emphasize beliefs only, not socioreligious practices—not the caste system, village society, gendered practices, or daily interactions with fellow citizens of other religious backgrounds. They present their children with a static belief system floating through time, an ideal system unresponsive to changing economic, political, and social forces—such a religion does not exist (although many other believers view their respective religions in the same way). Thus, at a time when scholars are recognizing the constructed nature of “Hinduism,” the distortion and inaccuracy involved in treating it as an organized whole, Hindus themselves are constructing or reconstructing it in ways that simplify and unify it. Some forces in Hinduism are busy producing the kind of Hindu beliefs the second generation is seeking. A major effort to standardize and inculcate Hinduism abroad is being made by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, or World Hindu Assembly) of America. In India, the parent organization is part of the militant Hindu
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political movement. In 1993, in Washington, D.C., the VHP held a major conference, which was ostensibly a centenary celebration of Vivekananda’s 1893 address to Chicago’s World Parliament of Religions but also a celebration of the demolition of the Babri Masjid (a mosque erected in the 16th century by order of the first Mughal emperor Babur, allegedly on the site of an earlier temple to the Hindu god Ram) only a few months earlier in India. This conference fueled the Hindu right in America. Despite its extreme political agenda, Hindu parents in the United States have flocked to join the VHP, seeing it as a way to formalize religious classes for their children and affirm their Hindu identity and Indianness. The growth of the VHP in America is one indication of the threat to the secular nature of the Indian state coming from Hindus in the United States. Both within India and transnationally, this contemporary insistence on the privileged position of Hinduism in Indian national culture leads to a narrowed and more rigid view of Indian civilization. Thus, despite centuries of presence in South Asia and many measures that show significant integration into Indian civilization, Muslims, Christians, Jews, and Parsis are being recast in the minds of some Hindu immigrants and their children as “alien” to India. Second-generation youth of Hindu background studying Indian history may ask why they have to learn about Islam and Muslims, no longer seen by them (or their parents) as important in India. Add to this situation a new generation of young academics and writers from India or of Indian background, people who are rewriting colonial and postcolonial interpretations of Indian history and culture, and you have active debates on American campuses today. Buddhist and Muslim immigrants from India are extremely diverse in terms of national origin, class, language, and race and ethnicity. In both cases, there are significant American-born components. Buddhists from India are a very small proportion of American Buddhists. While monks from India’s neighbor, Sri Lanka, with their high English-language educational attainments and the backing of well-off Sri Lankan immigrants, have been conspicuous in Buddhist institution-building and interfaith efforts, Buddhists from India are primarily Dalits or Untouchables. They are mobilizing in the United States to help their caste-fellows back in India, where a small-scale conversion movement of Dalits to Buddhism is underway. An international journal, Dalit, was published for about 10 years in the United States at the end of the 20th century, disseminating information about issues in India and soliciting funds for education and uplift projects. There are other international Dalit journals and Web sites, many with Christian or Buddhist orientations. Particularly among Muslims, there are efforts to unify believers across the many internal boundaries. Muslims from India are only a part, but a large and very important part, of America’s emerging Muslim community. The earliest Muslims in the United States were African Americans, and they are still about a third of the American Muslim population. Interestingly, it was Ahmadiyya missionaries
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from British India (the Ahmadi movement was founded in the Punjab in the late 19th-century) who helped the African American Muslim movements in the early 20th century by bringing an English translation of the Quran in 1920, publishing the first English-language Muslim magazine in the United States, and telling America’s black Muslims about the five pillars of Islam, thus heading them toward mainstream Sunni teachings. After the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act, new Muslim immigrants came from many countries. The post-1965 Indian Muslim immigrants rank high in terms of educational and socioeconomic status, and South Asian Muslim men, by the 1990s, began to share the national political leadership of American Muslims with earlier Arab Muslim immigrants. Many first-generation Indian Muslims are working to expand the basic definition of America’s civic religion, the JudeoChristian tradition, to the Abrahamic (Judeo-Christian-Muslim) tradition. American Muslims also write about the compatibility between Islam and democracy, and here the long experience of Indian Muslims with democratic politics in India qualifies them well for leadership positions. An American Islam is being constituted, and many Indian (and Pakistani) Muslims are contributing to it. Without long-standing communities and mosques, Indian Muslims in America teach Islam through texts, ones that are intended to convey universal teachings but often reflect the relocation and reorientation of the teachers. Thus a textbook for Islamic education produced in Orange County, California, authored by South Asian Muslim Americans, explains zakat (charity) thus: “Some have a lot and some have none. We live in America, the richest country in the world. We live in big houses, drive good cars, wear good clothes and play with the best toys. . . . We should also look at the other people here or in other countries who have nothing” (Ali 1991, 67). After September 11, 2001, Indian Muslims have had to battle against the stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists. They work with other Muslims, but American Muslims follow divergent beliefs and practices rooted in many countries and many sectarian traditions (the dominant Sunnis, the various Shiites, etc.). Leading scholars of fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, agree that Muslim mobilization in the United States involves the development of fiqh in a new context rather than transnational applications of fiqh from various homelands. Gender issues are prominent in American Muslim community discourses. Patriarchy and gender complementarity (different male and female roles) in family and community are generally upheld, although a vigorous “gender jihad” is underway, led by American Muslim women of African American, South Asian, and Arab backgrounds. Asra Nomani, an Indian Muslim feminist, has been prominent in this effort. Indian Christians in the United States are also very internally diverse, representing communities ranging from Latin and Syrian Catholics to Jacobite, Mar Thomite, Nestorian, and many post-Reformation Protestant denominations. Contrasting with
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the pattern of male-led family migrations from India, Christian nurses from Kerala led the way for their communities, with interesting gender reversals in some areas of family life. Indian Christians have sometimes joined mainstream American Christian congregations and sometimes retained their ethnic or national origin identities. Like Muslims from India, Indian Christians have asked for help not only from co-religionists but from other Indian immigrants as anti-Christian attitudes and actions in India have threatened their ancestral communities. In the United States, the Parsis or Zoroastrians from India and Pakistan find themselves confronting Zoroastrians from Iran. Both populations are doing extremely well economically, and the Indian Gujarati- and English-speaking Parsi immigrants are working hard with the Persian-speaking Iranian immigrants to build an integrated North American community of Zarthustis, the name upon which they have agreed. Zarthustis from Iran and India, worship together but are conscious of the national and linguistic differences. Marital and religious ties are international, with the funders of the Westminster center/temple in Southern California also funding temples in Chicago, Toronto, Canada, and Sydney, Australia. A journal, Fezana, published in the Chicago area includes North American and international news. The Zarthustis, whose religion traditionally prohibited conversion, are dealing with new issues raised in the diaspora. The Zoroastrian or Zarthusti centers being built in North America’s major cities include fire temples, but a gas flame replaces the ever-burning sacred fire, which is prohibited by U.S. fire regulations. Funeral rituals are carried out fully, but there are no “towers of silence” on which to place the bodies for disposal by flesh-eating birds, so most Parsis choose cremation. The Indian Parsis are providing trained priests to American congregations even where they are outnumbered by Iranians (in Los Angeles, for example), because the religion has been weakened in Iran, and the priests in India and America are no longer always in agreement. The priests in India refuse to marry Parsi women to non-Parsi grooms, and they refuse to baptize the children of mixed marriages. But in North America, such practices are becoming accepted as concern grows about the declining numbers in the community. The new Zarthustrian religious centers in the United States are also cultural centers, intended to strengthen second-generation attendance and encourage marriages among the young people. Intermarriages and baptisms of “mixed” children raise the possibility of conversion, at least in the United States. The Jains also have a Federation of Jain Associations in North America, and their challenge is to establish their religion as distinct from Hinduism and transmit it to the second generation. A small minority community similar to the Indian Parsis but without co-believers from elsewhere, they often represent and transmit an Indian ethnic identity, and members of the second generation may be marrying non-Jains far more than in India. The Jains are a predominantly lay community in
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the United States, one which uses its considerable resources to build temples that serve cultural as well as religious purposes. The religious landscape has changed from earlier decades, when immigrants from any one background were fewer and Indians of all religious backgrounds participated in nation-based meetings and associations. In the case of the so-called Mexican Hindus in California, Sikh, Muslim, or Hindu traditions may not have been transmitted in much detail, but there was recognition of and respect for religious differences. The many post-1965 Indian immigrants bring numerous, very specialized religious traditions, but the diversity is confusing to the second generation. In India, a whole range of societal beliefs and practices is readily observable and provides a rich context for religious and cultural learning. Children can see how religions function in extended families, in subcastes and castes, in neighborhoods and cities, and how religions are implicated in social practices, economic systems, and political movements. Children of Indian descent in America are growing up with less knowledge and less tolerance of the religious commonalities and differences in the homeland, and the simplification and standardization of these many strands into just a few major religious categories is taking place not only in an American context but in a politically charged global context.
Language Issues Indian Americans, while often multilingual (especially the first-generation immigrants), most often qualified for post-1965 immigration because of professional skills, so English is a language in which they are comfortable. Indeed, they are often outstanding (notice the many Indian American youth winning spelling bees), and they are contributing much to the growing field of Asian American and general immigration literature.
National/Regional Language Press and Other Media Reflecting the competence of Indian immigrants in English, almost all of the Indian American ethnic press is in English and it is growing, with new journals and magazines attempting to capture the second-generation readership. India-West, India Abroad, India Journal, and others cover news from India and regional events of interest to Indian Americans. India Currents, started in 1987 and based in San Francisco, specializes in cultural events and has won many media awards over the years. India-West started a glossy popular magazine aimed at younger Indian Americans, India Life and Style, in 2004 and shifted it from a print to an online publication in spring of 2007. The 2001 feature film American Desi (about American-born confused desis, or countrymen [ABCDs]) and other such films cater to the young Indian American crowd. Events like a Masala Cruise from Los Angeles to Ensenada,
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Mexico, featuring Indian cuisine, Dandia (Gujarati folk dance) on the Deck, Bhangra (Punjabi folk dance) by the Sea, Bollywood Fever Show, and so on, attract members of the second generation with full-page color ads in the ethnic press.
Celebration of National Holidays Celebrations mark India’s Independence Day, August 15, and Republic Day, January 26; other festivals and cultural performances based on the Indian national holiday calendar occur throughout the year in most U.S. cities. Their timings are sometimes adjusted to coincide with American holidays.
Foodways Indian women are the front line in families’ changing food habits, and their ideas about food and Indian ethnic identity emerge in many arenas. Indian women who manage ethnic grocery stores serve as cultural consultants for other immigrants and also for non-South Asian shoppers; they help diverse customers to formulate ideas about what is Indian or South Asian food, and they provide many other goods and services including cookbooks along with the foodstuffs, audio and video cassettes, clothing, and even supplies for religious rituals. They stock ready-made and fast foods for other South Asian working wives and for the many students who have no time or ability to prepare meals for themselves. Typically, snacks and sweets from several regional cuisines are sold side-by-side, the variety surpassing that available in almost any city in India itself. Just as it was for the early immigrants, food is at the core of identity construction for the new immigrants as well, and the domain of food and its preparation is strongly gendered. The Hispanic wives of the Punjabi pioneers had learned to prepare some Punjabi dishes, a task central to their “Hindu” identity. Two restaurants run by Punjabi Mexican sons from the Imperial Valley, El Ranchero in Yuba City and Pancho’s in Selma, feature chicken curry and roti in addition to full Mexican menus. More recent immigrant women from India shape ideas about the homeland as they prepare meals at home, patronize restaurants, and play hostess to guests from all over the world. They adjust recipes and menus and must also cater to their own children, who typically adopt a taste for more American foods than do their parents. (Thus mothers are charged both with enculturation of their children in Indian ways and with catering to their changing, Americanized tastes.) Indian couples and families have begun to dine out, too, often in South Asian restaurants that had been patronized primarily by non-South Asians and that are now adapting themselves to broader clienteles. There is a growing market for Indian restaurant food among both Americans and South Asian immigrants. Some Indian restaurants aim for affluent customers, but others are moderately priced, and many have gone into the catering business. Large
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El Ranchero Restaurant in Yuba City, California, owned by Ali Rasul, who was born in the Imperial Valley. (Photo by Karen Leonard)
upscale hotels sometimes seek convention and wedding business by advertising that they can offer Indian food. Tandoori and Mughlai cuisine is most common, but a few South Indian and vegetarian restaurants are springing up. Transnationalism shows up in the restaurant trade too, as great restaurant chains from India come to United States. This might happen because of an owner’s migration. For example, Kapal Dev Kapoor, the man who founded Delhi’s Embassy restaurant in 1948 and began the first automated ice cream plant in India in 1957 (Kwality ice cream), came to Los Angeles in 1977 and introduced excellent Mughlai and tandoori cuisine to Southern California by taking over the Akbar restaurant in Marina del Rey. Dasaprakash, a South Indian vegetarian restaurant chain in India, has a branch in California that helps set the standard for such food in the United States.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment The availability of Indian culture in the United States has increased dramatically, providing many resources for the construction of immigrant identities and strongly influencing the host society as well. In earlier decades, “Hindu” recreational activities were few: visits with other Punjabi-fathered families, going to the Stockton gurdwara and to wrestling matches and political speeches. The pioneer Punjabi farmers had to persuade Indian students from colleges in nearby cities to come out and give amateur performances in the small farm towns of California and Arizona
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Indian Weddings An Indian wedding economy has developed in the last two decades in North America. Pandits, moulvis, granthis, and priests are available to perform the various ceremonies throughout the United States. The strictly religious ceremonies themselves usually last one or two hours but are preceded and followed by other rituals and festivities. Despite astrological forecasts in some cases, for convenience they are increasingly scheduled on weekends just prior to a noon or evening meal. Some performers of marriages now use English-language texts, complete with explanations of text and rituals, while others reproduce the ceremonies of the homeland as closely as possible. Providers of goods and services for Indian weddings are springing up all over America, even offering horses or elephants for the bridegroom’s procession. An IndoPak Bridal Expo is held regularly in Buena Park, California. Like the first one in 1989, billed as showing “everything needed for an authentic wedding,” the expo is complete with fashion shows and the displays of more than 80 Indian and American mainstream vendors. Ads for horoscope-matching services (“Astro Scan USA”), wedding puja (Hindu worship) items, wedding catering, flower decorations, Indian-style disposable plates, wedding jewelry, and the like have joined other ads in the pages of the ethnic newspapers. (Courtesy of Neha Vora)
in the 1950s, putting the students up in their own homes. Hindi movies from India began to be screened soon after l965, in movie theaters central to new South Asian immigrants, but with the coming of VCRs around l980 the moviegoers retreated to home settings. Now, the new Indian immigrants sponsor and attend cultural performances and other popular recreational activities that are almost as accessible as back in the homeland, and there are many “fusion” or crossover arts and activities. All over the United States Indian organizations sponsor concerts by local and visiting artists. These are sponsored by established organizations or by private
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entrepreneurs, like ethnic grocery store owners or other businessmen. Events are advertised in the South Asian ethnic newspapers and by flyers distributed in grocery stores and religious centers. The mainstream press may also give advance notice and review the performance when a really big name performer comes to town. Depending upon the sponsor and audience, these performances may run on “Indian” time, meaning that they start late (and later than scheduled) and continue far into the night, or they may be more attuned to American timings, starting when scheduled and ending at a “sensible” hour. Indian classical music and dance play major roles in winning a place for Indian culture in the North American scene: Indian dance academies offer classical Bharatnatyam and regional folk dances like Punjabi bhangra and Gujarati garba raas or dandiya, along with dances from Hindi films and “hip-hop bhangra.” Ali Akbar Khan (d. 2009), master of the sarod, founded the Ali Akbar College of Music, which became a northern California Bay Area institution. Claiming descent from the lineage founded by Tansen, the renowned court musician of the Mughal emperor, Ali Akbar Khan taught many Euro-American students, as do other permanently settled Indian artists providing instruction in Indian music and dance all over the United States. The master sitarist Ravi Shankar settled down in Southern California; his daughter Anoushka has also become world famous as a sitarist, while her half-sister, Shankar’s daughter Norah Jones, is a Grammy Award– winning singer and songwriter. For Ravi Shankar’s 75th birthday in 1995, the Music Circle of Southern California sponsored an 11-hour concert in his honor, held in a Los Angeles college auditorium and featuring outstanding instrumentalists and vocalists. An Indian restaurant provided tea and food during the breaks, and the celebration drew a majority of non-South Asians. While the American public may be somewhat more familiar with North Indian Mughlai music (Ravi Shankar on sitar, Ali Akbar Khan on sarod, and Zakir Hussain on tabla) than the Carnatic or South Indian music, both vocal and instrumental Carnatic music is developing equally well in the United States. Cleveland, Ohio, hosts an annual Easter weekend of Carnatic music, which is the biggest assemblage of Carnatic musicians outside of India. This is the Thyagaraja festival, celebrating the great composer of the 18th century. Begun in 1977 by a small group in a church basement, the festival has grown to a four-day event with an audience of over 3,000, and it is now officially recognized by the state of Ohio. In other centers of Carnatic music activity, great teaching and performing lineages from India are continuing in the United States, and young Indian American Carnatic vocalists and instrumentalists can trace their ancestries back to famous disciples of Thyagaraja in India; some of them now tour in India. It is the South Indian bharatnatyam dance that has become best known in the United States. Originally practiced in South India by girls given to temples for dancing and perhaps for prostitution, bharatnatyam has become highly respected
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and is still strongly connected to Carnatic music and devotional Hindu themes. Among the outstanding schools established in the United States is the Kalanjali school run by K. P. Kunhiraman, from the Kalakshetra dance school in Madras, and his American wife Katherine, from the Bharata Kalanjali school in Madras; they began their Berkeley dance school in 1975 and have several branches. At the Padmini Institute of Fine Arts in New Jersey, Padmini, a former Indian movie star, teaches students bharatnatyam, also at several locations. American museums and funding agencies have become sources of support for Indian classical dance. For those Indian American daughters who study Indian classical dance with female professional teachers in the United States, the controlled sexuality and formal beauty of the performances convey new meanings in America. Bharatnatyam performance has been analyzed as “a marker of ethnic and feminine identity,” an opportunity for lavish public display of eligible daughters in an Indian cultural, even spiritual, setting. Not only Indian Americans looking for roots in the United States, but Euro-Americans, other Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans, South Asian Christians, and Muslims as well as Hindus, now study classical Indian dance. In one arangetran (debut) of two Muslim girls, sisters from Pakistan, the opening and closing numbers were qawwalis, Sufi devotional songs made famous by Pakistan’s Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan and choreographed by the bharatnatyam teacher for her students. Dance traditions from North India also are taught in the United States, including not only the kathak dance, patronized by the Mughals, but also the slightly less respectable mujra dance, associated with courtesans and oldstyle weddings of the Indo-Muslim nobility. Not only classical and courtly art forms but folk ones and especially Hindi film dances are being taught in the United States. On this more popular level, cultural performances typical of Indian celebrations and festivals feature teenage Indian American girls dancing in public in alluring costumes. The Hindi film dances are erotic and provocative. Indian American girls do not simply reproduce the film dances as they see them on video but reinterpret them, competing with other daughters of the community. Acceptable displays of adolescent beauty and skill in a coeducational setting, these dances performances meet with parental approval because they are Indian, “ethnic,” and “traditional.” Exuberant popular folk dances, especially Punjabi and Gujarati ones, similarly evidence an expanded public role for young Indian American women in community events. Second-generation Punjabi girls are performing the bhangra, the more flamboyant male form of Punjabi dance, rather than the tamer giddha traditionally danced by women in the Punjab. At the Gujarati festival programs, youngsters dance the garba raas in colorful costumes. Music and dance performances may dominate the Indian American cultural scene, but mushairas, evenings of Urdu poetry that typically feature both local and visiting international poets, and vernacular language theater performances are also popular. An excellent command of the language is needed to appreciate these
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compositions, and many associations sponsor mushairas, some of them branches of Indian, Pakistani, or international associations, such as Bazm-i-Urdu, Aiwan-iUrdu, or Urdu Markaz International. These poetry societies bring together not only Indians and Pakistanis but also Afghans, Bangladeshis, and others who may speak and appreciate Urdu. Indian language theater is barely visible in the United States, but Gujaratis are a large enough group to support local and transnational productions; some Gujarati directors and playwrights shift back and forth between Bombay, California, London, and New York. Indian Americans pioneering in many arenas draw upon their cultural heritage. Their training and their specific knowledge and cultural references may be originally Indian but they use these things in new ways and for American or international audiences. The pioneer movie stars Kabir Bedi and Persis Khambatta acted in both Hollywood and Bollywood (Bombay) films, and Kavi Raj acted regularly in TV’s St. Elsewhere. Parminder Nagra, London-reared star of Bend It Like Beckham, joined the regular cast of ER. Kal Pen, who starred in two Harold and Kumar films and the TV show House, took a job with President Obama, joining his administration’s Office of Public Liaison in 2009. There are many artists, mostly painters and mostly in New York, of Indian origin, and a well-known curator and scholar of Indian art (Pratapaditya Pal at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art). There are world-famous cultural figures from India whom Americans want to claim, people who did or do maintain residences, travel, and work in the United States very frequently: Zubin Mehta and his father Mehli Mehta, conductors originally from Bombay; Ismail Merchant, the independent filmmaker, also from Bombay; Shabana Azmi, Indian actress and political activist; Ravi Shankar, sitar virtuoso; and Salman Rushdie, the noted author born in Bombay now resident of New York. Many younger Indian immigrants and members of the second generation are highlighting their bicultural heritages as they move into mainstream American culture. There are those in the entertainment and media industries, older filmmakers like Amin Chaudhri, Krishna Shah, Ashok Amrit Raj, and Jagmohan Mundhra, and younger ones like Mira Nair, M. Night Shyamalan, Radha Bharadwaj, and Deepa Mehta whose films are being distributed by major Hollywood studios. Lessestablished directors of Indian ancestry are showing in film festivals and museum series. There are news reporters and anchors, the best example in the early 20th century being Fareed Zakaria from Bombay, editor of Newsweek International, host of a weekly hour-long TV program on foreign affairs, and author of a best-selling book, The Post-American World. Doctors Deepak Chopra and Sanjay Gupta appear frequently as TV guests and commentators. On the lighter side, the Indian grocer Apu is one regular animated character on the cartoon The Simpsons, and the actor/ writer Aasif Mandvi appears regularly on Jon Stewart’s Daily Show. These media figures come from very different backgrounds, but all are working with bicultural perspectives in one way or another.
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Indian American authors are highlighting cultural and multicultural themes. The list is long and includes many award winners and book club nominees. Names like Meena Alexander, Agha Shahid Ali, Chitra Banerjee Divakaruni, Amitav Ghosh, Minal Hajratwala, Jhumpa Lahiri, Gita Mehta, Ved Mehta, Bharati Mukherjee, A. K. Ramanujan, Raja Rao, and Vikram Seth are widely known. With solid careers as doctors, Atul Gawande and Abraham Verghese have also distinguished themselves as authors. Sexuality is a major theme in a powerful new writings by predominantly young women of Indian descent in America, not only heterosexual feelings and activities but lesbian ones as well. Genuinely new hybrid or fusion cultural productions abound, especially in the domains of music and food, where new combinations of instruments, rhythms, ingredients, and methods lead to innovative sounds or tastes, where there is a selfconscious combination of cultural elements from different traditions. Often the fusion producers are second-generation Indian immigrants, but not always—they can be first-generation immigrants, or they can be American business people. Dance, music, food, and restaurants are the big areas for fusion. Some Indian dance academies offer more classes on regional folk dances and dances from popular Hindi movies than on classical bharatnatyam and blend the styles in choreographed performances. Indian dance is also crossing over and inspiring American dance leaders, lending its instrumental music, its vocals, and its costumes. At the “high culture” end, examples of fusion music in the United States include Carnatic violin virtuosos L. Subramaniam and L. Shankar playing with Western musicians, or ragas (North Indian instrumental music) and ghazals (Urdu love songs, poems) combining Western instruments, for example the saxophone, and voice. These experiments and interactions are often truly transnational and not just American, and they include such striking examples as Pakistan’s qawwali singer Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan doing the sound track on the Hollywood film Dead Man Walking. Among the younger “popular culture” crowd, and taking the lead from the Punjabi British hit singer Apache Indian, it is bhangra rock or reggae that rules: it is a loud, vibrant dance music combining Punjabi peasant stock with Caribbean reggae, British rock, and black American rap. Dance parties throb to this music, now adding elements of hip-hop, chutney, and jungle. Weddings are occasions where music and dance frequently mix cultures: if the wedding guests include Punjabis, they may insist on dancing the boisterous bhangra at even the most dignified of Indian weddings. For that matter, American rock music is being played at more and more Indian weddings, as the young people demand it. The United States has become a major market for producers of Indian clothing in India. Exhibitions and sales of Indian women’s and men’s clothing are held in hotels or private homes, and the styles available in Little India shopping centers around the United States often come straight from Bombay or Delhi. Famous boutiques from India’s biggest cities send annual displays to American centers of the Indian diaspora like Los Angeles, Austin, Dallas, Chicago, New York, and
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Indianapolis. Stores from India are even opening outlets in the United States to sell saris and the salwar-kameez outfits originally typical of the Punjab. Fusion cuisine is another new trend, being pioneered in New York. Chutney Mary in Manhattan mixed desi flavors with Mexican, Italian, and Thai cuisine; Floyd Cardoz, chef at Tabla, infuses haute cuisine with flavors from Goa, his family’s home state. Vegetarian burritos, tacos, quesadillas, and nachos are natural candidates for crossover cuisine as well. In Indian restaurants, the trend is to use less oil and fewer spices, and there is a spate of Indian cookbooks tailored to American tastes, including popular ones by Ismail Merchant, Bharti Kirchner, Julie Sahni, Yamuni Devi, and Madhur Jaffrey. Padma Lakshmi not only wrote a cookbook but is the TV host of Top Chef. Indian restaurants offer amazing combinations of food, cultural performances, and ambience. (These kinds of changes are occurring back in India too, but with American clientele a major factor in the United States, the changes are faster and more attuned to non-Indian tastes.) Advertisements in the ethnic press tout Chinese Islamic and Thai Islamic restaurants, where all meats are halal. There are also halal Mexican restaurants and an Indian restaurant featuring Hindi karaoke. The Westin Bonaventure, perhaps Los Angeles’ most prestigious hotel, offers banquet facilities with Indian cuisine, that is, full-service catering by two of the finest local Pakistani and Indian restaurants. A miscellaneous set of enthusiasms and practices reflects the mixing of different cultural traditions, if not true fusion. This would include things like yoga and Ayurvedic medicine, now attractive and available options for recreation and health. Then there are the Indian entrants to beauty pageants and Miss India beauty pageants, well captured in a 1997 film, Miss India Georgia. Here the “showcasing of daughters” analysis applied to bharatnatyam seems relevant, and the prize monies can be used for higher education (for medical school, perhaps).
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Naturalization Taking U.S. citizenship is one way of dealing with the complex and changing U.S. immigration law and regulations, but at first many post-1965 migrants planned to take their expertise back to the home countries, having promised their parents they would return. Practical reasons for retaining Indian citizenship had to do with the holding of property and bank accounts in India and the nonnecessity of getting visas to visit there. About half of those migrating from India from 1977 to 1991 became naturalized U.S. citizens, although they had to give up their Indian citizenship to do so then. The 2000 Census showed 37.7 percent of Indian immigrants as
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naturalized citizens, slightly lower than previously because over 50 percent had come only since 1990. In the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey of 2007, 44.4 percent of those born in India had been naturalized, lower than for Vietnamese, Filipino, and Chinese immigrants (74%, 64%, and 58% respectively); the lower rate is no doubt explained by the impossibility, still, of dual citizenship and the very recent arrival of more than half of the immigrant population. Indian families are now strongly rooted in the United States, and the first generation realizes that it will not be easy to take the children “back home.” Many immigrants have finally told their parents they will not be returning and are instead bringing their parents to the United States, at least for the annual visits required to maintain their status as permanent residents. And as more and more immigrants bring their siblings and other relatives, whole families are shifting permanently to the United States, so there is less reason to return to India. Citizenship status expedites family reunification, since citizens are preferred over permanent residents when it comes to bringing relatives. There are also federal estate tax benefits for citizens with respect to foreign estate taxes and marital deductions. Finally, citizens are in a much stronger position than noncitizens to challenge existing laws and practices, mobilize public opinion, and initiate new laws, and, of course, to influence U.S. policies towards the homeland.
Dual Citizenship Indian Americans, termed NRIs or non-resident Indians by India, continually pressured India to change its policy and allow dual citizenship (Pakistan allowed it), but India’s leaders initially encouraged its NRIs to become American citizens and work for themselves and India through the U.S. political system. India finally developed an overseas citizen of India (OCI) category, close to dual citizenship, in 2003.
Forging a New American Political Identity Political Associations and Organizations Participation in American political life was a goal for the early Asian Indian immigrants and has become one for the newcomers. Political mobilization began with militant anti-British Ghadar party the early Punjabi immigrants formed in California in 1913, but this effort was very short-lived, ended by internal conflicts based on regional origins in the Punjab and U.S. government persecution. Instead, Punjabi farmers focused their strongest and most sustained political efforts on gaining access to American citizenship, working with other Indians across the United States in a lobbying campaign that succeeded in 1946 with the passage of the Luce Celler Bill. Many old-timers became citizens then and helped elect Dalip Singh Saund from California’s Imperial Valley in 1956, the first congressman from India. They also supported Indian nationalist leaders who visited California to raise money for
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the Congress party in the 1940s, but most Punjabis in California were taken by surprise by the partition of British India in 1947 into India and Pakistan. Other political mobilization was based in early decades on issues like crimes against Indians, discrimination against Indians in higher education and business, and problems with municipal regulations of various sorts. Indian merchants fought to achieve “minority” business preference status and many fight now to name a business area “Little India.” Indian American organizations show a progression over time from the individual-level adaptations made by the first migrants to early organizations based on national origin (India, Pakistan) or ecumenical religious categories (incorporating Indians into various Christian churches or Muslim mosques).
Civic and Electoral Participation After Dalip Singh Saund’s 1956 election to Congress, decades passed before the post-1965 immigrants mobilized for electoral participation. Among the nationallevel organizations based on Indian ancestry, the four leading ones were the Association of Indians in America, the National Federation of Indian Associations (NFIA), the Indian American Forum for Political Education (IAFPE), and the National Association of Americans of Indian Descent. These competing national federations reflected not only rivalry among leaders but uncertainty over the best term for the community—Asian Indian is the census term, while Indian American and IndoAmerican are the other leading contenders. However, in 2001, four major organizations did form the umbrella Indian American National Foundation (IANF). The four were the NFIA, the IAFPE, the American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin (AAPI), and the Asian American Hotel Owners Association (AAHOA). The chair position was to rotate among the four groups while the new umbrella organization focused its efforts on both the U.S. Congress and the Indian Embassy. This effort has not been successful: the AAHOA withdrew and the NFIA suffers from internal conflict, one faction suing the other from time to time. Indian Americans are active in both Democratic and Republican party political funding and campaigning. In 2004, Bobby Jindal, a Republican and a Catholic (since his high school conversion) of Indian descent, won a congressional seat from Louisiana’s first district (becoming the second congressman from India). In 2007, Jindal was elected governor of Louisiana, the first Indian American governor and the youngest governor at that time. Others of Indian descent have been winning seats in state legislatures and becoming the “first Indian American” to hold particular positions. Examples include Kalpana Chawla, astronaut, member of NASA space rocket crew in 1997; Anuradha Bhagwati, daughter of economists Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai, who became a U.S. Marine officer in 2000; and Kamala Harris, of mixed Asian Indian and African American descent, elected San Francisco’s first female district attorney in 2003 (and the first DA in the United States of South Asian descent; she was reelected in 2007).
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Louisiana congressional candidate Bobby Jindal (left) talks with a constituent at Dot’s Diner in Jefferson, Louisiana, October 18, 2004. Jindal, a Republican, later became governor of Louisiana. He is the son of immigrants from India. (AP Photo/Bill Haber)
Public Policies and Political Representation Indian Americans have led in the formation of international associations, with Global Organization of Peoples of Indian Origin (GOPIO) being the best known. Formed in 1989 in New York and with numerous chapters around the world, it puts out a monthly newsletter and holds annual conventions in India. GOPIO works closely with the government of India. Pressure from GOPIO helped spur the Indian government to set up a separate Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs for NRIs. A major purpose of that ministry was to facilitate investments in India by overseas Indians. GOPIO also pushed for a persons of Indian origin (PIO) card, a card made available in 1999 that provided PIOs like NRIs exemption from visa requirements and other economic and educational benefits. Most notably, GOPIO pushed for dual citizenship and came close to achieving that with the OCI category in 2003. In the late 20th century, Indian American businessmen, leaders in innovative enterprises, rose above local and regional interests to build a powerful economic network with international political potential. Indian businessmen in the United States founded the Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE) in the Silicon Valley in 1992, a South Asian organization that expanded rapidly and has chapters in 12 countries. These successful entrepreneurs, corporate executives, and senior professionals number more than 11,000 and work to foster entrepreneurship globally through mentoring, networking, and education. TiE hosts many events, and best known is its annual
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TiEcon, the largest professional and networking conference for entrepreneurs. It has branches for women and youth and, notably, works across political boundaries in South Asia. Its charter members are 17 transnational Indian businessmen and innovators, including, based in the United States, Arun Sarin of Airtouch, Vodafone, and Verizon Wireless; C. K. Prahalad, professor of business at the Ross School, University of Michigan, and author of books on corporate strategy; Kanwal Rekhi of Excelan/Novell, Inventus Capital Partners, and CyberMedia; Victor Menezes of Citicorp and New Silk Route Partners; and Vinod Khosla of Sun Microsystems and Khosla Ventures. Political issues continue to focus on race, class, gender, and generational issues in the United States. Leftist or liberal Indian American activists invoke African American and immigrant Indian history to argue eloquently against conservative religious and racist forces among the post-1965 immigrants and attack Asian American “model minority” status as a false stereotype that conceals sharp class differences among Indian Americans. Young Indian Americans, most of them members of the second generation, have worked for gay and lesbian rights. Urvashi Vaid, who came to the United States as a girl in the 1960s, became a lawyer, writer, and executive director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force from the late 1980s to 1991, the first woman of color and first Indian American in the position. Parvez Sharma, based in New York, filmed A Jihad for Love in 12 countries, focusing on the lives of gay and lesbian Muslims struggling to reconcile their sexual orientation with their faith. SATRANG (in California) formed in 1997 to serve the South Asian lesbian, bisexual, gay, transgender, intersex, queer, and questioning (LBGTIQ) people. It has gained support from more general community organizations like the South Asian Network (SAN) in Southern California to commemorate the annual National Coming Out Day, and the two organizations produced the first-ever South Asian LBGTIQ Needs Assessment report in 2007. The decision by Delhi’s High Court in India in July 2009 to decriminalize homosexuality was welcomed in America by such groups (although the decision is only the first step, as other jurisdictions in India must also repeal portions of the Indian Penal Code that treat consensual gay sex between adults as a crime). Coalition-building with other groups, such as Asian Americans and/or Muslim Americans, is a promising political strategy. Among Asian Americans, Indians or rather South Asians have moved from being the fourth-largest group, after the Chinese, Filipinos, and Southeast Asians, to third largest, overtaking the Southeast Asians. The South Asian group includes immigrants from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, the Maldive Islands, Afghanistan, and even Indian-origin people from Fiji and the West Indies. Also drawing on a very broad membership are the Islamic or Muslim coalitions. Islam either already is or will soon be the second-largest religious group in the United States, and Indian Muslims are among the intellectual and political leaders of Muslim Americans.
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After September 11, 2001, Indians (and South Asians) of all religions have found much of the American public unable to distinguish among them. Turban-wearing Sikhs have been singled out as possible terrorists, and they have mobilized, separately as well as with various Muslim groups, to fight media scapegoating, harassment, and attacks based on a generalized fear of terrorism. National Sikh organizations like Sikh Mediawatch and Resource Task Force (SMART), founded in Washington, D.C., in 1996, focus on old issues (issues like wearing the kirpan or the turban in various situations continue to crop up) and new 9/11–related issues. A New York-based national coalition, United Sikhs, formed in 1999, has also taken on political issues affecting Sikhs in the United States and internationally. Religious issues have become more important in the 21st century. Hindu groups mobilize to protest products or events that seem disrespectful of their religion, such as a Sony PlayStation video game called Hanuman: Boy Warrior, pictures of Hindu gods and goddesses on the inside of toilet seat covers, or the use of Hindu chants and symbols in performances and CDs by pop artists like Madonna. A Hindu Students Council formed in 1990 and has a network of chapters on campuses across America, presenting events and talks on Hinduism (they include Jainism and Buddhism within Hinduism). Muslim student unions on many campuses include Indian Muslims, and these groups present informative programs and particularly ones combating negative stereotypes. Writing and teaching in North America about Sikhism has also come under scrutiny, not so much by students as by self-proclaimed orthodox Sikhs based in North America. Their challenges have been particularly sharp to young Sikh scholars placed in North American universities, scholars who, in the view of the nonscholar believers, are falsely alleging that the Sikh religion has changed over time in various ways. Scholars teaching Hinduism and Islam on campuses have also come under attack, especially if they are not Hindu or Muslim by birth or belief, and sometimes if they are not “orthodox enough” Hindus or Muslims. Indian Americans want their culture and heritage taught in America’s higher educational institutions. South Asian studies have long been offered at many top universities, and research in India has been promoted by the American Institute of Indian Studies (AIIS) based at the University of Chicago. The institute was established in 1961 by a group of American scholars involved in programs of Indian studies at leading American universities. Wealthy Indian Americans have begun endowing chairs for scholars of India at American universities: chairs have been established so far for Indian studies generally, Indian history, Tamil studies, and Bengali studies. Chairs for the study of a religion have been more controversial, particularly in the case of Sikh studies. These chairs usually involve a matching contribution from the university, and agreements between the relevant community and the university are carefully negotiated.
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Return Migration In the early 21st century, Indian immigrants have begun to return to India, and this represents an economic loss for the United States. While some NRIs responded to India’s 1991 economic liberalization by returning to India, reportedly they often returned to the United States in frustration. But in the early 21st century, returnees are finding living conditions in India much improved. A study found that as many as 100,000 Indians will return to India in the next three to five years, moves that will boost India’s economy and undermine technological innovations in America. Even on the marriage market, where Indian men living in the United States at the end of the 20th century were very popular bridegroom choices by the families of young women in India, the tide is turning as parents in India fear the effects of the recession. India’s economy is also slowing down, but the situation there is not so bad as in the United States in 2009–2010, and parents and prospective brides both see better opportunities and more livable situations if bridegrooms live in India. Some older immigrants, concerned that their children will “lose” their culture and perhaps feeling that they themselves cannot ever be more than second-class citizens of the United States, are returning to India upon retirement. Complexes are being built in India for returning senior citizens, and Social Security payments can be sent to India after 10 years of employment. Their return presents a considerable problem to their children who were born or brought up largely in America. Again parents and children may be living on different continents, but travel is faster and perhaps more affordable in the 21st century than it once was.
The Second and Later Generations Many conference sessions, public talks, and private conversations are devoted to worrying about the children of Indian descent being raised in the United States. Parental ambitions are high with respect to the economic success of their offspring: children are encouraged to undertake higher education and professional training, particularly in medicine and engineering. Parents also stress the retention of the culture from home rather than the adoption of American culture. This places the children in a difficult position, since they are inevitably products of their American cultural context and are comfortable in that context in ways that their parents are not. When I asked a grandmother in Hyderabad, India, if her grandchildren in Texas were in any way Hyderabadi, she replied despairingly, “Hyderabadi? They’re not even Indian,” and then cried as she told how her granddaughter asked her to wear some other clothing, not a sari, when accompanying her to school.
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Neha Vora, Anthropologist Neha Vora, whose parents migrated to the United States from India in 1970, was born and raised in suburban New Jersey, where she enjoyed a vibrant Indian cultural life among the Gujarati community of the tristate area but also faced prejudice from schoolmates and teachers in her mostly Caucasian hometown. Always interested in bridging her personal experiences as a South Asian American with her academic pursuits, she researched her South Asian peers in college at Wesleyan University and went on to earn a MA in women’s studies from San Francisco State University, where she studied the dynamics of gender and ethnicity among Bay Area South Asian communities. As a PhD student in anthropology at UC Irvine, she conducted fieldwork among the large Indian migrant community in Dubai. Her work at every stage has centered on the dynamics of belonging and exclusion among South Asian migrant communities. She is currently an assistant professor of anthropology and women’s studies at Texas A&M University and continues to work on South Asian diasporas in the Middle East. In 2003, Neha married a Korean American software developer in a mixed Indian and Korean ceremony in her New Jersey hometown. She is currently working on her book manuscript and enjoying living among the large Indian community of the greater Houston area.
Ethnic Identity The experience of growing up in America has not been a uniform one because so much depends upon the local demographic mix and the specific context. Some youngsters of Indian descent go through a cycle of early identification with American culture and then, later, identification with Indian culture, and even after they become more interested in their heritage, these young people do not necessarily see themselves as part of a larger community of Indian Americans. Others remain closely tied to their parents’ ethnic or religious communities and aspire to maintain close relationships with those communities as adults. But, Gauri Bhat asserted (1992), what young Indo-Americans had in common was their parents: “parents who are overinvolved, overworried, overprotective. Parents who have an opinion on every minor life decision, who make demands, impose guilt, withhold approval. . . . As children of immigrants, the promise we fulfill is our parents’ own promise, long-deferred and transmuted now into the stuff of American dreams (and nightmares). So we must become respectable, make money, buy a house, bear children. . . . My parents’ love supports me and enfolds me, but sometimes also weighs me down” (1–6).
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Educational Attainment Statistical data is lacking but the impression that young Indian Americans are doing very well is overwhelming. They are a force in Asian American organizations and activities, overtaking representatives of groups that arrived earlier from more diverse class backgrounds. While parental pressure pushes youth toward careers as doctors, engineers, or professors, young Indian Americans are choosing to enter a wide range of careers. A South Asian Bar Association has many chapters nationwide, and young Indian Americans are moving conspicuously into the creative and performing arts.
Cultural Identification The second generation’s difference, its participation in American culture in all its contemporary diversity and intensity, is borne out in many ways. In campus youth conferences, discussion topics always include interracial marriage, South Asian coalition-building, hip-hop culture, homosexuality, premarital sex, and violence against women, as well as identity formation, discrimination in corporate America, and racism. Young Indian Americans, be they working class, middle class, or upper class, are forging confident new identities in communities across America. Members of the first generation of post-1965 immigrants, however, may perceive a “youth problem.” This concern often stems from religious leaders and organizations, both Hindu and Muslim, and it is ostensibly about the continuity of family, caste, and community religious traditions. Just as clearly, it is about sexuality and marriage, in particular about parental arrangement of marriages and parental control of family life. Indian American parents often oppose dating on the grounds that it inevitably leads to having sex or to date rape; this view prevailed in a survey of post-1965 Indian immigrants carried out in 1990. It is the young women of Indian background, not the young men, who are of most concern because it is their behavior that can damage a family’s or community’s reputation through pregnancy or an undesirable marriage. The strategy of nondisclosure, not telling one’s parents about the significant choices one is making in life, is common. Priya Agarwal’s 1991 book about the second generation, Passage from India: Post 1965 Indian Immigrants and Their Children, highlighted poor communication between parents and children, and more than half the young people in her survey preferred to date without telling their parents. Gender and generational differences become magnified when it comes to that very important life event, marriage. Because of parental opposition to dating and “love-marriages,” the children of the immigrants are usually put into an either/or situation. They must trust their parents to arrange their marriages or they must trust themselves. The stakes are high, for one knows of many marriages made by Indian
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parents for their children that have not worked out. Divorce is now a distinct possibility, and the frequently transglobal marriage and family networks add international legal complications to the emotional costs of divorce for Indian Americans. Most members of the second generation in the United States seem to be entering arranged or semi-arranged marriages. Although they increasingly have a say about the choice of spouse and even about the actual wedding arrangements, marriages continue to be at least partially arranged by family elders. Arrangements made by parents can bridge national boundaries to continue family, caste, or religious preferences. Adherents of all religions place matrimonial advertisements in ethnic newspapers, usually specifying or indirectly indicating preferences for caste, sect, and regional origin. Sometimes endogamy (marriage within) is redefined, by occupation (there are many couples where both man and wife are doctors) or “ethnicity” (this may simply mean nationality, as in Indian or Pakistani, or language, as in Punjabi- or Gujarati-speakers). Preferences for particular professions or for possession of a green card or U.S. citizenship are frequently included. Characteristically, parents or older siblings place these ads, although men and especially divorced or widowed men place their own ads, and an exchange of information and photographs follows. Matrimonial services are springing up within the United States, and on the Internet. These arranged or semi-arranged marriages still tend to emphasize the parents’ interests. In the worst cases, arranged marriages are strategies to assist individuals who want to migrate to the United States, but few families risk their children’s happiness to that extent. Perceptions of social distance and national difference concern those who manage the transnational marriage networks. People are quite conscious of the different contexts in which second-generation Indians abroad are being raised; they recognize that young people raised in America and young people raised in India will have different expectations, ones that pose risks to the marriage. Marriages between cousins (practiced primarily by Muslims), marriages essentially within family cultures, can overcome these differences, some say. Others stress that girls raised in India can adjust themselves, so the preference is to bring brides from India. But girls there worry about marrying boys raised in the United States, who may already have girlfriends, and young women in India know of friends who have married, migrated, and found themselves in second place. And Indians say that it is easier to make marriages between India and Great Britain than between India and the United States. Because the standard of life in England is lower and Indians are more segregated there, it is more like India, whereas in the United States the higher standard of life and greater integration with Americans means a wider gulf between the two ways of life. Also, the second generation in the United States is said to be Americanizing more rapidly than the second generation in Britain is becoming British, so marriages between India and Britain seemingly have a better chance of success.
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The public and highly celebratory nature of Indian weddings helps reconcile young people to some degree of marriage arrangement. The ideal marriage is a large, lavish, and very public display of the two families and their resources, representing major parental investments. Often now young people get to meet the proposed spouse or spouses and exercise a veto power. If one does not go along with the choice of spouse made by one’s parents, or if one marries against one’s parents’ wishes, there will be no wonderful wedding, no beautiful photo album, no four- or six-hour video—basically, no parental approval of or investment in the marriage, and that is something no one likes to forfeit. But, alternatively, the young people are quite aware of the problems that can arise after the arranged marriage has been carried out, after the money has been spent on dowry and wedding and honeymoon and house. They know that all marriages do not work out and they know that divorce is an option for them. If the child has trusted the parents and gone through with a recommended marriage, in exchange parents may now support the child, their love for a child triumphing over the lifelong commitment to a marriage however badly made, which was more traditional in South India. Indian weddings illustrate the changing gender and generational balances of power in Indian American families and communities. Decisions are many and the financial costs are usually high. Hindu and Muslim weddings require several days and involve rituals and dinners at homes, public wedding halls, gardens, or hotels. Many types of traditional clothing, foods, decorations, flowers, and other paraphernalia are involved. The dowry can include not only clothing and jewelry but a house, a car, major home furnishings, and even a boy’s continuing educational expenses. The guests may number from 300 to 1,300, some of them flown from India or other diasporic sites and put up in local hotels. Until quite recently, the preferred locations for marriages were back in Indian cities, partly because they were major sources of brides for the transnational marriage networks and partly because many, perhaps most, of one’s relatives and friends still resided there. Weddings were also held in India because of the availability of the necessary supplies and the cheaper costs there, but the balance is now tipping towards holding weddings in the United States. Weddings held in the United States do present some problems, particularly to communities that practice forms of gender segregation. The spatial arrangements in American hotels, community halls, or other hired meeting places where weddings are often held are not gendered. In the “function halls” of India or the outdoor tented pavilions of Pakistan, built-in purdah (seclusion of women) arrangements are typical. In the United States, purdah has to be enforced by those attending, and Indian immigrant men sometimes try to manage the space. Women had their own spaces and their own ceremonies in the set-ups in India, but they are making space for themselves at weddings in the West. At an Indian Muslim wedding in a Los Angeles hotel, men designated a rear section of the large room, a raised area
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with a railing around it, as the women’s place to sit. However, the women were not satisfied to be so far from the platform where the nikah (the marriage ceremony, the signing of the contract) was to take place, and they immediately filtered down into the general seating area, taking over the very front rows. Later, as the wedding guests entered the banquet room on another floor, Mexican American waiters tried to seat all the women on one side of the room and all the men on the other, as they had been ordered to do. But one of the first parties to enter was led by a young wife brought up in the United States. She insisted upon sitting at a central table “as a family, family style,” and this example was followed by many of the other guests. Thus, a member of the second generation successfully posed “family values” against gender segregation, suggesting a fruitful avenue for negotiation of traditions. Many issues centered on the making and unmaking of marriages for and by members of the second generation of Indians in the United States remain to be worked out. The trend, however, is for Indian parents to listen and find a middle way, helping their children to meet others of similar backgrounds and encouraging them to talk to potential spouses at length about family issues before deciding to marry. Most parents are not ready to trust love marriages, seeing the high rate of divorce in the United States and attributing it to the way of making marriages, but they are ready to take the best elements from both systems, balancing attraction, sensibilities, and family guidance, to strengthen their families in the West. Indian American young people are slowly but surely forging new identities for themselves and envisioning new kinds of marriages and families. Just one small but visible change began in the 1990s, signaled by a 1994 photograph in India-West: one looked directly into the eyes of a happy young bride seated next to her groom with a dazzling smile on her face. Before this, and back in India still, almost all brides, whether in person, on video, or in photo albums, look down modestly and often are covered with a veil of one sort or another. And the contrast found explicit and amusing confirmation in an account given by an Indian American of her trip to India for her Indian cousin’s wedding. I had a blast like everyone else, except maybe the bride. . . . [who] wore a very distressed look throughout. . . . During the obligatory picture-taking sessions with the 700-plus guests, she did not look up or smile once. I had to bribe her with a 5-Star chocolate to smile when taking a picture with us. Afterwards, she whispered that I would get her in trouble. . . . Even though she was happy about the beginning of her new life, [she] had to act, at the least, modest. But wouldn’t it be really neat if Indian women weren’t made to feel they had to act in such a way and actually enjoy the most important day of their lives with some overt tranquility and merriment. . . . just like the bridegroom? (Singh 1995, 59)
Issues in Relations between the United States and India | 1013
Issues in Relations between the United States and India Forecasts for the 21st Century U.S.–Indian relations can be discussed at the national level, looking at foreignrelations issues, or at the level of Indian immigrants and their relations with their homeland. A significant development was the signing on August 1, 2008, of the Indo–U.S. civilian nuclear agreement, or the Indo–U.S. nuclear deal. Developed from a joint statement of President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005, this bilateral accord on civil nuclear cooperation marks a high point in U.S.–Indian relations. India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place its civil facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, while the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India. The deal required amendments to American law and agreements within India between civil and military authorities, and it had to pass the U.S. Congress and India’s Parliament. President Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have met and emphasized their shared values: democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law. In addition to implementation of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, the two countries are implementing a 10-year defense agreement calling for expanding bilateral security cooperation, and they have engaged in combined military exercises. Major U.S. arms sales to India are underway. The U.S. Congress has an India caucus that is the largest country-specific one, recognizing the importance of the Indian American community as constituents. The United States favors India-Pakistan peace talks and recognizes the continuing problem of Kashmir and cross-border terrorists. India and the United States are interested in economic partnerships; the United States views India as a lucrative market and site for foreign investment and thus favors increasing liberalization of India’s economy. Interests in stopping the global warming process and the spread of HIV/AIDS also link the two countries. Even America’s premier mainstream conservation organization, the Sierra Club, has begun forging working relationships with “Green Groups” in India, awarding amounts of about $41,000 each to Ecosphere Spiti in Himachal Pradesh and Barefoot College in Rajasthan in 2009. Looking at Indian immigrants, it is clear that they are increasingly transnational in very real ways, ones that connect American interests to those of India at an individual level and in ways that produce incremental changes. For example, Indian doctors settled overseas are seeking permission to practice medicine in India. Licensing issues have prevented Indian doctors settled abroad (including those from the United Kingdom, where Indians constitute more than a third of all physicians) from working in India. Doctors from India have started or are trying to start health care projects in various Indian states, but despite memorandums of agreement,
1014 | Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants
bureaucratic obstacles often have slowed or prevented the initiation of projects. The Overseas Indian Affairs Ministry is considering granting permission to overseas doctors to come back to India for short- or long-term practice. In a related development, chief executives and clinical leaders of nearly 75 percent of America’s drug companies see the interests of U.S. and Indian biotech and pharmaceutical industries converging, as U.S. companies seek partnerships with Indian academics and industry leaders. Charitable projects link Indian Americans to their homeland. The American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin established clinics in the 1990s in the Punjab, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Gujarat, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. The Association of Indian Muslims of America (AIM) set up a polytechnic for Muslim women in Delhi in 1996, one of many such efforts linking Indian Muslim immigrants to their homeland; another major funder of Muslim projects is the Indian Muslim Relief Committee, a committee of the Islamic Society of North America. Other efforts are more narrowly based on “old boys” associations, like the MediCity project in Hyderabad initiated by the Osmania Medical Graduates Association. In the early 21st century, the post-1965 immigrants from India are beginning to honor the experiences of the Punjabi pioneers and their Punjabi-Mexican families, experiences that emphasized the flexibility of ethnic identity and of culture. They and their families are participating in the construction of new and changing identities in the American and global arenas. Time and place are very important components here, as changes in the historical context have powerful consequences for individual, family, and community identity. The turnabouts in U.S. citizenship and immigration policies in the 1940s and 1960s had dramatic consequences for Punjabi Mexican family life in California. For the “old” immigrants, the possibilities opened up by the 1940s access to U.S. citizenship and the sponsorship of relatives from India endangered the inheritance rights of some spouses and children in the United States, while also changing the pool of potential spouses for both first- and second-generation “Hindus.” Similarly, access to overseas citizenship rights and the rapidly changing global economy and society in the early 21st century are having dramatic consequences for the much larger and more diverse population of Indian American immigrants today.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 143 Indian Immigrants to the United States by year of admission 1946–1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
6,319 582 2,458 4,642 4,682 5,963 10,114 14,317 16,929 13,128 12,795 15,785 17,500 23,208 20,772 19.717 22,607 21,522 21,738 25,451 24,964 26,026 26,277 27,803 26,268 31,175 30,667 45,064 36,755 40,121 34,921 34,748 44,859 38,071 36,482 30,237 42,046 70,290 71,105 50,372
Sources: Adapted from Minocha (1987), and Statistical Yearbooks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1988 and 1994: Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989 and 1995, and The 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, published by Homeland Security, September 2004. After that, the categories have changed and total immigration figures are no longer available in this Yearbook.
Table 144 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009
1016
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
India
41,903
70,032
70,823
50,228
70,151
84,680
61,369
65,353
63,352
57,304
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics
Table 145 Asian Indians living in the United States, according to U.S. census data 1910
2,544
1920
2,544
1930
3,130
1940
2,405
1950
2,398
1960
8,746
1970
13,149
1980
387,223
1990
815,477
2000
1,678,765
Note: In 1980, “Asian Indian” became the official census designation. Before that, this population was termed or counted as “Hindu” (1920, 1930), included under “other Asian” (1940), or could be determined by subtracting whites born in India from the total born in India (1910).
Table 146 Asian Indians by major states of residence, 2000 State
Total
California
360,392
New York
296,056
New Jersey
180,957
Texas
142,689
Illinois
133,978
Florida
84,527
Pennsylvania
62,616
Michigan
60,236
Maryland
55,245
Virginia
54,781
Source: Lai and Arguelles (2003, 52).
1017
Table 147 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 region/ country: India
Total
Total
Male
Female
57,304
28,185
29,119
Leading states of residence 553
255
298
California
Arizona
12,826
6,313
6,513
Colorado
322
154
168
Connecticut
866
420
446
Florida
1,675
837
838
Georgia
1,856
909
947
Illinois
3,946
1,922
2,024
Maryland
1,518
750
768
Massachusetts
1,666
828
838
Michigan
1,294
620
674
596
303
293
New Jersey
Minnesota
7,080
3,423
3,657
New York
4,410
2,184
2,226
North Carolina
1,026
506
520
Ohio
1,101
546
555
Pennsylvania
2,142
1,056
1,086
Texas
4,716
2,306
2,410
Virginia
1,944
920
1,024
Washington
1,670
841
829
Other
6,097
3,092
3,005
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Table 148 Asian Indian American occupations, 2000, percentages Category Management, professional, related Service
Asian Indian
Asian
All workers
59.5
44.6
33.6
7.
14.1
14.9
21.4
24.0
26.7
Farming, fishing, forestry
0.6
0.3
0.4
Construction, extraction, maintenance
2.1
3.6
9.4
Production, transportation, material moving
9.4
13.4
14.6
Sales/office
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2004, 14).
Appendix III: Notable Indian Americans | 1019 Table 149 Asian Indian American educational attainment, 2000, percentages Category
Asian Indian
Asian
All workers
Less than high school
13.3
19.6
19.6
High school graduate
13.3
15.8
28.6
Some college, associate’s degree
12.5
20.5
27.4
Bachelor’s degree or more
63.9
44.1
24.4
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2004, 12).
Appendix III: Notable Indian Americans Ashok Amritraj was born in Madras. Amritraj became a tennis star and moved to the United States in the 1970s; he is now a Hollywood producer of over 809 films and chairman and CEO of Hyde Park Entertainment. Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar (October 19, 1910–August 21, 1995) was an astrophysicist and educator who moved from Cambridge in the United Kingdom to the University of Chicago in the mid-1930s; he won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1983 for his study of white dwarfs that laid the groundwork for the discovery of black holes. Dr. Deepak Chopra (ca. 1947–) was born in Delhi. A graduate of the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences, Chopra came to the United States in 1970; he was chief of staff of a Boston-area hospital but resigned in 1985 to write books and promote Ayurveda, an Indian system of holistic healing. Dr. Sanjay Gupta (October 23, 1968–) was born in the United States. He is a neurosurgeon and media personality, best known as CNN’s chief medical correspondent and host of the weekend health program House Call with Dr. Sanjay Gupta. Zakir Hussain (March 9, 1951–) was born in Mumbai; his father is the tabla player Ustad Alla Rakha. A child music prodigy, he began touring at the age of 12 and has a base in San Francisco. He plays the tabla and teaches students, composes music, acts in films, and collaborates with a variety of musicians on fusion musical projects. Bobby Jindal (June 10, 1971–) was born in the United States. His political career began with his election in 2004 and reelection in 2006 to the House of Representatives from Louisiana. He won the governorship of Louisiana in the fall of 2007, becoming at 36 the youngest current governor in the United States. Ali Akbar Khan (April 14, 1922–June 18, 2009) was born in Bengal. The son of the classical Hindustani musician Allauddin Khan, Ali Akbar plays the sarod. Following careers in India and Canada, he moved to the United States
1020 | Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants
and founded the Ali Akbar College of Music in Marin County, California, in 1967, training students in Indian music and dance. Har Gobind Khorana (January 9, 1922–) was born in India. He began teaching molecular chemistry at the University of Wisconsin in 1960 and in 1971, at MIT; he shared the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1968 and was awarded the U.S. National Medal of Science in 1987. Ved Prakash Mehta (March 21, 1934–), was born in Lahore, India (now Pakistan). Mehta studied at the Arkansas School for the Blind in Little Rock, Arkansas, eventually becoming an American citizen (in 1975), a staff writer for the New Yorker, an author of many books, and a filmmaker. Indra Nooyi (October 28, 1955–) was born in Chennai (Madras). She began her career in India but earned an MA at Yale in 1978 and has worked in the United States since then; in 2006, she became CEO and in 2007 chair of PepsiCo, one of the world’s leading food and beverage companies. Dalip Singh Saund (1899–1973) was born in India’s Punjab province. Saund attended the University of California, Berkeley, and earned a PhD in mathematics in 1924; he farmed in Southern California and was elected to the House of Representatives in 1956 and reelected twice (a stroke in 1962 forced his retirement). Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak (February 24, 1942–), Calcutta-born, earned an MA and a PhD in comparative literature at Cornell University in the 1960s. She teaches at Columbia University; her writings on French poststructuralism, modernism, and feminist issues have made her an influential educator in the interdisclipinary field of cultural studies. Fareed Zakaria (January 20, 1964–) was born in Mumbai, India. Zakaria attended Yale for his BA and Harvard for his PhD in political science; he became managing editor of Foreign Affairs, then in 2000, editor of Newsweek International, and, after numerous publications and news analyst TV appearances, in 2008, he began hosting a weekly TV show on CNN, Fareed Zakaria Global Public Square.
Glossary Arangetram: Debut performance of a Bharatnatyam dancer. Bhangra: Punjabi folk dance. Bharatnatyam: South Indian classical dance. Bollywood: The Indian film industry based in Bombay (now Mumbai).
References | 1021
Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence. Garba raas: Gujarati folk dance. Granthi: Sikh priest. Gurdwara: Sikh temple. Masala: Mixture of spices. Moulvi: Muslim cleric. Mughlai: Relating to the Mughal empire, to Indo-Muslim culture. Mushaira: Evening of Urdu poetry. Nikah: Muslim wedding ceremony. Prasad: Blessed food or offering distributed after Hindu worship. Puja: Hindu worship. Purdah: Seclusion of women. References Abraham, Margaret. 2000. Speaking the Unspeakable: Marital Violence among South Asian Immigrants in the United States. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Abramovitch, Ilana. 1988. “Flushing Bharata-Natyam: Indian Dancers in Queens, N.Y.” Paper presented at the Conference on South Asia, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, Nov. 4–6. Agarwal, Priya. 1991. Passage from India: Post 1965 Indian Immigrants and Their Children. Palos Verdes, CA: Yuvati Publications. Aiyar, V. Shankar. 1999. “The Dream That Died.” India Today International, February 8, 36. Ali, Faiz-u-Nisa A. 1991. The Path of Islam Book 3, 3rd ed. Tustin, CA: International Islamic Educational Institute. Anand, Shefali. 2009. “Ineligible Bachelors: Indian Men Living in U.S. Strike Out,” April 6. [Online article retrieved 04/09.] http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123896998996190775. html. Anand, Tania. 1993. “Gift-Wrapping Hindutva.” India Today, August 31, 48c–d. Arora, C. K. 2001. “United State.” India Today International, April 23. “Asian Indian Seniors Assoc. Hosts Temple Tour.” 1997. India-West, January 24. Balagopal, Sudha Sethu. 1994. “Sound of Music.” India Today, December 31, 64k. Barrier, N. Gerald. 2001. “Gurdwaras in the U.S.: Governance, Authority, and Legal Issues.” Understanding Sikhism 4 (1): 31–41. Basu, Kaushik. 2000. “Immigration Check.” India Today International, May 29, 38. Bhat, Gauri. 1992. “Tending the Flame: Thoughts on Being Indian-American.” COSAW [Committee on South Asian Women] Bulletin 7 (3–4): 1–6.
1022 | Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants Bhaumik, Saba Naqvi. 1999. “Privileges at a Price.” India Today International, April 12, 24c. Boxall, Bettina. 2001. “Asian Indian Remake Silicon Valley.” LA Times, July 6. Clothey, Fred. 1983. Rhythm and Intent. Madras: Blackie and Sons. “Despite Economy, Upswing in U.S.-India Drug Partnerships.” India-West, July 3, A31. Dusenbery, Verne A. 1999. “ ‘Nation’ or ‘World Religion’? Master Narratives of Sikh Identity.” In Sikh Identity: Continuity and Change, edited by Pashaura Singh and N. Gerald Barrier, 127–44. New Delhi: Manohar. Eck, Diana, ed. 1997. On Common Ground: World Religions in America (CD-ROM). New York: Columbia University Press. Fenton, John Y. 1988. Transplanting Religious Traditions: Asian Indians in America. New York: Praeger. Fenton, John Y. 1995. South Asian Religions in the Americas: An Annotated Bibliography of Immigrant Religious Traditions. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. George, Sheba Mariam. 2005. When Women Come First: Gender and Class in Transnational Migration. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ghei, Kiren. 1988. “Hindi Popular Cinema and the Indian American Teenage Dance Experience.” Paper presented at the Conference on South Asia, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, Nov. 4–6. Hansen, Kathryn. 1999. “Singing for the Sadguru: Tyagaraja Festivals in North America.” In The Expanding Landscape: South Asians and the Diaspora, edited by Carla Petievich, 103–21. Chicago: American Institute of Indian Studies. “India, U.S. Form Joint Working Group For Cooperation in Education.” 2009. India Journal, June 19, A23. “India Top Receiver of $27 Billion Remittances.” 2008. India Journal, March 28, B1. “Indians Corner 38 Per Cent of H1-B Visas in 2008: U.S.” 2009. India Journal, April 17, A8. Jain, Neela, and Benjamin Forest. 2007. “From Religion to Ethnicity: The Identity of Immigrant and Second Generation Indian Jains in the United States.” In Sociology of Diaspora: A Reader, vol 2, edited by Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Brij Maharaj, 816–44. New Delhi: Rawat Publications. Jain, Usha R. 1989[1964]. The Gujaratis of San Francisco. New York: AMS Press. Kang, K. Connie, and Robin Fields. 2001. “Asian Population in U.S. Surges, but Unevenly.” Los Angeles Times, May 15, A16. Karthik, Prabha. 1998. “Gita Patel Re-Opens Domestic Service Company.” India Journal, November 27, B3. La Brack, Bruce. 1988. The Sikhs of Northern California 1904–1975: A Socio-Historical Study. New York: AMS Press. Lai, Eric, and Dennis Arguelles. 2003. The New Face of Asian Pacific America: Numbers, Diversity and Change in the 21st Century. San Francisco: Asian Week. Leonard, Karen Isaksen. 1992. Making Ethnic Choices: California’s Punjabi Mexican Americans. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
References | 1023 Leonard, Karen Isaksen. 1997. The South Asian Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Leonard, Karen Isaksen. 1999. “Second Generation Sikhs in America.” In Sikh Identity: Continuity and Change, edited by Pashaura Singh and N. Gerald Barrier, 275–97. New Delhi: Manohar. Leonard, Karen Isaksen. 2002. “South Asian Leadership of American Muslims.” In Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, edited by Yvonne Haddad, 233–49. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leonard, Karen Isaksen. 2003. Muslims in the United States: The State of Research. New York: Russell Sage. Leonard, Karen, and Chandra Sekhar Tibrewal. 1993. “Asian Indians in Southern California: Occupations and Ethnicity.” In Comparative Immigration and Entrepreneurship: Culture, Capital and Ethnic Networks, edited by Parminder Bhachu and Ivan Light, 141–62. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Lessinger, Johanna. 1995. From the Ganges to the Hudson: Indian Immigrants in New York City. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Mazumdar, Shampa. 1995. “Sacred Spaces: Socio-Spatial Adaptations of Hindu Migrants.” Ph.D. diss., Northeastern University, Boston. Melwani, Lavina. 1994. “Migratory Montage.” India Today, December 15, 60d–f. Melwani, Lavina. 1997a. “Following Their Hearts.” India Today, May 15, 52c–d. Melwani, Lavina. 1997b. “East Storms West.” India Today, January, 56f–g. Melwani, Lavina. 2001. “Diaspora Spreads.” India Today International, July 2, 36c. Minocha, Urmilla. 1987. “South Asian Immigrants: Trends and Impacts on the Sending and Receiving Societies.” In Pacific Bridges: The New Immigration from Asia and the Pacific Islands, edited by James T. Fawcett and Benjamin V. Carino, 347–74. New York: Center for Migration Studies. Murarka, Ramesh P. 1998. “India’s T.V. Channels Begin Invasion of U.S. Market.” IndiaWest, June 26, B1, 10–12. Potts, Michel W. 2007. “SAN Joins Satrang in Support of South Asian Gays.” India-West, October 26, A16. Potts, Michel W. 2009. “NRI Doctors May Get Permission to Practice in India.” IndiaWest, January 16, A29. Rajagopal, Arvind. 1994. “Disarticulating Exilic Nationalism: Indian Immigrants in the U.S.” Paper presented at the American Anthropological Association Conference, November 30–December 4. Ramesh, Jairam. 2000. “India Ahead of Germany.” India Today International, May 29, 35. “Remade in America.” 2009. New York Times (National), March 15, 16 [Online article retrieved 06/09.] www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/04/07us/20090407-immigrationoccupation.html. Saxenain, Anna-Lee. 1999. “Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs.” Public Policy Institute of California study.
1024 | Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants Shankar, Shalini. 2008. Desi Land: Teen Culture, Class, and Success in Silicon Valley. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Shanker, Meenakshi. 1994. “The Annual Pilgrimage.” India Today, April 30, 44i. Shekhara, G. C. 1997. “Migratory Musicians.” India Today, January 31, 48d. Singh, Mona. 1995. “Oh Darling, Yeh Hai India.” India-West, February 3, 59. Sohrabji, Sunita. 2009. “Immigrant Exodus Means Huge Loss for U.S.” India-West, March 6, B1–2. Springer, Richard. 1998. “India Airs Soap Opera—With an NRI Twist.” India-West, June 19, C1–2. Springer, Richard. 1999. “Indians Prospering in Silicon Valley: Study.” India-West, July 9, A1, 32. Springer, Richard. 2001. “Calif. Has Most U.S. Indians.” India-West, May 25, A1. Springer, Richard. 2007a. “Indian Population In U.S. Nearly 2.5-M.” India-West, October 5, A1, 4, 16. Springer, Richard. 2007b. “India Again Sends Most Foreign Students to U.S.” India-West, November 23, A14. Springer, Richard. 2009a. “Fewer Indian Students Applying to U.S. Graduate Schools.” India-West, April 17, A4. Springer, Richard. 2009b. “Foreign Students Leaving U.S.” India-West, March 27, A44. Springer, Richard. 2009c. “India-Born Lead U.S. in Education, Median Income.” IndiaWest, February 27, A18. Springer, Richard. 2009d. “Less Indian Students Coming to U.S. for Graduate Studies.” India Journal, April 17, A18. Springer, Richard. 2009e. “Bill Would Give Foreign Ph.D.s Permanent Status.” India-West, April 17, A4. Springer, Richard. 2009f. “Sierra Club Awards Rs. 50 Lakh to Green Groups in India.” India-West, July 3, A12. Sundaram. Viji. 1994. “Nurturing Their Passion of Bharatnatyam in the West.” India-West, July 15, C49, 68. Swapan, Ashfaque. 2009. “Darwin’s 200th Anniversary.” India-West, March 13, A10. Thakar, Suvarna. 1982. “The Quality of Life of Asian Indian Women in the Motel Industry.” South Asia Bulletin 2: 68–73. Thakkar, Rahesh. 1992. “Transfer of Culture through Arts: The South Asian Experience in North America.” In Ethnicity, Identity, and Migration, edited by Milton Israel and N. K. Wagle, 217–37. Toronto: Center for South Asian Studies, University of Toronto. Trivedi, Niraj. 1997. “NRIs Want Indian Ministry Set Up For Overseas Indians.” IndiaWest, August 15. Tsering, Lisa. 2009. “Hollywood’s Motion Picture Association Opens First India Office.” India-West, March 5, C1, C6.
Further Reading | 1025 U.S. Census Bureau. 2004. We the People: Asians in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce. Varadarajan, Tunku. 1998. “Pat for Patels.” India Today International, November 23, 24i. Venkatachari, K.K.A. 1992. “Transmission and Transformation of Rituals.” In A Sacred Thread: Modern Transmission of Hindu Traditions in India and Abroad, edited by Raymond Brady Williams, 177–90. Chambersburg, PA: Anima. Williams, Raymond. 1988. Religions of Immigrants from India and Pakistan: New Threads in the American Tapestry. New York: Cambridge University Press. Williams, Raymond, ed. 1992. A Sacred Thread: Modern Transmission of Hindu Traditions in India and Abroad. Chambersburg, PA: Anima.
Further Reading Bhardwaj, Surinder M., and N. Madhusudana Rao. 1990. “Asian Indians in the United States: A Geographic Appraisal,” In South Asians Overseas: Migration and Ethnicity, edited by Colin Clarke, Ceri Peach, and Steven Vertovec, 197–218. New York: Cambridge University Press. This is good on settlement patterns. Dasgupta, Shamita Das. 1998. A Patchwork Shawl: Chronicles of South Asian Women in America New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. This gives personal voices. Eck, Diana. 2001. A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country”Has Now Become the World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation. San Francisco: Harper Collins. Read for a broad overview of religions from India in America. Gopinath, Gayatri. 2005. Impossible Desires: Queer Diasporas and South Asian Public Cultures Durham, NC: Duke University Press. This is a pioneering work on emergent population and issues. Gupta, Sangeeta R. 1999. Emerging Voices: South Asian American Women Redefine Self, Family, and Community. New Delhi: Sage Publications. This gives personal voices. Kerns, Roshni Rustomji. 1995. Living in America: Poetry and Fiction by South Asian American Writers. San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995) This is a representative selection of new writers on the American scene. Koshy, Susan. 1998. “Category Crisis: South Asian Americans and Questions of Race and Ethnicity.” Diaspora 7: 285–320. This discusses racial placement of Asian Indians. Lessinger, Johanna. 2003. “Indian Immigrants in the United States: The Emergence of a Transnational Population.” In Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora, edited by Bhikhu Parekh, Gurharpal Singh, and Steven Vertovec, 165–82. New York: Routledge.
1026 | Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants An excellent survey of the relationship between India’s prestigious state-funded technical universities (Indian Institutes of Technology or IITs) and their NRI (non-resident Indian) graduates in the United States; the NRI alumni are pressing to restructure the institutions in India more along the lines of mixed science and entrepreneurship prevalent in the United States. The Indian side is outraged by the idea of restructuring their state-funded universities. Maira, Sunaina Marr. 2002. Desis in the House: Indian American Youth Culture in New York City Philadelphia: Temple University Press. This is a pioneering work on second-generation Indian Americans. Mukherji, Dhan Gopal. 1923. Caste and Outcast. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Republished in 2002. The early immigrant experience is evoked here. Prashad, Vijay. 2000. The Karma of Brown Folk. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. This is an oft-cited work on racial placement of Asian Indians. Sahay, Anjali. 2007. “Indian Diaspora in the United States and Brain Gain: Remittances, Return and Network Approaches.” In Sociology of Diaspora: A Reader, edited by Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Brij Maharaj, vol 2, 940–74. New Delhi: Rawat Publications. There is lots of good economic information in this piece. The Women of South Asian Descent Collective. 1993. Our Feet Walk the Sky: Women of the South Asian Diaspora. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books. This is a pioneering work on women’s personal experiences.
Indonesian Immigrants by Jennifer Cho
Introduction Indonesia is one of the most diverse countries in the world. The national motto of Indonesia is Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which is generally translated as “Unity in Diversity.” The source of the motto was the 14th-century Javanese poem, Kakawin Sutasoma, written by Mpu Tantular in the 14th century (The Jakarta Post 2000). The poem and its message of religious tolerance continue to inspire Indonesians who stage contemporary performances of the text, most recently in Bali. The motto readily applies to a country with 17,508 islands, over 300 ethnic groups, and religious traditions in Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, animism, and local customs. With an estimated 240.3 million people, Indonesia is ranked fourth in total population behind China, India, and the United States (Vaughan 2009). Over 86 percent of Indonesia’s population is Muslim, which is higher than any other country. Yet Indonesian Americans are only the 14th-largest Asian American ethnic group in the United States (U.S. Census 2000).
Chronology 600s
The Buddhist kingdom of Srivijaya rises to prominence across the Malay peninsula.
1200s
The Muslim communities of Perlak and Pasai are established in Indonesia.
1293
The Hindu kingdom of Majapahit is founded by Raden Wijaya.
1602
The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) is formed as a consolidation of separate Dutch companies trading in Indonesia. Dutch colonial rule lasts from the 17th century to 1945.
1799
The VOC shuts down due to bankruptcy.
1800
The Dutch East Indies is established as a state colony of the Netherlands. 1027
Chronology | 1029
1801
The United States establishes consular relations in Batavia (now Jakarta).
1908
The founding of Budi Utono indicates the rise of the nationalist movement.
1928
The Youth Pledge is read at the Second All Indonesia Youth Conference on October 28. The pledge declares one country (Indonesia) and one language (Indonesian).
1942
Japan invades the Dutch East Indies and defeats the Dutch.
1945
Japan surrenders. The Republic of Indonesia declares independence from the Netherlands with Sukarno as its first president.
1947
The Dutch launch the first of two military actions to reclaim Indonesia as a colony.
1949
The Dutch government officially recognizes Indonesian independence after pressure from the United Nations and transfers sovereignty on December 27. The United States formalizes diplomatic relations with Indonesia on December 28.
1953
The U.S. Refugee Relief Act admits 7,831 Indo-Europeans to the United States. Small numbers of Indonesian students attend high schools and colleges in the United States.
1965
The Immigration and Nationality Act (also called the HartCellar Act) is passed in the United States, which raises immigrant quotas from Asian countries. The murder of six generals during the September 30 Movement unleashes a wave of violence to purge Indonesia of communists. An estimated 500,000 are killed, including scores of ethnic Chinese.
1968
Suharto replaces Sukarno as president. Sukarno is placed under house arrest until his death in 1970.
1997
The Asian economic crisis devalues the Indonesian rupiah.
1998
Amid protests, Suharto’s presidency ends and B. J. Habibie becomes president. The May 9 riots result in the mass murders and rapes of Chinese Indonesians, who apply for asylum in the United States.
2004
Bambang Yudhoyono is elected president in the first direct presidential voter elections. A tsunami kills an estimated 170,000; Indonesian Americans send aid to victims.
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2005
The Netherlands recognizes de facto independence of Indonesia as August 17, 1945.
2009
Inauguration of Barack Obama as the 44th president of the United States. His stepfather is Indonesian-born Lolo Soetoro. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits Indonesia in February. Yudhoyono is re-elected to a second term as president.
2010
U.S. President Barack Obama is scheduled to visit Indonesia.
Background Geography of Indonesia Indonesia is an archipelagic country that consists of approximately 17,508 islands (6,000 inhabited). With a total land mass of 1,125,657 square miles, Indonesia borders Malaysia, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, and East Timor, in close proximity to Australia (The World Factbook 2009). Indonesia’s largest islands are Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Java; the islands of New Guinea and Borneo are partitioned into territories claimed by other countries. New Guinea is the world’s second-largest island and is divided into Papua New Guinea to the east and the Indonesian provinces of West Papua and Papua to the west. West Papua was formerly known as West Irian Jaya until the name was changed in 2007 (Radio New Zealand International 2007). Borneo is the world’s third-largest island and is separated into regions claimed by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei (Cunningham 1997). In English, Kalimantan refers to the Indonesian part of Borneo; in Indonesian, the term specifies the whole island (Encyclopedia Britannica 2008). The capital city of Jakarta is located on Java, the country’s most populous island. Indonesia’s wet and dry seasons are characteristic of its tropical climate. The equator runs directly through the country, notably along the islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. Heavy rainfall during the monsoon seasons often results in flooding. There are four monsoons from each compass direction— summer monsoons from the east and south, and winter monsoons from the west and north. Temperatures are hot and humid at sea level, with some cooling in the mountains. Indonesia is prone to earthquakes and volcanic activity because it lies at the intersection of several tectonic plates. The majority of the country’s estimated 130 active volcanoes are situated between the islands of Java and Sumatra. The most famous volcanic explosion occurred in Krakatoa on August 26 and 27, 1883. From 2004 to 2009, several natural disasters occurred in Indonesia that resulted in scores of deaths and widespread homelessness. On December 26,
Background | 1031
2004, a tsunami triggered by a 9.1 magnitude earthquake killed over 122,000 people (Vaughan 2009). The official language of Indonesia is Bahasa Indonesia (“the language of Indonesia”), which is a standardized form of Malay. In English, the official language is known simply as Indonesian. Over 250 living languages and dialects are spoken in Indonesia (Suharno 2007). The largest ethnic group in Indonesia is the Javanese, who comprise 41.6 percent of a population that includes more than 300 ethnic groups (Suharno 2007). Other ethnic groups include the Sundanese (15.41%), Malay (3.45%), Madurese (3.37%), Balinese (1.51%), Batak (3.02%), Minangkabau (2.72%), and Betawi (2.51%) (Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta 2003). Chinese Indonesians comprise less than 4 percent of the total population.
History of Indonesia Indonesia encompasses a rich diversity of cultural, religious, and ethnolinguistic traditions that present ongoing challenges in governing the country. Waves of migrations from Southeast Asia, Taiwan, China, India, the Middle East, and Europe have made an indelible impact on Indonesia’s history and population. The human skull cap of “Java Man” (Homo erectus), discovered by Eugène Dubois in Trinil, Java, in 1891, offers evidence that Indonesia was inhabited over 500,000 years ago. Most Indonesians are believed to be descended from Austronesians who migrated to the archipelago by 2000 B.C.E. as well as Austromelanesians who arrived even earlier (Brown 2003; Drakeley 2005). The Austronesians are credited with introducing agricultural methods such as dry-rice farming and shifting cultivation, which supported larger settlements of people (Drakeley 2005). During the fourth century, certain regions of the archipelago were undergoing an “Indianization” from exposure to Hinduism and Buddhism (Cribb and Kahin 2004). In the seventh century, the Buddhist maritime kingdom of Srivijaya rose to prominence on the island of Sumatra and dominated the Sunda and Malacca straits until its decline. Construction on the Buddhist monument Borobudur began around the ninth century near present-day Magelang, Java. The ruler Airlangga (991–1046 C.E.) divided Mataram between his two sons. In Central Java, the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Mataram was founded in the 8th century and co-existed with Srivijaya until the two empires went to war in the 11th century. A second incarnation of Mataram emerged in the 1570s as a Muslim state. Ethnic Chinese settlements in Indonesia date back to the 10th century (Cribb and Kahin 2004). By the 16th century, the Indonesian archipelago had evolved into a major force in international trade. The region’s vast network of sea lanes and river routes facilitated migration and the exchange of goods and ideas, especially religions. The rise of Islam loosely coincided with the time period of the great HinduJavanese kingdom of Majapahit (1293–1527 C.E.). Although the exact dates for
1032 | Indonesian Immigrants
Islam’s first conversion in the archipelago are unknown, Marco Polo wrote that the state of Perlak in Sumatra was a Muslim community in 1292 (Brown 2003). As Islam spread across the coastal areas, Muslim traders also appeared in Majapahit. The reign of Hayum Wuruk (also called Rajasanagara, r. 1350–1389 C.E.) and his chief minister, Gajah Mada, was deemed the “golden age” of Majapahit because of the political, commercial, and cultural achievements made during this period (Cribb and Kahin 2004). Through conquest of its neighboring territories, Majapahit set a precedent for conceptualizing the scope of Indonesia’s present-day boundaries (Ricklefs 2008). Trade influenced Islam’s expansion across the archipelago (Brown 2003). Muslim traders from India, the Middle East, and China arrived in coastal areas to meet the exploding demand for Indonesian spices. Conversion to Islam was a spiritual decision as well as a strategic means of maintaining trade contacts. Aceh, Banten, and Pasisir in Java became Muslim in the 16th century; Minangkabau and Central Java followed in the 17th century (Cribb and Kahin 2004). Hinduism was largely on the decline except in Bali, which remains Hindu to this day. By the time the Europeans arrived in the 16th century, Islam had replaced Hinduism as the main religion in Java and Sumatra. The first Europeans to arrive at the archipelago were the Portuguese. Although an earlier Catholic presence had existed in Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan, the Portuguese were primarily responsible for spreading Catholicism throughout the islands after capturing Malacca in 1511. The objective of the Portuguese was to dominate trade in the region, so they built ports, trading posts, and missions to that end. East Timor became a Portuguese colony from 1702 until 1975, when it was invaded by Indonesia. Other European powers who followed Portugal to the archipelago included England, Spain, and the Netherlands. The Netherlands ultimately prevailed in Indonesia, mostly because the Dutch expended the most resources toward establishing a monopoly over the region while the rest of Europe shifted its attention to other pursuits. In 1596, the first Dutch fleet reached Java with four ships and 249 men (Brown 2003). A few years later, various Dutch trading companies consolidated into the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC). The English names for the VOC include the United East Indies Company, the Dutch East Indies Company, the Dutch East India Company, and the United East India Company (Cribb and Kahin 2004). The VOC was a joint-stock company that ran from 1602 to 1799, when it went bankrupt. Governor General Jan Pieterszoon Coen founded the VOC’s main headquarters in Jayakarta, which was renamed Batavia by the Dutch (Cribb and Kahin 2004). After the VOC collapsed, the Dutch government took control of VOC lands, assets, and debt. The territory became a Dutch state colony called the Netherlands Indies. Batavia remained the capital of the Netherlands Indies until World War II; the city’s name was changed to Jakarta after the declaration of Indonesian independence in 1945.
Background | 1033
Under VOC rule, the Chinese evolved into a limited economic class as farmers, tax collection agents, sellers of opium, and more (Cribb and Kahin 2004). Peranakan (“native born”) Chinese had already been assimilating to Malay customs since the 10th century. Both Chinese and Dutch men intermarried with pribumi indigenous women; these unions resulted in new generations of Chinese Indonesian or Eurasian descendants. The Chinese were excluded from politics by the Dutch, who became suspicious of a possible Chinese rebellion in the 18th century. Tensions exploded during the Chinese War of 1740–1741, in which an estimated 10,000 Chinese were massacred by the Dutch in Batavia (Brown 2003). The 19th century brought a new wave of Chinese immigrants who migrated to Kalimantan, Bangka, and East Sumatra (Cribb and Kahin 2004). Newly arrived Chinese who maintain cultural links to China were referred to as totoks (Cribb and Kahin 2004). The Agrarian Law of 1870, passed during the Liberal Period (1870–1900), prevented Chinese and Europeans from owning land. But the law granted long-term land leases to foreigners, especially corporations that commercialized agriculture to an industrial scale. Resistance to the Dutch dates back to Mataram’s attacks on Batavia in the 1620s, but the Netherlands continued to dominate the archipelago for over three centuries. The Java War of 1825–1830 was the last rebellion against the Dutch government until World War II. Led by Javanese prince Pangeran Diponegro, the Java War resulted in an estimated 250,000 indigenous deaths (Cribb and Kahin 2004). Within an international context of change, the early 20th century gave rise to a nationalist movement for an independent Indonesia. Revolutions in China and Russia instituted new governments while India and the Philippines struggled against their colonizers. The Dutch government instituted the Ethical Policy to civilize the “brown Dutchmen” by providing a Western education to inlanders, as Indonesians were called (Drakeley 2005). The Dutch caste system imposed a racial hierarchy in which inlanders were the lowest class (Drakeley 2005). Young nationalist leaders believed in education as a means of liberation from colonial rule. The shared experiences of Dutch colonialism brought people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds together in a collective struggle for independence. A precursor to the nationalist movement occurred in 1908 with the establishment of Budi Utono, an organization that advocated on behalf of Javanese identity and culture. Early nationalist parties included the Indische Partij (Indies Party), founded around 1911–1912, which advocated for equality on behalf of individuals born in the Indies. Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) emerged in 1920 and became the first Communist party in Southeast Asia (Cribb and Kahin 2004). In 1928, Sukarno founded the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) with members from the Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Union). (Cribb and Kahin 2004). Students were instrumental as leaders in the nationalist movement, which coalesced with the reading of the Youth Pledge at the Second All Indonesia Youth Congress
1034 | Indonesian Immigrants
on October 28, 1928. The Youth Pledge called for one nation (Indonesia) and one language (Indonesian) (Drakeley 2005). Malay was chosen as the official national language of the new Indonesia because of its common usage in trade and its nongeographical affiliation. The three most prominent nationalist leaders were Sukarno (1901–1970), Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980), and Sutan Sjahrir (1909–1966). They were all arrested and exiled by the Dutch but were released after the invasion of Indonesia by Japan. In 1942, Japanese forces landed in Borneo, Sumatra, and Java and swiftly defeated the Dutch. Japan occupied Indonesia for the remainder of World War II until its surrender in 1945. Indonesia declared its independence from the Netherlands on August 17, 1945. However, the Dutch government tried to reclaim its colony by force until it bowed to international pressure and officially transferred sovereignty on December 27, 1949 (Drakeley 2005). Sukarno became the first president of Indonesia, with Mohammad Hatta as vice president and Sjahrir as prime minister.
Supporters of Indonesian president Sukarno hold a banner bearing his portrait at a rally in Macassar, Indonesia, 1962. A leader of Indonesia’s independence movement, Sukarno’s secular model of government was opposed by traditional ethnic and religious groups and helped create political societal rifts in the young nation during the 1950s and 1960s. (Library of Congress)
Background | 1035
The democracy of Indonesia is based on five principles known as Pancasila. The Garuda Pancasila is the national coat of arms and represents each principle on a shield borne by the golden Garuda, a birdlike creature in Hindu mythology. The shield defends Indonesia and bears five emblems: (1) a golden star, which denotes belief in one God; (2) the golden chain of humanity that links together successive generations (circular links for women, squares for men); (3) the banyan tree of Indonesian unity; (4) the banteng (wild buffalo), which calls for Indonesian democracy by discussion and consensus; and (5) rice and cotton sprigs, which symbolize social justice for all (Mirpuri and Cooper 2002). In its talons, the Garuda carries a scroll with the national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. The five principles were read by Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, during a speech on June 1, 1945, that elucidated the future of Indonesia as an independent country. The United States established diplomatic relations with Indonesia in 1949. In 1950, Indonesia joined the United Nations as its 60th member. In 1963, Sukarno declared himself president-for-life (Cribb and Kahin 2004). His presidency was marked by corruption and growing tensions between the army and the PKI, whose membership surged in the 1960s. Sukarno’s downfall was triggered in 1965 by an attempted coup during the September 30 Movement, in which six generals were killed by army soldiers with the help of PKI youth (Brown 2003). General Suharto (1921–2008) and his forces crushed the coup and blamed the PKI. Over the next six months, hundreds of thousands of PKI members, suspected Communists, Chinese, and other civilians were murdered during the Massacre of 1965– 1966. Suharto became acting president of Indonesia in 1967 and then president in 1968. Sukarno was placed under house arrest and died in 1970. Dubbed the “New Order,” the Suharto years (1966–1998) resulted in significant economic growth for Indonesia, followed by financial catastrophe, rioting, and Suharto’s resignation. In 1997, the Asian economic crisis resulted in the rapid devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah and paved the political climate that led to Suharto’s downfall. Confidence in Suharto’s presidency deteriorated as he and his family were widely criticized for corruption. Widespread student protests called for reformasi (“reform”) and Suharto’s resignation. In May 1998, shooting deaths of four students by army troops launched massive rioting across the country. Resentment against the Chinese, a historically persecuted group in Indonesia, culminated during this time. The economic success of Chinese Indonesians made them an easy scapegoat during periods of unrest. During the May 9 tragedy, the Chinese became targets of outraged mobs who committed murders, rapes, looting, and arson against Chinese Indonesians. The attacks on Chinese Indonesians resulted in international condemnations of Indonesia and politicized Chinese Indonesians abroad to become involved in politics. Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998, and his vice president, B. J. Habibie, became Indonesia’s third president.
1036 | Indonesian Immigrants
Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as the fourth president with Megawati Sukarnoputri as vice president. When Wahid was ousted in 2001, Sukarnoputri became the fifth president. In the country’s first direct presidential election, Sukarnoputri lost to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was re-elected to a second term in 2009.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration Recent efforts to understand the history of early Indonesian immigration have been spearheaded by the Embassy of Indonesia in Washington, D.C., which began conducting oral histories of Indonesians who arrived in the United States before World War II. Retired embassy employee Abdullah Balbed (2006) wrote the article, “Indonesians in America,” which states that a small number of Indonesian immigrants likely arrived with Dutch settlers as domestic servants or farm laborers. Other Indonesians worked as seamen for Dutch ships and arrived in the United States in port cities such as New York or Baltimore (Balbed 2006). Prior to the Indonesian declaration of independence on August 17, 1945, immigrants from the region declared the Dutch East Indies as their birthplace or last residence and traveled with Dutch passports. Foreign exchange between the United States and the Dutch East Indies primarily occurred in the fields of diplomacy, business, trade, missionary work, and education. Cultural exchanges between the United States and Indonesia also occurred before World War II. For example, Balinese dancer Devi Dja brought a dance troupe and gamelan orchestra to the United States in 1939. Dja was unable to return to Indonesia due to World War II, so she settled in the United States and became a citizen in 1954. During the years between Indonesia’s proclamation of independence in 1945 to the official transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch on December 27, 1949, Indonesian passports were not recognized by other governments (Abdullah Balbed, interview with the author, December 8, 2009). Indonesians traveling outside the country were issued laisser passer travel documents by the United Nations, which was established on October 24, 1945. Indonesian seamen continued to arrive in the United States after World War II. On January 2, 1946, the Jan Steen ship arrived at the port of New York City with over 50 Indonesians listed as crew members. These Indonesians had joined the Jan Steen at the cities of Liverpool, Manchester, Cardiff, and Amsterdam before disembarking in New York City less than a month later. By the 1950s, a growing number of Indonesians arrived in the United States to study and explore the country. Medical faculty from the University of Indonesia received scholarships from the International Cooperation Administration (ICA, later USAID) to attend the University of California at Berkeley (Yang 1995). The ICA also facilitated an exchange program for faculty from the Bandung Institute of
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1037
Technology to attend the University of Kentucky and vice versa (Yang 1995). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Hart-Cellar Act) ended the exclusion of Asian immigrants that had been set forth by the Immigration Act of 1924.
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation After Indonesian independence, the United States granted entry to refugees from Indonesia and the Netherlands. The terms Indo and Indische have been used to describe individuals with mixed European and Indonesian ancestry. The status of Indos has been mostly at the periphery of Dutch colonial society in Indonesia because they were not completely accepted by full-blooded Dutch citizens or native Indonesians. After the declaration of Indonesian independence in 1945, thousands of Indos fled for the Netherlands, where they encountered resentment and suspicion from the host society (Kwik 1989). Dutch Indonesian author Greta Kwik (1989) published a comprehensive ethnography of the Indo community in Southern California in the 1970s. Her research reveals the process of assimilation undergone by Indos in both the Netherlands and the United States. Kwik describes how the immigration of Indos to the United States was greatly facilitated by American churches such as the Catholic Relief Service and the Church World Service, who matched sponsors with an Indo family or individual. Citing reasons such as cold weather, discrimination by the Dutch, and lack of socioeconomic opportunities, these Indo refugees began migrating to the United States under laws passed by Congress after World War II (see following table). Sponsors played an important role in easing the assimilation process for the new arrivals to American culture. Indo immigrants often settled near their sponsors, who introduced them to their social circles, churches, and local service organizations; and even found jobs for the adults (Kwik 1989). Discrimination against Chinese Indonesians resulted in migration from Indonesia to Europe or the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. Chinese Indonesians did not fare well under Suharto’s New Order policies, which banned the Guomingdang,
Indo immigration to the United States Act/year Refugee Relief Act of 1953 Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957 Act of September 2, 1958
Number of immigrants 7,831 582 12,544 (estimated)
World Refugee Year Law of 1960
12,544 (estimated)
1962–1973
30,000
Source: Kwik (1989, 69–70).
1038 | Indonesian Immigrants
Chinese organizations, the use of Chinese characters, and the celebration of Chinese holidays (Cribb and Kahin 2004). Chinese Indonesian Kong Oei left Indonesia with his family in 1955 to avoid persecution by the Indonesian government. Through a business connection, Oei’s father was able to gain Dutch citizenship, which allowed him to move his family to the Netherlands. The Oei family immigrated to the United States in 1961.
Later Waves of Immigration Out of a total of 25,002 foreign-born Indonesians counted by the 1990 Census, only 9,344 arrived in the United States before 1980 and 15,653 arrived between 1980 and 1990. These figures are considerably smaller than the number of Indo immigrants who arrived before 1980, most likely because the 1990 Census did not allow respondents to mark more than one ethnic group. An estimated 20,000 Chinese Indonesians applied for asylum in the United States as a result of the May 1998 riots in Indonesia with 7,359 cases approved and 5,848 denied (Sukmana 2009). By 2000, the Indonesian population in the United States had doubled to 63,073 Indonesians alone or in combination with another ethnic group. By 2005, this number grew by over 30 percent to an estimated 81,587 Indonesians alone or in any combination (U.S. Census 2005). Despite the growth in the Indonesian American community, a major Indonesian ethnic enclave has yet to take root in the United States. Southern California has the largest demographic of Indonesians and Chinese Indonesians in the United States, but residents are scattered throughout various cities. The Indo community in the 1970s did not evolve into a recognizable “Indotown,” because sponsors of Indo refugees did not live in one centralized location. Yet Indonesian community leaders remain hopeful that an enclave will emerge. In 1994, the Los Angeles Times reported that a promising cluster of Indonesian businesses opened in Hollywood, but those have now closed down (Brown 1994). Two Indonesian businesses in the Palms neighborhood of Los Angeles, Simpang Asia and Indonesian Café, are popular social magnets for Indonesians, Indonesian Americans, and Chinese Indonesians in Southern California.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community Although Indonesia is the fourth most populated country in the world, Indonesians are only the 14th-largest Asian ethnic group in the United States (U.S. Census 2000). The 2000 Census counted 63,073 Indonesians, which includes individuals who identified as Indonesian alone (39,757) or as Indonesian in combination with one or more ethnic groups. The 1990 Census counted 30,085 Indonesians but did
Demographic Profile | 1039
not differentiate between Indonesians alone or Indonesians in combination with another ethnic group (U.S. Census 1990). The 2000 Census questionnaire provided boxes to write-up two race categories but did not specify the non-Indonesian categories. The Indonesian alone population was 39,757 in 2000; 52,267 in 2004; 63,609 in 2005; 66,431 in 2006; and an estimated 61,384 in 2008 (U.S. Census 2005, 2006, 2007). California has the largest population of Indonesians alone and Indonesians in any combination with other races (14,785 in 1990 and 29,710 in 2000). In 1990, there were 6,490 Indonesians in Los Angeles County and 13,065 in Southern California overall. According to the 1990 Census, counties with Indonesian populations in California were San Bernardino County (1,609), Orange County (1,395), Santa Clara County (742), San Diego County (643), San Mateo County (587), San Francisco County (562), Ventura County (250), Alameda County (189), Monterey County (97), and Kern County (96). By 2000, there were 10,899 Indonesians in Los Angeles County—of which 6,648 were identified as Indonesian alone and the rest were listed as Indonesian in combination with one or more ethnic groups. Overall, the states of California, New York, and Texas have the largest Indonesian communities. The 2000 Census also reported 72,550 individuals who were born in Indonesia and reside in the United States. This number includes individuals who were born in Indonesia but are not of Indonesian descent—including 9,930 people categorized as “white alone” and 365 who are “Hispanic or Latino (of any race).”
Age and Family Structure The following data on the age and family structure of Indonesians is drawn from the 2006 American Community Survey (ACS), published by the U.S. Census, which counted 66,431 Indonesians alone (not in combination with other ethnic groups). According to ACS, there are a higher percentage of Indonesian females (53%) than males (47%) in the United States. The median age of Indonesians is 33.1 years, which is lower than the national median age of 36.4 years. Most Indonesians fall between the ages of 35 to 64 years (25,633), which is only slightly larger than the second-largest age group of 18- to 34-year-olds (24,108). Out of 13,063 Indonesian children in the United States, 7.8 percent are under five years old. Since Indonesian immigration is primarily a post–World War II phenomenon, the number of Indonesians who are ages 65 and older (3,627) is much smaller than other Asian ethnic groups. Approximately 43.6 percent of Indonesian grandparents are also responsible for taking care of their grandchildren. The average Indonesian household size in the United States is 3.06, which is slightly larger than the average Indonesian household size in Los Angeles County (3.0), but smaller than the average household size in Indonesia (4.5). In terms of
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marital status, 61.2 percent of Indonesians are married, 29.9 percent are single, 5.3 percent are divorced, 2.1 percent are widowed, and 1.6 percent are separated (margin of error: +/–0.1%). The majority of the 21,323 Indonesian households in the United States are families (74.7%). There are more male non-family households (15%) than female non-family households (10.3%), but there are more females living alone (8.2%) than males living alone (7.6%).
Educational Attainment The United States is a prime destination for Indonesian and Chinese Indonesian students at all levels of study. Among the 1990 Indonesian population ages 25 and over in the United States, approximately 41.6 percent (7,902 persons) had a bachelor’s degree or higher (U.S. Census 1990). In 2000, that number grew to 42.7 percent (15,699 persons) of Indonesians alone or in any combination (U.S. Census 2000). High school graduation rates are even higher; 92.4 percent of Indonesians ages 25 and over (17,548 persons) finished high school by1990, and 91.5 percent (33,641 Indonesians alone or in any combination) finished high school by 2000. In 2005, 31.6 percent of Indonesians in the United States spoke English only at home; 68.4 percent spoke a language other than English; and 31.1 percent spoke English less than very well (U.S. Census 2005). During the 1950s, the American Field Service (AFS) began to sponsor a foreign exchange program in which Indonesian and Dutch high school students lived with a host family in the United States for one school year. Biographical details of Indonesian high schoolers were recorded in yearbooks across the country. In 1961, Indonesian student Hendrati Insijah enrolled at Gettysburg High School in Pennsylvania for one term. In 1963, El Camino High School in California dedicated a yearbook page to Soetoro, an Indonesian exchange student who was excited to learn about American student government and sports such as baseball and football. Nineteen-year-old Muslim student Soemarja Toen Moerdijat was a senior at Fort Morgan High School in Colorado from 1962 to 1963. She was the third-youngest child in a family of five siblings and her father worked in the Surahaja municipal office as chief of accounting. While visiting Jakarta in 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced plans to expand educational opportunities for Indonesians and Americans by increasing the number of Indonesian students in the United States, opening a Peace Corps branch in Indonesia, and providing Fulbright fellowships for Americans to Indonesia. American scholars have conducted research in Southeast Asia as early as the 1870s. In 1947, Yale opened the first Southeast Asian studies program in the United States. The University of California at Berkeley (UCB) began offering courses in Indonesian language in 1942 and later established its Center for Southeast Asian Studies in 1960. The UCLA Center for Southeast Asian Studies was founded in 1999 and formed a consortium with the UCB program in 2000. In 2008, UCLA
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established the Indonesian Studies Program through a grant from scholar and filmmaker Robert Lemelson and held the first UCLA Indonesian Studies Graduate Student Conference in 2009.
Economic Attainment U.S. Census Bureau data from the years 1990, 2000, and 2006 reveals a steady rate of growth in the economic attainment of Indonesians in the United States. According to the 1990 Census, there were 14,972 Indonesians ages 16 and over in the labor force, including 6,387 women. The median household income was $28,597 and the per capita income was $12,559. The majority of Indonesians worked in technical, sales, and administrative support occupations (4,667); managerial and professional specialty occupations (4,609); service occupations (2,012); and precision production, craft, and repair occupations (1,383). Popular industries included manufacturing (2,458); retail trade (2,231); health services (1,522); education (1,234); finance, insurance, and real estate (1,296); personal, entertainment, and recreation services (906); business and repair services (756); and transportation (603). The unemployment rate was 5.2 percent, or 778 persons. The 2000 U.S. Census provided statistics in two categories: Indonesians alone and Indonesians alone or in combination with other ethnic groups. Out of a population of 39,757 Indonesians alone, 19,561 individuals were employed in the work force and earned a per capita income of $18,932. The median household income was $38,175, which was lower than the median family income of $47,038. About 1,353 Indonesian families and 7,650 individuals lived below the poverty level. For Indonesians alone or in combination with other ethnic groups: 31,433 were in the labor force; the per capita income was $18,819; and the median household income was $39,839, which was also lower than the median family income of $48,083. A higher number lived below poverty level: 1,953 families and 11,254 individuals. From 1989 to 2006, the median household income for Indonesians doubled from $28,597 to $57,594. The 2006 data is based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey of the Indonesian alone community. The per capita income was $22,380, which was lower than national per capital income of $25,267, but over 78 percent higher than the 1989 per capita income for Indonesians. Approximately 34,458 Indonesians ages 16 and over were employed in the civilian labor force, with a higher number of working males (18,550) than females (15,908). This represents a 130 percent increase in the total number of Indonesians in the labor force from 1989 to 2006. The unemployment rate for Indonesians was 4.4 percent, which was lower than the 1990 rate of (5.2%) and the national unemployment rate of 4.6 percent in 2006. Most Indonesians worked in management or professional occupations (39.4%), including law, dentistry, and engineering. Service occupations were
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the second-highest category (25.4%); and sales and office jobs employ the thirdhighest number of Indonesians (23.7%). Indonesians also served in the military, but in lower numbers than other Asian ethnic groups. The 1990 Census counted 106 Indonesians in the armed forces (including six women); by 2006, this figure remained steady at 0.2 percent of the total Indonesian alone population (about 108 persons). ACS 2006 provided the following breakdown of industries that employed Indonesians in the United States.
Health Statistics and Issues In the 1970s and 1980s, health care activists and advocacy groups began organizing to improve health care services for Asian Pacific Americans. Language and cultural barriers were often obstacles that prevented first-generation Asian Americans from finding and receiving quality health care. Founded in 1986, the Asian Pacific Health Care Venture (APHCV) in Los Angeles offered a full range of health care services to patients in 12 Asian languages, including Indonesian. As the Indonesian population grew in Southern California from the 1990s to the present, APHCV distributed outreach and educational materials translated in Indonesian to raise awareness about preventive health care and its services. Based on data from its annual reports,
Employment of Indonesians in the United States Industry
Percentage
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, food services
22.5
Educational services, health care, social assistance
17.7
Manufacturing
13.4
Retail trade
9.9
Professional, scientific, management, administrative, waste management services
8.7
Transportation, warehousing, utilities
5.6
Public administration
5.2
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing
5.2
Wholesale trade
4.1
Information
2.7
Construction
1.8
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting, mining
0.7
Other services
5.2
Source: U.S. Census 2006 American Community Survey. Note: Data available for the 2006 population of 66,431 Indonesians in the “alone” category.
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APHCV provided health care to 44 Indonesians in 1999–2000; 146 in 2000–2001; 65 in 2001–2002; 121 in 2002–2003; 152 in 2003–2004; and 104 in 2005. The 2007 Indonesian Community Needs Assessment Summary Report (ICNASR) surveyed health care issues among Christian and Muslim Indonesians in Montgomery County, Maryland, who immigrated in the 1980s and early 1990s. Participants indicated that diet-related health issues such as diabetes, obesity, and high cholesterol affect the Indonesian community due to an intake of fattening American and Indonesian foods (Maryland Asian American Health Solutions 2007). The National Diabetes Education Program published “The 4 Steps to Control Your Diabetes for Life” in Indonesian to combat diabetes within the community. Other health concerns among Indonesians are heart disease, hypertension, arthritis, and stroke. After Chandra Sutanti, who is Chinese Indonesian, suffered from a stroke in 2000 and entered a nursing home to recover in Bellevue, Washington, she encountered a language and cultural barrier between herself and the staff (Ho 2002). The growing Asian senior population and increased demand for services resulted in the establishment of Legacy House by the Seattle Chinatown International District Preservation Development Authority in 1998. Legacy House is an assistedliving facility that caters to the pan-Asian, low-income population in the greater Seattle area. By 2002, Sutanti had moved into Legacy House and was enjoying Asian cuisine and nightly games of Bingo with her new multicultural friends. ICNASR also identified the need to raise awareness within the Indonesian community about preventive care and screenings. Many Indonesian immigrants cannot afford health insurance and only go to the doctor for emergency cases. To educate the community about health care issues, Indonesian-language periodicals such as Kabari News include articles on diet, health, and beauty. Through its Web site and print publication, Kabari News also informs its readers about free or reduced-cost public health clinics in California. In Southern California, Indonesian and Chinese Indonesian consumers rely on Sam’s Nutrition Center in Monterey Park to purchase traditional medicines imported from Indonesia.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Indonesian wedding traditions depend on a variety of factors, including the ethnicity, region of origin, and religion of the bride and groom. For example, a Hindu Balinese wedding will involve different customs than a Javanese Muslim or West Sumatran wedding. Toba Batak people maintain wedding rituals such as the traditional tortor dance and the gift of a bridal dowry (Cunningham 2009). If cost is not a factor, then an Indonesian couple may prefer to get married in Indonesia to receive their parents’ blessing. A few common practices among Indonesian weddings in
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the United States include performances of gamelan music, traditional Indonesian dances, and the serving of Indonesian foods. Indonesian Christian weddings in the United States usually take place in a church with the reception held at a local restaurant. If the couple’s first language is Indonesian, then the pastor will perform the service in Indonesian. If the couple is Chinese Indonesian, they may hold a wedding banquet at a Chinese restaurant. To celebrate the arrival of a child, family and friends often throw a baby shower for the mother. The practice of baptism depends on the church. At Temple City CBC in California, children are not baptized at birth because the church wants the individual, not the parents or pastor, to decide if he or she wants to be baptized. Indonesian Muslims in the United States perform life-cycle rituals with the help of Islamic community networks that are usually based around an urban center. In New York City, Indonesian Muslim weddings take place at a local mosque, such as Masjid Al-Hikmah in Queens. Masjid Al-Hikmah provides wedding services to Muslims from all over the world; a licensed imam conducts the wedding ceremony and adheres to Islamic teachings for the completion of the marriage contract. The wedding reception, called the walima, will also be held in a local mosque if space allows. To celebrate the birth of a child, Indonesian Muslims follow the aqiqah custom of slaughtering an animal and donating the meat to the needy. One animal is sacrificed for a girl and two animals are sacrificed for a boy; the practice is done at a halal butcher. In Indonesia, Muslim boys are circumcised a few years after birth; in the United States, this practice is done during infancy to alleviate the cost of surgery and the physical pain associated with the procedure. Funerary traditions vary according to the religion, ethnicity, and country of origin of the deceased. Many Indonesian immigrants prefer to be buried in Indonesia. If the family of the deceased wishes to send the corpse back to Indonesia, they may seek the assistance of the Embassy of Indonesia. The embassy has a staff member who will accompany the corpse on the plane. Indonesian Christians generally hold a memorial service at their community church and arrange for burial at a local cemetery. Balinese Hindus cremate their dead, whereas cremation is strictly forbidden for Muslims. If an Indonesian Muslim dies in the United States, the family or community will come together to purchase a plot for the deceased at either an Islamic cemetery or the Islamic section of a local cemetery. Indonesian Muslims follow the practice of washing the body, usually within 24 hours of death. Mosques such as Masjid Al-Hikmah will host a tahlilan, a prayer service for the deceased that includes readings from the Qur’an.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Indonesian culture and identity are preserved and expressed through a variety of activities throughout the United States. The Consulate General of the Republic of
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Indonesia in Los Angeles (KJRI-LA) sponsors several events to bring Southern California’s Indonesian community together and to raise awareness of Indonesian arts and culture to the public. The Indonesian Consulate Dance Troupe performs regularly at official, social, and cultural events in Los Angeles. KJRI-LA holds monthly screenings of Indonesian films and sponsored the first-ever Indonesian Film Festival in the United States in 2009. KJRI-LA also allows Indonesian citizens living in America to vote in the national election. Voting for Pemilu 2009 occurred on July 8, 2009, with Indonesians throughout Southern California commuting to the consulate to cast their votes.
Social Organizations The growing population of Indonesian Americans corresponds to an increasing number of social organizations throughout the United States. The IndonesianAmerican Association (Ikatan Keluarga Indonesia, also known as “IKI” and the Indonesian Community Association) was founded on March 2, 1952, by a group of Indonesians in Washington, D.C. (www.indonesianamerican.org). The history of IKI was written by Abdullah Balbed (2006), who states that the goal of the association was to promote community and networking among a growing group of Indonesians, most of whom were either students or employees of organizations such as the Embassy of Indonesia, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or Voice of America. IKI provided valuable services to newly arriving Indonesians, such as instructions job placement and housing assistance, instructions on social security card and driver’s license procedures, and referrals to schools for English classes. Today, IKI plays an important role in uniting the evolving Indonesian community through events such as the annual Indonesian Independence Day celebration, voting for elections (pemilu) in Indonesia, and the Miss Indonesia pageant held in Washington, D.C. IKI also publishes a bilingual monthly newsletter called Warta Iki that keeps readers informed of Indonesian news and cultural events in the Washington, D.C.; Maryland; and Virginia metropolitan area. Another national organization is the Society for Indonesian-Americans, which was established in 2001 with the mission of building community and promoting awareness of Indonesian American culture. A small number of clubs catered to Indos (short for Indo-Europeans). Avio was a Dutch club that organized dances, card games, sports contests, and other activities for its members, who numbered 18,000 in Southern California (Kwik 1989). The IMI (Ikatan Masjarakat Indonesia) was a community center with a membership of 250 Indos (Kwik 1989). De Soos was founded in 1963 as a club for Indos only and had a membership of around 200 (Kwik 1989; Cunningham 2009). Indos in California were often members of more than one club. Indonesian youth in the United States are highly prolific in creating social networks through schools and the Internet. Established on December 24, 1961,
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PERMIAS stands for Persatuan Mahasiswa Indonesia di Amerika Serikat, which means Organization of Indonesian Students in the United States (Abdullah Balbed, interview with the author, December 8, 2009). PERMIAS is also known as the Indonesian Student Association. There are branches in several cities and universities such as Oregon State, Virginia Tech, Louisiana State, and Texas A&M. PERMIAS LA includes Indonesian youth and students from Southern California colleges and universities such as the University of Southern California, UCLA, California State University at Northridge, Santa Monica College, among others. Other Indonesian American organizations can be found in almost every state. The Indonesian American Association organizes several events for the community in Arizona. The Indonesian American Society of Florida celebrates Indonesian Independence Day every year. The Indonesian American Association of the Carolinas was founded in 2005. The Minnesota Indonesia Society and the Indonesian Performing Arts Association of Minnesota promote awareness about the arts and culture of Indonesia. Dharma Wanita of Chicago brings together Indonesian wives of civil officials for cultural activities and socializing. Organizations based on regional or ethnic affiliations include: (a) MAESA, which brings together Minahasa people from North Sulawesi (Cunningham 2009); (b) the Batak Community of California Club (Ikatan Masyarakat Batak di California), which dates back to the 1980s; (c) Minahasa NY, a group of Manadonese around New York City; and (d) Krama Bali, a Los Angeles–based organization of Balinese established around 2008. Many social groups are based in churches that offer services and activities throughout the week for adults and youth.
Religion A significant number of Indonesians in the United States are Protestant or Catholic. In 2009, Spirit Indonesian Magazine listed 152 Indonesian churches and fellowships in 18 states and Washington, D.C., with 99 in California alone (“Daftar Gereja” 2009). The first two Indonesian churches in Southern California were the Indonesian-American Seventh-Day Adventist Church and the First Indonesian Baptist Church (Cunningham 2009). With roots dating back to 1971, the IndonesianDutch Seventh Day Adventist Church was formally established on February 10, 1973. In 1986, the church changed its name to the Indonesian-American Seventh Day Adventist Church after moving to its present location in Asuza, California. Pastor John Lim arrived in the United States to attend seminary in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1971. In 1976, he migrated to Los Angeles and started a Bible study for Indonesian Christians in spaces rented from churches. The First Indonesian Baptist Church was founded in October 1980 with a congregation of 66 members. In 1983, the church moved to its current location in Monrovia, California, and raised enough funds to purchase the building. Today, there are First Indonesian Baptist churches in Houston, New York, and California.
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Although Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesian Muslims are a small minority within the overall Muslim American community (Widjanarko 2006). With roots dating back to the early 1980s, the Indonesian Muslim Community, Inc. (IMCI) was founded on December 22, 1989, in New York City (Masjid Al-Hikmah n.d.). After years of fundraising, IMCI bought a warehouse in Queens, New York, on the symbolic date of August 17, 1945, which was the 50th anniversary of Indonesian independence. The mosque was named Masjid AlHikmah (“Wisdom Mosque”), inspired by a passage in the Qur’an. With an estimated 600,000–800,000 Muslims in New York City, both Indonesian and non-Indonesian Muslims worship at the mosque and participate in its activities (Widjanarko 2006). Masjid Al-Hikmah offers Saturday school classes, Islamic gatherings called pengajian, and social services for the community. According to the Web site of Masjid Al-Hikmah, the mosque also provides space for weddings, prayers for the deceased, interfaith dialogues, and community bazaars. The prayer room holds about 450 individuals; as many as 2,000 Indonesian Muslims mark the end of Ramadan, Idul Fitri. Indeed, the prayer is held two or three times during the day to accommodate the crowd that fills the prayer room and parking lot to capacity. The Indonesian Consulate General in Los Angeles (KJRI-LA) has worship rooms for Muslims on the third floor and for Christians on the second floor. The consulate also holds public prayer ceremonies in its parking lot to observe Idul Adha (Feast of Sacrifice) and Idul Fitri (end of Ramadan). Every autumn, Idul Fitri attracts hundreds of Muslims to KJRI-LA for morning prayers and a day of socializing.
Language Issues Indonesian is a form of Malay that was chosen by nationalists as the official language of Indonesia on October 28, 1928 (Cribb and Kahin 2004). Malay had been widely spoken throughout Indonesia’s history and was selected as Bahasa Indonesia (“the language of Indonesia”) because it has no regional association. Indonesian belongs to the Austronesian language family, which includes an estimated 1,000 languages such as Javanese, Tagalog, Samoan, Maori, and Malay (Bengtson 2007). Unlike Chinese or Thai, Indonesian is written in the Roman alphabet and is not a tonal language. Indonesian does not use verb conjugations, and its vocabulary contains words borrowed from Arabic, Dutch, English, Sanskrit, and regional languages such as Javanese or Balinese (Quinn 2001). Dutch was spoken among the colonial population and a minority of Indonesians. Mixed-race Indos spoke a hybrid dialect of Dutch and Malay called Petjoh (Kwik 1989). When Japan occupied Indonesia from 1942 to 1945, Indonesians were forced to learn Japanese. First-generation Indonesians in the United States tend to speak Indonesian and one or more regional dialects or languages such as Balinese or Javanese. Language retention among the children and grandchildren of first-generation Indonesian immigrants varies greatly due to a variety of factors (Wijaya 2006). In recent years, the
1048 | Indonesian Immigrants
Indonesian Muslims mark the end of Ramadan, Idul Fitr, at the Indonesian Consulate of Los Angeles, September 20, 2009. (Courtesy of Jennifer Cho)
study of Indonesian in the United States has benefited from the growing number of classes in schools and other institutions. Indonesian language classes are available at universities such as UCLA, Yale, Cornell, University of Hawaii-Honolulu, University of California at Berkeley, University of Wisconsin–Madison, University of Texas–Austin, Arizona State University, and University of Michigan–Ann Arbor. The Embassy of Indonesia in Washington, D.C., also offers Indonesian classes to the public.
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media American academic interest in Indonesia began in the 19th century. Accordingly, the first American publications about Indonesia focused on the country itself. In April 1966, Cornell University released Indonesia Journal, a semi-annual publication of academic articles about the history, politics, society, and culture of Indonesia. In 1969, the Indonesian Letter was published by the Asia Letter, Ltd. and included articles on politics, economics, and sociology in Indonesia (Yang 1995).
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During the 1980s, the Indonesian population in Southern California became large enough to sustain Indonesian-language publications. In 1988, Emile Mailangkay founded the Indonesian Journal, a monthly magazine based in Fontana, California. Indonesian Journal was preceded by Pelita, also published by Mailangkay (Cunningham 2009). In addition to being the chair of MAESA, Mailangkay also published the 1994–1995 Indonesian Business Directory U.S.A., which lists over 370 Indonesian business entities. In 1996, K. E. Sianipar established Actual Indonesian News, a biweekly newspaper based in Loma Linda, California (Cunningham 2009). Published in Glendora, California, Indonesia Media was established in 1998 by Chinese Indonesians in wake of the May 9, 1998, riots in Indonesia. Alex Yee is the president and Dr. Ibrahim Irawan is executive editor and manager of day-today operations. Irawan and his wife immigrated to the United States in 1985, where they pursued advanced degrees in dentistry. Irawan’s family had a long legacy of medical service and activism throughout Asia. His grandfather, Chen Lung Kit, had been a colleague of Sun Yat-Sen during the 1911 revolution in China. In addition to Indonesia Media, Irawan is the vice president of the Indonesian Chinese American Association (ICAA) and a board member of the Arcadia Chinese Association. Irawan believes that the tragedy of May 9, 1998, was a wake-up call for Chinese Indonesians to get involved with politics and journalism. With the support of the Chinese Indonesian and Indonesian community in Southern California, the circulation of Indonesia Media quickly grew to 530,000 and it expanded from a monthly publication to a biweekly release in 2004. With offices in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Jakarta, Kabari magazine published its first issue in 2008 with the English motto: “Bridging the World for Indonesians.” It has a circulation of 15,200 issues in the United States and 10,000 in Indonesia. The Web site for Kabari (www.kabarinews.com) features blogs and articles about Indonesian culture and immigration issues. Another free publication called Spirit Indonesian Magazine is based in Rowland Heights, California. Los Angeles–based Bhinneka Indonesia TV (BITV) premiered on Channel 18 KSCI-TV in 2007 but was unable to continue its television programming past 2008. It continues to produce content via its Web site (www.bhinnekatv.com) and posts updates on the Twitter for audiences to follow. The show hopes to earn enough revenue to resume broadcasting in the future. A small number of Indonesian radio stations exist online. Voice of America Indonesia broadcasts news in Indonesia at http://www.voanews.com/indonesian. Indosound (www.indosound.com) is an online radio station that plays Indonesian music 24/7 and is used by the Indonesian consulate in Los Angeles to disseminate information. Based in Jefferson City, Missouri, the Indonesian Muslim Society in America (IMSA) was founded in December 1998 and sponsors an online radio station called Radio IMSA.
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Celebration of National Holidays The Indonesian calendar encompasses several holidays that reflect the country’s history and diversity. The Independence Day of the Republic of Indonesia is celebrated on August 17, with events at Indonesian consulates general in Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Houston, and the Embassy of Indonesia in Washington, D.C. Indonesian Independence Day is marked by an official flagraising ceremony and reception. Indonesian students dressed in white march to the flagpole and raise the red and white flag, which is accompanied by the singing of the national anthem. The Indonesian calendar observes Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist religious holidays. Indonesian Muslims celebrate the birthday and ascension of Muhammad; Idul Fitri, marking the end of Ramadan; Idul Adha, the Festival of Sacrifice; and Islamic New Year. Christian holidays include Good Friday, Christmas, and Easter. Called Nyepi, the Hindu New Year occurs in March, and the birthday of the Buddha, Waisak 2553, occurs in May. In 2000, President Wahid allowed Chinese Indonesians to celebrate Chinese New Year, which became a national holiday in Indonesia in 2003.
Foodways Indonesian cuisine reflects an array of regional tastes and international influences. The “spice islands” of Maluku were a leading supplier of cloves, nutmeg, and mace (Drakeley 2005). Black pepper was initially imported from India but then was cultivated by Sumaterans as a top export (Brown 2003). Rice is the mainstay of the Indonesian diet. Cooked rice (nasi) accompanies a variety of dishes such as nasi goreng (fried rice) or nasi bungkus (rice wrapped in banana leaves). Noodles are tossed with other ingredients to make favorites such as bihun goreng (stir-fried rice noodles), mie tek tek (street-style egg noodles with vegetables and chicken), and more. Like their Southeast Asian neighbors, Indonesians use coconut milk and curries in creative ways. Sweet coconut curry is combined with jackfruit, chicken, tofu, and eggs to make gudeg. The Minangkabau are known for their beef rendang, a ceremonial dish in which chunks of beef are simmered in coconut milk and spices for over an hour. During the 1970s, a growing demand for Indonesian groceries led to the establishment of restaurants and stores throughout the United States. Today, shoppers have a variety of choices for finding Indonesian food and groceries in Southern California. Every Saturday, the Indonesian Food Fair (Pondok Kaki Lima in Indonesian) is held in the parking lot of the Duarte Inn, which is run by Chinese Indonesians. Indonesian groceries are sold at popular stores such as Simpang Asia in West Los Angeles, Sam’s Nutrition Center in Monterey Park, Tip Top Mart in San Gabriel, and Asian grocery stores such as 99 Ranch Market, Ai Hoa Market, A
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Grocery Warehouse, India Sweets & Spices, and Bangkok Market. Food festivals around the country include the Indonesian Food Bazaar, which occurs regularly in the parking lot of the al-Hikmah mosque in Astoria, Queens.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Indonesian music and dance classes are offered throughout the United States. Gamelan is the most recognized type of Indonesian traditional music and is popular among students and musicians who comprise approximately 110 school-based or independent orchestras in the United States (Benary et al. 2006). The term gamelan describes an orchestra or ensemble of instruments that usually consist of metallophones, drums, cymbals, xylophones, gongs, gong-chimes, and flutes. Gamelan music may be accompanied by singers, dancers, or puppet shows such as wayang. Styles of gamelan vary by region; Balinese gamelan is generally faster in tempo and brighter in sound than Javanese gamelan. Indonesian traditional dances are also performed throughout the United States. Balinese dancer Devi Dja was a pioneering force in educating the world about Indonesian dance and music. On November 6, 1939, a review of “Devi Dja and her BaliJava Dancers” appeared in Time magazine after their sold-out performance at the Guild Theater in Manhattan (“Music” 1939). New generations of dancers continue to perform and promote Indonesian dance to the public. In 1995, the dance company Harsanari was founded in San Francisco to provide lessons and stage performances of Indonesian dance. In Los Angeles, the Indonesian Consulate Traditional Dance Troupe holds weekly practices and performs throughout Southern California several times a year. In 2009, University of Minnesota students presented “Rite of Fall” by Indonesian choreographer Sardono Kusomo. In art history, Indonesian textile arts have been the subject of recent exhibitions in the United States. From September 2008 to 2009, the Los Angeles County Museum of Art presented “Five Centuries of Indonesian Textiles: Selections from the Mary Hunt Kahlenburg Collection.” This exhibition featured 90 selections from guest curator Kahlenburg’s collection. Ann Dunham, the mother of 44th U.S. President Barack Obama, was an avid collector of Indonesian batik clothing. An exhibition of Dunham’s batik collection traveled to Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, New York, and Washington, D.C., in 2009. The batik collection is administered by Maya Soetoro-Ng, Obama’s half-sister, who was born in Jakarta in 1970. Soetoro-Ng’s father and Obama’s stepfather, Lolo Soetoro, was born in Indonesia in 1936 and died in 1987. Indonesian martial arts are collectively known as pencak silat and have a growing following in the United States. Regional styles have their own names, such as Pencak Silat Harimau Minangkabau or Pencak Silat Mande Muda. In the United States, classes and groups such as the Texas Association of Pencak Silat have been organized to promote the learning of Indonesian martial arts.
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Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Out of 30,085 Indonesians reported by the 1990 Census, 6,044 were naturalized citizens of the United States and 18,958 were not citizens. About 20 percent or 5,083 persons identifying as Indonesian were born in the United States. According to the 2000 Census, less than half of the total population of Indonesians became U.S. citizens (26,695), with the majority having arrived before 1980 (16,860). The majority of non-citizens arrived in the United States between 1990 and 2000 (33,535). This suggests that the road to citizenship is a long process for Indonesians, who, like other immigrant groups, must wait for many years before becoming citizens. From 1997 to 2006, approximately 11,972 Indonesians became U.S. citizens. In 2005, the American Community Survey counted 81,587 Indonesians alone or in any combination living in the United States; 26,279 were native born; 18,396 were naturalized U.S. citizens; and 36,912 were not citizens. The percentage of Indonesian women obtaining citizenship in 2005 was higher than males (57.6% females and 42.4% males). In 2006, there were 15,371 naturalized citizens and 34,578 noncitizens who identified as Indonesian alone. Indonesian-speaking lawyers cater to the Indonesian community by offering assistance in immigration, citizenship, asylum, removal or deportation, work visas, and other issues. Media outlets such as Indonesia Media and Kabari News provide the latest information on immigration, deportation, and citizenship matters. In the years 2008–2009, Indonesians in Southern California have expressed that obtaining U.S. citizenship is not a priority because the economic recession has prevented many from achieving long-term financial stability. Indonesian law prohibits dual citizenship for adults, but children born after 2006 are eligible for dual citizenship. However, Indonesians living in the United States who do not renew their passports at an Indonesian consulate risk losing their Indonesian citizenship.
Intergroup Relations With over 300 ethnic groups comprising the total population and centuries of trade with other countries, Indonesia presents a fascinating case study in intergroup relations. Before independence, Indonesia consisted of separate kingdoms delineated along ethnic, religious, and regional lines. Intermarriage between pribumi (“native Indonesians”) and non-Indonesians parallels the history of Indonesia itself. Peranakan (“native born”) refers to the descendants of Chinese and Indonesian parents, namely 15th-century ethnic Chinese traders who had children with Indonesian wives or concubines. During the colonial period, mixed marriages between Europeans and Indonesians gave rise to generations of multiracial Indo-Europeans,
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1053
also called Indos or indische. In 1608, Dutch soldiers were allowed to marry native women (Kwik 1989). A stamboel is a type of play that reflects the problems that arise between an Indo married to a Dutch spouse. After Indonesian independence, a high-profile marriage occurred between Sukarno and his Japanese wife, Naoko Nemoto, who was 19 years old when she met the Indonesian leader. Nemoto, known informally as “Madame Dewi” (shorter version of her married name Ratna Sari Dewi Sukarno), gave birth to one daughter, Kartika Sukarno. Interracial marriage among first and later generations of Indonesians in the United States has become increasingly common. From 1946 to 1952, Balinese dancer Devi Dja was married to Creek-Pawnee artist Acee Blue Eagle (also known as Alexander C. McIntosh). By the 1970s, 72 percent of Indos married outside of their group (Kwik 1989). In 2000, approximately 37 percent of Indonesians in the United States reported two or more ethnic groups (U.S. Census 2000). Although gado gado is widely known as an Indonesian salad with an eclectic combination of ingredients, the term is also used colloquially to describe an interracial couple. Setiawan and Jill Onggo run a business called Gado Gado Home Gallery in Atlanta, Georgia. The name reflects the variety of Indonesian handcrafted furniture sold in their store as well as their diverse backgrounds (Setiawan is from Sumatra; Jill is from Buffalo, New York, and is of Polish descent). The Web site www.indousacouples.com was founded by an interracial couple in the United States to provide a forum for couples to talk and build community with other Indonesians married to non-Indonesians.
Forging a New American Political Identity Indonesia gained a higher worldwide profile during the presidential campaign of 44th U.S. president Barack Obama, who lived for a time in Indonesia with his mother, Ann Soetoro. Both Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have called for greater cooperation and understanding between the people and governments of the United States and Indonesia. Earthquakes and tsunamis led to fundraising efforts by Indonesian Americans in the United States to aid victims of the natural disasters. The May 1998 riots in Indonesia served as a wake-up call for Chinese Indonesians in the United States to become more politically active. In August 1998, Chinese Indonesians organized a protest in front of the Indonesian Consulate in Los Angeles that drew over 3,000 people and gained national media coverage. On August 17, 2009, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger commemorated Indonesian Independence Day with a speech that celebrated the contributions and diversity of Indonesian Americans. San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom joined the governor in praising the Indonesian community by declaring August 17 Indonesian Heritage Day.
1054 | Indonesian Immigrants
Return Immigration Many non-naturalized Indonesians who are currently studying or working in the United States have expressed a desire to return to Indonesia sometime in the future. Increasing economic opportunities in Indonesia have encouraged Indonesian students to pursue college degrees in the United States with the goal of putting them to use in their homeland. After the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, Indonesian nationals were required to register with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Those whose papers were not in order were deported. Approximately 487 Indonesians were deported in 2006 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006).
The Second and Later Generations Like other immigrant groups, second and later generations of Indonesian Americans are more assimilated to American culture than their parents. Language retention depends on whether the parents speak Indonesian and/or a local dialect with their children. In the social organization Krama Bali, parents speak Balinese to their children; as a result, the children understand Balinese better than Indonesian. Since many Indonesian American children communicate in a mixture of Indonesian and English, a child’s listening skills tend to be stronger than speaking or writing in Indonesian. Interest in Indonesian culture among second and later generations of Indonesian Americans tends to be stronger in areas where there is a sizeable Indonesian community. Schools and universities such as UCLA that promote Indonesian cultural days as an annual activity play an important role in facilitating and reinforcing Indonesian American identity. At the 2009 UCLA Indonesian Cultural Night, students produced a play that examined Indonesian American identity among first- and second-generation families. The Indonesian Bruin Students Association at UCLA features first and later generations of Indonesians who proudly displayed various aspects of Indonesian culture, including fashion, pinisi ships, art and woodwork, and a slideshow of facts about the country. The term “1.5 generation” describes individuals who migrated to a new country as children. The 1.5 generation of Indonesians have shown a stronger predilection for learning and retaining their native language by speaking with their parents or taking classes, when available. Churches, mosques, social networking, and media are vital in reinforcing Indonesian cultural heritage among first, 1.5, second, and future generations of Indonesian Americans and Chinese Indonesians. Depending on their congregation, Indonesian churches may offer services in Indonesian, English, and Chinese. For their 2009 Christmas performance, the Temple City Christian Bible Church in California presented The Kingdom, a play that featured a cast of Chinese Indonesians who spoke Indonesian. A multicultural audience listened to audio headsets that
Issues in Relations between the United States and Indonesia | 1055
translated the play into Mandarin and English. Another young leader in the community is Bryant Irawan, a second-generation Chinese Indonesian who has already authored over 30 articles for the magazine Indonesia Media. The son of Dr. Irawan, managing editor of Indonesia Media, 16-year-old Bryant founded CUTE (Cultural Unification Through Education), a volunteer organization of high school students that provides services throughout Southern California.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Indonesia The United States has a vested interest in building and maintaining positive foreign relations with Indonesia. Since the end of Suharto’s rule in 1998, Indonesia has undergone a rapid transformation from an autocratic nation to the world’s third-largest democracy. The reformasi (“reform”) era of Indonesia bore fruit in the country’s first direct presidential election in 2004, in which voter turnout was an estimated 75 percent. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono welcomed former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in March 2007 and 43rd U.S. President George
Indonesian children march in the Muslim Day Parade in New York City, September 2004. (Ethel Wolvovitz/The Image Works)
1056 | Indonesian Immigrants
Youth Profile A Young Indonesian Actress Tania Gunadi was born in Bandung, Indonesia. As a youth, she was a carefree girl who preferred to spend her days at the roller rink instead of school. Her life changed during her teenager years when she won the green card lottery and was allowed to immigrate to the United States. She joined her older sister and brother in Southern California and got a job working full-time at a local Pizza Hut. Her big break came when her friend asked her to join her on an audition for a Disneyland commercial and she booked the part. The producer liked her work and hired her for two more Disneyland commercials. It was then that Tania discovered her calling in life—to become an actor. After signing with an agent, Tania booked roles on It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia, Boston Public, Go Figure, and several other productions. Although she was not the best student in high school, she became serious about her career and trained with acting coaches to hone her craft. Her hard work paid off when she landed her biggest role to date as a series regular on the Disney Channel’s Aaron Stone. While shooting Aaron Stone in Canada, Tania also found time to volunteer at a local animal shelter. She is passionate about animal rescue and donates her time to the cause when her schedule permits. Tania is devoted to her family and connects with them often. Tania’s brother and sister both live in San Gabriel, California. Her parents, who are Chinese Indonesian, remain in Bandung. Tania speaks Indonesian, Sundanese, a bit of Mandarin, and English. Her mother fondly tells her that she has become “Americanized.” Tania jokingly says that she sometimes craves peanut butter and jelly instead of fried rice. Yet, she is ecstatic to see Indonesian culture in Southern California—on the weekends, she occasionally visits the Indonesian Food Bazaar in Duarte or shops at Simpang Asia. She often encounters people who know little about Indonesia aside from Java coffee or the island of Bali—as a result, she has become a sort of informal cultural ambassador in Hollywood. In 2009, Tania became a United States citizen. It was a tough decision that required several years of thought, but Tania ultimately concluded that it was the best choice for her. Indeed, Tania’s rapid rise to success typifies the American Dream. She advises youth to listen to their hearts and work hard—because in America, all things are possible.
W. Bush in November 2007. Both American leaders called for a higher degree of partnership between the two countries, especially in fighting the war on terror. The election of 44th U.S. President Barack Obama further raised Indonesia’s profile on the world stage. Obama’s family ties in Indonesia focused media attention
Issues in Relations between the United States and Indonesia | 1057
on a country that few Americans were familiar with prior to the election. During her visit to Indonesia in February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised Indonesia as an example of how Islam, democracy, and women’s rights can coexist in one country (Vaughan 2009). As the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia plays a crucial role in fostering communication and bridging the gap in understanding between the United States and other Muslim countries. The geographical position of Indonesia also plays a critical role in the economic, trade, and security interests of the United States. The sea lanes of the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait, the Makassar Strait, the Ombai Straight, and local waterways provide routes for international shipping and U.S. military vessels that travel between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. These routes are vulnerable targets for piracy and terrorist activities. In terms of energy, Indonesia is a major resource for natural gas and has an estimated petroleum reserve of 9.7 billion barrels; the exportation of energy across these sea routes must be safeguarded. The United States and Indonesia have also launched talks about environmental issues, notably on illegal logging (Vaughan 2009).
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 150 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009
1058
Region and country of birth Total Indonesia
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
1,767
2,525
2,418
1,805
2,419
3,924
4,868
3,716
3,606
3,679
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 151 Indonesian refugees admitted Year
Total
1998
N/A
1999
26
2000
14
2001
5
2002
18
2003
17
2004
5
2005
6
2006
10
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008. Table 14, p. 40.
Table 152 Individuals granted asylum affirmatively by region and country of nationality: Indonesia Year
Applications granted
1998
15a
1999
1,543
2000
937
2001
616
2002
479
2003
211
2004
104
2005
95
2006
428
2007
566
2008
385
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008. Table 17, p. 45. a U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 1998. Table 29, p. 103.
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Table 153 Naturalizations of Indonesians 1998 to 2008 Year
Naturalizations
1998
609 a
1999
1,459
2000
2,480
2001
1,242
2002
1,003
2003
963
2004
1,131
2005
1,234
2006
1,287
2007
1,213
2008
1,832
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008. Table 21, p. 54. a U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 1998. Table 53, p. 189.
Table 154 Nonimmigrant admissions (I-94 only): Indonesia 1999–2008 Year
Total
1999
72,394
2000
86,938
2001
86,660
2002
59,609
2003
53,895
2004
62,517
2005
68,218
2006
71,345
2007
75,497
2008
76,828
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008. Table 27, p. 72.
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Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics
Table 155 Population of Indonesians alone 2000–2007 Year
Total
2007
61,384 (est.)
2006
66,431
2005
63,609
2004
52,267
2001–2003
N/A
2000
39,757
Source: 2000 U.S. Census; 2007 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates; 2006 American Community Survey; 2005 American Community Survey; 2004 American Community Survey.
Table 156 2000 U.S. Census statistics
Indonesians alone
Indonesians alone or in any combination
Total population
39,757
63,073
Male
19,287
30,789
Female
20,470
32,284
30
29
2,348
4,656
32,646
48,916
Demographic characteristics
Median age Under 5 years 18 years and over 65 years and over Household population Group quarters population
1,761
3,018
38,905
61,733
852
1,340
3
3
Average household size Average family size
3
3
13,173
20,300
Owner-occupied housing units
5,016
8,605
Renter-occupied housing units
8,157
11,695
Occupied housing units
Source: Fact Sheet Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, Population Group: Indonesian alone and Indonesian alone or in any combination (www.factfinder.census.gov).
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Table 157 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Indonesia, 1997 to 2006 Year
Total
1997
905
1998
1,017
1999
1,186
2000
1,767
2001
2,525
2002
2,418
2003
1,805
2004
2,419
2005
3,924
2006
4,869
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2006, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2007, Table 3, p. 13.
Table 158 Persons naturalized by region and country of birth: Indonesia, 1997 to 2006 Year
Total
1997
570
1998
603
1999
1,459
2000
2,480
2001
1,242
2002
1,003
2003
963
2004
1,131
2005
1,234
2006
1,287
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2006, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2007, Table 21, p. 54.
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Table 159 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 leading states of residence: Region/country: Indonesia Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
3,679
1,322
2,357
59
14
45
Arizona California
1,522
583
939
Colorado
83
29
54
Florida
67
18
49
Georgia
98
33
65
Hawaii
31
9
22
Illinois
75
30
45
Maryland
79
24
55
Massachusetts
45
16
29
Michigan
31
10
21
Minnesota
38
16
22
43
17
26
New Jersey
Nevada
105
36
69
New York
329
117
212
North Carolina
27
7
20
Ohio
53
19
34
Pennsylvania
157
62
95
Texas
190
67
123
Virginia
80
24
56
Washington
191
72
119
Other
376
119
257
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009. State of Residence, Stbk 15. 2010.
1063
1064 | Indonesian Immigrants
Appendix III: Notable Indonesian Americans Michelle Branch is a singer-songwriter of Dutch Indonesian, French, and Irish heritage. Her maternal grandmother was born in East Java in Indonesia. She has been nominated for five Grammy Awards, three MTV Video Music Awards, and three CMA Awards. In 2003, she won a Grammy Award for Best Pop Collaboration with Santana for the song, “The Game of Love.” Devi Dja (1914–1989) was a Balinese dancer who performed all over the world with her troupe, Devi Dja and her Bali-Java Dancers with Native Gamelan Orchestra. She arrived in the United States in 1939, stayed because of the war and later became a citizen in 1954. As a dancer or choreographer, she worked on films such as Road to Singapore, The Moon and Sixpence, Road to Morocco, The Picture of Dorian Gray, Three Came Home, and Road to Bali. She was buried under the name Ibu Devi Dja Assan with her nickname “The Pavlova of the Orient” on her gravestone. Mark-Paul Gosselaar is an actor whose mother is Indonesian and father is Dutch. Gosselaar was born in Panorama City, California, and rose to fame as a teenager on NBC’s Saved by the Bell. He later joined the cast of the television series NYPD Blue as Detective John Clark. Tania Gunadi is an actor who was born in Bandung, Indonesia. She was a series regular on the Disney Channel drama series Aaron Stone. She has also appeared in Boston Public, It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia, and Even Stevens. Tony Gunawan is an Olympic champion in doubles badminton. He relocated from Indonesia to play for the United States. Maya Soetoro-Ng is a writer, teacher, activist, and the half-sister of 44th U.S. president, Barack Obama. Her father is Indonesian-born Lolo Soetoro and her mother is Ann Dunham. Born in Jakarta, she attended Barnard College and New York University, and she received her PhD from the University of Hawaii at Manoa. In 2003, she married Konrad Ng, who was born in Canada to Malaysian Chinese parents. Soetoro-Ng spoke at the 2008 Democratic National Convention on behalf of Obama. Cindy Suriyani (Mei Xian Qiu) is a Chinese Indonesian artist based in Los Angeles, California. Born in Pekalongan, Java, she was given a Chinese name, Indonesian name, American name, and a Catholic name as a means of protection. Armand Van Helden is an internationally renowned DJ and record producer whose father is Dutch Indonesian. He was born in Boston, Massachusetts.
Glossary | 1065
Glossary Adat: Local customary law. Aqiqah: The sacrifice of an animal on the seventh day of a newborn. Bahasa: Bahasa Indonesia is the national language of Indonesia. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika: The national motto of Indonesia, translated as “unity in diversity.” Budi Utono: an organization founded by medical students in 1908 that called for the reawakening of Javanese culture through education. Gado gado: An Indonesian vegetable dish and a colloquial phrase to describe an interracial couple. Gamelan: Traditional music of Indonesia that consists of an ensemble of musicians. Garuda: Birdlike creature in Hindu mythology. Imam: A Muslim religious leader. Indische Partij: Early nationalist party that called for equality for those who were born in the Indies.
Kakawin Sutasoma: A Javanese poem written by Mpu Tantalar in the 15th century that was the source of Indonesia’s national motto. Pancasila: Five principles that describe the philosophy behind Indonesia’s government. Pemilu: The Indonesian word for election. Penchak silat: Indonesian martial arts. Pengajian: A gathering of Indonesians to recite from the Qur’an and discuss Islam. Peranakan: Mixed race descendants of Indonesian and ethnic Chinese parents. Pribumi: Term that describes one who is native or indigenous to Indonesia. Reformasi: Reform movement in Indonesia begun by students in 1997 and culminating in the resignation of Suharto in 1998. Tahlilan: A prayer for the deceased. VOC: Abbreviation for Dutch company Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or United East Indies Company. Also known as the Dutch East Indies Company.
Walima: An Islamic wedding ceremony. Wayang: Traditional Indonesian dramatic arts. Wayang kulit utilizes shadow puppets.
1066 | Indonesian Immigrants
References “Arja Dance Tells of the Need to Love and Respect. ” 2009. The Jakarta Post. [Online article retrieved on 6/30/09.] www.thejakartapost.com/news/2000/05/25/arja-dancetells-need-love-and-respect.html. Benary, Barbara, Jody Diamond, Richard North, and Marc Hoffman. 2006. “Gamelan Groups in the U.S.A.” [Online information; retrieved on 4/03/11.] http://www.gamelan. org/directories/directoryusa.html. Asian Pacific American Legal Center. 2004. The Diverse Face of Asian and Pacific Islanders in Los Angeles County, pamphlet. Balbed, Abdullah. 2006. “Indonesians in America” [Online information retrieved on 7/1/09.] http://indoeduculture.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=35&It emid=1. Bengtson, John D. 2008. Linguistic Fossils: Studies in Historical Linguistics and Paleolinguistics. Calgary: Theophania Publishing. Brown, Colin. 2003. A Short History of Indonesia: The Unlikely Nation? Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin. Brown, Scott Shibuya. 1994. “Indonesian Culture Takes Root in Hollywood Community: Shops Are Flourishing on Sunset Boulevard, Catering to the More Than 20,000 Island Immigrants in L.A.” Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1. Central Intelligence Agency. 2009. The World Factbook 2009. “Indonesia.” [Online article retrieved; 05/31/09.] www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ id.html. Cribb, Robert, and Audrey Kahin. 2004. Historical Dictionary of Indonesia. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press. Cunningham, Clark. 2009. “Unity and Diversity among Indonesian Migrants to the United States.” In Emerging Voices: Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans, edited by Huping Ling, 90–125. New York: Rutgers University Press. “Daftar Gereja di USA.” 2009. Spirit Indonesian Magazine, April, 46–47. Drakeley, Steven. 2005. The History of Indonesia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Encyclopedia Britannica. 2008. “Kalimantan.” [Online article; retrieved 07/02/09.] http:// www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/310183/Kalimantan. Ho, Vanessa. 2002. “The Number of Elderly Asians in America is Rising, and, in a Break with Tradition, Fewer are Living with their Children; Culture Shift Strains Social Services.” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, April 3. Kwik, Greta. 1989. The Indos in Southern California. New York: AMS Press. Maryland Asian American Health Solutions. 2007. “In Focus: A Summary of the Asian American Community Group Reports, Indonesian Community Needs Assessment Summary Report,” University of Maryland College Park School of Public Health. [Online article; retrieved on 04/1/2011.] http://www.maahs.umd.edu/Reports.html. Masjid Al-Hikmah New York City. “Beginning.” [Online article; retrieved on 07/31/09] http://www.masjidalhikmahnewyork.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=46&Itemid=54&lang=en.
References | 1067 Mirpuri, Gouri, and Robert Cooper. 2002. Indonesia. New York: Benchmark Books. “Music: Old Ladies from Bali.” 1939. Time Magazine, November 6. Quinn, George. 2001. The Learner’s Dictionary of Today’s Indonesian. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. Radio New Zealand International. 2007. “Papuan Province Changes Name from West Irian Jaya to West Papua.” February 7. [Online article; retrieved on 07/07/09]. www.rnzi.com/ pages/news.php?op=read&id=29965. Ricklefs, M. C. 2008. A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Suharno. 2007. “Forthcoming: The 2010 Indonesian Population and Housing Census.” The 23rd Population Census Conference, April 16–18, Christchurch, New Zealand. Sukmana, Damai. 2009. “Game of Chance: Chinese Indonesians Play Asylum Roulette in the United States.” [Online article; retrieved on 07/30/09.] http://insideindonesia.org/ content/view/1164/47/. Suryadinata, Leo, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Aris Ananta. 2003. Indonesia’s Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. U.S. Census Bureau. 1990. “Table 1: General Characteristics of Selected Asian and Pacific Islander Groups by Nativity, Citizenship, and Year of Entry: 1990.” Washington, D.C. U.S. Census Bureau. 2000. “Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights: Indonesian Alone or in Any Combination.” Washington, D.C. U.S. Census Bureau. 2005. “S0201. Selected Population Profile in the United States. Indonesian Alone or in Any Combination.” American Community Survey. Washington, D.C. U.S. Census Bureau. 2006. “S0201. Selected Population Profile in the United States. Indonesian Alone.” American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates. Washington, D.C. U.S. Census Bureau. 2007. “B02006. Asian Alone by Selected Groups.” American Community Survey. Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2008. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Refugee, Asylum, and Parole System (RAPS). Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2008. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security. Vaughn, Bruce. 2009. “Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and American Interests.” Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C. Widjanarko, Putut. 2006. “Indonesian Muslims in New York City: A Transnational Community in the Making?” Presented at the Muslim Peace Building and Interfaith Dialogue Conference, April 28–29, American University, Washington, D.C., organized by Salam Institute for Peace and Justice. Wijaya, Juliana. 2006. “Indonesian Heritage Learners’ Profiles: A Preliminary Study of Indonesian Heritage Language Learners at UCLA.” Journal of Southeast Asian Language Teaching 12(2): 1–14. Yang, Eveline. 1995. “Indonesian Americans.” In The Asian-American Almanac: A Reference Work on Asians in the United States, edited by Susan B. Gall and Irene Natividad, 91–98. Detroit: Gale Research.
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Further Reading Consulate General of Republic of Indonesia—Los Angeles. www.kjri-la.net. This bilingual Web site offers up-to-date information on Indonesian news and immigration. It also posts upcoming Indonesian cultural events and activities sponsored by the consulate. Cunningham, Clark. 2009. “Unity and Diversity among Indonesian Migrants to the United States.” In Emerging Voices: Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans, edited by Huping Ling, 90–125. New York: Rutgers University Press. Cunningham is a distinguished scholar on Indonesia and Indonesian Americans. His article is an excellent resource, particularly on Indonesian Americans in Southern California. Embassy of Indonesia. www.embassyofindonesia.org. The embassy recently launched the Indonesian Embassy Channel on its Web site, which is a series of videos about Indonesian news and culture. The Web site also features news articles and information about upcoming events in Indonesia and the United States. Ikatan Keluarga Indonesia—Indonesian American Association. www.indonesianamerican. org. The Indonesian American Association was established in 1952. The Web site provides information about the Indonesian American community and archival issues of its newsletter, Warta Iki. Indonesian American Association. www.indonesianamericanassociation.org. This Web site focuses on the Indonesian American community in Arizona. Indonesian Education and Cultural Center. www.indoeduculture.org. This Web site contains invaluable articles on Indonesian American history. It is sponsored by the Embassy of Indonesia and the Ministry of Education, Republic of Indonesia. The United States-Indonesia Society. www.usindo.org. The United States-Indonesia Society publishes academic reports and articles on politics, politics, public policy, economics, history, and culture affecting both countries. Yang, Eveline. 2008. “Indonesian Americans.” Every Culture. http://www.everyculture. com/multi/Ha-La/Indonesian-Americans.html. Yang’s article is a comprehensive overview of Indonesian American history.
Iranian Immigrants by Maboud Ansari
Introduction Iranian migration to the United States is a recent political phenomenon. It began 55 years ago with the study abroad of young Iranians. They came to the United States in the 1950s, often as temporary residents (students and interns), but eventually changed their status to permanent residents. However, it was the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that was both organizationally and culturally crucial to the making of the Iranian community in the United States. Prior to the revolution, though there were Iranians living in the United States, the Iranian immigrant community had not yet developed. With regards to the making of the Iranian community in America, it is suggested that the dialectically interrelated Islamization of Iranian society and anti-Iranian and anti-Islamic sentiments in America not only transferred the already available marginal situation to a much larger group of postrevolutionary immigrants and refugees, but also reinforced the development of a new community of Iranian Americans. This is a new kind of ethnic community, one of the highest-status foreign-born groups in the United States. It is a new, nonterritorial community based on nontraditional foundations found in an urban, bureaucratized America and manifests peculiarities derived predominantly from the middle class and highly trained professionals. Iranians brought not only the riches of the Persian culture, one of the oldest and most colorful heritages of humankind, but also a considerable amount of wealth. Of all recent immigrant groups, Iranians have made one of the greatest investments in America. However, Iranian pride does not just stem from what they were, but rather from what they have been able to achieve in the United States. Today, as the nation of Iran is passing through crucial historical moments, Iranian Americans are making their own history. Much of this history-making contains the best of both world adaptations. In doing so, Iranian Americans borrow heavily from their host society as well as from the resurrected imagery, symbolism, and cultural heritage of ancient Persia. In this state, even as the Iranian American community continues to accommodate to the American context, it rummages the distant past to self-consciously maintain and/or recreate its ethnic identity or “Iranianness.” Thus, the ethnic identity of this community, as modified by its American experience, is not simply Iranian but is something that is grounded more in Iranian nationalism and secular ideas.
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Chronology | 1071
Chronology 1500 B.C.E.
The Persians migrate to the Iranian plateau from Central Asia.
550–530 B.C.E.
The Achaemenid dynasty establishes the first Persian Empire, which is the world’s first religiously tolerant empire and consists of a multitude of different languages, religions and cultures.
334 B.C.E.
Alexander the Great invades Persia.
224–642
Sasanian dynasty, a golden era of city building and grand art.
662–1258
The Muslim-Arab occupation of the Iranian region. Persia is brought under Arab rule, but Persians remain a cultural force in the emerging Muslim world, becoming Islamized but remaining Iranians.
1220s
The Mongols invade Iran.
1501–1736
Safavid dynasty and the revival of religious-national spirit; Shia Islam begins, which coincides with major cultural contact between Persia and the West.
1795–1925
Qajar dynasty. Following the humiliating defeat by Russia in 1813, the process of study abroad begins, because this humiliation results in a realization that Iran’s weakness is due to its technologically backward army. Thus the first group of young Iranians is sent abroad to study military arts and techniques.
1908
The discovery of oil reserves in Iran.
1909
The constitutional revolution and establishment of Iran’s first parliament.
1921
Reza Khan (1888–1944) and modern times of Iran. Reza Khan executes a coup d’état and establishes the Pahlavi dynasty.
1941
Abdication of Reza Shah in favor of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.
1951
Premiership of Mohammad Mosaddeq (1880–1967) begins.
1953
The CIA-backed overthrow of Iran’s elected and popular prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, arguably a crucial point in Iran–U.S. relations.
1979
The shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, flees Iran and Iran becomes officially the Islamic Republic of Iran.
1979
The hostage crisis. On November 4, 1979, 52 American diplomats are taken hostage and subsequently held for 444 days in
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Iran. Diplomatic relations with the United States become severed and remain so until the present. 2002
President Bush in his State of the Union address in January 2002 classifies Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil.”
2009
The fallout from the Iranian election (on June 12) has been the most sustained challenge to the Iranian government since the 1979 revolution. It has also been a turning point in the political life of Iranian Americans.
Background Geography and Ethnic Diversity Iran is situated in southwestern Asia and is bounded in the north by the Caspian Sea, Azarbaijan, and Turkmenistan; to the west by Turkey and Iraq; to the east by Pakistan; and to the south by the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. However, historically, the Persian cultural and even political sphere was much wider than the present national boundaries. With an area of 635,932 square miles, Iran ranks 16th in size among the countries of the world. However, by European standards, Iran is a very large country. It is about three times the size of England and Northern Ireland. By American standards, it is about one-fifth the size of the continental United States, or slightly larger than the combined areas of California, Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. In comparison with one state, Iran is six times the size of Colorado. Iran, like the United States, is a multilingual and diverse society. The national (official) language of Iran is Farsi, known in English as Persian. In addition to Persian, other languages and dialects, such as Azeri, Kurdish, Blouch, Luri, and Arabic are spoken in various parts of the country. The Persian language is also the main language in Afghanistan (referred to there as Dari) and in Tajikestan (referred to as Tajik). Persian, Dari, and Tajik are essentially a single language despite numerous differences in specialized vocabularies and spoken dialects. Historically, the Persian language was, for several centuries, the chief literary and administrative language of a large part of central, western, and southern Asia, including northern India. Currently, the Persian language is the national language of a combined population of more than 150 million people. Moreover, it is the community language of as many as 6 million more who are part of Iranian, Afghan, and Tajik diasporas. The Iranian languages, of which the Persian branch is the most important, belong to the Indo-European family. As a language of written literature, Persian, in one or another form, had been used at least 1,200 years before the rise of Islam. However,
Background | 1073
after the Islamic conversion of Persia (637 C.E.), the Persian language (Pahlavi) was replaced by Arabic as a written language, though it continued in oral use and eventually emerged as what is now called New Persian. Moreover, many Arabic words were introduced into the Persian language and became an integrated part of the language in the same way that words of Latin origin have been absorbed into English. In the English language today, we use a number of Persian words, such as bazaar, balcony, jasmine, jungle, lilac, orange, paradise, pajamas, shawl, and spinach, to name a few. What is remarkable about the Persian language is that for over a thousand years it has shown a remarkable continuity: “the Persian of the tenth century C.E. presents no greater problem to a modern Persian than Shakespeare does to an Englishman today” (Morgan 1987).
Demography and Religious Groups The Iranian population increased dramatically during the latter half of the 20th century, reaching about 72 million by 2008. More than two-thirds of the Iranian population is under the age of 30. The vast majority of Iranians are Muslims, mostly of the Shia branch, which is the official religion and to which about 89 percent of Iranians belong. Shia Islam distinguishes the Iranian nation from the mainstream Sunni world. Since 1501, Shiism has been the official religion of Iran. Therefore, the Islamic religious identity has, over the centuries, even before the Islamic revolution of 1979, melded with the Iranian national identity. The most important cultural developments in Islam, in the area of medicine, mathematics, astronomy, philosophy, chemistry, music, literature, and theology resulted from the contributions of Iranian thinkers and scientists who wrote in Arabic, the lingua franca of the time. About 9 percent of Iranians belong to the Sunni branch of Islam, mainly Kurds and Iran’s Balochi. The remaining 2 percent are non-Muslim religious minorities, including Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Bahais. Historically, Iran has been the home of the largest and oldest Jewish community in the Muslim Middle East. All religious minorities, except the Bahais, are officially recognized and protected and have reserved seats in the Iranian Majlis (parliament). Iran, or Persia as it was known in the West for most of its history, is regarded by historians to be one of the world’s oldest civilizations. Iranians have always called their country Iran, while Westerners, using a Greek term, often referred to it as Persia. Iranians define their Iranianness, in part, in terms of history. The recorded history of the country itself spans some 2,500 years. When the Arabs conquered Persia in the seventh century C.E., 1,200 years had already passed since the establishment of the first Persian Empire. At this time, the Zoroastrian religion was the official faith of Iranians. The prophet Zoroaster (born in the second millennium before Christ—1767 B.C.E.) was one of the first prophets to introduce the concepts
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of monotheism and duality of good and evil. He believed that human salvation in life and the afterlife could only be ensured through “Good Thoughts, Good Words, and Good Deeds.” Many concepts of the Zoroastrian faith have influenced many religions, including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Nowhere is Iran’s cultural heritage and contribution to human civilization more apparent than in the precepts of the ancient native religion of Zoroastrianism. Are Iran and Persia truly synonymous? The short answer is no. The term Persia derives from an ancient Hellenized form, Persis, the name of one province in the southwest of the country. Parsa is the name of the Iranian tribe that founded the Persian Empire in 550 B.C., the most extensive empire that the world had yet seen. The empire once included what are today’s Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Jordan, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, and the Caucasus region. Cyrus “the Great” (known to Iranians as Kourosh), was the first king of the Achaemenid dynasty, who introduced the Declaration of Human Rights. This declaration (a clay cylinder) is housed at the British Museum in London, and a replica is displayed at the United Nations in New York City. Cyrus freed the Jews from their Babylonian captivity and permitted them to return to Jerusalem and rebuild their temple, which may be why he is referred to in the Book of Isaiah as the Shepherd of the Lord. In 1935, the government of Iran declared that the term Iran had to be used even by foreigners in all official correspondences when referring to the country. However, since World War II, the words Iran and Persia have been used interchangeably to identify the same country. The history of Iran throughout the two and a half millennia displays an unusual degree of continuity and homogeneity of a distinctive culture, despite enormous diversity and periodic upheaval of the societal and community life. “In the light of Iran’s ethnic and linguistic diversity, as well as invasions and all the changes in rulers and political boundaries, a sense of Persian consciousness, of Iranianness (Iraniyat) remains throughout the country’s history” (Morgan 1987).
Modern History Iranian society experienced two revolutions in the 20th century. The discontent with the Qajar Dynasty’s despotic rule and corruption (1786–1925) led to the constitutional revolution in 1906 and the establishment of Iran’s first parliament. The constitutional aspirations for the rule of law was flawed and brought about political instability. In 1921, through a coup, Reza Khan (an Iranian officer of the Persian Cossak Brigade), with some help from British military officers, abolished the Qajar Dynasty and made himself shah, thus establishing the Pahlavi dynasty and ruling as Reza Shah for almost 16 years. It was in the first decade of Reza Shah’s time that the foundation for modern industry was laid, security was reestablished in the state, and the army was reorganized. Reza Shah also reformed the educational system and secularized it.
Background | 1075
Moreover, Tehran University was established, and faculties of law, medicine, literature, science, and technical schools were opened. This period (1921–1931) was a decade of growing dictatorship. In 1941, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, who came to power at the age of 22. In 1951, Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq was elected prime minister. He nationalized Iran’s oil reserves. The nationalization of Iranian oil became symbolic for a popular movement to rid the country of British interference in Iran’s politics. Eventually the American and British governments managed to stage the coup d’état of August 1953. From the mid-1960s until late 1979, Iranian power was concentrated entirely in the Shah’s hands, and the explosion of the oil revenues greatly strengthened the state vis-à-vis the public. “The total absence of freedom coupled with Western, especially American, support for the Shah convinced the public that he was no more than a puppet who was implementing the policies of American imperialism. This led to very strong feelings against both the Shah and the West” (Katouzian and Shahidi 2008). Therefore, in 1978 the Shah’s opponents of all political affiliations were united and gave rise to a revolutionary movement that brought about the 1979 revolution and the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty. After 2,500 years of monarchy, Iran’s government was changed to an Islamic republic.
An effigy of the deposed shah of Iran is burned during a demonstration outside the United States Embassy in Tehran in late 1979. Iran’s Islamic Revolution of that year began as an uprising against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whose autocratic rule and ties to the West were extremely unpopular in his country. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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Causes and Waves of Migration The Pattern of Iranian Emigration Emigration from Iran to the United States is a recent phenomenon, developed within the last 30 years, and it is situated within the larger context of U.S.–Iran relations. It became significant only in the early 1980s and occurred during three phases. The first phase started in the 1950s and lasted until 1977. During this period, Iranians often came as sojourners and temporary migrants (students and interns), who eventually changed their status and became a community of nonreturnee professionals. During the peak period of immigration from other countries to the United States (1842–1903), only 130 Iranian nationals were known to have immigrated. However, starting in 1945, emigration from Iran rose steadily and in 1966 reached 12,624 per year. The number of nonimmigrants (visitors, students, and interns) increased drastically from an annual average of about 1,400 in the 1950s to 6,000 in the 1960s, reaching the highest figure of 98,018 in 1977. According to the Institute of International Education, more Iranian students were enrolled in U.S. institutions of higher education at this time than students from any other country. However, during the same period, a total of only 34,855 Iranian immigrants were admitted, and 8,877 became naturalized U.S. citizens. It is particularly notable that the pattern of Iranian migration during this period did not involve “chain migration”; it was basically individuals, and not the migration of whole families. For the most part, it involved professional groups such as physicians, dentists, scientists, engineers, and so on. From a different perspective, it was a problem of “brain drain,” that is, the migration of highly professional and technical young Iranians to the United States. The Iranian immigrant was usually a student immigrant—a sojourner who had not arrived in this country with the intention of becoming a permanent resident. However, the Iranian migration of physicians (interns and residents), for instance, was not essentially an “overflow” of excess talent at home. In the 1970s, an acute shortage of doctors in rural areas of Iran led the government there to hire several hundred Pakistani physicians to work in the countryside. In 1973, there was only one doctor for every 4,000 Iranians (the ratio in the United States during that same year was one doctor for every 600 people). At the time, the yearly cost of medical education in Iran was $40,000 to $700,000. The supreme irony was that the Iranian government, through migration of its American-trained physicians, used to pay $700,000 annually in “foreign aid” to the United States. The majority of these immigrant professionals had voluntarily chosen migration as an outlet for their general alienation from the sociopolitical system in Iran (Ansari 1988). The migration of these educated Iranians also involved a process of becoming immigrants while they were studying abroad. Few Iranian professionals had immigrant status upon arrival—most were admitted as students or as visitors.
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Once living in the United States as permanent residents, they perceived their return to Iran as involving three major dimensions of political, social, and professional marginality. The second phase of Iranian migration began immediately before and after the Iranian revolution of 1979 and became significant in the early 1980s. The 1979 revolution and the 1980–1988 war with Iraq transformed Iran’s class structure, politically, socially, and economically. As the revolution ousted the Pahlavi dynasty, displaced the ruling elite directly associated with it, and established itself as an Islamic republic, it drastically changed the pattern and nature of Iranian emigration to the United States. In addition to the revolution, the eight years of the Iran–Iraq war during the 1980s was also another factor that forced many of the best-educated and most wealthy families into exile in the United States and other countries. By 1990, the number of Iranian immigrants had steadily increased to a peak of almost 25,000. More recent Department of Homeland Security statistics show that these trends have continued in the years 2000–2009. The arrival of the postrevolutionary political refugees and immigrants opened an entirely new chapter in the short history of Iranians in the United States. Never before in Iran’s long history had so many people involuntarily had to leave their country. What was once basically a problem of “brain drain” during the Pahlavi regime was now predominantly an involuntary emigration of a relatively large number of middle- and upper-class families, including the movement of a considerable amount of wealth (in liquidated assets). There are no data available about the capital flight, but the estimate is in the range of $30 to $40 billion. Through all these waves of emigration, the United States was and still is the most favored destination of the Iranians. Iranians benefited more from the U.S. political asylum laws than any other nationality. According to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) statistics, in the period from October 1981 through February 1985, more Iranians (11,055) were being granted asylum than any other nationality. In addition, from 1990 to 2008, 6,255 Iranian refugees were granted asylum (see Table 160). The new pattern of Iranian emigration is complex in quality, motivation, and quantity. In terms of quality, it is heterogeneous in social class, education, occupations, political orientations, and age distribution. As far as religious affiliation, this wave of emigration includes higher proportions of such Iranian religious minorities as Sunnis (Kurds and Turkmen), Zoroastrians, Christians (Armenian and Assyrians), Jews, and Bahais. In terms of political orientation, it includes sympathizers with the old regime (monarchists) and postrevolutionary alienated intellectuals (both Marxist and non-Marxist activists). In terms of motivation, a combination of political, social, religious, and professional marginality has produced a “vocabulary of motive” for emigration of postrevolutionary immigrants to the United States. Therefore, the immigration of Iranians as a voluntary action contains some essentially involuntary factors (Ansari 1992). In other words, immigrants and refugees
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have managed to escape the compound crisis of being disenchanted intellectuals, individuals disillusioned with the Islamic republic, rejected Western-trained professionals, and the powerless affluent. Whether for political, economic, or religious reasons, Iranian immigrants and the self-exiled came to the United States to seek a better life, particularly for their children. However, they came not to stay, but to return home when and if the political situation would permit. Gradually, they decided to stay permanently but still maintained the hope of the eventual return home. Uprooted and transplanted, each wave of Iranian immigrants has undergone dramatic social, economic, and cultural transitions from their traditional native culture. Through hard work, perseverance, and education, Iranian immigrants have managed to become an ethnic community and to prosper in American society. Given the heterogeneity of Iranian American communities in terms of ethnic origin, religious affiliations (Iranian Armenian, Jewish Iranian, Zoroastrian Iranian, and others), generation, length of time in the United States, immigration status, language ability, and socioeconomic status, it was only a matter of time before Iranian Americans became an ethnic community and started using their growing financial clout to gain political power. The third phase of Iranian immigration started in 1995 and continues to the present. This phase comprises an increasing number of elderly (65 and over) middleclass Iranians, as well as young Iranian men who fled military service during the Iran–Iraq war. These elderly Iranian immigrants are those who arrived in America as aging parents to join their adult children or their siblings, who, as naturalized Tehranjeles Tehranjeles is a blend of Tehran, the capital of Iran, and Los Angeles. Iranians everywhere call Tehranjeles their largest exile community. Neon signs in Persian decorate the windows of the Westwood Iranian American stores in Los Angeles. Products labeled in Persian and English reflect the dual identity of most consumers. “The exile community of at least 500,000 Iranians has carved out a distinctive subculture here. At the Encino Town Center, two of six movie screens show Iranian movies.”* The Community has Iranian Republican clubs, Iranian Rotary clubs, Iranian banks, over 35 media outlets (TV, radio, and newspaper), Iranian bookstores, and Persian restaurants. The neighborhood, also called Little Persia, has the largest Persian bookstore outside of Iran. On March 16, 2010, Jimmy Delshad was reelected as the Mayor of Beverly Hills. Like Iranians anywhere, Los Angeles Iranians are rich or poor, Muslim, Jewish, Baha’i, Christian, or Zoroastrian, secular or religious, conservative or leftist, highly educated or less so. Most are Shiite Muslims, but in West Los Angeles, the Jewish Iranians are the most cohesive, connected through synagogues, marriages, and jobs. *Neil MacFarquhar, “Exiled in Tehranjeles Are Split on Iran,” New York Times, May 9, 2006.
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citizens, had filed for them to be admitted as permanent residents. The elderly immigrants arrive here at the age of retirement and often travel back and forth regularly between Iran and the United States. This phenomenon, of the Iranian elderly going back and forth between their homeland and their adopted country, was almost inconceivable 20 years ago.
Foreign Education and the Problem of Dual Marginality What is striking is that Iranians’ contact with the West since the early eighteenth century has had a paradoxical dual character: on the one hand, a high degree of acculturation of Western ideas and values; on the other hand, an ongoing resentment, both open and silent (symbolic reaction) toward the West. It is this historical character that greatly influenced the forming of a peculiar social type, such as the familiar stranger, in contemporary Iranian society. The familiar stranger (ashena-ibiganeh) is the cultural hybrid whose divided identification stems mostly from his foreign education and also from oversocialization abroad. The concept of dual marginality has been developed to explain the situation in which some immigrants find themselves. Those Iranians that came to this country initially as sojourners, with strong feelings of belonging at home, and a firm conviction of returning, are subject to the experience of dual marginality. That is, they find themselves estranged from both the host and the home society. The concept of dual marginality is considered here as having two major components: native and alien marginality. Each culture produces a dual pattern of partial identification and divided loyalty for the individual. Thus, the dually marginal person is an involuntary immigrant who is representative of marginality at home and abroad. The dually marginal person in the restricted sense is an unintended immigrant who is not a fully integrated member of either society, home or host. Both situations, at home and abroad, contain for this person some elements of uncertainty, nonbelongingness, and insecurity. As a sojourner who has become an uncertain immigrant, the person is caught between two conflicting reference groups in two different cultural settings. The immigrant remains an uncertain, undecided immigrant in conflict about whether to adhere to American cultural patterns and settle there or to embrace those of his own country and return home. As long as he remains an undecided immigrant, his situation may be characterized as one of dual marginality, with a feeling of not belonging to either society. While he has a feeling of being a marginal person at home, he experiences marginality in the United States as well. When he starts to psychologically organize himself as a permanent resident in this country, he is then a marginal person. A concrete example of dual marginality is that of the Iranian professional immigrants who were living in the United States prior to the 1979 revolution. During the revolutionary period, some returned to Iran and some settled permanently in the United States. Those returned professionals found themselves in a situation of
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political, social, and professional marginality and were forced to immigrate to the United States.
Demographic Profile Size The Iranian migration is essentially the migration of middle-class and highly trained professionals. It also contains a selective contingent of American-trained professionals who left Iran and retuned to the United States. The broadest definition of Iranian Americans includes all persons descended from Iranian stock: immigrants from Iran or those born in America of fully Iranian or mixed ancestry. At the present time, Iranian immigrants are disproportionately immigrants themselves or the children of immigrants rather than descendants of earlier generations of “hyphenated” Americans. In terms of quantity, estimates of the size of the Iranian American population vary from 500,000 to one million. The 2000 Census measured a U.S. population of 281.4 million, including 338,000 who reported an Iranian ancestry. According to the Census, Iranians are less than one percent of the total foreign-born U.S. population. It is possible that the census figure is an undercount, because the information on ancestry was collected on the “long form” of the census questionnaire, which was sent to approximately one-sixth of all households. Ancestry refers to ethnic origin, descent, “roots,” heritage, or place of birth of the person or the person’s ancestors. Despite persistent claims by some Iranian community activists that their population in the United States is over two million, a fair approximation in 2009 is about half a million. Regardless of the exact number, more Iranians live in the United States today than in any other country in the world except Iran. What is most significant about the Iranian community is its continuing growth. In less than three decades, Iranians in the United States have grown from a scattered, marginal, ambivalent, and undecided immigrant group (123,000 in 1980)—a community without a community—into a new ethnic community of over 338,000 (2000 Census). At the present time, Iranians are one of the fastest-growing ethnic groups in the United States. The population doubled from 123,000 in 1980 to 285,000 in 1990, primarily through immigration. With the current rate of influx, the Iranian population in the United States is expected to triple by 2020.
Composition of the Community According to the 2000 Census, about 60 percent of the total Iranian population resided in California, particularly in Los Angeles, where they live within a spatially bounded area called “Tehranjeles” or “Iranjeles.” Los Angeles became a favorite
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destination of many Iranian immigrants and refugees after the 1979 revolution. Despite the major settlement of Iranian Americans on the West Coast, a greater proportion lives in the Northeast and the South. Other large enclaves are in New York, Texas, and the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. The initial geographic distribution of Iranians in the United States shows the importance of universities and colleges in attracting Iranian students. By the late 1970s, their most pronounced concentrations were in southern California, New York, New Jersey, Texas, and Massachusetts. In the last decade, a few new Iranian American communities have developed in the southern states, such as Miami, Florida and Atlanta, Georgia. Despite their initial intention of being temporary immigrants and exiles, Iranians in the United States are today mostly American citizens or permanent residents. According to the Department of Homeland Security, from 1999 to 2008, approximately 130,310 Iranian immigrants obtained U.S. citizenship (see Table 161). Those Iranian immigrants who are not American citizens are permanent residents who have not been in the United States long enough to apply for American citizenship. It seems that almost 30 years of exile are homeland enough. In other words, like most exiles, Iranians have realized that they cannot go home. That is, there is no “home” to go back to, or it is changed beyond recognition. However, many of the self-exiled Iranians still dream of returning home and getting back what they lost, and though others have started new businesses and new lives, they remain saddened by their losses in Iran.
Educational and Economic Attainments From the very beginning, the Iranian immigrants differed from other arrivals by their high educational and professional achievements. They belong to a generation of upwardly mobile, secularized cosmopolitans. Unlike the “tired and poor,” uneducated traditional refugees, Iranian immigrants are urban professionals, entrepreneurs, and often bilingual. According to the 2000 Census, 57 percent of foreign-born Iranians have a college degree or higher, a rate twice as high as that among all foreign-born people (see Figure 18). Currently, many of the best universities and colleges have a disproportionately large number of Iranian American students. A combination of former college students and political elites and professionals of high socioeconomic status, including exiles, make Iranian Americans one of the country’s wealthiest and most educated immigrant populations. The Iranian experience in the United States from the start has included ethnic pride. However, the immigrants’ Iranian pride does not just come from what they were, but rather from what they have been able to achieve in the United States. An occupational profile of Iranians in the United States shows that they rank very high in the percentage of the population working in professional occupations, coming just after Asian Indians. About 50 percent of all working Iranian Americans are in professional and managerial occupations, greater than any other group in the United States. By comparison, 30 percent of all foreign-born people hold white-collar
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occupations such as physicians, engineers, accountants, and supervisors. Iranian Americans also have the smallest proportion of its members in low-status jobs. Today, American-trained professionals such as physicians, college professors, scientists, dentists, lawyers, engineers, nurses, and managers comprise the largest occupational segment of Iranian Americans. In the last 10 years, an increasing number of Iranian Americans have become college presidents, college deans, CEOs in corporate America, senior executives at Fortune 500 companies, top scientists in NASA, executives in the Silicon Valley, and even a deputy assistant to the president. A median income of approximately $59,000 makes Iranian American one of the highest-status ethnic groups in the United States (see Figure 19). While Iranians can be found in a variety of occupations, one striking aspect is their self-employment rate of 22 percent, making them one of the most entrepreneurial ethnic groups in the United States. It is estimated that Iranians are among the top 25 immigrant groups with the highest self-employment rate. There is growing evidence that such a high rate of self-employment has played an important role in the economic adaptation of the newly arrived Iranian immigrants in the United States. “In Los Angeles, the percentage of Iranians in self-employment is about fifty nine percent. Similarly, close to fifty six percent of working Iranian men and women in Dallas are self-employed and run some kind of business” (Mobasher 2006). These family owned businesses are found in both cities and suburbs and, with the exception of Iranian grocery stores, most of the Iranian businesses are oriented toward the larger market of the American society. Iranian businesses today go far beyond the traditional Persian carpet, garment, and jewelry outlets (Ansari 2005). As discussed earlier, Iranian emigration has not only been one of scientists, professionals, and entrepreneurs, but also one of a considerable amount of capital. Of all recent immigrant groups, Iranians have made the greatest investments in America. Herein lies the supreme irony of the closing decade of America’s post–World War II imperial claim over Iran—Iran’s loss of talent and capital turned out to be America’s gain. In other words, the Iranian revolution with all of its anti-American sentiments turned out to be a success for America. Iranian immigration also brought one of the most significant waves of affluent families to come to the United States. Regarding those super-rich Iranians or “money refugees,” there is no success like exile. They are today most likely naturalized Americans and have established themselves as wealthy real estate developers, bankers, and successful businesspeople in corporate America. Wherever Iranian American entrepreneurs have concentrated, they have injected new dynamism into local and national economies. Particularly in Los Angeles and New York City, their economic influence far outweighs their numbers. This success, however, is qualified by the initial downward mobility of some exiles and the discrimination Iranians as a whole face in the labor market. Not all Iranians who fled the country were part of an affluent group. Among the educated
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Iranians were a large number of refugees who were unable to follow their own line of training. For example, the entry of former army officers into the American occupational structure has been marked by downward mobility and some disappointments. These Iranian immigrants are well educated by Iranian standards, but after a lifetime of military careers they have had no choice but to drive cabs or manage their own small stores or restaurants. Iranian immigrants who were confronted with downward mobility (like the leading character in the recent movie House of Sand and Fog) experienced more than other Iranians the psychological pains of the loss of status and dislocation. Even today, not all Iranian Americans have affluent lifestyles. In 1994, over 12,500 Iranian immigrants received Supplemental Security Income benefits. However, during the same year, noncitizen Iranian elderly make up the smallest group of immigrants receiving Supplemental Security Income.
Adjustment and Adaptation New Community Structure Historically, Iranians were not only open to other cultures, but often freely adapted to other cultural systems they found useful. In fact, an eclectic cultural elasticity has been said to be one of the key defining characteristics of the Iranian spirit. Iranian Americans today are incredibly diverse. The differences are not only generational, although that is part of the story. In fact, what makes the Iranian Americans yet more intriguing, aside from their remarkable achievements, is the complexity of the community itself. Because each wave of immigrants came from differing circumstances, their adjustment to their new environment is also the story of their adjustment to each group that came before them. An additional layer of diversity can also be attributed to the various other Iranian immigrants that came to the United States from Iranian communities in countries such as Canada, France, England, and Sweden. The Iranian revolution of 1979 and its aftermath (including eight years of the Iraq–Iran war) were both culturally and organizationally crucial to the making of the Iranian community in the United States. Prior to the revolution, the Iranian immigrant community had not yet developed. It is suggested that the dialectically interrelated Islamization of Iran and anti-Islamic and anti-Iranian sentiment in America not only transferred the already available marginal situation to a much larger group of postrevolutionary immigrants, but also reinforced the development of a new community of Iranian Americans. Starting in 1980, Iranians gradually formed cultural organizations in several states. No organization, secular or religious, represents all Iranian Americans. However, today over 100 regional, cultural, religious, and professional Iranian American organizations and foundations exist in the United States.
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The Iranian American community is a new nonterritorial community based on nontraditional foundations found in an urban, bureaucratized America; it manifests peculiarities derived from the predominantly professional origin and business class of the immigrants. In other words, Iranian Americans live with no distinguishable pattern of common locale. In some areas such as Los Angeles, there is a heavy concentration but no “Little Iran” similar to Chinatown, Little Italy, or Little Cuba in Miami. The Iranians arrived in this country at a time when the host society had already undergone a rapid urbanization process and the disintegration of distinctively ethnic institutions. Moreover, the Iranians’ pattern of migration, along with their social conditions, were hardly conducive to the formation of a collective settlement. Since cultural assimilation goes hand-in-hand with education and economic advancement, Iranian immigrants have had no difficult time integrating into American society.
Family Structure The Iranian family in the United States is fundamentally different than the traditional family in Iran. In terms of structure, it is a nuclear family; a married man and woman living with their two or three children. Emigration as individual families has separated the Iranian American families from their own extended families. In some cases, the extended families are scattered throughout the United States, Europe, Australia, and Iran. The Iranian American family is decidedly child-centered, and its patriarchal and authoritarian character is already undermined in the new environment. There is also some evidence that among young Iranian American couples, the institutionalization of equalitarian norms has already taken place, particularly in the area of child rearing. Unlike in Iran, where the extended family, older siblings, and neighbors play a significant role in child rearing, in the United States parents chiefly play that role. The Iranian mother is the child’s most important socializer, and it is from her that the child receives the most affection and, in most cases, unconditional love. In the absence of older people at home, such as grandmothers, the Iranian mother depends heavily on experts for guidance regarding character training. The majority of first-generation Iranian parents express a strong desire to cultivate the positive aspects of their culture. However, because of cultural conflict, most second-generation Iranians have grown up alien to the culture of their parents. They have their own subculture, which contains a new set of values and new ways of thinking. Iranians are emotionally expressive people regardless of sex. Both men and women show their tears, anger, and affection easily. Kissing and hugging as ways of greeting are common between both men and women but are less socially acceptable between a man and a woman. Today, the second generation of Iranians receives an early socialization that involves a great amount of social-psychological absorption of the most subtle
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American middle-class values, training, and behavioral patterns. Their level of income, professional status, and assimilating tendencies allow Iranian American families to provide their children with a middle- and upper-class way of life. However, generational change has already brought about cultural conflict and tensions between parents and their children. Today many Iranian American parents are seriously challenged in their efforts to accommodate the values of two different worlds. Moreover, they experience a cultural divide with their children, because they have no frame of reference for their children’s high school and, in some cases, collegiate experience. This situation reflects modernity and tradition at a cultural crossroads. Growing up in America and being heavily influenced by the larger society, members of the second generation desire greater freedom to determine their own destinies. Second-generation Iranians will be shaped by the American social context rather than their parents’ memories of Iran or their cultural expectations. While they acknowledge their parents’ willingness to offer sufficient love and financial support, they complain that their parents are unprepared to understand the second generation’s way of life. Within the Iranian American family, elderly immigrants experience a degree of loneliness and isolation. It seems that the social-psychological problems of these late-life immigrants are due to a lack of social connections, and having traditional values that sometimes conflict with those of their assimilated children. In terms of family values, the Iranian American family emphasizes Iranianness, respect for elders, friendship, hospitality, obligation, loyalty, and respect toward the family above all else. Other values include an unquestionable thirst for education, which goes back to the very roots of their cultural heritage, as they reserve the highest respect for those who are superior to them in knowledge and wisdom. Friendship, hospitality, politeness, and courtesy are specific cultural behaviors to which Iranians attach special importance. In a major survey of Iranian Americans (Ansari 2006), in response to the question of “what qualities are important in the Iranian part of your identity?” the following categories were considered important for the participants: Iranian family, Persian language, Now-Ruz (the Persian New Year celebration), Persian food, love of poetry, politeness, hospitality, respect for elders, and courtesy. In the same survey, second-generation Iranian Americans identify “parental love and care” as the one Iranian family value that they are most proud to pass on to their children. Iranians have their own set of manners and etiquette, which are rooted in their culture. One of these unique cultural traits is ta’arof. Ta’arof derives from an Arabic root denoting knowledge and acquaintance. As a form of behavior, ta’arof dictates formalized expressions of respect, kindness, and genuine feelings of hospitality. Through ta’arof, Iranians manage the impression they give to others. Ta’arof is practiced particularly at the time of meeting, departure, and paying the bill at a restaurant.
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National Culture and Identity Ethnic identity in a new country is maintained in various ways. Iranian Americans, like many other past and present immigrant groups, have established institutions and foundations to preserve their cultural heritage, strengthen their ethnic identity, and keep them cohesive as a community. The Iranian American community has encompassed a variety of organizations since its inception. These organizations serve a variety of functions. Some are cultural and others are educational, charitable, religious, and political. Over the last 30 years, Iranian Americans have developed an impressive array of cultural programs. The Persian cultural centers, better known to the Iranian American community as kanoons or anjomans, are the earliest forms of community-based organizations for Iranians in the United States. The Iranian American community, particularly during the 1980s, witnessed a remarkable flowering of an essentially Persian character, as renovated cultural symbols and institutions provided channels for expressing their ethnic identity. They constituted the functional equivalent of the myths, values, and familiarities in which the traditional immigrant identity and community was grounded. The strongest supporters of these organizations have been the first-generation Iranians. Today, almost no major American city lacks its quota of Iranian American cultural associations. Among communal activities sponsored by Iranian cultural centers are celebrations of national festivals. From ancient times, Iranians have celebrated three national festivals, which play a significant role in the Iranian national consciousness. These celebrations are Now-Ruz, Mehregan, and Sadeh. Of all these festivals, Now-Ruz has had the greatest impact on the Iranian ethnic consciousness, because it reflects the core of Iranianness. Now-Ruz (pronounced no-ruze, meaning new day), the Persian New Year festival, is the greatest of the Persian feasts. It is celebrated on the first day of spring (March 21), the vernal equinox, and is deeply ingrained in the social structure of Iranian society and institutionalized in all of the Iranian religious groups. NowRuz has a long history—when the Pilgrims celebrated their first Thanksgiving in the United States, it had already been around for more than 2,000 years. Now-Ruz originated in pre-Islamic Iran and is celebrated today by over 300 million people throughout central Asia, the Caucasus, northwestern China, and in parts of the Middle East, the Balkans, and South Asia. The secret power behind Now-Ruz’s appeal to such a diversity of cultures has to do with the fact that it is a spring-time ritual that celebrates the relationship between humans and nature. For Iranians, Now-Ruz is a 13-day celebration anticipated all year. Preparations begin weeks ahead with spring cleaning, cooking, and buying new clothes and arrangement of the Sofreh Haftsin. Haftsin is traditionally a table beautifully decorated with flowers, typically hyacinth and daffodils, and with seven items that begin with the Persian letter “S.” These include “Sabzeh (wheat sprouts) for rebirth, Seeb (apple) for health and beauty, Seer (garlic) for health and medicine, Serkeh
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(vinegar) for age and patience, Samanu (a custard pudding) for affluence, Somagh (sumac) for sunrise and Senjid (oleaster fruit) for love” (Rahni 2007). Among NowRuz traditions is Charshanbeh Souri, which is the last Wednesday of the outgoing year. It is celebrated by jumping over a bonfire while declaring “take away my yellow complexion and give me your red glow of health.” The festivities continue until the 13th day of the new year, which is called Sizdah Bedar. On the morning of this day, Iranians plan an outdoor picnic. Since the early 1980s, Now-Ruz has been institutionalized among Iranians in the United States. It remains the most culturally distinctive institution for Iranian Americans and is celebrated with great extravagance. A telling sign of the growing cohesion and national consciousness among Iranian Americans is the number of new Now-Ruz public ceremonies in city halls and museums, where usually a sizable number of non-Iranians are among the guests. In the last few years, there have been Now-Ruz celebrations in the White House, New York City’s Mayor Bloomberg’s residence, Gracie Mansion, city halls in Los Angeles and San Francisco, the Metropolitan Museum of New York, and the Smithsonian Institution. The 2009 Now-Ruz was particularly important, because President Obama released a special message to the people and the government of Iran. President Obama’s message went significantly beyond the standard practice of U.S. presidents delivering statements in celebration of Now-Ruz. President Obama stated that “a common humanity binds us together despite three decades of strained relations. We know that you are a great civilization and your accomplishments have earned the respect of the U.S. and the world.” Acknowledging the contributions of Iranian Americans, he stated, “Here in the U.S., our own communities have been enhanced by the contributions of Iranian Americans.” In addition to Now-Ruz, there are other cultural systems that provide institutional support for Iranians to adjust and at the same time maintain their cultural identities in the United States. These institutional support systems include the Persian media, Shab-I-Shehr (poetry reading night), Persian language programs, religious centers, hanegah (Sufi centers), Persian food, Persian music, the Internet, and, as of 2004, the Persian parade in New York City. The Persian parade is held every year along 15 blocks of Madison Avenue in New York City. Iranian Americans of all ethnic backgrounds walk side-by-side and display native costumes ride floats to celebrate the richness and diversity of the Persian culture in exile. As the most spectacular Persian festival in America, the Persian parade has more effectively than any other festival attracted the new generation of Iranian Americans to their Iranian cultural heritage. As the only publicly visible Iranian American ceremony, the annual Persian parade has created an atmosphere of national identity, particularly for the second-generation Iranians. The Persian media in the Iranian American community have grown rapidly since 2000. Today, Iranians in the United States are an ethnic group with a large number of TV satellite stations. There are 30 TV and 5 radio stations broadcasting in
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Dressed in Iranian festival garb, Nelly Sayaidi, 15, of North Haven, Connecticut (left), walks down New York’s Madison Avenue as she and others participate in the Persian Day Parade, March 19, 2006. (AP Photo/Tina Fineberg)
the Persian language from Los Angeles to Iran, Europe, and a few other countries where Iranian immigrants live. The satellite TV programs have become an emotional outlet for a large number of Iranians in exile. In addition to the TV and radio programs, there are over 20 newspapers and magazines published in several states where there are large concentrations of Iranian Americans. Today, the Persian media are an active component of the Iranian American community and have helped Iranian Americans preserve their cultural heritage and remain in constant contact with Iranians in Iran and in the diaspora. The electronic community is another new feature of the larger Iranian American community. The Internet over the past decade has slowly become the public space in which Iranian Americans engage in a most influential dialogue. Today, regardless of where young Iranians physically reside, the Internet has enabled them to be able to exchange ideas and experience a sense of solidarity with other Iranians. The Internet, Facebook, Twitter, and other social media have become important means of association among the nationally and internationally scattered Iranian diaspora.
Religion Iran is a primarily Shia Muslim country, a fact reflected in the Iranian immigrant population in the United States. However, Iranian Americans are not homogeneous in terms of religious affiliations. There are Muslims, Jews, Zoroastrians, Christians, and Bahais. Even though the majority of Iranian Americans are Shia Muslim,
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initially they had no interest in establishing their own mosques. As a whole, they have maintained a secular rather than religious outlook and also consider “Iran’s theocratic regime” as the main cause of their involuntary emigration (Bozorgmehr 1998). Therefore, unlike many other immigrant groups, the religious institution was not there to serve as an anchor in the Iranian Muslim immigrants’ early years of adjustment. The Iranian Shia Muslims are also a diverse mixture of relatively secular and moderate Shias. A survey of Iranian Americans in New Jersey in 2005 indicates that Iranian American Shias are less religiously observant or “mosque going” than other Shia groups in America. However, since the early 1990s, a remarkable religious cohesiveness has developed among a devout segment of Iranian American Muslims. Yet, except in a few states, the Iranian mosque is not yet a visible symbol of Iranian American presence at the community level.
Language Although coming from a non–English speaking country, knowledge of English among Iranian immigrants is impressive and is undoubtedly related to their exposure to Western education. Nevertheless, like many of the other newly arrived immigrant groups, they prefer to use their own native language. More than 80 percent of Iranian American households in the United States communicate in both English and Persian. About 20 percent communicate only in English. The preference of Iranian Americans to speak Persian amongst themselves
Hossein Hejdazi, program director and talk show host at KIRN-AM, a Farsi-language radio station, poses at the console at his studio in Los Angeles, June 14, 2007. (AP Photo/Reed Saxon)
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indicates a renewed pride in their own cultural heritage as a response to the threat to their cultural identity posed by the Islamization of Iran and as an ironic by-product of successful integration—assimilation breeds nostalgia. Most Iranian Americans are bilingual. Some even speak other languages, such as French and German, but the majority of the second-generation Iranian Americans speak only English, except for some occasional Persian words or terms of affection. Another novel development that serves to mark a sense of Persian identity and community is the establishment of Persian language programs in every area in which Iranian Americans reside. It seems that the phenomenon of language loyalty found in some other immigrant groups has also prevailed among Iranian Americans. This renewed interest in teaching Persian to children who live in a cultural milieu that contains no significant elements of their own cultural heritage, a sense of ethnic identity, does seem to develop at an early age. Iranian Americans are fiercely proud of the continuity and stability of their language, and much debate persists about why and how Iranian parents should speak mostly, if not all, Persian at home.
Foodways Food habits are among the most persistent of all cultural patterns. Iranian food is diverse and reflects the diversity of Iranian society. Iranian immigrants have brought their Iranian cuisine to the United States, and it has quickly become one of the most popular ethnic foods in the country. Iranians in the United States, particularly the first generation, are extremely in love with their own native cuisines. Persian food is considered by many to be one of the most balanced and satisfying diets in the world. It is not surprising then that Iranian grocery stores and restaurants specializing in Iranian food products were among the first Iranian-owned businesses to open in Los Angeles, where a large number of Iranians have settled. The number of Iranian restaurants in America has doubled in the last 10 years. Iranian restaurants have been successful in comparison to other restaurants in the United States serving the ethnic cuisine of the most recent immigrants. Nearly all Iranian dishes are accompanied by rice, which is made with saffron to add color and flavor. Vegetables (including raw onions and greens, or sabzi) and fresh fruits are also an essential part of Iranian cuisine. Chelo kabab, khoresht sabzi, and fesenjan are the most favored dishes among Iranians. Younger Iranian Americans, who are born and raised in the United States, typically have the most diverse food habits, including the usual attraction to popular American fast foods. However, most Iranian Americans still prefer Iranian food most of all.
Music and the Arts Another integrating feature of the Iranian American community is Persian music. Iran has a great musical tradition, closely linked to poetry and mysticism. Yet, after
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the 1979 revolution, the Iranian government banned music, viewing it as a means of promoting the “decadent” culture of the West. At the present time, only certain types of music are allowed in Iran, and anyone caught in possession of nonpermitted music, such as pop music tapes and CDs, is treated as a criminal. However, the musical heritage that Iranian immigrants brought with them to the United States is rich and diverse. As a medium of subcultural expression, traditional Persian music reinforces a sense of ethnic identity and group consciousness among Iranian immigrants. The forced emigration of Iranian musicians and singers added another important communal focus for Iranians in the United States. Today, there are several centers whose purpose is to promote Iranian traditional music. In the absence of physical proximity, these cultural institutions provide the primary component of Iranian identity, and, like poetry reading nights, respond to the immigrants’ psychological needs. The Iranian community’s sphere of interest in the arts is growing, as evidenced by the two to three exhibits in New York City that occur every several months. Today, Iranian American artists, whose art works are inspired by Persian epics and landscapes, find their American home at major galleries in New York and Los Angeles.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Intergroup Relations Generally, Iranian Americans are not strangers in their new environment. Throughout their period of studentship or internship, they have familiarized themselves with the larger society. That is, they have become immigrants in this country. Iranian immigrants who have had an American education enjoy a greater opportunity for social contact with Americans. As a group of professionals, Iranian Americans have regular face-to-face contact with out-group individuals. However, most of these relations are based on secondary contacts, in which they are related by a single role relationship. However, those Iranian Americans who have married non-Iranians and achieved marital assimilation have an extended relationship with the host group. Based on a recent survey taken in New Jersey in 2005, there are a relatively high number of marriages between Iranians and non-Iranians. It is estimated that almost 50 percent of marriages between 1995 and 2007 are intercultural marriages. This figure shows that a large percentage of second-generation Iranians are structurally assimilated individuals.
Forging a New American Political Identity After over two decades of largely abstaining from organized political activity, Iranian Americans are beginning to seek a voice in American political affairs. In the last 10 years, Iranian branches of the two major political parties have been established. In 2003, two prominent Iranian Americans ran in the recall election for
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governor of California. A few years earlier, another Iranian American was a GOP candidate for Maryland’s Senate seat. In 2005, the first Iranian American woman ran for a seat in Congress from Oregon. Politically, Iranian Americans are still one of the least organized ethnic groups, but one of the potentially most powerful. Even in the areas with high concentrations of Iranian immigrants, like Los Angeles, Iranian American candidates have so far had little success in uniting the Iranian vote behind them. However, there are indications that Iranian Americans have come of age in terms of political participation and community empowerment. The election and reelection of an Iranian American as the mayor of Beverly Hills (2007) symbolizes the growing influence of the Iranian community of that area. By some accounts, Iranians comprise as much as 15 to 20 percent of Beverly Hills’s 35,000 residents, which is also a telling sign of the fact that the Iranian community is growing and integrating with the broader mainstream population. The year 2008 was indisputably the Iranian American community’s coming of political age. For the first time, a significant number of prominent Iranian Americans became actively involved in fundraising efforts for political candidates. There was also a large scale of community participation in the U.S. presidential election. For example, in New York and New Jersey, second-generation Iranians were visibly active, not only in voting in favor of their own candidates, but also in volunteering as campaign workers, poll watchers, and election judges. The most significant political development has been the establishment of the Iranian American Political Action Committee (IAPAC). The goal of IAPAC is to insure that Iranian Americans have an influential voice and presence in the American electoral and legislative process. Today, the leading Iranian American political group is the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (PAAIA). It seeks to achieve its mission through three major areas of activity: community-building, image-building and influence-building. The PAAIA is a new public affairs organization that seeks to represent the interests of the Iranian American community with U.S. policy makers, the media, and the American public. The PAAIA has produced an even greater momentum among the second generation of Iranian Americans. It is likely that during the next decade, the bipartisan nature of these political organizations will play a major role in the empowerment of the Iranian American community.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Children born in America to Iranian or Iranian American parents, or those who are brought to America young enough to receive their early socialization here, may be considered second-generation Iranian Americans. Currently, a profound
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demographic change is taking place in the Iranian American community. With regard to the generational change, in 2000 only 20 percent of the Iranians in the United States were American-born, while based on a New Jersey survey of Iranians in 2007, the American-born were estimated at 55 percent. In addition, there are about 10 percent who are considered one-and-a-half generation Iranians. They are generally the Iranian-born who came to America in their early teens and have become bicultural through school and work. Most members of the second generation of Iranian Americans are today of school age or older. As a whole, the younger generation of Iranian Americans does not share the same historical and cultural context as the older generation. Therefore, for some, being Iranian American is not a fixed state of being, something given to them by their parents. For this group, arguments on cultural authenticity or inauthenticity have no intellectual merit. The younger generation is decidedly American in their outlook, values, and attitudes. Even though they have a sensibility that is uniquely Iranian American and have a renewed pride in their cultural heritage, for the most part they think of Iran as simply the country from which their parents came. There is a fair amount of evidence that a sense of Iranianness or Persian pride exists at the forefront of most of the Iranian American second generation’s collective consciousness. Regarding ethnic self-identification, the second-generation respondents to the New Jersey survey in 2005 were asked, “How do you think of yourself?” Only 10 percent of the sample stated that they were American, and 20 percent said they were Iranian or Persian. The majority of the sample (70 percent) identified themselves as Iranian Americans, Persian Americans, or American Iranians. Obviously, these finding are suggestive of a significant degree of ethnic identification or Iranianness among the second generation of Iranian Americans. However, in an earlier study in 1988, only about 30 percent of the same age group identified themselves as Iranian Americans. It seems that many of the second generation have come all the way from shame to pride. During the hostage crisis, a large number of second-generation Iranian Americans found themselves subjected to negative comments and reactions because of their ethnic background and were therefore less likely to assert themselves as Iranian Americans. In the New Jersey survey in 2005, in response to the question of “who am I?,” most acknowledged stages of change in their attitudes toward Iran, from the age of 12 when they denied their origins to the age of 13 when they began to feel a sense of pride in attending Persian classes and having coethnic friends and peers and sensing a double strength in their two cultures. Empirical evidence indicates that for a large number of young Iranian Americans, the college years have had significant power in shaping their Iranian American identities. In fact, it is during the college years that, through involvement in Persian clubs, young Iranian Americans rediscover their roots and heritage and begin to feel comfortable about embracing their hyphenated identity.
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Youth Profile Proud to be an Iranian American: Two Cultures Becoming One This profile is by Pardis, a young Iranian American woman, on first realizing what it means to be an Iranian American. It’s all I thought it was going to be; just a visit. Just a visit that was going to make me miss school for a month. Little did I know then as a 13-year-old Iranian American that this visit was going to be a great turning point in my life. I was born in America but I lived in Iran until I finished first grade. That’s when my family left Iran to go to the “Land of Opportunity”—America. I hadn’t gone back to Iran until this trip. Because of the experiences I had during this visit in Iran, my expectations of myself changed drastically, and my perception (Courtesy of Esmat Ansari) of Iran and its wonderful people changed as well. One of the most important experiences I had was when I went outside and walked among everyday Iranians. It was very hard for me to believe that even though the government had set such strict rules for them, the people still managed to be high-spirited, optimistic, and grateful. On the airplane ride on the way back home, my mother was talking about her mother, who had passed away while we were in the United States. That is when I fully appreciated the sacrifices that she and my father had made just so my brother and I could have better educational opportunities. Before this trip, I hadn’t been exactly proud of being Iranian, thanks to the “objective” Western media at that time.However, I now found myself filled with nothing but pride and respect for my heritage. After this trip when people asked me who I was, without hesitating, I always said Iranian American.
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Like all immigrant groups, Iranian Americans feel torn between their parents’ traditions and their American culture. However, it seems that the length of residency, place of residency, the media’s image of Iran and Iranians, family context, school location, and population size all influence patterns of ethnic identification (Iranianness). Findings indicate that those second-generation Iranian Americans who were adolescents at the time of the 1979 revolution felt the greatest ambivalence about their identity. The age group over 40, who were too young to have had an independent life in Iran but too old to feel completely at home in America, are the social type who experienced a situation of dual marginality. While there are unifying features that make an Iranian identity possible, various religious subgroups living in the United States also display distinct features that make broad generalizations about Iranian Americans problematic. The main reason for such a high degree of ethnic revivalism among the younger generation is that in the last 15 years, through a process of reverse assimilation, they have become increasingly reintegrated into the Iranian communities in the United States. Their expression of Iranianness is evident in their voluntary participation in Now-Ruz celebrations, the annual Persian parade in New York City, political demonstrations (solidarity with other Iranian people), enrollment in Persian language classes at their colleges or universities, willingness to visit and revisit Iran, writing and publishing of memoirs, construction of and interest in Web sites on Iran and Iranian culture, organization and involvement in annual conferences such as Iranian Alliances Across the Borders (IAAB), creation of summer camps (Ayandeh camp for young Iranian Americans), and creation of Persian music bands and artistic works with Persian influences. However, the assimilation (called Americanization by Iranian parents) that the first generation of Iranians in the United States had feared is well underway. Yet, what the Iranian parents had not foreseen was that this assimilation is not a straightline process. It is a process of reverse assimilation, meaning that while their children become fully assimilated, they are also reclaiming their Iranianness. The second generation of Iranian Americans have not only reclaimed their cultural heritage, but also have come to recreate an ethnic identity that is both Iranian and American. Unlike the second generation of the earlier immigrants in America, for whom assimilation was the goal, for the second generation of Iranian Americans who are already fully assimilated, the goal is to keep alive the consciousness of their Persian heritage in the process of integration. In other words, for the second generation of Iranian Americans, the process of assimilation and maintenance of symbolic ethnicity go hand-in-hand. A more tolerant and pluralistic America, as well as the new era of globalization, notably the diffusion of personal computers around the world, including Iran, have allowed children of high-status immigrants like Iranians to have an experience of reverse assimilation (Bozorgmehr 1988). Additionally, those who identify themselves as Iranian American view their hyphenated identity as a positive one. In the past, Iranian immigrants might have underplayed their ethnic
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background to succeed. Today, however, the children and grandchildren of Iranian immigrants celebrate their ethnicity. Another interesting phenomenon has been the changing nature of Iranianness. The change has been from traditional Iranianness (being Iranian), in which proficiency in the Persian language is a necessity, to symbolic Iranianness (feeling Iranian), which is characteristic of the American-born generation of Iranian Americans, though the distinctions are not absolute. The symbolic Iranians conceive of their hyphenated identity as a choice, expressed in terms of pride in their Persian heritage and strong feelings toward the people and culture of Iran. However, this attachment or sense of belongingness is different from the attachment of the earlier generation. The American-born generation keeps a distance from the sentimental attachment their parents have with their homeland. What is evident is that a new definition of Iranianness is emerging from second-generation Iranian Americans. In this new definition, proficiency in the Persian language and observation of Persian mannerisms are not necessarily determining factors. As one respondent in the 2005 New Jersey survey stated, “For us, the Persian language, while very important, does not occupy as high of a place as it does for our parents.” However, an overwhelming number of the second-generation respondents said that they would insist that their children preserve their Persian heritage. They are Iranian in their own terms. For the second generation of Iranian Americans, their ethnic community does not exist in a fixed or identifiable location. It is a form of consciousness, a widely variable set of loyalties and personal identities. For those immigrant children who have no actual memories of Iran, a constructed memory of what Iran means is the basis for their identity. Almost three decades after the making of the Iranian American community, a new generation of Iranians is growing in numbers and asserting itself as a hyphenated new ethnic category. The second generation of Iranian Americans will continue to be shaped by their American social context rather than their parents’ memories of Iran or their cultural expectations.
Educational Attainment Second-generation Iranian Americans have demonstrated a strong commitment to pursuing higher education. According to the New Jersey survey in 2006, almost 99 percent of high school graduates in the survey finished at least four years of college. Currently, many of the best universities and colleges have a disproportionately large number of Iranian Americans. These students are pursuing more diverse majors and professional interests than the generation before them. While the first generation of Iranian Americans traditionally felt most comfortable entering fields of medicine and technology, the second generation is now more independently pursuing careers in the social sciences, law, liberal arts, media, and communication, in addition to the traditional sciences.
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Empirical observations (through multiyear New Jersey surveys) indicate that almost all of the one-and-a-half generation and second generation of Iranians have “made it,” in the sense that they have gained admission to highly selective institutions of higher education. They are the most highly educated and most advantaged in their cohort of the new immigrant group. Thus, many will be at the core of the future Iranian American elite. Among the younger generation of Iranian Americans, the one-and-a-half generation has been highly successful in obtaining the highest degrees and professional positions in American society. Today, they are partners at prestigious law firms, physicians with distinctions, young professors, senior executives at Fortune 500 companies, professional athletes, a founder of Google, an eBay inventor, philanthropists, editors, senior correspondents, and chief economists, to name a few. This success has been achieved despite three decades of antagonistic relationships between the Iranian and American governments. Based on a recent media report, young Iranian American professionals have outstripped most other recent immigrants in occupational achievements and education.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Iran Anti-Iranian Reaction in America Few ethnic out-group relations in the United States have had a more positive beginning than that which characterized the experience of the Iranian immigrants from 1950 to 1979. Prior to November 4, 1979, when a group of radical students took over the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran and America were close friends. America’s attitude toward Iranians in America was positive, resulting primarily from the medical and educational services of Iranian immigrants in the United States. From 1950 to 1979, an estimated 800,000 to 850,000 Americans had visited or lived in Iran, whether as teachers, health care workers, Peace Corps volunteers, scholars, or diplomats. These Americans returning from Iran had often expressed their admiration for the Iranian people. During the same period, Iranian people also had a positive and even welcoming attitude toward America and Americans. Iranians saw America as a liberating force whose influence would protect Iran from its traditional enemies (Britain and the former Soviet Union). However, Iranian attitudes toward America changed dramatically after the American role in the overthrow of Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq (in August 1953) and the restoration of the shah. U.S. foreign policy, not the American people, created a strong undercurrent of anti-Americanism among Iranians. This anti-Americanism was increasingly intensified by America’s close relationship with the shah, whom the Iranian intelligentsia considered a despotic client of the United States. It was
1098 | Iranian Immigrants
actually during the antimonarchial revolutionary movement of 1978–1979, with its sharp anti-American edge, that Iranian anti-Americanism reached its apex, as demonstrated by the hostage crisis of 1979. During the hostage crisis, Iran and Iranians were consistently in the headlines, and this provoked a considerable amount of anti-Iranian immigrant sentiment among Americans, a prejudice almost nonexistent prior to that time. The hostage crisis was primarily provoked by the actions of the radical Islamists in Iran. It brought about a new era in Iranian American relations—an era still dominated by hatred, distrust, violence, and the most adverse consequences for Iranian Americans. During the entire 14 months of the crisis, “Death to America” became increasingly intertwined in the ritualistic chants of the religious masses in Tehran, Iran. Thus, a wave of anti-Iranian sentiment swept across America, and the hatred of Iranians grew fast and deep among Americans. A Harris Poll taken in February 1987 showed that a majority of Americans named only one country as “the enemy,” which was Iran. Another major event that fueled the anti-Iranian, anti-Muslim feeling in the United States was the publication of Not without My Daughter in 1984. This book, and especially its 1991 movie adaptation, were met with angry reaction from Iranian Americans offended by what they considered a biased depiction of their culture. The movie was also criticized as an utter artistic failure for its reliance on cultural stereotypes. Caryn James of The New York Times, in a review, stated that the movie exploited the stereotype of the demonic Iranian. Iranians generally thought that the movie portrayed them as mean, rude, brutal, and uncivilized. Consequently, in a manner reminiscent of the experience of Japanese Americans in the 1940s, Iranians residing in the United States became the immediate targets of American anger and frustration. Paradoxically, Iranian immigrants and the political refugees who allied themselves with Americans against the extremist religious government in Iran felt that Americans resented them and unfairly blamed them for the hostage crisis. The anti-Iranian reaction was so widespread that it forced many Iranian Americans to either change their names or misrepresent their ethnic identity, because one’s Iranian identity was a stigma to be hidden or evaded as much as possible. To avoid potential confrontations and differential treatment, most Iranian Americans started to call themselves Persian Americans. Anti-Iranian reactions and negative characterization had a damaging effect on the psyche of Iranians, and particularly their children. The psychological damage done to second-generation Iranians, possibly irreversible, was evident when Iranian American children began to display feelings of inferiority and insecurity. This negative characterization of Iranian and Islamic culture was again reinforced following the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Despite the Iranian Americans’ high rate of citizenship at the time and their remarkable contributions toward building a better American society, Iranian Americans yet again became victims of defamation, negative media stereotyping, and discrimination. Widely-used phrases such as “Iran or Iranians supporting terrorism” and “Iranian behavior” by the American
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media and even American officials created an atmosphere in which Iranian Americans became victims of unjustifiable harassment and restriction. In December 2003, the Iranian community in Los Angeles was outraged when men from some Muslim countries including Iran were ordered to register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Reportedly, several hundred Iranians residing in Los Angeles, including many Iranian Jews, were detained on visa violations. Most were eventually released, but Iranian Americans came “to realize that the strategy of passing as non-Iranians or disassociating themselves from the Iranian regime does not protect them against hostility in the United States” (Bozorgmehr 2007). According to PAAIA, nearly half of the Iranian Americans surveyed in 2008 by ZAGBY International have themselves experienced or personally know another Iranian American who has experienced discrimination because of his or her ethnicity or country of origin. The most common types of discrimination reported are being stopped at the airport, employment or business discrimination, social discrimination, racial profiling, and discrimination at the hands of immigration officials. To increase awareness of the rise in discrimination against the Iranian American community, Congress member Martin Meehan, a member of the House Judiciary Committee, on July 1, 2005, introduced a House resolution condemning bigotry, violence, and discrimination against Iranian Americans. However, it is important to note that the estrangement and animosity was always between the governments of Iran and the United States due to their foreign policies. Despite three decades of estrangement between the two governments, from the hostage-taking to the “Axis of Evil” and more recently the depiction of Iran as the “nuclear pariah,” the dominant orientation of the Iranians (particularly the generation of the revolution, who grew up after 1979 and account for more than two-thirds of Iran’s population), has been one of respect and admiration for the United States and its people. Iranians living under the repressive regime that had long demonized the United States as the “Great Satan” and presented it as a scapegoat for all of Iran’s troubles called America the “fortune land.” In fact, Iranian have remained the most pro-American people in the Muslim world. After the tragedy of September 11, Iranian people were the only people in Islamic society that held a candlelight vigil as an act of solidarity with the American people. Moreover, in the United States, the Iranian community was among the very first ethnic groups that condemned the terrorist act and showed its support by contributing to the World Trade Center Relief Fund. The Iranian American community of New York had a one-page advertisement on the first page of The New York Times expressing profound sadness and condemning the attacks as a vicious criminal act. However, despite Iranians’ love for America, they are frustrated with or even angry about U.S. policy toward their country, which they tend to see as unjustly threatening and hostile. In the words of President Obama, “common humanities” bind the two people together. The fact that Iranians have had a special place in their hearts for American core values at least in part reflects the common grounds between the two cultures.
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Sa’di, a poet of Iran, probably better than anyone, captured the spirit behind the cultural affinity of Iranians for American values. He wrote, “We are all one by one by creation, bound together at limbs in a body, should one part ache, the rest would suffer as well.” Former Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas once stated that “Persians are spiritually close kin to Americans.” More recently, former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright has acknowledged this common ground by saying that “both are idealistic, proud, family-oriented, spiritually aware and fiercely opposed to foreign domination.”
Iranian Americans and Home Politics Historically, Iranian immigrants as a group have lacked a united political front regarding politics in Iran. However, the self-exiled Iranians throughout these years have maintained a “mission” orientation—a national commitment toward an eventual return to Iran. Having remained divided and disillusioned, this mission orientation did not function as an organizational element in the Iranian diaspora in the United States. However, in the last few years, the situation of disengagement from politics in Iran has changed to a certain degree. Since 1999, as the student uprisings in Iran have received more international attention, Iranians in the United States, regardless of political orientation, have come together as a national group and have become an outpost of the democratic movement in Iran.
Three generations of Iranian Americans celebrate Now-Ruz (Persian New Year), around the Haftsin table, with lights, flowers and sweets in Milburn, New Jersey, March 2010. (Courtesy of Alireza Tarighian)
Issues in Relations between the United States and Iran | 1101
As of June 2009, this situation drastically changed, and an unprecedented wave of citizen activism was born within Iranian American communities throughout the nation. As a reaction to the violent crackdown against protesters in Iran, Iranian American communities organized rallies and demonstrations, and the community, once again similar to the anti-shah demonstration of the late 1970s, became an active outpost for the Iranian democratic movement in Iran. This unexpected political activism is a telling sign that Iranian Americans’ main concern is still the politics of Iran, the very political situation that pushed them to emigrate in the first place. The large majority of Iranian Americans, based on a recent letter-writing campaign to Congress, do not, however, support confrontational approaches in how the United States should deal with the political situation in Iran. Likewise, Iranians are overwhelmingly in favor of Iran normalizing relations with the United States but oppose any level of military action against their homeland, where they still possess family and cultural ties.
Forecasts for the 21st Century The most remarkable achievement of the last century for Iranian immigrants has been the making of the Iranian community in America. As the 21st century progresses, qualitative and quantitative developments of the Iranian American community, at least in part, will be determined by political changes in Iran. If and when
To “Go Iranian” Means to Protest “Finally, a positive image of Iranians as proud, patriotic, courageous and prodemocracy people.” According to a recent blog entry posted on the Huffington Post by a New York City high school teacher, “Iran” has now become a verb. Below is the text of the blog entry: The word Iran has become a verb For any Iranians: I teach at a NYC high school, and recently one student stood up to our very intimidating principal, (something that almost never happens). When he did not get permission for what he intended another student said, “Let’s go Iranian on him.” By that he means organize a protest. And so now they “Iran” anything they want to change. So it has become a verb now and to “Iran” the situation is to stand up to authority, well at least here in this corner of the universe. And it is a huge bonus for me because I cannot usually get them to even pay attention to another part of the world. Point being, even these students who get very small amounts of news equate “Iranian” with bravery and I completely agree, and wish I had that kind of intestinal fortitude.
1102 | Iranian Immigrants
major democratic changes take place in Iran, there is most likely going to be a degree of reemigration of Iranian Americans to Iran. Those who will return home will share the wealth of their experiences, and thus, Iran will harvest the fruits of its diaspora. The 21st century will also provide an opportunity for history to catch up with the long-term magnitude of Iranians’ contributions to America. Regarding the Iranian American community, second-generation Iranian Americans are likely to become increasingly more politically involved and to have a forceful voice in the American electoral and legislative process.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics
Table 160 Asylum applications granted to Iranian nationals 1999 to 2008 Year 1999
1,004
2000
1,057
2001
1,119
2002
908
2003
536
2004
405
2005
285
2006
254
2007
279
2008
408
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS).
Table 161 Naturalizations of Iranian nationals 1999 to 2008 Number of Iranian Year
Naturalizations
1999
18,205
2000
19,171
2001
13,834
2002
11,773
2003
10,782
2004
11,781
2005
11,031
2006
11,363
2007
10,557
2008
11,813
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS).
Table 162 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and Country of Birth Total Iran
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
8,487
10,425
12,960
7,230
10,434
13,887
13,947
10,460
13,852
18,553
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher Percent of 25+ Age Group 70% 57%
60% 47%
50% 40% 30% 21%
24%
20% 10% 0% Cuban Americans
US
Chinese Americans
Iranian Americans
Figure 18 Bachelor’s degree or higher, percentage of 25+ age group. Source: 2000 U.S. Census.
Median Household Income $70,000 $59,000
$60,000 $51,000 $50,000 $42,000 $40,000
$37,000
$30,000 $20,000 $10,000 $0 Cuban Americans
US
Figure 19 Median household income. Source: 2000 U.S. Census.
Chinese Americans
Iranian Americans
1106 | Iranian Immigrants Table 163 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009, leading states of residence: Region/country: Iran Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
18,553
9,002
9,551
279
146
133
Arizona California
11,227
5,420
5,807
Colorado
124
62
62
Florida
310
143
167
Georgia
333
166
167
Illinois
322
167
155
Maryland
531
256
275
Massachusetts
208
92
116
Michigan
105
51
54
Minnesota
99
50
49
171
96
75
Nevada New Jersey
198
98
100
New York
495
245
250
North Carolina
164
78
86
Ohio
133
61
72
Pennsylvania
120
62
58
1,481
741
740
Texas Virginia
658
311
347
Washington
371
186
185
1,224
571
653
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix III: Notable Iranian Americans Although Iranians are a comparatively small group, their contributions to science, business, education, and government are perhaps equal to that of the larger ethnic groups in the United States. Christiane Amanpour has been an international correspondent for 18 years and is currently working for CNN. She has reported on many major crises from around the world, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans, and the United States during Hurricane Katrina. Anousheh Ansari became famous for being the first female private space explorer. A successful entrepreneur, Ansari is the fourth private explorer to visit space and the first astronaut of Iranian descent.
Glossary | 1107
Reza Badiyi is one of the most prolific television directors in America, having directed more hours of TV programming than any other person. Dr. Hamid Biglari is currently a vice-chairman and a Senior Leadership Committee member of Citicorp, the main operating arm of Citigroup, a $60 billion revenue business with operations in over 100 countries. Nariman Farvardin is currently president at Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New Jersey. Formerly Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs and Provost at the University of Maryland, College Park. Farvardin holds a PhD degree in Electrical Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Dr. Akbar Ghahary is the owner of several international patents (in polymers and advanced composites) and currently the CEO and chairman of the board of Safas Corporation, an equity partner with General Electric Capital Corporation. Mahin Khatamee founded Banou Inc., an Iranian American women’s organization, in late 1980s. Based in New Jersey, Banou is a nonprofit, nonpolitical, and nonreligious charitable organization that strives to promote Iranian culture within the Iranian American community. Omid Kordestani served as the senior vice president for Worldwide Sales and Field Operations of Google until April 2009. Dr. Firouz Naderi is the associate director of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). He led programs that included the successful landing of the Mars Exploration Rovers, Spirit, and Opportunity. Azar Nafisi is the best-seller author of Reading Lolita in Tehran and most recently Things I’ve Been Silent About: Memories. Shirin Neshat is a contemporary visual artist who lives in New York. She is known primarily for her work in film, video, and photography. Pierre Omidyar is the inventor of eBay and has been named one of the top 15 people “Who Make America Great” by Newsweek. He is currently a full-time philanthropist and founder of Family Foundation, a $10 billion foundation to “help people tap into their own power.” Atoosa Rubenstein served as the editor-in-chief of Seventeen magazine. She was also the founding editor of CosmoGIRL! and is currently the founder of Big Momma Productions, Inc., and Atoosa.com.
Glossary Ashena-i-biganeh: Familiar stranger. Now-Ruz: New year. Sofreh Haftsin: A table decorated with seven items all starting with the letter “s.” Ta’arof: Iranian etiquette.
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References Ansari, Abdolmaboud. 1988. The Iranian Immigrants in the U.S.: A Case Study of Dual Marginality. New York: Associated Faculty Press. Ansari, Maboud. 1992. The Making of the Iranian Community in America. New York: Pardis Press. Ansari, Maboud. 2005. “From Immigrant to Ethnic: Iranian Americans.” Mirase Iran 39(Spring): 28–31. Ansari, Maboud. 2006. “Iranian American Identify.” Iran Times 115: 10–12. Bozorgmehr, M., ed. 1998. “Iranians in America.” Iranian Studies 31(Spring): 3–95. Bozorgmehr, Mahdi. 2007. “Iranian Immigrants.” In The New Americans, edited by Mary Waters and Reed Veda, 150–95. Cambridge, MA. Bozorgmehr, Mahdi, and G. Sabagh. 1988. “High Status Immigrants: A Statistical Profile of Iranians in the U.S.” Iranian Studies 21: 4–34. Katouzian, Homa, and Hossein Shahidi. 2008. Iran in the 21st Century: Political, Economic and Conflict. New York: Routledge. Mobasher, Mohsen. 2006. “Migration and Entrepreneurship: Iranian Ethnic Economy in the U.S.” In Handbook of Research on Ethnic Minority Entrepreneurship, edited by Dana Lee-paul, 297–306. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Morgan, David. 1987. Medieval Persia 1040–1797. Essex, England: Pearson. Rahni, Davood N. 2007. “The Fourth Annual Persian Parade in New York City Draws Huge Enthusiastic Crowd.” March 27. Payvand.com. [Online article accessed 3/27/07.] http:// www.payvand.com/news/07/mar/1327.html.
Further Reading Abrahamian, Ervand. 2009. A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Abrahamian traces Iran’s modern history in the 20th century, through the discovery of oil, imperial actions, the Pahlavis’ rule, and the revolution and birth of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Abrahamian, Ervand. 1982. Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Abrahamian discusses Iranian society and politics during the period between the constitutional revolution of 1905–1909 and the Islamic revolution of 1977–1979. Bill, James, A. 1988. Eagle and Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Bill provides a thorough analysis of the American–Iran connection from its beginning in 1835. Dabashi, Hamid. 1992. Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. New York: New York University Press.
Further Reading | 1109 Dabashi examines the ideological foundations of the Islamic revolution, with particular attention to the most notable and enduring consequences for radical Islamic revivalism in the entire Muslim world. Dollafar, Arlene. 1994. “Iranian Women as Immigrant Entrepreneurs.” Gender and Society 8: 541–61. Dollafar illustrates how ethnic resources are gender specific, and that there is differential access to these resources in the ethnic economy, by examining two case studies of women’s entrepreneurial endeavors in family-run businesses and in home-operated businesses. Hanassab, Shideh. 1987. “Acculturation and Young Iranian Women: Attitudes Toward Sex Role and Intimate Relationships.” Journal of Psychology 127: 565–71. Hanassab’s study examines the acculturation of Iranian women into the American culture of Los Angeles, California, their attitude toward the role of women, and their attitude toward intimate relationships. Hillmann, Michael C. 1990. Iranian Culture: A Persianist View. New York: University Press of America. Hillmann focuses on leading Persian authors and classic literary works in attempting to discern enduring cultural features and values. Karim, Perssis, and Mehdi M. Khorrami, eds. 1999. A World Between: Poems, Stories and Essays by Iranian Americans. New York: George Braziller. Karim and Khorrami’s anthology includes stories, essays, and poems by more than 30 first-and second-generation Iranian Americans, set against the backdrop of the Islamic revolution in Iran and refugee life in America. Katouzian, Homa. 2003. Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society. New York: Routedge. Katouzian elaborates on his theory of arbitrary state and society in Iran, and its applications to Iranian history and politics, both modern and traditional. Kelley, Ron, and Jonathan Friedlander, eds. 1993. Iranjeles: Iranians in Los Angeles. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Kelley and Friedlander explore Iranian life and activities in the metropolitan Los Angeles area. Kinzer, Stephen. 2005. All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Kinzer reconstructs the CIA’s 1953 overthrow of the elected leader of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh. Mackey, Sandra. 1996. The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation. New York: The Penguin Group. Mackey chronicles the history of the Iranian people, from the “glory days” of Persia to the overthrow of Mohammed Reza Shah and the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Milani, Farzaneh. 1992. Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
1110 | Iranian Immigrants Milani illustrates that in Iran the 19th-century movement to unveil was closely linked to women’s emergence as literary figures. Nafisi, Azar. 2002. Reading Lolita in Tehran. New York: Random House. Nafisi’s memoir chronicles the true story of young women in the Islamic Republic of Iran who met in secret each week to read and discuss forbidden Western classics. Pinault, David. 1992. The Shiites: Ritual and Popular Piety in a Muslim Community. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Pinault provides an overview of the history, beliefs, practices, and various sects of Shiite Islam, with particular emphasis on the Shi’ites in Hyderabad, India. Sabagh, Georges, and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. 1987. “Are the Characteristics of Exiles Different from Immigrants?” Sociology and Social Research 10(January): 75–95. Sabagh and Bozorgmehr examine the demographic, religious, and socioeconomic differences between immigrants and political refugees or exiles from Iran in Los Angeles, California. Takeyh, Ray. 1990. Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Takeyh critically examines American–Iranian relations since the 1979 revolution. Tavakoli-Targhi, Mohamad. 2001. Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism and Historiography. New York: Palgrave. Tavakoli-Targhi argues for a radical rewriting of Iranian history, with profound implications for Islamic debates on gender. Wright, Robin. 1989. In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decades. New York: Simon and Schuster. Wright tells the story of the first decade of Khomeini’s Islamic revolution and explains Iran’s position in the Middle East, distinguished by its history, ethnic identity, and religious character. Zonis, Marvin. 1991. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Zonis addresses four basic elements of the shah’s psychological character (belief in divine protection, identification with other powerful people, sharing the strength of others, belief in the adoration of the Iranian people) and documents his deterioration, which began with the discovery of his cancer.
Iraqi Immigrants by Mary C. Sengstock
Introduction Iraqis represent one of America’s smallest ethnic groups, numbering less than 300,000 persons. Iraqis have been coming to the United States since the early 1900s, prior to the establishment of Iraq as an independent nation. Throughout its highly varied history, Iraq has been home to a wide variety of peoples. In today’s world, this translates into widely disparate religious and linguistic groups. Immigration from Iraq has varied throughout the past century, depending on conditions in the country of origin, as well as changes in American immigration laws. Consequently, Iraqi-Americans do not form a single cultural entity, being divided along religious, linguistic, and historical dimensions. All of these issues will be detailed in the following discussion.
Chronology B.C.E
Mesopotamia settled in Tigris and Euphrates valleys; occupied by Akkadians, Sumerians, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Babylonians, and Jews.
First century C.E.
Most residents of the area converted to Christianity, establishing Christian churches.
Seventh century C.E.
Conversion of most residents of the area to Islam. Karbala battle and formation of the Shi’a sect of Islam.
16th and 17th centuries
Occupation of the area by the Ottoman Empire.
19th century
British colonialism, including Protestant missionary activity, in area.
ca. 1910
Earliest immigrants from Iraq arrive in United States; most are Christians and a few are Jews.
1914
Hostilities in area involving local, British, and Ottoman forces. 1111
Chronology | 1113
1918
British protectorate over the area; Iraq’s population approximately three million, primarily Muslims, and including a portion of Kurdistan; Christians and Jews involved in British colonial government.
1921
Passage of legislation in the United States establishing the quota system, and limiting the number of Iraqi immigrants admitted to 100 per year; preference for relatives of citizens limits the immigration primarily to Christians.
1932
Iraq established as an independent nation by League of Nations.
1939–1945
World War II.
1948
Establishment of the nation of Israel, generating animosity against Jews in Iraq, and leading many to emigrate, mainly to Israel, but also to United States; diminished hopes of Kurds for an independent homeland; rise of the Ba’th Party in Syria, with influence in Iraq and other Arab nations; student visas also became available in the United States, increasing the number of young Iraqi immigrants, most Christian.
1965
Passage of the Immigration Act permits more Iraqis to enter United States.
1968
Saddam Hussein assumes control of Iraq; new immigration law in United States, allowing more immigrants from Iraq.
1973
Kurdish uprising in Iraq, causing continued ethnic unrest.
1980
War between Iraq and Iran, generating further ethnic hostilities between Sunnis/Shiites and Iraqis/Kurds; Muslims vs. Christians and Jews; impetus for increased emigration by Christians and Shiite Muslims.
1990
Iraqi forces invade Kuwait; United States and Western powers intervene on behalf of Kuwait, forcing Iraq to withdraw; continued ethnic hostilities in Iraq; sanctions against Iraq impede reconstruction; further impetus for immigration, and producing many refugees; major influx of Iraqi Shiites into United States begins; U.S. Census shows 44,916 Iraqi immigrants living in United States.
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2000
U.S. Census shows 89,892 Iraqi immigrants living in United States.
2003
U.S. invasion of Iraq and fall of Saddam Hussein’s government; U.S. occupation of Iraq; more refugees and increased impetus for immigration, primarily of Christians and Shiite Muslims.
2009
Iraqi Chaldeans estimate their population at 150,000; entire Iraqi-American population estimated at 245,000 to 265,000.
2010
United States ends major military involvement in Iraq.
Background Geography of Iraq Modern-day Iraq occupies the site of ancient Mesopotamia, a name that means “land between two rivers”: the Tigris and Euphrates. The name Iraq similarly refers to the river location. This area has often been viewed as the “cradle of civilization,” in which the earliest cultures leading to Western civilization developed. Iraq is bounded by Syria and Jordan on the west, Turkey on the north, Iran on the east, and Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait on the south. In the pre-Christian era, it was home to a wide variety of cultural groups, including the Akkadians, Sumerians, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Babylonians. Major cities included Ur, Babylon, Assur, and Nineveh. Ruins of these early settlements have been uncovered throughout Iraq. Jews also lived in Mesopotamia from preChristian times, a result of their capture by the Babylonians. Small communities of these cultural groups have continued to live in what is now Iraq since these early times. Throughout most of its history, the area has largely been a collection of tribal and familial connections. Beginning in the seventh century, most of them were loosely associated with the religion of Islam and the Arabic language and culture. Others, however, were remnants from the Jewish, Christian, and numerous smaller religious sects, all of which have remained there in varying numbers into the 20th century, often in isolated regions (Roux 1992).
History of Iraq Mesopotamia became part of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th and 17th centuries, with the Ottomans eventually controlling three provinces of modern Iraq, focused around the cities of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. The culture was predominantly
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based on Arabic and Muslim traditions, but with considerable village and tribal influences. There were also small pockets of other cultural and religious groups, including Christians (Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Protestants), Mandeans (followers of John the Baptist), and Jews. This segment of the Ottoman Empire was the focus of hostilities with the British, beginning in 1914, and ending with a League of Nations Mandate, which gave the British control over the area in 1918. There were also constant disputes between Iraq, Great Britain, and other nations over the rights to Iraq’s oil reserves. The Babylonian Jewish community traces its origins to the earliest days of Jewish history. The Prophet Abraham came from Ur in what is now southern Iraq, and the Jewish community of Baghdad traces its origin to the exile of Jews from ancient Israel, first by the Assyrians (around 721 B.C.E.), and later by the Babylonians (in 597 and 586 B.C.E.) (Roux 1992). Jews reportedly have continued to live in Iraq from that time until the 20th century (Shohet 1999). At the time of the British Mandate, it was estimated that Iraq had a population of approximately three million. Over half were Shiite Muslims; about 20 percent were Kurds, who lived in the northern province of Mosul. Kurds spoke Kurdish rather than Arabic, had a distinct culture, and were part of a larger population, which was divided among Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and several other countries. Sunni Muslims were a minority but constituted the majority of the army and government officials. Less than 10 percent of the population consisted of Jews, Christians, Turks, and other minorities. The Iraqi Jewish community reportedly had approximately 250,000 members. The Kurdish population consisted primarily of Muslims, with a few Christians and Jews. This British period was characterized by attempts on the part of the various subgroups to ensure their representation in the government, both during the British era and in the independent Iraq that was to follow. Some of the religious minorities played a role in British government agencies, leading to distrust on the part of the majority Muslims (Tripp 2007). The League of Nations recognized Iraqi independence in 1932, at which time the Hashemite monarchy was established. However, British influence remained strong, and minority Sunni Muslims had more influence than the majority Shiites, leading to continued resentment, unrest, and attempts to overthrow the government. In addition to the religious sectarianism, nationalistic issues were involved. A desire for unity among the various Arab nations was growing. Most Iraqis resented the continued control of the British. The powerful Sunnis distrusted the Shiites because of their presumed ties to non-Arabic Muslim nations, particularly neighboring Iran. Jews and Christians were distrusted because of their long-standing ties to the British (Tripp 2007). World War II and its aftermath exacerbated the situation. Israel was established as an independent nation, further fueling the Pan-Arab movement and raising questions about the loyalty of Iraq’s Jewish community, which then numbered slightly over 100,000 members. They were suspected of collaborating with Zionists and
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Israel; all but a few thousand were forced to leave Iraq. Soviet Russia’s desire for southern expansion threatened Iraq’s newfound independence and suggested the need for connections with other nations in the region. Sunnis sought ties to other Arab nations, particularly Egypt. The pan-Arab movement also diminished the hopes of Iraqi Kurds for a unified Kurdistan. The Ba’th Party, which had its origins in Syria, began to exercise an influence in Iraq during this period. The party was largely dominated by Iraq’s President, Ahmad al-Bakr, and his relative, Saddam Hussein. Ba’thists attempted to bring together the many conflicting perspectives within the nation: Iraqi nationalism, pan-Arabism, and the numerous ethnic and religious divisions. In 1968, Saddam Hussein assumed control, solidifying his own personal control of the Ba’th Party and the government. His rise to power was facilitated by the burgeoning wealth of Iraq’s oil reserves. He attempted to use his personal identity to forge a link among Iraq’s diverse ethnic groups and with its historical ties to ancient Mesopotamia. Again, this was largely a minority party, with most of its leadership drawn from a Sunni region of northern Iraq; however, members of several groups were included within his government. Some Iraqi immigrants claim that this period was one of interethnic and interreligious cordiality, and intergroup conflicts were rare (Tripp 2007). Kurdish dissatisfaction came to a head in 1973, with a Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq. Again, Kurds had hopes for greater autonomy, which were dashed when
Iraqi president Saddam Hussein waves to cheering crowds during a visit to the holy Muslim shrines in Samara on August 9, 1988. (AP/Wide World Photos)
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Iraq and Iran came to terms on an exchange of territory. Many Kurds were forced to relocate from their traditional villages in the north to largely Shiite areas in the south. Resistance of the Shiites remained strong and was brutally suppressed, leading many to escape to Iran, which became the scene of the next confrontation between the two countries in 1980. With the outbreak of new hostilities with Iran, the Ba’th Party began a campaign to purge those seen as enemies, reviving and intensifying old ethnic hostilities: Sunni/Shi’a, and Iraqi/Kurd. Conflicts developed over which Islamic traditions should dominate in controlling the economy and political structure. The majority Shiites were particularly targeted, due to their perceived association with neighboring Iran (Tripp 2007). By the mid-1980s, Iraq, with the assistance of the United States, Great Britain, and other Western powers, was experiencing success on the Iranian front. Again, Iraq’s many ethnic divisions played a role. The Iraqi army included large numbers of ethnic minorities who could not be depended upon to support the Hussein government. Kurdish areas again became the scene of unrest. Hussein viewed the Gulf as a means to solidify his power, leading to the invasion of Kuwait. This move did not have the desired success, and the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait generated uprisings among the disaffected populations of adjoining southern Iraq, where Shiites were a majority. To a considerable degree, this marked the beginning of the end for the Hussein regime. The UN Security Council was determined to prevent Iraq from taking similar aggressive actions in the future. Any substance that could conceivably be used in the production of weapons was placed under embargo, a measure that inflicted severe hardships on the people of Iraq. It became impossible to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure, including its supply of electricity and safe water. Food shortages and disease followed quickly, and medical supplies were in short supply, further fomenting unrest among the Iraqi people. Finally, continued suspicion about Iraq’s weapons stockpile led to an invasion by the United States and its allies in March 2003, culminating in the fall of Hussein’s government (Ricks 2007). With the Ba’thist government at an end, the old divisions that had plagued Iraq again came to the fore, greatly complicating the establishment of a new governmental structure, and forcing the U.S. government into its extended occupation of Iraq. The military aspect of this involvement was terminated under President Barak Obama in 2010. Clearly, the divisions that plague Iraq at the present time have their origin in these long-standing historical disputes among various economic, ethnic, and cultural divisions in Iraqi society. They have also served as the impetus for members of these groups to emigrate from Iraq in the hope of finding a better life elsewhere. Hence, migration from Iraq can include persons from the various religious and cultural groups, depending upon the varying conditions in Iraq for each group at different times. Furthermore, the location and nature of the communities they establish after leaving Iraq also differ significantly. In the following discussion, distinctions
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will be made among three groups of Iraqi-Americans, based on whether their religious preference is Christian, Muslim, or Jewish (Tripp 2007).
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration The earliest known immigration from Iraq to the United States occurred in the first two decades of the 20th century, during the final years of Ottoman control of Mesopotamia, and prior to the establishment of Iraq as a separate entity. At that time, the religion of Islam and the Arabic language predominated in the area, and groups that differed were more likely to emigrate. Christian Iraqis, feeling pressure from the surrounding Muslim society, were particularly likely to migrate. Their contact with the British government also made them aware of the advantages of living in a predominantly Christian society. Iraqi Chaldeans are an example. They began coming to the United States around 1910, with about a dozen members in the early 1920s, when the quota system of immigration control was introduced (Sengstock 1999, 2005). Iraq received the minimum quota (100 per year), slowing community growth. Iraqi immigrants to the United States in the earliest years of the 20th century included persons of Jewish descent. Approximately 20 Iraqi Jewish families came to the United States in the first decade. The breakup of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the migration of approximately 60 more members, with another 70 families coming with the outbreak of World War II in 1939. Most early Christian immigrants made a distinct effort to maintain their identity as Middle Eastern Christians. Both Christians and Jews took great pride in their origins from Mesopotamia, the cradle of civilization. Neither group viewed themselves as Iraqis or Arabs. Return to Iraq was not a goal; rather, they expended considerable effort to bring relatives to the United States and expand their communities here. The American quota system, with its emphasis on reuniting families, assisted in this goal.
Later Waves of Immigration Following World War II, the United States made student visas available; young Iraqi Christians took advantage of the program to attend school. In contrast, Muslims found Iraqi society more congenial and few sought to emigrate. Furthermore, the 1920s quota system was designed to ensure that new immigrants reflected, as closely as possible, the population already established in the United States, giving preference to persons with relatives already here and giving Iraqi Christians an
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advantage. Muslim Iraqis who came for educational purposes tended to complete their degrees and return to Iraq, as was expected under the program; Christians used the program to obtain entry into the country, after which they married citizens or obtained employment, enabling them to remain in the United States. The 1948 establishment of the state of Israel brought about major hostilities against Jews in Iraq and other Arabic countries and caused the exodus of the majority of Jews. Most were relocated to Israel, but some came to the United States. By the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Jews remaining in Iraq numbered less than a dozen.
Immigration Act of 1965 and Succeeding Legislation The Immigration Act of 1965 marked a change in the character of Iraqi immigration by making it possible for more Iraqis to obtain visas. While accurate numbers are difficult to obtain, agencies that work with American Middle Eastern communities report receiving dramatically more requests for assistance from Iraqi immigrants, both Muslim and Christian. Because Sunnis were more powerful in Iraq, Shiites were more likely to emigrate. Iraqi Christians continued to immigrate in substantial numbers, leading to a remarkable increase in community size (exceeding 100,000 by 2000). As noted previously, the greatest wave of migration from Iraq occurred as a result of the hostilities between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s, and the wars involving the United States that followed. As conditions in Iraq became unbearable, residents from all religious and ethnic backgrounds sought to leave. Many went to nearby countries, mainly Syrian and Jordan (Lobe 2007). Others came to the United States as refugees; upon arrival, most were in need of assistance, since some fled with little more than the clothes on their backs (Brown 2008; Wiswell 2007). Agencies within the Muslim, Chaldean, and Assyrian communities are often called upon to provide this assistance. Jews who left Iraq during this period were more likely to go to Israel; those who came to the United States generally sought assistance from Jewish agencies, such as the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, rather than from agencies in the Iraqi communities. The Sunni tradition predominates throughout the Muslim world, including the leadership of Iraq. Some Sunnis had come to the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, mainly for education. Iraqi Shiites are an anomaly within the Middle East. They are distrusted by Sunni Iraqis because of their association with predominantly Shiite Iran. Iranians, however, associate them with the Arab language and culture. During the war with Iran, Saddam Hussein questioned their loyalty and they were the target of vicious attacks, leading many to flee. Many Iraqi emigrants had planned to return to Iraq; with the growing unrest in Iraq, however, most were fearful of returning and remained in the United States.
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Through IRCA to the Present The major influx of Iraqi Shiites to the United States began following the war over Kuwait in 1990. Many Shiites living near the Kuwait border supported the Allied attack against Saddam Hussein, hoping the Allies would aid them in loosening Hussein’s grip on their region. However, Allied forces failed to provide support, leaving them defenseless when Iraqi troops pursued them. When these hopes were dashed, thousands fled to the desert, eventually being relocated in Saudi Arabian refugee camps by United Nations workers. The situation deteriorated with sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s and the Gulf War in early 2003. It is estimated that 1 million Iraqis have been killed, and another 4.5 million displaced by bombings and kidnappings as a result of the Gulf War (Tirman 2009). They fled to nearby nations, the largest numbers going to Syria (800,000), Jordan (700,000), and Egypt (80,000) (Lobe 2007). Many nations have given them refugee status, granted to persons who can prove a reasonable threat of danger in their homeland. The United States was expected to admit an estimated 17,000 Iraqi refugees by the end of 2009; the United States also grants special status to Iraqis who assisted U.S. forces as advisers or translators. However, humanitarian experts contended the United States had a responsibility to admit far more (Baltimore Sun Staff 2009; Brown 2008; International Rescue Committee 2009; Tate 2009).
The Plight of Iraqi Refugees The plight of Iraqi refugees is vividly demonstrated by the stories they bring. Ibrahim is a Christian who arrived with his wife, Asho, and their five sons (Wiswell 2007). In Saddam Hussain’s Iraq, the threat of jail or worse was always present. Ibrahim was in jail for three years, suspected of opposing the Iraqi government. He is missing two fingers, due to injuries received when a guard smashed his hand. His sister, a teacher, was jailed and beaten for refusing to raise the grades of a student whose relatives were government officials. She was killed in 2004 by anti-Christian rebels. Another relative had been jailed and beaten when she was only 15. The family fled to the Turkish border. During the flight, two teenaged sons were also jailed; the family feared they had been killed. Eventually they were freed and made it back to their family in Turkey. The boys reported sleeping on the floor, with no blankets and only bread to eat. Another refugee escaped with her three teenaged daughters. Her husband was not able to escape and remains in Iraq. She tells of a sister-in-law, kidnapped from a boarding school in Baghdad, who was held for two weeks until the family could raise money for her ransom. Although she was Christian, her kidnappers threatened to kill her if they ever saw her with her head uncovered; she continued to wear the veil out of fear for her life (Bardazzi 2009).
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Muslim Iraqis report similar atrocities. In the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait, Shiite Muslims near the Kuwait border rose up against the Hussain government. When the United States and allied forces allowed Hussain to remain in power, providing fuel for his planes and tanks, these weapons were used against the Shiites. Many tried to reach the Saudi Arabian border. Government forces attacked them as they fled. One man reported seeing the body of a woman, lying in the carnage, her infant still nursing at her breast. Another saw a friend, in tears, sitting amid the bombs, bodies, and dirt. He urged his friend to flee. However, the friend said the man lying dead was his cousin and insisted he must remain with the body, which was already half eaten by dogs. Refugee life had its own share of problems. Hundreds met death in Saudi Arabian refugee camps, which held over 30,000 Shiites. Dead bodies were kept in a refrigerator. An observer reported to an official that one of the bodies was still alive. The official raised his gun and fired, then ordered the body placed in the refrigerator with the others. In the north, Ibrahim’s family fled to Turkey, where they lived in a small, damp apartment. They spent much of their time indoors, fearful of being identified and returned to Iraq. Those who were able to find work found that illegal aliens like themselves were paid less than Turkish nationals. About life in America, Ibrahim says, “For the first time in our lives we feel like a human being. Everything is so clean, people treat us nice, and everything is legal” (Wiswell 2007).
Iraqi refugees include members of all social and religious groups. Among Muslims, there have been three major waves of immigrants during the last quarter of the 20th century and into the 21st century. Before 1980, most Muslims coming to the United States were educated Sunnis. During the Hussein regime, most were Shiites, currently the largest group of Iraqi Muslim immigrants; most came from rural southern Iraq, largely under the control of tribal leaders and relatively isolated from outside influences. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein, changes in the political structure forced Sunni Muslims to emigrate from Iraq, as Shiites showed resentment for their role in Hussein’s government (Lobe 2007). Adjustment to American society varies among these groups, with the urban, educated Sunnis adjusting more easily. Iraqi refugee problems cross religious lines, however. Most Jews had already left Iraq prior to the Gulf War. But Christians of all religions suffered greatly as a result of the Gulf War; they were associated, in the minds of Muslim Iraqis, with the Western Christian invaders, which caused them to leave (Bardazzi 2009). Christian leaders have complained that the suffering of Iraqi Christians has been ignored by both sides in the Gulf conflict (Kohn 2008).
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Unlike other immigrants, refugees usually migrate virtually penniless, greatly straining the community’s ability to provide assistance (Brown 2008). Indeed, local politicians have complained publicly about the refugee program, noting the difficulty a refugee influx creates in local communities, particularly during times of economic distress. In response, federal refugee programs attempt to minimize the local impact by directing refugees to widely varying parts of the country. This approach can be counterproductive, however, since areas without an Arabic-speaking population are less able to provide adaptive assistance. The Detroit area, particularly the suburb of Dearborn, is well known for its large Arabic community, and many refugees gravitate to this area where Arabic speakers and refugee assistance are available, together with services such as medical evaluations, employment assistance, and help with necessities such as food or household goods (Abraham 2000; Leonard 2003). However, the magnitude of the influx places great stress on community resources. One Detroit area agency, assigned to handle refugee mental health problems, dealt with 2,500 refugees in 2008; they were told to expect 4,000 in 2009. In 1997, the Dearborn school district enrolled over 800 Iraqi students; like most immigrant children, they needed assistance with English, but they also had health problems from their refugee experience. Refugees of all ages suffer from health problems and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), due to months or years in a war zone and refugee camps, and exposure to chemical agents, contaminated water, and communicable diseases. Those with chronic conditions, such as diabetes, may not have received treatment for months. Refugees bring these conditions with them to their new environments.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community In 2000 the U.S. Census Bureau counted 89,892 immigrants from Iraq living in the United States, more than double the number enumerated in the 1990 census (44,916). Iraqis still represented less than one percent of immigrants to the United States. Due to conditions in Iraq, immigration has increased recently, and approximately one-third of Iraqi immigrants hold refugee status. In 2000, Iraqi immigrants were concentrated primarily in three states: Michigan (31,927); California (20,532); and Illinois (9,634) (see Table 164). Other states with over 2,000 Iraqi immigrants at that time were Tennessee, Texas, New York, and Arizona. Most of Michigan’s Iraqi immigrants were in Detroit, with 30,569. Chicago had 9,513; San Diego, 7,507; Los Angeles, 5,499. Phoenix, Arizona, Nashville, Tennessee, and Washington, D.C., each had more than 1,700 Iraqi immigrants (see Table 165). As
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a result of the wars in Iraq, immigration into the United States increased dramatically since the mid-1990s, from less than 2,000 per year in1989 through 1991, to more than 4,000 in 1992, and over 5,000 per year in 1994 –1996 (see Table 166) (Grieco 2003). According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, this dramatic increase continued into the 21st century. In fiscal year 2009, 12,110 received legal permanent resident status. The number of Iraqis granted permanent residence in 2009 was well over double the number allowed just nine years earlier (see Table 167). This very likely represents an attempt on the part of the U.S. government to assist refugees from the Iraq War. Upon arrival, the major destinations of those migrants continued to be the states that already had the largest concentrations of Iraqi immigrants: Michigan (2,691) and California (2,768) (see Table 168). Most ethnic populations remain intact in further generations after immigration. Hence, a complete picture of Iraqi communities includes persons of Iraqi ancestry, as well as those born in Iraq. Census data present serious difficulties in estimating the size of the population by ancestry. This inadequacy derives from problems inherent in census data collection methods. Ancestry questions do not distinguish immigrants from subsequent generations, nor are they likely to generate a response from persons who no longer identify with their countries of origin. Even those who identify strongly with their homelands may not respond, due to suspicion about
Iraqi refugee Rawaa Bahoo laughs with her children Marvin (left), Maryana, and Maryam, in Farmington Hills, Michigan, August 21, 2009. Family ties and cultural support from the region’s large Middle Eastern community continues to draw new refugees despite a depressed economy. (AP Photo/Paul Sancya)
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data-collection programs and fear of reprisals. Consequently, nonresponse issues create a persistent undercount of ethnic ancestry. Some data collection problems are unique to Iraq. Some Iraqis prefer to identify with the general “Arab” category, and non-Muslim Iraqis are reluctant to claim Iraqi ancestry. Iraqi Jews and Kurds are also unlikely to claim Iraqi descent. Iraqi Christians, who identify as Assyrians, Chaldeans, or Syriac, were granted a new category in the 2000 census and are not included in either the Iraqi or the Arab category. The 2000 Census listed a total of 37,714 persons claiming Iraqi ancestry; most of these are likely to be Muslims (see Table 169). An additional 82,154 persons identified themselves as being of “Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac” ancestry. Most, but not all, probably originate from Iraq. Hence these Christian Iraqis are double the size of the Muslim Iraqi group. While they may not identify as Iraqis, it is clear they retain many ties with Iraq. Their immigration papers, or those of their ancestors, list Iraq as the country of origin. Many maintain contact and send remittances to relatives remaining in Iraq. If they were to commit crimes in the United States, they might be deported to Iraq. Hence Iraqi Christians, Jews, and other non-Muslims should be included among the Iraqi ancestry group. Since they identify more with their religious and linguistic orientations than with the nation of Iraq, once these immigrants arrive in the United States, their settlement patterns also vary, depending on their religious preference and linguistic orientation. Community estimates are an alternate source for the enumeration of ethnic community size. In 2009, the Chaldean community of Detroit estimated its numbers at 150,000 members. Iraqi Christians in other states probably constitute another 30,000 to 50,000 persons, for a total of 180,000 to 200,000 Iraqi Christians. Based on the total of 37,714 persons claiming Iraqi ancestry in the 2000 census, Iraqi Muslims probably number at least another 50,000 by 2009. The Iraqi American Jewish community is estimated at 15,000. Hence the total Iraqi American population is approximately 245,000 to 265,000 (see Table 169). In general, Christian Iraqis are concentrated primarily in Michigan, Illinois, Arizona, and California; Muslim Iraqis in Michigan; and Jewish Iraqis in New York and California (Schopmeyer 2000; Sengstock 1999, 2005; Shohet 1999). Muslim immigrants into the United States have come from a wide variety of nations, primarily southern Asia (India, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan) and the Arab world (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco). Iraqi Muslims are relative newcomers. Iraqi Kurds should be included here as well, since most are Muslim, with a few Christians and Jews. However, Kurds come from Iran and Turkey as well as Iraq. There is a community of Iraqi Kurds in the San Diego area, while Iranian Kurds are in Los Angeles. Most Kurds support the concept of an independent Kurdistan and tend not to identify as Iraqis. The most accurate estimates of Iraqi Jews come from Jewish agencies; one estimates their total number at over 15,000. Most live in New York and Los Angeles, both of which have
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organizations for Iraqi Jews; smaller concentrations are in Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. The American Babylonian Jewish community is considered the largest outside of Israel (Shoket 1999).
Age and Family Structure Iraqi American community make-up varies depending upon the religious and cultural background of the immigrants. Groups that began immigrating in the early years of the 20th century now have a substantial number of older members, some of them immigrants, and others the descendants of the earliest immigrants. This is true of Iraqi Jews and Christians. Muslim Iraqis, who began their immigration following the 1965 change in immigration law, or as refugees from the Iraqi wars, tend to be younger populations, with fewer aged members. All of these groups reflect, to a considerable extent, an overall family pattern prevalent in the Arab Middle East. This pattern is characterized by a strong commitment to long-term marriages, intense patriarchal authority, and an emphasis on modesty for women. Men are expected to be the head of the house. Women are valued for the number of children that are born to them and are expected to remain in the home rather than be employed. Marriage within most Iraqi groups is largely an extended family matter. Prior to the last half of the 20th century, many marriages were arranged, often preferring marriages within the patriarchal lineage. Even today, families attempt to exert a substantial influence over their children’s marital choices. Iraqi ethnic communities often sponsor youth groups and other social events to encourage their young people to socialize with each other only under the watchful eyes of the older members of the extended family and community. The authority of the father and the father’s lineage continues to remain strong, with wives and children expected to conform to the father’s expectations. Demands for female modesty are particularly strong. Girls are expected to remain virgins until they marry, and this represents a major influence on the family’s honor. Hence boys may be permitted a considerable degree of freedom to participate in social activities and dating prior to marriage, but girls are expected to remain close to home. These traditions are rigorously kept among the most religious Muslims; Christian and Jewish Iraqi Americans, and less religious Muslims, are less likely to do so.
Educational and Economic Attainment Iraqi Americans tend to exhibit the educational patterns typical of many immigrant groups, with the earlier arrivals being relatively uneducated, while their children and grandchildren are more likely to gain a higher education. Hence Christian and Jewish Iraqi Americans represent a more educated population; recently arrived Muslim Iraqis tend to be less educated.
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The earliest Iraqis in the United States tended to follow the occupational patterns of other Middle Easterners, such as the Syrians and Lebanese. In the earliest years, most Christian Iraqis were engaged in small business enterprises. Detroit’s first Chaldeans became extremely adept in the retail grocery business. By the late 20th century, there were over 1,000 retail grocery stores in the Detroit area owned and operated by Chaldeans. Some Chaldeans also established subsidiary businesses, such as wholesale food companies and suppliers to retail stores. Chaldeans also became adept at real estate sales and development. Their success in these businesses led them to maintain these occupations for several decades, rather than seeking advanced education. This began to change in the second half of the 20th century, when student visas and the 1965 Immigration Law produced more persons with higher education. By the 1990s, many Chaldeans had college educations and had moved into the professions, including law, business, teaching, and the medical fields. Assyrian Christians in other communities have a similar record of educational and professional advancements, and pride in their accomplishments. With the influx of Iraqi refugees, the economic structure of these communities has experienced considerable change. Refugees come with few resources and need more assistance upon arrival (International Rescue Committee 2009). Many recent arrivals
Rae Alzaweny sorts produce in the Iraq Market grocery store in Dearborn, Michigan, May 1, 2003. Alzaweny is an Iraqi immigrant and owner of the store, which caters to the largely Middle Eastern community of Dearborn. (AP Photo/Paul Sancya)
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are Shiite Muslims and are concentrated in lower income and nonprofessional occupations, particularly factory work and operating gas stations and convenience stores. Little data are available on Jewish Iraqis, but they have largely joined the larger Jewish community and exhibit similar income and occupational patterns.
Health Statistics and Issues Health statistics are rarely available on a group as small as Iraqis. In general, Iraqis who have been in the United States longer have good health care, while those with lower income often lack health care and have poorer health. They also tend to be accepting of the health care they receive, even though it may be lacking in several respects. Recent arrivals come with the health problems of the refugee camps. Some Middle Eastern cultural patterns are also conductive to poor health outcomes (Sengstock 1996). For example, smoking is a widely accepted behavior in this population, leading to smoking-related health problems. Detroit area health institutions have attempted to deal with these problems in the Arabic-speaking communities as a whole.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Patterns Family patterns have exhibited considerable change in some Iraqi communities, particularly the sizeable Christian population. Many communities have diverged from the traditional patriarchal structure. Family patterns also exhibit great divergence along religious lines. Iraqis generally follow the customs specified for their particular religious preference for the birth of a child. The Chaldean or Assyrian churches are the central focus for most activities of Christian Iraqis. Children are brought there for baptism, which generally follows Christian tradition, with the exception that it would be conducted in the Aramaic language. Similarly, Iraqi Jews follow Jewish religious tradition requiring circumcision for male children shortly after birth. Among Muslims, circumcision is also practiced; in the Middle East, this is often done later, when the child is six to eight years old; in America, it is usually done at birth, with a home celebration following. Muslims also recite a call to prayer at the time of birth, to accustom the child to his/her responsibility as a devout Muslim. The Muslim child’s head is also shaved, accompanied by the slaughtering of two goats (one for a girl) to celebrate the birth. For Christians, a confirmation ceremony often takes place when the child has completed a course of study in the religion, usually between 9 and 14 years of age.
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Some Christians also hold a major celebration when the child receives the Eucharist for the first time, giving a party similar to a wedding celebration. Muslim tradition requires that the child begin studying the Quran at the age of four years, four months, and four days; this event is marked by a ceremony, with another ceremony taking place a few years later, once the child has succeeded in reading the entire Quran. Jews hold a traditional Bar or Bat Mitzvah ceremony when the child reaches the age of 13, with the child reciting from the Torah. Iraqi Christian marriages generally occur in the families’ religious denomination. Many of these rituals have been altered from the original form in Iraq a century ago, where marriages were conducted in the village, beginning with a procession from the bride’s home to that of the groom. Following the patriarchal customs of the Middle East, the groom’s family played a major role. Brides of old dressed in the village’s traditional colorful dress. Today’s Iraqi Christian weddings tend to follow local Christian traditions, with the exception that the ceremony is usually in Aramaic. Chaldean brides wear an elaborate white gown, have numerous bridesmaids and groomsmen, and host a reception for several hundred guests, with alcoholic beverages, music, and dancing. Chaldean tradition does not acknowledge the Muslim prohibition against the consumption of alcohol, although other Christian groups may not agree. Many Iraqis still retain a major role for the groom’s family, which often pays for the celebration (Sengstock 1999, 2005). In Muslim tradition, marriage tends to be a cultural rather than a religious ceremony and often involves a family agreement, in addition to consent from the bride and groom (Patheos 2009). Grooms are expected to provide their brides with a dower, a gift of money or jewelry, which becomes her property; without this, the marriage may not take place. The bride’s family also provides her with a dowry to bring to the marriage; often this is a gift of a business or home for the young couple. Christian Iraqis have also been known to follow the dowry custom (Sengstock 1999, 2005). Again, Iraqi Jews tend to follow general Jewish customs, such as marrying under a chuppah (canopy). Death rituals also have a religious character. Chaldean funerals are similar to those of other Catholics, with the exception that they are generally conducted in Aramaic. Like other Chaldean rituals, they exhibit a boisterous exuberance that may surprise the typical American observer, with loud singing and chanting. Muslim tradition requires dying persons to repent their sins and repeat the first pillar of Islam (belief in Allah). Family members should gather around and join in the prayers, especially if the dying person is unable to do so. After death, the body must be washed, wrapped in a white shroud, and buried as soon as possible, with the body facing Mecca (Patheos 2009). Gifts of money or food are given to the poor in memory of the deceased. Jews also bury the dead soon after death and follow general Jewish custom.
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Among Christian Iraqis, gender relations have largely been adapted to the American environment. Choice of a marriage partner is an example. In the Chaldean community, the groom, and later the bride, gradually received the right to voice an opinion, or even decline a proposed marriage partner, although young Iraqi Chaldeans still give greater weight to family opinion in their marital choices than the typical American couple. Gender relations have changed in other respects as well. In the mid-20th century, seating in Chaldean churches was usually segregated by sex; this was rarely the case at century’s end. Today’s Chaldean women often obtain a college education and have professional positions. Many girls still complain, however, that Chaldean families prefer male children over females, and girls often have more household responsibilities than their brothers. In the area of gender relations, Muslim women are expected to keep themselves covered; at its extreme, they wear a long dress that covers from head to toe. Less traditional Muslim women may wear the hijab, covering only the head, or even no head covering at all (Barazangi 1996; Cainkar 1996; Haddad and Smith 1996; Sengstock 1999, 2005).
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Both Assyrians and Chaldeans have made extensive efforts to retain a sense of their unique identity as descendants of the people of ancient Mesopotamia and Babylonia, speakers of the ancient Aramaic language, and among the earliest converts to the Christian religion. They have done this mainly through their churches, by attempting to continue the Assyrian rituals handed down from their Apostolic founders, and by urging their children and grandchildren to learn the Aramaic/Assyrian language. This too has taken place largely through the churches and community centers, many of which offer language programs for both children and adults. It must be emphasized that this identity is to be distinguished from identification with the nation of Iraq or the Arab world. Few Chaldeans or Assyrians think of themselves in this manner, an issue that irritates, even angers, their fellow Iraqi immigrants, who seek to present a broadly based, unified front in influencing national and pan-Arabic issues in their homeland as well as the United States. Assyrians and Chaldeans, however, generally believe that Iraqi and Arab movements have placed them at a distinct disadvantage and seek fairer treatment in Iraq for persons of their heritage. Iraqi Christians also disagree among themselves over identity, with Chaldeans preferring their religious identity, while Assyrians identify linguistically (Sengstock 1999, 2005). Both Christian and Muslim Iraqis maintain close ties to their homeland, mainly through connections with relatives in Iraq. These ties are used to provide assistance to their families in the difficult conditions of 21st-century Iraq. This contact is often at a high level, involving frequent communication by phone or e-mail, sending
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remittances back to family members, and attempting to obtain visas for relatives to immigrate. These activities involve not only recent immigrants, but also secondand third-generation members. Since there are few Jews left in Iraq, Iraqi Jews tend to have few ties to their country of origin.
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background The Iraqi Chaldean community has a highly developed social structure: two Chaldean dioceses, several churches, and numerous community organizations, including a business association, women’s charitable group, and youth groups, to name but a few. They are also in the process of establishing a Chaldean Cultural Center, including a museum to display their history and culture and maintain archival records. Other Iraqi Christian groups also have well-established organizations, including churches and organizations to promote the Assyrian language. There have also been some recent attempts on the part of varying Assyrian and Chaldean religious leaders to form a united effort on behalf of the Christian minority suffering in Iraq. Both Christian and Muslim agencies provide community assistance, particularly to refugees. Dearborn’s Muslim community has the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Service (ACCESS), and the Karbala Islamic Education Center. Chaldeans, residing in northern Detroit and bordering Oakland and Macomb counties, provide services through the Chaldean Ladies of Charity and Chaldean Federation of America. The Arab and Chaldean Social Services Council attempts to serve clients from both religious communities. Refugee assistance is often funded by the federal government, but federal assistance is limited, and many refugees were led to expect more extensive aid. Shiite Muslims established the Islamic Center of America in Dearborn in 1963, with a new building opening in 2005; this center is mainly attended by Lebanese. Although Iraqi Shiites may also attend, many prefer the Karbala Education Center of America, established specifically for them in 1995. The center’s name is significant, since it commemorates the revered Shiite birthplace and shrine (Walbridge and Aziz 2000). Both centers have also developed museums to highlight Islamic religion, history, and culture. While Iraqi Jews associate with the larger Jewish community, they also have a Web site and newsletter to maintain their connection to Iraqi Jewry.
Religion Religion is one of the dominant cultural institutions in the Middle East. This was the case when the earliest immigrants left Iraq, and it continues in the United States This is true even for second- and third-generation Iraqis. Because of the critical role
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1131
of religion, the Christian communities tend to establish separate institutions for the different denominations. For example, Turlock, California, has churches for those who follow the ancient Assyrian Christian faith, as well as for the Chaldean rite and for Assyrian Protestants (Sengstock 1999). In this community, pride in being Assyrian and speaking Aramaic are the major unifying mechanisms. Iraqi Christians take pride in the fact that their Christian tradition originates from the earliest days of Christianity; they claim to have been converted to Christianity by St. Thomas, the Apostle of Jesus, during his missionary journeys. From the outset, this area was the site of numerous disputes within the Christian community. Nestorius, a local bishop, had a dispute with the Western Church in the 400s C.E., resulting in the establishment of a separate church, usually termed the Assyrian Church. About 1,000 years later, some members of this group joined the church in Rome, leading to the establishment of a separate “rite” of the Roman Catholic Church, the Chaldean rite (Sengstock 1999, 2005). During the 19th century, British missionary activities resulted in the conversion of some residents of this area to Protestantism. Consequently, Christians of northern Iraq adhere to a wide variety of religious denominations, some of which can be found in other parts of the Middle East as well. The two major divisions of Iraqi Christians in the United States focus on these two dimensions. Chaldeans belong to the Catholic Church, while followers of Nestorius and Protestants consider themselves “Assyrians” or “Syriac.” Little research has been conducted as yet on Iraqi Muslims in the United States. However, previous research on other Muslim communities provides a basis for analyzing the direction they are likely to take. Regardless of nationality, Muslims follow the religious traditions of Islam, established in what is now Saudi Arabia by the Prophet Muhammad in the early seventh century C.E. Muslim tradition is based on five core elements, called the pillars of Islam. The first is to have faith in Allah, the one God, and his Prophet, Muhammad; the other four are the obligation to pray five times each day, give alms (zakat), fast during the month of Ramadan, and make a pilgrimage (haj) to the holy city of Mecca if finances allow. The religious center for Muslims is the mosque, but the obligation is to pray daily, not necessarily in a common center. Muslims revere Friday as the holy day. Also critical to an understanding of Islam is shari’a, the law of Islam as drawn from the Quran, and from sunnah (the Prophet’s practices). These are applied to all aspects of social behavior, including marriage, family life, the economic sphere, and the manner in which society as a whole should be organized. Islamic religious leaders frequently issue opinions (known as fatwah), concerning the proper application of Islamic traditions. Early in the development of Islam, a dispute occurred regarding the appropriate leaders to impart Mohammed’s message. The earliest leaders were elected caliphs. One of the later candidates was Husain, grandson of Mohammed. Prior to his election, Husain and members of his family were killed in a battle that occurred in the city of Karbala in southern Iraq. Followers of Husain
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revered him and viewed him to be a martyr, leading to the development of the Shi’a sect. Karbala subsequently became a major Shiite shrine and is venerated as the birthplace of the Shi’a sect. A permanent split between the Sunni and Shi’a divisions resulted from this event, and different legal perspectives are taken by the two factions. Members of one group commonly do not accept the opinions issued by leaders from the other sect. This division is not rigid. Even in the Middle East, some Sunni and Shi’a followers interact regularly and may intermarry. Furthermore, Muslims may choose to attend a mosque of either sect. This pattern had prevailed within Iraq for several decades in the mid-20th century. These divisions are important for understanding the manner in which Muslim immigrants from different national and religious divisions interact within the U.S. context after immigration. Other issues also play a role, including cultural differences among immigrants. These include language variation, differences in cuisine, and urban–rural variations. The Arabic language has numerous dialects, which vary by national origin, making religious services uncomfortable for persons of a different nationality. In all these respects, recent Iraqi Muslim immigrants, most of them Shiites, represent a new category in the American Muslim community. In Dearborn, several mosques had been established by both Sunni and Shiite Muslims prior to the arrival of the Iraqis. The majority of Dearborn’s Shiites were Lebanese, and variations exist between the cultures of the two countries, including different Arabic dialects and variation in traditional foods. Furthermore, Iraqi Shiites are more rural, resulting in a more conservative pattern of religion and culture, as compared with Lebanese Shiites and Iraqi Sunnis, both of whom are more urbanized and assimilate more easily. Since Iraqi Shiites may not be comfortable with the patterns of Muslims who preceded them, some developed their own mosques and other organizations. It is important to note that the mosque is not equivalent to a Christian church, which is often used for social gatherings such as weddings. Mosques are centers for prayer and should not be used for such nonreligious activities. They are also primarily gathering places for men. Women either do not go to the mosque or must enter by a separate door or congregate in a separate area. Muslim marriages are family matters and are usually conducted in the home. In America, many marriage ceremonies have been moved to the mosque, but associated social events are usually held separately. Muslim communities often resolve these issues by developing a communal center, with an area for prayer equivalent to a mosque, and a separate area for social gatherings and educational activities. Both Sunnis and Shiites have developed such centers in the United States. Traditions of the Jewish community in Baghdad were distinctly different from those of European Jewish communities, the origin of most American Jews. European Jews follow the Ashkenazic tradition, which originated in Germany. In contrast, Iraqi Jews follow the Sephardic traditions, common throughout Asia,
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1133
Imam Husaini leads a group of Iraqi immigrants in prayer at the Karbala Islamic Center in Dearborn, Michigan. (Courtesy of MaryCay Sengstock)
Northern Africa, and Spain. These distinctions are not primarily religious in character but refer to various cultural traditions. For the most part, however, Iraqi Jews have been incorporated into the larger American Jewish community.
Language Issues and the Media Most Iraqis in the United States are Christians from the province of Mosul, in northern Iraq near the ancient city of Nineveh. They speak Aramaic rather than Arabic. Hence they differ from Iraqis as a whole in both religion and language. While Christian Iraqis are divided by religion, the one characteristic they share is their ancestral linguistic heritage. Recent Christian immigrants are more likely to know Arabic, but many still value the Aramaic heritage. Iraqi Christian churches often hold services in Arabic or English, to accommodate the needs and preferences of recent immigrants, or for second- or third-generation descendants who know only English. Muslims, on the other hand, speak Arabic. The few Kurdish Iraqis prefer to speak their traditional Kurdish, rather than Arabic. Iraqi Jews are generally integrated into the Jewish community, where English is generally spoken. Efforts to perpetuate their linguistic and religious identity have taken numerous forms in the Assyrian and Chaldean communities. The Assyrian linguistic heritage
1134 | Iraqi Immigrants
is highlighted in a publication entitled Nineveh, published by the Assyrian Foundation of America; the title pays homage to the ancient Mesopotamian city by that name. Members of Detroit’s Chaldean community publish a monthly newspaper, The Chaldean News. Iraqi Jewish congregations in New York and Los Angeles have developed newsletters to assist Iraqi Jews in maintaining their identity and contact with each other.
Celebration of National Holidays Iraqi holidays are not generally celebrated. However, religious holy days and religious festivals related to each group’s religious preference are celebrated. Christians recognize the traditional Christian observances (Christmas, Lent, Easter), which they commemorate in ways similar to those in their homeland. Religious ceremonies are conducted in Aramaic, and some traditions, such as the Chaldeans’ Lenten fast, tend to be more rigorous than in the American Catholic Church. Iraqi Muslims observe the annual Ramadan fast and the traditional Muslim feasts. In particular, Shiite Muslims commemorate the Karbala battle, which is viewed as the birth of the Shi’a sect. With regard to American holidays, some Iraqis have adapted their food patterns to American customs. For example, Thanksgiving is celebrated in Chaldean households, much as it would be in typically American households, with the traditional turkey dinner. Side dishes, however, are likely to include a combination of American and Chaldean foods.
Foodways Iraqi Americans have maintained many original food patterns. The Middle Eastern style of food preparation tends to be shared by both Christian and Muslim Iraqis. Both groups eat a great deal of lamb, rice, and pita bread; they also share a taste for dishes such as falafel (fried chickpea balls), hummus (a dip made from chickpeas), shish kebab (cubes of meat and vegetables grilled on a skewer), dolma (stuffed grape leaves), kibbeh (a ground meat and bulghur wheat dish), and pastries such as baklava (Najor 1981). Jewish Iraqis are likely to follow the food patterns of other American Jews, including keeping kosher for those who follow the Orthodox or Conservative tradition. Islamic law also governs food patterns, including a prohibition against eating pork, abstention from alcohol, and use of only hallal meats, which have been slaughtered in a ritually specified manner. Muslims are also required to fast during the holy month of Ramadan, which is determined by the lunar calendar and can occur at various times throughout the year. This fast is particularly rigorous,
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1135
requiring the observer to abstain from all food and drink during daylight hours, and partake of a ritual meal after sundown. The requirement can cause problems for the devout Muslim in a non-Muslim society, where work or school schedules require their presence throughout the fasting period. Christian Iraqis do not follow these restrictions.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Christian Iraqi Americans are just beginning to establish themselves in the world of arts and entertainment. Some actors and musicians are finding their way into the media, particularly at the local level, but also, to a limited extent, in the national media. Recently arrived Muslim Iraqis are less likely to have moved into these areas. To some degree, they are still limited by the prohibitions against secular entertainment prevalent in Shiite Muslim tradition.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Christian Iraqis tend to be more assimilated into American life than Muslim Iraqis. This is due, in part, to their longer period of time in the United States. It is also a reflection of the fact that Christians may find it easier to adjust to a Christian society than Muslims. Followers of Islam are more likely to settle in areas with immigrants from other Islamic nations. Since the differences between Iraqi Jews and other Jews are cultural rather than religious, Iraqi Jews have merged into the broader Jewish community upon their arrival in the United States. The plight of Iraqi Muslims, particularly Shiites, is also complicated by the fact that some do not, as yet, consider themselves to be permanent immigrants. Like most ethnic communities, Iraqis are greatly influenced by factors in the homeland. Each upheaval in Iraq has an impact upon them. Unlike the Christians and many Sunnis, some Iraqi Shiites are still committed to Iraqi society and hold a dream that conditions will improve, enabling them to return to a more peaceful Iraq. In many ways they resemble the Palestinian community, which is distressed by the absence of a Palestinian state and still longs for a homeland. As long as the dream of a new Iraq remains alive, some are likely to resist acculturation and attempt to retain as much of Iraqi Shiite culture as possible.
Paths toward Citizenship Attaining citizenship has long been a goal among Iraqi Christians, because it enables them to sponsor the immigration of their relatives. Most Iraqi Christians seem
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committed to the goal of recreating a new homeland for their Assyrian or Chaldean heritage in North America. Some Shiite Muslims hope for a change in Iraq, such that they could return to their homeland. As they adapt and have children born in America, they will feel more tied to American society, as their predecessors did before them, and seek citizenship. The number of Iraqis seeking citizenship has increased in recent years (see Table 170). Dual citizenship was generally not a major goal among most Christian Iraqis. However, when the Iraqi elections were held in January 2009, many Iraqi Americans, both Christian and Muslim, took advantage of the opportunity to vote. The earliest Iraqi immigrants tended to remain within their group and had little relations with outsiders. This was particularly true of Chaldeans, whose population was large enough to be relatively self-sufficient. Other Christian communities, as well as Iraqis Jews, were often forced to move outside the ethnic group. Recently, most Christian and Jewish Iraqis are becoming quite integrated into American life and are developing positive relations outside the ethnic circle. Muslim Iraqis, having come more recently, are less integrated into American society but are becoming integrated into the American Muslim community as a whole. It is difficult to view Iraqi Americans as a political entity due to their religious divisions. Instead, they constitute a minimum of three separate entities, although efforts to unite the groups around a common cause have developed around the problems in Iraq since 1990. Iraqi Americans who choose to become active in American politics do so through normal political parties and pressure groups. There have been some recent efforts on the part of Christian Iraqis to work together to influence American government policy with reference to Iraq and Iraqi refugees. Some Iraqi Muslims have also been involved in such actions. These actions have involved community leaders, including religious leaders. Only rarely do Muslim and Christian groups work together. Iraqi Americans have worked through existing political organizations more often than developing their own. In the last few decades of the 20th century, Iraqi Americans have begun to express interest in the political structure. Some have run for political office, often successfully. Upon occasion, Iraqi Americans attend or hold political rallies for political candidates. Political issues of most interest to Iraqi Americans focus on conditions in Iraq during the periods of war. On domestic issues, some Iraqi Chaldeans, as devout Catholics, have become involved with the antiabortion movement. Muslims are particularly concerned about freedom of religion, a matter of particular concern for them in a society that is not based on Islamic law; the United States is one of the few nations Muslims consider to be hospitable to the free practice of their religion.
The Second and Later Generations | 1137
Christian and Jewish Iraqi Americans exhibit little interest in returning to Iraq. Shiite Muslims may be interested in returning but are unlikely to do so under current conditions.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Detroit’s Chaldean community constitutes the largest and earliest community of Iraqis in the United States. It now includes third-, fourth-, and even fifth-generation descendents, as well as persons of non-Chaldean ancestry married into the community. Most Christian Iraqi immigrants adapt rapidly to American society. They learn English quickly and obtain employment, often within the ethnic community. Descendants of the immigrants often obtain higher education and move into nonethnic occupations (Sengstock 1999, 2005). Second-generation Shiite Iraqis tend to be less influenced by conditions in their parents’ homeland. They are more influenced by conditions in the United States and the community leadership they encounter. American-born Iraqi Muslims are obtaining an American education and moving into professional careers. Gradually, the divisions of their parents’ homeland have less influence. As they attend school and participate in community settings, they encounter Muslims from other nationalities and religious sects who have already adapted to America. Consequently, old world identity factors begin to decrease in importance. The newer generation becomes less likely to identify as Iraqi or Lebanese, Sunni or Shiite, and is more likely to cross nationality and sectarian divisions for religious services, friendships, even marriage. Community leaders recognize that an identity as “American Muslim” is being developed, and Iraqi Muslims, both Shiites and Sunnis, are gradually becoming part of that broader identity.
Educational Attainment and Cultural Identification Christian and Jewish Iraqi Americans of the second and subsequent generations are likely to be college-educated. This is also true of the few Sunni Iraqis. As the second generation of Shiite Iraqis grows up, many aim for higher education as well. Cultural identification among Iraqi Americans depends largely on religion. Most Christian and Jewish Iraqis identify with ancient Mesopotamia and the Assyrian, Chaldean, and Babylonian cultures, rather than with modern Iraq. If one reads their publications or visits their churches and community centers, one is likely to see Babylonian representations, such as the Lion of Babylon, Gates of Ishtar, or Hanging Gardens, rather than symbols of Iraq and the Arab world, all of which are associated with the Muslim tradition. Muslims, on the other hand, generally identify with Iraq, Islam, and the Arab world.
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Youth Profile Active in Community Service Andrew Bashi was born in Detroit, Michigan, in 1987; his parents are Chaldean immigrants from Iraq. Like many Chaldean youth, Andrew was educated in Catholic schools, attending St. Hugo grade school and the University of Detroit Jesuit High School. From a young age, he was interested in conditions in his parents’ homeland. He recalls being teased in grade school because of the actions of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. He empathized with family members remaining in Iraq. After high school, Andrew attended Oakland University, in Rochester Hills, Michigan, receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations in 2009, with a concentration in the Middle East and North Africa. He also took classes in both the Arabic and Aramaic languages and received numerous honors and scholarships. Throughout his college years, Andrew was active in community service activities, including assisting elderly deaf families in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, and building homes for Mexican laborers in Texas. He has also developed social programs for Iraqi refugees coming into the United States, with particular emphasis on assisting Iraqi youth in adjusting to life in America, and becoming responsible and successful in their new lives. Andrew has also been active in numerous organizations representing the various dimensions of Iraqi identity, including the Syriac community in New Jersey, Assyrians in Chicago, Chaldeans in Detroit, and numerous Arab American organizations. He plans to attend Loyola University School of Law in Chicago to prepare for a career in public interest law.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Iraq Until recently, Iraqi Christians were relatively uninvolved in American politics. The democratic process is largely foreign to Iraqis. This is changing as a result of two major circumstances. One is the increasing number of second, third, and successive generation community members, who are more knowledgeable about American government and the political process. This has led to increased political involvement, including a number of persons running for and being elected to political offices. Involvement in the political sphere also received considerable stimulus from the deteriorating situation in Iraq, where the basic necessities of life, such as food, clean water, and sanitary facilities, are scarce or nonexistent. Iraqi American Christians are particularly concerned about the plight of Christians in Iraq: churches have been bombed, and priests and bishops kidnapped and killed; many Iraqi-Americans have lost relatives to the violence.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics | 1139
These tragedies have led the heretofore nonpolitical Assyrians and Chaldeans to become politically active. This activity has taken the form of articles in their publications, Web sites, and contacts with their political representatives in the federal government. This tragedy has even generated contacts between clergy and members of different Iraqi Christian groups, which previously had little experience working together. Efforts have been made to provide direct assistance to the homeland. Lack of confidence in either Iraqi or U.S. government agencies lead Iraqi Americans to hire their own agents to carry relief supplies directly to friends and relatives. At the same time, most Iraqi Christians have little hope that their efforts will be of much use to those suffering in the Mesopotamia they consider their ancestral home.
Forecasts for the 21st Century With the continued unrest in Iraq, Iraqi Americans are likely to continue to bring their relatives to the United States. Consequently, they are also likely to continue their ties to Iraq and their attempts to influence public policy both in Iraq and the United States. They may begin to work together with other Iraqi Americans across religious lines, although the internal divisions among the different linguistic groups and denominations are likely to remain strong. Most Iraqi Christians and Jews already consider themselves Americans, though they maintain a nostalgic commitment to their Mesopotamian roots and attempt to aid relatives and friends still in Iraq. Shiite Muslims are unlikely to achieve their goal of returning to Iraq, since the violence is unlikely to subside to a significant degree. Over time, they too are likely to become established and have American-born children and grandchildren; they will adjust to American culture and develop community resources similar to those their predecessors established in previous generations.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 164 U.S. states with largest population of Iraqi-born (2000 Census: Total U.S. = 89,892) States
No. of Iraqi Foreign-Born in State
Percent of Total Foreign-Born in State
Michigan
31,927
6.10
California
20,532
0.23
Illinois
9,634
0.63
Tennessee
2,766
1.74
Texas
2,752
0.09
New York
2,721
0.07
Arizona
2,456
0.37
Table 165 U.S. cities with largest population of Iraqi-born (2000 Census) No. of Iraqi Foreign-Born in City
Percent of Total Foreign-Born in City
Detroit, MI
30,569
9.12
Chicago, IL
9,513
0.67
San Diego, CA
7,507
1.24
Los Angeles, CA
5,499
0.16
Phoenix, Mesa, AZ
2,343
0.51
Nashville, TN
2,143
3.72
Washington, DC
1,797
0.22
Cities
Table 166 Immigrants from Iraq admitted to United States annually from 1989 to 2001 1989: 1,516
1996: 5,481
1990: 1,756
1997: 3,244
1991: 1,494
1998: 2,220
1992: 4,111
1999: 3,372
1993: 4,072
2000: 5,134
1994: 6,025
2001: 4,985
1995: 5,596
Total (1989–2001): 49,006
1140
Table 167 Iraqis obtaining legal permanent resident status by country of birth, as compared with the overall total: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009
1141
Region and Country of Birth Total Iraq
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
5,087
4,965
5,174
2,450
3,494
4,077
4,337
3,765
4,795
12,110
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 168 Iraqis obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 by leading states of residence Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
12,110
6,206
5,904
751
369
382
California
2,768
1,425
1,343
Colorado
150
89
61
71
44
27
Florida
175
84
91
Georgia
217
97
120
Illinois
760
360
400
Maryland
127
62
65
Arizona
Connecticut
Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota
139
69
70
2,691
1,309
1,382
68
34
34
New Jersey
91
47
44
New York
289
151
138
North Carolina
177
96
81
Ohio
153
79
74
Pennsylvania
231
124
107
Texas
813
451
362
Virginia
559
295
264
Washington
244
125
119
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Table 169 Religious groups in the Iraqi American population as reported by U.S. Census data and community estimates
Ancestry Category
Census 2000 (Ancestry Only)
Iraqi (probably Muslim)
37,714
50,000
Chaldean
(not enumerated)
150,000
Assyrian/Syriac
(not enumerated)
30,000 –50,000
82,154
(180,000 –200,000)
Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac Jewish
(not enumerated)
Totals
119,868
Community Estimates (Immigrant + Ancestry)
15,000 245,000 –265,000
Note: Census data on the Iraqi population is inaccurate; hence most scholars make use of community population estimates, which have limitations as well. This table provides both sets of data for the reader’s information.
Appendix III: Notable Iraqi Americans | 1143 Table 170 Iraqi immigrants becoming U.S. citizens annually from 1994 to 2001 1994
1,808
1995
1,609
1996
2,309
1997
1,621
1998
2,033
1999
3,230
2000
5,217
2001
3,451
Appendix III: Notable Iraqi Americans Dr. Nathima Atchoo is an obstetrician/gynecologist who practices through the Gary Burnstein Community Health Clinic in Pontiac, Michigan. She frequently traveled to the Middle East to treat refugees and received the “Chaldean Humanitarian of the Year” award in 2009 from the Chaldean Federation of Michigan. The Burnstein Clinic named her an “Esteemed Woman of Michigan” in 2010. (http://www.garyburnsteinclinic.org/EsteemedWomen.html) Dr. Hind Rassam Culhane is cochair of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Division, Mercy College, Dobbs Ferry, New York. Wadie P. Deddeh is a former senator of the California State Assembly. Imam Husham al-Husainy is director of the Karbalaa Education Center of America, Dearborn, Michigan. Mar Sarhad Jammo is bishop of the Chaldean Church in the Western United States, St. Peter’s Chaldean Catholic Cathedral, El Cajon, California. Mar Ibrahim Ibrahim is bishop of the Chaldean Church in Eastern North America, Mother of God Church, Southfield, Michigan. Joseph Kassab is executive director of the Chaldean Federation of America and leader of refugee assistance programs. Dr. Majid Khadduri (1909–2007) was the founder of the Graduate Middle East Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland. Imam Hassan al-Qazwini is Imam of the Islamic Center of America, Dearborn, Michigan. According to his Web site, he has worked to “depict a genuine representation of Islam and Muslims. He has thus far spoken at over a hundred churches, colleges and universities about the genuine and authentic teachings of Islam, thereby dispelling the common misconceptions about Muslims in America” (http://alqazwini.org/qazwini_org/).
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Ahmed Qusai al-Taayie is a sergeant in the U.S. Army and a linguist. He was kidnapped in Iraq on October 23, 2006. There have been demands for ransom on his behalf, as well as reports that he has been killed, the most recent in February, 2010. He remains the only member of the American military still listed as missing in Iraq. Heather Raffo is a playwright and actress who has presented her works offBroadway and on tour. In her plays and acting she attempts to introduce American audiences to what it means to be an Iraqi woman. (http://www. heatherraffo.com/9parts.html). Alia Martine Shawkat is an actress who has been in several films, most recently playing an Arab American teenager in Amreeka. She also played in State of Grace, for the Fox Family channel, and in Arrested Development, on Fox Network, the role for which she is probably best known. (http://www.starglimpse. com/celebs/pages/alia_shawkat/alia_shawkat.shtml)
Glossary Baklava: A sweet Middle Eastern pastry. Ba’th: Political party in Iraq and the Arab world. Bulghur: Cracked wheat, used in Middle Eastern cuisine. Cailiph: A religious leader in early Islam. Dolma: Stuffed grape leaves. Falafel: Fried chickpea balls. Fatwah: Religious opinions issued by Islamic leaders. Karbala: Shiite religious shrine in southern Iraq. Kibbeh: A ground meat and wheat dish. Haj: Pilgrimage to Mecca. Hallal: Meat that has been processed according to Islamic ritual requirements. Hijab: A veil covering the head, worn by Muslim women. Hummus: A dip made from chickpeas. Quran: Islamic holy book. Rite: A cultural subgroup of the Roman Catholic Church with a unique ritual. Shari’a: Religious law of Islam. Shi’a, Shiite: The largest denomination of Islam in Iraq. Sunnah: Practices of the Prophet Muhammad. Sunni: The largest denomination of Islam in the Middle East. Zakat: Alms required under Islamic law.
References | 1145
References Abraham, Nabeel. 2000. “Arab Detroit’s ‘American’ Mosque.” In Arab Detroit: From Margin to Mainstream, edited by Nabeel Abraham and Andrew Shryock, 279–309. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press. Baltimore Sun Staff. 2009. “Iraqi Refugee Timeline.” Baltimore Sun, December 18. [Online article retrieved 6/18/09.] http://www.orlandosentinel.com/services/newspaper/ printedition/bal-iraqirefugeetimeline,0,4242845.story?page=1. Barazangi, Nimat Hafez. 1996. “Parents and Youth.” In Family and Gender Among American Muslims, edited by Barbara C. Aswad and Barbara Bilge, 129– 42. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Bardazzi, Marco. 2009. “The Diaspora of the Christians /1 That Corner of Iraq in Detroit.” Oasis Center. [Online article retrieved 7/18/09.] http://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/ node/2590. Brown, Matthew Hay. 2008. “U.S. Slow to Meet Needs, Refugees Say.” Baltimore Sun, December 29. [Online article retrieved 6/18/09.] http://www.orlandosentinel.com/services/ newspaper/printedition/bal-te.refugee29dec29,0,83186.story. Cainkar, Louise. 1996. “Immigrant Palestinian Women Evaluate Their Lives.” In Family and Gender Among American Muslims, edited by Barbara C. Aswad and Barbara Bilge, 41–58. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Grieco, Elizabeth. 2003. “Iraqi Immigrants in the United States.” Migration Policy Institute. [Online article retrieved 6/18/09.] http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/ print.cfm?ID=113. Haddad, Yvonne Y., and Jane I. Smith. 1996. “Islamic Values among American Muslims.” In Family and Gender Among American Muslims, edited by Barbara C. Aswad and Barbara Bilge, 19– 40. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. International Rescue Committee. 2009. “Iraqi Refugees in the United States: In Dire Straits.” [Online article retrieved 6/20/09.] http://www.theirc.org/special-report/iraqirefugee-crisis.html. Kohn, Joe. 2008. “Chaldean Bishop Ibrahim N. Ibrahim: ‘No One Is Defending Us’.” Catholic Online. [Online article retrieved 6/3/09.] http://www.catholic.org/international/ international_story.php?id=27184. Leonard, Karen I. 2003. Muslims in the United States. New York: Russell Sage. Lobe, Jim. 2007. “Iraq Exodus Fuels Rise in Refugees, Displaced.” Inter Press Service, July 11. [Online article retrieved 6/18/09.] http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/ content/article/167-attack/35667.html. Najor, Julia. 1981. Babylonian Cuisine: Chaldean Cookbook from The Middle East. Detroit, MI: Nationalbooks, International. Patheos. 2009. “Islam Rites and Ceremonies.” [Online article retrieved 8/23/09.] http:// www.patheos.com/Library/Islam/Ritual-Worship-Devotion-Symbolism/Rites-andCeremonies.html. Ricks, Thomas E. 2007. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: Penguin Books.
1146 | Iraqi Immigrants Roux, Georges. 1992. Ancient Iraq, 3rd ed. New York: Penguin Books. Schopmeyer, Kim. 2000. “A Demographic Portrait of Arab Detroit.” In Arab Detroit: From Margin to Mainstream, edited by Nabeel Abraham and Andrew Shryock, 61–92. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press. Sengstock, M. C. 1996. “Care of the Elderly within Muslim Families.” In Family and Gender Among American Muslims, edited by Barbara C. Aswad and Barbara Bilge, 271–97. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Sengstock, M. C. 1999. Chaldean-Americans: Changing Conceptions of Ethnic Identity. Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration Studies. Sengstock, M. C. 2005. Chaldeans in Michigan. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. Shohet, Maurice. 1999. Iraqi Jews. New York: Congregation Bene Naharayim. [Online article retrieved 6/1/09.] http://www.iraqijews.org/. Tate, Deborah. 2009. “US Senate Panel Considers Plight of Iraqi Refugees.” Voice of America News, March 31. [Online article retrieved 6/18/09.] http://sz104.ev.mail.net/ service/home/’/US%20Senate%2oPanel%20Considers%20Plight%20of%20Refugees. htm?auth=co&loc. Tirman, John. 2009. “Iraq’s Shocking Human Toll: About 1Million Killed, 4.5 Million Displaced, 1–2 Million Widows, 5 Million Orphans.” Alternet, February 2. [Online article retrieved 6/18/09.] http://www.alternet.org/world/123818/iraq%27s_shocking_human_ toll%3A_about_1_million_killed%2C_4.5_million_displaced%2C_1–2_million_ widows%2C_5_million_orphans/. Tripp, Charles. 2007. A History of Iraq, 3rd ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Walbridge, Linda S., and T. M. Aziz. 2000. “After Karbala: Iraqi Refugees in Detroit.” In Arab Detroit: From Margin to Mainstream, edited by Nabeel Abraham and Andrew Shryock, 321– 42. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press. Wiswell, Joyce. 2007. “A New Life: First Iraqi Refugees Arrive.” Chaldean News, September 1. [Online article retrieved 8/26/09.] http://www.chaldeannews.com/index. cfm?articleid=718.
Further Reading Abraham, Nabeel, and Andrew Shryock, eds. 2000. Arab Detroit: From Margin to Mainstream. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press. A series of research reports on the Muslim communities in the Detroit Metropolitan Area, which is the major concentration of Middle Eastern immigrants in the United States. “About Nineveh and Assyrians, Who Are We?” [Online article retrieved 8/26/09.] http:// www.nineveh.com. This Web site is dedicated to the interests and concerns of persons, many of them Iraqis, who identify as Assyrians. Attention is paid to the controversies about identity patterns
Further Reading | 1147 of persons of Assyrian backgrounds. Available in several languages to serve the needs of Assyrians in various parts of the globe. “Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac-Americans.” [Online article retrieved 8/26/09.] http://www.an swers.com/topic/assyrians-in-the-united-states. A Web site associated with Wikipedia and Answers.com, providing information on Christians from the Middle East who identify as Assyrian, Chaldean, or Syriac; many of these are from Iraq. Assyrian Community. [Online information retrieved 8/26/09.] http://www.assyrian4all.net. A Web site to bring Assyrian and Chaldean Christians together. Provides an opportunity for them to meet others, post pictures, obtain information, and the like. Some text is in Aramaic. Assyrian Voice. [Online information retrieved 8/26/09.] http://www.assyrianvoice.net. A Web site to enable persons who identify as Assyrians to maintain contact with each other, and obtain information on religion, history, sports, celebrities, and the like. Aswad, Barbara C., and Barbara Bilge, eds. 1996. Family and Gender Among American Muslims. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. A collection of essays about family patterns in American Muslim communities from several Middle Eastern and Asian nations. Chaldean American Chamber of Commerce. [Online information retrieved 8/26/09.] http:// www.chaldeanchamber.com. This Web site is sponsored by the business association of Detroit’s Chaldean community. It serves as an information and communication mechanism for the extensive Chaldean business community. Chaldean Federation. [Online information retrieved 7/16/09.] http://chaldeanfederation.org. This Web site was established by the federation of Chaldean organizations throughout the United States. It reports issues of concern to the community, particularly relating to the conditions of Christians in Iraq, and Iraqi Christian refugees in the Middle East and the United States. The Chaldean News. Farmington Hills, MI. A monthly newsletter published by the Chaldean community of Metropolitan Detroit. Provides information on activities of the local community, as well as reports and commentary on international status of Chaldeans. Christian Assyrians of Iraq. [Online information retrieved 8/26/09.] http://www. christiansofiraq.com/sympo.html. This Web site is devoted to providing the international community with information on conditions experienced by Assyrian Christians from Iraq. It contains reports from common news sources. Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society. [Online information retrieved 7/16/09.] http://www.hias.org. This Web site is devoted to the welfare of Jewish refugees throughout the world. It provides assistance and a source of communication. This group has provided considerable assistance to Iraqi Jews.
1148 | Iraqi Immigrants Marr, Phebe. 2004. The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. A detailed description and analysis of modern Iraqi history, from the British Mandate in 1920 to the early stages of the 2003 Iraq War. Miller, John, and Aaron Kenedi, eds. 2002. Inside Iraq. New York: Marlowe & Co. A series of journalistic essays on conditions in Iraq leading up to the 2003 war in Iraq. Nineveh. This quarterly publication of the Assyrian Foundation of America provides information on Assyrian-speaking communities in the United States, primarily those that identify as Assyrian or Syriac. Perry, Bryon. 2008. The Chaldeans. West Bloomfield, MI: Chaldean Cultural Center. An elegantly illustrated volume of essays about history, representatives, and events in the Chaldean Community of Metropolitan Detroit. Suleiman, Michael, ed. 1999. Arabs in America: Building a New Future. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. A series of essays analyzing the status of Arabs in the United States and Canada, and their views on various aspects of life in North America. Zinda Magazine—Periodical For The International Assyrian Community. [Online information retrieved 8/26/09.] http://www.zindamagazine.com. Zinda is a weekly online magazine that promotes the use of the Assyrian language.
Multicultural America
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Multicultural America AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEWEST AMERICANS Volume 3
Ronald H. Bayor, Editor
Copyright 2011 by Ronald H. Bayor All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Multicultural America : an encyclopedia of the newest Americans / Ronald H. Bayor, editor. v. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-313-35786-2 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-313-35787-9 (ebook) 1. Cultural pluralism—United States—Encyclopedias. 2. Multiculturalism—United States—Encyclopedias. 3. Immigrants—United States—Encyclopedias. 4. Ethnology— United States—Encyclopedias. 5. Minorities—United States—Encyclopedias. 6. United States—Ethnic relations—Encyclopedias. 7. United States—Race relations—Encyclopedias. I. Bayor, Ronald H., 1944E184.A1M813 2011 305.800973—dc22 2011004677 ISBN: 978-0-313-35786-2 EISBN: 978-0-313-35787-9 15
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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Greenwood An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America
Contents
Preface, ix Introduction, xiii Chronology, xxvii Afghan Immigrants, 1 Ceri Oeppen Argentinian Immigrants, 39 Judith Ann Warner Bahamian Immigrants, 79 Kathryn Beard Bangladeshi Immigrants, 109 Ahrar Ahmad Brazilian Immigrants, 149 Franklin Goza Cambodian Immigrants, 205 Justin Corfield Chilean Immigrants, 237 Cristián Doña-Reveco Chinese Immigrants, 277 Jonathan H. X. Lee Colombian Immigrants, 353 Enrique S. Pumar Costa Rican Immigrants, 381 Thea S. Alvarado v
vi | Contents
Cuban Immigrants, 413 Guillermo J. Grenier Dominican Immigrants, 471 Ramona Hernández and Anthony Stevens-Acevedo Ecuadorian Immigrants, 533 Kenneth Kincaid Egyptian Immigrants, 577 Caroline Nagel Eritrean Immigrants, 617 Tricia Redeker Hepner Ethiopian Immigrants, 657 Solomon Addis Getahun Filipino Immigrants, 701 Maria Paz Gutierrez Esguerra Ghanaian Immigrants, 753 Baffour K. Takyi Guatemalan Immigrants, 799 Timothy Steigenga and Sandra Lazo de la Vega Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants, 845 Stephen J. Sills and Natassaja Chowthi Haitian Immigrants, 887 Bertin M. Louis Jr. Honduran Immigrants, 933 Suyapa G. Portillo Villeda Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants, 969 Karen Isaksen Leonard Indonesian Immigrants, 1027 Jennifer Cho Iranian Immigrants, 1069 Maboud Ansari Iraqi Immigrants, 1111 Mary C. Sengstock
Contents | vii
Israeli Jewish Immigrants, 1149 Steven J. Gold Jamaican Immigrants, 1189 Alwyn D. Gilkes Japanese Immigrants, 1247 Eiichiro Azuma Kenyan Immigrants, 1287 Nicole C. D’Errico and Scott G. Feinstein Korean Immigrants, 1329 Won Moo Hurh Laotian Immigrants, 1397 Helen K. Kim Lebanese Immigrants, 1427 Stephen J. Sills Liberian Immigrants, 1459 Hana Brown Mexican Immigrants, 1493 Alma M. Garcia Nicaraguan Immigrants, 1557 Lisa Konczal Nigerian Immigrants, 1595 Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome Pakistani Immigrants, 1655 Kathleen M. Moore Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants, 1695 Randa Bassem Serhan Panamanian Immigrants, 1731 Joanna Doran and Anulkah Thomas Peruvian Immigrants, 1777 Erika Busse-Cárdenas and Rodrigo Lovatón Dávila Puerto Ricans, 1843 María E. Pérez y González
viii | Contents
Salvadoran Immigrants, 1903 Carlos B. Cordova Somalian Immigrants, 1965 Franklin Goza Sudanese Immigrants, 2013 Deidre Ann Tyler Taiwanese Immigrants, 2043 Franklin Ng Thai Immigrants, 2097 Jenjira Yahirun Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants, 2135 Teruyuki Tsuji Venezuelan Immigrants, 2191 Magaly Sanchez-R. Vietnamese Immigrants, 2229 Hien Duc Do Selected Bibliography, 2277 About the Editor and Contributors, 2279 Index, 2287
Israeli Jewish Immigrants by Steven J. Gold
Introduction The founders of Israel believed that the ingathering of exiles into a Jewish homeland would bring about an end to Jews’ existence as a minority group in other peoples’ lands, and they emphasized voluntary migration there. A very large fraction of the Israeli population came as stateless refugees, fleeing anti-Jewish oppression associated with Nazism and Communism in Eastern Europe and ejection from North African and Middle Eastern countries (Gold 2002). Retaining aspirations and connections associated with life outside of the Jewish State, a fraction chose to leave Israel. Because of the good relations between Israel and the United States, America’s extensive educational and economic opportunities, and its large Jewish population, Israeli emigrants’ major destination of settlement has been the United States, with current estimates suggesting that between 150,000 and 175,000 reside there. Israelis in the United States are well-educated. They often hold high-status jobs in the professions and entrepreneurship, earn incomes that match those of the native-born, and frequently marry American citizens. Moreover, they have easy access to the established Jewish community, within which they often live and work. Generally residing in desirable neighborhoods of major cities, they rank among the most successful of all immigrant populations and reveal impressive rates of English competence and naturalization (Gold and Phillips 1996). Despite this pattern of mobility and access to the American mainstream, Israeli emigrants seldom describe themselves as Americans, socialize with other Israelis, frequently describe their intentions to return home, and often do so. Westernized and white, the reason for Israeli emigrants’ reluctance to identify with the United States is seldom a consequence of racial or religious discrimination. Rather, it is due to the fact that they have been socialized into Israeli culture and citizenship, a central tenet of which is that Jews and especially Israelis should live in Israel.
1149
* Some borders are subject to controversy and debate and reflect various political and national agendas.
Chronology | 1151
Chronology 1004 B.C.E.
Jerusalem becomes the political and the spiritual nexus of the people of Israel.
1870s–1880s
Hovevei Zion (lovers of Zion) societies in Russia and Romania promote agricultural settlement in the Land of Israel.
1881–1928
2,414,989 immigrant Jews enter the United States, mostly from Russia and Eastern Europe.
1882–1903
First Aliya (large-scale immigration) to Israel, mainly from Russia, including many members of Hovevei Zion.
1896
Theodor Herzl, father of political Zionism, writes The Jewish State, asserting that the problem of anti-Semitism can be resolved only by a Jewish state.
1897
First Zionist Congress is convened (August 29); adoption of the Basle program, calling for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in the Land of Israel; Theodor Herzl, the congress’s initiator, writes in his journal: “In Basle I founded the Jewish State. . . . In . . . fifty years, everyone will realize it.”
1917
Four hundred years of Ottoman rule are ended by British conquest; British General Allenby enters Jerusalem. Balfour Declaration is issued, pledging the British government’s support for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine (November 2).
1922
League of Nations confirms British Mandate for Palestine, citing the Balfour Declaration in the preamble of the Mandate.
1933
Hitler comes to power in Germany.
1938
Aliya B, “illegal immigration” of Jews from Europe, begins; by 1948 almost 100,000 illegal immigrants will arrive.
1939
World War II breaks out (September 1); a master plan to liquidate the Jewish community in Europe is put into motion by Nazi Germany; some six million Jews, including 1.5 million children, are murdered by the Nazis between 1939 and 1945 (the Shoah—Holocaust).
1947
UN decides on establishment of Jewish and Arab states in Palestine, by a vote of 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions; Arab insurgence against Jewish settlements begins. (November 29).
1152 | Israeli Jewish Immigrants
1948
State of Israel is proclaimed (May 14) by David Ben-Gurion, hours before the British Mandate is due to end (May 15). War of Independence begins (May 15) as the armies of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon and a contingent from Iraq attack the new state; in 15 months of intermittent fighting, all invaders are repulsed. First census finds a population of 872,700 in Israel—716,700 Jews and 156,000 non-Jews.
1967
Six-Day War (June 6–11) expands holdings of land by Israel. UN resolution 242 adopted, providing an agreed framework for settling the Arab–Israel dispute (November 22).
1973
Yom Kippur War—on the Day of Atonement, the holiest day of the Jewish year, Egypt and Syria launch a coordinated surprise attack, repulsed by Israel after unprecedented fierce fighting and heavy losses.
1980
Lahis Report that claims 500,000 Israelis live in the United States is published.
1989
Mass immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union begins. While in Los Angeles, Israeli Absorption Minister Yitzhak Peretz states that Israelis living in the United States should become integrated into the American Jewish community to retain their Jewish identity.
1991
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin recants condemnation of Israeli émigrés in an interview with Israeli American Newspaper Hadashot LA.
2000
Al Aksa Intifada begins, increasing violence and conflict between Jews and Arabs in Israel and Occupied Territories. The Israeli economy and tourism falter, and rates of emigration increase, while return of Israeli emigrants is reduced.
Background Geography Long and narrow in shape, Israel is some 290 miles in length and about 85 miles across at the widest point. The country is bordered by Lebanon to the north, Syria to the northeast, Jordan to the east, Egypt to the southwest, and the Mediterranean Sea
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1153
to the west. Mountains and plains, fertile fields and desert are often minutes apart. The width of the country, from the Mediterranean Sea in the west to the Dead Sea in the east, can be crossed by car in about 90 minutes; and the trip from Metulla, in the far north, to Eilat at the country’s southern tip takes about six hours (Jewish Virtual Library).
History The presence of Jewish Israeli immigrants in the United States can be traced to the formation of the state of Israel, itself a product of the Jewish condition in 19th-century Europe. The late 1800s were a difficult time for European Jewry, who saw their earlier hopes for enlightenment-based acceptance from local Christians dashed by growing anti-Semitism. In an effort to end their legacy of exile and persecution, in 1897 Jews in Russia and Romania developed a movement called Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion), whose goal was to establish a political entity in the Land of Israel (Goldstein 1995, 104). The movement’s leader was Theodore Herzl, a secular native of Budapest who worked as journalist for a Viennese newspaper in Paris. As he reported on a series of anti-Semitic incidents, he became convinced that “the Jewish problem was intractable, emancipation had failed, and that a new approach was urgently needed” (Goldstein 1995, 111). Herzl and the other founders of Zionism were influenced by the political ideals of their time and place—especially socialism and nationalism—as they sought an opportunity for Jews to build their own lives on their own land. A half-century later, in 1948, their dreams were realized, and the State of Israel had been formed. Its presence is justified by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the League of Nations, and the United Nations. Over the next 50 years, Israel would overcome a variety of political and economic obstacles and survive several wars. Its Jewish population would swell from about 500,000 in 1948 to over 5,243,000 in 2001—the result of natural growth and in-migration from many nations.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration As time passed, it became apparent that emigration from Israel was not strictly a first-generation phenomenon caused by the lingering influence of the diaspora on the recently settled. Rather, native-born Israelis continued to exit, mostly settling in the large cities of Western industrial countries, especially those with significant Jewish populations. While sizeable communities of Israelis reside in London, Paris, Toronto, and Sydney, the overwhelming majority of Israeli emigrants dwell in the United States (Y. Cohen 2009). Israelis’ patterns of travel between Israel and the
1154 | Israeli Jewish Immigrants
United States have been shaped by the many economic, demographic, and political transformations and wars that their country of origin has encountered during its short history. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 2.6 percent of Israelis Jews in the United States arrived before 1950; 8.6 percent arrived in 1950–1959; 13.3 percent arrived in 1960–1970; 18.6 percent arrived in 1971–1980; 25.7 percent arrived in 1981–1990 and 31.2 percent arrived in 1991–2000 (Rebhun 2009, table 2). (See Table 171.) Small numbers of Israelis began to move to the United States soon after the country’s formation. Following the passage of the immigration Act of 1965, their numbers increased, facilitated by the presence of close relatives in the United States (Diamond 1969, 294). During the late 1960s, a growing number began to go abroad to obtain education in U.S. universities, and many stayed on. Based upon their long tenure in the States and American education, these early arrivals eventually became leaders of the community.
Issues of Assimilation and Separation During the 1970s and 1980s the Israeli government, as well as various pundits, journalists, and academics feared that the emigration of Jewish Israelis would endanger Israel’s military, demographic, and economic strength, and the legitimacy of its founding ideology. Accordingly, they exaggerated the number of emigrants in official reports, overstated the risks that their exit posed for the Jewish state, and depicted their sojourn as unsuccessful and unhappy in academic reports, journalistic accounts, novels, and films. During these years, Israeli emigrants were branded with the Hebrew epithet yordim (people who go down from the Holy Land to the diaspora, as contrasted with olim, in-migrants who go up from the diaspora to the Holy Land). Following the Israeli lead, organized institutions of the American Jewish community—which were enthusiastic supporters of the Jewish state—followed suit, berating Israeli immigrants and limiting their access to communal services that had been offered as a matter of course to nearly every other group of Jewish migrants in U.S. history (Gold 2007). Reflecting the prevailing outlook in her report, “The Israeli Corner of the American Jewish Community,” Sherry Rosen (1993) asserted that American Jewish agencies treated Israeli émigrés as “anything but Jewish settlers seeking to build new lives for themselves and their families in the United States.” Indeed, during the 1980s, some undocumented Israeli immigrants felt so distanced from organized American Jewry that a fraction utilized the service of Catholic rather than Jewish agencies to register for amnesty under the provisions of the 1986 Immigration Control and Reform Act (Gold 2002).
Later Waves of Immigration Since the late 1980s, both Israel and American Jewish agencies have taken an increasingly conciliatory approach towards Israeli expatriates. In so doing, they
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1155
removed some of the stigma associated with emigration and opened a path for incorporation into the American Jewish community. During a 1989 trip to Los Angeles, Israeli Absorption Minister Yitzhak Peretz claimed that Israel should change its attitude towards émigrés if they could not be convinced to return. “Israelis,” he said, “should be encouraged to be part of the Jewish community and become integrated because it offers them, and particularly their children, some chance of retaining their Jewish identity” (Tugend 1989). In 1991, Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin recanted his famous condemnation of Israeli émigrés in an interview in the Israeli American newspaper Hadashot LA, saying, “What I said then doesn’t apply today . . . the Israelis living abroad are an integral part of the Jewish community and there is no point in talking about ostracism” (Rosen 1993, 3). Finally, “because of the importance it attaches to the re-emigration of Israelis to Israel” in 1992, the Israeli government took responsibility for re-aliyah (remigration to Israel) and offered a package of benefits including cash assistance, low-cost air fair, suspension of import duties, education, assistance in finding jobs and housing, financial aid for school tuition, and reduction in military duty for Israelis and their family members who returned (For Those Returning Home 1995). Since the early 1990s, major American Jewish communities (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, South Florida, and the San Francisco Bay Area) have created various endeavors to aid and incorporate Israelis. These include social activities, secular, Israeli-style education programs, and Israeli divisions of communal organizations (Gold 2002; Rosen 1993; Uriely 1994). Israel’s modified attitude towards its emigrants was not a random event. It developed in a context of unprecedented demographic and economic growth and significant improvements in Israel’s political situation. In 1989—the time of the last major spike of antiemigrant editorializing in Israeli newspapers—Israel was suffering economic stagnation and had a rate of inflation near 20 percent, an ongoing fear of war, and an inability to retain many of its best and brightest (Moaz and Temkin 1989). However, a decade later, Israel had signed the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords with the Palestinians and seen a relaxation of the Arab economic embargo. In addition, due to the end of emigration restrictions in the former Soviet Union, Israel’s population had increased by close to 20 percent because of the Soviet Jewish Aliyah of almost a million persons, many of whom were highly educated. Its inflation rate was below three percent, and it had the greatest number of engineers per capita in the world (almost double that of the second-ranking United States [Richtel 1998]). Finally, the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990 permitted a significant number of skilled Israelis to enter the United States at the request of employers (City of New York 2009). During the 1980s, Israel’s economy was plagued by stagflation, and its major export was citrus. By 2000, Israel had become a center of high tech and was seen
1156 | Israeli Jewish Immigrants
United States president Bill Clinton watches as Israeli prime minister Yitzak Rabin (left) and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat shake hands at the ceremony for the signing of the historic Oslo Accords on September 13, 1993. (William J. Clinton Presidential Library)
as among the world’s top growth economies (Hiltzik 2000). As such, it could offer its more affluent citizens a standard of material life equal to that of the industrialized West (Hiltzik 2000; Trofimov 1995). Israel’s economic transformation made it ever more in need of a globalized workforce—including the overseas involvement of Israelis in venture capital markets—to facilitate the continued growth of its economy (Lipkis 1991). Finally, Israeli policy makers realized that emigration is not always permanent. In fact, former Israelis often travel to the Jewish state for business, pleasure, and family reasons and are much more likely to permanently settle than other segments of diaspora Jewry (Herman 2000). This fact was not missed by Israeli officials, who since the 1990s have altered emigration policy to encourage return rather than punish going abroad (For Those Returning Home 1995; N. Cohen 2009). These political, economic, and demographic developments transformed Israeli society, making it better able to tolerate population losses to emigration.
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1157
Migrants’ Motives When asked why they came to the United States, most Israelis offer one of three overlapping responses—economic opportunities (including education), family factors, and a need for a respite or broader horizons (Gold 2002; Lustic 2004; Rosen 1993; Sobel 1986). For example, a Los Angeles building contractor alludes to both “broadening his horizons” and increasing economic opportunities as he describes his desire to come to the United States. I came here in February ’78 as a student. Back in Israel, I see and hear so much about America and I figure America is somehow the final place in the progression of the world. Whatever happens in the world, somehow, America has a good hand in it. And so I decide that maybe it is the main source and I want to learn about America and open up my mind. And also, back home, there was not adequate opportunities. (Gold 2002, 34) A fairly large number, generally women and children, accompanied their husbands and fathers who sought economic betterment and educational opportunity (Kimhi 1990; Lipner 1987). In 1986, marriage to an American citizen accounted for a third of all Israelis who received immigrant status to the United States (Herman 1994, 92). Israelis often mention coming to the United States to join relatives. And reflecting the other side of the same process, émigrés in the States described bringing Israeli relatives and friends to join them (Sabar 2000). Israelis who were self-employed prior to migration and retain their entrepreneurial pursuits in the United States assert that the United States is a better location for capitalistic endeavors than Israel (Freedman and Korazim 1986; Gold 1994a; Uriely 1994). This is reflected in the following exchange with an émigré active in the garment business in Los Angeles: For the people who were in business in Israel, you don’t even have to ask why they came here. We just know that they came to do business. American is a better country for business: less regulations, taxes and controls. They want you to do some business. Israel, it’s too much socialism. (Gold 2002, 37) Like various groups in both previous and current migrant flows, Israelis are involved in chain migration. The presence of established coethnics in the host society is a valuable resource for later migrants. It lowers the social and economic costs associated with migration and plays a major role in organizing receiving communities. Israelis also ease their resettlement in the United States by residing in the Jewish neighborhoods in major cities (Herman and LaFontaine 1983; Sabar 2000). While most Israelis enter the United States with the specific goals of education, economic and career advancement, or family unification, another group arrived as
1158 | Israeli Jewish Immigrants
part of a “Secular Pilgrimage” of world travel, which is a common rite of passage among Israeli “Backpackers” following their military service, which is compulsory for men and women alike (Ben-Ami 1992; Haviv 2005). Reflecting such origins, Israelis interviewed in Los Angeles and New York described how they had come to the States as part of their travels, picked up a job to earn some cash, and then had “gotten stuck”—because of economic opportunities, relationships, or other factors—for a period longer than they had initially planned. Isaac described this: Israel is a country that is not easy to live in. Everybody finishes the army after three or four years. After the army, you understand life differently. So you are ready to try something else. I came to Los Angeles, and then I met my wife and that’s how I started. I got into the clothing business and I stayed. We had kids. (Gold 1995) An additional explanation for Israeli emigration is the desire to be outside of the confines of the Jewish state. For supporters of Israel, direct criticism of the Jewish state by those living beyond its boarders is seen as disloyal and as such is aired infrequently among émigrés. However, in explaining why they left Israel, certain migrants described feelings of disillusionment or a general attitude of not being able fit into the social order. Israelis who are from stigmatized ethnic backgrounds sometimes claimed they left because of discrimination. In contrast, secular intellectuals complained about the loss of idealism, the growing influence of religious parties, and the recent baseness of street culture (Gold 2002). Finally, Israelis occasionally describe their exit as an effort to escape military duty and the ever-present violence associated with life in the Middle East (Gold and Hart 2009; Lustic 2004; Sobel 1986). Especially since the beginning of the Al Aksa (or second) Intifada in fall 2000, a fraction of Israeli emigrants have been more open in expressing their negative feelings about the Jewish state and their desire to be away. An émigré living in the San Francisco Bay Area asserted that the danger associated with the Al Aksa Intifada significantly changed the way in which her fellow émigrés expressed their views about where they planned to live. There is a woman who moved here with her husband whose baby daughter and mother were killed in one of the terror attacks. She swears she will never come back. People [other Israelis] here discuss her with hushed tones. Friends of mine, an MD and a pilot, left because of the Second Intifada, not for a sojourn but to permanently settle. The Second Intifada did change the perception of Israel as a safe place. (Gold and Hart 2009)
Demographic Profile | 1159
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the rate of Israeli-born persons acquiring permanent residency status in the United States has steadily increased during the period from 2000 to 2009, from less than 3,000 persons annually in 2000 to almost 6,000 a year from 2005 to 2009. (See Table 176.)
Demographic Profile The number of Israelis in the United States has been a subject of intense controversy. In fact, given their broad array of national origins and their ongoing links to various nations and cultural forms, the very definition of an Israeli is problematic, making their enumeration difficult. For example, while the Israeli government considers children of Israelis born abroad to be Israelis even if they have never been there, such children are also bearers of U.S. citizenship. Since dual citizenship is permitted between the United States and Israel, American Jews who move to Israel and accept Israeli citizenship but then return to the United States would be considered Israelis by Israel even as they reside in the country of their birth. The number of actual migrants—as opposed to visitors—among this population is difficult to determine, since a sizeable fraction of all Israelis living in the United States at any given time will eventually return (Y. Cohen 2009). Because a large segment—close to 40 percent—of the Israeli population was born outside of Israel, their place of birth rather than last place of residence is recorded as their nationality by the U.S. Census (Gold 2002). Finally, due to the fact that the U.S. Census does not collect data on religion, it is difficult to determine how many Israeli emigrants are Jews and how many are members of other religious or ethnic groups. While almost 30 percent of Israeli citizens are of Palestinian nationality (including both Muslims and Christians), relatively few Palestinians would willingly identify themselves as Israelis in the United States. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, there are about 99,600 Israel-born adults living in the United States. On a regional basis, 45 percent live in the Northeast, 29 percent in the West, 19 percent in the South, and 7 percent in the Midwest. According to 2009 data, more Israelis are becoming permanent legal residents in California than New York, reversing a pattern in the ranking of the two most favored states for Israeli immigrants that has existed since the formation of the State of Israel. (See Table 175.) The three largest cities of settlement are New York, Los Angeles, and Greater Miami (Cohen and Veinstein 2009). Estimates drawing from the 2000 U.S. Census, the Israeli Census, and Israeli Border Police data suggest that approximately 153,000 to 175,000 Israelis (including those born in Israel and elsewhere) reside in the United States (Y. Cohen 2009). As time passes, the fraction of Israeli Jews in
1160 | Israeli Jewish Immigrants
the United States who were born in Israel has increased, from less than two-thirds in 1980 to three-fourths in 2000. This reflects the increasing fraction of native-born Jews in Israel (Rebhun 2009, 10). Israelis in the United States tend to be relatively young. The median age of Israelis in the United States in 2000 was 37, and only 4.4 percent were age 65 and over. In 2000, the population was 55 percent male and 45 percent female. The marriage rate of Israelis living in the United States is quite high, about 71 percent in 2000, while 8 percent are divorced or separated, 3 percent widowed, and 18 percent are never married. About 38 percent of Israelis live in households with four or more family members, and half of Israelis in the United States have children. A significant fraction of Israelis living in New York have very large families—15 percent in New York versus 6 percent in other states. This reflects the greater presence of Orthodox and Haredi Israeli Jews—whose religious values emphasize large family size—living there. Also indicative of the high concentration of highly religious Israelis in New York are the reduced levels of education and earnings in contrast to those representing the entire population in the United States (Cohen and Veinstein 2009). According to the 2000 Census, Israelis in the United States are relatively welleducated, and 43 percent had a bachelor’s degree or greater. Half of the population age 24–65 are employed as managers or professionals, while 31.4 percent are in technical/sales or administrative occupations. About 6.7 percent are in service occupations, and 11.9 percent are operators or laborers. Israeli Americans’ rate of self-employment—33.4 percent—is among the highest of all nationality groups recorded in the 2000 U.S. Census. This high rate of self-employment is achieved by extensive economic cooperation among Israelis, and with American Jews and Jewish immigrants from other countries in several areas of economic specialization. Israelis are notably active in the real estate, construction, jewelry and diamonds, retail sales, security, garment, moving companies, engineering (especially information technology), and media industries (Y. Cohen 2009; Gold 2002; Gold and Phillips 1996). Entrepreneurship has long been a viable economic strategy for Jewish immigrants to the United States who, as a group, are party to an extensive tradition of self-employment prior to their arrival in this country. As their generally lucrative occupations might indicate, the earnings of Israelis in the United States are considerable. The median household income of Israelis in the United States was $81,000 in 2000. However, there are significant gender differences in Israelis’ economic activity. The median income of Israeli men was $38,000, exceeding that of all foreign-born men by $15,000. In contrast, the median income of Israeli women in the United States was little more than half that of men: $20,000, and only about $2,200 more than the median income for all foreign-born women in the United States. As native speakers of Hebrew who are often trained
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as educators, Israeli women frequently find employment as instructors in American Jewish synagogues and schools. Others work as professionals, managers, and administrators, and in clerical jobs (Gold 2002). While men reveal high rates of labor force participation, a surprisingly large fraction of Israeli women are not in the labor market. Despite their relatively elevated educational profiles, according to the 2000 U.S. Census, their labor force participation rate, of about 54 percent, is below that of all foreign-born women in the United States (59%). This can be considered as an indicator of Israelis’ economic advancement over their status in Israel, because in the country of origin, a single income could not support the family, while it can in the United States. A survey of naturalized Israelis in New York found that only 4 percent of the women indicated “housewife” as their occupation in Israel, while 36 percent did so in the United States. This makes Israelis distinct from many other contemporary immigrant groups, which maintain higher labor force participation rates for women in the United States than in their countries of origin (Gold 1995). A final indicator of Israelis’ economic well-being is the fact that 59 percent own their own homes (Cohen and Veinstein 2009).
Adjustment and Adaptation Israelis in the United States earn incomes that approach those of native-born whites, learn English easily, frequently marry U.S. citizens, and exhibit high rates of naturalization (Gold 2002; Gold and Phillips 1996); 63 percent of Israelis in the United States are citizens. With increasing age and time of residence in the United States, rates of citizenship grow. In 2000, almost 94 percent of Israelis who had lived in the United States at least 26 years were U.S. citizens (Rebhun 2009). Consequently, Israeli Americans are characterized by numerous opportunities to join the host society—especially the American Jewish community—yet retain strong feelings of attachment to and identification with their country of origin. Some number of Israeli migrants does actually return—about 5,000 a year during the last half of the 1990s, but reducing to about 3,000 annually since then (Alon 2003).
Family, Culture, and Lifestyle Rituals Israeli Americans generally follow rituals common to Jews of other nationalities, with an emphasis on spoken Israeli Hebrew (which is distinct from the religious Hebrew practiced by diaspora Jews), the consumption of Israeli foods, the singing of Israeli songs, Israeli folk dancing, and the marking of Israeli national holidays, such as Israeli Memorial Day (Yom Hazikaron) and Israeli Independence Day (Yom Ha’atzmaut).
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In many American communities, Israeli immigrants and American Jews join together to commemorate Israeli Independence Day. For example, New Yorkers hold the Salute to Israel Parade on Fifth Avenue. In Los Angeles during the 1990s, Israelis and American Jews merged separate events to create a shared gala. Major Israeli film festivals are held each year in Miami, Los Angeles, and New York, with smaller ones in several other cities. Israeli Americans keep in touch with events at home though online newspapers, in both Hebrew and English. These include the Jerusalem Post, Ha’artez, and Yidiyot Achronot. Israel Shelanu and Shalom LA are Hebrew-language papers published in the United States. New York, Los Angeles, and South Florida communities also publish Hebrew/Israeli phone directories. The population maintains a number of Web sites that allow them to network and keep apprised of community activities. One of the most popular is Hamakom.com. Because of the small size of Israel’s population, talented and ambitious Israeli artists and entertainers often move to the United States in order to participate on the much bigger American stage. Accordingly, the most renowned Israeli American artists are not habitués of obscure nightclubs in ethnic enclaves—even through
Members of the Hashomer Hatzair youth movement celebrate the 51st anniversary of Israel’s independence during the Salute to Israel Parade on New York’s Fifth Avenue, May 9, 1999. (AP Photo/David Karp)
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such venues do exist. Rather, their names are household words. Classical musicians include violinists Itzhak Perlman, Pichas Zuckerman, and Gil Shaham, as well as former music director of the Chicago Symphony Daniel Barenboim. Gene Simmons (born in Haifa as Chaim Witz) is the long-tongued bassist of Kiss, while New York trumpeter Avishai Cohen is a leading figure on the international jazz scene. During the 1980s, Israeli-born film producers Menachem Golan and his cousin Yoram Globus owned a controlling interest in Cannon films. They produced action features like Death Wish and Cobra that starred Chuck Norris, Sylvester Stallone, and Charles Bronson, as well as romances such as Bo Derek’s Bolero, and art movies including Franco Zeffirelli’s Otello. Well-known Israeli American film actors range from Natalie Portman to Theodore Bikel. Israeli American visual artists including Omer Fast have enjoyed international acclaim. Several have been featured in the Whitney Museum of American Art’s prestigious Biennial Exhibitions since the 1990s. Reflecting the pioneering spirit of their country, Israeli Americans socialize in informal outdoor activities, including hiking, picnics, cookouts, and outings to the beach. Israeli foods are similar to those of other Middle Eastern countries. Popular dishes include falafel (chick-pea dumplings eaten with sesame paste sauce and vegetables on flat bread), shakshuka (eggs scrambled with vegetables and herbs) and schwarma (shredded barbequed lamb). Israelis also favor salads made of locally grown vegetables and citrus fruits. Israeli restaurants that specialize in Kosher pizza along with other Israeli and Middle Eastern specialties are popular in Jewish neighborhoods throughout the United States. The same is true for bakeries and grocery stores that sell familiar Israeli brands. Reflecting the stipulations of the Jewish religion, Israeli foods are Kosher. Accordingly, shellfish and pork are avoided. Meat and dairy dishes are not eaten together, and meat and poultry are slaughtered and prepared according to religious dictates.
Gender and Family Adaptation In nearly every study of Israelis in the United States, we find that while migration was considered a family decision and the family as a whole enjoys economic benefits as a result of migration, the actual decision to migrate was generally made by the men, for the expanded educational and occupational opportunities available in the United States (Gold 1995; Lev-Ari 2008; Rosenthal and Auerbach 1992). Once in the United States, men often enjoy the benefits of such expanded opportunities, and accordingly, feel more comfortable with the new nation. Women, however, especially those with children and established careers, have more negative views of migration. Survey research reveals that Israeli women are less satisfied with America and retain a stronger sense of Israeli and Jewish identity than men, who increasingly see themselves as American. Even when Israeli women work in
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the States, they have less of a professional identity than men and would prefer to return home (Kimhi 1990, 95). In the words of Rachael: For most of the people that came here, the men came and the women came after them. Like when I came, my husband came for a job. I had to leave my job and I had to find a new job and it was very painful. I think more and more now there are women coming on their own, but if you look at most cases, it is the men coming after jobs and it means that the women are the ones that have to take care of finding apartment, finding schools for kids and they get depressed, very badly depressed. (Gold 2003, 137) Through their immersion in education and work, men develop a social network and a positive sense of self. Women, however, often remain isolated in the home— saddled with the task of caring for children in a strange new country and lacking access to conational social networks. Further, because they are responsible for child rearing and many of the family’s domestic and social activities, Israeli women are the family members who most directly confront alien American social norms and cultural practices. However, separated from the resources and knowledge to which they had access at home, Israeli immigrant women find their domestic and communal tasks—such as building social networks, finding appropriate schools and recreational activities, dealing with teachers and doctors, obtaining day care, and the like—to be quite difficult in the United States. This increase in difficulty in women’s tasks is contrasted to the various advantages U.S. presence yields for husbands involved in the economic sphere. Michal described this: I am convinced from all my friends that the quality of life in Israel is better than the quality here and the problem for Israeli women, whether they have a career or they don’t have a career, they have to tend to the children also and those worries here are tremendous. Where do you send your kids to school? You deal with the public system if you cannot afford to send to private school, all those things, and they fall on the woman. They don’t fall on the man. And the man comes home and he hopefully brings the bread, that’s all he does. (Gold 2003, 138) It is important to note that while many of the economic advantages of residence in the United States can benefit Israeli women as well as men, due to the gendered division of labor, they most commonly go to men alone. Lipner’s research indicates that an Israeli woman’s family status and involvement have much to do with her opinion of the United States. Younger women who had few social attachments prior to migration (i.e., no children or established careers) looked forward to migrating and enjoyed being in the States. However, women who had children and who were
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forced to give up good positions in Israel had a much harder time and experienced their exit as “devastating” (Lipner 1987, 144–45). In reflecting on their experience in the United States, Israelis contrast the nation’s positive economic and occupational environment to its communal and cultural liabilities: Immigrants almost universally regard Israel as a better place for kids. At least prior to the start of the Al Aksa Intifada in 2000 (which involved suicide bombings in public settings), it was considered to be safer, to have fewer social problems, and to not impose the manifold generational conflicts Israelis confront when raising children in the United States. Further, in Israel, Jews are the culturally and religiously dominant group. The institutions of the larger society teach children Hebrew and instruct them in basic national, ethnic, and religious identity as well as Jewish history. In coming to the United States, however, Israelis become a minority group and lose communal networks based upon family, friendship, and neighborhood, which provided a social life and assistance in raising children. The presence of young or school-age children in Israeli immigrant families often heightens their ambivalence about being in the United States. Role reversals sometime occur between parents and children, with the younger generation gaining in power versus the older. This is because children generally become Americanized and learn English much faster than their parents. For example, Carmella reported that her teenage son would react to her advice by saying, “What do you know about it? You’re from Israel” (Gold 2002). Another source of family conflict occurs when various family members disagree regarding their chosen country of residence. These problems are most dramatic when one spouse is American-born or has many American relatives, while the other’s family resides in Israel. Similarly, children who have spent much of their lives in the United States often prefer to stay, while their parents wish to return to Israel. Finally, parents may wish to remain in the United States for career opportunities, while children would prefer to return to Israel. Israeli families are relatively resilient in the United States and provide valuable assistance and support to their members. At the same time, such families suffer from financial problems, separation from relatives, and generational conflicts in communication and identity.
Communal Patterns Most Jews who have entered the United States during the last 300 years have been de jure or de facto refugees, with few opportunities for returning to their countries of origin. By contrast, Israelis retain the real possibility of going back to Israel; indeed, American Jews, the Jewish state, and even the immigrants themselves generally agree that they should return. This distinguishes Israelis from most other Jewish entrants in U.S. history.
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While most Jews immigrating to the United States have become staunchly nationalistic soon after their arrival, Israelis in the United States often discuss their desire to return home, and many make frequent trips back to the Jewish state, sometimes culminating in permanent repatriation. In the words of a community leader in Los Angeles: Israelis would always suffer a certain touch of nostalgia because they are missing the things that they grew up with. Psychologically, most Israelis did not come here to be Americans. They did not come here to swear to the flag; to sing the national anthem and to go to Dodgers games. They came here to have the house and the swimming pool and the two cars and the job and the money. (Gold 2007, 187) Despite their ambivalence about being here, however, Israelis have been active in building a life for themselves in the United States. In fact, Israeli immigrants have developed many activities and organizations in order to resolve their misgivings about being abroad. Community activities include socializing with other Israelis; living near coethnics (and within Jewish communities); consuming Hebrew-language media (produced in both the United States and Israel); frequenting Israeli restaurants and nightclubs; attending coethnic social events and celebrations; joining Israeli associations; working with other Israelis; consuming goods and services provided by Israeli professionals and entrepreneurs; keeping funds in Israeli banks; sending kids to Israeli-oriented religious, language, recreational, day-care, and cultural/national activities; raising money for Israeli causes; calling friends and family in Israel on the phone; and hosting Israeli visitors. In the course of field work in Los Angeles, we identified some 27 Israeli organizations—ranging from synagogues, Hebrew schools, and political groups to scouting programs, sports teams, business associations, and even a recreational flying club (Gold 1994b). This number of organizations exceeds that created by other middle-class immigrant groups in Los Angeles, including Iranians and Soviet Jews. Such a multiplicity of organizations allows émigrés to maintain various Israeli practices and outlooks in the American setting (Gold 2002). Prior to the late 1980s, American Jewish organizations provided few resources for Israeli emigrants. More recently, these organizations have come to see Israelis as providing a vital, new, Jewish-identified population to an otherwise shrinking and aging community. The Israeli presence is especially appreciated in older urban neighborhoods, where large numbers of local Jews have recently left for more family-friendly suburban locations or retirement communities (Waterman 1997). Accordingly, American Jewish organizations supply Israeli newcomers with various services. Recent Jewish population studies in New York (1991, 2002), Los Angeles (1997), and elsewhere enumerate Israelis and note their presence as one
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of the few positive tendencies in a general trend of shrinking Jewish demographics (Gold 2002, 24–25; Herman 1998). Reflecting on Israelis immigrants’ and American Jews’ shared fate, David—a Los Angeles real estate developer and communal activist—elaborates on his approach to integration among American and Israeli Jews. He favors incorporation with local coreligionists in the local Jewish Federation as opposed to maintaining unrealistic expectations for return or creating an autonomous Israeli enclave. Pointing out that local Jews have similar origins and outlooks to Israelis, he encourages the many Israeli subcontractors that he employs to join local Jewish organizations. The Israelis have to come into the Jewish community. I don’t like the fact that some of them want to be independent. I’m not against them organizing, but we should become a part of the mainstream of Jewish-American life because we are not separate. Take for example my own family. I don’t see that just because somebody’s grandmother left the same village in Poland that my grandmother lived in 80 years ago and came to New York, and my relatives came to Israel, that I’m that different from that person. So, since we are the same people, we should not have a separate Israeli Federation—for two reasons. The main reason to me is that most Israelis will not admit that most of them will stay here forever. Most of them will end up living here, and 90 percent of their children will end up living here. I mean, all Israelis somewhere harbor the hope that they will go back to Israel. But the truth is that all of them are here temporarily, and then they die. You know, they cannot just pick up and leave. And they have gotten used to the way of life here and that’s their reality. So these two communities need each other. And I’m not saying the Israelis should assimilate into the Jewish community and become Americans, because they won’t. Their children probably will, but they won’t. I think that instead of having their divisive or divided Jewish community, we need to have one strong united community. This is not a process that will happen overnight, but it will happen. (Gold 2007, 195–96).
Gender and Community Activism Faced with isolation and the challenges of living in an alien culture, but often equipped with communal skills, married Israeli women often find the United States lacking in the resources they need to maintain a supportive environment for their families and children. Freed from the need to contribute to family coffers—as a consequence of the substantial earnings of their husbands—these women take a leading role in organizing many communal activities.
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Motivated by their desire to provide children with some forms of Israeli-style upbringing, a number of émigré women—in consort with Israeli and host society Jewish organizations—have developed programs for the Israeli community’s young people. In Los Angeles, two of the most popular were the AMI (Israeli Hebrew) school and Tzofim (Israeli Scouts). Similar programs exist in New York, Chicago, Silicon Valley, and Miami. While women predominate in most communal activities, men are also involved in coed community organizations, such as Hebrew-speaking, Israeli-oriented chapters of Jewish organizations like the Jewish Community Federation (Gold 2002; Rosen 1993). By linking their activities to those of the local Jewish population, émigré activists both benefit from and contribute to the indigenous Jewish communal structure.
Israeli Moving Companies While Israeli immigrants are, as a group, highly educated and professionally employed, in New York City they own several moving companies. Called shleppers (the Yiddish word for someone who drags or carries something), Israeli-owned moving companies with names like Moishes and Mazel Tov (good luck in Hebrew) dominate the local market and help New Yorkers transfer their belongings from one apartment to another. While these companies employ workers from a variety of ethnic groups, they often rely on hearty young Israelis who wish to earn some money in the course of their extended travel around the world, which has become a rite of passage following their compulsory military service.
A Moishe’s Moving Company van, New York City. (Courtesy of Steven Gold)
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Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture The Israeli community in the United States reflects much of the social diversity that exists in the country of origin. As such, the population reveals numerous subgroups defined in terms of age, social class, religious outlook, occupation, ethnicity, educational level, ideology, lifestyle, time in the United States, and other factors. Los Angeles, for example, includes left-leaning, secular intellectuals raised on kibbutzes, construction workers whose families came from North Africa, Yemini-origin Israelis who work as tile setters and have established a synagogue that maintains their unique religious traditions, the owners of several nationally prominent clothing firms, and the Summit Club, whose well-heeled members lobby American political figures on Israel’s behalf. New York’s Israeli population includes a similar array, ranging from members of several Ultra-Orthodox religious communities, to an enclave of artists and musicians whose creative skills are showcased in museums, galleries, and concert halls (Bleyer 2003). While members of these diverse subgroups occasionally interact, they are much more likely to spend time among those with whom they share similar backgrounds, outlooks, and resources (Gold 2002). Just as the majority of all recent immigrants to the United States have nonEuropean origins, so too do many new Jewish immigrants. Alongside the long-time residents and more recently settled Jewish yuppies in the older Jewish neighborhoods of major American cities, we now find increasing numbers of Israelis. The presence of these Jewish immigrants is what allows these neighborhoods to retain their Jewish complexion in a context of rapidly changing demographics. Recent arrivals purchase existing neighborhood businesses and create new ones. They rent apartments, buy homes, and attend neighborhood synagogues and public and day schools. As a case in point, directly across Robertson Boulevard from the Workman’s Circle building in Los Angeles (Workman’s Circle is a secular/socialist organization influential among European Jewish immigrants in the early 20th century) is the newly created Orthodox Gan Chabad program for Israelis, staffed by a Yemenite rabbi. In the garment center and jewelry districts of New York and Los Angeles, conversations in Hebrew echo Yiddish ones of decades past, as workers relish their lunch of pita bread, shwarma, and Turkish coffee as much as previous generations enjoyed corned beef or knishes. It is clear that Israeli immigrants often take over elements of American Jewish life. In so doing, they will maintain, but also transform these institutions and change the nature of the American community. The experience of Jewish immigrants making a place for themselves in the States can be viewed as the unfolding of another chapter in Jewish American history, distinct from but similar to the experience of earlier waves of Jewish immigrants to the United States.
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Adi Lavy, originally from Jerusalem, holds a drink at Aroma Expresso Bar in the SoHo neighborhood of New York, August 9, 2006. (AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews)
Involvement in American Jewish Life Israeli and American-Jewish notions of group membership often contrast, because the basic group identities associated with being Israeli, on the one hand, and American Jewish, on the other, are rooted in particular cultural/national contexts. For many Israelis, ethnic identity is secular and nationalistic. While Israelis are knowledgeable about Jewish holidays and speak Hebrew, they connect these behaviors to “Israeliness” rather than Jewishness. The majority does not actively participate in organized religious activities—as is the case among many American Jews—and Israelis depend on the larger society and public institutions to socialize their children. The Western denominations of Reform and Conservative Judaism, with which the great majority of American Jews affiliate (denominations that permit American Jews to maintain their religious outlooks while incurring few conflicts with the larger Christian society), are all but unknown in the Jewish state—marriages performed by Conservative and Reform rabbis in Israel have no legal standing. Finally, while American Jews are accustomed to life as a subcommunity in a religiously pluralistic society, Israelis grew up in an environment where religion and nationality were one and the same. Because of Israelis’ lack of familiarity with American forms of Jewish involvement, some pundits decry their assimilation into non-Jewish cultural patterns. They
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assert that Israelis’ very exit from the Holy Land signifies a traitorous move away from the Jewish ideal, and that their participation in and contribution to Jewish activities is limited and oriented toward secular pursuits with little religious content— meals, parties, Israeli folk dancing, and sports (Shokeid 1988). In contrast, other observers argue that Israelis are able to actively participate in American Jewish life while simultaneously maintaining their links to Israel. They support such claims by noting that Israelis speak Hebrew, live in Jewish neighborhoods, are involved in a variety of Jewish institutions, and visit Israel frequently. A growing body of survey data on Israeli Jewish American behaviors reveal that Israeli immigrants engage in many religious and cultural Jewish behaviors at higher rates than is the case among native-born Jews and also are more likely to live in neighborhoods characterized by high Jewish population density (Cohen and Veinstein 2009; Herman 1998; Rebhun 2009). They note, for example, that Israeli migrants’ synagogue membership exceeds that of American-born Jews. Further, a 1997 study in Los Angeles concluded that 80 percent of Israeli American parents provide their children with some form of Jewish education, a far greater rate than that of U.S.born Jews. Similarly, 50 percent of Israeli American children in Los Angeles and 35 percent in New York attend Jewish day schools. Israeli Americans’ rate of intermarriage to non-Jews, at only 8 percent, is 40 percent less than the recent average for American Jews (Cohen and Veinstein 2009; Herman 1998; Rebhun 2009). When comparing Israeli immigrants’ observance of Jewish religious practices— including lighting candles on Shabbat (the Jewish Sabbath) and Chanukah, attending synagogue on the High Holy Days and Shabbat and fasting on Yom Kippur— with their patterns in Israel, we find that among naturalized Israeli Americans in New York and Los Angeles, ritual behaviors have actually increased and far exceed those of U.S.-born Jews. Increased rates of ritual practice may reflect the efforts of these Jewish immigrants to retain their religious identity within a predominantly non-Jewish country (Cohen and Veinstein 2009; Gold and Phillips 1996; Herman 1998; Rebhun 2009). Finally, a growing number of Israeli American parents seek to maintain or reestablish connections with Israeli and/or Jewish behaviors through special family activities of their own creation, or involvement in various Israeli American programs such as after-school Israeli Hebrew courses and Hebrew language scouting activities. (See Table 172.)
Return Immigration and Transnational Identity Some Israeli émigrés address the conflicts associated with identifying with Israel yet living in the United States by pursuing a transnational outlook and emphasizing a notion of collective belonging that does not privilege nationality as the basis of membership. A whole series of factors surrounding Israelis makes their movement to the United States relatively easy. Well-educated, they possess occupational
1172 | Israeli Jewish Immigrants
and cultural skills that are useful in both countries. They generally have access to networks in both countries that can provide a broad variety of resources ranging from pretravel information, to job opportunities, child care, housing, and a social life. While some Israelis in the United States lack legal resident status, as a group they are very likely to become naturalized and are among a select few nationalities allowed to have dual citizenship. Even prior to migration, Israelis feel extremely familiar with American society from their exposure to popular culture, American visitors, and intergovernment relations. Suggesting this, an Israeli newspaper recently reflected on the visibility of Israeli emigrants in American reality TV programs, including Survivor, American Idol, Ultimate Fighter, and Miami Ink (Kupfer 2009). As Israeli social scientist Zvi Sobel put it, “America, it might be posited, has become the alter ego of Israel in political, economic and cultural terms” (Sobel 1986, 192–93). A substantial proportion of the Israeli population has resided within the Jewish state for fewer than two or perhaps three generations. Accordingly, their family lore and cultural baggage is rich with stories of—and techniques for coping with—life in other settings. Many émigrés we interviewed had lived in other nations, ranging from Japan and Hong Kong to Switzerland, England, South Africa, Italy, and Latin America, prior to their settlement in the States. And while professionals and highlevel entrepreneurs had dwelled overseas, so had less-skilled and less-educated immigrants such as carpenters and restaurant workers. Hence, many Israeli Americans possess a cultural orientation and life experiences compatible with an existence beyond the boarders of the Jewish state. Further facilitating Israeli–American transnationalism are the good political relations and extensive links shared between the United States and Israel. The U.S. government, American Jewish organizations, and Christian groups have developed an active presence in the Jewish state. American firms have branches there and American companies sometimes hire professional and skilled workers directly from Israel. At the same time, Israeli government agencies, banks, and industrial enterprises have offices in New York, Los Angeles, and other American cities. These not only give an Israeli flavor to the American environment, but also provide employment for migrants (Sobel 1986). We have already noted a variety of Israelioriented activities that allow migrants to maintain a semblance of Israeli life in the United States. Travel between the two nations is easily arranged. Israeli immigrants often report making frequent trips from the United States to Israel, and it is not uncommon for children to return to Israel to spend summer vacations with relatives. Israeli sociologist Zvi Sobel, in his 1981–1982 pretravel survey of 117 Israeli emigrants (most of whom planned to enter the United States), found clear evidence of a transnational outlook. About one-half of respondents denied “that leaving Israel and moving to the US was an act of emigration.” Instead, they defined the travel as “temporary” or “commuting.” Moreover, “almost all interviewees denied
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1173
that their leaving meant a cessation of contributing to the development of Israel . . . Almost all saw their departure as . . . to Israel’s good” (Sobel 1986, 196). Despite national, ideological, and religious differences between Israeli and American Jews, Israelis do feel connections to other Jews and see themselves, Jewish migrants from other countries, and native-born Jews in settlement countries as members of the same ethnic and religious group. It would appear that the whole notion of being an Israeli versus an American is not nearly as clearcut a distinction as the literature on international migration suggests. Instead, such factors as flexible notions of ethnic and national identity, access to and participation in social and occupational networks, and the ability of people to sustain cultural competence and legal status in more than a single society allow Israelis to maintain meaningful forms of involvement in multiple national settings at one time. Despite these many factors that permit Israelis to maintain a transnational existence, nevertheless, many remain troubled by the distance—physical, political, and cultural—between the two nations. As suggested in the following quote, even those Israelis who have accomplished a great deal in the States contrast America’s favorable economic and career-related environment to its communal and cultural liabilities. An Israeli is torn apart the minute he is leaving Israel [to come to the United States for an extended period]. It’s not like people from other countries who come here and settle down, hoping for better life. An Israeli is torn apart the minute he leaves Israel and that’s when he begins to wonder where it is better— here or there. I think that the reason so many Israelis are here is the illusion of materialistic comfort they can find here, period. It has nothing to do with spiritual, cultural or emotional values they are looking for. The issue is materialism. And it doesn’t fulfill all the needs a human being has. A person needs culture and some ideals to believe in. We Israelis continue to keep a close contact with Israel as if we left for a short time only. We come here and organize our lives as if we are going to stay for a short period and our life here is a make-believe. The reality is that we live here and at the same time we don’t live here. We are torn apart and that leaves the question for which I don’t have an answer—what will happen and where are we? (Gold 2002, 147–48) While these migrants build communities and networks that help them cope with the social and cultural dimensions of ties to two nations, and they enjoy economic benefits from migration, most are not quite comfortable with this status. In the words of a Los Angeles accountant: “Israel is my mother and America is my wife, so you can imagine the way I must feel.”
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The Second and Later Generations One of the most pointed critiques of transnational identity is that it is short-lived. Even those who question the utility of the concept admit that the members of foreign-born immigrant generation are likely to identify with and keep connected to the country of origin. Later generations, they submit, are much more likely to lose the cultural and linguistic knowledge associated with the country of origin and instead identify with the host society (Rumbaut 2002; Rumbaut and Portes 2001, 302). Evidence about the national identification of second-generation Israeli Americans is mixed. One body of research suggests that émigré youngsters—particularly those who arrived at an early age or were born abroad—are likely to identify with the host society. Summarizing her fieldwork, Rina Cohen argued “interviews with students who are the sons and daughters of Israeli migrants indicate that the younger generation is losing both its fluency in Hebrew and its national affiliation with Israel . . . the second generation is converging into the established Jewish community” (R. Cohen 1999, 121, 133). In contrast, another body of data suggests that some children of Israeli emigrants retain an Israeli identity in diaspora settings. Parents have encouraged this by speaking Hebrew, socializing with other Israeli immigrants, and sending children on regular trips to Israel. Natan Uriely (1995, 34) found that secondgeneration Israeli Americans in Chicago continue to call themselves “Israelis”
Youth Profile Young Israeli Emigrant Adjusting to the United States Nissan Aviv is a junior at Taft High School in the San Fernando Valley in Los Angeles. He came to the United States from Israel with his parents and 13-yearold sister in 2005. His father, who was born in Iran, moved to Israel in the 1960s and now owns a small clothing factory in the Los Angeles garment district. Nissan, who knows English better than his dad, helps him with work on the weekends. He plans to go to college at Cal State Northridge or UCLA and major in business. Most of his friends are the children of Israeli immigrants, and he is involved in an Israeli youth group that meets at the local Jewish Community Center. He enjoys playing soccer and basketball. He misses Israel and visits there every summer but knows that economic conditions are better for his parents in Los Angeles.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Israel | 1175
rather than Americans by a wide margin, while Moshe Shokeid (1988) encountered a similar pattern among Israeli immigrants’ children in New York. During our own fieldwork, we heard numerous stories of young Israeli emigrants who demonstrated their commitment to the Jewish state by returning to perform military service. A Jerusalem Post article corroborated this, reporting that 432 Israeli youths whose families lived in the greater Los Angeles area returned for military duty during 1990, even “though most were under no obligation to do so” (Burston 1990). A third pattern of adaptation available to the children of Israeli immigrants is synthetic. Young people who often travel back and fourth between Israel and points of settlement may develop a multinational outlook. In the words of a second-generation Israeli American: “I feel, I’m a person who wants to fit in everywhere. That’s what I want. I don’t know how much this can be true, but I want to travel back to see both sides.” In fact, émigré parents frequently described how their children went through periods of changing national allegiance, in which they identified with various environments and practices. Given Israeli Americans’ generally middle-class status, as well as the relative ease with which they can either return to Israel or merge with the larger Jewish American community, second-generation Israeli Americans are a relatively invisible social category. This is especially the case because many share ancestral origins with American Jews, and a considerable fraction have an American parent.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Israel The United States and Israel are extremely strong allies. Significant fractions of the American population—especially Jews and Evangelical Christians—are supportive of Israel’s existence and seek to provide it with political and economic support in its conflicts with surrounding countries and in international political venues, such as the United Nations. Both Democratic and Republican political parties highlight their backing of Israel. Recent presidential candidates Bush, Gore, McCain, and Obama emphasized their unwavering endorsement of Israel in general as well as their approval of specific Israeli policies. Israel is one of the major recipients of U.S. foreign aid (Tarnoff and Knowles 2004). While there have been some discussions in the United States about encouraging Israel to make greater efforts to make peace with the Palestinians and neighboring countries, these are unlikely to have a significantly detrimental impact on relations between the two countries. Accordingly, relations between the United States and Israel are likely to remain strong and facilitate travel and migration between the two countries.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics
Table 171 Period of arrival in the United States: Israeli Jews in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses by percentage Census Period of Immigration
1980
1990
2000
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
Before 1950
17.0
5.1
2.6
1950-1959
12.0
10.7
8.6
1960-1970
24.1
16.3
13.3
1971-1980
56.9
21.8
18.7
1981-1990
—
46.1
25.7
1991-2000
—
—
31.2
Source: U.S. Census data, tabulated by Rebhun 2009
Table 172 Israeli religious behaviors in Los Angeles, 1997 Israeli by Birth Households
All LA Jews
Children attend Jewish Day School
41%
20%
Belong to Jewish Organization
38%
20%
Donation to United Jewish Fund in the last four years
26%
24%
Orthodox
23%
4%
Reside in area of 25%+ Jewish density
59%
51%
Source: Herman 2000
Table 173 Area of origin of Israeli Jews in the United States, 1980–2000 (percentages) Year Area of Origin
1980
1990
2000
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
(N)
(712)
(974)
(1,183)
65.6
72.5
75.3
Israeli-born Foreign-born
34.4
27.5
24.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
West Europe
20.0
25.2
18.4
East/Central Europe
50.6
35.5
46.1
Asia
14.3
11.9
15.4
9.8
7.5
3.4
Areas:
North Africa Latin America
—
5.8
5.1
Oceania
—
2.9
3.8
11.2
7.8
Other Source: U.S. Census data, tabulated by Rebhun 2009
5.3
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 174 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 Region and Country of Birth
1178
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
Israel
2,783
3,744
3,826
2,741
4,160
5,755
5,943
4,496
5,851
5,612
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Table 175 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: fiscal years 2000 to 2009
Total
Total
Male
Female
5,612
3,156
2,456
Leading States of Residence Arizona
59
35
24
California
1,412
829
583
Colorado
39
25
14
Connecticut
36
16
20
Florida
624
351
273
Georgia
132
82
50
Illinois
170
84
86
Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Nevada
95
49
46
238
135
103
70
42
28
98
60
38
360
194
166
1,152
643
509
North Carolina
53
25
28
Ohio
89
51
38
Pennsylvania
121
64
57
Texas
277
158
119
Virginia
64
26
38
Washington
142
68
74
Other
381
219
162
New Jersey New York
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
1179
1180 | Israeli Jewish Immigrants Table 176 Fluency in English, citizenship, and educational attainment among Israeli Jewish immigrants in the United States: A comparison of three immigration waves
Age
1980 (Arrived 1965–1974)
1990 (Arrived 1975–1984)
2000 (Arrived 1985–1994)
A. Fluent English Speech 20–29
68.0
83.8
92.0
30–39
60.0
79.6
78.3
B. U.S. Citizenship 20–29
44.0
40.5
52.0
30–39
52.0
48.2
45.8
C. Mean Schooling Level 20–29
12.7
13.9
14.4
30–39
13.3
13.4
13.9
Source: U.S. Census data, tabulated by Rebhun 2009.
Appendix III: Noted Israeli Americans Theodore Bikel, born in 1924, is internationally known as an actor and singer. Born into a Jewish family in Vienna in 1924, he emigrated to Palestine with his parents when he was 13 years old. At the age of 19, he began his acting career in Israel. In 1946, he entered London’s Royal Academy of Dramatic Art, where he was “discovered” by Sir Laurence Olivier, who offered him a role in his production of A Streetcar Named Desire with Vivien Leigh. Since that time, he has appeared in many plays, musicals, and operas, in London, on Broadway, and internationally. He is best known for his starring roles in Zorba and as Tevye in Fiddler on the Roof. He has performed the latter over 1,600 times since 1967. In addition to his stage career, Bikel has been featured in numerous film roles, many of which are now classic, from The African Queen (1951) and The Defiant Ones (1958) (for which he received the Academy Award Nomination for Best Supporting Actor) to The Russians Are Coming, the Russians Are Coming (1965), Frank Zappa’s 200 Motels (1970), and Shadow Conspiracy (1996). One of the world’s best known folk singers, he cofounded the Newport Folk Festival in 1961, the same year he became a U.S. citizen. Between 1959 and 1992, he recorded over 34 albums, including folk music, sound tracks, a variety of Jewish and Israeli songs, and
Appendix III: Noted Israeli Americans | 1181
many books on tape. Active in the Civil Rights movement and a supporter of the arts, he was an elected delegate to the historic 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. He was president of Actor’s Equity (1973–1982) and a board member of Amnesty International. By presidential appointment, he became a member of the National Council on the Arts (1977–1992). He has also served as a senior vice president of the American Jewish Congress. Rahm Emanuel, born in 1959, was the White House chief of staff from President Barak Obama’s inauguration until October 2010, when he left to run for election as mayor of Chicago, a race he won. Prior to joining President Obama’s administration, Emanuel served in the House of Representatives, representing the fifth district of Illinois. Emanuel served as chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee for the 2006 cycle. Under his leadership, Democrats gained 30 seats in the House without losing a single incumbent and ushered in a new Democratic majority for the first time in more than a decade. Emanuel is described in the New Yorker as “a political John McEnroe, noted for both his mercurial temperament and his tactical brilliance” (Lizza 2009). A skilled ballet dancer, he graduated from Sarah Lawrence College in 1981 and received a master’s degree in speech and communication from Northwestern University in 1985. Emanuel’s father, a pediatrician still practicing near Chicago, immigrated to the United States from Israel and spoke Hebrew with his son when Emanuel was a boy. His mother, Marsha, was a civil-rights activist who was arrested several times during the 1960s. Emanuel’s connection to Israel is demonstrated by his service as a civilian volunteer in the Israel Defense Forces during the 1991 Gulf War. In this capacity, he worked in one of Israel’s northern bases, rust-proofing brakes. However, according to the United Jewish Communities, he never held Israeli citizenship (Kintisch 2003). Washington Post writer Chris Cillizza asserts that Emanuel “comes from a ridiculously accomplished family. One of his brothers—Ezekiel—is the chairman of the Department of Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health while another brother—Ari—is a Hollywood agent and the basis for the character of ‘Ari Gold’ on HBO’s ‘Entourage.’ ” Amitai Etzioni, born in 1929, is a sociologist, political activist, advisor of American presidents, and founder of the Communitarian movement. The latter seeks to achieve a balance between individual rights and collective responsibilities by stressing core American values to benefit all members of society. Born in Cologne, Germany, Etzioni escaped Nazi persecution by moving with his Jewish family to Palestine prior to World War II. Here, he lived in a cooperative settlement populated by German refugees. Etzioni traces his valuation of community to life to this small community wherein every face was familiar, values and belongings were shared, and neighbors solved common
1182 | Israeli Jewish Immigrants
problems at community meetings. Later, young Amitai fought within a small unit in the Israeli war of independence, an experience he considers to be “a most dramatic example” of the bonds of community. After receiving his first degrees at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, he came to the United States, where he obtained a PhD in sociology in only two years at the University of California, Berkeley. From the late 1950s to the 1970s, Etzioni was a member of the sociology department at Columbia University before becoming University Professor at George Washington University. He went on to serve as senior advisor to Richard Harden, as special assistant to President Jimmy Carter, as a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, and on the President’s Council on Foreign Relations. Expressing his ideas in newspaper columns, he edited a communitarian quarterly, The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities, and 19 books, including The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (1996). Etzioni was president of the American Sociological Association in 1994–1995. A 1982 study ranked Etzioni as the leading expert among a list of 30 who had made “major contributions to public policy in the preceding decade.” Liviu Librescu, 1930–2007, was born in Romania and lived in Israel from 1978–1985. In the United States he was a professor of engineering science and mechanics, specializing in aerospace engineering at Virginia Tech University. The 76-year-old scientist was murdered along with 32 others by a deranged student during the Virginia Tech massacre of April 2007. The morning of the massacre, Dr. Librescu was teaching a class in solid mechanics in Norris Hall. His students reported that when he realized shots were being fired in adjacent classrooms and in the hallway, Librescu ordered them to hurry and jump out of the windows but refused to follow, instead choosing to bar the door, which would not lock, with his body. Dr. Librescu himself was killed, but his action is credited with giving his students time to escape. Students stated that he saved their lives while sacrificing his own. Family, friends, colleagues, students, and former students all remarked on Dr. Librescu’s great dedication to his research and his love for his students. “Professor Librescu died as he lived; devoted to his students and to his profession,” said Dr. Ishwar Puri, head of the engineering science and mechanics department at Virginia Tech. “He loved his position as a professor. A prolific researcher and wonderful teacher, he devoted himself to the profession, solely for the love of it” (Virginia Tech 2007). Natalie Portman was born in 1981 in Jerusalem to Avner Hershlog, an Israeli fertility specialist, and Shelley Stevens, an American artist. Natalie and her family relocated to New York when she was three years old. Most noted for her roles as Queen Amidala in the Star Wars series and the black swan in the
References | 1183
movie of the same name, her acting career began at age 11 when an agent discovered her in a Long Island pizza parlor. In addition to the pursuit of a successful acting career, Portman attended Harvard University, where she majored in psychology. She has starred in films including V for Vendetta, Garden State, and Closer, for which she won the Golden Globe award for Best Supporting Actress in 2004, and The Black Swan, for which she won the Academy Award for Best Actress in 2011.
Glossary Aliyah: Moving to Israel. Diaspora or Golah: Anyplace outside of Israel. Haradim: Ultra-Orthodox Jews. The term literally means those who tremble before God. Olim: Israeli in-migrants who “go up” from the diaspora to the Holy Land. Yom Hazikaron: Israeli Memorial Day. Yom Ha’atzmaut: Israeli Independence Day. Yordim: Derogatory Hebrew term for an Israeli emigrant. Refers to someone who goes down from the Holy Land to the diaspora.
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1184 | Israeli Jewish Immigrants Cohen, S. M., and J. Veinstein. 2009. Israelis Jews in Greater New York: Their Numbers, Characteristics and Patterns of Jewish Engagement. New York: UJA Federation of New York Report. Cohen, Y. 2009. “Migration Patterns to and from Israel.” Contemporary Jewry 29: 115–25. Diamond, J. J. 1969. “Jewish Immigration to the United States.” American Jewish Yearbook 69: 289–94. “For Those Returning Home” [Hebrew]. 1995. Yisrael Shelanu (suppl). Freedman, M., and J. Korazim. 1986. “Israelis in the New York Area Labor Market.” Contemporary Jewry 7: 141–53. Gold, S. J. 1994a. “Patterns of Economic Cooperation among Israeli Immigrants in Los Angeles.” International Migration Review 28: 114–35. Gold, S. J. 1994b. “Israeli Immigrants in the U.S.: The Question of Community.” Qualitative Sociology 17: 325–63. Gold, S. J. 1997. “Transnationalism and Vocabularies of Motive in International Migration: The Case of Israelis in the US.” Sociological Perspectives 40: 409–26. Gold, S. J. 2002. Israeli Diaspora. London: Routledge. Gold, S. J. 2003. “Israeli and Russian Jews: Gendered Perspectives on Settlement and Return Migration.” Gender and US Immigration: Contemporary Trends, edited by Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, 127–47. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gold, S. J. 2007. “The Place of Israel in the Identity of Israelis in the Diaspora: An Ethnographic Exploration.” Israel, The Diaspora and Jewish Identity, edited by Danny BenMoshe and Zohar Segev, 185–205. Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press. Gold, S. J., and B. A. Phillips. 1996. “Israelis in the United States.” American Jewish Yearbook 96: 51–101. Gold, Steven J., and Rona Hart. 2009. “Transnational Ties during a Time of Crisis: Israeli Emigration, 2000 to 2004.” International Migration, July 9, 1–34. Goldstein, Joseph. 1995. Jewish History in Modern Times. Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press. Haviv, A. S. 2005. “Next Year in Kathmandu: Israeli Backpackers and the Formation of a New Israeli Identity.” Israeli Backpackers: From Tourism to Rite of Passage, edited by Chaim Noy and Erik Cohen, 45–88. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Herman, P. 1994. “A Technique for Estimating a Small Immigrant Population in Small Areas: The Case of Jewish Israelis in the United States.” Studies in Applied Demography, edited by K. Vaninadha Rao and Jerry W. Wicks, 81–99. Bowling Green, OH: Population and Society Research Center. Herman, P. 1998. Los Angeles Jewish Population Survey ‘97. Los Angeles: Jewish Federation of Los Angeles. Herman, P. 2000. “The Jews of the Jews: Characteristics of Los Angeles Households of Israelis by Birth and Israelis not by Birth.” Presented at the Thirteenth World Congress of Jewish Studies, December.
References | 1185 Herman, P., and D. LaFontaine. 1983. “In Our Footsteps: Israeli Migration to the U.S. and Los Angeles.” MSW thesis, Hebrew Union College, Los Angeles. Hiltzik, M. A. 2000. “Israel’s High Tech Shifts into High Gear.” Los Angeles Times, August 13. Jewish Virtual Library. [Online material retrieved 7/14/09.] http://www.jewishvirtualli brary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/geo/geo.html. Kimhi, S. 1990. “Perceived Change of Self-Concept, Values, Well-Being and Intention to Return among Kibbutz People Who Migrated from Israel to America.” Ph.D. diss., Pacific Graduate School of Psychology, Palo Alto, California. Kintisch, Eli. 2003. “Newest Jewish U.S. Representative Makes Instant Impact,” United Jewish Communities, January 7 [Online article; retrieved 7/16/09.] http://www.ujc.org/ page.aspx?id=38016, all web sources. Kupfer, R. 2009. “Why Are More and More Israelis Starring on American Reality TV?” Haaretz.com, May 14. [Online article; retrieved 7/14/09.] http://www.haaretz.com/news/ why-are-more-and-more-israelis-starring-on-american-reality-tv-1.276025. Lev-Ari, L. 2008. The American Dream—For Men Only? Gender Immigration and the Assimilation of Israelis in the United States. El Paso, TX: LFB Scholarly Publishers. Lipkis, G. 1991. “Business Envoys Whet US Appetites.” Jerusalem Post, November 26. Lipner, Nira H. 1987. “The Subjective Experience of Israeli Immigrant Women: An Interpretive Approach.” Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, Washington, DC. Lizza, Ryan. 2009. “The Gatekeeper, Rahm Emanuel on the Job” New Yorker, March 2. Lustick, I. S. 2004. “Recent Trends in Emigration from Israel: The Impact of Palestinian Violence.” Jerusalem, Israel: Association for Israel Studies, Conference, June 14–16. Moaz, S., and A. Temkin. 1989. “Olim and Yordim.” Jerusalem Post, May 9. Rebhun, U. 2009. “The Israeli Jewish Diaspora in the United States: Socio-cultural Mobility and Attachment in the Homeland.” Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Richtel, M. 1998. “New Israelis Get Computers to Aid Assimilation.” New York Times, January 21. Rosen, S. 1993. “The Israeli Corner of the American Jewish Community.” Issue Series #3. New York: Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations, The American Jewish Committee. Rosenthal, M., and C. Auerbach. 1992. “Cultural and Social Assimilation of Israeli Immigrants in the United States.” International Migration Review 99(26): 982–91. Rumbaut, R. G. 2002. “Severed or Sustained Attachments? Language, Identity, and Imagined Communities in the Post-Immigrant Generation.” In The Changing Face of Home: The Transnational Lives of the Second Generation, edited by Mary C. Waters and Peggy Levitt, 43–95. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Rumbaut, R. G., and A. Portes. 2001. “Conclusions—The Forging of a New America: Lessons for Theory and Policy.” In Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America, edited by Rubén G. Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, 301–17. Berkeley: University of California Press.
1186 | Israeli Jewish Immigrants Sabar, N. 2000. Kibbutznicks in the Diaspora. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Shokeid, M. 1988. Children of Circumstances: Israeli Immigrants in New York. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Sobel, Zvi. 1986. Migrants from the Promised Land. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Tarnoff, C., and L. Nowles. 2004. Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of US Programs and Policy. CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. [Online article retrieved 7/14/09.] http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31987. pdf. Trofimov, Y. 1995. “Booming Economy Lures Israelis home from US: Jewish State Now More Inviting.” San Francisco Examiner, October 8. Tugend, T. 1989. “Peretz: Integrate Yordim into Jewish Community.” Jerusalem Post, November 29. Uriely, N. 1994. “Rhetorical Ethnicity of Permanent Sojourners: The Case of Israeli Immigrants in the Chicago Area.” International Sociology 9: 431–45. Uriely, N. 1995. “Patterns of Identification and Integration with Jewish Americans among Israeli Immigrants in Chicago: Variations across Status and Generation.” Contemporary Jewry 16: 27–49. Virginia Tech. 2007. “Librescu, Liviu.” We Remember Biographies. [Online article retrieved 7/17/09.] http://www.vt.edu/remember/biographies/liviu_librescu.html. Waterman, S. 1997. “The ‘Return’ of the Jews into London.” London: The Promised Land? The Migrant Experience in a Capital City, edited by Anne J. Kershen, 143–60. Aldershot, UK: Avebury.
Further Reading Cohen, Yinon, and Yitchak Haberfeld. 1997. “The Number of Israeli Immigrants in the United States in 1990.” Demography 34(2): 199–212. One of the best sources of data on Israeli Americans. Gold, Steven J. 2002. Israeli Diaspora. London: Routledge. A study of the social characteristics, motives, and outlooks of Israeli immigrants in the United States, Europe, and other countries, and their relations with host country Jews, each other, and Israel. Goldscheider, Calvin. 1996. Israel’s Changing Society: Population, Ethnicity and Development. Boulder, CO: Westview. A description of Israeli society that is rich in data and analysis about the history and meaning of Israeli emigration. Lev-Ari, Lilach. 2008. The American Dream—For Men Only? Gender, Immigration and the Assimilation of Israelis in the United States. El Paso, TX. LFB Scholarly Publishers. A recently conducted study of how gender and ethnicity shape Israeli immigrants’ perspectives on life in the United States.
Further Reading | 1187 Noy, Chaim, and Erik Cohen, eds. 2006. Israeli Backpackers: From Tourism to Rite of Passage. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. An analysis of young Israelis’ world travels. Ritterband, Paul, ed. 1986. “Israelis in New York.” Contemporary Jewry 7: 113–26. A journal issue covering several aspects of Israeli emigration to the United States during the period when it was considered to be a major social problem for Israel. Sabar, Naama. 2000. Kibbutznicks in the Diaspora. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. The experience of Israelis who were raised on idealistic rural collectives and now live in Los Angeles. Shokeid, Moshe. 1988. Children of Circumstances: Israeli Immigrants in New York. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. An anthropological study of an Israeli American community in Queens, New York. Sobel, Zvi. 1986. Migrants from the Promised Land. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. An analysis of Israeli emigration to the United States from an Israeli perspective.
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Jamaican Immigrants by Alwyn D. Gilkes
Introduction By common agreement, and for the purposes of this chapter, Jamaican Americans are considered Americans of Jamaican heritage, or Jamaican-born people who live in the United States of America. Moreover, the identity is ascribed to those who are American citizens as well as those who are permanent residents. There are challenges when writing about this group. One particular challenge is the idiosyncratic patterns of migration that are evident in this population; there is a pre-1965 group and a post-1965 group. But this division is further complicated by race and class issues, which are not always clearly distinguishable. For example, the post-1970s migration pattern is characterized by race—the majority of those who are leaving are black, but they are working-class and poor. Nonetheless, this chapter will seek to identify the substantial contributions made by Jamaican Americans to all spheres of American life. For example, they are involved in politics, arts and entertainment, sports, education, and religion. More specifically, Jamaican American authors, academics, dancers, musicians, actors, and baseball, basketball, and football players have greatly enriched the American culture in many ways. The 2000 Census estimates the number of Jamaican Americans at 736,513. By most accounts these numbers are grossly underestimated, in part because of the large number of undocumented immigrants in the United States The largest numbers of Jamaican Americans make the New York City area their home. This is partly because New York City and its immediate environs have several Caribbean cultural elements, such as food, clothing, and music, bur more particularly because there is an intact ethnic group, with its embedded social capital, to attract other Jamaicans. While it is estimated that between 180,000 and 600,000 Jamaicans Americans live in New York City, there are also communities in South Florida, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. Most Jamaican Americans identify as Jamaicans first and as Americans second. Thus, they are more likely to celebrate Jamaica’s major cultural and historical milestones than they are to celebrate America’s. As we traverse the 21st century, one of the major issues to be resolved is to work to strengthen Jamaica’s economy, thus reducing need for the level of immigration currently experienced.
1189
Chronology | 1191
Chronology Circa 600 C.E.
The Taino (Arawaks) begin establishing settlements.
1492
Christopher Columbus arrives at Discovery Bay, St. Ann, on his second voyage to the “New World.”
1509
Spain takes formal possession of Jamaica.
1510
Sevilla la Nueva (New Seville) founded; abandoned in 1534, capital moved to Villa de la Vega (later, Spanish Town).
1611
Census shows 523 Spanish, 558 slaves, 107 free blacks, 74 Taino, and 75 “newcomers.”
1655
English army captures Jamaica; Spanish retreat; rogue soldiers and freed slaves (maroons) wage guerrilla war until 1660.
1670
Jamaica ceded to England in Treaty of Madrid.
1692
Earthquake destroys Port Royal.
1738
Peace treaty with Maroons signed.
1760
First large-scale slave rebellion, in northeastern parish of St. Mary, put down by militia and troops.
1795–1796
Second Maroon War, in Trelawny; defeated Maroons transported to Canada, and eventually Sierra Leone.
1808
Abolition of the slave trade to British colonies; there are about 320,000 slaves in Jamaica.
1830
Slave rebellion in western parishes.
1831–1832
Final, and biggest, slave rebellion, led by Deacon Sam Sharpe.
1834
Abolition of slavery; system of apprenticeship instituted, for six years; 313,000 slaves freed in Jamaica.
1838
Full emancipation from slavery.
1841
Arrival of first indentured Africans, to provide labor on sugar estates.
1845
First indentured workers from India arrive.
1848
Policy of free trade adopted by British government, removing preferential treatment for colonial exports, including sugar.
1865
Morant Bay uprising; Paul Bogle and George William Gordon hanged.
1870
Banana plantations set up as the sugar cane industry declines.
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1884
New constitution adopted.
1938
Rioting; People’s National Party (PNP) founded by Norman Manley.
1944
First general election under universal adult suffrage won by Jamaica Labour Party, formed the previous year; new constitution proclaimed, giving more power to local elected officials.
1955
People’s National Party wins office for first time.
1957
Internal self-government established.
1958
West Indies Federation comes into being.
1961
Jamaica elects to leave Federation, leading to its demise the following year.
1962
Jamaica achieves full political independence under the leadership of Alexander Bustamante.
1964
Remains of Marcus Mosiah Garvey (d. 1940, London), first national hero, returned to Jamaica and reburied.
1966
State visit of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia.
1967
Jamaica Labour Party returned to office in first postindependence general election; new prime minister, Donald Sangster, dies one month later of brain hemorrhage; Hugh Shearer appointed prime minister.
1969
Currency changeover to dollars and cents.
1992
Manley resigns as prime minister and party leader and is succeeded by Percival J. Patterson.
1993
People’s National Party reelected.
1998
People’s National Party elected for third consecutive term; for the first time in history Jamaican soccer team reaches World Cup finals.
1999
The army patrols Kingston following a massive increase in crime.
2006
February: Portia Simpson Miller is elected head of PNP. March: Portia Simpson Miller becomes Jamaica’s first female prime minister.
2007
September: Bruce Golding is sworn in as Jamaica’s eighth prime minister.
Background | 1193
Background Geography Jamaica, with an estimated population of 2.8 million, is the third-largest island in the Caribbean, and the largest of the English-speaking West Indian islands. It is about 90 miles south of Cuba, and 100 miles west of Haiti, the two nearest countries. The island’s area of 4,411 square miles makes it slightly smaller than Connecticut. The country is 146 miles east to west, and at its widest—from St. Ann’s Bay to Portland Point—Jamaica is about 50 miles wide. Jamaica, home to the Blue Mountains (est. 7,400 ft.)—famous for their rich-tasting coffee—is divided into 14 parishes grouped into three counties; Cornwall, Middlesex, and Surrey. Jamaica’s northern shores are lined with miles of lovely white sand beaches that attract thousands of foreign visitors annually. Kingston, in the southeast of the island, the capital and largest English-speaking city south of Miami, is Jamaica’s chief commercial and administrative center. Port Royal, part of the capital area of Kingston, has considerable historical and cultural significance; it was once home to the buccaneer Captain Henry Morgan, and before it was destroyed by an earthquake in 1692 it had been the center of a thriving contraband trade with Spanish America (Zahedieh 1986). Port Royal was by then as described by the Jamaican Gleaner, in its Jamaican History series, as “one of the wickedest places on earth.” Some of the other urban centers include Spanish Town—the first capital—Ocho Rios, Negril, and Montego Bay. There are several tourist attractions across the country, including Dunn’s River Falls, YS Falls, and the Blue Lagoon. Jamaicans pride themselves on the diversity of the country’s ethnic groups and the culture. The country’s 2001 census places the composition of the ethnic groups as follows: black 91.2 percent, mixed 6.2 percent, and unknown 2.6 percent (CIA 2010). Included in the mixed category are East Indians, who first came to Jamaica as indentured servants in 1845; and ethnic Chinese, who came from Hong Kong about 1849 and were followed in the 1860s by another group who arrived from Trinidad and British Guiana (Guyana), where they had been indentured servants. Also included in the mixed, or unknown, categories are Germans, Jews, and Syrians/Lebanese. The population’s multiracial roots are represented by the national motto, “Out of Many One People,” with members of the original settlers, the Taino tribe, embodied on the coat of arms. The Jamaica national flag, first raised on Independence Day, August 6, 1962, consists of a diagonal gold cross with four triangles of black and green, placed side by side. The top and bottom triangles are green and the hoist and fly triangles are black. The black depicts the strength and creativity of the people; gold, the natural wealth and beauty of sunlight; and green, hope and agricultural resources. The symbolism has been represented as “the sun shineth, the land is green and the people are strong and creative.”
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The country’s economy, which originally had an agricultural base, depending on the export crops of sugar and bananas, is now heavily dependent on services, which accounts for more than 60 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (CIA 2010). Furthermore, most of the foreign exchange is derived from tourism, remittances, and bauxite/alumina, with remittances and tourism accounting for approximately 40 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. Life expectancy is 73.53 years; infant mortality is 15.57 deaths per 1,000 live births; the literacy rate among the population 15 years and older is 87.9 percent (male 84.1 %; female 91.6%) (CIA 2010).
History As early as 600 C.E., Jamaica was settled by Taino Indians, also called Arawaks, who called the island Xaymaca. In May 1494, Columbus claimed the island for the king and queen of Spain, but it was not occupied until 1509, when Juan de Esquivel came from Santo Domingo and began transporting the Arawaks to Hispaniola as slaves. The Spaniards treated the Arawaks so harshly that in about 50 years all 60 thousand of them were dead. The Spaniards then got slaves from Africa to take their place. Jamaica was mainly a stopover place for ships that were traveling to Cuba and Spain from 1509 until about 1663. The Spanish colony in Jamaica was never very large or flourishing because, although the island had been given to the Columbus family as a personal estate in 1540, they did nothing to develop it. Instead it became the headquarters for pirate ships. In December 1654 a military expedition set out from Portsmouth, England, to capture the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo. This expedition, led by Admiral Penn and General Venables, was part of Oliver Cromwell’s grand design to insert the British more directly into the trading and mercantile affairs of the western Caribbean region. The expedition to the larger Spanish Caribbean failed but instead led to the capture, in May 1655, of the island. Jamaica at that time was sparsely inhabited by a cadre of Spanish soldiers, who along with their black slaves fled and easily surrendered the country to the British. Years later, Spain officially abandoned its attempt to colonize the country and ceded Jamaica to Britain at the Treaty of Madrid. But the British, like the Spanish before them, were indifferent settlers and colonizers and until 1670 virtually left the unfettered use of the island to the pirates who roamed the area. When the British captured Jamaica, many of the Spanish settlers fled to the north coast of the island, while others went to Cuba. On the other hand, some of the ex-slaves fled to the hills and mountains. Given the name Maroons, the diverse groups that formed the umbrella group became an organized band of fierce fighters, led at various junctures by Cudjoe, Accompang, Johnny, Cuffee, and Quaco. Throughout the years they frequently fought the British troops, looted the sugar plantations, and captured and carried off slaves
Background | 1195
to bolster their numbers. These skirmishes would continue for approximately 80 years until the first of two peace treaties was completed with them in 1738; the second peace treaty was completed in 1795. After England seized the island, it established a plantation economy based on sugar, cocoa, and coffee, one that relied on slave labor. This development in Jamaica was aided in part by the sharp decline of the British one-crop sugar economy in Barbados. This caused many of the planters in Barbados, along with their slaves, to relocate to Jamaica. In 1664 the island’s first House of Assembly was called. The first governor was one of the planters from Barbados—Sir Thomas Modyford— who helped English buccaneers, under Henry Morgan, who had moved to Port Royal from Tortuga. Modyford brought a thousand settlers with him and encouraged agriculture, especially the cultivation of cocoa and sugar cane. The Jamaican population grew rapidly with the arrival of hundreds of additional settlers and thousands of enslaved Africans. The increase in the slave population was so dramatic that by 1750 they represented 90 percent of the country’s population (Higman 1996). This large-scale increase in the slave population paralleled an increase in the tonnage of sugar exported. For example, by 1730, Jamaica’s 75,000 slaves produced 15,500 tons of sugar, and it replaced Barbados as Britain’s most lucrative colony. By 1750 Jamaica exported approximately 20,000 tons of sugar, far outstripping Barbados, which exported approximately 7,000 tons. After Jamaica’s capture by the British, blacks had formed a majority. This prompted the Cromwell government to attempt to balance the white-to-black population ratio. An attempt was made to correct the racial imbalance by recruiting individuals from Britain, Ireland, Scotland, Germany, and other European countries. But this effort was of limited success because as of a number of factors, one of which was the harsh conditions. Another was the terms by which the individuals would arrive in Jamaica—as indentured servants. The one area of qualified success was the decision to send into servitude Englishmen who were political prisoners, or Irish who were branded socially undesirable, for example, criminals, prisoners of war, and prostitutes. The decision to attempt to increase the size of the white population may have been prescient, because by the time the slave trade was abolished in 1807, blacks outnumbered whites by as many as 10 to 1. In 1808 the slave population exceeded 324,000. Local politicians were concerned about the population level of whites in Jamaica. For example, in 1730 the white population of 8,230 comprised only 9.8 percent of the total Jamaican population. This percentage fell to 6.1 percent (12,737) in 1774, rose to 8.1 percent (18,347) in 1788, and fell to 18,903, or 5 percent, by 1830. As living conditions worsened, political discontent grew. This was fomented by the ongoing antislavery campaign in Britain, and the work of missionaries, particularly the Baptists, in Jamaica. Events reached a flashpoint in December 1831, when what is called the Baptist War occurred. The revolt was led by Sam Sharpe,
1196 | Jamaican Immigrants
a slave who lived and worshipped at a Baptist church in Montego Bay. Perhaps the most important catalyst to the rebellion was the widely held belief among the slaves that they had been granted freedom, but that the plantation owners were withholding this freedom. Although the rebellion was unsuccessful—approximately 50 percent of those put on trial were executed, including Sharpe himself—it had a lasting impact on Jamaican history. For example, the testimonies of the missionaries’ personal experiences may have influenced the Colonial Office to formalize the abolishing of slavery as of January 1, 1838. The term formalize is used because in 1833 the British government passed the Abolition of Slavery Act, which stipulated that as of August 1834 any child younger than six would be free; but all other slaves would be “apprenticed” to their former owners for four to six years. This apprenticeship system provided that the ex-slaves would be free one-fourth of the week to sell the fruits of their labor from their own lands.
Modern Era The abolition of slavery in Jamaica freed more than a quarter million slaves, many of whom became small subsistence farmers, often on the lands from which they had been freed. Freed black slaves lived in legal freedom but had no rights or access to property, partly because they were formerly slaves, and slaves, as property, could not by law own property (Burnard 2001). This lack of economic freedom and continued servitude meant that they were exploited by the white ruling class, which was estimated to number about 1 percent of the population but held an estimated 85 percent of the country’s wealth. This gross inequity was fueled by the practices of the British governors, who not only treated the blacks contemptuously, but designed policies calculated to benefit whites. For example, ownership of land abandoned by absentee landlords was contested, By 1865 this blatant lack of fairness had become untenable for the now “free” masses that a second major revolt, the Morant Bay Rebellion, erupted. It should be noted that slave uprisings had been a frequent occurrence in Jamaica, but what made this revolt different was that it occurred almost 30 years after slavery had been abolished. Credit for leading and orchestrating the revolt is given to Paul Bogle, a farmer, supported by George William Gordon, a mixed-race merchant, both of whom had connections to the Baptist church. Historians have noted that this rebellion had profound social, religious, and political implications for modern-day Jamaican society. In 1969 the contributions of Bogle and Gordon were celebrated when they were both elevated to National Heroes status. The rebellion was suppressed as was expected. But the suppression by Governor Edward John Eyre was seen as ruthless; for example, Gordon was taken from his home in Kingston and hanged, as was an extensive group of the Bogle family and relatives; the suppression was viewed as excessive, reckless, and cruel” (Workman, 1974). This led to Eyre’s subsequent recall to Britain and a Crown
Background | 1197
Colony government, or direct rule from London, was instituted. The revolt also had political implications, because any ideas of self-government (local representative government) in Jamaica had been extinguished now that control was centered in London. The fact that this system was true for all West Indian colonies, except Barbados, did not appease the now freed blacks and coloreds. Moreover, it allowed people of the professional managerial classes, who had been put in place by absentee landlords and were often failed socialites in their countries, to continue to run rough-shod over the interest of the black masses. As late as the 1930s the political system continued to be closed to most Jamaicans. However, the movement to universal suffrage and self-government is believed to have begun in New York with the formation of the Jamaica Progressive League (JPL) (Zeidenfelt 1952). It was reportedly started, in 1935, by a group of Jamaicans residing in the United States; among the most prominent members were E. Ethelred Brown and W. A. Domingo. The manifesto advocated self-government, universal suffrage, and the repeal of the property laws, which limited nonproperty owners form running for public office. It also championed the rights of labor unions to function freely and openly. To gain traction locally, they sought and succeeded in getting the support of Norman Manley, one of the country’s most prominent and successful attorneys. Following on this success, the JPL morphed into a political party and was reborn as the People’s National Party (PNP) in September 1938. However, Fitzroy Ambursley (1983) believed that the workers’ rebellion found its most striking expression in the meteoric rise of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union led by Alexander Bustamante. The outbreak of World War II, plus the labor unrest resulting from rising prices and steep unemployment, and the arrest of political and labor figures, reinvigorated the once moribund political activities. A by-product of this increased political action was an increased push toward the goal of adult suffrage and self-government. The ongoing debate and negotiations with Britain ended with Jamaica’s first general election on December 14, 1944. Thirty-two members were elected to the House of Representatives, representing the 14 parishes in the island. What should have been a crowning moment for Norman Manley and his Peoples’ National Party turned out to be a pyrrhic victory. The party that had championed the cause of self-government ran second to the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) led by Manley’s cousin Alexander Bustamante, which captured 22 of the 32 seats. The Jamaica House of Representatives and party politics is patterned after the Westminster system, which created the two-party parliamentary democracy that led Jamaica into independence in 1962. The political fortunes of the PNP and the JLP waxed and waned, as did the popularity of their two leaders. For example, Norman Manley and his Peoples’ National Party again took the lead in negotiating with Britain for full political independence. However, as a preliminary step Jamaica joined with other British West Indian colonies in forming the Federation of the West Indies. This union in 1958, which
1198 | Jamaican Immigrants
Prime Minister of Jamaica Norman Manley (left) shares a joke with Sir Alexander Bustamante, the Jamaican Opposition leader, after the formal signing of the Jamaican Independence Conference Report, at the closing ceremony of the conference at Lancaster House, London, on February 9, 1962. Jamaica became independent on August 6, 1962. (AP Photo)
had long been advocated by the JPL and its successor organization the PNP, was not destined to last, and Jamaica gained full political independence when it withdrew from the West Indian Federation in 1962. Paradoxically, but somewhat predictably, deteriorating economic conditions during the 1970s fueled an outbreak of violence. The intensification of this violence in January 1976 is temporally associated with a visit to Jamaica by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who brought word of the American government disapproval of Michael Manley’s growing affection with Fidel Castro. However, it should be noted that although the violence was first associated with rival gangs affiliated with the major political parties, it quickly evolved into battles between crime syndicates involved in international drug smuggling, gun-running, and money laundering. Violent crimes associated with drug trafficking but rooted in poverty continue to create significant risks to the country’s stability. The spike in rates of crime, and increases in unemployment and poverty, were caused by the tension between the processes of globalization and the reduction in government expenditures on health care, education and literacy, and other social services (Thomas 2007).
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1199
Crime, including violent crime, has become such an everyday occurrence, particularly in Kingston, that both of the major parties, the JLP and the PNP, rely on strong-arm tactics to “assist” in the exercise and maintenance of control of electoral districts. As in most countries, the Jamaican party system was no different in believing that when a party controlled state power, that party should seek to maximize its political position by distributing the spoils of government to its supporters. Some of these spoils were low-income housing, work on makeshift labor-intensive projects, government contracts, and other political largesse. Included in this allocation was the distribution of tickets for seasonal farm work in the United States (Ambursley 1983). Although this system of (re)distribution reached it zenith in the early 1970s, since the middle 1970s there have been less spoils to distribute, so the gangs have had to supplement their underground capital. Since the late 1970s, the criminal gangs have grown in power in Jamaica, and drug posses often compete with rivals for turf, both in Jamaica and the United States. Things can become so bad that when law enforcement officials go into some of these areas to weed out crime or arrest criminals, they can themselves become targets. Nonetheless, many rural and resort areas remain relatively safe and contribute substantially to the economy.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration West Indians migrated to United States in three waves; the first ended in the 1920s, the second lasted from the mid-1940s to the early 1960s, and the third began in the late 1960s after the passage of the Immigration Act in 1965. The recorded history of black emigration from Jamaica into the United States is incomplete and disputed. For example, some records indicate that the process goes back to the 17th century. However, because Jamaica was a transit point for slaves en route to North America, it is reasonable to argue that the record of Jamaicans migrating to the United States is significantly associated with the business of slavery and postemancipation migration. By the 1850s large numbers of Jamaicans were being recruited to work in Panama and Costa Rica. After slavery was abolished in the United States in 1865, American planters imported many of these temporary workers to harvest crops yearly. Over the years these workers, many of them Jamaicans, returned to their countries after harvest. Some of these seasonal workers broke their contracts, refusing to return to Jamaica, and settled in Florida and New York, among other places. Further, by 1890 and until the beginning of World War I, approximately 90,000 Jamaicans were recruited by the U.S. government, and private industries, to work on the Panama
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Canal. Large numbers were also recruited to work on U.S.-owned sugar plantations in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Finally, during both World Wars, the United States again recruited Jamaican men for service on various American bases in the region.
Significant Immigration Waves The 2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics records indicate that in the 1910– 1929 periods approximately 190,000 Caribbean immigrants lived in America, with 12,769 coming from Cuba. Estimates are that about 100,000 were from the British Caribbean, including Jamaica, which according to Kasinitz (1992) sent 412 immigrants to the United States in 1899, 5,633 in 1907, and 12, 243 in 1924. The second immigration wave occurred between the 1930s and the mid-1960s. This was smaller than the first recorded period, because between 1930–1959 only approximately 56,000 immigrants from the English-speaking Caribbean, including Jamaica, took up permanent legal resident in the United States. The large reduction was partly caused by the passing of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (also known as the McCarran-Walter Act), which reaffirmed discrimination against black immigrants and limited legal entry to 100 Jamaicans into the United States annually. Some estimates put the number of annual entrants (legal and illegal) as much higher. This is a reasonable conclusion, because during World War II, when there was a shortage of male workers, New Jersey farmers recruited a number of migratory workers, among them southern blacks and Jamaican males, to make up the shortage resulting from the war effort. Interestingly, southern blacks and the Jamaican males were treated differently. For example, the Jamaicans lived in houses and had their meals provided, while the southern blacks lived in tents and had to buy and prepare their own food. Connecticut farmers also recruited Jamaican men as migratory workers, where they worked on tobacco farms. One other advantage the Jamaican workers had was that they were protected by the federal government, which provided for their care, transportation, and stability of wages, and settled any grievances with the farmers. The final, and largest, wave of immigration began in 1965 and continues to the present. This wave coincided with Britain’s restricting immigration from its former black Commonwealth colonies. Beginning in the 1960–1969 period, legal immigration from Jamaica, and the wider Caribbean, increased dramatically This was facilitated by the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (HartCeller Act), which altered U.S. immigration policy. Table 177 shows the result of this liberalization of immigration policy. As can be seen, Jamaicans again started migrating to the United States in large numbers. About 62,000 Jamaicans migrated to the United States legally from 1960 to 1969, but the number skyrocketed to a high of 193,874 in 1980–1989. Table 178 shows legal permanent resident numbers from Jamaica for each year from 2000–2009.
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Reasons for Migrating There are three distinct motivations to emigrate: preservation (physical, social, and psychological security), self-development (personal growth in abilities, knowledge, and skills), and materialism (financial well-being, wealth) (Tartakovsky and Schwartz 2001). Each of these motivations is seen among Jamaican immigrants, and more than one of these motivators can exist at the same time. Migration is selective; in some cases there is positive selection, with highly educated, ambitious, adventurous, and adaptive immigrants. In other cases, immigrants may be considered failures or social deviants. Jamaican Americans fall into both groups. For example, since slavery was finally abolished in Jamaica in 1838, black Jamaicans have had difficulties in getting and owning land. This meant that there was an uneven apportionment of workable lands. The result of this was that farmers did not have enough land, even for subsistence or cash crop farming. The direct result of that was an uneven distribution of income, high unemployment, and economic hardship. Thus, initially, migration was encouraged by economic conditions related to a decline in the plantation-based economy, and the restricted environment for social mobility. Therefore, many Jamaicans in the late 19th century found the opportunity to migrate a palatable solution to the conditions in a country only two generations away from a major revolt that was a catalyst to freedom from enforced servitude. But in recent times, it has continued because of lack of economic diversity, and scarcity of professional and skilled jobs. After the relaxation of immigration restrictions in 1965, a large number of Jamaicans left to study at American universities. However, because of poor economic opportunities, a deep-rooted bias against American education systems, and the changing social and political environments, a large number of them elected to remain in the United States. This pool of illegal immigrants was, by and large, from the middle class or the social elites, because these were the ones who had the education to qualify for entry into American universities and had the resources to afford the costs involved with overseas travel. In 1972, Michael Manley, then leader of the People’s National Party (PNP)—the party founded by his father—was swept into power after campaigning to initiate social change and racial equality. But the genesis for this, and later events, occurred in the mid-1960s. For example, income from the local bauxite industry had started to decline; Britain had closed its doors to emigrants—thus reducing the growth in remittances as a source of foreign capital; and unemployment had increased to 24 percent from 13 percent in 1962 (Ambursley 1983). This led to social unrest, which worsened with the 1968 Black Power riots when Walter Rodney, a lecturer at UWI Mona, was barred from reentering Jamaica. Quickly, after taking office Manley instituted levies on bauxite and alumina produced in the country and announced his intention to nationalize the industry. However, rather than this action
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promoting wide-ranging nationalistic fervor, it led to the flight of capital and the affluent members of the society, both white and colored. Thus, during the 1970s the Jamaican standard of living declined, partly due to failure of the agricultural sector, the downturn in mining, economic inflation, and low salaries. The exodus of human and financial capital from Jamaica, combined with the decline in U.S. and other foreign capital investments, exacerbated the economic situation. This led the Jamaican government to seek a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Moreover, when the government failed, in October 1977, to make its first quarterly IMF test and then another in 1978, they forfeited any claims to future loan disbursements. Unfortunately, this failure worsened the island’s economic woes—which continued into the 1980s and 1990s—and propelled a larger than usual number of migrants. From 1972 to 1980 real income fell by 25 percent, while the cost of living rose 320 percent (Ambursley 1983). Net foreign exchange had fallen 1,014 percent to minus J$900 million. Real investment fell by 65 percent and unemployment had gone as high as 31 percent in October 1979. Inflation, which was estimated to be a high as 105 percent, in combination with the loss of real economic power, led to the large-scale migration of professionals and self-employed individuals. During this period about 15 percent of the population left the country. The exodus led to a serious “brain drain,” which featured a shortage of trained professionals and skilled workers. In 1978 Jamaica trained 4,286 persons in managerial, administrative, and technical skills, but at the same time lost 2,705 to migration. Another more targeted indication of the brain drain, during the Manley era, was the immigration of approximately 60,000 Jamaican Chinese, some of whom came to the United States.
Demographic Profile Census data show that Jamaicans are the largest group of immigrants from the English-speaking West Indian region currently residing in the United States. But the exact number is difficult to verify. For example, the 2000 U.S. Census estimated the total number of documented Jamaican Americans at 736,513 (see Table 180), but the high Jamaican illegal alien phenomenon, and the group’s laissez faire attitude toward census responses, places this number in doubt. To underscore this point, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) statistics labeled Jamaica as one of the top 10 sources of undocumented immigrants living in the United States. One possible avenue for this large undocumented population may be illustrated by the number of Jamaican visitors to the United States. In 2007, 293,421 nonimmigrant admissions visas (I-94) were issued to Jamaicans (see Table 179). The most recent figures provided by the American Community Survey (ACS) estimate that 895,773 documented Jamaicans live in the United States (U.S. Census
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Bureau 2005–2007). With a median age of 33.5 years old, this group is younger than the general population, as well as four of the five immigrant groups displayed in Table 181. Of the Jamaican American population, 69 percent is 21 and older, with 9 percent, 65 and older. As one might expect, women make up more than 50 (53.8) percent of the Jamaican immigrant population, and they lead every age category except among those younger than 18; males comprise 51 percent of that age group. Overall, approximately 96 percent of Jamaican Americans list their ancestry as derived from one race—black—and the remaining 4 percent selected more than one ancestry group. However, closer examinations of the data suggest an added dimension or correlation between ancestry group and place of settlement. Approximately 97 percent of the Jamaican Americans who live in New York chose one ancestry group for their heritage. However, approximately 15 percent of Jamaican Americans living in California select a heritage that includes two or more races.
Settlement Jamaican Americans live in every state of the Union, but they are concentrated in the Northeast, mainly New York Sate, Connecticut, and Massachusetts (see Tables 182, 183, and 184). These three states are long-established locales, partly because of their importance as part of the trading route with the United States. For example, the city of Boston, Massachusetts, was one of the ports of call where ships en route to Europe, collected supplies. With respect to the major metropolitan centers, New York City has an estimated 300,000 legal Jamaican American immigrants. However, this figure excludes approximately 100,000 to 200,000 undocumented individuals. Finally, Jamaican Americans are found in sizeable numbers in the boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx. Those in Brooklyn, which is colloquially referred to as “Little Jamaica,” and Queens tend to be more recent émigrés, while the community in the Bronx tends to be more well-established. There are also sizable communities in Suffolk and Nassau counties on Long island. Jamaicans are similarly concentrated in the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach metropolitan areas in Florida, and the Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington area in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware metropolitan statistical area (see Table 183). Moreover, Jamaican Americans appear to have a significant impact on the demographics of some catchment areas. For example, in the Miami-Dade County area, Jamaicans account for 3 percent of the foreign-born population; and Jamaicans refer to Miami as “Kingston 22” to indicate the sense of connectedness or similarity to their home country. One recently identified settlement area is the Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta area in Georgia, where approximately 37,802 Jamaican Americans reside. Further, according to the 2007 ACS, Georgia and
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Pennsylvania have seen increases of 19.4 and 5.4 percent respectively in Jamaican Americans moving in from other states, as compared to the previous year. In contrast, in the same period, the increase in Jamaican Americans moving to New York State from another state, was less than one percent. Social capital, families, friends and church, jobs, group psychology (including gangs), and access to higher education are among the factors that explain the heavy concentration of Jamaican immigrants along the eastern coast. The Department of Homeland Security data indicate that 38.9 percent of the 18,477 Jamaicans who obtained legal permanent residence in 2008 settled in the New York-New Jersey area, with 20.9 percent settling in the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, Florida, area (Office of Immigration Statistics 2008).
Educational Attainment Jamaicans believe that upward mobility is possible for all regardless of race, with education the means to achieving this goal. This desire for upward mobility is keenly felt among the rural and black citizenry in Jamaica, who viewed this as a means of bringing them up to par with the brown elites in the country. However, despite this burning need for education, which extends across all strata of society, Jamaican society cannot provide this equality of opportunity for all, since the quality of schooling correlates closely with socioeconomic status, and its proxy, shade of skin. Moreover, the perniciousness of skin shade as a means of social mobility despite educational attainment reaches all the way to the highest corridor of powers. For example, the ascension to leader of the PNP, and thus the country’s prime ministership, of Percival Patterson—who is black—was actively and strongly opposed by Michael Manley, one of the brown elites. Thus, it is not coincidental that Jamaicans view immigration, with its possibility of improvement in educational outcomes and social mobility, as the ultimate possibility in America. There have been competing claims about education’s efficacy in immigrant adaptation. Nonetheless, education’s association with improved selfesteem, self-efficacy, personal beliefs, and cognitive style directly and indirectly influence the outcome of the immigrant experience. Despite the Jamaican American desire to use education as a vehicle to social achievement, the 2007 ACS data show that Jamaicans 25 years and older trail the general population in three of five categories of educational attainment. One area where they lead is in the percentage of individuals enrolled in college or graduate school; this advantage is true for both sexes. For example, 33 percent of Jamaican Americans are enrolled, as compared to 26 percent in the general population. For men, the rates are 25.9 percent vs. 23.2 percent, with Jamaican Americans holding the advantage. The spread between Jamaican Americans and the general population increases in the female category (39.4% vs. 29.0%).
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The percentage of those among this age demographic with more than a high school education was lower than the general population, but higher than the African American identified group (see Table 181). Not surprisingly, the gender skew seen in this immigrant group is also reflected in the educational attainment data. Of Jamaican American men, 20 percent, as compared to 25 percent of Jamaican American women, hold a college or professional degree. This may be an artifact of the higher literacy rate among Jamaican women, as compared to Jamaican men, because in the general American population a slightly higher percentage of men have graduated college as compared to women.
Employment and Economic Traditions Poor economic conditions in Jamaica were a catalyst for immigration, either directly, because of unemployment, or indirectly as related to education and social mobility. The popular narrative of the 1960s and 1970s held that immigrants from the English-speaking West Indies do better economically than a comparison group of African Americans. Explanations abound for this apparent achievement difference: the selectivity of the immigration process, and preferential hiring practices by white-owned institutions and corporations were two most frequently offered. This gave Americans, particularly blacks, the impression that West Indians—Jamaicans included—were specially favored in the job market. But subsequent economic analysis has cast doubts on this claim. Nonetheless, the ACS estimates of the median family income, median household income, and per capita income shown in Table 181 all seem to support this earning advantage as it relates to African Americans. Overall, Jamaican American families have higher poverty rates (11.2%) than families in the general population (9.8%). But these poverty rates are lower than those for African Americans. What is instructive, however, is that when we look inside these numbers, the subpopulation of Jamaican American married-couple families has lower poverty rates than a comparable group in the general population. Of particular interest are female-headed households, with no husband present, where the percentage of those below the poverty line is estimated to be lower than in the general population, 20.8 percent vs. 28.6 percent. But all is not rosy, because more older Jamaican Americans—those 65 years and above—are considered to be below the poverty line (14.8% versus 9.9%) compared to the general population Although Jamaican Americans have college and graduate school rates that are higher than the general population, they have lower mean earnings than the general population. For instance, the mean earning for Jamaican Americans was $60,929, while the mean earning for the general population was $68,965, both stated in 2007 inflation-adjusted dollars. Many Jamaicans bring technical and professional skills with them to the United States. This allows them to access better-paying jobs than African Americans. For example, overall an estimated 31 percent are employed in
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management, professional, and related positions. It is worthy of note that there are significant differences by region or state. As a case in point, the 2007 ACS estimates that 42 and 28 percent of the Jamaican Americans in California and Florida, respectively, indicate they hold management positions. One might speculate that this may be related to race/ancestry origins; in California mixed-race heritage is listed as high as 14 percent, as compared to Florida where mixed-race ancestry is 3 percent. Overall, 80 percent of this immigrant group is employed in private industry and 15 percent in the public sector, while 5 percent are self-employed. By far the largest industry penetration is educational services and the health care and social assistance category, where 33 percent of this immigrant group is employed. Looking at the health care industry, Waters (1999) found that often an entire household is employed at the same hospital; the husband works as a security guard and the wife might be a nurse, nursing aide, or dietary assistant. This major presence in the health care market is a tradition that dates back to the period between 1962 and 1973, when about one-third of the professional class of legal Jamaican immigrants were in fact nurses. “More recently, between 1990 and 1992, nurses were a quarter of the professional immigrants from the four major English-speaking Caribbean countries” (Foner 2000, 92). Jamaican immigrants are also found in sizable numbers in the area of education. As recently as 2001, the New York City Department of Education recruited approximately 300 Jamaican teachers to teach in the city’s school system. These are a part of the approximately 2,000 teachers who left Jamaica in the period 2000– 2003. Some 600 of these teach in New York and other American cities. This recruitment drive was championed by two Jamaican-born local politicians, former councilwoman Una Clarke, and state assemblyman Nick Perry, who lobbied to get the law changed so that these teachers could become fully certified before becoming U.S. citizens. There are many Jamaican Americans who have made significant contributions in the field of education, but two individuals are worthy of note. One is Dr. Marcia V. Keizs, president of York College, one of 11 senior colleges of the City University of New York, with a student body of nearly 6,000 and located in downtown Jamaica Queens. Significant contributions have also been made by Dr. Barbara Hall, who is the superintendent of the Atlanta Public Schools (APS)—an urban school system of 96 schools with approximately 52,000 students and over 4,100 teachers. Dr. Hall is also chair of Harvard University’s Urban Superintendents Program Advisory Board and was a member of the Teaching Commission, which issues policy recommendations to deal with the teaching crisis in America. Paradoxically, although the employment rates for individuals 16 years and older is higher for Jamaican Americans than the general population (72% vs. 64.7.0%), so too is the unemployment rate (6.3% vs. 4.2%). Seventy percent of the estimated 311,184 Jamaican households are family households, and 37 percent have their own children under 18 years old living at home. But, as Table 181 indicates, median
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family income for Jamaican American households is markedly lower than among the general population: $54,809 versus $60,374. They also spent more time traveling to and from work (in minutes), 33.6, as compared to 25.1 for the general population.
Health Issues There is no clear differentiation between the health statuses of Jamaican Americans and the general population, but one study conducted on a sample of 924 Jamaicans living in Jamaica may provide indicators for Jamaican Americans. For example, women on average weighed more than men and had higher body mass indexes—30.7 percent of women and 6.7 percent of men were obese (Jackson et al. 2003). Moreover, men consumed more macronutrients, fiber, and alcohol than women. The researchers also found that among males, cigarette smoking and being single were inversely associated with body mass index (BMI) (624). Finally, those (both sexes) who were married or in a stable union had higher BMIs than those who were not in unions. There are limited health statistics available for Jamaican Americans because health-related data for Jamaican, and all West Indian immigrants, are subsumed under the broad title of African American health outcomes. This still continues to be the case although longitudinal data from the National Survey of American Life has identified that West Indian immigrants are subjected to multiple stressors associated with acculturation. For example, West Indian men are at higher risk of psychiatric disorders than native-born black men. These risks were magnified for second and later generations. Other health-related findings indicate that Jamaican American women had higher rates of infant mortality than do U.S.born black women. Finally, in a 2006 report issued by New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, heart disease was found to be the leading cause of death among Jamaican Americans. Further, this group had the second most deaths in this category among the five largest foreign-born groups. Finally, 17 percent of adult Jamaican American men smoke, which may be a significant contributing factor to heart disease.
Adjustment and Adaptation As a heritage group, black immigrants from the English-speaking West Indies have a history of migration—whether involuntary or voluntary—and this archetypal or phylogenetic history may explain the group’s adaptive disposition. Moreover, the knowledge, kinship, and social capital held by family, friends, and coethnics assist in the adjustment process. Adjustment (acculturation) is a process of cultural and psychological change that results from continuing contact between people of different cultural backgrounds. There are two primary models for immigrant adaptation into the host society. The first is assimilation, where the immigrant loses
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all identification with his/her country of origin and fully embraces the culture of the host country. The second model is acculturation, which indicates that although immigrant individuals will become competent participants in the majority culture, they will always be identified as members of the minority culture. Jamaican American immigrants follow the second model, but the process of acculturation and assimilation are often impacted by unrealistic expectations and social and cultural variables. Nonetheless, Jamaican Americans are more likely to retain their distinctive cultural roots than most other immigrant groups from the English-speaking West Indies.
Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Family life for Jamaican Americans follows a similar trajectory as it does in Jamaica. Waters (1999) writes that middle-class immigrants often described West Indians as more likely than Americans to enjoy an intact husband-wife family. However, this ignores the reality that single parents are prevalent throughout the Caribbean. Of the immigrant group, 26 percent is under 17 years old, and of the approximately 272,533 Jamaican American women aged 15 to 50 years, 5.5 percent had given birth within the last 12 months. In New York City in 2007 three percent or 3,259 of the 64,871 births to foreign-born mothers were to Jamaican-born mothers. Customarily, children take their father’s name, even when the parents are unmarried.
Maria Nunes, from Jamaica, poses with her sons Alexander Nunes (left) and Emmanuel Nunes-Chavez in their apartment in Seattle, Washington, November 24, 2008. (AP Photo/Elaine Thompson)
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Jamaicans practice two types of baptisms: infant baptism, or christening, which usually occurs at any time between one and six months; and adult baptism. Christening, an important event because it is thought that an unchristened child is considered easy prey for ghosts, takes many forms. For example, among certain Christian groups, for example, Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists, and so forth, a baby or young child is baptized into the body of believers and of Christ by sprinkling water on its head. Later, when children are older (12–14 years, usually), they are confirmed in a ceremony in the church. In other Protestant-Christian and AfroCaribbean Christian traditions, the infant is blessed at “dedication” but baptized only after faith in Christ is stated. In adult baptism by immersion, the person is briefly held under the water by a minister or elder of the religious denomination, in a river, the sea, or a baptismal font located near the sanctuary.
Marriage Of the Jamaican American population, 38 percent of those 15 years and older are married, while 43 percent have never been married. These are, respectively, lower and higher than the general population average. Moreover, the data show a higher percentage of men 15 years and older who are now married, compared to women with the same demographic—43.8 percent and 34.4 respectively. However, the percentages for those never married are approximately the same at 42 percent for each sex, both of which are lower than the general population. There is speculation that this trend was related to the gendered psychological aspect of immigration, for example, role reversals and the attendant consequences that occur during and after immigration, in which women, often unassisted, take on the responsibility for the household. Another alternative is the continuation of the tradition of unmarried cohabitation, a practice that is seen in the majority of the lower- and middle-class echelons of Jamaican society. Estimates suggest that as many as 80 percent of adult Jamaicans have never married, which is closely correlated with a high rate of children born to single mothers. In a piece published July 7, 2004, by the Jamaican Gleaner, Rebecca Tortello writes that modern-day Jamaican weddings are similar to wedding in most Western countries, and they borrow from American and English customs. The one noted exception is the tradition of serving fruit cake, prepared with rum, to guests. As in most traditional American weddings, the bride and/or her parents pay for the bride’s gown and the wedding reception, while the groom and his parents are responsible for the rings as well as their marital residence. In the United States, as in Jamaica, there are variations from the norm. For example, in Jamaica many couples get married later in life, usually as a result of pressure brought by grown-up children, or if and when the couple achieve a measure of economic success or stability.
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In rural Jamaica, weddings are community events, with the community welcome to attend the reception, which features much good food and typically much rum and other drinks. In the United States, however, the ceremony and reception are kept within a small circle of close friends and relatives. The established—rural, or lower socioeconomic status—wedding menu usually includes traditional fare: “It starts with mannish water—a soup made from goat tripe (intestine). Guests are often given a choice of curry goat and white rice, rice and peas or kidney beans with fried chicken, or stewed chicken or beef for the main course. A light salad is served with the meal along with sorrel or rum punch.” Afterwards there is a usually a black cake or fruitcake, soaked in rum, and decorated (www.everyculture.com). Evidence suggests the cultural norms and practices that exist among the nonelite in Jamaica continue to operate in the United States.
Funerals Jamaican funerals in the United States are mainly Christian, held at a church or funeral home; the appropriate attire is semiformal, and there is a viewing followed, after the service, by a reception. In Jamaica funeral rites are performed in accordance with the religious beliefs of the deceased or his or her family members; these are variously African, Afro-Caribbean, or Christian. In form, the beliefs are the same: each individual has a mortal body, soul, and spirit. With death comes the end of the mortal bodily processes and the spirit returns to its maker. However, Jamaicans believe that the shadow, or duppy, wanders for several days and is only quieted by special rites. Consequently, Jamaican Christians and Afrocentric religions (Myalism, Pocomania, Shango) bury their dead after performing special rites or a formal church service (www.everyculture.com). For example, a Catholic priest gives the last rites to the dying and may offer a mass for a soul that departed to purgatory before making peace with God. The grieving process is very ritualistic. For example, it is customary to hold a wake for the dead on the night before the funeral, where friends and family come to offer condolences. In an attempt to prevent the dead from returning to haunt or harm the family, Afrocentric Jamaican custom requires all family members and friends to bid the dead farewell. A highlight of the funeral in Afrocentric religions is the “Ninth Night” service, conducted to ensure that the shadow of the deceased does not return after the ninth evening after death to visit with family members. It is believed that each night the ghost visits all that is his or hers and the “ninth night” rituals send them on their way forever. Ritual joy mixed with mourning precedes and follows the interment, which is concluded with a second ceremony at the gravesite. Rites of music, dancing, and singing are carried over to the “tombing,” or the celebration of building a little house for the dead (Horst 2004). In the past, the Jamaican rural inhabitants buried, and erected tombs for, the dead on family land. To
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these Jamaicans, this was seen as a fundamental marker of familial and ancestral identity, and family members usually travel back for these rites. This practice has lessened due to zoning and other city and town ordinances, and most burials in Jamaica are conducted in cemeteries.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Two views exist of Jamaican family life; one is a female-headed household coupled with mother dominance in low-income households, and the other is married/patriarchal European forms in higher-income families (Fox 1999). These stereotypes need to be reexamined in light of cultural transfer that results from transnational and return migration. Changes in behaviors, gender roles, and expectations occur with immigration. Breakdown of the family structure, long hours of work, and conflicts between traditional and American child-rearing norms are among the major factors being dealt with by Jamaican immigrants in the United States. Moreover, the high proportion of female-headed households, with young children, puts the traditional nuclear family model under strain. Many Jamaican women held jobs before immigrating, but they were still expected to do all the household chores. After moving to the United States things often change dramatically. Men help out much more with child-care responsibilities and home chores, and women often exert more financial control and more say in family matters as a result of their larger income. However, because many women work outside the home it creates two situations with starkly different outcomes. In one, women get more help from men inside the home and, where it is possible, couples with young children who have different shifts arrange their shifts so the husband can look after the children while the wife works. More often than not, this is not possible, and it contributes to the second change in the family life of women who work outside the house; children are left alone for long periods to care for themselves and their younger siblings. The modern Jamaican immigrant family is faced with a number of problems that are similar to problems that are encountered by most immigrant families to America. But one factor predominates, and that is the racialized nature of the American society. Because of the higher social capital, which enables them to get jobs easier, it is customary for Jamaican women to be the first to migrate to the United States, either as documented or undocumented immigrants. If and when their status is regularized the women set about reuniting their family. But in a number of instances, the lengthy period apart often results in the men and women starting new relationships and/or families. Sometimes, the men (fathers) opt not to join the family but make periodic visits to be with the family. Children present particular challenges in a number of Jamaican immigrant families. When those children who are left in Jamaica move to the United States, they often find it difficult to adjust to their new
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environment and deal with the discrimination, resentment, and prejudicial behavior. The net result is that some families must deal with the increased instability resulting from the immigration process.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Culture is “an organized body of rules concerning the ways in which individuals in a population should communicate with one another and toward objects of their environment” (LeVine 1973, 12). This definition suggests that culture is immutable, but researchers (e.g., Robotham 2000; Thomas 2007) have argued that Jamaican culture is constantly being negotiated. Jamaicans have been successful in legitimizing and valuing their indigenous cultural practices. Definitions of culture have been broadened and expanded to include the working-class and poor rural black Jamaicans, as well as the political and cultural elites, and the middle-class professionals. Also competing for this contested space are Rastafarianism and the Garvey movement of an earlier era. Thus, before coming to the United States, Jamaican immigrants may be faced with a complexity of cultural issues. After arriving in the United States, Jamaican immigrants generally have four options. They can remain a “bird of passage” or sojourner, which means the immigrants see themselves as being in the United States to accumulate some American dollars and then return to Jamaica. The second option is the Pan-African view, which means working for the improvement of the African-heritage community, self, and family. In the third option, the immigrant takes an assimilationist perspective, surrendering all, or a major portion, of their culture and taking on the culture of the dominant group, often living as the conspicuous black family in town that enhances the diversity of the community. Research indicates this is not a preferred option for the majority of West Indian immigrants; they prefer mixed communities. Paradoxically, this “nonJamaicanness” is associated with higher socioeconomic status. The fourth option, an enhancement of the first, has the immigrant developing his or her academic and professional skills, while all the while planning to return to Jamaica. Most early Jamaican immigrants chose the first option because they did not intend to become part of the American mainstream. One author wrote that the first cohort of West Indian immigrants was apprehensive about joining and associating with black Americans (Lewinson 1974). In his view, it was evident that West Indian immigrants were both aware of the negative stereotypes of African Americans, and considered African Americans inferior. This strained relationship often broke out into open hostilities. But some among this first group of Jamaican Americans realized the utility of creating relationships with black Americans. For example, in 1926 W. A. Domingo argued for a bond between West Indians and black Americans, one that would take into account the similarity of their problems, which could only be solved by the intelligent cooperation of each group (Lewinson 1974).
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The first and second waves of English-speaking West Indian immigrants often argued for and sought the protection of their unique status as subjects from the British Commonwealth. Nonetheless, they were subjected to much of the same racial prejudices that American blacks were subjected to under the laws of the pre–civil rights United States. Although more recent immigrants may not openly encounter the most blatant forms of racism, they often experience the effects of subtle everyday discrimination and stereotypical perceptions engendered by their color and ethnicity. The recorded history indicates that Jamaica has had battles based on color distinctions, but some writers argue that Jamaican Americans are, like most West Indian immigrants, more conscious of their blackness (often as a disadvantage) than they were in Jamaica, because they are the racial majority. Nancy Foner (1987) argued that race took a new and more painful meaning, because “blackness became more of a stigma than it had been in Jamaica” (202). On arrival in the United States, Jamaican Americans must adjust to living in communities where blacks are treated as a numerical, political, social, and economic minority. Thus, they must be conscious of, and adjust to, the cultural traditions and social roles of racial or ethnic groups with which they must interact The choices Jamaican American immigrants are faced with are being “black”—with the associated negative stereotypes; taking on a West Indian identity; or identifying as African Americans on some issues and as West Indian on others. As Jamaicans learn to adjust to life in America, some become street-wise very early and use their social capital and networks to provide information on work opportunities, and where to live. Occasionally, Jamaican Americans become victims of inner-city crimes, but many Jamaican youths have penetrated the gangs and drug culture in New York City, Miami, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Boston (www.everyculture.com). Reports suggest that the political turmoil in Jamaica, beginning in the 1970s, has facilitated the emigration of criminal political enablers. Some of these individuals found the U.S. drug culture of the 1980s and 1990s conducive to starting up, or continuing, a criminal drug enterprise. Some leaders of these “posses,” like the late Vivian Blake, a former top leader of the Shower Posse, were identified, arrested, and prosecuted by the FBI and other lawenforcement bodies. Partly because of the large numbers of Jamaican Americans in the United States, many uninformed Americans often classify any black with an accent as Jamaican. Therefore, when other African-descent immigrant individuals commit crimes, Jamaicans are often blamed by the media. Within the acculturation model, the integration option is held to be the optimal choice, because individuals choose to retain aspects of their traditional culture, while using aspects of the host country culture. Jamaican culture has a long history of violence, both as a means of resisting oppression, and in imposing order when informal civic norms break down. This cultural tradition is believed, in some quarters, to have legitimized violence as a potential mode of interpersonal relating.
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Thus, one downside of retaining the native culture may be the harsh treatment of women by men; domestic violence. Arscott-Mills (2001) provided descriptive data of 187 Jamaican women who sought the services of a women’s crisis center during a three-month period specifically for concerns surrounding interpersonal violence. She found that 98 percent of the women reported being psychologically abused by their husband or partner, 59 percent reported that they had been sexually assaulted, 15 percent reported that they had had their life threatened, and 89 percent reported that they had experienced physical injury at the hands of their husband or partner. Moreover, most women (54%) first sought the assistance of a pastor or friend, and only 17 percent had reported their abuse to the police. This behavior is sometimes replicated in America.
Religion The majority of Jamaica’s population is Christian, with small Hindu, Muslim, and Jewish communities. The older, established Christian denominations are Baptist, Native Baptist, Methodist, Anglican, Roman Catholic, Moravian, and Presbyterian. Many of these organizations played important roles in the country’s early history. For example, it was the protests and riots organized by Baptist laypersons that contributed to the reshaping of Jamaican society. Nonetheless, Jamaica’s most lively religious experiences come from the less formal Protestant religious denominations such as the Pentecostals, In 1907, the Pentecostal Church of God was introduced into Jamaica from the United States. This Fundamentalist organization quickly grew in numbers as the impact of the Denominational Christians (Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Methodists) declined. For example, the 1943 Jamaican Census had Pentecostals at 4 percent; by 1970 they had grown to 20 percent (Prince 1982). Prince further asserts that Pentecostalism flourished during the period of greatest social chance in Jamaica, 1950–1970. Moreover, in keeping with its origin, Pentecostalism introduces values and ideas of modernity and American culture. Jamaicans have a history that favors Christian beliefs, but they do this in the manner that best satisfies their needs. This tradition meant they did not slavishly follow the tenets of Eurocentric religious beliefs, but actively incorporated elements of their West African heritage. Standing as a counterpoint to the Pentecostal teachings are a number of religious groups that survived under slavery. Among these are Myalism, Pocomania, and Kumina, or the Native Baptist church; and Rastafarianism—which is of more recent origins. Myalism, one of the oldest religions from Africa, incorporates the practice of magic and spirit possession. It is community-centered and refuses to accept negatives in life such as sickness, failure, and oppression (www.everyculture.com). The Native Baptist church began as an indigenous church among black American slaves who were taken to Jamaica by their owners when they migrated to the island as Baptist loyalists.
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Rastafarianism is Jamaica’s most recent religious-cultural faction. It was developed by Leonard Howell following the 1930 coronation of Ras Tafari Makkonen as Emperor Haile Selassie, and inspired by the teachings of Marcus Garvey, who had prophesied about the coming of a black Messiah. Distinguishing features of Rastafari are the wearing of dreadlocks and loose-fitting clothes. An important part of Rastafarian theology is the idea of repatriation to Africa in order to escape oppression in “Babylon.” The movement has had a marked impact on Jamaican culture and cultural expression and has made its presence felt on every continent. While estimates vary as to the number of Rastafarians who live in the United States, Vickerman (2007) asserted that “very few Jamaicans or Jamaican immigrants are practicing Rastafarians” (483). Moreover, the majority of those who are belong to one of two major subdivisions, The Twelve Tribes of Israel or the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (Vickerman 2007). It is unknown how many, if any, of these revivalist religious groups operate in the United States. But choice of churches (religious institutions) was often proscribed. For example, early immigrants who were black, and who wanted to attend predominantly white religious institutions, would often be required to sit in special sections (Watkins-Owens 1996). This prompted a number to seek out predominantly African American churches, or establish congregations of like-minded individuals, some of who were from different countries in the Caribbean. Henry (1994) noted that religiosity among West Indian immigrants in Toronto tends to decline in the second generation. She notes however, that first-generation immigrants usually maintain their religious traditions, even attending similar denominations as they did back home. Although these findings are based on the immigrant experience in Toronto, there is credible anecdotal evidence that a similar pattern exists in the United States.
National Language English is Jamaica’s official language, although it is spoken using many variations ranging from Standard English to Jamaican Patois (Creole), which, although used widely, is not an official language. The variation used is related to both context and class. For example, Standard English is used in formal discourse or political discussions but changed to Creole in informal conversation and gossip. Although Standard English is taught in school, among the lower socioeconomic class and the rural poor, Creole is the variant of choice. Rural Jamaicans have many Creole sayings, which are scorned by the upper class and not easily understood by foreigners. Recent studies have indicated that attitudes to the use of Patois, or Jamaican Creole, are undergoing a positive change. Research indicates that multiple sources might be credited. For one, the performance dancehall culture, which uses Creole, has been popularized, both nationally and internationally. But perhaps the more important reason for the change, and long-term acceptance, may be the willingness
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of Jamaican English teachers to authorize its use in schools, perhaps because of its appeal to nationalism, and a shedding of all things colonial. Thus, in recent years, Creole have been used by most Jamaicans, including the old middle class, and brown elites, who previously had been more comfortable with Standard English, or versions of Creole close to it, even in informal settings. Interestingly, the code-switching seems unidirectional, because a large proportion of rural Jamaicans experience great difficulty in switching to Standard English, even in formal conversation. This tendency is reflected in the conversations of Jamaican Americans—the post-1965 immigrants—who live in Brooklyn and speak mainly Patois, or Creole. The use of animal characters is quite frequent in Jamaican proverbs: “When Jon Crow wan go a lowered, im sey a cool breeze tek im;” “Cow seh siddung nuh mean ress;” “Mi t’row mi corn but mi nuh call nuh fowl.” There are many Anglicized African proverbs that are popular in Jamaica: “When the mouse laughs at the cat there is a hole nearby”; “No matter how long the night, the day is sure to come”; “When a fowl is eating your neighbor’s corn, drive it away or someday it will eat yours.” These sayings are used to give caution, play with social conventions, or make uncomplimentary remarks. These all served useful purposes when the language form was in its nascent period, to have communications that were indecipherable to the slave-owner or manager, as well as to form a common “language” for the diverse slave population. The sayings are also used to teach morality, values, and modes of conduct. The Jamaican dialect began to include words and phrases taken from the spread of the Rastafarian movement. “Dread talk,” which is often very symbolic, combines the Rastafarians’ own non-Western vocabulary and the Afro-Jamaican way of speaking, and it is heavily laced with biblical references and metaphors. For example, the “de” sound in dedicate is replaced with “liv” to form the word “livicate.” Further, because all speakers are seen as equal, words like “understand” become “overstand,” and “oppression” is changed to “down-press.” Finally, words and phrases such as “I and I” instead of we are strictly Rasta. This makes it difficult for outsiders to understand or interpret.
Major Festivals and Holidays Jamaicans, like most of the English-speaking Caribbean, celebrate traditional Christian religious holidays such as Christmas, Good Friday, Ash Wednesday, and Easter Monday. Additional holidays include New Year’s Day, Boxing Day, Bob Marley’s Birthday (in February), and the National Heroes Day (in October). In early January, there is also a celebration of the birth of Accompong Maroon leader Kojo, and his and victory over the British. But the greatest day for celebration is August 6, which celebrates the day Jamaica got independence from Britain. On Labor Day, Jamaican Americans join other Caribbean people during the Carnival celebration in New York.
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Foodways Jamaica’s national dish is ackee and saltfish (codfish), but curried goat and rice, and fried fish and bammy (a flat baked cassava bread) are just as popular and delicious. Moreover, other culinary choices extend to cow-foot, goat head soup, jerk chicken and jerk pork, stew peas and rice, rundown, liver and green bananas, mannish water, and hard dough bread and pastries. Among the beverages favored by Jamaican Americans are rum, Red Stripe beer, and Dragon and Guinness stouts. In major metropolitan areas like Miami and New York City, one may find grocery stores that cater to the specific gustational needs of Jamaican Americans. Patties, which are hot and spicy, turtle soup, and pepper pot may contain meats such as pork and beef, as well as greens such as okra and kale. The popularity of patties, in the United States, has been aided by one company, Golden Krust Caribbean Bakery. Other companies manufacture and sell patties, but Golden Krust, which has locations in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and several other states is by far the best known purveyor of Jamaican dishes.
Music, Arts, Dance, and Entertainment Jamaica has a rich musical tradition that first was captured by the mento, a fusion of African and European musical traditions, popularized in the 1950s. Beginning in the early 1960s there emerged three distinctly Jamaican musical styles; these were ska, rock steady, and reggae. Count Ossie is credited with merging Jamaican, Afro-Caribbean, and Afro-American musical rhythms with rock and other influences to create a distinctively black music called reggae. Reggae, the music form once described by Henry Louis Gates Jr. (1976) as “the channel for urging forth an inevitable and drastic social change . . . soon” (304), was popularized by the Rastafarians and given worldwide exposure by Bob Marley. Like calypso before it, whose roots are in Trinidad and Tobago, reggae began as a working-class medium of expression and social commentary. But reggae soon became the first distinctly Caribbean music to become global in scope. The appeal of reggae music is the combination of its energy and its ability to speak to and communicate the past of exile and oppression (down-pression) and the future of hope, equality, and transformation. Implicit in the power of the early forms of reggae, as performed by Bob Marley, is the call for the nonacceptance of and the overthrow of Babylon, or “the system, the downpressor.” Songs like “Get Up Stand Up for Your Right” “Chant Down Babylon” were used to inspire hope that the “evil man system” would and could be replaced. The fear of the inspirational power of words in some reggae songs has led to them being banned from the airwaves. Each post-Lenten period, the streets of Kingston, and Negril, come alive when Jamaica stages its version of the preeminent form of cultural expression—Carnival.
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On these occasions streets in these two cities reverberate with the sounds of calypso and soca music. During this time, local and international artists treat visitors to an array of reggae, soca, and calypso. The culmination of these events is the masquerading of thousand of costumed participants who wind their way through the streets in a fashion reminiscent of the West Indian Day Parade on Eastern parkway in Brooklyn. In August, Jamaica plays host to a number of local and international artists at the Jamworld Center in Kingston. This is but one of a number of major entertainment events that coincide with the Independence Day celebration. This festival follows Reggae SumFest, which is usually staged in Montego Bay. Finally, many American urban centers often feature concerts, shows, and performances by Jamaican artists such as Buju Banton and Beres Hammond. Additionally, worldrenowned performers like Jamaican-born and Brooklyn-raised Shaggy, Sean Paul, Busta Rhymes, and Damian Marley, to name a few, often make featured appearances on U.S. television. Some of the other musical expressions popular in Jamaica are calypso and soca music, which mixes Afro-Caribbean rhythms with witty lyrics and finely tuned steel drums. One of the leading exponents of this art form was a Jamaican Chinese musician and band leader—Byron Lee, and his band, the Dragonnaires, who popularized calypso music both in Jamaica and the United States. Among the brown and
Onlookers wave Jamaican flags as an evil-looking character marches by during the West Indian Day Parade held along Eastern Parkway in Brooklyn, New York, September 5, 2005. (AP Photo/Mark Lennihan)
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middle-class expatriates, in Florida and New York, a Bryon Lee and the Dragonnaires concert was a must on their social calendar. Jamaica, and Jamaicans, often celebrate the country’s African heritage with events such as African folk dances, and the Accompong Maroon Festival. The National Dance Theater (NDTC), established in 1962, is a world-renowned troupe that has worked to fulfill its mission as a catalyst for social change, featuring the dance forms that celebrated the indigenous history of Jamaica, and the wider Caribbean region. Under the distinguished leadership of the late Professor Rex Nettleford, NDTC has made many tours to the United States, Britain, Canada, and other countries, often providing a view of unknown aspects of Jamaica’s African heritage. Two other Jamaicans have made recognizable contributions to cultural expression in the United States. One of these is Clive Campbell (DJ Kool Herc), who is widely credited as the first to create hip hop by transforming Jamaican rhythms and music-making to teens in the Bronx. The second contributor is Garth Fagan, who has played made a noteworthy role in the development and advancement of dance. Dr. Fagan, Distinguished Professor SUNY-Brockport and choreographer of The Lion King, was born in Jamaica and is founder and artistic director of Garth Fagan Dance, a modern dance company based in Rochester, New York.
Literature and Academia Many Jamaican have distinguished themselves as poets: Adriza Mandiela wrote Life of the Caribbean Immigrant, Living in America. Literature laureate and scholar Rex Nettleford is well known in the United States both as an academic and as a choreographer with the National Dance Theater Company. Claude McKay, author of such books as Home to Harlem and Banana Bottom, and a key figure in the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s and 1930s, immigrated to the United States in 1912 from Jamaica. Opal Palmer Adisa, a Jamaica-born artist and teacher, taught literature and served as chair of the Ethnic Studies Program at California College of Arts and Crafts in Oakland, California. Patricia Powell, who was born in Jamaica and moved to the United States in her teens, has been a lecturer in fiction at Harvard University and a visiting professor of creative writing at MIT. Jamaican-born Leonard Barrett, author of The Sun and the Drum: African roots in Jamaica Folk Tradition, taught religion at Temple University, Philadelphia, and was well-known for his academic writings on the Rastafarians. Orlando Patterson, who was born in Jamaica, is the John Cowles Professor of Sociology at Harvard University. In the early 1970s, Patterson was also an adviser to Michael Manley as Manley attempted to establish a democratic socialist system in Jamaica. The late Frederick Gomes Cassidy, professor of English at the University of Wisconsin and a linguist and lexicographer, was an authority on Jamaican English and pidgin and Creole languages. He also
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published a Dictionary of Jamaican English. In announcing his death, the New York Times called the former editor of the Dictionary of American Regional English an expert on American folk language.
Media John B. Russwurm was born in Jamaica, of a black mother and white father (Foner 1969), was one of the first blacks to graduate from an American college: Bowdoin College, in 1826. Russwurm distinguished himself as the cofounder of Freedom’s Journal, black America’s first newspaper. Mainstream North American media portray Jamaica, and Jamaicans, in a number of caricatures. They are the exotic and sexual beings of How Stella Got Her Groove Back or the quaint innocents in Cool Runnings. But more often than not the country, and the people, are associated in the minds of media consumers as evil and malevolent, as represented by criminal drug posses. For example, an analysis of 272 stories covered in major U.S. and Canadian newspapers found that more than 70 percent of the stories portrayed Jamaica negatively, usually resorting to sensationalization. The most popular topics covered were politics and violence/crime. Often these topics were inseparable, particularly during the time of electioneering in Jamaica. A specific illustration was the report by the Miami Herald that throughout the 1980s Jamaican gangs operated freely in the south Florida area. It is left to the “ethnic” media to try to present a balanced view of things. There are a number of newspapers and tabloids that cater to the Jamaican population in America. Among some of these are Caribbean Life, Everybody’s Magazine, and New York Carib News. Newspapers such as the Jamaican Gleaner and The Star are favorite daily papers in Miami and New York City, because they enable Jamaican Americans to get up-to-date on news from Jamaica. Both publications chronicle national and international news and are available online and in most major American cities. At the same time, broadcast enterprises such as Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation (JBC), and Jamaican radio stations such as RJR, which broadcast from Jamaica, are available on the World Wide Web to supply Jamaican Americans with current news of the island.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Naturalization The Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated that as of January, 2007, there were 240,000 legal permanent residents,
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160,000 of which were eligible to naturalize. Further, in 2008 the Office of Immigration Statistics report on naturalizations by region and country of birth showed the following rates for Jamaican immigrants in the period 2006–2008: 18,953, 12,314, and 21, 308. The huge increase in 2008 is explained by the growth in applications ahead of the increased costs for the process in 2007. However, there is reluctance on the part of Jamaicans to naturalize, and when they do it is often conditional and for instrumental purposes—enhancement of job opportunities, or family reunification—rather than nationalistic or patriotic reasons. The 2007 ACS report shows that 314,166, or 56.9 percent, of the total estimated foreign-born Jamaican Americans are naturalized citizens. This means that as many as 238,000 of the foreign-born Jamaican Americans are not naturalized. Thus, although a large number of Jamaicans have sought permanent residence in the United States since the 1970s, because of deteriorating social and economic problems back home, this should not be construed as abandoning their national culture or identity, because as the naturalization rates suggest, Jamaican immigrants appear loathe to make a symbolic, largely ceremonial break from their homeland. By comparison, Barbadian Americans, another group with dual citizenship rights, has a naturalization rate of 67.6 percent. Focusing only on the major settlement sites (states) shown in its Table 2.3(a), the 2007 ACS report indicates that 50 percent of the 495,271 foreignborn Jamaican American immigrants are citizens. More specifically, New Jersey and New York have the highest naturalization rates, at 61 and 60 percent, respectively, while at the other end Pennsylvania has a naturalization rate of 44 percent. Moreover, to illustrate this point the Brookings Institute released a report that showed that in the Philadelphia metro area the Jamaican immigrants’ naturalization rate is 56 percent, which is below the region’s 70 percent average (Singer et al. 2008). Jamaican immigrants make many adjustments to American society. First, they must come to terms with the racialized attitude that prevails in the society. Then, at some time they must adjust to their new residency or citizenship. For instance, naturalized Jamaican Americans often wrestle with the issue of a split allegiance; to Jamaica and to the United States, even with the possibility of dual citizenship. The following is likely to be heard: “I’m a Jamaican. I have American citizenship, but I’m not an American. I’m a Jamaican.” This reluctance by Jamaican Americans to naturalize may stem from their reluctance to sever ties, albeit symbolically, with the home country. Considering that dual citizenship is allowed by Jamaica, this reluctance is surprising. However, research indicates that this reluctance is fostered by feelings of noninclusion in the American society and is kept alive by an ideology of return. Another plausible explanation is provided by the sense of pride in Jamaican culture that ensues from the international impact of reggae and dancehall; a case of a nondominant culture significantly changing the dominant culture. This paradox allows the representations of Jamaican blackness to challenge the supremacy of American blackness (Thomas 2007).
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Intergroup Relations Race and the racialized American society are two issues with which all Africanheritage immigrants must deal. Many have postulated that this is the first time that Jamaican immigrants may be dealing with this level of racism, but this claim must be scrutinized. First, since the early 1960s many Jamaicans have gained knowledge of American racial history, either through personal visits, or via family and friends who had traveled to the United States and returned to share their personal experiences of the racial divide that exists. Second, West Indian immigrants, or their descendents, such as Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, and Kwame Ture (Stokely Carmichael), had been active players in the racial struggles before and after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The relationship between Jamaican Americans and the larger population has generally been cordial, although marked with suspicions. Most Americans gain knowledge of things Jamaican via the cuisine, music, or reports of crimes. For example, most crimes in the inner-city black communities are believed to be caused by Jamaicans. This social representation is clearly based on stereotypes related to the drug posses, which have a history and reputation for extreme violence, and where every person with an accent is believed to be Jamaican. However, an analysis conducted by Martinez and Lee (2000) set out to refute some of the stereotypical ideas. Looking at Haitian, Jamaican, and Mariel Cuban homicide rates, they found that killings in Miami were mostly intraethnic disputes, despite the city’s diverse population and its greater potential for intergroup conflict. Moreover, they concluded that the immigrant group–specific rates rarely exceeded the city average. It is argued that both working-class and middle-class Jamaican Americans have certain characteristics that set them apart from other groups (www.everyculture. com). For example, they use more Creole than Standard English, adhere more closely to cultural traditions, particularly in food choices, and tend to be more spatially segregated. In major metropolitan centers like New York City and Miami, working-class Jamaican Americans are able to carve out niches that foster distinct social activities, for example, cricket, dominoes, and entertainment clubs. Furthermore, in almost every area where Jamaican Americans are represented they have developed, and make extensive use of, susus or partner draws. This is a particular type of noninterest-bearing revolving credit in which each member gets a “partner hand” or turn. These economic arrangements have facilitated capital acquisitions (houses and cars), and thus have provided increased opportunities for social mobility. Although often described as very assertive, quick-tempered, and not easily dominated, Jamaican immigrants generally make good neighbors and contribute to the cohesion and growth of their communities, often taking up social and political causes and challenges other community members avoid.
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Thus, some Jamaican Americans, either by chance or planning, or some combination of both, influence the course of social justice; such was the case of Evelyn Coke. In a 2007 case heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, the late Ms. Coke, a former home care aide, sued to reverse federal labor regulations that exempt home care agencies from having to pay their employees overtime. The court unanimously rejected her claims, because in its opinion the Labor Department already had authority to include home care workers in minimum wage and overtime protection but had elected to exclude them because it was deemed too costly. At this time, both Congress and the Obama administration are reviewing the law to eliminate the exemption for home attendants. Another unwitting catalyst to social change was Esmin Green. Her death, in June 2008, on the waiting room floor of Kings County Hospital in Brooklyn, New York, which was captured on surveillance video as hospital staff walked by, was described as “a symbol of a health-care system that failed horribly” (Snow and Frantz 2008). Although Jamaican Americans generally have good relations with others in their community, there has been a contested relationship with African Americans; one that Vickerman (1999) sums up as “a mixture of conflict and consensus characterized relationships between the two groups” (85). Often this interethnic conflict occurs as the result of misunderstandings, stereotypes, and misperceptions, by both Jamaican Americans and African Americans. For example, some Jamaicans believe that their work ethic and social and human capital, along with their conservative family values, make them more valued in the wider society than African Americans. Ironically, this view of West Indian immigrants, including Jamaicans, has been used by certain elements to harshly critique African American efforts towards social and economic mobility. Although some members in the Jamaican American community continue to emphasize differences between the two groups, most eventually become aware that African Americans act as an important buffer or reference group when it pertains to their interactions in the American society. This is particularly true when seeking tangible benefits such as goods, position, and other rewards Evidence shows that with time, many of the differences between African Americans and Jamaican Americans will become less distinct, particularly for the second and later generations. Marriage patterns, for example, demonstrate that firstgeneration Jamaicans follow what may be characterized as an acculturation model based on separation; they marry and have relations with other Jamaicans. Second and later generations use an integration strategy when they elect to marry outside of their ethnic group, with African Americans being a primary target group. Obviously, factors such as their contact in school, interaction in their living environments, and the sharing of similar life experiences with African Americans all make this integration process more likely for second and later generations. The combined efforts of Jamaicans and African Americans to deal with racial incidences and injustice in their neighborhoods also help to improve relations.
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Forging a New American Political Identity West Indian immigrants generally, and Jamaicans particularly, have continued to make their presence felt in the political sphere, both nationally and in the state and municipal governments. There was always a high proportion of West Indians/Jamaicans involved in political assertiveness. In New York City, the impetus for forging of a new political reality among West Indians was the need to elect their own leaders after being embroiled in a number of racial incidents in Crown Heights, in Brooklyn. This was blamed on the polarization between blacks and Jews in the area. West Indian blacks felt that if they had their own independent leadership this may have aided in diffusing the divisions between the groups. Moreover, some in the community feel that some elected representatives were more interested in dividing and marginalizing Caribbean immigrants, especially Jamaican Americans, than in representing their interests. Thus, they sought to mobilize and get their own elected to various levels of government. For example, there are many Jamaicans active in the New York politics at the federal, state and municipal level. For example, as of 2009 the deputy majority leader in the New York City Council was a Jamaican American—Leroy Comrie Jr. Previously, former councilwoman Una Clarke, a Jamaican-born educator,
Wendy Irving, center, a legal resident from Jamaica living in the Bronx, New York, shouts slogans during a rally against immigration reform held in front of New York’s City Hall, April 10, 2006. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)
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became one of the prominent Jamaican American politicians in New York City. She was succeeded at the municipal level by her daughter Yvette Clarke, who was later elected to Congress representing the 11th Congressional District. State assemblyman Nick Perry (D-58th District), first elected in 1992 is also from Brooklyn. But perhaps the most famous “native” son is Colin Powell, who, in 2001 was appointed as secretary of state in George W. Bush’s first administration. In addition to the aforementioned group, we can add the names of David Patterson, governor of New York State; Anthony G. Brown, lieutenant governor of Maryland, and governor Patterson’s father, Basil Patterson, to the list of Jamaican Americans active in American politics.
Military Throughout the years, Jamaica and the United States have had mutually beneficial military relationships. During World War II the United States had two military bases in Jamaica. One was at Vernon Field, and the other on Goat Island. One of the tasks of the men stationed there was to locate and capture German submarines that were in the Caribbean trying to intercept U.S. naval ships. The Jamaica military, or Defense Force, has three branches: ground forces, coast guard, and air wing. In particular, the country’s Coast Guard works closely with U.S. facilities in Miami and Guantanamo Bay on humanitarian and counter-narcotics issues. Presently, 0.5 percent of the population 16 years and older are in the armed forces. Records indicate Jamaicans joined the U.S. Armed Forces beginning in World War I and continuing during World War II. For example, Jamaicans, both in America and on the island, were recruited and saw service in Europe, while some were stationed at U.S. bases in the region. One Jamaican American who served was Major Vincent Terrelonge, who flew with the famed Tuskegee Airmen and in 2007 was awarded a Congressional Medal of Honor. Since then, Jamaican Americans have continued to distinguish themselves in many different divisions of the armed forces. As an example, during the Gulf War, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell (born in New York City in 1937), was America’s most eminent second-generation Jamaican American. Powell not only served his country with distinction, but became a presence on the national and international stage as secretary of state during the second Bush administration. There was an almost universal lack of support from Caribbean countries for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. However, although the exact numbers are not known, many Caribbean nationals including Jamaican Americans continue to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. Tragically, the records show that Jamaican Americans from every state in the Union, whether it is California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, or New York, have paid the ultimate price in their defense of the United States.
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Political Associations and Organizations The National Association of Jamaican and Supportive Organizations, Inc. (NAJASO) is an umbrella organization that links the various organizations and funds that exist to help Jamaican nationals and Jamaican Americans. These include the Children of Jamaica Outreach, St. Vincent Benefit and Education Fund, Jamaican Nurses Association, Jamaican Policemen’s School Alumni Association of New York, Jamaica Awareness Association of California, and Atlanta Jamaican Association Inc. Several Jamaican American clubs and organizations comprise alumni associations, which are prominent vehicles developed to create networks among graduates of various Jamaican high schools and colleges (Vickerman 2007). Some, like the Cornwall College Alumni Association of South Florida Inc., state on their Web sites that the one focus of the group is raising funds for the high school in Montego Bay. The earliest record of Jamaican American involvement in political issues in the United States dates back to 1827, when Jamaican-born John B. Russwurm cofounded and co-edited the first black newspaper in America, Freedom’s Journal. According to Foner (1969), Russwurm’s vocal political views and antislavery criticism forced him to leave the paper under pressure from contributors and his own colleagues. After slavery was abolished in the British West Indies, a number of Jamaicans worked for the abolition of American slavery in collaboration with their black counterparts in the United States, and later they supported the Back to Africa movement. One of the chief proponents of this view was Marcus Garvey, who spurred blacks in Harlem into political action using self-confidence and black pride. In 1918 he established the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), with the aim of cementing bonds of racial consciousness between American and Caribbean blacks. Garvey was deported from the United States in the late 1920s, and back in Jamaica he established the People’s Political Party (PPP), which advocated for a number of social and labor reforms for the Jamaican society. Another fighter for black rights in both the American and Jamaican society was W. A. Domingo, a Jamaican-born Harlem Renaissance figure and writer. His support for black rights in Jamaica was championed by means of the Jamaican Progressive League, which eventually morphed into the PNP, a political party led by Norman Manley that played a significant role in Jamaican social change after 1938. It is believed that Domingo’s arrest—he was an American citizen—had international repercussions and may have spurred Britain into allowing adult suffrage in Jamaica. History shows that in the 1930s there was a confluence of political forces in the Caribbean and the United States working for the betterment of the black populations in both arenas. This resulted in increased political activity, with Caribbean immigrants joining African Americans in gravitating to, and playing an important role in, the Democratic Party. Vickerman (2007) believes that this affinity is because Jamaican Americans tend to see the Democrats as more representative of their interest than the Republicans.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1227
Return Immigration Thomas-Hope (1986) believes that over the past century and a half migration has become deeply engrained in the consciousness of people in the Caribbean. Caribbean immigration has always had an essentially transnational nature, usually characterized by an ideology of return. Return migration to Jamaica is closely associated with the persistence of the transnational household (Thomas-Hope 2003). The transnational household is a prominent feature of immigration from the Caribbean, particularly countries where there is stable governance. Moreover, the pattern of return migration is established and determined by each or all of the following: the manner and purpose of immigration, whether the immigration involves an individual or a family, and the immigrant’s obligations for the financial well-being of those remaining in the home country. It is expected that different types of return migrants will make different contributions to Jamaica’s development. However, the most significant development potential of return lies in the social, political, and economic conditions in Jamaica itself. Thomas-Hope (2003) argues that if confidence levels are high for the country’s future, there will be little difficulty in attracting persons to return, and financial transfers and investments will increase. Quite often the returnees find themselves as cultural outsiders in the very culture they identified with while abroad and sought to return to. But this notion of return must be supported by the local government, and Jamaica has done its share to make this a possibility. For example, the government established the Jamaicans Overseas Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade in Kingston to deal with matters of interest to the overseas Jamaican, in particular returning residents. The Jamaican government has instituted initiatives for overseas Jamaicans to invest in their country. One of these initiatives is improved passport services. Moreover, Thomas-Hope (2003) recounted that there were 16 organizations of returned residents then in existence that assisted in resettlement in Jamaica. In the early 1990s the government began a program to attract Jamaicans with skills that were deemed needed for the development of the country. Coincidentally, these skills mirrored those that left the country as a result of Manley’s aborted attempt to make Jamaica into a democratic socialist government. Unfortunately, not all return migration is voluntary. In recent years, the U.S. government has adopted a policy of deporting violent Jamaican criminals who are seen as a serious menace to national security. In fact, the INS rates Jamaica as fifth for aliens deported, and between 1994 and 1998, 8,626 deportees arrived back in Jamaica from the United States. However, these criminal returnees are seen as contributing to the burgeoning crime statistics in Jamaica. Deportees are held in the lowest possible esteem in Jamaica. For example, some have criminal records and convictions, but the greatest knock against them is that they blew an opportunity so many others wanted—to make it overseas. In a New York Times article
1228 | Jamaican Immigrants
published in 2007, Marc Lacey stated that deportees are usually met by a reception line made up of politicians and police officers who blame them “for the island’s spiraling crime, and neighbors and even relatives turning their backs on them.” For example, Peter David Phillips, the country’s security minister, voiced that “In an ideal world, I wouldn’t accept any deportees . . . but I acknowledge our obligations under international law.” Felicia Persuad presented data showing that almost 10 thousand immigrants, both legal and undocumented, were deported to the Caribbean in fiscal year 2002, up from over 7,000 in 2001 (www.caribvoice.org. Jamaica was once again the top destination for the deportees, with 2,122 arriving; this was up by five percent from the previous year. The island was also again among the top countries globally to receive deportees.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity The more an individual identifies with his or her own ethnic group, the lower the likelihood of this individual having a favorable attitude toward groups that are of different ethnic identities (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Jamaicans are not known for having unfavorable attitudes toward other groups; what they are known for is their belief in their group. As such, immigrants form stronger bonds with others of like minds and cultures in order to create the feelings of home while away from home. More broadly, ethnic identity and psychological well-being influence individual behavior, which in turn influences the way in which the individual conducts his or her life within society. Jamaican Americans, of all Caribbean immigrants, are most likely to retain their Jamaican ethnic identity. Moreover, when both parents have a Jamaican ethnic identity, their offspring are more likely to retain their ethnic identity. For some, ethnic identification depends on who is asking. If the questioner is a non-New Yorker, then ethnicity is black. If from New York, then they identify as West Indians. But if the questioner is a West Indian, then identification is Jamaican. Nonetheless, the experiences of many of these second-generation Jamaican Americans with the racialized American society teaches them they are “unmeltable” (Butterfield 2004). In a sample of second-generation West Indian immigrants living in New York City, Waters (1994), found those West Indians who identified as West Indians came from middle-class backgrounds. But others (e.g., Vickerman 1999) have found that this identification is not restricted to the middle class but operates to mediate acculturative stress across a number of socioeconomic groups. Contrary to most researchers, Deaux et al. (2007), argue that identifying as a West Indian, or Jamaican, is not so much a distancing from African Americans as
The Second and Later Generations | 1229
it is a reification of who they are. There is no directly available information to support this view, but it seems that most second-generation immigrants identify as, and with, Jamaican, culture. For example, they are more likely to participate in the Labor Day parade in Brooklyn, where they celebrate their Jamaican culture, than participate in July Fourth activities, in celebration of their American citizenship.
Youth Profile A Young Single Mother Earns a Master’s Degree and Begins Teaching Natalie Carter grew up in Jamaica. As the country was descending into political violence she decided to leave the island. However, as a young adult she knew she was leaving things she was familiar with to go to an uncertain situation. Natalie came to New York, where she had one known relative, and decided to make a new life. But things would not be easy. Because she was an undocumented alien there were limited choices over things like jobs and housing. For example, she was forced into dead-end jobs, some that required her to be on her feet 12 hours a day. Things would get worse for Natalie, when she found herself pregnant. This situation was worsened, because she was not only undocumented but unwed, and her living situation changed, because she had moved out of the home of her relative, with whom she had been living. Moreover, her newborn child was diagnosed with a chronic illness. Natalie struggled to make sense of her situation, but things were not helped when she unexpectedly found herself pregnant with her second child. By this time Natalie had married the father of her children, but that relationship too was fated to end, and Natalie and her children had to find alternative living arrangements; she turned to social assistance, and she and her kids were placed in a homeless shelter. After a short time in the shelter Natalie was able to establish her own household. Her life conditions did not deter Natalie from pursuing her goals of going to school and making a better life for her children and herself. She got her immigration status regularized and started school. Initially, Natalie planned only to get an associates degree. But she found significant support from her college professors and the university community. This motivated her to continue her studies. She excelled and earned her bachelors degree, with the highest academic honors. Natalie was also awarded substantial awards and scholarships, one of which she applied to earning one of the two masters degree, which she is currently completing. Natalie is also a teacher with New York City’s Department of Education, where she specializes in working with children with special education needs.
1230 | Jamaican Immigrants
Many theorists have written about the economic, social, and educational outcome of the second and later generation of immigrants to the United States. They have asserted that the outcome for these later generations will not be as positive as for their parents and grandparents. There are no readily available data on the economic, social, and educational outcomes of the second and later generations of Jamaican immigrants to the United States. However, if we rely on the ACS data, which show that Jamaican Americans underperform the general population on a number of income and employment categories, then we can theorize that the outcomes of the second generation are also below the general population. Part of this is related to human and cultural capital, and part is in response to society’s changing economic fortunes. This prediction is also predicated on the belief, and findings, that suggest that as these later generations take on more of the stereotypes of the native black Americans, their opportunities will be impeded. This acculturation/assimilation to the native black American culture may result in increased incarceration rates. For example, results from the third phase of the Children of Immigrants’ Longitudinal Study (CILS) indicate the incarceration rates among Jamaican and other West Indian male youths to be 20 percent, but zero among Chinese males and 3 percent among middle-class Cubans. Nationwide the incarceration rate of American males 18–40 is approximately 27 percent. Not coincidentally, research has indicated that Jamaican American adolescents living in New York City report significantly higher levels of psychological distress than African Americans living in New York City and Jamaicans living in Jamaica (Rosenthal and Wilson 2006). Further Massey et al. (2007) found that Caribbean-area immigrants, particularly Jamaicans, are overrepresented at selected colleges and universities; but they continue to underperform relative to whites on SATs (1250 vs. 1361) although they outperform African Americans. Moreover, although these students had parents who are doctors, lawyers, and other professionals, and the students mostly went to private schools, the researchers reported that “holding these entire background variables constant, however, does not eliminate the racial gap in grade performance. Both black immigrants and black natives earn significantly lower grade points (by 0.11) than whites” (Massey et al 2007, 263). Some, or all, of the factors listed in the following sections may not apply to the Caribbean sample in Massey and colleagues’ study. But some of the common factors for the poor academic outcomes are structural—poor educational facilities; situational—nonexistent or little parental support with homework; or social—stereotype of academic deficiency or oppositional learning. Finally, there is the economic issue—as the present situation worsens the available funds for scholarships, grants, and the like have declined. But research with a sample of Jamaican students, at a historically black university, indicates that those students who maintained their ethnic identity as Jamaicans were more likely to do well than those who did not (Buddington 2000).
Issues in Relations between the U.S. and Jamaica | 1231
Issues in Relations between the U.S. and Jamaica Jamaica and the United States have never confronted each other militarily. Moreover, Jamaica has not experienced a direct insertion of American troops, as have other countries in the region. Nevertheless, there have been points of tension when, for example, in 1976 the American government worked actively to destabilize the Jamaican government led by Michael Manley. As Smith (1991) notes, the U.S. government supported the JLP, campaigning against Manley, and both increased the number of CIA personnel, while at the same time discouraging tourism to Jamaica, as well as discouraging the influx of new American capital. Today, American tourists frequent the island in large numbers, thus adding to the economy. By 1986, Jamaica was identified as one of the top four Caribbean basin territories that supplied 90 percent of all marijuana imported into the United States. In 2002 Jamaica was identified by the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) as a major transit point for cocaine entering the United States from South America. Although drugs continue to be a problem in crimes in Jamaica, guns have now been frequently noted as playing significant roles in homicides and robberies. According to Jones (2002), Jamaican customs have seized many shipments coming into Jamaica, and all but one was loaded in the United States. Although these illegal guns coming into Jamaica posed a problem, the G. W. Bush administration opposed a U.N. draft resolution on the international sale of small arms, arguing it might infringe on the rights of legitimate owners. Some have argued that this increase in drugs, guns, and crimes was related to the effort to counteract the drug trade in Colombia—it has now been displaced to Jamaica (Jones 2002). Thus, the relative success the U.S. government has had in cracking down on the drug business in Colombia has resulted in a displacement of costs, to Jamaica, in increased crimefighting and thus a concomitant reduction in funds available for social programs. More recently, the increased deportation of Jamaicans convicted of crime in the United States has added strain to the relationship. Jamaicans of all political stripes, and economic classes, see this as America offloading its problems on Jamaica, particularly at a time when the country can least afford it. An average of 1,200 convicts per year were deported from the United States to Jamaica from 1993 to 2004. “For Jamaica the influx is deeply unwelcome and a cause of the island’s crime boom, the government claims. ‘There is a strong sustained relationship between the deportation of violent criminal offenders and increases in violent crimes,’ said a recent national security ministry report. Its data suggests that once back in Jamaica, most of the deportees reoffend, helping to drive the number of murders from 542 in 1990 to 1,674 in 2005, one of the world’s highest per capita rates” (Carroll 2007, 21). Therefore, Jamaica’s politicians frequently press deporting countries, like the United States, to slow the flow. Usually, the politicians argue that the deportees will soon be back in the countries that deported them, but even more hardened in
1232 | Jamaican Immigrants
lives of crime. Moreover, they add, if the deportees stay in Jamaica, many will operate international criminal rings that reach back to the deporting countries. One thing that unites both parties in opposition to the U.S. government policy is that both oppose the unequal allocation of costs, “It seems to me unfair to have to live with the failures of another society,” argued Bruce Golding, leader of the opposition, who argued that many of the deportees had picked up their criminal ways in the United States. But according to New York Times writer Marc Lacey (2007), the United States appears largely unmoved by pleas to keep the ex-convicts in America. Instead, the United States relies on a study commissioned by its embassy in Kingston in 2005, and conducted by Bernard Headley, a criminologist at the University of the West Indies. Lacey reported that Headley’s findings cast doubt on “the notion that deportees were largely responsible for Jamaica’s crime woes or that most of them were young innocents when they arrived in the United States.” The relationship between the two countries was strained further when Jamaica, despite intense pressure, refused to support the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. Further, in 2004 the United States also warned Jamaica against providing residence to overthrown Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
Forecasts for the 21st Century There are a number of issues related to Jamaican Americans that will demand the attention of researchers, demographers, and policy analysts. Going into the 21st century, the challenge for Jamaican Americans, both first and later generations, is the need to reconceptualize their place in, and contributions to, host and native countries. For example, with globalization, the aspect of diaspora and cultural boundaries needs to be renegotiated. The idea of the transnational immigrant, which has always been true for West Indians, forces a reevaluation, especially with cell phones, Internet, and expanded global travel and commerce. At the national level, a stronger, more stable Jamaican economy would reduce the strong trend to immigration and increase the rate of return migration. However, the economy, so heavily dependent on tourism and remittances, will face increasing problems as the global economy continues to struggle. Some of this stability will be predicated on the reduction in crime rates, unemployment, which exacerbates the crime problem, and underemployment.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 177 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status 1910–1919
1920–1929
1930–1939
1940–1949
1950–1959
1960–1969
1970–1979
1980–1989
1990–1999
Barbados
2000–2007 7,565*
Cuba
12,769
10,641
25,976
73,221
202,030
256,497
132,552
159,037
185,574
1,026
4,802
10,219
83,552
139,249
221,552
359,818
210,310
Guyana
131
596
1,131
4,546
38,278
85,886
74,407
57,745
Haiti
156
853
3,787
28,992
55,166
121,406
177,446
154,311
7,397
62,218
130,226
193,874
177,143
166,395
6,229
14,593
21,037
50,443
127,712
120,725
131,243
91,181
Dominican Republic
Jamaica Other Caribbean Trinidad and Tobago
120,860
70,713
59,868*
*Figures for Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago are for period 1998–2007 and are based by region and country of Birth. All other data is based on region and country of last residence. Source: 2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Office of Immigration Statistics (2008).
Table 178 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009
1234
Region and country of birth Total Jamaica
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
15,949
15,322
14,835
13,347
14,430
18,345
24,976
19,375
18,477
21,783
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3
Table 179 Nonimmigrant admissions by country of citizenship
1235
Country
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Barbados
58,521
58,229
55,929
51,918
45,298
47,812
55,198
58,826
60,494
62,107
Guyana
24,016
25,626
24,787
25,524
28,096
27,846
26,680
27,734
25,331
25,465
Haiti
70,290
85,517
86,305
83,162
81,566
78,816
82,101
85,458
72,518
101,276
Jamaica
241,205
261,457
275,051
277,985
248,092
221,075
223,898
222,945
269,980
293,421
Trinidad and Tobago
111,475
124,908
145,031
148,174
135,180
134,431
149,478
151,940
159,358
171,180
Source: 2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 180 Demographic of selected population groups as of 2000
1236
Country U.S.
281,421,906
35
182,211,639
146,496,014
44,462,605
31,107,889
41,994
50,046
21,587
26
33,899,812
54,509
41
41,346
32,974
9530
37302
43,189
51,413
24,454
40
5,771
Jamaica
736,513
33
465,703
349,757
94625
489,782
40,276
44,668
19,111
36
97,187
Trinidad and Tobago
164,738
35
164,738
108,012
22,585
122,886
41,077
46,328
20,075
40
20,834
Guyana
162,425
35
109,165
78,973
20,393
129,110
47,323
51,025
19,289
43
17,398
Haiti
548,199
30
311,417
198,719
47,981
361,731
35,459
36,503
13,210
35
109,967
34,658,190
30
19,858,095
14,350,401
2,831,269
2,099,865
29,423
33,255
14,437
29
8,146,146,
Barbados
African American
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Summary File 4 (SF 4)
High School Bachelor’s Graduate or Degree or Higher Higher
Foreign Born
Median Household Income
Median family income
Per Capita Median Individuals below Travel Income Time to Poverty (1999 Level Work Dollars)
Population Total 25 Years Population Median Age and Over
Table 181 Demographic of selected population groups as of 2007
1237
Population High School Bachelor’s 25 Years Graduate or Degree or and Over Higher Higher
Median Naturalized Household U.S. Citizen Income
Country
Total Population
Median Age
U.S.
298,757,310
36.4
195,646,383
164,342,962
52,824,523
37,234,785
16,628,659
50,007
60,374
26,178
25.1
13.3%
54,355
42.3
39,165
34,113
9,556
33,445
22,622
53,329
65,577
26,698
37.9
9.9%
Jamaica
895,773
33.5
560,951
458,297
127,336
552,348
314,155
47,559
54,809
22,170
33.6
13.5%
Trinidad
173,417
34.7
114,273
98,732
27,654
117,100
62,510
48,104
54,630
23,495
38.3
12.5%
Guyana
202,759
34.9
131,832
104,765
27,026
145,281
92,814
52,991
38,736
21,775
42.2
10.6%
Haiti
757,209
28.7
424,647
321,458
79,409
458,952
208,552
42,896
45,359
16,131
32.6
17.6%
36,969,083
31.3
21,846,370
17,324,171
3,692,037
2,880,302
1,342,449
33,407
39,464
17,123
27.5
25.3%
Barbados
African American
Source: 2007 American Community Survey. U.S. Census Bureau
Foreign Born
Mean Per Capita Travel Individuals below Median Income Time Poverty to (1999 Family Level Income Dollars) Work
Table 182 Major settlement sites of Jamaicans State
2000
2007
New York
275,744
300,710
Florida
173,785
232,407
New Jersey
46,272
55,320
Georgia
23,191
42,760
Connecticut
33,523
40,955
Maryland
26,680
31,462
Pennsylvania
17,846
24,729
California
24,309
24,194
Massachusetts
18,356
21,674
Source: Excerpted from U.S. Census Bureau 2000 Census and 2007 American Community Survey
Table 183 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009: leading states of residence. Region/ Country: Jamaica
Total Arizona California Colorado
Total
Male
Female
21,783
9,887
11,896
77
48
29
324
159
165
59
27
32
Connecticut
1,031
488
543
Florida
6,655
2,971
3,684
Georgia
973
462
511
Illinois
260
129
131
Maryland
693
323
370
Massachusetts
587
285
302
Michigan
116
55
61
Minnesota
40
21
19
New Jersey
1,309
601
708
New York
7,104
3,125
3,979
North Carolina
202
88
114
Ohio
114
60
54
Pennsylvania
573
249
324
Texas
344
159
185
Virginia
289
127
162
Washington Other
44
21
23
989
489
500
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix III: Notable Jamaican Americans | 1239 Table 184 Major metropolitan settlement sites of Jamaicans Metropolitan Area
2007
New York, Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
324,685
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL
156,105
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA
37,802
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
25,653
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL
26,010
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
24,116
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT
22,666
Source: Excerpted from U.S. Census Bureau 2007 American Community Survey.
Appendix III: Notable Jamaican Americans Jamaican Americans number less than one percent of the total United States population, but they have contributed, and continue to contribute, significantly to a broad cross-section of the social, cultural, and political spheres, to name a few of the contact areas. Following are a few of the notable Jamaican Americans. Maurice Ashley represents the world of chess and is the world’s first, and, as of 2009, the only black chess grandmaster. He was born in St. Andrew, Jamaica, and graduated from City College of the City University of New York with a BA in creative writing. Patrick Christopher Chung (of Jamaican Chinese descent), was born in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1987. He attended Rancho Cucamango High School in California, before enrolling at the University of Oregon. He currently plays for the NFL New England Patriots. Charles “Chili” Davis, born in Kingston, Jamaica, is a former Major League baseball player, and in a 19-year career played for the San Francisco Giants, California Angles, Minnesota Twins, Kansas City Royals, and New York Yankees. During his career he won three World Series rings, one with the Minnesota twins, and two (1998–1998) with the New York Yankees. Patrick Ewing is one of the most notable athletes of Jamaican heritage. A retired Hall of Fame basketball player, he was born in Kingston, Jamaica, and settled in Cambridge, Massachusetts, after immigrating with his family. He played college basketball at Georgetown University, professionally for the New York Knicks (15 years), and at the end of his career for the Seattle Supersonics and the Orlando Magic. Dwight Sean Jones is another former athlete who was born in Kingston, Jamaica, and played 12 years as a defensive lineman in the National Football League
1240 | Jamaican Immigrants
(NFL). During his career he played for the Los Angeles Raiders (1984–1987), Houston Oilers (1988–1993), and Green Bay Packers (1994–1996). Inger Miller, born in California but whose father Lennox Miller was an Olympic runner for Jamaica, has competed internationally for the United States. She has won a gold medal in the Summer Olympics in Atlanta, and two gold and two silver medals at World Championships. Sanya Richards, U.S. track and field star, was born in Trelawny, Jamaica, and moved to the United States when she was 12. At the international level, Sanya has won two Olympic gold medals, one at the Summer Olympics in Athens in 2004 and the other at Beijing in 2008. She has also won four gold medals in World Championships competition, the most recent in Berlin in 2009. Madge Sinclair was born in Kingston, Jamaica in 1938. She was a teacher in Jamaica until 1968, when she came to New York to pursue a career in acting. While in the United States, she starred in a number of roles, some of which led to Emmy nominations, such as Belle in the miniseries Roots, and an Emmy for Best Supporting Actress for Gabriel’s Fire. Sinclair died in 1995 from leukemia, and her ashes are interned in Jamaica. Devon White, a former Major League Baseball outfielder, was born in Kingston, Jamaica. During his 16-year career, White, who played on six teams, won three World Series rings and seven Gold Gloves. His first two rings, in 1992 and 1993, were won with the Toronto Blue Jays, where he also won five Gold Gloves; his final World Series ring was in 1997 with the Florida Marlins. White is currently an outfield coordinator with the Washington Nationals.
Glossary Duppy: A Jamaican Patois word of West African origin meaning ghost or spirit. Jon Crow (John Crow): The common Jamaican vulture, once widely known as carrion crow or turkey vulture. Kumina: A cultural form indigenous to Jamaica. It is a religion, music, and dance practiced by in large part Jamaicans who reside in the eastern parish on St. Thomas. Mannish water: A soup made from goat tripe (intestine). Maroons: Escaped ex-slaves who settled in the mountains of Jamaica. Myalism: A dynamic present-world-oriented tradition that rejects negative and tragic life experiences, blaming them on witchcraft and sorcery. It is a classic African Caribbean mode of religious expression.
References | 1241
Nine nights: A funerary tradition; an extended wake that lasts for several days, with roots in African tradition. Siddung: Sit down. Swallow migrants: Temporary workers imported to the United States to harvest crops on an annual basis.
References Ambursley, Fitzroy. 1983. “Jamaica from Michael Manley to Edward Seaga.” In Crisis in the Caribbean, edited by Fitzroy Ambursley and Robin Cohen. New York: Monthly Review Book: 72–104. Arscott-Mills, S. 2001. “Intimate Partner Violence in Jamaica: A Descriptive Study of Women Who Access the Services of the Women’s Crisis Centre in Kingston.” Violence Against Women 7: 1284–1302. Buddington. S. A. 2000. “Acculturation, Psychological Adjustment (Stress, Depression, Self-esteem) and the Academic Achievement of Jamaican Immigrant Students.” International Social Work 45(4): 447–64. Burnard, T. G. 2001. “ ‘Prodigious Riches’: The Wealth of Jamaica before the American Revolution.” The Economic History Review 54(3): 506–24. Butterfield, Sherri-Ann. 2004. “Being Racialized Ethnics: Second Generation West Indian Immigrants in New York City.” Research in Urban Sociology Series 7: 107–36. Carroll, Rory. 2007. “Home without Hope: The Deportees Blamed for a Tropical Crimewave.” The Guardian, April 2, 21. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2010. The World Factbook. [Online article retrieved 4/14/10.] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html. Deaux, K., N. Bikmen, A. Gilkes, A. Ventuneac, Y. Joseph, Y. A. Payne, and C. M. Steele. 2007. “Becoming American: Stereotype Threat Effects in Afro-Caribbean Immigrant Groups.” Social Psychology Quarterly 70(4): 384–404. Foner, N. 2000. From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s Two Great Waves of Immigration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Foner, Nancy. 1987. New Immigrants in New York. New York: Columbia University Press. Foner, Philip. S. 1969. “John Brown Russwurm: A Document.” The Journal of Negro History 54: 393–97. Fox, Diana J. 1999. “Masculinity and Fatherhood Reexamined: An Ethnographic Account of the Contradictions of Manhood in a Rural Jamaican Town.” Men and Masculinities 2: 66–80. Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. 1976. “Black London.” The Antioch Review 34(3): 300–17. Henry, Frances. 1994. The Caribbean Diaspora in Toronto: Learning to Live with Racism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
1242 | Jamaican Immigrants Higman, B. W. 1996. “Economic and Social Development of the British West Indies, from Settlement to ca. 1850.” In The Cambridge Economic History of the United States Vol. 1: The Colonial Era. Cambridge Histories Online. [Online article retrieved 4/14/10.] http:// histories.cambridge.org.proxy.wexler. Horst, Heather. A. 2004. “A Pilgrimage Home: Tombs, Burial and Belonging in Jamaica.” Journal of Material Culture 9(1): 11–26. Jackson, M., S. Walker, T. Forrester, J. Cruickshank, and R. Wilks. 2003. “Social and Dietary Determinants of Body Mass Index of Adult Jamaicans of African Origin.” European Journal of Clinical Nutrition 57: 621–27. Jones, Marilyn J. 2002. “Policy Paradox: Implications of U.S. Drug Control Policy for Jamaica.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 582: 117. [Online article retrieved 7/1/09.] http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/ abstract/582/1/117. Kasinitz, Philip. 1992. Caribbean New York: Black Immigrants and the Politics of Race. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lacey, M. 2007. “No Paradise for Criminals Deported to Jamaica.” New York Times, March 21. [Online article retrieved 2/23/10.] http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/ world/americas/21kingston.html. LeVine, E. A. 1973. “A Theory of Migration.” In Migration, edited by J. A. Jackson. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lewinson, Edwin. 1974. Black Politics in New York. New York: Twayne Publishing. Martinez, R., and Matthew T. Lee. 2000. “Comparing the Context of Immigrant Homicides in Miami: Haitians, Jamaicans and Mariels.” International Migration Review 34(3): 794–812. Massey, D. S., M. Mooney, K. C. Torres, and C. Z. Charles. 2007. “Black Immigrants and Black Natives Attending Selective Colleges and Universities in the United States.” American Journal of Education 113: 243–71. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2008. 2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, DC: Office of Immigration Statistics. Persaud, Felicia. 2009. “Jamaica Again Tops U.S. Deportation List.” June 26. [Online article retrieved 11/21/09.] http://www.caribvoice.org/Immigration/Jamaicatops. html. Prince, R. 1982. “Abstracts and Reviews: 7 Caribbean: Modernization and The Pentecostal Movement in Jamaica.” Transcultural Psychiatry, 19: 126–30 Robotham, D. 2000. “Blackening the Jamaican Nation: The Travails of a Black Bourgeoisie in a Globalized World.” Identities 7(1): 1–27. Rosenthal, B., and C. Wilson. 2006. “Adolescents’ Psychological Response to the Experience of Community Interpersonal Violence: A Cross-National and Cross-Cultural Comparison.” Adolescence 41(163): 417–33. Singer, A., D. Vitielo, M. Katz, and D. Park. 2008. “Recent Immigration to Philadelphia: Regional Change in a Re-Emerging Gateway.” Brookings Metropolitan
References | 1243 Program at Brookings. [Online article retrieved 7/15/09.] www.brookings.edu/ . . . / reports/2008/ . . . /1113_immigration_singer.pdf. Smith, M. G. 1991. Pluralism, Politics, and Ideology in the Creole Caribbean. Vera Rubin Caribbean Series No. 1. New York: Research Institute for the Study of Man. Snow, Mary, and Ashley Frantz. 2008. “Woman Who Died on Hospital Floor Called ‘Beautiful Person.’ ” CNN. [Online article retrieved 9/15/09.] http://www.cnn.com/2008/ US/07/03/hospital.woman.death/index.html. Tajfel, H., and J. C. Turner. 1986. “The Social Identity Theory of Inter-group Behavior.” In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 2nd ed., edited by S. Worchel and L. W. Austin, pp. 7–24. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Tartakovsky, E., and S. Schwartz. 2001. “Motivation for Emigration, Values, Well-being, and Identification among Young Russian Jews.” International Journal of Psychology 36(2): 88–99. Thomas, Deborah A. 2007. “Blackness across Borders: Jamaican Diaspora and New Politics of Citizenship.” Identities 14: 111–33. Thomas-Hope, Elizabeth. 1986. “Trends and Patterns of Migration to and from Caribbean Countries.” [Online article retrieved 8/12/09.] www.cepal.org/celade/proyectos/migra cion/ ThomasHope.doc. Thomas-Hope, Elizabeth. 2003. “Transnational Livelihoods and Identities in Return Migration to the Caribbean: The Case of Skilled Returnees to Jamaica.” In Work and Migration: Lives and Livelihoods in a Globalizing World, edited by Nina Syberg Sorenson and Karen Fog Olwig, 187–201. New York: Routledge. Tortello, Rebecca. 2004. “Pieces of the Past: Old-time Jamaican Weddings.” Jamaica Gleaner. [Online article retrieved 1/10/10.] http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/pages/ history/story0064.html. U.S. Census Bureau. 2005–2007. “American Community Survey.” http://www.census.gov/ acs/www/. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2010. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2007. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept of Homeland Security. Vickerman, M. 1999. Crosscurrents: West Indian Immigrants and Race. New York: Oxford University Press. Vickerman, Milton. 2007. “Jamaica.” In The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration since 1965, edited by Mary C. Waters, Reed Ueda, with Helen B. Marrow, 479–90. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Waters, M. C. 1994. “Racial Identities of Second-Generation Black Immigrants in New York City.” International Migration Review; Special Issue: The New Second Generation 28(4): 795–820. Waters, M. C. 1999. Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Watkins-Owens, Irma. 1996. Blood Relations: Caribbean Immigrants and the Harlem Community 1900–1930. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
1244 | Jamaican Immigrants Workman, Gillian. 1974. “Thomas Carlyle and the Governor Eyre Controversy: An Account with Some New Material.” Victorian Studies 18(1): 77–102. Zahedieh, N. 1986. “The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655–1692.” The William and Mary Quarterly 43(4): 570–93. Zeidenfelt, Alex. 1952. “Political and Constitutional Developments in Jamaica.” The Journal of Politics 14(3): 512–40.
Further Reading Arscott-Mills, S. 2001. “Intimate Partner Violence in Jamaica: A Descriptive Study of Women Who Access the Services of the Women’s Crisis Centre in Kingston.” Violence against Women 7, 1284–1302. The author describes the facts on women who access the services of the Women’s Crisis Centre in Kingston, Jamaica, who were victims of domestic violence. Buddington. S. A. 2000. “Acculturation, Psychological Adjustment (Stress, Depression, Self-Esteem) and the Academic Achievement of Jamaican Immigrant Students.” International Social Work 45 (4): 447–64. The author’s study was designed to develop a conceptual framework concerning the acculturation and the impact on the mental health functioning of Jamaican immigrants. Using 150 Jamaican students enrolled at Howard University, Buddington found that cultural identity and ethnic loyalty appear to influence students’ academic performance and level of stress, but not their levels of depression nor their self-esteem. Fox, Diana J. 1999. “Masculinity and Fatherhood Reexamined: An Ethnographic Account of the Contradictions of Manhood in a Rural Jamaican Town.” Men and Masculinities 2: 66–80. The author discusses the differences in the conceptualization of fatherhood in a rural Jamaican context. The author felt this was necessary because of the stereotypical view of the female-headed households and the absent father prevalent in stories labeling Caribbean men as irresponsible fathers. The case study indicated that fatherhood is a much contested variable with an emerging perspective of nurturing fathers. Horst, Heather. A. 2004. “A Pilgrimage Home: Tombs, Burial and Belonging in Jamaica.” Journal of Material Culture 9(1): 11–26. In this article the author explored how the painted, polished, or embellished cement structures mediate the relationship between people and land, a primary locus of identity in the Caribbean. The data was collected as part of her field work when the author immersed herself in the process of preparing for the entombment of the deceased individual. Jones, Marilyn. 2002. “Policy Paradox: Implications of U.S. Drug Control Policy for Jamaica.”The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 582: 117–34. Jones takes a look at the policy implications for Jamaica of the belief that ethnics and foreigners are primarily responsible for America’s drug problems. Deportation has emerged as the solution to the problem, which results in individuals who were convicted of drug
Further Reading | 1245 crimes being deported to drug producing, and/or transit nations. The author takes a look at the crime and other social problems in Jamaica, in particular as it pertains to drugs, and records an increase in the volume of cocaine, which is nonnative to Jamaica. She suggests this may be the result of the increased presence of Colombians, many of whom are involved in cartel activity, in Jamaica. Jones suggests that the policy of the United States, of targeting drugs in Colombia, has had significant implications for other nations in the Caribbean region, including Jamaica. Massey, D. S., M. Mooney, K. C. Torres, and C. Z. Charles. 2007. “Black Immigrants and Black Natives Attending Selective Colleges and Universities in the United States.” American Journal of Education 113: 243–71. The four authors used data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Freshmen (NLSF) to study black immigrants and natives attending selected colleges and universities in the United States. The impetus of the study was an attempt to satisfy the validity of the claims that immigrant blacks are provided with more benefits than native-born Africandescent individuals, which is believed to be contrary to the spirit of affirmative action. The authors described the social origins of the two populations of students of African ancestry and used statistical models to explore the determinants of academic success and whether this functions differently for African Americans, depending on their place of birth. The results indicate few differences in the social origins of black students from immigrant and native backgrounds. The authors conclude that immigrant origins per se are not favored in the admissions process, but children from immigrant families exhibit traits and characteristics valued by admissions committees. Robotham, D. 2000. “Blackening the Jamaican Nation: The travails of a Black Bourgeoisie in a Globalized World.” Identities 7(1): 1–27. Robotham’s study discusses the attempt of a black professional stratum in Jamaica to transform itself into a bourgeoisie. It outlines the situation in Jamaica, where a black political elite controls power, but a white or brown minority controls the economy. The paper shows how that the attempt by a black elite to obtain economic power was associated with a narrative of black nationalism. Thomas, Deborah. A. 2007. “Blackness across Borders: Jamaican Diaspora and New Politics of Citizenship.” Identities 14: 111–33. The author examines the relative understanding of “blackness” across the diaspora, particularly in Jamaica and America. She explores where Jamaica stands in relation to (black) America, and how this standing might be interpreted differently by different generations of Jamaicans. The author uses the discussion swirling around the Jamaican celebration of Black History Month to investigate the roles of transnational migration and media technologies in defining situations in which urban popular expressions of blackness have become paramount. In particular Thomas explores how working-class Jamaicans negotiate African American dominance in defining the meaning of blackness. In the end Thomas argues that Jamaicans use “America” in part to mitigate the effects of neocolonialist global political economy.
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Japanese Immigrants by Eiichiro Azuma
Introduction Japanese Americans have been part of the multicultural American experience since the end of the 1860s. Their long history is characterized by a quest for inclusion in the face of racial exclusion, including the mass incarceration of 120,000 individuals during World War II. Divided into four distinctive phases of immigration, Japanese American history is characterized by (1) the coming of mostly workingclass males from the mid-1880s to 1908; (2) the formation of immigrant families as a result of female-centered migration between 1908 and 1924; (3) the influx of wives of U.S. soldiers after 1947; and (4) the entry of family immigrants, including skilled workers and professionals, following the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act. A large number of native-born Japanese Americans (Nisei) emerged in the ethnic community between the 1910s and the 1930s, and their descendants, Sansei and Yonsei, have been a mainstay of Japanese America since the 1960s. Postwar immigrants (Shin Issei) and their children—many of mixed racial origin—tend to occupy the fringes of the mainstream ethnic community of Nisei and Sansei due to the language gap and/or difference in historical experience and mentality. The wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans still has a considerable influence over the group’s collective identity and overall attitude toward Japan—an important factor in perpetuating the cleavage between descendants of pre-1924 immigrants and postwar newcomers. Japanese Americans, except for Shin Issei, tend to be more cautious about getting involved in bilateral relations between the United States and Japan than other groups of Asian Americans.
Chronology 1868
Meiji Restoration marking the opening of Japan. The first group of Japanese plantation workers travel to Hawaii without government permission.
1885
The first government-contract laborers arrive in Honolulu to work on sugar plantations under three-year contracts. A growing number of Japanese also begin to cross the Pacific 1247
Chronology | 1249
to the American West for work on farms, sawmills, and railroads. 1900
Large-scale anti-Japanese agitation transpires in San Francisco.
1905
The Asiatic Exclusion League is formed in San Francisco, which marks the beginning of an organized anti-Japanese movement in California.
1906
The San Francisco Board of Education resolves to segregate Japanese students from white children at its public schools.
1907–1908
A series of diplomatic negotiations produces the Gentlemen’s Agreement between Japan and the United States, to effectively curtail labor migration from Japan. Family members of bona fide residents are still granted entry into the United States.
1909
The Japanese Association of America is formed, which encompasses affiliated locals throughout the American West. Japanese plantation workers in Oahu engage in the Great Strike of 1909.
1913
The first Alien Land Law is enacted in California, denying Japanese immigrants legal rights to own agricultural land.
1920
Japanese and Filipino laborers in Hawaii organize a major strike. California enacts the amendment to the Alien Land Law, which prohibits land lease by Japanese immigrants. Other states, such as Arizona, Washington, Texas, and Oregon, follow suit by adopting similar legal measures.
1922
The U.S. Supreme Court upholds the legal definition of Japanese as the race “ineligible for citizenship” in the Takao Ozawa case.
1924
U.S. Congress passes the Immigration Act of 1924, which terminates Japanese immigration into the United States.
1930
The first national convention of the Japanese American Citizens League is held in San Francisco. It is the first major organization for American-born Japanese in the mainland.
1941
The Pacific War begins. The FBI rounds up “dangerous enemy aliens,” leaving Japanese communities leaderless.
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1942
President Roosevelt issues Executive Order 9066 on February 19 to authorize the mass removal of Japanese Americans from designated military zones on the West Coast. The mass incarceration of 110,000 Japanese Americans begins in March.
1943
The “Loyalty Registration” is administered in the War Relocation Authority camps in February and March. Subsequently, while “loyal” Nisei males are inducted into the U.S. Army, the segregation of those deemed “disloyal” goes in tandem with the cancellation of their birthright U.S. citizenship under new legislation.
1944
The U.S. Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of the army’s race-based “evacuation order” on the ground of “military necessity” in a historic Korematsu v. U.S. decision. At the same time, the court orders that the incarceration of loyal Japanese Americans be terminated and that the West Coast be opened for them, thereby ending the mass incarceration except for the disloyal inmates at the Tule Lake Segregation Center.
1945
The Pacific War ends on August 14. Yet, the detention of the disloyal continues until March 1946, when the U.S. government finally begins their deportation to war-torn Japan.
1947
Japanese war brides are allowed entry into the United States under the amended War Brides Act.
1948
President Truman signs the Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act, designed to compensate former internees for certain economic losses, though the range of acceptable claims is very limited.
1952
The Walter-McCarran Act allows the naturalization of Japanese immigrants. It also sets aside an annual quota of 185 immigrants from Japan, thereby ending the prohibition of Japanese immigration into the United States.
1962
Hawaii, now a U.S. state, sends the first Japanese American senator, Daniel Inouye, to the U.S. Congress. Two years later, the first Asian American congresswoman, Patsy Takemoto Mink, is elected in Hawaii.
1964
The Civil Rights Act is passed, outlawing institutionalized racism.
Background | 1251
1965
The new Immigration Law is enacted. This repeals racial discrimination in immigration and places Asians and Europeans on equal legal grounds for the first time.
1968
The Asian American movement begins, culminating in the first student strike in quest for an ethnic studies program at San Francisco State College.
1973
In Hawaii, George Ariyoshi becomes the first Japanese American governor, who is reelected in the subsequent three terms.
1978
The JACL national convention passes a resolution to seek redress for the wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans.
1981
The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, established by Congress, holds a series of public hearings throughout the country.
1983
The commission report, entitled Personal Justice Denied, is submitted to Congress, which offers the formal recommendations for redress and reparations.
1988
A redress bill is signed into a law by President Reagan, which provides individual payments of $20,000 to each surviving internee, a $1.25 billion education fund, and an official apology for the wartime wrongdoing by the U.S. government.
Background Geography and History of Japan Located at an edge of the historically Sinocentric politico-cultural order in northeastern Asia, Japan consists of four major islands that are mostly mountainous, with limited landmass for farming. To the island nation, China and its immediate neighbor, Korea, were always important sources of cultural and intellectual influences. While Europeans, including Christopher Columbus, had conceived a romanticized idea about Japan since the 15th century, the rest of the world remained largely unknown to most Japanese. Far from the reach of European imperialists of the time, Japan did not face a serious threat of colonization, unlike the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations. While being a self-sustaining economy with minimum foreign trade, the island nation frequently grappled with the problem of rural famine and poverty due to the lack of natural resources and agricultural lands. The situation made some regions prone to the practice of temporary migration for work, albeit
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within the country. The domestic tradition of labor migration nevertheless did not automatically develop into overseas emigration, because Japan was closed to the rest of the world during the 270 years of feudal rule after the 1580s. Combined with its peripheral position in Asia, the policy of national seclusion kept Japan largely outside the global circulation of labor and commodities that engulfed much of the Indian Ocean and the southwestern Pacific until the mid-19th century. The origin of Japanese emigration goes back to the late-1860s—shortly after Japan opened its door to Western powers. The island nation was among the last Asian countries to be engrossed in the Euro-American scramble for new colonial territories and markets in the region during the age of the imperialism in the 19th century. In the contexts of its quest for a greater access to the China market and of the development of whaling, it was the United States that took the initial interest in Japan around 1852, since the archipelago seemed to serve as a good supply point in the western Pacific. Having overpowered Qing China since the Opium Wars, European imperialist powers wasted no time in joining the United States, and under their meddling, Japan was engrossed in a civil war, which was finally settled in 1868 with the victory of pro-emperor modernizers. Japan’s subsequent entry into modernity marked the formation of a nation-state in a formally feudalistic country, where mobility had been restricted in all aspects of individual lives. After 1868, the central government in Tokyo adopted a capitalistic economic system, Western political structure, and universal education, as well as the new ideology that valorized the value of national expansion and migration, modeled after Western colonialist thought of the time. Becoming part of the international network of labor, capital, and transportation, ordinary Japanese found themselves in the midst of rapid socioeconomic transformation. In rural Japan, the intrusion of a money-based economy resulted in the displacement of many small-scale farmers, while in urban areas unemployed workers and young students scrambled for scarce opportunities. Combined with the development of the print press, a new public school system produced an increasing pool of youngsters with an awareness of profits to be made outside their country. These changes made Japan suitable for a source of labor emigration to more advanced economies, such as the United States and Hawaii. Nonetheless, the actual exodus of workingclass Japanese did not take place until the mid-1880s, because the Japanese government was initially very careful not to let its subjects leave the country freely. What made the Japanese government so concerned about mass emigration were two historical precedents that they thought would endanger Japan’s search for international respect. The ill-treatment of Chinese migrant workers in the United States and other white settler colonies was well-known to new leaders of Japan. Negative images of the Chinese nation that accompanied racial discrimination convinced Tokyo officials to think twice about a policy of open emigration, because they were afraid Westerners might mistake lower-class Japanese for the Chinese. Rather than allowing the uncultured workers to denigrate Japan’s overseas image through
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misidentification, Tokyo leaders would forfeit the advantages of labor emigration, like foreign remittances. The unauthorized recruitment and shipment of 153 Japanese workers for plantations in Hawaii by an American merchant helped reinforce the elite fear about uncontrolled labor emigration. Commonly known as the gannen-mono, or “people of the first year of Meiji,” these workers traveled to Hawaii in 1868, only to find that they were at the mercy of abusive sugar planters. Without consular protection, many gannen-mono ended up living under primitive conditions, and Tokyo had to dispatch a special envoy to save them from poverty and exploitation. Although the first instance of Japanese migration planted a seed for an ethnic community in Hawaii, it struck Japanese officials as a clear warning against labor emigration. For the ensuing 17 years of modern Japan, no “imperial subjects” could formally leave Japan except for the educated classes of diplomats, international traders, and government-sponsored students. It was not until 1885 that Tokyo finally allowed working-class Japanese to lawfully leave the country as emigrants, albeit under its watchful eyes.
Causes and Waves of Migration There are four distinct phases of Japanese immigration to Hawaii and the United States. Spanning over two decades from 1885 to 1908, the first phase represents a common form of labor migration that was characteristic of the Great Migration of the 19th century, although there was a small core of merchants and intelligentsia in the flow. The second phase ran from 1908 through 1924, and it accounted primarily for the migration of family members of earlier (mostly male) working-class entrants. After a period of race-based exclusion under the 1924 Immigration Act, 1947 saw the beginning of the third phase, with an influx of “war brides,” of whom many were married to white and black GIs. Although the Walter-McCarran Act of 1952 allowed a small number of quota immigrants, a vast majority of Japanese immigrants between 1947 and 1965 were young wives of U.S. citizens. The passage of the 1965 Immigration Act has diversified the composition of immigrants from Japan in terms of their class, gender, and social backgrounds. In accordance with the basic design of the law, this flow includes a significant number of skilled and highly educated people who tend to come as a family unit—a phenomenon that was not common in the previous phases of Japanese immigration.
Early Immigration The First Phase and Immigrant Culture: 1885–1908 1885 marked a turning point in Japanese migration history. Not only did the first exodus of laboring masses from Japan take place in that year, but the migration flow
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accounted for the first page of the mainstay of Japanese American history. During the early half of the 1880s, the shifting domestic conditions of Japan and the United States provided a suitable environment for displaced rural Japanese to consider the option of pursuing economic remedies in Hawaii and North America. In Japan, the drastic deflation policy of 1881, which led to agricultural depression, compelled some officials to seek ways in which to abate the problem of rural unrest and acquire much-needed foreign currency through emigrant remittances. So the first group of Japanese workers were recruited for three-year plantation work in Hawaii in 1885 under the so-called government-contract system of emigration. The state-regulated migration of plantation workers was considered the best possible solution to the deep-seated fear that Tokyo elites had held with regard to an unregulated exodus of low-class workers. The Japanese government systematized the selection of contract laborers under its tight control, and in order to ensure their dignified treatment in the sugar plantations, Japan concluded the Immigration Convention with the Kingdom of Hawaii. When recruiting potential migrant laborers, Tokyo initially concentrated on specific regions of southwestern Japan, which set a basic pattern of Japanese emigration before World War II. The regions, like Hiroshima and Yamaguchi, remained the largest suppliers of Japanese emigrants to the Americas and beyond throughout the prewar years. Between 1885 and 1894, a total of approximately 29,000 Japanese laborers entered Hawaii. This scheme of government-controlled emigration ended with the demise of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1894 (Ichioka 1988, 40–46). In the meantime, a demand for cheap Japanese laborers was soaring, particularly in the post-bellum American West, where the main industries of mining, railroads, and agriculture started to feel the negative impact of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. An acute labor shortage created a labor vacuum in the Pacific coast states, and Tokyo’s change of policy in 1885 rendered Japanese people a desirable replacement for the excluded Chinese. Moreover, the early 1890s saw the emergence of immigrant labor contractors on the West Coast, who could facilitate the employment of Japanese-speaking immigrants by white American firms. In urban areas of the Pacific Coast, a small pool of Japanese student-laborers and political exiles had eked out a living as domestic servants and manual workers since the mid-1880s. With their knowledge of the English language and American social system, many of these immigrant intellectuals became labor contractors, who assisted a growing number of newcomers in finding work in the American West (Ichioka 1988, 57–82). Between 1894 and 1907, upwards of 127,000 and 70,000 immigrants from Japan arrived in Hawaii and in the western United States, respectively (Ichioka 1988, 51–52). Most of them initially looked for temporary work (dekasegi) and had no intention of settling down in the new land. Yet, from 1908 onward, many immigrants shifted from the dekasegi orientation to a propensity for settlement
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and family life. In the meantime, though minuscule in number, some merchants, students, and other educated Japanese went to midwestern and eastern cities. New York and Chicago held small but vibrant hubs of these Japanese after the 1880s (Sawada 1996).
The Second Phase and Immigrant Culture: 1908–1924 The Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907–1908 between the United States and Japan changed the composition of Japanese immigration from labor-based to more familyoriented. Since the turn of the twentieth century anti-Japanese agitators of California argued that Issei’s dekasegi practice presented itself as a chief justification for exclusion, since it purportedly proved the insidious nature of Japanese who were only keen on taking wealth from white America. To quell the rise of antiJapanese hysteria, Tokyo decided to stop issuing passports to U.S.-bound workers altogether, while Washington prohibited further entry of those Japanese who used Mexico or Canada as a stepping stone to the continental United States. This concerted bilateral ban on Japanese labor migration still made exceptions for family members of bona fide residents, whose U.S.-bound passports continued to be issued by Japan and honored by the United States. After 1908, the dominance of female immigrants, including “picture brides,” was a direct consequence of the state
Japanese workers on a sisal plantation on Hawaii, about 1910. (Library of Congress)
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interventions—one that promoted family formation and permanent settlement in early Japanese America. The family phase of Japanese immigration did not last long due to the resurgence of anti-Japanese agitation that moved its emphasis from the menace of dekasegi practice to that of permanent settlement. As Japanese quickly climbed up the economic ladder in western agriculture, exclusionists began to concentrate on the threat of “Japanese takeover” through land acquisition, which they alleged was secretly funded by Tokyo. In the 1910s, the rise of Japan as an imperialist rival led many white Americans to see the Asian empire as a major hindrance to its quest for dominance in the Pacific. It also caused Californians to fear a baseless notion of Japanese immigrants as transplanted imperial soldiers, whose mission was to colonize the western land for their home empire. To concerned white residents, what looked most perilous were the Japanese control of farmland and the increase of the American-born Nisei, who would be able to take advantage of their birthright U.S. citizenship in support of Japan’s “invasion.” After 1908, anti-Japanese agitators thus set up two battlefronts in their political campaign: arresting Japanese agricultural development, and seeking federal legislation against the immigration of Japanese, including but not limited to wives of bona fide residents, that is, the would-be mothers of Nisei (Daniels 1977, 46–90). On the first battlefront, twice, in 1913 and 1920, California passed the Alien Land Laws, which expressly prohibited land ownership and later tenancy by “aliens ineligible for citizenship”—a legal buzzword for Japanese immigrants. This action was imitated by many other western states, including Washington, Arizona, Oregon, Utah, and Texas. A legal ban on Japanese immigration was a more difficult proposition, because it required the involvement of the federal government, which was reluctant to offend Japan by passing an exclusionary act targeting people of that major military power. Thus, in 1917, when Congress created the so-called Asiatic Barred Zone, Japan was not included in the designated area for race-based immigration exclusion. Yet, a voracious white public demand for Japanese exclusion convinced Tokyo to make a good-will gesture in consideration of diplomatic interests before Washington had to take resolute action. In 1920, much the same way as in 1907, the Japanese government abruptly terminated the issuance of passports to “picture brides,” who ranked among the most oft-cited examples of the Japanese menace throughout the 1910s (Ichioka 1988, 173–75). This action came short of satisfying exclusionists, however, since they simply did not want any Japanese around in their white republic. Their tenacious agitation finally compelled Congress to pass the 1924 Immigration Act, which featured a total ban on Japanese immigration. From 1908 through 1924, an aggregate total of 69,377 came to the continental United States, and an additional 51,450 to Hawaii. (See Table 185.)
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Later Waves of Immigration The Third Phase and Immigrant Culture: 1947–1965 Until 1947, very few Japanese could come to the United States for settlement or work. On the top of legal exclusion, the Pacific War reduced the possibility of mobility in the region to a minimum. Race continued to pose a hurdle even to those who were married to U.S. citizens, because they could not migrate to the homeland of their spouses under the 1924 Immigration Act. Because the original War Brides Act of 1945 remained racially exclusive, many GIs could not bring their Japanese wives to the United States. Only in 1947 did Congress allow for the coming of Asian war brides, including Japanese, but that legislative action came primarily as a token gesture in the context of the Cold War. Five years later, with an annual immigration quota of 185, the Walter-McCarran Act extended another political gesture to Japan, a new U.S. ally that had just emerged out of the military occupation. However, even though the 1952 law abolished the legal treatment of Japanese immigrants as unnaturalizable aliens (the last group of Asians to become eligible for naturalization), America was not yet ready to accept immigrants from Japan and the rest of Asia on equal footing as Europeans, whose homelands had received much larger annual quotas for immigration since 1924. The Walter-McCarran Act nonetheless enabled a specific group of Japanese to bypass the restriction of the token national quota. Wives of U.S. citizens constituted one of the exempted classes, therefore immigrating to the United States in the thousands after 1952. Combined with some 8,000 women admitted under the 1947 Soldier Brides Act, over 60,000 such Japanese managed to enter the United States lawfully between 1953 and 1965 despite the remnants of racial exclusion in U.S. immigration legislation. (See Table 186.) These women made up a mainstay of the third phase of Japanese immigration.
The Fourth Phase and the Immigration Act of 1965 and Succeeding Legislation The 1965 Immigration Act repealed the racial basis for (in)eligibility for immigration—a criterion that had decidedly worked against Japanese and other Asians since the passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. Coupled with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this shift in U.S. immigration policy reflected an emerging public understanding of American nationhood as a racial mosaic, on the one hand, and pragmatic political calculations in the Cold War context, on the other. Even though most Americans did not expect a significant change in a preexisting Euro-centered immigration pattern, the legislation symbolized the extent to which America became eager to do away with institutionalized racism and accept the reality of diversity within. For the subsequent decades, the new law has unexpectedly opened the
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floodgate of immigration from Latin America and Asia. Compared with other Asian sending countries, however, Japan has produced a noticeably smaller number of immigrants after 1965. The statistics of Japanese emigration, compiled by Tokyo, show no significant change before and after the passage of the new law. If anything, the average yearly figures reveal a gradual decline from a range of 3,600–7,300 in the 1950s to that of 2,800–3,900 in the 1960s. (See the tables in Appendix I.) These trends also offer a sharp contrast to the pre-1924 pattern of massive Japanese immigration, which made the group the most populous of all Asian Americans until the 1960s. Although there is no reliable study on post-1965 Japanese immigration, Japan’s emergence as a major economic player seems to explain a primary reason for the lack of correlations between the liberalization of U.S. immigration policy and the numbers of admitted Japanese since the mid-1960s. While the demise of the Japanese empire had resulted in the total devastation of its national economy, Japan’s industries came back to life during the Korean conflict, and the decade between 1955 and 1965 saw what many observers call a “Japanese economic miracle.” By the mid-1960s, the domestic economy was large and prosperous enough to offer the people employment opportunities and comfortable lifestyles. Under the military umbrella of the U.S. armed forces, no realistic threat of war or political repression existed in postwar Japan, unlike its neighbors South Korea and Taiwan. It was therefore not coincident that the Japanese government relinquished the program to recruit Japanese settlers for Latin American countries by the mid-1960s. No longer did most Japanese see compelling politico-economic reasons for leaving their homeland for an unknown life overseas. Based on the consistency of Japan’s emigration statistics, it is conjectured that a majority of U.S.-bound Japanese remain family members of U.S. citizens and residents. Perhaps the most notable difference between the fourth and the previous phases is that the current immigration flow seems to contain a sizable number of professionals and technical workers, who can avail themselves of various occupation categories set up by the 1965 Immigration Act. None of the immigration legislation after 1965, including the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, had a significant impact on the basic pattern of immigration from Japan. Nor has the recent economic stagnation of Japan served as a significant catalyst to emigration from that country.
Demographic Profile Racism in U.S. immigration policy, and Tokyo’s tendency to restrict emigration, make it very difficult to provide an accurate picture of Japanese migration and their community in terms of statistical data. In order to circumvent the state regulations and bans, Japanese immigrants often resorted to extra-legal or even illegal measures
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to leave Japan and enter the United States before 1941. Unknown numbers of people came through the U.S.–Mexican border without proper documentation, while others masqueraded as nonimmigrants—like students or businessmen—to obtain U.S.-bound passports. A majority of these individuals were most likely unaccounted for in U.S. data. The numbers of passports issued by Japan (Appendix I) appear to be the most reliable source for prewar Japanese migration statistics.
Size, Composition, and Occupational Orientation of the Community The best demographic snapshots of the pre–World War II Japanese community can be provided on the basis of U.S. census information. As explained earlier, the first contingents of Japanese immigrants came to meet the labor demands in the American West and Hawaii, and hence, the vast majority of them lived and worked throughout these regions. The second phase of immigration did not change this basic pattern of population distribution or occupations, for most entrants of 1908– 1924 joined their family members (primarily husbands) in the hitherto established ethnic settlements and economic niches. As Table 189 reveals, Hawaii and the West consistently had well over 90 percent of the Japanese in the United States from 1900 through 1950. This also underscores the containment of Japanese immigrants in certain niche industries of these regions, like agriculture and small-scale ethnic businesses. According to Table 193, a majority of Japanese concentrated on the agricultural and service sectors before the Pacific War. Their small presence in manufacturing also explains the overall exclusion of Asians from organized labor until the 1940s. What distinguished Japanese from other Asians (and made them similar to European immigrants to a degree) was a dramatic shift in the nature of the average Japanese American community from a temporary space of iterant migrant workers into a more stable settlement of farmers and merchants. Another unique characteristic was that Japanese settlers tended to disperse throughout the rural regions of the Pacific coast states and Hawaii, when most Chinese stayed in urban enclaves by the turn of the 20th century. The influx of female immigrants as wives—an impossible option for other Asians—made early Japanese America unique in this respect. The only major power in Asia, Japan’s ability to negotiate diplomatic deals with the United States enabled Issei to avoid outright exclusion in 1907–1908. In the continental United States alone, nearly 89,700 Japanese arrived between 1909 and 1920, of whom over 41 percent were women (Mears 1928, 409). The influx of these women mirrored the widespread popularity of “picture marriage,” a practical way for many Issei men to seek a stable lifestyle such as farming in America. During the 1910s, a settled family life, rather than a migrant bachelor life, consequently became a norm in the ethnic community. Table 187 demonstrates how a gender balance in the Japanese immigrant population improved significantly with the coming
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of Issei wives. Importantly, the influx of young women in a prime childbearing age also led to the rapid increase of American-born Nisei, rendering the ethnic community in California evenly divided by generation by 1930. (See Table 188.) Statistics, however, cannot describe how the third and fourth phases of Japanese immigration have changed the demographic characteristics of Japanese America, not to mention how postwar newcomers influenced community formation and intraethnic relations. The 1908–1924 pattern of gender-slanted migration continued during the period of 1947–1965, and anecdotal accounts suggest that most Japanese wives of U.S. citizens, including war brides, appeared to have been wed to nonJapanese men. Seldom did these women likely settle in or near traditional Japanese American settlements comprising mostly the American-born generations after the war. In all probability, most post-1965 immigrants are equally detached from the mainstay of Japanese America. Because of differences in culture, language, and historical experiences, descendants of pre-1924 immigrants and postwar Shin Issei often maintain separate social networks and organizations. Because most scholars and laypersons automatically identify the community of Nisei and Sansei as the Japanese American community, postwar immigrants are rarely represented in
Japanese mother and daughter, agricultural workers near Guadalupe, California, March 1937. (Library of Congress)
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community affairs and accounts. Neither reliable statistical data nor comprehensive studies are yet available on Shin Issei.
Adjustment and Adaptation Until the end of the Pacific War, racial exclusion was the single most important factor that influenced, impeded, and deformed the process of social adaptation among Japanese immigrants. Ever since the Chinese were excluded under the 1882 legislation, Japanese and other Asians that followed them were similarly subjected to the denial of a place in American society, polity, and culture. The ideological basis of Asian exclusion lay in Orientalism, which defined Asian immigrants as the national “others”—those who did not belong with America, rather than being simply inferior. Such treatment also resulted in the containment of Asian residents in specific economic sectors and in de facto segregated enclaves and settlements outside the white world. In prewar Hawaii, Japanese laborers occupied the bottom tier of the racially constituted social hierarchy, which benefited the white oligarchy and its monopoly of the sugar industry. A majority of Issei laborers had no option other than to continue to toil on sugar plantations even after their contracts were expired. Still, some started their own businesses in Honolulu and around plantation settlements, but they tended to cater mostly to the needs of their own countrymen and women within the ethnic economy (Kimura 1988, 89–120). In the mainland, early immigrants usually formed migratory labor gangs and worked on railroads and farms and in lumber mills and canneries under the supervision of Issei labor contractors. As in Hawaii, many subsequently saved meager wages to move up the ranks from tenant farmers to landowners, or shop owners.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Social Organizations Based on Ethnic Background By the first decade of the twentieth century, the urban and rural Japanese communities in the Pacific coast states and Hawaii already had myriads of community organizations, ethnic newspapers, Christian churches and Buddhist temples, and Japanese-language schools. Established in 1909, the Japanese Associations created elaborate networks of local chapters under the regional headquarters in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle (Ichioka 1988, 156–64). Their reaches extended as far east as Nebraska and Colorado. By the 1930s, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle all had two major vernacular dailies equipped with English sections for American-born Nisei. Although their native tongue was English, their immigrant parents also considered the Nisei’s learning of basic Japanese language to be almost mandatory. Before the Pacific War, the ethnic community considered it to be important to observe major national celebrations of both Japan and the United
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States, including the emperor’s birthday and the Fourth of July, in order to showcase their dualistic identity and transnationalism. Community ties were central not only to ethnic survival but also to the development of an ethnic niche economy in the hostile land. In seeking appropriate compensation for their hard labor and better living conditions, Hawaii’s Japanese were known to engage in organized labor actions as early as the 1890s. In 1909 and 1920, Issei workers concertedly took the lead in large-scale plantation strikes that paralyzed Hawaii’s sugar production for months (Takaki 1983, 127–75). In their everyday life, as in sporadic collective struggles, ethnic cooperation was a key to their social advancement and activities. In almost every Japanese settlement, Issei formed farming guilds, chambers of commerce, and other organizations in order to gain broader entry into rural agriculture and urban small businesses. On the West Coast, ethnic solidarity helped Japanese agriculture to carve out prominence in the types of farming that white agriculturalists and agribusinesses had neglected or deemed unprofitable. Labor-intensive crops, like asparagus, celery, berries, and potatoes, ranked in the tops of Japanese-dominated specialties in western agriculture (Azuma 2005, 62–65).
Family and Changing Gender Relations Family ties provided a basis for community formation and Issei’s seeming “success” in labor-intensive farming and small business activities. While most immigrants adhered to traditional values and norms, the intricacies of American life also compelled them to alter gender relations and roles. Without the watchful eyes of their in-laws, Issei wives had more control over household matters than their compatriots in Japan, but the lack of support from the extended family meant that they needed to work alongside their husbands on the farms and in the stores. Although the women usually took care of everyday chores, like cooking and washing, as well as childrearing, the men often pitched in, sharing responsibilities. Despite these transformations in household gender relations, however, community politics, like the operation of the Japanese Associations and other organizations, remained a primary domain of male immigrants before World War II.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Forging a New American Political Identity: Struggle against Racism and Immigrant Cultural Pluralism in the Prewar Years As they forged their own economy and communities through hard work and ethnic cooperation, Japanese immigrants also confronted institutional racism. In 1905, white labor unions and opportunistic politicians of San Francisco spearheaded an
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organized anti-Japanese exclusion movement, which received a growing support from ordinary Californians. The movement soon culminated in the segregation of Japanese pupils in the public schools of San Francisco. Though this action was rescinded in accordance with the conclusion of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, antiJapanese agitation gained political momentum in local legislatures of the Pacific coast states through the 1910s. They eventually passed many discriminatory laws, including the alien land laws. Along with Issei’s predominance in agriculture, Japanese-language education became another notable target of exclusionists, who accused the schools of turning Nisei children into “worshippers of the Mikado.” From the late 1910s to the early 1920s, various regulations against Japanese-language schools were put into effect in California, Washington, and Hawaii (Asato 2006). These local developments grew into a nationwide demand for Japanese exclusion— political action that Congress took by passing the 1924 Immigration Act despite the oppositions of the president and the State Department (Daniels 1977, 92–105). Japanese immigrants did not sit quietly under these assaults. Unlike European immigrants who could gain American identity and political voice through franchise and unionization, Japanese and other Asians had to find ways to fight institutionalized racism outside the established political structure. Their legal status as unnaturalizable aliens negated even a nominal degree of political rights—and hence any form of their direct political participation. With no power to defend themselves in the American political system, Japanese immigrants had to often work with their home government, which could at least intervene in the most egregious instances of racial discrimination with a threat of diplomatic consequence. On more than one occasion, Japan’s status as a major global power benefited Issei residents, and the federal government was hesitant to pass an exclusionary law against the Japanese until 1924. Washington officials also put pressure on local politicians in the West when their anti-Japanese demagogueries were regarded as detrimental to bilateral diplomatic relations. It is for this reason that the legal euphemism—aliens ineligible for citizenship—was routinely employed in state legislation, and eventually in the 1924 Immigration Act, without mentioning the Japanese as the target of racial discrimination. Although the immigrant–homeland cooperation had an effect of reinforcing the racist notion of “Japanese conspiracy” in the long run, it was one of the few viable political tactics to which the immigrants could resort before World War II. Ironically, the integration of Japanese immigrants into racially exclusive America therefore hinged on their political partnership with their homeland (Azuma 2009, 25–37).
Paths toward Citizenship Naturalization Another method of Isseis’ struggle against institutionalized racism was the use of the U.S. judiciary—one branch of the government that was not closed to aliens
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ineligible for citizenship. The Japanese Associations served as the main vehicles by which the immigrants vigorously fought legal oppression. One of the most important pieces of litigation was the Takao Ozawa case, which revolved around the issue of Japanese naturalization rights. Issei residents throughout the American West contributed funds for this major test case beginning in 1917. In 1922, however, the U.S. Supreme Court betrayed the immigrant hope for color-blind justice, arguing that the Constitution did not intend to confer the privilege of citizenship upon a member of the Mongolian race. Other lawsuits included test cases against alien land laws and language-school regulations. Much to the disappointment of Issei farmers, most test cases that reached the U.S. Supreme Court by 1923 were decided unfavorably (Ichioka 1988, 210–32). One bright spot in this history of struggle was an exceptional legal victory in Hawaii of a group of Issei educators and parents who sought the right to send their Nisei children to Japanese-language schools after attending American public schools. Following more than several years of legal battles, the nation’s highest court ruled in their favor in 1927—a decision that effectively nullified a similar law against foreign-language schools in California and other states.
Civic Participation by Proxy While the U.S. government shut the door to new immigrants from Japan, and the courts denied Issei’s rights to land and naturalization, a large number of Japanese gave up on America and returned to their home country. The return migration continued through the 1930s, as many Issei became older and looked for retirement back in their native villages. Most parents of the Nisei nonetheless decided to stay despite the absence of citizenship rights, because they knew that their American-born children not only belonged in the United States, but also their birthright citizenship would allow for greater social integration and “success.” These Issei became more concerned about the future of their children than their own personal fulfillment. Because anti-Japanese legislation was all designed to discriminate against “aliens ineligible for citizenship,” the immigrants anticipated that their Nisei sons and daughters would be able to live free from the oppressive laws and attain real inclusion into American society as long as they received adequate upbringing. After 1927, Japanese-language schools flourished both in Hawaii and the mainland, since the Issei believed that the language would play a role in offering the Nisei new opportunities in a coming “Pacific” era. With the rise of the United States and Japan as major global powers after World War I, the immigrants felt, the Pacific would replace the Atlantic as a new center of the world civilization in the near future. Viewed from this perspective, providing Japanese cultural awareness and linguistic skill for Nisei was not only a means to enhance their ethnic pride as Americans of Japanese ancestry; it also meant fostering their ability to
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contribute to America’s national interests through their cultural strength—an idea that they borrowed from cultural pluralism of the time (Azuma 2005, 122–34). In this sense, Japanese immigrants already entertained an idea similar to today’s multicultural America when such a vision was not yet generally accepted, especially for nonwhites. Faced with severe racial exclusion, it was only this pluralist vision that could empower Issei parents to imagine a bright future for their posterity in the United States. From the mid-1920s onward, a number of community activities revolved around the second-generation children and youths. There emerged organized ethnic athletic leagues, including both “American” sports, like baseball and basketball, and Japanese martial arts. Many immigrants felt that certain Japanese qualities and values would help Nisei become better Americans and benefit the land of their birth. To make the American-born truly bicultural, a number of Issei parents opted to send their children to Japan for secondary or higher education during the 1930s. These second-generation youths were often called the Kibei, a subgroup of Nisei partially or wholly educated in their ancestral land (Azuma 2005, 135–39).
Pacific War and Mass Incarceration The immigrant hope for a better future was dashed instantly by the outbreak of the Pacific War. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 put the two generations of Japanese Americans in an extremely difficult position. In Hawaii, martial law was immediately proclaimed, and immigrant leaders, now classified as “dangerous enemy aliens,” were rounded up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and sent to detention centers, an event that caused a sudden shift of community leadership from the first to the second generation. On the mainland, too, the federal and local law enforcement authorities arrested many key Issei. Combined with their counterparts from Hawaii, these immigrant leaders were separated from their families and confined in the Justice Department Internment Camps along with German and Italian “enemy aliens” for the duration of the war. Meanwhile, the daily lives of Japanese residents became more and more restricted. The U.S. government, backed by the general public sentiment, moved quickly to enforce the mass incarceration of ordinary Japanese Americans on the West Coast. On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, authorizing the “evacuation” of the Japanese from the military zones, both “enemy aliens” and citizens alike. Starting in late March, a total of 110,000 Issei and Nisei were shipped to temporary “assembly centers” and then to ten War Relocation Authority (WRA) “relocation centers” built hastily on the wastelands of the interior. Identified with the enemy on the basis of common racial ancestry, these Japanese Americans were denied not only their American identity but also their constitutional rights. Later, in the historic Korematsu ruling of 1944,
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Japanese Americans arrive at the Santa Anita Assembly Center in Arcadia, California, prior to going to a relocation center, April 5, 1942. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, persons of Japanese ancestry living on the West Coast were required to go to internment camps for “security” reasons. (National Archives)
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this indiscriminate internment of a racial group in the name of “military necessity” (Irons 1983). While the mass incarceration thoroughly destroyed Japanese communities on the West Coast, the people of other mainland locations and Hawaii did not go to camps en masse. Yet, they lived in fear and anxiety, as they met constant scrutiny and hostility from the authorities as well as their neighbors, associates, and former friends. Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States, many Japanese residents cooperated in America’s war efforts in various capacities. Though initially excluded from military duty, thousands of Hawaii’s Nisei youths volunteered to serve in the U.S. Army, which led to the formation of the 100th Battalion in 1943—a unit that was subsequently merged into the all-Japanese 442nd Regimental Combat Team (Odo 2004, 117–251). Stripped of their civil rights as citizens of the United States, the Nisei who were incarcerated in WRA camps responded to their plight with complex choices. In the winter of 1943, the U.S. Army and the WRA jointly administered the infamous “Loyalty Registration” for the purpose of separating “disloyal” elements from loyal Japanese Americans for military enlistment and controlled release. Although most Nisei responded “loyally,” some refused to confirm their unconditional allegiance
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to the government that had incarcerated them. These “disloyal” Japanese were segregated at a special camp, and the United States facilitated the renunciation of these Nisei’s U.S. citizenship under the 1944 legislation for future deportations (Weglyn 2000, 134–265). Still, a minority of loyal Nisei took issue with the apparent hypocrisy in American policy that incarcerated them but asked for their military service when draft orders came. These youngsters were later called “draft resisters” (Muller 2001). Other Nisei quietly enlisted in the military forces, sensing a need to demonstrate their unconditional loyalty regardless of the circumstances. The majority who enlisted served in the European theater with the 442nd RCT; others worked as Japanese linguists in the Pacific as members of the Military Intelligence Service. Their proven loyalty and valorous contributions helped to redeem the name of Japanese Americans and to ease the process of the group’s postwar return to mainstream America. Outside of military service, every Japanese American endeavored to adapt to the most difficult situations, no matter how he or she responded. Yet, according to the arbitrary classifications and labeling by the government, their varied choices created everlasting ruptures within the ethnic community. Most notably, the bitter conflicts surfaced between Nisei veterans and draft resisters, between those deemed loyal and the disloyal, and between U.S.-educated Nisei and Japan-educated Kibei. When Japanese Americans returned to their homes, farms, and businesses on the West Coast, ethnic ties had been eroded, and intragroup relations were acrimonious. With the average Issei man in his sixties and the average woman in her high forties, young Nisei had to assume the primary responsibility for rebuilding the ethnic community while mending broken relationships within.
The Second and Later Generations Educational Attainment and Prewar Ethnic Identity Even before the war, Nisei youngsters had already developed their own social and intellectual world—one that helped shield them from the harsh reality of racism. Starting in the mid-1920s, Japanese immigrant newspapers attached daily English sections to mold the political thinking of Nisei and foster their sense of pride and connections to the ethnic community. Issei leaders encouraged older Nisei to take active part in society and politics to seek integration into middle-class white America. During the 1930s, a number of Nisei youths pursued higher education and turned out to be quite successful in schoolwork, even though their educational attainment did not translate into job opportunities due to racial discrimination. Nisei were also active in organizing themselves based on ethnic identity, with an eye to greater integration into mainstream society. In 1927, Honolulu Nisei leaders
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organized the Hawaiian Japanese Civic Association; their mainland counterparts formed the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) soon after. In Hawaii, the New Americans Conference annually provided Nisei adolescents with an opportunity to discuss the issues that they faced as minority Americans. Likewise, the JACL held a national convention biannually beginning in 1930. In the decade preceding the Pacific War, some Nisei, notably those in Hawaii, ran for local offices successfully. With the backing of Issei elders, Nisei also strove to expand the realm of their social and economic activities beyond the boundaries of the immigrant generation. A number of Nisei men and women sought higher education and vocational training, acquiring college degrees and such special skills as nursing and teaching. At the same time, the structure of the ethnic economy underwent a significant transformation. Plantation work became much less important to the Japanese of Hawaii. Conversely, more and more of them entered such occupational fields as truck farming, fishing, small businesses, and civil service, with an increasing rate of urbanization. On the mainland, many Nisei found work in urban businesses, especially those associated with agricultural wholesale and produce retail sectors, although racial discrimination still hindered their social mobility during the prewar years. The effects of racism often manifested themselves in the form of Nisei juvenile delinquency, a lack of employment and poverty, and a racial inferiority complex and alienation.
Fred Tayama, chairperson of the Southern District Council of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) explains curfew and travel laws to two fellow Japanese Americans in 1942. Founded in 1929, JACL stressed civil rights and Americanization, although during World War II the organization decided to cooperate with the government’s relocation policy. (Library of Congress)
Youth Profile A Case of Principle Ehren Watada was born in 1978 in Hawaii to a Japanese American father and Chinese American mother. A fourth-generation Japanese American (Yonsei), Watada attended Punahou School and Kalani High School before pursing a bachelor’s degree in finance at Hawaii Pacific University. The September 11 tragedy propelled him to join the United States Army in defense of his country, consequently being commissioned by the Army’s Officer Candidate School in November 2003. After serving in South Korea, First Lieutenant Watada was assigned to Fort Lewis, Washington, where he learned that his unit was to be deployed in Iraq. In preparation for a new assignment in the war-torn country, the Japanese American conducted research on the circumstances under which his country had been fighting there, as well as the history of Iraq and international law and diplomacy. Combined with his personal encounters with veterans returning from Iraq, his research led Watada to believe that the United States had no legal justification for fighting a war there. Citing the violation of the United States Constitution and the War Powers Act, among others, Watada not only refused to take part in the Iraq war, but he also requested a resignation from the military—a request that the Army rejected on the basis of Watada’s contractual obligation to remain in service for eight years. In early 2007, Watada was courtmartialed. In May 2009, a federal appellate court dropped the charges against Watada according to the request of the Justice Department, and five months later the Tonsei was discharged from the Army. Watada’s case revived the kinds of debates and conflicts that the Japanese American community had witnessed during the Pacific War with regard to the questions of loyalty and citizenship duty. Many Japanese Americans, including former members of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team and Nisei JACL members, were troubled by Watada’s disobedience to the military order. Just as they had condemned “draft resisters” and “disloyal Nisei” during the Pacific War, these Japanese Americans criticized the Yonsei as unpatriotic. Others, especially Nisei progressives and Sansei activists, defended Watada’s action as truly American, drawing a parallel between him and those who had challenged the constitutionality of the mass “evacuation” order by the military despite community ostracism. The locus of this community debate lay in the same issue that the ethnic community had grappled with since 65 years earlier: how American citizens should demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. One side stressed the importance of obeying the government decisions at the time of national crisis; the other considered that American citizens were responsible to adhere to the Constitution, making it necessary to oppose the government policy when it was deemed illegal. Indeed, throughout the debate, the history of the wartime internment was frequently invoked as a point of reference. In the early 21st century, Erhen Watada inadvertently emerged as a salient reminder of the living legacies of the internment history—the history that still bitterly divides the ethnic community over the meaning of loyalty and citizenship.
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Cultural Identification among Nisei The geopolitical events in the 1930s and the early 1940s made Nisei’s cultural identity markedly distinct from other second-generation Americans, including their fellow Asian Americans. Japan’s invasion of China exacerbated the existent fear of Japanese in the American minds, and Nisei frequently took the blame for the action of their ancestral land, even though most had no real ties to it. Every day they faced hostilities from their classmates, teachers, and random strangers. The casual suspension of their civil rights by the army in the spring of 1942 was an extension of the prevailing public view that tended to confuse Japanese Americans with the Japanese enemy on racial and cultural grounds. It was therefore very difficult for Nisei to hold onto the ideal of biculturalism that their parents entrusted them with. Insofar as white America deemed the Japanese component of Nisei’s identity incompatible, they were propelled to downplay it, while their racial bodies made it impossible for them to leave behind their “Japanese-ness” completely. This survival strategy characterized a dominant pattern of Nisei practice during and after the Pacific War. Instead of embracing Japanese cultural heritage, they would single-handedly endeavor to emulate the norms and values of white America and pursue “inclusion into society’s main institutions” (Kurashige 2002, 119–50). In particular, JACL members and 442nd RCT veterans would also emphasize how deeply they had internalized—and lived up to—the national creed of democracy. In Cold War America, it so happened that this practice, which desperately aspired to deflect public attention from their Japanese cultural heritage, dovetailed neatly with an emergent discourse of racial liberalism that valorized one’s politico-ideological orientation over his racial/cultural background when defining who was or was not acceptable as a member of the American nation. Nisei’s tendency to brush aside their cultural heritage could produce some tangible benefit after the war.
Postwar Ethnic Identity and Educational Attainment With the backing of the dominant liberal discourse, the postinternment history of Nisei was a story of remarkable integration and upward mobility. Initially, many Japanese Americans had to start all over again. For the mainland internees, the release from the WRA camps posed practical problems of how to eke out daily livings. Most former internees eventually returned to the West Coast, but they needed housing and jobs, which were not easily procurable in a postwar society still full of hatred and intolerance. Still, they gradually rebuilt their individual lives and communities. Those who served in the armed forces took advantage of the GI Bill to receive college and professional education, and unlike in the prewar years, their educational attainment directly led to good employment and career opportunities in corporate America and the government sectors. By the mid-1950s, many Nisei found themselves breaking racial barriers by entering occupational fields that had
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been closed to them in the past. Moreover, they increasingly partook in a wider range of sociocultural activities, producing literary works of their own, creating their own art pieces, and becoming visible in the performing arts. By the late 1960s, their successful integration into mainstream society even generated a new stereotype of Japanese Americans as a “model minority”—a self-serving label that many Nisei happily accepted at that time (Hosokawa 1969, 473–97). With a renewed sense of confidence as full-fledged members of the nation, Nisei actively engaged in America’s political affairs. First and foremost, community leaders confronted the survivals of past injustices, determined to repeal the discriminatory laws. Not only did they achieve the repeal of the alien land laws in Oregon and California, but they vigorously lobbied Congress for Issei naturalization rights—the worst symbol of race-based exclusion—which was finally wiped out by the Walter-McCarran Act of 1952. After the Pacific War, Hawaii’s Nisei played a pivotal role in changing the political and social landscape of the islands. In 1946, union leaders, including key Nisei, mobilized over 20,000 plantation workers to walk out in protest of low wages. The strike paralyzed the sugar industry for 79 days and challenged the dominance of the haole business elite. Eight years later, Nisei war veterans formed with liberal whites a powerful coalition to bring down the islands’ Republican oligarchy. Often characterized as the “bloodless” Democratic Revolution of 1954, Japanese Americans became the major political force in Hawaii’s territorial legislature and municipal governments (Kotani 1985, 117–51). With the statehood of Hawaii in 1959, Daniel K. Inouye, a decorated veteran of World War II, joined the U.S. House of Representatives as the first Asian American from the state; he was elected as a senator from Hawaii in 1962. Two years later, Patsy Takemoto Mink was the first Asian American woman elected to the House in 1964. Hawaii also produced the first Asian governor of an American state, George Ariyoshi, in 1973.
Ethnic Identity and Cultural Identification among Sansei As America entered the new era with the rise of the Civil Rights movement and a full-scale military engagement in Vietnam, the Sansei, third-generation Japanese Americans, joined Nisei’s quest for greater integration in the larger society. But the youngsters developed a very different attitude and outlook on the world. Rebellious to the status quo and their elders, many Sansei started to question the group’s past and present, often challenging, with youthful idealism, the quiet acceptance by Nisei of racial injustice and their model-minority behavior. Influenced by antiwar/ civil-rights politics, they soon realized a linkage between their collective experience of racial victimization and the larger social ills in the nation. These progressive Sansei committed themselves to social reform and the making of a better, truly multicultural America, where they did not have to downplay their Japanese heritage
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in favor of white American norms (Kurashige 2002, 151–212). Not only was their ethnic identity more politically progressive, but they were also eager to embrace their cultural background as something essential to their American identity. Within this historical context emerged a demand for redress and reparations, a movement that sought an official acknowledgement and apology by the government for its wartime violations of Japanese American civil rights. In 1978, the JACL adopted a resolution that called for the investigation of the matter by a congressional commission as a step toward redress. In response to persistent lobbying by Japanese Americans, the federal government three years later set up a special Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, which subsequently recommended concrete ways of redress for the former internees. In 1988, after a lengthy struggle, the Japanese American community finally saw the passage of a redress law. The first redress payment, $20,000, and an official letter of apology, signed by President George H. W. Bush, were delivered to the oldest Issei survivors in 1990. Fueled by the post-1970s rhetoric of multiculturalism, the Sansei’s uncovering of the internment past has brought about among them a strong interest in their cultural heritage. Much has been lost, however, since the war years. Thus, the youngsters need to reconstruct the kind of ethnic culture by which they wish to represent their personal and group identities. Some try to learn the Japanese language; others choose specific cultural activities and practices, like martial arts and taiko drumming. Whatever they pick, an element of Japanese culture they embrace is neither a simple transplant of the culture from Japan nor something identical to Issei culture. Posing no contradiction to their sense of being American, the post-1960s ethnic culture signifies Sansei’s American sensitivity and preferences. For example, neatly choreographed, athletic and lively, taiko drumming would resemble more the popular American dance and music routines than a subdued traditional Japanese dance act. While redefining their history, culture, and ethnicity, Sansei have concurrently gone beyond their ethnic boundaries to seek cooperation with other groups of Americans. With a deeper understanding of shared experiences in American society, the young men and women have taken part in the larger Asian American movement, establishing various organizations that offer social, educational, and cultural services to Asian-Pacific Islanders populations, as well as Asian American/Ethnic Studies programs in institutions of higher education both on the mainland and in Hawaii. Interracial coalitions for civil rights agendas are also not uncommon. Meanwhile, the greater integration of Japanese Americans into the American middle class is accompanied by more diversity in perspective and political orientation. In Hawaii, as Nisei have formed a political establishment of their own, some Sansei question whether Japanese Americans have joined the hegemonic ruling class—a charge often made by other minority groups in the islands. In fact, many
The Second and Later Generations | 1273
A young drummer performs in the Tsunami Taiko Drumming Group, Seattle, Washington. (Jay Syverson/Corbis)
Nisei have preferred a more conservative approach to social issues, often opposing the progressive views of Sansei youths. Similarly, a group of Nisei farmers in the agricultural heartland of California formed the Nisei Farmers League, which took a hostile attitude toward the farm labor movement led by Caesar Chavez. A large number of Nisei were also initially reluctant to support redress and other progressive social reform agendas.
Ethnic Identity and Cultural Identification among Shin Issei Postwar Japanese America is more than a home for Nisei and Sansei. After 1947, it saw the entry of many new immigrants. At first, most were wives of American GIs, but post-1965 immigrants included investors and business owners, workers with special skills and professionals, as well as family member of American citizens or permanent residents. While these newcomers have added vitality to the existing Japanese American community, it has simultaneously faced the challenge of accommodating them. In many locales, dominant community organizations tend to represent the interests, views, and priorities of U.S.-born Nisei and Sansei. Combined with the problem of language and cultural gaps, different experiences and viewpoints have propelled Japanese-speaking Shin Issei to form their own, loosely
1274 | Japanese Immigrants
organized networks and connections on the fringe of or outside mainstream Japanese America (Tsukuda 2004). Oftentimes, the two do not mix with each other; nor is the postwar immigrant experience usually incorporated into the existing narrative of Japanese American history. The concept of “community” has itself expanded beyond the conventional, monolithic notions of ethnicity and race. In recent years a majority of Sansei have married persons of other races or ethnicities, reflecting dramatic changes in the larger society. Many of the fourth- and fifth-generation children, Yonsei and Gosei, are thus multiracial, multiethnic Japanese Americans. So are children of war brides, usually of mixed racial origin. (See Table 187.) Their presence has forced the community to redefine itself, often shedding light on its own ethnocentrism and pureblood racism. Mirroring the legacies of the wartime incarceration, other forms of boundary making and exclusion also exist, perpetuating the preexisting rifts and divisions within. Indeed, the JACL could not even officially apologize for its mistreatment of draft resisters until 2002 because of Nisei members’ strong oppositions.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Japan Ever since the beginning of the 20th century, U.S.–Japan relations have always overshadowed the lives of Japanese Americans. Earlier exclusionist agitation, the wartime mass incarceration, postwar Nisei’s avoidance of the Japanese heritage and their insistence on a undivided national identity, all illuminate the extent to which geopolitics has had direct bearings onto their daily experiences as minority Americans. Although postwar Japan’s alliance with the United States has presented a different political situation than the prewar years, the JACL still refused to have any role or involvement in U.S.–Japan bilateral relations well into the 1960s. Later, the JACL decided to set up an International Relations Committee, but the Nisei-led organization clung to the policy of caution and prudence when dealing with issues involving Japan and East Asian affairs. It is only after the Civil Rights era that Sansei and Yonsei have showed a more relaxed attitude toward their ancestral land and culture. Nevertheless, the trauma of the wartime incarceration is still very deeply inscribed in the collective psyche of Japanese America. Despite the rise of multiculturalism and increasing globalization, the undercurrents of Orientalist thinking also remain strong in U.S. society, which continues to remind many Japanese Americans of the danger of having too close a relationship to Japan. One area where Japanese America reaped a real benefit from its ties to Japan is that of international trade and tourism. To the state of Hawaii, Japan has constantly sent the largest numbers of foreign tourists for the last few decades. The influx of Japanese-speaking visitors has created business opportunities and a culturally slanted job market for many Nisei, Sansei, and Shin Issei. Furthermore,
Issues in Relations between the United States and Japan | 1275
especially in California, many Nisei found a niche employment market during the 1970s and the 1980s, when Japanese firms set up their representative offices and hired local agents to handle their increasing exports to the U.S. market. Japanese corporate reliance on Japanese Americans allowed California—where one-third of Japanese Americans still live—to emerge as a principal site for the U.S. operational headquarters of Japanese multinationals. Despite their role as cultural brokers, however, Nisei employees at Japanese corporations have frequently encountered prejudices and discriminatory treatment, including limited opportunities for career advancement. Since the 1970s, the growth of Japanese investment has increased anxieties among many Japanese Americans. In Los Angeles’s Little Tokyo, Nisei and Sansei leaders often see Japanese corporate interests as hostile forces that are taking over the ethnic community (Kurashige 2002, 186–212). Close economic ties between the United States and Japan have come with another problem for Japanese Americans. That is, when the U.S. economy suffers, Japan sometimes takes the blame for some of its problems—a situation that has direct ramifications for the lives of Japanese Americas. For example, during the recession of the 1980s—a decade of “Japan bashing”—many Nisei and Sansei experienced firsthand how America could turn against them as if they represented Japan. The 1982 murder of Vincent Chin, a Chinese American mistaken for a Japanese, by laid-off white Detroit autoworkers, serves as a poignant reminder as to how easily international relations can strip Japanese Americans of their American identity and turn them into a national enemy, just as in 1942.
Forecasts for the 21st Century Ironically, the experience of Japanese Americans demonstrates that multiculturalism alone is not a sufficient safeguard against exclusive nationalism, which usually looks for a vilified “foreign” other as a scapegoat. The social ideology of multiculturalism has surely got many Sansei and Yonsei engaged in heritage learning through study tours and exchange programs to Japan. Notwithstanding these instances of increasing individual contact with the land of their ancestors, the ethnic community at large still tends to shy away from a public display of linkages to Japan. With their “Oriental” racial marking in their body, Japanese Americans do not yet have the luxury of embracing their ancestral land and heritage unconditionally. Hence their relationship to Japan is—and most likely will continue to be—fraught with complications in the years to come. By the same token, U.S.-born Japanese tend not to mix well with Shin Issei, who often symbolize the very foreignness that they would wish to avoid. To many Japanese Americans, their group history is not simply a detached past; it still regulates every aspect of their worldviews, identities, and sense of connection to their heritage and ancestral country in all too realistic a way.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 185 Japanese emigration to the United States (based on the numbers of U.S.-bound passports issued by the Japanese government)
Continental U.S.
Hawaii
1899
3,140
22,973
1900
7,585
1901 1902
U.S. (Hawaii included) 1946-50
1,168
1,529
1951
3,212
32
3,136
1952
4,436
70
14,490
1953
3,614
1903
318
9,091
1954
3,945
1904
640
9,443
1955
5,002
1905
714
10,813
1956
7,308
1906
1,715
25,752
1957
6,686
1907
2,712
14,397
1958
6,794
1908
1,585
3,455
1959
5,901
1909
777
1,329
1960
4,980
1910
926
1,717
1961
3,904
1911
1,963
2,595
1962
3,763
1912
3,378
4,732
1963
3,790
1913
4,381
4,276
1964
3,265
1914
5,553
3,187
1965
2,850
1915
5,498
3,055
1966
3,152
1916
5,761
3,643
1967
2,845
1917
6,457
4,111
1968
2,964
1918
6,306
3,024
1969
3,005
1919
6,273
3,088
Postwar Total
82,584
1920
5,959
2,789
1921
4,321
3,215
1922
3,558
2,960
1923
2,617
2,112
1924
4,064
2,163
1925
289
485
1926
344
636
1927
370
526
1928
306
265
1929
236
119
87,848
165,106
Prewar Total
Source: Gaimusho. 1971. Waga kokumin no kaigai hatten: Shiryohen. Tokyo: Gaimusho, pp. 2–3, 140–45. Notes: No data available for 1930–1945. Before 1941, a number of Japanese entered the United States via a third country, while others jumped ship or walked through the unprotected borders. They are not part of the statistics presented here. Prewar U.S. immigration data are even more unreliable and hence not cited here. In order to circumvent various exclusion measures, significant numbers of Japanese came as temporary visitors, students and merchants, among others. These individuals were often left out of immigration statistics.
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Table 186 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: fiscal years 2000 to 2009
1277
Region and Country of Birth
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
Japan
7,049
9,578
8,248
5,971
7,697
8,768
8,265
6,748
6,821
7,690
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics
Table 187 Total population of Japanese in the United States and gender breakdown Total
Male
Female
1900
85,437
70,849 (82.9%)
14,588 (17.1%)
1910
151,832
117,854 (77.6%)
33,978 (22.4%)
1920
220,284
135,351 (61.4%)
84,933 (38.6%)
1930
278,465
156,779 (56.3%)
121,686 (43.7%)
1940
284,852
154,787 (54.3%)
130,065 (45.7%)
1950
325,976
169,697 (52.1%)
156,279 (47.9%)
1960
464,332
224,828 (48.4%)
239,504 (51.6%)
1970
588,324
271,453 (46.1%)
316,871 (53.9%)
1980
716,331
328,703 (45.9%)
387,628 (54.1%)
1990
847,562
389,484 (45.9%)
458,078 (54.1%)
2000
796,700 1,148,932
(Single ethnicity/race selected) (Mixed heritage included)
Source: U.S. Census, 1900–1990. Note: The general statistics prior to 1960 did not include Hawaii, because it was still a territory. Therefore, they are conflated with the separate Hawaii figures by the author.
Table 188 Breakdown of California’s Japanese population by generation Issei
Nisei
Total
1910
38,184 (92.3%)
3,172 (7.7%)
41,356
1920
51,138 (71.1%)
20,814 (18.9%)
71,952
1930
48,477 (49.7%)
48,979 (50.3%)
97,456
Source: 1934 Report, U.S. Department of Commerce, cited in Zaibei Nihonjinkai. 1940. Zaibei Nihonjinshi. San Francisco: Zaibei Nihonjinkai, p. 590.
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Table 189 Regional distributions of Japanese in the United States Total
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Hawaii
1900
85,437
535 (0.6%)
349 (0.4%)
66 (—)
23,376 (27.4%)
61,111 (71.5%)
1910
151,832
1,915 (1.3%)
1,482 (0.9%)
610 (0.4%)
68,150 (44.9%)
79,675 (52.5%)
1920
220,284
3,613 (1.6%)
2,142 (1.0%)
973 (0.4%)
104,282 (47.3%)
109,274 (49.6%)
1930
278,465
4,014 (1.4%)
2,025 (0.7%)
1,126 (0.4%)
131,669 (47.3%)
139,631 (50.1%)
1940
284,852
3,400 (1.2%)
1,571 (0.6%)
1,049 (0.4%)
120,927 (42.4%)
157,905 (55.4%)
1950
325,976
7,438 (2.3%)
18,734 (5.7%)
3,055 (0.9%)
112,541 (34.5%)
184,611 (56.6%)
1960
464,332
17,962 (3.9%)
29,318 (6.3%)
16,245 (3.5%)
197,352 (42.5%)
203,455 (43.8%)
1970
588,324
39,125 (6.7%)
42,670 (7.3%)
28,504 (4.8%)
260,850 (44.3%)
217,175 (36.9%)
1980
716,331
46,913 (6.5%)
46,254 (6.5%)
47,631 (6.6%)
335,799 (46.9%)
239,734 (33.5%)
1990
847,562
74,202 (8.8%)
63,210 (7.5%)
67,193 (7.9%)
395,471 (46.7%)
247,486 (29.2%)
2000
796,700
76,350 (9.3%)
63,012 (7.9%)
85,180 (10.7%)
370,394 (46.5%)
201,764 (25.3%)
Source: U.S. Census, 1900–2000. Note: The general statistics prior to 1960 did not include Hawaii, because it was still a territory. Therefore, they are conflated with the separate Hawaii figures by the author.
Table 190 Japanese population by major states of residence State
1900
1910
1940
1970
1990
2000
HI
61,111
79,675
157,905
217,175
247,486
201,764
CA
10,151
41,356
93,717
213,277
312,989
288,854
WA
5,617
12,929
14,565
20,188
34,366
35,985
OR
2,501
3,418
4,071
6,213
11,796
12,131
NY
354
1,247
2,538
19,794
35,281
37,279
CO
48
2,300
2,734
7,861
11,402
11,571
IL
80
285
462
17,645
21,831
20,379
TX
13
340
458
6,216
14,795
17,120
Source: U.S. Census, 1900–2000.
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Table 191 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009: leading states of residence: Region/country: Japan Total
Male
Female
7,690
1,850
5,840
82
17
65
California
2,339
609
1,730
Colorado
84
15
69
Florida
230
41
189
Georgia
141
38
103
Hawaii
534
93
441
Illinois
237
67
170
Maryland
130
36
94
Massachusetts
173
45
128
Michigan
185
57
128
68
13
55
Nevada
107
19
88
New Jersey
231
77
154
New York
857
208
649
North Carolina
128
25
103
Ohio
142
44
98
Pennsylvania
149
45
104
Texas
296
74
222
Virginia
156
38
118
Washington
431
101
330
Other
990
188
802
Total Arizona
Minnesota
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009. State of Residence, Stbk 15. 2010
Table 192 Educational attainment
0–8 years
9–12 years
13–15 years
16+ years
Median school years
1950a
16,015
58,055
11,690
6,900
12.2
1960
86,502
179,998
36,596
29,164
12.2
1970
67,136
182,247
48,001
56,323
12.5 12.9
1980
53,119
273,226
133,650
137,792
1990
34,864
206,142
169,020
216,376
Source: U.S. Census, 1900–1990. Notes: The figures for 1950 and 1960 include those over 14 years or older. The 1970 and 1990 statistics are taken from those over 25 years or older, while the 1980 counterparts are from those over 15 years or older. a The 1950 statistics do not include the Hawaii data.
Appendix III: Notable Japanese Americans | 1281 Table 193 Occupational breakdown. Agriculture
Manufacturing
Professional
Commerce
Service
(Domestic)
26,789
6,926
1,295
4,879
18,014
(12,723)
25,193
3,977
1,970
8,693
14,397
(12,009)
1960
24,318
56,194
26,204
56,402
21,625
1970
10,203
77,612
50,083
92,109
33,965
1990
12,058
66,869
87,875
154,193
131,010
1920 1930
a
Source: U.S. Census, 1900–1990. Note: Each census has slightly different categories with which to sort out the data. Therefore, the statistics are compiled sometimes rather arbitrarily. This is intended to show a general picture of occupational breakdown among Japanese Americans in each year and a general sense of historical change over the period. For more detailed breakdowns, see the U.S. Census. a The 1930 statistics do not include Hawaii.
Appendix III: Notable Japanese Americans Kyutaro Abiko (1865–1936) was an Issei community leader and newspaper publisher in San Francisco. Having arrived in San Francisco in 1885 as a student-laborer, Abiko is known for his leadership in the Japanese immigrant society of northern California. Established in 1899, his Nichibei Shimbun [Japanese-American Daily] was one of the most influential newspapers before the Pacific War. He advocated permanent settlement when most immigrants held onto the ideal of dekasegi. In the mid-1920s, Abiko promoted a notion of the Nisei as a bridge between the United States and Japan. He encouraged the second-generation youth to appreciate their cultural heritage as much as their American citizenship. Abiko’s pluralist vision had a tremendous impact on discursive formation in prewar Japanese America. After the death of Kyutaro in 1936, his wife Yonako took over the operation of the Nichibei Shimbun until the wartime internment ended its long history. A highly educated and devout Christian, she was an important female Issei leader. Yuri Kochiyama (born 1921) is a Nisei political activist in Los Angeles and New York. Born in San Pedro, California, Kochiyama (nee Mary Nakahara) is a Nisei civil-rights advocate, whose political activism ranged from ethniccentered issues to interracial justice, and to the promotion of international human rights. At the age of 21, she was incarcerated at a War Relocation Authority camp in Arkansas—an experience that convinced her to fight against racism and other injustice in society. After the war, Kochiyama moved to New York City with her husband Bill Kochiyama, who was a member of the 442nd RCT. Kochiyama’s radical and internationalist vision made her a member of Malcolm X’s Organization for Afro American Unity in the 1960s, and she stayed aside him when Malcolm was assassinated. Subsequently, Kochiyama
1282 | Japanese Immigrants
was involved in the movement against the Vietnam War, while supporting struggles for ethnic studies and interracial solidarity. She has been also active in the cause of Puerto Rican independence. Fred Kinzaburo Makino (1877–1953) was an Issei community leader and newspaper publisher in Honolulu. Son of an English merchant and a Japanese woman born in Yokohama, Makino came to Hawaii in 1899 and operated a drug store in Honolulu, a popular hangout for local Issei. A grassroots leader of sorts, Makino played a key role in representing the voice of common working-class men and women in Hawaii’s Japanese community. Dissatisfied with the attitude of the established Issei leadership during the plantation strike of 1909, he started his own newspaper, Hawaii Hochi. In the 1920s, Makino used his paper to organize a popular movement for a test case against Hawaii’s restrictions on Japanese-language schools—a legal battle that ended in a historic victory at the U.S. Supreme Court. Makino is considered to have offered an alternative leadership in the immigrant community, which was generally governed by conservative Issei leaders. Mike Masaru Masaoka (1915–1991), was a Nisei community leader and political lobbyist in Salt Lake City and Washington, D.C. Born in California and growing up in Utah, Masaoka is unarguably the most well-known Nisei community leader, who headed the Japanese American Citizens League since 1941. His wartime role as an advocate of unconditional cooperation with the U.S. government has drawn both strong admiration and severe criticism from within the ethnic community. Serving as a public relations agent during the war, Masaoka was instrumental in the spread of positive news about the loyalty of Nisei soldiers; he was the first mainland volunteer for the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. While celebrating Nisei patriotism to improve the public perceptions of Japanese in America, he came down very hard on those who were deemed “disloyal” and “draft resisters.” After the war, Masaoka continued to work for the JACL as its Washington, D.C.-based lobbyist, contributing to the legislative actions that promoted the interests of the Japanese American community during the late 1940s and 1950s. Later, he went independent as a professional lobbyist, mainly representing Japanese business concerns in the United States. The Civil Rights movement of the 1970s made Masaoka a major target of attack by Sansei activists and anti-JACL factions, because his “conciliatory” attitude toward the internment looked like an act of acquiescence in racism. Until his death, Masaoka did not stop claiming that his decision to cooperate with the government was the best possible choice at the time, and he took pride in his role as a community leader, which got Japanese America out of its most challenging time. Masaoka represents the dominant current of Nisei’s political thinking during and after the war.
References | 1283
Kinji Ushijima (George Shima) (1864–1926) was an Issei community leader and agriculturalist in San Francisco and Stockton, California. Ushijima was one of the early Japanese immigrants who wished to pursue education while working as a common laborer. Soon after arriving in San Francisco in 1889, Ushijima found farming opportunities in the San Joaquin River delta, where frequent flooding kept the price of prime agricultural land low. By the late 1890s, Ushijima successfully turned the swamplands into profitable potato farms, and within the next decade, he became widely recognized as the “Potato King” of California. In 1913, he controlled over 28,000 acres of farmland near Stockton. Aside from being a paragon of Japanese agricultural success, Ushijima served as president of the Japanese Association of America, which played a major role in the community-wide struggle against the alien land laws.
Glossary Dekasegi: A practice of temporary work away from one’s home village. Gannen mono: “The first-year people,” who were the first group of Japanese plantation laborers shipped to Hawaii in 1868, the first year of Meiji. Haole: The term used to refer to white person or persons in Hawaii. Issei: The first generation of Japanese Americans, who immigrated to the United States before the Pacific War. Kibei: The American-born Japanese who returned to the United States after spending some years in Japan for education; a subgroup of Nisei. Nisei: The second-generation Japanese Americans. Picture brides: Immigrant wives who came to join their husbands with whom they became acquainted though the exchange of pictures. Most came between 1908 and 1920. Sansei: The third-generation Japanese Americans. Shin Issei: Literally “New Issei,” who immigrated to the United States after 1947. Yonsei: The fourth-generation Japanese Americans.
References Asato, Noriko. 2006. Teaching Mikadoism: The Attack on Japanese Language Schools in Hawaii, California, and Washington, 1919–1927. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Azuma, Eiichiro. 2005. Between Two Empires: Race, History and Transnationalism in Japanese America. New York: Oxford University Press.
1284 | Japanese Immigrants Azuma, Eiichiro. 2009. “Dancing with the Rising Sun: Strategic Alliance between Issei and Their ‘Home’ Government.” In The Transnational Politics of Asian Americans, edited by Christian Collet and Pei-te Lien, 25–37, 188–90. Philadelphia: Temple University. Daniels, Roger. 1977. The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hosakawa, Bill. 1969. Nisei: The Quiet Americans, the Story of a People. New York: William Morrow. Ichioka, Yuji. 1988. The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885–1924. New York: Free Press. Irons, Peter. 1983. Justice at War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases. New York: Oxford University Press. Kimura, Yukiko. 1988. Issei: Japanese Immigrants in Hawaii. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Kotani, Ronald. 1985. The Japanese in Hawaii: A Century of Struggle. Honolulu: Hochi. Kurashige, Lon. 2002. Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival, 1934–1990. Berkeley: University of California Press. Mears, Eliot Grinnell. 1928. Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Muller, Eric L. 2001. Free to Die for Their Country: The Story of Japanese American Draft Resisters in World War II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Odo, Franklin. 2004. No Sword to Bury: Japanese Americans in Hawaii during World War II. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Sawada, Mitziko. 1996. Tokyo Life, New York Dreams: Urban Japanese Visions of America, 1890–1924. Berkeley: University of California Press. Takaki, Ronald. 1983. Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835–1920. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Tsukuda, Yoko. 2004. “Future of the Nikkei Community: Relationship between JapaneseSpeaking and English-Speaking Nikkei.” M.A. thesis, San Francisco State University. Weglyn, Michi. 2000. Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Further Reading Azuma, Eiichiro. 2005. Between Two Empires: Race, History and Transnationalism in Japanese America. New York: Oxford University Press. Pre-World War II history of Japanese immigrants narrated from a transnational perspective. Daniels, Roger. 1977. The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion. Berkeley: University of California Press. Classic study of early exclusionist movements in California and Washington, D.C.
Further Reading | 1285 Densho. “Densho: The Japanese American Legacy Project.” [Online resource data; retrieved 8/31/09.] www.densho.org. A Web site dedicated to oral histories and documentary sources relating to the wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans with an emphasis on the Pacific Northwest. Hosakawa, Bill. 1969. Nisei: The Quiet Americans, the Story of a People. New York: William Morrow. Ichioka, Yuji. 1988. The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885–1924. New York: Free Press. Most comprehensive history of Japanese immigrant experiences on the mainland up to 1924. Ichioka, Yuji, edited by Gordon H. Chang and Eiichiro Azuma. 2006. Before Internment: Essays in Prewar Japanese American History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Collection of essays that look into various aspects of Issei and Nisei experiences in the interwar period of California and other western states. Irons, Peter. 1983. Justice at War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases. New York: Oxford University Press. Most comprehensive history of Japanese American internment and legal issues associated with that event. Japanese American National Museum. “Discover Nikkei.” [Online resource database relating to Japanese American experience; retrieved 8/31/09.] www.discovernikkei.org. Web site that offers a wide range of data on Japanese migrants and their descendants in the Americas. Available in English, Japanese, Spanish, and Portuguese. Kotani, Ronald. 1985. The Japanese in Hawaii: A Century of Struggle. Honolulu: Hochi. Popular history of Japanese American experiences in Hawaii up to the 1980s. Kurashige, Lon. 2002. Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival, 1934–2000. Berkeley: University of California Press. Historical study of a Nisei Week Japanese festival in Los Angeles and the politics of identity relating to it. Kurashige, Scott. 2007. The Shifting Grounds of Race: Black and Japanese Americans in the Making of Multiethnic Los Angeles. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Investigates a complex history of interactions between African Americans and Japanese Americans in Los Angeles since the 1920s. Odo, Franklin. 2004. No Sword to Bury: Japanese Americans in Hawaii during World War II. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Good account of Japanese American experience in wartime Hawaii and on the overseas battlefronts. Okihiro, Gary Y. 1991. Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865–1945. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Detailed history of anti-Japanese agitation in prewar Hawaii.
1286 | Japanese Immigrants Niiya, Brian, ed. 2001. Encyclopedia of Japanese American History. (Updated ed.). New York: Facts on File. Useful reference for Japanese American history. Entries organized alphabetically with a detailed chronology. Spickard. Paul R. 2009. Japanese Americans: The Formation and Transformations of an Ethnic Group. (Rev. ed.). Piscataway, NJ.: Rutgers University Press. Good survey of Japanese American history that covers Issei, Nisei, and Sansei. Takahashi, Jere. 1997. Nisei/Sansei: Shifting Japanese American Identities and Politics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Study of identity formation and political behaviors among Nisei and Sansei from the 1930s through the 1970s. Tamura, Eileen H. 1994. Americanization, Acculturation, and Ethnic Identity: The Nisei Generation in Hawaii. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Good study of Nisei experience in prewar Hawaii. Weglyn, Michi. 2000. Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Detailed study of the wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans. Yoo, David K. 2000. Growing Up Nisei: Race, Generation, and Culture among Japanese Americans of California, 1924–1949. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Study of Nisei experience in California and the internment camp from the 1930s through the end of the 1940s.
Kenyan Immigrants by Nicole C. D’Errico and Scott G. Feinstein
Introduction Though Kenyan immigrants have not been on U.S. soil for very long, they have already made their mark, especially on the education system. In the years between 1950 and 1970 the only real wave of immigration from Kenya to the United States occurred. Kenyans are known across academies in the country for their diligence and success as students. Certain Kenyan cultural traditions help them succeed when they arrive on foreign ground, such as those that encourage adaptive strategies and social support. Kenyan immigrants do not tend to cluster geographically, but they manage to maintain close social ties to each other. With the election of Barack Obama, the son of a Kenyan, to the U.S. presidency, many Kenyans feel a special connection to the United States, which could result in an increase of Kenyan immigrants in the future.
Chronology 600
Arabs arrive on the Swahili Coast.
16th century
Portuguese arrive on the Swahili Coast but are driven out by the turn of the century.
1884
Berlin Conference; European powers divided up the African continent and Kenya is taken by Great Britain.
1895
British East African Protectorate formed.
1940
A group of Kenyans with British passports settle in Chicago.
1952
State of emergency declared by British because of Mau-Mau uprisings against colonists.
1960
State of emergency ends; British make plans for a majority African rule in Kenya.
1963
Kenya becomes independent, with Jomo Kenyatta as first prime minister.
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Background | 1289
1964
Republic of Kenya formed.
1982
President Daniel Arap Moi declares a one-party system, marking a wave of emigration of scholars and others who fear persecution.
1987
Opposition groups and thinkers further oppressed, spurring oneway migration of Kenyans who choose not to return home.
1980–1990
Stagnating economy, corruption, and insufficient educational opportunities spur emigration.
2008
Postelection violence in Kenya kills 1,500 and discourages the return of immigrants.
2008–present A power-sharing agreement between President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga brings peace to the country, lasting until the present.
Background Physical Geography of Kenya The Republic of Kenya is located in the heart of East Africa. The country shares a 333-mile stretch of its border with the Indian Ocean, along with several other countries and bodies of water: the Republic of Somalia and the Indian Ocean to the east, Uganda and Lake Victoria to the west, Ethiopia and the Sudan to the north, and the Republic of Tanzania to the south. Bisected by the equator, Kenya’s borders reach roughly 4ºN to 4ºS and 34ºE to 41ºE. The total area of Kenya comprises 224,962 square miles, 5,174 square miles of which represents bodies of water, namely Lake Turkana and part of Lake Victoria (Potgieter 1976, 329–31; Africa South of the Sahara 2008, 592–94). The country received its name from Mount Kenya (5,200 meters above sea level), Africa’s second-highest peak. Many glaciers currently flow upon the country’s lofty namesake, contributing to Kenya’s unique and diverse physiography. Mount Kenya is also the country’s highest point, with a contrasting elevation extreme of the Indian Ocean (0 meters above sea level). The Kenyan Highlands also boast Mt. Elgon (4,321 meters above sea level) as well as a plateau at 2,500–3,000 meters above sea level, whose origins date back to the geologic Tertiary period. Together the isolated extinct volcanoes of Mount Kenya and Mount Elgon contribute significantly to the African Highlands and exist as a fertile zone of highly competitive agricultural production in Africa. The nearly two-thirds of the country that is not part of the Highlands is made up of desert and semidesert and is thus not as easily cultivatable (Potgieter 1976, 329–31; Africa South of the Sahara 2008, 592–94).
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Cultivation is dependent less upon temperature and more upon rainfall. It is most successful in areas where there is the greatest rainfall, at the coast, in the west of the country, and in the Highlands. In these areas there is a variety of food crops, but with an emphasis on sorghum, maize, cassava, and bananas. The main export commodities cultivated in the region are tea, coffee, and horticultural produce. While soda ash, fluorspar, rubies, and gold can be found in Kenya, these minerals fail to contribute significantly to the economy (“Kenya” 2009a). Kenya is grounded upon a Precambrian physical floor. The country is also bisected from north to south by the Great Rift Valley, characterized by steam vents and hot springs to which the many lakes and inactive volcanoes gave birth. The area of land west of the Great Rift leads slowly on a downward decline into Lake Victoria, forming a large part of the Nile Basin.
Human Geography of Kenya According to records in July 2009, the population of Kenya is 39,002,772, with just under a quarter of the population living in urban centers, namely Nairobi, the capital, and Mombasa (“Kenya” 2009a). The availability of jobs in cultivation is part of the reason that more Kenyans do not live in cities. Only 60 percent of the population is employed, but of those employed, three-fourths of them work in agriculture. There are still reports of significant numbers of Kenyans who work in towns for a short period of time and then return home to their villages at the conclusion of their work tenure, a phenomenon that is surely influencing this statistic. Approximately 36 percent of the population in these urban centers are nonAfrican, however, and this community historically and currently dominated the commercial undertakings in the cities, owning stores and fueling the economy. Two-thirds of the urban Kenyan population are concentrated in Nairobi and Mombasa (“Kenya” 2009a). An astonishing 98 percent of the population considers themselves to be religious, with most of the population divided between the two largest religions, Christian and Muslim. Though the ethnic Kikuyu population is the largest, there are several other large ethnic groups, all united by the two official national languages, English and Kiswahili. While these two languages allow for a common identity and social cohesion, there are over 40 languages spoken in the country and at least 42 ethnic groups, with major cultural distinctiveness other than just their native languages (“Kenya” 2009a). Kenya has been and still is a meeting point for physical, linguistic, cultural, and economic multicultural mutual influence. The Kiswahili language is a Bantu language, significantly influenced by Arabic. When considering Kenya’s language and the strong Persian and Arabic presence on the coast, the colonial history of Kenya makes sense.
Background | 1291
History of Kenya Before the first humans moved out of Africa to populate other parts of the world, they lived in Kenya. The archaeological record suggests that proto-hominoids were present in East Africa more than 20 million years ago. Excavations in the Lake Turkana region have produced evidence of hominid life 2.6 million years ago (Tattersall 1995). Around the first century C.E., Arab traders began arriving in Kenya. The Arabs stayed mainly in the coastal regions, until the slave trade put them in contact with those living in the interior of the country. The Arabs contributed greatly to Swahili culture, and the Swahili language that was the product of this culture. Today, over 50 million people in East and Central Africa speak Swahili (Potgieter 1976). By the eighth century C.E. Persians and Arabs were leaving the Persian Peninsula and settling in the region. This is approximately the time that the Swahili language saw its inevitable fusion with the Arabic language for the purpose of developing a trade language (Potgieter 1976). The arrival of the Portuguese in 1498 marked a 150-year hiatus of Arab colonization in the region. Though Christianity touched Kenya with the arrival of Vasco da Gama, a Portuguese explorer, the religion’s lasting power on the country’s coast was debilitated by the strong Islamic presence brought by the Arab traders. This was the trend until Europeans brought a strong, modern Christianity to Kenya, beginning in 1844. Their goal was to purge Kenyans of their traditional religions, and then fill this intentional void with Christianity (Choge and Choge 2007). It was not until the 19th century that Europeans came into Kenya en masse, at a rate higher then before. Many came as explorers and missionaries, but some also came as sportspeople and travelers. At the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, when the continent was partitioned among European powers for colonial purposes, Kenya was given to British control, while its neighbor, Tanzania, became part of German East Africa (Potgieter 1976). In 1895, after approximately 50 years of explorations in the area, Britain established the East African Protectorate, which is known to have displaced large numbers of Kikuyu from the land in order to make room for European settlers. The Europeans stuck mainly to the extremely fertile lands of the Rift Valley, displacing Massai and Kalenjin people, but leaving the less arable northern half of the country relatively untouched. The missionary efforts of British Protestant churches first took foot in Kenya around this time. Distribution of education and medicine, for example, was primarily under the auspices of the church (Potgieter 1976, “Kenya” 2009a). In 1920 Kenya was made an official British colony, but long before then Europeans were involved in governing the country, while Kenyans were barred from participating. British land policies and the exclusion of Kenyans from government led a group of freedom fighters known as the Mau-Mau, made up of mostly Kikuyus
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Jomo Kenyatta, newly elected prime minister of Kenya, waves to supporters on June 19, 1963. He would become Kenya’s first president in 1964. (Library of Congress)
in the highlands of central Kenya, to fight violently for their rights, and for their country. The Mau-Mau efforts served to put Kenya in a state of emergency for most of the 1950s, leading to the first election of Kenyans to the Legislative Council in 1957, and then full independence on December 12, 1963. Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu educated in the West and largely involved (leading, encouraging) in the resistance efforts, became Kenya’s first president (“Kenya” 2009b). The bloodshed that led to independence has been written into the Kenyan National Anthem and is pictorially represented on the Kenyan flag with the color red, standing for the blood of the freedom fighters (Lugano 2009). Since independence, Kenya had experienced relative peace despite sometimes insecure surroundings. That changed in 2008, when the presidential election brought ethnically charged fighting in Nairobi and extending outward. Though the local elections were believed to be largely fair, the presidential election was riddled with corruption, as more than 100 percent of the population apparently recorded votes. Ensuing violence was curbed by a power-sharing agreement between incumbent Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, who was later named prime minister (“Kenya” 2009a, 2009b). Though Kenya is now known as a beacon of stability in East Africa, the country is still fighting political corruption and a slow-paced economy, which means
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1293
aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other key sources is intermittent. In 2008, as a result of the political and ethnic violence and the global economic crisis, Kenya’s economy grew a mere 2.2 percent. Though the government created the Vision 2030 plan, to address matters such as deregulation of business, improved delivery of government services, structural reforms, massive investment in new infrastructure (especially roads), reduction of chronic insecurity caused by crime, and improved economic governance generally, it remains unclear how the government will fund these projects. As a result of these conditions and a rapidly growing population, which the state is unprepared to support, many Kenyans are leaving their country with hopes of gaining access to increased opportunities for educational and financial attainment elsewhere (“Kenya” 2009a).
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration Written records of Kenyan immigration are less than adequate, in part because Kenyan oral historical tradition proved impenetrable to change until the 19th century. Kenyans recorded and transmitted their history orally until the arrival of Europeans. European records show Kenyans arriving on American soil for over 300 years (Rudolph 2008). Up until 1808, the arrival of these immigrants was forced, as a result of the slave trade. Subsequent to the outlaw of the slave trade few Kenyans voluntarily emigrated to the Americas until the end of the 20th century. It was not until between 1980 and 1990 that records of Kenyan immigration show this number increasing with any significance. Recent reports/analyses have showed that the Kenyan diaspora is one of the top 10 largest from all countries in Africa (Oyelere 2007). Kenya has a strong tradition of encouraging education. Immediately following independence from Britain, Jomo Kenyatta, the country’s first president, spoke of education as the main road to the development of the country. But colonialism had changed the face of agricultural production from subsistence to commercial interests, and Kenyatta maintained the colonial practice of charging school fees for attendance. These realities combined meant that education was not simply a major driver of upward mobility and social status, but it was also a privilege of the wealthy. As more and more Kenyans sought schooling, the country’s educational infrastructure could not support these numbers (“Kenya” 2009b). In the 1980s Kenya had only six public and seven private universities (“Kenya” 2009a), whereas today the public system has yet to expand, but the private system has almost doubled. This relatively low number of seats for students meant that
1294 | Kenyan Immigrants
Kenyans had to go abroad in pursuit of education. Those who did remain in Kenya for university often found themselves part of the unemployed 40 percent of the population subsequent to graduation. The job opportunities that existed then, and still today, are primarily agricultural. Those who wish to study or work in alternative fields such as technology—or those with alternative qualifications—often choose to emigrate. Many Kenyans travel to the United States, to seize not only education, but economic opportunities. This is a phenomenon that is not specific to Kenya but is experienced in many African countries.
Immigrant Culture: Early Issues of Assimilation and Separatism and Later Waves of Immigration Though Britain, because of its colonial relationship with Kenya, had historically been the destination for Kenyans seeking education abroad, the Cold War (1945– 1991) altered this reality. Both the Soviet Union and the United States found themselves seeking to please Kenya’s policy makers using the same method: by attracting its best and brightest citizens. In efforts to attract more Kenyans than the Soviet Union—which was sending Kenyans for training to far-reaching places such as Cuba and the Ukraine—the United States used exchange programs such as Fulbright and the Kennedy student airlifts to bring Kenyans to its soil. Additionally, the United States maintained softer policies of employment for foreigners as compared to the UK, which effectively redirected the funneling of Kenyan minds (Kioko 2007, 157; Okoth 2003). It is recorded that the first group of Kenyans to settle in the United States arrived in the 1940s, having taken advantage of their British passports. The group, made up of mostly scholars and students, took up domicile in Chicago. The composition of this group is not a surprise, as education has historically been, and still is, the strongest motivating force for Kenyans to leave their home country. In fact, immediately preceding independence in 1963, a small number of Kenyans traveled to Britain for this same purpose (Ogeto and Steffes 2005). The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act opened Africa in general, but specifically Kenya, to the United States. The act abolished the national-origin quotas and greatly increased the access of non-Europeans to the United States. Furthermore, the changes helped propel and sustain the 20-year Kenyan wave of immigration to the United States and led the way for future Kenyan emigration in the 1980s and 1990s (“Three Decades of Mass” 1995). The 20 years between 1950 and 1970 encompass the only time period in Kenyan history that scholars call a “wave” of emigration (Kioko 2007, 157). For a 15-year span, beginning in 1960, Kenyans were among the top five nationalities of all countries in sub-Saharan Africa to be sending emigrants to the United States. Though the migratory trend for Kenyans during these years usually started in pursuit of
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education, Kenyans seemed to feel a magnetic pull to their homeland, as they often returned to use their foreign-born skills to develop their homeland. In fact, it was often the design of the recipient countries, such as the UK and the United States, to bring Kenyans over for education, with the intention that they could return home and help build a democracy. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) concluded that between 1985 and 1990 alone, the continent saw the flight of 60,000 professionals (Oyelere 2007, 113–14). The Kenyan diaspora remains one of the largest of all African populations abroad. The reasons for this are multifold. Literacy rates in Kenya are among the highest in Africa. High literacy rates and a predominance of English speakers in the country are both important factors in understanding why so many Kenyans are living abroad, especially in the United States. This trend switched in the 1980s and 1990s. During the 1980s, Kenya’s President Daniel Arap Moi drastically consolidated governmental powers under the executive branch after a failed military coup against him. Those who were perceived as a threat to Moi—especially those who where not members of his ruling party, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), or his tribe, Kalenjin—were forced to migrate. This resulted in the expatriation of many Kenyan intellectuals, and this therefore represents a time period that contributed strongly to Kenya’s brain drain, as many immigrants did not return home after relocating. Unlike during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when immigrants often returned home, fear of persecution reversed this pattern (Bullock 2010, 17–18; Okoth 2003). This trend continued strong straight up until the 21st century. The U.S. State Department and the Institute for International Education put out a report for the 2001–2002 academic year that showed that of all African countries, Kenya had sent the most immigrants to the United States. As of reports in 2007, the largest Kenyan diaspora in the world could be found in the United States, amounting to 47,000 Kenyans estimated to be living in the United States in 2002. This population is more than double the size in Canada, and more than triple the size in the UK (Mbaya, Mrina, and Levin 2007). The number of Kenyans being admitted into the United States has been on the rise in recent years. For example, while 1986 saw the arrival of a mere 719 Kenyans, this figure has been growing steadily each year, with 1,185 in 1991, 2,154 in 2001, and then a big jump in 2004 to 5,323 (Odera 2007, 5). The major spike in the number of Kenyans arriving in the United States was from 1990 to 1991, is in large part because of the diversity visa lottery (DVL) (Mbaya, Mrina, and Levin 2007). Economic despair was the catalyst for many Kenyans to travel abroad in the late 1980s through the 1990s. Kenya also saw ethnic conflict as a result of the general elections of 1992 and 1997, which spurred the departure of many skilled workers and intellectuals, many of them landing in the United States. It is clear that the
1296 | Kenyan Immigrants
stunted economic growth of the country throughout Moi’s presidency resulted in many Kenyans seeking opportunities elsewhere, where they existed, most significantly throughout the 1990s (“Kenya” 2009a). A continued problem in the history of migrants and up until today is disconnect between skilled/educated labor and jobs. Hundreds of thousands of highly skilled, highly educated workers are left without an outlet for work in their home country. Until this problem is resolved, we can expect the numbers of Kenyan immigrants to continue to increase (Oyelere 2007). President Kibaki, since election in 2002, has made vast promises to increase employment on the scale of 500,000 jobs per year. As of yet, these words remain promises. Kibaki has successfully curbed the political repression that sent many abroad during Moi’s presidency. Without the creation of new jobs, however, the country is unlikely to see a reversal in the large numbers of Kenyans traveling abroad for work. Today, many Kenyans are traveling to the United States to celebrate milestones in the lives of their loved ones living there already. Many come for weddings and graduations. A portion of those people traveling for this reason delay or significantly extend their stay abroad, introducing a wholly new migratory trend seen only because of extended stays of immigrants, and the birth of the second and later generations of immigrants (Gitahi 2005).
Demographic Profile There is a fair amount of criticism of the systematic data collection (or arguably, the lack thereof ) for the demographics of the African diaspora abroad. The main point of contention is the feeling among scholars that the African diaspora is considered a homogenous variable of analysis, irregardless of gender and nationality or any other differences, when looking at socioeconomic attainment. More recently, scholars (Kollehlon and Eule 2003) have drawn attention to how gender differences, among others, make up a great deal of crucial variability in the socioeconomic attainment among African immigrants. It has been established that human capital assets, such as skills and education, are correlated with socioeconomic attainment for economic immigrants. This is to say that migrants from countries with language, culture, and economic/legal structures that do not stray far from their potential country of residence will be more easily absorbed by the host country on account of easily transferable skills (Kollehlon and Eule 2003). Others (such as Portes and Back, quoted in Kollehlon and Eule 2003) argue that human capital is a less sound predictor of socioeconomic attainment than the sociocultural contexts themselves, in which the immigrants must infiltrate. Their
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contention is that the quality of the labor market in the destination country will have more of an impact on incorporation of immigrants than human capital can. This is an important consideration when analyzing Kenyan immigrants in the United States, a county where there are strong black–white inequalities in the labor market. When it comes to economic attainment, however, it is well established that Kenyan immigrants do better than non–English speaking African immigrants.
Size and Composition of the Community At a minimum, there are an average of 1,260 Kenyan immigrants living in each state of the United States. The education level of Kenyans arriving in the United States points to the U.S. government’s immigration policy, which privileges educated persons for obtaining visas. In 2000, for example, 82 percent of the Kenyans living in the United States had post-secondary education, while a mere 38 percent of their counterparts in the European Union states had achieved this level. Furthermore, only 5 percent of the population living in Kenya at the time could boast this degree of education attainment. At the same time, Kenyan students have gained a reputation among admissions boards in the United States as hard-working students, one hypothetical explanation for why their number continues to increase (Mbaya, Mrina, and Levin 2007). In 2000, the largest population of Kenyans could be found in Houston, Texas, followed by the second largest in Arlington, Virginia. The cities where Kenyans made up the largest percentage of the population were Leicester, Massachusetts, and Tyson Corner, Virginia, respectively (Makori 2006). According to an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) survey of illegal immigrants in the United States between 1900 and 1999, there were an estimated 15,000 Kenyans illegally living in the United States, either having violated the terms of their visas or having entered illegally. The East African Standard, an important newspaper for Kenyan immigrants, reports that many Kenyans have become “professional students,” bouncing from one degree to the next, in order to maintain a legal status. The United States, compared to the UK, is considered a safer destination for illegal immigrants, because it is widely believed that the only real reason for getting deported is criminal activity, and much less because one overstays a visa (Kahura 2006).
Age and Family Structure Data on the Kenyan diaspora in the United States are from 2000, and no official, subsequent data exist. The estimated number of Kenyan-born immigrants living in the United States at that time was 40,680. An estimate from 2001 raised the number to about 47,000. As a result of gender roles in Kenya, which make it easier for
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men to travel, the demographic composition of the population in 2001 was 54 percent male, and 46 percent female. Kenyan immigrants, as compared to other East African immigrants, were the youngest in age, with a median age of 32.1. Of the population 11.5 percent are under 15 years of age, while a mere 6.1 percent are 55 or over. The vast majority of the Kenyan diaspora are between 15 and 54, with 46.5 percent between 15 and 34 and 35.9 percent 35 to 54 years of age (Mbaya, Mrina, and Levin 2007). The Kenyan diaspora is still growing and expanding in recent years. We know this because only 25 percent of the community lived in the same house in 1995 as compared to 2000. It is also worthy to note that in 2000, when the census was taken, 39 percent of the Kenyans in the United States had been living in an entirely different country in 1995 (Mbaya, Mrina, and Levin 2007).
Educational Attainment East Africans have the highest rates of educational attainment of all immigrant groups in the United States. In fact, East African immigrants in the United States are twice as likely to have graduated from college than U.S.-born citizens, and three times as likely as U.S.-born blacks. Kenyan immigrants play a large role in making these statistics what they are. According to the U.S. Census, 94 percent of Kenyan immigrants graduated from high school and 51 percent hold a bachelor’s degree or higher. Thus, the majority of Kenyan students in the United States can be found in urban colleges and universities (Mbaya, Mrina, and Levin 2007). Based on these high rates of educational attainment, it follows that a high number of Kenyan immigrants have a place in the labor market. Kenyan-born U.S. residents, in fact, are more likely to be employed than the general population. Additionally, their unemployment rate is lower than that of the general population.
Economic Attainment, Occupation, and Income Patterns There are more than 25,000 Kenyans over 16 years of age who are in the labor force in the United States. Approximately half of them are in managerial/professional or related positions. The second most popular occupation is “sales or office,” with about a quarter of the population having these jobs. The next most common occupation is service, with 18 percent of the population falling in this field, followed by 8 percent in “production, transportation or material moving.” Only 2 percent of the Kenyan diaspora is employed in “construction, extraction and maintenance,” and a mere 0.1 percent has jobs in farming, fishing, and forestry, despite the fact that over 75 percent of the work force in Kenya are employed with agricultural jobs. These
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numbers undoubtedly represent the high rates of educational attainment among Kenyans living in the United States, achieved both in Kenya (among those who immigrated after obtaining a degree) and among those who come to the States to study (Mbaya, Mrina, and Levin 2007; “Immigration & Jobs” 2007). At the same time, there are reports from Kenyan parents of immigrants, who have never left their country, questioning their children’s decision to pursue a life with (debatably) more opportunities in the United States. This sentiment is reflective of a very symbolically contested idea: Is life really better abroad? Many parents of immigrants, who attempt to analyze their children’s decision to expatriate are not convinced that life is better abroad. Their evidence is what they claim to be the high numbers of children who refuse to take over family-run businesses or agricultural endeavors at home, yet are working as security guards or dish-washers in the United States. For those who have never left their home country of Kenya, it is difficult to understand the nature of the opportunities they hear about, especially when their children report working in jobs that they perceive to be less than ideal (“The Pain Abroad” 2007). It follows naturally that, given the high number of educated and employed Kenyans in the United States, these facts would foreshadow high household income, which they in fact do. The median household income for Kenyan Americans in 1999 was approximately $43,000, higher than the income for the general population. Their per capita income was also higher than for the general population, just under $30,000 (Mbaya, Mrina, and Levin 2007). Based on the immigration theories listed previously, the high number of educated and employed Kenyan immigrants could be the result of their advantage over other non–English speaking immigrants, but it could also be the result of the quality of the labor market in the United States, capable of absorbing these workers. Ironically, despite higher than average educational and economic attainment, Kenyans were not less likely to be living in poverty than the general population. In fact, despite scoring higher on educational and economic attainment than all other East African immigrants, Kenyans scored the poorest among their nativeregional neighbors from Tanzania and Uganda in terms of the number living in poverty. However, this high number of impoverished Kenyan immigrants could be representative only of the fact that many of them were in college at the time of the census in 2000. The next census will serve to validate or invalidate this possibility. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a large number of Kenyans in the United States are seeking training as nurses, in efforts to fill the growing demand in this field in the United States. The pull to work in the United States is strong: Kenyan immigrants in the United States have reported that one day’s salary abroad is equal to one month’s salary in Kenya.
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Health Statistics and Issues Relative to other immigrant groups, Kenyans score fairly well in health outcomes, indicating a lower prevalence of the depression and other mental disorders common among immigrants. Because notions of health and illness are so tightly bound to culture, as well as patterns of reporting symptoms and seeking help from health practitioners, it is difficult to know the reasons for this outcome. It can be hypothesized, however, that this positive outcome is in part related to the strong religiosity among Kenyans; there is a large body of literature relating positive health outcomes to strength of religious beliefs. The maintenance of the cultural practice of harambee, responsible for strong social cohesion and connectivity, is also a potential contributing factor to this outcome (Odera 2007). Harambee is best translated as “let’s all pull together” and is a concept referred to in the West as community self-help. Female immigrants tend to score worse on measures of mental health than do their male counterparts. There are many potential factors that could help explain this phenomenon. Importantly, Kenyan culture encourages a stoic male figure, devoid of most kinds of emotional expression. This might affect the reporting of mental health issues, as Kenyan male immigrants might be less likely to recognize and/or report symptoms. On the other hand, this result might point to a lower level of satisfaction for female immigrants, potentially pointing to some gender-specific differences in the immigrant experience. For example, while both male and female immigrants are faced with the abounding challenges that revolve around adjustment to a new culture, the female immigrant experience is undoubtedly compounded by the reality that in the United States, they are put face-to-face with a drastically new gender role as a woman, and now expected to acculturate, while at the same time achieving financial independence and the expectation of high positions in the work force (Odera 2007). These are just some of the many potential factors influencing differences in health patterns among male and female Kenyan immigrants.
Adjustment and Adaptation Kenyan immigrants who were leaders in their communities—teachers, doctors, pastors, and business people, for example—can find it particularly hard to adjust to a new society, where discrimination against skin color and country of origin differences can be part of life for a Kenyan immigrant. Differences in levels of adjustment vary among male and female immigrants. Male Kenyan immigrants tend to report higher levels of Kenyan acculturation, which could be the result of many factors. It has been hypothesized that this occurrence is the result of the Kenyan tradition in which immigrants grew up, which encourages males to have greater
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responsibilities for caretaking and the transmission of culture to younger generations. On the other hand, because there are dozens of ethnic groups in Kenya, and men and women often intermarry among them, women in Kenya are expected to display more cultural malleability, requiring a more rapid adaptation to their spouse’s culture. There are, however, many factors that could be responsible for this discrepancy. It is important to note that when asked specifically about bicultural identity—the maintenance of Kenyan identity while simultaneously adopting an American identity—both genders reported strongly possessing this duality of identity, without sensitivity to length of stay. This could be the remnant of life in colonized Kenya, where Kenyans, even in oppressive situations, were able to function within two cultures at one time. Similarly, it has been hypothesized that Kenyan immigrants use religion as an important buffer against the stress of adaptation in a manner they learned and practiced to do while living under a colonized regime (Kioko 2007). Data on this occurrence suggests that women use religion to help them cope and adapt more than men. Still, even when taking age and duration of stay into account, there are important differences in acculturation between men and women (Gitahi 2005; Odera 2007; Wamwara-Mbugua 2003). Similarly, there are differing patterns of acculturation that map onto age differences. Unsurprisingly, older Kenyan immigrants report much higher levels of Kenyan identity than do younger groups, tending toward higher levels of American identity. This is most likely due to the time differences both groups have spent in the differing countries. Importantly, age is only revealed as a factor affecting acculturation when it is considered next to length of stay in the United States, which is to say that those immigrants who migrated as adults face more of a challenge in the acculturation process when they arrive in the United States (Gitahi 2005; Odera 2007; Wamwara-Mbugua 2003). For those immigrants who arrive in the United States and then attend elementary, middle, or high school, the cultural differences in the classroom take a degree of acclimation. Kenyan immigrants who were teachers at home and become teachers
Harambee is a Kenyan tradition that is best translated as “let’s all pull together.” It has been described by Ngau (1987) as “the collective and cooperative participation of a community in an attempt to fill perceived needs through utilization of its own resources” (p. 525). Historically this meant that groups of men and women would gather together and help a family build a house or help with some kind of agricultural need. Today, harambee is usually exhibited when a family needs financial support for a wedding or a funeral. This cultural practice is integral to Kenyan immigrants, who, in the spirit of harambee, often help each other without any kind of familial or historical connection.
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abroad must acclimate to a new classroom dynamic and often perceive cultural differences in education to be solely a matter of discipline. The characteristics of the American classrooms that are the most new to Kenyan immigrants are the encouragement of free and open speech, discussion, and differences in the relationship between teacher and pupil. In Kenya, this relationship is much more hierarchical, characterized by large and expected displays of respect. Those who are accustomed to this system report being unfamiliar with the kind of relationships in the United States, characterized by open discussion and a perceived more free manner of speaking out loud. This can be an issue for both students and Kenyan teachers who arrive in the United States. Teachers must adjust to a new kind of role with a different system of discipline. Students find themselves making adjustments in their conduct in order to meet expectations (Oriaro 2007). Organizations such as the International Rescue Committee, in New York City, hold yearly “Readiness Camp” for those who have recently arrived, which attempts to slowly introduce and familiarize immigrants with the new educational system they will meet in the United States (Wamwara-Mbugua 2003). Another difference for Kenyan immigrants who have spent some of their childhood years in school in Kenya is the different means of assessing individual progress between Kenya and the United States. Kenyan immigrants must adjust to a more frequent and steadily paced assessment scheme that differs from the one at home, which tends to only assess students once, at the end of the year. Immigrants attempt to maintain elements of life in their home country when they come abroad. Though in most towns soccer (known as futbol in Kenya) is not as popular in the United States as it is in Kenya, participation in this game is one method Kenyans have to simulate the home environment abroad. In Kansas City, for example, Kenyans have organized around this sport with “Kenya FC,” a local club organized by immigrants. Soccer stars, such as Felix Makachia, who played in the premier league for Gor Mahia while at home in Kenya, and Simon Mulama, who was a star on AFC Leopards, one of Kenya’s top teams, have found a home with Kenya FC (Makori 2006). Soccer clubs often serve to socially organize African immigrants from many countries. It is a means for Kenyans to meet other Kenyans, often with different ethnic backgrounds, and for Kenyans to connect with members of other Kenyan diasporas in the United States. The byproduct of working toward a collective goal is usually unity among group members, which is a beneficial social outcome for those involved. Kenyan immigrants report experiencing greater freedom of expression, as a result of the tradition of human rights in the United States. As a result of this, many Kenyans report major differences in gender roles, coming from a more overtly maledominated society. As an example, Kenyan women have reported a certain freedom found in the utilization of 911, as a means of reporting spousal abuse (Odera 2007).
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Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals The differences between the individualized culture of the United States and the interdependent culture of Kenya become crystallized when analyzing rituals around birth. Kenyans have confirmed the presence of this difference in speaking about who a child belongs to; in Kenya, a child is said to have many fathers, mothers, sisters, and brothers because he or she belongs to the community (Gitahi 2005; Odera 2007; Wamwara-Mbugua 2003). Perhaps this is why the tradition of baby showers is so easily picked up by Kenyans living in the United States. While this type of celebration is not entirely new to Kenyans, the social structure of the celebration in the United States has been readily adopted by Kenyans, who are also finding out the sex of their children in utero more frequently than in the past (Gitahi 2005; Odera 2007; WamwaraMbugua 2003). Many Kenyans who give birth in the United States continue their ethnic group’s tradition in naming children. This means, depending on ethnic differences, that children born to Kenyan parent(s) may have names that correspond to the weather on the day they were born, the season, or perhaps a word that is religiously motivated (Gitahi 2005; Odera 2007; Wamwara-Mbugua 2003). Male circumcision among most ethnic groups in Kenya is a very different practice than it is in the United States. In Kenya, boys in their early adolescence go into the forest and spend weeks in isolation from their communities, being trained by elders about what it means to become a man. Because most circumcisions in the
Michael Njoroge poses with his one-yearold daughter, Hope, at thier home in Houston, Texas, February 29, 2008. Njoroge, an information technology consultant in Houston, immigrated from Kenya 11 years before. (AP Photo/Bob Levey)
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United States are completed immediately after birth (and therefore are devoid of symbolic memory), children of Kenyan immigrants in the United States tend to view the symbolism behind this right of passage in Kenya as corresponding instead with events such as graduations and obtaining one’s drivers license in the United States. Some Kenyans here lament the absence of this tradition in the United States, feeling that men who have not gone through this rite are missing out on lessons that would prepare them properly to be mature adults. The important elements of traditional Kenyan circumcision/initiation rites, such as leaving behind adolescent behavior in exchange for a newer, cleaner life, can be found in the Christian rite of baptism, which the majority of Kenyans in the diaspora take part in in their local churches. For Kenyan females, their rite of passage into womanhood can be symbolized by events such as a “sweet sixteen” celebration. Many Kenyans living in the United States, when surveyed, express nostalgia and even desire for traditional rites of passage as they are in Kenya. Furthermore, it is clear that Kenyans in the diaspora are less likely to celebrate their cultural rights of passage abroad in the way they would if they were at home (Gitahi 2005; Odera 2007; Wamwara-Mbugua 2003). Marriage is another rite of passage for both men and women, in Kenya and in the United States. The differences between the expectations of the union and the symbolism behind it, however, exhibit some of the changes in gender relations between men and women in the diaspora. In Kenya, procreation is the central role of a marriage, which is seen as offering a woman a space to exhibit her womanhood. Men are never blamed for infertility, and a woman who does not give birth can be seen as shameful, or without use in society. Kenyans who arrive in the United States are undoubtedly faced with differing notions of gender roles, as unions without children are more accepted, and infertility is approached as a possibility for both men and women. Because there is no dowry for women who wed in the United States, as is the practice in Kenya, the value of having children can be seen as different (Odera 2007;Wamwara-Mbugua 2003). There are other noteworthy differences in the role of marriage that Kenyans face in the United States. One such difference is the potential for a woman to propose to a man, which is prohibited in Kenya. In Kenya, when a woman gets married, she is seen as reborn as a new member of her husband’s family, and as a former member, a visitor even, of her own bereft family, hence the requirement of a dowry. Thus, for some Kenyans, such as the Kikuyu, marriage can be a sad event. This is of course different in the United States. While most women still choose to drop their maiden names to make room for their husbands’ family names, men and women who marry in the States are both seen to be adopted into each other’s family, with no particular difference between the genders. These are some of the ways that differences in marriage practices can affect a Kenyan immigrant’s experience in the United States. Furthermore, many Kenyans in the United States find themselves
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William Mukabane and his wife, Alice, are owners of a Kenyan restaurant in Washington, D.C. (Kevin Clark/The Washington Post/Getty Images)
in interracial relationships and marriages, despite the strong tradition in Kenya of marrying within one’s tribe (Gitahi 2005; Odera 2007). The Kenyan community in Atlanta, Georgia, is an example of how native traditions can be maintained in regard to marriage. Traditional songs are sung, as they are in Kenya, to mark the “taking” of a woman from her home, and dowries continue to be paid, even overseas. Because many tribes in Kenya view marriage as occurring not only between two people, but between two families, Kenyans marrying abroad tend to place great importance on earning the “blessing” of both families involved before a wedding date is set (Wamwara-Mbugua 2003). For many Kenyan immigrants, weddings and funerals are a time to join together and collectively help out a friend or relative in need. Importantly, Kenyan immigrants in the United States maintain the cultural tradition of daily/overnight collective prayers following the death of a loved one, or during challenging periods, called keshas. While keshas are held by Kenyan immigrants in the United States they are less frequent than in Kenya, suggesting among other things that certain aspects of U.S. culture may not leave room for or value this kind of event.
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Some Kenyans report differences in the way child bearing and rearing responsibilities are typically given to men and women in their culture versus the culture in the United States. For example, pregnancy and childbirth in Kenya are viewed as the woman’s work more so than in the United States, where men are encouraged to involve themselves throughout both child bearing and rearing. Kenyans in the diaspora also note differences in raising children, as life abroad tends to go handin-hand with more time spent at work for both parents, which encourages a parenting environment in which day-to-day responsibilities are shared. Like immigrants from other countries, Kenyans who arrive have a tendency to settle in cities where there are already existing communities of other Kenyans. This is a way for them to receive support and comfort from a familiar language and culture, so the shock of a new environment does not become overwhelming. When utilized, the social networking that comes from Kenyan organizations in the United States is a powerful way for Kenyans to stay connected to each other. Recently, the Internet has served as an additional outlet for the organization of Kenyans.
Continued Links to Kenya News sharing, in both directions, is a main reason that Kenyan immigrants report as the purpose of their contact with their families. A majority of immigrants report using phone calls as a way to stay in touch, and a minority report the Internet. This most likely results from the fact that large areas of Kenya are without electricity. Online newspapers are the main source of information about Kenyan news for immigrants. These connections are reported to be the main method through which immigrants maintain ties to their home. A study of Kenyan immigrants in New Jersey suggests that Kenyans in the United States have developed several effective ways of maintaining a link to their home country. The transmission of remittances represents a strong method by which Kenyans foster this connection, while also contributing to the Kenyan economy. In 2007, it was estimated by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) that 51 percent of all remittances entering Kenya from abroad were coming from legal and illegal immigrants in the United States (Kioko 2007). The CBK believes this number is an underestimate and cites challenges relating to capturing the data. This number excludes money transferred through hawalas, a popular informal way of transferring money often utilized by illegal immigrants. Nonfinancial remittances are also sent—especially by Kenyan organizations abroad—often in the form of social capital, for example, behavior and ideas. Other means of maintaining this link include continued personal connection, and the building and maintenance of houses in Kenya. Importantly, the sending of remittances can be a method through which Kenyan immigrants—especially those fighting low economic status in the United States—build pride in the face of the new
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discrimination that comes with being a minority for perhaps the first time in one’s life. Despite the many ways that Kenyans maintain their ties to their home, it is not always easy. Like most immigrant groups, Kenyan American parents have reported a sense of failure around imbuing their children with a strong sense of Kenyan culture and identity. Young adult Kenyan immigrants often clash with their parents, who tend to resist certain aspects of acculturation more than their children. Young adults, for example, report that their parents maintain a strict demeanor—the result of the Kenyan age-respect hierarchy—when they enforce rules around proper clothing style and language choice.
Social Organization Based on National/Ethnic Backgrounds Many Kenyan organizations have developed in the last decade for the purpose of locating members of the diaspora to encourage involvement in the development of their home country. The Kenyan Community Abroad (KCA) and the Kenyan Development Network Consortium (KDNC), among others, have been serving this purpose. Web sites like the Kenyan Community Abroad (KCA) can provide the needed virtual space for Kenyans to connect with one another and discuss themes surrounding the immigrant experience. For many Kenyans, sharing their experiences—both the struggles and the triumphs—can be an adaptation strategy as they attempt to achieve the “American Dream.” The Organization of East Africans (OEA) was a major source of social organization for Kenyans living in the Chicago area in the early 1990s. Formed by a group of Kenyans but also including Ugandans and Tanzanians, the organization sought to respond to some of the most common issues facing immigrants at the time. Some of these issues included general cultural and urban adjustment, unemployment, and navigation of the health care system. The organization played an important role in the social lives of immigrants as well, as it was responsible for organizing formal celebrations around important Kenyan holidays, such as Jamhuri Day (December 12), marking independence from Britain, and Madaraka Day (June 1), which celebrates the beginning of a self-governing Kenya. The OEA set the stage for the development of other Kenyan organizations in the area. Within a four-year period at the end of the 1990s, two important groups were founded: the Chicago Association for Kenyan Professionals (CAKP) and the United Kenyans of Chicago (UKC). The groups target Kenyan professionals, and nonimmigrants, in addressing general community issues such as housing, employment, and social organization (Ogeto and Steffes 2005). In 2001 Kenyan student members of Chicago’s Moody Bible Institute formed a group called Ushirika, the Swahili word for fellowship. Chicago is also home to TopDonn Entertainment, an entertainment business run by Kenyans, and the
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Association of Kenyan Runners Abroad, seeking to provide support and protection to Kenyan athletes in the area (Ogeto and Steffes 2005).
Religion When considering the work of European missionaries in Kenya detailed earlier, and the high number of Kenyans who consider themselves religious, it is no surprise that many Kenyan immigrants in the United States identify strongly with the communities they find in churches here. Kenyan immigrants often form congregations around their nationality. These churches can be denominational, but they are also interdenominational, leaving room for Kenyans of different faiths to bond spiritually together, while celebrating their native identity. For these congregation members, the church can be an important link to their home culture. Ethnic (Kenyan) immigrant churches can be a outlet for immigrants to take part in their old traditions. In these churches, there is a reported strong sense of collectivism, similar to that found in Kenya, in which an individual’s problems are seen and treated as the group’s problem (Gitahi 2005). Those who do not attend ethnically Kenyan churches tend to have arrived long ago, when such churches did not yet exist. Instead, they often attend Anglo and African American churches without ethnic majorities. Many Kenyans report these churches as a strong source of support, both psychosocial and financial, as church groups easily raise money for school fees and utility bills, and the like, for those who are in need. Furthermore, small Christian communities known as jumuiya ndogo ndogo meet together in members’ houses for collective prayer (Gitahi 2005).
Language Issues and Media A large majority of Kenyans arriving in the United States are at the very least trilingual; they speak English and Swahili (the co-official languages of Kenya) and usually at least one other native language. Thus, most Kenyans in the United States already have experience with code switching, using what is sometimes called “Sweng” in Kenya, a street language that blends Swahili and English. It would follow then that conversations among Kenyans who meet in the United States are often characterized by this kind of code switching. Most Kenyans in the United States find it difficult to express themselves solely in English, as language shapes cognitive understanding, and many important Swahili proverbs cannot be meaningfully translated into English. Furthermore, those who become parents often choose to teach their children in their native tongue. Some linguists describe the English spoken among some Kenyans in the United States as Kenyan English (KE). Kenyan English is distinctly different from American Standard English (AmE), and the British variety of English spoken in Kenya, and is
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said to be an “appropriated and reconfigured” (Bosire 2006) version of AmE. KE is characterized in its difference from AmE with its dipthongization of tense vowels and in variability in the pronunciation of “r,” “d,” and “t” (Bosire 2006). Though the differences between AmE and KE may seem trivial, upon greater analysis of immigrant culture, the importance of this linguistic reality is revealed as part of a greater part of the picture of what life looks like for a Kenyan immigrant in the United States. Language choice is not only a political choice that relates to one’s identity, but it can be analyzed as part of a greater adapting/coping strategy among those who intentionally employ one language instead of another in certain social situations. Patterns among first-generation Kenyan immigrants show that Kenyans are very cognizant of the implications of these decisions and often capitalize on their multilingualism to their advantage, according to the situation they find themselves in. Thus, in this way, code switching can be seen as an adaptation strategy; in situations in which Kenyans are most likely to be overheard by outsiders, AmE with an “idealized” accent is often chosen (Bosire 2006). The choice of Kenyan immigrants to code switch into Swahili or other languages native to Kenya is thus clearly a choice made to assert their identity in a foreign place, allowing those with a shared heritage or identify to recognize each other. Furthermore, the persistence of this trend among those who have been in the United States for a long time exhibits one way in which some Kenyans choose to maintain and foster their Kenyan identity. Following this line of inference, choosing not to code switch, or masking (or emulating) an accent is a way in which some Kenyans choose to hide their ethnic background. Because some immigrants have had experiences with discrimination about their country of origin, and because an accent is one of the first ways someone’s origin becomes known, some do choose to hide their accent or language (Bosire 2006). The East African Standard often publishes articles that confront the issues of emigration from Kenya. The Internet is responsible not only for keeping networks of members of the Kenyan diaspora in contact, but for providing free, easily acquired news about Kenya. The Standard, Kenya’s newspaper, is also accessible online and is a common newspaper among Kenyan immigrants.
Holidays, Foodways, and the Arts As stated earlier, the OEA is responsible for organizing groups of Kenyans in the United States to celebrate national holidays together. Churches can also serve the purpose of gathering Kenyans together in a manner that allows and even encourages them to celebrate Kenyan holidays. Kenyans in the United States have opened very successful Kenyan restaurants. One such example is Fanta in Overland Park City, Kansas. Menus typically offer all the traditional Kenyan foods one could find in Kenya: ugali, chapati, beef stew,
1310 | Kenyan Immigrants
nyama choma, kuku choma, kachumbari, mukimo, samosa, pilau, and maandazi. This is one way for Kenyans to not only experience elements of their native culture abroad, but for them to bring aspects of their culture to the masses in the United States. Fanta is well attended by Kenyan immigrants (Munene 2007). There are many Kenyan musicians living in the United States. Many of them are able to acquire a temporary visa to perform, and then, with the help of managers or publicists, decide to stay and continue their careers in the United States. Hardstone, a Kenyan musician, remained in the United States after his hit, “Uhiki,” brought him fame in the 1990s. Not all Kenyan musicians who decide to stay in the United States have continued success in their careers, despite relocation. Musicians such as Bamboo, Attitude, and Mercy Myra, for example, have had rare opportunities to perform (“The Pain Abroad” 2007). Kenyans are known to dominate marathons in the United States. In the early 20th century, European athletics were institutionally imposed in Kenya by colonists, as a part of the school curriculum and in other facets of social organization. This process has been described as having changed running in Kenya from folk culture to modern sport. On the global stage, at the Olympics—where the sporting events are almost entirely Euro-American in origin—it is no surprise that Kenyans excel in those sports that require the least amount of expensive equipment, which is usually not available in Kenya. Due to the geographic locations of major athletic competitions, Kenyans are forced to spend much time away from home. Those sports stars, especially runners, who gain international attention often seek domicile in other countries, fueling the Kenyan diaspora. One such example is Bernard Lagat, born in Kenya and currently residing in Tuscon, Arizona. Many Kenyans who go abroad and win races and break records earn large sums of money, which often get sent back home to be used on farms and to acquire land (“Immigration & Jobs” 2007).
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture The United States has become the destination of choice for Kenyan immigrants in recent history for several reasons, mostly related to immigrant policies. In the United States, for example, the children born to illegal immigrants are granted, by the Constitution, a free public education.
Paths toward Citizenship Some Kenyans arrive in the United States as legal permanent residents (LPR), or green card holders. According to immigration law, those who have obtained green cards have been granted “lawful permanent residence.” The Diversity Visa (DV) Program provides one method for obtaining permanent residence, through a lottery.
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The requirements, however, limit the potential recipients by requiring an applicant to have a high school education (or its equivalent) or two years of work experience during the five years that precede an application. Furthermore, the required work experience must be completed in a field that requires its workers to have at least two years of training. Legal residents who meet all requirements are allowed to apply for citizenship. Kenya’s government, however, like many other governments in Africa, does not allow its citizens to hold dual citizenship with any other country. This is, of course, a deterrent to applying for citizenship, as those Kenyan immigrants who do obtain it must relinquish their status, and the privileges that go along with Kenyan citizenship (“Kenyan Paper Says New” 2004; USCIS 2009). A small number of the Kenyan immigrants in the United States have come as professionals on contract, whose visas stipulate their return at the end of their prescribed work tenure. The visa utilized by this group is classified as H, and it is challenging to obtain. Since the advent of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military has offered an expedited path toward citizenship, sometimes as quick as six months, for immigrants who have lived in the United States for two years and pass an English test—a requirement that gives Kenyans an advantage over nonnative English speakers. Illegal immigrants, however, are barred by the government from taking this route. While Iraqis and Japanese have had the highest numbers of enrollment on this path, only one Kenyan immigrant from 2005 to 2008 had been granted citizenship via the military by 2007 (“Immigration & Jobs” 2007).
Stella Gichohi, from Kenya, holds her niece Alexis during a naturalization ceremony at the Citizenship and Immigration Services office in Irving, Texas, July 2, 2010. (AP Photo/Cody Duty)
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The data from the 2000 Census show, unsurprisingly, a positive correlation between duration of residence in the United States and citizenship, that is, the longer Kenyans have resided in the United States, the more likely they are to be citizens. To that end, those arriving after 1990 were far less likely to have achieved citizenship. There are not, however, specific data on the proportion of Kenyans who have stayed after the expiration of the visas (Mbaya, Mrina, and Levin 2007). About one in every four Kenyan immigrants arriving in the United States after 1990 are citizens. The majority of the noncitizen population are those who have arrived after 1990. Furthermore, as can be expected, duration of residence is also correlated with integration, leaving recent arrivals with less established lives in the United States. Scholars argue, however, that it is important to analyze not just length of stay as a measure of acculturation, but what aspects of the host environment enable a smooth process (Mbaya, Mrina, and Levin 2007).
Intergroup Relations As we know, it has only been the Kenyans arriving in the United States in the past two or three decades who have decided to take permanent residence. As a result, unlike the existence of “Little Italy” or “Chinatown” in major cities, Kenyans have not yet established distinctive geographic communities, densely populated with Kenyans immigrants, businesses, and Kenyan-culture-related spaces. To that end, patterns of assimilation and/or acculturation have been scarcely studied. At the same time, the lack of Kenyan enclaves is believed to be one of the reasons, among others, that Kenyans often enjoy smooth integration into U.S. life. Some other proposed reasons for this occurrence is the predominance of the consumption of U.S. culture in Kenya, namely through media outlets and movies, the presence of a common language (increasing the speed of acculturation and widening economic opportunities), and the fact that most Kenyan immigrants in the United States are highly educated and skilled. Unfortunately, this phenomenon does, for Kenyan immigrants, lead to “brain waste” (Oyelere 2007), which occurs when well-educated immigrants take jobs in their host countries for which they are overqualified. This phenomenon is different than “brain drain,” which signifies the draining of educated society members from their homes when they choose to emigrate and use their skills elsewhere. “Brain waste” takes place when well-educated immigrants take jobs that do not fully use their skills. Many Kenyan immigrants in the United States report connections to other Kenyan immigrants that fall along ethnic and linguistic lines. Noticing this trend in the last eight years in the United States, researchers fear this trend will be the cause of a weak national network of Kenyans abroad. As ethnic and linguistic subidentities become more socially and political useful to Kenyan Americans, the Kenyan supraidentity loses its utility and decreases the strength and need of the national
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networks of Kenyans abroad. Instead of the Kenyan American identity functioning as a political and social power, it is more useful to network within the ethnic and linguistic subgroups, reducing the utility of national networks. At the same time, Kenyans, in the spirit of harambee, report high frequencies of financially helping each other when necessary. Intergroup relations among Kenyans in the United States can be characterized by an important tradition called harambee, indigenous to Kenya. Literally translated to “let’s all pull together,” the tradition has been maintained in the United States among immigrant communities. The importance of social support among immigrants during the acculturation process is well established, and it is likely that this tradition plays a large role in the lives of Kenyan immigrants. The tradition is characterized by a pooling of collective resources for the benefit of a person or family in need. Harambee can lead to the collective funding of someone’s education or wedding, or funeral. The tradition, however, especially among immigrants, has gone far beyond the provisions of financial support to include the necessary psychological and emotional support that is crucial to the acculturation process for any immigrant attempting to make a life in a new culture. Harambee is also believed to provide a buffer against the acute stressors of immigration that can easily lead to depression and isolation (Ngao 1987; Odera 2007). Despite a lack of real geographical closeness, Kenyans sampled in a metropolitan city in the southern United States have been found to be very tightly interconnected. The interconnectedness is seen as the result of the camaraderie that comes from group events such as visiting hair salons, nightclubs, and churches that revolve around Kenyan identity (Wamwara-Mbugu, Wakiuru, Cornwell, and Boller 2008). Kenyans have, however, despite their geographic distance, created social networks across cities and states, many of which revolve around political organizations. An increasingly important organization for Kenyans abroad is the Kenya Community Abroad (KCA), a sociopolitical organization linking Kenyan immigrants (Gitahi 2005). As stated in the previous section, churches also serve as major networks of social connection for Kenyan immigrants, who in large part maintain their strong religiosity after they immigrate.
Forging a New American Political Identity Most Kenyan political organizations in the United States are for development and activism in Kenya and not an active political force in U.S. domestic politics (“Africa South of the Sahara” 2009). Many Kenyan Americans participate in the Kenyan Diaspora Network (KDN), which promotes the development of the Kenyan government (Stanford 2009). The Kenyan Community Abroad (KCA) is a nonpartisan sociopolitical organization based in Pennsylvania and Minnesota that promotes constructive political change and stability in Kenyan society and politics (“Africa
1314 | Kenyan Immigrants
South of the Sahara” 2009). It has been proposed that many Kenyan Americans do not fight as a single political entity in U.S. domestic politics because they can quickly assimilate to U.S. culture and become integrated into the current Left–Right partisan debate (Kaba 2006, 80). Furthermore, they have few large conglomerations in cities that are walled off from other groups, which limits the perceived need to create and maintain Kenyan American political power within U.S. politics (“USA Africa” 2008). These factors, combined with many Kenyan Americans’ continued significant interest in Kenyan politics, make political action and organization a practice primarily reserved for helping Kenya. However, for many Kenyan Americans the election of President Barack Obama was a unique and uplifting experience that often created a renewed interest in American political issues (Rhor 2008), as well as a renewed belief in the American Dream (Kay 2009). In 2008 Kenyans rallied around then Senator Barack Obama, the son of a Kenyan, in his successful bid for the U.S. presidency (Kay 2009; Rhor 2008). Not only is President Obama the first African American U.S. president, and also of Kenyan descent, for many Kenyans he is a clear representation of the potential of the American Dream—often a compelling concept when immigrants leave their native land for the United States (Kay 2009). According to the Immigration Department, records of “returnees,” or those immigrants who have chosen to go back to Kenya, are hard to keep. An easier number to keep track of, however, is the number of Kenyans who have been deported, sometimes because of crime, and other times because they have violated the terms of their visas. In 2003, 28 Kenyans were deported.
The Second and Later Generations It is well established among the Kenyan population in the United States that children of immigrants assimilate more readily into American culture than their parents. This overall measure incorporates general adaptation, as well as more specific measures, such as utilization of social services and other opportunities. The oral historical tradition of Kenya has created a culture in which the older generation, members of which are highly respected, is responsible for passing on values and behaviors of culture to the youth. There are great implications in this practice for the life of the immigrant. First-generation immigrants most likely hold strong cultural values that they were imbued with while in Kenya. The strength of these values has some important byproducts. The degree to which first-generation immigrants maintain their cultural values when faced with new life in the United States will directly impact the degree to which the second generation identifies with the Kenyan culture of their parents. More often than not, second-generation Kenyan immigrants develop a strong sense of American culture, much stronger than that of
The Second and Later Generations | 1315
their parents. And first-generation immigrants—because of these strong values— are less likely to acculturate in the United States than their children (Kioko 2007). Transnationalism among immigrants can be characterized by a bicultural identity that leaves room for the continued link and healthy cultivation of dual identities—both from home and host country. For many Kenyan immigrants, the practice of transnational identity is an important mechanism through which cultural values and knowledge are actively maintained. For second-generation immigrants, practicing transnationalism is like code switching; it is a functional way of actively participating in two worlds (Kioko 2007). Some Kenyan immigrants struggle with arriving in the United States and being grouped into the minority, lower on the social hierarchy group of African Americans,
Youth Profile The Search for Life Sheila Navalia Onzere was born on June 19, 1977, in Nairobi, Kenya, where she grew up. She earned her BA from Moi University in the west of Kenya, where she majored in human geography before deciding to emigrate. Like most Kenyans, Sheila went to the United States in pursuit of higher education. At 24, with $500 in her pocket, she arrived in Missouri, prepared to attend Central Missouri State University. After hearing from a fellow Kenyan that “Kenyans survive here by working as nursing assistants,” Sheila began working at a nursing home at nights in order to pay her school fees. Her second year she received an assistantship, but she continued to work at night in order to send money home to her family. After earning her MA in sociology, Sheila was encouraged by her advisor to pursue a PhD. She was accepted to every school she applied to, and decided to attend Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. Sheila’s dissertation—which is in progress at the University of Iowa—studies changing institutions within urban food markets in sub-Saharan Africa. She asks where the impact of these changes falls, and she worked primarily with “middle-men:” retailers and smallscale farmers in Uganda. Sheila recently married Erik Timmons, whom she met at Iowa State. She is now teaching Introduction to Sociology and Social Problems at Santa Fe College in Florida. Sheila believes that the Kenyan traditions of resilience and tenacity are responsible for her success in the United States. “I would say that never give up is Kenya’s motto.” She continued to explain that Kenyans are constantly trying to improve their lives as much as they can. “It is not because they are dissatisfied with what they have,” Sheila explained, “we are just raised to believe that you have to tafuta maisha,” which Sheila translated as “search for life.”
1316 | Kenyan Immigrants
who have a very distinct culture lending itself to patterns of behavior, ritual, and norms that are distinctly different than those of Africans. Second-generation Kenyans often have their choice of identity, and some do choose to dress, speak, and act as other African Americans do in the United States (Waters 1996).
Issues in Relations between the United States and Kenya The argument has been made that the United States and Kenya share a relationship with special privileges. Some of the evidence used to make this conclusion are the number of matriculating Kenyan students in colleges and universities in the United States. Though there are 52 independent nations in Africa, Kenyans make up nearly one-fifth of the percentage of African students pursuing bachelors degrees in the United States. When narrowing this population down to East African–born students alone, Kenyans make up close to 50 percent of this group. The presence of a special relationship between Kenya and the United States is further supported when combining these numbers with the fact that among all African nations, Kenya does not come close to having the largest population, with a mere 32 million compared to Nigeria’s 137 million; Kenya does not even score among the top seven most populated countries on the continent. The overrepresentation of Kenyans in colleges and universities in the United States is a fact African scholars have devoted time hypothesizing about. African scholars in the United States have hypothesized several reasons for this overrepresentation. The reasons they have come up with represent some of the major similarities between the two countries (Kaba 2005). Commonality of religion is an important connection between Kenya and the United States; according to a 2005 poll, four out of every five members of both countries reported themselves to be Christian. This similarity is not a surprise: there are many U.S.-affiliated private Christian colleges and universities in Kenya; 13 of the 14 private colleges and universities in Kenya are Christian-based, several of which were established by the United States. The possibility exists, then, that these institutions have a relatively easy time obtaining visas and sending students to the United States (Kaba 2005). It is important to note, when considering the large number of Kenyans studying at the university level in the United States, that the two countries share a common language of instruction at that level. An alternative hypothesis for the overrepresentation of Kenyans in the university system in the United States relates to the declining family size in Kenya. Kenya has one of the smaller family size averages on the continent. This might mean that smaller families have the ability to use a greater number of resources on each child, potentially with an increased likelihood of sending a child abroad to study (Kaba 2005).
Issues in Relations between the United States and Kenya | 1317
There is a long application process for any international student attempting to study in the United States, beginning with several exams, which can be taken in most countries of the world. Importantly, Kenya has been considered a hub for Western media for several decades. This means that Kenyans might be more privy to the kind of information about how one goes about applying to study abroad and what kinds of scholarships are available. This is one hypothesized reason for the disproportionate number of Kenyans studying in the United States. Furthermore, the Kenyan government began employing a American-modeled university system in the 1980s. This could have made it more likely for students to transfer credits to the United States or to understand the process of the university system (Kaba 2005). It is also important to note that post-Independence, the Kenyan government adopted a capitalist economic system very similar to the one found in the United States. Other countries, such as neighboring Tanzania, did not take this economic route. A similar economic system may provide enough familiarity about economics and life to make it an easier process for Kenyans to arrive in the States than for other Africans (Kaba 2005). Relations between the United States and Kenya are typically viewed as positive and mutually favorable, which is observable by the continued financial and physical aid provided by the United States to Kenya (Kaba 2006; ”Background Note: Kenya” 2009). This is in part the result of Kenya’s support for free market economics since its independence (Kaba 2006, 80). The favorable relationship between the United States and Kenya may also be the result of their British colonial histories, which imparted a common language, similar educational systems, and a large Christian influence (Kaba 2006, 80–83). More recently, the relationship between the countries was strengthened by the tragic terrorist attacks in 1998 on the U.S. embassy in Kenya (Kaba 2006), and the election of Barak Obama, the son of a Kenyan, to the U.S. presidency (“USA/Africa” 2008; Rhor 2008). The United States provides significant financial and physical aid to Kenya. In the most recent years prior to 2002, Kenya received around $90 million (USD) per year from the United States in economic aid. After the free presidential election of Mwai Kibaki in 2002, the United States nearly doubled economic aid to Kenya in each of the following years, reaching $390.5 million (USD) by 2006 (“U.S. Foreign Economic and Military Aid” 2009). The U.S. Peace Corps has worked with the Kenyan government since 1964, providing volunteer educators teaching economics, health, and science (”Kenya” 2008). The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supports education and treatment programs in Kenya and provides funding for antiretroviral drugs (“Act on Immigrants” 2001). Furthermore, U.S. President Obama recently pledged to support Kenyan entrepreneurs by developing agriculture and infrastructure (Gettleman 2009, August 5).
1318 | Kenyan Immigrants
A similar education system undoubtedly bonds the two countries. After independence Kenya moved from the British system and adopted an American educational system (Kaba 2006, 80). The change not only encourages high rates of application and acceptance of Kenyans to U.S. universities, but it eases their transition to U.S. schools (Kaba 2006; Remington 2005). The U.S. State Department had a role in bringing to trial key leaders in the postelection violence in 2007 (Gettleman 2009, August 5). A continued link between the two governments can be seen by U.S. encouragement to protect against the potential for renewed violence around the upcoming election in 2012 (Gettleman 2009, August 4).
Forecast for the 21st Century As the 21st century moves forward, immigration patterns from Kenya into the United States will largely be determined by economic conditions and domestic politics in Kenya. Unless new incentives are created by the United States or Kenyan governments to limit emigration, continued economic stagnation will likely promote further migration to the United States, as would a renewal of political violence (Kaba 2006; Kahura 2006). Adaptation and assimilation patterns of Kenyan Americans throughout the coming years of the 21st century will likely predict future immigration trends (Kahura 2006; Kaba 2006). Historically, immigrants from the middle class have high success rates in the United States because of their educational backgrounds (Kaba 2006). Though immigrants from lower-income families are receiving considerable help from Kenyan and American volunteer groups and nonprofit organizations, this population of immigrants is still expected to struggle with adaptation as compared to their higher-income counterparts. Second- and third-generation Kenyan Americans will likely meet new challenges as they attempt to reconcile their competing native and host country social environments. Future research on these generations of Kenyan Americans and the next wave of Kenyan immigrants will be vital in order to understand their process of assimilation and adaptation to life in the United States.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 194 Refugees and asylees obtaining legal permanent resident status by country of birth: Kenya Year
Number
1946 to 1950
0
1951 to 1960
0
1961 to 1970
0
1971 to 1980
4
1981 to 1990
87
1991 to 2000
1,438
2001 to 2006
5,461
2007
2,187
Source: All data and descriptions are taken directly from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2007 and 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.
Table 195 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status, who were born in Kenya: 1961 to 2009 Year
Number
1961 to 1970, total
(NA)
1971 to 1980, total
(NA)
1981 to 1990, total
7,853
1991 to 2000, total
13,989
2000
2,197
2001
2,501
2002
3,199
2003
3,209
2004
5,335
2005
5,348
2006
8,779
2007
7,030
2008
6,998
2009
9,880
Source: All data and descriptions are taken directly from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. NA = not applicable.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics
Table 196 Top 14 occupations for those born in Kenya Occupation
Number of Workers
(+/– Margin of Error)
6,000
+/– 19%
Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants Nurses
2,400
+/– 31%
Clerical and administrative staff
2,200
+/– 32%
Teachers
1,800
+/– 35%
Sales-related occupations
1,400
+/– 40%
Accountants and other financial specialists
1,000
+/– 47%
Doctors
900
+/– 50%
Drivers and other transportation workers
800
+/– 53%
Scientists and quantitative analysts
800
+/– 53%
Managers and administrators
800
+/– 53%
Computer software developers
800
+/– 53%
Child care providers
600
+/– 61%
Police and other protective service workers
600
+/– 61%
Other manual laborers
600
+/– 61%
Total workers in all occupations
36,100
Only occupations with at least 500 workers are shown. Source: All data and descriptions from the New York Times article, “Immigration and Jobs: Where U.S. Workers Come From.”
1320
Table 197 Kenyan Americans living in the United States by U.S. region Northeast
1321 Ancestry Kenyan
Midwest
Number
Number
Percent of Total Population
37,795
9,939
26
South
Number
Percent of Total Population
8,028
21
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 2006. “2006 American Community Survey.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau
West
Number
Percent of Total Population
Number
Percent of Total Population
16,218
43
3,610
10
Table 198 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009: leading states of residence: Region/country: Kenya
Total
Total
Male
Female
9,880
4,924
4,956
Arizona
248
104
144
California
660
293
367
Colorado
128
59
69
42
22
20
Florida
Connecticut
135
60
75
Georgia
512
236
276
Illinois
137
60
77
Maryland
383
173
210
Massachusetts
589
281
308
Michigan Minnesota New Jersey
100
57
43
1,159
640
519
332
153
179
New York
306
163
143
North Carolina
223
115
108
Ohio
449
222
227
Pennsylvania
269
135
134
1,085
563
522
Virginia
201
93
108
Washington
618
303
315
2,304
1,192
1,112
Texas
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix III: Notable Kenyan Americans | 1323
Appendix III: Notable Kenyan Americans Bernard Lagat is a runner for the U.S. Olympic team. He runs 1,500 meter and 5,000 meter races. In 2008 Lagat won the U.S. Olympic Trials in both events. At the World Championships in 2007 he received gold medals in the 1,500 and 5,000 meter races. Running for the Kenyan team in the 2000 and 2004 Olympics, Lagat received a bronze and silver medal, respectively (“Bernard Lagat” 2009). In 2005 Lagat became a U.S. citizen (Starr 2008). Wangari Muta Maathai was honored in 2004 with the Nobel Peace Prize for her work in sustainable development, human rights, and democracy. Maathai was the first East and Central African woman to obtain a PhD degree, and the first African woman to receive the Noble Peace Prize. Maathai earned her undergraduate degree from Mount St. Scholastica College in Atchison, Kansas (1964) and her master of science degree from the University of Pittsburgh (1966). Maathai returned to Kenya and obtained her doctorate from the University of Nairobi (1971). Her work with the Green Belt Movement has helped plant over 20 million trees in strategic locations throughout Kenya. Maathai has addressed the UN on several occasions, speaking on behalf of women, environmentalists, and Kenyans. Maathai is a Kenyan citizen (“Wangari Maathai” 2004). Mwende Window Snyder is the former “Chief Security Something-or-Other” (Chief Security Officer title) at Mozilla Corporation. She coauthored a manual on application security, Threat Modeling. Snyder is the daughter of an American father and a Kenyan-born mother (Swartz 2008). Ngugi Wa Thiong’o is the author of novels, plays, short stories, essays, and children’s literature. He wrote Weep, Child, Not, the first English novel published by an East African. Several of Thiong’o’s writings and plays dramatically critique the political and social world in neocolonial Kenya. His most recent work is Decolonizing the Mind (2009). He was imprisoned in 1977 without charge, likely for his criticisms and the controversy over his work. Thiong’o was later released but forced into exile. His time in exile has been spent speaking all over the world. He primarily resides in the United States and London, where he teaches and writes. Thiong’o has held professorships at several universities, including Yale and New York University. Currently he is a professor of language at the University of California, Irvine. Thiong’o continues as a prolific writer today. His works have been translated into more than 30 different languages (Ngugi Wa Thiongo.org 2010).
1324 | Kenyan Immigrants
Glossary Harambee: Let’s all pull together. Kalenjin: An ethnic tribe in Kenya of Nilotic origin. Kikuyu: Kenya’s largest ethnic tribe. Mau-Mau: Guerilla militia, made up of mostly ethnic Kikuyu peoples, who fought for Kenya’s independence.
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1326 | Kenyan Immigrants Odera, Lilian A. 2007. “Acculturation, Coping Styles, and Mental Health of First Generation Kenyan Immigrants in the United States.” Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan. Ogeto, Symon, and Tracy Steffes. 2005. The Electronic Encyclopedia of Chicago. Chicago: Chicago Historical Society. Okoth, Kenneth. 2003. “Kenya: What Role for Diaspora in Development?” Migration Policy Institute. [Online article; retrieved 8/29/09.] http://www.migrationinformation.org/ Profiles/display.cfm?ID=150. Onyango, Dennis. 2007. “Realizing the American Dream.” East African Standard, August 5. [Online article; retrieved 8/8/2010.] http://africanpress.wordpress.com/2007/08/05/ kenyan-realising-the-american-dream-through-hard-work/. Oriaro, Iris K. 2007. “Initial Classroom Discipline Issues Encountered by Kenyan Immigrant Teachers in Southern California.” Ph.D. diss., School of Intercultural Studies, Biola University. Oyelere, Ruth Uwaifo. 2007. “Brain Drain, Waste or Gain? What We Know about the Kenyan Case.” Journal of Global Initiatives 2 (2): 113–29. “The Pain Abroad.” 2007. East African Standard, July 13. [Online article; retrieved 8/2/10.] http://allafrica.com/stories/200707121252.html. Potgieter, D. J. 1976. Standard Encyclopedia of Southern Africa. Cape Town: Nasou. Remington, Robert. 2005. “Officials Accuse West of Stealing Developing World’s Nurses.” Calgary Herald, October 30, A-3. Rhor, Monica. 2008. “Kenyan Immigrants Embrace Obama.” USA Today, March 3 [Online article; retrieved 8/06/10.] http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2008–03–03– 4279719716_x.htm. Rudolph, Laura C. 2008. “Kenyan Americans.” [Online information; retrieved 8/29/09.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Ha-La/Kenyan-Americans.html. Starr, Mark. 2008. “YES, HE KEN: Lagat now runs for the U.S.” Newsweek, August 4, 46. Swartz, Jon. 2008. “ ‘Geek Girl’ Helps Keep Mozilla Safe in Scary Times.” USA Today, June 18, 9A. Tattersall, Ian. 1995. The Fossil Trail. New York: Oxford University Press. “Naturalization and Eligibility 2009.” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services [Online information; retrieved 8/29/09.] http://www.uscis.gov. “Three Decades of Mass Immigration: The Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act.” 1995. Center of Immigration Studies (CIS). [Online article; retrieved 9/13/09.] http://www.cis. org/articles/1995/back395.html. “USA/Africa: New Policy Prospects?” 2008. AfricaFocus Bulletin [Online information; retrieved 8/8/2010.] http://www.africafocus.org/docs08/usaf0809.php. “U.S. Foreign Economic and Military Aid by Major Recipient Country: 2000 to 2006.” 2009. U.S. Overseas Loans, Grants, Obligations, and Loan Authorizations, annual. [Online information; retrieved 8/06/10.] http://semanticommunity.net/StatAbs2010/
Further Reading | 1327 Foreign/Table%201263%20-%20U.S.%20Foreign%20Economic%20and%20Military %20Aid%20by%20Major%20Recipient%20Country.xls. Wamwara-Mbugua, L. Wakiuru. 2003. “An Examination of Immigrant Consumer Acculturation: The Case of Recent African Immigrants to the United States.” Ph.D. diss., University of Memphis. “Wangari Maathai: The Nobel Peace Prize 2004.” 2004. NobelPrize.org. [Online information; retrieved 8/27/09.] http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2004/ maathai-bio.html. Waters, Mary C. 1996. “Ethnic and Racial Identities of Second-Generation Black Immigrants in New York City.” In The New Second Generation, ed Alejandro Portes, chapter 8. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Further Reading Bullock, Leif J. 2010. “Who’s Telling This Country’s Tale?” Paper presented at the 12th Annual Conference of the Marxist Reading Group at the University of Florida, March 25–27, 2010. Written after fieldwork in Kenya, Bullock’s timely article illustrates how oral histories can be used to glean alternative political narratives in Kenya. The article exhibits how political tumult can be partly attributed to the lack of a uniform narrative in Kenya. Maathai, Wangari. 2006. Unbowed: A Memoir. New York: Knopf. In her memoir, Nobel Peace Prize winner Maathai speaks about her childhood in Kenya, her early adulthood in the United States, and her career in political activism. Mbaya, Martin, P. Mrina, and Michael J. Levin. 2007. “What the 2000 US Census Tells Us about the Kenyan Diaspora.” Journal of Global Initiatives 2 (2): 130–50. Mbaya, Mrinan, and Levin show how innovative ways of studying U.S. Census data can reveal clues about the nuances and dynamics of the Kenyan diaspora in the United States. Odera, Lilian A. 2007. “Acculturation, Coping Styles, and Mental Health of First Generation Kenyan Immigrants in the United States.” Ph.D. diss. University of Michigan. Odera’s dissertation is an essential for anyone trying to understand the psychological effects of immigration for Kenyan immigrants. This dissertation will be of particular interest for those interested in issues of mental health for immigrants. Okoth, Kenneth. 2003. “Kenya: What Role for Diaspora in Development?” Migration Policy Institute. [Online article: retrieved 8/29/09.] http://www.migrationinformation.org/ Profiles/display.cfm?ID=150. This article, found on the Web site for the Migration Information Source, provides a cohesive, historical summary of how Kenyan immigration patterns in the United States affect Kenya.
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Korean Immigrants by Won Moo Hurh
Introduction American diplomatic and trade relations with Korea began as early as 1882 with the Korean-American Treaty of Chemulpo, and the first boatload of 101 Korean immigrants arrived in Honolulu on January 13, 1903. Today, the number of Korean Americans is well over a million. More than the two-thirds of the current Korean population in the United States are foreign-born, and the majority of them arrived after 1970. Korean immigrants and their descendents are one of the “newest” groups of Americans who are striving to become another chapter in the history of multiracial and multicultural America. They are indeed in the historical process of creating a Korean American ethnicity—a community and identity that are new to Koreans and Americans.
Chronology 1882
Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed by Korea and the United States at Chemulpo (Inchon) opens the gate for Korean immigration to the United States.
1903
The first shipload of 101 Korean immigrant workers arrives in Hawaii to work on sugar plantations.
1908
United States and Japan sign the Gentlemen’s Agreement containing a provision allowing Korean “picture brides” to immigrate to the United States.
1910
Japan forces Korea to sign annexation agreement. Korea becomes a colony of Japan.
1924
U.S. Immigration Act of 1924 is passed excluding the immigration of all Asian laborers.
1948
Republic of Korea inaugurates Syngman Rhee as president (South Korea). People’s Republic of Korea is created with Kim Il-sung as premier (North Korea).
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Background | 1331
1950
North Korean People’s Army invades South Korea. The Korean War begins.
1952
The McCarran-Walter Immigration and Naturalization Act goes into effect. It allocates immigration quotas from Japan, Korea, and other Asian countries.
1953
Armistice documents ending the Korean War are signed at Panmunjom.
1965
Immigration Act of 1965 is passed, establishing an immigrant preference system favoring skilled workers and relatives of U.S. citizens or permanent residents.
1992
Protests and violent riots erupt in Los Angeles and last for three days. Koreatown is targeted for looting and burning by African American and Latino rioters.
2002
The U.S. Senate unanimously passes a resolution recognizing the historical significance of the upcoming 100th anniversary of Korean immigration to the United States.
2003
President George W. Bush issues Proclamation 7638 in recognition of “the invaluable contributions of Korean Americans to our nation’s rich cultural diversity, economic strength and proud heritage.”
2008
South Korea becomes a member of the United States visa waiver program, allowing South Koreans to travel to the United States for up to 90 days without a visa, and vice versa for U.S. citizens traveling to South Korea.
Background Geography of Korea The name Korea comes from the Koryo dynasty that ruled the Korean peninsula from 918 to 1392. Historically, Korea has also been known as Joseon (spelled as Choson in the past), meaning “the Land of the Morning Calm.” Joseon was the name of the earliest ancient kingdom (fourth century B.C.E.) as well as the name of the last kingdom ( Yi Dynasty, 1392–1910) in Korea. The Korean peninsula stretches southward from the northeastern section of the Asian continent (China and Russia) and faces the islands of Japan to the east. The size of the peninsula is about 85,563 square miles, roughly equivalent to the size of the state of Minnesota. Since the end of World War II in 1945, the Korean peninsula has been divided into
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two separate states—the People’s Republic of Korea in the north and the Republic of Korea in the south.
History of Korea During the fourth century B.C.E. early ancient kingdoms emerged in southern Manchuria and the northern Korean peninsula. By 676 C.E., for the first time in Korean history, the land was unified under the reign of a single dynasty—the Silla Kingdom. Two more territorially unified dynasties followed after the demise of Silla in the tenth century—the Koryo Kingdom (918–1392) and the modern Joseon Kingdom or Yi Dynasty (1392–1910), which was the last dynasty in Korea. The Yi Dynasty was also known as the Hermit Kingdom, because of its self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world—except for China with whom tributary relations were maintained. In the last half of the nineteenth century, Korea was pressured to open its ports for trade and commerce by its neighbor nations (Japan and Russia) and the Western powers (the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy). This meant Korea became an international competition ground for economic and political hegemony. Eventually, Japan became the unrivaled contender for domination of Korea after defeating China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. In 1905, Japan declared Korea to be its “protectorate nation” and forced the Korean monarch, King Kojong, to abdicate the throne in 1907. The Japanese take-over was complete when Korea was annexed by the Japanese Empire in 1910. As a Japanese colony, Korea not only lost its national sovereignty but also had its cultural heritage and identity uprooted when the Japanese government prohibited the use of Korean language and forced Koreans to change to Japanese-style names. This ruthless colonial rule continued for 35 years until the end of World War II and the defeat of Japan. However, this did not bring independence to the Korean people, because earlier at the Yalta Conference (February 1945), the Allied Powers had already decided to divide Korea at the 38th parallel, with the northern half to be occupied by Soviet troops and the southern half by American troops. Eventually two separate states were established in the Korean peninsula in 1948—the Republic of Korea with Syngman Rhee as president in the south, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north with Kim Il-sung as premier. South Korea’s government was modeled after the Western democratic political systems, whereas North Korea adopted the Communist model of the U.S.S.R. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean armed forces launched a full-scale, surprise attack against the Republic of Korea (South Korea), triggering the tragic Korean
Background | 1333
War of 1950–1953. After three years of bloody fighting, an armistice agreement was signed in July 1953. The armistice was merely a cease-fire agreement, and technically both sides are still at war. Certainly the Korean War did not accomplish anything for either side: the entire Korean peninsula was devastated, and about four million people, half of them civilians, lost their lives, but the military demarcation line between the north and south remained essentially the same (Toland 1991). In 1960 a political crisis erupted in South Korea when Syngman Rhee sought to retain his autocratic government through rigged elections. The ensuing protests and student demonstrations ended the Rhee regime. However, the newly elected president, Yun Po-sun, only lasted nine months before being overthrown by a military junta led by General Park Chung Hee, who stayed in power for 18 years and brought rapid economic development to Korea—along with labor exploitation, human rights violations, invisible corporate crimes, and government corruption.
South Korean women and children search the rubble of Seoul for anything that can be used or burned as fuel, November 1, 1950. In June 1950, North Korean forces launched a fullscale attack against its southern neighbor, leaving behind great devastation. (Department of Defense)
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In 1979, Park was assassinated and eventually another military dictator, General Chun Doo Hwan, became president. While Chun was in office, Korea experienced unprecedented economic growth. In 1988 Korea hosted the World Olympics. Chun Doo Hwan peacefully stepped down at the end of his term. Over the next 20 years, a succession of increasingly democratic elections brought remarkable progress in economic development, in democratization of the political process, and in opening a dialogue between South and North Korea for cooperation and reunion of families separated since the Korean War. In the 1950s, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, but today it ranks as the 13th-largest economy in the world. Its per capita gross national income soared from $87 in the 1950s to $20,045 in 2007 (Korean Culture and Information Service 2008, 85). In contrast, North Korea’s per capita income was estimated at only $1,700 in 2007 (CIA 2008). Kim Il-sung, the founding father of the People’s Republic of Korea, died in 1994, and his son, Kim Jong-il, became his successor. The North Korean government has been preoccupied with boosting its armed forces and developing nuclear programs. Since 2003, several rounds of Six-Party Talks (the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia), aimed to denuclearize North Korea, have been taking place, but so far no significant progress has been made.
People In 2007, South Korea’s population was 48,456,369 and the population of North Korea was 23,200,238 (Korean Culture and Information Service 2008, 18). The total number of people of Korean heritage residing abroad was estimated at about seven million in 2007 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2008). Hence, there are approximately 79 million people of Korean heritage in the world today.
Culture Language Korean belongs to the Ural-Altaic family of languages. Other languages belonging to the Altaic family are Turkish, Mongolian, and Japanese, but not Chinese. The Japanese language shares the most striking structural similarity with the Korean. However, the Chinese language has exerted a strong influence in terms of its vocabulary and writing system. The Chinese ideographic system of writing was first introduced to Korea in the first century C.E., and in the absence of a Korean writing, it was used for written communication and scholarly pursuits among the upper-class Korean people (the yangbans). Chinese characters are, however, basically incompatible with spoken Korean language, since they are not a phonetic alphabet
Background | 1335
but rather a pictorial sign or symbol, each of which stands for the meaning of a word but not the sound of a word. In 1446, King Sejong invented a highly efficient Korean phonetic alphabet, hangul, consisting of 10 vowels and 14 consonants that can be combined effectively to form a logical and regular syllabic system of writing. Today in Korea a selected number of Chinese characters are still used in conjunction with the hangul alphabet. Considering the frequent invasions and occupation of Korea by her powerful neighbors (the Chinese, Japanese, Mongols, and Russians), it is remarkable that Korea has maintained her distinctive language for more than 4,000 years.
Religion and Traditional Beliefs According to a 2005 census in the Republic of Korea, slightly more than half (53.1%) of the total population were religious believers (Korean Culture and Information Service 2008, 187–88). Among those believers, their religious denominations were as follows: Buddhism (42.9%), Protestantism (34.5%), Catholicism (20.6%), Confucianism (0.4%), and other beliefs (1.6%). However, these data are quite misleading, particularly regarding Confucianism. Confucianism entered Korea in the early period of the Three Kingdoms (57 B.C.E.–688 C.E.), and its social ethics eventually became the core of the Korean national character, particularly during the Yi dynasty (1392–1910). Although Confucianism is not a religion in the strict sense (having no concept of the supernatural, the sacred, or god), it has functioned almost like a religion in Korea by setting down social ethics or moral principles for maintaining harmonious relationships within members of the family and with the state. These family-centered Confucian values permeate many aspects of Korean culture, including the life of Korean immigrants in the United States who are largely Christian. In short, Confucian values have become the “collective unconscious” of the Korean people. Next to Confucianism, three religions—shamanism, Buddhism, and Christianity—have exerted major influences on the development of Korean culture. Shamanism is a generic term referring to the beliefs and rituals associated with spirit-mediators (shamans), who practice healing and divination. In Korea, shamanism has never become a formally established religion but has become commingled with Confucianism, Buddhism, and even with Christianity. In this sense, shamanism is still an indispensable part of Korean folk culture and has also affected some Korean immigrants in the United States. Originating in India around 6th century B.C.E., Buddhism has had a strong appeal to the people in China, Korea, and Japan since it provided what Confucianism and shamanism could not—a universal faith for attaining salvation in paradise, a profound metaphysical literature, systematically organized ceremonies, beautiful temples and religious arts, and the serene monastic life. Buddhism was introduced
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to Korea in 372 C.E. and reached its zenith during the Koryo Kingdom (918–1392). With the fall of Koryo Kingdom and the rise of Yi-dynasty (1392–1910), Confucianism became the state “religion”; however, Buddhism still remained a part of the Korean way of life. Today the most rapidly growing religion in Korea is Christianity, which was introduced in the early 17th century when Korean convoys to China brought back copies of The Doctrine of the Lord of Heaven (Chonju-silui), written by Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), an Italian Jesuit missionary priest who was quite successful in introducing Catholicism to Chinese cities. The book, written in Chinese in 1601, contained not only the Catholic doctrine but also various aspects of Western learning (science and technology). Ricci’s work had a great appeal among reform-minded neo-Confucian scholars in the Yi dynasty, and by 1863 the number of Catholic believers grew to about 23,000. However, government persecution of Christians and supporters of Western learning also grew, and thousands of believers were formally executed. Persecution of Christians continued under the Japanese colonial rule, but both Catholic and Protestant churches survived. There are 5.1 million Catholics in South Korea today, about 10.5 percent of the total population. Korea’s first contact with Protestantism also occurred in the 17th century. A Dutch sailor, named Jan Janse Weltevree, shipwrecked on Korean shores in 1627, was believed to be the first bearer of the Protestant Gospel to Korea (Han 1974, 317). The official introduction of Protestantism to Korea began after the ratification of the American–Korean Treaty in 1882, opening the way for American Protestant missionaries to Korea. Since the end of World War II, Protestant churches in South Korea have experienced a phenomenal growth. Today about 17.8 percent of the South Korean population is affiliated with Protestant churches, making them the second largest religious group next to Buddhists. Protestant and Catholic Christians in South Korea make up roughly 28.4 percent of the population, and the proportion is growing every year. No other country in East Asia, except for the Philippines, has such a high proportion of Christians. Moreover, the proportion of Christians among Korean immigrants in the United States is even higher, about 77 percent—again the highest among Asian Americans, except for Filipino Americans.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration On January 13, 1903, 101 Korean immigrants aboard the S.S. Gaelic, a U.S. merchant ship, arrived in Honolulu, marking the first entry of Korean immigrants to the United States. By 1905, over 7,000 Korean immigrants had reached Hawaiian shores (W. Kim 1971, 10). In 2008 the Korean American population was estimated
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1337
at 1,344,171, with 76 percent being foreign-born (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). What circumstances brought them to America? What were their general backgrounds? How did they settle in the new land? The history of Korean immigration to the United States evolved in three distinctive waves: (1) the early labor immigration of predominantly males to the Hawaiian islands (1903–1905) and their “picture brides”—Korean brides brought to the United States by arranged marriages through the exchange of pictures (1910–1924); (2) the post–Korean War immigration (1951–1964) of young Korean women married to American servicemen and their children, many Korean war orphans adopted by American families, and a small number of students and professional workers; and (3) the large wave of Korean “family immigration” since 1965, following the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, the most liberal immigration law in American history (see Table 199. Korea’s diplomatic and trade relations with the United States began as early as 1882 with the Korean–American Treaty (Chemulpo Treaty or the Treaty of Amity and Commerce) and opened the door for Korean entry to the United States. In 1888, a small number of Korean students, insam (ginseng) merchants, and migrant laborers began to arrive on American shores. The total number of Koreans in the United States was estimated at less than 50 before the first large wave of Korean immigrants reached the Hawaiian shores in 1903. The major pull factor for Korean immigration to Hawaii was the U.S. demand for inexpensive labor for Hawaiian sugar plantations. The push factors for the first wave of Korean immigration were the political and economic calamities in Korea stemming from foreign encroachment and Korea’s failure to meet the crisis. On the eve of the demise of the Yi dynasty (Korea was a monarchy before 1910), the corrupt government levied heavy taxes on the poor and was unable to deal with famine and cholera epidemics. Under these circumstances, the exodus of Korean peasants and laborers was hardly surprising. Over 7,000 entered Hawaii between 1903 and 1905. The majority of these Koreans came to Hawaii seeking work, but not with the intention of settling down permanently. “Most of them came to Hawaii to stay temporarily. They wanted to return to their homeland as soon as they made enough money or the political climate of the Korean peninsula permitted them to go back” (Choy 1979, 77). Some did return to Korea—964 men and 19 women by 1910— but most stayed. Most of the early immigrants who arrived at the Hawaiian sugar plantations were young bachelors between the ages of 20 and 30 who were largely uneducated, were engaged in semiskilled or unskilled occupations, and had some exposure to Christian missionaries. A few were relatively well educated and had converted to Christianity before leaving Korea. Because of the unbalanced sex ratio (10 males to every female), the exchange of photographs between prospective grooms in Hawaii and brides in Korea took place for arranged marriages, and 1,100 picture brides arrived during the period
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1910–1924. The picture brides were generally young and from rural villages in the southeastern province of Korea. The number of females who arrived as picture brides still fell short of balancing the sex ratio. About 3,000 male Korean immigrants had to spend the rest of their lives as bachelors (Yu 1977, 119). Only 104 Korean males married outside their own race, predominantly with Hawaiian women, during the period 1912–1924. The conditions on the plantations were deplorable for any worker—extremely hard work under the hot sun for 10 hours a day, with a daily wage of 65 cents for a man and 50 cents for a woman, no chance for promotion, and isolated communal living quarters. By 1910 nearly one-third of the male laborers had left the plantations for the mainland United States, where they eventually managed to open small businesses, such a grocery stores, laundry shops, vegetable shops, and barber shops. Although very few of them held semiprofessional jobs, some did manage to move into large-scale farming, and others acquired big trucking firms or real estate businesses. Another noteworthy aspect of the immigrants’ adaptation was their extensive involvement in Christian churches, which contrasts to the Japanese and Chinese immigrants, whose involvement in the Christian faith had been rather insignificant. Almost every Korean in the Hawaiian Islands eventually came to be identified with the Christian faith (Gardner 1970). Thus, the Korean ethnic church served the immigrant community as a social and cultural center as well as religious center (Hurh and Kim 1984, 46–47). In sum, the patterns of the early Korean immigrants’ adaptation can be characterized as showing some degree of adaptation to American culture, with an extensive involvement in Christian churches, but retaining a strong ethnic attachment without significant social assimilation.
Later Waves of Immigration The second wave of Korean immigration (1951–1964)—mostly Korean wives of American servicemen, war orphans, refugees, and some professionals including students—was a direct consequence of the post–World War II divided occupation of Korea, the Korean War, and the United States–Korean military alliance. The division of the country and the Korean War led many Koreans to emigrate; among them were political refugees, war orphans, and war brides and their dependents. For example, about 13,000 orphans were adopted by American families between 1955 and 1977, and 28,205 Korean wives of American servicemen immigrated to the United States between 1955 and 1975 (Hurh and Kim 1984, 49). This second wave of Korean immigrants was quite different from the early immigrants in terms of their demographic characteristics (mostly young women and children), push-pull factors (derived largely from the Korean War), and adaptation patterns (mostly familial and socialization problems). Particularly noteworthy is
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the striking difference in sex ratios: the early immigrants had a sex ratio of 10 males to 1 female, whereas the ratio for post–Korean War immigrants was 1 male to 3.5 females. Another contrast is their occupation, as a majority of second-wave immigrants reported no occupation other than housewife at the time of their admission to the United States (Hyung-chan Kim 1974, 30). After World War II, a significant number of Korean students reached the United States—about 6,000 between 1945 and 1965 (W. Kim 1971, 26). The first and foremost impetus for the third wave of Korean immigration was the U.S. Immigration Act of 1965, which heavily favored family reunion and gave preferential treatment to spouses, children, parents, and siblings of permanent residents or U.S. citizens. The revised immigration law largely benefited the relatives of two groups of Koreans: (1) wives of American servicemen, and (2) students and professional workers who became permanent U.S. residents. The latter group accounted for the largest share in the surge of Korean immigration in particular and Asian immigration in general. About 15,000 Korean students entered the United States between 1953 and 1980, but only about 10 percent of them returned to Korea (I. Kim 1987, 329; Fawcett and Carino 1987, 10). In addition, about 13,000 Korean doctors, nurses, and pharmacists immigrated to the United States during the period 1966–79 (I. Kim 1987, 332). The number of Korean students enrolled in 2008–2009 in U.S. universities was 75.065 (“Korean Students 3rd Most in US Universities,” 1). The push factors were the cumulative consequences of the national division of Korea and the military dictatorship’s policy of “guided capitalism.” From the mid1960s, President Park Chung Hee vigorously pushed an economic plan designed to rapidly industrialize the Korean economy and to transform it into an export-led economy. But it was at the expense of the Korean population, which suffered mass displacement. The Korean military regime established a symbiotic (mutually supportive) relationship with the chaebol (business conglomerates). In return for the chaebol’s political support and financial contributions, the military regime guaranteed foreign loans and rendered special favors to the chaebol, such as overlooking tax evasion and price fixing. The military elite also operated from self-interest at the expense of the lower and often even the middle strata of the Korean population. The byproducts of this “guided” industrialization were a weakening of the indigenous small and medium-size enterprises, the impoverishment of the rural population, a ban on labor activities, political oppression, human rights violations, career frustration of a large proportion of white-collar workers, polarization of the rich and poor, and the social and geographic dislocation of various strata of the population. Social conditions in Korea in the late 1960s were therefore conducive to a mass exodus of those who had been displaced or uprooted in their own country. However, not everyone so affected could afford to immigrate to the United States. Most
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of those who were in a position to take advantage of the U.S. Immigration Act of 1965 were urban and middle class. In contrast, the rural poor, who have been absorbed into factory jobs or urban marginal jobs in large numbers, had neither the resources nor opportunity to migrate. In short, Korean immigration to the United States needs to be understood from the perspective of the changing historical setting of global economic and political systems.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the size of the Korean population in the United States was 1,076,872, and the most recent American Community Survey (ACS) in 2007 estimated the figure at 1,344,171. Most of the new Korean immigrants have come from urban middle-class backgrounds, and most have settled in major metropolitan areas in the United States, such as Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Honolulu. The geographic distribution of the new Korean Americans is shown in Tables 200 and 201. Findings from the 1986 Chicago survey (Hurh and Kim 1988) are used to illustrate the settlement process, since this is the only comprehensive study on the preimmigration characteristics of recent Korean Americans. The sample for the Chicago survey included 622 Korean immigrants who resided in Chicago and 70 suburban communities. The Chicago survey reported that prior to immigration to the United States, three-fourths of the sample (74.9%) lived in Seoul, the capital, with 11 million residents. Only a small proportion of the respondents (2.6%) were from the rural areas of Korea. This indicates a highly selective process of Korean migration to the United States. A high proportion of these third-wave immigrants were well educated and held professional occupations before coming to the United States For example, more than half of the males (58%) were college graduates employed in white-collar occupations, while the majority of the female immigrants were nurses and other professional or technical workers (Hurh 1998, 44–45). Most of the recent Korean immigrants, regardless of gender, left their country during their economically most productive years, which suggests their migration to the United States was a painful experience of midcareer interruption or termination. What motivated these urban, middle-class Koreans to uproot and migrate to the United States? A desire for a better life or more opportunity was clearly the most important motivation (93%). Another common reason was to seek further education for their children (33%). One-fifth of the male respondents (19%) and 40 percent of female respondents came to the United States to join other family members (e.g., children, siblings, spouse, or parents). As mentioned earlier, a high proportion
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of recent Korean immigrants came to the United States by way of kinship-centered chain migration. It is therefore not surprising to find that three-fourths (78%) of the respondents already had family members or other relatives in the United States upon immigration (Hurh 1998, 45). According to the 2007 American Community Survey (ACS), conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, the age and family structure of Korean Americans is generally similar to that of other Americans, although the median age of Korean American males is slightly younger than that of other Americans (the national median). Significant differences are noted, however, in socioeconomic status—particularly in educational attainment, poverty level, and home ownership (see Table 202). As shown in Table 202, the level of educational attainment of Korean Americans as a group is higher than the total for all Asian Americans and the total U.S. population. Ironically, however, the proportion of Korean American families living below the poverty level is also the highest among the three groups. Another surprising finding in the 2007 American Community Survey is that the median value of owner-occupied Korean American homes is $413,200—more than twice the national median value of owner-occupied homes—$194,300. Since about half of Korean Americans own their homes, but 11 percent of Korean American families live below the poverty level, this may be indicative of a sharp class division between the haves and have-nots in the Korean American communities. About 60 percent of Korean Americans 16 years of age and older are in the labor force according to the 2007 ACS. Detailed data on the employment status and occupational characteristics of Korean Americans in major metropolitan areas are shown in Table 203. The 2004 ACS data for Korean Americans are also compared with those of Japanese Americans, the most economically successful group among Asian Americans, in Table 204. Japanese Americans show a remarkable similarity with the American population as a whole in terms of general employment patterns and occupational structure, but their unemployment rate is extremely low (1.9%)—less than half that for the total U.S. population and one-third less than for Korean Americans. This difference, along with differences in income and poverty level as previously mentioned, is particularly significant in light of the fact that Japanese Americans and Korean Americans have quite similar levels of educational attainment. Another striking difference in the occupational structure among Korean Americans vis-à-vis the American population as a whole is a significantly high proportion of self-employed Korean American workers in small business. As Table 204 indicates, 12.7 percent of Korean American workers are self-employed, and 0.7 percent are unpaid family workers. These rates are substantially higher than those found among Japanese Americans and in the total U.S. population. Moreover, these figures (particularly the self-employment rate of Korean Americans) do not include a separate category of “small business owners/managers,”
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Grace Cha, grandson Eron Kim, and son William Kim, originally from Korea, shop at the Costco Wholesale Los Feliz store in Glendale, California, October 7, 2009. (AP Photo/ Damian Dovarganes)
and therefore it cannot be determined exactly how many Korean Americans are self-employed. However, recent studies suggest a rate in the range of 20 to 30 percent (Hurh and Kim 1988; Min 1989; Yoon 1997). Why such a high rate of selfemployment in small business among Korean Americans? And what are its costs and benefits? These questions will be answered in greater detail, since most of the other important areas in the adaptation of Korean Americans (family life, sociocultural assimilation, and intergroup relations) hinge upon this exceptionally high rate of self-employment in small business.
Korean Immigrant Small Business: Causes and Consequences In order to explain why certain ethnic or immigrant groups are overrepresented in self-employed small business, sociologists have recently advanced three major theoretical perspectives: the disadvantage theory, the ethnic resources theory, and the opportunity structure theory (Kim and Hurh 1985; Light and Bonacich 1988; Waldinger, Aldrich, and Ward 1990; Yoon 1995). These theories are quite helpful in understanding the complex factors associated with the remarkably high level of Korean immigrants’ concentration in small business.
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According to the disadvantage theory, immigrant workers are generally disadvantaged in the American labor market due to the following problems: (1) their language barrier, cultural unfamiliarity, and most of all, less transferable educational credentials and occupational skills from their native country to the United States; and (2) the segmented nature of the American labor market in which minority workers in general (women, nonwhite, foreign-born) are systematically excluded from the core sector and contained in the marginal sector. The marginal or peripheral market is characterized by low wages, no significant fringe benefits, unfavorable work conditions, overtime work without compensation, no job security, little chance for promotion, and so on. Simply put, nonwhite immigrant workers are doubly handicapped in the American labor market because of their foreign cultural and racial backgrounds, even though many of them were well educated and held a high socioeconomic status in their native land. About half (46%) of the Korean immigrant workers in the Chicago survey were generally college graduates and held either managerial or professional occupations in Korea. Most of this group experienced downward job mobility in the United States. At the same time, the percentage of small business owners more than doubled upon immigration (14% in Korea to 30% in the United States). In fact, small business was the single largest occupational category among Korean immigrant workers in the United States (Hurh 1998, 58). The disadvantaged conditions in the American labor market alone, however, do not lead all nonwhite immigrant workers to become self-employed business owners or managers. One needs to have not only a strong motivation for upward economic mobility, but also a capacity to effectively mobilize and utilize the resources necessary for the formation and growth of ethnic entrepreneurship, which is the basis for the resources theory. The most crucial resources are undoubtedly capital and labor. Particularly for immigrant entrepreneurs, success at mobilizing these resources is closely related to the availability and effective utilization of class, ethnic, and family resources. Class resources refer to the socioeconomic and educational backgrounds of the immigrant workers; for example, Korean small business owners tend to be college-educated, urban, and middle-class. Ethnic resources include various types of help and cooperation available from members of one’s own ethnic group; they may include information, financial support, ethnic employees, ethnic customers, ethnic suppliers, and ethnic media. For example, Korean friends, kin, and Korean banks have been major sources of financial loans for the initial capital formation among Korean small business owners. Ethnic resources also include cultural heritage, that is, the values and traditions of the immigrant group that may be conducive to encouraging and promoting ethnic entrepreneurship in a new country. The Confucian ethic of honoring one’s family by working hard, living moderately, and helping kin and friends (social obligations) seems to have promoted the growth of
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Korean entrepreneurship in America. The so-called kye (the rotating credit association) that financed a significant number of Korean immigrant businesses is an “old fashioned Korean cooperative society” (Light and Bonacich 1988, 244). The history of this cooperative financial institution, based on a rotating pool of money and mutual trust and help, goes back many centuries in Korea and is certainly a part of Korean cultural heritage that Korean immigrants brought with them to the United States. Closely related to ethnic (cultural) resources are family resources. Traditionally, the family is the basic social unit in Korean culture. Family members provide all sorts of support when the head of the household starts a business enterprise—from unpaid labor at the store to performing household tasks including childcare at home. For example, more than half (58%) of the spouses of Korean small business owners in the Chicago area worked at their family stores without pay. Major empirical findings from an interview survey of 94 Korean immigrant entrepreneurs in the Chicago minority area are summarized below to illustrate these observations on class and ethnic/cultural resources (Kim and Hurh 1985). As expected, most (89%) of the business owners were male, and over half of them completed a college education in Korea. Before immigrating, most were employed in white-collar occupations, and less then one-third managed their own businesses in Korea. The majority (61%) of the respondents reported having kin in the Chicago area, primarily parents and siblings, as well as their siblings’ spouses. Nearly three-fourths (72%) of the respondents had Korean friends in the Chicago area, and two-thirds (69%) were members of Korean immigrant churches. These data certainly indicate the strong social ties of the Korea small-business owners with their own ethnic group. In contrast, they generally had no close social ties with whites or members of other ethnic groups. These close ethnic social ties were a crucial source for the initial capital these Korean entrepreneurs needed to launch their business. Their initial capital came almost exclusively from three ethnic financial sources: money brought from the home country; family savings in the United States; and loans mainly from their Korean friends and kin. Some also relied on Korean banks and the kye, the Korean rotating credit association, as mentioned earlier. The Korean immigrant entrepreneurs effectively mobilized their ethnic resources not only for capital formation and labor utilization, but also to obtain merchandise. Since most Korean business owners are engaged in retail business, effective procurement of merchandise is a crucial issue. Our respondents obtained merchandise from American (white) and/or Korean suppliers. However, almost all of the variety shop owners and four-fifths of the clothing store owners obtained merchandise from Korean suppliers. Several advantages are associated with purchasing merchandise from Korean suppliers. First, the Korean suppliers offer low-priced merchandise suitable for low-income minority markets. Second, there are no language
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or cultural barriers to overcome. Third, Korean suppliers are generally flexible in setting purchase conditions, offering credit, and rescheduling payments. This style of business transaction benefited the Korean American entrepreneurs enormously, since most of them had a limited amount of working capital. So far we have discussed the class and ethnic resources that have led Korean immigrants to open their own small businesses. Certainly one must have resources to open a business, but there must also be markets, and this is the focus of the opportunity structure theory. The markets that have been particularly favorable to Korean immigrant entrepreneurs include the Korean ethnic market and other ethnic minority markets, such as African and Hispanic American markets. The Korean ethnic market caters primarily to the needs of Korean customers in the United States, especially their demand for Korean cultural products and services; for example, such businesses as Korean grocery stores, restaurants, newspapers, book and video stores, gift shops, herb shops, Korean martial art schools, Korean bakery/liquor stores, translation/mailing services, and wedding halls. Professional services for Korean clients include law offices, doctors’ offices, medical clinics, banks, funeral homes, travel agencies, insurance agencies, accounting offices, and the like (e.g., see The 2009 Korean Business Directory in the major U.S. metropolitan areas, published by the Korea Times and the Korea Daily). In sum, the Korean immigrant entrepreneurs have taken advantage of opportunities in the ethnically sheltered markets that are not generally accessible to non-Korean entrepreneurs, due to cultural differences and the lack of ethnic resources. Another vital market for Korean immigrant entrepreneurs is the minority market, where the customers are predominantly African Americans and Hispanic Americans. More than one-fourth (26%) of the customers of the Korean small businesses in the Chicago area were from these two groups (Hurh and Kim 1988, 139). In Los Angeles, more than one-third (35%) of Korean businesses were serving African Americans or Mexican Americans as the majority of their customers (Min 1990, 441). The major reason for these phenomena is the availability of business opportunities in minority areas, particularly for Korean immigrant entrepreneurs who have class and ethnic resources but are disadvantaged in the mainstream labor market. Business opportunities in these marginal markets are further available to the immigrant entrepreneurs because the white merchants who have traditionally dominated such markets have gradually retreated to suburbs. In sum, the relative success of Korean entrepreneurs in the United States is thus a joint product of their effective utilization of ethnic resources and the opportunity structures in the American labor market. These “success” stories, however, do not reflect the high costs, both material and social, of Korean immigrant entrepreneurship. One of the most serious problems is the interethnic conflict between Korean merchants and minority customers in the inner city, particularly African Americans. Other high costs of Korean entrepreneurship include: severe competition
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among Korean small business owners, physical danger, overwork, demoralization, and family problems (Kim and Hurh 1985). Since the majority of Korean small businesses are located in the inner city, whether they cater to fellow Koreans or other minority customers, they are vulnerable to shoplifting, vandalism, robbery, and violence. Korean stores are especially vulnerable because they generally stay open 24 hours or well past midnight. The long hours of work under the threat of physical danger can demoralize owners and put a strain on family life that may lead to domestic violence, divorce, and child neglect. The economic adaptation of Korean Americans represents two distinctive patterns—some are successful, but others are just struggling to survive. However, whether successful or struggling, Korean Americans are in general the most overeducated group for their earnings as compared with whites and other major ethnic groups in the United States. The situation may change with the emergence of new generations of Korean Americans. As was the case of the third- and fourthgeneration Japanese Americans, American-born Korean Americans may leave the ethnic labor market for professional occupations in the core sector of the American economy. This possibility is supported by a national survey of 564 Korean American adolescents—only 4.5 percent of the youths indicated an occupational preference in the field of business. Most wanted to enter professional and technical fields such as medicine, law, and engineering (Pai 1993).
Adjustment and Adaptation The first-generation Korean immigrants are generally disadvantaged in the American labor market, due in part to their language barrier and cultural unfamiliarity. Since the majority (76%) of Korean Americans are foreign-born, their learning the American way of life (cultural assimilation) and fitting into the American society (social assimilation) are still problematic. For example, according to the year 2004 American Community Survey (ACS), nearly half (49%) of Korean Americans reported that they do not speak English very well and speak no English at home. The comparable figures for Japanese Americans and Asian Indian Americans are 27 percent and 23 percent respectively (U.S. Bureau of Census 2007a, 2007b). It is apparent, then, that Asian Americans’ life conditions largely depend on their adaptation to American culture, particularly language. This section will deal with cultural and social assimilation of Korean Americans, largely based on past sociological community surveys. Cultural assimilation refers to the changing of the immigrants’ cultural patterns to those of the host society, while social assimilation refers to the immigrants’ unlimited access and entrance to those of the host society. Simply put, cultural assimilation takes place
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when immigrants and their children learn the American way of life, such as language, customs, values, and beliefs, while social assimilation is possible only when immigrants and their posterity are socially accepted by members of the dominant group (whites) as close friends, close neighbors, working colleagues, fellow church members, or even as potential marital partners. As past studies reveal, while cultural assimilation of nonwhite minorities has taken place to a considerable degree in the United States, their social assimilation has not been extensive (Gordon 1964; Bogardus 1968). This shows that cultural assimilation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for social assimilation of many minorities in the United States; even attainment of high socioeconomic status may not necessarily lead to social assimilation, due to racial barriers. For instance, Korean immigrant physicians may become highly acculturated into the American way of life by virtue of their good command of English, conversion to Protestantism, and high professional status; but they may not be socially assimilated into the mainstream of the American social structure due to their immutable racial status. Other crucial factors impacting on assimilation patterns are generational differences (Korean-born adult immigrants versus their American-born children) and age at immigration. In light of these general observations, we will first discuss the adaptation patterns of Korean adult immigrants, and later their posterity (the second generation and the “1.5 generation”—those who immigrated to the United States at a very young age).
Cultural Assimilation Four major areas of cultural assimilation among Korean Americans are discussed in the following: (1) English proficiency, (2) exposure to American mass media, (3) food habits, and (4) cultural values and social attitudes.
English Proficiency As mentioned, one of the most important variables affecting cultural assimilation is language. About half of Korean Americans experience language problems, particularly among first-generation adult immigrants. For example, less than half of the Chicago survey (see Demographic Profile section for details) rated their English ability as “moderately well” or “fluent” in reading (35%), writing (31%), and speaking (40%). The respondents were also given an objective test, and the test scores confirm the subjective rating (Hurh 1998, 70). The 2004 ACS data on the English-speaking ability of Koreans also confirm the Chicago survey data. As expected, those who have lived longer in the United States generally have a better command of English and use English more frequently at home and in the workplace than newcomers. Moreover, male immigrants show
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a higher proficiency in English than female immigrants, and those who came to the United States at a younger age commanded better English than those who did so at a later age. However, most Korean first-generation immigrants use the Korean language at home. About 87 percent of the Chicago sample indicated that they never or occasionally use English with their spouse. A high proportion of respondents also never use English with the rest of their family members—with children (63%) and with siblings (60%). They also use mainly the Korean language primarily when they are with Korean friends, relatives, neighbors, and church members, although the majority (65%) of the respondents use English always at the workplace. This means Korean Americans are caught between two language communities every working day.
Exposure to American Mass Media Another measure of cultural assimilation is the extent of the immigrant’s exposure to the mass media of the host society. Nearly half of the Korean immigrants never read American newspapers at all, and only one in five regularly read American newspapers. However, a great majority (three in five) read U.S.-published Korean newspapers regularly. Again, length of residence in the United States and young age at immigration are positively related to readership of American newspapers. The favorite sections of American newspapers vary with the gender of the reader. The male readers favored politics (67%) and sports (61%). In contrast, the favorite sections for female readers were advertisements (72%), and cultural life (60%). The strong interest in sports events shown by male readers may reflect a seemingly universal aspect of the male interest in sports, whether American or Korean males. Nevertheless, it is also a part of the Americanization process—for example one’s identification with a particular team, such as the Chicago Bears or St. Louis Rams. In contrast, advertisements were most favored by the Korean American female readers. This seems to indicate the influence of American newspapers on the Americanization of female respondents in terms of consumer behavior. American newspapers are thus not only a medium of information, but also affect the Americanization of Korean American readers’ lifestyles. The development of Korean ethnic media offerings, particularly satellite television programming and programs streaming online from Korea, have provided many Korean American immigrants continuing contact with their native country. In addition, local television stations in metropolitan areas with a high concentration of Korean Americans (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago) produce local Koreanlanguage programming. No empirical research on the relationship of these media to Korean American acculturation has been conducted.
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Food Habits Food is another integral part of any culture. To what extent are Korean Americans acculturated in terms of food habits? This largely depends on the time of day and the day of the week. In the morning, American food dominates, but in the evening Korean food takes over. About two-thirds of the Chicago survey respondents reported eating an American breakfast on weekdays. During the lunch hour, American food dominates on weekdays, but Korean food dominates on weekends. Most Korean immigrants, whether they are newcomers or old-timers in the United States, eat a Korean dinner every day. However, the proportion of the respondents who ate American food for breakfast and lunch varied with the length of residence—the longer the stay the more often American food is eaten. It is questionable whether this pattern truly reflects an Americanization of their food habits, since cooking a Korean breakfast, packing a Korean lunch, or going out to a Korean restaurant every working day would not be a simple matter. In addition, the level of education and the age at immigration are also related to the respondents’ Americanization of food habits; the lower the age at immigration and the higher the educational level, the more American foods are eaten. In general, Korean Americans are strongly attached to their ethnic food, as most of them eat Korean food every day—at least for evening dinner—regardless of their length of residence, education, and age. What distinguishes Korean cuisine from Japanese and Chinese meals? Although Chinese, Korean, and Japanese cuisines share the same basic food elements, such as rice, noodles, and soy sauce, each has its own characteristics. In contrast to the richly flavored fried dishes of the Chinese or the attractively arranged but plain, small dishes of the Japanese, Korean food is highly spiced, usually with red chili pepper and garlic. One unique food is kimchi, a fermented celery cabbage seasoned with salt, garlic, red hot pepper, ginger, green onions, and pickled fish. Kimchi originated in Korea during the early period of Three Kingdoms (37 B.C.E.–7 C.E.) as the method of preserving vegetables in salt in order to have them available for the off-season. Pickled vegetables can also be found among Chinese and Japanese cuisines, but preserving cabbages with red chili peppers is unique to the Korean cuisine. With over 200 different kinds of kimchis for various needs and occasions, it is a vital part of every meal (Lee and Lee 1988). Among the most favorite dishes are bulgogi and kalbi (marinated, barbecued beef and short ribs). These dishes, kimchi, bulgogi, and kochujang (fermented red pepper bean mash) are part of the common cultural heritage of Koreans living around the world. Whether in New York, Moscow, or Hong Kong, Korean restaurants can be found serving authentic Korean food; for example, there are 83 Korean restaurants and 44 Korean food markets listed in the 2009 Korean Business Directory in Chicago.
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Kimchi is a traditional Korean dish made from fermented cabbage. (Courtesy of Won Moo Hurh)
Cultural Values and Social Attitudes The process of immigrants’ cultural assimilation also requires the adoption of American cultural values and social attitudes, such as individualism, equality, freedom, self-assertion, self-reliance, and so on. In this regard, two interrelated questions need to be addressed: (1) To what extent have Korean Americans adopted or accepted American cultural values and social attitudes? (2) To what extent have Korean Americans retained or modified their traditional Korean cultural values and social attitudes? In short, the first question deals with Americanization and the second is concerned with the persistence or weakening of ethnic attachment. In order to address these questions, a comprehensive, 26-item questionnaire was developed by Hurh and Kim, which covered family values (parents’ attitudes toward children, children’s attitudes toward parents, attitudes toward marital relations), attitudes toward Korean immigrants in general, and attitudes toward American culture and society (Hurh and Kim 1988).
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The results of this value/attitude survey indicated that Korean immigrants’ attachment to their Korean traditional cultural values and social attitudes is pervasively strong, particularly with respect to filial piety (honor and obedience to parents), negative attitudes on intermarriage, conservative gender ideology (traditional sex roles), family interest over individual interest, preference for Korean churches, and perpetuation of Korean cultural heritage to their posterity. This strong ethnic attachment is largely unaffected by length of residence in the United States (Hurh 1998, 72–75). Americanization in cultural values and social attitudes among Korean immigrants is, however, also noted in certain selected areas, such as egalitarian child socialization, acceptance of the wife’s work outside the home, individual achievement, self-reliance, self-actualization, and social interaction with white Americans. Their acculturation to these American values and attitudes is generally independent from their strong ethnic attachment. In sum, Korean Americans keep their traditional cultural values largely intact, while adopting selected dimensions of American values and social attitudes. In the process of this “adhesion,” or blending of two cultures, Korean Americans seem to experience feelings of ambivalence. For example, the respondents gave the same affirmative answers to two seemingly contradictory questionnaire items (“A woman’s place is in the home” and “A wife’s career is just as important as the husband’s career”). More will be said about this adhesive or additive mode of adaptation later.
Social Assimilation As discussed earlier, most Korean immigrants were helped by their relatives when settling in the United States. For example, the majority of Korean immigrants in the Chicago area have relatives in the area. Most of them maintain close ties with their relatives and contact them at least once a week. Frequency of kinship contact increases as immigrants stay longer in the United States. This means relatives constitute an integral part of Korean Americans’ social network. The kin network provides not only economic aid (such as job placement, small business preparation, and financial loans), but also social and emotional support in times of personal crisis. Since very few first-generation immigrants have non-Korean American spouses, kin contact is almost exclusively among Koreans. A similar pattern of close social ties was also observed in the area of friendship. The great majority (80%) of the Chicago respondents indicated having Korean friends in the Chicago area. About half (51%) saw their Korean friends once a week or more often, and three-fourths (74%) met their friends at least once a month. The longer they stayed in the United States, the more frequently they contacted their Korean friends. Thus, Korean Americans’ social ties with their own ethnic group have not been weakened by their international migration but rather strengthened as their length of residence in the United States increases.
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How about their social assimilation as reflected in their close interpersonal contact with other Americans, particularly with the American white majority? About one-third (38%) of the Chicago sample has non-Korean American friends, and nearly all (95%) of the respondents who had non-Korean friends reported having at least one white friend. Close to half of the respondents with American friends saw their American friends once a week or more often, and the majority (70%) at least once a month. And as expected, the proportion of the respondents who have non-Korean American friends increased significantly as length of residence in the United States increased. In general, the following additional factors are positively associated with the degree to which the respondents were socially assimilated: (1) level of education—the college graduates had more American friends than did noncollege graduates; and (2) gender—male respondents had more American friends than did female respondents. Besides the language factor, differential social settings also affect the formation and development of Korean Americans’ friendship. The Korean immigrants knew many of their current Korean friends in Korea as childhood friends, classmates, or work colleagues. After immigration, however, many new Korean friends were added in the United States, largely through the Korean ethnic church, workplace, neighborhood, or school. Korean alumni associations, Korean churches, and workplaces in the United States are the most common social settings for Korean Americans to meet their Korean friends. In contrast, most of the immigrants met American friends mainly at the workplace or through business contacts. Hence, Korean Americans’ social assimilation significantly hinges upon their employment role. The majority (58%) of Korean Americans in the Chicago area also reported having close neighbors. Their close neighbors are mostly Koreans (71%), and only 23 percent are white Americans. Unlike the friendship pattern, most of the respondents with close neighbors had either Koreans or whites as their close neighbors. Very few of them had both Korean and white close neighbors. This reflects the segregated nature of Chicago neighborhoods and the respondents’ residential mobility to suburban areas, where fewer Koreans reside as compared with the inner city. Taking advantage of geographical proximity, two-thirds of the respondents who have close neighbors saw their neighbors at least once a week. Length of residence does not seem to have any significant bearing on the neighborhood social relations. Very few Korean immigrants in the Chicago area (6%) report joining American voluntary associations, while one-fourth of the respondents were members of Korean voluntary associations other than church. Most of these voluntary associations are alumni associations, business-related associations, social clubs for personal hobbies, such as golf clubs, go clubs (a Japanese game resembling chess or checkers), and so on. In contrast, three-fourths (77%) of the respondents were affiliated with Christian churches, although only about 28 percent of Koreans in Korea are Christians. Almost all of these church affiliates in the Chicago sample attended
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Korean ethnic churches of various denominations, but only 3 percent of the church affiliates belonged to American churches. Length of residence was not found to be related to church affiliation or the frequency of church attendance. In sum, Korean Americans’ participation in American voluntary associations (including church) is severely limited in its scope and intensity. As revealed by earlier surveys in the Chicago and Los Angeles areas (Hurh and Kim 1984; 1988), social relationships of Korean Americans are built around ethnic organizations, especially church, within the well-defined boundaries of a Korean enclave. A later section discusses the Korean American church and other ethnic organizations in greater detail. At this point, a general profile of Korean Americans’ sociocultural adaptation emerges—the “adhesive” or “additive” mode of adaptation. Adhesive adaptation refers to a particular mode of adaptation in which certain aspects of the new culture and social relations with members of the host society are added on to the immigrant’s traditional culture and social networks, without replacing or modifying any significant part of the old (Hurh 1998, 79). Most Korean Americans have thus far maintained their pervasive attachment to Korean culture and social ties regardless of length of residence in the United States. They have retained Korean culture (daily use of Korean language, exposure to Korean mass media, eating Korean food for dinner every day, and keeping Korean traditional values) and maintained close social ties with members of their ethnic group (kin, Korean friends, Korean close neighbors, Korean church, and other Korean ethnic organizations). At the same time, however, they have also been assimilated to the American way of life in certain selected dimensions as their length of residence increases, such as learning and using English, exposure to American mass media, selective adoption of American cultural values, preference for American breakfast and lunch on weekdays, some friendships with Americans, and limited participation in American voluntary associations. This simultaneous occurrence of the two adaptation processes mentioned earlier—retention of “Koreanness” (ethnic attachment) and “Americanization” (selective assimilation)—clearly indicates the additive or adhesive mode of adaptation among Korean Americans, particularly among the first-generation Korean Americans.
Family Life and Adjustment A great majority of Korean immigrants came to the new country by the invitation of their immediate family members and other relatives who had already settled in the United States. Moreover, in Korea, the family—not the individual—is the basic social unit. Hence, the life of Korean Americans largely centers on family and kin relations. Korean immigrants have brought their traditional family values and structure to the United States, but with modifications. Caught between the old and new
1354 | Korean Immigrants
systems, Korean immigrants and their offspring have been struggling to develop a “happy medium” by blending the two, a task that has not been easy. The fundamental difference between the Korean and American family systems derives from two contrasting sets of family values or ideologies: the filial piety centered Confucian collectivism with its emphasis on family interest, duty, obligation, and mutual dependence among kin, versus the conjugal-love-centered American individualism, with its emphasis on individual interest, rights, intimacy, and independence. Traditionally, Korea has maintained the patrilineal extended family system, in which more than two generations lived together in the same household headed by a male patriarch (the father or the grandfather). The extended family system in Korea has gradually been modified to the conjugal family—a small nuclear family consisting of only a married couple and their children. However, in the mid-1980s, when Korean immigration to the United States reached its peak, the average family size in Korea was still fairly large—4.2 people—and the proportion of three-generational households was also still significant—15 percent (“The New Middle-Aged Generation” 1990). More importantly, many aspects of the traditional family ideology and customs remain largely unchanged. For example, almost threequarters (72%) of marriages in Korea are arranged; most Koreans still prefer sons over daughters; filial piety continues to be the cardinal virtue in family ethics; and a woman’s proper place is in the home—only 20 percent of married women in Korea are employed outside the home. The majority of Korean immigrants arrived in the United States with this tradition-oriented family system still largely intact. However, living in radically different conditions in the new society, the old Korean family system has undergone modifications. For instance, the nuclear family is more functional and compatible with the highly industrialized nature of American society. Many immigrant wives must be gainfully employed outside home in order to supplement the family income. Elderly immigrants often wish to live independently. The male child preference has no meaning in the egalitarian American family system. And the old Korean custom of arranged marriage simply does not work for the young generations of Korean Americans. According to the 2007 ACS data, the average size of the Korean American household is 3.22—very similar to that of the U.S. national average of 3.20. As Table 205 indicates, married-couple families predominate in Korean American households. Their proportion (56.2%) is larger than that of the U.S. national percentage of 49.7 percent. The percentage of relatives living with Korean American householders is also significantly higher than that of American householders in general (8.1% versus 6.7%). Similarly, a higher proportion (29.8%) of Korean American children under 18 years old live with both parents, whereas the comparable figure for the total U.S. population is 21.4 percent.
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Divorce rates of Korean Americans are far lower than those of the U.S. general population, and therefore the percentage of female householders is substantially lower for Korean Americans. Such family stability is a carryover from Korea, where the divorce rate was one of the lowest in the world when the majority of Korean immigrants left for the United States (1970–1990). In 1992, the divorce rate in Korea was only 0.95 (per 1,000 population) as compared with 4.6 in the United States. Although the divorce rate in Korea has increased in recent years to 2.9 in 2004, it is still much lower than in the United States (10.5). The main reason for this difference derives from the contrast between Korean collectivism (the family interest comes before the individual interest) and American individualism (the selfinterest comes before the family interest). The 2004 American Community Survey data show that the percentage of employed Korean women (16 years and over) is 51.6 percent, slightly lower than the national rate of 58.6 percent. Interestingly, however, the 2004 American Community Survey also shows the proportions of unpaid family workers and selfemployed workers among Korean Americans as double those of the U.S. population (see Table 199). Like many middle-aged American parents, some Korean American parents face the double tasks of elderly care as well as childcare. In 2004, 7.6 percent of the Korean American population was elderly (65 and over). Many of these elderly parents were originally invited to immigrate by their adult children, who felt a responsibility to care for their aging parents (filial piety) and who also sought advice and help from their parents in the initial settlement in the new country. But once the elderly parents arrived in the United States, the situation was quite different from what they expected or were used to. Traditionally, older parents live with their eldest son and his family in an extended family system. As the head of the family, they are served, respected, and consulted by their children about family matters. When they come to the United States, their role and status are reversed. They are no longer served and consulted by their adult children; rather, they have to serve and consult their children. The tasks of the parents are usually to take care of the grandchildren and do such household chores as preparing meals, cleaning the house, washing, and sometimes doing menial work in their children’s store. They see their status in the family as being greatly diminished. The elderly Koreans who live with their children in suburban settings are the unhappiest (Kim and Schwartz-Barcott 1983). Suburban living makes it difficult for them to visit friends or attend gatherings organized for the elderly because of difficulties in obtaining transportation. For many of the aged Koreans, the only social contact with their peers is their weekly attendance at Korean ethnic churches or temples, and going to church on Sunday is the happiest time for them. Many aged Koreans move out of their children’s homes and establish an independent residence close by other elderly Koreans. The Chicago survey showed 81
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percent of the elderly maintaining an independent residence with their spouse or alone, mostly within the city of Chicago. Such independent living arrangements help them to avoid conflicts with their children and to enjoy close friendships with people their own age (Hurh and Kim 1988). Korean Americans’ additive mode of adaptation (adhesive adaptation mentioned earlier) can be seen in their retention of traditional Korean customs and rituals associated with major lifetime events (birthdays, marriage, death), folk festivals, and Korean national holidays. The following describes the Korean traditional customs and rituals that have been retained or modified, largely by the first-generation Korean immigrants. The first birthday (dol)—In Korea, the one-year-old child wears colorful, traditional Korean clothes and sits on the floor in front of many objects that the child may like to pick up, such as money, a harmonica, a pen, a piece of yarn, and even a pocket calculator. Family members and invited guests gather around the birthday child and watch what object he or she might pick up first. Legend says that the child’s future can be predicted by what he or she first picks during the dol ceremony. If the child picks up money, he or she will become a wealthy person; if the child picks up a pen, a scholar; if the harmonica, then a musician; if the yarn, then a person with a very long life; and if the calculator, then a scientist. This funladen ceremony is followed by the dol banquet and the presentation of gifts to the birthday child. In the United States, these dol rituals and customs are retained by the first-generation Korean immigrants, and probably their children will also pass down these traditions to the next generations. Marriage (gyeol hon)—In Korea, the traditional marriage ceremonies used to take place in the bride’s house, but today most weddings take place in a commercial ceremonial hall, except for Christians (about 28% of the Korean population), who generally marry in the church. The brides wear Western-style white gowns, and grooms are dressed in tuxedos or business suits. The wedding ceremony is also similar to the Western-style wedding—exchange of vows, pronouncement of marriage, and a speech by the master of ceremonies. After the Western-style wedding, some couples go through another ceremony called paebeck, a traditional Korean bowing-ritual observed by the bridal couple and their families. The newly wedded couple change into Korean dress and pay respects to each other and to parents and relatives on both sides of the family. A wedding banquet follows, and a honeymoon trip. In the United States, most Korean American weddings take place in Korean American churches, since three-fourths of Korean Americans are Christians. The ceremony and related customs are very similar to weddings of Americans, except for some Korean ethnic cultural differences, such as the use of Korean language and hymns, the serving of Korean food, and the paying of respect in Korean traditional dress.
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The 60th Birthday (hwan-gap)—Hwan-gap means “returning to the beginning.” Koreans adopted the Chinese Zodiac that counts time in 60-year cycles instead of 100-year cycles (centuries) of the Western calendar. So when one reaches 60 years of age, it calls for a big celebration, because not very many people survived to that age in the past. And also, hwan-gap means you are starting another 60-year lifecycle again. Both in Korea and in the United States, the celebrant is dressed in the best Korean clothes, is honored and respected with deep bows from young family members and relatives, and receives lavish gifts, and all partake of a gorgeous banquet. Funerals (Jangsa)—In traditional Korea, funeral ceremonies took place in the home of the deceased, largely based on Confucian teachings of ancestor reverence. After the wake, lasting usually three or five days, the bier was carried to the gravesite by a procession of the family members, relatives, and friends. In modern urban Korea, most funerals are taken care of by funeral homes. In the United States, Korean Americans’ funeral services are conducted mostly by Korean American funeral homes in conjunction with Korean American churches. In most metropolitan areas in the United States, one can find Korean funeral homes in the business directory, for example, Chicago has 8 Korean-run funeral homes and Los Angeles has 11 (Korean Business Directory 2009).
Celebration of National Holidays: Korean Ethnic Festivals Solnal (Lunar New Year’s Day)—In the past this holiday was celebrated on the first day of the first lunar month, which usually falls in late January or early February. Today both in Korea and the United States, the primary celebration is on January 1 of the Western calendar. In Korea all the family gathers together, dressed in traditional clothes, and the non-Christians observe the jesa ceremony (ancestral memorial rites) at home, while the Christians participate in a memorial service in church. After the ceremony or service, the young members of the family pay respect to their elders with a deep ritual bow (sebae), and a feast follows. Children are dressed in colorful Korean dress and visit their older relatives to pay respect. In the United States, since the majority of Korean Americans are Christians, they attend church services in the morning, and the rest of the Solnal activities are very much the same as in Korea. Chusok (Autumn Evening)—Held on the 15th day of the eighth lunar month, the “Harvest Festival Day” is similar to the American Thanksgiving day. In Korea, it is a three-day national holiday. Families customarily hold memorial services at home early in the morning and later attend the graves of their ancestors, cleaning and performing ceremonies. In the United States, Korean Americans also visit their relatives’ graves in the church cemetery, hold a memorial service there, and later enjoy viewing the full moon in the evening with family members and friends.
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Special Korean rice-cake (song pyon), rice wine (soju or yakju), and fresh fruits of the autumn are usually served.
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background The close social and cultural ties among Korean Americans (ethnic attachment) is very strong, probably the strongest among all Asian Americans. This strong ethnic attachment among Korean Americans is reflected in their numerous ethnic organizations. For example, the 2009 Korean Business Directory of Chicago lists 201 Korean ethnic churches, 6 Buddhist temples, 40 other religious organizations (e.g., retreat centers, mission institutes, theological seminaries, and Bible schools), 79 Korean alumni associations, and 135 other Korean ethnic organizations, such as the Korean American Society of Chicago, social service centers for Korean seniors, Korean War veterans associations, Korean provincial associations, and various professional organizations and Korean language media for promoting Korean American art, music, and literature. The Korean-language media in the Chicago metropolitan area include three Korean television and radio stations, three Korean dailies and one weekly newspaper, and four monthly magazines (“110,000 Students” 2009). Several factors account for this unusually strong ethnic attachment or solidarity. The first is racial and cultural homogeneity. Except for the Japanese, Koreans are the most homogeneous people in Asia in terms of their racial composition and cultural characteristics, particularly language. Another indication of ethnic
Members of the Korean American Association of Chicago wear traditional hanbok dresses as they ride on their float during the Memorial Day Parade in Chicago, May 27, 2000. (Tim Boyle/ Newsmakers)
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homogeneity among Korean people is the prevalence of common surnames. The most common surname among Koreans is Kim; Kims comprise about 22 percent of the total Korean population in Korea and in the United States (Shin and Yu 1984). The next most prevalent surnames are Lee (spelled also as Yi, Rhee, or Li) and Park (spelled also as Pak or Bahk). These three surnames represent a majority of the Korean population. The second factor associated with Korean Americans’ strong ethnic attachment is their concentration in ethnically segregated small businesses, as discussed earlier. Min observes that: “Korean immigrants maintain strong ethnic attachment partly because more than 75% of them work in the segregated Korean ethnic subeconomy, either as business owners or as employees of business owned by co-ethnics. They also maintain strong solidarity mainly because of their businessrelated conflicts with outside interest groups” (Min 1995, 227). Third, and most important, Korean Americans’ strong ethnic attachment is reinforced by the unique historical legacy of the Korean ethnic church in the United States. Unlike Chinese and Japanese immigrants, a majority of early Korean immigrants had some exposure to Christian missionaries, and many of them were already baptized Christians prior to their emigration from Korea. Among the approximately 7,000 early Korean immigrants, more than 400 were already baptized Christians before their arrival in Hawaii. Within the first decade of their settlement, the number of Korean Christians grew to about 3,200—that is, about 40 percent of the total Korean American population in Hawaii at that time (Hurh 1998, 106). Since then the Korean immigrant church has become the center of the Korean American community by providing not only spiritual (Christian) fellowship but also ethnic fellowship, cultural identity, and social services. Beyond a place of religious worship, the Korean church has also functioned as a social center for promoting a communal bond among fellow immigrants, preserving Korean cultural traditions (language, family values, food, etc.), and providing social services (e.g., counseling, job referral, help with language and legal problems). This historical background of extensive church involvement among Korean Americans has lead to a phenomenal increase in Korean ethnic churches in recent years, from about 75 churches in 1970 to 3,933 in 2008 ( “Number of Korean” 2008). This would mean that there is one Korean ethnic church for every 34 Koreans in the United States. The Korean immigrant church has thus become the foremost important ethnic association among Korean Americans.
Religion: The Korean Ethnic Church As indicated earlier, compared with Chinese and Japanese Americans, Korean Americans have certainly been known as churchgoers. About 70 percent of the Los Angeles Koreans and 77 percent of the Chicago Koreans were affiliated with
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Korean ethnic churches, and the vast majority (78%) of the church affiliates attended church at least once a week (Hurh and Kim 1984, 1988). The Chicago survey also revealed that about 14 percent of the church affiliates belonged to the Roman Catholic church, and the rest were members of various Protestant denominations (Presbyterian, 42%; Methodist, 14%; Nondenominational, 13%; Evangelical, 5%; Baptist, 5%; Seventh Day Adventist, 3%; Holiness, 2%). Almost all of the church affiliates, whether Catholic or Protestant, attended Korean churches. In short, for the majority of Korean Americans—whether they are old-timers or newcomers, men or women, rich or poor—church participation has become a way of life.
Other Ethnic Associations Next to the Korean ethnic church, the most popular ethnic association is the alumni association. Whether in Korea or in the United States, friendship among Koreans centers heavily around high school and college alumni circles. Having been a classmate with someone means you have a bosom friend who is actually closer than some of your relatives. Moreover, there has been a traditional norm established in Korean society to define the senior and junior relationship among alumni friends: the seniors (seonbae) must help the juniors (hoobae), and the juniors are obligated to pay respect and loyalty to the seniors. The need for such an intimate camaraderie among Korean immigrants has become intensified due to their social estrangement and loneliness in the new country. Next to alumni associations, other popular associations are regional (provincial) associations and social service organizations. Those who came from the same native province in Korea organized so-called Dominhoe for social conviviality. Korean American social service organizations are exemplified by the following: Korean American Senior-Center, Korean American Community Service, Korean American Scholarship Foundation, Korean YMCA, Korean YWCA, Korean American Women in Need, Korean Self-Help Center, and Korean American Resource and Cultural Center. Also, there are numerous business and professional associations. In U.S. cities with populations over 150,000, one is likely to find the Haninhoe (the Korean Federation or Association). For example, the largest is in Los Angeles and one of the smallest is in Peoria, Illinois. Officers of the Haninhoe are elected by local Korean American residents. The major functions of these groups are to promote the general welfare of the Korean American community by coordinating with various Korean ethnic organizations, state and local government agencies, other ethnic organizations in the area, and often with the Korean consulates in major U.S. cities. Thus, ethnic associations are an integral part of Korean American life: providing social gatherings, mutual aid in times of crises, and vital links to Korean and
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American government and social service agencies. They also maintain and foster Korean ethnic identity. For example, the Haninhoe usually sponsors the annual Korean festival and parade, where Korean art, music, dance, and food are introduced to the American public. Through these events, Korean Americans feel proud of their ethnic heritage.
Koreatown: Ethnic Activities Center Most social events and business meetings of Korean ethnic organizations in large metropolitan areas take place in Koreatowns. The largest Koreatown is located in downtown Los Angeles and covers an area more than 20 square miles—larger than Little Tokyo and Chinatown combined. The city of Los Angeles officially designated this area as Koreatown with a signpost in 1980. Despite the recent public perception of Koreatown as a dangerous neighborhood—an image reinforced by the 1992 riots—the Los Angeles Koreatown still functions as the social, economic, and cultural center for 277,000 Korean Americans in the Los Angeles metropolitan area (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). Most of the offices for Korean ethnic organizations and several thousand Korean-owned businesses are located there, such as Korean restaurants, groceries, nightclubs, herbal medicine shops, acupuncturists, Tae-Kwon-Do gyms, and even marriage go-between and fortuneteller offices. Although smaller in scale, functionally similar Koreatowns have also developed in Flushing (Queens), New York, and in the north side of Chicago. In sum, whether in Los Angeles, New York, or Chicago, Koreatowns share the following characteristics: (1) they function as the economic and ethnic activities center for Korean immigrants, particularly for the newcomers; (2) Korean businesses in Koreatown cater primarily to Korean Americans; (3) Korean business districts are recognizable by Korean-language signboards; (4) they are generally located in multiethnic inner-city neighborhoods (such as Hispanic and or black neighborhoods); and (5) many of the business people and professionals (e.g., doctors, lawyers, accountants) who work in Koreatown live in the suburbs, while the poor and elderly tend to remain in Koreatown. Probably not many people realize that Korean Americans are a numerical minority in the Los Angeles Koreatown, where they constitute only 10 percent of the population. The majority (68%) of the residents are Latinos and the rest are black and other Asian Americans (Yu 1993b). During the 1992 Los Angeles riots, more than half of the looters arrested were, in fact, Latinos. The media portrayed the 1992 Los Angeles riot as mainly a conflict between African Americans and Korean American merchants. The riots were, however, multiethnic riots, involving white, black, Hispanic and Korean Americans (Chang 1994). Korean Americans’ relations with other ethnic groups will be examined in the next chapter.
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Celebration of American National Holidays On top of all these traditional Korean festive days, Korean Americans also observe the usual American holidays: Christmas, New Years, Easter, July 4, Thanksgiving, and so on (adhesive adaptation). Since the vast majority of Korean Americans are Christians, they are baptized, confirmed, and married in the church, and most Korean American churches have their own cemetery lot for their parishioners.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship During the decade 1999–2000, more than 227,000 Korean immigrants became legal permanent residents in the United States, and more than 200,000 of the Korean permanent residents have obtained U.S. citizenship through the naturalization process (see Table 206). Neither the Republic of Korea nor the United States recognizes dual citizenship (or nationality) as a general rule.
Relations with White (European) Americans The 2000 Census reported the following percentages for major racial/ethnic groups in the United States: whites (70.4%), blacks (12.6%), Hispanics (12.5%), and Asian/ Pacific Islanders (4.1%). These figures are changing rapidly due to the increase in nonwhite populations in recent years. According to the 2004 American Community Survey on Asian Americans, the percentages for whites and Asian Americans are 67.3 percent, and 4.2 percent, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). Korean Americans are only 0.4 percent of the entire U.S. population. Despite the small population, Asian Americans have often been perceived as a threat by white Americans. To understand Korean Americans’ relations with white Americans, a historical overview is needed. Compared with other Asian immigrants such as the Chinese and Japanese, Koreans are relative latecomers to the United States. The American image of these early “Oriental” immigrants has also been applied to later Asians immigrants, including Koreans. Table 207 shows five distinctive phases in American perception of Asians in the United States. In the early phases (1850–1945), the image was generally negative, reflecting America’s unfamiliarity with Asian culture, America’s economic problems in the late 1800s, and Japan’s status as an enemy nation during World War II. The negative images, however, eventually transformed to positive ones, notably since the 1960s. This change may be attributed to the professionalization and upward mobility of
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the second and third generations of Chinese and Japanese Americans. Moreover, as a result of the revision of the U.S. Immigration law in 1965, the influx of highly educated immigrants from Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and India reinforced the positive image of Asian Americans as an intelligent, industrious, and hardworking model minority. For better or worse, this “success” or “model minority” image of Asian Americans was conveyed to the American public by the mass media from the 1960s to the 1980s. Scholarly studies on this topic also grew during this period, creating heated debates on the validity and implications of such a success stereotype (Chiswick 1983; Hurh and Kim 1989; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1988). White American scholars tended to promote the model-minority image, whereas many Asian American scholars questioned the validity of such an ethnic stereotype and warned against its possible negative consequences—even though the image looked quite positive. The negative consequences include disguised (invisible) underemployment of highly qualified Asian American professionals, exclusion of poor Asian Americans from minority social programs, admission quotas restricting qualified Asian American students in elite universities, and downgrading of other less successful minorities such as African and Latino Americans. Unfortunately, some signs of the negative consequences of the success image began to emerge in the mid-1980s. White Americans began to express general uneasiness about the increasing number of new immigrants, particularly from Asia. In 1992 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported that Asian Americans face widespread prejudice, discrimination, and denials of equal opportunity. In addition, many Asian Americans, particularly those who are immigrants, are deprived of equal access to public services, including police protection, education, health care, and the judicial system. The report identifies several key factors contributing to the civil rights problems facing Asian Americans, including general stereotypes. Perhaps the most damaging of these is the “model minority” stereotype that causes resentment of Asian Americans within the general public and often leads federal, state, and local agencies to overlook the problems facing Asian Americans (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1992a, 1). Korean Americans are particularly vulnerable because most of them are recent immigrants, more than one-third of them are extensively involved in small business dealing with poor African American or Latino American customers, and many of them, due to their relatively high educational and professional backgrounds, are in direct competition with majority Americans in elite schools and in the primary labor market. In sum, studies show that majority Americans’ perceptions of Asian Americans fluctuated over time—from inscrutable heathens, to model minority, and then to overachieving and threatening minority. Overall, majority Americans consistently
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rank Asian Americans in general and Koreans Americans in particular low in social distance surveys and public opinion polls (Gallup 1989, 63; Hurh 1977; Owen, Eisener, and McFaul 1981; Schaefer 1987; Smith 1991; Song 1991). From a sociological point of view, it is interesting to observe that in general the dominant group does not need or like the minority as much as the minority needs or likes them. Past studies indicate that nonwhite minorities in the United States like white Americans almost as much as their own race or ethnic group; however, many white Americans do not reciprocate this feeling (Hurh 1994). Although no significant overt conflicts have been observed between whites and Korean Americans on the group level, Korean American merchants have experienced various problems dealing with white suppliers and landlords, particularly with Jewish and Italian Americans in the New York areas, as Min’s 1996 study revealed. At the same time, some Korean merchants feel that they learned from the past Jewish experiences in the 1960s, when Jewish merchants were operating businesses in African American neighborhoods (Min 1996, 181). As a whole, Korean Americans’ relations with majority Americans appear to be more or less ambivalent.
Relations with African Americans Korean immigrants in general know very little about the history and culture of African Americans and their experience in the United States. Likewise, the majority of African Americans know little about Korean culture and history (Stewart 1993). Most Koreans saw black people for the first time in their lives when 25,000 American soldiers arrived in Korea in 1945 to liberate Korea from Japanese colonial rule. Contacts between Koreans and American soldiers (including African American ones) were largely limited, except for Korean women who worked in or near the U.S. military bases and befriended the GIs. Many children were born out of wedlock to these Korean women and American GIs. And about one third of these children were black Koreans (Hurh 1972). Some of the Korean women did married American servicemen, and by 1980, over 50,000 Korean women immigrated to the United States as American servicemen’s wives (Barringer and Cho 1989, 112). About 30 years later (in the 1970s), African Americans and Korean Americans found themselves in the United States under different circumstances, as merchants and as customers in inner-city black neighborhoods. Ironically, these two disadvantaged minorities in the United States, who had no history of direct intergroup contact or hostility, were now in conflict with each other—both on the group and individual level. Korean–African American conflicts on the group level have usually taken two forms: (1) organized boycotts by African Americans of Korean American stores— for example, the long-term boycott of 1990–1991 in New York city; and (2) mass
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riots that involved looting and arson of Korean businesses such as in South Central Los Angeles in 1992. On the individual level, conflicts have usually taken the form of interpersonal disputes between African American customers and Korean American merchants. Often individual disputes trigger the group-level conflicts. For example, the 1990– 1991 New York boycott was triggered by a dispute between a black customer and a Korean merchant at a Korean American fruit and vegetable store, the Red Apple, on January 18, 1990. There are two contrasting versions of the incident: the customer’s and the merchant’s (Lee 1993, 83). A few days after the incident, about 150 black Americans participated in boycotts that lasted 17 months and led to the closure of many Korean stores (Min 1996, 77). During the same time period, racial tensions between African American residents and Korean American merchants in Los Angeles also intensified (Min 1996). In Los Angeles on a single day in 1989, four Korean store owners were killed at their stores during holdups by African Americans; and from 1992 to 1995 approximately one southern California Korean merchant was killed every month during robbery attempts (Kim and Yu 1996, 378). On the group level, the worst case of hostility and violence directed toward Korean Americans occurred on April 29, 1992, in South Central Los Angeles, when a predominantly white jury acquitted four white police officers charged with beating Rodney King (an African American motorist). In protest, three days of rioting erupted in South Central Los Angeles and Koreatown, resulting in the most destructive urban riot in U.S. history. Korean Americans were particularly shocked to find that Koreatown was specifically targeted by African American and Latino rioters, and that “the system,” including police, government agencies, and the media, controlled mainly by white Americans, failed to protect the Korean minority and other victims. The media fueled the riot by stereotyping Korean shopkeepers as ruthless “vigilantes” or greedy merchants who exploited poor African American neighborhoods (e.g., Ted Koppel’s Nightline, ABC News program). Korean merchants sustained approximately $350 million in property damage (Min 1996, 90), and total property damage reached $785 million; thus, about half of the damage inflicted was on Korean businesses in South Central Los Angeles and Koreatown (K. C. Kim and S. Kim 1995, 12). Contributing in part to African American and Korean American conflicts are racial and ethnic differences such as language barriers, cultural misunderstandings, and mutual prejudices. For example, Koreans have a negative stereotype about black people, and African Americans resent Korean merchants who exploit poor black residents. Sociopsychological factors are important to explain the racial and ethnic tensions on the individual level; however, on the group level, the roots of African American and Korean American conflicts stem from structural causes—that is, they stem from the social structure that has created a growing urban underclass
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largely made up of black and Latino Americans. What happened between the African Americans and Korean Americans in Los Angeles could happen between any ethnic groups in that situation. In sum, the African American and Korean American conflict is basically due to recent economic conditions developed in postindustrial societies. As manufacturers pulled out of major metropolitan areas and moved to overseas locations, little work remained for unskilled laborers living in inner-city neighborhoods. This process of economic realignment, known as deindustrialization, has had a serious impact on the African America community in major metropolitan areas, South Central Los Angeles in particular. It is too simplistic to reduce African American–Korean American conflicts to cultural differences and racial tensions between blacks and Koreans. As long as these structural problems remain unresolved, conflict between blacks and Korean Americans may continue, although many efforts have been made by both ethnic communities to improve relations. In particular, Korean American churches have played a leading role in facilitating cultural exchange, joint religious services, and scholarship programs. Korean merchants have also made special efforts to hire more African American workers and to contribute money to the African American community for various social and educational programs (Min 1996, 144). In the long run, however, African American–Korean American conflicts will eventually dissipate when first-generation Korean immigrants withdraw from the businesses they own in African American neighborhoods and their grown children move into professional jobs in the mainstream market, as was the case with Chinese and Japanese Americans.
Relations with Other Asian Americans According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2007a), the total number of Asian Americans is 13.5 million, which comprises about 4.7 percent of the total U.S. population. The Asian American population is the most diverse racial and ethnic minority in the United States, made up of: Chinese (23.4%), Asian Indians (18.6%), Filipinos (17.8%), Vietnamese (10.5%), Koreans (10.3%), and Japanese (6.9%). Among these major Asian groups, demographic and sociocultural diversity is enormous. Fortunately, no significant overt conflict has been observed among different Asian Americans. On the contrary, there has been significant cooperation among Asian Americans, particularly in times of crisis. As Min observes, “the victimization of Korean merchants in major metropolitan areas has strengthened inter-group cooperation among Asian Americans—the pan-Asian solidarity” (Min 1996, 153–54). An interesting trend has been developing in recent years that may bring Asian American panethnicity closer to reality. According to Shinagawa and Pang’s study
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(1996, 41), pan-Asian interethnic marriages in the United States has been increasing. For example, the majority of Asian American intermarriages in California in 1980 were interracial marriages—mostly with whites; however, in 1990 Asian Americans’ interracial marriages with whites decreased from 54 percent to 27 percent for men, and from 73 percent to 45 percent for women. In contrast, the rate for Asian Americans marrying another Asian American outside of their own ethnic group (interethnic marriages) increased dramatically—from 21 percent to 64 percent for men and from 11 percent to 46 percent for women. Korean Americans’ interaction with other Asian Americans is expanding as the number of second- and third-generation Korean Americans increases—not only in the rising rate of intermarriage with other Asian Americans, but also in the areas of political empowerment (pan–Asian American movement), civil rights (fighting glass-ceiling discrimination), education (promoting Asian American studies), religion (unity between Asian American churches), and social services (expanding Asian American mental/physical health).
Unique Characteristics of the Newest Korean Americans and Their Impact on American Society Korean Americans today share many similar characteristics with other “Newest Americans.” For example, the majority of the newest Americans came to the United States after 1965, largely from non-European regions such as Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Hence, unlike the “old immigrants” from Europe, the racial and cultural backgrounds of the newest immigrants are distinctively different from those of the majority Americans. Newest Americans are also similar in terms of their mobility patterns. Unlike the old immigrants, who generally migrated from rural areas to American cities, the newest immigrants came from urban areas. In addition, many of them are highly trained professionals, particularly among Asian immigrants. Taking advantage of highly developed modern communication technologies and means of travel, the newest immigrants can establish much closer links between their new and native countries. They can instantly communicate with relatives in their native countries by phone, fax, or Internet; have access to news and other TV programs from their homelands via satellite; and may hop on a plane at any metropolitan airport to return home temporarily or for good. These possibilities were indeed beyond the wildest imagination of most earlier immigrants who bought oneway tickets for a voyage to American shores and could only dream of someday returning for a visit to their native lands. This means that the ethnic attachment of the newest immigrants is stronger, and their Americanization process is significantly slower than that of their predecessors. In short, you can go home again, not just for a temporary visit but also for a permanent homecoming.
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As a newer group of immigrants, Korean Americans share these characteristics, particularly with other new immigrants from East Asia, such as from Taiwan, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Also, except for Filipinos, these Asian Americans share many similar cultural characteristics (Confucianism/Buddhismbased social ethics, strong family ties, some usage of Chinese customs and writing systems). Nevertheless, as noted throughout this chapter, Korean Americans are unique in a number of ways. The following summarize some of these differences and their impact on American society. The Korean American community has not developed kinship or regional associations comparable to the Chinese hui kuan (speech and territorial association) or the Japanese kenjinkai (prefectual or provincial associations). The most prominent aspect of the Korean pattern of ethnic association is the Korean Christian church. Its rapid growth in numbers, as well as its role in providing pivotal community functions (social, educational, and psychological) have been phenomenal. Korean Americans are definitely different from other Asians on this account. No one knows why, although speculation abounds. In any case, the best and surest place to meet Korean Americans is the Korean ethnic church on Sunday mornings. One will find about two-thirds of Korean Americans there. Historically immigrants in general and Asian Americans in particular have shown a high rate of self-employment in small business. However, as noted earlier, the self-employment rate of Korean Americans is the highest of all new immigrants from Asia. Moreover, Korean small businesses are heavily concentrated in the low-income minority neighborhoods. As compared with other new immigrants from Asia, such as from the Philippines, Hong Kong, and India, who had a better exposure to English under Western colonialism, Korean immigrants experience more severe problems from language barriers and job transferability, although the majority of them were highly educated in Korea. Hence, they don’t have many employment alternatives, except for filling the business niches in the low-income minority neighborhoods vacated by earlier middleman merchants, such as Jewish or Italian merchants. Admittedly, “old” immigrants from China and Japan were also engaged in the middleman merchant’s role, but their businesses were not heavily concentrated in African American or Latino neighborhoods in the inner city. Their business was usually centered around Chinatowns or Little Tokyos, serving extensively their own ethnic customers, other Asians, and tourists. Moreover, these early immigrants from China and Japan became the “traditional” middleman minority engaged in low-skilled and labor-intensive small business due mainly to their lower-class backgrounds. In contrast, many of the recent Korean immigrants became the “new” middleman minority partly because of their middle-class backgrounds. Thanks to their high education and professional experience, the Korean small business owners are highly motivated toward achievement and have organizational skills that
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allow them not only to survive but also to succeed in the high-risk, conflict-laden, and often hostile minority market. In sharp contrast to the early Asian immigrants, the new Korean immigrants are highly educated professionals from urban areas, particularly Seoul. The high preimmigration status of Korean immigrants has been an important factor for shaping the characteristics of Korean Americans in several ways. First, as mentioned earlier, the middle-class background of the new Korean immigrants has helped their success in small business. Second, their high level of education and professional experience have contributed to their wide geographic dispersion in settling in the United States. Unlike the Chinese and Japanese, who settled mainly in Hawaii and the West Coast, the Koreans have settled in many diverse areas, including the southern states. This geographic dispersion has affected also the formation of Koreatowns. Unlike Chinatowns, where a dense concentration of exclusively Chinese dwellers and their establishments took place, Koreatowns emerged in the mixed neighborhoods of other ethnic groups. Third, the middle-class background of Korean immigrants is in part responsible for creating the unique Korean American concept of the “1.5 generation” (those who immigrated to the United States at a very young age). Some of the unique characteristics of Korean Americans will undoubtedly change with time, while others may persist. For example, the rate of Korean Americans’ self-employment in small business will eventually decline as their children move into the professional labor market. Recent studies indicate that most of the Korean American merchants do not want their children to inherit their current business but instead want them to succeed in professions with higher status (Kim, Kim, and Choi 1996; Min 1996). In this way, the Korean merchants’ role as a middleman minority will become history, probably within a couple of decades. The early Korean immigrants contributed their labor to America’s agricultural economy—first as a major productive force in Hawaiian sugar plantations, and later as the best rice growers in California. The new immigrants from Korea have supplied not only highly skilled workers to professional occupations, such as medicine, science, engineering, and law, but have also filled the niches in the minority labor market as small business owners for distributing goods and services produced by U.S. corporations. In so doing, Korean Americans revitalized many dilapidated inner-city neighborhoods (Hing and Lee 1996, 5) And further: “the Koreans have changed the face of commercial New York, opening thousands of stores, rescuing whole neighborhoods from decay, and inventing entirely new retail industries in the process. In the New York region, Koreans own 1,400 produce stores (85 percent of all such stores in the area), 3,500 groceries, 2,000 dry cleaners, 800 seafood stores, and 1,300 nail salons … ‘They are New York City‘s most productive community,’ Emanuel Tobier, a professor of economics at New York University, says unequivocally” (Goldberg 1995, 45).
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The estimated number of Korean American college professors in the United States is approximately 2,000. The majority of them are in the field of science, such as in physics, biology, and engineering. A significant number are affiliated with Ivy League colleges, and most are teaching at major state universities. Their teaching and research contributions are yet to be documented. Korean American students have also gravitated to the nation’s best colleges and universities, particularly to Harvard. For example, Asian Americans in general make up 19 percent of Harvard College’s students and 12 percent of those attending Harvard Law School. Korean Americans, however, seem more concentrated in Harvard than other Asian Americans. “There are more Korean Americans per capita at Harvard than any other Asian ethnic group. . . . At Harvard Law School, Koreans made history in 1990, when they made up 5 percent of the class of 1993 and 50 percent of the total Asian enrollment” (K. C. Kang 1996). Despite such a short history of immigration to the United States, Korean Americans’ participation in American politics has been remarkable. For example, Ryu (1995) reported that in 1994 Korean Americans were elected to the Senate, to Congress, to three state houses of representatives, and to two metropolitan city councils. In 1996, Jay Kim was reelected to his third term as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 41st Congressional District, a primarily white residential area around Diamond Bar in Southern California. Kim, born in Seoul, immigrated to the United States in 1961 and became a civil engineer. Before being elected to the House, he served as the mayor of Diamond Bar and as a council member. Similarly John Lim is also from Korea and was reelected to his second term as the state senator for Oregon‘s 11th District, a predominantly white district. As many 1.5 and second-generation Korean immigrants approach their 50s, more extensive political participation among Korean Americans is anticipated in the near future. Moreover, rapidly increasing naturalization rates among Korean Americans in recent years will further enhance their civic and electoral participation, although so far their voter turnout has been low. During the 2008 presidential elections on November 4, 2008, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF 2009) conducted multilingual exist polls in 52 cities. Out of 16,665 Asian American voters surveyed, the percentages of the respondents by their ethnicity were: Chinese (32%), South Asians (31%), Koreans (14%), Southeast Asians (9%), and Filipinos (5%). Their on-site survey data also details the serious nature of the problems Asian Americans encounter in the nation’s voting places, largely due to Asian American voters’ limited proficiency in English (see Table 208). For example, as compared with other Asian Americans, the highest proportion of Korean American voters are foreign-born (83%) with limited proficiency in English (54%). Interpreters and translated materials are not always available. In addi-
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1371
tion, the AALDEF reports a number of attitudinal and behavioral problems of poll workers that made Asian American voter participation difficult and unpleasant. However, the growing political power of Korean Americans was evident on June 27, 2002, when the U.S. Senate unanimously passed a resolution noting the historical significance of the 100th anniversary of Korea American immigration to the United States. The resolution “recognizes the achievements and contributions of Korean-Americans to the United States over the past years, and requests that the President issue a proclamation calling on the people of the United States to observe the anniversary with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities” (U.S. Senate Press Release, June 28, 2002). The resolution lauds the contributions of the early Korean American community, including their unity in “the common goal of attaining freedom and independence for their colonized mother country” and their service in the U.S. Armed Forces in conflicts such as World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. It also credits more recent Korean American contributions, such as “the invention of the first beating-heart operations for coronary heart disease, the development of the nectarine, a four-time Olympic gold medallist, and achievements in engineering, architecture, medicine, acting, singing, sculpture, and writing.” The resolution also points out the critical role Korean Americans have played in advancing the United States–Korea partnership, which helps provide peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 135,571 American businesses are owned and operated by Korean Americans across the country with gross sales and receipts of $46 billion. These businesses employ 333,649 men and women, with an annual payroll of $5.8 billion (U.S. Senate Press Release, June 28, 2002).
Return Migration As indicated in Table 199, Korean immigration to the United States reached its peak in 1987 (35,849) but started to decline thereafter. The most significant decline took place from 1991 through 1992, when immigration dropped to nearly half the peak year figure (18,026). Parallel to these trends, the number of Korean Americans returning to Korea has also increased dramatically—from 848 in 1980 to 6,487 in 1992 (“New Middle-Aged Generation” 1994). The main reason for these phenomena was the economic factor—the rapidly expanding economy in South Korea and the shrinking job market in the United States. Other reasons for return migration are social, cultural, and psychological. Korean immigrants’ strong attachment to their own ethnic group and culture has been well documented. Their desire to return “home” becomes acute, regardless of length of residence, especially when they perceive their chances of success are limited in the United States, not due to their lack of ability, but because of their
1372 | Korean Immigrants
existential alienation from the mainstream of American society due to race and culture (Hurh and Kim 1990). For example, one of the respondents in a Chicago survey had lived in the United States for 12 years and was economically successful as a manager of a small factory and a motel. He felt that his immigrant life had been generally satisfactory, but he planned to return to Korea someday, because his identity problem as a minority in the United States was constantly troubling him. As soon as his children finish college, he would like to go home to Korea (Hurh and Kim 1988, 212).
The Second and Later Generations Adaptation of Next Generations of Korean Immigrants Seventy-six percent of Koreans in the United States are foreign-born, firstgeneration immigrants. Hence their adaptation problems are heavily linked with their unfamiliarity with American culture and society. Unfortunately, no comprehensive study has been done on the emerging generation of Korean Americans— the second and the so-called 1.5 generation Korean Americans. The 1.5 generation refers to Korean immigrants who came to the United States with their parents while they were very young—mostly in their early and middle adolescence. Since they were born in Korea, they certainly are not second-generation immigrants; but because of their young age at immigration they are differentiated from their parents (the first generation) and their offspring (the second generation) as being the “inbetween” or “one-and-a-half” generation (Hurh 1993). In terms of cultural adaptation, both the 1.5 and second generation of Korean Americans can be considered 100 percent Americans. They speak impeccable English; many are functionally bilingual. Many of them prefer American food over Korean food, have never been to Korea, and carry American first names, such as John or Linda. However, whether these “culturally perfect” but “racially different” young Korean Americans will be socially assimilated into American society is an important question. Several exploratory studies (D. Lee 1994; Min and Choi 1993; Yu 1993a) on the Korean American youth generally indicate that their close social interactions with white Americans appear to be limited, whether by the youth’s choice or parental pressure, or because of white Americans’ social distance from racial minorities. For example, Lee’s 1994 survey of 104 Korean American youth on their dating practices and attitudes toward mate selection revealed that 57 percent of the youths indicated their dating partners were Korean Americans and 68 percent of the respondents preferred to marry Korean Americans. This study seems to confirm earlier studies (Yu 1993a; Min and Choi 1993) that advanced similar findings:
The Second and Later Generations | 1373
in spite of their high level of assimilation to American culture, the majority of young Korean Americans still prefer members of their own ethnic group for close friends, dating, and marital partners. However, being caught between two cultures, the young Korean Americans often face problems of existential ambivalence and identity.
Youth Profile Occupying the Middle Ground between Two Cultures: Korean and American My name is Grace Park. I was born in 1986 in Flushing, New York. My parents immigrated to New York from South Korea in 1985. I grew up first in New York. I lived in Flushing until I was seven years old, when I moved to Windsor, Canada. After six years in Windsor, I moved to Peoria, Illinois, where my parents and brother now live. My main childhood interests were reading and playing the piano. My parents came to the United States shortly after they were married so that my dad could obtain his PhD from New York University. They also moved in order to give me better educational opportunities, for which I am grateful. My dad is a professor at Bradley University in Peoria. I have one brother; he is 13 years old and currently is in the eighth grade. Most of my relatives are still in Korea. However, my uncle’s family lives in Florida and my mom’s uncle lives in Chicago. When I was younger, I attended Korean school. Because midstate Illinois does not have a large Korean population, our family’s Korean-orientated activities have been limited. However, my family attends a Korean Christian church in Peoria and my dad has served as a chairman of the Peoria Korean American Community Organization in the past. I attended high school at the Illinois Mathematics and Science Academy, where my main extracurricular activity was serving as an editor for the school newspaper. I then attended Cornell University, majoring in psychology with a minor in Law and Society. At Cornell, I did a lot of work for the psychology department—as a research assistant, lab manager, and teaching assistant. It was sometimes hard to deal with criticism that I should have picked a more practical field of study such as engineering. However, I stuck to what was exciting for me and I recently graduated from Cornell with a Bachelor of Arts with distinction in all subjects. I have developed several passions throughout my education— writing, psychology, and most recently, law. I just finished my first semester at Emory University School of Law. It was a difficult four months; everything you hear about the first year of law school is absolutely true. But at the end of the day there is nothing else I would rather do than work with the law. Though I am
1374 | Korean Immigrants
undecided about my ultimate career goal, I hope to incorporate my passion for psychology into my practice as an attorney. Growing up as a Korean American was challenging at times. I was born and raised in the United States yet looked fully Korean. Thus, I never truly identified as either a Korean or an American, hovering instead in an indeterminate middle ground. I often felt like I did not fit in with my American peers, especially in places where the Asian population was low (such as the Midwest), despite the fact that I had never lived anywhere else. Conversely, when I spent the summer of 2008 working at a law firm in Seoul, Korea, I came to realize that I could never set up a life in Korea. While I am proud of my Korean heritage, the United States has always been my home and I am simply too entrenched to ever think about moving. I know that many Korean Americans feel differently, depending on how close their ties are to Korea. Now that I am older, I am comfortable with occupying this middle ground between the two cultures. Now, I look forward to participating in the American legal profession—a field still underrepresented by Asian Americans. (Grace Park, December 27, 2009)
In short, Korean Americans’ social assimilation has not been as pervasive as the assimilation pattern of European immigrants and their posterity. However, with time this picture will change. For example, according to the 1989 statistics on outmarriage rates (marriage to a non-Korean) in Los Angeles County, 13.3 percent of first generation Korean females out-married; 62.5 percent of the second-generation females out-married, while 100 percent of the third-generation females outmarried. The comparable figures for the Korean male are 3.7 percent, 33.3 percent, and 68.4 percent respectively (Kitano 1994). Eventually, extensive cultural and social assimilation of Korean Americans will occur. The leadership of the Korean American community is still in the hands of the first-generation immigrants, and for many of them Koreatown and its vicinities are still the center of their economic, sociocultural, political, religious, and recreational activities. What this ecological pattern means is that the Korean ethnic community is today both centrifugal (the residential scattering to suburbs) and centripetal (the persistence of Koreatowns).
Socialization of Korean American Children According to the 2004 American Community Survey (ACS), one-fourth of Korean Americans are under age 18, and the majority of them were born in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2007b). This means that among Korean Americans under age 18, one third may be called the 1.5 generation, and the rest belong to the
The Second and Later Generations | 1375
second and the third generations. What general patterns and specific differences are seen among these generations in the United States? Unfortunately, no comprehensive empirical study has been carried out on these emerging generations of Korean Americans since the 1990s (H. Kwon and S. Kim 1993). One reason for this is the relatively short history of Korean immigration to the United States, but also it derives from the problem of generalizing the socialization experiences of quite diverse groups of Korean American children. The most significant in-group differences are the children’s nativity (Korean-born or American-born), age at immigration, and the background characteristics of their parents (such as birthplace, socioeconomic status, and particularly, the location of residence). In other words, the children’s performance in school, social relations with peers, attitudes toward parents, and self-identity all hinge upon these factors. Even within a group of the same nativity (Korean-born), individual differences in the socialization context are enormous. For example, the life course of a sevenyear-old Korean immigrant child growing up in a middle-class American neighborhood begins with rapid assimilation of English, leading in turn to other areas of sociocultural assimilation, including the acquisition of American peers, social norms, and cultural values. This rapid progress in Americanization may also mean, however, a rapid loss of Korean cultural heritage and ethnic identity. The life course of this child is closer to that of the second-generation Korean Americans than that of 1.5-generation Korean Americans. On the other hand, a 16-year-old Korean immigrant adolescent living closer to the Korean ethnic neighborhood would have a better chance of attaining bilingualism and biculturalism, although the process may require a considerable amount of time and may result in psychosocial ambivalence. This is a typical socialization context of the 1.5-generation Korean Americans— that is, adolescent immigration, bilingualism, biculturalism, and existential ambivalence. For some, such ambivalence may turn out to be an opportunity to become cosmopolitan, taking advantage of the best in both Korean and American cultures. For others, however, it may lead to an existential limbo, in which one perceives a marginal self-identity for oneself (Hurh 1990).
Passion for Education and High Academic Achievement The historical legacy of attaining one’s social mobility through education has been deeply rooted in the Korean consciousness. Whether in Korea or in the United States, Korean parents’ primary concern is to provide their children with the best education available. Due to the Korean immigrants’ passion for education, urban middle-class backgrounds, and willingness to sacrifice for their children’s success, many Korean American children have excelled in scholastic achievement. For example, Korean American students made up 5 percent of the class of 1993 and 50 percent of total Asian enrollment at Harvard Law School (“Los Angeles Times
1376 | Korean Immigrants
Focuses” 1996, 12). Like other Asian American peers, the majority of Korean American youth focus their studies on medicine, law, business, and engineering. The major reason for these choices is parental pressure, but there are also other reasons. As compared to white youth, Asian American youth exhibit relatively lower verbal skills, while generally excelling in math and science. Consequently, many Asian American students study mathematics, sciences, and other technical fields that require less competition in verbal, interpersonal, and leadership skills. It seems Asian American students have become a model for all young American minorities, particularly in scholarly achievement. Ironically, however, this success image has been a mixed blessing (Hurh and Kim 1989). Often Asian American students are viewed as “overachievers” and “over-represented” for admission to the nation’s best universities (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1992b).
Issues in Relations between the United States and Korea U.S. forces liberated South Korea from Japanese colonial oppression after World War II and helped the South Korean people establish their own nation, the Republic of Korea, in 1948. In 1950 the U.S. and U.N. forces fought alongside the South Koreans to save the Republic from the invasion by the communist armies from North Korea and China. During the Korean War, more than 54,000 U.S. soldiers were killed in action, and the overall casualties reached 142,000. For this sacrifice, the South Korean people are forever grateful and continue to be close allies for maintaining peace in the Korean peninsula. Moreover, with U.S. assistance for economic reconstruction after the Korean War, the Korean economic recovery has been remarkable, and in 2008 it ranked as the 13th-largest economy in the world (Korean Culture and Information Service 2008, 33). However, an ongoing concern is the North Korean nuclear threat, which raises serious security issues for Northeast Asian countries. The close alliance and partnership between the Republic of Korea and the United States has also brought a high rate of Korean immigration to the United States. In 2008, of about seven million Koreans residing abroad, 2,762,160 were residing in China. The second-highest concentration of Koreans living abroad was in North America (United States and Canada)—2,233,539 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2008). Except for a temporary decline in the 1990s, the flow of Korean immigrants to the United States is gradually increasing in recent years (on average 20,000 annually). Two concerns in this regard are the “brain drain” experienced by South Korea, and a small number of undocumented Korean immigrants, estimated at 182,000 by the South Korean Foreign Ministry in 2004 (“Undocumented Korean in the U.S.” 2004).
Issues in Relations between the United States and Korea | 1377
In addition to the constant flow of Korean immigrants, South Korea is now the third-largest source of international students at U.S. colleges and universities. In the 2008–2009 academic year, 75,065 students from South Korea were enrolled at U.S. institutions of higher learning (“Korean Students” 2009). However, many of these students may settle down in United States after completing their studies.
Forecast for the 21st Century The strong political alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea will continue, particularly under the persisting nuclear threat from North Korea. Korean immigration to the United States may gradually decline as the South Korean economy improves, but the steady flow of temporary visitors and sojourners will continue or even increase, for example, Korean students, business entrepreneurs, skilled technicians, and tourists. In order to expedite this flow, the U.S. government has already approved South Korea’s entry to the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) in 2008. The program allows South Koreans to visit the United States for up to 90 days without a visa, and vice versa for U.S. citizens traveling to South Korea. In the past, more than 360,000 South Koreans applied yearly for a U.S. visa for tourism and commercial purposes (“Korea Gets Set” 2008). A concern is that this program may increase the number of undocumented Koreans in the United States. Above all, however, 1.3 million Korean Americans and their offspring, who have adapted to American society and have made their home in the United States today as one of the newest groups of Asian Americans, will continue making their contributions and becoming an integral part of multicultural America.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 199 Korean immigration to the United States, 1903 to 2008 Year
Number of Immigrants Admitted
Category First Wave
1903–1905
7,226
Labor Immigration to Hawaii
1910–1924
1,100
Picture Brides Second Wave
1951–1964
14,027
Post-Korean War Immigration: mostly wives of American servicemen (6,423) and war orphans (5,348). Others are professional workers. Third Wave
1965
2,165
Family Immigration:
1966
2,492
Effect of the Immigration Act of 1965
1967
3,956
(P.L. 89-236) is gradually evident.
1968
3,811
1969
6,045
1970
9,314
1971
14,297
1972
18,876
1973
22,930
1974
28,028
1975
28,362
1976
30,803
1977
30,917
1978
29,288
1979
29,248
1980
32,320
1981
32,663
970
1982
31,724
1,088
1983
33,339
1,169
1984
33,042
1,338
1985
35,253
1,838
1986
35,776
2,060
1987
35,849
2,669
1988
34,703
3,313
Return Migration 848
(Continued)
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics | 1379 Table 199 Korean immigration to the United States, 1903 to 2008 (Continued) Year
Number of Immigrants Admitted
Category
1989
34,222
4,667
1990
32,301
4,882
1991
26,518
5,539
1992
19,359
6,487
1993
18,026
5,494
1994
16,011
5,914
1995
16,047
4,610
1996
18,185
4,377
1997
14,239
4,021
1998
14,268
3,132
1999
12,795
2,906
2000
15,721
2,612
2001
20,532
2,034
2002
21,724
2,122
2003
12,382
1,927
2004
19,766
1,426
2005
26,562
1,319
2006
24,386
1,403
2007
22,405
1,576
2008
26,666
1,654
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (1952-2008); U. S. Department of Homeland Security (1994-2009); W. Kim (1971); Korea Times Chicago (1994); KoreAm Journal (1995); Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea (1994–2009).
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics How the U.S. government tracks the Korean population in the United States is through the U.S. Census, but it occurs only every ten years. To fill the gap, the U.S. Census Bureau conducts the American Community Survey (ACS) every year on the representative samples of various populations in the United States. The most recent statistical data on Korean Americans can be found through American FactFinder online (www.census.gov).
Table 200 Distribution of Korean American population in selected states (2007) Selected States
Foreign born N
American born N
Naturalized citizen N
100.0
838,473 (75.4%)
273,374 (24.6%)
444,369
414,105
37.2
310,253
103,852
158,797
20,105
1.8
15,103
5,002
9,649
Florida
24,451
2.2
18,334
6,117
10,844
Georgia
42,760
3.8
32,964
9,796
15,328
Hawaii
23,091
2.1
17,035
6,056
11,011
Illinois
62,776
5.6
45,932
16,844
27,978
Maryland
45,177
4.1
33,902
11,275
20,071
Massachusetts
20,985
1.9
15,643
5,342
7,709
Michigan
25,180
2.3
20,014
5,166
11,048
N
%
1,111,847
California Colorado
Total
New Jersey
85,868
7.7
65,364
20,504
32,525
New York
132,425
11.9
99,579
32,846
51,016
Pennsylvania
36,992
3.3
27,837
9,155
15,944
Texas
59,584
5.4
46,404
13,180
22,843
Virginia
61,616
5.5
47,535
14,081
24,400
Washington, D.C.
56,732
5.1
42,574
14,158
25,206
Note: States with more than 10,000 Korean Americans. Source: U.S. Bureau of Census (2008)
Table 201 Korean Americans in major metropolitan areas (2007) Los Angeles
276,525
New York
190,900
Washington, D.C.
71,262
Chicago
56,223
Seattle
45,653
San Francisco
41,089
Atlanta
35,392
Philadelphia
33,041
San Jose
26,466
Dallas
25,377
Baltimore
22,609
Honolulu
21,253
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census (2008)
1380
Table 202 Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Korean, Asian, and all Americans (2007) Population
Korean
All Asian
U.S. Total
1,344,171
13,233,287
301,621,159
45.2
48.2
49.3
Male (%) Female (%)
54.8
51.8
50.7
Median age
35.8
35.7
36.7
Average family size
3.22
3.53
3.2
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%)
53.1
49.5
27
Median family income ($)
63,905
77,046
61,173
27,078
29,466
26,688
11
8
9.5
Family, below poverty level (%) Owner-occupied homes (%)
49.3
60.7
67.2
Renter-occupied homes (%)
50.7
39.3
32.8
413,200
399,500
194,300
1,088
992
789
Median value of owneroccupied homes ($) Median gross rent ($) Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2007).
Table 203 Employment status and occupational characteristics of Korean Americans by selected metropolitan areas (2007)
Koreans Total Employed (%) Unemployed (%)
Los Angeles
New York
Washington, D.C.
Chicago
276,525
190,900
71,262
56,223
54.0
59.6
61.9
59.0
3.6
3.0
2.1
3.9
Managerial and Professional (%)
46.3
44.6
50.3
46.9
Technical Sales, Administrative Support (%)
31.0
13.0
50.3
27.9
Service Occupations Farming, Forestry and Fishing (%)
11.4
13.0
14.0
12.3
Self-Employed Workers (%)
16.5
10.0
11.8
13.0
Families, Below Poverty Level (%)
10.3
10.2
8.9
9.4
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census (2008)
1381
Table 204 Employment status and occupational characteristics of Korean Americans, compared with the U.S. total population and Japanese Americans, 2007 U.S. Total Population
Japanese Americans
Korean Americans
(% of persons 16 yrs. and over)
60.3
55.0
56.1
(females 16 yrs. and over)
54.8
46.5
49.0
(% of civilian labor force)
4.1
1.9
2.8
(females 16 yrs. and over)
3.7
1.4
2.6
27.5
46.5
53.1
Employed
Unemployed
Educational Attainment Bachelor’s degree or higher (%) Occupation: (% of employed persons 16 yrs. and over) Managerial & Professional, and Related Occupations
34.6
52.1
44.5
Service Occupations
16.2
11.8
13.8
Sales and Office Occupations
25.6
26.1
28.9
9.7
4.3
4.0
12.7
5.4
8.7
Self-employed workers
6.7
7.8
12.7
Unpaid family workers
0.2
0.2
0.7
3.2
5.2
4.7
11.4
8.9
14.6
Construction, Extraction, and Maintenance Production, Transportation, and Material Moving Class of Worker (% of employed persons 16 yrs. and over)
Industry (% of employed persons 16 yrs. and over) Wholesale Trade Retail Trade
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007American Community Survey 1-year Estimate. (S0201. Selected Population Profile in the U.S.).
1382
Table 205 Structural characteristics of the Korean American family Family Characteristics
Korean American
U.S. Total
454,871
112,377,977
69.9%
66.8%
Average household size
2.67
2.61
Average family Size
3.22
3.20
Married-couple families
56.2%
49.7%
With own children under 18 years
29.8%
21.4%
Other relatives in the household
8.1%
6.7%
Female householder, no husband present, family
9.1%
12.5%
Number of households Family households
Living alone
15.1%
15.3%
Male householder
12.4%
15.4%
Living alone
9.8%
12.0%
Now married
58.3%
52.3%
Divorced
3.4%
9.3%
Now married
57.2%
48.3%
Divorced
6.7%
11.7%
Percentage of women in labor force (16 yrs, & older)
51.8%
58.6%
Unpaid family workers
0.7%
0.2%
Self-employed workers in own not incorporated business
12.7%
6.7%
Marital Status Male 15 years and over
Female 15 years and over
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2007. The American Community—Asians 2004 (Selected Population Profiles, S0201).
1383
Table 206 Naturalized Korean Americans (1999 to 2009)
Year
Naturalized Citizens
Legal Permanent Residents
1999
17,663
12,795
2000
23,717
15,721
2001
17,979
20,532
2002
17,252
20,724
2003
15,928
12,382
2004
17,184
19,766
2005
19,223
26,562
2006
17,668
24,386
2007
17,628
22,405
2008
22,759
26,666
2009
17,576
25,859
Total
204,597
227,798
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Office of Immigration Statistics), 2010.
1384
Table 207 Changes in the American image of Asians in United States Phases
Ethnic Group
Stereotype
Actual Consequences
1850–1940
Chinese
unassimilable,
Chinese Exclusion Act (1882)
1890–1940
Japanese
inscrutable,
Gentlemen's Agreement (1908)
tricky, immoral
Alien Land Act (1913)
heathens
Immigration Act of 1924
I
II 1941–1945 1941–1945
Japanese
cruel, disloyal, enemy aliens
Japanese evacuation (1942-1944)
Chinese
faithful ally
Eligibility for naturalization (1943)
Chinese
industrious,
Cultural assimilation and
Japanese
quiet,
emergence of Chinese/
law-abiding
Japanese-American middle class
successful,
Disguised underemployment;
III 1946–1965
IV 1966–
Chinese Japanese
intelligent,
Exclusion from minority
1975–
Koreans
hard-working,
programs;
Filipinos
model minority
False consciousness among AsianAmericans (assimilation and
1980–
Asian Indians
mobility myth);
Vietnamese
Legitimation of the “open society” and downgrading of other less “successful” minorities
V 1982-
Japanese
overachieving,
Glass-ceiling effect;
Chinese
insular,
Bigotry, resentment, and
Koreans
threatening
anti-Asian violence
Source: Hurh (1998, 124).
1385
1386 | Korean Immigrants Table 208 AALDEF Multilingual Exit Poll, Nov. 4, 2008: Survey respondents and results
All Voters Surveyed TOTAL: (N = 16,665)
First-Time Foreign No formal Voter Born U.S. Education 31%
79%
21%
English As Limited Native English Language Proficient 20%
Largest Ethnic Groups Surveyed
35% 32% Chinese 31% South Asian 14% Korean 9% Southeast Asian 5% Filipino
By Ethnic Group: Chinese
29%
74%
23%
15%
45%
Korean
25%
83%
20%
18%
54%
Filipino
24%
74%
12%
26%
6%
South Asian
36%
87%
22%
24%
20%
49% Indian 25% Bangladeshi 11% Pakistani
Southeast
35%
83%
20%
9%
49%
70% Vietnamese 18% Cambodian
Source: Asian American Access to Democracy in the 2008 Elections: A Report of the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, 2009 (www.aaldef.org).
Appendix III: Notable Korean Americans It would be impossible to document all the significant contributions made by Korean Americans. Those listed here represent some of the most notable; many others could not be included due to space limitations. Admittedly, the selection process was highly subjective and hence very difficult. The most important criterion for inclusion was that the individual’s achievements primarily benefited the American community, whether Korean American, Asian American, or all-American. Moreover, neither the order of these listings nor the extent of coverage necessarily reflects the relative importance of the individual’s contributions. Judge Herbert Y. C. Choy (1916–2004), a third-generation Korean American whose grandparents worked in Hawaii’s sugar plantations, was appointed by President Nixon to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Court in 1974. He was the first Asian American appointed to a United States federal court.
Appendix III: Notable Korean Americans | 1387
Wendy Gramm (born in 1945), a third-generation Korean American whose grandparents had immigrated to Hawaii and worked in the plantations, served as chair of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission under Presidents Reagan and Bush. David Hyun (1917–2007), a second-generation Korean American architect, has made unique contributions to American society. He revitalized Little Tokyo (Japantown in Los Angeles), an area suffering from urban decay, by developing the Japanese Village Plaza shopping center. The plaza saved Little Tokyo, mainly because it sponsored various programs of community culture and facilitated ethnic services in the marketplace. Hyun has worked among the Japanese community for nearly 30 years and has been honored by the Japanese American Citizens League. He was also one of the founding board members of Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics (LEAP) and served as chair of the board of directors of the Korean-American Coalition. Charles (Ho) Kim (1884–1968), who came to the United States in 1914, became one of the most successful entrepreneurs and philanthropists among the early Korean immigrants. In 1921, he cofounded (with his friend, Harry Kim) the Kim Brother Company, a wholesale agricultural business in Reedley, California. The Kims were not only successful businessmen, but also generous donors to the Korean community. They were cofounders of the Korean Foundation, which provided scholarships to many Korean American students. Jim Yong Kim (born in 1959), a first-generation Korean American physician and medical anthropologist, was named the 17th president of Dartmouth College on March 2, 2009. Dr. Kim became the first Asian American to head an Ivy League institution when he took his post on July 1, 2009. Born in Seoul, he accompanied his parents to the United States at age five, grew up in Iowa, graduated from Brown and Harvard, and is now chair of the Department of Global Health and Social Medicine at Harvard Medical School. He was the director of the World Health Organization’s HIV/AIDS division and cofounder of the nonprofit organization called Partners in Health, which promoted the global fight against diseases among the poorest of the poor in Third World countries. Young-Kee Kim (born in 1962), was born in Kyeong-Book, South Korea, obtained a Ph.D. in Physics at the University of Rochester in 1990, became a postdoctoral fellow at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (1990–1995), and served as a professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley for six years (1996–2002). Since 2003, Dr. Kim has been professor of physics at the University of Chicago. In July 2006 she was appointed to the position of deputy director of Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, which maintains one of the world’s largest proton-antiproton colliders, the Tevatron. She
1388 | Korean Immigrants
received South Korea’s most prestigious science award, the Ho-Am Prize, in 2005, for her outstanding achievement in basic research into the fundamental particles and their interactions. She is one of the leading pioneers in worldwide high-energy physics. Harold Hongju Koh (born in 1954), a second-generation Korean American native of Boston, has served since 2004 as the 15th dean of Yale Law School. From 1998 to 2001, he served as U.S. assistant secretary of state for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor under the Clinton administration. On March 23, 2009, President Obama nominated Dean Koh to be legal advisor to the U.S. Department of State. Koh is a leading expert on public, private, and international law, national security law, and human rights. He received more than 30 awards for his human rights work and was named one of the “100 most influential Asian-Americans of the 1990s” by American Lawyers Magazine. K. W. (Kyung Won) Lee (born in 1928), a first-generation Korean American journalist, can be regarded as the leading pioneer in Korean American journalism. He often was the first Asian American on staff at mainstream newspapers covering minority issues, particularly on immigrants. His most significant contribution has been to edit Korean newspapers into English for the benefit of the young generation of Korean Americans. He started a Los Angeles–based weekly, Koreatown, in 1979, and the English edition of the Los Angeles Korea Times in 1990. He founded the Korean American Journalist Association and has received many awards from professional organizations, such as the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, the AP News Executive Council, the National Headliners Club, and the Asian American Journalist Association. Sammy Lee (born in 1920), whose father immigrated to Hawaii in 1905, was the first Asian American to win two Olympic gold medals in diving—in 1948 in London and in 1952 in Helsinki. In 1953, he won the James E. Sullivan Award, the most prestigious award given to America’s outstanding amateur athlete. Lee was the first nonwhite to win the Sullivan Award. He also served on the council on physical fitness and sports for Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan. Sang Hyun Lee (born in 1938), came to the United States at the age of 17 in 1955 (a typical 1.5 generation), became the first tenured Asian American professor at Princeton Theological Seminary, one of the most prominent theological institutions in the country. He served as Kyung-Chik Han Professor of Systematic Theology, chaired the Theology Department, and directed the Asian American Program at Princeton Theological Seminary. Professor Lee is a widely recognized authority on Jonathan Edwards, one of America’s greatest thinkers. His book, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards (1988),
Appendix III: Notable Korean Americans | 1389
has been highly influential for its completely new interpretation of Jonathan Edwards. Lee is also one of the leading pioneers in the development of Asian American theology and ministry. Henry Moon (1914–1974), a second-generation Korean American pathologist, became a world-renowned hormone researcher. He chaired the Department of Pathology at the University of California School of Medicine, San Francisco. He served as a member of the Scientific Advisory Board and of the National Board of Medical Examiners, and also as president of the American Association for Experimental Pathology and of the International Academy of Pathology. Angela Oh ( born in 1955), a second-generation Korean American attorney, has been a most articulate spokesperson for the Korean American community, and a very effective civil rights advocate for Asian Americans in general. She served as president of the Korean American Bar Association of Southern California and was appointed by President Clinton to an advisory panel on race relations in the United States. Alfred H. Song (1919–2004), a second-generation Korean American attorney, became the first Korean American to be elected to a state legislature—as a member of the California State Assembly in 1962. He was reelected to the Assembly in 1964 and elected to the State Senate two years later. He won reelection to the State Senate twice (in 1970 and 1974) and chaired the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. During his 16-year tenure in the state legislature, Song authored 176 bills—many of which were instrumental in protecting the civil rights of minorities, particularly of Asian Americans. In other professional areas, contributions made by Korean Americans are quite comparable to those of Chinese and Japanese Americans. Many thousands of Korean American professionals, particularly those who arrived in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, have filled the needs of American education, health, and business. As a report by the Center for Immigration Study put it, “Foreign-born professionals have been a double gift to the United States. They have helped meet the needs of underserved populations and enriched scientific research and education. Moreover, they tend to have native-born children who perform well academically and in many cases will themselves become professionals” (Suro 1994). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Korean-born Americans have also excelled in American literature, for example as authors of such books as Younghill Kang’s Grass Roof (1931), Richard E. Kim’s The Martyred (1964), Donald K. Chung’s The Three Day Promise (1989), Chang Rae Lee’s Native Speaker (1995), Connie Kang’s Home was the Land of Morning Calm (1995), Helie Lee’s Still Life with Rice (1996), Nora Okja Keller’s Comfort Woman (1997), and Mia Yun’s House of the Winds (1998).
1390 | Korean Immigrants
Glossary Asian American Panethnicity: Refers to a recent movement among Asian Americans toward the construction of an overarching collective consciousness or identity for all Asian/Pacific Islander Americans regardless of national origin and cultural differences. Bulgogi and Kalbi: Marinated barbecued beef and short ribs. Favorite Korean traditional dishes loved by both Koreans and Americans. Chusok: Autumn Evening—the 15th day of the eighth lunar month, the Harvest Festival Day, equivalent to American Thanksgiving day. DMZ (Demilitarized Zone): A 3-mile-wide and 150-mile-long no-man’s land between North and South Korea that was created by the armistice agreement on July 27, 1953. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK): Commonly known as North Korea. Domin Hoe: Provincial associations based on Koreans’ geographic origin in Korea. Hanbok: Korean traditional costume. Hangul: Korean phonetic alphabet invented by King Sejong in 1446. Hwan-gap: “Returning to the beginning”. Refers to the elaborate 60th birthday celebration. Koreans adopted the Chinese Zodiac, which counts time in 60-year cycles instead of the 100-year cycle (century) of the Western calendar. Also, hwangap means one is starting another 60-year life-cycle. Kimchi: A spicy, fermented Korean dish made from celery cabbage and turnips, seasoned with salt, garlic, hot peppers, ginger, green onions, and often with pickled fish. It is a vital part of every meal. Korean-American Treaty (1882): This treaty, also known as the Chemulpo Treaty or the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, opened the door for the first wave of Korean immigrants to the United States. Kye: “Mutual trust and help”. Refers to the rotating credit association that financed many Korean immigrant businesses. 1. 5 generation (ilchom ose): Refers to Korean immigrants who came to the United States while they were young—mostly in their early adolescence. Because of their young age at immigration they are differentiated from their parents (first generation) and their offspring (second generation) as being the “in-between” or 1.5 generation. Picture Brides: Korean brides brought to the United States by arranged marriages through the exchange of pictures (1910–1924).
References | 1391
Sa-ee-gu: Korean term for April 29, 1992, referring to the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Solnal (Lunar New Year’s Day): The first day of the first lunar month, which usually falls in late January or early February. Tae-Kwon-Do: Korean marshal art for self-defense, comparable to Chinese Kung-Fu and Japanese Karate.
References Asian American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (AALDEF). 2009. Asian American Access to Democracy in the 2008 Elections. New York: AALDEF. Barringer, Herbert R., and Sung-Nam Cho. 1989. Koreans in the United States: A Factbook. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Bogardus, Emory S. 1968. “Comparing Racial Distance in Ethiopia, South Africa, and the United States.” Sociology and Social Research 52: 149–56. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2008. The World Factbook 2008. Washington, DC: CIA. Chang, Edward T. 1994. “Los Angeles ‘Riots’ and the Korean American Community.” In Korean Americans: Conflict and Harmony, edited by Ho-Youn Kwon, pp. 159–76. Chicago: North Park College. Chiswick, Berry R. 1983. “An Analysis of the Earnings and Employment of Asian American Men.” Journal of Labor Economics 1: 197–214. Choy, Bong-youn. 1979. Koreans in America. Chicago: Nelson Hall. Fawcett, J. T., and B. V. Carino, eds. 1987. Pacific Bridges: The New Immigration from Asia and the Pacific Islands. Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration Studies. Gallup, George Jr. 1989. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1989. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resource. Gardner, Arthur L. 1970. The Koreans in Hawaii: An Annotated Bibliography. Honolulu: Social Science Institute, University of Hawaii. Goldberg, Jeffery. 1995. “The Overachievers.” New York Magazine, April 10, 44–51. Gordon, Milton M. 1964. Assimilation in American Life. New York: Oxford University Press. Han, Woo-Keun. 1974. The History of Korea. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Hing, Bill O., and Ronald Lee, eds. 1996. Reframing the Immigration Debate. Los Angeles: LEAP Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute. Hurh, Won Moo. 1972. “Marginal Children of War: An Exploratory Study of AmericanKorean Children.” International Journal of Sociology of the Family 2: 10–20. Hurh, Won Moo. 1977. Comparative Study of Korean Immigrants in the United States. San Francisco: R and E Research Associates.
1392 | Korean Immigrants Hurh, Won Moo. 1990. “The 1.5 Generation Phenomenon: A Paragon of Korean-American Pluralism.” Korean Culture 11(Spring): 21–31. Hurh, Won Moo. 1993. “The 1.5 Generation Phenomenon: A Paragon of Korean-American Pluralism.” Korean Culture 14: 17–27. Hurh, Won Moo. 1994. “Majority Americans’ Perception of Koreans in the United States.” In Korean Americans: Conflict and Harmony, edited by Ho-Youn Kwon, 3–21. Chicago: North Park College. Hurh, Won Moo. 1998. The Korean Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Hurh, Won Moo, and Kwang Chung Kim. 1984. Korean Immigrants in America: A Structural Analysis of Ethnic Confinement and Adhesive Adaptation. Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. Hurh, Won Moo, and Kwang Chung Kim. 1988. “Uprooting and Adjustment: A Sociological Study of Korean Immigrants’ Mental Health.” Final Report submitted to the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 40312). Macomb, IL: Western Illinois University. Hurh, Won Moo, and Kwang Chung Kim. 1989. “Success Image of Asian Americans: Its Validity, and Its Practical and Theoretical Implications.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 12: 512–38. Hurh, Won Moo, and Kwang Chung Kim. 1990. “Adaptation Stages and Mental Health of Korean Male Immigrants in the United States.” International Migration Review 24: 456–79. “Increasing Numbers of Korean Immigrants Returning Home.” 1995. KoreAm Journal, October, 6. Kang, K. Connie 1996. “Korean American Dreams of Crimson.” Los Angeles Times, September 25, A1–2. Kim, Elaine H., and Eui-Young Yu. 1996. East to America: Korean American Life Stories. New York: The New Press. Kim, H., and D. Schwartz-Barcott. 1983. “Social Network and Adjustment Process of Korean Elderly Women in America.”Pacific/Asian American Mental Health Research Review 2: 1–2. Kim, Hyung-chan. 1974. The Korean Diaspora. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio Press. Kim, Hyung-chan. 1986. Dictionary of Asian American History. New York: Greenwood Press. Kim, Illsoo. 1981. New Urban Immigrants: The Korean Community in New York. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kim, Illsoo. 1987. “Korea and East Asia: Pre-Emigration Factors and U.S. Immigration Policy.” In Pacific Bridges, edited by J. T. Fawcett and B. V. Carino, pp. 327–45. Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration Studies. Kim, Kwang Chung, and Shin Kim. 1995. “Three Forms of Korean and African American Conflict in Major American Cities: Comparative Analysis.” Paper presented at the
References | 1393 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C., August 19–23. Kim, Kwang Chung, Shin Kim, and InChul Choi. 1996. “The Stereotype Images and Reality of Korean Entrepreneurs in Inner-City African American Communities.” A paper presented at the Annual Meeting, American Sociological Association, New York, August 16–20. Kim, Kwang Chung, and Won Moo Hurh. 1985. “Ethnic Resources Utilization of Korean Immigrants in the Chicago Minority Area.” International Migration Review 19: 82–111. Kim, Warren. 1971. Koreans in America. Seoul: Po Chin Chai. Kitano, Harry. 1994. “Korean Intermarriage: A Tale of Two Cities.” In Korean Americans: Conflict and Harmony, edited by H. Kwon and S. Kim, 79–87. Chicago: North Park College. “Korea Gets Set to Enter U.S. Visa Waiver Program.” 2008. Korea Daily Chicago, October 20, Sec. IV, 11. Korean Business Directory (in Korean). 2009. Chicago: The Korea Daily. Korean Culture and Information Service. 2008. Facts about Korea. Seoul: Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. “Korean Students 3rd Most in US Universities.” 2009. Korea Times, November 17. [Online article; retrieved 11/22/2009.] http://www.koreatimes.co.kr. Kwon Ho-Youn and Shin Kim. 1993. The Emerging Generation of Korean-Americans. Seoul: Kyung Hee University Press. Lee, Daniel. 1994. “Attitudinal Survey on Dating and Mate Selection among Korean College Students.” In Korean Americans: Conflict and Harmony, edited by Ho-Youn Kwon, pp. 89–101. Chicago: North Park College. Lee, Florence C., and Helen C. Lee. 1988. Kimchee: A Natural Health Food. Seoul: Hollym Corporation Publishers. Lee, Heon Chul. 1993. “Black-Korean Conflict in New York City: A Sociological Analysis.” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York. Light, Ivan, and Edna Bonacich. 1988. Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles, 1965–1982. Berkeley: University of California Press. “Los Angeles Times Focuses on Korean American Fascination for Harvard College.” 1996. CrossCurrents, Fall/Winter, 12. Min, Pyong Gap. 1989. “Some Positive Functions of Ethnic Business for an Immigrant Community: Korean Immigrants in Los Angeles.” Final Report submitted to the National Science Foundation. Queens College of CUNY, Flushing, New York. Min, Pyong Gap. 1990. “Problems of Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurs.” International Migration Review 24: 436–55. Min, Pyong Gap. 1995. Asian Americans: Contemporary Trends and Issues. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
1394 | Korean Immigrants Min, Pyong Gap. 1996. Caught in the Middle: Korean Merchants in America’s MultiEthnic Cities. Berkeley: University of California Press. Min, Pyong Gap, and Y. Choi. 1993. “Ethnic Attachment among Korean-American High School Students.” Korean Journal of Population and Development 22: 167–79. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea. 1994–2009. Diplomatic Whitepapers. [Online information; retrieved 11/3009.] http://www.korea.net. “Number of Korean Churches Approaching 4,000” (in Korean). 2008. Korea Daily Chicago, December 18, Sec. 1V, 2. “110,000 Students Are from Korea” (in Korean). 2009. Korea Daily Chicago, February 2, Sec. I, 3. Owen, C. A., H. Eisner, and T. McFaul. 1981. “A Half-Century of Social Distance Research: National Replication of the Bogardus’ Studies.” Sociology and Social Research 66: 80–98. Pai, Jeannette Yeunyul. 1993. “Caught between Two Worlds: From Ambivalence to Resolution.” In The Emerging Generation of Korean-Americans, edited by Ho-Youn Kwon and Shin Kim, pp. 17–27. Seoul: Kyung Hee University Press. “The Return Migration Update” (in Korean). 1994. Korea Times Chicago, January 12, 6. Ryu, Jung S. 1995. “Footprints: Becoming Somebody.” KoreAm Journal, January, 5. Schaefer, Richard T. 1987. “Social Distance and Black College Students at Predominantly White University.” Sociology and Social Research 72: 30–32. Shin, Eui-Hang, and Eui-Young Yu. 1984. “Use of Surnames in Ethnic Research: The Case of Kims in the Korean-American Population.” Demography 21: 347–60. Shinagawa, Larry H., and Gin Yong Pang. 1996. “Asian American Panethnicity and Intermarriage.” Amerasia Journal 22: 127–52. Smith, Tom W. 1991. What Do Americans Think About Jews? New York: The American Jewish Committee. Song, Tae Hyun. 1991. “Social Contact and Ethnic Distance between Korean and White Americans.” Unpublished research paper, Western Illinois University, Macomb, IL. Stewart, Ella. 1993. “Communication between African Americans and Korean Americans: Before and after the Los Angeles Riots.” American Journal 19: 23–53. Suro, Roberto. 1994. “Study of Immigrants Finds Asians at Top in Science and Medicine.” Washington Post, April 18, A6. “Time Machine.” 2003. KoreAm Journal. January, 48–51. Toland, John. 1991. In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950–1953. New York: William Morrow. “Undocumented Koreans in U.S.” 2004. Asian Week, October 14, 20. U.S. Census Bureau. 2007a. The American Community—Asians: 2004 (Asian American Community Survey Reports). [Online information; retrieved 3/8/09.] http://www.census. gov/population/www/socdemo/race/api.html. U.S. Census Bureau. 2007b. 2007 American Community Survey: S0 201. Selected Population Profile in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Further Reading | 1395 U.S. Census Bureau. 2008. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2008. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 1986. Recent Activities against Citizens and Residents of Asian Descent: An Exploratory Investigation. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 1988. The Economic Status of Americans of Asian Descent: An Exploratory Investigation. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 1992a. “Civil Rights Issues Facing Asian Americans in the 1990s.” Executive Summary. Washington, DC February 28, 1. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 1992b. “Civil Rights Issues Facing Asian Americans in the 1990s.” Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2009. “U.S. Legal Permanent Residents: 2008.” Annual Flow Report (March), Table 3. U.S. Senate Press Release. 2002, June 28. “Full Senate Passes Allen Resolution Commemorating 100 Years of Korean-American Immigration.” Waldinger, R. H., H. E. Aldrich, and R. Ward. 1990. Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Immigrant and Ethnic Business in Western Industrial Societies. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Yoon, In-Jin. 1995. “The Growth of Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurship in Chicago.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 18: 315–35. Yoon, In-Jin. 1997. On My Own: Korean Business and Race Relations in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Yu, Eui-Young. 1977. “Koreans in America: An Emerging Ethnic Minority.” Amerasia Journal 4: 117–31. Yu, Eui-Young. 1993a. “Attitude toward Dating and Marriage among Young Korean Americans: An Exploratory Observation.” In The Emerging Generation of KoreanAmericans, edited by Ho-Young Kwon and Shin Kim, 125–42: Seoul, Kyung Hee University Press. Yu, Eui-Young. 1993b. “The Korean-American Community.” In Korea Briefing 1993, edited by D. N. Clark, 139–62. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Further Reading Abelmann, Nancy, and John Lie. 1995. Blue Dreams: Korean Americans and Los Angeles Riots. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. An excellent ethnographic work that vividly illuminates the Korean-Americans’ view of the L.A. riot by an intensive analysis of personal anecdotes. Amerasia Journal, published three times a year by the Asian American Studies Center, 3230 Campbell Hall, University of California Los Angeles, CA 90095-1546. TEL. (310) 825–2968. http://www.sscnet.ucla/aasc. A scholarly journal for all Asian Americans.
1396 | Korean Immigrants Chun, Hyock, Kwang Chung Kim, and Shin Kim, eds. 2005. Koreans in the Windy City: 100 years of Korean Americans in the Chicago Area. New Haven, CT: East Rock Institute. The first and most comprehensive book on the Korean Americans in the Chicago area, an area often bypassed by Korean American researchers. Clark, Donald N. 2000. Culture and Customs of Korea. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. One of the most comprehensive, well-documented, and very readable books on Korean history and culture, especially for the general reader. Korea, published monthly by the Korean Culture and Information Service, Republic of Korea. http://www.korea.net or e-mail
[email protected]. An excellent source for the most recent news on sociocultural change in Korea. KoreAm Journal, published monthly by KoreAm Journal, 17000 S. Vermont Ave., Ste. A, Gardena, CA 90247. TEL (310) 769–4903. http://www.koreamjournal.com. So far, the only magazine catering primarily to young generations of Korean Americans. Korean Quarterly, published quarterly by nonprofit volunteers to promote Korean American community, including all generations of Americans, adopted Koreans, and their families. Tel. (651) 398–2325. http://www.koreanquarterly.org. This publication caters to Korean American adoptees and their American parents. Koreana: Korean Art and Culture, published quarterly by The Korea Foundation, Republic of Korea. TEL 82–2-2046–8583. E-mail:
[email protected]. An outstanding professional art magazine, introducing Korean art and culture to English readers around the world. Seth, Michael J. 2006. A Concise History of Korea. Oxford, England: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. A recent and comprehensive book on Korean history recommended for researchers and advanced students. Kwon, Ho-Youn, Kwang Chung Kim, and R. Stephen Warner, eds. 2001. Korean Americans and Their Religions: Pilgrims and Missionaries from a Different Shore. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. This book is a must to find out why an overwhelming majority (about 75%) of Korean Americans are affiliated with Christian churches..
Laotian Immigrants by Helen K. Kim
Introduction Laotian Americans are one of the most diverse groups to recently immigrate to the United States. Laotian Americans are geographically dispersed throughout the United States, speak several languages, and practice a variety of religions. Laotian Americans are also socioeconomically diverse among newer immigrant groups to the United States. Almost all Laotian Americans arrived in the United States as refugees or children of refugees after the defeat of the U.S.-supported Laotian government by the Communist Pathet Lao.
Chronology 1893
Laos becomes French protectorate until 1945; occupied by Japanese toward end of World War II.
1946
France resumes rule over Laos.
1950
Laos granted semiautonomy as associated state within French Union.
1954
Laos gains independence as constitutional monarchy; Civil War ensues between monarchists and Communist Pathet Lao.
1960s United States drops aerial bombs in attempt to break up Ho Chi Minh Trail and destroy North Vietnamese sanctuaries. 1975
Pathet Lao, renamed Lao People’s Front, defeats U.S.-supported government of Laos.
1975
U.S. Congress passes Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. Allows U.S. admission of Southeast Asians closely associated with American military activities.
1976
U.S. Congress amends Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act to provide for greater inclusion of refugees from Laos.
1980
U.S. Congress passes Refugee Act of 1980.
1397
Background | 1399
2000
U.S. Congress passes Hmong Veterans’ Naturalization Act. Removes English language requirement for naturalization for Hmong who were admitted to United States as refugees from Laos who served with a Laotian special guerilla or irregular unit in support of U.S. forces during 1961–1978.
Background Laos is a landlocked country bordered by China to the north, Cambodia to the south, Vietnam to the east, Thailand to the west, and Myanmar to the northwest. Vientiane is the capital of Laos and the country’s largest city. Laos is approximately 91,400 square miles in area. Much of the western border of Laos is defined by the Mekong River, which is an important transportation route and source of drinking water. The topography of Laos is largely mountainous, especially to the north. Also, Laos has a tropical climate, heavily influenced by monsoons. Its rainy season typically lasts from May to October; a cool and dry season runs from November to February and a hot and dry season marks March and April. Tracing its history to the T’ai people, an ethnic migrant group from southern China, Laos was originally part of the Cambodian Empire. In 1353, Laos achieved independence when prince Fa Ngum from Luang Prabang declared himself king after having claimed a large territory from the declining Khmer empire. Luang Prabang served as the capital of Laos until 1563 when King Setthalhiralh moved the capital to Vientiane. In the late 1600s, the Lao Kingdom was broken into three principalities— Vientiane, Luang Prabang, and Champassak. This division resulted in a weakening and greater vulnerability to Siam and Vietnam. By the mid 1800s, northern Laos was controlled by Vietnam, while Siam controlled almost all of southern and central Laos. As part of an expanding French Indochinese empire in the mid- to late 1800s, Laos became a French colony at the end of the 19th century. However, widespread resistance to French rule did not occur until after the end of World War II. In 1945, Laotian Prime Minister Prince Phetsarath declared Laos an independent kingdom and headed the Lao Issara or “Free Lao” movement. While many Laotians were in favor of returning to French colonization because they believed Laos was not ready for independence at the time, the Lao Issara opposed the continuation of French rule. Prince Phetsarath’s half-brother, Prince Souphanuvong, helped to form the Pathet Lao or “Lao Nation,” a communist organization and political movement that called for armed resistance against the French. The Pathet Lao also sought support from the Viet Minh.
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After the 1954 Viet Minh defeat of the French during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, France agreed to withdraw from its Indochinese colonies under 1954 Geneva Accords. To avoid a complete takeover of Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh’s communist government, the Geneva Accords also divided the country at the 17th parallel. Due to the political connection between the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh, as well as the support of the Viet Minh by many Laotians, Laos was further drawn into the war when North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam. In its efforts to halt communism in Southeast Asia, the United States provided economic and military support to the Laotian royal government. However, U.S. troops withdrew in 1973 and the Pathet Lao overthrew the Laotian government in 1975. Subsequently, thousands of Laotians fled primarily to refugee camps in Thailand. While Laos is a geographically small country, it is quite ethnically diverse, composed of many distinct groups. The dominant ethnic group is the Lao Loum, or Lowland Lao, who comprise approximately 70 percent of the Laotian population. The Hmong population in Laos is sometimes referred to as the Highland Lao. Other prominent ethnic groups include the Mien, Khmu, and Thai Dam. Of the numerous Laotian ethnic groups, the Lao and Hmong constitute the largest populations in the United States.
Communist Pathet Lao troops during a military exercise in Laos, 1959. (Library of Congress)
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Causes and Waves of Migration Most immigrants from Laos arrived in the United States during the mid- to late 1970s. On the heels of the political turmoil in Southeast Asia, Laotian immigration primarily occurred after the Pathet Lao assumed power of the country in 1975 by defeating a U.S.-supported monarchy government. The passage of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act in 1975 allowed for Southeast Asians who had been closely associated with American military activities in the region to emigrate to the United States. However, this first wave of immigration included only 800 Laotian refugees. During 1976, the United States admitted 10,200 Laotian refugees living in Thai border camps. Most of these refugees were relatives of those employed by the U.S. Information Service, the U.S. Agency for International Development, or the U.S. embassy in Vientiane. In 1977 the number of Laotian refugees dropped to 400; in 1978 this number rose to 8,000. Between 1979 and 1981 the number of Laotian refugees and immigrants continued to increase substantially, due to attention paid to the hardships incurred as a result of the war and because of U.S. immigration policy’s emphasis on family reunification. According to Phapphayboun (2003), two significant waves of Laotian immigration have taken place. A first wave of 105,477 refugees arrived in the United States from Laos between 1979 and 1981, while a second wave of 52,864 Laotians arrived between 1986 and 1989. Based on the 2000 U.S. Census figures, Bankston and Hidalgo (2007) estimated that 81 percent of Hmong Americans and 74 percent of Lao Americans were either post-1980 immigrants or children who had been born since 1980. The current landscape of Laotian settlement in the United States reflects a significant decrease in refugee migration from Southeast Asia and an expansion of the Laotian American population. Fewer and fewer Laotians arrive in the United States as refugees relative to the overall immigrant Laotian population. In part, this is due to the fact that U.S. immigration policy emphasizes family reunification. Thus, as the number of U.S. citizens and residents who are Laotian increases, the opportunity for family members from Laos to immigrate to the United States increases as well (Bankston and Hidalgo 2007).
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community According to the 2007 American Community Survey, 221,420 Laotian Americans live in the United States based on self-reporting of one or more ethnic backgrounds. The states with the greatest numbers of Laotian Americans include California, Texas, Minnesota, and Washington.
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According to the 2007 American Community Survey, the median age of Laotian Americans is 28.0 years, while the median age of the total U.S. population is 36.7 years. Among Laotian Americans, 62.9 percent of this population is 21 years of age or younger, in comparison to 71.1 percent of the total U.S. population. However, 4.5 percent of the Laotian American population is 65 years of age or older, while 12.5 percent of the total U.S. population falls into the same age range. Laotian families typically consist of a nuclear family that lives in close proximity to an extended family. For Laotian families, this family structure, especially the closeness to an extended family, may provide for a significant source of social and financial support.
Educational Attainment Because many Laotians arrived in the United States with little formal education and no written language, the educational attainment of this group overall is comparatively low in relation to the U.S. population as a whole. According to the 2007 American Community Survey, among the Laotian American population 25 years or older, 34.1 percent attained less than a high school diploma compared to 15.5 percent of the total U.S. population. Additionally, 8.4 percent of this population attained a bachelor’s degree compared to 17.4 percent of the total U.S. population. That few Laotian Americans attend college relative to the total population may be attributed to the economic and educational disadvantages of Laotian individuals and families coming into the United States. However, U.S. Census data from 1990 and 2000 indicate marked improvements among the Laotian population regarding specific characteristics related to education. Bankston and Hidalgo (2007) analyzed these changes over 10 years pertaining to high school and college graduation rates, college attendance, and English proficiency. Their data show vast improvements in English language skills. In 1990, 79.6 percent of Laotians under age 30 spoke English well or very well, with an increase to 92.9 percent of the population in 2000. Also in 1990, 3.9 percent of Laotians age 25 and over graduated from college, with an increase to 7.6 percent of the population in 2000.
Economic Attainment Related to the educational attainment levels of Laotian immigrants, Laotians have largely occupied low-skilled jobs. According to the 2000 Census, 45.6 percent of the Laotian population 16 years and older work in production, transportation, and material moving occupations, while 14.6 percent of the overall U.S. population are employed in this sector. In contrast, 13.6 percent of the Laotian population 16 years and older work in management professional and related populations, while 33.6 percent of the overall U.S. population are employed in this sector.
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Regarding income patterns, the 2000 Census reports a median family income of $42,838 for Laotians, while the median family income for the overall U.S. population is $50,046. Among Laotians, 14.2 percent receive public assistance, compared to 9.5 percent of the overall U.S. population. Also, 19.1 percent of Laotians live below the federal poverty level compared to 12.4 percent of the overall U.S. population. In addition to level of education and proficiency in English, occupation and income patterns among Laotians can be partially attributed to the difficulties encountered in transitioning from a predominantly agricultural to a highly industrialized society.
Health Statistics, Issues Traditional medicine in Laos involves herbal remedies and massage. Illness is often seen as a spiritually connected problem. Thus, chants and other healing practices are used to address sickness. Practitioners of traditional Laotian medicine include monks and laypersons. Reliance on mainstream Western medicine is somewhat common among Laotian Americans, although some traditional Laotian medicine is practiced in areas with large Laotian American populations. As so much of the Laotian immigrant population consists of refugees, many of the health issues facing this group reflect typical patterns among refugees, especially regarding mental health. For instance, psychological adjustment to life in the United States often takes place during the third or fourth year in the United States, after a period of euphoria followed by shock and helplessness during the first and second year. One of the main concerns facing the Laotian American community regarding health is access to health care. Because many are not accustomed to or feel uncomfortable using the U.S. health care system, various preventable and treatable health conditions, such as cancer and heart disease, go unchecked. In addition to cultural differences regarding traditional Laotian medicine and Western medicine, Laotian Americans may underutilize the U.S. health care system for various reasons, including lack of culturally appropriate staff, embarrassment in revealing health problems to others, fear of authority figures as a result of war-related trauma, and ineffective community outreach and support (Lao Association of Connecticut 2008).
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Among the most important rituals for Laotians is the sookwhan or baci. The sookwhan calls forth the kwhan or 32 spirits that watch over the 32 organs of the body.
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The kwhan comprise each individual’s spiritual core. The baci is the connecting of these spirits to the individual. The baci is often performed by a monk and is done as part of many important ceremonies, such as weddings. Especially for Laotian Buddhists, the naming ceremony, which shortly follows a birth, is perhaps the most important life-cycle ritual. This ceremony takes place in the home among family members. For traditional Laotian weddings, the groom visits the bride’s house the day before the wedding feast. Monks present the couple with bowls of water, and when the bride and groom meet, their wrists are tied together with a long thread, which is looped around the bowls of water and then tied to the monks’ wrists. The following morning, family members and friends sprinkle the couple with the water and a baci ceremony is conducted. As many Laotians subscribe to Theravada Buddhism, funerals incorporate many aspects of this religious tradition. Cremation is a common funeral practice, symbolizing the freeing of the soul from bondage.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Traditional Laotian families are hierarchical according to age and gender. Informed by the Theravadan Buddhist conception of life as a circle, children and grandchil-
Laotian wedding procession in Boise, Idaho. The groom, wearing traditional dress, is escorted to the bride’s house for the wedding ceremony by friends and relatives. (David R. Frazier/ The Image Works)
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dren are raised by parents and grandparents with the expectation that they will fulfill obligations to their elders in the future. Also, men are the head of the Laotian family, making major important decisions concerning the well-being and development of its members. Men also represent their families in community or village affairs. In contrast, women have traditionally been in charge of the financial decisions pertaining to the household and have also been responsible for running the domestic sphere, including taking care of children. As independent decision making is not highly valued during childhood, Laotian children are expected to put the interests of one’s family above their own. Respect and subordination to elders is expected, as is interdependence with other family members. Family obligation is also reflected in the expectation of children to contribute to the household through various chores. Boys engage in tasks such as farm work, tending to livestock, and building and repairing household materials. Girls are largely expected to work inside the home, performing duties such as cleaning, cooking, and weaving. With migration to the United States, Laotian families have undergone significant changes in family structure and roles. In particular, resettlement has resulted in a vast increase in the number of women participating in the paid labor force out of economic necessity and survival. As a result, women have acquired much more power in their families after coming to the United States Additionally, because of low levels of English proficiency among Laotian refugees and immigrants, children often act as translators for parents. This change has also given children a greater degree of influence in families in the United States than in Laos. However, this shift in power dynamics creates struggles between parent and child, as it upsets the traditional family hierarchy. Parents often feel undermined in their authority, while children feel they are on more equal footing with their parents. Lee (2000, 141) notes that with migration to the United States, Laotian families undergo a significant shift in communication of traditional Laotian values from parents to children. In particular, certain spiritual practices pertaining to harmony (e.g., no lying, no stealing, no sexual misconduct) are of little to no consequence to second-generation children who are born and raised in the United States. Moreover, authority granted to elders in traditional Lao families is often challenged not just by children, but by U.S. police and the legal system.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity For many Laotian Americans, especially the children of immigrants who were born and raised in the United States, maintaining a connection to Laos is often difficult because of factors such as generational gaps, lack of time and money to travel to Laos, and the absence of a Laotian ethnic enclave in many areas where Laotian Americans reside. Furthermore, many members of the second generation
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have minimal exposure to the culture and history of Laos throughout their schooling because these topics are underrepresented in educational texts and course offerings. According to a 2009 article in Asian Week, the Center for Lao Studies has recently sponsored an eight-week Vientiane-based Summer Study Abroad program. Participants can learn about Laotian history and culture, through academic, volunteer, and cultural immersion. This program was instituted in recognition of the fact that second-generation children, especially, often go through a difficult time coming to terms with their bicultural identity in the United States, particularly when few resources and little support exist for U.S.-born children to learn about their cultural heritage (“Lao Americans Discover Homeland” 2009). A variety of organizations focusing on Laotian Americans and/or Southeast Asian Americans, more broadly, have been founded during the last 20 years. Most of these organizations were set up to help Laotian Americans adapt to life in the United States and have emphasized provision of social services, English language instruction, job counseling, and psychological services. Most Laotian Americans practice Theravada Buddhism, a type of Buddhism that predominates among lowland Laotians. Some Laotian Americans have converted to Christianity, especially in areas of the United States where the concentration of Laotians is weak and, therefore, unable to maintain traditional religious practices. Theravada Buddhism, which is also prominent in other Southeast Asian countries such as Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar, emphasizes transcending suffering, good deeds and acts of kindness, the impermanence of worldly desires and possessions, and one’s detachment from them. Additionally, Theravada Buddhism stresses a belief in spirits, or phi. Quite significant to Theravada Buddhism is the belief in karma and its connection to reincarnation. If one performs good deeds in one’s present life, then the soul will be reborn in a better state; if one performs bad deeds in one’s present life, then the soul will be reborn in a worse state. While performing good deeds can take the form of acts of kindness toward others, the ultimate expression of good deeds includes either becoming a monk or supporting monks or a temple. The transition to the United States makes these kinds of expression difficult, because of the dearth of temples coupled with occupational demands. As Theravada Buddhism is also a common religion among the more numerous Thai American population, Laotian Americans often attend Thai temples. More recently, Laotians have been able to establish their own temples. Bankston and Hidalgo (2007) report at least 76 Lao temples in the United States at the beginning of the 21st century. While a Lao temple exists in almost every state, California is home to the greatest proportion, with approximately 20 Lao temples. Lao language is tonal, incorporating variations in pitch from high to low to indicate distinctions. The language has its roots in Tai languages, which are
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The Grand Priest Fouvang Tang leads a procession during the opening ceremony of the King Pan Buddha Light Palace, Oakland, California. (Wildflowers Institute)
spoken in what is currently Southern China and Northern Vietnam. While the Lao Language has various dialects, they are mutually intelligible. Lao is written in an abugida script, which emphasizes consonants as primary and vowels as secondary.
Celebration of National Holidays Holidays and festivals in Laos are closely linked to agricultural seasons and traditional Buddhist holidays. Because the Laotian calendar is based on a solar-lunar mix, these holidays are not celebrated on the same day every year according to the Gregorian calendar. Some of the more prominent holidays include the following: Bun Pi Mai: The start of the New Year in Laos takes place in April and typically lasts three days. Laotians clean their houses, put on new clothes, and bathe statues of Buddha with jasmine water. Laotians also pour water on one another and respectfully on monks as part of an invitation of rain during this time of the year. Bun Bang Fai: This is a rocket festival, which typically takes place in May. Large bamboo rockets are fired to prompt the heavens to bring along the rain to the
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Lao New Year The Lao New Year, or Bun Pi Mai, is a three-day celebration. During this time, the country largely shuts down while the people worship and celebrate. Laotians typically clean their homes and don new clothes. Water also plays a prominent role during the New Year festivities. Statues of Buddha, in temples, homes, and elsewhere, are washed. Offerings of fruit and flowers are also given to Buddha. Mounds of sand decorated with streamers also mark temple courtyards as symbolic requests for health and happiness during the coming year. Traditional Laotian folk singing and circle dancing also mark the holiday.
rice fields and initiate the rainy season. This festival includes an abundance of music and dance. Lao National Day: Celebrates the 1975 proletariat victory over the monarchy. Celebration of this day is mandatory throughout the country and is marked by pervasive hammer and sickle imagery and speeches by Lao politicians. Visakha Puja—Celebrates Buddha’s birthday, day of enlightenment, and day of passing. Celebrations are focused around the temple and involve chanting, sermons, and candlelight processions. Haw Khao Padap Din—Festival devoted to paying respect to the deceased. Monks chant on behalf of the deceased and cremations often take place during this time.
Foodways Laotian meals typically consist of rice or rice noodles as a staple grain. While rice can be glutinous or nonglutinous, Laotian meals most often include glutinous or “sticky” rice. Rice is usually accompanied by vegetables and laap or larb—fish or pounded, spiced meat prepared with a combination of herbs, spices, and greens. Some other common dishes include tam som or tam mak hoong, a spicy green papaya salad; lard na, stir-fried noodles in a fragrant sauce; tom kha, soup infused with galangal; and khao tom, steamed rice wrapped in a banana leaf. Laotian cuisine also relies heavily on ingredients such as galangal, lemon grass, kaffir limes, tamarind, basil, ginger, garlic, hot peppers, and shallots. Typical Laotian beverages include coffee, alcohol produced from rice, sugar cane juice, coconut juice, and beer. Also, because of France’s colonization of Indochina, Laotian cuisine also draws on French influences. During a meal, it is common to use one’s hand to take rice between thumb and fingers and use it to scoop up accompanying foods. It is also common to have a soup dish, greens, and a grilled dish at a meal. Laotian food is commonly seen in Thai restaurants, which include the cooking of northeastern Thailand.
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Music, Arts, and Entertainment According to tradition, Laotian performing arts include the lam or call-andresponse folk song and the lam luang dance and music of the former royal courts. While lam currently is known for its boisterous call-and-response exchange between men and women, the function of lam derives from oral legend and history, story telling, and communication with spirits and healing (Visiting Arts Cultural Profiles Project 2009). Central to lam is the khene, a musical instrument made of seven to eight pairs of bamboo tubes that are fitted inside a wooden box. While the khene is a longstanding traditional Laotian reed instrument, nowadays it is often played alongside more modern band instruments, such as the electric guitar, bass, and keyboards. Lam luang is a genre of performing arts that includes singing, storytelling, dance, and musical accompaniment. It is akin to a kind of theater or opera, in which narratives, social issues, epics, legends, or myths are presented on stage. While lam luang is less popular in Laotian urban areas, it has maintained appeal in rural areas. Lam vong is a type of social dance involving couples who dance circles around one another until three types of circles—an individual circle, a circle danced by a couple, and a circle danced by all participants—are completed. Lam vong is performed in slow rhythms accompanied by a musical ensemble that include the khene.
Laotian American youth play bamboo khene at the International Lao New Year Festival in San Francisco, California. (Boon Vong)
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Lakhon tukkata is a form of puppetry based predominantly in Luang Prabang. Lakhon tukkata draws on rod-puppetry, called ipok, which is associated with the former royal court. Puppets are held from below on sticks, and arms are maneuvered by strings. Puppet shows recount stories derived from local traditions. With colonization, Laotian performing arts were influenced by the French. Plays, film-making, ballad-style singing, and pop music have become an integral part of contemporary Laotian performing arts. While Western-style developments were lost during the war, efforts to produce modern performing arts such as music and theater have been recently made. Especially with the loosening of musical regulations by the Laotian government, Laotian-produced popular music has grown substantially and occupies ample playtime on Laotian radio.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Between fiscal years 1987 and 2001, 84,180 individuals from Laos have been naturalized as U.S. citizens. Naturalization of Laotian migrants reached its peak in 1996 with 10,621. During 2001, 6,507 individuals from Laos were naturalized. In terms of U.S. policies specifically pertaining to the naturalization of Laotians, the Hmong Veterans’ Naturalization Act of 2000 (H.R. 371/P.L. 106–207) is one of the most important recent pieces of legislation to impact this process. This law especially impacted Hmong who were admitted to the United States as refugees from Laos and who served with a Laotian special guerilla or irregular unit in support of U.S. forces during 1961–1978, by removing English language requirements for naturalization. While the Hmong are an Asian ethnic group from the mountain regions of China, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, the Hmong from Laos were singled out for punishment by the Pathet Lao, who overtook the Laotian government in 1975. As a result, the Hmong fled to Thailand in search of asylum, and many, in turn, resettled in the United States. The government of Laos currently has a ban on dual citizenship.
Forging a New American Political Identity Various local and national organizations are devoted to advancing the political interests of Laotian Americans. On a national level, the Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC) focuses on leadership, capacity building, and empowerment for Laotian Americans as well as Cambodian and Vietnamese Americans. Current programs include accurate representation in the 2010 U.S. Census, outreach regarding changes to digital television nationwide and its impacts on low-income, limited
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English speakers, and capacity building for mutual assistance associations and refugee-led faith-based organizations. SEARAC also publishes a variety of resources pertaining to education, welfare and public benefits, legal aid, and demographic statistics regarding the Laotian American population. Efforts to engage Laotian Americans in civic and electoral participation have historically been conducted as part of larger efforts targeted toward the Asian and Pacific Islander American community. For example, national organizations such as Asian and Pacific Islander American Vote and the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund work to ensure access and participation in civic life and electoral politics across all Asian American groups, including Laotian Americans. On a national level, organizations such as the Southeast Asia Resource Action Center are working on public policy efforts aimed at the Asian American Pacific Islander (AAPI) population in general, but that have some specific ramifications for Laotians and other Southeast Asians. For example, SEARAC is working on issues pertaining to education, health disparities, poverty, and language through the recently reestablished White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (SEARAC 2009). SEARAC is also involved in advocacy pertaining to the funding for the Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander Serving Institutions Program (AANAPISI), as well as efforts to ensure accurate representation of Laotian Americans and other AAPIs in the 2010 U.S. Census. According to an article in Asia Times, Stephen Kurczy (2009) notes that many Lao refugees who migrated to the United States and various European countries are returning to Laos to invest in a transitioning market-based economy. Especially for former refugees who are approaching retirement, the pull of returning to Laos is strong, as it provides an opportunity to reconnect to their homeland and contribute to a growing but relatively poor economy.
The Second and Later Generations Similar to many children of immigrants, ethnic identification of second- and latergeneration Laotian Americans is complex and changing. While many identify as Lao, the fact that children of Laotian refugees and immigrants have had vastly different experiences from those of their parents influences a primary identification with coethnics of the same generation. Bankston and Hidalgo (2007) also note some panethnic identification among second-generation Laotian Americans, especially as many have settled in areas heavily concentrated with Vietnamese and Cambodians. It is not uncommon for second and subsequent generations to identify as “Asian” in some contexts and as “Lao” in others. According to their analysis of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), Portes and Rumbaut and (2006) found that among children of immigrants
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Youth Profile A Badminton Star Goes to the Olympics Khan “Bob” Malaythong is a Laotian American Olympic badminton player. Born in 1981 in Vientiane, Malaythong moved with his mother from Laos to the United States where they were reunited with his sister, Mary. Mary escaped Laos in 1980, crossing into Thailand, and eventually received sponsorship to move to the United States, landing in Rockville, Maryland. At a young age, Malaythong took up badminton and, at the age of 14, moved to the Olympic Training Center in Colorado Springs. In 2000, he moved to California with the U.S. badminton team and eventually competed in the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Malaythong’s journey from Vientiane to the Olympics was not always a happy one, especially from a psychological point of view. In a 2008 pre-Olympics interview with the New York Times, Malaythong talked about being “burdened” for a number of reasons. In particular, Malaythong discussed feeling guilty for being able to leave Laos while other family members stayed behind, and for pursuing badminton instead of fulfilling family expectations of getting a good education and a well-paying job. Malaythong is profiled in greater depth by the New York Times: Bishop, Greg. 2008. “An Olympian Is Smacked by Burden.” New York Times, July 31. [Online article; retrieved 8/30/09.] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/31/sports/olympics/31badminton.html?pagewanted=1&_ r=3&sq=badminton&st=cse&scp=3.
from Latin America and Asia, second-generation Laotian children (in addition to Cambodians and Mexicans) were at the greatest educational disadvantage across all groups. Even with positive governmental reception toward Laotian refugees, Laotian American children faired poorly in terms of educational achievement, especially regarding high school graduation rates. As is the case with the second and later generations of many immigrant groups to the United States, the Laotian American community has faced a decline in cultural practices. As Laotians are dispersed throughout the United States, the concentration of Laotian American communities is isolated to a few primarily metropolitan areas.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Laos: Forecasts for the 21st Century While U.S. relations with Laos were at a relative low point after 1975 with the end of the Vietnam War, full diplomatic relations were restored in 1992. A major part
Issues in Relations between the United States and Laos | 1413
of bilateral relations between the United States and Laos focuses on accounting for Americans missing in Laos as a result of the Vietnam War. Counternarcotics are also a main component of U.S.–Laos relations, with an emphasis on poppy-related opium control. Prospects for a stable economic and political relationship between the United States and Laos appear strong. According to the U.S. Department of State (2009), a Bilateral Trade Agreement between the United States and Laos became effective in 2005 and has contributed to a rise in Lao exports to the United States. In 2007, bilateral trade amounted to $25.4 million, while in 2008 this figure rose to $60.7 million. Also, during 2008, the U.S. government provided more than $18 million in foreign aid to Laos. These monies were targeted to activities relating to counternarcotics, health and avian influenza, economic development, education, and governance.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 209 Immigration statistics
Fiscal Years
Number of Immigrants (Excluding Refugees and Asylees) from Laos
1951–1970
227
1971
24
1972
35
1973
46
1974
61
1975
96
1976
163
1977
237
1978
—
1979
—
1980
179
1981
78
1982
130
1983
159
1984
185
1985
212
1986
4,239
1987
3,557
1988
6,037
1989
6,973
1990
6,364
1991
5,792
1992
670
1993
738
1994
607
1995
572
1996
692
1997
572
1998
502
1999
471
2000
672
2001
896
Total
41,186
Source: 2003 Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (www.searac.org).
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Table 210 Immigration statistics: refugees Fiscal Years
Number of Refugees from Laos
1975
800
1976
10,200
1977
400
1978
8,000
1979
30,200
1980
55,500
1981
19,777
1982
3,616
1983
2,907
1984
7,218
1985
5,195
1986
12,313
1987
13,394
1988
14,597
1989
12,560
1990
8,715
1991
9,232
1992
7,285
1993
6,944
1994
6,211
1995
3,682
1996
2,203
1997
915
1998
9
1999
19
2000
64
Total
241,956
Source: 2003 Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (www.searac.org).
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Table 211 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and country of birth
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
Laos
1,358
1,398
1,245
896
1,147
1,242
2,892
2,575
2,198
1,688
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics The U.S. Census category “Laotian” includes individuals who self-identify as Laotian, Laos, or Lao under subject heading “Race.” Table 212 Laos census, by state State
Lao Populationa
Alabama
1,023
Alaska
1,515
Arizona
1,243
Arkansas
3,256
California
65,058
Colorado
2,543
Connecticut
3,267
Delaware District of Columbia
130 62
Florida
4,126
Georgia
5,220
Hawaii
2,437
Idaho
597
Illinois
5,973
Indiana
1,138
Iowa
4,778
Kansas
3,926
Kentucky
378
Louisiana
1,511
Maine
109
Maryland
772
Massachusetts
4,449
Michigan
3,846
Minnesota
11,516
Mississippi
111
Missouri
840
Montana
85
Nebraska
1,078
Nevada
1,421
New Hampshire
513 (Continued )
Table 212 Laos census, by state (Continued ) Lao Populationa
State New Jersey
629
New Mexico
457
New York
3,715
North Carolina
6,282
North Dakota
27
Ohio
3,277
Oklahoma
1,216
Oregon
5,176
Pennsylvania
2,536
Rhode Island
3,507
South Carolina
1,040
South Dakota
295
Tennessee
4,761
Texas
11,626
Utah
2,715
Vermont
99
Virginia
3,076
Washington
9,382
West Virginia
40
Wisconsin
5,405
Wyoming
21
Total
198,203
a Individuals who report one or more ethnic/racial designation Source: 2003 Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (www. searac.org).
1418
Table 213 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009: leading states of residence, region/ country: Laos Characteristic
Total
Male
Female
Total
1,688
558
1,130
D
D
Arizona
7
California
351
117
234
Colorado
20
7
13
Connecticut
20
Florida
43
D 9
D 34
Georgia
40
13
27
Illinois
28
10
18
Massachusetts
22
12
10
Michigan
32
6
26
Minnesota
324
136
188
18
8
10
6
—
6
Nevada New Jersey New York
13
5
8
North Carolina
44
12
32
Ohio
32
4
28
Pennsylvania
21
5
16
Texas
86
23
63
Virginia
27
6
21
Washington
70
15
55
484
164
320
Other
D = Data withheld to limit disclosure. Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
1419
Table 214 Top 50 metropolitan areas for Laotians CMSA/MSAa
Lao Populationb
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA
11,545
Sacramento-Yolo, CA
9,814
Los Angeles-Riverside, Orange County, CA
7,626
Minneapolis-St.Paul, MN-WI
7,576
San Diego, CA
7,002
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX
6,642
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA
6,572
Fresno, CA
6,381
Portland-Salem, OR-WA
4,502
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT
3,857
Atlanta, GA
3,596
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI
3,564
Nashville, TN
3,535
Stockton-Lodi, CA
3,054
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA
2,939
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV
2,801
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA
2,617
Milwaukee-Racine, WI
2,362
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO
2,071
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT
1,944
Merced, CA
1,890
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC
1,890
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA
1,867
Des Moines, IA
1,829
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD
1,790
Honolulu, HI
1,778
Fort Smith, AR-OK
1,768
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
1,765
Modesto, CA
1,627
Redding, CA
1,557
Rochester, NY
1,408
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI
1,402
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX
1,355
Kansas City, MO-KS
1,299
Columbus, OH
1,265 (Continued )
1420
Table 214 Top 50 metropolitan areas for Laotians (Continued ) CMSA/MSAa
Lao Populationb
Wichita, KS
1,204
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI
1,201
Greensboro-Winston-Salem-High Point, NC
1,195
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC
1,153
Hartford, CT
1,152
Rockford, IL
1,190
Anchorage, AK
1,170
Las Vegas, NV-AZ
1,093
Amarillo, TX
1,063
Cleveland-Akron, OH
721
Greenville-Spartansburg-Anderson, SC
703
Oklahoma City, OK
666
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ
648
Chico-Paradise, CA
698
Madison, WI
500
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA
451
CMSA ⫽ Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area; MSA ⫽ Metropolitan Statistical Area. Individuals who report one or more ethnic/racial designation. Source: U.S. Census 2000 data compiled by Mark E. Pfeifer; http://hmongstudies.org/ LaoCensusData.html.
a
b
1421
1422 | Laotian Immigrants Table 215 Age groups of Laotian Americans Age Groups (years)
Percentage of Laotian Americans in Age Group
0–9
18.7
10–19
22.4
20–29
17.3
30–39
16.6
40–49
13.4
50–59
6.5
60–69
3.0
70–79
1.5
80+
0.6
Source: 2003 Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (www.searac.org).
Table 216 Occupation by sex for Laotian employed civilian population age 16 and older (in percentages) Female
Male
Overall
Management, professional, and related occupations
14.1
13.2
13.6
Service occupations
16.1
13.7
14.8
Sales and office occupations
25.7
14.1
19.4
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
0.5
0.6
0.5
Construction, extraction, and maintenance occupations
1.3
10.0
6.1
42.2
48.4
45.6
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations
Source: 2003 Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (www.searac.org).
Appendix III: Notable Laotian Americans TC Huo is a Laotian American writer who emigrated to the United States in 1979. His works include A Thousand Wings and Land of Smiles, which was awarded the Asian Pacific American Award for Literature in Adult Fiction in 2001. Khan “Bob” Malaythong is a Laotian American Olympic badminton player. He was profiled in a New York Times blog in 2008: http://beijing2008. blogs.nytimes.com/category/games/badminton/?scp=1&sq=Khan%20 Malaythong&st=cse.
Glossary | 1423
Nary Manivong is a Laotian American fashion designer. In fall 2005 Women’s Wear Daily named him one among 12 up-and-coming designers to watch. Nary was also nominated by Fashion Group International as a Rising Star in women’s ready-to-wear. He is the subject of the documentary film Dressed (2009), http://www.narymanivong.com/. Vongduane Manivong is a Laotian American painter whose work focuses on daily life for Laotians around the world. She has exhibited in her home state of Texas in addition to California, Rhode Island, and the Midwest: Vongduane Manivong’s Fine Arts: http://www.vongduane.com. Catzie Vilayphonh is a Laotian American fashion designer and spoken word artist. She has appeared on Russell Simmons’s HBO special “Def Poetry Jam.” Bryan Thao Worra is a Laotian American writer whose works include On the Other Side of the Eye, Barrow, Winter Ink, and The Tuk Tuk Diaries: My Dinner with Cluster Bombs. Thao Worra is the first Laotian American to receive a Fellowship in Literature from the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts: http://thaoworra.blogspot.com/.
Glossary Baci: Ceremony to celebrate a special event such as a birth, wedding, or homecoming. Fon phun muang: Traditional repertoire of Lao folk dances. Kao: Rice. Khene: Laotian reed instrument made out of bamboo. Kwhan: 32 spirits believed to watch over the 32 organs of the body. Laap or Larb: Pounded fish or meat, marinated in herbs, spices, and greens. Lam: Traditional call-and-response singing style. Lam luang: Genre of performing arts that includes singing, storytelling, dance, and musical accompaniment. Lam vong: Type of social dance involving couples circling each other and one another. Lakhon tukkata: Form of puppetry based predominantly in Luang Prabang. Lieng: Giving nourishment. Phi: Belief in spirits. Piep: Prestige.
1424 | Laotian Immigrants
Sookwhan: Invitation of the kwhan. Wat: Theravada Buddhist temple.
References Asian Week: The Voice of Asian America. 2009. “Lao Americans Discover Homeland.” [Online article retrieved 8/30/09.] http://www.asianweek.com/2009/03/09/laoamericans-discover-homeland/. Bankston, C. L. III, and D. A. Hidalgo. 2007. “Southeast Asia: Laos, Cambodia, Thailand.” In The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration Since 1965, edited by M. C. Waters and R. Ueda with H. B. Marrow, 625–40. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lao Association of Connecticut, Inc. 2008. “Laotian Association Proactive in Educating its Community on Preventing Premature Deaths.” [Online information retrieved 8/30/09.] http://www.laoaoc.com/doc/file/Press5.pdf. Lee, E., ed. 2000. Working with Asian Americans: A Guide for Clinicians. New York: The Guilford Press. Kurczy, S. 2009. “It’s a Bumpy Road Back for Lao Exiles.” [Online article retrieved 8/29/09.] http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KG24Ae01.html. Niedzwiecki, M., and T. C. Duong. 2004. Southeast Asian American Statistical Profile. Washington, DC: Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC). Phapphayboun, Toon. 2003. “Laotian Americans.” Asian-Nation: The Landscape of Asian America. [Online article retrieved 9/1/09.] http://www.asian-nation.org/laotian.shtml. Portes, A., and R. G. Rumbaut. 2006. Immigrant America: A Portrait, 3rd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press. Southeast Asia Resource Action Center. 2009. “President Obama Signs Executive Order for the White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders.” [Online information retrieved 10/20/09.] http://www.searac.org/pr-searac-10–15–2009.pdf. U.S. Department of State. 2009. “Background Note: Laos.” [Online information retrieved 8/30/09.] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2770.htm. Visiting Arts Cultural Profiles Project. 2009. “Laos: Cultural Profiles.” [Online information retrieved 8/30/09.] http://www.culturalprofiles.net/laos/Directories/Laos_Cultural_ Profile/-20.html.
Further Reading Adams, Nina S., and Alfred W. McCoy, eds. 1970. Laos: War and Revolution. New York: Harper and Row. Collection of essays and information pertaining to pre-1975 Lao society. Bankston, Carl. “Laotian Americans.” http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Ha-La/LaotianAmericans. Article on Laotian Americans. Comprehensive overview of Laotian Americans from overview of Laotian history to life in the United States.
Further Reading | 1425 Center for Lao Studies (CLS). http://www.laostudies.org. San Francisco, CA based organization whose mission is to advance knowledge about Lao Studies through research and education. Publishes the Journal of Lao Studies and maintains a Lao oral history archive. Dressed. 2009. David John Swajeski, dir. Onerock Motion Pictures. Documentary movie about Nary Manivong, a Laotian immigrant from Columbus, Ohio, who overcame a difficult upbringing, including homelessness, to achieve success in the fashion world. Evans, Grant. 1998. Politics of Ritual and Remembrance: Laos Since 1975. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Examines ritual and symbolic structures from the 1975 revolution until the present. Evans traces attempts at ritual and symbolic changes vis à vis communism, and their consequences for cultural memory and continuity. Evans, Grant. 2003. A Short History of Laos: The Land in Between. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin. Introductory history of Laos. Chronicles Laos from ancient, dynastic times to the Vietnam War and independence from France. Hmong Studies Internet Resource Center. http://hmongstudies.org. Web site that includes comprehensive statistical data on Laotian Americans. Includes data from the American Community Survey, U.S. Census, as well as comprehensive bibliographies on the Laotian American population. Also includes information regarding Hmong, Cambodian, and Vietnamese American populations. Ireson, Carol. 1999. Fields, Forest and Family: Women’s Work and Power in Rural Laos. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Examines the impact of Socialist policies and reorganization on women’s power and autonomy through their work. Ireson looks at the ways women from lowland Lao, Hmong, and Khmu ethnic groups have responded to drastic political and economic changes after the Vietnam War. Ireson-Doolittle, Carol, and Geraldine Moreno-Black. 2003. The Lao: Gender, Power, and Livelihood. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Examines the impact of development projects on men’s and women’s power in rural Lao society and how traditions are preserved in response to change. Explores village life, kinship and family relations, gender relations, and ethnicity. Khmu National Federation (KNF). http://www.khmunational.org. Nonprofit organization founded in 1990 to assist individuals of Khmu background with social and economic problems, promote Khmu culture, and strengthen relationships between Khmu communities in the United States. Lao American Women Association (LAWA). http://www.lawadc.org. Washington, D.C. area organization established by Lao-born American women. Founded in 1995 to preserve and promote Lao culture and promote higher education among Lao American women.
1426 | Laotian Immigrants Lao Association of Connecticut. http://www.laoaoc.com. Statewide nonprofit grassroots organization founded in 1980 to respond to the needs of the Laotian refugee population who fled the country after the Vietnam War. Lao Khmu Association, Inc. (LKA). http://www.laokhmu.org. San Joaquin County, CA organization whose mission is to enhance quality of life among Southeast Asians living in the area through assistance with social and economic problems. Lao Language and Culture Learning Resources. http://www.seasite.niu.edu/lao/. Northern Illinois University Web site geared toward learning Lao language and culture. Laotian American National Alliance (LANA). http://www.lana-usa.org. National organization whose mission is to advocate for social, economic, and educational advancement of Laotian Americans. Pholsena, Vatthana. 2006. Post-War Laos: The Politics of Culture, History and Identity. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Examines Lao ethnic minorities’ sense of Lao nationalism 30 years after the civil war. Relies on ethnographic and archival analysis to investigate national identity formation and the geography of collective memory. Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC). http://www.searac.org. National organization devoted to advance interests of Laotian Americans as well as Cambodian and Vietnamese Americans, through advocacy, community empowerment, and capacity building. Founded in 1979 as the Indochina Refugee Action Center (IRAC) to facilitate relocation of Southeast Asian refugees and development of nonprofit organizations for Southeast Asian Americans. Stuart-Fox, Martin. 1997. A History of Laos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wide-ranging history focusing on the French colonization of Laos, independence from France, involvement in the Vietnam War, formation of the Communist republic, and authoritarian government.
Lebanese Immigrants by Stephen J. Sills
Introduction Lebanese immigrants have been settling in the United States since the late 19th century, and they have become the largest subgroup of immigrants from the Middle East in America. According to the 2000 Census, approximately one-third of persons reporting Arab ancestry were Lebanese. The 2008 American Community Survey estimate places the tally at 501,907 persons of Lebanese ancestry, up 14 percent from the 2000 Census. As with other Arab American groups, Lebanese Americans are undercounted. The Arab American Institute differs with these estimates and places the number at above one million Americans of Lebanese heritage. Early migrants originated from the region of Mount Lebanon, then a part of the Ottoman Empire. Sojourning young males intended to stay only a short time in the United States, working to assist their families or to buy land back home. A large number of the first arrivals became peddlers, traveling about the United States selling imported wares. World War I temporarily ceased the influx of migrants, reduced the number of returnees, and disrupted ties to the homeland, pressing many to stay and become settled. The wealth generated from peddling allowed many Lebanese migrants to move into the middle class. An assimilationist view was adopted by most. Members of the community were encouraged to gain their citizenship, send their children to American schools, and adopt many American values. While the early waves of Lebanese immigrants were primarily Christians, later waves became increasingly Muslim, as a result of the civil war in Lebanon and the influx of Palestinian refugees. Current unrest in the region is likely to result in continued emigration.
Chronology 5000 B.C.E.
Earliest known settlements in Lebanon.
1100 B.C.E.
Phoenician independence from Egypt.
875–64 B.C.E.
Phoenicia conquered by Roman Empire.
1516–1916
Greater Syria (modern Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel) part of Ottoman Empire. 1427
Chronology | 1429
1854
First immigrants from Lebanon to United States (Maronite Christians).
1920
League of Nations grants mandate for Lebanon to France.
1926
Constitution establishes the Lebanese Republic.
1941
Lebanon independent from France.
1943
France recognizes independence.
1948
Arab-Israeli War.
1958
President Chamoune asks the United States to send troops.
1967
Arab-Israeli war; Palestinians use Lebanon as base for attacks against Israel.
1975–1990
Lebanese Civil War.
1976
Syria invades Lebanon.
1978
Israel invades Lebanon.
1978
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
1978
Israel withdraws from Lebanon.
1982
Israel invades Lebanon.
1982
U.S., French, and Italian peacekeeping force arrives in Beirut.
1983
241 U.S. marines and 56 French paratroopers are killed in car bomb attack.
1985
Israel withdraws from Lebanon.
1990
Syria attacks Presidential Palace and installs new government.
1993
Israeli “Operation Accountability” attempts to eliminate Hezbollah presence in Lebanon.
1996
Israel bombs Beirut.
2000
Israel withdraws from Lebanon.
2005
Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri killed by a car bomb. Syria blamed. Uprising against pro-Syrian government known as the “Cedar Revolution” leads to Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.
2006
Lebanon War (Hezbollah–Israeli).
2007
Hezbollah and Lebanese government battles lead to general strike, protests, and violence including a siege on the Palestinian refugee camp near Nahr al-Bared.
1430 | Lebanese Immigrants
2008
Clashes continue between Hezbollah and Lebanese government forces.
2009
National unity government formed.
2011
National unity government collapses over involvement in 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Background Geography The Republic of Lebanon is a country of just over four million people in the Middle East (Central Intelligence Agency 2010). Nearly ninety percent (87%) of the population lives in urban areas. As a result there is a relatively low total fertility rate of only 1.9 children per female of child-bearing age. Lebanon is a relatively developed nation, ranked 78 of 177 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI). The population has an average life expectancy of 74 years, and nearly 90 percent are literate (93.1% of males and 82.2% of females). The population is predominately ethnic Arab (95%), with a small minority of Armenians (4%) and less than 1 percent other ethnicities. Sixty percent of the population is Muslim and forty percent are Christians. There are about half a million displaced Palestinian refugees, and a small population of Iraqis. Lebanon is located at just above the 33rd parallel (specifically 33'54⬚N 35'32⬚E), on the same latitude as Atlanta, Georgia. Its neighbors are Syria to the east and north, Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights to the south, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. The country has a total area of 4,015 square miles, or just a little smaller than Connecticut and a little larger than Delaware. While only 55 miles at its widest point, the topography of this country may be divided into four north–south ribbons. Along the sea is a thin strip of coastal plain (less than 4 miles wide) in which a fair amount of agricultural production is accomplished. The land quickly rises into the Lebanon Mountains (also known as Mount Lebanon), which run the length of the country. This range includes impressive peaks of up to 10,000 feet and several ski slopes with a vista of the Mediterranean. Between this mountain range and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains on the eastern border with Syria lies the 10-mile-wide Bekaa Valley, home to most of Lebanon’s famous vineyards, as well as fields of grains, cotton, vegetables, and grazing lands. Along the coast the weather is generally mild but rainy in the winters, with hot and muggy summers, while the central mountains receive heavy winter snows. The Bekaa Valley is dry as it sits in the leeward shadow of the Lebanon Mountains. The capital city of Beirut is located at about the midpoint of the 140-mile Mediterranean coastline. It has a busy container-shipping seaport and is home to just
Background | 1431
over half of Lebanon’s population, or about 2.1 million, depending on the source of estimates, as there has been no official census since 1932. The second-largest city, Tripoli, is located on the north coast and has a population of about half a million. Other urban centers are located along the costal plain and in the Bekaa Valley.
History There is evidence of human activity in the area of modern Lebanon as far back as the Paleolithic era. Phoenician tribes (Canaanites) were the first to have settled there, around 4000 B.C.E. The present-day capital of Beirut itself dates back more than 5,000 years. Over the centuries, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Turks, and Kurds, as well as European Crusaders and Persian invaders, all laid claim to this Mediterranean country. Lebanon’s history is rife with religious and ethnic division. From 1516 to 1918 Lebanon fell under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The people who inhabited Mount Lebanon and the coastal plains were at times given great autonomy. Yet, they divided themselves by religious and ethnic background. Maronite Christians, Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and Druze sometimes battled over land and political power. Thus, the population did not really develop a sense of nationalism until the State of Greater Lebanon was made a French mandate in 1920 following World War I. In 1926 the French introduced a new constitution and a parliamentary system. On November 22, 1943, Lebanon gained its independence from France and established a pattern of shared political power between Islamic and Christian religious communities. In 1948, Palestinian refugees flooded into Lebanon following the Arab–Israel war, yet the area remained stable until civil conflict between Muslims and pro-Western Christians flared up in 1958, resulting in a U.S. military intervention of over 14,000 troops. In 1975, the Lebanese Civil War broke out between various religious and political factions. The demographic changes caused by the influx of Palestinians, as well as regional tensions with Israel, Syria, Egypt, and other neighbors exacerbated the conflict. Over the course of the war, Lebanese religious militias, terrorist groups, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hezbollah, and military from Israel, Syria, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (27 nations providing military and support), and the Multinational Force in Lebanon (including U.S., French, Italian, and British forces) battled. As many as a quarter of a million Lebanese were killed and over a million wounded during the 15 years of civil conflict. From 1987 to 1997, there was a ban on travel of American citizens to Lebanon, due in part to the 1983 terrorist car bombings of Multinational Force barracks (which killed 241 American soldiers), as well as a series of 96 terrorist hostage incidents, including the 1985 TWA Flight 847 hijacking that left an American serviceman dead. Emigration figures for this time period are difficult, but estimates are in the
1432 | Lebanese Immigrants
neighborhood of nearly one million leaving Lebanon. While many leaving during the war were Christians, Muslim emigrants have increased since the end of the conflict in 1990, when Syrian troops took control of the central government. Almost 15 years later, in February 2005, an uprising began against the Syrian occupation and the Syrian-backed government. It is known in the West as the Cedar Revolution. The conflict was sparked by the Syrian assassination of a former Lebanese prime minister (Rafik Hariri). Public outrage at the attack resulted in demonstrations of tens of thousands, demanding a withdrawal of Syrian troops. Counter-demonstrations, backed by pro-Syrian Hezbollah, also were held. Arab and Western nations backed the call for Syrian pull-out and, within two months of the assassination, Syria conceded to moving troops out of Lebanon in April and elections were held in May and June of 2005. The following year, the Lebanesebased Palestinian group Hezbollah engaged Israel in a rocket attack that resulted in Israeli blockades, air raids, and a land invasion of Lebanon. Though there are conflicting reports, more than 1,000 Lebanese died in the one-month-long siege. Sporadic rocket attacks and violations of the August 2006 cease fire continued. As recently as March of 2010, Hezbollah has refused to disarm its militia.
An explosion erupts during fighting in the Palestinian Nahr el-Bared refugee camp near Tripoli, Lebanon, June 15, 2007. (AP Photo/Matt Dunham)
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1433
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration Lebanese immigrants have been settling in the United States since the late 19th century and have become the largest subgroup of immigrants from the Middle East in America. According to the U.S. Census Bureau estimates for 2007, there were just under half a million individuals of Lebanese ancestry, and just over 100,000 who emigrated from Lebanon. However, estimates for people of Lebanese descent range from one to over three million depending on the source. Confounding these figures is the fact that families who immigrated before the 1940s may have counted themselves among the 140,000 or more Syrian Americans, as Lebanon was still part of Greater Syria. Yet, today, fully a third of all Arab Americans claim Lebanese ancestry. Arab Christians, principally Maronites, began immigrating to the United States in the late 1800s. These early migrants originated from the region of Mount Lebanon, then a part of the Ottoman Empire, and would have been identified as coming from Greater Syria at the time, since Lebanon had not yet been formed as a nationstate. Calculations of the number of migrants before 1900 vary greatly, as they were tabulated with others from the Ottoman Empire (Greeks, Armenians, Turks, etc.). Statistics for the early 1900s were a little more accurate, and most sources agree that there were in the neighborhood of 5,000 to 10,000 migrants from Mount Lebanon per year, with a dramatic drop during World War I (1914–1918), picking back up until the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924. By 1925, when their immigration was all but halted, there were well over 100,000 immigrants from Mount Lebanon in the United States. A variety of factors have been given for the mass emigration of the Lebanese. Ethnic violence in mid-1800s between Druze and Maronites culminated in an 1860 massacre of more than 10,000 and the displacement of over 100,000 individuals, as villages throughout the region were burned and ransacked. The Maronites called on their historic ties to France and other European powers (established when they helped the Europeans during the Crusades). These countries in turn put political pressure on the Ottoman government to establish an autonomous region for the Maronites in the area of Mount Lebanon. Ethnic tension and the strengthening of social and economic ties to France and other Western nations led some to look for a life elsewhere. Adding to this was a scarcity of arable land, which had resulted from overpopulation. Also, poor economic conditions played a part, as export commodities such as silk had experienced a decline in value as a result of increased competition with the Far East. Finally, just after the turn of the 20th century the Ottoman government began conscription of Christian males into the army, leading some to migrate elsewhere to avoid service.
1434 | Lebanese Immigrants
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separatism Early migrants from the region were often uneducated and unskilled. Many were sojourning young males—intending to stay only a short time in the United States to earn enough money to assist their families or to acquire property back home. Like many migrants, some were forced to borrow money, mortgage family property, or sell heirlooms and valuables in order to pay for their passage abroad. A large number of the first arrivals became traveling peddlers, selling everything from rosaries and jewelry to imported rugs and linens. They developed trade routes from New York to California, international networks of suppliers, and even a banking system. Impressive remittances from those aboard, and the stories of high earnings from returnees to Mount Lebanon led to an increase in the number of emigrants toward the end of the 19th century. As this migration network expanded, married males and families began to emigrate to the United States as well. By the turn of the 20th century, nearly half of the migrants from the region were women coming with their families or traveling to join their spouses who were already in the United States. While the earliest arrivals were sojourners oriented toward returning to the homeland, later migrants came to settle. World War I played an important part, as it temporarily ceased the influx of migrants, reduced the number of returnees, and disrupted ties to the homeland. This helped to reorient many to permanent settlement in the United States. They had already formed immigrant enclaves in the cities of the Northeast (New York and Boston in particular) and established Maronite, Melkite, and Orthodox churches (in 1920 there were about 75 that had been built), cultural associations, social clubs, and more than a dozen Arabic-language newspapers. Yet, by the mid-1920s, when the flow of migrants was halted by the JohnsonReed Act, many of the Arabic-language newspapers had folded, as the children of migrants were learning English in American schools. Some publications shifted to English to appeal to the second generation. Likewise, many of the churches became Americanized and translated their rites into English in order to compete with local Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, which had begun to lure away immigrant parishioners. An assimilationist view was adopted by most. Members of the community were encouraged to gain their citizenship, send their children to American schools, and adopt many American values. The wealth generated from peddling allowed Lebanese migrants to settle and to move into the middle class. While peddling continued to be a significant economic activity, many opened small groceries and dry goods shops. Very few engaged in homesteading activities like other migrant groups of the time. Many found employment in factories, such as those in the fledgling automobile industry of Michigan, which eventually led to the greater Detroit area becoming the largest Lebanese American community today. By the 1930s and 1940s patterns of residential assimilation mirrored European migrants, as Lebanese moved to the suburbs.
Demographic Profile | 1435
Later Waves of Immigration Several major events contributed to an increase in the number of Lebanese immigrants coming to the United States after 1965: the Arab-Israeli War in 1967, the civil war in Lebanon from 1975 to 1990, and the most recent “Cedar Revolution.” While the early waves of Lebanese immigrants were primarily Christians, later periods became increasingly Muslim as the demographics of the sending country have changed over time, due in part to the exodus of Christians and the influx of Palestinians in Lebanon. As a result of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, a wave of about 13,000 Lebanese immigrants came to the United States to escape political, ethnic, and religious tensions and fighting that resulted from Palestinian refugees flooding into Lebanon. This diaspora continued during the Lebanese Civil War (1975 to 1990), during which time another 50,000 immigrants arrived in the United States. Following the end of the Lebanese Civil War there was again an increase in the number of immigrants. In the year following the end of the conflict, just over 6,000 new arrivals came to the United States. This number later dropped to about 3,000 per year by the end of the 1990s. New fighting between Hezbollah, Israel, pro-Syrian forces, and others caused the numbers to continue to rise and fall, leveling recently at around 4,000 new arrivals per year. Current unrest in the region is likely to result in continued migration.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community The 2008 American Community Survey estimate places the tally at 501,907 persons of Lebanese ancestry, up 14 percent from the 2000 Census. However, the Arab American Institute differs with these estimates, placing the number above one million Americans of Lebanese heritage. This discrepancy is due to their long immigration history, the move by most Christian Lebanese into the middle class, their rapid assimilation, and the fact that many were not accounted for in the earliest waves of migration. Lebanese immigrants who were born abroad and permanently settled in the United States are much easier to account for than those of Lebanese descent. Data compiled from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Office of Immigration Statistics show about 141,746 individual U.S. residents from Lebanon. The influx of foreignborn Lebanese has remained fairly constant through the last decade, dipping slightly after 9/11 and increasing to a current level of about 4,000 to 5,000 new permanent residents per year. Large Lebanese communities may now be found in California, Texas, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Louisiana, Florida, and Ohio. About 400,000 Arab Americans live in the Detroit Metropolitan Area, with nearly two-thirds being
1436 | Lebanese Immigrants
Lebanese Americans celebrate with traditional dance and music at the Lebanese Festival at Our Lady of Lebanon Catholic Church in Coral Gables, Florida. (Jeff Greenberg/The Image Works)
of Lebanese descent. Dearborn, Michigan, in particular has one of the largest Lebanese American communities in the country. This community is largely homogenous, with striking uniformity in cultural identity based on commonality of the spoken Arabic language and adherence to traditional values and practices.
Age and Family Structure According to the 2000 Census, the majority (61.9%) of the population of Lebanese ancestry were between the ages of 18 and 64, with a mean age of 38.9 years (Brittingham and De la Cruz 2005). This is slightly older than the mean age of the U.S. population (36.7 years). The foreign-born Lebanese community was also a bit older, with a mean age of 39.6 (U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations STP-159). (See Figure 20.) More than half of Lebanese households were married couple households. This rate is even higher among foreign-born Lebanese, with 64.7 percent living in marriedcouple households (U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations STP-159). The households often include children under the age of 18. Single-parent households are rare; 2.5 percent as compared with 9.0 percent of the general population (U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations STP-159). This is due in part to the fact that divorce is considered uncommon among Lebanese Americans. However,
Demographic Profile | 1437
actual divorce statistics by ancestry are not available for the United States (this data is collected by race/ethnicity, age, and other vital characteristics), but anecdotally the divorce rate has been reported to be on the rise among Arab Americans.
Educational Attainment Even though the earliest immigrants had low socioeconomic statuses and lacked formal educations, Lebanese Americans have achieved higher educational attainment than the total population. Most (85.6%) of Lebanese Americans have received a high school education or more, fully five percentage points higher than the general population (Brittingham and De la Cruz 2005). Moreover, 38.6 percent received a bachelor’s degree or higher, as compared to only 24.4 percent of the total population. Educational attainment among the foreign-born Lebanese community is a little lower, with 77.6 percent having received a high school education or more. Still, 36.6 percent of this population has a bachelor’s degree or higher (see Figure 21). This bifurcation results from the nature of migration to the United States, which pulls families from both the highest and lowest social classes.
Labor Force Participation and Economic Attainment Due in part to this high educational attainment, Lebanese Americans often work in management, professional, and related fields, followed by sales and office positions. Many Lebanese immigrants had been skilled workers before migrating, bringing with them a high level of human capital. There is, however, some divergence in labor force participation by sex. Nearly three-quarters of Lebanese American men of employable age were active in the workforce, compared to just half of Lebanese American women (Brittingham and De la Cruz 2005). The labor force participation of foreign-born Lebanese was lower, with 61.1 percent of males working and only 42.1 percent of females employed (U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations STP-159). According to the census data, the median household income for Lebanese Americans in 1999 was $60,677, about $10,000 more than the median for the general population, and the highest among Arab American groups. Foreign-born Lebanese were just under the national average, with a median household income of $49,708 (U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations STP-159). A smaller proportion of Lebanese Americans were in poverty compared to the total population: just over 10 percent of Lebanese American households fell below the poverty threshold, while 12 percent of the total population was in poverty. The robust economic attainment of Lebanese Americans has resulted in a high rate of homeowners, at 69.6 percent, a strong sign of the economic health of this community (Brittingham and De la Cruz 2005).
1438 | Lebanese Immigrants
Health Statistics and Issues The Arab American community is best described, regarding health care, as understudied and medically underserved. The health disparities and barriers to preventative health practices in this population remain underexplored. Several barriers to health care have been identified. The most commonly reported were lack of health insurance and/or cost of care, language barriers, lack of awareness, mistrust of physicians and/or medications, and transportation issues (Sills, Jaber, and Pinelli 2008). Diabetes in particular is an emerging clinical and public health problem among Arab Americans. Rapid economic change, changes in lifestyle, and dietary changes have been associated with the increasing prevalence of diabetes among Arab American immigrants. According to Jaber et al. (2003), prevalence rates of diabetes are 15.5 percent in Arab American women and 20.1 percent in Arab American men. These rates are considerably higher than those reported for the white, African American, and Hispanic populations in the United States, and for rural Arab populations, and present a major clinical and public health problem (Jaber et al. 2003). Community-based culturally appropriate intervention programs to reduce the incidence of diabetes are currently being studied (Sills, Jaber, and Pinelli 2008).
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Among Lebanese immigrants, close-knit families are an important characteristic. The social order is traditionally paternalistic. Adult children often live with their parents until they are married and do not often move far away from their kin. Solidarity is maintained via a high degree of social obligation and family loyalty. These norms, however, are shifting among the American-born Lebanese community, with patterns approaching that of the general U.S. population in terms of the role of women and the independence of young adults. Lebanese Americans are, however, still more likely than other native-born Americans to live in family households (as opposed to living alone or with nonkin). Performance of culture among the Lebanese community in the United States varies greatly based on background, generation, and length of time in the United States. Birth rites, coming of age ceremonies, weddings, and death rituals also vary greatly based on religious background. Some commonalities in cultural practices can be found. For example, meghli, a rice pudding with aniseed, fennel, caraway, and cinnamon, is often served to celebrate the birth of a child. Weddings are almost always large celebrations that extend over the course of three days with the third being the day of the Zaffeh, or wedding dance and celebration. Another point on which the different Lebanese groups agree is their funerals. Lebanese families are very expressive in their grief. Emotional displays are commonplace at funerals.
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1439
Lebanese Americans, while somewhat more reserved, are yet more demonstrative of the loss felt for a loved one than other North American ethnic groups.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Gender roles within the Lebanese community also vary based on religion, ethnic background, generation, and length of time in the United States, yet they have undergone some general changes as a result of assimilation and incorporation. Early flows of immigrants were male dominated. According to Naff (1993), in the late 1800s women constituted only a little over a quarter of the immigrants from Lebanon, rising to just about a third of the migrant flow in the first decade of the twentieth century. By the 1930s, women accounted for nearly half of immigrants, as families were reunited and single men were returning to Lebanon seeking brides to bring with them back to the United States. Early on these Lebanese women were integral in the formation of community and establishing Lebanese and Arab organizations. According to Naff (1993) the funds for many early churches and mosques came from the efforts of women who went door-to-door asking for donations and engaging in other fund-raising activities. Read (2003) argues that, “while many attempted to sustain traditional gender roles, most recognized and needed the economic benefits provided by educated female workers.” Read goes on to explain that there was “considerable intra-group diversity” on the degree of traditionalism in gender norms, yet, over time, we have seen that increased educational attainment and sociopolitical activism has led to a degree of independence and power for women within the community and in the home. More recently, Read compared Arab American women, finding that the greatest difference in gender norms is not between Muslim and Christian women, but between native and foreign-born Arab Americans. Thus, while Muslim women were more traditional in their gender norms, they are also more likely to be recent immigrants to the United States.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Early groups assimilated easily into American society. Children of Lebanese immigrants quickly learned English (sometimes to the exclusion of Arabic). More than half of Lebanese Americans today only speak English in the home, and among those who speak Arabic in the home, most speak English very well. The early waves of Lebanese were primarily Melkite, Maronite, and Antiochian Christians. They established churches as the heart of their ethnic enclaves wherever they settled. These churches served social as well as religious functions within the community. Melkite and Antiochian churches maintained Greek Orthodox traditions, while the Maronite churches preserved the Aramaic language and traditional rites that date back as far as the fifth century. Many of the churches have since become Americanized and translated their rites into English in order to compete with local
1440 | Lebanese Immigrants
Roman Catholic or Protestant churches, which had begun to lure away immigrant parishioners. Following the Lebanese Civil War, a growing numbers of Lebanese Muslims have been coming to the United States. Lebanese American Muslims have built mosques throughout the country. These religious institutions play a decided role in providing resources to newly arrived migrants and in facilitating in the acculturation process. Lebanese Muslims are less likely to assimilate than earlier Christian immigrants. As recent arrivals, they are more likely to live in enclaves with other
Youth Profile Starting in Special Ed Classes, Finishing at Wellesley College, and Establishing a Program for Blind Children in Lebanon Sara Minkara is the daughter of Lebanese immigrants. She grew up in an Arabic-speaking Muslim household and wears the traditional hijab, a head scarf that is intended to show her modesty. She was the only Muslim student in her school. This set her apart from her peers while growing up in Hingham, Massachusetts. Sara is also legally blind due to macular degeneration. Although Sara was made to take special education classes in high school, she finished by taking advanced placement (AP) chemistry and Calculus, and she just received a degree in 2009 from Wellesley College in Boston, Massachusetts. Last year she received a Howard Hughes Medical Institute grant to do research in computational chemistry, researching ways to improve medicines. She was also president of Al-Muslimat, an Islamic student group at the college, where she worked to affirm interfaith relations. Last year she won a speaking and writing competition to become the commencement speaker for her graduating class (Corday 2009). Sara and her partner Maysa Mourad, a Lebanese international student studying at Wellesley, won the Emily Greene Balch Summer Stipend from Wellesley College (2009) and the prestigious Outstanding Award of Education from the Clinton Global Initiative Association (2009) for their project entitled Empowerment through Integration. The project was to assist 16 visually impaired students between the ages of 8 and 13 in Tripoli, Lebanon. Their program teaches these students to become more autonomous by training them to use computers and developing their language and personal management skills. As she explained in an interview with the Clinton Global Initiative University (CGIU), “I felt a sense of duty to go back and create opportunities for blind children in Lebanon, and hopefully blind children everywhere in the world.” They also established a network of volunteers to assist in the efforts of raising awareness of students with disabilities in Lebanon (Clinton Global Initiative University. 2009).
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1441
Arabs, preserve their Arabic language, and maintain closer social and political ties to the homeland. Since the second wave of Lebanese immigrants (following the 1967 Arab–Israeli War), there has been a resurgence of Lebanese culture and traditions. Lebanese Americans, and especially Lebanese immigrants, have retained strong ties to Lebanon, even though many have become U.S. citizens. Lebanese immigrants have also been very active in promoting economic, political, and social ties through lobbying groups, cultural exchange groups, academic institutions, and other organizations. Many of those who fled during the long Civil War have returned to visit Beirut or provincial homes during the periods of stability that followed. While much of the $7 billion in remittances to Lebanon come from oil-rich Arab countries, a sizable proportion is generated by Americans of Lebanese descent.
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media In the early days of the Lebanese communities in the United States, many Arabiclanguage papers and publications were established. For example, the Kawkab Amerika, or Star of America, was first published in the 1890s. However, most of these publications came and went, with few surviving more than a few years. The number of media sources have begun to increase since the late 1990s as the Internet has provided a platform for ethnic news services and blogs connecting immigrant communities to each other as well as to the homeland. A few news sources include: the Arab American News, with pan-Arab, English language, and Arabic editions published since 1984 (http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/); the Beirut Times, a weekly Lebanese newspaper published in United States (http://www. beiruttimes.com/); the Cedar News Corp, an Arabic-language newspaper for Lebanese Americans (http://cedarnews.net); and the National Arab American Times, a pan-Arab English-language quarterly in print with an online blog (http://www. aatimesnews.com/).
Celebration of National Holidays Lebanese Independence Celebrations (November 20) are held in almost every sizeable Lebanese community across the country. For example, the Lebanese American Heritage Club of Dearborn hosts an annual event with traditional folkloric dance, foods, speeches, music, awards ceremonies, and other entertainment. Other important holidays include those of the Christian and Islamic calendars. Cultural and social groups also gather to celebrate traditions at other times during the year. For example, the Lebanese American Chamber of Commerce in Birmingham, Michigan, holds a three-day event known as LEBFEST! in which live bands, famous Lebanese and Lebanese American singers, DJs, dance troupes, and
1442 | Lebanese Immigrants
others perform. They also have cultural education displays, arts and crafts, traditional activities, and Lebanese foods.
Foodways Like much of the food from region, Lebanese food is characterized by its liberal use of garlic, olive oil, and lemon juice. According to Dekmak and Bridgdale (2008), a Lebanese breakfast might include labneh, a strained yogurt, and perhaps manakeesh bi zaatar (also spelled manouche) a “pizza” or pastry prepared with sesame seeds and thyme. Lunch and dinner are often served as mezze or a collection of small dishes. Commonly a mezze will include dishes such as fattoush, a light salad of romaine and other vegetables, and bread seasoned with sumac, a spice made from the dried berries of a tree by the same name. Or one might have parsley and bulgur salad seasoned with lemon juice and olive oil, a dish known as tabbouleh. Another customary dish is hummus, made from cooked garbanzo beans, olive oil, lemon juice, and tahini (a paste prepared from toasted ground sesame seeds). The mezze might also include baba ghanouj, roast eggplant and tahini spread over fresh pita. Falafel, or fried garbanzo bean patties, is frequently served in a piece of pita bread with tahini sauce, lettuce, and tomato. Grape leaves stuffed with ground meats (beef or lamb), rice, and seasonings are also a favorite. Entrees common to Lebanese cuisine include kabobs, or grilled seasoned meats on a skewer, or a shawarma, made from seasoned chicken or lamb roasted stacked on a vertical spit then sliced and served wrapped in a pita or served over rice. Being a Mediterranean nation, there are a variety of fish dishes, like sayadieh, a fish and rice stew, or samak harra, fried fish served with coriander, cumin, pine nuts, and chili powder. Dessert would include the popular and well-known baklava, a pastry made of phyllo dough layered with chopped nuts and honey. Many of these dishes are widely available in Lebanese or Middle Eastern restaurants across the United States, and the ingredients may be found in many ethnic grocery stores in places with a high percentage of Arab Americans.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Since the late 1800s, Lebanese immigrants have brought with them their arts and musical traditions. Immigrants brought traditional folkloric instruments such as the lute-like instrument called the buzaq, a small decorated drum known as the durbakke or tablah, and the mijwiz, a double-pipe reed instrument. Immigrants danced the dabkeh, a traditional line-dance with energetic stomping still seen at Lebanese American weddings and events. While maintaining many of the traditional music and dance styles, Lebanese Americans are also well represented in the modern American popular culture. Paul Anka (pop star, teen idol of the 1960s), “Casey” Kasim (radio host and personality), Herbert Khaury (“Tiny Tim,” singer and ukulele
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1443
Chicken shawarma served with hummus and pita bread, a traditional Lebanese meal. (Andrea Skjold/Dreamstime.com)
player), Dick Dale (surf guitarist), Jamie Farr (actor), Sammy Hagar (rock singer and guitarist), Farah Fawcett (actress), and Frank Zappa (singer/songwriter) are just a few among the many of Lebanese ancestry who have made a mark in the entertainment industries. Lebanese immigrants stay abreast of current pop stars and celebrities in Lebanon and in other countries of the Lebanese diaspora. Current popular Lebanese singers such as Wael Kfoury, Najwa Karam, and Fadel Shaker have toured the United States and performed for large pan-Arab audiences in Chicago, San Francisco, Las Vegas, Detroit, New Jersey, Boston, and Miami.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Most Lebanese Americans today were born in the United States. Still, foreign-born Lebanese immigrants have a high rate of becoming citizens, a sign of their incorporation and adaptation into the community. Data from the U.S. Census show that in 2000 nearly 70 percent of immigrant Lebanese had become naturalized. Only 3 percent of those who had been here for 20 years or more had not become U.S. citizen (see Table 217). The most recent data available from the Office of Immigration Statistics (2008) show that three-quarters of newly arrived Lebanese immigrants obtain their legal status through family-sponsored preferences or as immediate
1444 | Lebanese Immigrants
relatives of U.S. citizens. Another 17.7 percent received employment-based preferences. Refugees (3.4%) and diversity-based preference made up the remainder of the 4,254 newcomers from Lebanon in 2008. Early waves of Lebanese immigrants had no choice but to assimilate in order to become a part of the American society. But while most recent Lebanese immigrants become naturalized citizens, there is a degree of transnationalim within this newer community. Many Lebanese immigrants maintain property and even businesses in the homeland. Solid data is unavailable, but, anecdotally, many maintain de facto dual citizenship. Immigrant Lebanese incorporate and adapt to the United States, but they do not necessarily assimilate. Their orientation and identity remains Lebanese, while their nationality has changed. They “straddle a fence,” developing dual or hyphenated identities. As Nagel and Staeheli (2004) explain, “Interviews reveal a sense of uneasiness with, and in some cases alienation from, ‘American’ society and there is a widespread desire among Arab American activists and organizations to preserve cultural distinctiveness. But these expressions of difference coexist with active assertions of citizenship and social membership in American society.”
Intergroup Relations There are many intragroup divisions among Lebanese immigrants. Primarily these divisions are among the 18 different religious groups from Lebanon, but they have also resulted from differing political views among native and foreign born Lebanese over the events of the Lebanese Civil War, the relations with Palestinian refugees, positions on Israeli-Hezbollah clashes and U.S.-Lebanese policies. Still, Lebanese immigrants are among one of many Arab American groups in the United States who share linguistic, cultural, and historical ties. Pan-Arab community organizations such as the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS) in Dearborn, Michigan have worked to overcome “linguistic, cultural, and social barriers” Arab immigrants faced. The organization, headed currently by Hassan Jaber (a Lebanese immigrant himself), provides mental and community health clinics, employment services and job training, youth academic services, adult literacy programs, and other community services to a diverse community of Arab Americans. In addition, ACCESS has established the Arab American National Museum to preserve the social and cultural heritage of this immigrant group (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services 2007).
Forging a New American Political Identity Lebanese Americans, like many Arab Americans, have a high degree of political participation. According to a poll conducted by Zogby International, 88.5 percent of Arab Americans are registered to vote. While previously most were affiliated with
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1445
the Republican platform (based primarily on their ownership of small businesses and traditional family views) this affiliation shifted during the George W. Bush years in response to a growing anti-Arab sentiments and displeasure with the war in Iraq. According to the Arab American Institute, Arab Americans have increasingly identified with the Democrats. By the election of 2008, “54 percent identified themselves as Democrats. The number of Arab Americans identifying as Democrats has steadily increased since 2002” (Arab American Institute 2008, 9). A number of Lebanese Americans have held high rank in U.S. political institutions, including Ralph Nader (four-time presidential candidate), John E. Sununu (senator), his father John H. Sununu (governor of New Hampshire and White House Chief of Staff under George H. W. Bush), Spencer Abraham (senator and U.S. Secretary of Energy under George W. Bush), and Donna Shalala (Secretary of Health and Human Services under Bill Clinton). Lebanese American interests are also well represented through a number of political action committees and lobbying groups, like the American Task Force for Lebanon Policy, the Arab American Leadership PAC (ALCPAC), American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), and others.
Ayman Sokkarie and his son, Tariq, of Lebanon, celebrate after being officially sworn in as American citizens in the Broward County Convention Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, September 20, 2000. (Robert King/Newsmakers)
1446 | Lebanese Immigrants
Select Arab/Lebanese Political, Social, and Cultural Organizations • American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) 1732 Wisconsin Ave. NW Washington DC, 20007 Tel: (202) 244-2990 Fax: (202) 244-7968 http://www.adc.org/ • Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services 2651 Saulino Ct. Dearborn, MI 48120 Tel: (313) 842-7010 Fax: (313) 842-5150 http://www.accesscommunity.org/ • American Lebanese Alliance 8025 Bonhomme Avenue Suite 1403 Clayton, MO 63105 Tel: (314) 727-7494 Fax: (314) 721-8588 http://www.alcoalition.org/ • American Lebanese Coordination Council 19300 W Dixie Hwy # 12–20 Miami FL 33180 Tel: (305) 542-6322 Fax: (305) 402-0364 http://www.alcc-research.com/ • American Lebanese Foundation http://www.alfusa.org/ • American Task Force for Lebanon 1100 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 1250, Washington DC 20036 Tel: (202) 223-9333 Fax: (202) 223-1399 http://www.atfl.org/ • Arab American Institute/ Arab American Leadership PAC (ALCPAC) 1600 K Street, NW Suite 601 Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 429-9210
Issues in Relations between the United States and Lebanon | 1447
Fax: (202) 429-9214 http://www.aaiusa.org/ http://www.aaleadershipcouncil.org/ • Lebanese American Association P.O. Box 4464 Burlingame, CA 94010-4464 Tele: (650) 259-9871 Fax: (650) 259-9874 http://www.laa.org/ • Lebanese American Foundation 12198 Ventura Blvd. Suite 207 Studio City, California 91604 Tel: (818) 980-0003 Fax: (818) 980-0003 http://www.houseoflebanon.com/ • Lebanese Information Center 4900 Leesburg Pike, Suite 203 Alexandria, VA 22302 Tel: (703) 578-4214 Fax: (703) 578-4615 http://www.licus.org/
Return Immigration As many studies have shown, there are social, cultural, economic and political motives for return that are related to the migrants’ original intention. Migrants’ motives for return have included strong family ties in the home country, dissatisfaction with the social status or condition in the receiving country, obligation to relatives, feelings of loyalty or patriotism, perception of better opportunities in the homeland, and nostalgia. In the case of early Lebanese migrants, those who returned typically were successful migrants who saved enough money to return and buy land or to marry. Later migrants returned during periods of economic and political stability. Rates of return are hard to establish, as there are no mechanisms in place to track this reverse flow.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Lebanon Lebanon and the United States have typically had close connections over the century and a half of formal relations. Diplomatic ties with Beirut were established in
1448 | Lebanese Immigrants
1833, when Lebanon was still a part of the Ottoman Empire. These relations have been interrupted twice, first during World War I and later during the Lebanese Civil War. According to the U.S. Department of State (2010), after Ambassador Francis Meloy was assassinated in 1976 and the embassy in Beirut was attacked in 1983, it relocated north of Beirut to the town of Awkar in 1984. It was again attacked in 1984 and finally closed entirely in 1989. Moreover, a 1987 travel ban was imposed on Americans wishing to visit the country, restricting U.S. economic and political involvement in Lebanon. In 1990, following the end of the Civil War, the United States reopened the embassy, but the threats to U.S. citizens caused the government to maintain the travel ban until 1997, when then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright lifted the restrictions. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other U.S. government agencies slowly returned to the country thereafter, assisting with postwar reconstruction . U.S. relations with Lebanon continued to improve in the early 2000 and especially after the withdrawal of Syrian troops. However, there was a serious set-back during the 2006 Hezbollah–Israel War. U.S. support for Israel during the conflict threatened relations with Lebanon. According to Jeremy Pressman of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, “The United States wanted to make sure that Israel had the time to accomplish its military goals” (2006). The United States defines Hezbollah as a terrorist organization that threatens the stability of the region. Pressman continues to explain, “by letting Israel fight for weeks, the United States saw itself as weakening Hezbollah: Israel would weaken Hezbollah militarily, while the Israeli attack would force the Lebanese government to finally take control of southern Lebanon and thereby constrain Hezbollah politically.” The ensuing Israeli air raids and attacks on Lebanon weakened economic growth and empowered Hezbollah politically. It now controls about 10 percent of the seats in the Parliament of Lebanon. Under the Doha Agreement, which ended the deadlocked political process and allowed the formation of the National Unity Government, the Hezbollah-led opposition has veto power over cabinet decisions. The United States has continued to back reconstruction and economic development as part of its policy toward Lebanon. According to USAID, $67.5 million went to aid programs in Lebanon in 2009. Yet, even still, the Department of State warns U.S. citizens against traveling to Lebanon because of security concerns (U.S. Agency for International Development 2010).
Forecasts for the 21st Century Immigration from Lebanon is expected to continue due to a variety of demographic, social, and political causes. Lebanon has a fairly young populace, with a quarter of the population under the age of 15 and, according to the UN, a fertility rate of about 1.85 births per women (see Figure 22). While these are lower replacement
Appendix I: Migration Statistics | 1449
levels, some population momentum is expected to occur, leading to a natural increase in the population. Some population increase is also expected among minority populations, such as Palestinian refugees, who have an estimated fertility rate of 2.3 per woman (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics). Growing populations tax the resources of developing nations, sometimes contributing to un- or underemployment, political unrest, and ethnic tensions. In addition, Lebanon’s political arrangement is fragile at best. Hezbollah has continued to refuse to disarm its militia, which may lead in the future to further conflict with Israel or internally with pro-Western political parties. Most important is the pull of family reunification. We have seen that three-quarters of newly arrived Lebanese immigrants in 2008 gained their status through family ties (see Figure 22).
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 217 Naturalizations and period of U.S. entry Number
Percent
71,685
67.7
Entered 1990 to 2000
9,410
8.9
Entered 1980 to 1989
26,800
25.3
Entered before 1980
35,475
33.5
34,225
32.3
Entered 1990 to 2000
21,470
20.3
Entered 1980 to 1989
9,605
9.1
Entered before 1980
3,155
3.0
Naturalized U.S. citizen
Not a U.S. citizen
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations (STP-159) Table FBP-1. Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics: 2000
Table 218 Immigrant admissions from Lebanon by decade, 1961 to 2000 Decade
Lebanese Immigrants
1961 to 1970
7,500
1971 to 1980
33,800
1981 to 1990
41,634
1991 to 2000
43,440
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2005 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Table 8. Immigrants, by Country of Birth: 1961 to 2005.
Table 219 Immigrant admissions from Lebanon by year, 1990 to 2009
Year
Lebanese Immigrants (Permanent Resident Status)
1990
5,634
1991
6,009
1992
5,838
1993
5,465
1994
4,319
1995
3,884
1996
4,380
1997
3,567
1998
3,283
1999
3,033
2000
3,662
2001
4,579
2002
3,935
2003
2,956
2004
3,818
2005
4,282
2006
4,083
2007
4,267
2008
4,254
2009
3,831
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2005 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Table 8. Immigrants, by Country of Birth: 1961 to 2005 and Office of Immigration Statistics. “2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.” and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Table 3
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Table 220 U.S. places with the highest percentages of people of Lebanese ancestry Community
Percent Lebanese
Dearborn, MI
15.7
Grosse Pointe, MI
6.7
Grosse Pointe Shores, MI
6.6
Dearborn Heights, MI
4.7
Crownsville, MD
4.0
Deal, NJ
3.7
Methuen, MA
3.5
Burritt, IL
3.3
Emmet, IL
3.1
Fairlawn, OH
3.1
Source: Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000
Table 221 Top five states where Lebanese Americans live (2000) Percent of All Lebanese Americans
State Michigan
11
California
9
Ohio
6
Florida
6
Massachusetts
5
Source: Arab American Institute 2006 “Who are Lebanese-Americans?” http://www.aaiusa.org/issues/2549/who-are-lebanese-americans
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1452 | Lebanese Immigrants Table 222 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009: leading states of residence, region/country: Lebanon Total
Male
Female
3,831
1,989
1,842
65
35
30
California (2)
730
357
373
Connecticut
41
22
19
Florida
209
116
93
Georgia
57
30
27
Total Arizona
Illinois
83
44
39
Maryland
45
25
20
Massachusetts (4)
247
127
120
Michigan (1)
829
415
414
Minnesota
37
21
16
Nevada
38
22
16
New Jersey
156
83
73
New York (5)
219
110
109
North Carolina
42
22
20
Ohio
162
95
67
74
40
34
Texas (3)
251
154
97
Virginia
141
65
76
47
23
24
358
183
175
Pennsylvania
Washington Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics According to the U.S. Census Bureau estimates for 2008, there were about 1.6 million individuals who claim Arab ancestry in the United States. However, it is recognized that this figure is inaccurate and well below the actual total. According to the Arab American Institute, the true figure of those who have Arab ancestry is at least 3.5 million. Arab Americans, both foreign-born and their descendents, are a steadily growing population in the United States. Between 1990 and 2000 this population grew by 38 percent (De la Cruz and Brittingham 2003). While temporary visitors from the Middle East dropped in recent years (due to the events of
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics | 1453
9/11 and the ensuing anti-Arabism in the United States), the number of individuals permanently immigrating to the United States from Arabic-speaking countries has remained constant since 2001 (Kayyali 2006). As with other Arab American groups, Lebanese Americans are undercounted. As we have seen, Lebanese immigrants have been settling in the United States since the late 19th century, making them the largest subgroup of Arabic-speaking immigrants in America. Through assimilation and acculturation, many with Lebanese ancestry have become “invisible” to demographers. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, approximately onethird of persons reporting Arab ancestry were Lebanese. Lebanese immigrants, on the other hand, defined as those born in Lebanon and migrating permanently to the United States, totaled 105,910 individuals in 2000 (Census 2000 Special Tabulations STP-159). Since 2000, another 35,836 permanent U.S. residents have come from Lebanon (Office of Immigration Statistics 2009). Age Distribution of Lebanese Immigrants 30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0% Under 5 years
5–9 years
10–14 years
15–19 years
20–24 years
25–34 years
35–44 years
45–54 years
55–59 years
60–64 years
65–74 years
Figure 20 Age distribution of Lebanese. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations STP-159.
75–84 85 years years and over
Educational Attainment among Lebanese Immigrants 25%
19.9%
20%
18.5% 16.7%
16.5% 15% 11.4%
11.0%
10% 6.1% 5%
0% Less than 9th grade
9th to 12th grade, no diploma
High school Some college, graduate no degree (includes equivalency)
Associate degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate or professional degree
Figure 21 Educational attainment among Lebanese immigrants. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations STP-159.
Total Fertility Rate Lebanon 7
Children per Woman
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1950-1955 1955-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005
Figure 22 Fertility rate in Lebanon, children per woman. Source: World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, United Nations Population Division.
Appendix III: Notable Lebanese Americans | 1455
Appendix III: Notable Lebanese Americans Lebanese Americans have made a number of contributions in the areas of politics, academia, and entertainment. Below is a list of just a few well-known personalities of Lebanese ancestry. Spencer Abraham is a former senator from Michigan and U.S. Secretary of Energy under George W. Bush. Paul Anka was a 1960s teen idol. Michael Baroody was a lobbyist and former Deputy Assistant and Director of Public Affairs under Ronald Reagan. Elias Corey was winner of the 1990 Nobel Prize in Chemistry. Shannon Elizabeth is an actress and fashion model. Jamie Farr is a television and film actor best known as Corporal Maxwell Klinger on the show M*A*S*H. Bill Ferris has been chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities. Kahlil Gibran was an artist, poet, and writer. Joseph Marion Haggar was founder of the Haggar Corporation, manufacturers of men’s clothing. Sammy Haggar is a guitarist and former lead vocalist for Van Halen. Kamal Amin “Casey” Kasem is a radio personality and voice actor known as the voice of the American Top 40. Ralph Nader is a political activist, and four-time candidate for president. Jack Nasser is the former president of the Ford Motor Company. Harold Ramis is a comedy actor, director, and writer. Donna Shalala is former Secretary of Health and Human Services under Bill Clinton. John E. Sununu is a former Republican senator from New Hampshire. John H. Sununu is former governor of New Hampshire and White House Chief of Staff under George H. W. Bush. Danny Thomas was a comedian and actor known for his 1950s television series Make Room for Daddy. Marlo Thomas is an actress and social activist known for her role in the series That Girl in the late 1960s. Frank Zappa is a former jazz and rock guitarist and composer. James J. Zogby was founder and president of the Arab American Institute. John Zogby was founder of Zogby International market research and polling institute.
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Glossary Cedar Revolution: The 2005 uprising in Lebanon against the pro-Syrian government after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, which eventually led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Doha Agreement: The 2008 accord made in Doha, Qatar, between Lebanese political parties, which resulted in a viable government after 18 months of political instability. Druze: A minority Arab Islamist religious group found in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. Hezbollah: A political and paramilitary organization formed in Southern Lebanon in 1982 to fight against Israel. Maronites: Members of a large Christian sect from Lebanon affiliated with the Roman Catholic church. Mezze: A meal of small Lebanese dishes. Zaffeh: A traditional Lebanese folk dance typically performed as part of the wedding celebration.
References Arab American Institute. “Facts on Arab American Voters.” [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://aai.3cdn.net/7822e7f9ea4990cbc1_q8m6bxau3.pdf. Arab American Institute. 2008. “Arab American Institute Election Report 2008: Our Voice. Our Future.’ [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://aai.3cdn.net/45b90235c5510f78 08_7nm6bi6px.pdf. Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services. 2007. “A Brief History.” [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://www.accesscommunity.org/site/PageServer? pagename=ACCESS_History2. Brittingham, Angela, and G. Patricia De la Cruz. 2005. “We the People of Arab Ancestry in the United States.” Census 2000 Special Reports. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2009. “Lebanon.” The World Fact Book. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/le.html. Clinton Global Initiative University. 2009. “Empowerment through Integration.” [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://cgiu.clintonglobalinitiative.org/Page.aspx?pid=3634. Corday, Arlie. 2009. “Wellesley Senior Mona Minkara Finds No Limits to Her Future” [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://www.wellesley.edu/PublicAffairs/ Releases/2009/060209.htmlDe la Cruz, G. Patricia, and Angela Brittingham. 2003. “The Arab Population: 2000.” Census 2000 Brief. U.S. Census Bureau. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-23.pdf.
Further Reading | 1457 Dekmak, Hussein, and Martin Brigdale. 2008. The Lebanese Cookbook. New York: Hippocrene Books. Jaber, Linda., Morton Brown, Adnan Hammad, Sandra Nowak, Qian Zhu, Anisa Ghafoor, and William Herman. 2003. “Epidemiology of Diabetes among Arab Americans.” Diabetes Care 26: 308–13. Kayyali, Randa. 2006. “The People Perceived as a Threat to Security: Arab Americans Since September 11.” Migration Policy Institute. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=409. Naff, Alixa. 1993. Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Nagel, Caroline R., and Lynn A. Staeheli. 2004. “Citizenship, Identity and Transnational Migration: Arab Immigrants to the United States.” Space and Polity 8 (1): 3–23. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2009. 2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ ois_yb_2008.pdf. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Statistical Atlas of Palestine [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://atlas.pcbs.gov.ps/atlas/Default.asp. Pressman, Jeremy. 2006. “The United States and the Israel-Hezbollah War.” Middle East Brief No. 13. Waltham, MA: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University. Read, Jen’nan Ghazal. 2003. “The Sources of Gender Role Attitudes among Christian and Muslim Arab-American Women.” Sociology of Religion 64: 207–22. Sills, Stephen, Linda Jaber, and Nicole Pinelli. 2008. “Knowledge and Perception of Diabetes Risk Among Arab-Americans” 5th National Conference on Health Issues in the Arab American Community. Dearborn, Michigan. United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2010. USAID: Lebanon. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://www.usaid.gov/lb/. United States Census Bureau. 2007. “Table B04003 Total Ancestry Categories Tallied for People with One or More Ancestry Categories Reported.” 2007 American Community Survey. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ DTSubjectShowTablesServlet?_lang=en&_ts=266959055207. United States Census Bureau. Census 2000 Special Tabulations STP-159 [Online table; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-africa. pdf. United States Department of State, Embassy of the United States, Beirut Lebanon. 2010. About The Embassy. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/10.] http://lebanon.usembassy.gov/ about_the_embassy.html.
Further Reading Abinader, Elmaz. 1997. Children of the Roojme: A Family’s Journey from Lebanon. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
1458 | Lebanese Immigrants Naff, Alixa. 1993. Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Orfalea, Gregory. 2006. The Arab Americans: A History. Northhampton, MA: Olive Branch Press. Walbridge, Linda S. 1996. Without Forgetting the Imam: Lebanese Shi’ism in an American Community. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
Liberian Immigrants by Hana Brown
Introduction Liberian immigration to the United States is a relatively new phenomenon. During the 19th century, migration patterns flowed in the opposite direction between the two countries, as freed slaves in the United States settled in Liberia. Until the late 1980s, only small numbers of Liberians immigrated to the United States. However, with the onset of a bloody civil war in Liberia in 1989, immigration increased dramatically. By the early 21st century, Liberia had become the second-largest refugee-sending country in the United States. Because Liberian Americans are a small and recent population, little is known about their general assimilation patterns and their opportunities for mobility. On the whole, the individuals who arrived in the United States with significant human capital have been able to do quite well economically. They have established Liberian community associations throughout the country and are engaged politically and socially in their new communities. On the other hand, those individuals arriving with legal refugee status have come from rural areas, are largely illiterate, and have few marketable skills. This makes upward mobility a challenge. A final group of Liberian Americans is composed of thousands of individuals who have only temporary legal status in the United States. Since 2006, their temporary protection has been in jeopardy, and they face an ongoing risk of being deported back to Liberia now that the political situation in the country has stabilized. As the 21st century progresses, the immigration relationship between the United States and Liberia will be largely determined by the ability of the new Liberian government to establish peace and prosperity in the country.
Chronology 1820
Freed slaves from the United States (Americo-Liberians) settle in Liberia.
1847
Liberian independence.
1980
End of Americo-Liberian rule in Liberia. Samuel Doe assumes power.
1989 Civil war begins in Liberia. Liberian immigration to the United States begins to rise dramatically. 1459
Background | 1461
1991
United States grants Temporary Protected Status to Liberians residing in the United States without documentation or temporarily.
1992
United States begins formally resettling Liberian refugees.
2002
Liberians become the second-largest refugee-sending country in the United States.
2003
Civil war ends in Liberia but the country remains unstable and underdeveloped. Refugees remain in camps and urban areas throughout West Africa.
2004
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees announces a rapid relocation program for Liberian refugees in West Africa. Over 7,000 Liberian refugees are resettled in the United States.
2005
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is elected president of Liberia.
2006
Temporary Protected Status expires for Liberian immigrants in the United States.
2007
President George W. Bush grants Deferred Enforced Departure status to temporary and undocumented Liberians in the United States, equivalent to an 18-month stay of deportation.
2009 Deferred Enforced Departure expired. President Barack Obama extended Temporary Protected Status to Liberians for 12 months.
Background Geography of Liberia Liberia is a county of approximately 3.5 million people, situated on the coast of West Africa. With a landmass of 43,000 square miles, Liberia is slightly larger than the state of Ohio. It borders the countries of Cote D’Ivoire to the east, Guinea to the north, and Sierra Leone to the northwest. The southern edge of Liberia borders the Atlantic Ocean. Monrovia, the country’s capital and largest city, is home to over one million inhabitants. Other major towns include Ganta, Buchanan, Gbarnga, Kakata, and Voinjama, each of which has a population between 25,000 and 45,000 (Bureau of African Affairs 2009). Liberia is home to three major habitats or ecosystems. The coastal areas are characterized by mangrove swamps and beaches. The area just inland from the coast is home to wooded hills and shrubs. The interior of the country is characterized by dense tropical forests. In total, the country is home to 40 percent of West Africa’s rain forests. The climate in Liberia is hot and humid, with heavy rains in the summers and drier winters. The country’s primary natural resources are iron ore, timber, rubber, diamonds, and gold. Agriculture is the country’s main industry, with
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major food crops including rice, coffee, palm oil, cassava, and cocoa (Bureau of African Affairs 2009). Although Liberia’s official language is English, 16 different indigenous languages are also spoken in the country. The largest tribes in the country are Kpelle, Bassa, Gio, and Kru. Descendants of immigrants from former slaves in the United States, called Americo-Liberians, make up five percent of the population. The life expectancy at birth is 42.5 years. The literacy rate is about 20 percent. About 40 percent of the population practice Christianity. Another 40 percent practice traditional African religions while 10 percent are Muslim. The literacy rate is 20 percent (Bureau of African Affairs 2009).
History of Liberia According to modern-day anthropologists, people began to settle in what is now Liberia as early as 3000 B.C.E. The rich soil on the coast provided ample opportunity for small-scale agriculture, and wildlife in the rainforests offered a significant source of game. Over time, these people dispersed throughout West and North Africa, with the descendants of modern Liberians arriving between the 11th and 17th centuries from North Africa. Like their predecessors, they were attracted to the area by farm land, having been pushed off their own lands by the expanding Sahara Desert. Additionally, when Ghana was invaded in the 11th century by a Muslim sect, the Almoravids, thousands of people fled into neighboring areas, including what is now Liberia. By this time, over 12 different ethnic groups had settled in Liberia, each eventually forming its own tribal territory, characterized by its own language and customs (Bureau of African Affairs 2009; Wells 2008). The first European explorers to make contact with Liberia were from Portugal. The Portuguese first arrived in the country in 1461 and established trade routes between Europe and Liberia. By 1663, the British had arrived in the country as well and established trading posts along the coast. The Dutch destroyed these settlements in short time, and the next wave of European settlers did not arrive in Liberia until freed slaves came in the early 1800s. The modern Liberian nation-state was founded in 1820 by freed African American slaves from the United States. In fact, the name “Liberia” means “land of the free” in Latin and was given to the country by these freed slaves. The first group of freed slaves to arrive in Liberia was only 86 immigrants. These individuals, called Americo-Liberians, established a settlement in what is now Monrovia, named after U.S. President James Monroe. Over the following years, thousands of freed slaves arrived in Liberia, and in 1847 these individuals created a declaration of independence for the Republic of Liberia. The flow of immigrants was sponsored by the American Colonization Society (ACS), an organization of white clergymen, abolitionists, and slave owners. From
Background | 1463
1821 to 1867, the ACS resettled over 10,000 African Americans and several thousand Africans from intercepted slave ships. The ACS also governed the Commonwealth of Liberia until independence in 1847. When the U.S. Civil War ended, culminating in the emancipation of the U.S. slave population, immigration to Liberia came to a halt. In Liberia itself, AmericoLiberians only made up one percent of the country’s total population but had a disproportionate share of the country’s political and economic power. For example, Joseph Jenkins Roberts, Liberia’s first president, was born and raised in the United States. Americo-Liberians modeled the Liberian government after that of the United States, but until 1904 they excluded indigenous Africans from citizenship rights. As a result, they faced strong and often violent opposition from local communities (Bureau of African Affairs 2009). From its early years through to 1980, Liberia was a one-party state, ruled by the True Whig Party (TWP). Over time, rights expanded to the native tribes in the country. In 1930, President Charles King resigned when the League of Nations found him to be trading native groups as slaves. In 1944, upon the election of President William Tubman, the native groups were allowed greater political participation and were granted the right to vote for the first time. The presidency of Tubman also brought sustained economic growth to the country, including the development of a major port (with the aid of the United States under President Franklin D. Roosevelt) and a road system. Ties with the United States remained strong, as Liberia sided with the United States during World War II (Bureau of African Affairs 2009). After serving six terms in office, Tubman died in 1971 and was succeeded by Vice President W. R. Tolbert. Opposition to Tolbert, bolstered by anti-Tolbert Liberian students in the United States, peaked in 1979 when economic instability led to riots and civil strife. Tolbert’s assassination in 1980 fueled the downfall of the True Whig Party and ended 133 years of Americo-Liberian rule in Liberia. Tolbert was replaced in a violent coup by then Army Master Sergeant Samuel Doe and the People’s Redemption Council (Bureau of African Affairs 2009). Doe’s regime, dominated by his own Krahn ethnic group, quickly and forcibly acquired leadership of the country’s political and military institutions. The ethnically divisive regime heightened tensions around the country between the Krahn and other groups. Sparked by the Doe dictatorship and widespread corruption and human rights abuses by Doe’s regime, a civil war broke out in 1989. In 1990, Doe was assassinated, and Charles Taylor, leader of a prominent rebel group, took control of the Liberian government and proclaimed himself president. Civil unrest continued in the country (Bureau of African Affairs 2009). Despite the horrors of the Doe regime, the U.S. government had maintained close ties with the Liberian government during the 1980s. However, under Charles Taylor, the United States sent a unit of 2,500 Marines to Liberia to evacuate American citizens from the country. After the evacuation the civil war continued between
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Taylor’s supporters, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, and rebel forces. Attempts at a peace agreement failed. From 1989 to 1996, the civil war in Liberia became one of the bloodiest in the world. According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, the civil war during this time period forced nearly one-third of the population to flee to neighboring countries. The war continued until 1997 when, amid charges of election fraud and voter intimidation, Liberians elected Charles Taylor to head the country’s government (Bureau of African Affairs 2009). Under Taylor, economic and social development stalled. Illiteracy and unemployment rates stood at around 75 percent, and few foreign countries were willing to invest in Liberia due to the prolonged instability. Most communities around the country had no running water or electricity. By 2003, the economic situation was so dire that armed groups composed of former Taylor opposition members began to challenge Taylor’s rule once again. In 2003, the government of Sierra Leone indicted Charles Taylor for his role in perpetrating the civil war and human rights abuses in that country over the last six years. Later in 2003, a peace agreement between Taylor’s government and rebel forces collapsed, and fighting resumed in downtown Monrovia and throughout the country in August 2003, leading to what the U.S. Department of State called “a massive humanitarian disaster” (Bureau of African Affairs 2009).
Liberian president Charles Taylor waves at the Roberts International Airport east of the Liberian capital Monrovia, July 6, 2003. Taylor had just accepted an offer of asylum in Nigeria but gave no timeframe for leaving power. (AP Photo/Ben Curtis)
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1465
Facing immense international pressure, Taylor resigned from office in late 1993 and went into exile in Nigeria. A United Nations peace-keeping mission entered the country, and a newly signed peace agreement created a two-year transitional government. In late 2005, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected president of Liberia, defeating her opponent, soccer star George Weah, to become the first democratically elected female president in Africa. She remains in office to this day. Politically, Liberia has remained relatively stable since the election, but a long road of economic recovery stands before the country. President Johnson-Sirleaf has focused heavily on promoting foreign investment in the country, on creating jobs, and on restoring basic services to Liberian communities.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration Because Liberia was settled by former slaves from the United States, early immigration between the two countries was from the United States to Liberia, not vice versa. In the first half of the 20th century, only several hundred Liberians immigrated to the United States, an extremely small number compared to those that arrived from Europe, Asia, and Latin America. From 1925 to 1949 only 85 Liberians immigrated to the United States, according to statistics from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In the 1950s, Liberian admissions rose to 232 and then to 569 in the 1960s (Victor n.d.). Since the early waves of immigration from Liberia to the United States were quite small, little is known about the early assimilation process for these individuals. Later waves of immigrants from Liberia, like other immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, have had a challenging time adapting to the U.S. racial hierarchy. Many of these early immigrants, however, were successful in establishing themselves economically in their new country, starting businesses and achieving some upward mobility. The assimilation process has been more challenging for the more recent waves of less economically advantaged immigrants from Liberia (Arthur 2000).
Later Waves of Immigration As previously noted, there was very little immigration from the Liberia to the United States before 1965. Given the difficulty of reaching the United States from Liberia and the poverty of most Liberians, the Immigration Act of 1965 had little influence on Liberian immigration to the United States. Slowly, entry numbers continued to rise through the 1970s and 1980s (Victor n.d.). Again, given the small number of Liberian residents in the United States, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 also had a limited impact on Liberian Americans.
1466 | Liberian Immigrants
It was not until the 1990s that the United States witnessed a massive increase in Liberian immigration. The drastic increase in immigration from Liberia to the United States since the 1980s can be attributed to political instability in Liberia. From 1989 to 2003, the civil war in Liberia displaced nearly one-third of the country’s population, forcing over 400,000 people into neighboring countries. Until 1989, less than 1,000 Liberians left their homeland for the United States each year. But in 1989, the number jumped to 1,175 and increased to 2,004 in 1990. From 1990 through 1997, the INS reported 13,458 Liberian arrivals in the United States. From 1998 to 2003 another 12,654 Liberian immigrants entered the country (Victor n.d.). These figures represent only those individuals who arrived in the United States with permanent nonrefugee legal status. The thousands of individuals mentioned previously are joined in the United States by tens of thousands who hold two other types of formal legal documentation: refugee status and temporary protected status. The United States first began resettling Liberian refugees in 1992 through the U.S. Refugee Program. With continued political instability in Liberia, these refugee admissions numbers began to increase in 1998. Beginning in 2002, Liberians rose to the top of refugee admissions lists in the United States. In 2004, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced a rapid relocation program, which would resettle 7,000 of these refugees in the United States and send thousands more to Canada and Europe (Coulibaly 2004). The first wave of these individuals arrived in the United States in May of 2004, with additional groups arriving over the next two years. Overall, from 1997 to 2006, over 27,000 Liberian refugees were resettled in the United States (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008). As with all refugee resettlement endeavors, the Department of Homeland Security assigned each refugee to a Voluntary Agency (VOLAG), which then resettled the refugees throughout the United States. In addition to the refugees arriving since 1989, other Liberian immigrants arrived in the United States during this period seeking temporary protection from the civil war. In 1991 alone, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) granted temporary protective status (TPS) to approximately 9,000 Liberians in the United States, which allowed all Liberian citizens, whether in the United States legally or not, to remain in the country, because conditions in Liberia were too dire for them to safely return home. Many of the individuals who applied for TPS were people who arrived in the United States on temporary visas but overstayed when the conflict intensified back in Liberia (Brulliard 2007; Irwin 2006; Sieh 2009). The INS revoked TPS in 1997 following national elections in Liberia. However, many Liberian Americans with TPS resisted returning to Liberia. Shortly thereafter, renewed unrest and civil war in Liberia led to the extension of TPS for Liberians once again (Brulliard 2007; Irwin 2006; Sieh 2009). By the 2005 Liberian elections, the retraction of TPS returned as a viable possibility. In late 2006, the Department of Homeland Security announced that only legal residents from Liberia would be allowed to stay in the United States, and all
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1467
others would need to leave the country by October 1, 2007. Federal officials indicated that 3,600 individuals would be affected by the decision, but activists contended that the actual numbers were substantially higher (Irwin 2006). The pending expiration of TPS generated widespread panic in Liberian American communities across the country. Employers in some areas began firing Liberian employees, noting their work permit expiration dates (Brulliard 2007; Irwin 2006; Sieh 2009). While some U.S. government officials claimed that the country was now safe for return, many Liberians in the United States doubted the claims. Many individuals with TPS proclaimed their intention to remain in the United States illegally rather than return to Liberia. Liberian government officials themselves implored the U.S. government to extend TPS. With high unemployment rates, few job prospects, and dismal living conditions, these Liberian leaders, including President JohnsonSirleaf, believed the country was not yet ready to accept a new wave of returnees from the U.S. Minnesota Senator Norm Coleman, along with other politicians from states with large Liberian populations, expressed his support for the extension of Temporary Protected Status. Coleman stated, “With Liberia still struggling to rebuild and stabilize following years of civil strife, the country is simply not ready to absorb these people yet” (MPR News 2007).
YMCA International Services cultural orientation instructor Jean-Francois Mukendi leads Liberian refugees Abraham Daramay (center); his brother, N’Vabury; and members of their family through a kosher market in Houston, March 3, 2007. The Daramay family immigrated from Liberia on February 7, 2007, and were participating in the YMCA program to ease the transition to living in the United Sates. (AP Photo/Dave Einsel)
1468 | Liberian Immigrants
At the last minute, on September 13, 2007, President George W. Bush delayed the termination of TPS for Liberians by 18 months by granting these individuals deferred enforced departure (DED) status, equivalent to a stay of deportation. Justifying the decision, President Bush said, “Although the armed conflict in Liberia ended in 2003, and conditions have improved, I have found that the political and economic situation in Liberia continues to be fragile” (MPR News 2007). When DED expired for Liberians in March of 2009, President Barack Obama extended TPS to Liberians once again. TPS was set to expire in March of 2010, but President Obama extended DED for Liberians to September 30, 2011.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community Census figures provide the best estimates of the Liberian population in the United States; however, due to the relatively small number of Liberians in the country and the open-ended census questions about country of origin, even these figures do not provide a full or detailed view of the Liberian population in the United States. As of 2005, there were approximately 61,000 Liberian-born blacks in the United States, according to the American Community Survey, but Liberian community organizations place the full estimates of Liberian-born immigrants in the United States at between 250,000 and 500,000 (Wells 2008). Like most African immigrants, Liberian immigrants tend to settle on the East Coast of the United States, with large communities in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, Georgia, Rhode Island, and Washington, D.C. The resettlement of Liberian refugees, however, has expanded the geographic settlement of Liberians across the United States, because individuals with legal refugee status are resettled through local Voluntary Agencies (VOLAGs). The location of these different VOLAGs may or may not map onto traditional immigrant destinations. In 2004, the peak year for Liberian refugee admissions, the top resettlement states were Arizona, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. However, all but seven states resettled at least a handful of Liberian refugees during that year (Wells 2008; Brown 2011).
Age and Family Structure The most recent wave of Liberian immigrants to the United States has been composed of families whose kinship networks and nuclear families have been shattered by the ongoing civil war in Liberia. Although official estimates are not available, many of the newly arriving refugees are families consisting of single mothers with
Demographic Profile | 1469
children or grandparent-headed families. These family formations reflect the effects of the civil war, which killed many young men in the country, leaving women to raise children alone or, in some cases, leaving grandparents to raise their grandchildren when both parents perished in the war. From 2003 to 2005, the United States also initiated a special resettlement program for “double-flight female heads of household,” that is, for female-headed households who fled persecution two or more times (Schmidt 2009).
Educational Attainment While the earlier and much smaller waves of Liberian immigration to the United States may have been characterized by higher-skilled and higher-educated immigrants, the latest wave of refugees from Liberia arrived with low levels of human capital. Most of the recent arrivals lived in extremely rural conditions in Liberia. Most are illiterate and have no formal schooling, and many spent up to a decade in refugee camps in West Africa before coming to the United States. For adults arriving in the United States, this lack of formal education presents a challenge in terms of employment and makes it difficult for parents to negotiate the U.S. public school system on their children’s behalf. Adults are often unaware of the need to be involved in children’s schooling and/or unable to provide routine support such as helping with homework (Schmidt 2009). For the children, those who arrived in the United States having never attended school faced challenges adjusting to age-specific grade placements in the United States These children are unfamiliar with American school norms. Furthermore, having grown up in a society that relies on oral tradition, these children are often more comfortable memorizing than problem solving or asking questions (Schmidt 2009).
Economic Attainment; Occupation and Income Patterns Those Liberian Americans with appropriate skills have sought employment in a variety of fields, including health care, service, and hospitality. Some, particularly those who arrived through channels other than refugee resettlement, have opened their own businesses and achieved economic success. Employment opportunities and niches often depend on where the immigrants live. For example, Liberian Americans in agricultural areas like the Central Valley of California tend to find agricultural jobs. In the San Francisco Bay area and in North Carolina, Liberian women lean toward the health care professions and work in hair braiding salons. Many males along the east coast have become security guards (Brown 2011; Wells 2008). Employment patterns depend in part on preexisting employment networks within the Liberian community, but also upon the job placement services provided by refugee resettlement agencies. Newer immigrants tend to start with low-paying jobs,
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such as kitchen workers, janitors, hair braiders, or health care workers, due to their high rates of illiteracy and low skill levels (Wells 2008). One economic tradition that many Liberian Americans have carried with them to the United States is sousou, where women in particular will contribute money to a communal pot for a given period of time and then turn the money over to one of the contributors. In the Bay Area in California this tradition is particularly common among women who work in hair braiding salons (Brown 2011).
Health Statistics and Issues While there are no health issues specific to Liberians in the United States, many newly arriving refugees come with a battery of health problems, resulting from poor health care access in Liberia and the trauma of war and refugee flight. Among the most prominent health concerns for Liberian Americans are: high blood lead levels among children (usually due to malnourishment and/or poor housing conditions), high rates of anxiety, mental health disorders, and posttraumatic stress (due to abuses suffered during the civil war and the breakdown of traditional social roles) (Schmidt 2009).
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Because Americo-Liberians played a significant role in the social and political development of Liberia as a nation-state, many Liberian Americans share customs and traditions with native-born Americans. For example, birthdays, weddings, and funerals are celebrated in ways that are very similar to Americans in general and African Americans in particular (Wells 2008). The birth of a child and subsequent birthday celebrations involve birthday cakes, parties, festive decorations, and gifts. As with most Liberian celebrations, music and dance are usually involved. Although birthdays are often celebrated in this manner, many of the new refugee arrivals from Liberia do not know their exact birthdays. This is particularly true of individuals from rural areas where literacy rates are extremely low. These individuals are often assigned a birthday upon receiving papers to immigrate to the United States. The assigned birthday is usually January 1 (Wells 2008; Schmidt 2009). Traditionally, weddings in Liberia involve a verbal contract between the groom and the bride’s family and a dowry exchange. The dowry is usually some combination of money, animals, and household goods. The wedding is characterized by food, singing, dancing, and drumming. In the United States, however, Liberian
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1471
Americans meld Liberian traditions with American traditions. Weddings frequently occur in churches and follow traditional church doctrine, and dowries are rarely exchanged. As with traditional Liberian weddings, the ceremony is followed by dancing, food, singing, and music (Wells 2008). A Liberian funeral is characterized by a show of grief and sorrow. In Liberia, mourners both grieve the loss of the deceased and celebrate the individual’s entry into a better afterlife. The formal funeral is preceded by a wake held in the family home. For many Liberian Americans, the death of a loved one back in West Africa is a challenging and tumultuous time. Given distance, cost, and immigration concerns, many cannot return to Liberia for wakes and funerals. Mourners in the United States may often sequester themselves inside for a brief period to mourn and will send large sums of money back to Liberia to cover funeral expenses for the deceased (Wells 2008).
Families and Changing Gender Relations Traditionally in Liberia, extended families are of key importance to family and community life. Elders are particularly respected, and children are chided for not showing proper respect and esteem for their elders. Because elders are held in such high regard, family members will often turn to them when important decisions must be made (Wells 2008). The lack of respect for elders among Americans is often appalling to Liberian Americans, who will lament that American children challenge or disrespect not only family elders but teachers and other adults. As in Liberia, Liberian Americans will often turn to family and community elders to make important decisions about dealing with immigration officials, moving, starting businesses, and so on (Wells 2008). Due to the ongoing civil war, the traditional Liberian family structure has been significantly disrupted over the last 20 years. Many Liberian Americans fled their homelands, having lost extended family members in the conflict. As a result, elders in the Liberian American community will often play the role of family elder for those families for whom grandparents may have passed away or been left behind in Liberia (Schmidt 2009). Similarly, due to both the civil war in Liberia and economic necessity in the United States, gender roles are very different for Liberians in the United States than they were in Liberia. In Liberia, women tend to assume responsibility for childrearing and for small-scale farming. In the United States, Liberian women with more education (usually those who arrived in the 1980s and 1990s before the major refugee flows) have jobs and are very involved in community organizations. For Liberian refugee women, many of these individuals also work, but usually in low-skill jobs. Many also receive public assistance. As previously mentioned,
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many of these women lost their husbands in the civil war and must then become the main breadwinners or caretakers for their families. For many women, this new role is overwhelming and challenging. New arrivals frequently lament the fact that they have no husbands or men in their lives to help them adjust and survive in their new country (Brown 2011).
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Liberian Americans, like many immigrants, maintain close ties with their country of origin. They do so via the maintenance of specific cultural and religious practices, as well as through ongoing contact with their country of origin. International phone cards make it possible for Liberian Americans to call home and stay in touch with extended family and friends. International monetary transfers are often common. Liberian Americans, particularly new arrivals, will save money to transfer back to family in Liberia as remittances. Even those Liberian Americans who rely on welfare or disability benefits will save part of their meager income to send home. In addition to sending cash, Liberian Americans will also send clothes, computers, and other items back home when their financial situation allows. However, connections with the home country involve more than material exchanges. For example, Liberian Americans remain attuned to politics in Liberia, particularly as the country rebuilds under President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Liberian Americans closely followed the election between Johnson-Sirleaf and her opponent, George Weah, in 2005 (Brown 2011).
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background, and Religion Throughout the United States, Liberian communities have formed social and political organizations that sponsor community events and engage in political advocacy. Such organizations exist in North Carolina, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Michigan, California, and other areas of the country. While some of the groups engage primarily in political activism, others sponsor monthly meetings to discuss issues facing the community and hold community events to celebrate Liberian holidays or traditions. Some, such as Liberia First in North Carolina, hold activities and events to introduce Liberian American youth to the history and culture of their country of origin. These groups tend to be founded by more educated Liberian Americans rather than by the low-income individuals who arrived as refugees since the renewal of the civil war. These community associations are complemented by the Liberian Studies Association, a scholarly organization of academics who do research on Liberia, and by Liberian History, Education, and Development, Inc. (LIHEDE), which aims to educate Americans about the history of Liberia and to promote social and economic development in Liberia (Wells 2008).
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Liberian immigrant and home health aide Theresa Gildersleve prepares an afterschool meal for children at the Liberian Cultural Center on Staten Island, New York, October 11, 2005. As Gildersleve stirred her pot, Liberians in the war-ravaged country cast their ballots for the country’s first postwar president. Gildersleve mused, “I’m here but I’m there.” Staten Island’s Liberian community is so well established that at least six of the leading candidates made the borough a stop on the campaign trail. (AP Photo/Kathy Willens)
About 40 percent of people in Liberia practice traditional African religious beliefs. Approximately 20 percent are Muslims and 40 percent Christian (Bureau of African Affairs 2009). Most Liberian Americans, however, practice Christianity, while a minority practice Islam. As the number of Liberians in the United States has increased, Liberian Americans have formed their own churches and religious communities around the country. Dallas, Texas, Trenton, New Jersey, Atlanta, Georgia, Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, are among the cities in the United States that have Liberian churches. In some areas, Liberian Americans attended churches that serve a broader West African population. The Web site http://www.allliberianchurches.org maintains a list of Liberian churches around the world, including in the United States (Wells 2008).
Language Issues and Media Most Liberian Americans speak multiple languages, including Liberian English and various tribal languages. French is commonly spoken by those refugees who fled to and resided in Cote d’Ivoire before coming to the United States. While similar to American English, Liberian English has a distinct vocabulary and accent. For example, many Liberians will greet each other not by asking “How are you?” but rather by asking “How’s the body?” In addition to different vocabularies, Liberian
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English often leaves off the ends of many words (e.g., “haw” instead of “house”) and adds “-o” to others (e.g., “We going-o.”) Those Liberian Americans who attended school in Liberia prior to entering the United States had a background in American English before immigrating, since schooling in Liberia was conducted in American English. However, for those individuals who did not attend formal schooling before arriving in the United States, adjusting to American English takes some time. Among tribal languages spoken by Liberian Americans, Kru and Kranh are common (Wells 2008; Schmidt 2009). Unlike larger immigrant groups in the United States, Liberian Americans do not have an extensive network of news or other press available in their local languages or dedicated to issues in Liberia. Some Web sites exist to provide news specifically related to Liberia, including The Liberian Journal (http://www.theliberianjournal. com), The Liberian Dialogue (http://www.theliberiandialogue.org), The Perspective (http://www.theperspective.org/), The Liberian Connection (http://www.liberi an-connection.com/), The Liberian Observer (http://www.liberianobserver.com/), and AllAfrica (http://www.allafrica.com). Most Liberian Americans receive news from home through these Internet sites, if they have access, or by word of mouth from other community members and from family and friends in West Africa (Wells 2008). The Liberian Studies Journal is an academic journal that publishes scholarly articles about Liberian politics, history, and development.
Celebration of National Holidays and Foodways Again, due to historical ties with the United States and the political and social dominance of Americo-Liberians in Liberia, Liberians celebrate many of the same holidays as Americans. These holidays include Christmas, Easter, and New Year’s Day. Christmas Day is characterized by attending church ceremonies and the eating of a large meal. Although the exchange of Christmas presents is not common in Liberia, the practice is increasing in popularity among Liberian Americans. Liberians also celebrate National Independence Day on July 26 every year. Community members gather together for food, music, and dance. Additional holidays include J. J. Roberts Day and President Tubman Day. Thanksgiving is also a national holiday in Liberia (Wells 2008). In Liberia, rice and cassava are staples of any diet. Rice is eaten at nearly every meal. Cassava is frequently fermented, ground up, and then boiled until it thickens to make fufu. These starches (rice and fufu) are usually served with soups, fish, greens, and other vegetables. Chili peppers are frequently used in cooking, and many Liberian dishes are very spicy. Fufu is made from granulated cassava that is fermented, and then the liquid is boiled until it thickens. It is served with soup. Palm oil is also commonly used in cooking In the United States, Liberian Americans mix traditional Liberian cooking with American staples. In large cities, African food stores give Liberian immigrants the
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1475
opportunity to purchase large bags of fufu flour, large quantities of palm oil, and other staples for traditional cooking. These stores usually serve not just Liberian Americans but the larger African immigrant community in the area (Wells 2008).
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Music and songs are a central part of Liberian culture and traditions. Celebrations and daily life alike are marked by the presence of music, particularly drumming. In the United States, Liberian Americans continue to listen to West African music and to play and sing these songs during traditions and celebrations. Over the last couple of decades, music from around sub-Saharan Africa has spread increasingly across national borders. Many Liberians both in Liberia and in the United States listen to musical artists from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa, and other countries outside of Liberia. This music is widely available in many African stores in the United States (Wells 2008). Just as West African music is popular among Liberian Americans, so too are West African television shows. In particular, Nigerian television shows and soap operas are widely viewed among Liberian immigrants and are available for rent at a number of African stores in the United States.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Naturalization rates are rather low for Liberians in comparison to other groups in the United States, due to the recent nature of Liberian immigration to the United States, the poor literacy skills of many newly arriving refugees, and the temporary status held by many new immigrants. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2008), from 1999 to 2008, over 13,000 Liberian immigrants obtained U.S. citizenship. In 2007, the bulk of individuals naturalized lived in Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Most were between 25 and 44 years of age. By and large, most Liberians in the United States have not yet been in the country long enough to apply for American citizenship. Those with Temporary Protected Status (TPS) or Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) are ineligible for citizenship unless they marry U.S. citizens or first obtain other permanent documentation status. The main concern for individuals with TPS or DED is not citizenship, but rather the looming possibility of deportation. Since 1999, the U.S. Senate has considered legislation that would grant permanent residency status to Liberians with TPS, but the legislation has never passed (Brulliard 2007; Irwin 2006; Sieh 2009).
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For those who arrived as refugees under the UNHCR resettlement program in the mid-2000s, citizenship is not yet an option. Although guaranteed permanent residency via their refugee status, many of these individuals waited years to receive their green cards, in part because of a freeze on green cards for Liberians issued in the late 2000s. Furthermore, for many of these refugees, their illiteracy poses a challenge for the pursuit of citizenship. Many do not have the educational background to take or even read the test required for citizenship (Brown 2011).
Dual Citizenship Little data exist as to the frequency with which Liberian Americans hold dual citizenship. Formal Liberian citizenship is also very difficult for many refugees to demonstrate, as they do not have Liberian passports or birth certificates. The Liberian Embassy in Washington, D.C., has set up procedures to help Liberian American war victims obtain Liberian passports. In the absence of a birth certificate, individuals may present a court affidavit attesting to Liberian citizenship. Individuals may also receive a laissez-passer for travel to Liberia. To demonstrate Liberian citizenship and receive a laissez-passer, individuals must show three notarized letters from Liberian citizens testifying to the citizenship claim of the applicant. The authors of these notarized letters must also present photocopies of their own Liberian passports. These barriers are often challenging to overcome, as family and friends back home may not have Liberian passports themselves.
Intergroup Relations Although recent arrivals, Liberian Americans have established many ties with other West African immigrants in the United States. Many West African churches have arisen around the country, bringing together communities from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, and other West African countries. A number of social and cultural organizations also serve a broader African or West African clientele. Some civil rights groups in the United States have also reached out to Liberian Americans and have engaged in lobbying for permanent residency for Liberians with Temporary Protected Status in the United States. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Rainbow Coalition have endeavored to include Liberian Americans in their activities (Wells 2008). On the whole, Liberian Americans frequently cite their historical ties to African Americans when discussing their relationships with other groups in the United States. Saymendy Lloyd, a Liberian American activist, echoed the sentiments of many Liberian Americans when he said, “We consider ourselves the sister of America” (Brulliard 2007). However, relations between Liberian Americans and nativeborn African Americans are not always friendly. Like many West Indian and
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African immigrants, Liberian Americans understand the social stigma attached to being black in the United States and make efforts to distinguish themselves culturally from native-born blacks. In some areas, such as Staten Island, New York, Liberian American youth have joined a West African gang, the All Black Mob Crew, and engage in turf wars and rivalries with local African American gangs. Refugee children in predominantly black neighborhoods in Philadelphia have also faced significant discrimination and physical abuse from classmates, which spurred the rise of Liberian American gang-like groups, Liberians in Blood (LIB) and 215, in West Philadelphia. Local Liberian American community leaders have established antiviolence efforts as a result (Ludden 2008).
Forging a New American Political Identity Little data exist on Liberian political and civic participation in the United States. As a result, it is unclear how frequently Liberians with American citizenship vote in elections, and unclear the rates at which Liberian Americans more generally participate in political activism or civic groups. Generally speaking, individuals with as little education as the most recent Liberian refugee arrivals have tend to participate rarely if at all in politics. It is likely that the most politically active of all Liberian Americans are those with more education and higher incomes who have been in the United States for more than just a few years. Despite their common national origins, these individuals do not necessarily share the same political persuasion. Liberian Americans are divided between several political parties in Liberia, including the ruling National Patriotic Party, and the opposition Liberian National Union, National Democratic Party, and the United People’s Party. All of these parties have organizations in the United States (Wells 2008).
Political Associations and Organizations While official data on Liberian civic and political participation is unavailable, there is a large network of Liberian American social and political organizations across the United States. Some of these organizations include: the Liberian Immigration Solidarity Committee in Minnesota; the Liberian Community Association in Washington, D.C.; Liberia First Organization in Durham, North Carolina; the Liberian Community Association of Rhode Island; the Liberian Community Association of North Jersey; the Liberian Association of the Piedmont in Winston-Salem, North Carolina; the Liberian Community Association of Michigan; the Liberian Community Association of Southern California; the Liberian Community Association of Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas; and the Liberian Community Association of Massachusetts. Numerous other such organizations exist across the country. Some organizations have joined together to form regional coalitions (Wells 2008).
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The objective of these organizations is largely to provide assistance to community members, to organize social and cultural events for local Liberian American communities, to foster development and peace in Liberia, and to engage in advocacy and lobbying around issues of concern to Liberian Americans.
Civic and Electoral Participation Liberian Americans have dedicated significant time and energy lobbying for increased development assistance to Liberia and for additional support for peace initiatives and wildlife programs in Liberia. Over the last decade, the most salient political issue for Liberian communities across the United States was the debate over Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and efforts to guarantee permanent residency for Liberians with TPS. Around the country, Liberian Americans and Liberian community associations lobbied for the extension of TPS and for a guarantee of permanent residency (Brulliard 2007; Irwin 2006; Sieh 2009). In Minnesota, home to 25,000 Liberian immigrants, the Liberian Immigration Solidarity Committee held demonstrations at the Minnesota state capitol to protest the expiration of Temporary Protected Status of Liberia and to push for permanent residency. Minnesota employers and communities publicly supported the lobbying effort, as did Minnesota’s Congressional delegation. In Washington, D.C., the Liberian Community Association has consistently lobbied for green cards for TPS holders in recent years. The organization has also participated in and sponsored rallies in Washington, D.C., in support of the cause. Although there are no Liberian Americans currently serving in the national government, congresspersons from areas with large Liberian American populations have been very supportive of issues of concern to Liberian immigrants, particularly the extension of permanent residency and green card status. Most notably, Rhode Island Congressman Jack Reed made extensive efforts to propose and pass legislation guaranteeing permanent residency status to Liberians with TPS from 1999 to 2007 (Brulliard 2007; Irwin 2006; Sieh 2009). There is only one known Liberian American elected official in the United States. Paye Flomo is mayor of Hanover, Minnesota.
Return Immigration Prior to the war, some families sent their children home to spend summers in Liberia. However, on the whole, the civil war in Liberia has prevented even smallscale return immigration. Political instability and the threat of violence made return travel, even short-term, a remote and dangerous possibility. While return immigration is rare, in 2007 The New York Times published a profile on one Liberian American family in which the mother, Musu Sirleaf, sent her teenage son, Augustus Massalee, back to Liberia for four years to remove him from the gang violence, drug dealing, and other social ills in their New York neighborhood. In those four
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years, the teenager witnessed civil war, poverty, and human rights abuses. According to the article, when Augustus returned to New York, “Life in Africa had taught him to appreciate even the modest comforts of Park Hill. He had returned home a new man, humble and law-abiding, whether or not his old friends realized it” (Barry 2007b). Augustus’s story is rare, as is permanent return immigration to Liberia. With the election of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and the restoration of peace, however, return immigration is increasingly an option. The Christian Science Monitor reported in 2006 that many elite Liberian Americans were returning home to Liberia to assist in reconstruction efforts and establish new businesses (Clark 2006). For nonelites, however, the lack of jobs and infrastructure in the country leave many reluctant to return home. The reluctance to return to Liberia is epitomized by the reaction of Liberian Americans to the 2007 retraction of Temporary Protected Status for Liberia. Said Bendu Simpson, a Liberian immigrant with TPS, “You’ve come to a greener pasture and are trying to make a better life for you and your family, and all of a sudden it’s going to be taken away from you. It’s hard. Because I’ve worked hard here in America.” Another Liberian immigrant and TPS holder, Marpue Steward, commented on the TPS situation, “If America sends me to Liberia, maybe they send me to die” (Brulliard 2007). For the recent wave of Liberian immigrants to the United States, even those with permanent legal status, return immigration presents a challenge in other ways. Many recently arrived refugees lack the formal documentation to prove their own Liberian citizenship. However, many individuals do proclaim their intentions of eventually returning permanently to Liberia. With increasing stability in Liberia, return immigration may increase.
The Second and Later Generations In general, very little is known about second-generation Liberian Americans, because the immigrant population in the United States is so recent. As the Liberian community in the United States expands, and as more time passes, future research must document the ethnic identity and educational and occupational experiences of second-generation Liberians as compared to their parents. Although few studies exist about Liberian Americans specifically, existing research on black immigrants shows an increasing ethnic affiliation with African Americans in the second generation, and diminishing ties with the country of origin (Arthur 2000). What little anecdotal evidence exists suggests that the adaptation and achievements of second-generation Liberian Americans depends in large part on their parents’ economic and educational situations. Those second-generation individuals with relatively middle-class parents tend to achieve more upward mobility than do those with low-income, poorly educated parents.
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Youth Profile A Rough Beginning in East Oakland, a Successful Student at Berkeley Torbertha Torbor grew up in Liberia. When she was growing up, civil war erupted in her home country, forcing her and her family to flee to safety. They walked for days before they reached safety in neighboring Cote D’Ivoire. Although Torbertha, her siblings, and her mother made it safely across the border, many of her aunts, uncles, and cousins were killed by rebel fire during the civil war. Torbertha and her family lived in a refugee camp in Cote D’Ivoire until 2004, when her family joined thousands of other Liberian refugees resettling in the United States. They were sent to Oakland, California, where an organization, the International Rescue Committee, was responsible for resettling Torbertha and her family. Representatives from the organization greeted Torbertha, her mother, and her siblings when they first arrived in Oakland. The International Rescue Committee provided them with a small apartment and basic furniture and helped them adapt to their new city. Adapting to life in Oakland was a challenge for Torbertha and her family. Because they had little income, they lived in a neighborhood in East Oakland where violence and drug use were common. In one year, there were five shootings in her neighborhood alone. One of her friends was shot twice in the head, and Torbertha herself was attacked while waiting for a bus. Luckily, the bus arrived before she could be injured. Torbertha was surprised to find that her family, in their effort to escape the violence in Liberia, arrived in the United States to a different but still frightening type of violence . The conditions in her neighborhood did not deter Torbertha from pursuing her goals and working hard in school. She enrolled in Upward Bound, a program that helped her adapt to the American educational system. She also found significant support from her refugee resettlement agency. While most refugees only receive a few months of assistance from their resettlement agencies, the International Rescue Committee received a grant to open a Liberian Family Resource Center, which provided additional years of support to families like Torbertha’s. The Resource Center recruited local volunteers who worked closely with Torbertha and her family, both as “family mentors” who helped the family with day-to-day tasks, and as academic tutors. With her tutor, Torbertha worked hard preparing for the SAT, writing college essays, and researching financial aid options (Goger 2008). Although Torbertha arrived in her new home with limited English skills, she quickly excelled in school. In 2008, she graduated in the top 10 percent of her high school class and won $35,000 in college scholarships. She decided to attend the University of California, Berkeley. She is now the first member of her family to attend college and hopes to major in public health and give back to her community.
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Liberian immigrant Rufus Arkoi (center) tutors his daughter, Rucelia, and Theodore Lettein at the after-school community youth program he runs for African immigrants on Staten Island, New York, October 11, 2005. (AP Photo/Kathy Willens)
Fears are also high that low-income children will fall victim to street violence and gang activity. Among the Liberian community associations around the country there are certainly efforts to quell gang activity and to educate Liberian American children about their country of origin and to instill in them a sense of attachment to Liberia (Ludden 2008).
Issues in Relations between the United States and Liberia The Unites States has had a long-standing relationship with Liberia since Congress appropriated $100,000 in 1819 for the resettlement of freed slaves and the establishment of the country by the American Colonization Society. The United States officially recognized Liberia in 1862 and maintained a close relationship with the country during the Cold War. The civil war in Liberia and the dictatorship of Charles Taylor challenged the United States–Liberia relationship. Intense debate ensued in the media and in public circles about the extent of U.S. responsibility to intervene in the civil war.
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Since the restoration of peace and the election of President Johnson-Sirleaf, the United States has provided significant financial assistance to reconstruction efforts. Since her election, Johnson-Sirleaf has traveled numerous times to the United States to give speeches and to meet with public officials. Between 2005 and 2008, President Bush met four times with President Johnson-Sirleaf, once in Liberia. According to the State Department, the United States has contributed over $1.5 billion in assistance to Liberia for reconstruction and democratization projects (Bureau of African Affairs 2009). Peace Corps volunteers returned to Liberia in 2008 for the first time since the onset of the civil war in 1989. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) coordinates large-scale development and reconstruction efforts in Liberia for the United States. Their efforts focus on building infrastructure, improving education, promoting business development, and preserving Liberia’s wildlife. Another recent aspect of United States–Liberia relations is evidenced by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission established in Liberia. Aimed at creating a historical record of the atrocities committed during the civil war, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission became the first such Commission to look outside its national borders to conduct hearings and collect testimonies. With the sponsorship of Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission began holding hearings in eight Liberian communities throughout the United States. Liberian Americans came forward to share their recollections of the civil war and the horrors they and their communities faced. The hope of many participating is that their testimony will help bring Charles Taylor, who currently awaits trial in prison in The Hague, Netherlands, to justice (Barry 2007a; Brulliard 2007).
Forecasts for the 21st Century As the 21st century progresses, immigration flows between the United States and Liberia will largely be determined by the political and economic situation in Liberia. If newly restored peace holds and economic and social development hasten, immigration flows to the United States will likely decrease. The U.S. government will likely remove Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) status for Liberians, leading some to return home to Liberia and others remain in the United States as undocumented immigrants. On the other hand, should the country relapse into civil war, we would likely see increased flows of refugees to the United States, and the U.S. government would likely extend TPS further for Liberian Americans. The 21st century will also bring a unique opportunity to learn how Liberian Americans, particularly second-generation Liberian Americans, are adapting to life in the United States. Existing studies on other black immigrants suggests that Liberian Americans will have slightly better economic success than native born blacks, but that this advantage may dissipate in the second and third generations. Future research will be needed to understand the assimilation trajectories of these individuals.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics
Table 223 Refugee admissions from Liberia, 1997 to 2007
Year
Number of Liberian Refugees Admitted
Liberians as Percentage of Total Refugee Admissions
Rank
1997
231
0.3
9th
1998
1,494
2.0
7th
1999
2,495
2.9
7th
2000
2,620
3.6
11th
2001
3,429
5.0
7th
2002
559
2.1
10th
2003
2,957
10.4
2nd
2004
7,140
13.5
2nd
2005
4,289
8.0
4th
2006
2,402
5.8
7th
2007
1,576
3.3
9th
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Refugee, Asylum, and Parole System (RAPS). Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008. Table 13.
Table 224 Asylum applications granted to Liberian nationals 1999 to 2008 Year
Applications Granted
1999
681
2000
688
2001
774
2002
605
2003
347
2004
308
2005
123
2006
54
2007
48
2008
60
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Refugee, Asylum, and Parole System (RAPS). Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008. Table 17.
Table 225 Naturalizations of Liberian nationals 1991 to 2008 Year
Naturalizations
2008
2,468
2007
1,815
2006
2,193
2005
1,548
2004
1,218
2003
917
2002
1,047
2001
778
2000
1,022
1999
846
1998
557
1997
719
1996
1104
1995
745
1994
609
1993
453
1992
361
1991
356
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Refugee, Asylum, and Parole System (RAPS). Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008. Table 21.
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Table 226 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009
1485
Region and Country of Birth Total Liberia
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
1,570
2,273
2,869
1,766
2,757
4,880
6,887
4,102
7,193
7,641
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
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Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics While the census does collect data on Liberian Americans, their numbers are so small that they do not appear in reports published by the census. Furthermore, the census counts as Liberian American those individuals who are foreign-born and who report Liberia as their country of origin, or who report Liberian ancestry in Table 227 Top receiving states for Liberian refugees 2000–2007 State
Total
Pennsylvania
3,352
New York
2,900
Minnesota
2,466
Texas
1,597
New Jersey
1,336
Arizona
1,013
Georgia
917
Rhode Island
905
Maryland
893
Massachusetts
834
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Refugee Arrivals by Country of Origin and State of Initial Resettlement for FY 2000–2008.
Regional Distribution of Liberian Refugees in US, 2000–2007 West, 6.69% Midwest, 22.93%
Southwest, 11.14%
Southeast, 14.66%
Northeast, 44.59%
Figure 23 Regional distribution of Liberian refugees in United States, 2000–2007. Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Refugee Arrivals by Country of Origin and State of Initial Resettlement for FY 2000–2008.
Appendix III: Notable Liberian Americans | 1487 Table 228 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 Total
Male
Female
7,641
3,474
4,167
Arizona
195
83
112
California
153
70
83
Colorado
85
40
45
Connecticut
68
29
39
Florida
144
69
75
Georgia
342
151
191
Illinois
125
53
72
Maryland
441
207
234
Massachusetts
292
142
150
Michigan
118
54
64
1,013
465
548
New Jersey
510
240
270
New York
500
226
274
North Carolina
266
138
128
Total
Minnesota
Ohio
144
60
84
1,277
565
712
Texas
403
192
211
Virginia
209
91
118
57
23
34
1,299
576
723
Pennsylvania
Washington Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
open-ended questions. As a result, the census does not have full or accurate estimates of the total Liberian population in the United States. In 2000, 25,575 individuals reported at least one Liberian ancestry group in the U.S. Census. In 1990, that number was 8,797.
Appendix III: Notable Liberian Americans Not only do Liberian Americans constitute a very small percentage of the total U.S. population, they are a relatively recent immigrant group. As a result, the number of notable Liberian Americans is quite small but will likely increase over time. A few notable Liberian Americans include the following individuals.
1488 | Liberian Immigrants
e. g. bailey is a Liberian American spoken-word artist and filmmaker who has won numerous awards for his work. Jacob M. Daynuah is a Liberian American who founded Zoto Records, an independent record production company and label, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The label specializes in Liberian arts and music. Benjamin G. Dennis was born in Monrovia, immigrated to the United States, and received his PhD in 1964 from Michigan State University, spending his career as a sociology and anthropology professor at the University of Michigan, Flint. He has published numerous books about the history of Liberia. Paye Flomo served on the Hampton, Minnesota, city council from 2003 to 2008 and in 2008 became the first black individual ever elected to be mayor in the predominantly white town. According to Emmanuel Wettee, president of the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas, Flomo is the first Liberian American elected official in the United States. Melvin Johnson is the first black chief judge of Lithonia, Georgia, and a Liberian American. The Liberian track and field Olympic team has historically been made up of Liberian Americans in addition to Liberians. In 1996, Liberian Americans Sanyon Cooper, Robert H. Dennis III, Kouty Mawenh, Eddie Neufville, and Grace Dinkins all competed for the Liberian national Olympic team.
Glossary Almoravids: A Muslim sect from Ghana that invaded Liberia in the 11th century. American Colonization Society: Organization of white clergymen, abolitionists, and slave owners who sponsored the migration of freed American slaves to Liberia and governed the Commonwealth of Liberia in the 19th century. Americo-Liberian: Freed American slaves who founded the modern Liberian state and their descendants. Buchanan: A city in Liberia. Bassa: One of the largest ethnic groups in Liberia, concentrated along the coast; also a language. Deferred Enforced Departure (DED): A presidential authorization that allows nationals of certain countries to remain in the United States if they are temporarily unable to return to their home countries due to safety concerns such as armed conflict or natural disaster. Fufu: Cassava, frequently fermented, ground up, and then boiled until it thickens.
References | 1489
Ganta: A city in Liberia. Gbarnga: A city in Liberia. Gio: One of the largest ethnic groups in Liberia, concentrated in the northeastern part of the country; also a language. Kakata: A city in Liberia. Kpelle: The largest ethnic group in Liberia, concentrated in central and western Liberia; also a language. Krahn: One of the largest ethnic groups in Liberia, concentrated in the interior of the country; also a language. Kru: One of the largest ethnic groups in Liberia, concentrated in the interior of the country; also a language. Monrovia: Capitol city of Liberia. People’s Redemption Council: Defeated the True Whig Party in 1980 in a military coup led by Army Master Sergeant Samuel Doe. Temporary Protected Status (TPS): A temporary immigration status granted by the Department of Homeland Security to nationals of designated countries who are temporarily unable to return to their home countries due to safety concerns such as armed conflict or natural disaster. True Whig Party: Political party that controlled the Liberian government from the late 19th century until 1980. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): International organization charged with the support and protection of refugees around the world. Voinjama: A city in Liberia. Voluntary Agency (VOLAG): 10 agencies in the United States that have agreements with the U.S. State Department to resettle refugees.
References Arthur, J. A. 2000. Invisible Sojourners: African Immigrant Diaspora in the United States. Westport: Praeger. Barry, E. 2007a. “From Staten Island Haven, Liberians Reveal War’s Scars.” The New York Times, September 18. Barry, E. 2007b. “Exiled to a War Zone, for His Safety.” The New York Times, December 14. Brown, H. 2011. “Refugees, Rights, and Race: How Legal Status Shapes Liberian Immigrants’ Relationship with the State.” Social Problems 58 (1): 144–63. Brulliard, K. 2007. “Area Liberians Recount Horrors for Commission.” The Washington Post, January 5, B1.
1490 | Liberian Immigrants Bureau of African Affairs. 2009. “Background Note: Liberia.” U.S. Department of State, February. [Online article; retrieved 6/15/09.] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618. htm. Clark, M. 2006. “Liberia’s Elites Leave American Comforts for War-Torn Home.” Christian Science Monitor, October 5. [Online article; retrieved 2/15/09.] http://www.csmoni tor.com/2006/1005/p01s04-woaf.html. Coulibaly, L. 2004. “Thousands of Liberian Refugees to Resettle in U.S.” Washington Post, February 23. [Online article; retrieved 2/15/09.] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A64811-2004Feb23.html. Goger, A. 2008. “Trailblazing: Si Se Puede!” April 7. [Online information; retrieved 7/15/09.] http://ladybugbuzz.blogspot.com/. Irwin, R. 2006. “3,600 Liberians Will Lose TPS on Oct. 1, 2007.” National Immigration Law Center. [Online article; retrieved 7/31/09.] http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/ asylrefs/ar133.htm. Ludden, J. 2008. “Liberian Youth in U.S. Find Threat from New Violence.” All Things Considered. Philadelphia, PA: National Public Radio, February 18. [Online recording; retrieved 7/31/09.] http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=19148453&sc=emaf. MPR News. 2007. “Bush Extends Stay for Thousands of Liberians in U.S.” Minnesota Public Radio, September 13. [Online recording; retrieved 6/15/09.] http://minnesota. publicradio.org/display/web/2007/09/13/liberianstatus/. Schmidt, S. 2009. Liberian Refugees: Cultural Considerations for Social Service Providers. Baltimore, MD, and Washington, DC: Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services and U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration and Refugee Services. [Online article; retrieved 6/30/09.] http://www.brycs.org/documents/liberian_cultural_consider ations.pdf. Sieh, M. 2009. “President Obama Extends Liberians Stay in U.S., but Advocates Push for Permanent Residency.” Metro Voices, March 27. [Online article; retrieved 6/30/09.] http://blog.syracuse.com/metrovoices/2009/03/thousands_of_my_fellow_liberia. html. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). 2008. “Refugee, Asylum, and Parole System (RAPS).” Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. Victor, C. n.d. “Statistics on Liberians in the United States.” TLC Africa. [Online information; retrieved 6/30/09.] http://www.tlcafrica.com/Liberian_statistics1.htm. Wells, K. R. 2008. “Liberian Americans.” Every Culture. [Online article; retrieved 6/20/09.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Le-Pa/Liberian-Americans.html.
Further Reading Chicoine, S. 1997. A Liberian Family. Minneapolis, MN: Lerner Publishing Group. Chronicles the life of a Liberian family escaping the civil war in Liberia and resettling in Texas.
Further Reading | 1491 Dennis, B. G., and A. K. Dennis. 2008. Slaves to Racism: An Unbroken Chain from America to Liberia. New York: Algora Publishing. A history of the effort to repatriate freed American slaves to Liberia, written by a two Liberian American academics. Ellis, S. 2006. The Mask of Anarchy Updated Edition: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War. New York: New York University Press. A history of the civil war in Liberia. Ham, A., J. Bainbridge, T. Bewer, J. Carillet, P. Clammer, M. Grosberg, R. Landon, K. Lobeck, and M. Phillips. 2006. West Africa. Oakland, CA: Lonely Planet Publications. A travel guide to West Africa with detailed information on Liberian history, geography, culture, and customs. Henries, A.D.B. 1966. Liberian Folklore. London: Macmillan Press. A compilation of 99 traditional Liberian folktales. Hope, C. M. 1987. Let’s Visit Liberia. Broomall: Chelsea House Publishers. A travel guide to West Africa with detailed information on Liberian history, geography, culture, and customs.
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Mexican Immigrants by Alma M. Garcia
Introduction At the beginning of the 21st century, the United States continues to deal with the impact and consequences of immigration from various countries to the United States. As with other immigrant groups, Mexican immigration to the United States created generations of new Americans. Mexican immigration differs from other immigrations in one major way: Mexico shares a 2,000-mile-long border with the United States. Mexican immigrants never had to cross an ocean to reach American shores. Unlike all other immigrant groups, the American Southwest belonged to Mexico until the United States defeated Mexico in 1848. The history and culture of contemporary Mexican society have always influenced the lives of Mexican immigrants living in the United States. Mexican immigrants continue to come to the United States and serve as a source of cultural replenishment for those Mexicans already living in the country and their U.S.-born children. The United States prides itself on its ability to integrate the many immigrant groups that have left their homelands to begin a new life for themselves and provide a better life for their U.S.-born children. An understanding of historical developments in Mexico and contemporary issues in the United States will help everyone appreciate and respect past, present, and future generations of new Americans.
Chronology 1000 B.C.E.
Arrival of Olmec Indians to ancient Mexico.
300–900 C.E.
Classic Period in ancient Mexico; rise of Maya, Toltec, and Zapotec civilizations.
1300
Rise of Aztec empire; establishment of religious and political capital (pyramids to the Sun and Moon) of Teotihuacan in what is now Mexico City.
1519
Arrival of Spanish led by Hernan Cortes.
1521
Spanish conquest of Aztecs and establishment of New Spain as a colony of Spain. 1493
Chronology | 1495
1810
Benito Juarez, a priest living in Oaxaca, Mexico, begins the Mexican Independence movement with his famous “Grito de Dolores” (Cry of Dolores), issued on September 16.
1821
Mexico wins independence from Spain.
1848
U.S.–Mexico War. Mexico defeated and cedes the Southwest to the United States.
1855
Benito Juarez seizes control of Mexico and establishes a liberal democratic government.
1862
General Porfirio Diaz delays French invasion of Mexico at port city of Veracruz on May 5 (Cinco de Mayo).
1864
French defeat Mexican troops and establish Archduke Maximillian of Habsburg as emperor.
1867
Maximillian executed and Benito Juarez takes control of government and serves as president until 1872.
1876–1911
Porfirio Diaz rules Mexico as dictator.
1911
Mexican Revolution begins, Diaz exiled, and Francisco I. Madero elected president.
1917
Immigration Act of 1917 establishes quota system to deter certain immigrant groups such as Mexicans from entering the United States.
1911–1924
Revolutionary factions led by Francisco I. Madero, Pancho Villa, and Emiliano Zapata vie for control of Mexican government.
1924
Consolidation of Revolution, establishment of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which retains control of the presidency until 2000.
1924
Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act) replaces the Immigration Act of 1917, which had been enacted to curb the growing concern over the country’s national security during World War I; the new act increases restrictions on immigration.
1942
The U.S. and Mexican governments initiate the Bracero Program to guarantee a steady supply of Mexican immigrant workers. The program ends in 1948.
1952
McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 increases restrictions on immigration as a reaction to the Cold War period in U.S.– Soviet relations.
1496 | Mexican Immigrants
1965
Hart-Cellar Immigration Act amends McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 and eliminates the national quota system for immigration from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) curbs illegal immigration, creates sanctions against employers of illegals, and provides new amnesty requirements for illegals living in the United States.
1990
Immigration Act of 1990 aids U.S. businesses in securing technical and professional immigrant labor.
1994
Proposition 187 approved by California voters; bans undocumented immigrants from receiving such social services as health care and education. The proposition was overturned by the courts because immigration legislation is under the jurisdiction of the federal government.
2006
Massive protests throughout the United States in support of immigrant rights.
2009
President Barack Obama pledges to address immigration issues during the second year of his administration.
2010
Arizona passes law against undocumented immigrants; federal government challenges the law; U.S. District Court rules against parts of the law.
Background Geography of Mexico Located in North America between the United States and Guatemala, bordering the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico on the east and the Pacific Ocean to the west, Mexico is a land of stark contrasts. In the north, vast arid deserts stretch out across the states of Chihuahua and Sonora. High, rugged mountains extend from Mexico’s border with the United States to its southern borders. In the country’s southeastern tip, the Yucatan peninsula reveals lush tropical plains, once home to the ancient Mayas. The Central Valley of Mexico is the country’s geographic and symbolic heart and the site of Mexico’s capital since Aztec times. The coastal state of Veracruz, on the Gulf of Mexico, is Mexico’s principal seaport and the site of vast oil fields. On Mexico’s Pacific side, large coffee plantations in the state of Chiapas thrive on the fertile soils on the steep hillsides.
Background | 1497
History of Mexico The earliest groups to arrive in Mexico migrated from the north near the Bering Strait, around 8000 B.C.E. These nomadic tribes roamed the countryside hunting buffalos, mammoths, and mastodons. When these herds died out in about 7000 B.C.E., tribes living in what is now the state of Puebla discovered how to cultivate crops such as corn and beans. Agriculture transformed the nomadic tribes into village dwellers, and by 2000 B.C.E., large villages existed in the Valley of Mexico, in what is now Mexico City, and in the southern highland region with its fertile soil, which was ideal for farming. An evolving and complex society emerged around 1000 B.C.E. The Olmecs settled in the southern Gulf of Mexico Coast, and their empire thrived between 1200 and 400 B.C.E. Major contributions included the development of a counting system and a sophisticated and accurate calendar. The Olmec civilization is most well known for its colossal human sculptures made of 40-ton blocks of basalt. The Classic Period (300–900 C.E.) in ancient Mexico represents the most significant cultural and artistic period. The rise of cities, particularly in the Valley of Mexico, led to the development of complex societies characterized by social classes, commerce, transportation systems, and religious centers. Cultural centers in the Classic Period included those of the Maya in Yucatan and Guatemala, the Mexican Highlands of Teotihuacan, the Zapotec cities of Monte Alban and Mitla in Oaxaca, and the Totonac cities of Tajín on the Gulf Coast. One of the most famous archaeological sites in this period is the Toltec’s monumental pyramids to the sun and the moon in Teotihuacan, and another is the Zapotec capital of Monte Alban. These civilizations declined as a result of the frequent warfare that existed throughout the Classic Period, dramatic declines in favorable climatic conditions for agriculture, and threats from new tribes, such as the Chichimecas, who invaded the central valley. From 900 to 1520, a variety of tribes continued to engage in warfare. Later preColumbian cultures thrived but never reached the cultural heights of the Classic Period’s civilizations. Beginning in 1300, the Aztecs entered the Valley of Mexico. They established their capital of Tenochtitlan on an island in Lake Texcoco. The Aztecs selected this site because one of their legends said that they should build their capital on the site where they found a cactus with an eagle sitting on it, holding a serpent in its mouth. This symbol became the national symbol of Mexico. The population of this Aztec city reached the amazing number of 300,000. The Aztecs ruled over a loose confederation of surrounding states and spread their social, cultural, and, most important, their religious influence throughout the Valley of Mexico. In 1519 when the Spanish arrived in what is now the state of Veracruz, Hernan Cortes encountered an Aztec empire ruled by the emperor Moctezuma. The arrival
1498 | Mexican Immigrants
of the Spanish signaled the defeat of the Aztecs and the creation of a Spanish colony that would eventually rebel against the Spanish Crown and establish its independence in the 19th century. When Moctezuma first heard of the arrival of these strangers from the east, he believed that Cortes was the Aztec god Quetzalcoatle— the Feathered Serpent—who, according to legend, flew away from the world but promised to return from the east. Moctezuma also realized that the Spaniards represented a military threat to his Aztec Empire, and he tried to appease Cortes with gifts of gold and other precious metals. The Spanish subdued the Aztecs in 1521 with the surrender of Cuauhtemoc, who was to become the last Aztec emperor. The Spanish Conquest incorporated a vast territory into the Spanish Empire. In the two centuries that followed, the Spanish maintained governmental control over its colony, building large, landed feudal estates owned by Spaniards and worked by indigenous peoples. The Spanish accumulated great wealth from the silver mines and other raw materials discovered throughout Mexico, facilitating its economic and political superiority over other European powers by means of the wealth accumulated in the New World (Barroqueiro 1999). During the 16th century, Spanish America experienced the continued expansion of the Spanish monarchy. Spain brought with it its culture and language and continued its exploration of the region, while engaging in persistent warfare with native tribes. The Spanish built settlements, established their form of local and regional government, and supported the Christianization efforts of the Catholic Church. Tragically, the Spaniards brought European diseases with them that led to the decimation of native populations. One of the major results of the introduction of Spanish to the Americas was the expansion of the Spanish language. The earliest contributions to Spanish literature consist of the records of explorers and clergy who travel throughout New Spain. The Spanish conquest of Mexico created a highly stratified society. Spaniards (born in Spain) and Peninsulares (Spaniards born in Mexico) dominated almost every aspect of life in the colony. They controlled the government, owned all the land, and maintained a strong coalition with the Catholic Church. As a result of intermarriage, many other racial/ethnic groups developed within New Spain. Intermarriages between Spaniards and indigenous people created a completely new group called “Mestizos,” who eventually formed the majority of present-day Mexican people. Indigenous groups, enslaved Africans, and free Africans remained at the bottom of the social class ladder. At the beginning of the 19th century, Europe found itself in a state of political uprising. In Spain, King Charles IV’s reign was built on corruption and repression. Charles IV was forced to abdicate, and his son became King Ferdinand VII. Napoleon gave refuge to Charles, who began a campaign to regain the Spanish throne. Napoleon’s attempt to place his brother Joseph Bonaparte on the throne in Spain led to the Peninsular War of Spain in 1808. These political upheavals had
Background | 1499
an impact on New Spain, where a growing resentment against colonial rule continued to increase. Various opposition groups joined together in a common cause to overthrow the Spanish. The Mexican War for Independence started as opposition to Spain intensified. Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, a local priest, began organizing a combination of Mestizos and indigenous groups. His revolt is best remembered for his proclamation of independence: the “Grito de Dolores” (the Cry of the city of Dolores), a call to revolt issued on the night of September 15, 1810. Hidalgo issued the call for independence from his church pulpit, when he shouted to the large crowd: “Mejícanos, Viva Mejíco” (Mexicans, Long Live Mexico). These are the famous words that are repeated every year by the Mexican president on Mexican Independence Day. Hidalgo led a band of his followers to the town of San Miguel, where he again issued a cry that has become a central part of Mexico’s historical and cultural past. Hidalgo proclaimed, “Long Live Our Lady of Guadalupe [The Mexican image of the Virgin Mary] and death to the Spaniards.” Spain won several critical battles that increased the disorganization of the opposition’s forces. Eventually Hidalgo and his military coleader Ignacio de Allende were captured and court-martialed. Spain continued to subdue any rebellion by increasing repressive measures against the insurgents, but their strategy backfired as more and more groups joined the independence movement. As a result of a coalition of anti-Spanish leaders, Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821. New Spain became the young nation of Mexico. Hidalgo had succeeded in turning the course of Mexican history and is considered Mexico’s greatest patriot (Garcia 2002). The decades after 1821 proved to be some of the most turbulent in Mexican history. The political coalitions that had been formed to gain independence from Spain soon disintegrated, producing intense civil strife. Some groups favored establishing a monarchy to rule Mexico, whereas others dreamed of creating a form of government patterned after the United States. Iturbide, the former leader of the independence movement, gained control of the country and declared himself emperor of Mexico until the military overthrew him. In 1824, the various factions agreed upon a republic headed by an elected president and a Congress, and Guadalupe Victoriano became Mexico’s first president. Although a democratic republic existed on paper, political chaos prevailed throughout the country. Some groups opposed the constitution, while others favored military intervention. Shifting political coalitions produced one of the most confusing periods in the country’s history. One military leader, General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, gained the presidency 11 times between 1833 and 1855. Prior to 1848, the most northern region of Mexico—the American Southwest and particularly Texas—was sparsely populated. After Mexican independence in 1821, the Mexican government encouraged greater numbers of Mexicans to move into this border region. The government recognized the potential threat of American settlers crossing the U.S.–Mexico border.
1500 | Mexican Immigrants
Under the leadership of such well-known historical figures as Sam Houston, Americans settled in Texas. By 1835, an estimated 65,000 Mexicans lived in Texas; about 50,000 were Americans, most of whom opposed the Mexican government that enforced restrictions on them. Santa Anna set siege on San Antonio, where serious uprisings had developed. The famous Battle of the Alamo witnessed the efforts of Americans and some Mexicans who joined in opposition to the Mexican government. Santa Anna’s victory put a temporary halt to the Texas uprising. Between 1836 and 1848, several political developments shaped the course of Mexican history. With the declaration of independence, border raids and skirmishes became an everyday occurrence. Texans raided Mexican settlements, and Mexicans sent forces into Texas. Many Mexicans living in Texas sided with the Anglo Americans against the Mexican government. Mexico declared war against Texas in 1845. American General Zachary Taylor claimed victory over the Mexican general Santa Anna’s forces in the north. General Winfield Scott landed in Veracruz and led an invasion force that captured Mexico City in 1847. One of Mexico’s most revered national monuments is the statue outside of Chapultepec Castle commemorating the heroic actions of six young military cadets who gave their lives fighting against Scott’s invading army. Mexico surrendered in 1848 and signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ceded Mexico’s northwest territory to the United States. The states of California, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, and certain areas of Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado became part of the United States. In 1853, the United States gained the remaining parts of Arizona and New Mexico through the Gadsden Purchase. Mexico also recognized the annexation of Texas by the United States. The annexation of the Southwest by the United States produced a complex social order in this land ceded by Mexico. Those Mexicans residing in this land became U.S. citizens as a result of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Although the treaty stipulated that their property, wealth, and civil rights would be respected, former Mexican citizens soon confronted the harsh realities of military defeat, and by the latter part of the 20th century, those Mexicans living in the Southwest lost almost all their rights. As a result of its defeat, Mexico experienced a wide range of economic, political, and social catastrophes that produced new conflicts. Santa Anna returned to power as an even stronger dictator, but his authoritarian rule sparked an opposition movement led by Benito Juarez, a Zapotec Indian. Juarez seized control of Mexico in 1855 by establishing a liberal democratic republic with a new constitution. The United States played a key role in championing Juarez and his followers. The U.S. government pledged its support for Juarez, recognizing him as the legitimate national head of state of Mexico. By 1858, a very strong group of upper-class conservatives joined with the majority of the Catholic hierarchy and forced Juarez from the presidency. Juarez left Mexico City but established himself and his followers in Veracruz, where he continued the struggle against the conservative group. Civil
Background | 1501
war broke out in Mexico and Juarez’s army eventually recaptured Mexico City in 1861, but his victory proved to be short-lived (Meier 1993). This historic period witnessed one of the most unusual European interventions into Mexican politics. The Juarez government found itself almost bankrupt, as England, France, and Spain demanded repayment of their loans. Mexico’s default on these loans resulted in a joint invasion of Mexico in 1862. Led by Napoleon III, France set out to conquer Mexico, and in May, 1862, Juarez’s army resisted the French invasion and won a famous victory against the French, whose army was considered the best in the world. This event is still celebrated both in Mexico and in the United States by Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans as Cinco de Mayo. Despite this defeat, the French captured Mexico City, sending Juarez and his followers into exile. Through a combination of political intrigues, this conservative opposition group, with the support of Napoleon III, appointed Archduke Maximillian of Habsburg as emperor of Mexico in 1864. Juarez continued to maintain his opposition forces with the support of the United States. This combination of pressure on France resulted in the removal of its troops from Mexico in 1867. Maximillian was taken prisoner and executed by a firing squad in the city of Queretaro, Mexico, in 1867. Juarez returned to power, serving as president from 1867 to 1872, the year of his death. The political developments that followed the presidency of Juarez unleashed an unprecedented upheaval in Mexican history: the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz from 1876 to 1911, and the Mexican Revolution that succeeded in overthrowing him. The Mexican Revolution led to one of the largest mass immigrations to the United States. This generation of Mexican immigrants fled their country, beginning a cycle of constant immigration that has lasted to the present. When Díaz became president in 1876, who won the elections through a series of fraudulent practices, but intensified opposition forces, Mexicans still admired him for his military victory against the French in 1862. But his economic policies produced extreme inequalities throughout Mexico. By 1900, opponents of the Díaz regime mobilized against the federal government, even though such opposition groups experienced swift and harsh repression at the hands of federal troops. The United States supported Díaz in suppressing these uprisings. The presidential election of 1910 served as a major catalyst for the Mexican Revolution. Francisco I. Madero mobilized liberals who favored the establishment of a republic in Mexico. Madero launched his presidential campaign against Díaz in 1909. The presidential elections of 1910 proved to be the ultimate downfall of the Díaz dictatorship. Madero and other revolutionary leaders such as Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata joined forces in city after city on their way to Mexico City for the final showdown with Diaz. Outside the National Palace in Mexico City, Díaz encountered masses of his opposition calling for his resignation. Díaz went into exile in 1911 in Europe. The Mexican revolutionaries claimed victory, but they soon found themselves embroiled in one of the bloodiest social revolutions of the 20th century (Garcia 2002).
1502 | Mexican Immigrants
Mexican revolutionaries Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata (foreground) assemble with their army of peasants and farmers on horseback in Mexico in 1910. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Madero became president on November 6, 1911. Opposition to Madero soon led to violent upheavals, as rivals fought for control of the government. Madero was assassinated three months after he won the presidential election. Approximately two million Mexicans lost their lives during the Revolution. General Victoriano Huerta gained control of the presidency in 1915, but he was soon challenged by Venustiano Carranza, who had served in Madero’s provisional government and later was governor of the state of Coahuila. Under the leadership of President Woodrow Wilson, the U.S. government supported Carranza by providing him with both military and diplomatic assistance, to assure a climate of peace and economic stability in Mexico that would favor American business ventures. When Wilson learned that Germany had furnished Huerta with munitions, he order U.S. troops to occupy the eastern port of Veracruz. Carranza occupied Mexico City in 1914, and his forces battled against his opponent, Francisco “Pancho” Villa in the northern region of Mexico, and Emiliano Zapata in the southern region. Carranza emerged victorious in 1916. Under his leadership, delegates to a constitutional convention adopted the Mexican Constitution of 1917, which established a liberal republican form of central government, with control of education, land reforms, and subsoil rights such as those for oil and for the Catholic Church. It restricted the presidency to a single six-year term. Mexico’s chaotic revolutionary period ended in 1924 when the Institutional Revolutionary Party of Mexico, known as the PRI, emerged as an all-powerful political
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1503
party and dominated both national and state elections. The PRI ruled Mexico as the longest-lasting political party, maintaining its control of Mexican national politics until the presidential elections of 2000, when Vicente Fox Quesada, the candidate of the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN—National Action Party), the major opposition political opposition party, became president. In 2006 Felipe Calderón, also of the PAN party, was elected to the presidency.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration From the beginning of the Mexican Revolution, Mexicans sought refuge in the United States. They left their small villages and set out to El Norte—the North—as they called the United States. The railroad system built under the Díaz regime transported the mass migration of Mexicans to the American Southwest. Hundreds of thousands of Mexicans made this trip across the Rio Grande. Many crossed and then recrossed la frontera, as Mexicans called the U.S.–Mexican frontier. They entered without checking at border entry points. Existing figures show a constant increase in Mexican immigration from 1894 to 1920, with approximately 18,000 Mexicans entered the United States. The U.S. Census started keeping records for Mexican immigration in 1930, although record keeping for immigration figures continues to be difficult even to the present day, due to the large numbers of undocumented immigrants and patterns of reentry to the United States by deported immigrants. Data gathered in the 1930 Census show that the total population of Mexican immigrants living in the United States increased from 367,510 in 1910 to 700,541 in 1920. By the beginning of the Great Depression, approximately one million Mexicans resided in the United States. The majority of Mexican immigrants who came during these years settled along the U.S.–Mexican border in such states as Texas, Arizona, and California. Communities of Mexican immigrants were established in places such as El Paso, San Antonio, San Diego, and Los Angeles. By 1920, El Paso had the largest Mexican population of any city in the United States and had more Mexicans than Anglos. San Antonio had the second-largest population of Mexicans. The Immigration Act of 1917 represented an early attempt to restrict the flow of immigrants to the United States. Mexicans as well as other immigrants were seen as posing health problems and representing a bad moral influence on American citizens, and this view contributed to this early episode of anti-Mexican immigrant sentiments. The Immigration Act of 1917 called for immigrants to pay a head tax of $8 and pass a literacy test. The act barred entrance to any person born in an “Asiatic Barred Zone.” Japanese were not affected because the Japanese government
1504 | Mexican Immigrants
had already limited immigration under the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907. Filipinos were also excluded because the Philippines were an American colony and their citizens were American nationals who could travel to the United States. The Chinese had already been restricted under the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. Soon after the passage of the 1917 Act, Congress took up the issue of immigration. Many believed that the literacy test was ineffective in barring immigrants. Advocates of stricter immigration policies introduced legislation that would set the limit at three percent of the total population of the foreign-born of each nationality in the United States as recorded in the 1910 census. This Emergency Quota Act of 1921 resulted in the establishment of 350,000 visas per year to new immigrants, but such quotas did not apply to immigrants from the Western Hemisphere. President Warren Harding supported this legislation (Gamio 1931). Mexican immigration decreased sharply from 1917 to 1918. Although they were not eligible to be drafted, many Mexicans feared conscription to the American armed forces fighting in World War I and returned to Mexico. American employers experienced economic difficulties caused by a shortage of labor, due to decreases in Mexican immigration and the numbers of American citizens drafted into the armed services. Employers exerted strong pressure on the U.S. government, and eventually the Department of Labor suspended the immigration law to allow Mexican immigrants to enter the country as agricultural workers. By the middle of 1918, Mexican immigration resumed and continued to increase rapidly. Many companies, especially the railroads and mining, actually went to Mexico to recruit laborers (Meier 1993).
Later Waves of Immigration The relationship between Mexican immigrants and the United States has been characterized by periods of alternating cycles of hospitality and antagonism. The changing nature of the economy and the political climate affected which of these cycles confronted the newly arrived Mexican immigrants. As a result of a serious labor shortage of workers during the World War I, the United States government designed immigration policies to recruit greater Mexican immigrants to work in war industries. The liberalization of U.S. immigration restrictions led to a significant increase in Mexican immigrants living in the border states. In the twenty years between 1920 and 1940, the Mexican population living in the United States increased by 22 percent. The population grew from 8.8 million in 1920 to 14.4 million in 1940, with migration from central and southern states in Mexico to border states increasing dramatically. Large numbers of Mexicans who moved to the border states eventually entered the United States and settled in existing Mexican communities throughout the Southwest. With the end of World War I, the United States attempted to return to prewar normalcy, but national and international economic instabilities
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produced widespread and collective anxiety among Americans. During the 1920s, extreme prejudices and discriminatory practices against Mexicans and other immigrants increased. (Garcia 1981). Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act) in order to lower the existing quota from three to two percent of the foreign-born population. Quota calculations were based on 1890 data rather than 1920 data. The percentage of visas available to individuals from the British Isles and Western Europe increased, but newer immigration from other areas like Southern and Eastern Europe was now highly restricted. The 1924 Immigration Act included a provision that led to international outrage. The act excluded immigrants who by virtue of race or nationality were ineligible for citizenship. Asians could not become naturalized as a result of the existing nationality laws enacted in 1790 and 1870. The 1924 Act meant that even Japanese who had previously been limited from immigration to the United States but not excluded could not enter the United States (Cardoso 1980).
Phases before the 1965 Immigration Act With the collapse of the stock market in the early 1930s, public hostility against Mexican immigrants culminated in a government policy of repatriation to send Mexicans back to Mexico. Many Mexican immigrants had already left the depression-stricken United States, even though Mexico did not escape the impact of the Great Depression. About 500,000 Mexican immigrants left the United States. Not all these immigrants made the return journey to Mexico voluntarily. Many Mexican immigrants were forcefully repatriated by the government and sent back to Mexico. Between 1929 and 1935, it is estimated that between 400,000 and 500,000 Mexicans, many U.S.-born, were forced to leave their Mexican communities in the United States. The highest rates of deportations (called “repatriation” by the Hoover administration) took place in California, where the majority of Mexicans resided. Many U.S.-born children of Mexican immigrant parents were deported along with their families. This chapter in Mexican immigrant history continues to be a source of resentment in Mexican communities throughout the United States. In 2006 California passed the Apology Act for the 1930s Mexican Repatriation Program, officially recognizing the “unconstitutional removal and coerced emigration of United States citizens and legal residents of Mexican descent” and apologizing to residents of California “for the fundamental violations of their basic civil liberties and constitutional rights committed during the period of illegal deportation and coerced emigration.” Mexicans laborers in the United States began collective efforts to improve their working conditions. The anti-immigrant climate and the deteriorating working conditions soon developed into labor activism. During the 1920s and 1930s, Mexicans workers, primarily male immigrants, represented the dominant labor population in
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such industries as mining, agriculture, and the railroads. Mexican immigrants migrated outside the Southwest and established communities in such states as Washington, Colorado, Michigan, and Kansas. Mexican workers established unions that initiated several large-scale strikes. California’s agricultural workers experienced the majority of these strikes. The Cantaloupe Strike of 1928 proved an early victory for Mexican immigrants. Other strikes soon took place throughout the Southwest. Many strikes succeeded in improving working conditions for the immigrants, but many proved unsuccessful. As the economy improved, resentment against immigrants subsided gradually. Increased numbers of Mexicans began to enter the United States, and their numbers would grow even more when the United States entered World War II. When the Bracero Program ended, debates over the immigration issue continued. American employers relied on a reliable source of cheap labor and turned to the ever-growing numbers of Mexicans willing to leave Mexico, and the percentages of undocumented workers increased. These workers were called mojados, meaning “wetbacks,” referring to their crossing the Rio Grande River to reach the United States. Those who entered the United States by crossing under the long stretches of barbed wire were called alambristas from the Spanish word for wire, alambre. Employers actively recruited undocumented workers to work in canneries, construction, and service industries. The flow of Mexican immigrants increased as the Mexican economy worsened. Employers welcomed this new flow of undocumented workers. Despite terrible living and working conditions, the numbers of undocumented workers continued to increase dramatically. Once in the United States, immigrants moved in search of work, blending in with documented Mexicans and American-born Mexicans to avoid apprehension by the authorities. Employers themselves often assisted the workers in avoiding the Border Patrol and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in order to maintain a stable work force (Driscoll 1999). Hostilities increased against Mexican immigrants during the early 1950s. The Cold War period in American history created a climate of both anticommunism and anti-immigration. The fear of communist conspiracy within the United States became associated with a deep-rooted suspicion of immigrants. Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950, barring the immigration of any member or former member of the Communist Party. It also included a provision that allowed for the deportation of members of the Communist Party already living in the United States if they were deemed threats to national security. The widely held restrictionist sentiments of numerous legislators formed the spirit and letter of the 1952 McCarranWalter Act. A stipulation renewed the existing quotas from Northern and Western European countries that would be awarded an annual admission quota representing 85 percent of the total quotas. President Truman supported the views of other political figures in opposing the continuation of quotas, which discriminated against
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immigrants by their country of origin. Truman opposed the McCarran-Walter Act because he was responding to the demand from many U.S. industries, particularly the agricultural sector, who were experiencing labor shortages. Truman’s veto was overridden by Congress. The McCarran-Walter Act was designed to limit the number of undocumented workers. The act stipulated that immigrants with professional or technical skills and their relatives were given preferential treatment over unskilled workers. President Truman and his advisors supported less restrictionist immigration policies, going so far as to support the repeal of the McCarran-Walter Act. Truman appointed a special commission in 1953 to examine the provisions of the immigration act (Garcia 2002). The Border Patrol seized nearly 280,000 immigrants in 1949, and by 1953, the numbers increased to 865,000. The Border Patrol records make it difficult to count those immigrants who are deported but then reenter the Unites States. The U.S. government responded to the growing pressure to curb further increases in “undocumented” immigration by authorizing the Immigration and Naturalization Service to implement “Operation Wetback” to reverse the tide of “illegal aliens” from Mexico. Operation Wetback’s policies were aimed at “Mexican looking” individuals who were stopped and asked for documentation. As a result, many second-generation children of Mexican immigrants were illegally deported along with their parents. Although the program lasted less than a year, it is estimated that over one million Mexicans were deported. Strong opposition to the program contributed to its revocation. Within a few months after the Border Patrol ended these deportation raids, the flow of undocumented Mexicans resumed. The escalation of the Cold War and the perceived threat of unrestricted immigration to the United States led to major revisions in the existing immigration laws.
The Immigration Act of 1965 and Succeeding Legislation The Immigration Act of 1965 abolished a national origins quota system, replacing it with several provisions that would shape future immigration patterns. The law established ceilings for particular countries to replace the quota system. Mexico represented the country with the largest number of documented immigrants to enter the United States. The Immigration Act of 1965 also allowed for unlimited numbers of spouses, unmarried children, and parents of U.S. immigrants to enter as immigrants. Declining economic conditions in Mexico during the 1960s served to “push” Mexicans from Mexico to the United States just at the time when immigration reforms were “pulling” Mexicans to the United States. American industries, particularly in California and the Southwest, continued to rely on a supply of cheap immigrant labor, contributing to the further “pulling” of Mexican workers to the United States. Although many legislatures and sectors of the general public in
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the United States continued to oppose increased immigration, they anticipated that increasing the numbers of documented immigrants would at least curb what they still called “illegal immigration.” The Immigration Act of 1965 did not curb the continued influx of undocumented Mexican immigrants in the post-1965 period. Given the economic urgency to come to the United States, Mexicans considered the legal procedures set up under the Immigration Act of 1965 as too burdensome and time-consuming. Many immigrants who had been residing in the United States at the time the Bracero Program ended decided to remain in the United States rather then return to Mexico, even at the risk of apprehension and deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The steady flow of undocumented Mexican immigration fueled anti-immigrant sentiments within American society. Resentment against Mexican immigrants, increased within the general U.S. public. Such an anti-immigrant climate led to the passage of new and more restrictionist immigration laws (Garcia 2002), including a 2010 state law in Arizona that would require immigrants to prove their legal status in this country if the police stopped them for a legal violation. The federal government, however, on July 28, 2010, struck down most provisions of the law in a preliminary injunction, before it could go into effect.
From the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 to the Present The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 was designed to curb undocumented immigration but resulted in an increased influx of undocumented immigrants. The IRCA contained three major provisions: (1) employer sanctions, (2) amnesty provisions for undocumented immigrants residing in the United States, and (3) increased funding for law enforcement programs along the U.S.–Mexico border. Employer sanctions penalized those employers who hired undocumented workers. The IRCA also contained a provision that granted amnesty to undocumented workers who had resided in the United States continuously since January 1, 1982. It set a May 4, 1988, deadline for amnesty applications to be filed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). After November 1986, employers were required to verify the eligibility of their employees to work in the United States by completing an INS form and verifying those documents. Although the IRCA was designed to curb the flow of immigration, in reality it merely kept the flow constant. Many undocumented immigrants made trips back and forth to Mexico and therefore were not eligible for amnesty. Many undocumented parents had children who had not entered the United States with them and had not been reunited with them until after 1982. They hoped for an amendment that would allow for greater flexibility for family reunifications in cases where a family’s children were not eligible for amnesty under the IRCA. The IRCA contained a Special Agricultural Worker (SAW)
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Program that gave producers of perishable crops an exemption from the employers’ sanctions until December 1, 1988. SAW allowed agricultural growers harvesting perishable crops to continue their long-established practice of recruiting and hiring undocumented workers, almost exclusively Mexican workers (Gonzales 1999). The passage of the IRCA and its implementation marked a new period of immigration. In 1990, 1.5 million immigrants, a record number, entered legally to the United States, and the number rose to 1.8 million in 1991. The proimmigration climate of the IRCA period persisted in the years following its passage. Congress passed additional legislation in 1990 that set revised numerical ceilings and revised the system of preferences. It established a flexible cap of 700,000 for all admission categories. This would revert to 675,000 in 1995. A three-tiered preference system was adopted favoring: (1) unification of family members, (2) admission of immigrants with designated skills and professions, and (3) increased applications from countries underrepresented in immigration admissions. Congress projected a yearly admission number of 700,000 plus another 100,000 with refugee status. Congress also set up a Commission on Immigration Reform in 1990 in order to design new procedures for curbing undocumented immigration to the United States (Gonzales 1999). In 1990 Congress passed an additional bill that demonstrated the continuation of legislative attempts to control undocumented immigration. The Immigration Act of 1990 became effective in November 1991. The bill was designed to assist the growing number of businesses that were experiencing a shortage of highly skilled and educated professionals, particularly in the high-tech industries. The Immigration Act of 1990 reserved visas for those immigrants with the ability to find employment in these industries or set up a business in key target areas in the United States characterized by high unemployment. This act did not result in any significant increase in Mexican immigration because of its provisions calling for such high socioeconomic backgrounds of immigrants. Mexican immigrants continued to enter into the United States in unprecedented numbers (Garcia 2002). The immigration reforms signed into law by President Clinton represented important developments for Mexicans. During the election year of 2000, both Democratic and Republican candidates targeted Mexicans who were naturalized citizens and Mexican Americans as a growing voting block. Immigration reform was seen as a key to winning their votes. Anti-immigration groups organized to defeat the immigration legislation. They opposed establishing more lenient naturalization requirements, fearing a potential influx of undocumented immigrants becoming citizens. The Coalition for Immigrant Reform led the opposition to this bill’s Section 245(I) of the Immigration Reform and Control Act that removed the requirement that undocumented immigrants had to leave the country before applying for citizenship.
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With the election of President George W. Bush in 2000, supporters of continued legislation for further leniency in the naturalization process feared that the conservative wing of the Republican Party would pressure President Bush into vetoing immigration reform laws. While he was governor of Texas, Bush maintained a record that demonstrated his political goal of establishing “good neighbor” relations with Mexico by not pressing for strict anti-immigration policies. From the earliest months of his presidency, Bush continued this policy, favoring the path of binational cooperation between the United States and Mexico. Bush and his Latin American foreign policy advisors maintained that increasing Mexican economic development would be the best way to curb illegal Mexican immigration. As a result, President Bush moved closer to a centrist position regarding immigration than many conservative Republicans in the House and Senate, by focusing more on the status of the millions of undocumented Mexicans living in the United States. Bush established a task force on immigration that would give legal status to the more than three million Mexicans living in the United States. Mexican president Vicente Fox Quesada has supported what both countries now call a “regularization” of Mexican migrants living in the United States. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, altered the course of immigration policies that had been under consideration throughout the summer months. A tightening of American national security represented one of the immediate consequences of September 11. The Bush administration echoed widespread public sentiments by calling for an analysis of current immigration laws. The administration answered the terrorist threat to American society by delaying initiatives to grant amnesty to Mexicans living in the United States and supporting antiterrorist policies designed to expand the government’s ability to restrict or deport those immigrants identified as terrorist links. A Foreign Terrorist Tracking Force monitored immigrants under suspicion of terrorist association. Many legislators expressed their concern that such antiterrorist policies had the potential of initiating widespread incidents of civil rights violations. Fox Quesada was fearful that Mexico would feel the brunt of antiterrorist policies with the establishment of an anti-immigrant climate. President Fox Quesada called for a judicious application of immigration restrictions and urged restraint in the treatment of Mexicans and other immigrants living in the United States, the majority of whom have no ties to terrorist organizations. President Felipe Calderon will continue to work with the U.S. government to examine the international dimension of immigration until the end of his presidency in 2012.
Demographic Profile The country’s need for a large supply of workers increased dramatically when the United States entered World War II. War industries needed workers to fill in for the
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troops fighting in Europe and Japan. The U.S. government joined with the Mexican government and designed the Bracero Program to guarantee a steady supply of Mexican immigrant workers. The Spanish word for hired hand is bracero from the word brazo, meaning arm. Bracero became the word used to refer to contracted Mexican immigrant workers. During the years of the Bracero Program, it is estimated that approximately 350,000 changed their status from temporary workers to immigrants living on a permanent basis in the United States. The Bracero Program was created in 1942, and about a quarter of a million Mexican men made the trip to the agricultural fields and war industries. These workers harvested food supplies and worked in the railroads and mines. Their numbers increased steadily from 1942 through 1947. They harvested such crops as lettuce, carrots, strawberries, peaches, apricots, melons, and other vegetables. Under this program, Mexican workers were guaranteed minimum wages, adequate living conditions, and the right to end their participation in the program and return to Mexico. California became the temporary home for about half of all Bracero workers who were recruited to come to the United States to work in agriculture.
Mexican workers (braceros) harvest sugar beets near Stockton, California, in 1943. Large numbers of Mexicans were recruited by the U.S. Farm Security Administration to help with the labor shortage following the outbreak of World War II. (Library of Congress)
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At the end of World War II, Mexican workers lost their jobs to workers coming out of wartime industries and to returning servicemen. The 1947 Emergency Farm Labor Service decreased the number of braceros. When World War II ended in 1945, most growers wanted the U.S. government to extend the program. Pressure was exerted on various congressmen and the Bracero Program was extended until 1948. The agricultural business sector continued to experience labor shortages. Their efforts to extend the program and make it renewable every two years led to the passage of another congressional bill. American involvement in the Korean conflict, beginning in 1950, produced a marked increase for contract laborers from Mexico.
Size and Composition of Community The U.S. Census Bureau and other sources of demographic data define “foreign born” as persons who did not have U.S. citizenship at birth and uses the term “immigrant” interchangeably with “foreign born.” The growth in the population of Mexican immigrants represents the major force accounting for the increase in the total foreign-born population. In 1960, Mexican immigrants ranked seventh (6%) in the share of the total foreign-born population, and by 1980 they were the topranked group of foreign born (16%) and remained at number one in 2006 with 31 percent (approximately 12 million) of the foreign-born (Gibson and Lennon 1999). (See Table 229.) Between 1990 and 2000, the number of Mexican immigrants increased by 81 percent compared with 42 percent for the non-Hispanic foreign-born population. In 1990, Mexicans accounted for 22 percent of the total foreign-born population, or one in every five of the total. This increased to 30 percent or one in every three foreign born in 2000. The population grew by 32 percent between 1960 and 1970, and it tripled in size (189%) between 1970 and 1980. This pattern continued between 1980 and 1990, with the number of immigrants doubling (95%), and between 1990 and 2000, the population more than doubled, with an increase of 114 percent. It is estimated that in 2002, the Mexican foreign-born population numbered 10 million. Men accounted for the majority of the Mexican-born population living in the United States in 2006 (60%), while women accounted for 40 percent (Batalova 2008). The majority of immigrants were displaced peasants, unemployed, and the working-class Mexicans who fled from the impoverished conditions and violence prevalent throughout Mexico. The need for unskilled and semiskilled workers for the rapidly industrializing American Southwest represented one of the major reasons that Mexican workers found employment in the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Southwest’s booming economy in mining, ranching, and agriculture followed a national and international industrialization
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period, characterized by industrial expansion and production. The South and Southwest served as suppliers of the raw materials and agricultural products needed to supply the industrial centers and the growing working class they employed. Mexican immigrants provided an abundant, constant, and cheap source of mostly unskilled labor. These jobs created strong barriers to the upward social mobility for the masses of immigrants. Unskilled Mexican immigrants found jobs working on railroads and in construction, mining, and agriculture. Mexican women also became part of the paid labor force. Widowed and young, single women worked as domestics, laundresses, seamstresses, and garment workers. Economic discrimination created a dual labor force, with Anglo-American workers concentrated in higher-paying occupations than Mexicans. Unskilled workers found it practically impossible to improve their occupational, status because most unions restricted membership to Anglos (Gonzalez 1999). About one in five Mexican immigrants were naturalized U.S. citizens in 2006. Among the Mexican foreign-born, 22 percent were naturalized U.S. citizens in 2006, compared to 42 percent among the overall foreign-born population. Over the last five years, there has been an increase in the number of Mexican women immigrants, as a result of worsening economic conditions in Mexico. The most recent statistics from 2009 indicate a marked decline in the number of Mexicans coming to the United States, as the economic recession deepened and a loss of jobs, such as those in the service sector usually available to Mexican immigrants, declined. In 2000 there were four states with over half of their foreign-born population from Mexico: New Mexico (72%), Arizona (66%), Texas (65%), and Idaho (55%). The remaining 10 states with the highest percentage of Mexican immigrants in their foreign-born populations include Colorado (49%), Nevada (49%), Kansas (47%), Arkansas (46%), California (44%), and Oklahoma (43%). California has the largest number of Mexican immigrants, followed by Texas and Illinois. More immigrants are settling in the South in states such as Georgia, Nebraska, and Iowa in their attempts to find more stable employment. The other states with large numbers in rank order are: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Colorado, North Carolina, Nevada, and New York. Mexicans in these 10 states account for 83 percent of all Mexican immigrants in the United States. Metropolitan area rankings show that the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, California areas contains the largest number of Mexican immigrants, followed by Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin, and Dallas-Fort-Worth-Arlington, Texas. These three states have 28 percent of all Mexican immigrants in 2006. The population of Mexicans doubled between 2000 and 2006 in South Dakota, Louisiana, Alaska, and Ohio. The states that experienced the greatest percentage increases in their foreign-born populations from Mexico between 1990 and 2000 include Tennessee and Alabama. Georgia and North Carolina also experienced considerable growth in their Mexican immigrant population between 1990 and
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2000. In 2001, The following states had a large percentage of Mexican immigrants in comparison to the percentage of all immigrants in each of the following states: California (43%), Texas (60%), Illinois (41%), Florida (64%) and Colorado (43%). (See Table 231.) Table 232 shows the states with the largest number of Mexicans who obtained legal permanent resident status in 2009, which included California, Texas, Arizona, Florida, and Illinois as the top five, in order. When grouped by region of the United States, Mexicans have the highest percentages of the total percentage of all immigrants in the West (62.7%) followed by the South, 26 percent; the Midwest, 10 percent and the Northeast, 2 percent (Gibson and Lennon 1999) (see Figure 24). Mexicans represented 27 percent of all lawful residents living in the United States in 2006, and almost a third of all those eligible to be naturalized were Mexicans. Mexicans represented about 50 percent (5.3 million) of all unauthorized immigrants in the United States in 2002 (Baker 2007; Grieco 2003). The undocumented population from Mexico increased from two million in 1990 to 4.8 million in 2000 and to 5.3 million in 2002. Between 1990 and 2002, the undocumented population from Mexico increased by about 250,000 to 300,000 per year on average. The population of undocumented Mexicans continues to represent a larger percentage of the total Mexican immigrant population. Between 1990 and 2002, the legal population from Mexico roughly doubled, while the undocumented population grew by 165 percent. The proportion of undocumented among Mexican immigrants living in the country increased from approximately 47 percent to about 54 percent by 2002. This increase has occurred because a very large proportion of all new immigrants from Mexico are undocumented. Of all Mexicans who came to the United States since 1990, more than four of every five remained undocumented by 2002. Among those who entered in the 1980s, only about one in five is still undocumented.
Age and Family Structure Major trends can be identified regarding the age structure of foreign-born individuals by country and year of immigration. Between 1960 and 1990, the median age dropped from 57 to 37 years old and did not change from 1990 to 1997. The median age (31 years) of Mexican immigrants is lower than that of any other immigrant group. Another way to examine the age structure of any population is to determine the percentage of persons within a specific age group. The percentage of the total foreign-born population between the ages of 25 and 44 increased from 1960 to 1997 (19% and 44%, respectively). The percentage of Mexican immigrants within this age group is 48 percent. The population 65 years old and over decreased from 33 percent in 1960 to 11 percent in 1997 for all immigrant groups. The elderly population of Mexican immigrants (4%) remains among the lowest of all the foreign born.
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Demographers from the U.S. Census Bureau account for these changes in the foreign-born population in two major ways. First, the elderly population of foreign born, particularly the male population, is experiencing higher mortality rates than any other age group, primarily due to bad health and lack of adequate health care. Second, the number of younger immigrants to the United States, particularly from Mexico, continues to increase, with women in this age bracket having very high fertility rates. In 2006, the population between 18 and 54 represented 78 percent of all Mexican immigrants, while the number 18 years old and under equaled 10 percent, and 12 percent were age 55 and older. Men outnumbered women by 16 percent. Mexican immigrants are more likely than other immigrants to live close to their families, and 9 out of 10 came to the United States as a result of family sponsorship. Mexican families are larger than other immigrant families and are more likely to include extended family members. Mexican immigrants (65%) have the highest percentage of households headed by a married couple. The majority (90%) of all Mexican immigrant households consist of parents and children, and 62 percent report married status (Passel 2004; Ramirez 2004).
Educational Attainment With only a few exceptions, educational attainment levels for the foreign-born population in the United States fall behind those of the total U.S.-born population. (See Table 233.) Immigrants 25 years and older are less likely to have a high school diploma than U.S.-born (24% and 31% respectively). Only 25 percent of all Mexican immigrants have a high school education, 1 percent larger than the total foreign born. A more accurate count of undocumented Mexican immigrants would lead this percentage (25%) to decrease. One-fifth of the foreign born (20%) had less than a ninth-grade education in comparison to the U.S.-born population (4%). Mexicans had the highest percentage (41%) of persons with less than a ninth-grade education. This was larger than immigrants from Central America (32%) and the Caribbean (15%). A smaller percentage of Mexicans completed some college (10%) in contrast to the native-born population (29%) and the total foreign born (17%). Eighteen percent of the nativeborn population graduated from college in comparison to 4 percent of Mexicans, less than immigrants from Central American (8%) and the Caribbean (13%) (Pew Hispanic Center 2007). (See Table 233.)
Occupation and Income Patterns Mexican immigrant men 16 years and over are most likely to be a part of the civilian work force (86%) in comparison to the total foreign born (79%). Mexican immigrant women were less likely (50%) to be in the labor force than foreign-born women
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(55%). Major differences exist among the native born, Mexican, and total foreign born. Mexicans are more likely to cluster in the service sector industries such as food preparation and serving (11%) and cleaning and maintenance (13%) than the native born (6% and 3%, respectively). The percentage of the native-born population in the combined industries of management/business and science and engineering is larger (18%) than the Mexicans (5%) and Central Americans (6%). A marked difference can be seen in the construction/extraction industries, with Mexicans representing 19 percent. Only 6 percent of the native born are found in this labor sector. Mexicans are more concentrated in the installation/repair/production category (17%) than the native born (10%), Central American (15%), and the foreign-born population (12%) (Pew Hispanic Center 2007, Table 24). (See Table 234.)
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Mexicans place a very strong value on the importance of the family and on maintaining strong family ties. Siblings usually see their relationships with each other as unconditional, taking primacy over outside friendships. Parents see themselves as responsible for creating a family environment where blood ties are placed above all others. Family members inculcate within each other the value of working for the good of the family unit, often at the expense of individual gratification. Family members assist each other financially and emotionally. Mexican immigrants often do not rely on banks or other lending institutions for loans. The first place they turn to for financial help is to other family members. Children value the importance of providing financial assistance to their parents, even when they find themselves in difficult economic circumstances. Emotional support for each other has often resulted in low utilization rates for public assistance, particularly welfare, family social services, and counseling. Strong family loyalties extend beyond the immediate nuclear family and include other relatives and kinship networks. It is common for families to consist of family members such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. Many times a family will raise a niece or a nephew, usually until the rest of the family settles in the United States. Migration patterns result in the creation of immigrant neighborhoods where many relatives live in close proximity to each other. Relatives usually provide childcare for working parents. Celebrations of birthdays, name days, anniversaries, and such religious events as baptisms, first communions, confirmations, and weddings become extended family events. Sponsors for many religious events are generally selected from among family members. Family kinship networks are strengthened by religious practices. Mexican immigrants use these strong family
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ties for everyday living situations and emergencies. They are able to continue their tradition of placing a very high value on the family, making it possible to retain an important aspect of Mexican culture long after their arrival in the United States. Baptism is one of the major religious ceremonies practiced by Christians, because it is a ritual that signifies that the newborn is beginning its religious life as a member of the Christian community. Mexicans, like many other Roman Catholic immigrants, practice the ritual of coparenthood. This practice is not exclusive to Mexicans—Italians, Greeks, and others also maintain the rituals and practices surrounding coparenthood. With the birth of a child, the Mexican immigrant family selects a married couple to be the sponsors at their child’s baptism. Mexicans consider it an honor to be asked to serve as a child’s godparents, refusing only under extreme circumstances. Given the tightly knit family structure among Mexican immigrants, it is not unusual for coparents to be related to the parents of the child to be baptized. The sponsoring couple enter into a religious and life-cycle bond with the child’s parents, becoming their compadre and comadre (cofather and comother). Their godchild usually refers to them as padrino (godfather) and madrina (godmother). These bonds can remain strong into adulthood. Godparents assume the duty of assisting in the religious upbringing of the child. Each family usually follows its own traditions in delineating specific degrees of responsibilities. The godparents often give their godchild, particularly a goddaughter, a small piece of gold jewelry, which becomes a cherished memento of this event. Within many Mexican communities, items needed for such life-cycle religious events can be found in the numerous stores that cater to these needs. Many shopping centers within Mexican immigrant communities even have specialty stores that carry only religious items. The baptismal ceremony takes place traditionally on a Sunday afternoon at a local Catholic Church. During the ceremony, the godmother holds the baby as the priest says the prayers and anoints the child with holy water and oils (Garcia 2002). The quinceañera (from the Spanish word for 15—quince) refers to the cultural practice of celebrating a young girl’s 15th birthday and is similar but not identical to a cotillion or a sweet-16 party. Although a quinceañera celebration can be quite expensive, it remains a common celebration even among those Mexicans with limited resources who cannot afford to be extravagant. The young girl wears a long white gown, carries a bouquet, and walks down the center aisle of the church with her father or parents. The first part of the quinceañera involves a mass in church where the girl gives thanks for guidance. During the mass, a religious medal is presented to the girl by her padrinos (sponsors similar to godparents), and blessed by the priest. Many Mexican immigrants believe that a quinceañera is another step beyond a girl’s baptism. The ceremony and its deeply rooted Catholic religious connotation serves to bring the quinceañera to a higher level of religious responsibility. She is renewing her baptismal vows, pledging herself once again to the service of God. Her public display of commitment to her Catholicism brings honor to herself
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Esmeralda Verdi (left) and Laura Verdi take part in a Baptism Mass at the community center in Pueblo De Palmas, Texas, July 7, 2007. (AP Photo/Eric Gay)
and to her entire family, particularly her parents, whom the community recognizes for raising a traditional Mexican daughter. Many quinceañeras are more like a sweet-16 party and less of a traditional Mexican religious practice, but participants are still reminded of their Mexican cultural roots. The continued and constant influx of new generations of Mexican immigrants will contribute to the practice of hosting a quinceañera. In addition, many American-born Mexicans are rediscovering the quinceañera as a means to teach their daughters, and all those who join in the celebration (Garcia 2002). Marriage rituals are rooted in Catholic dogma that views marriage as a sacrament as well as a basis for a family lifestyle. Among Mexican immigrants arriving in the United States in the early 20th century, highly structured courtship rituals preceded marriage rituals. Mexican tradition dictated the boundaries for interaction and socializing between single women and men. Young girls were always under the watchful eyes of a family-appointed chaperone. Group activities represented the most common way for prospective couples to meet and begin a highly ritualized courtship pattern. Group functions such as church-sponsored dances, family parties, or baptismal celebrations represented an acceptable early stage of courtship. These social functions could then lead to a prospective suitor’s visit to his future bride’s family. These meetings usually took the form of chaperoned visits on a Sunday afternoon after mass. Sometimes the prospective suitor brought his
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parents or a brother with him. After several such family visits, the parents of the girl would allow the couple to take a short walk together, but only if accompanied by a chaperone such as a godmother or aunt. The final stage of courtship in this type of traditional Mexican immigrant setting involved the use of an intermediary, usually a family member, to go to the girl’s father and ask for her hand in marriage. If the marriage proposal was accepted, then subsequent visits between families were arranged, and the girl’s family was expected to serve as the host. After several visits, the family announced the engagement, and the couple could now interact with each other, but under the continued scrutiny of her parents. These elaborate rituals were designed to safeguard the future bride’s reputation by preventing any premarital sexual relations. Of all rituals associated with marriage, these traditional courtship patterns have been the first to undergo dramatic changes, if not complete replacement with modern-day dating practices (Williams 1990). The marriage ceremony follows the traditionally accepted marriage rituals prescribed by the Catholic religion. Similar to the rituals associated with Mexican baptisms, married couples are invited to serve as sponsors for the wedding. These are usually selected by the bride and her family, but recently both sides of the family and the bride and groom assume an active role in this practice. Catholic marriages take place within the ritual of a mass. Mexican cultural practices involve a series of ritual objects that play a prominent role in the marriage ceremony. As a symbol of financial support, the groom presents the bride with 13 gold coins, called arras. In cases of financial difficulties, decorative coins are substituted. Many brides attach these coins to a bracelet to be worn on special occasions throughout their lives. During the ceremony one of the bridesmaids or the maid of honor places a long white rosary, resembling a rope, around the kneeling couple as a sign of their union. These lazos, or ropes, can be fashioned from such material as satin or a garland of white flowers. The couple keeps this lazo on for only a few minutes, and then it is removed by one of the wedding attendants. The patron saint of Mexico and Latin America is the Virgin of Guadalupe—the indigenous representation of the Virgin Mary. Many Catholic churches located in communities with a large number of Mexican immigrants display a statute of the Virgin of Guadalupe in a place of honor. If this is the case, another custom among Mexican immigrant brides is to place a special wedding bouquet at the feet of this statue during the wedding ceremony. One of the bridesmaids carries this bouquet and hands it to the bride, who then walks to the shrine and places the wreath as a symbol of her transition to a married status. All these special objects are often presented to the bride and groom by various couples that are cosponsors. Usually these couples are married and may be either friends of the wedding couple or of their families. It is customary for these sponsors to form part of the wedding party, following the bridesmaids but before the maid of honor. Mexican immigrant families prefer Spanish-language marriage ceremonies (Williams 1990).
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Funeral rituals among Mexican immigrants vary by region of origin from Mexico, place of settlement in the United States, age of the immigrants, economic status, and many other factors. Funerals combine many folk traditions and religious beliefs with contemporary rituals. Mexican attitudes toward death reflect their acceptance of the Catholic religion’s teachings about death and salvation. Death leads to an afterlife in which redeemed souls enter what Catholics refer to as the kingdom of God. When persons are dead they receive the last sacrament in the Catholic religion. The priest blesses an individual with holy oils. In Mexico, the family of the deceased announced the death and funeral arrangements by placing an announcement in the local newspaper. The format for this announcement, different from an obituary, involves very little text, resembling an advertisement with large, bold type that includes the name of the deceased, the date of death, the names of the immediate family, the location of the wake, the time and place of the funeral mass, and the cemetery where the deceased will be buried. Many of these funeral announcements, or esquelas as they are called, can be quite large, depending on the resources and preferences of the family. Mexicans immigrants did not continue this practice in the United States, because English-language newspapers did not have a policy for the custom. Even with the existence of Spanish-language newspapers serving Mexican communities, this practice has all but disappeared (Williams 1990).
Families and Changing Gender Relations Social forces in the United States introduce Mexican immigrant families to different values and practices that can lead to changes in traditional gender roles. Although most Mexican immigrants retain a sense of pride and loyalty to Mexico and their traditional cultural values and practices, they adopt new gender roles and behavior patterns that usually lead to changes in their family. Machismo is one of the most commonly identified characteristics associated with traditional Mexican immigrant families. Machismo comes from the Spanish word for male: macho. Machismo is defined as a form of masculinity involving an exaggerated sense of male bravado. The belief that the Mexican male is the unquestionable authority within the household represents a key component of the ideology of machismo. Machismo is an extreme form of male dominance and is often associated with a double standard of sexuality for men. Men are expected to demonstrate their sexual prowess, whereas Mexican women are expected to guard their virginity until marriage at all costs. Mexican immigrant men, like other men, can exhibit varying levels and dimensions of machismo and are capable of adopting new and more egalitarian gender ideologies and behavior patterns. The nature of immigration often changes existing gender relations. Under certain conditions, Mexican immigrant men and women are very likely to experience a shift from a traditional maledominated family to a more egalitarian form of family structure. Gender roles are
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more likely to change when families experience economic difficulties. Mexican women who work either part or full time in the paid labor force report that their relationships with their husbands change the longer they work outside the home. Immigrant families, whose structure may show signs of becoming less traditional and more egalitarian, often continue to support the retention of other Mexican traditions. Although unequal gender relations still persist in varying degrees within Mexican families, many Mexican immigrant families experience changes from traditional roles to more egalitarian gender roles (Baca Zinn 1980, 1982).
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Mexican immigrants struggle to find the best of both possible worlds by blending their past cultural traditions and identity with those they encounter in American society. The continuous flow of Mexican immigrants strengthens their efforts to build new American lives within socially created worlds of Mexican culture, traditions, and identity. Most residential patterns of Mexican immigrants link them together as they live side by side with their compatriots who also traveled to the United States in search of a better life for themselves and for their children. Extended family members and friends seek each other out in a conscious effort to survive in their new surroundings and build thriving immigrant communities. Neighborhoods such those in East Los Angeles, East San Jose, and South El Paso have contained residential enclaves of Mexican immigrants since the turn of the twentieth century. Immigrant businesses develop in these enclaves, because their clientele seek out immigrant consumer items, particularly food items. Mexican immigrant entrepreneurs have been a mainstay of their surrounding Mexican immigrant communities. In the early years of the 20th century, Mexican business enterprises were already prominent in Mexican communities in the United States. This continues to be evident in contemporary neighborhoods. Other stores in Mexican immigrant enclaves carry tapes and CDs of the most current Mexican artists, particularly traditional music genres, but also current popular traditional and contemporary music. Pharmacies carry a large array of Mexican herbs, ointments, salves, teas, and other medicines that are usually imported directly from Mexico. Entertainment also provides a means for Mexican immigrants to live as Mexicans within the United States. Video stores carry Mexican-produced films, and many communities have theaters that show only Mexican films. Concerts by Mexican singing artists in venues in or close to immigrant enclaves draw large audiences. Spanish-language television networks such as Univision and Telemundo provide Spanish-language programs that are viewed by Mexican immigrants and American-born Mexicans. Perhaps the most popular type of television program is the Mexican soap opera. Unlike their American counterparts, Mexican soap operas run for a fixed time period, usually no more than a few months.
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Language and Spanish-Language Media The majority of Mexican immigrants recognize the importance and value of learning to speak English. Responses to a national survey reveal that Mexican immigrants want their American-born children to master the English language. Mexicans want their children to be bilingual. Mexican immigrant parents attempt to provide their children with Spanish-language skills by speaking Spanish to them. Mexican immigrants learn basic-level English skills and many attend night school classes for non-English speakers. Many high schools, adult education facilities, and community centers located in areas with large Mexican immigrant communities offer such classes. The combined use of Spanish and English can be found in legal notices, voting material, government agencies, and health care delivery systems. Studies of other immigrant groups such as Germans, Italians, and Jews from Eastern Europe have documented the importance of newspapers printed in the language of the particular immigrant group. The availability of newspapers in their native language represented a major source of cultural continuity and solidarity among immigrants. An immigrant press provided news from the immigrant’s homeland and news from their new surroundings in the United States. Mexican immigrants coming to the United States, as early as the turn of the 20th century, established their own Spanish-language press. Between the years 1890 and 1920 more than 20 Mexican daily and weekly newspapers were started in El Paso, Texas, and surrounding border communities. Newspapers established during the Mexican Revolution of 1910 carried news articles discussing the victories and defeats of the various revolutionary factions. The Mexican immigrant press still provides Mexicans with a sense of Mexican national identity. Spanish-language newspapers continue to flourish in Mexican immigrant communities throughout the United States. These newspapers provide an important service to the wide audience of monolingual Spanish-speaking immigrants. Mexican immigrants read about current events in both the United States and Mexico and are informed of local news, particularly on topics such as immigration, elections, housing programs, and health care services. Some Englishlanguage newspapers, such as the San Jose Mercury News, often carry articles in Spanish on topics that are of immediate concern for Mexican immigrants. Spanish-language television broadcasting evolved slowly with the general expansion of the television industry in the United States beginning in the early 1950s. A San Antonio–based television station began broadcasting in 1955. One of the first programs was a weekly show called Buscando Estrellas (Star Search) and included a mix of entertainment and amateur talent contests. Every Sunday afternoon Buscando Estrellas reached large audiences of Mexican immigrant and Mexican American communities. Many of the featured entertainers included Mexican stars that were particularly popular among Mexican immigrants. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, similar television variety programs expanded their productions,
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growing in revenue and audiences. Although many Mexican immigrant families found the cost of television sets prohibitive, it was common to gather at the home of a family member or friend who owned one. By the early 1960s, short news segments appeared alongside entertainment programs. Advertising revenues increased as business owners recognized the potential purchasing power of Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans. Spanish-language stations such as the Spanish International Network (SIN), Telemundo, and Galavisíon have competed for control of Spanish-speaking audiences. Both Mexican and American businessmen had united to create the Spanish International Network (SIN). Mexican investor and citizen Azcarraga Vidaurrta was limited to controlling only 20 percent of SIN under the stipulations of the Federal Communication Act. Americans became the primary SIN stockholders. Spanish International Network eventually changed its name to Univision and designed programming combined with broadcasts originating in Mexico. The changes in SIN sheds light on the changing character of its Latino and Mexican immigrant audiences. The emergence of Spanish-language television stations put pressure on the English-language stations to direct programming efforts for the Spanish-speaking audience already tuned into Telemundo, Univision, and Galavisíon. During the 1970s and early 1980s, these stations experienced alternating cycles of profit and loss, but by the late 1980s and 1990s, the growing Spanishlanguage audience contributed to their unprecedented stabilized growth. Spanish-language stations aired a variety of programs. Many entertainment programs originated in Latin America, particularly Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil. Over the last few years, Univision’s programming has included an ever-increasing number of programs produced in the United States for Mexicans and Latinos. The introduction of national news programs in Spanish represented one of the most significant developments in the recent history of Spanish-language television broadcasting. Noticieros (news programs) reach Spanish-language audiences across the United States. Mexican Americans, particularly in the Southwest, listened to nightly news programs featuring news from Latin America and the United States. Other stations soon had noticieros of their own which brought issues of specific interests to Latino communities on a regular basis. These news programs also ran stories that linked Latino communities with their Latin American neighbors on topics such as the elections in El Salvador, corruption in Mexican politics, and drug violence in Colombia. Spanish-language television stations are reaching unprecedented numbers of Mexican Americans and all other Latinos living in the United States. Their programming reflects the diversity of Latino groups. Univision met with great success when it introduced several musical specials, particularly its version of the Grammy Award program: the Premio lo Nuestro Latin Music Awards. This musical award program, which was cosponsored with Billboard Magazine, draws one of the largest television viewing audiences in the Latino community.
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Another interesting programming feature involved a series of special programs commemorating the quincentennial of Columbus’s voyage to the Americas. Despite the ongoing competition among the major Spanish-language television stations and their respective internal organizational and financial changes and crises, the industry will expand as the Hispanic population of immigrants and Americanborn individuals continues to grow.
Celebration of National Holidays Long after their arrival to the United States, Mexicans celebrate secular and religious holidays that are of significance in the history of Mexico. On September 16, Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans celebrate Mexico’s independence from Spain in 1811 with parades, music festivals, and other forms of entertainment. On Cinco de Mayo (May 5), Mexicans commemorate the 1862 victory of a small battalion of Mexican soldiers against the superior French army. Mexican immigrants also adopt U.S. holidays such as the Fourth of July and other holidays that do not at first have a specific significance for Mexican immigrants, but do for their American-born children, and eventually for the immigrants themselves.
El Dia de Los Muertos celebration in Hollywood, California. (Zepherwind/Dreamstime.com)
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Mexican immigrants have adapted certain aspects of Catholicism in a way that reinforces their Mexican culture and identity. Catholic religious holidays take on a Mexican style among immigrants. All these holidays and festivals retain their religious function, but, as among other immigrants, Mexican immigrant Catholics have given these events their own particular and recognizable Mexican motifs. On November 2, Mexicans celebrate El Dia de los Muertos (Day of the Dead) as a remembrance to their departed. This celebration now coincides with All Saints’ Day and All Souls’ Day (November 1 and 2). Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans visit the graves of their families and friends and celebrate their lives. Christmas represents a celebration that has always been marked with specific Mexican cultural traditions. The Feast of the Virgin of Guadalupe on December 12 marks the beginning of the Christmas celebration, which ends with the January 6 celebration of the Tres Reyes—the three kings—who brought gifts to the baby Jesus. Christmas celebrations among Mexican immigrants feature distinctive music and special holiday foods. The tradition of the posadas is one that is being replaced with more American forms of Christmas celebrations. Posadas derive from the 16th-century Spanish missionary miracle plays called actos sacramentales. During the days leading up to Christmas, posadas reenact the traditional story of Mary and Joseph leaving their home, traveling to Bethlehem, and looking for lodging for the night during which Christ would be born. A Mexican couple recreates this religious scene by visiting people’s homes, sometimes carrying statues of Mary and Joseph. By a previously agreed-upon plan, the couple is refused shelter until they enter a designated house. Once they arrive, a celebration follows consisting of traditional Mexican foods, including hot chocolate and sweet bread. In some areas of the Southwest, the houses participating in a posada are decorated with luminarios, bags of sand in which a lighted candle has been placed. The light from the candle provides a beautiful, illuminated decorative piece. Due to the fire hazard involved, this custom is rarely practiced. The major posada takes place on Christmas Eve, during which time the parish church is the last stop of the couple playing the roles of Joseph and Mary. This usually takes place around midnight. Once the parishioners are in the church, the priest celebrates midnight mass. All age groups are encouraged to attend this midnight mass, including young children. After the conclusion of the mass, children take turns breaking a pinata—a clay pot containing candy and covered with brightly colored paper. Pinatas can take any shape, including a star or globe. It is now customary for most Mexican immigrants to distribute Christmas gifts on December 25 instead of on January 6, the day of the Three Kings, which is still the day on which Mexicans living in Mexico open their presents. Many Mexican families now distribute gifts both on Christmas day and on the Feast of the Three Kings.
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Music Mexican immigrants continued their musical traditions in the United States. The influence of music traditions from Mexico, particularly regional music, has always played an important role in the lives of Mexican immigrants. Throughout Mexican immigrant communities in the United States, distinctively Mexican music styles continue to flourish. Although a diversity of musical styles eventually develops within all immigrant groups, traditional music usually continues within a specific sector of the immigrant community. Musica norteña (music from north of Mexico) represents one of the major and most recognizable styles of music from Mexico. Musica norteña refers to a music genre that originated in the northern states of Mexico such as Nuevo Leon, Tamualipas, and Chihuahua, and along the U.S.–Mexico border states, particularly Texas. From the earliest phases in their immigrant history, Mexican immigrants brought musica norteña with them to their new communities in the United States, where the music evolved within their communities, blending new elements with those of the past. Musica norteña can be traced back to the latter part of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century. Mexican musicians and songwriters built on the influence of German immigrants, who brought their distinctive music styles with them from Germany in the 19th century to south Texas and northern Mexico. Within their communities, Germans listened and danced to German polkas and mazurkas. Immigrants from Germany introduced the accordion to their new homeland. As a result, musica norteña developed as a musical genre that blended elements of two cultures: German and Mexican. Musicians played musica norteña throughout the early years of Mexican immigration. From about 1900 through the 1940s, this traditional music style could be heard at major celebrations within Mexican communities. Musica norteña continues to be played wherever Mexican immigrants settle in the United States. It continues to evolve, changing over time with the influence of modern American music such as rock, pop, and techno. Many musica norteña groups, such as the celebrated and award-winning Los Tigres del Norte (The Tigers from the North), from San Jose, California, have sold hundreds of albums in both the United States and Mexico. They have appeared in 14 films geared toward a Mexican and Mexican immigrant audience. The group’s most famous corridos have thrilled fans for over thirty years. Los Tigres del Norte gained the attention of promoter and record producer Art Walker, who started Fama Records, which soon became the most important Spanish-language record company on the West Coast. Los Tigres del Norte are responsible for making musica norteña an international genre. Their music, recorded in their San Jose, California, community, spread to all parts of Mexico and even into El Salvador and Nicaragua.
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Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Beginning with the first major influx of Mexican immigration to the United States in the early 20th century, the issue of naturalization confronted both Mexican immigrants and the United States. Proponents for naturalization debated the positive aspects for Mexican immigrants with those who opposed their becoming citizens by stressing the negative consequences. As early as 1920, the American labor movement, under the leadership of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), opposed policies that would increase Mexican immigration, believing that a large supply of cheap Mexican workers would keep wages low for all workers. The AFL also believed that an abundance of Mexican laborers increased unemployment by taking jobs away that would otherwise be filled by U.S.-born workers. Without the ability to join unions whose contracts established wage standards, Mexican immigrants provided employers with an abundant and cheaper labor force than the union members. The AFL initiated a campaign against all Mexican immigrants, stereotyping Mexican immigrants as having morally reprehensible cultural values and living habits. Such racist attacks ironically existed side by side with the AFL’s support for naturalization. Even though the labor unions wanted to place strict quotas on future Mexican immigration, they also wanted to encourage those Mexicans already living and working in the United States to become citizens, making them eligible for unionization, in an attempt to increase their membership and gain more political clout. The Great Depression triggered a deep animosity against Mexicans living in the United States, culminating in large-scale deportations, including the deportation of U.S.-born Mexicans. The combined effects of discrimination and segregation produced strong impediments to the naturalization of large numbers of Mexicans. Some educators and reformers attempted to inculcate what they considered to be “American” values among Mexican immigrants. The American public school system represented a key institution in achieving this end. Mexican immigrant children attended U.S. schools once their parents achieved some type of stable residency. Public school administrators and members of school boards have supported these “Americanization” programs for Mexican immigrants. American public schools with a large student body of Mexican immigrants designed a curriculum intended to smooth the transition to American citizenship. Although many children of immigrants were American born, significant numbers of children were Mexican citizens. “Americanization” policies contained implicit and explicit assumptions about Mexican immigrant culture, that is was less “advanced” than American culture, and as a result the curriculum included courses on hygiene, morality, and health care
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as well as traditional civics lessons in American history and government. Mexican children were tracked into nonacademic studies such as woodworking for boys and domestic services for girls. The actual implementation of Americanization programs designed for Mexican children in the 1920s and 1930s functioned more as training sites for future low-skilled workers than as a basis for naturalization for American citizenship.
Naturalization and Dual Citizenship A comparison of immigrants from Asia, Latin America, and Africa reveals marked differences in rates of naturalization. Several key factors demonstrate a greater likelihood that immigrants from a particular country will seek citizenship. These factors include the economic and educational background of immigrants, their geographic mobility to the country of origin, and the percentage of undocumented immigration in the United States. Mexican immigrants have the lowest rate of naturalization among immigrant groups entering the United States. Between 1976 and 1993, naturalization rates for Mexican immigrants remained about 5 percent of the total number of all immigrants becoming citizens. This trend takes on a greater significance, because Mexican immigrants accounted for the greatest percentage of immigration from all countries. Statistics for citizenship rates between 1970 and 1993 reveal that even with the immigration reforms of the mid-1960s and the subsequent increase in Mexican immigration, the percentage of Mexicans who become citizens was only 17 percent of the total population of Mexican immigrants. This low percentage reflects their persistently low educational and economic levels when they entered the United States. Undocumented Mexicans living in the United States are not eligible for naturalization. During the eight years of the George W. Bush administration the issue of citizenship for undocumented Mexicans became a major political issue, as it has for President Obama’s administration, which continues to grapple with the immigration issue. Almost half the world’s countries recognize dual citizenship. Mexico passed a law in 1996 that allows Mexicans to hold a dual nationality. This law stipulates that Mexican nationals living in the United States who become naturalized American citizens do not have to relinquish their Mexican citizenship. Between four and five million Mexican residents in the United States now have access to rights as citizens of both countries. Up until the passage of this law, it is estimated that large numbers of Mexicans living in the United States who were eligible for naturalization did not pursue citizenship because they would lose their rights as Mexicans, particularly their right to own property and to vote in Mexico. The 1996 law allows people born in Mexico, or with one parent born in Mexico, to hold dual citizenship, but they are not allowed to vote in Mexico, hold a political post, or join the Mexican army. Mexican immigrants can maintain property rights, travel to Mexico without
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a visa, and invest in Mexico without the restrictions placed on foreigners. This law also permits those Mexicans born in the United States to apply for dual nationality by registering in any Mexican consulate. The U.S. government does not encourage dual citizenship but does recognize Mexico’s law. The U.S. Supreme Court has declared as unconstitutional the forced denationalization of U.S. citizens who obtain dual nationality. The increased tolerance for dual citizenship reflects a changing international context. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union that brought an end to the Cold War represents a major international development contributing to the growing and widespread acceptance of dual citizenship. Naturalization patterns among Mexican immigrants will be shaped by several factors, including the continued increase of the undocumented, preferences by U.S. employers for nonU.S. citizens documented or undocumented, relations between the United States and Mexico, rising anti-immigrant sentiments, and the continuation or increase in economic inflation in the United States.
Intergroup Relations In November 1994, Californian voters approved Proposition 187, which banned undocumented immigrants from receiving such social services as health care and education. The proposition appeared on the ballot after a successful signature drive, “Save the State,” sponsored by the Pioneer Fund, an ultraconservative organization. Facing political defeat for reelection as a result of California’s economic decline, California’s governor Pete Wilson gave his political support for Proposition 187, linking the state’s economic recession to the rising numbers of undocumented workers taking advantage of social services. Proposition 187 made undocumented immigrants ineligible for public social services, public health services (except for emergencies as stipulated by federal law), and public education (elementary, secondary, and postsecondary). Proposition 187 required employees of public agencies to report any person suspected of being undocumented to either of two government agencies: the office of the California attorney general or the INS. Proposition 187 would make it a felony to print, sell, and/or use false citizenship documents. During the statewide campaign, California’s Latino population mobilized against Proposition 187. Mexican immigrants (documented and undocumented) and Mexican Americans considered Proposition 187 as a potential threat to their civil rights. One of the largest demonstrations against Proposition 187 took place in Los Angeles, where 100,000 protesters marched to show their opposition. Proposition 187 was passed 59 percent to 41 percent. Support for the proposition varied by race: 63 percent of whites voted for Proposition 187 but 77 percent of Latinos voted against it. The approval of Proposition 187 resulted in several court injunctions to prevent its implementation. The federal courts placed a temporary halt to its enforcement. Tensions deepened in California as Mexican immigrants and Mexican
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Americans experienced increased incidents of discrimination. Hotlines were set up to handle the growing number of complaints of discrimination. In March 1998, Judge Mariana Pfaelzer declared Proposition 187 unconstitutional, citing the 1982 Supreme Court decisions in Plyler v. Doe that all children under 18 years of age are entitled to public education regardless of their immigration status. Judge Pfaelzer also overturned Proposition 187 because immigration law is a federal and not a state-level issue. Governor Wilson appealed this decision, but his successor Gray Davis decided to send the issue into mediation. The settlement bars the enforcement of Proposition 187’s major provisions. The only provisions that were upheld involved the sanctions placed on making, using, distributing, or selling false citizenship documents. Although Proposition 187 faded into the political background, events surrounding its introduction, passage, and challenges produced another period of antiimmigrant sentiments. This climate pushed many immigrants to begin the necessary steps toward American citizenship. President Bill Clinton signed a new immigration law in December 2000 that eased the existing residency criteria for naturalization. The existing law disqualified immigrants for naturalization if they left the country during their application for naturalization. Clinton attached an amendment to a pending budget bill in order to allow for changes in the immigration law. Clinton’s amendment eliminates the requirement stipulated by the 1986 IRCA that stated that undocumented immigrants who wanted to apply for citizenship had to leave the country and apply for readmission to the United States, a process that could last as long as 10 years. This new immigration law provided a shorter time period for immigrants applying for naturalization to obtain a resident visa and thus speed up the process for family reunification. In 2006, immigration protests around the country develop in opposition to a proposed crackdown on undocumented immigrants. A cross-section of groups rallied against legislation passed by the U.S. House of Representatives that would make it a felony to be in the country illegally. This legislation introduced new penalties on those who hire or assisted “illegal” immigrants. Churches would be required to verify the citizen status of their congregants. The legislation also included a provision to build fences along the U.S.–Mexican border. President Bush had called for a guest worker program that would provide a path toward citizenship for the approximately 12 million undocumented Mexicans living in the United States. Many of these had resided long enough to have U.S.-born children. Protestors included a variety of participants, including Mexican immigrants. The demonstration in Los Angeles, the largest in the country, numbered about 500,000 and is considered the largest mass protest in the city’s history. Other cities witnessed massive turnouts. Police estimated that close to 50,000 marched through downtown Denver. Demonstrations continued for the next four months and spread throughout the country and even outside the United States. Legislators became
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deadlocked on the issue, but the U.S. Senate passed S. 2611, which includes a path to citizenship for up to 8.5 million illegal immigrants. The bill eventually failed and was never enacted. President Barack Obama has also faced this issue during his presidency, and the law has yet to be passed. With tough economic times and lack of commitment from either Republicans or Democrats, such legislation continues to face difficulties.
Forging a New American Political Identity Mexican immigrants strive to maintain their cultural traditions, but they experience many cultural changes the longer they live in the United States. In the early 20th century, Mexican immigrants displayed a reluctance to use English in their homes and in public. The majority of Mexicans who established immigrant communities along the U.S.–Mexico border and in other areas of the Southwest and Midwest could function quite well in their jobs without a command of English. For the most part, Mexican immigrants worked in unskilled and semiskilled occupations, requiring little spoken interaction with their supervisors. Mexican workers spoke Spanish among themselves at their various work sites, such as the railroad yards, mines, and agricultural fields. This generation of Mexican immigrants preferred to speak Spanish in their homes. Mexicans conducted their business in Spanish in the various types of business establishments they frequented, such as restaurants, barber and beauty shops, and retail stores. Mexicans read Spanish-language newspapers and listened to Spanish-language radio stations, but the more time that Mexicans spent in the United States, the more they began to make some degree of transition to speaking English. Mexican immigrants move toward greater English language usage and skills through the experiences of their U.S.-born children. As Mexican immigrants remained in the United States and raised children born in the United States, they began to make a more complete transition to learning the English language. By the early 1940s, the Mexican population in the United States had more American-born individuals than foreign-born. This trend has never been reversed, even though immigration from Mexico will continue well into the 21st century. As their children advanced in school, Mexican immigrant parents eventually began to learn more and more English. To the extent that Mexican immigrant parents increased their active participation in school and local politics, they began to see themselves as “citizens” more than immigrants, even if they had not completed the formal naturalization process. Their intentions of returning to Mexico also decreased as they mobilized themselves to defend the civil rights of their American-born children. Mexican immigrant men and women began to transform themselves into New Americans. Mexicans experienced varying degrees of prejudice and discrimination that created a societal climate within which immigrants felt unwelcome. Without a sufficient
1532 | Mexican Immigrants
knowledge of English and the political system, immigrants lacked the skills with which to express their concerns, but over time and increased interaction with U.S.born Mexican Americans, Mexican immigrants either created or joined political associations that responded collectively to social discrimination and prejudice. The history of immigrant groups in the United States reflects diverse patterns and variations in the development of political associations and organizations. The establishment of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) in 1929 stands as a major transition in the history of Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans. Although Mexican Americans represented the majority of the founders of LULAC, the organization, its leadership, and its ideology directly affected Mexican immigrant communities. The league mobilized both Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the struggle against prejudice, discrimination, and inequality experienced by generations of Mexicans and Mexican Americans. Other organizations, such as the National Council of La Raza, provide a voice for Mexican immigrants. The U.S.–Mexican border has always facilitated Mexican documented and undocumented immigration. Immigrants cross the border and settle in existing immigrant communities, particularly in the Southwest in places such as El Paso, Los Angeles, San Antonio, and San Jose. Mexican immigrant communities are emerging in places such as Iowa, Virginia, and Florida as new business enterprises require more unskilled and semiskilled labor. Immigration has become more of a transnational migration process, with an increase in Mexican immigrants returning to Mexico to visit their families, particularly the children, many of whom remained behind until their immigrant parents earned enough money to bring them to the United States. Undocumented immigrants find it difficult to return to Mexico and then reenter the United States. Improvements in communication such as the availability of cell phones, cheap rates for land-line phones, and e-mail allow these immigrants to stay in contact with their families. Immigrants directly contribute to their families in Mexico and the Mexican economy in general by sending money to their families, who convert the dollars into Mexican pesos and also keep some dollars in Mexican banks. Mexico relies heavily on these remittances as a source of its supply of international currency. After tourism, remittances from Mexicans and Mexican Americans living in the United States accounts for the largest source of money for Mexico.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity All immigrants, including Mexicans, share a common dream: to assure a better life for themselves and for their children, particularly their American-born children.
The Second and Later Generations | 1533
The process through which Mexican immigrants transform themselves into “New Americans” is shaped both by their own adjustment to their new country and by the experiences of their second-generation children. Mexican Americans use a variety of ethnic self-identification terms, including Hispanic, Hispano, Mexican, Mexicano, Latino, and Chicano. Ethnic labels vary across history, geographical region, and age. Many Mexican Americans use all or some of these terms interchangeably. Immigrants keep their culture alive within their communities long after they arrive in the United States. Many identity issues develop, and the process is not smooth. Mexican immigrants experience a transformation of identity as they increase their participation in American society and institutions. Their memories of their lives in Mexico become a source of cultural retention and, as the years go by, a source of cultural change. Mexican immigrants keep many of their cultural traditions while blending in American ones. They transform themselves into immigrants with multiple sources of ethnic identity. A sense of being Mexican does not disappear as a new identity emerges. Their U.S.-born children experience a similar process of ethnic identity formation. Their identity develops both from the influence of their immigrant parents and their own experiences as U.S. citizens. These Mexican American children see themselves as bearers of two sources of ethnic identity that shape their own lives and those of their immigrant parents. This blending of ethnic identity is also influenced by their different experiences of social class, gender, and other important social experiences, such as religion and region of the country (Garcia 2002). Second-generation Mexican Americans express a sense of ethnic identity that blends the two cultures. Their experiences within the United States are differ from those of their immigrant parents. Second-generation Mexican Americans maintain multilayered aspects of ethnic identities. They recognize that their identities are complex and always blending aspects of two or more cultures. Children of immigrants understand that their parents left their homeland because they wanted a better life for their families. They express gratitude that their parents left Mexico to improve their economic circumstances in order to secure a better future for their children. The formation of ethnic identity among Mexican Americans suggests that the transition from Mexican to Mexican American is not simple. Continued immigration from Mexico has created Mexican communities consisting of individuals from different generations: immigrants, children of immigrants, and children of children of immigrants. In 2001 immigrants represented 38 percent of the total Mexican community, followed by third generation or later (32%). Children of Mexican immigrants represent 21 percent of the Mexican-origin population (Ramirez 2004).
1534 | Mexican Immigrants
Daughter of Mexican Immigrants Wins Awards at College Mariana Barba-Iñiguez is the second-oldest of five children born to Mexican immigrant parents Elena and Jose Asuncion (“Chon”). Her father decided to come to the United States because Mariana’s father had five brothers who had settled in San Jose, California, 20 years earlier. Mariana’s father returned to Mexico twice to see his parents when they became ill. During one of these visits Jose began to court the girlfriend whom he later married: Mariana’s mother. In July 1986, 10 months after their marriage, her parents decided to head north from their hometown in the northern region of the state of Jalisco to San José, California. They left their modest home, hoping to provide better opportunities for their first and eldest son, who was born just two months after their arrival in San José. Mariana’s maternal aunt and her friend also immigrated with them in search of employment. They did not have green cards to come to the United States. They experienced many hardships, such as poor living conditions, as they continued their immigrant journey to the United States. They hid in small shacks in towns near the Mexico–U.S. border until a coyote smuggled them into the country, running up and through hills until they reached a house in Oceanside in southern California. The family later settled in San Jose. The young couple initially settled in a two-story home with three of Mariana’s paternal uncles and their families. At first, her mother did not work outside the home. Mariana’s father worked painting houses, recycling cardboard, and dealing cars, among other temporary jobs. Since her father was undocumented and could not always find regular employment, he eventually turned to selfemployment. Years later, her mother worked from home by babysitting and making home decorations that she sold to family and friends. In 1990, the family of six moved to its own three-bedroom house in the same neighborhood, south of the downtown business district of San José, where many immigrants, primarily Mexican immigrants, live. Crime rates have always been higher in this neighborhood in comparison to surrounding neighborhoods. It also has a remarkably high number of low-income families with low educational attainment levels. Developments such as a public library and a community youth center are among the initiatives developed by the city of San Jose to decrease crime rates and improve educational opportunities. Despite its unfavorable conditions, the residents of this community have created a flourishing neighborhood that resembles their home communities in Mexico, with informal markets, an ethnic business district, an active parish community, and a host of cultural events. With the support of her parents, Mariana and her siblings have overcome the adversities of their surroundings by focusing on their schooling. She and all but one of her siblings attended public schools through high school. She benefited from bilingual education until the third grade, and all but one of the schools had a predominantly Latina/o student population. Each school prepared her for
The Second and Later Generations | 1535
college, because of its advanced placement courses and cocurricular activities, both of which propelled her into leadership roles. As one of the only Latinas in her advanced placement courses, Mariana struggled to find her niche in the classroom. Her academic goals offset the isolation and motivated her to surpass the disadvantages she encountered in her community. She also participated in fine arts and religious ministry activities, which became a healthy distraction from the problems in her neighborhood. Mariana’s mother encouraged her to learn to play the violin in the sixth grade with a small mariachi band. After a year, she transferred to a middle school that offered orchestra and decided to participate in it throughout high school. Mariachi music continues to be Mariana’s favorite genre of music, a preference that she attributes to her family’s close ties to traditional Mexican culture. Mariana is deeply involved at her local parish by serving in youth ministry, religious education, and outreach programs for high school students, specifically undocumented students who need financial resources to attend college. The support that she received from her family and an education mentor served as a network that successfully led to her away from the dangers of her neighborhood. Mariana’s academic record and involvement in her parish community earned her the Juan Diego Scholarship: a full scholarship to attend Santa Clara University, a midsized liberal arts Jesuit university in the Silicon Valley. While at Santa Clara, Mariana continued to excel academically. She became a student leader of on-campus organizations such as the Multicultural Center and a communitybased learning program of the Ignatian Center. She also worked as an intern for several social service organizations in the Bay Area. This community service provided her with an inside look into the social needs of the marginalized communities that she had studied in the classroom. In 2009, Mariana graduated as the first in her family with high honors and a BS in sociology and a BA in ethnic studies. Her undergraduate thesis was published in the sociology department’s annual undergraduate student journal. She received the sociology department’s academic award for best senior thesis, as well as the comparable award in ethnic studies. Mariana hopes to pursue a doctoral degree in sociology and conduct research on immigrants and their employment experiences in the informal economy.
Educational Attainment Mexican Americans shows persistently low levels of education when compared to the total U.S.-born, including blacks and Asian Americans. Although population differences relate to such factors as parents’ immigrant status, and geographic concentrations produce marked diversities within their communities, Mexican Americans have historically lacked access to high school and college.
1536 | Mexican Immigrants
The demographic profile obtained by the last census taken in 2000 reveals marked differences in the educational attainment levels between the total population and Mexicans (25 years and older). The Mexican American population has not shown comparable educational levels with the total U.S. population, although their educational attainment levels are higher than Mexican immigrants. For the total population, 80 percent had a high school education or more, while the Mexican population had only 46 percent; and only 8 percent of Mexican Americans had a bachelor’s degree or more in comparison to the total population (24%). Education reflects a person’s occupation and income, and higher education usually leads to better occupations and higher incomes. Poverty levels show that 23 percent of all Mexicans live below the poverty line, in comparison with the total population (12%). Mexicans under the age of 18 had higher rates of poverty (28%) than the total population of all those under 18 years (17%) (Ramirez 2004). Several factors contribute to the low levels of educational levels in comparison to the total population. Such historical and contemporary barriers to higher education as segregation, tracking, cultural biases in administrative and curricular organizational structures, and institutional discrimination within the educational system, and the stresses and strains of high levels of poverty contribute to the low levels of educational achievement of Mexican Americans. Structural barriers persisting into the 21st century have worked against Mexican Americans achieving success within the educational system. Many high schools and universities lack adequate support services.
A Nation in Transition Many social issues will undoubtedly confront American society as it becomes a more diverse population and must deal with welfare programs, subsidized health care, and housing. As the population of Mexican Americans increases, their political potential will continue to increase. Latinos will continue to be targeted by both Democrats and Republicans in an effort to harness their voting power. Mexican Americans have had more difficulties than African Americans in securing their political base of power. The Mexican American population continues to be a much younger population than all other racial/ethnic groups in the United States. For these reasons, it is understandable that Mexican Americans face vastly different obstacles related to political mobilization than African Americans. Mexican American community organizations assist Mexican immigrants in becoming American citizens and organize voter registration campaigns for those already citizens and American-born Mexican Americans. The 21st century will see the rise of key political organizations within Latino communities.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Mexico | 1537
Issues in Relations between the United States and Mexico: Forecasts for the 21st Century Mexican immigration will continue to produce demographic changes and contribute to the United States moving closer to being a nation where no one racial/ethnic group is in the majority. About 50 percent of the population growth in the United States can be attributed to the growth rates of Asians and Latinos, Mexicans, and other Hispanics, such as Puerto Ricans and Central Americans. California has the largest number of Mexican Americans in comparison to all other states. In 2000, whites were no longer the largest racial/ethnic group in the state. High rates of Mexican immigration and high birth rates surpass all other immigrant groups and account for such population changes in the state. Los Angeles County has more Latinos than the total population of Oregon. Mexican immigrants usually reside in the state’s major urban centers such as Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area. Mexican immigrants come to the United States, specifically California, and find cultural practices, activities, and networks that make the state appear to be a continuation of their Mexican lives and cultural traditions that they thought were being left behind. Mexican immigrants feel “at home” even if they are now in a new home, where they become New Americans. Their U.S.-born children and their experiences within the United States lead to cultural changes and adjustments for immigrant parents. Public policies will continue to be proposed to curb immigration, as will proposals to make citizenship available to undocumented Mexican immigrants. In an effort to address a major problem that developed during the implementation of the 1986 immigration law, the 2000 Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, known as the Life Act was passed. The 1986 Amnesty Act had required that those seeking legal documentation in the United States had to have been residing, without interruption, in the United States from 1982 on. Those who left and came back to the United States could not apply for amnesty. Some of those denied access to citizenship filed lawsuits, but these ended once Congress passed the Life Act. The Life Act allowed undocumented immigrants who had returned to Mexico and then reentered the United States to apply under the provisions of the Amnesty Act. Other public policy issues underline the need to improve the socioeconomic status of Mexican immigrants currently residing in the United States. Many policy makers and experts on Mexican immigration agree that the starting point is education. Raising the level and quality of education for Mexican immigrants and their children is identified as a cornerstone of public policy that will prove the most effective in improving the everyday living conditions of Mexican immigrants, which in turn will benefit American society in general. An alarming rise in teenage pregnancies is also seen as a major health issue, and many local agencies are attempting to increase their funds in order to maintain strong family planning services.
1538 | Mexican Immigrants
Although family planning centers have been making a difference in lowering the rates of teenage pregnancies, the rates continue to show a marked upswing. Prenatal health care is becoming a serious issue in need of more attention. A slow but rising increase in the elderly population of Mexican immigrants will undoubtedly become a critical issue in the next few years. The 2008 economic recession created new conditions for Mexican immigrants. The lack of jobs and a post-9/11 period of heightened security has decreased the number of documented and undocumented Mexicans coming to the United States more than at any time since the 1970s. Apprehensions of undocumented immigrants decreased by 34 percent in 2009. Increased border security by U.S. agencies and the economic downturn account for such developments. In 2009, the undocumented in the United States, most of whom are Mexican, numbered 11 million, down from 12 million in 2006. Mexicans who continue to live in the U.S. experience greater problems as jobs disappear, housing becomes more expensive, and health care becomes less available. Local governments in states such as California, Arizona, and Texas have introduced legislation to address the immigration issue. President Barack Obama pledged to focus on immigration in 2011, while his administration addressed health care reform in 2009 and 2010. Mexican immigrants will continue to follow the path of Americanization but will experience the balancing of two cultures. Unfortunately, gang violence, drug trafficking, racial profiling, and other overt and covert manifestations of prejudice and discrimination will also confront Mexican immigrants arriving in the United States in the 21st century. History will tell how successful the United States will be in welcoming each new wave of Mexican immigrants, future New Americans.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 229 Total and Mexican foreign-born populations, 1960–2006 Mexican-Born Year
Foreign-Born
Rank
Share of All Foreign-Born
Number
1960
9,738,091
7
5.9
575,902
1970
9,619,302
4
7.9
759,711
1980
14,079,906
1
15.6
2,199,221
1990
19,767,316
1
21.7
4,298,014
2000
31,107,889
1
29.5
9,177,487
2006
37,547,315
1
30.7
11,541,404
Source: Gibson, Campbell and Emily Lennon, 1999. U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 29, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850 to 1990, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. Data for 2000 and 2006 are from U.S. Bureau’s Census 2000 and American Community Survey 2006, respectively.
Table 230 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and Country of Birth
2000
2001
2002
Total
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
Mexico
173,493
205,560
218,822
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
115,585
175,411
161,445
173,749
148,640
189,989
164,920
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 231 Top six receiving states for legal Mexican immigration, 2001, in thousands California
Texas
Illinois
Arizona
Florida
Colorado
Mexican Immigrant Population
3,785
1,452
468
402
196
178
Total Immigrant Population
8,781
2,443
1,155
630
2,767
412
Mexican Share of Total
43.1%
59.4%
40.5%
63.8%
63.8%
43.2%
Source: Camarota, Steven A. 2001. Immigration from Mexico: Assessing the Impact on the United States. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies.
Table 232 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009: leading states of residence
Total Arizona
Total
Male
Female
164,920
69,581
95,338
9,168
3,769
5,399
California
59,814
24,686
35,127
Colorado
3,433
1,508
1,925
276
135
141
Florida
4,407
1,897
2,510
Georgia
3,325
1,454
1,871
Illinois
9,202
3,919
5,283
Maryland
604
289
315
Michigan
1,168
531
637
869
382
487
Nevada
3,207
1,314
1,893
New Jersey
1,123
542
581
New York
1,858
844
1,014
North Carolina
Connecticut
Minnesota
2,923
1,215
1,708
Ohio
515
236
279
Pennsylvania
794
359
435
Texas
38,597
16,070
22,527
Virginia
1,005
447
558
Washington
2,710
1,129
1,581
19,922
8,855
11,067
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
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South, 25.30%
West, 62.70% Midwest, 9.60% Northeast, 2.40%
Figure 24 Regional Distribution of Mexican Immigrants, 2001 Source: Camarota, Steven, 2001. Immigration from Mexico: Assessing the Impact on the United States. Center for Immigration Studies, Washington D.C.
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Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 233 Educational attainment by region of birth, by percentage Less Than 9th Grade, %
1542
Total U.S.-born
9th to 12th Grade, %
High School Graduate, %
Some College, %
College Graduate, %
Advanced Degree, %
Total
3.6
8.7
31.3
28.8
17.6
9.9
100.0
Total foreign-born
20.4
11.5
24.0
17.1
16.1
10.9
100.0
Mexico
41.3
18.6
24.9
10.1
3.8
1.4
100.0
Central America
32.2
15.9
26.0
15.5
7.8
2.6
100.0
Caribbean
14.6
12.9
30.4
22.4
13.2
6.4
100.0
Source: Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2007. Table 22.Persons, by Educational Attainment and Region of Birth: 2007. Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of 2007 American Community Survey.
Table 234 Industry by area of birth, 2007, by percentage Total Native-Born Management and business
Mexico
Central America
Total Foreign-Born
13.2
3.7
5.2
9.7
Science and engineering
4.4
0.8
1.2
5.7
Legal, community and social services
2.7
0.5
1.0
1.4
Education, arts and media
8.0
1.8
2.4
5.1
Health care
6.7
1.7
3.3
6.6
Food preparation and serving
5.6
10.9
8.6
7.6
Cleaning and maintenance
3.2
13.5
16.1
8.2
Sales
12.1
5.7
6.8
9.2
Office and administrative support
15.1
6.1
8.3
9.5
Farming, fishing and forestry
0.6
5.9
1.3
2.1
Construction and extraction
5.7
18.9
16.7
9.8
Installation, repair and production
9.5
17.2
14.7
12.4
Transportation and material moving
6.3
9.3
9.1
6.8
Military
0.4
0.1
0.1
0.1
Other services
5.7
3.1
4.5
5.0
Unemployed
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total
Source: Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2007. Table 24. Occupations, by Region of Birth, 2007. Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of 2007 American Community Survey.
Table 235 Educational attainment of U.S. population by race and ethnicity, percentages Hispanic U.S.-Born % Less than 9th grade
Non-Hispanic
Foreign-Born %
White %
Black %
Asian %
9.2
34.2
3.2
5.6
8.1
9th to 12th grade
14.3
16.4
7.3
14.2
6.0
High school graduate
31.5
25.8
30.7
34.4
17.7
Some college
29.0
29.0
28.3
28.6
18.4
College graduate
16.0
16.0
30.5
17.3
49.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total
Source: Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2007. Table 21.Educational Attainment, by Race and Ethnicity: 2007. Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of 2007 American Community Survey.
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1544 | Mexican Immigrants
Appendix III: Notable Mexican Americans Cesar E. Chavez (1927–1993) Cesar Chavez was born in Yuma, Arizona, on March 31, 1927. The severe economic conditions brought on by the Great Depression of 1929 forced his family to move to California in search of work and a better life. He was the son of migrant farm workers, and his family moved throughout the agricultural fields of the Southwest, in search of work. Chavez attended more than 30 elementary schools. By the late 1930s, the Chavez family had settled in San Jose, California, in a predominately Mexican immigrant and Mexican American barrio called Sal Si Puedes (Get Out If You Can). As a young child, Chavez worked in the fields surrounding San Jose. His father participated in some of the early labor activities organized to improve the working conditions experienced by farm workers. From 1952 until 1962, Cesar worked with a grassroots community organization, the Community Service Organization (CSO), founded by community activist Saul Alinsky. Chavez dedicated himself to registering voters and assumed the duties of general director for community relations for the CSO. After several years of working in the CSO, Chavez founded the United Farm Workers Union in 1962 and established its headquarters in Delano, California. He supported Filipino grape workers in their 1965 strike. Robert F. Kennedy became one of his closest friends and supporters. Chavez expanded the grape strike into a national and international strike and boycott that succeeded in elevating the struggling United Farm Workers Union into a growing and influential group in the labor movement. A 1966 statewide march from Delano to Sacramento became of the most significant activities organized by Cesar Chavez. Chavez and the United Farm Workers emerged victorious in their dramatic challenge to the powerful groups of growers. In 1970, the United Farm Workers, assisted by the Catholic Bishops Committee on Farm Labor, signed three-year contracts with 26 California growers. Various organizational problems led to more setbacks for the union, with the growers eventually signing contracts with the Teamsters Union in an attempt to break Chavez and his union. Over the 1970s, the union declined. Chavez turned his attention to the lettuce growers and initiated a national and international strike. The strike was eventually settled, with the United Farm Workers winning major concessions, but the union experienced serious internal problems that continued to plague the United Farm Workers. By the 1980s, the union’s membership had dropped to its lowest levels since its creation. Chavez then turned his attention to the use of pesticides in fields, adopting newer strategies such as mass mailings. He organized a new grape boycott in 1984, but it never gained the level of success of the previous one. Chavez went on several fasts to bring attention to the cause of the farm workers.
Appendix III: Notable Mexican Americans | 1545
Chavez emerged as one of the central figures in Mexican immigrant and Mexican American history. His strategy of nonviolence and his lifelong commitment to social justice remain a legacy for Latino communities and all Americans. In 1990, then Mexican president Carlos Salinas Gotari presented Cesar Chavez with Mexico’s highest award given to a foreigner: the Aguila Azteca Award (the Aztec Eagle Award). Cesar Chavez died in his sleep on April 23, 1993, during a trip to Arizona where he was testifying in a United Farm Workers court case. His funeral in Delano, California, was covered by national and international media. The San Jose California City Council voted unanimously to establish his home in San Jose as a national landmark. In 1994, President Clinton honored Chavez with the highest civilian award: the Presidential Medal of Freedom. In 1996, Chavez was remembered by a commemorative march through San Jose, California. California now celebrates the struggles and triumphs of Cesar Chavez with a statewide holiday. Ernesto Galarza (1905–1984) Ernesto Galarza immigrated to the United States with his family in 1913 during the Mexican Revolution of 1910. He was the first Mexican American to be accepted at Stanford University for graduate studies and became the first Mexican American to receive a doctorate. He was born in 1905 in Jalcocotan, Nayarit. His family first moved to Tepic, Mazatlan, and then continued their journey to the United States, arriving first in Tucson, Arizona, and settling in Sacramento, California. Galarza attended public school in Sacramento and eventually became fluent in English. He graduated from high school and attended Occidental College in southern California with a full scholarship, specializing in Latin America. He earned his master’s degree in political science and history from Stanford University and received a PhD from Columbia University in 1944. Galarza and his wife, Mae Taylor, worked as teachers and later codirectors at a private school in New York. He also served as a research associate for the Foreign Policy Association in New York and later held a similar position at the Pan American Union (PAU) in Washington, D.C. His success at the PAU led to his appointment as director of its Division of Labor and Social Information. His work for the PAU sparked what would be Galarza’s lifelong passion: the conditions and treatment of Mexican immigrant workers in the United States. Galarza moved back to San Jose, California, where he dedicated over 30 years to improving conditions for Mexican farm laborers, particularly undocumented workers. He served as a consultant for various government agencies. During the Chicano social protest movement of the 1960s, Galarza worked for various causes but always focused on farm laborers or urban workers. He taught at Harvard University and Notre Dame. Galarza published two important monographs of farm labor that remain the classic books on farm workers and labor organizing: Strangers in Our Fields (1956) and Merchants of Labor (1964). In 1970, Galarza published one of
1546 | Mexican Immigrants
his most famous works, Spiders in the House and Workers in the Fields. In 1971, Galarza wrote his acclaimed autobiography, Barrio Boy, in which he recounts his immigration to the United States with his mother and uncles and his adaptation to American society. Barrio Boy is considered one of the literary classics in Mexican American studies and continues to be used in colleges and universities throughout the United States. Galarza is considered to be the dean of Mexican American studies. Henry B. Gonzalez (1916–2000) Henry Gonzalez was elected to the Texas State Senate in 1956, becoming the first Mexican American state senator in 100 years. In 1961, Gonzalez was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as the first Mexican American from Texas ever elected to national office. Gonzalez was born in San Antonio, Texas, on May 3, 1916, when his parents fled the turmoil of the Mexican Revolution. His father had been the mayor of a small town in the state of Durango, Mexico, and after his immigration to Texas, he continued his public career when he became an editor of La Prensa, a major Mexican immigrant newspaper in the United States. Despite his father’s professional status, Gonzalez’s parents experienced economic hardship, but they managed to support their six children and instilled in them the value of education as a key to upward mobility. In 1936, Henry Gonzalez accomplished the first of many lifelong successes when he earned admission to the University of Texas at Austin as an engineering major. The Great Depression made it impossible for him to continue working to pay for his college expenses. Returning to San Antonio, he eventually was able to attend St. Mary’s University, from which he was later awarded an honorary Doctor of Jurisprudence degree. After World War II, Gonzalez started his long and illustrious political career in the early 1950s when he served as a member of San Antonio’s city council. By the end of the 1950s, Gonzalez had gained a respected reputation as a national political figure. Throughout his political life, he devoted his legislative energies to the struggles for social justice. He worked to end segregation, improve housing conditions, and increase educational opportunities and civil rights for his constituency in the predominantly Mexican American 20th Congressional District of Texas. As a result of his political successes and seniority in the Congress, Gonzalez was appointed chair of the House Banking and Currency Committee. He monitored the policies of the Federal Reserve System Board in order to expand economic opportunities available to minority populations. He became a voice for reform for such issues as the poll tax, restrictive covenants in housing, and mortgage constraints aimed at economically marginal groups. Together with Edward Roybal, congressman from California, Gonzalez founded the Hispanic Congressional Caucus.
Appendix III: Notable Mexican Americans | 1547
Congressman Gonzalez retired in 1996 and passed away at the age of 84. His son, Henry Gonzalez Jr., was elected to Congress from the same Texas district as his father. Dolores Huerta (1930–) Dolores Huerta is the most prominent Mexican American woman labor leader in the United States. She was cofounder and first vice president of the United Farm Workers Union, and, together with Cesar Chavez, she shaped the course of farm labor history. Huerta has dedicated her life to the cause of the farm workers and to the attainment of social justice. Huerta was born in 1930 in the mining town of Dawson, New Mexico. Her maternal grandparents were born in New Mexico, and her paternal grandparents were Mexican immigrants. When she was a small child, her parents divorced, and she moved to Stockton, California, with her mother and two brothers. After graduating from high school, Huerta helped her mother run a small grocery store. She received her associate in arts degree from Stockton Junior College in the early 1950s. Huerta became a founding member of the Stockton chapter of the Community Service Organization (CSO) in 1955. The CSO was a grassroots organization that focused on local community issues such as housing, access to medical care, and police brutality. Huerta established the Agricultural Workers Association within the CSO in 1960. She became one of the organization’s most successful lobbyists in Sacramento. Her lobbying efforts contributed to the passage of legislation allowing voters the right to vote in Spanish, and the right of individuals to take the driver’s license examination in their native language. Huerta met Cesar Chavez through her work in the CSO. She agreed with his decision to leave the CSO to form an organization for farm workers: the United Farm Workers Union. Together with Chavez, Dolores Huerta became the symbol of the farm workers’ struggle. She served as a picket captain during the famous Delano grape strike in the 1960s. Huerta became the union’s major negotiator with the various growers’ organizations with which the United Farm Workers Union entered into contract negotiations. Throughout the years of the Delano grape strike, Dolores Huerta played a key role along with Chavez. She coordinated major activities of the United Farm Workers in California and throughout the United States. She spoke at local, state, and national conferences and universities. Huerta testified before several congressional committees dealing with farm workers and Mexican immigration. She became a well-known figure in Mexico and other Latin American countries. With Chavez, Dolores Huerta founded the Robert F. Kennedy Medical Plan, the Juan De La Cruz Farm Worker Pension Fund, the Farm Workers Credit Union, the first medical and pension plan, and a credit union for farm
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workers. They also formed the National Farm Workers Service Center, a community-based housing organization. Huerta is also active in the Fund for the Feminist Majority, an advocacy group for the equal rights of women, and in the Women’s Majority Organization, whose goal is to encourage women to run for public office. Huerta has received many awards for her untiring efforts to improve the living conditions of farm workers. In 1984, she was awarded the Outstanding Labor Leader Award by the California State Senate. She was inducted into the National Women’s Hall of Fame in 1993. Huerta also received the American Civil Liberties Union Roger Baldwin Medal of Liberty Award. In 1998, Huerta was also honored by Ms. magazine as one of the three “Women of the Year.” She is included in Ladies Home Journal’s “100 Most Important Women of the 20th Century.” Francisco Jimenez (1943–) Francisco Jimenez immigrated with his family to California from Tlaquepaque, Mexico, and as a child he worked in the fields of California. He is currently a professor of modern languages and literatures and holds the Fay Boyle University Academic Endowed Professorship at Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California. Having received his BA from Santa Clara University and an MA and PhD in Latin American literature from Columbia University under a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship. He has served on various professional boards and commissions, including the California Council for the Humanities, Accreditation Commission for Senior Colleges and Universities, the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing, and the Far West Lab for Educational Research and Development. Jimenez has published and edited several books on Mexican and Mexican American literature, and his stories have been published in over 50 textbooks and anthologies of literature. His collection of autobiographical short stories, The Circuit: Stories from the Life of a Migrant Child (1997, 1999, 2000), was selected as a Booklist Editors’ Choice in 1997 and has received several literary awards, including the Boston Globe Horn Book Award for Fiction, the Americas Award, the California Library Association John and Patricia Beatty Award, a Jane Addams Honor Book Award, the New York Public Library 1999 Book for the Teen-Ager, and an American Library Association Best Book for Young Adults award. His children’s book La Mariposa, published in English, Spanish, and Chinese, won a Parent’s Choice Recommended Award, made the Americas Commended List, and was a Smithsonian Notable Book for Children. The Pacific Conservatory for the Performing Arts adapted portions of the book for a one-act play performed in various schools and colleges in California, and Audio Bookshelf has published a recording in both English and Spanish (January 2001). His book The Christmas Gift/El Regale de Navidad (2000), an illustrated bilingual book for children, received a starred review in Publisher’s Weekly.
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In 2001 he published Breaking Through, in which he continues his story from a migrant child to a high school student. Breaking Through was selected a Booklist Editors’ Choice, an American Library Association Best Book for Young Adults, a Smithsonian’s Notable Book for Children and Young Adults, a New York Public Library Book for the Teen-Ager, a Notable Books for a Global Society, CBC-Social Studies Trade Books for Young People, a Parents’ Choice Award, a Choice List of Books for 2002 from Children’s and Young Adult Literature, an American Booksellers Association Pick of the Lists, the American Library Association’s Pura Bupré Authors Honor Book Award, the Tomas Rivera Mexican American Book Award, and the Americas Award. It was selected for the William Allen White Children’s and Young Adult Book Award 2003–2004 Master List. It was also selected for the Silicon Valley Reads: One Book, One Community Reading Program for the winter 2003, and by Jefferson County, Oregon, Community Read Program, spring 2005. Houghton Mifflin published his Spanish translation of Breaking Through in 2002 under the title Senderos Fronterizos. Recorded Books, Inc. released an audiocassette recording of it in 2003. It was published in Japanese in 2005 and selected by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the American Library Association for the “We the People” Bookshelf program for 2008. Reaching Out, the sequel to Breaking Through, follows the narrator’s journey from high school through college. It has received several national literary awards and recognitions, including the 2009 American Library Association Pura Belpre Honor Book Award, a 2009 Smithsonian Magazine Notable Book, 2009 American Library Services for Children and Young Adults Notable Book, and the 2009 Carter C. Woodson award. Gloria Molina (1948–) Gloria Molina broke traditional political barriers in 1982 when she won a seat in the lower house of the California legislature. Molina was born to Mexican immigrant parents in Los Angeles, California. She attended the local grade school and high school. After graduating from high school, Molina attended Los Angeles City College, where she became active in the Mexican American student movements during the 1960s. She joined various student organizations that worked to improve the status of Mexican and Mexican American students in higher education. After graduating from California State University at Los Angeles, Molina took a position as an employment counselor. In 1973, Molina founded the Commission Yemeni de Los Angeles (Women’s Commission of Los Angeles). The commission developed various social services programs for Mexican and Mexican American women. During her term as president of the commission (1974–1976), Molina gained a statewide reputation and became an important role model for Latinas and all women. Molina entered politics in 1982 when she ran a successful campaign for the California State Assembly, where she became a vocal advocate for Mexican Americans. In 1987, Molina ran for
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the Los Angeles City Council and gained 57 percent of the vote. With this electoral victory, Molina became the first Mexican American woman to sit on the City Council. Molina has received many awards for her outstanding work as a public official and community advocate. She was selected Hispanic of the Year by Caminos magazine in 1982 and received the Woman of the Year Award presented by the Mexican American Opportunity Foundation. She has also been honored by the Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee. In 1984, Molina was voted Woman of the Year by Ms. magazine. The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund gave her its Woman of Achievement Award. Molina broke new political ground in 1991 when she was elected to the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors. She became the first Mexican-American woman to be elected to this key political office. In 1992, Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gotari presented her with the prestigious Aguila Azteca award, the highest award given to a foreigner by the Mexican government. Edward James Olmos (1947–) Edward James Olmos is one of the most recognized Mexican American movie and television personalities. He was born in East Los Angeles, California, where he attended high school and college. He started his career as a rock singer but quickly moved to acting. His first major acting experience came when he won the lead role in the musical play Zoot Suit (1978), for which he won the Los Angeles Drama Critics Circle Award. Olmos later starred in the 1981 film version. He gained national recognition when he joined the television cast of Miami Vice (1984–1989), where he played Lt. Castillo. He won the Emmy as Best Supporting Actor in a Continuing Drama Series for that role. Olmos played the lead character in the film The Ballad of Gregorio Cortez (1982). He continued to gain a national reputation, starring in the widely acclaimed Stand and Deliver (1988), the true story of a Latino math teacher with a deep commitment to East Los Angeles Latino students. The film brought national attention to the needs of Latino students in the American educational system. Olmos expanded his role as a television and movie personality by traveling throughout the country lecturing on the need for educational reforms, particularly for Mexican students. Olmo appeared on the cover of Time in recognition of his work for educational reform. In 1992, Olmos turned to directing with the film American Me (1992), a depiction of gang and prison life among Mexicans in East Los Angeles. Olmos played the narrator in the film Mi Familia/My Family (1995), and the role of the father of Tex/Mex singer Selena in the film Selena (1997). Anthony Quinn (1915–2001)Anthony Quinn was a widely acclaimed actor who came to the United States as a Mexican immigrant in 1915 from his native Chihuahua, Mexico. His grandfather had come to Mexico to escape the severe
Appendix III: Notable Mexican Americans | 1551
economic difficulties in Ireland and married a Mexican woman. The entire family fled the Mexican Revolution, moving to the border town of Juarez. They eventually crossed the border to live in El Paso, Texas. The family moved to Los Angeles in 1911. His father died when Quinn was 11 years old and his mother faced many economic hardships as a single parent. Quinn dropped out of high school during the Great Depression and worked at a series of odd jobs. Quinn began to work in theater, obtaining small parts in local productions. He gained his first experience in the motion picture industry when he was hired to play a small role in a Mae West film. This proved to be an important start in his career, when he came to the attention of the famous director Cecil B. DeMille. The young Quinn was subsequently cast as a Cheyenne leader in the movie The Plainsmen (1936). Quinn later married DeMille’s adopted daughter, with whom he had five children. Between 1937 and 1947, Quinn appeared as a supporting actor in a series of films including The Last Train from Madrid (1937), Blood and Sand (1941), The Oxbow Incident (1943), Guadalcanal Diary (1943), Irish Eyes Are Smiling (1944), and Back to Battan (1945). Quinn, who became a U.S. citizen in 1947, turned to Broadway but returned to Hollywood three years later. One of his most memorable roles was in the 1952 film Viva Zapata, with his portrayal of Eufemio Zapata, the older brother of Mexican revolutionary leader Emiliano Zapata, played by Marlon Brando. This performance earned him an Academy Award, which he won again for his performance as Paul Gauguin in Lust for Life. Quinn appeared in many other movies, including Guns of Navarrone (1961), Requiem for a Heavyweight (1962), and Lawrence of Arabia (1963). During the late 1960s and 1970s, Quinn was cast as a Latin American and other ethnic characters in such films as The Greek Tycoon (1978), The Children of Sanchez (1978), Lion in the Desert (1981), and Onassis: The Richest Man in the World (1988). The role for which he will always be best remembered is his portrayal of Zorba in Zorba the Greek (1964). Edward R. Roybal (1916–1993) Edward Roybal’s political career spanned over 39 years, beginning in 1949 when he became the first Mexican American since 1881 to win a seat on the Los Angeles City Council. In 1962, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from the 25th District in Los Angeles. The first of eight children of Eloisa and Baudilio Roybal, Edward Roybal was born in 1916 in Albuquerque, New Mexico. His father worked for the railroads, but after an unsuccessful railroad strike cost many workers their jobs, Roybal’s family moved to the working-class Mexican community of Boyle Heights in Los Angeles in 1920. Although his family stressed the importance of education, the Great Depression made it difficult for Roybal to continue his studies after his graduation from high school. Roybal joined
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the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), created by Franklin D. Roosevelt, as an answer to the chronic unemployment produced by the Great Depression. After leaving the CCC and with the general economic recovery, Roybal was able to continue his education, when he enrolled as an accounting major in the School of Business Administration at the University of California at Los Angeles. After graduation, Roybal went to work for 20th-Century Fox Studios. Roybal entered the election for the Los Angeles City Council in 1947 and lost by a small percentage. He continued his community activism and joined with long-time community organizer Fred Ross and his Community Service Organization (CSO). Roybal won the 1947 race for the Los Angeles City Council, becoming the first Mexican American to sit on the council since 1882. Roybal lost the 1954 election for California’s lieutenant governor, and the 1959 election for a seat on the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors. He continued to serve on the city council until 1962, winning twice without opposition. In 1962, Roybal embarked on what was to be his national political career. He ran for the U.S. House of Representatives in California’s 25th District. His victory represented a major breakthrough for Mexican Americans. Roybal’s distinguished work as a congressman spans from 1962 until his retirement in 1992. Roybal’s political concerns always centered on issues critical to all his constituencies, but he specifically addressed issues confronting the Mexican American community. He introduced legislation reforms in the areas of health care and aging. He also distinguished himself by serving on such committees as the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, the Appropriations Committee, the Select Committee on Aging, the Committee on Veterans Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Education and Training. In 1967, Roybal introduced a bill that would have long-lasting implications. He wrote the federal bilingual education act that was successfully passed. Roybal fought sustained opposition to this bill for years to come, but particularly during the Reagan Administration. He served as one of a handful of Mexican American political figures with a national reputation. He founded the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials in 1975, and in 1977 he played a prominent role in the creation of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. As caucus chair, Roybal led the struggle against the Simpson-Rodino Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Roybal was active in many other organizations, including the Democratic National Committee, the American Legion, the Knights of Columbus, and the Boy Scouts. He received many awards for his public service, including the Excellence in Public Service Award from the American Academy of Pediatrics and the Joshua Award for his advocacy of Jewish–Latino Relations.
References | 1553
Glossary Alambrista: From the Spanish word for wire, alambre, an alambrista refers to one who crosses the wire fence used along some parts of the U.S.–Mexico border. Corridos: Mexican folk ballads. El Norte: “The North”—used by Mexicans to refer to the United States. Frontera: Border. Los mojados: “The Wet Ones”—used to refer to undocumented Mexican immigrants that cross the Rio Grande River to enter the United States; considered a pejorative term. Madrina/padrino: Godmother/godfather—female/male sponsor at baptism or other religious ritual. Mariachi: Traditional form of Mexican music. Musica norteña: Mexican music typical of Mexico’s northern states and bordering state of Texas; influenced originally by 19th-century German polka music brought by German immigrants to Texas. Quinceañera: From the Spanish word for 15— quince—refers to the coming-out party for a girl of 15, similar to a sweet-16 party.
References Baca Zinn, Maxine. 1980, February. “Employment and Education of Mexican American Women: The Interplay of Modernity and Ethnicity in Eight Families.” Harvard Education Review 50: 47–62. Baca Zinn, Maxine. 1982. “Familism among Chicanos: A Theoretical Review.” Humbolt Journal of Social Relations 10: 224–38. Baker, Bryan. 2007, December. Trends in Naturalization Rates. US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. [Online information; retrieved 09.] http:// www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ntz_rates508.pdf. Barroqueiro, Silverio. 1999. The Aztecs: A Pre-Columian History. [Online information; retrieved 09.] http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1999/2/99.02.01.x.html. Batalova, Jeanne. 2008, April. Mexican Immigrants in the United States. Migration Information Source, Migration Policy Institute. [Online information; retrieved 09.] http:// www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id=679. Camarota, Steven A. 2001. Immigration from Mexico: Assessing the Impact on the United States. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies. Cardoso, Lawrence A. 1980. Mexican Emigration to the United States. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Driscoll, Barbara A. 1999. The Tracks North: The Bracero Program of World War II. Austin: University of Texas Press.
1554 | Mexican Immigrants Gamio, Manuel. 1931. Mexican Immigration to the United States: A Study of Human Migration and Adjustment. New York: Dover. Garcia, Alma M. 2002. The Mexican Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Gibson, Campbell, and Emily Lennon. 1999. US Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 29, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850 to 1990. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Data for 2000 and 2006 are from U.S. Bureau’s Census 2000 and American Community Survey 2006, respectively. Gonzales, Manuel. 1999. Mexicanos: A History of Mexicans in the United States. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Grieco, Elizabeth. 2003, October. The Foreign Born from Mexico to the United States. Migration Information Source. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. [Online information; retrieved 09.] http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=163. Meir, Matt S. 1993. Mexican Americans, American Mexicans: From Conquistadors to Chicanos. New York: Hill and Wang. Passel, Jeffrey. 2004. Mexican Immigration to the U.S.: The Latest Estimates. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. [Online information; retrieved 09.] http://www.migra tioninformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=208. Pew Hispanic Center. 2007. Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States. Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of 2007 American Community Survey. Ramirez, Robert R. 2004. We the People: Hispanics in the United States: Census 2000 Special Reports. US Census Bureau. [Online information; retrieved 09.] http://www.census. gov/prod/2004pubs/censr-18.pdf. United States Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. 2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. [Online information; retrieved 09.] http://www.dhs. gov/files/statistics/publications/LPR07.shtm. Williams, Norma. 1990. The Mexican American Family: Tradition and Change. New York: General Hall.
Further Reading Azuela, Mariano. 1915. The Underdogs. New York: New American Library. Azuela’s novel is considered the best novel written about the Mexican Revolution of 1910. He brings to life the people who fought for their beliefs and how their lives changed as a result of this violent period in Mexican history that was responsible for the first major immigration wave to the United States. Barroqueiro, Silverio. 1999. The Aztecs: A Pre-Columian History. [Online information; retrieved 09.] http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1999/2/99.02.01.x.html. This site provides a general overview of Aztec history, as well as lesson plans for middle school students.
Further Reading | 1555 Fox, Geoffrey. 1996. Hispanic Nation: Culture, Politics, and the Construction of Identity. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Fox provides an overview of how Hispanic immigrants and subsequent generations have participated in U.S. society and politics. The book includes a discussion of Mexican and other Hispanic immigrants. Galarza, Ernesto. 1971. Barrio Boy. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame. Galarza’s autobiographical novel of his early childhood in Mexico and his move with his family to Sacramento, California, is considered a classic. Galarza takes us with him as he crosses the border, encounters a new culture, and starts a new life as an immigrant in a Mexican community in Sacramento. Gamio, Manuel. 1931. Mexican Immigration to the United States: A Study of Human Migration and Adjustment. New York: Dover. Gamio was the first Mexican to earn a doctorate from a university in the United States. He was commissioned by the U.S. government to research the lives of Mexican immigrants. Gamio used a variety of research methods, including oral histories and demographic data such as education attainment, occupations and income. García, Mario T. 1981. Desert Immigrants: The Mexicans of El Paso, 1880–1920. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. El Paso, Texas, has always been one of the major points of entry for Mexican immigrants. Garcia documents the cultural, economic, and political experiences of Mexicans who crossed the desert from Mexico to the United States and formed a thriving community. Gonzales, Manuel. 1999. Mexicanos: A History of Mexicans in the United States. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Gonzales provides a panoramic view of Mexicans and their adjustment to their new lives in the United States by analyzing the major social institutions, such as education and politics, that have shaped the everyday lives of these immigrants. The book also examines the lives of second and later generations of Mexicans. Handlin, Oscar. 1951. The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations That Made the American People. Boston: Little Brown. Handlin is considered a pioneer historian in the study of immigrants in the United States. He focuses on Western European immigrants who came to the United States during the late 19th century and early 20th centuries. His book provides an excellent source to compare and contrast the experiences of other immigrant groups along with Mexican immigrants. Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette. 1994. Gendered Transitions: Mexican Experiences of Immigration. Berkeley: University of California Press. This is a sociological study of Mexican women immigrants and how they adapt to working conditions in the United States. The book focuses on women who work as domestic workers, nannies, and elder care workers.
1556 | Mexican Immigrants Jiménez, Francisco. 1997. The Circuit: Stories of a Migrant Child. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press; Jiménez, Francisco. 2001. Breaking Through. New York: Houghton Mifflin; Jiménez, Francisco. 2008. Reaching Out. New York: Houghton Mifflin. These three autobiographical novels take the reader through the life cycle of a migrant child from grade school through college. Each book stands on its own and captures the sufferings, hopes, and dreams of a Mexican immigrant boy who labored in the fields alongside his family and went on to graduate from college. McWilliams, Carey. 1948. North from Mexico: The Spanish-Speaking People of the United States. New York: Greenwood Press. Reprinted in 1990. This is a classic history of Mexicans and their arrival, settlement, and adaptation to their new lives in the United States. McWilliams examines how Mexicans left Mexico but retained their culture among themselves and their children. The book documents the Mexican community’s struggles for civil rights. Ruiz, Vicki L. 1998. From Out of the Shadows: Mexican American Women in Twentieth Century America. New York: Oxford University Press. Ruiz focuses on the experiences of Mexican immigrant and Mexican American women as they struggle to survive once they leave Mexico and begin their lives in the United States. This book highlights key women whose lives helped to change Mexican communities through their civic participation. Samora, Julian. 1971. Los Mojados: The Wetback Story. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame. The 2,000 mile border between Mexico and the United States has always made it possible for Mexicans to enter the United States without legal documents. Samora’s book documents the social and economic conditions that faced these immigrants. Sanchez, George J. 1993. Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900–1945. New York: Oxford University Press. The story of Mexican immigrants is also a story of the U.S.-born children. Sanchez provides a historical record of how Mexican immigrants adjust to the United States and how their children combine both their Mexican culture and their American one into a secondgeneration identity. Sanchez focuses on Los Angeles, because the city has always had a large population of Mexicans. Tywoniak, Frances, and Mario García. 2000. Migrant Daughter: Coming of Age as a Mexican American Woman. Berkeley: University of California Press. This oral history traces the life of Frances Tywoniak, a daughter of Mexican immigrants, as she grows up in California and eventually becomes one of the few Mexican American women to graduate from the University of California at Berkeley. She reminisces about a wide range of issues, including her relationship with her parents, her experiences in grade school, and her relations with communities where there were few Mexicans.
Nicaraguan Immigrants by Lisa Konczal
Introduction It can be a daunting task for those who wish to research and appreciate Nicaraguans in the United States. Studies of Nicaraguan immigrants are often amalgamated under the monolithic labels “Hispanic” or “Latino,” U.S. social constructions that sometimes deprive interested parties (and Nicaraguan Americans themselves) of rich histological narrative and a unique example of perseverance. Nicaraguans do share things with other U.S. immigrant groups such as Mexicans (language, destination cities, colonial history, mestizo caste) and Cubans (language, destination city of Miami, a migration based on similar political history involving strong-man politicians). But while there are similarities between Nicaraguan immigrants and their Spanish-speaking compatriots, their story is much more salient than those associations. (The monolithic perception itself is an intriguing facet.) By the year 2000 the U.S. Census had counted 220,335 foreign-born Nicaraguans in the United States. Most have settled in South Florida (Miami, Dade County), and most came during the now infamous Nicaraguan Contra/Sandinista civil war of the late 1970s and 1980s. On the whole, their children fair better economically and educationally than do their “Hispanic” cohorts, but many still struggle with the same individual and structural discrimination bestowed on most immigrants who arrived over the past 30 years. Nicaraguan young adults (first and later generations) have been burdened with the task of confronting varying degrees of opposition and acceptance among the people in their communities. In effect, many have forged a new identity, which combines both characteristics of their homeland and of the United States. This chapter represents some of the relevant factors that have shaped (and continue to shape) the lives of Nicaraguan immigrants in the United States.
Chronology 1522
Spanish explorer Gil Gonzalez de Avila names Nicaragua after a local Indian chief, Nicarao.
1523–1524
Spanish explorer Francisco Hernandez de Cordoba continues the conquest of Nicaragua and establishes the cities of León and Granada.
1557
Chronology | 1559
1610
The Momotombo volcano eruption demolishes León.
17th–18th centuries
Foreign attacks by English, French, and Dutch explorers, and pirates extend their influence over the inhabitants of Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast.
September 15, 1821
Nicaragua formally declares its independence from Spain and becomes part of the autonomous Mexican Empire (date is currently the Independence Day national holiday).
July 1823
Nicaragua becomes part of the Central American Federation, along with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
April 30, 1838
Nicaragua declares full independence.
1855
Tennessee’s William Walker leads a group of armed U.S. filibusters with support from Nicaragua’s Liberal Party. Walker declares himself president of Nicaragua in July 1856 but surrenders in May 1857.
1856
Charles Frederick Henningsen, working under Walker, sets fire to Granada, causing great devastation. Henningsen leaves a famous inscription, “Here was Granada.”
1912–1925
United States establishes military bases in Nicaragua.
1927–1933
Guerrillas led by Augusto Cesar Sandino campaign against U.S. military presence.
1934
Sandino assassinated on the orders of the National Guard commander, General Anastasio Somoza Garcia.
1937
General Somoza elected president, heralding the start of a 44-year-long dictatorship by his family.
1956
General Somoza assassinated, but is succeeded as president by his son, Luis Somoza Debayle.
1961
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) founded.
1967
Luis Somoza dies and is succeeded as president by his brother, Anastasio Somoza.
1972
Managua is devastated by an earthquake that kills between 5,000 and 10,000 people.
July 19, 1979
The Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) military offensive ends with the ouster of Somoza and the Sandinista-led coalition taking power. FSLN leader Daniel Ortega begins nationalizing land and large businesses.
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1979–1982
The first wave of approximately 120,000 Nicaraguans leave Nicaragua and enter the United States. They consist mainly of large landholders, industrialists, and managers of North American enterprises fleeing new nationalist policies.
1982
U.S.-sponsored attacks by “Contra” rebels begin; state of emergency declared. The United States, under Ronald Reagan, withholds aid. A resulting second wave of Nicaraguans enter the United States.
1985
U.S. aid continues through illegal operations, in which funds from weapons sold to Iran are diverted to the Contras.
1988
Nicaraguan leadership signs peace agreement.
1989
The war, Hurricane Joan in 1988, and a severe drought leaves the country in economic ruins, resulting in a mass exodus of Nicaraguans who then entered the United States (mostly to South Florida).
1990
Violeta Chamorro becomes president.
1992
Earthquake renders 16,000 people homeless.
1996
Arnoldo Aleman elected president. The U.S. Congress passes the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).
1997
With organized efforts of Nicaraguan American groups, a bill to Congress is passed—The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), which gives primarily Central Americans an extension to file immigration paper work.
1998
Hurricane Mitch causes massive devastation. Some 3,000 people are killed and hundreds of thousands are left homeless.
2001
Liberal party candidate Enrique Bolaños beats his Sandinista party counterpart, former president Daniel Ortega, in presidential election.
2002
Former president Arnoldo Aleman charged with money laundering, embezzlement during his term in office.
2006
Ex-president Daniel Ortega is returned to power in elections.
2010
Costa Rica accuses Nicaragua of invading its territory and destroying protected forests. In response to the conflict, the Organization of American States passes a resolution calling on both sides to “avoid the presence of military or security forces in the [disputed] area.”
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2011
Nicaragua makes its mark on American pop culture by being the location of the American reality TV show Survivor, in which contestants battle to “survive” in San Juan Del Sur.
Background Geography Centered between Honduras to the north and Costa Rica to the south, Nicaragua is the largest nation in Central America in terms of land mass. The tropical climate can be felt year-round, especially during the hot and humid summer and fall months. Its location and climate make it a target for hurricanes, which can be disastrous. Notably, hurricanes Joan in 1989 and Mitch in 1998 left an already war-torn nation in shambles. Nicaragua is a mountainous region, with the Cordillera Isabella range on the northern portion on the border with Honduras and the Cordillera de Maribios (or Cordillera de Marrabios) mountain range in León and Chinandega to the west. The valleys are fertile and volcanic, especially near the Pacific coast to the west. The fittingly named “Miskito Coast” sits along the swampy and damp Caribbean coast areas. Two big lakes, Lake Nicaragua and Lake Managua near the west side, are connected by the Tipitapa River. On the southwestern shore of Lake Managua is the nation’s capital, Managua, where many of Nicaragua’s people reside. In fact, of Nicaragua’s 6,610,260 people (Worldbank 2007), 1,817,096 reside in Managua (Alcaldia de Managua 2004). What makes its capital unique is the demographics of the population’s residential areas, where it is the poor residents who predominately live in the central areas, while the outskirts are reserved for the middle and upper-middle classes. This is a distinctive geographic characteristic of the nation. In most other Latin American nations the upper classes occupy the central areas, and the outlining circumference is dotted with poor shantytowns.
History Nicaragua’s history is similar to that of other South/Central American nations: a pre-Columbian history of indigenous peoples (predominately the Maya people); the discovery of Nicaragua by Christopher Columbus on the Miskito Coast on the eastern side; followed by a vicious conquest by Spanish conquistadors. Independence was declared in the early 19th century after years of Spanish exploitation that devastated the indigenous population. Also similar to its Central and South American neighbors is that since colonial times, Nicaragua has suffered from political instability, civil war, poverty, foreign intervention, and natural disasters.
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Precolonial History The historical exploitation of the indigenous peoples is still alive via the racial ideas of the country today. Like Mexico, the racial/ethnic clash between indigenous and European settlers resulted in social class conflict whereby those of European background rule, and the mestizo (a mix of indigenous and European ancestry—currently about 60 percent of Nicaragua) population holds a more subservient position. The historic origins of Nicaragua’s indigenous people date back to between the sixth and eighth centuries, as the location was a key point where the Mesoamerican and South American native cultures met. Western Nicaragua was populated by Maya and Aztec from the north, while the eastern region was home to the earliest inhabitants, who were believed to have migrated to the region from South America. Spain was more interested in exploiting the vast riches of Mexico and Peru rather than the smaller area of Nicaragua, but still military expeditions ensued. One of the first was led by Gil Gonzalez De Avila, who arrived through Costa Rica in 1522 and named the region Nicaragua after a local Indian chief, Nicarao. Shortly afterward, Hernandez de Cordoba, coming from Panama, founded the cities of León and Granada, which later became the centers of colonial Nicaragua. By the 1700s, after years of exploiting raw minerals in the area, the focus turned to agriculture, for example traders in León exported animal products (i.e., leather). It was also during this time that political factions arose. While liberal free traders in León were exporting their goods, the conservative elite in Granada were intent on protecting their fortunes under traditional Spanish rule and resisting change. The rivalry between the two political parties (Liberals in León and Conservatives in Granada) continued for years.
Independence (1821–1857) The first movements against Spanish rule in Central America, prompting other areas to follow suit, was in 1811 when the province of El Salvador staged a revolt. From there, Nicaragua’s independence developed in gradual stages. The first stage is represented by Nicaragua’s current Independence Day national holiday, when on September 15, 1821, the captaincy-general of Guatemala, under which Nicaragua and other Central American provinces were located, formally declared its independence from Spain and became part of the autonomous Mexican Empire. During the second stage, in July 1823, Nicaragua declared independence from Mexico and shortly after became part of the Central American Federation, along with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Political factions grew hostile toward one another during the efforts to centralize power in Nicaragua, which resulting in a civil war between 1826 and 1829, delaying a formal declaration of independence until April 30, 1838.
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U.S. Intervention U.S. interest in Nicaragua was motivated by prospective financial gain, due to the strategic location as a transit route across the Central American isthmus. In 1849 Nicaragua and the United States negotiated a treaty that gave the United States exclusive rights to a transit route across Nicaragua, but the plans never evolved. In 1855, with strong support from the Nicaraguan Liberal Party in León, a Tennessee mercenary named William Walker led an army into Nicaragua to take control of the government. He declared himself president but was forced to surrender in 1857. Throughout the early 20th century Nicaragua was rife with civil wars, U.S. intervention, and military takeovers. In 1927 a general named Augusto Sandino, denouncing U.S. intervention, refused to accept a peace accord drawn up by the United States and led a force against the U.S. Marines. Sandino became a national hero, safeguarded by then President Sacasa. About 10 years later, Anastasio “Tacho” Somoza Garcia (the general of the “non-partisan” Nicaraguan National Guard) forcibly replaced local government officials loyal to the president with his close associates. In 1936 Sacasa resigned and Somoza Garcia was “elected” president, beginning the almost 40-year Somosa military dictatorship. His sons, Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza Debayle took control over the country after their father was assassinated in 1956.
Contra/Sandinista War Nicaragua and its people entered into the U.S. consciousness during the economic and political upheavals in Nicaragua that started with the Sandinista Revolution in the late 1970s and continued with a civil war during the 1980s, known as the Contra/Sandinista war (Portes and Stepick 1993). The Sandinista revolution stemmed from opposition to the Somoza family’s abusive regime. Opposition grew in the 1960s and early 1970s (Booth 1990). In 1974 the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional—FSLN) seized the home of a Somosa government official and took as hostages a handful of leading Nicaraguan officials, many of whom were Somoza relatives. That was followed by several Sandinista revolts against Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s dictatorship that took place all over Nicaragua in late 1978. A year later the FSLN managed to beat down the resistance of Somoza’s guard. Somoza eventually fled, the guard collapsed, and the Sandinista-led coalition took power on July 19, 1979 (Booth 1990, 472). Sandinista opponents, encouraged and financed by the United States, took up arms against the Sandinistas. These rebels, known as Contras, waged warfare from 1981 to 1988. The country’s poor economy under socialist policy got worse when
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Soldiers of the Sandinista Army hold captive members of the Contra revolution in La Pinuelas, 205 miles northeast of Managua, Nicaragua, November 5, 1989. (AP Photo/Oscar Navarrete)
the Reagan administration suspended all U.S. aid to Nicaragua in 1981 and implemented a total embargo on U.S. trade in 1985. The only U.S. support came in the form of military aid for groups trying to overthrow the Sandinistas. This aid was banned by the U.S. Congress in 1985, but it continued through illegal operations in which funds from weapons sold to Iran during 1985 were diverted to the Contras. In the aftermath of the “Iran-Contra affair,” the U.S. Congress again stopped all military support in 1987. The Iran-Contra affair did more than send funds to Nicaragua. The scandal put Nicaragua into U.S. consciousness. Some Americans saw the nation as a beneficiary of U.S. protection against socialism, and others saw it as a nation bearing the brunt of U.S. political control during the final decade of the Cold War. The war would have an even greater impact on the United States, in the form of large waves of incoming Nicaraguan immigrants.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration The U.S. Census Bureau did not collect immigration data on individual nations prior to the 1960s, which makes it difficult to assess exact numbers. Existing
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data sets on incoming immigrants were combined by region, so evidence of Nicaraguan flows to the United States can only be implied from those coming from Central America in general. Documented migration to the United States from Central America rose from 500 people entering between 1890 and 1900 to 800 between 1900 and 1910. Seventeen-thousand documented Central Americans came to the United States when the demand for labor during World War I increased during that time (Smagula 2006). The number decreased during the 1930s, partly due to tight restrictions in immigration laws that kept people from Central/South America out of the United States. Nearly 7,500 Nicaraguans immigrated legally into the United States between 1967 and 1976 (Smagula 2006). In 1970, 28,620 Nicaraguans were living in the United States, according to the U.S. Census Bureau (Orlov and Ueda 1980), mostly women who came as domestic servants.
Later Waves of Immigration Nicaraguan immigration to the United States coincided with a shift in immigrant flows in general. Immigrant flows to the United States have changed dramatically over the past 30 years, shifting from primarily European to Asian and Latin American sources. Civil wars that persisted throughout Central America during the 1970s and 1980s, and various exoduses from Cuba, brought massive waves of Hispanics to the United States. To census statisticians and some scholars, Nicaraguans fall under the broad category “Hispanics.” That, along with the fact that Nicaraguans came to the United States during the same period as other Spanish-speaking peoples, presents an argument for an examination of Nicaraguan immigrants under that context. The largest Hispanic group in the United States, Mexicans, represents almost 30 percent of both the total immigrant population and annual immigrant flow. Their population in the United States has quadrupled since 1980 and, in effect, has made a significant impact on the major urban centers of California and Texas (Fix and Passel 2001) (see Table 236). More recent Department of Homeland Security statistics show that these trends continue (see Table 237). These immigration trends made an impact on other immigrants entering the United States, especially from Spanish-speaking countries, because it became part of the context into which they settled.
Immigration during the Contra/Sandinista War The first major wave of Nicaraguans to the United States came during the Contra/ Sandinista civil war. One of the FSLN’s goals during their brief rule was to socialize key profit-generating economic sectors including the enactment of the Agrarian
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Reform Law, which nationalized all rural properties owned by the Somoza family or people associated with the Somozas. Business interests disliked FSLN rule, and the increased government control of the economy. As a result, the first wave of approximately 120,000 Nicaraguans left Nicaragua and entered the United States. They consisted mainly of large landholders, industrialists, and managers of North American enterprises (Portes and Stepick 1993). Many Nicaraguan upper-class exiles had economic roots in the United States and in Miami before the upheaval (Portes and Stepick 1993). This phase of upper-class arrivals included exiled dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle and his family, who owned homes in Miami and were among the richest people in Florida (Portes and Stepick 1993, 152). The second wave of Nicaraguans to the United States, which began during the early 1980s, was made up of professionals and white-collar workers migrating because of both political and economic strife in Nicaragua (Marin 1996; Portes and Stepick 1993). This was the result of the continuing tumultuous civil war and the withholding of U.S. aid under the Reagan administration. In 1986 the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) offered amnesty to all undocumented immigrants who could prove that they had entered the United States before 1982. This act was timely for the almost 16,000 Nicaraguans who applied for amnesty, more than double the number of Nicaraguans who entered the country legally between 1979 and 1982 (Smagula 2006). The number of amnesty applicants suggests that there were about 200,000 Nicaraguans living in the United States during the mid-1980s (Smagula 2006; Funkhouser 1992, 1210). A third wave of Nicaraguans to the United States, consisting primarily of bluecollar workers, peaked in the dramatic exodus of early 1989 (Portes and Stepick 1993, 152). Again, their motivation for migration was escape from both political and economic torment in their homeland. By the late 1980s, the war, Hurricane Joan in 1988, and a severe drought in 1989 left the country in economic ruins. Many in this third wave of immigrants settled in poor and deteriorated sections of Miami, where struggling Cubans who came during the Mariel boatlift exodus of 1980 had previously lived. The influx of Nicaraguans between 1988 and 1990 had significantly diminished by 1991. This decrease was mainly attributed to the defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1989 elections and the beginning of the administration of the newly democratically elected Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. Since then, the figures rise and fall slightly due to families wishing to escape extremely poor economic conditions in their homeland. There were large numbers of asylum seekers in the late 1980s, which decreased during the early 1990s. In 1998 more than two million Nicaraguans were left homeless due to hurricane Mitch. As a result many Nicaraguans received permanent residence or temporary protected status (TPS) in the late 1990s. Nicaraguans have been migrating in smaller, but continuous streams since then, due to the many already established compatriots in the United States, which have
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made the move more feasible, but also due to the continuing poor conditions of the nation. The current World Bank figures show that Nicaragua has the secondlowest per capita income in the Western Hemisphere, with a high infant mortality rate and low life expectancy and primary school completion rates (see Table 241). Nicaraguan migration to the United States subsided (but never stopped) as Arnoldo Aleman became the nation’s president. He defeated Daniel Ortega in 1997, thus completing the first peaceful transfer of the presidency in Nicaragua’s history. Although the democratic process since then ran relatively smoothly, Nicaragua was still not free of political turmoil. In 2002 Aleman was charged with and sentenced a year later for money laundering and embezzlement during his term in office. Despite this, in 2004 the nation got what then President Enrique Bolaños described as the “best news for the country in 25 years”: the World Bank wiped out 80 percent of its debt. Shortly afterward, the left-leaning political ideology that the United States so much opposed during the last stages of the Cold War became the favored ideology among the Nicaraguan population. In 2006 Daniel Ortega won Nicaragua’s presidential election.
Edgar Murillo, an immigrant from Nicaragua, poses for a photo in his cafe in Miami, September 7, 2006. (AP Photo/J. Pat Carter)
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Demographic Profile The 2000 U.S. Census data counted about 220,335 foreign-born Nicaraguans living in the United States, and over half of those (148,945) did not have U.S. citizenship during that data collection (see Table 240). Although sizable groups of Nicaraguans moved to Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, most (about half ) settled in south Florida (Fernandez-Kelly and Curran 2001), in particular Miami-Dade County, which has the largest proportion of foreign-born of any other large municipality in the nation. The Miami-Dade County Department of Planning and Zoning (MDCDPZ) estimated that 105,000 people of Nicaraguan origin lived in Miami-Dade County in the year 2000 (MDCDPZ 2003). They are just a part the 1,295,500 people of Hispanic origin living in the same county, that same year. People of Cuban origin make up the majority of this population, with 780,000 (about 60% of the Hispanic population) (MDCDPZ 2003). Nicaraguans are the second-largest Hispanic group in South Florida. Leaders in the Nicaraguan community dispute that these figures do not take into account the large concentration of undocumented Nicaraguans. For example, the 1990 U.S. Census reported 74,244 people of Nicaraguan origin residing in MiamiDade County, but according to immigration attorneys at least 65,000 were left uncounted (Garvin 2000; Marin 1996). The Planning Department of Miami-Dade County, which estimated that approximately 90,000 people of Nicaraguan origin resided in Dade County in 1995, and 105,000 in 2000, gives a more conservative figure. The former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which reported 250,000 people of Nicaraguan origin living in the United States in 1995, may be the most reliable estimator of the size of the Nicaraguan community, since it accounted for all Nicaraguans who arrived already with legal documentation or who, upon arrival to the United States, filed political asylum applications. Half of these, according to the INS approximately 125,000, were living in Miami-Dade County in 1995 (U.S. INS 1995).
Age and Family Structure According to the 2000 Census, foreign-born Nicaraguans are marriage- and familyoriented, and their household make-up reflects both their economic situation and their traditional ideas about the family. The median age is 36, right between the median age of the total United States (35) and the total U.S. foreign-born (37) (see Table 239). Nicaraguans tend to be clustered between the ages of 20 and 50, while the U.S. population is more widely spread along all groups. A few numbers reflecting family/household make-up are similar to figures describing U.S. households in general. Of the Nicaraguan-born population age 15 and older, 52.1 percent are married (compared to U.S. native-born cohorts, about
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53%) and 12.4 percent are separated or divorced (12% for U.S. native-born). Eleven percent of Nicaraguan families in the United States are headed by single mothers (compared to the lower 7% U.S. native-born). Other figures highlight the Nicaraguan value of extended family (discussed more later in this chapter). Thirteen percent of Nicaraguan households have other relatives (extended family) living with them, and another 20 percent of Nicaraguan households in the United States have 8.4 percent nonrelatives (to Nicaraguans these are “like family”) living in their home (for U.S.-born households the percentages are 4.5 for each).
Educational Attainment Nicaraguans fall below average when compared to their immigrant counterparts. As of the 2000 Census, over 40 percent of first-generation Nicaraguans did not complete high school (compared to 35% of all immigrants). This is especially a concern during the past 20 years, which have seen a flood of Nicaraguan immigrants in the schools. According to Miami-Dade County Public Schools Statistical Abstract (MDCPS 1999), there were about 14,000 foreign-born Nicaraguan children who attended the pubic schools in that district in 1995. They are just a part of the large and growing foreign-born student body attending Miami-Dade County Public Schools. During the 1998–1999 school year almost 10,000 foreign-born Nicaraguan students attended Miami-Dade County Public Schools (MDCPS 1999). During the first four months of the year 2000, these schools have absorbed over 17,000 foreign-born students Educational outcomes, though, are variable, depending on generation and community. According to Rodriguez (2002) and Portes and MacLeod (1996), Nicaraguans suffer significantly in inner-city schools, where minority youth are concentrated, but do better in either private or middle-class neighborhood schools. These findings support the assertions of Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler (1994) that educational failure among Nicaraguan youth is due to an unfavorable reception once in the United States. The perceptions of discrimination from the Cuban community in South Florida are channeling second-generation Nicaraguans into a path of downward mobility and into adoption of oppositional attitudes (FernandezKelly and Schaffer 1994, 674, 678). Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler propose that in the absence of U.S. governmental support to normalize their resident status and hence be able to find gainful employment, “Nicaraguans are experiencing a rapid process of downward mobility even though many have middle-class backgrounds” (Fernandez-Kelly and Schaffer 1994, 674). Indeed, as the generations pass, education among Nicaraguan youth tends to decline. That, some immigration scholars say, is a result of a “dual-frame-ofreference” (Konczal 2003; Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler 1994; Gibson 1991;
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Ogbu 1991; Suarez-Orozco 1997), which argues that immigrant youths’ remembrances of the prior, often less fortunate, situation of their homeland prompts them to appreciate what they perceive as newfound educational opportunity in the United States. Those who have arrived recently have the advantage of measuring their opportunities in the United States in direct comparison to the lack of opportunities in Nicaragua. On the other hand, those who are second-generation (U.S.-born) immigrants have no “homeland” with which to compare and measure their current situation, prompting them to have a more adversarial outlook toward schooling. Still, Nicaraguans in south Florida fare better than Nicaraguans in California. Still another variable, gender, plays a role in Nicaraguan educational outcomes. Recently, girls outscore boys in grade point averages, which is a surprise, given the traditional ideas of the family the Nicaraguan community holds (Feliciano 2008).
Economic Attainment Compared to the U.S. native-born population, Nicaraguans are struggling financially. Over 15 percent of Nicaraguan immigrant families live in poverty, and a quarter of the individuals living in poverty are under the age of 18 (see Table 239). Their predominant occupations are low-wage service and office jobs, and the top industries they work in are manufacturing, retail, educational, health, and social service sectors. Some, but not most, work in informal sectors in South Florida factories for low wages, or informal construction, hairdressing, and tailoring. These figures shine in comparison to most other immigrant groups, for example the Hondurans and Guatemalans. Nicaraguans in the United States are almost twice as likely to be employed in managerial professional, technical, or sales positions (43.3% versus 19 to 27% for the other two) (Chinchilla and Hamilton 2007, 333). The advantage is attributed to characteristics brought from the homeland. The first few waves of Nicaraguan immigrants to the United States tended to be disproportionately of working age and more likely to have a secondary or university-level education, and they were more likely to have been employed in a white-collar occupation before leaving Managua (compared to Hondurans and Guatemalans). In addition, Nicaraguan emigrants in the first two major waves tended to come from higher-income households. In sum, not all Nicaraguans are struggling financially.
Adjustment and Adaptation The journey from a homeland to a foreign nation can be frightening, especially for the many young Nicaraguans who have come to the United States over the past 20 years. In most cases, they and their families have settled in large urban areas and among other foreign-born Spanish speakers. The public schools in these areas
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usually offer ESL (English as Second Language) classes. Feelings about arriving in the United States are best described by this Nicaraguan 16-year-old boy in 1995 from an assignment that instructed ESL students to write a short essay about their initial contact with the United States and their new school: When I first came to Miami, I was very happy because I was going to see my father again, after two long years. But when I came to Coral High I felt very lost and lonely. I was frightened and scared in my new school. I was a good student but because of my poor English my grades started to fall. After four or five weeks in Coral High, things became better and more clear. I was starting to get adjusted to the new school system. As this young man indicated, many Nicaraguans arriving to the United States are joining other family members who came before them. He also indicates only a brief period of fear, followed by adjustment, as young Nicaraguans tend to adapt quickly to their school and community and learn English quickly. Often they become the translators for the older generations in their family who have not become fully fluent in the language.
Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals What was originally deemed as a rite of passage among 15-year-old girls of Mexican origin, the quinceñera (or “quince años,” meaning 15 years) celebration has became widely popular among other U.S. Hispanics, including Nicaraguans. It is said that the Mexican president Porfirio Diaz brought this celebration to Mexican culture due to his admiration of French culture. The meaning of the ceremony has changed over the centuries; today, it is becoming more popular in the United States than it is in Latin America. The quinceñera celebrated in the United States represents the family’s economic and social status. The ceremony has become a need to celebrate, so that Latinos can preserve their culture as they become more Americanized. Quinceñera has meaning among Catholics especially and often resembles a Catholic wedding (Alvarez 2007). The quinceñera’s court is typically composed of her padrinos (godparents) and a chambelan, a young man who is her companion and date for the evening. The chambelan typically has the first dance with the quinceñera, a traditional ballroom dance, followed by dances with her requested by her father or another close male relative such as an uncle or older brother, and then her godfather. This coming-of-age ceremony is also telling of the Nicaraguan assimilation in the United States. To cultural anthropologists the extravagance of the celebration represents a reinvention of culture and reformation of social class in the United States. In fact, organizers of this event have seen families pay between $5,000 and
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$50,000 (Alvarez 2007), a large price for many Nicaraguans in terms of monetary value, but worth it in terms of cultural capital the celebration may bestow.
Continued Links to Country of Origin Nicaraguans in the United States continue their links to their home country by visiting (it is not atypical for a Nica (a term used for Nicaraguans) family in the United States to visit extended family in Nicaragua once or twice per year). This keeps the traditions alive as generations pass and insures that the second and later generations abide by the wishes of their parents to know their heritage. According to my own qualitative study of Nicaraguan teenagers, most were familiar with La Gigantona or the “large lady,” who processes through the streets of Nicaragua during festivals and other occasions. The colorful costumed lady is symbolic of the power the Spanish had over the indigenous population. Besides travel and cultural knowledge as a glue between the new country and old, monetary remittances are sent regularly. In 2004 remittances to Nicaragua were over 800 million U.S. dollars (see Tables 242 and 243). That falls somewhere between the highest remittances in Central America, Guatemala, with 2.7 billion, and the lowest, Belize, with 77 million. These numbers reflect the official, recorded money flows and are therefore underestimated due to informal, underground remittances (between 5% and 15% uncounted according to the World Bank). Yet even the underestimated money flows far outweigh what Nicaragua exports in coffee. These large remittances, while beneficial to the individual recipients, may not impact the overall development the nation. Some economists believe remittances lead to passive and dangerous dependency (Agunias 2006).
Religion and Celebrations Nicaraguans are predominately Christian with Catholicism most commonly practiced. Patron saint holidays are grand occasions throughout Nicaragua. During the first 10 days of August, Santo Domingo (Saint Dominic de Guzmán), the patron saint of Managua, is celebrated with the procession of the saint, which is attended by thousands of people and is full of traditional cultural and religious expression and enthusiasm. Minguito, the miniature statuette of the saint, is taken in a procession to the center of Managua (it is taken to the Santo Domingo Church located in the old city center), where it is kept for several days until it returns “back home” during a final procession. Similar festivals are held during the end of summer months in other Nicaraguan cities (for example the patron saint festival of Santiago in Boaco and Jinotepe; and the patron saint festival of St. Ana in Nandaime, Chinandega, and Ometepe).
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In the United States these festivals are celebrated less frequently, although Nicaraguan households in the United States keep the patron saint tradition alive with displays of the saint figurines in their homes. It is not uncommon in many Nicaraguan American homes to see a sometimes elaborate shrine with their hometown patron saint front and center. In December, churches with predominately Nicaraguan membership (such as Our Lady of Divine Providence in Miami, Florida), enjoy the festivities of La Purísima, which celebrates the Virgen de la Asuncion (the Virgin Mary, the patroness of Nicaragua). On the seventh night they have a celebration in which a decorated altar is placed in a corner of a family’s house, with a statue of the Virgin Mary. A formal celebration would start with prayers to the Virgin. Other activities of the Purisima gathering include the use of whistles, tambourines, and other instruments. Sometimes the children wear colorful hats and receive gifts of prizes and candy. In the United States these traditions have been altered to be not as boisterous, but rather limited to a family gathering with a fusion of traditional Nicaraguan and American food.
Families and Changing Gender Relations It is no surprise that children of Nicaraguan immigrants engage in conflicts with their parents over maintaining U.S. versus Nicaraguan customary ways. Parents romanticize about, at some point in the future, returning to Nicaragua, while their children would not hear of it. Nicaraguan parents want their children to maintain their use of Spanish. While they do (and also plan to teach their own children Spanish), they prefer to speak English with their peers at school. Nicaraguan parents view deviant acts like drug experimentation, bad grades, and sexual promiscuousness as something very American, so when their children engage in these things, through the parents’ eyes, they are adopting American ways. Nicaraguan teenagers in the United States sometimes protest about their parents being overly strict. Students at a Miami high school science classroom were overheard to make these complaints about their overly strict Hispanic parents: “Hispanic parents don’t let you do anything!” “American parents let you do anything you want!” and “My parents don’t realize, this is America! When I have kids I’m gonna’ give them some space, let them be independent!” The family unit to most Nicaraguans includes extended family: aunts, uncles, cousins, and grandparents often cohabitate and become participants in child rearing. The idea of children moving far away from parents when they turn 18 years of age is relatively unheard of, and it is not atypical for an adult child of Nicaraguans to stay with their parents until they get married (and even then they stay close to home).
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Traditional ideas of gender dictate the roles of women and men in Nicaraguan culture: the women have power over the household, while men have power over the world outside of the home (Keefe and Padilla 1987; Kulig 1998). Thus many scholars point out that young Nicaraguan women are socialized into caring for home and children and young men are socialized into providing financial security (Kulig 1998). However, as with most U.S. immigrants, Nicaraguan culture is an ongoing negotiation between the culture they confront in United States and the culture of their parents; therefore, an examination of Nicaraguan American culture must consider the particular context to which immigrants come. In south Florida, Nicaraguan culture has been reconstructed but still preserved. Nicaraguans in south Florida do not (and need not) assimilate into a white, Protestant class (as was the case of early-20th-century immigrants), but rather one that allows daily conversation in Spanish, eating of traditional Hispanic food, and children voluntarily following the traditions of their families.
Language Like Haitians in South Florida (see Stepick et al. 2001), Nicaraguans often discard or hide some of their Nica ethnic traits, such as their particular Nicaraguan Spanish dialect. For example, Nicaraguan Spanish uses vos (meaning you, a word other Latin American’s rarely use). But rather than discard their Spanish altogether, Nicaraguans have modified it to fit the mainstream of Miami. My own qualitative research shows that some Nicaraguan youth speak what local Miami media refers to as Cubonics, a mix of English and the particular Cuban dialect of Spanish (Balmaseda 1997). For example, when beepers were popular, one could hear Nicaraguan teenagers tell their friends “beep-a-me” (“beep me on my beeper”) or “oye [“listen” or “hey”]!, bro, are you going to the football game?” (Konczal 2003). Given the large population of immigrants from Spanish-speaking counties, it is no surprise that the Spanish language is heard on a daily basis in Miami. Only 32 percent of Miami-Dade County households speak English only in their homes (Romanik and Froman 2002). High schools like Miami Coral Park, whose student body is over 90 percent Hispanic (approximately one-third of those of Nicaraguan heritage), has at least three ESL (English as Second Language) classes running at any given time throughout the day. According to the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal study, children of Spanish-speaking immigrants in Miami are overwhelmingly bilingual. As mentioned previously, school-age children of Nicaraguans overwhelmingly speak Spanish in their homes but prefer to (and do) speak English with their friends and at school (Konczal 2003; Rumbaut and Portes 2001). Indeed, the idea that the United States will adopt Spanish as the national language due to immigration is a myth. Both the preference and knowledge of English
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1575
(accompanied with a declining knowledge of Spanish) is the dominant pattern among second-generation Nicaraguans (U.S.-born, with at least one Nicaraguanborn parent). A longitudinal study of immigrants shows that by the second generation 93 percent of Nicaraguan Americans in the sample know English well, while 64 percent of them know Spanish well (only 21% know it very well) (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Furthermore 73 percent prefer English over Spanish (Portes and Hao 1998).
Foodways Nicaraguan food can be found in restaurants, cafeterias, and markets in any city with a significant population of Nicaraguans, such as Miami, New York, and Los Angeles. It can be especially easy to find in small municipalities like that of Sweetwater, located in southwest Miami-Dade, near the everglades. Although Sweetwater is the area’s formal name, it is known as “Little Managua” to locals. Little Managua possesses an array of Nicaraguan fritangas, small streetside, open grills. In Miami, many of these fritangas have moved indoors, such as La Fritanga in the Centro Comercial Managua Shopping Center, which sells popular dishes such as Nicaraguan tamales (corn meal with meat and vegetables wrapped in banana leaves), called nacatamales, and Nicaraguan chorizo (sausage). One can also shop at traditional Nicaraguan markets like Mercadita Nicaraguense, which sells machine-embroidered clothing and “maxi” dresses. Young Nicaraguan immigrants, when asked, say they enjoy a combination of both traditional Nicaraguan food and American cuisine.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Nicaraguans came to the United States under circumstances similar to that of Cubans—the overthrow of a strong-man government coinciding with a socialist revolution, loss of private ownership for the upper and middle classes, followed by severe economic hardship for all. Yet, Washington did not welcome the Nicaraguans as they did the Cubans. All Cuban migrants, until the 1980 Mariel flow, were automatically extended the right to remain in the United States. They received generous benefits packages. However, a different ideology was employed toward Nicaraguans and the situation in Nicaragua. Washington virtually demanded that Nicaraguans, rather than escape to the United States, accept the opportunity to fight against the Sandinistas on their own terrain (Portes and Stepick 1993, 156, 157). The position that the federal government and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (the now-defunct INS) took with Nicaraguan immigrants can be more accurately compared to way in which Haitians have always been treated by
1576 | Nicaraguan Immigrants
the U.S. government. (The INS has been replaced, mainly by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS.) First, like the Haitians, Nicaraguans claimed to be fleeing political repression and government violence in their country and, like Haitians, they are also emigrants from a poor country. Second, the U.S. government had classified both Haitians and Nicaraguans as economic, rather than political, refugees and thus refused them asylum on political grounds (Masud-Piloto 1996; Nackerud 1999). Nicaragua presented a particularly difficult problem for the federal government’s immigration policy. Although the administration openly and covertly financed and supported the Sandinistas’ enemies, Nicaragua was never really considered a communist nation. Thus, when Nicaraguans fleeing Sandinista repression applied for political asylum, the INS was able to use this to reject their applications. From
The Brighter Side of U.S.–Nicaraguan Relations Over the past 10 years there has been a large increase in the number of charitable organizations run from the United States that either send aid to Nicaragua or have found creative ways to assist in the development of the nation. This no doubt is influenced by the many Nicaraguans that are living in the United States who have either succeeded themselves and want to give back, or have influenced their U.S. peers to gain interest in the nation of Nicaragua. Some of the activities these organizations engage in are what Nicaragua needs most, for example, building schools (Fabretto Children’s Foundation based in Virginia, Nicaraguan American Foundation based in South Florida); supporting agriculture (organizations like Agros International, which gives micro loans to farmers) and fair trade coffee makers like Higher Grounds, Dean’s Beans, and Café Campesino, among many others. One of the organizations assisting with both education and fair trade is Building New Hope, based in Pennsylvania and Granada, Nicaragua. Since its founding in 1992, it has built two schools and a library in Granada. One of these schools, “Quinta Los Chavalos,” sees more than 50 barrio children throughout the day for homework tutoring, extra reading and math classes, music and art activities, computer training, and sports. The resident boys, many of them victims of neglect or violence in their family lives, have found refuge in La Quinta, where they are assured of safety, an education, and challenge. Building New Hope supports a coffee cooperative located in El Porvenir (near León), which is operated by 48 farming families. The coffee beans are shipped to the United States and processed by the fully certified organic coffee roaster La Prima Espresso Company. After that it is sold at specialty stores and/or by U.S. students who gain an understanding of life in Nicaragua.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1577
1984 to 1990, the United States granted 26 percent of the 48,000 requests from Nicaraguans. This figure, although significantly lower than the Cuban acceptance rate, was generous compared to other Central American asylum seekers, such as Salvadorians and Guatemalans, who had an acceptance rate of 2.6 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively (McBride 1999; Russell 1995). Over the years this rate gradually decreased for all Central Americans seeking asylum, and by 1992 only 16.4 percent of the Nicaraguan requests were granted.
Immigration Legislation and Nicaraguan Political Battles In 1996 the U.S. Congress passed the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Among other things, this act signaled a more coordinated attempt by the government to stop the flow of illegal immigration. This legislation also led to revisions in INS’s procedures, including the “expedited removal” process, which would subject asylum seekers to arbitrary treatment and deportation by INS official without sufficient judicial review of their actions. Provisions of the new law relating to deportation proceedings primarily affected refugees from Central America, especially El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, who had been granted temporary legal protection (McBride 1999, 300). One of the organizations in Miami active in the fight for Nicaraguan residency was Fraternidad Nicaraguense (now known as American Fraternity). In 1996 they witnessed 30 immigration judges in Miami sending out deportation notices by the thousands. The director of this organization at the time, who was also an immigration attorney, remarked about the desperation of seeing more and more Nicaraguans deported. In March 1997, 41 immigrants from Nicaragua and other countries sued the government to block the deportations, saying they were unfairly deprived of the promised suspension-of-deportation hearings. This event, along with at least four protests (one of which I witnessed) held by Nicaraguans in front of the INS building in Dade County, prompted U.S. District Judge James Lawrence King to issue a temporary restraining order barring the deportations. The day after the restraining order was successfully submitted, the front page of The Miami Herald read, “A Victory for Nicaraguans” (1997, A1). Fraternidad Nicaraguense representatives then went to Washington to lobby and spoke before members of the U.S. Congress directly. In March of 1997 a bill to Congress was passed—the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), which gave primarily Central Americans an extension to file immigration paper work. The fight for and passing of NACARA demonstrated the existence of a Nicaraguan local support system, which had been growing ever since the first wave of Nicaraguans came in the 1970s. Fraternidad Nicaraguense was not the only group involved, but at least five other groups as well. Our Lady of Divine Providence, a predominantly Nicaraguan Catholic church in Sweetwater,
1578 | Nicaraguan Immigrants
served their members by recruiting local immigration attorneys who, according to one of these attorneys, “Worked pro bono, on Sundays; reaching out to people” during that time. These events, which happened during the course of my fieldwork, had a profound affect on the youth and their families, many of whom were caught directly in the middle of these legal battles. The four U.S.-born students were the only U.S. citizens in my sample. Others were either legal residents or had various forms of immigration status (temporary, student visa, etc.) Those arriving between 1979 and 1990 were most affected by deportation threats after the passing of IIRIRA in 1996. They had spent much of their lives growing accustomed to American society, but without legal residency or citizenship. During the years of my observations, at least four individuals in my sample received legal residency status as a result of the NACARA enactment.
Intergroup Relations and Discrimination Nicaraguans have faced substantial degrees of discrimination. Sometimes the discrimination is structural, stemming from unwelcoming legal barriers that make it difficult for Nicaraguans to get legal residency, but also discrimination happens on
Nicaraguans living in Miami protest the possible deportation of some 40,000 Nicaraguans living in South Florida who were admitted to the United States in the early 1980s after fleeing persecution by the Sandinistas, June 20, 1997. (Roberto Schmidt/AFP/Getty Images)
The Second and Later Generations | 1579
a more micro level. Racial discrimination within Latino immigrant communities stems from ideas of race in their homelands. The term “Hispanic” includes a wide range of people with indigenous heritage, such as Nicaraguans, who may be castelike in the face of non-mestizo (a mix of European and Indian ancestry), non-black Hispanics (Dunn 1997; Grenier and Castro 1999; Stepick 1998). At a local high school in Sweetwater, young Nicaraguans are sometimes labeled with the epithet tira flecha, which literally translates to “arrow thrower,” but colloquially denotes the indigenous heritage shared by many Nicaraguans (Konczal 2003). In spite of these derogatory labels, Miami Nicaraguans have a substantial advantage over other caste-conscious Hispanics in the United States. That is, they settled into an area that houses a larger group of Hispanics with power and status, Cubans. While the Nicaraguan group is less populous and subject to racial discrimination, they find it easy to blend into a larger, influential group or general “Hispanic” group, and thus derive ample benefits from doing so (Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler 1994; Suarez-Orozco 1997). Nicaraguans that settle in poor inner-city areas where other immigrants are discriminated against (i.e., among poor Mexicans in Los Angeles) face the most discrimination.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity The way Nicaraguans self-identify is telling of their extent of discrimination from their community. Visa constraints, economic frustration, and distrust of a system that holds them back motivates them to find solidarity via a homogenous panethnic (i.e., Latin or Hispanic) identity. A study of Nicaraguan and Cuban high school students in South Florida showed that second-generation Nicaraguans self-identify with panethnic labels (call themselves “Hispanic” or “Latino”) more so than Cubans, who identify with their national label (Cuban or Cuban American) (Fernandez-Kelly and Shauffler 1994, 685; Portes and Macleod 1996). The ethnic label “Hispanic” assigned by the U.S. Census to people with origins in Spanish-speaking countries has been criticized for stripping people of their historical identity and reducing them to imputed common traits (Oboler 1998). But for some Nicaraguans, it may very well represent self-assertion and a more inclusive solidarity, which the Cubans in Miami experience. The study by Portes and Rumbaut (2006), which included almost 300 Nicaraguans in Miami, indicates that most (over 50%) choose the label “Nicaraguan” to describe themselves, but the second generation was much more likely to chose the panethnic label. Almost half of their second-generation subsample chose “Hispanic.” More and more, though, Nicaraguans are gaining a stronger sense of nationality. Recent studies have found that, over time, Nicaraguans in Miami have successfully secured certain degrees of influence, and as a result, embrace their national identity
1580 | Nicaraguan Immigrants
(calling themselves “Nicaraguan” or “Nicaraguan American”) (Fernandez-Kelly and Curran 2001; Konczal 2003), as the aforementioned fight for legal residency shows.
Educational Attainment The Nicaraguan second generation does not often do as well as their foreign-born peers, according to immigration scholars. This sense of belonging to a broader, stronger community of Hispanics carries over into feelings about school. Students perceive that teachers do not differentiate among “Nicaraguans,” “Cubans,” and others, specifically because they (their teachers) too are “all Hispanic.” Again referring to our identity focus group, we posed the question, “Does a teacher think that Nicas are either better or worse students, or that Cubans or better or worse . . . or Americans, anything?” None thought the teachers differentiated based on ethnicity. One of the students explained why. “I think the main reason is because they’re Hispanic, too, or they’re of Hispanic descent.” In terms of differential treatment by teachers, most mentioned differential treatment in terms of blacks and nonblacks or differential treatment based on the gender of the student.
Using Success to Advocate for Immigrant Social Justice Studies of both first- and second-generation Central American immigrants often highlight the barriers that tend to lead them into academic failure and continuing poverty. But many Nicaraguan Americans in Miami have gone in the opposite direction, toward success, like Yashoda Sandoval, who excels academically while advocating for Nicas and other immigrants. The push toward that path of success (and social justice) was likely due to the many aspects of being a secondgeneration Nicaraguan growing up in south Florida. Her father, from Managua, and mother, from Chontaoes, were married just two years before migrating to the United States in 1985 during the height of Nicaragua’s Contra/Sandinista civil war. Once in the United States, her father took a job in a shoe factory while struggling to learn English and then started the long process of getting his U.S. physician’s license. Her father worked so much Yashoda recalls, “My little brother didn’t even recognize him.” Although Yashoda is second generation (born just a couple years after her parents migrated), her first language is Spanish. That is not atypical for even U.S.-born Nicaraguans who grow up in Miami, where youngsters with parents from Spanish-speaking nations usually speak Spanish in the home. Once in school, she learned English quickly. Yashoda excelled academically, an accomplishment she credits to her parents who, even while struggling financially, managed to engage Yashoda and her two younger siblings in activities. Her mother in particular pushed her to excel in school, despite Yashoda’s reservations: “In my household school comes first. My mom was a huge influence.”
Issues in Relations between the United States and Nicaragua | 1581
Another aspect forging Yashoda’s success was her clever negotiation of combining positive aspects of both her Nicaraguan and American heritage. Being family oriented is a trait that some immigrants discard once in the United States, but she always embraced it, limiting conflicts with her parents. She also appreciates Nica traditions. “We still eat gallo pinto at our house and I’ve even started cooking Nicaraguan food myself.” Her parents would like her to marry a Nicaraguan and she has “no preference.” She plans to teach her children Spanish. Like many Nica young people, she still lives at home until she goes to graduate school. She visits Nicaragua every year, and her family has even decided to purchase a home on a finca (farm) there. Yashoda is currently a successful college student studying nutrition and dietetics, and in 2007 she helped found her university’s Nicaraguan Student Association (NSA) and became its president in 2008. Through an NSA contact she began working with American Fraternity (formally called Fraternadad Nicarageance, an organization that has been highly successful in fighting for the rights of Central Americans in the United States). “I love it. It provides for low income people and it got me interested in social justice issues.” This and other life experiences as a Nicaraguan American have influenced her to get a graduate degree at an excellent school in Washington, D.C. in public policy, concentrating on medical care for immigrants. She will have ample support from her family, “They want me to accomplish my dream, but also would like me to stay [in Miami]. They support me 100 percent.”
These examples demonstrate that second-generation Nicaraguan youth in Miami are not experiencing the “second-generation decline” (or downward mobility as described by Gans 1992; Ogbu 1991; Perlman and Waldinger 1997; and Waldinger 1994). My own ethnographic study found that Nicaraguans experience some differential treatment in the broader context of the United States and within the Miami enclave of Hispanics, especially from Cubans. But from the perspective of those who have lived and gone to school in Miami most of their lives, this discrimination is insignificant. And rather than abandoning their national heritage, these Nicaraguan youth have selectively embraced something in between. This in turn has benefited their educational goals and aspirations.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Nicaragua During the summer of 2009, a group of Nicaraguans gathered with Colombians and Cubans and met at a Miami Peruvian restaurant to celebrate the Senate confirmation
1582 | Nicaraguan Immigrants
of federal appellate court judge Sonia Sotomayor to a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court. While Sotomayor is not Nicaraguan (she is of Puerto Rican descent), the gathering was demonstrative of what the new generation of Nicaraguans in the United States have become: still Nica, but also Hispanic and American. Yet, they excel, not despite this ethnic preservation, but rather, because of it. In a city where the majority of the population are various groups of immigrant minorities, the amount of power the ethnic segment has in the broader society varies dramatically. Settling into an area with a poor, ethnic minority, inner-city segment is more likely to increase the probability of downward mobility (Portes and Stepick 1993; Portes and Zhou 1993). On the other hand, assimilating into an economically and politically powerful segment can be as or even more rewarding than assimilating into mainstream American society. Challenges still plague what is still one of the poorest nations in the Western Hemisphere. The military coup that ousted Honduran president Manuel Zelaya in June 2009 rattled Nicaragua’s own politics. Besides that, the United States cut off aid to Nicaragua, claiming fraud in its 2008 municipal elections, and leaving a poor nation ever more uncertain of its future.
Forecasts for the 21st Century July 19, 2009, marked the 30th anniversary of the revolution that was celebrated by some and loathed by others. The event that ended four decades of authoritarian rule and began a decade of war will forever be a milestone not only in Nicaragua, but in the United States. Most of the Nicaraguans who came to the United States came during that period. Their children entered schools, learned English, and adopted American ways but still kept the historic memory of their parents alive. Large U.S. metropolitan areas, such as those in south Florida, California, New York, and Texas had transformed and were transformed by these immigrants. The populations of these cities, Miami especially, provided a destination that was not of a traditional white, Protestant, middle-class culture, but rather made up others from the new stock of already settled, mostly Spanish-speaking immigrants from Latin America. While mostly positive, this American social transformation that coincided with the arrival of immigrants during the past 20 years has instigated challenges for both the cities and the immigrants who live in them. Nicaraguans have faced structural discrimination via legal matters that have blocked them from citizenship. They have also faced individual discrimination within the neighborhoods and schools that have labeled them “refees” (for refugee). One the other hand, Nicaraguans have succeeded where many immigrants have not, as is demonstrated by their educational, occupational, and political achievements. Many factors account for this, including the social capital brought by the first few waves of Nicaraguans to the United States, and in some cases the compassion and power of the already settled Spanish-speaking communities they encountered upon arrival.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Nicaragua | 1583
Even later generations of Nicaraguans feel a sense of Nicaraguaence in the symbolic activities like teaching their children Spanish, celebrating La Purisima in December, or eating a combination of Nicaraguan and American cuisine. Local politics too are affected by the later generations that fight for rights of Nicaraguans in the United States and celebrate its successes. The history of Nicaraguan immigration in the United States offers a number of lessons about the consequences of the make-up of American society and the integration of immigrants into it. First, in most cases immigrants are not “temporary.” U.S. policy toward immigrants coming from war-torn Central American nations during the 1980s assumed that they would return to their homelands once stability returned to them. This was not the case with Nicaraguans and others. By 1990, when the Contra/Sandinista war was over, Nicaraguan children had spent 10 years in the U.S. public schools and their parents had settled in jobs and homes. They would only return for vacations and/or to bring remittances. Second, in a few cases, immigrants can establish sufficient power locally to dominate and thus change the course of assimilation, prodding new immigrants to assimilate into a particular ethnic segment of American society, rather than the mainstream, ethnically white American society. This is the case of many Nicaraguans who settled in South Florida. They already had a Spanish-speaking group with status that made their transition easier and in turn made it easier for their Nicaraguan compatriots who arrived in subsequent waves. Finally, U.S. society does allow room for immigrants to maintain their ethnic heritage. In the case of Nicaraguans in Miami it is not only socially acceptable, but a prerequisite for upward mobility. Even the later generations of Nicaraguans eat Nicaraguan food, celebrate during Purisima, and speak Spanish. It is an Americanization with an accent. One is better off learning English, but knowing English and Spanish is better yet.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 236 Top four states as destination of Nicaraguans (number of Nicaraguans in each state and state distribution (%)). 1980 U.S. Total
1990
45,000
Florida
2000
171,004
228,346
8,440 (18.8)
72,838 (42.6)
100,432 (44.0)
California
22,020 (48.9)
58,926 (34.5)
65,404 (28.6)
New York
3,840 (8.5)
8,779 (5.1)
10,467 (4.6)
Texas
1,380 (3.1)
5,759 (3.4)
10,599 (4.6)
Note: Values are weighted (1980 equally by 20, and 1990/2000 by individual-level weights unless indicated otherwise). Source: 1980, 1990, 2000 U.S. Census, 5% IPUMS Sample.
Table 237 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009: leading states of residence
Total Arizona
Total
Male
Female
4,137
1,578
2,558
27
13
14
California
923
350
573
Colorado
15
4
11
Connecticut
23
13
10
1,857
711
1,146
Georgia
Florida
55
25
30
Illinois
50
18
32
100
36
64
Massachusetts
Maryland
40
17
23
Michigan
13
6
7
62
24
38
New Jersey
Nevada
114
40
73
New York
135
44
91
North Carolina
69
23
46
Ohio
27
13
14
Pennsylvania
28
9
19
Texas
223
83
140
Virginia
102
43
59
29
12
17
245
94
151
Washington Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
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Table 238 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009
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Region and Country of Birth Total Nicaragua
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
20,947
19,634
10,659
4,094
4,009
3,305
4,145
3,716
3,614
4,137
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 239 Select demographics of foreign-born Nicaraguans, U.S. Census 2000
TOTAL FOREIGN BORN NICARAGUAN POPULATION SEX AND AGE
Number
Percentage of U.S. Foreign-Born
220,335
0.7
Number
Percentage
Male
101,740
46.2
Female
118,595
53.8
36.0
(X)
Under 5 years
1,610
0.7
5 to 9 years
3,535
1.6
10 to 19 years
27,875
12.7
20 to 34 years
71,540
32.5
35 to 54 years
83,690
38.0
55 to 64 years
16,810
7.6
65 to 84 years
13,930
6.3
1,340
0.6
Median age (years)
85 years and over EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
Number
Population 25 Years and Over
164,445
Percentage 100
Less than 9th grade
31,900
19.4
9th to 12th grade, no diploma
34,610
21
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
37,300
22.7
Some college, no degree
29,745
18.1
Associate degree
8,545
5.2
Bachelor’s degree
13,150
Graduate or professional degree
9,195
8 5.6
Percent high school graduate or higher
(X)
59.6
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher
(X)
13.6
Number
Percentage
INCOME AND POVERTY Median Family Income ($)
37,879
(X)
Individuals below poverty line
36,475
16.7
18 years and over
30,350
15.6
2,450
16.2
Related children under 18 years
5,645
24.4
Related children 5 to 17 years
5255.0
24.3
10,320
35.2
65 years and over
Unrelated individuals 15 years and over Source: Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF 3)—Sample Data.
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Table 240 Nicaraguans as U.S. citizens (U.S. Census 2000) Total Population
220,335
100
71,390
32.4
U.S. CITIZENSHIP, PERIOD OF U.S. ENTRY Naturalized U.S. citizen Entered 1990 to 2000
7,260
3.3
Entered 1980 to 1989
33,240
15.1
Entered before 1980
30,890
14.0
Not a U.S. citizen
148,945
67.6
Entered 1990 to 2000
54,340
24.7
Entered 1980 to 1989
83,035
37.7
Entered before 1980
11,570
5.3
Table 241 Social and economic indicators in Nicaragua, select years. 2000 Population, total (millions)
5.11 a
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (billions)
3.72
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)b Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) c
2005 5.46 4.86
2006
2007
5.53
5.6
5.16
890
930
990
43
37
36
35
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)
66
74
73
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
70
72
72
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)d
3.2
e
Net migration (thousands)
Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees, received (current US$) (millions) a
5.53
730
2.9
–160
–210
320
616
2.8 — 698
— 73 2.8 — 740
Gross National Income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method. GNI divided by the midyear population c The percentage of students completing the last year of primary school. It is calculated by taking the total number of students in the last grade of primary school, minus the number of repeaters in that grade, divided by the total number of children of official graduation age. d The number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates. e The net total of migrants during the period, that is, the total number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and noncitizens. b
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1588 | Nicaraguan Immigrants Table 242 Remittances to Nicaragua (in millions) of U.S. dollars. Year
$US Millions
2001
660
2002
759
2003
788
2004
810
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Inter-American Development Bank/Multilateral Investment Fund (IADB/MIF).
Table 243 Remittances to Nicaragua as percentage of other economic indicators (2004). GDP
17.8
FDI
310
ODA
127
Tourism
432
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Notes: GDP (Gross Domestic Product); FDI (Foreign Direct Investment); ODA (Official Development Assistance).
Appendix III: Notable Nicaraguan Americans Jessica Aguilera (born 1985), a track and field sprint athlete, competed in the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Maurice Benard (born 1963) is an actor on American soap operas All My Children and General Hospital. Christianne Meneses Jacobs (born 1971) is publisher of a Spanish-language children’s magazine. Diana López (born 1984) is an American-born Olympic Taekwondo competitor of Nicaraguan ethnicity. She represented the United States at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Steven López (born 1978) is a 2000 and 2004 Olympic gold medalist in taekwondo at the Olympic Games. Dennis Martínez (born 1955) was the first Nicaraguan to play in Major League Baseball, pitching the 13th perfect game in Major League history. Camilo Mejía (born 1975) is a former staff sergeant of the Florida National Guard and an antiwar activist.
References | 1589
Hilda Solis (born 1957) was born to a Nicaraguan immigrant mother and Mexican immigrant father, is former U.S. congresswoman, and is currently the 25th U.S. Secretary of Labor, serving in the Obama administration.
Glossary Chicharrón: A dish made of fried pork rinds. It is sometimes made from chicken, mutton, or beef. Quinceñera: A wedding-like, elaborate celebration of a U.S.-Latina/Hispanic girl’s 15th birthday. Nacatamal: A dough that is prepared with ground corn and butter. Gallo Pinto: Most people in Nicaragua eat this almost daily, and it is considered a national symbol. It is composed of a mixture of fried rice with onion and sweet pepper, and red beans boiled with garlic. They are mixed and fried all together. La Purísima: A celebration to the “purest conception of Virgin Mary,” taking place on December 8, according to the Catholic calendar. La Purísima is a tradition celebrated in all parts of Nicaragua. These celebrations take place at the end of November and during almost all of December. Santo Domingo: The patron saint of Managua. Vos: In Spanish, the “you” in second person. Use is atypical in most Latin American countries, except Nicaragua.
References Agunias, D. R. 2006. “Remittance and Development: Trends, Impacts, and Policy Options: A Review of the Literature.” Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Alcaldia De Managua. 2004. “Datos Generales de Managua.” [Online information; retrieved 5/26/09.] http://www.managua.gob.ni/index.php?s=2001. Alvarez, Julia. 2007. Once upon a Quinceañera: Coming of Age in the USA. New York: Viking Adult. Balmaseda, L. 1997. “Guasimara? What’s Ron, No Understand?” The Miami Herald, January 4, 1B. Booth, J. A. 1990. “Nicaragua: Revolution under Siege.” In Latin American Politics and Development, edited by H. J. Wiarda and H. F. Kline, 471–73. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chinchilla, N. S., and N. Hamilton. 2007. “Central Americans.” In The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration since 1965, edited by Mary C. Waters and Reed Ueda with Helen B. Marrow, 328–39. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. “Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents, Washington DC” [Online article or information; retrieved 6/24/09.] http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/data/dslpr.shtm.
1590 | Nicaraguan Immigrants Dunn, M. 1997. Black Miami in the Twentieth Century. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Feliciano, C. 2009. “Education and Ethnic Identity Formation among Children of Latin American and Caribbean Immigrants.” Sociological Perspectives, 52(2): 135–158. Fernandez-Kelly, M. P., and R. Schauffler. 1994. “Divided Fates: Immigrant Children in a Restructured U.S. Economy.” International Migration Review 28 (27): 662–89. Fernandez-Kelly, Patricia, and Sara Curran. 2001. “Nicaraguans: Voices Lost, Voices Found in Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America.” In Ethnicities: Coming of Age in Immigrant America, edited by Rubén G. Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes, 127–56. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Fix, M. E., and J. S. Passel. 2001. U.S. Immigration at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Hearing on “The U.S. Population and Immigration” Committee on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives. Funkhouser, E. 1992. “Migration from Nicaragua: Some Recent Evidence.” World Development 20 (8): 1209–18. Gans, Herbert J. 1992. “Second-Generation Decline: Scenarios for the Economic and Ethnic Futures of the Post-1965 American Immigrants.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 15 (2): 173–92. Garvin, G. 2000. “Nicaraguans in U.S. Urged to Seize Amnesty: Fear of Expulsions and Chaos Brings Warning from Officials.” The Miami Herald, March 2, A1. Grenier, G. J., and M. J. Castro. 1999. “Triadic Politics: Ethnicity, Race, and Politics in Miami.” Pacific Historical Review 68 (2): 273–93. Gibson, Margaret A. 1991. “Minorities and Schooling: Some Implications.” In Minority Status and Schooling: A Comparative Study of Immigrant and Involuntary Minorities edited by M. Gibson and J. Ogbu, 169–203. New York: Garland Publishing. Keefe, Susan, and Amado Padilla. 1987.Chicano Ethnicity. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. Konczal, L. 2003. “Homeland References: Influences on the Academic Attitudes of Nicaraguan Immigrant Adolescents.” The International Journal of Educational Policy, Research and Practice 4 (3): 3–22. Kulig, J. C. 1998. “Family Life among El Salvadorans, Guatemalans and Nicaraguans: A Comparative Study.” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 29 (3): 469–80. Marin, H. A. 1996. “The Nicaraguan Community in Dade County.” Report for the Human and Labor Rights Institute, Florida International University, Miami, Florida. Masud-Piloto, F. R. 1996. From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959–1995. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. McBride, M. J. 1999. “Migrants and Asylum Seekers: Policy Responses in the United States to Immigrants and Refugees from Central America and the Caribbean.” International Migration 37 (1): 289–99.
References | 1591 MDCPS. 1999. Miami Dade County Public Schools Statistical Abstract, 1998–1999. Miami Dade County: The Office of Educational Evaluation and Management Analysis. Miami Dade County Department of Planning and Zoning (MDCDPZ). 2003. Miami-Dade County Facts—2003: A Compendium of Selected Statistics Updated Annually. Miami, FL: MDCDPZ. Nackerud, L. 1999. “The End of the Cuban Contradiction in US Refugee Policy.” The International Migration Review 33 (1): 176–92. Oboler, S. 1998. “Hispanics? That’s What they Call Us.” In The Latino/a Condition, edited by R. Delgado and J. Stefancic, 2–4. New York: New York University Press. Ogbu, John U. 1991. “Immigrant and Involuntary Minorities in Comparative Perspective.” In Minority Status and Schooling: A Comparative Study of Immigrant and Involuntary Minorities, edited by M. A. Gibson and J. U. Ogbu, 3–33. New York: Garland Publishing. Orlov, A., and R. Ueda. 1980. “Central and South Americans.” In Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, edited by Stephan Thernstrom, 210–17. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Perlman, J., and R. Waldinger. 1997. “Second Generation Children of Immigrants, Past and Present—A Reconsideration. International Migration Review 31 (4): 893–922. Portes, A. and R. Rumbaut. 2006. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press. Portes, A., and L. Hao. 1998. “E Pluribus Unum: Bilingualism and Loss of Language in the Second Generation.” Sociology of Education 71 (4): 269–95. Portes, A., and D. MacLeod. 1996. “Educational Progress of Children of Immigrants: The Roles of Class, Ethnicity, and School Context.” Sociology of Education October: 255–75. Portes, A., and A. Stepick. 1993. City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami. Berkeley: University of California Press. Portes, A., and M. Zhou. 1993. “The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 530: 74–95. Rodriguez, T. D. 2002. “Oppositional Culture and Academic Performance among Children of Immigrants in the USA.” Race, Ethnicity and Education 5 (2): 199–215. Romanik, D., and T. Froman. 2002. The Miami-Dade Educational Environment: Special Circumstances, Special Challenges. Miami-Dade County, FL: Department of Human Services Research Brief. Rumbaut, R. G., and A. Portes, eds. 2001. Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Russell, S. S. 1995. “Migration Patterns of US Foreign Policy Interest.” In Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration Policy, edited by M. S. Teitelbaum and M. Weirner, 38–87. New York: The American Assembly.
1592 | Nicaraguan Immigrants Smagula, Stefan. 2006. “Nicaraguan Americans.” Multicultural America [Online article or information; retrieved 6/24/09.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Le-Pa/NicaraguanAmericans.html. Stepick, A. 1998. Pride against Prejudice: Haitians in the United States. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Stepick, A., Stepick, C. D., Eugene, E., Teed, D., and Labissiere, Y. 2001. “Shifting Identities and Intergenerational Conflict: Growing Up in Haitian Miami.” In Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America, edited by R. G. Rumbaut and A. Portes, 229–66. Berkeley: University of California Press. Suarez-Orozco. 1997. “Becoming Somebody: Central American Immigrants in U.S. InnerCity Schools.” In Beyond Black and White: New Faces and Voices in U.S. Schools, edited by M. Seller and L. Weis, 115–29. New York: State University of New York Press. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1995. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1994 to 2008. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. “A Victory for Nicaraguans.” 1997. Miami Herald, June 25, 1A. Waldinger, Roger. 1994. “The Making of an Immigrant Niche.” International Migration Review 28 (1): 3–30. Worldbank. 2007. Country Profiles Nicaragua. Washington, DC [Online article or information; retrieved 6/24/09.] http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewShared Report?&CF=1&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED&HF= N&WSP=N.
Further Reading Gibson, M. A., and John Ogbu. 1991. Minority Status and Schooling: A Comparative Study of Immigrant and Involuntary Minorities. New York: Garland Publishing. This book addresses the question: why do some immigrant and minority children excel in school even despite individual and structural barriers, while others fail, drop out, or underachieve in school? It compares immigrants and their experiences. Marcelo SuarezOrozco wrote a chapter called “Immigrant Adaptation to Schooling: A Hispanic Case,” which compares various Hispanic groups in terms of school aspirations and achievement. The book also looks at issues of ethnic identity. Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 2006. Immigrant America: A Portrait. 3rd ed. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. This classic book about U.S. immigration looks at the dynamics of immigrant politics, varying modes of acculturation, patterns of settlement, and trajectories of immigrant children. Nicaraguan Americans are discussed throughout. Portes, A., and A. Stepick. 1993. City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami. Berkeley: University of California Press. Authors Portes (Princeton University) and Stepick (Florida International University) are both sociologists who have dedicated their careers to topics of immigration and of cities
Further Reading | 1593 that received large populations of immigrants. This book profiles Miami by focusing on its history of cultural diversity. The authors tell the story of how immigrant groups, especially Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans, shaped Miami. Intergroup relations are highlighted. Rumbaut, Rubén G., and Alejandro Portes, eds. 2001. Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America. Berkeley: University of California Press. This book uses data from one of the largest and most comprehensive studies of U.S. immigrants to date: The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS). The study spans almost 20 years. It started by interviewing thousands of first- and second-generation immigrants in the early 1990s, when the people in the sample were about 13 years old. Researchers then interviewed them every four years. The book includes a chapter called “Nicaraguans: Voices Lost, Voices Found,” by Patricia Fernandez-Kelly and Sara Curran. Fernandez-Kelly’s eloquent use of ethnography gives the reader a personable account of Nicaraguans in the United States. Smagula, Stefan. 2006. “Nicaraguan Americans.” Multicultural America [Online article or information; retrieved 6/24/09.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Le-Pa/NicaraguanAmericans.html. In this article Smagula gives comprehensive information about Nicaraguan Americans, including their history in the United States, occupations and work, cultural rituals, and socioeconomic characteristics.
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Nigerian Immigrants by Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome
Introduction No incontrovertible evidence exists for pre-20th-century Nigerian immigration to the United States, since undocumented alien information cannot be fully captured. Nigeria was created in 1914 when the Northern and Southern Protectorates of the Niger, fashioned by the British in 1900, were amalgamated with the colony (created in the late 19th century). Previously, many of the territories’ peoples had been enslaved and transported to the “New World.” During British colonization of Nigeria (1914–1960), since education was unavailable in the colony, a few Nigerians sought education in Great Britain, and fewer in the United States. This depended on family wealth, information, and/or donations from extended families and/or villages, with expectations that those educated would help others do likewise. The trickle of students to the United States increased, intensifying after World War II. Changes in immigration laws in 1965 caused increased immigration. Nigerians flowed into the United States for education and refuge during the civil war (1967–1970), and during the era of military dictatorships (1980s–1990s). Today, more migrate for education and employment, and the number of Nigerian immigrants to the United States is high compared with other Africans but minuscule as a percentage of total immigration. Most Nigerian immigrants could be considered economic refugees from the mid1980s, when the economic downturn was compounded by the noneffectiveness of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) devised as a solution. Unlike previously, many entertained permanent immigration, entering immigration lotteries, leaving “by any means necessary” for informal economy work either temporarily or permanently, and being trafficked. Some took menial jobs, while others combined their studies with work. Nigeria has also contributed skilled technical and professional experts, clergy, and service sector workers to the American labor force.
Chronology 17th century to 1900
West and Central African peoples (including people of today’s Nigeria) transported to the New World in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. 1595
Background | 1597
1900
Informal British colonization began.
1914
Formal colonization began. Nigeria was named by Flora Shaw, future wife of the first governor general. A few people came to the United States for education. Most returned home upon completion.
1945–1965
The end of World War II and increased nationalism cause more Nigerians to seek higher education abroad. Most return home to participate in anticolonial struggle.
1965–1970
Biafran War. Refugee settlement throughout the United States; scholarship students increase.
1970–1985
More seek higher education but not permanent immigration, then return home to good jobs. Those fleeing coups d’etat and political turmoil stay temporarily.
1985–1999
Some seek refugee status to escape persecution under military regimes. With intensified economic crisis more stay and seek permanent immigration.
1985–present
Increased desire for out-migration for economic and political reasons. More seek American citizenship.
Background Geography of Nigeria Nigeria has a huge population, valuable natural resources, fertile land, and few natural disasters. Nigeria’s population is 148 million (2008). The 2007 population growth rate was 2.2 percent. There are over 400 ethnic groups. The numerically largest are the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, and Kanuri. The land area is 356,700 square miles. Nigeria is divided into three natural parts by the Niger and Benue Rivers, which meet in its center and flow into the Atlantic through a delta, the source of most of Nigeria’s petroleum and gas. Nigeria has 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). It is divided into six geopolitical zones and 774 Local Government Areas. On December 12, 1991, Abuja (estimated population: 452,000) became the capital, replacing overcrowded Lagos (capital from the 1914 amalgamation, estimated population: 9.01 million). Other major Nigerian cities include Kano (in the north, population 9.3 million), Ibadan (in the southwest, estimated population 5 million), and Enugu (in the southeast, population approximately 500,000). Average life expectancy in 2006 was approximately 47 years.
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Nigeria’s terrain is diversified. The southern coastal zone has mangrove swamps, the hinterland, tropical forests, open woodlands, and grasslands, and the north, an arid semidesert zone. Highlands include Jos Plateau (3,937 to 7,874 feet above sea level) and mountains on the Cameroonian border. Annual rainfall ranges from 150 inches in the coast to approximately 25.2 inches in the north (U.S. Department of State).
History of Nigeria Nigeria was described by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a nationalist leader, as “a mere geographical expression.” This is apt, given its peoples’ extraordinary ethnic, regional, and religious diversity, and their nonconsultation before the British forced them together. Conflicts were almost inevitable, particularly given the great inequality between the north and south in economic and educational development and the great urban–rural disparity. Nigeria’s history is rich. It was named on January 8, 1897, when Flora Shaw, future wife of Frederick Lugard, Nigeria’s first governor general under British colonization, suggested this derivative from the River Niger. To the north, Kano and Katsina existed before 1000 C.E. Hausa City States and the Bornu Empire were trans-Saharan trade terminals. By the 19th century, Usman dan Fodio, a Fulani leader, made a jihad to renew and rid Islam of Hausa and Fulani superstitions and indigenous practices. Islam was imposed on surrounding peoples, and the Sokoto Caliphate soon controlled northern Nigeria. In the southwest were Ile Ife, ancestral birthplace of the Yoruba, and the magnificent and powerful, politically strong Oyo Empire, established around 1400 C.E., extending to today’s Togo during the 17th to 19th centuries. In mid-western Nigeria, the Benin Kingdom was powerful by the 15th and 16th centuries, with a great army, a grand court, and skilled artists who produced outstanding ivory, wood, bronze, and brass artwork. European impact grew from the 17th to the 19th centuries, when demand for slaves brought them to Nigeria’s coastland. As the trans-Atlantic slave trade ended. Slave labor was used in Africa to gather or produce commodities as raw materials for European factories during the Industrial Revolution. Nigeria also had some acephalous (without central authority) people, like Southeastern Igbos and Middle Belt Tivs, where all adult males made decisions by consensus. Igbo heritage includes Igbo Ukwu culture, with bronze, copper, and clay artifacts from the ninth century. Nok culture emerged around 1000 B.C.E. in today’s Jos Plateau, a Tiv area renowned for its life-sized terracotta sculptures. It had iron and metal technology from around 500 B.C.E. This sophisticated, wellorganized culture, with similar artifacts to those in Benin and Ife, disappeared mysteriously.
Background | 1599
The Coming of the Europeans: Colonialism Imperialism propelled European states to sponsor exploration of potential sources of monopolistic, profitable, exploitative trade worldwide. The Portuguese arrived first in the 15th century. By the 18th century, the British and Dutch became dominant. The British pushed into the hinterland. A British sphere of influence was internationally recognized in 1885. The Niger Company was granted a royal charter to trade. By 1900, its territories were appropriated by the British government. To prevent other Europeans’ encroachment, Britain strengthened its dominion, finalized through the 1914 amalgamation. Western education was provided to a few men, who became low-level colonial employees. Since pioneer missionary schools favored Christian converts in admission, communities in southern Nigeria established more schools, some for girls. Southern Nigeria more readily embraced Western education, modern capitalist economy, and Christianity than northern Nigeria, where the Sokoto Caliphate had imperial control and could negotiate a more handsoff colonial policy. Anticolonial agitation was constant, intensifying after World War II. Nigerian British army conscripts joined nationalists to demand political representation, social welfare, and respect for Nigerian culture. Radical nationalists demanded immediate, full independence. Britain granted incremental rights in undemocratic legislative councils. Eventually, self-government (the northern elites’ demand), began on October 1, 1954, and full independence on October 1, 1960. Nigeria became a federal republic in October 1963, under a new constitution. Independent Nigeria was a federation with three regions (Northern, Western, and Eastern), each with some autonomy. The Midwest region was established in 1963, making four. The federal government controlled defense, security, foreign relations, commerce, and fiscal policies in a British parliamentary system. A cycle of coups d’état soon began. On January 15, 1966, a coup was led by Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu and predominantly southeastern Nigerian army officers, the majority of them Igbos. Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and the premiers of the Western and Northern regions were assassinated. Soon, more senior officers took over, and Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo, became head of state. Ethnic tensions escalated. The new regime attempted to replace the federal system with a unitary one, generating tremendous resistance and a coup in July 1966. General Yakubu Gowon, a Tiv from Nigeria’s Middle Belt became head of state. In the north, trouble erupted when thousands of Igbos were massacred, and many flooded back to southeastern Nigeria. Perceived unfairness in revenue allocation and access to petroleum export earnings also fueled strong secessionist desires. Gowon created 12 states from four regions on May 5, 1967. South-Eastern and Rivers States were not Igbo-only areas, and contained Nigerian oil reserves.
1600 | Nigerian Immigrants
Predominantly Igbo East-Central State was landlocked and denied access to the sea. Constitutional revisions were proposed that Igbos found as objectionable in the new state creation. Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, military governor of the Eastern region, demanded full autonomy. The federal military government uncompromisingly rejected the demand, and peace negotiations in Aburi, Ghana, failed. On May 30, 1967, Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra’s independence in the former Eastern region. A destructive and bloody civil war ensued, ending on January 13, 1970, when Biafrans surrendered. Biafran refugees fled abroad. Complaints of marginalization by Igbos continue today by the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). Post–civil war Nigeria was awash in petroleum revenue, particularly after the 1970s Arab-Israeli war. Economic development was declared the foremost priority, but most Nigerians remained impoverished. Profligacy and massive corruption thrived, fueling popular disenchantment. When General Murtala Mohammed led a bloodless coup on July 29, 1975, he was hailed as a patriot. Mohammed announced a timetable for return to democracy by October 1, 1979. The regime fired thousands of federal bureaucrats and hired new personnel (creating bureaucratic mayhem). It promised to create new states and move the capital from overcrowded and ill-planned Lagos to more central Abuja. On February 13, 1976, Murtala Mohammed was assassinated. Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, erstwhile chief of staff, became head of state. Obasanjo attempted economic nationalism, armed forces modernization, and reorganization. On February 3, 1976, 7 new states were created, with 12 more on August 27, 1991. By October 1, 1996, Nigeria had 36 states and one Federal Capital Territory.
The Second Republic Plans began from 1977 for a new constitution that was published on September 21, 1978. The ban on political activity ended. Five political parties competed in the 1979 elections. All won National Assembly seats. Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), a Hausa from Northern Nigeria, was elected president. In August 1983, the NPN won another election, in a landslide victory, giving it a National Assembly majority and power over 12 state governments. Both the 1979 and 1983 elections were rigged. The 1983 elections were plagued by violence and chicanery. Despite numerous legal challenges of the results, the NPN maintained its dominance.
Another Military Coup: Buhari, 1983–1985 By December 31, 1983, Major General Muhammadu Buhari’s military coup overthrew Shagari’s government. The junta expressed most Nigerians’ views in
Background | 1601
accusing Shagari’s government of economic incompetence, endemic corruption, political shenanigans, and total abdication of responsibility for Nigerians’ welfare. The regime promised speedy economic advancement, and return to democracy. Nigeria had intractable economic problems. The Shagari administration had sought balance of payments relief from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but rejected its harsh deflationary policies. The Buhari regime’s negotiations with the IMF also failed, as did attempts to swap oil for commodities with other developing nations. Most Western businesses halted business with Nigeria without the IMF guarantee. The regime was also draconian toward opposition, and political resistance grew.
Palace Coup: Babangida, 1985–1993 The Buhari regime was overthrown in an August 1985 coup (dubbed the IMF coup), led by its third-ranking member, the army chief of staff, Major General Ibrahim Babangida. Babangida’s adroit political moves earned him the name “Maradona” (recalling Diego Maradona, the former Argentinean footballer [soccer player] who gained notoriety for a handballed soccer during a 1986 World Cup match between England and Argentina. Maradona said the hand of God was responsible). The regime imposed an economic emergency, across-the board pay cuts, staple food imports banning, and a national debate on whether to take an IMF loan. Given widespread opposition to the IMF loan, Babangida imposed a “home-grown” program (drawn up with substantial World Bank input, although the strategies were identical to the IMF’s) without taking the loan. Nigerians felt tricked. Opposition grew among intellectuals, university students, and professional organizations. Many were jailed for being antigovernment.
Sapped Transition: Stillborn Third Republic By 1989 Nigeria had a new constitution and the formation of political parties began. Allegedly, midlevel officers attempted an abortive coup in April 1990. After secret military tribunal trials, 69 people were condemned to death and executed. There were local government elections (December 1990); and governorship and state legislative elections (December 1991). Babangida abruptly canceled the 1992 presidential primaries, charging widespread fraud. There was a presidential election on June 12, 1993, after the regime banned political parties, forming and imposing two of their political parties—the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC). Babangida declared one as “a little bit to the left” and the other “a little bit to the right.” The June 12 presidential election is widely considered Nigeria’s freest and fairest. M.K.O. Abiola, a multimillionaire Yoruba businessman, won in early returns,
1602 | Nigerian Immigrants
but the election was annulled on June 23. Riots and demonstrations erupted. Many lives were lost. Babangida said he was “stepping aside.” On August 27, Babangida, promising new elections in February 1994, convened an interim national government led by Ernest Shonekan, a Yoruba businessman. Shonekan could not handle Nigeria’s economic and political problems.
Brutal Dictatorship: Abacha, 1993–1998 General Sani Abacha, the defense minister, seized power, imposed military rule, and ejected Shonekan on November 17, 1993. Most Nigerians embraced Abacha’s coup, but disillusionment was swift. A prodemocracy movement developed, coalescing into the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), spearheading opposition to the regime and demanding democracy. This movement was supported by Western democracies and Nigerian diaspora groups. Abacha initiatives, including the May 1994 elections for a Constitutional Conference, were overwhelmingly rejected. Abiola, supported by NADECO, declared his presidency on June 11, 1994, but, fearing assassination, he fled Nigeria. Upon returning on June 23, he was arrested and jailed. The prodemocracy opposition was strengthened, supported by unions, which went on strike. Abacha dismissed national union leaders, banned professional associations, jailed critics, muzzled the press, and suppressed all opposition, including critics like Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni eight, who were sentenced to death by hanging by a military tribunal. Despite widespread domestic and international appeals, the Ogoni environmental activists were executed in November 1995. Nigeria became a pariah state internationally. International sanctions were imposed. Abacha alleged in 1995 that 40 military officers and civilians plotted his overthrow. Included were retired Generals Olusegun Obasanjo and Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, former military head of state and deputy, as well as numerous human rights activists and journalists. A secret tribunal convicted and sentenced many to death. Abacha planned to become a civilian president. On October 1, 1995, he announced a three-year transition. Widely considered a sham, below 10 percent participated in local government elections in December 1997 and state assembly and governorship elections in April 1998. All five Abacha-regime-approved political parties—the United Nigeria Congress Party, Grass Roots Democratic Movement, Democratic Party of Nigeria, Congress for National Consensus, and National Centre Party of Nigeria—nominated him as presidential candidate. Nigeria was declared most corrupt country in the world by Transparency International. There was much relief and jubilation when Abacha died allegedly of a heart attack on June 8, 1998.
Background | 1603
Another Transition: Abdulsalami Abubakar, 1998–1999 General Abdulsalami Abubakar was drafted to lead another transition. Most political detainees were released and there was a declared commitment to end human rights abuses. In August 1998, the regime appointed the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to run elections from December 1998 to February 1999. General Olusegun Obasanjo, People’s Democratic Party (PDP), newly released from prison, won the presidential election. There were numerous complaints about electoral malpractices, including by Chief Olu Falae, the presidential candidate for the Alliance for Democracy (AD) and All People’s Party (APP), who allegedly lost. The 1979 constitution previously suspended after the Buhari coup was rehabilitated as the 1999 Nigerian constitution. The federal system established by the constitution has an American-style executive branch with a strong president. The Nigerian National Assembly has two chambers, a Senate with 109 members and a House of Representatives with 360. Reforms began to ensure judicial independence. The inauguration of the president and beginning of Nigeria’s fourth republic was scheduled for May 29, 1999.
General Obasanjo Returns to Power as a Two-Time Civilian President in the Fourth Republic, 1999–2007 Many Nigerians were euphoric when the Obasanjo administration began, expecting imminent economic and democratic dividends of democracy. Many considered Obasanjo a confirmed democrat committed to ending human rights abuses. Nigeria’s military was restive and discontented; its bureaucracy was inefficient and corrupt, its infrastructure decayed, and its population oppressed by long-term economic crisis and political repression. Obasanjo’s administration rationalized and reorganized the military and charged the Oputa Commission with investigating human rights abuses. Many Nigerians languishing in detention without trial, were released, and past military regimes’ economic policies were scrutinized. Efforts began to recover funds from the Abachas’ secret foreign bank accounts. Nigerian democratic space expanded with greater freedom of the press, and attempts to operate a system of checks and balances. This was evident in disagreements between legislature and executive over revenue allocation formulas and budget appropriations. Nigeria faced slow economic recovery and conflict over access to resources in communities where combined religious intolerance and disputes between indigenes and newcomers generated conflict. Amendments to the 1999 constitution and a Sovereign National Conference to determine the country’s future were demanded. Disenchantment with the Obasanjo administration increased over the military-type tactics used to quell uprisings, for example, army
1604 | Nigerian Immigrants
Supporters of former military ruler General Olusegun Obasanjo rally outside the venue of a People’s Democratic Party (PDP) convention in Jos, Nigeria, February 13, 1999. Some 2,500 delegates of the PDP would choose their presidential candidate from seven, including the main contenders, Obasanjo and former vice president Alex Ekwueme. Nigeria, which had been ruled by the military for all but 10 years since independence in 1960, had been moving toward civilian rule since the death of the country’s former dictator, General Sani Abacha, in June. (AP Photo/Clement Ntaye)
deployment to attack Odi, in Bayelsa State, to avenge the alleged November 1999 killing of 12 policemen in Odi. Numerous lives and much property were lost. In 2003 the first elections under a civilian administration in the fourth republic were conducted. Obasanjo and the PDP won widely condemned implausible landslide victories. The elections were violence-prone, and election tribunals confronted massive caseloads of challenges to the elections. Many results were invalidated. Obasanjo’s administration faced disputes over the Niger Delta’s growing violence, insecurity, and decrepit infrastructural and environmental status. Armed ethnic militias began interethnic conflicts, attacked oil installations, and kidnapped multinational oil companies’ foreign employees. Soon kidnappings began of wealthy Nigerians, particularly politicians and their relatives. The government established the Niger Delta Development Commission in 2000 to replace the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission, established in 1992. Neither effectively addressed environmental degradation complaints or pent-up desire for development. Instead of gracefully leaving office after his second term, Obasanjo aggressively sought a constitutional amendment for a third term. Attempts to push this through the National Assembly were vigorously resisted and in May 2006, defeated.
Background | 1605
Second Post-Authoritarian Elections of the Fourth Republic—2007: Yar’Adua Administration INEC had to organize and conduct the 2007 elections. Over 35 political parties participated in governorship and state assembly elections (April 14); and presidential and National Assembly elections (April 21, 2007). The elections were deeply flawed. Violence, intimidation, rigging, and other malpractices were rife. Challenges were mounted against the governorship elections results in 34 states. Petitions were brought before the Court of Appeals, 1,527 compared with 527 in 2003. Many results were overturned by election tribunals, and incumbent governors, legislators, and local government officials were thrown out. The presidential elections were also challenged, but on December 12, 2008, in a 4–3 vote, the Nigerian Supreme Court declared these results valid. INEC was widely condemned for nontransparency, inefficiency, lack of autonomy from incumbents, and politicizing elections. INEC certified that the PDP won over 70 percent of the votes in the presidential elections. Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, former governor of Katsina state, and brother to Obasanjo’s second-in-command when he was a military head of state, was declared winner. Yar’Adua agreed that the elections were flawed and appointed a Constitutional Review, and an Election Review Committee. Although highly suspect, Nigerians accepted the transition, fearing a military coup. Obasanjo handed the government over to President Yar’Adua on May 29, 2007. Patricia Olubunmi Etteh (PDP) made history as first woman speaker of the federal House of Representatives. Her term was short-lived. By October 2007, she had to resign over allegations of abuse of office and misappropriation of funds, after a legislative impasse, conflict within the National Assembly, and widespread public demands. Dimeji Bankole (PDP) became the speaker. Legislative and judicial autonomy have coexisted with policy drift and rootlessness. The executive branch’s problems include the Niger Delta violence, ethno-religious conflicts, flawed elections, and a sluggish economy. The administration declared commitment to the rule of law, but no institutional reforms were forthcoming. From August 6, 2009, there were unsuccessful amnesty and job-creation programs for demobilized Niger Delta armed militia members (Olukoya 2009). With a serious kidney ailment, President Yar’Adua was sickly. A constitutional crisis erupted due to his mysterious absence for nearly 60 days, and a lack of transparency on his medical condition. Allegedly in Saudi Arabia, Yar’Adua neglected to hand over power to Vice President Goodluck Jonathan. A Yar’Adua interview on BBC caused further confusion and, after lawsuits demanding respect for constitutional provisions and/or Yar’Adua’s resignation, a letter informed the National Assembly that he was on vacation. The vice president became interim president on
1606 | Nigerian Immigrants
February 8. Finally, on May 5, 2010, Yar’Adua’s death was announced. Jonathan was sworn in as president.
Causes and Waves of Migration The peoples of today’s Nigeria were among enslaved Africans transformed into an undifferentiated mass in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. In the 18th and 19th centuries, about 10 million African slaves were brought to America. Enslaved Africans and indentured servants, among them the abolitionist Olaudah Equiano (Gustavus Vassa), and an “Ibo Negro fellow” in James City prison mentioned in a Williamsburg, Virginia, advertisement, were transported from Nigeria to America (Williamsburg VA Slave Notice 1766). They arrived predominantly through ports in Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, purchased by land and business owners who scattered them throughout the country (Library of Congress). Both when the United States allowed free non-Asian inflows, and after the 1924 Immigration Act when national origin immigration quotas were legally mandated, Nigerians did not come to the United States in significant numbers. Immigration laws discriminated against blacks, due to institutionalized segregation and racism. Nigeria was under British colonization (1914 until 1960), and few could migrate. The second wave (1945–1965) saw increased migration, but Britain remained the favored destination. A third wave responded to political turmoil and economic crisis, dating from the Biafran war, when Igbo refugees came to the United States, through the 1980s when deep economic crisis and harsh SAP policies, imposed by the IMF and World Bank, pushed Nigerians out. From 1979 to 1983, military dictatorships produced flows of political and economic refugees. Some Nigerians came to the United States after winning the Diversity Lottery, or as health care professionals (whose skills are in high demand, so that they could secure immigrant visas). Undocumented immigrants also come “by any means necessary.” With democratically elected governments since 1999, out-migration has coexisted with return immigration by politicians, professionals, and businessmen and women.
Immigration Act of 1965 and Succeeding Legislation Before the 1965 Immigration Act, restrictions against non-European immigrants to the United States foreclosed emigration to Africans. Most Nigerians emigrated for education, and after graduation they promptly returned home; many were professionals, particularly in the medical and ancillary fields. Between 1965 and 1986, the numbers of Nigerian immigrants increased slowly. Most came for higher education, with some sponsored by the government. Refugee status was automatically extended to those fleeing Communist regimes, but Nigerians were not so classified. Nigerian refugees first came to the United
Demographic Profile | 1607
States before the Biafran war (July 6, 1967, to January 15, 1970). The war refugees raised funds for relief efforts back home. Many who stayed now live all over the country. Later, those fleeing draconian military regimes and political tensions came after each coup d’état. Due to the brutal dictatorships of General Muhammadu Buhari (December 1983–August 1985), General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (August 27, 1985–August 27, 1993), and General Sani Abacha (November 17, 1993–June 8, 1998), Nigerian refugees also flowed in after the 1980 Refugee Resettlement Act.
The Refugee Act of 1980 The 1980 Refugee Act incorporated international standards into U.S. law. The 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol on Refugees were adopted in response to critiques of U.S. refugee laws as politicized, being geared predominantly toward fulfilling America’s Cold War objectives (United Nations). Previously, those fleeing Communist governments were accepted as refugees, and those from U.S.-supported right-wing authoritarian regimes were rejected. After the 1980 Act, refugee settlement programs were established that received and resettled African refugees.
IRCA (Immigration Reform and Control Act, 1986) to the Present By 1986 the IRCA was passed, extending amnesty to immigrants and criminalizing the hiring of undocumented aliens, mandating employer verification of employees’ work authorization. Farm workers received exemptions to seek employment. Undocumented immigrants and agricultural seasonal workers who came before January 1, 1982, and had lived in the United States continuously, were granted amnesty (USDOJ 1986). Many undocumented Nigerian immigrants applied for permanent resident status and family reunification. The 1990 Immigration Act increased limits on family-based immigration from 216,000 to 480,000. The 480,000 ceiling was exceeded in 1993. Immigration for employment was increased from 54,000 to 140,000 annually, with a permanent lottery system to accommodate countries with fewer immigrant admissions (USIS 1990; Greenwood and Ziel).
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community There were 91,499 Nigerians in the United States in the 1990s, and 164,691 in 2000, representing 0.1 percent of the total U.S. population and an 80 percent increase from the 1980s (Brittingham and de la Cruz 2004). Nigerian immigrants have high levels of formal education that does not match their income, which is
1608 | Nigerian Immigrants
lower than similarly situated Americans. This is attributed to their citizenship status. Only 21.4 percent had U.S. citizenship in 1990. Citizens and green card holders can access well-paying jobs with benefits. Nigerian immigrants combine part-time work, often in minimum-wage jobs, with schooling, and if compliant with immigration law, they cannot work over 20 hours weekly. Immigrants face more discrimination for jobs requiring higher levels of education (Kaba 2007, 275). Discrimination against immigrants means underemployment and lower wages than for green card holders and citizens.
Age and Family Structure The Nigerian immigrant population in the United States is young, with most in high school or tertiary institutions. This follows African trends, where in 2006, 40.6 percent of 910.8 million African immigrants were under 15 years old, compared with 42.3 percent of Nigerians. In 2006, the African median age was 19.6 years compared with Nigeria’s 18.7 years. In the United States, in 2000, 31 percent of 700,000 African immigrants were under 25 years old. Nigerians had the youngest average age: 34.5 years among immigrant males in the United States in 1990 from nine African countries (Kaba 2007, 38).
Educational Attainment Compared with other Americans, Nigerian immigrants are better educated (U.S. Census Bureau 2001). As Amadu Jacky Kaba (2007) shows, in the 1990 census of 158.9 million people in the United States aged 25 and over, 20.3 percent had bachelor’s degree or higher and 7.2 percent had graduate degree or higher. For 52,388 Nigerians aged 25 and over, 52.9 percent had bachelor’s degree or higher and 26.3 percent had graduate degree or higher. The 52.9 percent of Nigerians with bachelor’s degree or higher were second only to another African group, Egyptians, with 60.4 percent. The 26.3 percent of Nigerians with graduate degree or higher was the highest rate among all 68 ancestry groups listed. . . . Nigerians in the United States are at the top of the ladder in 1990 in educational attainment. Their average rate in bachelor’s degree attainment was 36.6 percentage points higher than the national average and doubled and tripled many of the dominant groups in the country in 1990. Their average rate in graduate degree attainment in 1990 was 19.1 percentage points higher than the national average and more than doubled many of the dominant ethnic groups in the country. Leslie Casimir (2007) shows that 37 percent of Nigerians in the United States had bachelor’s degrees, 17 percent had master’s degrees, and 4 percent had doctoral degrees.
Demographic Profile | 1609
Economic Attainment African immigrants in the United States, including Nigerians, may be highly educated but are poorly paid compared with others with similar levels of education. Many obtain advanced degrees when very young, probably due to desired compliance with immigration laws denying them legal authorization to stay after graduation. Many hope for future advancement, failing to complain for fear of employers’ penalty by nonsponsorship for a green card. Being young could also mean earning less (Butcher 1994, 267–68). Race, skin color, skin tone, and the prejudicial behavior that darker skin still evokes mean that Nigerian immigrants may earn less than lighter-skinned Africans from northern and southern Africa (Kaba 2007; Takyi 2002). Low earnings relative to qualification could arise from lack of social capital, nonconnectedness to networks facilitating access to well-paying jobs (Portes and Rumbaut 1996), relative newness to the United States (Moore and Foster 2002) or insufficient acculturation. Gender inequality, expressed as wage inequality, affects African women more profoundly (Dodoo 1997). The wage disparities between north and south also affect African workers who are predominantly in the South (Moore and Foster 2002; Kaba 2007). According to Dodoo and Takyi (2006), wage disparities are caused by white privilege in access to resources.
Debe, an immigrant from Nigeria, stands in the African variety store he owns in Harlem, New York, December 10, 2007. (AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews)
1610 | Nigerian Immigrants Nigerian immigrant occupations Occupation
Number of Workers
Margin of Error (⫹Ⲑ⫺)
1. Nurses
11,300
⫹Ⲑ⫺14%
2. Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants
7,400
⫹Ⲑ⫺17%
3. Sales-related occupations
6,500
⫹Ⲑ⫺19%
4. Managers and administrators
5,700
⫹Ⲑ⫺20%
5. Teachers
5,300
⫹Ⲑ⫺21%
6. Policemen and other protective service workers
4,500
⫹Ⲑ⫺22%
7. Drivers and other transportation workers
4,200
⫹Ⲑ⫺23%
8. Accountants and other financial specialists
4,100
⫹Ⲑ⫺23%
9. Social service and legal professionals
3,700
⫹Ⲑ⫺25%
10. Doctors
3,000
⫹Ⲑ⫺27%
11. Scientists and quantitative analysts
2,900
⫹Ⲑ⫺28%
12. Clerical and administrative staff
2,500
⫹Ⲑ⫺30%
13. Computer software developers
1,200
⫹Ⲑ⫺43%
14. Janitors
900
⫹Ⲑ⫺50%
15. Engineers and architects
700
⫹Ⲑ⫺57%
16. Machinists and craftspeople
700
⫹Ⲑ⫺57%
17. Cooks and other food preparers Total workers in all occupations
600 92,500
⫹Ⲑ⫺61% Change 1990–2007: ⫹240%
Source: Bloch, Carter, and Gebeloff (2009).
Statistics on the occupational and income patterns of Nigerians in the United States are inaccurate. However, according the New York Times, the top 20 occupations of Nigerian immigrants are as follows:
Health Statistics and Issues While Read and Emerson (2005) claim that Nigerian immigrants in the United States are healthier than others of African descent in predominantly white countries, Early, McKinney, and Murray claim that Nigerian immigrants and refugees have preexisting health conditions, including a host of “tropical diseases” like river blindness, yellow fever, and malaria. Unfortunately, they give neither statistical nor analytical indication of the prevalence of these conditions among Nigerian immigrants, including whether their health status differs from that of refugees, whether the socioeconomic status of immigrants or refugees makes any difference, or how they compare with other groups.
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1611
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals: Birth/Baptism, Coming of Age, Marriage, Funerals Nigerian immigrants value and nurture family relations. Consanguinity matters, but conventionally, most establish fictive kinship with close friends. These relationships are often so close that outsiders cannot distinguish blood relations from fictive kin. Islam, Christianity, and a wide variety of indigenous religions are practiced in Nigeria. The language of government, English, is now combined with indigenous Nigerian languages in various states (U.S. Department of State). Due to modernity, the adoption of religions like Christianity and Islam, and lack of will, most Nigerian families do not observe indigenous coming-of-age rituals and rites as originally constructed. However, the 1st, 10th, 16th, 21st, 50th, and 70th birthdays; weddings; graduation from high school, college, and professional schools; and advanced degrees are celebrated with great fanfare. The 16th and 21st birthdays are considered indicative of maturity. The size and grandness of the party depends on family resources. Nigerians celebrate births with great joy. Friends and family assemble for childnaming ceremonies. Traditionally, Nigerian children are named after seven days. Given modern realities, the child is named in the hospital/at birth, with traditional child-naming at the baby’s parents’ home after one week. Some Nigerians names are not gendered. However, some names are believed to be more suited to males or females. The Yoruba saying: “Ile laa wo k’a to s’omo l’oruko” (the family circumstances and/or circumstances of birth are essential determinants of naming a child) means that children’s names are deeply meaningful, connecting with family heritage, and parents’ experiences during gestation. Thus, immigrant Yoruba may give their children names such as Tokunbo (one from overseas), Babatunde (male child born after the grandfather’s death), Babarimisa (male child born after his father’s death), or Yetunde or Yewande (female child born after her grandmother’s death). Yoruba twins are named Taiwo (first born) and Kehinde (second born). In traditional Yoruba naming ceremonies, the baby is given a taste of kolanuts, bitter kola, alligator pepper, honey, salt, palm oil, salt, and water. There are prayers for the baby’s life to be productive (alligator pepper and its numerous seeds), useful and distinguished (kola), meaningful (bitter kola), sweet (honey), crucial (salt), smooth and trouble free (water). In Nigeria, these ceremonies are at dawn, but difficult work schedules mean flexible timing for immigrants. Refreshments are served. Babies are given money and other presents. Traditional practices include a 40-day out-dooring ceremony for new mothers. Akara (savory fried paste from black-eyed
1612 | Nigerian Immigrants
peas, onions, tomatoes, and pepper) is served, marking the completion of confinement. In immigrant communities, confinement ends when the mother returns to work, or because she has everyday chores and lacks the three-month maternity leave and supportive family network that enables confinement in Nigeria. Weddings are usually grand and large, with lavish parties and religious ceremonies in church or mosque combined with traditional ceremonies. Nigerian funerals are modest and sad when a young person dies. Among the Yoruba, it is anathema for parents and those older than the deceased to attend funerals of the young. However, modern realities make compliance difficult. Nigerian immigrant communities often take a collection to assist with expenses. Some take the body back to Nigeria for burial and hold a memorial service in the United States, but increasingly, there are more U.S. burials. When parents die back home, services of songs are held by Christians, and fidau prayers by Muslims. Funerals of aged Nigerians are celebrations of life, because these are considered lives well-lived. These funerals feature people dressed in aso-ebí (uniform) colors or clothing. There is dancing, and lots of food and drink, often for hundreds of people, in banquet halls.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Due to cultural retention, African American family patterns are influenced by African origins (Sudarkasa 1998). Gender relations inevitably change over time. However, some scholars claim that immigration changes gender relations to give women more autonomy and sometimes disrupts the gender balance within families. Many Nigerian immigrant professional women, like those back home, have financial autonomy. Lacking social networks to assist with child, family, and elder care, they also have heavier burdens than back home. Nigerian women work (some in the informal economy). Many are skilled technical professionals, home health aides, and service sector workers. Many are parttime, small-scale informal international traders in cloth, jewelry, and accessories from Asia (China, Bangkok), Europe (Italy, France, U.K.); the Middle East (Dubai, Beirut); Nigeria; and the United States. Most Nigerian families struggle with life challenges and the harsh immigrant experience but manage to live in relative harmony and peace. In Nigeria fathers and even mothers take less direct responsibility for housework and child care because they can hire staff, which they cannot afford in the United States. So the family must cooperatively clean, cook, and manage child care. Reluctance to change traditional gender roles causes tensions and arguments. Insecurity and anguish about lost status and income cause or escalate hostility, distrust, and rancor between family members. Some families experience domestic violence, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that this may arise from women earning more than their husbands, causing men’s insecurity. Some men also believe their wives, upon becoming credentialed
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1613
and moneyed, become arrogant and disrespectful. Sometimes domestic violence tragically causes deaths or mutilation of wives by husbands.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Nigerians attempt retention of cultural and national identity, particularly in food and folkways. Many join ethnic or hometown associations to maintain connections with people of like culture and interests. Rites of passage are marked by wearing the clothing, cooking and serving the food, and speaking the languages of Nigeria. Nigerian immigrant parties and celebrations, and the music, speeches, and practices are almost identical to those back home. Communal social events like picnics, award ceremonies, and fundraisers bring together Nigerians who network, socialize, and access resources connecting them with their national culture. Many immigrant groups organize language lessons for their offspring. Some attend exclusively Nigerian churches and mosques. Products from Nigeria are available in Nigerian immigrant stores. Loom-woven cloth is sold by women traders to satisfy demand for these essential items for weddings, birthdays, and other celebrations.
Continued Links to Nigeria Nigerian immigrants are transnational. Many send remittances home to contribute to philanthropy, family welfare and survival needs, community development projects, philanthropic efforts, and business ventures (Okome 2004). Some links are political. During the Abacha dictatorship, Nigerian prodemocracy and human rights activists organized coalitions worldwide where Nigerian immigrant and refugee populations resided. For example, Hafsat Abiola, M.K.O. Abiola’s daughter, established the Kudirat Initiative for Democracy (KIND). M.K.O. Abiola was reputed to have won the June 12 presidential election invalidated by the Babangida regime. Abiola was jailed for treason after declaring himself president and, on the eve of his release, died under suspicious conditions. Kudirat Abiola, one of M.K.O.’s wives, was assassinated later by the Abacha regime. KIND was established to mobilize domestic and international efforts to unseat Abacha. Through Radio Kudirat, KIND beamed broadcasts into Nigeria from abroad, in five of Nigeria’s numerous languages (Okome, “African Diasporas,” 159). Migrant, alumni, hometown associations, and individuals fundraise for philanthropic efforts in the United States and Nigeria (Okome 2007, 168). Sometimes they connect with philanthropic institutions, as with collaboration by Ford, MacArthur, and Rockefeller Foundations and the Carnegie Corporation, to help African universities address infrastructural decay caused by SAP. The University of Ibadan established the Fanton challenge to raise $250,000 to match funds donated by the
1614 | Nigerian Immigrants
MacArthur Foundation’s president and the Nigeria Higher Education Foundation, headquartered in Uniondale, New Jersey (Nigeria Higher Education Foundation). New philanthropic organizations are being founded by prominent individuals. Hakeem Olajuwon, the Houston Rockets star, founded the Hakeem Olajuwon Dream Foundation in Nigeria (Copeland-Carson 2005, 83–84). Unfortunately, in the post-9/11 period, Olajuwon got more media scrutiny for allegedly supporting a mosque that made donations to Al Qaeda than for his philanthropy (Okome 2007, 169). Kase Lawal, a wealthy Nigerian immigrant in the petroleum industry, also undertakes philanthropy in the United States and Nigeria (Chappell 2006; Hughes and Robinson 2006). To accumulate funds for individual or communal remittances, Nigerian immigrants use formal and informal savings mechanisms. The Yorùbá of southwestern Nigeria call these èsúsú or àjo, the Igbo, oha; the Ibibios, osusu; the Annang, etibe, and in northern Nigeria, adashi or dashi (Osondu 2011). A group puts an agreedupon amount of money in a weekly, biweekly, monthly, or other scheduled basis into a pool, then decides when each member takes the entire pot, sometimes by drawing lots. The designated banker could be a group member or an outsider with a reputation for trustworthiness. The banker collects money from group members and pays members as scheduled (Okome 2007, 170).
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background Nigerians in the United States have a rich associational life. Most organizations are ethnic, hometown, alumni, and professional associations, but a few have national scope. Their roots are historically deep, being influenced by social organizations first established for mutual assistance for Nigerian rural and urban migrants in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (N’Diaye 1997). Many community-based organizations with established institutional presence in the African immigrant community are ethnic, professional, religious, and social. Some examples include, but are not limited to those described briefly in the following. • The Association of Nigerian Physicians Abroad (ANPA) does fund-raising for medical outreach to Africa. It donates medical services, equipment, and medicines. ANPA participated actively in the prodemocracy movement in Nigeria from 1995 until 1999, funding exiled prodemocracy activists like Wole Soyinka, and participated in lobbying Congress for U.S. intervention in Nigerian politics (Sayo 1999). • Afénifére is a Yoruba political group actively involved in Nigerian politics. A member, Dr. Sikiru Fadairo, ran in 2001 for a New York City Council seat in Queens (Okome 2004, 191).
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1615
• The Association of Nigerian Lawyers provides pro bono immigration and other legal services. • The Yoruba Alliance, a community-based umbrella organization established in November 1996, has eight independent U.S.-based member organizations. • The Nigerian American Community Association, based in Staten Island, New York, has the mission of positive portrayal of Nigerian Americans’ image (Nigerian American Community Association). Recent Caribbean and African immigrant communities are building political, social, and cultural bridges between continental African and Caribbean communities. Common experiences of immigration, accommodation, and transnational interests foster these relations. African, Caribbean, and African American communities share African ancestry and experiences of racial discrimination. Mayor Marion Barry’s administration in Washington, D.C., appointed a Commission of African and Caribbean Community Affairs, with equal numbers of continental African and Caribbean Americans. Some African American organizations have sister cities in Africa and the Caribbean and work closely with African and Caribbean immigrant organizations, sponsoring and encouraging exchange visits between the United States, Africa, and the Caribbean, and organizing and promoting philanthropic cultural activities and fundraisers (N’Diaye 1997), for example, the Odunde festival, an African-Caribbean effort in Philadelphia, now in its 34th year (African and Caribbean Business Roundtable 2009).
Religion Nigerians of many faiths, including Christianity, Islam, and indigenous African religions, reside in the United States. The oldest presence is among Africans of the old diaspora created by slavery, who worship Yoruba deities. Mainline Christian denominations are well represented, but the fastest-growing are African-initiated charismatic Pentecostalist churches. Some are branches with headquarters in Nigeria, including the Celestial Church of Christ, the Cherubim and Seraphim (Aladura) Church, Christ Apostolic Church, Deeper Christian Life Ministry, Mountain of Fire and Miracles, and Redeemed Christian Church of God. Others are independently founded by Nigerians in the United States (Genocchio 2006; “Aliens in a New America” 2004). Some mainline churches bring clergy from Nigeria and have services in its languages (Kwakye-Nuako 2006; Cogan and Ibe). Nigerian Muslims have a strong presence in the United States. A National Council of Nigerian Muslim Organizations (NCNMO) in the USA was established in Washington, D.C., in 1976. By December 2009, NCNMO listed 26 U.S. chapters with mosques established by Nigerian immigrants, including the Nigerian Islamic Center on the north side of Chicago, Rhode Island’s Masjid Ar-Razaq, and various
1616 | Nigerian Immigrants
Muslim Community Centers in major cities in the United States (National Council of Nigerian Muslim Organizations in the USA).
Language Issues Nigeria has over 400 distinct ethnic groups. The three largest are the Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba. Some first-generation Nigerian American parents teach their children their mother tongue. However, many find this a struggle. Some send children back home for education and desire eventual return to Nigeria. There are increasingly more attempts to establish language and cultural schools. Some Nigerians in the diaspora have developed multimedia language teaching tools sold online. The major Nigerian languages are taught in colleges and universities with African studies programs and are taken by many Nigerian American youth. Unfortunately, the numerous languages make efforts to develop material and promote retention disparate. Larger ethnic groups may have more resources to ensure the production and dissemination of language materials. Also, efforts are duplicated since these languages are mutually unintelligible.
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media Nigerian newspapers in the United States are published in English for longer reach and broader readership. However, there may be newspapers in Nigeria’s indigenous languages in the future if there are enough subscribers. Most Nigerians access the major Nigerian dailies, some of which are published in Nigerian languages, online. The Guardian is one of Nigeria’s crusading newspapers. It is privately owned by Alex Ibru. Until the 1999 election, it provided a prodemocracy perspective. This tradition of militant journalism is traceable to the nationalist resistance to colonial rule. The Guardian is favored by Nigerian intellectuals and is respected for its independence and sound analysis (Olukotun 2004). It is found at http://www. ngrguardiannews.com. Vanguard is privately owned by Sam Amuka-Pemu. It is also one of the crusading newspapers that engaged in militant journalism during the transition to civilian rule (Olukotun 2004). It is found at http://www.vanguardngr.com. This Day is privately owned and published in Lagos, Nigeria, by Nduka Obaigbena. It was first published on January 22, 1992. It is found at http://www.thisday online.com. The Sun is a relatively new tabloid, owned by Orji Kalu (Olukotun 2004). It is found at http://www.sunnewsonline.com. The Daily Independent is one of the newer privately owned Nigerian newspapers (Olukotun 2004). It is found at http://www.independentngonline.com.
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1617
The Punch is privately owned by Ajibola Ogusola. It is a widely read crusading newspaper (Olukotun 2004). It is found at http://www.punchonthenet.com/default. aspx. The Daily Trust is privately owned by Kabiru Yusuf, chairman of the Board of Directors and CEO). It is found at http://www.dailytrust.com/. The Daily Times is one of Nigeria’s oldest newspapers. It began as a state-owned newspaper but is now privately owned. It is found at http://www.dailytimesofni geria.com/. Alaroye is a privately owned Yoruba newspaper with wide coverage. This and similar newspapers became stronger and more prominent during military rule (Olukotun 2004). It is found at http://www.alaroye.com. Tell Magazine is a privately owned weekly published in Lagos, Nigeria (Nosa Igiebor, editor). It is found at http://www.tellng.com. Newswatch is a privately owned weekly published in Lagos since December 3, 1984. It pioneered the weekly news magazine genre in Nigeria (Dan Agbese, editor-in-chief ). Its first editor-in-chief and chief executive, Dele Giwa, was killed by a mail bomb during the Babangida era, on October 19, 1986. It is found at http:// www.newswatchngr.com/. News sources established by Nigerian immigrants in U.S. newspapers publish Nigerian and African news, photographs of social events, and advertisements of businesses owned by Africans, Nigerians, and those serving them, including professional services, restaurants, groceries, and shipping services. Advertisements of churches and revival services are featured. Their print edition is found in African grocery stores, churches, and businesses. These include: USAfricaonline (established in Houston, Texas, May 1992), which covers Nigerian, African, and U.S. news. It is found at http://www.usafricaonline.com/. ViewNaija, established in Georgia, October 1, 2007, by Ehi Binitie, Jude Idada, and Michel Karera as “a one stop shop for . . . wholesome Nigerian entertainment,” is found at http://www.viewnaija.com. The Chicago Inquirer, established August 1, 2003, Joseph Omoremi, editor, is published twice weekly and provides news on “politics, economy, culture, fashion, sports, art, religion, crime, affluence and the poor.” It seeks to facilitate connections between Africans and African Americans. It is found at http://www.chica goinquirer.com. Light of the World (Julius Ogunnaya, publisher), is a monthly with offices in Annapolis, Maryland; Queens, New York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Columbus, Ohio. Together with articles on Christianity and advertisements by Nigerian churches and businesses, it carries Nigerian and African news. Sahara Reporters was created as “an online community of international reporters and social advocates.” It uncovers and reports Nigerian political corruption and excesses and is found at http://www.saharareporters.com.
1618 | Nigerian Immigrants
African Sun Times (Chika Onyeani, publisher), is headquartered in East Orange, New Jersey. It is found at http://africansuntimes.com. African Abroad-USA (Alex Okiemute-Kabba, publisher and editor-in-chief ) is published biweekly from Queens, New York. It is found at http://www.africana broad-usa.com. US Immigration News is published by immigration attorney Joseph Rotimi Famuyide. It provides information, analysis, and advertisements on immigration. It is found at http://www.usimmigrationnewspaper.com. The Diasporan Star (published by Ekerete Udoh, who has an MA in political science from Brooklyn College, CUNY), is a tabloid featuring news on Nollywood and the Nigerian diaspora arts and entertainments scene in the United States. It is found at http://www.thediasporanstar.com. There is also a myriad of other Web presences. Among them are online communities and social networking media with links to Nigerian newspapers online. Nigeria World, Odilinet, nigeriaweb, naijapages, and naijanet are part of a network, each with multiple Web pages, including message boards. They provide current Nigerian news and blogs on Nigerian society, politics, economy, and popular culture, at http://nigeriaworld.com/. Nairaland Forum is found at http://www.nairaland.com/. Nigeria-based television broadcasters include the following. Africa Independent Television (AIT), Raymond Dokpesi, proprietor, broadcasts in Nigeria and has coverage in some African countries. It was previously available by subscription in the United States. Channels Television, John Momoh, proprietor, was established in June 1993 as a news channel, found at http://www.channelstv.com. Nigerian Television Authority, owned by the federal government of Nigeria, is found at http:// www.ntanewsonline.com/. There are several radio stations broadcasting from Nigeria. Radio Abeokuta, a webcast station on LIVE360 Internet radio network at 5780 kHz on the shortwave band, seeks to advance and support Yoruba culture, language, and music. It is primarily focused on Abeokuta (in southwest Nigeria). It is found at http://www. live365.com/profiles/abeokuta_webpages. Eko FM (Radio Lagos) 88.9FM, owned by Lagos State, was established in 1977 as a spin-off from the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). It provides music, news, and features programming and is found at http://www.radiolagosekofm.net/radiolagosekofm/Aboutus2.asp. Radio Palmwine.com, established in 2004, has six channels—Afro hiphop, Igbo, Mixed, Yoruba, Gospel, and DJ Live. It provides and facilitates the distribution of digital Nigerian music online at http://www.radiopalmwine.com/. Cool FM, 96.9 Lagos, located in Victoria Island, Lagos, has an online presence and broadcasts 24 hours every day, at http://www.coolfm.us/. Radio 1960, Lagos has a web presence but broadcasts from the United States (CEO, Peter A. Olaniran).. It is found at http://www.unity1960.com/about.php. Radio Nigeria is owned by the federal
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government of Nigeria and is found at http://ww2.radionigeria.gov.ng/home2.php. Nigerian Web Radio is Internet based, geared at reaching Nigerians in the diaspora. It provides Nigerian and international news, features, entertainment, sports reports, and music (both religious and secular) of Nigerian artists. It is found at http://www. nigerianwebradio.com/.
Celebration of National Holidays Nigerian Independence Day (October 1) is celebrated by Nigerian Americans. New York celebrations include a parade on Second Avenue. Elected city officials are invited, and Nigerian states sponsor floats showcasing indigenous ethnic clothing, music, and dance. The 2009 parade stretched over 15 blocks. Many Nigerian clubs, churches, mosques, and businesses participate and advertise. Patriotic memorabilia are sold (Adujie 2009). In Chicago, Nigerian immigrants have the Nigeria Festival at the DuSable Museum of African American History every summer (Cogan and Ibe). There are annual banquets, as in Portland, Oregon, to commemorate Nigeria’s independence, with keynote speakers addressing contemporary issues, pageants, award ceremonies, and much merrymaking. The 50th year of Nigeria’s independence was marked in 2010, and festivities were grand. There was a three-day celebration in New York City (“Nigerian Independence Day” 2010). In Miami, the Nigerian American Foundation celebrated in 2009 with a parade (Umahi 2009). Nigerian Muslims celebrate Eid el Fitr, to end Ramadan, which is marked with prescribed fasting, reflection, and abstinence from pleasurable activities for 30 days. Activities include prayers, alms to the poor, feasts, and presents for children. Eid el-Adha (called Eid el Kabir by most Nigerians), the Feast of the Sacrifice, commemorates Prophet Mohammed’s return to Mecca. In Nigeria, rams are slaughtered by Muslims, then cooked and served with jollof rice and other festive foods for family and neighbors. Muslims congregate at prayer grounds in their best finery to pray for Allah’s blessings. In the United States, Muslims purchase slaughtered (halal) rams from farms. Others buy affordable portions from Nigerian or Muslim grocery stores. There are also festivities and prayers and at mosques. Igbos, who consider yams men’s crop, and cocoyam women’s crop, celebrate the New Yam Festival annually. Immediately before midnight, elders lead thanksgiving prayers to God and indigenous Igbo deities (for fertility, plenty, and goodness), and celebrate with a kolanut ceremony, libations, drumming, blessings, dancing, and eating. Nigerian Christians celebrate Christmas and Easter, and predominantly Nigerian immigrant churches have annual harvest ceremonies with dancing and prayers. Aladura churches celebrate annual Adoption Services instead. Fruits and foodstuff are brought to the church and shared after the ceremonies, ending with a feast. Many Nigerians celebrate the major American holidays, particularly Thanksgiving,
1620 | Nigerian Immigrants
A group of women dressed in traditional garb march in the Nigerian Independence Day parade on Second Avenue in New York, 2000. (Linda Rosier/NY Daily News Archive via Getty Images)
appropriated and embraced as family time for appreciating positive accomplishments in their families and communities. Retained by enslaved people, Orisa worship preceded contemporary Nigerian immigrants’ presence in the Americas. Puerto Rican Santeria, African American Yoruba religion, Ocha, Haitian Vodun, Cuban Lucumi, and Brazilian Cadomble and Umbanda are offshoots that sometimes combine Yoruba religion with Christianity and other religions. Some contemporary Yoruba immigrants also worship ancestral deities. Prayers, chanting, singing, and drumming accompany worship and festivals.
Foodways Food is basic to human existence, social systems, and processes, but it goes beyond sustenance, facilitating social interactions and multiple human expressions. Like its ethnic groups, Nigerian food is diverse, mostly spicy and varied. Nigerians conventionally have taboos against eating with the left hand. However, it is increasingly recognized that left-handedness is natural. Nigerian food reflects rich ethnic diversity and historical heritage, the contact and admixtures of various ethnicities, contact with Europeans and with returnees from “New World,” and slavery. Nigerian
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food has flavors of Brazil, Sierra Leone, and the Americas. Frijole and emojo, part of Afro-Brazilian cuisine in Lagos Island, are examples of such foods. Nigerians in the United States crave and relish food from home. Small grocery stores, restaurants, catering businesses, and wholesale markets of major metropolitan areas sell staple ingredients. In New York City, the Bronx and Brooklyn Terminal Markets are frequented by Nigerians, for bulk food purchase. All Nigerian food is delicious; however, this discussion focuses on the Yoruba. Nigerian cuisine includes dried and fresh meats, fish, poultry, seafood, vegetables like spinach/calaloo, jute leaves (ewedu), peppers, tomatoes, onions, okra and corn, yams, and cassava. Oils include palm and groundnut/peanut oil. Grains include rice and sorghum. Fruits include oranges, bananas, and pineapples, imported mostly from tropical Caribbean and Latin American countries. Immigrant Nigerians substitute kale and mustard greens for spinach. Ogbono (dried, ground wild mango seeds, cooked with tomatoes, peppers, and meat or fish of choice), is stewed and served with fufu (from cassava flour), tuo (from rice, millet, or corn flour), láfún (cassava flour), iyán (pounded yam flour, traditionally made from cooked yam pounded in a mortar with a pestle), èlùbó ògèdè (dried green plantain flour), àmàlà (flour of dried yam), and gàrí (cassava grits made into èbà) (Yoruba). It is eaten all over Nigeria, as are legumes like beans and peas. Nigerian ethnic groups have various soups and stews. The Niger Delta and southeastern Nigerians have pepper soup, a highly spiced and hot soup with seafood, goat meat, chicken, or beef. Depending on the herbs included, it could be medicinal food for the sick, or pregnant and nursing mothers. Most stews (called soup by Nigerians) combine blended tomatoes, onions, peppers, and oil. Meat, fish, seafood, poultry, or bush meat (game) is added. Leafy vegetables and egusi (ground melon seeds) are added to another variety, and okra and jute leaves are chopped and cooked with iru (fermented locust beans) or dadawa (fermented soybeans) or bouillon and combined with stews, served with fufu, eba, iyan, lafun, tuo or amala. Edi ka ekong and afang are Efik and Ibibio stews loved by most Nigerians. Tuo is a northern Nigerian staple. Nigerians also consume a lot of rice, cooked in multiple ways. White rice is served with stews (Nigerian soup) and sauces (Nigerian stew). Jollof rice, staple Nigerian party food, is a one-pot dish including blended onions, peppers, tomatoes, tomato paste, vegetable oil, and mixed vegetables, seasoned with curry, thyme, and white pepper. Móín-móín (skinned black-eyed peas or Nigerian brown beans, blended with onions, peppers tomatoes, oil, and tomato paste, wrapped in leaves (or aluminum foil) and steamed in a pot), is another favorite at Nigerian parties, as is fried ripe plantains/dòdò. Green plantains are sliced thinly and fried in hot oil to make ìpékeré/plantain chips. Either green or ripe plantains are roasted on hot coals to make bòòlì, a popular street food. For Nigerians in the United States this is summer
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barbeque food. The same ingredients as móín-móín are ground into a thicker paste, fried to make àkàrà, and served with corn porridge/ògì or èko (solidified, thicker corn porridge), for breakfast. Òjòjò is grated water yam/Colombian yam seasoned with hot pepper and onions and fried. Àsáró or èbe is peeled, cut up (Brazilian or Ghana) yam, with blended onions, peppers, tomatoes, tomato paste, and vegetable or palm oil. If desired, dried fish, dried ground shrimps, seafood, meat, or chicken is added. Ìkókoré is indigenous to the Ìjèbú Yoruba. It combines peeled and finely grated water yam (Colombian yam) with blended onions, peppers, tomatoes, tomato paste, and palm oil, dried fish, and shrimp. Boiled or roasted corn on the cob/ maize is popular street food. Yorubas also combine fresh corn kernels with Nigerian brown beans or black-eyed peas in àdàlú. Obì (Kolanut in Yoruba) and goro (Hausa) are significant symbols for most ethnic groups, produced in southern Nigeria and used for divination rituals, and as a stimulant. For Igbos, it symbolizes welcome to guests and is used at the beginning of formal gatherings, with elaborate ceremony and prayers. At naming ceremonies, it symbolizes significance and productivity. However, old practices and beliefs about kolanut in social praxis are changing, although more changes may be found in Nigeria than abroad, where people cling to indigenous social practices for their integrative qualities (Duru 2005). Orógbó (bitter cola) is used for Yoruba naming ceremonies and as medicine. Snacks include àádùn: ground roasted maize/corn kernels, red hot pepper, and palm oil; kulinkuli: ground maize or millet and sugar; and kokoro: ground roasted maize/corn kernels rolled into thin sticks and fried. Suya, originally from northern Nigeria, but now most Nigerians’ favorite, is barbequed meats, poultry, or fish rubbed with dry barbecue spice, skewered and roasted around a tall hearth, served at Nigerian restaurants, summer barbecues, and parties. Groundnuts are boiled, or roasted in or out of their shell. Almonds are eaten raw, and cashew nuts are roasted. Postcolonial Nigerian snacks include puff-puff, buns, sausage rolls, meat pies, chin-chin, and Scotch eggs. Puff-puff is sweet fried dough leavened with baking powder. Buns are fried dough of a thicker consistency. Chin-chin is stiff kneaded dough, rolled flat, cut into small rectangles or squares, and fried in hot oil. Sausage rolls are sausage meat baked in puff pastry. Meat pies are baked pastry filled with seasoned ground beef and potatoes. Scotch eggs are hard-boiled eggs covered in sausage meat, rolled in breadcrumbs, and fried. Nigerians eat fruits like oranges, pineapple, and grapefruit, and drink manufactured fruit juices. Juice drinks are popular. Various home-brewed beers and liquors are produced, including otí okà/topó (millet beer) bùrùkùtù, ògógóró (home-brewed gin), ginger beer, zobo/sorrel, and ìshápá/hibiscus, boiled, strained, and sweetened with honey or sugar. Palm wine is consumed throughout Nigeria, either freshly tapped from the palm tree or fermented. These drinks are imported from Nigeria and sold in Nigerian food markets.
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Postcolonial soft drinks, which Nigerians call “minerals,” are produced by Coca Cola, Pepsi, and other multinationals, as are beer and Guinness Stout. Nigerians drink them at social gatherings, with the exception of observant Muslims with alcohol prohibitions (“Food”). Nigerian food has deep roots in the Americas and Caribbean due to past enslavement. Hopping John (black-eyed peas) and chitterlings are examples. Excavations in Monticello, Mount Vernon, and other slave plantations show significant West African influences and foods made from maize, rice, peanuts, yams, and dried beans as “one pot meals combining meat, vegetables and broth” eaten by the enslaved Africans (Samford 1996).
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Nigeria has rich music traditions. Nigerians’ transnationalization has generated cross-fertilization between home and diaspora. African music is also evident in the Americas and Caribbean (Meadows 1979; Ekwueme 1974). Babatunde Olatunji’s percussion, Fela Anikulapo’s Afrobeat, and King Sunny Ade’s juju became popular in the United States from the 1960s on. Musical genres like Yoruba’s apala, waka, agidigbo, rara (Adegbite 1991; Drewal, Pemberton, and Abiodun 1989; Ajuwon 1982), juju, fuji, highlife (Euba 1989); itseko (Itsekiri); and abigbo (southeastern Igbo) (Onyeji 2004) are today used to deliver Gospel music, combined with reggae, hip-hop, soul, and pop (Babalola and Taiwo 2009) and played in religious and secular settings. Paintings, sculptures, fabric design, and mixed media arts are produced in Nigeria and the United States, by internationally recognized artists, including Bruce Onobrakpeya and Taiwo Olaniyi (otherwise known as Twins Seven Seven), once selfexiled in the United States (Mundy-Castle and Mundy-Castle 1972; Soyinka 1990).
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture By introducing Nigerian popular and material culture to the United States, Nigerians have diversified black ethnicity. Western-educated Nigerians speak English, and most others, pidgin. Being highly educated, they don’t have linguistic challenges, but when newly arrived, some find American accents difficult. Americans have similar issues with Nigerians, but these are soon resolved. Most contend with lowered postimmigration social status, and menial jobs as taxicab drivers, security guards, home health aides, childcare workers, and janitors. Many pursue financial autonomy and higher education. Some train as nurses to secure work authorization and higher income.. Most insist on their children’s excellence in education. Nigerian immigrants’ professional offices and businesses, including those selling Nigerian foods, are in all major cities (Cogan and Ibe).
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Paths toward Citizenship Whereas most pre-1980s immigrants from Nigeria wanted education and immediate return home, many contemporary Nigerian immigrants in the United States with student/F-1 visas seek permanent residence (green card), and naturalization. Unwillingness to return home is due to Nigeria’s profound economic difficulties, consequent lack of opportunities for gainful employment and/or upward mobility, and fear of political upheaval. Naturalization is increasingly embraced by Nigerian immigrants with Nigerian legalization of dual citizenship.
Profile: Five Notable Nigerian Americans Bandele Adeyemi was born in Beijing, China, to Nigerian parents Bandele grew up in Lagos, Nigeria, moved to the United States as a preteen, and has since lived in New York City. She graduated from Hunter College, New York, in 1997 (BA cum laude in psychology); and in 2002 from Fordham University, New York (MA in international political economy and development plus an advanced certificate in emerging markets risk analysis). Bandele spent 11 years in various analytical and leadership capacities in the financial services industry, most recently with Thomson Reuters, where she managed a group of analysts providing corporate ad(Courtesy of Bandele Adeyemi) visory services for industrial companies, helping publicly traded companies make informed business decisions and communicate effectively. Given her desire to effect positive change in people’s lives, especially the underserved, Bandele aligned with the Foundation for Sustainable Development and traveled to Jinja, Uganda, where she helped a women-run nongovernmental organization (NGO), Women’s Rights Initiative, design and structure an economic empowerment program for financial education, micro-loans, and mentoring to marginalized women in eastern Uganda. She volunteers in her community, most recently teaching social
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studies and English as a second language classes for immigrants (Adeyemi interview with the author, March 14, 2010). Sefi Atta is an award-winning writer who was born in Lagos, Nigeria. She was educated there, in England, and in the United States. She attended Queen’s College, Lagos, Nigeria; and Millfield School and Birmingham University in England. She also graduated from the creative writing program at Antioch University, Los Angeles. Sefi is the author of Everything Good Will Come, Swallow, and News From Home (Lubin & Kleyner). A former chartered accountant and CPA, her short stories have appeared in journals like Los Angeles Review and Mississippi Review, and she has won prizes from Zoetrope and Red Hen Press. Her radio plays have been broadcast by the BBC. She is the winner of PEN International’s 2004/2005 David TK Wong Prize, and in 2006, her debut novel Everything Good Will Come was awarded the inaugural Wole Soyinka Prize for Literature in Africa. In 2009, her short story collection, Lawless (now published as News from Home), received the Noma Award for Publishing in Africa. Sefi lives in Mississippi with her husband Gboyega Ransome-Kuti, a medical doctor, and their daughter, Temi (Atta interview with the author, February 16, 2010). Ibrahim Agboola Gambari has many years of distinguished service in multilateral and international diplomacy. He was born in Nigeria. A scholar-diplomat, he is the Joint African Union-United Nations Special Representative for Darfur as of January 1, 2010. Gambari was under-secretary-general and special adviser to the secretary-general on the Iraq Compact and Other Issues (2007 to 2009). In 2007, the secretary-general entrusted him with the Good Offices mandate on Myanmar. He was under-secretary-general for political affairs (2005 to 2007); UN special adviser on Africa (1999–2005), and special representative of the secretary-general and head of the United Nations mission to Angola (2002–2003). As Nigeria’s ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations (1990–1999), Gambari chaired the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid. He was Nigeria’s minister for foreign affairs (1984–85), and the director general of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Gambari attended King’s College, Lagos. He graduated from the London School of Economics (BSc Economics, 1968). He received his MA in 1970 and his PhD in 1974 (political science/international relations) from Columbia University in New York. From 1979 to 1983, he taught at universities in Nigeria and the United States. He was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., a resident scholar with the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Center in Italy; and the author of several books and scholarly articles. Gambari has received numerous honorary awards, including: the Harry Edmonds Award for Lifetime Achievement (May 2009); the Distinguished (Foreign) Service Award presented by the Federal Government of Nigeria (April 2008); and in 2002, the Commander of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Gambari 2010).
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Udoka Nwogugu is an executive director in the Compliance Department of Morgan Stanley Investment Management Inc. She joined the firm in April 2002 and is responsible for guideline surveillance oversight of the mutual fund business and special projects. Prior to joining the firm, Nwogugu was an audit manager at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP in the Investment Management Group. She received her BS degree in accounting (Magnum Cum Laude) from Rutgers University in 1997. She is a certified public accountant and member of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Udoka was born in Enugu, Nigeria. She attended University Primary School and (Courtesy of Udoka Nwogugu) Queens College, Yaba, Lagos, for secondary school. In 1991, she left Nigeria for Vienna, Austria, where she completed her high school education and moved to the United States in August 1993 for her university education (Nwogugu 2010). Olufunmilayo Olopade, MD, is the Walter L. Palmer Distinguished Service Professor of Medicine and Human Genetics, associate dean for Global Health, and director of the Center for Clinical Cancer Genetics at the University of Chicago in Chicago, Illinois. Olopade specializes in risk assessment, prevention, early detection, and treatment of breast cancer, particularly for young women of African ancestry. She founded the Cancer Risk Clinic in 1992. Olopade attended St. Anne’s School, Ibadan. In 1980, she graduated with distinction from the University of Ibadan, College of Medicine. She completed her internship and residency in internal medicine at Cook County Hospital, Chicago; trained in hematology/oncology as a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Chicago; and in 1991 joined the faculty (“Nigerian Woman Wins” 2005). Her early research led to the identification of a tumor suppressor locus on the short arm of chromosome 9. Her more recent work focuses on the molecular genetics of breast cancer in women of African ancestry. Olopade has received numerous honors and awards, including the James S. McDonnell Foundation Scholar Award, and the 2005 MacArthur Fellowship “Genius” Grant. In 2008, she was inducted into the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies (Olopade 2010).
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Some Nigerians have American citizenship. Some join political parties and vote regularly. Others join political clubs and form political pressure and advocacy groups, and some run in local elections.
Political Associations and Organizations Nigerians remain concerned with politics back home. Most of the major political parties, including the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Action Congress (AC), and the Peoples Mandate Party (PMP) have U.S. branches or affiliates. From the 1980s to the 1990s, when Nigeria was under the brutal Babangida and Abacha dictatorships, Nigerians in the United States established newspapers to provide news from home, and to challenge repression and intolerance for democratic freedoms. A Nigerian–North American Conference was convened in May 1995 to propose solutions for political and economic problems. While Wole Soyinka, Nigeria’s Nobel Prize Laureate, was exiled in the United States during the Abacha regime, he worked with other pro-democracy activists to organize resistance to the dictatorship (Okome 2004, 183).
Civic and Electoral Participation The first Nigerian American elected to political office in the United States is two-term Councilman Kyrian Nwagwu of Lathrup Village in Michigan. He arrived in 1982 to study at Eastern Michigan University (http://www.kyriannwagwu.com/). In March 2010, Omonigho Ufomata was appointed acting director of the Office on African Affairs in the mayor’s office, Washington, D.C. There are advocacy groups formed with other recent African immigrants, like the Bronx African Advisory Group in New York City, currently chaired by Ololade Toba LaCrown (Reuter and Beekman 2010). Some Nigerian immigrant groups have welfare, sociopolitical, and economic functions. Many remain interested in Nigerian politics. Some claim nonpartisanship, often belied by their activities. Some individuals travel to Nigeria to participate in party activities, or to contest elections. Since over 400 languages are spoken in Nigeria, its immigrant communities are not homogenous. Shared ethnicity is assumed to produce panethnicity, but although panethnic groups exist, historical and contemporary cleavages can subvert panethnicity. For example, among the Igbos, Onitsha Igbos, Mid-Western Igbos, and central Igbos consider themselves as distinct historically and culturally, they also have major differences in dialect. The Yorubas are similar. Oyo Yoruba, Ondo, Ijebu, Ekiti, and others share history, ethnicity, and culture but have widely differing dialects and alliance formation patterns. Many Nigerian Americans form philanthropic social welfare groups. These facilitate informal socializing and mutual support, provide informal youth and marriage
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Edward Adedeji, a Nigerian immigrant, checks in with a poll worker as he votes in the U.S. presidential election at the St. Marks Day School in the Crown Heights section of New York, November 4, 2008. (AP Photo/Kathy Willens)
counseling, job and professional advice, avenues for friendship or dating, and opportunities for leadership that validate the immigrant’s gifts, expertise, and skill. They also provide development assistance back home (Okome 2004, 183).
Public Policies and Political Representation As more African immigrants become active in American politics, tensions have developed about what black identity means. Most black immigrants identify as nationals of their country of origin rather than as “Black or African American.” Cooperation and collaboration among people of African descent could be pursued, and some power sharing negotiated. Change is, however, unlikely until the cost of maintaining the status quo becomes unbearable (Okome in Krase et al., 190).
Return Immigration Early 20th-century Nigerian immigrants to the United States had little desire for a permanent stay. Most, including Lincoln University-educated Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, nationalist and first president of post-independence Nigeria, desired return to
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contribute to the anticolonial struggle. This continued until the Biafran war, when some Igbos left permanently. Many more left beginning in the 1980s to escape economic crisis and political upheaval occasioned by the SAP recommended in 1986 by the World Bank and IMF, and imposed by the Babangida regime. Nigeria lost decades of development. However, with political and economic improvements, some Nigerians in the United States are returning home. Many Nigerians in the United States travel back and forth frequently, make significant remittances in cash and kind, and are committed to philanthropy. Some professors arrange exchange programs between U.S. and Nigerian universities (Lindow 2009). Of remittances from Nigerians abroad in 2007, 39.5 percent of the $9.221 billion came from the United States, mostly for extended families’ survival needs (UNDP 2009b).
The Second and Later Generations Some second-generation Nigerians would likely surpass their parents’ generation in educational attainment (Anekwe 2008). However, while many second-generation Nigerians might excel, others might struggle, break even, or fail. Being one generation removed from direct memories of, and intimate connection with, Nigeria
Adebayo Ogunlesi Adebayo Ogunlesi, 56-year-old chairman and managing partner of Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP), in New York City, is an exceptional example of Nigerian immigrant professionals in the finance sector. His company has worldwide infrastructure asset investments and recently acquired London Gatwick Airport in a £1.455 billion contract with British Aviation Authority Airports Limited. Ogunlesi gives informal advice on privatization to the Nigerian government. He previously worked with Cravath, Swain & Moore, a New York law firm, later moving to First Boston, which Boston acquired Credit Suisse in 1997 and became Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB). CSFB later became involved in the Nigerian liquefied natural gas project. Ogunlesi’s father is a professor of medicine. He attended King’s College, Lagos, and studied philosophy and economics at Oxford University; and law and business at Harvard University. He was a law clerk for Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, taught at Harvard and Yale Law Schools, and has expertise and worldwide experience in project finance in petroleum and mining, particularly in emerging markets. Ogunlesi chairs the board of directors of Lagos-based Africa Finance Corporation (“Gatwick Buyer Promises ‘First Class’ Service” 2009; “Nigerian Acquires London Gatwick Airport” 2009).
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Profiles Governor Bola Ahmed Tinubu. Tinubu began his university education at Richard Daley College, Chicago, later transferring to Chicago State University while working as a dishwasher, security guard, and taxi driver. He graduated in 1979 with a bachelor’s degree in business administration and worked with Arthur Anderson, Deloitte Haskins and Sells, and GTE in the United States. Tinubu worked with Mobil Nigeria Limited as an auditor, becoming the treasurer before leaving the company. He was a founding member of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). He was elected to the Federal Senate to represent Lagos West District. Tinubu belonged to NADECO in the United States during the Abacha years. He returned to Nigeria in 1998, ran for governor as the AD candidate, and was an elected governor of Lagos State, from 1999 to 2007. Dr. Eugene Ezekwueche, PMP Anambra State governorship candidate for the 2010 elections, came to the United States in 1982. He studied for his bachelor’s in accounting and economics at New Jersey City University, and the bachelor’s and doctoral degree in pharmacy from Howard University. Ezekwueche established businesses in Nigeria and founded Solon Institute, a Washington, D.C., think tank (Peoples Mandate Party 2009). Professor Lazarus E. N. Ekwueme is an ethno-musicologist who returned home from the United States and later became the traditional ruler of Oko in Anambra State (southeastern Nigeria). Ekwueme studied music in the U.K., from 1960 to 1964, returning to teach at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He established the university’s Choral Society. Ekwueme was in the United States during the Nigerian civil war. He obtained his PhD in music theory from Yale University and taught at Yale and other universities. At Yale, he established the New Haven International Chorus. In 1974 he was recruited to teach music at the University of Lagos. There, he established the Laz Ekwueme National Chorale and was the coordinator of the Nigerian National Choir for FESTAC, the International Black Arts Festival held in Lagos in 1977 (Adegboye 2009). Dr. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala is an economist with a bachelor’s degree from Harvard University and a PhD from MIT. She was a vice president at the World Bank before appointment as the first female minister for finance in Nigeria in July 2003. Under her watch, Nigeria repaid $12 billion of its $18 billion debt to the Paris Club to reduce the burden of debt servicing. In June 2006, she became Nigeria’s first female foreign minister, resigning soon after and subsequently returning to the World Bank, where she was considered for the presidency. After Paul Wolfowitz’s appointment as president, Okonjo Iweala was promoted to managing director.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Nigeria | 1631
as home, the second generation may be more panethnic, pan-African, or embrace hyphenated-American or exclusively American identity than their parents (Clark 2008). Many second-generation Nigerian Americans passionately declare and defend their African origins (Clark 2008, 6), but they have widely disparate positions on identity, varying from embracing African American identity to an exclusively African one, despite African American or American accents, serious study of, and sympathetic disposition toward African American history and politics. Social capital, intermarriage, family, careers, and other ties in the United States propel the development of hyphenated American or American identity by second-generation Nigerian immigrants. Their high levels of education, being English speaking, the institutional context (immigration laws, regulations, and enforcement); the local context (size of Nigerian community, extent of associational life, local beliefs, and race relations) also increase the degree of integration into American society. Integration increases with a critical mass participating actively in ethnic, national, and other civic associations (Cordell and Garcia y Griego 2005).
Issues in Relations between the United States and Nigeria Nigeria has the second-largest petroleum reserves in Africa and huge natural gas reserves. It produces highly desired low sulphur petroleum, called sweet crude. It is Africa’s largest and the world’s 12th-largest producer of petroleum; and the 5th-ranked supplier of petroleum to the United States (U.S. Energy Information Administration). With investments in the petrochemical and liquefied natural gas industries, the United States has replaced the U.K. as Nigeria’s largest foreign investor. U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria declined from $2 billion in 2004 to $339 million in 2006. The dominant U.S. corporations in Nigeria are Exxon-Mobil and Chevron, with investments in petroleum mining and oil and gas production. Nigeria is the biggest U.S. trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa ($42 billion per annum in 2008). 11 percent of U.S. oil imports are from Nigeria, representing approximately 46 percent of daily production. The United States exported over $4 billion in machinery, wheat, and motor vehicles, and imported over $38 billion (mostly petroleum products) from Nigeria in 2008. It also imports over $70 million in rubber products, cocoa, gum arabic, cashews, coffee, and ginger (2007 figures). Nigeria has a trade advantage vis-à-vis the United States. In 2007 the U.S. trade deficit with Nigeria was $21 billion. Nigeria ranks as the 50th-largest export market for U.S. goods and is the 14th-largest exporter of goods to the United States. Nigeria’s tariffs are high, but many goods from the United States are smuggled.
1632 | Nigerian Immigrants
The United States and Nigeria negotiated continuance of a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in March 2009, to fine-tune trade policies, improve market access, diversify exports, enforce intellectual property laws, foster technical assistance, and improve infrastructure, and investment. They also discussed possible cooperation within the World Trade Organization (WTO) (U.S. Department of State).
Forecasts for the 21st Century Nigerians in the United States will continue developing strong institutions and social capital that support their transnationalism. Religious, civic, communal, and professional organizations proliferate and impact American social life. The number of second-generation Nigerian American and new Nigerian immigrants is growing. Substantial return immigration flows both ways, and efforts by Nigerians in the United States to vote in Nigeria’s elections might be successful. Improvements in communication technology will make those ties easier to maintain and will enhance social, economic, political, and cultural life. Black identity will draw from these and other sources contributed by other Africans in the United States, who like Nigerians are part of the old, ongoing, and future diaspora. Nigerian American trade will probably grow, since there is mutual interest in both countries for continuance.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics The emigration rate of Nigerians to the United States from 2000–2002 was 0.8 percent; with 14.8 percent of Nigerian immigrants worldwide in the United States, where they are 0.38 percent of all immigrants (UNDP 2009a).
Table 244 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and Country of Birth Total Nigeria
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
7,831
8,253
8,105
7,872
9,374
10,597
13,459
12,448
12,475
15,253
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
1634 | Nigerian Immigrants Table 245 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence
Total Arizona
Total
Male
Female
15,253
7,316
7,937
98
46
52
California
1,307
590
717
Colorado
109
54
55
Connecticut
120
60
60
Florida
382
183
199
Georgia Illinois Maryland
1,176
558
618
868
448
420
1,878
875
1,003
Massachusetts
372
180
192
Michigan
247
130
117
Minnesota
329
149
180
New Jersey
1,020
486
534
New York
1,757
864
893
328
160
168
North Carolina Ohio
284
140
144
Pennsylvania
360
168
192
2,616
1,210
1,406
Virginia
252
123
129
Washington
121
53
68
1,629
839
790
Texas
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics The US Census bureau gathers information on Nigerian immigrants in the American Community Survey (ACS), using standard categories. However, some data would be elusive despite the best fact-gathering efforts, because undocumented aliens fear that contact with government agencies would jeopardize their stay in the United States. There are sometimes insufficient numbers within the sample to make clear-cut assessment, but with increases in the numbers of Nigerian immigrants, such figures will be more easily provided.
Table 246 Selected population profile in the United States Margin of Error
Nigerian (553–560)
Margin of Error
301,237,703
—
239,990
⫹Ⲑ⫺8,324
One race
97.8%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
97.4%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.6
Two races
2.0%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
2.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.5
Subject
Total Population
TOTAL NUMBER OF RACES REPORTED Total Population
Three races
0.1%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
0.1%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
Four or more races
0.0%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
0.0%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
301,237,703
—
239,990
⫹/⫺8,324
Male
49.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
54.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.0
Female
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.0
SEX AND AGE Total Population
50.7%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
45.7%
Under 5 years
6.9%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
10.8%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.7
5 to 17 years
17.6%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
21.8%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.1
18 to 24 years
9.8%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
12.9%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.9
25 to 34 years
13.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
14.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.8
35 to 44 years
14.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
16.9%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.7
45 to 54 years
14.6%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
15.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.7
55 to 64 years
10.8%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
5.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.4
65 to 74 years
6.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
1.6%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.3
75 years and over
6.1%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
0.7%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.2
Median age (years)
36.7
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
18 years and over
75.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
67.4%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.1
21 years and over
71.1%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
61.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.1
62 years and over
15.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
3.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.4
27.9
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.7
65 years and over
12.6%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
2.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.3
Under 18 Years
73,806,575
⫹Ⲑ⫺13,423
78,235
⫹Ⲑ⫺4,285
51.2%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
51.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.8
Male
48.8%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
48.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.8
227,431,128
⫹Ⲑ⫺13,385
161,755
⫹Ⲑ⫺5,654
Male
48.6%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
55.7%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.2
Female
51.4%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
44.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.2
Female 18 Years and Over
69,762,524
⫹Ⲑ⫺13,255
65,723
⫹Ⲑ⫺3,263
Male
51.1%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
49.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺2.4
Female
48.9%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
50.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺2.4
18 to 34 Years
(Continued )
Table 246 Selected population profile in the United States (Continued )
Subject
Total Population
Margin of Error
Nigerian (553–560)
Margin of Error
35 to 64 Years
119,688,468
⫹Ⲑ⫺18,899
90,516
⫹Ⲑ⫺3,323
Male
49.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
61.2%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.3
Female
50.7%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
38.8%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.3
37,980,136
⫹Ⲑ⫺7,120
5,516
⫹Ⲑ⫺826
Male
42.2%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
39.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺6.1
Female
57.8%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
60.7%
⫹Ⲑ⫺6.1
293,015,322
*****
231,956
⫹Ⲑ⫺8,137
Householder or spouse
57.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
47.9%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.0
Child
30.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
39.9%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.2 ⫹Ⲑ⫺0.9
65 Years and Over
RELATIONSHIP Population in Households
Other relatives
6.7%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
8.1%
Nonrelatives
5.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
4.1%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.5
Unmarried partner
2.1%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
0.9%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.2
⫹Ⲑ⫺2,679
HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE 112,386,298
⫹Ⲑ⫺100,058
76,823
Family households
66.6%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
66.4%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.8
With own children under 18 years
31.0%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
47.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺2.1
Married-couple family
49.6%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
47.0%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.5
With own children under 18 years
21.4%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
35.6%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.7
Female householder, no husband present, family
12.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
12.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.2
7.4%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
8.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.1 ⫹Ⲑ⫺1.8
Households
With own children under 18 years Nonfamily households
33.4%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
33.6%
Male householder
15.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
23.2%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.7
Living alone
12.1%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
19.9%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.6
3.4%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
3.3%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.7
Female householder
17.9%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
10.4%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.0
Living alone
15.4%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
8.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺1.0
Not living alone
2.5%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.1
1.9%
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.5
Average household size
2.61
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.01
3.17
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.08
Average family size
3.20
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.01
4.08
⫹Ⲑ⫺0.07
Not living alone
Notes: Population group: Nigerian (553-560) data set: 2006–2008 American community survey 3-year estimates. Survey: American Community Survey. Source: (selected categories) U.S. Census Bureau, 2006–2008 American Community Survey (U.S. Census Bureau 2008).
Appendix III: Notable Nigerian Americans | 1637
Appendix III: Notable Nigerian Americans Chris Abani is an award-winning writer, author of Song for Night (Akashic, 2007), The Virgin of Flames (Penguin, 2007), Becoming Abigail (Akashic, 2006), GraceLand (FSG, 2004), and Masters of the Board (Delta, 1985). Albert Chinualumogu “Chinua” Achebe is a world-renowned and celebrated writer born in Nigeria in 1930 and raised in Ogidi village in Eastern Nigeria. He graduated from University College, Ibadan. His early career in radio ended abruptly in 1966, when he left his post as director of external broadcasting in Nigeria during the national upheaval preceding the Biafran War. He joined the Biafran Ministry of Information, representing Biafra on diplomatic and fund-raising missions. Subsequently, he was appointed senior research fellow at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, and lectured widely abroad. For over 15 years he was the Charles P. Stevenson Professor of Languages and Literature at Bard College. He is now the David and Marianna Fisher University Professor and Professor of African Studies at Brown University. Achebe has written over 20 books—novels, short stories, essays, and collections of poetry—including Things Fall Apart (1958), which has sold more than 10 million copies worldwide and has been translated into more than 50 languages, and Arrow of God (1964). Achebe has received numerous honors worldwide, including the Honorary Fellowship of the American Academy of Arts and Letters; honorary doctorates from over 30 colleges and universities; and Nigeria’s highest award for intellectual achievement, the Nigerian National Merit Award. In 2007 he won the Man Booker International Prize for Fiction (“Chinua Achebe Profile” 2010). Tunde Adebimpe is an actor and musician. He is a member of the band, “TV on the Radio,” based in Brooklyn, New York. (Henry Olusegun Olumide Adeola “Seal”) is a three-time Grammy-winning singer, songwriter, and performer. Born in Paddington, London, to a Brazilian father and a Nigerian mother, he now lives in New York (Seal.com). Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, award-winning writer, author of Purple Hibiscus, Half of a Yellow Sun, and The Thing Around Your Neck, was born in Nsukka, Nigeria, and now lives in the United States. Peyi Soyinka-Airewele is an associate professor of African and international politics at Ithaca College, New York. Born in Lagos, Nigeria, she received her bachelor and master’s degrees in international relations at the University of Ife, Nigeria, and her PhD from the University of Birmingham, U.K. Before joining Ithaca College, she taught at Colgate University, New York. She served as vice president and later as president of the Association of Third World Studies, Inc., from 2007 to 2009 and is the founder and director of
1638 | Nigerian Immigrants
the Alliance for Community Transformation, ACT Africa. Her writings have been published in several books and scholarly journals (author interview with Airewele, March 23, 2010). Gbenga Akinnagbe, actor of The Wire fame, was born in Washington, D.C. He earned a bachelors from Bucknell University. He has also been featured in Law and Order, Special Victims Unit (2009), and Cold Case; film credits include Edge of Darkness (2010). Olubowale Victor Akintimehin “Wale” is a rap artist born to Yoruba parents on September 21, 1985, in Washington, D.C. His parents migrated to the United States from Austria in 1979. He dropped out from college to pursue a music career (“Wale Biography” 2009). Mobolaji E. Aluko was born in Lagos, Nigeria. He is a professor and past chair of chemical engineering at Howard University, Washington, D.C. An indigene of Ekiti State in Nigeria, he is president of the Nigerian Democratic Movement (NDM). With a B.Sc. (1976) in chemical engineering from the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University), he attended Imperial College, University of London; University of California, Santa Barbara; and State University of New York, Buffalo (for graduate and postdoctoral studies). He is president/CEO of Alondex Applied Technologies, LLC; lead consultant and international coordinator of the LEAD Program at the National Universities Commission (NUC) in Nigeria; and principal academic consultant of AfriHUB (Nig.) Ltd., an ICT resource provider for universities in Nigeria. He is an activist and frequent commentator on Nigerian and African affairs. John Ekwugha Amaechi was a professional basketball player born to a British mother and Igbo father in Boston, Massachusetts. He played for the New York Knicks before retiring in 2007. He declared that he is gay in a memoir, Man in the Middle (Holmes, PA: ESPN Books, 2007), and he is currently a broadcaster and political activist in the U.K. (“John Ekwugha Amaechi”; “John Amaechi.”) Folashade (“Sade”) Adeyinka Baderinwa was born in Baltimore to a Nigerian father and German mother. She graduated from the University of Maryland, College Park and joined WABC in 2003, relocating from Baltimore, where she was a WABL-TV (Channel 11) news anchor. She is currently (March 2010) an ABC News (Channel 7) anchor for Eyewitness News (“Sade Baderinwa”). Lami Alheri Dogonyaro originates from Hadeja Local Government area, Kano State, Nigeria. She has a masters of arts degree in mass communications and was a producer/director for the Nigerian Television Authority in Jos, and manager in the Public Affairs Department of the Kaduna Refinery of the
Appendix III: Notable Nigerian Americans | 1639
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). She is currently a licensing program analyst with the state of California’s Department of Public Social Services and a member of the board of trustees, International Center for Immunization (“Public Relations Officer”). Maurice Edu is a professional soccer player, born in Fontana, California. He has played for the Rangers in the Scottish Premier League, for the Toronto Football Club, and for the U.S. National League (“Maurice Edu”). Peter P. Ekeh was born in Nigeria. He is trained in sociology and economics and has an interest in African history and politics. His education was from the University of California, Berkeley (PhD); Stanford University (MA), and the University College, Ibadan (BSc). He taught and chaired academic departments at Nigerian and U.S. universities, including Buffalo University, New York, and the University of Ibadan. He has made significant contributions to scholarship in sociological and psychoanalytic theory, African politics, and history. His publications have significant impact on African studies. He held several fellowships in Europe, the United States, and Japan and received research and scholarship awards and grants in Nigeria and the United States. He is the founder of Urhobo Historical Society and editor of the Web site URHOBO WAADO. He is active in the campaign for environmental integrity, justice, and sustainable development in Nigeria’s Niger Delta (Urhobo Waado). Toyin Falola is the Frances Higginbotham Nalle Centennial Professor in History at the University of Texas at Austin. He was born in Ibadan, Nigeria. He is a fellow of the Nigerian Academy of Letters, and author and editor of numerous books, articles, and book chapters. He is co-editor of the Journal of African Economic History, and Series Editor of Rochester Studies in African History and the Diaspora. He has received various awards and honors. In 2002, Falola instituted the Africa Conference at the University of Texas, Austin. The conference attracts international scholars, and papers presented have made noteworthy contributions to African Studies (“Toyin Falola”) Helon Habila is an award-winning writer, born in Kaltungo, Nigeria. His books include Waiting for an Angel and Measuring Time. Joseph Inikori is a professor of Atlantic World economic history at Rochester University. He was born in Nigeria. A prolific author and distinguished scholar, Inikori has made significant contributions to the study of the transatlantic slave trade and its role in Western industrialization and economic development. His numerous publications include books, journal articles, and book chapters (“Joseph E. Inikori”).
1640 | Nigerian Immigrants
F. Abiola Irele is a professor emeritus at Harvard University and currently (March 2010), a visiting professor of African and Afro-American Studies and Romance Languages and Literatures. His areas of specialization are Black African and Caribbean literature in English and French, with strong interests in contemporary thought in Francophone Africa, and black intellectual history. He is a distinguished and prolific scholar with numerous books, journal articles, book chapters, and edited volumes. From 1992 to 2003, he edited the journal, Research in African Literatures. He has also received major research grants and awards (“Abiodun Irele.”). Anthonia Kalu is a professor and chair of the Department of African American and African Studies at the Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. She developed and chaired the African American Studies program at the University of Northern Colorado, Greeley. She serves on the editorial boards of several journals and plays a leadership role in several organizations. She has published extensively in the field of literary criticism and has been a keynote speaker in the United States and internationally. Ras Kimono is a reggae artiste now based in the United States. His music critiques domestic political shenanigans and international imperialism. He has performed with prominent artists, including Stevie Wonder (“Biography of Ras Kimono”). Obioma Nnaemeka is Chancellor’s Distinguished Professor of French, Women’s/Gender Studies and African/African Diaspora Studies at Indiana University, Indianapolis. She is originally from Agulu in southeastern Nigeria. A former Rockefeller Humanist-in-Residence (University of Minnesota), Edith Kreeger-Wolf Distinguished Visiting Professor (Northwestern University), and Verne Wagner Distinguished Visiting Professor (University of Kansas), Nnaemeka is the president of the Association of African Women Scholars (AA WS), the president/CEO of the Jessie Obidiegwu Education Fund, and board member of numerous national and international NGOs and academic journals. She has delivered numerous keynote addresses, lectures, and papers worldwide and published extensively in development, human rights, women/gender, and African/African diaspora studies. She is the author of over 60 scholarly articles and book chapters, editor of the 10-volume WAAD collection, and author/editor of 11 books (Nnaemeka interview by the author, March 17, 2010). Dr. Ferdinand Ofodile is a board-certified plastic surgeon and clinical professor of surgery at Columbia University, New York, and chief of plastic surgery at Harlem Hospital Center, New York. His BSc and MD are from Northwestern University, Chicago. His surgical training was at Columbia Presbyterian and Harlem Hospitals, New York, and his fellowship in plastic surgery was
Appendix III: Notable Nigerian Americans | 1641
at Mayo Clinic. He designed the “Ofodile Implant,” a nasal implant for rhinoplasty for black and Hispanic/Latino/Latina people. He has published numerous articles on plastic surgery in scientific journals, received several awards, and led voluntary medical missions to several countries, including the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nigeria, and Mozambique (“About Dr. Ofodile”). Lola Ogunnaike earned an MA in journalism from New York University and a BA in English literature from the University of Virginia. She was a features and entertainment reporter for New York Daily News and the New York Times, and a reporter for CNN (“Anchors & Reporters: Lola Ogunnaike”). Chukwuemeka Ndubuisi Okafor is a professional basketball player born in Houston, Texas, to Igbo parents. He won a bronze medal as a member of the U.S. 2004 Olympics team, played for the New Orleans Hornets, and currently plays for the Charlotte Bobcats (Emekaokafor.org) Femi Oke is a journalist born in London. She graduated from Birmingham University (BA in English language and literature). She was a weather anchor and reporter for CNN, and host of Inside Africa. Previously, she worked for the BBC (“Anchors & Reporters: Femi Oke”). Oke is currently a senior editor and correspondent for The Takeaway, on National Public Radio. Amobi Okoye is a professional football player born in Anambra State, Nigeria. He plays for the Houston Texans (“Amobi Okoye”). Hakeem Olajuwon is a retired professional basketball player, born in Lagos, Nigeria. He played for the Houston Rockets (“Hakeem Olajuwon”) Jacob K. Olupona is a professor of religion and African American studies at Harvard University. He is a noted scholar of indigenous African religions, who was previously at the University of California, Davis. His current research focuses on the religious practices of contemporary African immigrants to the United States. He has authored and edited several books. Olupona has received prestigious research grants from several foundations, and served on the editorial boards of many influential journals and as president of the African Association for the Study of Religion. In 2000, Olupona received an honorary doctorate in divinity from the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, and in 2007, the Nigerian National Order of Merit, a prestigious annual award for intellectual accomplishment (“Jacob K. Olupona”). Osonye Tess Onwueme was born in Ogwashi-Uku, Delta State, Nigeria. She is married with five children. A distinguished professor of cultural diversity and professor of English at the University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire, she has taught at universities in Nigeria and the United States. She is a socially conscious, and a prolific and award-winning writer. Her plays have been staged in Africa, the United Kingdom, and off-Broadway, to widespread acclaim.
1642 | Nigerian Immigrants
She has also received major scholarly grants to explore contemporary global social, political, historical, cultural, and environmental issues (“Dr. Osonye Tess Onwueme”). Oguchialu Chijioke Onyewu is a professional soccer player born in Washington, D.C. He plays for Milan’s Serie A and the U.S. National team (“Oguchi Onyewu”). Winston Wole Soboyejo is a professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering at Princeton University. He was educated at King’s College London, and Cambridge University. He came to the United States in 1988 as a research scientist at the McDonnell Douglas Research Labs, St. Louis, Missouri. In 1992, he was a principal research engineer at the Edison Welding Institute, later joining the engineering faculty of the Ohio State University in Columbus. He was a visiting professor in the departments of mechanical engineering and materials science and engineering at MIT from 1997 to 1998. He moved to Princeton University in 1999 and is the director of the U.S./Africa Materials Institute, and director of the Undergraduate Research Program at the Princeton Institute of Science and Technology of Materials. His research focuses on experimental studies of biomaterials and the mechanical behavior of materials (“Winston Soboyejo”). Adaora Udoji is a broadcaster who covered Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Asia for ABC as a cohost, with John Hochenberry, for National Public Radio’s The Takeaway. Titilayo Ufomata is associate provost and a distinguished professor at Kentucky State University. Born in Nigeria, she obtained the PhD and masters in phonetics from the University of London and the masters and bachelors in English from the University of Ibadan. She is an alumna of the Harvard Institute of Educational Management. She has received several prestigious awards, including the Visiting Fellowship of the British Academy, the Commonwealth Academic Staff Scholarship, and the American International Visitor Fellowship. She was an associate of the African Gender Institute, University of Cape Town, and a laureate of the Gender Institute of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. She was commissioned a Kentucky Colonel for honorable contribution to the Commonwealth of Kentucky by the governor in 1999. She serves on the editorial boards of several journals and plays a leadership role in several organizations. She has published extensively and has given keynote speeches at several institutions and internationally (Ufomata interview with author, March 24, 2010). Mfon Ufot is a dedicated community activist, coproducer, and host of African Experience Worldwide on WRFG 89.3fm Atlanta, for the past 19 years.
Glossary | 1643
She is a founding member and past president of Nigerian Women Association of Georgia, a service organization. In 1999, Ufot founded the Nigerian Youth Alliance, Inc. (NYA) a leadership organization for Nigerian youth living abroad. She is the cofounder of an Atlanta-based African women’s group called African Sisters for Information, Knowledge and Empowerment (ASIKE). Ufot has received many awards and much recognition for her work with women, children, and families in Georgia and Africa. They include the 2001 Hands on Atlanta Social Entrepreneur of the Year, and the 2003 M. L. King Community Service Awards. Mfon received her MA in community counseling from Georgia State University. She works in Atlanta as a crisis intervention counselor. Ufot was born in Afaha Ibesikpo, Uyo, Nigeria (Ufot interview with the author, March 18, 2010). Olufemi Vaughan is the Geoffrey Canada Professor of Africana Studies and History, and director of the Africana Studies Program at Bowdoin College, Maine. Previously, he was a professor of history and Africana studies, associate dean of the Graduate School, and associate provost at Stony Brook University. He is the author and editor of 7 books, over 40 scholarly articles, and numerous reviews. He has been awarded many prestigious professional awards, including a Woodrow Wilson fellowship, SUNY Chancellor’s Award for Excellence in Teaching, and Distinguished Scholar Award, Association of Third World Studies. Vaughan was born and raised in Ibadan, Nigeria. He holds a BA and MA in government and politics from St. John’s University, New York, and a DPhil in politics from Oxford University (Vaughan interview with the author, March 17, 2010). Samuel Zalanga was born in Zalanga village, Bauchi State in Northeastern Nigeria. He attended a mission elementary school in Zalanga; pursued Teacher’s Grade III and Grade II certificates at Teachers’ College Misau, Bauchi State; the BSc in sociology and graduate certificate in education at Bayero University, Kano (1982–1986), and MSc in sociology at the University of Jos. He completed his doctoral degree in sociology at the University of Minnesota in 2000. Currently an associate professor of sociology at Bethel University, St. Paul, Minnesota, he is the associate editor for the Journal of Third World Studies (Africa section) (Zalanga interview with the author, March 17, 2010).
Glossary Protectorates: Dependencies. Structural Adjustment Program (SAP): Economic austerity program imposed on countries with balance of payments problems on the advice of the IMF and World Bank.
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Deflationary policies: Austerity policies geared at balancing budgets and preventing inflation balance of payments relief: assistance given to countries from the IMF that enables them pay their import bill when they do not earn enough from exports. Trans-Saharan trade terminals: Depots and stations in the trade that goes through the Sahara desert from sub-Saharan Africa to Northern Africa. Imperialism: Empire-building, expansionism, colonialism. Sokoto Caliphate: The empire established by Usman Dan Fodio in Northern Nigeria in the 19th century.
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1646 | Nigerian Immigrants Ekwueme, Lazarus E. N. 1974. “African Music Retensions in the New World.” The Black Perspective in Music 2 (2): 128–44. Emekaokafor.org. [Online article; retrieved 1/10/10.] http://www.emekaokafor.org/emekaokafor-profile.php. Euba, Akin. 1989. Essays on Music in Africa 1989. Bayreuth: IWALEWA-Haus, Universität Bayreuth. “Food.” Motherland Nigeria. [Online article; retrieved 12/26/10.] http://www.motherland nigeria.com/food.htm. “Gatwick Buyer Promises ‘First Class’ Service.” 2009, October 29. Sky News.com. [Online article; retrieved 2/16/10.] http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Business/Gatwick-Air port-Adebayo-Ogunlesi-Tells-Jeff-Randall-He-Will-Shake-Up-Britains-AirportBusiness/Article/200910415421255. Genocchio, Benjamin. 2006. “Art Review: Stories of New Americans, Told in Their Own Way.” New York Times, August 20. Greenwood, Michael J., and Fred A. Ziel. “Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: The Impact of the Immigration Act of 1990 on U.S. Immigration.” University of California, Davis. [Online article; retrieved 12/3/09.] http:// migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/cir/Greenwood/combined.htm. “Hakeem Olajuwon.” NBA.com. [Online article; retrieved 12/10/09.] http://www.nba.com/ playerfile/hakeem_olajuwon/index.html. Hughes, Alan, and Tennille Robinson. 2006, June 1. “Black Gold: Kase Lawal’s Business Prowess, along with a Spike in Oil Prices, Is Fueling CAMAC International’s Rise to the Nation’s Second-Largest Black Business.” Black Enterprise, 128–30, 132, 134. “Jacob K. Olupona.” Harvard Divinity School: Meet the Faculty. Harvard University. [Online article; retrieved 2/20/10.] http://www.hds.harvard.edu/faculty/olupona.cfm. “John Amaechi.” nba.com. [Online article; retrieved 12/20/09.] http://www.nba.com/ playerfile/john_amaechi. “John Ekwugha Amaechi.” JohnAmaechi.com. [Online article; retrieved 2/14/10.] http:// www.johnamaechi.com/john. “Joseph E. Inikori.” Rochester University. [Online article; retrieved 1/10/10.] http://www. rochester.edu/college/his/faculty/inikori/. Kaba, Amadu Jacky. 2007. “Educational Attainment, Income Levels and Africans in the United States: The Paradox of Nigerian Immigrants.” West Africa Review. [Online article; retrieved 8/23/09.] http://www.westafricareview.com/issue11/kaba.htm. Kwakye-Nuako, Kwasi. 2006. “Still Praisin’ God in a New Land: African Immigrant Christianity in North America.” In The New African Diaspora in North America, edited by by Kwadwo Konadu, Takyi K. Baffour, and John Arthur Agyemang, 126. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Library of Congress. “New Beginnings: African Migrations.” [Online article; retrieved 8/15/09.] http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/ presentations/immigration/african10.html.
References | 1647 Lindow, Megan. 2009, December 13. “Academics in African Diaspora Reach Back to Help Universities Rebuild.” The Chronicle of Higher Education. [Online article; retrieved 12/14/09.] http://chronicle.com/article/Academics-of-African-Diaspora/49441/ ?sid=at&utm_source=at&utm_medium=en. “Maurice Edu.” Toronto Football Club Players’ Bio. [Online article; retrieved 1/15/10.] http://toronto.fc.mlsnet.com/players/bio.jsp?team=t280&player=edu_m&playerId=edu 029662&statType=current. Meadows, Eddie. 1979, Fall. “African Retentions in Blues and Jazz.” Western Journal of Black Studies 3 (3): 180–85. Mundy-Castle, A. C., and Vicky Mundy-Castle. 1972. “Twins Seven Seven.” African Arts, 8–13. National Council of Nigerian Muslim Organizations in the USA. “Member Chapters.” [Online article; retrieved 12/21/09.] http://www.nmnationalcouncil.org/content/LocalChapters.asp. N’Diaye, Diana Baird. 1997. “African Immigrant Culture in Metropolitan Washington, D.C.: Building and Bridging Communities.” Smithsonian Institute: Articles from the 1997 Festival of American Folklife Program Book. [Online article; retrieved 11/21/09.] http://www.folklife.si.edu/resources/Festival1997/afrindi.htm. “Nigerian Acquires London Gatwick Airport.” 2009, November 8. Newspage Weekly, the Online Edition. [Online article; retrieved 2/13/10.] http://www.newspageng.net/index2. php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=2887. Nigerian American Community Association. “About NACA.” [Online article; retrieved 1/24/10.] http://www.nigeriancommunity.org/AboutNACA.html. “The Nigerian Independence Day Celebration in New York City.” 2009. The Organization for the Advancement of Nigerians (OAN). [Online article; retrieved 1/26/10.] http:// www.oanweb.org/nidc.html. “Nigerian Woman Wins the Macarthur Genius Award.” 2005. Jenda: A Journal of Culture and African Women Studies 7. [Online article; retrieved 2/13/10.] http://www.jendajour nal.com/issue7/olopade.html. “Oguchi Onyewu.” Milan Serie A. [Online article; retrieved 12/10/09.] http://www.gfdb. com/Player.9941.Oguchi-Onyewu.aspx. Okome, Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké. 2004. “Emergent African Immigrant Philanthropy in New York City.” In Race and Ethnicity in New York City (Research in Urban Sociology, Vol. 7), edited by Jerry Krase and Ray Hutchison, 179–91. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Okome, Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké. 2006. “The Contradictions of Globalization: Causes and Consequences of African Immigration to the United States.” In The New African Diaspora in North America: Trends, Community Building and Adaptation, edited by Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, Baffour K. Takyi, and John Arthur, 29–48. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
1648 | Nigerian Immigrants Okome, Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké. 2006. “The Dividends of Democracy: The Nigeria Experience.” In Nigeria in Global Politics: Twentieth Century and Beyond, edited by Olayiwola Abegunrin and Olusoji Akomolafe Abegunrin, 47–62. New York: Nova Publishers. Okome, Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké. 2006. “Spinning an African Academy into the World Wide Web: The Liberatory and Democratic Potential of African Scholarship in Cyberspace.” In Bridging the North-South Divide in Scholarly Communication on Africa: Threats and Opportunities in the Digital Era Conference. Leiden: The Netherlands Online. [Online article; retrieved 10/31/08.] http://www.ascleiden.nl/Pdf/elecpublconfokome. pdf. Okome, Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké. 2007. “African Diaspora.” In Diasporas and Development, edited by Barbara Merz, Lincoln Chen, and Peter Geithner, 154–84. Boston: Harvard University Press. Olukotun, Ayo. 2004, December. “Media Accountability and Democracy in Nigeria, 1999– 2003.” African Studies Review 47 (3): 69–90. Olukoya, Sam. 2009. “Nigeria: Slow Start for Niger Delta Amnesty.” Inter Press Service (Johannesburg) [Online article; retrieved 1/10/10.] http://allafrica.com/ stories/200908110001.html. Onyeji, Christian. 2004, Winter. “Abigbo Music and Musicians of Mbaise, Igbo: An Introduction.” Ethnomusicology 48 (1): 52–72. Peoples Mandate Party. 2009. “Dr. Ezekwueche, Nigeria, Governor. Anambra State, Guardian, Vanguard, Awka Press Release.” [Online article; retrieved 1/26/10.] http://www. free-press-release.com/news-dr-eugene-ezekwueche-the-peoples-mandate-party-2010gubernatorial-candidate-for-anambra-state-nigeria-1258562573.html. Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 1996. “Making It in America.” In Immigrant America: A Portrait, edited by Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut Portes, 90. Los Angeles: University of California Press. “Profile: Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu.” [Online article; retrieved 1/26/10.] http://asiwa jubolatinubu.com/about/index.html. “Public Relations Officer—Mrs Lami Alheri Dogonyaro.” Zumunta Association. [Online article; retrieved 3/18/10.] http://www.zumunta.org/public_relations_officer.php. Read, Ghazal Jen’nan, and Michael O Emerson. 2005. “Racial Context, Black Immigration and the U.S. Black/White Health Disparity.” Social Forces 84 (1): 181–99. Reuter, Delphine, and Daniel Beekman. 2010, January 22. “Bronx Founds African Advisory Council: Diaz Jr. Will Listen to Immigrant Leaders.” YourNabe.com. [Online article; retrieved 1/22/10.] http://www.yournabe.com/articles/2010/01/25/bronx/ doc4b57801a2af61188145516.txt. “Sade Baderinwa.” WABC. [Online article; retrieved 3/10/10.] http://abclocal.go.com/ wabc/bio?section=ontv/stationinfo/bios&id=3301260. Samford, Patricia. 1996. “The Archaeology of African American Slavery and Material Culture.” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series 53 (1): 96. Seal.com. [Online information; retrieved 12/21/09.] http://www.seal.com.
References | 1649 Soyinka, Wole. 1990. “Twice Bitten: The Fate of Africa’s Culture Producers 1990 Modern Language Association.” Publications of the Modern Language Association 105 (1): 110–20. Sudarkasa, Niara. “Interpreting the African Heritage in Afro-American Family Organization.” In Families in the US: Kinship and Domestic Politics, edited by Karen V. Hansen and Anita Ilta Garey, 91–104. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 1998. “Toyin Falola.” University of Texas, Austin. [Online article; retrieved 1/10/10.] http:// www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/falola.html. Umahi, Henry. 2009, October. Nigerian Music: Culture in Yankeeland—Day Nigerians Rocked America with Music and Dances. [Online article; retrieved 2/3/10.] http://www. nigeriamusicmovement.com/index.php/culture-in-yankee-land-day-nigerians-rockedamerica-with-music-and-dances. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2009. “Country Fact sheets: Nigeria.” Human Development Report, 2009. [Online article; retrieved 2/3/10.] http://hdrstats. undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_NGA.html. United Nations. “Text of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Text of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees Resolution 2198 (XXI) Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly with an Introductory Note.” Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. [Online article; retrieved 11/23/09.] http:// www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf. Urhobo Waado. “Peter P. Ekeh.” [Online article; retrieved 1/10/10.] http://www.waado. org/Biographies/Profiles/UrhoboIntellectuals/Ekeh/AASProfile-Ekeh.html. U.S. Census Bureau. 2008. “U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2008 American Community Survey.” S0201. Selected Population Profile in the United States Population Group: Nigerian (553-560); Data Set: 2006-2008 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates; Survey: American Community Survey. [Online article; retrieved 12/23/09.] http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IPTable?_bm=y&-reg=ACS_2008_3YR_ G00_S0201:567;ACS_2008_3YR_G00_S0201PR:567;ACS_2008_3YR_G00_ S0201T:567;ACS_2008_3YR_G00_S0201TPR:567&-qr_name=ACS_2008_3YR_ G00_S0201&-qr_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_S0201PR&-qr_name=ACS_2008_3. U.S. Census Bureau. 2001. “Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2000.” [Online article; retrieved 12/23/09.] http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/ p23-206.pdf . U.S. Department of Justice. 1986. “8 USC 1255a TITLE 8—Aliens and Nationality, Chapter 12—Immigration and Nationality, Subchapter II—Immigration, Part V—Adjustment and Change of Status.” US Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Coordination and Review Section. [Online article; retrieved 12/23/09.] http://www.justice.gov/crt/cor/ byagency/doj1255a.php. U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Nigeria.” Diplomacy in Action. [Online article; retrieved 12/23/09.] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm. U.S. Energy Information Administration. “Nigeria Energy Profile.” [Online article; retrieved 12/23/09.] http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=NI.
1650 | Nigerian Immigrants U.S. Immigration Service (USIS). 1990. “Immigration Act of 1990.” [Online article; retrieved 12/3/09.] http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66 f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=84ff95c4f635f010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&v gnextchannel=b328194d3e88d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD. “Wale Biography.” 2009, June 20. Last FM. [Online article; retrieved 12/10/09.] http:// www.last.fm/music/Wale/+wiki/diff?&a=10&b=11. “Williamsburg VA Slave Notice 1766” Wikipedia. [Online article; retrieved 11/9/09.] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Williamsburg_VA_slave_notice_1766.jpg. “Winston Soboyejo.” Princeton University. [Online article; retrieved 3/17/10.] http://www. princeton.edu/mae/people/faculty/soboyejo/.
Further Reading Adepoju, Aderanti. 1995. “Migration in Africa: An Overview.” In The Migration Experience in Africa, edited by Jonathan Baker and Tade Akin Aina, 87–108. Uppsala, Sweden: GOTAB. Africa is a continent in flux, indicated by considerable, ongoing migration in response to political, economic, religious, and security situations, and demographic stressors. Adepoju gives an overview of migration that presents the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial era as related to contemporary migration. Today’s migration is also caused by the ongoing crises in the African continent, and migration will decrease only with enduring solutions for these myriad problems. Adepoju, Aderanti. 1995. “The Politics of International Migration in Post-Colonial Africa.” In The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, edited by Robin Cohen, 166–69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Since independence, several African countries have experienced recurrent internal instability and ethnic or related conflicts resulting in population displacements. Adepoju argues that contemporary migration in Africa can best be understood in the context of the political and historical evolution of African societies and superpowers’ role in destabilization. Afolayan, A. A. 1988. “Immigration and Expulsion of ECOWAS Aliens in Nigeria.” International Migration Review 22 (1): 4–27. The immigration of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) citizens into Nigeria gathered momentum after the protocol on the free movement of goods, capital, and people was ratified in 1980. This period coincided with the oil-boom era in the country. However, the influx was disrupted by the expulsion orders of January 1983 and April 1985. Although the protocol is a laudable objective, spatial mobility and state sovereignty challenge the free movement of people within ECOWAS. Afolayan provides regional information on a global issue—the free movement of people. She shows that the largest population of African migrants are within the continent, and while Nigerians desire to migrate elsewhere for better opportunities, citizens of other West African states see Nigeria as a more favorable locale from which they can pursue their dreams.
Further Reading | 1651 Arthur, John A. 2000. Invisible Sojourners: African Immigrant Diaspora in the United States. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000. This book introduces readers and scholars to the study of African immigrants in the new global migration, pointing to issues such as the causes of African migration, African immigrant social networks and social integration, the lives of immigrant women and children, pathways to naturalization, and so on. The book concludes with an analysis for the future of African migration. Bakewell, Oliver. 2008. “ ‘Keeping Them in Their Place’: The Ambivalent Relationship between Development and Migration in Africa.” Third World Quarterly 29 (7): 1341–58. There is a relationship between development and migration, but Oliver questions the meaning of development and shows that ideas undergirding development interventions across Africa have roots focused on the control of mobility and conceptualization of migration as symbolizing development failure. To the contrary, Oliver links migration to development and argues that these links will remain flawed until development is reconceptualized for a mobile world. Bastian, Misty L. 1999. “Nationalism in a Virtual Space: Immigrant Nigerians on the Internet.” West Africa Review 1 (1) [Online article; retrieved 11/9/09]. http://www.africare source.com/war/bastian.html. Immigration is a key issue in the contemporary world. Nigerian immigrants in the United States have established magazines, newspapers, and information sheets to disseminate information and news about home. Arguing that nationalism brings Nigerians together, Bastian observes that most Nigerians abroad are often critical of the ruling regime. Information technology, including Naijanet, offer opportunities for Nigerians to congregate online to discuss issues of mutual interest. Brown, Lawrence A., Tamar E. Mott, and Edward J. Malecki. 2007. “Immigrant Profiles of Urban Areas and Agents of Resettlement.” The Professional Geographer 59 (4): 56–73. Brown examines the role of intermediaries, such as refugee resettlement programs, in altering the geography of the foreign-born. Under the influence of such intermediaries, destination choice within the United States is largely determined not by economic mechanisms but by information-related factors, including friction of distance, migration chains, labor procurement, and resettlement intermediaries. Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) destinations are grouped into four profiles based on their mix of foreignborn. The result is sets of MSAs differentiated by the era of immigration, immigrant origins, geographic pattern, and place characteristics that draw migrants. Carling, Jorgen. 2006. Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking from Nigeria to Europe. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. [Online information; retrieved 3/20/10.] http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_ docs/serial_publications/mrs23.pdf. Carling, originally from Oslo, Norway, focuses on Nigerians in Europe. He argues that corruption, religious and ethnic crises, riots, violence, poverty, and human trafficking
1652 | Nigerian Immigrants are all issues that plague Nigeria. Hence in search of hope and a better life, Nigerians migrate to different parts of the world in order to escape their difficult circumstances. Some of them seek asylum in the process. De Haas, Hein. 2006. International Migration and National Development: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in Countries of Origin: The Case of Nigeria. Oslo: Oxford University Press. De Haas focuses on migration and national development using Nigeria as a case study. His study considers the culture but does not neglect the political or social conditions that force the Nigerian people to migrate. The trends in Nigerian international migration and the effects of migration and development policies within the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, are also examined. Dow, Mark. 2004. American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dow focuses on immigrants in immigration prisons in the United States. The harsh conditions, intimidation, and cruelty in these privatized prisons are illustrated in a chilling account about immigrants, including a Nigerian, who come to the United States as asylum seekers but are treated as criminals instead. Hagopian, Amy, Anthony Ofosu, Adesegun Fatusi, et al. 2005. “The Flight of Physicians from West Africa: Views of African Physicians and Implications for Policy.” Social Science and Medicine 61: 1750–60. There is a well-developed culture of medical migration from West Africa to rich countries, primarily the United States and the United Kingdom. Hagopian presents her research and analysis on the magnitude, causes, and consequences of these migrations. Kent, Mary Mederios. 2007. “Immigration and America’s Black Population.” Population Bulletin 62 (4): 1–20. Mederios focuses on the demographics of immigrants in the United States, and U.S. policies and laws easing entry for African and Caribbean immigrants; she shows that the number of foreign-born blacks more than tripled between 1980 and 2005. About twothirds of foreign-born blacks are Caribbean and Latina, and 40 percent of African-born blacks arrived between 2000 and 2005. Merz, Barbara J., Lincoln C. Chen, and Peter F. Geithner. 2007. Diasporas and Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Understanding migration and diasporas has become critical to a global world in order to develop a clearer picture of enduring relationships with the immigrants’ homelands. This book, including Okome’s chapter on Africa’s old and new diasporas, examines the promise and pitfalls of diaspora engagement with their home countries, and how such engagement may bridge or increase the gaps between societies in an unequal world. The book documents and evaluates the influence of transnational migrant communities through various forms of philanthropy, remittances, commercial investments, knowledge, and skills to their home countries. Millman, Joel. 1997. The Other Americans: How Immigrants Renew Our Country, Our Economy, and Our Values. New York: Viking, Penguin Group.
Further Reading | 1653 Millman analyzes immigrants’ role in building the United States in this behind-thescenes examination and profiles of immigrant communities in New York City, to give an original account of their experiences as they pursue “the American dream.” Ogbaa, Kalu. 2003. The New Americans: The Nigerian Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. Kalu Ogbaa provides an account focused on new Nigerian immigrants in the United States of America, giving a background of Nigerian history, culture, and geography, and exploring the causes and characteristics of Nigerian immigration to the United States. The book also studies Nigerian immigrants once in the United States, analyzing adjustment and adaptation through explications of Nigerian American identity, family values, education, media, and intergroup relations. Okome, Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké. 2006. “The Contradictions of Globalization: Causes of Contemporary African Immigration to the United States of America.” In The New African Diaspora in North America: Trends, Community Building, and Adaptation, edited by Kwado Konadu-Agyemang, Baffour K. Takyi, and John A. Arthur. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Okome focuses on historical changes in the nature, form, and process of African immigration to the United States and evaluates the causes and consequences of this move to the United States. Globalization (some of whose characteristics include harsh economic and political conditions) is identified as a causal factor for migration. But unbearable material conditions coexist with the creation of prodigious wealth in a process fraught with contradictions. Reynolds, Rachel R. 2002. “An African Brain Drain: Igbo Decisions to Migrate to the U.S.” Review of African Political Economy 29 (92): 273–84. Reynolds outlines the causes of Igbo chain migration to the United States. She identifies the educational, cultural, and economic factors influencing Igbo immigration to the United States from the 1970s to the 1980s. Tormala, Teceta Thomas, and Kay Deaux. 2006. “Black Immigrants to the United States: Confronting and Constructing Ethnicity and Race.” In Cultural Psychology of Immigrants, edited by Ramaswami Mahalingham, 131–50. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. African American identity has undergone continuous construction and revision over the past 400 years, a consequence of intertwined historical, economic, social, political, and psychological factors affecting blacks in the United States. More recently, changes in immigration patterns challenge the definition of African American identity. West Indian and African immigrants have increased numerically historically, impacting the social construction of blackness in the United States and affecting understandings of race, ethnicity, and immigration.
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Pakistani Immigrants by Kathleen M. Moore
Introduction The experience of Pakistani Americans has been shaped by the convergence of two immigration trends, the first Asian and the second from the Muslim world. The earliest arrivals to the United States were Punjabi men in the 1890s, and immigration from the area that now constitutes Pakistan lasted until the U.S. Congress placed severe restrictions on all Asian immigration through the 1917 “barred Asiatic zone” law and the 1924 Johnson-Reed immigration act. Though they were mostly Sikhs, they were often classified in official records as Asian Indian or, alternatively, Punjabi or Hindu immigrants. Most were from soldiering and farming backgrounds, and many settled in the agricultural sector of California. An estimated 6,000 to 7,000 rural immigrants arrived and settled in the United States between 1890 and 1917. After an interruption of nearly 50 years, Pakistani immigration resumed in the late 1960s, following the adoption of the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act. This second wave witnessed a steady upward trend in the number of Pakistanis admitted into the United States. Most have arrived as family units and typically came with university degrees in hand or under student visas to pursue degrees in the United States. Many are highly skilled and thus are in high demand in the American economy. These immigrants are financially well off, with household incomes well above the median income in the United States. On the other hand, a proportion of immigrants at the close of the 20th century are less-skilled persons who have been admitted through the immigration service’s diversity visa lottery program and other channels. In general they have been employed in small retail stores, gas stations, restaurants, and taxi services. While the majority of the first wave of immigrants were Sikh but were miscategorized as Hindu, in the second wave most arrivals from Pakistan and their children define themselves increasingly as primarily Muslim. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were a pivotal point in the process of assimilation. The post-9/11 homeland security initiatives and political developments in the Middle East and the Muslim world generated strong feelings of panethnic Muslim solidarity within the United States. This has proven to be a crucial factor in the formation of a Pakistani American identity. A recent study by the Pakistan Embassy in Washington, D.C., estimates that the size of the Pakistani community in the United States is approximately 500,000,
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Chronology | 1657
three-quarters of which is foreign born. Most Pakistani Americans are concentrated in a handful of states (e.g., California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Virginia) and major urban centers. Today Pakistan is ranked 11th in terms of volume of immigrant admissions to the United States. Pakistan has become the largest single Muslim source country of immigration to the United States. As the 21st century progresses, further Pakistani immigration will be determined by the global political economy. Occupational preferences in the United States, as well as political instability and wars in South Asia, will drive immigration flows. Both governments’ ability to address global terrorism and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan will be important in sustaining the U.S.–Pakistani diplomatic and immigration relationship.
Chronology 712
Arab general Muhammad bin Qasim conquers Sindh and Mulan in southern Punjab.
1893
Immigrants from the Punjab province begin to settle in western United States.
1917
U.S. immigration law enacted with a “barred Asiatic zone” provision, denying entry into the United States of people from south and southeast Asia.
1923
United States v Baghat Singh Thind ruling by U.S. Supreme Court that defined a “high caste Hindu” from Punjab as “ineligible for U.S. citizenship” because he was not a white person. The federal government subsequently rescinded the naturalization of between 60 and 70 citizens of South Asian origin.
1924
U.S. Congress adopts the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act, placing very low limits on legal immigration.
1946
Asian Exclusion Repeal Acts of Congress paved the way for Indians, and soon-to-be Pakistanis, to enter the United States as immigrants, acquire naturalized citizenship, and own property in the United States, reversing the 1917 “barred Asiatic zone” provision and the 1923 Supreme Court ruling.
1947
The British end colonial rule of India, and the Partition Plan creates two independent nations, India and Pakistan. The first of three Indo-Pakistan wars is fought.
1965
The second war between Pakistan and India. In the United States, President Lyndon Johnson signs an immigration bill
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that replaces national origins quotas with occupational skills and family reunification criteria. This opens the door for more Asian (including Pakistani) immigration. 1971
Civil war resulting in secession of East Pakistan as independent Bangladesh.
1972
Civilian rule of Pakistan under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
1977
Military coup installs General Zia ul-Haq as Pakistan’s third military president. Zia introduces shari’a (Islamic law), which increases influence of religion on civil service and military.
1988
Election of first female prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, American-educated daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
1991
Pakistan sends 5,000 troops to fight in Gulf War as part of U.S.led coalition to defend Saudi Arabia.
1999
Military coup installs General Parvez Musharraf (1999–2008).
2001
September 11 attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania attributed to Muslim terrorists.
2001
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (Pakistan’s northwestern neighbor) and overthrow of the Taliban. Many Taliban militants flee into Pakistan.
2002
“Voluntary” interviews of thousands of U.S. residents of Muslim background, targeting Pakistanis in the United States.
2005
A massive earthquake hits Pakistan.
2007
Exiled political leaders return for parliamentary elections. Government postpones elections due to Benazir Bhutto’s assassination during election campaign.
2008
Musharraf resigns and Asif Ali Zardari becomes president.
2009
Millions of refugees flee armed conflict in northwestern region between government and Taliban militants.
2010
Faisal Shahzad, dubbed the “Broadway Bomber,” pleads guilty to failed attempt to car-bomb Times Square in New York City.
Background Geography Pakistan is located in South Asia, along with the countries of India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan. Its southern coast lies along the Arabian Sea and
Background | 1659
the Gulf of Oman. By land it is bordered by India on the east, Afghanistan and Iran on the west, and the Karkoram mountain range and China on the north. Modernday Pakistan is divided into four major geographic regions: the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sindh, Punjab, and Baluchistan. Each of these regions has its own ethnic groups and language. The capital of Pakistan is the modern city of Islamabad, although the cultural and economic centers are located in Lahore and Karachi.
History Pakistan is the site of the ancient Indus Valley civilization (2500–1700 B.C.E.). For many centuries the region served as the crossroads of several military campaigns, expeditions, and trade routes, and witnessed invasions of and/or colonization by Persians, Greeks, Afghans, Arabs, Turko-Mongols, and British. In the eighth century an Arab general named Muhammad bin Qasim conquered the Sindh province and the southern portion of Punjab, laying the foundation for several successive Muslim empires. Muslim rulers established kingdoms in northern India and, as a result, many local inhabitants converted to Islam. During this period, Sufi missionaries were instrumental in converting Buddhist and Hindu inhabitants of the region to Islam. With the gradual decline of the Mughal Empire in the 18th century, the opportunity arose for the Afghans, Balochis, and Sikhs to exercise control over large territories until the British gained a foothold in the region through the commercial activities of the British East India Company. Eventually the British Crown established military and administrative control over all of India by the 1850s. From the outset, the 20th-century independence movement in India joined Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus together in a common struggle against British colonial rule. Led in the 1920s and 1930s by the nationalist leader Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi, the independence movement followed the principle of ahimsa (nonviolence) and engaged millions of protesters in civil disobedience. However, fearing that Muslim interests would be subordinated to those of Hindus in an independent India, the All India Muslim League rose in popularity during the 1930s. In due course the perceived differences outweighed commonalities, and calls for an autonomous region for Muslims in the northern and western provinces of India evolved into a two-state solution. Under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Muslim League called for the creation of a separate nation-state based on Muslim identity. In 1947 when the British signaled their intention to end colonial rule, the leaders of the independence movement agreed to a proposal to partition colonial India and transfer power and independence to two separate governments. Upon independence, the Hindu majority areas became India and the Muslim majority areas became Pakistan. Thus the modern sovereign nation-state of Pakistan came into existence in August 1947. It was carved out of the two Muslim-majority regions of colonial India,
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British lord Louis Mountbatten (in uniform) officially transfers power to Muhammed Ali Jinnah (to left of Mountbatten), leader of the new nation of Pakistan, on August 14, 1947. (Library of Congress)
in the eastern and northwestern provinces of Baluchistan, East Bengal, the NorthWest Frontier Province, West Punjab, and Sindh. The very name Pakistan was invented in 1934 as an amalgam of the names of these regions of the British Raj: Punjab, Afghania (now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Kashmir, Islamabad Capital Territory, Sindh, and Baluchistan. The partition of colonial India was marked by upheaval and bloodshed. The partition displaced several million people and caused a massive, and sometimes violent, population exchange between the two newly formed nation-states as provincial leaders chose whether to align with India or Pakistan. Approximately 7.5 million Muslims fled their homes in the newly independent India to resettle in Pakistan, while an equal number of Hindus and Sikhs fled Pakistan to resettle in India. The strains of partition led to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 and later conflicts between India and Pakistan. The two countries have fought three wars and continue to contest the destiny of Kashmir, a fertile Muslim-majority province that lies on the mountainous northern border of both countries and is subject to a threeway struggle between Pakistan, India, and the Kashmiris, who seek their own independence from both India and Pakistan.
Background | 1661
Pakistan’s political history has been unstable. When formed, Pakistan consisted of two regions separated by more than 1,000 miles of Indian terrain: East and West Pakistan. Pakistan’s central government was located in the western region, and inhabitants of East Pakistan, physically distant from the seat of government, felt they received inferior treatment. Economic disparities and cultural, ethnic, and linguistic differences made tensions worse. Disputes centered on language differences and the issue of refugee settlement. Bengali was spoken in the east, and Punjabi, Pushtu, Sindhi, and Baluchi in the west; yet Urdu, the language spoken by many of the refugees coming from India to Pakistan, was chosen as the national language. When Urdu was declared the sole official language, a popular movement emerged in the east to demand that the Bengali language also be recognized by the state. Reaching its climax in a bloody street demonstration in 1952, this Bengali movement in time provided the basis for popular cries for secession. Eventually a liberation war broke out between the Pakistani army and Bengali liberation forces, ending in the formation of newly independent Bangladesh in December 1971. Early attempts at democratic rule succumbed to long periods of martial law. Coups d’état suspended democratic rule from 1958 to 1962, and 1969 to 1971. Next Pakistan experienced six years of “Islamic socialism” under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the Pakistan People’s Party, a center-left political party. In 1977, General Zia ul-Haq seized control of the government, reimposed martial law, and had Bhutto arrested and eventually executed in 1979. Under Zia, the influence of Islamic law increased. When Zia was killed in an airplane accident in 1988, Benazir Bhutto, the American-educated daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was elected as prime minister and formed a civilian government, which remained in power until 1990. The first woman to be elected as prime minister of a Muslim country, Benazir Bhutto returned to power again in 1993–1996. In 1996 she was removed from government under corruption charges and went into self-imposed exile in Dubai in 1998. She returned to Pakistan again in 2007 when the government under General Pervez Musharraf dropped the corruption charges against her. She was assassinated at a campaign rally just two weeks before general elections in 2008, where she was the leading opposition candidate. In the same year General Pervez Musharraf was forced to resign from the presidency of Pakistan and was replaced with Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of the late Benazir Bhutto. At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, more than three million civilians have been displaced by the ongoing armed conflict between the Pakistani government and Taliban militants along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. Western diplomats and intelligence experts say the Pakistani Taliban formed in 2007 specifically to maintain control over Pakistan’s tribal regions and to train fighters for jihad against American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, and to strike at the Pakistani state. The state religion is Islam, and today 96 percent of Pakistan’s population is Muslim. The majority of Muslims are Sunni, but Pakistan also has the world’s second
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largest Shi’a population (second to Iran). There are tiny minority faith communities of Zoroastrians, Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus. There are many different ethnic and linguistic groups, the major ones being Pathans (also known as Pashtoons), Punjabis, Sindhis, and Baluchis. The form of government is federal constitutional parliamentary system, with a president and prime minister. Pakistan has had four constitutions since 1947, and control of government has traded off between military and civilian hands. The military plays a powerful role in Pakistan. Pakistan has been a close ally of the United States, particularly during the Soviet-Afghani war of the 1980s, and again after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. Increases in U.S. foreign aid have been given to Pakistan to secure Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terrorism.
Causes and Waves of Migration To understand the Pakistani American experience, it is necessary to take into account the impact of exclusionary government policies and social prejudice. The contours of immigration and settlement correspond with changes in U.S. immigration regulations. The early arrivals came at the end of a series of Asian migrations to the Pacific coast, beginning with the Chinese in the middle of the 19th century and including the Filipinos, the Japanese, and many other Asian immigrants. But these migrations were abruptly brought to an end by U.S. legislation in 1917—with the creation of the “barred Asiatic zone” restricting immigration from 17 Asian countries—and 1924—setting very low quotas for admissions from nations outside of Europe. Assimilation was also greatly affected in the early 20th century by laws barring Asians from land ownership in some cases, from certain occupations and intermarriage in others, and even from naturalized U.S. citizenship. Barriers against Asian immigration and assimilation were part of the regulatory scheme until the middle of the 20th century. These legal prohibitions had important implications for the development of the Pakistani American community in the United States in ways that are specifically discussed in the following.
Early Immigration The first stage of immigration to the United States occurred before Pakistan’s independence. The vast majority of early immigrants were men from the British Indian province of Punjab. These pioneers were predominantly rural, coming to work in agriculture in the western United States. They arrived in the thousands between 1893 and 1917, just at the time when public opinion and federal and state policies were turning against Asian immigrants in general. Other immigrants from Asia, in particular from China, Korea, and Japan, had already been working in California,
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1663
mostly in agriculture and mining. In contrast to the small, family-owned farm of the Atlantic coast and the Midwest, by the 1870s California’s landowners developed a corporate, capital-intensive form of agriculture by using large-scale irrigation systems to cultivate commercial crops of fruits and vegetables. Irrigation was a technology that was new to California but was already familiar to those from the British Indian province of Punjab. The Punjab is traversed by the Indus River and its tributaries, and an extensive canal-irrigation system provides water for agricultural production in spite of the region’s dry climate. Thus immigrants from the Punjab were well versed in the technical aspects of irrigated agriculture. Approximately 6,000 to 7,000 rural immigrants from Punjab arrived in California between 1893 and 1917. Many were attracted to come by the economic opportunities advertised by companies seeking to import contract labor. Several did not come directly to the United States but instead migrated first to the Pacific coast of Canada. As British subjects these Asian Indians in theory were entitled to move freely throughout the British Empire, of which Canada was a part. In practice, though, Canada successfully sought power over immigration control in order to limit Asian migration. It is reported that between 1904 and 1908 more than 5,000 Asian Indians (mostly Punjabi) entered British Columbia, Canada. Facing harassment and social prejudice driven by local fears of job competition, many returned to India. Yet the persistent problems of subdivision of land and rural debt in the homeland did not make return an attractive option. Thus a small number migrated further south along the Pacific coast to the United States. Averaging about 30 per year between 1898 and 1903 and then 250 annually from 1904 to 1906, the flow quickly reached its peak of nearly 2,000 per year by 1908. Canada officially ended Asian Indian migration in 1909, and the number reaching the western United States via Canada dropped off significantly. Just as they had in Canada, these Asian Indian immigrants met with opposition in the western United States. They were subject to the prevailing anti-Asian bias in the Pacific coast states at the turn of the 20th century. Called “Hindus” by other Americans regardless of their religion—roughly 85 percent were Sikh and another 10 to 15 percent most likely were Muslim—the newcomers from the Punjab were treated with derision. Popular magazines and newspapers decried the arrival of the “Hindu invasion” and the “tide of turbans.” One periodical warned its readers that the United States was about to be flooded with “Hindus” because the Vedas—scriptures of Hinduism—enjoins them to “cover the earth.” Concerns over their assimilability were expressed frequently in popular media not only with respect to outward appearance but also in terms of belief. (Moore 1995, 55–56; Jensen 1988, 39). Evidence of organized efforts to exclude these new immigrants in the early 1900s is plentiful. A nativist association of citizens called the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League widened its scope to include “Hindus” as a target of its anti-immigration campaign. When a handful of “Hindu” laborers were assaulted in
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riots in Washington State lumber camps in 1907, this association claimed that the “Hindus” themselves were responsible for their own injuries, because they were willing to work for less than the prevailing wage and kept “filthy and immodest habits.” Changing its name to the Asiatic Exclusion League in 1910 in order to reflect its widening ambit, these immigration opponents called for the resignation of the immigration commissioner in San Francisco because he putatively encouraged “Hindu” immigration and permitted the entry of Asian Indian arrivals having communicable diseases. In the same year, H. A. Millis, chief investigator for the federal Immigration Commission on the Pacific coast, conducted a study of the growing Asian Indian immigrant population and reported in his findings that the Asian Indian “was the most undesirable of all Asiatics and the peoples of the Pacific states were unanimous in their desires for exclusion.” As Punjabi immigration to the United States increased, prejudice also grew to the point where the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization began to reject new applicants for entry out of a concern for public safety. Before 1907 fewer than 10 percent of applicants for entry as immigrants were rejected. In 1909, 1911, and 1913, though, as many as 50 percent were rejected. Literacy tests were required, but it was the public demand that officials “especially bar Hindus,” as the local Imperial Valley press put it, which resulted in the climbing rejection rate. (Moore 1995, 56–57; Khan 1984, 43–46). In spite of this unfriendly welcome, the early immigrants from the rural Punjabi region showed tenacity and challenged their lowly status within the first decade of their arrival. A few made alliances with bankers and attorneys in the agricultural valleys of California and went about financing their own enterprises and filing court cases. Some spent time and resources working through the legal system trying to validate their Aryan ancestry in the courts so they might be considered “white” and thus eligible for naturalized citizenship. The push factors that had enticed these newcomers to leave their homeland help to explain why these immigrants succeeded in the face of the odds. As the mortality rate declined in the Punjab and more sons survived to claim their inheritance, family landholdings dwindled. This motivated many young men to leave home to seek their fortunes overseas. At the same time, a significant portion of the pre-1917 immigrants had served in the British colonial military and had been in service overseas, in such places as China and East Africa. It was often in the service of the British Empire that these pioneers learned of opportunities in the United States. Whatever it was that forged their determination, the immigrants from the Punjab often traveled in small groups in the early years, working in railroads, lumber, and agriculture. In the agricultural economy they cultivated rice in northern California, grew grapes in central California, and helped establish cotton and lettuce fields in the Imperial Valley. They found work picking cantaloupes and planting sugar beets. They were especially successful in working the land as tenant farmers, for instance, in growing rice in Butte, Sutter, and Colusa counties. Many began
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sending sizeable money orders from local post offices as remittances to their kin in India. A California (“Anglo”) farm woman, who attested to the skills of these farmers and spoke admiringly of their determination, said they lived in a place she called “Hindu” camp. E. E. Chandler, a chemistry professor and owner of a ranch near Brawley, California, leased land to tenant farmers. He had this to say of the Punjabis: “This Hindu resembles us except he is black—and we are shocked to see a black white man.” (Moore 1995, 55). In 1913 California adopted the Alien Land Law (amended in 1920 and 1921) to bar “aliens ineligible for citizenship” from leasing or owning agricultural land. While directed primarily against Japanese farmers, this law discriminated against all Asian immigrants because of the perception that their farming activities presented unfair competition for “white” landowners and agribusiness. It put at risk the rights of Asian Indian immigrants to farm the land, and how it did so requires explanation. The term “aliens ineligible for citizenship” was first introduced into federal law by immigration legislation in 1875 that classified all Asians as persons “ineligible for citizenship” on the basis of race. Notwithstanding this legislation and the subsequent Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, federal district courts continued to grant naturalized citizenship, in many cases determining for themselves who counted as “white” for purposes of naturalization. In 1907 U.S. Attorney General Charles Bonaparte advised the courts that Asian Indians were not suitable applicants for citizenship because, according to federal law, naturalization was limited to “free white persons” and persons of African nativity or descent. However, several federal courts refused to adhere to this advice and accepted the petitions of Asian Indian applicants who had proven they were of the same racial origins as Europeans (i.e., Aryan) and were members of the Caucasian “race.” For instance, in 1908 the federal district court of New Orleans accepted this line of reasoning in the cases of Abdul Hamid and Bellal Houssain, two Asian Indian Muslims. While it remained unclear whether immigrants from British colonial India were eligible for citizenship, they continued to farm unhindered by the California Alien Land Law. By 1919 they had some 100,000 acres of California land under cultivation. However, an immigration act of the U.S. Congress in 1917, which contained the “barred Asiatic zone” restriction, proved to be an effective barrier to further immigration from virtually all Asian countries, including British colonial India. Admission of new immigrants to the United States was ended. Moreover, the consequences for Asian Indian immigrants already in the United States were profound. Soon after the adoption of the “barred Asiatic zone” provision, the federal government began to challenge the naturalizations of individuals from British colonial India. The reasoning was that persons who were formerly classified as “alien” and now belong to a class barred from entry into the United States (i.e., Asians) should no longer be considered acceptable as citizens. Thus the attorney general’s office renewed efforts to exclude Asian Indians, by retroactively changing the legal status of those already naturalized.
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In the 1923 landmark decision of United States v. Baghat Singh Thind, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the claim of the government that Thind, a man who had described himself in his petition for citizenship as a “high caste Hindu,” was no longer an acceptable citizen. The Court revoked the citizenship that had been granted to Thind years before by a federal court in Oregon. The basis for this decision was that Congress had clearly meant Europeans and not “Hindus” when it used the term “white person” in legislation. While the Court accepted Thind’s contention that Asian Indians are members of the Caucasian race, it ruled that by virtue of their skin color Asian Indians are not a part of the popular understanding of the term “white person.” Further, the Court wrote that while immigrants from the southern regions of Europe—Greeks and Italians—may be “dark eyed and swarthy,” within a generation they would fit into the popular category of whiteness. On the other hand, the descendants of “Hindus [would] retain the clear evidence of their ancestry.” The Court quoted statutory language from the 1917 “barred Asiatic zone” provision to argue that the next logical step would be to exclude persons of Asian Indian ancestry from U.S. citizenship. The Court held that: It is not without significance . . . that Congress . . . has now excluded from admission to this country all natives of Asia . . . including the whole of India. This . . . is persuasive of a similar attitude towards Asiatic naturalization as well, since it is not likely that Congress would be willing to accept as citizens a class of persons whom it rejects as immigrants. This ruling met with approval from many newspapers in California—the state with the highest concentration of immigrants from British colonial India—which praised the ruling in their editorial pages and noted that the state’s Alien Land Law would now be enforceable against persons of Punjabi or Hindu descent. The California attorney general, a leading proponent of the anti-Asian movement, promised swift action to “stem the menacing spread of Hindus holding our lands.” Not only did Thind lose his U.S. citizenship; many others also had their certificates of naturalization rescinded by the federal government. Between 1923 and 1926 some 70 “Hindu” Americans lost their citizenship. In addition, lower courts relied on the Thind ruling as precedent in cases involving persons of Arab and Afghani origins, deciding against their fitness as naturalized citizens as well. Effectively the Court’s decision in the Thind case triggered a campaign to revoke the citizenship of a class of persons previously deemed lawful citizens. Many in the Asian Indian community living in the United States responded, and a long struggle ensued to change the laws so that Asian Indians would again be allowed to enter the country as legal immigrants and eventually apply for naturalized citizenship. Their extensive lobbying efforts proved successful in 1946 when Congress enacted legislation that specifically allowed immigration and naturalization to resume from
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what was then British colonial India. The new law also enabled Asian Indian immigrants once again to own property in the United States and reversed the 1923 Thind decision that had declared “Hindus” nonwhite and consequently ineligible for citizenship. (Moore 1995, 57–61). Historian Karen Leonard has noted that for the first wave of Asian Indian immigrants, being categorized by other Americans as “Hindu” had important political consequences. Asian Indian men became highly politicized in response to legal and social barriers to full citizenship, fighting hard for citizens’ rights in the United States and freedom for India. Besides the legal obstacles, there were significant social stereotypes that limited the new immigrants’ life chances. Outbursts of public sentiment targeted Asian Indians, who were not only visibly different and presumed inassimilable but also becoming economically prosperous. Like other Asians, many in the Asian Indian community were shunned and confined to living in the foreign sections of California’s cities and towns. In Los Angeles, most Punjabi men lived in Little Tokyo and made a living as peddlers, elevator operators, butlers, and the like. A small handful built acting careers, often portraying characters of Indian, Arab, Mexican, Gypsy, or other “exotic” complexion (see also Appendix III). Others emerged as prosperous farmers in California or among the growing number of intellectuals who had come to the United States to study in universities and colleges on the Atlantic coast and stayed on. However, social stigma and legal constraints combined to shape the circumstances of this budding community even in the area of family life. Arriving without wives or families due to immigration restrictions, the early pioneers tended to marry Mexican women and had families known locally as “Mexican-Hindu.” The second generation of Asian Indian immigrants tended to emphasize their South Asian heritage, choosing to feature certain aspects of their Punjabi background presented by their immigrant fathers. The children took great pride in following Indian customs; daughters dressed in saris for festive occasions, and dietary prohibitions and traditional burial rituals were observed. Second-generation descendants who were Sikh or Hindu avoided eating meat, and those of Muslim background avoided pork and alcohol, even though typically their fathers did not abstain. Likewise, according to their children, the early Muslim immigrants rarely observed the five daily prayers or the month-long fast during Ramadan. Few owned a copy of the holy book, the Qur’an, or a prayer mat. There is some evidence that Arabic classes were offered for biethnic children being brought up in the Imperial Valley in the early 20th century, allegedly as a result of the conversion of one Mexican wife to Islam. The early immigrants’ spouses, chiefly Mexican women, actively contributed to the construction and maintenance of a “Hindu” identity in the United States (Leonard 1997, 60). After grinding to a near halt between 1920 and the 1940s, Pakistani immigration resumed in fits and starts with the lifting of legal barriers in 1946. In 1947–1948, when Britain’s empire in India collapsed and produced the independent nations of
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India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Burma, the U.S. government allotted to each new sovereign nation-state an annual quota of 105 immigrants. Approximately 1,800 Pakistanis were granted immigrant status between 1948 and 1965. Most were the families and relatives of those who were already in the United States, or were students or government officials in the country for training who would decide to stay or return later as immigrants. A noteworthy impact of the 1946 law was that it made both the old immigrants and their newly reunited kin eligible to acquire naturalized citizenship. The net effect was to broaden the base for Pakistani Americans to grow as a distinct community. Substantial community formation could not begin in the early years because of the low numbers of immigrants and the legal and social barriers to their success. However, with American citizenship and property ownership made obtainable, a new generation of young, more educated professionals in postcolonial Pakistan was enticed to pursue its future in the United States.
Recent Immigration The Asian Exclusion Repeal Acts in the United States (1946) and the independence of Pakistan (1947) altered migration patterns to be sure, but sweeping changes did not come until the 1965 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act. This new law jettisoned discriminatory admissions criteria by eliminating the national origins quotas that had heavily favored European immigration to the United States since the 1920s. Immigration reform replaced national origins quotas with preferred occupational skills, family reunification, and humanitarian criteria. Since the late 1960s the total numbers of immigrants from Asian and Muslim countries, including Pakistan, have risen dramatically. Table 247 presents the number of immigrants admitted to the United States from Pakistan in five-year intervals beginning in 1965. A strong upward trend is clear, in particular from 1980 onward. The numbers began at a low of 2,704 in the second half of the decade in the 1960s but grew exponentially to reach 87,110 in the 2005–2009 interval. The first post-1965 wave of Pakistani immigrants on average was highly educated, being admitted because of employment-based preferences in the new immigration scheme. Many were employed as physicians, engineers, and other professionals. However, beginning in the late 1980s a large number entered under family-sponsored preferences and as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Next, in the 1990s there was an increase of 180 percent over the previous decade, which is accounted for by persons admitted under the U.S. Diversity Program started in 1990. Finally, in the five-year interval between 2000 and 2004, Pakistani immigration jumped from 61,850 to 66,256, an increase of nearly 8 percent; and between 2005 and 2009 there was an extraordinary growth rate of 30 percent, increasing to 87,110 over the five-year period.
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This might seem surprising given the priority given to national security after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. However, there are two things to keep in mind. First, this period coincides with the U.S. invasion of Pakistan’s neighbor, Afghanistan, and the overthrow of the Taliban government. Taliban militants fled to northwestern Pakistan, and the continuing armed conflict between them and the Pakistani forces created a refugee crisis within the country. The U.S. government stood to benefit from Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terror, and the flow of migration from Pakistan to the United States relieved some of the pressures on Pakistan’s weak economic sector. Second, in the post-9/11 period, official U.S. immigration policy has been convoluted. To neutralize any future terrorist threat the government has taken a broadbased approach by tightening airport and seaport security while simultaneously placing Muslims and their institutions in the United States under constant surveillance. In May 2002, the U.S. Congress enacted the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, which reduced the number of nonimmigrant (visitor) visas to the United States from Pakistan and other Muslim and Middle Eastern countries. While 2001 was a peak year for nonimmigrant visas—72,982 were issued to Pakistanis for temporary entry into the United States for tourism, work, business, and study—by 2002, the number of such visas issued to Pakistanis was cut to 46,735, and cut further to 39,429 in 2003. This represents a decrease of 45 percent over two years. Thus, while immigration to the United States continued to grow in the first decade of the 21st century, there was a decisive decline in temporary admissions because of changes in nonimmigrant visa policies. Table 248 indicates, on a yearly basis in the first decade of the 21st century, the number of immigrants from Pakistan granted permanent resident status (a green card) in the United States; the percentage this represents of the total permanent resident status granted in that year; and Pakistan’s rank as a sending country. This information is obtained from the Department of Homeland Security’s Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2009. According to these statistics there was nearly a 40 percent reduction in the number of Pakistani permanent residents admitted into the United States between 2001 and 2003, when the numbers were 16,393 and 9,415, respectively. This nearly corresponds to the decrease in the number of temporary visas issued to Pakistanis in the same interval. However, in terms of immigration dynamics, two considerations are crucial. First, while in 2003 there was a sharp drop in Pakistani admissions, the numbers immediately began to climb again. In 2004, 12,086 Pakistanis became green card holders, a number already exceeding that of 2003. Furthermore, in each subsequent year the number of Pakistani green card holders continued to increase, to the point that the figure for 2006 (17,418) surpassed the figure for 2001 (16,393). In 2009 a record number of Pakistani nationals achieved permanent resident status in the United States in a single year, at 21,555. This is nearly 10 times as many as were admitted between 1965 and 1969.
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The second consideration to keep in mind is that immigration admissions were decreased across the board. In other words, cutbacks in immigration did not affect immigrants from Pakistan more adversely than any other group in the first decade of the 21st century. Table 248 shows that the Pakistani proportion of total admissions remained fairly steady, ranging from 1.25 to almost 2 percent of all green cards granted between 2000 and 2009. Also, Pakistan’s rank in terms of volume of immigration to the United States increased over the same decade, rising from its lowest position as 20th in 2005 to 11th in 2008 and 2009. It is too early to say whether this will be a lasting trend; however, at the close of the first decade of the 21st century, Pakistan is the largest sending country of Muslim immigrants to the United States. In sum, in the second half of the 20th century into the 21st, Pakistani immigration and settlement in the United States reached historic proportions. Moreover, the principle of family reunification and the 1990 U.S. diversity visa program provided the impetus for a far more diverse immigration pattern to emerge from Pakistan in terms of socioeconomic status. During these decades a substantial community could form into viable support networks, particularly in large cities in the United States. Being highly educated and middle class, these communities could afford to sponsor new immigrants, assist new arrivals in finding jobs and places to live, and help them navigate the new environment. Additionally from a Pakistani vantage point, better means of communication and transportation made the United States seem less distant than it had in the past, which also encouraged immigration. More than 75 percent of Pakistanis who have acquired immigrant status since 1965 did so between 1990 and 2009. In the aftermath of 9/11, public attention focused on persons of the same or similar ethnic and religious backgrounds as the alleged terrorists. The impact of national security initiatives and social prejudice in the United States selectively targeted Middle Easterners, Muslims, Sikhs, and others resembling these categories of people. Persons of Pakistani descent fell within this sphere. In spite of their presence in the United States for over a century, the Pakistani community was suddenly thrust into the glare of publicity as part of the larger Muslim American community. While prior to 9/11 Pakistanis were usually understood as being a part of the South Asian diaspora, the post-9/11 story of persons of Pakistani descent has been defined much more within the context of Pakistan being a Muslim country. Muslim immigrants in America—roughly evenly divided among those originating in South Asia (including Pakistan), the Middle East and North Africa, and Southeast Asia—were the initial focus of attention from law enforcement after the terrorist attacks of 2001. Thousands of men of Asian Indian and Middle Eastern origins were detained for months without being charged with crimes, and many were deported, not for reasons related to terrorism but for minor infractions of visa regulations. Many Muslim charities and nonprofit organizations were shut down, and the U.S.
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Treasury Department seized assets and prosecuted officials on terrorism-related charges. Student visas became difficult to obtain, and transnational labor migration on nonimmigrant visas was sharply curtailed. With the advent of homeland security, the civil rights and opportunities for persons of Pakistani origin have significantly deteriorated. Like Muslim Americans in general, Pakistani Americans live with a high degree of apprehension about their own future in the United States and that of future immigrants. For example, in 2002 the U.S. government conducted “voluntary interviews” with approximately 42 percent of the estimated 6,000 Muslim noncitizen men detained after the events of 9/11. This resulted in the arrest of about 20 individuals on immigration and criminal charges, and at least 241 individuals were deported, more than half of them being Pakistani. In addition, between June 2002 and May 2003, about 82,000 nonimmigrant visitors from Muslim countries complied with “special registration” orders from the National Security Exit Entry Registration System (NEERS), a program established to monitor certain foreign nationals in the United States whose presence warranted special attention in the interest of national security. Special registration required persons to be photographed and fingerprinted upon entering the United States. The NSEERS program was ended in 2003 under heavy criticism for targeting persons on the basis of national origins and alienating immigrant communities that might otherwise have been willing to help the U.S. government in uncovering terrorist cells in the country.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition At the beginning of the 21st century, Pakistanis in the United States are estimated to be roughly 500,000 persons. Pakistanis in the United States are a relatively new and young community. According to a study by the Pakistan Embassy in Washington, D.C., nearly 75 percent of Pakistanis in the United States have U.S. citizenship, through naturalization or birth, or permanent residence status. Less than 1 percent of these have obtained immigrant status prior to 1965, and only 10 percent did so before 1978. The Pakistan Embassy’s study demonstrates that Americans of Pakistani origin live in all 50 states, but the 5 states with the most Pakistanis are New York, New Jersey, California, Illinois, Texas, and Virginia. Of Pakistanis in the United States, 40 percent live in only two states: New Jersey and New York, and 60 percent live on the Atlantic coast; however, the size of the Pakistani population on the Pacific coast is growing rapidly. California has the third-largest Pakistani population, divided evenly between the San Francisco/San Jose metro area and the Los Angeles metropolitan center.
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The Muzaffar family, originally from Pakistan, gathers around the computer at their Brooklyn, New York, home searching for news on the earthquake that devastated Kashmir, November 5, 2005. (AP Photo/Kathy Willens)
According to the 2007 American Community Survey, New York City is home to hundreds of thousands of persons from the Indian subcontinent, including approximately 40,000 from Pakistan. Concentrations of Pakistanis live in the boroughs of Queens and Brooklyn. The population more than doubled between 1990 and 2000, according to a study of the 2000 U.S. Census data by the American Asian Federation of New York. Although many work as city engineers and staff the city’s hospitals, another 28 percent of the city’s Pakistani population lives below the poverty line at the beginning of the 21st century.
Age and Family Structure Today Pakistani Americans tend to be young. Approximately 30 percent of persons of Pakistani descent are young adults between 18 and 39 years of age, compared to 21 percent of the American population as a whole. Intermarriage—that is, marrying members of other ethnic or cultural origins—is more common than would be expected. It is quite likely that the rate of intermarriage will increase with each successive generation in the United States, as this is commonly observed in other immigrant groups. Another indicator of integration is the use of English language
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at home. According to 2000 census data on language use at home, families from Pakistan (80%) are among the most likely to be bilingual. Data from the U.S. immigration services suggest that the gender composition is balanced. Pakistanis who acquire permanent residence status tend to be married, and those who acquire naturalized citizenship are even more likely to be married. In 2005, the popular Music Television network (MTV) launched a niche cable channel called “MTV Desi,” aimed at the South Asian American youth. The word desi means “from the homeland,” and it is increasingly used to refer to South Asians in diaspora, particularly in North America. This category indicates the emerging influence of young South Asians, including Pakistanis, as consumers and producers of distinctive cultural forms. The channel features Bollywood songs, Indie-pop music videos, and diasporic deejays from North America and the United Kingdom.
Educational and Economic Attainment Approximately one-half of Pakistani Americans have a bachelor’s degree or more. Pakistanis in the United States tend to be affluent. Pakistani Americans are a community that has a higher-than-average household income, higher-than-average savings rates, and a higher-than-average representation in the professions. A large proportion is in white collar jobs in managerial or professional positions. Approximately 29 percent report they are self-employed or own their own businesses. However, increasingly since 1990 new immigrants have been working class. According to the 2000 U.S. Census data on the official poverty rate among children, 22 percent of Pakistani American children of immigrant families were living under the poverty line.
Health Statistics, Issues Little information is available about health care and status of persons of Pakistani background in the United States. Existing medical literature shows that, similar to Indians, Pakistanis are at high risk for coronary heart disease and diabetes relative to the general population. Compared to their counterparts in Pakistan, Pakistani American women have a higher rate of breast cancer. Other health problems include hypertension and oral sub-mucous fibrosis (related to chewing paan, a mix of tobacco and many added spices). High-risk behaviors typically include diets high in saturated fats, sedentary lifestyles, and the prevalence of smoking and chewing tobacco, especially among men. However, these behaviors tend to pass with each successive generation. In addition to conventional medicine, traditional health practices are sometimes utilized. When ill, the elderly may wear the taawiz, an amulet containing verses from the Quran. Death rituals include positioning a dying person directionally, so
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that the soles of the feet face toward Mecca, while family members recite verses from the Qur’an.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Rituals Family life among the early immigrants of the 19th and 20th centuries was influenced by the climate and circumstances of immigration and settlement. Because of antimiscegenation laws, nonwhites generally were prohibited from marrying white people. So immigrants of “Asian Indian” origin—many of whom were single men—were not given marriage licenses to marry white women in California, although they could legally wed in Arizona. The crazy-quilt of differing state marriage laws resulted in a variegated pattern of family structure. However, marriages between Punjabi men and Mexican women were not uncommon in the early 1900s. Anthropologist Karen Leonard has pieced together the documentary evidence of these marital unions. She writes that the earliest records of “Mexican-Hindu” marriages date to 1916 in Southern California, when, for example, Sher Singh and Antonia Alvarez married, followed by the marriage of Sher’s business partner, Ghopal Singh, to Antonia Alvarez’s sister, Anna Anita. The women, having moved from Mexico to El Paso, Texas, and then the Imperial Valley in California, picked cotton in the fields owned by these immigrants from the Punjabi region. They became brides at the ages of 18 and 21; their husbands were ages 36 and 37. By 1919, two more sisters, as well as a niece of Antonia and Anna Anita, had also married Punjabis in civil ceremonies. This peculiar pattern of sister-partner marriages was repeated in many households. One marriage to a Punjabi led to others, as Mexican women helped to arrange more matches with their relatives and friends. The pattern of arranged marriages formed joint households in which Punjabi business partners often resided together with their sister brides. Moreover, in the hot climate of California’s agricultural valleys, many households lived in tents or dirt-floored shacks without ice, electricity, or running water. The early years of adjustment to a new culture and family life led to extraordinary adaptations—husbands teaching Mexican wives how to prepare Punjabi-style meals, and bachelor partners staying on as helpful “uncles” to raise bicultural children. Historians estimate that in the first half of the 20th century, as many as one-fifth to one-third of the Asian Indian population in California was married in this way, so the “Mexican-Hindu” family life was a fairly typical pattern in these early decades.
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The data show that between 1913 and 1949, fully 80 percent of the recorded marriages within this population in California, were between Asian Indian men and Mexican women, with the largest numbers located in the California counties closest to the United States–Mexico border. Mexican-Hindu families were large, with an average of six children per family. These bicultural families created a distinct community. There were collective cultural celebrations—weddings, dinners and dances, holiday outings—that solidified social networks and invented new kinship ties. Networks based on kinship, so crucial in both Punjabi and Mexican cultures, were an obvious basis for social life, cultural practices, and economic livelihoods. This newfound kinship structure was built on the Roman Catholic “godparent” system in the southwestern United States. In other words, many Catholic parishes accepted non-Catholic Punjabi men as legitimate godfathers in baptisms, giving them hispanicized names on baptismal certificates. This relationship linked extended immigrant families together through their children. Falling under the jurisdiction of the 1913 Alien Land Law in California— particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court clarified their “nonwhite” status in the 1923 Thind decision—Asian Indian men could no longer be secure in their ownership of property. Although unevenly enforced, the law permitted the government to seize Asian Indian assets at any moment. One might think that these men would be motivated to marry in order to secure their land holdings. However, marriages to non-Asian or nonalien women could not help to save their property. In accordance with the Cable Act (in effect from 1922 to 1931), women who married aliens ineligible for citizenship also became ineligible for citizenship themselves. In effect, women acquired the legal status of their husbands in marriage, which means that even women who had been born in the United States stood to lose their birthright citizenship. This was known as “marital expatriation” and had momentous implications for marriage practices, since unions arranged for the sake of economic stability were pointless. To keep hold of their property, Asian Indians in the Imperial Valley began to put their landholdings in the names of their American-born children in 1934. This strategy followed the pattern set by the Japanese, who also circumvented the alien land law by placing their property in the names of their American-born children. It also served as an alternative to Asian Indians’ holding agricultural land in corporation with so-called Anglo partners, a practice that was challenged in a 1933 court ruling. Family structures and rituals of the post-1965 immigrants contrast sharply from the choices made by the pioneers who, out of necessity, married wives of different cultural backgrounds. (Information in this section is adapted from Karen Isaksen Leonard, 1997, The South Asian Americans, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 49–52. Used by permission.)
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National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media Pakistan Link is the largest publication in the United States for the Pakistani American community. The weekly newsletter is published in English and Urdu and distributed in the United States and Canada. The same publishing company provides a daily electronic version called the Pakistan Link ePaper. Chowrangi is an English-language magazine and Web site that features the lives and concerns of Pakistani Americans. It covers business, entertainment, current events, religion, science, technology, and sports in Pakistan, the United States, and the Muslim world. There are over 5,000 Web sites with Pakistani American content, and yes Pakistan.com provides an English-language compendium of the various Pakistani cultural, social, and relief organizations based in North America.
Celebration of National Holidays Pakistani Americans celebrate August 14 as Pakistan’s Independence Day, and December 25 for the birthday of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of the nation of Pakistan. Pakistan Day is celebrated on March 23 to commemorate the date in 1940 when the All India Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution, asserting the necessity of a separate Muslim majority nation. Religious celebrations include Eid al-Adha, observing the pilgrimage to Mecca, and Eid al-Fitr, ending the month of fasting during Ramadan.
Foodways The cuisine of Pakistan is similar to that of northern India. Spices common in South Asian food, such as cumin, turmeric, and chili powder, combined with cinnamon, cloves, and cardamom make Pakistani fare distinct. Meats are lamb, goat, and beef. In compliance with Islamic dietary law, pork is prohibited, and the meat is slaughtered in a way that makes it halal (lawful or permissible). Vegetable dishes and unleavened bread are eaten with many meals. Sweets include jalebi, an orangecolored fried dessert made of syrup and flour, and ras malai, made from heavy cream. Teas flavored with cardamom and cinnamon are common. Religious celebrations such as Eid al-Fitr, marking the end of the month of fasting called Ramadan, and Eid al-Adha, signifying the season of pilgrimage to Mecca, involve feasts including many traditional foods.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment In 2005 MTV launched a special music channel called “MTV Desi.” The channel features Bollywood songs sequences, Indie-pop music videos, and diasporic
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Aeesha Ayyub (left) and her sister, Habiba, of Brooklyn, watch a parade on New York’s Madison Avenue celebrating the 52nd anniversary of Pakistan’s independence. (AP Photo/ Diane Bondareff )
deejays from North America and the United Kingdom. These cultural forms are transnational in nature and express neither an India- or Pakistani-centric nor a North American/Western-centric aesthetic. The audience is second-generation South Asian youth in North America. Bohemia, a Pakistani American born in San Francisco, is a popular rap artist who is noted as a pioneer of Desi Hip Hop music. Singer Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, who performed devotional music of the Sufi tradition, is a breakthrough performer who played to large concert audiences at world music festivals. He was recognized by Time Magazine in 2006 as an “Asian Hero,” one of the top 12 Asian artists of the past 60 years. His music is produced on Peter Gabriel’s Real World label and has been featured on soundtracks of major Hollywood studio productions, including The Last Temptation of Christ and Dead Man Walking. A small number of Pakistani Americans are actors, screenwriters, and directors in the United States (see also Appendix III). For example, Kamran Pasha is a famous Hollywood screenwriter/director most famous for writing the Showtime series Sleeper Cell. Actress Christel Khalil is of mixed Pakistani/African American heritage; she appears on the CBS soap opera The Young and the Restless.
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Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Intergroup Relations Out of the tragedy of 9/11, new coalitions have been formed and older ones transformed. A new broad coalition of civil liberties, human rights, ethnic, and immigration advocacy groups has emerged to push a common agenda: to roll back the post-9/11 homeland security policies they regard as the most egregious compromises of basic civil rights and equal treatment under the law. Pakistani American advocacy organizations and the building of coalitions across lines of ethnicity, religion, and national origins are all a part of the broader picture. Arbitrary and indefinite detentions, secret hearings, and severe restrictions of due process have been regarded as a violation of First Amendment rights and have mobilized many Pakistani individuals and organizations to become politically active. Pakistani Americans, like others who are “Muslim-looking,” have had to present themselves to authorities for “special registration,” have experienced hate crimes, and have learned how South Asian religions have become closely associated with violence in mainstream American discourses. Employment discrimination has also yielded a number of cases for which Pakistani Americans have sought legal counsel from advocacy organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union. The federal agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, has documented how after 9/11 there was a surge in backlash-related unlawful firings, refusals to hire or promote, and failures to accommodate employees properly with regard to religious observances. According to the EEOC, the number of complaints from individuals who are or are perceived to be Muslim, Arab, South Asian, or Sikh saw a significant increase after 9/11, so much so that the agency created a special category just to handle complaints of this nature. To confront this rising Islamophobia, several advocacy organizations have coordinated intergroup campaigns and have enjoyed a number of successes, including policy changes and the implementation of cultural awareness training for law enforcement officials. Coalitions have begun to wield considerable political influence and have mounted voter registration drives. In 2007 the Sikh Coalition and the Muslim American Society won reforms to the Federal Transportation Security Administration guidelines concerning permissible religious attire while working at the nation’s airports, and a new procedure for screening religious headgear for passengers passing through airport security. In another example, the South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT) and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) coordinated a campaign to inventory their communities’ concerns about hate crimes and immigration policy. Generally speaking, Pakistani Americans have been engaged in organizations that are pan-Muslim in membership, which foster a sense of common identity through social networks that constitute a collectively aggrieved minority. The result of this activism has been the reinforcement of a pan-Muslim identity.
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Aamardeep Singh (left), legal director of the Sikh Coalition, discusses a new policy by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) that requires Sikh employees to wear MTA logos on their turbans, New York, July 15, 2005. Five Sikh station agents planned to file discrimination charges against the MTA, charging that a post-9/11 policy requiring them to brand their turbans with an MTA logo amounted to religious discrimination. (AP Photo/Julie Jacobson)
Representative Pakistani American Organizations Al Shifa Foundation of North America, a nonprofit organization, supports al Shifa hospitals in Pakistan to treat acute eye disease and blindness and to provide preventive eye care for the poor. AMT, American Muslim Task Force on Civil Rights and Elections, led by Muhammad Salim Akhtar. APPNA, Association of Physicians of Pakistani Descent in North America. Founded in 1977, has worked to put into place several health care facilities in Northwest Frontier Province and Kashmir and has raised relief funds and assisted disaster victims throughout the world. APSENA, Association of Pakistani Scientists and Engineers of North America. Founded in the 1980s, this organization assists scientists, computer programmers, and engineers in the United States and Pakistan in science, technology, and software. ISNA, the Islamic Society of North America, an organization that developed out of the Muslim Student Association of the United States and Canada (founded 1963). A Muslim organization, ISNA has had multiethnic leadership over the years, including many Pakistani Americans.
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New York Pak Brothers’ Yellow Cab Drivers Union. An advocacy group for Pakistani American taxi drivers working to protect the safety and rights of those particularly vulnerable in the aftermath of 9/11. OPEN, Organization of Pakistani Entrepreneurs of North America. Founded in 1998 by a Boston-based group of entrepreneurs and technology professionals. Mentors young professionals in business and high technology fields. This is decentralized with chapters throughout the nation. Pakistani Merchant Association of Coney Island. Special fund to support the needy within its local community, including widows and orphans. PANA, Pakistan American National Alliance. Founded in 2002 by Dr. Agha Saeed, Pakistani American political science professor at California State University Hayward. A union of five major groups to act collectively on issues pertaining to the Pakistani American community. Includes members of the Association of Pakistani Physicians of North America, Council of Pakistan American Affairs, Pakistan American Congress, Pakistan American Democratic Forum, and PAKPAC. SAALT, South Asian Americans Leading Together. Founded in 2000 as the Indian American Leadership Center, this group focuses on leadership development primarily among youth. After developing more into a civil rights advocacy organization, the name was changed in 2008 to South Asian Americans Leading Together. SALDEF, the South Asian Legal Defense and Education Foundation. Founded in 1996 as the Sikh MediaWatch and Resource Taskforce (SMART), the name was changed in 2001 to reflect the mission of civil rights advocacy, beyond the organization’s original conception as media watchdog. It is one of the largest advocacy organizations on Sikh issues.
Forging a New American Political Identity Gaining a clearer understanding of Pakistani Americans’ emerging political identity requires looking at the post-9/11 politicization of the wider category of Muslim American. Within the political context of homeland security, the profiling of Muslim, Arab, and South Asian communities in the United States became a frequently used tool of surveillance after 9/11, and this generated political and cultural responses from the targeted groups. Community organizations played a crucial role in the process of forging an American political identity. The ability of the Pakistani community’s (ethnically based) organizations to articulate traditional civic themes in America—volunteerism, voting, minority rights—has permitted their entry into the political process. For example, since 9/11, highly public federal probes have yielded the arrest of small numbers of Pakistani men in the United States on terrorism charges. In
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1681
2005, 24-year-old Hamid Hayat and his father, Umar, an ice cream truck driver, were arrested on charges of funding and organizing a “terrorist cell” in the central California city of Lodi. A U.S.-born citizen, Hamid was alleged to have attended a terrorist training camp in Pakistan in 2003 and had returned to the United States supposedly intending to attack hospitals and large food stores. In its investigation of the Hayats, the FBI interviewed several members of the Pakistani community and raided homes in Lodi. The community is largely working class and numbered between 2,000 and 4,000, many of whom worked in the fruit-packing industry. Lodi, located about 40 miles south of Sacramento, is known for winemaking and fruit-packing, and the small Pakistani population dates from the 1920s. This makes it a much older community, but less affluent, than the upwardly mobile Pakistani population of the nearby metro areas of San Jose and San Francisco. Being agricultural and working class, Lodi lacked any immigrant or civil rights organizations to assist the Pakistanis when they felt under siege during the FBI investigation. National news coverage of the terrorism investigation in Lodi broke just as President George W. Bush was lobbying for the renewal of the USA Patriot Act amid growing criticism of government abuses of civil liberties. As it became apparent the FBI lacked material evidence linking Hamid with terrorism, government prosecutors reduced the charges against the Hayats to lying to federal investigators. The case against Hamid rested on the role played by another Pakistani man, Nasim Khan, who had infiltrated the Lodi community as a paid FBI informant. In taped conversations Khan could elicit Hamid’s verbal support for Islamic militants, thereby expressing dissent against the United States, but Hamid repeatedly rejected Khan’s insistence that he attend a “jihadi camp” while he was visiting Pakistan. The Hayats were brought to trial separately in 2006. Hamid was found guilty of making false statements to federal investigators and providing material support for terrorism. Terrorism charges against Hamid’s father, Umer, were dropped, and his trial on charges of lying to U.S. Customs ended in a hung jury. The Lodi case illustrates an important dimension of homeland security policy, one that has been adopted by law enforcement and security authorities. It is an example of preemptive detention of individuals for their expression of political opinion, charging them with crimes for the alleged intention of possible attacks, rather than tangible terrorist activity. The pattern is to use paid informants, often Muslim immigrant men, to infiltrate mosques and befriend other Muslim men. Then the informants provoke their targets to express their opinions in support of militant violence. This has placed young Muslim (often Arab and Pakistani) men at risk for their political views about U.S. policies in the Middle East and the war on terrorism. Another notable example of terrorism charges against a Pakistani American occurred in 2010. Dubbed the “Broadway Bomber,” a 30-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen named Faisal Shahzad was arrested for being behind the failed attempt, on May 1, 2010, to bomb Times Square in midtown Manhattan in New York City.
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Shahzad was taken into custody less than 54 hours after the car bomb was discovered, as he sat on a passenger airlines jet awaiting departure from the John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York to Dubai. In June 2010, Shahzad pleaded guilty to trying to detonate the bomb in Times Square and thus avoided a public trial. Allegedly he learned how to make bombs in Waziristan, Pakistan. In his courtroom statement at his sentencing, Shahzad said that he was frustrated by U.S. pressure on Pakistan to control militants along the border with Afghanistan. He said, “It’s a war. I am part of the answer to the U.S. terrorizing the Muslim nations and the Muslim people” (“Verbatim” 2010). Shahzad had come to the United States on a student visa in 1998 and earned a bachelor’s degree in computer science from the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut. Later he earned an MBA and worked for a financial company in Connecticut. In April 2009 Shahzad became a U.S. citizen.
The Second and Later Generations Approximately 25 percent of Pakistanis in the United States today were born in the United States. Muslim youth of the second generation form their identity from multiple sources of identification, including Pakistani heritage and kinship networks, American popular culture, and Islam. How the current generation of Pakistani Americans create and enact their identities will be influenced greatly by political and social conditions that put their multiple identities in tension. The effect of media coverage has sustained some barriers to Pakistani American assimilation. Anti-Muslim sentiment remained high in the United States after the events of 9/11, and Pakistanis have not been spared. Several prominent leaders, including the Reverends Franklin Graham, Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and Jerry Vines, the former president of the Southern Baptist Convention, became frequent commentators on prime time television shows denigrating Islam as inherently evil and the Prophet Muhammad as a terrorist. To some extent this powerful denigration molded public opinion, and a majority of Americans came to believe that Muslims are disproportionately prone to violence. In a USA Today/Gallup poll conducted on July 28–30, 2006, about 4 in 10 respondents favored requiring Muslims, including U.S. citizens, to carry special IDs as a means to protect Americans from another terrorist attack.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Pakistan The concerns the United States and Pakistan share in common relate to security; global terrorism and the war in Afghanistan are two issues that continue to affect diplomatic relations between the two nations. The Pakistani American Public
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Youth Profile A Gifted Athlete Surmounts Disabilities Atif Moon grew up in Torrance, California. Physical activity is a top priority for this young man. In 1990, he won his first 5k race at the age of five, just the beginning of his list of triumphs in competitive sports. A gifted athlete, sports have shaped Atif’s life. But Atif is no ordinary athlete. In 1985, he was born with neuroblastoma, a tumor on his spinal cord. The physicians told his parents he had no chance of surviving the cancer. Yet after three surgeries at the age of one month, Atif defied the odds. He was left paralyzed from the waist down and became wheelchair bound. Three more surgeries, at the ages of 13, 15, and 16, stabilized his spinal cord. Another surgery at the age of 24 was needed to correct a problem with the rod in his back. But none of this has prevented Atif from leading an active lifestyle. Atif began playing tennis tournaments in early childhood. He won his first major tournament in 1998 and since then has been ranked one of the top Junior Wheelchair Tennis players in the country. He is also a competitive swimmer. Atif is a second-generation Pakistani American. He visited his parents’ homeland when he was in the third grade. A gifted student, when Atif decided to go to college he was accepted at many universities, including the University of Southern California, the University of California Irvine, and the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA). But to begin his collegiate journey, Atif thought perhaps it would be best to stay at home and attend the local community college. Commuting would present a challenge. However, when he decided to go to UCLA, he discovered that living on his own was a great experience. Living in the dorms all four years of his undergraduate experience gave him the confidence and independence he wanted. Atif graduated in 2007 with a degree in business economics. During his sophomore year at UCLA Atif interned at FOX Sports, developing on-air marketing promotions. He later interned with the ice hockey franchise, the L.A. Kings, and with the Los Angeles professional soccer team, the Galaxy. In 2010 he volunteered with the International Special Olympics at Long Beach State, where he is enrolled in the masters program in sports management. Sports are not Atif’s only passion. While an undergraduate at UCLA, Atif was accepted in the UCLA internship program to be an intern in the White House. Serving in White House Office of Presidential Scheduling, Atif had the chance to work with President Bush’s scheduled events and handled the invitations the White House received. Though not initially interested in electoral politics, Atif found the experience opened new horizons for him, increasing his independence as he moved across the country to Washington, D.C. As a cofounder of the Center for Global Understanding (CFGU), a nonadvocacy nonreligious organization, Atif’s passion for public life has grown. His focus
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has been to encourage Muslim American youth to become involved in civic life and to observe and understand the process of democratic governance. His efforts are concentrated in securing scholarships for college students to intern in Washington, D.C. He says his own experience as a White House intern led him to try new things and to figure out how to take care of himself. And while he considers himself to be in a “double minority”—as a Muslim and a person with a physical disability—he doesn’t see himself as limited. People are accepting of who he is and, he says, they shouldn’t be afraid. By bringing people together to improve the lives of Muslim Americans, Atif hopes to encourage other Muslims to become engaged in public policy debates, not only about national security but also about poverty, health, and education. In 2009 Atif was named one of the 10 outstanding young Americans by the U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce.
Affairs Committee (PAKPAC) is a nonprofit lobbying organization working to advance and strengthen U.S.–Pakistani relations. According to this organization, issues of primary importance concern bilateral trade between the two nations, addressing the American corporate world’s outsourcing of information technology jobs to Pakistan, and Pakistan’s wish to increase imports of Pakistani products to the United States, particularly of rice, cotton, carpets, surgical equipment, and sporting goods. Since the tragic events of 9/11, PAKPAC has also prioritized the civil liberties and employment opportunities of Pakistani Americans. The dramatic increase in the laws and regulations associated with counterterrorism has adversely affected the civil rights and opportunities for Pakistani Americans.
Forecasts for the 21st Century Immigration from Pakistan will largely be shaped by the challenges presented by global terrorism. Concerns over homeland security have not slowed Pakistani immigration to the United States in the 21st century, contrary to what one might expect. In the first decade of the new century, the United States has admitted more Pakistani immigrants than ever. Pakistan now ranks as the 11th-largest source country of new immigrants, just behind Vietnam, the Philippines, Mexico, and South Korea. In the past 10 years it has consistently been the largest single source country for Muslim immigration to the United States. The largest obstacle to the assimilation of this population will have to do with U.S.–Pakistani diplomatic relations and the conduct of the war on terrorism. Americans in general are becoming less isolated and as a result are more familiar with Islam and Muslims. In many cases Americans are distinguishing between “good” peaceloving Muslims and “bad” terrorists. However, the tendency to react negatively to perceived security threats is not likely to change much in the future. Success in the
Appendix I: Migration Statistics | 1685
war in Afghanistan is increasingly measured by how well Pakistan contains the spread of militant Islam. That the United States was able to carry out a military action in May, 2011 (without Pakistan’s official knowledge), to kill the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, elevated distrust between the United States and Pakistan. Questions about Pakistan’s role and responsibility in harboring bin Laden frayed already fragile support in both countries for the agenda of cooperation that officials of both countries believe is necessary to end the war in Afghanistan.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 247 Number of immigrants admitted to the United States from Pakistan 1965–2009 (in five year intervals) Year
Pakistanis
1965–1969
2,704
1970–1974
11,228
1975–1979
17,282
1980–1984
24,405
1985–1989
31,495
1990–1994
57,923
1995–1999
61,850
2000–2004
66,256
2005–2009
87,110
TOTAL
360,253
Sources: U.S. INS (1969, 1971, 1979, 1982, 1988) and U.S. DHS (1996–2009).
Table 248 Legal permanent resident status granted to Pakistani nationals, 2000–2009
Year
Number of Pakistanis Obtaining Permanent Status
Pakistanis as percentage of Total of Permanent Status Granted
Rank
2000
14,504
1.75
16th
2001
16,393
1.55
18th
2002
13,694
1.25
17th
2003
9,415
1.35
15th
2004
12,086
1.25
19th
2005
14,926
1.30
20th
2006
17,418
1.40
17th
2007
13,492
1.30
18th
2008
19,719
1.80
11th
2009
21,555
1.90
11th
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2009. Table 3.
Table 249 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009; leading states of residence: Region/country: Pakistan
Total Arizona California Colorado
Total
Male
Female
21,555
10,796
10,759
120
55
65
2,812
1,441
1,371
76
33
43
Connecticut
360
192
168
Florida
637
307
330
Georgia
641
322
319
1,389
691
698
Maryland
825
417
408
Massachusetts
397
215
182
Michigan
573
286
287
Minnesota
146
81
65
Illinois
New Jersey
1,490
748
742
New York
4,798
2,387
2,411
North Carolina
368
185
183
Ohio
274
143
131
Pennsylvania
573
302
271
Texas
2,605
1,256
1,349
Virginia
1,514
736
778
Washington Other
181
89
92
1,776
910
866
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
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Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 250 Selected demographic statistics of Pakistanis in America, compared to U.S. general population Select Demographics of Pakistani Americans, U.S. Census 2009 American Community Survey
Pakistani American Population
Total U.S. Population
Total Pakistani American Population
333,064
307,006,556
Total Foreign-Born Pakistanis
225,674
Population Born Outside the U.S.,
225,674
38,517,234
Entered 2000 or later (percent)
38.20%
31.60%
Entered 1990 to 1999 (percent)
34.30%
27.90%
Entered before 1990 (percent)
29.40%
40.50%
Total population
333,064
307,006,556
Male
53.80%
49.30%
Female
46.20%
50.70%
Under 18 years
30.70%
24.30%
18 to 34 years
27%
23.50%
35 to 54 years
29.30%
28.10%
55 and above
12.90%
24.20%
30.7
36.8
141,449
16,846,396
96,617
21,670,837
126,756
268,489,322
Population 25 years and older
196,314
201,952,383
Less than high school
13.50%
14.70%
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
16.00%
28.50%
Some college or associate’s degree
17.50%
28.90%
Bachelor’s degree
29.30%
17.60%
Graduate or professional degree
23.70%
10.30%
Sex and Age
Median age (in years) Citizenship Foreign born, naturalized U.S. Citizen Foreign born, not a U.S. Citizen Native born U.S. Citizens Educational Attainment
Source: 2009 American Community Survey 1-year Estimates, U.S. Census Bureau; S0201. Selected Population Profile in the United States; Population Group: Pakistani alone or in any combination.
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1688 | Pakistani Immigrants Table 251 Occupational statistics of Pakistanis in America, compared to U.S. general population
2009 American Community Survey Total Pakistani American Population
Pakistani American Population
Total U.S. Population
333,064
307,006,556
138,191
140,602,470
44.5%
35.7%
7.2%
17.8%
Occupation Civilian employed population, 16 years and older Management, professional, and related occupations Service occupations
33.7%
25.2%
agricultural, fishing, forestry occupations
Sales and office occupations
0.2%
0.7%
construction and repair occupations
2.30%
8.7%
production, transportation, and materials moving occupations
12.0%
11.9%
138,191
140,602,470
Class of worker Civilian employed population, 16 years and older private wage and salaried worker
84.7%
78.6%
government workers
8%
14.8%
self-employed workers in self-owned (not incorporated) businesses
7.1%
6.4%
unpaid family workers
0.2%
0.1%
Male
72,006
61,985
Female
55,761
44,256
All families
13.4%
10.5%
Families with related children under 18 years
16.7%
16.6%
Female householder, with no husband present, family
26.1%
29.4%
35.8%
38.2%
Median earnings (in dollars), fulltime, year-round workers
Poverty Rates
with related children under 18 years
Source: 2009 American Community Survey 1-year Estimates, U.S. Census Bureau; S0201. Selected Population Profile in the United States; Population Group: Pakistani alone or in any combination.
Appendix III: Notable Pakistani Americans Mohammad Akhter is health commissioner of the District of Columbia and executive director, American Public Health Association. Saqib Ali was elected as a Democrat in 2006 as state representative to the Maryland state assembly. Ali’s career is often mentioned alongside that of U.S.
Appendix III: Notable Pakistani Americans | 1689
Representative Keith Ellison (D-MN) as a sign of increasing Muslim American political participation. Dr. M. Ali Chaudry was elected mayor of Basking Ridge, New Jersey, in 2001. Sabu Dagastir (1924–1963) played leading roles in motion pictures. He is best known for his work in the 1940s. His credits include Elephant Boy (1947); The Drum (1938); The Thief of Baghdad (1940); Jungle Book (1942); Black Narcissus (1947); The End of the River (1947); Sabu and the Magic Ring (1957); and A Tiger Walks (1964) (released posthumously). Although born in South India and arriving to the United States well before the partition in 1947, Sabu claimed Pakistan as his mother country. During World War II he enlisted in the U.S. Army Air Corps and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. The subject of a famous paternity suit (Dagastir v. Dagastir, 241 P. 2d 656 [Cal App. 1952]), Sabu was alleged to have had an affair that issued an infant daughter. The complaint was tried by a jury which returned a nine to three verdict in favor of Sabu; however, the verdict was reversed on appeal. Famous as “Sabu, the Elephant Boy,” this film actor is celebrated in popular song in folk singer John Prine’s “Sabu Visits the Twin Cities Alone.” Tariq Farid is owner and CEO of Edible Arrangements, Inc. Fazal Mohammed Khan, a business and community leader in northern California, arrived in the United States in the 1920s. He and his family became patrons of the early Pakistani community. Fazlur Rahman Khan, from what was then East Pakistan, arrived in the United States in 1952 to study engineering at the University of Illinois. He is best known for his engineering design of the John Hancock Tower (100 stories) and the Sears Tower (110 stories) in Chicago. Mohammad Asad Khan, born in 1940, is a geophysicist at the University of Hawaii. Shahid Khan, president of Flex-N-Gate, Inc., purchased the St. Louis Rams, an NFL franchise, in 2010. He is an engineering graduate of the University of Illinois. Eboo Patel, founder in 1998 of the Interfaith Youth Core, earned a doctorate in sociology from Oxford University. In 2009 President Obama appointed Patel to the Advisory Council of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships. Islamica Magazine named Patel one of the 10 young Muslim leaders shaping Islam in America. Haroon Saleem was elected mayor of Granite Falls, Washington, in 2009. Salam Shahidi (1933–1992) was a medical researcher in the Department of Health, New York City.
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Kamila Shamsie is an award-winning author of such books as Salt, Saffron, and Broken Verses. Hammad Siddiqi is an economist and social commentator. Shahzia Sikander, a 2006 recipient of a MacArthur Foundation “Genius” grant, creates murals, mixed-media installations, and performance art. She specializes in Pakistani, South Asian, and Persian miniature painting. Faran Haroon Tahir was born in 1963 in Los Angeles, where his parents studied acting at the University of California Los Angeles. Having grown up in Pakistan, Tahir returned to Hollywood in 1980 to act in blockbuster movies. His movie credits include Disney’s live action version of The Jungle Book (1994); Charlie Wilson’s War (2007); Iron Man (2008) (playing the villain Reza); and Star Trek (2009) (playing Starfleet captain Richard Robeau). Tahir has made guest appearances on many television shows, including Grey’s Anatomy (playing the character Isaac), The Practice, Alias, Family Law, Lost, The Agency, 24, NYPD Blue, West Wing, and others. Saghir Tahir (R-NH) was the first elected Muslim of the Republican Party. Tahir was elected to the New Hampshire State Assembly in November 2000 and has served four terms.
Glossary Hindi: The name given to a broad language group spoken in India, Pakistan, Fiji, Mauritius. and Suriname. It is the official language of the federal government of India and many states in India. Hindu: An adherent of Hinduism, a set of religious, philosophical, and cultural systems that originated in the Indian subcontinent. With more than a billion adherents, Hinduism is the third-largest world religion. Hinduism involves yogic contemplative traditions and a wide array of daily morality based on the notion of karma (the results or fruits of one’s deeds). Hindus divide their scriptures into two categories: sruti (that which is heard, divine in nature) and smrti (that which is remembered, authored by humans). The vast majority of Hindus live in India, and about 1.5 percent of Pakistan’s population is Hindu. Punjab: A province in Pakistan. It is the country’s most populous region, with about 56 percent of Pakistan’s population. To the east, it is bordered by the Indian province of Punjab. This region is the primary source of 19th- and 20th-century South Asian immigration to North America. The main languages are Saraiki and Punjabi and the provincial capital is Lahore. It is known as the “Land of the Five Rivers” (all tributaries of the Indus River).
References | 1691
Shi’ite: An adherent of Shi’i Islam, the second-largest denomination of Islam (second to Sunni Islam). Like Sunni Islam, Shi’i Islam is based on the teachings of the holy book, the Qur’an, and the traditions and sayings of the final prophet Muhammad. In contrast with Sunni, Shi’i Islam maintains that the family of the Prophet Muhammad and certain descendants have special religious and political authority over the community. The first of these leaders was Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Muhammad and the most important figure in Islam after the Prophet himself, according to Shi’ites. Roughly 15 percent of the world’s Muslim population is Shi’ite. Estimates of the Shi’ite population in Pakistan range from 10 to 30 percent of the total population, making it the second largest in the world, after Iran. Sikh: An adherent of Sikhism, a religion that originated in the 15th century in the greater Punjab region of the Indian subcontinent. The sikh is a disciple of the 10 gurus recognized in the religion. Sikhs are easily recognized by their turbans and sidearms. Men go by the name Singh (lion) and women by the name Kaur (princess). There are about 25 million Sikhs in the world, roughly 20,000 of which live in Pakistan. Sufi: An adherent of Sufism or tassawuf (Arabic), the mystical dimension of Islam. It involves a spiritual practice known as dhikr, in other words chanting the names of God as a means of pursuing a mystical union with God. Sufi orders have played a major role in the spread of Islam around the world. Sunni: An adherent of Sunni Islam, the largest denomination in Islam. The word Sunni is derived from sunna, meaning tradition. Sunni Muslims, constituting roughly 85 percent of the world’s Muslims, invest political and social authority in a series of caliphs after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, beginning with his father-in-law, Abu Bakr. In contrast, Shi’ites believe that Islam’s leader must share the Prophet’s bloodline, and instead of Abu Bakr, they recognize his son-in-law and cousin Ali as his legitimate successor. In Pakistan the majority of Muslims are Sunni. Zoroastrians: Also known as Parsees, a community who migrated to India in the 10th century to escape persecution in Iran. They are adherents of Zoroastrianism, also known as Mazdaism, a religion and philosophy based on teachings of the prophet Zoroaster. The central belief is that good and evil have distinct sources and that the one universal and transcendent God, Ahura Mazda, is all good and no evil originates with him. Most Zoroastrians live in India, although today there are small numbers in Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, and Hong Kong. References Biondi, Joann. 2008. “Sabeen Ali and Hashim Mian.” New York Times Late Edition, January 15, Society Section, 15.
1692 | Pakistani Immigrants Jensen, Joan M. 1988. Passage from India: Asian American Immigrants in North America. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Khan, Salim. 1984. “Pakistanis in the Western United States.” Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 5: 43–46. Leonard, Karen Isaksen. 1997. The South Asian Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Moore, Kathleen M. 1995. Al Mughtaribun: American Law and the Transformation of Muslim Life in the United States. Albany: State University of New York Press. “Verbatim.” 2010. Times International (Atlantic Edition) 176 (1): 16. [Online article; retrieved 7/14/10.] Academic Search Complete. EBSCO. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). 2009. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Further Reading Das Gupta, Morisha. 2005. “Of Hardship and Identity: The Impact of 9/11 on New York City Taxi Drivers.” In Wounded City: The Social Impact of 9/11, edited by Nancy Frazer, 208–42. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. This article, like the book of which it is a part, is about the long-term consequences of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on New York City residents. This piece relates personal stories of New York’s taxi cab drivers, offering a portrait of the heightened discrimination directed at the city’s South Asian Muslim population. Leonard, Karen Isaksen. 1997. The South Asian Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Presents background information on the history, culture, and politics of people who have immigrated to the United States from South Asian countries, including the challenges of acculturation from roughly 1900 to the 1990s, as well as the cultural traditions, family life, and controversies today. Malik, Iftikhar Haidar. 1989. Pakistanis in Michigan: A Study of Third Culture and Acculturation. New York: AMS Press. Presents information on heterogeneous cultural groups, lifestyles and adaptations to American life represented by decades of migration from Pakistan. Moore, Kathleen M. 1995. Al Mughtaribun: American Law and the Transformation of Muslim Life in the United States. Albany: State University of New York Press. Looks at the legal challenges faced by Muslim Arab and South Asian immigrants to the United States and African American Muslims in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Nadam, Adil. 2007. Portrait of a Giving Community: Philanthropy by the Pakistani-American Diaspora. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. This book analyzes nationwide data on the giving habits of Pakistani Americans. It provides the demography of Pakistani Americans and examines how this immigrant community manages its multiple identities through charity and volunteering.
Further Reading | 1693 Obama, Barack H. 2010. “Statement on Pakistan National Day.” Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents 1. [Online article; retrieved 6/26/10.] Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost. The president’s acknowledgement of the constructive role played by Pakistani Americans in American society. Pakistan American Business Association. [Online information; retrieved 6/26/10.] http:// www.pabausa.org. Web site serving the networking needs of entrepreneurs and promoting trade and investment opportunities in Pakistan and the United States. Pakistani American Public Affairs Committee. [Online information; retrieved 6/26/10.] http://www.pakpac.net. Web site of a nationwide nonprofit lobbying organization that advances U.S.–Pakistani relations and fosters greater political and civic engagement of Pakistani Americans. Pakistani American Leadership Center. [Online information; retrieved 6/26/10.] http:// www.pal-c.org. Web site representing the Pakistani American community to the U.S. government since 2004. Pew Research Center. 2007. “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” [Online article; retrieved 6/26/10.] http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans. pdf. This is a report analyzing public opinion data collected by a reputable research center about Muslim residents in the United States. Sirin, Selcuk R., and Michelle Fine. 2008. Muslim American Youth: Understanding Hyphenated Identities through Multiple Methods. New York: New York University Press. This collection of essays is about identity development among young Muslim persons after 9/11, providing accounts of marginalization and resistance. Williams, Raymond Brady. 1998. Religions of Immigrants from India and Pakistan: New Threads in the American Tapestry. New York: Cambridge University Press. This is a book about the adaptive and organizational patterns developed by Indian and Pakistani Americans and their influence on the changing face of American religion and culture.
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Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants by Randa Bassem Serhan
Introduction Palestinian immigrants have been migrating to the United States since the late 1880s. Like other Levantines, Syrians and Lebanese, the earliest immigrants assimilated with little resistance, and their descendents are often difficult to discern from the majority population. It was only after 1948 with the established of the State of Israel and the exile of Palestinians that the number of immigrants to the United States spiked. This trend was repeated in 1967 when the West Bank and Gaza were occupied by Israel. Jordanians have formed a newer migration group but are often difficult to distinguish from Palestinians, since many of the latter carry Jordanian passports. Together Palestinians and Jordanians constitute a recognizable, but relatively small segment of the Arab American population, in comparison to immigrants of Lebanese and Egyptian origin. While they share with other Arab Americans the higher levels of education, and geographic and occupational heterogeneity, they have distinctive group features. Most prominent among these are higher levels of marriage and retention of Arabic language into the second generation and beyond. The significance of this from a migration literature perspective is that it is a signal of greater intergenerational cohesion. The latter is exhibited in qualitative ways through the hennas and wedding ceremonies, where group cohesion is displayed through performance of the national identity, especially for Palestinians who tend to lace their weddings with Palestinian flags, scarves, and folkloric and resistance music. There was a time, especially shortly after 9/11, when the tensions between the two generations seemed to threaten the community’s sense of belonging across generational lines. However, through the various community events, family negotiations, and reaffirmations of Palestinian identity, the second generation was drawn back into the community, and the first generation came to appreciate the former’s desire to maintain their connections to their American identity. The dilemma of many immigrants between wanting to hold on to their place of origin and wanting to belong to their new home was resolved in the second generation as they created a space that allows them to be both Palestinian and American. It is noteworthy that the classic immigrant dilemma was exaggerated for Palestinian Americans because of the strong
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Chronology | 1697
U.S. support of Israel, the country that Palestinians blame for their exile. Palestinians, and to a lesser extent, Jordanians had to consciously and actively contend with the dichotomies of belonging. Ultimately, members of the second generation, born and raised in the United States, have craved out their own narratives and identities that accommodate both the Palestinian and American aspects of their identities with minimal compromise.
Chronology 1880s
“Syrians from Asia”—Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians travel to the United States as merchants, adventurers, and economic immigrants. They are predominantly Christian, no national identity.
1916
Sykes-Picot Agreement to divide the Arab countries between Russia, Britain, and France.
1917
Balfour Declaration by Lord Arthur Balfour of Britain promising a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
1921
Britain given mandate power over Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq by the League of Nations. Transjordan detached from Palestine to become Emirate of Transjordan. Mandate Palestine is ruled by Britain.
1923
League of Nations recognizes French Mandate over Syria (including Lebanon) that had been de facto in place since 1920.
1926
France expands to Lebanon Mountains to create Lebanon.
1936–1939
Peasant Revolt against the British colonial powers in response to increased Zionist presence in Mandate Palestine. Increase in migration of families to the United States from Mandate Palestine.
1946
Emirate of Transjordan is renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
1947–1949
Another spike in family migration to the United States from Mandate Palestine during the “war of independence” (Israel) and “Nakba/catastrophe” (Palestine).
1947
U.N. passes Resolution 181 to partition Palestine to create a Jewish state on 56.47 percent of the land and an Arab state on the remainder.
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1948
State of Israel is established on most of the land of Mandate Palestine, beyond that allocated by U.N. Resolution 181.
1948
750,000 Palestinians flee or are expelled from their homes and end up in refugee camps in neighboring Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.
1949
Armistice agreement between Israel, Jordan, and Egypt giving Jordan control over the West Bank and Egypt control over Gaza—Palestinians naturalized as Jordanians.
1948–1967
Limited immigration from the West Bank and to a lesser extent Gaza to Arab Gulf States and Latin and North America.
1967
Israel occupies the West Bank and Gaza and places them under military rule. Census conducted by the State of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza, only considering those present at the time of the census as residents of the territories. 350,000 new Palestinian refugees flee or are expelled to neighboring countries, including Jordan. Israel gains the support, moral and financial, of American Jews. The year 1967 was documented by numerous American Jewish scholars as the point in time when popular support for Israel was given by American Jews across the political spectrum; it was in the months leading up to the 1967 war when American Jews felt that there was a real threat to the existence of Israel and raised enough funds to supplement Israel militarily. West Bank Palestinians immigrate to the Americas to join single males already working there. Palestinian economic immigrants become exiles.
1987
First intifada or popular uprising by Palestinians in the West Bank against the Israeli occupation. For the first time American television networks show the conditions endured by Palestinians under occupation.
1991
First Gulf War leads to the expulsion of tens of thousands of Palestinians from the Arab Gulf. Palestinian and Jordanian economies are negatively affected. Palestinians and Jordanians (mainly of Palestinian origin) immigrate to the United States.
Background | 1699
1993
Oslo Accords are signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority under U.S. auspices toward the creation of an independent Palestinian state.
1994
Immigrants in the United States start relocating their families to the West Bank.
1996
First democratic election in the Palestinian Authority territories.
1998
Tension rises between Palestinians and Israeli forces, and immigrants begin returning to the United States.
2000–2005
Second intifada or popular uprising by Palestinians in the West Bank against the Israeli occupation, much bloodier and more costly than previous conflicts.
2003
Israel begins construction of “security fence/wall” along the Green Line and within the West Bank to block access of Palestinians to Israel.
2005
Israel pulls out of Gaza, while maintaining control over all its passageways: air, sea, and land borders for security purposes.
2006
Hamas (considered a terrorist organization by the United States) democratically wins control of the government in the Palestinian territories (second election).
2008–2009
Over 22 days from December 2008–January 2009 Israel bombards Gaza reportedly to fend off Palestinian rocket attacks and to destroy smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt.
2011
Ceasefire begun in 2009 ends between Israelis and Palestinians. Violence is reignited as rockets are launched from Gaza, and Israeli warplanes bomb Gaza.
Background Geography of Palestine and Jordan Palestine and Jordan have both experienced great changes in their boundaries and sovereignty over the past century. Both areas were under Ottoman rule until shortly after World War I, when the League of Nations granted Britain a mandate over Palestine (now Palestinian territories) and Transjordan (now Jordan) (Pappé 2004; Toukan 1994). Transjordan was deemed an independent emirate by the British powers in 1921 and gained sovereignty in 1946, when it was renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Mandate Palestine, on the other hand, was broken up into parts
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to establish the State of Israel in 1948, with the remaining land of the West Bank and Gaza going to Jordan and Egypt, respectively, under the Armistice Agreement of 1949 in cooperation with Israel. Jordan expanded west of the River Jordan to annex the West Bank under this agreement. Gaza came under the control of Egypt. In 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, reducing the territory of Jordan to 34,495 square miles (CIA Factbook 2010). Jordan shares borders with Israel and the West Bank. Israel occupied the territories without annexation, which became the Palestinian territories. Since 1967, the West Bank and Gaza have been cut off from one another, and Israeli settlements and roads have been built with in, reducing the areas open and claimable by Palestinians. By 2000, the Palestinian Authority had control over 18 percent of the West Bank and Gaza (Usher 2005). The West Bank and Gaza was divided into three enclaves, Jenin and Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron, and Gaza (Usher 2005). According to the CIA Factbook (2010) there are 400,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank alone, and the official geographic territory is 2,263 square miles between Israel and Jordan. Gaza lies between Israel and Egypt and has a total area of 139 square miles. Israel began building the “security fence/wall” in 2003 as a barrier between Israel and the West Bank. This construction further appropriated West Bank territory. Today, Jordan stands as a sovereign nation with fixed borders, and the West Bank and Gaza have increasingly restricted access to land.
History Much of Palestine and Jordan’s histories are intertwined with their geographies. Palestine and Jordan experienced foreign rule under the Ottoman Empire, followed by Britain until Jordan achieved its independence in 1946. Since its independence, Jordan has experienced relative calm and monarchical rule. Over 60 percent of the Jordanian population is of Palestinian descent (Masaad 2001). Immigration out of Jordan has been predominantly to the Arab Gulf for work and the United States for education. These immigrants are considered economic immigrants, leaving to gain a better living rather than to escape violence or unrest. Palestine (Mandate and territories) has been mired by unceasing conflict and violence, making documentation of its history a convoluted and oft-contested task. Accordingly, this segment will only cover the most prominent dates and events that affected migration. Until the end of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Syria and Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan were under Ottoman rule. Migration out of the Ottoman Empire was limited to adventurers and merchants, or those who had heard about the offerings of America through American missionaries in Jerusalem and Beirut. Shortly after the war, France and Britain divided the areas among themselves; France took control of Syria and Lebanon, and Britain took
Background | 1701
control of Palestine and Transjordan. Palestine was the only mandate not to have made the transition into a postcolonial state. Prior to assuming the mandate over Palestine, Britain’s Lord Arthur Balfour in 1917 promised that a Jewish homeland would be established in Palestine. This led to unrest among Palestinians, culminating in the Peasant Revolts of 1936–1939 (Swedenburg 1990). During these years, Palestinians experienced the first persecution-based migration. The next large flight or expulsion occurred during and after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. 750,000 Palestinians fled or were forced to leave their homes to become refugees in neighboring countries. Some of these individuals traveled from northern Mandate Palestine to the West Bank and Gaza, where they also became refugees. In 1949 an Armistice Agreement was signed between Israel and Jordan and Egypt, which gave control of the West Bank and Gaza to their neighboring Arab countries. Egypt administered Gaza and granted Palestinians Egyptian travel documents, but not passports (Beinin and Hajjar 2010). This has continued to make travel for Gazans extremely difficult and has limited their ability to send remittances from work abroad back to their families. The situation of West Bankers was less cumbersome, for they were allowed to travel east into Jordan for employment and education between 1949 and 1967. They were also issued Jordanian IDs, and many were naturalized as Jordanian citizens. After the occupation in 1967, Palestinians fleeing from the West Bank to Jordan were deemed refugees. In total, between 300,000 and 350,000 Palestinians became refugees in the aftermath of the 1967 Israeli occupation. The intifada, or popular uprising, interrupted the military rule in 1987 when Palestinian women and children went out into the streets. The latter started the process that resulted in the 1993 Oslo Accords, when the United States helped broker an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) to gradually give autonomy to the PA over the West Bank and Gaza. The interim government was intended to remain in control for five years before full transfer of powers was to be given to the PA (Beinin and Hajjar 2010). When this failed, tensions increased and in turn so did out-migration. In 2000 a second intifada broke out, albeit more violent and costly than the first. This once again propelled more Palestinians to find avenues out of the West Bank and to a lesser extent Gaza (their access was severely circumvented). While the intifada ended in 2005, the repercussions and Israeli military response continue today. The most significant of these measures was the building of the “security fence/wall” separating the West Bank from Israel. In the last four years, the West Bank and Gaza have come under greater military control, with the Hamas, the Islamic Movement, being voted into government by a majority vote. The state of Palestine is as far from realization as ever at this moment in history, with populations of the West Bank and Gaza experiencing further pauperization and in turn pressures to leave the territories to join family members elsewhere in the Arab Gulf and the Americas.
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Palestinian protesters, some with their faces covered in the traditional keffiyeh headdress, hurl rocks at Israeli Defense Forces soldiers, Nablus in the occupied West Bank, January 12, 1988. (AP/Wide World Photos)
Causes and Waves of Migration Most migration to the United States was from the Palestinian territories or by Jordanians of Palestinian descent. Jordanians largely traveled to the United States as students and professionals, often returning to their place of origin. Palestinians on the other hand had a long and protracted history of migration to the United States. As such, most of the section will be discussing Palestinian immigration. Following the path of other Arab American scholars, while also recognizing that there are Jordanian immigrants, it is presumed that most Jordanians are of Palestinian descent. The discussion of Jordanians will be subsumed under Palestinians. See Appendix I for summary of migration flows.
Early Migration Palestinians first began to arrive in the late 19th century. Their numbers were limited and they were mainly Christian traders from Ramallah and Jerusalem (Hitti 1924; Naff 1985; Orfalea 1988, 2006). They had learned about opportunities here through American Christian missionaries (Hitti 1924; Kayal and Kayal 1975; Younis 1995). At the time, all individuals were considered “Turkish from Asia” because
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1703
of Ottoman rule over the territory (Gualtieri 2009; Hooglund 1987; Naff 1985). Later, a separate Syrian category was established; however, it incorporated Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians (Younis 1995; Orfalea 2006). Most sources confer that the greater component of that early migration stemmed from Syria and Lebanon based on the city and towns of origin. Samir Khalaf, a Lebanese American sociologist, estimated that 80 percent of the first wave was from present-day Lebanon (1987). The majority was of peasant origin and worked in peddling upon arrival. Although New York and Boston were gateway cities for many, peddling took them in numerous directions (Aruri 1969; Kayal and Kayal 1975; Naff 1985; Younis 1995). This early migration of Christians from “Syria” was the bulk of Arab migration to the United States until the change in immigration laws in 1965 (Marvasti and McKinney 2004). It has been noted that 90 percent of the first wave was Christian, compared to the 70 percent Muslim since 1965 (Elkholy 1969). It is unremarkable that Arabs today are spread across the continent following the trends set by the earliest immigrants, albeit that New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, and California remain primary hubs of settlement.
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separatism There were two main types of immigrants at the time: young men looking to raise funds to return to their villages to get married, and families who were in pursuit of the American life of opportunity and freedom as described to them by American missionaries in the Levant. The former often returned when their goals were reached or to marry women from their villages. The families that moved to the United States did so with the intent of assimilating. Churches helped them integrate into their new surroundings and they were quick to anglicize their last names and immerse themselves in the local culture. By 1920, “Syrians” had won a legal case to ascertain their status as “white.” The second generation, born and raised in the United States, intermarried with other white Americans.
Second Wave of Migration Palestinian migration did not become a distinct entity until the late 1930s after the Peasant Revolts in Mandate Palestine (Al-Tahir 1952; Naff 1985). The Zionist movement had been gaining strength in the previous decades, and sharecrop tenants were being dispossessed of the land they lived on (Khalidi 1997). When violence broke out, migration rose between 1936 and 1939. This was followed by a lull before spiking in 1947–1948 when the Israeli war of independence, or AlNakba (“catastrophe” according to Palestinians) took place (Al-Tahir 1952; Cainkar 1988; Seikaly 1999). This latest migration flow was characteristically different
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from previous ones, which were mainly of young men looking for employment and a way to raise funds to improve their lot in their villages upon return. Young migrant men used to live in singles’ accommodations and did not belong to any particular community (Cainkar 1988). Small communities arose in the aftermath of 1948 when women and children began to arrive to join their male relatives. Also, more professionals, students, and people of different skills and socioeconomic statuses appeared in the post-1948 flow (Seikaly 1999). Although migration reportedly spiked during this period, the numbers remained in the thousands. Muslims and Christians were arriving in equal numbers (Marvasti and McKinney 2004; Seikaly 1999). It has been documented that with each migration, the newcomers were more politically conscious than those before them. Immigrants who arrived during Ottoman rule arrived with parochial identities, and the Christians among them quickly assimilated through church affiliations (Aruri 1969; Hagopian 1969; Kayal and Kayal 1975). Since World War I and the establishment of Mandate Palestine under British rule, Palestinian immigrants have arrived more politicized, with a national identity. Writings in each era claim that their era is when Palestinian migrants became politicized. Research on Palestinian Americans usually followed a fresh flow of migration or political developments in the Palestinian– Israeli conflict. These junctures used to be easier to pinpoint and discern prior to 1967. However, since Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip, there have been steady streams of migrants and political changes in the conflict, whether from possibilities for peace or increased violence.
Later Waves of Immigration Leading up to 1965 Immigrant Act The number of Palestinian Americans has grown steadily through childbirth and a continuous flow of new immigrants. The story of those who came to form the post1967 community followed a similar trajectory to those mentioned in the aftermath of the 1948 war. Namely, the small of number of men who lived in the United States prior to 1967 were economic migrants looking to earn enough money to return home to a better life. The Israeli occupation forbade them by law from returning as legal residents of the West Bank and made living conditions more difficult for those who remained. More women and children began appearing in New York and New Jersey, resulting in the emergence of a community. This pattern was repeated in other cities across the US. The differences between the 1948 and post-1967 migrations are predominantly numerical. During the 1940s and 1950s, U.S. immigration laws had quotas restricting the number of immigrants by national origin. Fewer Palestinians could make their way to the United States. Also, most of the population fleeing in 1948 became refugees in neighboring Arab countries. Conversely, the 1965 Immigration Act had abolished national origin quotas, making the United States one of the more
Demographic Profile | 1705
attractive immigrant destinations and more accessible to the post-1967 Palestinians (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Finally, many West Bank Palestinians wanted to avoid the predicament of those Palestinians who had become refugees in 1948, and they began to consider alternatives such as the United States for their families. The outcome was comparatively larger communities, albeit still small in relation to other ethnic groups.
Immigration Act of 1965 The Immigration Act of 1965 was passed just shortly before the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. By ignoring the circumstances in the Palestinian territories, one may assume Palestinians were like so many other immigrants looking for a better life in the United States, who benefited from the Immigration Act of 1965. The Act opened the gates to immigration, which had effectively been closed since 1924, to previously inadmissible people from all around the world. Notwithstanding that was the case for some or even many individuals, many Palestinian immigrants who began to arrive on the heels of the immigration reform were self-defined exiles (Cainkar 1988). The immigration law was timely and essential to the well-being of many villages in the West Bank that depended on remittances and sponsorship from relatives in the United States. One of the primary stipulations utilized by Palestinians to migrate to the United States was the “family reunification” clause. This meant that many of the newcomers could not speak English or lacked the credentials to integrate on their own, and as such came to depend on their families as much, if not more, than they did in their villages of origin. The significance of the 1965 Act was that it opened a steady stream of migration rather than a floodgate, as some conservative commentators cautioned about recent immigrants. Although the immigration reform removed country quotas imposed in 1924, it also kept the requirements for migrant applications demanding and inaccessible to many.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community Demographic data for Arab Americans is difficult to obtain, and even more so for Palestinian Americans. Like all Arab Americans, Palestinians are categorized as white on the census and often become invisible statistically against the white majority. Beyond that, Palestinians face additional identification obstacles, since they leave from numerous points of origin and arrive with one of numerous travel documents or identity cards issued to them from their countries of exile or last residence.
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U.S. Census 2000 data count the Palestinian population at just over 110,000 (since many Palestinians arrived with Jordanian passports this figure is the combination of both; see Cainkar 1988 for discussion of this point). This figure is roughly 10 percent of the Arab American population. According to the Arab American Institute, which uses Zogby Polls International and is designated the only Census Information Center to analyze Arab American data, the number of Arab Americans is triple the official figure at 3,500,000. The American Arab Institute (AAI) based its estimate on a statistical analysis of census data that underrepresented Arab Americans because of the aforementioned categorization issues. Although accurate enumeration of Arab Americans is unavailable, the Arab American Institute provides some overview of their residential distribution. The largest communities are found in California (20%), Illinois (10%), Florida (8%), Texas (8%), New York (7%), New Jersey (6%), Michigan (6%), and Virginia (4%), and the remaining 30 percent are dispersed across the United States (AAI 2006).
Age and Family Structure According to the 2000 Census, 63.9 percent of Palestinians and 66.9 percent of Jordanians were between the ages of 18 and 64. Palestinians and Jordanians were the most likely to be married of all Arab Americans at 66.1 percent and 67.2 percent, respectively (Brittingham and de la Cruz 2005). See Appendix II for further detail. After 1965, 70 percent of Arab immigration was Muslim, practically reversing the 90-percent Christian religion of immigrants of earlier eras. However, Christians remain the majority of Arabs, at 63 percent of the population (AAI 2003). This most likely is an accurate description of Lebanese Americans, which is the largest segment of the Arab American population at 39 percent (AAI 2003). Palestinian and Jordanian Americans are more recent arrivals and as such can be deduced to be mainly Muslim (the largest number arriving after 1965).
Socioeconomic Background and Education In terms of socioeconomic background and educational levels, Palestinian immigrants arriving after 1965 are a diverse population. Some came as students and professionals looking to further their education and pursue their careers, while others came to join family members already in the United States (Cainkar 1988; Seikaly 1999). While many in the first generation are independent store owners or contractors, the second generation has entered or attempted to enter all sorts of professions and fields of employment.
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1707
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Palestinians and Jordanians were the most likely to be married of all Arab Americans, at 66.1 percent and 67.2 percent, respectively (Brittingham and de la Cruz 2005). Studies in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and again in the 1980s, and also according to my own research after 2001, Palestinians have their families as their references and the setters of standards rather than society at large. An eminent component of the stress on family has been the loss of the homeland and prejudice experienced in their new context. The threats these pose to the Palestinian identity is arguably the reason they withdraw into their family structures. In particular, Palestinian women are entrusted with raising Palestinian children and preserving Palestinian values and customs (Cainkar 1988).
Wedding Videos Wedding video watching is a phenomenon in itself among Palestinian Americans. All weddings are videotaped and edited for community viewing. Wedding videos take up to 10 months after the wedding to be produced and distributed to family members in various parts of the United States and sent back to the West Bank. People not only watch the wedding videos of their closest relatives, but also of distant relatives, and at times people they are only tangentially connected to in the community. Individuals of all ages watch these videos, from toddlers to the elderly, both men and women. Often wedding videos are watched in groups with multiple generations, but seldom are they watched in a scheduled pattern. Beyond the first viewing of a new wedding video, watching them is impromptu and at times serves as background entertainment while individuals are doing other tasks. The videos have been described as being more important than the actual weddings. To make sense of this, one has to look beyond the wedding celebrations. The significance of the video watching to various Palestinian American communities around the United States lies in their geographic dispersion and their relationship to Palestine, especially in the American-born generations. In the first instance, many of post-1965 immigrants came from villages in the West Bank and as such were accustomed to face-to-face interactions with their covillagers and extended families. Moving to the United States and living where they work left Palestinian Americans disconnected from one another in most of their everyday interactions at work and in their neighborhoods. Palestinian Americans have never been numerically significant enough to establish ethnic enclaves like many other ethnic minorities. Their residential areas are vastly diverse, and in turn maintaining connections to the community and its values and
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norms takes a great deal of effort and time on the part of the members of the different Palestinian American communities. In this lies the essence of the wedding videos—they allow relatives to see one another and be aware of how each is related. They are a substitute for the face-to-face interactions so prevalent in smaller societies. Videos allow for comparisons in terms of wealth (the amount of gold women wear), for updates on people’s personal status (who got married/ divorced/had children), and for generating gossip that allows people to feel they have knowledge and some influence over one another. For the adolescent generation, videos offer yet another incentive for attending weddings and watching them; namely that they get to be seen and see potential spouses and boyfriends/girlfriends. In the privacy of their living rooms, young men and women get together with their cohorts to scrutinize the videos or to “check out the hot girls/guys.” This may seem odd, until one realizes that this community is largely endogamous, advocating and expecting marriages between Palestinians. One final aspect of the video is that they become documentation of Palestinian Americans’ lives. The weddings have a strong Palestinian theme, with Palestinian music, flags, and scarves. They are also happy occasions when the community members are not working or otherwise occupied and can enjoy being together. This image and sentiment is preserved in the wedding videos. In the present, they allow Palestinian Americans to escape the worries of their everyday lives. In the future, they are said to teach the coming generations about what it really means to be Palestinian.
One of the most important rituals in Palestinian American communities is the wedding. Whether Christians in Florida or Muslims in New Jersey, Palestinians from the West Bank city of Ramallah and its suburbs carry out elaborate “Palestinian weddings,” complete with Henna Nights and Palestinian embroidered dresses for the bride. The Henna Night, which was once a private affair for the bride and her closest female relatives and friends to decorate her body with herbal dye, has been transformed into a community event at a wedding hall. The herbal dye is seldom used and becomes merely symbolic against the backdrop of a wedding that is not called a wedding because the bride is not wearing white. However, after the henna ceremony, there is a “second” wedding party where the bride wears a white wedding dress (Serhan 2008). Families continue to help each other and newcomers financially, regardless of the duration of their tenure in the United States. There is a sense of obligation to help others from their extended families or villages of origin (Serhan 2008). Funerals are significant in bringing community members together, but they do not assume the prominence accorded them in other ethnicities. When families can afford to, the
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1709
A Palestinian wedding circle. (Courtesy of Randa Serhan)
body of a relative is shipped back to the West Bank for burial. This applies only to the most recent immigrants and those who were born in the West Bank.
Changing Gender Roles The first generation after the change in immigration laws in the United States tended to marry outside of the community. Many married Latina women (Serhan 2009). However, as the community grew, the younger generation could find suitable Palestinian partners in the United States. Many young men reject the notion of returning to their ancestral village to find a spouse, as had been customary until recently. Young men began to want a partner rather than someone who was completely dependent on them (Serhan 2009). Young women were considerably more likely to complete their education, defer marriage, and reduce the number of children they had. Nonetheless, it is important not to overstress this point, since many Palestinian and Jordanian Americans still prefer first-cousin marriages and expect women to raise the children and preserve their culture of origin.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity The year 1987 was pivotal for Palestinian Americans, because the first intifada was covered in the American media as a popular movement rather than the usual coverage
1710 | Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants
of Palestinians as violent or terrorists. Christian and Muslim Palestinians alike were proud to finally be able to claim their heritage publicly (Kifner 1988). Since then, the younger generation has had more opportunity to express its ethnic pride like other minorities in the United States, albeit with some restrictions in terms of the Palestinian flag and kuffiya (black and white scarf ). After the signing of the Oslo Accords, some West Bank families relocated to their villages of origin, leaving the head of the household in the United States (Serhan 2009). Parents saw this as an opportunity for their American-born children to reconnect with their heritage. Others take their children every two or three years to visit their villages. These trips, along with a steady stream of relatives moving to the United States, have kept most Palestinian Americans attached to their heritage and political awareness of the Israeli occupation. Christian Palestinians arrived in the earlier waves and blended in with their surroundings. Later, Muslim Palestinians arrived, but to a new environment that was less than welcoming to them as Palestinians and most recently as Muslims. Nonetheless, both groups extol their connections to Palestine despite having little contact with each other.
Language Palestinian Americans have the highest rates of Arabic language retention, while speaking English very well. The census question on speaking a language other than English fluently at the same time as speaking English very well showed that Palestinians, in comparison to Arabs and the general American population, had the highest rates of bilingualism. The percentages for each group were as follows: Palestinians 61.2 percent, Arabs 44.4, and the general American population 9.8 percent (Brittingham and de la Cruz 2005). In other words, Palestinian Americans have learned English in the second generation without complications and without losing their parents’ mother tongue.
Celebrations of National Holidays Palestine does not have an independence day or other national holiday. In some instances, weddings become a surrogate for national holidays, being filled with Palestinian nationalistic songs, flags, and traditional dresses (Serhan 2008). Fundraisers for aid to the West Bank and Gaza often become celebrations of the communities’ connections to the homeland and their ability to contribute to its survival and betterment. Christians and Muslims respectively celebrate Christmas and Eid el-Adha among family to reaffirm their connections to one another. They also celebrate the Fourth of July and Thanksgiving like other Americans. Also, like other ethnic groups, they tend to mix Palestinian dishes with turkey on Thanksgiving (Gans 1979).
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1711
Ramadan Most of the Palestinian newcomers to the United States are Muslim, and like other Muslims Ramadan is an important month for them. The level of religious practice and adherence throughout the year varies greatly among Palestinian American communities, but Ramadan is observed diligently by most. Ramadan is the holy month in Islam when one of the five pillars of Islam is practiced: fasting. Muslims fast for the entire month by refraining from food and water from sunrise to sunset. This is more difficult to practice in non-Muslim countries, because the days are generally longer (especially in the summer) and work and school duties do not change. In countries with large Muslim populations, work and school days are shortened, and public consumption of food and drink is generally frowned upon. However, this does not seem to deter many. Although fasting is difficult for all these reasons, Palestinian Americans look forward to Ramadan. During Ramadan, the visits between families are more frequent; the outings for young people are later even on school and work nights; and the general mood is festive. During the day, people text and call each other to commiserate, but once the food is served, people become more vibrant. Some play cards, some smoke hookahs, some sit aside and catch up on each other’s news. This scenario is repeated throughout Ramadan in different homes every night. This is the busiest social time of year for Palestinian Americans, besides the summer months when weddings take place. Another highlight in recent years during Ramadan are the Arab and Turkish (dubbed in Arabic) soap operas that are shown throughout the month. Some of the most popular have been those that deal with the Palestinian 1948 exile from Palestine and the years leading up to it. The different generations watched this together, the older to help explain the events, and the younger to learn about a history far removed from them. Two other popular soap operas were a Syrian series about a poor neighborhood in Damascus and another about a modernizing village in Turkey. Other shows had varying interest among the different generations, but these three themed series seemed to be the most popular in 2008–2009, and young people were including information about them on their Facebook status updates. New seasons or similarly themed shows continue to capture their imaginations and attention. Eid al-Adha, which directly follows Ramadan, is less festive in the United States than in Muslim-dominant countries. The younger generations appreciate the monetary gifts they receive but generally find it a boring holiday. In the Arab countries, this Eid is festive and is felt in the streets, where the shops are buzzing with customers and everyone is dressed in their holiday clothes. In the United States, it is another school or workday (unless it falls on a weekend) with no one but the “grandparents” to celebrate it with. As with other communities before them, this largely Muslim community is finding it hard to compete with Christmas (Gans 1994). The Jewish community, according to sociologist
1712 | Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants
Herbert Gans, responded to the “threat/competition” of Christmas by elevating Hanukah to a major celebration that was child-centered. While Eid al-Adha is child-centered, it does not have the grandeur of Christmas in the United States since there are no carnivals or special events/cards/entertainment to mark its distinctiveness. In other words, without commercialization, this Muslim holiday pales against others in its surroundings.
Food, Music, Arts, and Entertainment Food, music, arts, and entertainment constitute an amalgamation of Palestinian, Arabic, and American products. Palestinian dishes are often made at home, with families having one or two staple dishes representing the region they originate from in Palestine. Throughout the weekdays, fast food, meal ideas taken from the food network, and sandwiches are commonly consumed. Eating out ranges from Sushi and Italian, to diners and large restaurant chains. Recently, “hookah” (nargileh, water pipes) bars have become popular in many cities in the United States and in turn have become parent-condoned entertainment for the younger generation. Hookah bars allow young community members to stay out late and socialize without feeling they are defying their parents. Among the young, hip-hop and rock music are as familiar and popular as Arabic music. Individuals bring new Arabic music back from their summer travels, and local grocery stores sell Arabic DVDs and CDs at low prices. For immigrants from the West Bank, wedding music is tinged with longing for a lost homeland and political aspirations for return, and it is listened to in cars and homes (Serhan 2008). The advent of satellite television has made Arabic news and entertainment possible in most households, especially those of immigrants who arrived after 1965. Al-Jazeera is the most popular channel for news, and MBC for Syrian and Turkish soap operas dubbed in Arabic. Many stay-at-home moms watch American soap operas in the morning and Turkish-dubbed soap operas in the evening. Recently, the latter are preferred because they are “culturally” more applicable and relevant to the Palestinian community. Palestinians share these trends to a large extent with most recent immigrants in what sociologist Herbert Gans (1979) has termed “symbolic ethnicity.” Immigrants tend to maintain and nurture aspects of their culture that give them a sense of belonging without jeopardizing their daily livelihoods. This phenomenon has become even more pronounced since the 1964 Civil Rights Bill and the 1965 Immigration Act, which allowed for celebration of identity politics/ethnic pride and a flow of new immigrants from one’s place of origin (Alba and Nee 1997, 2003; Brubaker 2001; Glazer 2004; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Steinberg 2001).
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1713
Hip-Hop Many American adolescents listen to hip-hop music as a form of expression of their youthful rebellion (Quinn 1996). Most album sales are to white suburban teens (Watkins 2005). A large segment of the Palestinian American young population are fans of hip-hop. However, rather than to express rebellion against their suburban parents, they feel it speaks to their angst at the injustice of the Palestinian political predicament. They liken the police surveillance and brutality described in hip-hop lyrics to the Palestinian relationship with Israeli military forces. When rappers sing about a denied history, Palestinian Americans connect it to Palestine’s mired history and struggle for recognition. In turn, they believe that only black Americans can really understand the ways Palestinians have been dismissed historically. Hip-hop is so central to many that it is played in cars along with Palestinian wedding music. CDs are mixed to include hip-hop and Palestinian wedding music, whose lyrics are often also about longing for a lost past, and the struggle to reclaim a land and identity that was lost. In one telling statement from a Lebanese person who grew up and went to school with Palestinians, she said, “Other people like rap, Palestinians love it. I have never met a Palestinian who doesn’t like hip-hop.” While she does not speak for all Palestinians, her observation has credence for a large segment of the younger population. However, all hip-hop is not equal. The favored hip-hop artists are regional according to where Palestinian Americans live in the United States. The regionalism of the music has less to do with being Palestinian and more to do with being American. Those on the West Coast listen to West Coast rap, and the same goes for the East Coast. As rap in recent years has become more popularized in the South and Midwest, the music is becoming even more localized. Palestinian Americans take pride in their surroundings and are committed to the rappers that were born close to home.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths to Citizenship Palestinians have been said to be the most likely of their Arab counterparts to naturalize. This is corroborated by U.S. Census data from 2000, where those foreign-born and naturalized are twice the number of foreign-born without citizenship (36.9% to 18.1%) (Brittingham and de la Cruz 2005). This is not the case for any other Arab group; for instance Moroccans are 21.9 percent foreign-born and naturalized vs. 44.2 percent foreign-born without citizenship, and Syrians are 22 percent naturalized and 18.1 percent without citizenship (Brittingham and de la Cruz 2005).
1714 | Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants
As noted earlier, Palestinians enter the United States with a myriad of documents and passports, many of which have been imposed on them. This, along with their precarious relationship to their ancestral home, compels most to pursue American citizenship as quickly as possible.
Intergroup Relations Palestinians and Jordanians generally have good relations with their surroundings, which can vary from predominantly white native-born, to black, Latino, or Arab enclaves. However, when it comes to marriage, the trends have changed from the first generation to the second generation. One might expect more out-marriage in the second generation, but the opposite has proven to be true. The first generation was more likely to marry non-Palestinians and the second to marry within the group. The explanation for this offered by various communities is that the first generation had little choice in partners and wanted to secure their citizenship, whereas native-born Palestinian Americans were Americans by birth and had more choice in spouses given the growth of their communities (Serhan 2009). It is unclear how long this trend will last, since in 1952, a similar phenomenon was noted among second-generation Palestinians in Chicago (Al-Tahir 1952).
Forging a New American Political Identity In 1952 Abdul Jalil al-Tahir found that the first generation considered the United States a “purgatory of labor” where they awaited return to their homeland (189). In 1988 Louise Cainkar came to a similar conclusion based on qualitative research among Palestinian women living in Chicago, that first-generation Palestinians felt little connection to their new homeland. She asserted, “Palestinians feel they are involuntary emigrants. . . . For although their bodies are here, their minds and spirits are in Palestine” (18). In the early 2000s, first-generation Palestinians continued to use the mind/body split, whereby they were only physically present in the United States but their thoughts and emotions remained in their villages (Serhan 2009). The second generation was unwilling or unable to accept this dichotomy between being Palestinian and American. Rather than have to accept the distinctions made by their parents and society at large, second-generation Palestinians embraced both political identities. There was a sense of pride in both aspects of their identities, albeit with the exception of rejecting and distancing themselves from American foreign policy. The second generation seemed to benefit from the contradictions and paved their own space that allowed them to be American in their achievements and success and Palestinian in their aspirations for a nation-state and close family relationships.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1715
A multigenerational demonstration against Israeli aggression on Gaza, 2008. (Courtesy of Randa Serhan)
Palestinian Americans vote and engage in local politics, as well as fundraise and demonstrate for the West Bank and Gaza. In national politics, they vote in consultation with their families and communities. In the last elections, Barack Obama was favored because of his immigrant background. For the younger generation, he was also popular because he was black, which some felt would enable him to identify with the prejudice and discrimination against Palestinians domestically and in the Middle East. As far as their politics in relation to the West Bank and Gaza are concerned, most of their organizing is in the form of contributing to the basic needs of Palestinians in the occupied territories, and advocacy. Advocacy takes many forms, but the most common have been street protests and using Facebook to disseminate news about the region. The youngest generation is most active on Facebook, which they rely on for news, links, and direct connections with distant relatives living in the West Bank and Gaza. More popular than political organizing is community organizing for social welfare. One of the first such associations that many have come to model was the Children of Beituniya Society in Chicago, formed at the turn of the 20th century (al-Tahir 1952). The purpose of this association was to assist newcomers in integrating into American society by providing them with small loans, raising funds to develop their villages, and finally acting as a social organizer to bring people together. Presently, almost every community has such an association that represents their village of origin. Some have annual dues of $40 and others raise hundreds of thousands per year to assist the destitute in the West Bank. The largest of these associations with the longest history is
1716 | Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants
the American Federation of Ramallah, which has local chapters in Florida, California, Michigan, and other states where there are Ramallah communities (see http://www. afrp.org/ for further information). This association is Christian, yet is undifferentiated in its mission and its commitment to the West Bank. In fact, it has come to represent an organizational success to be emulated by more nascent associations.
The Second and Later Generations The second generation had been successful in defining a space and identity for themselves whereby they could identify as Palestinians without forgoing being American and vice versa. For most second-generation immigrants, there is a tension growing up, but the dichotomy is not as severe as that for Palestinian Americans. Whereas most immigrants who arrived after the Immigration Act of 1965 were also able to benefit from the newly minted Civil Rights Act by participating in ethnic pride and learning about their heritage in the classroom, Palestinian heritage was associated with terrorism in the popular imagination and media in the United States, and school maps and history books excluded Palestine from any mention. The American media sided categorically with Israel against the Arabs and Palestinians after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, according to much scholarship on Arab Americans (Abraham and Abraham 1981; Abraham 1994; de Boer 1983; Hagopian 1976; Shaheen 1984; Stockton 1994; Suleiman 1994, 1999; Trice 1978). The latter were depicted as terrorists (Shaheen 1984; Stockton 1994). Despite these obstacles and at times suspicion, if not outright rejection, second-generation Palestinians were still permitted to express some pride and to partake in everyday social and educational life. They did not need to reject their American identity, because most of the bias against them was not experienced at the interpersonal level. The same cannot be said of the third generation, which has grown up in the shadow of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Since 9/11, the threats and discrimination have become more personalized and evident in people’s everyday surroundings. This has begun to negatively impact the third generation as they contend with the Palestinian and now Muslim issues. In terms of the Palestinian issue, the reasoning as always has been that there is a strong pro-Zionist contingent in the United States. However, prejudice arising against the more generalized label of Muslim takes it beyond national struggle to the rejection of people’s faith regardless of their practice. It is not uncommon to hear the third generation state that they are not the ones who are “anti-American,” but rather that America is anti-them. It remains to be seen how this upcoming generation deals with such rejection, especially since their parents were native born as well. It is unclear if they can make the accommodations the second generation made, or whether they will come closer to having to choose between their ethnic heritage and their country of birth.
The Second and Later Generations | 1717
Youth Profile Hoping for a Career in Basketball Broadcasting Nadia Laith was born in Chicago to parents who had migrated from the West Bank shortly after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. Nadia’s father was in Panama as an economic migrant when the occupation occurred. Since he was abroad, he was excluded from the Israeli census and thus needed a travel permit to return to his village. After several years, Nadia’s mother was brought to the United States through her sister, and she sponsored her husband. Neither parent was educated, but they were hardworking and opened up a grocery store. Nadia’s father worked 12-hour days and only saw his six children at nights before they went to bed. Nadia was the fourth child of six, but as a child she made her presence known. Her three older siblings were in a rush to finish high school and work. Soon thereafter, they met their spouses and settled into family life. Nadia had different ideas. She had a thirst for knowledge and for life; she believed there was more to life than a comfortable living. Being close to one of her brothers, she had learned to love basketball. She was an avid fan, and a tough talker during games. She always said her dream was to work for the NBA. No one really took her seriously, but her parents supported her plans for college. Once out of college, Nadia had only her resolve to rely on. She looked for a job quietly without involving her family and friends. She was offered a position with a publisher, which she excelled at because of her outgoing attitude. She still loved basketball, and when she heard from an acquaintance that the WNBA needed someone to fill in for an employee for a weekend, she jumped at the chance. Nadia’s responsibilities were to watch the monitors when the technicians were busy or away from the screens. However, her knowledge and passion for basketball caught the attention of one of the decision makers at the WNBA and she was asked to be on standby for when other employees were absent. Within a few months, Nadia went from a fill-in to an editor of the live broadcast. Although this meant giving up her weekends, Nadia took the position and stuck with it. She still aims to reach the NBA, and with her attitude, she might actually succeed. Nadia’s character was her motivation to go beyond her siblings. However, equally important is that her parents supported her throughout the process. They may have not understood her dreams or fully appreciated her education (beyond being proud on faith), yet they supported her financially and admired her resolve.
1718 | Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants
Director of the Arab American Association of New York, Linda Sarsour advises a Jordanian American woman in Brooklyn on December 4, 2009. Born in Brooklyn and of Palestinian decent, Sarsour has been active in community work since the September 11, 2001, attacks brought concern and insecurity about ethnic discrimination against Arab Americans. (Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images)
Issues in Relations between the United States and Palestine/Jordan The United States has been actively involved in Palestinian politics since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. At the international level, the United States was using its veto power in the Security Council in favor of Israel and replaced France as Israel’s main supplier of arms (Barringer 2003; Stork 1974; Trice 1978). It has also been involved in or led every peace initiative between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but many scholars purport that the United States has not been impartial (Aruri 2003; Usher 2005). Most Palestinian Americans are weary of American foreign policies in the Middle East, yet recognize and reiterate that it is only the U.S. government that can help resolve the Palestinian predicament. Their counterparts in the Palestinian territories also feel that their fate will be determined by the United States for better or for worse.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 252 Palestinian migration to the United States Period of Migration
Categorization
Places of Origin
Type of Migration
Population Size
1899–1919
Syrians prior to 1899: “Ottomans,” “Turks,” “Arabs”
Jerusalem, Ramallah (Palestine), Tripoli, Zahli (Lebanon) Damascus (Syria)
Economic, mainly Christian families. Most from Lebanon and Syria. Palestinian migration, single men
89,971 (entered the United States) (Hitti 1924)
1922
Palestine: Category dropped in 1957
Acre, Jerusalem, Ramallah, and villages in between
Economic, some came through Latin America. Single men
Unclear. Quota was set at 56 (Cainkar 1988)
1936–1939
Palestine
Acre, Jerusalem, Ramallah, and villages in between
Unrest in Mandate Palestine, resistance against Zionist movement
250/year (Naff 1985) ~2,000/year (Al-Tahir 1952; Cainkar 1988; Naff 1985)a
1947–1949
Palestine, Israel, Jordan
Acre, Jerusalem, Ramallah, and villages in between
Women and children joining male relatives, 1948 war
Unknown, noted in numerous sources (Al-Tahir 1952; Cainkar 1988; Naff 1985)a
1954–1958
Palestine, Israel, Jordan. Palestinian Refugees admitted under Refugee Act of 1953
Acre, Jerusalem, Ramallah, and villages in between
Refugee
1,939 (Cainkar 1988)
1967–Present
Israel, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, other passports
Ramallah, Jerusalem, villages in between, refugees in other Arab countries
Legally: Economic, students, family reunification, professional
Unknown. Total estimate of Arab Americans of Palestinian descent: 110,00–350,000b
a 1936–1939 estimates based on Syrian and Palestinian migration to the United States, where al-Tahir claims Syrian migration was in reverse at the time and Palestinian migration accounted for most of the new immigrants. b U.S. Census 2000 and Arab-American Institute (official center for analyzing Arab American Census data).
Table 253 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and Country of Birth Total Jordan
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
3,900
4,572
3,964
2,927
3,431
3,748
4,038
3,917
3,936
4,282
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics | 1721 Table 254 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence: Palestine Total
Male
Female
4,282
2,278
2,004
53
30
23
California
625
314
311
Colorado
27
13
14
Connecticut
36
21
15
212
125
87
Total Arizona
Florida Georgia Illinois Maryland Massachusetts
56
30
26
560
306
254
53
30
23
40
25
15
238
124
114
Minnesota
40
23
17
New Jersey
238
131
107
New York
355
181
174
North Carolina
140
84
56
Ohio
294
156
138
86
41
45
Texas
370
185
185
Virginia
126
67
59
49
20
29
684
372
312
Michigan
Pennsylvania
Washington Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Limitations of U.S. Census Data There are two additional reasons, besides the counting of Arabs as “white” in the Census and not asking about ancestry until 2000, for the undercounting of Arab Americans and Palestinians in particular. In the first instance, the methodology employed by the U.S. Census in 2000 was to add the ancestry question to the long form of the census. With such a small population to begin with, which is so widely dispersed, the sample was too small to be representative. In the second instance, many Palestinians carry Jordanian passports and may be inclined to list themselves as Jordanian. Even more
1722 | Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants Table 255 Census 2000—Palestinian Americans vs. U.S. Population Indicator
Total Population Arab Ancestry Palestinian Ancestry
Language English only at home
82.1
31.3
14.8
9.8
44.4
61.2
Never married
27.1
26.7
25.1
Married
54.4
60.6
66.1
Married
52.5
59.8
70.8
Non-family
31.5
28.4
18.4
Separated, Widowed, Divorced
18.5
12.7
8.7
High school
80.4
84.0
81.6
BA and higher
24.4
41.2
37.9
Males
70.7
73.3
77.0
Females
57.5
45.5
39.4
Management, Profession
33.6
42.0
41.6
Services
14.9
11.7
9.2
Sales
26.7
30.2
35.9
Other language, but “very well” in English Marital Status > 15
Household
Education
Employment
Occupation
Source: Brittingham, A., and G. de la Cruz. 2005. “We the People of Arab Ancestry.” Census Special Reports.
important is the suspicion of self-identification on government forms. Given the history of Palestinians prior to immigration to the United States and the lukewarm reception they received upon arrival, many have been distrustful of self-disclosure for fear of being singled out and persecuted at some point (AAI 2006). The U.S. Census actively worked toward overcoming these shortcomings in the 2010 census. One of their primary targets is adequately counting Arab American communities because of the inadequacy of statistics in the past. The Census Bureau throughout 2009 actively recruited census takers from within predominantly Arab communities across the nation.
Appendix III: Notable Palestinian Americans Mohammed Abu-Ghazaleh has been chair and CEO of Del Monte Fresh Produce since 1996. He started out by importing to Kuwait from Africa in 1971. IN 1996, he purchased Del Monte Fresh Produce from the Mexican
Glossary | 1723
government for $435 million. Del Monte is the largest fresh fruit company in the world, with over $3.8 billion dollars in sales. Abu-Ghazaleh was born in Jerusalem, Palestine. Rashid Khalidi is a Palestinian American intellectual and university professor of history and the modern Middle East at Columbia University. He has written a book on the Palestinian identity by that name, and another about the U.S. involvement in the Middle East since World War II, and is one of the earliest proponents of the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He served as the advisor to the Palestinian delegation between 1991 and 1993 at both the Madrid and the Washington Arab-Israeli talks. His most recent book, published in 2009, is Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East. Khalidi was born in New York City. Kathy Najimy, actress, writer, director, and AIDS activist, had a lead role in the television sitcom Veronica’s Closet as Olive Massery and was the voice of Peggy Hill on the King of the Hill television series. Najimy was born in San Diego, California. Edward Said was a Palestinian American intellectual and university professor of comparative literature at Columbia University before his passing in 2003. Said was known for his literary criticism, and his active participation in the Palestinian struggle as a writer and an advisor to the Palestinian Authority until the signing of the Oslo Accords. His most notably work was Orientalism, published in 1978, which revolutionized postcolonial thought and theory. Said was born in Jerusalem, Mandate Palestine. Simon Shaheen is a musician and composer, renowned for his infusion of traditional Arabic music with jazz. He is a master ‘oud player. He has played at Carnegie Hall, Kennedy Center, Cairo’s Opera House, Theatre de la Ville in Beirut, and Belgium’s Le Palais des Arts. Shaheen was born in Tarshiha, Akka, in Mandate Palestine. Abdelmajeed Shoman is founder of the Arab Bank. After immigrating to the United States with only a few dollars in his pockets, Shoman worked as a peddler selling wares before he saved enough money to return to Palestine to establish the Arab Bank. The bank was established with seven investors in 1930. Its greatest success came on the heels of the fall of Mandate Palestine, since Shoman guaranteed his clients their moneys in full. The Haifa branch was relocated to Beirut in 1948. Shoman was born in Beit Hanina, north of Jerusalem, Palestine.
Glossary Debka: Folkloric dance performed at weddings and large celebrations. It entails the holding of hands in a circle and a three-to-five step move to the music. At weddings, men perform this dance while women stand back and observe.
1724 | Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants
Eid al Adha: Celebration following the month of Ramadan, when people fast during the day and eat and socialize during the evening. During this Eid, families visit one another and adults give children monetary gifts. Falaheen: Peasant or of peasant origin. Palestinian Americans from the West Bank use this term in self-identification as people who are closest to the land, as authentic Palestinians. Hamas: A religious Palestinian movement that grew out of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. For many years it remained marginal, but as frustration grew with the Palestinian Authority’s corruption and inability to secure more rights for Palestinians, West Bank and Gaza residents began paying more attention to Hamas. In 2006, Hamas defeated the Palestinian Authority’s president’s party (Fatah) in West Bank and Gaza elections. Hamas refuses to recognize Israel and is deemed a terrorist organization by the United States, which has brought about economic sanctions against the territories. Kuffiyah: Black-and-white head covering traditionally worn by peasants that has come to represent the Palestinian struggle and resistance when worn around the neck. Mandate Palestine: The territory that was under Ottoman rule until shortly after World War I, when the League of Nations granted Britain mandate power over it. The mandate lasted from 1921 to 1948. Palestinian Scarf: Thin scarf made of kuffiyah material in the center, with the Palestinian flag coming down the edges in string. References Abraham, Nabeel. 1994. “Anti-Arab Racism and Violence in the United States.” In The Development of the Arab-American Identity, edited by E. McCarus, 155–214. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Abraham, Sameer Y., and Nabeel Abraham. 1981. The Arab World and Arab-Americans: Understanding a Neglected Minority. Detroit, MI: Center for Urban Studies, Wayne State University. Al-Tahir, Ali. 1952. “The Arab Community in the Chicago Area: A Comparative Study of the Christian-Syrians and the Muslim-Palestinians.” Unpublished PhD diss. University of Chicago. Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 1997. “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration.” International Migration Review 341: 826–74. Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 2003. Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Arab American Institute (AAI). 2003. “Who Are We?: Arab-American Demographics.” [Online article; retrieved 5/10/09. http://www.aaiusa.org/arab-americans/22/demographics.
References | 1725 Arab American Institute (AAI). 2006. “Population Estimates of Americans of Palestinian Ancestry.” [Online article; retrieved 5/10/09.] http://www.aaiusa.org/issues/2550/ population-estimates-of-americans-of-palestinian-ancestry. Aruri, Naseer. 1969. “The Arab-American Community in Springfield, Massachusetts.” In The Arab-Americans: Studies in Assimilation, edited by Elaine Hagopian and Ann Paden, 50–66. Wilmette, IL: The Medina University Press International. Aruri, Naseer. 2003. Dishonest Broker: The Role of the United States in Palestine and Israel. Boston: South End Press. Barringer, Felicity 2003. “U.S. Uses Its Veto to Block Anti-Israel Measure in U.N.” New York Times, Septemper 17. [Online article; retrieved 5/10/09.] http://www.nytimes. com/2003/09/17/world/us-uses-its-veto-to-block-anti-israel-measure-in-un.html. Beinin, Joel, and Lisa Hajjar. 2011. Middle East Research and Information Project. “Palestine, Israel, and the Arab Israeli Conflict.” [Online article; retrieved on 4/5/11.] http:// www.merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/intro-pal-isr-primer.html. Brittingham, A., and G. de la Cruz. 2005. “We the People of Arab Ancestry.” Census Special Reports. Washington, DC: Census Bureau. [Online chapter; Retrieved 4/5/11. www. census.gov/prod/2005pubs/censr-21.pdf. Brubaker, Rogers. 2001. “The Returning of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24: 531–48. Cainkar, Louise. 1988. “Palestinian Women in the United States: Coping with Tradition, Change, and Alienation.” Unpublished PhD dissertation: Northwestern University. CIA Factbook. 2010. “West Bank: Country Profile.” [Online article; retrieved 4/5/11.] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html. CIA Factbook. 2010. “The Gaza Strip.” [Online article; retrieved on 4/5/11.] https://www. cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html. de Boer, Connie. 1983. “The Polls: Attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 47: 121–31. Elkholy, Abdo 1969. “The Arab-Americans: Nationalism and Traditional Preservations.” In The Arab-Americans: Studies in Assimilation, edited by Elaine Hagopian and Ann Paden, 3–17. Wilmette, IL: The Medina University Press International. Gans, Herbert J. 1979. “Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 2: 1–19. Glazer, Nathan. 2004. “Assimilation Today: Is One Identity Enough?” In Reinventing the Melting Pot, edited by Tamar Jacoby, 61–74. New York: Basic Books. Gualtieri, Sarah M. A. 2009. Between Arab and White: Race and Ethnicity in the Early Syrian American Diaspora. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hagopian, Elaine. 1969. “The Institutional Development of the Arab-American Community of Boston.” In The Arab-Americans: Studies in Assimilation, edited by Elaine Hagopian and Ann Paden, 67–83. Wilmette, IL: The Medina University Press International.
1726 | Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants Hagopian, Elaine. 1976. “Minority Rights in a Nation-State: The Nixon Administration’s Campaign against Arab-Americans.” Journal of Palestine Studies 5: 97–114. Hitti, Philip Khuri. 1924. The Syrians in America. New York: George H. Doran Company. Hooglund, Eric J. 1987. Crossing the Waters: Arabic-Speaking Immigrants to the United States before 1940. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press. Kayal, Philip M., and Joseph M. Kayal. 1975. The Syrian-Lebanese in America: A Study in Religion and Assimilation. New York: Twayne Publishers. Khalaf, Samir. 1987. “The Background and Causes of Lebanese/Syrian Immigration to the United States before World War I.” In Crossing the Waters, edited by Eric J. Hooglund, 11–28. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute Press. Khalidi, Rashid. 1997. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press. Kifner, John. 1988. “New Pride for Palestinian-Americans.” New York Times. [Online article; retrieved on 5/5/11.] http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/12/world/new-pride-forpalestinian-americans.html. Makdisi, Ussama. MERIP. “Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Secularism in Lebanon.” [Online article; retrieved on 1/18/10.] http://www.merip.org/mer/mer200/ makdisi.html. Marvasti, Amir B., and Karyn D. McKinney. 2004. Middle Eastern Lives in America. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Massad, Joseph Andoni. 2001. Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan. New York: Columbia University Press. Naff, Alixa. 1985. Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant Experience. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Orfalea, Gregory. 1988. Before the Flames: A Quest for the History of Arab Americans. Austin: University of Texas Press. Orfalea, Gregory. 2006. The Arab Americans: A History. Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press. Pappé, Ilan. 2004. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Portes, Alejandro, and Rueben Rumbaut. 2006. A Portrait of Immigrant America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Quinn, Michael. 1996. “ ‘Never Shoulda Been Let Out the Penitentiary’: Gangsta Rap and the Struggle over Racial Identity.” Cultural Critique 34: 65–89. Seikaly, M. 1999. “Attachments and Identity: The Palestinian Community of Detroit.” In Arabs in America: Building a New Future, edited by M. Suleiman, 25–38. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Serhan, Randa. 2008. “Palestinian Weddings: Inventing Palestine in New Jersey.” Journal of Palestine Studies 37 (4): 21–37.
Further Reading | 1727 Serhan, Randa. 2009. “Suspended Community: An Ethnographic Study of PalestinianAmericans in New York and New Jersey.” PhD diss., Columbia University, New York. Shaheen, Jack. 1984. The TV Arab. Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press. Steinberg, Stephen. 2001. The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America. Boston: Beacon Press. Stockton, R. 1994. “Ethnic Archetypes and the Arab Image.” In The Development of the Arab Identity, edited by E. Marcuse, 119–53. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Stork, Joe. 1974. “Oil and the International Crisis.” MERIP Middle East Report, November: 3–20; 24. Suleiman, Michael. 1994. “Arab-Americans in the Political Process.” In The Development of Arab-American Identity, edited by Marcuse, 37–60. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Suleiman, Michael. 1999. Arabs in America: Building a New Future. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Swedenburg, Ted. 1999. “The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936–1939)” in The Israel/Palestine Question, edited by Ilan Pappé, 129–68. London: Routledge. Tilly, Charles. 1990. “Transplanted Networks.” In Immigration Reconsidered, edited by Virginia Yans-McLaughan, 79–95. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Toukan, 1994. “Transjordan: Past, Present, and Future.” Royal Central Asian Journal 31 (3): 253–64. Trice, Robert. 1978. “Foreign Policy Interest Groups, Mass Public Opinion and the ArabIsraeli Dispute.” The Western Political Quarterly 31: 238–52. Usher, Graham. 2005. “Unmaking Palestine: On Israel, the Palestinians, and the Wall.” Journal of Palestine Studies 35 (1): 25–43. Watkins, S. Craig. 2005. Hip Hop Matters: Politics, Popular Culture, and the Struggle for the Soul of a Movement. Boston: Beacon Press. Younis, Adele L., and Philip M. Kayal. 1995. The Coming of the Arabic-Speaking People to the United States. Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration Studies.
Further Reading American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, “The Israeli Occupation of Palestinian Land Is the Foremost Obstacle to Peace.” [Online article; retrieved 4/5/11.] http://www. adc.org/index.php?id=251 American Federation of Ramallah, Palestine. [Online article; retrieved 4/5/11.] http://www. afrp.org/. Arab American Institute. “Issues: Palestine.” [Online article; retrieved 4/5/11.] http://www. aaiusa.org/issues/palestine.
1728 | Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants Cainkar, Louise. 2009. Homeland Insecurity: The Arab American and Muslim American Experience after 9/11. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Louise Cainkar has extensive scholarly experience in the Palestinian American community in Chicago. In Homeland Insecurity, she takes this intimate knowledge and understanding and expands it to include Arabs and Muslims in Chicago after 9/11. This text is not specific to Palestinian Americans but allows for contextualization of Palestinians among Muslims and Arabs in the United States. Palestinian Americans share in the experiences of discrimination against veiled women and Arab/Muslim businesses in the aftermath of 9/11, as they become less of a single national group and more of a larger Muslim-Arab connection in the American mainstream psyche. Christison, Kathleen. 2001. The Wound of Dispossession: Telling the Palestinian Story. Santa Fe, NM: Sunlit Hills Press. Kathleen Christison is a former CIA analyst who came to know the Palestinian American community during her service for the agency. Christison does not claim to present a theoretical text, but rather in-depth narratives into Palestinian Americans’ lives. The stories and descriptions reflect many of the experiences Palestinian Americans have had and continue to have in the new generations. It is a book with rich descriptions of everyday experiences. Deir Dibwan Association. [Online article; retrieved 4/5/11.] http://www.spiritus-temporis. com/deir-dibwan/deir-dibwan-association.html. Farsoun, Samih K., and Christina E. Zacharia. 1997. Palestine and the Palestinians. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. The late Samih Farsoun and Christina Zacharia provide a macro-level analysis of modern Palestinian history as it relates to the Nakba (“catastrophe” and exile of Palestinians in 1948) and its aftermath. It provides a predominantly state and institutional view of relations between Palestinians and their political representatives, and their relations with the governments of the countries where they ended up as refugees or as naturalized citizens. Kayyali, Randa. 2006. The Arab Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. While this book is not restricted to Palestinian Americans, it does allow for some contextualization of Palestinians among their fellow Arab immigrants. The book is commendable for its breadth, allowing for a general overview of Arab Americans’ history in the United States. It is a useful reference book that highlights issues immigrants contend with and suggests readings to pursue for further studies. Khalidi, Rashid. 1997. Palestinian Identity. New York: Columbia University Press. Rashid Khalidi provides the most authoritative text on the origins of Palestinian identity, from the first nationalist movements against the Ottoman Empire to resistance against the increased Zionist presence in Mandate Palestine. Khalidi, as a historian, deals less with subjectivities and narratives and more with archival documentation of the inception of development of Palestinian nationalism. The book stops short of touching the more recent social developments of Palestinian communities in exile.
Further Reading | 1729 Middle East Research and Information Project. “Palestine, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Primer.” [Online article; retrieved 4/5/11.] http://www.merip.org/palestineisrael_primer/toc-pal-isr-primer.html. Palestine Remembered. [Online article; retrieved 4/5/11.] http://www.palestineremem bered.com/. Said, Edward W., and Jean Mohr. 1986. After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives. New York: Pantheon Books. Edward Said wrote this book shortly after the Israeli invasion of Beirut, Lebanon, in 1982, where the Palestinian Liberation Organization had established itself institutionally. During the invasion, the massacres at Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps were committed. The PLO ended up leaving Beirut, which to many signaled a massive blow to the Palestinian movement in general. Edward Said takes this as his starting point and searches for Palestinians’ self-representations and national narrative. Through pictures, poems, text, and narrative, Said concludes that Palestinians lack a coherent Palestinian identity. Throughout the book he discusses how Palestinians try to create a semblance of coherence and often end up with a fragmented and uncertain representation of themselves. Serhan, Randa. 2008. “Palestinian Weddings: Inventing Palestine in New Jersey.” Journal of Palestine Studies 37 (4): 21–37. This article is based on ethnographic field research in New York and New Jersey after 9/11. Spanning seven years, the study was an attempt to understand the unorganized and “invisible” Palestinian American families who migrated as a result of the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian weddings are used to analyze the history of Palestinian nationalism and its transformation in exile, especially among the second generation, who were born and raised in the United States. Serhan argues that the Palestinian wedding has come to replace Palestinian national celebrations and serves to produce a coherent narrative of Palestinian-ness in the space of a wedding hall against the external world that contradicts any unity to Palestinians.
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Multicultural America
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Multicultural America AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEWEST AMERICANS Volume 4
Ronald H. Bayor, Editor
Copyright 2011 by Ronald H. Bayor All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Multicultural America : an encyclopedia of the newest Americans / Ronald H. Bayor, editor. v. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-313-35786-2 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-313-35787-9 (ebook) 1. Cultural pluralism—United States—Encyclopedias. 2. Multiculturalism—United States—Encyclopedias. 3. Immigrants—United States—Encyclopedias. 4. Ethnology— United States—Encyclopedias. 5. Minorities—United States—Encyclopedias. 6. United States—Ethnic relations—Encyclopedias. 7. United States—Race relations—Encyclopedias. I. Bayor, Ronald H., 1944E184.A1M813 2011 305.800973—dc22 2011004677 ISBN: 978-0-313-35786-2 EISBN: 978-0-313-35787-9 15
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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Greenwood An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America
Contents
Preface, ix Introduction, xiii Chronology, xxvii Afghan Immigrants, 1 Ceri Oeppen Argentinian Immigrants, 39 Judith Ann Warner Bahamian Immigrants, 79 Kathryn Beard Bangladeshi Immigrants, 109 Ahrar Ahmad Brazilian Immigrants, 149 Franklin Goza Cambodian Immigrants, 205 Justin Corfield Chilean Immigrants, 237 Cristián Doña-Reveco Chinese Immigrants, 277 Jonathan H. X. Lee Colombian Immigrants, 353 Enrique S. Pumar Costa Rican Immigrants, 381 Thea S. Alvarado v
vi | Contents
Cuban Immigrants, 413 Guillermo J. Grenier Dominican Immigrants, 471 Ramona Hernández and Anthony Stevens-Acevedo Ecuadorian Immigrants, 533 Kenneth Kincaid Egyptian Immigrants, 577 Caroline Nagel Eritrean Immigrants, 617 Tricia Redeker Hepner Ethiopian Immigrants, 657 Solomon Addis Getahun Filipino Immigrants, 701 Maria Paz Gutierrez Esguerra Ghanaian Immigrants, 753 Baffour K. Takyi Guatemalan Immigrants, 799 Timothy Steigenga and Sandra Lazo de la Vega Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) Immigrants, 845 Stephen J. Sills and Natassaja Chowthi Haitian Immigrants, 887 Bertin M. Louis Jr. Honduran Immigrants, 933 Suyapa G. Portillo Villeda Indian (Asian Indian) Immigrants, 969 Karen Isaksen Leonard Indonesian Immigrants, 1027 Jennifer Cho Iranian Immigrants, 1069 Maboud Ansari Iraqi Immigrants, 1111 Mary C. Sengstock
Contents | vii
Israeli Jewish Immigrants, 1149 Steven J. Gold Jamaican Immigrants, 1189 Alwyn D. Gilkes Japanese Immigrants, 1247 Eiichiro Azuma Kenyan Immigrants, 1287 Nicole C. D’Errico and Scott G. Feinstein Korean Immigrants, 1329 Won Moo Hurh Laotian Immigrants, 1397 Helen K. Kim Lebanese Immigrants, 1427 Stephen J. Sills Liberian Immigrants, 1459 Hana Brown Mexican Immigrants, 1493 Alma M. Garcia Nicaraguan Immigrants, 1557 Lisa Konczal Nigerian Immigrants, 1595 Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome Pakistani Immigrants, 1655 Kathleen M. Moore Palestinian and Jordanian Immigrants, 1695 Randa Bassem Serhan Panamanian Immigrants, 1731 Joanna Doran and Anulkah Thomas Peruvian Immigrants, 1777 Erika Busse-Cárdenas and Rodrigo Lovatón Dávila Puerto Ricans, 1843 María E. Pérez y González
viii | Contents
Salvadoran Immigrants, 1903 Carlos B. Cordova Somalian Immigrants, 1965 Franklin Goza Sudanese Immigrants, 2013 Deidre Ann Tyler Taiwanese Immigrants, 2043 Franklin Ng Thai Immigrants, 2097 Jenjira Yahirun Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants, 2135 Teruyuki Tsuji Venezuelan Immigrants, 2191 Magaly Sanchez-R. Vietnamese Immigrants, 2229 Hien Duc Do Selected Bibliography, 2277 About the Editor and Contributors, 2279 Index, 2287
Panamanian Immigrants by Joanna Doran and Anulkah Thomas
Introduction In September 2008, U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) agents staged the largest single-workplace raid in the country’s history, detaining nearly 600 workers in the small town of Laurel, Mississippi (Mohr 2008). The majority of the detainees were from Latin American countries including Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and Panama, although there were some German nationals among them as well. As a result of the raid, families were broken apart, parents were afraid to send their children to school, and pregnant women were separated from their husbands. The raid was part of a strategy adopted by ICE to show a tough stance against undocumented immigrants. Perhaps it is not very surprising that Central American immigrants were caught up in the raid. Immigrants from this region, ravaged by war and natural disasters, tend to be uneducated, poor, and undocumented. As such, they are likely to be working in immigrantdominated industries and vulnerable to such attacks. What is interesting about this story is that the detention of the Panamanian immigrants should be as surprising as that of the Germans. Panamanians tend not to work in immigrant-dominated industries and are much more likely to have high educational attainment and work in management and other professional occupations. They are much more likely than many other immigrant groups to speak English exclusively in the home, join the military, and be naturalized U.S. citizens. Also, the flow of migration is not just from Panama to the United States, since a sizable population of American retirees is migrating to Panama from the United States (Dixon et al. 2006). This population of American seniors is expected to grow, given the size of the retiring baby boom generation, the expense of medical costs relative to Social Security benefits, and the decreasing cost of travel. A blogger from an online diaspora journal wryly noted that he would not be surprised if the Panamanian government, in protest of the treatment its citizens received in the Mississippi ICE raid, took the symbolic counter-measure of rounding up a few undocumented American immigrants in Panama (Winner 2008). The reason the true characteristics of Panamanian immigrants are not better known is that the group has received little attention from researchers. When descriptions of Central American immigration are written, the characteristics attributed to
1731
Chronology | 1733
“Central America” more closely describe Salvadorians, Nicaraguans, and Guatemalans (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Suarez-Orozco, Suarez-Orozco, and QinHillard 2005). Even experts in Central American immigration know little about Panama (Norma Chinchilla, personal communication, May 13, 2009). This is unfortunate, since knowing more about Panamanian immigration and immigrants would help us achieve a more nuanced understanding of Central American immigrants in this country. Describing the characteristics of this group, as well as attempting to explain them, will be the purpose of this entry. The description of the population will be based on U.S. Census 2000 figures that describe the characteristics of the whole population of those born in Panama. In order to put these characteristics in perspective, a comparative method will be utilized. Panamanian first-generation immigrants will be compared to Salvadorians (currently by far the major immigrant group from Central America), Latin American immigrants in general, immigrants in the aggregate, and finally, the nonimmigrant population in general. Panamanians will be shown to most frequently resemble either the native born, or the larger immigrant group, but not the Latin American populations. To supplement our understanding of Panamanian immigrant culture from the various waves of immigration, we conducted informal interviews with immigrants from the community.
Chronology ca. 10,000 B.C.E.
Settlement of migrants crossing land bridge from Asia to North America.
ca. 1,500 B.C.E.
Panama’s highly diverse indigenous people develop cultivation methods and become an agricultural people.
1501
Rodrigo de Bastidas is the first European to set foot on Panamanian soil.
1509
Beginning of slave trade in New World.
1513
Vasco Nuñez de Balboa crosses Isthmus of Panama and claims the Pacific Ocean for Spain.
1519
Panama becomes Spanish vice-royalty of New Andalucia (later New Granada); disease and the brutality of Governor Pedro Arias Davila destroy majority of indigenous population.
Early 1500s
Large number of slaves brought to Panama and eventually abandoned as the search for gold results in little success.
1700s
Decline in Panama’s importance as trading route.
1734 | Panamanian Immigrants
1821
On November 28 Panama gains independence from Spain and joins the Confederacy of Gran Colombia (today’s Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia).
1830
The collapse of Gran Colombia leaves Panama a department of Colombia.
1846
The Colombian government allows the United States to build the first transcontinental railroad across the isthmus, reestablishing Panama’s importance in trade.
1880s
France attempts and fails to build canal.
1903
On November 3, Panama gains independence from Colombia with encouragement from the United States.
1903
United States buys rights to build Panama Canal from France and is given control of Canal Zone in perpetuity through Hay-Bunau Treaty.
1914
Panama Canal opens on August 15.
1939
Panama ceases to be U.S. protectorate.
1964
On January 9, President Roberto F. Chiari Remón temporarily breaks off diplomatic relations with the United States over conflicts between Panamanian civilians and the U.S. Army.
1968
General Omar Torrijos Herrera imposes dictatorship.
1977
United States signs Panama Canal Treaty, giving Panama control of the Canal after 1999. This and the attendant provisions are made final with the Panama Canal Act of 1979.
1981
Torrijos dies in plane crash.
1983
In August Manuel Noriega, former CIA informant, promotes himself to general and becomes de facto leader of Panama.
1988
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration indicts Noriega on drug charges, stages failed coup; Noriega declares state of emergency.
1989
In May Noriega annuls results of presidential elections, declares state of war.
1989
In December the United States invades Panama and instates Guillermo Endara, winner of presidential elections.
Background | 1735
1999
On December 31, Panama gains full control over Panama Canal under the leadership of the country’s first female president, Mireya Moscoso.
2006
In October Panamanians approve plan to double Canal’s capacity.
2014–2015
Expected end of Panama Canal renovation.
Background Geography of Panama Briefly stated, Panama is an isthmus, a narrow strip of land that links two continents and separates two oceans. In terms of size, it is slightly smaller than South Carolina, with the Panama Canal straddling its narrowest point. A careful consideration of Panama’s geography is necessary to understand Panama’s history, culture, and unique position among the other countries of Central America. Panama’s natural resources, separate from its location in the world, are worth considering first. Its people can grow bananas, rice, corn, and coffee and harvest shrimp. Panama has no oil or gas reserves, and not many natural minerals. Beyond the rolling hills of the coastal areas, the country is made up of scraggly hills and steep mountains. The climate is tropical: hot, humid, and cloudy. The rainy season lasts most of the year, with the dry season lasting from January to May. Considerably wider then it is tall, with the Gulf of Panama carving out the southeastern part of the country, Panama’s shape is reminiscent of a chair tipped back against a wall. This country is the only one in the world where it is possible to see the sun rise over the Pacific and set over the Atlantic from the same vantage point (Hartston 2007). The diversity of the wildlife is also exceptional. A careful consideration of Panama’s geography is necessary to understand Panama’s history, culture, and unique position among the other countries of Central America. Panama occupies, as the CIA Factbook describes, a “strategic location” (CIA 2010). Panama lies at the crossroads of different worlds. The northeast to southwest axis joins large bodies of water; the northwest to southeast axis joins land; the north is a long curved border with the Caribbean Sea, itself framed by islands including, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Cuba. These islands make up Panama’s last frontier before the expanse of the North Atlantic Ocean begins, and beyond it, Europe and Africa. The Caribbean islands and Africa and Europe beyond them will have a great effect on Panama’s diverse ethnic composition, music, and cuisine, and thus the Caribbean islands need to be considered its intimate northern neighbors. Panama’s long southern coast borders the Pacific Ocean, with little inhabited land before Asia. The famous Panama Canal cuts through the middle of
1736 | Panamanian Immigrants
Top Three Little Known Facts about Panama 1. Panama is the site of Scotland’s only attempt at establishing a colony, during the 15th century. 2. Panama has the only place in the world where it is possible to see the sun rise over the Pacific and set over the Atlantic. 3. The Panama hat is actually a national hat of Ecuador.
the country, enabling ships to cross the Americas more efficiently. Control over this juncture puts anyone that commands the canal at a great advantage. The northwest to southeast axis joins Central America, of which Panama is considered to be a part, to South America. This puts Panama precisely in the path of the cocaine flow from Colombia and other South American countries. According to the CIA World Factbook, Panama currently serves as a major cocaine trans-shipment point and money-laundering area (CIA 2010).
History of Panama Archaeological remains found in Lake Alajuela suggest that the earliest inhabitants of the isthmus arrived about 11,000 years ago, having crossed the land bridge from Asia to North America (Labrut 1997). They began agricultural activity about 3,500 years ago, supplemented with stone tool making, fishing, and trade between villages. Gold jewelry, beads, and multicolored pottery found in huacas, or burial mounds, show sophisticated craftsmanship. By 500 B.C.E., the indigenous people were organized in three cultural regions: western, eastern and central. Their occupants conducted trade with each other and with groups along Central America and up through Mexico. These relationships would remain active until the arrival of the Spanish. The first European to set foot on Panamanian soil was Rodrigo de Bastidas, in 1501, traveling with Juan de la Cosa and Vasco Nuñez de Balboa. The three Spaniards, overcoming fierce resistance from the indigenous people, eventually established Santa Maria de la Antigua del Darien. The colony became an important part of the Spanish mercantile system. After Balboa crossed the isthmus and managed to reach the Pacific in 1513, the Camino Real, or Royal Road, was established to transport treasures from western South America (especially gold from Peru) to galleons bound for Spain on the Atlantic coast (O’Reggio 2006). The indigenous population was largely decimated during this time. The drastic and rapid decline in the native population was caused, in part, by disease and by intermarriage with the polygamous early settlers. Pedro Arias de Avila, the new governor of Santa Maria, was responsible for much of the rest. By some accounts, he enslaved or killed two million Indians (LeFeber 1989). Today, only 200,000 descendants of the original Indians remain in Panama (Labrut 1997).
Background | 1737
Zimbalist and Weeks (1991) argue that the early destruction of the native population would play a key role in making Panama’s political, economic, and ethnic structure so different from its Central American neighbors. In these other countries, the elite typically controlled both the land and the labor. In agrarian societies like Mexico or Peru, oligarchic landowners extracted wealth from coerced indigenous labor. These elites exercised not only political power, but control over the means of production. Panama simply did not have sufficient labor for large agrarian projects, making the importation of slave labor an attractive alternative. Slaves brought from Africa would transport the precious minerals across the Camino Real and mine Panama’s limited gold deposits. However, since a landed oligarchy would never emerge in Panama, the merchant class arising from the transport centers became the de facto elite. The key difference from the landed oligarchy of the other countries is that these merchants could maintain political power, but not economic power. After interest in Panamanian gold waned, the slaves dispersed into the jungles of Panama, where they engaged in subsistence farming. As attacks from English pirates finally forced the Spanish to avoid the Camino Real in the 18th century, much of the merchant class followed them. The limited economic control of the Creole merchant class over the largely black majority of the population made them more amenable to allowing external powers to enter, especially if this would serve their trade interests (Zimbalist and Weeks 1991). Thus, when the rest of the Spanish colonies agitated for independence Panama did not join the mutiny. However, once the Gran Confederacy consisting of modern-day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia was formed, Panama seceded from Spain and joined the association (“Panama” 2010). However, the independence Panama obtained from Spain on November 28, 1821, would not be as dramatically different from their former status as it initially appeared. In 1843, a new constitution gave officials in Bogota the power to choose the Panamanian governor, and the country became a state of Colombia, despite later efforts to break away. In the meantime, the 1840s brought renewed interest in Panama’s ports, with the establishment of regular steamship service. A decade later, the Colombian government negotiated with New York entrepreneurs to build a railroad that cut the time of transport across the isthmus from days to hours. The building of the railroad was instrumental in Panama’s later relationship with its powerful northern neighbor. The success of the railroad project reinvigorated international interest in building a canal. France’s Ferdinand de Lesseps, having helped build the Suez Canal, was the first to be granted the rights to make the attempt (“Panama” 2010). Construction began in the 1880s but then ended in 1889, leaving the French company bankrupt and 20,000 workers dead, mainly from malaria and yellow fever (Edge 2007). A French national, Phillippe Bunau-Varilla, sold de Lesseps’s assets to the United States and then tried to pressure the Colombian government to grant the United States control over the strip of land surrounding the canal. Rebuffed, Bunau-Varilla turned to Panamanian revolutionaries, who
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declared independence from Colombia on November 3, 1903. Troops sent from Colombia to crush the insurrection were mired at the southern port of Colon when the American northbound trains were conveniently missing (“Panama” 2010). Panamanians celebrate this as a day of independence as well. In fact, many celebrate November as the “month of independence” (Victor Grimaldo, personal communication, February 11, 2010). Once again, this independence turned out to be less definitive than it may have seemed at first. The Panamanian secessionists appointed Bunau-Varilla as their minister to the United States, with the power to negotiate treaties. Bunau-Varilla and U.S. secretary of state John Hay signed the Bunau-Varilla-Hay Treaty on November 18, 1903. This treaty gave the United States not just the rights to build the canal, but to control the five miles on either side of it “in perpetuity.” The resulting Canal Zone would operate with full legal and economic autonomy for almost a century, with “the treaty that no one read” embittering relations between the two countries (“Panama” 2010).
Construction of the Panama Canal, about 1910. The canal was completed in 1913. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
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The importance of the Panama Canal is difficult to overstate, and it is worth pausing the chronological narrative to consider its impact. The facilitation of trade routes is most immediately impressive. Travel through the canal allows ships to more than halve the distance they would have to travel if taking the route around Cape Horn. It is also widely regarded as one of the greatest engineering feats in the world. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ eventually successful effort was also a success for the number of lives saved. As mentioned, about 20,000 people died of disease during the French construction. A 1909 letter from Alfred E. Dottin, a West Indian worker, gives a sense of the difficulty encountered before the sanitation efforts proved successful: Working conditions in those days were so horrible it would stagger your imagination. I don’t think I could ever find words to express the true conditions that existed. Death was our constant companion. I shall never forget the train loads of dead men being carted away daily as if they were just so much lumber. I saw mosquitoes. I say this without fear of exaggeration, by the thousands, attack one man. (O’Reggio 2006, 166) Sanitation efforts eliminated the disease carrying mosquitoes and are credited with saving 71,000 lives (Meditz and Hanratty 1987). What might be immediately less obvious is the strategically crucial role the canal played in developing U.S. geopolitical dominance. Control over the Panama Canal enables its military to be effectively bicoastal, allowing its navy to quickly mobilize against attack from other continents. It also enabled the United States to more easily involve itself in situations arising within the American continent. Its hemispheric military involvement would also prove important for immigration to the United States from the Central American countries, especially El Salvador, in the last three decades of the 20th century. Construction of the canal was completed on August 15, 1914. Workers came from different parts of the world to help with the construction, including many from China, and some 12,000 workers from southeastern Europe. Chief among the 65,000 workers on the 1913 payroll were West Indians. Most would remain in the country and inflect Panamanian culture with a Caribbean influence (O’Reggio 2006). The other ethnic groups would also remain, frequently self-employed as merchants; thus the economic consequence of the Canal’s construction was the creation of a new middle class (Black and Flores 1989). However, Panamanian society now became divided along ethnic and racial lines (Kluck 1989). Almost from the beginning, resentment grew towards the strong presence of the United States. This resentment would shape the relations between the two countries. Harmodio Arias would be the first Panamanian president to come from the mestizo middle class and to clearly express the frustration against the heavy-handed approach of the
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United States (Kluck 1989). With a campaign of “Panama for the Panamanians,” he articulated a vision of an economically and militarily antonymous Panama. Among his accomplishments was founding the University of Panama and launching the first attempts to address poverty in the countryside. Arias also pressured Roosevelt to state that the United States had only the rights to protect and maintain the Canal, thus ending in 1939 Panama’s role as a de facto protectorate of the United States. However, his brother Arnulfo Arias’s nationalism went even further, since he sympathized with the Nazis. He pressured the United States to repatriate the Canal workers (Kluck 1989). He also refused to allow the United States to use the canal for military purposes. With the encouragement of Arias’s brother, Harmodio Arias, the United States aided a bloodless coup in 1941 while Arnulfo Arias was secretly visiting his mistress in Cuba. The Panama Canal then became heavily used by the United States during World War II. The Japanese had active plans to attack the canal, but the war’s abrupt end prevented these from actualizing (“Panama” 2010). After the war, relations between the two countries continued to be strained and intermittently erupted into serious conflicts. Two were especially serious, and both ended with more concessions from the United States. Serious civilian protests in 1958–1959 over flying the Panamanian flag inside the Zone forced Dwight D. Eisenhower to concede Panama titular power over the area. On January 9, 1964, President Roberto F. Chiari Remón temporarily broke off diplomatic relations with the United States after a scuffle over flying their national flags between U.S. and Panamanian schoolboys from Balboa High School on the Canal Zone turned into a riot that killed more than 20 people (“Panama” 2010). The Bunau-Varilla-Hay Treaty was finally reversed in 1977 with a treaty signed by Presidents Jimmy Carter and Omar Torrijos. The treaty granted Panama increasing sovereignty over the Canal before its complete surrender December 31, 1999. As Panama pushed for increasing independence from the United States, the Panamanian populace was ruled, with few exceptions, by de facto dictators. They promoted themselves to power by augmenting and controlling the national police force known as the National Guard (“Panama” 2010). Their terms of governance would often end with their sudden deaths. Colonel José Antonio Remón Cantera controlled the presidential office from behind the scenes after the war and until he was officially elected president in 1952. Three years later he was gunned down while in office by mysterious forces that many alleged came from the mafia in the United States (Kluck 1989). Although aided with a loan from the World Bank to help build the trans-America highway, in the 1950s Panama experienced difficulties in the agrarian regions, as a demographic shift with decreasing death rates and continued higher fertility made the regions less able to even support the subsistence farming with which the country’s impoverished used to support themselves (Kluck 1989). The underdevelopment of the regions outside the Canal and the urban areas associated with trade drives Panama’s high economic inequity.
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In 1968, General Omar Torrijos Herrera imposed a dictatorship and strove to redress the economic disparities through massive public works projects. The degree to which he was successful remains a matter of dispute (Zimbalist and Weeks 1991). Nevertheless, the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s was a time of relative economic prosperity and a diminished disparity between the classes. Torrijos also successfully brokered the transfer of the canal from Carter in 1977, threatening the United States with another Vietnam (Zimbalist and Weeks 1991). He was killed in a mysterious plane crash in 1981. General Manuel Noriega was the de facto dictator during the 1980s. Although formerly on the CIA payroll as an informant, the United States found him increasingly difficult to control. This was especially bothersome since President Reagan pursued an active policy of rolling back Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere during that decade. While Reagan fought the Cold War through support of rebel forces against left-wing governments in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and other counties, Noriega used increasingly repressive action against the press and political opponents and actively involved himself in the transfer of narcotics from Colombia to the United States. In the late 1980s the United States staged several unsuccessful coups and indicted Noriega on drug charges in 1988. In response to a failed coup Noriega declared a state of emergency in 1988, and then a state of war a year later. The U.S. military invaded Panama in December 1989 and instated Guillermo Endara, the winner of the May 1989 elections that Noriega had annulled. The military invasion shocked the Panamanians, even though there was little affection for Noriega by the time it happened (Guillermoprieto 1994). The invasion was followed by five difficult years of transition. The 1994 elections that followed were, for the first time in Panama’s history, fair and peaceful. When the opposition won, the defeated candidates gave concession speeches and congratulated the victors (Scranton 1995). The elections since that time have continued to be fairly administered. The successive presidents have been generally successful in maintaining or building economic gains (U.S. Department of State 2010). Poverty fell in the years between 2001 and 2007 (overall poverty: 37% to 29%; extreme poverty: 19% to 12%) according to a United Nations report. Nevertheless, the country continues to have the second-greatest level of economic inequality in the region. In 2006 the Panamanians approved a measure to double the Canal’s capacity, a project that is expected to be completed by 2014 (Beatty 2007). It remains to be seen to what degree the expected economic gains will be able to ease the economic inequality.
Causes and Waves of Migration In contrast to migration from other countries in general and Latin American countries in particular, Panamanian migration into the United States is considerably
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older. The median age of the portion of the American population born in Panama is higher, at 42.6 years old, than either that from Latin America (34.2) or the foreignborn in aggregate (37.5) (U.S. Census 2000). Whereas the vast majority of other immigrants entered the country in the decades after 1980, and only about a quarter did so before this time, almost half of those born in Panama entered the United States before 1980 (U.S. Census 2000). From World War II and through the 1960s, it was Panamanians who dominated Central American immigration. Although the number of Panamanians entering the United States would spike again in the 1980s, the significance of this wave would be dwarfed by other, considerably greater inflows of migrants. By the end of the 20th century, those born in Panama would make up less than one percent of the total foreign-born population in the United States (U.S. Census 2000).
Early Immigration Little is known about immigration from Panama before the 1930s. Since the country would not gain independence from Gran Columbia until 1904, it is conceptually difficult to talk about immigration from the isthmus before this time. Even after achieving independence, rates of migration from Panama would not be tracked until the 1930s. This absence of data is also true for most Central and South American countries. Beginning in the 1930s, however, it becomes possible to obtain a sense of the size of the immigration flow from all of these countries through the decennial counts of Legal Permanent Residents in the United States available through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Legal Permanent Residents are immigrants who have been issued a document that allows them to permanently reside in the country. The document is commonly known as the green card. This source of data necessarily does not track undocumented migration (whether of those who entered without permission or visa over-stayers) and also misses those who have naturalized as citizens. Nevertheless, it is useful to get a sense of the change in the immigrant flow over time.
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separatism Since a count of early Panamanian immigration does not exist, it is all the more difficult to describe early immigrant culture. Certainly the United States during the first half of the 20th century was highly assimilationist. The nativist sentiment that gave rise to the restrictive immigration acts of the 1920s was also particularly directed against immigrants from the countries the United States was fighting during the World Wars. Teddy Roosevelt adopted a “swat the hyphen” campaign against German Americans, and the internment of Japanese immigrants during World War II is well known (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Is it likely that the same pressure to
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conform to an America identity held true for Panamanians? Perhaps. However, several facts indicate that Panamanian immigrants might have avoided a harsh welcome precisely based on their national origins. There are two pieces of suggestive evidence. Panama City in Florida was incorporated in 1909, which suggests that the name Panama did not have negative connotations at the time. Also, the popularity of the Panama hat in 1940s fashion (as seen in Paul Henreid and Charlie Chan movies, a hat that actually originates from Ecuador) points to a possibly positive association with the region. More importantly, however, from 1904 to 1939, Panama was a de facto American protectorate. By 1914, Panama was also the site of one of the greatest U.S. engineering triumphs. Control over the strategically located Panama Canal also increased American military capacity during the wars, which could have made any of its nationals be trusted as important allies. These factors combine for a favorable view of the country— friendly, remote, now civilized. This is not to suggest that the interference of the United States was welcome within Panama. In fact, expressions of resentment show just the opposite (Harding 2006). However, within the United States, Panamanians may have been viewed with relative favor during the first decades of the 20th century.
Later Waves of Immigration Panama’s economy boomed during World War II. During this time 65,000 American soldiers were stationed in the Panama Canal Zone, and the drop in commercial traffic was replaced by military convoys (Dixon et al. 2006; Tollefson 1989). It appears that, as in other countries where soldiers were stationed, a proportion of the immigrants arriving during the war were brides. Data from the 2000 census shows a high proportion of Panamanian immigrants born after 1925 relative to the larger aggregate group of the foreign born (U.S. Census 2000). While overall immigration from Central American countries was negligible during this time, the number of Panamanian immigrants, at 1,400 in the 1930s, was almost three times that of the other countries from the region. Immigration rates from Central America would increase during the 1940s and the end of the war, but Panamanian immigration was still the highest, at over 5,000 legal permanent residents recorded. The population of immigrants from Panama would double both in the 1950s and the 1960s over their preceding decades. In the 1950s, Panama was experiencing the beginning of a demographic transition, with lower death rates and continued high fertility creating population pressure in the rural areas (Kluck 1989). At the same time, the presence of the U.S. military and the status of the Canal Zone proved increasingly unpopular. Protests and uprisings would culminate in the 1964 riots over the raising of the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone. The rising tensions of the 1960s were likely to have spurred the increase of emigration from the country of
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West Indian Panamanians for two reasons. One is that the country’s frustration with the United States was also directed at Panamanians of West Indian origin. This is the group that tended to speak English fluently, work in the U.S.-run Canal Zone, and have the contacts to leave for the United States (O’Reggio 2006). Migration to the country would be facilitated by familiarity with its culture through associations built in the Canal Zone (Sassen 1996). Links to any family members from earlier waves of migration could have been actualized after the passage of Immigration Act of 1965, which made family reunification the basis of new admission policy. After decades of doubling rates of the number of legal immigrants from Panama, the 1970s were a time of stagnation and even slight reversal. The number of green card holders in the 1970s was 21,000, down from 22,000 in the previous decade. It is also the first decade that Panamanian immigration did not constitute the dominant inflow from the region. El Salvador (29,000) and Guatemala (24,000) would send more legal migrants during this period. At this time Panama was under the Torrijos dictatorship, and the first half of the decade was still relatively prosperous economically (Black and Flores 1989). Torrijios’ attempts to narrow the dramatic income gap and his success in negotiating an end to U.S. control over the Panama Canal in 1977 may have given Panama’s citizens more reason to stay in the country. The rates of migration from Panama, as suggested by the number of Legal Permanent Residents, rose dramatically from 21,000 to 32,000 in the 1980s. There were many contributing factors. Most well known is the final demise of the Noriega regime, with the military invasion by the United States in the final month of the decade. Panama’s economic downturn in the 1980s was likely a contributing factor. However, it is possible that rates of immigration would not have reached such heights if a more open admission policy had not facilitated the increased flow. In addition to the Immigration Act of 1965, the Panama Canal Act of September 27, 1979 (Public Law 96–70) created a special admission category based on previous employment in the Canal Zone. (It is possible that the amnesty provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act enabled some Panamanians residing without legal status to obtain legal residence, even though the low proportion of Panamanian immigrants working in the agricultural sector means the effect of this act would likely have been very limited.) Although the 1980s was a decade that marked the height of Panamanian immigration over the 20th century, this rise would go unnoticed by migration scholars and the popular media. The civil war in El Salvador instigated by aggressive U.S. involvement destabilized the surrounding countries as well (Byrne 1996; LeoGrande 1998). Honduran levels of legal migration were greater than the Panamanian. At 59,000, Guatemala sent almost twice as many legal immigrants as Panama. El Salvador would dwarf the other countries by sending 137,000 green card holders. Of course, these numbers do not include those who were undocumented. Only a limited proportion of individuals fleeing war would be able to obtain legal
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Anti-Noriega demonstrators gather at the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, D.C., where OAS ministers are meeting on the Panamanian situation, May 17, 1989. (AP Photo/Scott Applewhite)
authorization, especially since the size of previous migrant waves limited opportunities for sponsorship through family ties. Since the United States did not recognize those fleeing war as refugees, a significant proportion were forced to enter the country illegally (Alba and Nee 2003). (See Table 256.) By the 1990s, Panamanian legal migration rates, at 28,000, would exceed only those of Belize and Costa Rica. Extrapolating from the numbers available from 2000 to 2007, it looks like the number for the first decade of the 21st century will be even lower, at about 20,000 legal permanent residents, leaving immigrants from other Central American countries (Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador) to represent Central American immigration. Chief among these would be El Salvador, which contributed about a quarter million legal immigrants during the 1990s and 2000s. A comparison of the immigrants from the two countries is warranted to show just how different immigration from the same region can look. (See Table 257.)
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community Panamanian immigrants are spread out across the country. This makes sense, since almost half (46%) of those who were born in Panama entered the United States
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before 1980. Nevertheless, larger Panamanian communities can be found in New York, Miami, and San Diego. These cities are classic immigrant gateways, and it would make sense that an immigrant group from a country that specializes in shipping and trade would settle in cities where this activity is particularly salient (Singer 2007). In addition, these cities are home to military bases, which are especially likely to be important given Panamanian links to the U.S. military stationed in its Canal Zone, and the immigrants’ own high rates of military participation. Whereas 0.2 percent of individuals born in other countries were part of the military service in the year 2000, and 0.6 percent of those who were born in this country were enlisted at this time, 1.4 percent of Panamanian immigrants were in the military (U.S. Census 2000). Panamanians are more likely to list black or African American as their only race (34%) than Salvadorians (1%) or Latin American immigrants (9%), and they are less likely to list white as their only race (29%) than the other two groups (35% and 42% respectively). The vast majority (79%) consider themselves Hispanic or Latino (of any race), as do Salvadorians (98%) and immigrants from Latin America in general (87%). Although more Panamanians speak only English in the home (19.3%) than any of the other groups (5.1% Salvadorians, 12.3% Latin American, 17% foreign born), they are also very likely to speak Spanish (79% of Panamanians, 94.8% of Salvadorians, 83.1% of all Latin American foreign born) when that is not the case. One puzzling trait of Panamanian immigrants is the large gender imbalance. Latin American immigrants have a slightly larger proportion of men, while immigrants taken as a group and those native born have slightly more men. The differences between the two genders are, at their most dramatic, about 4 percent (immigrants with Latin American origin have 52.2% men and 47.8% women). In the Panamanian group, the difference is almost 15 percent, with 62.8 percent women. The number of war brides from World War II does not explain the imbalance. (See Table 259.)
Age and Family Structure Another likely effect of the longer tenure of Panamanian migrants in the country relative to other immigrants is that their median age is considerably higher: 42.6 years for Panamanians in comparison to 37.5 for immigrants as a group. The difference in median age is especially dramatic when compared to the median age of immigrants from Latin America in general (34.2) and El Salvador in particular (33.6). Perhaps this later median age and the gender imbalance is a result of many Panamanian-born women immigrating to join American-born husbands? If so, this would explain why the divorce rates are so much higher for Panamanian immigrants (12.9%) than El Salvadorians (5%) or Latin Americans and the foreign born
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in general (6.3%, respectively). Panamanian divorce rates exceed but are fairly similar to the proportion of nonimmigrants who reported being divorced (10.3%) (U.S. Census 2000). Children of Panamanians are less likely to be raised by their two parents than the children of other immigrant groups. Another way that the Panamanian family structure is more similar to that of Americans than the other immigrant groups mentioned is in the proportion of grandparents assuming primary caretaking responsibility if living with grandchildren. This is the situation for less than a third of the other immigrant groups (26.4–29.7%), but holds true for 38.1 percent of the Panamanian grandparents. Almost half (47.1%) of the native-born grandparents assume responsibility for their children’s offspring if living with them. Otherwise, all groups are similar in that about a quarter of those over 15 years old have never been married and about half are currently married. (See Table 260.)
Educational Attainment The rates of educational attainment for Panamanians are also unusually high for their regional origin. Panamanian immigrants are older and have been in the country longer than the other immigrant groups. Unlike the Salvadorians’ flight from life-threatening conditions and economic devastation, Panamanian immigration in large part arises from fairly well-educated individuals leveraging their connections to trade. Thus, while more than 41.2 percent of Salvadorians over the age of 25 years possess less than a high school education, only 6.3 percent of individuals born in Panama do not possess a high school diploma. This is a proportion that is much more similar to those who are born in this country (5.2%) then those who were born in some other country (23.0%). Panamanian adults also have completed more postsecondary education, with 22.9 percent having obtained a bachelors degree or higher, a rate that is unusual in comparison to all Latin American (9.6%) or Salvadorian (4.9%) immigrants. As such, they are more similar to immigrants in the aggregate (24%) and nonimmigrants (24.5%) than to immigrants from their region of origin. (See Table 261.)
Economic Attainment In 1999, immigrant families were more likely than nonimmigrant families to live in poverty (U.S. Census 2000). In this case, Panamanian rates of poverty (12.4%) are more similar to those of immigrants as an aggregate (15.3%) than those of Salvadorians (19.2%) and Latin American immigrant families in general (20.7%). By contrast, 8.3 percent of nonimmigrant families are in poverty. The same pattern is evident when comparing median earnings across the groups. Panamanian families’ median income ($44,303) is more similar to that of immigrants in general ($42,085) than to native-born families ($50,976). The median income level for
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Salvadorian families ($32,934) is close to the Latin American median ($33, 421). However, when per capita incomes are compared, Panamanians’ earnings ($23,760) are similar to but higher than both those of immigrants as a whole ($21,543) and nonimmigrants ($21,592). The per capita incomes of these three groups far exceed those of the Salvadorians ($15,437) and all Latin American immigrants as a group ($15,607). (See Table 262.)
Occupation and Income Patterns Panamanian immigrants are most likely to work in offices. A full third (33.3%) are employed as managers or related professionals, and almost as many are in sales or office occupations (30.7%). The next most popular occupation also entails interpersonal transactions, with almost a fifth (19.4%) working in the service occupations. These proportions are most similar to those of nonimmigrants. Salvadorian and Latin American immigrants are more likely to work in service (32.3 and 25.3% respectively) and production (24.5 and 24.3% respectively, in contrast to 10.9% Panamanians) occupations. They are also more represented in construction (16.1 and 15.3% respectively, as opposed to 5.5% of Panamanians and 9.3% nonimmigrants). The occupations of the respective groups are reflected in their income patterns. A visual representation of the relative distributions would show that the bell curves of the Panamanians, immigrants as an aggregate, and native-born all tend to center around $50,000 to $74,999, with the native-born being somewhat more represented in the higher income ranges, and the lower ranges being more prevalent among Panamanians and immigrants in general. In contrast, Salvadorians and Latin American immigrants have an income curve that is rather sharply pulled toward the lower income ranges, with a considerably higher percentage of their families among the most poor and much fewer in the upper ranges. Within the two highest income groups (above $150,000), immigrants as a whole are almost identical to the native-born (ranging between 2.2 and 2.5%), while the Panamanians proportions (1.5 to 1.8%) are between that of these groups and the Salvadorians and Latin Americans (ranging from 0.9 to 1.1%). This suggests that despite their general financial success, Panamanians may be hitting an earnings ceiling. (See Table 263.)
Health Statistics, Issues Across the different groups, those who were born in the United States have the lowest rates of disability across the age groups (U.S. Census 2000). The rates of disability among Panamanians are somewhat higher, followed by immigrants in the aggregate, Latin American immigrants, and finally, Salvadorians, who have the
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Dr. Pablo Pella, originally from Brazil and the Chief Resident of Medicine at Lincoln Hospital in the South Bronx, examines an HIV patient on the hospital’s HIV floor, March 13, 1991. (AP Photo/David Cantor)
highest rates of disabilities. This rank ordering holds true across all age groups. (See Table 264.)
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Personalismo (“formal friendliness”), respeto (respect), confianza (trust), and familismo (closeness to the extended family) are values that are known to be important to Latinos of all national origins, and the people of Panama are no exception (Dean n.d.; Reynolds and Somerville 1972). While there is not enough research on Panamanian Americans to show to what extent these and other cultural values remain important to those that settle in the United States, the fact that these concepts remain salient for Latino Americans of other nationalities suggests that it would endure for Panamanian Americans as well (Caballero 2006). For example, a healthcare study on Panamanian Americans in Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia showed how signs of personalismo, confianza, and respeto can influence a patient’s receptiveness to the recommendations of medical professionals (Purnell 1999).
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Birth/Baptism, Coming of Age, Marriage, Funerals Given the way in which Catholicism permeates mainstream Panamanian culture, certain rites of passage are universally recognized regardless of one’s overall level of devoutness throughout the rest of the year (Library of Congress 1987). In particular, baptism soon after birth, the quinceañeara celebration for females, the sacrament of marriage, and the conferral of the last rites upon one’s death are unquestioned rituals for many Panamanians in the home country (Library of Congress 1987; Seales Soley 2009). Selecting the godparents, or padrino and madrina, for newborn children remains an important custom that Panamanians in the United States continue to practice (Dean n.d.; Seales Soley 2009). Upon the death of loved ones, people in Panama often hold a velorio, or wake, in honor of the deceased (Dean n.d.; Seales Soley 2009). The fact that many churches and businesses throughout the United States cater to Latino communities has enabled Panamanians and other Latinos to continue to practice many of these traditions.
Families and Changing Gender Relations The value of familismo not only emphasizes the importance of being connected to one’s immediate and extended family, but also involves the notion that the interests of the extended family supersede those of the individual (Dean n.d.; Reynolds and Somerville 1972). For example, the nature of the Panamanian kinship system has always responded in supportive ways to relationships that produce children outside of wedlock (Library of Congress 1987; Seales Soley 2009). Traditionally, a single mother and her child(ren) will have the assistance of both her own family and that of the paternal grandparents, sometimes even being taken in by the parents of the father of her child(ren) (Library of Congress 1987; Seales Soley 2010). The proportion of families headed by single mothers has increased within the republic itself and is apparently reflected in the migrant population in the United States (Seales Soley 2009). It is not unusual for single mothers from Latin America and other parts of the world to leave their children with trusted family members when they migrate to the United States to earn money to send back home or to lay the groundwork for bringing their children over eventually; this was particularly the case for some Panamanian families in the 1970s and 1980s (Seales Soley 2009). This may partially account for the trends observed in the 2000 census, in which Panamanian women reported being divorced at much higher rates than other Latin Americans females and all other foreign-born females. This could also contribute to the higher rates of Panamanians who function as primary caregivers for their grandchildren. The concept of machismo exists in Panamanian culture and crosses into the United States with immigrants from that part of the world (Dean n.d.). However, the existence of female-headed households in Panama and the United States surely
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1751
turns this notion on its head to some extent. At this time, there is no research on how life in the United States has influenced gender role norms among Panamanian immigrants.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity The fact that there are many Panamanian American social organizations (discussed later) across the United States indicates a desire to remain connected to Panamanian culture in the new home country. However, this is not the only way in which immigrants retain a sense of cultural identity in their new home. Studies focusing on Panamanian Americans of various backgrounds across the country will be needed in order to truly understand how they nurture their Panamanian identities.
Continued Links to Country of Origin Naturally, Panamanian Americans have been able to sustain ties to their home country by utilizing ever-evolving communication technologies to keep in touch with loved ones in Panama. Trends in remittances, or funds sent back to the home country to assist those left behind, serve as another indicator of the endurance of the ties immigrants hold to their home countries. Panama does not receive nearly as much income from remittances as its Central American neighbors. The first explanation is simply a matter of numbers, since the population of Panamanians in the United States is much smaller than other Central American groups. However, Orozco (2003) found that the per capita remittances to Panama, about $220 per month, were not that far behind the $270 average for remittances to El Salvador. The same characteristics that have made Panamanian history and its emigration patterns differ so greatly from El Salvador and other neighboring countries explains this difference as well. The political and economic instability that has pushed other Central Americans to emigrate has caused the size of these populations to quickly exceed the longer-standing Panamanian community. Furthermore, the situations in their home countries elicited a greater outpouring of sustained support for struggling relations left behind. Orozco (2003) suggests that since Panamanians have a longer history of immigrating to the United States, their longer tenure in the country may correspond to weaker ties to their home country. Another plausible explanation is that Panamanian emigration up through the 1970s, as described by Conniff (1985), may have transplanted entire networks to the United States, meaning that primary familial relations who would ordinarily be the recipient of remittances had eventually migrated as well.
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background There are a good number of Panamanian American organizations across the United States. The activities of these groups serve a range of social, philanthropic, political,
1752 | Panamanian Immigrants
and entrepreneurial missions. The following are a few examples that in no way are meant to capture the diversity of Panamanian American organizations across the country. Groups like the Las Molas Association in Seattle, Washington are possibly the most typical, organizing events recognizing Panamanian holidays and managing an ensemble of members to perform traditional dances (http://www. lasmolasassociation.com/home.html). The Panamanian Nurses Association of the United States is a professional community service organization that was founded in New York in 1979 (http:// www.pnausa.net/). The House of Panama, which is affiliated with the House of Pacific Relations in San Diego’s historic Balboa Park, is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to “present to the public the traditions, music and culture of the Republic of Panama; and to contribute to foster and cultivate a spirit of understanding, tolerance and goodwill between all the national groups residing in the city of San Diego” (http://www.houseofpanama.org). The National Panamanian Friendship Reunion, Inc. hosts a large gathering in a different part of the United States each July, drawing Panamanians that live in the United States, Panama, and elsewhere for a weekend full of informational seminars, cultural programs, and dances (http://www.panamanianre union.org/index.htm).
Religion Like many other Latinos, the majority of Panamanians grow up practicing Roman Catholicism in their home countries. However, there is a sizeable group of people in Panama who practice Protestant as well as non-Christian faiths including Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism (Seales Soley 2009). Like so many other cultural characteristics of Panama, this diversity in faith exists because of the many racial and ethnic communities that have been drawn to Panama throughout its history. Panamanian Americans are typically able to join congregations within the denomination of their choice, allowing them to continue to practice their faiths in the United States.
Language Issues The 2000 Census reveals that almost 71 percent of foreign-born Panamanians speak only English in the home, which is much higher than the rate for all other countries with Spanish as its official language—and for all immigrants in general, for that matter. Of course, there are reasonable explanations as to why the rate is so
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1753
high among Panamanian Americans. The majority of Panamanians have undergone some level of English-language instruction as part of their schooling in the home country. Also, Panamanians have been in the United States longer than many other immigrant groups and do not tend to live in ethnic enclaves; thus a shift towards English might be expected. Furthermore, the strong American presence in Panama, as well as the maintenance of English among the West Indian community, give Panamanians of all backgrounds some level of exposure to the language. Given that Antillean-Panamanians seem to make up a large portion of the Panamanian American population, the linguistic heritage of that community surely influences the high rates of English monolingualism. Keeping in mind that a large share of Panamanian Americans identify as black, Logan’s (2003) finding that “for nearly half the black Hispanic children [in the 2000 Census], one of the parents is non-Hispanic black” may play a role here. If Panamanians are not marrying other Latinos, Spanish is less likely to be used regularly within their households.
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media Just as those first steps towards globalization made the country of Panama the diverse, interoceanic center of trade that it has become today, the shrinking of our social worlds with the growth of the Internet has served to bind the diasporic Panamanian community in interesting ways. Individuals and groups alike have created paper and cyber periodicals that focus on issues and events specific to Panamanians living in the United States. An example is the Panama Cybernews and Noticiero Popular Panameño, which are distributed via e-mail. These two newsletters feature content of general interest to Panamanians, most typically from a West Indian Panamanian viewpoint.
Celebration of National Holidays The various organizations that bring together members of the Panamanian community provide an outlet for panameños in the United States to recognize key holidays from their home country. While they cannot fully recreate the festivities as they once enjoyed them, they have begun to create their own traditions for recognizing dates like the November 3, marking Panama’s separation from Colombia, and December 8, which is Mother’s Day in Panama. Panamanians in New York have been gathering for a Pre-Independence Day Parade (often in October, when the weather is a little more conducive to outside events) for over a decade now. More recently, Panamanian associations in southern California have also organized Panamanian Independence Day parades, holding them in downtown Los Angeles. Christian holidays like Christmas are also celebrated heartily by most Panamanians.
1754 | Panamanian Immigrants
Women carry the Panamanian flag in the Latino Festival parade in Washington, D.C., September 26, 2010. (Richard Gunion/Dreamstime.com)
Foodways Like other immigrant groups, Panamanians in the United States are able to enjoy some of their favorite foods from home by learning where to find the necessary ingredients, and improvising when it is called for. Given the ever-growing diversity of the American people, it is possible to access ethnic ingredients in ethnic grocery stores and even in major supermarket chains. Meals are often served with rice, which at times is combined with kidney beans or pigeon peas and coconut milk (a direct contribution of the West Indian community to the national cuisine) (Dean n.d.). Food makers like Goya are also known for being a consistent source of ethnic ingredients and also produce frozen dishes for reheating. Some members of the Panamanian American community have been known to combine their prowess in the kitchen with an entrepreneurial spirit, preparing large batches of tamales wrapped in banana leaves, empanadas, hojaldas (fried bread dough), and other treats to sell at both formal and informal Panamanian gatherings. These are also the people many Panamanian Americans go to should they choose to leave the catering for a family celebration or other event to someone else.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1755
Music Many Panamanian American organizations across the country assemble folkloric dance groups that perform traditional dances, at times providing their own live musical accompaniment. For example, the Los Angeles area group Viva Panama trains new students interested in learning Panamanian traditional dance and oversees a dance company that has performed across the United States and abroad (http://www.vivapanama.org). While these ballet folklorico groups feature traditional folk music and dress, the people of Panama enter the United States with an appreciation of a wide variety of music, since radio stations in Panama play salsa, merengue, reggae, and the latest hits from the United States, to name a few (Seales Soley 2009). With Panama being home to El General, a Spanish reggae artist that some consider the father of reggaeton, many Panamanian Americans also enjoy the reggaeton music that has become so popular in the last several years (Seales Soley 2009).
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Panamanians have been able to obtain U.S. citizenship in a variety of ways. The heavy presence of Americans in Panama naturally led to many marriages, which gave Panamanian spouses naturalization preference (Orozco 2003). Many Panamanians pursue higher education in the United States and develop personal or work relationships that bridge them from their student visa status to other forms of legal residence and eventually citizenship. Another path to citizenship that likely boosted naturalization rates for Panamanians is their high level of service in the U.S. military. The 1.4 percent of foreign-born Panamanians who reported being on active duty in the 2000 census surpasses the rates for U.S.-born Panamanians (0.6%) and far exceeds Latinos as a group (0.2%) and the total foreign-born population (0.2%). Furthermore, almost 1 out of every 10 foreign-born Panamanian reported being a U.S. military veteran, while just 2 percent of all Latinos and 3 percent of all foreignborn Americans reported having served. Some Panamanians also benefited from the presence of private American employers in the isthmus that would sponsor their entry into the United States (Orozco 2003).
Naturalization Panamanians have significantly higher rates of naturalization than other Latin American immigrant groups (Orozco 2003). Given that Panamanian immigration
1756 | Panamanian Immigrants
to the United States has conformed to a different pattern than the greater Latino and foreign-born populations, the fact that many Panamanians have been in the United States longer than these other groups has given them more time and opportunities to pursue and obtain citizenship. Correspondingly, the average age of 58 for foreign-born Panamanians is much higher than other groups, compared to 30 for Latinos and 40 for the total foreign-born population. About 46 percent of foreignborn Panamanians entered the United States before 1980, while only one-quarter of all Latinos had arrived by that time. Of all foreign-born Americans, 30 percent entered before 1980.
Dual Citizenship Having recognized dual citizenship since 1972, the Republic of Panama is considered to belong to a group of “early adopters” in Latin America for this sort of policy (Jones-Correa 2001; Renshon 2001). The impetus to recognize dual citizenship came from the Panamanian government itself, rather than from the emigrant community abroad, as was the case with other Latin American countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Ecuador (Jones-Correa 2001). In 2007 a decree allowing Panamanian citizens living abroad to cast absentee votes in Panamanian presidential elections was made law, a right they were able to exercise for the first time in 2009 with the election of Guillermo Martinelli (Tribunal Electoral de Panama 2007). In addition to recognizing the American (or other non-Panamanian) citizenship of native-born Panamanians, the government of Panama also extends Panamanian citizenship to the children of Panamanian nationals born outside of the isthmian republic. The law only requires that one of the petitioner’s parents be a citizen of Panama, a relationship that must be confirmed through an official application process.
Intergroup Relations There is much to be learned about how Panamanians have settled into the mosaic of races and cultures in the United States. In a study that drew its participant pool from Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia, Purnell (1999) found that most of his Panamanian American informants tended to reside in predominantly Latino communities. These Panamanian Americans generally worked in the service and agrarian industries, which is less common for Panamanian immigrants than for other Latino immigrants in the United States. The fact that many Panamanians work in professional office settings and live in a variety of neighborhoods across the country indicates they would have considerable contact with whites, African Americans, and other non-Latinos.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1757
Panamanian-born Castalia Haynes and U.S.-born teenager Alexandra Lombardo indicated having diverse friendship circles. Being one of few Latinos in her Seattle-area high school, Alexandra often had to explain to her peers that her Spanish-speaking parents did not come from Mexico, an assumption that they tended to make about all Latinos. (On several occasions she also had to explain that Panama is not a part of Mexico, but a completely separate country.) Castalia, a Bay Area resident who calls herself a “salsa soul sister,” also engaged in a bit of educational outreach when African Americans would ask her about her accent, by explaining a bit about the presence of blacks in Panama and Latin America. Enrique Cobham, a 60-year-old native of Panama now residing in Washington, D.C., was the only one to indicate any sense of outright rejection, stating that even when Latinos realized he is a native Spanish-speaker they would treat him differently than other Latinos because he was black (interviews with the author, February 2010).
Forging a New American Political Identity Unfortunately, little is known about trends of political involvement among Panamanian Americans. However, Jones-Correa (2001) posits that immigrants that become citizens tend to become more involved in the American political sphere. If this rings true for Panamanians in the United States, we should expect to see them active in political movements in various arenas. Nonetheless, aside from their involvement in Central American solidarity movements, much more needs to be learned about the political life of Panamanians in the United States (Priestley 2004). It is also worth noting that many Panamanians have engaged in professional activities that call on their intimate knowledge of the small country. As members of the U.S. military, many Panamanian Americans have played roles in military operations in Panama (Dean n.d.). Panamanian Americans have also provided training and operations assistance to the Drug Enforcement Agency in its attempts to deal with the narcotics trafficking problem (Dean n.d.). Their role in these interventions may have come with considerable conviction or inner conflict.
Political Associations and Organizations Panamanians in the United States have remained engaged with events unfolding in Panama, utilizing their influence as American citizens to serve Panamanian nationalist interests abroad. In particular, Panamanian Americans played a role in the negotiation process leading up to the signing of the Carter-Torrijos treaty. Sociologist George Priestley (2004) asserts that Antillean-Panamanian members of the National Conference of Panamanians in New York were at the forefront of the efforts Panamanians throughout the country made to support the decolonization of the Canal Zone (see also Conniff 1985).
1758 | Panamanian Immigrants
Civic and Electoral Participation The high rates of literacy, education, and citizenship among Panamanian Americans strongly suggests that some portion of that group would take their civic duty as eligible voters to heart. As far as participatory trends for causes related to domestic U.S. issues, more research is needed.
Public Policies and Political Representation Conversations with two first-generation Panamanian Americans yielded diametrically opposed assessments of the importance of engaging in American politics. Enrique spoke of the way he identifies himself in surveys and applications as both a political and economic choice. Though he would never deny his Panamanian background, when he does not have the choice to “mark all that apply” he identifies himself as being black because he feels it is important for that community not to be undercounted and, as a result, penalized in terms of funds allocations. On the other hand, Castalia did not see any significant tension with the greater Latino and black communities in the United States and felt accepted by both groups. When it came to politics, she said she did not follow developments in Panama or the United States. The responses of these two individuals make it clear that Panamanian American involvement in U.S. political and civic life is worthy of further research.
Return Immigration Little is known about return migration to Panama, though Conniff (1985) noted that some Panamanian nationals returned to their home country after the Carter-Torrijos treaty negotiations concluded. Jumping ahead to the present, Panama has become an increasingly popular retirement destination for Americans, but perhaps the underreported part of this story is that a portion of these retirees are native Panamanians returning to their home country. Take for example, Castalia Haynes, who has resided in the United States for over 30 years and emphatically states that as soon as she can afford to retire she will move back to Panama. On the other hand, Enrique Cobham plans to stay in the Washington, D.C., area in order remain close to his children and grandchildren and accommodate the preferences of his American wife. Further research is needed to understand how many Panamanians return to live in Panama, and why.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Research on identity among second-generation Latinos in the United States has shown just how intertwined the concepts of race and ethnicity are for this group,
The Second and Later Generations | 1759
and how other attributes such as education, income, neighborhood type, region of residence, and personal characteristics influence the development of ethnic identity. In general, the literature on second- and later-generation Latinos has captured a range of outcomes that have been conceptualized as segmented assimilation. The primary outcomes are as follows: acculturation into the mainstream, white middleclass culture; poverty in the urban underclass; and economic advancement while remaining tied to the ethnic community (Zhou 1999). In other words, social scientists have come to understand that class positioning is influential in the formation of ethnic identity. Furthermore, research on the interaction between race and ethnicity has shown that perceived racial identity, based on both physical and other cues, also plays a role (Stafford 1987; Waters 1991; Bailey 2001). So what might this mean for Panamanian Americans born and raised in the United States? First, we must remember that Afro-Panamanians have been numerically overrepresented among the waves of Panamanians that have settled in the United States. One out of three foreign-born Panamanians claimed to be black or African American, while only 9 percent of the total Latin American–origin population identified in this way, signaling a substantial departure from the norm. Unfortunately, not much is known about Panamanians who do not identify as black, leaving us to the assumption that they blend into the
Youth Profile Loving Ballet Folklorico Alexandra Lombardo is a 17-year-old high school junior who was born and raised in Washington State. She has been able to learn about the Panamanian culture of her parents as a member of the Las Molas Association. She is a member of their dance ensemble and has performed traditional Panamanian dances for various audiences over the years. Alexandra considers herself to be a typical American teenager and plans to attend an art institute after graduating from high school. Alexandra describes her reaction to being asked to join the ballet folklorico group at the age of 8: “I was excited because my mom had approached me [and told] me, ‘I signed you up for dance.’ . . . I went to one of the performances and . . . I was in complete envy of all the girls with their pretty, long dresses. . . . They’re wearing all these pretty beaded flowers in their hair with their makeup all pretty. They all just looked like princesses. And the way the danced, they danced so elegantly. I was just so excited to do that . . . it was like joining a little group of princesses. That’s the way my mom had made it out to me, that they all were princesses because they were wearing these beautiful things and they got to dance in such beautiful ways.”
1760 | Panamanian Immigrants
larger U.S. Latino population and follow similar trajectories. If Purnell’s (1999) observation of his nonblack respondents in Delaware, Virginia, and Maryland is at all applicable to their counterparts in the rest of the United States, the fact that this group of Panamanians tend to reside in Latino communities suggests that their U.S.-born offspring will follow the general patterns of ethnic identification that have been observed among the greater Latin American–origin second generation. Two second-generation Panamanians whose parents were members of vastly different immigration cohorts exemplify the potential complexity. Both Alexandra Lombardo, 17, and Don Jose Barrelier, 61, have nonblack Panamanian parents (also, Don’s mother was Irish American) and expressed having differing levels of exposure to the Panamanian culture, but basically identified as Americans (interview with Barrelier, February 19, 2010). One research study concerning ethnic identity among second-generation Afro-Panamanians revealed a tendency to identify with African Americans in some situations, while still feeling a connection with Latinos based on culture (Thomas 2008). All of this suggests that further investigation will reveal overarching differences in how black and nonblack members of the second and later generations experience and express their ties to Panama, and how this shapes their ethnic identities.
Educational Attainment Foreign-born Panamanians have much higher rates of secondary and postsecondary schooling under their belts than other Central Americans and all Latinos in general. First-generation Panamanians also tend to earn higher incomes and are more likely to be homeowners than other Latinos. According to segmented assimilation theory, some children of immigrants experience downward mobility into the minority underclass, while others continue to associate closely with the ethnic community as they advance economically (Alba and Nee 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Kalmijn 1996; Zhou 1999). So what does this mean for the U.S.-born children and grandchildren of Panamanians? The fact that a considerable portion of Panamanian Americans racially identify as black makes this quite an open question. Research has shown that second-generation West Indians in New York who fare well do so by taking advantage of the fact that they are able to straddle two worlds and employ the strategies that work best for them (Waters 1999; Kasinitz et al. 2008). It remains to be seen if these and other advantages will bear out for Afro-Panamanian Americans, and if there will be any significant difference in the outcomes of their nonblack counterparts.
Cultural Identification Not all persons who identified themselves as being of Hispanic origin in the 2000 Census indicated their national origin in answering that question. By looking at
Issues in Relations between the United States and Panama | 1761
those who failed to be specific regarding their Hispanic identity but reported Panamanian birth and/or ancestry elsewhere in the survey, Cresce and Ramirez (2003) estimated that the official count of Panamanians in the United States may be underreported by around 20,000. Some may have simply chosen to select a more general descriptor, such as Central American or Hispanic, in one part of the survey but in the answer to another question revealed their connection to Panama. The potential explanations for this are numerous, but it is clear that the small size of the population, its lengthy history of immigration to the United States, and the fact that it is so geographically dispersed and racially heterogeneous suggests that Panamanian American cultural identification will take on many different forms among the U.S.born population.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Panama Forecasts for the 21st Century Perhaps the full autonomy that Panama finally achieved through the transfer of the Panama Canal on December 31, 1999, and the concomitant exit of the last U.S. soldiers makes its citizens less immediately connected to United States. However, the importance of Panama’s strategic location for trade and the ever-growing forces of globalization will continue to keep it well connected to economic superpowers like the United States and China. The initiation of the ambitious project of doubling the width of the Canal in 2006 makes it likely that migration rates will stay low at least until 2014 or 2015, the estimated end of the renovation.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 256 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and selected country of last residence (1930–1999) Region and country of last residence1 Central America
1930–1939
1940–1949
1950–1959
1960–1969
1970–1979
1980–1989
1990–1999
6,840
20,135
40,201
98,560
120,374
339,376
610,189
1762
Belize
193
433
1,133
4,185
6,747
14,964
12,600
Costa Rica
431
1,965
4,044
17,975
12,405
25,017
17,054
El Salvador
597
4,885
5,094
14,405
29,428
137,418
273,017
Guatemala
423
1,303
4,197
14,357
23,837
58,847
126,043
Honduras
679
1,874
5,320
15,078
15,651
39,071
72,880
Panama
405
4,393
7,812
10,383
10,911
31,102
80,446
Nicaragua
1,452
5,282
12,601
22,177
21,395
32,957
28,149
Other Central Amer.
2,660
—
—
—
—
—
—
1. Data for years prior to 1906 refer to country of origin; data from 1906 to 2007 refer to country of last residence. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007.
Table 257 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and selected country of last residence (2000–2007) Region and country of last residence1
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Central America
60,331
72,504
66,298
53,283
61,253
52,629
74,244
53,834
774
982
983
616
888
901
1,263
1,089
Costa Rica
1,390
1,863
1,686
1,322
1,811
2,479
3,459
2,722
El Salvador
22,301
30,876
30,472
27,854
29,297
20,891
31,258
20,009
Guatemala
9,861
13,399
15,870
14,195
18,655
16,468
23,674
17,198
Honduras
5,851
6,546
6,355
4,582
5,339
6,825
8,036
7,300
Nicaragua
18,258
16,908
9,171
3,503
3,842
3,196
4,035
3,587
Panama
1,896
1,930
1,761
1,211
1,421
1,869
2,519
1,929
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Belize
1763
Other Central Amer.
1. Data for years prior to 1906 refer to country of origin; data from 1906 to 2007 refer to country of last residence. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007.
Table 258 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence Total
Male
Female
1,806
714
1,092
15
6
9
California
160
56
104
Colorado
13
5
8
Leading states of residence Arizona
Connecticut
12
5
7
Florida
435
173
262
Georgia
95
39
56
Illinois
37
18
19
Maryland
42
21
21
Massachusetts
37
14
23
Minnesota
10
4
6
Nevada
12
5
7
New Jersey
44
22
22
New York
253
109
144
North Carolina
53
16
37
Ohio
28
13
15
Pennsylvania
25
7
18
Texas
156
61
95
Virginia
67
20
47
Washington
36
14
22
276
106
170
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
1764
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 259 Relative size and composition of first-generation Panamanian American population Panama
El Salvador
Latin America
All Foreign Born
105,175
817,335
16,086,975
31,107,890
Entered 1990 to 2000
27
40
45
42
Entered 1980 to 1989
27
45
30
27
Entered before 1980
46
15
25
30
U.S. Native Born
Size and Composition Total population
250,314,015
RACE One race
90
93
94
94
White
29
35
42
43
Black or African American
34
1
9
7
1765
American Indian and Alaska Native
0
1
1
0
Asian
2
0
1
23
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander
0
0
0
0
Some other race
24
56
41
22
Two or more races
10
7
6
6
Hispanic or Latino (of any race)
78
98
87
46
Not Hispanic or Latino
22
2
13
54
7
1
2
22
Male
37.2
51.5
52.2
49.8
48.9
Female
62.8
48.5
47.8
50.2
51.1
HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN
White alone SEX
Source: Census 2000.
Table 260 Age and family structure of first-generation Panamanian American population Panama
El Salvador
Latin America
42.6
33.6
34.2
37.5
35
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Never married
21.9
34.5
28.3
24.6
27.5
Now married, excluding separated
53.6
53.2
57.7
60.9
53.4
Separated
5.3
4.9
4.2
2.9
2.0
Widowed
6.3
2.4
3.5
5.3
6.8
Female
5.6
2.1
2.9
4.5
5.6
12.9
5.0
6.3
6.3
10.3
Median age (years) 1
MARITAL STATUS
Divorced
1766
Female
All Foreign Born
U.S. Native Born
9.5
3.1
3.8
3.8
5.8
38.1
27.6
29.7
26.4
47.1
Family households (families)
70.6
87.5
84.6
77.6
67.3
With own children under 18 years
37.9
63.1
57.4
45.9
31.8
Married-couple family
40.8
58.6
59.1
59.0
51.7
With own children under 18 years
21.6
45.4
42.6
36.2
22.8
Female householder, no husband present
25.4
17.3
16.1
12.1
11.8
With own children under 18 years
14.2
11.5
10.3
6.9
7.0
Nonfamily households
29.4
12.5
15.4
22.4
32.7
GRANDPARENTS AS CAREGIVERS2 HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE
1. Population 15 years and over. 2. Percentage of grandparents living in household with one or more own grandchildren under 18 years who are responsible for grandchildren. Source: Census 2000.
Table 261 Educational attainment of first-generation Panamanian American population Latin All Foreign U.S. Native Panama El Salvador America Born Born Percent high school graduate or higher
82.7
34.8
43.9
61.8
83.3
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher
22.9
4.9
9.6
24.0
24.5
Source: Census 2000.
Table 262 Economic attainment of first-generation Panamanian American population
Panama
El Salvador
Latin America
All Foreign Born
U.S. Native Born
12.4
19.2
20.7
15.3
8.3
Median family income (dollars)
44,302
32,934
33,421
42,085
50,976
Per capita income (dollars)
23,760
15,437
15,607
21,543
21,592
POVERTY STATUS IN 1999 Families living below poverty
Source: Census 2000.
1767
Table 263 Occupation and income patterns of first-generation Panamanian American population Latin All Foreign U.S. Native Panama El Salvador America Born Born OCCUPATION Management, professional, and related occupations
33.3
9.5
14.3
28.4
34.4
Service occupations
19.4
32.3
25.3
20.0
14.1
Sales and office occupations
30.7
16.3
17.0
19.9
27.6
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
0.1
1.2
3.8
2.0
0.5
Construction, extraction, and maintenance occupations
5.5
16.1
15.3
10.4
9.3
10.9
24.5
24.3
19.2
14.0
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1999 Less than $10,000
12.7
9.3
11.4
11.0
9.4
$10,000 to $14,999
6.2
7.4
7.7
6.8
6.2
$15,000 to $24,999
13.5
16.8
16.9
13.9
12.7
$25,000 to $34,999
13.7
16.9
15.9
13.1
12.8
$35,000 to $49,999
15.4
19.4
17.8
15.9
16.6
$50,000 to $74,999
18.4
17.4
16.5
17.5
19.7
$75,000 to $99,999
9.9
6.8
7.1
9.3
10.3
$100,000 to $149,999
6.8
4.1
4.5
7.6
7.7
$150,000 to $199,999
1.5
0.9
1.1
2.4
2.2
$200,000 or more
1.8
0.9
1.1
2.5
2.4
38,339
34,722
33,519
39,444
42,299
Median household income (dollars) Source: Census 2000.
Appendix III: Notable Panamanian Americans | 1769 Table 264 Disability status of the civilian noninstitutionalized population
Panama
El Salvador
Latin America
All Foreign Born
U.S. Native Born
DISABILITY STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONALIZED POPULATION Population 5 to 20 years With a disability
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
8.8
14.1
12.1
10.5
7.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
With a disability
21.9
27.6
26.3
22.5
18.6
No disability
78.1
72.4
73.7
77.5
81.4
Population 65 years and over 100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
46.8
46.5
42.9
41.8
Population 21 to 64 years
With a disability
42.3
Source: Census 2000.
Appendix III: Notable Panamanian Americans Ruben Blades is a singer, songwriter, composer, actor, and activist who has won several Grammys and Latin Grammys. Blades was part of a generation of musicians that popularized salsa music in the United States and Latin America and is best known for recording one of the best-selling salsa albums of all time, Siembra, with trombonist and bandleader Willie Colon. As an actor, Blades has appeared in several English-language films, as well as the Broadway musical Capeman. Blades, who earned a masters degree in international law from Harvard, has also been active in Panamanian politics, most notably when he ran (and came in third) for president in 1994 and was appointed the minister of tourism in 2004 (Seales Soley 2009). Rod Carew made a big entrance into the world by being born, of all places, on a train in Gatun, Panama, which was then part of the Canal Zone. At the age of 14 he and his family migrated to the United States. An incredibly gifted baseball player, Carew signed with the Minnesota Twins the very day he graduated from high school and went on to play for that team for 12 seasons. He spent another 7 seasons playing for the California Angels. A few of his impressive achievements include being voted Rookie of the Year in 1967 and Most Valuable Player in 1977, having played on 18 All-Star teams, earning the largest all-time total of All-Star votes, and winning seven batting titles. In 1991 Carew became part of an elite group of athletes to be voted into the Hall of Fame on the first ballot. Panama’s national baseball stadium is named after him (Seales Soley 2009; http://www.rodcarew29.com/).
1770 | Panamanian Immigrants
Kenneth Clark was born in the Panama Canal Zone and immigrated to New York with his mother as a young child. He earned his bachelors and masters in psychology from Howard University in Washington, D.C., where he met another psychology student who would become his wife and colleague. After becoming the first African American to earn a PhD from Columbia University, Clark accepted the first permanent professorship to be held by a black scholar at the City College of New York. Together, Kenneth and Mamie Clark conducted many studies exploring the connection between racism, prejudice, and child development and dedicated their careers to establishing and managing programs that addressed the educational needs of New York’s underprivileged black population. They are best known for conducting the famous doll study that helped Thurgood Marshall make his case in the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education hearings, which marked the beginning of the end of segregated schooling in the United States (Klein 2004, http://www.columbia. edu/cu/lweb/digital/collections/nny/clarkk/profile.html). Shoshana Johnson was born in Panama and migrated with her family to the United States at the age of five. After graduating from college Johnson followed in her father’s footsteps and joined the U.S. military. On March 23, 2003, while on deployment in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Army Specialist Johnson was part of a military convoy that was ambushed in the city of an-Nasiriyah. Shocking video images of Johnson and six of her comrades were released by their captors and were proliferated over international media. Thankfully, all seven service members were rescued by a unit of U.S. Marines on April 6, 2003, and returned safely to the United States several days later. Due to her clear African ancestry, Johnson is known as the first African American female prisoner of war in U.S. history. However, her Panamanian parentage and birth probably make her the first Latina to own such a distinction. She has been awarded the U.S. Army Service Ribbon, the Purple Heart Medal, and the Prisoner of War Medal, among other honors, and has been hosted by the president of Panama and the Congressional Black and Hispanic Caucuses (Johnson 2010; http://shoshanajohnson.com). Justine Pasek calls herself a “child of the planet,” which is appropriate given her background and eventual accomplishments. She is the daughter of Stanislaw Pasek, a Polish engineer who worked for the Panama Canal Authority, and Elizabeth Patino, a Panamanian homemaker from Chiriqui. Her parents met while studying chemistry in the Ukraine, and this is where she was born in 1980. In 2003, Justine Pasek became the first Panamanian to win the Miss Universe crown. She now lives in Los Angeles, where she pursues a career in the entertainment industry while maintaining ties with the Panamanian American community (Victor Grimaldo, personal communication, February 9, 2010).
References | 1771
Danilo Perez is a Grammy award–winning pianist, composer, and bandleader that emigrated to the United States from Panama as a young adult. He is known for blending the music of the Americas and other folk and world traditions to yield a genius blend called pan-American jazz. Over his career Perez has performed and collaborated with the biggest names in jazz, such as Terence Blanchard, Paquito D’Rivera, Dizzie Gillespie, Wynton Marsalis, Tito Puente, and Arturo Sandoval. Perez is the president and founder of the Panama Jazz Festival (Seales Soley 2009; http://www.daniloperez.com/ about.aspx). Mariano Rivera, a native of Panama, has spent his entire professional baseball career as a popular player for the New York Yankees. Rivera has been most useful to the team as a relief pitcher and closer. Some critics believe he is one of the greatest relief pitchers of all time and are confident that he will be elected to the Hall of Fame upon retirement (Schwarz 2002; Stewart 2009).
Glossary Confianza: Trust. Empanada: Turnover pastry filled with meat, cheese, or fruit. Familismo: Importance of being connected to one’s immediate and extended family. Hojalda: Fried bread dough. Madrina: Godmother. Padrino: Godfather. Panameño(a): Panamanian. Personalismo: A “formal friendliness” in which interactions between strangers are warm. Quinceañeara: A 15th birthday celebration representing a female’s first introduction to society as a woman. Respeto: Respect. Tamales: A mixture of chicken or pork, onions, olives, and other hot or mild spices stuffed in a cornmeal mixture wrapped in banana leaves, tied with string, then steam cooked. Velorio: A funeral wake.
References Alba, R., and V. Nee. 1997. “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration.” International Migration Review 31: 826–75.
1772 | Panamanian Immigrants Alba, R., and V. Nee. 2003. Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bailey, B. 2001. “Dominican-American Ethnic/Racial Identities and United States Social Categories.” International Migration Review 35 (3): 677–708. Beatty, A. 2007. “Work Starts on Biggest Ever Panama Overhaul.” Reuters, September 4. [Online article; retrieved 3/14/10.] http://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSN0334522620070904. Black, K.J., and E. Flores. 1989. “Historical Setting.” In Panama: A Country Study, edited by S. W. Meditz and D. M. Hanratty. Washington DC: U.S. G.P.O. [Online article; retrieved 3/4/10.] http://lccn.loc.gov/88600486. Byrne, H. 1996. El Salvador’s Civil War: A Study of Revolution. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Caballero, A. E. 2006. “Building Cultural Bridges: Understanding Ethnicity to Improve Acceptance of Insulin Therapy in Type 2 Diabetes.” Ethnicity & Disease 16 (Spring): 559–68. CIA World Factbook. 2010. “Panama.” [Online article; retrieved 3/14/10.] https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pm.html. Conniff, M. 1985. Black Labor on a White Canal. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Cresce, A. R., and R. R. Ramirez. 2003. “Analysis of General Hispanic Responses in Census 2000.” U.S. Census Bureau Population Division, Working Paper No. 72. [Online article; retrieved August 2, 2007.] http://www.census.gov/population/www/documenta tion/twps0072/twps0072.html. Dean, R. S. n.d. “Panamanian-Americans.” [Online article; retrieved September 18, 2007 and February 20, 2010.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Pa-Sp/Panamanian-Amer icans.html. Dixon, D., J. Murray, J. Gelatt, and D. Papademetriou. 2006. America’s Emigrants: US Retirement Migration to Mexico and Panama. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. Edge, S. 2007. “Hats Off to Panama.” The Express, December 12, 34. Guillermoprieto, A. 1994. The Heart That Bleeds: Latin America Now. New York: Vintage. Harding, R. C. 2006. The History of Panama. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Hartson, W. 2007. “Ten Things You Never Knew about Panama.” The Express, December 12, 28. Jones-Correa, M. 2001. “Under Two Flags: Dual Nationality in Latin America and Its Consequences for Naturalization in the United States.” International Migration Review 35 (4): 997–1029. Kalmijn, M. 1996. “The Socioeconomic Assimilation of Caribbean American Blacks.” Social Forces 74 (3): 911–30. Kasinitz, P., J. H. Mollenkopf, M. C. Waters, and J. Holdaway. 2008. Inheriting the City: Children of Immigrants Come of Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
References | 1773 Klein, W. 2004. Toward Humanity and Justice: The Writings of Kenneth B. Clark, Scholar of the 1954 Brown V. Board of Education Decision. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Kluck, P. 1989. “The Society and its Environment.” In Panama: A Country Study, edited by S. W. Meditz and D. M. Hanratty. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. [Online article; retrieved 3/4/10.] http://lccn.loc.gov/88600486. Labrut, M. 1997. Getting to Know Panama. 2nd ed. El Dorado, Panama: Focus Publications. Lefeber, W. 1989. The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press. LeoGrande, W. 1998. Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Library of Congress. 1987. “Panama: A Country Study.” [Online information; retrieved 2/19/10.] http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/patoc.html. Logan, J. 2003. “How Race Counts for Hispanic Americans.” University of Albany, Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research. [Online article; retrieved 3/15/11.] http://mumford.albany.edu/census/BlackLatinoReport/BlackLatino01.htm. Meditz, S. W., and D. M. Hanratty, eds. 1987. Panama: A Country Study. Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress. Mohr, H. 2008. “ICE: Nearly 600 Detained in Mississippi Plant Raid.” USA Today, September 2. [Online article; retrieved 3/19/10.] http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/200808-25-822092385_x.htm. O’Reggio, T. 2006. Between Alienation and Citizenship: The Evolution of Black West Indian Society in Panama 1914–1964. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Orozco, M. 2003. “The Panamanian Diaspora in Perspective.” The Panamá News 9 (13), July 6–19. [Online article; retrieved February 21, 2008.] http://www.thepanamanews. com/pn/v_09/issue_13/business_02.html. “Panama.” 2010. Encyclopædia Britannica. [Online article; retrieved 2/11/10.] http:// search.eb.com/eb/article-41026. Portes, A., and R. Rumbaut. 2001. Legacies: The Stories of the Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Portes, A., and R. Rumbaut. 2006. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press. Priestley, George. 2004. “Antillean-Panamanian or Afro-Panamanian: Political Participation and the Politics of Identity during the Carter-Torrijos Treaty Negotiations.” Transforming Anthropology 12: 50–67. Purnell, Larry. 1999. “Panamanians’ Practices for Health Promotion and the Meaning of Respect Afforded them by Health.” Journal of Transcultural Nursing 10: 331–39. Rehnson, Stanley. 2001. Dual Citizenship and American National Identity. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies. Reynolds, Cecil, and Anderson Somerville. 1972. “Comparative Adolescent Experiences between the United States and Panama.” Adolescence 9 (36): 569–76.
1774 | Panamanian Immigrants Sassen, S. 1996. “Globalization and Its Discontents.” In The Blackwell City Reader, edited by G. Bridge and S. Watson, 161–171. West Sussex, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing. Scranton, M. 1995. “Panama’s First Post-Transition Election.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 37 (1): 69–100. Schwarz, A. 2003. Baseball All-Stars: Today’s Greatest Players. New York: Rosen Publishing. Seales Soley, L. 2009. The Culture and Customs of Panama. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Singer, A. 2007. “Introduction.” In Twenty-First Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America, edited by A. Singer, S. W. Hardwick, and C. B. Bettell, 1–28. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Stafford, S. B. 1987. “The Haitians: The Cultural Meaning of Race and Ethnicity.” In New Immigrants in New York, edited by N. Foner, 131–58. New York: Columbia University Press. Stewart, M. 2009. Baseball. Pleasantville, NY: Gareth Stevens Publishing. Suarez-Orozco, M., C. Suarez-Orozco, and D. B. Qin-Hillard. 2005. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the New Immigrants: Theoretical Perspectives. New York: Routledge. Thomas, Anulkah. 2008. “Lineage and Ethnoracial Identity among Second-Generation Afro-Panamanians.” Masters thesis, Harvard University. Tollefson, S. D. 1989. “The Economy.” In Panama: A Country Study, edited by S. W. Meditz and D. M. Hanratty. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. [Online article; retrieved 2/12/10.] http://lccn.loc.gov/88600486. Tribunal Electoral de Panama. 2007. “Elecciones.” [Online article; retrieved 2/18/10.] http://www.tribunal-electoral.gob.pa/elecciones/voto-extranjero.html. U.S. Census Bureau. 2000. “People Born in Panama.” Tables FBP 1–3. Profile of selected demographic and social characteristics. Washington D.C.: U.S. Census. [Online information; retrieved 3/14/10.] http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/stp159panama.xls. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2007. 2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Table 2: Persons Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status by Region and Selected Country of Last Residence: Fiscal Years 1820 to 2007. [Online information; retrieved 3/10/10.] http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/LPR07.shtm. U.S. Department of State. 2010. “Background Notes: Panama.” [Online information; retrieved 3/24/10.] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2030.htm. Waters, M. C. 1991. “The Role of Lineage in Identity Formation among Black Americans.” Qualitative Sociology 14 (1): 57–76. Waters, M. C. 1999. Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Winner, D. 2008. “Fear Grips Immigrants after Mississippi Plant Raid.” Panama-Guide, September 2.
Further Reading | 1775 Zhou, M. 1999. “Segmented Assimilation: Issues, Controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation.” In The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience, edited by Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Jose DeWind, 196– 211. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Zimbalist, A., and J. Weeks. 1991. Panama at the Crossroads: Economic Development and Political Change in the Twentieth Century. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Further Reading Conniff, Michael. 1985. Black Labor on a White Canal. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Latin American Studies scholar Michael Conniff provides a detailed accounting and analysis of the effort to build the Panama Canal, the diverse groups that came together in the isthmus to realize this project, and the evolution of the small country’s relationship to the United States. Johnson, Shoshana, with M. L. Doyle. I’m Still Standing: From Captive U.S. Soldier to Free Citizen—My Journey Home. New York: Touchstone. Panamanian-born Shoshana Johnson is most often recognized for being the first black female POW in U.S. history and has received honors from a range of groups, including the government of Panama as well as the Congressional Black and Hispanic Caucuses. In I’m Still Standing, the Purple Heart Medal holder shares her life story and wartime experience with the world. Klein, Woody. 2004. Toward Humanity and Justice: The Writings of Kenneth B. Clark, Scholar of the 1954 Brown V. Board of Education Decision. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Dr. Kenneth Clark was born in Panama and immigrated to the United States with his family as a child. In Toward Humanity and Justice, Klein features the writings of the AfroPanamanian psychologist whose research, conducted alongside his wife Dr. Mamie Clark, would lead to one of the most important court decisions in U.S. history. Orozco, Manuel. 2003. “The Panamanian Diaspora in Perspective.” The Panamá News 9 (13), July 6–19. [Online article; retrieved 2/21/08.]. http://www.thepanamanews.com/ pn/v_09/issue_13/business_02.html. This brief piece describes how and why Panamanian immigration to the United States and remittance patterns do not conform so closely to that of other Central American nations (with the exception of Costa Rica). Priestley, George. 2004. “Antillean-Panamanian or Afro-Panamanian: Political Participation and the Politics of Identity during the Carter-Torrijos Treaty Negotiations.” Transforming Anthropology 12: 50–67. The late Dr. George Priestley provides a political and historical analysis of how AfroPanamanians continued to assert and articulate their Panamanian identity through activism in the United States during the Carter-Torrijos treaty talks, which eventually led to the United States deoccupying the Canal Zone and transferring its management over to the Panamanian government.
1776 | Panamanian Immigrants Purnell, Larry. 1999. “Panamanians’ Practices for Health Promotion and the Meaning of Respect Afforded them by Health.” Journal of Transcultural Nursing 10: 331–39. There is little research focusing exclusively on Panamanians in the United States. This contribution from the field of nursing medicine provides much-needed insight into some of the cultural traits and practices particular to this group of Latin American immigrants. Siu, Lok C. D. 2005. Memories of a Future Home: Diasporic Citizenship of Chinese in Panama. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Siu offers an intriguing case study of the Chinese diaspora by focusing on the Chinesedescent communities of Panama. In addition to exploring the meaning of citizenship for this group of Panamanians, Siu also addresses the secondary migration of ChinesePanamanians who moved to the United States.
Peruvian Immigrants by Erika Busse-Cárdenas and Rodrigo Lovatón Dávila
Introduction Records show that the first Peruvians came to the United States to work in the gold mines of California in 1849. However, there is little information about whether they settled down or returned to Peru. There is, however, a record of increasing numbers of Peruvians migrating to the United States after World War II. These numbers have increased steadily since the 1980s due to the economic hyperinflation and political instability that has characterized Peruvian politics. Most Peruvian migration tends to be concentrated in cities such as Los Angeles; Miami; Chicago; Paterson, New Jersey; and New York City and surrounding cities. The 2000 Census registered 233,926 Peruvians, though other estimates indicate that as many as one million reside in the United States. These figures make the United States the primary destination of Peruvian immigrants.
Chronology 1532
Francisco Pizzaro, Diego de Almagro, and Hernando de Luque arrive in what they called Peru. African slaves are reported to have come along with the Spaniards. The Spanish capture Inca Atahualpa in Cajamarca, which leads to the defeat of the Inca Empire by the Spanish. A colonial government is established.
1535
Lima, or the City of Kings, is founded on January 18. Lima later becomes the seat of the Viceroyalty of Peru.
1542
The Spanish Crown creates the Viceroyalty of Peru.
1780–1781 Indigenous rebellion led by Túpac Amaru II, along with other events, creates a favorable climate for emancipating ideas to be developed in Spanish South America. 1821
General Jose de San Martin proclaims the independence of Peru on July 28.
1824
Spanish troops are defeated at the Battle of Ayacucho. 1777
Chronology | 1779
1849
The “Chinese Bill” marks the beginning of Chinese contract laborers’ (or coolies) migration to Peru. Workers are bound to serve Peruvian planters at fixed wages, and food, clothes, and lodging are provided.
1850s
First German migration wave. They later become part of the contract to colonize the central jungle to improve connections between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.
1854
President Ramon Castilla emancipates African slaves.
1860
The first wave of Italians comes during the “Guano Era” (animal manure era). A second wave arrives after World War II.
1866
Spain War—The Battle of May 2, 1866.
1872
Manuel Pardo y Lavalle is elected president. He is the first civilian elected president in Peru.
1879
Spain recognizes Peruvian independence.
1879–1884 War of the Pacific. Peru enters the war in alliance to Bolivia. Peru loses the southern region that includes the department of Tarapacá, the provinces of Tacna and Arica, and the Atacama region. 1899
The first of several waves of Japanese migration arrives in Peru. They come mainly from Okinawa. During World War II many Japanese have their assets expropriated and are deported to the United States.
1941
Ecuadorian-Peruvian War ends with the Rio Protocol establishing the international border between Ecuador and Peru. Although there were two subsequent wars (1981 and 1995), in 1998 these two countries sign a peace agreement.
1948–1949 Migration from Palestine. 1968
General Juan Velasco Alvarado leads a coup d’état overthrowing Fernando Belaunde. Velasco carries out extensive land reform and nationalizes industries, petroleum companies, banks, and mining firms.
1970s
The oil boom attracts Peruvians to Venezuela.
1975
General Morales Bermúdez takes over the presidency of Peru, leading a more conservative presidency, and begins the process of returning to civilian government.
1979
A Constitutional Assembly is created and drafts a new constitution.
1980
Fernando Belaunde is elected president for the second time, and the Shining Path starts its insurgent movement actions.
1780 | Peruvian Immigrants
1985
Alan García is elected president. His term is marked by the nationalization of the bank, and by hyperinflation, which reaches 7,649 percent in 1990. It is also characterized by political instability, especially Shining Path and counterinsurgency military actions. Migration to the United States and elsewhere increases.
1990
Alberto Fujimori is elected president for the first time.
1992
With the support of the military, Fujimori closes down the Congress on April 5 in order to implement the reform efforts that have faced opposition in the first year and a half of his first term in office.
1992
The head of the Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán, is captured, ending one of the bloodiest civil conflicts in Peru.
1993
A new Constitution is drafted.
1996
MRTA takes over the Japanese ambassador’s home in Lima, taking 72 people hostage. They are liberated in May 1997.
2000
Alberto Fujimori vacates the presidential office when making an official visit to Brunei. The president of the Congress, Valentín Paniagua, takes over to lead the Government of the Transition and calls for Presidential Elections to be held in May 2001.
2001
Alejandro Toledo is elected president. His main accomplishment is to keep economic inflation very low.
2001
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is created with support from all political parties.
2003
The Commission submits its Final Report to the President of Peru on August 28, 2003, and presents it to the people of Ayacucho on August 29. Dr Lerner, the Commission chairman, said “The Report we hand in contains a double outrage: that of massive murder, disappearance and torture; and that of indolence, incompetence and indifference of those who could have stopped this humanitarian catastrophe but didn’t.”
2005
Former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori is arrested in Chile.
2006
The United States–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (Tratado de Libre Comercio Perú-Estados Unidos) is signed on April 12, 2006, and ratified by the Peruvian Congress on June 28, 2006. The U.S. House of Representatives ratifies it on November 2, 2007, and the U.S. Senate ratifies it in December 2007. The agreement is implemented on February 1, 2009.
2006
Alan Garcia is elected president for the second time.
Background | 1781
2007
Fujimori is extradited and brought back to Peru on September 22, 2007.
2009
Fujimori is convicted on charges of human rights abuses, murder and kidnapping, abuse of power, embezzlement, corruption, and bribery and sentenced to 25 years in prison.
Background Geography/Population Peru is located on the east coast of South America. To the north, it shares borders with Ecuador (949 miles and 1,398.2 yards) and Colombia (935 miles and 1,410 yards). To the west, Peru is adjacent to Brazil (1,753 miles and 1,439.1 yards); and to the south it shares borders with Bolivia (650 miles and 1,188.1 yards) and Chile (105 miles and 184.6 yards). To the west, there is the Pacific Ocean (1,913 miles and 360.8 yards). It has a perimeter of 6,308 miles and 701 yards. Its continental area is of 798,596.198 square miles, which includes the coastal islands, and the Peruvian area of Lake Titicaca, which is the highest navigable lake. The Peruvian sea is 383,696 square miles (see Cueva 1991). It is worth mentioning that the Amazon River, which has the greatest river flow, originates in Peru. Morphologically, it is divided into three regions. The Andes mountains run parallel to the Pacific Ocean, dividing the country into three geographic regions. The coast, to the west, is a narrow plain, largely arid except for valleys created by seasonal rivers. The highlands is the region of the Andes; it includes the Altiplano plateau, deep two canyons, Colca and Cotahuasi, as well as the highest peak of the country, the 22,204.724-foot Huascarán. The third region is the jungle, a wide expanse of flat terrain covered by the Amazon rainforest that extends east. Almost 60 percent of the country’s area is located within this region. Because Peru is close to the Equator, its climate should be tropical. However, and unlike most other equatorial countries, Peru has a great diversity of climates. Having the influence of the Andes and the Humboldt Current creates the climatic diversity within the country. The costa has moderate temperatures, low precipitations, and high humidity, except for its warmer, wetter northern reaches. In the sierra, rain is frequent during summer, and temperature and humidity diminish with altitude up to the frozen peaks of the Andes. The selva is characterized by heavy rainfall and high temperatures, except for its southernmost part, which has cold winters and seasonal rainfall. Because of its varied geography and climate, Peru is one of the most diverse nations on the planet when it comes to wildlife and microclimates. Peru has high biodiversity, with 21,462 species of plants and animals reported as of 2003; 5,855 of these are indigenous. It has 84 of the 117 life zones,
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making the country very fertile for agriculture. It also produces minerals like copper, silver, and gold. Finally, Peru has about 63 natural areas or conservation units that comprise about 14 percent of the national territory. Administratively, Peru is divided into 24 regions, and the province of Callao. Throughout the nation there are 50 native languages, and Spanish is the official language of Peru. However, Quechua and Aymara are co-official in areas where they are prevalent. According to the 2007 Peruvian census, the population was 28,220,764. The population estimate for 2010 is 29,461,933. Approximately onethird of the population lives in Lima, the capital city. According to the United Nations Development Programme the index of Human Development has deteriorated slightly, from 0.771 to 0.788 from the period 2003 to 2006. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Peru is among the Medium Index of Human Development, in sixth place after Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador. The ratio of population growth is 1.13 for 2010. For 2006 the life expectancy was 71 years (73.6 for women and 68.5 for men).
History As scholars have pointed out, an understanding of the movement of people in and out is essential to comprehend the history of Peru. Although there is not much evidence of movement of people during the cultures prior to the Incas, such as the Mochica, Chavin, Paracas, Nazca, Wari, and Chimú, movement of people was a common practice during the Inca Empire. The Incas emerged in the 15th century and during the span of a century formed the largest empire in pre-Columbian America. Among the different developments the Incas put in place, the most notable were agricultural techniques such as irrigation and terracing. In order to incorporate new conquered territories and their peoples, the Incas used mitimaes, or resettlement of those colonized into the Inca territory. This was a widely practiced aspect of the Incan political economy to diffuse possible rebellions, and to populate regions to increase agricultural productivity. In 1532 a group of Spanish conquistadors and Native Americans led by Francisco Pizarro defeated, captured, and executed the Inca Atahualpa. Pizarro conquered the Incas and imposed Spanish rule. Ten years later, the Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of Peru, which included all of its South American colonies. The Spanish that arrived at this time were fortune-hunters, settlers, administrators, traders, and missionaries who came voluntarily. They were mainly men. According to researchers, after the first 50 years of the Viceroyalty of Peru, the population decreased from about 9 million to 1.1 million. Most people died because of the diseases brought by the conquerors. This not only fostered concubinage and marriages between Spaniards and the indigenous population, but also generated a shortage of labor for the fields. Thus, Peru also participated in the African slave trade.
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After independence from Spain, Peru still relied on slaves until 1854, when President Castilla abolished slavery. Shortage of labor was among several consequences of abolition. This encouraged hacienda owners to contract workers. This time workers came first from China and later from Japan. Because of the conditions of Chinese and Japanese indentured labor, some argue that they lived a slave-like life while in Peru. These workers were domestic servants, sugar and cotton plantation laborers, mine or railroad workers, or collectors of guano (bird manure). Between 1848 and 1874 the Chinese migrated in large numbers to Peru, mainly from the Canton area. These numbers rapidly increased after the abolition of slavery in 1854. This ended in 1874, when the Chinese and Peruvian governments signed an agreement to terminate the labor contract. In the first decade of the 20th century another large wave of Chinese workers came to Peru, this time composed of free rather than indentured workers. From 1874 to 1899, Peruvian land and mine owners drew on the local population to work the fields and mines. This proved to be insufficient, however. In 1899 the first wave of Japanese came to Peru for work. The Japanese continued to come to Peru, and other countries in Latin America, throughout the first half of the 20th century. Peru has the second-largest Japanese community after Brazil in South America. Japanese immigration ceased during World War II because of Peru’s alliance with the Allies against the Axis, and Japanese immigrants in Peru experienced expropriation and deportation during the war. Both the Chinese and Japanese migrations were part of government incentive programs.
Chinese immigrants pick cotton at the foot of the Andes in Vitarte, Peru, about 1907. (Library of Congress)
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Although not new to Peru, after Peruvian independence the country attracted more people from Western European countries. Because of colonization, the Spanish composed the largest immigrant group in Peru. However, in the 1860s, Italians, who previously had composed the second-largest immigrant group, surpassed the Spanish and became the largest group in Peru (Paerregaard 2008a, citing Ciccarelli 1988). There were also immigrants from France, Ireland, England, Portugal, and Germany. The latter group came as groups of settlers that mainly resided in the jungle, but also as individual immigrants. Migration from Europe continued, but in small numbers until World War II. After the war, there are indications of Palestinian migration to Peru. Jews, who compose a large group in Peru to date, have migrated since the Spanish conquerors first arrived. All the different groups of immigrants that have come to Peru over the years have created the networks that Peruvians have used to emigrate to countries like Japan, Italy, or Spain. Along with following social networks, Peruvians have also ventured to other countries seeking better work opportunities. In the 1970s Peruvians ventured to Venezuela during the oil boom, and to countries like the United States, Italy, Spain, Argentina, and Chile, among others. According to researchers, the United States is the main destination for Peruvians. Peruvian migration to the United States has been constant for the past 80 years; however, the composition of these groups have changed. In 1939 the first wave of Peruvians migrated to the United States. This group was small and composed of political refugees that arrived in exile. After World War II, the United States attracted middle- and upper-middle-class Peruvians seeking education. Along with this education migration, during this period there was also a female migration from rural areas in Peru moving to the United States as domestic workers for Peruvian and American families. In the late 1950s and 1960s, working-class men seeking better jobs migrated to the United States. They settled in New Jersey. Some of them moved to the Los Angeles area afterwards. In the 1970s and 1980s Peruvian immigrants tended to settle in southern Florida. The second Belaunde administration (1980–1985), whose first regime had been overthrown by the coup d’état in 1968, adhered to the economic demands of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Democracy came, along with an internal conflict. This conflict was initiated by a radical Maoist group called Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, hereafter SL). SL’s first public action was to burn a poll box in a rural town in the Andes, as a protest against the democratic elections. The civil conflict lasted for 12 years and the toll was about 70,000 casualties. The following government, led by Alan García (1985–1990), sought to solve internal demands through populist programs and special benefits for disadvantaged groups, such as subsidies for poor people. In Garcia’s administration, Peru experienced hyperinflation, which was exacerbated with the civil conflict between
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SL and the military forces. Peruvians decided to seek better opportunities, and in the 1980s the first to leave were those with means. Middle-class Peruvians, mostly from Lima, tended to settle in Southern Florida at that time. In 1990 the vote favored a nontraditional politician, Alberto Fujimori, to run the country. During this period, although the administration contributed to social fragmentation, individualism, and atomization of the state and politics, there was political and economic stability. However, Peruvians continued to migrate to the United States. During this period, Peruvians settled in the southwest of the United States and Washington, D.C.
Causes and Waves of Migration Latin America has shifted from an immigration to an emigration region. This was particularly the case after the economic depression of the 1930s, and after World War II, when South America received a large number of European migrants (Castles and Miller 2003; Altamirano 2000; Bonfiglio 2001). However, since the 1970s, South America has been increasingly sending rather than receiving migrants. This coincides with a declining level of economic performance, rapid growth of the labor force, and political instability. Although Peruvians can be found in most large metropolitan areas, Peruvian migration to the United States is concentrated in cities such as Los Angeles; Miami; Paterson, New Jersey; New York City and surrounding cities; Washington, D.C.; Dallas; and Chicago. This tends to be urban-to-urban migration. There is also a large migration from rural towns in Peru to ranches in the United States. This migration is composed of shepherds working in the U.S. west.
Waves of Immigration As early as 1849, records indicate that the first Peruvians came to the United States to work in the gold mines of California, but there is little information about whether they actually settled down or returned to Peru. There is record of increasing numbers of Peruvians migrating to the United States after World War II. Their number has risen steadily since the 1980s due to the economic hyperinflation and political instability that characterized Peruvian politics. Studies on this migration indicate that it was fostered by social networks (Altamirano 1990). From the 1970s onward, American sheep ranchers in California, Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming started recruiting Peruvians. These migrants came on H-2A visas as sheepherders. Peruvians not only make cheap labor, but they also make isolated, dependent workers who are unfamiliar with their rights and resources in a foreign workplace. In Peru, these migrants were workers
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on the ex-haciendas and peasant communities in the central highlands. Most of the Peruvian sheepherders are from the mining region of Junín (Bedoya 2003). A second group is composed of young women from the highlands who had already migrated to Lima to work as maids. These women have little education. Beginning in the 1950s, employers began bringing them into the United States. In the past five decades these women have built up a network that helps recruit women from Andean villages to Miami and other cities in North America. A third important group is those from the middle class who often arrive without legal status, language skills, or employment sponsorship. Lacking these resources, many have experienced employment instability and downward mobility. As a coping strategy, these middle-class Peruvians view their situation in the United States as temporary, aspire to gain legal status, and are working toward regaining the social status they held in Peru. This group has clearly distinguished themselves from other Peruvians, and they have contributed to the reproduction of the racial and ethnic hierarchy of Peruvian society while in the United States. A fourth type of migration is the so-called brain drain. These are professionals that leave the country to work in low end jobs, or those who transfer their credentials and stay in the United States (Altamirano 2006). In all these cases, social networks have played an important role in Peruvians’ migration choice, as most immigrants have access to family or friends already living in the United States who provide them with an optimistic version of life in the United States.
Demographic Profile Altamirano (1990) identifies several elements that make Peruvian communities into ethnic enclaves: geographical residency, use of Spanish, town of origin in Peru, solidarity among members of the same town of origin, existence of social and cultural organizations, similar occupations, and participation in similar institutions such as school, church, and so on. According to the same author, Peruvians tend to organize themselves in social and cultural organizations composed of only Peruvians or other Latin American people as a mechanism to deal with social discrimination or forced assimilation. This is particularly important for those that come from the working class in Peru, with little cultural and financial capital.
Size and Composition of Community Peruvians in the United States have gone unnoticed by the political, economic, and cultural radar because of their small number relative to other Latin American immigrant groups, yet their historic and continued significance transcends the limited size of the community. The size of the Peruvian community grew from only a few
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thousand to an average close to 400,000 in recent years. The largest numbers of Peruvian migrants are located in Florida, California, New York, and New Jersey, each of them with approximately 50,000 or more people, with other states like Virginia, Texas, Connecticut, or Maryland also holding considerable numbers. The pattern of geographical concentration in these locations is more evident beginning in the 1970s, but even before that states like California or New York had a sizable population of incoming migrants from Peru. In terms of gender composition, there is a similar number of men and women, with a slightly larger proportion of men. This pattern is consistent with the earlier migrants to the United States. Peruvians tend to migrate to large cities because they offer more work opportunities (Altamirano 1990). The 2000 Census registered 233,926 Peruvians, though other estimates indicate as many as one million reside in the United States. Most of them live in five cities: Paterson, New Jersey; Miami, Florida; Los Angeles, California; Chicago, Illinois; and New York, New York. According to the existing data, Paterson hosts the largest number of Peruvian immigrants. At the beginning of the 20th century, due to many subsidiary plants in Peru, Paterson attracted immigrants who worked for the silk industry. Migration to this city has been consistent ever since. Outside of this particular case, Peruvians tend to settle where other Latin American communities have already been established. Close to one-third (30.9%) of the total population of Peruvian emigrants have settled in the United States, constituting the largest Peruvian population in another country (De Los Rios and Rueda 2005). As is the case with many other immigrants from the global south, most Peruvians have come to the United States to work. Because of the economic motivations to migrate, about 35 percent of the Peruvian immigrant population falls between 20 and 39 years of age, and approximately onethird of them are single, according to Census data (2000–2008).
Age and Family Structure The Peruvian migrant population tended to be younger in the earlier waves of migration. According to census data, between 1950 and 1990 most Peruvian migrants were 25 to 40 years old (about 30–40%). In more recent years, perhaps due to aging of the existing migrants from earlier waves, the proportion of those between 40 and 55 years old grew considerably, representing one-third of the total. Another possible explanation is that Peruvian economic migrants tend to come to the United States only after first attempting to make ends meet in Peru. Therefore, the dependency ratio (proportion of dependent household members who are less than 15 or older than 64 years of age to nondependent household members) has slightly decreased, with an average of 0.34 between 1950 and 1990 compared to 0.24 between 2000 and 2008. The characteristics of family structure show two-parent families with older children. Predominantly, there are married-couple families, particularly for those
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households where first- and second-generation Peruvian Americans live together. However, between 20 and 25 percent of the households that have only firstgeneration Peruvian Americans consist of female or male householders living alone. Ethnographic research shows that although for different motivations, both fathers and single mothers migrate to the United States to make ends meet, leaving their families behind. Therefore, as we would expect, the majority of the firstgeneration group report themselves to be married with spouse present, followed by an important proportion of single, never-married persons. The number of own family members and own children in Peruvian households has decreased, particularly children under five years old. Consistent with this last trend, the average age of the youngest and the eldest child in the household is older. In recent years, the age of the youngest child is about 15 years old, while the oldest child tends to be over 18 years old.
Educational Attainment Like many other voluntary migrants, Peruvians have migrated to the United States seeking better education and living conditions. However, they differ from many Latino immigrants in terms of socioeconomic background, because they are better educated. In 2008, 37 percent of first-generation Peruvians in the United States had only completed high school, and 50 percent had either attended college for one to three years or obtained a college degree. Because of their educational background, some researchers have argued that Peruvians mirror those coming from Western European countries and Canada (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Similar characteristics were found for Peruvian immigrants in New York, where 70 percent had a high school or higher education, which was the highest level of education among the Latin American countries with representation in the city (Cordero-Guzmán and Grosfoguel 2000). Despite the higher educational level, it has not translated for the most part into better jobs. The relatively higher educational level of the first-generation group has improved over time. In spite of the fact that in earlier migration waves about 20 to 30 percent of Peruvian Americans 19 years old or older reported having less than a high school education, this proportion is considerably smaller in more recent years. Only 5 to 8 percent of the group 19–35 years old and 9 to 13 percent of the group 36 years old or more report having less than a high school education between 2000 and 2008. Furthermore, in these age groups not only have an average of 40 percent completed high school, but also more than one-third have postsecondary studies that led to a degree. School attendance also improved: between 70 and 90 percent of children less than 18 years old attended school in earlier waves, but that proportion is always larger than 90 percent in later years and even reaches 96 percent in 2008.
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Economic Attainment Occupation and Income Patterns Most Peruvians, in spite of their high labor force participation (Cordero-Guzmán and Grosfoguel 2000), perform jobs from the lower rungs of the occupational ladder (Julca 2001). Further, there is sex segregation in occupations; women tend to work in the service or care sectors (elder- and child care) while men tend to work in construction (Julca 2005). There is also high representation of Peruvians in the service occupations (Cordero-Guzmán and Grosfoguel 2000). In recent years, most first-generation Peruvian Americans earn between $20,000 and $40,000 per year (approximately one-third of them correspond to this earning category); however, there are important proportions of them in the lowest-earning categories, which is consistent with the intermediate skill jobs required where many of them are employed. Most first-generation Peruvian Americans are in the labor force and employed (about two-thirds), work for an employer (85–90%), and work full-time (60%), which have been tendencies even in earlier waves of migration. Even though it might be surprising that about 25 percent are not in the labor force, this number is consistent with the overall U.S. population. In addition, even though small proportions work part-time, a considerable proportion (one-fifth) work more than 40 hours per week. Three occupational categories comprise most of the Peruvian migrant population in the United States: management, professional, and related occupations; services; sales and office. In addition there is a relatively important fourth occupational category: production, transportation, and material moving. While the occupational category of management, professional, and related occupations refers basically to white-collar workers, the remaining categories are intermediately skilled occupations. Surprisingly, despite the documented migration to work as sheepherders, less than one percent of first-generation Peruvian Americans work in farming, fishing, and forestry occupations. In terms of occupational segregation by gender, in the period 2006–2008, the higher proportions of men work in management, professional, and related occupations, and production, transportation, and material moving, while women are mostly occupied in services and sales and office occupations. The most important industries are wholesale and retail trade; and educational, health, and social services; followed by arts and entertainment; professional-scientific; and manufacturing. Between 2000 and 2008 the distributions in each of these occupational categories and industries were largely similar. Since about half of first-generation Peruvian Americans have postsecondary education (with or without a degree), there is therefore a sizable proportion that are working in less-skilled occupations relative to their education. For instance,
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Hermes Carbajal, an immigrant from Peru, is seen in the kitchen of the Heritage Point retirement community where he works in Teaneck, New Jersey, June 5, 2009. (AP Photo/ Mike Derer)
between 2006 and 2008, approximately 60 percent of first-generation Peruvians with postsecondary education and no degree are employed in services, or sales and office occupations, while 40 percent of those with postsecondary education and degree are employed in the same occupational groups. Consistent with these intermediate-skill jobs, where most of the first-generation Peruvian Americans are employed, about half of them earn $20,000 or less a year. In terms of total household income, most first-generation Peruvian families earn between $50,000 and $100,000 (30%) or $25,000 or less (20–25%), which might be related to other sources of income.
Health Statistics and Issues About two-thirds of first-generation Peruvians have access to health insurance, implying that an important proportion of migrants is not covered to receive appropriate health care. Only a small proportion of Peruvian migrants report having either a work or other type of disability. In this respect, we need to consider that reporting of disabilities is not consistent across censuses. Besides work disability (available for most census years), other types include cognitive difficulties, ambulatory difficulties, independent living difficulties, self-care difficulties, and vision or hearing difficulties.
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Adjustment and Adaptation Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Overall, Peruvians comprise a small portion of the Hispanic population in the cities where they are concentrated. However, they are highly organized (into professional, social, and cultural Peruvian American organizations) and highly involved in business and commerce (Altamirano 2000).
Marinera Marinera is a courtship folk dance that is a product of the mestizaje (the mixture of cultures and bloods) of Spanish, African, and indigenous Andean cultures. This is apparent in the instruments used for the music and in the lyrics, along with the attire, ornaments, and steps of the dance. The dance was renamed from Zamacueca to Marinera in 1879, as a tribute to the Peruvian Navy, during the War of the Pacific (Aguilar 1998). The dance itself has an open chorography performed by a couple, but this must be performed within certain rules. Thus the dance draws on dancers’ creativity in combining steps, footwork, and following the rhythm of the melody. Further, it is a dance of the town or city, rather than of the peasantry. Although it was popular and heavily associated with Peruvian national pride, Marinera was not danced much after the War of the Pacific. Marinera reemerged in 1962 (Aguilar 1998). The content of Marinera refers to a courtship dance between a male landlord and a female peasant. It is about the (impossible) romance, shown through challenge and truce, with no physical contact. There are different dancing styles associated with different regions of Peru. The most popular version of Marinera is the one from the northern coast of Peru, which is more vivacious than the other styles. It is called Marinera Norteña. Due to several factors, this dance has become institutionalized. There has been a National Marinera Tournament and Festival since 1959, organized by Club Libertad and recognized by a Ministerial Resolution—Ministry of Education (June 17, 1969—Res Dic # 1441). In addition, there are organizations of Peruvians in other countries who organize tournaments and festivals, create dance schools, and have Marinera champions teach the dance in the United States and Europe (Burmester and Burmester 2000). Marinera is a counterpoint dance between the woman and the man, a fact expressed in the melody as well. The structure of Marinera is made up of seven sections: (1) calling or invitation; (2) stroll; (3) waiting; (4) first greeting/salute (flirting with facial gestures and movements of the handkerchiefs); (5) second greeting/salute; (6) talking (chatting) when dancers get to know their opponent, discrete at first but more daring/audacious as the dance goes on; and (7) escaping, when the dancers show their footwork (tapping), and the intensity of the
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footwork crescendos. At the end, the man does not surrender to the woman. The woman, in turn, insinuates and suggests with her skirt, without showing her legs (or thighs) or making overly large gestures. Even though this section of the dance is called “escaping” it is more as if the woman feels besieged and presents herself as aloof. In the dance, the use of the handkerchief is indispensable because it is the way in which dancers communicate. It is the means of the Marinera language. Further, it has to be used properly, that is, delicately with a good sense of opportunity. After the “escaping” comes “the second.” This part begins when the man accompanies the female dancer to the point in which she began “the first” dance. This is done in a very knightly (noble and chivalrous) manner. The music marks each of these three moments. The dance ends with the couple facing each other very closely (without any physical contact). When one thinks that the dance is over, the drums announce a second round of all three sections of the dance. Each section of the dance has a repertoire of steps, for women and for men, all of them requiring control of the arms (handkerchiefs and hat or skirt), the feet, the face, and body posture. When possible, there is a band composed of three instruments: cajón (wooden box), guitar, and a trumpet. These instruments create a very upbeat, lively, and passionate music. Marinera is a well-established practice in the Peruvian ethnic community in the United States—it is Peruvian dance par excellence. For instance, Marinera is performed in all ethnic celebrations in Paterson and in other cities in northern New Jersey. This is not to say that Marinera is the only such dance, but rather that it is the one that is always performed. This holds true for civic, family, social, and religious celebrations. Several dance schools have emerged only to disappear shortly after, and very few remain. Despite the life duration of dance schools, all of them have offered Marinera lessons. Further, the Peruvian civic organization Peruvian Parade Inc., in charge of organizing the Peruvian Independence Day Parade in July, has also organized a Marinera tournament every year since 1995. This arguably has made the dance more prevalent in the area. There are several schools in Paterson and nearby cities. The first school was founded in 1999 by three professional dancers from Peru, who had launched a Peruvian folk group in New York in 1991.
Religion One way to retain a sense of Peruvian identity is through religion. Like many other Latino immigrants, Peruvians are more likely to organize themselves within cultural rather than political spaces. One type of cultural organization revolves around religion. As such, religiosity has been the most common site to study the extent to which Peruvians retain their national identity and/or assimilate into U.S. society. Peruvians in the United States are disproportionately Catholic, which is not surprising as it is the dominant religion of Peru (Ruíz Baía 2001; Paerregaard 2008b).
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However, there is a rapid growth of evangelical Protestantism, and particularly Pentecostalism. This conversion appears to play an important role in the construction of community and collective identity in the United States, as it combines liberation from the hierarchical world of Latin American Catholicism with Anglo values of freedom of conscience and action (Vásquez 1999). In short, religion could be a vehicle to both integration into U.S. society and breaking out of Peruvian social hierarchies. Regarding the maintenance of national identity, there is a line of research that follows those Peruvians who remain Catholic. They have brought to the United States certain religious practices, such as brotherhoods of the Lord of the Miracles, a popular Peruvian tradition. Here religiosity works for Peruvians as a vehicle for maintaining Peruvian culture in the United States and for negotiating and reconstructing identity. At any rate, religious groups appear to be the spaces through which Peruvians, women and men, negotiate their ethnic identity, whether as Latinos or as Peruvians. Whether Peruvians will assimilate into the U.S. society remains to be seen.
Language Issues According to Altamirano (1990), the Spanish language is a crucial factor for integration that may strengthen solidarity among Peruvians. This is particularly important in an ethnic enclave. Altamirano indicates that Peruvian tend to go back to the enclave as a mechanism to deal with marginalization and discrimination due to, among other factors, lack of knowledge of English. Staying in the ethnic enclave, Peruvians do not need to learn English. Although Peruvians can get by speaking Spanish, Altamirano indicates that not learning English limits immigrants’ possibilities to get better jobs. According to census data, however, most first-generation Peruvians are fluent in English (45%) or speak it well (25–30%) and only a small proportion (less than 10%) do not speak English. This trend is similar for all the census data years available, between 1980 and 2008. A possible explanation for these contradictory results could be underreporting by the immigrant community. Those Peruvians who do fill out the census could be those already established and who are fluent in English.
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media In Passaic County alone there are three Peruvian biweekly newspapers: Amauta, El Chasqui, and Campana News. There are also several newspapers that are for the Latino community in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. In every region where there is a high concentration of Peruvians, there is a Peruvian newspaper. Via the print press, along with Web sites and listservs, Peruvians remain informed of what is happening in the area where they live.
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Celebration of National Holidays The most important civic celebration is the Independence Day Parade/Festival that takes place in July, close to July 28—Peruvian Independence Day. However, the most well-attended celebration is the procession of the Lord of the Miracles Brotherhood, which takes place throughout the month of October. There are also new celebrations, albeit smaller in the number of attendees, that are becoming important. One of these is the celebration of the Virgin of Chapi—a regional Catholic celebration from Arequipa.
Foodways In areas of high concentration of Peruvians there are numerous restaurants, bakeries, and coffee shops that offer a variety of traditional Peruvian dishes, pastries, and delicacies. Cities like New York City; Paterson, New Jersey; Chicago; Los Angeles; Miami; and Washington, D.C., offer the largest number of restaurants. Some of these cater to Peruvian immigrants that miss Peruvian food. However, recently
The Lord of the Miracles Procession in Paterson, New Jersey, passing on Main Street in 2006. The procession was organized by the Brotherhood of Paterson at St John’s Cathedral. (Courtesy of Erika Busse)
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Peruvian chefs like Gaston Acurio are opening restaurants like La Mar in San Francisco. These high-end restaurants are bringing Peruvian cuisine to a larger audience. Popular dishes include ceviche, pollo a la brasa (rotisserie chicken), and cuasa.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship According to Altamirano (1990), Peruvians tend to assimilate into the U.S. culture through their work, schools, church, and the Hispanic community. The percentage of first-generation Peruvian Americans who are not citizens represents more than a half of the total (50–60%), even though this number has decreased over time. Only about 40 percent of them obtained citizenship through naturalization. In recent years (2000–2008), most first-generation Peruvian Americans report that they have been living in the United States between 1 and 5 years (16–25%) or 11 and 20 years (about 30%). There are not many previous years of data available, but even in the beginning of the 20th century a considerable percentage of people reported between 6 and 20 years in the United States.
Carlos Sialer of Peru takes the oath of allegiance during the 22nd Annual Naturalization Ceremony in Seattle, Washington, July 4, 2006. (AP Photo/Jim Bryant)
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Forging a New American Political Identity Peruvian American Political Action Committee of New Jersey (PAPAC) in Paterson is a good example of a political organization that fosters Peruvian political participation in the United States. It is a member of Peruvian American Political Organizations—U.S.A. (PAPO-USA). Both organizations are also interested in participating in politics in Peru that pertain to Peruvian American individuals and businesses. They have been supporting municipal, state, and federal politics. In so doing, Peruvians are gaining political representation at the municipality level in cities in northern New Jersey, such as Paterson, Saddle Brook, and Prospect Park.
The Second and Later Generations Size and Composition of Community According to the census data from 2000 to 2008, the largest concentrations of second-generation Peruvian Americans, similar to the first generation, are found in the states of California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Texas, and Virginia. In 2008, census data shows an approximate 270,000 individuals of Peruvian descent in the United States. It is worth noting is that the distribution of the second-generation Peruvian population is even by gender in the more recent years analyzed.
Youth Profile A Successful Businessman Keeps Ties to Peruvian Community Jose came to the United States from a small town where most of his extended family also lived, about 100 miles north of Lima (the capital of Peru). He was 11, and he arrived along with his mother and siblings. They left Peru to join his father, who had migrated a year earlier. Migration changed the family arrangements, among other aspects of their life, so his family had to adjust to a new way of life. Jose recalls that his mom, with the help of his father’s remittances, had started a small business in Peru. This business, which she ran until the time she and her children moved to the United States, not only served as another source of income for the family, but also gave Jose’s mom the skills and confidence to get a job when she would later arrive in Paterson, New Jersey. Jose remembers that his mom and dad’s determination to succeed, above all obstacles, was a great example of love, courage, and strength, values that he strongly practices today. Jose has two younger siblings. They were seven and six at the time of the family’s migration. Upon arriving in the United States, Jose had to quickly learn
The Second and Later Generations | 1797
a new language and adapt to a new way of life. For Jose, Paterson was an example of a melting pot. Although there is a strong Peruvian community in this city, there were young kids from other countries as well. Jose’s hard work earned him academic and soccer scholarships, which guaranteed that his parents would not have to spend much on his expenses for college. His two other siblings also followed Jose’s path and have both earned college degrees. He ultimately earned a bachelor of science (BS) degree in business and finance, with a concentration in management at a university in Maryland. He furthered his education by earning a master’s in business administration (MBA) in international business in a prestigious graduate program in Maryland. Jose looks back at his education experience and mentions that Paterson was a place where he learned most about ethnic diversity. Networking with people from different socioeconomic backgrounds enriched his knowledge about all the great qualities each person can add to his life. After he graduated from college, his first professional job was at a financial firm. Since then, he has worked at other large multinational and small companies in the New York/New Jersey area. He currently works in sales and marketing with pharmaceutical, medical device, and biotechnology companies all across the United States. He lives with his wife and son in the Upper East side of Manhattan, while his parents live close by in northern New Jersey. He is a proud father and he enjoys soccer, golf, and sailing. Throughout his life, Jose has been asked the question: What is your nationality? Where do you come from? Although most of Jose’s upbringing has been in the United States, and even though most of his personal and professional life is spent outside of the Peruvian community, he has managed to give back to the Peruvian community that welcomed him in the United States by participating in civic and ethnic Peruvian organizations, where he has volunteered his professionalism, experience, and knowledge. Even though his current busy life keeps him from more actively participating, he finds a way to enjoy his beloved Peruvian cuisine, as well as other cuisines, as much as he can by eating out and making dishes at home for his family.
Age and Family Structure Second-generation Peruvian Americans are mostly under 15 years old (60–65%), although there are considerable proportions between 15 and 25 years old (about 20%) and between 25 and 40 years old (10–15%). The characteristics of family structure for this group show that they are living in families with both parents present, remain single more frequently than the first-generation group, and have progressively less children. In general, this group lives in family households with both the head and spouse present, though a growing number live with single mothers (i.e., female householders with no husband present). Consistent with their age, almost 90 percent of the second-generation Peruvian Americans in each census year
1798 | Peruvian Immigrants
report that they are single and have never been married. Furthermore, if we compare the period between 1950 and 1970 with later years, we observe that there is a decreasing trend in the number of own children in the household, as well as the number of own children under five years old.
Educational Attainment The second-generation group also has a high education level, which has improved over time. In earlier years, throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, a considerable percentage of the group between 19 and 35 years old had not completed high school. However, after 1980 and in more recent years, this percentage drops to 5–10 percent and could be as low as 4–5 percent. In turn, compared to a proportion of people with some postsecondary studies in 1950 (about 30%), there are a significantly higher number with this education level beginning in 1990 (between 60–70%). Even though there is also an increasing proportion of persons completing high school for the 36-years-old-or-more groups, the percentage of people with postsecondary studies is lower in this age group compared to the younger group. Similar to the first-generation Peruvian Americans, school attendance increased considerably from about 70 percent in 1980–1990 to 90 percent after 2000. This could be explained by the fact that parents migrated to provide better opportunities for their children.
Economic Attainment Compared to the first generation, there are higher proportions of second-generation Peruvian Americans who are in the lowest wage category. In terms of their labor market participation, most of the second-generation Peruvian Americans are in the labor force and employed (approximately 60%), work for an employer (90–95%), are employed most of the year (about 50% work 50–52 weeks), and work full time (50%). These tendencies are similar even in earlier census years (from 1950 to 1990), probably with the exception of the lower employment rates in 1950 or before. This group also has an important proportion of persons working more than 40 hours per week, which represent approximately 15–25 percent between 1990 and 2008. The second-generation Peruvian Americans are distributed mostly in four industries: wholesale and retail trade; professional-scientific; educational, health, and social services; and arts, entertainment, and related activities. These four industries represent more than 60 percent of the working second-generation Peruvian Americans. Similar to the first generation, most of them are employed in the following occupations: management, professional, and related occupations; services; and sales and office, which represent more than 80 percent of the total. In this case
Issues in Relations between the United States and Peru | 1799
there is less occupational segregation, since the proportions for each of these occupational groups are largely similar across gender. The distribution by industry and occupation each year is very similar between 2000 and 2008. For this group, it is also expected that some of those working are in less-skilled occupations with respect to their education level. Similarly to the first-generation group, for example, there is an important proportion of those with postsecondary education employed in services or sales and office occupations.
Health Statistics and Issues Most second-generation Peruvian Americans have access to health insurance. For 2008, 82 percent report that they have some type of health insurance. Even though there is some incidence of disabilities (either working or other type), this proportion (around 5%) is even lower than for first-generation Peruvian Americans.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Peru On April 12, 2006, the United States and Peru signed the Trade Promotion Agreement. The goal of this agreement is to eliminate barriers to goods and services, promote economic growth, and expand trade between the two countries. The expectation is that this agreement would strengthen the ties between the United States and Peru.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 265a Population by state, first-generation Peruvians 1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Alabama
0
0
0
100
0
0
60
115
1,230
1,544
1,139
1,222
611
566
Alaska
0
0
0
0
171
154
145
168
301
545
0
441
740
694
Arizona
0
0
0
300
1,989
0
2,178
892
1,726
4,961
2,279
2,583
5,226
3,428
Arkansas
0
0
0
100
0
0
2,035
0
939
429
305
569
178
1,216
California
636
796
6,400
12,600
43,602
46,431
68,554
57,985
61,809
80,063
63,508
66,983
68,000
72,430
Colorado
0
100
300
600
1,230
11,357
2,723
3,204
2,938
4,732
2,601
2,505
4,136
3,148
166
0
300
1,100
2,086
2,549
5,897
6,454
8,565
6,017
10,269
9,955
14,129
11,570
0
0
0
400
0
2,044
274
94
101
164
478
848
374
1,086
462
0
0
0
744
1,475
1,237
1,126
1,101
1,869
1,168
644
1,035
1,183
Florida
0
299
2,200
4,700
19,824
34,566
50,930
61,426
59,460
65,255
72,304
75,622
82,853
80,906
Georgia
0
0
0
200
980
3,322
4,436
3,442
3,571
3,654
6,900
7,128
9,238
6,289
Hawaii
0
0
0
0
98
0
177
100
161
0
644
480
440
1,529
Idaho
0
0
0
100
0
0
178
0
1,659
948
457
61
1,746
1,006
Illinois
0
693
2,200
1,900
4,920
14,592
5,267
6,603
4,678
6,910
7,169
8,392
8,754
8,240
Indiana
82
100
100
0
64
0
0
376
1,,137
1,390
2,784
2,385
1,606
687
Iowa
66
99
0
0
0
0
0
426
211
0
0
0
255
468
Kansas
0
0
0
100
270
0
0
491
264
0
365
390
488
344
Kentucky
0
0
100
100
558
0
583
0
616
171
455
773
592
67
Louisiana
0
100
0
100
120
1,075
542
210
1,659
803
484
197
1,227
1,326
Maine
0
0
0
0
44
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
319
Maryland
0
200
600
1,600
4,676
6,756
10,394
11,198
11,368
8,514
8,263
9,854
12,436
10,158
Connecticut Delaware
1800
District of Columbia
Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi
66
396
100
800
3,744
1,289
2,515
5,231
6,596
3,677
6,937
5,858
7,231
7,397
110
100
600
700
171
1,844
1,638
497
2,197
1,600
2,520
338
1,664
1,571
0
0
1,000
0
414
632
355
417
278
1,390
1,870
454
885
2,391
0
0
0
0
135
0
192
122
105
0
846
0
105
522
Missouri
55
0
200
100
170
0
1,068
182
856
124
863
454
945
665
Montana
0
0
0
0
0
369
104
86
194
0
558
56
24
0
Nebraska
0
0
0
0
0
0
546
201
280
0
708
372
2,316
0
Nevada
0
0
0
0
117
0
878
1,976
2,374
2,872
3,373
3,443
3,645
4,357
New Hampshire
0
0
0
0
306
0
0
263
466
108
196
623
164
251
232
495
800
5,800
25,701
32,961
45,710
69,402
58,086
38,858
53,394
59,122
63,989
48,543
New Jersey New Mexico
1801
0
0
0
0
450
0
649
0
350
824
90
637
541
480
1,133
1,493
4,200
12,400
26,782
34,297
46,363
50,975
50,267
47,922
60,400
55,157
51,989
50,338
North Carolina
0
0
0
600
510
570
2,779
1,271
3,076
1,867
5,268
3,867
7,392
5,126
North Dakota
0
0
0
0
0
0
36
65
0
0
0
0
268
0
Ohio
0
198
900
400
1,696
627
1,331
2,218
2,139
983
1,682
2,459
3,798
3,537
Oklahoma
0
0
100
100
238
0
2,821
685
3,103
727
1,018
1,641
452
1,013
Oregon
0
99
400
200
672
0
3,059
390
451
844
3,259
1,608
2,179
2,353
Pennsylvania
0
0
300
300
2,142
3,135
1,776
2,143
1,999
3,548
4,872
4,090
6,931
2,800
Rhode Island
0
0
0
0
611
0
234
1,849
785
418
163
425
1,247
1,659
South Carolina
0
0
0
200
255
1,272
857
256
695
491
293
1,024
1,209
1,554
South Dakota
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
71
Tennessee
0
0
200
100
420
614
0
225
457
692
617
1,646
1,081
985
Texas
66
200
1,200
1,900
7,518
10,375
13,234
17,427
12,706
14,918
18,312
15,733
14,606
22,202
Utah
0
0
200
0
714
0
458
7,952
2,419
2,410
4,191
4,653
3,176
5,435
New York
(Continued )
Table 265a Population by state, first-generation Peruvians (Continued)
1802
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
Vermont
0
0
0
0
0
1,161
29
185
58
50
0
347
0
37
Virginia
0
200
500
1,700
5,610
10,008
15,604
15,101
20,909
21,403
22,363
20,839
24,533
21,603
Washington
0
0
0
500
315
1,104
1,447
1,861
4,602
4,177
4,447
3,266
2,175
3,215
West Virginia
0
0
0
0
0
0
104
133
94
59
131
168
45
0
Wisconsin
0
0
100
200
312
0
2,325
0
1,637
110
1,060
574
3,193
2,473
Wyoming
0
0
0
0
108
0
48
0
20
0
0
573
56
193
State not identified
0
0
0
100
189
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Table 265b Population by state, second-generation Peruvians 1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
Alabama
0
0
0
Alaska
0
0
0
Arizona
0
0
Arkansas
0
California Colorado Connecticut
2003
2004
2005
0
0
760
1,569
203
928
954
447
0
38
0
363
0
266
462
473
0
100
910
2,046
1,447
867
615
5,338
2,625
0
0
0
0
0
289
0
78
260
586
3,085
6,600
10,800
20,579
16,837
47,950
58,113
38,583
0
200
500
200
975
2,400
1,124
997
785
0
0
300
1,100
2,380
3,238
2,344
3,884
5,265
2006
2007
2008
349
306
1,066
214
403
527
3,576
2,609
2,471
0
229
0
468
61,295
42,564
48,834
50,615
49,359
662
1,520
2,721
2,987
2,717
5,238
5,222
6,800
5,018
5,123
1803
Delaware
0
0
0
200
0
557
88
104
136
426
306
760
57
23
District of Columbia
0
0
0
100
372
457
388
448
647
559
301
645
639
339
Florida
0
699
1,000
2,300
9,204
16,184
32,083
29,316
30,547
27,410
38,692
41,052
46,424
46,710
Georgia
0
0
0
300
462
1,935
3,029
3,325
1,744
1,515
3,317
2,485
5,516
9,128
Hawaii
0
0
200
0
0
0
1,077
64
289
508
544
0
348
536
Idaho
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
60
36
881
42
105
911
1,078
Illinois
0
397
1,200
1,600
2,310
4,563
2,475
4,149
4,547
11,926
6,745
5,631
5,737
8,529
Indiana
0
300
400
0
96
0
299
1,382
1,293
1,726
548
2,156
752
1,054
Iowa
0
198
0
0
0
0
112
0
85
0
0
0
130
1,014
330
0
0
200
234
0
0
0
157
0
429
653
414
189
Kentucky
0
0
0
0
270
0
349
0
122
803
630
410
509
262
Louisiana
330
0
0
0
255
4,243
829
0
317
671
373
76
835
358
0
0
0
0
110
0
306
83
115
0
0
590
0
616
Kansas
Maine Maryland
328
0
400
1,100
2,240
3,848
4,746
8,501
3,698
2,372
5,326
6,472
5,282
7,254
Massachusetts
264
299
0
800
2,301
1,202
884
2,806
3,279
3,359
2,698
1,922
2,421
4,576 (Continued )
Table 265b Population by state, second-generation Peruvians (Continued) 1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
220
100
1,100
300
0
1,441
2,006
450
1,655
1,807
1,023
304
826
1,463
Minnesota
0
0
100
0
805
2,071
509
396
211
474
1,228
595
1,044
1,365
Mississippi
0
0
0
0
0
0
709
72
185
296
211
0
122
312
Missouri
0
0
300
0
221
2,529
1,949
216
1,968
522
945
740
1,327
435
Montana
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
216
361
127
309
36
Nebraska
0
0
0
0
210
0
245
97
351
239
68
0
450
262
Nevada
0
0
0
0
520
0
670
2,101
1,541
1,606
1,912
1,824
1,511
3,222
Michigan
New Hampshire New Jersey
1804
New Mexico New York
0
0
0
0
510
0
0
501
418
0
204
0
495
106
166
299
900
3,500
11,544
12,812
16,886
36,247
24,924
27,985
23,504
32,252
35,732
33,821
0
0
0
0
60
0
1,019
0
1,303
284
200
398
1,184
1,024
1,159
2,497
3,200
8,300
10,164
27,702
23,720
24,838
20,282
34,629
32,046
31,767
28,333
28,863
North Carolina
0
0
0
500
285
0
2,090
3,509
767
4,077
3,695
3,030
4,791
4,066
North Dakota
0
0
0
0
0
0
99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Ohio
0
0
1,600
700
2,288
0
374
1,068
1,138
1,308
559
1,196
1,743
2,296
Oklahoma
0
0
0
0
357
0
147
162
2,323
1,192
1,089
460
630
504
Oregon
0
597
300
100
400
1,195
645
473
0
682
1,019
751
1,097
2,449
Pennsylvania
0
300
1,400
400
1,080
0
724
3,024
2,076
4,038
2,340
2,873
2,288
3,861
Rhode Island
0
0
0
0
416
0
156
869
884
784
339
0
712
568
South Carolina
0
0
0
0
510
448
657
282
264
0
1,231
391
368
586
South Dakota
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
159
Tennessee
0
0
300
200
555
838
415
607
371
1,077
711
1,195
1,330
1,469
Texas
0
596
900
1,900
3,122
11,698
7,438
9,344
6,894
14,796
8,869
11,687
7,497
16,678
Utah
0
0
400
0
663
0
942
5,012
2,143
1,825
2,037
1,664
1,646
4,139
Vermont
0
0
0
0
0
825
28
248
0
0
0
107
475
0
Virginia
83
199
200
1,100
3,210
7,833
5,986
5,280
7,095
7,892
13,468
11,256
11,423
12,573
Washington
0
0
0
800
810
4,122
320
2,287
3,563
3,447
2,144
1,805
2,981
3,864
West Virginia
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
213
76
144
0
109
0
0
Wisconsin
0
0
100
100
144
0
0
0
1,053
1,178
195
335
2,145
524
Wyoming
0
0
0
0
0
164
61
29
58
0
0
0
0
0
State not identified
0
0
0
0
225
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
1805
Table 266a Population by gender (%), first-generation Peruvians
1806
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total
3,074
5,568
23,000
50,100
160,676
224,579
301,770
335,423
340,693
338,041
381,003
380,459
419,903
397,431
Male
1,601
2,885
12,800
26,400
81,340
117,870
157,260
177,643
175,821
185,512
192,486
201,987
218,896
210,138
%
52.08
51.81
55.65
52.69
50.62
52.48
52.11
52.96
51.61
54.88
50.52
53.09
52.13
52.87
Female
1,473
2,683
10,200
23,700
79,336
106,709
144,510
157,780
164,872
152,529
188,517
178,472
201,007
187,293
%
47.92
48.19
44.35
47.31
49.38
47.52
47.89
47.04
48.39
45.12
49.48
46.91
47.87
47.13
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 266b Population by gender (%),second-generation Peruvians
1807
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total
3,466
9,766
21,400
36,700
80,835
131,948
169,546
211,627
175,075
236,863
212,200
230,546
242,372
268,042
Male
1,729
5,577
10,000
17,400
39,438
70,682
80,419
103,578
82,843
119,249
98,743
115,590
121,304
133,044
%
49.88
57.11
46.73
47.41
48.79
53.57
47.43
48.94
47.32
50.35
46.53
50.14
50.05
49.64
Female
1,737
4,189
11,400
19,300
41,397
61,266
89,127
108,049
92,232
117,614
113,457
114,956
121,068
134,998
%
50.12
42.89
53.27
52.59
51.21
46.43
52.57
51.06
52.68
49.65
53.47
49.86
49.95
50.36
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 267a Population by age (%), first-generation Peruvians 1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
32.8
10.7
25.2
10.4
9.8
9.1
7.2
6.2
8.6
6.3
7.0
5.4
6.0
6.4
15-25
8.8
19.7
16.5
14.8
13.9
9.2
13.3
10.9
13.1
11.6
10.4
12.4
11.2
10.0
25-40
28.8
39.3
40.0
45.5
41.2
33.0
35.5
32.2
33.9
33.8
33.6
30.4
30.8
28.5
40-55
11.1
19.6
13.0
19.4
21.1
37.3
27.9
30.7
27.8
32.5
30.3
30.5
30.1
33.0
55 or more
18.5
10.7
5.2
10.0
14.1
11.5
16.1
20.0
16.5
15.9
18.7
21.2
22.0
22.1
Under 15
1808
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota
Table 267b Population by age (%),second-generation Peruvians
1809
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Under 15
40.5
45.9
56.5
80.1
69.0
62.5
69.0
63.1
62.4
61.3
64.8
63.5
65.8
60.1
15-25
19.0
16.3
13.6
12.0
16.7
17.6
14.8
22.0
17.9
16.9
18.0
18.4
18.0
19.7
25-40
34.3
19.4
18.7
5.2
10.9
15.7
12.3
10.6
12.4
14.5
12.0
12.1
10.8
12.7
40-55
6.2
8.1
6.1
2.5
2.4
1.1
2.5
1.5
4.9
5.3
3.6
4.6
3.8
5.2
55 or more
0.0
10.2
5.1
0.3
1.0
3.1
1.4
2.7
2.5
2.0
1.7
1.3
1.6
2.3
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 268a Characteristics of family structure, first-generation Peruvians
1810
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Number of own family members in household
3.67
3.32
4.23
3.48
3.61
3.16
3.50
3.60
3.32
3.44
3.28
3.24
3.31
3.31
Number of own children in household
0.89
0.84
1.03
0.98
0.81
0.86
0.85
0.93
0.72
0.91
0.79
0.78
0.79
0.80
Number of own children under age 5 in household
0.33
0.43
0.32
0.27
0.19
0.12
0.18
0.20
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.14
0.14
0.14
11.67
10.05
11.18
11.65
14.28
16.63
16.18
17.85
16.31
16.21
16.82
17.90
18.50
18.60
7.62
7.36
7.04
8.21
11.29
13.18
13.03
14.10
13.44
12.31
13.57
14.64
15.25
15.31
Age of eldest child in household Age of youngest child in household
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 268b Characteristics of family structure, second-generation Peruvians
1811
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Number of own family members in household
3.87
3.93
4.39
4.40
4.09
3.92
3.86
4.11
3.78
3.85
3.87
3.97
4.10
3.96
Number of own children in household
0.47
0.47
0.49
0.10
0.11
0.16
0.10
0.11
0.20
0.15
0.15
0.14
0.15
0.16
Number of own children under age 5 in household
0.33
0.25
0.21
0.01
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.05
Age of eldest child in household
6.75
10.26
9.82
14.16
7.95
9.72
7.22
16.49
13.11
13.77
9.60
11.33
10.24
12.58
Age of youngest child in household
5.01
7.80
6.08
11.42
5.43
5.68
5.90
12.90
9.67
11.77
6.58
7.76
7.36
8.96
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 269a Marital status (%), first-generation Peruvians
1812
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Married, spouse present
44.73
58.91
44.78
55.49
50.85
49.76
50.36
49.48
45.26
49.08
45.47
45.56
45.96
46.16
Married, spouse absent
3.58
7.11
2.17
2.2
4.56
3.84
4.07
4.22
5.87
5.61
6.34
5.79
6.26
6.28
Separated
0
1.74
3.99
2.87
5.27
4.25
5.11
3.72
3.88
5.19
4.84
3.52
4.25
Divorced
0
0
2.17
5.79
6.76
10.08
8.69
8.74
10.16
7.91
9.85
10.35
9.13
9.42
Widowed
5.82
3.59
2.61
2.99
2.25
4.28
3.86
5.35
2.53
2.82
3.44
4.25
3.92
4.23
45.87
28.59
46.52
29.54
32.71
26.78
28.77
27.11
32.46
30.71
29.71
29.21
31.21
29.65
Never married / Single
1.8
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 269b Marital status (%),second-generation Peruvians
1813
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Married, spouse present
41.46
33.67
33.18
5.45
9.02
11.46
9.24
5.4
10.45
11.36
9.71
8.08
8.85
9.64
Married, spouse absent
0
0
0.51
0.46
1.26
0.63
1.06
1.32
1.24
1.78
0.6
0.87
Separated
0
1.02
0
0.82
0.23
0
0.7
0.81
0.82
0.93
0.72
0.68
0.33
0.36
Divorced
0
0
0
0.82
1.91
2.05
1.33
1.62
1.93
2.93
1.52
2.26
1.49
2.33
Widowed
0
4.09
0.93
0.27
0.31
0
0.14
1.33
0.38
0.74
0.43
0.3
0.19
0.24
58.54
61.22
64.49
92.64
88.02
86.03
87.34
90.2
85.37
82.72
86.38
86.89
88.53
86.55
Never married / Single
0
1.4
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 270a School attendance (%), first-generation Peruvians
1814
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Yes, in school
72.94
75.00
81.82
90.91
85.13
80.86
93.20
92.84
85.62
95.52
94.95
91.26
95.69
96.20
No, not in school
27.06
25.00
18.18
9.09
14.87
19.14
6.80
7.16
14.38
4.48
5.05
8.74
4.31
3.80
18 years old or less
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 270b School attendance (%),second-generation Peruvians
1815
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Yes, in school
28.04
100.00
77.78
69.30
81.80
90.03
93.75
80.98
88.02
91.27
88.91
91.13
88.07
91.54
No, not in school
71.96
0.00
22.22
30.70
18.20
9.97
6.25
19.02
11.98
8.73
11.09
8.87
11.93
8.46
18 years old or less
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 271a Educational attainment (%), first-generation Peruvians 1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Less than high school
55.56
24.00
20.22
14.55
8.31
4.31
7.23
7.95
7.71
4.95
7.75
4.05
7.32
5.49
High school
22.22
40.01
33.71
37.56
32.74
42.50
37.12
39.22
44.39
39.35
39.57
40.76
39.66
34.70
0.00
16.04
12.36
5.63
28.74
9.80
10.22
6.02
18.53
19.28
19.74
21.33
19.88
23.78
22.22
19.94
33.71
42.25
30.21
43.39
45.43
46.82
29.38
36.41
32.94
33.87
33.15
36.03
32.10
37.48
30.00
26.13
17.97
7.36
12.08
15.14
10.14
8.70
10.01
9.55
13.21
10.59
0.00
33.29
40.00
31.08
36.76
32.05
34.33
35.25
40.17
43.21
40.66
40.21
37.59
38.79
Post-secondary, no degree
40.74
8.33
5.71
4.50
16.07
4.47
7.73
4.23
16.52
14.51
14.13
14.16
12.82
15.17
Post-secondary, degree
27.16
20.90
24.29
38.29
29.20
56.13
45.86
45.38
33.18
33.58
35.21
36.08
36.39
35.45
19–35 years old
Post-secondary, no degree
1816
Post-secondary, degree 36 years old or more Less than high school High school
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 271b Educational attainment (%),second-generation Peruvians 1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Less than high school
42.11
22.26
18.37
11.43
6.69
17.78
2.64
3.93
5.28
9.92
8.58
4.90
4.70
3.87
High school
29.88
29.65
28.57
40.00
26.66
5.12
23.95
18.77
28.97
23.55
36.29
29.71
27.24
28.17
0.00
18.47
6.12
11.43
41.20
15.72
6.78
6.25
22.07
23.85
22.47
23.80
30.88
32.74
28.01
29.62
46.94
37.14
25.45
61.38
66.63
71.04
43.67
42.69
32.67
41.59
37.18
35.22
19–35 years old
Post-secondary, no degree
1817
Post-secondary, degree 36 years old or more Less than high school
100.00
63.69
22.86
0.00
19.86
25.96
15.49
21.23
8.78
15.54
12.55
17.14
6.15
10.32
High school
0.00
27.19
34.29
56.25
21.85
38.42
17.32
15.72
39.55
38.72
29.87
27.39
29.97
28.32
Post-secondary, no degree
0.00
0.00
2.86
12.50
28.94
0.00
11.20
1.94
13.30
8.87
16.66
14.65
12.27
13.93
Post-secondary, degree
0.00
9.12
40.00
31.25
29.35
35.61
56.00
61.11
38.37
36.87
40.91
40.82
51.61
47.43
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 272a Employment status (%), first-generation Peruvians
1818
Employed Unemployed Not in labor force
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
55.33
49.96
60.22
66.82
68.96
71.3
69.68
5.97
0.00
3.31
6.24
7.28
2.62
3.98
38.69
50.04
36.46
26.95
23.75
26.08
26.34
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
64.65
64.9
66.73
67.16
70.63
68.15
72.37
4.29
6.13
4.56
4.82
3.80
4.72
3.86
31.06
28.98
28.71
28.01
25.58
27.14
23.76
Table 272b Employment status (%), second-generation Peruvians
1819
Employed Unemployed Not in labor force
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
37.28
54.51
57.28
61.64
59.55
62.4
57.74
56.32
61.68
58.51
59.99
61.7
61.79
66.89
7.82
3.65
1.94
2.74
7.74
4.44
9.43
6.26
9.51
7.29
7.28
6.83
4.97
5.81
41.84
40.78
35.62
33.16
32.83
37.42
28.81
34.21
32.73
31.48
33.24
27.31
54.9
32.7
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 273a Occupation (%), first-generation Peruvians
1820
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Management, professional, and related
27.08
19.17
21.06
22.39
22.13
23.43
23.37
22.25
23.07
Services
24.68
26.45
22.08
27.15
29.19
26.62
27.14
26.20
26.43
Sales and office
25.69
26.55
29.08
23.84
25.07
23.98
24.58
23.18
24.74
Farming, fishing, and forestry
0.00
0.07
0.28
0.57
0.16
0.43
0.18
0.49
0.33
Construction, extraction, and maintenance
8.43
8.75
8.02
10.28
9.05
10.01
8.75
10.87
9.71
14.12
19.00
19.45
15.76
14.12
15.28
15.84
16.79
15.62
0
0.03
0.28
0.25
0.12
0.22
0.1
Production, transportation, and material moving Military specific
0
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
0
Table 273b Occupation (%),second-generation Peruvians
1821
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Management, professional, and related
26.25
30.38
26.44
28.94
29.85
30.31
29.25
33.72
29.27
Services
20.94
19.81
14.23
20.41
18.01
19.78
21.85
20.09
20.04
Sales and office
39.66
38.04
44.39
36.75
30.67
33.57
37.58
35.41
36.98
Farming, fishing, and forestry
2.74
0.00
0.92
0.47
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.14
0.59
Construction, extraction, and maintenance
6.34
5.62
6.60
3.96
7.38
6.61
5.27
4.43
6.16
Production, transportation, and material moving
4.07
6.15
7.1
9.05
14.09
9.56
6.05
6.12
6.81
Military specific
0
0
0.32
0.43
0.13
0
0.09
0.15
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
0
Table 274a Occupation by gender (%), first-generation Peruvians 2006
2007
2008
1822
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Management, professional, and related
22.89
23.87
20.66
23.94
24.50
21.59
Services
19.35
35.24
19.03
33.78
20.24
32.86
Sales and office
19.83
29.52
16.80
29.93
16.83
32.94
0.36
0.00
0.86
0.10
0.60
0.05
Construction, extraction, and maintenance
16.56
0.64
20.22
0.97
18.16
0.94
Production, transportation, and material moving
20.84
10.66
22.00
11.28
19.48
11.62
0.16
0.08
0.43
0.00
0.19
0.00
Farming, fishing, and forestry
Military specific
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 274b Occupation by gender (%),second-generation Peruvians 2006
2007
2008
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Management, professional, and related
29.16
29.35
30.04
37.00
28.21
30.39
Services
18.36
25.41
21.67
18.69
20.95
19.09
Sales and office
32.56
42.68
28.18
41.81
26.76
47.70
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.26
1.15
0.00
10.45
0.00
8.56
0.78
12.02
0.00
Production, transportation, and material moving
9.48
2.56
11.37
1.47
10.62
2.82
Military specific
0.00
0.00
0.18
0.00
0.29
0.00
Farming, fishing, and forestry Construction, extraction, and maintenance
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
1823
Table 275a Occupation by education level (%), first-generation Peruvians 2006
2007
2008
Less PostPostLess PostPostLess PostPostthan high High secondary, secondary, than high High secondary, secondary, than high High secondary, secondary, school school no degree degree school school no degree degree school school no degree degree Management, professional, and related
1824
6.13
7.31
18.83
45.10
4.80
6.45
20.16
43.11
10.07
9.31
18.56
40.98
Services
40.69
35.00
24.04
18.01
42.53
35.31
23.31
14.35
32.67
31.78
26.88
19.86
Sales and office
16.12
23.00
34.24
23.40
12.04
21.71
34.70
22.50
18.32
23.38
32.15
23.78
0.76
0.27
0.19
0.00
0.96
1.03
0.04
0.04
1.43
0.18
0.00
0.41
Construction, extraction, and maintenance
12.40
11.75
8.08
5.29
15.57
12.20
8.18
9.53
15.36
12.02
10.15
6.17
Production, transportation, and material moving
23.90
22.57
14.12
8.20
24.11
22.97
13.47
10.27
22.15
23.32
12.26
8.55
0.00
0.09
0.51
0.00
0.00
0.33
0.12
0.21
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.26
Farming, fishing, and forestry
Military specific
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 275b Occupation by education level (%), second-generation Peruvians 2006
2007
2008
Less PostPostLess PostPostLess PostPostthan high High secondary, secondary, than high High secondary, secondary, than high High secondary, secondary, school school no degree degree school school no degree degree school school no degree degree 6.62
7.72
29.55
50.71
12.36
16.55
15.53
60.94
11.32
16.52
12.06
54.25
Services
38.28
30.53
20.56
11.41
38.58
25.05
22.47
10.89
31.52
25.06
22.69
11.65
Sales and office
40.46
43.52
39.87
31.59
37.85
42.31
47.45
23.24
38.01
40.33
50.97
25.39
Farming, fishing, and forestry
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.51
0.00
0.00
4.91
0.34
0.00
0.00
Construction, extraction, and maintenance
4.77
8.57
1.32
5.16
1.11
9.44
4.03
2.10
9.58
10.51
4.15
3.34
Production, transportation, and material moving
9.88
9.66
8.71
1.12
10.11
6.13
10.15
2.83
4.65
7.25
10.13
4.96
Military specific
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.37
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.40
Management, professional, and related
1825
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 276a Industry (%), first-generation Peruvians 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting
0
0.18
0.91
0.87
0.16
0.4
0.31
0.54
0.52
Mining
0.77
0.1
0.2
0.49
0
0.09
0.08
0.11
0.15
Construction
5.15
5.97
5.49
6.92
6.6
8.24
6.74
8.55
7.59
1826
Manufacturing
13.3
16.78
13.92
10.35
12.2
10.28
10.91
10.66
11
Wholesale and retail trade
13.99
10.42
17.69
15.91
16.77
14.88
15.98
15.26
16.95
Transportation and warehousing
3.5
6.48
5.73
4.4
4.15
4.57
4.6
6.31
4.65
Utilities
0.36
0.14
0.33
0.38
0.46
0.27
0.24
0.36
0.26
Information and communications
3.27
1.31
2.87
2.03
2.03
2.08
1.6
1.96
2
Finance, insurance, real state, and rental / leasing
4.5
6.43
5.77
5.64
6.01
7.85
6.13
6.16
6.67
Professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management
13.05
11
11.14
11.63
10.68
10.38
11.97
11.14
11.31
Educational, health, and social services
19.15
14.86
16.41
15.35
16.91
16.64
17.56
16.64
17.48
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accomodations, and food services
10.92
13.87
9.15
13.31
12.27
13.19
13.28
11.33
11.67
Other services
8.41
10.24
8.42
9.74
8.74
8.65
8.47
8.36
7.52
Public administration
2.89
2.06
1.83
2.83
2.68
2.11
1.93
2.25
1.97
Armed forces
0.74
0.15
0.14
0.15
0.34
0.37
0.2
0.38
0.26
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 276b Industry (%), second-generation Peruvians 2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
1827
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting
1.11
0
0.87
0
0
0.28
0
0.2
0.5
Mining
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
0.08
Construction
2.22
2
6.39
4.5
5.37
4.44
3.52
3.3
5.01
Manufacturing
13.12
7.76
3.4
6.07
9.02
5.09
5.53
6.46
4.76
Wholesale and retail trade
30.37
23.78
22.26
18.93
22.56
22.07
21.21
16.61
21.97
Transportation and warehousing
1.55
1.71
5.44
6.13
0.9
1.58
3.21
2.17
2.39
Utilities
0
0
0
0.36
0
0.16
0.31
0.43
0.15
Information and communications
0.51
7.43
5.67
2.68
4.81
4.74
3.52
3.73
3.58
Finance, insurance, real state, and rental / leasing
8.31
9.77
10.42
9.21
9.79
7.89
9.61
8.65
6.46
Professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management
13.34
13.38
8.89
14.26
8.48
12.96
11.38
13.48
11.01
Educational, health, and social services
12.49
12.12
19.2
17.97
15.85
18.16
16.55
22.98
17.66
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accomodations, and food services
12.38
14.31
14.51
12.88
15.22
15.66
18.09
14.35
15.85
Other services
1.47
1.98
0.92
1.48
5.3
3.3
3.77
3.3
3.77
Public administration
2.89
2.06
1.83
2.83
2.68
2.11
1.93
2.25
1.97
Armed forces
0.74
0.15
0.14
0.15
0.34
0.37
0.2
0.38
0.26
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 277a Wage and salary income (%), first-generation Peruvians 1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
10,000 or less
48.33
37.72
21.02
26.35
23.75
24.95
22.03
20.67
22.16
19.7
21.53
10,000–20,000
36
31.34
28.1
25.51
25.25
29.72
26.12
24.26
23.37
23.75
22.55
20,000–40,000
12.33
22.68
30.43
33.83
32.23
26.57
34.44
35.4
32.62
33.92
32.22
40,000–60,000
1.67
5.58
10.37
8.44
10.97
12.5
10.61
10.81
12.16
11.75
13.8
60,000 or more
1.67
2.68
10.09
5.87
7.8
6.27
6.81
8.86
9.7
10.88
9.9
2006
2007
2008
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
1828 Table 277b Wage and salary income (%), second-generation Peruvians 1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
10,000 or less
71.11
51.24
37.39
31.41
40.43
31.25
19.36
32.18
25.9
31.17
26.74
10,000–20,000
24.44
22.95
20.5
13.74
18.94
13.69
21.82
16.9
17.52
12.49
17.14
20,000–40,000
4.44
17.01
29.56
37.19
28.36
33.74
32.54
27.11
27.21
26.98
28.64
40,000–60,000
0
5.55
7.73
7.36
8.03
10.24
13.95
14
16.83
14.51
14.44
60,000 or more
0
3.25
4.82
4.23
11.08
12.33
12.53
14.85
13.04
10.3
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
9.81
Table 278a Proficiency in English (%), first-generation Peruvians
No, does not speak English
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
5.61
6.07
7.01
10.73
9.37
8.63
5.85
7.02
8.39
8.04
6.1
Yes, speaks only English or very well
47.49
49.6
54.04
43.94
40.72
44.09
44.97
43.06
43.8
43.33
45.6
Yes, speaks well
28.46
27.29
24.33
26.22
26.16
24.87
29.73
28.39
26.86
26.59
28.76
Yes, but not well
18.44
17.04
14.62
19.12
23.76
22.42
19.45
21.52
20.95
22.04
19.53
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
1829 Table 278b Proficiency in English (%), second-generation Peruvians
No, does not speak English
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
0.97
0.16
2.02
1.06
0.57
1.83
1.89
0.52
0.77
0.47
0.93
Yes, speaks only English or very well
77.42
82.72
89.08
86.63
85.57
85.42
87.68
90.12
Yes, speaks well
15.16
12.03
5.43
5.34
9.06
7.7
7.83
8.02
6.73
7.27
7.37
Yes, but not well
6.45
5.1
3.47
3.01
3.74
4.91
4.86
3.79
2.38
2.37
2.64
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
90.6
89.9
89.07
Table 279a Citizenship status (%), first-generation Peruvians 1950
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Born abroad of American parents
10.02
7.78
4.29
6.19
1.91
2.71
2.42
2.14
2.38
2.01
2.34
3.18
Naturalized citizen
14.54
24.55
27.71
39.93
37.02
38.92
34.38
39.22
40.18
41.94
39.24
42.02
Not a citizen
60.21
67.66
68
53.88
61.06
58.37
63.21
58.65
57.44
56.05
58.42
54.8
Foreign born, citizenship status not reported
15.22
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
1830 Table 279b Citizenship status (%), second-generation Peruvians
Born in the U.S.
1950
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
83.32
89.37
89.99
93.63
92.45
92.08
92.01
88.16
93.31
93.89
94.45
92.55
Born abroad of American parents
7.62
2.72
0.34
0.91
1.03
1.58
0.65
0.78
0.58
1.08
0.77
0.64
Naturalized citizen
4.3
3.27
1.48
1.95
1.65
2.91
3.33
2.97
2.34
1.76
1.8
3.21
Not a citizen
2.39
4.63
8.2
3.51
4.87
3.43
4.01
8.09
3.76
3.27
2.99
3.6
Foreign born, citizenship status not reported
2.37
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
0
Table 280a Years in the United States (%), first-generation Peruvians 2000 0 years
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2.04
3.67
3.43
1.61
2.38
1.68
1.67
1.38
1.21
1-5 years
17.32
22.22
21.39
28.33
23.56
25.97
22.21
21.57
16.17
6-10 years
28.58
22.85
17.06
19.42
16.55
13.93
17.84
22.94
25.64
11-20 years
28.44
28.79
30.15
27.4
31.37
31.45
31.21
26.6
26.62
21-30 years
14.39
11.29
15.97
12.24
14.92
16.24
15.26
14.88
17.6
9.23
11.18
12
11
11.21
10.73
11.81
12.62
12.75
31 or more years
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
1831 Table 280b Years in the United States (%), second-generation Peruvians
Born in the U.S.
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
93.63
92.01
91.62
91.53
86.95
92.65
93.51
93.7
92.03
0 years
3.02
0.3
0.17
0
0.24
0.28
0
0.03
0.34
1-5 years
0.58
1.58
2.42
1.85
5.46
1.79
1.34
1.8
1.16
6-10 years
0
1.61
2.41
0.88
2.03
1.36
1.46
1.14
1.65
11-20 years
0.82
2.87
2.02
3.82
2.77
2.52
1.82
1.44
2.12
21-30 years
1.05
0.65
0.52
0.63
1.49
0.65
0.9
0.93
1.66
31 or more years
0.9
0.96
0.84
1.28
1.06
0.74
0.97
0.96
1.04
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
Table 281 Household income (%) 1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
25,000 or less
71.68
40.47
19.6
27.61
33.25
24.23
22.57
25.53
26.23
24.19
22.31
25,000–35,000
12.14
16.89
13.84
17.22
13.05
14.41
11.98
13.35
10.83
13.08
11.82
35,000–50,000
8.67
18.85
19.03
13.95
16.36
20.19
21.39
17.4
16.71
15.77
15.21
50,000–100,000
7.51
18.38
36.52
27.37
25.22
31.26
31.48
28.85
29.78
29.56
32.1
100,000–200,000
0
3.22
8.46
8.85
11.62
7.45
10.09
10.74
14.06
13.99
16.25
200,000 or more
0
2.19
2.56
5.01
0.5
2.46
2.48
4.12
2.39
3.4
2.32 16.37
First-generation household only
Second-generation household only 25,000 or less
68.42
41.09
18.62
23.93
18.22
17.16
21.25
20.52
17.99
14.69
25,000–35,000
15.79
16.94
2.76
6.02
8.88
14.71
6.15
4.18
9.36
6.39
35,000–50,000
13.16
10.92
17.01
17.83
20.58
13.08
25.92
17.55
10.32
17.04
11.92
50,000–100,000
2.63
25.34
45.06
37.02
36.46
37.6
30.1
34.14
36.32
32.93
38.32
100,000–200,000
0
4.64
16.55
13.43
14.91
15.83
12.91
18
21.69
23.98
21.52
200,000 or more
0
1.07
1.77
0.95
1.61
3.67
5.6
4.31
4.98
4.86
14.02
11.71
0
7
First and second-generation household 25,000 or less
58.13
28.62
20.24
18.71
17.75
18.09
21.66
18.15
13.44
25,000–35,000
21.25
15.27
14.07
11.82
13.1
10.6
13.77
13.87
11.83
7.68
9.73
35,000–50,000
9.38
22.38
16.3
19.5
17.86
19
20.39
17.12
15.96
17.43
15.18
50,000–100,000
11.25
26.51
30.87
36.09
31.22
36.53
28.36
32.99
39.63
37.37
38.58
13.1
12.63
13.98
15.79
18.82
19.21
3.19
3.89
3.35
4.69
5.59
100,000–200,000
0
4.32
15.44
11.68
18.79
200,000 or more
0
2.9
3.09
2.2
1.27
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Version 5.0, University of Minnesota.
2.68
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics | 1833
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics The profile of Peruvian migrants and their descendants is based on the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). The IPUMS consists of samples of the American population from federal censuses (between 1860 and 2000) and the American Community Surveys (2000–2008). In this sense, the estimated numbers using IPUMS are representative of the population in the United States. Even though they were not designed specifically for the Peruvian migrant population, they should give a good representation of their characteristics. However, we should mention some limitations of the analysis. For the samples between 1860 and 1940, we found a reduced number of observations, which implied that the analysis was performed on the pooled group of observations rather than for individual years. Furthermore, we would reasonably expect less participation in a census for a migrant population. We cannot verify if the nonparticipation rate was important or negligible for Peruvian migrants, but this should be considered in the interpretation of results. In each of the years with data available, we identified first-generation Peruvian Americans and second or further generations. In particular, the first generation were identified using birthplace, which indicates the U.S. state, area, or territory, or the foreign country of birth. The second or further generations were identified using the following variables: • father’s or mother’s birthplace • ancestry, which refers to the self-reported ancestry or ethnic origin • Hispanic origin, which identifies people as Hispanics, Spanish, or Latinos and classifies them according to their country of origin, when possible The total number of Peruvians and Peruvian descendants found in each database are described in Table 284, which also states which variable was used to identify the second or further generation group. Since a person could be identified as of Peruvian descent through more than one of these variables, we applied these criteria in the exact order proposed before: first using the father’s or mother’s birthplace, second using ancestry, and finally using Hispanic origin. More than two-thirds of the cases for the second or further generation group were identified using the father’s or mother’s birthplace.
Table 282 Sample of first- and second-generation Peruvians, census data 1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
First generation
41
56
230
501
1,484
255
940
927
1,089
1,041
3,028
3,096
3,388
3,350
Second or further generation
41
98
214
367
786
159
565
598
644
748
1904
1,966
2,109
2,349
Father’s or mother’s birthplace
27
54
154
305
563
106
376
407
365
479
1,250
1,290
1,399
1,379
Ancestry Hispanic origin
0
0
0
62
175
44
148
146
242
215
530
561
579
742
14
44
60
0
48
9
41
45
37
54
124
115
131
228
Appendix III: Notable Peruvian Americans | 1835
Appendix III: Notable Peruvian Americans Marie Arana (writer) was born in 1949 in Lima, Peru. She is the daughter of Jorge Enrique Arana (a Peruvian American engineer) and Elverine (Clapp) Arana, an American. At an early age (nine years old) her family immigrated to the United States. She has degrees in Russian, Chinese, and linguistics. She worked for the Washington Post and is currently a writer-at-large for the same newspaper. She has written American Chica: Two Worlds, One Childhood. This is a memoir of her Peruvian American background and upbringing. This book was a finalist for the National Book Award in 2001. She has written two other novels since American Chica. She is married and has two children. Arana was an Invited Research Scholar at Brown University in 2008–2009, and in April 2009 she was named John W. Kluge Distinguished Scholar at the Library of Congress through 2010. In September of the same year, Arana was elected to the Scholars’ Council of the Library of Congress. A month later, she received the Alumnae Award of the Year at Northwestern University. Benjamin Bratt (actor) is one of the most popular Peruvian Americans known in the United States. His mother is Peruvian and his father is American. He became famous first for his role on Law & Order, then through several other roles in film and television. Benjamin Bratt has won several awards, including ALMA Awards (best actor on 2009), an Emmy Award in 1999, and the Screen Actors Guild Awards in 2001. Guillermo Callegari (community leader) was born in Trujillo in 1941. He arrived in Paterson, New Jersey, in 1962 to work as a car mechanic. Since his arrival, Callegari has been involved in the emergent Peruvian community, and he founded the long-lived civic organization, Peruvian Parade Inc. in 1986. This organization has helped to make the Peruvian community visible. He is also the father of 10 children, and 19 grandchildren. Because of his prominence in the Peruvian community, he has been interviewed several times by researchers and journalists. He remains one of the role models in the community. Along with the political and civic organizations in New Jersey, in 1969 he also founded the first soccer school for his older kids. He founded the first New Jersey soccer league, with participants from Europe and South America. In addition, he spearheaded several other sports, social, political, and civic organizations. Teofilo Cubillas (athlete) was born in Lima in 1949 and moved to the United States as a professional soccer player. He is one of the most popular players in Peruvian history. His nickname is El Nene, because of his kid-like face, and he led Peru to three World Cups: 1970, 1978, and 1982. He has played for different teams in Peru, Brazil, Switzerland, and the United States. He currently lives in Florida, where he teaches football to children at his soccer academy.
1836 | Peruvian Immigrants
Eduardo Gonzalez-Viaña (writer) was born in Peru. He migrated to the United States in the early 1990s to take a visiting professorship at the University of California at Berkeley and later took a position at Western Oregon State College, in Portland. He is a prolific Peruvian writer who has published 20 books and nearly 400 articles. His most recently released novel, El Corrido de Dante, won the 2007 International Latino Book Award for best adventure or drama novel. Melcochita (comedian and singer), born Pablo Branda-Villanueva, of AfroCuban and French ancestry, was born in Lima in 1936 and was involved in music at a very young age. He received the nickname “Melcochita” (sugared the audience) during one of his appearances on a TV program in Lima. His performances include dancing and playing various instruments. He is also great at imitating famous performers. As a singer, Melcochita went on to record for various labels beginning in 1984. He moved to New York in 1978 seeking better opportunities and has been active in the community there ever since. Carlos I. Noriega (astronaut) was born in Peru in 1959 and raised in California. Noriega became famous when selected to go into space. He is the first Peruvian American to do so. He is married and has five children. He obtained a BS in computer science from the University of Southern California in 1981 and has also earned an MS in computer science and an MS in space systems operations from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1990. Maria del Pilar Rivas (politician and businesswoman): Rivas was born in Piura. She is the first deputy major for the Hispanic community in Paterson, New Jersey. She came in the early 1980s to the United States. She has been the first and only female president of the Peruvian Parade Inc (2001–2003), member of the Lord of the Miracles Brotherhood, and active member of the PAPAC since 2003. She also ran for a seat in the Council of Paterson. Because of her dress design business, Rivas is also a member of the Chamber of Commerce in Paterson. Omar Rodriguez (politician) immigrated to the United States in 1986. Twelve years later, in 1998, Rodriguez became involved with the Democratic Party and ran for office (council member of Saddle Brook) for the first time. He lost by a slim margin. He ran again in 2002 and was elected, making him the first Peruvian elected in New Jersey. Alejandro Toledo (politician) was born in 1946 in Cabana, Ancash. He holds a BA in economics from the University of San Francisco, and an MA in economics and education and a PhD in education from Stanford University. Toledo led the opposition to the then third-time elected president Alberto Fujimori in 2000 and was later elected president of Peru from 2001 to 2006. During his administrations the Peruvian economy grew. After his presidential term, Toledo returned to the United States, where he was a Distinguished Scholar
Glossary | 1837
in Residence at Stanford University during the 2006–2008 academic years. In 2007–2008 he was a Payne Distinguished Visiting Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law Visiting Scholar (http://fsi. stanford.edu/people/alejandrotoledo/). Simultaneously, Toledo served as the president of the Global Center for Development and Democracy. He serves as visiting scholar and senior fellow at different organizations in Washington, D.C.
Glossary Anticucho: This is a popular and affordable dish. It consists of grilled skewered meat (often cow heart). It is popular because it can easily be found on street-carts or food stalls in Peru. It is offered in restaurants or in ethnic celebrations in the United States. Ceviche/Cebiche: One of the most popular Peruvian dishes. It is lime-marinated seafood (or fish) with hot chili pepper. The marinated fish is served with cold sweet potato, corn-on-the-cob, and sliced red onion. There are variations depending on regions. Cholo: Person from the Andes who has migrated to Lima, Peru. Criollo: This concept comes from the colonial time. The name Criollo (Creole) indicates an offspring of Spanish parents, but born in the colony. The immediate consequence was that Criollos were below the Spanish in the social hierarchy, often working as civil servants; they were restricted to the colonies. The current use of the word refers to music from the coastal region that is a mixture of local and foreign influence. A colloquial meaning of Criollo indicates trickery. Huayno: Traditional dance from the Andes (Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador), which represents an important Andean genre of dance and music that combines pre-Hispanic elements with colonial ones. It is danced in a circle of dancing couples. They tend to have a band of musicians playing instruments like flute and harps, to name a few. There is a diverse forms of Huayno depending on the local or regional traditions. Mestizo: Individuals of mixed race. This is a Spanish term used during the colonial period to refer to individuals of mixed Spanish and Amerindian ancestry. Pisco: The Peruvian liquor, distilled from grapes and originally from the city of Pisco. The pure Pisco is made of Quebranta grape. This spirit is the base of the emblematic pisco sour drink, or the “national drink.” This is prepared with egg whites, lime juice, Arabic syrup, sugar, and ice cubes.
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References Aguilar Luna-Victoria, Carlos. 1998. La Marinera, Baile Nacional del Perú: Alcances Teóricos para la Ejecución de la Marinera. 2nd ed.,corrected and augmented. Lima: Idigraf. Altamirano, Teófilo. 1990. Los que se Fueron: Peruanos en Estados Unidos. Lima: Universidad Católica del Perú Fondo Editorial. Altamirano, Teófilo. 2000. Liderazgo y Organizaciones de Peruanos en el Exterior: Culturas Transnacionales e Imaginarios sobre el Desarrollo. Lima: Universidad Católica del Perú Fondo Editorial & PromPerú. Altamirano, Teófilo. 2003. “El Perú y el Ecuador: Nuevos Países de Emigración. Quito: PADH-UASB. Altamirano, Teófilo. 2006. Remesas y Nueva “Fuga de Cerebros” Impactos Transnacionales, Lima: Fondo Editorial PUCP. Avila, Javier. 2003. “Lo que el Viento (de los Andes) se Llevó: Diásporas Campesinas en Lima y los Estados Unidos,” In Comunidades Locales y Transnacionales: Cinco Estudios de Caso en el Perú., edited by Carlos Iván Degregori, pp 167-261 Lima: IEP. Bedoya, Alvaro. 2003. “Captive Labor: The Plight of Peruvian Sheepherders Illuminates the Broader Exploitation of Immigrant Workers in U.S. Agriculture,” Dollars & Sense, September- October 2003, 30-40. Berg, Ulla D. 2008. “In Defense of Community? Long-Distance Localism and Transnational Political Engagement Between the US and the Peruvian Andes.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34(7):1091-1108. Bonfiglio, Giovanni. 2001. La Presencia Europea en el Perú. Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú. Burmester, Carlos, and Claudia Burmester. 2000. La Marinera: El renacimiento. Trujillo: El Buho. Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. 2003. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. New York: The Guilford Press. Cordero-Guzmán, Héctor, and Ramon Grosfoguel. 2000. “The Demographic and SocioEconomic Characteristics of Post-1965 Immigrants to New York City: A Comparative Analysis by National Origin.” International Migration 38 (4): 41–77. Cueva García, Aníbal, ed. 1991. Gran Atlas Geográfico del Perú y el Mundo. Lima: A.F.A. Editores. De Los Ríos, Juan, and Carlos Rueda. 2005. ¿Por Qué Migran los Peruanos al Exterior? Un Estudio Sobre los Determinantes Económicos y no Económicos de los Flujos de Migración Internacional de Peruanos entre 1994–2003. (Report) Lima: CIES–Universidad Pacífico. Durand, Jorge. 2010. “The Peruvian Diaspora: Portrait of a Migratory Process,” Latin American Perspectives 37(5):12-28.
References | 1839 Julca, Alex. 2001. “Peruvian Networks for Migration in New York City’s Labor Market: 1970–1996.” In Migration, Transnationalization, and Race in a Changing New York, edited by Héctor Cordero-Guzmán, Robert C. Smith, and Ramon Grosfoguel, pp. 239257. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Julca, Alex. 2005. “Socio-Economics and Conflict in Sending Remittances from New York City’s Instable Labor Markets to Peru.” In The New Urban Immigrant Workforce: Innovative Models for Labor Organizing, edited by Sarumathi Jayaraman and Immanuel Ness, pp 9-32. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Massey, Douglas S., and Chiara Capoferro. 2006. “Salvese Quien Pueda: Structural Adjustment and Emigration from Lima.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 606(1):116-127. Nunura, Juan y Edgar Flores. 2001. El Empleo en el Perú; 1990-2000. Lima: Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción Social (Report). Paerregaard Karsten. 2002. “Power Recycled; Persistence and transformation in Peruvian Transnationalism”. In Salmon and Zoomers (eds.) The Andean Exodus. Transnational Migration from Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. Cuadernos del CEDLA Vol. 11, Pp. 1-28. Amsterdam :Vjije Universiteit. Paerregaard, Karsten. 2005. “Inside the Hispanic Melting Pot: Negotiating National and Multicultural Identities among Peruvians in the United States.” Latino Studies, 3: 76-96. Paerregaard, Karsten. 2008a. Peruvians Dispersed: A Global Ethnography of Migration. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Paerregaard, Karsten. 2008b. “In the Footsteps of the Lord of Miracles: The Expatriation of Religious Icons in the Peruvian Diaspora.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34 (7): 1073–89. Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén Rumbaut. 1996. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press & Russell Sage Foundation. Ruggles, Steven, J., Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek. 2010. “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0.” [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. Ruíz Baía, Larissa. 2001. “Rethinking Transnationalism: National Identities among Peruvian Catholics in New Jersey.” In Christianity, Social Change and Globalization in the Americas, edited by Anna Peterson, Manuel Vásquez, and Phillip Williams, 147–64. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Sabogal, Elena. 2005. “Viviendo en la Sombra: The Immigration of Peruvian Professionals to South Florida.” Latino Studies, 3:113-131 Smith, Robert C., Héctor Cordero-Guzmán, and Ramon Grosfoguel. 2001. “Introduction: Migration, Transnationalization, and Ethnic and Racial Dynamics in A Changing New York” In Migration, Transnationalism and Race in a Changing New York, edited by Héctor Cordero-Guzmán, Robert C. Smith, and Ramon Grosfoguel, pp 1- 32. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
1840 | Peruvian Immigrants Vásquez, Manuel A. 1999. “Pentecostals, Collective Identity, and Transnationalism among Salvadorans and Peruvians in the U.S.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 67 (3): 617–36. Vásquez, Manuel A. and Philip J. Williams. 2005. “Introduction: The Power of Religious Identities in the Americas.” Latin American Perspectives 32(1):5-26.
Further Reading Altamirano, Teófilo. 1990. Los Que se Fueron: Peruanos en Estados Unidos. Lima: Fondo Editorial PUCP. This is a classic book on Peruvian migration written from the perspective of the sending country. Altamirano identifies the causes and consequences of Peruvian international migration. His focus is on the cultural identity of Peruvians in the United States. In so doing, he finds that ethnic enclave formation responds to structural and historical factors. The causes of migration are push factors (e.g., poverty, lack of jobs) and pull factors (e.g., social networks). The latter are the ones that help create ethnic enclaves. Focusing on Peruvian American organizations in the United States, mainly in New Jersey, he finds there are nine elements that distinguish an ethnic enclave: space, language, origin, sense of belonging to a group, socioeconomic integration, solidarity, social organizations, occupations, and members of similar institutions (e.g., school, church, and mass media). What fosters cultural identity are: language, local social networks, religion, family values, music and dance, and notions of time and space. He goes on to claim that in spite of migration and time abroad, migrants retain their cultural identity. Avila, Javier. 2003. “Lo Que el Viento (de los Andes) se Llevó: Diásporas Campesinas en Lima y los Estados Unidos.” In Comunidades Locales y Transnacionales: Cinco Estudios de Caso en el Perú, edited by Carlos Iván Degregori, 167–261. Lima: IEP. This chapter is about a case of stage migration. This is the case of individuals from the Peruvian Andes that migrated to Lima first. Once established, some of them then migrated to the United States. The chapter is about community-to-community migration, and the connections among the rural community, the migrant community in Lima, and those in the United States. It is about transnational connections, and reciprocity. Similar to internal migration, these social and cultural organizations have been crucial for the exchange of information and services at both ends of transantional migration. Kin—and fictive kin—have been crucial to organizing and revitalizing those exchanges Avila, Javier. 2005. “Worshipping the Senor de Qoyllur Ritti in New York: A Transnational Andean Ethnography.” Latin American Perspectives 32 (1):174–92. This article presents a religious celebration from Cuzco, Peru, taking place in New York. The original celebration is an expedition to the top of Ausangate Mountain. This article illustrates how religious practices are transplanted in a new environment. Berg, Ulla D. 2008. “In Defense of Community? Long-Distance Localism and Transnational Political Engagement between the U.S. and the Peruvian Andes.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34 (7): 1091–1108.
Further Reading | 1841 This article highlights the political dimension of Peruvian Americans in the United States and in Peru. It focuses on Peruvian immigrants from the rural community of Ucamarca. It is about the transnational political engagement of Peruvian immigrants in the United States in citizen-state relationships in Peru. It is about how migration shapes experiences of citizenship and belonging. Paerregaard, Karsten. 2005. “Inside the Hispanic Melting Pot: Negotiating National and Multicultural Identities among Peruvians in the United States.” Latino Studies 3 (1): 76–96. This article addresses the ways Peruvians construct their ethnic identity vis-à-vis the larger society. It also analyzes the negotiations among the different Peruvian communities in the United States. Finally, the author presents the possible alliances among communities to engage in a pan-Latino identity. Paerregaard, Karsten 2008. Peruvians Dispersed: A Global Ethnography of Migration. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. This is a comprehensive ethnography conducted over the period of three years, tracing Peruvians around the world. The author studied Peruvians in the United States (Miami, Los Angeles, and Paterson, New Jersey), Spain (Barcelona and Madrid), Italy (Milan), Japan (Tokyo and other cities), Argentina (Buenos Aires), Chile, and Canada. He points out that the Peruvian diaspora is diverse in term of social classes, regions of origin in Peru, professions/occupations, ages, and ethnic/racial groups. Unlike other Latin Americans, Peruvians are dispersed all over (there are few immigrants that share this characteristic according to the author). Thus, this work contributes to the analysis of transnationalism, when individuals of the same country live in many localities around the world. The focus of his research is to explore how Peruvians, on the one hand, adapt to the receiving country, and, on the other hand, experience and interpret, collectively as well as individually, this adaptation. Ruíz Baía, Larissa. 2001. “Rethinking Transnationalism: National Identities among Peruvian Catholics in New Jersey.” In Christianity, Social Change and Globalization in the Americas, edited by Anna Peterson, Manuel Vásquez, and Philip Williams, 147–64. New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Rutgers University Press. This chapter deals with religious brotherhoods in the Peruvian community of Paterson, New Jersey. It highlights both the elements of the brotherhoods brought from Peru and also the adaptations of the practice in the United States. Sabogal, Elena. 2005. “Viviendo en la Sombra: The Immigration of Peruvian Professionals to South Florida.” Latino Studies 3 (1): 113–31. This is one of the very few articles that analyzes the experiences of middle-class Peruvians residing in Miami, Florida. One of the aspects studied is how Peruvians deal with downward economic mobility in the United States upon arrival. Takenaka, Ayumi. 2004. “Asian—Latinos: Japanese-Peruvians’ Ethnic Adaptation and Social Mobility in New York and Los Angeles.” In Immigrant Life in the U.S.: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Donna Gabaccia and Colin W. Leach, pp. 65–80. London & New York: Routledge.
1842 | Peruvian Immigrants Takenaka shows the complexities of migration when second-generation immigrants to Peru migrate to the United States. She studies Peruvian citizens of Japanese ancestry and their ethnic identity in the United States. Takenaka presents two different forms of adaptation of a group that migrated to the United States about the same time and that are Spanish monolinguals. Those in the Los Angeles area tend to work for Japanese or Japanese Americans. Those in New York, however, tend to reside and work with other Latinos. This piece is a great example of how context affect socioeconomic mobility. Vasquez, Manuel A. 1999. “Pentecostals, Collective Identity, and Transnationalism among Salvadorans and Peruvians in the U.S.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 67 (3): 617–36. Vasquez provides a great case to show how religion, like Pentecostalism, can be an avenue for immigrants to incorporate in U.S. society. Verdaguer, Maria E. 2003. “Class, Ethnicity, Gender and Latino Entrepreneurship: Salvadoran and Peruvian Networks in Greater Washington D.C.” Dissertation Abstracts International, A: The Humanities and Social Sciences 63(10): 3741-A. This is qualitative research on Salvadoran and Peruvian immigrant entrepreneurs in Washington, D.C. As a comparative study, it shows how gendered their business practices and social networks are, and that their location in the stratification system shapes their access to entrepreneurial opportunities. It also shows that Peruvian and Salvadoran entrepreneurs are able to mobilize their social networks to enhance their opportunities.
Puerto Ricans by María E. Pérez y González
Introduction Puerto Rico and its people represent a remarkable historical phenomenon that places them in a unique position dating back to the turn of the 20th century when Puerto Rico became a nonincorporated territory belonging to, but not part of, the United States. Many of the obstacles that immigrants face upon entering the United States differ for Puerto Ricans, particularly as the people of Puerto Rico became U.S. citizens in 1917 via the Jones Act. During the mid-20th century, Puerto Ricans became the first great airborne migration, and the first Spanish-speaking group to settle in the northeastern corridor, having already fought for U.S. interests in two world wars. In 2003, for the first time, the stateside Puerto Rican population surpassed the Puerto Rican population in Puerto Rico; never before has any diaspora outnumbered those in the source country. Puerto Ricans are of great interest and provide a contrast to the other groups that have entered the United States in more recent times. For over a century, the political status of Puerto Rico remains unresolved and, whatever the future holds, one thing is certain—the outcome will impact not only the Puerto Ricans here and there but all Americans in one way or another.
Chronology 1898
On July 25, the United States invades Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American War. Spain cedes Puerto Rico to the United States.
1900
Foraker Act establishes a civil government.
1900–1945
Pioneer Migration to the United States occurs.
1901
Downes v. Bidwell declares Puerto Rico belongs to, but is not a part of, the United States.
1917
Jones Act confers U.S. citizenship.
1937
The Ponce Massacre occurs. Widespread female sterilization campaign begins with Law 116. Oscar García Rivera, a 1843
Chronology | 1845
Republican, becomes the first Puerto Rican elected to serve in a U.S. legislative post (NY). 1942
Hiram Bithorn, first Puerto Rican and black, enters major league baseball as a starting pitcher for the Chicago Cubs.
1946
Jesús T. Piñero becomes the first Puerto Rican to be appointed governor in Puerto Rico.
1946–1964
Great Migration to the United States becomes the first great airborne migration.
1946–1968
Felisa Rincón de Gautier becomes the first female mayor of San Juan.
1947–1954
Operation Bootstrap, an industrialization program, becomes the model for worldwide free trade zones.
1948–1964
Luis Muñoz Marín becomes Puerto Rico’s first elected governor.
1948–1957
The Gag Law is in effect.
1950
The Jayuya Revolution, an attack on the governor’s mansion, La Fortaleza, and the attempted assassination of President Truman occur.
1952
On July 25, the Commonwealth and Constitution are inaugurated, and the national flag and song are made official.
1954
Independentists led by Lolita Lebrón fire shots in the U.S. House of Representatives.
1959
The New York Puerto Rican Day Parade begins.
1965
The Voting Rights Act is prompted in part by María López from Rochester, New York.
1965–present
Revolving Door Migration between Puerto Rico and the United States occurs.
1967
The political status plebiscite results in a majority vote for commonwealth with 61 percent, followed by 39 percent favoring statehood, and .6 percent for independence.
1970
Hermán Badillo becomes the first Puerto Rican Congressman in the U.S. House of Representatives (NY).
1973
The Center for Puerto Rican Studies is established.
1974
The Aspira Consent Decree supporting bilingual education is upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.
1846 | Puerto Ricans
1977
Rita Moreno becomes the first person to earn all of the top awards in show business—Oscar (1962); Grammy (1972); Tony (1975); and Emmy (1977).
1978
United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization declares Puerto Rico a colony. Olga Méndez becomes the first Puerto Rican/Latina woman elected to a legislative post in the United States (NY).
1992
The Puerto Rican Studies Association is founded. Nydia Velázquez becomes the first Puerto Rican woman in the U.S. Congress (NY).
1993
The political status plebiscite results in 48.4 percent for commonwealth, 46.2 percent for statehood, 4 percent for independence, and 1 percent blank votes.
1998
The U.S.–Puerto Rico Political Status Act passes in the U.S. House of Representatives by one vote; tabled indefinitely in the U.S. Senate. The political status plebiscite results in 50.3 percent for “none of the above,” 46.5 percent for statehood, 2.5 percent for independence, and .1 percent each for free association and limited selfgovernment.
1999
U.S. Navy fighter jet target practice in Vieques kills one and injures others. Eleven of the imprisoned nationalists who accepted President Clinton’s offer of conditional clemency were released.
2000
There are pro-Vieques protests and peaceful civil disobedience. Sila M. Calderón becomes the first female governor of Puerto Rico.
2001
With 68 percent of the vote, the people favor the immediate removal of the U.S. military from Vieques. At 37 million, Latinos and Latinas become the largest ethnic minority in the United States, of which Puerto Ricans are a part.
2003
The Navy vacates Vieques. Stateside Puerto Ricans, numbering 3.9 million, surpass Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico, numbering 3.7 million.
2007
Resident commissioner of Puerto Rico is given a symbolic vote in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Background | 1847
2009
The federally minted commemorative quarter featuring Puerto Rico is circulated. The Puerto Rico Democracy Act passes the House Resources Committee. Judge Sonia Sotomayor from New York becomes the first Puerto Rican/Latino and Latina and third female justice on the U.S. Supreme Court.
2010
Student protests regarding tuition hikes and fiscal transparency at the University of Puerto Rico are fueled by police brutality. Congressional Representative Luis Gutierrez and the American Civil Liberties Union denounce civil rights violations.
Background Geography of Puerto Rico Puerto Rico, la Isla del Encanto (the Island of Enchantment), is a land of enormous beauty and rich fertile soil. Its landscape is a delightful panorama of rolling hills, plains, majestic mountain ranges, rivers, tropical rain forests, beaches, and desertlike conditions. Puerto Rico is an archipelago surrounded on the north by the Atlantic Ocean and on the south by the Caribbean Sea. The easternmost of the Greater Antilles, it measures 35 miles from north to south and 110 miles from east to west, including the largest of its territorial islands of Vieques, Culebra, and Mona; in total, its area is 3,435 square miles. Puerto Rico is located between the U.S. Virgin Islands to the east, and the Dominican Republic to the west.
History The indigenous Taínos of Borikén (or Boriquén; today it is written Borinquen), which means “Land of the Valiant Lord,” spoke Arawakan, were highly skilled navigators and farmers, and had a clear division of labor and a stratified social structure. They encountered Christopher Columbus and the conquistadors commissioned by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabela of Spain on November 19, 1493, when the island was renamed San Juan Bautista (Saint John the Baptist). The year 1508 marked the beginning of Spanish colonization with the arrival of Juan Ponce de León via the harbor he named Puerto Rico (Rich Port). By the year 1521 the island was popularly called Puerto Rico and the city built on that bay became known as San Juan, the capital of Puerto Rico. The Spaniards were interested in gold and other natural resources on the island and needed the Taínos’ help to avoid starvation. In exchange the Spaniards offered
1848 | Puerto Ricans
protection against the Caribs, long-standing enemy of the Taínos. Subsequently, the colonizers instituted two different types of slave labor. The first is known as the repartimiento (enforced labor) system, which required the “Indians” to provide wage-free labor. A ritual known as the guaitío, in which Agüeybaná the Elder (head chieftain) and Ponce de León (governor) pledged brotherly affection, prevented the Taínos from rising up against the brutal domination of the Spaniards. Several priests protested the treatment of the Taínos, and the Spanish Crown instituted an encomienda (perpetual serfdom) system, which ordered the colonizers to pay the indigenous a wage for their labor and to care for their basic needs. Enforcement of the new system was lax. During this time of slave labor and rebellions, Taínos diminished from approximately 70,000 in 1508 to 4,000 in 1514. As a result, in 1509 the first negros (blacks) were brought as domestic workers; by 1516 they were a valuable source of slave labor. The majority of Africans brought to Puerto Rico came from West Africa, mostly Yorubas from Nigeria and Dahomey. At the height of the sugar production from 1825 to 1845 there were approximately 60,000 enslaved Africans in the southern coast of Puerto Rico. Miscegenation occurred among the Taínos, Spaniards, and Africans due to intermarriage and the brutal rape of Taína and African women by the Spaniards. Various racial categories were imposed: mestizos were children of Spaniards and Taínas; mulatos were children of Spaniards and Africans; and zambos were children of Africans and Taínos. From the 1530s until 1870, Spanish authorities imposed an expediente de sangre (blood registry) requiring documentary evidence that one was a “pure-blooded” Spaniard in order to obtain civil or military employment. During the 1500s and 1600s, Puerto Rico experienced constant attacks, some more successful than others, by the English, French, Dutch, and Danes who sought to conquer the island, mainly because of its strategic military location in the Caribbean. Over time, including the 1815 Real Cédula de Gracias (Royal Decree of Concessions), many Asian, European, Latin American, and Middle Eastern foreigners settled in Puerto Rico with some incentives from the Spanish government. By the 1860s three political ideologies flourished in Puerto Rico—the Assimilationists wanted Puerto Rico to become a province of Spain with political representation in its legislature; the Autonomists wanted control over insular affairs while remaining under Spain’s protection; and the Separatists wanted independence. The stirrings of a Puerto Rican national consciousness culminated in an armed rebellion against Spain—El Grito de Lares (the Battle Cry of Lares). In 1867, during his exile in St. Thomas, Dr. Ramón Emeterio Betances wrote the Ten Commandments of Free Men, which demanded the abolition of slavery; the rights to assemble, bear arms, decide their own taxes, and elect their own officials; the inalienable rights of the citizenry; and freedom of religion, speech, the press, and trade.
Background | 1849
On September 23, 1868, about 1,000 people successfully captured Lares, proclaiming Puerto Rico a republic; however, the revolt was short-lived. El Grito de Lares is the most notable attempt to overthrow Spanish rule and manifests a national consciousness, the forging of a separate, collective identity known as “the Puerto Ricans.” It was the catalyst for the abolition of slavery on March 22, 1873, freedom of the press in 1874, and autonomy in November 1897. The 1897 Charter of Autonomy guaranteed self-government and the rights to create currency, negotiate foreign treaties, and establish its own tariffs, among others. The government convened in February 1898. Meanwhile Spain was involved in revolutionary wars in Cuba and the Philippines. When the U.S. Maine, stationed in Havana Harbor, exploded and sunk, the United States blamed Spain and invaded Puerto Rico via Guánica Bay on July 25, 1898. Puerto Ricans fully expected that the United States would keep its pledge to aid them in their struggle for independence. But on December 10, 1898, the Spanish-Cuban-American War came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Paris, and Spain surrendered Puerto Rico as booty to the United States with no Puerto Ricans present in the negotiations. The military occupation of the island established martial law and the devaluation of currency (the Puerto Rican peso/dollar was set equal to U.S. $.60), which adversely affected imports and exports. On April 12, 1900, the U.S. Congress passed the Foraker Act, which replaced military rule with a civil government headed by an American governor appointed by the president (he carried a military title and was Anglo-Saxon) and an Executive Council of 11 members, five of them native Puerto Ricans, which was to be the ultimate decision-making body. The law also created a House of Delegates, but its decisions could be overturned by the governor or the U.S. Congress. Puerto Ricans were granted the right to elect a resident commissioner in Washington, D.C., who could address federal departments but not Congress; the right to be present in the House of Representatives was granted in 1902; and the right to speak came in 1904. In 2007, the resident commissioner was given a symbolic vote that would not count if it made a difference in the final outcome of a vote. Puerto Rico was prohibited from trading with other nations, and U.S. currency was made official. The U.S. court system was set in place with all U.S. laws applying to Puerto Rico, except as specified otherwise. The people were declared citizens of Puerto Rico. In 1901 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Downes v. Bidwell that Puerto Rico was a nonincorporated territory belonging to, but not part of, the United States. Thus, the Constitution did not automatically apply to the island. In 1916, the first resident commissioner, Luis Muñoz Rivera, spoke out against the Jones Bill in the U.S. House of Representatives, but on March 2, 1917, the Jones Act was signed by President Woodrow Wilson, making Puerto Rican males eligible for the military draft just in time to join the overseas forces sent to fight in World War I. It also instituted a bicameral legislature. The Executive Council served as
1850 | Puerto Ricans
the cabinet, and the U.S. president continued to appoint the governor and was given unconditional veto power, along with the U.S. Congress, over any legislative decision made in Puerto Rico. The terms of the Foraker Act with respect to trade, tariffs, treaties, currency, shipping of goods, and the judicial system remained unchanged. The political, social, and economic impact of being a colony of the United States was enormous. Landowners became indebted to American banks, who took possession of the land. The island’s economy went from one that depended on coffee, tobacco, sugar, and cattle to a sugar economy. Hurricanes destroyed the crops that were heavily relied upon, and the Great Depression was felt more acutely in Puerto Rico than in the United States, causing immense poverty; hunger alone killed 15,000 children per year. Conditions were such that by 1930, approximately 80 percent of Puerto Rico’s food had to be imported. Puerto Ricans consumed what they no longer produced and produced what they no longer consumed (Christopulos 1974, 132; Rivera and Zeig 1983). Frustration grew among the populace, targeted against the North American sugar corporations and landowners, and U.S. control over Puerto Rican affairs was expressed in strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts. Pedro Albizu Campos, the foremost independentist of the 20th century, became the president of the Nationalist Party in 1930. He obtained a doctorate in philosophy and letters and a doctorate in law from Harvard University and served as a U.S. Army First Lieutenant in World War I. He was vocal against the U.S. takeover of Puerto Rico, maintaining it was illegal for Spain to have ceded Puerto Rico to the United States in 1898, because the Charter of Autonomy granted Puerto Rico the right to negotiate foreign treaties. Another prominent figure during this crisis was Luis Muñoz Marín, son of resident commissioner Muñoz Rivera. In 1938 he and others, such as Felisa Rincón de Gautier, who later became the first female mayor of San Juan and remained in that office from 1946 to 1968, formed a new political party called the Partido Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Party) or the Populares, which would attempt to redress the immediate social and economic woes plaguing the island before striving for independence. In 1940 Muñoz Marín became the president-elect of the Senate and by 1944 the Populares had control of the legislature. Puerto Rico developed a plan to improve the infrastructure of the country, including land reform initiatives; however, the United States began to view government-run operations as socialistic and pressured Muñoz Marín to dismantle them, including the party’s stance for independence. The most significant reform was an industrialization plan called Manos a la Obra (Operation Bootstrap), which involved the creation of jobs by luring U.S. companies to Puerto Rico through tax exemption incentives and a surplus of cheap labor. It served as the experimental model for free trade zones throughout the world. The results were impressive; by 1970 personal income rose from $118 to $1,200 per year, creating a large middle class with the highest per capita income in Latin America.
Background | 1851
The island became a profitable tourist attraction and earned the title of “Showcase of the Americas.” Becoming an export-oriented economy meant Puerto Rico had to depend more heavily than ever before on U.S. goods. During this time, the island’s agricultural sector was neglected and in continual decline, further increasing the loss of jobs for men and raising food prices. By 1950, one-third of the island’s work force was compelled to seek a means of survival by (im)migrating to the United States. With encouragement from Muñoz Marín, in 1946 President Truman appointed the first Puerto Rican governor, Jesús T. Piñero, who urged the U.S. Congress to grant the people of Puerto Rico the right to elect their governor; in 1948 they elected Muñoz Marín. His vision for Puerto Rico’s political future had changed to that of commonwealth, an association with the United States whereby Puerto Rico would be self-governing and have control over its insular affairs, but the U.S. Congress could overturn its decisions and would handle its foreign and military affairs. On July 25, 1952, Puerto Rico became El Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico (Free Associated State of Puerto Rico), officially referred to in English as
Ceremonies at a flag raising event on Constitution Day as troops and guests gather at El Morro Fortress in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1952, to commemorate the new constitution, which established the island as a Commonwealth. (AP Photo)
1852 | Puerto Ricans
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The Constitution of Puerto Rico was made official, along with its anthem, “La Borinqueña,” and its flag, decorated with three red and two white horizontal stripes protruding from a blue triangle (whose base is along the left side, its remaining angle facing right) with a white star in its center, was made official. The United States filed a request that Puerto Rico be taken off the United Nations’ list of protected territories, which was granted via U.N. General Assembly Resolution Number 748 in 1953. Since 1960, critics, church bodies, and the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization have stated that the commonwealth status is colonialism under a different name; to date, the General Assembly has not addressed the issue.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early (Im)migration The dual political situation Puerto Ricans experience merits that they be referred to as (im)migrants. They are immigrants because they relocated from one country to another. However, because Puerto Rico belongs to the United States and its people are U.S. citizens, they can be considered migrants, moving within territorial bounds. Although there is evidence of Puerto Ricans in the United States as early as the late 1700s and settlements as early as the mid-19th century, primarily Puerto Ricans entered the United States during the Pioneer Migration stage (1900–1945), when settlement was predominantly to New York City’s (Manhattan, Bronx, and Brooklyn) vibrant industrial sector. Many were also hired as seasonal contract agricultural laborers in California, Illinois, Connecticut, Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, and Hawaii. During this period, there was an average annual net (im)migration (factoring in those returning to Puerto Rico) of 2,111 Puerto Ricans arriving in the United States (Díaz-Stevens 1993, 13). In 1926 an estimated 200,000 Puerto Ricans were living in New York City colonias, urban centers characterized by dense Puerto Rican settlement and institutions that provided assistance for adjusting to the host society. As Puerto Ricans began to (im)migrate to the United States, they immediately became a significant part of the economy. Men and women served as migrant workers to toil in agricultural fields, orchards, and vineyards of the United States. Moreover, Puerto Ricans were employed as domestic workers; bodega merchants (grocery store owners); in cuchifritos (fritters) eateries, and as piragüeros (snow cone makers); and as factory workers, and/or pieceworkers at home (women made or assembled items at home and were paid a certain amount for each piece produced, such as making costume jewelry, hats, artificial flowers, and lampshades).
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1853
In skilled labor, Puerto Ricans were traditionally employed in needlecraft work and cigar making. The women engaged in crocheting, embroidering, and sewing, highly skilled traditions from Puerto Rico that produced delicate and beautiful undergarments and clothing that were sought after by U.S. government officials’ wives. Puerto Ricans worked as tabaquer@s (cigar workers) in New York City’s cigar factories, where they were responsible for bringing the practice of la lectura (having “readers”) to the workplace. This practice, paid out of their own wages, resulted in tabaquer@s well versed in works by Darwin, Marx, Engels, Palacio Valdes, Victor Hugo, and Dostoevsky. Puerto Rican women served as child care providers for other women who had to work outside of the home. They also took in boarders from Puerto Rico, Europe, Israel, and South America who were new to this country and needed a place to live until they were ready to make it on their own.
Migrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separatism In this stage, selective (im)migration was at work. Those who could afford to leave Puerto Rico did so and tended to be more economically stable than those who remained. They were largely viewed as industrious and hard-working; they organized mutual aid societies to assist those in need from across Latin America and formed social networking groups that served as outlets for cultural affirmation in an alien and sometimes hostile environment. The ongoing struggles with the English language and a Spanish accent, going to school, being culturally distinct from whites and blacks, and new cultural mores and behavioral norms brought to the fore a host of challenges for the (im)migrants and their children. The pressures to learn English and assimilate to American culture particularly influenced the young through the education system. Aside from the typical generation gap between parents and children, there was a developing cultural/linguistic gap. Complete separation from non-Spanish-speaking groups was not possible, but parents sought to minimize assimilation by transplanting traditional Puerto Rican socioreligious cultural values and expectations in their adopted homeland.
Later Waves of (Im)migration The Great Migration stage (1946–1964) saw Puerto Ricans enter at an average rate of 34,165 per year for 18 years. The peak year for net (im)migration to the United States was 1953, when the number reached an unprecedented 74,603 (Díaz-Stevens 1993, 13). By 1973, 40 percent of Puerto Rico’s population was living in the United States, mostly in New York City. This is a remarkable historical phenomenon: never before “has such a large proportion of one nation migrated to another single nation in so short a time . . . [particularly during] a time of planned economic growth and
1854 | Puerto Ricans
progress,” as was experienced in Puerto Rico (Stevens-Arroyo and Díaz-Ramírez 1982, 202–3). Puerto Ricans were the first great airborne migration to the United States; were the first (im)migrants to come as U.S. citizens; and had already served U.S. interests in two world wars and the Korean War. They were the first Spanishspeaking group to settle in the northeastern United States and whose skin color ranged from ebony to ivory. From 1950 to 1977, 350,000 Puerto Rican contract workers were “employed in the harvests of 22 states: peaches in South Carolina, apples in Vermont, shade tobacco in Connecticut, vegetables in New Jersey and so on” (Seidl, Shenk, and DeWind 1980, 418). The Puerto Rican communities established outside of New York City were largely formed by these workers and their families. It was during the Great Migration that social scientists began to speak of the “Puerto Rican problem” in New York City—limited English-language skills, lowpaying and dead-end jobs, increasing unemployment and public assistance levels, and their deteriorating housing conditions. Dr. Clara Rodríguez, a stateside Puerto Rican social scientist, placed the so-called Puerto Rican problem in its proper perspective. She began a contextual analysis of the factors affecting New York City during the time of the Great Migration that had a detrimental effect on the labor force participation of Puerto Ricans. First, there was a decline in the manufacturing sector, which employed 60 percent of the Puerto Rican work force, and a rise in the service sector, where greater skills were required. The loss of manufacturing jobs was attributed to the relocation of plants to suburban areas or to countries where labor was cheaper and tax exemptions were granted, such as Puerto Rico. Technological advancements also replaced manual labor. Factors such as racism and ethnic and language discrimination were obstacles to Puerto Ricans seeking economic betterment and upward social mobility, and an inefficient school system was tracking youngsters into vocational programs at a time when the number of blue-collar jobs was shrinking.
Immigration Act of 1965 and Succeeding Legislation While the 1965 Immigration Act and subsequent legislation had an enormous influence on changing the composition of immigrants entering the United States, it did not directly impact Puerto Ricans due to their U.S. citizenship. It did mean that Puerto Rican settlements would see other Spanish-speaking newcomers, such as Dominicans and other Latin Americans. Simultaneously, the Revolving Door Migration stage (1965 to date) of the back-and-forth movement between Puerto Rico and the United States was occurring. During this time, out-migration from Puerto Rico declined. For example, between 1964 and 1973 net migration out of Puerto Rico and into the United States equaled 66,829, as opposed to 302,293 10 years earlier (Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños 1979, 141). Although the 1980s also
Demographic Profile | 1855
experienced back-and-forth (im)migration, the trend definitely favored emigration from Puerto Rico with a net migration of 301,089 people to the United States (Rivera-Batiz and Santiago 1994, 14). However, this stage of (im)migration involves the greater tendency of settlement outside of New York than in previous years.
Through IRCA to the Present Although the 1996 Immigration Reform and Control Act and subsequent immigration legislation proposals have greatly impacted Latino and Latina communities, Puerto Ricans are beyond their scope due to U.S. citizenship. However, they are indirectly impacted by immigration reforms because those reforms affect the composition, economic stability, civic institutions, and social networks of their neighborhoods, as well as their familial ties via intermarriage. Puerto Ricans are also subject to requests for their “green cards” and having to prove their U.S. citizenship status in order to gain employment. Many non-Latinos and Latinas are unaware of the unique status of Puerto Ricans, while Latinos and Latinas are keenly aware of it. For over a century, the United States has played a major role in the socioeconomic development of Puerto Rico, and (im)migration to the United States is a direct outgrowth of that.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community The 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing indicates that there were over 3.4 million stateside Puerto Ricans and that 58 percent were born in the United States. This reflects a population growth of 26 percent from 1990 when they numbered 2.7 million. More current figures indicate that Puerto Ricans represent 9 percent, or 4.1 million of the total U.S. Latino and Latina population, estimated at 45.4 million (see Appendix II). Latinos and Latinas represented 15 percent of the estimated 302 million people in the United States (Pew Hispanic Center 2007). Making history in 2003, the trend continued in 2007 with the diaspora surpassing the Puerto Ricans living in Puerto Rico, which numbered 3.8 million. The largest concentration of stateside Puerto Ricans is still in New York City, where they remain the largest Latino and Latina ethnic group, but, as of 2000 only 23 percent reside there. The majority, 77 percent, lives in every state of the union and can be found in largest numbers in New York, Florida, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. While they predominantly reside in the Northeast, from 1990 to 2000 there was a significant move to the South of the United States, where Florida’s Puerto Rican population almost doubled in numbers during that time (see Appendix II; Falcón 2004, 5).
1856 | Puerto Ricans
Age and Family Structure This population is relatively young when compared to other groups. In 2004, the median age for Puerto Ricans was 28, among the youngest of the major racial/ethnic groups, with non-Latino and Latina whites at 40 and the general population at 36. Over one-third were children; 76 percent were 44 years of age and younger, on par with Dominicans but much younger than the general population (66%), and second only to Mexicans with 83 percent. The percentage of Puerto Rican females was slightly higher than that of Puerto Rican males—51 percent as compared to 49 percent. Of Puerto Ricans who were 15 years of age and over, 41 percent were married; this population had the lowest rate of marriage when compared to other Latino and Latina groups and Latinos and Latinas as a whole with 51 percent, and the general population with 54 percent. The percentage of female householders was 27 percent, higher than the overall Latino and Latina population with 19 percent, and much higher than the general population with 13 percent (U.S. Department of Commerce 2007, 7).
Educational Attainment For Puerto Ricans, education, specifically higher education, is often the means through which they attain economic upward mobility. It is seen as an investment
A single mother, originally from Puerto Rico, spends time with her two young daughters at their home in Schenectady, New York. (Ellen B. Senisi/The Image Works)
Demographic Profile | 1857
of time, effort, and money that cannot be revoked. Among stateside Puerto Ricans, the level of education increased from 1990 to 2000. Those with less than a high school diploma dropped sharply from 44 percent to 37 percent (Acosta-Belén and Santiago 2006, 125), and in 2005 it declined further to 28 percent (National Institute for Latino Policy 2007), although this remains unacceptably high. In 2000, 26 percent had earned a high school diploma, the same as in 1990, but in 2005 it rose to 34 percent. However, the proportion of Puerto Ricans who had acquired some college education rose from 21 percent in 1990 to 26 percent in 2000, and those who completed college or more rose from 10 to 13 percent (Rivera-Batíz and Santiago 1994, 89–90; Acosta-Belén and Santiago 2006, 125). In 2005, 10 percent of Puerto Ricans had earned a bachelor’s degree, while 4 percent had earned an advanced degree, which reflects at least half of the national average (National Institute for Latino Policy 2007). However, overall the percentages reflect an upwardly mobile trend for this population. It is a fact that those who continue with higher education gain a substantially higher income than those who do not. In general, by 2006 those who completed advanced degrees earned four times those who did not complete high school. Those with a high school diploma earned $31,071, as opposed to those with a bachelor’s degree who earned $56,788 (U.S. Department of Commerce 2008). Higher education has been a significant source of upward mobility for Puerto Ricans, because it serves as an equalizing factor in society, but the prospect of higher education is inconceivable to many who constantly struggle to meet their most basic needs, even with the federal education grants programs, which translates into depressed economic advances until the individual obtains a degree. With the large percentage of schools that are not equitably funded or prepared to deal with overarching systemic issues faced by Puerto Ricans and other ethnic minority groups, children are not being adequately prepared to compete in this global economy.
Economic Attainment In 1950, 61 percent of the Puerto Rican labor force held blue-collar jobs. In the subsequent decades there was a drastic departure of manufacturing jobs; New York City lost approximately half a million jobs in manufacturing from 1960 to 1980, and in the early 1980s the decline in the manufacturing sector accounted for half of the total job loss in New York City. For many Puerto Ricans, the loss of manufacturing sector jobs signaled a move toward steady unemployment. The exodus of manufacturing jobs was due to the relocation of businesses seeking to make a greater margin of profit through lower taxes or tax exemption and cheaper labor costs. The areas of destination for plant relocation were the suburbs, the southern states, and the Caribbean (including Puerto Rico), Asian, and Latin American countries.
1858 | Puerto Ricans
Before the mid-20th century, European immigrants needed physical strength and/or a willingness to work in order to obtain employment; the English language and a formal education were not necessary for climbing the economic ladder of success. By the mid-20th century and onward limited opportunities existed for immigrants, even those with U.S. citizenship, because the English language, a formal education, and eventually computer skills became the standard for decent employment with possibilities for upward mobility. Those who were fortunate enough to obtain a job often faced discrimination and restrictive union policies and practices, such as father-son clauses favoring family members of unionized personnel for membership into the union and the old boy network that excluded Puerto Ricans from apprenticeships and promotions. Consequently, many were forced into unsteady, temporary work where they were nonunionized and underpaid, or into lowlevel service sector jobs. According to the 2000 Census, Puerto Ricans accounted for just over 15 percent of the manufacturing workforce, down from 1990 when it was over 20 percent (Rivera-Batíz and Santiago 1994, 67, 131; Acosta-Belén and Santiago 2006, 119), reflecting a gradual move away from this sector, and for the first time in four decades being on par with non-Latino and Latina whites therein. This move accounted for some of the economic gains made by Puerto Ricans since the 1980s, reflecting entry into low-level white-collar jobs. In 2004, 30 percent were in sales/office occupations, 21 percent held service jobs, and 26 percent were in professional-managerial occupations, with numbers in the manufacturing sector falling steadily as reflected in the production, transportation, and material moving occupations, which totaled 15 percent (U.S. Department of Commerce 2007, 16).
Occupation and Income Patterns The labor force participation rate for Puerto Ricans in 2000 was 59 percent. The one percent decline was among the lowest of the overall decline in each racial/ethnic group that took place from 1990 to 2000. In 2005 and again in 2009 the Current Population Survey showed a steady rate of 63 percent, despite the economic crisis, and comparable to the 65.3 percent labor force participation rate of the general population (National Institute for Latino Policy 2007; U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2009). In 2002, Puerto Ricans earned an average of $33,927; however, there were about 24,450 who earned $100,000 or more, as compared to only 4,059 a decade earlier. Women earned an average of $30,613 and men earned an average of $36,572. The women were closer to income parity with their male counterparts than other Latino and Latina, Asian, and non-Latino and Latina white groups. In 2009, Puerto Ricans earned a median income of $35,174 compared to $40,517 earned by the general population (U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2009). It is estimated that remittances to Puerto Rico average about $1 billion per year (Falcón 2004, 11–12).
Demographic Profile | 1859
In 2000, Puerto Ricans experienced an unemployment rate of approximately 11 percent, over twice the national average (and over three times the rate of nonLatino and Latina whites), but only about a one percent difference from their 1980 and 1990 figures (Acosta-Belén and Santiago 2006, 114). In 2009 the Current Population Survey showed an unemployment rate of 13.9 percent among Puerto Ricans, slightly higher than the 11.7 percent among Latinos and Latinas in general, and higher than the 8.7 percent unemployment rate of non-Latinos and Latinas (U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 2009). From 1990 to 2000, the mean household income per capita for Puerto Ricans rose from $8,343 to $13,399. This is significant in that since 1980 it places the economic progress of Puerto Ricans, when compared to the major racial/ethnic groups, among the highest. Using yet another measurement of economic change, the 2009 median household income of Puerto Ricans was $37,052, compared to that of the general population, which was $50,221 (U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2009). According to the 2000 Census, 26 percent of Puerto Ricans fell below the poverty level, which was set at $17, 463 for a family of two adults with two children, ranking Puerto Ricans among the poorest in the nation, but faring better than the 32 percent poverty level they experienced in 1990 (Acosta-Belén and Santiago 2006, 131). The decline in poverty by six percentage points for Puerto Ricans marked the strongest improvement among all ethnic/racial groups. In 2004, the poverty level fell to 23 percent. In spite of these dire numbers, it is important to note that an overwhelming majority of the population is not in poverty. In part, this improvement is attributable to increased entry into low-level white collar occupations, and the overall gains made from an economic boom experienced during the mid-1990s that helped Puerto Ricans recover from its early 1990s setback, when the poverty level reached 39 percent in 1994. Statistics also indicate that those who live in the South and Southwest tend to fare better than those who live in the Northeast and Midwest (Acosta-Belén and Santiago 2006, 137). In 2009 the Census thus far reveals that Puerto Ricans have been adversely affected by the recession of the late 2000s, showing a reversal of trends to match the poverty level in 2000. All indications are that poverty will continue to increase across the board for the most vulnerable during the economic downturn (U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2009). Public assistance or welfare is a sensitive issue for Puerto Ricans, as it has been stereotypically associated with this group for a long time, although unjustly so when one compares poverty levels to public assistance beneficiary rates. In New York City, 36 percent of Puerto Ricans were below the poverty level in 2000, yet 7 percent were receiving some kind of public assistance (Acosta-Belén and Santiago 2006, 139, 141). Puerto Ricans in Providence-Fall River-Warwick, Rhode Island, had the highest poverty rate of any major city where they resided in 2000
1860 | Puerto Ricans
(51%), yet they had a public assistance beneficiary rate of 9 percent (Acosta-Belén and Santiago 2006, 139, 141). Overall, statistics indicate that in areas where there is a large concentration of Puerto Ricans and their poverty levels are high, they receive public assistance benefits well below their need for them.
Health Statistics, Issues Health statistics for Puerto Ricans are woefully inadequate; when data does include Latinos and Latinas, it is often collected and/or reported for Latinos and Latinas in general. Latinos and Latinas disproportionately suffer and die from diseases and medical conditions that are preventable and/or treatable. Latinos and Latinas also tend to smoke less than non-Latino and Latina whites. They are twice as likely to develop diabetes and more likely to die from related complications than non-Latino and Latina whites. They also have higher rates and are more likely to die of tuberculosis and AIDS than non-Latino and Latina whites. Although Latinos and Latinas have a lower mortality rate than non-Latino and Latina whites, particularly among the elderly, that does not apply to those aged 25 to 44. Infant mortality rates are also lower, with the exception of Puerto Ricans and “Other Hispanics” (Pew Hispanic Center 2002). Infant low birth weight for Latinos and Latinas is lower than those of non-Latino and Latina whites, but for Puerto Ricans it is 50 percent higher than the rate of non-Latino and Latina whites. Puerto Ricans also suffer disproportionately from asthma and HIV/AIDS (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2004). Puerto Rican women have also had high rates of sterilization, stemming from the sweeping population control campaign begun in 1937 with Law 116, which saw a zero percent growth rate in several towns in Puerto Rico by 1970. Between 1974 and 1976 alone, 24,000 women were sterilized; by 1985 over 35 percent of women in Puerto Rico had been sterilized (García 1982; Women’s Task Force 1985). In 1984, 24 percent of stateside Puerto Rican women had been sterilized, the highest rate among Latinas (Institute for Puerto Rican Policy 1990). Recent data are not available for stateside Puerto Rican women, but among Latinas the sterilization rate is 20 percent as compared with 22 and 16 percent for non-Latina blacks and whites respectively (Mosher et al. 2004). The 2002 National Survey of Latinos indicated that 35 percent of Latinos and Latinas are uninsured. Puerto Ricans reported an 82 percent rate of health coverage, highest among all Latino and Latina groups, with 13 percent stating they have had difficulty getting care because of their race/ethnic background, lowest among all Latino and Latina groups; in all likelihood this is related to their proficiency with the English language (Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation 2004, 1–2, 4). In 2004, 47 percent of Puerto Ricans had private health insurance; among Latinos and Latinas they are second only to Cubans, with a rate of 58 percent. Twentynine percent of Puerto Ricans had Medicaid coverage, highest among Latinos and
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Latinas; and 20 percent were without any type of health insurance, lowest among Latinos and Latinas, which is related to their U.S. citizenship. In general, 32 percent of Latinos and Latinas, as opposed to 10 percent of non-Latino and Latina whites, were uninsured (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2004). Among Puerto Ricans in the United States, it is clear that the population is exhibiting signs of being a polarized group between those who are making remarkable strides in improving their socioeconomic status and those whose situation tends to be worsening, with those who have less than a high school diploma bearing the brunt of the poverty. Many Puerto Ricans have successfully climbed the ladder of social mobility. However, that success is not shared equally among them. It varies according to geographic location, English-language proficiency, generational status, educational attainment, and level of job skills. They still remain at an overall disadvantage when compared to the general population, particularly non-Latino and Latina whites. This is influenced by various factors, which have a cascading effect on socioeconomic status indicators: their youthfulness, lower levels of education, larger household size, higher percentage of female-headed households, Englishlanguage proficiency for new arrivals and some elderly, and issues of discrimination. In many ways the struggles of Puerto Rican migrants mimic those of earlier groups. However, the colonial situation of Puerto Rico and U.S. citizenship set them uniquely apart. As with other immigrants, the historical juncture in which Puerto Ricans arrived has shaped their socioeconomic status in the United States, but having come en masse after World War II, as deindustrialization spread, was not to their advantage in the overall economic and technological climate of the United States. Their status reflects a polarized experience of poverty and significant economic advancement.
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Puerto Ricans value the extended family unit, which includes the nuclear family of parents and children, as well as grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins from both sides of the family, and compadres (coparents), who are traditionally not related to the family by blood. A person’s identity is linked to being rooted in the family. Compadrazgo (coparentage) is a relationship of commitment between the biological parents of a child and the married couple asked to be his or her godparents at baptism. Godparents are often in a better social position than the child’s family. Traditionally, the obligation entails providing for the spiritual, social, and economic needs of the child so that if the parents are no longer able to care for the child due to illness or death, the godparents will raise the child as their own. In modern
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times, godparents tend to be biologically related to the child, are not a married couple, and are not expected to care for the child upon the illness or death of parents, but they are expected to be an integral part of the child’s life, although many lament the fact that the role of godparents is not as it once was—truly a second set of parents. Life-cycle rituals include quinceañeras (sweet 15) or sweet sixteen parties for the more assimilated, baptisms, baby and bridal showers, weddings, and birthdays. Each of these is well invested in to provide guests with an impressive fiesta (celebration) and is remembered with a capia (a store-bought ready-made or home and handmade type of favor that is pinned to the clothing of a participant as a keepsake). It can be made of satin, lace, or crocheted material and is often decorated with feathers, beads, and small plastic ornaments that celebrate the occasion. The pertinent information can be found on the ribbon: name(s), occasion, and date. Families have collections of capias that span several generations. At weddings, capias are displayed on the wedding dress of a doll that represents the bride. When it is time to greet everyone personally, the doll is carried by the groom while the bride affixes the capias onto the guests’ clothing. The doll serves as an adornment for the back window of the newlyweds’ “getaway” car/limousine. In terms of how Puerto Ricans handle death, they tend to believe in the afterlife according to the Christian belief system. Upon a death, wake/funeral arrangements are prepared by the closest family members within several days, giving time for those who live a distance away to arrive and take part in the rituals. Traditionally, in Puerto Rico the body was viewed in the home with the casket covered by a mosquito net. Currently, for health and safety reasons due to the tropical heat, bodies tend to be viewed in funeral homes, most of which are air conditioned. For Roman Catholics, a priest is brought in to do a small service at the funeral home with a homily and prayers, and for Protestants or Evangelicals a pastor is brought in to do a small service, bring a sermon, and lead in prayers, and this person is accompanied by members of the parish who sing worship songs about heaven and the crowning day of glory that awaits if the deceased was among the faithful. There is a celebratory spirit. Otherwise, the homily and sense of the service is more of a consolation for the relative(s) of the deceased, with some words of God’s mercy and hope that in those last moments before meeting the Maker, the person asked for the forgiveness of sins and was reconciled with the Lord. The body is usually viewed in an open casket over the course of two full days plus the day of interment, and family, friends, and well-wishers stop by the deceased, kneel on the bench located in front of the casket, and say goodbye, oftentimes with a kiss to the forehead and gentle caresses to the face and hands. The wake/funeral is not necessarily a quiet place. There are children carrying on; there are family rivalries that stir up; funny stories are shared as long-lost relatives stroll down memory lane together; there are those who wail without any consolation and seem to take on everyone’s sadness and regrets, aptly named the lloronas (female
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weepers); and those who suffer what medical literature has dubbed “The Puerto Rican Syndrome” but is known among Puerto Ricans as el ataque de nervios (basically, a nervous breakdown). This is a sudden partial loss of consciousness with an epileptic-type of attack including the bodily convulsions, the screaming, and the foaming at the mouth, without any physiological cause for epilepsy. It is also cause for a loved one to attempt to get into the casket, attempt to pull the body out of the casket, or attempt to jump into the grave. This acting out is a culturally acceptable way of dealing with great stress, anxiety, and grief, and is an expression of the inability to cope. On the day of interment, there is a private family viewing at the funeral home, an early mass or service at the church followed by a funeral procession of cars to the cemetery, and perhaps food at the home of the deceased for close friends and relatives. For Roman Catholics, this is followed by novenas (nine days of prayers led by a rezador/a, or communal prayer leader) at the family home.
Families and Changing Gender Relations The family is traditionally based on male authoritarianism (or machismo); the father is to be respected and feared and his decisions unquestioned and final. He is responsible for financially maintaining the family and protecting it. However, machismo also includes the attributes of sexual prowess (despite his marital status), virility (exhibited through the number of children he can engender), competitiveness, male superiority, strength, and pride. The male spends much time outside of the home working, in recreational activities, or in political or extramarital affairs. Traditionally, a woman’s identity is rooted in the function she plays in the family– housekeeping, childbearing, and child rearing. She is socialized to adhere to marianismo (maryanism), which emphasizes the virtues attributed to La Virgen María (the Virgin Mary): obedience, submission, fidelity, and humility. The expectation is that women will remain virgins until they are married, after which they will bear children without any recourse to contraceptives and will show little interest in and enjoyment of sex—that is the function of a mistress or prostitute–una mujer de la calle (a “street” woman). Machismo and marianismo are still present to some degree, although external influences, including the migrant experience, have challenged these gender roles, particularly in the realm of economics, where available jobs often cater to women more readily than men, and women tend to enter college at a higher rate than men.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity As Puerto Ricans settled in the United States, they imagined they would return to their beloved Puerto Rico once they had amassed some riches. For many that would not be the case. They would settle down and grow their roots in the states—their children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren would have little desire to settle
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in a place they did not know as home. The luxuries and commodities available in the States were not readily available on the island, and neither was employment, so it was usual that the migrants would experience nostalgia and a yearning for their homeland while their offspring would not. Some of them would only return to stay upon their retirement or burial. As time went by, the planned return trip home became distant, but their sense of Puerto Rican culture and identity grew strong. This Puerto Rican pride was passed on to the next generations, who might not know much about their history but would know they are the Puerto Rican people in a new setting, who form an integral part of a hugely diverse U.S. society.
Continued Links to Country of Origin All Puerto Ricans have family members living in Puerto Rico, although the relationship might not be a strong one. There is a saying that if you talk long enough to another Puerto Rican, you will find that you are related. It is also true that many of the younger generations have never visited Puerto Rico, but they usually have relatives who go frequently and bring back freshly made “treats” that are not commonly found in the United States, such as coconut candies or brazo gitano (literally “a gypsy arm,” it is a Spanish-origin jelly roll type of pastry filled with typical fillings of guava and white cheese, pineapple, vanilla cream, chocolate, or dulce de leche, caramel-milk flavoring). A fundamental expression of identity, pride, and continued links to Puerto Rico are the Puerto Rican parades, which are held primarily throughout the East Coast and in Chicago, as well as Hawaii. The largest of these is the National Puerto Rican Day Parade, begun in 1959; it has become the most widely attended parade in New York City and is possibly the largest of any parade in the United States, with over 100,000 participants, including Puerto Rico town beauty pageant winners, mayors, and other politicians, as well as over three million spectators, not counting the numerous television viewers watching on Spanish- and English-language channels. Some families choose to have their children born or baptized in Puerto Rico to keep the connection to the island. Many migrants have elected to return upon retirement and purchase a home there. There is a profound spiritual and emotional link stateside Puerto Ricans have to the island. Some say it is nostalgia for the motherland; others say it is a place they or their families hail from and why they are who they are.
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background Puerto Ricans created organizations that would help relieve the stressors of relocating to a country that was culturally and linguistically distinct from their own; some were created as early as the pioneer stage of (im)migration previous to World War I, and all that have survived now serve other Latinos and Latinas as well. Casita
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Rhina Valentin, of New York’s Harlem neighborhood, dances up Fifth Avenue during the Puerto Rican Day Parade in New York, June 13, 2010. (AP Photo/Jason DeCrow)
María, Inc., a Bronx community settlement house, was founded in 1934 by a Puerto Rican Trinitarian nun called Sister Carmelita (Carmela Zapata Bonilla Marrero) to provide educational and social services to the Puerto Rican (im)migrants whose spiritual and material needs were not adequately being served by the Roman Catholic Church. Founded in 1953, the Puerto Rican Association for Community Affairs focuses on Puerto Rican/Latino and Latina families by providing foster care services and day care programs, developing school curriculum, and coordinating youth leadership development conferences and policy conferences on the effects of federal legislation on Latino and Latina families. Founded in 1960, Puerto Rican Family Institute in New York City primarily serves Puerto Rican/Latino and Latina families. It provides professional services that include home-based crisis intervention, children’s intensive care management, mental health clinics, and an adolescent day treatment program. The United Puerto Rican Organization of Sunset Park and Bay Ridge (UPROSE), founded in 1966, is the oldest community-based organization in Sunset Park, Brooklyn. It provides community services, does drop-out prevention counseling and student tutoring, and has an active ecojustice program.
Religion One of the most pronounced features of Puerto Rican culture is its religion, Roman Catholicism, although there is a sizeable group of Protestant and/or Evangelical
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Christians. In daily language, its immense effects can be observed. When Puerto Ricans bid each other farewell, they say adios, literally meaning “to God.” When empathizing with someone’s misfortune, the phrase ay bendito is used, literally meaning “oh, blessed one” (in other words “oh, what a pity”). Disbelief or frustration is expressed by Ave María purísima, literally, “Hail Mary, the most pure one,” but it is often used without regard for any religious meaning. Upon entering or leaving the presence of one’s highly respected older relatives, the word bendición (blessing) is said; this is a request for the older person(s) to bless the individual so that God will protect his/her comings and goings. The response is Que Dios te bendiga y la Virgen te acompañe (May God bless you and the Virgin accompany you); Protestants say only the first half. This is a tradition influenced by the Islamic Moorish culture, which Spain experienced for nearly 800 years. Upon entering a home, one usually sees an altar that includes a portrait of the Virgin Mary, a crucifix or the thorn-crowned head of Jesus Christ, venerated saints, a few lit candles, rosary beads, and perhaps a depiction of the Last Supper. Among Protestants/Pentecostals, a type of altar and other religious symbols can also be found. There might be an open Bible turned to a favorite Scripture passage, usually Psalm 23, or photos of living loved ones are displayed along with photos of those who have died (alongside their personalized funeral cards). A copy of the poem “Footprints,” and a poster of Jesus Christ knocking on a door, asking to be let in, are popular. Some older Pentecostals exhibit framed creative illustrations of the narrow and wide paths spoken of in Scripture, the Resurrection, and the Last Judgment. Upon closer inspection and inquiry, religious symbols might reflect other dimensions of spirituality: the survival of the Yoruban religion from Nigeria and Spiritism from Europe. The enslaved Africans practiced their religion under the guise of Catholicism by using the saints, who had characteristics similar to those of their orishas (powers or divine emissaries), as representatives of those orishas. For example, the orisha Changó is the god of fire and thunder; his color is red and he is represented by Saint Barbara, who is dressed in red and considered the patroness of artillery. The name of this religion, which evolved over a long time, is Santería (its root word santos means “saints”). Santería is practiced outside of the church setting in casas (houses); its practitioners see no conflict between the two. It has its priests, patakis (folktales), and rituals that include divination, possession, divine contact, animal sacrifices, music and dancing, and utilization of the African and Spanish languages. Espiritísmo (Spiritism) is a religious practice brought from France during the mid-19th century and is based on a belief system that the world is full of good and evil spirits that interact with humans, and spirits of the dead are in communication with the living. Its practice includes reading of tarot cards, use of herbal remedies and mediums, and objects of faith. In Puerto Rico there is a combination of the practices of Santería and Spiritism, and there are times when the people themselves are not certain of the origin of a particular custom.
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A significant part of religious life is the fiestas patronales (patron saint festivals) in Puerto Rico, which traditionally last for about a week, into the early hours of the morning. Nowadays, the celebrations include children’s rides and gambling, and the religious rituals seem secondary. However, the celebration and duration of such festivals is almost nonexistent in the United States.
Language Issues Traditionally, Puerto Ricans speak a Spanish language into which Arawakan and African words have been incorporated. Some of the Arawakan words are canoa (canoe), barbacoa (barbecue), maíz (maize), and nagua (enagua, Spanish for “halfslip”). There remain pueblos (towns) and barrios (neighborhoods) that carry their original Arawakan names, such as Arecibo, Tanamá, and Vieques. Scholars believe that Africans arrived in the Americas in the 1300s (Van Sertima 1987). Some African words have an Arawakan equivalent such as nitaíno, which means “noble man/ leader;” bohío is linked to the African word bo, meaning house; and guanín is linked to the African word ghanin, meaning gold. English has influenced the usage of Spanish among Puerto Ricans. In such cases, Anglicisms, such as rufo (roof ), and el estín (steam radiator), have been substituted for Spanish words. Also, Spanglish—a continuous, spontaneous code-switching pattern utilizing the Spanish and the English languages in the same sentence with correct grammar—has arisen. This phenomenon is not new but has a rather long history whenever there has been contact between two or more languages, and it cuts “across time, space, and social class” (Haiman 1993, 50). The maintenance of the Spanish language, particularly by the elderly (some of who have resided in the States longer than in Puerto Rico), can be understood in the context of Puerto Rican cultural pride. Resistance to linguistic assimilation encompasses the affirmation, rather than the shedding, of one’s identity in the midst of a dominant mainstream culture and language. Puerto Ricans born and raised in the United States are a bilingual and bicultural people. Although English is fast becoming the dominant language, new Latino and Latina immigrants and the increasing visibility of Latinos and Latinas in mainstream media, particularly in the music world of rap, hip-hop, and reggaeton, have also stirred a sense of pride in culture and language that links the traditional with the newer aspects of cultural expression as they evolve in the United States.
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media El Diario-La Prensa came about in 1963, but its origins date back to 1913 when it was established in New York as a weekly Spanish-language newspaper and converted into a daily newspaper by 1918. It reports news from Latin America,
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particularly Puerto Rico, and the United States, but it is also a vehicle of community services and sponsors fundraisers. Puerto Ricans were actively involved in this paper. Carlos Ramírez became its publisher in 1984, and since 1999 Rosanna Rosado has served as publisher and CEO. Print media is experiencing a crisis with ready access to the news via the Internet. Considered the first Spanish-language radio program in 1924, Revista Roqué (Roqué’s Revue) was playing Spanish melodies and providing music ensembles a venue to perform on the air. Representing “El Barrio’s version of the professional patron of the arts,” Julio Roqué, a wealthy Puerto Rican dentist in Harlem, helped Latino and Latina music flourish during the Great Depression (Glasser 1995, 111). As consumers in the film and television industries, Puerto Ricans first viewed the Mexican and Argentine Spanish-language films that were marketed. Today, telenovelas (Spanish language soap operas) from Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia dominate the global airwaves. The largest Spanish-language networks in the United States are Univisión, established in 1968, and Telemundo 47 WNJU-TV, established in 1965 as an English-language television station with part-time programming in Spanish until 1971, when it switched completely to Spanish with Puerto Ricans serving as president—Héctor Modestti, and program director—Raúl Dávila (interview with S. M. Santiago, traffic manager of Telemundo 47, July 1997). These stations feature movies and talk shows, as well as culturally oriented entertainment with Latino and Latina megastar singing sensations. The news programs include coverage of local events affecting Latinos and Latinas and international Latin American stories that are gravely disregarded by mainstream media. In 1972 the Puerto Rican Education Action Media Council was organized to counter the overwhelmingly racist images of Puerto Ricans in the media. Although there were other organizations that protested the skewed images in the media, this organization made positive inroads. Its members helped to establish a WNET/ Channel 13 magazine-type, English-language, local program featuring documentaries titled Realidades (Realities) about the Puerto Rican/Latino and Latina experience in New York, headed by its executive director, José García Torres, a Puerto Rican from Spanish Harlem. Realidades had become the hub for launching the media careers of Puerto Ricans/Latino and Latina such as Raquel Ortíz, the producer of the 1995 documentary Mi Puerto Rico (My Puerto Rico). It led the way for mainstream English-language public affairs shows, such as Visiones and Tiempo. Currently, two award-winning television programs target the Latino and Latina younger generation, American Latino TV and LatiNation, aired in 100 cities. Initiatives against underrepresentation and misrepresentation of Puerto Ricans in the media have been waged since 1940, when 40 Puerto Rican organizations vehemently protested the article published in Scribner’s Commentator entitled “Welcome Paupers and Crime: Puerto Rico’s Shocking Gift to the U.S.” (Jiménez 1990, 29–30). As Puerto Ricans continue to enter these industries, form their own
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mediums of communication, and represent themselves, images emerge that portray a balanced view of a people with many accomplishments and challenges. Their focus is to educate and disseminate information about who they are, where they come from, and what they have achieved using documentaries titled In the Heart of Loisaida (1979), Manos a la Obra: The Story of Operation Bootstrap (1983), and Plena is Work, Plena is Song (1989); and a PBS-American Playhouse film The House of Ramón Iglesias (1982). More recent examples include Vaso de Leche Productions, founded in 1992 by Carlos Serrano, which worked out of LaTea Theater; Almost a Woman, a Masterpiece Theatre American Collection film based on Esmeralda Santiago’s book by the same name (1998), and Lillian Jiménez’s Antonia Pantoja ¡Presente! documentary (2009).
Celebration of National Holidays Three major national holidays in Puerto Rico are Noche Buena (Christmas Eve)/ Navidad (Christmas), Año Nuevo (New Year’s Day), and Día de los Tres Reyes Magos (Three Kings’ Day/Epiphany), which is January 6. Due to U.S. influence, Noche Buena and Navidad have become the focus. In Puerto Rico the Christmas season begins just after Thanksgiving (a U.S. celebration that is increasingly being observed) and ends with Las Octavitas—eight days after Epiphany. The 12 days of Christmas are a reality; from Christmas Day until Three Kings’ Day festivities and food, family and friends are the center of attention, where doing parrandas (a type of Christmas caroling) is the norm, not ordinarily in the traditional sense of going from house to house but rather tending to remain in one social setting, all night long. Traditionally, the Three Kings’ Day celebration is more festive than Christmas. On the eve of this occasion the children must place grass or hay in a box and a glass of water underneath their beds for the kings and their camels (or horses, as depicted in Puerto Rican artistry) to refresh themselves. In exchange, the Kings— Gaspar, Baltazar, and Melchior—leave gifts for the children as they did for baby Jesus so long ago.
Foodways Puerto Ricans are a hospitable people. The mi casa es su casa (my home is your home) principle is in effect. The first question asked a guest is usually about whether one has eaten or is thirsty. The sharing of food and drink is a very important way for the host to show that he or she can provide for the needs of the guest, and it establishes trust; it is considered rude to refuse both. Puerto Rican cuisine is delectable. Some favorite dishes include arroz con gandules (yellow rice with pigeon peas), pernil (roast pork shoulder), pasteles (green banana and meat patties wrapped in plantain leaves and boiled), arroz con
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habichuelas (white or yellow rice with beans on the side or mixed in the rice), asopao (a thick rice soup with meat or seafood), arroz con pollo (yellow rice mixed with chicken), verdura con bacalao (a mixture of boiled, starchy root vegetables and salt codfish), plátanos maduros or tostones (fried ripe or green plantains), cuchifritos (a variety of fritters stuffed with meat), and sancocho (vegetable stew with meat). Other tidbits of Puerto Rican cookery include bacalaítos (codfish fritters), sorrullos (corn dogs), alcapurrias (green banana meat-filled fritters), escaveche de mollejitas y guineos (a salad of boiled green bananas and cooked gizzards that includes onions and olives), and mofongo (mashed, fried green plantains seasoned with garlic and pork rind, served with gravy). Traditional drinks include café con leche (espresso coffee with steamed milk), piña colada (the pineapple, coconut, and rum drink invented in Puerto Rico in the 1950s), maví (a root bark drink of the Taínos that can be fermented by exposure to the sun), and malta (a barley, molasses, and hops malted drink). One of the key ingredients used in the food is sofrito, a combination of Spanish onions, garlic, green and red peppers, ají dulce (small sweet pepper), recao (dark green leaves), cilantro (coriander), and olives. The combination varies, but the ingredients were traditionally mashed together in a pilón (a wooden mortar and pestle); nowadays it is often made in an electric blender. When sofrito is sautéed, it fills the house with an unforgettable and irresistible aroma.
Arroz con gandules, rice with pigeon peas, is one of the traditional dishes served during Christmastime in Puerto Rico. (iStockPhoto)
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Achiote (annatto) is another key ingredient and is what makes rice yellow. It can be bought in a ready-made paste, which consists of lard colored with achiote, or in its natural seed form in a jar. It also comes in ready-to-use powder packaged in small envelopes; the more popular brands are Sazón Goya and Sasón Accent. In order to preserve their foodways, Puerto Ricans in the United States became bodegueros (grocery store owners), making familiar food products available that would enable them to replicate the cuisine of their homeland. They also established food outlets that ranged from sit-down restaurants to smaller enterprises that had several stools and served most of their food on a take-out basis. During the summer, especially in the past, one could see piragua (a type of snow cone) carts where chips were scraped from a huge block of ice and topped with tropical-flavored fruit syrups. Specialty shops sold typical confectionery, as well as helados de coco (coconut ices) and other tropical flavors, such as piña (pineapple) and parcha (passion fruit).
Music, Arts, and Entertainment The music is a rich mixture of Taíno, Spanish, and African. The Taíno is reflected in instruments such as the maraca (a hollow gourd, filled with beans or rice and held by a handle that is shaken to produce sound) and the güiro (a hollow gourd that is played by rubbing a comblike tool against its ridges). The Spaniards’ influence is reflected in the Spanish-language lyrics and in the use of stringed instruments, such as the guitar. There is a guitar unique to Puerto Rico called the cuatro (four). It has ten strings arranged in five pairs. Originally, the cuatro had only four strings. A fifth string was added later and eventually the strings were doubled. There is also a form of “European classical ballroom” music known as the danza, which reflects Spanish influence; an example is “La Borinqueña,” the national anthem of Puerto Rico. The Aguinaldo, another musical form, is sung during Christmas. The décima is an improvised, rhyming poem or song of 10 lines that expresses a story or reflection of the circumstances the singer finds himself in. The African culture has left its mark in the fast-paced music known as bomba (which is also the name of the drums), in which there is a “dialogue” between the dancer and the drums, and plena, which served as a singing newspaper. Percussion instruments are also used, such as the congas, timbales (played with drumsticks), and panderetas (tambourines without the cymbals, played with bare hands) to accompany songs, some of which contain African-language lyrics. Many Puerto Rican laborers in the United States were also great musicians who composed, sang, and played music in addition to full-time employment. Among these figures were Pedro Flores, Rafael Hernández, Plácido Acevedo, Manuel “Canario” Jiménez, and Pedro “Davilita” Ortíz Dávila, who wrote and sang many of the most famous Puerto Rican songs on the streets of New York City. Their songs were
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sentimental, nationalistic, nostalgic, patriotic, and passionate. Puerto Ricans such as Noro Morales, Augusto Coen, Johnny Rodríguez, Mario Bauzá, and Francisco López Cruz were also part of the Big Band Era and the American music ensembles as trumpeters, percussionists, and pianists, playing alongside great musicians such as Dizzy Gillespie, Duke Ellington, Guy Lombardo, and Tommy Dorsey. Besides forming their own musical bands, Puerto Ricans played in African American bands as well as white American bands, depending on their skin color, creativity, and/or preference. Puerto Ricans also contributed to the American music scene by the fusing of African American jazz and the Latin, largely Afro-Cuban, rhythms to create a new sound that was commercially labeled as salsa (literally this means sauce, referring to the harmonious blend of the instruments). The essential components are percussion instruments, including congas, bongos, and timbales; cencerro (cow bell); maracas; and güiro; and vocals that include a call and response with the lead singer doing some improvisation. In the early 20th century, European instruments such as the piano, trumpet, trombone, and saxophone were added. American music clubs and ballrooms from the 1930s through the 1950s were influenced by the Latin music sounds of Cuba and Puerto Rico. When the Cuban Revolution took place in 1959 and the United States imposed a trade embargo, this resulted in a cultural blockade. During this time, Puerto Ricans began to create new musical forms by synthesizing jazz and the predominantly Afro-Cuban sounds; this resulted in Latin jazz. Among the Latin jazz artists are the late Tito Puente, a legendary figure renowned as the world’s foremost timbalero (kettle-drummer) whose musical career spanned over 60 years; Ray Barreto; and Eddie Palmieri. A group that shaped salsa during the 1960s and 1970s and is still singing today is Puerto Rico’s El Gran Combo orchestra. Puerto Ricans on the island and in the United States are responsible for today’s salsa style, the way it is played, its choreography, and its syncretism (interview with A. Nadal, deputy chairperson, Department of Puerto Rican and Latino Studies, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, February 1999). In the United States, Puerto Ricans contributed to the famous doo-wop, bebop, and rhythm and blues sounds of the 1950s and 1960s. The cocomposer of the 1956 hit “Why Do Fools Fall in Love?” was Herman Santiago, one of the original members of The Teenagers. They also impacted the music scene with the likes of Sammy Davis, Jr., whose song “Candy Man” is part of the American imaginary (his mother was Puerto Rican), and José Feliciano, who can be heard on the radio singing “Felíz Navidad/I want to wish you a Merry Christmas” every Christmas season. Puerto Ricans were among the pioneers of the early 1970s phenomenon of hip-hop and rap music/culture, including break dancing and graffiti art, which originated in the African American and Puerto Rican neighborhoods of New York City. Rock Steady Crew’s Crazy Legs, Master O.C. of the Fearless Four, and the Real Roxanne are among them (R. V. Rivera 1996, 214).
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Puerto Ricans play a pivotal role in the music phenomenon of reggaeton or reguetón (Reggae Rap in Spanish), which traces its origins to Spanish reggae in Panama. It is music that blends West Indian reggae with Latin American/Caribbean elements of salsa, bomba, plena, merengue, bachata, Latin pop, cumbia, and U.S. contemporary rhythm and blues, hip-hop, and techno. It is either sung or rapped in Spanish. In the 1980s and 1990s the music became popular among youth in Latin America and was known in Puerto Rico as “underground” music created in the low-income projects. Its lyrics speak of harsh realities, drugs, love, and sex. Reggaeton hit the top of the charts in the United States and non-Hispanic Europe in 2004. Puerto Rican youth culture crowned the raggaeton superstars, such as Vico C, Daddy Yankee, Don Omar, Tego Calderón, Calle 13, and Ivy Queen. Puerto Ricans are a key part of the Latino and Latina pop culture. Non-Latinos and Latinas occasionally get a glimpse of this, but only when something seemingly unexpected occurs, such as when the Puerto Rico–based singing group Menudo received a greater welcome to New York City in 1984 than the Beatles did in their prime; or when the National Puerto Rican Day Parade gained the attention of the media for being the most widely attended parade in New York City with three million people in 1999; or when Ricky Martin stole the show with “The Cup of Life” at the 1999 Grammy Awards ceremony; or when “In the Heights,” written by LinManuel Miranda who also starred in the show, exploded onto Broadway and won four Tony Awards in 2008 and a Grammy in 2009. Puerto Ricans have made headway in U.S. entertainment. One of the most distinguished actors in the North American cinema is José Ferrer. He made a name for himself as an actor, director, and producer. His career began with theater performances in 1935, and he went on to acting in films (starting in 1949), to directing in the 1950s, to television appearances. He won the Academy Award for Best Actor in Cyrano de Bergerac in 1950. Ferrer was inducted into the Theater Hall of Fame in 1981, and he continued his directing career into the late 1980s, shortly before his death. Miriam Colón is an actress, director, and playwright whom the New York Times has called the most famous Puerto Rican actress in the United States. She made her Broadway debut in 1953 with In the Summer House, and appeared in several films, including One-Eyed Jacks (1961) and Scarface (1983). In 1966 she established the Puerto Rican Traveling Theater, which continues to feature the work of Latino and Latina playwrights and actors. Chita Rivera is an actress and a dancer who made her debut on Broadway in Call Me Madam (1952). This led to numerous other shows including West Side Story (1957), The Rink (1984), for which she won a Tony Award, and the musical Kiss of the Spider Woman (1993), for which she won her second Tony Award at about 60 years of age. She also starred in A Dancer’s Life, a Broadway show based on her life in 2005. She also appeared in several films, such as Sweet Charity (1969),
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and television programs, including one in Britain where she starred with the Beatles (1964). In 1985 she was inducted into the Television Hall of Fame. Rita Moreno was the first person to earn all of the top awards in show business— an Oscar in 1962 for the movie version of West Side Story; a Grammy in 1972 for her musical performance on the Electric Company Album for children; a Tony for her part in the Broadway show The Ritz (1975); and two Emmy Awards for an episode on The Muppet Show (1977) and an episode on The Rockford Files (1978). She has appeared in countless television shows, movies, and stage productions, including The King and I (1956) and I Like It Like That (1994). In terms of the arts, three establishments continue to stand out. The Nuyorican Poets Café, located on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, was founded in 1974 by Miguel Algarín to serve as a vehicle for the voices of Puerto Rican/Latino and Latina poets. The Puerto Rican Traveling Theatre, located in the heart of Manhattan’s cultural district, was founded in 1967 by pioneering Puerto Rican actress Miriam Colón. Her vision was to establish a theater accessible to those who could not afford to attend Broadway shows, as well as to promote Puerto Rican/Latino and Latina cultures, through free bilingual performances in public places during the summertime. This provided Puerto Rican/Latino and Latina playwrights and actors opportunities that were otherwise scarce. El Museo del Barrio, located along Museum Mile in Manhattan, was founded in 1969 by Martha Moreno Vega, who wanted to create a space for Puerto Rican culture and provide opportunities for Puerto Ricans/Latinos and Latinas to display their art work. It is the only museum of its kind in the United States, and one among four museums dedicated to Latino and Latina cultures.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Puerto Ricans born on the island have had U.S. citizenship since the 1917 Jones Act and do not have varying pathways toward that end. Those born in the United States are automatically citizens.
Naturalization Puerto Ricans born on the island are not subject to a naturalization process and do not need a “green card,” since they have been U.S. citizens since 1917.
Dual Citizenship The issue of dual citizenship has gained momentum in Puerto Rico. Proindependence lawyers have argued that the Jones Act did not withdraw Puerto Rico
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citizenship from its people; it granted them U.S. citizenship in addition to the one they were already recognized as having in the 1900 Foraker Act. To that end it is being claimed that each citizen of Puerto Rico has dual citizenship. Legal challenges have been presented in the international arena before the World Court, the United Nations, Puerto Rico, and the United States by a well-known independentist leader, lawyer Juan Mari Bras, who initiated a campaign in 1995 to recruit 100,000 Puerto Ricans to renounce U.S. citizenship and solely claim Puerto Rican citizenship. Puerto Rican passports are issued in Puerto Rico and are used to travel, having already been recognized by several Latin American countries including Cuba and Venezuela. In de Ferrer v. Mari Bras (1997), Puerto Rico’s Supreme Court reaffirmed a separate Puerto Rican citizenship. Some independentists argue that it would be conceivable that once Puerto Rico is independent of the United States, it would not be opposed to dual citizenship with the United States, since many countries have this agreement.
Intergroup Relations The diverse racial heritage of Puerto Ricans is reflected in their physical appearance; there is no one particular racial experience that all can claim to share. Puerto Ricans have a skin color gradient that ranges from a deep black to a pale white. Their facial features reflect a mixture of their ancestors. Some Puerto Ricans have high cheekbones, distinctively rounded pala (shovellike) front teeth, thick straight hair, and bronze skin, reflecting their Taíno heritage; some have sharp noses, blue-green eyes, fine light-colored hair, and ivory skin, reflecting their European heritage; yet others have wide noses, thick lips, tightly curled hair, and ebony skin, reflecting their African ancestry. Their physical appearance can be misleading—they can be taken for East Indians, African Americans, Native Americans, Middle Easterners, Dominicans, Italians, Jews, Chinese, Anglo-Saxons, or some other group. For stateside Puerto Ricans, “black” is more than skin color; it is associated with African Americans and perceived as a cultural term linked with socioeconomic challenges, a particular style of clothing and/or speech pattern, and an ethnic minority. Even a Puerto Rican who has black skin is not black. “White” is perceived as a cultural term linked with privilege, access, wealth, and the dominant majority attitude. Even a Puerto Rican who has white skin is not white.
Puerto Ricans and African Americans Upon entry into the northeastern region of the United States, Puerto Ricans settled primarily in predominantly African American neighborhoods, which were more accessible in terms of rental costs and the willingness to rent out apartments to the new migrants. They experienced help from some African Americans, but the
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overall relationship between the two groups started out on rugged terrain. Puerto Ricans had limited English-language skills, and therefore communication between the two groups was difficult at best. As the numbers of Puerto Ricans increased, African Americans had a sense that they were being displaced from their living quarters, had to compete harder for jobs, and felt a deep cultural separation even from black Puerto Ricans who outright rejected the black racial categorization and insisted that they were Puerto Rican. This bred a distrust of Puerto Ricans, who were perceived by African Americans as siding with whites and thereby were categorized as whites. However, Puerto Ricans and African Americans have collaborated and exchanged ideas, styles of dress, music, and mannerisms to create an urban trend that even big-time corporate advertisers have imitated and catered to. These two groups have gained a greater understanding of one another through their frequent interactions in neighborhoods and schools, and their relationship has improved substantially over time. They have also formed political alliances to gain strides in their shared neighborhoods. More often than not, these two groups stand together on issues of racism, diversity, and survival in often desperate situations.
Puerto Ricans and Non-Latino and Latina Whites As Puerto Ricans continued to grow in numbers, they carved out a space for themselves and found themselves concentrated in a “buffer zone” between the African American and neighboring non-Latino and Latina white communities. Although Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens, whites viewed them as immigrants that wanted what rightfully belonged to whites–jobs, an education, housing, and the American dream. This subjected Puerto Ricans to prejudice, discrimination, and violence. In order for some Puerto Rican children to attend their zoned school, they had to go into white neighborhoods primarily inhabited by Irish, Italian, Polish, and other European Americans. Violence broke out against the children on several occasions, warranting police intervention and escorts in order for them to enter school grounds. There are also stories of men who lined up as day laborers to work on the docks and barely spoke for fear that it would be known they were Puerto Rican. There were signs at certain locations that read “No Puerto Ricans.” If they were found out, they were subjected to physical violence, both by potential employers and by workers (the “¿Por Qué Brooklyn?: Our Borough’s Latino Voices” exhibition at the Brooklyn Historical Society during 1991–1992 focused on the settlement of Latinos and Latinas in Brooklyn, NY). As the first group to settle en masse in the northeastern region of the United States who spoke Spanish, had a Caribbean background, and were racially mixed, Puerto Ricans confronted many difficulties in trying to adapt to their new environment and bore the brunt of the consequences for making some headway in this
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region that would eventually make it more bearable for other Latino and Latina and non-English-speaking groups. Overall, relations between Puerto Ricans and nonLatino and Latina whites have improved, and some of the credit can be attributed to affirmative action programs that have given Puerto Ricans the opportunity to prove their abilities and skills through entry into the workforce and colleges in greater numbers, through successfully occupying government and teaching positions, and through serving as resources for the community at large. Puerto Ricans and nonLatino and Latina whites have begun to share interests in music, computers, technology, and business; they also share an interest, along with African Americans, in pop culture, which exhibits greater cultural inclusivity than ever before.
Puerto Ricans and Newcomers As other Latinos and Latinas settled in predominantly Puerto Rican neighborhoods, Puerto Ricans have shown both great hospitality and cautious reserve. The other Latino and Latina groups largely include Cubans, Dominicans, Mexicans, Colombians, Salvadorans, and Ecuadorans. Puerto Ricans have assisted other Latinos and Latinas by renting apartments to them and serving as interpreters for them with English-speaking landlords. They have served as bodegueros (grocery store owners) that provide Latino and Latina foods and have allowed an internal credit system called fiado. In places where speaking English is crucial to one’s well-being, such as in health care institutions, Puerto Ricans, whether workers or patients, have made conversations possible by translating the exchange between the health-care provider and the non-English speaking Latino and Latina patient. They have been instrumental in this way in schools, government agencies, stores, churches, offices of politicians, and workplaces. Puerto Ricans have also assumed a similar role when it comes to non-Latino and Latina newcomers. Simultaneously, as shops were sold by Puerto Ricans to other Latinos and Latinas, who then became the local merchants, some experienced a sense of displacement and resentment. Grassroots leadership in the community slowly began to reflect the growing number of other Latinos and Latinas. Some Puerto Ricans felt threatened and began to caucus around Puerto Rican interests and concerns rather than making pan-Latino and Latina coalitions that would address neighborhood concerns. The end result was usually a divided community weary from the struggle, rather than a united community demanding that its grievances be redressed by the government. Similar situations have developed when the newcomers have been non-Latinos and Latinas, such as Chinese or Middle Easterners, except that there is often greater cultural, linguistic, and religious difference, leading to greater tension. The racial heritage, cultural background, and array of phenotypical characteristics allow Puerto Ricans the opportunity to serve as a bridge to, and form alliances with, several racial and ethnic groups. It is clear that their potential for playing a
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significant role in race relations and serving as ambassadors in the process of working toward establishing better, more harmonious intergroup relations is great.
Forging a New American Political Identity Political Associations and Organizations As Puerto Ricans familiarized themselves with politics, they began to ally themselves with others and create institutions that would advocate on their behalf at the legislative level. Throughout New York City, in the 1920s and 1930s, Puerto Ricans formed political clubs and working-class and social organizations that had the political status of Puerto Rico, culture, and education at the forefront. Several of these organizations included La Liga Puertorriqueña e Hispana (The Puerto Rican and Hispanic League), the Puerto Rican Brotherhood, the Puerto Rican Social Club, De Hostos Democratic Club, the Nationalist Party New York City branch, and the Hispanic Section of the International Workers Order. Jesús Colón, a labor leader, writer, and activist, is known to have been a leader of the Communist Party and was brought before the House Un-American Activities Committee to testify about his political views and activities. Puerto Ricans also joined political forces with African Americans to form the New York State Black and Puerto Rican/Hispanic Legislative Caucus, which focuses on issues they have in common and, where necessary, issues unique to each group. Some organizations were focused on specific subgroups, such as the National Conference of Puerto Rican Women, which was founded in Washington, D.C., by professionals in 1972 to advocate for women’s rights and address ethnicity and gender discrimination. Addressing issues affecting Puerto Rican women across the economic spectrum, it offers leadership training and educational scholarships via local chapters throughout the nation. Another such organization is the Institute for the Puerto Rican/Hispanic Elderly, founded in 1978, an agency that supports the Spanish-speaking elderly by providing recreational activities and assistance in acquiring entitlement benefits. It actively lobbies against policies that adversely affect seniors.
Civic and Electoral Participation In Puerto Rico, people are very active in unions and have an 80–85 percent turnout of registered voters during election time. Upon (im)migrating to the United States their voting behavior was altered due to discriminatory practices of fatherson clauses in unions, gerrymandering, English language criteria, and the language barrier. María López, a Puerto Rican from Rochester, New York, helped to ensure that all U.S. citizens had an equal right to vote. She was denied the right to vote because she did not have sufficient knowledge of the English language. In a civil
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action suit, she and others were successful in shaping part of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that provided equal access to voting for all U.S. citizens by providing onsite literature and translators in the voters’ native languages. Puerto Ricans in the United States are predominantly Democrats; however, they tend to vote on issues rather than along party lines, and regardless of race/ethnicity, they are receptive of candidates with whom they can identify and who demonstrate a genuine interest in the community. This can be attested to in the cases of Congressman Vito Marcantonio in East Harlem in New York City, and Presidents Kennedy and Obama, all of who were successfully elected to office with the help of Puerto Ricans/Latinos and Latinas. Since the 1920s, Puerto Ricans have taken to the streets to protest the major shortcomings in government (lack of police protection, police harassment, and inadequate community services), the lack of civil rights for certain groups, and the New York City Board of Education, which was failing their children miserably in terms of the language barrier between teachers and students and the circumstances that led to the “pushing out” of their children from school, resulting in high dropout rates. They protested fascism in Spain and rallied for workers’ rights alongside progressive African Americans and Jews. They exercised their civic duties as U.S. citizens and fought to make the United States a better place for all peoples. A Puerto Rican woman was responsible for establishing the precursor of the Legal Aid Society, which is geared toward providing legal counsel for those who cannot afford a lawyer. Felisa Rincón de Gautier served as the first female politician in Puerto Rico when she was elected mayor of San Juan from1946 to 1968. She saw the need for legal counsel among the impoverished, as well as other support services such as day care for children and recreational/health care centers for the elderly, and she provided these services to her constituents during her tenure as mayor. She is credited with having created the first model in the Western Hemisphere for these types of assistance.
Public Policies and Political Representation Despite the many challenges of adapting to the nuances of the United States, it is important to note that there have been quite a few Puerto Ricans in the political life of the United States. As early as 1937, Oscar García Rivera, a Republican, became the first elected Puerto Rican to serve in the New York State Assembly. Hermán Badillo became the first Puerto Rican ever to hold a citywide position as the New York City Commissioner of Urban Renewal and Relocation, from 1962 to 1965; he subsequently became the Bronx Borough president until 1969. In 1961 Arturo Morales Carrión became the first Puerto Rican to be appointed to the position of deputy assistant secretary of State for Latin America in the Kennedy administration and in 1963 became the special assistant to the secretary general of the Organization
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of American States. In 1970 Badillo became the first Puerto Rican voting member of the U.S. Congress. Robert García became the first Puerto Rican New York State senator. José Serrano was elected as a New York State assemblyman in 1974 and since 1990 has served as a U.S. congressman. In 1978 the late Olga Méndez became the first Puerto Rican/Latina woman ever elected to a U.S. legislative post in New York State and served in that capacity until 2004, when she ran as a Republican candidate and lost her seat and well-earned seniority. In 1984 Nydia Velázquez became the first Puerto Rican/Latina woman to serve in the New York City Council when she was appointed to the post. Becoming the first Puerto Rican woman ever to be elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1992, with over 75 percent of the vote in the 12th District of New York, which was one of nine districts created to encourage ethnic minority voting power under the 1965 Voting Rights Act, she continues in that capacity. In that same year, Luis Gutierrez became the first Puerto Rican/Latino to represent the state of Illinois in the U.S. Congress, winning 78 percent of the vote in the newly created 4th District; he continues to serve. In 1989 Pedro Espada Jr. ran as a candidate for the New York City Council. He received the highest vote ever for an independent candidate in the history of U.S. electoral politics. To the dismay of his constituents, as a New York State senator in 2009, he sided with the Republicans and was instrumental in the upheaval of the new Democratically controlled Senate, which was won after 40 years of a Republican majority. Adam Clayton Powell IV followed in his forefathers’ footsteps as a leader championing the civil rights of underrepresented groups in Manhattan and the Bronx and has served as a New York State assemblyman since 2000. Because of his Puerto Rican mother, he identifies with the Puerto Rican community and is fluent in Spanish. In 1991 Lucy Cruz became the first Puerto Rican/Latina woman to be elected to the New York City Council, and Carmen E. Arroyo became the first Puerto Rican/ Latina woman to be elected into the New York State Assembly in 1994. New York State assemblyman Roberto Ramírez was the first person of Puerto Rican/Latino and Latina heritage to be elected as the chair of the Bronx County Democratic Committee, while New York City Council member Antonio Pagán was the first openly gay person of Puerto Rican/Latino and Latina heritage to be elected to any post in New York in 1991. César Perales was appointed by President Carter as assistant secretary in the Department of Health and Human Services in 1980. From 1983 to 1991 he served as the New York State commissioner of Social Services, and in 1992 New York City Mayor David Dinkins appointed Perales deputy mayor for Health and Human Services. Since 2003, he has served as president and general counsel for the Latino Justice Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF), which he cofounded in 1972. In 2011 he was named the New York Secretary of State by Governor Andrew Cuomo.
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Puerto Ricans have served in the U.S. judicial system. José Cabranes was the first native Puerto Rican to serve as a federal judge within the continental United States. He became part of the Carter administration in 1977 and in 1979 was appointed to the U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut, where he became its chief judge. He gained greater recognition when he was being seriously considered by the White House and supported by the Puerto Rican/Latino and Latina community as a candidate for the U.S. Supreme Court upon the retirement of Justice Harry Blackman in 1994. Two other notable judges with distinguished careers are Luis Rovirá and Juan Torruella. Rovirá was appointed as judge to the Colorado District Court for the 2nd District in 1976 and by 1990 became the Colorado Supreme Court chief justice. Torruella was appointed to the U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico in 1974, became its chief justice in 1982, and in 1984 was subsequently appointed by
First Latino and Latina/Hispanic Named Supreme Court Justice is a Puerto Rican Woman from New York First gaining fame in 1995 as “the judge who saved baseball” when she ended an eight-month-long strike by siding with the baseball players against the Major League Baseball owners, a Puerto Rican woman and a life-long Yankees fan gained international attention when President Barack Obama nominated her for the highest court in the nation. But it did not begin or end there. Sonia Sotomayor is the product of a post–World War II migrant Puerto Rican working class family, whose head of household died too early, leaving her mother, Celina, with two young children to care for, including Sonia, who was diagnosed with juvenile diabetes. Raised in the public housing projects of the South Bronx of New York City, she became a graduate of Princeton University and Yale Law School and has served in almost every branch of the legal system. President George H. W. Bush appointed her a federal judge in the Southern District of New York in 1992, making her the first Latino and Latina and the youngest to be appointed therein. Then in 1998 President Bill Clinton named her the first federally appointed Latina judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Sotomayor received Senate confirmation and was sworn in on August 8, 2009, as the country’s 111th U.S. Supreme Court justice, having more federal judiciary experience than any such justice in 100 years. This all-American story of overcoming great obstacles to accomplish one’s dreams echoes the familiar phrase—“only in the greatest country in the world.” As the first Puerto Rican/Latino and Latina and third woman to serve in the history of the Supreme Court, the entire Puerto Rican community at home and abroad is extremely proud of Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor and all that she represents for Americans from all walks of life.
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President Reagan to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit. In 2009, history was made when Sonia Sotomayor became the 111th U.S. Supreme Court justice, occupying what some argue is the highest judicial post in the world, which is a lifelong political appointment. A dissatisfied Puerto Rican community responded to the educational needs of their children by forming ASPIRA (Aspire), which was founded in 1961 by Dr. Antonia Pantoja, a social worker and educator. Aspira is a nonprofit social and educational services organization targeting Puerto Ricans/Latinos and Latinas. It has a national agenda and operates via its high school clubs; its curriculum focuses on “Awareness, Analysis and Action.” ASPIRA spearheaded the 1972 landmark case of Aspira of New York v. Board of Education of the City of New York, challenging discrimination faced by Puerto Ricans and others whose native language was other than English. This case resulted in the Aspira Consent Decree, which that mandated nationwide “transitional program[s] for all LEP [limited English-proficient] students be implemented” (Rodríguez 1991, 140). Their partner in changing the law and impacting educational policy across the United States was the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF), a nonprofit civil rights organization established in 1972 in New York City that protects and promotes the legal rights of Puerto Ricans/Latinos and Latinas through advocacy and litigation. It provides leadership training opportunities and scholarships for Latinos and Latinas interested in the legal profession. Among its many accomplishments, it also successfully argued its landmark case for political redistricting to correct for gerrymandering. In 2008 it changed its name to Latino Justice PRLDEF to reflect the changing demographics in New York City. Puerto Ricans have experienced the challenges of adapting to the United States as both migrants and an ethnic minority. They engaged in self-preservation and affirmation by creating organizations and institutions that facilitated their transition to the United States as well as that of other immigrants.
Return Immigration Return (im)migration for Puerto Ricans is discussed in the section on Causes and Waves of Migration, particularly called the Revolving Door Migration, from 1965 to the present. During this stage, back-and-forth (im)migration depended on the nature of the economy in Puerto Rico and in the United States. Although both are connected because of Puerto Rico’s economic dependence on the United States, there are certain waves that prompt workers to stay in Puerto Rico or to go to the United States. Return (im)migration was also prompted in part by the desire of parents to “straighten out” their children who were misbehaving and not following the Puerto Rican traditions of respecting their parents. Perhaps the children were being disobedient, not attending school, or were hanging out on the streets with their “hoodlum”
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friends. In those instances, parents would send their children to live with their grandparents or some other relatives in Puerto Rico. They believed this would guarantee a turn-around in their misconduct and in their attitude and keep them out of trouble, because it was the contradictory cultural messages the children were receiving from the United States that caused this bad behavior. After a while, the kids would then return to the States, perhaps to find themselves back in Puerto Rico upon another turn of events. This is called the “ping-pong” effect. Another major contributing factor for return (im)migration is the return of those who have reached retirement age and desire to die in the land in which they were born, or who have had to return for health reasons that include breathing easier and being in a warm climate.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity To use the term Puerto Rican American is not to have properly understood the sociopolitical and historical relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. All Puerto Ricans were declared U.S. citizens in 1917 unless they officially denounced it within six months of the Jones Act, and thus they are Americans; it is, therefore, redundant for Puerto Ricans to be among the “hyphenated Americans” as are, for example, Dominican Americans. This is not to be confused with how Puerto Ricans perceive themselves. There is a sense of “us” and “them”; they differentiate themselves from Americanos, gringos, blancos, Anglos (Americans, non-Latino and Latina whites), and morenos or negros (non-Latino and Latina blacks). Stateside Puerto Ricans acknowledge that they differ from those who were born or raised on the island. Upon visiting or return (im)migration to Puerto Rico, the islanders tend to set the returnees apart. A term for Puerto Ricans who are influenced by their New York context is “Nuyorican,” which is a contraction for New York Puerto Rican with a Spanish twist. The term would not be appropriate for those living outside of New York and is not entirely embraced by Puerto Rican New Yorkers, because they consider themselves to be Puerto Rican; others dislike the term because it has been used pejoratively by islanders who began to blame the returnees for having brought crime, drugs, and gangs to their homeland. The limited ability of some to speak Spanish was equated with a loss of what makes one Puerto Rican, and thus, one became a Nuyorican; whether or not one came from New York was irrelevant. During the Civil Rights Movements of the 1960s and the 1970s, Puerto Ricans formed coalitions with African American, Asian, Native American, and Women’s Equal Rights groups. It was a time when young people proclaimed and reclaimed their identity and heritage with the emergence of groups such as the Black Panthers and the Brown Berets; Puerto Ricans were among them. In 1967 a Chicago Puerto
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Youth Profile A Young Puerto Rican Becomes Head of a Program Promoting Minorities for Legal Careers Dr. Jodie G. Roure is the daughter of Puerto Rican migrants who came during the Great Migration—her mother worked as a hairdresser because her own father and school guidance counselor told her that medicine was not for women; her father became a doll factory worker and a delivery boy. They returned to Puerto Rico for a short time during the Revolving Door Migration, but moved back in the mid-1970s when Jodie was a grammar school child. The New Jersey education system wanted to place her in special education because she spoke Spanish, despite also being fluent in English. When she was a teenager, her father took her to the fields where Puerto Rican migrant workers made a living, and she saw firsthand the unfair labor practices they were subject to. She became interested in law as a means to change educational policy and advocate for workers’ rights. In the Spring of 1994 as an undergraduate, after pleading her case directly to Justice Ruth Ginsberg in Washington, D.C., she became the first Puerto Rican and Latino and Latina to serve as an intern for the Office of Public Information and the Clerk’s Office at the U.S. Supreme Court. She obtained her juris doctor from Western New England College School of Law in Massachusetts in 1997 and studied international human rights law protection in San José, Costa Rica, while living among the Bri Bri indigenous tribe, where she dealt with legal cases concerning pesticide sterilization and the patenting of medicinal plants by major pharmaceutical companies. In 2004 she completed her PhD in intercultural studies and international human rights at the University of Buffalo-State University of New York. She is currently an associate professor in the Department of Latin American/Latina/o Studies at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, and serves as the director of the Ronald H. Brown Summer Law School Prep Program in collaboration with St. John’s University Law School in Queens, which helps ethnic minorities who aspire to enter law school. Dr. Roure has published and teaches courses in the areas of human rights, including violence against women in Brazil, Puerto Rico, and the United States; gender rights, domestic violence, international criminal justice, race, class, ethnicity, and Latino and Latina Studies.
Rican street gang called the Young Lords Organization (YLO) had become a political organization to combat the system that was oppressing them; an example of this oppression was police harassment. The Young Lords of New York City, consisting of many university students, emerged in 1968 as an offshoot of the Chicago group and in 1970 renamed itself the Young Lords Party (YLP), drawing upon a
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political platform that delineated what they believed in. Their activities addressed community grievances, such as sanitary conditions and health care. They organized food programs and clothing drives; conducted TB testing; helped to make lead paint illegal inside of apartments; offered free classes about Puerto Rican culture, politics, and Marxist ideology; established a radio program on WBAI-FM and created a biweekly newspaper both called Pa’lante (Moving Forward). They also actively promoted the independence of Puerto Rico. The protests, rallies, and activities included children, teenagers, young adults, and the elderly. They numbered in the thousands; one march alone had 10,000 participants. But, eventually their momentum weakened due to their divided vision. Their failed efforts to mobilize Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico for independence put an enormous strain on the organization, along with lack of money, as well as infiltration by the FBI Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which bred distrust. By 1973 the YLP had taken on another form, the Puerto Rican Revolutionary Workers Organization, but it did not have the same drive and force possessed by the Young Lords. In September of 2009, the Young Lords held their 40th reunion at the same Spanish Methodist Church on 111th Street and Lexington Avenue in Spanish Harlem that they had occupied and renamed the People’s Church in 1969. It was an enormous gathering that filled the church and left people in the streets, hoping to get in. The Young Lords is considered the first massive collective expression of Puerto Rican identity in the United States and is a clear example of successful grass-roots organizing and self-empowerment. Their legacy remains an inspiration for many, especially young Puerto Ricans. But, it is also a time in history that is looked upon with pride by those who experienced it firsthand and who benefited from its achievements. It is a time of nostalgia, when unity among Puerto Ricans was at its peak, for the great majority of Puerto Ricans who can now be found spread throughout the country. What is of interest is that many of the Young Lords can still be found working for social justice and exposing issues of interest that need to be addressed by society. Examples of some former Young Lords include Juan González, NY Daily News journalist and author; Iris Morales, film producer of Pa’lante, Siempre Pa’lante: The Story of the Young Lords (1996); Pablo “Yoruba” Guzmán, a television news reporter; and Luis Garden Acosta, an ordained minister and founding director of El Puente community-based organization in Brooklyn, New York, which now runs a charter high school.
Educational Attainment The educational attainment of Puerto Ricans was discussed earlier in the section Demographic Profile. In addition to the statistics, it is relevant to add a bit about what has been achieved by Puerto Ricans in the realm of academia. The Young Lords placed emphasis on educating the masses about their cultural and racial
1886 | Puerto Ricans
heritage as a means of self-knowledge and self-pride, and for connecting to others with similar struggles. Their demand, joined with those of educational activists and parents, that higher education institutions reflect more than Eurocentrism in their curriculum contributed to the impetus that established Puerto Rican studies programs across the Northeast, one of the precursors of today’s Latino and Latina studies programs. In the midst of this Civil Rights era arose the 1968 establishment of Eugenio María de Hostos Community College in the City University of New York, named for a Puerto Rican educator and sociologist. In 1974 a desire for higher education that was relevant to the Puerto Rican community prompted the establishment of Boricua College, which was founded in New York City as a private bilingual (Spanish-English) institution with a Puerto Rican identity. Boricua is a noun for one who comes from Borikén (Puerto Rico), also known as Borinquen. Nowadays this college serves various Latino and Latina constituencies in Manhattan and Brooklyn. These successes, along with the aforementioned bilingual education programs across the nation, have given Puerto Ricans a historical foothold in American education and a sense of empowerment.
Cultural Identification Puerto Ricans identify as Puerto Ricans rather than as black or white; culturally rather than racially. Although stateside Puerto Ricans will identify with the broader categorization of “Hispanic” or the more increasingly popular term “Latino and Latina,” derived from Latinoamérica (Latin America), the preference remains for the Puerto Rican identifier, even among those who have never visited Puerto Rico. Puerto Ricans wave the Puerto Rican flag and wear clothing and accessories that identify them as Puerto Rican, particularly during the weeks leading to the National Puerto Rican Day Parade in June. The flag is a major cultural identifier for Puerto Ricans because there is no stronger symbol for this community. The coquí (the singing tree frog of Puerto Rico), which is a very strong symbol of being Puerto Rican on the island, is a bit removed from the urban reality of stateside Puerto Ricans, some of whom have never set foot on the island and have never heard the melodious tune of the coquí. There is also no religious figure to rally themselves around, such as the Virgin of Guadalulpe for the Mexicans.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Puerto Rico Forecasts for the 21st Century The major issue that needs to be resolved in the 21st century is that of the political status of Puerto Rico. Since July 25, 1952, its status has been that of the Estado
Issues in Relations between the United States and Puerto Rico | 1887
Libre Asociado (Free Associated State) or simply the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which has been defined by the United States as a self-governing territory of the United States, a status that is ambiguous at best. The other two main political status options include independence from the United States, and becoming the 51st state of the union. Whatever their position on the political status of Puerto Rico, Puerto Ricans clearly understand that Puerto Rico and the United States are not equal partners. Its colonial relationship with the United States is recognized by independentists, statehooders, and the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization, while commonwealthers claim they have the “best of both worlds.” The United States points to the 1953 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 748, which removed Puerto Rico from its protected territories list when the United States petitioned this upon the approval of Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status the preceding year. There have been three status plebiscites on the political status of Puerto Rico. In 1952, before the commonwealth status was made official, a referendum was held on the approval of the Puerto Rican Constitution and the commonwealth status. The vote resulted in the approval of 81 percent of the voters. Many claim that the strong propaganda campaign against independence during the time of McCarthyism in the United States, the Communist “red scare,” and the Gag Law in Puerto Rico guaranteed commonwealth its victory. In 1967 the status plebiscite resulted in 61 percent favoring the commonwealth, although statehood was making headway with 39 percent of the vote, and as evidenced with the election of a prostatehood governor in 1964 when a disillusioned procommonwealth Governor Luis Muñoz Marín opted not to run for a fifth term. In the1993 plebiscite, Puerto Ricans voted for the following: enhanced commonwealth 48.6 percent; statehood 46.3 percent; independence 4.4 percent; and blank votes .7 percent. This showed a marked increase in favor of statehood. There was also a 1998 non-Congressionally mandated plebiscite held in Puerto Rico; however, the majority favored a “none of the above” option with 50.3 percent of the votes, while statehood garnered 47 percent. This reflected a political disagreement whereby those who favored commonwealth believed the commonwealth option, as it was written on the ballot by a prostatehood legislature, was purposely misrepresented. The independentists had the same contention over the definition of a sovereign nation. Therefore, they each encouraged their constituents to vote for the “none of the above” option. Those who cling to the commonwealth status quo do so fully acknowledging its existence was meant to be temporary and that one day it would have to come to an end; originally, that end would be complete independence from the United States once economic stability was reached. They claim to have the “best of both worlds” because they have the greatest superpower on Earth to protect and assist them, with the added bonus of being U.S. citizens, which allows them free access to come and go as they please, while maintaining their distinct language, culture, and international identity, such as in the Olympics and the Miss Universe beauty pageant. The commonwealthers, represented by the Partido Popular Democrático (Popular
1888 | Puerto Ricans
Democratic Party), believe a more egalitarian relationship can be achieved without changing the current political status; they want an enhanced commonwealth. Commonwealthers believe that statehood would bring an end to Puerto Rico’s language, culture, and identity, while independence would result in economic and social collapse. They hope to include an enhanced commonwealth option in any status plebiscite held in Puerto Rico, a status that would not fall under the territorial clauses of the U.S. Constitution but be a pact between two equal partners. Since the beginning of the U.S. invasion and occupation in 1898, independentists have been under government surveillance. The FBI Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) constantly monitored the independentist activists and used the strategic tactics of infiltration to “divide and conquer,” which continues today. The independentists consist of various groups, ranging from those the United States has labeled terrorist organizations, such as the clandestine Fuerzas Armadas para la Liberación Nacional—FALN (Armed Forces for National Liberation), the Macheteros (machete wielders), the socialist Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist Party), and the well-established political party the Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño—PIP (Puerto Rican Independentist Party). Those who want independence for Puerto Rico denounce the U.S. exploitation of the island and its great natural resources, which includes its people. They denounce colonialism, evidenced by the fact that the United States can overturn any legislative decision made in Puerto Rico, and they point to the history of the 13 colonies, which fought for their independence against Britain and were successful, giving birth to the United States. That is what they desire for Puerto Rico, and they argue the United States should honor that. All independentists want complete sovereignty from the United States, but there is a diversity of opinions about what type of relationship would be maintained with the United States under the Republic of Puerto Rico, if any; whether dual citizenship with the United States would be allowed; and whether it would be a democratic, socialist, or one-party government. They argue that not allowing Puerto Rico its freedom is a matter of human rights; a nation’s freedom is not something for another people to decide. Freedom is a human right. Independentists believe commonwealth is a cowardly choice of “sitting on the fence” and not making any real decisions except to stay as a colony, while statehood would be comparable to allowing the home invaders to keep the house with one’s permission, leading to the eventual annihilation of Puerto Ricans. As recently as June 2008, the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization passed a resolution calling for the decolonization of Puerto Rico. Proindependence leaders are working on bringing the resolution and case of Puerto Rico to the floor of the U.N. General Assembly; previous attempts have been blocked by the United States and deemed as outside interference. The statehood movement has gained momentum over the past few decades to rival the voting block of the commonwealthers. They are represented by the Partido
Issues in Relations between the United States and Puerto Rico | 1889
Nuevo Progresista—PNP (New Progressive Party). Those who want statehood for Puerto Rico criticize the U.S. treatment of the islanders because it has not granted full citizenship rights with political representation in the U.S. Congress to the people of Puerto Rico. Statehooders, as well as independentists, have argued that racial discrimination is a motivating factor in the lack of regard Congress has demonstrated with respect to the political status of Puerto Rico. They also stress that having U.S. citizens that do not have all of the rights and privileges of U.S. citizens unless they reside in the United States is a matter of civil rights. The morally correct action is to accept Puerto Rico as the 51st state of the union so that all U.S. citizens would have equal rights. Statehooders believe that commonwealth has outlived its usefulness and must cease to exist, since we are now living in a postcolonial era, while independence would be akin to inviting chaos and giving unwanted enemies free reign to seize the island so near U.S. shores. Statehooders are working alongside the U.S. Congress in the Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2009, which provides for a federally sanctioned plebiscite that would lead to the resolution of the political status question. Each of the political status options for Puerto Rico has compelling arguments. However, it is clear that commonwealth is not a long-term solution. Independence and statehood are viable political options, but none will be easy. The United States has traditionally stated that it would decide upon Puerto Rico’s political status once the people of Puerto Rico decide, but each of the plebiscites has included the commonwealth option, and none has been binding on the United States. In March of 1998, the U.S.-Puerto Rico Political Status Act was an effort to have a Congressionally binding plebiscite on the status issue. It passed by one vote in the U.S. House of Representatives, but it died in the Senate, having taken no action. Many Puerto Ricans do not vote in the nonbinding status plebiscites because they claim they are a farce. Aside from a revolution, which the United States wants to avoid, the decision rests in the hands of the United Nations or in the hands of the U.S. Congress, where Puerto Rico has no viable representation. The future is uncertain but one thing is clear—the resolution of the political status of Puerto Rico is long overdue. In the meantime, the Puerto Rican diaspora will continue to grow in influence, move freely between Puerto Rico and the United States, and be part of the grand mosaic of the United States.
| Puerto Ricans
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 283 Net emigration from Puerto Rico to the United States, 1900–2000 Decade
Net Number of Out-Migrants
1900–1910
2,000
1910–1920
11,000
1920–1930
42,000
1930–1940
18,000
1940–1950
151,000
1950–1960
470,000
1960–1970
214,000
1970–1980
65,817
1980–1990
116,571
1990–2000
130,185
Source: Data for 1900–1970 are from José L. Vázquez Calzada, La Población de Puerto Rico y su Trayectoria Histórica (Río Piedras, P.R.: Escuela Graduada de Salud Pública, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1988), p. 286; data from 1980–2000 are from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population and Housing: Puerto Rico.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 284 Distribution of the Puerto Rican population by top 10 states, 2000 State
Percentage of Stateside Puerto Ricans
New York
35.54
Florida
16.31
New Jersey
12.41
Pennsylvania
7.73
Massachusetts
6.74
Connecticut
6.58
Illinois
5.34
California
4.76
Texas
2.35
Ohio
2.24
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000Note: For the federal government, Puerto Ricans are classified under Hispanic/Latino and are segregated when detail of Hispanic/Latino origin is specified for the data set. Hispanics/Latinos may be of any race and are defined as persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin.
1890
Table 285 U.S. cities with largest concentrations of Puerto Ricans, 2000 City
Puerto Rican Population
New York City, New York
789,172
Chicago, Illinois
113,055
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
91,527
Newark, New Jersey
39,650
Hartford, Connecticut
39,586
Springfield, Massachusetts
35,251
Bridgeport, Connecticut
32,177
Jersey City, New Jersey
29,777
Boston, Massachusetts
27,442
Cleveland, Ohio
25,385
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000.
Table 286 Statistical portrait of Hispanics in the United States, 2007 Number Mexican
Percent
29,189,334
64.3
4,114,701
9.1
All other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino
2,880,536
6.3
Cuban
1,608,835
3.5
Salvadoran
1,473,482
3.2
Dominican
1,198,849
2.6
Guatemalan
859,815
1.9
Colombian
797,195
1.8
Honduran
527,154
1.2
Ecuadorian
523,108
1.2
Peruvian
470,519
1.0
Spaniard
353,008
0.8
Nicaraguan
306,438
0.7
Argentinean
194,511
0.4
Venezuelan
174,976
0.4
Panamanian
138,203
0.3
Costa Rican
115,960
0.3
Puerto Rican
(Continued )
1891
Table 286 Statistical portrait of Hispanics in the United States, 2007 (Continued ) Number
Percent
Other Central American
111,513
0.2
Chilean
111,461
0.2
Bolivian
82,434
0.2
Other South American
77,898
0.2
Uruguayan
48,234
0.1
Paraguayan
20,432
0.0
45,378,596
100.0
Total
Hispanic populations are listed in descending order of population size. Universe: 2007 Hispanic resident population. Source: Pew Hispanic Center Tabulations of 2007 American Community Survey (1% IPUMS).
Table 287 Occupational distribution of the U.S. labor force by select groups, 2000 (in percentages) 2000 U.S.
Non-Hispanic Non-Hispanic White Black Hispanic Puerto Rican
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries
1.84
1.79
0.71
3.61
0.72
Mining
0.43
0.50
0.20
0.35
0.06
Construction
7.57
7.73
5.00
10.60
5.13
Manufacturing
15.24
14.91
13.93
17.59
15.27
Transportation
4.58
4.33
6.60
4.36
5.76
Communication and public utilities
0.92
1.01
0.84
0.55
0.52
Wholesale Trade Retail Trade Finance, insurance, and real estate
3.80
3.85
2.58
4.74
4.08
13.54
14.02
11.70
12.46
14.17
7.18
7.63
6.37
5.12
7.72
Business and repair services
1.55
1.53
1.22
2.15
1.70
Personal, entertainment, and recreational services
17.12
16.23
18.36
19.88
18.05
Professional and related services
21.26
21.52
25.57
15.20
21.45
4.98
4.97
6.92
3.39
5.39
Public administration
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 5% files.
1892
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics | Table 288 Labor force participation by groups, 1990–2000 (in percentages) 1990
2000
Total Population
65.13
63.99
Non-Hispanic white
65.26
64.99
Non-Hispanic black
62.42
60.69
Hispanic
67.25
61.33
Puerto Rican
60.27
58.62
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (5% IPUMS) 1990. Census 2000, Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 5% files.
Table 289 Poverty level of United States by groups, 1990–2000 Percent under Poverty Level 1990
Percent under Poverty Level, 2000
13.05
12.32
Non-Hispanic white
8.97
8.24
Non-Hispanic black
29.26
24.45
Hispanic
25.13
22.65
Puerto Rican
31.52
26.05
Total Population
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990 and 2000. 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 5% files.
Table 290 Educational attainment by groups in the United States: 2000 (in percentages) Less Than High School
High School
Some College
College or More
Total population
19.52
28.60
27.41
24.47
Non-Hispanic white
14.50
29.96
28.58
26.96
Non-Hispanic black
27.12
29.63
28.62
14.63
Hispanic
47.60
22.05
19.89
10.46
Puerto Rican
36.81
25.97
24.69
12.53
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 5% files.
1893
1894 | Puerto Ricans
Appendix III: Notable Stateside Puerto Ricans In addition to the Stateside Puerto Ricans already mentioned are the following individuals who have left an indelible mark on society. Joseph Acaba, former math teacher, in 2004 became the first person of Puerto Rican heritage to become a NASA astronaut candidate; in 2009 he made history again when he launched into space on the Discovery Space Shuttle, carrying with him a Puerto Rican flag. Marc Anthony’s powerful voice, intense and passionate love songs, and range of artistic talent have made his albums best-sellers. In 1997 Marc Anthony became the first salsa singer to fill New York City’s Madison Square Garden, and in 1999 he won a Grammy Award for his third album, Contra la Corriente (Against the Current). He has sung duets with Puerto Rican salsera India and actress-singer Jennifer López, whom he later married. He began his public life as an actor and appeared in Broadway’s controversial musical, The Capeman (1998). His successful crossover into the English-speaking market began with his release of “I Need to Know” and his English-language album, Marc Anthony, in 1999. Roberto Clemente became the first Latino to be inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame. He began his career with the Montreal Royals minor league team in 1954. Among his victories were: four National League batting titles, 12 Gold Gloves Awards, and Most Valuable Player (MVP) and Series MVP Awards, and he set a major league record when he led the National League in assists five times. He was one of 16 players to have 3,000 or more hits during his career, with 240 home runs, and a lifetime batting average of. 317 He was best known for playing with the Pittsburgh Pirates. In 1973, a few months after the tragic Nicaragua-bound mission of mercy plane crash that caused his death, Clemente became the first baseball player to be inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame without the usual five-year waiting period after a player’s last game. Gigi Fernández is a tennis champion who began her professional career in 1985. By 1991 she ranked 17th in the world among women players and ranked first in the world in women’s doubles. She has won over 61 women’s doubles at the U.S. Open, the French Open, and Wimbledon. Although it was a difficult decision, she opted to play under the U.S. flag rather than the Puerto Rican flag in the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, where she became the first stateside Puerto Rican to win an Olympic gold medal. She is the first Puerto Rican female athlete to turn professional. Dr. Teresa Mercado is a research physiologist who works with the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the National Institutes of Health.
Appendix III: Notable Stateside Puerto Ricans | 1895
She has conducted substantial research in the areas of histochemistry, biochemistry, and the cytochemistry (pertaining to tissues and cells) of parasitic diseases, particularly malaria and trypanosomiases (relating to flagellate protozoans that live as parasites in the blood). Rafael Montañez Ortíz, known as “Ralph Ortíz,” was a key player in the 1960s European and American movement known as destructive art. His best-known piece is Piano Destruction Concert, for which he displayed a piano and had viewers, using axes, destroy it. He was strongly criticized for this and called antiart. In his series Archeological Finds he used pre-Columbian figures to express the violence used by the Europeans against the indigenous throughout the Americas during the time of the encounter between the two worlds. His artwork is intended to bring attention to the widespread violence in our midst. He has been on the faculty of Rutgers University since 1972 and continues to be known for his participatory artworks. Dr. Sonia Nieto is professor emerita of education at the University of Massachusetts and has taught at all levels of the education system. Her reputable scholarship focuses on multicultural and bilingual education, curriculum reform, the education of Latinos and Latinas, and Puerto Rican children’s literature. Among her publications is her outstanding book entitled Affirming Diversity: The Sociopolitical Context of Multicultural Education (1992 and 1996), used extensively in college courses and for professional development. Lissette Nieves is a 1990 Truman Scholar and a 1992 Rhodes Scholar. She is the first person to have successfully competed for such an honor in the history of Brooklyn College and the first Puerto Rican woman from the City University of New York to earn this prestigious scholarship, which includes a year’s study at Oxford University. She is involved in the leadership of nonprofit organizations and currently heads “Year Up NYC.” Judith Ortíz Cofer is a well-known poet, author, and English professor. Among her best-known works are Silent Dancing: A Partial Remembrance of a Puerto Rican Childhood (1990); her first novel, The Line of the Sun (1989); The Latin Deli: Prose and Poetry (1993); and An Island Like You: Stories of the Barrio (1994). She has received numerous awards, including a 1989 National Endowment for the Arts Fellowship in poetry and the 1994 O. Henry Award for Short Fiction. The themes that run through her works of literature are selfidentity, and the bicultural/bilingual experience of Puerto Ricans caught between the culture of Puerto Rico and that of the urban settings in the United States. Sandra Ortíz Del Valle coached high school basketball in New York City and has refereed basketball games since 1978. Her aspiration was to someday referee for the National Basketball Association (NBA). In 1991 she became the
1896 | Puerto Ricans
first woman to professionally referee a game for the U.S. Basketball League. Ortíz Del Valle suspected her yearly applications to the NBA summer training camp were being denied due to her sex, and she filed a lawsuit against the NBA for sexual discrimination, which she won in 1998 and for which she was awarded nearly $8 million. This urged the NBA to hire their first two women referees in the 1997–1998 season. Unfortunately, she was not among them; however, she paved the way for women to begin to be considered equals in the area of refereeing NBA games. The late Pedro Pietri is an outstanding poet of the Nuyorican genre. His bilingual poetry is a powerful rendition of Puerto Rican (im)migrants struggling to achieve the American dream and in the process forgetting their own sense of self-worth and beauty. His most popular contribution, “Puerto Rican Obituary” (1973), has been translated into several languages. Its style set a standard that aspiring young poets imitated for years. Geraldo Rivera is one of the most renowned investigative journalists in the United States. Formerly knows as “Jerry Rivers,” he embraced his Puerto Rican heritage when he became the lawyer for the Young Lords in New York City. His documentary Willowbrook: The Last Disgrace exposed the abuses suffered by the mentally challenged in institutions and called national attention to this problem. He has worked on television programs including 20/20, Eyewitness News, Good Morning America, and Now It Can Be Told. In 1986 “The Mystery of Al Capone’s Vault” was the highest-rated syndicated show in television history. He hosted his own talk show, Geraldo, on television, and CNBC’s Rivera Live on cable. Dr. Virginia Sánchez Korrol is recognized for breaking new ground in American history and ethnic studies. She is professor emerita of Puerto Rican and Latino studies at Brooklyn College, City University of New York, and founding president (1992–1994) of the Puerto Rican Studies Association. Her monograph From Colonia to Community: The History of Puerto Ricans in New York City (1983 and 1994) stands among the foremost books written about that subject. Her most recent co-edited publications are Latina Legacies: Identity, Biography, and Community (2005) and Latinas in the U.S.: A Historical Encyclopedia (2006). Jimmy Smits got his big break in Running Scared (1986), starring Gregory Hines and Billy Crystal. From 1986 until 1991 he played the role of Victor Sifuentes on the television series L.A. Law, for which he received an Emmy Award in 1990. He starred in several films, such as Believers (1987) and My Family/Mi Familia (1995). From 1994 until 1998, he became part of the popular series NYPD Blue as police officer Bobby Simone. In 2006, as Senator Matt Santos on The West Wing, he became the first U.S. president-elect of
References | 1897
Latino and Latina descent in television history. He is a founding member of the National Hispanic Foundation for the Arts. Diana L. Vargas is a media executive. In 1988 she was hired by KTTV/Fox 11 in Los Angeles, the second-largest television market in the United States, as its local account executive. By 1997 she rose through the ranks to become the vice president and general manager of Fox 11. With this promotion Vargas became the first Puerto Rican/Latina woman ever to manage a major Englishlanguage Los Angeles television station. Under her leadership Fox News at 10 won local Emmy and Golden Mike Awards for the Best Daily 60-Minute Newscast.
Glossary Americanos: Non-Latino and Latina white Americans. Barrios: Neighborhoods, communities. Blancos: Whites. Boricua: One who comes from Borikén/Boriquén/Borinquen, a Puerto Rican. Borikén, Boriquén, or Borinquen: Taíno term for “Land of the Valiant Lord.” Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico: Free Associated State of Puerto Rico, officially referred to as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Latinoamérica: Latin America. Machismo: Male chauvinism, authoritarianism, sexual prowess, and superiority. Negros: Blacks. Nuyorican: New York Puerto Rican. Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño: Puerto Rican Independentist Party. Partido Nuevo Progresista: New Progressive Party. Partido Popular Democrático: Popular Democratic Party. Puerto Rico: Literally, Rich Port. Salsa: A musical form known for its harmonious blend of instruments. Taínos: Indigenous peoples of Borikén/Puerto Rico.
References Acosta-Belén, E., and C. E. Santiago. 2006. Puerto Ricans in the United States: A Contemporary Portrait. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños. 1979. Labor Migration under Capitalism: The Puerto Rican Experience. New York: Monthly Review Press.
1898 | Puerto Ricans Christopulos, D. 1974. “Puerto Rico in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Survey.” In Puerto Rico and the Puerto Ricans: Studies in History and Society, edited by A. López and J. Petras, 123–63. New York: Halsted Press. Díaz-Stevens, A. M. 1993. Oxcart Catholicism on Fifth Avenue: The Impact of the Puerto Rican Migration upon the Archdiocese of New York. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Falcón. A. 2004. Atlas of Stateside Puerto Ricans. Washington, DC: Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration. García, A. M. 1982. “La Operación.” Documentary video. Latin American Film Project. Skylight Pictures; New York Cinema Guild, producer. Glasser, R. 1995. My Music Is My Flag: Puerto Rican Musicians and Their New York Communities, 1917–1940. Berkeley: University of California Press. Haiman, A. 1993. “Spanish-English Code Switching in Puerto Rico: Functional or Problematic?” In Puerto Rican Communication Studies, edited by Joan Fayer, 49–61. San Juan: Fundación Arqueológica, Antropológica e Histórica de Puerto Rico. Institute for Puerto Rican Policy. 1990. “The Health Status of Latinos in the United States: The 1984 Hispanic Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (HHANES).” IPR Datanote on the Puerto Rican Community. New York City, Number 7, February. Jiménez, L. 1990. “From the Margin to the Center: Puerto Rican Cinema in New York.” CENTRO Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies 2(8): 22–43. Morales, I. 1996. Pa’lante, Siempre Pa’lante: The Story of the Young Lords. Documentary video. Latino Education Network Service, New York. Mosher, W., G. Martínez, A. Chandra, J. Abma, and S. Wilson. 2004. “Use of Contraception and Use of Family Planning Services in the United States: 1982–2002.” Advance Data, no. 350. U.S. Department of Health Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Institute for Latino Policy. 2007. “Stateside Latinos: 2005.” Datanote. February 5. Pérez y González, M. E. 2000. Puerto Ricans in the United States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Pew Hispanic Center. 2002. “Fact Sheet—Hispanic Health: Divergent and Changing.” January. [Online article; retrieved 3/19/11.] http://www.pewhispanic.org. Pew Hispanic Center. 2007. Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States, 2007. Table 1. Population, by Race and Ethnicity: 2000 and 2007, and Table 5. Detailed Hispanic Origin, 2007. Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation. 2004. “Survey Brief: Health Care Experiences.” 2002 National Survey of Latinos. Rivera, P., and S. Zeig. 1983. Manos a la Obra: The Story of Operation Bootstrap. Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, Hunter College. Documentary video. Rivera, R. Z. 1996. “Boricuas from the Hip-Hop Zone: Notes on Race and Ethnic Relations in New York City.” CENTRO Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies 8 (1–2): 202–17.
Further Reading | 1899 Rivera-Batíz, F. L. and C. E. Santiago. 1994. Puerto Ricans in the United States: A Changing Reality. Washington, DC: The National Puerto Rican Coalition. Rodríguez, C. E. 1991. Puerto Ricans: Born in the USA. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Ruíz, V. L., and V. Sánchez Korrol, eds. 2006. Latinas in the United States: A Historical Encyclopedia. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Sánchez Korrol, V. 1983. From Colonia to Community: The History of Puerto Ricans in New York City, 1917–1948. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Seidl, T., J. Shenk, and A. DeWind. 1980. “The San Juan Shuttle: Puerto Ricans on Contract.” In The Puerto Ricans: Their History, Culture, and Society, edited by A. López, 417–32. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc. Stevens-Arroyo, A. M., and A. M. Díaz-Ramírez. 1982. “Puerto Ricans in the States: A Struggle for Identity.” In The Minority Report: An Introduction to Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Relations, edited by A.G. Dworkin and R. J. Dworkin, 196–232. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. U.S. Census Bureau, 2009 Current Population Survey. U.S. Census Bureau. Selected Population Profile in the United States: Puerto Rican. 2009 American Community Survey. U.S. Department of Commerce. 2007. The American Community—Hispanics: 2004. American Community Survey Reports. Washington, DC: Bureau of the Census. U.S. Department of Commerce. 2008. Current Population Survey. Educational Attainment in the United States: 2007. Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Washington, DC: Bureau of the Census. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2004. Hispanic/Latino Profile. Washington, DC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, The Office of Minority Health. Van Sertima, I., ed. 1987. African Presence in Early America. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Women’s Task Force/National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights. 1985. Moliendo Café: Puerto Rican Women against All Odds. New York: National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights.
Further Reading Boricua.com. [Online information; retrieved 3/19/11.] http://www.Boricua.com. This website is a bilingual telecommunications network “for Puerto Ricans, by Puerto Ricans” and includes a store, information, and links to cultural events. Bósque Pérez, R., and J. J. Colón Morera, eds. 2006. Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule: Political Persecution and the Quest for Human Rights. New York: SUNY Press. This edited work is an array of various essays written about the history of the Puerto Rico-U.S. government’s activities to undermine the independence movements in Puerto Rico. Center for Puerto Rican Studies. [Online information; retrieved 3/19/11.] http://www.Cen troPR.org.
1900 | Puerto Ricans The Center, founded in 1973 at Hunter College, City University of New York, holds the largest archive in the world of the Puerto Rican diaspora and houses a library and private collection of papers, publishes the CENTRO Journal, and offers seminars, conferences, academic fellowships, and cultural exhibits and events open to the public. Flores, J. 1993. Divided Borders: Essays on Puerto Rican Identity. Houston, TX: Arte Público Press. The author brings together his essays pointing to the development of the varied expressions of Puerto Rican identity in the United States. Haslip-Viera, G., A. Falcón, and F. Matos-Rodríguez, eds. 2004. Boricuas in Gotham: Puerto Ricans in the Making of Modern New York City, 1945–2000. Princeton, NJ: Marcus Wiener. This is a collection of multidisciplinary essays on the impact of Puerto Rican migrants on New York City from the Great Migration to the year 2000. National Institute of Latino Policy. [Online information; retrieved 3/19/11.] http://www. LatinoPolicy.org. Formerly the Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, the institute was founded and headed by sociologist Angelo Falcón in 1982. It is a nonprofit and nonpartisan policy center that addresses Latino and Latina issues by making available information and statistical data pertinent to those groups. New Progressive Party of Puerto Rico. [Online information; retrieved 3/19/11.] http://www. PNP.org. The official Web site of this prostatehood party is available in English. Pérez y González, M. E. 2000. Puerto Ricans in the United States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. This book provides a sociohistorical view of the stateside Puerto Rican community, covering a broad range of issues, including the impact of Puerto Ricans on the United States. Popular Democratic Party of Puerto Rico [Online information; retrieved 3/19/11.] http:// www.PPDPR.net. This is the official Web site of the procommonwealth party, available in English. Puerto Rican Independentist Party of Puerto Rico. [Online information; retrieved 3/19/11.] http://www.Independencia.net. This is the official bilingual Web site of the proindependence party. Puerto Rican Studies Association. [Online information; retrieved 3/19/11.] http://www. PuertoRican-Studies.org. This organization, founded in 1992, holds a biennial conference that brings together international academics and grassroots activists to discuss themes pertinent to Puerto Ricans everywhere. Sánchez, J. R. 2007. Boricua Power: A Political History of Puerto Ricans in the United States. New York: New York University Press.
Further Reading | 1901 This book focuses on stateside Puerto Ricans to examine power relations using archival, historical, and empirical data. Torres, A. and J. E. Velázquez, eds., 1998. The Puerto Rican Movement: Voices from the Diaspora. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. These essays are written by those from the Puerto Rican diaspora who identify various collective efforts to change the sociopolitical dynamics directly affecting the stateside community.
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Salvadoran Immigrants by Carlos B. Cordova
Introduction Salvadorans have a long history of migrating to the United States. A number of migration waves have taken place since the early 1900s, but it was not until the 1960s when the population began to rapidly increase in numbers. The 1980s were marked by civil wars in Central America, and Salvadorans fled by the thousands and relocated in U.S. communities seeking refuge during that time. At the present time, Salvadorans reside in every state in the United States and have established cohesive and well-structured social, economic, and cultural communities. Salvadoran Americans play different roles in American life based on their social background and area of residence in the United States.
Chronology 1899
United Fruit Company was formed.
1932
General Hernandez Martinez assumes power and begins the military dynasty in El Salvador. The communist-inspired peasant revolution in El Salvador, this event is known as “la Matanza” (the Massacre), is smashed by the National Guard in El Salvador. First wave of Salvadoran migrations to the United States.
1941
Second wave of Salvadorans arrives in the United States during World War II.
1946
Return migrations of Central Americans back to their home countries.
1949
U.S. Army creates the School of the Americas in Panama.
1960
U.S. investments more than doubles in Central America during the decade ($747 million).
1961
Central American Common Market is created. U.S. investments dramatically increase. 1903
Chronology | 1905
Alliance for Progress is created by John F. Kennedy. 1964
CONDECA is created by the U.S. military in Central America.
1965
Immigration Act of 1965 is passed by the Johnson administration in the United States. Large Salvadoran migration wave arrives in United States as permanent residents.
1969
War between El Salvador and Honduras known as the Soccer War.
1979
Civil war begins in El Salvador. The largest migration wave of Salvadoran immigrants and refugees arrives in the United States.
1982
The Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) is created by left-wing guerrilla organizations in El Salvador.
1983
Salvadoran migration wave peaks with thousands of Salvadorans arriving in the United States fleeing the war violence in their country.
1986
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, passed by the U.S. Congress, offers amnesty to undocumented immigrants that can prove their residence in the United States prior to January 1, 1982. The Reagan administration denies Salvadorans extended voluntary departure. In October, a 7.9 earthquake destroys a large part of San Salvador, hundreds die in the capital and surrounding areas, and working-class Salvadorans relocate to U.S. Salvadoran communities.
1990
Congress grants temporary protected status (TPS) for a period of one year to Salvadorans residing in the United States.
January 1991
The 9th Circuit Court approves the American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh landmark case as it affirms the settlement in a nationwide class action suit that challenged systemic discrimination against Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers.
1992
Peace accords led by the United Nations bring an end to civil war in El Salvador.
1906 | Salvadoran Immigrants
Instead of extending the TPS when it expired, the Bush Administration grants deferred enforced departure (DED) through December 1994 to an estimated 190,000 Salvadorans residing in the United States. Mara Salvatrucha street gang formed in Los Angeles. 1993
The United Nations Truth Commission Report is published.
1995
The Immigration and Naturalization Service begins a wave of deportations of gang members back to Central America.
1998
Hurricane Mitch hits Central America with 180 mph winds creating a complete devastation in Honduras and El Salvador. The number of deaths made Mitch the second deadliest hurricane in Caribbean history. Thousands are left homeless, and the economic infrastructure is severely impacted. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, Attorney General Reno has the stays for deportation extended for 60 days for Salvadorans.
2001
Two earthquakes in January (7.9) and February (6.6) strike El Salvador and destroy many parts of the country; thousands die in mud slides and rubble. Large numbers of refugees arrive in U.S. Salvadoran communities. The Bush Administration grants TPS to Salvadorans in the United States after the two earthquakes devastated the country.
2007
The INS has deported more than 10,000 gang members back to El Salvador since 1995. Salvadoran society has been dramatically impacted by these deportations as a new gang culture and wave of violence has affected the region since the deportation began.
2008
TPS is extended for 18 months until September 2010 for 234,000 Salvadorans residing in the United States.
2010
TPS is extended for another 18 months by the U.S. government. Salvadorans replace Dominicans as the fourth-largest Latino group living in the United States. Arizona’s governor Jan Brewer signs SB 1070, the toughest anti-immigrant law in the country.
Background | 1907
Background Geography of El Salvador El Salvador is the smallest country on the mainland of Latin America. Because of the small size of its territory, the great Chilean poet Gabriela Mistral baptized it as “El Pulgarcito de America” or the Tom Thumb of the Americas. The country is also known as the land of lakes and volcanoes. El Salvador has an area of 8,124 square miles, which is approximately the size of the state of Massachusetts. Its neighbors are Guatemala to west and north; Honduras to the east and north; and Nicaragua across the Gulf of Fonseca. To the south it has the Pacific Ocean as a natural boundary. El Salvador is approximately 160 miles long from east to west and about 60 miles long from the Pacific Ocean to the Honduras border. The coastline is approximately 186 miles long. The Pacific coast region has a very hot tropical climate, and inland, the terrain rises to a cooler region characterized by valleys and volcanoes. The land until recently was known to have a luscious tropical forest, but in recent decades the country has experienced a high level of deforestation, soil erosion, water pollution, contamination of the soil from disposal of toxic waste, and environmental degradation, which in turn have had a serious impact on the climate as well as the human environment. The civil war that took place in the 1980s also contributed a great deal to the environmental destruction and contamination of the fertile valleys and mountainous regions. The “scorch the earth” tactics and the use of napalm and white phosphorous bombs utilized during the war had a serious impact on the countryside. Another factor that contributed to deforestation and the destruction of the rich soil in the coastal valleys was the intensified agricultural practices in huge farms that were dedicated to the cultivation of cotton and sugar cane. The extensive and uncontrolled use of pesticides, herbicides, and extensive irrigation ended up destroying many rich agricultural areas to the point that large portions of agricultural lands had to be abandoned and left idle for many years. Chemicals and human waste have contaminated many water resources all over the country. The climate is also characterized by two different seasons: the rainy season takes place from the months of May through October, and the dry season from November to April. The dry season has a climate with very high temperatures and dusty winds; during the rainy season, tropical storms are common, and tropical hurricanes are a threat. Approximately 39 percent of the land is used for agricultural purposes. Because of its many volcanoes, the country is frequently affected by very strong and destructive earthquakes and frequent volcanic activity, and the capital San Salvador, located in the region known as the Valley of the Hammocks because of its frequent shakes and earthquakes, has been destroyed by earthquakes throughout its history.
1908 | Salvadoran Immigrants
The country is divided into 14 departments or states, and the capital is San Salvador. In recent years, as a result of the large numbers of Salvadorans that have left the country, a new concept has been developed in regards to the structure of the nation. A 15th and a new department, “el Departamento Quince,” has been created by the Salvadoran media and supported by the Salvadoran government, as an abstract concept to include Salvadorans who live abroad throughout the migration diasporas but continue to contribute to the social, economic, political, and cultural life of the country. Salvadorans living abroad are referred to as “Hermanos Lejanos,” the brothers who live far away. As one drives from the Comalapa International Airport into San Salvador, there is the huge monument of the “Hermanos Lejanos” that was erected to honor those that left the country but continue to contribute to the local economies by sending monetary remittances to their families. The population of El Salvador was estimated to be at 6,052,064 during May 2010. It is also estimated that at least another 2 million Salvadorans live outside the country. El Salvador has a population growth rate of 0.332 percent. Approximately 31.5 percent of the Salvadoran population is under 14 years of age; about 62.2 percent of the population is between the ages of 15 and 64; only 6.3 percent of the population is over 65 years of age. The country experiences a high rate of infant mortality with about 20.97 deaths per 1,000 live births. The life expectancy at birth in El Salvador is approximately 73.18 years (69.91 years for males and 76.62 years for females). El Salvador has also a very high death rate of 5.61 deaths per 1,000 in the population. The Salvadoran government official sources state that the ethnic makeup of the population is 90 percent mestizo, which is a racial mixture of Spanish and indigenous peoples; 9 percent white or European; and only one percent indigenous. There are also other ethnic groups that are part of the Salvadoran society, including Middle Easterners, Arabs, Palestinians, and Jews; and there is a significant Chinese community in the country. The top two candidates in the 2004 Salvadoran presidential elections were Salvadorans of Palestinian origin.
History of El Salvador The Central American region has a long history of cultural development as well as social unrest. The land is rich and suitable for intensified agricultural activity, therefore over the centuries different groups have colonized its territory. During pre-Hispanic times, the area was populated and controlled by various groups that arrived from Mexico as well as Guatemala and Honduras. Cultural groups such as the Toltecs, the Mayas, and the Aztecs extended their economic, social, and cultural influences to the area as they colonized it and used the natural resources found there.
Background | 1909
The contemporary indigenous peoples of El Salvador still show aspects of the ancient pre-Hispanic cultures such as their language known as Nahuat; their social organization, which is based on the Aztec and Mayan social systems; as well as their religious and spiritual traditions. One important social institution that still remains from pre-Hispanic times is the Chinamit or Calpulli, as it was called in Central Mexico. The Calpulli is the organization led by the Indian elders who are in charge of communal land distribution, conflict resolution, and social organization in Central American indigenous societies. It is a government that is parallel to the national government, and many indigenous peoples gave more respect and allegiance to the Chinamit than to the nation-state. With the arrival of the Spanish conquistadores, the Central American indigenous societies experienced dramatic changes. The Spanish conquest of Central American brought an immediate collapse to the ancient indigenous social systems and decimated the great majority of the population as a result of the wars of conquest; slavery; forced labor imposed on the native populations; and the introduction of new diseases from Europe that indigenous peoples had no biological resistances to protect them. The colonial economic structure had its foundations on slavery, which segregated the natives from the colonizers and created a new social structure based on racial mixture known as castes. The more European blood that a person had, the higher their position was in the social structure and the more opportunities, both financial and political, they had available to them. The export agricultural system was designed to bring a limited amount of wealth to the Central American colonies while paying very high taxes to the Spanish Crown. As a result, Central American revolutionaries began to organize an independence movement from Spain. This was a movement led by an aspiring social class known as the “Criollos,” or creoles, who were the full-blooded children of Spaniards but were not allowed to hold the most important positions in the political and economic power of the colonial society because they had been born on the American continent. The leadership of this revolutionary movement included lowlevel and mid-ranking members of the military and the Catholic Church. The colonial society in Central American had been somewhat independent from Mexico, where the seat of the Viceroyalty of New Spain was located. After independence from Spain was achieved on September 15, 1821, the Mexican and the Central American conservatives attempted to incorporate Central America into the Mexican empire of Agustin Iturbide without any major opposition. This political move was part of the plan of the conservative landowners, aristocrats, and civil and religious leaders in Guatemala to create an independent society based on the feudal colonial economic and political system left by the Spaniards in the Americas. On June 24, 1823, the First Congress of Central America declared that the provinces would unite and be called the “Provincias Unidas de Centro America,” the
1910 | Salvadoran Immigrants
United Provinces of Central America. They adopted a system of government based on the federal system of the United States. The Federalists modeled their reformist platform around a strategy to make Central America a main exporting region of raw materials to the industrializing countries of Europe. By 1865, the United Provinces disbanded into the five countries that presently make up the Central American region, and a group of very powerful and wealthy conservative landowners began to share the economic and political power in the area. They shared the political power among their own family members up until 1930 and became known as the “Oligarchic Families” in El Salvador. They nationalized Indian lands and began the forced cultivation of coffee as an export crop. They developed large coffee plantations that eventually were acquired from the government at very low prices by the ruling families. This was the beginning of economic dependency on a single agricultural crop in the Salvadoran economy. During the early years of conservative oligarchic rule, the government of El Salvador tried to balance the economic crisis brought about by the earlier period of anarchy. The first measure was to relieve the indigo monoculture that had been decaying for many decades. New crops were being considered as export crops, such as cacao, balsam, gum, coffee, tobacco, agave fiber, vanilla beans, and wheat. The growers of these preferred crops were exempt from taxation, and their workers were exempt from military service. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, indigenous people suffered a great deal of political repression. The collapse of the world market had a negative impact on the Salvadoran economy, and it affected the rural agricultural communities. Coffee prices collapsed in the world market, and landowners decided not to harvest coffee. The agrarian economy of El Salvador was collapsing, and the campesinos or farm workers felt the direct effects of the depression, as they were seasonal workers. Without work, they had no money, food, or shelter. Hunger, then, created the perfect catalyst for revolution. The urban workers and the campesinos organized to demand better living and working conditions, but the results were devastating for them, as their revolution was unsuccessful in 1932. Because of their communal social structure, the government labeled indigenous peoples and their leaders as “communist,” and therefore a campaign of persecution was started against indigenous communities. The Salvadoran government created a wave of terror, and the rural people suffered the repressive search-and-destroy tactics of the National Guard. The National Guard led by General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez was a new military institution that had been designed to protect the economic interests of the ruling families. The majority of the people in the rural areas fit into the description of the suspects wanted by the government armed forces: Anyone carrying a machete, the traditional work tool and weapon used in the countryside; anyone dressed as a campesino or in traditional indigenous clothing; and anyone who had Indian features or spoke the
Background | 1911
native Indian languages was captured and was executed without trial by the National Guard firing squads. It is estimated that the number of dead range between 10,000 and 30,000 people. These individuals were summarily executed in less than three weeks by the National Guard (Gomez 1972; Anderson 1976). Since the 1932 revolution, the majority of the campesinos and indigenous peoples of El Salvador were forced to abandon much of their traditional culture because of the National Guard’s continued systematic persecution and repression of the indigenous people. They were forced to drop their native languages and traditional dress styles; and to hide ritual practices and use of the ancient pre-Hispanic calendar. Presently, few Indian people are willing to speak in their native language in front of strangers, and only a small number of Indian women still wear their traditional colorful dress particular to their community. This period marked the beginning of a new political experience in El Salvador. The military assumed a powerful position in the political life of the country. Military officers became the political representatives of the economic interests of the oligarchic families. This period was also important because the first significant migration of Salvadorans began to arrive in the United States escaping persecution and the political unrest that affected the region at the time. The military presidents between 1932 and 1979 controlled the political life of El Salvador, and militarism became part of the social fiber in Salvadoran politics. By the late 1970s, many of the military governments had become repressive military dictatorships that did not allow political dissention and subjected the Salvadoran population to political repression and human rights abuses. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Salvadoran economy was concentrated in largescale agricultural farms that cultivated cash crops for export. The best available lands in the coastal regions were dedicated to the cultivation of cotton, while the majority of Salvadoran farm workers had difficulties in obtaining small plots of land that were used for subsistence agriculture. By the 1970s, the economic power of the elites had grown to high levels never seen before in the region.
The Salvadoran Civil War The economic reality of Central America during the 1970s was very difficult, and in El Salvador the military governments and the oligarchic families had changed the emphasis from agricultural exports as the foundation of the Salvadoran economy. The rural areas suffered from underemployment as few economic opportunities were available in the rural sector. Large numbers of Salvadorans were displaced from their rural communities, and a large migration of unskilled agricultural people moved to the capital seeking new employment opportunities. The new economic emphasis was placed on foreign economic investments that were bringing a new supply of low-paying jobs in urban factories, which would
1912 | Salvadoran Immigrants
More than 2,000 leftist demonstrators paraded through the streets in San Salvador, September 11, 1979, demanding an end to the military-backed government. (AP Photo/ Cotera)
give the local and foreign investors huge profits from the manufacture of products that would be sold in the U.S. markets. The 1970s were characterized by the development of “free economic zones,” where transnational corporations would set up an assembly line factory that provided low wages to the workers while paying very low or no taxes at all to the government. This was a time when the wealth became even more concentrated in the hands of a few families. The impact of the new economic model brought a number of problems to the Central American countries. Workers worked for low pay, and no health or other types of benefits was provided to them. Rural and urban workers began to organize and took to the streets to protest the working conditions and exploitation in the factories. The labor unions and worker organizations became highly organized and militant in their efforts to get positive results to their demands to the government. They organized massive labor strikes, took over land from the large landowners, demonstrated in the streets, and had peaceful marches that would be dispersed with the use of violent tactics on the part of the government forces. On October 15, 1979, a group of young military officers interested in reforming the armed forces overthrew the military dictatorship of General Carlos Humberto Romero and put a civilian military junta in power. After the 1979 overthrow of the military government of General Romero, the military and police forces began to escalate the repression and the violence and resorted to the creation of paramilitary death squads that targeted for assassination the most important political activists
Background | 1913
and militants of the opposition. The death squads were organized by the top military officers and financed by civilians associated with the powerful economic oligarchic families; they were led by off-duty military officers and its membership included off-duty members of the armed forces and police organizations, as well as right-wing civilian organizations. Their main targets were priests and lay preachers associated with the Liberation Theology movement; political party leaders and activists; labor leaders; teachers; high school and university students; and their families; as well as anyone associated with the emerging revolutionary organizations throughout the country. Members of the Salvadoran death squads would often wear plain clothes and make use of trucks or vans with tinted windows and without license plates. Sometimes victims were shot from passing cars, or victims were taken from their homes or on the streets, and their bodies were abandoned far from the scene of the crime. Bodies were thrown along roadsides in full view of the public, or in trash dumps. Among the methods used by the death squads to intimidate their victims was the publication of threats in advertisements in the national press. During the 1980s, Salvadoran governments claimed that death-squad activity and killings were the work of extremist groups operating beyond government control. In 1984 Amnesty International concluded that death squads were made up of regular police and military personnel, often operating in plain clothes but under the orders of superior officers. Investigative reports conducted after the civil war ended and based on classified documents released by the Clinton administration disclosed the involvement of high-ranking members of the armed forces and of the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista political party (ARENA) in the planning and operation of death-squad activities in El Salvador through out the 1980s and into the 1990s. Moreover, documents from 1990 link such activities to top officials of the ARENA government and armed forces. The report describes how ARENA’s paramilitary organization operated in coordination with a death squad composed primarily of members of the National Police, and how the National Police would provide weapons to support ARENA paramilitary operations. ARENA often acted as an umbrella organization for a diversity of death squads, including those operating out of the security forces, to tie the work of these distinct paramilitary groups together under a unified political plan. The 1980s were marked by an escalation of military repression, political assassinations, and large-scale violations of human rights on the civilian population. There were a number of massacres that killed hundreds of civilians in various parts of the country. Death squads targeted priests and religious leaders, and a death squad in San Salvador assassinated Archbishop Oscar Romero, who had taken a position against the military’s use of violence against civilians, while he was saying mass in a neighborhood church. Other victims were the leadership of the Revolutionary
1914 | Salvadoran Immigrants
Democratic Front and large numbers of activists, teachers, union leaders and others that opposed the government. Estimates put the number of dead in 1981–1982 to a figure close to 25,000 people. As a result, tens of thousands of Salvadorans fled the country in an attempt to escape the political violence and repression. It is in this context that approximately 600,000 campesinos became refugees inside their own country. Many others went to refugee camps in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Another 800,000 Salvadorans went to Mexico, Venezuela, the United States, Canada, Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Greece, risking their lives by crossing borders. Some went as far away as Australia. In the United States, the refugees lived in fear of deportation. By the late 1980s, it was estimated that close to one million Salvadorans, about 20 percent of the total population, had left the country. By the beginning of 1981, Ronald Reagan became the president of the United States and started to infuse massive amounts of military and economic aid to the Salvadoran government. The military aid given by the Reagan administration to the Salvadoran government more than tripled to amounts of over $300 million per year. By 1982, many of the opposition groups joined the revolutionary organizations after they had exhausted all the possibilities to bring changes to the social and political systems with the use of peaceful methods. As the opposition leadership became victims of political assassinations and disappearances at the hands of the death squads, the revolutionary organizations became more sophisticated in their organizing efforts and created the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), an umbrella organization that included the most important military organizations of the Left. The FMLN began a military campaign against the military forces and repressive government organizations. During the early 1980s, the FMLN had gained the momentum in the war, but by 1985, the military gained ground as they began to utilize the training, funding, and equipment provided by the United States. The military aid to the government came at a time in which the military was beginning to lose the war to the guerrillas, and the aid helped to change the balance of power in the war. By 1988, the war was not just being fought in the countryside; by that time the FMLN had developed the capabilities to also run an effective urban warfare, and the FLMN had deployed a large percentage of their fighting force in underground activities in San Salvador and other large cities. By this time more than 70,000 Salvadorans had died in the military campaigns of the war or at the hands of the government repression. The FMLN had modified its military strategy since they were having heavy casualties in the open war in rural areas and were trying to prepare the ground for a major offensive. In March 1989, the ARENA party candidate Alfredo Cristiani was elected president. He took a hard line with the FMLN groups supporting a military solution to the conflict. In November 1989, after peace negotiations had broken down, the FMLN launched a major military offensive on the capital, San Salvador, resulting
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1915
in the deaths or injury of around 2,000 people. The military offensive against the government was not completely successful as the FMLN was not able to take over the major cities. The psychological effect of the offensive was very important because for the first time the war was brought to the upper-class neighborhoods of the capital, and its inhabitants were terrified by the impact of the offensive. The military in return began an indiscriminate aerial bombing of working-class neighborhoods, and large numbers of civilians were killed and wounded. In March 1991, elections resulted in the ARENA party winning 39 seats, followed by the Christian Democrats with 26. In April 1991, the outgoing members in the Legislative Assembly agreed on a set of reforms that would give more civilian control over the armed forces, create a civilian police force separate from the army, remove judicial control from the ruling party, and improve the electoral process. With the mediation of the United Nations, President Cristiani and the FMLN signed a peace agreement that ended 12 years of civil war that had killed approximately 80,000 persons; displaced a million people inside the country; forced an additional million people to leave the country to escape the war; and caused material losses of over $1 billion. On December 14, 1992, the demobilization of FMLN and government troops was finally complete, marking the end of the civil war. The election of U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1992 brought in new policymakers with little interest in continuing the failed Reagan/Bush Salvadoran policy. Military aid to El Salvador was sharply reduced, and a greater insistence was made that the Salvadoran government comply with the 1992 Peace Accords. After 12 years of war in El Salvador, its long-term effects are not always visible. Wars affect people in various ways and the war in El Salvador was no exception. Besides the destruction of individual lives, the other long-term effect was the erosion of the social fabric, exemplified by the breakdown of trust, security, and solidarity. The war left more than 80,000 people killed and over 9,000 disappeared, most of which were non-combatants killed by military missions carried out by the Salvadoran army and its paramilitary forces trained and financed by the United States. The arbitrary detention or abduction, followed by the disappearance of victims, became a common practice of the security forces in El Salvador under the Doctrine of National Security.
Causes and Waves of Migration Causes of Salvadoran Migrations to the United States Migrations have various social, economic, political, or cultural factors that influence individuals to make a decision to migrate and relocate in a new area of residence. Migration movements from El Salvador to the United States have taken
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place at various times since the early years of the 20th century, and each migration movement has its own characteristics based on the economic, social, and political conditions present in El Salvador and the United States at that moment in history. The Salvadoran emigration processes during the 1980s were caused by the political climate of El Salvador, or “la situación,” as Salvadorans addressed the issue. This is an ambiguous term frequently used by Salvadorans to describe the sociopolitical reality of El Salvador; it can be used without expressing clear and concrete accounts of the extent of personal involvement in the political crisis.
War and Revolution The migration of Salvadorans to the United States between 1979 and the late 1990s were motivated mostly by political and economic factors influenced by the civil war that ravaged that Central American nation between 1979 and 1992. One of the main characteristics of this migration wave was the involuntary or forced character of the population movements out of El Salvador during this period of time. This migration wave also had both direct and indirect political determinants. Most Salvadorans who left their country during the 1980s fall into the following categories for leaving the Central American region. First, there were individuals who left El Salvador as a consequence of being actively and directly involved in political activities in their country. They had an active membership in political parties or organizations, military or revolutionary organizations, or labor unions. Many of them were arrested, abducted, tortured, or attempts were made against their lives by Salvadoran security forces or paramilitary death squads. These are individuals who actively participated in political parties; and labor, agricultural, and teacher unions such as the Christian Democrat party, Farm Worker Unions, and the National Association of Salvadoran Educators (ANDES). Others forced to leave were Catholic or Protestant catechizers. They were common targets of paramilitary groups since they were labeled as subversives or communists because of their practice of the Theology of Liberation. Salvadoran individuals who were employed in specific fields or resided in specific geographic or socioeconomic communities were considered subversive and, therefore, became direct targets for political violence. Other Salvadorans had indirect political reasons for leaving their country. During this period, there was a great deal of uncontrolled or selective political violence against specific groups, including institutionalized violence and violations of human rights against the civilian population. There were those who received threats from paramilitary death squads against their life or those of their family members because of involvement, activism, or membership in labor unions, academic circles, or religious associations. Some were forced to emigrate as a consequence of receiving death threats from Leftist guerrillas because of their personal or family involvement in right-wing political parties, government agencies, military service,
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or paramilitary organizations. And there were persons that were forced to emigrate because they had relatives who had been assassinated by the Right or the Left. It was often assumed that the families of political activists were targets of political violence. Individuals associated with the National University in the capacity of administrators, faculty, staff, and students were often considered targets for political persecution by the security forces and paramilitary organizations. During the early 1980s, many students migrated to the United States and abroad after the university was militarized and closed for over four years. The government had considered the university the brewing grounds for political activism; it had historically been a target of government repression. A large percentage of the population was displaced because of the military activity in rural El Salvador. Many towns were under government military control, and the population was forcibly relocated in refugee camps. A large number of these individuals were unable to find employment opportunities and feared for their personal safety. Many were farm laborers with low levels of educational attainment relocated to the agricultural regions of the U.S. Southwest rather than to the metropolitan centers. Finally, there are individuals who emigrated from El Salvador because they considered it dangerous to remain in the country based on the probability of getting caught in the crossfire of the political violence because of the nature of their employment, residence, and/or age level. Some individuals may have been motivated to emigrate from El Salvador to the United States for more than one reason. It is obvious that whatever influenced their migration, Salvadoran migrants were affected either directly or indirectly by the sociopolitical and military conflict occurring in that Central American nation. The civil war affected everyone living in El Salvador, and even those that were not politically involved suffered the consequences. There are very narrow political definitions used in the country. One is either on one side or the other. There are no middle grounds available.
Economic Migrations The migration of Salvadorans to the United States before 1979 and after the late 1990s has been motivated mostly by economic factors. Both voluntary as well as involuntary causes based on a variety of factors forced the population movements out of El Salvador. Immigrants that make a conscious decision to migrate because of economic reasons experience the same type of migration stresses manifested in recently arrived immigrants. They suffer from culture shock, but their cultural adaptation and social incorporation experiences tend to have a lower level of anxiety and stresses than those who are forced to migrate. Voluntary migrations may include the experience of family reunification, and when that happens, there is a high degree of excitement and good performance in the family dynamics. The decision to migrate
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is always made by the heads of the family, and it must be noted that children do not always participate in the decision-making process. Many times children do not feel that their migration is of a voluntary nature since the elders in the family made the decisions. Individuals affected by the so-called brain drain phenomenon, which involves the flight of highly skilled workers and professionals to the industrialized nations where there is a stable economic system and an ample supply of jobs, may be involved in an economic migration of a voluntary nature. Significant numbers of Salvadoran professionals migrated to the United States before 1979 and established themselves in Latino communities in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, New York, and Washington DC. These Salvadoran professionals and highly skilled workers were the ones that paved the way for others that would follow during the civil war and thereafter. Presently, the Salvadoran economy is undergoing difficult times. After the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the world economic system suffered a severe blow, investments went down, tourism to many parts of the world was almost paralyzed, and oil prices began to rise at a very fast pace. The Salvadoran economic system, which is highly dependent on United States investments, was critically affected by the economic impact created by the terrorist attacks. As a result many businesses had to fold and close their doors, their workers in turn were not able to find employment opportunities in the Salvadoran economy and have been forced to seek better opportunities outside the country.
Salvadorans Arrive in the United States For more than a century, Salvadorans and other Central Americans have continuously immigrated into the United States as a result of a number of social, political, and economic factors as well as of numerous natural disasters that have plagued the region during the past century. Salvadoran immigrants have been incorporated into the social fabric of the United States in different ways. Migration waves have been defined as the rises, peaks, and declines in population movements, as they reflect the economic, social, and political conditions of both the United States and the national origin of the immigrant population. Those migration waves were not significantly large until recently, when Salvadorans and other Central Americans began to arrive in larger numbers. Unfortunately, the U. S. Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization did not begin to keep detailed records of Central American migrations up until 1932. Between 1820, when data on legal migrations began to be recorded, and 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service reported that over one million immigrants from Central America had legally resettled in the United States. More than half of the Central American immigrant population settled in the United States after 1980. The post-
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1980s Central American migration waves have also included a very large number of undocumented persons. As a result of the unclear immigration policies and practices regarding Central Americans in effect before 1965, the numbers on record appear to be extremely low. For example, Salvadoran consular records estimated that by the early 1970s there was already a population of about 40,000 living in the San Francisco Bay Area, but INS records indicate a much lower figure at the national level.
The First Salvadoran Migration Wave (1870 –1930) The first wave of Salvadoran immigration to the United States can be traced to the late-1800s, when coffee was introduced as a cash crop in Central America and a thriving export trade developed in the West Coast, with San Francisco as the chief processing center. Central Americans began to arrive in the San Francisco Bay Area as part of labor and business contracts with many of the local coffee or banana companies that conducted business and owned property in El Salvador and the rest of Central America. These coffee companies included MJB, Hills Brothers, and Folgers. Once these links were established, the foundations of various social migration networks were created, and the networks led to migratory movements back and forth between the United States and Central America. At first limited to individuals who were members of the Central American elite classes, the migrations gradually included many Central Americans, both male and female, who were recruited to work in coffee factories and other industries in California.
The Second Salvadoran Migration Wave (1930 –1941) The second wave of Salvadoran immigration to the United States occurred during the 1930s. The economic crisis and political instability that affected Latin America in the 1930s created the right conditions for the first significantly large Central American migrations to the United States. During the 1930s the Central American military institutions ascended to high levels of control in the government structure and began to share political and economic power with the oligarchic families that had ruled most Central American countries since the 1860s. In El Salvador, the military under the leadership of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez created one of the most repressive dictatorships in Central America, which forced large numbers of Salvadorans to leave their country. This cohort of Salvadoran immigrants was composed of men and women from the urban middle and upper classes who had relatively high levels of education—intellectuals, teachers, labor organizers, political dissidents, and exiled military officers who were not in agreement with their national government. There were also individuals that had direct ties to their governments and/or who were members of the dominant social class in their
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countries. Their migration was motivated by their desire to escape failing economies, political persecution, and lack of personal freedoms. It was common for the Salvadoran military to issue an ultimatum to a dissident, place the person and the family under house arrest, and soon after force the family into exile. They were allowed to take with them only the things that they could carry in their hands, and quite often high-ranking officers in the military kept for their own personal use the dissidents’ assets and belongings. For the first time, a significant population of Central Americans began to resettle in the San Francisco Bay Area, New York, and Los Angeles. Nicaraguans became the largest Central American immigrant group and started to develop the social and economic foundations for the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran ethnic communities in the United States. Many of these new immigrants found employment in the U.S. industrial sectors. Men often worked as longshoremen or in construction while women found work in the textile and shipping industries.
The Third Central American Migration Wave (1941–1950) The significant demand for labor during World War II provided the opportunity to many Central Americans to find work in Panama, where there was an economic boom because of the high traffic of ships and commerce in the Panama Canal Zone. Large numbers of Salvadorans went to Panama during this time to seek fortune and with the hope for an opportunity to get a labor contract in the United States. Many Salvadorans distinguished themselves as good workers in Panama and eventually ended up getting a labor contract in the United States. They would make the journey on a California-bound ship and relocate in Los Angeles or San Francisco. The high labor demands in the industrial military economy during World War II offered the opportunity to many Central Americans to find many employment opportunities in the United States. Both men and women were able to easily find work in various industries, especially in the shipping and naval yards, as well as in the textile industry. California became a popular destination for many Salvadorans during that period. Salvadoran immigrants during this time resettled in established Latin American communities in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Houston, and New Orleans. They revitalized the cultural, social, and economic life in the small Central American ethnic communities and neighborhoods that had already been established during the past two decades. Unlike subsequent waves of Salvadoran immigrants, this third wave of immigrants relied not only on the labor contracts but also on extended family networks established by the first waves of immigrants. Future migration waves would also rely on ethnic, neighborhood, village, or national migration networks. It was this cohort of Salvadoran and other Central American immigrants who became active members of social migration networks and helped to establish the social and
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economic foundations of U.S. based Latin American immigrant communities that would benefit the future generations of newly immigrated Central Americans. It is then that immigrants began to establish their business, cultural, and religious institutions in those communities. These individuals were responsible for the creation of the economic structures, support institutions, and community organizations that later became essential in the migration patterns and adaptation dynamics of the Salvadoran and Central American diaspora in the United States. This migration wave had an interesting characteristic as a significant number of Salvadorans returned to live permanently in Central America. Many Salvadoran immigrant workers found themselves competing for job opportunities with the returning service men that had fought overseas during World War II. As the service men returned, the job market became more difficult for immigrants, and many Central Americans decided to permanently return to their native countries. Many of the Salvadorans and Nicaraguans who arrived during World War II eventually returned to Central America with their families or by themselves. During the 1950s, the returning migrants became part of a new aspiring industrial and commercial economic force in El Salvador. They had managed to save their earnings while working in the United States, and when they returned to their countries of origin, they invested their savings on innovative economic enterprises that rapidly introduced the local societies to U.S. technology and material culture. The immigrants that remained in the United States after World War II continued to develop the economic and social foundations of the Latino ethnic enclaves and ethnic communities. They worked together with other Latino groups such as Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, and created many ethnic coalitions to achieve their goals.
The Fourth Salvadoran Migration Wave (1960 –1970) The fourth wave of Salvadoran immigration to the United States is traced to the 1960s when over 100,000 Central Americans were legally admitted to the United States as permanent resident aliens. In the mid-1960s, Salvadoran immigration to the United States increased dramatically. The migration was influenced by the new policies of the Immigration Act of 1965, passed during the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, which encouraged professionals and skilled laborers to migrate and allowed them to resettle in the United States. These new immigration policies allowed for the granting of immigrant quotas to countries that historically had not been included in U.S. immigration policies. Newcomers resettled in established Latin American neighborhoods in U.S. cities where existing social networks, familiar cultural traditions, and support systems were developed and maintained by the Latin American immigrants that had been residing in those communities since the 1930s. The new Salvadoran arrivals further developed the economic, social, and cultural structures of existing Latin American ethnic communities, social networks,
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and economic enclaves in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Houston, New York, New Jersey, New Orleans, and Washington DC. The impact of the new immigrants to these already established Latin American communities was clearly discernible during the late 1960s and early 1970s. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, prior to 1965, about 57,737 Central Americans resided in the United States.
The Fifth Central American Migration Wave (1975–1990) The influx of Salvadoran immigrants to the United States has sharply increased since the 1970s. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, migration patterns from Central America changed as a direct result of sociopolitical and socioeconomic conditions in the region. Political turmoil and revolutionary movements in Central America forced large numbers of Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Nicaraguans, and Hondurans to enter the United States as political asylum applicants or without legal immigration documentation. While the pre-1979 migrations were mostly economic in nature, the post-1979 migrations were generated by the political stresses and the severe economic conditions faced by most of the nations in the Central American region. The Central American political climate began to heat up in the mid-1970s as a number of insurgent movements started to challenge the established governments in the political and military arenas. In El Salvador, the FMLN escalated its armed insurgency campaign against the conservative oligarchy and the military and civilian governments. Amnesty International and other human rights organizations reported that between 1980 and 1983, right-wing paramilitary death squads assassinated more than 55,000 people in El Salvador. The people targeted for assassination were labor leaders, intellectuals, professionals, organizers, Catholic priests and lay workers, and anyone that attempted to change the social system. Salvadoran society had been seriously impacted by a long history of political corruption, and the effects of the civil war affected the social realities of the country. The judicial system was not able to offer protection to civilians. Threats and intimidation prevented justice and personal freedoms to exist in El Salvador. Furthermore, the violence that was so evident in Salvadoran society reflected the years of war, political violence, and repression, and as well as the breakdown of law and order. Civilians were in serious danger during both the counterinsurgency operations of the government and the guerrilla campaigns. In areas of conflict, the civilian population was forcibly removed and relocated in refugee camps throughout El Salvador and in other Central American countries. In many occasions, the refugees were subjected to government’s anti-insurgency campaigns that resulted in the massacres of the elderly, women, and children, who made up the vast majority of the refugee population. Civilians very often were caught in the crossfire of the civil war. A narrow definition of political activities
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Sarah Martinez, a social worker from El Salvador, poses at the Rescate Refugee Center in Los Angeles, California, on December 6, 1986. (AP Photo/Lennox McLendon)
existed in El Salvador during that period; an individual was either a subversive or a government sympathizer. As a result, many civilians were abducted, tortured, or killed by paramilitary death squads based on their political, social, or religious associations. The unsafe political climate displaced large numbers of people and influenced the migration from El Salvador to other Central American countries, the United States, and Canada. The prestigious Colegio de Mexico conducted a study for the United Nations and the Mexican government; they found that the Salvadoran migration to Mexico was motivated by fear of political repression. The study concluded that it was impossible to determine whether the Salvadorans who continued their journey to the United States were mainly interested in political and social freedoms or simply wanted to enjoy better job opportunities. Political instability, war, revolution, and their impact on the local Salvadoran economy were the main causes for Salvadorans to leave the Central American region. The Salvadoran diasporas became very active as new immigrants arrived on a daily basis to their new environments. Salvadorans relocated in other Central American countries, either on their own or in refugee camps found in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Others relocated in Venezuela, Mexico, Canada, the United States, France, Sweden, Spain, or Australia. The Salvadorans who came to the United States continued to follow their social migration networks and relocated
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in communities that had a significant Latin American population in order to better adjust to their new cultural environment. Salvadorans followed different types of social migration networks; some followed family, and some followed a hometown network or an ethnic network where they found the necessary support systems for survival in the United States. During the early 1980s, Salvadorans established their new residence in Los Angeles; Washington, D.C.; New York; New Jersey; San Francisco; Houston, Texas; Boston; and Miami. The great majority of these new immigrants arrived without the proper immigration status and documentation.
The Sixth Central American Migration Wave (1991–2010) When Hurricane Mitch hit Central America at the end of October 1998, it left thousands dead and millions of people homeless as the force of the hurricane devastated their communities. The governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras were forced to face one of the most serious economic crises that they had faced in recent years as the economic infrastructure was severely affected by the hurricane. For the poor, and specially the young, that were affected by this natural calamity, the only available option for survival was to migrate to the United States. Many Central Americans who were uprooted from their homes by Hurricane Mitch were forced out of their countries by the severe impact of the natural phenomenon on the local economies. The impact of the migration of these displaced persons has added more fuel to the ongoing immigration debate in the United States as more Central American immigrants continue to arrive in this country. Almost three years after Hurricane Mitch, El Salvador was again affected by more natural disasters: two major earthquakes struck the country during January and February 2001. On January 13, 2001, a 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck El Salvador, killing at least 844 people, injuring 4,723 people, destroying 108,226 houses, and seriously damaging more than 150,000 buildings. Public utilities and roads were also severely damaged by more than 16,000 landslides all over the country. A month later, on February 13, 2001, another earthquake measuring 6.6 on the Richter scale hit El Salvador, causing a large number of landslides, destroying and damaging homes, and severely damaging the rural water systems throughout the country. The earthquakes destroyed large sections of the capital and its surrounding communities, and approximately 1.5 million Salvadorans were left without shelter. The earthquake further aggravated the Salvadoran economy, and many more Salvadorans embarked on the journey north following the well-established social migration networks in Salvadoran and Central American communities and enclaves in the United States. Other migration determinant factors in recent years have been the rise in violence created by street gangs and the recruitment and persecution of individuals by gang members in working-class neighborhoods in El Salvador.
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During the past few years, Salvadorans and other Central Americans have continued with their migration within the United States and are moving to areas that traditionally have not been within their target for migration. Many are moving to the South to places such as central Florida and Atlanta to pursue jobs in factories that are relocating in those regions, while others are moving to Oklahoma to work on construction or agriculture. Some of the reasons stated by these immigrants for moving from Los Angeles, San Francisco, or any other large metropolitan areas are related to urban issues such as lack of employment opportunities, high cost of living, decaying school systems, youth gangs, and crime. The areas that are becoming more popular for relocating have a lower cost of living, more opportunities for purchasing homes, and higher availability of employment. The transnational impact of migration is so evident in the Central American countries that people in many Central American villages today know exactly when the apples are being picked in the valleys of Washington State or when hotels are hiring in Atlanta (Rodriguez 1998).
Demographic Profile Salvadoran Demographic Figures in the 1990 and 2000 Census The exact numbers of undocumented Salvadorans are not presently available for a variety of reasons. Population statistics from the 1990 Census placed the numbers of Salvadorans in the United States at over 565,081 people. The 2000 Census originally counted 708,741 Salvadorans living in the United States. But as census officials made revisions of the original count, the numbers increased significantly as more Salvadorans as well as other Central Americans were counted in the review process. Salvadorans make up the largest group of Central Americans presently living in the United States. Census projections state that Salvadorans are the fourthlargest Latino national group in this country and have displaced Dominicans from that position in the demographic statistics. Most immigration scholars and community leaders agree that the decade of the 1990s was a period of increased immigration from Central America, and therefore, the numbers of Central Americans in the 2000 Census were expected to be much higher than those actually reported by the Census Bureau. For example, according to the official census figures, more than 100,000 fewer Central and South Americans appeared to be residing in California than they did in 1990. In California, the numbers are particularly striking in Los Angeles County, home to the state’s most diverse Latino community. A number of Salvadoran and Central American community organizations say the Salvadoran population in Los Angeles at least doubled in the 1990s as a result of increased migration and fertility rates, but the 2000
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Census shows that the Salvadoran population declined 26 percent from 253,086 in 1990 to 187,193 in 2000. (See also Tables 294 and 295 for locations of Salvadorans in the United States.) Community leaders fear that a negative impact has been felt in Central American communities because of the lower numbers reflected in the census. Some fear that the undercount has influenced the ongoing national debate in Washington, D.C., in regards to the possibility of granting legal residency to Salvadoran undocumented immigrants. The demographic figures are also utilized to allocate funding and resources to the communities, and the undercount might mean fewer federal funds available to Central American communities in the future. There are numerous factors that must be accounted for when considering the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Census undercount of Salvadorans. First, many Salvadorans are undocumented immigrants and do not necessarily like to cooperate with official census enumerators or respond to census questionnaires. They might be afraid of anyone representing government agencies because of their undocumented immigration status. Secondly, undocumented persons, as well as recently arrived immigrants, tend to reside in overcrowded housing conditions, and they are often renters; therefore, they do not provide accurate responses to the census questionnaires. Heads of households often declare a lower number of residents in order to insure that they would not get in trouble with their landlords for having more people living in a housing unit than the number of tenants recorded in the actual rental agreements. Third, the Bureau of the Census has encountered a common practice among immigrants that shows that foreign-born immigrants would declare their own national origin in the questionnaire, but quite often their children would be entered as Americans rather than by the national origin or ethnicity of the parents. This practice appears to be common and also skews statistical data on Salvadoran immigrants, especially among those that have recently become naturalized citizens. The 2000 Census forms had specific check boxes for Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican. Another blank box was designated for “other Hispanic” and that was the place where Salvadorans and other Latin Americans were expected to fill out the information about their national origin. The problem with the form is that it was confusing for many individuals with low literacy rates, and large numbers of people just checked the box and did not write down the information necessary to determine their national origin. Approximately 6.2 million or 17.6 percent of all people who filled out the 2000 Census questionnaires as Hispanics have been recorded in census reports as “other Hispanics” without any specific national origin classification. A study commissioned by the Population Division of the U.S. Census Bureau and conducted by census statisticians Arthur R. Cresce and Roberto R. Ramirez (2003) investigated the researchers’ concerns that the format and wording of the 2000 Census question on Hispanic origin may have influenced individuals, and
Demographic Profile | 1927
specifically Salvadorans, to provide more generalized responses such as Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino rather than their specific national origins. Cresce and Ramirez examined the individual responses to the place of birth and ancestry questions from people who provided a general response to the question on Hispanic origin. Their study indicates that a substantial proportion of people who provided a general Hispanic response such as “Spanish,” “Hispanic,” or “Latino” also provided information in the place of birth or ancestry questions about their national origin that was more specific than the information they provided in the question on Hispanic origin. Approximately 5.7 million people chose to respond to the Hispanic category to define their ethnic background during the 2000 Census, and 3.1 million of these individuals also pointed out a specific country of origin in Latin America. Cresce and Ramirez modified the original 2000 Census statistical data if individuals marked they were “Latino” in the question on Hispanic origin and their place of birth was El Salvador, then Salvadoran was used to designate their ethnicity. After reviewing all the census questionnaires in question, they found a much higher number of Salvadorans that were actually counted during the 2000 Census. Salvadorans experienced a large increase from the simulation (301,999), representing a relative increase of 42.6 percent, and placing the Salvadoran population at 1,010,740. The total numbers of Central Americans rose from 1,323,830 individuals reported in the 1990 Census to 1,811,676 persons reported in 2000 Census. After the Cresce and Ramirez (2003) count, the number of Central Americans was estimated to be at 2,435,731 persons. It is important to note that the Census Bureau takes the position that the simulated totals presented by Cresce and Ramirez are illustrative and do not replace the official 2000 Census totals for these groups. The totals from 2000 Census are based on sample estimates from the Spanish/Hispanic/ Latino question on the long form and are the official figures. Another series of important reports on the Hispanic population characteristics and the census undercount have been recently published by the Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research at the University at Albany in the State University of New York. The report on the New Latinos written by John R. Logan, the Center’s director, addressed a variety of issues related to the growth and characteristics of the new Latino populations in the United States. The report states that there is a severe underestimate of the new Latinos; introduces a new and improved estimate of the size of these populations; and presents new evidence that the largest new Latino groups are Dominicans and Salvadorans, both of whom doubled in the last decade and have now reached over 1.1 million. According to the Mumford Center Census count, Central Americans (2,863,063) rank third after Mexicans (23,060,224) and Puerto Ricans (3,640,460) in the rankings of the Latino population, and Salvadorans (1,117,959) rank fifth in the Latino populations after Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans (1,315,346), and Dominicans (1,121,257).
1928 | Salvadoran Immigrants
The official Census figures appear to be a low reflection of the actual Salvadoran population numbers. The Salvadoran government and Salvadoran community organizations put the Salvadoran population at approximately 1.5 million in 1990 and at about 3 million in 2003. The Los Angeles area alone is estimated to have close to a million Salvadorans living in its metropolitan area. The Salvadoran government estimates are also based on the people that have received exit visas for the country as well as those individuals sending monetary remittances to relatives in El Salvador. The Salvadoran government has an accurate count of the numbers of Salvadoran nationals that enter and leave their country. The government database keeps the records of the numbers of Salvadoran permanent residents and tourists who leave their country on their way to the United States. In addition, the Central Bank of El Salvador keeps records on the numbers of persons that send monetary remittances to their relatives in El Salvador. Scholars and community activists have challenged the demographic figures of the 1990 and the 2000 Census since it is believed that the undercount of the Salvadoran population in the United States is quite significant. Usually undocumented workers do not fill out census questionnaires, or they fill out incorrect information in the census questionnaires out of their fear of being apprehended by immigration authorities.
Settlement Characteristics of Salvadoran Populations in the United States In the 1980s the migration patterns changed because of the sociopolitical and economic conditions prevailing in the Central American region, which resulted in large numbers of Salvadorans entering the United States without legal documentation or as political asylum applicants. Sociopolitical and economic crises are the most important determinant factors for the contemporary Central American migrations to the United States. The majority of Salvadorans that left their country to escape the civil war were searching for personal safety and a new life. Salvadoran society was severely affected by political corruption, and the impact of the civil war has been multidimensional. The judicial system does not offer protection to civilians, and threats and intimidation prevent justice and freedom to exist in El Salvador. Many Salvadoran immigrants brought with them the fears and residual effects of living in a society severely impacted by a climate of terror. They project those fears to their social experiences while living in this country and are extremely apprehensive of interacting with governmental agencies and the authorities. According to the 1990 and 2000 Census data, Salvadorans can be found in every single state throughout the country. Salvadoran immigrants and their U.S.-born children can be found from California to Alaska and from Hawaii to New York.
Demographic Profile | 1929
Salvadorans and Central Americans in general are more likely than non-Hispanic whites to reside in the western, northeastern, and southern states and less likely to relocate in the Midwest. Salvadorans play an important role in the local economies in their states of residence. There is concrete evidence of the existence of at least three different migration patterns that have been followed over time by Central American immigrant populations as they resettle in the United States: The first pattern is followed by Salvadoran urban dwellers relocating to urban centers in the United States. These individuals lived in San Salvador, Santa Ana, or San Miguel, which are the three largest metropolitan centers in El Salvador. It is expected that individuals who are accustomed to city life will make every possible attempt to relocate in an urban environment in order to take advantage of the social and economic opportunities available in U.S. cities. These individuals have higher levels of education and possess some of the skills necessary to be successfully incorporated into U.S. society. The Central American communities in San Francisco and Los Angeles are examples of this migration. Most Central Americans and specifically Salvadorans reside in the largest U.S. metropolitan areas where they can find ample employment opportunities and better educational opportunities for their children. The second pattern is observable in rural-origin populations relocating to U.S. urban communities. These populations have lower levels of education and quite often are not well prepared for a successful incorporation into the U.S. urban environment and the more technically demanding sectors of the labor force. Many of these individuals lack the skills and education to be able to economically succeed in the United States; therefore, they have become part of an urban underclass in many U.S. metropolitan areas. Salvadorans are more likely than other Latino groups to work in the service industry. They are employed in the restaurant, hotel, gardening, and domestic sectors of the local economies. These situations may be observable in Houston, Texas; Washington, D.C.; New Jersey; Long Beach, California; and Los Angeles. The third pattern, followed by Salvadoran rural dwellers relocating to U.S. rural areas and continuing to work as agricultural laborers in the United States, is commonly observed in the large agricultural fields in California, Texas, and Florida. Significant numbers of Salvadorans live in rural communities and dedicate themselves to work in agricultural farms as farm workers. Young Salvadoran men who live in agricultural camps and work as seasonal farm laborers throughout California and the Sun Belt states make up a large segment of this rural population group. Some exceptions to this group are rural people who become entrepreneurs in their rural communities in the United States providing services to other Salvadorans and Latinos. In addition, social class status plays an important role in their relocation and incorporation into the labor force. Immigrants always attempt to relocate in areas where there are ample opportunities for employment based on their own educational
1930 | Salvadoran Immigrants
and labor skills. One important characteristic of the Salvadoran migrations during the 1980s and 1990s was the fact that many people across different socioeconomic levels arrived in the United States while fleeing the war and political violence. The Salvadoran immigrant population in the United States is not a homogeneous social group as Salvadorans come from different socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds, and hold diverse political ideologies. In the 1970s, members of the ruling classes could foresee the developing political crisis, and many of them left El Salvador and resettled in Florida and California. They had already established economic, cultural, and political ties in the United States. Many were educated in U.S. universities, and their socioeconomic status, educational background, bilingual skills, and legal residency status or U.S. citizenship helped them to readily adjust to their new life in this country. On the other hand, large numbers of Salvadoran immigrants arriving in the United States after 1979 entered without legal immigration status and originate from middleand lower-class backgrounds, many of them lacking the economic and social support available to upper-class Salvadorans. A significant number of them do not have the educational, occupational, and language skills needed to succeed in this country. The working-class populations throughout the various Central American countries have strong similarities in their social and cultural experiences and have very little in common with the upper-class social and cultural experiences. For example, large numbers of persons from the eastern part of El Salvador relocated in the United States in metropolitan centers on the East Coast, Florida, and Texas. This population is mainly from Salvadoran rural areas or provincial cities and towns; they characteristically have low levels of educational attainment and very few labor skills that would allow them to succeed in U.S. urban centers. Many of them have been incorporated into the lowest levels of the U.S. labor force, working as day laborers in construction, landscaping, domestic work, and the hotel and restaurant industries. In Texas, there are large numbers of people from the San Miguel area. In the Washington DC metropolitan area there are many people from Intipuca, San Miguel, and La Union areas. These populations also have lower levels of educational attainment. The California experience is mixed, but large numbers of urban dwellers and persons with higher educational attainment have relocated to the Los Angeles and San Francisco metropolitan areas. In San Francisco, for example, there are large numbers of persons that originate from San Salvador, Sonsonate, and other major provincial cities. These new immigrants arrived in the United States as a result of already established ethnic and family networks as seen in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Houston, New Jersey, Long Beach, Chicago, New York, and Washington DC. Migrations to the United States are a social process that is mediated by long-standing family, friendship, ethnic, home town, and community ties that facilitate moving and ease the immigrant’s integration into the new environment. The great majority of
Demographic Profile | 1931
Salvadorans are presently residing in California, Texas, New York, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, Florida, and Washington, D.C. The largest Salvadoran population in the United States can be found in the Los Angeles metropolitan area with a Salvadoran population of over 312,384. According to the revised 2000 Census figures, almost half of the Salvadoran population in the United States resides in the Los Angeles area, and more than half of the Salvadoran population lives in Southern California. It is important to point out again that these statistical figures are based on census data and might not include a large segment of the undocumented and immigrant population as a result of the census undercount. According to INS data, the greater majority of undocumented persons in the United States select to migrate to the Southern California region. Therefore, it is possible to say that the majority of undocumented Salvadorans have also migrated to this region. And it is clear that the actual numbers of the Salvadoran population must be much higher than the population statistics reflected in the 1990 and the 2000 Census.
Characteristics of Central American Immigrants to the United States According to the 1990 U.S. Census, 1,323,830 Central Americans resided in the United States in 1990. The official 2000 Census figures put the Central American population at 1,811,676, an increase of almost half a million people from the 1990 numbers. The revised numbers by Cresce and Ramirez put the Central American population at 2,435,731 while the Mumford Center has it at 2,863,063. The revised numbers demonstrate an increase of almost one million Central Americans living in the United States by the year 2000. According to the official 2000 Census statistical data, the largest group of Central American immigrants continues to be from El Salvador: 565,081 people were reported in 1990, and 708,741 were officially reported in 2000. The revised data by Cresce and Ramirez puts the Salvadoran population at 1,010,740, and the Mumford Center puts it at 1,117,959. The revised numbers show that the Salvadoran population doubled during the decade of the 1990s. Compared with other populations, the Central American population is young, with proportionately more children and fewer elderly. In 1990, the median age of the population was approximately 28 years old. Only 4 percent of the population were 62 years of age or over, and 32 percent were 19 years of age or under. This youthful age structure is a result of a combination of new immigration, which consists mostly of young adults in their reproductive years and high fertility at younger ages, particularly among the foreign born. According to the official 2000 Census statistics, 31.3 percent of all males are under 21 years of age while 31.4 percent of all females are under 21 years old.
1932 | Salvadoran Immigrants
The number of foreign-born persons is significantly larger for every Central American group. Among the Central American population as a whole, the official 1990 Census number of foreign-born persons is 1,046,099, as compared to 277,731 U.S.-born persons. The 2000 Census official numbers put the number of foreignborn Salvadorans at 536,162, or 75.3 percent, while only 172,579, or 24.3 percent, are U.S. born. On the other hand, the Mumford Center reports that 69.6 percent of the Salvadoran population are foreign born, and 45.9 percent are recent arrivals to the United States. It is important to note that the Mumford Center gives an estimate that accounts for a higher number of U.S. born Salvadorans, and they also have calculated that the Salvadoran population is almost half a million people higher than the official 2000 Census figures.
Adjustment and Adaptation The processes of acculturation and assimilation have a wide variety of meanings depending on the disciplinary framework utilized in the analysis of the immigrant experience. Acculturation emphasizes that immigrants and their children in a new society are able to retain their original cultural identity while learning to interact and adequately function in the mainstream society. Cultural pluralism has its foundations in the notion that there will be a significant level of tolerance and acceptance of others on the part of the mainstream population. In addition, the minority groups, immigrants, or other ethnic groups will have the willingness to learn the rules of the new cultural and social systems. These processes of learning the new cultural and social experiences may be referred to as acculturation. Acculturation involves a series of dynamic processes in which the adult immigrant acquires the basic survival skills of the new society, such as learning a new language, finding employment, and securing housing, as well as the survival skills within other existing ethnic communities. Language acquisition is an important measure and determinant of acculturation because language is a primary element of culture and it is the dynamic principle of enculturation or the learning of culture by children. Acculturation will be herein used to describe and analyze the dynamics of interaction between Salvadoran populations and the U.S. society. Included in this definition are the intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic, and minority-majority relations within the U.S. society. The process of assimilation, on the other hand, may be described as the total absorption of the individual by the new society. Under this form of majority-minority relations, the original cultural patterns and traditions are abandoned while those of the new society are adopted in its totality. For Latinos in general, acculturation in a pluralistic society is the most acceptable process, allowing for mutual borrowing of cultural traits without abandoning original culture and personality structures. Acculturation allows the individual to be bilingual and
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1933
bicultural; and it enriches the individual’s experience and permits proper functioning and interaction in the mainstream society and culture. Upon their initial arrival in the United States, Salvadoran immigrants frequently experience “culture shock,” a condition manifested through a sense of anxious disorientation. Immigrants experience culture shock right after finding themselves in a new and substantially different way of life, where they are forced to interact in a new social and cultural environment where a different language is spoken. New immigrants find themselves in a situation that includes a general unfamiliarity with the customs and expectations of the new country, and they engage themselves in a marginal level of interaction with the mainstream society and culture. Like most newcomers to the United States, Salvadoran immigrants have a lack of understanding of the societal rules and cultural patterns present in the United States, which in turn, makes them feel inadequate and alienated in this country. Whenever the new environment and society are more difficult and hostile towards the immigrant experience, the more problems that the immigrant will suffer in the acculturation process. In the case of undocumented Salvadorans in the United States, the added pressures regarding their immigration status and the lack of U.S. governmental support make their acculturation processes more difficult
Nelly Rodriguez practices her English by reading aloud in the Echo Park section of Los Angeles on May 27, 2004. Rodriguez, who immigrated to California in 1979 from El Salvador, was studying for her high school diploma. (AP Photo/Ric Francis)
1934 | Salvadoran Immigrants
than those of immigrants who have legalized their immigration status in this country. Undocumented Salvadorans have additional stresses in their social adaptation experiences because of fears of apprehension and deportation by immigration officials. The stresses created by forced relocation may have physiological, psychological, and sociocultural causes. During the 1980s and 1990s, Salvadorans suffered a variety of physiological stresses created by the civil war and their involuntary migration experiences. Individuals suffered a variety of tropical diseases such as parasites, gastroenteritis, malnutrition, tuberculosis, as well as increased mortality rates. Psychological stresses common to political refugees were also manifested in Salvadoran immigrants throughout the United States. They suffered from posttraumatic stress disorders associated with the environment of violence and the effects of the civil war in El Salvador. Undocumented Salvadorans also suffer the sociocultural stress related to the economic, political, and cultural effects of their migration. Besides losing all their personal possessions during the move, forced migrants may find hard-earned skills of little immediate utility in making a living in the new environment. Economic migrants may find themselves in similar situations. Another important form of stress is brought about by a major reduction in cultural inventory due to a temporary or permanent loss of behavioral patterns, economic practices, institutions, and symbols.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture The most common recurring acculturation problems faced by Central American and specifically Salvadoran immigrants include: language acquisition; lack of employment opportunities, labor market exploitation, and low income; educational attainment; access to health care, both physical and psychological; and cultural differences. For those living in the United States without immigration papers, their “undocumented” status is the most overwhelming problem. Undocumented Central American immigrants have more difficulties in adapting to their host society than do their legal counterparts. Their undocumented immigration status forces them to live in constant fear of deportation by immigration officials. Oftentimes, psychological problems caused by the repressive political conditions in which they previously lived in Central America affect their daily lives and resettlement experiences. Many undocumented Salvadorans feel trapped as they are not able to return to their country of origin because of their documentation status and their fear of persecution and lack of personal safety. They encounter a series of difficulties that prevent them from becoming fully incorporated into U.S. society and culture.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1935
Language Acquisition Language acquisition is considered an important priority in the acculturation process. Mastering the English language is necessary to improve the socioeconomic and cultural experience of recently arrived immigrants. The higher the degree of proficiency in the new language, the greater the opportunities and skills the individual will possess to enable him/her to effectively interact in the mainstream society. Individuals holding professional degrees or some formal education demonstrate higher level language acquisition over those who are unskilled laborers; this facilitates labor market opportunities. However, for those individuals who do not have legal status in the United States, it is very difficult to find work in their fields. Central American professionals, university professors, and teachers encounter serious obstacles because they cannot find employment in their areas of expertise. Many professionals often experience downward social mobility as they are employed in occupations where they cannot use their professional training or skills; this generates frustrations and emotional and psychological problems for these individuals. Their high expectations of opportunities available in the United States, and the disappointment of not fulfilling those expectations, create a high degree of stress.
Alcides Hernandez at his job at the Roseville Electric Company in Roseville, California, April 11, 2007. Hernandez left a management and research job at El Salvador’s largest utility company to be with his wife, whom he met while vacationing in California. He assumed his degrees in industrial engineering, his MBA, and his experience setting national price structures for electrical rates in his home country would land him a suitable job. Instead he supported his new wife and baby by juggling jobs as an electrician’s helper, a teller at a courier company, and on weekends, as a wedding videographer. (AP Photo/Steve Yeater)
1936 | Salvadoran Immigrants
Age also plays an important role in the acquisition of language skills. Younger individuals demonstrate higher motivation to learn English than older persons. With the exception of individuals with a professional background, middle-aged and older immigrants often limit their social interaction to their ethnic enclave and demonstrate a preference of retaining Spanish as their primary means of communication. This provides them with social comfort but constrains their integration into the labor market, American culture, and society.
Educational Issues Salvadorans in California tend to be long-term residents who are generally better educated than immigrants from Mexico. Two-thirds of California’s Salvadoran population has been living in the state longer than 14 years. A significant number of these individuals were professionals that fled the Salvadoran civil war, and they have in most cases a higher level of educational attainment than most Mexican immigrants. According to data from the 2000 Census, about one-fourth of the Salvadoran immigrants over 25 years of age have attended college, a figure that is about twice the number of Mexican immigrants. That high level of educational attainment may contribute to the fact that 25 percent of Salvadoran American families headed by one or more Salvadoran immigrants earn salaries higher than $50,000 a year. But it is important to note that more than half of the Salvadoran population has salaries of less than $30,000 per year. This population of low earners continues to exist despite the fact that 81 percent of Salvadoran men are steadily employed, a figure that is much higher than the 61 percent of U.S.-born Latino men. Latino adults in the United States have a significant disadvantage in educational attainment in relation to other population groups. However, the contrasting educational profiles of Central Americans exemplify some of the significant differences between Latino subgroups. As noted, compared to other Latin Americans, Central Americans have lower rates of educational attainment. Also noted there are significant differences between rates of educational attainment between naturalized and non-citizen immigrant populations, with citizen populations having much higher rates of educational attainment. Central American students lead the statistics in high school dropout rates in various parts of the country. The educational and cultural realities of Salvadoran youth are at risk as a result of the low educational attainment rates and the increased participation of Salvadoran youth in street gangs. These student populations are undergoing experiences based on socioeconomic, cultural, political, and demographic factors such as area of residence, degree of sophistication of the organizing structures in the various communities, length of residence in the United States, plus their individual levels of cultural adaptation and social integration.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1937
Poverty appears to play a significant role in educational attainment among youth. Among Latinos generally, the high school dropout rate has ranged from two to three times the rate of other children depending on the measure that was used. Poverty forces teenagers prematurely into the labor force and problems of over-crowded, poorly equipped big-city schools, which most Salvadorans attend, also boost dropout rates and discourage education. Central Americans also suffer from discrimination in U.S. schools and in their communities. One glaring obstacle to educational attainment in higher education is lack of documentation status. Almost all institutions of higher learning require access to a social security number and other evidence of legal immigration status. Legislation, like Proposition 187 in California, a 1994 ballot initiative that was designed to prohibit undocumented immigrants from using any state health care, public education, and other social services, have also limited the educational opportunities of undocumented persons even further. An important court case that affected undocumented students’ access to higher education was the Leticia “A” v. Regents of the University of California 1985. The case held that undocumented students in California were eligible for California public colleges’ in-state tuition rates and state financial aid. This case was significantly important because it gave undocumented students’ equal access to California city colleges, state universities, as well as to the University of California. In 1990, Bradford v. Board of Regents of the University of California overturned the Leticia “A” decision, and undocumented students were no longer eligible for state financial aid or in-state tuition rates at any California Public Universities. And in 1995 the case of AAW v. Board of Trustees of California State University overturned the Leticia “A” court decision disfranchising undocumented students from equal access to higher education once again, this time in California state universities and California community colleges. In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) enacted into law by the Clinton administration that made it more difficult for undocumented students to have equal access to higher education. IIRIRA prohibited states from granting unauthorized immigrants certain postsecondary educational benefits on the basis of state residence, unless equal benefits are made available to all U.S. citizens. On the other hand, California Assembly Bill 540 allows undocumented students who have successfully completed three years of high school in California to be eligible for in-state tuition at any California community college, California state university, or at any university of California. And the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act), which failed to pass in the Senate, would have provided similar benefits to those afforded by the California AB 540 legislation. The DREAM Act would have offered undocumented students a path towards legalization. Even though states like California, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Washington, Utah, and Texas offer undocumented
1938 | Salvadoran Immigrants
students in-state tuition, none of these states offer undocumented students a path towards legalization. As a result these students are prohibited to work after attaining their educational degrees. Therefore, the future of these students after college is uncertain.
Employment Issues Employment opportunities are considered one of the major issues influencing the social adaptation and economic stability of Salvadorans in this country. The available employment opportunities are closely dependent on the immigration status of the immigrants. The economic opportunities available to undocumented Salvadoran workers in the mainstream society are extremely limited; employment is often found only in factories, construction and janitorial firms, the hotel and restaurant industry, or in domestic services where a high level of English proficiency may not be required. Individuals with higher levels education or English communication skills may be able to find better paid employment. On the other hand, many undocumented Salvadorans or those with low skills end up working within the enclave economy where they often find employment for subminimum wages and are subjected to abuse and exploitation. Working conditions in the enclave appear to be acceptable, mainly because wages are often paid in cash. Cash payments minimize the fears of disclosing an individual’s undocumented status to strangers and do not require showing the proper documentation needed to work such as a social security number or an alien registration card. Many need to hold more that one full-time job to meet their financial needs since jobs in the ethnic enclave usually pay subminimum wages. Financial need forces these immigrants to take whatever employment is available for them. Professionals, university professors, and teachers encounter serious obstacles because they cannot find employment in their specific areas of expertise and experience downward social mobility, and they are often employed in menial occupations that generate frustrations and emotional and psychological problems on the individuals. It is difficult for professionals to earn a living as dishwashers, janitors, or babysitters.
Participation in the Labor Force Salvadorans with legal status and high levels of education have been able to integrate into many sectors of the labor market. Those with legalized immigration status and low levels of education have some opportunity to pursue education and training, but educational programs for adults are limited. Because employment opportunities are so closely dependent on an individual’s immigration status, although individuals with high education and good English language skills are able to find better paid
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1939
employment, the economic opportunities available to undocumented workers are very limited. Even for the educated, especially those with limited language proficiency, employment is mostly found in factories, construction and janitorial firms, the hotel and restaurant industry or in domestic services, sectors where undocumented workers are vulnerable to exploitation and low wages. Employment is secured through contacts established in their social migration network, from family and friends who find jobs for new arrivals at their place of employment, or in places known to hire undocumented workers. For Central Americans, church-based groups and nonprofit community agencies have provided job counseling, referral services, and job networks. Under the present day antiimmigrant climate, undocumented immigration status is the most serious problem faced by the majority of Central American immigrants in this country. Legislation, such as Proposition 187 in California, seriously impacts the economic, social, and cultural experience of the undocumented Latino population. Immigrants bring economic benefits to the new homeland. As in the case of California, large-scale immigration has not depressed the local economy and perhaps has increased the per capita income in the state. The economic benefits outweigh the costs, which primarily come from the immigrants’ use of public services such as schools and hospitals. Conservative and anti-immigrant groups continue to hold the view that undocumented workers have a negative effect in our economy because they create unfair competition for jobs with native workers. They argue that undocumented immigrants take jobs at the bottom of the economic structure, but strive harder, and in many instances do not hold one but various jobs in order to make ends meet, therefore depleting the available pool of jobs for native workers. Salvadorans, both men and women, have high rates of labor force participation. However, the population is poorly integrated into the U.S. labor market with the vast majority of its members disproportionately employed in low-wage sectors of the labor force. Their unemployment rates are 5.1 percent lower than the rates experienced by other Central Americans with the exception of Nicaraguans, who show a 4 percent unemployment rate. The Nicaraguan low unemployment rates may be attributed to the fact that they have a much higher educational level at 12 years of completed education since they have been in this country for a longer period of time. The vast majority of Central Americans (approximately 85%) are employed in jobs requiring lower levels of education. In 1990, only 9 percent of Central Americans were employed in the managerial and professional sector. The majority of Salvadorans are employed in the service industry. Men are often working as busboys, dishwashers, cooks, janitors, and unskilled jobs in the hotel and restaurant industry. Others work in construction, gardening, landscaping, auto mechanics, as well as day laborers. Women are employed in domestic services, working as babysitters, house cleaners, cooks, and live-in maids. Women also work in the hotel and restaurant area as cleaning and laundry maids, and cooks. Others work
1940 | Salvadoran Immigrants
in manual labor in factories. Many other Salvadorans work in the informal sectors selling goods in the streets that range from traditional foods prepared at home to videotapes, audio cassettes and CD’s, flowers, souvenir clothing, and much more. As a direct consequence of low earnings, many Central American families are quite poor. The majority would be described as “working poor” since these are families where adults are working full-time but their wages are not high enough to lift them out of poverty. In 1990, 25 percent of Central American families with children were living below the poverty level. Among Central Americans, rates of poverty are highest among Salvadoran families. Importantly, rates of poverty are highest among families whose members are not citizens. In 1990, 15 percent of Central American households had incomes of more than $50,000 and 4.6 percent had incomes of more than $75,000. In 2000, the major Central American groups had mean earnings of less than $10,000 per year, which are roughly equivalent to that of Puerto Ricans in average earnings, though they are less likely to fall below the poverty line. El Salvadorans were reported to have mean earnings of $9,631, with approximately 20.8 percent falling below the poverty line.
Size and Composition of the Community In the United States, Salvadorans usually resettle in communities where other Salvadorans have established a cultural and economic base because newly arrived immigrants prefer to relocate in places that look familiar and remind them of their home. Newcomers attempt to move the shortest distance not only in space, as they like to remain in contact with a familiar environment, but also in terms of the psychological and sociocultural context of their lives (Scudder and Colson 1982). Salvadoran immigrants have helped in the development of ethnic enclaves in San Francisco; Los Angeles; Washington, D.C.; New York; Houston, Texas, and other cities in the United States as the means of creating familiar social environments, support systems, and survival strategies. Different levels of organizing have taken place over many decades in Salvadoran communities in this country. Communities are very diverse as a result of a long history of migration of Salvadorans to the United States. Salvadorans have settled in San Francisco and Los Angeles since the late 1800s while other communities were established later; therefore, Salvadoran American communities are not made up of a homogeneous population. Individuals may be immigrants, first, second, third or fourth generation born in the United States. They hold different levels of acculturation and adaptation to the U.S. society. On the one hand, some persons may discriminate against recent immigrants because of their low levels of English language proficiency and their low acculturation experiences. While on the other hand, recent immigrants may hold prejudices against those with a long period of
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1941
residence in the United States or those who are U.S. born, based on the individual’s low levels of proficiency in the Spanish language and their lack of understanding and competency of the Salvadoran cultural experience. Salvadorans have arrived in the United States metropolitan centers following already established social migration networks. These networks are an essential mechanism in the migration patterns and cultural adaptation dynamics. Social migration networks play an important role in the migration and adaptation experiences of Salvadorans in the United States. These networks provide the new immigrants with a series of support structures that help them relocate and adapt to their new social environment in the United States. These social migration networks may be organized according to: 1. Family ties, which can be either nuclear or extended. For most Salvadoran and other Central American immigrants, the extended family plays a very influential role in deciding to migrate as well as in helping to adjust and adapt to their new home in the United States. 2. Neighborhood networks in which friends and acquaintances that are already established in the host society that may help the new immigrants relocate and adapt in U.S. society.
Youth Profile A Member of the Young American Salvadorans’ Writer’s Movement Leticia Hernandez is part of the young Salvadoran writers’ movement in the United States. She was born in Hollywood, California, and she is active in working with youth in the Salvadoran communities of San Francisco and Los Angeles. Her poetry includes musical and performance elements that give her work a vibrant and innovative flavor while expressing her experiences as Salvadoran American woman in the United States. Her poetry has been published in a number of literary journals and her chapbook Razor Edges of My Tongue was published by Calaca Press and has received critical acclaim. Leticia’s artistic work also includes theater and performance. Leticia’s work was also published in Izote Vos, the first-ever collection of young Salvadoran American writing and visual art. In the book, 14 writers from San Francisco and Los Angeles, ranging from ages 15 to 29, share their essay narratives, poems, and photographs depicting their communities, family histories, war stories, and personal lives. Almost all of the writers were born in El Salvador; some came to the United States as infants or as young children and some even as teenagers.
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3. Town or village networks, in which people from the same town in El Salvador help others migrate and adjust in the United States. 4. Ethnic or national networks, in which people of the same ethnicity or national origin help others of migrate, adjust, and adapt in the United States. When people are forced to move away from their traditional cultural settings and when they find themselves as strangers in a cultural or social environment that is unfamiliar to them, social migration networks provide a sense of security and belonging. Immigrants need to find in the host country the traditional social and cultural experiences that were present in their country of origin that provided them with psychological satisfaction and security in order to move with confidence toward interaction with the new larger society. Newly arrived Salvadorans relocate in Latino ethnic enclaves as a response to discrimination and their lack of understanding of the new societal systems that they encounter in the United States. They usually limit their primary relationships to members of their own national or ethnic group while in this country. Furthermore, this phenomenon is encouraged by the immigration status of undocumented Salvadorans, for whom insecurity, fear of persecution, and a variety of mental health problems prevents them from fully participating in the dynamics of interaction with the mainstream society and culture. Salvadoran immigrants prefer to interact with individuals of their own culture and nationality in order to undergo a gradual adaptation to the new social environment. As the new immigrants establish themselves in the ethnic enclave, the majority of their primary relationships and institutions are maintained almost exclusively within the intra-ethnic dimension. Since Salvadorans generally relocate in U.S. cities where there is already a significant number of Salvadorans or Central Americans, their social and cultural interaction is usually limited to the Salvadoran or Central American experiences found in the ethnic community. It is quite common for Salvadorans to help other family members or friends relocate, and the already established immigrants help the newcomers adjust to their new life in the United States. People involved in the social migration networks can help with the logistics of the trip from El Salvador to the United States by providing the prospective immigrant with the legal sponsorship to become lawful permanent residents, or by providing monetary and logistic help for the journey north. If the person is coming to the United States with undocumented immigration status, their contacts in the United States or at home may help defray the cost of the journey as well as the cost of the smuggler or “coyote” that will help them across the U.S. border and then bring them to their new home in the United States. There are established businesses in El Salvador that provide transportation and border crossing services that may cost anywhere from $5,000 to $20,000. Many family members lend money to relatives so that they can move to the United
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1943
States, and the loans must be repaid once the new immigrant finds employment in this country. In addition, friends or relatives may give a temporary place to live to recent arrivals. The newcomers may be provided with temporary room and board until they can become independent. This may take from a few months to a few years, depending on the new immigrant’s economic resources, educational background, occupational skills, and English language proficiency. The new arrivals use their ethnic or family contacts to secure employment or housing, or to meet any of their immediate needs. Individuals already established in the network provide the newcomers with information and a basic orientation to the new societal and cultural systems. The new arrivals are also provided with information and leads regarding employment opportunities, and in many instances, they already have employment opportunities that have been secured by their family members or friends, and these employment opportunities are waiting for them at low-paying jobs available mostly for newcomers or undocumented workers. Once the new immigrants settle down and get adjusted to their new social environment and are able to save enough money, they begin to look for independent housing and better economic opportunities. They also begin to help other relatives back in El Salvador to make the journey north to join them in their new life. After a few years of living in the Latin American neighborhoods, many Central American immigrants socially adapt to the U.S. lifestyle. They acquire the necessary employment and language skills as well as the necessary education to fully participate in the mainstream economic life, and they may relocate in other ethnically mixed neighborhoods or suburban communities. Others take advantage of economic opportunities and develop business enterprises in the Latin American neighborhoods and utilize the immigrant labor force to maximize their profits. An important feature of the Salvadoran migration is the role of remesas, or monetary remittances, that are sent back to family members in El Salvador. Remittances play an important role as they help maintain the struggling Salvadoran economy. The money sent back to El Salvador is the biggest source of income to the Salvadoran economy since the total amount of money sent is much largest than even coffee exports, the most important source of revenue in El Salvador. Salvadoran official sources state that about $2 billion enter the country annually from monetary remittances sent to family members by Salvadoran immigrants in the United States. Many communities in El Salvador are able to survive the economic crisis thanks to the remesas flowing in from the United States. Many U.S. cities and rural neighborhoods have well established Latino ethnic communities that were developed over the decades by earlier Latin American immigrants. As a rule, Central American immigrants initially relocate in Latino ethnic communities where there are a few small business enterprises that meet local consumption demands. However, ethnic neighborhoods lack the sophisticated
1944 | Salvadoran Immigrants
economic structure and the extensive division of labor of the enclave. There are concrete features that illustrate the clear distinctions between an ethnic enclave and ethnic immigrant communities. The ethnic enclave is where the new immigrant becomes familiarized with a new social environment as it provides the proper mechanisms and institutions to gradually introduce new arrivals to U.S. society. Latin American enclaves maintain the culture, language, religion, foods, and traditional festivities. The Central American enclaves in San Francisco; Los Angeles; New Jersey; New York; Washington, D.C.; Boston; and Houston, Texas, demonstrate a welldiversified economic base and division of labor. There are also emerging Salvadoran communities in Las Vegas, Nevada; Greensboro and Raleigh, North Carolina; and Atlanta, Georgia. The economic structure of the enclave provides for availability of bilingual professional services to the community. The ethnic enclave allows the immigrant to receive legal, educational, immigration, medical, dental, accounting, income tax consulting, counseling, employment training and referrals, food services, and so forth. This sector is made up not only of immigrants, but first- and second-generation Central Americans and other Latin Americans providing professional services. Other bilingual ethnic and mainstream professionals and merchants also provide services in Spanish within the enclave. The enclave provides familiar settings by allowing the development of regional or hometown associations that support the immigrant with cultural, social, and recreational activities. Regional associations and the enclave provide new immigrants with the support structures and resources that develop cultural identification, security, and a sense of belonging in the host society. Regional associations allow the preservation of cultural traditions and the retention of a strong cultural and national identification as a Salvadoran and a Central American. Many regional associations are named after towns, cities, states, or regions where the immigrant populations originate in Central America. Some organizations are affiliated with religious societies, sports clubs, artistic or cultural organizations, or social service organizations, as they exist in Central America. Some of the most popular regional associations are identified with soccer or baseball clubs that participate in Latin American or mainstream sports leagues. These associations have well-structured organizations and large memberships. Their members pay dues and usually rent a small place as a recreation center. There are number of soccer clubs that are organized by members of the Salvadoran community and create opportunities for the local youth. There is a midnight soccer league that has been sponsored by the city and county of San Francisco that is run by Salvadorans and targets youths associated with the local gangs. This has proven to be a successful option to prevent youth gangs and violence in the Latino community. Some of the most active and better organized hometown associations include those on the East Coast associated with the Salvadoran towns of Intipuca and
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1945
Chirilagua and those in Los Angeles and San Francisco associated with Santa Elena. These associations organize regular events that include picnics, dances, an annual ball, and other fundraisers for their hometown communities in El Salvador. In the San Francisco Bay Area, there are other groups that are informally organized, such as the Sonsonate Association. This association is composed of immigrants that arrived in the Bay Area in the 1950s and 1960s. They come from middle-class origins and hold conservative political orientations. Many of them are U.S. citizens and are members of the Republican Party. Their activities are merely social and most of them do not participate in political activities for the local Salvadoran community, but they are individual members of the Hispanic chamber of commerce and other associations that promote economic growth for their business affairs. Ethnic enclaves develop as subgroups within society as a result of an antagonistic social environment where the members of the immigrant or minority group are not totally functional in the mainstream society and thus become victims of discrimination and economic exploitation. Therefore, it is in the Salvadoran community where the primary relationships are conducted and as they involve intimacy and privacy, primary relationships are restricted mostly to members of the same national or ethnic group. On the other hand, their interaction in the mainstream society is often limited to their employment situation, as it represents the individual’s
Pedestrians stroll by a Salvadoran restaurant and souvenir shop in the Mission District of San Francisco, August 28, 2002. (AP Photo/Julie Jacobson)
1946 | Salvadoran Immigrants
public life or the pursuance of secondary relationships for utilitarian and survival reasons. The immigrants only develop secondary relationships at the societal level because that is the place where the individual experiences discrimination as a result of racial, cultural, and linguistic differences.
The Emergence of Political Organizing in U.S. Salvadoran Communities As it can be observed in the socioeconomic and political diversity of the Salvadoran American communities, they have limited political power and influence within the United States political structure. The Central American communities are divided on issues related to national identity and origin, political affiliations in Central America and the United States, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. These divisions do not allow at the present time the necessary social cohesion needed to transform this population into a strong political body that is able to seek viable political solutions to the problems and realities that they encounter in this society. There is a need to develop responsible and accountable political and social activists within the Salvadoran American community in order to critically confront the wide range of problems that they face in this country. There is a great deal of interest on the part of Salvadorans in this country in keeping up with the news and current events in El Salvador; however, there is considerable variation in the ways in which they attempt to keep informed on the news. Some read Salvadoran newspapers, which are more readily available than other Central American newspapers, largely as a result of the Salvadoran community being larger and more “established,” hence more informed and in touch with the home country. More men than women read the newspapers from the home country, as it is most likely the women are busy doing household chores when they are not working, while men have more leisure time to read. On the other hand, most Salvadorans keep informed through television and radio news programs. In the cases of both newspapers and radio/television, most Salvadoran immigrants receive their news about the home country through Spanish language media. Another important source of news from the home country is contact with family members. Salvadorans keep informed of current events and keep in close contact with family members in Central America by using telephone services. The sociopolitical characteristics of the Central American populations and specifically Salvadoran American populations are very diverse. The Salvadoran community in San Francisco has had difficulties in becoming a cohesive and empowered group in the San Francisco political and social arenas as a result of various social and political factors, which tend to divide the various Salvadoran groups in San Francisco. Some of the divisions are based on the divergent political ideologies
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1947
ranging from conservative right-wing views to orthodox Marxist orientations based on the political ideologies and affiliations held in El Salvador. Individuals living in the United States may be sympathizers with political parties in El Salvador, which may include ARENA, PCN, or the FMLN. Their affiliations also reflect their political philosophy or ideology. In addition, Salvadoran Americans are also politically diverse when observing their affiliations in the U.S. political parties, as there are Salvadorans registered and actively involved in a variety of parties, including the Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.
Paths toward Citizenship One major drawback to political empowerment in many communities has been the common belief on the part of the immigrants that their stay of residence in the United States will be of a temporary nature. Consequently, many Salvadorans remain isolated and neglect to participate in domestic political affairs at the community, municipal, state, or national levels. Unless an individual has some degree of political sophistication or experience, most Salvadoran Americans show signs of apathy towards U.S. political and social issues. Over the years, community activists have attempted to persuade Salvadoran immigrants to become U.S. citizens and to participate in the electoral process. Until recently, these efforts were fruitless because many Central Americans believed that if they became U.S. citizens, they would betray their national identity and citizenship. The situation changed rapidly in the 1990s because of the anti-immigrant currents affecting the United States, the passage of Proposition 187 in California in 1995, the passage of the Welfare Reform Bill in 1996, and new immigration legislation initiated by the federal government. These changes motivated thousands of Salvadorans to apply for U.S. citizenship in order to retain their social service benefits and protect themselves from INS harassment. For the first time in decades, community activism and political empowerment began to take root in Central American communities throughout the country as a response to immigrant bashing and antiLatino legislation being proposed and passed locally and nationally. Within the Salvadoran population, the undocumented status of the population has contributed to the community’s not achieving formal political power. However, many Central American community organizations have attempted to achieve political power by forming organizations that are closely associated with political parties or organizations in their home country or region. In California, left-leaning solidarity groups successfully employed organizing actions against U.S. policies in Central America. Their success was based on the fact that they did not limit their activities to organizing only with Latin American communities. They reached out to the mainstream and created multiethnic coalitions by working closely with international solidarity coalitions and networks such as the Committee in Solidarity with
1948 | Salvadoran Immigrants
the people of El Salvador (CISPES), Amnesty International, and the Emergency Response Network. Their main objective was to deal with issues that directly affected the Central American region, but they did not place their main emphasis on the empowerment efforts within the local communities.
Forging a New Political Identity in the United States Organizations such as the Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights and Services work within a local community structure to advocate for immigrant issues, especially for abuses against immigrant women. Their efforts have been successful in organizing within the local immigrant community by creating bridges between different immigrant communities. Central American service organizations have been particularly effective in the internal affairs of the Central American community while, at the same time, they represent the refugees in the mainstream society and local political structures. Some of these organizations such as the Central American Resource Center (CARECEN) and El Rescate provide legal and immigration services and advocacy for refugee organizations in Washington DC, Houston, San Francisco, and Los Angeles that provide legal representation to refugees in immigration hearings, give health referral services, provide training for health promoters, carry out citizenship drives, and help youth with a tattoo removal program. During the mid-1980s and the early-1990s, CARECEN played an important role in the formation of the Central American National Network (CARNET), which included 38 refugee agencies and grassroots organizations in the United States. The development of local leadership is an important priority in the selection and training of low-income Central American immigrants who work as immigrant and refugee rights promoters and advocates. The promoters provide services to the immigrant community; speak in public forums; and monitor and attempt to impact legislation affecting the Central American immigrant community at the municipal, state, and national levels. In these organizations, immigrants work together to empower other immigrants. Because of their organizational structure, history, philosophy, and their empowerment efforts, these community groups are recognized to represent the leadership in the Central American refugee and immigrant community. They address issues affecting the social experiences and cultural adaptation of Guatemalan and Salvadoran immigrants and refugees. These organizations work closely with the religious organizations, network of churches, Catholic charities, Baptist ministries, and the Quakers, among others. They receive funds and direct services from religious organizations and private foundations. One successful model can be seen in the work done by St. Peter’s Church in the heart of San Francisco’s Mission District. Led by the efforts of refugees working side-by-side with the local pastor, they created a Central American refugee program that provides a wide variety of
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1949
services such as a long-term shelter for homeless men, mental health counseling, rights advocacy, day laborer advocacy, and cultural support to the Central American population in the area.
Salvadoran American Arts and Culture Central American regional associations are sometimes dedicated to the religious worship of a patron saint or a special Catholic deity. The regional associations take charge of the planning, organizing, fundraising, and taking care of the festivities to honor their sacred symbols. Some of these events take place in cooperation with Catholic Church priests and officials while others are organized in social clubs, parks, or cultural centers. Such are the examples in the Nicaraguan community with organizations and individuals dedicated to the worship of Our Lady of the Conception (La Purísima Concepción) or the Fiesta of Saint Dominic (Santo Domingo). Salvadorans have regional associations dedicated to El Dívino Salvador del Mundo (the Savior of the World), the patron saint of El Salvador, and they are responsible for the celebrations of la bajada del Señor during the August festivities. In Los Angeles, for example, the Salvadoran American National Association commissioned a replica of the original icon of the Salvador del Mundo that is housed at the National Cathedral in San Salvador in order to bring more authenticity to the celebration. Just like the celebrations in San Salvador, the image is dressed in purple robes and stands on top of a globe of the world. The statue is lowered into the globe and a few minutes later it reemerges dressed in white to represent the transfiguration of Christ. This celebration brings together the Salvadoran community and has become a symbol of the continuation of the Salvadoran experience outside the Central American borders. Other Salvadoran festivities that are organized and celebrated by the regional associations include the independence celebrations on September 15 and the San Miguel Carnival in November. The Salvadoran community also celebrates the Day of the Cross on May 3, and it is an important festival in El Salvador as it marks the beginning of the rainy season and the greening of the landscape. Some communities have adopted the festival to celebrate the Salvadoran immigrant experience in the United States. In recent years, Salvadoran business owners have formed various chapters of the Salvadoran American Chamber of Commerce in a number of cities throughout the country. They provide Salvadoran business enterprises with support, training, and assessment of their business plans. The Salvadoran American Chambers of Commerce are also engaged in organizing social events, cultural programs, and business seminars for Salvadoran professionals and businesses in their local communities. In addition, the Chambers of Commerce sponsor numerous Salvadoran art exhibits throughout the most important Salvadoran communities in the United States.
1950 | Salvadoran Immigrants
Salvadoran American communities in the United States have a rich artistic and cultural expression. In every Salvadoran community in this country, individuals are involved in every aspect of the arts, in painting, murals, music, poetry, theater, and many other artistic disciplines.
Issues in Relations between the United States and El Salvador The Street Gang Phenomenon in Salvadoran Communities The great majority of Salvadoran immigrants and refugees that arrived in the United States during the period of the Salvadoran civil war in the 1980s and early 1990s resettled in already established Latino communities in Los Angeles. These neighborhoods were located in the territory under the jurisdiction of the ramparts division of the Los Angeles Police Department. The new Salvadoran immigrants were perceived as outsiders. Not readily accepted into these traditionally Mexican neighborhoods, they were often the targets of vicious attacks from the active Mexican gangs present in those communities. Young Salvadorans began to organize smaller scale gangs in their neighborhoods, since a significant number of these young men had received military training in El Salvador either as members of the Salvadoran army or the FMLN. Because of their military experience and training, they were able to train the new Salvadoran gang members with a high level of military discipline and efficiency. They eventually formed what became known as La Mara Salvatrucha, the best-organized Salvadoran gang in Los Angeles. The word mara is used in El Salvador to refer to a group of friends that hang around together; it originates from the word marabunta, which is the name given to the Amazonian soldier ants that destroy everything on their path in the rainforest. Salvatrucha is a slang word used to refer to being Salvadoran. During the early days of this youth gang, their activities were designed to protect themselves from the actions of the Mexican gangs, but eventually they began to demanded payments in return for protection from local merchants and neighbors. The gang expanded rapidly through other parts of California and the United States as a result of their high level of organization and sophistication in their tactics, and very soon it became very well known for their ruthlessness and extreme violence. The gang began to recruit many second-generation Salvadoran and Central American children into their ranks. La Mara Salvatrucha has now expanded their activities and territories from California and Washington DC to New York, Florida, Maryland, New Jersey, Nevada, Colorado, Texas, the Carolinas, Utah, Oregon, Illinois, Michigan, Georgia, Oklahoma, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, El Salvador, and other
Issues in Relations between the United States and El Salvador | 1951
Central American countries. According to FBI reports the La Mara Salvatrucha is active in 31 states throughout the country and has thousands of members in Central America. Most recently the gang members have expanded their activities to rural communities where they are able control larger territories that have weaker law enforcement agencies. They have relocated in new communities where Central Americans and other Latinos are rapidly moving to work in a variety of blue-collar jobs in giant food factories and food processing plants. The transnational impact of the gang is very significant because their sphere of control goes across international borders, as gang members in the United States maintain very close ties with their counterparts in El Salvador. There have been many reports in the Salvadoran media how Mara Salvatrucha gang members in Los Angeles have been responsible for numerous crimes committed in El Salvador and other Central American countries. The contact and levels of communication taking place between gang members in the United States and El Salvador is very important because of the trade that is carried out by gang members involving military weapons, munitions, handguns, drugs, and smuggled stolen cars; and because of other illicit activities conducted by the gangs. It has been reported that a high percentage of the cars driven in El Salvador were actually stolen in the United States by Salvadoran gang members. When La Mara Salvatrucha was originally created, only Salvadorans could join its membership, but as time has passed, other Central and South Americans have been allowed to join its ranks. But still the great majority of its membership is of Salvadoran origin; most of its members are young people with ages ranging from 11 to 40 years old. The gang members identify themselves with numerous tattoos all over their bodies and often use the letters MS or the number 13 or trece in Spanish, and the gang is often referred to as the MS13. They also are identified with the Sureño gangs, in reference to their Southern California origins and as opposed to the other gangs that originated in northern California. They have held a rivalry with other Southern California gangs such as the 18th Street gang in Los Angeles, but in recent years Salvadorans have also joined the 18th Street gang and have recreated the gang structure and rivalries in El Salvador. Law enforcement agencies and the judicial systems have arrested, incarcerated, or deported Salvadoran gang members. Many La Mara Salvatrucha gang members remain illegally in the United States or are facing deportation to El Salvador. When gang members are deported to El Salvador, they face a very difficult experience since many of them came to the United States when they were very young children and know very little about life in Central America. In addition, the gang members are not welcome by the mainstream Salvadoran society; they are seen as undesirables and antisocial individuals and not accepted by the societal standards. During the past decade, young Salvadoran immigrants who were involved in the L.A. gang scene and were convicted of felony crimes were deported by the
1952 | Salvadoran Immigrants
INS and were sent back to El Salvador. La Mara Salvatrucha was originally created in Los Angeles, but their deported gang members recreated their Los Angeles turfs and rivalries in El Salvador, and recruited many young Salvadorans to join their ranks. Salvadoran sociologists have stated that for every gang member that was deported from the United States, a new group of 20 –25 young men could be recruited, trained, and incorporated into the gang lifestyle by each gang member that had been deported from the United States. The deported gang members began to recruit new members in the working-class middle and high schools, and in the poor neighborhoods in the capital city of San Salvador. Soon thereafter, the gangs also began to spread their influence to rural communities and provincial cities, as well as to other Central American countries. Salvadoran police has estimated that El Salvador has about 17,000 gang members, while other reliable sources say it may be double that number. In a period of just over 10 years, Salvadoran society has been seriously impacted by the new youth gang violence brought about by those gang members that were deported from the United States. Gang violence in Central America, the United States, and Mexico has become a major challenge to law enforcement agencies. The violent acts they commit are quite serious, even when carried out by 10 year olds. Some gangs have been involved in extortion and mass murders. Some have been linked to organized crime in the United States and El Salvador. Salvadoran government officials have stated that gangs are responsible for 80 percent of the violent deaths in that country. Gangs have become the most destabilizing factor to Salvadoran society and to Salvadoran communities in the United States since the civil war ended in 1992. During October 2003, the Salvadoran government passed what has become known as the anti-Mara law in El Salvador. Thousands of young men fitting the physical descriptions of gang members have been arrested in El Salvador as part of the Mano Dura, or hard-hand policies of the ruling ARENA Party that has targeted gang members and promised to put an end to all gangs. Article 29 of the new antiMara legislation states that individuals deported for gang activity can be arrested as they return to El Salvador, regardless of whether they have committed any crimes in their country of origin. Large numbers of recent deportees have been arrested in El Salvador under the new law because they are suspected gang members. These policies have mirrored the crackdown on street gangs in the United States, and specifically La Mara Salvatrucha in Los Angeles by police Chief William J. Bratton, who, as the head of the New York Police Department, successfully carried out Zero Tolerance programs against gangs in New York City. In addition, in March 2003, General James T. Hill, the head of U.S. Southern Command, cited gangs as one of the most important sources of terrorism in the Latin America. This broadening of the definition of a terrorist has created a controversy in regards to the social, political, and social role of governments in the United States and Central America in trying to control the gang problem in the region. Gang members,
Issues in Relations between the United States and El Salvador | 1953
or mareros, are certainly not terrorists in the strictest sense of the word. Their violent acts are not politically motivated. They usually target their own or rival gang members, not noncombatants or innocent civilians as terrorists do. On the positive side, former gang members and community activists in Los Angeles and San Salvador created a few years ago an organization called Homies Unidos, with an emphasis on gang intervention and prevention. They are involved in the Latino community by giving gang prevention talks and discussions with youths at the local schools, churches, and community centers. They work with the gangs in facilitating conflict resolutions and truces between rival gangs; they also have created a tattoo removal program and help involve the youth in art and cultural programs as the means of rehabilitating gang members and preventing further gang activities in the Central American communities. They have been very effective in helping former gang members in their rehabilitation and reincorporation into society by providing counseling, guidance, and employment referral services to youth at risk. It is important to note that prevention and educational programs are necessary tools to help slow down gang activities in the Central American communities in the United States. Law enforcement and incarceration are not necessarily the only solutions to this serious social problem presently faced by Salvadoran and Central American communities in the United States and in Central America.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 291 Refugee and asylum applications filed by Salvadorans with the I.N.S., 1987–2008 Asylum applicants
Asylum cases reopened
1987
2,684
N/A
39
74
172
1988
27,048
N/A
149
60
170
1989
29,680
N/A
443
74
198
1990
22,271
N/A
260
136
245
1991
10,244
N/A
185
110
1249
1992
6,781
N/A
110
259
743
1993
14,616
N/A
74
1,006
811
1994
18,600
N/A
185
N/A
275
1995
75,860
N/A
234
0
283
1996
65,588
N/A
198
0
262
Year
Asylum granted
Refugee arrivals
Asylees and refugees granted residency
1997
8,156
3,450
182
0
128
1998
3,847
2,498
388
0
129
1999
2,008
1,046
296
0
47
2000
1,006
863
146
0
76
2001
725
746
158
0
195
2002
274
597
75
0
187
2003
N/A
N/A
90
0
N/A
2004
N/A
N/A
119
0
N/A
2005
N/A
N/A
181
0
N/A
2006
N/A
N/A
499
0
N/A
2007
N/A
N/A
418
0
N/A
2008
N/A
N/A
321
0
N/A
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the INS 1987–2002; 2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Office of Immigration Statistics. Department of Homeland Security.
1954
Table 292 Salvadorans who are naturalized citizens in the United States Year
Numbers
1979
770
1980
988
1981
1,252
1982
1,187
1983
1,126
1984
1,380
1985
2,119
1986
2,628
1987
2,428
1988
2,291
1989
2,001
1990
2,410
1991
3,653
1992
2,056
1993
3,038
1994
5,643
1995
13,702
1996
35,478
1997
18,273
1998
12,267
1999
22,991
2000
24,073
2001
13,663
2002
10,716
2003
8,719
2004
9,602
2005
12,174
2006
13,430
2007
17,157
2008
35,796
2009
18,927
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the INS1993–2002; 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Office of Immigration Statistics. Department of Homeland Security.
1955
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 293 Central American population in the United States, 1990 –2000
Central Americans
Census 1990
Census 2000
Cresce and Ramirez
Mumford Center
1,323,830
1,811,676
2,435,731
2,863,063
Salvadoran
565,081
708,741
1,010,740
1,117,959
Guatemalan
268,779
407,127
574,785
627,239
Nicaraguan
202,658
194,493
272,655
294,334
Honduran
131,066
131,066
333,636
362,171
Panamanian
92,013
98,475
126,500
164,371
Costa Rican
57,223
71,175
93,583
115,672
Other C.A.
7,000
93,234
23,832
181,228
Source: Arthur R. Cresce and Roberto Ramirez, 2003; Jorge del Pinal, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1995; Hispanic Population and Residential Segregation Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research University at Albany, State University of New York; http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/HispanicPop/HspPopData.htm.
1956
Table 294 Salvadoran population in U.S. metropolitan areas 2000 Rank
Census 2000
Mumford 2000
Census 1990
LA-Long Beach
1
187,193
Washington DC-MD-VA-WV
2
85,539
312,384
340,072
184,513
1
129,631
132,472
51,228
2
Houston, TX
3
50,390
78,325
89,941
39,965
3
Nassau-Suffolk, NY
4
New York, NY
5
42,500
57,108
61,237
19,143
6
28,566
39,662
41,264
27,169
5
San Francisco, CA
6
22,581
37,839
37,948
33,660
4
Dallas, TX
7
19,871
29,073
33,557
10,501
8
Oakland, CA
8
14,002
22,054
25,610
9,901
9
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA
9
11,889
19,524
23,520
8,053
11
Orange County, CA
10
12,122
11,892
19,668
20,607
7
Boston, MA-NH
11
8,450
13,755
19,260
20,341
10
Miami, FL
12
7,339
9,115
13,055
13,179
12
Jersey City, NJ
13
6,570
8,873
13,443
12,737
13
Newark, NJ
14
5,479
8,658
12,012
12,717
16
Las Vegas, NV
15
2,076
7,180
10,704
12,242
20
Chicago, IL
16
6,160
6,802
8,460
10,114
15
Atlanta, GA
17
1,386
6,731
8,883
9,446
24
San Jose, CA
18
6,181
4,975
7,403
9,036
14
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ
19
1,470
2,936
4,720
6,572
25
Fort Lauderdale, FL
20
1,779
3,794
5,771
5,616
22
City
Census 2000 Revision
1990 Rank
Source: Hispanic Population and Residential Segregation Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research University at Albany, State University of New York http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/HispanicPop/ HspPopData.htm.
1957
1958 | Salvadoran Immigrants Table 295 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009 leading states of residence region/ country: El Salvador Total
Male
Female
19,909
8,885
11,024
125
60
65
California
6,509
2,829
3,680
Colorado
114
53
61
77
30
47
674
287
387
Georgia
410
192
218
Illinois
162
75
87
1,635
753
882
Total Arizona
Connecticut Florida
Maryland Massachusetts
533
261
272
Minnesota
108
49
59
Nevada
417
197
220
New Jersey New York North Carolina
657
268
389
2,100
948
1,152
370
156
214
Ohio
48
26
22
Pennsylvania
59
26
33
Texas
2,632
1,150
1,482
Virginia
1,646
741
905
175
95
80
1,458
689
769
Washington Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix III: Notable American El Salvadorans Ana Sol Gutiérrez Ana Sol Gutiérrez was born in El Salvador. She has lived over 45 years in the United States, and she has traveled extensively and worked in Switzerland, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Peru. She was elected as a member of the Montgomery County Board of Education in Maryland in 1990 She was the only Latino high-level elected official in the Washington area and holds the distinction of being the first Latina elected to this position in Maryland. Ana Sol Gutiérrez was twice elected regional vice-president of the Hispanic Caucus of the National School Board Association,
Appendix III: Notable American El Salvadorans | 1959
a national education public policy organization. In January 1999, the Maryland State Teachers Association (MSTA) recognized her leadership in education with the MSTA Outstanding Service/Politics Award. In 1994, Ms. Sol Gutiérrez received a political appointment from President Clinton to the U.S. Department of Transportation as the Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Research and Special Programs Administration. She directed the agency’s safety, regulatory, research, and development programs, with oversight of major national transportation safety programs including Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety, Pipeline Safety, and Emergency Response. As a nationally known Latina leader, Ms. Sol Gutiérrez has been recognized twice (in 1996 and in 1991) by Hispanic Business Magazine as one of the “100 Most Influential Hispanics in U.S.A.” She is 1 of 12 Latinas selected for their significant contribution to American quality of life by the Bread and Roses Project: Women of Hope—Latinas Abriendo Camino. She received the Hispanic Achievement Award in Science from Hispanic Magazine and Apple Computer in 1993. She was featured in “Outstanding Women in Non-Traditional Careers” in VISTA Magazine.
Roberto Lovato Roberto Lovato is a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, where he was a student activist interested in Central American and Latino immigrant issues. He took an active role in the Central American community in the San Francisco Bay Area. He became the director of the Central American Resource Center (CARECEN) in Los Angeles, where he was an advocate for Central American immigrant rights and services. Lovato has also served as president of the Los Angeles Human Relations Commission. He is the CEO of Lovato and Associates, a consulting firm that specializes in the Latino market strategies in the United States. Lovato presently resides in New York and is a writer for numerous news services and journals including the Nation and the Huffington Post. He has published dozens of articles and commentaries of Latino issues in a variety and newspapers and magazines.
Dr. Juan Romagoza Dr. Juan Romagoza grew up in Usulutan in El Salvador. He followed the teachings and example of Archbishop Oscar Romero while attending medical school in San Salvador and began working to help the poor in El Salvador. He received his medical degree from the University of El Salvador in 1980. As a young doctor he provided free medical services to the rural poor, and he was arrested under suspicion
1960 | Salvadoran Immigrants
of being a guerrilla leader. He was tortured for 21 days, during which his fingers were cut to prevent him from being a surgeon. He was released through the efforts of relatives and, while still recovering from his wounds, was smuggled into Guatemala and Mexico, and then into the United States with the help of the Sanctuary Movement. In 1983, he went to San Francisco, California, where he worked as the founder and director of the Central American Refugee Committee. In 1986, he moved to Washington DC and served simultaneously as the program director for Casa del Pueblo and as mental health counselor for La Morada Homeless Shelter. In 1987, he returned to San Francisco, where he served as the director of health promoter projects for the Good Samaritan Community Center and as the director of health projects for the Central American Refugee Center. Dr. Romagoza returned to Washington DC in 1988 to become the executive director of La Clinica del Pueblo, where he continues to serve the health care needs of the Latino community. In 2002, he was part of a civil suit against a group of Salvadoran generals who had been implicated in ordering the violence and torture against him and others. The West Palm Beach, Florida, jury found the generals guilty and awarded Romagoza and the other plaintiffs the amount of $54.6 million dollars in damages. Dr. Romagoza has received many awards and citations for his service to the community. Among the most notable are: the Robert Wood Johnson Community Health Leadership Award; the International Center for Health Leadership and Development and University of Illinois at Chicago Leadership Award; La Raza Maclovio Barraza Leadership Award; and the Marcelino Pan y Vino Foundation Humanitarian Award.
Glossary Salvadoran idioms are very extensive. Many terms are humorous; others range on the vulgar side. Others may have very strong sexual connotations but are often approved across the different social classes and according to different situations. Many of the terms tend to take grammatical liberties in the Spanish language, and some are not necessarily grammatically correct, as Salvadorans tend to combine words together or to abbreviate them as part of the combination of words. It is important to remember that many of the words used in the Salvadoran language have their origins in the ancient Nahuat language used in the region before the arrival of the Europeans. Some of terms may be frowned upon by individuals in the upper and middle classes, since the idioms are commonly used by people in the lower social classes, but in the long run they are terms that are readily accepted as “Salvadoreñismos,” or Salvadoran idioms.
Glossary | 1961
Baboso: A common expression used to refer to someone who acts dumb, often used to refer to any person, that is, ese baboso, or that guy. Literally translation is “someone who slobbers.” Bicho: Young boy; bug. Cacaso: Refers to things, objects, tools, or anything that have an inferior quality. Casamiento: A mixture of fried rice and beans, usually eaten for breakfast in El Salvador. Chamba: A name to refer to a person named Salvador, also used to refer to a job or job site. Chele: A term to describe a light-skinned person. China: Baby sitter. Choto: Usually expressed as de choto, or for free. “The movies are free today”—El cine es de choto ahora. “I went all the way to look for Maria for nothing, she was not home”—Hoy fui de choto hasta allá bien lejos a buscar a la Maria, y no estaba en su casa.” Chucho: Common name for a dog. Also used to refer to an individual that does not like to share things or money. Chumpe, chompipe: Turkey. Pan con Chumpe is a traditional Salvadoran sandwich with turkey meat, sauce, watercress, radishes, romaine lettuce, and curtido on a French roll. Cipote: A young child or boy. Cuche: Pig, something that is full. For example: “The bus is full of people”—La camioneta va bien cuche. A variation on this is the word encuchar, “to be left in a tight spot.” Curtido: A mixture of cabbage, onions, carrots, oregano, and other spices that is pickled in vinegar and then eaten with pupusas or other Salvadoran foods. Desmadre: A situation that is out of control that ends up in a disorderly fashion. Guanaco: Slang name for Salvadoran, commonly given to Salvadorans in Central America. Guaro: Generic name given to any alcoholic beverage in El Salvador, but it usually refers to hard liquor. Gueviar: Popular term used to refer to the act of stealing or appropriating something that is not yours. Mara: Street gang; a group of friends. Another name used is majada. Mareros: Street gang members.
1962 | Salvadoran Immigrants
Mascón: A game of soccer, basketball, or baseball. Pisto: Money. Púchica: A common expression of admiration or disgust. Used like “wow.” Pupusa: The national dish of El Salvador,: a corn tortilla filled with cheese, pork, beans, or mixed. It is topped off with curtido. In some regions of El Salvador they may be made from rice flour rather than corn. A pupuseria is a restaurant that specializes in selling pupusas. Salvatrucha: Slang name for Salvadorans. Volado: An expression used to refer to almost anything that a person does not know the name of. For example: Pasame ese volado, or “pass me that thing.” Voy a ir a hacer un volado, or “I am going to do something.” Another word used with similar meanings is chunche. References American Civil Liberties Union. 1984. Salvadorans in the United States: The Case for Extended Voluntary Departure. National Immigration and Alien Rights Project, Report No. 1. Washington, DC: American Civil Liberties Union. Amnesty International. 1983. Annual Report. Washington, DC: Amnesty International. Anderson, Thomas. 1976. El Salvador 1932. San Salvador, El Salvador: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana (EDUCA). Arias Gomez, Jorge. 1972. Farabundo Marti. San Salvador, El Salvador: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana (EDUCA). Boyd Caroli, B. 1983. “Recent Immigration to the United States.” In Ethnic and Immigration Groups: The United States, Canada and England, edited by P.J.F. Rosof, W. Zeizel, J. B. Quandt, and M. Maayan, 49– 69. New York: Haworth Press. Camarda, R. 1985. Forced to Move: Salvadorean Refugees in Honduras. San Francisco, CA: Solidarity Publications. Córdova, Carlos B. 1987. “Undocumented El Salvadoreans in the San Francisco Bay Area: Migration and Adaptation Dynamics.” Journal of La Raza Studies 1 (1): 9–37. Córdova, Carlos B. 1989. “The Mission District: The Ethnic Diversity of the Latin American Enclave in San Francisco, California.” Journal of La Raza Studies 2 (1): 21–32. Córdova, Carlos B. 1992. “Organizing in Central American Communities in the United States.” In Community Organizing in a Diverse Society, edited by Felix G. Rivera and John L. Erlich, 177–96. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Córdova, Carlos B. 1996. Hispanics-Latinos: Diverse Populations in a Multicultural Society. Written with Jorge del Pinal. Washington, DC: National Association of Hispanic Publications. Córdova, Carlos B.1999b. “Central and South Americans.” Written with Raquel Rivera-Pinderhughes. In A Nation of Peoples: A Sourcebook on America’s Multicultural
References | 1963 Heritage, edited by Elliott Robert Barkan, 96–118. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. Córdova, Carlos B. 2004. The New Americans: The Salvadoran Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Córdova, Carlos B., and Felix S. Kury. 2001. “Salvadoran Populations.” In The Latino Psychiatric Patient: Assessment and Treatment, edited by Alberto Lopez and Ernestina Carrillo, 97–108. Washington, DC: National Institute of Mental Health. Cresce, Arthur R., and Roberto R. Ramirez. 2003. Analysis of General Hispanic Responses in Census 2000. Working Paper No. 72. Population Division. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Fazlollah, M. 1984. “Fleeing Salvadorans: The Painful Journey North.” Migration Today 12 (2): 22–27. Gettleman, M. E., P. Lacefield, L. Menashe, D. Mermelstein, and R. Radosh, eds. 1981. El Salvador: Central America in the New Cold War. New York: Grove Press. Hamilton, Nora, and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla. 1991. “Central American Migration: A Framework for Analysis.” Latin American Research Review 26 (1): 75-110. Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research. 2004. Hispanic Population and Residential Segregation. University at Albany, State University of New York. [Online article retrieved 05/06.] http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/HispanicPop/HspPopData.htm. Logan, John R. 2001. The New Latinos: Who They Are, Where They Are. Albany, NY: Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, University at Albany, State University of New York. Mahler, Sara. 1995. American Dreaming: Immigrant Life on the Margins. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Muller, Thomas, and Thomas Espenshade. 1986. The Fourth Wave: California’s Newest Immigrants. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press. National Lawyers Guild. 1981. Immigration Law and Defense. New York: Clark Boardman Company. Portes, A., and R. L. Bach. 1985. Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States. Berkeley: University of California Press. Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben G. Rumbaut. 1990. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press Ramirez, Roberto R., and G. Patricia de la Cruz. 2002. The Hispanic Population in the United States: March 2002. Current Population Reports, P20 –545. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Scudder, T., and E. Colson. 1982. From Welfare to Development: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Dislocated People. In Involuntary Migration and Resettlement: The Problems and Responses of Dislocated People, edited by A. Hansen and A. OliverSmith, 267-287. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
1964 | Salvadoran Immigrants
Further Reading Argueta, Jorge. 2003. Xochitl and the Flowers. San Francisco, CA: Children’s Books Press. Baker Cristales, Beth. 2004. Salvadoran Migration to Southern California: Redifining El Hermano Lejano. Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida. Bencastro, Mario. 1999. Odyssey to the North. University of Houston, TX: Arte Publico Press. Bencastro Mario. 2010. Portable Paradise. University of Houston, TX: Arte Publico Press. Bibler Coutin, Susan. 2003. Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immigrants’ Struggle for U.S. Residency. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. El Salvador: Cuisine and Recipes. [Online article; retrieved 03/07.] http://www.whats4eats. com/central-america/el-salvador-cuisine. Garcia, Maria Cristina. 2006. Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hamilton, Nora, and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla. 1991. “Central American Migration: A Framework for Analysis.” Latin American Research Review 26 (1): 75-110. Hamilton, Nora, and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla. 2001. Seeking Community in a Global City: Guatemalans and Salvadorans in Los Angeles. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Jurado Ertll, Randy. 2009. Hope in Times of Darkness: A Salvadoran American Experience. Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books. Mahler, Sarah J. 1995. Salvadorans in Suburbia: Symbiosis and Conflict. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Mahler, Sara. 1995. American Dreaming: Immigrant Life on the Margins. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Menjivar, Cecilia. 2000. Fragmented Ties: Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Perez, Rossana. 2007. Flight to Freedom: The Story of Central American Refugees in California. University of Houston: Arte Publico Press. Rodriguez, Ana Patricia. 2009. Dividing the Isthmus: Central American Transnational Histories, Literatures, and Cultures. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Somalian Immigrants by Franklin Goza
Introduction New patterns of immigration have brought about significant shifts in the racial (Kritz and Gurak 2004; Saenz 2004) and religious composition of the United States (Bixler 2005; Leonard 2003). Often overlooked, but important components of this transition are the African (USDHS 2004) and Muslim (Leonard 2003; Pipes and Duran 2002) immigrants who are now entering North America in greater numbers than ever before. At the intersection of race and religion is one large group of newcomers that is extremely disadvantaged and about which little is known, the Somalis. The general lack of knowledge regarding Somalis and their uniquely disadvantaged position may be partially explained by their relatively recent arrival, which coincides with that nation’s most recent civil war, which began in 1991. This oversight is especially unfortunate given that Somali refugees may be the most disadvantaged group to ever enter the United States. This fateful condition is due to a variety of issues. First, like most refugees before them, Somalis are extremely disadvantaged as a consequence of their forced migration. For some this is because they experienced severe psychological trauma that will remain with them for the rest of their lives. For others, it is because they have relocated to a nation where they do not speak the language and are also unfamiliar with societal norms and customs. Still others must learn to adapt to a level of technical sophistication for which they are completely unprepared. All, however, are by definition refugees, as they fled to escape persecution (Shacknove 1985), willingly relocating wherever the odds of survival were better than those encountered in their homeland at time of departure (Hein 1993). Second, Somalis may be disadvantaged in the United States because they are a racial minority subject to prejudice and discrimination (Berry and Kalin 2000; Richmond 2001). Such negative attitudes and behaviors can severely affect access to opportunity and reward structures, which in turn may lead to additional disadvantages. Third, Somali disadvantages may also be due to the fact that they are Muslims residing in a predominantly Christian nation in a post-9/11 world. This drawback may be especially pronounced for the easily identifiable Somali women, who frequently wear distinctive head coverings (hijabs) or head-to-toe burqas.
1965
| Somalian Immigrants
Chronology | 1967
Finally, because many Somalis are unable to read or write in their own language much less English, they are at a pronounced cultural disadvantage in the United States. Furthermore, many adults have never had any formal education, and they now find themselves in a society that is extremely different from their homeland in almost every regard. Upon arrival many of these refugees almost completely lacked the tools required to cope socially or to effectively compete in the labor force. This in turn has affected their ability to improve upon their socioeconomic condition.
Chronology 1500 B.C.E.
Egyptian expedition arrives in Punt.
100 C.E.
Samaal people occupy the entire Horn of Africa.
600s
Arab tribes establish the sultanate of Adel on the Gulf of Aden coast.
1500s
Sultanate of Adel disintegrates into small states.
1860s
France acquires foothold on the Somali coast, later to become Djibouti.
1875
Egypt occupies towns on Somali coast and parts of the interior.
1887
Britain proclaims protectorate over Somaliland.
1889
Italy sets up a protectorate in central Somalia.
1925
Territory east of the Jubba River detached from Kenya to become the westernmost part of the Italian protectorate.
1936
Italian Somaliland combined with Somali-speaking parts of Ethiopia to form a province of Italian East Africa.
1940
Italians occupy British Somaliland.
1941
British occupy Italian Somalia.
1960
British and Italian parts of Somalia become independent, merge, and form the United Republic of Somalia; Aden Abdullah Osman Daar is elected president.
1967
Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke beats Aden Abdullah Osman Daar in elections for president.
1969
Muhammad Siad Barre assumes power in coup after Shermarke is assassinated.
1970
Barre declares Somalia a socialist state and nationalizes most of the economy.
1968 | Somalian Immigrants
1974 –1975
Severe drought causes widespread starvation.
1977
Somalia invades the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia.
1991
Civil war begins, which creates anarchy that continues until today; former British protectorate of Somaliland declares unilateral independence.
1992
More than one million refugees depart Somalia.
1998
Puntland region declares autonomy.
2004
In the 14th attempt since 1991 to restore central government, a transitional parliament is inaugurated in Kenya.
2007
Another 320,000 refugees flee renewed fighting in Mogadishu.
2008–2009
Somali pirates undertake a record number of attacks in the Gulf of Aden.
2010
Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, a Somali American, becomes the prime minister of Somalia. Hussein Samatar becomes the first Somali American elected to public office in the United States when he is elected to the Minneapolis School Board.
Background Geography and Population Somalia is strategically located between the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, in the Horn of Africa. It has a land mass of 246,200 square miles (i.e., slightly smaller than Texas) which includes a coastline of 1,880 miles. Its topography is predominated by flat plateaus and plains. In the north these plateaus reach between 2,950 and 7,000 feet. The highest plateaus of the country are located in the extremely dry northeast, and the highest point reaches an elevation of 8,038 feet. In the southern and westerns regions, and extending to the Shebelle River in the east, is a plateau with a maximum elevation of only 2,247 feet. Only two percent of Somalia’s land is arable, and most of it is located here between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers, where it is used for agricultural purposes. The area that extends southwest of the Juba River to Kenya is low pastureland. The principal crops produced in Somalia are sorghum, corn, bananas, coconuts, rice, sugarcane, mangoes, sesame seeds, bean and khat—the popular mild narcotic that is chewed by users and banned in many countries. However, livestock is currently the most important sector of the Somali
Background | 1969
economy, recently accounting for 65 percent of the nation’s exports (CIA World Factbook 2006). In 2010 Somalia’s population was estimated to be 9.4 million (PRB 2010). Only 34 percent of the population resides in urban areas, where most people are concentrated in a few large cities. The country’s age structure is typical of a developing nation in that it resembles a pyramid. The large base reveals that 45 percent of the population is less than 15 years old, while the pointed tip documents that less than 3 percent is 65 or older. The lack of the aged at the top of the pyramid is because in 2010 life expectancy at birth was only 49 years. Just 12 nations have shorter expected life spans. In addition, Somalia’s infant mortality rate (i.e., infant deaths per 1,000 live births) is 111, the sixth-highest of any nation. Furthermore, Somali women, on average, give birth to 6.5 children. This figure is the third-highest in the world and is likely due to the fact that only one percent of all women 15– 49 were using modern methods of birth control in 2010. These demographic complications are exacerbated by the fact that only about 40 percent of the population can read and write. In 2002 the overall literacy rate was only 19 percent (WHO 2004). While precise literacy figures are unknown (PRB 2010), it is recognized that the nation’s literacy rate for women is much lower than for men. Most Somalis are Sunni Muslims. However, there is a small Christian minority in Mogadishu. Ethnic Somalis comprise about 85 percent of the population. The largest ethnic minority is the Bantu. They primarily reside in southern Somalia, near the Juba and Shebelle Rivers, and are the descendants of slaves brought to the region by Arab slave traders in the 19th century. Because Bantus are ethnically, physically, and culturally distinct from Somalis, they have long been subject to various forms of discrimination, so much so, that recently many nations gave them preferential refugee status, including the United States. This point is elaborated later. In addition, there are about 30,000 Arabs who reside in Somalia. Besides speaking Somali, many people also speak Arabic, as this is the language typically used for religious training. Smaller numbers of Somalis also speak English and Italian.
History The country today known as Somalia has a long history. Significant historical markers include the following: an Egyptian expedition arrived in the 14th century B.C.E.; Judaism appeared 12 centuries later; Christianity reached the Horn prior to the seventh century C.E.; and, Islam arrived in the next century. The residents of this region have traditionally been either pastoral nomads or agro-pastoralists. These two groups occupied the interior regions, while on the coast trading communities existed in several locations, such as Mogadishu in the south and Berbera in the north. In the late 1400s the Portuguese became the first European power to attempt to subdue the region. However, their attacks failed to establish any colonies.
1970 | Somalian Immigrants
Colonization, however, did occur in 1884 when at the Berlin Conference Somalia was carved into multiple parts. The result was that the British controlled the northwest, the French Djibouti, the Italians the south, and the Ethiopians the Ogaden region in the west. In 1940 Mussolini’s troops invaded British Somaliland, resulting in an Italian occupation of most of the territory. However, in 1941 the British defeated the Italians and regained control of their earlier possessions. Somalia, formally known as the Somali Democratic Republic, was created on July 1, 1960, when the newly independent states of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland merged to form the Somali Republic. However, problems developed not long thereafter, reaching a crisis situation when President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated on October 15, 1969. Less than a week later the army staged a successful coup d’état and Mohammed Siad Barre became president. Siad Barre’s ambition led him to attempt to occupy Ethiopia during the Ogaden War of 1977–1978. This unsuccessful venture cost him both politically and militarily. Opposition spread, especially throughout the northern region of the country. Siad Barre responded in May 1988 with an aerial attack on the country’s two largest northern cities, Hargeisa and Burco. Approximately 500 thousand people were displaced and another 50,000 may have been killed. This military action led many survivors to seek refuge in other nations, including the United States. This was essentially the beginning of Somalia’s current civil war, one that has continued for more than 20 years. In fact, throughout his reign, “Both the urban population and nomads living in the countryside [were] subjected to summary killings, arbitrary arrest, detention in squalid conditions, torture, rape, crippling constraints on freedom of movement and expression and a pattern of psychological intimidation” (Africa Watch Committee 1990, 9). Siad Barre’s government collapsed in January 1991 and he was forced to flee Mogadishu. Since this time Somalia has been without an effective central government. Civil war, anarchy, lawlessness, inter-tribal warfare, and general chaos have characterized the country since then. Immediately following Siad Barre’s departure many Somalis fled the country in search of safety elsewhere. Prendergast (1997) estimates that 300,000 people died within the first year following the state collapse, while the United Nations estimates suggest that by 1992 more than one million of Somalia’s then population of 8.5 million had departed as refugees. Although many at least initially went to Kenya, tens of thousands began making their way to third countries where they would be permanently resettled. During the early 1990s the country experienced additional political transformations. First, in May 1991 the major clans in the northwestern part of Somalia created an independent sovereignty called the Republic of Somaliland. Second, Puntland, located in the northeast region, similarly began operating as a self-governing, selfdeclared autonomous state in 1998. Although not yet recognized by any members of the world community, Somaliland continues to distance itself from the south
Causes and Waves of Migration | 1971
as it attempts to gain recognition as an independent entity. Puntland, on the other hand, seeks to remain an independent territory within Somalia. Meanwhile the rest of the country remains extremely fragmented, with continuing conflict between rival clans. Although various groups attempted to reestablish a central government in 2004 and 2006, these endeavors were largely unsuccessful.
Causes and Waves of Migration The passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act meant that earlier excluded groups, such as the Somalis, were now for the first time able to immigrate to the United States. This legislation abolished the national-origin quotas that had been in place since the 1920s and in effect opened U.S. immigration portals to all newcomers. However, in the case of Somali natives, few would take advantage of this possibility. In fact, as demonstrated by Table 296, prior to 1991 very few people of Somali descent resided in the United States. However, with the onset of the 1991 Somali civil war this situation rapidly changed (Pagliacolo 2004). Since that time tens of thousands of Somali refugees have relocated to the United States, making them the largest African refugee group in this country and one of the most unique
Armed Somali guerrillas. Since the early 1990s, battling clan factions have kept Somalia in a state of civil war. (Corel)
1972 | Somalian Immigrants
sets of newcomers to ever enter this nation. In many of the sections that follow, I use data from the 2000 U.S. Census of Population to examine their situation.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of the Somali Community in the United States Before discussing the situation of those included in the census it is important to note that many Somalis residing in the United States were missed by this census. This information is based on numerous interviews conducted with Somali community leaders in a number of cities with large Somali populations. There are various reasons for the Somali undercount. Sometimes they were mistaken for African Americans. Other times, like African Americans, they were undercounted as they too typically reside in urban inner city neighborhoods and are relatively poor, precisely those population segments that are most likely to be underenumerated by the U.S. Census (Anderson and Fienberg 1999). In addition, many Somalis are fearful of government officials, even those from the Census Bureau. Nonetheless, over 50,000 individuals with connections to Somalia were counted by the 2000 census. As such, the data to be analyzed herein represent the most complete count of Somalis in the United States currently available. The 2000 U.S. Census of Population counted approximately 36,600 people born in Somalia, over 8,300 people with Somali ancestry not born in Somalia, and over 5,600 Somali speakers not born in Somalia or of Somali ancestry. Together these three distinct subgroups total more than 50,000 individuals. While a sizable number, this is still far short of the 150,000 that are estimated to live in the United States by community leaders and others who work with this population. Census data reveal that over 63 percent of those not born in Somalia, but with Somali ancestry, were born in the United States. As such, nearly two-thirds of the Somali ancestry subgroup can correctly be considered as second-generation Somali Americans. Another 17 percent of this subgroup was born in Kenya, followed by 4 percent born in Ethiopia. Both of these countries are home to large refugee camps that housed Somalis for many years. As such, it is likely that many born in those two countries experienced time in a refugee camp before relocating to the United States. Among the Somali-speaking subgroup, over 85 percent was born in either Ethiopia or Kenya. The other 15 percent were born in the United States. Census data document that less than 2 percent of those born in Somalia entered the United States prior to 1980. Between 1980 and 1990 an additional 7 percent arrived, while the majority (91%) entered after 1990. The other two Somali subgroups mirror the Somali-born pattern, but to a lesser degree, as over 80 percent of each of these
Demographic Profile | 1973
groups arrived after 1990. For additional information on the composition of these subgroups see Goza (2007).
Place of Residence Data from the 2000 Census reveal that Minnesota had the highest Somali population and percentage of total for all three Somali subgroups. In 2000 over 51 percent of the Somali speakers and approximately 25 percent of the two other subgroups resided there. Since 1991 Minnesota has become the focal point for the Somali community in the United States. Some newcomers arrived directly from refugee camps, while secondary migrants relocated to this area because of its good employment prospects and established network of refugee service agencies. Today Minneapolis/ St. Paul is the de facto capital of Somalis in the United States, as it is home to an estimated 50,000 Somali residents, while Columbus, Ohio has the second largest concentration, estimated at 30,000. Note that these estimates are not from the Census Bureau, but rather from those who closely work with this population. In the 2000 census data, however, Georgia was the second-most-popular state among the Somali born (10%) and those with Somali ancestry (10%). Next came Ohio and Washington, as each contained between 8 percent and 10 percent of these subgroups. Among Somali speakers, however, Washington (20%) and California (12%) ranked second and third, respectively, as preferred places to live. Both California and Virginia also had significant numbers of the Somali-born and those with Somali ancestry. Thus these numbers reveal that significant clusters of Somali refugees are being formed in many regions throughout the United States. An analysis of the metropolitan areas with the highest numbers of Somali residents again reveals that the Minneapolis/St. Paul area had the largest populations for all three subgroups. Approximately 20 percent of those born in Somalia and of Somali ancestry live there, as did 36 percent of the Somali speakers. Next in 2000 was Atlanta, Georgia, home to approximately 10 percent of the Somali ancestry and Somali-born subgroups, as well as 5 percent of the Somali speakers. Columbus, Ohio, ranked third among those born in Somalia (9%), but fifth among those with Somali ancestry (7%) and sixth for Somali speakers (2%). Seattle and Washington, D.C., also had sizeable Somali populations. The former had the second-largest collection of Somali speakers (15%) and the third-highest number of those with Somali ancestry (10%). Meanwhile, Washington, D.C., had the third-most Somali speakers (6%), fourth most with Somali ancestry (9%), and fifth most Somali-born residents (8%). These data reveal that within the destination states, Somalis tend to prefer to reside in a few specific urban areas. Since 2000, however, a great deal of secondary and tertiary migration has occurred as Somalis relocate in search of various types of opportunities (e.g., affordable housing, employment, education, and health care). As such, it is unlikely that
1974 | Somalian Immigrants
Isha Hussein Gudey, an immigrant from Somalia, sits with her three children at a shelter in Columbus, Ohio, June 8, 2005. The family joined some 200 Somali Bantus who recently migrated to Columbus from other U.S. cities, seeking jobs and affordable housing. (AP Photo/Terry Gilliam)
the population distribution in 2010 remains as it was in 2000. One consequence of such searching is that since 2001 at least 1,000 Somalis relocated to the small town of Lewiston, Maine, from Atlanta (Jones 2004). Prior to 2000 there were no Somalis present in this community. Yet today this population segment continues to expand in that community. Another example of a small town witnessing significant growth in its Somali population is Barron, Wisconsin. Since 2001 over 400 Somalis relocated to this small city in northern Wisconsin, just 90 miles from the Twin Cities, where many found work at a local meat-processing plant (Schaid and Grossman 2004). The 400 Somalis represent 13 percent of this community’s population. This city’s attraction was the opportunity to work at the local meatpacking plant where inexperienced workers can begin earning wages from $8.50 to $9 per hour. Similarly, many other former Twin Cities residents have relocated to the Minnesota cities of St. Cloud and Rochester. Parallel patterns of dispersion are also occurring in other locales. One such place is Columbus, Ohio. Former residents of this city
Demographic Profile | 1975
have relocated to Cleveland, Toledo, and Dayton, as well as numerous small communities within a 100-mile radius of Columbus. Not all secondary migration is to new locations. Some is to metropolitan areas that have large and established Somali communities. For example, even though Columbus is losing some Somalis to other cities and towns, its Somali population continues to grow, since it serves as an important magnet for Somalis from throughout the United States and Canada. In addition, because of the close ties between the Columbus and Toronto Somali communities, numerous Canadian families and individuals have opted to relocate to the Columbus area. The most recent newcomers to the Columbus area are the Somali Bantus, an ethnic minority the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement specifically targeted for resettlement (UNHCR 2002). During 2004 between 10,000 and 15,000 Somali Bantu were resettled throughout the United States. Although initially dispersed to many states, large numbers have since relocated to the Columbus region (interview with I. Thaci, Columbus Public Schools, April 11, 2006; interview with S. Walker, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Refugee Services Section, 2005). Hence Somalis continue to relocate throughout North America as they search for better opportunities and more favorable conditions. Such shifting patterns of population distribution will probably continue until solid social roots and perhaps Somali communities become established.
Age and Family Structure Auxiliary tables document that in all three Somali subgroups there are more men than women. However, these differences are not large, as the male totals range from 51 to 53 percent. As such, these results reveal sex distributions that are generally well balanced for all subgroups. However, further examination did reveal that there were important demographic distinctions among the subgroups. For one, the Somali ancestry group was the youngest of the three. More specifically, their modal age was 0, as over 1,100 children, more than 13 percent of the total, were less than one year old. In addition, 70 percent of this subgroup were less than 10 years old and another 13 percent were between 10 and 19. Thus the mean age of this subgroup was 10 years old and 83 percent were under 20 years of age. This age distribution provides additional important evidence documenting why the Somali ancestry group can effectively be labeled second-generation Somali Americans. Among the other two subgroups, those born in Somalia and the Somali speakers, mean age was 27 years. Likewise, approximately 45 percent of each subgroup were between the ages of 30 and 49. However, this is where similarities end. The age and sex distributions of the Somali born are relatively balanced, with roughly equal numbers of men and women and small numbers of the aged and very young. Among Somali speakers, however, the age and sex distributions are extremely unbalanced and there is not a single individual under the age of five.
1976 | Somalian Immigrants
In none of the three subgroups did the population over the age of 50 constitute more than 8 percent. In other words, the Somali American population is extremely young. This age structure will have important consequences for the future of this group. For instance, the 63 percent of the Somali ancestry group born in the United States will grow up knowing the United States as their home. Consequently, their experiences and attitudes will be very different from those of their parents and other older Somalis. Likewise, the relatively young age distribution of this population bodes well for the future, since many of these refugees are young enough to successfully adapt to the requirements of life in an extremely distinct social context, something that is known to become more difficult the older one is at time of relocation.
Educational Attainment Census data reveal that the modal level of educational attainment for those born in Somalia is a high school education, while for the other two subgroups it is one to three years of college. Relatively high percentages of all subgroups have attended college, and many even completed four-year degrees. The percentage of those who completed at least one year of college ranges from 30 percent for the Somali born, to 47 percent for both the Somali-speaker and Somali-ancestry subgroups. Given the young age of the Somali-ancestry subgroup, their share of the college educated will likely continue to increase as they mature. When considering the adult refugees who rarely if ever attended school, it is obvious that the Somali born are the most disadvantaged. Nearly 24 percent of the adults born in Somalia completed less than eighth grade, and over 13 percent of this group did not complete a single year of schooling. For the Somali-speaker and Somali-ancestry subgroups the corresponding figures for those completing less than eighth grade are 14 percent and 11 percent, respectively. Thus, for all three subgroups a bimodal distribution emerges. Although many individuals possess advanced training and degrees, the proportion of individuals with limited or no formal education is an important concern that must be addressed by policy makers. Illiterate adults who speak limited or no English will pose a significant challenge for all who attempt to assist them with their adaptation to U.S. life. Such individuals may find it extremely difficult not only to adapt socially, but perhaps more importantly, economically to life in the United States.
Economic Attainment Economic assimilation is one of the most important aspects of an immigrant or refugee’s transition to life in a new country. More specifically, how and to what degree have Somalis been able to integrate themselves into the economy of this host nation? In an attempt to answer these questions various auxiliary tables were
Demographic Profile | 1977
created and examined. The first measure examined from the 2000 census monitored labor force status for those 16 and older. Without participating in the labor force, which is defined as either being employed or looking for employment, it is almost impossible to advance economically. In 2000, irrespective of subgroup, only between 66 percent and 69 percent of the men participated in the labor force. However, for women this figure declined to 48 percent and revealed significant intergroup differences. For instance, among women born in Somalia only 46 percent participated in the labor force, while over 64 percent of Somali-speaking women did. On a positive note, however, supplemental data reveal that labor force participation rates tend to increase with each additional year of U.S. residence. Therefore, it is likely that the 2010 Census will document much higher rates of Somali labor force participation. Of course, not all people in the labor force are employed, as those who are unemployed and looking for work are also counted. When monitoring unemployment levels, the Somali ancestry group again fared the best, as, irrespective of sex, they had the lowest unemployment levels. For men in this subgroup unemployment was less than 3 percent, which was lower than the national average. For women, however, it rose to 11 percent. For Somali-born men and women these figures were 12 percent and 22 percent, respectively. Somali speakers were between the two other subgroups at 7 percent and 12 percent for men and women, respectively. These results document the difficulties that foreign-born Somalis, especially women, have in locating U.S. employment. Although conclusive data are not available, it is probably true that the recent economic recession in the United States has worsened the employment situation of all Somali subgroups.
Occupational Patterns Additional census analyses examined the 10 occupations most often reported among Somalis, age 18 and over (see Tables 305 and 306). The largest category for both men and women is N/A or unemployed. As a mixed category, this grouping contains various types of individuals, including students, the retired, and the disabled, as well as those looking for employment. Still, for men of all subgroups this category contains between 34 percent and 82 percent. Among women the figures are even higher, ranging from 56 percent to 83 percent. Various patterns emerged among the employed men. First, the activities of the Somali speakers and those born in Somalia were similar but very distinct from those with Somali ancestry. Among the two former groups the most common professions were driving-related activities. Of these, cab driver was the most common activity, as more than 21 percent of the Somali speakers and 10 percent of those born in Somalia worked in this profession. Other common nondriving-related professions were cashiers, waiters, laborers, security guards, and assemblers. Among those
1978 | Somalian Immigrants
with Somali ancestry the only profession with more than 15 percent was miscellaneous assemblers and fabricators. The female subgroups revealed fewer discernible patterns than those observed among the men. The most common professions among Somali-born women were data entry keyers, janitors, cashiers, retail sales, assemblers, and child care workers. Among Somali-speaking women the most common professions were data entry keyers, cashiers, assemblers, receptionists, nurses or health aides, and cleaners. Thus, while some overlap is evident, it is not as pronounced as it was among the men. Among the much younger Somali ancestry subgroup janitor was the most common female profession (15.9%). These tables collectively indicate that Somalis in the United States are having a very difficult time finding their place in the labor market. Not only is the unemployment rate extremely high, but very few individuals with college educations appear to be working in the professions for which they were trained. Rather, it appears that most Somalis, regardless of education, are working in low-level positions that do not require advanced degrees and presumably do not pay very well. Perhaps 2000 was too soon to have expected much occupational mobility to have occurred. The 2010 census data will likely reveal much more meaningful long-term patterns of occupational and employment adjustment patterns. These data also document how it is not always the individual with the highest level of education who has the easiest time finding a job. As documented, the profession of cab driver is one that employs many Somali men. This is because driving skills are easily transferred from one nation to another; unlike legal or medical skills. Similarly, those willing to work in the dirty and sometimes dangerous conditions of a meat-packing plant are also able to find numerous employment options. This section indicates that the Somali refugees, although making important strides, still have a very long way to go to become economically assimilated in the United States. Although some progress has occurred, too many Somalis who desire to work remain unemployed. As a consequence, far too many Somalis live below the poverty line. Furthermore, a sizeable component of this population remains outside of the labor force, not even looking for employment. In addition, most of those who have found gainful employment are presently working at lowpaying, entry-level positions, irrespective of their educational qualifications. As such, much remains to be accomplished in order to determine how to successfully assist this population’s adaptation to life in the United States.
Income Patterns Clearly, one important consequence of not being gainfully employed is poverty. Auxiliary tables indicate that 42 percent of all Somali households fell below the poverty line in 2000. Furthermore, these households accounted for 49 percent of
Demographic Profile | 1979
all Somalis. There was, however, significant intergroup variation. Again the Somali born were the most disadvantaged, as 52 percent of these households lived below the poverty line. This figure declined to 35 percent for the Somali-speaker subgroup. Relative to other U.S. groups these figures are extremely high. For instance, in 2000 the African American poverty rate was 22 percent, while for Hispanics it was 21 percent. As such, a great deal needs to be accomplished in order to reduce the current level of Somali poverty. As mentioned earlier, the recent U.S. recession may well have affected many Somalis, thereby worsening what was already a bad financial situation.
Health Issues The most pervasive types of health issues facing Somali refugees in the United States are psychological ones. However, Somalis do not tend to admit serious psychological problems. Consequently, many times those in need of assistance do not seek it, and those with pronounced mental illness are oftentimes kept at home. This may be partly due to their belief that whatever happens to them is the will of Allah and something that should not be questioned. Accordingly, psychological issues are often handled at the family level. Thus few statistics are available to carefully monitor the frequency of these health concerns. The civil war in Somalia often pitted neighbor against neighbor, largely on the basis of clan affiliation. The trauma experienced by many was severe. Numerous individuals witnessed either parents or children first tortured then killed. Still others witnessed their sisters, spouses, and/or daughters raped. At times such occurrences happened prior to flight; for still others this occurred during their attempted escape to safety; others still were attacked within the “safe” confines of the refugee camps in which they resided. In the worst-case scenario, these experiences occurred multiple times in multiple places. Upon arrival to the United States, after surviving the horrific experience of a civil war and the abysmal conditions of refugee camps, Somalis must confront numerous additional challenges. As has already been pointed out, many refugees lack the skills needed for successful adjustment to life in this country. Without appropriate job skills and the ability to speak English, few employment opportunities are available. Lack of gainful employment leads to more stress, as it is very difficult to find affordable housing and health care without income. Regardless of employment status, almost all refugees continue to worry about family members either left behind or missing, as well as the perceived and/or real discrimination they encounter due to their race and religion. While any one of these stress factors might be enough to trigger psychological difficulties, the combination of many of these can be almost guaranteed to do so. Children are among the most vulnerable refugees, as many knew little more than conflict and hardship prior to their U.S. arrival. Almost all children and youth have
1980 | Somalian Immigrants
suffered displacement and observed, experienced, and even occasionally participated in violent actions. Some have never known “normal” social relationships, while many had little or no opportunity for education. Some, because of racism and discrimination, experience lowered self-esteem and feel as if they do not belong in the United States. Consequently, they are more likely to drop out of school and to join gangs. The Twin Cities are currently dealing with 100s of Somali youth involved in such gangs. Many have also been exposed to weapons, khat chewing, and other social disorders. For these reasons, the mental health and adjustment of Somali children and youth should be a high priority among those who assist this refugee population. Fortunately, several psychologists at Ohio State University (Schwirian and Schwirian 2005) have been working to specifically design linguistically appropriate psychological scales to monitor mental health issues among Somali refugees. Their Somali Psychological Distress Scale (SPDS) is culturally and linguistically appropriate, and its validity and reliability are established. This scale can be used in several ways. First, a high score indicates that individuals continue to experience a significant amount of psychological distress. Such individuals are provided with the names and addresses of agencies able to assist them. Second, the SPDS score can be used as an independent variable in analyses that predict social and economic incorporation. This research holds a great deal of promise, not only for assisting this refugee population with its psychological issues, but it is also likely that it will be effective with other populations that find themselves in similar need. Another health issue known to affect most of the female population in Somalia is female genital mutilation (FGM). Also known as female circumcision, FGM has been practiced in Somalia for at least hundreds of years. Somalis believe that this practice keeps women pure until marriage and that it is required by the Koran, a point on which many Muslims disagree. This cutting or mutilation can cause severe bleeding and result in long-term problems urinating, as well as childbirth complications that can also result in newborn deaths. Gali (1998) also noted that circumcised women are generally at risk of receiving poor medical treatment due to the lack of knowledge in the United States about this procedure, especially in the area of reproductive health. FGM typically is performed on young girls between infancy and age 15. The procedure is outlawed in Canada, the United States, and many other countries. Nonetheless, it is still practiced in this country by those who believe it to be an important religious duty and social custom that needs to be respected. Consequently, the Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1995 was passed in September 1996. This law provides for prison sentences of up to five years for anyone who practices FGM on another person under the age of 18. The first arrests under the law were made in 2003 in California. Because of the clandestine nature of FGM it is impossible to obtain accurate data on its prevalence in this country. Still, the social, physical, medical, and psychological costs of this procedure are extremely high for all those affected by it.
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1981
Adjustment and Adaptation Families and Changing Gender Relations Due to the violent nature of Somalia’s civil war, the rapid flight to survive, and the ensuing mortality and separations that occurred, many families no longer look like their former selves. Numerous households have been reconstituted in new and unique ways. Some now lack fathers, while others lack mothers, and many reside with unrelated individuals. Data from the 2000 U.S. Census provide numerous insights into household composition. For example, the census measure number of household members related to the respondent reveals that the modal category (18%) for the Somali born was zero. In other words, 18 percent of this subgroup did not reside with a single relative. This response was almost as high for Somali speakers (16%) but was much lower among those with Somali ancestry (4%). These results suggest two things. The first is that many among the Somali born and the Somali speakers find themselves isolated from their family members, a finding that is consistent with disruptions that affect many refugees. The other is that because the Somali-ancestry subgroup is very young, of necessity they reside with other older relatives, such as parents, grandparents, or siblings. In Somalia extended families often reside together. As such, households can be rather large. This practice continues in the United States, as nearly 19 percent of the Somali speakers and Somali born resided with seven or more relatives. Furthermore, 2000 Census data reveal two important tendencies. The first is for some individuals to live apart from all other family members, likely through little choice of their own but rather due to the complications of the refugee relocation experience. The second pattern, in keeping with Somali tradition, is to reside with many relatives, often in an extended family type of situation. The census variable relationship to the head of household shows that most people are either the head, the spouse of head, or a child of the head. These three relationship types account for at least 74 percent of all three subgroups. Among those of Somali ancestry, however, they account for more than 92 percent. This is because more than 76 percent of this group comprises the head’s children. When this information is considered with their young ages and the fact that they were born in the United States, it becomes obvious that this subgroup primarily consists of the Somali second generation. The variable relationship to the head of household also reveals an additional result that is consistent with the trauma of refugee relocation. That is, nearly 13 percent of the Somali-speaking men and 10 percent of those born in Somalia resided with nonrelatives. While some may opt to live this way, for others it indicates the lack of family members with whom to reside. Most likely, this has occurred due to the death or separation from family members. In Somalia the oldest man in the family makes decisions even for his adult sons, while females are raised to obey all males in the family, including brothers. Many
1982 | Somalian Immigrants
Somali women and their children shop at the Mogadishu Store in downtown Lewiston, Maine, May 8, 2007. Stores feature Somali food, clothing, and phone cards that keep buyers in touch with family members in Somalia or refugee camps in Kenya. Over the past six years, as many as 3,500 refugees from the wartorn African country have settled in this nearly allwhite, heavily French-Canadian, and largely Roman Catholic city of 36,000. (AP Photo/ Robert F. Bukaty)
former clan elders who traditionally served as family advisors may have perished or been left behind, meaning that younger men must now assume their roles and responsibilities. As noted earlier, family size is typically large, with each couple having between 5 and 10 children. Furthermore, it is not uncommon in Somalia for one man to have multiple wives. Because polygamy is banned in the United States, this has also led to some unique housing arrangements. For example, sometimes two apartments in the same housing complex are rented to two women married to the same man. Although this marital information is kept from authorities, it serves as one way to reconstitute the entire family under one roof. Somali households have also been transformed in other important ways. Often children are now the ones with the power, something that would never have occurred in Somalia. This has resulted primarily because children are the ones who most quickly learn how to communicate in English. While they often use this newfound skill to assist their families (e.g., communicating with government officials, landlords, etc.), there are other instances when it is used for their own advantage.
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1983
For example, I have been informed of numerous 911 calls to the police where children claimed child abuse when this was clearly not the case. Similarly, students have been known to misconstrue the meaning of a report card to their parents or to manipulate a parent-teacher conference so that the parents believe all is well when in fact this is not the case. Somali women in the United States have also become empowered in ways not earlier possible. In Somalia, men are the primary decision makers and the ones with the power, while women take the lead in caring for the home and children. In the United States women have acquired more power and authority. In fact, many women have begun to assert themselves in important ways. First, the Somali women who work now realize that they have the financial ability to survive on their own. Many have decided to end undesirable marriages, leading to increased levels of divorce. In addition, women have also learned to call 911 when they feel threatened by their husbands. They have learned that the police will quickly come to their aid and protect them from domestic violence—not something that would have necessarily occurred in Somalia. In sum, more egalitarian relationships are beginning to develop among Somali men and women in this country.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Retaining a sense of national culture and identity has been a challenge for Somalis. Because they are extremely proud of their homeland and their national identity, they sometimes believe that they have been unfairly persecuted by the popular press and public opinion in this country. They point to the movie Blackhawk Down as a film that portrays Somalia and Somalis in the worst possible light. In addition, news outlets seem to almost daily feature at least one negative story about Somalis. At the time of writing, news features about the Somali pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden were commonplace, as were stories about the missing young men who have apparently returned to Somalia to participate in the jihad against the west. Community leaders argue that very few Somali men work either as pirates or have returned to Somalia to participate in the jihad. They also argue that those relatively few misled individuals mentioned in the news have been portrayed as typical individuals within the Somali American community. Somali leaders instead claim that nothing could be farther from the truth, as most young men are pleased with their situation in the United States and would never entertain such an undertaking. My primary data collection has revealed that those who migrated as adults seem to take more pride in remembering their homeland and in identifying with Somali culture than do their younger coethnics. This is not to say that young Somalis are not proud of their heritage, but rather that they are too young to personally identify with Somalia. Instead, most young adults consider the United States to be their
1984 | Somalian Immigrants
homeland and have little inclination to relocate to Somalia. Adults, on the other hand, often state that once things stabilize in their homeland they will return. Of course since this has not yet occurred, it is impossible to determine if this would actually happen. Somali pride is usually also displayed on all their businesses, as these commercial establishments are typically decorated inside and out with Somali artifacts, as well as the national colors, blue and white.
Continued Links to Country of Origin Somalis continue to maintain very strong ties to their homeland. Most notably this is demonstrated by the fact that virtually all who are able send regular remittances to their family members left behind. The primary data that I collected from hundreds of Somalis indicate that essentially every man who was capable of sending remittances did so. In addition, many women also sent remittances. In some cases this imposes a severe financial strain on the remitters, yet they say that the recipients might not survive without these. They also explain that were the roles reversed, the recipients would do the same for the remitters. At the macro-level, these remittances, called hawilaad, annually contribute an estimated $500 million to $1 billion per year (UNDP 2006) to the Somali economy. Maimbo (2006) indicated that the remittances currently account for as much as 40 percent of the income of many urban Somali households. Not only do these funds provide Somalis with the resources they need to survive, but they also help promote all types of productive ventures that would otherwise be impossible. Some of the more affluent members of the Somali American community maintain strong commercial ties in Somalia, and many also own or co-own businesses there.
Social Organizations Somali newcomers in all communities are quick to form social organizations that serve as centers of social support. Even in the smallest of Somali communities one finds a prayer room that often also serves as a gathering place. As communities increase in size small businesses emerge, as well as the community’s mosque. Initially the mosque might be a transformed store, but ultimately in larger cities like Columbus or Minneapolis mosques are full-sized places of worship. In a similar manner, almost all Somali communities also possess health and/or community centers that cater to their needs. Obviously, smaller communities will not be able to support many of these, and there might only be one community center for all Somalis. However, in Columbus, Ohio, a metropolitan area with over 30,000 Somali residents, there are approximately 50 different community centers. Various informants have told me that these centers exist to cater to the needs of their specific clans. Regardless of the specific people helped by these organizations, those
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1985
assisted receive information on how to locate housing, employment, and social services. They also serve as community meeting places.
Religion As indicated at various prior points, Somali refugees are a unique group of newcomers. To begin, they are the first black newcomers to arrive in large numbers who are not Christians. In addition, this Muslim group is now living in the post-9/11 United States. Consequently, they have had to confront a number of issues. First, they must address the challenges of practicing Islam in a non-Muslim country, and transferring those values to their children amid an array of competing belief systems. They have addressed these challenges in various ways. Some have responded, not by assimilating, but by integrating elements of their birth and adopted cultures together. They have become Western—not Westernized—Muslims as they confront and redefine their practice of Islam and what it means to be a good Muslim. Such individuals attempt to progressively join their traditional customs and values with those of U.S. society. Others opt to protect their religious identity by isolating themselves from mainstream society. Others still have combined adaptation to the United States with stronger ties and identification with Islamic values and traditions. For example, in Columbus, Ohio there are numerous college-educated women who have informed me that they are much more religious in the United States than they ever were in Somalia. Some have revealed that they formerly wore shorts and t-shirts in Somalia, whereas in the United States they now proudly wear their hijabs whenever they go out in public. When addressing the issue of identity, it appears that for the majority of older Somalis, religious identity comes first. That is, first and foremost they are Muslim, then Somali, and finally, perhaps somewhat later, Somali American. The type of identity selected obviously will vary somewhat by place of birth, age, education, and gender.
Language Issues The 2000 Census was used to monitor the English-speaking ability of Somalis over the age of five. This five-category ordinal measure ranges from “does not speak English” to “speaks only English.” The modal category for all three Somali subgroups on this self-reported measure is “speaks English very well.” The Somaliancestry subgroup spoke the best English, which is not surprising given that most were born in the United States. Among this subgroup over 17 percent spoke only English, while over 90 percent speak English well or better. Among the two other subgroups the corresponding figure is 15 percent to 18 percent lower. When considering those with limited English ability, results again conform to expectations.
1986 | Somalian Immigrants
Worshippers attend evening prayers during an open house at the Abubakar As-Saddique Islamic Center in Minneapolis, Minnesota, February 25, 2009. (AP Photo/Craig Lassig)
Approximately 25 percent of the Somali speakers and those born in Somalia either do not speak English or do so poorly.
Foodways Virtually all Somalis are Muslims who follow Islamic dietary rules. For such individuals all food must be halal. That is, it must be considered appropriate according to Islamic law. Halal practices not only encompass food and drink, but all aspects of daily life. Accordingly, banned or unlawful haram food and drink (e.g., pork and alcohol) is forbidden. Like all other practicing Muslims, Somalis fast from dawn to dusk throughout the Islamic month of Ramadan. The majority of Somalis prefer their traditional diet to U.S. fare. Meals are usually prepared by women, after which the entire family unit eats together. While lamb and goat meat are considered the best meats, Somalis also enjoy fish, chicken, and beef. Frying is the most common method of cooking. In addition, boiled pasta dishes, such as spaghetti and deep fried sambusas (triangular-shaped dumplings), are very popular. In Somalia many fresh fruits are available, and the favorite of many is the banana. Tea is the preferred drink but Somalis also enjoy camel milk,
Adjustment and Adaptation | 1987
which they believe is more nutritious than the milks they consume from goats and cows. Not surprisingly, Somali cuisine bears a similarity to foods found in neighboring countries. For example, the injera (a spongy, pancake-style bread) consumed in Somalia is like that eaten in Ethiopia. Likewise, the food consumed in the Saaxil region is similar to the cuisine of nearby Yemen. In order to sustain their distinct diets, Somalis in the United States rely on small grocery stores that are for the most part owned and operated by other Somalis. In these stores they are able to obtain most of the important ingredients of their diet, including halal meats. Because not all of these items are produced locally, elaborate distribution networks have been developed. For example, one relatively small grocer in Columbus, Ohio, explained to me how his sides of beef were imported from Toronto, where halal butchers prepared the meat. Similarly, halal goat meat from Columbus is transported to others states where it is less prevalent. In addition to the small grocery stores, Somalis also typically have the option of dining out in Somali restaurants. In small communities like Barron, Wisconsin (pop. 3,200), there might be only one restaurant available, while in cities like Columbus, Ohio with large concentrations of Somalis, there may be as many as 10 to choose from. My observations reveal that these restaurants are usually very active at meal time and typically serve up a variety of the food choices indicated earlier. Portions are also generous and prices extremely reasonable, so that most can afford them. In Toronto I discovered several Somali restaurants that were divided, with single men eating in one room, while women, children, and men who were part of these groups ate in another. Although I have not yet witnessed this type of dining arrangement in the United States, it may exist in some locations. In an effort to supply the Somali taste for goat meat, a number of goat farms have recently emerged or been expanded. Likewise, a number of studies have been undertaken by various universities in Ohio to determine the demand for goat meat in the state (Worley et al. 2004; Stock 2006). Among other things, these studies have determined that in 2002, when the Columbus Somali population was much smaller than it is today, just one of the larger stores had the potential demand for between 90 and 100 goats per week (OCDC 2002). The same study determined that in 2002 Somalis residing in the greater Columbus metropolitan area consumed approximately 14,040 goats per year. As such, there is both tremendous need and potential for the expansion of the existing number of heads of goat produced locally to feed this population. Furthermore, the same conclusion would probably be reached in other cities with large concentrations of Somalis, such as the Twin Cities.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment With the fairly recent arrival of the Somali population in North America, relatively few individuals have emerged in the area of the arts. Still, there are several
1988 | Somalian Immigrants
important figures who serve as an inspiration for their coethnics. In the area of music, K’Naan is one young Somali artist who has begun to establish quite a reputation. Although he now lives in Toronto, he is becoming well-established in the area of American hip-hop, so much so, in fact, that one of his songs was recently featured as the free song of the week on iTunes, ensuring that millions of listeners would be exposed to his music. K’Naan has released four CDs, and all have been highly acclaimed. He composes his own songs, and his lyrics tend to deal with topical issues that many others, especially Somalis, can relate to. In the area of letters, Nuruddin Farah is a Somali novelist in exile who has written more than a dozen highly acclaimed books that have been translated into many languages. This award-winning writer has lived in exile since the early 1970s. During this time he has taught in many countries, including the United States. Although he currently resides in Berlin, the themes of his books almost always deal with topics related to Somalia. His novels, short stories, and essays have led some to refer to him as one of the world’s greatest contemporary writers. Consequently his writings have resulted in numerous awards, including the Kurt Tucholsky Prize in 1991, the Premio Cavour Award in 1992, Zimbabwe’s Best Novel Award in 1993, the Neustadt International Prize for Literature in 1998, and the Lettre Ulysses Award in 2003. Another successful Somali artist is Abdi Roble. He is a photographer who has developed a world-class reputation as a photographic artist. Roble has lived in Columbus, Ohio, for approximately 20 years. From this home base he has traveled around the world to photograph, among other things, Somali refugees. His awardwinning pictures have been on display at galleries all around the United States. In addition, he also recently published his photographs documenting the Somali refugee experience in a book, The Somali Diaspora: A Journey Away (2008).
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Naturalization The adoption of U.S. citizenship bestows not only a U.S. passport to the naturalized individual, but also the right to vote in U.S. elections, as well as complete and unrestricted access to all government benefits. Data from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security reveal that as of 2004 approximately 20 percent of all Somalis admitted had become U.S. citizens. These data also reveal that the tendency has been for more Somalis to naturalize each year. U.S. Census data also contain statistics on naturalization status. When this data is broken down by subgroups, significant variations emerge. While over
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1989
32 percent of the Somali speakers became U.S. citizens, the corresponding figures for the other two subgroups, those born in Somalia and those of Somali ancestry, were significantly lower at between 10 percent and 15 percent. Part of this difference is likely explained by the Somali speakers being in the United States longer than the other groups. Another possible explanation is that many of those born in Somalia, as well as the small children they care for, have not yet naturalized as they continue to hope to one day return to Somalia.
Dual Citizenship U.S. citizens can acquire foreign citizenship a variety of ways (e.g., by marriage or through naturalization). Naturalized U.S. citizens may sometimes lose citizenship in their country of birth, depending on the specific laws in effect in that country. U.S. law does not mention dual nationality or require a person to choose one type of citizenship over another. On the other hand, U.S. citizens could lose their citizenship if they, through free choice, voluntarily apply for foreign citizenship. In actuality, however, few people with dual citizenship in the United States are ever prosecuted. In the case of Somali refugees, although all of those who have become naturalized Americans are technically dual nationals, probably very few are in a possession of a valid Somali passport at this time.
Intergroup Relations The Somali adjustment to life in the United States has not been without problems. Because Somalis are culturally, racially, and religiously distinct from almost all other groups, problems were bound to occur. In addition, when the first of these refugees arrived in the United States there was not an existent Somali community in place that could welcome, protect, and assist them. Consequently, they were largely on their own, with the exception of the government agencies and refugee support groups that attempted to provide them with assistance. Due to their lack of financial resources, the housing they were provided was typically in the poorest neighborhoods. This brought them into direct contact and conflict with a large number of other financially challenged minorities. For example, in Columbus, Ohio, home to over 30,000 Somali refugees, there were numerous problems with African American residents in the same public housing complexes. Some African Americans believed that the Somalis were receiving large cash gifts from the U.S. government, including cars. In addition, Somalis were sometimes given access to rental apartments that African Americans thought should go to their friends and/or families. Tensions boiled over and there were numerous violent incidents that occurred, including the murder of a Somali man. These black-black tensions also carried over to the local high schools. In these schools there were numerous fights and suspensions.
1990 | Somalian Immigrants
Focus groups I conducted revealed that these occurred when African American students insulted Somali students, who then defended themselves and their culture. Suspensions and fights of this type occurred among both boys and girls. Tensions also occurred between Somalis and the local police in Columbus. For example, in December 2005 Nasir Abdi, a 23-year-old Somali refugee suffering from mental illness, was shot and killed by police. On that day four sheriff’s deputies came with a court order to bring Nasir to a psychiatric center where he was to receive medical treatment. The deputies said that he lunged at them with a large kitchen knife. One of the deputies then fatally shot Nasir. This incident provoked the Somali community and made them even more wary of authority figures. Since then, many in the Columbus community have worked together to establish a Community Intervention Team so that similar events might never occur again. Somalis also believe that they are discriminated against for a variety of reasons in the United States. Perhaps the most important is race. Skin color is not a cultural or social structural aspect of Somali society. As such it does not enter into their consciousness, and as a consequence, race relations do not exist in Somalia (Maines and Kusow 2001). In Somalia, social differentiation is tied to the clan of membership but not race. They learn what racism is in the United States. They also feel hurt when someone identifies them as black, as they believe that this connotes a lower status.
Approximately 50 of Barron High School’s 300 students are Somalis, Barron, Wisconsin. (Courtesy of Franklin Goza)
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 1991
Forging a New American Political Identity Political and Student Associations As mentioned earlier, almost all communities with a significant number of Somali residents also have at least one community center. Such centers help provide their clients with information about housing, employment, English classes, and healthrelated issues. Some of these organizations, such as the Somali Action Alliance of the Twin Cities, actively pursue social change, social justice, and from time to time, political candidates. Notwithstanding, even small communities such as Barron, Wisconsin (pop. 3,200), have similar organization(s) that also assist their coethnics. In Barron, a Somali woman directs the International Center. So in effect, even this small center serves many of the same functions as larger ones found in bigger cities. Since their arrival in the United States, Somali students have entered institutions of higher learning in ever greater numbers. Consequently, the students at many of these schools have also founded Somali student associations. The Somali Student Association at the University of Minnesota is the largest in the United States, with over 500 members. Similarly, the Ohio State University’s association has well over 100 members. Other Somali student associations are also found in rather unexpected places, such as the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Meanwhile, at Stanford University, in addition to a Somali student association, there is also Puntland Students Association. Puntland is the self-governing, autonomous state in the country’s northeast region. In general, the purpose of all of these associations is to assist Somali students and those from other backgrounds, ethnic groups, and beliefs to better understand Somali culture in its various aspects. In addition, these associations also serve to welcome and mentor new Somali students and to provide them with opportunities for additional social interactions with the members of these and other student organizations.
Civic and Electoral Participation Due to their relatively recent arrival in the United States and the fact that less than one-half of all adults have become naturalized citizens, no Somali American that I am aware of has yet been elected to public office in this country. However, many naturalized citizens with the ability to vote have opted to do so. In 2006 the Somali voting bloc that resides in the Twin Cities turned out en masse to support two candidates for federal office. Both candidates won. The first, Keith Maurice Ellison, became the first Muslim elected to the U.S. Congress when he was elected to serve as the representative of Minnesota’s fifth congressional district. In addition, Ellison is the first African American ever elected to the House of Representatives from Minnesota. The second, Amy Klobuchar, was elected as Minnesota’s junior U.S. senator.
1992 | Somalian Immigrants
Both candidates received large-scale Somali support due to the fact that each was perceived to be a friend of the Somali community. Ellison has been involved with the Somali community for nearly 15 years, at one time providing it with legal advice. Klobuchar similarly became a friend of the community back in 2003 when she played an important role in assuring that those responsible for the murder of two Somali cab drivers were arrested and prosecuted. During her run for office she also made frequent campaign stops throughout the Somali community. On July 1, 2008, Senator Klobuchar commemorated the 49th anniversary of Somalia’s independence from Great Britain and Italy. At that time she declared, “Minnesota is proud to be home to the largest Somali population in the United States—and I am honored to represent Minnesota’s Somali residents in the Senate. I have always believed that America’s strength comes from the diversity of our people. Somalis are among those who contribute so much to the cultural and economic vitality of America, especially here in Minnesota.” I expect that she and Ellison will continue to garner most of the Somali vote the next time they run for public office.
Return Immigration Other than a few anecdotal cases, little is known about Somali return migration. Few who have endured the civil war, refugee camps, and the difficult journey to safety are willing to give up their new lifestyles to return to the unsafe and dangerous situation that caused them to flee. However, among the more traditional, especially older, Somalis there is a pronounced desire to return if and when things should become stable in their homeland.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Not surprisingly, ethnic pride and ethnic identity are much stronger among firstgeneration Somalis than they are among the second generation and generation 1.5 (Rumbaut and Ima 1988): those born in Somalia but who departed at a young age and were then educated in the United States. This is because either these individuals were not born in Somalia (the second generation) and have never been there, or they departed at a young age and recall very little. Consequently their ethnic identity is somewhat fluid and still developing. At present, there is no group of thirdgeneration Somali Americans. Nonetheless, the data presented also document many ways in which secondgeneration experiences are and will be significantly different from those of the
The Second and Later Generations | 1993
Youth Profile A Political Activist in Minneapolis Because she was confronted with civil war and cultural conflict early in her life, Nimco Ahmed became a political mediator at a very young age. In 1990, when Nimco was just seven years old, conflict in Somalia forced her family to flee their home in Mogadishu, Somalia, for Nairobi, Kenya. Soon after arriving in Nairobi, Nimco was sent to Bonn, Germany. In Germany, Nimco found herself in a very homogenous community that was not very tolerant of people from other cultures. Consequently, when she moved to the Twin Cities in 1998, she was astounded by its ethnically diverse (Courtesy of Nimco Ahmed) population. When Nimco began attending Roosevelt High School in Minneapolis, she spoke almost no English. Nevertheless, she began her career as an organizer almost immediately. At that time, Roosevelt was plagued with fights between Somalis and African Americans. To resolve these conflicts, Nimco joined a mediation group and helped start the high school’s Somali Student Association. She was also a cofounder of FATA—First African Then American. FATA was dedicated to easing the tensions between these two feuding groups. FATA later expanded to other Twin City schools. This group was so successful that it ceased to exist, as the conflicts that led to its creation no longer occurred. Nimco was also a cofounder of the Minnesota League of Young Voters. Soon after high school Nimco began her career in professional politics when she joined the late Minnesota Senator Paul Wellstone’s campaign team in 2002. She also became one of the organizers of the 2004 National Hip Hop Political Convention in New Jersey and served as cochair of the 2005 convention in Chicago. During the 2004 presidential election, she was the African/African American base vote organizer. At this time, she also organized Muslim voters in Minnesota. In 2005, she was the African American base director for Victory, the Democratic Party’s campaign to rally voters, in New Jersey. In 2006, she also worked as the base director for Amy Klobuchar’s successful U.S. Senate
1994 | Somalian Immigrants
campaign. In 2008 she was part of Barack Obama’s Minnesota leadership team. Nimco currently works as a policy aide for the vice president of the Minneapolis City Council. She was also recently named as one of two “Women to Watch” by the Minnesota Women’s Political Caucus. This award recognizes women 35 and under who are working to improve the status of women and are emerging leaders. Nimco also serves on the board of directors of the Minneapolis Community Action Circle of Discipline and on the board of the reNEW Minnesota Campaign. In addition, Nimco was a 2009–2010 policy fellow at the University of Minnesota’s Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. This program offers practical training in public affairs leadership for emerging leaders seeking new experiences and skills.
first generation. These data also enable us to predict that the futures of the distinct Somali generations will likely be very different. Because many members of the first generation will almost certainly never attain their former levels of status and success in the United States, they will likely cling to their Somali identity in a way that will be very distinct from their more mobile second-generation coethnics.
Educational Attainment As documented previously, second-generation Somalis are doing rather well in this country. In fact, a subset of this cohort is obtaining advanced degrees at some of the nation’s best public universities (e.g., University of Minnesota, Ohio State University). Although many of their parents also possessed similar levels of education, their degrees were completed in Somalia and for the most part their skills were not transferable to the United States Nonetheless, second-generation children benefit from the aspirations of their parents, who are undertaking numerous sacrifices to ensure that they acquire as much education as possible. Their educational attainment will likely ensure their future success in many other realms.
Cultural Identification The cultural identity of second-generation Somalis is also very fluid and still in a state of development. Adapting to the U.S. lifestyle has been a very big challenge for many of their parents. Many first-generation Somalis were at a pronounced cultural disadvantage when they arrived in the United States. For some this continues as they remain unable to read or write in any language, to speak English, or to effectively compete in the U.S. labor force. The second generation will not have these difficulties. They are almost all fluent in English, familiar with the technology
Issues in Relations between the United States and Somalia | 1995
and social norms of 21st-century U.S. society, and in possession of solid educations acquired in this country. Some from more traditional families will continue to identify themselves first and foremost as either Muslims or Somalis. However, I expect that the vast majority of the second generation will first see themselves as either Somali Americans or Americans.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Somalia Forecasts for the 21st Century There are numerous issues that will affect the future relationship between the United States and Somalia. To begin, Somalia remains a nation without a central government. Thus bilateral negotiations are largely impossible at this point. However, the United States should attempt to do what it can behind the scenes, so as not to appear to be meddling in Somali affairs, to encourage the development of a stable government in this extremely strategic part of the world. Should such stability occur, it would be important for the United States to become actively involved in assisting this nation to rebuild. Presently such assistance is already arriving in the form of remittances sent directly to Somalia by the Somali residents of the United States. Until the political situation in Somalia changes, the United States should not attempt to shut down the flow of such money transfers as it has in the past. While some of these funds may end up supporting jihad, I believe that it is a very small amount and that it is easily canceled out by the goodwill created through the receipt of the other funds, the vast majority of which goes to supporting the basic consumption needs of those left behind. The acute poverty of Somalia has caused many in need to consider any activity that results in an income. Of late, the pirating of tankers and other large vessels on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has emerged as one such possibility. Clearly the U.S. government, in conjunction with others, as well as the residents of Somalia, will need to find a way to control this disruptive activity. Finally, the United States and the rest of the international community will have to decide what to do with the remaining Somali refugees still languishing in refugee camps. Repatriation may be an option for some, but for many it is not. In 2004 the United States came up with a creative plan to resettle nearly 15,000 Somali Bantu from the refugee camps in Kenya. Because of their persecuted minority-group status in Somalia, it was determined that repatriation was not an appropriate solution for this group. Similar creative solutions need to take place at the highest levels to ensure that those still in the camps are moved elsewhere so that they might finally get on with their lives. In addition, the United States should attempt to do more, so that the chaotic situation that led to this massive relocation of humanity never occurs again.
1996 | Somalian Immigrants
Conclusions Much of the data presented in this study of Somali residents of the United States is from the 2000 U.S. Census of Population. Although these data are national in scope and represent the best survey information available, they provide only a somewhat superficial overview of the population examined. For instance, while they tell us where people live, they do not tell us why they live there, nor do they provide detailed information on their experiences in that locale. Nonetheless, the census data analyzed herein have allowed for the development of a detailed sociodemographic portrait of the Somali residents of the United States. The combination of this information with data from other micro- and macro-level studies will enable the development of a more comprehensive understanding of the Somali diaspora and its many experiences and outcomes. This portrait documented the arrival of a new and growing population that has established a few important population centers, while at the same time spreading throughout all regions of the United States. The data also document a growing second generation and clearly demonstrate how their experiences are significantly different from those of the first generation, the refugees born in Somalia. They also enable us to predict that the futures of the distinct Somali sub-groups examined will likely be very different. Some will certainly attain high levels of success in the United States, while others will probably be left behind, never to achieve the social, occupational, or economic status formerly held in Somalia.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Homeland Security tracks and categorizes Somali residents of the United States in a variety of ways. As depicted in Table 296, they are categorized as refugees, immigrants, or nonimmigrants. Their naturalization patterns are also monitored, as are their asylum claims. However, Somalis were not separated out as a unique national origin group prior to 1985, as before that time only extremely small numbers of Somalis entered the United States on an annual basis.
Table 296 The immigration status of Somalis entering the United States from 1985 to 2004.
Year
Refugee Arrivals
1985
x
1986
Nonimmigrants
Granted Asylum
Persons Naturalized
139
x
x
x
139
x
Immigrants
1
16
x
1987
4
197
x
14
x
1988
13
183
x
79
x
1989
68
228
x
128
x
1990
52
227
x
204
x
1991
305
458
x
117
x
1992
1,690
500
122
x
44
1993
2,802
1,088
233
130
1994
3,508
1,737
x
36
565
154
1995
2,506
3,487
x
285
211
1996
6,436
2,170
x
531
306
1997
4,974
4,005
x
699
171
1998
2,951
2,629
634
1,315
306
1999
4,320
1,710
889
2,344
816
2000
6,026
2,465
1,030
1,982
1,247
2001
4,951
3,026
1,003
1,247
1,168
2002
238
4,537
440
435
1,791
2003
1,993
2,448
288
138
2,237
2004
13,331
3,929
383
144
2,714
Totals
56,169
35,302
4,747
10,598
11,251
Source: Tables 3, 15, 17, 23 and 32. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: various years.
Table 297 Country of birth for the Somali subgroups in the United States, 2000. Born in Somalia Country
Frequency
Percent (%)
Somali Ancestry Frequency
Percent (%)
Somali Speaker Frequency
Percent (%)
Ethiopia
x
x
341
4.1
3,780
75.2
Kenya
x
x
1,377
16.6
495
9.9
Other
x
x
1,354
16.0
615
10.9
Somalia
36,595
100.0
x
x
x
x
x
5,240
63.0
749
14.9
36,595
100.0
8,312
100.0
5,639
100.0
United States Total
Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population.
x
Table 298 Year of Entry into the United States for the Somali Sub-Groups, 2000 Born in Somalia Year of entry
Frequency
Somali Ancestry
Percent (%)
Somali Speaker
Frequency
Percent (%)
Frequency
Percent (%)
before 1950
16
0.0
x
x
x
x
1950 to 1954
41
0.1
x
x
x
x
1998
1955 to 1959
54
0.1
x
x
x
x
1960 to 1964
67
0.2
x
x
x
x
1965 to 1969
133
0.4
x
x
x
x
1970 to 1974
63
0.2
95
3.1
69
1.4
1975 to 1979
285
0.8
20
0.7
37
0.8
1980 to 1984
1,101
3.0
219
7.1
506
10.3
1985 to 1989
1,566
4.3
257
8.4
395
8.1
1990 to 1994
7,399
20.2
615
20.0
1,245
25.5
1995 to 1999
23,886
65.2
1,759
57.3
2,519
51.5
2000
2,004
5.5
107
3.5
119
2.4
Total
36,595
100.0
3,072
100.0
4,890
100.0
Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population
Table 299 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: Fiscal years 2000 to 2009. Region and country of birth
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
2,393
3,007
4,535
2,444
3,929
5,829
9,462
6,251
10,745
13,390
REGION Total Somalia
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 300 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence. Region/ country: Somalia.
Total Arizona
Total
Male
Female
13,390
6,843
6,547
509
284
225
California
518
290
228
Colorado
475
270
205
24
14
10
Connecticut Florida
7
4
3
Georgia
231
119
112
Illinois
196
131
65
Maryland
41
27
14
Massachusetts
264
134
130
Michigan
121
58
63
4,173
1,981
2,192
Minnesota Nevada New York North Carolina Ohio Pennsylvania Texas Virginia
15
11
4
236
107
129
74
37
37
1,470
685
785
83
47
36
512
284
228
170
88
82
Washington
1,236
647
589
Other
3,035
1,625
1,410
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
2000
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 301 Age distribution by sex for the Somali subgroups, 2000. Born in Somalia Males
Somali Ancestry
Females
2001
Age
N
0 to 9
1,783
9.2
1,626
10 to19
5,326
27.4
20 to 29
5,129
30 to 39
3,707
40 to 49
Females
N
%
N
%
N
%
8.4
3,057
69.6
2,762
70.5
330
11.4
676
24.6
4,194
21.6
587
13.4
512
13.1
588
20.3
518
18.9
26.4
4,645
23.9
178
4.1
231
5.9
504
17.4
457
16.6
19.1
3,160
16.3
131
3.0
324
8.3
859
29.7
629
22.9
2,129
11.0
1,851
9.5
296
6.7
50
1.3
458
15.8
168
6.1
50 to 59
575
3.0
871
4.5
85
1.9
0
0.0
112
3.9
144
5.2
60+
790
4.1
809
4.2
60
1.4
39
1.0
43
1.5
153
5.6
Total
19,439
100.0
17,156
100.0
4,394
100.0
3,918
100.0
2,894
100.0
2,745
100.0
Mean
26.5
27.8
11.0
9.7
28.5
25.8
25
25
5
4
30
22
15.1
15.8
15.1
13.1
14.2
17.3
Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population.
%
Males
%
Std. Dev.
N
Females
N
Median
%
Males
Somali Speaker
Table 302 The 10 largest Somali populations by metropolitan areas for Somali subgroups, 2000. Born in Somalia State
Somali Ancestry
Frequency
Percent (%)
Frequency
Percent (%)
10,024
27.4
2,058
24.8
2,263
51.6
Georgia
3,668
10.0
Ohio
3,454
9.4
820
9.9
272
6.2
794
9.6
88
2.0
Washington
3,098
8.5
795
9.6
869
19.8
California
2,635
7.2
766
9.2
549
12.5
Virginia
2,615
7.1
746
9.0
179
4.1
Massachusetts
1,706
4.7
220
2.6
16
0.4
New York
1,353
3.7
157
1.9
84
1.9
North Carolina
1,277
3.5
76
0.9
0
0.0
805
2.2
292
3.5
63
1.4
5,960
16.3
1,588
19.1
1,256
28.7
36,595
100.0
8,312
100.0
4,383
100.0
Minnesota
Missouri Other States Total
Frequency Percent (%)
Somali Speaker
Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population.
2002
Table 303 The top 10 metropolitan areas with the largest Somali populations by the Somali groups, 2000. Born in Somalia Metropolitan area Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN
Somali Ancestry
Somali Speaker
Frequency
Percent (%)
Frequency
Percent (%)
Frequency
8,030
21.9
1,560
18.8
2,056
Percent (%) 36.5
2003
Atlanta, GA
3,640
9.9
820
9.9
272
4.8
Columbus, OH
3,454
9.4
619
7.4
88
1.6
Seattle/Evert, WA
3,084
8.4
795
9.6
843
14.9
Washington, DC/MD/VA
2,920
8.0
720
8.7
351
6.2
Boston, MA
1,650
4.5
220
2.6
16
0.3
San Diego, CA
1,448
4.0
512
6.2
89
1.6
Rochester, NY
801
2.2
134
1.6
171
3.0
Buffalo/ Niagara Falls, NY
732
2.0
96
1.2
0
0.0
Portland/Vancouver, OR
327
0.9
168
2.0
334
5.9
Other
10,509
28.7
2,668
32.1
1,419
25.2
Total
36,595
100.0
8,312
100.0
5,639
100.0
Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population.
Table 304 Educational attainment for the Somali subgroups 18 and over, 2000. Born in Somalia Education level
Somali Ancestry Frequency
Somali Speaker
Frequency
Percent (%)
Percent (%)
Frequency
Percent (%)
None or Preschool
3,423
13.3
132
8.4
350
9.3
Grade 1, 2, 3, or 4
490
1.9
13
0.8
0
0.0
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8
2004
2,113
8.2
27
1.7
194
5.1
Grade 9
631
2.5
84
5.4
59
1.6
Grade 10
625
2.4
52
3.3
199
5.3
Grade 11
1,068
4.2
65
4.2
168
4.4
Grade 12
9,495
37.0
457
29.2
1,025
27.1
1 to 3 years of College
4,862
18.9
615
39.3
1,267
33.5
4+ years of College Total Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population.
2,983
11.6
120
7.7
520
13.7
25,690
100.0
1,565
100.0
3,782
100.0
Table 305 Top 10 occupations for the male Somali subgroups, 2000 Born in Somalia Occupation
Somali Ancestry
Somali Speaker
2005
Frequency
Percent (%)
Frequency
Percent (%)
Frequency
Percent (%)
Taxicab drivers and chauffeurs
712
10.5
51
11.9
206
21.4
Cashiers
596
8.8
30
7.0
123
12.8
Drivers/sales workers and truck drivers
574
8.4
0
0.0
47
4.9
Miscellaneous assemblers and fabricators
510
7.5
139
32.3
23
2.4
Stock clerks and order filers
391
5.8
16
3.7
123
12.8
Customer service representatives
365
5.4
32
7.4
0
0.0
Janitors and building cleaners
363
5.3
62
14.4
84
8.7
Cooks, except private household
356
5.2
0
0.0
13
1.4
Other production workers
310
4.6
0
0.0
0
0.0
Parking lot attendants
283
4.2
0
0.0
0
0.0
4460
65.7
330
76.7
619
64.4
Total Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population.
Table 306 Top 10 occupations for the female Somali subgroups, 2000 Born in Somalia Occupation
Somali Ancestry
Somali Speaker
Frequency
Percent (%)
Frequency
Percent (%)
Frequency
Janitors and building cleaners
602
10.6
58
15.9
35
4.5
Cashiers
531
9.4
11
3.0
70
9.0
Child care workers
454
8.0
19
5.2
49
6.3
Retail salespersons
416
7.3
20
5.5
0
0.0
Miscellaneous assemblers and fabricators
394
7.0
41
11.2
77
9.8
Maids and housekeeping cleaners
320
5.6
49
13.4
24
3.1
Customer service representatives
303
5.3
0
0.0
6
0.8
Stock clerk and order filers
258
4.6
38
10.4
15
1.9
Cooks
214
3.8
33
9.0
45
5.8
Receptionist and information clerks
214
3.8
17
4.7
64
8.2
3706
65.4
286
78.3
385
49.4
Total Source: 2000 U.S. Census of Population.
Percent (%)
Appendix III: Notable Somali Americans | 2007
Appendix III: Notable Somali Americans Noor Arte is president of Halal Zabiah Goat Meat Company and owner of Safari Cuisine and Grocery, Barron, Wisconsin. Somali refugees today comprise approximately 10 percent of the population of this town. As such the Safari Cuisine and Grocery provides an important service to this community, whose values and norms emphasize purchasing specific types of foods. Noor Arte caters to these needs not only by providing a retail outlet and eating place for Somalis and those in search of a unique dining experience, but he also helps local farmers by purchasing their fruits, vegetables, and natural, pastureraised lamb and goat meat. Noor said that “Purchasing locally grown foods is an important community value and the norm in our ancestral land. For centuries our families have taken simple ingredients and made exciting, nutritious meals.” His store is open daily and provides take-out, as well as delivery and catering services to the Barron community. Hassan Omar is president of the Ohio Somali Community Association, Columbus, Ohio. Columbus is home to the nation’s second-largest Somali refugee population. In one of the city’s less affluent neighborhoods, Somali refugees meet for camaraderie, English lessons, and information on how to find a job and a place to live. Hassan Omar arrived in Columbus in 1997, so he is familiar with the challenges immigrants face. He now uses his knowledge and skills to assist his compatriots in Columbus by serving as the president of the city’s largest Somali community association, the Somali Community Association of Ohio. His association attempts to assist Somali refugees in overcoming the cultural and linguistic difficulties they encounter. He and his association now work closely not only with the refugee population, but also with county government and local funding agencies in order to locate and direct scarce funds for those groups and individuals most in need of social and immigrant services. Abdi Roble is an award-winning photographer who has resided in Columbus, Ohio, since 1989 when he immigrated to the United States. He is the founder of two photography groups, Focus Group and African American Photographers of North America. He is also the founder of the Somali Documentary Project. His photographic exhibitions include One Month in Europe with Leica, Leica Portrait of Cuba, Japan: A Leica Perspective, and most recently, The Somali Diaspora. His latest book, The Somali Diaspora: A Journey Away, was published by the University of Minnesota Press in 2008. Hashi Shafi is a community organizer in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The Twin Cities are home to as many as 75,000 Somalis. As such, this is the nation’s largest Somali community. Hashi is an important community organizer among
2008 | Somalian Immigrants
this population, as he serves as the executive director of the Somali Action Alliance. He recently was also in the news because of his support for a new program of engagement that aims to establish a dialogue between Somalis living in Minneapolis and officials with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This initiative began in February 2009 when he became one of the first Somali leaders in Minnesota to condemn the actions of the young Somali men who were returning to Somalia to fight in the jihad against Americans and Western interests. He has also argued that the Somali community needs to get involved in public policy in order to repair the broken system of government that currently exists in Somalia. Keinan Abdi Warsame, who today uses the name K’naan, is the most wellknown Somali rapper, musician, and poet in North America. Warsame was born in Mogadishu in 1978.While growing up in Somalia, his aunt, Magool, was one of Somalia’s most famous singers. His grandfather, Haji Mohamed, was also a respected poet. His adopted name, K’naan, means “traveler” in the Somali language. In 1991, as the civil war worsened, K’naan’s mother, Marian Mohamed, petitioned the U.S. embassy for an exit visa so that they could reunite with K’naan’s father, who was working as a taxi driver in New York City. They joined relatives in New York City before later relocating to Toronto, Canada, where there is also a large Somali refugee community. Despite not speaking English when he arrived, K’naan has since become fluent in the language, released four CDs, and even had one of his songs distributed as the iTunes Single of the Week.
Glossary Burqa: An outer garment worn by women in some Islamic traditions for the purpose of cloaking their entire body. It is worn over their daily clothing and removed when the woman enters a private domain. Hijab: A distinctive head covering traditionally worn by some Muslim women. Khat: Leaves from a flowering plant that are chewed by users, including some Somalis. This mild narcotic causes excitement, loss of appetite, and euphoria, leading to its ban in many countries, including the United States.
References Africa Watch Committee. 1990. Somalia: A Government at War with Its Own People. New York: Africa Watch Committee. Anderson, M., and S. Fienberg. 1999. Who Counts? The Politics of Census-Taking in Contemporary America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
References | 2009 Berry, J., and R. Kalin. 2000. “Racism: Evidence from the National Surveys.” In Race and Racism: Canada’s Challenge, edited by L. Driedger, and S. Halli, 172–85. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Bixler, M. 2005. The Lost Boys of Sudan: An American Story of the Refugee Experience. Athens: University of Georgia Press. CIA World Factbook. 2006. Somalia. [Online information; retrieved 6/13/09.] http://www. umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2006/geos/so.html. Gali, M. 1998. “Female Circumcision: A Transcultural Study of Attitudes, Identity and Reproductive Health of East African Immigrants.” PhD diss., Wright Institute, Berkeley, California. Goza, F. 2007. “The Somali Presence in the United States.” In From Mogadishu to Dixon: The Somali Diaspora in a Global Context, edited by A. Kusow and S. Bjork, 255–74. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. Hein, J. 1993. “Refugees, Immigrants and the State.” Annual Review of Sociology 19: 43–59. Jones, M. 2004. “The New Yankees.” Mother Jones 29 (2): 64 – 69. Kritz, M., and D. Gurak. 2004. Immigration and a Changing America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Leonard, K. 2003. Muslims in the United States: The State of Research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Maines, D., and A. Kusow. 2001. “Somali Migration to Canada and Resistance to Racialization.” In The Faultline of Consciousness, edited by D. Maines, 135–62. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Maimbo, S. 2006. “Remittances and Economic Development in Somalia.” Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, Paper No. 38. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Ohio Cooperative Development Center (OCDC) 2002. Meat Goat Market Analysis: A Pilot Study of the Somali Market in Columbus, Ohio. Piketon, OH: Ohio Cooperative Development Center. Pagliacolo, E. 2004. “Group Backgrounds: Somalis.” [Online information; retrieved 6/15/09.] http://www.diversitywatch.ryerson.ca/backgrounds/somalis.htm. Pipes, D., and K. Duran. 2002. Muslim Immigrants in the United States. Washington, DC: The Center for Immigration Studies. Population Reference Bureau. 2010. 2010 World Population Data Sheet. Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau. Prendergast, J. 1997. Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia. London: Pluto Press. Richmond, A. 2001. “Refugees and Racism in Canada.” Refugee 19: 12–20. Roble, A., and D. Rutledge. 2008. The Somali Diaspora: A Journey Away. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
2010 | Somalian Immigrants Rumbaut, R., and K. Ima. 1988. The Adaptation of Southeast Asian Refugee Youth: A Comparative Study. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Family Support Administration, Office of Refugee Resettlement. Saenz, R. 2004. Latinos and the Changing Face of America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Schaid, J., and Z. Grossman. 2004. “Somali Immigrant Settlement in Small Midwestern US Communities: The Case of Barron, Wisconsin.” Unpublished manuscript. Schwirian, K., and P. Schwirian. 2005. “Measuring Psychological Distress in Somali Refugees.” In New Research in Mental Health, 2002–2003 Biennium, edited by D. Roth and W. Lutz, 229–232. Columbus: Ohio Department of Mental Health. Shacknove, A. 1985. “Who is a Refugee?” Ethics 95: 274 –84. Stock, R. 2006. “Toledo Halal Meat Consumption and Purchase Survey: Final Report.” Project # 5061, Dayton, OH: University of Dayton. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2002. 2002 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook. Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2006. Human Development Report 2006. New York: UNDP. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2004. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. World Health Organization (WHO). 2004. WHO Somalia Annual Report 2003. Mogadishu, Somalia: WHO. Worley, T., J. Ellerman, D. Mangione, T. West, and Y. Yang. 2004. “Meat-Goat Market Analysis: A Pilot Study of the Somali Market in Columbus, Ohio.” Journal of Food Distribution Research 35: 182–87.
Further Reading Abdullahi, Mohamed Diriye. 2001. Culture and Customs of Somalia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Those who know little about Somalia will find this introductory volume to be a great initial source of information. The book’s chapters focus on religion, literature, art, cuisine, family and gender roles, social customs, and music and dance. The book also contains some nice black and white photographs, a chronology, and a guide to the pronunciation of Somali words. Farah, Abdulkadir Osman, Mammo Muchie, and Joakim Gundel, eds. 2007. Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa. London: Adonis & Abbey. This edited volume contains 18 chapters written by experts from a variety of disciplines. This book’s two sections focus on (1) diaspora, identity, and development and (2) conflict, reconciliation, and state formation. The first section looks at Somali refugee experiences in a variety of countries and locations. The second section focuses on the factors that affect the Somali political situation and the possible ways in which the Somali state might be rebuilt.
Further Reading | 2011 Kusow, Abdi, and Stephanie Bjork, eds. 2007. From Mogadishu to Dixon: The Somali Diaspora in a Global Context. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. This edited volume contains 13 chapters by recognized experts in the area of Somali studies. These scholars represent a number of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, demography, history, and political science. The book’s three sections focus on distinct regions of the world. The first, Africa, provides the reader with a great deal of background material on the Somali diaspora. The others examine the Somali experience in Europe and North America. Together, these articles comprise the first academic undertaking to seriously examine the Somali refugee experience. Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. 1993. Somalia: A Country Study. 4th ed. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. This book is part of the series of books written by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. Prepared by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists, it strives to provide the reader with a detailed understanding of Somalia’s history, economy, government, and society. Although a little dated, this intermediate-level text provides a great deal of information for those who require a thorough understanding of this nation. Roble, Abdi, and Douglas Rutledge. 2008. The Somali Diaspora: A Journey Away. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. This beautiful book contains scores of photographs by the award-winning Somali photographer Abdi Roble. Roble’s pictures, collected over a five-year period, document the experiences of Somalis in Kenyan refugee camps and in numerous U.S. locations. More specifically, the authors visited several U.S. cities with large Somali populations, including Minneapolis, Columbus, and Portland, Maine. Together these pictures present the most comprehensive photographic documentation of the Somali refugee experience in the United States and one of the most complete exposés of refugees ever collected. The stunning photographs are accompanied with detailed and lucid essays written by Douglas Rutledge. This book will instantly convey to its readers a crystal-clear portrait and better understanding of the Somali American population.
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Sudanese Immigrants by Deidre Ann Tyler
Introduction Civil War has led to a massive migration of people from Sudan to the United States. A book entitled The Lost Boys of Sudan: An American Story of the Refugee Experience has made the public aware of the hardships of the male Sudanese refugee (Bixler 2005). What makes the Sudanese a special story of assimilation into American society in a short period of time? First, the Sudanese refugees have embraced secondary structural assimilation by taking advantage of the educational opportunities in America. These men were taught that if they were younger than age 18 they would go to high school before going to college. Many of the Sudanese want to obtain an education so they can return to Sudan after the war is over and lead successful, useful lives there (Bixler 2005). The next level of secondary structural assimilation that is widely achieved among the Sudanese is employment. Many of the Sudanese have acquired jobs and work long hours to earn the income necessary to lead productive lives. This is a story of survival and achievement of the American dream.
Chronology 1881
Major uprising in opposition to the Turco-Egyptian administration.
1899–1955
Sudan administration now under British-Egyptian Rule.
1956
Independence for Sudan.
1958
A military takeover is headed by General Abboud.
1962
The Anya Nya Movement starts a civil war in the south.
1964
An Islamist national government is recognized The “October Revolution” overthrows Abboud.
1969
With a military coup, Jafar Nymayi directs the “May Revolution.”
1971
After a brief coup the Sudanese Communist Party is destroyed. 2013
Chronology | 2015
1972
The south becomes a self governing region under the Addis Ababa peace agreement.
1978
Bentiu located in southern Sudan realize that oil is on the land.
1983
John Garang leads the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, and civil war occurs in the south.
1985
After widespread popular unrest Numayri is deposed by a group of officers and a Transitional Military Council is set up to rule the country.
1986
Sadiq al-Mahdi is the prime minister and is a member of the Umma party. The government is under Sharia Law.
1993
Omar al-Bashir is appointed president and the Revolution Command Council is dissolved.
1995
Sudan accused of attempting to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
1998
United States alleges that a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum is making material for a chemical weapon, resulting in United States launching a missile attacking the plant.
1999
Exporting of oil starts in Sudan.
2000
Reelection of President Bashir for five more years.
2001
The Libyan/Egyptian initiative to end the civil war is accepted.
2002
Talks in Kenya between the southern rebels and the government to end the civil war.
2003
Rebels in Darfur start a revolt alleging that the government is neglecting them.
2004
The Janjawee militias are alleged by the UN officials to be implementing killings against the villagers in Darfur. The southern rebels and the government allow power-sharing as part of the peace deal. UN indicates that Sudan is not disarming the Darfur militias and they must accept outside help to protect the citizens.
2005
The southern rebels and the government sign a peace deal agreeing to have a permanent ceasefire and power sharing. A constitution giving more autonomy to the south is signed.
2016 | Sudanese Immigrants
2010
Justice and Equality Movement of Darfur rebels signs peace agreement with government. President Bashir says that war is over, though some rebels continue attacks.
2011
The country may vote to divide itself if the people in the south vote in a January 2011 referendum to separate and form the continent’s newest state (BBC News).
Background Geography and Population The Democratic Republic of Sudan is the formal name for Sudan, which is the largest country in Africa. Its capital is Khartoum, and its citizens are called Sudanese. Many different languages are spoken in Sudan, but the official language is Arabic. In the southern part of Sudan, English is the second-most-common spoken language. Over half of the population is Muslim, and half is under the age of 18. As a result of the civil wars, infrastructure, including many hospitals, has been damaged or destroyed. According to the Population Reference Bureau (2009), the estimated population of Sudan in the middle of 2009 was 42,272,000. Life expectancy is about 59 years for males and 61 years for females. The infant mortality rate is 81 per 1,000 live births. Approximately 41 percent of the population is less than 15 years old, and only 3 percent of the population is 65 years or older. Women in Sudan have an average of 4.5 children. About 49 percent of females in the population are illiterate, while 15 percent of males cannot read or write (WHO 2007). The soil quality, water, and water patterns influence where people live in Sudan. The more urban area is in the northern part of Sudan. The majority of the people who live in the northern part are Arabic-speaking Muslims. In the southern part of Sudan the temperature can be as hot as 120°F in the summer. Rain occurs more in the south than in the north. In the north the farms must rely on irrigation (Beswick 2004). The land is mostly flat, but there are mountains in the northern and western areas. The highest point is Mt. Kinyeti and the lowest point is the Red Sea. One of the greatest natural hazards is dust storms. Northern Sudan is located between Khartoum and the Egyptian border. In this area there are two parts, which are the desert and the Nile Valley. On the west of the Nile is the Libyan Desert, and to the east of the Nile is the Nubian Desert. Another area of distinction in Sudan is the central clay plains. This area basically provides the region with water. The East Clay Plains lie in the land between the Blue Nile and the White Nile. Sudan boarders the following countries: Ethiopia,
Background | 2017
Egypt, Kenya, Chad, Central African Republic, Uganda, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire).
History Central to Sudan’s history and crises is the issue of religion. In Sudan, the northern part of the country is composed of mostly Muslims and Arabs. In the southern region there is considerable religious diversity. According to Stephanie Beswick (2004), many people there practice Christianity as well as the ancient religions. Many of the Dinkas in this region revere Totems, symbols of power believed to attract wealth and prosperity, to ward off or heal illness, and to protect people from evil and danger, including bad weather and war. In the 1880s the loose Ottoman-Egyptian colonial government collapsed in the area now known as Sudan. In 1898 the Anglo-Egyptians captured Khartoum, and from 1899 to 1955, Sudan was under British rule. The British administered the north and south separately until 1947 and did not allow northerners to enter the southern part of Sudan. After Sudan gained independence from Britain on January 1, 1956, many changes occurred in the country, particularly under the regime of General Abboud (Iyob and Khadigala 2006). He did not allow missionaries to enter the country, and under his rule many of the people in the northern area of Sudan oppressed and exploited the people in the southern area. As a result, a civil war began in the south in 1962. Many refugees fled to neighboring countries. Leaders sought to minimize and control the exodus by asking Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania to sign nonintervention agreements. In 1972 the Addis Ababa peace agreement was signed by the Nimeiri government and the Anya-Nya. It provided integration of the Anya-Nya forces into the national army and limited autonomy for the south. There were many violations of the agreement, and this led to war. The Khartoum government revised the agreement in 1977, and many of the northern troops were deployed to the oil-rich area of Bentiu. In 1983 southern troops mutinied against the government. In September 1983, Khartoum imposed Sharia law, causing further agitation among the nonMuslim southern population. Dr. John Garang, a rebel leader from the south, started the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement or SPLA. The economy suffered, political tension in the north escalated, and hopes for a peace agreement diminished. This occurred a day before a bill was passed in parliament indicating that Sharia law would be frozen. General Omar al-Bashir banned all opposition parties, revoked the constitution, and declared a jihad or holy war against the mostly non-Muslim south. In 1991 the SPLA was weakened by a major split within its own ranks, and interethnic fights broke out in the south. The government in Khartoum pursued a strategy of “divide and conquer.” The SPLA survived because of regional support and northern
2018 | Sudanese Immigrants
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) soldiers at a 2003 rally where their leader, John Garang, was speaking. The SPLA was the armed wing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. Following a January 2005 peace agreement between the SPLA and the Sudanese government, United Nations peacekeepers began arriving on April 27 to oversee the demobilization and reintegration of former rebel forces. (Simon Maina/AFP/Getty Images)
oppositional support. The United Nations Security Council and Ethiopia implicated Sudan for their involvement in the June 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during his visit to Addis Ababa. Khartoum gained a reputation for harboring Osama bin Laden and other terrorists in the 1990s. This led to more international isolation. In 2002, the Maschakos Protocol gave the southern region of Sudan the right to a referendum on self-determination, and a six-year period in which Sharia law would be in force only in the north. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on January 9, 2005. By October 2005 a new constitution was in place, and a new government was sworn in (with 52% of the executive posts for the National Congress Party, and 28% for the SPLM), and the south had an autonomous legislature and government in place. The next crisis came in Darfur when two groups, the Sudan Liberation Amy (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), took up arms against the government in February 2003. The rebels were from several tribes—Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit—that claimed economic, political, and social marginalization in the region. The government responded by arming Arab Janjaweed militia, who simply
Demographic Profile | 2019
burned and cleared villages and towns inhabited by people suspected of supporting the rebellion. Many of the civilians and those who survived fled the area. On May 6, 2006, peace talks occurred. This resulted in the Darfur Peace Agreement, in which the SLA signed an agreement with the government; however, the rebel group decided to fight on. Since the signing of the agreement Khartoum continues to support the Janjaweed militias and their attacks on civilians. In Darfur there are many displaced people who are unable to plant food because of the lack of water. These individuals rely on assistance from different countries. The individuals in Dafur are suffering from inadequate shelter, safety issues, and medical needs. Currently, there is a movement to separate Sudan, with a referendum set for 2011 in which Southern Sudanese could vote to secede and form a new country.
Causes and Waves of Migration The vast majority of individuals who migrated from Sudan to the United States in the 1990s did so as a result of war and are generally considered refugees. A refugee is a person who fears persecution because of race, religion, nationality, or political affiliation within their country of citizenship and must therefore seek asylum or safety elsewhere. Many of the refugees coming to the United States in the year 2000 and beyond have experienced militia attacks, intratribal fights, and sexual and physical attacks.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of the Community Immigration from Sudan to the United States started in the 1990s as a result of the civil war between Sudan’s Muslim north and the Animist and Christian South. Most Sudanese immigrants to the United States were repatriated from refugee camps in the 1990s. The size and composition of Sudanese American communities vary by city. According to the 2000 census, approximately 19,790 people who were born in Sudan now live in the United States, and New York City has the highest concentration of Sudanese Americans. The nine other cities with the highest concentration of Sudanese are as follows: Des Moines, Iowa; Alexandria, Virginia; San Diego, California, Omaha, Nebraska; Sioux Falls, South Dakota; Salt Lake City, Utah; Denver, Colorado; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Age and Family Structure The Sudanese refugees are typically young when they migrate to the United States. The Lost Boys (Bixler 2005) gives a detailed explanation of the lives of boys who
2020 | Sudanese Immigrants
migrated to the United States from Sudan. From 2000 to 2001, the United States opened its doors to 3,800 lost boys from Sudan and resettled them in 40 states. According to the Population Reference Bureau, there are 12,280 male Sudanese and 7,510 female Sudanese in the United States. Males are approximately 62 percent of the Sudanese American population and females are 38 percent of the population. The average age of the Sudanese population is 30 years. Seventy percent of the population is over 21 years of age, but the highest concentration (28%) is in the age group of 25 to 34 years old. The majority of the population is young married couples. These couples make up approximately 53 percent of the Sudanese American population, while the never-married population is approximately 37 percent. Many of their customs are still prevalent when they immigrate to the United States. According to Buttry (2001), arranged marriages are common in Sudan. Parents of a prospective groom must pay 25 cows and 5 bulls to the bride’s family to arrange a marriage to a young girl. When the refugees come to the United States the bride’s family requires a payment from $4,000 to $8,000 for the bride. In some of the cases the child protective services had to intervene, because girls younger than 16 were placed in arranged marriages.
A man, who was a Lost Boy from Sudan, and his wife with their young baby at their home in Syracuse, New York, December 30, 2006. (David Lassman/Syracuse Newspapers/The Image Works)
Demographic Profile | 2021
Educational Attainment Most of the refugees try to obtain a college degree. Education is a major goal for them in the United States. The census data indicate that 82 percent of the Sudanese population graduate from high school and 40 percent have a bachelors degree or higher. Individuals with a graduate or professional degree make up 15 percent of the population.
Economic Attainment The census information gives a clear picture of the employment status of the Sudanese over the age of 16. Approximately 66 percent are employed and 7.0 percent unemployed in the United States. The Sudanese have been obtaining bachelor’s degrees at a higher number in the past 10 years. It would be likely that their employment status has increased as a result of education.
Occupational Patterns The highest percentage (29.7%) of workers from Sudan are employed in the production, transportation, and material moving job sectors. As a result of educational advancement of the Sudanese, 26 percent are employed as managers in professional and related occupations. Another large category of employment falls in the category of sales and office occupations. The Sudanese make up 24.5 percent of individuals employed in the sales category. Many immigrants start their employment in the manufacturing sector; approximately 17 percent of the Sudanese are employed there. Finally, 16 percent of the Sudanese immigrants are employed in education, health, and social services.
Income Patterns The census indicates that the largest group of families (17.9%) earn less than $10,000 a year. Perhaps after benefiting from educational advantage, 16.8 percent of Sudanese families earn incomes of $50,000–74,999 a year. Another 14 percent make between $35,000 and $49,000 a year. Finally, 1.9 percent of the Sudanese families make over $200,000 a year in the United States.
Health Issues The CDC indicates that young adults migrating from Sudan should be treated for schistosomiasis and strongyloidiasis (parasitic diseases) before or when they enter the United States. Some of the most common illnesses Sudanese suffer from are tuberculosis, gastrointestinal disease, schistosomiasis, and AIDS (Metz 1992). Two other medical issues are HIV and posttraumatic stress disorder.
2022 | Sudanese Immigrants
Adjustment and Adaptation Celebration According to my interview with Benahin Kur (2009), January 1 is celebrated by many Sudanese refugees as the day Sudan obtained independence from British and Egyptian rule. It is a time when family and friends get together to celebrate by eating and listening to music.
Family According to Ebbeck and Cerna (2007), many of the refugees have different childrearing practices than most Americans. For example, in the area of discipline the child is taught to obey because of the threat of violence. When a child does not lie down it is given five lashes with a stick and soon learns to obey because of the threat of being beaten. Another area of child rearing that is different is the age at which the mother begins potty training: it is started at three months of age. The mother holds the baby over her thighs and tells it to use the toilet. At age two or three the child learns to use a hole dug as a toilet. The child is able to use the hole and is considered potty trained.
Changing Gender Roles The changing gender roles of many Sudanese men have been documented in a study done by Este and Tachble (2009). This study stated that many Sudanese men said they would not enter a kitchen in their country because preparing food was women’s work. However, these men indicated that once they got to Canada, they become willing to prepare food.
Sudanese Population in Utah According to Pam Perlich of the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Utah (interview with the author, February 9, 2010), approximately 2,000Sudanese live in Utah. Many of these individual are new immigrants who started to arrive in Utah in 1999. Salt Lake City, Utah’s capitol, is one of the 15 major refugee relocation sites in the United States. Reasons for Utah’s high ranking for refugees include the family-friendly environment, a low cost of living, and relatively plentiful entry-level jobs. Sudanese refugees in Utah are adapting well in several areas, including education, business, and religion.
Education Many Sudanese refugees enroll in Utah’s various colleges and universities, including Salt Lake Community College and the University of Utah. Hecht (2005) indicates that many of the Sudanese see America as a golden opportunity to make
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 2023
their dreams come true through educational opportunities. For example, in 2001 there were 160 “lost boys” who were relocated to Utah from Sudan; Geo-JaJa and Mangum (2005) report that of those 160, about 90 have advanced their education. Three have obtained bachelor’s degrees from the University of Utah after first completing two-year degrees at Salt Lake Community College. Unfortunately, however, the other lost boys dropped out of school because of the stress of working and attending school. Still, other educational opportunities remain. For example, the Utah Refugee Employment and Community Center and the Horizonte Instructional Training Center conduct English as a Second Language (ESL) classes.
Business Many Sudanese women in Utah have gone to the Horizonte School in Salt Lake to obtain the necessary skills to start their own businesses. One example is Alual Majok, who moved to Utah with four children in 2000. After learning English and earning a General Educational Development (GED) certificate, she opened a Sudanese Restaurant on the West side of Utah in August 2009 (Sanchez 2009).
Religion Most of the refugees in Utah are from southern Sudan. The majority are Christian and the rest are Muslims. The Christian Sudanese population has partnered with the Wasatch Presbyterian Church in Utah. Each Sunday from 2:00 to 3:00 P.M. the church allows the Sudanese to have a service in their sanctuary led by members of the Sudanese fellowship. The Presbyterian Church also provides ESL training for the Sudanese women, and financial support for Sudanese families in Utah. Also, they are raising money to build a hospital in Sudan. Many of the Sudanese plan on returning to Sudan after they complete their education. The United States has been shipping food to Sudan since the beginning of the food shortage. However, in January 2009 CNN reported that the United States has shipped the following to Sudan: oversized vehicles, water purification systems, and tents. According to my interview with one of the original “lost boys,” Aurelio Irio (2010), some of the foods that Sudanese eat in the United States are beef, rice, beans, vegetables, fruit, and pumpkin. He indicated that they do not eat fast food unless they are extremely busy and cannot get to their homes. Irio also noted that they eat one meal a day and not three meals and snacks as do most Americans.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Many laws were passed that have a major impact on immigration and refugee policy in the United States. A new refugee act was accepted in 1980 that gave the president
2024 | Sudanese Immigrants
and Congress authority to indicate a ceiling on the number of refugees admitted into the United States. Another piece of legislation that impacted immigration is the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act. This act allowed permanent resident status to individuals who had some connection in the United States. The Immigration Act of 1990 allowed for more skilled labor to enter into the United States. The United States also included a label entitled “diversity immigrants.” Diversity immigrants are from low-admission regions of the world. Many individuals enter the lottery system and receive a visa. These new policies have increased the number of Africans who come to the United States.
Political Associations and Organizations There are no individuals from Sudan who are elected to any political offices in the United States. However, many Sudanese have started their own ethnic organizations for support and connection in a new land. For example, in Utah Irio started the Didinga Association in 2003 to help those individuals who are still in Sudan. They collect money to send to Sudan for clean water, hospitals, and schools. The president of the Didinga Association is Aurelio L. Irio, an original member of the “lost boys.” Very few Sudanese in the United States are financially able to return to Sudan, even for a visit.
Brandeis University student Aduei Riak during an interview with Associated Press at the university in Waltham, Massachusetts, July 3, 2006. Twenty years after she fled the Sudan, Riak would be sworn in as a U.S. citizen during a ceremony in Boston. (AP Photo/Chitose Suzuki)
Issues in Relations between the United States and Sudan | 2025
President of the Didinga Association in Salt Lake City, Utah Aurelio Irio started the Didinga Association in Salt Lake City, Utah, for three reasons. First, he wanted to find a way to play the music of their culture and perform the music at events. As a result of performing the group will raise money to send back to their family and friends in Sudan, who have suffered from drought and the inability to plant any crops for food. The people in Sudan do not have hospitals or many schools. Many of the refugee’s family members call them asking for money. Second, he started the association to keep the younger people from getting into trouble. Some Sudanese children become involved in gangs and drugs when they come to the United States. His organization’s goal is to keep the children active with dance and music as a positive outlet. Finally, he wants his organization to provide workshops to the new refugees to teach them a wide variety of skills necessary to live in the United States.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity Irio (2010) stated the individuals who are in the United States from Sudan have had to adopt to the U.S. culture. He is a father of a two-year-old and says he wants to teach his daughter the customs and culture of Sudan. He also indicated that the reason for the establishment of the Didinga Association is to keep their culture alive in Utah and to pass it down from generation to generation.
Educational Attainment Many of the Sudanese refugees are experiencing very difficult times because of the recession and have to drop out of college to work full-time. According to Aurelio (2010) many Sudanese are just staying inside their homes and receiving unemployment because they do not have jobs. He indicates that this can bring on major depression. because they have nothing to do.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Sudan Forecasts for the 21st Century According to USAID (2010), food insufficiency is still a major problem in Sudan because of the lack of rain. Conflict as a result of the April 2010 elections is predicted. The United States will continue to accept refugees in America. However, Sudan is on the list of state-sponsored terrorists.
2026 | Sudanese Immigrants
Youth Profile A Sudanese Community College Student Looks Forward to Snowboarding Benahin Kur is a student at Salt Lake Community College majoring in chemical engineering. Benahin finished Murray High School, Salt Lake City, Utah, in May 2008 and was in the concurrent program, meaning that she was able to take a number of basic college courses while in high school. She planned to transfer to the University of Utah in Spring 2010 and complete a bachelors degree in chemical engineering, intending to find a job in that field. Benahin was young when she came to Utah. She said the first day of school she wore shorts and a t-shirt and was dressed like a tomboy, while the other girls wore low-heeled shoes and nice clothes. She did not speak English but the teacher communicated with her with hand gestures, and at play time, which she recognized, other children spoke to her and were friendly. Benahin said she was not discriminated against in the schools by anyone. She said the only discrimination she occasionally encounters is from other Sudanese. Benahin explained that she is the only young woman in Utah from the Shilluk Tribe, while the rest are from the Dinka Tribe, and the two tribes traditionally do not get along. Benahin is a very outgoing girl and has friends from Bosnia, Brazil, and Jamaica, although the majority of her friends are from Sudan. Every year a Shilluk conference is held in Iowa; there, young women gather, strike up friendships, and have meetings and dances. Benahin keeps up with these Shilluk friends through Facebook and e-mail. She does not have any friends who are African Americans. Benahin is a member of St. Jude’s Catholic Church in Salt Lake and says her family was Catholic when in Sudan. One Utah activity Benahin has adopted is snowboarding, and she is looking forward to the next winter’s snowfall. Ambitious and curious, she wants to travel and continue to learn about everything. She also hopes to return to Sudan one day, build a house, and create a life there.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 307 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by broad class of admission and region and country of birth: Fiscal year 2009
Region and country of birth
Total
Family-sponsored preferences
Employment-based preferences
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens
Diversity
Refugees and asylees
Other
1,130,818
211,859
144,034
535,554
47,879
177,368
14,124
REGION Total Africa
127,050
5,450
5,707
45,823
24,122
45,315
633
Asia
413,312
81,218
78,881
168,366
13,536
69,561
1,750
Europe
105,398
4,393
23,529
55,844
8,737
10,453
2,442
North America
375,236
106,602
19,839
196,817
437
42,700
8,841
5,578
404
1,075
3,357
582
139
21
102,878
13,665
14,856
64,611
414
8,926
406
Unknown
1,366
127
147
736
51
274
31
Sudan
3,577
31
28
685
443
2,380
10
Oceania South America
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Table 10.
Table 308 Profile of selected demographic and social characteristics: 2000 population universe: people born in Sudan.1 Geographic area: United States (Continued ) Subject Total population
Number
Percent
19,790
100.0
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND PERIOD OF U.S. ENTRY Naturalized U.S. citizen
4,235
21.4
Entered 1990 to 2000
1,670
8.4
Entered 1980 to 1989
1,650
8.3
915
4.6
Entered before 1980 Not a U.S. citizen
15,555
78.6
Entered 1990 to 2000
13,465
68.0
Entered 1980 to 1989
1,885
9.5
200
1.0
One race
16,195
81.8
White
1,790
9.0
12,305
62.2
65
0.3
235
1.2
Entered before 1980 RACE
Black or African American American Indian and Alaska Native Asian
10
0.1
Some other race
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander
1,790
9.0
Two or more races
3,595
18.2
HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN Hispanic or Latino (of any race) Not Hispanic or Latino White alone
130
0.7
19,660
99.3
1,755
8.9
19,180
100.0
1,430
7.5
17,750
92.5
8,410
43.8
50
0.3
30
0.2
LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME Population 5 years and over English only Language other than English Speak English less than “very well” Spanish Speak English less than “very well” Other Indo-European languages Speak English less than “very well” Asian and Pacific Island languages Speak English less than “very well”
840
4.4
180
0.9
75
0.4
60
0.3 (Continued )
2028
Table 308 Profile of selected demographic and social characteristics: 2000 population universe: people born in Sudan.1 Geographic area: United States (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
19,790
100.0
19,480
98.4
Householder
7,380
37.3
Spouse
3,290
16.6
Child
5,040
25.5
4,210
21.3
2,040
10.3
490
2.5
RELATIONSHIP Total population In households
Own child under 18 years Other relatives Under 18 years Nonrelatives Unmarried partner In group quarters Institutionalized population Noninstitutionalized population
1,740
8.8
240
1.2
310
1.6
80
0.4
230
1.2
7,380
100.0
5,160
69.9
3,540
48.0
3,685
49.9
2,800
37.9
655
8.9
530
7.2
2,220
30.1
1,465
19.9
60
0.8
HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE Total households2 Family households (families) With own children under 18 years Married-couple family With own children under 18 years Female householder, no husband present With own children under 18 years Nonfamily households Householder living alone Householder 65 years and over RESIDENCE IN 1995 19,180
100.0
Same house in 1995
Population 5 years and over
3,505
18.3
Different house in the U.S. in 1995
7,085
36.9
Same county
3,410
17.8
Different county
3,680
19.2
Same state
1,495
7.8
Different state
2,180
11.4
8,585
44.8
Elsewhere in 1995
(Continued )
2029
Table 308 Profile of selected demographic and social characteristics: 2000 population universe: people born in Sudan.1 Geographic area: United States (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
19,790
100.0
12,280
62.1
7,510
37.9
SEX AND AGE Total population Male Female
610
3.1
5 to 9 years
Under 5 years
1,305
6.6
10 to 14 years
1,720
8.7
15 to 19 years.
1,945
9.8
20 to 24 years
1,480
7.5
25 to 34 years
5,575
28.2
35 to 44 years
4,655
23.5
45 to 54 years
1,320
6.7
55 to 59 years
355
1.8
60 to 64 years
320
1.6
65 to 74 years
340
1.7
75 to 84 years
135
0.7
85 years and over
30
Median age (years)
30.2
0.2
18 years and over
14,940
75.5
Male
9,620
48.6
Female
5,315
26.9
21 years and over
13,880
70.1
62 years and over
685
3.5
65 years and over
500
2.5
(X)
Male
255
1.3
Female
245
1.2
16,150
100.0
Never married
6,105
37.8
Now married, excluding separated
8,520
52.8
445
2.8
MARITAL STATUS Population 15 years and over
Separated Widowed
415
2.6
Female
330
2.0
Divorced
665
4.1
Female
265
1.6 (Continued )
2030
Table 308 Profile of selected demographic and social characteristics: 2000 population universe: people born in Sudan.1 Geographic area: United States (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
GRANDPARENTS AS CAREGIVERS Grandparent living in household with one or more own grandchildren under 18 years Grandparent responsible for grandchildren
300
100.0
115
38.3
7,670
100.0
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT Population 3 years and over enrolled in school Nursery school, preschool
125
1.6
Kindergarten
240
3.1
Elementary school (grades 1–8).
2,595
33.8
High school (grades 9–12)
1,905
24.8
College or graduate school
2,810
36.6
12,730
100.0
960
7.5
9th to 12th grade, no diploma
1,230
9.7
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
2,485
19.5
Some college, no degree
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT Population 25 years and over Less than 9th grade
2,155
16.9
Associate degree
780
6.1
Bachelor’s degree
3,255
25.6
Graduate or professional degree
1,860
14.6
Percent high school graduate or higher
(X)
82.8
Percent bachelor’s degree or higher
(X)
40.2
14,880
100.0
250
1.7
VETERAN STATUS Civilian population 18 years and over Civilian veterans
X = not applicable. See http://factfinder.census.gov/metadoc/birthplace.pdf for Place of Birth Code List. 1. This table includes only the foreign-born population; people born in Sudan to a U.S. citizen parent are considered native and are not included in this table. 2. Characteristics for households and families are based on the country of birth of the householder. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations (STP-159).
2031
Table 309 Profile of selected economic characteristics: 2000. Population universe: people born in Sudan1 (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
15,730
100.0
10,455
66.5
10,395
66.1
Employed
9,300
59.1
Unemployed
1,095
7.0
(X)
10.5
EMPLOYMENT STATUS Population 16 years and over In labor force Civilian labor force
Percent of civilian labor force Armed Forces Not in labor force Females 16 years and over In labor force Civilian labor force Employed
55
0.3
5,275
33.5
5,625
100.0
2,680
47.6
2,670
47.5
2,175
38.7
815
100.0
355
43.6
9,300
100.0
Management, professional, and related occupations
2,430
26.1
Service occupations
1,415
15.2
Sales and office occupations
2,275
24.5
Own children under 6 years All parents in family in labor force Employed civilian population 16 years and over OCCUPATION
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
4
Construction, extraction, and maintenance occupations Production, transportation, and material moving occupations
—
415
4.5
2,765
29.7
INDUSTRY Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining
20
0.2
Construction
175
1.9
Manufacturing
1,650
17.7
Wholesale trade
215
2.3
Retail trade
1,335
14.4
Transportation and warehousing, and utilities
1,080
11.6
Information
305
3.3
Finance, insurance, real estate, and rental and leasing
320
3.4
Professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services
955
10.3
(Continued )
2032
Table 309 Profile of selected economic characteristics: 2000. Population universe: people born in Sudan1 (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
1,555
16.7
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services
905
9.7
Other services (except public administration)
450
4.8
Public administration
335
3.6
Private wage and salary workers
7,925
85.2
Government workers
1,020
11.0
Educational, health and social services
CLASS OF WORKER
Self-employed workers in own not incorporated business Unpaid family workers
355 —
3.8 —
DISABILITY STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONALIZED POPULATION Population 5 to 20 years
5,245
100.0
350
6.7
13,305
100.0
2,850
21.4
(X)
63.8
10,460
78.6
(X)
65.0
490
100.0
200
40.8
Workers 16 years and over
9,150
100.0
Car, truck, or van—drove alone
5,800
63.4
Car, truck, or van—carpooled
1,290
14.1
Public transportation (including taxicab)
1,330
14.5
Walked
450
4.9
Other means
165
1.8
Worked at home
115
1.3
Mean travel time to work (minutes)
25.2
(X)
Households2
7,380
100.0
Less than $10,000
1,415
19.2
$10,000 to $14,999
730
9.9
$15,000 to $24,999
1,025
13.9
With a disability Population 21 to 64 years With a disability Percent employed No disability Percent employed Population 65 years and over With a disability COMMUTING TO WORK
INCOME IN 1999
(Continued )
2033
Table 309 Profile of selected economic characteristics: 2000. Population universe: people born in Sudan1 (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
$25,000 to $34,999
1,135
15.4
$35,000 to $49,999
1,070
14.5
$50,000 to $74,999
1,070
14.5
$75,000 to $99,999
490
6.6
$100,000 to $149,999
280
3.8
$150,000 to $199,999
45
0.6
$200,000 or more
115
Median household income (dollars) With earnings Mean earnings (dollars) With Social Security income Mean Social Security income (dollars) With Supplemental Security income
(X)
6,670
90.4
40,729
(X)
390
5.3
7,804
(X)
145
Mean Supplemental Security Income (dollars)
6,193
With public assistance income
735
Mean public assistance income (dollars)
3,278
With retirement income
195
Mean retirement income (dollars)
1.6
29,437
2.0 (X) 10.0 (X) 2.6
18,435
(X)
5,160
100.0
Less than $10,000
925
17.9
$10,000 to $14,999
450
8.7
$15,000 to $24,999
710
13.8
$25,000 to $34,999
775
15.0
$35,000 to $49,999
760
14.7
$50,000 to $74,999
865
16.8
$75,000 to $99,999
320
6.2
$100,000 to $149,999
210
4.1
$150,000 to $199,999
45
0.9
100
1.9
Families2
$200,000 or more Median family income (dollars)
31,399
(X)
Per capita income (dollars)
14,765
(X)
Male full-time, year-round workers
27,428
(X)
Female full-time, year-round workers
22,160
(X)
Median earnings (dollars)
(Continued )
2034
Table 309 Profile of selected economic characteristics: 2000. Population universe: people born in Sudan1 (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
Subject
Number below poverty level
Percent below poverty level
1,440
27.9
POVERTY STATUS IN 1999 Families2 With related children under 18 years With related children under 5 years
1,295
34.9
860
35.5
Families with female householder, no husband present2 With related children under 18 years With related children under 5 years Individuals 18 years and over 65 years and ove Related children under 18 years Related children 5 to 17 years Unrelated individuals 15 years and over
400
61.1
375
63.6
180
64.3
6,590
33.8
4,110
27.9
60
12.2
2,415
51.5
2,045
49.9
1,335
33.5
— = zero or rounds to zero; X = not applicable. See http://factfinder.census.gov/metadoc/birthplace.pdf for Place of Birth Code List. 1. This table includes only the foreign-born population; people born in Sudan to a U.S. citizen parent are considered native and are not included in this table. 2. Characteristics for households and families are based on the country of birth of the householder. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations (STP-159).
2035
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 310 Profile of selected housing characteristics: 2000. Population universe: people born in Sudan1 (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
7,335
100.0
Owner-occupied housing units
1,150
15.7
Renter-occupied housing units
6,185
84.3
1-unit, detached
1,175
16.0
1-unit, attached
400
5.5
2 units
495
6.7
3 or 4 units
850
11.6
5 to 9 units
1,030
14.0
10 to 19 units
1,095
14.9
20 or more units
2,220
30.3
Occupied housing units2 HOUSING TENURE
UNITS IN STRUCTURE
Mobile home
75
Boat, RV, van, etc.
—
1.0 —
YEAR STRUCTURE BUILT 1999 to March 2000
65
0.9
1995 to 1998
360
4.9
1990 to 1994
400
5.5
1980 to 1989
1,060
14.5
1970 to 1979
1,950
26.6
1960 to 1969
1,285
17.5
1940 to 1959
1,195
16.3
1939 or earlier
1,020
13.9
1999 to March 2000
3,830
52.2
1995 to 1998
2,535
34.6
1990 to 1994
540
7.4
1980 to 1989
325
4.4
1970 to 1979
60
0.8
1969 or earlier
40
0.5
1 room
1,050
14.3
2 rooms
1,515
20.7
3 rooms
1,340
18.3
YEAR HOUSEHOLDER MOVED INTO UNIT
ROOMS
(Continued )
2036
Table 310 Profile of selected housing characteristics: 2000. Population universe: people born in Sudan1 (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
4 rooms
1,360
18.5
5 rooms
990
13.5
6 rooms
520
7.1
7 rooms
250
3.4
8 rooms
125
1.7
9 or more rooms
180
2.5
Median number of rooms
3.3
(X)
VEHICLES AVAILABLE None
1,620
22.1
1
3,355
45.7
2
1,815
24.7
545
7.4
3,660
49.9
140
1.9
3,090
42.1
3 or more HOUSE HEATING FUEL Utility gas Bottled, tank, or LP gas Electricity Fuel oil, kerosene, etc.
315
Coal or coke
—
—
4.3
Wood
—
—
Solar energy
—
—
Other fuel
50
0.7
No fuel used
80
1.1
Lacking complete plumbing facilities
205
2.8
Lacking complete kitchen facilities
185
2.5
No telephone service
265
3.6
950
100.0
Less than $50,000
20
2.1
$50,000 to $99,999
135
14.2
$100,000 to $149,999
310
32.6
$150,000 to $199,999
160
16.8
$200,000 to $299,999
190
20.0
$300,000 to $499,999
95
10.0
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS
Specified owner-occupied units VALUE
(Continued )
2037
Table 310 Profile of selected housing characteristics: 2000. Population universe: people born in Sudan1 (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
$500,000 to $999,999.
15
1.6
$1,000,000 or more
15
1.6
Median (dollars)
151,700
(X)
MORTGAGE STATUS AND SELECTED MONTHLY OWNER COSTS With a mortgage
805
84.7
Less than $300
4
0.4
$300 to $499
4
0.4
$500 to $699
65
6.8
$700 to $999
160
16.8
$1,000 to $1,499
265
27.9
$1,500 to $1,999
145
15.3
$2,000 or more
160
16.8
Median costs (dollars) Not mortgaged Median costs (dollars)
1,249
(X)
145
15.3
392
(X)
SELECTED MONTHLY OWNER COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1999 Less than 15.0 percent
260
27.4
15.0 to 19.9 percent
125
13.2
20.0 to 24.9 percent
115
12.1
25.0 to 29.9 percent
115
12.1
30.0 to 34.9 percent
80
8.4
250
26.3
35.0 percent or more. Not computed Specified renter-occupied units
4
0.4
6,185
100.0
315
5.1
GROSS RENT Less than $200 $200 to $299
170
2.7
$300 to $499
1,480
23.9
$500 to $749
2,540
41.1
$750 to $999
1,130
18.3
$1,000 to $1,499
445
7.2
$1,500 or more.
70
1.1
No cash rent Median (dollars)
35 593
0.6 (X) (Continued )
Appendix III: Notable Sudanese Americans | 2039 Table 310 Profile of selected housing characteristics: 2000. Population universe: people born in Sudan1 (Continued ) Subject
Number
Percent
GROSS RENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1999 Less than 15.0 percent
1,110
17.9
15.0 to 19.9 percent
895
14.5
20.0 to 24.9 percent
640
10.3
25.0 to 29.9 percent
635
10.3
30.0 to 34.9 percent
445
7.2
2,060
33.3
400
6.5
35.0 percent or more Not computed
— = zero or rounds to zero; X = not applicable. See http://factfinder.census.gov/metadoc/birthplace.pdf for Place of Birth Code List. 1. This table includes only the foreign-born population; people born in Sudan to a U.S. citizen parent are considered native and are not included in this table. 2. Characteristics for occupied housing units are based on the country of birth of the householder. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Tabulations (STP-159).
Appendix III: Notable Sudanese Americans Valentino Achak Deng collaborated with Dave Eggers to write a novel entitled What is the What: The Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng. Based on Deng’s real life story, the novel also includes fictional elements. The Ohio State University selected the novel as one of two choices for the freshman book club and has distributed thousands of copies. Tom Tykwer plans to adapt the novel into a film. Deng Gai is a Sudanese professional basketball player who stands six feet nine inches tall. He played college basketball at Fairfield University in Fairfield, Connecticut, and was named to the first team All-MAAC for leading the nation in blocks. Gai was in the 2004 NBA draft but withdrew his name. In 2005 he played for the Philadelphia 76ers as a free agent. In 2007–2008 Gai represented Poland’s Slask Wroclaw, but the team disbanded after that season. Lopez Lomong is a Sudanese American track and field athlete. At age six he was abducted while attending a Catholic mass in Sudan. He was able to escape and run to Kenya. He became a citizen of the United States in 2007. In Olympic track and field trials in Oregon, he qualified for the 1,500-meter race for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. He was chosen by the team captains to carry the U.S. flag for Beijing’s opening Olympic ceremonies. He was elimi-
2040 | Sudanese Immigrants
nated in the semifinals because he was the last person in the 1,500 meters. In 2008 he returned to Sudan to open a school.
Glossary Nafir: Assistance that is provided to another person for duty or specific purpose. Sanduk: A fund that is put together by the community to give other community members in time of need. Suq: Grocery store.
References “BBC News. “Time Line: Sudan. A Chronology of Key Events.” 2010. BBC News. [Online article; retrieved 10/29/10.] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/827425.stm. Beswick, Stephanie. 2004. Sudan’s Blood Memory: The Legacy of War, Ethnicity and Slavery in South Sudan. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Bixler, Mark. 2005. The Lost Boys of Sudan: An American Story of the Refugee Experience. Athens: University of Georgia Press. Buttry, Stephen. 2001. “An Unhappy Marriage: Sudanese Custom, U.S. Law.” Omaha World-Herald, March 11: 1 A+.Ebbeck, Majory Anne, and Carmencita H. Dela Cerna. 2007. “A Study of Child Rearing Practices amongst Selected Sudanese Families in South Australia: Implications for Child Care Service Selection.” Early Childhood Education Journal 34 (5): 307–14. Este, David, and Admasu A. Tachble. 2009. “The Perceptions and Experiences of Russian Immigrant and Sudanese Refugee Men as Fathers in an Urban Center in Canada.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 624 (1): 139–55. Geo-JaJa, Macleans A., and Garth Mangam. “Struggling at the Golden Door: International Refugees in Utah.” [Online article; retrieved 8/09.] http://www.cppa.utah.edu/publi cations/social%20services/Struggling_at_the_Golden_Door.pdf. Hecht, Joan. 2005. The Journey of the Lost Boys. Jacksonville, FL: Allswell Press. Iyob, Ruth, and Gilbert M. Khadiagala. 2006. Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher. Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. 1992. “Sudan: A Country Study.” Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Headquarters, Dept. of the Army. Population Reference Bureau. 2009. World Population Data Sheet. Washington, DC: The Center for Immigration Studies. Sanchez, Jennifer. 2009. “African Fare Available at New Sudanese Eatery.” Salt Lake Tribune, May 26. [Online article; retrieved 8/09.] http://www.sltrib.com/ci_12455639? IADID=Search-www.sltrib.com-www.sltrib.com.
Further Reading | 2041 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). “Southern Sudan Food Alert.” [Online article; retrieved 2/20/10.] http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/ sudan/. World Health Organization (WHO). 2007. WHO Sudan Annual Report 2007. Khartoum, Somalia: WHO.
Further Reading Ajak, Benjamin, Benson Deng, Alephonsian Deng, and Judy Bernstein. 2005. They Poured Fire on Us from the Sky: The Story of Three Lost Boys from Sudan. New York: Public Affairs. This is a vivid account of three of the 25,000 “lost boys” of Sudan. It brings to real life the images of children who were victims of a civil war. The lives of the lost boys are a nightmare situation in Sudan. Bixler, Mark. 2005. The Lost Boys of Sudan: An American Story of the Refugee Experience. Athens: University of Georgia Press. This book gives us the story of four young men who are now living in Atlanta, Georgia. The author gives a detailed account of their assimilation process, The young men focus on their new empowering tool, which is education. Clammer, Paul. 2007. Sudan: The Bradt Travel Guide. Chalfont, St. Peter, Buckinghamshire, UK: Bradt Publishing. This is one book one should read before traveling to Sudan. The author gives lots of information on the southern towns of Juba, Malakal, Wau, and Rumbek. Driving routes for adventurous travelers are described. The new wildlife tourism is described. Collins, Robert. 2008. A History of Modern Sudan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Collins is a frequent visitor to Sudan. In this book he traces the 200-year history of Sudan. The book summarizes the country’s ethnic and religious divides. Eggers, Dave. 2006. What Is the What: The Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng. San Francisco: McSweeney’s. This is a fictional account of the stories of the lost boys of Sudan. This story gives the reader information on genocide, and living in a refugee camp. Flint, Julie, and Alex de Waal. 2008. Darfur: A New History of a Long War (African Arguments). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. This text discusses the following rebel groups: the Sudan liberation Army, Justice and Equality movement, and Janjaweed. One important question this book answers is “How did the government respond?” Fardol, Santion. 2006. Southern Sudan and Its Fight for Freedom. Bloomington, Indiana: Authorhouse. This is a clear version of what has happened in Sudan since January 1956. The author gives a portrait of the domination of northern Sudan over the southern region.
2042 | Sudanese Immigrants Hari, Daoud. 2008. The Translator: A Memoir. New York: Random House. This book recounts stories of genocide. The author escaped the genocide of his village and lived to tell the stories of how others were killed. Johnson, Douglas H. 2002. Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (African Issues). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. This qualified historian focuses on the civil wars starting in 1960, the current war, and the minor conflicts. The book focuses on the issues of oil, humanitarian aid, and terrorist organizations. Jok, Madsut Jok. 2007. Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence. Oxford: Oneworld. Jok Madut Jok is a former southern Sudanese teaching at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles. He tells the story of Sudan beginning in 1956 with its independence. The book gives insight into the way in which the government kept conflict going between ethnic membership and religion. Lost Boys of Sudan. Film Directed by Megan Mylan, and produced by Jon Shenk. Actual Films / Principe Productions 2003. This is a feature length documentary that tells the story of 2 lost boys. It shows a story of survival from gunfire, lions, and living in a refugee camp in Kenya. Madani, Mahmood. 2009. Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror. New York: Pantheon Books. The author is an expert on African Postcolonial political history and international relations. He gives a sophisticated view of the problems and events that are occurring in Sudan. Maskalyk, James. 2009. Six Months in Sudan: A Young Doctor in a War-Torn Village. New York: Spiegel and Grau. A young doctor shares his experiences providing care to the citizens of war-torn Sudan. He describes the suffering he encounters and attempts to mitigate with limited supplies and equipment. Patterson, Donald. 1999. Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe. New York: New York Times. Patterson visited Sudan many times and describes his experiences there. He explains what happened when the U.S. government put Sudan on the list of governments who sponsor terrorism and examines the government in Sudan.
Taiwanese Immigrants by Franklin Ng
Introduction Taiwanese American is a term for immigrants from Taiwan and their descendants who are in the United States. Taiwanese immigration to the United States took place mostly after World War II. Before the 1950s, few Taiwanese journeyed to this country, for Taiwan had been under the colonial control of Japan from 1895 to 1945. Since the 1950s, a greater number of Taiwanese have made their way to the United States to study and to work. However, the most dramatic increase came with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which opened the opportunity for significantly greater Taiwanese migration to America. But in the 1990s, as Taiwan became more industrialized and experienced greater prosperity, some return migration occurred. Migration from Taiwan continues today but in smaller numbers, due to the widespread availability of economic and educational opportunities in Asia and Taiwan today. Taiwanese Americans are often categorized together with Chinese Americans, but this association is contested due to the existence of mainland China separate from Taiwan. Many Taiwanese Americans seek to be labeled differently, as a way of supporting the visibility of Taiwan as an independent political entity. Because of their efforts, in 2000 the U.S. Census started to classify Taiwanese Americans as a group apart from Chinese Americans. At the same time, when popular Chinese American celebrations or events are observed in various communities, Taiwanese Americans often join in as well. Taiwanese American identity is complex and evolving, related to the political situation in Taiwan. While some prefer to be called Taiwanese Americans, others want to be described as Chinese Americans. Still others see themselves as simultaneously Taiwanese Americans and Chinese Americans.
Chronology 1644
The Ming dynasty comes to an end, and Qing dynasty begins, with rule by the Manchus in China until 1911. Increased numbers of Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong settle in Taiwan from the 17th to the 19th century. 2043
Background | 2045
1895
Japan defeats China in Sino-Japanese War and assumes control over Taiwan.
1911
Chinese revolution leads to the overthrow of the Manchus and the creation of the Republic of China.
1945
Pacific War comes to a close as Japan is defeated, and its rule over Taiwan ends. Civil war begins between Nationalist and Communist forces in China.
1947
February 28 Incident leads to widespread unrest, which is suppressed by the Nationalist government.
1949
Communist Chinese emerge as the victors in the civil war and establish the People’s Republic of China. The defeated Nationalist government retreats to Taiwan.
1965
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 is passed, allowing for a greater number of Asian and Taiwanese immigrants to enter the United States.
1971
Beijing is seated as China in the United Nations, and Taiwan is ousted from the organization.
1979
President Jimmy Carter recognizes People’s Republic of China and severs diplomatic relations with Republic of China. Congress passes Taiwan Relations Act to maintain informal relations with Republic of China.
1988
Lee Teng-hui succeeds to presidency after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo. As leader of the Nationalist Party, he later becomes the first president to be elected by the public in 1996.
2000
Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party wins the presidential election and secures a second term in 2004.
2008
Ma Ying-jeou of the Nationalist Party wins the presidential election.
Background Geography of Taiwan The Republic of China, often called Taiwan, with its capital at Taipei, is a group of islands located off the southeast coast of China, less than 100 miles from the province
2046 | Taiwanese Immigrants
of Fujian. The Taiwan Strait to its west is the body of water that separates it from China. To its north is the East China Sea, beyond which lies the Ryukyu Islands, Okinawa, and Japan. To its east is the Pacific Ocean, while to the south is the Baishi Channel, which borders the Philippines. Taiwan, also the name of the largest of the island group, has a land area of almost 13,900 square miles. Shaped like a tobacco leaf, it is 245 miles in length and almost 90 miles in width. Among the other islands, the key ones are the Penghu group (Pescadores), the Matsu group, and Kinmen (Quemoy). The main island of Taiwan is predominantly mountainous, especially in the eastern portion. The western portion is a lower, flat plain, where most of the people reside. The largest cities are located here, such as Taipei, Kaohsiung, Taichung, and Tainan. In the eastern portion are smaller cities such as Ilan and Hualien. The population of Taiwan is about 23 million people, with a sizable number concentrated in the capital of Taipei. Taiwan has a tropical and subtropical climate, with temperatures generally moderated by the Pacific Ocean and the Japan Current (Kuroshio). The monsoon rains that frequent this part of Asia provide verdant scenery for tourists and supply water for agriculture. Geologically, Taiwan is in a region with several longitudinal faults and is subject to tectonic plate movement. As a result, it is characterized by seismic activity, with occasional tremors and earthquakes. The population of Taiwan is made up of people of Chinese ancestry and those of aboriginal background from several different tribes. Most of those with Chinese origins are the descendants of migrants from Fujian and Guangdong provinces, although in 1949 there was a sizable influx of refugees from many other regions of China. These distinctions are important, however. Those who are linked to Fujian are from the southern region and are usually called the Fujianese or Hoklo. The ones who came from Guangdong were mainly the Hakka, a group of people who migrated there from north China. The smaller aboriginal population is of Austronesian background and is related to the peoples of the southern Philippines. A developed industrial nation, Taiwan has low infant mortality and a growing elderly population. Even as its people have a longer life expectancy, its families also show a declining fertility rate that ranks as one of the lowest in the world.
History of Taiwan Situated close to China, Taiwan was settled by people from the Asian mainland several millennia ago. Some anthropologists see the island as having been a stepping stone for continental migration to Southeast Asia, and the Pacific region, especially Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. These early people became some of the tribes that spoke Austronesian languages and settled in the plains of the western region and the mountains of the eastern region of Taiwan. In the centuries that followed, few from China settled on Taiwan, although its presence was known. As Europeans made their voyages of discovery in the 16th
Background | 2047
and 17th centuries, those from Portugal, Spain, and Holland made contact with its shores. It is from the Portuguese that Taiwan received the name of “Ilha Formosa” in the 16th century, which means “Beautiful Island.” However, Spain and Holland exercised greater degrees of control on the island, with the Dutch eventually driving out the Spanish. An increasing number of Chinese settled on the island during this period of Dutch rule. In the 17th century, the Manchus entered China, ended rule by the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), and established the Qing dynasty (1644–1911). But Zheng Chenggong, also known as Koxinga, a Ming loyalist, vowed to continue the struggle by using Taiwan as a base. He and his followers were able to resist until 1683, when the Manchus invaded the island and placed it under their control. When the Manchus consolidated their control and established peace on the island, more people from southeast China, primarily the Fujian and Guangdong provinces, moved into Taiwan. Their settlements and cultivation of lands for agriculture brought them into conflict with the aboriginal peoples that had been there earlier. As a result, the Qing government was repeatedly forced to resolve disputes between the Chinese settlers and the aboriginal groups. Taiwan was first administered as an area under Fujian province, but in 1886 it was designated as a separate province. In 1895, Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War and obtained Taiwan and an indemnity under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Taiwan was transformed into a Japanese colony, and its people became Japanese subjects. The adult men were required to serve in the Japanese army, and the people were instructed to learn the Japanese language. Under Japanese rule, the island received a system of colonial education and witnessed improvements in public hygiene, railway construction, and agricultural production. These changes introduced under Japanese colonial rule were a legacy that facilitated later economic development. The surrender of Japan to the Allies in 1945 marked the end of World War II, and Taiwan was returned to Chinese control under the Republic of China. As Chinese officials and troops came onto the island, friction arose between them and the local population. On the one hand, some mainlanders saw the Taiwanese who spoke Japanese as being collaborators with Japan and disloyal to China. On the other hand, the Taiwanese saw the mainlanders as being insensitive and brusque in their behavior. On February 28, 1947, an incident with a local vendor involved in a dispute with authorities led to the killing of a person by the police. The event triggered angry protests and an uprising by the Taiwanese against the mainlanders, which was followed with harsh reprisals and the declaration of martial law in 1948 by Chinese government officials. The February 28 Incident, or er er ba shi jian (literally 2-2-8 incident), resulted in the deaths of several thousand people and aroused resentment among many Taiwanese against the mainlanders. Meanwhile, in China itself, the defeat of Japan cleared the way for an open civil war between the Nationalist Chinese government and the Chinese Communists. In this bitterly fought contest, the Communists emerged victorious and forced the
2048 | Taiwanese Immigrants
Nationalist Chinese to withdraw to Taiwan. On October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong in Beijing proclaimed the establishment of the new People’s Republic of China, while the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek relocated its capital from the city of Nanjing on the mainland to Taipei on Taiwan. The United States elected to wait on a decision about the Beijing government and continued to recognize the Nationalist government. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, President Harry Truman sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits, protecting the island from a Communist takeover. For the next 30 years, the United States recognized Taipei as the government of China and did not enter into formal diplomatic relations with Beijing. Despite being driven from the mainland, the Nationalist government maintained that there was only one China, and that it was still the legitimate representative government for all of China. During the Cold War era, it was aligned with the United States and saw itself in competition with Communist China for support from world opinion and the overseas Chinese community. Within the Nationalist party (Kuomintang or KMT) that governed Taiwan, mainlanders held the key posts, even though Taiwanese constituted the vast majority
A Chinese Nationalist soldier stands guard on a sandy beach somewhere along Formosa’s (Taiwan’s) shoreline as Chinese Communists on the mainland continued their threats to attack the island stronghold of the Nationalists, February 1, 1955. (Library of Congress)
Background | 2049
of the local population. The Nationalist government emphasized the need to speak Mandarin Chinese, while most of the local Taiwanese were more accustomed to conversing in the southern Min or Hokkien language, which is found in the southern part of Fujian. Other local Taiwanese spoke the Hakka language, which is also found in Guangdong and Fujian. The differences in background, power, language, and the February 28 Incident caused friction between the mainlanders and the local population. This eventually led to distinctive labels referring to the two groups. The mainlanders who came from China in 1949 were called the waishengren or “people from outside the province.” In contrast, the local people who resided in Taiwan before World War II were called the benshengren or “people from this province.” The aboriginal population was referred to as the yuanzhumin or “original inhabitants.” During the 1970s, the international situation began to change rapidly for Taiwan. In 1971, the United Nations gave the seat for China to the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of China on Taiwan found itself without diplomatic representation within the international body. In 1972, President Richard Nixon visited China and issued the Shanghai Communiqué, acknowledging that there was but one China and that Taiwan was a part of China. Seven years later, under President Jimmy Carter, the United States recognized Beijing as the official government of China and broke off formal diplomatic relations and its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. At the same time, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which set up an American Institute in Taiwan to watch over U.S. commercial interests there. The sequence of events shocked the Nationalist Party leadership into making reforms to government policies in a bid to win favor from the local population and the international community. Chiang Ching-kuo, the son and successor to Chiang Kai-shek, ended martial law in 1987. He brought more Taiwanese into the membership of the Nationalist Party, and opened the way for local, provincial, and national elections. When he passed away in 1988, his successor Lee Teng-hui continued these reforms and was elected president in the first direct election for that office in 1996. The changes instituted by Chiang and Lee were dramatic and paved the way for multiparty competition in the politics of Taiwan. In the 1980s and 1990s, Taiwan became widely known for its flourishing and dynamic economy, one of the four young tigers of Asia, along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea. Land reform, American foreign aid, and astute development policies had helped to transform Taiwan into an economic dynamo. A larger middle class, a more educated population, and a thriving consumer culture were among the benefits of widespread prosperity in a more affluent and prosperous Taiwan. Its success was touted as a model for its Chinese mainland counterpart across the straits to emulate. An even more surprising event occurred in 2000. The Nationalist Party, which had governed Taiwan since the end of World War II, was upset in the presidential
2050 | Taiwanese Immigrants
election of that year. Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (Minchintang or DPP), whose members supported an independent Taiwan separate from China, was elected president and went on to serve two terms. However, the Nationalist Party was able to retain control over the nation’s legislature, the Legislative Yuan. In 2008, the Nationalist Party was able to elect Ma Ying-jeou to become president over his rival, Frank Hsieh of the Democratic Progressive Party. The peaceful transition in power at the presidential level between the two parties in 2000 and 2008 indicated that Taiwan was now functioning as a democratic nation. Nonetheless, history and geography dictate that Taiwan must reckon with China. Many people on Taiwan prefer the status quo, in which they are able to remain apart from China. Aside from this, some feel that Taiwan is a part of China but would not like to see it united with that country until China is democratic. Still others want Taiwan and China to be separate countries, each pursuing its own path. But from the perspective of the Beijing government, China and Taiwan are one country, and the latter must be joined together with the motherland, just like Hong Kong and Macau. In military power and economic power, there is an asymmetry as the advantage lies with China, so Taiwan wants the United States to provide assurances and protection against its larger neighbor.
Causes and Waves of Migration Early Immigration Chinese immigration to the United States until the end of World War II was primarily comprised of Cantonese from the southeastern coastal province of Guangdong. In 1943, as a result of China’s being its wartime ally against Japan, the United States repealed the Chinese exclusion acts that had been legislated since 1882 and granted a small immigration quota. It also passed legislation for war brides, fiancés, displaced persons, and refugees, which allowed a modest number of Chinese to enter the United States. In the midst of these changes, Taiwan and the United States became closer because of American concern over Communist China and the Soviet Union during the Korean War and the Cold War. Taiwanese immigration to the United States at this time was only a trickle. A U.S. presence in Taiwan because of intelligence gathering operations, a mutual defense treaty, and other military activities led to some women being married to American military personnel. Some students also had traveled to the United States to study but had decided to remain in this country. They believed that opportunities for advancement and professional growth were greater in the United States.
Causes and Waves of Migration | 2051
Immigrant Culture/Early Issues of Assimilation and Separation Before the 1965 Immigration Act From the end of World War II to the 1960s, the population of immigrants from Taiwan was small. Many of them were of mainland background from China who had moved to Taiwan in 1949. Often coming to the United States as students for postgraduate degrees, they found themselves as a distinct minority. They spoke Mandarin, while the Chinese American population in the United States conversed in Cantonese. The immigrants from Taiwan were scattered across the U.S. landscape, frequently at different university communities, so that their being lost in a sea of Cantonese speakers was all the more pronounced.
Later Waves of Immigration Immigration Act of 1965 and Succeeding Legislation In 1965, Congress approved a measure that permitted a larger number of Asians to enter the country. The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, or the Hart-Celler Act, increased the quota for Chinese immigrants to 20,000 per year. The act, with its provisions for family unification and those with occupational skills, permitted a larger number of Taiwanese to migrate to the United States each year. After Washington recognized the Beijing government in 1979, Congress passed legislation in 1982 that permitted Taiwan to have an immigration allotment of 20,000. Starting from 1965, the Taiwanese population in the United States began to increase more noticeably. As Taiwan began to develop economically, the opportunity to migrate abroad for foreign study at the graduate level was more attainable. Adult men generally had to serve in the military before they could go abroad, so educational study was usually at the graduate level. Because of the political and military ties between Taiwan and the United States, as well as the postwar global stature of the United States, graduate study in America was considered the most desirable and prestigious. A common refrain of the time was “Lai, lai, lai; lai Taida. Qu, qu, qu; qu Meiguo.” In translation, it means “Come, come, come; come to Taiwan National University; Go, go, go; go to America” (Wang 2009). When the students finished their graduate studies, many remained in the United States instead of returning to Taiwan. Employment prospects and compensation were better in this country, as were the working conditions, facilities, and equipment. Furthermore, the Immigration Act of 1990 contained provisions that favored those with occupational skills to come to the United States, thereby providing increased opportunities for many highly educated Taiwanese professionals to enter this country.
2052 | Taiwanese Immigrants
As these Taiwanese students and professionals stayed in the United States and started families, the possibility for chain migration and family reunification increased. Taiwanese Americans began to bring their relatives over to America. In addition, many believed that educational opportunities were more abundant in the United States for children and that access to colleges and universities was more readily available than in the extremely competitive testing environment in Taiwan. American universities were renowned for their pioneering research and strength across the many academic disciplines. To live in the United States meant that their children could enjoy a less stressful life even while gaining admission to a prestigious educational institution of higher learning. Political unease and a heightened sense of insecurity about the Republic of China’s isolation also contributed to increased Taiwanese immigration to the United States. First of all, Taiwan had lost its membership in the United Nations in 1971 to mainland China. Second, when the United States decided to recognize the People’s Republic of China instead of the Republic of China in 1979, the announcement in 1978 sent shock waves throughout Taiwan. Angry demonstrations erupted, calmed only by Taipei government officials who feared that violence might alienate its supporters in the United States. Without any support and protection from the United States, Taiwan would be precariously alone in any confrontation with China. A career and life in America seemed to be more stable and promising. Certainly the attention focused on the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 in Beijing, in which the Chinese government forcefully crushed demonstrations by students and workers, additionally surprised people in Taiwan. Then, in 1996, China fired missiles near Taiwan, just before the island held its presidential election. In the next year, Great Britain lowered its Union Jack flag in a ceremony as it ceded its colony of Hong Kong back to China, and in 1999, Portugal returned its former colony of Macao to Beijing. China seemed to be ever more powerful and influential in East Asia and in global politics. In comparison, Taiwan was shorn of diplomatic relations with most nations throughout the world except for a few small countries.
Through IRCA to the Present Because many Taiwanese to wished to come to the United States, there was some illegal immigration as well. Some were dissidents or political refugees who were hoping to escape persecution by the Nationalist government in the era before the end of martial law. Other individuals stayed beyond the length permitted by their student or visitor visas and escaped scrutiny by immigration authorities. However, the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) allowed some of the undocumented immigrants to correct their status and become permanent residents (Chen 2008, 20).
Demographic Profile | 2053
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community According to the 2000 Census figures, the Taiwanese American population is relatively small. There were 118,048 who reported themselves as only Taiwanese, with another 26,747 who reported as Taiwanese with at least one other race or Asian group. This amounted to a total of 144,795 reporting themselves as Taiwanese alone or in combination with at least one other race or Asian group. In comparison, the population of those who reported as Chinese alone or in combination with at least one other race or Asian group is 2,734, 841 (Barnes and Bennett 2002, Table 4, p.9). The American Community Survey for Asians in 2004 stated the Taiwanese household population to be 70,771 and 0.6 percent of the Asian alone population. It stated the Chinese household population, excepting Taiwanese, to be 2,829,627 and 23.4 percent of the Asian alone population. The smaller Taiwanese number in this case, as compared to the 2000 Census figure, comes because the household population figure excludes those living in institutions, college dormitories, and other quarters (U.S. Census 2004, Table 2, p.2). Taiwanese immigrants who have entered the United States after 1965 generally have not settled in the older Chinatowns established by the Cantonese-speaking Chinese. Rather than congregating in the inner city or downtown sections, they have often moved to other locales in the suburbs or to relatively affluent middle-class communities. On the West Coast, the Taiwanese have found California to be hospitable in terms of employment and climate. In northern California, they have found employment and good schools in the Silicon Valley region. This includes the Santa Clara Valley and San Jose, with cities such as Cupertino and Milpitas. In southern California, the Taiwanese initially moved to Monterey Park in the San Gabriel Valley, thanks to promotional efforts by developer and realtor Frederic Hsieh. It became widely known as “Little Taipei,” the first suburban Chinatown (Fong 1994, vii). But as more mainland Chinese immigrants began to move into the area, the Taiwanese began to locate to neighboring towns and cities in the San Gabriel Valley, such as San Gabriel, Rosemead, Alhambra, Arcadia, Rowland Heights, Hacienda Heights, and Irvine. On the East Coast, the Taiwanese have developed a sizable community in the Flushing neighborhood in the borough of Queens in New York City (Chen 1992). In Texas, a flourishing Taiwanese community can be found in Houston. But aside from California, New York, and Texas, large numbers of Taiwanese have settled also in New Jersey, Illinois, Washington, and other states. Because of their professional, educational, and entrepreneurial backgrounds, many Taiwanese do not find it necessary to join with the older Chinatown enclaves and have elected to reside at sites where they believe that opportunity beckons.
2054 | Taiwanese Immigrants
Age and Family Structure The Taiwanese population in the United States largely reflects the importance of migration and the Immigration Act of 1965. Taiwanese in this country are predominantly foreign born and outnumber the American born. The 2000 Census statistics of those born in Taiwan indicate that 4.1 percent are over the age of 65, 29.7 percent are between 45 and 64, 57.6 percent are between 20 and 44, and 8.7 percent are 19 and under (U.S. Census 2004, Table FBP-1). While in Taiwan the notion of having an extended family of parents, children, and grandparents living together is valued, that practice has been modified in the United States. Migration has often left the grandparents in Taiwan, while their children and grandchildren reside in this country as nuclear families. While family unification is possible under immigration law, oftentimes the grandparents prefer to remain in Taiwan. The ease of air transportation makes it possible for the Taiwanese in this country to visit their parents or siblings in Taiwan, or vice versa. The ease of air transportation coupled with a dynamic economy in Taiwan also makes it feasible to have transnational families. One member of a family, the husband, lives and works in Taiwan, while the wife and children remain in the United States. While in Taiwan, this family member maintains close ties with his parents,
A Taiwanese American extended family at their home in Schenectady, New York, 2001. (Ellen Senisi/The Image Works)
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siblings, and other relatives, and from time to time flies back to the United States to see his wife and children. These trans-Pacific commuters are often labeled taikongren or “astronauts.” As China looms larger in the global economy, the husbands may also travel there to develop business opportunities or to supervise their investments. Chinese kinship terminology as used in Taiwan is very specialized and precise. Classified by anthropologists as the Sudanese kinship system, it recognizes family members and relatives according to age, generation, gender, and lineage or relationship to the person’s parents. Thus, zufumu is the term for the parents of one’s father, while waizufumu is the term for the parents of one’s mother. Gege is the word for an older brother, while didi is the word for a brother younger than the speaker. Jiejie is the label for an older sister, while meimei is the label for a sister younger than the speaker. There are similar descriptive terms for uncles, aunts, and cousins. Bofu refers to the older brother of one’s father, while shufu is the father’s younger brother. Gumu is the sister of one’s father, while yimu is the sister of one’s mother. Tangge is the father’s brother’s older son, while gubiaoge is the mother’s brother’s older son. While these kinship terms are easily understood by those in Taiwan or immigrant Taiwanese parents, their American-born children may have difficulty comprehending these terms and their correct usage, as these labels are much more precise than the American practice of referring to grandparents, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, and cousins in general terms. The terms have embedded in them intricate kinship relationships that are befuddling to the American-born offspring. In all likelihood, second- or third-generation Taiwanese Americans will not make use of these Chinese kinship terms. They will use what anthropologists call North American kinship terminology, or the Eskimo kinship system, which does not distinguish between relatives on the father or mother’s side. The parents’ siblings are differentiated by sex as uncles and aunts only, and the children of the parents’ siblings are just labeled as cousins without distinction as to sex.
Educational Attainment Taiwan is often described as a society with Confucian values with a strong emphasis on education. In Taiwan, entrance into the most prestigious universities, such as National Taiwan University, is extremely competitive. Parents strive to prepare their children for entry into these selective universities by closely monitoring their education even before junior high school. The schools in which the children are to be enrolled are carefully scrutinized. The children are also placed in cram schools called buxiban to instill extra information and to reinforce learning, so that they can perform well on entrance examinations for the universities. These cram schools conduct their sessions after the regular school day.
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Given this stress on education in Taiwan, it is not surprising that the amount of schooling for those from Taiwan is quite high. Many of them have stellar credentials and advanced degrees. The 2000 Census of those born in Taiwan indicates that 93.4 percent had a high school education or higher, 66.6 percent had a bachelor’s degree or higher, and 37.1 percent had a graduate or professional degree. This level of educational attainment for an immigrant population is certainly impressive, but not surprising to those familiar with the premium placed on education in Taiwan. There a sound education is seen as a prerequisite for a successful career and advancement in society.
Economic Attainment Because many of the first-generation Taiwanese immigrants came to the United States to further their education and professional development, their educational background level was quite high. Because of the Confucian emphasis on education in Taiwan, a large number entered careers teaching in American universities and colleges. Many taught in the natural sciences, engineering, mathematics, computer science, and information sciences. Those who had pursued advanced degrees in the humanities, social sciences, and linguistics often remained in this country as the experts teaching about China from the 1960s to the 1990s. Today, however, as this generation retires, they are being replaced in American universities by professors who come from mainland China. Other Taiwanese immigrants went into different professions as scientists, engineers, computer specialists, and software developers. Some worked for corporations and universities, while others started their own ventures. The Taiwanese have especially made a reputation for themselves in the computer and software industry, bringing about innovation and introducing new breakthroughs. The Silicon Valley phenomenon as an incubator for new business and technological developments has become legendary, with many Taiwanese playing key roles in this remarkable success story. Jerry Yang, who was born in Taipei and is a graduate of Stanford University, and a cofounder of Yahoo!, is perhaps one of the most visible examples of a Taiwanese American who has made a significant contribution to the development of the Internet in the United States. Of course, some of the professionals also include physicians, dentists, pharmacists, optometrists, counselors, therapists, teachers, and social workers. Still other Taiwanese have been entrepreneurs and entered careers in business. They may have started as accountants or have been investors, financiers, insurance agents, bankers, stockbrokers, and realtors. They may also have been managers and owners of businesses. In sites with large numbers of Taiwanese residents, strip malls and ethnoburbs have appeared, which show the influence of Taiwanese capital and business acumen. Ethnoburbs is a term for suburban ethnic groupings of
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businesses and residences, which are different than the older ethnic enclaves known as Chinatowns (Li 1998). In the ethnoburbs, there are concentrations of restaurants, banks, bookstores, groceries, karaoke parlors, bakeries, snack shops, pharmacies, medical clinics, dental and optometrist offices, beauty salons, and other establishments. Frequently, a large Asian supermarket may be in the vicinity, as, for example, the Ranch 99 Markets founded by Taiwanese Roger H. Chen.
Occupation and Income Patterns Taiwanese Americans are heavily represented in the management, professional, and related occupations. They may also be found in the sales, manufacturing, retail, finance, entertainment, and food service areas. Still others work in the sector of educational, health, and social services. Because of their educational level and economic attainment, the household income for Taiwanese Americans allows many of them to enjoy a suburban and middle-class lifestyle. The mode income in 1999 for 17.0 percent of households was in the $50,000 to $74,999 range, while 15.2 percent were in the $100,000 to $149,999 range. Of the Taiwanese households, 12.1 percent had an income of $150,000 or more. The median income for households was $59,612. Given the very pronounced professional occupation representation and high educational level of Taiwanese Americans, it is easy to perceive them as a model minority. While the successful trajectories of many Taiwanese Americans are easily noticeable, there are also those who are less fortunate. According to several researchers, the percentage of Taiwanese immigrant families that are below the poverty line is higher than that of non-Hispanic whites. In 1990, the poverty rate for Taiwanese American families was 11.2 percent (Zhao 2010, 135, 180fn7; Lai and Arguelles 2003, 43–44).
Health Statistics and Issues Taiwanese Americans appear to have no outstanding health issues in the United States. Because of a diet that traditionally favors vegetables, fish, and rice, with modest portions of meat in bite-sized morsels, many do not have problems with high cholesterol and heart attacks. Some do have anemia due to iron deficiency, while others exhibit lactose intolerance in not being able to digest milk or dairy products. As Taiwanese become more acculturated to the United States, however, especially the second and subsequent generations, their diet may undergo change with the accompanying consequences in health. Some studies do suggest that Taiwanese Americans may face mental health issues of several types. There are seniors who feel linguistically and socially isolated because of language, culture, and the absence of others of their age group. And there
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are others who feel that coming from Taiwan to the United States, there are difficult challenges and stress in adjusting to a different society and culture. Finally, some feel that there are issues of discrimination and racism in American society. Taiwanese professionals in various settings may express dissatisfaction with being passed over for promotion because of perceptions that they do not possess the requisite social skills to act in a supervisory or leadership position. They complain that as skilled and educated professionals, they have encountered “a glass ceiling” (Asian American Health Initiative 2008; Gu 2006).
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals The family is important in Confucian values and Taiwanese culture, and children are told from an early age that what they do reflects upon the reputation of the family. In Taiwan, every child has the family surname and then a given name in Chinese. Thus, a boy could be called Li Dayi. But a child could also be given a English name in Taiwan, and this is certainly the case for those of the second generation in the United States. Hence, a child could be identified as David Dayi Li or Dayi David Li. In this country, a second-generation Taiwanese American is likely to have in order the English name, then the given Chinese name, and finally the family surname. Within the family, children are told to respect parents and older relatives. Respect for the parents does not only mean being obedient and showing filial piety, but also doing well in school. This brings honor to the family name. The children are also asked to obey older siblings and to watch and help their younger brothers and sisters. This keeps the family cohesive and harmonious as a single unit. When in public, children should conduct themselves with proper decorum and exhibit good manners, as it reflects upon the family in the community. Life-cycle rituals are important in the Taiwanese American family. Marriage can be considered the first phase in starting a family. While traditionally there could be arranged marriages, in contemporary Taiwan and in the United States a marriage occurs because of love between the couple. Often the couple will meet at a university, workplace, or a social function. If the pair appears to be serious, traditionminded Taiwanese parents may consult a Chinese almanac to read the horoscopes for the prospective bride and groom to see if the match is auspicious. They may also look at the almanac to select a favorable day for the wedding ceremony. There may be an engagement party, but there almost certainly will be a wedding ceremony and banquet. In the United States, the ceremony can be at a church or a civil ceremony at city hall. If it is a celebration according to traditional Taiwanese custom, there will be a tea ceremony, in which the couple will serve cups of tea to
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the parents. In exchange, they will receive red envelopes filled with money and the bride will receive jewelry. Guests may bring gifts or envelopes bearing money to present to the couple. At the wedding banquet, the bride may wear a Chinese dress and Chinese foods may be served. There may also be the use of firecrackers and performers dancing as lions to celebrate the occasion. Guests and well-wishers may play games and tease the newly wedded couple. In some instances, the couple may also have a second wedding banquet in Taiwan. Such an event may occur if one or two sets of parents or many relatives and friends are in Taiwan. But a second banquet does not happen as frequently, as the costs of the flight and the banquet in Taiwan can be expensive. The birth of children is a joyous happening. Before the birth of the baby, the mother is provided with foods that will strengthen her body and good nourishment for the child. There are also food taboos or items that should not be consumed during this time, such as the eating of lamb. After the birth of the child, foods are offered to restore the strength of the mother and to ensure her good health. In the Taiwanese community, the birth of a baby is an exciting event, and when the baby is one month old, many families follow up with a first month party. In general, Taiwanese Americans observe birthdays each year much as in the rest of American society. The 60th, 70th, and 80th birthdays are considered special occasions to be celebrated with greater fanfare. At birthdays, longevity noodles and longevity buns in the shape of peaches are often served with the usual birthday cake graced with candles, ice cream, and other foods. Gifts or envelopes of money will also be offered to the one celebrating the birthday. Funerals are the occasion for mourning and the gathering of relatives and friends. In Taiwan, the rites can be Christian, Buddhist, and Daoist, along with other religious beliefs. In the United States, many Taiwanese Americans do not have as elaborate funeral services as in Taiwan. In many instances, the family conducts the observances at funeral parlors or mortuaries. Christians, for example, may have services at the funeral parlor before the interment at a memorial park or grave site. Those who are Buddhists may have services, to be followed, in some cases, with cremation. Daoist ceremonies have the burning of incense, paper money, and other burial goods to accompany the deceased in the other life. Afterward, those who attended the funeral service or the interment are usually invited to a meal at a restaurant.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Taiwan, with its traditional Confucian background, values the idea of the extended family with three generations under one roof. But migration to the United States means that not all members of the family will be represented in this country. Most
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Taiwanese Americans live in a nuclear family with the parents and their children. It may also be that siblings and their families are in the United States but in different geographical regions of the country. But the parents still try to maintain ties with their own relations by use of the phone, Internet, or a trip across the country or to Taiwan. Even though there may by physical separation, attempts are made to bridge the distance by constant contact. The traditional Taiwanese family also tended to be more patriarchal in orientation. Although contemporary Taiwan is changing, the father continues to have a more dominant presence and is considered the head of family. The father is heavily involved with work and may not be as directly linked with the raising of the family. The mother, on the other hand, is supposed to be overseeing the children, supervising their schooling, and handling all the activities concerned with the smooth operation of the household. Even if the wife is employed, the domestic chores are considered her major responsibility. In the United States, relations between a husband and wife in the Taiwanese community are generally more egalitarian. American middle-class mores dictate that there is more symmetry in the roles of the parents, and both may be breadwinners and holding jobs. Moreover, it is not considered inappropriate for men to share household responsibilities with their wives and do the laundry, the washing of dishes, cooking, and other duties. The idealized American lifestyle is supposed to be one with greater leisure and time for recreation. As a result, parents can spend more time with their children by getting involved in their schools, and participating in other activities. That interracial and interethnic dating, as well as intermarriage, often occurs in American society may also confer greater power and autonomy upon Taiwanese women. Taiwanese women can date those of other Asian ethnic groups as well as those of other races. Thus, Taiwanese women may date or marry Chinese from Hong Kong, China, Singapore, or Southeast Asia. Or, they may interact with those who are Americans of Japanese, Korean, Filipino, South Asian, or Southeast Asian descent. Open, too, is the possibility of links with those of European American, Latino, or African American backgrounds. That all these options are available indicates the wide realm of choices that Taiwanese women can make. And, indeed, intermarriage has been taking place among Taiwanese American men and women with those of other backgrounds. Thus, the 2000 Census indicated that the number of those who were Taiwanese alone was 118,048, while the number of Taiwanese background with that of another group was 144,795.
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity The question of national culture and identity is a complex one for Taiwanese Americans. In the Republic of China on Taiwan, opinion is divided as to whether the
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residents there are Chinese, or Taiwanese, or both. The politics among the different parties reflects these divisions. For example, the Nationalist Party believes that Taiwan is the Republic of China, its people are Chinese, and that there should be one China, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) favors the independence of Taiwan from China. The DPP prefers to categorize the people on Taiwan as Taiwanese and distinct from the Chinese. The Nationalist Party is supported by a Pan-Blue Coalition, which includes the People First Party and the New Party. The Democratic Progressive Party is linked to a Pan-Green Coalition, which includes the Taiwanese Solidarity Union and Taiwan Independence Party. But the question of Taiwanese American identity is also related to the international status of Taiwan. Apart from the politics in the Republic of China, do people in the United States think that Taiwan should be part of China? Or are Taiwan and China separate countries? American public opinion is important, as the United States is the major source of weapons such as aircraft and missiles to ensure the defense of Taiwan. In addition, the international reality is that Taiwan is not accorded representation in the United Nations and many other international organizations. Few countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, as most recognize the People’s Republic of China. In the Olympic competitions, Taiwan is labeled as Chinese Taipei. As the economy of China grows ever more prominent on the global scene, will Taiwan be more inextricably linked to its Chinese neighbor?
Continued Links to Taiwan Because Taiwanese immigration to the United States is relatively recent, with most migrants having entered this country since 1965, ties to Taiwan are still strong. These connections are many. First, many of the first-generation Taiwanese immigrants still retain close relationships with family members, friends, and other acquaintances in Taiwan. Second, because of their familiarity with the Taiwanese economy, Taiwanese Americans can see business possibilities in acting as intermediaries or investors in services and manufacturing that can be sold to American consumers and corporations. As an example, Taiwan has shipped software, computers, computer boards, and other items to the United States. Third, because of the economic importance of Taiwan, transportation and communication between that country and the United States is easy and convenient. Numerous air carriers offer service to Taiwan, so it is easy to hop onto a flight headed there from major American cities. Some Taiwanese Americans have become transnational businessmen who jet back and forth between this country and Taiwan, or even reside there for extended intervals. Fourth, when Taiwanese Americans hear about natural disasters and calamities to Taiwan, many of them offer donations and other assistance. This was certainly the case for the great earthquake that rocked Taiwan on September 21, 1999. There was also a tremendous outpouring of concern for the
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disastrous flooding and destruction wrought by Typhoon Morakot, which hit Taiwan in August of 2009. At the same time, because some first-generation immigrants have feelings for their former homeland, they are extremely interested in the politics of Taiwan. They have formed support groups for politicians from the Nationalist Party or the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan. They are involved in political organizations like the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), which is located in Washington, D.C., and favors an independent Taiwan. It keeps a close eye on U.S. government policies that might affect Taiwan and tries to lobby Congress on various issues. Understandably, some Taiwanese Americans have even participated in the presidential elections in Taiwan. But in order to vote, they had to return to that country to vote in person. Such activity by Taiwanese Americans was reported in the Chinese press for the presidential elections in 2000, 2004, and 2008.
Social Organizations Based on National/Ethnic Background In the early phase of Taiwanese immigration, those who sought community involvement might join with Chinese organizations whose membership was largely Cantonese. They affiliated with the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Associations, Chinese American clubs, and professional organizations. But as the stream of Taiwanese migrants increased, by the 1980s and 1990s, more and more Taiwanese organizations began to appear. Today in numerous large and midsized communities, the opportunities to link up with a Taiwanese American organization are many. Probably the first of the Taiwanese organizations to be readily visible were the student organizations. At many colleges and universities, the Taiwanese formed clubs and associations to socialize and organize activities. Oftentimes, these organizations welcomed new arrivals to a campus, gave them orientation, and offered guidance on how to adjust to life in a new community. They also scheduled activities such as sightseeing, camping, visiting other universities, and holding dances, parties, picnics, and celebrations for the lunar New Year. At the present time, numerous colleges and universities have Taiwanese student organizations whose members are international students from Taiwan and Taiwanese Americans. Across the United States, many of the Taiwanese student organizations on campuses are affiliated with the Intercollegiate Taiwanese American Student Association (ITASA). From its founding in the 1990s, the organization has evolved to encompass the East Coast, the Midwest, and the West Coast. It holds annual regional meetings that are opportunities for socializing as well as exploring issues of Taiwanese identity. In 2010, there were regional conferences in Boston at MIT, in Austin at the University of Texas, and in San Diego at the University of California, San Diego.
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Another type of organization that is visible in the Taiwanese community is the alumni association. First-generation Taiwanese Americans cherish the memories of their school days in Taiwan, so they have organized alumni associations linked to various colleges and universities. These alumni may come from universities such as National Taiwan University, National Chiao Tung University, and National Tsing Hua University. They may even have come from high schools; for example, there is an alumni association for the graduates of the Taipei First Girls’ High School. Alumni from medical schools and universities in the health professions also have their associations. At meetings of these alumni associations, there may be symposia, speeches, meals, and entertainment. Representatives from these schools, colleges, and universities in Taiwan may attend to give information about changes that are taking place and engage in fundraising with the alumni who are present. Associations representing the different professions have also appeared in the Taiwanese community. As Taiwanese Americans are heavily represented in many professional fields, organizations have formed to cater to their interests. There are professional organizations for engineers, computer scientists, educators, businessmen, accountants, scientists, and physicians. For example, there is a North American Taiwanese Professors Association (NATPA). There is even an organization for those who operate hotels and inns. At meetings of these organizations, there are opportunities to exchange information and to socialize. But they can also help to protect the interests of the members from policies or pending actions that might impact them negatively. As a body, they can lobby or apply pressure to try to effect a compromise or to achieve a better result. There are also other kinds of organizations for Taiwanese Americans, including groups for women, and those of the Hakka background. The Taiwanese American Citizens League (TACL), for example, was formed in Monterey Park in 1985, with several chapters throughout the United States. Most strongly represented in California, it promotes a sense of pride in the Taiwanese American heritage and identity, even as it promotes an awareness of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. It tries to network with other organizations in the Taiwanese, Asian, and Pacific Islander communities to further an appreciation of diversity in the United States. In the past, it mounted a campaign to have the Taiwanese listed as a separate category in the U.S. Census. For Taiwanese Americans, too, there are a number of Taiwan or Taiwanese centers, in places such as New York and Los Angeles. These centers provide a site for scheduled recreational, social, and other activities. For women, there is a North American Taiwanese Women’s Association (NATWA), which has chapters distributed across the United States. The organization holds an annual meeting with speakers and other activities. Local chapters also host their own events. For those from Taiwan who are of the Hakka cultural and linguistic background, there are several organizations for them in this country.
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Religion For the Taiwanese community, religion assumes an important function in their lives. Not only is it a matter of faith, but the churches and temples are also the sites for the organization of important social activities for their families and other acquaintances. Even as these sites help to maintain their sense of identity as people from Taiwan, these locations can provide them with the means to transcend ethnic boundaries in America, too. It allows them to join with others of the same religious persuasion in the United States and Taiwan and feel that they are part of a larger national or international community. In recent years, the American cultural landscape has witnessed a rapid growth in the practice of many religions that can be found in Taiwan, such as Christianity and Buddhism. In the United States, it appears that a greater percentage of Taiwanese attend Christian churches than in Taiwan. One reason may be that many of the Christians in Taiwan were highly educated and were more likely to be among those who migrated to America. Another reason is that attendance at Christian churches offers fellowship and companionship to those who have moved to a different country. The Taiwanese Christian churches are immigrant or ethnic centers, and some Taiwanese see the churches as convenient sites to meet with other Taiwanese. The denominations of Christianity that are subscribed to within the Taiwanese community are those of Protestant Christianity and Catholicism. The Protestants may be Presbyterians, Baptists, Congregationalists, Seventh Day Adventists, or other denominations. All of these denominations can be found in Taiwan (Rubinstein 1991, 271–72). Many, however, join nondenominational Protestant churches with an evangelical or fundamentalist outlook. In many cases the churches offer services in the Mandarin Chinese or Taiwanese language. English services are also offered, which are especially needed for the more acculturated children who are of the first generation or those of the second generation. In Taiwan itself, the Presbyterian Church identified early with the Taiwanese and printed Bibles with Taiwanese romanization. In the past, it also sided with those Taiwanese dissidents who were opposed to Nationalist government rule (Tyson 1967, 167). Because of this legacy, some Taiwanese continue their affiliation with the Presbyterian Church in the United States. Nonetheless, the location is important, and in some areas, Taiwanese Presbyterians find it easier to join with other Taiwanese or Chinese Protestant churches. The Christian churches that the Taiwanese belong to vary in size and membership. If the number of Taiwanese in a geographical region is not large, they may seek permission to use a non-Asian church or a school for their services. Alternatively, they may be part of a congregation that includes Cantonese-speaking Chinese and Chinese from Southeast Asia or China. For churches to be viable, there must be a larger congregation to bolster its finances. The ministers must receive
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A Presbyterian church in Irvine, California, with a Taiwanese congregation. (Courtesy of Franklin Ng)
salaries and benefits, the church and its grounds must be maintained, the utility bills have to be paid, and there are other costs. As a result, it is not unusual to have several Taiwanese or Chinese churches in the same area competing for membership. Under these circumstances, Taiwanese churchgoers have a choice as to the congregation with which they wish to affiliate. They may base their decision of membership on several considerations. First of all, the language of the service is important. Whether the language used is Mandarin Chinese or Taiwanese may matter. Another concern is the personality and manner of the pastor, or the operating style of the lay board that governs the church. For the youth, it may be the way activities and services are handled in a way that appeals to them. Finally, the composition of the church itself can be crucial. The number of American-born Chinese or Taiwanese, and of Cantonese, mainland Chinese, or non-Chinese congregants might play a role. Whether the class background or the status of the congregation is middle class or professional might make the church more desirable. Also, if most of the congregation is of middle age with younger families, or if they are mostly of a more elderly or senior generation, may mean a great deal to some persons. All these aspects may influence the range of activities available in a church. People often wish to join with those who have a similar background and comparable interests (Palinkas 1984, 255–77).
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Buddhism is also practiced within the Taiwanese American community. The Buddhist organizations and temples popular among Taiwanese Americans are generally of the Mahayana school, which is also widely practiced with those of Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese ancestry in this country. The temples in this country are often branches affiliated with larger ones in Taiwan. An example is the Tzu Chi organization, with its many temples in the United States. The Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation with its headquarters in Hualien, a city in eastern Taiwan, is led by Master Cheng Yen. By emphasizing charity, compassion, and service, the Tzu Chi Foundation has been able to infuse its members with a sense of purpose and energy. The organization has experienced rapid growth in Taiwan and other countries. In the United States, it has established many branches devoted to helping those in need. It has developed a reputation as a charitable organization that provides medical, dental, and other health services to those who are indigent or in distress. The Tzu Chi Foundation often dispatches teams to areas that have suffered natural disasters and aids the victims. Thus, it sent its members to help the victims of the San Francisco earthquake in 1989, the Northridge earthquake in Southern California in 1994, and Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2007. Another example is the Fo Guang Shan Monastic order, which has the largest Buddhist monastery in Taiwan at Kaohsiung. Founded by Master Hsing Yun, with the purpose of promoting Buddhism through education, charitable work, and other activities, the order has developed branches in many countries outside of Taiwan. In the United States, its most visible presence is the large Hsi Lai Temple at Hacienda Heights in the San Gabriel Valley near Los Angeles. It is an enormous complex with many halls and gardens that rests on 15 acres. Seen from a distance, its yellow-tiled roof and red columns are an impressive sight. There is a constant stream of visitors and practitioners who come to witness the imposing temple or to participate in its busy schedule of services and events. The Hsi Lai Temple is connected with the Buddhist Light International Association, which seeks to realize Buddhist ideas in the contemporary world by benefiting society through helping others and relieving their suffering. Taiwanese popular religion is also practiced among Taiwanese Americans. The popular religion of Taiwan is a syncretism of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. For its practitioners, there is the worship of different gods, deities, and cultural or historical figures. Among the Taiwanese, an important goddess in their popular religion is Mazu, who is also known as Tianhou. Mazu is a goddess of the sea and the empress of heaven. Believed to originate in Meizhou in the province of Fujian in China, she was known for her kindness and compassion for sailors and for those in need. There are Mazu temples throughout the United States, but practitioners can also worship her in the privacy of their homes. In recent years, Taiwanese Americans have also made pilgrimages to Mazu temples in Taiwan, or to Mazu temple on Meizhou island, just off the coast of Fujian.
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Language Issues People from Taiwan speak the Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese, or Hakka languages. For a long period after World War II, the Nationalist government of Taiwan emphasized the use of Mandarin Chinese as the official language. The local people in Taiwan, who had lived there before 1949, were more accustomed to speaking in the Taiwanese, Hakka, aboriginal, or Japanese languages. Taiwanese is the popular term for the Hokkien or Southern Min language spoken in the southern part of Fujian province. It is also widely used by the Chinese in Southeast Asia. The Hakka, who migrated to Taiwan from Guangdong province, used their own language. The aboriginal groups in Taiwan preferred to use their own tribal languages. Finally, because of the Japanese occupation of the island from 1895 to 1945, many of the people on Taiwan also learned to speak the Japanese language. Because the educational system under the Republic of Taiwan has emphasized the use of Mandarin Chinese, the majority of people in Taiwan can speak this language. A sizable number can speak Hokkien, while a smaller minority speaks Hakka. With the ending of martial law in 1987, there has been a greater tolerance for the free expression of ideas in Taiwan. Reacting against the legacy of harsh Nationalist governance in the past and undemocratic Communist rule on the mainland, many people on Taiwan wish to chart a course for Taiwan that is independent of China. In keeping with this desire, they argue that Taiwan has its own history, its own culture, and its own language, which is different from that of China and the Chinese. As a result, on political campaigns, some candidates speak in Hokkien, rather than in Mandarin Chinese, to demonstrate their ties to the Taiwanese heritage. In this context, whether to promote the official use of Mandarin Chinese versus that of Hokkien has become a subject for contentious debates in Taiwan. The Hakka minority in Taiwan objects to the teaching of Hokkien in schools, as they feel a focus on Mandarin Chinese and Hokkien will negatively affect the continued usage of the Hakka language. The divisions over language usage in Taiwan are mirrored to a certain extent among those from Taiwan in the United States who speak the Mandarin Chinese, Hokkien, and Hakka languages.
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media The Taiwanese community in the United States has a wide array of news and media sources available to them. There are many Chinese newspapers, all of which offer news about Taiwan and the Taiwanese in this country. The Chinese newspaper with the largest circulation in the United States is the World Journal, also known as the Chinese Daily News. The paper is affiliated with the United Daily News and its associated news conglomerate in Taiwan. Another newspaper that is available is the Taiwan Daily. It was formerly linked to a newspaper of the same name in Taiwan
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that no longer is published. While the World Journal supports the Nationalist Party and the idea of one China, the Taiwan Daily is close to the Democratic Progressive Party and favors independence for Taiwan separate from China. The World Journal can be considered the most popular Taiwanese paper in the United States, and it is also the Chinese paper with the largest circulation. In comparison, the Taiwan Daily has a much smaller readership and is not available at many newsstands. There are other Chinese newspapers that can be read by Taiwanese Americans, and these include the Sing Tao Daily, the International Daily News, and the China Press. The Sing Tao Daily is generally viewed as a paper that covers Hong Kong, while the International Daily News and the China Press tend to be more sympathetic to mainland China. All the papers compete for Chinese readers and advertisers, so they generally offer news to varying degrees about Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, and the Chinese and Taiwanese in the United States. Reflecting the changes in media today, the Taiwanese newspapers have Internet sites so that they can be read online. Even the government of the Republic of China has Internet sites for its publications, Taiwan Today and Taiwan Panorama. Those who read English and wish to keep up to date with the news in Taiwan can also go online to read the China Post and the Taipei Times. The former takes a Pro-Blue Coalition stance, while the latter is allied to the Pro-Green Coalition. Those who can read Chinese can go online to read the papers on Taiwan, such as the United Daily News, the China Times, the Liberty Times, and the Apple Daily. In addition, Taiwanese Americans can gain access to news and entertainment through television stations, cable networks, satellite transmissions, and personal
A newspaper rack with Taiwanese, Chinese, and Hong Kong newspapers, California. (Courtesy of Franklin Ng)
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computers. In certain parts of the country, local television channels transmit Chinese and Taiwanese programming at scheduled times. This can be seen in various parts of California, such as the San Francisco Bay and San Gabriel Valley areas. Those who subscribe to cable television can get continuous television programming from Taiwan through different cable and satellite packages. With the use of personal computers, access to television and radio news and entertainment, such as music, movies, clips, and dramas, is not difficult. Particularly popular with Taiwanese Americans these days are Taiwanese television dramas modeled on the Korean serial dramas. These dramas can easily be purchased from stores that stock Taiwanese CDs, DVDs, games, and other entertainment media. It is also possible to get news and information by communicating though social networking or blogging via computers, cell phones, and other new technologies.
Celebration of National Holidays Taiwanese Americans observe the regular holidays in the United States, but they also celebrate some of the festive occasions that are common in Taiwan. Some of these events are determined according to the lunar calendar used for these occasions in South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. The most notable holidays are the Chinese New Year, the Lantern Festival, the Dragon Boat Festival, and the Mid-Autumn Festival. The Chinese New Year is also called the lunar New Year in East Asia. It is a happy occasion for the Taiwanese community, as it augurs the coming of spring, a time for new beginnings. Special preparations include the cleaning of the house before the arrival of the New Year, decoration with flowers, plants, and fruits, and the cooking of holiday foods. Expressions of good wishes are posted on the walls and doors, and families gather for reunions. On the day of the New Year, children may serve tea to their parents and elders and are rewarded with red envelopes filled with money. In communities where this is permitted, firecrackers can be lighted, and the loud noise adds to the festiveness of the celebration. Linked with the New Year is the Lantern Festival. This event occurs on the 15th day of the Lunar New Year. In Taiwan, it is the occasion for an elaborate celebration with a tremendous display of colorful lanterns. In the United States, the celebrations usually focus on the Chinese New Year itself, but in some communities with sizable Taiwanese and Chinese populations, the lantern festivals may also be observed. Families may serve as a holiday treat a glutinous rice ball soup called yuanxiao or tangyuan. The smooth rounded shape of the balls is a symbol for harmony and the togetherness of the family. The Dragon Boat Festival is traditionally celebrated on the fifth day of the fifth month of the lunar calendar. The event commemorates the death of Qu Yuan, an upright and honest minister of the Zhou dynasty in China, who drowned in the Mi
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Lo River. People rushed to their boats in a desperate but vain attempt to rescue him. Qu Yuan’s death is seen as an act of courage and patriotism, and his memory is honored by this tradition of racing dragon boats. The practice of dragon boat racing is observed in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China, but in recent years, it has also been introduced to the United States. Communities such as Honolulu, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle schedule dragon boat races. A holiday food known as zongzi, made of glutinous rice with various fillings, may also be eaten at this time. The Mid-Autumn Festival or Moon Festival is a harvest celebration that takes place on the 15th day of the eighth month of the lunar calendar. At this time, a full moon, round, smooth, and bright can be seen at night. The moon is viewed as a symbol of family harmony and peace. For thousands of years, the Chinese have celebrated this occasion, and it is also observed in various forms in Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, China, and Taiwan. Special moon cakes with different fillings, fruits, and other food can be eaten at this time. In several U.S. cities today, there are organized Mid-Autumn Festivals that are celebrated in the form of street fairs. This is the case with Boston, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. A carnival-like atmosphere prevails as crowds are free to wander about to purchase foods and souvenirs, watch entertainment, and learn about Asian culture. In addition to the festivals and holidays already mentioned, there are also observances held in memory of ancestors and the deceased. The Clear and Bright Festival falls around the fifth day of the fourth month according to the lunar calendar. A spring festival, it is the time to visit cemeteries and gravesites to remember departed ancestors. Graves and tombstones are swept clean, and food offerings are placed there. The Ghost Festival occurs on the 15th day of the seventh month of the lunar calendar. On this day, the departed souls of the dead are able to return to earth to visit the living. Food and other offerings are usually prepared for the visiting spirits. Finally, the Republic of China and many overseas communities of Chinese and Taiwanese celebrate “Double Tenth Day” or shuang shi jie. Observed on October 10, the 10th day of the 10th month, the occasion commemorates the outbreak of the Chinese revolution in 1911 that overthrew the Manchus of the Qing dynasty and established the Republic of China. In Taiwan, the day is also referred to as Guoqing Ri or the National Celebration Day. As a result, Chinese calendars in Taiwan are dated from 1911 as a pivotal year. Thus, 2010 is referred to as Zhonghua Minguo jiushijiu nian or “the 99th year of the Republic of China.”
Foodways Taiwan is the home to rich culinary traditions. The Guangdong, Fujian, and Hakka migrants of the past introduced their food practices to the island. During the period of Japanese occupation, Japanese food practices were also brought to Taiwan.
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When China fell to the Communists, the refugees from the mainland with their knowledge of different regional cuisines also came to the island. As Taiwan prospered in recent decades, its affluence allowed it to refine the quality and appearance of its dishes and to innovate in new artistic and creative directions. Initially, Taiwanese Americans, as purveyors of culinary traditions from Taiwan, opened restaurants for different regional Chinese cuisines, other than that of the Cantonese variety. But as the number of Taiwanese in the United States increased, more Taiwanese restaurants began to appear with their Fujianese and Hakka dishes. As befits a background from an island setting, there is also a rich assortment of seafood dishes. In addition, menus feature the popular beef noodle soup dishes, scallion cakes, stinky tofu, and Taiwanese sausages. As staples, the restaurants serve rice, noodles, porridge, glutinous dumplings, and buns. Snack shops sell boba tea drinks with their tapioca balls and Taiwanese-styled ice cream desserts. Bakeries offer many of the pastry items that might be found in Taipei. Markets, like those of the Ranch 99 Supermarket chain, offer fresh and live seafood, which is prized by Taiwanese consumers. Swimming in their water tanks are different kinds of fish, shrimp, crabs, lobsters, and mussels.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Taiwanese Americans of the first generation are familiar with a wide array of music, arts, and entertainment from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The music, for example, can be Beijing opera or Taiwanese opera. But much more popular is the contemporary, traditional, and folk music from the three regions, which has a rich history. Both in Taiwan and the United States, Taiwanese Americans are aware of singers and groups, past and present, in the “Chinese cultural sphere,” and, depending upon personal preferences, they can listen to those that they like. The performers may sing in Mandarin Chinese, Hokkien, and Cantonese. Thus, any list of the top Taiwanese singers is likely to elicit a spirited debate over the names of female or male artists and groups and be favored by only a particular age group. Some candidates to consider might be A-mei Zhang, Jay Chou, the late Teresa Teng, Leehom Wang, Coco Lee, Vic Zhou, Jolin Tsai, and S.H.E. Interestingly, Wang was born in the United States, while Lee was raised in this country, but both pursued musical careers in the Chinese musical world. Taiwan has a number of famous film directors who have gained international renown, such as Ang Lee, Hou Hsiao-hsien, Tsai Ming-liang, and Edward Yang. Except for those produced by Ang Lee, however, films from Taiwan have not performed successfully at box offices in Taiwan or abroad. They are seldom shown in American theaters for extended periods, if at all. This is a contrast to films from Hong Kong and a few films from China. An interesting trend that is occurring in the Chinese cultural sphere now is the production of films that feature actors and
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actresses from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Sometimes there are even stars from Japan and South Korea. The objective is to have these films shown to audiences across several different countries for greater commercial success. An area in which Taiwan appears to be achieving success is the production of television dramas. Since Korean dramas became popular several years ago in Asia and elsewhere, many countries have tried to duplicate their success. Taiwan seems to have been able to capitalize on this formula and has produced television serials that have romance and appeal to younger audiences. Oftentimes singers are cast in the series to enhance the appeal to television viewers. These productions have been popular not only in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China, but also among Taiwanese Americans.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship The majority of the immigrants from Taiwan who were born there have become naturalized citizens of the United States. U.S. Census statistics for 2000 indicate that of the 326,215 who have entered this country, 59.2 percent or 193,040 have become U.S. citizens. Those not having U.S. citizenship amounted to 40.8 percent or 133,175 persons. The largest group that had not naturalized is that of the most recent immigrants, who had come between 1990 and 2000. From this group, 29.4 percent or 95,965 persons were not U.S. citizens. Fluency in English may have a bearing on naturalization. Of these immigrants that were born in Taiwan, 93.9 percent that were five years of age and older spoke a language other than English, which was probably Mandarin Chinese, Hokkien, or Hakka. For this first generation, 54.4 percent indicated that they spoke English less than very well, while 6.1 percent said they spoke only English at home. For the group of recent arrivals, who had come between 1990 and 2000, it may be that with time, there will gain greater facility with the English language.
Dual Citizenship For Taiwanese immigrants who have become U.S. citizens through naturalization, they may be the dual citizens of two countries. They may be dual citizens because the Republic of China does not consider being naturalized with U.S. citizenship as ending citizenship status with Taiwan. To terminate citizenship with the Republic of China, one must make a formal application to its government officials. The issue of dual citizenship has sometimes led to criticism of some Taiwanese candidates for political office. Their critics have charged that these dual citizens did not
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have confidence in the future of Taiwan. It was claimed that the possession of U.S. citizenship was to provide an escape route to America if China ever threatened the security of Taiwan.
Intergroup Relations While some Taiwanese Americans consider themselves to be different from Chinese Americans, the reality is much more complex. Many Taiwanese Americans see their identity as fluid and multilayered. Depending on the situation, they can be Taiwanese American, Chinese American, Asian American, or American. On some occasions, they may interact solely with Taiwanese Americans, but on others, they will join together with Chinese Americans who may speak Mandarin Chinese, Cantonese, or other Chinese languages. In the United States, Taiwanese Americans interact with Chinese Americans that have variegated backgrounds. While many are Cantonese, there are those who are from Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the different regions of China. While the majority of the Chinese in the United States are foreign-born, a large group is also American-born. In attending churches, starting businesses, enrolling children in a Chinese-language school, attending universities, or other activities, Taiwanese Americans must interact with a variety of Chinese Americans. This is also the case in the celebration of events such as the Lunar New Year, Lantern Festival, Mid-Autumn Festival, and Dragon Boat Races. Indeed, some Taiwanese Americans have become members of civil rights groups such as the Organization for Chinese Americans. Others have entered pageants for Miss Chinatown contests or pageants. Along with mixing with Chinese Americans, Taiwanese Americans are finding common ground with Asian Americans. Some discover that a process of racialization categorizes all Asians together, regardless of whether they might be Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, or South Asian. Taiwanese Americans, who are university students, learn in Asian American Studies courses that in the past discriminatory legislation and laws affected all the groups of Asians in the United States. As a result, some Taiwanese Americans find it beneficial to cooperate with other Asian American and Pacific Islander groups to promote a climate of greater tolerance and acceptance of other cultures. They may participate in Asian American festivals, street fairs, and other community events.
Forging a New American Political Identity Political Associations and Organizations The Taiwanese American community has witnessed the development of many political associations and organizations. Some focus on the politics of Taiwan, while
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others focus on the politics of the United States. That they should be concerned about the politics of Taiwan is not surprising, as some harbor memories of the suppression of their political involvement and expression of opinions until martial law finally ended in 1987. With their history of opposition to the Nationalist Party, many have sided with the opposing Democratic Progressive Party. They champion independence for Taiwan, favor stronger U.S. support for Taiwan, and are opposed to policies that might benefit China or draw Taiwan closer to China. Examples of organizations with such a political stance are abundant. They include the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) and the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). WUFI was formed in 1970 with chapters in countries outside of Taiwan. It continues to oppose the Nationalist Party, promote the independence of Taiwan, and criticize China. FAPA was started in 1982 in Los Angeles and maintains its headquarters in Washington, D.C., so that it can lobby the U.S. Congress and other policy organizations to protect the independence of Taiwan. It also puts out the Taiwan Communique, a bimonthly journal about the
Demonstrators representing more than 30 Taiwanese American and allied organizations reach the west side of the Capitol during the March for Taiwan in Washington, D.C., February 28, 2007. The march made its way from Philadelphia to Washington to mark the anniversary of the February 28, 1947, Nationalist Chinese massacre of Taiwanese people. (Karen Bleier/ AFP/Getty Images)
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politics of Taiwan. The publication used to be issued by the Center for Taiwan International Relations, dating from 1980, but in 2006, FAPA assumed control of the journal. Both WUFI and FAPA maintain Web sites to report on events in Taiwan and to publicize their positions on various issues. Taiwanese American political organizations, and organizations that support the Nationalist Party and the idea of closer ties between Taiwan and China, are less evident. But most cities in the United States with large Chinese communities have traditional organizations and associations that are supportive of the Republic of China, the Nationalist Party, and closer ties with mainland China. An example of such an organization is the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association in many cities with large Chinese American populations. Supporters of the Nationalist Party can thus forge ties with these Chinese Americans. For Taiwanese Americans who wish to influence the course of domestic American politics at the local, state, or national levels, the opportunities are many. Whether they are permanent residents or U.S. citizens, they can participate by voting in elections, appearing at meetings and rallies, donating labor in organizational efforts, or giving financial support to help the candidate or party of their choice. One organization that encourages participation in American community life is the Taiwanese American Citizens League (TACL). Started in 1985 and having several chapters distributed across the country, the TACL encourages knowledge about the responsibilities and rights of U.S. citizenship, the development of leadership skills, and participation in community service. It has supported efforts to have Taiwanese Americans counted in the U.S. Census as a way of encouraging empowerment and improving the quality of life for Taiwanese Americans. At the same time, it has taken a position of endorsing sovereignty and self-determination for Taiwan.
Civic and Electoral Participation Taiwanese Americans are aware that the cornerstone of any democracy is active engagement with the issues of the community and the nation. For this reason, they are seen as potential donors for campaigns and possible voters in elections. But the Taiwanese Americans also know that they can lobby government agencies and try to influence those holding political office. They are not afraid to take contrary positions even if that leads them to oppose the U.S. government and local officials. There are many instances of this. For example, the United States formally recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the official government of China. Nevertheless, many Taiwanese Americans try to influence Washington to sell military arms and equipment to Taiwan. They also press for the representation of Taiwan in international organizations such as the World Health Organization. To lobby the Congress, they often join with think tanks to influence legislation. This includes organizations such as the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation.
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They also maintain ties with the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, composed of members of Congress, to apprise them of developments that may affect the security and status of Taiwan. Another example is the furor that arose in Irvine, California, in 2006. Irvine city officials had sought to have a sister city relationship with Xuhui, a district in Shanghai. They signed agreements that would have halted the sending of delegations to Taiwan, the playing of the anthem of the Republic of China, or the displaying of its flag. When the Taiwanese Americans in the area found out about these agreements, they were upset and protested. Irvine had previously set up a sister city arrangement with Taoyuan in Taiwan in 2000, and the new agreements appeared to be slighting their former homeland. Faced with the angry response, Irvine city officials backed down and revised the agreement (Pasco 2006).
Public Policies and Political Representation Influencing public policies and legislation on the domestic and international level is enhanced if there is a high degree of involvement and participation at a leadership level. For Taiwanese Americans, their political representation has been increased through their organizations, civic engagement, and participation in running for elected positions. In recent years, a number of Taiwanese Americans have campaigned for political offices and have been successful in attaining these posts. One illustration of this is the career of David Wu. Born in Hsinchu, Taiwan in 1955, he immigrated with his parents to the United States in 1961. He graduated from Stanford University and received a law degree from Yale University in 1982. After working for a law firm in Oregon, he was elected to Congress as a Democrat in 1998. He holds the distinction of being the first Taiwanese American to have served in the House of Representatives and has been reelected for five additional terms. Another example is Elaine Chao, who has attained high political office, but not by being elected. Born in Taipei, Taiwan, in 1953, she moved with her family to the United States in 1961. After graduating from Mount Holyoke College in 1975, she earned an MBA degree from Harvard Business School in 1979. Working at first for several corporations, she began to serve in government posts, including that of the director of the Peace Corps. After being the president and chief executive officer for the United Way, she later accepted the position of U.S. Secretary of Labor under President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2009. She thus became the first Asian American woman and Taiwanese American to have held a cabinet post. A Republican in politics, she is also the wife of Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky.
Return Immigration Since Taiwan has achieved the status of a major economic power in the past several decades, some return migration has occurred among Taiwanese Americans. For
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some of the first generation, going back to Taiwan is a chance to rekindle childhood memories and to reignite ties with family and friends. Moreover, the establishment of Hsinchu Science and Technology Industrial Park in northern Taiwan was a successful attempt to replicate the Silicon Valley experience. The area is a hightechnology center for the information, semiconductor, and electronic industries. High incomes for those with the requisite technical and scientific skills can now be found in Hsinchu and some other sites in Taiwan. Yuan-tseh Lee, the Nobel Prize winning chemist, who left the University of California at Berkeley to go to Taiwan in 1993, is an example of return migration. He gave up his U.S. citizenship to head Academia Sinica, Taiwan’s most prestigious academic organization. As the leader of this organization, he also sought to recruit other Taiwanese Americans to return to Taiwan to further its scientific and technical capabilities. Not all who have returned to Taiwan are necessarily remaining there permanently. Some are cases of transnational families who are capitalizing on opportunities available at the moment in Taiwan and China. Taiwan exports and imports much from China, and some Taiwanese Americans find that they can act as brokers or entrepreneurs in facilitating the ties or investments between the two countries. Others are acting as brokers or supervising investments with linkages between the United States and Taiwan or China. Should there be political tensions in the future between Taiwan and China, or China and the United States, then the return migrations might well be affected.
The Second and Later Generations Ethnic Identity The fate of ethnic identity for the second and later generations of Taiwanese Americans is far from certain. It may be that they will cherish the memories of their parents for Taiwan and see Taiwanese American identity as being separate and distinct from that of Chinese Americans. But Taiwanese American identity may also be influenced by the future of intergroup relations within the United States, events in Taiwan, and the relations between Taiwan and China. Eric Liu, who was born in New York in 1968, calls himself “an accidental Asian” (1998). His parents emigrated from Taiwan to the United States, and Liu got to know his grandmother, who lived here as well. Liu graduated from Yale University and Harvard Law School, became a speechwriter for President Bill Clinton, and so his career can be deemed successful. But birth does not make him an Asian, only “an accidental Asian.” He does not want to be labeled as an Asian or an assimilated American, and he wishes to just be himself, one of a kind. In his personal life, he married a white woman from the South, who is a Jewish American. Liu’s questioning of his identity may be indicative of the scenarios that will be faced by other
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Singer and Actress Evonne Hsu, also known as Xu Huixin, is a Mandarin Chinese singer in Taiwan. Born in 1979 in Longview, Texas, she graduated from the University of Texas in Austin with a BA in psychology. While on a visit to Taipei, she met with members of a music agency, who had seen a tape of her singing. She signed a contract with Universal Music and in 2002 released an album, To Be Happy, which was very well received. Since then, she has recorded many other albums and published a book, Evonne (2004). Extremely versatile, she appeared as the leading character “Snow” in noted singer Jacky Cheung’s musical Snow Wolf Lake (2005). She also had a role in the much-watched Taiwan television drama, Miss No Good (2008). Hsu has received favorable notice as a fast-rising Mandopop singer, extremely popular with audiences in Taiwan and Asia.
Taiwanese Americans of the second and later generations. How will intermarriage and mixed ethnicity affect Taiwanese American identity? Events in Taiwan may also introduce unpredictable changes that impact on Taiwanese American identity. Some of the first-generation Taiwanese Americans remembered the legacy of one-sided Nationalist Party rule and yearned for democracy in Taiwan. From 2000 to 2008, the Democratic Progressive Party won two presidential elections and espoused policies that favored Taiwanese sovereignty and a distinctive Taiwanese identity separate from that of China. However, the policies of the Democratic Progressive Party were divisive and were not popular with the electorate, and in the 2008 presidential election, the Nationalist Party candidate, Ma
The NBA Claims This Taiwanese American Jeremy Lin is a basketball player who was drafted by the Golden State Warriors in 2010. One seldom thinks of an Ivy League student as a basketball star. But Lin is one such person. Born in 1988, in Palo Alto, California, he played basketball in his childhood. During his high school years, he led his team to the division II state championship. Outstanding as a player on the Palo Alto High School team, he was given extensive coverage by much of the California sports media and was selected to be his division’s Player of the Year. Also having a strong academic record, he was admitted to Harvard University in 2006. He played for the university for four years and helped his team to compile winning records. In July of 2010, he was drafted by the Golden State Warriors of the National Basketball Association.
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Up-and-Coming Director Justin Lin is a rising film director with several prominent titles to his credit. Born in Taipei in 1971, he grew up in Buena Park in Orange County, California. He attended UCLA and received a BA and MFA from its School of Film and Television. While working with youth, he hatched the idea for a screenplay that became the film Better Luck Tomorrow. Shown at the Sundance Film Festival in 2002, the film went on to win critical success to debunk the image of Asian Americans as only a model minority. It particularly appealed to young audiences for its depiction of wild and unruly behavior of Asian American youth, challenging the conventional stereotypes of Asian Americans as commonly depicted in the media. Some of his other films include Annapolis (2006), The Fast and the Furious: Tokyo Drift (2006), and Fast & Furious (2009). The last film scored with high attendance figures and was a box office success.
Ying-jeou, defeated his DPP rival. Since assuming office, President Ma has been conciliatory to China and has muted the idea of Taiwan independence. Finally, relations between Taiwan and China may undergo change. With China projected to be the world’s second-largest economic power behind the United States but ahead of Japan, its role in the global economy has become ever more important. This has had ramifications for Taiwan. Chinese tourists are now visiting Taiwan, flights go directly between China and Taiwan, and Taiwanese businessmen are supervising investments and factories in China. Taiwanese singers and actors are performing before large audiences in China, and they join also in film productions
A Successful Actress and Engineer Tiffany Shiau is starting a career as a promising actor. This might be surprising, as she is a graduate in 2006 from the University of California at Berkeley, majoring in industrial engineering and operations research, with a minor in music performance. Born in Cerritos, California, to Taiwanese parents, she studied piano when she was young. But her talent was obvious as she performed at many concerts. After taking an acting class during college, she was cast in several films and television programs. She has had roles in L.A. Hit (2008), One Child (2008), K-Town (2009), and Bait & Switch (2010). Even as she pursues her artistic interests, she also works as an engineer for Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems. In 2009, she competed in the Miss Taiwanese-American pageant and demonstrated her bilingual fluency in speaking English and Mandarin Chinese.
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with actors from Hong Kong and China. Colleges and universities in Taiwan are also eagerly anticipating the admission of students from China. As Taiwan renegotiates its place vis-à-vis China in the “Chinese cultural sphere,” that might have consequences for Taiwanese American identity.
Educational Attainment Taiwanese Americans of the first generation are an example of a brain drain from Taiwan to the United States. Beneficiaries of higher education in Taiwan, they were human capital that had taken flight to America. The first generation is all too cognizant of the value of an investment in education, and they have tried to transmit these values to the second generation. From the very beginning, Taiwanese American parents have tried to direct the course of their children’s educational experience. As a result, many of the second generation have been successful in gaining admission to prestigious colleges and universities in the United States and have entered professional occupations. But whether the same successful results will be relayed to the third generation of Taiwanese Americans is an open question. The social capital and networks by which the first generation of Taiwanese Americans shared information and resources in their adaptation to the United States may be less available for the second generation. As the second generation seeks to be assimilated and win acceptance by the larger society, their values diverge from that of the immigrant generation. At that point, their children of the relatively affluent and highly educated second generation, namely, the third generation, may “converge to the mean” (Zhou 2009, 224). Intergenerational mobility may mean downward mobility. Only time can tell.
A Career at the Piano and in Song Vienna Teng was originally named Cynthia Yih Shih. But she adopted the name Vienna for her performing career. Born in Saratoga, California, in 1978, she graduated from Stanford University with a degree in computer science and worked for Cisco Systems. But as a student, she had joined a musical group and had composed songs. This interest eventually crested as she left her job in 2002 and began a career in playing the piano and writing her own songs. Since then, she has appeared on national television, gone on tours, and released several albums that have been bestsellers. Many of her fans cite as one of their favorites her version of “Green Island Serenade,” a Taiwanese song, sung in Mandarin.
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A Popular Taiwanese American Musician, Actor, and Producer Leehom Wang is a popular singer in Taiwan and Asia. Born in 1976, in Rochester, New York, to immigrant parents from Taiwan, he attended Williams College and majored in Asian Studies and religion. In his childhood, he had received violin lessons, and in college, he had joined a singing group. While in Taiwan visiting his grandparents, he was signed to a recording contract and launched his singing career. In the 1990s, he won several prestigious Golden Melody Awards in Taiwan and was acclaimed for both his vocalist and composing abilities. Many of his albums have achieved breakthrough success. He is known for his versatility in musical styles and has sung in Mandarin, Cantonese, and Japanese. Not only has he been an actor and producer for several films, but he has also served as conductor for the Hong Kong Philharmonic Orchestra.
Cultural Identification First-generation Taiwanese American organizations are not certain that the second and later generations are committed to a Taiwanese American identity. Even in Taiwan itself, a younger generation is reportedly less interested in the issues of Taiwanese identity that were so compelling for the activists of the last two decades. While more and more people seem to be identifying with Taiwan, they do not necessarily see themselves as Taiwanese or exclusively Taiwanese. In any event, the situation is fluid and far from unidirectional. In the same way, younger Taiwanese Americans of the second and third generations may not be as concerned about claiming a Taiwanese American identity. Moreover, in American universities and Chinese-language schools, the emphasis today is on teaching Mandarin Chinese and learning about the society and culture of China. The Advanced Placement SAT tests given each year by the College Entrance Board for college credit is for fluency and comprehension of Mandarin Chinese, not the Hokkien or Hakka languages. Taiwanese American organizations are aware of this fluid situation, and many of them have committed resources to promote the formation of a Taiwanese American identity among the younger generation. This includes scholarships, internships, trips to Taiwan, summer camps, conferences, and other activities that can lead to discussions about Taiwanese American identity. Web sites such as TaiwaneseAmerican.org highlight the accomplishments of Taiwanese American youth and try to instill a sense of pride in being Taiwanese American. In a number of different geographical regions, social networking is encouraged as a means of building ties among budding Taiwanese Americans professionals of the younger generation. There are also events to foster an awareness about being Taiwanese American,
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like a Miss Taiwanese American pageant, a Taiwanese American Heritage Week in May, and a “Write in ‘Taiwanese’ ” campaign for the 2010 U.S. Census. Oftentimes, these efforts tend to lend direct or indirect support to the idea of an independent and sovereign Taiwan.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Taiwan Forecasts for the 21st Century The fate of the Republic of China on Taiwan depends to a great extent on diplomatic and military support from the United States. While Washington does not extend formal diplomatic recognition to Taipei, it has repeatedly stated that it wished the issue of relations between China and Taiwan to be resolved peaceably without conflict. In the global arena, it is only the United States that has suggested that it might protect Taiwan if China were to threaten the island with military force. No other country in the world has been willing to make such a pronouncement, and the United Nations might not act on behalf of a threatened Taiwan, as the Republic of China is not a member of that international body. For their part, China’s leaders believe that Taiwan is an integral part of the People’s Republic of China and should be united with it, just like Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999. For that reason, Taiwan and Taiwanese American organizations feel that it is important to try to influence American public opinion and the U.S. Congress to support Taiwan. Since 1949, a China Lobby, which later became the current Taiwan Lobby, has been generally successfully in this endeavor. But with the tremendous rise of China as an economic power, this situation may undergo change. China and the United States are important trade partners, and Washington also feels it needs to enlist the help of Beijing on international issues, so the desire is for greater cooperation between the two capitals. With this new development, Taiwan and Taiwanese Americans have a growing sense of unease. They cannot predict the future, but they fear that the outcome may not bode well for Taiwanese sovereignty or independence. Yet it may also be that as China increasingly becomes a key player in the world arena, there may be a peaceful resolution to the issue of a Taiwan separated politically from China. That would be an outcome that Taiwanese Americans would very much welcome.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 311 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and selected country of last residence: fiscal years 1950 to 2009 Region and Country of Last Residence Taiwan Year
Number
1950–1959
721
1960–1969
15,657
1970–1979
83,155
1980–1989
119,051
1990–1999
132,647
2000
9,457
2001
12,457
2002
9,932
2003
7,168
2004
9,314
2005
9,389
2006
8,545
2007
9,053
2008
9,237
2009
8,105
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2009. Table 2.
Table 312 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by broad class of admission and region and country of birth: fiscal years 2008, 2009 2008
2009
Total
9,073
8,038
Family-Sponsored Preferences
2,751
1,884
Employment-Based Preferences
3,281
2,519
Immediate Relatives of U.S. Citizens
2,762
3,372
263
251
6
5
10
7
Diversity Refugees and Asylees Other
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2008, 2009. Table 10.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 313 Taiwanese population by detailed group: 2000 Asian Alone
Taiwanese
One Asian Group Reported
118,048
Two or More Asian Groups Reported
14,096
Asian in Combination with One or More Other Races One Asian Group Reported
11,394
Two or More Asian Groups Reported Asian Detailed Group Alone or in Any Combination
1,257 144,795
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Brief. The Asian Population: 2000, Table 4.
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Table 314 Profile of people born in Taiwan: U.S. citizenship and period of entry: 2000 Number Total Population
326,215
Percent 100
U.S. Citizenship and Period of U.S. Entry Naturalized U.S. Citizen
193,040
59.2
Entered 1990 to 2000
19,760
6.1
Entered 1980 to 1989
97,270
29.8
Entered before 1980
76,010
23.3
133,175
40.8
Entered 1990 to 2000
95,965
29.4
Entered 1980 to 1989
32,485
10
Entered before 1980
4,730
Not a U.S. Citizen
1.4
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2000. Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics: 2000. Table FBP-1. People Born in Taiwan.
Table 315 Profile of people born in Taiwan: sex and age: 2000 Sex and Age
Number
Percent
Total Population
326,215
100.5
Male
145,070
44.5
Female
181,145
55.5
Under 5 Years
1, 245
0.4
5 to 9 Years
3,160
1
10 to 14 Years
5,885
1.8
15 to 19 Years
17,950
5.5
20 to 24 Years
31,665
9.7
25 to 34 Years
71,195
21.8
35 to 44 Years
85,005
26.1
45 to 54 Years
73,350
22.5
55 to 59 Years
13,555
4.2
60 to 64 Years
9,745
3
65 to 74 Years
9,255
2.8
75 to 84 Years
3,460
1.1
745
0.2
85 Years and Over Median Age (Years)
Not applicable (Continued )
2085
Table 315 Profile of people born in Taiwan: sex and age: 2000 (Continued ) Sex and Age
Number
Percent
18 Years and Over
307,420
94
Male
135,090
41.4
Female
172,330
52.8
21 Years and Over
292,390
89.6
62 Years and Over
18,675
5.7
65 Years and Over
13,460
4.1
Male
5,495
1.7
Female
7,965
2.4
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2000. Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics: 2000. Table FBP-1. People Born in Taiwan.
Table 316 Profile of people born in Taiwan: language spoken at home: 2000 Language Spoken at Home
Number
Percent
324,970
100.3
19,905
6.1
Language other than English
305,065
93.9
Speak English less than “very well”
176,760
54.4
Spanish
720
0.2
Speak English less than “very well”
280
0.1
1,840
0.6
850
0.3
Population 5 Years and Over English only
Other Indo-European languages Speak English less than “very well” Asian and Pacific Island languages
302,315
93
Speak English less than “very well”
175,545
54
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2000. Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics: 2000. Table FBP-1. People Born in Taiwan.
2086
Table 317 Profile of people born in Taiwan: enrollment and educational attainment: 2000 School Enrollment
Number
Percent
88,580
100
Population three years and over Enrolled in school Nursery school, preschool
645
0.7
Kindergarten
620
0.7
7,385
8.3
High school (grades 9–12)
12,875
14.5
College or graduate school
67,055
75.7
Elementary school (grades 1–8)
Educational Attainment Population 25 years and over
266,315
100
Less than 9th grade
9,610
3.6
9th to12th grade, no diploma
8,025
3
High school graduate (includes equivalency)
28,125
10.6
Some college, no degree
24,090
9
Associate degree
19,110
7.2
Bachelor’s degree
78,550
29.5
Graduate or professional degree
98,805
37.1
Percent high school graduate or higher
Not applicable
93.4
Percent college graduate or higher
Not applicable
66.6
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2000. Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics: 2000. Table FBP-1. People Born in Taiwan.
2087
Table 318 People born in Taiwan: profile of selected economic characteristics: 2000 Income in 1999
Number
Households Less than $10,000
Percent
134,600
100.0
19,120
14.2
$10,000 to $14,999
4,920
3.7
$15,000 to $24,999
9,475
7.0
$25,000 to $34,999
9,935
7.4
$35,000 to $49,999
14,775
11.0
$50,000 to $74,999
22,895
17.0
$75,000 to $99,999
16,770
12.5
$100,000 to $149,999
20,430
15.2
$150,000 to $199,999
8,635
6.4
$200,000 or more
7,635
5.7
59,612
Not Applicable
Median household income (dollars)
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2000. Profile of Selected Economic Characteristics: 2000. Table FBP-2. People Born in Taiwan.
Table 319 Occupations of employed workers in the civilian labor force age 16 and older by gender and origin, 2008 Taiwanese Foreign Born
Persons 16 and older employed in the civilian labor force Total Percent
All Foreign Born
Male
Female
Male
Female
114,411
112,723
13,630,931
9,505,339
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Management, business, finance
23.2
27.9
10.7
10.4
Information technology
15.8
5.8
4.0
1.9
Other sciences and engineering
14.2
6.4
4.1
2.2
Social services and legal
2.2
1.7
1.1
2.0
Education/training and media/entertainment
8.4
10.0
3.4
7.1
Physicians
4.7
1.8
1.2
1.0
Registered nurses
0.1
2.7
0.4
3.4
Other health-care practitioners
1.3
2.9
1.0
2.9
Health-care support
0.2
1.3
0.6
5.4
Services Sales
6.1
8.2
17.4
25.7
10.8
11.4
7.5
10.5
5.3
15.3
5.3
14.7
Administrative support Construction, extraction, and transportation
3.9
1.0
25.9
3.3
Manufacturing, installation, and repair
3.6
3.0
14.6
8.5
Source: 2008 American Community Survey, cited in Lin 2010.
2088
Table 320 Residence of those born in Taiwan in 2008 State
Numbers
Percent
California
160,675
46.9
New York
29,954
8.7
Texas
24,781
7.2
New Jersey
14,085
4.1
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA
83,294
24.3
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
39,617
11.6
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA
30,562
8.9
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA
23,299
6.8
Metropolitan Area
Source: Lin 2010.
Table 321 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence; region/ country: Taiwan
Total Arizona
Total
Male
Female
8,038
3,033
5,005
81
31
50
California
3,749
1,510
2,239
Colorado
72
29
43
Connecticut
45
11
34
Florida
154
59
95
Georgia
102
30
72
Hawaii
53
12
41
Illinois
179
72
107
Maryland
193
71
122
Massachusetts
196
72
124
Michigan
111
44
67
Nevada
45
12
33
New Jersey
350
131
219
New York
732
250
482
North Carolina
74
28
46
Ohio
80
29
51
120
46
74
Pennsylvania Texas
555
195
360
Virginia
184
65
119
Washington
188
114
174
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009. Cobbook 181. 2010 and State of Residence, Stbk 15. 2010.
2089
2090 | Taiwanese Immigrants
Appendix III: Notable Taiwanese Americans Elaine Chao is the former U.S. Secretary of Labor. Born in Taipei in 1953, she emigrated with her family to the United States in 1961. She attended Columbia University but graduated from Mount Holyoke College with a major in economics. Continuing at Harvard Business School, she earned an MBA degree in 1979. She worked in the private sector and then became the Peace Corps director under President George H. W. Bush. After that post, she was asked to be the president and chief executive officer for the United Way of America. When George W. Bush became President, she took on the cabinet position of Secretary of Labor. Elaine Chao is a Republican and is married to Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky. David Ho is a scientist known for his research into AIDS. Born in 1952, in Taichung, Taiwan, he came with his family to the United States and grew up in Los Angeles. He graduated from the California Institute of Technology with a major in physics and went on to receive a medical degree from Harvard Medical School. Interested in academic medicine, he decided to focus his research on AIDS. He has published hundreds of papers on AIDS and HIV. He is well known for his idea of combining several antiviral medications as a means to combat HIV. He was hailed as Time magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 1996 and has received many honors and awards. Ang Lee is a director who has won critical acclaim for many of his films. Born in Taiwan in 1954, he came to the United States to study at the University of Illinois. Because of his lack of fluency in English, he decided to major in film rather than acting. Upon graduation, he went to New York University to study film making and earned an MFA degree. Since starting his career, he has had a string of successful films, which include Pushing Hands (1992), The Wedding Banquet (1993), Eat Drink Man Woman (1994), Sense and Sensibility (1995), The Ice Storm (1997), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), Brokeback Mountain (2005), and Lust, Caution (2007). Especially astonishing to film critics is Lee’s uncanny ability to direct films that have a tremendous diversity in cultural background and subject matter. Goodwin Liu is a professor of law and associate dean at the Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley. He was born in 1970, in Augusta, Georgia. His parents were medical doctors who had emigrated from Taiwan to the United States in the 1960s. Liu graduated from Stanford University with a BA in biology and attended Oxford University on a Rhodes Scholarship. He followed up by earning a law degree from Yale University, clerking for a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, serving in a number of different government posts, and finally joining the law faculty at Berkeley. He
Glossary | 2091
has published widely and is often asked by the media for insight on legal and educational issues. David Wu is a member of the House of Representatives from Oregon. Born in 1955, in Hsinchu, Taiwan, he immigrated with his family to New York in 1961. He graduated from Stanford University, briefly attended Harvard Medical School, and earned a law degree from Yale University. After clerking for a judge and working as an attorney, he ran for Congress as a Democrat in 1998 and was reelected for five terms. He is popular with the voters in his home state and is a member of the Taiwan Caucus and the Asian Pacific American Caucus in the Congress. Jerry Yang was born in Taipei in 1968 but moved with his family to San Jose, California. He received his undergraduate education at Stanford University, earning a BA degree in electrical engineering, and continued there for a doctoral degree in the same subject. However, while developing a list of Web sites with David Filo, they created the directory for the Internet later to be known as “Yahoo!” With the popularity of their Web portal, Yang and Filo started Yahoo! Inc. and launched what became an entrepreneurial success story. The two never completed their doctoral studies but are considered pioneer visionaries in helping to develop the architecture of the global Internet. Yang later became the CEO of Yahoo! and also served on the board of several organizations and corporations.
Glossary (Note: Names of persons, places, and organizations use the spelling of the country that they are associated with. For Taiwan, the words are often romanized according to the Wade-Giles system. For China, the words are romanized according to the Hanyu Pinyin system.) Benshengren: The people who lived in Taiwan before 1949. Boba tea: A drink with small tapioca balls. Buxiban: Cram schools. Er er ba shi jian: The February 28, 1947, incident. Fo Guang Shan: A Buddhist order linked to Taiwan. Hakka: The “guest people” who migrated from northern China to Guangdong province. Hokkien: The language from southern Fujian province in China. Hoklo: People and their descendants from southern Fujian province in China.
2092 | Taiwanese Immigrants
Kuomintang: The Nationalist Party. Mandarin Chinese: The national language of China. Mazu: A goddess worshipped by people of Taiwan, and the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. Minchintang: The Democratic Progressive Party. Shuang shi jie: Double Tenth Day or National Day in Taiwan on October 10. Stinky tofu: Fermented tofu. Taikongren: “Astronauts,” or people who fly back and forth between the United States and Taiwan. Tangyuan: Glutinous rice balls. Tianhou: Empress of Heaven; another name for Mazu. Tzu Chi: A Buddhist order with ties to Taiwan. Waishengren: People who moved to Taiwan from mainland China after 1949. Yuanxiao: Glutinous rice balls. Yuanzhumin: The aborigines of Taiwan. Zongxi: Glutinous rice that often has fillings.
References Asian American Health Initiative. 2008. “Taiwanese Community Needs Assessment Summary Report.” In Focus: A Summary of the Asian American Community Group Reports. Asian American Health Priorities. Strengths, Needs, and Opportunities for Action. A Study of Montgomery County, MD. [Online information; retrieved 7/12/10.] http://www. aahiinfo.org/english/pdf/needsAssessment/AAHI_FocusG_K_Taiwanese.pdf. Barnes, Jessica S., and Claudette E. Bennett. 2002. The Asian Population: 2000. Census 2000 Brief. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census. [Online information; retrieved 6/3/10 .] http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:lyxxTH_0GZkJ:www.census.gov/ prod/2002pubs/c2kbr0116.pdf+census+2000,+taiwanese+americans&hl=en&gl=us&p id=bl&srcid=ADGEESgXgza9xnhCLWOCROYTnKisNKeFg0tuqIIAUPynN7pHzdd 6JPKiSZpYrnbovlk3Jt4TV5Hbj1wwPtl8p1y3YMFksxT0azvvOMFcPLF_0NOndDqB q2IHMAxV-VTJOBE9ZIbm&sig=AHIEtbQRoyvwQaSGSQs9-kTGIzutIaNRtA. Chen, Carolyn. 2008. Getting Saved in America: Taiwanese Immigration and Religious Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chen, Hsiang-shui. 1992. Chinatown No More: Taiwan Immigrants in Contemporary New York. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Fong, Timothy. 1994. The First Suburban Chinatown: The Remaking of Monterey Park, California. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Gu, Chien-Juh. 2006. Mental Health among Taiwanese Americans: Gender, Immigration, and Transnational Struggles. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing.
Further Reading | 2093 Lai, Eric, and Dennis Arguelles, eds. 2003. The New Face of Asian Pacific America: Numbers, Diversity and Changes in the 21st Century. San Francisco: Asian Week. Li, Wei. 1998. “Anatomy of a New Ethnic Settlement: Chinese Ethnoburbs in Los Angeles.” Urban Studies 35 (3): 479–501. Lin, Serena Yi-Ying. 2010, July. “Taiwanese Immigrants in the United States.” Migration Information Source. [Online information; retrieved 7/16/10.] http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=790. Liu, Eric. 1998. The Accidental Asian: The Notes of a Native Speaker. New York: Random House. Palinkas, Larence A. 1984. “Social Fission and Cultural Change in an Ethnic Chinese Church.” Ethnic Groups 5: 255–77. Pasco, Jean O. 2006. “In Irvine, Taiwanese Miffed over Sister City Deal.” Los Angeles Times, June 28: 1–2. Rubinstein, Murray A. 1991. “Taiwanese Protestantism in Time and Space, 1865–1988.” In Taiwan: Economy, Society and History, edited by E.K.Y. Chen, Jack F. Williams, and Joseph Wang, 250–82. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong Press. Tyson, James. 1967. “Christians and the Taiwanese Independence Movement: A Commentary.” Asian Affairs 14: 163–70. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2000. Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics: 2000. Table FBP-1. People Born in Taiwan. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2004. The American Community, Asians: 2004. American Community Survey Reports (ACS-05). [Online information; retrieved 6/19/10.] http://docs. google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:NVMtr7I8MjoJ:www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/ acs05.pdf+american+community+survey+2005,+taiwanese+americans&hl=en&gl=us &pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgY2C6SU-XTfup4IS8–2-BQugv-QXCSCkkjEcuAPUD7d_ pvtH7cCq3eFTSOHi5cDT0OYkgsraUu0smwjPKWpKwJ9fazgsIkCHh4abgDe6Aw1CU rOMcKbPxw8nRgbvnMpTQuDTcp&sig=AHIEtbQGdCrPqZb7jKIpDDtYpJtneFcntA. Wang, James. 2009. “Taiwan Moving Backward in Time.” Taipei Times, May 21. [Online information; retrieved 5/21/09,] http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/ archives/2009/05/21/2003444124. Zhao, Xiaojian. 2010. The New Chinese America: Class, Economy, and Social Hierarchy. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Zhou, Min. 2009. Contemporary Chinese America: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Community Transformation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Further Reading Andrade, Tonio. 2008. How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century. New York: Columbia University Press. Overview of the foreign and colonial contacts with Taiwan.
2094 | Taiwanese Immigrants Browne, Melissa J. 2004. Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities. Berkeley: University of California Press. Examination of the issue of Taiwanese identity. Chang, Shenglin. 2006. The Global Silicon Valley Home: Lives and Landscapes within Taiwanese American Trans-Pacific Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Insights into the transnational aspect of Taiwanese American lives. Chee, Maria W. L. 2005. Taiwanese American Transnational Families: Women and Kin Work. New York: Routledge, 2005. Ethnography of Taiwanese American transnational families, with an emphasis on the women. Chen, Carolyn. 2008. Getting Saved in America: Taiwanese Immigration and Religious Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Studies the importance of religion in the Taiwanese American experience. Chen, Hsiang-shui. 1992. Chinatown No More: Taiwan Immigrants in Contemporary New York. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Reveals lives of Taiwanese immigrants in New York. Collet, Christian, and Pei-te Lien, eds. 2009. The Transnational Politics of Asian Americans. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Collection of essays with insights into transnational politics of Asian Americans. Copper, John F. 2009. Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Succinct guide to Taiwan’s history, politics, and place in the international arena. Fapa.org. [Online information; retrieved 7/17/10.] Site reporting on activities and legislation of concern to the Formosan Association for Public Affairs. Fong, Timothy. 1994. The First Suburban Chinatown: The Remaking of Monterey Park, California. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Brief history of Chinese and Taiwanese moving into a changing Monterey Park. Formosafoundation.org. [Online information; retrieved 7/17/10.] Organization with an Ambassador program in Washington, D.C., that trains youth to becoming activists for the self-determination of Taiwan. Greene, J. Megan. 2008. The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan: Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Looks into the trajectory of Taiwan’s scientific and educational development. Horton, John. 1995. The Politics of Diversity: Immigration, Resistance, and Change in Monterey Park, California. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Another account of changes in Monterey Park due to immigration. Itasa.org. [Online information; retrieved 7/17/10.] Site of the Intercollegiate Taiwanese American Students Association, with news about conferences, regional meetings, and university organizations.
Further Reading | 2095 Koehn, Peter H., and Xiao-huang Yin, eds. 2002. The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.-China Relations. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Examines Taiwanese and Chinese participation in U.S.–China relations. Lai, Eric, and Dennis Arguelles, eds. 2003. The New Face of Asian Pacific America: Numbers, Diversity and Changes in the 21st Century. San Francisco: Asian Week. Essays about Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, with one about Taiwanese Americans. Li, Wei. 1998. “Anatomy of a New Ethnic Settlement: Chinese Ethnoburbs in Los Angeles.” Urban Studies 35 (3): 479–501. Succinct explanation of the “ethnoburb” phenomenon. Liu, Eric. 1998. The Accidental Asian: The Notes of a Native Speaker. New York: Random House. Questioning about the meaning of being Asian in America. Louie, Vivian S. 2004. Compelled to Excel: Immigration, Education, and Opportunity among Chinese Americans. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. The role of education in the Chinese and Taiwanese American communities. Ma, Laurence J. C., and Carolyn Cartier, eds. 2003. The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Essays on Chinese communities outside of China, with one on the Taiwanese. Ng, Franklin. 1998. The Taiwanese Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Coverage of different aspects of the Taiwanese American experience. Rigger, Shelley. 2001. From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Insights into the dynamics of the main political opposition to the Nationalist Party in Taiwan. Roy, Denny. 2003. Taiwan: A Political History. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Guide to the history of modern and contemporary Taiwan. Rubinstein, Murray A., ed. 2007. Taiwan: A New History. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Essays by several contributors giving insight into different aspects of the history of Taiwan. Shepherd, John Robert. 1993. Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Analysis of the relations among the aborigines, migrants, and the Qing government. Taa-usa.org. [Online information; retrieved 7/17/10.] Bilingual site of the Taiwanese Association of America, with information on issues of importance to Taiwanese Americans. Tacl.org. [Online information; retrieved 7/17/10.] Site of the Taiwanese American Citizens League. Taiwancenter.com. [Online information; retrieved 7/17/10.]
2096 | Taiwanese Immigrants Web site with links to several Taiwan Centers and their activities and programs. TaiwaneseAmerican.org. [Online information; retrieved 7/17/10.] Site for news and links to Taiwanese Americans. Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker. 1994. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945– 1992: Uncertain Friendships. New York: Twayne Publishers. Explores the development of the relationships among the three entities. Wachman, Alan M. 1994. Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Discusses how democracy and national identity in Taiwan have evolved. Wong, Bernard P. 2006. The Chinese in Silicon Valley: Globalization, Social Networks, and Ethnic Identity. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. A look into the Silicon Valley side of the immigration experience. Zhao, Xiaojian. 2010. The New Chinese America: Class, Economy, and Social Hierarchy. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Examines the role of importance of class and hierarchy in the community. Zhou, Min. 2009. Contemporary Chinese America: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Community Transformation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Insights into the contemporary community from a sociological perspective.
Thai Immigrants by Jenjira Yahirun
Introduction The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that in 2007, 210,850 individuals of Thai descent lived in the United States. These Thai Americans are a heterogeneous population; most are foreign-born, and a smaller share consists of children and grandchildren of Thai immigrants. Thai Americans reside throughout the United States, with sizeable concentrations on the East and West coasts. The Thai American population has increased rapidly over the past 30 years, mainly through the arrival of new immigrants. Despite a growing presence in the United States, little is known about Thai Americans. Unlike other Southeast Asians living in the United States, Thai Americans do not trace their ancestry to grievous political experiences that sparked mass migration abroad. Thai Americans who are compared to Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian refugees are quick to refute these parallels, citing the “benefits,” rather than the “burdens” Thai migration has brought to American society.
Chronology 1000
Tai people, the ancestors of modern-day Thai and Laotians, arrive in Southeast Asia.
1351
The Kingdom of Ayudhya is founded as the first powerful Tai empire. The empire becomes synonymous with Syam (Siam).
1511
Ayudhya signs a peace treaty with the Portuguese, guaranteeing the Portuguese the right to settle, practice their own religion, and trade in the kingdom; Ayudhya, in turn, is provided with firearms. This is Siam’s first encounter with the West.
1767
Ayudhya falls to the Burmese and the Siamese capital is moved to Thon Buri.
1781
The Siamese capital is moved to Bangkok, and the Chakri dynasty (1781–current) is founded. 2097
Chronology | 2099
1826
Siam signs the Burney trade treaty with Great Britain in 1826, solidifying trade relations with the West after a long period of isolationism.
1851
Rama IV and Rama V modernize Siam and skillfully negotiate treaties with European powers so that Thailand is never colonized.
1932
A handful of Thai elite form the People’s Party, a political party lead by Luang Phibun Songkhram. The People’s Party forces the king to accept a constitution, putting an end to absolute monarchy.
1934
Rama VII abdicates the throne. Siam is renamed Thailand and Luang Phibun Songkhram becomes the first prime minister and military dictator of Thailand.
1942
Thailand signs a Treaty of Alliance with Japan during World War II, declaring war against the United States and Great Britain.
1945
World War II ends and, although Thailand faces some international criticism for its Japanese alliance, most believe that Thailand was forced into the agreement. The United States maintains goodwill toward Thailand, and Thailand joins the United Nations.
1946
The monarchy is restored when King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX) succeeds his brother Ananda Mahidol (Rama IIX) and is officially crowned king of Thailand in 1950.
1954
Thailand allies with the United States in the Vietnam War. Along with sending 11,000 troops to Vietnam, Thailand grants the United States the use of Thai air force bases for massive bombing sorties against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Vietcong.
1971
The prime minister, Thanom Kittikachorn, imposes military rule based on increasing threats of insurgency from hill tribes in the north and Muslim Malays in the south.
1970s
Political and social instability prompt the first real wave of Thai immigration to the United States, following the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. This first wave of immigrants consists predominantly of doctors, nurses, engineers, and students.
2100 | Thai Immigrants
1990s
A second wave of Thai immigration to the United States occurs. These are mostly unskilled workers immigrating through family reunification policies.
2006
A bloodless military coup deposes Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai political party is banned. A new constitution is drawn up.
2008
Pro- and anti–government demonstrators clash. Anti-government demonstrators occupy Bangkok’s international airport.
2010
Thousands of antigovernment supporters and Thaksin supporters arrive in Bangkok from mostly rural provinces to demand new elections. Violent clashes ensue, although most demonstrations are peaceful. Antigovernment leaders surrender and protestors return home.
Background Geography The majority of Thai Americans living in the United States trace their ancestry to Thailand, a country in Southeast Asia approximately twice the size of Wyoming. Thailand borders Myanmar to the north, Laos to the east, Cambodia to the southeast, and Malaysia to the south. A thin stretch of land in southern Thailand is flanked by water; the Gulf of Thailand lies to the east and the Indian Ocean to the west. The country has two large stretches of flat land, the central plain surrounding Bangkok and the Korat plateau in the east. The rest of the country is largely mountainous or coastal. Thailand’s geographic location in the heart of Southeast Asia has left a strong impression on its regional culture. Cultural norms and diet in the northern part of Thailand nod to historic links to Myanmar (Burma), and the multiple ethnic groups spanning the border between Thailand and Myanmar. Similarly, language and norms in the northeastern part of Thailand, known as Isaarn, parallel cultural practices found in modern-day Laos. In southern Thailand again, food and culture are similar to that found in Malaysia. The local dialect is infused with Malay and Khmer (Cambodian) elements. It is also the region with the largest population of Muslims, a religious minority among Thailand’s Buddhist majority.
History The earliest-known settlements in what is now modern-day Thailand extend back 40,000 years. However, the people who brought the core elements of contemporary
Background | 2101
Thai culture to the area arrived only 1,000 years ago (Wyatt 1984). These were the Tai people, an ethno-linguistic group of approximately 70 million whose modernday descendents include the ethnic Thai (or Siamese) living in Thailand, the Lao in northeast Thailand and Laos, the Shan in northeastern Myanmar, the Lü of the Yunnan Province in China, the various upland Tai living in Laos and Northern Vietnam, and the Tai Phake in Assam, India (Wyatt 1984). Popular folklore suggests that the Tai were pushed out of southern China and forced to settle throughout Southeast Asia, where they subsequently intermarried with ethnic Mon and Khmer people living in the area. Tai life in the first millennia C.E. was based on the farming household (Wyatt 1984). One to two dozen households made up a village that was subsequently linked to other villages via the Müang, the primary unit of social organization above the village level (Wyatt 1984). The Müang was governed by a chao (lord) who managed village life and negotiated on behalf of the villages with other non-Tai groups, such as the Chinese and the Vietnamese. As a political unit, the Müang also levied taxies and worked to distribute manpower between villages, as labor shortages occurred often (Wyatt 1984). Gradual expansion occurred when ruling lords of a Müang conquered or colonized nearby areas, populating them with people from the parent Müang and installing a loyal leader. By the 10th century, the Tai had expanded into what is now present-day Thailand. Their culture was greatly shaped by the prominent kingdoms of the Mon in Pagan (present-day Myanmar) and the Khmer Angkor Empire (present-day Cambodia). Although historians believe that Tai conversion to Buddhism was initiated through contact with the Dvaravati, a Mon civilization living in the area now known as the Three Pagodas pass, Theravada Buddhism as it is practiced today in Thailand was much more heavily shaped through contact with the Angkor Empire. With the obliteration of Pagan by the Mongols, the Angkor Empire grew in strength, expanding and eventually governing areas in which the Tai resided (Wyatt 1984; London 2008). The Tai and Khmer elite intermarried, but the Tai continued to maintain a distinct culture and form of social organization. Historical documents reveal that several Tai states resisted control from the Angkor Empire. Lopburi in particular was distinguished as an Angkor province with a distinctly “Syamese” (Siamese) character in the 12th century (London 2008). To the north, Sukhothai also emerged as an influential Tai city in the 13th century. Although Lopburi and Sukhothai were the first Tai kingdoms of note, they never attained the regional strength necessary to rival Pagan and Angkor. Ayudhya’s (Ayutthaya’s) rise to power marked the beginning of the first powerful Tai empire. The city was founded in 1351 in the heart of Lopburi and became increasingly synonymous with Siam (London 2008). Ayudhya’s strategic location on the Chao Praya river basin guaranteed its success as a commercial center. Beyond commerce,
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Tai culture and Theravada Buddhism also thrived. Under the Ayudhyan king Ramathibodi I, foundations for the Siamese legal system were developed. Many early Ayudhyan rulers also adopted bureaucratic and court practices similar to the Angkor kingdom, often by appointing the Khmerized elite to positions of power. The Ayudhya period also marked the first encounter between the Tai and Europeans. As Ayudhya grew in strength, it became a formidable authority over the Bay of Bengal to the east and the Malay Peninsula to the south. The Portuguese, who had recently taken over the Malaccan Straits, sent their first mission to Ayudhya in 1511. After negotiation, the two signed a peace treaty that guaranteed the Portuguese the right to settle, practice their own religion, and trade in the kingdom; Ayudhya, in turn, was provided with firearms. Ayudhya suffered multiple attacks by the Burmese and the Khmer in the mid 16th century but was later restored to independence by King Naresuan, after several decades of negligence. Foreign interests expanded and dominated the political landscape in this period, with King Naresuan sending missions to China and vigilantly protecting Ayudhya’s borders against further foreign assaults. Subsequent in-fighting among the Ayudhyans and a series of rulers who did little to develop the kingdom eventually lead to Ayudhya’s downfall, with another attack by the Burmese in 1767. With the fall of Ayudhya, the capital was moved across the Chao Praya River to Thon Buri, where its location would help buttress against future Burmese assaults. The leader who emerged during this period was a Chinese-Siamese man named Taksin (London 2008, 39). Taksin strengthened the military, recovered previously conquered territories from the Burmese, and extended the territory into Laos and Cambodia. Under his reign, trading relations with the Chinese improved and Chinese settlements in Thailand thrived. Taksin was eventually overthrown in an internal coup in 1781, at which point the capital was moved to Bangkok. The Chakri dynasty (1781–present) was founded with the move to Bangkok. The early contributions of the dynasty are too many to list but can be summed up in two words: nation-building and modernization. Under King Chetsadabodin, the third monarch (Rama III) to reign as part of the dynasty, foreign relations with the West were reestablished. Siam signed the Burney trade treaty with Britain in 1826, partly out of fear that the British would declare war on Thailand as they had on Burma in 1824. The most famous of the Chakri kings were King Mongkut (Rama IV) and his son, King Chulalongkorn (Rama V). Together, their reign lasted from 1851 to 1910. King Mongkut is widely recognized for his achievements in pacifying internal struggles and integrating the Tai and non-Tai peoples who lived within the kingdom’s territories. His skillful negotiations with British, French, U.S., and other Western interests further opened Thailand to trade with foreign countries, while simultaneously evading a dependent relationship with any of them. This, in the
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end, was central to Thailand’s continued independence. Unlike other countries in Southeast Asia that were colonized by the British and French, Thailand was never colonized. Mongkut’s son, Chulalongkorn (Rama V) continued his father’s legacy and is today credited for modernizing Thailand. In many ways, he was influenced by the excellent education he received; he was the main pupil of Anna Leonowens, the main character of Margaret Landon’s book and Oscar Hammerstein II’s play, The King and I. Chulalongkorn established ministries that divided governmental duties, replacing a regional system where all executive and legislative functions emanated from the same source. He created a tax system, brought a modern system of currency into practice, abolished slavery, and introduced a modern education system. Transportation and communication systems also expanded under his rule. Upon Chulalongkorn’s death in 1910, the monarchy suffered from a lack of clear direction. Although his son (Rama VI) carried forth many of the nationalizing goals of his father, the subsequent king (Rama VII) was ill-prepared to challenge the growing discontent among a group of overseas-educated Thai who opposed the absolute powers of the monarchy. The growing Thai middle class resented their exclusion from government and in 1932 forced Rama VII to abdicate his throne and flee to England (London 2008). Taking the king’s place, Luang Phibun Songkhram became the first military dictator and the first prime minister
Chulalongkorn, whose throne name was Rama V, ruled Siam (present-day Thailand) from 1868 to 1910 as the fifth king of the Chakri dynasty. Chulalongkorn secured the independence of Siam at the height of European imperialism. (Library of Congress)
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of Thailand (London 2008). Under Luang Phibun’s rule, the military took center stage, as it would for years to come. Thailand replaced Siam as the official name of the country. A constitutional monarchy was later formed with the return of Rama VIII to Thailand. But his unexpected assassination meant that his younger brother, Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX), would ultimately be responsible for restoring the monarchy’s place in society. Since the 1940s, conflict and internal struggle has characterized most of Thai history. Although Thailand was forced into a wartime alliance with the Japanese during World War II, Thailand later played a central role in the Cold War, siding with the United States against the spread of communism. Most notably, Thailand allied with the United States during the Vietnam War, sending approximately 11,000 of its own troops to Vietnam (London 2008). In addition, Thailand granted U.S. forces the use of Thai air bases for massive bombing sorties against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Vietcong. American forces stationed in Thailand increased to 25,000 by the end of 1972. Although the United States ultimately withdrew from the war, the bond between the two countries as allies was solidified. By the early 1970s, the oil crisis had increased inflation and threatened job security for many Thai (Boonprasat Lewis 1997). Spurred by worsened economic conditions and a growing frustration with continued military dictatorship, students and the middle class took to the streets in 1973, demanding a constitution and fair elections. Although a brief window of democracy emerged, the threat of communism brought the military to power once again in 1976, with the king’s approval. This extinguished any further hopes of an elective government. The constitution and parliament were dissolved.
Causes and Waves of Migration During this domestic turmoil many Thai began leaving for the United States. However, they were not the first. The first known Thai immigrants to the United States were Chang and Eng Bunker, the original Siamese twins, who arrived as part of a traveling tour in 1831. Chang and Eng settled in North Carolina, where they married two sisters. They brought land and slaves and owned a tobacco plantation until the Civil War broke out. Until the 1960s, only a handful of Thai had settled in the United States. Antiimmigrant sentiments were solidified in the National Origins Act of 1924, which banned virtually all immigration from Asia, including Thailand. Those who did immigrate were mostly students, a small number of travelers and visitors who had become permanent residents or American citizens. Some had also immigrated through connections with American missionaries (Bao 2009).
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Early Waves of Migration Thailand’s social and political upheaval during the 1960s and 1970s, together with a drastic change in U.S. immigration policy, instigated the first real wave of Thai immigration to the United States (Desbarats 1979). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (also known as the Hart-Cellar Act) lifted the ban on immigration from Asia that had been in place since 1924. The Act established a preference system to attract skilled and unskilled immigrants in much-needed occupations. Thus, the first wave of Thai migrants consisted mostly of professionals: doctors, nurses, and other white-collar workers (Auerbach 1994). Students also began arriving in large numbers. An exponential increase in the number of student visas was issued in the late 1960s and 1970s. In 1965, Thailand ranked number six in the number of student visas granted annually, following Mexico, Iran, Japan, China, and Nigeria (Desbarats 1979). Although many Thai arrived with the intention of going to school, several found that financial hardships, language barriers, and unexpected scholastic demands made completing their degrees impossible. Those who dropped out did not return to Thailand but instead stayed on to find unskilled or semiskilled jobs (Desbarats 1979, 304). Because they had overstayed their student visas, many petitioned for a change of status to become permanent residents. The ease with which these immigrants changed their status, however, was phased out with the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1984 (IRCA), which made applying for permanent residency while on a student visa almost impossible. A separate subset of Thai immigrants arrived as wives of American servicemen stationed in Thailand during the Vietnam War (Boonprasat Lewis 1997). The female biased sex-ratio of Thai immigrants to the United States for every year since 1968 is further evidence that marriage migration and family reunification constitutes a large part of Thai immigration (Desbarats 1979, 304). This process was further enabled by passage of the American Homecoming act in 1987, which allowed children born of U.S. military personnel to immigrate to the United States, usually with accompanying family members (Boonprasat Lewis 1997, 884). Marriage migration continues to be a significant path of entry for many Thai women wishing to immigrate to the United States. Although wives of American servicemen comprised the majority of these initial marriage migrants, the large sex tourism industry in Thailand, a legacy itself of the American presence during the Vietnam War, soon became a popular venue for men seeking wives abroad.
Later Waves of Immigration A second wave of Thai immigrants arrived in the 1990s. These were mostly unskilled workers immigrating through family reunification policies. Sociologists
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have long pointed to the network-driven nature of migration in more established immigrant communities (Massey et. al. 1999). In these situations, once initial migrants move, the financial, informational, and physical costs of migration are lowered for further migrants with the help of friends and family. Approximately half of all Thai who are foreign born arrived after 1990. See Appendix I for more information on Thai migration to the United States.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of the Community With a little over 200,000 individuals, the Thai community in the United States comprises less than one percent of the U.S. population. The age distribution of Thai Americans is similar to that of the total population, with the exception that a smaller proportion of Thai Americans are 65 and older (4.1%) compared to the general population (12.5%). Over the next decade, a large share of Thai Americans who arrived during the first migration wave will retire, and the percentage of Thai Americans age 65 and over will increase. This will significantly change the demographic character of the Thai community, which until now has consisted largely of working-age individuals. Based on 2000 Census figures, the largest share of Thai Americans reside in California, followed by Texas, Florida, and New York (see Appendix II for more details). The top cities where Thai Americans live are Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. Not coincidentally, many of these cities are also considered “gateway” cities for all immigrants, not just Thais. Los Angeles is home to the largest population of Thais living outside of Thailand; it is often considered by many as Thailand’s 77th province (Thailand officially has 76 provinces), as it hosts the first and only “Thai Town” in Hollywood. Thai Town hosts a number of restaurants, supermarkets, and stores and is a popular tourist destination for Thai Americans visiting southern California.
First- and Second-Generation Immigrants Foreign-born Thai Americans (first-generation Thai immigrants) make up approximately 60 percent of the Thai American community, according to Census 2007 estimates. Women are dominant among foreign-born individuals, outnumbering foreign-born men by a ratio of 1.5 to 1. The children and grandchildren of Thai immigrants who are born in the United States (second-generation Thai immigrants) constitute 40 percent of the Thai American community.
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Family and Marriage Patterns Compared to the sex ratio of the total population, the Thai American population is female-biased: 51 percent of the total population is female, compared to 58 percent of Thai Americans. This bias is more evident among adults aged 35 to 64; 51 percent of the total population are female, whereas 66 percent of all Thai Americans within that age range are women. Several scholars have linked the gender bias in the Thai American community to the sustained military presence in Thailand during and after the Vietnam War, which encouraged Thai female marriage migration to American men (Perreira 2007). Like other Americans, Thai Americans tend to live in family households. Female-headed households are as common among the Thai community as they are among the general population. The average household size is a little over three people. A smaller share of Thai American men over the age of 15 are married (45.2%) compared to the general population (52.3%). However, Thai American women are more likely to be married than women in the general population (54.7% versus 48.3%). Interestingly, Thai Americans, regardless of sex or nativity, are the most likely of any Asian American group to marry outside their ethnicity. In addition, they also have the most diverse marriage partners (Perreira 2007, 164). Although first- and second-generation Thai Americans who marry outside of their ethnic group show a strong preference for marrying whites, their marriage partners span the racial and ethnic spectrum. For example, 68 percent of Thai American women are married to non-Thai men; 26 percent are married to other Asians and 42 percent are married to non-Asians. Again, high levels of out-marriage within the Thai community may stem from historic ties between the United States and Thailand, through which marriage migration patterns were formed. Second, taboos against marrying non-Thais are relatively weak, especially among the second generation. Weak taboos against marrying foreigners, or farangs, may stem from Thailand’s historic eagerness to Westernize and modernize, as well as its history of independence, which mitigated any association between out-marriage and betrayal of one’s country.
Socioeconomic and Labor Force Characteristics Thai Americans are more likely to have gone to college or completed graduate level schooling than the average American (see Appendix II for details). Of all Thai Americans aged 25, 40% have at least a college degree, compared to 27.5 percent in the general population. On average, Thai American families are less likely to be affected by poverty (7.5%) when compared to the population at large (9%). Despite being more likely to have at least a college degree and having lower poverty rates, Thai Americans on average have a lower per capita income ($22,000) compared
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to the average American ($27,000). However, the average family income for Thai Americans was $62,000 in 2007, which was the same when compared to all other American families. The fact that average family incomes are the same for Thai American families and other American families despite lower levels of per capita income among Thai Americans may reflect the high degree of labor force participation among Thai American women. Although Thai American men share similar labor force characteristics as the average American man, Thai American women over the age of 15 are more likely to be in the labor force than women in the general population (64.5% versus 58.6%). Thus, norms of dual-earner families may balance out lower individual earnings in Thai American families. Unlike the general population, Thai Americans are more likely to rent than to own their homes (46.2% vs. 32.8%). They are also more likely to live in attached units, such as apartment building or condominium high-rises, than unattached, single-dwelling units. This latter fact likely reflects the urban concentration of many Thai Americans. Finally, the occupational distribution among Thai Americans differs significantly from the general population (see Appendix II for a complete breakdown). Thai American women are less likely to work in management or professional occupations than the general population (31.4% vs. 37.9%) and are also underrepresented in sales and office occupations (28.6% vs. 34.5% in the general population). Thai American men are underrepresented in construction, maintenance, and repair occupations compared to men in the total population. On the other hand, both Thai American men and women are greatly overrepresented in service occupations: 24.2 percent of Thai Americans are employed in these occupations compared to 13.7 percent of the general occupation. This likely reflects the high concentration of Thai Americans in the arts, entertainment, and food service industries. Anecdotal evidence of this has been the growth and popularity of Thai restaurants in urban and suburban areas across the United States, which are typically family-owned and family-run businesses.
Health Similar to other Asian Americans, Thai American adults suffer from high rates of hypertension, diabetes, and osteoporosis. In the only known health study to specifically survey Thai immigrants, researchers found that those who suffer from chronic disease (e.g., hypertension and diabetes) are also more likely to experience stress in everyday living (Thai CDC 2004, 8). One reason for the high rates of chronic disease in the Thai American community may be the lack of access to health care, as well as low levels of health awareness among Thai immigrants. Research has suggested that a majority of Thai immigrants lack access to health insurance, and
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a large share of Thai immigrants do not have a regular health care provider (Thai CDC 2004, 9). Health awareness is not widespread in the Thai community. The study shows that with regards to cancer screenings, the percentage of Thais who were screened for breast, cervical, or colorectal cancer was lower than the general population in Los Angeles County and California. Screening rates of cervical and breast cancers were moderate, even though cervical and breast cancer early detection programs have been implemented by nonprofit organizations in the Thai American community for years (Thai CDC 2004, 15). Unlike other Americans, first-generation Thai Americans are unlikely to participate in recreational activities that would keep them physically fit, such as going to the gym, jogging, or hiking. The study found that only 34 percent of Thai immigrants engaged in regular physical activity. On the other hand, nearly 90 percent consumed mainly Thai food, which is generally considered more nutritious than a typical American diet. However, assimilation to life in the United States might change regular eating habits, leading to increased consumption of American fast food. Promoting regular exercise and preserving the Thai diet is therefore important in reducing health risks in the Thai American community (Thai CDC 2004, 15).
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals Families play an integral role in Thai life. In Thailand, the family is highly structured, and each member has his or her specific place based on age, gender, and rank within the family. Relationships are strictly defined and named with terms so precise that they reveal the relation (parental, sibling, uncle, aunt, cousin), the relative age (younger, older), and the side of the family (maternal or paternal). In Thailand, living in extended family households is the norm, although this has been changing in favor of nuclear households with increased Westernization (Ratner 2008). Perhaps the biggest distinguishing factor between Thai households in the United States and Thailand is the absence of extended family households in the United States. But even here, a few households are multigenerational, with grandparents immigrating to care for young grandchildren (Jarusasi 1999, 14). The majority of Thai American households in the United States, however, consist only of parents and children. It is through the family that most second-generation Thai Americans learn about Thai customs and norms. One particularly important coming-of-age ritual for Thai American boys who are raised Buddhist is to become a monk-in-training, also
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A mother, originally from Thailand, and her two young children during a naturalization ceremony at the Onondaga County Courthouse in Syracuse, New York, April 22, 2010. (Syracuse Newspapers/M. Gabel/The Image Works)
known as a novice or nehn, for a period ranging from three months to three years. Historically, this ritual was meant to expose young Buddhist men to the monkhood; those who enjoyed the ascetic lifestyle would stay on and specialize in either meditation or scholarship, but those who did not returned to lay life. A young man typically completes this ritual in his early teens or early twenties, and usually for a period of three months, which in Thailand is equivalent to one rainy season (phansa). During this time, the novices learn to accept the 10 core Buddhist precepts and are expected to live the lifestyle of monks. This includes waking up early in the morning, praying, meditating, receiving food from villagers or those who visit the temple, limiting meals to twice a day, wearing a traditional monk’s robes, and living at the temple. In the United States, Thai Buddhist temples also play an important part in birth, marriage, and death rituals. Upon the birth of a child, parents visit the temple to make merit for their newborn child. This ceremony involves giving gifts to monks, usually in the form of flowers, robes, or food. This ceremony is designed to allow the newborn child to build up his or her good karma (Giles 2004).
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Members of the Thai community may also choose to marry at the Thai temple, although a religious ceremony is not necessary for the wedding. If the couple chooses, they will begin the day at the temple, where they give gifts to the monks such as flowers, food, or robes in order to gain merit. In return the monks bless them. This is then followed by a Thai cultural ceremony, which follows the bride wealth (as opposed to a bride dowry) customs of Thailand. The groom is expected to give a sum of money (sinsod) to the bride’s family in order to show the family that he is worthy of their daughter and can provide for her material needs. This usually takes place on the day of the wedding, when the groom is required to pass through several “gates” where members of the bride’s family playfully demand money from him in exchange for passage. Once he passes, elder members of the family anoint the bride’s and groom’s foreheads with three dots of paste to represent the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha of Buddhism. The elders also hang garlands around the bride and groom’s necks and place a string on the top of their heads that connects them to one another (sai monkhon). It is symbolic that the thread forms two circles that, while linked, also remain independent. All elders then step forth to give the couple a blessing by pouring holy water on their hands (rod nam sang). Thai funerals also take place at the local temple. Traditionally, these funerals last for a week, during which several activities are scheduled to make merit for the deceased. Monks are invited to chant prayers that are intended to provide merit for the deceased, as well as to provide protection against the possibility of the dead relative returning as a malicious spirit. Often, a thread is connected to the corpse or coffin, which is held by the chanting monks during their recitation; this thread is intended to transfer the merit of the monks’ recitation to the deceased. The corpse is usually cremated according to Thai Buddhist tradition.
Families and Changing Gender Relations Several scholars have noted that assimilation into American life has changed both family and gender relations (Jarusasi 1999; Codman-Wilson 1992; Arpanantikul 2001; Bao 2008). Within families, intergenerational conflict between parents and children in Thai American families are as frequent as they are among other immigrant families (Portes and Rumbaut 2002). In general, children of Thai immigrants born in the United States have an easier time adapting to American culture than their parents. Parents, however, are usually resistant and hold on to collective Thai values that stand against the core American principles of privacy and individuality. For example, Thai culture deeply stresses the idea of bun khun, which is the sense of obligation and indebtedness that children owe to their parents for raising them (Codman-Wilson 1992, 101). In typical Thai families, household power lies solely in the hands of parents, often equally distributed between mother and father. Intergenerational conflict arises when children attempt to exert their own independence
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and not follow the tradition of bun khun. Respect to all individuals who are older than oneself is also an important aspect of Thai culture. Spousal relations also change in the United States. Specifically; Thai American women’s labor force participation has promoted more equal relations between couples (Bao 2008). In the United States, Thai American men take on more responsibilities at home and share housework with their wives rather than viewing it as a purely “women’s work.” Fathers may also interact more with children, rather than taking on a detached relationship, which is more common in Thailand (Bao 2008, 150). Wives’ income contributions to the household are also interpreted differently in the United States. In Thailand, women’s labor force participation is used to provide economic support to aging parents or children; thus, their work could be interpreted as fulfilling the role of “good mothers” or “good daughters.” In the United States, Thai women’s breadwinner role is often so obvious that it need not be interpreted under other guises (Bao 2008, 152).
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Many Thai Americans maintain links to their country of origin. Personal links with family and friends who are left behind are fostered through new and cheaper communication possibilities, such as e-mail, Internet, and phone cards. Direct flights from New York and Los Angeles to Bangkok are now available and continue to decrease in cost as Thailand grows as a tourist destination.
Social Organizations A number of Thai associations can be found across the United States. These associations vary by size and purpose. Some serve to unite Thais living in the same geographic area, for example, the Thai Association of Northern California or the Thai Association of San Diego County. Others may be based on professions, for example, Thai nurses and Thai physicians have their own associations. Others include organizations formed by university alumni, for example, the Thammasat University Alumni Association in California or the Chulalongkorn University Alumni Association. Interestingly, a number of associations bring together Thai Americans from the same region in Thailand, uniting individuals who may have closer cultural ties (e.g., diet, dialect) to one another than with other Thai. For example, the Thai Isaarn Association of Washington, D.C., and the Lanna Thai of Southern California Association are home country regional organizations. In recent years, a number of service-oriented organizations have emerged to serve the Thai community. The Thai Community Development Center (CDC) has offered numerous services to help Thai entrepreneurs in Los Angeles. Thai Health and Information Services, Inc. (THAIS, Inc.) also has a service-oriented mission
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to provide culturally and linguistically appropriate health, mental health, and social services to the Thai community in the greater Los Angeles area.
Religion Of the Thai population living in Thailand, 95 percent is Theravada Buddhist. The remaining 5 percent are either Christian or Muslim. Because of their majority, it is not surprising that a large portion of the Thai American social scene takes place at the local Thai Buddhist temple (wat). Wats offer individuals the chance to fulfill their religious obligations by offering food and clothing to monks as a way of making merit, which can loosely be interpreted as gaining good kharma. There are approximately 90 Thai Buddhist temples in the United States. Religious holidays are often celebrated at the temple. For example, Buddha Day (Vesaka Puja) is the most celebrated religious day of the year. Thai temples all over
Thai Buddhist monks gather for an early morning prayer service at Wat Thai Los Angeles, the largest Thai Buddhist temple in the United States, in the North Hollywood section of Los Angeles, July 19, 2003. (AP Photo/Nick Ut)
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the United States commemorate Buddha’s birthday, Day of Enlightenment, and Day of Pari-Nirvana all in one. This is a joyous celebration involving music, circumambulating the temple, and offering food to the monks. A second important religious holiday is known as Macarpoocha, or Dharma Day, which marks the day of Buddha’s first sermon. Activities at the temples focus on learning the history of Buddha. Finally, Sangha Day (Magha Puja) commemorates the Buddha’s visit to Veruvana Monastery in the city of Rajagaha, when 1,250 monks are said to have spontaneously returned from their wanderings to pay their respects to him. The temple community hears the story of the five followers of Buddha who originally doubted him but, upon hearing his sermon, were instantly enlightened by his words. Two secular holidays, Thai New Year (Songkran) and the Festival of Lights (Loy Krathong), are also celebrated at the temple. Songkran is the biggest nonreligious holiday in Thailand and takes place in early April. Although it was originally set by astrological calculation, it is now fixed and coincides with other New Year celebrations in Southeast Asia and South Asia. Beginning early in the morning at the temple, the day involves a number of religious activities, including the pouring of lustral water to honor the Buddha image and to honor the monks, chanting by the monks, and a sermon given by the abbot in Thai. The day also involves many cultural events, including a Thai music and dance show. Local Thai stores and restaurants come to sell their merchandise and food on the temple grounds, creating a fairlike atmosphere. Loy Krathong is another important secular festival. “Loy” literally means “to float” and “Krathong” is a small raft made from a section of a banana treat tree trunk surrounded by banana leaves. Inside the rafts are flowers, candles, and incense sticks. The festival is celebrated by floating small rafts down the river and has similar origins to the Hindu Diwali. In the United States, this festival may take place at the temple but more often takes place where rafts can be floated. For example, the Thai American community in Washington, D.C., has used the Lincoln Memorial reflecting pool to launch their floats.
Language Issues Thai is a Sino-Tibetan language and is one of the oldest languages in East or Southeast Asia. In many ways, Thai is similar to Chinese. The two languages are monosyllabic tonal languages, meaning that words are determined by five different tones: a high or low tone; a level tone; and a falling or rising tone. For example, depending on the inflection, the syllable ma can mean “to come,” “horse,” or “dog.” In addition to the tonal similarities with Chinese, Thai has also borrowed the phonetic alphabet from Pali and Sanskrit. The original alphabet conceived by King Ram Khamhaeng in 1283 is still in use today. The signs of the alphabet take their pattern from Sanskrit; there are also supplemental signs for tones, which are like vowels and can stand beside or above the consonant to which they belong (Ratner 2008).
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Celebrating Thai New Year in Los Angeles, California Thai New Year, also known as Songkran, is the most widely celebrated holiday in the Thai American community. In Los Angeles, celebrations typically take place on the Sunday closest to April 13, 14, or 15. Celebrations traditionally begin with Thai Americans attending the local wat (temple), where they pray, offer food to monks, and donate money and other goods to the temple as a way of making merit. Most of the local temples in the Los Angeles area then have a cultural program that includes Thai classical music, Thai country music, and pageants. At around noon, temple-goers are invited to join in a parade around the temple. In addition to celebrations at various wats, The Thai American community also hosts a Songkran festival in Thai Town, Los Angeles. The festival takes place along Hollywood Boulevard, between Normandie Avenue and Western Avenue. Activities include Thai cooking demonstrations, arts and crafts displays, a Muay Thai fight, and country music (Luk thung) performances. Shopkeepers and other vendors set up booths along Hollywood Boulevard to sell small gifts, handicrafts, and often food. Besides bringing the Thai American community together, the street festival also provides an opportunity for Thai Americans in Los Angeles to reach out to their fellow Angelenos.
Thai American women dressed in traditional dress prepare to take part in the sixth annual Thai New Year’s Day Songkran Festival in the Hollywood section of Los Angeles, April 5, 2009. (AP Photo/Richard Vogel)
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Most first generation Thai Americans (i.e., foreign-born Thai Americans) speak Thai on a daily basis. According to U.S. Census Bureau estimates, 85 percent of all foreign-born Thai Americans speak a language other than English at home. Among these individuals, 45 percent speak English less than very well. Language barriers are especially a problem for older immigrants, either because English use becomes less prevalent with shrinking social circles as they age, or, as in most cases, because older immigrants never learned English in the first place. These are individuals who arrived in later life to care for grandchildren or to be close to their own immigrant children (Jarusasi 1999).
Thai Media In light of the extensive use of Thai in Thai American homes, Thai language media play an important role in helping foreign-born Thai Americans adjust to life in the United States while still retaining a sense of cultural identity. They also help the children and grandchildren of Thai immigrants in the United States to understand issues relevant to Thailand. In the United States, Los Angeles is the official base for Thai media (Worawongs 2005). According to a study conducted in 2005, there are approximately nine Thai-language newspapers circulated nationally and regionally on a weekly basis (Inter Thai LAX News, Sereechai Khao Sod U.S.A., Siam Media, Mahachon Thai, Thai L.A. News, Mati Seree Thai, Thai Times U.S.A. and New Choomchon News). Two Thai-language magazines are also distributed regularly. Both newspapers and magazines focus on events that occur in Thailand, as well as local events related to the Thai American community. The majority of these papers are printed in Thai, but a growing demand among second-generation Thais has also encouraged several newspapers to print articles in English (Worawongs 2005, 21). Thai newspapers are usually free and funded by advertisements. They are widely distributed in Thai restaurants, grocery stores, and bookstores. More recently, the growing demand for Thai media has lead to the popularity of satellite television (Worawongs 2005, 22). Individuals in the Thai community have installed satellite dishes, which allow them to directly receive a variety of Thai programs. Thai TV is a channel that directly serves U.S. customers and has condensed several Thai television stations into one; providing a variety of soap operas, game shows, and news (Worawongs 2005, 22).
Foodways In Thailand, a common greeting to ask someone is whether they have eaten yet (Gin kao ler yang?). The centrality of food among Thai Americans is also evident, with festival and holidays often celebrated with Thai cuisine. The popularity of Thai restaurants in the United States means that finding acceptable Thai cuisine has not
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 2117
been difficult for many Thai Americans, at least in recent years. Traditionally, Thai restaurants in the United States serve food found in the central region of Thailand, which includes Bangkok. Thailand’s national dish, pad thai, originated in this region and combines fish sauce, wide rice noodles, crispy garlic, salted and preserved cabbage, tiny dried shrimp, Chinese leeks, roasted and ground peanuts, and roasted chili powder into a stir-fry. The dish is popular and can be found in almost all Thai restaurants in the United States. However, the demand for regional cuisine has increased as the Thai American population grows. Los Angeles boasts a number of restaurants serving northern Thai, southern Thai, and northeastern Thai cuisine that can be found within blocks of one another in Thai town.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Traditional Thai music, dance, and kickboxing are still practiced in the United States, but mostly by second-generation Thai Americans who cultivate these talents at the local wat on weekends or during Thai summer camp. Today, Thai Americans who wish to listen to contemporary Thai pop or country music (pleng luk thung) can attend the numerous concerts performed by traveling Thai musicians throughout different U.S. cities. Thai kickboxing has also become a popular recreational sport that has reached out to the broader American community.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship Over the past 10 years, 45,000 Thai were naturalized (DHS 2008). For Thai Americans, naturalization rates remained stagnant between 2001 and 2007 but nearly doubled in 2008 (see Appendix I). There are two potential reasons for this. First, Prime Minister Taksin Jinawatra was officially overthrown in 2008, resulting in a precarious political situation that is far from being settled. Thai Americans who had not yet naturalized and had harbored hopes of return may have decided that the latest political instability in Thailand have made it unfit for return. A second explanation for the spike in 2008 naturalization rates was the expected fee increase associated with naturalization in 2009. This prompted those who were eligible to naturalize before then. Of the 6,930 individuals to naturalize in 2008, 36 percent resided in California, with the next largest share living in Texas (5%). Dual citizenship among Thai Americans is fairly common and generally tolerated by U.S. and Thai officials. First-generation Thai Americans who immigrate to the United States and subsequently naturalize are required to renounce their Thai citizenship. However, naturalized Thai Americans can easily recover their Thai
2118 | Thai Immigrants
citizenship through the Thai embassy. Second-generation Thai Americans who were born in the United States to Thai parents can also apply for Thai citizenship, as long as they are registered to a fixed household address in Thailand. This is usually the address where one of their parents is registered. One caveat is that all male Thai nationals are required to serve in the military for two years. This deters many second-generation Thai immigrant males from becoming dual citizens, since most do not want to join the Thai military. The number of undocumented Thai immigrants living in the United States is unknown. However, it is clear that the official Census Bureau estimate of 210,850 individuals undercounts the actual number of Thais residing in the United States. Like other undocumented migrants, Thai immigrants without legal status continue to wait for critical immigration reform, promised by President Barack Obama during his 2008 presidential campaign.
Intergroup Relations Throughout history, Thai relations with the neighboring countries of Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar (Burma) have often been contentious. Historical conflicts stem from century-old territorial disputes and constant warfare. Unfortunately, relations between Thailand and its neighbors worsened when Thailand allowed U.S. troops to use its military bases for bombing sorties in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the 1970s. Laos and Cambodia in particular resent Thailand’s power and wealth in the region, and the Laotian media is quick to cite Thailand’s growing cultural imperialism in the region as well. In the United States, relations between these groups are normally neutral, although disagreements occasionally arise when political conflicts in the countries of origin emerge. For example, members of the Cambodian community in southern California gathered at MacArthur Park in July 2008 to protest what they viewed as a recent incursion into their homeland by the Thai military. The protestors were angered over Thailand’s aggressive claim to Preah Vihear temple, a World Heritage site that straddles the border between Thailand and Cambodia (Mellen 2008). Although the protest did not lead to direct conflict between the Thai and Cambodian communities in the United States, the neutral atmosphere usually characterizing their relations was briefly interrupted. On the other hand, festivals organized within the Thai American community are often attended by other Southeast Asian groups. Laotian Americans are known to attend Thai New Year festivals and to visit Thai temples frequently. Part of this is due to the shared culture and language between Thai and Laotian Americans. A significant share of Thai Americans is also made up of Thai Chinese. These are individuals whose ancestors stemmed from China, but who settled in Thailand over the past centuries. For the Thai Chinese living in the United States, intergroup relations with Chinese Americans have been fostered by a similar culture and similar values.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 2119
The influence of Thai Americans on mainstream American culture is somewhat disproportional to the actual number of Thai Americans living in the United States. One needs only look at the popularity of Thai food and Thai kickboxing to understand this. Again, part of this may be due to the U.S. presence in Thailand during the Vietnam War, which exposed American soldiers to Thai culture and subsequently eased the incorporation of Thai culture into mainstream American culture.
Forging a New American Political Identity There is little data on the political and civic participation of Thai Americans. However, it has been noted that Thai Americans, like other Asian Americans, are not as civically or politically engaged as their Latino or African American counterparts. One reason for this is the long history of discriminatory laws that denied citizenship to Asian immigrants and rendered them ineligible to vote. It was not until 1943 that Chinese Americans were first permitted to become citizens; for Japanese Americans and other Asian Americans, that right did not come until 1952. The legacy of these discriminatory policies and the notion of Asian Americans as foreigners remain strongly felt today, impeding Asian American political participation. While Thai Americans are only beginning to participate in local politics, they have always been involved in homeland affairs. During the 1970s, several Thai American organizations formed to provide political and financial support for groups in Thailand opposing the military dictatorship (Boonprasat Lewis 1997, 887). They sent letters to Washington, urging their congressional representatives to protest against the Thai government’s treatment of political dissidents and to put pressure on the Thai government to implement democratic procedures (Boonprasat Lewis 1997, 887). More recent political events in Thailand have also engaged Thai Americans in homeland politics. The 2006 overthrow of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra by a military coup rallied Thai Americans who supported the ousted leader, as well as those who were anti-Thaksin. Pro-Thaksin supporters argued that his time in office was associated with a noticeable drop in drug use and an increase in education and health reforms that benefited all Thais and not just the urban elite. Those who opposed the former prime minister accused his government of widespread corruption and antidemocratic tactics. Thai Americans went to rallies and staged protests in front of the Thai embassy to let their voices be heard. They also participated in large numbers in the April 2007 run-off election between the former prime minister’s party and opposition parties by voting through their local consulates (Vongs 2006). Immigrant advocates hope that Thai Americans’ renewed interest in Thai elections will encourage their participation in the American democratic process (Vongs 2006). Until now, the first and only U.S. elected official of Thai descent is Gorpat Henry Charoeon. He was elected to the La Palma City Council in California on
2120 | Thai Immigrants
November 7, 2006; then on December 18, 2007, Charoen became the first mayor of Thai descent in the United States. In 2009 Ladda Tammy Duckworth was appointed by Barack Obama as the assistant secretary of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs for the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. Duckworth, the daughter of a Thai mother and an American father, was previously the director of the Illinois Department of Veterans Affairs. She is a veteran herself, having served in the Iraq war and sustained battle injuries (losing both legs) when the helicopter she was flying was hit by Iraqi insurgents.
Return Immigration Official statistics on return migration for immigrants living in the United States are not available. Although information can be pieced together through Social Security records, these data are often unreliable. Anecdotally, many first-generation Thai immigrants harbor the “dream” of returning to Thailand in later life, usually after retirement. However, assimilation into American life and the rooting of families in the United States through American-born children means that very few Thai immigrants actually migrate back. Not only do many Thai Americans find the amenities in Thailand incomparable to those in the United States, the increasingly unstable political situation in Thailand has also discouraged return for many.
The Second and Latter Generations Very little research has been conducted on the second and later generations of Thai immigrants. Nationally representative data for this group are unavailable, although smaller studies based on regional samples have been conducted. One study based on a sample of first- and second-generation Thai immigrants in the Los Angeles area found that the second generation was more likely to be “Americanized” than the first generation. This is logical, given that the second generation is born in the United States while their parents were born in Thailand. Interviews conducted with second-generation Thai immigrants suggested that the size of the Thai American community was a factor in their Americanization. For example, because there are only a handful of second-generation Thai immigrants, compared for example to second-generation Chinese Americans, finding the appropriate social networks with which they could appreciate and explore Thai culture was difficult. Beyond friends, parents are usually the main venue through which second-generation Thai immigrants learn about Thai culture. Parents may enforce “Thai only” rules when speaking at home, although this of course varies from family to family. A more common alternative is for parents to send their children to Thai Sunday school or Thai summer camp to learn Thai language and culture. This option is
The Second and Latter Generations | 2121
Youth Profile Trying to Maintain Ties to the Thai American Community Sarawon “Jane” Jetabut was born in Washington, D.C., and raised in the nearby suburb of Rockville, Maryland. Both of Jane’s parents emigrated from Thailand to the United States in the 1970s. Jane, as her family and friends know her, was raised in a typical American environment with ample exposure to Thai culture. Although she spoke English at school, her parents spoke Thai with her at home. In addition, Jane’s parents enrolled her in Thai language and culture classes on the weekend and during the summers at the local Thai Buddhist temple (wat ). This was the foundation for her formative years, in which she developed a strong sense of what it meant to be Thai American. Growing up, Jane attended both private and public schools and during the week was heavily involved in school activities, such as soccer and student government. But on the weekends, Jane took classical Thai dance and Thai music lessons. She practiced classical Thai dance and music for several years and performed at numerous events, including a highly televised benefit concert in Thailand for the king of Thailand. Through visits to Thailand during most summers, Jane became connected to her heritage in tangible ways, from hearing Thai fables firsthand from her grandmother to visiting cultural landmarks throughout the country. At the same time, Jane happily attended school with her non-Thai American friends. She played soccer throughout high school and was involved with a variety of other extracurricular activities as well, including volunteering with Key Club and drawing for her high school newspaper. In many ways, she grew up like every other American teenager, from adoring McDonald’s hamburgers and FOX’s summer teen dramas to abhorring the SATs and early morning bus rides. The cultural ways in which she differed became something she was proud of. She gladly introduced her non-Thai American friends to her “Thai side” by inviting them to her local temple for various events, and even performing Thai classical music in her school’s talent competitions. When Jane moved away to college, it was difficult for her to remain as heavily involved in the Thai American community. She came home and attended important temple functions and celebrations but no longer performed Thai classical dance or music. She now works at the Discovery Channel but often returns home to visit her parents and practice Thai customs. Jane continues to be proud of her heritage and is thankful that her parents encouraged her to embrace her Thai heritage while fully appreciating her American surroundings.
2122 | Thai Immigrants
Thai American girls from the Dhammapratip Temple in Accokeek, Maryland, and the Thai Temple D.C. Youth Group prepare to perform Thai classical dances at Thai Festival 2003 in Washington, D.C., August 24, 2003. (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)
only available for those living in metropolitan areas that have a local Thai Buddhist temple, as these classes are arranged through the wat. Through these classes, the children of Thai immigrants learn to read and write Thai, are exposed to the history of Thailand, learn about Buddhism, and may often learn other Thai traditions. For girls, this usually includes learning how to ram Thai, or dance traditional Thai dances. For boys, this might entail muay Thai or Thai kickboxing. Boys and girls may also learn how to play Thai classical instruments. Educational attainment is an important goal set by Thai American parents for their children. Like other immigrants, many Thai Americans left Thailand so that their children could have better educational and occupational prospects than themselves. Therefore, scholastic achievement and educational attainment are strongly stressed in the Thai American community.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Thailand Immigration from Thailand to the United States will likely continue as the 21st century progresses. Immigrant flows will depend largely on the political and economic
Issues in Relations between the United States and Thailand | 2123
situation in Thailand as well as the United States. Thus far, the political upheaval in Thailand has not grossly disturbed the domestic economy, meaning that Thai immigration to the United States has not drastically increased. However, this may not be the case in the future. Likewise, if the economic recession in the United States does not improve, some Thai Americans may be forced to return to their ancestral homeland to find better economic opportunities and more affordable living conditions. There is even some anecdotal evidence that second-generation Thai Americans are immigrating to Thailand to make use of their bilingual skills and American degrees in an increasingly global labor market. Finally, the 21st century will also bear witness to the aging of first-generation Thai immigrants and the emergence of a new generation of Thai Americans, the second generation. These two demographic trends will drastically change the make-up of the Thai American community, which until now has largely consisted of foreign-born, working-age adults. The aging of the older generation brings several issues to mind: who will take care of these individuals? Will they return to Thailand or prefer to stay in the United States, where they may or may not be cared for by their Americanized second-generation children? More positively, the growth of a second generation Thai American adult community could increase Thai American’s representation among Asian Americans as well as civic participation among this group more broadly.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 322 Admissions to the United States from Thailand, 1968–2008 (Continued) Year
Number
1968
645
1969
1,250
1970
1,826
1971
2,915
1972
4,102
1973
4,941
1974
4,956
1975
4,217
1976
6,923
1977
3,945
1978
3,574
1979
3,194
1980
4,115
1981
4,799
1982
5,568
1983
5,875
1984
4,885
1985
5,239
1986
6,204
1987
6,733
1988
6,888
1989
9,332
1990
8,914
1991
7,397
1992
7,090
1993
6,654
1994
5,489
1995
5,136
1996
4,306
1997
3,092
1998
3,090
1999
2,366
2000
3,753 (continued)
2124
Table 322 Admissions to the United States from Thailand, 1968–2008 (Continued) Year
Number
2001
4,245
2002
4,144
2003
3,126
2004
4,318
2005
5,505
2006*
11,749
2007
8,751
2008
6,637
Total
207,888
Note: 5539 of these individuals were admitted as refugees. Sources: INS Annual Report (Years 1968–1977), Statistical Yearbook of the INS (Years 1978–1995), DHS 2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Years 1996–1998), DHS 2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Years 1999–2008).
Table 323 Thai naturalizations by year, 1999–2008 Year
Number
1999
4,026
2000
5,197
2001
4,088
2002
4,013
2003
3,636
2004
3,779
2005
4,314
2006
4,583
2007
4,438
2008
6,930
Total
45,004
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. 2008
2125
Table 324 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: fiscal years 2000 to 2009
2126
Region and country of birth Total Thailand
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
3,753
4,245
4,144
3,126
4,318
5,505
11,749
8,751
6,637
10,444
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 325 Geographic distribution of Thai-American population Top 10 states
Total population
California
46,868
Texas
9,918
Florida
8,618
New York
8,158
Illinois
7,321
Washington
5,527
Virginia
5,406
Nevada
4,220
Maryland
3,782
Georgia
3,090
U.S. Total
150,283
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 data.
2127
Table 326 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence; region/ country: Thailand Total
Male
Female
10,444
3,944
6,500
303
114
189
California
2,011
677
1,334
Colorado
182
73
109
Florida
459
135
324
Georgia
346
150
196
Total Arizona
Illinois
374
151
223
Maryland
141
35
106
Massachusetts
183
60
123
Michigan
139
40
99
Minnesota
532
262
270
Nevada
196
43
153
New Jersey
104
19
85
New York
682
292
390
North Carolina
327
162
165
Ohio
168
66
102
Pennsylvania
151
47
104
1,054
447
607
Texas Virginia
313
94
219
Washington
382
108
274
2,397
969
1,428
Other
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009.
Appendix III: Notable Thai Americans | 2129
Distribution of Educational Attainment for Adults Aged 25+ Graduate degree
General Population Thai Americans
Bachelor’s degree
Some college
High school graduate
Less than high school 0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
Figure 25 Distribution of educational attainment for adults, aged 25+. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2007, 1-Year Estimates.
Distribution of Occupations for the Civilian Employed Population Aged 16+ Production/transportation General Population Construction/maintenance
Thai Americans
Farming, fishing, forestry Sales, office Service Management/professional 0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
Figure 26 Distribution of occupations for the civilian employed population, aged 16+. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2007, 1-Year Estimates.
Appendix III: Notable Thai Americans Gorpat Henry Charoen is the first and only elected official of Thai descent in the United States. He was elected to the La Palma city council in 2006 and later became mayor pro tem of La Palma in 2007. Chareon was born in Bangkok but later moved to the United States.
2130 | Thai Immigrants
Cherry Chevapravatdumrong is an author and executive story editor/ coproducer on Family Guy. She was born in Columbus, Ohio, and graduated from Yale University and New York University Law School. After graduation, Chevapravatdumrong moved to Los Angeles to pursue writing. The Thai American’s role as executive story editor/coproducer on Family Guy is notable, given the show’s portrayal of stereotypical “American” family life. Ladda Tammy Duckworth is the assistant secretary of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs for the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. She was nominated to this position by President Barack Obama. Duckworth was previously the director of the Illinois Department of Veterans Affairs. She was born in Bangkok in 1968 to an American father and a Thai mother but later moved to the United States. Duckworth herself is a veteran of the Iraq war and came to public service after being injured when the helicopter she was flying was shot down in Iraq. Eric Koston is a professional skateboarder who grew up in San Bernardino, California. Koston was born in Bangkok, Thailand, to an American father and a Thai mother. He moved to California when he was still an infant. Stacy Prammanasudh is an American professional golfer who plays on the LPGA Tour. Prammanasudh was born and raised in Oklahoma to an American mother and a Thai father. Eldrick Tont “Tiger” Woods is an American professional golfer, born in Cypress, California, to an American father and a Thai mother. Tiger Woods’s professional achievements to date rank him among the most successful golfers of all time. In 2008, he was the highest-paid professional golfer, and in 2009 he had earned an estimated $111 million from winnings and endorsements. In 2010, he struggled both professionally and personally, as problems regarding his marriage and divorce became prevalent in the news media.
Glossary Bun khun: A sense of obligation and indebtedness that children owe to their parents for raising them. Loy Krathong: An important secular holiday in Thai culture that shares roots with the South Asian Festival of Lights known as Diwali. Macarpoocha: Dharma Day, which marks the day of Buddha’s first sermon. Magha Puja: Sangha Day, which commemorates the Buddha’s visit to Veruvana Monastery in the city of Rajagaha, when 1,250 monks are said to have spontaneously returned from their wanderings to pay respects to him. Muay Thai: Thai kickboxing, which has gained mainstream popularity in the United States.
References | 2131
Nehn: A novice Buddhist monk. Thai boys who are raised Buddhist are required to become ordained novices for a period ranging from three months to three years. Historically, this ritual was meant to expose young Buddhist men to the monkhood; those who enjoyed the ascetic lifestyle would stay on and specialize in either meditation or scholarship, but those who did not returned to lay life. Phansa: A period of three months, which in Thailand is equivalent to one rainy season, when young men typically complete their time spent as a novice monk, or nehn. Pleng luk thung: A form of country music that is popular among Thai immigrants. Literally translated, it means music from children of the fields. Ram Thai: Classical Thai dance that is taught at several Thai temples across the United States. Rod nam sang: The last part of a traditional Thai wedding ceremony, where all elders step forth to give the couple a blessing by pouring lustral water on their hands. Sai monkhon: A string connecting the heads of the bride and groom during a traditional Thai wedding ceremony. It is symbolic that the thread forms two circles that, while linked, also remain independent from one another. Sinsod: A sum of money the groom is expected to give to the bride’s family in a traditional Thai wedding ceremony in order to show that the family is worthy of their daughter and can provide for her material needs. Songkran: Thai New Year, the biggest nonreligious holiday in Thailand. Vesaka Puja: Buddha Day, the most celebrated religious holiday of the year. The day commemorates Buddha’s birthday, Day of Enlightenment, and Day of PariNirvana all in one. Wat: A Thai Buddhist temple.
References Arpanantikul, Manee. 2001. “Understanding Midlife Experience through the Voices of Thai Women Living in Seattle.” Unpublished Master’s Thesis. School of Nursing, University of Washington. Auerbach, Susan. 1994. “Thai Americans.” In Encyclopedia of Multiculturalism, ed. Susan Auerbach, p. 1615. New York: Marshall Cavendish. Bao, Jiemin. 2008. “Thai Americans: Performing Gender.” In Emerging Voices: The Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans, edited by L. Huping, 253–88. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Bao, Jiemin. 2009. “Thai American Middle-Classness: Forging Alliances with Whites and Cultivating Patronage from Thailand’s Elite.” Journal of Asian American Studies 12 (2): 163–90.
2132 | Thai Immigrants Boonprasat Lewis, Nantawan. 1997. “Thai.” In American Immigrant Cultures, edited by D. Levinson and M. Ember, 883–87. New York: Macmillan Reference USA. Codman-Wilson, Mary. 1992. “Thai Cultural and Religious Identity and Understanding of Well-Being in the U.S.: An Ethnographic Study of an Immigrant Church.” PhD diss., Joint Garrett/Northwestern Program in Religious and Theological Studies, Northwestern University. Dissertations Abstracts International 53A (6): 1985. Desbarats, Jacqueline. 1979. “Thai Migration to Los Angeles.” Geographical Review 69 (3): 302–18. Giles, Clare. 2004. “Wat Thai Washington DC.” The Pluralism Project at Harvard University. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/11.] http://pluralism.org/research/profiles/display. php?profile=71491. Jarusasi. Rose S. 1999. “Being Old in a Foreign Country: The Elderly Thai People in the United States.” Master’s Thesis, Sociology, California State University, Dominguez Hills. Masters Theses Abstracts International 38 (2): 373. London, Ellen. 2008. Thailand Condensed: 2000 Years of History and Culture. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editors. Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor. 1999. Worlds in Motion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mellen, Greg. 2008. “Thai Protest Hits 2nd Day.” Long Beach Press Telegram, July 27. Perreira, Todd LeRoy. 2007. “The Gender of Practice: Some Findings among Thai Buddhist Women in Northern California.” In Emerging Voices: The Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans, edited by L. Huping, 160–82. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Portes, A., and R. Rumbaut. 2002. Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ratner, Megan. 2008. “Thai Americans.” Every Culture. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/11.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Sr-Z/Thai-Americans.html. Thai Community Development Center (CDC). 2004. “Healthcare on the Margins: The Precarious State of Physical Health for Thais in Thai Town.” [Online article; retrieved 3/25/11.] http://www.thaicdchome.org/cms/assets/Uploads/research/healthsurvey.pdf. U.S. Census Bureau. 2007. “S0201. Selected Population Profile in the United States. Thai Alone or in Any Combination.” American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 2007. 2007 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, DC. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/11.] http://www.dhs.gov/files/ statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 2008. 2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Washington, DC. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/11.] http://www.dhs.gov/files/ statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm.
Further Reading | 2133 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services. INS Annual Report (Years 1968–1977). Washington, DC: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services. Statistical Yearbook of the INS (Years 1978– 1998). Washington, DC: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services. Vongs, Pueng. 2006. “Unrest in the Homeland Awakens Thai American Community.” New America Media. [Online article; retrieved 3/25/11.] http://www.imdiversity.com/Villages/Asian/world_international/pns_thai_unrest_0306.asp. Worawongs, Worapron Tina. 2005. “Thai Americans and the Mass Media: A Reconstruction of Cultural Identity.” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Faculty of Communication, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA. Wyatt, David. 1984. Thailand: A Short History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Further Reading Desbarats, Jacqueline. 1979. “Thai Migration to Los Angeles.” Geographical Review 69 (3): 302–18. This article is the first academic exploration of the roots of Thai immigration to the United States. It describes early Thai American settlement in California through census statistics. London, Ellen. 2008. Thailand Condensed: 2000 Years of History and Culture. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editors. London provides a short but detailed history of Thailand, as well as a contemporary look into Thai culture. This is an excellent resource for those who are unfamiliar with Thai culture or history. Perreira, Todd LeRoy. 2007. “The Gender of Practice: Some Findings among Thai Buddhist Women in Northern California.” In Emerging Voices: The Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans, edited by L. Huping, 160–82. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. This book chapter is an excellent resource on recent waves of Thai migration and Thai marriage migration to the United States. Ratner, Megan. 2008. “Thai Americans.” Every Culture. [Online article; retrieved3/25/11.] http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Sr-Z/Thai-Americans.html. This Web site provides a good summary of how Thai culture is experienced in the United States. Wyatt, David. 1984. Thailand: A Short History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wyatt’s book provides a long and detailed summary of Thai history. This is a good resource for those who want to learn the intricacies of Thai history.
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Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants by Teruyuki Tsuji
Introduction Trinidadian and Tobagonian (Trinbagonian) immigration to the United States can trace its beginnings to the late 17th century. However, Trinidad and Tobago (TT) continued to receive laborers long after emigration had surpassed immigration in other West Indian colonies, because of TT’s late development as a sugar-producing colony, which began with British recolonization. The restructuring of the metropolitan-dependent colonial economy in the early 20th century could not keep pace with the accelerating migration of surplus labor from agricultural districts. The result was a swelling reservoir of potential migrants in towns and cities, characterized by high unemployment and poor living environments not unlike other West Indian colonies. TT, however, would develop in a unique manner, which had critical implications for Trinbagonian migration. As Eric Williams, TT’s first prime minister, noted, in the 1910s “cocoa [was] the reigning queen, sugar [was] the ex-king, [and] oil [was] the future emperor.” Economic control by foreign investors and multinational corporations was common; however, these staples have enabled continuous economic growth in TT, compared to other resource-limited West Indian nations. Together with relatively stable national politics, despite the impact of race and ethnicity, prior to the 1960s, a persistent yet fluctuating economic development had moderated the pace of Trinbagonian migration. Nonetheless, in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, the rate of Trinbagonian immigration to the United States remained equal to or greater than that of Jamaican, Haitian, or Guyanese. As a result, the Trinbagonian has emerged as one of the major components of U.S. residents of West Indian ancestry.
Chronology 1498
Christopher Columbus lands in Trinidad during his third voyage to the Indies and claims it for Castile. He also spots a nearby island—Tobago.
1797
Britain captures Trinidad. Spanish Governor José Maria Chacon signs the Articles of Capitulation, prepared by the conquering British General Sir Ralph Abercromby. 2135
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1802
Treaty of Amiens ends the French Revolutionary Wars, in which Spain was France’s ally against Britain. By the Treaty, Trinidad is ceded from Spain to Britain.
1814
France and Britain conclude Treaty of Paris, by which Tobago becomes a British colony.
1834
Slavery is abolished, which frees about 25,000 Africans.
1838–1848
Scores of contract workers arrive from West Africa, Portuguese-ruled Madeira, the United States, and neighboring West Indian territories.
1845–1917
Approximately 144,000 indentured workers are brought to Trinidad from the Indian subcontinent.
1853–1866
The indenture system brings contract workers from China, chiefly from its southern provinces.
1889
Tobago is annexed by Trinidad. TT becomes a joint Crown Colony in 1899.
1946
TT is granted full adult suffrage. In 1950 the Portuguese-descended Albert Gomes is elected the first chief minister.
1956
TT is granted self-government with a constitution. Eric Williams, the leader of the People’s National Movement (PNM), is elected chief minister.
1958–61
TT joins nine other West Indian territories in forming the Federation of the West Indies.
1962
The Federation is formally dissolved. On August 31, TT becomes independent within the Commonwealth, with Eric Williams as the first prime minister and the Chinese-descended Solomon Hochoy as governor general.
1970
In February, university faculty and students march, which develops into nationwide riots, popularly known as the beginning of the “Black Power” movement.
1976
TT becomes a republic. Under the new constitution, the president becomes the head of the state and commander-in-chief in the place of the governor-general, who had ruled on behalf of the queen regnant of the Commonwealth realms.
1980
Tobago resumes its House of Assembly and is granted a degree of autonomy.
1986
The National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), a combination of racially and occupationally aligned opposition parties, posts a landslide win in the parliamentary elections.
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1990
The Jamaat al Muslimeen, led by Imam Yasmin Abu Bakr, attempts the armed overthrow of the government of TT, which results in the deaths of 24 people and millions of dollars in property damage. The ringleaders are offered amnesty if they surrender and are later released.
1995
The general elections result in the birth of a government under the leadership of the United National Congress (UNC), and the first prime minister of South Asian descent, Basdeo Panday.
2001
The PNM and UNC divide the elected seats (18 seats each) as a result of the general elections in December. President A.N.R. Robinson appoints Patrick Manning, the leader of the PNM, as the interim prime minister.
2002–2010 The PNM regains control of the government in the 2002 elections and remained in power until 2010, when the People’s Partnership, a coalition of opposition parties, won general elections and formed the government with Kamla Persad Bessessar, the leader of the UNC, and the country’s first female prime minister.
Background Geography TT is a former British colony and a member of the Commonwealth in the southern Caribbean Sea. It lies over 1,500 miles southeast of the United States and less than 10 miles off the northern coast of Venezuela. TT has an area of roughly 1,980 square miles, with the two main islands, Trinidad (1,864 square miles) and Tobago (116 square miles), and a number of satellite islets and unpopulated landforms. TT generally enjoys a pleasant maritime tropical climate influenced by northeast trade winds. Being outside the path of hurricanes has allowed the country to elude their impact, although it has been struck by tropical storms. Trinidad accounts for more than 95 percent of the total area and population and is the location of the major towns and cities, including Port-of-Spain, the capital and political and commercial center of the country; Tobago attracts tourists with its unspoiled beaches, protected vegetation, and the legendary story of Robinson Crusoe. TT’s population continuously increased from the late 18th century on. The national censuses calculated it as 1,079,791 in 1980, 1,114,772 in 1990, and 1,125,128 in 2000. According to an interim estimate by the government, it dropped to 1,047,366 in 2008, despite the rebound of the average annual percent change in the birth rate during the corresponding period (specifically, 0.55 percent in 2004, 0.70 percent in 2005, 1.42 percent in 2006, and 1.32 percent in 2007). A wave of emigration is the
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chief cause of the current downward trend in TT’s population. The net migration rate—that is, the difference between the number of persons entering and leaving TT during the year per 1,000 persons—has become increasingly negative (–10.02 in 2002, –10.83 in 2004, –11.07 in 2006, and –11.2 in 2008) (CIA 2009). Concerning its ethnic configuration, in 2000, Trinbagonians consisted of “Indian” (those with South Asian descent, also called Indo-Trinbagonian), who accounted for 40 percent of the population, and “African” (those of African descent, known as Afro-Trinbagonian), who made up 37.5 percent. The rest of the population registered as “mixed” (18.4%), “White/Caucasian” (0.6%), “Chinese” (0.3%), “Syrian/Lebanese” (a generic term for those of Middle Eastern origins) (0.3%), and “Other” (1.8%). The number of people who identified themselves as “mixed” has grown since the 1960s; unlike other ethnic groups, the proportion of Indo-Trinbagonians to the total population has continually increased, which made them the largest ethnic group, surpassing the formerly dominant Afro-Trinbagonians, as of the 1990 census. Trinbagonians are religiously diverse, as well. According to the 2000 Census, 26 percent of the population claimed to be Roman Catholic, 24.6 percent Protestant (including 7.8% Anglican, 6.8% Pentecostal, 4% Seventh-Day Adventist, 3.3% Presbyterian or Congregational, 1.8% Baptist, and 0.9% Methodist), 23 percent Hindustani (13% Sanatanist and 10% “Other Hindu”), and 6 percent Islamic (4% Anjuman Sunnat-Ul-Jamaat and 2% “Other Muslim”). The smaller organizations were Jehovah’s Witness (1.6%), atheists (1.9%), or those listed as “Other,” which included a number of small Christian denominations, as well as Baha’is, Rastafarians, Buddhists, and Jews. Comparing national censuses indicates that the number of followers of Roman Catholicism, Hinduism, and other traditional religions are declining, with the main conversions being to Protestant churches, especially Pentecostal and other Charismatic Christian denominations.
History The current demographic composition and ethnic diversity of TT are an outgrowth of the coerced and voluntary immigration that began during the colonial period and lasted till the 1920s. The Spanish colonization of Trinidad began with the arrival of Christopher Columbus during his third voyage to the Americas in 1498. The size of the indigenous population in pre-Columbian Trinidad remains a matter of conjecture; however, it is accepted that the native people quickly decreased in number and by the end of the 18th century had become nearly extinct. However, the nearextinction of native Amerindian tribes was not immediately followed by the inflow of immigrants that would characterize the Caribbean in the coming centuries. The early Spanish colonies, including Trinidad, functioned as raiding and trading posts rather than permanent settlements for exploitation.
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By the late 18th century, Spanish-ruled Trinidad remained largely undeveloped. Nevertheless, Spain had no intention of abandoning this colony, because of its strategic location just off the coast of the South American mainland. In order to populate the nearly deserted island to defend it against rising European powers, particularly England, the Spanish government promoted immigration to Trinidad, publishing the Cedula de Poublacion of 1783. The Cedula allowed the settlement of non-Spanish “foreigners” as long as they professed Roman Catholicism, guaranteed the settlers of mixed parentage (i.e., coloreds) civil and legal equality with white counterparts, and conferred free land to newcomers based on the number of slaves they owned. The total inhabitants, which numbered fewer than 3,000, doubled within a year after the issue of the Cedula and reached nearly 20,000 by the end of the 18th century. More important, the Cedula-induced mass settlement produced the demographic and ethnic structure peculiar to Trinidad, which would have broad implications for its subsequent social development. When Trinidad became a part of the British Empire in 1802, it contained (1) a heterogeneous European (or European-descended) landowning class, the majority of which was French-Creole elites; (2) those who spoke French-derived Creole and professed Roman Catholicism, which included white, coloreds, and blacks, and represented more than 90 percent of the total population; and (3) the region’s largest community of free coloreds, which surpassed the landowning European population in number. The post-Emancipation era in the British West Indies was generally characterized by the planters’ efforts—under the patronage of colonial governments—to secure a dependable and affordable plantation labor force to take the place of African slaves. This was particularly the case in Trinidad, where the development of a sugar plantation economy began in earnest in the early 19th century. Many immigrants, predominantly of African descent, arrived from neighboring British possessions, West Africa, Portuguese-ruled Madeira and Cape Verde, and the United States. These post-Emancipation settlements did not meet the increasing demand for labor, not only because of their limited extent, but because the new arrivals were usually more educated and skilled, so they were often assigned higher positions in plantations or sought for nonagricultural jobs. In the mid-19th century, Britain adopted an extensive labor importation scheme for Trinidad (and other possessions), which recruited indentured servants from various places, though the majority came from India, the most populous colony in the British Empire at the time. From 1845 to the repeal of the indenture system in 1917, roughly 400,000 laborers left the Indian subcontinent for the British West Indies, and 144,000 (36% of the total) settled in Trinidad. (The exact numbers of the indentured settlers remain arguable.) Differing patterns of development made the islands of Trinidad and Tobago demographically and ethnically distinctive. After a group of Dutchmen formed a short-lived settlement, Tobago changed hands many times between the French,
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Dutch, British, and Courtlanders (those from a region of Latvia), but was finally ceded to Britain in the Treaty of Paris (1814). In the 1840s, declining sugar production slowed the flow of immigrants into Tobago, unlike Trinidad, which had started receiving abundant labor from South Asia, among other places. According to the 1891 Census, a total of 18,353 people resided in Tobago, 97 percent of whom were of African origin. The 2000 Census reported that the total population of Tobago was 22,020, 89 percent of whom identified as “African.” In the 1930s, which were marked by worsening economic hardship, political mobilization climaxed with the creation of trade unions in TT, as in other British colonies. In the trade union movement, race and ethnicity played little part in the surge of political consciousness among the working class. Union leaders, such as Portuguese-descended Arthur Cipriani (Trinidad Workingmen’s Association), South Asian-descended Adrian Cola Rienzi (Oilfields Workers Trade Union and All Trinidad Sugar Estates and Factory Workers Union), and African-descended Uriah Butler (who later formed the British Empire Citizens’ and Workers’ Home Rule Party), employed the rhetoric of anticolonialism and anti-imperialism, which enabled them to weld racially and ethnically identified unions into a large-scale political movement. In response, the number of elected members of the Legislative Council was increased in 1941, giving the elected members a majority, and universal adult suffrage was introduced in 1946. In 1958, TT helped form the West Indian Federation, which was established to foster political, economic, and cultural solidarity within the region. However, the Federation collapsed in 1961, when Jamaica seceded. Eric Williams, TT’s premier at the time, decided to withdraw from the Federation with his famous affirmation, “Ten minus one is zero.” TT became a sovereign state on August 31, 1962. Once Britain agreed to withdraw and decolonization began, anticolonialism and anti-imperialism became ineffective as mobilizing idioms. When the focus of political campaigns shifted to domestic contention over the control of the state apparatus, competing political leaders realigned their organizations along racial and ethnic lines to secure the support of the largest voting blocs. Given the racially and ethnically divided residential patterns and the more or less overlapping boundaries of electoral constituencies, the introduction of the single-seat electoral district system rendered TT’s party politics less policy-oriented and election outcomes predictable. Eric Williams and the PNM he represented worked to become a mass political party that crossed racial and ethnic bounds. Regardless of whoever is in power, however, TT’s party politics are bound to racialize (or ethnicize) due to the socioeconomic structure’s roots, which reach back to the colonial period. Reflected by Williams’s political career (which ended with his death in 1981), political development in TT is almost equivalent to the struggle to organize and mobilize the working classes across racial and ethnic segmentation (Hintzen 1989).
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Dr. Eric Williams, prime minister of Trinidad, addresses the opening session of the Independence Conference at Marlborough House, London, on May 28, 1962. The talks would result in independence for Trinidad and Tobago before the end of that year. (AP Photo/ Staff/Harris)
Causes and Waves of Migration The developments of Trinbagonian migration to the United States are best understood placed within larger sociohistorical contours of West Indian immigration, which had three distinct phases: (1) the late 19th century to the 1920s; (2) the late 1920s to the 1960s; and (3) the mid-1960s to the present.
Early Immigration In Search of Yankee Dollars: The Late 19th Century to the 1920s In 1882, in response to the arrival of a record number of immigrants, the U.S. Congress enacted the new immigration act, which levied a head tax on alien immigrants and set qualitative standards on immigration, excluding “convicts, lunatics, idiots, and persons likely to become a public charge.” However, compared to arrivals from other areas, Caribbean immigration remained uncontroversial in the United States, despite the fact that it was continuously increasing (Henke 2000). There were 9,484
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Caribbean-born (which did not include Cuban-born) residents in the United States in 1880, 14,354 in 1900, and 64,090 in 1920. These numbers included quite a few West Indians, who were recruited for development projects in the Caribbean region by American capital and then remigrated to the United States. In the early 1880s, more laboring migrants from the British West Indies joined the plantation and railroad construction workforce for the United Fruit Company’s banana operation on the Atlantic coast of Central America. U.S. investments also caused sugar booms in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic, which attracted many West Indian workers as cane cutters. More important, the construction of the Panama Canal, begun by the French in 1880 and taken over by the United States in 1904, employed a large number of West Indian laborers. By the early 1890s, an estimated 25,000 West Indians worked for the ill-fated French undertaking, and by the completion of the canal in 1914, 35,000 or more West Indians worked on the U.S. canal dig. Upon the expiration of their contract, some remained in Panama; others were repatriated to their West Indian territories of origin; and many remigrated to the mainland United States (Rogozinski). In the late 19nth century, the declining sugar industry in the British West Indies created a constant stream of emancipated slaves and time-expired contract workers into cities and their suburbia, which accelerated urbanization and worsened unemployment. This was particularly the case in the long-standing sugar plantation colonies, such as Jamaica, from which unemployed workers departed for Central America and other parts of the Americas “in search of Yankee dollars.” In contrast, TT remained a minor supplier of migrants during this period. Due to its late development as a sugar-producing colony, the island of Trinidad still had spacious and fertile lands, and the declining sugar industry drove the expansion of free peasantry. At the same time, the increase in chocolate production and consumption in England caused a cocoa (cacao) boom in Trinidad, which absorbed the swelling surplus labor in agricultural districts. Cocoa cultivation requires much less land and capital than that of sugar cane. This enabled the laboring class, both former slaves and time-expired indentured laborers, to gain relatively decent livelihoods or even become proprietors in Trinidad—the only British West Indian producer and exporter of cocoa.
Later Waves of Immigration Reverse Colonialism: The Late 1920s to the 1960s During the first two decades of the 20th century, there were 230,972 Caribbean immigrants, averaging 11,549 per year. These numbers represented only 1.6 percent of total immigration to the United States during that period, although they were significant in light of the small populations of Caribbean societies. However, in the mid-1920s, Caribbean immigration to the United States substantially dropped and
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subsequently remained at a low level. The number of admitted immigrants from the entire Caribbean (excluding Cuba) was estimated to be 51,613 between 1921 and 1924, and 44,724 between 1924 and 1942. The primary causes of the decline in Caribbean immigration include: (1) a World War I–induced flood of foreign-born populations that prompted the United States to establish the quota system in 1921 and to further tighten its restrictive immigration policy in 1924; and (2) the Great Depression, which significantly reduced the job market for unskilled and lesseducated migrant workers, who constituted the majority of immigrants arriving from the Caribbean at that time. Industrialization in TT, which began in the late 1940s, resulted in an annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 8.5 percent during the 1950s. However, the postwar boom merely recast the traditional metropolitan-dependent economic structure, because TT had to invite foreign investors and multinational corporations for capital and technology. Foreign investors favored prospective capital-intensive sectors, such as tourism and oil/petrochemical industries, over labor-intensive manufacturing, which could create enough jobs for the workers migrating into urban areas from agricultural districts. The rapid and corresponding increase in the population, aggravated by the arrivals from less-developed West Indian territories, and uneven economic development, created a large-scale outflow of working-class Trinbagonians. However, up to the early 1960s, their major destination was the “Mother Country,” which was looking for an affordable workforce for postwar reconstruction. As an incentive measure, in 1948 Britain enacted the Nationality Act, which granted British citizenship to its colonial subjects. On the other hand, the United States passed the Immigration and Nationality Act (also known as McCarran-Walter Act) in 1952. The Act, however, continued the exemption of TT and other countries and colonies in the Western Hemisphere from the quotas. This “colonization in reverse”—so described by Jamaican poet Louise Bennett—brought an average of 32,850 immigrants from the British-ruled Caribbean to the UK; as a result, the number of UK residents of British West Indian origin, including Trinbagonians, increased from 17,000 in 1951 to 174,000 in 1961. According to the 1941 “Bases-for-Destroyers Agreement,” Britain leased large areas of Trinidad to the United States for air and naval bases. U.S. contractors hired hundreds of local men, whereas Trinbagonian military personnel were stationed at the bases in the U.S. Virgin Islands and southern Florida. After the war, a number of these soldiers and workers remained in the United States or remigrated to the mainland in search of better socioeconomic opportunities (Neptune 2007). However, due to the restrictive immigration legislation, only 2,210 Trinbagonians, generally characterized by relatively high socioeconomic status, were admitted to the United States between 1951 and 1960.
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Moving North: The Mid-1960s to the Present The early 1960s marked another turning point in Trinbagonian immigration to the United States. In Britain, beginning in the late 1950s, recurring demonstrations of Afro-West Indian workers against discrimination occasionally led to violent clashes, and inflamed antiblack immigrant public sentiment, aggravated by Britain’s economic recession in the 1960s. In response, in 1962 the British government reversed its immigration policy, which had favored working-class immigration from overseas territories, by enacting the Commonwealth Immigration Act, which restricted the issuing of work permits to close relatives of British citizens and those who had a job in Britain already arranged. British West Indians, 66,300 of them, rushed into the UK in order to be admitted before the “door slammed”; the number of West Indian immigrants to Britain then dropped to 14,848 in 1964 and to 688 in 1969 (Sunshine 1988). The Act had profound and far-reaching implications for TT, which was now an independent country and the second-largest West Indian place of departure of working-class migrants, following Jamaica. While Britain barred immigrants with restrictive laws, North America opened its door. Following Canada, which liberalized its immigration policy in 1962, the United States passed the Hart-Cellar Immigration Reform Act (1965), which abolished the system of national quotas, which favored immigrants from Western Europe, and instead imposed a 120,000 person per year ceiling (with no per country quota until 1976), shifting the basis of immigration policy away from race, ethnicity, religion, and nationality of origin toward the reunification of families. Coming into effect in July 1968, the Act ushered in a record wave of West Indian immigration. Trinbagonian immigrants admitted to enter the United States increased from 2,149 (1961–1965) and 2,236 (1966–1970) to 33,278 (1971–1975). Unlike Jamaican immigration to the United States, whose numbers continuously increased after immigration reform in 1965, its Trinbagonian counterpart slowed in the late 1970s and became nearly flat during the 1980s. After the peak between 1971 and 1975, the number of Trinbagonian immigrants to the United States dropped to 27,297 between 1976 and 1980 and decreased to only half that number (17,018) between 1981 and 1984. The primary cause of this difference lay in the “pushing” side. Unlike Jamaica, where radical socialist reforms resulted in an economic recession in the 1970s and early 1980s, the steep rise in crude oil price brought unprecedented economic growth to oil-producing TT, which reduced the impetus for working-class migration, bringing down the unemployment rate and driving up wages. In the United States, in response to the economic recession that began in the mid-1970s, undocumented immigration became a high-profile social problem. According to a report prepared and submitted to President Reagan by the Select
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Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (1978), an increasing portion of an estimated 3 to 5.5 million undocumented immigrants “come from countries other than Mexico,” mostly the Caribbean, including TT. Although resistance from the Hispanic-Black caucus had delayed the implementation of a more restrictive regulation on immigration, in 1986 the U.S. Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which set guidelines on undocumented immigrants, making it illegal to knowingly recruit immigrants who did not possess work authorization, and requiring employers to attest to their employees’ immigration status (LeMay 2007). However, the Act appears to have had limited impact on immigration from TT and other English-speaking Caribbean countries, which mostly occurred legally. In fact, after passage of the Act, the number of Trinbagonian immigrants rebounded. Largely fleeing the islands’ sluggish economy after a collapse in oil prices, Trinbagonians began entering the United States in increasing numbers beginning in the mid-1980s: 22,515 between 1986 and 1990, 33,708 between 1991 and 1995, and 29,548 between 1996 and 2000. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s latest reporting, the ups and downs of TT’s national economy from the late 1990s have had a limited impact on Trinbagonian migration to the United States: 28,446 and 27,876 Trinbagonian-born persons obtained legal permanent resident status between 2001 and 2005, and 2006 and 2009, respectively.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of the Community The 2000 Census documented a total of 164,738 U.S. residents of Trinbagonian ancestry. This number represented 8.9 percent of 1,852,874 West Indians (i.e., those from circum-Caribbean countries and areas, including Haiti and the South American country of Guyana but excluding the Spanish-speaking Caribbean), which made Trinbagonians the third-largest group—after Jamaicans (36%) and Haitians (27%)—in the United States. Trinbagonian Americans were among the ancestry groups whose numbers doubled in the 1990s, along with Brazilian, Pakistani, Albanian, and Honduran. In 1990, 76,270 U.S. residents claimed TT as at least one of their ancestries. By 2000, a 116 percent increase made Trinbagonians the secondlargest population of English-speaking West Indian ancestry after Jamaicans, surpassing Guyanese (there were 162,456 Guyanese Americans in the United States in 2000). In 2000, of U.S. residents of Trinbagonian born, 68.6 percent were Africandescended. Those of Asian heritage (South Asian and Chinese) made up only 9 percent, while they accounted for more than 40 percent of TT’s entire population. Among Guyanese-born residents in the United States, 42.9 percent and
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22.1 percent claimed African and Asian heritage, respectively. Comparing TT and Guyana is interesting and fruitful, because the South Asian diaspora forms the largest ethnic group in both countries. Trinbagonian and Guyanese Americans accounted for 4.1 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively, of foreign-born U.S. residents who reported having Indian ancestry (Terrazas 2008). In 2000, there were 12 U.S. states that had one percent or more of the total U.S. residents of West Indian heritage, and these states together embraced 92 percent of all West Indians in the United States. The state with the largest concentration of West Indians is New York (37%), followed by Florida (26%), and New Jersey (6%). The state-by-state distribution of Trinbagonians reflects the same pattern of West Indian settlement: the largest clusters are in New York (84,197; 51%) and Florida (21,872; 13%) (Boswell and Jones 2006). In all cases, the bulk of West Indians are located in the major cities and their suburbia. According to the 2000 Census, for example, there were 544,434 West Indians (80% of New York’s West Indians: 679,245) in New York City, and almost 65 percent of Florida’s (487,528) in the Miami-Fort Lauderdale Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) (including Miami-Dade and Broward Counties). Of the 84,197 Trinbagonians in New York, 75,563 (90%) lived in New York City, whereas 12,569 Trinbagonians (58% of a total of 21,872 Trinbagonians in Florida), lived in the metropolitan areas of the Miami-Ft. Lauderdale CMSA (Boswell and Jones 2006). There are three major concentrations of Trinbagonians in New York City. The largest is in Kings County (Brooklyn), which had 47,389 Trinbagonian Americans in 2000. Second is Queens County (19,782) and includes places like Richmond Hill and South Ozone Park, where Trinbagonians of South Asian descent are historically concentrated. Third is Bronx County (4,700), particularly its northern and eastern parts, including Riverdale and Wakefield (Boswell and Jones 2006). In the same year, there were 5,581 and 6,988 Trinbagonians residing in Miami-Dade and Broward County, respectively. The Trinbagonian community in the MiamiFt. Lauderdale CMSA is concentrated primarily in two areas: the southern part of Miami-Dade County (including Cutler Ridge, Perrine, Homestead, and Florida City) and southern Broward County (including Lauderdale Lake, Oakland Park, North Lauderdale, and Margate); and northern Miami-Dade County (including North Miami Beach, Carol City, and Miramar) (Boswell and Jones 2006; Tsuji, Ho, and Stepick 2009). New York remains the major destination for Trinbagonian and West Indian immigration. TT was among five Caribbean countries (along with Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, and Haiti) that sent one out of every four immigrants to New York City in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 2000, New York City’s Trinbagonianborn population increased by 57.2 percent (from 56,478 to 88, 794), which made TT the eighth-largest foreign-born population by country of birth in New York City
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(Rosen et al. 2005). However, Florida’s West Indian population has grown exponentially, outpacing the West Indian communities in New York, due to a constant influx from the Caribbean as well as domestic (re)migration from traditional West Indian communities in other parts of the country, particularly New York and New Jersey. As a result, many West Indians who currently reside in South Florida have created translocal and transnational communities, including West Indian communities in the northeastern United States, South Florida, and their home countries, for example, TT, Haiti, Jamaica, or other Caribbean nations and territories. A close look at South Florida shows that West Indians are increasingly concentrated in Broward County, where the overall West Indian population soared from 56,893 in 1990 to 154,714 in 2000. Jamaicans remain the largest West Indian population in Broward, with 67,945 residents, followed by Haitians, who nearly tripled their number to 65,100 by 2000. However, the 2000 Census also showed a sharp increase in the number of Trinbagonians and Bahamians (6,793 and 4,190, respectively) (Arthur, Daniel, and Henderson 2006). In addition to international and interstate immigrations, intrastate resettlement has been a factor in the sudden increase in West Indians in Broward. Miami-Dade County remains the first port of call for most newly arriving Trinbagonians and other West Indians. According to recent patterns, once immigrants settle, West Indians are attracted to Broward, where they
Natalia Wilson, a Brooklyn resident of Trinidadian descent, poses next to a Trinidadian restaurant near her home in Brooklyn, New York, March 16, 2006. (AP Photo/Jason DeCrow)
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see better prospects for employment and cultural opportunities (Broward County Planning Services Division 2004). It should be noted, however, that the recent increase of Broward’s West Indian population consists almost exclusively of Africandescended people, and not just Jamaican and Haitian but also Trinbagonian. As a result, the influx of West Indians has driven up Broward’s percentage of blacks from 15 percent in 1990 to 20.5 percent in 2000 (Cavanagh 2001).
Age and Family Structure Trinbagonian Americans have the following demographic characteristics, according to the 2000 U.S. Census: First, the median age of U.S. residents who reported Trinbagonian ancestry (35 years) is similar to that of the overall U.S. population (35.3 years). Thus Trinbagonians are slightly older than other major West Indian ancestry groups residing in the United States. For example, the median age of Jamaicans and Haitians was 33 years and 30 years, respectively. Nevertheless, the age distribution of Trinbagonians is within the overall pattern of West Indians, with 12,897 (78.3% of the entire Trinbagonian population) in the productive age group (18–64 years). In 2000, the age dependency ratio among Trinbagonian Americans was 27.7 percent with 26,731 Trinbagonians of 18 years and younger and 9,029 Trinbagonians of 65 years and over. Second, as is often the case with immigrants to the United States, the sex ratio in Trinbagonian immigration has been female-biased. In the past, immigration from the West Indies, including TT, was depicted in terms of male migration, and prior to immigration reform in the 1960s women were not a major part of the arriving groups. However, during the 1970s, the increased number of female migrants changed sex/gender composition of West Indian immigration, and by the early 1980s the sex ratio of West Indian immigrants amounted to 80 to 87 percent. And the ratio of women to men has since widened. In 1980, the sex ratio in Trinbagonian immigration was 82.3 percent (36,155 men, 65,907 women), whereas it was 76.3 percent in 2000. It should be noted, however, that the sex ratio of the Trinbagonian community varies by state. The imbalance between men and women is narrower among Florida’s Trinbagonians (100 women: 80 men) than New York’s (100: 74). This is possibly due to the fact that the booming South Florida’s West Indian population, including Trinbagonians, contains a large number of inter- and intrastate settlers, who have spent years in the United States. Third, more than a quarter (25.1%) of all the households headed by Trinbagonians are female-headed (with no husband present). The male-female imbalance in Trinbagonian immigration is partly due to the U.S. labor market. Women often find it easier to secure employment in the United States, which has sustained a pattern of Trinbagonian and West Indian settlement: women migrate first, leaving children and/or husbands behind, and then apply for their families’ immigration as
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kin after attaining permanent residence status. One reason is that the relative ease for Trinbagonian women to secure work often results in men’s loss of self-esteem, which makes them unwilling to follow their wives to the United States; if willing, in many cases, they are not financially able. The separation becomes permanent and may lead to divorce (Henke 2000).
Educational Attainment Compared with other ethnic and regional groups of immigrants, West Indians, as a group, have better socioeconomic status (SES), which is usually measured by education, income, and occupation. In 2000, of the U.S. residents with West Indian ancestry who were 25 years and older, 73.6 percent were high school graduates and 19 percent held a bachelor’s (BA) or higher degree. West Indians’ comparative high standard of education is highlighted when compared with Latinos, of whom 52.5 percent and 10.5 percent held a high school diploma and a BA or higher degree, respectively. As far as high school graduates are concerned, there is little difference between West Indians and non-Hispanic blacks; however, if we look at those with a BA or higher degree, West Indians show higher educational attainment than African Americans. Only 14.3 percent of African Americans 25 years and older had a BA or higher degree in 2000 (Boswell and Jones 2006). In 2000, among the four largest West Indian populations in the United States, Trinbagonians had the highest proportion of high school graduates (78.9%) and individuals with BAs or higher degrees (21.6%), then Jamaicans (75.1%; 20.3%), Haitians (63.8%; 15.4%), and Guyanese (72.3%; 18.7%) (Boswell and Jones 2006). This reflects the comparatively high level of educational standard of the country of origin. For the year 2000, as estimated by United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), literacy rates were 100 percent for the youth (15–24 years) in TT, an age group that is most likely to compose immigration flow into the United States. Besides, according to another estimate by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), more than three-quarters of Trinbagonians, who were university graduates (both from educational institutions in TT and abroad), were living and working outside of TT, and the largest portion of whom is located in the United States. To look at the flip side of the coin, considerable cultural capital of Trinbagonian Americans means that there exists a serious issue of brain drain that threatens TT’s long-term development and prevents it from reaching a critical mass of human resources. For example, it is estimated that almost three-quarters of the doctors and nurses born in TT work abroad (Burns and Mohapatra 2008).
Economic Attainment In terms of income and occupation, West Indians perform substantially better than either Latinos or non-Hispanic blacks. In 2000, the median household income in
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the West Indies was U.S.$16,600; the income of Latinos and of African Americans was U.S.$11,200 and U.S.$12,660, respectively. The poverty rate for West Indian families was 17.2 percent, compared to 24.1 percent for Latinos and 28.2 percent for non-Hispanic blacks (Boswell and Jones 2006). Comparing the major populations of West Indian descent living in the United States demonstrates that Trinbagonians have the highest income and occupational status. As of 2000, Trinbagonians’ median household income was U.S.$19,700, whereas that of the Jamaicans and Haitians was U.S.$19,000 and U.S.$12,200, respectively. In the same year, 14.1 percent of all Trinbagonian households lived below the poverty level, compared to 15.8 percent of Jamaican households and 20.1 percent of Haitian households (Boswell and Jones 2006). These numbers are compatible with the data concerning Trinbagonian’s occupational standing. Of the 95,532 U.S. residents of Trinbagonian descent in the labor force (aged 16 years and over), 27.5 percent work in managerial and professional positions, compared to 25.4 percent of Jamaicans (410,100 in the U.S. labor force) and 20.7 percent of Haitians (260,326). The difference in socioeconomic status within the West Indian community in the United States partly reflects the disparity in economic well-being of their countries of origin. The relatively stable labor market and constant economic growth in TT has enabled Trinbagonians to be more selective in their decision-making process when deciding whether to migrate. And better educational standards have made Trinbagonian migrants better prepared for the U.S. labor market. In the case of Haitians, in addition to the disadvantages due to socioeconomic conditions in the home country, most immigrants have difficulty with English, something that handicaps them when searching for higher-paying jobs. Comparing Trinbagonian Americans living in different states shows that those in New York have better socioeconomic statuses than their counterparts in Florida. In 2000, the median household income of New York’s Trinbagonian community was U.S.$40,165, compared with U.S.$36,944 in Florida. In part, this is because Trinbagonians in Florida have had less time to establish their neighborhoods and to adjust to living in the United States. But this is not the sole reason for the difference, because, as noted earlier, a large portion of South Florida’s Trinbagonian and West Indian communities came from other parts of the United States. The disparity is due also to the fact that in south Florida, particularly Latino-dominated MiamiDade County, Trinbagonians and immigrants from English-speaking countries face tougher competition for employment and greater difficulty establishing social capital than their counterparts in New York. According to The New York Times (Roberts 2006), which drew on the U.S. Census Bureau’s Community Survey, in 2005 black households in New York City’s Queens County reported a median income of U.S.$51,836, surpassing that of U.S.$50,960 for non-Hispanic whites. As suggested by the report, foreign-born immigrants of African descent drove the income gains among blacks with higher
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median household income of U.S.$61,151, compared to U.S.$45,864 for U.S.born blacks. The economic performance of West Indians in the United States has drawn much scholarly attention, particularly in comparison with that of the U.S. native black population. U.S. residents of West Indian ancestry, including Trinbagonians, are, as noted earlier, predominantly African-descended. Like immigrants from other geo-cultural origins, most West Indians aspire to settle first in a national enclave containing people from their country of origin; if that is impossible, then they attempt to find housing in a regional/ethnic enclave that includes a large number of West Indians. In New York, the major destination of the pre-1965 waves of West Indian immigrants, these communities are usually located either within or on the fringe of traditional African American neighborhoods. There is a popular conception that West Indian Americans have achieved a living standard that is substantially better than that of native blacks, notwithstanding the shared residential pattern, and more important, the experience of phenotypic race-based discrimination. Extant studies, listed here as suggestions for further reading, present research findings that both substantiate and deconstruct the stereotype of the West Indian in the United States as a “model immigrant minority” (see, for example, Foner 2001; Kashinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2004; Model 2008).
Health Statistics and Issues There are no reported health issues specific to Trinbagonians in the United States. In TT and the wider Caribbean, nutrition-related chronic diseases are prevalent. Unique cooking methods and dietary practices have historically caused high incidences of diabetes and coronary heart disease. In addition, the recent proliferation of U.S.-style fast food restaurants and the increased consumption of meals high in fat, sugar, and salt have contributed to the increase in health problems, including obesity, hypertension, cardiovascular diseases, and cancer. The diet of migrant Trinbagonians in combination with retained island cooking traditions and higher dependency on processed and high-fat foods has seriously threatened their health (Henry 2000). As of 2008, in TT, the life expectancy was 69.7 years, which was below the average of the non-Latin English-speaking Caribbean nations and areas (71.8 years). The average national mortality rate (including deaths of all causes) between 2003 and 2005 was estimated at 7.5 per 1,000, which was also worse than the region’s average (7.0 per 1,000). As for women, both life expectancy and mortality rate are almost equivalent to (yet slightly below) the region’s average, whereas the numbers for men fall much below the regional level. See the following table for the top 10 causes and rates of death (all ages) in TT in 1994 and 2004 (TTMH 2005). The AIDS epidemic continues to cause premature deaths among the youth, sexually active males and females, and the children of HIV-positive individuals. As of 2007, in TT, approximately 13,000 people aged 15 years and over (more
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The top 10 causes and rates of death (all ages) in Trinidad and Tobago in 1994 and 2004 1994
%
2004
%
1
Ischaemic heart diseases
25.1
Ischaemic heart diseases
24.8
2
Malignant neoplasms
13.1
Diabetes mellitus
13.9
3
Diabetes mellitus
12.2
Malighant neoplasms
13.8
4
Cerebrovascular diseases
11.2
Cerebrovascular diseases
9.6
5
Pneumonia
5.1
Intentional self-harm
9.2
6
Accidents
3.6
Respiratory and cardiovascular disorders
5.9
7
AIDS/HIV
2.6
Diseases of the digestive system
3.9
8
Signs, symptoms, and ill-defined conditions
2.1
AIDS/HIV
3.2
9
Perinatal conditions
1.9
Diseases of the genitourinary system
2.2
Nephritis and nephrosis
1.4
Perinatal conditions
1.9
10
than 1.2% of the population) live with HIV/AIDS. Sixty percent (77,000) of the total laboratory-reported HIV-positive individuals were women. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the HIV prevalence rate rose from 1.1 percent in 1999 to 1.4 percent in 2001 to 1.5 percent in 2007 (UNAIDS/WHO 2009). Research is needed to examine the implications of West Indian immigration and their assimilation into the African American population in terms of AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases in the two communities (UNAIDS/WHO 2009).
Adjustment and Adaptation Family, Culture, and Life-Cycle Rituals For Trinbagonians, as for West Indians in general, the family is the traditional primary social institution. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, most Trinbagonian families move not as complete units, but with the mother (or, less likely, the father) going ahead and the spouse and child(ren) either eventually following or remaining in TT. The separation leads to a breakdown in conjugal and parent-child relationships and in turn to a disruption in family structure. In other cases, however, successfully adjusting to the new transnational/translocal environment can foster relationships. It should be noted, however, that “families” in the West Indian sense are more malleable and fluid forms of social networks, more inclusive of kindred and territorial connections than the exclusive nuclear families commonly known in the United States. These broadly defined “families” are maintained at home and created in the host society and perform support functions, which considerably reduce
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the psychological and financial costs of migrants and their relatives (Henke 2000; LaBennett 2004). Born and raised in diverse religious traditions, Trinbagonians have many different modes of performing life-cycle rituals. Baptisms, weddings, funerals, and other rites of passage are complexes of unique cultural practices and symbols, and thus the participation in them evokes people’s sense of ethnic affiliation and socializes children into the ethnically distinct norms and faiths of the family. A case in point is the Hindu wedding, an intricate set of pundit (Hindu priests)-led rites in the ancient language of Hindi, accompanied with traditional tassa drumming and theatrical performances. Not only the kin, but also the entire neighborhood is involved in the three-to-four-day ceremony, which reconfirms ties of extended family. Another example comes from Afro-Creole Christian traditions. At Spiritual/Shouter Baptist churches (see the section of religion), the infants are blessed at a dedication ceremony. The followers believe that man should be baptized by immersing in “living water,” such as a stream, river, or the sea after their faith in Christ is voluntarily confessed. The life-cycle rituals mobilize kinship and friendship networks within and beyond national boundaries. Equally notable, however, it is not uncommon in TT that members of the same family profess different religious traditions as a result of relative toleration toward interfaith marriage. In such a case, Trinbagonians either repeat a rite of passage, each time following different religious fabrics and modus operandi, or somehow create a way to integrate competing customs into a single rite around common denominators. For example, a common cosmological view of death and life enables performance of unified funeral rites beyond religious and denominational differences within a family.
Families and Changing Gender Relations There is a powerful analytic framework of socialized gender roles in the West Indies. Colonial rule constructed discourse so that “respectable” women limited their activities to the domestic realms of a church-sanctioned family structure, as opposed to “reputable” men, who defined themselves around public activities, characterized by peer rivalries and pressures, and involving drinking and street culture. In this dichotomy, men almost completely stay away from domesticity. However, this dialectic of ideal femininity and masculinity is contentious and is hardly grounded in the reality of working-class Afro-West Indian lives, which are marked by chronic financial insecurity. In fact, West Indian women have become more independent and empowered in the household through outside work. Migration to the United States further liberated West Indian women from traditional gender roles, whereas men are required to take on greater domestic responsibilities. As noted above, West Indian migration to the United States is female-led and often divides existing households
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at home. The physical separation expands their autonomy, and their employment affords migrant women financial emancipation and greater leverage in their relations with their partner (Henke 2000; LaBennett 2004).
Retaining a Sense of National Culture and Identity Continued Links to Trinidad and Tobago Trinbagonian Americans, either Trinbagonian- or U.S.-born, retain strong bonds with the home country. It is common for migrants to return to TT for periodic visits. Moreover, many continue to go back to TT for varying periods of time in order to observe national holidays like Carnival, religious ceremonies, and life-cycle rituals. Not only has physical, spatial movement maintained migrants’ transnational ties, remittance is even more important. Although not as significant (0.7% of TT’s annual GDP) as for other West Indian countries (19% of Jamaica’s, 20.7% of Haiti’s, and 34.1% Guyana’s annual GDP), remittance flows have constantly increased. As estimated by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), remittance to TT from Trinbagonians living abroad (including the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom) equaled U.S.$50 million in 2002 and U.S.$97 million in 2005, in proportion to the accelerating pace of Trinbagonian migration. Note that these numbers exclude “remittance” beyond money transfers. As noted, Trinbagonian migrants often have to leave their children behind. This has given rise to “barrel children,” meaning those who are left behind and receive assistance in the form of barrels of consumer goods sent to them from the United States.
Religion The fact that TT gained political independence from British rule often led to the myth that Anglicanism—or more broadly Protestantism—dominates its religious landscape. However, the majority of Trinbagonians have historically belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, living side-by-side with those who profess a wide range of Christian denominations and non-Christian religious traditions, including Hinduism, Islam, and African-derived sects. Politicized as a means for contesting cultural claims, religion has occasionally caused conflicts, but fundamentally, religious freedom, toleration, and compromise have informed intergroup relations in TT. Trinbagonian immigrants have transplanted a religious mosaic, in which different traditions remain distinct yet interrelated, to the United States. The religious institution is generally a space for Trinbagonian American social networking, while contributing to the (re)construction of immigrants’ imagined national communities but reaching out to TT. What implications it has for their construction and the politics of identities varies according to the faith and demographic constitution of the congregation.
2156 | Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants
In the case of Trinbagonians who profess major Christian denominations, such as Roman Catholicism and Anglicanism (Episcopal), the religious affiliation facilitates their participation and blending in ethnically mixed congregations and the acquisition of social capital beyond racial and national/regional-based enclaves. For instance, at Christ the King Catholic Church (16000 SW 112th Ave., Miami, FL 33157), Trinbagonian parishioners founded the Trinidad and Tobago Catholic Community in 1990 and have hosted an Annual Mass of Thanksgiving to celebrate TT’s independence, bringing celebrants from TT and drawing Trinbagonians living in South Florida and beyond (Tsuji, Ho, and Stepick 2009). Pentecostal and other independent “nondenominational” churches are rapidly gaining adherents in TT. Both before and after migration to the United States, these North American-derived faiths lead the followers to focus their social activities within their own congregation. Even when intended to expand the congregation, their civic engagement incorporates only those who follow the same faiths, though often crossing traditional social divisions along racial, ethnic, and national lines (Tsuji, Ho, and Stepick 2009). Many Trinbagonian immigrants belong to ethnically rooted religious institutions and depend on networks that revolve around religious leaders and peer followers to ease the difficulties of raising their families in the new environment of the host society. For Trinbagonians of South Asian heritage, generically called “Indian religions,” specifically Hinduism and Islam, have historically served as a diacritical symbol for organizing and mobilizing themselves in their struggle for cultural representation against Christian stigmatization and assimilation. The struggle results in modes of worship and salvation peculiar to TT, which are distinct from the religious fabrics and expressions in South Asia. Being Trinbagonian- (or West Indian-) specific, though sharing putative origins, these “Indian religions” are depreciated as untrue religious representations by immigrants from South Asia, which forge an exclusive relationship between Indo-Caribbean and South Asian immigrant communities. A combination of factors, including the shared experience of discrimination and closer interaction enabled by the breakdown of the language barrier, has articulated what may be referred to as “Pan-Indian ethnic religions” through the mutual adaptation and adoption of locale-specific traditions. For example, one Hindu temple after another has emerged in South Florida since the late 1980s, driven by the expansion of the Indo-Caribbean community. For example, the Florida Hindu Organization–run Shiva Mandir, (3000 NW 29th St., Oakland Park, FL 33309), Shiv Lingam Temple (251 S. State Rd., Margate, FL 33068), Shiva Vishnu Temple of South Florida (5661 Dykes Rd., Southwest Ranches, FL 33331), and Krishna Mandir Hollywood (1450 N. Dixie Hwy, Hollywood, FL 33020) are well attended by Indo-Trinbagonian immigrants. Spiritual/Shouter Baptist is a Trinbagonian-derived Afro-Creole religion, which combines a local interpretation of West African religious traditions with
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Christianity. The term “Shouter” was a derogatory term used by mainstream society for a congregation of Baptists, whose ritual was marked by shouting, clapping, and singing loudly. The Spiritual Baptists believe that their religion comes from John the Baptist; their name is derived from the practice of immersing followers in water to baptize them into the faith (Houk 1995). Sharing beliefs and ritual elements with Baptism and other Protestant faiths, and symbolizing a history of resistance against colonial cultural domination, Spiritual Baptist churches have drawn large numbers of adherents, chiefly of African descent, first in parts of the Caribbean and then in North American destinations of Afro-Trinbagonian and Afro-West Indian immigration. Churches in New York include St. Paul Seven Day Apostolic Spiritual Baptist Church (166 Utica Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11213); St. Michaels Spiritual Baptist Church (5122 Clarendon Rd., Brooklyn, NY 11203); St. Anthony Spiritual Baptist Church (966 Rogers Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11226); and St. John’s Spiritual Baptist Church (2805 Church Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11226). Established in 1985, the Spiritual Baptist Archdiocese of New York (1057 Nostrand Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11225) includes 22 parishes and 19 committees in North America, Canada, and the Caribbean under its jurisdiction.
Language Most Trinbagonians residing in the United States have a good command of the English language. This is true not only of the U.S.-born second and later generations but also of first-generation immigrants, because English is TT’s sole official language, and as noted, because of the relatively high standard of education in TT. In 2000, of the Trinbagonian-born U.S. residents who were five years old and over, almost 93 percent use only English and only 1.8 percent speak English “less than very well.” In a sense, English facilitated Trinbagonians’ assimilation into the host society. Although Trinbagonian English Creole is mutually intelligible with other varieties of international standard English, the vernacular and its unique locution, which have evolved within TT’s peculiar sociohistorical contexts, remain an important means for Trinbagonians to make and contest cultural claims about their ethnic and national identity, and for other ethnic groups to distance themselves from Trinbagonians. The island of Trinidad remained Spanish-ruled for 300 years and was then surrendered to England. However, French Creole cultural imprints were prevalent in the island until the late 19th century. In the meantime, a mass of laboring immigrants settled in Trinidad from diverse geo-cultural origins. Grounded in British English, Trinbagonian English Creole developed as a merger of Spanish, Frenchderived Creole, various tongues of African and South Asian parentage, and later Americanisms (Winer 2009). Reflecting more-or-less clear-cut colonial hierarchy
2158 | Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants
and social divisions, Trinbagonian English Creole developed as inclusive of a wide range of wordings and articulations, which arguably form a continuum. In the circumstances, Trinbagonians have been trained to adjust their ways of speech, selecting “proper” elements from a large repertoire depending on their collocutors and the audience. The sound of Trinbagonian speech is characterized with a rising and falling inflection of the voice. They are often described of speaking as if singing. The long history of colonial rule in the European rivalry rendered each Caribbean territory a more or less isolated and self-sufficient enclave. As a result, TT’s English Creole greatly differs from Jamaica’s or Guyana’s in phonology and vocabulary (Winter 2009). However, the deterritorialization attendant upon migration to and living side-by-side in the United States caused the assimilation of a variety of localized dialects into more or less integrated “ethnic” lingua franca of West Indian immigrants and become a diacritical symbol for a broader regional/ethnic community.
National/Regional-Language Press and Other Media There are numberless publications, both/either in print and/or online, which target the West Indian communities in the United States. They distribute news from their home countries while carrying up-to-date information that concerns the communities, for example, immigration issues, education, health care and insurance, real estate, and the job market. These publications have served to build and reinforce a broader sense of community among West Indians or Caribbean Americans. The following table shows New York (and New Jersey)- and South Florida-based media that specialize in the West Indian or Caribbean American populations. In addition to the listed media, radio and television stations regularly broadcast programs geared to West Indian and Caribbean American communities. Also, there are a dozen publications and broadcasting media that target West Indians in other parts of the United States, though they are not listed due to space limitations.
Celebration of National Holidays Annual holidays peculiar to Trinbagonians include: Indian Arrival Day (May 30), which commemorates the arrival of the first indentured laborers from the Indian subcontinent to Trinidad in May 1845; Labor Day (June 19), which celebrates the anniversary of the general strikes in 1937; Emancipation Day (August 1), which commemorates the abolition of slavery in 1834; Independence Day (August 31); and Republic Day (September 24), which commemorates the day when TT became a republic in 1976. Reflecting its colorful religious landscape, TT observes religiously appointed days as national holidays, including Liberation Day (March 30), which was declared in 1996 as a public holiday, in honor of Spiritual/Shouter Baptist sect, Diwali (the 15th day of the month of Kartika in the Hindu calendar), otherwise
New York (New Jersey) and South Florida-based media specializing in West Indian or Caribbean Americans (Continued ) New York (New Jersey)-based Publications Caribbean American Weekly
Print and online weekly
http://www.thenegroworldinc.com/caw/home.html 26 Court St., Suit 701, Brooklyn, NY 11242; (718) 771-0988 Caribbean Business Journal
Print monthly magazine
http://www.cbji.com/home.aspx P.O.B. 178, South Orange, NJ 07079; (973) 275-1405 Caribbean Contact USA
Print weekly
165 Euclid Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11208; (718) 642-3319 Caribbean Daylight
Online daily
http://www.caribbeandaylight.com/index.html Caribbean Life
Printed and online weekly
(718) 260-4551 http://www.caribbeanlifenews.com/ Caribbean Voice
Printed and online weekly
http://www.caribvoice.org/ CaribbeanWorldNews.com
Online daily
(718) 476-3616 http://www.caribbeanworldnews.com/index.php?ad=home New York Carib News
Online daily
http://www.nycaribnews.com/ 7 West 36th Street, New York, NY 10018; (212) 944-1991 New York (New Jersey)-based Broadcasting Stations One Caribbean Radio
Radio (620AM)
http://www.onecaribbeanradio.com/ Restoration Plaza, 1360 Fulton St., Brooklyn, NY 11216; (718) 622-1081 Whatz Up TV
TV
1655 Flatbush Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11210 http://www.whatzuptv.com/ South Florida-based Publications Caribbean-American Commentary Newspaper
Print and online weekly
http://www.caribbean-americancommentary.com/ 4693 N. State Rd., 7, Lauderdale Lakes, FL 33319; (954) 822-4878 (Continued )
2160 | Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants New York (New Jersey) and South Florida-based media specializing in West Indian or Caribbean Americans (Continued ) Caribbean Contact
Print weekly
16155 SW 117th Ave., Unit B22, Miami, FL 33177; (305) 278-4569 Caribbean Today
Print and online weekly
http://www.caribbeantoday.com/ 9020 SW 152nd St., Miami, FL 33157; (205) 238-2868 Caribbean Voice
Print weekly
P.O.B. 450127, Sunrise, FL 33325; (954) 749-5112 Caribbean National Weekly
Print and online weekly
http://www.cnweeklynews.com/ 4812 West Commercial Blvd., Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33319; (954) 739-6618 South Florida Caribbean News
Online daily
http://www.sflcn.com/index.php P.O.B. 841403, Pembroke Pine, FL 33084; (954) 892-5622 South Florida-based Broadcasting Stations WAVS-AM
Radio (1170AM)
http://www.wavs1170.com/ 6360 SW 41st Place, Davie, FL 33314 Island TV
TV
http://www.islandtv.tv/ 10761 SW 138th St., Miami, FL 33176
known as the “Festival of Lights,” which is a Hindu festival in honor of Lakshmi and Deepavali, and Eid-Ul-Fitr (Id-Ul-Fitr or simply Eid) (the first day of Shawwal in the Islamic calendar), a Muslim holiday that marks the end of Ramadan, the month of fasting. Both Carnival Monday and Carnival Tuesday, when bands of costumed masqueraders go on street procession, are not public holidays, but most businesses are closed on these days. On the date of Diwali, many Indian ethnic stores sell jewelry and traditional outfits, such as chiffon saris and kurta, as well as murtis (statues) of Hindu deities and incense used in prayer. The climax of Diwali is the lighting of diyas (small clay pots filled with oil in which a wick is immersed and lit) after sundown. In rural districts with a strong Hindu presence, it is common to see whole streets illuminated. EidUl-Fitr begins with an early family meal, followed by social celebration characterized by a special charity in the form of money, food, or produce, which is given to the needy or to Muslim organizations. Diwali and Eid-Ul-Fitr are celebrated among Hindu and Muslim communities in the United States, although they are not national
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public holidays. Participating in the celebration of these religious holidays helps Trinbagonians who profess these religious faiths build relationships with Hindus and Muslims of different geo-cultural origins, which helps build a broader sense of community. Political figures of districts and states that contain many Hindu and Muslim populations usually make public announcements expressing their greetings and best wishes to these groups.
Foodways For the Trinbagonian, as for other immigrant groups, food forms a vital component of cultural uniqueness, on which they construct and retain ethnic and national identity in the United States. Trinbagonians have varied their daily diet somewhat to better suit the hectic pace of American life, particularly in urban areas where most of them live. On some special occasions (e.g., wakes, weddings, and days of prayer), however, the dining table is spread with types of cuisine that are considered typically Trinbagonian. They include callaloo (or calalue, calilou, kalalu) (a thick soup made with dark green leaves of amaranth, or taro, which is known as dasheen), pelau (or peleau) (rice mixed with seasoned chicken or pork pieces and vegetables, including pigeon peas or okra), buljol (or bhuljol, bull-jowl) (oilmarinated salted cod with chopped onions, tomatoes, and peppers eaten with a loaf of bread or fried bake), or a Trinbagonian-style macaroni pie. These meals are often served with mauby (or marbay) (a dark-colored drink made from the bark of the tree hogplum, which is bitter in taste, though heavily sweetened with sugar), rum punch (a mixture of rum with diluted lime juice and syrup), Trinbagonian-brewed Carib or Stag beers, or Trinbagonian-brand sweet drinks (soft drinks). Being a soup in which a number of different ingredients are cooked down to a homogeneous mash, callaloo has become a routinely employed term that means something mixed, with great variety together, often said of a person’s racial and cultural heritage. Trinbagonians often use this term to refer to the national credo of harmonious multiracial, -ethnic, and -religious coexistence. However, the concept of callaloo has created as much controversy as agreement, as with the case of other metaphoric analogies of assimilation used in accordance with particular sociopolitical demands. Trinbagonians of South Asian heritage have developed unique cooking traditions in keeping with harvest time and the religious ritual cycle. Most of them have already formed indispensable parts of general Trinbagonian dietary habit. Doubles is a popular Trinbagonian-style street food, which is made with wet curried channa (a kind of yellow pea) wrapped with two bara (or baaraa) breads (a small round flat fried bread made with ground urdee dal). Phulouri (or pholouri) is balled spiced and deep-fried dough made with ground split peas and flour, usually accompanied by a curried sauce. Probably, however, the most popular of all Indo-Trinbagonian
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delicacies is roti (or rhoti), which is a very thin flat round bread, folded over a curried meat, fish, or potato filling. Trinbagonians enjoy roti in various styles, such as paratha or buss-up-shut, which is torn or beaten into pieces and served as a side dish with curried meat or other ingredients. They often argue or exchange information about where to find the best roti shop. Migration to the United States does not discontinue a Trinbagonian’s perpetual search for a better roti. In New York and South Florida, great magnets to Trinbagonian immigrants, a number of roti shops compete to satisfy the passion for this “Indian” delicacy. For Trinbagonian Americans, these dishes, though of putative South Asian origin, evoke and reinforce a broad sense of affiliation to the Trinbagonian nation; they help Indo-Trinbagonian immigrants construct a broader sense of community with those of Indian heritage, regardless of their place of birth. In fact, many roti shops in the United States were either/both owned or/and run by Pakistani or Asian Indian immigrants, who live in or close to large West Indian neighborhoods.
Music, Arts, and Entertainment Nothing represents “Trinbagonian-ness” than Carnival. The origin of the Trinbagonian Carnival can be traced to a Catholic elite-class pre-Lenten festivity in the early 19th century; in time, Carnival came to serve as a synonym for Trinbagonian peoplehood, which embraces cohesion within diversity. Today, Carnival is a complex of Trinbagonian music, arts, and entertainment, and the most important sphere wherein to (re)produce, dramatize, advertise, and consume them. Wherever they settled, Trinbagonian migrants brought Carnival to their new home. The internationalization of Trinbagonian or West Indian Carnival advanced in close relation with the pattern of Trinbagonian immigration. The first West Indian Carnival outside the region was in New York. In the 1920s, a small group of Trinbagonians and their West Indian friends started to hold annual costume parties and competitions indoors; in 1947, they went on street procession for the first time on Labor Day. probably due to the better weather than the traditional pre-Lent time. This allegedly became the prototype of today’s West Indian American Day Parade (or Labor Day Parade), which occurs each year in Crown Heights in Brooklyn and is by far New York City’s biggest street parade: it attracts one to three million spectators. Yoranda Lezama-Clark, a second-generation Trinbagonian American, presides over the West Indian American Day Carnival Association (WIADCA), having taken over the responsibilities in 2001 from her father of Trinbagonian origin and late president, Carlos Lezama. As a relatively new destination of West Indian immigrants, Miami has celebrated Carnival since 1984. The Miami Carnival developed from a small neighborhood festival to an international event, now including J’ouvert (the official opening of Carnival at daybreak), a Junior (Kiddies) Carnival Parade, a Miss Miami Carnival Beauty
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Curtis Baptiste performs with a group from Trinidad in the West Indian Day Parade in Brooklyn, New York, September 5, 2005. (AP Photo/Mark Lennihan)
Pageant, and other numerous musical and theatrical functions prior to the final street parade on Columbus Day. Trinbagonian Americans have been leading members of Miami Carnival Inc., which was incorporated in 1999 as a merger of two competing bodies—Caribbean American Carnival and Carnival Association of South Florida. However, a more recent, separate competing Carnival was launched in Broward County, which emerged as the new “capital” of Florida’s West Indians. Between 2003 and 2008, by the Broward Carnival Inc. (later renamed the Broward Caribbean Carnival Inc.), the separate Broward Caribbean Carnival had been held annually on the Columbus Day weekend and similarly accommodates a variety of events, including J’ouvert and Children’s Carnival, which culminate in a West Indian-style street parade of troupes of costumed masqueraders. In 2009, representatives of Miami Carnival Inc. and Broward Caribbean Carnival Inc. have come together as Miami-Broward One Carnival Host Committee Inc. to celebrate 25 years of Miami Carnival in the City of Miami, on Sunday October 11 (Miami-Broward One Carnival Inc. 2009). TT is often referred to as the “Land of Calypso,” a form of statement song of Trinbagonian origin. However, Trinbagonian migration eventually dislodged the music from TT’s national spatial bounds. Outside of TT, calypso achieved its greatest commercial presence in the United States. During the 1930s, top Trinbagonian Calypsonians migrated to or visited New York City, where they recorded, appeared on radio broadcasts, and performed for the local West Indian immigrant
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community. The lyrics of their calypsos commented both on events in TT and on their new experience in the United States. Brought by transnational Calypsonians, these songs served to update the knowledge of Trinbagonian Americans about sociopolitical affairs at home and to report to families left behind what the migrants’ life was like in the United States at a time of limited travel and communication. During the 1950s, in response to a huge hit, Calypso, the first album by Jamaicandescended Harry Belafonte, a large number of calypso records were released by West Indian and American singers, including Cecil Anderson, better known as the Duke of Iron, who was a Trinbagonian-born New Yorker. Recording producers and nightclubs in the United States and the UK sought calypsonians. These drove the migration of music makers and singers of talent from TT and other parts of the West Indies. Trinbagonian-derived calypso has been established as a major form of expression in West Indian immigrant communities, although it no longer enjoys as high status as it used to in the wider American popular culture (Stuempfle 2004). Denyse Plummer, an American singer of Trinbagonian descent, exemplified the transnationality of the “Land of Calypso,” winning the title of the 1992 Calypso Monarch, the most prestigious appellation for Trinbagonian calypsonians. Steel-pan, also known as steel-drum or pan, is a percussion instrument of the Trinbagonian-born and is closely associated with the music of the English-speaking countries of the region. Although the instrument had been familiar to New York City’s West Indians since the late 1930s, the expansion of the Trinbagonian American community led to the founding in Brooklyn of Panorama in 1974, an annual steel-pan competition and festival. Steel-pan has established a unique position in American popular culture, giving rise to a myriad of steel-bands throughout the country. In TT, the so-called “pan-yard” serves as a key space for neighborhood interactions while performing its primary functions as the place of steel-band practices and the storage of pans and equipment. For Trinbagonians living in the United States, the pan-yard also affords a venue for “liming (or lime),” a Trinbagonian term for informal social gatherings for talking and drinking, through which they confirm the social network among Trinbagonians, crossing generations and their immigration status, and consolidate an interethnic relationship with the West Indians of distinct national origins and the U.S.-born blacks.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship In 1977 TT was among the 20 countries that were the largest sources of immigrants (aged 16 and over) traveling to the United States. The 1997 Immigration Yearbook compared these countries in terms of the number who had become citizens and the
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 2165
cumulative naturalization rates for 1977 through 1997. TT was ranked 11th with a naturalization rate of 47.8 percent, meaning that 2,160 of 4,516 Trinbagonian immigrants admitted in the United States in 1977 had become citizens by 1997. Their cultural capital, such as fluency in English language and educational attainment, had facilitated the Trinbagonians’ assimilation into the host societies, which was one of the major factors to encourage immigrants to naturalize. However, being primarily family-based immigrants (i.e., neither refugees nor asylees) from a geographically nearby country, Trinbagonians were less likely to aspire for U.S. citizenship compared to immigrants from Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. According to the Department of Homeland Security, between 1989 and 1998, 48,808 Trinbagonian immigrants became citizens; between 1999 and 2008, 55,233 Trinbagonian immigrants obtained U.S. citizenship. By 2000, 197,400 people of Trinbagonian descent had naturalized. This means that the naturalization rate for those of Trinidadian born living in the United States was 47.8 percent, which was the same as in 1997. In reaction to the increasing number of Trinbagonians living outside the country of origin, in 1988, the TT government amended the Citizenship Act to allow Trinbagonians to hold their TT citizenship by birth or descent even if they became citizens of another country by a voluntary act other than marriage (upon which it is automatically granted). Likewise, in 2000, the Act was amended to enable those who voluntarily gained citizenship in another country before 1988 to restore their citizenship in TT. As a result, an increasing number of Trinbagonians live a transnational life from a base in the United States, using their dual citizenship to facilitate movement between the two countries while maintaining their connections in the home country. These reforms were intended to tap migrants’ human and financial resources for TT’s national development in terms of the fact that more than threequarters of Trinbagonians who earned tertiary education live and work abroad. At the same time, though, dual citizenship has become a contentious part of the political agenda in TT. For example, following the 2001 general elections, the PNM raised a petition stating that two candidates of the competing UNC were ineligible to stand for election because they held passports for the United States and Canada, respectively, along with their Trinbagonian passports. As stipulated by the Constitution, candidates for TT’s national parliamentary elections should not have dual nationalities. The legal frameworks governing citizenship are in flux, with no consensus on how to balance the obligations, rights, and interests of migrants.
Intergroup Relations Migration does not exempt Afro-Trinbagonians from the burden of race-based discrimination. The immigrants who settled in the United States after it was desegregated face less overt racism than those who migrated before the Civil Rights movement. Nevertheless, the presence of a stratification of color, which places
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“blacks” as a group on the bottom rungs, has strongly affected how Afro-Trinbagonians interact with African Americans and other racial and ethnic groups. Despite the shared experiences of racial discrimination with African Americans, Afro-Trinbagonians and Afro-West Indians in general do not necessarily attach the same social, political, and ideological meanings to their racial identity (Foner 2001, 2005; Waters 2001). In the West Indies, people of African descent form a majority or, as in the case of TT, are slightly outnumbered by those of South Asian descent. In either case, the African-descended population has played leading roles in economic, political, and social development. Forming a minority within the West Indian communities in the United States and being of a race that is neither black nor white, Indo-Caribbean immigrants take on contextually fluid and multidimensional identities distinct from those of AfroCaribbean immigrants, who usually use either distinctly African American (racebased) or distinctly West Indian (ethnicity-based) identities. At the same time, their unique cultural assets, a product of the West Indian multiethnic sociopolitical milieu, have prevented Indo-Caribbeans’ automatic integration into a broader panIndian community. For example, in Richmond Hill in Queens, New York, West Indians, most of whom are of South Asian descent, began arriving from TT and Guyana in the 1960s and currently make up 18 percent of the residents. Scores of immigrants from South Asia started to settle in the district in the late 1970s and have come to make up some 7.5 percent of the neighborhood’s population (Chan 2004). Ethnic contrasts, particularly in language and religion, originally caused the two communities to be mutually clannish and their relations strained. West Indians grew up speaking English and only a hint of Hindi, whereas those from South Asia spoke chiefly Gujarati, Hindi, or Punjabi, but little English. Most West Indians or South Asians professed Hinduism or Islam; however, South Asian immigrants tended to devalue locale-specific Hinduism and the Islam of West Indians as spurious and inauthentic, which caused their relations to be defined by rivalry, distrust, and contention. Today, the two communities are building closer ties through intermarriage and collaboration in economic activities enabled by a greater familiarity with English among South Asian immigrants.
Forging a New American Political Identity Composed chiefly of people of African descent, the West Indian immigration has always had implications for national and local politics in the United States. The experience of race-based, institutionalized discrimination caused West Indian immigrants to build coalitions with African Americans for sociopolitical redress. In fact, early West Indian immigrants in segregated America played disproportionately important roles in the Civil Rights movements. Trinbagonian Americans were no exception. George Padmore, born Malcolm Ivan Meredith Nurse in the village of Arouca, Trinidad, in 1903, was an important black student leader and later became a leading
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advocate of Pan-Africanism. Padmore was an active member of the Workers (Communist) Party while he studied at New York University and Howard University. In 1929 he moved to the USSR, where he worked to build propaganda geared to the people of color in European colonies and African Americans. From 1931, he lived in Germany, where he served as an editor of The Negro World, a weekly organ newspaper of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League, an organization founded by another renowned intellectual activist of West Indian origin, Marcus Garvey. In 1934 he moved to England, where he emerged as an influential leader of the Pan-African movement. He was in contact with many black radical intellects, including C.L.R. James, a Trinbagonian-born intellect who wrote numerous books, including Black Jacobin. As chairman of International African Service Bureau, he organized the Pan African Conference in Manchester, attended by Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, and W.E.B. Du Bois. He died in 1959 shortly after Nkrumah, who was then president of Ghana, appointed Padmore as his advisor. Kwame Toure, better known as Stokely Carmichael, was an American of Trinbagonian parentage who became one of the most distinguished black activists. Arguably, he coined the term “Black Power” (Kaufman 1998). Carmichael was initially integrationist-oriented and was a vocal leader of the Student Nonviolence Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which supported the formation of the crossracial Mississippi Democratic Party. Frustrated with attempts at racial reconciliation, as well as the violence against nonviolent activists such as James Meredith and Martin Luther King Jr., he grew involved with the ideology and praxes of those calling for separatism, including the Black Panther Party, which gave him the title of “Honorary Prime Minister.” In the rise of Black Power movements in the Caribbean from the late 1960s, Carmichael was declared persona non grata throughout the British Commonwealth Caribbean, including TT, the country of his origin. He died in 1998 at the age of 57. Roughly speaking, pre-1965 West Indian immigrants politically blended into African American communities, downplaying their ethnic and national uniqueness while emphasizing their common African heritage. However, current West Indian communities are more selective, contextually allying themselves with or distancing themselves from African Americans. The confluence of significant developments since the 1960s may have caused this shift in the West Indians’ political approach to African Americans. A widening socioeconomic disparity lies between AfroWest Indians and native African Americans. As a result, these communities have had different or even competing socioeconomic interests and have emphasized their sense of ethnic affiliation over common racial heritage. Mutually stereotyping and stereotyped as inconsistent from outside, these ethnic communities have occasionally expressed distrust, jealousy, and rivalry. However, their competing claims for group worth would not have been translated into actual ethnic-based political mobilization without the following conditions.
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First, the West Indian-descended population continues to expand and concentrate. Constant arrivals from the West Indies, starting in the late 1960s, and the expanding immigration from Africa in the late 1980s have bolstered the U.S. black population. The number of the foreign-born blacks rose nearly seven-fold between 1960 (125,000) and 1980 (816,000) and more than tripled between 1980 and 2005 (2,815,000), which boosted the foreign share of U.S. blacks from less than one percent to eight percent during these decades. In 2005, two-thirds of approximately 2.8 million foreign-born blacks hailed from the West Indies. Having nearly tripled in number in the corresponding years, the Trinbagonian is among the foreign-born populations that have contributed to the recent increase in the U.S. black population of non-Hispanic origin. Second, several significant institutional shifts in politics, such as the reinscription of voting-district boundaries, have facilitated the political organization and mobilization of West Indians. For instance, in Brooklyn, the largest concentration of people of West Indian descent in the United States, the redistribution of the electorate in the 1990s created two districts of predominantly West Indians and resulted in the election of Una Clarke, a Jamaican immigrant woman, to the New York City Council. In the United States, where census results have broader implications for policy making and implementation, the census became a focus of attention among West Indian communities, which have become more ethnically and politically conscious. For example, in 2008, a campaign called CariBid2010 (www.caribid2010. com) was launched to “ensure Caribbean Americans or West Indians get their own category on the U.S. Census . . . [and] to get Caribbean Americans who remain undercounted and remain largely invisible as an economic and political bloc to mainstream America counted.” At the kick-off rally held in June 2008, Felicia Persaud (a first-generation Guyanese-born journalist), who chairs the campaign, asserted: “Being visible in America begins and ends with the U.S. Census. If you don’t get counted you don’t exist in many important ways. . . . [T]he Census Bureau [will] finally recognize our existence.” This campaign is an initiative of Hard Beat Communications (a consulting agency that specializes in the Caribbean), in collaboration with Caribbean Immigrant Services (an organization with the goal of mobilizing and empowering U.S. residents of Caribbean heritage), and CbeanMedia.TV (a broadband and IPTV network for Caribbean content). Although these three leading agencies are New York-based, there are participating and sponsoring organizations from throughout the United States. They include: Institute of Caribbean Studies (a Washington, D.C.-based nongovernmental organization (NGO) dedicated to education, advocacy, and action on issues relating to Caribbean Americans); Caribbean Research Center (an academic component of Medger Evers College of the City University of New York); Jamaica Organization of New Jersey (http://www.jaorgnj.org/index. php); the Guyanese American Workers United, Soca D’Vote (a Washington, D.C.-
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based nonpartisan voter education and registration program as a part of Caribbean American Heritage Month Celebration); the South Florida representative of the Jamaica Diaspora (an international organization that encourages and fosters the participation of Jamaicans overseas in all aspects of Jamaica’s national development; http://www.jamaicandiaspora.gov.jm/diaspora/); and Atlanta Carnival Associations (http://www.atlantacarnival.org/main.html). Cosponsoring Caribbean media companies include: One Caribbean Radio; South Florida Caribbean News; Whatz Up TV; Deeraj TV; Carib Nation TV; CaribVoice Radio; Tropicalfete; WFGG Atlanta; Everybody’s Magazine; Jamaicans.com; and Caribbean Life Style TV.
Return Immigration Generally, it is difficult to understand the reality of the dynamic of “return migration,” because the transnational lifestyle of migrants has long made it difficult to define “home” spatially. For reference, from 1990 to 1998, TT government’s Survey of Return Migration counted at least 240 immigrants that may have returned to TT on a permanent basis, with another more than 6,000 entering on a temporary or semipermanent basis from the United Kingdom (15.5%), Canada (30.7%), and the United States (39.4%). Twenty-three percent of the returnees spent 5 to 9 years in the country where they had emigrated from TT, 20 percent had spent at least 10 years abroad, and 10 percent had stayed away for more than 20 years. Combined, more than a half of the returnees had spent five years or more living abroad. Note that in regards to the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom, the majority of the returnees (92%) remained in the host country to which they migrated and did not move on to settle elsewhere before repatriating to TT.(St. Bernard 2005) Contrary to the popular assumption, the return is not confined to retirement, although many do repatriate permanently at that stage of their lives. According to the survey, the age cohort 20–44 years accounted for 51.4 percent, and, combined with the cohort 45–64 years, the productive-age population made up almost 80 percent of the returnees during this period. Reflecting on the female-biased composition of Trinbagonian migration, nearly 60 percent of the returnees were women. A look at the socioeconomic characteristics of the return migration shows a strong tendency for the return of high-level educational and occupational groups, again contradicting a general conception about return migration (St. Bernard 2005).
The Second and Later Generations As described earlier, prior to the mid-1960s, Trinbagonian migration to the United States was not as numerous as that in a number of other West Indian countries, for example, Jamaica, Haiti, or Guyana. Accordingly, the first or “one-and-a-half”
2170 | Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants
generation immigrants still form the majority of Trinbagonian Americans. In 2000, of 164,783 U.S. residents of Trinbagonian ancestry, people born in TT made up 74.6 percent (122,886). In New York and Florida, the ratio of Trinbagonian-born to Trinbagonian-descended residents was 76.8 percent (64,639 of 84,197) and 74.7 percent (16,334 of 21,872), respectively. The racial and ethnic identities of the one-and-a-half and later generation Trinbagonian immigrants are multifaceted and can be classified into three general types
Youth Profiles “Education Is the Source of Liberation” Born in 1978 and raised in Trinidad and Tobago, Renee moved to the United States in 1996. She thinks her move was typical of the Caribbean immigrant movement to the United States. Like any immigrant, Renee’s mother wanted the best for her family, and eventually Renee’s brothers and she were able to join her in the United States. When Renee got to the United States, she spent two years in high school; her first year in Long Island, New York, and the other in North Miami Beach Senior High, in Florida. She experienced culture shock like all immigrants. Everything about living in this new place was emotionally challenging for Renee. Her first real intimate experience of culture shock was her need to do ethnic work. One of the questions people would ask her was “what are you?” Her initial response to herself was “duh—human!” Actually, Renee was baffled by the question and did not know how to answer. It took a great deal of emotional work. After her high school experience, Renee came to realize that ethnicity was an important descriptive tool, not just informally but formally. It took her a long time to realize that ethnicity is important to her, at least to the point where Renee appreciates her (East) Indian heritage, her Chinese heritage, and her African heritage. She does not claim one heritage over another. Being a Trinidadian national living in the United States, Renee has had the opportunity to experience a society where difference is the norm. She feels ethnically privileged, and her ethnicity allows her to recognize and embrace differences, but it does not define her, for she is more than just ethnicity. Renee feels fortunate. Education has always been an important part of her life. She believes education is a source of liberation. Education is not just about getting a degree but is about exploration and growth. Her education did not stop after high school. She went to Florida International University, where she earned a bachelors degree in biological sciences and a master’s degree in comparative sociology. Renee is currently a PhD candidate in comparative sociology. Along the way, she got married and gave birth to three children.
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Chayim Bynoe, age seven, from Brooklyn, New York, and his grandfather, Aldwyn Bynoe, from Trinidad, watch a live broadcast of the inauguration of President Barack Obama from a restaurant in New York’s Harlem neighborhood, January 20, 2009. (AP Photo/Tina Fineberg)
(Waters 1994, 2001): (1) identifying as African Americans, (2) identifying as ethnic (or hyphenated) Americans with some distancing from native-born blacks, or (3) maintaining an identity as an immigrant somewhat external to traditional American racial and ethnic categories. According to Waters, the social class background of their parents, the social networks parents are involved in, the type of school they attended, and the family structure constitute the contexts of racial socialization of young immigrants and children of Afro-West Indian immigrants in the United States. These variables affect the daily discrimination that they experience, in response to which young immigrants develop their understanding of race, which in turn shapes their reaction to race relations in American society. The children of Afro-West Indian immigrants are most often seen by others as African American due to their phenotypic affinity, and they must actively work to assert their unique regional-/national-based ethnic identities as either West Indians or Trinbagonians. Such research findings warn against the facile and popular assumption that secondand later-generation Afro-West Indian immigrants tend to or are able to emphasize their ethnic and national origins in lieu of identifying themselves as African Americans based on common racial attributes.
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Issues in Relations between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago There have been several turning points in the relationship between the United State and TT. Because of the 1941 Bases-for-Destroyers Agreement, the United States ended up controlling large portions of TT, including the deepwater harbor in Chaguaramas Bay (northeastern peninsula of the island). U.S. control of these areas became seen as imperialism during the postwar nationalist mobilization toward independence. Led by Eric Williams, intense protests to put an end to the U.S. occupation dominated national politics until the early 1960s. In addition, U.S.–TT relations became strained when the TT government, led at the time by George Chambers, opposed the U.S.-led military intervention in Grenada in 1983. Despite an occasional rise in diplomatic tension, the United States and TT have maintained a cordial relationship centered on their commercial ties, which have always been strong and have grown significantly since the late 1980s due to economic liberalization. In order to lead the economy out of its quagmire, TT governments have worked to build a better investment climate, concluding a tax information exchange agreement with the United States in 1989, and a Bilateral Investment Treaty and an Intellectual Property Rights agreement in 1994. As a result, the number of U.S. firms operating in TT has constantly increased, and U.S. direct investment reached U.S.$3.85 billion in 2007. U.S. investment is concentrated in TT’s most competitive, prospective, and profitable energy sectors, that is, crude oil production and the petrochemical industries, which range from methanol, ammonia, and urea to liquefied natural gas (LNG). TT is currently the leading exporter of LNG to the United States, supplying some 70 percent of U.S. LNG imports. U.S. merchandise exports to TT also grew, increasing from U.S.$666 million in 1996 to U.S.$1.6 billion in 2006. However, U.S. purchase of TT’s merchandise exports, chiefly energy-related goods, has grown at a pace far exceeding the increase of the exports, which has widened the U.S. trade deficit with TT. The United States is now TT’s irreplaceable trading partner, being a destination for almost 60 percent of all exports from TT. Within the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) (a diplomatic and trade pact among English-speaking Caribbean nations and territories), TT is the only country to have applied for entrance into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with its steady economic growth and expanding commercial ties with the United States.
Forecasts for the 21st Century Unlike most Caribbean nations, whose national economy depends heavily on tourism, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States did not seriously affect TT’s economic growth. Rather, with crude oil prices soaring, thus far 21st-century TT has
Issues in Relations between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago | 2173
been marked by steady economic growth. However, the distribution of oil dollars remains uneven, which has deepened the gulf between wealth and poverty. In 2002, the World Bank estimated that more than three-quarters of the total national income were received by the 20 percent of households with the highest income; whereas, as estimated by UNDP, in the same year, 17 percent of the entire population lived below the poverty line. If we include the underemployed in TT, the level of unemployment remains high, despite a substantial decline beginning in 2000 (30.3% in 2000, 24.4% in 2002, 23.5% in 2004, and 17.8% in 2006). More important, the age cohort between 15 and 24 years old constantly accounts for the largest proportion of the unemployed (69.6% in 2000, 61.1% in 2002, 51.1% in 2004, and 39% inn 2006). Compared with other Caribbean nations, relatively high social mobility is possible, but there is often little opportunity for the poor, particularly less-educated youth, to improve their economic outlook other than through migration, seeking unskilled and low-paying jobs and following kin who have already settled in the United States or elsewhere. Many youths, for whom international migration is not an option, often fling themselves into violent crime, much of it associated with drugs and gang warfare. For fast cash, they increasingly turned to drug smugglers, or “drug mules,” to export the narcotics to North America. What is worse, the major drug operations are allegedly shifting their Caribbean hub to TT from Jamaica, the traditional stopover of South American cocaine and embarkation port of marijuana, currently under close U.S. surveillance (Hall 2009). In response, the United States has concentrated its bilateral financial and technical assistance in streamlining TT’s judicial system and reinforcing its security forces, using, for example, the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement funds (INL 2009). A current stereotyping of the West Indian in the United States as a model immigrant minority is increasingly at odds with the facts, which concern future U.S.–TT relationships. First, as noted above, the introduction of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 did not interrupt expanding West Indian immigration to the United States, because a relatively small proportion of undocumented aliens are from the region. In 1996, however, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security estimated that there were 50,000 unauthorized U.S. residents of Trinbagonian descent, which ranked TT in the top 20 source countries of undocumented immigrant population in the United States. Second, in this context, the United States has deported an increasing number of Trinbagonians, especially since the late 1990s. According to the U.S. Census, the most remarkable recent development is that increased criminal activity abroad has been attributed to Trinbagonian deportations. A study done by Caribbean Community Secretariat indicated that about 30,000 criminal offenders had been deported to member countries, including TT, between 1990 and 2005. Of this number, over 17,000 were deported for drug offenses, 1,800 for possession of illegal firearms, and more than 600 for murder. The United States is responsible for more than
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three-quarters of all crime-related deportations to the region. The study demonstrated that deported nationals fail to participate in civic social life and often continue to commit criminal acts. For instance, in TT, deportees are over three times more likely to be arrested than the average person. At Caribbean nations’ urging, the integration of deported nationals featured high on the agenda of the Fifth Summit of the Americas in April 2008. Hosting the Summit, TT became the first Caribbean country to receive President Barack Obama’s official call.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 327 Immigrants admitted from TT and other major West Indian countries: fiscal years, 1987–2009 All Regions and Countries
TT
Jamaica
Haiti
Guyana 11,384
1987
601,516
3,543
23,148
14,819
1988
643,025
3,947
20,966
34,806
8,747
1989
1,090,924
5,394
24,523
13,658
10,789
1990
1,536,483
6,740
25,013
20,324
11,362
1991
1,827,167
8,407
23,828
47,527
11,666
1992
973,977
7,008
18,915
11,002
9,064
1993
904,292
6,577
17,241
10,094
8,384
1994
804,416
6,292
14,349
13,333
7,662
1995
720,461
5,424
16,398
14,021
7,362
1996
915,900
7,344
19,089
18,386
9,489
1997
798,378
6,409
17,840
15,057
7,257
1998
654,451
4,852
15,146
13,449
3,963
1999
644,787
4,283
14,733
16,532
3,300
2000
841,002
6,660
16,000
22,364
5,746
2001
1,058,902
6,665
15,393
27,120
8,303
2002
1,059,356
5,771
14,898
20,268
9,962
2003
703,542
4,153
13,384
12,314
6,820
2004
957,883
5,384
14,414
13,998
6,329
2005
1,122,373
6,568
18,345
14,524
9,317
2006
1,266,129
8,854
24,976
22,226
9,552
2007
1,052,415
6,829
19,375
30,405
5,726
2008
1,107,126
5,937
18,477
26,007
6,823
2009
1,130,818
6,256
21,783
24,280
6,670
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.
Table 328 Trinbagonian immigration by selected class of admission: fiscal years, 1997–2008 Immediate Relatives of U.S. Citizens
1997
Total
Family-sponsored Preferences
Employmentbased Preferences
Total
Spouses
Children
Parents
Refugee & Asylee Adjustments
Diversity Program
Other
6,409
1,747
1,355
3,194
1,759
1,064
371
0
94
10
2176
1998
4,852
1,437
851
2,429
1,052
684
243
2
126
5
1999
2,171
1,476
377
1,535
298
542
695
23
12
1
2000
6,660
2,380
961
3,095
1,784
988
323
0
178
16
2001
6,665
2,149
998
3,397
2,182
844
371
2
83
12
2002
5,682
1,572
681
3,372
2,135
855
382
2
36
9
2003
4,153
1,588
430
2,075
1,261
529
285
0
26
29
2004
5,384
1,689
589
3,034
2,018
679
337
N/A
31
34
2005
6,568
1,413
955
4,119
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
53
2006
8,854
1,726
1,073
5,955
N/A
N/A
N/A
14
55
31
2007
6,829
1,477
590
4,659
N/A
N/A
N/A
17
57
29
2008
5,937
1,385
444
4,019
N/A
N/A
N/A
5
55
29
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration statistics, Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008.
Table 329 Trinbagonians and other West Indian populations naturalized: fiscal year, 1988–2008 Total Persons
TT
Jamaica
Haiti
Guyana
1988
242,063
2,079
6,441
2,350
3,535
1989
233,777
2,552
6,455
3,692
3,654
1990
270,101
3,198
6,762
5,009
4,306
1991
308,058
3,033
6,838
4,436
4,826
1992
240,252
2,602
6,765
3,993
4,717
1993
314,681
3,293
7,976
5,202
4,938
1994
434,107
4,905
12,216
7,997
6,043
1995
488,088
4,484
11,049
7,876
5,584
1996
1,044,689
8,619
24,270
24,556
10,618
1997
596,010
5,273
18,746
15,667
7,008
1998
461,169
3,770
14,999
10,391
4,565
1999
837,418
7,711
28,554
19,507
10,347
2000
886,026
7,239
22,497
14,373
10,794
2001
606,259
4,474
13,947
10,355
7,038
2002
572,646
4,814
13,949
9,268
7,220
2003
462,435
3,774
11,218
7,247
4,929
2004
537,151
3,958
12,271
8,215
4,877
2005
604,280
4,832
13,674
9,740
5,543
2006
702,589
6,612
18,953
15,979
7,434
2007
660,477
4,514
12,314
11,552
5,631
2008
1,046,539
7,305
21,324
21,229
8,290
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008.
2177
Table 330 Trinbagonians and other West Indian populations removed by criminal status: fiscal years, 1998–2008 All Countries
TT
2178
Total
Criminal
NonCriminal
Total
Criminal
1998
174,813
62,108
183,114
270
1999
183,114
71,188
111,926
316
2000
188,467
73,065
115,402
2001
189,026
73,545
2002
165,168
72,818
2003
211,098
2004
Jamaica
Haiti
NonCriminal
Total
Criminal
NonCriminal
192
78
1,873
1,235
638
214
102
2,046
1,392
654
356
209
147
1,945
1,359
115,481
362
185
177
2,046
92,350
403
193
210
2,172
82,822
128,276
445
225
220
240,665
91,508
149,157
457
273
2005
246,431
91,725
154,706
455
2006
280,974
97,365
183,609
398
2007
319,382
999,924
219,458
2008
358,886
97,133
261,753
Guyana
Criminal
NonCriminal
Total
Criminal
NonCriminal
525
315
210
253
146
107
483
304
179
287
131
156
586
488
384
104
244
88
156
1,319
727
492
368
124
134
44
90
1,556
616
513
304
209
321
243
78
2,086
1,528
558
1,154
532
622
356
187
169
184
2,541
1,680
861
878
225
653
388
233
155
313
142
2,023
1,506
517
1,204
593
611
396
260
136
251
147
1,662
1,260
402
907
300
607
289
177
112
363
240
123
1,490
1,160
330
1,492
523
969
293
193
100
484
276
208
1,641
1,246
395
1,570
422
1,148
290
183
104
Total
Sources: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008.
Appendix II: Census Statistics Table 331 Profile of U.S. residents of Trinbagonian ancestry: 2000 All States
New York
Florida
New Jersey
General Characteristics Total Population
164,738
84,197
21,878
10,685
Male
71,924
35,770
9,639
4,586
Female
92,814
48,427
12,233
6,099
Median Age Under 5 years 18 years and over 65 years and over
35
35
35
34
8,516
4,276
1,196
564
128,978
66,413
16,545
7,966
9,029
5,084
1,431
399
161,533
83,461
21,625
10,509
108,012
56,288
13,864
6,691
High school graduate or higher
86,958
43,270
11,450
5,490
Bachelor’s degree or higher
22,585
9,640
2,606
1,573
Speak a language other than English at home ( population 5 years and over)
8,953
3,918
1,444
637
Male, now married, except separated (population 15 years and over)
28,852
13,830
4,063
1,934
Female, now married, except separated (population 15 years and over)
31,584
15,463
4,611
2,284
Disability status (population 5 years and over)
29,793
17,922
3,399
1,601
Civilian veterans (civilian population 18 years and over)
5,605
630
1,956
312
In labor force (population 16 years and over)
95,532
47,082
12,215
6,250
Median household income (in 1999) (US$)
41,077
40,165
26,944
52,292
Median family income (in 1999) (US$)
46,328
44,995
41,781
57,335
Per capita income (in 1999) (US$)
20,075
19,203
17,037
21,327
5,256
3,247
709
239
20,834
12,139
2,743
967
Household Population Social Characteristics Population 25 years and over
Economic Characteristics
Families below poverty level Individuals below poverty level
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder. Fact Sheet for Trinidadian and Tobagonian. http://factfinder.census.gov/ servlet/SAFFFactsCharIteration?_submenuId=factsheet_2&_sse=on.
2179
Table 332 Profile of selected demographic and social characteristics: 2000—U.S. residents born in TT (Continued ) Number
Percent
197,400
100.0
Naturalized U.S. citizen
94,445
47.8
Entered 1990–2000
13,685
6.9
Entered 1980–1989
28,740
14.6
Entered before 1980
52,025
26.4
TOTAL POPULATION U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND PERIOD OF U.S. ENTRY
Not a U.S. citizen
102,950
52.2
Entered 1990–2000
54,365
27.5
Entered 1980–1989
31,690
16.1
Entered before 1980
16,895
8.6
166,465
84.3
6,870
3.5
135,510
68.6
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS Race One race White Black or African American American Indian and Alaska Native Asian Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander Some other race Two or more races
1,095
0.6
17,820
9.0
670
0.3
4,500
2.3
30,935
15.7
85,420
43.3
111,975
56.7
Sex and Age Male Female Median Age (Years)
40.1
Under 5 years
920
0.5
15–19 years
13,120
6.6
20–24 years
13,955
7.1
25–34 years
33,515
17.0
35–44 years
51,755
26.2
45–54 years
36,870
18.7
55–59 years
12,980
6.6
60–64 years
9,180
4.7
65–74 years
10,065
5.1
75–84 years
3,880
2.0 (Continued )
2180
Table 332 Profile of selected demographic and social characteristics: 2000—U.S. residents born in TT (Continued ) Number
Percent
85 years and over
1,065
0.5
18 years and over
179,175
90.8
76,310
38.7
102,865
52.1
15,005
7.6
Male
5,570
2.8
Female
9,440
4.8
186,385
100.0
Never married
55,640
29.9
Now married, excluding separated
92,550
49.7
Separated
11,335
6.1
Widowed
8,060
4.3
Female
6,900
3.7
Divorced
18,800
10.1
Female
12,360
6.6
Total Population
197,400
100.0
In households
194,420
98.5
Householder
88,070
44.6
Spouse
42,040
21.3
Child
33,300
16.9
Other relatives
19,500
9.9
Nonrelatives
11,500
5.8
2,980
1.5
Total households
88,075
100.0
Family households (families)
65,250
74.1
With own children under 18 years
36,960
42.0
Married-couple family
38,095
43.3
With own children under 18 years
22,225
25.1
Female householder, no husband present
22,120
25.1
With own children under 18 years
12,285
13.9
Male Female 65 years and over
SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS Marital status Population 15 years and over
Relationship
In group quarters Households by type
(Continued )
2181
Table 332 Profile of selected demographic and social characteristics: 2000—U.S. residents born in TT (Continued ) Number
Percent
Nonfamily households
22,825
25.9
Householder living alone
19,360
22.0
3,360
3.8
Population 5 years and over
196,475
100.0
English only
182,185
92.7
Householder 65 years and over Language spoken at home
Language other than English Speak English less than very well
14,295
7.3
3,570
1.8
Educational attainment Population 25 years and over
159,310
100.0
High school graduate
48,000
30.1
Some college, no degree
33,015
20.7
Associate degree
14,025
8.8
Bachelor’s degree
18,840
11.8
Graduate or professional degree
10,155
6.4
41,435
100.0
Nursery school, preschool
265
0.6
Kindergarten
380
0.9
School enrollment Population 3 years and over enrolled in school
Elementary school (Grade 1–8)
8,445
20.4
High school (Grade 9–12)
12,070
29.1
College or graduate school
20,270
48.9
Population 16 years and over
184,105
100.0
In labor force
127,795
69.4
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS Employment status
Civilian labor force
126,680
68.8
Employed
117,300
63.7
9,380
5.1
Unemployed Armed forces Female 16 years and over In labor force
1,115
0.6
105,295
100.0
69,015
65.5
Civilian labor force
68,755
65.3
Employed
63,640
60.4 (Continued )
2182
Table 332 Profile of selected demographic and social characteristics: 2000—U.S. residents born in TT (Continued ) Number
Percent
Management and professional
34,820
29.7
Service
26,925
23
Sales
31,945
27.2
90
0.1
Construction, extraction, and maintenance
11,075
9.4
Production and transportation
12,445
10.6
88,075
100.0
Less than $10,000
9,675
11.0
$10,000–$14,999
4,735
5.4
$15,000–$24,999
11,240
12.8
$25,000–$34,999
12,815
14.6
$35,000–$49,999
14,360
16.3
$50,000–$74,999
17,460
19.8
$75,000–$99,999
8,925
10.1
$100,000–$149,999
6,435
7.3
$150,000–$199,999
1,285
1.5
$200,000 or more
1,150
1.3
Occupation
Farming, fishing, and forestry
Income (in 1999) Households
Median household income (US$)
40,168
Median family income (US$)
45,240
Per capita income (US$)
23,026
Poverty status (in 1999) Families below poverty level
8,065
12.4
Families with female householder, no husband present
4,875
22.0
26,570
13.7
Individuals living below poverty level
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000. Table FBP-1: Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics.
2183
2184 | Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants
Appendix III: Notable Trinbagonian Americans Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (born 1947) is a legendary American basketball player of Trinbagonian heritage. During his 20-year professional career, he scored the highest lifetime points total of any player in NBA history, in addition to earning a record six MVP Awards and six NBA championships, while playing for the Milwaukee Bucks (1969–1974) and the L.A. Lakers (1975–1989). Off the basketball court, he has also made a number of appearances on American TV shows. However, he is also known for his role of Hakim, an alpine opponent to Bruce Lee in a sequence of fights in Lee’s film, Game of Death (1978). Foxy Brown (born Inga Fung Marchand, 1978) is a Trinbagonian American rapper who is internationally acclaimed for her solo work as well as numerous collaborations with other artists. Her discography includes her debut album, Ill Na Na (1996), which sold more than a million copies in the United States, followed by Chyna Doll (1999), which was ranked at No. 1 on the Billboard 200. Guru (born Keith Edward Elam, 1966) has enjoyed a flourishing career, first as half of the hip-hop duo Gang Starr and then as a solo performer. His Jazzmatazz series of recordings is often viewed as trail-blazing work for hiphop/jazz crossover. Heather Headley (born 1974) is a Trinbagonian American singer, songwriter, record producer, and actress, who won the 2000 Tony Award for Best Actress in a Musical for her performance in The Lion King. In 2009, she was among performers who appeared in We are One, a public celebration of the inauguration of Barack Obama as the 44th U.S. president. Geoffrey Holder (born 1930) is a pioneering American choreographer, producer, and director of Trinbagonian origin. His career spans more than half a century; in 1975, he won a Tony Award for directing and designing costumes for the Broadway musical The Wiz. Nitara Carlynn “Nia” Long (born 1970) is an actor, who is best known for her roles in the television series, The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air (NBC: 1990–96) and Third Watch (NBC: 1999–2005), and the films Boyz n the Hood (1991), Soul Food (1997), and Big Mamma’s House (2000). Gabrielle Reece (born 1970) is another notable athlete-cum-entertainer of Trinbagonian descendant. Her success as a volleyball player earned Reece a place in the Florida State University Athletics Hall of Fame in 1997. In her modeling career, which began while attending college, she has graced the cover of well-sold magazines, including Shape, Women’s Sports & Fitness, Life, and Playboy. In 1989, the fashion magazine Elle named Reece as one of the five most beautiful women in the world.
Glossary | 2185
Lauryn Williams (born 1983) is an American track-and-field sprinter of Trinbagonian ancestry, competing internationally for the United States. She was a silver medalist at the 2004 Summer Olympics (in the 100-meters sprint) and a four-time medalist at the World Championships in Athletes (a gold medal in the 4 x 100-meter relay in 2005 and 2007, as well as a gold and silver medalist in the 100 meters in 2005 and 2007).
Glossary Anjuman Sunnat-Ul-Jamaat: The largest school/denomination of Islam in TT, which was officially established in 1935. Calypso: A popular satirical song in rhymed verse, arguably originating in TT and usually commenting on any recognized figures or sociopolitical affairs of TT and the wider Caribbean. Many other forms of music have derived from calypso, including soca, chutney soca, and ragga soca. CARICOM: A legal international grouping, first established in 1973 and later expanded to include the 12 member states and areas of former British colonies. Cocoa: An anglicized derivative from cacao. Nowadays, in TT, the term cocoa is generally used to describe the fruit and cacao is reserved for the tree. Crown colony: A type of colonial administration of the British Empire, in which governors ruled the colonies on behalf of the authority of the British Crown, supported by an Executive Council consist of nonelected members, without selfgoverning local parliamentary representatives. Dougla: A person of mixed East Indian and African parentage, which sometimes has a very negative association, especially in implying that good Indian features are being degraded by combination with Negro features. Federation of the West Indies: A short-lived (1958–1962) federation among British-ruled Caribbean colonies, which was established toward independence from Britain as a single political unit. The withdrawal of Jamaica and TT in 1962 led to the collapse of the Federation. Freshwater: A vernacular adjective term for speaking with an American accent, or adopting other American sociocultural characteristics without ever having been to the United States. J’ouvert: A French-Creole term that literally means daybreak and popularly stands for the official opening of Carnival at daybreak on the Monday preceding Ash Wednesday in Trinidad and Tobago. Lime: An informal, open-ended gathering characterized by semiritualized talking about sociopolitical and cultural issues or more broadly socializing, accompanied
2186 | Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants
with drinking and eating. Liming means participation in a lime; and limer is a person who often enjoys liming. Sanatanist: Sanatan(a) is a Sanskrit term, which literally means “eternal” and is usually used conjointly in the phrase Sanatan(a) Dharma. A Sanatanist is a follower of Brahmanized Hindu Orthodoxy and considers Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha of Trinidad and Tobago (founded in 1952) to represent his or her spiritual, cultural, and sociopolitical interests. Steelpan: A type of percussion instrument made from a discarded metal oil drum, usually a 55-gallon container, whose top has been indented and tempered. Tuned chromatically, it is played either as solo instrument or collectively in a steel band that can range in size up to 140 musicians, known as panmen. Trinbagonian: A term for a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, emphasizing unity of the two islands, rather than a more current term, Trinidadian.
References Arthur, Lisa, Trenton Daniel, and Tim Henderson. 2006. “Census Shows Florida’s Broward County Leads Nation in Attracting Residents.” Miami Herald, August 4. Boswell, Thomas D., and Terry-Ann Jones. 2006. “The Distribution and Socioeconomic Status of West Indians Living in the United States.” In Race, Ethnicity, and Place in a Changing America, edited by J. W. Frazier and E. L. Tettey-Fio, 151–80. Binghamton, NY: Global Academic. Cavanagh, Sean. 2001. “Caribbean Communities Nearly Triple in 10 Years.” Sun-Sentinel, August 18. Chan, Erin. 2004. “Neighborhood Report: Richmond Hill; For Indians Born Far Apart, Bridges of Song and Sugar Cane.” New York Times, December 4. Foner, Nancy. 2001. Islands in the City: West Indian Migration to New York. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Foner, Nancy. 2005. In a New Land: A Comparative View of Immigration. New York: New York University Press. Henke, Holger. 2000. The West Indian Americans. Westview, CT: Greenwood Press. Kaufman, Michael T. 1998. “Stokely Carmichael, Rights Leader Who Coined ‘Black Power,’ Dies at 57.” The New York Times, November 16. [Online article; retrieved 9/12/09.] http://www.interchange.org/Kwameture/nytimes111698.html. LaBennett, Oneka. 2004. “West Indian Americans.” In Encyclopedia of Sex and Gender: Men and Women in the World’s Cultures, edited by C. R. Ember and M. Ember, 956–66. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum. Model, Suzanne. 2008. West Indian Immigrants: A Black Success Story? New York: Russell Sage Foundation Press. Neptune, Harvey R. 2007. Caliban and the Yankees: Trinidad and the United States Occupation. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Further Reading | 2187 Roberts, Sam. 2006. “Black Incomes Surpass Whites in Queens.” New York Times, October 1. [Online article; retrieved 10/5/09.] http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/ nyregion/01census.html?ex=1317355200&en=2ef39d445a4d36da&ei=5090&partner= rssuserland&emc=rss. Rosen, Rae, Susan Wieler, and Joseph Pereira. 2005, June. “New York City Immigrants: The 1990 Wave.” Current Issues in Economics and Finance 11 (6). [Online article; retrieved 10/2/09.] http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ ci11–6.pdf. St. Bernard, Godfrey. 2005. “Return Migration to Trinidad and Tobago: Motives, Consequences, and Prospect of Re-Migration.” In The Experience of Return Migration: Caribbean Perspectives, edited by R. B. Potter, D. Conway, and J. Phillips, 157–82. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Terrazas, Aaron. 2008, July. “Indian Immigrants in the United States.” Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, Migration Information Source. [Online article; retrieved 8/22/09.] http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?id=687. Trinidad and Tobago, Ministry of Health (TTMH). 2005. Annual Statistical Report, 2004– 2005. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago: Ministry of Health, 2005. Tsuji, Teruyuki, Christine Ho, and Alex Stepick. 2009. “The Struggle for Civic Social Capital in West Indian Churches.” In Churches and Charity in the Immigrant City: Religion, Immigration, and Civic Engagement in Miami, edited by A. Stepick, T. Rey, and S. J. Mahler, 208–30. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. UNAIDS/WHO. 2008, August. 2008 Report on Global AIDS Epidemic. Geneva, Switzerland. [Online article; retrieved 8/28/09.] http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/ HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global_report.asp. Waters, Mary. 1994. “Ethnic and Racial Identities of Second Generation Black Immigrants in New York City.” International Migration Review 28 (4): 795–810. Waters, Mary. 2004. Black Identities: West Indians Dreams and American Realities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Winer, Lise. 2009. Dictionary of the English/Creole of Trinidad and Tobago. Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Further Reading Boswell, Thomas D., and Terry-Ann Jones. 2006. “The Distribution and Socioeconomic Status of West Indians Living in the United States.” In Race, Ethnicity, and Place in a Changing America, edited by J. W. Frazier and E. L. Tettey-Fio, 51–180. Binghamton, NY: Global Academic Publishing. A comparative inquiry into socioeconomic status of the four major populations of West Indian descent—Jamaican, Haitian, Trinbagonian, and Guyanese Americans, based on the 2000 U.S. Census. Foner, Nancy. 2001. Islands in the City: West Indian Migration to New York. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
2188 | Trinidadian and Tobagonian Immigrants A collection of original essays that explore the implications of West Indian immigration by leading scholars of the West Indian community in the United States, including Philip Kasinitz, Karen Fog Olwig, Milton Vikerman, and Mary Waters. Foner, Nancy. 2005. In a New Land: A Comparative View of Immigration. New York: New York University Press. A comparative, diachronic study of post-1965 “new immigrants” of different geocultural origins in New York, which discusses their racial and ethnic consciousness, gender, transnational connections, and more in a combination of statistical, ethnographic, and archival data. Forde, Maarit. 2011. “Modes of Transnational Relatedness: Caribbean Migrants’ Networks of Childcare and Ritual Kinship.” In Everyday Ruptures: Children, Youth, and Migration in Global Perspective, edited by C. Coe, R. Raynolds, and D. A. Boehm, 79–96. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. A pioneering close ethnographic account of how Trinibagonians have retained and realigned their family networks and life-cycle rituals in the migratory and transnational contexts. Hintzen, Percy. 2001. West Indian in the West: Self-Representations in an Immigrant Community. New York: New York University Press. An ethnographic work with the West Indian community in the San Francisco Bay Area, which illuminates the complex ways in which sociopolitical context affects ethnic identity construction. Ho, Christine. 1991. Salt-Water Trinnies: Afro-Trinidadian Immigrant Networks and NonAssimilation in Los Angeles. New York: AMS Press. An ethnographic analysis of Trinbagonian migrant populations in Los Angeles, with a focus on their segmented assimilation to the mainstream society and culture. Kasinitz, Philip. 1992. Caribbean New York: Black Immigrants and the Politics of Race. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. A pioneering study of West Indian immigrant communities in the United States, which discusses historical, socioeconomic, and political factors that have affected their racial and ethnic identity construction and economic and sociopolitical participation in the host societies. Kasinitz, Philip, Juan Battle, and Ines Miyares. 2001. “Fade to Black? The Children of West Indian Immigrants in South Florida.” In Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America, edited by A. Portes and R. Rumbaut, 267–300. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. An extensive ethnography of one-and-a-half and later generation West Indian immigrants in South Florida, which focuses on their politics of identity construction in their relation to the native-born African Americans and the dominating Latino population. Kasinitz, Philip, John H. Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters. 2004. Becoming New Yorkers: Ethnographies of the New Second Generation. New York: Russell Sage.
Further Reading | 2189 A collection of in-depth ethnographies that explore how immigrants shape their identities, reconciling their ethnic and cultural heritage with American social norms in light of the new second generation. O’Neill, Joseph. 2008. Netherland. New York: Pantheon. Critically acclaimed novel about life in New York after 9/11, where a Dutch equities trader working in New York becomes friends and plays cricket with a charismatic Trinidadian, Chuck Ramkissoon. Potter, Robert B., Dennis Conway, and Joan Phillips. 2005. The Experience of Return Migration: Caribbean Perspectives. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. A compilation of papers that examine the sociocultural (re)adjustments of transnational Caribbean migrants, drawing on a wide range of case studies from the Anglophone, Francophone, and Hispanic Caribbean. Rogers, Reuel Reuben. 2006. Afro-Caribbean Immigrants and the Politics of Incorporation: Ethnicity, Exception, or Exit. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. An exploration of the political behavior and participation of Afro-West Indian immigrants in New York City. Stepick, Alex, Terry Rey, and Sarah J. Mahler. 2009. Churches and Charity in the Immigrant City: Religion, Immigration and Civic Engagement in Miami. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. An ethnographic work that examines the implications of religious faiths and practices for immigrants’ development of social capital and civic engagement in South Florida. Westmoreland, Guy T. 2001. West Indian Americans: A Research Guide. Westport, CT: Blackwell. A comprehensive bibliographic survey of the West Indian population in the United States, which covers over 500 books, articles, and other written studies on the experience of West Indian immigration.
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Venezuelan Immigrants by Magaly Sanchez-R.
Introduction This chapter presents an overview of the Venezuelan international migration to the United States. Considering the global characteristics and the current situation of the country, there are a number of possible explanations at the root of the present flux of migration, which has been transforming Venezuela from a traditionally “reception/receiving country” to a “sending migration country.” This examination of Venezuelan immigrants reviews, first, the current socioeconomic dynamic existent in Venezuela, as well as the political arena and the violence that have affected different layers of society. The second part reviews important aspects of the migration in Venezuela, namely, the dynamics of migration into Venezuela during the 20th century, and the elements that characterized the Venezuelan migration to the United States. Finally, the discussion shows how Venezuelans are negotiating their identity and integration to the American society. There appears to be a scenario of integration into the American society, but if the conditions in the country of origin vary in the near term, we can predict a return of immigrants as was observed with the Chilean or the Spanish experience. Methodologically speaking, and due to the lack of data, different sources of information are used in order to analyze statistics. Sources used include the Encuesta de Migración 1981; and the “American Community Survey” 2007 (a nationwide survey designed to provide communities a look at changes, collecting and producing population and housing information every year instead of every 10 years); indicators of the World Bank for structural data of Venezuela; and figures from U.S. Homeland Security. The end of the essay uses personal data related to the emergence of Venezuela’s immigrant organizations in the United States.
Chronology As with most Latin American countries, Venezuela has been a country of immigrants. About two-thirds of the population are mestizo (a mix of European and Indian
2191
Chronology | 2193
ancestry) or mulatto–mestizo (African, European, and Indian), about one-fifth of Venezuelans are of European lineage, and one-tenth have mainly African ancestry. The Native Indian population is numerically small. 1821
Just after its independence from Spain, the government of Venezuela induces immigration from Europe, competing with Argentina as a reception country. Canary Islanders, Germans, and Italians are the pioneer immigrants
1948
Prior to this year, Venezuela does not openly encourage nonHispanic immigration, except for a selective influx of merchants, sailors, and entrepreneurs from neighboring West Indian islands.
1948–1958
With the growth of the petroleum industry, the Venezuelan government opens a 10-year period of immigration, recruiting workers for agriculture and other skilled labor from Spain, Italy, and Portugal. Simultaneously, immigration from Colombia increases, and approximately one million enter the country. Later, many of them return to their original countries.
After 1958
The Venezuelan government tightens immigration controls in support of foreigners with high-level skills; however, during the 1960s Colombian laborers continue to move into the rural sector.
Before 1965
In the United States, country-of-origin quotas allocate the bulk of the visas to European countries, and two-thirds go to Germany and the UK.
1965
Amendment to the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act. The 1965 legislation (effective 1968) abolishes the quotas, so that immigrants from all countries can compete more equally for the available visas. It establishes a maximum quota of 20,000 for each Eastern Hemisphere country, subject to a ceiling of 170,000. In addition, a ceiling of 120,000 visas is set for the Western Hemisphere.
1976
Immigration legislation is amended again by the act of 1975 (effective 1977), allowing quotas of 20,000 per country, together with the system of preferences extended to Western Hemisphere countries.
1978
Western Hemisphere ceilings are combined into an overall quota of 290,000 visas.
1983
With the implementation of structural economic measures in Venezuela, incipient migration out of Venezuela starts.
2194 | Venezuelan Immigrants
1990
The most important amendment of the post-1965 regulation in the United States comes with the 1990 Immigration Act (effective 1992). This legislation introduces an overall quota of 675,000.
After 2000
Economic insecurity, violence, and political factors promote significant migration flow from Venezuela to the United States and other destination countries in the world.
Background Geography Venezuela emerged as a country after the disintegration of the Gran Colombia in 1830. With 353,841 square miles and situated in the north of South America, the country has a north coastline of 1,740 miles on the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. In the east is the border of 462 miles with Guyana, in the west 1,274 miles with Colombia, and in the south, and southeast 1,367 miles bordering with Brazil (Haggerty 1990).
History Venezuela’s population in 2009 has been estimated at 26,814,843, with a median age of 25.5 years and a population growth rate of 1,508. Ethnically speaking, Venezuela, as with the majority of Latin American countries, became a mixed ethnicity involving combinations of white, black, and Indian. Ethnic categories are a continuum rather than contrasting groups. There is not a national census that classifies the population by ethnic groups, but estimates refer to 1 percent of the population as indigenous Indians, between 60 and 80 percent as mestizos (a mix of Indian and European ancestry), 21 percent Caucasian, and about 10 percent blacks (“Venezuela” 2009). The discovery of oil, and its subsequent exploitation, promoted an intense process of modernization and urbanization around the oil region. Later, the population concentrated in the central coast axis of the country, forming the big metropolis of Caracas and other urban areas. At this time, 93 percent of the total population resides in urban areas, with an urbanization rate of 2 percent annual change (“Venezuela” 2009). In the early 20th century and after a long dictatorship period under the power of General Juan Vicente Gomez, Venezuela had a sequence of short democracies and then the rule of the military dictatorship of General Marcos Perez Jimenez in 1948. This military period ended in 1958, with popular demonstrations all around the country making possible a transitory government that give way to the emergence
Background | 2195
of a period of democracies that characterized the country as exceptionally stable in a region where political instability was the rule. The democratic stability in Venezuela resulted from the combination of a military model of professionalism and the cooperation between two leading political parties, the Democratic Party (AD) and the Christian Democratic Party (COPEI). Some authors say that Venezuelan leaders were socially responsible and progressive, funding social programs with the resources derived by the oil rent, and supporting social mobility inside the political parties (Goodman et al. 1995). In Venezuela the national state has been defined as the Oil Rentist State. This refers to governments that have been receptors of considerable rent, generated by the oil exportation, which in return is distributed throughout for public expenses, services in general, as well as protection to the economic national groups. For a period of 40 years, Venezuelan political stability was maintained and characterized by the Oil Rentist State, which had a relative social stability with the implementation of social policies for the less affluent sectors of the society (Koeneke Ramirez 2006). At the end of the last century, in the late 1980s, the implementation of a sequence of socioeconomic readjustments that derived from a combination of international economic changes made the state more vulnerable and with less capacity to maintain the social balance through the traditional social policies. As a result, discontent emerged, which provided an opening for new populist radical positions that resulted in the present authoritarian political regime.
Venezuela Today: Economics,Violence, and Politics Venezuela has been at the top of the news in recent years, showing the imposition of the peculiar personalistic leadership of President Hugo Chávez, and a sequence of multiple referendums and electoral demonstrations characterizing the pro and con of the political arena and the sociopolitical polarization. One of the consequences of the recent process: Venezuelans were on the move, in particular, as immigrants to the United States. The important structural, political, and economic changes that occurred during the last 40 years, and most recently, the political changes, appear to be among the motivations for the departure of Venezuelans. Venezuela has been considered a country with a long democratic tradition, as well as a wealthy country, after the explosion and exportation of oil production. The combination of these two elements has characterized the last 40 years. Due the enormous amount of oil rent, the country started to modernize its infrastructure, with the collateral side effects in terms of urbanization in a Latin American metropolis today. The primary and original characterization of Latin American urbanization is the development of the “barrios.” Barrios are defined as agglomerations of housing
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and population, built over the years on public or private land by squatters. At its origin, the barrio was a very unstable construction characterized by a homogeneous population without resources. But over the years, the consolidation of the barrios illustrates the urban reality in Latin America, with heterogeneous social composition and regularization processes. This regularization has been implemented by a combination of efforts between inhabitants, university community work, and policy makers, which, in conjunction, achieved plans in housing, infrastructure, services, and land ownership. This is the so-called marginal universe, which is so complex that it is impossible to explain only by means of rural migrations, by the lack of homes in process of urbanization, or by the processes of territorial invasions. It could not be explained by the lack of incorporation of the workforce in the formal production structure, or by the globalizing explanations of poverty, given that there exists a huge market for informal work activities, creating jobs and in a different way circulation and redistribution of capital. The truth is that urbanization follows its own dynamic, and in spite of the existence of these phenomena, which are difficult to explain, the great metropolis ends up establishing itself. In it as well, some sectors of the population succeed in connecting themselves to the universal metropolitan dimension, while others—the great majority—do not even succeed in incorporating themselves to the essential and primary mechanisms of a formal socialization model and have thus created a new socialization model through urgency. As we know, the traditional and formal model of socialization, based in the basic institutions of family, school, and work, does not explain the other ways of socialization that a significant number of children and adolescents have to follow. This socialization is characterized by the substitution of the traditional family for one where children have to work for subsistence before going to school, where school is hard to attend, and where work is replaced by informal and most of the time illegal activities. This is expressed in the culture of urgency in which the majority of children and adolescents in the metropolises of Latin America live (Pedrazzini and Sánchez 1998). A country with its level of income derived from oil production and exportation could be a country with more opportunities and less inequalities. However, redistribution has never significantly improved the level of inequalities, which shows the paradox of a rich country with high poverty levels. As is shown in Figure 27, even if social inequalities are high, we can see a slight reduction of inequalities, decreasing over time, from 55.8 in 1981, to 43.44 in 2006. There are different explanations that can be related. On one side, there is a possibility that the decreasing tendency is due to the enormous increase of oil prices, and consequently to money circulation derived from the economy in general. Today, the decline of poverty registered by official sources has more to do with the spreading of the proceeds from the new oil prices boom rather than with a recovery of labor productivity (Freije 2007). On the other side, those data have to be looked at with attention, due to a significant number of “No” responses resulting in the alteration of the quality of data.
Background | 2197
This last argument has been interpreted by some authors as reporting the existence of political pressure that created an atmosphere where “No” responses appear to be statistically significant. In others words, due to the political authoritarian situation, people preferred not to give any answer that could compromise personal freedom and security (Chang-Tei, Edward, Ortega, and Rodriguez 2007 See Figure 2.) The globalization process, accompanied by the expansion of global markets and the constitution of the “Network Society,” has been affecting the composition of societies with important changes, but also increasing the levels of social inequalities. The Network society is a society where the key social structures and activities are organized around electronically processed information network. Networks have become the basic units of modern society (Castells 2000). Different interpretations in Latin America have demonstrated that the growing polarization within the societies stemmed from global changes that have widened the gap between those with access to technology and those who are excluded from its benefits. Larger inequalities of wealth and income are socially expressed in the institutional restructuring of the metropolis, as well as in their spatial fragmentation. In the last decades this structurally rooted inequality has generated a sequence of increasingly violent phenomena. Under conditions of extreme social exclusion and economic isolation, the interpersonal relations and institutions became adapted to the constant reality of crime that legitimized violent social behavior (SanchezR. 2006). These structural characteristics became a daily routine for inhabitants in large urban areas, especially in the areas of major social exclusion and segregation. In the barrios or areas of major exclusion, violence usually resulted from informal illegal activities, as well as by the brutality of police and repressive control groups. Nevertheless, insecurity and violence also become a shadow that progressively transforms the public spaces, creating as a consequence a general social fear that traverses any social group, status, or neighborhood. At the end of the millennium and beginning of the new century, Venezuela was characterized by this urban characteristic, as well as by a scenario of measures and economic adjustments that accentuated social inequalities, poverty, unstable equilibrium, and political discontent. Suddenly, from an economic model with new adjustments, deterioration resulted, and politically, Venezuela moved from a regime of democracy based on agreement and alliances to a populist authoritarian democracy.
Economics Venezuela’s socioeconomic history has been characterized by the oil production industry and by the relations between elites and governments in power, shaping and characterizing a country and rentist state (Coronil 1997). In this sense, economy and social life are related and defined by the up and down movements of the oil
2198 | Venezuelan Immigrants
industry, international prices, and the amount of exports established with the other countries in the world. Since the earliest part of the 20th century Venezuela has been an oil-related economy, called by some authors an economic dependency relation (Maza Zavala 2001). The country follows a transformation that placed it as one of the richest economies in Latin America. Between 1900 and 1920, the per capita GDP grew 1.8 percent and between 1920 and 1948 the per capita GDP grew 6.8 percent per annum. At the beginning of the 1970s, Venezuela was situated as the richest country in Latin America and one of the richest in the world. But, after the boom of the 1970s, the per capita nonoil GDP declined at an annual rate of 0.9 percent to a cumulative 18.64 percent between 1978 and 2001 (Haussman and Rodriguez 2007). Given the magnitude of the oil sector in the Venezuelan economy, it is important to understand oil production, and its relation to the performance of the rest of the economy. Oil has played an important role in making the country one of the richest in the region; however, evidence also shows that oil has played a role in the collapse of the Venezuelan economy. After 1973, oil production almost collapsed, and it is only after 1986 that it began to increase again. In 2002, oil production was at the level of three million barrels a day, lower than the level attained in 1973. The consequence of this is the fall in oil production per capita, decreasing from 1972 until 1985. In 2002, oil production per capita was 31 percent lower than in 1976 (Manzano 2007). One of the basic interpretations is related to the fact that in an oil country with a growing population and a stable oil production, the oil per capita will fall through the years, with the corresponding socioeconomic consequences. Other elements could emerge as an explanation of the collapse and the impossibility of the economy to restimulate sectors outside the oil sector. Additional elements considered could be attributed to the lack of progress in carrying out free market reforms after the implication of the reform measures for structural adjustments during the 1980s and 1990s. But again, data have proved that in 1999, Venezuela was a freemarket-oriented economy, more than Mexico and other countries of Latin America, concluding that the lack of reforms does not appear to be the explanation for Venezuela’s lack of growth. Other explanations are centered on the hypothesis of the Venezuelan rentist state that concentrated all oil resources, allowing the emergence of privileges and corruption in different layers of society, and creating a distortion on the intentionality of resources. Haussman and Rodriguez (2006) concluded that the growth performance in Venezuela is related to three forces, the decline of oil production, the decline of nonoil production, and the incapacity of the economy to move resources into alternative industries as a response to the decline in oil rents that occurred since the 1970s. This incapacity can be related with the specificity of the oil industry, which has
Background | 2199
specialized inputs, knowledge, and institutions, that cannot be transferred to other production industries. The economic studies on the collapse of the production growth in Venezuela become a key issue, not only in the search for an explanation for the growth stagnation of the country, but also as a way to respond to the subsequent side effects experienced by the country. During the years of growing and economic expansion, Venezuela invested a lot of resources in human capital, in particular on the younger pyramid of the population. By 2009, the total estimated population of Venezuela is 26,414,816 persons; 30.5 percent are less than 14 years old, 64.3 percent between 15 and 64, and 5.2 percent more than 65 years old (“Venezuela” 2009). An important fraction of these younger individuals became the intellectual and technical elites that later on found a country in a progressive deterioration in terms of employment and work creation. These situations, as well as other factors, are at the root of the explanation for the recent migration from Venezuela.
In Political Terms Venezuela has a political history characterized by times of military dictatorship and long periods of democracy, with a sequence of recent transformations that are pointing to a peculiar authoritarian reelection with no alternative representation. The country gradually goes through periods of personal dictatorship—the times of General Juan Vicente Gomez in the early 1920s—to the pluralistic governments that legalized all political parties, allowing political and union action, but keeping some restrictions on political participations (Arenas and Calcaño 2006). In 1928, after the Gomez dictatorship, a new political elite emerged and dominated the political arena for the rest of the century, participating initially in the construction of democratic institutions. It was the so-called 28 generation. For 17 years Venezuela gradually passed from a personal dictatorship with total army control, to an authoritarian regime legitimized by an institutional army, and finally to a pluralist government with the legalization of political parties (Arenas and Calcaño 2006, 63). The leaders designated the 1945 coup d’état a “revolution,” to accentuate the differences with the previous regime, and with the central idea of promoting the pueblo as the new political actor. The political dynamics between the political party and the government became the space for negotiations and the articulation of different interests. Some authors refer to this period as Modernist Populism (Arenas and Calcaño 2006). At this moment, and for the first time in history, the Venezuelan state emerged as the center for distribution of the national oil rent. With a period of military dictatorship between 1948 and 1958, the democracy model emerged again in Venezuela and was characterized by different authors as a democracy of conciliation (Arenas and Calcaño 2006). Maintaining the same
2200 | Venezuelan Immigrants
ideological frame that gave the national state a central role for the continuation of society, this type of populism of conciliation change this practice over time. The political model based on conciliation had been successful with the attenuation of political conflicts. With the existence of oil rent, the two principal political parties led the negotiation between elites, and the redistribution of the rent was implemented through different forms of institutionalized participation. These different forms of participation were realized in social policies, in general social housing plans, transport and communication, and infrastructure for the less developed areas of the cities. The measures of structural adjustments represented a critical moment for the democratic dynamic of conciliation. The institutions responsible for social policies progressively deteriorated without adapting to the new social and economic changes, and an emerging disappointment in the general population, accentuated by the diagnosis of a critical social and economic situation, as well as the dominant corruption on the political elite, created the conditions for the emergence of the Bolivarian movement, with Hugo Chávez as the leader. Initially, with a military coup d’état, and later with the political move to the presidency, Chávez took power in 1998. The Bolivarian movement refers to the movement initiated with the military, which attempted to secure power with a coup d’état that failed. The new model in Venezuela has been characterized by a “populist” regime, originally democratic by election, and quickly transformed to a personalist and
Venezuelans demonstrate in the streets of Caracas against a reform proposed by Hugo Chávez that would prolong his presidency, November 29, 2007. (Pantxorama)
Causes and Waves of Migration | 2201
authoritarian model. Some authors claim that the risks of populist regimes are based in the forms of power representation in which the imposition of excessive personality produces alignments in favor or against a leader (Mires 2001, 2004). The Chávez government has been defined as a case of extreme delegation, where the strong concentration of power ignored the democratic forms of management. All the institutional powers have demonstrated unconditional support to the executive, sometimes with an extreme violation of the principle of impartiality, as in the case of the judicial power (Arenas and Calcaño 2006). As a general conclusion on the political situation in Venezuela, we can say that the Chávez government has the mixed characteristics of traditional and new populism. The prevailing characteristics are the “direct” execution of measures without institutional mediation, the autonomous conception of development, and a nationalist ideology. The populism deliverance is based on the authoritarian appropriation of the popular determination, and in the Venezuelan case, Chávez’s populism is also militaristic (De la Torre 2003). The imposition of authoritarian regimes brings polarization effects on the population, followers, and opponents. The politically polarized situation, with the imposition of rules and violation of human rights and basic principles of democracy, accentuates the perception that political violence plays an important role in the explanation of the recent international migration from Venezuela.
Causes and Waves of Migration The Perverse Shadow of the Violence Violence in Latin America, and particularly in Venezuela, has been a growing shadow affecting development, daily life security, and the confidence of the citizens, with drastic and terrible consequences, where homicide in the last decade has reached the highest historical levels in the country. The social expression of violence in Latin America occurred in different historical moments, each one characterized by its owns forms of violence. At the origins, the widespread economic inequality, social exclusion, and persistent poverty, in association with the neoliberal economic policies, shaped the structural violence. As a consequence, and responding to these policies, two other forms of collective violence emerged, the political and the criminal. Political violence involves the imposition of authoritarian rules and law enforcement that yields widespread violations of human rights, directed particularly to those who disagree with the political regime. Simultaneously, the precarious economic situation of the poor and the exclusion of the disadvantaged youth caused the latter to turn to criminal violence in the form of youth gangs, sometimes linked with criminal mafias, drugs, and cartels. In Latin America,
2202 | Venezuelan Immigrants
these different forms of violence interact and produce an “unstable equilibrium,” a tenuous stability under which those in power negotiate political compromises with diverse interests in an effort to maintain social control, while coexisting with violence and insecurity to create a “new social disequilibrium.” This, in fact, leads to a progressive loss of control throughout the continent (Sanchez-R. 2006). The urban social violence connected to a sophisticated division of labor in the production and trafficking of drugs and guns, along with the involvement of the police in this traffic, yields new networks devoted to private revenge that ultimately produce high homicides rates in the larger cities. In previous work, the expression of urban violence is not an isolated act, but rather it is part of a set of interconnected activities that traverse all levels of society. Informal and illegal economic activities generate a multiplural world in which a perverse criminal economy has infiltrated different levels of society (Sanchez-R. 2006). Information from the CICPC (Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas) on Venezuela shows that irregular groups committed 305 kidnappings in 2007, mostly in states bordering Colombia, such as Zulia (81), Barinas (37), and Táchira (39). Also, data from a survey implemented through the popular network in the barrios reported 4,375 crimes in the Municipio Sucre-Miranda State, in which 83.2 percent of the perpetrators were younger than 25 years old and 80 percent of the crimes were murders. The Venezuelan Observatory on Violence, which tabulated the number of crimes committed in Venezuela in 2006, registered 12,237 crimes, representing 61 percent of the total number of threats against human security. Even though urban violence has adverse side effects on social development, to date, public policy interventions have been restricted to increasing police and military budgets to enforce “social control.” In this context, “security” is understood as increasing armaments and deploying more police on the streets, which only increases fear among inhabitants and promotes deadly confrontations between the young and the police agents. It is evident that the social control achieved through traditional enforcement instruments has not had the “desired” effect. On the contrary, attacking crime in this way seems to only produce more violence. Rising rates of gun-related mortality, a concentration of violence in younger ages, and the extended insecurity, suggest an urgent need for review and discussion. The expansion of spaces of violence has become a significant push factor explaining international migration, particularly recently for Venezuelans.
Dynamics of Migration and Pattern Change In order to analyze the migration process we must consider the factors and conditions that prevail in the country of destination, as well as the pressing elements that exist in the sending country. The future immigrants are pressed by difficult times,
Causes and Waves of Migration | 2203
lack of jobs, or shortage of “good jobs” that provide the desire for social and economic reward. They vary in terms of skills and needs, from small-scale farmers to graduate professionals. Push factors vary from wars and civil violence, political crisis and other transformations, to catastrophic natural disasters (Massey 2008). The dynamic of pushing and pulling explains the migration flow between countries. In times of difficulties and pressure conditions, the attracting factors play an important role in the majority of the cases, and the hope for better opportunities of jobs and economic stability are the leading factors. But also, and this could be one of the major elements that explain Venezuelan migration flow, the knowledge of a bigger and stable work market, even with low wages for their professional status, but with the compensation of human security and respect for their condition, moves Venezuelans to depart. The unemployment rate in Venezuela moved from 6 percent in the 1980s to 17 percent in 2003. Unemployment measures the lack of opportunities in the formal economy sector, which could be the only reason for Venezuelans leaving the country. With growing unemployment, the economically active population searches for potential economic opportunities outside the country. By proximity, the United States plays an important attraction role. (See Figure 28.) A widespread expression in Venezuela was that “any person who comes to the country stays,” perhaps fascinated by the contrast and opportunities that the country had been offering. In the same way, Venezuelans who go out of the country seem always to return. Under dictatorships Venezuelan political persecutees leave the country and return when favorable conditions of freedom and democracy are reestablished. In present times, not only political factors, but economics and the lack of security create sufficient cause to leave the country.
Immigrants to Venezuela Before 1950, the Venezuelan census registered very low numbers of immigrants, with a total of 47,026 persons that were born in foreign countries representing 1.4 percent of the total population in 1936, with a small increase to 49,928 (1.2%) in 1941. It is only after World War II that the immigration dynamic began in Venezuela. Until that time Venezuela had a low demographic growth, and even with the political intention of promoting immigration into the country, the results were not visible until the 1950s. At that time, the European population represented 65.5 percent of the total immigrants in the country, a proportion that was maintained until the 1960s, when a significant migration from Latin America began to play an important demographic role. After the 1960s, the migration policy become more restrictive, and a growing number of Colombians entered the country without regular status. The European population represented 65.5 percent of the foreign-born population in the 1961 Census and decreased to 55.3 percent in 1971. (Bidegain, Papail, and Pellegrino 1984)
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The Colombian population registered an increase after the Census of 1950, showing in the 1971 Census to be one of the largest foreign-country groups, with 180,144 persons, representing 30.2 percent of the total foreign-born population. During the 1970ss, the economic and financial oil boom, as well as the political democratic tradition existing in the country since 1958, attracted significant numbers to Venezuela, predominantly represented by Latin America and Caribbean immigrants, with Colombia the most representative. Later on in the 1970s, and with the emergence of military dictatorships in the south, Chilean and Argentineans migrated to Venezuela, engrossing the existent social capital in the country. The migration from the south was characterized by professional and highly educated individuals, who saw in Venezuela a democratic country where they could end their experience of political dictatorship. The Colombian migration to Venezuela was rooted in growing violence and the economic repercussions that characterized the agrarian life. These earliest peasant immigrants were originally absorbed by agricultural activities in Venezuela, oil exploration, and later in urban sites, agglomeration and service activities. The coincidence of a major oil boom during the late 1970s and the growing political dictatorships in South America explain the important presence of immigrants registered in the Venezuelan Census of 1981. Unfortunately, at the time of this writing, because of internal turmoil in the country, it has been impossible to get any country-specific information that could give us a reference for the recent migration to Venezuela. However, due to the increase of oil prices in the international market (early 2000) and the combination of a “highly populist government,” a significant early flow of immigrants into the country should be expected. However, considering the indicators given by the World Bank as well as a Venezuelan migration survey as shown in the following table, the net migration rate shows negative signs from 1995 until 2008.
Immigrant population in Venezuela differentiated by origin 1981 Country
Total
%
Masculine
%
Feminine
%
European (Spain,Portugal, Italy)
291,138
37.1
169,001
41.5
122,137
31.9
Colombia
316,616
40.3
141,162
34.7
174,954
45.7
Other Latin American S.A
100,380
12.7
51,113
13.3
49,263
12.8
9,515
1.2
4,150
1.1
5,363
1.5
USA, Canada, Bermudas Rest of Countries Total
68,835
8.7
38,508
9.3
30,327
7.8
786,502
100.0
403,934
100.0
382,044
100.0
Source: Encuesta de Migración 1981. Caracas, Venezuela.
Causes and Waves of Migration | 2205 Population growth in Venezuela, with migration indicators Venezuela Total population
1981
1995
2005
2008
14,570,085
21,549,000
25,269,000
26,414,815
1.9
1.5
1.5
Growth rate % Net migration rate (per thousands pop.)
No data
–2
–2
–1
Net number of migrants (in thousands)
No data
–50
–56
No data
79.2%
84%
88.1%
No data
Urban
Source: Combined data: Los Inmigrantes en Venezuela. (Encuesta de Migración de 1981.)
Venezuelan Immigrants to the United States Based on recent fieldwork and analysis (Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) Venezuelan Immigrants Fieldwork, Princeton University), there is evidence that actual political and socioeconomic conditions in the country, as well as the criminal violence, are at the base of the explanation for the recent Venezuelan international migration to the United States. In the last years of the previous century, immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean dominated the flow of migration to the United States, contrasting with the earlier years when Europeans characterized the international migration flow. Since the 1970s, the number of immigrants has gradually increased and the percentage of Latin Americans has steadily risen, with Mexicans as the leading group. Whereas the non-Hispanic white population increased by 6 percent during the 1980s and the 1990s, the Latino population grew by 50 percent, becoming the nation’s largest minority sooner than most had expected (Massey 2008). From 1990 to 2000, the fastest-growing Latino population subgroups were Hondurans (166%) followed by Venezuelans (157%), Costa Ricans (134%), Guatemalans (118%), Ecuadorians (116%), Mexicans (115%), Paraguayans (101%), and Dominicans (100%) (Rodríguez, Saenz, and Menjívar 2008). In addition to this diversity in national origins, the Latin American immigrant population is also characterized by its diversity with respect to class origins, ethnic roots, documentation, and skin tone, making Latin American immigration a controversial public issue and Latinos a lightning rod for popular discontent, especially after the events of 9/11 (Massey and Sanchez-R. 2009). Venezuelan immigrants’ entry into the United States became very significant after 2000, as different data report. Considering the data statement by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which detailed yearly entrance, a sharp increase of Venezuelan nonimmigrant admission was perceived, going from 569,902 in 1999 to 606,628 in 2001, and then a sharp decrease to 343,490 persons in 2003. The number of Venezuelan nonimmigrants increased progressively again to 531,685 in
2206 | Venezuelan Immigrants
2008. The increase could be explained by the socioeconomic causes, the political violence, and insecurity-related factors referred to at the beginning of the chapter. The abrupt entry decrease could be explained by the combination of two important factors that play in Venezuela: the creation of a controlled dollar and restrictions on the money exchange, as well as by immigration controls imposed by the United States as a way to regulate the imminent flow of immigrants. The referred data just confirms the significant number of Venezuelans entering the United States with a specific period of stay, which can be extended later in time. If we compare the two figures, we can see that the entrance of Venezuelans, although there is a decrease in a specific year, has been gradually increasing, and at the same time, we also observe a growth in permanent resident status, jumping from 2,498 persons in 1999 to 10,514 persons in 2008, denoting an intention of staying in the United States. (See Figures 29 and 30.) As we observe, formalization and legalization status of Venezuelan immigrants can be seen as an indicator of adaptation and decision to stay overseas, explained by the present political situation in the country of origin. It will be necessary to follow the dynamics of the first generation, in order to understand if the legalization status is a permanent exit or whether we can expect a return migration, as was observed in Spain and even in Chile, after long political authoritarian governments (Massey 2008).
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of Community The Venezuelan immigrant population in the United States is characterized as young and well educated. For analytical purposes Venezuelan immigrants will be compared with the total U.S. population, and the database used is the 2007 American Community Survey One-Year Estimates, United States, and Venezuela. The number of Venezuelans in the United States has been quantified to a total of 155,492 persons (American Community Survey 2007). The largest concentration of Venezuelan immigrants is localized in the age group of 25–44 with 48.2 percent, contrasting with 27.7 percent for the U.S. population, just confirming that international migration typically occurs at the ages of major potential for work. If the numbers are further broken down, the contrast becomes greater, showing in the age group 24–34 Venezuelan immigrants with 22.1 percent, and the United States population 13.3 percent. We find a similar pattern with the age groups of 35–44, where Venezuelans concentrate at 26.1 percent and U.S. population 14.4 percent. For the age group between 45 and 64 years old, proportions appear more alike, with 22.7 percent for Venezuelans and 26.5 percent for the U.S. population.
Demographic Profile | 2207
The two other extremes of the age groups are highly contrasting due to the fact that the immigrant population follows these characteristics mentioned, with a major proportion in labor ages. For the group under 5 years old the U.S. population leads over Venezuelan immigrants, with 6.90 percent over 0.7 percent, and for the group of 75 years and over, similar proportions are represented, 6.1 percent for U.S. population and 1.6 percent for Venezuelan. (See Figure 31.) Generally speaking, and as we see here, Venezuelans in the United States are a recent, growing group of immigrants and have been primarily characterized for being a population in labor ages, 25 to 44 years old. Females and males are almost equally represented, with a slightly larger proportion of females in these age groups. For the group 18–34, males represent 15 percent, whereas 17 percent are females; a similar breakdown is evident for the group 35–64, with 23 percent males and 25 percent females. (See Figure 32.)
Educational Attainment The Venezuelan immigrant population is characterized for having high educational attainment. Data from the American Community Survey 2007 demonstrate that 29.3 percent of Venezuelan immigrants have a bachelor’s degree and 21.4 percent have a graduate or professional degree; combined, they show a proportion of 51 percent of the population with a high level of education. This is in contrast the U.S. population, which has only 17 percent with a bachelor’s degree and 10.1 percent with graduate or professional degrees, with a combined total of 27.1 percent of the population with high educational achievement.
Economic Attainment The human capital of the Venezuelan immigrants finds a correspondence with their occupational status when we observe data released form the American Community Survey 2007. A significant proportion of Venezuelans are concentrated in the professional, management, and other related occupations with 43.20 percent, in contrast with 34 percent for the U.S. population. Other proportions are followed by 26 percent in sales and offices occupations, and 15 percent in services activities, with similar behavior in the total U.S. population. (See Figure 34.) One of the important indicators in terms of adaptation of an immigrant group could be related to the intention of obtaining permanent status, and securing naturalization through their labor and job incorporation into society and the mainstream. Also, they can show their desire to adapt by becoming a homeowner to secure future stability and social mobility. As observed before, there is a growing tendency not only in the entrance of persons from Venezuela, but also an increased tendency of becoming permanent residents and/or naturalized. Housing numbers shows that
2208 | Venezuelan Immigrants
Carlos Carbonell works from his desk at a suburban Atlanta bank, May 24, 2006. Carbonell is a legal immigrant from Venezuela and has lived in the United States for four years. (AP Photo/Gene Blythe)
56 percent of Venezuelans in the United States have an owner-occupied house, and 44 percent live in rental houses, with an average of two to three persons per house. Because this immigrant population has high human capital, which also appears to be correspondent with occupational status, it will be interesting to learn if the growing exit of intelligentsia from Venezuela has found equal incorporation in the United States. Whether the language barrier has played a blockage role as occurs with other immigrant groups should also be examined. All these elements could perhaps shed some light on the readjustment, incorporation, and solidarity that Venezuelans are dealing with in their recent entry into the American Society.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Negotiating Identities: Transnational Links, Network and Integration In these times, the advantages of globalization and the information age allow immigrants to be simultaneously participants in different societies, incorporating values that identify them, and adding to the original identity a gradient of social, human,
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 2209
and cultural information. These new values can be in contrast with the original ones, without any apparent conflict. Today, the complexity of the international migration dynamic cannot be reduced to a duality of progressive assimilation or not, to integration or exclusion, to the immigrant outsider or the local insider. We are globally assisting in the combination and growing diversity of immigrants from different parts of the world, and a binary solution does not seem to be plausible any more. The rich diversity is incorporated in the processes experienced by immigrants, where aspects related with the new place, the characteristics of their origins (national, regional, ethnic, and cultural), and finally the negotiations involved in their incorporation to work, customs, cultural values, language, approach, and political views of the world are creating their own identity. Integration is still a necessary path to adjust in a new society, but there is a variation: New international immigrants do not need to renounce their original identity. These are related at different levels. On the social and cultural level, the importance of their cultural values appears even more significant when immigrants cannot find any compensation in the new society, either because they do not identify
First-Generation Venezuelan The President, Lyquix Inc.
(Courtesy of Ruben Reyes)
Ruben Reyes holds a bachelor’s degree in electronic engineering from the Universidad Simon Bolívar in Caracas, Venezuela. He moved to the United States in February 2005 and became a permanent resident in March 2006. Since 1997 he has worked in the Internet, telecommunications, and technology consulting industries for Fortune Global 100 companies and his own businesses. Reyes is the owner and president of Lyquix, an information technology consulting firm based in Philadelphia. Before starting Lyquix in 2008, he was a solution sales manager for Nokia Siemens Networks, responsible for the northeast region of the United States.
2210 | Venezuelan Immigrants
More than 50,000 marchers protest against Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez in the Little Havana section of Miami, January 18, 2003. (AP Photo/Luis M. Alvarez)
with the new values, or just because these can be perceived as very distant from their own personal aspirations. In having the choice of selection, they can decide which parts to incorporate and which not. Added to this perception of new values and society, there emerges a stereotyped attitude by the media, some policy makers, and “Americans” in general, where they reject and have a biased attitude vis à vis the newcomers. The formation of the immigrant’s identity relates to two fundamental aspects: on one side, the international migration and the strength or not of transnational links, and on the other side, the integration to the mainstream society while immigrants intensely negotiate their identities. The first aspect, transnational relations, is a process where the remittances are just one of the elements that constitute these links in their totality. The emotional and cultural ties also express an important and significant part of their communication, and these are another element of the transnational links. This diversity of communication, ties, and links has been well developed in the concept of transnational social field, and the global idea of simultaneity. These concepts of transnational social fields have been defined in the literature as a set of multiple networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed. The concept of transnational social field becomes a powerful tool for understanding the
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 2211
social relations between those who move and migrate and those who stay behind (Levi and Glick Schiller 2007). If we observe the remittances from Venezuelan immigrants in the United Sates to Venezuela, we find a striking increase of resources in only one year. During 2007, Venezuelans registered $330 million in sent remittances, jumping to a record of $832 million in 2008 (http://www.iadb.org/mif/remesas_map.cfm?language=English). These recent data appear to correspond with the number of people who have been entering the United States, as well as the worsening of opportunities in the country of origin. Although up to now there is so much systematic data related to the transnational material links, there is a lack of information on the emotional and other communication links that appear to be also important and prevailing. We should take into account that the recent exit of Venezuelans is explained by the socioeconomic and political situation of the country and the repercussions of the growing criminal and political violence, and we could expect a continuum of migration with the proliferation of networks, as with any other immigrant group. As Massey and associates argue the culture of migration sustains the reality that nonimmigrants observe migrants to whom they are socially connected and seek to emulate their migratory behavior (Massey and Kandel 2002, 983).
Venezuelan Immigrants’ Organizations The other aspect is related to integration or adaptation, but that is due to the fact that Venezuelans are a recent immigrant population. There are not enough studies about these immigrants, and even less in terms of the second generation. Nevertheless, we have referred to their human capital as well as to some integration indicators like work, naturalization of their status, occupation, and housing ownership. The emergence of Venezuelan immigrants’ organizations in the United States (Sanchez-R. 2009) is an indicator of integration and identity negotiations. The data have been collected between 2008 and 2009, following the emergence of the South American organizations, with Venezuelans one of the selected immigrant groups. We know that immigrants’ incorporation is determined by a combination of elements, where human capital, government policies, economic opportunities, and group’s organizations appear to be significant in immigrant trajectories. Immigrant organizations are important locally and transnationally and serve as bridges in preserving links with the original countries, but also as representation and demands of the groups in the new society (Portes and Escobar 2007). The data show the existence of 22 Venezuelan immigrant organizations, with a high number created after the year 2000. The analysis of the organizations leads to a classification where three significant aspects determine the character of the organization, the goals, and their priorities: transnational links; sociocultural links;
2212 | Venezuelan Immigrants
and network and institutional links. Also, each organization was not inclusive, but rather defined by a plurality of intentions and goals, with emphasis on one or two or three of these characteristics. If we review the 22 Venezuelan immigrant organizations, we find that the majority of them are self-defined as sociocultural, where student associations, and cultural and community services for Venezuelans, as well as for the U.S. Latino population in general, were the most salient. Almost all Venezuelan organizations (90.9 %) have institutional links with other organizations, pointing out the importance of networks in this immigrant population. Finally, 27 percent of the organizations have transnational links with Venezuela, either because they have activities in Venezuela, provide information about and promote Venezuela, or give donations to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Venezuela. (See Figure 35.) The Venezuelan organizations registered became more visible in the American society after 2000, and the majority of them appear to be concentrated in the Northeast region as well as in the Southern region of the country. Florida and the Northeast seem to be the regions with the highest concentration of Venezuelan immigrants. (See Figures 36 and 37.) Finally, after immigrants arrive in the United States, they undergo two formative experiences that tend to result in group solidarity and common identification: first, their experiences in the labor market and work, and second, their experiences that are similar to other immigrants from Latin America. The emergent identity becomes visible through common social group experiences. We need to wait and see if the Venezuelans will have the chance to mediate and change the stereotypical
First-Generation Venezuelan Emilio A. Buitrago, Engineer and President of Casa de Venezuela Emilio Buitrago is a telecommunications engineer and community activist; he holds a bachelor’s degree in telecommunications engineering from the Universidad Antonio Jose de Sucre in Caracas, Venezuela. He arrived in the United States with a student visa in September 1996, to pursue learning English as a Second Language in Washington, D.C. In March 1997, he moved to Philadelphia to work for a new telecommunications company that hired him as contractor for a period of six months; later the company offered him a permanent position. He became a U.S. citizen in 2006. Currently, besides working for a telecommunications company, he is involved with several community, cultural, and advocacy organizations in the greater Philadelphia region, including Casa de Venezuela, the Association of Latino Professionals in Finance and Accounting (ALPFA), and the Latino Partnership Initiative, among others.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture | 2213
perception that some Americans have of the immigrants. Otherwise, they will experience the same frustrations and disillusions that the majority of Latinos are dealing with in the United States, suggesting a tension between “American” and “Latino” identities (Massey and Sanchez-R. forthcoming).
Possible Scenarios Ahead for Venezuelan Immigrants The history of the Venezuelan immigrant wave to the United States is recent, and perhaps it is too early to arrive at a final conclusion. However, there are possible scenarios. As with any other immigrant group, Venezuelans arrived in this country during difficult times, not only in the country of origin but also in the destination country. Economic sector difficulties and anti-immigrant attitudes characterize the social arena in which new immigrants arrive into this country. In this scenario, one issue that emerges is related to the fact that under these difficult economic conditions, Venezuelan immigrants will follow the path of integration and identity negotiation and will become part of this multicultural and diverse society, projecting perhaps an image that will compete with the negative stereotypes created by other images of the Latino immigrant. Due to the high human capital and capacity to link and network, as we see in the analysis of Venezuelan organizations, we can expect linking and networking with other Latino immigrant groups, either for unifying mechanisms of integration to the mainstream society or in the opposite situation of discrimination and rejection by native groups, creating organizations with the capacity to demand their rights as residents or citizens, negotiating for a specific ethnic and social identity. Another scenario is if there is a change in Venezuela, if economic and political conditions were to become favorable, and where we could expect a reverse migration to the country of origin. Expectations will change, however, if the time frame is too long.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 333 Venezuelan immigrant occupations compared with U.S. population Total U.S.
Venezuelan
Professional, management, and related occupations
34.60%
43.20%
Service occupations
16.70%
15.20%
Sales and office occupations
25.60%
26.00%
Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
0.70%
0.20%
Construction, extraction, maintenance, and repair occupations
9.70%
6.10%
12.70%
9.30%
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations
Source: Data set 2007 American Community Survey. S0201 Selected Population Profile in the U.S. United States: Country of birth: Venezuela
Table 334 Housing tenure and density by household Housing Tenure
Total Population
Venezuelans
112,377,977
61,122
Owner-occupied housing units
67.20%
56.00%
Renter-occupied housing units
32.80%
44.00%
Average household size of owner-occupied unit
2.7
3.19
Average household size of renter-occupied unit
2.42
2.63
Occupied housing units
Source: Data set 2007 American Community Survey. S0201 Selected Population Profile in the U.S. United States: Country of birth: Venezuela.
2214
Table 335 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Region and Country of Birth
2215
Total Venezuela
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
4,693
5,170
5,228
4,018
6,220
10,645
11,341
10,692
10,514
11,154
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
2216 | Venezuelan Immigrants
Appendix II: Census Statistics U.S. Census Bureau. American Community Survey (ACS) 2007 Data Release The American Community Survey (ACS) is a nationwide survey designed to provide communities with a fresh look at how they are changing. It is a critical element in the Census Bureau’s reengineered decennial census program. The ACS collects and produces population and housing information every year instead of every 10 years.
60 50 40 30 Gini Index
20 10 0 1981
1987
1989
Figure 27 Gini index, percentage. Source: World Bank Indicators.
1993
1996
1998
2003
2005
2006
18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2003
Year
Figure 28 Unemployment in Venezuela. Source: U.S. Census Bureau International Database.
700,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 300,000 Venezuela
200,000 100,000 0 1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Figure 29 Nonimmigrant admission. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FY 1999–2008.
2006
2007
2008
12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 Venezuela
4,000 2,000 0 1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Figure 30 Venezuelan immigrants obtaining legal permanent resident status. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FY 1999–2008.
Over 75 65 to 74
Venezuelans
55 to 64
US Total
45 to 54 35 to 44 25 to 34 18 to 24 5 to 17 Under 5 0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Figure 31 Total U.S. population and Venezuelan immigrants, by age. Source: Data set 2007, American Community Survey. S0201 Selected Population Profile in the United States. Country of Birth: Venezuela.
2218
65 and over
35–64
18–34
Females Under 18
–30%
–20%
–10%
Male 0%
10%
20%
30%
Figure 32 Venezuelans in the United States, by age group and gender. Source: Data set 2007, American Community Survey. S0201 Selected Population Profile in the United States. Country of Birth: Venezuela.
35 Total US Population 30
Venezuela
25
20
15
10
5
0 Less high school diploma
High school grad
College or associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate or professional degree
Figure 33 Educational attainment: Venezuelans and total U.S. population. Source: Data set 2007, American Community Survey. S0201 Selected Population Profile in the United States. Country of Birth: Venezuela.
2219
50% 45% 40%
Total US
35%
Venezuela
30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Professional, management
Service occupations
Sales and office
Farming, fishing, forestry
Construction, Production, extraction transportation
Figure 34 Venezuelan immigrants compared with U.S. population. Source: Data set 2007, American Community Survey. S0201 Selected Population Profile in the United States. Country of Birth: Venezuela.
25
20
Series 1
15
10
5
0 Transnational links
Socio cultural
Network
Figure 35 Venezuelan organizations in the United States, by type of activity. Source: Author data from Venezuelan immigrant organizations.
2220
Inst links
18 16 14 No. “Venezuelan Org”
12 10 8 6 4 2 0
No date
Before 1980
1980–2000
Figure 36 Venezuelan organizations, by year of creation. Source: Author data from Venezuelan immigrant organizations.
Northeast, 32%
South, 36%
Midwest, 23%
West, 9%
Figure 37 Venezuelan organizations, by region. Source: Author data from Venezuelan immigrant organizations.
2221
After 2000
2222 | Venezuelan Immigrants
Appendix III: Notable Venezuelan Americans Elena Abend, born in Caracas, Venezuela, is well known as a piano soloist and chamber musician and has performed worldwide, including Avery Fisher Hall in New York’s Lincoln Center, Weill Recital hall at Carnegie Hall, Wigmore Hall in London, and at the United Nations, the Toulouse Conservatoire in France, the Corcoran Gallery in Washington, D.C., Merkin Concert Hall in New York, and many other places. She teaches at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Carlos Blanco Is a professor of international relations at Boston University. Before, he was a professor at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, fellow of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, and visiting scholar at Boston University, International Relations Department (since 2005). He has been a research scholar in the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University. Blanco served as minister for the Reform of the State and president of the Presidential Commission for State Reform in Venezuela. Blanco’s books include Revolucion y Desilusión/La Venezuela de Hugo Chávez; La Reforma del Estado y la Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado; and Venezuela, Del Siglo XX al Siglo XXI: Un Proyecto Para Construirla (editor). He authored a chapter titled “The Latin American Military Enigma” in the book The Construction of Democracy, by Jorge Dominguez and Anthony Jones, and a chapter titled “Venezuela y Sus Conflictos” in the book Política Pública y Democracia en América Latina, by Freddy Mariñez Navarro and Vidal Garza Cantú. Dr. Allan R. Brewer-Carias since 1963 has been professor at the Central University of Venezuela. He was the director of the Public Law Institute (1978– 1989), head of the Administrative Law Chair, and head of the Public Law Department at the same University. He has been a professor in post-graduate courses in the Law Faculties at the University of Cambridge (LLM), UK, the Université de Paris II, the University of Rosario, and the University Externado of Colombia in Bogotá. In 2006 and 2007, he was adjunct professor of law at Columbia Law School, New York. In 1981 he was awarded the National Sciences Prize of Venezuela, for his achievements in the law and institutional studies. He is vice-president of the International Academy of Comparative Law (The Hague); member of the Board of Directors of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights; and member of the Venezuelan National Academy of Political and Social Sciences, where he served as president in 1997–1999. His last book in English: Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in Latin America, Cambridge University Press, New York 2009, was written for the seminar he gave as adjunct professor of Law at Columbia Law School in New
References | 2223
York. Since 1974 he has been a partner of the law firm Baumeister & Brewer. He has been a resident of United States since 2000. Ricardo Haussman is director of the Center for International Development and professor of the practice of economic development at Harvard University, after serving as the first chief economist of the Inter-American Development Bank (1994–2000); he was minister of Planning of Venezuela (1992–1993); a member of the Board of the Central Bank of Venezuela; and chair of the IMF-World Bank Development Committee, among other positions. Ignacio Rodriguez-Iturbe is a Princeton professor of civil and environmental engineering, who received the 2009 William Bowie Medal, the highest honor awarded by the American Geophysical Union. Rodriguez-Iturbe came to Princeton University in 1999 after serving as the head of the civil engineering department at Texas A&M University. His research focuses on the movement of water through ecosystems, landscapes, and the atmosphere. In April 2009, Rodriguez-Iturbe was one of six recipients of the 2009 Edward O. Wilson Biodiversity Technology Pioneer Award., presented to scientists whose work has helped advance the biodiversity of life on Earth. Jose Urdaneta is a Venezuelan and the first Latino elected to the City Council in the city of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, as the chair of Economic Development.
Glossary Barrios: Agglomerations of housing and population, built over the years on public or private land originally squatted. At the origin, the barrio was a very unstable construction characterized by a homogeneous population without resources. But over the years, the consolidation of the barrios illustrates the urban reality in Latin America with heterogeneous social composition and progressive stabilization infrastructure and services.
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2224 | Venezuelan Immigrants De La Torre, C. 2003. “Masas, Pueblo y Democracia: Un Balance Critico de los Debates sobre el Nuevo Populismo.” Revista de Ciencias Politicas 23, no. 1: 55–56. Freije, Samuel. Forthcoming. “Income Distribution and Redistribution in Venezuela.” In Venezuela: Anatomy of a Collapse, edited by Ricardo Haussmann and Francisco Rodriguez, Chap 8. Forthcoming from Penn State University Press. Goodman, Louis, Johanna F. Mendelson, Moises Naim, Joseph Tulchin, and Gary Bland. 1995. Lesson of the Venezuelan Experience. Washington, DC: WWC Press, and Baltimore, MD and London: The John Hopkins University Press. Haggerty, Richard A., ed. 1990. Venezuela: A Country Study. Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress. [Online article; retrieved 2009.] http://countrystudies.us/ venezuela/. Hausmann, Ricardo, and Francisco Rodriguez, eds. “Venezuela: Anatomy of a Collapse.” [Online article; retrieved 2009.] http://frrodriguez.web.wesleyan.edu/docs/Books/Ven ezuela_Anatomy_of_a_Collapse.pdf. Hsieth, Chang Tai, Daniel Ortega, Edward Miguel, and Francisco Rodríguez 2007. “The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela’s Maisanta.” Unpublished manuscript. Interamerican Development Bank. The Multilateral Investment Fund. “Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean 2008 (US$ millions).” [Online article; retrieved 2008.] http://www.iadb.org/mif/remesas_map.cfm?language=English. Koeneke, Ramirez Herbert. 2006. “El Petro Estado Paternalista y la Nación Peticionista.” In Cuando el Estado Empobrece la Nación, edited by Venezuela Positiva. Caracas: Fundacion Venezuela Positiva. Levi, Peggy, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2007. “Conceptualizing Simultaneity.” In Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, edited by Alejandro Portes and Josh De Wind, Chap 7. New York: Berghahn Books. Manzano, Osmel. 2007. “Venezuela after a Century of Oil Exploitation.” In Venezuela: Anatomy of a Collapse, edited by R. Hausmann R and F. Rodriguez, Chap. 3. [Online article; retrieved 2009.] http://frrodriguez.web.wesleyan.edu/docs/Books/Venezuela_ Anatomy_of_a_Collapse.pdf. Massey, Douglas S. 2008. New Faces in New Places: The Changing Geography of American Immigration. New York: New york Russell Sage Foundation. Massey, Douglas S., and Magaly Sanchez-R. 2010. Brokered Boundaries: Construction of Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times. Russell Sage Foundation. Maza Zavala, Domingo. 2001. “Lo Bueno y lo Malo del Petróleo en el Siglo XX: Fortalezas y Debilidades.” In Testimonios de una Realidad Petrolera, Chap. 6. Caracas: Venezuela Positiva. Mires, Francisco Civilidad. 2001. Teoría Política de la Postmodernidad. Madrid: Trotta. 2001.
Further Reading | 2225 Pedrazzini, Yves, and Magaly Sánchez-R. 1998. Malandros:Bandes, Gangs et Enfants de la Rue: Culture d’Urgence à Caracas. Paris: C. L. Mayer: Desclée de Brouwer. Portes, Alejandro, Cristina Escobar, and Alexandria Walton. 2007. “Immigrant Transnational Organizations and Development: A Comparative Study.” In CMD 05–07. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Rodríguez, Haviâdán, Rogelio Saenz, and Cecilia Menjívar. 2008. Latinas/os in the United States: Changing the Face of América. New York: Springer. “ Sanchez-R, Magaly, and Aysa Maria. 2009. “Formation of Immigrant Organizations: A comparison of the Colombian, Ecuadorian and Venezuelan in the United States. Immigration Round Table.” San Francisco: ASA. Sanchez-R., Magaly. 2006. “Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America.” In Chronicle of a Myth Foretold: The Washington Consensus in Latin America, edited by Douglas Massey, Magala Sanchez-R, and Jere Behrman, 178-195. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. “Venezuela.” 2009. The World Factbook 2009. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. [Online article; retrieved 2009.] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/ve.html.
Further Reading Although the following suggested readings are not specific to the migration group referred to in this article, I consider this reading list as basic and fundamental to understanding international migration in the present times. Alba, Richard D., and Victor Nee. 2003. Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. In this book, the authors re-review the Assimilation Theory in the new era, the 21st century, showing how the assimilation process is not a linear process of ethnic annihilation, but a dynamic one in which majority and minority cultures converge. With a systematic analysis the authors show how assimilation continues to shape the immigrant experience, although the composition shifted from Europe to Latin America. goes from the rethinking of assimilation, the reviewing of old and new theories on assimilation, as well as the practices of assimilation by Europeans and Asians. The last part of the book deeply analyzes contemporary immigration and assimilation and concludes with what the authors call Remaking the American Mainstream. The authors conclude that “assimilation” will not apply to all immigrant minorities to the same extent, and this is one way in which the incorporation stories of the past and present are likely to differ. The contemporary immigration is more diverse than the past ones, in terms of “the forms of capital the immigrants bring, the nature of the community they entered, and their race and legal status.” The book concludes with an empirical grounded theoretical synthesis to serve as guide for researchers and policy makers in the 21st century.
2226 | Venezuelan Immigrants Bean, Frank D., and Gillian Stevens. 2003. America’s Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity. The Rose Series in Sociology. New York: Russell Sage. This book is considered the result of a well researched, policy-relevant investigation of the large impact of recent immigration in the United States. The book reviews the ambivalence and major immigration issues, and how Americans perceive and deal with immigration. The authors refer to two major issues that lie at the root of concerns about immigration: the implications of immigration for sociocultural identity, and the implications of immigration for the economy. They call sociocultural identity the ways people view and think of themselves in terms of language, social relationships, and racial or ethnic identification. After analyzing aspects of diversity and multiethnic and racial identities, the authors confirm that the old models of cultural accommodation and bipolar racial divides may be less relevant to the contemporary Latino immigrants than for earlier immigrants. This is also relevant for Asians who came from different countries. Many of the new Asian and Latino immigrants seem to have adopted different paths of adaptation without assimilation. Important proportions of Latinos and Asians are either immigrants or children of immigrants, and their perception of race and ethnicity, boundaries and color lines are shaped by different circumstances than have been for Africans. Massey, Douglas S., and Magaly Sanchez-R. 2010. Brokered Boundaries: Creating Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrants Times. Russell Sage Foundation. In Brokered Boundaries, Douglas Massey and Magaly Sanchez untangle the complex political, social, and economic conditions underlying the rise of xenophobia in U.S. society. The book draws on in-depth interviews with Latin American immigrants in metropolitan New York and Philadelphia and—in their own words and images—reveals what life is like for immigrants attempting to integrate in anti-immigrant times. The authors review the plurality of elements characterizing Latino immigrants and their position in the United States, including their mixed ethnic roots, employment patterns, legal status, experience of discrimination, social inequalities, and self-perceptions of identity. Systematic analyses of these factors drive the book’s central discussion on diversity and identity, focusing particularly on how Latino immigrants are able to negotiate complex identities without total assimilation. Massey, Douglas S., Joaquín Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor. 1998. Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The book is the result of an important objective for developing a fuller theoretical understanding of the forces producing contemporary international migration, not just in traditional receiving countries such as the United States, but throughout the world. In this book, with empirical research from different parts of the world, authors explain various propositions and hypotheses of currents theories, identifying areas of conflict or harmony. The book provides a significant contribution in building a conceptual and empirically valid theoretical model to explain the emergence of international migration worldwide in the late 20th century. The review of research around the world “suggests that international migration originates in the social, economic, and political transformations that accompany the penetration of capitalistic markets into non-markets or pre-market soci-
Further Reading | 2227 ety.” In the context of a globalizing economy, the entry of markets and intensive capital technologies into peripheral regions disrupts existing social and economic arrangement, “producing a widespread displacement of people, creating an active mobile labor market.” Massey, Douglas S. 2008. New Faces in New Places: The Changing Geography of American Immigration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. With quantitative and qualitative analysis, the authors in this book document the transformation of immigration to the United States that started in the 1990s and has continued into the recent years of the 21st century. During this period of time, immigration shifted from being a regional phenomenon to a national one, affecting communities of different sizes of population around the country. The geographic diversification of destinations experienced by all immigrant groups was especially marked by Mexicans and Latinos, and much less by Asians. The book refers to different reasons that explain this transformation, placing in first place the relevance of U.S. border policies, and the steel wall in the traditional crossing points. Immigrants responded by building new crossing points and new destinations. The presence of Latinos from Central and South America in this transformation responded to other factors, some related to the restructuring of the manufacturing industry in nontraditional reception sites. Finally, and very importantly, the book illustrates how communities across the country are reacting to the new immigrants’ arrival, suggesting that new immigrants will face different paths in integration and or assimilation in the American 21st century. Portes, Alejandro, and Josh DeWind. 2007. Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives. New York: Berghahn Books. This book presents contrasting approaches by European and North American scholars for the same topics in the field of immigration studies and the lesson to be learned from one another. Rodríguez, Haviâdán, Rogelio Saenz, and Cecilia Menjívar. 2008. Latinas/os in the United States: Changing the Face of America. New York: Springer, 2008. This volume reflects the contemporary panorama of Latinas/os in the United States, showing how Latinos represent the largest minority group. Hispanics/Latinos grew more than seven times faster than the population of the nation as a whole. The chapters reflect the heterogeneity of Latinos and seeks to include information about all groups, not only the largest ones like Mexican, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. In addition, the book also reflects how the heterogeneity of Latinos affects or determines the different ways of incorporation into the American society. This volume’s accurate results and balanced trends will prove to be a important resource to citizens seeking to understand Latinos and their changing role in the population and society of the 21st century. Sullivan, Mark P. 2009, July 28. “Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy.” CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service. [Online article; retrieved 2009.] http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32488.pdf http://www.casadevenezuela.net/en/ about-us/links.
Vietnamese Immigrants by Hien Duc Do
Introduction On or around April 30 each year for the last 35 years, thousands of Vietnamese Americans gather to commemorate the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975. In addition, during the Lunar New Year celebration, thousands of Asian Americans celebrate the coming of the New Year and all the possibilities that it offers. Across the country, from Falls Church, Virginia, to San Jose, California, there are hundreds of Tet (New Year) celebrations organized by Vietnamese Americans. Thousands of Vietnamese Americans and others participate in these activities, and these are some of the occasions when the media covers this community extensively. There are more than one million Vietnamese Americans living in the United States, according to the 2000 Census. The United States is home to the largest Vietnamese community outside of Vietnam. However, the word Vietnam is still largely associated with the Vietnam War in which the United States was involved until 1975. This word itself is controversial and invokes a wide range of emotions. We have finally begun the healing process resulting from this war. This chapter focuses on the immigration history and development of the Vietnamese American community in the United States since 1975.
Chronology 1627
French influence begins in Vietnam.
1887
France creates Indochina, which includes Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
1940
Japanese troops occupy Indochina during World War II.
1945
World War II ends. France attempts to return to Indochina.
1954
The French are defeated by Vietnamese nationalists at Dien Bien Phu.
1954
Geneva Conference. Vietnam is temporarily divided to prepare for a National election in 1956, which never occurred. One million northern Catholics are evacuated to the south.
1964 The Gulf of Tonkin incident. President Johnson asks Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 2229
Background | 2231
1965
U.S. combat troops arrive in South Vietnam.
1968
The Tet Offensive.
1973
Paris Peace Agreement signed.
1975 On April 30, North Vietnam defeats South Vietnam and captures the country. More than 100,000 Vietnamese flee their country as refugees. 1980
Passage of Refugee Act of 1980.
1987
Amerasian Homecoming Act.
1994
President Clinton lifts trade embargo against Vietnam.
1992
Tony Lam becomes the first Vietnamese American to be elected as a city council member in Westminster, California.
2005 Madison Phuong Nguyen is the first Vietnamese American woman elected to the City of San Jose City Council in California. 2006
Van Thai Tran is the first to be elected to the California State Legislature.
2008 Anh “Joseph” Cao sworn in as the first Vietnamese American official elected to the U.S. House of Representative from Louisiana.
Background Geography of Vietnam Vietnam is located on the southeastern coast of the Indochinese peninsula and possesses 127,244 square miles. The country is a reverse S-shaped, more broadly spread in the north and south and quite narrow in the middle, with the narrowest point about 31 miles in width. There is a long coastline of about 2,025 miles to the east and the country shares borders with three other countries: China to the north, Laos to the west, and Cambodia to the southwest. Vietnam is a country of tropical lowlands, hills, and densely forested highland, with level land covering no more than 20 percent of the total land area. About threequarters of the country consist of mountains and hills. The highest mountain, at 10,311 feet, is Phan Si Pan in the far northwest of northern Vietnam. The central highlands include the Giai Truong Son mountain range. There are two major agricultural areas that include the Red River Delta in the north and the Mekong Delta in the south. Since the Mekong Delta was created from the tremendous amount of silt from the Mekong River, it is one of the most fertile areas in the world. The major crop is rice. The geography of the country created a diverse climate. The weather is primarily determined by two monsoon seasons. From about May to October, the summer monsoons originating from the south greatly influence the weather in the northern
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and southern regions yet leaves the central area dry as a result of the air-flow patterns. In short, there is a large variation in the weather in each region, and there are noticeable seasonal differences throughout the year.
History Vietnam’s history stretches back more than 4,000 years. As with most older countries, this history is long, complicated, multilayered, and rather complex. Therefore, this section will focus more thoroughly on the influence of Chinese domination, the French occupation, and the U.S. involvement and the Vietnam War. According to Vietnamese legends, Vietnamese are the offspring of the marriage of a dragon and a fairy. The marriage of the Dragon Lord of the Lac and the Mountain Princess named Au Co produced 100 children. Since it was impossible for a dragon and a fairy to live together, their children were divided equally between the two parents—50 of the children returned to the sea to live with their father and the other 50 settled in the Red River with their mother. One of the children became the first king of Vietnam, and thus begins the country’s legend. The historical origins of Vietnam commence in 208 B.C.E. when a renegade Chinese general named Trieu Da conquered Au Lac, a province in the northern mountains of modern-day Vietnam and established a capital city then proceeded to declare himself emperor of Nam Viet. Since its inception, the history of Vietnam has been one of continuous rebellions against Chinese control and influence. There are many rebellions that have been documented in Vietnam’s history, and among the most famous and significant one is that the of the Trung sisters (Trung Nhi and Trung Trach). This rebellion occurred after the Chinese brutally executed a Vietnamese lord. His widow and her sister began a rebellion against the powerful Chinese army and declared themselves queens of the newly independent country. Unfortunately, after three years of constant battle and fighting, the Chinese defeated them. Instead of surrendering or risking the chance of being captured, the two sisters committed suicide by jumping into the Hat Giang River. This rebellion and their suicides immortalized the sacrifices of the Trung sisters and served as the impetus to create a permanent independent country. This was temporarily achieved in 967 when Emperor Dinh Bo Linh set up a new country called Dai Co Viet, which was followed by a period of peaceful independence before the next wave of foreign invasion.
Chinese Occupation From its inception, the history of Vietnam has been tumultuous. Foreign domination and influence have been continuous. One of the most consistent historical characteristics of the people has been their willingness to fight against foreign
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occupation and domination. Among the countries that have had a history of foreign occupation in Vietnam are China, France, Japan, and the United States. Each country left a legacy and influenced Vietnam’s political, social, cultural, economic, and historical development. China greatly influenced Vietnam. There is a popular Vietnamese folk song that reminds listeners of their most recent history by stating “one thousand years of Chinese domination, one hundred years of domination by the French, twenty years of internal civil war, the inheritance left by our mother is a ‘sad’ country.” China finally recognized Vietnam’s independence in 1428 after a decade-long revolt led by Emperor Le Loi. His dynasty lasted three centuries. This was also the period when Vietnam established its modern-day borders, extending its territory southward by conquering the kingdoms of Champa and part of Cambodia. The European influence began in 1627 when Alexandre de Rhodes, a Catholic missionary, changed the Vietnamese language from Chinese characters to the roman alphabet. As a result, modern-day Vietnamese is more similar to English in its roman alphabet than other Asian alphabets, for example, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean. Another country that is closely associated with Vietnam is France. The French official presence began in 1777 when other European powers including England, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands were colonizing countries around the world. As soon as the French were able to establish political and military control, the government implemented a policy of total political control and economic exploitation. As a result of France’s ruthless rule, there were continuous armed rebellions throughout the country. These rebellions were led by different members of different social groups, including scholars and officials. Their goals were to defeat the French government and to achieve independence for Vietnam. The most significant of these rebellions was the Revolutionary Youth Movement in 1925 by Nguyen Thai Hoc, who later changed his name to Ho Chi Minh in 1943. This organization evolved into the Indochina Communist Party in 1929 and then the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1930. The French ruthlessly and successfully repressed all of the Vietnamese nationalist movements. During World War II, when France fell to Germany, Vietnam was briefly under the control of Japan. As they had done against the French and Chinese, Vietnamese nationalists continued to fight for their country’s independence.
Causes and Waves of Migration On January 28, 1973, after having spent years and millions of dollars financing the Vietnam War, the U.S. government reluctantly agreed to withdraw its financial and military assistance after signing the Agreement on Ending the War and
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Restoring Peace in Vietnam. The peace agreement was signed by representatives of the U.S. government, the government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), and the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) in Paris. The main features of the Agreement committed the United States and other signatories to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam. It called for prisoners of war to be exchanged, and declared an in-place cease fire. In addition, the agreement required the United States to “stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by ground, air, and naval forces wherever they may be based; and end the mining of the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.” Furthermore, it required the United States to “not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.” This historic agreement was enthusiastically approved by the North Vietnamese but reluctantly signed by the United States and South Vietnam’s President Nguyen Van Thieu. However, soon after the withdrawal of the U.S. military and economic support, the military situation deteriorated rapidly for the government of South Vietnam. The flight of Vietnamese refugees began within the country, with the North Vietnamese military offensive of mid-March 1975 resulting in the defeats at Pleiku, Kontum, and Ban Me Thuot. As a result of this military offensive, about one million refugees poured out of these areas and headed for the capitol city, Saigon, and the coast. Most traveled by foot, few were fortunate enough to travel by car, truck, bus, or motorbike. The coastal city of Da Nang was evacuated on March 27 and 28, 1975. This was soon followed by other coastal cities, such as Nha Trang and Cam Ranh (Kelly 1977). President Thieu resigned on April 21, 1975, and was succeeded by Vice Prime Minister Huong. As the political, economic, and military conditions continued to deteriorate even further, Vice Prime Minister Huong transferred the remaining government power to General “Big” Minh (Liu, Lamanna, and Murata 1979). By the end of April 1975, South Vietnam, under the direction of General “Big” Minh surrendered to the North Vietnamese Communist government. On April 30, 1975 Saigon, the capitol of South Vietnam, and thus the country itself, came under the control of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. This resulted in the plight of the newest Asian Pacific immigrant group to the United States at the time.
The Vietnamese Refugee Immigration Experience Vietnamese emigration is generally divided into two periods, each with several “waves” (Kelly 1977; Nguyen 1985). The first period began in April 1975 and continued through 1977. This period included the first three waves of Vietnamese refugees in the United States.
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The first wave of refugees, involving some 10 to 15 thousand people, began at least a week to 10n days before the collapse of the government. The second wave, and probably the largest in numbers, involved some 80 thousand who were evacuated by aircraft during the last days of April. The evacuation of American personnel, their dependents, and Vietnamese affiliated with them was achieved through giant helicopters under “Operation Frequent Wind.” According to Newsweek magazine (May 12, 1975), it was a “logistical success . . . the biggest helicopter lift of its kind in history.” These individuals were relatively well educated, spoke some English, had some marketable skills, came from urban areas, and were Westernized. Members of these two waves were primarily Vietnamese who worked for the U.S. government, American businesses and corporations, or the Vietnamese government. All were thought to be prepared for life in the United States on the basis of their contact with the U.S. government and association with Americans (Kelly 1977). The following is a familiar story told by a female who was 23 years old in 1986 and who at that time recalled her experience leaving Vietnam: We came in 1975. My dad was an officer in the navy. We were going to stay outside on the ocean until the war was over and come back in because all the people on board didn’t think we were going to lose. But it turned out that we lost and so we kept going and going out into the ocean until we saw this big old boat. The boat that eventually picked us up was a large American cargo ship. They took us to an island and after a long time, we were taken to Guam Island. (Do 1994) The final wave during this period involved 40 to 60 thousand people who left on their own in small boats, ships, and commandeered aircraft during the first two weeks of May 1975. They were later transferred to Subic Bay and Clark Air Force base in the Philippines and Guam Island after having been picked up, in many cases, by the U.S. Navy and cargo ships standing off the coast of Vietnam. My Dung, a 20-year-old young woman attending college in Southern California, recalls her family’s narrow escape from Vietnam in 1987: We came during the summer. I remember how my mom told us to pack all our stuff and we were supposed to meet our father at a remote beach outside of Saigon. Our dad was going to meet us there because he managed to get access to a boat. I was only five years old but I remember it took us a very long time to get to where we wanted to go. I think we must have walked for a day. . . . I just remember rushing, rushing, rushing. We finally got on a boat and just went out to the water. I don’t think we knew where we were going, we were just kept going straight out toward the ocean. We were finally picked up by foreign ship. (Do 1994)
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A Vietnamese refugee, his belongings secured in a bag held by his teeth, climbs a cargo net to the deck of the USS White Plains in the South China Sea, July 1979. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, thousands fled Vietnam in an effort to emigrate abroad, chiefly to the United States. (National Archives)
The second period of the Vietnamese refugee migration began in 1978 and continues even today, but the numbers are very small. Since the fall of South Vietnam, many Vietnamese have tried to escape the political oppression, the major social, political, and economic reforms instituted by the authoritarian government of North Vietnam. Although the influx was steady for many years, the numbers are no longer as massive as they once were. A significant characteristic of this period, especially between the years 1978–1980, is the large number of ethnic Chinese migrating out of Vietnam and Cambodia (St Carmail 1983; Whitmore 1985). The following is an account of this migration process by a young Vietnamese ethnic Chinese who left during this period: I don’t know how much it cost us but we had to do a lot of paper work. We had to go through many different government agencies and they wanted a lot of different papers. At that time, paper money was not worth anything so we had to pay in gold. You had to be of Chinese descent or have proof in order to apply at this time. . . . Our original goal was to go to Hong Kong but our captain didn’t know the way. When we were in the middle of the ocean, we met and asked two fishermen for directions and had to pay them before they showed us the way. In the end though, they didn’t really show us the way, they just pointed and told us to go straight. We did and were lucky to end up in a refugee camp. (Do 1994) In addition to the Vietnamese ethnic Chinese, there were many Vietnamese who also left during this period. These individuals have been called “Vietnamese boat
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people” because the majority of them escaped in homemade, poorly constructed boats and wooden vessels (Grant 1979; Haskins 1980; Wain 1981). Due to the lack of sophistication of vessels that cannot withstand the forces of nature, their scant knowledge of navigational skills, the very limited amount of food and water they were able to bring and, finally, numerous attacks by Thai sea pirates, the death rate of the “Vietnamese boat people” is very high. Some verbal testimony from surviving refugees has estimated it to be as high as 50 percent, while Grant (1979) and Wain (1981) have placed it much lower at 10 to 15 percent. However, the percentage will never be accurately known since there is no systematic way of knowing how many refugees actually left Vietnam, and only survivors are accounted for. The Vietnamese government did not have an accurate population count, since people frequently moved after the war. Since 1979, many former receiving countries have turned away refugees because of the economic toll, political cost, and social strain that they are putting on their economies (Grant 1979; Los Angeles Times 1989; New York Times 1990). The following accounts are from two refugees who left Vietnam five years apart. The first account is from Hoang Mai, who arrived in the United States in 1981. She was quite fortunate; her entire family was able to leave together and stayed together throughout the long and dangerous journey. After 1975, we had a small mom-and-pop shop that sold pretty much everything. This is where the whole family worked together. It was our only source of income since we were not allowed to do anything else. . . . Our journey lasted about 10 days and we went straight to Thailand. The boat was really small, only about 16 meters long and there were 36 people cramped in it. We were fortunate; there were few small problems during our journey. We came to Thailand and lived in a refugee camp there for three years and then went to Indonesia for our interviews to be relocated elsewhere. I don’t know what happened but we were admitted to the United States. (Do 1994) The second account is from Hung. He was not as fortunate, having left by himself in 1985, leaving behind his parents and his other siblings: Our lives before 1975 were pretty normal. Both of my parents were into business and so they had a small shop that was doing well. But once the communists came in after the war, we were restricted a lot more in terms of our business activities. We were not allowed to do a lot and couldn’t really earn enough to feed all of us. In fact, we tried to escape in 1975 but were caught at Phu Quoc and all of us spent 2 months in prison. Afterward, when we came out of prison, we were left with nothing. . . . My father was then sent to re-education camp for nine years. My mother was left behind to take care of the eight of us. In 1978, when my older brothers were threatened to be drafted, my uncle, who lived in the
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United States at the time, sent money for their journey out of Vietnam. The two of them left by themselves in 1978. I managed to leave in 1984 by myself. . . . The journey was long and often times frightening. I was young and didn’t have anybody and it was worse because I didn’t know where we were because we just wanted to get out but we ended in Indonesia. (Do 1994) In sum, the exodus of Vietnamese refugees to the United States was a difficult process. Regardless of which period they came in, the journey to America left a long-lasting impression on all those involved. For some, the long journey was made easier because they were able to leave during the earlier period, or when they were younger. For others, the journey was more traumatic because of their circumstances and the uncertain journey across the ocean to a new and unknown destination.
The U.S. Response The Vietnamese exodus and their resettlement in the United States could not have come at a worse time in that period of American history. The Vietnam War was an extremely unpopular war at home, in which 57,692 American men and women died, with 2,500 listed as “missing in action” or as prisoners of war (Capps 1982). The war deeply divided the nation. Indeed, the general atmosphere of the American public at the end of the war was hostile toward the Vietnamese refugees. A Gallup Poll taken in May 1975 showed “54% of all Americans opposed to admitting Vietnamese refugees to live in the United States and only 36% were in favor with 12% undecided” (Time, May 19, 1975). A common concern of the American public was one of economic selfinterest—a fear of having jobs taken away, as well as having too much public assistance and welfare given to the refugees. During this time, the United States was in a period of recession, with an unemployment rate of 8.3 percent (Kelly 1977). Several early studies documented that a substantial number of Americans preferred the exclusion of the refugees from the United States (Schaefer and Schaefer 1975; Liu, Lamanna, and Murata 1979; Starr and Roberts 1982). Apart from specific conditions resulting from the Vietnam War and the recession, this hostile reception given by the American public represented a continuation of the tradition of racism and hostility toward immigrant minority groups that has been prevalent and well documented throughout U.S. history (Dollard 1957; Thomas and Znaniecki 1958; Knowles and Prewitt 1969; Conroy and Miuyakawa 1972). The Vietnamese refugees therefore arrived in the United States with a legacy of hostility directed toward Asians. Most of the hostility was racially and economically based (Daniels and Kitano 1970; Rabaya 1971; Saxton 1971; Sandmeyer 1971; Sue and Kitano 1973; Chan 1991). Despite this legacy, there were also many Americans who extended humanitarian aid and sponsored families out of refugee camps.
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The U.S. Government Dispersal Policy In order to minimize the social impact of the large influx of Vietnamese refugees on an American public that was unfavorable to the Vietnam War, the U.S. government adapted the Refugee Dispersion Policy. This policy served four purposes: (1) to relocate the Vietnamese refugees as quickly as possible so that they could achieve financial independence; (2) to ease the impact of a large group of refugees on a given community, which might otherwise increase the competition for jobs, social services, and housing; (3) to make it logistically easier to find the largest pool of sponsors possible; and (4) to prevent the development of an ethnic ghetto (Liu, Lamanna, and Murata 1979). Given the political and social climate of the United States at the time, the influential factors leading to this Dispersion Policy were primarily political and financial, not social (Kelly 1977). The logic was that if this policy was carried out successfully, the Vietnamese refugees would quickly assimilate into the American society. The goal was for a rapid, and, hopefully, smooth and seamless transition for the refugees into society. The goal was for them to become economically and financially independent as quickly as possible without much consideration of the social impact that might result from this dramatic event. As a result, nine voluntary agencies (VOLAGS) were contracted by the federal government’s Interagency Task Force to handle the resettlement of the refugees in the United States. The agencies included the United Hebrew Immigration and Assistance Service, the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, the International Rescue Committee, Church World Service, the American Funds for Czechoslovak Refugees, the U.S. Catholic Conference, the Travelers Aid International Social Service, and the Council for Nationalities Service. While in refugee camps, each family was given a choice to choose a resettlement agency. If the family did not have a preference, a random agency was assigned (Liu, Lamanna, and Murata 1979). The primary task of these voluntary agencies was to find sponsors that would have the ability to fulfill both financial and moral responsibilities and match them with refugees’ families. The responsibilities included providing temporary food, clothing and shelter, assistance in finding employment or job training for the head of the household, enrolling the children in school, and finally, providing ordinary medical care (Liu, Lamanna, Murata 1979). In other words, the sponsors would serve as a resource to introduce the Vietnamese refugees into the society while they become economically self-supporting.
The Resettlement of Vietnamese Refugees There were four ways for the refugees to leave the four temporary refugee camps (Camp Pendleton, California; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania) and enter into American society: (1) resettle to a third country, (2) obtain repatriation to Vietnam, (3) demonstrate
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proof of being financially self-supportive, and (4) find a sponsor through the voluntary agencies (Kelly 1977). Although third-country resettlement was encouraged by the U.S. government, this avenue was hardly ever chosen by the Vietnamese refugees. Very few other countries offered their assistance unless the refugees fulfilled at least one of the following requirements: (1) were certified professionals in needed areas, (2) had relatives in that country, or (3) could speak that country’s language (Kelly 1977). Since most refugees were not likely to be certified in professional areas as a result of the long war and lack of research and development, it was unlikely that there were many qualified for this option. Only a small number of refugees chose to return to Vietnam. Darrel Montero, an anthropologist, reported “by October 1975, repatriation had been granted to 1,546 refugees by the new government of Vietnam” (Montero 1977). The majority were military men who were forced to leave their families behind at the time of their evacuation. Once they realized that they might be separated from their loved ones for a long time, they chose to return to see if they could be reunited and were wiling to face the uncertainties that awaited them. There is no record of what happened to those who returned under this repatriation process. The third method by which the refugees were allowed to leave the camps was to demonstrate their financial independence. Kelly (1977, 129) and Montero (1977, 27) again documented, “the Task Force required a refugee family to show proof of cash reserves totaling at least $4,000 per household member” (Montero 1977). However, due to their abrupt plight, only very few refugees were qualified to use this avenue. This was a rather large sum of money, and it was unlikely that they were able to bring such a large sum of cash under the conditions that they left their country. In addition, not many refugees would report to the authorities their financial savings for the fear of the unknown that awaited them in this new country. Thus, the first waves of Vietnamese refugees entered the U.S. society primarily through the family sponsorship method. The sponsors found by voluntary agencies consisted of congregations, parishes, or affiliates, individual families, corporations, and companies with former Vietnamese employees. In addition, if the refugees had relatives who could fulfill the same requirements, they could qualify as sponsors as well. However, Skinner (1980), reported only 15,000 Vietnamese living in the United States prior to 1975. Most of these individuals were students staying temporarily on visas or wives of U.S. soldiers. In essence, the Vietnamese did not have an established ethnic community in the United States and therefore, this method hardly applied to the first waves of refugees. Nevertheless, the family sponsorship method was used more frequently at a later time by the Vietnamese from the first waves in order to sponsor family and relatives who were stranded in Vietnam after 1975. The primary way in which this method was used was through the implementation of two federal government sponsored
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programs that resulted from the Conference on Indochinese Refugees, held in Geneva, Switzerland, on June 14, 1980: (1) the Orderly Departure Program and (2) the Humanitarian Operation Program. The goal of these programs was to “provide Vietnamese a ‘viable alternative’ to dangerous clandestine departure by boat or over land” (Congressional Hearing, June 14, 1980). However, this viable alternative was not as successful as originally anticipated, as many Vietnamese refugees continue to leave by boat. Currently, there are three categories under which people can participate in these programs: (1) category I—family reunification, (2) category II—former U.S. government employees, U.S. firms or organizations, and so on, and (3) category III—reeducation center detainees. As a result of these avenues, many Vietnamese families who arrived during the first and second period, who now have citizenship or permanent residence status, are using the first category to bring family members to the United States. Thu Hoai, a 20-year-old woman at the time of her interview in 1986, reports: My family has been trying to bring my mom’s older sister over for a few years now. It has taken a lot of time and a lot of money because we have to bribe many of the government agencies and officials in Vietnam in order for them to speed up the process. You have to do this in order to get the required official papers. We’ve been waiting for a long time for the papers to clear. They have told us a few times that they were going to be on the next flight out of Saigon but that’s been going on for a few months. . . . I think we will probably be lucky if we receive two weeks’ notice before they’ll arrive. It has been pretty hard . . . both financially and emotionally for our family, but it’s been especially challenging for my mom. (Do 1994) In summary, as a result of the U.S. Federal Government Dispersal Policy, Vietnamese refugees were dispersed throughout the United States. The next section examines the adaptation processes by Vietnamese immigrants to the existing structural conditions since their arrival.
The Vietnamese Adaptation Process These were the structural conditions in the United States that the first Vietnamese refugees had to face at the time of their arrival. How did this affect their experience? First, as a result of the Refugee Dispersion Policy, the Vietnamese refugees were resettled throughout the United States. Table 336 illustrates the results of this Government Dispersion policy for the first waves of Vietnamese in the United States. The Dispersion Policy continued throughout succeeding waves of Vietnamese refugees. Table 337 represents the number of refugees admitted to the United States between 1975–1978 while Table 338 represents the years 1979–1982 along with their primary immigration state.
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South Vietnamese refugees disembark from the first of 10 refuge flights arriving at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, May 9, 1975. (AP Photo)
Second, the extended family network that existed in their homeland was temporarily broken by the different processes of migration. In order to find churches, social organizations, families, and individuals that were willing to sponsor the Vietnamese refugees, many Vietnamese extended families were broken up. Only immediate family members were allowed to stay together. Despite the chaotic and abrupt nature of the Vietnamese refugees’ departure, a substantial number of people came in family groups, accounting for approximately 62 percent of all the immigrants from the first two waves (Kelly 1977). In addition, many of the social networks that formed while they were abandoning their homeland, as well as in refugee camps, were also temporarily disrupted, as illustrated in a mimeo from 1975, cited in Liu, Lamanna, and Murata (1979). This forced the Vietnamese refugees to interact with, and depend on, the sponsors and the immediate environment for social and emotional support. In essence, the Vietnamese were deprived of the emotional, social, and psychological support generated from the extended family, and also the support that was generated from shared culture, language, customs, and experience. Third, in order to minimize the strain put on local economies by the refugees, the government encouraged the American sponsors to help the refugees become financially independent as soon as possible. Therefore, in order to survive, many Vietnamese accepted jobs of lower status than the ones they had in Vietnam. The
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majority of these jobs were concentrated in the peripheral economy or were service jobs that required few skills and little or no English proficiency. Most Vietnamese reported a decline in their families’ socioeconomic status since their arrivals to the United States. This was especially striking when compared to their socioeconomic standing in Vietnam prior to the political changes that occurred after 1975. Consistent with earlier research and results (Bach and Bach 1980; Kelly 1977; Kirayama 1982), refugees from the first period are generally reported to hold better jobs and occupations than those from the second period. For example, it was not uncommon for earlier refugees to have reported their previous positions as officers in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces but who are now janitors at a high school; a former businessman who is now employed as a dishwasher in an ethnic-owned restaurant; a former college professor who now drives a school bus; and a former government official working as a low-level technician in a high-tech company. Similarly, it was not uncommon for many Vietnamese women to work for the first time outside the home as technicians or assemblers in high-technology industries, cooks, cosmologists, social workers, or maids. The consequence of this policy resulted in the relocation of Vietnamese across the United States, which temporarily disrupted their mutual support systems. These systems included extended family members and friendships that were formed during these tumultuous times. Weather conditions that exist in many parts of the country where they were relocated were substantially different from those in their homeland. In only a few states was the weather similar to that of Vietnam (among these California, Texas, and Florida). This fact played a significant role in the formation of a secondary migration initiated by Vietnamese refugees that took place later. The 1980 Census data on the Vietnamese in the United States indicated that the most populated states were California with 34.78 percent, Texas with 11.34 percent, Louisiana with 4.43 percent, Washington state with 3.65 percent, Virginia with 3.86 percent, Pennsylvania with 3.31 percent, and finally, Florida with 2.89 percent. Table 339 presents the population of Vietnamese in the United States from the 1980 Census data, along with the percentage in each state. As the harsh winter conditions hit the cities throughout the United States where Vietnamese refugees were initially resettled, the desire to find a location with a warmer climate and a Vietnamese community increased for those who had settled in colder parts of the country. California’s reputation of having a warm climate with an abundance of unskilled jobs, especially in San Jose’s “Silicon Valley,” Santa Ana, and San Diego, along with the existence of small Vietnamese communities in Los Angeles and San Jose, became a magnet or an “attraction” that would draw people. Baldwin (1984) found that 43 percent of Vietnamese who had migrated to Orange County gave “climate” as their primary reason for migrating, while 22 percent gave “job/finances/education” as their second reason, followed by “family nearby” with 13 percent. This secondary migration pattern is repeated as many
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Vietnamese communities have been established throughout the United States, but the largest communities are primarily concentrated in California, Texas, Washington, and Virginia. The latest census data on Vietnamese living in the United States indicate that those states in which the immigrants concentrated their secondary migration are still those states most populated with Vietnamese. Table 340 reveals that California is still the state most preferred by the total number of Vietnamese immigrants living in the United States, with 45.36 percent of the population. Texas is still second at 11.27 percent. Washington with 4.81 percent and Virginia 3.30 percent, having moved ahead of Louisiana 2.85 percent. Florida is still fifth with 2.65 percent, while Pennsylvania is now sixth with 2.57 percent. These seven states together combine for almost 73 percent of the total number of Vietnamese immigrants living in the United States.
Summary The end of the Vietnam War, compounded with the fear of the new Vietnamese government, contributed to the large and sudden influx of Vietnamese refugees and immigrants to the United States. This chapter argues that the social, political, and economic conditions in the United States during the time of their arrival greatly affected the ways in which the U.S. federal government designed and implemented its policies. That is, the Dispersal Policy was implemented with the intention of quickly assimilating Vietnamese refugees into the United States. However, despite the original intention of the federal government to disperse Vietnamese refugees throughout the United States, the Vietnamese refugees initiated a secondary migration by themselves, which has resulted in their concentration in seven states. As a result of the original resettlement, this secondary migration, and the length of time since their first arrival in 1975, Vietnamese immigrants have been able to establish small communities throughout the United States, but concentrated in only a few states. Moreover, programs implemented by the United States, such as the Orderly Departure Program 1989, the Humanitarian Operation Program 1990, and the Homecoming Act of 1987, discouraged Vietnamese from risking their lives as boat people and instead encouraged them to apply for political asylum as a result of their military, political, and social standing during the war. As a result, many earlier refugees are now able to sponsor immediate family members for immigration to the United States. This has contributed to the continuing influx of Vietnamese to the United States. Most Vietnamese immigrants live in metropolitan and urban areas. Refugees concentrate in inner-city ethnic enclaves. As mentioned earlier, California has the largest number of Vietnamese among the 50 states. The cities in the state of California with the largest concentration of Vietnamese Americans are Westminster, Santa
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Ana, Long Beach, Los Angeles, San Jose, San Francisco, and San Diego. From all recent research reported, there do not seem to be many changes in this.
Demographic Profile Size and Composition of the Community The U.S. Census Bureau report, “The American Community Survey Reports— Asians 2004” (issued 2007), showed the Vietnamese American population to be 1,267,510. Similar to previous census data, the majority of Vietnamese Americans reside in California, Texas, Washington, Virginia, Florida, and Massachusetts. They are now the fourth-largest Asian American group in the United States.
Age and Family Structure The Vietnamese American population is relatively young, with a median of 35.5 years old. The majority are between the ages of 18 and 44 (45.7%), followed by those under 18 (24.8%), people between 45 and 64 (22.7%), and finally only 6.5 percent are 65 years or older. The majority of the people reported as being married (55.8%), while 32.4 percent reported “never married,” with a very small 5.3 percent divorced rate. The average Vietnamese American family size reported in the Census 2000 data is 3.99 compared to 3.14 for the total U.S. population. Vietnamese Americans are typically found in large metropolitan areas and in larger cities. There is an important Vietnamese American community in Louisiana that has been in the news recently because of Hurricane Katrina and the British Petroleum oil spill. The community is primarily made up of Vietnamese American Catholics working in the fishing and shrimp industries that were devastated by Hurricane Katrina, and again by the British Petroleum Oil Spill. When Vietnamese business enclaves are mentioned, they are usually shopping enclaves, minimalls, and ethnicspecific businesses and services.
Educational Attainment Vietnamese Americans report a relatively low level of educational attainment. According to the 2000 Census data, 30 percent report to have less than a high school education, 70 percent reported as high school graduate or more, and 23.5 percent reported to have a bachelor’s degree or more. While they are relatively well-educated, only 11.8 percent report to only speaking English at home. The majority of those reported (55.1%) still report that English is not well spoken at home. Since this is a relatively new group to the United States, it seems natural for many of the
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The Reverend Luke Nguyen (left), Jennifer Vu, and Mary Tran show the Vietnamese American community’s development plans in eastern New Orleans, September 18, 2007. Language and cultural barriers long kept Vietnamese Americans on the sidelines, however, since Hurricane Katrina, they have been emerging as a force in the city. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon)
older people to not feel as comfortable speaking English as it is for the younger people and those from the second generation. As this is a recent population, it will take some time for families to be completely bilingual.
Economic Attainment The economic attainment of this group is a complex topic, since it involves a variety of subgroups as well as different times of arrival. The 2000 data from the Census Bureau indicate that 29.2 percent are engaged in “management, professional, and related occupations,” while 24.6 percent classify themselves in “service occupations” and 19 percent reported “sales and office” as their occupations. Although these data are interesting at the macro level, they do not provide specific information regarding what types of occupations within each category Vietnamese Americans are likely to be employed in. For example, Linda Vo, a sociologist, found that throughout the country, many Vietnamese American women found work as pedicurists, hairstylists, and manicurists. This is a profession that requires a limited education, minimal
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English proficiency, relatively easy licensing, and small start-up funds (Vo 2003). If one examines the types of businesses that Vietnamese Americans are engaged in, the majority are small businesses that require only limited English proficiency, modest start-up funds, and reasonable licensing requirements. As a result, they are concentrated in small restaurants, gas stations, and car repair shops, pho, or noodle shops, ethnic bookstores, gift shops, clothing stores, herbal medicines, entertainment (music, videos, DVDs, soap operas), and businesses that cater specifically to their own ethnic group, including travel agencies, insurance companies, home repair, landscaping services, and after-school tutoring programs.
Adjustment and Adaptation Religion In general, four philosophies and religions have influenced and shaped the spiritual life of Vietnamese people: Confucianism (Khong Giao), Buddhism (Phat Giao), Taoism (Lao Giao), and since the 16th century, Catholicism (Cong Giao). Collectively, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism are referred to as the Three Religion system or Tam Giao. In their everyday life, Vietnamese tend to not differentiate between and among these religions and philosophies (except for Catholicism) since these have been continuously incorporated into the culture and traditions. Confucianism was founded by Confucius, who was born in 550 B.C.E. in China. He believed that people are shaped by their society and that they shape their society. Since we are members of a society, he believed that we need a code of ethics to govern and monitor our social interactions. He developed a specific code of ethics that explained an individual’s obligations to family, society, and the state. Two of the most basic foundations in Confucianism are duty and hierarchy. The most important ritual in Confucianism is that of ancestor worship. Confucius’s influence can clearly be seen in Vietnamese homes and businesses, where there is an altar dedicated to family ancestors. On the altar, there are pictures and names of ancestors in the last five generations, along with candlesticks, incense bowls, flower tray, and food offerings. On the anniversary of a death, or ngay gio, the altar is filled with special foods, fruit, drinks, flowers, and incense to pay special homage to the ancestors. This is an important regular cultural practice. Buddhism originated in India about 500 B.C.E. and was founded by Prince Siddhartha Gautama, who later became known as the Buddha. Prince Siddhartha was born a crown prince, and as he witnessed pain and suffering around him, he decided to give up his privileged life in search of human salvation. After many years of searching and following a variety of different methods, Prince Siddhartha finally achieved enlightenment after meditating under a Bodhi tree for a long time.
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Although there are many sects of Buddhism, in general, Buddhists believe in the Four Noble Truths taught by the Buddha: first, life is suffering; second, suffering is caused by desire; third, suffering can be eliminated by eliminating desire; and fourth, to eliminate desire, one must follow the Eightfold Path. The Eightfold Path includes: right understanding, right purpose, right speech, right conduct, right vocation (livelihood), right effort, right thinking (mindfulness), and right meditation (concentration). As a Buddhist, one must follow these paths and practice them every day in order to become enlightened, the goal of every Buddhist. As Vietnamese Americans become more and more economically stable, more and more Buddhist temples have begun to appear throughout their residential landscapes. These temples range from small, individual “home” temples to large, well constructed, elaborate, and highly decorated temples that are prominently seen in many cities throughout the United States. One of the most well known and respected Vietnamese Buddhist monks is Thich Nhat Hanh. He was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and has written numerous books and articles about Zen Buddhism. Taoism entered Vietnam through China. Lao Tse founded Taoism around 604 B.C.E. Although sometimes thought of as a religion, it was originally a philosophy. The fundamental belief in Taoism is that there are laws in the universe and nature and that these cannot be changed. An individual should not try to change these laws; instead, one should try to live with them and to make the best situation possible. Given the long history of suffering from war and foreign invasions, this philosophy was readily and easily accepted by the Vietnamese, because it offered a plausible explanation for all the difficult life conditions that many people experienced throughout the years. Catholicism was brought by missionaries from Spain, France, and Portugal in the 16th century. As a foreign religion without cultural and historical roots, Catholicism was discouraged and outlawed by the Vietnamese government upon its arrival. It was perceived as a threat to the established social structure of the society. However, as a result of harsh treatment and persecution of Catholic missionaries and their followers by the Vietnamese government, France was able to use that as a context for military intervention. Although there are many Vietnamese who later converted to Catholicism throughout the country, most come from the North, including many who became refugees in 1954 when the country was divided in half as a result of the Geneva Accord, and again in 1975 when Saigon fell to the communists. Since there was a large proportion of Vietnamese Catholics who left in 1975, it was easier for them to continue to practice their religion, both in refugee camps and once they entered the United States. Vietnamese Americans have built Catholic churches in many of the communities where they reside. In fact, on Sundays when Catholic masses are held, most churches are completely full. Vietnamese Americans are also active in many church-related activities, as well as in the larger Catholic Church itself. One of the advantages that Vietnamese Catholic refugees had
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was the assistance they received during the processing period from U.S. Catholic Charities, as well as the existing Catholic community in the United States. There are two other important minor religions for Vietnamese. Cao Dai was founded in 1919 by Le Van Trung. He created his religion by combining beliefs from different people and traditions, including those from the Buddha, Jesus, Confucius, Lao Tse, and the French author Victor Hugo. The Great Temple, which also serves as the headquarters, is located in the city of Tay Ninh, about 60 miles out of the capitol. The most recognizable symbol is that of the Heavenly Eye, which represents the omnipresence of Cao Dai. The other religion is Hoa Hao, a reformed Buddhist sect of the Theravada tradition. It was founded by a 20-year-old youth named Huynh Phu So in 1939 and is primarily located in the southwest and in the Mekong Delta. This religion teaches that virtue in one’s daily life conduct is the primary way to achieve salvation. This belief also extended into the political realm, since Huynh argued that both religion and politics were concerned with salvation. He was later killed by Vietnamese communists and, as a result, his followers became opposed to the communists and were persecuted throughout the Vietnam War.
Celebration of National Holidays There are two major holidays that Vietnamese Americans have continued to organize and celebrate since their arrival to the United States. The most import day is Tet, the Lunar New Year. The celebration follows the lunar calendar, and therefore the actual day varies from year to year but typically falls in mid- to late January to early February. There are many traditions and beliefs associated with this holiday. First and foremost, Vietnamese believe that what occurs on that day will determine the rest of the year. As a result, everyone is to be on their best behavior during this long celebration, since they want to bring good fortune to themselves and their family for the rest of the year. To begin the festivities, firecrackers are lit on New Year’s Eve to chase away the bad spirits and last year’s misfortunes. On New Year’s Day, everyone puts on their best clothes and visits family members in order to ring in the new year with good wishes. Parents and the elders give children li xi, small envelopes filled with small bills, so that the children will receive good fortune during the year. The children in turn wish good fortune and good health to their elders. This is generally followed by visits to family and friends to give good wishes, eat, relax and play games, and celebrate. Work and other activities are generally discouraged since the goal is to provide a relaxing atmosphere and an environment for people to celebrate. The other major cultural celebration is Tet Trung Thu, or the Mid Autumn Festival. Since Vietnam was an agricultural society, Tet Trung Thu was a day set aside to celebrate the children as well as the successful harvest. It was a time when parents
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A traditional Vietnamese dance group performs a dragon dance to celebrate Tet, the Vietnamese New Year, in Little Saigon, Westminster, California, February 16, 1999. (AP Photo/Nick Ut)
could relax and devote more time to their children, because all the hard work had been completed and there was a little break between the planting seasons. Vietnamese Americans continue to celebrate this custom, because it is a festival that primarily focuses on children. The festival is generally held on the 15th day of the 8th month in the lunar calendar, which generally falls in mid-September to early October in the United States. Although it is celebrated throughout the day with arts and crafts, music and dancing, the highlight is a lantern procession held at night. The lanterns are either homemade or commercially bought and have many shapes, including animals, houses, suns and moons, and the like. The procession takes place, in which all the children follow the Lion dancers and sing traditional songs while parading with their lit lanterns. At the end of the procession, there is generally banh trung thu, or moon cakes for people to enjoy.
Foodways Vietnamese restaurants and grocery stores have appeared throughout the American landscape and provide both Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese access to a cuisine that is generally lighter than Chinese, and one that uses a variety of spices and
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vegetables. As an agricultural country and a country surrounded by the ocean, the main staples are rice, vegetables, and fish. While there are a variety of rices, rice is generally used in two ways: as a daily staple or pounded into powder to make different types of rice noodles, and a variety of sticky rice that is generally steamed and often eaten at ceremonies. Vietnamese eat rice several times a day in either small or large rice bowls with a lot of vegetables, a little salted fish or meat, and soup. A very important and popular ingredient in Vietnamese cuisine is nuoc mam, or fish sauce. This sauce is made of a combination of water, fish extract, and salt. The ingredients are marinated in large containers or clay kegs for a period of time ranging from a month to longer. This sauce is generally used to create a dipping sauce by adding fresh lime juice, fresh chili peppers, garlic, and sugar to provide additional flavor to the vegetables or other dishes. It is also used to make meat or fish more salty. Vietnamese do not generally eat large quantities of meat. When meat is served, it is generally in small pieces mixed in with stir-fry vegetables or in larger pieces that are more salty. Free-range chickens and eggs supplement this diet. Vietnamese generally go to the local market to get their daily ingredients fresh to prepare their meals. An additional food that was introduced by the French is the Vietnamese baguette. There are numerous stores that sell banh mi or Vietnamese sandwiches, which have become quite popular. These are small baguettes filled with pickled vegetables and some meat (chick, barbecued pork, beef, fish, eggs, etc.). One of the most famous and successful sandwich shops is Lee’s Sandwiches. One of the most well-known Vietnamese dishes is pho. Although the dish originated from North Vietnam, it is generally eaten by everyone. The broth is either chicken- or beef-based with a variety of spices. The broth is then poured into a large bowl with cooked rice noodles and pieces of cooked chicken or thin slices of beef that are either cooked or rare with scallions, onions, and cilantro added on top. Pho is normally served at the table with a plate of lime slices, bean sprouts, and sweet basil, along with some chili sauce and hoisin sauce (a sweet brown sauce). Although traditionally a morning meal in Vietnam, noodle houses serve pho anytime during the day.
Integration and Impact on U.S. Society and Culture Paths toward Citizenship To be a refugee is to be without a homeland. As such, for Vietnamese Americans, many were granted permanent residency status when they were accepted as refugees. Data from the Census Bureau 2000 indicate that almost half, 49.6 percent, of all Vietnamese Americans who are foreign born are naturalized citizens, while only 20.9 percent are not citizens. This reflects the importance placed on citizenship by
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this population. Having U.S. citizenship means that one can access many of the important social, economic, and political benefits that are given to American citizens. Although there is a five year required time before one is eligible to apply for citizenship, many social service organizations provide a lot of information, as well as classes, in order to support those who are eligible and want to file the necessary papers and to take the necessary exams. Vietnamese refugees have taken advantage of these services and have become citizens. There is an additional incentive for Vietnamese Americans, since becoming a citizen also gives them an opportunity to sponsor other family members left behind in Vietnam under different immigration policies. One of the important benefits is also to be able to return to Vietnam for family visits without too much fear, and with limited restrictions by the Vietnamese government. Another important reason for them to become citizens is to be eligible to vote and ask for the various social services needed in the community. Recently, they have utilized this avenue readily, as more and more Vietnamese Americans are running for public office and more and more are elected to a variety of local, state, and national political offices.
Dual Citizenship Since Vietnam is a communist government, Vietnamese Americans are not permitted to hold dual citizenships. As a result, they are either native-born citizens (29.5%), naturalized citizens (49.6%), or not yet citizens and hold a permanent resident status. It is interesting to note, however, that although the United States does not recognize dual Vietnamese and American citizenships, the Vietnamese government considers all Vietnamese their citizens and therefore can apply their own laws to Vietnamese Americans who have American citizenship while visiting their ancestral homeland.
Forging a New American Political Identity Vietnamese Americans have begun to build alliances and coalitions with different racial and ethnic groups throughout the country, and these alliances and coalitions are issue- and geographically based. As the second generation comes of age, they have begun to participate in local, state, and federal politics. In general, Vietnamese Americans are found to be more likely to identify with the Republican Party than with the Democratic Party. However, the group that is more likely to identify with the Republican Party is also likely to be the older generation, because there is a general belief that they are more anticommunist and more probusiness. As a result, more older Vietnamese American tend to support candidates that are more likely to oppose the Vietnamese communist government. By contrast, younger Vietnamese Americans tend to identify more with the Democratic Party and tend to focus their
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energy more on the local issues. In large cities where they reside, it is not uncommon to find Vietnamese Americans running for elections on the local school board, city councils, county supervisor, and state legislature. Tony Lam was the first Vietnamese American to be elected as a member of the Westminster City Council in California in 1992. Since then, there have been others elected to public offices at different levels. Van Tran was elected in 2004 as a Republican representative to the California State Assembly to represent the 68th District in California. In the same year, Hubert Vo was elected to serve as a Democratic member of the Texas House of Representative to represent the 149th District in Texas. Madison Nguyen was the first Vietnamese American woman elected to serve on San Jose City Council in California in 2005. In 2008, Anh “Joseph” Cao was elected as Louisiana’s 2nd Congressional District representative and was also the first Vietnamese American elected to the U.S. Congress.
The Second and Later Generations Even though there are many signs pointing to the outward adaptations and success of Vietnamese Americans to the American way of life, there are also concerns that the younger generation is “losing” their culture. These are topics and debates discussed in public forums, private conversations, and radio talk shows, and academic research focused on this very sensitive and difficult topic. Vietnamese American children are strongly encouraged to attend colleges and universities to pursue degrees in math, science, engineering, and medicine in order to become successful. However, while encouraged to succeed academically, they are also expected to retain their cultural heritage and traditions instead of the American culture. It is difficult to understand, appreciate, and practice the complex nuances of a culture that has been transformed over thousands of years. Children cannot and do not instinctively learn cultural customs and practices simply because they are born into the family or have been taught by their parents or grandparents. The differences between some Vietnamese customs and cultural practices and those in America have created many difficulties between the parents and the children, since the messages are sometimes not compatible and often clash. The children tend to be more exposed to the American society and culture through their interactions with their peers at school, on sports teams, and listening to and watching the media, including the Internet, television, radio, and films, and as a result they are likely to want to follow some of these ideals. However, some of these American cultural values, such as independence, outspokenness, emphasis on certain trends in clothing and music, and so forth, present some challenges to the children when interacting with their parents and grandparents.
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Youth Profile A Vietnamese Teen and the Digital Clubhouse Network T. is a 9th grader at a high school in San Jose, California. Her parents came to the United States in 1994 from Vietnam under the Humanitarian Operations Program. She has three older brothers and is the youngest in her family. She sees herself as a typical teenager who has good grades in school and loves to play badminton. She sees her ethnic identity as that of a Vietnamese American, because she is the only one in her family who was born here. She views herself as bicultural and bilingual since she is able to participate in both cultures easily. She enjoys celebrating the Lunar New Year, the Mid-Autumn Festival, Ngay Gio, and other Vietnamese traditions, as well as taking part in Halloween, Fourth of July, Christmas, and Labor Day activities. One of the activities that she has helped establish is the Digital Clubhouse Network. It is a group of young people, primarily middle and high school students (and a couple of college students) who get together during the weekend to work on different projects. One of the projects she worked on was the Vietnamese Heritage Project, where the group interviewed both Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese people about their memories of the Vietnam War. It has been highlighted by a lot of newspapers and television programs, as well as the Smithsonian Institute, and there are efforts to replicate this project around the country, as well as to incorporate it into the public school curriculum in California. Although young, T. has accomplished a great deal.
Ethnic Identity Since Vietnamese Americans are very diverse with respect to their time of arrival, their status upon arrival, their family’s socioeconomic class, their level of English proficiency, and so forth, their experiences growing up in the United States has been just as diverse. The development of an ethnic identity is dependent on a number of factors, including the strength of the ethnic community, racism and discrimination, class differences, parents’ relationship to the child, educational institutions, availability of opportunities, and many others. As a result, the identity of Vietnamese Americans ranges from those who only identify with the American culture to those who only identify with the Vietnamese culture and everything in between. On one end of the spectrum, there are those who see themselves as members of the larger Vietnamese American community and participate in all of the available cultural, social, political, and religious practices and traditions that the local community has to offer because they identify themselves more with their parents’ or family’s ethnic community. Since there are so many Vietnamese American communities throughout the United States, it is easy for someone to be able to spend the majority of their time interacting only with other Vietnamese. In essence they can conduct all their daily activities in Vietnamese. They can reside in a largely Vietnamese neighborhood.
The Second and Later Generations | 2255
They can obtain employment and work in a Vietnamese-owned business, eat at Vietnamese restaurants, attend social, cultural, and religious activities in the community itself. They can get their news through Vietnamese newspapers and magazines. They can even watch television programming or listen to radio programs that are exclusively Vietnamese. Should they decide to watch soap operas, movies, and other entertainment activities, they can go to their local Vietnamese video store and rent them there. This is especially available after the first group of Vietnamese refugees were able to establish Vietnamese American communities and provide many of the needs that were not available at the time. In short, they can live as if they were living in Vietnam and not have any interactions with the larger American society. At the other end of the spectrum, there are those who see themselves as Americans who “happen” to be of Vietnamese ancestry. There are several factors that might lead to this identity formation. They may have not been exposed to their parents’ culture or have chosen not to participate in it. As their parents become economically more stable, they may purchase homes and reside in a neighborhood that does not have a large Vietnamese American presence. As a result, they might attend schools that are more diverse and have fewer Vietnamese American students and therefore develop friendships with non-Vietnamese students. In other words, they have forged a new identity growing up and attending American schools that does not include their ethnic identity and cultural heritage. They may occasionally
Young dancers from the Hong Bang Vietnamese Cultural Center perform a traditional Vietnamese dance on stage at the 21st Annual Lotus Festival at Echo Park in Los Angeles, July 11, 1998. (AP Photo/Katie Callan)
2256 | Vietnamese Immigrants
attend Vietnamese churches and temples, but they may just as well attend a church or temple close to their house. Similar to other middle-class children, they may participate in club sports, music lessons, and activities that are more class-based and less ethnic-based. The majority of the second generation are probably somewhere in between, forging and creating a new identity that is uniquely theirs by combining elements from both cultures since they are products of both cultures. It will be interesting in the future to see how well they are going to negotiate and create an identity that is uniquely their own.
Educational Attainment The 2000 U.S. Census Bureau data regarding Vietnamese American educational attainment indicate that they are the lowest group. For individuals under the age of 25 years old, 30 percent have less than a high school education as compared to 16.1 percent for the overall population. This is also the largest number when compared to the other larger Asian American populations (Asian Indian 9.8%, Chinese 19.2%, Filipino 9.2%, Japanese 6.6%, Korean 9.8%). While 70 percent reported to have a high school education or more, this percentage is also the lowest when compared to other groups in the United States. This trend continues at the bachelor’s degree or more level, where only 23.5 percent of Vietnamese Americans reported to have these as compared to 27 percent for the overall population. For other Asian American groups, the percentages range from a low of 43.7 percent for Japanese Americans to a high of 67.9 percent for Asian Indians. This is also reflected in the reported median household income, where Vietnamese Americans are second from the bottom of all larger Asian American groups (Koreans reported the lowest household median income). The final statistic is that 14 percent of all Vietnamese Americans live below the poverty rate as defined by the federal government. These statistics might be a surprise to those unfamiliar with Vietnamese Americans, since they are often reported to be doing well and are thought to be the “model minority.” These statistics reveal a much more complex and wide range of educational attainment, household income, and poverty level within this community.
Issues in Relations between the United States and Vietnam Forecasts for the 21st Century U.S.–Vietnam relations can be discussed at two different perspectives, from the foreign relations perspective and from that of Vietnamese American relations with
Issues in Relations between the United States and Vietnam | 2257
their homeland. For almost 20 years after the fall of Saigon in 1975, the United States imposed an embargo on Vietnam. This embargo was finally lifted under President Clinton’s administration in 1994. As a result of this embargo, Vietnam was in effect cut off from formal ties to many countries, and Vietnamese Americans were not able to freely interact with their families. Despite that, many were able to send and receive news from their families and send remittances to them. The foreign-relations relationship is somewhat unique, because the two countries are now working together in allowing American companies and corporations to establish factories and industries as well as economic relationships. However, there is still tension in the political arena, since Vietnam is still a communist country and has been accused of many human rights, religious intolerance, and political rights violations by the international community. The first time that a Vietnamese prime minister visited the United States was in 2005 by Prime Minister Phan Van Khai. He drew a lot of protests from Vietnamese Americans throughout the country, and many were angered by his invitation to visit by President George W. Bush. Vietnamese Americans and human rights watch groups were opposed to the continued crackdown on political dissidents and religious leaders by the Vietnamese government. As recently as April 2010, four members of Congress (Loretta Sanchez, Joseph Cao, Zoe Lofgren, and Daniel Lungren), all in districts with large Vietnamese American constituencies, sent President Obama a letter protesting Vietnam’s current Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit and reminded him of that country’s human rights violations. However, in July 2010, Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton visited Vietnam and in August 2010, the United States and Vietnam held joint military exercises in Da Nang. These are indicators that the two countries have begun to hold closer discussions on foreign relations and increasing exchanges between the two countries. From the Vietnamese Americans’ perspective with their homeland, many are still angered by the fact that Vietnam is a communist country and that there is only limited freedom in Vietnam. Many want a new government, one that is more democratic and freely elected by the people. In addition, they continue to condemn that country’s record on human rights violations as well as all the atrocities that were committed after the war. For them, these crimes have not been sufficiently acknowledged and addressed by the international community. They demand that the government be more transparent and open, and allow their citizens to have more freedoms. These sentiments can easily be seen in the news and media coverage when there are dignitaries, entertainers, or other visitors from Vietnam. There are usually a group of people who protest or boycott the activities and condemn the Vietnamese Communist government. One of the interesting recent developments is the increasing number of Vietnamese American individuals and companies that have established business relationships there. It is clear that they are transnational in their daily lives and have
2258 | Vietnamese Immigrants
incorporated the advantage of technology to conduct their businesses and to perhaps influence some social and political changes. Additionally, there have been many nonprofit organizations and NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) that have participated in establishing schools, clinics, vocational training centers, and charitable projects in Vietnam. These organizations include both Vietnamese living abroad as well as American veterans that have begun a process of healing and rebuilding the country that they fought in during the war. Vietnam has also begun to open its door for artists, especially film makers, to make movies there. There have also been concerts from American and other musicians. Finally, there are recent exchanges in academic and research projects between Vietnam and other countries.
Appendix I: Migration Statistics Table 336 Number of immigrants resettled by state as of December 31, 1975 State Alabama
Total
%
State
1,262
0.97
Nevada
338
0.26
81
0.06
New Hampshire
161
0.12
2,042
1.57
New Jersey
1,515
1.17
Alaska Arkansas Arizona
Total
%
1,059
0.82
New York
3,806
2.93
California
27,199
20.1
North Carolina
1,261
0.97
Colorado
1,790
1.38
North Dakota
448
0.35
Connecticut
1,175
0.91
Ohio
2,924
2.25
155
0.12
Oklahoma
3,689
2.84
District of Columbia
1,254
0.97
Oregon
2,063
1.59
Florida
5,322
4.10
Pennsylvania
7,159
5.52
Georgia
1,331
1.03
Rhode Island
223
0.17
Hawaii
2,039
1.57
South Carolina
759
0.59
Delaware
Idaho
412
0.32
South Dakota
545
0.42
Illinois
3,696
2.85
Tennessee
922
0.71
Indiana
1,785
1.38
Texas
9,130
7.03
Iowa
2,593
2.00
Utah
559
0.43
Kansas
1,897
1.46
Vermont
150
0.12
Kentucky
967
0.75
Virginia
3,733
2.88
Louisiana
3,602
2.76
Washington
4,182
3.22
375
0.29
West Virginia
1,821
1.40
Maryland
Maine
2,319
1.79
Wisconsin
195
0.15
Massachusetts
1,169
0.90
Wyoming
115
0.09
Michigan
2,200
1.70
Guam
778
0.60
Minnesota
3,802
2.93
American Samoa
1
0.00
Mississippi
488
0.38
Puerto Rico
1
0.00
Missouri
2,669
2.06
Montana
Nebraska
1,211
0.09
Unknown Total
Source: Kelly (1977), Table 6, p. 154.
198
0.15
8,182
6.30
129,792
100%
Table 337 Vietnamese refugee arrival by year and state of primary migration, 1975–1978 State Alabama Alaska
1975
1976
1977
1978
1,420
11
6
73
74
0
7
14
Arizona
1,341
1
17
148
Arkansas
2,775
10
12
118
California
24,550
344
1,041
4,080
Colorado
1,988
15
58
241
Connecticut
1,129
5
37
145
Delaware
160
0
3
0
District of Columbia
839
3
28
212
Florida
5,629
12
106
401
Georgia
1,464
20
35
95
Guam
247
0
0
0
Hawaii
807
26
28
220
Idaho
306
0
7
9
Illinois
4,090
20
78
595
Indiana
1,924
42
45
122
Iowa
2,427
8
18
78
Kansas
1,902
0
30
176
Kentucky
9,85
11
11
98
Louisiana
4,268
8
271
496
388
2
5
23
Maryland
2,263
11
25
200
Massachusetts
1,195
2
0
147
Michigan
2,401
17
41
246
Minnesota
4,123
11
58
318
Mississippi
481
0
0
87
Missouri
3,180
3
40
208
Montana
214
1
5
26
1,311
3
26
96
Nevada
384
5
4
100
New Hampshire
166
0
3
0
New Jersey
1,709
0
10
86
New Mexico
1,124
9
60
147
New York
4,298
37
351
726
Maine
Nebraska
(Continued )
2260
Table 337 Vietnamese refugee arrival by year and state of primary migration, 1975–1978 (Continued ) State North Carolina North Dakota
1975
1976
1,394
0
1977
1978
3
56
427
0
4
32
3,117
4
16
131
0
1
21
261
Oregon
1,681
4
63
417
Pennsylvania
7,995
4
52
624
Puerto Rico
1
0
0
0
Rhode Island
0
0
0
26
Ohio Oklahoma
South Carolina
221
5
27
9
South Dakota
842
0
18
29
Tennessee
579
1
18
182
Texas
1,148
65
388
1,491
Utah
9,789
1
0
142
576
0
0
1
Virgin Islands
4,019
0
0
0
Virginia
4,157
0
33
355
Washington
4,116
1
132
431
Vermont
West Virginia
214
0
0
5
Wisconsin
1,972
0
52
129
Wyoming
140
0
7
1
Unknown
158
0
0
0
1,24,108
813
3,333
14,053
Total
Source: Appendix A from Strand & Jones Indochinese Refugees in America, 1985. Author’s Note: The data reported in this appendix were obtained from the Center for Disease Control (CDC), as the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) could not provide ethnic and state breakdowns. However, the CDC data were not complete for 1975. They contained only 109,000 records against an ORR figure of 129,792. To resolve this problem, the CDC figures for 1975 were adjusted upward in proportion to their original contribution to the CDC total so that a revised total of 129,792 could be shown. The assumption of this adjustment is that the missing records would be distributed in a manner identical to those that exist.
2261
Table 338 Vietnamese refugees arrival by year and state of primary migration, 1979–1982 (Continued ) State Alabama
1979
1980
1981
1982
409
324
280
194
Alaska
41
97
21
19
Arizona
574
681
300
191
Arkansas
437
577
329
196
California
21,067
29,630
21,111
11,313
Colorado
875
1,071
763
534
Connecticut
557
612
430
335
35
44
23
10
108
1,228
933
490
1,621
1,770
1,323
905
698
1,079
1,358
870
1,428
1,113
577
407
Idaho
82
116
81
133
Illinois
2,191
2,600
1,531
1,102
Indiana
624
729
257
222
Iowa
695
726
495
281
Kansas
640
1,001
1,104
860
Kentucky
229
321
281
322
Louisiana
1,148
2,027
1,620
1,001
Maine
195
173
91
49
Maryland
683
944
452
296
Massachusetts
984
1,921
1,828
1,089
Michigan
1,163
1,525
754
462
Minnesota
1,724
2,107
1,132
807
Mississippi
284
330
205
201
Missouri
872
997
799
544
Montana
153
72
17
21
Nebraska
284
354
312
245
Nevada
372
410
157
86
Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii
New Hampshire
43
35
41
32
New Jersey
693
1,229
624
571
New Mexico
434
419
552
222
2,835
3,328
2,439
856
792
922
399
345
New York North Carolina
(Continued )
2262
Table 338 Vietnamese refugees arrival by year and state of primary migration, 1979–1982 (Continued ) State
1979
1980
1981
1982
North Dakota
117
48
99
36
Ohio
980
1,066
640
432
Oklahoma
978
1,097
768
567
Oregon
1,322
1,902
1,250
821
Pennsylvania
2,469
3,223
2,259
1,243
Rhode Island
75
85
217
65
South Carolina
252
292
243
179
South Dakota
153
113
39
67
Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont
539
413
184
272
4,812
7,550
4,906
4,407
899
1,144
522
198
12
61
22
10
Virginia
1,592
2,282
1,304
924
Washington
2,246
3,186
2,211
1,352
West Virginia
80
142
44
40
Wisconsin
492
499
331
248
Wyoming
59
39
12
13
Unknown Total
3
0
0
0
63,020
83,654
57,673
37,085
Source: Appendix A from Strand and Jones, Indochinese Refugees in America, 1985.
2263
Table 339 Vietnamese population in the United States (1980) by state State
Total
%
State
1,220
0.50
Montana
306
0.13
Arizona
1,756
Arkansas
1,900
California
85,238
34.78
New Jersey
Colorado
3,247
1.33
New Mexico
936
0.38
Connecticut
1,575
0.64
New York
5,849
2.39
171
0.70
North Carolina
1,966
0.80
Alabama Alaska
Delaware District of Columbia
Total
%
82
.03
Nebraska
1,276
0.52
0.72
Nevada
1,018
0.42
0.78
New Hampshire
136
0.06
2,846
1.16
435
0.18
North Dakota
288
0.12
Florida
7,077
2.89
Ohio
2,751
1.12
Georgia
2,339
0.96
Oklahoma
4,174
1.70
Hawaii
3,403
1.39
Oregon
5,743
2.35
Idaho
443
0.18
Pennsylvania
8,127
3.32
Illinois
6,287
2.57
Rhode Island
287
0.12
Indiana
2,137
0.87
South Carolina
1,113
0.45
Iowa
2,101
0.86
South Dakota
Kansas
3,331
1.32
Tennessee
Kentucky
1,461
0.60
Louisiana
10,853 260
Maryland
265
0.11
1,158
0.47
Texas
27,791
11.34
4.43
Utah
1,991
0.81
0.11
Vermont
94
0.04
4,162
1.70
Virginia
9,451
3.86
Massachusetts
2,847
1.16
Washington
8,933
3.66
Michigan
4,364
1.78
West Virginia
168
0.07
Minnesota
5,316
2.17
Wisconsin
1,699
0.69
Mississippi
1,477
0.60
Wyoming
Missouri
3,134
1.28
Total
Maine
Source: 1980 U.S. Bureau of the Census. General Social and Economic Characteristics.
2264
43
0.02
245,025
100%
Table 340 Vietnamese population in the United States (1990) by state State Alabama Alaska
Total 2,274
%
State
0.37
Montana
Total
%
159
0.03
582
0.09
Nebraska
1,806
0.29
Arizona
5,239
0.85
Nevada
1,934
0.31
Arkansas
2,348
0.40
New Hampshire
553
0.09
California
280,223
45.36
New Jersey
7,330
0.12
Colorado
7,210
1.12
New Mexico
1,485
0.24
Connecticut
4,085
0.66
New York
15,555
2.52
348
0.06
North Carolina
5,211
0.84
Delaware District of Columbia
747
0.12
North Dakota
281
0.05
Florida
16,346
2.65
Ohio
4,964
0.80
Georgia
7,801
1.26
Oklahoma
7,320
1.19
Hawaii
5,468
0.89
Oregon
9,088
1.47
Idaho
600
0.10
Pennsylvania
15,887
2.57
Illinois
10,309
1.67
Rhode Island
772
0.13
1,752
0.28
268
0.04
2,062
0.33
Indiana
2,467
0.40
South Carolina
Iowa
2,882
0.47
South Dakota
Kansas
6,577
1.07
Tennessee
Kentucky
1,506
0.24
Texas
69,634
11.27
Louisiana
17,598
2.85
Utah
2,797
0.45
642
0.10
Vermont
236
0.04
Maine Maryland
8,862
1.44
Virginia
20,693
3.30
15,449
2.50
Washington
29,697
4.81
Michigan
6,117
0.99
West Virginia
184
0.03
Minnesota
9,387
1.52
Wisconsin
2,494
0.40
Mississippi
3,815
0.62
Wyoming
Missouri
4,380
0.71
Total
Massachusetts
124
0.02
617,747
100%
Source: 1990 U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Population and Housing. Summary Tape File 1C. Issued February 1992. CD 90-1C.
2265
Appendix II: Demographics/Census Statistics Table 341 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status by region and country of birth: fiscal years 2000 to 2009
2266
Region and country of birth Total Vietnam
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
841,002
1,058,902
1,059,356
703,542
957,883
1,122,257
1,266,129
1,052,415
1,107,126
1,130,818
26,553
35,419
33,563
22,087
31,524
32,784
30,691
28,691
31,497
29,234
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics. 2010. Adapted from Table 3.
Table 342 Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status during fiscal year 2009. Leading states of residence, region/country: Vietnam Total
Male
29,234
11,296
17,938
410
153
257
California
10,280
3,900
6,380
Colorado
428
171
257
Florida
1,040
394
646
Georgia
1,011
414
597
Total Arizona
Female
Hawaii
213
73
140
Illinois
527
197
330
Maryland
420
156
264
Massachusetts
872
366
506
Michigan
373
132
241
Minnesota
512
200
312
Nevada
181
48
133
New Jersey
419
160
259
New York
557
210
347
1,158
548
610
Ohio
North Carolina
322
125
197
Pennsylvania
816
329
487
3,361
1,323
2,038
991
401
590
Washington
1,539
573
966
Other
4,017
1,496
2,521
Texas Virginia
Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Profiles on Legal Permanent Residents: 2009. State of Residence, Stbk 15. 2010.
2267
2268 | Vietnamese Immigrants
Appendix III: Notable Vietnamese Americans Tony Bui born in 1973 in Vietnam, came to the United States in 1975. He grew up in Sunnyvale, California, where his family owned a video store. He graduated in film from Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles. He has produced, directed, and written several award-winning films, including Three Seasons and Green Dragon. Anh “Joseph” Cao was born in 1967 in Saigon and escaped to America. He graduated from Baylor University with a bachelor of science in physics. He earned a master’s degree in philosophy from Fordham University and later a law degree from Loyola Law School. He lived in Louisiana and lost both his house and law office to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. On December 2008, he was elected as Louisiana’s 2nd Congressional District Representative and also the first Vietnamese American elected to the U.S. Congress. Kieu Chinh, born in 1939, is one of the most recognized Vietnamese American actresses. She left Vietnam at the end of the war. She has starred in many films and is most well known in her role in The Joy Luck Club. She has recently been honored for her lifetime achievement in 2003 at the Vietnamese International Film Festival, as well as the Women’s Film Festival in Turin, Italy. She was the recipient of the Lifetime Achievement Award at the San Diego Asian Film Festival in 2006. Viet D. Dinh, born in 1968, is a professor of law at Georgetown University and director of the Asian Law and Policies Program. He is a former U.S. assistant attorney general and the primary architect of the U.S. Patriot Act. He graduated from Harvard Law School in 1993 and clerked for appellate court judge Laurence H. Silberman and Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. John Quoc Duong, born in 1973, served as the executive director of the White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders under President George W. Bush. He was charged with coordinating all federal activities to increase the quality of life for Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders by increasing opportunities and accessing federally funded projects. He also served in this capacity as advisor to the president on issues regarding Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders. Thich Nhat Hanh, born in 1926, is a Vietnamese Buddhist monk. He has been living in exile since 1966. He was nominated by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1967. “Thay” (teacher) has authored more than 100 books, including prose, poetry, and prayer. He practices engaged Buddhism, which combines meditation and active nonviolent civil disobedience. Thich Nhat Hanh founded the Plum Village in France as a monastery for monks and nuns and a retreat and meditation center for lay people.
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Frank Jao was born in Vietnam and arrived in 1975. He became a successful businessman and real estate developer. He facilitated the development of one of the most well-known Vietnamese American enclaves, Little Saigon, in Orange County, California. He also helped develop and own other malls, including the Garden Mall on Bolsa Avenue in Southern California. He was appointed by President George W. Bush as head of the Vietnam Education Foundation in 2005. Tony Lam was born in Vietnam in 1937 and arrived in America in 1975. He was the first Vietnamese American to be elected to political office. In 1992, he was elected to the Westminster City Council in California. Prior to his political career, he was the owner of a Vietnamese restaurant in Garden Grove and was active in the community. Cung Le was born in Saigon, Vietnam in 1972. He is a mixed martial artist who became the Middleweight Champion in 2008. He is well known and a crowd favorite with the Ultimate Fighting Championship. Although still competing, he has also become an actor and has appeared in a number of movies. Jane Luu was born in Vietnam in 1963 and immigrated as a refugee in 1975. She received her bachelor’s degree in astronomy from Stanford University and her PhD from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1992. Although she has discovered many asteroids, she is best known for the discovery of the Kuiper Belt with her colleague, Dr. Dave Jewitt. Dustin Nguyen was born in Vietnam in 1962 and escaped in 1975. He made his professional debut in 1980 and became a well-known actor in the popular series 21 Jump Street, where he played Detective Harry Ioki. He has acted in a variety of films throughout his career. Madison Nguyen was born in Vietnam in 1975 and came to the United States as a boat person. She received her BA in history from the University of California, Santa Cruz and her MA in social science from the University of Chicago. She was the first Vietnamese American woman elected to serve on the San Jose City Council in California in 2005. Dat Tan Nguyen was born in a Fort Chaffee, Arkansas refugee camp in 1975. He was the first Vietnamese American to play in the National Football League for the Dallas Cowboys. He played as a linebacker from 1999 to 2005. He was drafted after a brilliant collegiate career at Texas A&M, where he won the Bednarik Award for the College Defensive Player of the Year and the Lombardi Award for Outstanding College Lineman. Anh Duong Nguyet came to the United States as a boat person. She graduated from the University of Maryland with a double major in chemical engineering and computer science. She was on a team that created the BLU118/B,
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called the “thermobaric” bomb, which was designed specifically to attack deep caves and destroy anyone hiding in them. The bomb targeted the al Qaeda hideouts in the Tora Bora Mountains, Afghanistan. She was awarded the National Security Medal by the Homeland Security Department in 2007. Dat Phan was born in Saigon, Vietnam, in 1975 and immigrated to the United States as a child. He grew up poor and struggling in San Diego, California. He is the original winner of NBC’s Last Comic Standing. He has made numerous TV and movie appearances. His mission is “to bring a more positive portrayal of Asian Americans to mainstream entertainment and Hollywood.” Eugene H. Trinh was born in Saigon, Vietnam, in 1950 and moved to France when he was two years old. He received his baccalaureate from Lycee Michelet in Paris, France. He moved to the United States and received his BS in mechanical engineering and applied physics from Columbia University in 1972, a master of science in 1975, a masters of philosophy in 1975, and a PhD in applied physics in 1977 from Yale University. He is the first Vietnamese American to go to outer space in 1992, when he served as a payload specialist crew member to the Space Shuttle flight.
Glossary Banh mi: Vietnamese bread that is shaped similar to a baguette. Banh trung thu: Moon cake. Generally sold during the Tet Trung Thu or the Mid Autumn festival. There are many varieties but they are generally divided between the sweet and salty kinds. Cao Dai: A minor religion in Vietnam. The practitioners are primarily located in the Central highlands. Hoa Hao: A minor religion in Vietnam. The practitioners are concentrated in the Mekong Delta. Khong Giao: Confucianism—one of the three main religions in Vietnam before the introduction of Christianity. It was founded by Confucius in China around 55 B.C.E. Lao Giao: Taoism—one of the three main religions in Vietnam before the introduction of Christianity. It was founded by Lao Tse in China around 640 B.C.E. Li xi: A small red envelope that is given to children during the New Year celebration by their parents or the older generation for good luck and prosperity. Nuoc mam: Fish sauce. A sauce used in Vietnamese cuisine that is made from marinating fish extract, water, and salt.
References | 2271
Pho: A popular Vietnamese noodle dish that is made of rice noodles and served with beef or chicken, broth, and vegetables, including bean sprouts and basil. It is garnished with onion and cilantro with a slice of lime on the side. Tam Giao: The “three religions.” Vietnamese combine Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism to form the core of their spiritual foundation. Tet: Lunar New Year. The single most important holiday in the Vietnamese society. Tet Trung Thu: Mid Autumn Festival. A celebration that takes place on the 15th day of the 8th month of the lunar calendar. It generally falls in mid-September to early October.
References Bach, Robert, and Jennifer B. Bach. 1980. “Employment Patterns of Southeast Asian Refugees.” Monthly Labor Review 103 (10): 10–14. Baldwin, C. Beth. 1984. Patterns of Adjustment: A Second Look at Indochinese Resettlement in Orange County. Westminster, CA: Orange Immigrant and Refugee Planning Center. Capps, Walter. 1982. The Unfinished War: Vietnam and the American Conscience. Boston: Beacon Press. Chan, Sucheng. 1991. Asian American: An Interpretive History. Boston: Twayne Publishers. Conroy, Hilary, and T. S. Miuyakawa, eds. 1972. East Across the Pacific: History and Sociological Studies of Japanese Immigration and Assimilation. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio. Daniels, Roger, and Harry Kitano. 1970. American Racism: Exploration of the Nature of Prejudice. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Do, Hien Duc. 1994. “The New Outsiders: The Vietnamese Refugee Generation in Higher Education.” PhD diss., University of California, Santa Barbara. Dollard, John. 1957. Caste and Class in a Southern Town. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Grant, Bruce. 1979. The Boat People—An “Age” Investigation. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books. Haskins, James. 1980. The New Americans: Vietnamese Boat People. Hillside, NJ: Enslow Publishers. Jordan, Wintrop D. 1968. White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro 1550– 1812. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. Kelly, Gail Paradise. 1977. From Vietnam to America—A Chronicle of the Vietnamese Immigration to the United States. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Kirayama, Kasumi K. 1982. “Evaluating Effects of the Employment of Vietnamese Refugee Wives on Their Family Roles and Mental Health.” California Sociologist 5(1): 96–110.
2272 | Vietnamese Immigrants Knowles, Louis L., and Kenneth Prewit, eds. 1969. Institutional Racism in the United States. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Liu, William T., Maryanne Lamanna, and Alice Murata. 1979. Transition to Nowhere— Vietnamese Refugees in America. Nashville, TN: Charter House Publishers. Los Angeles Times. 1989. Montero, Darrel. 1977. Vietnamese Americans: Patterns of Resettlement and Socioeconomic Adaptation in the United States. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. New York Times. 1990. Nguyen, Manh Hung. 1985. “Vietnamese.” In Refugees in the United States: A Reference Handbook, edited by David Haines, 195–208. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Rabaya, Violet. 1971. “Filipino Immigration: The Creation of a New Social Problem.” In Roots: An Asian American Reader, edited by A. Tacjhiki et al, 110-111. Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Asian American Studies Center. Sandmeyer, Elmer Clarence. 1971. The Anti-Chinese Movement in California. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Saxton, Alexander. 1971. The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California. Berkeley: University of California Press. Schaefer, Richard T., and Sandra L. Schaefer. 1975. “Reluctant Welcome: U.S. Responses to the South Vietnamese Refugees.” New Community 4: 366–70. Skinner, Kenneth A. 1980. “Vietnamese in America: Diversity in Adaptation.” California Sociologist: 3 (32): 103–24. St. Cartmail, Keith. 1983. Exodus China. Auckland, Exter: Heinemann. Starr, Paul, and Alden E. Roberts. 1982. “Attitudes toward New Americans: Perceptions of Indo-Chinese in Nine Cities.” Research in Race and Ethnic Relations 3: 165–86. Strand, Paul J., and Woodrow Jones Jr. 1985. Indochinese in America—Problems of Adaptation and Assimilation. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Sue, Stanley, and Harry Kitano. 1973. “Stereotypes as a Measure of Success.” Journal of Social Issues 29: 83–98. Thomas, W. I., and J. Znanicke. 1958. The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. New York: Dover Publications. Time, May 19, 1975. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1980. “Census of Population.” U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1990. “Census of Population.” U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1993. “Population Profile in the United States.” Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2000. “Census of Population.” Vo, Linda Trinh. 2003. “Managing Survival: Economic Realities for Vietnaemse American Women.” In Asian/Pacific American Women: A Historical Anthology, edited by Shirley Hune and Gail M. Nomura, 237-52. New York: New York University Press.
Further Reading | 2273 Wain, Barry. 1981. The Refused: The Agony of the Indochina Refugees. New York: Simon and Schuster. Whitmore, John K. 1985. “Chinese from Southeast Asia.” In Refugees in the United States: A Reference Handbook, edited by David Haines, 59–76. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Further Reading Chan, Sucheng. 2006. The Vietnamese American 1.5 Generation: Stories of War, Revolution, Flight and New Beginnings. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Using a combination of historical overview and personal narratives, Professor Chan combines essays written by college students to reveal the complexities of their lives and how they have “become strong and eloquent adults” as a result of the war and their experiences in the United States. It reveals the many different aspects of the trials, tribulations, and, ultimately, triumphs that young people achieved. The book is important in providing first-person accounts by young Vietnamese Americans regarding their experiences. Elliott, Duong Van Mai. 1999. The Sacred Willow: Four Generations in the Life of a Vietnamese Family. New York: Oxford University Press. This book provides a generational view of the Vietnamese people through a personal history. The author traces her family and their relationships to the French during the French occupation as well as during the Vietnam War. Throughout the book, she provides insights on how Vietnamese worked hard at maintaining their Vietnamese traditions despite how foreign countries attempted to govern their homeland. It is an important book because it reveals how people negotiated their political or government positions and their personal lives. It has less to do with the French occupation or the Vietnam War and more with how Vietnamese saw themselves during these conflicts. Freeman, James M. 1989. Hearts of Sorrow: Vietnamese American Lives. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Freeman examines the lives of Vietnamese Americans using ethnographic and in-depth interviews about the different phases of their lives. Freeman divides the book into different sections with regards to life in Vietnam, the experiences of the war, the trials and tribulations of becoming a refugee, and then finally, adjusting to life in the United States. It is one of the first accounts of the Vietnamese American experiences in America. Freeman, James M., and Nguyen Dinh Huu. 2005. Voices from the Camps: Vietnamese Children Seeking Asylum. Seattle: University of Washington Press. This is an important collaboration between James Freeman, an anthropologist, and Nguyen Dinh Huu, a social worker, which addresses the experiences of Vietnamese seeking asylum in Asia. It provides a moving account of the hardships and inhumane treatment that these children face and how they are caught in a very difficult situation of having to prove that they are refugees seeking asylum. There are many government agencies involved and, as pointed out by the authors, they are incapable of helping these
2274 | Vietnamese Immigrants powerless children. This is an important book that calls attention to the plight of Vietnamese children who often cannot defend themselves. Hayslip, Le Ly, with Jay Wurts. 1989. When Heaven and Earth Changed Places: A Vietnamese Woman’s Journey from War to Peace. New York: Doubleday. This is a personal memoir of a Vietnamese woman who experienced the Vietnam War from a very young age. She grew up in a village that was influenced by both the Americans and the Viet Cong. As a young person, she experienced the many brutalities of war, including imprisonment, torture, rape, starvation, and witnessing the deaths of members of her family. She escaped to the United States and eventually returned to her homeland. The memoir recounts her life and her work toward peace. Huynh, Jade Ngo Quang. 1994. South Wind Changing. St. Paul, MN: Graywolf Press. This is a personal story of a young Vietnamese refugee who survived the communist government after the war. He escaped Vietnam as a “boat person” and finally arrived in the United States. In his new life, he encountered a wide range of interactions ranging from discrimination to kindness and a new opportunity for a new life. McKelvey, Robert S. 1999. The Dust of Life: American’s Children Abandoned in Vietnam. Seattle: University of Washington Press. This is a collection of oral histories of Vietnamese Americans who are Amerasian children. These are children who were fathered by American soldiers and Vietnamese mothers. After the Vietnam War, they were ignored by the U.S. government and discriminated against by the Vietnamese communist government. Although the stories are heart-wrenching, they are also testimonies to the human spirits and the strength of these children. Nguyen, Kien. 2001. The Unwanted: A Memoir. Boston: Little Brown. This is a memoir of Kien Nguyen, a Vietnamese American who is Amerasian, having been born to a Vietnamese mother and an American father. After experiencing the horrors of the communist government, Kien and his family immigrated to the United States under the Orderly Departure Program. The memoir provides a view into the lives of children who are often unwanted by both societies. It’s a moving account of survival and the brutality that occurred after the war. Nguyen, Qui Duc. 1991. Where the Ashes Are: The Odyssey of a Vietnamese Family. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. This is the story of Duc since he was nine years old. The account is of his parents’ years after the war as well as his interactions with them when they were reunited in America. His father had been sent to reeducation camp for 12 years because of his affiliation with the former government. Despite all the horrors and pain that were inflicted on his family Duc is still very much interested in rediscovering Vietnam, his homeland. Nguyen Qui Duc is a journalist, translator, and writer. He has written extensively about Vietnam and Vietnamese Americans. Pham, Quang X. 2005. A Sense of Duty: My Father, My American Journey. New York: Ballantine Books.
Further Reading | 2275 This is an account of Quang Pham, who became a successful student at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA), the first Vietnamese American to become a U.S. Marine Corp aviator, a soldier who served in Desert Storm and other places, as well as a successful businessman. His book details a variety of issues, ranging from his life experiences growing up as a “typical” American to his desire to understand his father and the Vietnam War. He also reflects on the ways in which Vietnamese are portrayed in the mass media and criticizes the sexualization of Vietnamese women, as well as the stereotypes created by Hollywood. Thai, Hung Cam. 2008. For Better or Worse: Vietnamese International Marriages in the New Global Economy. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Thai examines the relationship between marriage and migration. Using Vietnamese women from Vietnam who marry Vietnamese men living in the United States, he examines the challenges and hurdles they face as couples. He reveals the complexities in a relationship despite having similar ethnic background but being separated by differences in geography, cultural understanding and practices, and changing gender relations.
Documentary Films Bolinao 52—Duc Nguyen, 2009. Saigon, USA—Lindsey Jang and Robert C. Winn, 2010. The Story of Vinh—Crosscurrent Media Keiko Tsuno, 1991. Viet Nam: At the Cross Roads—KETH (PBS) Bob Gliner and Hien Duc Do, 1994. A Village called Versailles—S. Leo Chiang, 2010.
Popular Films All About Dad—Mark Tran, 2009. Green Dragon—Timothy Linh Bui, 2001. Heaven and Earth—Oliver Stone, 1993. Indochine—Regis Wargnier, 1992. Journey from the Fall—Ham Tran, 2006. The Scent of Green Papaya—Anh Hung Tran, 1993. Three Seasons—Tony Bui, 1999.
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Selected Bibliography
In addition to the sources listed here, there are numerous studies of specific immigrant groups, many of which are noted in the “References” and “Further Reading” sections in the chapters of this book. American Immigration Council. http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org. A Web site that offers up-to-date events and legislation regarding U.S. immigration. Barkan, Elliott R. 1996. And Still They Come: Immigrants and American Society, 1920s to the 1990s. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson Publishers. A short but incisive and readable history of 20th-century immigration patterns and laws. Barkan, Elliott R., ed. 2007. Immigration, Incorporation, and Transnationalism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Articles from a conference on immigration and ethnicity dealing with various ethnic groups and their adjustment to America. Bayor, Ronald. 2004. The Columbia Documentary History of Race and Ethnicity in America. New York: Columbia University Press. A collection of essays and documents detailing America’s experience with immigration, race, and ethnicity. Daniels, Roger, 1990. Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life. New York: Harper Perennial. The best book-length coverage of immigration to America, spanning the period from colonial days to 1990. Foner, Nancy. 2000. From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s Two Great Waves of Immigration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. An excellent comparison of the two major immigrant waves, the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and the period after 1965. Graham, Otis. 2006. Unguarded Gates: A History of America’s Immigration Crisis. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. An anti-immigration argument from a prominent historian.
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2278 | Selected Bibliography Kivisto, Peter, and Thomas Faist. 2009. Beyond a Border: The Causes and Consequences of Contemporary Immigration. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. Deals with theories of immigration, settlement, regulation, and citizenship. LeMay, Michael C., and Barkan, Elliott Robert. 1999. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues: A Documentary History. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. A volume offering immigration and naturalization legislation and other documents from the early history of American immigration to the late 1990s. Min, Pyong Gap, ed. 2002. Mass Migration to the United States: Classical and Contemporary Periods. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press. A collection of articles comparing immigration and immigrants from the 1880–1930 time period to the contemporary immigration wave. Reimers, David. 1992. Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America. 2nd edition. New York: Columbia University Press. Excellent narrative with statistics on immigration to the United States after 1965. Reimers, David. 1999. Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration. New York: Columbia University Press. An expert on immigration discusses the anti-immigrant attitudes and movements. Ueda, Reed. 2006. A Companion to American Immigration. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. An interdisciplinary collection of essays dealing with various topics relating to American immigration and ethnicity, including politics, nativism, and identity. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (UCIS). http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security UCIS government Web page, which supplies current information on U.S. immigration laws, regulations, and forms. Zolberg, Aristide R. 2006. A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. A comprehensive study of immigration policy, nativism, public opinion, and interest groups since the colonial period.
About the Editor and Contributors
Editor Ronald H. Bayor is professor of history at Georgia Tech and founder and longtime editor (1980–2004) of the Journal of American Ethnic History. He is author of Neighbors in Conflict: The Irish, Germans, Jews, and Italians of New York City, 1929–1941 (1978); and Race and the Shaping of Twentieth-Century Atlanta (1996), and editor of The New York Irish (1996); and Race and Ethnicity in America: A Concise History (2003), among other books.
Contributors Ahrar Ahmad, professor of political science at Black Hills State University, Spearfish, South Dakota, teaches courses on comparative politics and international relations, and explores issues relating to development, democracy, Islam, and South Asia in his research. He had received a Senior Fulbright Award for teaching and research in Bangladesh in 2007–2008. Thea S. Alvarado is an adjunct professor of sociology and social science in California and is currently working towards her doctorate in education at the University of California, Davis. Her research interests include education, race and ethnicity, and immigration. Maboud Ansari is professor of sociology at the William Paterson University in New Jersey. His books include The Making of the Iranian Community in America (1992) and Iranian Immigrants in the United States: A Case Study of Dual Marginality (1988). He also wrote “Islam in New York State” and “Iranian-Americans” for the Encyclopedia of New York State and “Islam and Modernity” for the Encyclopedia of Social Problems. Eiichiro Azuma is Alan Charles Kors Term associate professor of history and Asian American Studies at University of Pennsylvania. He is author of Between 2279
2280 | About the Editor and Contributors
Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America (2005) and co-editor of Yuji Ichioka, Before Internment: Essays in Prewar Japanese American History (2006). Kathryn Beard is in the department of history at Wayne State University. Her field of study is African Diasporic history, with a concentration on West Indian immigrants. She has taught African and African American history for several years and recently received her PhD. Hana Brown is an assistant professor in the sociology department at Wake Forest University. As a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, her research examined the intersection of race, immigration, and public policy and is published in such journals as Social Problems, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Research in Political Sociology, and Sociological Inquiry. Erika Busse-Cárdenas is a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of Minnesota, where she specializes in international migration and gender relations within the family. She plans to expand her dissertation into a book that explores the transnational life experiences of Peruvian migrants and their families left behind. Jennifer Cho is a board member of the Chinese Historical Society of Southern California. She is the author of Chinatown in Los Angeles, Chinatown and China City in Los Angeles, and Chinese in Hollywood. She received her MA in Asian American studies from UCLA. Natassaja Chowthi earned her master’s degree in sociology from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. Her thesis research explored the migration, settlement, and daily life experiences of Indo-Guyanese in New York City. She is currently an analyst for the U.S. Census Bureau in Washington, D.C. Carlos B. Cordova is a professor of Raza studies at San Francisco State University. He has directed research projects addressing the migration patterns/adaptation dynamics of Central American immigrants and the formation of Central American communities and identities in the United States. He is the author of The Salvadoran Americans. Justin Corfield completed his doctorate at Monash University in Australia. He teaches history and international relations at Geelong Grammar School, Australia. His research interests focus on colonial history and politics especially relating to Southeast Asia. He has written histories of Vietnam and Cambodia, and reference books on Singapore. Nicole C. D’Errico is a PhD fellow in anthropology at the University of Florida. She is the co-author of several journal articles concerning medical anthropology in East Africa.
About the Editor and Contributors | 2281
Hien Duc Do is professor of social science at San Jose State University. His current research focuses on the impact of religion (Catholicism and Buddhism) on the development of the Vietnamese American community. He is a frequent contributor to local, state, and national media regarding Vietnamese American issues. Cristián Doña-Reveco is a doctoral candidate in sociology and history at Michigan State University. His research involves the intersection of history and biography in the migration process from the Southern Cone of America to the United States. He also does research on using cinema in teaching sociology and history. Rodrigo Lovatón Dávila is a PhD student of applied economics at the University of Minnesota. His main interest is education policies in developing countries, and he has previous research experience in the field of development in his own country, Peru. Joanna Doran is currently pursuing a doctorate at the University of California, Berkeley, through its School of Social Welfare. Her research interests include immigrant integration, asset theory, and social capital. Maria Paz Gutierrez Esguerra is a PhD candidate in the history department at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Her work focuses on early 20th-century American history, Asian American studies, and law. Scott G. Feinstein is a PhD fellow at the University of Florida. His research interests include identity construction and conflict. He is associate editor to East African Journal of Research. Alma M. Garcia is a professor of sociology and the director of the Latin American studies program at Santa Clara University. She specializes in Chicana feminism and immigration. She is the co-author of Ethnic Community Builders: Mexican Americans’ Search for Justice, Power and Citizenship Rights (2007), which won the Oral History Association’s national award for best oral history project. She is working on a study of Latina day workers. Solomon Addis Getahun received his PhD in African history from Michigan State University and is now on the faculty at Central Michigan University. His research is on African and African diaspora history focusing on contemporary Ethiopian refugee and immigrant communities in the United States. His publications include The History of Ethiopian Immigrants and Refugees in the U.S. (2007) and The History of the City of Gondar (2006). Alwyn D. Gilkes is an assistant professor at Medgar Evers College, CUNY and has multiple research interests, which include immigrant acculturation, educational success and achievement, and resilience. He is the author of The West Indian Diaspora.
2282 | About the Editor and Contributors
Steven J. Gold is professor and graduate program director in the department of sociology at Michigan State University. Gold is the author, co-author, or co-editor of several books, including the award-winning The Israeli Disapora (2002). He is also the editor of the New Americans series from LFB Publishers. Franklin Goza is professor of sociology and associate dean in the College of Arts and Sciences at Bowling Green State University in Ohio. His current research foci include the adaptation and adjustment of Somali refugees and Brazilian immigrants in the United States and Canada. Guillermo J. Grenier is a professor of sociology in the department of global studies, Florida International University. His interests are immigration, ethnicity, and work in Latin America. Tricia Redeker Hepner is assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Tennessee. Her research agenda focuses on Eritreans in the global diaspora. She is the author of Soldiers, Martyrs, Traitors and Exiles: Political Conflict in Eritrea and the Diaspora (2009). Ramona Hernández is at the City College of New York, where she holds the position of director of the City University of New York (CUNY) Dominican Studies Institute and professor of sociology. She is a member of the doctoral faculty in the sociology department of the Graduate Center at CUNY. Won Moo Hurh is distinguished professor emeritus at Western Illinois University. He earned his PhD in sociology at Heidelberg University, Germany, in 1965, and has taught at various universities in the United States and in Korea. His major publications include The Korean Americans (1998) and Personality in Culture and Society (2003). Helen K. Kim is an assistant professor of sociology at Whitman College in Washington. She earned her PhD in social work and sociology from the University of Michigan. Her research interests include race and ethnicity, gender, second-generation Asian Americans, and intermarriage. Kenneth Kincaid is an assistant professor of Latin American history at Purdue University North Central in Westville, Indiana. His research interests include indigenous movements and environmental history of the Andes. Lisa Konczal is an associate professor of sociology at Barry University in Florida. Her research interests include immigration, Nicaragua, and global stratification. She has written several articles, the most recent of which were published in Ethnic and Racial Studies and the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
About the Editor and Contributors | 2283
Sandra Lazo de la Vega is pursuing her MA in Latin American studies at Florida International University. She is co-author (with Dr. Timothy Steigenga) of several publications on immigration, transnationalism, gender, and religion. Jonathan H. X. Lee is an assistant professor of Asian American studies at San Francisco State University. He is co-editor of Encyclopedia of Asian American Folklore and Folklife and author of Cambodian American Experiences: Histories, Communities, Cultures, and Identities. Karen Isaksen Leonard is a historian and anthropologist at the University of California, Irvine. She has many publications on the social history and anthropology of India and on Punjabi Mexican Americans, South Asian Americans, and Muslim Americans. A recent book, Locating Home: India’s Hyderabadis Abroad (2007), details the construction of identity in the diaspora by emigrants from Hyderabad, India, settling in Pakistan, Britain, Canada, the United States, Australia, and the Gulf states of the Middle East. Bertin M. Louis Jr. is an assistant professor of anthropology and Africana studies at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. His research interests include Haitian Protestantism, nationalism, and race and ethnicity. His published work has appeared in the Journal of African American Studies, the Journal of Haitian Studies, and Transforming Anthropology. Kathleen M. Moore is professor of religious studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her research interests include law and religion and Islam and Muslims in Western democracies. Her major publications include The Unfamiliar Abode: Islamic Law in the United States and Britain (2010). Caroline Nagel is an assistant professor of geography at the University of South Carolina. Her interests include migration, citizenship, and political identities. She recently received a National Science Foundation grant to study immigrant faith communities in the American South. She is currently serving as a Fulbright scholar at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon. Franklin Ng is professor of anthropology at California State University, Fresno. He has written on Asian American topics and is the editor of Studies in Asian Americans: Reconceptualizing Culture, History, and Politics. He is also the author of The Taiwanese Americans (1998). Ceri Oeppen is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, and associate research fellow at the University of Exeter, United Kingdom. She co-edited the book Beyond “The Wild Tribes”: Understanding Modern Afghanistan and Its Diaspora (2010).
2284 | About the Editor and Contributors
Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome is an international political economist and professor of political science at Brooklyn College, CUNY. She authored A Sapped Democracy: The Political Economy of the Structural Adjustment Program and the Political Transition in Nigeria, 1983–1993 and various journal articles and book chapters in her areas of research interest. María E. Pérez y González is associate professor and chairperson of the department of Puerto Rican and Latino studies at Brooklyn College, City University of New York. Her research interests include Latinas and women in religion. Enrique S. Pumar is associate professor of sociology and faculty fellow at the Institute for Policy Research and Catholic Studies at the Catholic University of America. He is the consulting editor for sociology to the Library of Congress’s Handbook of Latin American Studies. His current research involves studying the inception of migration and violence and the incorporation of Hispanic immigrants in the Washington, D.C., metro area. Magaly Sanchez-R. is a senior researcher at the Office of Population at Princeton University. Her research interests included Barrios’ poverty and inequality, youth and urban violence, expansion of violence as a power relation in Latin America, Latino immigrants in the United States, identity formation, and international migration of talent. She is co-author, with Douglas Massey, of Brokered Boundaries: Creating Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times. Mary C. Sengstock is professor of sociology at Wayne State University. She does research on ethnic groups, primarily from the Middle East. Her most recent book, Voices of Diversity, was awarded the Wayne State University Board of Governors’ Award for Outstanding Faculty Achievement in 2010. Randa Bassem Serhan is an assistant professor of sociology at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon. She is a political sociologist specializing in migration, citizenship, and contentious politics. She is preparing to turn her dissertation on Palestinian Americans in the New York metropolitan area into a manuscript for publication. Stephen J. Sills is an assistant professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro. His research focuses on labor migration and globalization. His most recent work is “Unfair Housing Practices in Black and Brown” in Being Brown in Dixie: Race, Ethnicity, and Latino Immigration in the New South, edited by Cameron D. Lippard and Charles A. Gallagher. Timothy Steigenga is a professor of political science at the Wilkes Honors College of Florida Atlantic University. He is the author/editor of four books and numerous other publications on religion, politics, and immigration. In 2006, he served for six months in Guatemala as a Fulbright visiting scholar.
About the Editor and Contributors | 2285
Anthony Stevens-Acevedo is assistant director of the CUNY Dominican Studies Institute at the City College of New York. Former social studies teacher and a historian by training, his research, based on archival sources of the time, explores the sugar oligarchy, slaves, and cane-milling technology of 16th-century Hispaniola. Baffour K. Takyi is professor of sociology and director of the Pan African studies program at the University of Akron, Ohio. His research focuses on African immigrants, reproductive behavior, and family dynamics in Africa. He is co-author of The New African Diaspora in North America (2006) and African Families at the Turn of the 21st Century (2006). Anulkah Thomas received a BA in ethnic studies from Pomona College and a MA in sociology from Harvard University. Presently, she works for a Los Angeles nonprofit organization focused on health care education, counseling, and advocacy, and is pursuing teaching sociology and ethnic studies at the community college level. Teruyuki Tsuji earned his PhD at Florida International University and currently holds a postdoctoral fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Social Research, Kwansei Gakuin University (Japan). His research focuses on ethnic and transnational identity construction and performance of the South Asian diaspora in the Anglophone Caribbean and of the West Indian immigrants in the United States. Deidre Ann Tyler is a professor of sociology at Salt Lake Community College and adjunct at the University of Utah. She is the author of Our Corner of the World: Utah African American Women Tell Their Stories 1940–2002. Suyapa G. Portillo Villeda is a graduate student in the history department at Cornell University, where she is working on her dissertation on the Honduran banana strike of 1954. Judith Ann Warner is a professor of sociology and criminal justice in the department of sociology at Texas A&M International University. In 2008, she received the Distance Educator of the Year Award, and in 1991, she received the Scholar of the Year Award from her university. She is co-editor of the Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries and has published in the areas of immigration, homeland security, and domestic violence. Research interests include immigration, race, class, and gender. Jenjira Yahirun is a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles. Her research interests include international migration and its effects on parent-child relationships across multiple social contexts. She is currently pursuing research on intergenerational obligations and the effects of partner choice on parent-child relationships in immigrant and nonimmigrant families.
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Index
A Thousand Splendid Suns (Hosseini), 32 AAW v. Board of Trustees of California State University (1995), 1937 Abani, Chris, 1637 Abdul-Jabbar, Kareem, 2184 Abend, Elena, 2222 Abiko, Kyutaro, 1281 Abraham, Spencer, 1445, 1455 Abu-Ghazaleh, Mohammed, 1722 – 23 Acaba, Joseph, 1894 ACCESS (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services), 1130, 1444 Achaemenid dynasty, 1071, 1074 Achebe, Albert Chinualumogu “Chinua,” 1637 Adderly, Julian “Cannonball,” 89, 101 – 2 Addis Ababa Peace Treaty (Ethiopia), 668 Adebimpe, Tunde, 1637 Adeola, Henry Olusegun Olumide “Seal,” 1637 Adeyemi, Bandele, 1624 – 25 Adichie, Chimamanda Ngozi, 682, 1637 Adjustment and adaptation: Afghani immigrants, 15 – 20; Argentinean immigrants, 55 – 62; Bahamian immigrants, 93 – 95; Bangladeshi immigrants, 120 – 29; Brazilian immigrants, 173 – 82; Chilean immigrants, 252 – 55; Chinese immigrants, 310 – 24; Colombian immigrants, 364 – 68; Costa Rican immigrants, 391 – 99; Cuban immigrants, 430 – 41; Dominican immigrants, 495 – 505; Ecuadorian immigrants, 549 – 57; Egyptian immigrants, 589 – 97; Eritrean immigrants, 633 – 40; Ethiopian immigrants, 674 – 79; Filipino immigrants, 721 – 33; Ghanian immigrants, 772 – 73; Guatemalan immigrants, 811 – 16; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 859; Haitian immigrants, 904 – 15; Honduran immigrants, 951 – 53; Indian
2287
(Asian Indian) immigrants, 981 – 1001; Indonesian immigrants, 1043 – 51; Iranian immigrants, 1083 – 91; Kenyan immigrants, 1300 – 1310; Korean immigrants, 1346 – 62; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1570 – 75; Nigerian immigrants, 1611 – 19; Pakistani immigrants, 1674 – 77; Panamanian immigrants, 1749 – 55; Peruvian immigrants, 1791 – 95; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1861 – 74; Salvadoran immigrants, 1932 – 34; Taiwanese immigrants, 2058 – 72; Thai immigrants, 2109 – 17 Adu, Freddie, 789 Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, 613 Adwa, Battle of (1896) (Ethiopia), 657 Adwa, Treaty of (1884) (Ethiopia), 662 Afewerki, Isayas (Eritrean president), 626 – 27, 644, 686 Affirming Diversity: The Sociopolitical Context of Multicultural Education (Nieto), 1895 Afghani immigrants, 1 – 32; age and family structure, 12 – 13; births in the U.S. (1982 – 2005), 31; citizenship pathways, 20 – 21; civic and electoral participation, 22; community size and composition, 11 – 12; cultural identity retention, 17 – 18; demographics and census statistics, 12 – 13, 31 – 32; economic attainment, 13; educational attainment, 13; families and changing gender relations, 16 – 17; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 15 – 16; foodways, 19 – 20; health statistics and issues, 14; history of Afghanistan, 5 – 9; holiday celebrations, 18; intergroup relations, 21 – 22; legal resident status by state, 30; migration, causes and waves, 9 – 11, 27; music, arts, entertainment,
2288 | Index 20; national language press, 18; naturalization data, 28; notable Afghan Americans, 32; opinions of elders towards second generation, 17, 23; refugee admissions, 29; refugee resettlement by state, 30; return immigration, 22 – 23; second and later generations, 23 – 24; U.S.-Afghan issues, 26; youth profile, 23 – 26 Afghanistan: chronological history, 1 – 3; ethnic group diversity, 11 – 12; geography, 4 – 5; historical background, 5 – 9; migration, causes and waves, 9 – 11; refugee settlements, 8; Taliban presence, 3 – 4, 8 – 9, 10, 26; UNHCR aid to, 9, 10 – 11; war with Soviet Union, 3, 6 – 7 Africa Betrayed (Ayitteh), 790 Africa In Chaos (Ayitteh), 790 Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Development (Ayitteh), 790 African Voices, Best American Short Stories (Díaz), 522 Afro-Asian Conference (1960), 583 Agarwal, Priya, 1009 Age and family structure: Afghani immigrants, 12 – 13; Argentinean immigrants, 53; Bahamian immigrants, 92 – 93; Bangladeshi immigrants, 117 – 18; Brazilian immigrants, 167 – 69; Cambodian immigrants, 215; Chilean immigrants, 250; Eritrean American immigrants, 632 – 33; Ethiopian immigrants, 674, 681; Filipino immigrants, 717 – 18; Ghanaian immigrants, 771; Guatemalan immigrants, 808–9; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 857; Haitian immigrants, 903; Honduran immigrants, 949 – 50; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 977 – 78; Indonesian immigrants, 1039 – 40; Iranian immigrants, 1095 – 96; Iraqi immigrants, 1125; Lebanese immigrants, 1436 – 37; Liberian immigrants, 1468 – 69; Mexican immigrants, 1514 – 15; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1568 – 69; Nigerian immigrants, 1608; Pakistani immigrants, 1672 – 73; Palestinian, Jordanian immigrants, 1706; Panamanian immigrants, 1746 – 47; Peruvian immigrants, 1787 – 88, 1797 – 98; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1856; Somalian immigrants, 1975 – 76; Taiwanese immigrants, 2054 – 55; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2149 – 51 Agha Shahid Ali, 1000 Aging and Family in an Afghan Refugee Community (Omidian), 17
Agrarian Reform and Colonization Law (Ecuador), 533 Agrarian Reform Program (1961) Honduras, 936 Aguilera, Christina, 568 Aguilera, Jessica, 1588 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 701, 707 – 8 Ahmadi movement, 990 – 91 Ahmed, Leila, 613 Akan peoples (Ghana), 757, 773, 790 – 91 Akhter, Mohammad, 1688 Akinnagbe, Gbenga, 1638 Akintimehin, Olubowale Victor “Wale,” 1638 Akomeah, Bismarck, 789 Al-Qazwini, Hassan, 1143 Albright, Madeleine K., 227, 1100, 1448 Alemayhu, Mimi, 694 – 95 Alexander, Meena, 1000 Ali, Saqib, 1688 – 89 Ali Akbar Khan, 997, 1019 Alianza Hondureña de Los Angeles (AHLA), 958 – 59 Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) political party, 1913, 1915 Alien Land Laws (1913, 1921), 115, 302, 969, 975, 1249, 1256, 1265 – 66, 1275 Aliens Compliance Order (1970) (Ghana), 760 All Black Mob Crew (Liberian immigrants), 1477 All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (AESM), 670 – 71 Allende, Isabel, 272 Alliance for Progress (U.S.), 239, 242 – 44, 539, 823, 1905 ALPFA (Association of Latino Professionals in Finance and Accounting), 2212 Altidore, Josmer (Jozy) Volmy, 918 Aluko, Mobolaji E., 1638 Amaechi, John Ekwugha, 1638 Amanpour, Christiane, 1106 Amanullah (King of Afghanistan), 1, 3 Amda Tsion (Ethiopian emperor), 667 America Is in the Heart (Bulosan), 746 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), 1445 American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin (AAPI), 1003, 1014 American Baptist Churches (ABC) Settlement Agreement (1991), 801, 806 – 7 American Baptist Churches v. Thornbaugh (Supreme Court decision), 1905
Index | 2289 American Civil Liberties Union, 559, 1548, 1678, 1847 American Colonization Society (ACS), 1462 – 63, 1481, 1488 American Community Survey (ACS) data: Bahamian immigrants, 101; Chilean immigrants, 248, 249; Costa Rican immigrants, 390, 407; Cuban immigrants, 429, 452, 454, 456; Dominican immigrants, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521; Ghanian immigrants, 761, 763; Guatemalan immigrants, 799, 807, 835; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 845, 881; Haitian immigrants, 903 – 4, 926; Honduran immigrants, 949, 950 – 51, 954, 962; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 977, 979 – 80, 1002; Indonesian immigrants, 1039, 1041, 1042, 1052, 1061; Jamaican immigrants, 1202 – 3, 1239; Korean immigrants, 1340 – 41, 1346, 1355, 1362, 1374 – 75; Laotian immigrants, 1401 – 2; Lebanese immigrants, 1427, 1435; Liberian immigrants, 1468; Nigerian immigrants, 1634, 1636; Pakistani immigrants, 1672, 1687, 1688; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1858 – 59, 1890; South American immigrants, 51; Taiwanese immigrants, 2053; Venezuelan immigrants, 2206, 2207, 2222 American Desi (film), 993 American Federation of Labor (AFL), 1527 American Federation of Ramallah, 1708, 1716 American Field Service (AFS), 1040 American Funds for Czechoslovak Refugees, 2239 American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), 941 American Institute of Indian Studies (AIIS), 1006 American Lebanese Alliance, 1446 American Lebanese Coordination Council, 1446 American Lebanese Foundation, 1446 American Military Advisory & Assistance Group (MAAG), 659 American political identity establishment: Afghani immigrants, 22; Argentinean immigrants, 63; Bahamian immigrants, 96; Bangladeshi immigrants, 131 – 32; Brazilian immigrants, 185; Cambodian immigrants, 224 – 25; Chilean immigrants, 257; Chinese immigrants, 326; Ecuadorian immigrants, 559 – 60; Egyptian immigrants, 599 – 603; Filipino immigrants, 735 – 36; Guatemalan
immigrants, 817 – 18; Honduran immigrants, 954 – 55; Indonesian immigrants, 1053; Iranian immigrants, 1091 – 92; Jamaican immigrants, 1224 – 25; Japanese immigrants, 1262 – 63; Kenyan immigrants, 1313 – 14; Laotian immigrants, 1410 – 11; Lebanese immigrants, 1444 – 45; Liberian immigrants, 1477; Mexican immigrants, 1531; Pakistani immigrants, 1002 – 3, 1680 – 82; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1714 – 16; Panamanian immigrants, 1757; Peruvian immigrants, 1796; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1878; Somalian immigrants, 1991; Thai immigrants, 2119 – 20; Trinidad and Tobago immigrants, 2166 – 69; Vietnamese immigrants, 2169 – 70 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009), 705 American Task Force for Lebanon Policy, 1445, 1446 Amity and Commerce Treaty (U.S.-Korea), 1329 Amnesty Act (1986) (U.S.-Mexico), 1537 Amnesty International, 627 – 28, 1181, 1913 Amritraj, Ashok, 1019 An Island Like You: Stories of the Barrio, 1895 Andaleeb, Saad, 141 Andino, Tiburcio Carias, 935 – 36, 940 Angel Island Immigration Station (California), 301 – 2 Anglo-Dutch Treaty (1814), 847 – 49 Anka, Paul, 1455 Ansari, Anousheh, 1106 Ansary, Tamim, 32 Anthony, Marc, 1894 Appiah, Kwane Anthony, 790 Aquino, Benigno, 709 Aquino, Corazon, 704, 709 Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, 600 Arab American Institute, 600, 1427, 1435, 1445, 1446, 1451, 1452, 1455 Arab American Leadership PAC (ALPAC), 1445 Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS), 1130, 1444, 1446 Arab-Israeli War (1948), 1182, 1429, 1703 Arab-Israeli War (1967), 579, 600, 1435, 1441, 1716 Araband Egyptian American Community, 604 Arana, Marie, 1835
2290 | Index Arawak Amerindians (Bahamas), 82, 84, 158, 819, 891, 942, 1191, 1194 Arbenz, Jacobo, 801, 804 Argentina: chronological history, 41 – 42; ethnic group diversity, 44 – 45; geography, 42; historical background, 42 – 44; human trafficking issues, 48; immigration to, 45 – 48 Argentinean immigrants, 39 – 72; admissions status, 70; age and family structure, 53; childhood and baptism, 56 – 57; citizenship pathways, 62 – 63; civic electoral participation, 63; coming-of-age, 57; demographics and census statistics, 51, 69; economic attainment, 54 – 55; educational attainment, 53 – 54; families and changing gender relations, 57 – 58; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 55 – 57; foodways, 61; health statistics and issues, 55; holiday celebrations, 60; identity retention, 59 – 60, 64 – 67; intergroup relations, 63; legal permanent resident status, 72; migration, causes and waves, 48 – 51; migration statistics, 68; music, arts, entertainment, 61 – 62; national language press, 60; notable Argentine Americans, 73 – 74; occupations in the U.S., 71; religious beliefs, 60; second and later generations, 64 – 67; temporary worker admissions, 71; U.S.-Argentina issues, 67 Arias, Moises, 375 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 889 – 90, 899 – 901, 903 Arjona, Ricardo, 816 Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) (Ghana), 760 Arnaz, Desi, 461 Arrested Development tv show, 1144 Arrow of God (Abani), 1637 The Art of Political Murder: Who Killed the Bishop (Goldman), 837 Arte, Noor, 2007 Arts. See music, arts and entertainment ASFADDES (Colombian Commission of Jurists and the Association of Families of the Disappeared), 360 Asfaw, Ingida, 693 Asgedom, Mawi, 639, 642 Ashenafi, Nina, 695 Ashley, Maurice, 1239 Ashok Amrit Raj, 999 Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander Serving Institutions Program (AANAPISI), 1411
Asian American Hotel Owners Association (AAHOA), 980, 1003 Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF), 1370 – 71, 1386, 1411 Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (Chan), 348 Asian Exclusion Repeal Acts (1946), 1657, 1668 Asian Indian Women of America, 982 Asian Law and Policies Program (Georgetown University), 2268 Asian Pacific Health Care Venture (APHCV), 1042 – 43 Asian Pacific Islander Health Forum (APIAHF), 720 Asiatic Exclusion League (1905), 1249, 1664 Aspira Consent Decree (1974) (Puerto Rico), 1845, 1882 Aspira of New York v. Board of Education of the City of New York (1972), 1882 Assimilation and separatism issues: Argentinean immigrants, 54, 64; Bahamian immigrants, 89 – 91; Brazilian immigrants, 149, 169; Cambodian immigrants, 213 – 14; Chinese immigrants, 294 – 305; Eritrean American immigrants, 629; Eritrean immigrants, 629; Ethiopian immigrants, 675 – 76; Filipino immigrants, 712 – 13; Guatemalan immigrants, 805 – 6; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 975; Indonesian immigrants, 1037 – 38; Iranian immigrants, 1154; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1154; Kenyan immigrants, 1294 – 96; Lebanese immigrants, 1434; Panamanian immigrants, 1742 – 43; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1853; Taiwanese immigrants, 2052 Association for Guyanese Americans, 863 Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 600 Association of Economic and Development Studies on Bangladesh (AEDSB), 125 Association of Haitian Women in Boston, 916 Association of Indian Muslims of America (AIM), 1014 Association of Indian Pharmacists in America, 979 Association of Indians in America, 1003 Association of Latino Professionals in Finance and Accounting (ALPFA), 2212 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 208
Index | 2291 Associations of Haitian Physicians Abroad, 915 – 16 Atash, Samira, 32 Atchoo, Nathima, 1143 Atta, Sefi, 1625 Australopithecus afarensis (Lucy), 660, 665 The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man (Johnson), 102 Awate Foundation (Eritrean American Community), 650 Ayacucho, Battle of (1824) (Peru), 1777, 1780 Ayitteh, George, 790 Baderinwa, Folashade (“Sade”) Adeynka, 1638 Badiyi, Reza, 1107 Bahamas: chronological history, 79 – 81; geography, 81 – 82; historical background, 82 – 86; Immigration Act, 91 – 92; Immigration Reform and Control Act, 92; migration, causes and waves, 87 – 89; 1900 to World War Two, 85; post-emancipation period, 85; post-WW II era, 85 – 86, 91 – 92 Bahamas Junkanoo Group of Metro D.C. (BJAM-DC), 94 – 95 Bahamian American Association Incorporated (BAAI), 94 Bahamian American Cultural Society, 94 Bahamian immigrants, 79 – 103; age and family structure, 92 – 93; assimilation and separatism issues, 89 – 91; citizenship pathways, 95 – 96; civic electoral participation, 96; cultural identity retention, 94 – 95; demographics and census statistics, 101; economic attainment, 93; educational attainment, 93; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 93 – 94; foodways, 95; health statistics and issues, 93; intergroup relations, 96; language issues, 95; legal permanent resident status, 100; migration, causes and waves, 86 – 92, 99; notable Bahamian Americans, 101 – 2; second and later generations, 96 – 98; U.S.Bahamas issues, 98; youth profile, 97 bailey, e. g., 1488 Bailón, Adrienne Eliza, 568 Baksh, Dave, 881 Balaguer, Joaquín, 474, 483 – 84, 521, 526 Balbed, Abdullah, 1036, 1045 – 46 Baldeo, Albert, 881 Baldissera, Antonio, 667 Balfour Declaration (1917), 1151, 1153, 1697 Banana Bottom (McKay), 1219
Bangladesh: chronological history, 111 – 12; geography, 112; historical background, 109, 112 – 13; Immigration Act (1965), 115; IRCA to the present, 116 – 17 Bangladesh American National Alliance (BANA), 131 Bangladesh-American Public Affairs Committee (BAPAC), 131 Bangladesh Development Initiative (BDI), 125, 142 Bangladesh Environment Network (BEN), 125 Bangladeshi-American Foundation Inc. (BAFI), 125 Bangladeshi immigrants, 109 – 43; age and family structure, 117 – 18; census and demographic statistics, 138 – 39; citizenship pathways, 129 – 30; civic electoral participation, 131 – 32; economic attainment, 119; educational attainment, 119; families and changing gender relations, 123 – 24; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 120, 122 – 23; foodways, 128; health statistics and issues, 119 – 20; holiday celebrations, 127 – 28; identity retention, 124 – 25; intergroup relations, 130 – 31; language issues, 126; migration statistics, 136; music, arts, entertainment, 128 – 29; national language press, 127; notable Bangladeshi Americans, 141 – 42; religion, 126; return immigration, 132; second and later generations, 132 – 34; U.S.Bangladesh issues, 134 – 35; youth profile, 134 Baptist practitioners: Costa Rican immigrants, 395; Filipino immigrants, 727; Haitian immigrants, 906; Indonesian immigrants, 1046; Jamaican immigrants, 1214; Salvadoran immigrants, 1948; Taiwanese immigrants, 2063; Trinidadian and Tobagonian immigrants, 2156 Barba-Iñiguez, Mariana, 1534 Baroody, Michael, 1455 Barred Zone Act (1917) (U.S.), 969, 975 Barrett, Leonard, 1219 Barrow (Thao Worra), 1423 Bases-for-Destroyers Agreement (Great Britain-Trinidad-U.S.), 2144, 2172 Bashi, Andrew, 1138 Bastien, Marleine, 927 Batak Community of California Club (Ikatan Masyarakat Batak di California), 1046 Ba’th Party (Iraq), 1113, 1116 – 17 Bay of Pigs invasion (Cuba), 421
2292 | Index The Beautiful Things That Heaven Bears (Mengiste), 682 Becoming Abigail (Abani), 1637 Benard, Maurice, 1588 Bend It Like Beckham (film), 999 Beneath the Lion’s Gaze (Mengiste), 682 Bengal Studies Conference (Bangladesh), 130 Bennett, Louise, 2144 Betancourt, Ingrid, 356, 361 Bhagwati, Anuradha, 1003 Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1003 Bharadwaj, Radha, 999 Bhutto, Benazir, 1658, 1661 Biglari, Hamid, 1107 Bikel, Theodore, 1180 – 81 Bilateral Trade Agreement (2005) (U.S.-Laos), 1413 Bin Laden, Osama, 6, 8, 686, 2018 Black Power movement (U.S.), 86 Blades, Ruben, 1771 Blakely, George, 89 Blanco, Carlos, 2222 Bloomberg, Michael, 863, 1087 The Blueprint For Ghana’s Economic Recovery (Ayitteh), 790 Boateng, Kofi, 790 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 538, 894 Border Identifications: Narratives of Religion, Gender, and Class on the U.S.-Mexico Border (Vila), 73 Borgella, Joanne, 920 Borja, Hernán “Chico,” 568 – 69 Boyer, Jean-Pierre, 895 Bracero Program, 91, 1495, 1506, 1508, 1511 – 12 Bradford v. Board of Regents of the University of California (1990), 1937 Braga, Sonia, 198 – 99 Branch, Michelle, 1064 Bratt, Benjamin, 1835 Brazil: chronological history, 151 – 53; ethnic diversity, 157 – 58; geography, 153 – 56; historical background, 158 – 64; migration, causes and waves, 164; population data, 156 – 57 Brazilian immigrants, 149 – 200; age and family structure, 167 – 69; census and demographic data, 164 – 66, 192; citizenship pathways, 182 – 84; civic and electoral participation, 185 – 86; economic attainment, 170 – 72; educational attainment, 169, 187, 189; ethnically-based social organizations,
175 – 76; families and changing gender relations, 173 – 74; foodways, 179 – 81; health statistics and issues, 172; holiday celebrations, 178 – 79; identity retention, 174 – 78, 189 – 90; income patterns, 171 – 72; intergroup relations, 184 – 85; language issues, 176, 178, 198; legal permanent resident status, 193; links to Brazil, 174 – 75; migration statistics, 191; music, arts, entertainment, 182; notable Brazilian Americans, 198 – 200; occupational data, 170 – 71, 197, 198; political and student associations, 185; religion, 176; return immigration, 186; second and later generations, 186 – 90; U.S.-Brazil issues, 190 – 91; youth profile, 188 – 89 Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 166 Bread and Roses Project, 1959 Breath, Eyes, Memory (Danticat), 928 Brewer, Jan, 1906 Brewer-Carias, Allan R., 2222 – 23 The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao (Díaz), 522 Brokeback Mountain movie (Ang Lee), 2090 Brown, Foxy, 2184 Bu Me Bé: Proverbs of the Akan (Appiah), 790 Buddhism practices, 176, 209, 286; Bangladeshi immigrants, 126; Brazilian immigrants, 1261; Cambodian immigrants, 210; Chinese immigrants, 317; Costa Rican immigrants, 395; Filipino immigrants, 727; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 972 – 73; Indonesian immigrants, 1027; Korean immigrants, 1336; Laotian immigrants, 1403; Pakistan immigrants, 1659; Panamanian immigrants, 1659; Taiwanese immigrants, 2064; Thai immigrants, 2113; Trinidadian and Tobagonian immigrants, 2139; Vietnamese immigrants, 1261 Buddhist Compassionate Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, 2046 Budi Utono movement (Indonesia), 1029, 1033 Bui, Tony, 2268 Buitrago, Emilio A., 2212 Bulosan, Carlos, 746 Bunau-Varilla-Hay Treaty (1903), 1738, 1740 Bündchen, Gisele, 199 Bureau of Democracy (U.S.), 644 Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (U.S.), 1664, 1918 Burlingame-Seward Treaty (U.S.-China), 279, 284
Index | 2293 Burnham, Forbes, 847, 850 – 52, 859, 867 – 68, 874 – 76 Bush, George H. W., 326 Bush, George W., 32, 98, 282, 326, 356, 417, 429, 462, 600, 608, 1013, 1055 – 57, 1072, 1231, 1272, 1329, 1331, 1445, 1455, 1461, 1468, 1482, 1906 Caberera, Orlando, 375 CAFTA (Central American Free Trade Agreement), 802, 824 Caine, Shakira, 881 Callegari, Guillermo, 1835 Cambodia: chronological history, 205, 207 – 9; early immigration, 212 – 13; geography/ demography, 209 – 10; historical background, 210 – 12; later immigration, 214 – 15; migration, causes and waves, 212 – 13 Cambodian immigrants, 205 – 31; age and family structure, 215; assimilation and separatism issues, 213 – 14; citizenship pathways, 223 – 24; civic and electoral participation, 224 – 25; demographics and census statistics, 228 – 30; economic attainment, 217; educational attainment, 216 – 17, 226 – 27; families and changing gender relations, 219; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 218 – 19; foodways, 222; health statistics and issues, 218; holiday celebrations, 221 – 22; identity retention, 220, 228; intergroup relations, 224; migration statistics, 228; music, arts, entertainment, 223; national language press, 220 – 21; notable Cambodian Americans, 230 – 31; occupation/income patterns, 217; return immigration, 225 – 26; second and later generations, 226 – 28; size/community composition, 215; youth profile, 227 Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), 208 – 9, 212 Campos, David, 837 Canela, Luis A., 521 Cao, Anh “Joseph,” 2268 Carbonell, Carlos, 2208 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 164 CARECEN (Central American Resources Center), 395, 955 – 56 Carew, Rod, 1771 – 72 Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), 2172 – 73, 2185 Carter, Jimmy, 244, 876, 936, 1182 – 83, 1740 – 41, 1758, 2045, 2049 Carter, Natalie, 1229 Cassidy, Frederick Gomes, 1219 – 20
Castillo, Raysa, 521 Castro, Fidel, 416, 417, 418, 419, 444, 446, 448 – 49, 453 Castro, Raul, 417 Castro Madriz, José Maria, 387 Castronovo, Charles, 569 Catholic Bishops Committee on Farm Labor, 1544 Catholicism practitioners: Afghani immigrants, 11; Argentinean immigrants, 60; Bangladeshi immigrants, 128; Brazilian immigrants, 176; Chilean immigrants, 252; Colombian immigrants, 366; Costa Rican immigrants, 395; Cuban immigrants, 437; Dominican immigrants, 476; Ecuadorian immigrants, 553; Eritrean American immigrants, 636; Ethiopian immigrants, 661; Filipino immigrants, 723; Ghanaian immigrants, 776; Guatemalan immigrants, 813; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 868; Haitian immigrants, 905; Honduran immigrants, 951; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 553; Indonesian immigrants, 1027; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1154; Jamaican immigrants, 1214; Lebanese immigrants, 1440; Mexican immigrants, 1525; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1572; Pakistani immigrants, 1675; Panamanian immigrants, 1752; Peruvian immigrants, 1792; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1865; Salvadoran immigrants, 1949; Somalian immigrants, 1982; Taiwanese immigrants, 2064; Trinidadian and Tobagonian immigrants, 2155; Vietnamese immigrants, 2247 Cayetano, Benjamin, 704, 738, 746 Caymmi, Dori, 199 Caymmi, Dorival, 199 Cedar Revolution (Lebanon), 1429, 1432, 1435, 1456 Celski, John Robert, 746 Census Bureau (U.S.) data and demographic statistics: Afghani immigrants, 11, 12 – 13, 20 – 21, 31 – 32; Argentinean immigrants, 51, 69; Bahamian immigrants, 92, 93 – 94, 101; Bangladeshi immigrants, 116, 117 – 18, 138 – 39; Brazilian immigrants, 164 – 66; Cambodian immigrants, 217, 228 – 30; Chinese immigrants, 305 – 8, 333, 335, 338 – 47; Colombian immigrants, 362 – 64, 373 – 75; Costa Rican immigrants, 390 – 91, 401, 407 – 8; Cuban immigrants, 456, 459 – 61; Dominican immigrants, 484 – 95, 494 – 96,
2294 | Index 518 – 21; Ecuadorian immigrants, 545 – 49, 568; Egyptian immigrants, 609 – 13, 649; Eritrean immigrants, 630, 632 – 33, 649; Ethiopian immigrants, 674, 691 – 92; Filipino immigrants, 717, 742, 744 – 46; Ghanaian immigrants, 786 – 89; Guatemalan immigrants, 807, 827 – 36; Guyanese (IndoGuyanese) immigrants, 845, 880 – 81; Haitian immigrants, 926 – 27; Honduran immigrants, 962 – 63; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 977, 979, 980, 1002, 1017 – 19; Indonesian immigrants, 1041, 1061 – 63; Iranian immigrants, 1105 – 6; Iraqi immigrants, 1142 – 43; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1159 – 61, 1178 – 79; Jamaican immigrants, 1236 – 39; Japanese immigrants, 1278 – 81; Laotian immigrants, 1401 – 3; Lebanese immigrants, 1435, 1452 – 54; Liberian immigrants, 1486 – 87; Mexican immigrants, 1512, 1515, 1538; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1564 – 65, 1568 – 70, 1586 – 87, 1608, 1636; Pakistani immigrants, 1687, 1688; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1721 – 22; Panamanian immigrants, 1767 – 71; Peruvian immigrants, 1833 – 34; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1855 – 61, 1890 – 93; Salvadoran immigrants, 1922, 1925 – 32; Somalian immigrants, 1972 – 73; Sudanese immigrants, 2031, 2035, 2039; Taiwanese immigrants, 2084 – 89; Venezuelan immigrants, 2216 – 21; Vietnamese immigrants, 2243 – 44, 2266 – 67 Center for Attention to Migrants Return (CARM) (Honduras), 959 Center for Development and Governance (CDG) (Bangladesh), 125 Center for Disease Control (CDC), 720, 904, 2021, 2108 – 09, 2112 Center for International Development (Harvard University), 2223 Center for Latin American Studies (Georgetown University), 273 Central American Common Market, 1904 Central American Federation, 383, 386, 935, 1559, 1562 Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) (2006), 384, 388, 509, 802, 823 – 24, 943 Central American National Network (CARNET), 1948 Central American Refugee Committee, 1960
Central American Resources Center (CARECEN), 395, 955 – 56 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 42, 708, 801, 804, 875, 890, 1071, 1193 – 94, 1231 Cepeda-Leonardo, Margarita, 522 Cevallos, F. Javier, 569 Chaldean Federation of America, 1130, 1143 Chan, Sucheng, 348 Chandrasekhar, Subrahmanyan, 1019 Chang, Iris Shun-Ru, 348 Chang, Michael Te-Pei, 348 Chang Chan et al. v. John D. Nagle (1925), 281 Chang-Diaz, Franklin, 408 Chao, Elaine, 2090 Charlie Chan Is Dead: An Anthology of Contemporary Asian American Fiction (Hagedorn), 747 Charoen, Gorpat Henry, 2129 Charter of Autonomy (1897) (Puerto Rico), 1849 Chaudhri, Amin, 999 Chaudry, M. Ali, 1689 Chavez, Cesar, 748, 1273, 1544 – 45, 1547 Chávez,, Hugo, 372, 2195, 2200 – 1, 2210 Chawla, Kalpana, 1003 Checole, Kassahun, 649 Cherng, Andrew J. C., 348 Cheung, Jacky, 2078 Chevapravatdumrong, Cherry, 2130 Chicago Association for Kenyan Professionals (CAKP), 1307 Children of Beituniya Society (Chicago), 1715 Children of Immigrants’ Longitudinal Study (CILS), 453, 1230, 1411 Children of Jamaica Outreach, 1226 Chile: Alliance for Progress (1930 – 1973), 242 – 44; chronological history, 237, 239 – 40; democratization process, 245; early migration, 245 – 46; geography, 240 – 41; historical background, 242 – 45; migration, causes and waves, 245 – 48, 262 – 65 Chilean immigrants, 237 – 74; age and family structure, 250; citizenship pathways, 255 – 56; civic and electoral participation, 257 – 58; community size and composition, 249 – 50; demographics, 249 – 51, 265 – 71; economic attainment, 251; educational attainment, 250 – 51; families and changing gender relations, 252; family, culture, lifecycle rituals, 252; foodways, 254; forecast for the 21st century, 261 – 62; health
Index | 2295 statistics and issues, 251; holiday celebrations, 253; identity retention, 252 – 53, 257; intergroup relations, 256 – 57; music, arts, entertainment, 255; national language press, 253; notable Chilean Americans, 272 – 73; return immigration, 258; second and later generations, 258; U.S.-Chile issues, 260 – 61; youth profile, 259 – 60 Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 240 Chin, Vincent “Randy,” 348 – 49 China: assimilation and separatism, 294 – 305; chronological history, 277, 279 – 82; early immigration, 291 – 92; geography, 282 – 87; migration, causes and waves, 287 – 305, 333 – 38; women in Hawaii vs. California, 293 – 94 Chinese American Citizens Alliance (CACA), 326 Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, 277 Chinese Exclusion Act (U.S., 1882), 279, 281, 297, 298, 300, 325 – 26, 1254, 1257, 1504, 1665 Chinese immigrants, 277 – 350; adjustment and adaptation, 310 – 24; citizenship pathways, 325; civic and electoral participation, 326 – 27; community size and composition, 306 – 7; demographics and census statistics, 305 – 6; economic attainment, 309; educational attainment, 308; employment data, 308 – 9; ethnically-based social organizations, 316 – 17; families and changing gender relations, 313 – 14; family structure, 307 – 8; foodways, 321 – 23; funerals and death rituals, 312 – 13; health statistics and issues, 309 – 10; holiday celebrations, 320 – 21; identity retention, 314 – 15, 326; intergroup relations, 325; language issues, 319; links to country of origin, 315 – 16; migration statistics, 333 – 38; music, arts, entertainment, 323 – 24; national language press, 319 – 20; notable Chinese Americans, 348 – 49; religions, 317 – 19; return immigration, 327; second and later generations, 328 – 32; U.S.-China issues, 332 – 33; youth profiles, 329 – 32 The Chinese in America: A Narrative History (Chang), 348 Chinese Progressive Association, 326 Chinh, Kieu, 2268 Chopra, Deepak, 999, 1019 Choy, Herbert Y. C., 1386 – 87
Christian Democratic Party (COPEI) (Venezuela), 2195 Christian religion practitioners: Bangladeshi immigrants, 126; Brazilian immigrants, 176; Cambodian immigrants, 216; Chilean immigrants, 252; Chinese immigrants, 319; Dominican immigrants, 477; Ecuadorian immigrants, 536; Egyptian immigrants, 594 – 96; Eritrean American immigrants, 636; Ethiopian immigrants, 661, 667; Filipino immigrants, 727; Ghanaian immigrants, 773; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 859; Honduran immigrants, 939; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 973; Indonesian immigrants, 1046; Iranian immigrants, 1088 – 89; Iraqi immigrants, 1131; Israeli immigrants, 1170; Jamaican immigrants, 1214; Japanese immigrants, 1261; Kenyan immigrants, 1308; Korean immigrants, 1335; Laotian immigrants, 1406; Lebanese immigrants, 1441; Liberian immigrants, 1462; Mexican immigrants, 1572; Nigerian immigrants, 1615; Pakistani immigrants, 1662; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1710; Panamanian immigrants, 1754; Peruvian immigrants, 1862; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1862; Somalian immigrants, 1965; Sudanese immigrants, 2023; Taiwanese immigrants, 2064; Thai immigrants, 2113; Trinidadian and Tobagonian immigrants, 2155 Christophe, Henry, 895 Chronological history: of Afghanistan, 1 – 3; of Argentina, 41 – 42; of the Bahamas, 79, 81; of Cambodia, 205, 207 – 9; of China, 277, 279 – 82; of Egypt, 579; of El Salvador, 1903 – 6; of Eritrea, 619 – 20; of Ethiopia, 660 – 64; of Ghana, 755 – 56; of Guatemala, 799 – 802; of Guyana, 845 – 47; of Haiti, 889 – 90; of Honduras, 935 – 37; of India, 969 – 71; of Indonesia, 1027 – 30; of Iran, 1071 – 72; of Iraq, 1111 – 14; of Israel, 1151 – 52; of Jamaica, 1191 – 92; of Japan, 1247, 1249 – 51; of Kenya, 1287 – 89; of Korea, 1329 – 31; of Laos, 1397 – 99; of Lebanon, 1427 – 30; of Nicaragua, 1557 – 61; of Peru, 1777 – 81; of the Philippines, 701 – 5; of Puerto Rico, 1843 – 47; of Somalia, 1967 – 68; of Taiwan, 2043 – 45; of Venezuela, 2191 – 94 Chu, Steven, 326 Chung, Donald K., 1389
2296 | Index Chung, Patrick Christopher, 1239 Church World Service, 2239 Cigarmaking communities (Florida), 424 – 25 Cisneros, Ana, 562 – 63 CISPES (Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador), 1947 – 48 Citizenship pathways: Afghani immigrants, 20 – 21; Argentinean immigrants, 62 – 63; Bahamian immigrants, 95 – 96; Bangladeshi immigrants, 129 – 30; Brazilian immigrants, 182 – 84; Cambodian immigrants, 223 – 24; Chilean immigrants, 255 – 56; Chinese immigrants, 325; Ecuadorian immigrants, 558; Egyptian immigrants, 597 – 98; Eritrean American immigrants, 640 – 41; Ethiopian immigrants, 680 – 81; Filipino immigrants, 733 – 34; Ghanaian immigrants, 760 – 61; Guatemalan immigrants, 816 – 17; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 854, 865; Honduran immigrants, 953 – 54; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 1001 – 2; Indonesian immigrants, 1052; Iranian immigrants, 1076 – 79; Iraqi immigrants, 1135 – 37; Jamaican immigrants, 1220 – 21; Japanese immigrants, 1263 – 65; Kenyan immigrants, 1310 – 12; Korean immigrants, 1362; Laotian immigrants, 1410; Lebanese immigrants, 1443 – 44; Liberian immigrants, 1475 – 76; Mexican immigrants, 1527 – 28; Nigerian immigrants, 1624 – 27; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1713 – 14; Panamanian immigrants, 1755 – 56; Peruvian immigrants, 1795; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1874 – 75; Salvadoran immigrants, 1947 – 48; Somalian immigrants, 1988 – 89; Taiwanese immigrants, 2072; Thai immigrants, 2117 – 18; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2164 – 65; Vietnamese immigrants, 2251 – 52 Citizenship Proclamation (1992) (Eritrea), 640 Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (2003) (U.S.), 705, 734 Civic and electoral participation: Afghani immigrants, 22; Argentinean immigrants, 63; Bahamian immigrants, 96; Bangladeshi immigrants, 131 – 32; Brazilian immigrants, 185 – 86; Cambodian immigrants, 224 – 25; Chilean immigrants, 257 – 58; Chinese immigrants, 326 – 27; Cuban immigrants, 445 – 46; Dominican immigrants, 506 – 9; Ecuadorian immigrants, 559 – 60; Egyptian immigrants, 599 – 603; Eritrean American immigrants, 640; Ethiopian immigrants,
675 – 76; Filipino immigrants, 735 – 36; Ghanaian immigrants, 774 – 77; Guatemalan immigrants, 817 – 18; Guyanese (IndoGuyanese) immigrants, 867 – 69; Haitian immigrants, 909, 915 – 17; Honduran immigrants, 954 – 56; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 1002 – 6; Indonesian immigrants, 1053; Iranian immigrants, 1091 – 92, 1100 – 1102; Jamaican immigrants, 1225; Liberian immigrants, 1478; Mexican immigrants, 1531 – 32; Nigerian immigrants, 1627 – 28; Panamanian immigrants, 1758; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1878 – 79; Somalian immigrants, 1991 – 92; Taiwanese immigrants, 2075 – 76 Civil Rights Act (1870) (U.S.), 295, 300 Civil Rights Act (1964) (U.S.), 1222, 1257 Civil Rights Bill (1964), 1712 Civil War of El Salvador, 1911 – 15 Clark, Kenneth, 1772 Clarke, Hansen, 141 Clemente, Roberto, 1894 Clinton, Bill, 111, 190, 273, 326, 434, 524, 747, 824, 900, 922, 1156, 1445, 1455, 1545, 2077 Clinton, Hillary, 111, 135, 1030, 1040, 1053, 1057 Clinton-Bush Haiti Fund, 923 Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (C.G.D.K.), 208 Coalition of Guatemalan Immigrants in the United States (CONGUATE), 818 The Code (Asgedom), 639 Coen, Jan Pieterszoon, 1032 Cofer, Judith Ortíz, 1895 Collor de Mello, Fernando, 164 Colombia: ethnic composition, 356; historical background, 357 – 61; migration, causes and waves, 361 – 62 Colombia nos Une (Columbia Unites Us) program, 367 Colombian Commission of Jurists and the Association of Families of the Disappeared (ASFADDES), 360 Colombian immigrants, 354 – 77; adjustment and adaptation, 364 – 68; demographic and census statistics, 362 – 64, 373 – 75; demographic data, 362 – 64; family, culture, lifecycle rituals, 364 – 65; family and changing gender relations, 365 – 66; identity retention, 366 – 68; impact on U.S. society and culture, 368 – 69; migration statistics, 373; notable
Index | 2297 Colombian Americans, 375 – 76; second and later generations, 369 – 70; U.S.-Colombia issues, 370 – 72; youth profile, 369 Colombian Professionals and Students Abroad (PECX) program, 368 Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Appiah), 790 Columbus, Christopher: Bahamian arrival, 79, 82; Costa Rican arrival, 383, 386; Cuban arrival, 415; Dominican Republic arrival, 471, 475; Haitian encounter, 891; Honduran arrival, 935; Jamaican arrival, 1191, 1194 Comerford, Cristeta, 746 – 47 Comfort Woman (Keller), 1389 Commission on Hispanic Affairs Advisory Board (U.S.), 527 Commission on International Religious Freedom (U.S.), 627, 644 Commission on Wartime Relocation and Evacuation of Civilians (U.S.), 1251 Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), 1947 – 48 Community Service Organization (CSO), 1544, 1547, 1552 Community size and composition: Afghani immigrants, 11 – 12; Argentinean immigrants, 51; Bahamian immigrants, 92; Brazilian immigrants, 164 – 66; Cambodian immigrants, 215; Chilean immigrants, 249 – 50; Chinese immigrants, 306 – 7; Costa Rican immigrants, 390; Dominican immigrants, 484 – 85; Ecuadorian immigrants, 545 – 46; Egyptian immigrants, 587 – 88; Eritrean American immigrants, 630 – 32; Eritrean immigrants, 630 – 32; Ethiopian immigrants, 674 – 76; Filipino immigrants, 717; Ghanaian immigrants, 770 – 73; Guatemalan immigrants, 807 – 8; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 855 – 57; Haitian immigrants, 903; Honduran immigrants, 949; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 977; Indonesian immigrants, 1038 – 39; Iranian immigrants, 1080 – 81; Iraqi immigrants, 1122 – 1125; Japanese immigrants, 1259 – 61; Kenyan immigrants, 1297; Korean immigrants, 1340 – 42; Laotian immigrants, 1401 – 2; Lebanese immigrants, 1435 – 36; Liberian immigrants, 1468; Mexican immigrants, 1512 – 14; Nigerian immigrants, 1607 – 8; Pakistani immigrants, 1671 – 72; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1705 – 6; Panamanian immigrants, 1746; Peruvian
immigrants, 1786 – 87, 1796; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1855; Salvadoran immigrants, 1940 – 46; Somalian immigrants, 1972 – 73; Taiwanese immigrants, 2053; Thai immigrants, 2106; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2146 – 49; Venezuelan immigrants, 2206– 7; Vietnamese immigrants, 2245– 47 CONDECA (Central American Defense Council), 1905 Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers (CTE), 540 Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), 535, 539 Confucianism beliefs and practices: Chinese immigrants, 285 – 86, 287, 288, 312, 317 – 19, 328; Korean immigrants, 1335 – 36, 1343, 1354, 1357, 1368; Taiwanese immigrants, 261 – 62, 268, 2055 – 56, 2058, 2059 – 60, 2066; Vietnamese immigrants, 2247, 2249, 2270, 2271 Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in Latin America (Brewer-Carias), 2223 Consulate General of the Republic of Indonesia in Los Angeles (KJRI-LA), 1044 – 45, 1047 Contra-Sandinista War, 1563 – 64, 1565 – 66, 1583 Copts Association (U.S.), 602 Cordova, Suazo, 936 Corey, Elias, 1455 Cortés, Hernán, 935, 939 Costa, Gal, 199 Costa Rica: chronological history, 383 – 84; ethnic diversity, 389; geography, 384 – 86; historical background, 386 – 89; migration, causes and waves, 389 – 90 Costa Rican immigrants, 381 – 409; community size and composition, 390; demographics and census statistics, 390 – 91, 407 – 8; economic attainment, 390; educational attainment, 390, 401; ethnically-based social organizations, 395; families and changing gender relations, 393; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 391 – 93; foodways, 398; health statistics and issues, 391; holiday celebrations, 396 – 98; identity retention, 393 – 94, 401 – 3; integration/impact on U.S., 399 – 401; language issues, 395 – 96; links to Costa Rica, 394 – 95; migration statistics, 404 – 7; music, arts, entertainment, 398 – 99; national language press, 396; notable Costa Rican Americans, 408 – 9; religion, 395;
2298 | Index second and later generations, 401 – 3; U.S.Costa Rica issues, 403 – 4; youth profile, 402 Council for Nationalities Service, 2239 Crossing Borders, Reinforcing Borders: Social Categories, Metaphors and Narrative Identities on the U.S.-Mexico Frontier (Vila), 73 Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon movie (Ang Lee), 2090 Crown Center for Middle East Studies, 1448 Cruz, Celia “Queen of Salsa,” 461 The Cry and the Dedication (Bulosan), 746 Cuba: chronological history, 415 – 17; early exiles (1959 – 1962), 425 – 26; ethnic diversity, 421; Florida cigarmaking communities, 424 – 25; historical background, 418 – 23; Marial boatlift (1980), 426 – 27; New York 19th-century exiles, 424; post-1959 migration to U.S., 425; pre-1959 migration to U.S., 423; Rafter Crisis (1994), 425, 428; Spanish influences, 421 – 22; 21st-century migration, 428 – 29; West Indian influences, 423 Cuban immigrants, 413 – 64; aging and retirement, 432; demographics and census statistics, 429 – 30, 459 – 61; economic capital, 443; exile identity and culture, 435 – 36; exile politics and ideology, 445 – 46; family and economic adjustment, 434 – 35; female employment, 432 – 33; foodways, 439 – 40; holiday celebrations, 438 – 39; integration/ impact on U.S., 441 – 42; language issues, 436 – 37; migration and family structure, 430 – 31; migration statistics, 454 – 58; music, arts, entertainment, 440; notable Cuban Americans, 461 – 63; post-1959 migration, 431 – 32; primacy of the homeland, 446 – 48; religion, 437; second and later generations, 449 – 51; social capital, 444 – 45; U.S.-Cuba issues, 451 – 54; youth profiles, 450 – 51 Cuban Revolution, 357, 413 – 14, 416, 430 Cubillos, Teofilo, 1835 Culhane, Hind Rassam, 1143 Cultural traditions: Afghani immigrants, 15 – 16; Argentinean immigrants, 55 – 56; Bahamian immigrants, 93 – 94; Bangladeshi immigrants, 120; Cambodian immigrants, 218 – 19; Chilean immigrants, 252; Colombian immigrants, 364 – 65; Costa Rican immigrants, 391 – 93; Ecuadorian immigrants, 549 – 51; Egyptian immigrants, 589 – 90; Eritrean American immigrants, 633 – 34;
Ethiopian immigrants, 674, 681 – 82; Filipino immigrants, 721 – 23; Ghanaian immigrants, 772 – 73, 772 – 75; Guatemalan immigrants, 811 – 12; Guyanese (IndoGuyanese) immigrants, 859 – 61; Haitian immigrants, 904 – 6; Honduran immigrants, 951 – 52; Indonesian immigrants, 1043 – 44; Iranian immigrants, 1084 – 85; Iraqi immigrants, 1127 – 29; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1161 – 63; Jamaican immigrants, 1208 – 11; Japanese immigrants, 1270; Kenyan immigrants, 1303 – 6; Korean immigrants, 1334 – 36, 1350 – 51, 1353 – 57; Laotian immigrants, 1403 – 4; Lebanese immigrants, 1438 – 39; Liberian immigrants, 1470 – 71; Mexican immigrants, 1516 – 20; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1571 – 72; Nigerian immigrants, 1611 – 12; Pakistani immigrants, 1674 – 75; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1707 – 9; Panamanian immigrants, 1749 – 50; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1861 – 63; Taiwanese immigrants, 2058 – 59; Thai immigrants, 2109 – 11, 2112; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2153 – 54 Da Gamma, Christopher, 661 Dabydeen, David, 881 Dagastir, Sabu, 1689 Danticat, Edwidge, 927 – 28 Daoism practitioners: Chinese immigrants, 285 – 86, 317 – 18; Taiwanese immigrants, 2066 Daoud, Sardar Mohammad (Prime Minister of Afghanistan), 3 Darya, Farhad, 32 Das, Taraknath, 115 Daughter of the Killing Fields (Seng), 231 David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies (Harvard University), 188, 2222 Davidovsky, Mario, 73 Davis, Charles “Chili,” 1239 Daynuah, Jacob M., 1488 De Matos, João, 199 De Villacis, Roberto, 569 Dead Man Walking (film), 1000 Decolonizing the Mind (Thiong’o), 1323 Deddeh, Wadie P., 1143 Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) status, 1461, 1475, 1482, 1488 DeFillipis, Daisy Cocco, 498 – 99, 522 Demessie, Menna, 684
Index | 2299 Democracy and Development Fund (DDBF) (Bangladesh), 125 Demographic statistics. See Census Bureau (U.S.) data and demographic statistics Deng, Valentino Achak, 2039 Dennis, Benjamin G., 1488 Department of Labor (U.S.), 772, 1504 Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (DLLR) (U.S.), 524 Derg regime (Ethiopia), 624, 663, 669, 671 – 72, 680 – 82 Desai, Padma, 1003 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 894 – 95, 912 Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act), 559, 1937 Díaz, Junot, 522 – 23 Diaz, Porfirio, 1495, 1501, 1571 Díaz-Balart, Lincoln, 461 Díaz-Balart, Mario, 462 Dillet, Helen Louise, 87 Dinh, Viet D., 2268 Diponegro, Pangeran, 1033 Displaced Persons Act (1948) (U.S.), 281 Divakaruni, Chitra Banarjee, 1000 Diversity Visa programs (DV-1, 1995 – 1996) (U.S.): Afghani Immigrants, 10; Bangladeshi immigrants, 109, 111, 116, 135; Eritrean American immigrants, 629; Ethiopian immigrants, 660, 674, 685; Ghanaian immigrants, 756, 767 – 68, 770; Indonesian immigrants, 1056; Kenyan immigrants, 1295, 1310 – 11; Nigerian immigrants, 1606, 1607; Pakistani immigrants, 1655, 1668; Sudanese immigrants, 2024 Dja, Devi, 1036, 1051, 1053, 1064 Doctrine of National Security (El Salvador), 1915 The Doctrine of the Lord of Heaven (Chonjusilui) (Ricci), 1336 Dogali, Battle of (Ghana), 662 Dogeaters (Hagedorn), 747 Dogonyaro, Lami Alheri, 1638 – 39 Doha Agreement (2005) (Lebanon), 1448, 1456 Dominican American National Roundtable Organization, 504, 527 Dominican Republic: chronological history, 471 – 74; demographics and census statistics, 518 – 21; geography, 474 – 75; migration statistics, 516 – 17; military occupation (1916 – 1924), 479 – 81; post-1965 immigration, 484
Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), 388 Dominican Republic immigrants, 471 – 532; adjustment and adaptation, 495 – 505; civic and electoral participation, 506 – 9; community composition and size, 484 – 85; demographics and census statistics, 484 – 95, 518 – 21; economic attainment, 489 – 90, 492 – 95; educational attainment, 489, 509 – 13; family structure, 505; geographic distribution, 485 – 88; identity retention, 495 – 501; integration, impact on U.S. society, 505 – 9; language issues, 486; music, arts, entertainment, 513 – 16; notable Dominican Americans, 521 – 25; second and later generations, 509 – 16; settlement patterns, 486, 488; unemployment data, 491 – 92; youth profile, 486, 512 Dos Rios, Battle of (Cuba), 415 Douglas, William O., 1100 Douglass, Frederick, 889 Dragon’s Gate (Yep), 349 Dragonwings (Yep), 349 Draves, Victoria Manalo, 747 DREAM (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors) Act, 1937 Drown (Díaz), 522 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 371 Dual Citizenship Act (1992) (Ghana), 756 Dual Citizenship Law (2003) (U.S.), 705, 734 Dual citizenship status: Afghani immigrants, 20 – 21; Argentinean immigrants, 62 – 63; Bahamian immigrants, 95 – 96; Bangladeshi immigrants, 130; Brazilian immigrants, 184; Chinese immigrants, 325; Costa Rican immigrants, 400; Ecuadorian immigrants, 558; Egyptian immigrants, 579, 593, 598; Eritrean immigrants, 641; Filipino immigrants, 705; Ghanaian immigrants, 756; Guatemalan immigrants, 817; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 971, 981, 983, 1002, 1004, 1014; Indonesian immigrants, 1052; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1159, 1172; Jamaican immigrants, 1221; Kenyan immigrants, 1311; Korean immigrants, 1362; Laotian immigrants, 1410; Lebanese immigrants, 1444; Liberian immigrants, 1476; Mexican immigrants, 1528 – 29; Nigerian immigrants, 1624; Panamanian immigrants, 1756; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1874 – 75, 1888; Somalian immigrants, 1989; Taiwanese
2300 | Index immigrants, 2072 – 73; Thai immigrants, 2117 – 18; Vietnamese immigrants, 2252 Dubois, Eugène, 1031 Duckworth, Ladda Tammy, 2130 Duhalde, Eduardo (Argentine president), 43 – 44 Duong, John Quoc, 2238 Duvalier, Francois, 889, 896 – 902, 908, 913, 915 Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 889, 898 – 99, 902, 908, 913, 915, 922 East of Kabul (Ansary), 32 Eat Drink Man Woman movie (Ang Lee), 2090 Economic attainments: Afghani immigrants, 13; Argentinean immigrants, 54 – 55; Bahamian immigrants, 93; Bangladeshi immigrants, 119; Brazilian immigrants, 170 – 72; Cambodian immigrants, 217; Chilean immigrants, 251; Chinese immigrants, 309; Costa Rican immigrants, 390; Cuban immigrants, 434 – 35, 443; Dominican immigrants, 489 – 90, 492 – 95; Ecuadorian immigrants, 548; Egyptian immigrants, 588 – 89; Eritrean immigrants, 633; Ethiopian immigrants, 674; Filipino immigrants, 718 – 20; Ghanaian immigrants, 764 – 66; Guatemalan immigrants, 809 – 10; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 857 – 58; Honduran immigrants, 950 – 51; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 978 – 80; Indonesian immigrants, 1041 – 42; Iranian immigrants, 1081 – 83, 1105; Iraqi immigrants, 1125 – 27; Jamaican immigrants, 1205 – 7; Kenyan immigrants, 1298 – 99; Korean immigrants, 1342 – 46; Lebanese immigrants, 1437; Liberian immigrants, 1469 – 70; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1570; Nigerian immigrants, 1609 – 10; Pakistani immigrants, 1673; Peruvian immigrants, 1789 – 90, 1798 – 99; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1857 – 58; Somalian immigrants, 1976 – 77; Taiwanese immigrants, 2056 – 57; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2150 – 52; Venezuelan immigrants, 2207 – 8 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 755 Economic Recovery Program (ERP) (Ghana), 759 Economic Recovery Program (ERP) (U.S.), 852 Ecuador: chronological history, 533 – 35; early immigration, 542 – 43; geography, 535 – 36;
historical background, 535 – 42; migration, causes and waves, 542 – 45, 565 – 67; ongoing waves of immigration, 543 – 45; undocumented immigrants, 545 Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI), 540 Ecuadorian immigrants, 533 – 71; age and family structure, 546 – 47; citizenship pathways, 558; civic and electoral participation, 559 – 60; demographics and census statistics, 545 – 49, 568; economic attainment, 548; educational attainment, 547 – 48; families and changing gender relations, 551 – 52; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 549 – 51; foodways, 555 – 56; forecasts for 21st century, 564; health statistics and issues, 548 – 49; holiday celebrations, 554 – 55; identity retention, 552 – 54; integration, impact on U.S., 557 – 58; intergroup relations, 558 – 59; music, arts, entertainment, 556 – 57; national language press, 554; notable Ecuadorian Americans, 568 – 70; return immigration, 561; second and later generations, 561 – 63; size, community composition, 545 – 46; U.S.-Ecuador issues, 563 – 64; youth profile, 562 – 63 Ecuadorian-Peruvian War (1941), 1779 Educational attainments: Afghani immigrants, 13; Argentinean immigrants, 53 – 54; Bahamian immigrants, 93; Bangladeshi immigrants, 119; Brazilian immigrants, 169, 187, 189; Cambodian immigrants, 216 – 17, 226 – 27; Chilean immigrants, 250 – 51; Chinese immigrants, 308; Costa Rican immigrants, 390, 401; Dominican immigrants, 489, 509 – 13; Ecuadorian immigrants, 547 – 48; Egyptian immigrants, 588 – 89; Eritrean immigrants, 633, 642; Ethiopian immigrants, 659, 673; Filipino immigrants, 739 – 40; Ghanaian immigrants, 770 – 71, 779; Guatemalan immigrants, 809, 823; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 858 – 59; Haitian immigrants, 919 – 21; Honduran immigrants, 950; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 978, 980, 1009; Indonesian immigrants, 1040 – 41; Iranian immigrants, 1081 – 83, 1096 – 97, 1105; Iraqi immigrants, 1125 – 27, 1137; Jamaican immigrants, 1204 – 5; Japanese immigrants, 1270 – 71; Kenyan immigrants, 1298; Korean immigrants, 1375 – 76; Laotian immigrants, 1402; Lebanese immigrants, 1437; Liberian immigrants, 1469; Mexican
Index | 2301 immigrants, 1515, 1535 – 36; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1569 – 70, 1580 – 81; Nigerian immigrants, 1608; Pakistani immigrants, 1673; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1706; Panamanian immigrants, 1747, 1760 – 61; Peruvian immigrants, 1788, 1798; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1856 – 57, 1885 – 86; Somalian immigrants, 1976, 1994; Taiwanese immigrants, 2055 – 56; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2150; Venezuelan immigrants, 2207; Vietnamese immigrants, 2256 Edusei, Kwame Bawuah, 790 Egypt: chronological history, 579; demographic profile, 587 – 89; geography, 580 – 81; historical background, 582 – 84; migration, causes and waves, 584 – 87; migration statistics, 609 – 10 Egyptian American Community Foundation, 594 Egyptian American Cultural Association, 600 Egyptian American Group, 601 Egyptian American Society (EAS), 606 Egyptian immigrants, 577 – 616; adjustment and adaptation, 589 – 97; American identity establishment, 599 – 603; citizenship pathways, 597 – 98; civic and electoral participation, 599 – 603; community size and composition, 587 – 88; demographics and census statistics, 611 – 13; economic attainment, 588 – 89; educational attainment, 588 – 89; families and changing gender relations, 591 – 93; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 589 – 90; health statistics and issues, 589; identity retention, 593 – 94; impact on U.S. society, 597 – 603; intergroup relations, 598 – 99; legal permanent resident status, 609 – 10; national language press, 596 – 97; notable Egyptian Americans, 613; occupation data, 613; religion, 594 – 96; second and later generations, 603 – 8; U.S.-Egypt issues, 608; youth profile, 604 – 5 Egyptian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, 593 Egyptian Nationality Law (1975), 579 Egyptians Abroad Law (1983), 593 Eisenhower, Dwight, 416, 874 – 75 Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army) (Colombia), 355, 356, 359, 360, 361 Ejeta, Gebisa, 693 Ekeh, Peter P., 1639 El-Baz, Farouk, 613
El Norte (film), 816 El Salvador: chronological history, 1903 – 6; Civil War, 1911 – 15; demographics and census statistics, 1956; economic migrations, 1917 – 18; geography, 1906 – 8; historical background, 1908 – 15; migration statistics, 1954 – 55; war and revolution, 1916 – 17. See also Salvadoran immigrants El Salvador migration waves: fifth wave (1975 – 1990), 1922 – 24; first (1870 – 1930), 1919; fourth wave (1960 – 1970), 1921 – 22; second wave (1930 – 1941), 1919 – 20; sixth wave (1991 – 2010), 1924 – 25; third wave (1941 – 1950), 1920 – 21 Elizabeth, Shannon, 1455 Ellison, Keith Maurice, 1991 Emanuel, Rahm, 1181 Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law (1983) (Egypt), 593 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (2002), 1669 Entertainment. See music, arts and entertainment Eritrea: chronological history, 619 – 20; demographic profile, 630 – 33; geography, 620 – 22; historical background, 622 – 25; migration, causes and waves, 625 – 30; migration statistics, 645 – 48 Eritrean American immigrants, 617 – 51; adjustment and adaptation, 633 – 40; age and family structure, 632 – 33; assimilation and separatism issues, 629; citizenship pathways, 640 – 41; civic and electoral participation, 640; community size and composition, 630 – 32; cultural identification, 642; demographics and census statistics, 630 – 33, 649; early immigration, 628 – 29; economic attainment, 633; educational attainment, 633, 642; ethnic identity, 641; families and changing gender relations, 634; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 633 – 34; foodways, 638; forecasts for 21st century, 645; holiday celebrations, 638; identity retention, 635 – 36, 641 – 42; impact on U.S. society, 640 – 41; intergroup relations, 641; language issues, 631 – 32; music, arts, entertainment, 638 – 40; national language press, 636 – 37; notable Eritrean Americans, 649 – 50; religion, 636; return immigration, 631; second and later generations, 641 – 42; U.S.-Eritrea issues, 642, 644 – 45; youth profile, 643 Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA), 635
2302 | Index Eritrean Democratic Party (EDP), 635 Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) (1962), 620, 624, 629, 635, 663, 668, 671 Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), 669 Eritrean People’s Liberation Front: (EPLF) (1970), 620, 624 – 25, 629, 634 – 35, 640 – 43, 663, 668, 671, 677 – 80, 686 Eritrean Peoples Party (EPP), 635 Eritrean Relief Association, 635 Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, and Nationalism, 1941 – 1993 (Iyob), 650 Escobar, Pablo, 355, 377 Estefan, Gloria, 462 Ethiopia: chronological history, 660 – 64; early migration, 670 – 71; geography, 664 – 65; historical background, 665 – 70; later migration, 671 – 73; migration, causes and waves, 670 – 73; migration statistics, 687 – 90; U.S.Ethiopian issues, 659, 685 – 87 Ethiopian Community Development Council, 670 Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), 670 – 71 Ethiopian-Eritrean border war (1998 – 2000), 620, 626, 642 Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation (1952), 620, 666 Ethiopian immigrants, 657 – 700; adjustment and adaptation, 674 – 78; age and family structure, 674, 681; citizenship pathways, 680 – 81; civic and electoral participation, 675 – 76; community size and composition, 674 – 76; demographics and census statistics, 673 – 74, 691 – 92; economic attainment, 674; educational attainment, 659, 673; ethnic group diversity, 673 – 74; families and changing gender relations, 678 – 81; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 674, 681 – 82; foodways, 678; forecasts for 21st century, 672 – 73, 680 – 81; identity retention, 681 – 83; integration/impact on U.S. society, 679 – 81; intergroup relations, 675 – 77; language issues, 677; music, arts, entertainment, 678, 682; national language press, 681 – 82; notable Ethiopian Americans, 692 – 95; religion, 675 – 78; return immigration, 679 – 80; second and later generations, 681 – 85; youth profile, 682 Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (1991), 663 – 64, 672 – 73, 677, 679 – 80, 686 Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP), 670 – 71
Ethiopian Revolution (1974), 659 – 60 Ethiopian Sports Federation in North America (ESFNA), 678 – 79 Ethnic group diversity: in Afghanistan, 11 – 12; in Argentina, 44 – 45; in Brazil, 157 – 58; in Colombia, 356; in Costa Rica, 389; in Cuba, 421; in Eritrea, 641; in Ethiopia, 673 – 74; in Ghana, 771; in Guyana, 845, 848, 856, 865; in Honduras, 956 – 57; in Iranian, 1072 – 73, 1083; in the Philippines, 740 – 41 Etzioni, Amitai, 1181 – 82 Euraque, Dario, 963 Evangelical practitioners: Cuban immigrants, 437; Eritrean immigrants, 622, 627, 636; Filipino immigrants, 727; Ghanaian immigrants, 773, 776; Guatemalan immigrants, 804, 813; Haitian immigrants, 910; Honduran immigrants, 952; Israeli immigrants, 1175; Korean immigrants, 1360; Peruvian immigrants, 1793; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1862, 1865 – 86; Taiwanese immigrants, 2064 Everything Good Will Come (Atta), 1625 Ewing, Patrick, 1239 Exchange Visitor Program (EVP) (1948) (U.S.), 714 Expatriate Bangladesh 2000 (EB2000), 125 Ezana (Eritrean/Ethiopian emperor), 619, 622, 660 – 61 Fadola, Toyin, 1639 Families and changing gender relations: Afghani immigrants, 16 – 17; Argentinean immigrants, 57 – 58; Bangladeshi immigrants, 123 – 24; Brazilian immigrants, 173 – 74; Cambodian immigrants, 219; Chilean immigrants, 252; Chinese immigrants, 313 – 14; Colombian immigrants, 365 – 66; Costa Rican immigrants, 393; Cuban immigrants, 430 – 31, 434 – 35; Ecuadorian immigrants, 551 – 52; Egyptian immigrants, 591 – 93; Eritrean American immigrants, 634; Ethiopian immigrants, 678 – 81; Filipino immigrants, 715, 723; Ghanaian immigrants, 773, 779; Guatemalan immigrants, 812 – 13; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 861 – 62; Haitian immigrants, 906 – 7; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 981 – 82, 991; Iranian immigrants, 1084 – 85; Jamaican immigrants, 1211 – 12; Japanese immigrants, 1262; Laotian immigrants, 1404 – 5; Lebanese immigrants, 1439; Liberian
Index | 2303 immigrants, 1471 – 72; Mexican immigrants, 1520 – 21; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1573 – 74; Nigerian immigrants, 1612 – 13; Panamanian immigrants, 1750 – 51; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1863; Somalian immigrants, 1982 – 83; Taiwanese immigrants, 2059 – 60; Thai immigrants, 2111 – 12; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2154 – 55 Family, culture, life-cycle rituals: Afghani immigrants, 15 – 16; Argentinean immigrants, 55 – 56; Bahamian immigrants, 93 – 94; Bangladeshi immigrants, 120; Cambodian immigrants, 218 – 19; Chilean immigrants, 252; Chinese immigrants, 311 – 13; Colombian immigrants, 364 – 65; Costa Rican immigrants, 391 – 93; Cuban immigrants, 433 – 34; Dominican immigrants, 505; Ecuadorian immigrants, 549 – 51; Egyptian immigrants, 589 – 90; Eritrean American immigrants, 633 – 34; Ethiopian immigrants, 674, 681 – 82; Filipino immigrants, 721 – 23; Ghanaian immigrants, 772 – 73, 772 – 75; Guatemalan immigrants, 811 – 12; Guyanese (IndoGuyanese) immigrants, 859 – 61; Haitian immigrants, 904 – 6; Honduran immigrants, 951 – 52; Indonesian immigrants, 1043 – 44; Iranian immigrants, 1084 – 85; Iraqi immigrants, 1127 – 29; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1161 – 63; Jamaican immigrants, 1208 – 11; Kenyan immigrants, 1303 – 6; Korean immigrants, 1353 – 57; Laotian immigrants, 1403 – 4; Lebanese immigrants, 1438 – 39; Liberian immigrants, 1470 – 71; Mexican immigrants, 1516 – 20; Nigerian immigrants, 1611 – 12; Pakistani immigrants, 1674 – 75; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1707 – 9; Panamanian immigrants, 1749 – 50; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1861 – 63; Taiwanese immigrants, 2058 – 59; Thai immigrants, 2109 – 11; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2153 – 54 Family Reunification Immigration Act (1965) (U.S.), 484, 629, 978 Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), 937, 943, 1905, 1914 – 15, 1922, 1947, 1950 FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), 355 – 61, 377 Farid, Tariq, 1689 Farr, Jamie, 1455 Fauzi, Hala, 607
Federal Government Dispersal Policy (U.S.), 2241 Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act (1995), 1980 Federation of Bangladeshi-Americans in North America (FOBANA), 125 Female genital mutilation (FGM), 592, 1980 Fernández, Gigi, 1894 Fernández, Juan Mora, 383, 386 Fernández, Raul J., 569 Ferrer, José Figueres, 409 Ferrera, America, 963 – 64 Ferris, Bill, 1455 Fiancées Act (1946) (U.S.), 704, 714 Fifth Chinese Daughter (Wong), 324 Filipino Federation of Labor, 703 Filipino immigrants, 701 – 52; adjustment and adaptation, 721 – 33; age and family structure, 717 – 18; citizenship pathways, 733 – 34; civic and electoral participation, 736 – 38; community size and composition, 717; demographics and census statistics, 717 – 21, 744 – 45; economic attainment, 718 – 20; ethnic group diversity, 740 – 41; families and changing gender relations, 715, 723; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 721 – 23, 727 – 28; foodways, 730 – 31; forecasts for 21st century, 741 – 42; health statistics and issues, 720 – 21; holiday celebrations, 729 – 30; identity retention, 723 – 27, 739 – 41; intergroup relations, 735; language issues, 727 – 28; music, arts, entertainment, 731 – 33; national language press, 728 – 29; notable Filipino Americans, 746 – 48; occupational data, 704, 711 – 20, 735, 746; religion, 727; return immigration, 738 – 39; second and later generations, 739 – 41; U.S.-Filipino issues, 741 – 42; youth profile, 740 First Congress of Central America, 1909 Flatbush Haitian center, 909 Flomo, Paye, 1488 Fong Yue Ting v. United States (Supreme Court decision), 280 Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 403, 903 Foodways, 913 – 14; Afghani immigrants, 19 – 20; Argentinean immigrants, 61; Bahamian immigrants, 95; Bangladeshi immigrants, 128; Brazilian immigrants, 179 – 81; Cambodian immigrants, 222; Chilean immigrants, 254; Chinese immigrants, 321 – 23; Costa Rican immigrants,
2304 | Index 398; Cuban immigrants, 439 – 40; Ecuadorian immigrants, 555 – 56; Eritrean American immigrants, 638; Ethiopian immigrants, 678; Filipino immigrants, 730 – 31; Ghanaian immigrants, 772, 776; Guatemalan immigrants, 815; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 864 – 65; Haitian immigrants, 913 – 14; Honduran immigrants, 952 – 53; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 994 – 95; Indonesian immigrants, 1050 – 51; Iranian immigrants, 1090; Iraqi immigrants, 1134 – 35; Jamaican immigrants, 1217; Kenyan immigrants, 1309 – 10; Korean immigrants, 1349; Laotian immigrants, 1408; Lebanese immigrants, 1442; Liberian immigrants, 1474 – 75; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1575; Nigerian immigrants, 1620 – 23; Pakistani immigrants, 1676; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1712; Panamanian immigrants, 1754 – 55; Peruvian immigrants, 1794 – 95; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1869 – 71; Somalian immigrants, 1986 – 87; Taiwanese immigrants, 2070 – 71; Thai immigrants, 2116 – 17; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2161 – 62; Vietnamese immigrants, 2250 – 51 Foraker Act (1900) (Puerto Rico), 1843, 1849 – 50, 1875 Ford, Henry R., 928 Forecasts for the 21st century: for Argentinean immigrants, 67; for Brazilian immigrants, 190; for Chilean immigrants, 261 – 62; for Chinese immigrants, 332 – 33; for Costa Rican immigrants, 403 – 4; for Ecuadorian immigrants, 564; for Eritrean immigrants, 645; for Ethiopian immigrants, 672 – 73, 680 – 81; for Filipino immigrants, 741 – 42; for Ghanaian immigrants, 779 – 81; for Guatemalan immigrants, 823 – 24; for Guyanese immigrants, 876; for Haitian immigrants, 921 – 22, 921 – 23; for Honduran immigrants, 959; for Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 1013 – 14; for Iranian immigrants, 1101 – 2; for Iraqi immigrants, 1139; for Jamaican immigrants, 1232; for Japanese immigrants, 1275; for Kenyan immigrants, 1318; for Korean immigrants, 1377; for Laotian immigrants, 1412 – 13; for Lebanese immigrants, 1448 – 49; for Liberian immigrants, 1482; for Mexican immigrants, 1537 – 38; for Nicaraguan immigrants, 1582 – 83; for Nigerian immigrants, 1632; for Pakistani
immigrants, 1684; for Panamanian immigrants, 1761; for Puerto Rican immigrants, 1886 – 89; for Somalian immigrants, 1995; for Sudanese immigrants, 2025; for Trinidad and Tobago immigrants, 2172 – 74; for Venezuelan immigrants, 2213; for Vietnamese immigrants, 2256 – 58 Foreign Miner’s Tax (1852) (U.S.), 295 Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), 1905 Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular (FRNP) (Honduras), 944 Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN), 1559 – 60, 1563, 1565 – 66 From Colonia to Community: The History of Puerto Ricans in New York City (Korrol), 1896 Funj dynasty (Sudan), 622 Gabriel, Roman Ildonzo, Jr., 747 Gai, Deng, 2039 Galarza, Ernesto, 1545 – 46 Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, 613 Gambari, Ibrahim Agboola, 1625 Gandhi, Indira, 987 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand, 974, 984 Gandolfi, Giuseppe, 667 The Gangster of Love (Hagedorn), 747 Garcés, José, 569 García, Andy, 462 García, Ramon, 523 Garcia-Marquez, Gabriel, 369 Garifuna Coalition (2010) (U.S.), 820 Garifuna Heritage Foundation (GAHFU), 958 Garvey, Marcus, 87, 90 – 91, 1192, 1215, 1222, 1226, 2167 Gawande, Atul, 1000 Gebeyehu, Worqneh, 665 Gender-related Index (GDI) (UN), 391 Generations, second and later: Afghani immigrants, 23 – 24; Argentinean immigrants, 64 – 67; Bahamian immigrants, 96 – 98; Bangladeshi immigrants, 132 – 34; Brazilian immigrants, 186 – 90; Cambodian immigrants, 226 – 28; Chilean immigrants, 258; Chinese immigrants, 328 – 32; Colombian immigrants, 369 – 70; Costa Rican immigrants, 401 – 3; Cuban immigrants, 432, 449 – 51; Ecuadorian immigrants, 561 – 63; Egyptian immigrants, 603 – 8; Eritrean American immigrants, 641 – 42; Ethiopian immigrants, 681 – 85; Filipino immigrants, 739 – 41;
Index | 2305 Ghanaian immigrants, 778 – 81; Guatemalan immigrants, 819 – 23; Guyanese (IndoGuyanese) immigrants, 870 – 71; Haitian immigrants, 917 – 21; Honduran immigrants, 956 – 59; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 1007 – 12; Iranian immigrants, 1092 – 97; Iraqi immigrants, 1137; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1174 – 75; Jamaican immigrants, 1228 – 30; Japanese immigrants, 1267 – 69; Kenyan immigrants, 1314 – 16; Korean immigrants, 1372 – 74; Laotian immigrants, 1411 – 12; Liberian immigrants, 1479 – 81; Mexican immigrants, 1532 – 36; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1579 – 81; Nigerian immigrants, 1629 – 31; Pakistani immigrants, 1682; Peruvian immigrants, 1797 – 1799; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1883 – 86; Somalian immigrants, 1992 – 94; Taiwanese immigrants, 2077 – 82; Thai immigrants, 2106, 2120 – 22; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2169 – 71; Vietnamese immigrants, 2253 – 56 Gentleman’s Agreement (U.S.-Japan), 1255, 1329 Geography: of Afghanistan, 4 – 5; of Argentina, 42; of the Bahamas, 81 – 82; of Cambodia, 209 – 10; of China, 282 – 87; of Dominican Republican, 485 – 88; of Egypt, 580 – 81; of El Salvador, 1906 – 8; of Eritrea, 620 – 22; of Ethiopia, 664 – 65; of Ghana, 756 – 57; of Guatemala, 802 – 3; of Guyana, 847 – 48; of Haiti, 890; of Honduras, 938 – 39; of India, 971; of Indonesia, 1030 – 31; of Iran, 1072 – 73; of Iraq, 1114; of Israel, 1152 – 53; of Jamaica, 1193 – 94; of Japan, 1251 – 53; of Kenya, 1289 – 90; of Korea, 1331 – 32; of Lebanon, 1430 – 31; of Nicaragua, 1561; of Peru, 1781 – 82; of the Philippines, 705; of Puerto Rico, 1847; of Somalia, 1968 – 69; of Taiwan, 2045 – 46; of Venezuela, 2194 Gerima, Haile, 693 Ghahary, Akbar, 1107 Ghana: chronological history, 755 – 56; geography, 756 – 57; historical background, 757 – 59; migration, causes and waves, 759 – 68; migration statistics, 782 – 85 Ghanaian immigrants, 753 – 91; adjustment and adaptation, 772 – 73; age and family structure, 771; citizenship pathways, 760 – 61; civic and electoral participation, 774 – 77; community size and composition, 770 – 73; demographics and census statistics, 761 – 63, 786 – 89; economic attainment, 764 – 66;
educational attainment, 770 – 71, 779; ethnic group diversity, 771; families and changing gender relations, 773, 779; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 772 – 75; foodways, 772, 776; forecasts for 21st century, 779 – 81; health statistics and issues, 757, 778; holiday celebrations, 772; identity retention, 774 – 78; intergroup relations, 774; language issues, 776 – 77; music, arts, entertainment, 772 – 73; religion, 776; return immigration, 762; second and later generations, 778 – 81; youth profile, 780 Ghani, Ashraf, 32 Ghannam, Shareef, 604 – 5 Ghosal, Kumar, 115 Ghose, Shailendranath, 115 Ghosh, Amitav, 1000 Giacomini, Breno, 199 Gibran, Kahlil, 1455 Gil, Gilberto, 199 Global Organization of Peoples of Indian Origin (GOPIO), 1004 Glorious May Revolution (Ecuador), 540 Goizueta, Roberto, 462 Goldman, Francisco, 837 Gomez, Scott, 376 Gómez Santos, Andrés, 569 Gonzalez, Henry B., 1546 Gonzalez-Viaña, Eduardo, 1836 Good Samaritan Community Center (San Francisco), 1960 Gosselaar, Mark-Paul, 1064 Governors Island Accord (1992), 900 GraceLand (Abani), 1637 Gramm, Wendy, 1387 Grass Roof (Kang), 1389 Great Atlantic Banana Plantation strike (Costa Rica), 388 Green Card Lottery. See Diversity Visa programs Green Dragon movie (Bui), 2268 Guatemala: assimilation and separatism issues, 805 – 6; chronological history, 799 – 802; early immigration, 805; geography, 802 – 3; historical background, 803 – 5; later immigration, 806 – 7; migration statistics, 825 – 27 Guatemalan immigrants, 799 – 843; adjustment and adaptation, 811 – 16; age and family structure, 808 – 9; citizenship pathways, 816 – 17; civic and electoral participation, 817 – 18; community size and composition, 807 – 8; demographics and census statistics,
2306 | Index 827 – 36; economic attainment, 809 – 10; educational attainment, 809, 823; families and changing gender relations, 812 – 13; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 811 – 12; foodways, 815; health statistics and issues, 810 – 11; holiday celebrations, 814 – 15; identity retention, 813; intergroup relations, 817; language issues, 806, 809; music, arts, entertainment, 816; national language press, 814; occupational data, 832 – 33; return immigration, 818 – 19; second and later generations, 819 – 23; U.S.-Guatemalan issues, 823 – 24; youth profile, 822 Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 813 Guatemalan National Council for Attention to Migrants (CONAMIGUA), 824 Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG), 804 – 5, 943 Guatemalan Truth and Reconciliation Committee, 823 – 24 Gudat, Battle of (Ethiopia), 662 Gunadi, Tania, 1064 Gunawan, Tony, 1064 Gupta, Sanjay, 1019 Gura, Battle of (Ethiopia), 662 Guru (Keith Edward Elam), 2184 Guyana: chronological history, 845 – 47; geography, 847 – 48; historical background, 848 – 52; migration, causes and waves, 852 – 55; migration statistics, 877 – 79 Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 845 – 85; adjustment and adaptation, 859; age and family structure, 857; citizenship pathways, 854, 865; civic and electoral participation, 867 – 69; community size and composition, 855 – 57; demographics and census statistics, 880 – 81; economic attainment, 857 – 58; educational attainment, 858 – 59; ethnic group diversity, 845, 848, 856, 865; families and changing gender relations, 861 – 62; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 859 – 61; foodways, 864 – 65; forecasts for the 21st century, 876; holiday celebrations, 860 – 61; identity retention, 862 – 64, 871 – 74; intergroup relations, 866 – 67; music, arts, entertainment, 864 – 65; notable Indo-Guyanese Americans, 881; religion, 859 – 61; return immigration, 869 – 70; second and later generations, 870 – 71; U.S.-Guyanese issues, 874 – 76
Habibie, B. J. (Indonesian president), 1029, 1035 Habila, Helon, 1639 Habte, Aklilu, 692 – 93 Hagedorn, Jessica, 747 Haggar, Joseph Marion, 1455 Haggar, Sammy, 1455 Haile, Getachew, 693 Haile, Sossina, 695 Haiti: chronological history, 889 – 90; geography, 890; historical background, 891 – 900; migration, causes and waves, 900 – 903; migration statistics, 924 – 26 Haitian-American Public Health Initiative (HAPHI), 916 Haitian American United for Progress Community Center (HAUP), 909 Haitian-Americans United Organization, 916 Haitian Centers Council (1982) (U.S.), 909 Haitian Hometown Association Resource Group (2008), 908 Haitian immigrants, 887 – 931; adjustment and adaptation, 904 – 15; age and family structure, 903; civic and electoral participation, 909, 915 – 17; community size and composition, 903; demographics and census statistics, 926 – 27; early immigration, 901; educational attainment, 919 – 21; families and changing gender relations, 906 – 7; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 904 – 6; foodways, 913 – 14; health statistics and issues, 904; holiday celebrations, 912 – 13; identity retention, 907 – 8; intergroup relations, 915; language issues, 911 – 12; later immigration, 901 – 3; music, art, entertainment, 914 – 15; national language press, 912; notable Haitian Americans, 927 – 28; occupational data, 903 – 4; religion, 909 – 11; second and later generations, 917 – 21; U.S.-Haitian issues, 921 – 23; youth profile, 920 Haitian Ministries International, 910 Haitian Multi-Service Center Organization, 916 Haitian Neighborhood Service Center, 909 Hajratwala, Minal, 1000 Half of a Yellow Sun (Adichie), 1637 Hamza, Redwan, 679 Han Dynasty (China), 284, 286 Hanh, Thich Nhat, 2268 Hare Krishna movement, 985, 987 Harold and Kumar (film), 999 Harris, Kamala, 1003
Index | 2307 Hart-Cellar Immigration Act (1965) (U.S.), 92, 305, 704, 1029, 1037, 1158, 1200, 1496, 2051, 2105, 2145 Hasan, Fazle, 141 Hatata (Yacob), 661 Haussman, Ricardo, 2223 Havana, Declaration of (2001), 356, 361 Hawaiian Organic Act (1900) (U.S.), 280 Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association (HSPA), 703, 711 Hay-Bunau Treaty (U.S.-Panama), 1734 Hazrat Inayat Khan, 985 Headley, Heather, 2184 Health statistics and issues: Afghani immigrants, 14; Argentinean immigrants, 55; Bahamian immigrants, 93; Bangladeshi immigrants, 119 – 20; Brazilian immigrants, 172; Cambodian immigrants, 218; Chilean immigrants, 251; Chinese immigrants, 309 – 10; Costa Rican immigrants, 391; Ecuadorian immigrants, 548 – 49; Egyptian immigrants, 589; Filipino immigrants, 720 – 21; Ghanaian immigrants, 757, 778; Guatemalan immigrants, 810 – 11; Haitian immigrants, 904; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 980; Indonesian immigrants, 1042 – 43; Iraqi immigrants, 1127; Jamaican immigrants, 1207; Kenyan immigrants, 1300; Laotian immigrants, 1403; Lebanese immigrants, 1438; Liberian immigrants, 1470; Nigerian immigrants, 1610; Pakistani immigrants, 1673 – 74; Panamanian immigrants, 1749; Peruvian immigrants, 1790, 1799; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1860 – 61; Somalian immigrants, 1979 – 80; Taiwanese immigrants, 2057 – 58; Thai immigrants, 2108 – 9; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2152 – 53 Hejdazi, Hossein, 1089 Heng, Cheng, 230 Hernandez, Leticia, 1941 Hernandez, Martha, 370 Hernandez Martinez, Maximiliano, 1910, 1919 Hezbollah (Shi’a militant group), 1429 – 32, 1435, 1444, 1448 – 49, 1456 Hezbollah-Israel War (2006), 1448 Hinds, Samuel, 852 Hinduism: Bangladeshi immigrants, 126; Costa Rican immigrants, 395; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 859; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 972 – 73; Indonesian immigrants, 1027
Hispanic Caucus of the National School Board Association, 1958 – 59 Historical background: of Afghanistan, 5 – 9; of Argentina, 42 – 44; of Brazil, 158 – 64; of Cambodia, 210 – 12; of Egypt, 582 – 84; of El Salvador, 1908 – 15; of Eritrea, 622 – 25; of Ethiopia, 665 – 70; of Ghana, 757 – 59; of Guatemala, 803 – 5; of Guyana, 848 – 52; of Haiti, 891 – 900; of Honduras, 939 – 44; of India, 971 – 74; of Indonesia, 1031 – 36; of Iran, 1073 – 74; of Iraq, 1111, 1114 – 17; of Israel, 1149; of Jamaica, 1189, 1194 – 96; of Japan, 1247, 1251 – 53; of Kenya, 1287, 1291 – 93; of Korea, 1329, 1332 – 34; of Laos, 1397, 1399 – 1400; of Lebanon, 1427, 1431 – 32; of Nigeria, 1598 – 1606; of Peru, 1782 – 85; of the Philippines, 705 – 9; of Puerto Rico, 1847 – 52; of Somalia, 1965 – 67, 1969 – 71; of Taiwan, 2043, 2046 – 50; of Venezuela, 2191, 2194 – 95 HIV/AIDS issues: Brazilian immigrants, 189; Costa Rican immigrants, 391; Guatemalan immigrants, 811; Haitian immigrants, 904; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 1013; Korean immigrants, 1387; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1860 Hmong Means Free: Life in Laos and America (Chan), 348 Hmong Veterans’ Naturalization Act (2000), 1399, 1410 Ho, David, 2090 Holder, Geoffrey, 2184 Holding Serve: Persevering On and Off the Court (Chang), 348 Holiday celebrations: Afghani immigrants, 18; Argentinean immigrants, 60; Bahamian immigrants, 94; Bangladeshi immigrants, 127 – 28; Brazilian immigrants, 178 – 79; Cambodian immigrants, 221 – 22; Chilean immigrants, 253; Chinese immigrants, 320 – 21; Costa Rican immigrants, 396 – 98; Cuban immigrants, 438 – 39; Ecuadorian immigrants, 554 – 55; Eritrean American immigrants, 638; Filipino immigrants, 729 – 30; Ghanaian immigrants, 772; Guatemalan immigrants, 814 – 15; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 860 – 61; Haitian immigrants, 912 – 13; Honduran immigrants, 952; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 994; Indonesian immigrants, 1050; Iranian immigrants, 1084 – 85; Iraqi immigrants, 1134; Jamaican immigrants,
2308 | Index 1216; Kenyan immigrants, 1309 – 10; Korean immigrants, 1357 – 58, 1362; Laotian immigrants, 1407 – 8; Lebanese immigrants, 1441 – 42; Liberian immigrants, 1474 – 75; Mexican immigrants, 1524 – 25; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1572 – 73; Nigerian immigrants, 1619 – 20; Pakistani immigrants, 1676; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1710 – 12; Panamanian immigrants, 1753 – 54; Peruvian immigrants, 1794; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1869; Salvadoran immigrants, 1949 – 50; Taiwanese immigrants, 2069 – 70; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2158, 2160 – 61; Vietnamese immigrants, 2249 – 50 Home to Harlem (McKay), 1219 Home was the Land of Morning Calm (Kang), 1389 Homeland Security Department (U.S.) data: Afghanistan immigrants, 30; Argentinean immigrants, 51, 52, 62, 69, 70, 72; Bahamian immigrants, 92 – 93, 96, 99, 100; Bangladeshi immigrants, 136, 137; Brazilian immigrants, 165, 193; Cambodian immigrants, 228, 229, 230; Chilean immigrants, 255, 264, 265; Chinese immigrants, 334, 336, 338, 339; Colombian immigrants, 374, 375; Costa Rican immigrants, 390, 400, 404, 407; Cuban immigrants, 457, 458; Dominican immigrants, 496; Ecuadorian immigrants, 542 – 43, 544, 552, 558, 565 – 68; Egyptian immigrants, 586, 588, 609, 610, 612; Eritrean immigrants, 617, 631, 647, 648; Ethiopian immigrants, 672, 680, 688 – 92, 689, 690, 691, 692; Filipino immigrants, 743 – 44; Ghanaian immigrants, 754, 782, 785; Guatemalan immigrants, 825, 826, 827, 836; Guyanese immigrants, 865, 877, 878, 879; Haitian immigrants, 924, 925, 926; Honduran immigrants, 954, 959 – 60; Indian immigrants, 1016, 1018; Indonesian immigrants, 1054, 1058, 1059, 1060, 1062, 1063; Iranian immigrants, 1077, 1081, 1106; Iraqi immigrants, 1123, 1141, 1142; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1159; Mexican immigrants, 1540; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1565, 1584, 1585; Nigerian immigrants, 1633, 1634; Pakistani immigrants, 1685, 1686; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1721; Panamanian immigrants, 1742, 1762, 1763, 1764, 1765, 1766; Salvadoran immigrants, 1954, 1955, 1958; Somalian
immigrants, 1988, 1997, 1999, 2000; Taiwanese immigrants, 2083, 2084, 2089; Thai immigrants, 2125, 2126, 2128; Trinidad and Tobago immigrants, 2146, 2165, 2173, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178; Venezuelan immigrants, 2205, 2215, 2217; Vietnamese immigrants, 2266, 2267 Homo erectus (Java Man), 1031 Honduran immigrants, 933 – 68; adjustment and adaptation, 951 – 53; age and family structure, 949 – 50; citizenship pathways, 953 – 54; civic and electoral participation, 954 – 56; community size and composition, 949; demographics and census statistics, 949, 962 – 63; early immigration, 944 – 45; economic attainment, 950 – 51; educational attainment, 950; ethnic group diversity, 956 – 57; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 951 – 52; foodways, 952 – 53; holiday celebrations, 952; identity retention, 958 – 59; language issues, 950; later immigration, 945 – 49; music, art, entertainment, 953; notable Honduran immigrants, 963 – 64; occupational data, 950 – 51; return immigration, 954; second and later generations, 956 – 59; U.S.-Honduran issues, 959 Hondurans United in Los Angeles (HULA), 948, 955, 958 – 59 Honduras: chronological history, 935 – 37; geography, 938 – 39; historical background, 939 – 44; migration, causes and waves, 944 – 49; migration statistics, 959 – 61 Hope II Trade legislation (U.S), 922 Hosseini, Khaled, 32 House of Sand and Fog (film), 1083 House of the Winds (Yun), 1389 Houssay, Bernardo, 54 Hoyte, Desmond, 852 Hsu, Evonne, 2078 Huerta, Dolores, 1547 – 48 Human Development Index (HDI) (UN), 391, 581, 1430 Human Rights and Labor Bureau (U.S.), 644 Human Rights Congress for Bangladesh Minorities (HRCBM), 125 Human Rights Watch (HRW), 627 Humberto Romero, Carlos, 1912 Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs (Minnesota), 1994 Huo, TC, 1422 Hussain, Zakir, 997, 1019 Hussam, Abul, 141
Index | 2309 Hussein, Saddam, 1113, 1114, 1116, 1119 – 21, 1138 Hyun, David, 1387 Ibrahim, Mar Ibrahim, 1143 The Ice Storm movie (Ang Lee), 2090 Identity development (American identity): Afghani immigrants, 22; Argentinean immigrants, 63; Bahamian immigrants, 96; Bangladeshi immigrants, 131 – 32; Brazilian immigrants, 185; Cambodian immigrants, 224 – 25; Chilean immigrants, 257 – 58; Chinese immigrants, 326; Ecuadorian immigrants, 559; Egyptian immigrants, 599 – 603; Filipino immigrants, 735 – 36; Guatemalan immigrants, 817; Honduran immigrants, 954 – 55; Indian immigrants, 1002 – 6; Indonesian immigrants, 1053; Iranian immigrants, 1091 – 92; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1171 – 73; Jamaican immigrants, 1224 – 25; Japanese immigrants, 1262 – 63; Kenyan immigrants, 1313 – 14; Laotian immigrants, 1410 – 11; Lebanese immigrants, 1444 – 45; Liberian immigrants, 1477; Mexican immigrants, 1531 – 32; Pakistani immigrants, 1680 – 82; Palestine and Jordan immigrants, 1714; Panamanian immigrants, 1757; Peruvian immigrants, 1796; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1878; Somalian immigrants, 1991; Taiwanese immigrants, 2073 – 74; Venezuelan immigrants, 2208 – 11; Vietnamese immigrants, 2252 – 53 Identity retention (cultural and national): Afghani immigrants, 17 – 18; Argentinean immigrants, 59 – 60; Bahamian immigrants, 94; Brazilian immigrants, 174 – 78, 189 – 90; Cambodian immigrants, 220, 228; Chilean immigrants, 252 – 53, 257; Chinese immigrants, 314 – 15, 326; Colombian immigrants, 366 – 68; Costa Rican immigrants, 393 – 94, 401 – 3; Cuban immigrants, 435 – 36; Dominican immigrants, 495 – 501; Ecuadorian immigrants, 552 – 54; Egyptian immigrants, 593 – 94; Eritrean American immigrants, 635 – 36, 642; Ethiopian immigrants, 681 – 83; Filipino immigrants, 723 – 27, 740 – 41; Ghanaian immigrants, 774 – 78; Guatemalan immigrants, 813; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 862 – 64, 871 – 74; Haitian immigrants, 907 – 8; Honduran immigrants, 958 – 59; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 983 – 93, 1008 – 12;
Indonesian immigrants, 1044 – 46; Iranian immigrants, 1079 – 80, 1086 – 88; Iraqi immigrants, 1129 – 30; Jamaican immigrants, 1212 – 14; Japanese immigrants, 1261 – 62, 1271 – 74; Laotian immigrants, 1405 – 7; Lebanese immigrants, 1439 – 41; Liberian immigrants, 1472; Mexican immigrants, 1521; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1579 – 80; Nigerian immigrants, 1613; Pakistani immigrants, 1680 – 82; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1709 – 10; Panamanian immigrants, 1751, 1757; Peruvian immigrants, 1791 – 92; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1863 – 64; Somalian immigrants, 1983 – 84; Taiwanese immigrants, 2060 – 61; Thai immigrants, 2119 – 20; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2155; Vietnamese immigrants, 2254 – 56 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) (1996) (U.S.), 226, 716, 1937 Immigration Acts (U.S.) data: Argentinean immigrants, 51; Bahamian immigrants, 91 – 92; Bangladeshi immigrants, 115 – 16; Brazilian immigrants, 164; Chinese immigrants, 282, 303, 305, 325; Ecuadorian immigrants, 533, 542; Egyptian immigrants, 586; Eritrean American immigrants, 628 – 29; Ethiopian immigrants, 660; Filipino immigrants, 704, 713 – 14, 714 – 15, 716, 733 – 34; Ghanaian immigrants, 767; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 847, 853, 855; Haitian immigrants, 902; Honduran immigrants, 945 – 46; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 971, 975 – 76, 978, 980, 991; Indonesian immigrants, 1029, 1037; Iraqi immigrants, 1113, 1119, 1126; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1155; Jamaican immigrants, 1199, 1200; Japanese immigrants, 1247, 1250, 1251, 1253, 1257 – 58, 1271; Kenyan immigrants, 1294; Korean immigrants, 1331, 1337, 1339 – 40, 1363; Liberian immigrants, 1465; Mexican immigrants, 1496, 1507 – 9; Nigerian immigrants, 1606; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1705, 1716; Panamanian immigrants, 1744; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1854 – 55; Salvadoran immigrants, 1905, 1921; Sudanese immigrants, 2024 Immigration and Naturalization Service (U.S.) data: Afghani immigrants, 10, 20 – 21, 31; Argentinean immigrants, 68; Bangladeshi immigrants, 117; Brazilian immigrants,
2310 | Index 164; Chilean immigrants, 263; Chinese immigrants, 282, 298, 316, 325; Dominican immigrants, 517; Ecuadorian immigrants, 545, 565; Ethiopian immigrants, 671, 672; Filipino immigrants, 713; Guatemalan immigrants, 801, 807; Haitian immigrants, 901 – 3; Iranian immigrants, 1077, 1099; Jamaican immigrants, 1202, 1227; Kenyan immigrants, 1297; Liberian immigrants, 1465 – 66; Mexican immigrants, 1506 – 8; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1568, 1575; Salvadoran immigrants, 1905, 1918 Immigration Reform and Control Acts (IRCA) (U.S.) data: Bahamian immigrants, 92; Bangladeshi immigrants, 111, 116 – 17; Eritrean American immigrants, 629; Eritrean immigrants, 629; Filipino immigrants, 716; Ghanaian immigrants, 756, 767; Guatemalan immigrants, 806 – 7; Guyanese (IndoGuyanese) immigrants, 855; Honduran immigrants, 947; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 976; Iraqi immigrants, 1120; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1154; Japanese immigrants, 1258; Liberian immigrants, 1465; Mexican immigrants, 1496, 1508 – 9, 1552; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1566; Nigerian immigrants, 1607; Panamanian immigrants, 1744; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1855; Salvadoran immigrants, 1905; Sudanese immigrants, 2024; Taiwanese immigrants, 2052; Thai immigrants, 2105; Trinidadian and Tobagonian immigrants, 2146, 2173 In My Father’s House (Appiah), 790 India: chronological history, 969 – 71; geography, 971; historical background, 971 – 74; migration, causes and waves, 975 – 77; migration statistics, 1015 – 16 Indian American Forum for Political Education (IAFPE), 1003 Indian American National Foundation (IANF), 1003 Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 969 – 1026; adjustment and adaptation, 981 – 1001; age and family structure, 977 – 78; assimilation and separatism issues, 975; citizenship pathways, 1001 – 2; civic and electoral participation, 1002 – 6; community size and composition, 977; demographics and census statistics, 977 – 78, 1017 – 19; economic attainment, 978 – 80; educational attainment, 978, 980, 1009; families and changing
gender relations, 981 – 82, 991; foodways, 994 – 95; health statistics and issues, 980; holiday celebrations, 994; identity retention, 983 – 93, 1008 – 12; language issues, 993; legal permanent resident status, 1016, 1018; music, arts, entertainment, 995 – 1001; national language press, 993 – 94; notable Indian Americans, 1019 – 20; occupational data, 978 – 80, 1018; religion, 972 – 74; return migration, 1007; second and later generations, 1007 – 12; U.S.-Indian issues, 1013 – 14 Indian Muslim Relief Committee, 1014 Indian National Congress (1885), 974 Indo American Hospitality Association (1989), 980 Indo-American Physicians and Dentists Political Association, 980 Indo-Caribbean Federation, 863 Indo-Pakistani War (1947), 1660 Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (1975), 1397 Indonesia: chronological history, 1027 – 30; geography, 1030 – 31; historical background, 1031 – 36; migration, causes and waves, 1036 – 38; migration statistics, 1058 – 60; U.S.-Indonesian issues, 1055 – 57 Indonesian-American Association (Ikatan Keluarga Indonesia) (IKI), 1045 – 46 Indonesian American Association of the Carolinas, 1046 Indonesian American Society of Florida, 1046 Indonesian Business Directory U.S.A. (publication), 1049 Indonesian Chinese American Association (ICAA), 1049 Indonesian Community Needs Assessment Summary Report (ICNASR), 1043 Indonesian immigrants, 1027 – 68; adjustment and adaptation, 1043 – 51; age and family structure, 1039 – 40; assimilation and separatism issues, 1037 – 38; citizenship pathways, 1052; civic and electoral participation, 1053; community size and composition, 1038 – 39; demographics and census statistics, 1038 – 39, 1052, 1061 – 63; economic attainment, 1041 – 42; educational attainment, 1040 – 41; family, culture, lifecycle rituals, 1043 – 44; foodways, 1050 – 51; health statistics and issues, 1042 – 43; holiday celebrations, 1050; identity retention, 1044 – 46; intergroup relations, 1052 – 53;
Index | 2311 language issues, 1047 – 48; legal resident status by state (2009), 1063; music, arts, entertainment, 1051; national language press, 1048 – 49; notable Indonesian Americans, 1064; occupational data, 1041 – 42; religion, 1046 – 47; return immigration, 1054; youth profile, 1056 – 57 Indonesian Muslim Community, Inc. (IMCI), 1047 Indonesian Muslim Society in America (IMSA), 1049 Indonesian Performing Arts Association, 1046 Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE), 1004 Inikori, Joseph, 1639 Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC) (Ecuador), 539 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), 165, 1584, 1833, 1892, 1893 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), 922 Inter-American Monetary Fund, 922 Inter-American Regional Organization of Labor (ORIT), 941 Intercollegiate Taiwanese American Student Association (ITASA), 2062 Interfaith Youth Core (U.S.), 982 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 644 Intergroup relations: Afghani immigrants, 21 – 22; Argentinean immigrants, 63; Bahamian immigrants, 96; Bangladeshi immigrants, 130 – 31; Brazilian immigrants, 184 – 85; Cambodian immigrants, 224; Chilean immigrants, 256 – 57; Chinese immigrants, 325; Ecuadorian immigrants, 558 – 59; Egyptian immigrants, 598 – 99; Eritrean American immigrants, 641; Ethiopian immigrants, 675 – 77; Filipino immigrants, 735; Ghanaian immigrants, 774; Guatemalan immigrants, 817; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 866 – 67; Haitian immigrants, 915; Indonesian immigrants, 1052 – 53; Iranian immigrants, 1091; Jamaican immigrants, 1222 – 23; Kenyan immigrants, 1312 – 13; Lebanese immigrants, 1444; Liberian immigrants, 1476 – 77; Mexican immigrants, 1529 – 31; Pakistani immigrants, 1678; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1714; Panamanian immigrants, 1756 – 57; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1875 – 78; Somalian immigrants, 1989 – 90; Taiwanese immigrants, 2073;
Thai immigrants, 2118 – 19; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2165 – 66 International Academy of Comparative Law (The Hague), 2223 International Catholic Migration Committee (ICMC), 672 International Center for Health Leadership and Development, 1960 International Committee for Migration (ICM), 672 International Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), 628 International Cooperation Administration (ICA), 362, 564, 628, 659, 755, 760, 1036 International Institute for Education (IIE), 770 International Military Education Training (IMET), 659 International Monetary Fund (IMF) support: for Brazilian immigrants, 174 – 75; for Ghanaian immigrants, 759, 765; for Guyanese immigrants, 852; for Haitian immigrants, 922; for Indonesian immigrants, 1045; for Jamaican immigrants, 1202; for Kenyan immigrants, 1293; for Nigerian immigrants, 1601, 1606, 1629, 1643 – 44; for Peruvian immigrants, 1786 International Organization for Migration (IOM) data: Argentinean immigrants, 67; Ghanaian immigrants, 759, 765, 778; Guatemalan immigrants, 805, 807, 843; Kenyan immigrants, 1295 International Relations Committee (JapanU.S.), 1274 International Rescue Committee (IRC), 672, 2239 International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) (Hare Krishnas), 985 Iran: chronological history, 1071 – 72; geography, 1072 – 73; historical background, 1073 – 74; migration, causes and waves, 1076 – 80; migration statistics, 1103 – 5; modern history, 1074 – 75 Iran-Contra affair, 1564 Iranian Alliances Across the Borders (IAAB), 1095 Iranian American Political Action Committee (IAPAC), 1092 Iranian immigrants, 1069 – 1110; adjustment and adaptation, 1083 – 91; age and family structure, 1095 – 96; assimilation and separatism issues, 1154; citizenship pathways, 1076 – 79; civic and electoral participation,
2312 | Index 1091 – 92, 1100 – 1102; community size and composition, 1080 – 81; demographics and census statistics, 1105 – 6; dual marginality, 1079 – 80, 1095; economic attainment, 1081 – 83, 1105; educational attainment, 1081 – 83, 1096 – 97, 1105; ethnic diversity, 1072 – 73, 1083; families and changing gender relations, 1084 – 85; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 1084 – 85; foodways, 1090; forecasts for 21st century, 1101 – 2; holiday celebrations, 1086 – 87; identity retention, 1079 – 80, 1086 – 88; intergroup relations, 1091; language issues, 1089 – 90; legal permanent resident status, 1104, 1106; music, arts, entertainment, 1090 – 91; national language press, 1087; notable Iranian Americans, 1106 – 7; occupational data, 1076, 1081 – 82; religion, 1088 – 89; second and later generations, 1092 – 97; U.S.-Iranian issues, 1097 – 1101; youth profile, 1094 Iraq: chronological history, 1111 – 14; early and late migration, 1118 – 19; forecasts for the 21st century, 1139; geography, 1114; historical background, 1111, 1114 – 17; Immigration Act (1965), 1119; migration statistics, 1139 – 41; 1963-present, 1120 – 22; U.S.-Iraq issues, 1138 – 39 Iraqi immigrants, 1111 – 44; age and family structure, 1125; citizenship pathways, 1135 – 37; community size and composition, 1122 – 1125; demographics and census statistics, 1142 – 43; economic attainment, 1125 – 27; educational attainment, 1125 – 27, 1137; ethnically-based social organizations, 1130; family, culture, life-cycle patterns, 1127 – 29; foodways, 1134 – 35; health statistics and issues, 1127; holiday celebrations, 1134; identity retention, 1129 – 30; language issues, 1133 – 34; music, arts, entertainment, 1135; national language press, 1133 – 34; notable Iraqi Americans, 1143 – 44; religion, 1130 – 33; second and later generations, 1137; youth profile, 1138 Irele, Abiola, 1640 Islamic Center of America, 1130, 1143 Islamic faith: Bangladeshi immigrants, 126; Costa Rican immigrants, 395; Egyptian immigrants, 594 – 96; Eritrean American immigrants, 636; Ethiopian immigrants, 676 – 77; Filipino immigrants, 727; Guyanese (IndoGuyanese) immigrants, 859; Indian (Asian
Indian) immigrants, 973; Iranian immigrants, 1088 – 89 Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), 130, 1014 An Island Like You: Stories of the Barrio, 1895 Israel: chronological history, 1151 – 52; early immigration, 1153 – 54; geography, 1152 – 53; historical background, 1149; late immigration, 1154 – 57; migration statistics, 1176 – 77; motivation of migrants, 1157 – 59; U.S.-Israel issues, 1174 Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1149 – 83; assimilation and separatism issues, 1154; communal patterns, 1165 – 67; demographics and census statistics, 1159 – 61, 1178 – 79; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 1161 – 63; gender and community activism, 1167 – 68; gender and family adaptation, 1163 – 65; impact on U.S. society, 1169; involvement in American Jewish life, 1170 – 71; notable Israeli Americans, 1180 – 83; return immigration, identity development, 1171 – 73; second and later generations, 1174 – 75; youth profile, 1174 Iyasu, Lij, 662 Iyob, Ruth, 650 Jaar, Alfredo, 272 Jacobs, Christianne Meneses, 1588 Jagan, Cheddi, 847, 850 – 52, 874 – 75 Jagdeo, Bharrat, 847, 852, 872 Jahan, Rounaq, 141 Jainism (religious beliefs), 972 – 73, 976, 985, 987, 992, 1006 Jalali, Ali Ahmad, 32 Jamaica: chronological history, 1191 – 92; early immigration, 1199 – 1200; geography, 1193 – 94; historical background, 1189, 1194 – 96; migration statistics, 1233 – 35; modern era, 1196 – 99; significant immigration waves, 1200; U.S.-Jamaica issues, 1231 – 32 Jamaica Awareness Association of California, 1226 Jamaican immigrants, 1189 – 1241; American identity development, 1224 – 25; citizenship pathways, 1220 – 21; civic and electoral participation, 1225; demographics and census statistics, 1236 – 39; economic attainment, 1205 – 7; educational attainment, 1204 – 5; families and changing gender relations, 1211 – 12; family, culture, life-cycle rituals,
Index | 2313 1208 – 11; foodways, 1217; forecasts for the 221st century, 1232; health issues and statistics, 1207; holiday celebrations, 1216; identity retention, 1212 – 14; intergroup relations, 1222 – 23; language issues, 1215 – 16; literature and academia, 1219 – 20; music, arts, entertainment, 1217 – 19; notable Jamaican Americans, 1239 – 40; political associations and organizations, 1226; reasons for migrating, 1201 – 2; religion, 1214 – 15; return immigration, 1227 – 28; second and later generations, 1228 – 30; settlements in the U.S., 1203 – 4; youth profile, 1229 Jamaican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1227 Jamaican Nurses Association, 1226 Jammo, Mar Sarhad, 1143 Jao, Frank, 2269 Japan: chronological history, 1247, 1249 – 51; early phase immigration, 1253 – 55; forecasts for the 21st century, 1275; geography, 1251 – 53; historical background, 1247, 1251 – 53; Immigration Act (1965), 1257 – 58; migration statistics, 1276 – 77; second phase immigration, 1255 – 56; third phase immigration, 1257; U.S.-Japan issues, 1274 – 75 Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), 1249, 1268, 1282, 1387 Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act (1948), 1250 Japanese Association of America, 1249 Japanese immigrants, 1247 – 83, 1249, 1268; American identity development, 1262 – 63; citizenship pathways, 1263 – 65; community size and composition, 1259 – 61; cultural identification, 1270; demographics and census statistics, 1278 – 81; educational attainment, 1270 – 71; ethnic identity, cultural identification, 1271 – 74; ethnicallybased social organizations, 1261 – 62; family/changing gender relations, 1262; identity retention, 1261 – 62; notable Japanese Americans, 1281 – 83; Pacific war and mass incarceration, 1265 – 67; second and later generations, 1267 – 69; youth profile, 1269 Jarrín, Jaime, 569 Jean, Wyclef, 918 Jehovah’s Witnesses: Eritrean immigrants, 622; Filipino immigrants, 727; Trinidad and Tobago immigrants, 2139 Jetabut, Sarawon “Jane,” 2121
Jews/Judaism: in Argentina, 39, 45, 51; in Brazil, 160, 176; in China, 286; in Costa Rica, 395; in Cuba, 423, 437; in Egypt, 580 – 81, 599; in El Salvador, 1908; in Ethiopia, 676; in India, 990; in Iran, 1073 – 74, 1077, 1088 – 89, 1099; in Iraq, 1111, 1113 – 15, 1118, 1125; in Israel, 1169; in Jamaica, 1124, 1193; in Mexico, 1522; in Palestine and Jordan, 1698; in Peru, 1784; in Puerto Rico, 1875, 1879; in Trinidad and Tobago, 2139. See also Israeli Jewish immigrants A Jihad for Love (film), 1005 Jiminez, Francisco, 1548 – 49 Jindal, Bobby, 1019 Johnson, James Weldon, 87, 102 Johnson, Lyndon B., 482, 1921 Johnson, Melvin, 1488 Johnson, Shoshana, 1772 Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 (U.S.), 89, 1433, 1496, 1505, 1655, 1657 Jones, Dwight Sean, 1239 – 40 Jones, Jim, 875 – 76 Jones, Norah, 997 Jones Act (1917) (U.S.-Puerto Rico), 1843, 1849, 1874, 1883 Jones Law (1916) (U.S.), 708 Jonestown Massacre (1978), 875 – 76 Journal of Bangladesh Studies (Andaleeb), 141 The Joy Luck Club (Tan), 324, 2268 Juanes (Juanes Esteban Aristizabal Vasquez), 375 Kahn, Reza, 1071, 1074 Kalanjali, Bharata, 998 Kaldas, Pauline, 613 Kalu, Anthonia, 1640 Kang, Connie, 1389 Kang, Younghill, 1389 Karbala Education Center (Michigan), 1130, 1143 Karim, Jawed, 133 Karzai, Hamid, 4, 8 Kasem, Kamal Amin “Casey,” 1455 Kassab, Joseph, 1143 Kebede, Liya, 694 Keller, Nora Okja, 1389 Keng, Lon, 230 Kennedy, Edward, 529 Kennedy, John F., 243, 421, 874 – 75, 1905 Kenya: chronological history, 1287 – 89; early immigration, 1293 – 94; historical background, 1287, 1291 – 93; human geography,
2314 | Index 1290; migration statistics, 1319; physical geography, 1289 – 90; U.S.-Kenya issues, 1316 – 18 Kenyan African National Union (KANU), 1295 Kenyan Community Abroad (KCA), 1307, 1313 Kenyan Development Network Consortium (KDNC), 1307 Kenyan Diaspora Network (KDN), 1313 Kenyan immigrants, 1287 – 1324; adjustment and adaptation, 1300 – 1310; age and family structure, 1297 – 98; American identity development, 1313 – 14; assimilation and separatism issues, 1294 – 96; citizenship pathways, 1310 – 12; community size and composition, 1297; continued links with Kenya, 1306 – 7; demographics and census statistics, 1320 – 22; economic attainment, 1298 – 99; educational attainment, 1298; ethnically-based social organizations, 1307 – 8; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 1303 – 6; foodways, 1309 – 10; forecasts for the 21st century, 1318; health statistics and issues, 1300; holiday celebrations, 1309 – 10; intergroup relations, 1312 – 13; language issues, 1308 – 9; music, arts, entertainment, 1309 – 10; notable Kenyan Americans, 1323; occupational and income patterns, 1298 – 99; religion, 1308; second and later generations, 1314 – 16; youth profiles, 1315 Khadduri, Majid, 1143 Khalidi, Rashid, 1723 Khalilzad, Zalmay, 32 Khalistan movement, 987 – 88 Khan, Fazal Mohammad, 1689 Khan, Fazlur Rahman, 141 – 42, 1689 Khan, Mohammad Asad, 1689 Khan, Shahid, 1689 Khatamee, Mahin, 1107 Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), 214, 225 Khmer Rouge (“Red Cambodians”), 207, 208, 211, 216, 220, 222, 225, 229, 331 Khorana, Har Gobing, 1020 Kim, Charles (Ho), 1387 Kim, Jim Yong, 1387 Kim, Richard E., 1389 Kim, Young-Kee, 1387 – 88 Kimono, Ras, 1640 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 2268 The King and I (London), 2103
Kingston, Maxine Hong, 324 Kirchner, Bharti, 1001 Kissinger, Henry, 239, 248, 937, 1198 The Kite Runner (Hosseini), 32 Klobuchar, Amy, 1991 – 92 Kludze, Ave, 790 – 91 Kochiyama, Yuri, 1281 – 82 Koh, Hongju Koh, 1388 Kordestani, Omid, 1107 Korea: chronological history, 1329 – 31; early immigration, 1336 – 38; forecasts for the 21st century, 1377; geography, 1331 – 32; historical background, 1329, 1332 – 34; language, 1334 – 35; later immigration, 1338 – 40; migration statistics, 1378 – 79; religion and traditional beliefs, 1335 – 36; U.S.-Korea issues, 1376 – 77 Korean-American Treaty of Chemulpo (1882), 1329, 1336, 1337 Korean Exclusion League, 1663 Korean immigrants, 1329 – 89; adjustment and adaptation, 1346 – 62; citizenship pathways, 1362; community size and composition, 1340 – 42; demographics and census statistics, 1379 – 86; economic attainment, 1342 – 46; educational attainment, 1375 – 76; ethnically-based social organizations, 1358 – 61; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 1353 – 57; foodways, 1349; holiday celebrations, 1357 – 58, 1362; language issues, 1347 – 48; notable Korean Americans, 1386 – 89; relations with African Americans, 1364 – 66; relations with other Asians, 1366 – 67; relationship with white Americans, 1362 – 64; return migration, 1371 – 72; second and later generations, 1372 – 74; socialization of Korean children, 1374 – 75; unique characteristics, 1367 – 71; youth profile, 1373 – 74 Korematsu v. U.S. (Supreme Court decision), 1250 Koston, Eric, 2130 Krama Bali organization, 1046 Krik Krak (Danticat), 928 Kris, Dim, 230 Krishnamurti, Jiddu, 985 Kulthum, Umm, 590 Kur, Benahin, 2026 Kwan, Michelle, 349 Labor Code (1957) (Honduras), 941 – 42 Lady Pink (Sandra Fabara), 570
Index | 2315 Lagat, Bernard, 1323 Lahiri, Jhumoa, 1000 Lai, Mim Mark, 349 Lakshmi, Padma, 1001 Lam, Tony, 2269 Lam Mow v. Nagle (1928), 281 Land of Smiles (Huo), 1422 Language issues: Bahamian immigrants, 95; Bangladeshi immigrants, 126; Brazilian immigrants, 176, 178, 198; Chinese immigrants, 319; Costa Rican immigrants, 395 – 96; Cuban immigrants, 436 – 37; Dominican Republican immigrants, 486; Eritrean American immigrants, 631 – 32; Ethiopian immigrants, 677; Filipino immigrants, 727 – 28; Ghanaian immigrants, 776 – 77; Guatemalan immigrants, 806, 809; Haitian immigrants, 911 – 12, 993; Honduran immigrants, 950; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 993; Indonesian immigrants, 1047 – 48; Iranian immigrants, 1089 – 90; Iraqi immigrants, 1133 – 34; Jamaican immigrants, 1215 – 16; Kenyan immigrants, 1308 – 9; Korean immigrants, 1347 – 48; Liberian immigrants, 1473 – 74; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1574 – 75; Nigerian immigrants, 1616; Panamanian immigrants, 1753; Peruvian immigrants, 1793; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1867; Somalian immigrants, 1985 – 86; Taiwanese immigrants, 2067; Thai immigrants, 2114 – 16; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2157 – 58 Laos: chronological history, 1397 – 99; historical background, 1397, 1399 – 1400; migration, causes and waves, 1401; migration statistics, 1414 – 16; U.S.-Laos issues, 1412 – 13 Laotian immigrants, 1397 – 1423; American identity development, 1410 – 11; citizenship pathways, 1410; community size and composition, 1401 – 2; demographics and census statistics, 1417 – 21; economic attainment, 1402 – 3; educational attainment, 1402; families and changing gender relations, 1404 – 5; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 1403 – 4; foodways, 1408; health statistics and issues, 1403; holiday celebrations, 1407 – 8; identity retention, 1405 – 7; music, arts, entertainment, 1409 – 10; notable Laotian immigrants, 1422 – 23; second and later generations, 1411 – 12; youth profile, 1412 Last Comic Standing tv show (Phan), 2270
Latin American Economic System study (2005), 368 Latin American Migration Project (LAMP), 2205 The Latin Deli: Prose and Poetry (Cofer), 1895 Latino Partnership Initiative, 2212 The Laughter of My Father (Bulosan), 746 Le, Cung, 2269 Le Code Noir (The Black Code), 892 – 93 Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics (LEAP), 1387 League of Nations, 669, 1113, 1115, 1151, 1153, 1429, 1463, 1697, 1699, 1724 League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), 1532 Lebanese American Association, 1447 Lebanese American Foundation, 1447 Lebanese immigrants, 1427 – 56; age and family structure, 1436 – 37; American identity development, 1444 – 45; assimilation and separatism issues, 1434; citizenship pathways, 1443 – 44; community size and composition, 1435 – 36; demographics and census statistics, 1452 – 54; economic attainment, 1437; educational attainment, 1437; ethnicity-based organizations, 1446 – 47; families and changing gender relations, 1439; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 1438 – 39; foodways, 1442; forecasts for the 21st century, 1448 – 49; health statistics and issues, 1438; holiday celebrations, 1441 – 42; identity retention, 1439 – 41; intergroup relations, 1444; music, arts, entertainment, 1442 – 43; national language press, 1441; notable Lebanese Americans, 1455; occupation and income patterns, 1437; return immigration, 1447; youth profile, 1440 Lebanon: chronological history, 1427 – 30; early migration, 1433; geography, 1430 – 31; historical background, 1427, 1431 – 32; later migration, 1435; migration statistics, 1449 – 52; U.S.-Lebanon issues, 1447 – 48 Lee, Ang, 2090 Lee, Chang Rae, 1389 Lee, Helie, 1389 Lee, K. W. (Kyung Won), 1388 Lee, Sammy, 1388 Lee, Sang Hyun, 1388 – 89 Legacy House by the Seattle Chinatown International District Preservation Development Authority (1998), 1043
2316 | Index Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (2000), 1537 Leguizamo, John, 376 Leloir, Luis, 54 Leticia “A” v. Regents of the University of California (1985), 1939 Letters of Cairo (Kaldas), 613 Liberation Theology movement (Central America), 1915 Liberia: chronological history, 1459 – 61; early immigration, 1465; forecasts for the 21st century, 1482; geography, 1461 – 62; historical background, 1459, 1462 – 65; later immigration, 1465 – 68; migration statistics, 1483 – 85; U.S.-Liberia issues, 1481 – 82 Liberia Association of the Piedmont (North Carolina), 1477 Liberia First Association (North Carolina), 1477 Liberian Community Association (Southern California), 1477 Liberian Community Association (Washington, D.C.), 1477 Liberian Family Resource Center, 1480 Liberian immigrants, 1459 – 89; age and family structure, 1468 – 69; American identity development, 1477; citizen pathways, 1475 – 76; civic and electoral participation, 1478; community size and composition, 1468; demographics and census statistics, 1486 – 87; dual citizenship, 1476; economic attainment, 1469 – 70; educational attainment, 1469; ethnically-based social organizations, 1472 – 73; families and changing gender relations, 1471 – 72; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 1470 – 71; foodways, 1474 – 75; health statistics and issues, 1470; holiday celebrations, 1474 – 75; identity retention, 1472; intergroup relations, 1476 – 77; language issues, 1473 – 74; music, arts, entertainment, 1475; national language press, 1473 – 74; notable Liberian Americans, 1487 – 88; political associations, organizations, 1477 – 78; return immigration, 1478 – 79; second and later generations, 1479 – 81; youth profile, 1480 Liberian Immigration Solidarity Committee (Minnesota), 1477 Liberians in Blood (LIB) gang, 1477 Librescu, Liviu, 1182 Life Act (2000), 1537
Life-cycle rituals: Afghani immigrants, 15 – 16; Argentinean immigrants, 55 – 56; Bahamian immigrants, 93 – 94; Bangladeshi immigrants, 120; Cambodian immigrants, 218 – 19; Chilean immigrants, 252; Chinese immigrants, 311 – 13; Colombian immigrants, 364 – 65; Costa Rican immigrants, 391 – 93; Cuban immigrants, 433; Ecuadorian immigrants, 549 – 51; Egyptian immigrants, 589 – 90; Eritrean American immigrants, 633 – 34; Ethiopian immigrants, 674, 681 – 82; Filipino immigrants, 721 – 23; Ghanaian immigrants, 772 – 73, 772 – 75; Guatemalan immigrants, 811 – 12; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 859 – 61; Haitian immigrants, 904 – 6; Honduran immigrants, 951 – 52; Indonesian immigrants, 1043 – 44; Iranian immigrants, 1084 – 85; Iraqi immigrants, 1127 – 29; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1161 – 63; Jamaican immigrants, 1208 – 11; Kenyan immigrants, 1303 – 6; Korean immigrants, 1353 – 57; Laotian immigrants, 1403 – 4; Lebanese immigrants, 1438 – 39; Liberian immigrants, 1470 – 71; Mexican immigrants, 1516 – 20; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1571 – 72; Nigerian immigrants, 1611 – 12; Pakistani immigrants, 1674 – 75; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1707 – 9; Panamanian immigrants, 1750; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1863 – 65; Taiwanese immigrants, 2060 – 61; Thai immigrants, 2111 – 13; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2155 – 56 Life of the Caribbean Immigrant (Mandiela), 1219 Limann, Hilla, 758 Lin, Jeremy, 2080 Lin, Justin, 2081 Lincoln, Abraham, 563, 889 Lindo, Allan Pineda, 740, 747 The Line of the Sun (Cofer), 1897 “The Little War” (Cuba), 415 Liu, Eric, 2079 Liu, Goodwin, 2092 – 93 Lobo, Pepe (Honduran president), 937, 944 Lomong, Lopez, 2041 – 42 Lon Nol (Cambodian President), 205, 207, 211 – 13, 224 – 25, 230 London, Margaret, 2105 Long, Nitara Carlynn “Nia,” 2186 The Long Night of White Chickens (Goldman), 837
Index | 2317 López, Diana, 1588 López, Steven, 1588 Lorenzo, Benny, 523 Los Angeles Human Relations Commission, 1961 The Lost Garden (Yep), 349 Louima, Abner, 928 Louverture, Toussaint, 894 Lovato, Roberto, 1961 Luce-Celler Bill (1946) (U.S.), 115, 704, 714, 969, 975, 1002 Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio, 164 LULAC (League of United Latin American Citizens), 1532 Lust, Caution movie (Ang Lee), 2092 Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, 2241 Lutheran practice: Bahamian immigrants, 89; Eritrean American immigrants, 636; Vietnamese immigrants, 2241 Luu, Jane, 2271 M-19 insurgency (Colombia), 355, 361, 377 Maathai, Wangari Muta, 1323 Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria, 709, 734 Magnuson Act (1943) (U.S.), 282, 300, 303, 325 Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 985 Makino, Fred Kinzaburo, 1282 Malaythong, Khan “Bob,” 1412, 1422 Malkin, Michelle, 747 Man in the Middle (Amaechi), 1638 Mandefro, Mehret, 694 Mandiela, Adriza, 1219 Mandvi, Aasif, 999 Manivong, Nary, 1423 Manivong, Vongduane, 1423 Manlapit, Pablo, 736 Marcatili, Enrique A. J., 73 Marcos, Ferdinand, 704, 708 – 9, 715, 737 Mariá Figueres Olsen, José, 408 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 624 Martínez, Dennis, 1588 Martinez, Mel, 462 The Martyred (Kim), 1389 Maryland State Teachers Association (MSTA), 1961 Masaoka, Mike Masaru, 1282 MASSOB (Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra), 1600 Masters of the Board (Abani), 1637 McKay, Claude, 1219
McKinley, William, 701 Measuring Time (Habila), 1639 Medellín cartel, 355, 377 Meehan, Martin, 1099 Mehretu, Julie, 693 Mehta, Deepa, 999 Mehta, Gita, 1000 Mehta, Ved Prakash, 1000, 1020 Mejía, Camilo, 1588 Mejía, Gerardo, 569 Melcochita (entertainer), 1838 Menendez, Robert “Bob,” 462 Mengiste, Maaza, 682 Mengistu, Germame, 665 – 66 Menica, Carlos, 964 Mercado, Teresa, 1896 – 97 Merchant, Ismail, 1001 Mereb Convention (1891) (Ethiopia), 668 Merello, Tita, 62 Merida Initiative (Guatemalan), 824 Merkorios, Abune, 694 Meroe kingdom (Ethiopia), 660, 666 Metema, Battle of (1889), 667 Meth, Abdulgaffar Peang, 230 Methodist practitioners: Costa Rican immigrants, 395; Jamaican immigrants, 1209, 1214; Korean immigrants, 1360; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1887; Trinidad and Tobago immigrants, 2141 Mexican Revolution, 1495, 1501 – 3, 1522, 1545 – 46, 1550 Mexico: Bracero Program, 91, 1495, 1506, 1508, 1511 – 12; chronological history, 1493 – 96; early immigration, 1503 – 4; geography, 1496; historical background, 1497 – 1503; Immigration Act, succeeding immigration, 1507 – 8; IRCA (1986) to the present, 1508 – 10; later immigration waves, 1504 – 5; pre-1965 Immigration Act, 1505 – 7; U.S.-Mexico issues, 1537 – 38 Mexican immigrants, 1493 – 1553; age and family structure, 1514 – 15; citizenship pathways, 1527 – 28; civic and electoral participation, 1531 – 32; community size and composition, 1512 – 14; demographic profile, 1510 – 16; educational attainment, 1515, 1535 – 36; families and changing gender relations, 1520 – 21; family, culture, lifecycle rituals, 1516 – 20; holiday celebrations, 1524 – 25; identity retention, 1521; intergroup relations, 1529 – 31; music, arts, entertainment, 1526; national language
2318 | Index press, 1522 – 24; naturalization, dual citizenship, 1528 – 29; notable Mexican Americans, 1544 – 52; occupation, income patterns, 1515 – 16; second and later generations, 1532 – 36 Mi Sangre Foundation (Colombia), 375 Michael, Yegizaw, 643 Migration, causes and waves: from Afghanistan, 9 – 11, 27; from Argentina, 48 – 51, 68; from the Bahamas, 86 – 92; from Brazil, 164; from Cambodia, 212 – 13, 228; from China, 287 – 305, 333 – 38; from Colombia, 361 – 62, 373; from Costa Rica, 389 – 90, 404 – 7; from Cuba, 423 – 29; from Dominican Republic, 483 – 84; from Egypt, 584 – 87; from El Salvador, 1917 – 27; from Eritrea, 625 – 30; from Ethiopia, 670 – 73; from Ghana, 759 – 67; from Guyana, 852 – 55; from Haiti, 900 – 903; from Honduras, 944 – 49; from India, 975 – 77; from Indonesia, 1036 – 38; from Iran, 1076 – 80; from Iraq, 1118 – 19, 1139 – 41; from Israel, 1153 – 54, 1154 – 57, 1176 – 77; from Jamaica, 1199 – 1200, 1233 – 35; from Japan, 1255 – 56, 1257, 1276 – 77; from Kenya, 1293 – 94, 1319; from Korea, 1336 – 38, 1338 – 40; from Laos, 1401, 1414 – 16; from Lebanon, 1433, 1435, 1449 – 52; from Mexico, 1503 – 10, 1538 – 43; from Nicaragua, 1564 – 67, 1584 – 85; from Palestine and Jordan, 1702 – 4, 1702 – 5, 1719 – 21; from Panama, 1741 – 45, 1762 – 66; from Peru, 1787 – 88; from the Philippines, 709 – 16; from Puerto Rico, 1854 – 57; from Somalia, 1973 – 74, 1998 – 2008; from Taiwan, 2085 – 86; from Venezuela, 2203 – 8 Migration statistics: Argentinean immigrants, 68; Bangladeshi immigrants, 136; Brazilian immigrants, 191; Cambodian immigrants, 228; Chinese immigrants, 333 – 38; Colombian immigrants, 373; Costa Rican immigrants, 404 – 7; Cuban immigrants, 454 – 58; Dominican Republic immigrants, 516 – 17; Egyptian immigrants, 609 – 10; Eritrean immigrants, 645 – 48; Ethiopian immigrants, 688 – 90; Filipino immigrants, 712 – 15, 742; Ghanaian immigrants, 782 – 84; Guatemalan immigrants, 825 – 27; Guyanese (IndoGuyanese) immigrants, 877 – 79; Haitian immigrants, 924 – 26; Honduran immigrants, 959 – 61; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 1015 – 16; Indonesian immigrants, 1058 – 60; Iranian immigrants, 1103 – 5; Iraqi
immigrants, 1139 – 41; Israeli immigrants, 1176 – 77; Jamaican immigrants, 1233 – 35; Japanese immigrants, 1276 – 77; Kenyan immigrants, 1319; Korean immigrants, 1378 – 79; Laotian immigrants, 1414 – 16; Lebanese immigrants, 1449 – 52; Liberian immigrants, 1483 – 85; Salvadoran immigrants, 1956 – 57 Miller, Inger, 1240 Milstein, Cesar, 54 Minahasa people from North Sulawesi (MAESA), 1046 Ming Dynasty (China), 284, 287 – 89, 2045, 2049 Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs, 1004 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Korea), 1334, 1376 Ministry of Manpower and Emigration (Egypt), 585 – 87, 593 – 94 Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs (Egypt), 584 Mink, Patsy Takemoto, 1271 Minkara, Sara, 1440 Minneapolis Community Action Circle of Discipline, 1996 Minnesota Indonesia Society, 1046 Miranda, Laura Chinchilla, 387 Miss India Georgia (film), 1001 Mogahed, Dalia, 613 Mohammad Mosaddeq, 1071, 1075, 1097 Molina, Gloria, 1549 – 50 Monirith, Chhea, 223, 230 Monroe Doctrine (1823) (U.S.), 242, 823, 896 Monserratt, Lloyd, 569 Montejo, Victor, 837 Montilla, Elaine, 523 – 24 Montnero, Darrel, 2242 Montoya, Juan Pablo, 376 Moon, Henry, 1389 Mormon practitioners: Costa Rican immigrants, 395; Filipino immigrants, 727 Morrobel-Sosa, Anny, 524 Mourad, Maysa, 1440 Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), 1600 Movement of Guatemalan Immigrants in the United States (MIGUA), 814, 818 Moya, Francisco, 569 – 70 Mubarak, Gamal, 608 Mubarak, Hosni, 579, 583 – 84, 597, 606 – 8 Muirraguí, Gilo, 570 Mukherjee, Bharati, 1000
Index | 2319 Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research (SUNY Albany), 1929, 1933 – 34, 1958, 1959 Music, arts and entertainment: Afghani immigrants, 20; Argentinean immigrants, 61 – 62; Bangladeshi immigrants, 128 – 29; Brazilian immigrants, 182; Cambodian immigrants, 223; Chilean immigrants, 255; Chinese immigrants, 323 – 24; Costa Rican immigrants, 398 – 99; Cuban immigrants, 440; Ecuadorian immigrants, 556 – 57; Eritrean American immigrants, 638 – 40; Ethiopian immigrants, 678, 682; Filipino immigrants, 731 – 33; Ghanaian immigrants, 772 – 73; Guatemalan immigrants, 816; Guyanese (Indo-Guyanese) immigrants, 864 – 65; Haitian immigrants, 914 – 15; Honduran immigrants, 953; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 995 – 1001; Indonesian immigrants, 1051; Iranian immigrants, 1090 – 91; Iraqi immigrants, 1135; Jamaican immigrants, 1217 – 19; Kenyan immigrants, 1309 – 10; Laotian immigrants, 1409 – 10; Lebanese immigrants, 1442 – 43; Liberian immigrants, 1475; Mexican immigrants, 1526; Nigerian immigrants, 1623; Pakistani immigrants, 1676 – 77; Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1712; Panamanian immigrants, 1755; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1873 – 76; Salvadoran immigrants, 1951 – 52; Somalian immigrants, 1989 – 90; Taiwanese immigrants, 2073 – 74; Thai immigrants, 2119; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2164 – 66 Muslim American Task Force (AMT), 130 Muslim Brotherhood, 583, 597 Muslim League Party of Eritrea, 668 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan (1972), 2051 Nader, Ralph, 914, 1445, 1455 Naderi, Firouz, 1107 Nafisi, Azar, 1107 Nagra, Parminder, 999 Najimy, Kathy, 1723 Nasser, Jack, 1455 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 102, 1476 National Association of Americans of Indian Descent, 1003 National Association of Jamaican and Supportive Organizations, Inc. (NAJASO), 1226
National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) (U.S.), 720 National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR), 909 National Council of Ghanaian Associations (NCOGA) (Ghana), 776, 791 National Council of La Raza (NCLR), 395, 1532 National Democratic Congress (NDC), 775 National Federation of Indian Associations (NFIA), 1003 National Front (Colombia), 355, 358, 361, 377 National Front of Popular Resistance (FNRP) (Honduras), 937 National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 1005 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), 720 National Integration Program (Brazil), 163 National Liberation Army (ELN) (Colombia), 355, 356, 359, 360, 361 National Organization for the Advancement of Haitians (NOAH), 915 National Origins Quota Act (1924) (U.S.), 586, 969, 975 – 76, 2106 National Party of Nigeria (NPN), 1600 National Patriotic Front of Liberia, 1464 National Security Exit Entry Registration System (NEERS), 1671 National Survey of Latinos, 430, 436, 1862 National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students, 642 Nationality Act (1790) (U.S.), 295 Native Speaker (Lee), 1389 Naturalization Act (1790) (U.S.), 735, 737 Naturalization data: Afghani immigrants, 20; Argentinean immigrants, 62 – 63; Bahamian immigrants, 95 – 96; Bangladeshi immigrants, 111, 115, 130; Brazilian immigrants, 149, 182 – 84; Chilean immigrants, 256; Chinese immigrants, 279, 282, 298 – 99, 303, 324 – 25; Costa Rican immigrants, 400; Dominican immigrants, 506 – 7; Ecuadorian immigrants, 557, 559; Egyptian immigrants, 587, 598; Filipino immigrants, 712, 714, 716, 733 – 34, 737; Guyanese immigrants, 865; Honduran immigrants, 954; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 969; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1149, 1161; Jamaican immigrants, 11221; Japanese immigrants, 1250, 1257, 1264, 1271; Kenyan immigrants, 1311; Korean immigrants, 1362, 1370; Laotian immigrants, 1399, 1410; Mexican immigrants, 1509 – 10, 1527 – 28,
2320 | Index 1530 – 31; Nigerian immigrants, 1624; Pakistani immigrants, 1657, 1665 – 66, 1671; Panamanian immigrants, 1755 – 56; Peruvian immigrants, 1797; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1876; Somalian immigrants, 1990 – 91; Taiwanese immigrants, 2074 – 75; Thai immigrants, 2119; Trinidad and Tobago immigrants, 2166 – 67; Venezuelan immigrants, 2209, 2213 Nazarian, Sam, 1107 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 974, 984 Neshat, Shirin, 1107 New Patriotic Party (NPP) (Ghana), 775 Neway, Germame, 665 News From Home (Atta), 1625 Newsom, Gavin, 1053 Ngor, Haing S., 231 Nguyen, Dat Tan, 2271 Nguyen, Dustin, 2271 Nguyen, Madison, 2271 Nguyet, Anh Duong, 2272 Nicaragua: chronological history, 1557 – 61; Contra-Sandinista war, 1563 – 67; early immigration period, 1564 – 65; geography, 1561; independence (1821 – 1857), 1562; later immigration waves, 1565; precolonial history, 1562; U.S. intervention, 1563 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) (U.S.), 801, 806 – 7, 917, 947, 1560, 1577 – 78 Nicaraguan immigrants, 1557 – 89; adjustment and adaptation, 1570 – 75; age and family structure, 1568 – 69; demographics and census statistics, 1568 – 70, 1586 – 87; economic attainment, 1570; educational attainment, 1569 – 70, 1580 – 81; families and changing gender relations, 1573 – 74; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 1571 – 72; foodways, 1575; forecasts for the 21st century, 1582 – 83; holiday celebrations, religion, 1572 – 73; identity retention, 1579 – 80; immigration legislation, political battles, 1577 – 78; impact on U.S. society, 1575 – 79; intergroup relations, discrimination, 1578 – 79; language issues, 1574 – 75; links to Nicaragua, 1572; notable Nicaraguan Americans, 1588 – 89; second and later generations, 1579 – 81; social justice examples, 1580 – 81; U.S.-Nicaragua issues, 1576, 1581 – 83 Nieto, Sonia, 1897 Nieves, Lissette, 1897
Nigeria: chronological history, 1595 – 97; demographics and census statistics, 1634 – 36; geography, 1597 – 98; migration, causes and waves, 1606 – 7, 1632 – 34 Nigerian immigrants, 1595 – 1644; age and family structure, 1608; citizenship pathways, 1624 – 27; civil and electoral participation, 1627 – 28; continued links to Nigeria, 1613 – 14; economic attainment, 1609 – 10; educational attainment, 1608; ethnicallybased social organizations, 1614 – 15; families and changing gender relations, 1612 – 13; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 1611 – 12; foodways, 1620 – 23; forecasts for the 21st century, 1632; health statistics and issues, 1610; holiday celebrations, 1619 – 20; identity retention, 1613; impact on U.S. society, 1623 – 29; music, arts, entertainment, 1623; national-language press, 1616 – 19; notable Nigerian Americans, 1637 – 43; political associations, organizations, 1627; public policies, political representation, 1628; religion, 1615 – 16; return immigration, 1628 – 29; second and later generations, 1629 – 31; size and community composition, 1607 – 8; U.S.-Nigeria issues, 1631 – 32 Nisei Farmers League (California), 1273 Niway, Mengestu, 663 Nixon, Richard, 244, 260, 282, 332, 2051 Nkrumah, Kwame, 755, 758, 760 Nnaemeka, Obioma, 1640 Nobel Prize laureates: from Argentina, 54; from Bangladesh, 112, 129, 134, 142; from China, 326; from Colombia, 369; from Costa Rica, 326; from Egypt, 613; from Latin America, 369 Non-resident Indians (NRIs), 983, 1002, 1004, 1007 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 248, 257, 1640, 2214, 2260 Nooyi, Indra, 1020 Noriega, Carlos I., 1838 Noriega, Manuel, 1734, 1741, 1744 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 240, 261, 2174 North American Taiwanese Women’s Association (NATWA), 2065 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 4, 26, 1661 Not without My Daughter (Mahmoody/ Hoffer), 1098
Index | 2321 Notable immigrants: from Afghanistan, 32; from Argentina, 73 – 74; from the Bahamas, 101 – 2; from Bangladesh, 141 – 42; from Brazil, 198 – 200; from Cambodia, 230 – 31; from Chile, 272 – 73; from China, 348 – 49; from Colombia, 375 – 76; from Costa Rica, 408 – 9; from Cuba, 461 – 63; from Dominican Republic, 521 – 25; from Ecuador, 568 – 70; from Egypt, 613; from El Salvador, 1960 – 62; from Eritrea, 649 – 50; from Ethiopia, 692 – 95; from Ghana, 789 – 91; from Guyana, 881; from Haiti, 927 – 28; from Honduras, 963 – 64; from Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 1019 – 20; from Indonesian immigrants, 1064; from Iran, 1106 – 7; from Iraq, 1143 – 44; from Israel, 1180 – 83; from Jamaica, 1239 – 40; from Japan, 1281 – 83; from Kenya, 1323; from Korea, 1386 – 89; from Laos, 1422 – 23; from Lebanon, 1455; from Liberia, 1487 – 88; from Mexico, 1544 – 52; from Nicaragua, 1588 – 89; from Pakistan, 1688 – 90; from Palestine and Jordan, 1722 – 23; from Panama, 1771 – 73; from Peru, 1837 – 39; from the Philippines, 746 – 48; from Puerto Rico, 1896 – 99; from Somalia, 2009 – 10; from Taiwan, 2092 – 93; from Thailand, 2131 – 32; from Vietnam, 2270 – 72 Notes From the Hyena’s Belly (Mengiste), 682 Nothing is Impossible (Asgedom), 639 NRIs (non-resident Indians), 983, 1002, 1004, 1007 Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, 998, 1000 Nwogugu, Udoka, 1626 Obama, Barack, 1030, 1051, 1053, 1056; Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, 613; Afghanistan withdrawal plan, 4; Alemayhu appointment, 694 – 95; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 705; appointment of Duckworth, 2122; Chinese American appointees, 282, 326 – 27; Cuban travel restrictions, 417, 429; dialogue with China, 332; Dominican cabinet appointment, 508, 524; Eritrean American community interactions, 644 – 45; immigration issue pledge, 1496; international family background, 779, 1314; Manmohan Singh honored by, 694; Medal of Freedom presentation to Yunus, 112; meeting with Mubarak, 608; Minnesota
leadership team, 1996; Muslim World speech (Cairo), 579 Occupational and income patterns: Afghani immigrants, 31 – 32; Argentinean immigrants, 50 – 51, 70 – 71; Bahamian immigrants, 90, 93; Bangladeshi immigrants, 119, 123, 139; Brazilian immigrants, 170 – 71, 197 – 98; Cambodian immigrants, 217; Chilean immigrants, 247 – 48, 251, 261 – 62; Chinese immigrants, 308 – 9, 342 – 43; Colombian immigrants, 366, 373 – 74; Cuban immigrants, 442; Ecuadorian immigrants, 548, 567; Egyptian immigrants, 588, 613; Eritrean immigrants, 633, 649; Filipino immigrants, 704, 711 – 20, 718 – 19, 735, 746; Ghanaian immigrants, 787; Guatemalan immigrants, 832 – 33; Haitian immigrants, 903 – 4; Honduran immigrants, 950 – 51; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 978 – 80, 1018; Indonesian immigrants, 1041 – 42; Iranian immigrants, 1076, 1081 – 82; Kenyan immigrants, 1298 – 99; Laotian immigrants, 1403; Lebanese immigrants, 1437; Liberian immigrants, 1469 – 70; Mexican immigrants, 1515 – 16; Panamanian immigrants, 1748, 1770, 1771; Peruvian immigrants, 1791; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1860 – 62; Taiwanese immigrants, 2059; Thai immigrants, 2109 – 10 Ochomongo, Battle of (Costa Rica), 383, 386 O’Connor, Sandra Day, 2270 Oeur, Chanthou, 230 Of Beetles and Angels: A Boy’s Remarkable Journey from a Refugee Camp to Harvard (Asgedom), 639 Ofodile, Ferdinand, 1640 – 41 Ogaden Liberation Front (Ethiopia), 670 Ogunnaike, Lola, 1641 Oh, Angela, 1389 Ohio Somali Community Association, 2009 Okafor, Chukwuemeka Ndubuisi, 1641 Oke, Femi, 1641 Okoye, Amobi, 1641 Olajuwon, Hakeem, 1641 Olmos, Edward James, 1550 Olopade, Olufunmilayo, 1626 Olupona, Jacob K., 1641 Omar, Hassan, 2009 Omidyar, Pierre, 1107 On the Other Side of the Eye (Thao Worra), 1423
2322 | Index Once More Removed: A Journey Back to India (film), 872 Onwueme, Osonye Tess, 1641 – 42 Onyewu, Oguchialu Chijioke, 1642 Operation Accountability (Israel), 1429 Operation Peter Pan (Cuba), 416 Opium Wars (China), 277, 287, 288 – 89 Opportunity Visa programs (OP-1, 1990 – 1991), 116, 135 Orejuela, Rogriguez, 376 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 669 Organization of East Africans (OEA), 1307 Oromo Liberation Front (Ethiopia), 670, 679, 686 Oromo Sports Federation in North America (OSFNA) (Ethiopia), 679 Orozco, Manuel, 760, 763, 768 Ortíz, Rafael Montañez, 1897 Ortíz Del Valle, Sandra, 1897 – 98 Overseas Absentee Voting Act (2003) (U.S.), 734 Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) (2003), 971 Overseas Indian Affairs Ministry, 1004, 1014 Owusu, George Y., 791 Page Law (1857) (U.S.), 306 Pahlavi, Reza, 1071, 1075 Pakistan: chronological history, 1657 – 58; early immigration, 1662 – 68; geography, 1658 – 59; historical background, 1655 – 56, 1659 – 62; recent immigration, 1668 – 71 Pakistani immigrants, 1655 – 91; age and family structure, 1672 – 73; demographics and census statistics, 1687; economic, educational attainment, 1673; family, culture, rituals, 1674 – 75; foodways, 1676; forecasts for the 21st century, 1684 – 85; health statistics and issues, 1673 – 74; holiday celebrations, 1676; identity retention, 1680 – 82; intergroup relations, 1678; migration statistics, 1685 – 86; music, arts, entertainment, 1676 – 77; national language press, 1676; notable Pakistani Americans, 1688 – 90; representative organizations, 1679 – 80; second and later generations, 1682; size and composition, 1671 – 72; U.S.-Pakistan issues, 1682 – 84; youth profile, 1683 – 84 Palestine and Jordan: assimilation and separatism issues, 1703; chronological history, 1697 – 99; early migration, 1702 – 3; geography, 1699 – 1700; historical background,
1700 – 1701; Immigrant Act (1965), 1704 – 5; Immigration Act (1965), 1705; second wave migration, 1703 – 4 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 1156, 1431 Palestinian and Jordanian immigrants, 1695 – 1724; age and family structure, 1706; American identity establishment, 1714 – 16; changing gender roles, 1709; citizenship pathways, 1713 – 14; community size and composition, 1705 – 6; demographics and census statistics, 1721 – 22; educational attainment, 1706; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 1707 – 9; foodways, 1712; holiday celebrations, 1710 – 12; identity retention, 1709 – 10; intergroup relations, 1714; language issues, 1710; music, arts, entertainment, 1712; notable Palestinian Americans, 1722 – 23; second and later generations, 1716 – 18; U.S. issues with Palestine and Jordan, 1718; youth profile, 1717 Pan American Union (PAU), 1545 Panama: chronological history, 1733 – 35; geography, 1735 – 36; historical background, 1731 – 32, 1736 – 41 Panama Canal, 87, 353 Panama Canal Act (1979), 1734, 1744 Panama Canal Treaty (1977), 1734 Panamanian immigrants, 1731 – 73; age and family structure, 1746 – 47; assimilation and separatism issues, 1742 – 43; citizenship pathways, 1755 – 56; civic and electoral participation, 1758; community size and composition, 1746; demographics and census statistics, 1767 – 71; dual citizenship, 1756; early immigration, 1742; economic attainment, 1747 – 48; educational attainment, 1747, 1760 – 61; ethnic identity, 1759 – 60; ethnically-based social organizations, 1752; families and changing gender relations, 1750 – 51; family, culture, lifecycle rituals, 1749 – 50; foodways, 1754 – 55; health statistics and issues, 1749; holiday celebrations, 1753 – 54; identity retention, 1751, 1757; intergroup relations, 1756 – 57; language issues, 1753; links to country of origin, 1751 – 52; music, arts, entertainment, 1755; national language press, 1753; naturalization issues, 1756; notable Panamanian Americans, 1771 – 73; occupation and income patterns, 1748; religion, 1752 – 53;
Index | 2323 return immigration, 1758 – 59; U.S.-Panama issues, 1761 Paramahansa Yogananda (Swami), 985 Paris Peace Treaty (1898), 701 Park, Grace, 1373 – 74 Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), 1033, 1035 Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), 1033 Pasek, Justine, 1772 – 73 Passage from India: Post 1965 Indian Immigrants and Their Children (Agarwal), 1009 Patel, Eboo, 1689 Patriot Act (2001) (U.S.), 630 Pauslon (Paulsen), Albert, 570 Peace Accords (1992) (El Salvador), 1917 Pei, I. M., 324 Pelligrino, Carlos Alberto, 73 Pen, Kal, 999 Pensionado Act (1903) (Philippines), 701, 704, 710 Pentecostal Christian practitioners: Eritrean immigrants, 622, 627, 636; Ghanaian immigrants, 773, 776; Guatemalan immigrants, 813; Haitian immigrants, 906; Jamaican immigrants, 1214; Nigerian immigrants, 1615; Peruvian immigrants, 1795, 1841; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1868; Trinidad and Tobago immigrants, 2141, 2158 People v. Hall (1854), 300 Peoples Democratic Front for the Liberation of Eritrea (PDFLE), 635 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 5 – 6 Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) (Eritrea), 625 – 27, 635 – 36, 640, 642 People’s National Congress (PNC) (Guyana), 847, 850 – 52, 857, 867 – 68, 874 – 76 People’s Political Party (PPP) (Jamaica), 1226 People’s Progressive Party (PPP) (Guyana), 847, 850 – 52, 868, 874, 875 People’s Republic of Kampuchea (P.R.K.), 208 Pererz, Thomas, 524 Perez, Danilo, 1773 Perez, Martha, 369 Perón, Eva and Juan (Argentina), 43, 44 Persatuan Mahasiswa Indonesia di Amerika Serikat (Organization of Indonesian Students in the United States) (PERMIAS), 1046 Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Union), 1033 Persian Cossak Brigade, 1074
Peru: chronological history, 1779 – 83; geography, 1783 – 84; historical background, 1784 – 87; migration statistics, 1803 – 34 Peruvian immigrants, 1779 – 1839; age and family structure, 1789 – 90, 1799 – 1800; American identity establishment, 1798; citizenship pathways, 1797; community size and composition, 1788 – 89; demographics and census statistics, 1835 – 36; economic attainment, 1791 – 92, 1800 – 1801; educational attainment, 1790, 1800; foodways, 1796 – 97; health statistics and issues, 1792, 1801; holiday celebrations, 1796; identity retention, 1793 – 94; language issues, 1795; national language press, 1795; notable Peruvian Americans, 1837 – 39; religion, 1794 – 95; second and later generations, 1799 – 1801; U.S.-Peru issues, 1802; youth profile, 1799 – 1800 Pew Hispanic Center data: Cuban immigrants, 429 – 30, 436, 454; Ecuadorian immigrants, 549; Honduran immigrants, 949 Phan, Dat, 2272 Philippine-American War (1899), 707 Philippines: assimilation and separatism issues, 712 – 13; chronological history, 701 – 5; geography, 705; historical background, 705 – 9; migration, causes and waves, 709 – 16; migration statistics, 712 – 15, 742. See also Filipino immigrants Philippines Independence Act (1934) (U.S.), 703 – 4, 713 – 14 The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Lee), 1388 – 89 Pichardo, Juan M., 524 – 25 Pichincha, Battle of (Ecuador), 538, 554, 560 Pietri, Pedro, 1898 Pineda-Kirwan, Diccia T., 525 Ping, Whitney, 231 Pinto, Jenn, 570 Platt Amendment (U.S.) (1901), 415 Pointe DuSable, Jean Baptiste, 889, 901 Poitier, Sidney, 102 Pol Pot (Khmer Rouge leader), 208, 321 Política Pública y Democracia en América Latina (Navarro and Cantú), 2224 Polo, Marco, 287, 1032 Portman, Natalie, 1182 – 83 Poverty status: Afghani immigrants, 9; Argentinean immigrants, 44, 49, 55 – 56; Bahamian immigrants, 83; Bangladeshi immigrants, 112, 119, 135, 139; Brazilian
2324 | Index immigrants, 149, 158, 171; Cambodian immigrants, 217; Chilean immigrants, 245, 251; Chinese immigrants, 289, 291, 309, 341, 344 – 45; Colombian immigrants, 353, 362, 363 – 64, 374; Costa Rican immigrants, 388, 408; Cuban immigrants, 429, 432, 442, 460; Dominican immigrants, 474, 484, 489, 490 – 92, 505, 512; Ecuadorian immigrants, 564; Egyptian immigrants, 585, 588 – 89; Filipino immigrants, 709, 720; Ghanaian immigrants, 771; Guatemalan immigrants, 799, 809, 811, 835; Guyanese immigrants, 850, 858, 872, 881; Haitian immigrants, 887, 898 – 900, 904, 908, 922; Honduran immigrants, 951, 962; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 978; Indonesian immigrants, 1041; Jamaican immigrants, 1198, 1205, 1236; Japanese immigrants, 1251, 1253, 1268; Kenyan immigrants, 1299; Korean immigrants, 1341, 1381; Laotian immigrants, 1403, 1411; Lebanese immigrants, 1437; Liberian immigrants, 1465, 1479 Powell, Colin, 112 Prammanasudh, Stacy, 2132 Pran, Dith, 230 Prasad, Shundell, 872, 881 Presbyterian practitioners: Bahamian immigrants, 89; Filipino immigrants, 727; Ghanaian immigrants, 776; Jamaican immigrants, 1209, 1214; Korean immigrants, 1360; Sudanese immigrants, 2025; Taiwanese immigrants, 2066 – 67; Trinidad and Tobago immigrants, 2141 Presidential Medal of Freedom recipients (U.S.): from Bangladesh, 112; from Colombia, 142 Press (and other media) in national/regionallanguages: Afghani immigrants, 18; Argentinean immigrants, 60; Bangladeshi immigrants, 127; Cambodian immigrants, 220 – 21; Chilean immigrants, 253; Chinese immigrants, 319 – 20; Costa Rican immigrants, 396; Ecuadorian immigrants, 554; Egyptian immigrants, 596 – 97; Eritrean American immigrants, 636 – 37; Ethiopian, immigrants from, 681 – 82; Filipino immigrants, 728 – 29; Guatemalan immigrants, 814; Haitian immigrants, 912; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 993 – 94; Indonesian immigrants, 1048 – 49; Iranian immigrants, 1087; Iraqi immigrants, 1133 – 34; Korean immigrants, 1348; Lebanese immigrants,
1441; Liberian immigrants, 1473 – 74; Mexican immigrants, 1522 – 24; Nigerian immigrants, 1616 – 19; Pakistani immigrants, 1676; Panamanian immigrants, 1753; Peruvian immigrants, 1795; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1869 – 71; Taiwanese immigrants, 2069 – 71; Thai immigrants, 2118; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2160 Préval, René (Haitian president), 887, 890, 900 Proclamation on Citizenship (1992) (Eritrea), 640 – 41 Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) (Bahamas), 85 – 86 Prohías, Antonio, 462 – 63 Protestant practitioners: Brazilian immigrants, 176; Costa Rican immigrants, 395; Ethiopian immigrants, 686; Filipino immigrants, 727; Haitian immigrants, 909; Honduran immigrants, 951; Indonesian immigrants, 1027 Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance (PAIS) (Ecuador), 542 Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), 671 Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) (Ghana), 762, 766 Ptacek, Fatima, 570 Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (PAAIA), 1092, 1099 Puerto Rican immigrants, 1845 – 99; age and family structure, 1858; citizenship pathways, 1876 – 77; civic and electoral participation, 1880 – 81; community size and composition, 1857; cultural identification, 1888; demographics and census statistics, 1857 – 63, 1892 – 95; economic attainment, 1859 – 60; educational attainment, 1858 – 59, 1887 – 88; ethnically-based social organizations, 1866 – 67; families and changing gender relations, 1865; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 1863 – 65; foodways, 1871 – 73; health statistics and issues, 1862 – 63; holiday celebrations, 1871; identity retention, 1865 – 66; intergroup relations, 1877 – 80; language issues, 1869; links to country of origin, 1866; music, arts, entertainment, 1873 – 76; national language press, 1869 – 71; notable Puerto Rican Americans, 1896 – 99; occupation and income patterns, 1860 – 62; religion, 1867 – 69; return immigration, 1884 – 85; second and later
Index | 2325 generations, 1885 – 88; U.S.-Puerto Rico issues, 1888 – 91; youth profile, 1886 Puerto Rico: assimilation and separatism issues, 1855; chronological history, 1845 – 49; early migration, 1854 – 55; geography, 1849; historical background, 1849 – 54; Immigration Act (1965), 1856 – 57; IRCA to the present, 1857; later waves of migration, 1855 – 56 PUNCINPEC Party (Cambodia), 208 Purple Hibiscus (Adichie), 1637 Pushing Hands movie (Ang Lee), 2092 Qaderi, Habib, 33 Qing Dynasty (China), 277, 287, 288 – 89, 294, 316, 2045, 2049, 2072 Quadir, Iqbal, 142 Quarshie, Rose, 791 Quinn, Anthony, 1550 – 51 Qusai al-Taayie, Ahmed, 1144 Raffo, Heather, 1144 Rafter Crisis (Cuba), 425, 428 Raj, Kavi, 999 Ramanujan, A.K., 1000 Ramis, Harold, 1455 Ramon Villeda, Morales, 936, 940 – 41, 945 Ramos, Fidel, 709 Rao, Raja, 1000 The Rape of Nanking (Chang), 348 Ras Alula Aba Nega, 662 Rawlings, Jerry, 758, 762 Razor Edges of My Tongue (Leticia Hernandez), 1943 Reading Lolita in Tehran (Nafisi), 1107 Reagan, Ronald, 326, 448, 933, 1251, 1387, 1388, 1455, 1552, 1559, 1560, 1564, 1566, 1741, 1883, 1916 – 17, 2147 – 48 Recovery of Historical Memory (REMHI) (1998), 801 Red Terror Era (Ethiopia), 663, 671 – 72 Reece, Gabrielle, 2186 La Reforma del Estado y la Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado (Blanco), 2224 Refugee Act (1980) (U.S.), 620, 629, 663, 1397 Refugee Dispersion Policy (U.S.), 2241 Refugee Relief Act (1953) (U.S.), 1029, 1037 Reinterpreting the Banana Republic Region and State in Honduras, 1870 – 1972 (Euraque), 963
Religious practice: Argentinean immigrants, 60; Bangladeshi immigrants, 112, 126; Brazilian immigrants, 176; Chinese immigrants, 317 – 19; Costa Rican immigrants, 395; Cuban immigrants, 437; Eritrean American immigrants, 622, 636; Iraqi immigrants, 1130 – 33; Jamaican immigrants, 1214 – 15; Kenyan immigrants, 1308; Korean immigrants, 1335 – 36; Nicaraguan immigrants, 1572 – 73; Nigerian immigrants, 1615 – 16; Pakistani immigrants, 1661 – 62; Panamanian immigrants, 1752 – 53; Peruvian immigrants, 1794 – 95; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1867 – 69; Somalian immigrants, 1987; Taiwanese immigrants, 2066 – 68; Thai immigrants, 2115 – 16; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2157 – 59; Vietnamese immigrants, 2249 – 51. See also individual religions Remapping Asian American History (Chan), 348 Reng, Thach, 231 Reno, Janet, 1908 Renteria, Edgar, 376 Reporters without Borders, 627 Representation of the People’s Amendment bill (ROOPA) (Ghana), 756 Republic of China. See Taiwan; Taiwanese immigrants Rescate Refugee Center (Los Angeles, CA), 1925 Return immigration: Afghani immigrants, 22 – 23; Bangladeshi immigrants, 132; Brazilian immigrants, 186; Cambodian immigrants, 225 – 26; Chilean immigrants, 258; Chinese immigrants, 327; Ecuadorian immigrants, 561; Eritrean American immigrants, 631; Ethiopian immigrants, 679 – 80; Filipino immigrants, 738 – 39; Ghanaian immigrants, 762; Guatemalan immigrants, 818 – 19; Guyanese (IndoGuyanese) immigrants, 869 – 70; Honduran immigrants, 954; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 1007; Indonesian immigrants, 1054; Israeli Jewish immigrants, 1171 – 73; Jamaican immigrants, 1227 – 28; Korean immigrants, 1371 – 72; Lebanese immigrants, 1447; Liberian immigrants, 1478 – 79; Nigerian immigrants, 1628 – 29; Panamanian immigrants, 1758 – 59; Taiwanese immigrants, 2078 – 79; Thai immigrants, 2122; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2171
2326 | Index Revolucion y Desilusión/ La Venezuela de Hugo Chávez (Blanco), 2224 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 355 – 61, 377 Reyes, Ruben, 2211 Reynoso, Julissa, 512 Reza, Shah, 1071, 1074 – 75 Ribbons (Yep), 349 Ricci, Matteo, 1336 Rice, Condoleezza, 227, 1055 Richards, Sanya, 1240 Rivas, Battle of (Costa Rica), 387 Rivas, Maria del Pilar, 1838 Rivera, Geraldo, 1898 Rivera, Mariano, 1773 Rizal, Jose, 707, 725, 729 Robert Wood Johnson Community Health Leadership Award, 1962 Roble, Abdi, 1990, 2009 Rodriguez, Jennifer, 463 Rodriguez, Omar, 1838 Rodriguez-Iturbe, Ignacio, 2225 Roker, Roxie, 102 Rolle, Esther, 102 Romagoza, Juan, 1961 – 62 Romero, Rosita, 525 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 703, 713, 1265, 1463, 1551 Roosevelt, Theodore (Teddy), 102, 712, 1742 Roosevelt Corollary (1904) (U.S.), 896 Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana, 463 Roure, Jodie G., 1886 Rousseff, Dilma Vana, 164 Roybal, Edward R., 1551 – 52 Rubenstein, Atoosa, 1107 Rumsfeld, Donald, 112, 122, 644 Russo-Japanese War (1904 – 1905), 1332 Russwurm, John B., 1220 Ryswick, Treaty of (1697), 891 Saa, Adolfo Rodriguez, 43 Sabbagh, Jocelyn, 822 Sadat, Anwar, 579, 582 – 83 Sahni, Julie, 1001 Said, Edward, 1723 Sakr, Laila Shereen, 613 Saleem, Haroon, 1689 Salvadoran American Chamber of Commerce, 1951 Salvadoran American National Association, 1951
Salvadoran immigrants, 1905 – 64; adjustment and adaptation, 1934 – 36; arrival in the U.S., 1920 – 21; characteristics in the U.S., 1933 – 34; citizenship pathways, 1949 – 50; community size and composition, 1942 – 48; holiday celebrations, 1951 – 52; impact on U.S. society, 1936 – 52; migration, causes and waves, 1917 – 27; music, arts, entertainment, 1951 – 52; notable Salvadoran Americans, 1960 – 62; political organization in the U.S., 1948 – 49; settlement characteristics, 1930 – 33; street gang phenomenon, 1952 – 55; U.S.-El Salvador issues, 1952 – 55; youth profile, 1943 Sam, David, 791 Sam-Ang, Sam, 231 Samara, Noah, 695 Samuelsson, Marcus, 694 Sanchez, Oscar Arias, 387 Sánchez Korrol, Virginia, 1898 Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), 943, 1559 – 60, 1563, 1565 – 66 Sarkodie, Kofi, 780 Saund, Dalip Singh, 969, 1002 – 3, 1020 Save Cambodia Inc., 231 Schifrin, Lalo, 73 School of the Americas (Panama), 1905 Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 1053 Scott Act (1888) (U.S.), 280 SEARAC (Southeast Asia Resource Action Center), 1410 – 11, 1414, 1415, 1418, 1422 Sears, Khandra, 97 Segura, Francisco “Pancho” Olegario, 570 Selassie, Bereket Habte, 623, 650 Selassie, Haile, 623 – 24, 662 – 63, 666, 668 – 69, 673, 682 Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (U.S.) (1978), 2148 Selective Service Act (1942) (U.S.), 703 – 4, 713 Self Realization Fellowship, 985 Sellassie, Haile, 623 – 24, 628 Seng, Theary C., 231 Sense and Sensibility movie (Ang Lee), 2092 September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S., 1, 3, 8, 21 – 22, 24, 25, 112, 116, 261, 577, 673, 866, 991, 1066, 1098 – 99, 1277, 1510, 1658, 1662, 1716, 1718, 1914 Sepulveda, Elena Clarisa, 486 Seth, Vikram, 1000 Seventh-Day Adventist practitioners: Costa Rican immigrants, 395; Eritrean
Index | 2327 immigrants, 622; Filipino immigrants, 727; Indonesian immigrants, 1046; Korean immigrants, 1360; Taiwanese immigrants, 2066; Trinidad and Tobago immigrants, 21414 Shafi, Hashi, 2009 – 10 Shah, Krishna, 999 Shaheen, Simon, 1723 Shahidi, Salam, 1689 Shahrani, Nazif, 33 Shakira (Shakira Isabel Mebarak Ripoll), 376 Shalala, Donna, 1445, 1455 Shamsie, Kamila, 1690 Shang Dynasty (China), 285 Shankar, Ravi, 997, 999 Shapiro, Sophiline Cheam, 231 Shawkat, Alia Martine, 1144 Shiau, Tiffany, 2081 Shiite Muslims, 1078, 1113, 1114 – 15, 1121, 1127, 1130, 1132, 1134, 1136 – 37, 1139, 1431 Shoman, Abdehameed, 1723 Shuar Confederation (Ecuador), 539 Shyamalan, M. Night, 999 Siddiqi, Hammad, 1690 Siddique, Palbasha, 134 Sihanouk, Norodom, 207 – 8, 210 – 11, 212, 222 Sikander, Shahzia, 1690 Sikh Mediawatch and Resource Task Force (SMART) (U.S.), 1006 Sikh practitioners: Guyanese immigrants, 866; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 866, 975 – 76, 984 – 88, 993, 1006; Pakistani immigrants, 1655, 1659 – 60, 1663, 1667, 1679 Silent Dancing: A Partial Remembrance of a Puerto Rican Childhood (Cofer), 1897 Sinclair, Madge, 1240 Singh, Manmohan (Prime Minister of India), 1013 Sino-Japanese War (1894 – 1895), 1332, 2047, 2049 Sium, Okbazghi (Obi), 650 Siv, Sichan, 231 Six Day War (1967) (Israel), 579, 600 Sjahrir, Sutan (Prime Minister of Indonesia), 1034 Skinner, Robert P., 657 Slave Song (Dabydeen), 881 Slavery/slave trade: in Argentina, 43 – 44; in the Bahamas, 79, 82 – 83, 82 – 85, 87, 103; in Brazil, 151 – 52, 157 – 60, 159, 162, 176, 180; in China, 285, 291, 293, 297, 331; in Costa Rica, 383, 386, 389; in Cuba, 415,
418, 422 – 23, 437; in the Dominican Republic, 473, 476 – 78; in Ecuador, 538; in El Salvador, 1911; in Ghana, 757, 761, 774; in Guyana, 845, 848 – 49; in Haiti, 889, 891 – 95, 912, 921; in Honduras, 939, 942; in Jamaica, 1191, 1194 – 96, 1199, 1201, 1214 – 16, 1226; in Kenya, 1291, 1293; in Liberia, 1459, 1462 – 63, 1465, 1481; in Nigeria, 1595, 1598, 1606, 1615, 1620, 1623; in Panama, 1733, 1736 – 37; in Peru, 1779, 1781, 1784 – 85; in Puerto Rico, 1850 – 51; in Somalia, 1971; in Thailand, 2105 – 6; in Trinidad and Tobago, 2139, 2142, 2145, 2160 Slumdog Millionaire (film), 983 Smits, Jimmy, 1898 – 99 Snyder, Mwende Window, 1323 Soben, Huon, 230 Soboyejo, Winston Wole, 1642 Soccer War, 936, 946 Social organizations, ethnically-based: Brazilian immigrants, 175; Chilean immigrants, 253; Ecuadorian immigrants, 540 – 41; Eritrean immigrants, 629; Filipino immigrants, 724, 725 – 26; Indonesian immigrants, 1045; Iraqi immigrants, 1130; Japanese immigrants, 1261 – 62; Kenyan immigrants, 1307 – 8; Korean immigrants, 1358 – 61; Lebanese immigrants, 1446 – 47; Liberian immigrants, 1472 – 73; Nigerian immigrants, 1614; Panamanian immigrants, 1751; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1866 – 67, 1880; Somalian immigrants, 1986 – 87; Taiwanese immigrants, 2064 – 65; Thai immigrants, 2114 – 15; Venezuelan immigrants, 2213 – 15 Society for Indonesian-Americans, 1045 Society of Ethiopians Established in the Diaspora (SEED), 684 Soetoro, Lolo, 1051 Soetoro-Ng, Maya, 1051, 1064 Sol Gutiérrez, Ana, 1960 Soldier Brides Act (1947), 1257 Solís, Hilda, 1588 Solomonic Dynasty (Ethiopia), 661, 663, 666 – 67, 669 The Somali Diaspora: A Journey Away (Roble), 1990, 2009 Somali Psychological Distress Scale (SPDS), 1982 Somalia: chronological history, 1969 – 70; geography and population, 1970 – 71; historical
2328 | Index background, 1967 – 69, 1971 – 73; migration, causes and waves, 1973 – 74 Somalian immigrants, 1967 – 2010; age and family structure, 1977 – 78; citizenship pathways, 1990 – 91; civic and electoral participation, 1993 – 94; community size and composition, 1974 – 75; economic attainment, 1978 – 79; educational attainment, 1978, 1996; ethnically-based social organizations, 1986 – 87; families and changing gender relations, 1983 – 85; foodways, 1988 – 89; health statistics and issues, 1981 – 82; identity retention, 1985 – 86; income patterns, 1980 – 81; intergroup relations, 1991 – 92; language issues, 1987 – 88; links to country of origin, 1986; migration statistics, 1998 – 2008; music, arts, entertainment, 1989 – 90; notable Somali Americans, 2009 – 10; occupational patterns, 1979 – 80; place of residence, 1975 – 77; political and student associations, 1993; religion, 1987; return immigration, 1994; second and later generations, 1994 – 96, 1994 – 97; U.S.Somalia issues, 1997 – 98; youth profile, 1995 – 96 Song, Alfred H., 1389 Song, Chhang, 230 Song Dynasty (China), 286 – 87 Song for Night (Abani), 1637 Soray (Soray Raquel Lamilla Cuevas), 376 South American Asian-Americans Leading Together (SAALT), 130 – 31 South Asian Bar Association, 1009 South Asian lesbian, bisexual, gay, transgender, intersex, queer, and questioning (LBGTIQ), 1005 South Asian Network (SAN), 1005 Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC), 1410 – 11, 1414, 1415, 1418, 1422 Soyinka-Airewele, Peyi, 1637 – 38 Spanish-Cuban-American War (1898), 1851 Spanish International Network (SIN), 1523 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorti, 1020 Srila Prabhupada, 985 St. Fleur, Marie, 928 St. Vincent Benefit and Education Fund, 1226 State of Grace tv show, 1144 Still Life with Rice (Lee), 1389 Stowe, Madeleine, 409 Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) data: Ghanaian immigrants, 759, 765; Guyanese
immigrants, 852; Nigerian immigrants, 1595, 1606, 1613, 1629, 1643; Venezuelan immigrants, 2200, 2202 Subramaniam, L., 1000 Sudan: chronological history, 2015 – 18; geography and population, 2018 – 19; historical background, 2015, 2019 – 21; migration, causes and waves, 2021 Sudanese immigrants, 2015 – 42; age and family structure, 2021 – 22, 2024; changing gender roles, 2024; citizenship pathways, 2025 – 26; community size and composition, 2021; demographics and census statistics, 2038 – 41; economic attainment, 2023, 2024 – 25; educational attainment, 2023, 2027; health statistics and issues, 2023; holiday celebrations, 2024; income patterns, 2023; migration statistics, 2029 – 37; notable Sudanese Americans, 2041 – 42; occupational patterns, 2023; political associations and organizations, 2026 – 27; population in Utah, 2024; religion, 2025; second and later generations, 2027; U.S.-Sudan issues, 2027; youth profile, 2028 Sufism: Bangladeshi immigrants, 114, 143; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 985, 998; Iranian immigrants, 1087; Pakistani immigrants, 1659, 1677, 1691 Suharto, 1029, 1035, 1055 Sui Dynasty (China), 286 Sukarno, 1029, 1033 – 35, 1053 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 1036 Sultan, Ibrahim, 624 The Sun and the Drum: Africa Roots in Jamaica Folk Tradition (Barrett), 1219 Sununu, John E., 1445, 1455 Sununu, John H., 1445, 1455 Supreme Court decisions: AAW v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 1939; Aspira of New York v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 1884; Bradford v. Board of Regents of the University of California, 1939; Chang Chan et al. v. John D. Nagle, 281; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 280; Korematsu v. U.S., 1250; Lam Mow v. Nagle, 281; Leticia “A” v. Regents of the University of California, 1939; People v. Hall, 300; United States v. Baghat Singh Thind, 1657; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 280, 325; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 279 Suriyani, Cindy, 1064
Index | 2329 Survivors: Cambodian Refugees in the United States (Chan), 348 Suthsakhan, Sak, 231 Swallow (Atta), 1625 Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 1697 Tagore, Rabindranath, 129, 134 Tahir, Faran Haroon, 1690 Tahir, Saghir, 1690 Taiping Rebellion (China), 277, 287 Taiwan: chronological history, 2045 – 47; early immigration, 2052; geography, 2047 – 48; historical background, 2045, 2048 – 52; migration statistics, 2085 – 86; 1986-present, 2054; post-1965 Immigration Act, 2053 – 54; pre-1965 Immigration Act, 2053 Taiwan Relations Act (1979), 2051 Taiwanese American Citizens League (TACL), 2065, 2077 Taiwanese immigrants, 2045 – 93; adjustment and adaptation, 2060 – 74; age and family structure, 2056 – 57; assimilation and separatism issues, 2053; citizenship pathways, 2074; civic and electoral participation, 2077 – 78; community size and composition, 2055; continued links to Taiwan, 2063 – 64; demographics and census statistics, 2086 – 91; dual citizenship, 2074 – 75; economic attainment, 2058 – 59; educational attainment, 2057 – 58; ethnically-based social organizations, 2064 – 65; families and changing gender relations, 2061 – 62; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 2060 – 61; foodways, 2072 – 73; health statistics and issues, 2059 – 60; holiday celebrations, 2071 – 72; identity retention, 2062 – 63; intergroup relations, 2075; language issues, 2069; music, arts, entertainment, 2073 – 74; national language press, 2069 – 71; notable Taiwanese Americans, 2092 – 93; occupation and income patterns, 2059; political associations, organizations, 2075 – 77; public policies, political representation, 2078; religion, 2066 – 68; return immigration, 2078 – 79; second and later generations, 2079 – 84; U.S.-Taiwan issues, 2084 Takasaki, Tatsunosuke, 583 Taliban terrorist group, 3 – 4, 8 – 9, 21 – 22, 26, 1658, 1661, 1669 Tam, In, 230 Tan, Amy, 324 Tan, Narath, 230
Tang, Sailing, 331 – 32 Tantular, Mpu, 1027 Tayama, Fred, 1268 Teeda, Buitt Mam, 230 Tefera, Legesse, 662, 694 Tehranjele (Iranjeles) Iranians, 1078, 1080 Tekabe, Yared, 695 Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (1882) (Egypt), 579 Tela Railroad Company (Honduras), 933, 935 – 36, 940 – 41, 948 Temporary protected status (TPS): for Argentinean immigrants, 50; for Guatemalan immigrants, 818, 824; for Haitian immigrants, 923; for Honduran immigrants, 937, 947 – 49, 953 – 54, 956, 959; for Liberian immigrants, 1461, 1466 – 67, 1466 – 68, 1475 – 76, 1478 – 79, 1482, 1489; for Nicaraguan immigrants, 1566; for Salvadoran immigrants, 1907 – 8 Ten Years’ War (Cuba), 415 Teng, Vienna, 2082 Thai Community Development Center (CDC), 2114 Thai Health and Information Services (THAIS, Inc.), 2114 – 15 Thai immigrants, 2099 – 2132; adjustment and adaptation, 2111 – 19; citizenship pathways, 2119 – 20; community size and composition, 2108; cultural identity, 2114; ethnicallybased social organizations, 2114 – 15; families and changing gender relations, 2113 – 14; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 2111 – 13; family and marriage patterns, 2109; first and second generation immigrants, 2108; foodways, 2118 – 19; health statistics and issues, 2110 – 11; identity retention, 2121 – 22; intergroup relations, 2120 – 21; language issues, 2116 – 18; music, arts, entertainment, 2119; national language press, 2118; notable Thai Americans, 2131 – 32; occupational and income patterns, 2109 – 10; religion, 2115 – 16; return immigration, 2122; second and later generations, 2122 – 24; U.S.-Thailand issues, 2124 – 25; youth profile, 2123 Thailand: chronological history, 2099 – 2102; demographics and census statistics, 2129 – 31; early migration, 2107; geography, 2102; historical background, 2099, 2102 – 6; later migration, 2107 – 8; migration statistics, 2126 – 28 Thao Worra, Bryan, 1423
2330 | Index The Thing Around Your Neck (Adichie), 1637 Things Fall Apart (Abani), 1637 Things I’ve Been Silent About: Memories (Nafisi), 1107 Thiong’o, Ngugi Wa, 1323 A Thousand Splendid Suns (Hosseini), 32 A Thousand Wings (Huo), 1422 Threat Modeling (Snyder), 1323 The Three Day Promise (Chung), 1389 Three Seasons movie (Bui), 2270 Tiger’s Blood (Yep), 349 Tigray Liberation Front (TLF), 670 – 71, 685 Toledo, Alejandro, 1838 – 39 Toote, Fred A., 89 Toote, T. W. “Sankey,” 89 Torbor, Torbertha, 1480 Trade Promotion Agreement (Peru-U.S.) (2006), 1782, 1801 Tne Traitor: Gold Mountain Chronicles: 1885 (Yep), 349 Transcendental Meditation movement, 985, 987 Travelers Aid International Social Service, 2241 Trinh, Eugene H., 2272 Trinidad and Tobago: chronological history, 2137 – 40; early migration, 2144 – 45; geography, 2140 – 41; historical background, 2137, 2141 – 43; later migration, 2145 – 48; migration statistics, 2177 – 80; U.S.-Trinidad and Tobago issues, 2174 Trinidadian and Tobagonian (Trinbagonian) immigrants, 2137 – 88; age and family structure, 2151 – 52; American identity development, 2168 – 71; citizenship pathways, 2166 – 67; community size and composition, 2148 – 51; demographics and census statistics, 2181 – 85; economic attainment, 2152 – 54; educational attainment, 2152; families and changing gender relations, 2156 – 57; family, culture, life-cycle rituals, 2155 – 56; foodways, 2163 – 64; forecasts for the 21st century, 2174 – 76; health statistics and issues, 2154 – 55; holiday celebrations, 2160, 2162 – 63; identity retention, 2157; intergroup relations, 2167 – 68; language issues, 2159 – 60; music, arts, entertainment, 2164 – 66; national language press, 2160; notable Trinbagonian Americans, 2186 – 87; religion, 2157 – 59; return immigration, 2171; second and later generations, 2171 – 73; youth profile, 2172
True Whig Party (TWP) (Liberia), 1463, 1489 Trujillo Railroad Company (Honduras), 933, 935, 940 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1482, 1782 The Tuk Tuk Diaries: My Dinner with Cluster Bombs (Thao Worra), 1423 21 Jump Street tv show (Nguyen), 2271 Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934) (U.S.), 703 Tzu Chi Foundation (U.S.), 2048 Ubico, Jorge, 801, 803 – 4 Udoji, Adaora, 1642 Ufomata, Titilayo, 1642 Ufot, Mfon, 1642 – 43 Undocumented immigrants: from Argentina, 49; from Bangladesh, 117, 135; from Brazil, 186; from Chile, 257; from China, 277, 327, 333; from Dominican Republic, 496; from Ecuador, 543 – 45; from Egypt, 587; from El Salvador, 1907, 1921, 1928, 1930, 1935 – 36, 1939 – 41, 1944 – 45, 1949, 19271928; from Eritrea, 631; from Ghana, 756, 763, 769 – 70; from Guatemala, 799, 806 – 7, 810, 816, 818; from Haiti, 902, 923; from Honduras, 946 – 47, 949, 951, 953, 956; from Israel, 1154; from Jamaica, 1189, 1202, 1211; from Korea, 1376 – 77; from Liberia, 1482; from Mexico, 1496, 1503, 1508 – 9, 1529 – 30, 1532, 1537 – 38; from Nicaragua, 1566, 1606 – 7; from Nigeria, 1606 – 7, 1634; from Panama, 1731; from the Philippines, 716, 756, 763, 769 – 70; from Taiwan, 2054; from Thailand, 2120; from Trinidad and Tobago, 2148 Unemployment data: Argentinean immigrants, 49, 56, 58; Brazilian immigrants, 170 – 72; Chilean immigrants, 245; Chinese immigrants, 289; Colombian immigrants, 362, 370; Dominican immigrants, 474, 484, 491 – 92; Ecuadorian immigrants, 561; Egyptian immigrants, 581, 584; Filipino immigrants, 713, 715; Ghanian immigrants, 765; Haitian immigrants, 908; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 978; Indonesian immigrants, 1041 – 42; Jamaican immigrants, 1197 – 98, 1201 – 2, 1205, 1206 – 7, 1232; Kenyan immigrants, 1298, 1307; Korean immigrants, 1341; Liberian immigrants, 1464, 1467; Mexican immigrants, 1509, 1527, 1551; Puerto Rican immigrants, 1856, 1859, 1861; Salvadoran immigrants, 1941;
Index | 2331 Somalian immigrants, 1979 – 80; Sudanese immigrants, 2027; Trinidadian and Tobagonian immigrants, 2137, 2145, 2147, 2175; Venezuelan immigrants, 2205, 2219; Vietnamese immigrants, 2240 Unionist Party of Eritrea, 668 United Bahamian Party (UBP), 86 United Farm Workers Union, 747 – 48, 1544, 1547 United Front Party (UF), 875 United Hebrew Immigration and Assistance Service, 2241 United Kenyans of Chicago (UKC), 1307 United Nations Development Program, 759, 1784 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA), 1295 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 7, 9, 10 – 11, 625, 630, 645, 646, 818, 1461, 1464, 1466, 1489 United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI), 391, 581, 1430 United Nations Human Development Programme, 799, 1784 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 1429, 1431 United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization, 1848, 1854, 1889 United Nations Special Representative for Darfur, 1625 United Nations Truth Commission Report (1993), 1908 United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), 1226 United Provinces of Central America, 41, 799, 1912 United States (U.S.): Afghanistan issues, 9 – 10, 26; Alien Land Laws, 115, 302, 969, 975, 1249, 1256, 1265 – 66, 1275; Alliance for Progress, 239, 242 – 44, 539, 823; American Federation of Ramallah, 1716; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 705; Amnesty Act, 1537; Angel Island Immigration Station, 301 – 2; Argentina issues, 67; Bahama issues, 98; Bangladesh issues, 134 – 35; Barred Zone Act, 969, 975; Bases-for-Destroyers Agreement, 2146, 2174; Bilateral Trade Agreement (U.S.Laos), 1413; Black Power movement, 86; Bunau-Varilla-Hay Treaty, 1738, 1740; Bureau of Democracy, 644; Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, 1664, 1920;
Burlingame-Seward Treaty, 279, 284; Children of Beituniya Society, 1715; Chilean issues, 260 – 61; Chinese Exclusion Act, 279, 300, 326; Chinese issues, 332 – 33; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act, 705, 734; Civil Rights Acts, 295, 300, 1222, 1257; Civil Rights Bill, 1712; Colombian issues, 370 – 72; Commission on Hispanic Affairs Advisory Board, 527; Commission on International Religious Freedom, 627, 644; Commission on Wartime Relocation and Evacuation of Civilians, 1251; Costa Rican issues, 403 – 4; Cuba issues, 451 – 54; Department of Labor, 772, 1504; Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 524; Displaced Persons Act, 281; Diversity Visa programs, 10, 111, 116, 135, 629, 660, 674, 681, 756, 760, 763, 767, 769 – 70; Drug Enforcement Administration, 371; Dual Citizenship Law, 705, 734; Economic Recovery Program, 852; Ecuador issues, 563 – 64; Egyptian issues, 608; El Salvador issues, 1952 – 55; Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, 1669; Eritrean American issues, 642, 644 – 45; Eritrean issues, 642, 644 – 45; Ethiopian issues, 659, 685 – 87; Exchange Visitor Program, 714; Family Reunification Immigration Act, 484, 629, 978; Federal Government Dispersal Policy, 2243; Fiancées Act, 704, 714; Filipino issues, 741 – 42; Food and Drug Administration, 403, 903; Foreign Miner’s Tax, 295; Garifuna Coalition, 820; Gentleman’s Agreement, 1255, 1329; Great Depression, 91; Guatemalan issues, 823 – 24; Guyanese issues, 874 – 76; Haitian issues, 921 – 23; Hart-Cellar Immigration Act, 92, 305, 1029, 1037, 1496; Hawaiian Organic Act, 280; Honduran issues, 959; Human Rights and Labor Bureau, 644; Indian (Asian Indian) issues, 1013 – 14; Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, 1397; Indonesian issues, 1055 – 57; Interfaith Youth Core, 982; Iranian issues, 1097 – 1101; Iraq issues, 1138 – 39; Israel issues, 1174; Jamaica issues, 1231 – 32; Japan issues, 1274 – 75; Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act, 1250; Johnson-Reed Act, 89, 1433, 1496, 1505, 1655, 1657; Jones Act, 1845; Jones Law, 708; Kenya issues, 1316 – 18; Korea issues, 1376 – 77; Laos issues, 1412 – 13; Lebanon issues, 1447 – 48; Luce-Celler Bill, 115,
2332 | Index 704, 714, 969, 975, 1002; Magnuson Act, 282, 300, 303, 325; McCarran-Walter Act, 282, 704, 1200, 1495 – 96, 1506 – 7; Mexico issues, 1537 – 38; Monroe Doctrine, 242, 823, 896; Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, 2051; National Origins Act, 2106; National Origins Quota Act, 586, 969, 975 – 76; National Security Exit Entry Registration System, 1671; Nationality Act, 295; Naturalization Act, 735, 737; Nicaragua issues, 1576, 1581 – 83; Nigeria issues, 1631 – 32; Opportunity Visa programs, 116, 135; Overseas Absentee Voting Act, 734; Page Law, 306; Pakistan issues, 1682 – 84; Palestine Jordan issues, 1718; Panama issues, 1761; Patriot Act, 630; Peru issues, 1802; Philippines Independence Act, 713; Platt Amendment, 415; Puerto Rico issues, 1888 – 91; Refugee Act, 620, 629, 663; Refugee Dispersion Policy, 2241; Refugee Relief Act, 1029, 1037; Roosevelt Corollary, 896; Scott Act, 280; Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 2148; Selective Service Act, 703 – 4, 713; September 11, 2001 attacks, 1, 3, 8, 21 – 22, 24, 25, 116, 261, 577, 673; Soldier Brides Act, 1257; Somalia issues, 1997 – 98; Taiwan issues, 2084; Taiwan Relations Act, 2051; Thailand issues, 2124 – 25; Trinidad and Tobago issues, 2174; Tydings-McDuffie Act, 703; Tzu Chi Foundation, 2048; Vietnam War involvement, 2231, 2234, 2235 – 36, 2240 – 41; War Brides Act, 281, 313, 704, 714, 1250, 1257; Welch Repatriation Act, 703; Welfare Reform Bill, 1949 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 362, 564, 628, 659, 755, 760, 1036, 1317, 1448, 1482, 2027 United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), 713, 716 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 627, 644 United States Committee for Refugees (USCR), 629 United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (2006), 1782 United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1989), 280, 325 Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), 90 – 91 Urdaneta, Jose, 2225 Urdu Markaz International (India), 999
Uribe, Alvaro, 356, 357, 360, 361, 371, 372 U.S. Bangladeshi Advisory Council (USBAC), 131 U.S. Catholic Conference, 2241 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) data: Guatemalan immigrants, 807; Haitian immigrants, 925 – 26; Indonesian immigrants, 1059 – 60; Kenyan immigrants, 1311; Liberian immigrants, 1483 – 84 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 627, 644 Ushijima, Kinji (George Shima), 1283 Vaid, Urvashi, 1005 Valenzuela, Arturo, 272 – 73 Van Helden, Armand, 1064 Varejão, Anderson, 199 – 200 Vargas, Diana L., 1899 Vargas, Getúlio (Brazil’s Father of the Poor), 162 – 63 Vasques-Ajmac, Luis, 837 Vaughan, Olufemi, 1643 Védrine, Soliny, 910 – 11 Veloso, Caetano, 199 Venezuela: chronological history, 2193 – 96; current events, 2197 – 99; demographics and census statistics, 2218 – 23; geography, 2196; historical background, 2193, 2196 – 97; migration, causes and waves, 2203 – 8; migration statistics, 2216 – 18; political history, 2201 – 3; socioeconomic history, 2199 – 2201 Venezuelan immigrants, 2193 – 25; community size and composition, 2208 – 9; economic attainment, 2209 – 10; educational attainment, 2209; ethnically-based organizations, 2213 – 15; forecasts for the 21st century, 2215; identity negotiation, 2210 – 13; notable Venezuelan Americans, 2224 – 25 Vera Cruz, Philip, 736, 747 – 48 Veras, Lidia Maria, 486 Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) (Dutch East Indies Company), 1027, 1032 Verghese, Abraham, 1000 Versailles, Treaty of, 707 Vietnam: Chinese occupation, 2234 – 35; chronological history, 2231 – 33; geography, 2233 – 34; historical background, 2231, 2234; migration, causes and waves, 2235 – 40, 2261 – 67; refugee immigration experience, 2236 – 40
Index | 2333 Vietnam War: Ecuadorian immigrants and, 542 – 43; Guatemalan immigrants and, 604; involvement of Cambodia, 205; involvement of Thailand, 2101, 2106 – 7, 2109, 2121; Laotian immigrants and, 1412 – 13; U.S. involvement, 2231, 2234, 2235 – 36, 2240 – 41 Vietnamese immigrants, 2231 – 73; American identity establishment, 2254 – 55; citizen pathways, 2253 – 54; community size and composition, 2247 – 49; demographics and census statistics, 2268 – 69; dual citizenship, 2254; educational attainment, 2258; foodways, 2252 – 53; forecasts for the 21st century, 2258 – 60; holiday celebrations, 2251 – 52; identity retention, 2256 – 58; notable Vietnamese Americans, 2270 – 72; religion, 2249 – 51; second and later generations, 2255 – 58; youth profile, 2256 Vila, Pablo, 73 Viladrich, Anahi, 73 – 74 Vilayphonh, Catzie, 1423 Villa, Pancho, 1495, 1501, 1502 Vinson, Stuart, 402 La Violencia period (Colombia), 355, 357, 358 The Virgin of Flames (Abani), 1637 Visa Entry Reform Act (2002) (U.S.), 1669 Visa Waiver Program (VWP), 1377 Vodou practices in Haiti, 892 – 93, 909, 911, 914 – 15 Voice of America, 32, 127, 1045, 1049 Voices from Exile: Violence and Survival in Modern Maya History (Montejo), 837 Volunteer Association of Bangladesh (VAB), 125 Von Ahn, Luis, 837 – 38 Vora, Neha, 1008 Wagaw, Teshome, 695 Wahid, Abdurrahman, 1036, 1050 Waiting for an Angel (Habila), 1639 Walker, William, 383, 387, 397 Wang, Leehom, 2083 War Brides Act (1945) (U.S.), 281, 313, 704, 714, 1250, 1257 Warsame, Keinan Abdi, 2010 Watada, Ehren, 1269 The Wedding Banquet movie (Ang Lee), 2092 Weep, Child, Not (Thiong’o), 1323 Welch Repatriation Act (1935) (U.S.), 703 Welfare Reform Bill (1996), 1949
West of New York and Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes (Ansary), 32 What is the What: The Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng (Deng), 2041 White, Devon, 1240 White House Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships, 613, 982 Williams, Bert, 87 Williams, Lauryn, 2187 Wilson, Woodrow, 474, 479, 624, 708 Win the Inner Battle (Asgedom), 639 Winter Ink (Thao Worra), 1423 Woldemariam, Woldeab, 624 Women and Gender in Islam (Ahmed), 613 Women Warrior: Memoirs of a Girlhood Among Ghosts (Kingston), 324 Wong, Anna May, 349 Wong, Jade Snow, 324 Wong, Shawn, 324 Woods, Eldrick Tont “Tiger,” 2132 World Bank, 685, 692, 759, 852, 922 – 23, 1045 World Economic Forum (Geneva), 142 World Hindu Assembly of America, 989 – 90 World Parliament of Religions (U.S.), 985, 990 World Trade Center Relief Fund, 1099 Wu, David, 2093 Wuchale Treaty, 662 Xavier, Emanuel, 570 Yacob, Zera, 661 Yang, Jerry, 2093 Yélé Haiti Foundation, 918 Yep, Laurence Michael, 349 Yick Wo v. Hopkins Supreme Court decision (1886), 279 Younis, Saleh, 650 Youth Pledge (Indonesia), 1029, 1033 – 34 Youth profiles: from Afghanistan, 23 – 26; from Bangladesh, 134; from Brazil, 190 – 91; from Cambodia, 227; from Chile, 259 – 60; from Colombia, 369; from Costa Rica, 402; from Cuba, 450 – 51; from Ecuador, 562 – 63; from Egypt, 604 – 5; from Eritrea, 643; from Ethiopia, 682; from Ghana, 780; from Guatemala, 822; from Haiti, 920; from Indonesia, 1056 – 57; from Iran, 1094; from Iraq, 1138; from Israel, 1174; from Jamaica, 1229; from Japan, 1269; from Kenya, 1315; from Laos, 1412; from Lebanon, 1440; from Liberia, 1480; from Mexico, 1534 – 35; from
2334 | Index Pakistan, 1683 – 84; from Palestine and Jordan, 1717; from Peru, 1799 – 1800; from the Philippines, 740; from Puerto Rico, 1886; from Somalia, 1995 – 96; from Thailand, 2123; Trinbagonian immigrants, 2172; from Vietnam, 2256 Yuan Dynasty (China), 287 Yudhoyono, Bambang, 1029 – 30, 1036, 1055 Yun, Mia, 1389 Yunus, Muhammad, 112, 142 Zaher, Baktash, 33 Zalanga, Samuel, 1643
Zamka, George David, 376 Zapata, Emiliano, 1495, 1501, 1502, 1551 Zappa, Frank, 1180, 1443, 1455 Zelaya, Manuel, 937, 943 – 44 Zewail, Ahmed, 613 Zhou Dynasty (China), 285 – 86 Zogby, James J., 1455 Zogby, John, 1455 Zoroastrian religious practices: Chinese immigrants, 286; Indian (Asian Indian) immigrants, 976, 987, 990, 992; Iranian immigrants, 1073 – 74, 1077 – 78, 1088 – 89; Pakistani immigrants, 1662, 1691
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